Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/81930
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | The context-undermining of practical reasons |
Author: | Cullity, G. |
Citation: | Ethics: an international journal of social, political, and legal philosophy, 2013; 124(1):8-34 |
Publisher: | Univ Chicago Press |
Issue Date: | 2013 |
ISSN: | 0014-1704 1539-297X |
Statement of Responsibility: | Garrett Cullity |
Abstract: | Can one fact deprive another of the status of a reason for action—a status the second fact would have had, but for the presence of the first? Claims of this kind are often made, but they face substantial obstacles. This article sets out those obstacles but then argues that there are at least three different ways in which this does happen. |
Rights: | © 2013 by The University of Chicago. |
DOI: | 10.1086/671390 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/671390 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 4 Philosophy publications |
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RA_hdl_81930.pdf Restricted Access | Restricted Access | 581 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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