THE AL-QAEDA TRANSNATIONAL JIHADIST MOVEMENT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT: UNDERSTANDING AND COUNTERING RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR FORMS OF TERRORISM

Margaret Mary Egudo

Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Social Sciences
The University of Adelaide
South Australia

November 2016
Thesis Declaration

I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in my name, in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name, for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint award of this degree.

I give consent to this copy of my thesis when deposited in the University Library, being made available for loan and photocopying, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.

The author acknowledges that copyright of published works contained within this thesis resides with the copyright holder(s) of those works.

I also give permission for the digital version of my thesis to be made available on the web, via the University’s digital research repository, the Library catalogue and also through web search engines, unless permission has been granted by the University to restrict access for a period of time.
Disclaimer

This thesis reflects the author’s personal judgements and not necessarily those of the Australian government or its agencies. The author’s views should not be attributed to any staff, department or agency of the Australian government.
Contents

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................ V

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................................... VII

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 1 .......................................................................................................................................... 33

AL-QAEDA’S PHILOSOPHY .................................................................................................................. 33

CHAPTER 2 .......................................................................................................................................... 46

CHALLENGES POSED BY AL-QAEDA ............................................................................................... 46

CHAPTER 3 .......................................................................................................................................... 58

CAUSES FOR ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ................. 58

CHAPTER 4 .......................................................................................................................................... 73

CAUSES FOR MUSLIM RADICALISATION AND TERRORISM IN THE DIASPORA ................... 73

Australia ............................................................................................................................................. 74
Denmark ............................................................................................................................................ 82
The United Kingdom ....................................................................................................................... 84
The United States ........................................................................................................................... 85

CHAPTER 5 .......................................................................................................................................... 100

CASES OF REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM .................................................................................... 100

Religious terrorism .......................................................................................................................... 100
Anarchist terrorism (1820-1920) .................................................................................................. 104
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA) ..................................................... 109
Italian Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse BR), 1970-1980s .................................................................. 112
The German Red Army Faction (RAF), 1970-1998 ...................................................................... 116
Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), 1963-1972 ......................................................................... 119

CHAPTER 6 .......................................................................................................................................... 123

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – Algeria ...................................................................... 123
Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Saudi Arabia ........................................................... 134
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia AQI) ....................................................................... 139
| Page |
|------|-----------------|
| 154  | Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM), Al Shabaab in Somalia |
| 161  | The Islamic State group |
| 182  | Jabhat al Nusra Front |
| 195  | CHAPTER 7 |
| 195  | DECLINE OF TERRORISM |
| 215  | CHAPTER 8 |
| 215  | GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO AL-QAEDA’S TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM OUTSIDE THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA |
| 215  | The European Union |
| 225  | Australia |
| 234  | The United Nations |
| 238  | CHAPTER 9 |
| 238  | COUNTER-RADICALISATION IN ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST |
| 247  | SUMMARY |
| 262  | CONCLUSION |
| 264  | APPENDICES |
| 270  | BIBLIOGRAPHY |
Abstract

Transnational terrorism promoted by the Al-Qaeda movement gained high-level strategic attention after 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, Shanksville, and Arlington in the United States of America that killed at least 3000 people. Attacks by Al-Qaeda inspired groups also occurred in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, West Africa, and East Africa. Al-Qaeda which means the ‘base’ or foundation in Arabic was established by Abdullah Yusuf Azam, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and a small group of mujahideen volunteers who fought in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation during the 1980s. Under their leadership the movement expanded its ideology by establishing regional franchises with insurgent groups. The shifting pattern of its activism is highlighted through selected cases of transnational jihadist terrorist Sunni groups in the Middle East, North Africa, and East Africa that developed formal links to its senior leaders and facilitated ideological decentralisation whilst drawing from the Salafist model. Many groups used its brand name to conduct terrorist attacks on its behalf.

To gain further knowledge and understanding of the scale and security implications of the Al-Qaeda movement’s ideology, comparative analysis has drawn from early forms of religious and secular terrorism to highlight the salience of religious, socio-political, and economic grievances that have formed the basis of insurgencies. Based on grievances, Al-Qaeda’s transnational focus has projected unlimited objectives and differed from domestically focused groups whose campaigns declined or were ended.

The Al-Qaeda movement influenced the nature of domestic terrorism by hijacking and redefining its ideological space and narrative and turning it into a global conflict and holy war. This political model
was picked up by its more potent and zealous informal affiliate the Islamic State group (IS), successor to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that sought to establish an Islamic caliphate in Sunni dominated provinces of north western Iraq and eastern Syria. Under the leadership of Abu Bakr Baghdadi the Islamic State group rapidly evolved from near obscurity into a global jihadist insurgent network despite facing heavy criticism from terrorist groups and Muslim communities because of its overly violent image.

The Islamic State group’s excessive violence became an extension of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, at the time of growing opposition towards the presence of US-led coalition forces in mid-2003 to 2006. The group’s hardline behaviour surpassed that Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), Al-Qaeda’s informal affiliate that also operated in Syria in 2012. The strategic move by the group to change its name on 29 June 2014 from the Islamic State in Iraq and greater Syria (ISIS) to ‘Islamic State’ group (IS) reflected its transnational ambitions of establishing a caliphate, a move which by 2015 posed greater challenges when compared to earlier affiliates of the Al-Qaeda movement.

Al-Qaeda movement framework has posed new challenges for counter-terrorism strategists who had to continually modify policy approaches to deal with its emergent activities. In terms of ideological appeal, the Al-Qaeda brand name may not disappear from the political scene as its religious discourse is likely to inspire new generations of activists.
Acknowledgements

Undertaking doctoral study as a part-time student is challenging. I thank all the people who supported me with intellectual insight and time. The opportunity to work with people in academia and defence science has been invaluable, as it provided me with depth of knowledge to analyse various aspects of this topic. Associate Professor Dr Felix Patrikeeff, thank you for being my principal supervisor. Your interest, broad experience and intellectual guidance enabled me to develop new ideas that were useful for achieving research goals of the project. Thanks for reviewing and providing constructive comment. Dr Wayne Hobbs, as co-supervisor, your rigorous critique and suggestions during various meetings and the time you invested in them have been invaluable. Thank you for your support.

I have been fortunate to have supportive colleagues in Defence Science and Technology Group of the Australian Department of Defence. Dr Brandon Pincombe, thank you for your support in getting this project off the ground through initial scoping. Dr Neville Curtis, as the Research Leader recognised the project’s potential and provided support. I am indebted to these colleagues and many others whose names I have not listed here for their intellectual encouragement. Finally, I thank my family for their long-term support.
**Glossary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>the base (in Arabic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>religious duty or struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>adherent of Islam (religion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salafism</td>
<td>a mode of Islamic practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni and Shia</td>
<td>denominations of Islam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abbreviations for sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Mission to Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIO</td>
<td>Australian Security Intelligence Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIS</td>
<td>Australian Secret Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communications technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and greater Syria (ISIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPT</td>
<td>Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONA</td>
<td>Office of National Assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBS</td>
<td>Public Broadcasting Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of terrorist groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQI</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIS</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades), Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna), Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSA</td>
<td>Free Syrian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLQ</td>
<td>Front de Libération du Québec (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Algerian Salafist group for Call and Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HASI</td>
<td>Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSM</td>
<td>Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen, Al Shabaab (Somalia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and greater Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JN</td>
<td>Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIF</td>
<td>Kurdish Islamic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Taiba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFG</td>
<td>Libyan Islamic Fighting Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDPA</td>
<td>People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Rote Armee Fraktion or Red Army Faction, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRG</td>
<td>Religious Rehabilitation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SILF</td>
<td>Syrian Islamic Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Definition of key terms

**Apostasy.** Apostasy according to the *Encyclopaedia of religion and society* is defined as defection from both belief, and normative group identification and participation (Scherer 1998). Al-Qaeda portrayed its actions in cosmic religious terms similar to Armageddon. The latter has referred to inevitability or end of the world scenario (Blasi 1998).

**Terrorism.** Terrorism is violence or threat of violence that is designed to have psychological impact beyond the immediate victim or target. It is conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure that can be a sub-national group or non-state entity (Hoffman 2006, p. 40).

**Political Islam.** Political Islam is a ‘form of instrumentalisation of Islam by individuals, groups, and organizations that pursue political objectives’ (Ayoob 2006, p. 2).

**Ideology.** Ideology can be considered as an ‘image of society and a political paradigm’ that offers a vision, purpose, and means. It provides an explanation of how the social world should operate in addressing perceived social problems (Stigler 2007, p. 5). Its references to attitudes, beliefs, and values suggest it can be used to influence and actualise a particular world view (Geertz 1973, in Freeden 1998, pp. 20-21).

**Religion.** Religion is a ‘system of symbols’ or ‘cultural system’ that serves as a vehicle to explain how people should view their social world (Geertz 1993, pp. 90-123). The concept is associated
with some transcendent truths and serves social and psychological roles in terms of imparting a range of intellectual, emotional, and moral experiences (Zubaida 2007).

**Insurgency.** An insurgency is a struggle between a non-ruling group and ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (organisational expertise, propaganda, demonstrations, violence) to establish legitimacy by changing some aspect of the political system that is considered to be undesirable (O'Neill 1990, p.13).

**Counterinsurgency.** Counterinsurgency involves ‘political, social, civic, economic, psychological, and military actions taken to defeat an insurgency’ (Australian Army Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 3-0-1, Counterinsurgency 2009, Glossary, p. xx).

**Millenarianism.** Millenarianism is the belief of a coming saviour, and the anticipated peace, prosperity, and righteousness that is linked to a new social order (Swatos, et al. 1998).

**Social movement.** A social movement is an organised collective acting with some degree of continuity in the pursuit of common objectives that seek to promote change in a society or group of which it is a part (Snow et al. 2004, pp. 8-11).
Introduction

This thesis examines Al-Qaeda transnational movement activities within a framework of contemporary insurgent movements of the Middle East, North Africa, East Africa, and West Africa to gain further knowledge and understanding of its revolutionary jihadist ideology in secular political environments. While Arab Muslim communities are the focus of study as they have been largely targeted by its religious and political campaigns, comparative analysis also draws on examples of some early forms of non-Islamist terrorism to test some contemporary assumptions that depict the movement’s characteristic features (over-zealous religious behaviour, network structure, transnationalisation, higher propensity for violence, indiscriminate targeting, less state sponsorship) as representing a new form of terrorism. Comparing Al-Qaeda movement’s religious and political behaviour to that of historical and contemporary groups, what differentiates Al-Qaeda-linked groups from others is the global focus of their activities and violent approach to socio-political issues.

Embedding Al-Qaeda movement ideology to historical developments in terrorism has been helpful in drawing important insights and analogies with campaigns of similar terrorist groups. Zealous political activism of religious terrorists of ancient times such as the revolutionary Jewish groups that fought against Roman rule in Judea (e.g. Sicarii 40 AD; Jewish zealots 66-73 AD), and Muslim Shia assassins (1090-1275 AD) who fought against Christians in what is now Syria and Iran, is similar to Al-Qaeda’s in terms of religious and political extremism (Rapoport 1984, pp. 665-666).

Similar violent behaviour can also be found in activities of some contemporary secular groups such as: revolutionary anarchists in Western Europe in the 1820s-1920s; left wing terrorist groups that were active during the 1960s-1980s such as the German Red Army Faction RAF, Italian Red
Brigades BR, Spanish Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ETA, and Canadian Front de Libération du Québec FLQ. The high level of violence and fear generated by these groups required domestic and international responses. Their activities that are explored in later chapters highlight how economic, socio-cultural, and political factors were influential in their emergence and subsequent decline.

While Al-Qaeda’s terrorist activities and those of domestic groups have emerged from a similar basis that draws from social, economic, and political grievances, Al-Qaeda’s transnational approach and logic for violence sets a boundary on how local grievances ought to be resolved. Despite some alignment with causes of certain domestic groups, Al-Qaeda’s inability to address local issues at depth caused its approach to be depicted as superficial while its transnational ideology alienated most Muslims.

Al-Qaeda’s key limitations have related to localisation problems where its top-down approach and transnational narrative tended to gloss over key issues in different contexts by homogenising socio-political and economic grievances and events that affected Muslim societies, assuming their specific priorities were mutually reinforcing and needed to be pursued through the global agenda. The movement’s leaders have been criticised in target societies for paying little attention to preferred conflict resolution mechanisms. Lack of contextual discrimination was compounded by reliance on the cultural and religious frames to advocate needed reforms. These aspects, including use of extremist religious doctrine that promoted indiscriminate violence on non-Sunni communities contributed to marginalise this form of jihadist ideology from mainstream Islamist politics, leaving the movement to be regarded as a wild card intent on local disruption and political destabilisation.
The mainstream constitutes the Muslim majority that has preferred pluralism in politics and non-militaristic approaches to resolving domestic grievances.

Al-Qaeda movement’s strategic behaviour can be compared to that of a business corporation’s branding and marketing efforts. In the communications industry for example, localisation strategy would involve promoting ‘cultural and linguistic adaptation of a product or service in a manner that matches requirements of a foreign market, and managing the brand across the physical and digital market’. Globalisation strategy would require ‘addressing emerging issues associated with product marketing, its sales and support’, (Schaler 2007, p. 40). In terms of returns on investment, Al-Qaeda movement’s branding and marketing strategies in Muslim dominated and non-Muslim dominated countries needed to overcome challenges of market entry because targeted locations largely reflected secular social demands, and different versions of political Islam. Basically, not all political Islamists have sought to establish an Islamic State in its pure form or to establish it through revolutionary military means. Some have preferred incremental change within a context of plural politics (Hassan, MH 2005, p. 17).

However, despite the contextual difficulties it experienced in host locations, the Al-Qaeda movement ideology has persisted, suggesting its type of ideology may not disappear totally from the political scene. Its operational franchise structure that developed after the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-1989 to incorporate other Muslim conflicts allowed individuals and affiliates in Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, East Africa, and West Africa to continue to articulate jihadist narrative by drawing from its religious and cultural frameworks whilst also promoting their causes. The movement’s ideology evolved as it linked anti-Western narrative to stated objectives of establishing
pure Islamic states and an Islamic caliphate, an approach that added strategic value to some groups’ campaigns by raising their political profiles. The transnational ideology was likely to continue to inspire new generations of extremists and to pose new types of challenges for counter-terrorism because of emergent transnational activities.

The following map has provided some indication of the geographical scope and implications of Al-Qaeda’s military and ideological operations.

Map 1. The Al-Qaeda movement

![Map of Al-Qaeda movements](image)


In defining Al-Qaeda, Libicki et al. (2007, pp. 2-5) described it as the “residual network imbued with the ideological outlook of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri and acting according to their strategic direction. Together with Dr Abdullah Azzam, the three leaders were instrumental in
establishing the Al-Qaeda core of the movement while in combat training camps in Peshawar, Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989). Their guidance and inspiration helped to attract more fighters to join the Afghan resistance movement that later was widened as a stated objectives evolved to include: removing Western forces and influences from the Islamic world, toppling apostate regimes and replacing them with pure Islamic states, and re-establishing a caliphate in the long term to govern and protect the *Ummah* or Muslim community.

The core of the movement evolved to become a ‘network of networks’, a major trait that has characterised its franchise operations (Stewart 2012). By mid-2001, Al-Qaeda was reported to have had some active presence in 76 countries (Gunaratna 2002, p. 79). By 2012, affiliates and their associates operated in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Algeria, Yemen, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria (Jones 2012, p. 24), Nigeria, and the Philippines. The movement’s ideology has attracted mostly young activists to fight in domestic and international conflicts involving Muslims (Gunaratna 2002, pp. 21-43, 53).

**Figure 1: Al-Qaeda’s franchise structure**

![Franchise Structure Diagram](image-url)

Adapted from Zimmerman 2013, p. 21.
The Al-Qaeda movement’s affiliates in the discussion whose terrorist activities were reported in Muslim conflicts have been united by an extremist interpretation of Salafist Islam, and an eschatological orientation. For example, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM), and the Islamic State group (IS formerly ISIS) have staged high profile attacks in the name of religion although they generally operated independently. Relations among affiliates and with smaller groups indirectly added strategic value to Al-Qaeda movement’s ideology.

New groups such as the Islamic State group (IS) have demonstrated higher lethality compared to the first generation of Al-Qaeda militants. The Islamic State group evolved from Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2006 under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and progressed to become a conventional organised militia group when it expanded its activities from Iraq to Syria in 2012. Despite the split between its new leaders and those of the older Al-Qaeda command (the core) due to strategic approaches, both groups operated within the same jihadist framework. They in principle promoted a global Salafi jihadist model and had a similar mindset. Strategic issues that caused the split were linked to timing of the formation of the Islamic caliphate by the Islamic State group, and primary enemy focus of whether to attack the US and Western allies first or apostate regimes in the Islamic world. Bin Laden envisaged establishing a virtual caliphate as a longer term goal for future generations and attacking the far enemy first, and was considered much more measured in making declarations and seeking outcomes. The new leaders of the Islamic State group sought immediate outcomes and successfully implemented the caliphate goal through territorial expansion beginning with Iraq and Syria (Laub & Masters 2016). The speed at which the Islamic State group achieved
its military conquests surpassed that of Al-Qaeda core during its expansion. The group was condemned world-wide because of its broader recruitment activities and jihadist implications.

These groups employed similar themes and justifications for violence in their oppositional frameworks which criticised existing governments for failing in their role of properly governing countries, and the social order that oppressed Muslims. The political systems needed to be replaced with governments that implemented Sharia law. The new political systems would address governance issues of corruption, ‘apostasy’, and ‘moral degeneration’ of society caused by ‘impious’ practices of some Muslims who were not adhering to the required strict practices of the faith. Actions against other faith communities were considered collateral to the struggle to establish a new social order. Long term goals were to be achieved using any available means including armed warfare.

By strategically establishing ideological alliances with Al-Qaeda’s senior leaders, affiliates facilitated reciprocal attacks on the transnational movement’s ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemies in different countries. Information drawn from the terrorism incident database of the US University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) project highlighted how the most lethal groups in 2012 and 2013 were from Al-Qaeda’s affiliates and associates; the Taliban, Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (which became known as the Islamic State group IS), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Shabaab, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jabhat al-Nusrah Front (JAN), and al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam Brigade (those who sign with blood). While leaders of Al-Qaeda core command did not direct the
terrorist attacks, affiliates could demonstrate capacity for the type of lethal engagement that could only be attributed to the Al-Qaeda brand (Braniff 2014).

Based on the START database, seven of the ten most lethal groups in first nine months in 2014 included the Islamic state (IS) group formerly known as ISIS, the Taliban, Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and Jabhat al-Nusrah Front. The Islamic state group conducted the most terrorist attacks during this period (A.1, Table 1), (Braniff 2015). In their project, researchers from the United States University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) defined terrorism as ‘the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain political, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation’. Groups associated with Al-Qaeda movement were found to be the most lethal in the world. Besides the human cost, their sectarian violence polarised communities to the extent of causing some individuals to join extremist organisations out of fear and concerns for self-preservation (Braniff 2015).

Combining the capabilities of Al-Qaeda core with those of established formal affiliates and their associated groups in North Africa and the Sahel region, the Middle East, East Africa, West Africa; informal affiliates and inspired individuals, the ideology of the transnational movement has persisted despite constant political pressure from governments, Muslim majorities, and ideological competitors. The entity has managed to survive because its flexible and adaptive behaviour enabled it to continually shift activities from hostile locations to areas of vulnerability, or new conflict ones where its affiliates had opportunity to engage in armed operations against non-Sunni groups. This strategy has facilitated geographic expansion through re-branding (Rollins 2011, pp. 1-25).
Synergies with regional Sunni groups created tactical payoffs in terms of being able to carry out terror attacks for particular groups or on its behalf.

While capabilities of the Al-Qaeda core may have been degraded during early years of the movement’s operations through counter-terrorism operations and community resistance, semi-autonomous activities of franchises of affiliate groups and their informal associates continued to promote its transnational ideological brand in their areas operation (Rollins 2011, pp.1-3). In countering the movement’s extremist jihadist ideology and transnational logic, vulnerability factors such as clan-based authority structures, moderate Sufi Islam, and counter-terrorism efforts to a greater extent limited its ideological appeal, even though to varying degrees activities of emergent groups were likely to continue to promote certain aspects of the Al-Qaeda brand of politics.

The Al-Qaeda movement, origin and evolution

The Al-Qaeda movement emerged from strategic post-Cold war developments characterised by economic and political rivalries among regional and major powers vying for influence in Central Asia. Rivalry can be traced to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries where Afghanistan occupied a strategic location between Russia and India, and became a focal point in the “Great Game” between British and Russian empires in their competition for conquest (Hopkirk 1992, pp. 4-8). In the two Anglo-Afghan Wars that were fought in Afghanistan (1839-1842; 1878-1880) Britain was concerned Russia’s expanding influence could extend to India and threaten its strategic interests. The imperial Anglo-Afghan Wars were fought based on competing ideologies. Afghanistan’s strategic location in South West Asia became the buffer zone in the competition between the East and West.
Chay & Ross (1986, p. xiii) have defined a buffer state as ‘a country that is geographically located between two rival powers, and which could be found in regions experiencing most turbulence’ (Bayly 2015, p. 817). Afghanistan’s history of regional and great power competition shaped its future narrative of state identity and interests (Bayly 2015, p. 824). The Afghan-Soviet War in 1979 and the emergence of nationalist and transnational forms of political Islam can be viewed from the perspective of continuing competition among regional and major powers in the region.

The Soviet Union had for some time maintained political ties with Afghanistan but was blamed for supporting some of its unpopular socialist regimes. On 27-28 April 1978, a coup de'tat led by a small group of Soviet military-trained Afghan officers toppled President Mohammad Daud Khan’s government and installed the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan that was dominated by leaders of the Marxist-oriented People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Within months the new government led by Nur Muhammad Taraki introduced radical policies aimed at improving literacy, and reforming marriage and land rights. The reforms were unpopular because they challenged Muslim values and social and economic structures of the largely rural-based Afghan society. By late 1978 increasing opposition and insurrections led by political and religious leaders had spread to various parts of the country (Nyrop & Seekins 1986, pp. xxiii-xxiv).

The reforms had imposed limits on land holdings by setting an upper limit of 15 acres, with the rest distributed to landless peasants and families owning less than five acres. On marriage, the minimum marriageable age was raised to 18 years for boys and 16 for girls. Monetary limits were set on bride price and child marriages became illegal. These reforms were perceived by land
owners as an attack on traditional values and attempts to impose foreign economic and social models on poor communities (Rasanayagam 2003, pp. 76-77). The Taraki government on 19 October 1978 also introduced a red flag that resembled flags of the Soviet Central Asian republics (Edwards DB 2002, p. 30). The new flag was viewed as an effort to impose atheism on Afghanistan’s largely Muslim society, while modern secular education and land reforms were considered un-Islamic.

Influential Afghan leaders portrayed the insurgency in nationalistic and religious terms, urging all Afghans to defend the Muslim faith through jihad by removing Taraki’s regime (Jalal & Grab 1995, p. xvi). Government attempts to suppress the insurgency were unsuccessful, prompting Soviet intervention on 24 December 1979.

The Soviet Union appointed a new president to prevent conservative Islamic fundamentalists from taking control of Afghanistan, at the time of the Islamic revolution in Iran and Islamisation of the state and society in Pakistan. Efforts to prevent radicalising Islamist influences spilling into Afghanistan were largely unsuccessful because of the religious nature of the conflict, which increasingly attracted large numbers of fighters from various countries in the region and beyond to support the Muslim cause (Hussain 2007, pp. 19-20). Al-Qaeda movement founders were among the volunteers who fought on behalf of Afghan Muslims. The Afghan resistance provided Pakistan’s fighters a new opportunity to help fellow Muslims fighting government oppression and communism. Travelling to Afghanistan added a new dimension to their jihad which at the time was focused on India’s disputed Kashmir region. The resistance privatised the concept of jihad as militants considered it their individual duty to fight for the Muslim cause (Hussain 2007, pp. 20-21).
Geopolitically, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was considered a watershed event of the Cold War as it was the first time the Soviet Union had conducted a full scale invasion of a country outside Eastern Europe. Its projection of military power into Afghanistan during a time of relative peace re-ignited super power rivalries in the region. Many countries decided to support the insurgency to prevent Soviet political control of the country (US Dept. of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones 1978-1980).

US President Jimmy Carter in his State of the Union Address in 1980 was concerned with the Soviet Union’s expanding power and considered its invasion of Afghanistan a threat to America’s strategic interests. The President reiterated his government’s willingness to use military force to defend American economic interests in the Persian Gulf. The strategic importance of the region was emphasised. The region contained more than two-thirds of the world’s exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan brought its military forces to within 500 kilometers of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world’s oil flowed. Its attempts to consolidate a strategic position posed a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil and threatened global security (Carter 1980, State of the Union Address 23 January).

The government of Pakistan was equally uncomfortable with Soviet presence in Afghanistan because of its potential to form an alliance with India. It decided to support the mujahideen to prevent external influences spilling into its own territory as a large Pashtun minority lived in the regions bordering Afghanistan (Jalali & Grau 1995, p. xviii).
Subsequently, Pakistan, India, the United States, Peoples’ Republic of China, Great Britain, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates provided military, humanitarian, and financial aid through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), (Jalali & Grau 1995, p. xviii). Seven major Sunni factions based in Peshawar, Pakistan played a major role in the insurgency. They included: the Islamic Unity for the Liberation of Afghanistan, Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan, Mahaz-ye Nijate Milli Afghanistan, Jamiat-i-Islami, Hezb-i-Islami, Harakat-i-Inquilabi Islami, and Jabhe-ye Nijate Milli Afghanistan. These political factions fought under the umbrella known as the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Shia groups including the Shura, Nasr, Revolutionary Guards, and Hezbollah also fought in the campaign as part of other larger organizations (Goldman 2015, p. 253).
It was during this conflict that Dr Ayman Zawahiri an Egyptian paediatrician, Dr Abdullah Yusuf Azzam a Palestinian scholar from King Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia, and Osama bin Laden a former student of Azzam also from Saudi Arabia travelled to military training camps in Peshawar to help the Afghan resistance. Zawahiri travelled to Peshawar in 1980 to help the Red Crescent Society take care of cross-border refugees. Azzam and Osama bin Laden followed and together they inspired and recruited more foreign Muslim fighters to join the resistance, and were later instrumental in establishing the core of Al-Qaeda’s transnational jihadist movement (Wright 2002).
Azzam lectured briefly at the University of Islamabad before joining the jihadist movement where he became its main ideologue and recruiter for the Afghan jihad. Azzam also helped his colleague Hafiz Saeed to establish an organization for Islamic preaching and guidance (Markaz Dawal al-Irshad MDI) at Lahore University to spread a pure form of Islam. Hafiz Saeed later founded one of the most hardline terrorist groups known as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in 1990 (Hussain 2007, p. 54).

Soviet forces fought an unwinnable war and officially withdrew on 15 February 1989, after signing the Geneva accords on 14 April 1988. They left Afghanistan with a fragile government that relied on mujahideen factions to establish a new order. The predominantly Pashtun Taliban regime emerged and ruled from 1996 to 2001 but faced factional infighting. It also lacked popular support because of its repressive sharia-enforced actions that were based on an extremist interpretation of Islam, and ruthless behaviour and persecution of non-Sunni communities (e.g. Hazaras) that earned it pariah status. The Taliban government was toppled in late October 2001 by the United States-led international coalition (Oxfam International 2009, p.11) after its leaders refused to hand over Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to the United States for questioning as he was the alleged mastermind of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States (Bernard 2010, p. 842).

Effects of the Soviet-Afghan war were costly in human terms. Between 1978 and 1987, an estimated 870,000 Afghans were killed and over one million were left disabled (1.2 million). Two million people were internally displaced while over five million constituting a fifth of the country’s population fled to Iran or Pakistan (Oxfam International 2009, p. 8). At least 90,000 Mujahideen fighters, 18,000 Afghan troops, and 14,500 Soviet soldiers lost their lives in the conflict (Taylor
From 1979-1989, an estimated 35,000 foreign mujahideen fought in the Soviet-Afghan war with the largest number originating from the Middle East (Hussain 2007, p. 17).

For the Afghan mujahideen, the anti-Soviet campaign had political and religious dimensions. The religious dimension provided a new opportunity to revive the concept of military jihad to evict a foreign occupier from a Muslim country and restore Islamic identity. Most Muslims viewed their participation as an obligation to help liberate Islamic lands that were not governed under Islamic law (e.g. Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya). The fatwas issued by clerics encouraged more fighters to join jihad and provide financial support (Bar 2004, pp. 29-30).

The Soviet-Afghan war was a watershed for militant revivalist Sunni movements in the Islamic world as it provided a new platform to promote jihadist causes. It helped to create an imagery of defensive jihad against a common foreign enemy and ideology. The religious nature of the conflict facilitated ideological constructions of various entities including ‘Al-Qaeda’ which became referred to as the ‘core’. This entity formed by Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Osama bin Laden and associates became the starting reference point for viewing their militants as the vanguard of Salafi movements whose inspirational heroic activities transcended geography, culture, and ethnicity (Gul 2010, pp. 902-906). The Afghan invasion broadened the international dimension of political Islam. It allowed the formation of new pan-Islamist movements to mobilise based on the concept of ‘defensive’ jihad which united all Muslims across ethnic and national divides. Many non-Afghan fighters who returned to their countries continued to fight for the creation of pure Islamic states, leaving Afghanistan groups with an international ideological outlook (Thomas 2011, p. 1).
Al Qaeda core

Maktab al Khidamat lil-Mujaheddin al-Arab (MaK), commonly known as the Afghan Services Bureau was founded in 1984 in Peshawar, Pakistan, by Islamist scholar Doctor Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, Osama bin Laden, and eye surgeon Doctor Ayman al-Zawahiri to raise funds and to serve as a recruiting organisation for foreign Muslim volunteers of the anti-Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden became Azzam’s deputy and principal financial coordinator of MaK. The three leaders recruited several thousand foreign Arab and Muslim youth volunteers for the war effort. Osama bin Laden was particularly credited for raising funds from Saudi Arabia. MaK at the height of the campaign had established offices in various countries including Pakistan, United States of America, Germany, United Kingdom, and Pakistan. Other notable figures who played a role in supporting MaK included Abdul Muizz, Abu Ayman, Abu Sayyaf, Samir Abdul Motaleb, and Mohammad Yusuf Abbas. The relationship between Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam soured towards the end of the anti-Soviet campaign, causing the two to split and form different training camps. It is during this period that Osama bin Laden’s group laid the foundation for the formation of what became known as the ‘Al-Qaeda core’ of the movement on 18 August 1988. When Abdullah Azzam was killed in a car bomb attack in 1989, Osama bin Laden broadened the campaign (Gunaratna & Woodall 2015, pp. 163, 185). Prior to the Soviet withdrawal Azzam and Bin Laden had renamed MaK as al’-Qaeda al-Sulbah (the Solid Base). This organisation was intended to become a source of inspiration and a model for Muslims to emulate worldwide.

In April 1988 Azzam published a brief article in al-Jihad Magazine titled al’-Qaeda al-Sulbah (the Solid Base) that emphasised the notion of vanguard and devotion to Al-Qaeda (Smith II 2014, p.1).
For every invention there must be a vanguard to carry it forward and, while forcing its way into society, endure enormous expenses and costly sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require such a vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory for this ideology. It carries the flag along the sheer endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination in the reality of life, since Allah has destined that it should make it and manifests itself. This vanguard constitutes the solid base (al-Qa’idah al-Subah) for the expected society.

In the creation of the Islamic society, Azzam was helping to facilitate shaping of transnational jihad by providing early leadership and guidance. The conceptual Solid Base was intended to define leaders’ positions and their matching roles, including guidance for training the first generation of pious groups and pioneering vanguard (Smith II 2014). Drawing experience from the training camps Afghanistan, Zawahiri had commented how the Muslim youths fought based on pure loyalty to God’s religion. Similarly, the ‘jihadist movement needed an arena that would act like an incubator to allow seeds to grow, one that provided practical experience in combat, politics, and organisational matters’, (Mansfield 2006, pp. 35-36).

Thus, the label ‘Al-Qaeda’ meaning the ‘base’ in Arabic has referred to its founding years, with the two charismatic leaders Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri later becoming its symbols for religious resistance and global spread of jihadist activism. They inspired subsequent generations of militants to continue the fight against Western influence but also became the most wanted terrorists.
The challenges for counter-terrorism strategists and policy makers increased after the end of the Afghan-soviet conflict as some Al-Qaeda militants returned to home countries, while some moved to third countries and linked up with leaders of insurgent groups in the Middle East, North Africa, East Africa, West Africa, and Asia and partly began to influence the scope of their ideologies. During this second phase of the movement’s expansion, militants used established networks of Afghan veterans to promote mutual interests. The target range was expanded to include Western nations and allies who were considered enemies of Islam. Discontent of Muslim communities living outside Muslim dominated regions was influenced (Abuza 2002, pp. 429-430).

Militants made frequent references of ‘near’ (al-‘aduw al-qarib) and ‘far enemies’ (al-‘aduw al-ba‘id), and there was a shift from the early pan-nationalist Islamist activism that drew foreign fighters abroad to fight against immediate occupiers in Afghanistan, Serbia, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Palestine. From the 1990s the hierarchy of enemies was re-ordered and the perspective extended to out-of-area operations. The pan-Islamist discourse extended to saving the Ummah from non-Muslim oppressors and occupiers (Hegghammer 2007, p. 263). Elements of the jihadist discourse were articulated in the fatwas issued by Bin Laden in 1996 and 1998, although he was criticised by the majority of Muslims for lacking authority to speak on Islam.

Hegghammer’s doctoral thesis (2007) highlighted how the global jihadist discourse attributed Muslim injustices to ‘Zionists’, ‘the West’ and their ‘allies’. These enemy categories were demonised and portrayed as evil and aggressive. Foreign policies of the United States of America (US) and other western countries sought political and economic domination. Their purpose for involvement in Muslim countries aimed at military occupation and imperial expansion. The global
narrative tended to homogenize generally heterogeneous historical and contemporary events affecting Muslims to create an impression of similarity in experience and need for urgent united action. In this type of criticism and attribution, the global discourse strategically departed from the domestic political realm where emphasis was secondary (Hegghammer 2007, pp. 285-287).


Osama bin Laden’s criticism of the Saudi Arabia’s royal family in the 1990s after he returned to the Middle East was linked to the presence of US forces in the Kingdom after Iraq invaded Kuwait. He accused the regime for ‘colluding’ with the Americans who were occupying Muslim lands (Hegghammer 2007, p. 264). Bin Laden had sought political support from the royal family to form a coalition of mujahideen to assist in ousting Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. When this proposal was rejected by the royal family that preferred protection from US forces, Bin Laden felt humiliated and accused Saudi rulers of being apostates who needed to be replaced. He was forced out of Saudi Arabia because of militant activities and relocated to Sudan, where he spent some time setting up business ventures (factories, farms). International pressure on the Sudanese government caused him to leave the country in May 1996, and return to Afghanistan during the Taliban regime where he spent several years in training camps and recruiting jihadist supporters from Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and globally. Subsequent years were spent expanding ideological reach of the Al-Qaeda movement (Gunaratna & Woodall 2015, pp. 185-186).
Although the Taliban was defeated in 2001 its militants supported Al-Qaeda in their tribal areas because of historical links developed during the 1980s. Cumulative events caused Bin Laden to declare war on the government of Saudi Arabia and the United States.

From the 1990s onwards the Al-Qaeda movement established mergers with a number of regional groups. It merged with small groups in Saudi Arabia and Yemen to form Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria to create Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); and *Jama’aat Tawhid wal Jihad* in Iraq to create Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Ideological and operational links were also established with the Libyan Islamic Group (LIFG). These groups’ commonly stated goal was to establish an Islamic state that implemented Sharia law. Some of these groups’ leaders were Afghan veterans or had informal links to veterans who fought in the anti-Soviet Afghan campaign. Veteran links extended to Southeast Asia, where leaders of terrorist groups such as Abu Sayyaf Group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines), Jemaah Islamiyah, Laska jihad (Indonesia), Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia (Malaysia) were Afghan veterans. Up to 1000 volunteers from this region fought in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Personal relationships developed with veterans helped to link movement ideology to political campaigns of domestic insurgent groups (Abuza 2002, pp. 428-431).

When Zawahiri's group formally allied with Osama bin Laden's group on 23 February 1998, the London-based newspaper *Al-Quds al-Arabi* reported the formation of the International Front for Jihad on Jews and Crusaders. This alliance included jihadist groups in Afghanistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Yemen, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Bangladesh, Kashmir, Azerbaijan, and Palestine.
Although Zawahiri temporarily resigned from this alliance due to strategic disagreement, his Egyptian group the Islamic Jihad merged with Al-Qaeda core in June 2001 to form a single entity called Al Qaeda al-jihad (Wright 2002).

In East Africa, the Somalia-based Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM) mixed its goals with Al-Qaeda’s agenda. Al-Qaeda also had some political influence in activities of Boko Haram insurgent group that operated in Northern Nigeria. This group strongly opposed ‘westernisation’ and sought to implement Sharia in the country (Forest 2011, pp. 64-70). Mutual relations developed with various groups facilitated Al-Qaeda’s propaganda activities, recruitment campaigns, funding, and carrying out of terrorist operations at times simultaneously in different locations (Berman S 2003, p. 11; Cronin 2006, p. 7). The movement became a rallying point for the mujahideen youth because of the comradeship that was formed to fight enemies of Islam (Mansfield 2006, p. 38). Characteristically, Al-Qaeda’s broad range of targets included: military, police, symbols of government, private citizens, property, businesses, transportation, religious figures and institutions, and tourism (The University of Maryland, START 2014).

**Al-Qaeda movement ideology**

The nature of Al-Qaeda movement ideology can be gleaned from Osama bin Laden’s statements in the fatwa (religious ruling) that were issued in 1996 and 1998 that outlined the movement’s philosophy and reasons to engage in defensive jihad against the United States and its allies, and Arab regimes. The movement draws from basic grievances that have historically existed in most countries of the Arab Muslim region, such as opposition to western support for Israel, western
presence in Arab lands, and government weaknesses that have contributed to the general social disillusionment because of unmet social, economic, and political needs.

The first fatwa issued in August 1996 makes reference to American military presence in the land of the two holy places, citing the cities of Mecca and Medina. In it, Osama bin Laden laments the injustice suffered by Muslims in Palestine, Tajikistan, Burma, Cashmere, Assam, Philippines, Fatani, Ogadin, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 'Zionist-crusader' alliance and collaborators are deemed as the aggressors. Muslims are urged to correct injustice and oppression that affected every section of society's economic, political and religious life. The regime of Al-Saud family is criticised for failing to protect its people because it allowed the 'Zionist-crusader' alliance to continue humiliating people. As foreign influence threatened the very existence of Islamic principles, Muslims should take action to recover their dignity by fighting against Americans and their allies without discrimination (US Public Broadcasting Service, Online News hour 1996).

The second fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden in 1998 continued to criticise US occupation of the holy lands, plundering riches of the Arabian Peninsula, and dictating politics in the region. Reference is again made to the Zionist-crusader alliance whose objectives aimed to humiliate and fragment Muslim countries to ensure Western influence. The US involvement in the Iraq conflict was depicted as an example of such humiliation. The religious ruling suggests crimes that America was inflicting on Muslims were to be punished as they clearly represented a declaration of war. It is on this basis that Muslims should unite to repulse America and its allies 'in any country in which it is possible to fight them' as they were intent on attacking the Muslim religion and its way of life (US
Public Broadcasting Service, Online News Hour 1998). This fatwa highlighted a tacit alliance between Al-Qaeda and a number of regional groups as Bin Laden and Zawahiri linked it to the founding of the World Islamic Front for jihad against the Jews and crusaders.

The declarations revealed the shifting nature of Al-Qaeda’s ideology as it entered a new phase in religious violence that targeted the United States and regimes in the Middle East. Bin Laden characterised the emerging conflict between the Christian West and the Islamic world in civilisational terms, and urged Muslims to unite as a seamless community (umma) to defend themselves against aggressive forces and their allies (Blanchard 2007, pp. 3-4). The issuing of the two fatwa raised Al-Qaeda’s notion of protecting Muslim identity to a new and higher level as Bin Laden encouraged Muslims from different countries to participate in global conflicts involving other Muslims.

The Al-Qaeda movement’s global objectives were directed at transforming political regimes in the Middle East that it considered ‘morally corrupt’, ‘heretical’, and ‘authoritarian’. The ‘non-Islamic’ regimes were to be replaced with governments that implemented strict Sharia Law. Anger was also directed towards foreign policies of the United States (US) and its allies that it blamed for interfering with proper functioning of an Islamic order in the region. The US was particularly singled out for supporting the Jewish state of Israel that should be destroyed and replaced with the state of Palestine. Creation of an Islamic order based on the notion of a virtual caliphate was considered a better option as it would unite Muslims worldwide for their own protection (Mandaville 2005; Kushner 2003, pp. 22-23). This grand strategy emphasised an injustice framework that exploited
issues of Muslim domination and alienation within and outside the Arab/Muslim region (Kilcullen 2005, p. 559).

The movement’s efforts to broaden its ideology have focused on physical and virtual domains. The latter has also facilitated communication, recruitment, fundraising and publication of training materials to existing and prospective Muslim audiences. Pro Al-Qaeda websites have also helped to promote ‘self-radicalisation’ and development of ‘virtual cells’ that could organise for terrorist operations when necessary. Online media tools facilitated command and control mechanisms, allowing local and global spheres of virtual and physical campaigns to combine and evolve with some degree of interoperability (Ranstorp 2007, pp. 36-40, 47).

In July 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri noted how ‘half of the battle in winning hearts and minds of the Umma was fought in the media’. Political and media strategies were considered inseparable in mobilising against common adversaries. Bin Laden also used the Internet to disseminate his message in the fatwa and other declarations to increase recruitment and support for the movement (Lynch 2006, pp. 50-53).

Jihadi media has disseminated doctrinal statements from clerics and leading figures from Al-Qaeda’s central command whose emphasis on winning the battle of ideas contributed to inspire potential recruits. Regional franchises and affiliate groups linked to the movement disseminated jihadist media products (text, video, audio) through their own media outlets in Arabic and other languages using platforms such as Face book and Twitter to attract the faithful (SITE Intelligence Group 2015). From 2001 to May 2013 Al-Qaeda central command communicated core aspects of
its ideology in Arabic, English, Urdu, Pashto, Farsi, and German to reach a broad audience (IntelCenter 2016a).

Ideological expansion and diffusion of an extremist globalist ideology posed serious security concerns for the counter-terrorism community, as groups with similar ideologies and strategies added ideological and military capability to the core of Al-Qaeda, and risked potential diffusion. Some could emerge in the future and take over from Al-Qaeda (Mandaville 2005). The emergence of the Islamic State group in 2012 whose activities eclipsed those of Al-Qaeda’s older affiliates on lethality, political vision and use of social media attracted world attention that required international intervention. Thus, the suggestion that the Al-Qaeda movement’s ideology needed to be de-legitimised using short, medium, and long-term counter-terrorism measures because its affiliates have targeted the same category of ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemies and can act as proxies (Perl 2006, pp. 4, 10; Hoffman 2005, p. 10). The emphasis in counter-terrorism has been to leverage hard and soft strategic approaches. Hard strategies have required providing inducements in the form of ‘carrots’ and threats or ‘sticks’. Soft ones involved co-opting ideological groups by encouraging consideration of alternative approaches and outcomes (Nye 2003).

Corman & Shiefelbein (2006) argued that Islamist militants employed an explicit communicative and public relations campaign strategy to win hearts and minds in the Muslim world. Their activities were part of “a structured and focused system” in a legitimating strategy they were pursuing. They highlighted that there was ‘not enough’ understanding of how militant jihadists communicated and marketed their narrative to target populations. Their framing strategies, collective mobilisation efforts in different socio-political and cultural contexts needed to highlight these aspects. While
pursuing a legitimating strategy, communicating it has been one of their biggest challenges (pp. 19-22). A key challenge for violent jihadists including Al-Qaeda lies in legitimation and it is in the communicative realm where concerted counter-terrorism efforts were needed to exploit ideological schisms or contradictions within the movement (Campbell & Darsie 2006, pp. 2-3, 92-93), and with other groups.

At physical and ideological levels the transnational movement has strategic weaknesses that can be exploited at the level of domestic grievances (social, economic, and political) through identification of its strengths and focusing on weaknesses (Brachman & McCants 2006, p. 5). The long-term goal is to protect current and future generations of young people from being inspired by an intolerant ideology (Tibi 2007, pp. 36-37).

Members of Al-Qaeda movement have generally been regarded as a minority in the framework of contemporary insurgent movements operating in the Middle East, North Africa, and East Africa that have focused at the domestic context. The majority Muslim opinion has considered its ideology to be overly violent and extremist in the way it sought to transform their socio-political orders. The minority of jihadist groups that have been drawn and inspired to act based on transnational jihadist ideology have been depicted as ultra-conservatives. It is the minority of groups within this category that have contributed to Al-Qaeda’s resilient nature through their strategic adaptation. Thus, the likelihood that extremist groups or individuals with a global world view will continue to emerge and pose unpredictable challenges. Al-Qaeda as an emergent entity has focused on renewal. Its ideas are likely to continue to inspire Sunni ultra-conservatives.
Methodology

This thesis uses case study methodology and a qualitative interpretative framework to explore Al-Qaeda’s ideology and approach to socio-political issues. The approach assists in understanding how militants as religious and political actors construct social reality and interact with target audiences (Stake 1995, p. 12). Yin (2003, p.1), suggests that the case study method is often a preferred strategy for empirical inquiry as it facilitates exploration of issues related to complex social phenomena, and asking ‘how’ or ‘why’ research-type questions. Yin (1984, p. 23) defines a case study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used’. Yin (1984, pp. 13) emphasises that the form of question for the intended research study will suggest the type of strategy to use. The case study method allows flexible use of single or multiple cases, as well as qualitative or quantitative evidence, or a mixture of both (Yin 1984, pp. 24-25, 29).

The case study method has been used for scholarly analysis in disciplines and fields such as political science, public policy, psychology, sociology, social work, business, community planning, and program evaluation (Yin 2003, pp. 1, 14).

One important aspect in the study aims to understand how leaders of Islamist militants have been able to propagate their ideology across local and regional domains. The strategic goal of Al-Qaeda movement groups is to change the status quo by influencing Muslim audiences. Communication has been through the Internet, other new media tools, and through face to face interaction. Similar to other groups, Al-Qaeda militants have tapped into prevailing social values, culture, reward and
punishment systems (Hofstede 1981, pp. 15-41; Schwartz 1999). Drawing from different disciplinary perspectives allows discourse concepts such as knowledge, power, authority, sovereignty, collective action, and logic to be explored (Ganor 2009, p. 16). The strength of case study approach lies in enabling analysis of concepts such as meaning, truth, falsehood, intent, passion, values, and beliefs that form part of an ideology (Lambert 2005, Abstract).

The multi-faceted concepts are explored using an overarching social movement theoretical framework as it analytically captures different forms of social organisation and mobilisation, and related perceptions, beliefs, interests and aspirations of individuals or groups involved. Snow et al. 2004 (pp. 8-11), described social movements as organised collectives that acted with some degree of continuity in pursuit of common objectives in a particular constituency. Social movements have sought to promote or challenge to change some aspect(s) of existing authority in social relations. Actions may be directed towards institutional, cultural, religious, or societal practices. The discourse involved is used to represent the desired social world or an aspect of it’ (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 1). Social movements can play a constructive or destructive role. Opposition movements have targeted authorities and competitors in the pursuit of their preferred social realities (Alimi EY 2006, p. 264). Within the same political space the Al-Qaeda movement mobilised its networks of cells and affiliate organisations to promote its brand of transnational jihadist politics and type of social world.

The thesis relies on open data sources for the information it uses for analysis and conclusions, and uses triangulation to address issues of validity (Yin 1984, p. 35). Due to the difficulty in obtaining primary source material on terrorism, most researchers on the topic have largely drawn from
secondary or tertiary data sources (Koschade 2006, p. 11). A few analysts have been able to interview terrorists. Others have had access to notebooks or letters left behind by terrorists. These information sources are useful for this type of research (Dugan et al. 2008, p. 7). The study also benefits from the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) which provides translation services for Arabic, Farsi, and Hebrew languages. This resource has assisted in shedding light on some useful sources in the study of religion (e.g. Pape 2005; Sageman 2004, Stern 2004).

In terms of interpreting study findings, the study compares ideological propositions of Al-Qaeda transnational jihadist groups with those of terrorist groups whose grievances focused at the domestic level, and the Sunni Muslim majority whose opinions promoted mainstream beliefs and practices.

Similarities between Al-Qaeda and domestic groups that exist at the basic level of socio-political grievances highlighted a requirement to use historical and comparative analytical frameworks (Jackson et al. 2007, pp. 3-6, 24; Crenshaw 2000 Abstract p. 405). The need for broader contextualisation has been emphasised as the focus has largely been on recent threats and cases, on contemporary, as opposed to historical research on terrorism (Bergesen & Han 2005, p. 141; Ranstorp 2006, p. 88). These approaches could reveal potential differences and similarities among terrorist groups, and whether or how terrorist campaigns can be ended (Crenshaw 2000, Abstract p. 405). Drawing on historical lessons from past terrorist campaigns facilitates comprehensive understanding of terrorism, and also allows filling some knowledge gaps in understanding and addressing the Al-Qaeda movement phenomenon (Jackson et al. 2007, p. 24).
Jones’ (2007) brief review of scholarly evaluations on trends in terrorism research during the period 2000-2007 found only six articles discussed terrorism prior to 1960 in depth in two key terrorism journals *Terrorism and Political Violence* and *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. There has been some bias towards current threats and a strong focus on policy-oriented research compared to that dealing with historical context and comparison. A review by Silke (2004, p. 209) of a catalogue of 490 articles published during the period 1990-1999 in the same journals found only thirteen articles focused on non-contemporary terrorism. From the thirteen, seven considered terrorism that occurred prior to 1960. The bulk of research focused on nationalist rather than religious groups. A comparative framework will be used in the discussion.

**Thesis aims**

The transnational movement has been chosen as a particular case for study, to gain a clearer view of the complexity and uniqueness its ideology represents within the regional socio-political context of Muslim countries, and in the broader global political environment.

A review of some of the literature on resurgence of militant Islam, of which Al-Qaeda is a part, seeks to address the following questions:

(i). How popular is militant Islam as a political and social force in the broader context?

(ii). What theories can best explain emergence of the Al-Qaeda movement?

(iii). How do Al-Qaeda militants market their narrative?

(iv). How does the movement cope with existing constraints?

(v). To what extent does it compare with past and present militant groups?
The basis of these questions is to draw attention to Al-Qaeda’s world view based on its value framework (attitudes and beliefs) and desired social reality, when compared to that of radical and terrorist Islamist and non-Islamist groups that have also advocated social change. The aim is to address an ideological gap that some empirical analyses have identified in relation to approaching the threat posed by transnational terrorism, which requires developing further conceptual understanding of the ideological dimension.

In the discussion, consideration will be made on elements that directly or indirectly may be generating support for extremist ideology. This involves examining the role of social, political, economic, cultural, or psychological factors in locations where terrorism has emerged. The power and influence of extremist ideology in host locations, its strengths and potential limitations will also be examined (Stigler 2007, pp. 3-5). The discussion adopts Geertz’s (1973) neutral conception of ideology as it presents ideology as a cultural system with norms, values and beliefs. This definition provides greater scope to evaluate different idea systems to highlight true or false world views.
Chapter 1

Al-Qaeda’s philosophy

The term ‘Al-Qaeda’ originates from Arabic meaning root (quaff-any-dal) or ‘the base’. The term also means a precept, maxim, or mode of activism (Burke 2004, pp. 1-2). Al-Qaeda’s Salafist model of activism has violently sought purity in Islamic practices that deviate from the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. The movement’s model that has philosophically drawn from different schools of Islamic thought was inspired by a pan-Islamist revolutionary political ideology and pursuit of jihad, which means to ‘strive’ or fight in defence of Islam (Esposito 2004, p. 23).

Map 4. Distribution of the main Islamic Schools of law

The model partly draws inspiration from Wahhabi Islam, a sub-branch of the Hanbali School of religious law that is predominantly practiced in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Of the four recognised schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam (Hanafi, Shafi, Hanbali, Maliki), Hanbali is considered the most conservative because it stresses strict adherence to all practices of Sharia (Dougherty & Ghareeb 2013, p. 421).

While Al-Qaeda movement ideological model has utilised some aspects of Wahhabi Islam, it has been suggested the ‘takfiri ideology’ it promoted was not representative of Wahhabi Islam. His Majesty King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein of Jordan during a speech to parliament in 2014 condemned and described such an ideology as extremist because its militants were ‘murdering Muslims as well as innocent women and children in the name of Islam’. The King made a moral
distinction based on the movement’s projected values (HM Hussein 2014). Takfiri is a term that describes other Muslims as kafir (unbelievers). Mainstream Sunni Muslims and a majority of Islamist groups in the region have considered the takfir concept un-Islamic and a doctrinal deviation, and associated its practices with bigotry and zealotry (Oxford Islamic Studies Online 2006).

The Al-Qaeda model has also partly been inspired by the Sufi Deobandi sub-branch of Islam as a result of Osama bin Laden’s close connections in the 1980s and 1990s with leaders of the Taliban, a hardline insurgent movement that fought against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden is alleged to have funded training of recruits in some of the camps in Afghanistan (e.g. Khaldun, Al Farouq, Darunta) until 2001 when the US-led coalition intervened and toppled the Taliban regime. Veterans of these training camps dominated jihadist terrorism from 1999-2002, the formative years of Al-Qaeda movement (Sageman 2010, pp. 11-12). In all phases of its expansion, the Al-Qaeda movement maintained close relations with the Pashtun militant networks located in the lawless border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the North-west Frontier Province (NWFP), and Balochistan Province where Taliban leaders established strongholds during the resistance (Gishkori 2015).

In addition to these influences, Osama bin Laden and Egyptian-born Dr Ayman Al-Zawahiri drew intellectual and spiritual inspiration from the revolutionary ideas and world view promoted by Egyptian activist Sayyid Qutb, a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Oliver 2002, pp. 7-9). Generally regarded as the spiritual father of Al-Qaeda’s Salafi ideology, Sayyid Qutb’s (1906-1966) scholarly experience in the USA and Egypt, and also prison life in the early 1960s in Egypt,
moulded his ideological views for Islamic renewal. His revolutionary ideas made him a controversial political figure (Esposito 2004, p. 154).

Qutb’s concept of *jahiliyya* portrayed Muslim societies as having reverted to the pre-historic age of religious ‘ignorance’ because they allowed themselves to be governed by secular Muslim rulers who were ‘apostates’ or non-believers. It was preferable to be governed by a political system whose values were bestowed by God than one based on man-made laws (Esposito 2004, p. 154). In one of his influential works *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Arabic) or *Milestones* first published in 1964, Qutb urged Muslim communities to fight on Quranic grounds and free themselves from the ‘servitude’ of *jahili* beliefs and ideas regardless of geographical boundaries. Change and the right to propagate the Islamic message had to begin from the grassroots (Qutb 2005, p.46).

Qutb contrasted *jahili* cultures with life under Islamic law. Under a communist society, ideology and leadership maintained full control of people, deprived them of spiritual enlightenment and freedom of individual expression. This society denied them the existence of God. Idolatrous societies in India, Japan, the Philippines, and Africa that believed in other gods besides God, had laws and regulations that tended to be derived from other sources such as priests, magicians, astrologers, secular institutions, and elders. By virtue of their positions, these sources assumed absolute authority over local people in the name of nation, party or some other political entity. Christian and Jewish societies distorted original beliefs about God and ascribed some aspects to other beings. Such societies treated their religious leaders (rabii, priests) as lords in addition to God. This authority attached to titles with associated rights and privileges allowed certain individuals to make laws that were not permitted by God (Qutb 2005, pp. 53-54).
According to Qutb, a Muslim society based its socio-political and religious beliefs on the submission to ‘God alone, today, tomorrow or in the remote future’. The Islamic society was unique because its legislative aspect of authority belonged to God alone. Dignity and honour were respected according to what God prescribed, because God’s position was considered to be higher than that of human beings and the angels. Islamic morals and values were worth fighting for (Qutb 2005, pp. 55, 66).

The emphasis was on religious purity in all ways of life as opposed to the power of the state that emphasised a materialist system (Qutb 2005, pp. 26, 45). Qutb was arrested, jailed and executed by the Egyptian state for his radical views. He was criticised for espousing literal understanding of the Quran and promoting a political and religious struggle through violent jihad (Hanzen & Kainz 2007, pp. 57-63).

The Muslim Brotherhood in its English website Ikhwanweb.com praised Qutb’s efforts for enlightening the Islamic world and compared his intellectual quest to the philosophy of John Locke (1632-1704). In The second treatise of government (1690) Locke was responding to contemporary issues of western democracy and liberalism, and revocability of the social contract. Highlighting that not all people were equal, Locke emphasised that “the natural liberty of man was to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authoritative of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule”. According to the Brotherhood, Qutb was spiritually fighting against an imperial political culture of the 1950s and 1960s that was impacting negatively on the Muslim world. This political form of society and government could also be revoked (Sabrin 2010). Despite criticism of his approach in certain reformist circles, Qutb’s philosophy endured and has inspired successive generations of radical groups.
Qutb’s world view largely shaped Al-Qaeda’s ideology and strategic framework when it was conceptualised by Palestinian born scholar Dr Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in 1988, while in Afghanistan supporting Muslim volunteers fighting against Soviet invasion. The death of Azzam in 1989 and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan caused Bin Laden to return to Saudi Arabia until the Gulf War (1990-1991). Prior to the Gulf conflict, Azzam, Zawahiri, and Bin Laden had focused their attention on the Soviet Union as the principle enemy and not the United States (Gerges 2011, p. 48).

Events from the Gulf War caused Osama bin Laden to widen the Muslim struggle to include the United States and its Western allies, and regimes in the Muslim world. The focus turned to fulfilling strategic objectives of their new revolutionary campaign which included: (i). eliminating American and Western influence in the Islamic region; and (ii). overthrowing and replacing secular Arab regimes with true Islamic states or theocracies (Gunaratna 2002). Throughout its campaigns, Al-Qaeda movement has advocated a return to traditional values of the early days of Islam and strict implementation of Sharia or Islamic law (Shepard 1987, p. 308). It is its takfiri form of Salafism that critics and competitors have used by to distinguish its activities from that of other Islamist groups.

**Salafism**

Salafism in Arabic means *salaf or al-salafiya*, or pious ancestors of Islamic society. Salafists generally agree on bringing back the true teachings of Islam but disagree on how it should be achieved (Campo 2009, p. 601). Contemporary Salafism according to Hafez (2007, pp. 67-70), is characterised by greater emphasis on the concept of *tawhid* (unity of god, or monoethism) that required devotion and belief in God and proper conduct; upholding God's sovereignty (*hakimiyyat*
*al-lah*) as the only law giver to define what is permissible and forbidden; implementing strict constructionist jurisprudence and rejection of innovations (*bid'a*), adherence to the Quran as the final revelation of God; and the obligation to engage in jihad against infidel regimes who failed to rule according to God's laws.

In discussing Salafism, Forte (2001) has recommended using moral distinctions in beliefs and practices as a starting point of reference. Based on this framework, Al-Qaeda's version of extremism is differentiated from the orthodoxy of Wahabbism, moderate forms of Islamism, and traditional Islam. It is located closer to Qutb's form of extremism whose framework sought to replicate in modern guise activities of the violent faction of the Kharajite, a seventh-century militant Muslim sect that operated during the early period of Islam. The extreme position adopted by this sect put its activists at odds with views of the majority of Muslims.

The Kharajites advocated their own religious purity and posed a challenge to the ruling authorities during the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphate periods. Their image portrayed by other Muslims was that of overly pious zealots whose ideas lay beyond the norms of Islam. They attacked fellow Muslims who disagreed with their views and were depicted as misguided and threatening to the political order. The rebellious Kharijites engaged in numerous battles. Upon defeat, their moderate counterparts (Ibadiyyah) were scattered across the region (Kenney 2006, pp. 4-9, 23).

On how groups interpreted contemporary problems and devised appropriate solutions, Wiktorowicz (2006, p. 208) divided the Salafist community into three major categories or factions: the 'purists', 'politicos', and the 'jihadists'. Purists emphasised non-violent methods of religious propagation and
education, politicos emphasised applying religion in the political arena to influence issues of social justice and the right of God alone to legislate. Jihadists adopted a more militant position on contextual analysis and advocated violent revolutionary action. Differences largely related to contextual analysis of problems and not belief.

**Growth of the Al-Qaeda movement**

The charismatic Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri became symbols of Al-Qaeda religious violence as the movement evolved from a hierarchical management structure that characterised its early years in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to a network-based structure that expanded regionally. Bin Laden led the movement until his death in Pakistan in June 2011, leaving Ayman al-Zawahiri to continue to improve the movement’s capabilities and prospects. With his leadership Zawahiri expanded Al-Qaeda model of activities by establishing new alliances with disparate militant groups. Relationships with the Taliban network operating in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, including those with other regional affiliates were retained.

To draw attention to the suffering of Muslims the Al-Qaeda movement also tapped into new opportunities provided by the revolutionary wave of political demonstrations and protests that occurred in North Africa and the Middle East known as the ‘Arab Spring’, that began in December 2010 in Tunisia and spread across to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Iraq, and Syria. The Israel-Palestinian issue remained unchanged in terms of using it to inspire and recruit fighters to assist Muslim causes (Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, 1 June 2012). As the number of radical groups grew, some were willingly conducting terrorist activities in Al-Qaeda’s name within their countries. Some that pledged allegiance to Zawahiri during the period 2014-2015 sent their
members to fight in Iraq and Syria in support of Al-Qaeda affiliates. Gradually the Al-Qaeda movement ideology became a brand name that benefited from a minority of religious terrorist groups and individuals.

The movement’s ideological framework features formal and informal affiliate relations that have enabled flexible adaptation to carry out terrorist operations. In terms of defining the network, the Al-Qaeda core is the original group that was formed during the early years of the anti-Soviet campaign when it was led by Al-Qaeda leadership (emir) based in Pakistan. Affiliates are groups that the Al-Qaeda leadership (emir) publicly formally recognised as part of the broader network. These groups pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda emir, adopted Al-Qaeda ideology, shared resources and used a common Al-Qaeda signature brand. Associates are groups that whilst not publicly recognised, are ideologically and functionally aligned to the Al-Qaeda movement network. They are loosely associated but benefit from its resources. Within this framework, the Islamic State group can be considered an informal associate while Jabhat al Nusra was the publicly recognised affiliate in the Syrian conflict. Members of the two groups operated together in Iraq until the split between the leaders of the Islamic State group and the older Al-Qaeda core network over leadership and strategic approach (Zimmerman 2013, pp. 13-15).

While not publicly recognised as a formal affiliate by Ayman al-Zawahiri the spiritual leader of the older Al Qaeda core network, the military leadership of the Islamic State group (IS) operated under the same injustice principle. Both groups pursued common goals although the Islamic State group progressed to physically seize and control territory during its military campaigns in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State group operated similar to a conventional military organisation and engaged in
outbidding rivals to prove its military, political and financial capability. The competitive and collaborative environment has featured groups with varying degrees of affiliation to the Al-Qaeda core that have contributed to the resilience of the transnational network.

Ayman al-Zawahiri in an interview with Al-Qaeda’s official media outlet Al-Sahab on 18 April 2014 highlighted the reality of Al-Qaeda’s decentralisation by stating that “Al-Qaeda is a message before it is an organization”, (Humud et al. 2014, p. 1). The purpose of the message was to spread the plight of the downtrodden in the Islamic world (Joscelyn 2014). Media organizations such as Al-Sahab Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), Al-Furqan, Al-Fajr and others established by specific groups promoted the movement’s ‘war of ideas’ campaign (Alshech & Apelbaum 2010, p. 4).

**Funding sources**

The transnational movement derived funding from a variety of sources. Al Jazeera has reported of leaked US cables that revealed Al-Qaeda and affiliated insurgent groups such as the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Taiba were funded by wealthy individuals from the Gulf States through donations, financial remittances of the informal money transfer networks such as the *hawala* system, and other business interests (Al Jazeera 2010). Al-Qaeda’s revenue in South East Asia in late 1980s to early 1990s was provided by supporters and sympathisers in the form of proceeds of petty crime, extortion, racketeering, and kidnapping. This revenue was used to strengthen capabilities of affiliates such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf in Southeast Asia (Abuza 2003, pp. 171-194).
Captured financial records of its affiliate Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in Anbar Province revealed that at its peak in power and influence from June 2005 to May 2006, the organisation used money derived from extortion, theft, and black market sales to fund its operations. It raised nearly US$4.5 million or approximately US$373,000 per month. 50 per cent of this revenue was obtained from selling stolen goods (e.g. construction equipment, generators, and electric cables). Other sources included car sales, looted property, and money transfers received from other terrorist sectors or organisations. Oil may have also been stolen and sold for the same purpose (Bahney et al. 2010, pp. 36-37). Al-Qaeda’s early alleged involvement in the diamond trade in Sierra Leone, gold and uranium in the Republic of Congo, and Tanzanite from Tanzania in the early 1990s provided added revenue to its operations. At the time civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa were being exploited by various rebel groups for operational purposes (Farah 2001).

Terror networks have used affiliated charities, businesses, and permissive financial institutions in high risk and under-developed areas of the world to finance their activities. Despite their social welfare functions and image of legitimacy, some charities have acted as front organisations and diverted proceeds to fund terror activities. At the lower level, individual terrorists have funded their activities through employment, access to credit or social welfare payments (Financial Action Taskforce FATF 2008, pp. 8, 11). The terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005 were self-financed, with the overall cost estimated at GBP 8,000 (FATF 2008, p. 14). The challenge in counter-terrorism has related to identifying such individual practices because of the low amounts of funding required to conduct terror activities.
Terrorist financing has also been raised through drug trafficking, credit card fraud, and bank fraud using false identities. The absence of jurisdictional control in safe havens, weak institutional capacity in failed states, and the role of some state sponsors has enabled terrorists to move money and transfer value across different countries’ borders to pursue their objectives. Activities can be facilitated through the use of the financial system, physically through cash couriers, or through the international trading system (FATF 2008, pp. 19-21).

Access to a wider range of potential sponsors or sympathisers, the ease of obtaining money through electronic, online, and new payment methods are some of the vulnerabilities in the banking industry that have been exploited by terrorist organisations as many systems can be accessed globally for quick transfer of funds. While funds may be traceable, it can be difficult to identify the end user or beneficiary (FATF, October 2015, p. 6).

Communal and sectarian links between groups overseas and individuals can facilitate terrorist financing. In Australia for example, terrorism financing was likely to be facilitated through conduit countries rather than sending money directly to high-risk jurisdictions. This made it difficult for financial institutions to directly link international funds transfers to terrorism. Conflicts in Iraq and Syria when they emerged posed significant financial risks to counter-terrorism strategy as some terrorists could obtain funds from overseas sponsors or sympathetic radical groups. Legitimate transactions from families and community members to support humanitarian aid provided an opportunity to disguise funds meant for terrorism financing. In Australia, the banking and remittance sectors were the most frequently used channels for sending funds to individuals engaged in foreign conflicts (AUSTRAC Report 2014, pp. 5-7).
Unlike most terrorist and insurgent organisations, the Islamic State group, successor to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) whose activities heightened in 2012 primarily funded its activities from gas and oil revenues in territories it captured in Syria and Iraq. It smuggled oil to Turkey, Jordan, and other areas in Syria and Iraq for sale on the black market. Other funding was derived from taxes imposed on residents for using government services (e.g. electricity, telecommunications, gas); taxes on non-Muslims living in its occupied territories; bank robberies; theft and sales of museum artefacts including coins and golden statues; profits from farmers’ livestock, and food crops including wheat (Weiss & Hassan 2015). Some sympathetic private donors in the Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar), and Turkey are reported to have provided support to the group (Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom SIF0006). The group also raised funds through human trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, and extortion activities at checkpoints. The Islamic State group in September 2014 was estimated to be earning US$2 billion annually, higher than funds available to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and rival insurgent organisations (Weiss & Hassan 2015). It earned approximately US$2 million per day, making it the wealthiest independent terrorist organisation in the world during its campaign. This level of financial and military capacity transformed it to become a rival organisation of Al-Qaeda’s formal affiliates (Lister 2014, p. 2).

The perceived military and administrative capacity of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria attracted thousands of volunteer fighters from various regions of the world to fight alongside its members. In terms of capacity of the broader jihadist network, the growing list of affiliates indicated a possibility for reciprocal funding that enabled carrying out terrorist attacks for particular groups or on Al-Qaeda’s behalf (Zimmerman 2013, p. 21).
Chapter 2

Challenges posed by Al-Qaeda

The Al-Qaeda movement’s world view has promoted an anti-western and anti-Semitic narrative that provided normative justification for adherents and supporters, including groups with peripheral ties to the movement to follow its jihadist model’s precepts and methods. This approach has allowed inspired groups to operate independently or collaboratively to support its ideology (Burke 2004, p. 18).

Al-Qaeda has exploited vulnerable locations exhibiting three common traits: a disenfranchised citizenry, perceived incompetence of incumbent regimes, and a history of strong radical Islamist activism. Locations where the movement has expanded such as in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa had a long history of violence, and radical movements (Salafi, Deobandi) whose ideologies aligned well with Al-Qaeda’s (Szrom & Harnisch 2011, pp. 9-10). In West Africa, the Group of People of Sunna for Preaching and Struggle (Boko Haram) in north eastern Nigeria was associated to Al-Qaeda through Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), before it pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group. Boko Haram similarly exploited issues related to bad governance and corruption, and activities of other Islamic revivalist movements that have advocated reform. The group has sought to correct perceived injustices through the creation of a strict Islamic state in the north of the country (ICG 2014, pp. 5-9).

Al-Qaeda movement objectives extended to other majority Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and majority Muslim areas in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines.
where it exploited perceived injustices, and relatively narrow goals and objectives of local extremist groups. Jemaah Islamiyah was co-opted into Al-Qaeda’s expansionist regional agenda in the late 1990s (Vaughn et al. 2005, p. 1).

The type of environment the Al-Qaeda movement has operated in determined the level of its strengths and capabilities. Thus, denying the movement entry to safe havens has been one of the counter-terrorism strategies aimed at reducing its territorial expansion and ideological appeal (Szrom & Harnisch 2011, pp. 9-10).

Challenges posed by the Al-Qaeda movement are linked to its opposition to secular politics, transnationalisation, and relying on the religious platform to debate socio-political issues. Transnationalisation allowed it to frame endogenous issues largely as exogenous ones, while religion facilitated its violent approach to socio-political issues. These ideological and temporal challenges created constant reminders of what might lie ahead because of Al-Qaeda’s shifting emphasis and capacity to influence and support terrorist campaigns of domestic groups.

These characteristics place Al-Qaeda transnational movement outside the realm of most domestic group activities because they raise its profile to a higher and different level. Its capacity to shift locations in search of new opportunities in vulnerable political environments sets it apart from the domestic realm of politics. Non-territoriality has combined with its other attributes such as largely non-negotiable goals that have been promoted by hardliners at the leadership level (Albini 2001, Abstract p. 255; Stares & Yacoubian 2007, p. 425), millenarian approach (Dunning 2008) and
fanatical behaviour exhibited by some of its members that has caused Al-Qaeda groups to rely on suicide tactics (Schmid 2005; Hoffman 1999, pp. 13-15; Lesser 1999, pp. 141-143).

The movement’s use of modern technology for ideological propagation also raised fears that some of its militants could use radiological, chemical, or biological agents to cause mass-casualties to achieve religious or political objectives (Morgan 2004, pp. 29-32, 41). These dangerous attributes contributed to make Al-Qaeda a challenging entity. It has required policy makers and strategists to continually modify their counter-terrorism approaches to cope with its shifting patterns and emergent behaviour from affiliates and their associates (Brown 2007, p. 40; Spencer 2006, p. 5).

Thus, there are qualitative and quantitative differences between Al-Qaeda transnational movement and domestic groups in motives, goals, scope of operations, and declared targets (Stares & Yacoubian 2006, p. 89). Al-Qaeda operated on a transnational scale, overly relies on violent logic, and has a broad range of targets that it categorised as near enemies (Muslim countries) and far enemies (the US, the West and allies (Hoffman 2004, pp. 551 & 553). While generalisations can be drawn at the basic level of domestic grievances, these aspects of scale or degree in terms of operational settings need to be considered. They highlight a new strategic approach adopted by the movement that has differentiated it from domestically focused terrorist campaigns.

An exploration of Al-Qaeda’s narrative has found its key leaders (e.g. Osama bin Laden, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) tended to mix politics and religious zeal which Muslim majorities have considered to be extremist because it is driven primarily by a purist transcendental rhetoric. The movement’s strategists have been criticised by informed commentators and clerics for framing
grievances largely on the basis of culture and religion, while downplaying their mutual interaction with economic, social, and political issues that formed the basis of local grievances. The Muslim majority has depicted Al-Qaeda’s leaders as authoritarian and dogmatic, who selectively magnified local issues to justify violent agendas and serve their own interests (Hoffman 1993, p. 2). Muslim majorities have expressed the view that their domestic issues were being conflated with global ones, and the rigid social world the movement promoted was risky and untenable because it stifled diversity and creativity. These progressive aspects were considered useful attributes for interacting in the contemporary social world (Mandaville 2005).

The ideology of the transnational movement has been challenged on political and religious grounds. On moral grounds, its practice of killing innocent Muslim civilians in the name of religion has been pointed out as contradicting its purpose of liberation and being the vanguard for Muslim protection. This includes targeting Muslims that it considered to be ‘non-believers’ or non-pious (Takfir), who it excommunicated and punished (Hoffman 2004, pp. 552-553). Analysis conducted by researchers at the US West Point Centre for Combatting Terrorism on the region from 2004-2008 found that in the 310 terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda, 85% of 3,010 of its casualties were Muslims, the rest were Westerners. The report relied on Arabic media sources to produce results (Helfstein et al. 2009, pp. 2-3).

As advocates of justice, Al-Qaeda’s actions violated basic western values including human rights of Muslims. This has been one of the areas where ideological contradiction has occurred. The issue of civilian deaths negatively affected the movement’s image. In one of the declassified documents released by the US Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point military academy, Osama bin Laden
warned his associates in Iraq of potential loss of trust from Muslim communities if civilian casualties continued to rise (The Australian, 4 May 2012). The legitimacy of Al-Qaeda’s religious authority in being able to issue fatwa was challenged by respected religious scholars (al-ulama) who felt it was their moral duty to scrutinise its leaders’ justification to engage in violent jihad (Cronin 2010, pp. 840-842).

It has been emphasised that Al-Qaeda leaders lacked religious authority to speak for Islam. Clarification of the concept of Jihad has required clerics with legitimate authority to highlight its different meanings which related to greater and lesser jihad, including the requirement for martyrdom (shahid) as there are situations when Islamic law can approve or disapprove armed struggle.

Regulatory norms that governed jihad are analogous to ethics that justify conventional warfare with legitimate sanction for action and need for proportionality, rather than advocating all-out war on non-Muslims or apostates. Views of the larger Muslim constituency largely emphasised that jihad ought to be pursued peacefully and ethically, rather than equating it solely with armed warfare. The consensus view from the moderate majority has been to liberate the concept of jihad from ‘misappropriation’ and ‘mistranslation’ by leaders who lacked authoritative knowledge or legitimate authority (Omar 2008, pp. 757-758). Issues in the religious dispute have related to questions on tactics: (i) when is fighting justified and in what circumstances?, (ii) who are the legitimate targets?, and (iii) the right authority to authorise fighting (Kelsay 2010, p. 235).
The word Jihad is generally described as involving two levels. The inner (greater) jihad involves an individual struggle to avoid sinful behaviour by practicing principles of the Quran and Islamic law. Inner jihad focuses inwards on one's piety and righteous behaviour. Outer (lesser) jihad refers to defence of the Muslim community from attack. It may involve 'soft' defence such as verbal persuasion, or 'hard' defence such as physical or military defence of the Muslim community (DeLong-Bas 2016).

Goals and aspirations for engaging in violent jihad have been differentiated as having national and transnational dimensions, and the Muslim backlash on Al-Qaeda world-wide clarified that not all extremists, jihadists, or terrorists were the same. The movement's religious rhetoric polarised religious communities as it has sought to blur geographical differences. This ideological behaviour has resulted in the movement being edged out in many locations as differences between it and many domestic groups widened (Wesley 2004, p. 6). Al-Qaeda’s versions of the ‘caliphate’ and the ‘Islamic state’ where all social and political life should be governed strictly by Sharia law principles was considered unrealistic and therefore untenable (El-Affendi 2008, pp. 32-39; Bukay 2007). The notion of global ‘pan-Islamism’ has been contrasted with Arab nationalism and local forms of identification. While the movement’s rhetoric and ideology may be receptive to some individuals and a minority of groups, localisation of issues is a tool that has been used to reduce the number of recruits seeking to join foreign Al-Qaeda movement groups (Hegghammer 2011).

Human rights advocates and women’s groups in the region have pointed out how the global movement’s rhetoric could not address issues of accommodation in the treatment of minorities. Its ‘conservative’ and ‘patriarchal’ interpretation of religious texts that assumed monopoly on truth
claims, has sought to undermine decades of their struggle in trying to improve conditions of marginalised groups including women. Key ideologues of the movement were opposed to the idea of democracy, and sought to discourage individual religious autonomy and knowledge creation (Bayat 2010, pp. 4-30).

The tendency to use literal interpretations of the religious text to drive a political agenda distorted informed analysis of practical social problems and exaggerated solutions as religious and cultural ones. Focusing on remote supranational issues of imperialism through religious and cultural narrative frameworks downplayed commonly known concerns that were backed by empirical evidence, that linked social issues to lack of good governance (Krueger & Laitin 2008; Krueger & Malecková 2003, Campos & Gassebner 2009) and problems in the economy (Li & Schaub 2004; Stern 2004; Lofmark 2008). Larger issues were not about imperialism.

In relation to distorting analysis of social issues, this practice was not confined to Islamist groups as examples can be found among other religious faiths when reacting to circumstances of their socio-political environments. Violent opposition may result from introduction of modern concepts into traditional religions such as making adjustment of doctrine by reformist elements of society to make certain aspects appropriate to contemporary times. Modern technologies can be used by teleevangelists to skilfully manipulate the mass media for their groups’ advantage (Kaplan 1992, p. 5). All ‘three religions of the Book’ (Islam, Judaism, Christianity) can be prone to literalist interpretation of scriptures. Combined with nationalism, patriotism and self-centric ideals their appeal can be easily followed by some adherents to the point of adopting sacral strategy to achieve socio-political change (Vorster 2008, p. 49).
Many ordinary Muslims perceived Al-Qaeda’s world view as elitist and impractical in contemporary times. It is at the religious doctrinal level where the Al-Qaeda movement ideology has been challenged based on contemporary social values. In both tactics and logical argument, the majority of Muslims have considered Al-Qaeda’s foreign insurgents as trouble makers to be avoided. This has allowed social policies of many countries to focus on preventing foreign extremists from recruiting and influencing their vulnerable young people (Malet 2010, pp. 113-114).

Al-Qaeda’s ideology was being countered with reasoned argument based on community dialogue and formal education that promoted notions of justice, peace, consultation, consensus, and conscience. A democratic argument that has steadily grown depicted Al-Qaeda militants as their own worst enemy because of their violent politics (Kelsay 2007, p. 198). Their dictatorial ideology gradually lost sympathetic adherents as campaigns by moderate majorities including some secular hardliners intensified against the movement’s activities (Kagan 2005, Abstract pp. 1, 8). While some Muslim populations particularly the susceptible youth may be drawn to Al-Qaeda’s transnational ideology (Zeidan 2001, p. 27), the idea of reverting to the pan-Islamist early years of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism failed to win a permanent support base.

Pan-Islamic ideology of the golden age of Islamic civilisation was also considered obsolete in the sense that its transnational ideas and values, and the type of unity that existed during the Ottoman Empire were overtaken by contemporary realities of ‘local nationalisms’ of a lesser expansive territorial nature. For example, the popular uprisings known as the ‘Arab Spring’ that began in Tunisia in 2010 and spread to Libya, Egypt, and Syria were mobilised on the basis of pursuing secular claims (e.g. civil and political rights). They occurred within their own states, and activists
were not seeking Islamic re-unification to form one political entity (Lungu & Gokcel 2011, pp. 122-130). The idea of pan-Arab ideology was absent from socio-political claims although some leaders of militant groups exploited public anger and frustration to advocate for Muslim unity, and to shift the blame for the low level of economic development in some countries and suffering of Muslims to Western countries (Lungu & Gokcel 2011, p.133).

Map 5. Historical Islamic Caliphate

![Map 5. Historical Islamic Caliphate](image)

Source: The Norman B. Leventhal Library, Boston; Islamic history.org.
Efforts in 2014 by the Islamic State group’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to establish a caliphate in its controlled territories of Iraq and Syria to unite Sunni Muslims under one ruler (caliph) were also criticised and challenged based on contemporary realities of nationalism. The plan was to extend this caliphate to majority Muslim countries in the Levant (Neriah 2014). The political entity was modelled similar to the one that succeeded the Abbasid caliphate (750–1258 AD), the third to succeed the one led by Prophet Muhammad. The Abbasid caliphate descended from the prophet’s paternal uncle Al-‘Abbas ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib. This caliphate overthrew the Umayyad Empire based in Syria, but was also destroyed by Mongol invasion in 1258.
Concerns of Islamist extremism including Al-Qaeda and associated groups steadily increased as Muslim majorities continued to express negative opinion. The global attitudes survey (A.2, Table 2) that was conducted by the Pew Research Centre in the US during the Spring of 2014, in Lebanon, Tunisia, Egypt, the Palestinian Territory, Jordan, Turkey, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Israel, indicated concerns among Muslims and Christians had increased significantly in these counties where the movement has operated or those bordering them. When contrasted with groups such as the Taliban, and Hamas, Al-Qaeda ranked at the top on violent behaviour. From 2002-2014 the level of support for suicide terrorism declined in these countries, highlighting growing public opposition to this tactic which resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties (A.2, Table 2). Al-Qaeda is among groups that relied on this tactic to conduct high profile terrorist attacks to gain publicity (Pew Research Centre 2014).

Value-based assessments would locate Al-Qaeda movement ideology at the extreme right of the political continuum because of its puritanical, absolutist, and literalist religious approach to socio-political issues. Although its influence has been weakened by the loss of key leaders and strategists (Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi), regional affiliate groups based in the Middle East, North Africa, East Africa, and indirectly with West Africa, promoted its image despite opportunistic objectives of some groups.

The main objective of most affiliate groups was to gain more resources and improve failing image at home. The contemporary challenge that has confronted Al-Qaeda is being able to win permanent allies. This dynamic factor was compounded by its lack of contextualisation, extremist approach in debating socio-political issues, and the issue of transnationalisation (Ginges 1997, p.
Fundamentalist violence was the root of Al-Qaeda’s emergence in demonstrating support for Muslim causes worldwide. The same ideological posture contributed to decline in certain areas. Its shifting pattern of activity and re-branding indicated failure to win a large following to enable it to survive in host locations in the longer term.

Al-Qaeda’s challenges needed to be viewed from the perspective of mainstream political groups seeking to change political systems from within their countries (Esposito 1994). Domestic terrorist groups with ideological links to Al-Qaeda while prominent, have been few as the costs for joining the movement can result in loss of constituent support (Asal & Blum 2005).

The next chapter embeds Al-Qaeda’s transnational terrorist activities in contemporary social activism of the Middle East and North Africa, to compare, analyse, and evaluate the scope and strength of its grievances based on value priorities of Muslim populations. Contributory causes for emergence of terrorism have been drawn from a sample of empirical analyses on these regions. Qualitative analyses highlight the significance of economic, political, social, and cultural factors that act as drivers for contentious issues at the domestic level. It is at this level where social values and priorities have differentiated Al-Qaeda’s transnational movement ideology because of its reliance on religion and cultural framing.
Chapter 3

Causes for Islamist terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa

Countries that are part of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) include: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. The two regions are characterised by resource rich economies in the Gulf States as well as poor economies in countries such as Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen. The region features different types of political systems.

Causes of terrorism in some of these countries have been linked to state-based issues of governance: lack of political and civil rights, unemployment, low wages, social inequality, and inadequate provision of health care services. These social needs that are fundamental for human survival are largely considered to be driven by political, economic, social issues, and not religion or culture.

Analysis by Krueger & Malečková (2003, pp. 125-128) of opinion poll data collected by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah in December 2001 on Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza strip revealed that: 90% supported armed attacks against Israeli soldiers, while smaller majorities (60%) supported attacking civilians. The data revealed political issues related to sovereign territorial rights were the likely causes for terrorist attacks. Attackers were likely to have secondary to higher education. The poll involved 1,357 Palestinians aged 18 years or older. Krueger & Malečková (2003) note how the importance of the political variable was
also highlighted by Berrebi (2003) and Hassan N (2001) in their analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hassan’s interviews conducted during the period 1996-1999 involved 250 militants belonging to Hamas and Islamic jihad. Participants included suicide volunteers, families of bombers killed in the political campaign, and those responsible for training young men for suicide missions. None of the suicide volunteers was found to be economically desperate, simple minded or depressed. Many were largely from working middle class backgrounds, with secondary or higher education level. These analyses linked political factors to emergence of terrorism, highlighting issues of political repression, indignity, and frustration (Krueger & Malečková 2003, pp. 139-142).

To support their political view, Krueger & Malečková (2003) also drew attention to Piazza (2003) whose study examined the incidence of terrorism based on country of origin and where terrorist events occurred. Piazza found that terrorism had little connection with economic factors (Krueger & Laitin 2008, p. 149). Piazza found Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and literacy were positive predictors for suicide terrorism. More educated and affluent people were often selected as leaders of terrorist groups that could carry out suicide missions because of their likely competence and reliability (p. 73). Ahmed Ramzi Yousef the bomber of the World Trade Centre on February 1993 had a degree in engineering. Osama bin Laden preferred individuals with expertise in engineering, medicine, physics, communications, and computer programming to plan operations. These skills have been sought by domestic terrorist organisations (Hudson 1999, p. 4).

Similarly, studies undertaken by Krueger & Malečková (2003, pp. 139-142) on the Israeli Jewish underground who engaged in terrorist activities against Palestinians during the 1970s and 1980s found they were educated professionals with well-paying jobs. Terrorists were most likely to
originate from poorer countries that lacked civil political liberties. In terms of recruitment, the tendency has been for terrorist leaders to prefer educated professionals in the middle and upper classes because of their suitability to successfully carry out assigned tasks with less risk of detection or capture. Skilled individuals can fit and adapt successfully to a foreign environment.

Abadie (2006) examined the link between effects of terrorist risk on insurance from domestic and international levels. Evidence indicated that a country’s income per capita was unrelated to terrorism risk, but issues of political and civil rights measured in terms of Freedom House political rights designations of ‘free’ or ‘not free’, had a causal relationship. Countries with high levels of political rights or authoritarian rule had the lowest terrorism risk. While economic factors failed to wholly explain emergence of terrorism, feelings of relative deprivation were likely to inspire poor people to join terrorism even though terrorist leaders preferred educated ones. Relative deprivation was regarded as one of the main drivers for joining terrorism (Krueger & Laitin 2008, pp. 148-149).

These analysts found a weak and indirect link between economic conditions (poverty, unemployment, less education) with terrorism. The main cause for terrorism was political, fuelled by perceptions of indignity and frustration. They suggested that some suicide terrorists were not motivated by economic gain, but by passionate ideological support for their movement. For example, poverty levels of members of Hezbollah’s militant wing were found to be lower relative to the general population. Many resided in the south of Lebanon and Beirut where living conditions were comparatively better. Militants were most likely to have completed high school education (Krueger & Malečková 2003, pp. 119-122, 131-132). The analyses suggest strategies that aim to
increase education or to reduce poverty levels will each provide partial solutions. They highlight a non-linear relationship with economic development (Krueger & Malečková 2003).

Other analysts (Berman & Laitin 2008; Lofmark 2008; Freytag et al. 2010) have emphasised the important role that issues such as poverty and unemployment can play in a poorly performing economy in affecting cost-benefit calculations for engaging in terrorism. Violence is likely to result if a certain threshold in expectations is surpassed. Lofmark (2008) found terrorism correlated with transnational processes in countries with inadequate macro-economic and legal opportunities. Authoritarian countries transitioning to weak levels of governance were likely to experience difficulty unless they implemented appropriate processes (p. 27). The need for caution was however, highlighted as transitioning requiring a greater degree of change could create new problems for the incumbent regime. Freytag et al. (2010) highlighted how educated people tend to be much more aware of unfavourable socio-economic conditions in their environments and can articulate issues politically. Status and reputational issues can feed into feelings of humiliation and further resentment.

Thus, groups with different ideological persuasions including Al-Qaeda’s have drawn most of their recruits from the disaffected youth, urban poor, unemployed, and under-employed middle classes (Kitschelt 2004; Kilcullen 2005, p. 603). Dynamics of change in the two regions have been driven by socio-economic, political, and cultural factors. Need fulfilment (political rights, civil liberties, legal rights, employment, economic development) has been compounded by spill-over effects from interstate conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, creating displacement effects that led to general dissatisfaction and a state of disillusionment with the status quo (Campos & Gessebner 2009, p. 1).
Waves of unpopular protests and revolutions termed the ‘Arab Spring’ that spread from Tunisia to other countries in North Africa and the Middle East in 2010 were fuelled by frustration and desperation. They demonstrated how a threshold for dissent had been reached as governments were viewed as a threat to their own countries future (Goldstone 2011). Effects of activism spread across countries via insurgency and terrorism (Kilcullen 2009, pp. 16-17). While resurgent causes may have differed to a certain extent, common catalysts included perceived failure of the secular model to produce prosperity and leaders’ lack of a mandate to govern. Some leaders were deemed authoritarian, ‘un-Islamic’, or non-elected. Contentious issues were political, economic, and moral (Esposito 1994). They spread contagiously as problems were also magnified by historical legacies and demographic issues (Miller B 2005, pp. 17, 33; Buzan & Waever 2003, p. 40).

Weak governing capacities of some governments may have been compounded by poor conflict management practices which contributed to lowering costs for radical and terrorist development. Shared cultural and religious traditions also broadened the conflict context allowing various political activists to articulate similar views and grievances (Rabasa et al. 2004, pp. 32-33). The complex nature of radicalism and terrorism in MENA was reiterated by some foreign leaders. Former US President George Bush emphasised how “poverty does not transform poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, corruption and repression were a toxic combination in weak governments”1; (Krueger & Laitin 2008, p. 171).

Disillusionment, explained in terms of Gurr’s (1968a) theory of relative deprivation refers to ‘actors’ perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations and the environment’s value

---

capabilities’. Expectations relate to goods and services to which people believe they are justifiably entitled, while value capabilities are reflected in conditions that determine people’s perceived changes in the achievement of values they legitimately expect to attain (pp. 252-253).

Gurr’s (1968a, p. 258) relative deprivation theory can explain a frustrating situation when actors perceived they have experienced barriers in attaining expected values. According to this concept, the greater the frustration experienced by the individual or community, the greater the anger and resentment in goal seeking behaviour. Extending this concept to ideology, community frustration and aggression can result in civil disobedience and political violence. At this higher level of discontent, social conditions may have become unbearable. To varying degrees discontent gets directed towards rejection of the political system’s legitimacy in part or totally unless an appropriate mediating variable intervenes to reduce imbalance in the system of relationships between the existing government and citizens.

On the state of political rights and civil liberties in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), political ratings of the Freedom House Report (2014) designated one country as ‘free’ (Israel), five countries as ‘partly free’ (Tunisia, Lebanon, Morocco, Libya, Kuwait), and 12 countries as ‘not free’ (Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, Qatar, Oman, Yemen, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Syria). Category designation of ‘free’ suggests the country allows open political competition, respect for civil liberties, significant civic independence, and independent media. Freedom House uses a rating scale that evaluates countries from one to seven for political rights and civil liberties. A numerical rating of one indicates countries that are considered to be ‘mostly free’, and seven ‘least free’. Designation of ‘partly free’ suggests the country has limited respect for political rights
and civil liberties, frequently suffers from corruption, is weak in enforcing the rule of law, and experiences ethnic and religious strife. The country may also have a single party that is dominant, despite having some pluralism. Designation of ‘not free’ suggests absence of political rights and systematic denial of basic civil liberties (Freedom House Report 2014). Tunisia’s rating improved in 2015 after holding democratic elections under a new constitution. Together with Israel, they were the only ‘free’ countries in 2015 (Freedom House Report 2015, p.10). Freedom House regularly surveyed the state of civil liberties, political rights, economic freedom, and religious freedom.

On economic causes, the level of youth unemployment in the Middle East, and North Africa was considered to be one of the highest in the developing world (A.3, Table 3). The total unemployment rate for all age groups exceeded 10% in 2012 according to the International Labour organisation. One in four of economically active young population in the Middle East was considered to be actively seeking gainful employment. Youth unemployment in the region in the same period stood at 28.3% and this rate was projected to increase to 30% by 2018. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories unemployment rate was 38.8% in 2010 and 29.9% in 2011. Saudi Arabia had 28.3%, and the Islamic Republic of Iran recorded 23% in 2008 (International Labour Organisation 2013, p. 19).

In North Africa, the unemployment rate for people with tertiary education in 2010 was 21.4% in Algeria, 18.9% in Egypt, and 17.4% in Morocco. In 2012 the unemployment rate in the region was 23.7%. Young males accounted for 18.3% while young women accounted for 37.0%. The persistent high level of unemployment in the region largely affected the youth cohort (15-24 year olds), that had to depend on the informal employment sector. Compounded by demographic
pressures these economic challenges contributed to the deteriorating political environment where the youth cohort also played a critical role in the social uprisings that affected the two regions in 2010.

The 2010 uprisings labelled as the “Arab Spring” or a “reawakening” that began in Tunisia and spread to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, and other countries in the region were linked to perceived failures by many governments to satisfactorily provide basic human needs (food, water, health, shelter), and other fulfilment needs such as education, employment, physical safety, and access to open government. There is a hierarchical ordering of these human needs (physiological, safety, social esteem, self-actualisation) according to Maslow’s theory of human motivation. Deficiencies in lower level needs (i.e. physiological, safety) should ideally be addressed first (Maslow 2005, pp. 167-177). The focus has been on addressing issues concerning basic necessities of life within countries rather than pursuing global agendas promoted by Al-Qaeda’s transnational terrorists.

Many countries in the region have struggled to cope with problems of slow economic growth, high inflation, high unemployment, and labour migration. While some may have fared slightly better than others because of oil revenues and some economic diversification, commonality existed in terms of weak government capacity to satisfactorily provide public goods. Instability from inter-state conflicts compounded negative effects of some of these issues (Kitschelt 2004). Protests and riots from 2010 onwards were directed towards political, social, and economic reform (Nabli 2004, pp. 1, 23). Issues have largely been about structural reform and regime change (Neugart 2005), not religious reform.
Findings of the 2010 Arab Youth Survey by the Dubai public relations agency ASDA-A Burson-Marsteller, revealed how youth movements expected to have a greater say on issues affecting their future. An enduring desire for democracy, concerns of political stability, and socio-economic improvements ranked high on their agenda (Bohler-Muller & Van der Merwe 2011, pp. 1-9). While forms for democratic government would not necessarily mirror those of Western countries, younger generations preferred a socio-political order that was inclusive, promoted individual creativity, and reflected globalising realities. These types of activist groups and ordinary citizens were likely to become the main agents of future change. They were also likely to become new recruits for political mobilisation if they got disenchanted with the existing socio-political order.

Gurr’s (1968a) theory of relative deprivation highlighted how collective dissent that is directed towards government inefficiency and ineffectiveness can shift political dynamics in the relationship to cause a social crisis. This has been the reality in societies experiencing the ‘full swing’ of sociopolitical change (pp. 252-258). In the Middle East economic, social, political, cultural, and religious aspects reached a tipping point as each was considered uniquely important because social goals intertwined (Richards 2002, pp. 22-23).

Islamist activism has largely focused on local issues although some causes may have had regional or global links. Goals of most opposition groups in the two regions largely focused on issues of social justice, economic opportunity, and greater political openness. In many ways their discourse resembled that of 19th century activists who were also advocating for economic and political reforms, and cultural adaptation to modern realities and norms (Abu-Rabi 1996, pp. 6-8). Contemporary conflict patterns also resembled those experienced in the region during the 1950s-
1970s, where targets for opposition included political figures and foreigners. Religious activism has often worked in parallel with economic and political concerns (Bronson 1996, pp. 208, 222).

Political paths in MENA in 2011 involved violent rebellion in some countries (e.g. Libya, Egypt, and Syria), in others (e.g. Tunisia) they were largely non-violent. The majority of opposition groups preferred political dialogue than rebellion (Ryan 2011; Bouazza & Ganley 2011; Campos & Gessebner 2009, p. 1; Koch 2004; Esposito 1994). Rich countries fared relatively better than poor ones in resolving contentious issues (Mudd 2011, pp. 7-9). Some responded to social pressures coercively, others through co-optation. Still, others have adopted a mix of these strategies. Those that allowed some form of democratic participation (e.g. Jordan) managed to reduce the appeal for radicalism. However, most states continued to face reform issues at the time of declining financial revenues that began as early as the 1980s, which forced some to scale back investment on development programs. Domestic and international pressures were mounting despite incremental improvements in the economy (Bronson 1996, pp. 222-225).

Political and socio-economic causes suggest radicals (including religious ones) may be inclined to engage in oppositional activism when a government’s provision of public goods is deemed to be inadequate or poor by social standards (Berman & Laitin 2008, pp. 1962-1963). This type of environment will affect cost-benefit calculations for potential radicalism and emergence of terrorist opposition as it lowers opportunity costs for violent action (Freytag et al. 2010, pp. 1-3, 17-19). Where the population thinks its strategies have failed some groups can resort to terrorism including suicide terrorism. Religious, material, cultural and social motivations can be used to justify engagement in suicide terrorism. Some individuals may be inclined to make this type of sacrifice for
the greater good of their societies (Bloom 2006, pp. 35-36). Lofmark (2008, p. 37) found terrorism correlated with transitional processes in countries with inadequate macro socio-economic and legal opportunities. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) with weak political systems were at risk of terrorism unless they addressed identified grievances.

**Solutions to extremism in MENA**

Solutions to extremism and terrorism in the region emphasised addressing domestic level conditions. At the political level, opening political opportunities was likely to improve political representation and address perceptions of regime repression as countries undergo transition (Krueger & Laitin 2008; Abadie 2006; Krueger & Malečková 2003; Freytag et al. 2010). The pace of change in the political system was important as some countries experienced transition challenges. Some countries with limited political reforms such as Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, and Kuwait were faced with organised groups that advocated quality improvements in existing regimes (Brynen et al. 2013, p. 5). The status quo would continue to be challenged.

Socio-economic insecurity that generally affected developing countries (Gurr 1970; Blomberg et al. 2004; Harrison 2006) could be addressed by increasing job opportunities, improving public spending on local services, and providing outside market options. Interventions that targeted local groups and communities where terrorist recruitment was likely were useful as they had potential to undermine the value of terrorism. Socio-economic incentives could induce some individuals to pursue change through non-violent means and to engage in productive activities (Berman & Laitin 2008, pp. 1962-1964).
The importance of implementing domestic reforms was highlighted by Muslim experts and academics. In a workshop on *Regional voices and transnational challenges* held at the Institute of Policy Studies in Pakistan’s city of Islamabad in July 2008, Muslim academics from Egypt, the Philippines, Afghanistan, southern Thailand, and Pakistan affirmed that the pursuit for justice was linked to political rather than religious objectives. The workshop that drew attention to regional trends also highlighted how the majority of political activists in the two regions were pluralists who preferred changing existing political systems from within, even though some groups used exclusivist or conservative platforms. It was a small minority that has sought removal of incumbent governments and rulers, and changing the social order entirely (Pandya & Laipson 2009, pp. 73-105).

Lizardo (2008) suggested that terrorism was a phenomenon that was often ‘reluctant to internationalise’. When it emerged in ‘weak’ and ‘quasi’ states, militants often adopted a violent mode of interaction with state entities and could cross national borders. At certain times host countries considered ‘foreign occupiers’ or supporters of detested home countries become targets of their terrorist activities as well (Krueger & Laitin 2008, pp. 112, 161). The disproportionate influence of Al-Qaeda terrorists resulted from its capitalisation on prevailing conditions at home and abroad, and catalytic events (Rabasa et al. 2004, p. 36).

In terms of social activism, religion has served different purposes. Some terrorist groups have used it to redefine their understanding of Shari’a, some to define socio-political goals and challenge expansive approaches (Mazen 2006, p. 23), others have used it for identity purposes. Religion played temporal and inspirational role in political campaigns. Interpretations of Shari’a varied as
indicated by traditionalist, modernist, and secularist approaches to socio-political change (Rabasa et al. 2004, pp. 21-24). Lack of a central authoritative religious structure for Sunni Muslims allowed a variety of recognised leaders to engage in theological debate (Burek & Norton 2001). This has included Al-Qaeda’s leaders.

Differences in political environments highlighted systemic challenges for globally-oriented Al-Qaeda groups whose goals largely focused on supranational issues of Islamic identity and cultural humiliation from a perspective of continuing imperialistic domination. These threats were framed existentially as an attack on Muslim culture and tradition (Denoeux & Carter 2009, Executive summary, p. iii). The approach caused local constituents to distance themselves from the movement as it glossed over important socio-political issues.

It is at this supranational level where Al-Qaeda ideology was differentiated from political campaigns of other radical or terrorist groups whose focus was local. Thus, the movement’s challenges needed to be viewed from the perspective of mainstream groups seeking to change political systems from within their countries (Esposito 1994). Most domestic groups focused inward while Al-Qaeda largely adopted an outward transnational orientation. Domestic groups with ideological links to Al-Qaeda were few as the political cost of ideological allegiance was likely to result in loss of domestic constituent support. Mass casualty terrorism relied on by Al-Qaeda groups was a practice that most groups ‘very rarely’ used as the costs in human and image terms could hurt their constituencies (Asal & Blum 2005).
The cross-national analysis by Piazza (2008) of 4,660 incidents of suicide and non-suicide terrorism from 1998-2005 drawn from the Rand-MIPT Terrorism Incident database highlighted how political and organisational factors were responsible for the incidence of suicide terrorism. Aspects that included group typology, religious diversity, and foreign occupation were considered likely predictors of suicide terrorism (Abstract, p.28). The ‘target side’ (regime type of target country e.g. democracy, authoritarian) and the ‘supply side’ (terrorism, suicide terrorism) needed to be considered in understanding different forms of terrorist violence and desire to employ suicide tactics (p.30). According to Piazza (2008, pp. 37-38), many groups ‘rarely’ used suicide tactics. Groups that were likely to use suicide terrorism tended to pursue ‘universal’ or ‘abstract’ political objectives, compared to the majority that advocated for national liberation or self-determination. It was more common for suicide attackers to hail from non-democratic countries. The solution to suicide terrorism was to include democracy promotion in the package of counter-terrorism measures, particularly for terrorists who were motivated by secular or political grievances than purely religion.

Piazza’s (2009) empirical study of Al-Qaeda’s behaviour during the Iraq conflict from 2003 to 2006 found its goals were overly ambitious, and driven primarily by extremist ideology. Groups linked to the movement appeared to have a distant and symbolic relationship with constituents as they lacked a domestic focus. The recommendation was for terrorism analysts, strategists, and policymakers to use group typology as a basic tool as it had potential for distinguishing different groups in how they ordered their values and ideological preferences during political campaigns. This approach made it easier to understand and deal with their concerns, as it facilitated engagement with pragmatic groups whose strategic objectives were domestic, whether they were secular, left or
right-wing, or nationalist liberationist. Al-Qaeda movement goals remained unlimited, universal, and abstract. Its higher propensity for violent confrontation compared to indigenous groups placed it in a disadvantageous position (pp. 65, 77).

Al-Qaeda movement actions in the two regions were claimed to be by products of Muslim humiliation and injustice from authoritarian regimes and their foreign Western supporters. It used historical narrative and contemporary events to rally young generations to join terrorist networks and engage in jihad (Amirahmadi 2015). Similar to the political arena, contradictions in theological narrative that advocated absolute beliefs and unconstrained violence on behalf of religion were exploited by competitors, critics and counter-terrorism strategists to limit its ideological expansion.

The following chapter uses selected cases of Muslim radicalisation from Australia, Denmark, and the United Kingdom (UK) to highlight how causes of radicalisation can lead to terrorism. Countering the threat of terrorism has required tailoring response strategies to particular groups and addressing radical views and activities that can lead to terrorism.
Chapter 4

Causes for Muslim Radicalisation and Terrorism in the Diaspora

Countries in Western Europe (Great Britain, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Italy) have experienced right wing, left wing, and nationalist forms of terrorism. The recent threat of home grown Islamist radicalism and terrorism linked to Al-Qaeda movement groups added a new dimension to the list of contemporary experiences (Schmid 2008, pp. 9, 15). Externally, the threat to Europe from Al-Qaeda’s extremists and affiliate terrorist groups has been linked to developments in the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia, where some countries had a history of political instability and civil war. While countries such as Australia had smaller Muslim populations compared to Europe, community concerns about extremism required understanding political and social implications of Al-Qaeda’s religiously driven terrorism given its transnational connections. The sense of religious identity in community concerns has required drawing inferences from its various causes, and to try to prevent its threat from its formative stages during radicalisation.

In defining radicalisation, the Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department has considered it as a stage ‘when a person’s beliefs shift from being relatively conventional to radical, to the extent of seeking a drastic change in society’. The process may or may not lead to violence. When it does, an individual will be driven to varying degrees to achieve a particular cause based on a preferred view of the social world. This situation can occur regardless of what the majority in society normatively thinks or believes to be the social reality (Commonwealth of Australia, Attorney-General’s Department 2015, pp. 4-6).
In exploring radicalisation, Denmark and the United Kingdom have been selected for case study because of the growing threat posed by Islamist terrorism in the European Union context, and commitment from member states to deal with its emerging risks. The United States and Australia were included to compare perspectives on radicalisation and counter-radicalisation interventions. The case studies provide an overview of vulnerabilities, and policy responses that have aimed to contain the influence of Al-Qaeda’s transnational terrorism including risks posed by the recruitment of Islamists to fight in foreign conflicts including Iraq and Syria (A.10 &11, Tables 10 &11).

Counter-radicalisation models adopted by selected countries highlight key elements that have been reinforced in the four pillars of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Framework that were agreed to on September 2006, which emphasised the need for linkages among member states and holistic and inclusive approaches to counter-terrorism (UN CTITF 2006).

United Nations global counter-terrorism strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar 1</th>
<th>Pillar 2</th>
<th>Pillar 3</th>
<th>Pillar 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism</td>
<td>Preventing and combating terrorism</td>
<td>Building states’ capacity and strengthening the role of the United Nations</td>
<td>Ensuring human rights and the rule of law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Australia

A qualitative study involving telephone interviews of 221 Muslims in Western Australia in 2006 involved 111 males and 110 females. Of these 99 were between 15-29 years of age. Participants drawn from different countries, ethnicities, educational, and professional backgrounds were asked related questions on migration, citizenship, identity, developments within and outside Australia, role
of the media and the wider society including government, and racism. Respondents highlighted concerns of relative exclusion and identity as reasons for radicalisation. While the media was blamed for projecting incompatibility between Islamic and Australian identities, blame was also directed towards some sections of the Muslim community who were perceived to have insular attitudes. Different explanations were provided for inclusion and exclusion which highlighted differences in historical experience and personal disposition. Religious diversity that was expressed ranged from orthodox to progressive interpretations of faith. At the time of the research in 2006, Western Australia had around 24,200 Muslims and was the third largest state in terms of concentration of followers of Islam with 1.2% (Yasmeen 2008, Executive Summary, pp. iv, 9-12, 72). The total Muslim population in 2006 was 340,400 constituting 1.7% of the Australian population (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006).

Table 4. Birthplace of Muslim interviewees

Source: Yasmeen 2008, p.16.
The West Australian study used a perceptual spectrum to highlight opinions. The category of perceived exclusion from the wider Australian community ranged from relative to absolute exclusion, while responses on religious identity ranged from orthodox, to practicing (moderate/liberal understanding), and non-practicing Muslims (quiet observance, secular, or exited Islam) (Yasmeen 2008, p. 30).

A sample of 108 non-Muslim respondents was used to evaluate opinions of the Muslim profile. With respect to non-Muslims, not all expressed exclusionary attitudes about Muslims although there were indications that some individuals had low knowledge about Islam, and reported stereotypical images that linked oppression to wearing hijab and violence to the religion. The emphasis was for both groups to engage in further interaction and cooperation (Yasmeen 2008, pp. 56-57).

Table 5. Birthplace of non-Muslim interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>No. of Respondents by %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A similar study that was conducted in Southwest Sydney as part of a government initiative to prevent radical extremism in Australia also highlighted similar issues of vulnerability at individual, group, and societal levels. Reasons for radicalisation were linked to search for identity and belonging, feelings of alienation, discrimination, and social disadvantage. This pilot study used seven focus groups, 160 youth participants, and over 50 phone interviews that were conducted with Muslim youth leaders, parents, Imams and community leaders. The youth, both males and females were aged from 15 to 26 years. The broad representation from the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia included youth from migrant backgrounds and some converts to Islam. The study covered issues of vulnerability to extremist ideology and origins of theological frameworks, and developed a model for recruiting vulnerable youth (Kara-Ali 2010, pp. 20-26).

On vulnerability, the study found young people consistently reported concerns of victimisation, low self-esteem, discrimination and frustration in their formative stages of identity and spiritual development. Some rated religion as a primary marker of their identity. Other causes included perceived injustices of government policies, public debate that sometimes marginalised Muslims in the media, a sense of disenfranchisement and alienation that was linked to an inter-generational divide, and the community leadership crisis in the Muslim community itself that was failing to properly represent views of the majority in public debate. Some community leaders were described as lacking awareness and not proactive in addressing disillusionment of Muslim youth. The perception was that the youth lacked a ‘voice’ and a stake in political and civic affairs. They preferred more ‘representative’ and ‘effective’ community leadership. By implication community role models were needed to guide at-risk youth from radicalising influences (Kara-Ali 2010, pp. 25-26).
On the radicalisation process, the Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation (BIRR) model of Muslim youth living in Southwest Sydney had three observed phases.

(i). Phase 1: indoctrination (covert). This phase begins from the perspective of the socially and politically vulnerable individual who, due to dissatisfaction, associates with an extremist group over the internet (virtually) or with peers. The individual becomes susceptible to extremist ideologues quoted by Al-Qaeda promoters using influential scholarly writings (e.g. Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn `Abd Al-Wahhab, Sayyid Qutb). There is yet no clear emphasis on violent extremism at this stage. Books, websites and talks act as propaganda and recruitment tools. The individual is highly vulnerable at this formative stage of radicalisation, and the pool of at-risk youth could be persuaded either way.

(ii). Phase 2: activation. This phase involves actualisation of doctrine after its principles have been accepted. Youth at risk are further radicalised by preachers who act as mentors but hardly have public profile or religious expertise. Intensive one-on-one interaction occurs in person or through other social media.

(iii). Phase 3: violent extremism. Activities in this phase require demonstrating extremism through violence. Actions can be triggered by outsiders entering local communities to recruit individuals, or to support local figures because of their combat experience in overseas conflicts. Al-Qaeda’s theology is sanctioned and actualised by fully radicalised individuals. Operatives carry out violent acts as lone individuals or groups.
The BIRR model clarifies developmental levels of individual exposure, commitment and capacity, with progression moving from passive to active membership. In phases two and three perceived credibility of the preacher, mentor, or radicalising agent is critical in influencing individual action (Kara-Ali 2010, pp. 51, 55-56).

The radicalisation model developed by Kebbell & Porter (2009)\(^2\) in their study of twelve convicted Australian terrorists has four behavioural change phases: pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadisation. The authors found personal and group identity factors were strong themes among home grown terrorists. Lack of positive identity in Australia created feelings of isolation and frustration that led some individuals to seek new identity in the Internet or with religious sources. Individuals sought to bond with those they could identify with if they were likely to offer a sense of positive identity or purpose to them. The civic community had a role to play in promoting the feeling of being Muslim and Australian. This could be achieved by improving working partnerships between Australian agencies and communities to develop networked resources.

Woodlock & Russell (2008, pp. 69-80) also carried out a study in 2007 and 2008 to gauge Muslim responses on extremism. Of the 520 responses from surveys that were sent to 600 Muslims living in Sydney, Melbourne, and regional Victoria, an overwhelming majority rejected extremism. A sizeable number argued extremism to be un-Islamic, and there were differences in how individuals approached religion and politics. Education was recommended as a ‘good’ and necessary tool in reshaping radical views and approaches to modern social realities. Some root causes of extremism

\(^2\) The twelve convicted terrorists in Kebbell and Porter’s study were: Jack Roche, Faheem Lodhi, Belal Khazaal, Abdul Nacer Benbrika and Benbrika’s followers: Aimen Joud, Abdullah Merhi, Ahmed Raad, Fadal Sayadi, Amer Haddara, Ezzit Raad, Izzydeen Atik, and Shane Kent.
(social exclusion, political problems, and some foreign policy decisions of Western governments) were believed to be feeding into dynamics of alienation and frustration that some young Muslims were experiencing.

The share of Australian Muslim population has grown since 1921 when the total number of Muslims living in Australia was less than 3,000. This number increased due to migration effects of the first and second world wars; conflicts in North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia; and changed immigration policies that encouraged migrant settlement to Australia. Based on the national population census Australia had 146,600 Muslims in 1991; 281,586 (1.5%) in 2001; and 340,392 (1.7%) in 2006 (Yasmeen 2008, p.5). In the 2011 national census there were 476,290 Muslims in Australia, constituting 2.2% of the total population. Muslims were the third largest community after Christians (61%) and Buddhists (2.5%). Followers of Hinduism accounted for 1.3%, Judaism 0.5%, while non-identifying categories accounted for the remainder. In 2011, the proportion of Australian Muslims born overseas was 61.5% (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012).

In terms of trends between the two national census 2006 and 2011, Hinduism was the fastest growing religion in Australia as it increased by 86%, followed by Islam 39.9%, Buddhism 26.3%, Judaism 9.6% (Hassan R 2015, p. 18). The number of people who reported ‘no religion’ also increased from 15% of the population in 2001 to 22% in 2011. Christianity accounted for 3.7%. While Christianity predominated, its affiliation decreased from 96% in 1911, 68% in 2001, to 61% in 2011 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012).
The arrival of migrants from the Middle East conflicts in Syria and Iraq was likely to have increased the Muslim proportion. In terms of geographic distribution 78% lived in New South Wales and Victoria in 2011. Three quarters lived in Sydney and Melbourne, although numbers were also increasing in other urban cities and centres. Two thirds were of North African or Middle Eastern origin while a quarter originated from South and Central Asia. Most Australian Muslims tended to be younger than the general population, implying they were also in the economically productive segment of the labour force which was also likely to report discriminatory practices in employment and the justice system despite having high levels of educational attainment. Inequality was one of the factors that contributed to perceptions of Muslim marginalisation from mainstream Australian society (Hassan R 2015, pp.14-22).

In the context of terrorism, countries such as Australia with small Muslim populations also faced increasing risk of radical development as personal factors such as search for meaning in life could lead some individuals to empathise with co-religionists in countries where Islam was considered to be under threat. An overview of the literature on radicalisation in Western Europe also found identity and socio-economic issues were main precipitants in the process that led to extremism and terrorism.

Similarly, the impact of hate groups on Muslims can cause young people to gravitate towards radicalisation influences and to engage in terrorism as it can reinforce existing perceptions of marginalisation from mainstream society. The post-September 2001 terrorism environment caused the issue of online hate speech targeting Muslims to become one of the key concerns for Australian Muslim community leaders and security agencies (Awan 2016). Categories of anti-Muslim hate in
Australia that were highlighted by the report of the International Human Rights Day Online Prevention Institute included: presenting Muslims as terrorists and a threat to public safety; promoting threats and violence against Muslims; dehumanising and demonising Muslims by claiming they were a "threat to our way of life"; depicting Muslims as manipulative and dishonest; promoting xenophobia including making references on refugees; preventing Halal certification of food, or the building of new mosques; and trying to undermine community efforts intended to foster harmony and prevent societal hate against Muslims (Oboler 2015).

Denmark

A research study funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice Intelligence Services (PET 2007) on home grown Islamist terrorists groups in the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, and Denmark found three categories of motivational factors were influential in their radicalisation: individual background, triggers, and opportunity factors (Precht 2007, p. 6).

Personal background factors related to experiencing identity crisis, personal trauma, disadvantage, problems in the living environment (family, peers, neighbourhood); feelings of relative deprivation, alienation, and perceived injustice. These factors contributed to a search for new identity whereby individuals turned to religion and sometimes radicalism. Trigger factors related to some aspects of Western foreign policy, single provocative incidents that prompted desire for action, and presence of a charismatic spiritual advisor. Opportunity factors related to locations where individuals could meet sympathetic people in places of worship, Internet, television broadcasts, educational institutions, youth clubs, work, sporting events, cafes, bars, or bookstores (Precht 2007, pp. 6, 13, 42).
The Danish model of radicalisation started with conversion due to frustration with life, society, or government policies (domestic or foreign). Interactive influences through the Internet or face to face with like-minded others facilitated progression to terrorism. Of those who became radicalised, only a few became terrorists. Some radicals could drop out or return to violence at a later time depending on circumstances. The study identified four phases of radicalisation, with some overlap. Each had its associated characteristics, catalysts and dynamics that played a critical facilitating role in progression towards terrorism (Precht 2007, Summary, p. 5).

(i). Phase 1: pre-radicalisation, no observable specific indicators or signs.

(ii). Phase 2: conversion and identification with Islam. Indicators include changed appearance and gradual rejection of Western lifestyle.

(iii). Phase 3: ideological indoctrination and in-group bonding.

(iv). Phase 4: planning and committing terrorist acts.

Group and organizational psychological processes are dominant in the model. No timeline applied as individuals could enter and re-enter the process at any phase. Conversion could occur within a few months or years with some progressing to commit terrorist acts. Situational or catalytic events and small group dynamics became significant accelerators in phases two and three (Precht 2007, p. 33, 71).

To counter terrorist radicalisation the model recommended implementing preventive-based measures that used a mix of non-military and hard security measures. Policing needed to support community oriented initiatives. It suggested tracking and monitoring changes in characteristic
behavioural patterns of young people (especially males) so that issues could be addressed at the earliest phase of vulnerability, when individuals began seeking inspiration from radical sources. The most effective preventive measure was to block entry into the second phase of the radicalisation process where socialisation into radical influences could occur (Precht 2007, pp. 10, 71).

Issues highlighted by the Danish study were similar to Australian cases. The emphasis was placed on addressing grievances through counter-ideology, public diplomacy, policing, education, and community development. Dialogue with community leaders as stakeholders could promote individuals’ sense of equality, and alternative ways of expressing dissent. A balance between adequate policing and community sensibilities needed to be maintained. Public campaigns should aim at reducing misunderstanding and hostility among communities. Emphasis is placed on countering extremist narrative through education and community involvement where religious leaders could play an influential role by capitalising on the growing Muslim public opinion against Al-Qaeda’s violence (Precht 2007, pp. 72-74, 77).

The United Kingdom

In their empirical examination of radicalisation processes of 117 home grown ‘jihadist’ terrorists in the United States and the United Kingdom, Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman (2009, pp. 7-13) concluded that some indicators of radicalisation could be partially observable:

(i). Believers adopted legalistic approach to religion and interpreted their rights and obligations in relation to Islam’s holy texts using a rules-based approach. This kind of faith applied to everyday lives.
Believers tended to trust only selected religious authorities and their ideological interpretations. Low tolerance for perceived theological deviance was often expressed verbally by chastising other Muslims. Attempts were made by individuals to impose religious beliefs on others.

Highlighting the existence of a schism between Islam and the West, and ignoring any possibility for co-existence between Islam and other religions.

Adopting a conspiratorial frame of reference to explain the loss of Muslim faith and causes of social problems in the Islamic world including corrupting influences on Western powers, and promoting a belief that the only option left to correct injustices was to engage in violent action.

Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman (2009) analysis that was based on court cases and open-source information highlighted the important role of religious ideology. Over 40% of terrorists reported religion as a reason for joining violent jihad. Some linked it to political concerns. The influential role of the spiritual sanctioner was highlighted in the process, including having international connections to travel overseas for religious training. The study found prisons played a relatively less important role in radicalisation. Countering radicalisation required community engagement (pp. 14-15).

The United States

The New York Police Department study undertaken by Silber & Bhatt (2007) focused on five different cases of home grown terrorism: the Madrid’s March 2004 bombers; Amsterdam’s Hofstad Group; London’s July 2005 bombers; Australian suspects arrested as part of Operation Pendennis in late 2005 in Melbourne and Sydney; and 18 suspects arrested in Toronto, Canada in June 2006. Reviews and discussions on the specifics of each case by police, security analysts, and academics found Jihadi-Salafi ideology to be an inspirational driver for causing young men and women to
radicalise and become terrorists. The addition of the 11 September 2001 home grown terrorist cases in the USA (Lackawana; New York; Portland; Oregon, Northern Virginia) that the team used to test developmental frameworks for radicalisation revealed similar results. This included the added Hamburg cluster led by the 9/11 hijackers (Silber & Bhatt 2007, pp. 6, 15).

The Madrid case in Spain involved coordinated bombings against the Cercanias (commuter train) system that took place on 11 March 2004 that killed 191 people and wounded 2,050. In the Netherlands, Mohammad Bouyeri, a member of the Hofstad Group murdered film maker Theo Van Gogh in November 2004 in Amsterdam. The group had also plotted to attack various strategic targets including the Dutch Parliament. Coordinated terrorist bombings on London’s public transport system on July 7, 2005 killed 52 commuters and injured 700 civilians. Four suicide bombers were among those injured (Silber & Bhatt 2007, pp. 23 - 26).

In Australia, police raids on properties in Melbourne and Sydney on 9 November 2005 resulted in 17 arrests. In the operation codenamed Pendennis, police uncovered and seized bomb making materials and maps of Casselden Place, and Melbourne headquarters of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Immigration. Melbourne suspects had photographs of the Australian Stock Exchange and Flinders Street railway Station. Sydney suspects had carried out surveillance on the Lucas Heights nuclear power plant, and may have also targeted the Sydney Opera House and Sydney Harbor Bridge (Silber & Bhatt 2007, pp. 26-27).

The Toronto 18 Plot on 2-3 June 2006 was uncovered through a series of counter-terrorism raids in the Greater Toronto area by Canadian police and security agencies resulting in 17 arrests. A large-
scale terrorist attack that was planned would have involved detonating truck bombs in at least two locations in Toronto. This included a plot to murder Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and to attack strategic buildings such as the Broadcasting Centre, the Parliament, the Secret Intelligence Headquarters, and the CN Tower (Silber & Bhatt 2007, p. 27). The nature of these attacks highlighted the importance of coordination among agencies.

The New York police study on radicalisation aimed to develop a useful conceptual framework for understanding this type of western-style home grown extremism and terrorism that the team defined as “involving local citizens who gradually adopted an extremist religious-political ideology that was hostile to the West and which legitimised terrorism as a tool to affect social change”. The study found that not all radical individuals ended up as terrorists. Different pathways and catalysts were involved. For a variety of reasons it was possible for some individuals to opt out of violence and choose alternative courses of action to fulfil their personal or social needs. Some of the main factors that undermined this positive change were social and personal. Timing for individual exposure to legitimate contacts inside or outside an organization was an important factor in facilitation (Silber & Bhatt 2007, pp. 15-16).

The study found radicalisation was a gradual process that involved four distinct phases: pre-radicalisation, self-radicalisation, indoctrination, and Jihadisation. Each phase had unique and specific indicators, and signatures. Not all individuals passed through the four stages, and radicalisation did not occur in a perfectly linear fashion. Many stopped or abandoned the process at different points. Those who completed the four stages were likely to become active planners and terrorists. The timeline for radicalisation was likely to take months or years before a potential
terrorist emerged and acted. The process could begin anonymously in locations where likeminded individuals interacted such as places of worship, schools, prisons, student associations, nongovernmental organizations, or the Internet (Silber & Bhatt 2007, pp. 5, 11).

Phases of radicalisation.

(i). Pre-radicalisation. This phase started before individuals were exposed to Jihadi Salafist ideology. They often led ordinary ‘unremarkable’ lives with little if any criminal history. Most did not begin as radicals or even devout Muslims. Important factors at this stage were: religion, social status, the environment or neighbourhood, and level of education (p. 22).

(ii). Self-identification. Individuals at this stage were influenced by internal and external factors. As they explored Salafist ideology they gradually lost their old identities and assumed new ones. Association with like-minded others and adoption of extremist ideology led to the adoption of new world views. The catalyst at this stage was “religious seeking”. Triggers were found to be economic (job loss, blocked social mobility); social (alienation, discrimination, real or perceived racism); or personal (family crisis), (p. 6). Individuals who were vulnerable at this stage found themselves at a crossroad in life, and sought new identities and direction by validating the paths they had chosen. Some indicators at this stage included gravitation towards extreme religious ideological belief and regular prayer attendance (pp. 30-31).

(iii). Indoctrination. At this stage search for identity intensified and individuals wholly adopted extremist Salafist ideology. As radicalisation deepened individuals developed unquestioning acceptance in supporting militant causes. A “spiritual sanctioner” was likely to reinforce politicised
arguments of jihad and cause individuals to interpret their social worlds from a new lens (pp. 7-8). Some indicators in this phase involved withdrawal from locations of worship and politicisation of new beliefs (p. 36).

(iv). Jihad. At this stage radical clusters appeared and individuals were committed to violence. Members accepted jihad as a duty and designated themselves as ‘holy warriors’. Their roles included planning, preparing and executing attacks. Unlike earlier phases, this phase could occur rapidly. At this critical stage for dedication and commitment “group think” became a catalyst and force multiplier for terrorist action. At this competitive environment members became much more radical and extreme (pp. 7-9). Acceptance of jihadist commitment might require travelling abroad for training and mental reinforcement. This phase had many sub-stages and each was characterised by a unique set of indicators (pp. 43-45). As part of the group, the “spiritual sanctioner” provided justification for jihad while the “operational leader” organised, controlled, and kept the group focused and highly motivated (Silber & Bhatt 2007, p. 83).

**NYPD model of radicalisation**

![Diagram](image)

Radicals in each of these western-based plots shared many commonalities. One main characteristic was their initial behaviour that appeared innocuous. On the surface many appeared well integrated into Western society with no known links to terrorist or militant groups, or criminal organisations (Silber & Bhatt 2007, pp. 84-85). Radicalisation was found to be a function of the environment in which individuals lived, and often involved second or third generation immigrants
who felt economically and socially vulnerable as they were also torn between secular western values and their traditional values or heritage (cultural, religious). They were likely to experience internal conflict and to yearn for traditional roots. In the process of seeking identity, some ended up becoming extremists and terrorists. Use of extremist ideology then became a tool for solving local and global problems through violence (Silber & Bhatt 2007, p. 82).

In summary, the NYPD study found violent radicals were a ‘sub-culture’ and a minority because of their extremist rhetoric. Those in the West were driven by a religious dimension because of jihadist ideology. The mix of influences from political, demographic, and psychological factors combined to affect vulnerability and further radicalisation. It caused individuals to gravitate towards loose-knit groups, networks, and clusters that served their needs. Some were politically naïve and easily drawn to a simple but powerful “one-size fits all” philosophy of Al-Qaeda. This experience appeared to be common among young radicals generally. However, new radical groups were also hybrids. Some were opportunists who were potentially capable of rapid transformation to non-violence. The study recommended addressing jihadist inspiration at the point of pre-radicalisation (pp. 13-22). The challenge for security agencies, law enforcement, and community agencies was to identify, pre-empt, and prevent radical processes before they resulted in terrorist activity (Silber & Bhatt 2007, p. 85).

This form of radical extremism is not limited to Islam. Stern’s interviews with religious terrorists belonging to Christian, Moslem, and Jewish faiths undertaken in various world locations found their grievances were basically similar to those cited by most analysts. Radicalisation was a stage process that began with feelings of alienation and frustration. Individuals’ motives for joining
terrorism included: correcting what some believed was a godless world characterised by chaos and loose rules; feelings of alienation and loneliness, fear and humiliation; preserving wounded masculinity; search for political power, land; or money. Many desired a new social order and had secular demands (Stern 2004, pp. xix - xx).

Benefits sought were partly spiritual, emotional, material, political, or cultural. Some regarded moral obligation to join jihad as a form of payment for gaining authority or heavenly rewards. Some reported fear of retribution, desire for adventure, and psychological pressure to adhere to the violent code. Friendships formed through social networks provided individuals with a sense of belonging. The glamour of being a militant caused some to feel powerful and worthy of recognition for the first time in their lives. There were emotional benefits to be derived from incentives that provided or promised status, glamour, political power, prestige, friendship, money, or attention. Some sought monetary rewards to assist their families while others fought on altruistic motives claiming to be doing a good thing by purifying the social world. For some, motives were more business oriented. A few who sought martyrdom viewed this role as a supreme act that provided an escape from life’s dilemmas. The majority in the interview sample such as Hamas pursued political goals that focused on political power or territory. Muslims in Indonesia sought greater autonomy or independence (Stern 2004, pp. 3-7).

Stern found some motivational factors were unrelated to societal grievances. For example, spiritual longing and fulfilment was a personal pursuit. Individuals joined religious terrorist groups partly to transform and simply life or to fulfil spiritual causes. As the weak became strong and altruistic, their conception of the world got divided into good/evil, victim/oppressor. No room was left for alternative
views. Uncertainty was replaced with confident belief in a just cause, to protect the deprived, abused and the helpless. The path taken was believed to be the right one morally and politically. However, in some cases cynicism was likely to emerge. For some, what may have started as a moral cause turned out to be greed for money, power, or simply attention seeking. Altruism and spiritual contribution to a “good cause” were sufficient incentives, including those that were profit-driven. It was possible for individuals to pursue terrorism with passion and as a career path. Some would join for survival reasons beyond initial grievances their organization set out to address (Stern 2004, pp. 281-282, 292).

**Results from case studies**

These cases of Islamist radicalisation in non-Muslim countries highlighted how the process largely affected young people, and the importance of addressing societal and personal factors that formed part of initial grievances that had economic, social, psychological, political, cultural, or religious drivers (Sageman 2008; Tessler & Nachwey 1998, p. 143; Hutson et al. 2009). The importance different individuals attached to each of these factors depended not only on environmental conditions, but also value systems of particular individuals, and political cultures of their societies in terms of providing opportunities and capability to resolve identified grievances.

Stern’s study of Christians, Moslems, and individuals belonging to Jewish faiths in different world locations found many of the underlying themes for radicalisation in non-Muslim countries were essentially similar to those in the Middle East, and North Africa. They had a structural, personal, and social basis. Social context and historical legacy were mediating variables for the
operationalisation of strongly held beliefs and practices that were directed at leaders of political institutions, culture, or religion (Stern 2004).

On preventive measures, one policy recommended addressing the threat of terrorism from the point of radicalisation, at its early stages with policies that emphasised less violence (Hutson et al. 2009, pp. 21-22). Selected models on radicalisation highlighted how radical processes were informed by environmental conditions, value systems (societal, organisational), and organisational ideology. It was during early stages of radicalisation that affiliate factors predominated because of personal characteristics and social network relations that acted as primary motivators for radicalisation. Ideological influences were largely found to be secondary in entry decisions. Its adoption tended to occur later after the individual became a member of a radical organization (Morris et al. 2010, pp. 2-4). Thus, the emphasis was for counter-radicalisation policies to focus on affiliate and ideological factors as vulnerabilities (Olsen 2009, p. 59) to reduce and prevent progression to the violent phase. It is in the early phase where displacement effects could act as indicators for future disenfranchisement, frustration, and pessimism (Hutson et al. 2009, pp. 21-22).

The terrorist radicalisation model of Moghadam (2005) compared the process to climbing a narrowing staircase leading to the top of a building. As individuals climbed higher they encountered fewer choices. A few who completed the climb were likely to become fully committed terrorists. Prevention policies were likely to be much more effective if they targeted lower levels of the process (p. 161).
The importance attached to affiliate factors suggested there was some space for flexibility, pragmatism, and even potential for negotiation with certain types of radicals and terrorists (Bayat 2007). Radicalisation processes could be disrupted by targeting individuals within the group (Sageman 2008, pp. 13, 150), or groups as entities.

Sprinzak’s (1991) model divided the trajectory of radicalisation into three consecutive ideological and behavioural stages involving a crisis of confidence, conflict of legitimacy, and crisis of legitimacy. Terrorism being the result of this process was a phenomenon where a very radical group could reject a regime’s legitimacy by challenging it conventionally or unconventionally because of perceived abuse of power or some other contested aspect of the socio-political system. Each of these stages had activists and supporters who acted collectively against the incumbent regime in a psycho-political way. In this context individual behaviours became part of groupthink even though they were not likely to lose their former identities (pp. 50-54).
Crisis of confidence involved angry criticism of the established system’s authority or rulers and their ideological assumptions for governing. Conflict of legitimacy continued the crisis of confidence process where the group readied itself to begin questioning the legitimacy of the whole system. The group would then accuse the prevailing regime of “oppression”, “misleading” people, and urge citizens to vote for an alternative ideological system (Sprinzak 1991, p. 55). The challenging group at this stage solidified itself with a revolutionary rhetoric that discredited the existing social order. Crisis of legitimacy was the culmination of previous stages where the opposition side got depicted as sub-human. The narrative bifurcates lives of the masses in terms of living in ‘light’ or ‘darkness’, making radical groups to readily disengage morally and to commit atrocities without giving their actions a second thought. Few radicals who made it to the third stage were usually second generation radicals or accomplished revolutionaries. At this stage they convinced themselves they were fighting a ‘just war’ that required mass support. The operational manifestation of this third stage involved engaging in systemic terrorism (p. 56). Some terrorist groups would not even complete the last stage if there was a ‘deeply rooted’ history of opposition and conflict as terrorism could use a platform of liberation to continue to agitate for political freedom (Sprinzak 1991, p. 59).

Radicals and terrorists needed to be approached as groups whose activities were opposed to the domestic socio-political system. While their activities highlighted trust and legitimacy issues, they needed to be approached as ‘hybrid groups’ and ‘sub-cultures’ with different motivations (political, religious, economic, criminal, free riders), capacities, and scope of action. Thus, different group types (domestic, regional, transnational) needed to be targeted using tailored incentives (Silber & Bhatt 2007, pp. 13, 85) that can also leverage attributes of political cultures in countries they operated.
It has been shown how some radicals can become extremists, and some can also become fanatics and zealots who considered themselves as true believers. Adoption of rigid ritualised practices could lead to departure from moderate political or religious views (Hogg et al. 2010, p. 1062). Moral disengagement created potential for absolutist reaction to issues (Yasmeen 2008, p. 2). In this context extremist Jihadists also needed further differentiation from existing sub-sets of violent extremists (Hutson, et al. 2009, p. 18), as some groups’ value preferences have focused at the global or national level. A desegregation strategy was applicable to these groups as well.

The policy recommendation from Stern’s (2004) multi-faith study was to approach each extremist or terrorist group according to its values and incentive structure. Carrot and stick approaches employed during the 1960s and 1970s on secular groups were still valid in countering contemporary militants. Their threats could be dealt with largely at a political level based on the list of social grievances. Stern likened terrorist activities to ‘a virus’ that spreads risk factors across various levels (personal, national, inter-state, and global). Some aspects of the threat could be altered economically, politically, and culturally as militants have fought for different motives (political, economic, psychological, and spiritual). It is possible therefore, to exploit violent groups by sowing discord, confusion, and rivalry among them and their sponsors. Emphasis needed to also be placed on education, public diplomacy, more covert action, and less military solutions. On education, it was perhaps better to develop alternative curricula in schools than publicly persuading local groups to shut down extremist schools. Public diplomacy needed to employ a narrative of tolerance and empathy, and to encourage condemnation of extremist interpretations of religion (Stern 2004, pp. 283, 290-296).
Sageman’s (2008) biographical analysis on 500 jihadists drawn from various world locations also revealed similar experiences of dislocation felt by second and third generation migrants. Most individuals appeared to be ‘nice guys’ at the beginning, but radicalised later and joined terrorism through friendship and kinship networks. Radicalisation processes involved four steps. Terrorism occurred at the extreme end of the radicalisation continuum that started from non-violent activity. Extremists fought for justice, fairness, solidarity, or glory (pp. 4, 35, 48). Exposure to religious ideology occurred informally mainly through bottom-up processes. Social bonds reinforced motivation and commitment (pp. 66-70). Sageman’s study found young people were generally idealistic and some approached situations from an ‘imagined utopia’. Some who perceived themselves as warriors showed an ideological commitment and viewed the social world in simplistic terms. They had vague knowledge about religion, society, or history in their simple explanations for heroic sacrifice. Some adhered to a conspiratorial world view although their ideological beliefs were non-universalist (pp. 40, 80-82).

Thus, radical recruitment has adopted both bottom-up and top-down approaches. Individuals faced with high self-uncertainty were likely to reduce it by seeking to identify with others who they perceived to have similar values as they could offer some clarity and guidance. The link between self-uncertainty and high group entitativity was likely to enhance in-group identity and solidarity. It also accentuated differences between ‘we’ and ‘they’. Potential adoption of totalistic orthodoxy was not limited to extremist political groups as religious cults and lifestyle change groups could behave similarly. Identification and conformity to the group’s powerful ideology required little contradiction to its values (Hogg 2005, pp. 211-215).
Sageman’s conception of ‘terrorism in context’ was similar to Hutson et al. (2009) ‘person in the environment’ (PIE) framework where group relationships and dynamics needed to be understood from within their environment. This could show the type of groups that individuals socialised with before they committed violence. It was possible to observe how relationships formed within groups, and how they intensified and potentially faded over time. Some could continue. Opportunities for intervention existed at individual and group levels to assist disruption. Certain individuals were likely to leave extremism and terrorism and be transformed (Sageman 2008, pp. 23-28).

In terms of recruitment, how group leaders marketed the religious or political product mattered. A strong club model framework has been used to explain some cultic-type behaviours of some Christian and Ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups (Iannaccone 1992; Berman E 2000). Berman & Laitin (2008) also used a similar framework to explain activities of the Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in the way they marketed their products. The model could be applied to secular and non-secular groups as ritual and conservative behaviour was likely to bind individuals to their faiths. In certain cases the public good that was sought and consumed was religion itself. Even when their activities deviated from accepted social norms, some would believe their actions were rational. Religion can be used as a positive or negative force to achieve political and economic end states (pp. 1-4). The role played by societal culture and associated emotions of shame, domination, or dishonour could signal the fulfilment of certain rights such as obligations for action (Goodwin et al. 2000, p. 79).

The next chapter builds on the radicalisation framework by drawing insight from lessons of religious terrorism, and historical and contemporary terrorist groups in Western Europe and North America.
Terrorist campaigns include those of anarchist terrorists (1820-1914), left wing, and right wing terrorist groups that were active during the 1960s and 1970s (West German Red Army Faction, Italian Red Brigades, Spanish nationalist terrorist group ETA, Canada’s Front de Libération du Québec). Lessons show how some terrorists can leave terrorism because of changes in personal, social, or organizational outlook. The terror mission is not static as it can evolve and transform with time. Changes at individual, group, societal, or ideological level may precipitate re-evaluation of goals and options of some individuals or groups. The behaviour of terrorist groups in the discussion is compared to that of the Al-Qaeda movement to highlight some analogies and aspects that can be influenced to counter Islamist terrorism. Case studies reflect general emphasis on religious and non-religious based terrorism that has drawn examples from the Middle East, European Union, and Asia.
Chapter 5

Cases of Revolutionary Terrorism

While Al-Qaeda’s form of terrorism has adopted a heavy religious undertone, it shared basic similarities with terrorist campaigns of historical religious and contemporary secular groups in relation to focusing on economic, social, political, and religious factors that act as motivations for joining terrorism (Hoffman 2008, p. 59). The objective of this chapter is to highlight weaknesses in terrorist campaigns that can influence group decline, which could also be applied to Al-Qaeda transnational movement groups.

Religious terrorism

The most cited examples of sacred terrorism of ancient times are the Assassins and Zealots-Sicarii who operated in the Middle East, and the Thugs of India. These groups’ messianic doctrines provide a perspective for viewing contemporary activities of Al-Qaeda movement groups in the broader international context.

Activities of a medieval small Shiite Muslim sect of the Order of Assassins known as Nizari Isma'ilis (1090-1275 AD) formed in modern-day Syria and Iran by Hassan-i Sabbah were directed towards achieving nationalist political and religious goals that included religious purity through creation of a new social order based on a single Muslim community. The movement became famous for espionage activities, and martyrdom assassinations of high ranking political, religious, and military figures of the Roman regime, and individuals deemed to be collaborators. Its tactics were aimed to induce fear within local populations and raising group profile. Often using the dagger as a weapon,
victims were murdered in public places (e.g. royal courts, venerated sites) with many people watching to demonstrate religious commitment. Public actions were justified in defensive terms and the assailants preferred to be captured or killed. Martyrdom was a central component in their operations and victims were sacrifices. Extensive networks of cells in sympathetic urban areas ensured secrecy for planning such activities (Rapoport 1984, pp. 665-666).

The term ‘assassin’ in Arabic was variously used to describe the dispersed movement’s groups. Some people used it to refer to their alleged use of hashish where activists drugged themselves before committing violent actions. This view of ‘hashashins’ was used in derogatory ways to describe their activities. Another description of the term was linked the faithful disciples of Hassan-i Sabbah, whose teachings were based on the Prophet Muhammed (Ross 2015, pp. 78-82). The assassins were considered heretics by Shia groups because of their zealous behaviour (Gray 2010). Armed conflict with the Mongols, and then the Sunnis (the Seljuk Turks) ended their terror campaigns by 1275 (Chaliand & Blin 2007, pp. 60-63). Ideological commitment of the assassins, suicide tactics, and targeted assassinations were techniques that Al-Qaeda’s Sunni groups also used to target their adversaries.

During the first century, nationalist aspirations of Jewish groups the Sicarii (40 AD), and zealots (66-73 AD) were also religiously inspired by millenarian hopes of eventually succeeding in transforming the political order through armed struggle against the Greek population living in Judea, and the Roman government. Both groups envisioned a new social order for Jewish people. In their attempts to instigate popular insurrection, Zealots’ tactics included poisoning water supplies
and food granaries to instil fear in local communities, and to exploit Roman rule which they considered foreign and vulnerable (Rapoport 1984, pp. 664-675).

For a small resistance group that lacked a broad base of social support, the Sicarii committed murders in Jerusalem in broad daylight, usually during festivals, in holy places and holy days. The assailants would mingle with the crowd and then stab their enemies with short daggers known as *sica*, a weapon *from* which the group derived its name. They assassinated the ruling elite, high priests, Jews deemed to be collaborators of Roman rulers, and soldiers. To the Sicarii, the conquerors imposed an alien culture that needed to be removed from Judea as it was ‘desecrating God’s name’ in their land (Rapoport 1984, pp. 668-670). The Sicarii also engaged in kidnapping important people in exchange for the release of their imprisoned members as a form of bargaining. Activities of these groups had the same symbolic effect of instilling fear among common people (Horsely 1999, pp. 200-207).

The fanaticism of the Sicarii was considered excessive by local standards as their terrorism was directed at fellow Judeans who they considered to be sympathisers or collaborators of Roman rulers. Traitors were punished by destroying their properties. Constant attacks on fellow Jews led to the expulsion of Sicarii to the Fortress of Masada where 960 men, women and children committed suicide after a long siege rather than surrendering to Roman soldiers. The Sicarii sought to implement a theocracy (Zeitlin 1967, pp. 262, 317), but played a limited role as their violence alienated local communities. However, their ideas of freedom and liberty continued to inspire other Sicarii in the diaspora to revolt against Roman rule.
In comparison, nascent liberation movements reacted similarly to foreign rule during colonial times as demonstration effects were aimed at mobilising popular resistance. The difference with contemporary groups is that the Sicarii lacked technological coverage to propagate their ideology to a mass audience (Horsely 1999, pp. 200-207). While their terrorism was limited in scope (Laqueur 1987, p. 204), available tools still had a psychological effect on local populations as they were lethal. Al-Qaeda movement groups have behaved similarly, aiming to incite a mass uprising against foreign occupiers in Islamic countries. Their attacks have been designed to instil fear among populations, and to convey a religious message of potential repercussions on collaborators of detested regimes. Unlike the Sicarii and Zealots, the Al-Qaeda movement benefited from advanced technology and communications that enabled its groups to conduct much larger, sophisticated mass casualty terrorist attacks to influence a global audience.

The Thugs of India often referred to as Phansigars or stranglers committed atrocities against travelers to please Kali, the Hindu goddess of terror and destruction. The deceitful practice of disguising themselves as legitimate travelers and forming relationships with fellow travelers, and then murdering and dismembering them was beyond comprehension by Hindu standards as victims were not accorded proper burial or cremation. The only people spared from their violent practice were women, lepers, vagabonds, the blind, amputees, and Europeans. The fear of Thug operations in India became widespread as their activities transcended acceptable social norms. Their weapon of choice was the noose, and their doctrine was to target individuals rather than institutions. To maintain brotherhood loyalty and numbers they mainly recruited from families of fellow thugs. Each thug participated at in least three murders annually to maintain supply of sacrifices required by Kali to keep the religious order in equilibrium. Thug activities were prevalent
in the seventh and 13th centuries, and were reported to have ceased by 1850. Thugs appeared to have lived two different lives, one as role models of society and industry where they were known for generosity and another where they engaged in robbing and murdering people for the sake of a deity. Thugs were reported to have murdered an estimated half a million to one million people (Rapoport 1984, pp. 660-664).

In terms of religious doctrine, Rapoport described how the Hindu Thugs placed emphasis on making sacrifices to the supernatural (Rapoport 1984, p. 673). Focus on inspiring popular insurrection, emphasis on God, and the morality associated with being viewed as a fighting group of a movement with a desire to create a new socio-political order in Assassin and Zealots-Sicarii campaigns were aspects that were justified in Al-Qaeda’s ideological narrative and military campaigns. Technology was also a relevant aspect as every terrorist group during its time has sought to use a particular type of weapon, transportation, and communications system to achieve its short or long term objectives. The noose of the Thug, the dagger of the Assassin, and the sica of the Zealots-Sicarii left a psychological impact even though their activities were considered to be counter-productive by the general population at the time. Modern technology provided Al-Qaeda extended flexibility that surpassed the scope of these groups’ capabilities.

Anarchist terrorism (1820-1920)

Activities of anarchist terrorists during the period 1820-1920 in Western Europe were influenced by socialist philosophy (McLaughlin P 2007, p.1). This period of radical enlightenment was characterised by social disillusionment arising from high levels of unemployment and effects of economic globalisation (Jensen RB 2009, p. 104). Anarchism is a political ideology that opposed
authoritarian rule. Its principles advocated individual liberty, freedom, and collective equality. Anarchists therefore sought to remove political systems that failed to fulfil this ethical social ideal (McLaughlin P 2007, p. 25). They sought to change and create alternative socio-political orders through revolution (Borum & Tilby 2005, pp. 202-203). Oppressiveness of the socio-political system at the time was perceived to have alienated most people and militants sought to liberate the poor and disenchanted by providing an alternative political system (Jensen RB 2009, pp. 104-105; Esenwein 2008, p. 599).

Russian anarchist revolutionary doctrine was promoted by prominent ideologues like Sergei Nechaev, Nicholas Mozorov, Serge Stepniak and Peter Kropotkin (“propaganda by the deed”). Michael Bakunin’s (1814-1876) Catechism emphasised total revolution in institutions, social structures, civilisation, and morality. According to Bakunin, ‘every state power, every government, by its nature and by its position stands outside the people and above them, and must invariably try to subject them to rules and objectives which are alien to them, we declare ourselves the enemies of every government and every state power . . . the people can only be happy and free when they create their own life, and organise themselves from below upwards by means of independent and completely free associations’ (Shatz 1990, p. 136).

Anarchist philosophy sought to inspire like-minded terrorists to instigate similar revolutions. It spread through imitation, gaining prominence in Europe, Australia, North America, South America, China, and Japan during the period between the 1880s and 1914. Anarchists assassinated prominent people (monarchs, presidents, prime ministers) to gain media publicity. The objective was to remove autocratic regimes in Russia, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Spain, Italy, and France.
(Third Republic). In Russia, anarchist actions culminated in the October 1917 revolution (Crenshaw 1995, p. 22). Activities of these groups occurred within an environment of social crises (Jensen RB 2009, pp. 90-91).

Anarchist tools that included poison, knives, ropes, and dynamite were regarded necessary to cleanse Russian soil from evil regimes (Laqueur & Alexander 1987, 15, 30-31). Dynamite was viewed as an ‘equalising force’ to be used against the army, police, and hired gunmen of the employers (Avrich 1984, p. 166).

There are some analogies that can be drawn between 19th century anarchists and the Al-Qaeda movement.

(i). Extremist reaction to capitalism, globalisation, authoritarian governance, and desire to create a new social order through violent revolution was directed towards the existing political system (Kelsay 2008, p. 603). These aspects and related psychological effects exploited broad sentiments of the population during periods of social crisis.

(ii). The revolutionary anti-authoritarian rhetoric and ideological justification for violence employed by anarchist radicals such as Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin, was generally similar to one used by Al-Qaeda’s key ideologues who sought to unite all Muslims into a community (umma) of believers to fight against exploitation by un-Islamic regimes, and to revert to historical Islamic tradition (Gelvin 2008, p. 610; Kometer 2004, p. 49). In calling for the abolition of the dictatorial power of the Church and State, Bakunin’s ideal plan for the creation of a new social order in Russia was to be carried out by an association of working class movements that would spread revolutionary activity from local towns to the national level, then universally to other nations. The revolutionary process
was to culminate into the great international, one that reconciled interests of the state and the individual (Dolgoff 1971, on Mikhail Bakunin and Anarchy, 1871).

(iii). Decentralised organisation has facilitated flexibility in planning and tactical actions of these types of groups (Marks 2002, p. 37; Jensen RB 2009, p. 105).

(iv). High level of violence employed by these groups generated a universal concern that galvanized different governments to respond at domestic and international levels to contain terrorism through multilateral alliances and partnerships (Lizardo & Bergesen 2003, pp. 175-188; Jensen RB 2009; Sandler et al. 2008). Each group exhibited nihilist tendencies and was viewed by the general public as pathological, with generally vague political and social objectives (e.g. Russia’s Narodnaya Volya or Peoples’ will), (Lizardo & Bergesen 2003).

While there were similarities between 19th century European anarchists and Al-Qaeda’s jihadists in terms of their activities being considered marginal to public debate, some qualitative differences needed to be noted. Al-Qaeda’s scope of terrorism was further enhanced by access to modern transportation and technology. European anarchists had limited technological resources (Lizardo 2008, pp. 7, 112; Jensen RB 2009, pp. 90, 105). The scope of Al-Qaeda’s goals, targets, and actions was much broader (Alexander 2009, p. 527). Al-Qaeda is a religious political movement that hated anyone it considered a ‘non-believer’ including Muslims or ‘Kuffar’ while anarchists were largely non-religious (Gelvin 2008, p. 607).

In terms of counter measures, many governments in northern and central Europe effectively contained the anarchist terrorist threat through public diplomacy, police cooperation, intelligence efforts, and implementing tighter border controls (Jensen 2009, pp. 89, 96). Implementation of anti-
anarchist legislation outlawed criminal use of explosives, incitement to commit anarchist crimes, and belonging to an anarchist association. Diplomatic ties among governments were strengthened at the global level, while formalised anti-anarchist alliances among governments facilitated international police cooperation and bilateral security agreements. Security and intelligence networking was promoted among countries such as Italy, Russia, and Britain. These counter-terrorism efforts were symbolised by the first international terrorism conference held in Rome in 1898. The conference was precipitated by the assassination of Empress Elizabeth of Austria in Switzerland by an Italian anarchist. It symbolised a significant attempt to contain the threat at an international level (Jensen RB 2009, pp. 91-93).

At the social level, local populations chose to support their existing governments and anarchist militant philosophy was increasingly marginalised (Gelvin 2008, p. 610). Other developments such as World War One and the Russian revolution also played a catalytic role in prompting some of the group’s activists to reconsider violent strategy. Society had by then moved on to consider new social issues (The Economist 18 August 2005, pp. 17-20). At the group level, terrorists made errors of judgement by often justifying violent action regardless of whether this strategy assisted or hindered the revolutionary struggle (Franks 2003, p. 23). Anarchists were a small group and factors that contributed to the decline of their terrorism were: institutional (timely implementation of political measures such as needed social improvements, and legal measures); societal (opinion rejection of high level of violence); and terrorist group dynamics (errors in leaders’ decision making).

In countering Al-Qaeda’s terrorism, affected governments also tended to respond by denying militants the political support they need to propagate violent ideology. The majority of populations in
Muslim dominated countries have rejected the movement’s reliance on violence as the only means for achieving political change. Insights drawn from these early forms of terrorist campaigns suggested there were basic counter-terrorism strategies that policy makers could effectively exploit to influence decline of Al-Qaeda’s terrorism. The discussion on contemporary left wing terrorist groups in the next section has also highlighted the dynamic role that political, economic, social, and organisational factors played in their emergence and gradual decline.

**Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA)**

Basque Fatherland and Liberty, or Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) was founded in 1959 by Basque Marxist separatist rebels opposed to Francisco Franco’s suppression of the Basque language and cultural identity in Spain (Cronin et al. 2004). The relatively small group pursued nationalist and socialist goals with the aim of establishing an independent homeland in Basque areas of northern Spain and south western France (Zanias 2005, p. 99-100). The Basque population in Spain comprised about 2.1 million in 2000 (Abadie & Gardeazabal 2003, p. 3).

The group’s campaign activities included bombings and assassinations of prominent government leaders (e.g. Spanish premier Luis Carrero Blanco in 1973), military, judiciary, and police personnel (Barros 2003, p. 402). In 1995 an assassination attempt was made on King Juan Carlos and former Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar. More than 850 people had died as a result of ETA’s violence by 2005 (Zanias 2005, pp. 100-101). At its peak of activity (1978-1980) the group’s violence claimed 235 victims. In terms of resources, ETA’s funding was derived primarily from Basque supporters, through kidnapping-for-ransom activities, drug trafficking, and armed robberies (Barros 2003, p. 403). While ETA’s terrorist attacks occurred in almost all Spanish regions, approximately 70 per
cent of deaths that occurred during the period 1968-1997 were in the Basque Country (Abadie & Gardeazabal 2003, p. 115).

Factors that contributed to ETA’s decline were political, social, and organisational. Politically, restoration of democracy after the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975, allowed the Basque region to gain autonomy. The region had its own parliament and controlled education and taxes. Basque language was also promoted in schools (Barros 2003, pp. 402-403). Composition of the Regional Basque Parliament from 1980-2009 (based on 2009 estimates) suggested radical nationalism had declined from 20.63% to around 9% of the vote. Moderate nationalists opposed continued violence (Barros & Gil-Alana 2009, p. 36). Basque nationalist parties opted for political negotiations and signed political pacts with new governments (Abadie & Gardeazabal 2003, p. 122). Changes in government policy marked a new era in resolving the conflict without resorting to violence (Vedder 2010, p. 46).

At the socio-economic level, psychological fear from intimidation, extortion, and daily monitoring of suspected collaborators left the Basque population traumatised (Javier, et al. 2010, p. 115). Terrorist violence also negatively impacted on the Spanish economy by hindering tourism and foreign direct investment (Enders & Sandler 1991, Abstract p. 49). Organisationally, changes in the group’s activities with emergence of a new youth wing known as Basque ‘Kale Borroka’ (street fighting in Spanish) were indicative of sustainability problems in the main organisation (Barros & Gil-Alana 2009, pp. 5-7).
ETA’s terrorism was deterred through effective policing, implementation of needed political changes, new competition from political parties opposed to violence, and social backlash from the masses who rejected violence as the main strategy to effect change (Zanias 2005, p. 97). The hardline government approach during early years was considered detrimental to resolving grievances (e.g. banning political protest actions, closing down of Radical Basque newspaper Égin, banning of Herri Batasuna political party). Subsequent conciliatory actions by successive governments managed to shift public opinion and contained some of ETA’s violence (Barros 2003, pp. 404, 412; Barros & Gil-Alana 2009, pp. 7, 22-23). On 10 January 2011, ETA declared a permanent ceasefire to facilitate a democratic end of its violent campaign (Elkin 2011).

Lessons drawn from countering ETA’s terrorism highlighted how governments went through a learning curve in devising response strategies. In most situations proactive political measures were found to be much more effective in reducing terrorism than largely retaliatory policies. The latter strategy had to be used with extreme caution as it fed into negative social perceptions and the resulting political backlash. Past experience became a positive value and timing in the use of political measures at later stages of the conflict was also important (Barros & Gil-Alana 2009, pp. 21-24).

While ETA was a nationalist terrorist group, its activities were similar to Al-Qaeda’s in terms of drawing from a basic framework of injustice to raise socio-political grievances. Countering ETA’s activities required focusing at the domestic level to address real cultural and political issues, and cooperating with neighbouring countries such as France to limit the spread of violence and
terrorism. Countering Al-Qaeda has required improving international cooperation among various countries’ security agencies and their populations to contain its violent global threat.

Italian Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse BR), 1970-1980s

Left-wing revolutionary terrorist activities of Italian Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse) emerged from waves of radical social protests during the late 1960s. The organization originally started as a small group of urban radical students and militant workers seeking to change the political status quo (Smith PJ 2008, p. 21) that was allegedly caused by the bourgeois capitalist state and imperialist system. Their proposed solution was to replace the existing government with a socialist one, and this goal was to be achieved through a mass revolution (Alexander & Pluchinsky 1992, p. 194; Drake 1995, p. 249).

The government was considered repressive and right-wing, and symbolised a political order that was unjust and exploitative. To achieve their objectives militants embarked on indiscriminate violence, kidnapping, and assassination of prominent figures including Christian Democratic leader and former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978 (Fishel & Manwaring 2006, pp. 149, 152). Targets included police, lawyers, judges, university professors, union leaders, industrialists, and civilians. Initially, terrorists were largely supported by the Italian public as locals sympathised with their campaign narrative of injustice, inequality, and need for reform (Smith PJ 2008, pp. 15, 25). This social support declined gradually as groups engaged in a higher level of violence.
Smith PJ (2008, p. 19) has divided the tactical history of the BR into four periods:

(i). Phase 1 (1969-1972): engagement in propaganda activities, attacks on private businesses primarily through fire bombings;

(ii). Phase 2 (1972 to mid-1972): expansion of activities to industrial cities (Milan, Turin, Genoa), kidnapping, and exploiting media attention;

(iii). Phase 3 (1972-1976): ascendance of second generation BR, with larger campaigns directed at the Italian state. Kidnapping and murders of prominent individuals; and

(iv). Phase 4 (1976-1980): growing public revulsion against violence (e.g. murder of Aldo Moro), coupled with chaos and social anxiety marked the beginning of a steady decline for BR.

Despite its narrative of injustice, BR’s liquidation strategy in later years was considered destabilising and counter-productive. This factor caused it to lose previous gains it made in legitimacy and public support. It created a situation where the public began assisting government authorities by providing useful intelligence (Fishel & Manwaring 2006, p.159). The benefit of human intelligence enabled exploitation of the developing social backlash and increasing defections within the group. Informants’ intelligence led to arrests of original members and key individuals, and caused some to flee to France (Smith PJ 2008, pp. 19-20, 22).

At the group level, lack of ideological experience among new leaders became a detriment to their vision. Their uncompromising attitude even while positive political changes were being implemented resulted in internal tensions and ideological splits as goals of young leaders increasingly became regarded as incoherent and elitist (Wieviorka 1993, pp. 92-94). Consequently,
BR fragmented further as some members felt alienated or betrayed by fellow comrades and external supporters (Parker 2007, p. 168).

At the governmental level, a series of soft and hard measures were able to restrict BR terror activities. They involved the use of traditional police work, military measures, political and social measures, diplomacy, and information warfare campaigns. This broad approach proved effective in isolating BR activists from local supporters and limiting their activities (Fishel & Manwaring 2006, pp. 152-159). On law enforcement, the government created new security structures such as the General Inspectorate for Action against Terrorism Inspettorato Generale per la Lotta contro il Terrorismo and the Special Group of the Judiciary Police Nucleo Speciale di Polizia Giudiziaria. A ‘collaboration’ law known as Pentiti (repentance policy) enacted during 1980 and 1982 allowed penalties for crimes committed prior to 1980 to be reduced in return for collaboration (Parker 2007, pp. 167-172). The law provided incentives for surrender and influenced an increasing number of defections and arrests. It directly and indirectly hastened disintegration and splintering of BR (e.g. into The Communist Combatant Party BR/PCC; and The Union of Fighting Communists BR/UCC). Competition and organisational schisms among these splinter groups effectively limited BR’s capability to conduct terrorist activities (Chenoweth 2007, pp. 359-362).

The government’s informal and formal agreements established with other Western European countries facilitated multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation (Fishel & Manwaring 2006, p. 157). Restrictions imposed on BR affected other people being viewed as part of its personal or operational network as they raised fear of being arrested by authorities (Jamieson 1990, Abstract, p. 1). The public relations campaign also used the media to undermine perceived acceptance of
terrorist violence as it portrayed terrorists as subversives and selfish self-appointed elites whose interests were at odds with those of the general population (Serafino 2002, CRS 3-4).

Ideologically, Italy was entering the post-industrial period and communist philosophy and culture no longer had a future in the country. Terrorists could no longer justify their causes with violence as the majority of the population had moved on to embrace a new political reality (Drake 1995, pp. 259, 261). As genuine policy efforts were made to effectively address economic, social, and political deficiencies, it was easier for the government to shift the balance of political power and popular perceptions towards the state, and to effectively discredit and neutralise BR ideology which progressively became regarded as irrelevant (Fishel & Manwaring 2006, pp. 155-160).

One of the lessons to be drawn from the BR terror campaign is that ‘soft support’ from a political constituency can sustain a campaign for longer periods when the narrative used aligned with general public concerns on issues relating to injustice, inequality, and need for reform. When terrorists lose legitimacy, this shift can signal decline and potential demise of the campaign (Smith PJ 2008, p. 25). For the government, negative public perceptions of its repressive attitude would have continued until it implemented needed reforms.

There were some common features between Italian Red Brigades and Al-Qaeda groups. Both groups have reacted to state behaviour and global forces (i.e. cultural, political, economic). BR student protests were part of leftist movements of the 1960s (e.g. German Red Army Faction, the US Weather Underground, French Action Directe, Japanese Red Army) that morally opposed US military action in Vietnam. Their philosophy supported the plight of Third World masses that were
reacting to colonialism. The Al-Qaeda movement has also reacted to forces of capitalism, economic globalisation and what it described as cultural imperialism, while simultaneously seeking to change political regimes in the Arab world. Both group types viewed their actions as noble and part of a larger revolutionary struggle (Smith PJ 2008, pp. 23-24) aimed to transform the state of their societies.

The difference between the two groups was in the size and location of activities. At the height of operations in the 1970s the Red Brigades had 400-500 active members, and 1,000 provided assistance periodically. A few thousand supporters provided funds and shelter (Jenkins 2016). BR was a small nationalist organisation while Al-Qaeda is a global movement with broader political, cultural, and religious objectives and constituency. Strategic failures of BR resulted from its extremist militant approach to domestic issues. Al-Qaeda’s extremist unlimited approach to socio-political and economic issues also caused it to lose ideological influence in host locations, including being viewed as a marginal actor in Muslim politics. Reliance on violence to resolve social issues was a consistent critical factor that caused decline of terrorist group campaigns.

**The German Red Army Faction (RAF), 1970-1998**

The West German Red Army also known as Red Army Fraction (RAF) was officially founded on 4 May 1970 by a left wing militant group of students led by Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof, and Horst Mahler. The group was similar to other leftist groups in philosophy as its cultural and moral values were also influenced by the anti-Vietnam war sentiment (Miller, BH 1987, pp. 37-38), and anti-colonialist struggles. RAF ideology embraced the notion of a ‘world communist revolution’, and condemnation of Israel as an arm of American ‘imperialism’. It equated Zionism
with racism, and capitalism with imperialistic exploitation. Activists projected pacifist ideals of moral purity (Becker 1981, pp. 1-3), and depicted the existing regime as fascist and repressive. The existing power structures that privileged the political and business elite were to be removed, and reforms were to be gained through a Marxist-Leninist revolution (Stefanik 2009, p. 1). RAF had some links with a Palestinian group (Front for the Liberation of Palestine or PFLP) that provided some of its leaders such as Baader, Meinhof, and Ensslin, military training in Jordan (Aust 2008, pp. 49, 52-54).

To achieve political goals the group carried out a series of bombings, assassinations, arson attacks, and kidnapping activities particularly during the 1970s and 1980s (Amador 2003, p. 5). It targeted prominent individuals in the judiciary, police, industry, American military personnel, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization interests (Miller BH 1987, p. 38). According to Moghadam (2012), the group’s violent activities intensified in the 1980s when new and inexperienced leaders took over following the imprisonment of key members. The period 1984-1998 is when high profile terror attacks continued on state officials and businessmen, causing some members to abandon armed struggle as they began to question the group’s ideological premises. Disagreements over strategy and doctrine resulted in splintering.

By 1990 the RAF had splintered into smaller organizations (e.g. the Movement 2 June, the West Berlin Tupamaros10, and Revolutionary Cells). Initially most of the West German population supported the RAF because of widespread disillusionment with the economic and political situation. Public support declined over time because of its destructive activities (Amador 2003, pp. 6-9). Emergence of non-violent competitors such as the Green Party, and a new middle class with
moderate views isolated the RAF further and it became regarded as an elitist organization of the radical fringe. As a result, many RAF members began to refocus their attention on pursuing other careers. The majority of activists opted to pursue political reforms through peaceful rather than violent means (Amador 2003, pp. 52, 55-57). The appeal of communist ideology at the time was also declining, causing the RAF to lose its sanctuary in East Germany (Hoffman 2008, p. 64). The general population felt it had more pressing domestic concerns to deal with at home rather than concentrating on distant issues in Vietnam or Palestine (Amador 2003, pp. 55-56).

On the government side, counter-terrorism measures involved implementing new legislative measures. Security and police powers were expanded, allowing restrictions to be imposed on some constitutional rights. Changes were made to Basic Law and the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch). A dedicated counterintelligence centre and an elite anti-terrorist unit (the GSG-9) were established, and powers of the Federal Border Control organisation (Bundesgrenzschutz or BGS) were expanded. The media were used to facilitate information operations (Amador 2003, pp. 25-26, 49-55).

The West German government’s targeting of top Red Army Faction leaders (e.g. Andreas Baader) early in their campaign, achieved some success as some were imprisoned. Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe committed suicide while in prison. As time progressed significant members of the group were captured (Aust 2008, pp. 53-55) as police successfully infiltrated the organisation (Stefanik 2009, p. 59). As the prevailing political climate preferred non-violence, the RAF ended up being considered a threat to democracy and societal stability. RAF success was only tactical as it could not achieve its stated revolutionary goals (Miller BH 1987, pp. 38, 53). In a paper published in 1982
titled ‘Guerilla, Resistance, and Anti-Imperialist Front’ the RAF admitted defeat. It acknowledged making serious errors of judgement. On April 20 1998, through the news agency Reuters based in Cologne, the RAF announced it had formally ended its revolutionary project. There was realisation it could no longer achieve political objectives through violence (Aust 2008, pp. 53-57).

The revolutionary activities of the RAF and Al-Qaeda were similar in some ways. They both aimed at revitalisation and reorganisation of governments and society even though conceptions of their desired socio-political worlds were largely considered ill-informed. RAF’s reactionary actions failed to mobilise the masses to accept its type of revolution. Violent tactics, group competition, and changing political realities contributed to its marginalisation to the point where its ideology was considered irrelevant to social realities. While the RAF and Al-Qaeda relied on violence, the RAF was a small group with no more than three dozen active members. The Al-Qaeda movement operated at a transnational level. Its franchises facilitated manoeuvre, allowing it to shift from hostile to new conflict-prone locations where it could co-opt individuals and groups to fight on its behalf.

Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), 1963-1972

The separatist Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) in Canada was founded in 1963 with the aim of establishing an independent state of Quebec through a social revolution. Most of FLQ members were drawn from splinter organizations such as Rassemblement pour l’indépendance nationale (RIN) and L’action socialiste pour l’indépendance du Québec (ASIQ) that were also founded in the 1960s (Ross & Gurr 2004, p. 290). Some FLQ members were reported to have received training

Membership of FLQ was estimated at around 100 active fighters, with 200-300 active sympathisers, and 2000-3000 passive sympathisers. Its activities included bombing, kidnapping, bank robbery, and property destruction (Tetley 2007, p. 29). A turning point for the group occurred when James Cross and Pierre Laporte were kidnapped and murdered in October in exchange for convicted terrorists. This action ruined the group’s public image as the situation created a political crisis that led to the establishment of the War Measures Act on 15 October 1970. The act allowed deployment of the Army as a peacekeeping force to assist police in regaining law and order in the province. The high level of violence attributed to FLQ by the majority of the affected population contributed to its gradual decline (Tetley 2007, pp. 61, 64).

Ross (1995, pp. 286-295) has observed how some factors that contributed to emergence of Quebec’s separatist terrorism were similar to those of its decline. Reasons that contributed to its rise were: counter terrorism’s organizational failure, availability of weapons and explosives, social support, historical facilitation, and socio-political grievances. FLQ’s terrorism declined through a combination of structural measures (i.e. deterrence, accommodation, co-optation, and effective counter-terrorist practices), and precipitants that resulted from death of terrorists, imprisonment, individual burnout, group disintegration due to organizational splits, and lack of public support.

Government deterrent measures from 1970-1972 involved increasing the special role of police and implementing new legislation to restrict terrorism. Security measures included improving
surveillance capabilities at Canadian airports and government facilities. Military capabilities were strengthened through development of quick response teams. International political agreements with other countries (Cuba, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany, and USA) were strengthened to prevent hijackings and state sponsorship for FLQ. Various measures contributed to reducing terrorist activity and enabled arrest of suspects. Accommodation and co-optation was facilitated by emergence of new separatist political parties committed to non-violence such as Mouvement Souveraineté Association (MSA) and Parti Quebecois (PQ). These moderate parties drew away some of FLQ’s members, while some of its prominent members also began to publicly denounce ambiguity of its values. Labour unions also denounced its violence, and a majority of Quebecans supported conventional forms of political participation (Ross 1995, pp. 292-295).

FLQ operated in a democratic political cultural environment that preferred tolerance than confrontation. Its loss of a public support base, and frequent leadership changes hampered by lack of experience undermined its influence and capacity to recruit more members (Charters 1997, pp. 134-142, 162). The Canadian government dealt with national-separatist terrorism by resolving one of its main grievances. It improved social conditions and granted the region the right to vote on secession. This conciliatory political move quelled social resentment. The government’s model of granting concessions, restricting terrorists’ activities through surveillance, and target-hardening worked in its favour (Miller GD 2007, pp. 334, 338).

Lessons to be learned from FLQ terror activities were that counter-terrorism measures employed during the early years of the campaign were probably not as effective because the government may have underestimated their capacity. The early years were also those where FLQ had a larger
social following because of real grievances that needed to be resolved. With the passage of time, the government managed to transform the conflict to its political advantage by implementing new and better strategies that reduced the need for further violence (Ross 1995, p. 294).

Miller GD (2007, pp. 342-343) has proposed five categories of government counter action: occasionally do nothing, conciliate, legal reform, restriction, or military force. Strategies that were found to be most effective in countering primarily national-separatist groups such as FLQ and ETA involved a combination of concessions, legal reform, and restriction. Restriction measures involving surveillance tended to work effectively against small groups including Al-Qaeda’s because it was religiously-motivated and opposed even minor reforms. Counter-terrorism approaches can be tailored to match the scope of terrorist group goals and type of ideology.

Lessons from nationalist and separatist groups highlighted how governments have prioritised their counter-terrorism measures by resolving grievances at the local level. This approach managed to shift public attention and anger towards constructive political engagement. Domestic grievances that formed the basis for violent opposition and terrorism were addressed by implementing needed improvements in the economy and polity. Revolutionary groups with expansionist approaches were then gradually marginalised and left to face legitimacy and trust issues and challenges from their constituents as the rationale for continued violence was questioned. Organisational weaknesses from strategic errors, elitist behaviour, generational changes, group competition, lack of resources; and changes in political ideology were factors that contributed to physical and ideological decline of such groups.
Chapter 6

Cases of Transnational Jihadist Terrorism in the Middle East, North Africa, and East Africa

This chapter evaluates the extent of support Al-Qaeda’s transnational terrorist movement has in the Middle East, North Africa, and East Africa using cases of Sunni terrorist groups that formally pledged allegiance to its senior leaders and adhered to its ideology. The groups that are explored include Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM) in Somalia. These groups’ terrorist activities are also evaluated in light of new political developments in North Africa and the Middle East that occurred from 2010 onwards, that created new opportunities as well as impediments in Al-Qaeda’s ideological expansion. The movement has often made efforts to overcome new challenges by increasing the number of affiliate groups that can flexibility conduct terrorist attacks on its behalf. This expanded and diversified approach enabled the movement to project itself globally as a tough opponent because of the scope and capability of its violence.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – Algeria

The Organization of Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an Algerian Sunni Muslim faction that was founded in 2006 after a formal alliance with Al-Qaeda (Knight 2009, p. 1). Originally known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat GSPC that was formed in 1998, the group broke away from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in opposition to GIA’s brutal violence on civilians (Harmon 2010, p. 16). GIA was formed after Algerian military forces took control of the government in 1992. GIA’s targets at
the time included teachers, intelligentsia, journalists, administrators, and civilians. The group’s mounting death toll of over 700 deaths caused some of its members to question the usefulness of continuing to engage in indiscriminate violence (Atkins 2004, pp. 26-27). Hassan Hattab, GSPC’s leader later resigned when GSPC began to lean towards Al-Qaeda’s international jihadist agenda, and was replaced by Nabil Sahraoui in 2001. After Nabil was killed by Algerian security forces in June 2004 Abdelmalek Droukdel took over the leadership of GSPC. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was officially founded on 11 September 2006 by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s second in command, and GSPC’s leader Abdelmalek Droukdel (Harmon 2010, pp. 14-15).

AQIM expanded its non-secularist domestic goals by linking activities with Al-Qaeda’s pan-Islamist ideology. It established camps in Tunisia, Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Mauritania. The group sent some its members to assist fellow Sunni insurgents fighting against coalition forces in Iraq (Colvin 2008, p. 6). Thus, AQIM’s targets have included foreigners (e.g. Americans, French, and Israelis), westerners, and supporters of secular Arab governments that were considered to be ‘un-Islamic’ and authoritarian (Hansen & Vriens 2009). It adopted Al-Qaeda’s tactics of suicide bombing, a strategy not practiced in Algeria until the arrival of Al-Qaeda’s ideologues (Harmon 2010, p. 16).

AQIM’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda’s senior leaders became a limitation as the motive was probably aimed at drawing external resources to improve its image and survival in Algeria (Gray & Stockham 2008, p. 91). Despite some of its leaders having shared combat experience with Al-Qaeda’s core leaders in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Caucasus, and Iraq, some leaders within AQIM were hesitant of
merging with Al-Qaeda because of its transnational jihadist ideology (Kohlmann 2007, p. 19; Knight 2009, pp. 3-5).

Consequently, disagreements emerged over campaign strategy and scope, as some leaders began to question the necessity of fighting under a global jihadist ideology. Moderates in the organisation such as Hassan Hattab considered a global agenda unachievable, including the pursuit of national jihad that involved overthrow of the Algerian government and its replacement with an Islamist state based on Sharia law (Harmon 2010, pp. 16-20). Implementation of Al-Qaeda-type Sharia law (Botha 2008, p. 76), and reliance on suicide bombing also increased tension and led to leadership splits. There was growing perception and suspicion among some key leaders of AQIM that Al-Qaeda groups were in the country to promote their selfish interests. AQIM’s strategies widened ideological differences between moderates and hardliners as disagreements over leadership style and tactics continued between Hassan Hattab and the globally oriented Nabil Sahraoui, Abdelmalek Droukdel, and Saïfi. When Droukdel took over leadership, he is alleged to have replaced experienced leaders with loyalists and ordered suicide attacks without consulting junior leaders. His actions lowered morale of low ranking members as well (Guitta, 2008). Droukdel’s leadership style was deemed autocratic, and to have sacrificed group goals and independence (Botha 2008, pp. 77, 82-83).

Due to ideological differences in perspectives and approaches, some of AQIM’s top moderate leaders opted for peace and accommodation with the Algerian government. Hassan Hattab is reported in 2007 to have called on other moderate members to accept national amnesty in return for immunity from prosecution. Hassan Hattab considered Al-Qaeda’s influence in Algerian politics
as importing a foreign security problem that contributed to increase the level of violence in the country (Johnson 2006). AQIM’s broad targeting gradually shifted from its original domestic focus of targeting government personnel.

Some former leaders of GSPC and AQIM who reconciled with the government and surrendered included Said Ameur, Abdelkader Benmessoud, and Hassan Hattab. Some who did not surrender chose to distance themselves from the Al-Qaeda global phenomenon (Botha 2008, pp. 77-78). This included some foreign leaders and fighters. Many militants who opted for accommodation with government accepted to participate in the electoral process. AQIM’s prospects by 2010 were diminishing as some of its key leaders were killed or detained, while some are reported to have turned to trafficking contraband and other illegal activities for survival. The operational capability of AQIM was reduced to smaller attacks (Harmon 2010, pp. 16-27; Colvin 2008, p. 10). AQIM operated mainly in the northern coastal areas and southern parts of Algeria, and Northern Mali (The US National Counterterrorism Centre, Counter Terrorism Calendar 2014).

To reduce AQIM’s terrorist threat the Algerian government focused predominantly on reducing domestic terrorism by strengthening counter-terrorism capabilities and criminalising terrorism. Involvement in transnational terrorism was subject to a fine or 10-20 years imprisonment (Botha 2008, pp. 6, 8). The government’s reconciliation programs aimed to improve socio-economic conditions. Political space in Algeria gradually opened and positive improvements occurred although incrementally. Survival needs of the local population were being addressed through workable solutions. Internationally, increasing counter-terrorism presence of the United States and some European governments in North Africa also contributed to deny AQIM safe havens to expand
its activities (Gray & Stockham 2008, pp. 91, 96). Cooperation with the United States through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) included capacity building through technical training and economic development assistance (Godec 2010, p. 5).

AQIM’s influence was drastically marginalised, and reduced in size and strength. Fragmentation was facilitated through intense government pressure that caused it to shift operations to ungoverned areas of Mali, Niger, and Mauritania (Hansen & Vriens 2009). The majority of Algerians rejected Al-Qaeda’s pan-Islamist ideology (Gray & Stockham 2008, p. 91; Botha 2008, p. 76), and its high level of violence that largely targeted civilians. Local communities strongly supported pursuing reform through domestic processes (Harmon 2010, pp. 16, 20). Lack of financial resources, problems with recruitment, and low level of public support contributed to lower morale within AQIM (Colvin 2008, pp. 10-11). Changes in the group’s posture (i.e. shift from terrorism to more criminal activities) suggested its capacity to impose its version of an Islamic state on the Algerian people was diminishing (Filiu 2009, p. 223). In 2009, AQIM appeared to have been much more concerned with survival at home than advancing national or global jihadist objectives (Harmon 2010, pp. 16-27). Lack of cohesion was an issue that led to leadership rivalries and group fragmentation. Successful counter-terrorist approaches subsequently reduced its capability as an effective threat to the Algerian regime (Cristiani & Fabiani 2011, p.11).

AQIM’s growing problems were highlighted by its change in focus from national priorities to international objectives when it linked with the Al-Qaeda movement groups (Gray & Stockham 2008, p. 94). This strategic choice of forming alliances negatively impacted on its ability to achieve stated domestic goals, as well as selling the Al-Qaeda brand of politics and religion to the Algerian
people (Harmon 2010, pp. 16-17, 20). As political legitimacy and religious authority of Al-Qaeda core leadership continually got scrutinised, that of AQIM’s hardliners was also challenged from a similar basis because its leaders were ideologically bound to Al-Qaeda’s jihadist ideology (Knight 2009, pp. 3-5). Political and social developments highlighted how younger generations of activists and some terrorist leaders could focus differently on contentious issues and pose competitive challenges for transnational groups (Botha 2008, p. 202). While Al-Qaeda movement ideology resonated with a few groups, it was considered alien and the source of increased insecurity in Algeria.

AQIM’s main objective was to overthrow the Algerian government and to replace it with one based on strict Sharia law. It advocated for the freeing of Maghreb countries of North African from Spanish and French influences, and to regain lost Islamic regions in Southern Spain known as al-Andalus. The group also extended its support for the Palestinians, and targeted Jewish and Christian interests (Australian Government, Parliamentary Committee 2011, p. 60). By linking with Al-Qaeda movement it declared support for conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Chechnya, and Palestine. This approach caused it to target foreigners and Western interests throughout North Africa and Europe (Australian Government, National Security website, 11 February 2015). While some splintering occurred within AQIM, its splinter groups have continued to fight for Islamic causes.

AQIM responded to growing hostility towards its activities in Algeria by establishing loose alliances with small extremist North African groups fighting for regime change such as the Libyan Ansar al-Sharia group (defenders of the faith) that operated in Derna and Jebel Akhdar; Ansar Eddinne in
Mali formed in December 2011 by Iyad ag Ghali; Nigerian groups Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis-Sudan (JAMBS) established in 2012 that advocated for the protection of Muslims in Black Africa, and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad popularly known as Boko Haram that was founded by Abubakar Mohammed Shekau. Ansar al-Sharia Derna (Libya) ideologically linked with Ansar al-Shari’a (Tunisia) and is believed to have operated training camps for foreign terrorists who intended to travel to join fighting groups in Iraq and Syrian conflicts (The United Nations Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, 23 January 2015).

Dissident groups of AQIM such as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) were founded in late 2011, while al-Mulathamun Battalion and its subordinate al-Muwaqi’un Bil-Dima (Those Who Sign With Blood) was founded in 2012. This group was led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar. These two groups merged in August 2013 to form al-Murabitun (The Sentinels) with the objective of “uniting all Muslims from the Nile to the Atlantic into a jihadist network to oppose “westerners” and “liberate Mali from France”. AQIM was also linked to Ansar Bayt al Maqdis that operated in Egypt (US National Counterterrorism Centre, Counterterrorism Calendar 2014). Another splinter group known as the Caliphate soldiers in Algeria or Jound al Khilafa fi Ard al Jazayer and led by Abdelmalek Gouri, was formed in 2014 (Chikhi 2014).

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) made little political progress in Algeria prior to linking with the Al-Qaeda movement ideology. Internationalisation drew political attention to its perceived high profile and success, which perhaps also contributed to the emergence of newly branded groups in North Africa from 2011 that sought to benefit from AQIM’s growing network activities in weak states of the Sahel. This type of rebranding and franchising was also reflected in the activities of a number
of small Middle Eastern groups that declared allegiance to Al-Qaeda movement senior leaders (Alda & Sala 2014, pp. 2-3). The map shows how AQIM exploited resurgent group activities in several African countries to broaden its appeal, targeting, and tactics. The mutual relationship enabled various groups to operate using the same basic jihadist outlook, despite having different capabilities (Chivvis & Liepman 2013, p. 4).

Map 7. AQIM’s relationships with other jihadist groups

AQIM has operated in the same geographical space where criminal networks engaged in smuggling activities of cigarettes, guns, drugs, and human trafficking. There are suggestions the
group benefited in its operational areas from taxes it imposed on the narcotics trafficking trade in cocaine and hashish originating from Latin America destined for the European market (Rodriguez 2013, p.22). AQIM’s primary source of revenue was derived from kidnapping for ransom in the Sahel and Sahara region. The US department of the Treasury reported that the average ransom payment per hostage to AQIM in 2010 was US$4.5 million. Demands increased in 2011 to US$5.4 million. Ransom payments could be increased for western hostages as they could pay more money for the release of captives (US Department of the Treasury 2012, 5 October 2012). Other funding was derived from protection rackets, trafficking (people, arms), and money laundering (Australian Government, Parliamentary Committee 2011, p. 61). The security vacuum created by porous borders in some countries in the region including political instability facilitated activities of criminal groups including “gangster-jihadists” who got paid by AQIM to recruit and supply foreign fighters. The term “gangster jihadists” was used by French parliamentarians to refer to Al-Qaeda’s economic gunmen (Lewis & Diarra 2012).

AQIM in 2012 was reported to have had around 1,000 fighters operating in Algeria and a small number in the Sahel. The group’s activities were constrained by lack of general appeal (US Department of State 2012, p. 259). In terms of shaping its future prospects, AQIM also linked its activities to Syria and Iraq conflicts in 2012 and supported Sunni opposition groups fighting for regime change (Chivvis & Liepman 2013, p. 7). Like Al-Qaeda movement, AQIM’s long term survival was also likely to be determined by the strength of its associated groups. While there may have been some resonance of Al-Qaeda’s Salafist brand of Islam in Arab Africa, theological and ethno-racial divisions in black African countries limited its physical and ideological expansion. In Nigeria, the predominant brand of Islam is Sufism (Thornberry & Levy 2011, p.7).
Nigeria’s multi-religious society was 50% Muslim and 40% Christian in 2010. Speaking on behalf of the leadership of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), Abdul-Lateef Adegbite on 2 February 2010 emphasised on IslamOnline.net that Al-Qaeda was ‘not welcome’ in Nigeria because it had the potential to incite ethnic and social crisis (Oriyomi 2010). Nigeria was at the time grappling with terrorism from the Boko Haram group in the majority Muslim north of the country. Cooperation between the two groups had potential to increase sectarian tensions in the country as the two groups shared training, funding and social media resources and were linked to the Al-Qaeda movement (Institute for Economics and Peace, Global terrorism index 2015, p. 41).

The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) known as Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya was founded in 1995 by returnees from the Afghan-Soviet conflict, whose goal was to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi’s government and replace it with an Islamic state. To fulfil this objective, the group’s leader Abu Laith al Libi announced an alliance with the Al-Qaeda movement in November 2007 (BBC News UK, 3 November 2007). In the deal, Al-Qaeda’s second in command Ayman al-Zawahri called for the overthrow of governments in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria (Roggio 2007). With this reciprocal move, the group affiliated with some extremist groups fighting in Egypt and Algeria. It targeted security forces, and was accused of involvement in the Casablanca suicide bombing attacks in May 2003. At its peak LIFG was estimated to have 1,000 active members and a network of supporters in Libya, the Middle East, and Europe (Black 2011).

LIFG found itself under pressure from the Gadaffi regime and was officially banned in 2010. It was also placed on the list of designated foreign terrorist organisations by the US government (US
National Counter Terrorism Centre, Counter Terrorism Calendar 2014). However, changes in the political landscape in 2011 after the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime resulted in LIFG forging a common political bond with other reform movements in the country. One of the group’s leaders, Abd al-Hakim Belis, became the commander of the Tripoli Military Council (TMC) which was part of the National Transitional Council (NTC) until the time of political elections in 2012. Some leaders disassociated from Al-Qaeda ideology because it largely targeted civilians and feared losing constituent support (Gunaratna 2011, p. 4). In 2007, Noman Benotman, ex-leader of the group wrote a letter to Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s second in command asking him to cease terrorist operations in Muslim and western countries. Al-Qaeda’s objectives were becoming counterproductive to the group’s domestic aspirations (Stakelbeck 2010).

The rationale for Al-Qaeda’s extremist ideology in Libya was undermined as LIFG reshaped its ideological domestic narrative to fit new national political and social realities (Stern & Schweitzer 2011). This action marginalised Al-Qaeda movement and caused it to be viewed as an outsider or outlier in terms of achieving long-term aims of LIFG and aspirations of the Libyan people. The group distanced itself from Al-Qaeda affiliation even though some of its leaders fought alongside Al-Qaeda militants during the Afghan-Soviet conflict in the 1980s.

On 15 February 2011 LIFG transformed and changed its name to the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC) al-Harakat al-Islamiya al-Libiya. LIMC participated in coalition efforts to form a political party with other Islamist and non-Islamist groups. This strategic adaptation of the group leaders’ actions highlighted the benefit of pragmatic politics (Ashour 2012, pp. 4-5).
While LIIG insurgent activities ceased, the emergence of new jihadist groups that sought to implement strict sharia law continued to raise concerns of Al-Qaeda type violence. Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi (ASB) was led by Muhammad Zahawi until January 2015 (Joselyn 2015). The group was linked to smaller Salafi-jihadist katibas (battalions) in Libya such as Ansar al-Sharia in Darnah (ASD) that was led by Abu Sufyan bin Qumu, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee. Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi was also alleged to be connected to the Tunisian group Ansar al-Sharia. While these terrorist groups’ activities were not transnational, their operational linkages introduced a different type of violent confrontation linked to Al-Qaeda movement groups (Zelin 2012). These groups were less popular in their own countries, highlighting consistent challenges faced by Al-Qaeda inspired groups.

**Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Saudi Arabia**

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was established in January 2009 following a merger of Saudi Arabian and Yemeni groups whose leaders (e.g. Nassir al Wahishi) had close connections to Al-Qaeda’s commanders who fought in Afghanistan during the 1980s (Novak, 2009). The group comprised mainly veterans from the anti-Soviet-Afghan campaign in the 1980s, and the Taliban campaign in the 1990s. Some had fought in the Bosnian or Chechnya conflicts (Hegghammer 2006a, pp. 45-46).

Counter-terrorism operations in Saudi Arabia forced AQAP to shift operations to Yemen and operate primarily in the Arabian Peninsula. The group targeted Saudi Arabia as well as Yemen. Targets in Yemen included government forces, tourists, and infrastructure. In Saudi Arabia it targeted civilians, the United States, and western interests. The strategy was to use Yemen as a
hub for groups based in Saudi Arabia and other countries (University of Maryland, National Counter Terrorism Centre 2014). AQAP's objectives included the expulsion of Jews and crusaders (Westerners) from the Arabian Peninsula, re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate, introduction of sharia, and the liberation of Muslim lands from external western influences (Australian Government National Security Website, 2015).

Chart 2. AQAP’s messaging focus 2013

Analysis of more than 45 AQAP’s messages by the US private firm IntelCenter on 4 August 2013 highlighted the US was the number one target in terms of its opposition to western interests followed by France. References to Yemen, Mali, and Saudi Arabia indicated its historical pattern of activity. Messages that were drawn from audio, video, written statements, magazines, and press
comments indicated the group’s focus extended to western countries and interests (IntelCenter 2013).

AQAP was blamed for an assassination attempt on the counter-terrorism chief Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in 2009, and seeking to provoke sectarian conflict between the Sunni majority and Shiite minority communities, potentially undermining the stability of Saudi Arabia (Stratfor, Editorial note, June 2012). AQAP experienced difficulties in marketing its extreme pan-Islamist ideology in Saudi Arabia because the country lacked a socio-revolutionary culture that it could exploit, and the majority of the population opposed its violence (Hegghammer 2008, p. 714).

The Saudi Arabian government dealt with sporadic instances of terrorism before the Al-Qaeda movement attacks occurred in the United States on 11 September 2001. In dealing with Al-Qaeda’s ideological influence, the government’s counter-terrorism measures included freezing assets belonging to Osama bin Laden and his associates, revoking Osama bin Laden’s Saudi citizenship (Zuhur 2005, p. 22), and continually monitoring radical activities of some social charities and clergy. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation to share counter-terrorism information with neighbouring countries was enhanced. The government’s amnesty program established in 2004 facilitated return of weapons and surrender of some militants. The coercive power of the state and lack of popular support for violence generally restricted AQAP’s transnational jihadist narrative in the country. AQAP at its peak numbered 500-600 members. By the end of 2004, 400-500 of its militants including most leaders had either been killed or detained. AQAP’s capacity was subsequently limited to recruiting young and inexperienced fighters who were subject to intelligence infiltration, capture, and imprisonment (Cordesman & Obaid 2005, pp. 5-20). These strict measures limited the
impact of AQAP’s influence in Saudi Arabia where its threat was considered less significant (Hegghammer 2008, p. 703) as its credibility was tainted with a violent image.

Popular protests in Saudi Arabia that were inspired by the Arab spring uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East in December 2011 influenced positive changes from the government side, such as increasing spending on housing, job creation, and making political concessions (Stratfor 2011). The Saudi situation demonstrated how Al-Qaeda’s attempts to exploit popular feelings of anger and injustice, and the Arab-Israeli conflict could fail by prioritising domestic concerns. Reform-minded Islamist groups preferred the certainty of measured changes (Cordesman & Obaid 2005, p. 21; Burton & Stewart 2009).

In evaluating the nature of terrorism in Saudi Arabia, the biographies of 240 Saudi militants (A.6, Table 6), who were interviewed by Hegghammer between 2004 and 2005, suggested the ‘Afghan factor’ was the main cause for their violence rather than socio-economic conditions in the home country (Hegghammer 2006a, p. 46). Saudi militants expressed divergent motives even for participating in jihadist activities in Afghanistan (Hegghammer 2006b, p. 14). Motives were political, religious, and personal, and many militants had experienced social adjustment problems on their return to Saudi Arabia (Hegghammer 2006c, pp. 24-29). These results, drawn from Hegghammer’s field work research indicated how the ideology exhibited by some individuals who joined AQAP’s terrorism in Saudi Arabia was fuelled by an extreme version of pan-Islam that was anti-American because of the government’s alleged connection with the United States. At the time of AQAP’s formation its focus was largely on the ‘far enemy’ not Saudi Arabia the ‘near enemy’. Earlier phases of AQAP’s discourse of armed struggle focused less on governance or regime change. The
broader Saudi population did not support jihadist extremism including globalising jihad, and regime change was not high on the list of grievances (Hegghammer 2008, pp. 705-706).

The theological debate against terrorism in the country between moderates and extremists was influenced by clerics such as Salman al-Awda, Safar al-Hawali, and Nasir al-Umar who also issued statements in May 2003 and April 2004 urging militants to surrender to government authorities (Hegghammer 2008, pp. 705-706). The general public in Saudi Arabia rejected and condemned violent methods to effect change. AQAP by 2015 largely operated in the southern region of Yemen, where it posed direct threats to governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and to western interests because of its declared Al-Qaeda affiliation. The strategy for countering AQAP consistently involved denying it a representative constituency and weakening its network of relations with Al-Qaeda movement in the country.

Yemen provided a favourable political environment for AQAP as it was confronted with a number of local conflicts involving Shia and Sunni armed groups fighting over access to power and resources. The country at the time was on the brink of a civil war. Shia Houthi rebels officially referred to as Ansar Allah in the north and north-western Yemen fought against the government since 2004. They also fought to prevent Salafi influence in their regions as AQAP’s local affiliated Ansar al-Sharia militants got involved in the sectarian clashes (Adaki 2014). AQAP exploited the sectarian narrative of Sunni Muslims in the south who felt marginalised as a result of unification of the north and south in 1990 to form the Republic of Yemen (Maslin 2015).
On 11 July 2010, AQAP launched its English language publication *Inspire* as a recruitment drive to broaden its campaign to non-Muslim speaking populations. The first edition included statements of leading figures such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Musab al Suri (Zimmerman, 2010). In the context of jihadist ideology, AQAP targeted Al-Qaeda’s ‘far’ and ‘near’ enemies from its activities in Yemen, and developed links to other groups in the region. Its militants also travelled to support fellow Sunnis fighting in Iraq and Syria in 2012. The *Yemeni Times* on 17 August 2014 reported how some AQAP leaders in Yemen also supported jihadist activities of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria indicating sharing of tactics and strategies among some groups (Al-Moshki 2014). Old Al-Qaeda affiliates were benefiting from new groups.

**Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia AQI)**

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was established in 2004 by Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to assist Sunni insurgent communities in Iraq who were fighting against US-led coalition forces. Prior to its formation, Zarqawi was in charge of a small group known as *Jamā‘at al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād* (JTJ) or the ‘United Salafi Group’ which he had established with Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi in 1994 while in Jordan. Prior to moving to the Middle East Zarqawi had spent some time in Afghanistan in 1989, having been recruited into Al-Qaeda in 1988 by Abdul-Majid Majali, also a Jordanian to join a recruitment organization known as Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) formed to support the Afghan resistance. In 1989 Zarqawi served as one of the key organizers for Palestinians, Syrians, and Jordanian arrivals in Peshawar and Afghanistan who were destined for combat training in Khost (Youssef 2009, p.12).
When the Afghan insurgency ended Zarqawi returned to Jordan in 1994 and linked up with Abu Muhammad Al-Maqqdisi where both were later arrested by the Jordanian government for radical activities which included distributing radical literature, and planning terrorist attacks on Jordanian and Israeli interests. Upon release in 1999, Zarqawi fled to Afghanistan and linked up with the remaining Al-Qaeda leaders, and ran a training camp while preferring to maintain operational independence from Al-Qaeda. The emergence of insurgency in Iraq prompted Zarqawi to relocate to the country in 2003, where numbers of his small group Jamāʿat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād (JTJ) increased. At its height JTJ had around 1,500 fighters distributed in Fallujah (500), Mosul (400), al-Qaim (150), a-Anbar (60), Baghdad (50), commanded by some talented military operatives (Youssef 2009, pp. 13-15).

The group’s name JTJ was changed in October 2004 to Tanẓīm Qāʿidat al-Jihād fī Bilād al-Rāfidayn (TQJBR) or Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) after Zarqawi informally pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and allied with Al-Qaeda. From then onwards AQI under Zarqawi became the model of Al-Qaeda’s insurgent operations (Felter & Fishman 2007, p. 4), and the new movement affiliate although Zarqawi continued to maintain operational independence.

In the period 2004-2006, five other small groups were integrated into AQI. They included Jaysh al-Ta’ifa al-Mansura, Saraya Ansar al-Tawhid, Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami, Saraya al- Ghuraba, and Kataib al-Ahwal to form a coalition known as Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen (MSM). Following Zarqawi’s death on 7 June 2006, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (Abu Ayyub al-Masri) became AQI’s new leader who strengthened MSM by establishing al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq, or the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in October 2006. ISI in 2006 was earning approximately US$70-200 million per year,
mostly from extortions, oil smuggling, and ransom payments. ISI in 2007 represented a qualitative evolution of an Al-Qaeda affiliate as it later transformed into a military-political actor with a structured administrative cabinet responsible for governing territory (Lister 2014, pp. 6-11).

Under the leadership of Zarqawi, AQI attracted an increasing number of local and foreign jihadists to support the Sunni insurgency, which was depicted as a war of liberation against America and its allies. Young Arab volunteers travelled from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, countries in North Africa, and Europe. The majority of volunteers were from Saudi Arabia with some connection to transnational networks already established during the Soviet-Afghan conflict in the 1980s (Hafez 2007, p. 5). To increase numbers AQI launched its first online magazine Zurwat al-Sanam (Arabic for tip of the camel’s hump, meaning ideal Islamic practice) in 2005. Featuring texts, stories of fallen jihadists, and photographs of Osama bin Laden and US President George Bush, the magazine was aimed at spreading jihadist propaganda and conveying the group’s version of events which required urgent response from the Sunni Muslim community (Seib 2009, p. 75).

A review in November 2007 by the US Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point of the Sinjar Records of 595 foreign Al-Qaeda recruits who entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007 indicated most fighters were drawn from neighbouring countries in the region: Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, and Jordan. Saudi Arabia had 244 (41%), Libya 112 (18.8%), Syria 49 (8.2%), Yemen 48 (8.1%), Algeria 43 (7.2%), Morocco 36 (6.1%), and Jordan 11 (1.9%), (Felter & Fishman 2007, pp. 3-9).
The majority of Libyan fighters originated from coastal cities of Dernah 53 (60.2%), and Benghazi 21 (23.9%) in the North East, areas that were associated with jihadist militancy since the mid-1990s (Felter & Fishman 2007, p. 11). In the table that highlighted types of intended work in the country’s conflict, categories of “combatant” and “fighters” were counted as “fighter”, while “martyr”, “martyrdom”, “suicide,” and “suicide mission” were counted as “suicide bomber” (Felter & Fishman 2007, p. 18). Libyan fighters were mostly registered as ‘suicide bombers’ than fighters. Of the 122 Libyans, 52 listed as suicide bombers (Felter & Fishman 2007, p. 19).

**Table 7. Intended work of fighters by nationality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Suicide bombing</th>
<th>Fighter</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>76 (50.3%)</td>
<td>73 (48.3%)</td>
<td>2 (1.3%)</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>52 (85.2%)</td>
<td>8 (13.1%)</td>
<td>1 (1.6%)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>22 (91.7%)</td>
<td>2 (8.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>21 (65.6%)</td>
<td>10 (31.2%)</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5 (13.9%)</td>
<td>30 (83.3%)</td>
<td>1 (2.8%)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>18 (46.1%)</td>
<td>21 (53.9%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>10 (41.7%)</td>
<td>14 (58.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average age of foreign fighters in the sample was around 25 years. Most were first time volunteers, and students, indicating universities were becoming a critical source in the recruitment of a new generation of Al-Qaeda fighters (Felter & Fishman 2007, pp. 16-17). Most fighters entered Iraq via Syria, and were facilitated by smugglers and criminal networks working for money (Felter & Fishman 2007, p. 25). Al-Qaeda ideology embraced the concept of suicide bombing, and continued to attract new generations of volunteers to fight in conflicts involving pan-Islamic nationalism.

Similar to Afghanistan, Zarqawi reinforced the notion of an Islamic state and viewed his role of ‘establishing for Islam a homeland’ to require ‘waging jihad, applying Shari’a, and establishing a caliphate’. This message attracted hundreds of young militants who adhered to an extremist strain of Salafi jihadism. Zarqawi is reputed to have directly contributed to Al-Qaeda’s key ideological tenets of focusing on anti-Shiism and restoring the caliphate, although he later clashed with Al-Qaeda leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi for overly targeting Shia communities. He deliberately targeted Shia communities and considered this branch of Islam historically deceitful and responsible for converting Iranian dynasty into Shiism during the Safavid dynasty in the 16th to 17th centuries. AQI’s leader clearly intended to provoke a sectarian civil war which he nearly succeeded in achieving. To Zarqawi, Shia communities posed a greater threat compared to the Americans who represented the occupying power. The main objective of the Sunni insurgency was to prevent Shi’ites and America from seizing political power (Bunzel 2015, pp. 14-15).

In terms of ethnic structure, Arabs formed the majority followed by Kurds, Turkoman, Assyrians, and other groups. The majority of the population were Shia Muslims, followed by Sunni. Christians,

### Table 8. Ethnic and religious characteristics of Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic composition</th>
<th>Religious composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian, other smaller groups (5%)</td>
<td>Muslim 99% (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%); Christians 0.8%; Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, followers of folk religion, and the unaffiliated account for approximately 1% each.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s goals of expelling US forces from Iraq, extending the jihadist terrorist wave to secular communities throughout the country, and targeting Israel caused him to rely on suicide bombers which resulted in the death of many Muslims including clerics. Consequently, this tactical decision strained AQI’s relations with local communities, and created a schism within the leadership of Al-Qaeda movement (Cordesman 2006, pp. 32, 36). Although 80% of attacks were aimed at coalition forces, violence by AQI militants was also directed at Shia, Kurds, and other minorities. 80% of civilian casualties that occurred during Zarqawi’s leadership were attributed to AQI’s foreign fighters (Cordesman 2006, p. 1). AQI became famous for suicide bombings and beheadings, actions that even Ayman al-Zawahiri who technically was the leader of Al-Qaeda command considered to be damaging the movement’s image and its social standing within the Muslim community. Zarqawi’s focus on achieving victory at any cost created strategic vulnerabilities that weakened the organisation (Gerges 2011).
A copy of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi dated 9 July 2005 that was released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on 11 October 2005, urged Zarqawi to stop violent attacks on ordinary Shia. While acknowledging the importance of expelling Americans and extending jihad to secular countries neighboring Iraq, Zawahiri emphasised to Zarqawi the value of maintaining popular support in the media battle (GlobalSecurity.org, July 2016). Zarqawi was later killed by an American air strike in June 2006 (Gerges 2011).

AQI operated mainly in northern, central, and western Iraq (Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2014, p.1). Zarqawi’s brutal operations in these areas soured relations with local Sunni communities who expected the role and presence of foreign fighters to complement their efforts. The temporary alliance deteriorated due to ideological differences and indiscriminate violence. The developing schism created a strategic opportunity for the US-led coalition and Iraqi government forces to exploit and transform the insurgency to the government’s political advantage (Kilcullen 2007).

Contributing factors for AQI’s decline in Anbar province in the period 2004-2007 were strategic and tactical. Its leaders demonstrated bad leadership by seeking to impose political and religious authority over local tribal and clan structures. They encouraged indiscriminate and sectarian violence between Shia and Sunni communities which created political and cultural backlash against foreign fighters, while at the same time failing to defend their Sunni allies from retaliation. Attempts by AQI leaders to create an Islamic State of Iraq that would dominate Iraq after US withdrawal was considered farfetched as most Sunni groups fought over different domestic objectives (Fishman 2009, p. 5).
Zarqawi was a foreigner whose behaviour became dictatorial. Locals, whose kinship ties were stronger than those largely based on religion found their social customs and economic survival threatened by foreign insurgent agendas. To them, AQI had interfered with the local balance of power relations and downplayed the importance of cultural ties and customs when dealing with social and political issues. Attempts by some of AQI’s militants to cement strategic alliances by marrying into local families did not bode well in some communities as local custom did not allow marriage to foreigners or strangers. Cultural and political insensitivity contributed to the inevitable break down of the temporary alliance between the two allies (Kilcullen 2007, p. 2).

AQI’s overly ambitious vision of transforming nationalist Sunni aspirations into a country-wide and regional conflict between Sunni and Shia, Kurds, and other minorities was not what locals wanted. The outcome would have spread jihadist activism across Muslim-dominated Arab countries. Global revolutionary objectives were contrasted with local Sunni aspirations that were essentially nationalist, and reformist. Some Sunni and Shia groups advocated for religious tolerance (Phillips 2009a, Abstract p. 66). While religious differences existed between some extremist groups, there were moderates, and most Sunni communities disliked the prospect of the insurgency transforming into a sectarian civil war. Secular ideology, tribal sensitivities, and concerns of moderates were perceived by local groups to be mutually reinforcing (Baram 2005, pp. 1, 16-17).

There were varying reasons for participating in the Sunni insurgency:

(i). Primary concerns among Sunni groups were related to security, and preservation of cultural values of honour and identity. Shame and humiliation affected these values that were considered as one package in group relations. Tribal ethics determined what was right and wrong. The Al-
Qaeda model of activities interfered by imposing its own values and rules and trying to change social norms (Dilegge 2007).

(ii). Some insurgent groups sought to reverse political developments and prevent Shia or Kurd ascendancy (Hafez 2007, p. 36). They feared a future of political exclusion in the new government’s allocation of jobs.

(iii). Some groups joined the insurgency out of fear of persecution for being previously associated with Saddam Hussein’s government, while others joined to avenge deaths of relatives. AQI’s presence in their areas was supposed to provide some certainty and protection but was failing to deliver as expected (Rose 2009).

AQI had expansionist goals, lacked local sensitivity, displayed an inflexible attitude, and relied on indiscriminate violence. Its extremist ideology was deemed incompatible with local approaches (Kilcullen, 2007). Attempts by AQI’s foreign insurgents to hijack the entire conflict and turn it into a holy war, and prevent any possibility of secular groups joining the political process was viewed by local tribes as imposing their will and authority on them. Prior to Zarqawi’s leadership the insurgency was largely about the presence of American-led forces following the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime (Jones 2015, Transcript of ABC Lateline program interview with Michael Ware, 3 June).

Zarqawi used Falluja as the headquarters of insurgent operations, and had the grand vision of establishing an Islamic State of Iraq and a caliphate. Formation of the Islamic State that was announced by the Shura Council of Jihad Fighters on 15 October 2006 through a video posted on Islamist websites, was intended to unite the mujahideen and prevent ‘fitna’ (sedition). The political
entity would have incorporated provinces of Baghdad, Al-Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah Al-Din, Nineveh, and parts of Babil Province (see map). Sunni Muslims around the world were urged to support the new political entity (MEMRI, October 17, 2006).

Zarqawi's grand vision of establishing an Islamic State of Iraq and a caliphate may have captured the imagination of a new generation of jihadists who were inspired by AQI's victories in Iraq. However, the decision was made without consulting leaders of Al-Qaeda central command (Kazimi, 2008), or traditional local leaders.

Map 8. Envisioned Islamic state of Al-Qaeda in Iraq

There were concerns AQI was attempting to impose Taliban-style rule which intimidated less radical groups. A United Nations official who served in Iraq, and who requested anonymity indicated in a telephone interview in 2005 that the nationalist part of the insurgency had become
‘fed up’ with foreign jihadists who were focused on ‘grabbing headlines’ and attacking civilians. The Al-Qaeda model was dominated by hardline groups and the willingness to fight within it was eroding. Zarqawi had probably not anticipated the developing rift that subsequently fed into red-on-red fighting or enemy development (Roggio 2005).

Targeting Sunni Muslims and religious leaders who disagreed with AQI’s extremist version of jihad alienated local religious leaders and militants. This approach contributed to growing differences in political, cultural, and religious objectives that eventually led to the formation of the Awakening Movement, that pushed foreign fighters out of local areas as the transnational agenda was rejected (Phillips 2009a, pp. 65-66). Sheikh Abdel Sittar Baziya, the head of the Abu Risha tribe played a key role in establishing the nationalist Al Anbar or Awakening Council that opposed Al-Qaeda’s radical ideology and violent tactics in Al Anbar province (Kukis 2006). AQI leaders miscalculated their ability to unify various tribes and moulding the local insurgency according to their world view (Ridolfo 2008).

The relationship between AQI’s with local tribes soured in the summer of 2006 as it faced mounting challenges of achieving political objectives in an increasingly hostile setting. It had to balance its penchant for violence with limited funding, which at the time was derived from AQI leaders, foreign suicide bombers, and donations from Iraq’s local communities. It also had to deal with criminal allegations of looting by some of its operatives. AQI violence affected the Syrian side of the border because of family and clan links. Failure to maintain a disciplined force negatively affected supplies of personnel and logistic facilities from Syria (Shapiro 2008, pp. 70-78, 91). AQI had also interfered with local economic sources of livelihood for traditional leaders by attempting to monopolise
smuggling networks for livestock and cigarettes that operated across Iraq and Syria's border. Reliance on criminal and smuggling networks exposed the group as greedy, and introducing a higher level of uncertainty to communities (Bergen et al. 2008, pp. 8-10).

A coalition of 25 tribes in Anbar Province joined forces to expel AQI, which Sheik Abdul Sattar Buzaigh Al-Rishawi, one tribal leader blamed for “killing people for no reason”. AQI was claimed to be responsible for the wave of crime and violence that was destroying the fabric of tribal life. Its fighters were no longer acting like ‘liberators’ but criminals and killers. The 25 tribes contributed a force of 30,000 to the war effort (Von Zielbauer et al. 2006).

**Tribal structure in al Anbar**

Tribal and clan authority in Anbar has played a very important role in military and political decisions. Based on the tribal structure, the segmentary lineage system has an overarching confederation (qabila) comprising of main tribes. Below this unit is the biet that functions like an extended family, which incorporates the khamsah group whose key roles include defending interests of members, resolving disputes with other tribes, avenging deaths of members (al-Tha‘r) including ensuring payment of blood money (diyya). Several biet constitute a clan (fakh’dh), and a number of clans constitute a tribe (‘ashira). A tribe can vary in size and can range from a few thousand to more than 100,000 members (Asfura-Heim 2014, p. 5).

Each tribal confederation, tribe, and clan has a leader or sheikh whose position while largely hereditary is tasked to protect communities from harm and to guarantee a basic level of economic well-being. Tribal identity has influenced norms and values of honour, shame, hospitality, collective
responsibility, and reciprocal relations through kinship ties. As tribal customary law sought to preserve social structures, it was important to develop favourable working relationships with tribal leaders as they were the figureheads of legitimate authority within their communities (Asfura-Heim 2014, pp. 6-18).

**Figure 3. Tribal structure in al Anbar**

Kilcullen (2009, p. 172) highlighted how custom (*aadat*) in a tribal society can be as important as religion (*deen*). When all involved are Muslim, kinship has tended to override religion. Most tribes considered the Al-Qaeda brand ‘foreign’ to their traditional and syncretic interpretation of Islam.

AQI’s setbacks continued up to early 2007. As the US counter-terrorism effort was increasing, money from volunteers also began to dry up. Subsequently, AQI cells disintegrated into criminal franchises that engaged in kidnapping activities and extortion to pay members’ salaries rather than funding the insurgency. The group faced defeat by 2009. In April 2010 it lost Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and war minister Abu Ayyub al-Masr, two of its most senior leaders and was on the verge
of complete disintegration in 2010 according to the US commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno. The appointment of a new emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husayni al-Qurashi (alias Abu) in the summer of 2010 improved the group's prospects as he exploited resurgent activities in Iraq and the sectarian civil war in Syria (Knights 2013).

While Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was not the largest insurgent group it posed a significant tactical threat to coalition forces as it had potential to spread its form of violence beyond Iraq's borders. Zarqawi was the most feared leader whose group regularly posted videos of beheadings of hostages and high profile bomb attacks. These tactics were transferred from the Afghan-Soviet campaign experience and perfected in Iraq. By 15 October 2007 AQI was linked to 864 suicide bombings in Iraq that had killed more than 10,000 people and was claimed to have been responsible for 90% of suicide attacks (Bergen 2008, p. 6).

The locals shifted their support to coalition efforts and facilitated expulsion of foreign insurgents by providing useful intelligence. Anbar's success was inspirational as it caused other Sunni dominated provinces such as Diyala, Salah-ad-Din, Babil, and Baghdad to wage similar opposition. The support of local Sunnis as allies was a significant factor in reducing jihadist terrorism in Anbar province. AQI's presence in their areas was considered 'bad for business' and a political liability. It posed a bigger threat to locals than coalition forces or the new Iraqi government. Coalition forces were considered a lesser evil and credible alternative (Phillips 2009a, pp. 65-66), and it was useful to establish a short term alliance with them as their image in local areas was improving. A future allied withdrawal was viewed favourably (McCary 2009, pp. 44-56).
The Sunni insurgency was local, not regional, or global. AQI's success in the country could only be described as partial, tactical, and temporary because most locals preferred politics of accommodation with the new government (Cordesman 2006, pp. 14-16, 45-58, 61).

The revolt against AQI in Iraq's Anbar province demonstrated the evolving nature of an insurgency, and also popular support, as public perceptions quickly shifted in a tribal environment where new alliances were formed to counter a foreign threat. Factors outside AQI's control such as flexible partnerships based on traditional trusted clan and tribal networks denied AQI its hold on Iraq territory (Kilcullen 2007).

Counter-terrorism placed emphasis on securing the population from foreign insurgent influence through efforts aimed at improving security and stability in the country. While some pockets of AQI elements remained, to a large extent its capability had been degraded by late 2008 (Hamilton 2008, pp. 4-6). Sunni insurgents who fought after 2008 were mostly newly radicalised young people (Cordesman 2006, pp. 48, 60-63). AQI faced defeat by 2010, until the renewed wave of insurgent violence following US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. This development allowed AQI to re-invigorate and continue exploiting sectarian divisions. New political opportunities also emerged with the civil war in Syria in 2011 that resulted in the group’s expansion into the country, and to transform itself by adopting a new name known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to reflect broader objectives. The name ISIL was later changed to the Islamic State group (IS) to reflect caliphate objectives.
Coalition success in countering AQI in Anbar province prompted some speculation that the tribal and cultural logic could be replicated in other Muslim dominated areas with persistent conflict and violence such as Pakistan or Afghanistan. Some insurgents in these countries have strong cultural bonds and similar interests across borders. Transnational jihad has also been strong in these countries. However, some in the counter-terrorism community have expressed caution, suggesting that reliance on a tribal approach can only achieve mixed results (Phillips 2009b, Abstract, p. 27) due to differences in contexts (Fishman 2009, pp. 6, 32). The fight in Anbar province was largely about divergent conceptions of the state, jihad, victory, and defeat. The two perspectives are useful as in designing and implementing counter-terrorism campaigns in Arab societies awareness of cultural frames of reference is still crucial (Dilegge 2007).

**Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM), Al Shabaab in Somalia**

Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM) also known as Al Shabaab (the youth) is a hardline splinter group of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that was formed in 2004 when Somalia was a lawless failing state. The group succeeded Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AlAI, or Unity of Islam) that was active during the civil war following the collapse of Siad Barre’s military regime that lasted from 1969 to 1991. A rift developed between Al Shabaab and the moderate AlAI in 2003 which resulted in Al Shabaab forming a new militia unit and to join an alliance of sharia courts known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The extremism of ICU prompted the transitional government that was set up in 2004 to request Ethiopian intervention in December 2006, which contributed to defeating ICU. This intervention transformed the group into a nationalist armed faction fighting an occupying foreign force. It contributed to the large number of fighters who joined Al Shabaab from 2006 and
2008 as it preferred an Islamist government that implemented a strict version of Sharia law (Masters & Sergie 2015).

Al shabaab’s numbers varied. In 2008 Al Shabaab was estimated to have had 6000-7000 fighters (Stratfor, May 5, 2008). Numbers have ranged from 3000 to 9000 and most were ethnic Somali. The group has recruited mostly from Somalia, although some fighters originated from other countries including the United States, Canada, and Australia (Australian National Security website, 2 November 2015). Young people from Yemen, Sudan, the Swahili Coast of Tanzania and Kenya, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and some from Western countries are reported to have travelled to Somalia to join Al Shabaab (Shinn 2010). The group actively recruited foreign fighters to boost its ranks. Al Shabaab’s broader objective was to create an Islamic Emirate that included Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, north-eastern Kenya, and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and Djibouti (Australian Government National Security Website, 19 February 2015).

Al Shabaab was one of various factions that fought for state power. The group’s activities were largely directed against the Transitional Federal Government that was established after a series of temporary administrations failed to unite disparate fighting groups (Kohlmann 2009, p. 28). It also targeted western countries that supported the transitional government, including the regional African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) whose forces were deployed in 2007 to help secure political stability in the country (Dagne 2011, pp. 8, 5). AMISOM had police and military components. In 2015, Uganda contributed 6,223 troops, Burundi 5,432, Djibouti 1000, Kenya 3,664, Sierra Leone 850, and Ethiopia 4,395 to the military component. The police component was supported by Burundi, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Nigeria,
and Uganda (AMISOM website, viewed 29 October 2015). AMISOM replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia or IGASOM, whose capacity by 2006 needed reinforcement (AMISOM website, viewed 29 October 2015).

To boost its operational profile Al Shabaab formally allied with Al-Qaeda movement ideology in November 2008 and supported its attacks on US interests and western allies (Roggio 2010). Adoption of this transnational dimension did not occur in isolation as some senior Al Shabaab commanders and Al-Qaeda's fought together during the Afghan-Soviet military campaign in the 1980s. Some received support during the militant period in Somalia in the early 1990s where members of Mohamed Farah Aided were assisted in targeting US forces to force them out of the country (Stratfor, May 5, 2008). Al-Qaeda is also reported to have assisted the group in subject matter expertise for operational planning (McLaughlin J 2009, p. 2).

Al Shabaab in its evolutionary phase also benefited from informal links it developed with the Al-Qaeda Algerian-based affiliate Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that was ideologically and operationally linked to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based in Yemen (Humud et al. 2014, pp. 1-25). Al Shabaab in 2014 was led by Ahmed Omar Abu-UBeyda, who took over following the death of Godane from an airstrike. The new leader urged Muslims to rise up and fight against “evil Christians” and “migrate to the lands of Jihad” to fight in battlefields all over the world (Akbar 2015).
By 2011 Al Shabaab controlled most parts of central and southern Somalia, areas that also provided safe haven to Al-Qaeda operatives linked to AQAP. Proximity to armed conflicts in the Middle East allowed these groups to benefit from safe havens in both regions (Kahan 2011). The deepening financial, logistical, and ideological collaboration between Al Shabaab, AQIM, and the Nigerian group Boko Haram posed a larger threat as mobile fighters could travel through porous borders of their countries to carry out attacks in the region and internationally (Rodriguez 2013, pp. 5-7).

Between 2007-2014 Al Shabaab carried out more than 1,700 terrorist attacks, killed more than 4,000 people, and wounded more than 4,000. The group’s targets included the military, multinational forces, civilians, government officials, businesses, diplomatic entities, journalists, and the media (The University of Maryland, START 2015, p. 1). Other targets included United Nations staff and institutions. Al Shabaab’s capability declined from 2009-2010 although it operated beyond Somalia (UN Security Council Report S/2014/726, p. 14). The group’s activities outside Somalia included: the terrorist attack by two gunmen at Garissa University in eastern Kenya on April 2015 that left 147 people dead and 79 wounded; the Westgate Mall in Kenya’s capital Nairobi on 21 September in 2013 where gunmen killed 73 people and wounded 201. The group’s aim was to force Kenyan forces out of Somalia (The University of Maryland, START 2015, p.1). The group was also blamed for the high profile suicide bombings in the Ugandan capital Kampala in 2010 that claimed the lives of 74 people who were watching the World Cup championship match. Its top spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage claimed the attack was an ‘Islamic duty’ in the fight for Somali nationalism (Roggio 2010).
In terms of funding, Al Shabaab’s sources included donations from individuals in the Arabian peninsula and Somali diaspora (Kohlmann 2009, p. 28), ransoms from piracy (Ibrahim 2009), extortion from local businesses (Pflanz 2011), and the lucrative charcoal trade where it controlled production sites and trucking routes to Kismayo and Barawe ports until its activities were disrupted by the coalition’s military offensive (UN Security Council, Report S/2014/726, p. 11).

On legitimacy, the group faced numerous challenges in trying to unite different clans to support its campaign (Hanson 2011). Internal divisions over leadership style, ideology, suicide tactics, and foreign insurgent control were aspects that negatively impacted on its image. These aspects were exploited by local communities, rival insurgent groups with non-global agendas, and the Somali government (Menkha 2009, p. 9). Clashes between the group’s hardline leaders and rival groups such as Ahlu Sunna wa’l-Jama’a occurred regularly (Gartenstein-Ross 2009). Some clan leaders strongly opposed Al Shabaab’s forced recruitment of young people and using foreigners to train militants in the country (Kohlmann 2009, pp. 23, 33). Financial problems caused some defections to the government side, causing the group in December 2012 to make appeals to local clans and businessmen through its media arm the al-Kataib Media Foundation for more funds (Ahmed 2013). Increasing pressure from internal and external factors gradually weakened its military capability and caused it to lose some of its territorial gains (Roble 2011, Radio Bar-kulan 2011).

Al Shabaab’s declining popularity in Somalia has been attributed to its links to Al-Qaeda’s ideology. This posture created ideological divisions with other groups, and caused the general public to distance domestic objectives from a global narrative. While some groups may have considered the transitional government unpopular, moderate elements of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)
disapproved Al Shabaab’s hardline approach (Peraino 2010). The greatest threat to Al Shabaab originated from its former allies who turned rivals (e.g. Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, Hizbul Islam). Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Sheikh Hassan Aweys defended power-sharing arrangements and participated in the 2009 democratic elections. This democratic political entity was incompatible with the strict Islamic state sought by Al Shabaab (Kohlmann 2009, pp. 23, 33).

The containment approach on Al Shabaab’s activities involved implementing Somali-led initiatives that included political and military measures (Dagne 2011, p. 16). Al Shabaab’s competitors benefitted politically as security efforts by the government and multinational teams sought to promote development programs, which they also supported. Attempts by the Somali government to politically negotiate with Al Shabaab’s leaders failed to progress as most members refused to participate in the dialogue process (International Crisis Group Africa Briefing 2010, pp. 1-2, 15-17).

Al Shabaab was designated as a terrorist organisation by the US government on 18 March 2008. The US has also provided financial and human resources to help control the transnational terrorist threat in East Africa (US National Counter Terrorism Centre, Calendar 2014). This commitment has extended to strengthening domestic institutions by promoting dialogue with key stakeholders. The partnership for regional East African counter-terrorism (PREACT) that was established in 2009 with member states sought to address extremist violence and vulnerabilities by improving capacity in law enforcement, the military, and providing resources to improve multilateral cooperation (United States Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism 2013, p. 9). Various measures contributed to reduce Al Shabaab’s ideological appeal and capability. The loss of some of its key leaders affected the group. The co-founder of al-Shabaab, Ahmed Abdi Godane was killed in a US air strike
in Somalia on 1 September 2014. The new leader Ahmad Umar vowed to avenge Godane’s killing and renewed allegiance to Al-Qaeda’s chief Ayman al-Zawahiri (Radio Australia, 7 September 2014). This ideological posture consistently distanced Al Shabaab from domestically inclined rival groups.

Summary

In summary, formal and informal linkages that Islamist groups in the Middle East, North Africa, and East Africa developed with the Al-Qaeda movement have been shown to be strategically opportunistic. The main focus of affiliates and associated groups was to gain more resources and improve political prospects and image at home. Groups that aligned with Al-Qaeda’s ideology were often sidelined because of their expansive target set and reliance on high profile suicide methods. The behaviour of Al-Qaeda’s affiliates demonstrated how the movement sought to link ideologically with indigenous groups whose religious and socio-political environments offered leveraging opportunities. The trend has been that once the Al-Qaeda movement ideology got marginalised or physically rooted out from one location, it quickly shifted activities to another. Despite the limitations presented by its jihadist violence, the attraction and prestige it could offer in raising political image and contributing funding caused some groups with limited means to tap into its expertise, finances, and grand strategy. By benefiting themselves, they also supported the image of the global movement, even though the linkage was weak and created political disadvantages.

Extremist violence and global jihadist ideology has continually been challenged at the domestic realm because it has tended to conflate grievances, incite sectarian religious tensions and conflict, and increase political instability. Such an ideology tended to be discredited as it did not align with
contemporary social realities. An example was the Islamic State group, successor of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that emerged in 2012, whose expansive objectives in Iraq and Syria under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were disapproved by reputed clerics and leaders of Al-Qaeda’s central command. The group faced growing condemnation that prompted international military and humanitarian intervention to contain its religious and territorial expansion.

The Islamic State group

The Islamic State group (IS) evolved from insurgent operations of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under the leadership of Zarqawi. The group later transformed and became known as the Islamic State of Iraq and greater Syria (ISIS) and was led by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi until his death in 2010, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over the leadership. Under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS which was also referred to as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was re-branded and became known as the Islamic State group (IS) to reflect Syrian operations in the civil war that intensified in 2011. Over the course of its military and political campaign the group was able to seize large parts of territory in eastern Syria and north western Iraq as part of its broader strategic objective of establishing an Islamic caliphate.

The size of the intended Islamic caliphate covered at least 680 kilometres across Western Iraq and Eastern Syria (Lister 2014, pp. 1-2). The revival of a caliphate (khilāfah) under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was announced on 29 June 2014, the first day of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan (1435H of the Islamic calendar) by ISIS spokesman Taha Subhi Falaha (Abu Muhammad al-Adnani). From then on ISIS transitioned and was to be referred to as the Islamic State group (IS) (Lister 2014, p. 4). In a 34 minute speech posted on the group’s Twitter al-Itīsaam
Media Foundation titled “This is the promise of Allah”, Adnani demanded “all jihadist factions, not only in Iraq and Syria but everywhere to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State”. Adnani acknowledged Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by his real name Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarra’iyy (SITE Intelligence Group, 29 June 2014). This declaratory move was viewed by some analysts in the region as a ‘significant development in international jihadism since 11 September 2001’ as it attracted large numbers of Sunni Muslims to support its cause (Jorgic 2014).

Iraq and Syria had a similar mix of religious and ethnic divisions that key players in the Syrian conflict exploited to define and justify their roles based on the notion of solidarity with similar groups (Reese 2013, pp. 7, 13).

**Table 9. Ethnic and religious characteristics of Syria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic composition</th>
<th>Religious composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab 90.3%; Kurds, Armenians, other smaller</td>
<td>Muslim 87% (Sunni 74%; Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia 13%); Christians 10% (includes Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groups (9.7%)</td>
<td>Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian), Druze 3%; and small Jewish communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Arabs formed the majority in Syria while the Kurds, Armenians, and other groups were in the minority. The majority of the population was Muslim and Sunni. Other Muslim faiths (Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia), Christians (Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian), Druze, and Jewish communities were in the minority (US CIA, The World Factbook, June 2014).

The scope of terrorist activity in both countries widened as fighting groups with different motivations drew from similar grievance themes of authoritarianism, state ideology, marginalisation, and
religious persecution. The malleability of political environments in both conflicts allowed Al-Qaeda movement affiliates to insert themselves by seeking to protect co-religionists or ethnicities from existing and potential adversaries. The environments provided the Islamic State group (IS) the opportunity to pursue Al-Qaeda's original vision of caliphate (Bunzel 2015, p. 36), which it quickly achieved through territorial acquisition and expansion. This broader goal had the effect of attracting thousands of jihadists from the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond to its ranks. By 2015, the influence of Islamic State group surpassed that of Al-Qaeda's formal affiliates.

By October 2015, the Islamic State group (IS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra Front) also formed by the Al-Qaeda central command in 2011, were the two known key Al-Qaeda affiliates operating in the Syrian civil war. The two affiliate groups pursued slightly different approaches as they disagreed over strategic vision of the military campaign and on tactics. The Islamic State group was considered to be the most hardline of all anti-regime groups operating in Iraq and Syrian conflicts (Reuters, February 2014).

**Islamic State group's media campaign**

The Islamic State group published its first online edition of the monthly *Dabiq magazine* on 20 July 2014, titled ‘the return of Khilafah’. The title *Dabiq* had symbolic meaning because it is an area in northern Aleppo in Syria that was mentioned in a hadith where ‘one of the greatest battles between the Muslims and the crusaders will take place’ (*Dabiq*, July 2014, p. 4). It symbolically reinforced the clash between two forces, believers and non-believers. The publication has religious significance because it explained in simple terms the foundations of the caliphate, and the need to support the Islamic State group (IS). The group was considered to be the true Imama because it
was carrying out ‘the command of Allah – in the best possible manner … that most emulates the millah (path) of Ibrahim with regards to imamah (leadership) in the areas where it exists’, (Dabiq, July 2014, p. 27). The discussion in the July edition focused on aspects of the Muslim ummah, issues of might and dignity for Muslims, a call to hijra, need for liberation, and the crucial role of leadership in fighting against injustice, oppression, and humiliation.

In a sermon delivered through ISIS’s media arm Al-Ḥayāt Media Center on 4 July 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi implored the mujahideen and the Muslim ummah to “refuse humiliation, subjugation, and sub-ordination to the infidels (kuffār). Terrorism is for the Muslim to live as a Muslim, honourably with might and freedom” (Al-Ḥayāt Media Center, 4 July 2014). The mujahideen were urged to fight against oppression, and the killing of Muslims worldwide. Countries such as Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, Kashmir, the Caucasus, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Egypt, Palestine, Iran, and Turkey were used to highlight the suffering of Muslims (Al-Ḥayāt Media Center, 4 July 2014).

Berger & Morgan (2015) have provided a demographic snapshot of the Islamic State group’s social media campaign on Twitter from 4 October through to 27 November 2014. While not all accounts were active at the same time they estimated at least 46,000 were being used by the group’s supporters. Inferred locations in the support profile indicated: Saudi Arabia had 866, Syria 507, Iraq 453, United States 404, Egypt 300, Turkey 203, Palestinian Territory 162, Lebanon 141, United Kingdom 139, and Tunisia 125 (pp. 7, 12).
From July 2014 the Islamic State group set up cyber information booths in cities and towns in territories it and its affiliates controlled in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Media outlets were used to screen videos of war, distribute pamphlets, CDs, photographs, other religious education materials to the public, and served as a tool for indoctrination (Stalinsky & Sosnow 2015).
Scope of the Islamic State group

By October 2014 the Islamic State group controlled an area stretching from North of Aleppo to the south of Baghdad. This area included cities of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq. It controlled approximately six million people on either side of these countries’ borders. The group tended to seize territory held by weaker fighting groups regardless of their ideology (Shia or Sunni), and to consolidate political and economic gains (Barret 2014, p. 8).

By 2015, the Islamic State group had established a franchise structure similar to Al-Qaeda’s to expand its geographical reach and influence by affiliating with some of the most hardline insurgent and extremist groups in North Africa, the Middle East (Schmitt & Kirkpatrick 2015), Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. A number of groups from these regions sent some of their members to fight alongside the Islamic State group, and to a lesser extent Jabhat al-Nusra. 43 groups by June 2016 had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, based on information provided by the US private security contracting firm IntelCenter (A.12, Table 12), (IntelCenter.com, June 2016). The extent of the group’s campaign rivalled that of Jabhat al-Nusra (an-Nuṣrah li-Ahl ash-Shām) that focused only on Syria.

The Islamic State group recruited widely and attracted the largest number of fighters including foreigners to its ranks. In 2013, when the group was still known by the name of ISIS in Iraq it had approximately 3,000 fighters (Schmitt & Rubin 2014). Al Jazeera News in 2014 estimated its fighters had increased to more than 50,000 in Syria (19 August 2014), while the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2014 indicated it had between 20,000 and 31,500 militants fighting in Iraq and Syrian theatres (Walsh 2014). For religious, ideological, or economic motives, fighters
travelled from Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. Leaders of some extremist Sunni groups from various regions pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Lister 2014, pp. 1-2).

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was credited in some jihadist circles for reviving the group’s objectives of establishing a caliphate (Blanchard et al. 2014, pp. 7-9). While the Islamic State group largely operated in Iraq and Syria, it expanded to other countries including Jordan where it was linked to a plot to bomb several targets in Amman including the US embassy (Katzman 2014, pp. 9-10). By November 2015, the Islamic State group (IS) was the most powerful insurgent group in both theatres, displaying a military capability that surpassed any previous Al-Qaeda affiliate.

**Islamic State group, capabilities**

Throughout its campaigns in Iraq and Syria the Islamic State group presented itself as a serious opponent and competitor, displaying an image of a proto-state because of its technical and military capacities. It captured and controlled other countries’ territories, and this symbolic victory inspired and attracted large numbers of local and foreign fighters to join its ranks. There are suggestions that some poor people joined the group because it could pay salaries (Lister C 2014, p. 24). By mid-2010 the group was reported to be paying higher salaries than the Syrian government, and was recruiting Sahwa militants in Iraq with knowledge and military experience (Lister C 2014, p. 10). Each soldier was paid US$400 per month with a yearly bonus. An added premium was paid for dependants (IEP, Global terrorism index 2014, p. 52). The Islamic State group’s salaries were based on skills and nationality of members (The United Nations Security Council, 14 November 2014, p. 26). Fighters for Jabhat al-Nusra received monthly salaries of US$100-200 compared to its
rival (The Economist, 7 June 2014). Fighters were drawn to the conflicts for religious, ideological, or economic motives (Lister C 2014, pp. 1-2).

**Islamic State group, Iraq operations**

The insurgency in Iraq involved a number of anti-government groups. Among them were: Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshbandia (JRTN), General Military Council of the Iraqi Revolutionaries (GMCIR), the Falluhah Military Council, 1920 Brigades, Jaysh al-Mujahidin, Islamic Army of Iraq, and Ansar al-Islam. These groups occasionally clashed with the Islamic State group and Ansar al-Islam that were criticised for being jihadist (Adnan & Reese 2014, p. 9). Other groups included the Military Council of the Tribes of Iraq that was formed by a coalition of nearly 80 Sunni Arab tribes. This coalition operated in Fallujah, Ramadi, Nineveh, and Salaheddin and included 41 armed groups. Its fighters included former soldiers and officers of Saddam Hussein’s government; Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order formed in 2007 that operated in Mosul (Hassan H 2014); Kurdish Peshmerga, and a number of Shia armed groups (Bayoumi & Harding 2014).

Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam) formed in 2001 primarily operated in the northern region of Iraq but maintained a presence in western and central Iraq. The group was founded by Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad and was associated with Al-Qaeda (UN Security Council, Al-Qaeda Sanctions List, 23 January 2015). Ansar al-Islam operated independently from the Islamic State group.

The Islamic State group’s military campaign in Iraq, similar to Syria was detailed in its first edition of the Arabic language *al-Naba* Magazine that was published on 31 March 2014 through its media arm the I’tisaam Media Foundation. The report that was re-posted online through secondary
sources covered the group's activities in Iraq from November 2012 to November 2013, detailing military organisation, attack types, and operational statistics in its Wilayats or local governorates where it implemented Sharia law and governance structures. Based on its listed activities the group functioned like a proper military organisation capable of advanced planning and synchronised operations. Its concept of operation used a phased campaign in the provinces of Ninewar, South, Diyala, Anbar, Kirkuk, Salah ad-Din, Baghdad, and Northern Baghdad. It tailored tactics according to each province and documented statistics for evaluation. The list of attack types included: assassinations, armed attacks, bombing (mortars, grenade launchers, rockets); bombing and burning houses with house-borne improvised explosive devices (HBIEDs); suicide operations using suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs), suicide vests (SVESTs); vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs); improvised explosive devices (IEDs); knife attacks; targeted attacks; sniping; repenting of apostates; running over of apostates; and expulsion of rafidha (Shia). Emphasis was placed on assassinations, targeted attacks, and use of IEDs to gain greater control and consolidation of territory (Bilger 2014, pp. 1-3).

The Islamic State group's military command employed a top-down command and control structure that appeared to be superior to all other regional military commands in Iraq, which was also reflected in Syrian operations. Based on information supplied on the group, its campaign was 'not simply that of a terrorist organisation' but an insurgency that sought to gain and control territory (Bilger 2014, p. 11). The report of the University of Maryland' National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism in the US highlighted how the Islamic State group’s performance rose steadily under Baghdadi’s leadership (START, November 2014).
Islamic State group in Central Asia

The Islamic State made efforts to influence group activities in Central Asia. On 23 June 2015 its spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani announced formation of a new governorate called Wilayat Qawqaz in the north Caucasus region of Russia after a number of senior militants from Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and KBK (Kabarda, Balkaria, Karachay) pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Abu Mohammad al-Qadari was named leader of the new Wilayat. This alliance placed the Islamic State group into competition with the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus (IEC), an Al-Qaeda official affiliate that operated in Russia from 2007. The Islamic State group gained control of four of the six operational areas that traditionally belonged to IEC, allowing it to exert control in the region by sharing expertise with allied groups (Gambhir J 2015).
Islamic State group in South Asia

On 3 September 2014 a Pakistani-based affiliate known as Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) was formed to oversee Al-Qaeda’s operations in India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (Burke 2014). The group that incorporated smaller groups was formed soon after Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State group (IS) announced the establishment of a caliphate with him as Caliph on 29 June 2014. The core of AQIS was led by Asim Umar from India, assisted by leaders based in Pakistan, and Bangladesh (Chandran 2015).

The Hakkani network that has operated in Northern Pakistan on both sides of Pakistan and Afghanistan’s border since the mid-1970s maintained strong ties to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which also developed strong ideological relations with senior Al-Qaeda leaders during the anti-Soviet campaign in the 1980s. The strategic location of the Hakkani network in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Northern Pakistan was pivotal as it provided a safe haven for a number of foreign militant groups. Places such as Peshawar and Miranshah in Pakistan, and Loya Paktia and Khost in Afghanistan became key locations for training fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and many countries in the Arab Muslim region. The Hakkani and Al-Qaeda networks evolved together in the 1980s, and the north Asian network remained a local operational partner for Al-Qaeda. The network helped to extend Taliban operations, and provided a foundation that Al-Qaeda core leaders subsequently used to extend their ideological brand of the movement beyond Afghanistan because of ideological and physical connections developed among jihadist fighters during insurgent campaigns in the region (Rassler & Brown 2011, pp. 3-6, 14).
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) or “Army of the Pure’ was established in 1990 and has been active in the Kashmir region of Pakistan in the south. The group was led by veterans of the anti-Soviet campaign Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi and Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. The jihadist group challenged Indian sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir, and has fought to unite Indian Muslim regions with Pakistan. It also sought to restore Islam in India. LeT’s terrorist attacks have occurred in various parts of India including New Delhi and Mumbai. The group targeted security forces, non-Muslims, Westerners, and was linked to some Indian extremist groups operating in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Jammu, and Kashmir. India’s National Security Adviser MK Narayanan suggested on 11 August 2006 that LeT was part of Al-Qaeda “compact” because its networks in Pakistan and India had links to jihadist groups in Bangladesh, South East Asia, the Middle East, and the United Kingdom (South Asia Terrorism Portal, viewed 19 October 2015).

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) was blamed for 12 coordinated shootings and bombing attacks across Mumbai that occurred from 26 to 29 November 2008, which left 166 people dead and more than 308 injured (Bora 2014). The group by 2015 was considered one of the significant Islamist groups operating in Pakistan. LeT had extensive links as its members fought in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, and other locations in Central Asia. Its training camps in Pakistan were used by fighters from Bosnia, the Philippines, Somalia, and some Arab countries. In addition, the group was claimed to have established cell networks in Spain, Bangladesh, and Australia; and associates in North Africa and Southeast Asia. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) facilitated a number of extremist and insurgent groups including Al-Qaeda’s through its training camps (Padukone 2011).
Islamic State group in Southeast Asia

The key opposition groups in Syria such as the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra have attracted growing numbers of recruits from Southeast Asian countries with large Muslim populations such as Indonesia and Malaysia, and where Muslims formed the minority and had a history of armed conflict such as the Philippines.

The Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was for some time allied to Al-Qaeda on ideological objectives (ABC Lateline program, interview of Rohan Gunaratna by Tony Jones, 22 May 2003). In its early years of operation the group sought to establish an Islamic state that encompassed Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Muslim dominated southern regions of Thailand and the Philippines. JI was inspired by Al-Qaeda transnational jihadist ideology, and was a proxy for some of its terrorist attacks in the region (Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs, White Paper 2003, pp. 6-9). Between 2014 and 2015 Jemaah Islamiyah was among some regional groups that pledged ideological allegiance to the Islamic State group.

Janes Intelligence Review reported on 28 January 2015 of growing numbers of militants from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia who travelled to fight in Iraq and Syria. In November 2015 groups that pledged allegiance and support to the Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi included: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Ansar al-Khilafah, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), Rajah Solaiman Movement from the Philippines; Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid from Indonesia; and the Kuala Lumpur Cell from Malaysia. Some of these groups sent members to the two combat zones to assist in a humanitarian or military capacity.
The head of Indonesian Police indicated on 22 June 2014 that at least 56 Indonesian citizens were fighting in Iraq and Syrian theatres (Janes Intelligence Weekly, 16 July 2014, p. 2). By December 2014, Indonesia’s National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) Chief Saud Usman Nasutio estimated 514 Indonesians had travelled to both theatres. Of this number nearly half were migrant workers, and students living in neighbouring countries of the Middle East (Janes Intelligence Review, 28 January 2015, pp. 2-3). In January 2015, 70 Malaysians were reported to have travelled to Iraq and Syria. The Philippines had 200 nationals, while a small number were reported from Singapore (Chan 2015, p. 5). In March 2015, Malaysian police estimated the number was probably as high as 80. A few cases were reported from Thailand (Yasin 2015, p. 26). Key opposition groups fighting in Syria such as the Islamic State, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya, and Jabhat al-Nusra were attracting growing numbers of militants from the region (Jendruck 2014).

Eighteen Indonesian-based groups were listed in April 2015 as supporters of the Islamic State group. Some, including JAT, JTWJ, and Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT) pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group and sent members to join the Islamic State group (Taufiqurrohman 2015, pp. 18-23).

Table 13. Indonesian groups supporting the Islamic State group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (BIB)</th>
<th>Umat Islam Nusantara</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT)</td>
<td>Ikhwan Muwahid Indunisy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaah Anshurat Tauhid (JAT)</td>
<td>Jazirah al-Muluk (Ambon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaah Tauhid Wal Jihad (JTWJ)</td>
<td>Ansharul Kilafah Jawa Timur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darul Islam Ring Banten (DI)</td>
<td>Halawi Makmun Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Aktivis Syariah Islam (FAKSI)</td>
<td>Gerakan Tauhid Lamongan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pendukun dan pembela daulah</td>
<td>Khilafatul Muslimin Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerakan Reformasi Islam</td>
<td>(Khilmus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asybal Tawhid Indonesia</td>
<td>Laskar Jundullah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kongres Umat Islam Bekasi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Taufiqurrohman 2015, p. 23.
JAT, JTWJ, MIT, DI, and FAKSI were considered Takfiri groups that accused other groups of apostasy (Taufiqurrohman 2015, p. 17). During a speech at the Sidney Lowy Institute in Australia, journalist Sidney Jones highlighted that the number of Indonesians who travelled to the Syrian and Iraq conflicts by 2015 exceeded that which fought during the Afghan-Soviet campaign in the 1980s which did not exceed 300 (The Straitstimes, 8 December 2014). This view was supported by the National Police Inspector-General Karnavian who indicated the number of Indonesians in Al-Qaeda-linked camps in Afghanistan at the time was approximately 200 (Schonhardt 2015). Indonesia’s total population in the 2010 national census was 237 641 326 million (Badan Pusat Statistik). Approximately 88% were Muslim and predominantly Sunni (Ministry of Religious Affairs, Republic of Indonesia 2010).

The Islamic State group (IS) strongly exploited social media to promote its concept of an Islamic ‘caliphate’, and has won supporters through its online campaign (Chan 2015, p.6). In January 2015, the Singapore-based Centre for Political Violence identified 300 listed extremist websites, forums, and social media accounts published in Bahasa. Malaysia had 500 extremist social media accounts belonging to its nationals. The group’s propaganda material was promoted on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Tmblr, and Instagram (Yasin 2015, pp. 27, 30).

**Challenges for the Islamic State group and Jabhat al Nusra Front**

More than 1000 fighting groups operated in Syria in 2013 (Sinjab 2013) in competition with foreign groups including the Islamic State group and Jabhat al Nusra Front. Some of the leading Syrian Sunni groups in November 2013 fought under a new alliance known as the Islamic Front to effectively exploit resources and decentralised campaigns. They included Harakat Ahrar al-Sham
al-Islamiyya (HASI), Kataib Ansar al-Sham, Liwa al-Haqq, Kurdish Islamic Front (KIF), former Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF) brigades Suqur al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, and Jaish al-Islam (Zelin 2013).

Similar to the experience of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), activities of the Islamic State group and Al-Nusrah Front were criticised by domestic opposition groups, influential religious figures in the jihadist movement, and civilian populations on ideological and methodological grounds. Activities of the two Al-Qaeda affiliates in Iraq and Syria were largely not publicly supported, even though they clashed on several occasions as Al-Nusrah Front tried to project a positive image.

Both groups were criticised for foreign imposition of authority and control, and were blamed for their extremist approach to local populations and their political issues. Ahrar al-Sham ("Free Men of Syria" in Arabic), a domestic jihadist organisation that had some Arab foreign jihadists fighting among its ranks criticised the Al-Nusrah Front describing it as a ‘hardline’, ‘rigid’ and ‘fanatical’ organisation. Ahrar al-Sham was largely composed of Syrian nationals and sought to distance its activities and image from the Al-Nusrah front. In January 2013 it announced the creation of a coalition known as Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya to include organisations such Liwa al-Haq and Jamaat al-Taliaa al-Islamiya. The nationalist organisation has claimed to advocate a moderate form of Islam and preferred an Islamic state based on Sharia law that also guaranteed the rights of other religious minorities. Ahrar al-Sham was active in the provinces of Idlib, Aleppo, and central Hama. Its founders were all former political prisoners who were released in May 2011 through the government amnesty (The Daily Star, Lebanon, 13 February 2013).
The Islamic State group by far faced the strongest criticism as it publicly advocated unlimited objectives in Syria and Iraq. Its brutal and controlling behaviour created ideological and methodological disagreements with domestic-based groups, including leaders of the Al-Qaeda central command who considered its presence in Syria a threat to national objectives. The decision to carve out a territory in northeastern Syria and to establish an Islamic state that included Iraq contradicted nationalist goals of domestic groups that were aimed at defeating the Assad regime and establishing an alternative government. Syrian rebel forces largely fought for limited political objectives and disagreements with the Islamic State group widened (Nassief 2014, pp. 9-10).

The widespread backlash against the Islamic State group’s Syrian operations was evident in 2013, as Syrian opposition groups including Islamic Front criticised its growing extremism (Nassief 2014, p. 41), which was similar in many ways to Al-Qaeda movement groups in Iraq including the previous campaign led by Zarqawi in 2006. Violent clashes involving the Islamic State group occurred with the Asifat a-Shamal group on the 18 and 19 September 2013 over its violent approach to simple incidents. The group (IS) also clashed with units of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) over control of supply routes and resources in northern areas of the country. A statement released on September 2013 by the leader of the Syrian National Council (al Majlis al-Watani al Souri), the main political umbrella group established in October 2011, also criticised Al-Qaeda’s formal affiliate, Al-Nusrah Front for pursuing an “un-Syrian” agenda contrary to their domestic objectives and questioned its continued membership in the Syrian alliance (Szybala 2013, pp. 2-3).

Baghdadi’s declared goal of establishing a caliphate system of Islamic rule that was abolished 100 years ago, but reminded Muslims of the golden age, shocked many Muslim groups, religious
scholars and even jihadists who described the act as ‘heresy’. Baghdadi’s announcement was considered ‘null’ and ‘void’ as it was made without consulting Muslims in Iraq and Syria (Moussaoui 2014). On tactics, mainstream insurgent opposition groups heavily criticised the Islamic State group and distanced their activities from its extremist violent approach where it targeted rival groups, critics, and engaged in kidnapping activities (Reuters, February 2014). Prominent clerics criticised the group for being ‘too quick to declare other groups apostate and execute their members on spurious grounds’ (Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, 18 June 2014).

In a statement posted on 1st July 2013 on his website, Assem Barqawi also known as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi branded the Islamic State group “deviant” and to have departed from true Islamic principles and Sharia law. Maqdisi who was highly respected in Jordan and among jihadist groups suggested Baghdadi had set a bad example for youth groups in the region because his actions did not reflect the social reality ‘on the ground’. Maqdisi served as spiritual mentor to the late Abu Musab Zarqawi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Jordan's Islamic Action Front leader Sheikh Hamza Mansour in a phone interview with Al-Monitor emphasised the requirement of “consent” in establishing a caliphate and feared consequences of ‘imposing’ it on Muslims (Oddone 2014).

Abu Mohamed al-Maqdesi, supporter of the Al-Nusra Front likened the Islamic State group’s activities to ‘a sword hanging over Muslims who disagreed with them’. Muslim organizations also criticised the group’s actions. A letter published on the website for the International Union of Muslim Scholars emphasised that “simply announcing a caliphate was not enough to establish it”. The pan-Islamic political party Hizb ut-Tahrir emphasised how the issue of the Khilafah was ‘too great to
have its image distorted’. Tunisia’s main Islamist party Ennahda joined the chorus of criticism describing Baghdadi’s actions ‘reckless’ and his speeches ‘deceptive’. Prominent figures in the jihadist community, and Muslim majorities considered the self-proclaimed caliphate ‘void’ and ‘deviant’ based on Islamic law. Public opinion was of the view that Baghdadi was hurting the Muslim cause. This disapproval extended to his ‘harsh’ implementation of Islamic law through violent methods (Mandhai 2014).

Baghdadi’s violent methods were criticised by Zawahiri who denounced the atrocities committed under his leadership, branding his group ‘devious’ and to have departed from Al-Qaeda’s original path of measured campaigns (Zelin 2014, p. 5). The two leaders clashed publicly on issues related to legitimate authority, strategic vision, and tactics. Baghdadi’s group transitioned from being directly linked to Zawahiri to operating largely independently while remaining an informal affiliate of Al-Qaeda (Schmitt & Rubin 2014). Baghdadi is reported not to have publicly pledged allegiance (Bayat) to Zawahiri in 2010, an issue of legitimacy that may have also played a role in souring relations with Zawahiri who publicly condemned and disowned the group, preferring to recognise Al Nusra as the only official affiliate in Syria (Zelin 2014, pp. 4-5). The power play between Zawahiri and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi adopted historical overtones that were aired publicly by Al-Qaeda’s media outlets. A subtle shift in strategic direction was evident by October 2015.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi retaliated with criticism that questioned Zawahiri’s religious authority over Muslims and described Zawahiri’s role as ‘illegitimate’. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whose real name was Ibrahim Awad al-Badri emphasised his claims as heir to the Al-Qaeda movement having descended from the Prophet Muhammad’s Quraysh tribe (Zelin 2014, p. 5). Some of Baghdadi’s
supporters added value to the hereditary claim on the basis that if the quality of caliph were to be narrowed down to the prophet’s sub-clan within the Quraysh tribe, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s tribe Abu Badri of Samarra was Quraysh. Baghdadi descended from the prophet’s grandson Hussein (Lund 2015). There was some suggestion that the main reason Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was selected to revive the Islamic State in Iraq was because of his tribal connection to the prophet Muhammad. It is claimed that former Islamic State group member Abu Omar emphasised how this qualification was “very important to those planning the future strategy of the group”. This claim was made in reference to “those who wanted to fulfill Zarqawi’s dreams of subsequently announcing the caliphate” (Hashem 2015).

When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared a caliphate and pronounced himself as caliph he was supported by Islamic State group members Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, Abu Ibrahim al-Masry, Turki al-Binali, and Abu Suleiman al-Otaibi who also stressed the importance of genealogy and feared they would have been preceded by Zawahiri if Baghdadi did not act quickly and declare a caliphate. The declaration attracted donations and new recruits, and increased leadership competition with Zawahiri (Hashem 2015).

In addition, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had academic credentials having obtained a PhD in Islamic Studies from the Islamic University of Baghdad. He preached in Samarra as an imam and had a clerical background that elevated him to a higher level on religious knowledge than Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri (Lister 2014, p. 21).
Throughout the Syrian and Iraq campaigns Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi tried to project his group as a legitimate component of Al-Qaeda's model. He clashed with Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) on 9 April 2013 when he claimed Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) was as an offshoot of the Islamic State, hence a subordinate to his leadership. Jabhat al-Nusra refused and maintained its independence, operating as the official Al-Qaeda affiliate under Zawahiri's leadership (Lister 2014, p. 13). Questionable claims on political and religious authority, and brutal tactics became key limitations for the Islamic State group. Its territorial expansion in Iraq and Syria was interrupted by the US-led international coalition in 2015, a counter-terrorism response that was similar to the counter-terrorist campaign in Iraq during AQI's influence. By September 2014, 62 countries had joined the anti-Islamic State group coalition (Wordsworth 2014), (A.14, Table 14).

The dictatorial behaviour of the Islamic State group which many Islamic leaders including Zawahiri and jihadist groups denounced for its extremist approach highlighted the same type of critical argument related to issues of leadership style and strategic vision, authority to speak on politics and religion, and the scale of violence that had created social divisions among Sunni jihadist groups during Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) operations under Zarqawi in the period 2005-2006. Zarqawi's leadership style was deemed insensitive towards local groups and communities, and their social norms. AQI violently targeted ordinary Shia, Christians, and Sunni jihadist groups it disagreed with. It harshly treated groups that did not conform to its 'pure' Islamic practices. These key mistakes were highlighted by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri who considered Zarqawi's indiscriminate methods too extreme and to have alienated Muslims (Oddone 2014).
The Islamic State group’s wider objectives dictated its overly violent approach. Al-Nusrah Front largely focused on Syria and tried to distance itself from the Islamic State group to win local support. However, both groups were considered hardline and foreign, and promoted aspects of the Al-Qaeda’s brand of politics despite strategic and tactical differences.

**Jabhat al Nusra Front**

The Al-Nusrah Front meaning "Support Front for the People of Levant" was formed on 23 January 2012 after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. The group led by Al-Fateh Abu Muhammad al-Golani was initially a branch of AQI. It comprised largely Syrian fighters and some foreign militants, and was the formally recognised affiliate by the Al-Qaeda central leadership led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. The group’s activities in Damascus, Ziyara, Harasta, Aleppo, Drousha, Al-Midan, and Hamah targeted government personnel and institutions, private citizens and their property, military, police, businesses, journalists, media, religious figures and institutions. Al-Nusrah Front was also noted for bombings, hostage taking, and armed assaults (The University of Maryland, START 2014).

The vision of the Al-Nusrah Front in Syria was outlined by its leaders. During a rare interview on 17 May 2015 that was broadcast in Al Jazeera television program “Without Borders”, and moderated by Ahmed Mansour, Abu Muhammad al-Golani emphasised that the group’s objective was to overthrow the Assad regime and defeat Hezbollah because they massacred Sunnis. He presented the group as pragmatic, and claimed it humanely treated the Christian population compared to the Islamic State group. The interview was held in the city of Idlib in northwestern Syria that was occupied by Al-Nusrah and its allies (MAITIC, Transcript 4 June 2015).
The vision of the Al-Nusra Front in Syria was also outlined by Sheik Abu Ahmed, one of the group’s military leaders during an interview with a journalist working for the National newspaper in the north-eastern town of Ras al-Ayn. The group’s goals involved getting rid of Assad’s government, and creating a government where the ‘Quran is the only law’. He indicated tobacco, alcohol, cinema, and television shows were to be banned under Sharia law as these practices corrupted young people’s morals. Laws under the civil code would be replaced (Szlanko 2012). While the group was considered relatively moderate and less brutal than the Islamic State group when dealing with civilians and other rebel groups it also advocated the creation of an Islamic state although within Syria (Solomon & Holmes 2014).

Al-Nusrah Front tried to avoid mistakes of its rival the Islamic State group that engaged in beheadings, and sectarian violence. However, statements made by Al-Nusrah Front through its publication the White Minaret also indicated it planned to purify Syria by expelling Christian and Alawite communities from their territories. Directly or indirectly it oppressed other religious communities (Australian National Security Website, 28 June 2013).

Membership of the Al-Nusrah Front was estimated in 2013 at around 6,000-10,000 fighters. Fighters were primarily Syrian nationals, with some originating from the Levant, North Africa, and European countries (Australian Government, Listed terrorist Organisations 2013). Foreign militants fighting with Al-Nusrah included Jordanians led by Iyad Toubasi (Abu Gelebebis) and Mustafa Abdul Latif, both Palestinian-Jordanians who occupied leading positions in Nusra fronts. Iyad Toubasi fought in Iraq as part of AQI and was the brother-in-law of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Thus, depending on ideological differences some groups allied with the Islamic State group or Al-Nusrah
(Alimi 2014). The group also fought in conjunction with a number of Syrian groups of the Al-Fatah Army, and the Khorasan group that in the past fought in Afghanistan and Pakistan (MAITIC, Transcript, 4 June 2015). Some fighters from the ‘Free Syrian Army (FSA) joined Al-Nusrah Front as it was well resourced (Mahmood & Black 2013). Al-Nusrah Front was funded by supporters from Iraq and the Gulf States (Australian National Security Website, 28 June 2013).

Following the split in June 2013 the Islamic State group and Al-Nusrah Front operated independently in Northern and Eastern Syria. They competed and their problematic relationship occasionally led to violent confrontation. Al-Nusrah Front blamed the Islamic State group for indiscriminate violence and controlling behaviour over its operations. Power and leadership struggles over the civilian sphere were played out in the media as both groups competed for ideological space. Each group’s public relations media websites posted videos from operations to gain sympathy and support. For example, the Al-Nusrah Front used the White Minaret while the Islamic State used its Baqiya Media Foundation (Roggio 2014).

The contrast between Jabhat Al-Nusrah Front and the Islamic State group was on strategy. While both shared the same Al-Qaeda ideology, Jabhat Al-Nusrah Front adopted a slightly subtle approach as it consulted with local tribal and religious leaders, and their local councils. Jabhat Al-Nusrah’s main efforts focused on overthrowing the Assad regime unlike the Islamic State group that prioritised territorial conquest and control, and mistreated populations under its control. The Islamic State group was prone to torturing, imprisoning, and violently dealing with people it disagreed with. It prioritised issues of Islamic dress, prayer, smoking, and was quick to ban and punish practices it did not like. While Jabhat Al-Nusrah’s leadership was mainly Syrian, most
leaders of the Islamic State group including fighters were from Iraq and other foreign countries. The Islamic State group was considered a foreign occupier in Syria as it was not familiar with local customs (Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, 7 March 2014, pp. 2-3).

The Islamic State group’s inability to work well with local jihadist groups due to its aggressive and heavy-handed approach, and refusal to follow Al-Qaeda central command’s directives were factors that worked against its ideological appeal in Iraq and Syria (Khalil & Prucha 2014). Lack of popular support, and military intervention were among counter-terrorism tools that sought to contain the threat within Iraq and Syria.

**International intervention**

To contain the Islamic State group US President Barack Obama on 10 September 2014 announced the formation of an international coalition that comprised more than 60 countries and partner organisations (A.14, Table 14). The coalition, which included countries in the European Union, The Arab League, and Australia contributed in various capacities to five designated lines of effort that involved military support, impeding the flow of foreign fighters, stopping financing and funding, addressing humanitarian crises, and exposing the group’s true nature (The US Department of State website, 4 November 2015). The US-led Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF–OIR) coordinated these efforts (Allen 2014).

For effectiveness, each of the five lines of intervention’s broad strategy was led by at least two countries: (i). supporting military operations, capacity building, and training - led by the United States and Iraq; (ii). stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters - led by the Netherlands and
Turkey; (iii). cutting off Islamic State group’s access to financing and funding - led by Italy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United States; (iv). addressing associated humanitarian relief and crises - led by Germany and the United Arab Emirates; and (v). exposing Islamic State group’s true nature - led by the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States (McInnis 2015, p. 1).

The United States-led military campaign began in August 2014. The Iraq air campaign was assisted by the Netherlands, Australia, Denmark, Belgium, France, United Kingdom, Jordan, and Canada. The Syrian air campaign was supported by Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Canada, United Kingdom, and France. A number of coalition countries also sent military personnel to train and provide military advice to local ground forces to build their capacity (Mills et al. 2015, p. 4).

Whilst the foreign fighter phenomenon was not new, the discourse employed by the Islamic State group radicalised and mobilised more foreign fighters than any other insurgent organisation in terrorist history. In view of the US-led coalition, researchers from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) based at the University of Maryland highlighted that since 1980, more than 200 of its citizens had travelled to fight alongside 35 militant groups in over a dozen countries (A.15, Table 15). By September 2015, the Islamic State was in the leading position among the top ten insurgent groups sought by US foreign fighters (Patrick et al. 2015, p. 2).
By November 2015, the US-led military campaign had dispersed the Islamic State group’s fighters, increasing its vulnerability to advances from partnering local ground forces. The campaign’s objective was to protect vulnerable minorities. Falling oil prices and coalition attacks on oil fields where the group generated most funding had begun to affect its ability to pay fighters’ salaries and provide basic services. This issue became a vulnerability that influenced the likelihood of some of its fighters defecting to other groups including Jabhat Al-Nusrah (Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report 2015, p. 1).

**Arab opinion of the international military intervention**

The US-led military campaign against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria was largely supported in most Muslim majority countries. Results of the November 2014 telephone survey on Arab public opinion by the Doha-based Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) indicated the majority supported air strikes. The survey was based on a sample of 600 respondents in each of the seven Arab countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Iraq). In addition, 900 Syrian refugees drawn in equal proportion were interviewed in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. The highest level of support for air strikes was from Lebanon, while the lowest was from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine (ACRPS 2014, p. 1).

Survey respondents were asked to provide their opinion on military airstrikes, the coalition’s capability to achieve its stated aims, participation of Arab countries in the coalition, US foreign policy towards the Arab region, and the threat posed by the Islamic State group.
Based on respondents' views, 59% expressed varying degrees of support for airstrikes against the group, while 37% were opposed. On the coalition’s capability to achieve its stated aims 22% across all populations expressed confidence, 38% indicated achievement would be partial, while one third suggested their achievement was unlikely. 61% across the sampled groups supported Arab countries taking part in the anti-Islamic State group international coalition, while 36% were opposed. Overall, 63% supported stated aims of the international coalition military campaign against the Islamic State group while 32% were opposed (ACRPS 2014, pp. 2-8).

Respondents were generally divided in relation to the nature of the threat posed by the Islamic State group and consequences. A total of 14% feared the prospect of foreign intervention against its activities extending to their own countries. 18% of Palestinians and 17% of Saudi Arabians expressed fear of the conflict evolving and transforming into a war against Sunni Islam, while 10% feared the possibility of retaliatory attacks by the group in their home countries. 11% reported the protracted conflict would lead to deterioration of economic conditions in the region (ACRPS 2014, p. 9).
In defining the two largest threats to the security and stability of the Arab region, on average 28% of public opinion surveyed listed Israel, followed by involvement of the United States (21%), Iran (17%), and Islamist militancy (13%). A further 7% cited weak governance, absence of democracy (5%), and economic difficulty (5%). Most respondents attributed the popularity of the Islamic group to its military achievements and declaration of caliphate. The general opinion from the 2014 survey indicated the vast majority considered the Islamic State group to be a direct threat and supported confronting its activities, while 11% expressed a positive view towards it. There was some indication the coalition’s campaign was promoting the political interests of some countries in the region (ACRPS 2014, pp. 12-22).

The Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) has published annual reports on Arab opinion covering a range of topics that have included views on democracy, economy, and the region’s conflicts. Its Public Opinion Index of 2015 was based on face to face interviews with 18,311 respondents in twelve Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania). The 2015 survey confirmed fears raised by the 2014 survey with regard to potential ascendancy of the Islamic State group and its regional repercussions. An overwhelming majority (89%) in the 2015 survey were opposed to the group. Those who supported the group’s activities were in the minority, with ‘positive’ 3% and ‘positive to some extent’ 4% responses. The group faced growing opposition with an increase in negative views from 85% in the 2004 Arab Public Opinion Index, to 89% in 2015 (ACRPS 2015, p. 36).
In the 2015 survey 9% of respondents who considered themselves to be ‘very religious’, and 8% of the ‘non-religious’ expressed favourable views of the Islamic State group indicating the complexity in attitudes towards the group. Support for the Islamic State group was based on political considerations affecting the region’s conflicts and not entirely on religiosity. The group’s popularity was also attributed to its “military achievements” which was cited by 22% of supporters, “abiding by Islamic principles” 18%, “defence of the Sunni Muslim community” 9%, “defiance of the West” 13%, and “defiance of Iran” 6%. 38% of the respondents considered the Islamic State group a product of internal politics in their societies, while 50% considered it a product of foreign powers. 48% linked reasons for the group’s formation and subsequent rise to extremism and fanaticism in Arab societies. 35% linked its emergence to ‘bad policies’ of Arab regimes (ACRPS 2015, pp. 37-40).

While there was no clear consensus on the best measures for dealing with various terrorist groups, respondents suggested the following measures would counter the Islamic State group’s activities (ACRPS 2015, pp. 38-40): (i) supporting democratic transition in the region 28%; (ii). resolving the Palestinian issue 18%; (iii). ending foreign intervention 14%; (iv). intensifying the military campaign against the group 14%; and (v). solving the Syrian crisis in line with its people’s aspirations 12% (ACRPS 2015, p. 40).

Outside the region, results from the Global Attitudes Survey that were published on 17 November 2015 by the US Pew Research Center covering Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Palestinian territories, Indonesia, Turkey, Niger, Burkina Faso, Malaysia, Senegal, and Pakistan, also highlighted how most people’s views of the Islamic State group in countries with significant Muslim majorities were largely negative. None of these countries had more than 15% of their population reporting
favourable attitudes towards the Islamic State group. However, while 28% of respondents in Pakistan had a negative view of the group 62% offered no definite opinion on its activities (Poushter 2015).

**Implications of foreign jihadist terrorism**

Activities of the Islamic State group and affiliated groups in the Middle East, North Africa, and East Africa introduced new security challenges as a result of competition that developed among Al-Qaeda groups with the Islamic State group, which contributed to increase the scale of violence in affected countries. Jihadists aligned to the Islamic State group posed immediate to long-term threats nationality and internationally because they promoted sectarianism, and introduced new types of radicalising influences that could be transferred to home countries on their return or to third countries. Its militants risked reviving jihadist activities through transfer of technical skills that could empower domestic militant groups to engage in more extreme forms of religious militancy (Hegghammer 2010, p. 53). Veterans could also become sources of financial support because of historical links to the well-funded Islamic State group (The United Nations Security Council, 14 November 2014, p. 12).

Activities of newer Al-Qaeda affiliates exemplified by the Islamic State group (IS) highlighted security concerns that much more violent groups could emerge in the future and compete with weakened Al-Qaeda’s core groups. The Islamic State group splintered in 2014 from Al-Qaeda and began establishing new affiliations with some groups that were previously aligned to the Al-Qaeda core. The group quickly expanded the scale of violence in the Middle East, and North Africa. While overly politically ambitious, it still promoted Al-Qaeda’s global image. In comparing the approaches
adopted by Al-Qaeda core groups and the Islamic State group (IS), Lister (2015) in an interview with Salon Magazine described the Islamic State group as inherently ‘impatient’ in seeking to secure ultimate objectives. Groups formally allied to Al-Qaeda core adopted a slightly different strategic approach. While Al-Qaeda was brutal, it was pragmatic and ‘willing to play a much longer game’. Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) closely aligned with its directives as it adopted a subtle approach, and approached its military campaign with a longer term view (Isquith 2015). The Islamic State group introduced a new perspective to the Al-Qaeda model of operations.

In terms of recruitment of militant Islamist groups including the Islamic State group to the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, estimates provided by the Washington Institute's Near East Policy Center for the Study of Radicalisation indicated at least 3,300-11,000 foreign fighters travelled to join fighting groups opposed to the Syrian government from late 2011 to 10 December 2013 (Appendices, Tables A.10 & A.11). The Arab Middle East and Western Europe were the source of most foreign fighters (up to 80%), followed by Southeast Asia, North America, and non-Arab Africa. At least 74 countries had citizens or residents who travelled to join the militant opposition (Zelin 2013). Newer estimates on 26 January 2015 from the King’s College London International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) indicated the total number of foreign fighters who travelled to join militant groups in the two conflicts had exceeded 20,000. Nearly a fifth of foreign fighters were residents or nationals from Western European countries. These figures were based on data drawn from the second half of 2014. The numbers travelling to the two conflicts continued to rise and posed serious security challenges (Neumann 2015).
By 2015, foreign-terrorist related threats had created added dangers and challenges of preventing radicalisation and terrorism, in terms of successfully screening, monitoring, or rehabilitating returnees. The global response to countering foreign jihadism has continually emphasised information sharing and improving intelligence capacities. The threat magnified existing security concerns as some foreign fighters travelled from countries that had never experienced armed conflict, or had groups that associated with Al-Qaeda. Thus, the chance of any country becoming a victim of foreign insurgent influence or attack was becoming a reality, particularly if the intention was to provoke a government or community to overreact. Countries of origin, third countries, and transit countries were all at risk of terrorism (United Nations Security Council, letter dated 19 May 2015, pp. 3-11).

The developing challenges posed by the two main groups have been explored in terms of scenarios they might present. Feakin & Wilkinson 2015 (pp. 9-11) suggested four potential scenarios for Al-Qaeda core’s response to the Islamic state group’s activities:

(i). Maintain the uneasy relationship by tolerating the Islamic State group. Each group operates semi-autonomously. This option has the disadvantage of alienating Al-Qaeda’s support base.

(ii). Merge with the Islamic State group and pool resources to achieve common political and religious objectives. This option would allow the movement to pursue its transnational agenda without the disadvantage of being constrained by command leadership issues.

(iii). Continue confrontation with the Islamic State group. With this option Al-Qaeda core could risk losing financial and military resources, and increase defection of aspiring members to the Islamic State group. The latter would increasingly become a group of choice for aspiring jihadists.
(iv). Outdo each other by conducting spectacular attacks. This scenario has the potential of increasing the ferocity of each other’s campaigns.

Highlights from the report of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service workshop held on 29 February 2016 on the theme ‘Al-Qaeda, ISIL and their offspring’ also drew attention to potential evolutionary developments from the two main groups. Among the highlights was suggestion that while Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group differed on the use of violence, their core objectives and strategies were essentially similar. Similarities were more significant than differences. The latter were related to leadership egos, and style rather than substance and core beliefs. Both groups embraced the same transnational jihadist ideology, and made efforts in some occasions towards unity. If the two competitors re-united or cooperated tactically, emerging dangers from their alliance could be significant in terms of countering consequences (Canadian Security Intelligence Service 2016, pp. 11-15).
Chapter 7

Decline of Terrorism

The objective of this chapter is to evaluate strengths of institutional, organisational, societal, ideological, and political factors that were identified in preceding chapters that influenced terrorism’s emergence, sustainability, and decline. Reviews of campaigns included in this chapter have highlighted familiar reasons that point to group type and scope of ideological objectives.

A systematic study by Jones & Libicki (2008) on 648 terrorist groups that ended or were active worldwide from 1968-2006, and drawn from the US RAND terrorism-incident database and the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism revealed that out of the 268 groups that ended their campaigns four reasons were responsible. They included policing, military force, politics, and the group’s achievement of victory that included political accommodation. The terrorism problem was approached largely as a security problem. On approaches, transitioning towards the political process accounted for 43% of the cases, and was found to be the most common way terror campaigns ended. Military force was effective in seven per cent (7%), only in 10% of cases did groups in the study achieve all their stated goals. Religiously-inclined groups rarely achieved victory although they took longer to eliminate than other groups. For groups that failed to transition to non-violence, policing (police and intelligence) accounted for 40% in neutralising their campaigns. Size was also found to be a significant determinant for a group’s fate. Victory was lower for smaller groups with less than 1,000 members as opposed to larger groups with more than 10,000 members (Summary, pp. xiii-xv).
Factors that influenced how groups sustained or ended campaigns included; ideological orientation, socio-economic conditions, regime type, group size, and breadth of terrorist goals. Breadth of group goals that ranged from preference of the status quo, changing policy, territorial change, empire building, and a social revolution presented an opportunity for bargaining with those having narrow goals. This situation was more likely to cause a government and the terrorist organization to agree on a peace settlement. Groups with broader revolutionary goals aiming for sweeping socio-political changes failed to win audiences. Income level (low, middle, high) in the country was also found to influence group size and possibility of ending a terror campaign (Jones & Libicki 2008, pp. 15, 22-44). Jones & Libicki’s conclusions were supported by other analysts. For example, Sageman (2004, p. 175) suggested that Al-Qaeda movement activities could be successfully targeted through ‘good police work’ and intelligence measures as its mode of operation was not entirely different from those of criminal groups. Movement members needed to communicate, transfer funds, move material, and build support networks. These activities could be infiltrated using intelligence, policing, legal measures, and working with local groups.

Analysis by Abrahms (2006, pp. 43, 53) of campaign outcomes of 28 foreign terrorist groups designated by the United States State Department since 2001 also found that some groups achieved certain policy objectives more than others. The key variable for evaluating a terror campaign was tactical, one of target selection. Groups whose attacks on civilians outnumbered military targets rarely achieved their objectives regardless of the political nature of their campaigns. Poor success rates were related to excessive and indiscriminate use of violence. Coercion succeeded in three out of 28 cases when group objectives were over territory. It failed in all cases when groups had unlimited and cosmic objectives that sought to destroy a target state and its
society’s values. This suggested that limited objectives were more likely to be resolved or accommodated than unlimited ones.

Cronin (2006, pp. 18-32) has drawn valuable lessons from various terrorist groups that were active in the modern era, and proposed seven factors that contributed to the decline or ending of terror campaigns:

(i). capturing or killing the group leader would provide insight into the depth of the group’s popularity as it represented a turning point for the organization. Depending on the type of leader (e.g. charismatic) and group ideology, lack of morale among members could have a negative impact on the organisation’s prospects;

(ii). violent small groups with right-wing (fascist/racist) and anarchist tendencies failed to transition to the next generation due to failure to articulate clear vision of their goals. Over reliance on violence and involvement in criminal activity were aspects that can weaken the group’s strength and negatively impact on image;

(iii). in a minority of cases, the terrorist group can become a legal political actor having fought for the cause. The African National Congress (ANC) engaged in a guerrilla terror campaign against the apartheid regime in the 1960s and became a political actor in 1994. The Irgun fought to advance Jewish interests between 1931 and 1948 and contributed to the creation of the state of Israel;

(iv). depending on the type of leadership and group ideology, a negotiated political agreement can reduce need for further violence as it opened avenues for further dialogue. Negotiation may also be associated with offers of political amnesty, which provided members with incentives to abandon the need to engage in terrorism;
(v). diminishing popular support may be due to leadership errors and miscalculation as a result of excessive violence targeted on constituent populations, undermining issues within the organization’s leadership, or the effectiveness of government counter-terrorism measures which may include implementing reforms;

(vi). repressive tactics involving restriction through military force or policing hastened the decline of small revolutionary groups such as the 19th century anarchist group Narodnaya Volya; and

(vii). depending on group motivations, some groups can transition from terrorism to criminality or conventional warfare. This shift changes the nature of the group’s original conflict objectives as new goals could become ends in themselves. Strength of the group’s ideology diminishes.

Critical elements featured in these internal and external factors can be broadly categorised into four domains: organisational, political, social, and ideological.

Crenshaw’s (1999, pp. 3-4) factors that contributed to ending a terrorist campaign involved:

(i). successful accomplishment of stated objectives such as overthrowing government or ending an occupation;

(ii). preliminary success involving achievement of at least some recognition for a pursued cause. This is in consideration that further violence could alienate supporters and sponsors;

(iii). organizational breakdown as a result of maintenance problems, failures in sustainability when recruitment sources dry up, or some leaders seeking to continue fighting regardless of others’ wishes to give up. It may be due to differences in strategy, ideology, personality clashes, or fatigue; and

(iv). the group may also decline due to loss of public and external support.
Ross & Gurr’s (1987, pp. 408-409) proposed factors for terrorism decline included counter-terrorism policies and the effect of general conditions:

(i). pre-emption - making it difficult for the group to act by increasing costs through target hardening, and eliminating coercive capabilities through imprisonment and other forms of restriction;

(ii). deterrence – increasing risks of the group’s operations and dissuading individuals who might want to join or provide support;

(iii). burnout – organizational conditions that contribute to diminish commitment to organization’s goals such as factionalism, defections, and shift in tactics; and

(iv). backlash - facilitating decline of public support for the terrorist organization through public media campaigns that discredited its causes and strategies.

These factors draw from the same template where institutional, organizational, and social drivers influence emergence of terrorism and ideological types. They suggest the basic determinant for a terrorist group’s survival is political behaviour which is influenced by type of ideology. Public support and government policies can influence the final outcome.

A study by Vittori (2009, pp. 444, 463) on life spans of 100 different terrorist organizations found campaign longevity depended on a group’s autonomy to conduct operations without interference from sponsors (states, private donors, other terrorist organisations) and ability to conduct violence. It found the median of a terrorist group’s campaign activity was three years. Approximately 30% to 44% of groups survived beyond their first year. Groups with moderate to high levels of autonomy in conducting operations and capability level could withstand challenges and lasted longer. Groups
with largely religious or ethnic based goals lasted longer because they had a ready population to
draw support from. Diversification in resourcing (money, tangible goods, personnel) shaped group
longevity. According to the study most campaigns could be defeated using combined strategies of
local law enforcement and multilateral approaches implemented by governments to counter
terrorism including intelligence cooperation.

Miller’s (2007, pp. 334-335, 343) brief review of state policies that were directed towards terrorist
campaigns have been classified into five categories:
(i). do nothing: ignore terrorism, do not apprehend terrorists;
(ii). conciliate: resolve a crisis to forestall future crisis, pursue avenues for change by including
social reform, third party negotiations, release of prisoners;
(iii). legal reform: strengthen government ability to deal with terrorism (e.g. expand police powers,
create specific laws, co-operate with other states and agencies);
(iv). restriction: limit the group’s activities by increasing intelligence powers, hardening targets to
withstand attack, use sanctions against state sponsors; and
(v). use force on terrorists and active supporters. Strategies that were considered to be most
effective in countering groups with primarily separatist goals involved using a combination of
political concessions, legal reform, and restriction (e.g. FLQ, ETA). Revolutionary terrorist groups
with expansive agendas have required a combination of legal reform and restriction through
intelligence work (surveillance and target hardening). This suggests strategies involving restriction
and reforms (political, legal) can also be applied to religiously-motivated groups such as Al-Qaeda.
The Al-Qaeda movement founders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have historically pursued unlimited objectives. The movement has faced a legitimacy crisis because it propagated an idealised version of Islam (Kagan 2005, p. 7) that had potential to radicalise some young and vulnerable people to engage in terrorism. Criticism directed towards Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri has related to their lack of authoritative mandate to speak on religious and political matters. Their views on causes of social grievances and solutions were considered too extreme and a danger to the fabric of Arab societies where normative values in a collectivist culture emphasised conformity to authority figures (Hofstede 2001). In addition to questions on religious and political authority (Harmon 2010, p.10), the issue of foreign terrorist control in local areas created an inhospitable operating environment for the movement as militants heightened the level of insecurity and communication problems experienced by local leaders. These credibility problems had a negative impact on Al-Qaeda’s ideology and image. Leaders of newer affiliates such as the Islamic State group and Jabhat Al-Nusrah Front faced the same criticism for imposing their power and authority on local populations’ activities. The Islamic State group was the most criticised for excessive violence which it exploited to carve out an Islamic caliphate in areas it controlled in Iraq and Syria.

The manipulative behaviour of the movement’s militants in local conflicts involving Muslims has been illustrated in the ‘accidental guerrilla syndrome’ concept developed by Kilcullen (2009, p. 35). The concept has four-stage cyclic processes of (i). infection, (ii). contagion, (iii). intervention, and (iv). rejection. Infection is where foreign extremists seek to establish physical presence in remote ungoverned tribal locations or conflict areas by embedding themselves in an existing societal problem. Aiming for ideological contagion, Al-Qaeda operatives then use the area to serve as a
base or safe haven for spreading their extremist ideology and violence. New recruits get drawn to the new ideology with the intention of instigating negative local reaction towards the incumbent regime and intervening external forces. In this situation, local communities reject foreign occupiers in their areas by attacking them while providing support to Al-Qaeda's foreign activities. Consequently, insurgent efforts in the area would end up undermining government efforts to improve security. From this perspective, Al-Qaeda’s efforts were aimed to cause political destabilisation.

**Figure 5. Accidental guerrilla syndrome**

1. **Infection**
   Al-Qaeda establishes a presence in remote, ungoverned conflict affected area

2. **Contagion**
   Al-Qaeda uses the safe haven to spread violence and takfiri ideology to other groups

3. **Intervention**
   Outside forces intervene to deal with Al-Qaeda threat, disrupt safe haven

4. **Rejection**
   The local population rejects outside intervention, ally with Al-Qaeda

Source: Kilcullen 2009, p. 35.

Kilcullen’s concept can be usefully extended to incorporate emergent developments such as potential shifts in local community perceptions that cause them to resist the presence of foreign terrorists in their areas. While there may have been cooperation and co-optation among different insurgent and radical groups at some point, foreign insurgent violence in the long-term was likely to
increase vulnerability of local communities to reprisals from government and competing groups instead of improving their physical security and social welfare. Al-Qaeda’s foreign insurgents were repulsed from Iraq under the leadership of Zarqawi, and other host locations because of ideological and tactical differences. Local survival issues such as competition for power and material resources, and accusations of cultural insensitivity played a role in distancing local communities from foreign terrorist influences. Whatever gains the Al-Qaeda movement made from the initial backlash against Western intervention, its image as a transnational violent movement was used to differentiate its activities from local and national approaches. The movement’s failure to win genuine popular appeal from Muslim majorities related to its history of intrusiveness and meddling. Its leaders were considered incapable of changing extremist political behaviour in framing their type of social world (Kilcullen 2009, p. 34; Phillips 2009a, pp. 77-78).

The Al-Qaeda movement’s strategic approach in marketing its extremist ideology can be compared to that of a global corporation trying to remain ‘relevant and locally transferable’ while competitive advantages over its adversaries were slowly declining (Lessard 2003, p. 7-8). A strong club model (Iannaccone 1992; Berman 2000) used to illustrate religious behaviour of hardline groups was also applicable to Al-Qaeda. This model suggested leaders of any radical religious group (e.g. Christian, Jews, or Muslim) sometimes marketed their public goods in an ultra-orthodox or cult-like manner (Berman & Laitin 2008, pp. 1-4), potentially ending up propagating nihilist tendencies that deviated from what general society considered to be accepted social reality. Individuals in such groups were likely to form an insular mindset and consider earthly life to have little value (Lesser 1999, p. 101; Hoffman 1999).
The Al-Qaeda movement model was countered based on societal values as it had a number of vulnerabilities that could be exploited. At the political level, the movement’s leaders’ predatory leadership behaviour and ‘grossly’ flawed political strategies (Phillips 2009a, pp. 67, 73-76, 81) were negative attributes that alienated most host communities whose causes remained nationally bounded. This left transnationals to be viewed as a destructive force to be sidelined (Fishman 2009, pp. 6, 35-36; Clutterbuck & Rosenau 2009, pp. 4-5). Secular and non-secular groups with local and nationalist objectives were likely to continue critiquing the movement’s credibility based on its leaders’ policies and ideological values (Cronin 2006, pp. 42-46; Kilcullen 2007).

Organisationally, Al-Qaeda movement groups could be made susceptible to measures that seek to reduce their recruitment capacity, if grievances of domestic groups that have sought to align with its ideology were appropriately addressed. Disruption of recruitment potential achieved through ideological de-legitimisation could degrade operational capability. Some counter-terrorism achievements since 2001 included eliminating safe havens, and encouraging some less ideologically committed or disaffected insurgents to defect and become informants. Not all terrorists have adhered to a global jihadist agenda (Hegghammer 2009, pp. 27-28).

The movement’s recruitment campaign has relied on the strength of its affiliates that were themselves in competition with each other and local groups in their countries or regions. In a democratising context, popular rejection of foreign-related violence could limit the number of recruits willing to fight for its affiliates on political or religious grounds.
The revolutionary wave of popular protests labelled the ‘Arab Spring’ or a ‘reawakening’ that began in December 2010, in Tunisia and spread to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria (Ryan 2011), created mixed prospects for Al-Qaeda. The high levels of violence in some countries (e.g. Libya, Egypt, Syria) in comparison to others (e.g. Tunisia, Bahrain) were linked to practical issues of unresponsive government, worsening unemployment, poverty, and lack of political rights (Campos & Gessebner 2009, p.1; Koch 2004). Although many governments were accused of being authoritarian (Esposito 1994), the secular nature of these economic and political issues acted as a counter force to Al-Qaeda’s non-secular ideology and global adventurism. The Arab Spring was a significant political event that set in motion aspirations of the vast majority of Muslims in ways that turned out to be contrary to Al-Qaeda’s expectations.

Foreign militants have faced the prospect of being forced out by inhospitable political cultures as the majority of people favoured secular values, even though their attainment may have been considered to be slow because of the developing nature of most countries’ economies and polities (Marshall & Cole 2014). The rise of emancipatory and developmental attitudes shifted the balance of political power towards building new government models with open systems. This was contrary to Al-Qaeda’s intentions of seeking to halt, devalue, and at times reverse the pace of political and economic reforms that had been achieved in some of the newly democratising countries. Growth of secular contexts in non-western countries allowed public opinion to influence preferred polities.

The December 2010 uprisings prompted other countries to implement some needed constitutional changes. Reform concerns highlighted that the status quo would not be accepted and governments would continually face challenges if they did not implement some needed changes. The playing
field was gradually changing as pragmatic compromises were made in some countries with different political groups, including some Al-Qaeda former affiliates (e.g. the Libyan Group). The majority of local groups were part of progressive secular movements that opposed open-ended conflict. For a variety of disaffected groups (religious, political, women activists, trade unions, youth movements) incremental changes were good enough rather than total revolution. Collective efforts of these groups had the potential of weakening the narrative power of Al-Qaeda’s transnational ideology further (Bayat 2010, p. 20).

On political reform, efforts towards democratisation were likely to create a positive future for the region. Ayoob (2006, p. 8) cited countries such as Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, and Pakistan where some terrorist groups made compromises by joining political coalitions to influence government outcomes. Knudsen (2003) also suggested that the future of political opposition needed to be weighted in light of democratisation trends that were occurring throughout the Middle East and North Africa (Executive Summary, p. iii). A global shift in political attitudes and social norms was also influencing some compromises based on certain basic policy standards and practices. Universal values such as freedom and liberty were preferred alternatives (Bayat 2007, pp. 12-20) because they provided a better political environment than ones based on autocracy. Authoritarianism was associated with perceptions of lack of trust in the state’s institutions, and regime intolerance of political opposition. Modernisation was having a transformative impact on people’s lives as it linked to socio-economic development and preferred democratising political cultures. This ongoing process was difficult to reverse as people linked aspects of political openness with human development (Al-Braizat 2002). The role of religion was largely linked to framing and addressing domestic grievances, not to support Al-Qaeda’s global agenda.
While likely future issues would concern the form of the democratic model, ongoing debates among various groups and with governments were indicative of secular interaction. Concerns raised by some religious militant groups as to whether the tenets of Islam were compatible with liberal Western democracy would remain part of ongoing theological and political debates. Issues on incompatibility of these concepts were likely to persist (El-Affendi 2008, pp. 32-39; Bukay 2007), but were also indicative of religious accommodation of some modern realities. The future depended on capacity and willingness of incumbent regimes to continue engaging with opposition groups and making needed adjustments to address real grievances (Ayoob 2005, p. 956).

On economic reform, the 2011 Economic Freedom in the Arab World Annual Report indicated that despite the moderate levels of economic development in some countries, inequality had reached critical levels that consequently lowered societal tolerance (Al Ismaily et al. 2011, p. 4). The Arab Spring demonstrated how a tipping point was reached when political grievances gradually linked up with economic issues of food scarcity, unemployment, and high cost of living. The 2011 Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report emphasised how economic growth had potential to promote fulfilment of individual needs such as employment, literacy, access to quality health care, and improve political and civil rights. The report measured degrees of economic freedom based on: (i). size of government; (ii). expenditures, taxes, and enterprises; (iii). commercial and economic law, security of property rights; (iv). access to money; (v). freedom to trade internationally; and (vi). regulation of credit, labour, and business. Countries in the Middle East had experienced noticeable setbacks in economic performance (Gwartney et al. 2011, pp. v, 20-24) prior to 2010 that needed to be addressed. Economic growth policies had potential to increase labour participation rates as flow-on effects were likely to filter through to the general population (Feldman 2010, p. 197).
Economic and political improvements were likely to lower the likelihood of fractious relations progressing into extremist violence and terrorism. Thus, developments in the region from 2011 placed the image of the Al-Qaeda transnational movement in the spotlight for public pressure and further scrutiny because its leaders either lacked depth in understanding key issues, or refused to acknowledge the local basis of issues and how they ought to be resolved.

Secular trends in the Middle East, and North Africa were likely to constrain Al-Qaeda’s ideological expansion because public opinion in these two regions preferred a democratic model that upheld universal liberal values of justice, equality, diversity (in culture, political affiliation, religion) and their freedoms. Political cultures in advanced countries of Western Europe, North America, and Australia were predominantly Christian, and religious debate in their political discussions was largely linked to improving socio-economic conditions. Political and religious openness in their political systems acted as a deterrent to foreign extremist influence. When extremism emerged as a social problem, it was challenged based on local values.

Survey evidence on transitions to democracy in majority Muslim countries indicated Al-Qaeda movement’s ideological influence was being constrained on the domestic front. The Arab Democracy Index that conducted yearly assessment on countries in the region since 2005 evaluated government performance based on criteria on constitutional or legal aspects, public opinion, and actual practices of the regime (Shikaki et al. 2012, p. 10). The 2010 Index highlighted that a large proportion of countries were in the process of democratic transition. Of the 12 countries that were surveyed, 11 scored over 400 points out of 1,000, the score that was earmarked as the cut-off point between autocratic and totalitarian political systems’ behaviour and performance.

The international factor also influenced growth in democratic values (Gleditsch & Ward 2006, pp. 912-913, 930). Analysis from the US Centre for Systemic Peace Polity IV Project on regime characteristics and transitions from 1800-2011, revealed preference for democratic governance was rising globally. An evolutionary normative shift from the 1980s influenced regime transitions to democratic forms of governance (Marshall et al. 2013; Marshall & Cole 2014, pp. 20-22), (Appendices, Figures A.6 & A.7). Freedom House’s assessments on patterns of political rights and civil liberties in the region also highlighted how the political uprisings in the Arab world since 2010 indicated a democratic ferment was being influenced by global trends (Freedom House 2014).

Socially, the Al-Qaeda transnational movement was considered by many Muslims as a destructive force and was likely to continue experiencing organisational, political, social, religious, and cultural challenges because of its leaders’ errors in political strategy, timing, broad range of targets, and the technique of relying on violence. Such behaviour was being capitalised on by ideological competitors and moderate Muslim majorities during political debates (Kilcullen 2009, p. 171; Cronin
2006, p. 44). It allowed the terrorism problem to be bounded and differentiated as a local or foreign entity so that the latter could be de-linked and undermined on ideological grounds (Cronin 2006, p. 18).

Organisationally, the Al-Qaeda movement lost key operatives including central figures such as Bin Laden and Zarqawi who were effective leaders and planners for its terrorist attacks. This loss forced the movement to rely on young and inexperienced leaders and individuals whose activities could be infiltrated by security forces. Ideological marginalisation often forced the movement to seek out and support new groups whose locations in the long term turned out to become hostile to its presence (Mneimneh 2009, pp. 8-9).

According to Hutchinson & O’Malley (2007, pp. 1-11), while factors for decline of one group’s terror campaign may be difficult to recreate in another, at least more than one of these was involved:

(i) changes in popular support may occur externally (e.g. loss of foreign state support). Internally, support for terrorism may shift from active to passive and lead to rejection. Consequently, terrorists will experience problems obtaining food, information, concealing their activities, and finding shelter. They will no longer be tolerated;

(ii) coercive intervention involving violence or the threat of violence, capture or killing of terrorist group leaders, and use of new surveillance technologies;

(iii) competition between and among terrorist groups for resources; criminal markets, recruits, and territory needed for constituent support;
(iv). institutionalisation where groups or key individuals join politically legitimate activities (e.g. the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) based in Turkey and Iraq Kurdistan; *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* (EOKA) in Cyprus);

(v). environmental change resulting from broad social or political changes that rendered the group’s activities redundant. Dissolution of the Soviet Union and the wider de-legitimation of communism as an ideology destroyed legitimacy and organisational frameworks of several socialist groups (e.g. German Red Army Faction);

(vi). internal changes in the group that cause distractions in frameworks, such as mixing formal military engagement and criminality (e.g. the Khmer Rouge; the Uruguayan Tupamaros; Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines). This aspect caused some jailed leaders to denounce violent resistance and to call for ceasefires from their constituent groups (e.g. PKK and the Shining Path). A group’s ability to persist into the next generation depends on recruiting new members who can progress the cause. Failure to outline ideological principles and goals clearly, and pursue them consistently may lead to demise of a campaign; and

(vii). perceived success of terrorist actions may be the result of withdrawal by the adversary from armed action, creation of a new political entity, or abandonment of terrorism. Success may not necessarily result from complete elimination of the group.

The Al-Qaeda movement has been subjected to coercive intervention and declining popular support. Leadership schisms on strategic approaches between the core of the movement and newer affiliates created divided loyalties and cohesion problems. At the societal level, while the movement exploited information and communications technology (ICT) to propagate jihadist ideology to win more recruits, access to the same technology increased community resilience.
against its transnational logic that conflated domestic issues (economic, political, and social) as external ones. Even in countries where ICT access was limited, competition among domestic Islamic groups for political power acted as a social and political force that sidelined the movement’s activism. The social and cultural standing of Al-Qaeda’s local and foreign operatives was likely to be continually challenged based on different political perspectives that helped to draw the line between local versus national, regional, and transnational aims of resistance including military jihad.

The movement’s legitimacy challenges have been strategically exploited by affected governments and their societies, whose hostile operational environments acted to constrain expansion of transnational extremism and terrorism. Counter-terrorism measures forced the movement to continually shift activities to new areas where it encountered similar marginalisation challenges from opposition groups and societies. The movement could not overcome key challenges because it remained distant from mainstream values, relied on violence, and engaged in sectarian behaviour which set it apart from pragmatic terrorist groups with localised political agendas.

Most terrorist groups pursued limited goals. Few groups have pursued totalistic (unlimited) or nihilistic agendas. For some, there is hope that the conflict will end with some form of accommodation and recognition of grievances by government. Military force also does not preclude the possibility for reaching some future compromises with government. In a political conflict there will be hardliners, moderates, sympathisers (passive, active), and neutrals. Weaknesses and opportunities can emerge during the course of conflict where political interactions can enable
moderate leaders to be co-opted if positive incentives such as conciliatory programs became available (Sederberg 1995, pp. 3000-310).

While a minority of terrorist groups and individual cells may be inspired by Al Qaeda’s global agenda, its religiously driven ideology can fail to inspire other potential recruits if new socio-political options become available. New generations of terrorist group leaders may prefer building new identities and differentiate themselves from Al-Qaeda’s ideological posture and image, consequently leaving its extremist ideology to be portrayed as divisive and an inherent danger to future society. A local group’s sense of identity can make it resilient to infiltration by Al-Qaeda if it re-orientates preferences and commitments to influence and protect its own interests.

On prospects, the Al-Qaeda movement of 2015 was dominated by self-radicalised youths with little political association to key leaders of the 1980s who fought in the Afghan-Soviet conflict. Generational changes created their own challenges as they impacted on leadership experience, and capacity to increase membership numbers. New leaders could adopt different ideology, leadership styles and strategic vision (Rollins 2011, Summary, p. 1). The scenarios exhibited by the movement have drawn some evaluative comments. Sageman (2008) suggested its future prospects appeared somewhat mixed, and its threat was becoming a ‘diminishing problem’. Cronin (2006) supported this view because Al-Qaeda leaders failed to provide practical solutions to social problems that mattered at the local level. Hoffman (2008) offered a dissenting view by suggesting that while such a supranational ideology was unpopular, it could still produce copycats because a young and disenchanted demographic tended to be drawn to a grand narrative. However, the general trend was that the Al-Qaeda movement was experiencing a recruitment crisis, and was
increasingly being viewed as a political liability in traditional host locations (Black & Norton-Taylor 2009). Economically poor countries with social cleavages that it has sought to influence such as Somalia, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq because of the religious nature of conflicts were undergoing political and economic challenges of a secular nature (Rippin 2005, p. 277).
Chapter 8

Government Responses to Al-Qaeda’s Transnational Terrorism Outside the Middle East and North Africa

This chapter briefly discusses responses that various governments outside the Middle East and North Africa have implemented to counter the threat posed by the Al-Qaeda movement. They include countries comprising the European Union, and Australia. Efforts by the United Nations integrative framework are highlighted in light of terrorist challenges from conflicts in Syria and Iraq.

The European Union

Many countries in the European Union (EU) have dealt with separatist terrorism and extremism of left wing, right wing, and single issue groups. The threat of ‘home grown’ Islamist terrorism including that of foreign terrorist fighters returning to European countries added more issues to existing concerns. Terrorist developments from the Al-Qaeda movement have been linked to conflict zones of North Africa, the Arab world, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and others where some militants shared expertise in training, fighting, or had contacts. Al-Qaeda’s ideology played an inspirational role by acting as a reference point for disaffected Muslim youths of the second generation migrants in the diaspora (EUROPOL TE-SAT 2009, Executive Summary, pp. 6-7; Cesari 2009, pp. 10-11). Involvement of the Islamic State group, Jabhat Al-Nusra and other jihadist groups in Iraq and Syrian conflicts had global implications within and outside the region, considering the total war approach employed by these groups and the capability to recruit more young people from Europe to continue shaping broader objectives.
The number of suspects in the European Union who were arrested for engaging in religiously inspired terrorism from 2009-2013 was 786 (EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2014, p. 23). In 2014, 395 further arrests were made bringing the total number from 2009-2014 to 1,181. The threat to European Union citizens and interests remained high as extremists could pragmatically collaborate with foreign terrorist organisations or individuals to further certain causes. Terrorist attacks by lone actors were increasing, with a number of incidents targeted at symbols of faith. In 2014, French authorities thwarted two plots involving individuals who returned from the Syrian conflict. They also arrested individuals who had been involved in a year-long exercise recruiting and facilitating other individuals to travel to fight alongside terrorist groups in Syria (EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2015, p. 19).

The coordinated shooting and suicide bombing attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 which killed 129 people and wounded more than 352 was claimed by militants linked to the Islamic State group. The terrorist group claimed its attacks at the Le Bataclan concert venue, the soccer stadium, McDonald’s restaurant, restaurants and cafes in the city were chosen in retaliation for France’s involvement in coalition air strikes against its activities in Syria. It also chose France because it was the capital of ‘obscenity and prostitution’ (Moore 2015).

The shooting attacks from 7-9 January 2015 in Paris by Islamist militants Cherif and Said Kouachi that resulted in the deaths of 17 people were also related to religion. This attack prompted the French Prime Minister to create 2,680 more jobs to curb extremism. 700 million euros (US$990) was earmarked to be spent over three years to fight terrorism, while 60 more Muslim chaplains were to be hired in addition to the existing 182 to work in jails. Authorities also aimed at increasing their engagement in countering “cyber jihadism” (ABC news, 22 January 2015).
On 7 January 2015 two brothers, Cherif Kouachi (32) and Said Kouachi (34) forced their way into the offices of the French weekly newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* known for satirising Islam and other religions. 12 people including eight cartoonists, journalists and a police officer were killed in this incident. 11 people were wounded. Kouachi had informed the television channel BFMTV that their actions had been financed by al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based in Yemen (SBS Australia 2015, 12 January). Amedy Coulibaly, who attacked the Jewish supermarket in eastern Paris in which four people were killed, claimed his actions were carried out on behalf of the Islamic State group (Hinnant 2015).

The Paris attacks spurred overwhelming solidarity and commitment among European Union leaders to accelerate the adoption of tighter security measures to counter violent radicalisation and terrorism. The package of targeted measures included strengthening intelligence sharing, fostering counter narrative policies to prevent radicalisation, tightening border controls, and juridical cooperation in terrorism cases including returned foreign fighters (Bigo et al. 2015, p. 6). On 15 January 2015, the European Union adopted a ‘Communication on preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: strengthening the EU’s response’. This initiative was intended to enhance effectiveness of collaborative tools and existing networks tasked to combat radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism (The European Commission 2014, p.12).

The issue of foreign inspired jihadist terrorism originating from North Africa and the Middle East figured prominently in European Union (EU) parliamentary debates, and influenced various responses that included increasing funding for police, intelligence agencies, and community cohesion programs. Spain proposed implementation of a different criminal law to deal with
“jihadism”, while Belgium announced 12 new measures to deal with radicalisation and terrorism. Belgium broadened its definition of terrorism to enable implementation of tougher penalties for terrorist offenses (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights FRA 2015, pp. 5-6).

Gambhir (2015a), an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War in Washington (US) noted how the strategy of the Islamic State group simultaneously focused on Iraq, Syria, countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and the wider world. The group’s leaders influenced home grown terrorism, intensified civil wars in Yemen and Libya, and made similar attempts to influence conflicts in the Asia Pacific region (p. 7). The military focus of the group was described by some intelligence analysts as involving three concentric rings: the ‘interior ring’, ‘near abroad ring’, and ‘far abroad ring’ as shown in the following chart (Gambhir 2015b).

Figure 8. ISIS global strategy

Countries in the European Union particularly those that were affected by Islamist terrorism in recent years had the largest number of Muslims. In 2010 there were 4.8 million Muslims living in Germany or 5.8 per cent of the total population. France had 4.7 million Muslims comprising 7.5 per cent of its total population. The United Kingdom had approximately three million Muslims representing 4.8 per cent of the total population. The Muslim share of the population in these countries tended to be younger than the median age of Europeans (Hackett 2015). Counter-terrorism measures adopted by the European Union countries emphasised proactive law enforcement and intelligence measures (EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2009, p. 39). Governments restructured, expanded, and strengthened the scope of their security measures to increase capacity and capability of counter-terrorism laws and other instruments. Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, France, and Germany implemented a range of soft and hard measures (Cesari 2000, pp. 9-12).

Spain and Italy implemented selective migrant intake into their countries and applied harsh measures for illegal migrants. Measures adopted by the Dutch Ministry of Alien Affairs and Integration required Muslim migrants to show signs of integration at the basic level. The Netherlands Aliens Act of 2001 emphasises assimilation into common societal values (Cesari 2009, pp. 3, 10-11). The French government faced greater challenges of accommodating Muslim views because it had the largest Muslim immigrant population in Europe. It adopted secular assimilation policies and positive discrimination to provide nominal distinctions on a territorial rather than ethnic basis. This included setting up priority zones to improve educational and employment opportunities. It set up a Muslim Council in 2003 and a Ministry for Equal Opportunities in 2006. The German government encouraged inter-faith dialogue with Muslim organizations across the country with the objective of reducing xenophobia and racism. Annual open days allowed different faith communities
to visit mosques and interact with Muslims (Cesari 2009, pp. 3-12). The threat of radical extremism was localised to be addressed at community level, while other measures targeted it at national and international levels.

Anti-terror laws of France and the Netherlands allowed for deportation of radical imam for inciting terrorism. France’s expanded Law on Everyday Security permitted security officials to stop and search vehicles, unoccupied premises, and to monitor and record electronic transactions as part of its anti-terrorist investigations. New immigration laws instituted in 2003 provided for deportation of individuals who committed acts justifying a ‘committal trial’ or behaviour that was deemed threatening to public order. Measures also included increased penalties for illegal immigration, limits on family re-union, freezing and confiscation of funds associated with terrorism or affiliate organisations (Cesari 2009, pp. 8, 11). Spain and France imposed lengthy prison sentences on terrorists. France had a penalty of banishment from its national territory including financial penalties (EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2009, p. 16).

Regionally, countries in the European Union could facilitate arrest of suspected terrorists including those who committed related offences (e.g. financing, propaganda, facilitation, and training). Some individuals arrested on suspicion of financing Islamist terrorism were found to have engaged in fraudulent activities and extortion. The terrorism-crime nexus was increasingly being recognised by European Union countries (EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2009, Executive Summary, p. 6).

Article 1 of the European Union’s Council Framework decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA) had a list of various terrorist offences. Article 2, paragraph 2, obliged
member states to take necessary measures to ensure that directing a terrorist group and participating in its activities, supplying information or material resources or funding its activities was punishable. Article 3 obliged EU member states to take necessary measures to prevent terrorist-related offences including aggravated theft, extortion, and using false administrative documents. Article 4 reinforced the necessity for legal measures to deal with incitement, aiding, or abetting terrorist-related offences (EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2009, p. 44).

Counter-terrorism measures of Western European countries against the Al-Qaeda movement continued to evolve. Cooperation aimed to close identified gaps to prevent and disrupt other forms of terrorism. Generally, transnational terrorism was approached as a global threat to democracy and societal stability, and emphasis on mutual responsibility to reverse its trend to manageable levels at it could not completely be eliminated. Partnerships and cooperation among countries intensified, including dialogue with Muslim countries and communities that were victims of extremist radicalisation and terrorism. Various approaches were widened and strengthened to prevent attacks in the short term. In the medium to longer term preventive measures sought to address social and economic issues at community and national levels (Benjamin et al. 2006, pp. 21-22).

The government of the United Kingdom (UK) also adopted a broad approach to counter radicalisation and transnational terrorism. This response, guided by the Counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) was closely aligned to the Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare pillars of the response framework that sought to contain the Al-Qaeda movement threat and protect the country’s interests and citizens overseas.
The four pillars of CONTEST strategy

*Pursue:* investigate and disrupt terrorist attacks;

*Prevent:* stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism and extremism;

*Protect:* improve protective security to stop terrorist attacks; and

*Prepare:* minimise the impact of an attack and recover from it as quickly as possible.

The CONTEST strategy has been continually reviewed and revised since its inception in 2003 to enable a more effective and better focused response to changing dynamics of the Al-Qaeda transnational theat. The national risk preventive strategy was considered broader and flexible enough to deal with ideological challenges of various radical groups ranging from extreme right-wing, ethnic, to religious organisations. It sought to promote community interaction with government agencies in areas where risks of radicalisation needed to be addressed (Government of the United Kingdom, Home Office, 2011, pp. 7-25).

Of the four pillars or strands, *Prevent* was considered most controversial as some of its elements were criticised because of the inherent tension that existed between short and long term objectives of the *Pursue* and *Prevent* strands. A conceptual flaw in the *Prevent* strategy required further review to effectively deal with the ideological challenges posed by Islamist terrorism (Gendron 2013). Some Muslim communities raised concerns that some elements of the *Prevent* strategy risked being applied in an insensitive and discriminatory manner and needed to be reviewed (Anderson 2016).
A review of the strategy, particularly as it also related to the role of schools in preventing radicalisation was announced by the government in 2010. The new strategy prioritised dividing preventive from pursue programs to make their outcomes more effective and focused (May 2010). The UK strategy aimed at gaining better understanding of causes and processes that lead to radicalisation, and how to address them. The strategy involved challenging extremist ideology by supporting mainstream voices, and addressing grievances that extremists tended to exploit. Enhanced policing mechanisms provided support to at risk individuals. The government funded a range of programs at the national level and supported community-led programs through statutory and voluntary organizations. Efforts were made to foster strategic communication through partnerships (Government of the United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy 2008, pp. 25-28).

The UK Department for Communities and Local Government also supported a range of programs that aimed to build and strengthen civic leadership. The role of religious leaders in de-radicalisation processes was emphasised as they could focus on at risk individuals who could be drawn to persuasive radical messages. At the social and religious levels, specialist training was provided to Imams to equip them with necessary skills to counsel terrorist suspects in prison. Local communities were also encouraged to participate in forums to contribute new ideas to the National Advisory Board on how to contain radical extremism (Government of the United Kingdom, Cabinet Office 2009, pp. 82-85). Extremist narrative was challenged through the media (radio, TV, newspapers, internet) or physically through face to face interaction. The counter strategy approached the problem of radicalisation as a social process, as it was at the community-level.
where changes to circumstances that lead to radicalisation could be influenced (Government of the United Kingdom, Home Office, 2011, Annex, pp. 69-70).

In the UK, law enforcement remained the principal method for countering terrorism. The Terrorism Act 2006 was broadened to deter individuals who facilitated or engaged in terrorism. The act facilitated arrests and prosecutions. Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 strengthened immigration laws and led to deportations of foreign nationals suspected of participating in terrorism. The government’s Control Order Act 2005 restricted suspects from using communication equipment and associating with like-minded others. Financial controls required financial organisations to ‘know their customer’, and this approach facilitated seizure and freezing of assets. At institutional and legal levels the government enhanced its intelligence capabilities to improve collaboration and coordination between stakeholder agencies (Government of the United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy 2006, pp. 17-21).

The UK government utilised both short and long term counter measures. Wide-ranging counter strategies enabled pursuit of individuals or their sponsors, and to protect the public and national interests. Disrupting terrorism was deemed to require multi-agency coordination and international collaboration. Relations between police and affected communities aimed at improving local public safety. Partnerships with local religious leaders have sought to prevent extremists gaining influence. The government’s expanded public diplomatic campaign also included providing development assistance to Muslim communities overseas. Counter-terrorism approaches have largely been preventive. They included improving broader security (Government of the United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy 2006, pp. 1-22).
Australia

Australia adopted similar counter-terrorism measures as the European Union that included multilateral agency coordination, public diplomacy, and community education initiatives. These measures were implemented to negatively influence Al-Qaeda’s ideological threat from the point of radicalisation. The integrated measures targeted political, social, economic, cultural, and religious dimensions that acted as drivers for socio-political grievances and radical development. Strategies of the government at local, state and federal levels reinforced values of Australian political culture and the positive role that religion played in politics. Democratic culture and largely Christian values were some of the ideological constraints that prevented Al-Qaeda’s terrorists from establishing permanent bases to spread its ideology.

In the domestic realm, Australia’s counter-terrorism measures also largely focused on utilising intelligence, law enforcement, and community engagement. Like other countries that sought to contain the global threat, government strategies continued to evolve as indicated by amendments to existing legislation on criminal behaviour, border security, telecommunications, and strengthening intelligence sharing (Commonwealth of Australia, Counter-terrorism White Paper 2010). Legislative measures to counter-terrorism financing and communication\(^3\) facilitated prosecutions of a number of individuals and preventing planned terrorist attacks. These practices were generally similar to those of its allies and security partners (USA, Canada, UK, and New Zealand).

The Australian government approach emphasised intelligence sharing in domestic and international levels to increase situational awareness of the danger posed by the threat. The threat of radicalisation was being addressed through policing programs, community-driven initiatives, public diplomatic campaigns, and prison de-radicalisation programs aimed at inducing disengagement through provision of positive incentives (Kara-Ali 2010, p. 47).

The logic of de-radicalisation was that vulnerable individuals could be influenced to shift extremist attitudes if appropriate non-violent alternatives were made available. Behavioural changes could then induce disengagement and ultimately de-radicalisation. One of the ways the Australian government has sought to localise the threat of radicalisation involved projects such as the building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation Initiative (Kara-Ali 2010) that was facilitated through the department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. This initiative was one example where the government sought to enhance relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim communities as it supported other initiatives that sought to address issues of marginalisation and radicalisation. Similar programs allowed Muslim community reference groups and Muslim youth summits to focus on issues such as employment, education, training, community engagement, and the need for leadership development roles. These community-led initiatives formed part of the National Action Plan (NAP) that was established by the government in July 2005 to build social cohesion and improve national security (Australian Dept. of Immigration and Citizenship 2007). The basic aim was to promote equality and a sense of national identity among Muslims (Campbell 2007, p. 5).

In the state of Victoria for example, police engagement with immigrant communities (e.g. from Somalia) was a preventive measure aimed to deter vulnerable youth from being exploited by
manipulative leaders in the community. Recognition of the problem of radicalisation and the need to build resilient communities led to the creation of a dedicated unit at the federal government level in the Attorney-General’s Department which focused on countering all forms of violent extremism, home grown terrorism, and deterring Australians from travelling to fight in overseas conflicts. Australian authorities also consulted overseas with countries that were implementing de-radicalisation programs targeted at convicted terrorists using moderate leaders in the community (Vermeulen 2010). One such program that was implemented by the Government of New South Wales employed specialist staff and psychologists who engaged in intensive one-on-one interactions with detainees to confront extremism. Measures were aimed at de-programing radical beliefs and encouraging moderate behaviour. The New South Wales program was based on the US prison system approach (ABC News Online 2010).

Australia’s approaches in dealing with radical extremism continued to evolve and mature. They shifted from simply being able to respond to identified threats to building resilient communities. The emphasis was on prevention and early intervention. Local communities, families, and friends of at risk individuals were often the ones who could observe changes that led to radical behaviour. It was at this lower level that they could influence a sense of belonging and challenge radicalism at the point of emergence (Campbell 2007, pp. 1-6).

While prisons were not a major source for radicalism, the federal government was conscious that life in prisons could encourage further radicalism. It supported de-radicalisation programs through task force groups that were set up at federal, state, and community levels to contribute views on improvements (McClelland 2010). The objective of de-radicalisation programs was to deter
Individuals from violence through dialogue. It was at the community level where the multi-layered tailored strategies could identify at risk individuals and link them with mentors to provide needed political, social or spiritual support (Neighbour 2010).

Like other countries the threat of terrorism in Australia raised security concerns that included potential incitement of vulnerable individuals to engage in political violence, espionage, foreign interference, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Increased efforts were therefore made to facilitate cooperation at local through to national and international levels. Public education and awareness campaigns of potential consequences of domestic and transnational terrorism increased while enhancements to intelligence and legislative frameworks aimed at prevention and preparedness were made. This included international cooperation to ensure domestic security remained adaptable to new developments overseas (Commonwealth of Australia, Attorney-General's Department Portfolio 2007-08, pp. 1-8).

Partnerships among government agencies at various levels and with local communities sought to improve coordination to reduce the appeal of extremist ideology that fuelled terrorism (Australia’s Counter-Terrorism White Paper 2010, pp. 7, 19, 65-66). The government also strengthened capabilities of its partner states in the Asia Pacific region through development aid and training programs to allow the problem of radicalisation and terrorism to be targeted locally within those states (AusAID 2003, p. 5).

In light of foreign terrorist-related activities of Australian citizens, some with dual nationality, who travelled to fight in Iraq and Syrian conflicts, Australia’s Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Australian
Attorney-General George Brandis jointly announced on 5 August 2014 the introduction of a range of new counter-terrorism measures to deal with foreign incursion and recruitment. There was potential some individuals could commit terrorist activities or influence extremism within Australia on their return (Abbot & Brandis 2014). New measures such as Counter-Terrorism legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014, Act no.116 broadened the criteria for listing terrorist organizations that promoted and encouraged terrorism. They provided additional powers for security agencies’ protective actions. The Australian government in 2014 committed additional funding of more than $600 million to be spent over four years by its agencies; the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), Office of National Assessments (ONA), and Customs and Border Protection (Abbot & Brandis 2014).


Like other countries, Australia also increasingly became a source of foreign fighters for conflicts in Iraq and Syria. The assessment by Australia’s Attorney General George Brandis during his speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington in April 2014 estimated 120-150
Australians had travelled to participate in the Syrian conflict. Some were directly fighting while others facilitated travel to the two conflicts (Brandis, speech transcript 8 April 2014). Estimates from the King’s College London International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) based on data drawn from the second half of 2014 indicated 100-250 Australians travelled to fight in the two conflicts (Neumann 2015). At least 60 Australians were confirmed to have been fighting in the Syrian and north-western Iraqi theatres by 2014 (Brandis, interview 4 July 2014). The January 2015 estimate by Australian security agencies suggested up to 400 Australians were fighting with the Islamic State group (IS) or actively supporting their cause in Australia (Benson 2015). Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) reported at least 100 were fighting for the Jabhat al-Nusra Front in 2013. Most Sunni fighters from Australia entered Syria via northern Lebanon (Maley & Stewart 2013).

The foreign fighter threat to Australia was exacerbated by the growing number of extremists from South-East Asia who were also fighting in Syria and Iraq. A plot to attack Australian leaders was foiled by intelligence agencies in September 2014 after “chatter” was intercepted of a potential random attack on Parliament House, and a reprisal attack against ASIO (Benson 2014). On 3 December 2013, two Australian males were arrested and charged by the joint counter-terrorism team of Australian Federal Police and New South Wales Police with foreign incursion criminal offences. One of the men (39 years old) was actively recruiting people to travel and fight in Syria while the other (23 year old) was preparing to travel to fight in Syria. Offences under the Foreign Incursions and Recruitment Act carried a maximum of 10 years imprisonment (Brandis, speech 8 April 2014).
Foreign fighters posed immediate to longer-term threats in Australia as some returnees through their interaction with extremists, and engagement in violence could become leaders and use their extremist jihadist mindset to radicalise vulnerable people. Some could carry out terrorist attacks in Australia themselves (Brandis, speech 8 April 2014).

However, while the government’s National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No.1) 2014 on Foreign Fighters (Bill 2014) was aimed at bolstering the powers of security agencies to identify and prosecute Australians involved in terror-related offences, it was criticised by some concerned groups and organizations that included Australian Human Rights Commission; Australian Lawyers Alliance; Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance; Islamic organizations; the Senate Committee, and others. Their submissions to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security raised concerns on some aspects of the terrorism package that could endanger individual freedom of speech and right to travel, and infringe on human rights and privacy if passed without careful consideration. Foreign policy and human rights issues that required further clarification and refinement or removal included:

(i). the language used in defining a terrorism act;

(ii). a new offence of advocating terrorism;

(iii). areas to be designated as declared areas;

(iv). legitimate purposes of travel; and

(v). control and preventive detention orders, and sunset clauses.

There was a consensus among interested parties that the Bill in its original form was passed within an extremely short time frame that did not allow sufficient consultation and scrutiny. In the counter-
terrorism environment, there was a view that emerging resentment could feed into prevailing perceptions of marginalisation in Muslim communities. Thus, the Bill had to be sensitive to potential Muslim misperceptions. The Australian Human Rights Commission was concerned of the broadness of certain aspects of the new laws that it claimed imposed further restrictions that posed a risk of creating legal difficulties in justification. For example, postponement of sunset dates for preventive detention orders, control orders, stop, search, seizure powers, questioning and detention warrants, should not have been passed in their original form as they created potential for abuse. This included suspension of travel documents (Australian Human Rights Commission 2014, pp. 2-3).

The Bill introduced a new offence to the Criminal Code of entering or remaining in a declared area. Provisions relating to ‘declared areas’ needed to be refined because of the limitation associated to what was to be considered travelling for ‘legitimate purposes’. This aspect infringed on freedom of movement protected by Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Individuals faced the risk of being charged for entering or remaining in a declared zone if they failed to prove they were in a foreign country for legitimate reasons other than engaging in hostile activity. As the burden of proof rested on individuals, the list of legitimate reasons needed further clarification and broadening because reasons for traveling could include visiting friends, transacting business, retrieving property, or attending to personal or financial affairs (Australian Human Rights Commission 2014, p. 5).

The Human Rights Commission questioned the justification of creating a new Foreign Fighters offence Act, noting that the Foreign Incursion Act 1978 (Cwth) already prohibited engaging in
hostile activity and was probably sufficient to deal with similar offences. Restrictions placed on freedom of movement and detention needed to be proportionate to justify increased penalties for offences. This included decisions for cancelling visas that needed to be based on reasonable grounds rather than on the simple suspicion that an individual posed a security risk to Australia. In addressing emergent challenges, the Commission was concerned of the limited judicial review rights provided to individuals to challenge a Minister’s decisions. It suggested society should be provided the necessary information to understand what the government relied on in making its decisions and judgements on terrorist-related offences (Australian Human Rights Commission 2014, pp. 6-18).

Greg Barns, spokesperson for the Australian Lawyers Alliance (ALA) was similarly concerned that the Foreign Fighters Bill 2014 could lead to the detention of innocent people because it lowered the threshold for arrest on alleged offences. The outcome could lead to community resentment as individuals would serve longer sentences or were jailed for life. In the previous foreign Fighters Act 1978 authorities had to “believe a terror crime was about to be committed”. In the 2014 counter-terrorism legislation authorities have to simply “suspect a crime is to be committed to charge someone”. The recommendation of Australian Lawyers was to refine the legislation to match the gravity of offenses it sought to address (Australian Lawyers Alliance News, 25 September 2014).

Vivienne Thom, the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security was concerned the scope of the new “Foreign Fighters’ legislation had been broadened to the extent it sought to “redefine the meaning of security” itself. The Bill needed some refinement as it gave ASIO expanded powers to gather intelligence information on various activities committed overseas, including criminal activities
that probably were not clearly associated with terrorism or national security. The general view was that there were issues in the Bill that needed further clarification (Ashton 2014), which the government later supported by making necessary amendments (Attorney-General’s Department, 22 October 2014).

The new laws on foreign fighters were introduced in three stages, and were accompanied by an increased terrorism alert level which raised the threat’s potential from ‘medium’ to ‘high’, the first time since 2002 when Al-Qaeda posed a significant threat to Australia. Australia’s public alert system was based on four levels. Low – implied a terrorist attack was not expected, medium - it could occur, high - a terrorist attack was likely, while extreme indicated an attack was imminent or had occurred (Griffiths 2014).

**The United Nations**

Through its relevant institutions, conventions and protocols, the United Nations has spearheaded the counter-terrorism campaign framework by promoting political will among member states to prevent and suppress the threat posed by the Al-Qaeda movement and associated groups. The umbrella organisation has encouraged cooperation and consistency among member states in their implementation of economic, political, and legal instruments. Cross-cutting efforts by its international, regional, and sub-regional organizations also involved re-definition and refining of certain policy instruments to ensure common strategic frameworks were used in dealing with new aspects of Al-Qaeda’s terrorism (The United Nations News Centre, October 2004). By 2014, the United Nations had 19 International legal instruments and additional amendments that dealt with various aspects of terrorism, including hostage taking (e.g. on aircraft), bombing, financing, and
supply and use of nuclear material for terrorist purposes (International legal instruments, 13 July 2016).

On 8 September 2006, the United Nations established a Task Force to coordinate efforts to counter terrorism and extremism. It was the first time all 192 member states united under a common strategy which they identified as:

(i) engaging and working with civil society;
(ii) implementing prison programmes;
(iii) improving educational outcomes;
(iv) promoting intercultural dialogue;
(v) tackling economic and social inequalities;
(vi) focusing on global programmes aimed at countering radicalisation;
(vii) addressing problems of radicalism and extremism on the internet;
(viii) adopting legislative reforms;
(ix) implementing rehabilitation programmes;
(x) developing and disseminating information on extremism; and
(xi) training agencies involved in implementing counter radicalisation policies.

The organisation’s attention also increasingly focused at countering radicalisation using non-coercive counter policies and programmes. Member states were expected to continue learning from their own experiences and others’ lessons. The focus was on containment, using proactive and defensive measures to counter extremism and terrorism (UN Counter Terrorism Task Force.
The counter-terrorism strategy was reviewed every two years, to ensure better alignment with Member States' counter-terrorism priorities.

The United Nations has also addressed the terrorism threat via the international police organisation (INTERPOL). In September 2014 the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2178 that recognised the important role in law enforcement of INTERPOL in combating transnational terrorism through its tools and services. For example, the organization's Counter-terrorism Fusion Centre established in 2002 supported 160 member countries through sharing of information on terrorist networks. INTERPOL also supported the conduct of investigations on networks across borders. In July 2013 the centre established a dedicated project to share and exchange information on foreign terrorist fighters. These two main initiatives helped to identify and investigate a number of terrorists in different conflict zones. In 2015 INTERPOL had a database containing 5,000 records of suspected foreign fighters that were contributed by 52 member countries. The number of records by 2015 for all types of terrorist offences had increased by 500 per cent from 2002 to 12,000 indicating the growing impact of transnational terrorism (INTERPOL, 29 September 2015).

INTERPOL has engaged in worldwide support operations since its creation in 1914. The agency's capacity improved over the years and also contained a global database of profiles of wanted criminals, and criminal trends which police services from member states could access. New technologies facilitated cross-border investigations and arrests of criminals involved in stealing vehicles, travel documents, smuggling, trafficking human beings or drugs, cybercrime, corruption, financial crime, and terrorism. The linkage between transnational terrorism and organised crime was being addressed through international police cooperation among member states. The agency
had specialised response teams that could also be deployed to assist investigations of terrorist incidents. The agency worked with the European Union and other United Nations agencies (INTERPOL Annual Report 2010; United Nations office on drugs and crime 2006).

During an official visit to Tunisia in July 2015 by the United Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries in terrorism activities, the team highlighted that recruiters of the North African terrorist networks paid US$3,000 to US$10,000 per new recruit depending on qualifications, stage of recruitment, and foreign fighter activity to travel and fight in Iraq and Syria. The emerging foreign fighter phenomenon raised complex issues because of its magnitude, diversity in fighting profiles and recruitment methods. It posed serious short to longer term impacts on countries as it created vulnerabilities in many dimensions; physical proximity, socio-economic, psychological, and financial that needed to be simultaneously addressed (United Nations, OHCHR 1-8 July 2015).

In dealing with the threat posed by the Islamic State group and associated groups, the United Nations Security Council emphasised the need for member states to improve prevention, interdiction, and enforcement measures through international cooperation and information sharing, and undertaking priority actions by providing membership assistance as expeditiously as possible (The United Nations Security Council, Meeting of 29 May 2015).
Chapter 9

Counter-radicalisation in Asia and the Middle East

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight counter-radicalisation approaches in selected Asian and Middle Eastern countries that focused on addressing the problem of radicalisation through rehabilitation of imprisoned terrorists. Countries in the discussion include the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Singapore, and Indonesia. While variation existed in these countries’ approaches and success rate, their programs basically aimed at countering extremist ideology by influencing a shift towards moderate understanding of politics and religion, and re-integration of individuals into mainstream society.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia’s wider counter-radicalisation efforts included an official counselling program that began in 2004, when the government’s Ministry of Interior sought to balance its counter-terrorism program with an ideological component. According to Hamed El-Said, the program’s objective required “dealing with the wrong convictions of the detained person in order to change and substitute them with correct convictions that agreed with the middle way of Islam and its tolerance”. This approach was to be realised through ‘dialogue’, ‘wisdom’, and ‘gentle preaching’ by competent and credible people drawn from areas of religion, psychology, and social sciences. Detainees were viewed as needing good advice rather than being treated as criminals (El-Said 2012, pp. 37-38). The focus was to undermine ideological justification for extremist violence by promoting the argument that terrorists were being ‘misguided’ by leaders who lacked credibility and knowledge of religious doctrine (Nasir 2010; Boucek 2007).
In the program, individuals and groups participated in two weeks of short term and six weeks of long term counselling sessions. Towards the end of their sentences those who collaborated and renounced violence were placed in a halfway house for further counselling and after care. In the facility individuals participated in other educational programs to shape positive views. Visiting relatives also participated in the halfway house program. Upon release the government provided some assistance to individuals to prevent recidivism and ensure smooth integration into their local communities. Financial assistance was paid for one year, and individuals were helped to find jobs, or resume education to improve employment opportunities (El-Said 2012, p. 38).

The Saudi Arabia program was considered successful as 1,400 out of 3,000 who completed the program, 45 were re-arrested. While Saudi Arabia was not able to stop radical and terrorist developments in the country, the success of the program caused it to become a model for other countries in the region to emulate (El-Said 2012, p. 39). The merger of Saudi Arabian and Yemeni branches of Al-Qaeda to form Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in 2009 highlighted the necessity to utilise this type of counter-radicalisation program to try to localise the threat.

Success factors for Saudi Arabia’s de-radicalisation program were linked to complementary roles played by government through independent and credible religious experts, scholars, and family support networks. The perceived legitimacy and credibility of the program was linked to these types of leaders. The government was also viewed favourably by detainees as the rehabilitation program was well funded and the government provided material support upon release to the community (Nasir 2010, pp. 4, 9-10).
A number of countries including Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia established counter-radicalisation programs similar to Saudi Arabia’s model because of its positive public support and impact. During the period of the military intervention in Iraq in 2008, the United States’ military “Task Force 134” implemented aspects of this program in its detainee policies (The Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Information Office 2015, p. 7). Task Force 134 offered theological debate in addition to an education initiative, enabling some prisoners who were illiterate to read religious texts and study foundational classes on subjects such as English, mathematics, carpentry, masonry, welding, and textile manufacturing (Seifert 2010). The de-radicalisation program enabled detainees to interact with religious leaders through counselling, undertake vocational training, civic education, and engage with family members and the local community (Kruglanski et al. 2010, p. 2).

**Yemen**

The counter-radicalisation dialogue program with imprisoned militants suspected of collaborating with Al-Qaeda movement’s terrorists also formed a central component of Yemen’s counter-terrorism strategy. Following events of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the government of Yemen through the Presidential Decree established a dialogue program on 30 August 2002. The program led by Hamoud Hittar, a former Supreme Court Judge involved a select group of detainees who were considered most radical and hardened in their activities. The process involved small group sessions to influence a shift to moderate views, and integrate individuals with those who were considered moderate in larger sessions. Regular meetings involved discussions on the Islamic nature of the state, meaning of jihad, responsibilities of a Muslim ruler, the right to issue *fatwa*, and relations with non-Muslim states. Family involvement played the role of influencing participants’ views by imparting social and tribal norms (El-Said 2012, p.41).
Between 30 August 2002 and 2010 a total of 500 detainees were released after participating in ideological debates. Upon release the government provided social and economic incentives to prevent recidivism. Released prisoners were provided YR 20,000 each to help rebuild lives. The country’s de-radicalisation program was deemed successful from 2002-2005, but was forced to shut down in 2006 due to limited funds, and increasing negative perception on how it was being run. Renewed Houthi rebellion in the North of the country in 2004 and a violent secessionist movement in the South also compounded its efforts, as the government had to re-direct available funds to quell mounting violence elsewhere (El-Said 2012, pp. 41-43).

There was some criticism of the detainee program with claims the Dialogue Committee lacked legitimacy. Clerics involved were perceived to be working to promote state interests, so that the government would be viewed by Western countries to be acting to curb insurgent violence. Another criticism was that the project was undertaken within prison, in a non-conducive atmosphere that did not allow effective dialogue, debate, and discussion. After-care financial assistance was suspected of being unevenly provided. However, despite the criticism, the program opened further channels for general debate on causes for radical ideology and terrorism in the country (Beg 2010, pp. 15-18).

**Singapore**

While not all countries in Southeast Asia suffered to the same extent from extremism and terrorism, the persistent threat from regional terrorist groups including the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) required implementing preventive ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ measures to contain recruitment activities. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a regional terrorist organisation formed in 1993 previously sought
to establish an Islamic state that encompassed southern Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, southern Philippines, and Brunei. JI was inspired by Al-Qaeda transnational jihadist ideology and became a proxy for its transnational terrorist attacks in the region from the 1990s up to early 2000 (Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs, White Paper 2003, pp. 6-9).

At the height of its activities in early 2000 JI was structured under four regional divisions known as *mantiqi* in Arabic, that fulfilled operational, communications, economic (fund raising), security, and missionary roles (Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs, White Paper 2003, p.10).

**Map 9. Jemaah Islamiyah operations**

![Map 9. Jemaah Islamiyah operations](image)

*Source: Vaughn et al. 2005, p. 9.*

Due to its small size and location in the region Singapore was vulnerable to activities from regional groups including some that sent members to fight in Syria and Iraq conflicts in 2012. In the context of containing Jemaah Islamiyah’s activities, the government in 2003 established a Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) that comprised of teachers, religious scholars, and clerics who
assisted the government in challenging a ‘distorted and over simplistic’ ideology promoted by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Counselling sessions of detainees and their families focused at rebutting misunderstood aspects of Islam which promoted anger and hatred, aspects that influenced and legitimised violence (Hassan MFM 2010, pp. 8-9). The programme was modelled similar to the Yemeni government’s theological dialogue process and focused on aspects of extremism, misinterpreted aspects of Islamic concepts and principles, relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, application of jihad and sharia law, anti-western sentiment, and how to live in a multi-ethnic society (Institute for Strategic Dialogue UK, Case Study Report 2014).

In the period 2002-2015, authorities released 60 rehabilitated detainees as a result of this program (Clarke 2015). One case of recidivism was reported in 2014 from those who were released. In commending the program the Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong emphasised how the role of rehabilitation and reintegration complemented operational security capabilities (Saad 2015).

Singapore’s de-radicalisation programme consisted of four interlocking components: psychological rehabilitation in prison; religious rehabilitation to shape mainstream interpretations of religion; social rehabilitation through provision of educational and employment opportunities upon release; community involvement and family support to ensure proper interpretation and teaching of religion. The community component was linked to after care service groups that continued to provide emotional support to detainees’ families. The Singapore government institutionally sought to blur ethnic and religious distinctions to promote unity (Rabasa et al. 2010, pp. 95-100).
**Indonesia**

Indonesia’s programmes were not as structured as Singapore’s, and there was no formal theological dialogue. One prison-based approach led by detachment 88, Indonesia’s counter-terrorism police unit involved former militants of Jemaah Islamiyah and a team of psychologists who engaged with the group’s detainees to elicit intelligence information on terrorist networks for the purpose of disruption. In the process detainees were also counselled and persuaded to recant their extremist views before returning to their communities. This approach was described as ‘cultural interrogation’ as it immersed detainees into social norms of their societies, to understand hopes and fears from involvement in extremist and terrorist activity. They were reminded of their social roles as fathers and sons and consequences of leaving their families. While this approach was not successful for all prisoners, the information enabled police to make arrests and disrupt terrorist networks in Indonesia (Rabasa et al. 2010, pp. 106-108).

Ex-detainees of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Ali Imron and Nasir Abas were veterans of the Afghan-Soviet conflict and held high profile roles in their past activities. Their dialogue with inmates in various prisons managed to persuade some members to cooperate with government authorities. To improve effectiveness of the program the police provided financial assistance that allowed families from Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Malaysia to visit detainees and provide social support (ICG 2007, pp. 12-14).

While government-led programmes were useful and continued to be utilised, counter-radicalisation programs were largely based on non-government and community-led initiatives. Some rehabilitation programs also used moderate religious clerics whose role was to promote views of
tolerance, pluralism, and peace. This framework capitalised on majority public opinion which was similar to other Muslim majority countries in the region that found Al-Qaeda’s revolutionary project to Islamise governments in an extremist fashion socially unacceptable (Snider 2008, p. 132).

Singapore and Malaysia’s prison rehabilitation programmes utilised formal religious dialogue models. They were centrally-driven while those in Indonesia tended to be informal (Rabasa et al. 2010, p. 105). Prison-based de-radicalisation programmes were some useful tools that various countries used to prevent recidivism. The programmes based their assumption on the likelihood of prisoners’ cooperation with government strategies, and worked towards promoting anti-radical activities in the longer term.

While acknowledging the success of some of these programmes, the recommendation from some in the scholarly community was to implement disengagement programmes prior to de-radicalisation. Disengagement was where an individual changed behaviour by not engaging in violence but not the belief system. De-radicalisation involved a change in an individual’s belief system, rejection of extremist ideology, and embracing mainstream values. When the two programmes’ aspects were combined they were expected to create further barriers to recidivism (Rabasa et al. 2010, Summary, p. xiii). De-radicalisation also needed to combine inter-dependent individual and group processes to be effective (Rabasa et al. 2010, p. 178).
De-radicalisation according to the United Nations Working group (2008) referred to ‘programmes that were generally directed against radicalised individuals with the aim of reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them from engaging in violence’ (UN CTITF Working Group 2008, p. 5). For example, responses of counter-radicalisation policies and programmes that were provided by 34 member states to the United Nations Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism aimed to tackle Al-Qaeda-related terrorism using programmes that involved: engaging and working with civil society; prison programmes; education; inter-cultural dialogue; tackling social and economic inequalities; rehabilitation programmes, legislative reforms; benefiting from global programmes aimed to counter radicalisation; training and qualifying agencies involved in counter-radicalisation; developing and disseminating information; and addressing the problem of Internet use (UN CTITF Working Group 2008, p. 5). While de-radicalisation programmes were generally directed towards individuals and groups, they highlighted the need to address systemic causal factors for them to be effective in the medium to longer term.
Summary

In exploring the nature, scale and security implications of Al-Qaeda’s revolutionary ideology this comparative study has drawn valuable insight from selected cases of historical non-secular groups, secular contemporary left-wing groups, and Sunni Islamist terrorist groups that formally or informally allied with Al-Qaeda’s ideology.

Analysis of various forms of terrorism has highlighted the salience of socio-political and economic grievances in shaping the basis of political violence and insurgencies. Al-Qaeda has drawn from a similar injustice template as other terrorist groups that have sought to represent grievances of their populations. However, the difference between Al-Qaeda and most domestic groups has related to its transnational approach that caused it to target many adversaries, and employ a superficial approach to local issues. This approach to terrorism continually created contextual challenges in marketing its jihadist ideology.

In exploring Al-Qaeda’s strategic behaviour the Introduction has drawn attention to its foreign origin in the conflict areas of Afghanistan in the early 1980s and consequent evolution that was facilitated by its pioneering charismatic leaders Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam who propagated jihadist ideology to other Muslim conflicts through physical or virtual domains.

Chapter one explored Al-Qaeda’s philosophy and Salafist model of pan-Islamist jihadist activism that was inspired by a revolutionary political ideology that opposed Western influence and its support for Arab/Muslim governments. Drawing from different theological branches of Sunni Islam
(Wahhabi, Sufi Deobandi), and intellectual and inspirational revolutionary ideas of leading activists such as Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, the movement’s ideological model sought to enforce purity in religious practices. In pursuing its political goals the movement violently engaged in overthrowing targeted regimes with the objective of replacing them with governments that implemented strict Islamic law. Despite being considered a minority within the Islamic social movement framework, Al-Qaeda’s extremist ideology resonated with some young and alienated Muslims who were likely to provide a pool of potential recruits that could be sent to fight in support of Muslim causes.

Chapters two and three highlighted how the movement in the course of its campaigns in the Middle East and North Africa exploited local grievances although its expansive list extended to re-establishing a historic Islamic caliphate, which was criticised by the Muslim majority based on contemporary realities of nationalism. Transnational challenges it posed have related to its violent approach in resolving socio-political issues, shifting pattern of activity, non-negotiable goals of key leaders who adopted absolutist, puritanical, literalist approaches in debating local issues; and fanatical behaviours exhibited by some of its members. The scale implication of this type of revolutionary political ideology has required continual modification of counter-terrorism approaches. In countering Al-Qaeda, its activities were differentiated from those of domestic groups based on its extremist religious doctrine and transnational logic. Solutions to extremism and terrorism were linked to addressing local social, economic, and political concerns. As many countries in the Islamic world were democratising, Al-Qaeda’s leadership that opposed democratic political systems was marginalised from the mainstream political debate.
Chapter four explored the problem of extremist radicalisation of diaspora Muslims in Australia, Denmark, United Kingdom, and United States. It highlighted the implications for not addressing personal and societal issues of alienation and frustration that led some individuals to progress and engage in terrorism. Motivational factors had spiritual, emotional, material, political, or cultural drivers that could be exploited in vulnerable individuals by recruiters of extremist groups, and terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda. Models of radicalisation were informed by emergent issues arising from vulnerable social conditions, value systems of individuals derived from their societies, and ideological influences. Preventive measures in counter-radicalisation models emphasised tailoring positive incentives to prevent violence and engaging effective community leaders in supportive or mentoring roles. The broad scope of counter-radicalisation approaches highlighted the need to promote moderate understanding of religion and addressing systemic and personal issues of alienation that led to terrorism.

Chapter five compared Al-Qaeda's terrorism campaigns with that of medieval religious terrorist groups (Assassins, Zealots-Sicarii) in the Middle East, Thugs of India, Anarchist terrorists (1820-1920) in Western Europe, and secular left-wing groups that were active during the 1960s-1980s (ETA, BR, RAF, FLQ) to highlight similarities and differences in emergence, and decline factors that could be applied to counter Al-Qaeda’s transnational movement groups. The defining features of religious-based groups were related to fanaticism, martyrdom, zealotry, and use of available technology to achieve their goals. These features have been similarly portrayed by Al-Qaeda’s groups. Each medieval group behaved according to its religious doctrine, and declined because of violent logic that alienated communities.
Anarchist terrorism (1820-1920) reacted against capitalism, globalisation, and authoritarianism. These aspects were similar to Al-Qaeda’s although the latter’s rhetoric was largely religious. Anarchist terrorism was defeated because of its reliance on violence and non-pragmatic approach despite changing times. The scope of Al-Qaeda’s terrorism has been much broader and its indiscriminate violence became detrimental to achieving socio-economic and political objectives.

The movement campaigned to re-establish historical political entities such as an Islamic caliphate, while secular left-wing groups (ETA, BR, RAF, FLQ) campaigned on a nationalist platform. Muslim majorities preferred nationalist frameworks, and the same issue of relying on violence emerged as a continuing discriminating factor in differentiating terrorist group campaigns. Local grievances were contained at the national level through constructive engagement with different groups. Al-Qaeda groups were excluded because their foreign agendas failed to resonate with preferred local approaches.

Chapter six has explored cases of transnational jihadist terrorism in the Middle East, North Africa, and East Africa that Al-Qaeda movement co-opted into its transnational network as affiliates. The latter have conducted terrorist attacks on the movement’s behalf while exploiting advantages of its brand image and resources to shore up their own image and profiles. While their participation enabled the movement to project a powerful image of being a formidable adversary, the same emergent issues of leadership differences, lack of resources, lack of contextual sensitivity, questions on legitimacy and credibility continually negated the movement’s capability to operate as a united entity. Alliance to Al-Qaeda’s expansionist goals was considered by locals to be politically destabilising. It disadvantaged affiliates’ prospects relative to domestically focused groups. Allied
groups faced the prospect of marginalisation from pluralist politics because of nationalist priorities. Linkages (informal or formal) that were developed were basically opportunistic as weaker groups sought to improve political profiles. Affiliates were likely to face growing condemnation nationally and internationally because of their intransigence.

Chapter seven has evaluated strengths of institutional, organisational, societal, ideological, and political factors that influenced terrorism emergence, sustainability, and decline. On counter-terrorism, it found that most campaigns were ended through policing, political measures, or a group’s achievement of victory that included political accommodation. Military force was effective in a minority of cases. On campaigns, religious terrorist groups rarely achieved main goals because of the unlimited nature of their objectives. Al-Qaeda movement’s goals were similar but much broader. Thus, ideological type, approach to socio-political grievances, group size, and breadth of a group’s goals determined prospective outcomes. Domestic groups were likely to achieve positive outcomes compared to religious or transnational groups. In terms of counter-terrorism, aspects of group type, scope of ideological objectives, and target selection emerged as key considerations for understanding the behaviour of secular and non-secular terrorist groups.

Chapter eight highlighted broad counter-terrorism measures that a number of countries in the European Union and Australia adopted to contain Al-Qaeda’s terrorism including that of its competing affiliate the Islamic State group. It highlighted how each country countered terrorism through integrated measures involving law enforcement, promoting multi-lateral agency cooperation, public diplomacy, and community education to prevent extremist radicalisation. The latter highlighted the importance of engaging with and supporting local communities. Foreign
inspired terrorism required adopting new legislation within criminal law. The United Nations framework has acted as an umbrella organisation to ensure member countries used a common framework to address existing and new aspects of terrorism, including Al-Qaeda’s.

Chapter nine has explored counter-radicalisation approaches implemented by governments in Singapore, Indonesia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Depending on each country’s capacity, the problem was addressed through phased formal or informal rehabilitation programmes. Extremist ideology was countered in prisons through counselling sessions with religious clerics, psychologists, and the support of families and local communities. Theological dialogue focused on re-orientating individual mindsets to value living in a pluralistic political and multi-religious society. The benefit of radicalisation programmes rested on the premise that disengagement was a useful starting point because it aimed at changing behaviour not to engage in violence. This phase could then be followed through by aiming to change the belief system (de-radicalisation) to reject extremist ideology. Disengagement and de-radicalisation were two program aspects that needed to be combined to be effective. Both were linked to addressing systemic conditions that led to the emergence of terrorism. Similar to terrorism, counter-radicalisation programmes highlighted that individuals had different motivations for joining extremist groups. Differences in willingness or commitment levels were likely to influence some to disengage and de-radicalise.

This study has highlighted how groups that relied on violence alienated target communities, and failed to achieve stated objectives. For Al-Qaeda, this issue continually caused it to shift activities to new conflict environments involving Muslims hoping to improve prospects. Geographical expansion was an indicator of its efforts to try to remain ideologically relevant, although franchising had its
own costs as it created further credibility and legitimation challenges. The branching out of the Islamic State group from the core of the movement undermined unity of effort and increased criticism of foreign inspired violence.

The movement’s main challenges related to legitimacy at political and religious levels in both secular and non-secular environments, because of its idealised version of Islam, and imposition of authority. Activities of Syrian affiliates (Islamic State group, Al-Nusra Front) further highlighted its predatory and manipulative political behaviour. Both groups engaged in high levels of indiscriminate violence and their leaders were criticised for adopting hardline approaches. Despite attracting large numbers of foreign militants to join its ranks the Islamic State group faced the most criticism as it publicly advocated establishing a regional caliphate in Iraq and Syria, a religious historical objective that was contrary to the contemporary political objectives sought by domestic rebel groups in the two countries.

Therefore, Al-Qaeda’s campaign approach can be differentiated from that of domestic groups because it promoted an idealised version of Islam. Its reliance on transnational logic caused it to develop a distant relationship with target communities, whom it alienated as it glossed over their contentious issues and priorities. Al-Qaeda movement’s attempts to impose authority and to control religious and political debate were strongly resisted. Its shifting pattern where it developed affiliate links with various Sunni extremists, terrorist and insurgent groups in North Africa, the Middle East, East Africa, and West Africa, has been shown to be largely opportunistic. Affiliate groups were also likely to be similarly challenged based on extremist religious doctrine, transnational logic, and on the legitimacy of their political or religious claims.
However, based on existing and emerging links with some jihadist groups, Al-Qaeda’s ideology was likely to remain an inspirational force rather than a popular value system for the Muslim majority. Al-Qaeda has evolved over the years into a brand name because its political ideology could be flexibly remodelled, rebranded, and used by militant and insurgent group leaders to promote domestic and transnational causes in conflicts affecting Muslims. The brand was continually evolving, noting the growing number of jihadist groups opposed to secular authority that have been attracted to the idea of establishing strict Islamic governments within their countries or regionally. Historical, religious, or ethnic links could magnify domestic issues and make them form part of the transnational religious narrative. Conflicts in Afghanistan (1980s), Iraq (2000-2016), and Syria (2012-2016) attracted foreign jihadist fighters who justified their involvement on defensive religious, political, and ethnic grounds. The strength of fatwa to fight against foreign occupation or aggression can draw activists to foreign conflicts because of the strength attached to religion, and its authority figures.

While causes of terrorism have generally been linked to issues of regime capacity (political and civil rights), economic (inequality, poverty, unemployment), social (lack of education), religion has played a role in shaping some jihadist campaigns. The significance of grievance issues lies in their interaction, which different theoretical approaches have helped to explain by highlighting the diversity in motivations for joining radical or terrorist organisations, and why some groups declined over time or persisted.

Gurr’s (1968a, 1970) theory of relative deprivation has explained political violence in terms of frustration and aggression. The essential argument in this theory for the analyst is to consider three
inter-related general factors: popular discontent (relative deprivation) and its sources, justifications and beliefs for violence, and the balance in capacities between discontented people and the government. While the theory was developed in the 1960s to explore violence in postcolonial states, the Why Men Rebel theoretical model was still valid in the 21st century despite some limitations. For example, some of the limitations include the concern that it has not explored in detail the origins of people’s beliefs about justice or the good life, how they organized and mobilised into action, mechanisms such as social media they could have used to communicate and spread political ideas, or rationality of political action. The model was developed on the assumption political violence was a form of non-rational action to frustration. It did not explore rational behavior or government responses to political violence (Gurr 2011).

The relationship between relative deprivation and participation in the model is mediated by a number of social variables, namely coercive potential (e.g. retribution), institutionalisation, and social facilitation (Gurr 1968b, pp. 1104-1105).

Figure 10. Causal model of civil strife

![Diagram of causal model of civil strife](Source: Gurr 1968b, p. 1105.)
Gurr’s theory has been beneficial as it partly informed causes for initial emergence of terrorism and potential decline. It facilitated drawing ideological boundaries between domestic and transnational campaigns by highlighting key issues of localisation and scope of political activity.

This study has also been partly informed by economic approaches of Collier & Hoeffler (2001, 2004), and Fearon & Laitin (2003) whose studies of civil war onset built on Gurr’s relative deprivation ‘grievance’ model. Their econometric model provides a rationalist explanation on the political economy of conflict by suggesting rebels can be motivated by different objectives including opportunities for economic gain. Collier & Hoeffler (2001, 2004) have argued that rather than ‘grievance’, rebellion could also be motivated by ‘greed’. In their investigation that covered 45 cases of civil war from 1960-1999, their analysis found opportunity factors to have greater explanatory power in determining the incidence of civil war than grievance factors of inequality, lack of political rights, and ethnic and religious divisions in society. Objective measures of grievance (primary commodity exports, per capita income, proxy earnings from education and diaspora) in the opportunity model provided a better explanation for rebellion. Rebellion needed motive and opportunity, and rebels needed to be paid to prevent desertions. Thus, military advantage depended on availability of finance which economic incentives for survival presented. The opportunity model can be utilised by non-profit organisations, and rebel organisations to improve survival prospects (pp. 565-589).

Fearon & Laitin (2003) investigated countries that experienced violent conflict during the period 1945-1999. Their analysis highlighted the important role played by economic conditions that favoured insurgency compared to those related to cultural diversity and grievances. According to
the researchers, the economic opportunity model can be harnessed by groups with diverse motivations and agendas, whether they were communist, nationalist, or Islamist (pp.75-76).

Similar to Gurr's grievance model, the Collier & Hoeffler model has some limitations. Sambanis 2003 (pp. 48-52) has suggested that it does not include the explanatory role played by political elites, or explored inequality issues in society which were equally important in explaining some causes of potential violence. The economic model also did not clearly capture how rebel organizations developed, an aspect that Gurr's grievance model highlighted. Effects of low-level political violence were not represented as civil war was defined as violence that resulted in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths.

In exploring campaigns of extremist groups, and terrorist groups this study has considered the two approaches (grievance and greed) to be complementary. Both had explanatory value as their variables highlighted diversity in grievances and motivations for engaging in violence, including the aspect of fluid identity that has caused some groups to seek economic opportunities elsewhere to ensure survival. The ‘greed’ hypothesis highlighted atypical behaviour of some groups in violent conflict. The reinforcing theories have facilitated exploration of different terrorist ideologies from their historical and philosophical contexts. They helped in highlighting contributing factors for terrorism emergence, longevity, or decline of groups.

Terrorists have reacted to globalisation and also benefited from it. Their critique of the capitalist economy, and state sovereignty reflected issues of social structure and power relations that were influenced by its changing contexts. Globalisation is a system construct whose interconnected
processes have influenced technological, economic, social, cultural, political change and transformation. The rise of Al-Qaeda in 2001 and transnationalisation of its operations was made possible because of its capability to harness advances in information and communications technologies, and transportation. This study has integrated the impact of globalisation as it helped to provide conceptual clarity, by contextualising and distinguishing political ideologies and their competing value frameworks across time and space to highlight the nature of emergence, adaptation, contagion, diffusion, and prospects.

In facilitating decline, some generalisations have been made. The study found security strategies of enhanced law enforcement and intelligence sharing remained the principal methods for deterring extremist activities of small networked groups, including groups that formally or informally affiliated with the Al-Qaeda movement.

Insights from historical lessons on the behaviour of secular and non-secular groups highlighted how relying on the violent tactic in resolving socio-economic and political grievances could be detrimental to the main cause. Al-Qaeda’s unique quality and one that became a significant differentiating factor was transnationalisation of its ideology of violence, which it applied indiscriminately based on an open-ended conflict. The transnational logic provided it the flexibility to achieve some tactical objectives despite facing serious ideological challenges in hostile environments.

Insights from contemporary forms of terrorism have also highlighted the importance of contextualising terrorism in terms of origin, and differentiating group types based on motivations
and behavioural patterns. This bounded approach facilitated strategic tailoring of counter-terrorism measures to expose Al-Qaeda’s transnational ideology in Arab/Muslim societies where it originated as extremist and impractical in modern times. Its leaders were branded elitist and opportunists, who, while relying on religious and cultural frames to debate causes and solutions to socio-political grievances employed a conspiratorial, imperialistic, identity-based, civilisational, and sectarian perspective. As conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa, West Africa (Northern Nigeria), and East Africa (Somalia) were largely about fulfilment of basic local needs and not religion or culture clash, Al-Qaeda’s narrow and superficial approach to key issues became a key limitation in political campaigns that rival groups, affected societies, and governments exploited to counter its extremism. While Muslims valued religious identity, fighting to reclaim a gloried past (e.g. caliphate) was not a top priority for the moderate majority. Such characterisation of the social conflict was considered a direct threat to modern societies as it potentially reversed constructive efforts that had been achieved through cultural and religious dialogue with other groups. Al-Qaeda’s references to a clash of religions or civilisations highlighted evidence of a clash of its values and priorities with those of domestic groups and their constituents.

Al-Qaeda movement leaders misrepresented the nature of linkages between domestic and external causes of grievances. Its overly globalist narrative was directed at historical traumas and events that Muslim majorities considered peripheral to key issues in their contemporary political debates. Al-Qaeda leaders projected themselves as the visionary vanguard for future generations of Muslims to follow but were found to lack credible authoritative knowledge to speak on politics, the economy, or religion. Leadership issues that included inexperience, dogmatic and authoritarian
style that focused on punishment to promote religious purity contributed to increase rather than
decrease distress levels in Muslim communities it sought to influence.

A post-modern world was considered by the majority of Muslims to be globalising, progressive,
multicultural, one that promoted values of religious and cultural tolerance. Younger Muslim
generations benefited from modern technological advances. They viewed their future within this
contemporary framework and increasingly voiced support for secular values that included social
equality and political inclusion. This holistic world view was contrary to Al-Qaeda’s that promoted a
reductionist (scientific, atomised), static, and intolerant closed social world. Since a group’s desired
world view was considered the main reference point for interacting with communities, Al-Qaeda’s
ideology was likely to generate further questioning and differentiation because it promoted a
version of social reality that was deemed incomprehensible and therefore impractical, and largely at
odds with majority Muslim expectations.

Societies in the Middle East and North Africa generally expressed unwillingness to sacrifice political
gains made prior to the Arab Spring events in 2010. Developments since then, including those
linked to the conflicts in Iraq and Syria from 2012-2016 continued to negatively affect Al-Qaeda’s
image. Its prospects and political space had reduced significantly in traditional locations it initially
gained some popular support. Outside Muslim regions, the Al-Qaeda threat was being contained
with preventive strategies that aimed to address religious concerns regarding political and
economic grievances. Counter-terrorist measures have largely focused at the domestic sphere
where efforts of moderate majorities were harnessed to isolate hardliners.
Compared to many countries in the Middle East and North Africa that were in a weaker position, counter-terrorism approaches of western countries were much more effective in dealing with terrorism in general, including Al-Qaeda’s transnational terrorism. Governments from Western countries had robust economies and strong democratic institutions that increased the resilience of their societies from extremist influences. They could effectively utilise public diplomatic tools to reorientate social issues and to positively shape public opinion to acknowledge global realities of religious pluralism, political toleration, multicultural and economic integration (Perl 2005, p. 10).
Conclusion

In comparing domestic and transnational forms of terrorism the study attributed Al-Qaeda movement’s gradual loss of popularity to its extremist transnational jihadist ideology. From a position of strength on 11 September 2001, its networks of cells and regional affiliates have been subjected to persistent challenges from negative public opinion, international public and military pressure, ideological competitors, and government counter-terrorism measures that facilitated collaboration at national and international levels. Transnational logic and reliance on religious and cultural frames were used to differentiate its activities from the domestic realm where socio-economic and political grievances that affected the majority of Muslims in their countries needed to be addressed. It was highlighted that religion could play a positive role in shaping positive future outcomes.

The transnational movement’s key limitations that related to conflation of local issues with global ones, and use of extremist religious doctrine that promoted indiscriminate violence, marginalised its ideology from mainstream politics leaving the movement to be regarded as a foreign entity and wild-card intent on social and political destabilisation. The movement has manoeuvred around these limitations by exploiting its franchise affiliate structure that allowed any religiously inspired Sunni extremist and terrorist group, or individuals from any part of the world to exploit its ideas to benefit their own causes, and to reciprocate as proxies by attacking its adversaries. The ability to continually inspire new generations of activists to engage in terrorism in home countries, or to travel abroad and fight in Muslim conflicts in support of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State group and Jabat Al-Nusrah in Syria, was an advantage that was likely to keep its transnational ideology and global brand within the realm of contentious Muslim politics.
The novelty of Al-Qaeda lies in the tacit acceptance of its ideology which interested individuals could obtain from a variety of sources including publications, face to face interaction, or from the Internet. On future implications, the study has highlighted a number of challenges. One related to potential expansion of sectarian violence from newer groups such as the Islamist State group whose scope of terrorist activity transcended the conflicts of Iraq and Syria. A related issue involved the potential merger of Al-Qaeda’s formal groups and Islamic group brands which, despite their competition, were beginning to soften. The future could involve a formal alliance where the two jihadist models may pose unprecedented challenges for counter-terrorism as most affiliates originated from weak states. Future study could explore developing trends related to the merging of these types of jihadist groups.

This study has sought to contribute towards deepening understanding of ideology as an operational tool. It focused on counter ideology and contributed towards countering terrorism by developing further understanding of militants’ operational contexts and ideational constructs. Like most terrorist groups, and insurgent groups the Al-Qaeda movement engaged in a war of ideas and values. Containing its threat required focusing on its domestic and transnational dimensions. The emphasis was directed towards understanding its theological and political ideological frameworks, and to differentiate its campaign approach on the basis of its transnational logic and extremist religious doctrine. While the Al-Qaeda movement shared some basic similarities with domestic groups differentiating factors relating to the logic of violence were found to be significant. The thesis almost entirely relied on open-source documentation, reports, survey results and library resources. Due to the difficulty in obtaining primary source material on terrorism, most researchers on the topic have largely drawn from secondary or tertiary data sources to explore the topic of ideology.
Appendices

Table 1. Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements (AQAM), attacks from 2012-2014

Affiliated movements: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Ansar Al-Sharia (Libya), Ansar Al-Sharia (Tunisia), Al Shabaab, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also known as ISIS, ISIL, IS), and Al Nusra Front. Source: Braniff 2015, based on information drawn from the Global Terrorism Database, START. AQAM in 2014 (top) had more groups than ISIL.

Table 2: Negative opinion of Al-Qaeda prevails

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Unfavourable (%)</th>
<th>Favourable (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Territory</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Economic and social developments in Middle East and North Africa, 2009–19 (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour force</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (total)</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth unemployment rate</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment growth</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth employment growth</td>
<td>–0.2</td>
<td>–1.9</td>
<td>–1.1</td>
<td>–1.6</td>
<td>–1.2</td>
<td>–0.8</td>
<td>–0.4</td>
<td>–0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real wage growth</td>
<td>–1.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>–0.5</td>
<td>–0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity growth</td>
<td>–0.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>–1.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6. Biographies of AQAP militants

Life histories – militants had previous jihad combat experience in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. Some had been in imprison and or experienced torture in captivity. Demographic profile – the majority were Saudi nationals. Foreign nationals were drawn from Yemen, Morocco, Syria, Chad, and Mauritania. Most militants were from middle or lower middle classes. Most were aged in their late twenties, ranging between 19 and 42. Average age was 27. QAP was an urban middle-class youth phenomenon and male dominated. Biographies of the 240 Saudi militants were obtained during field work research in 2004-2005 in Saudi Arabia (Hegghammer 2006a, pp. 42-44).
### Table 10. Number of foreign fighters in Syria: Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Low estimate</th>
<th>High estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>2,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>1,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greater Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 11. Number of foreign fighters in Syria: Western Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Low estimate</th>
<th>High estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Allegiance</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Table 14. The Anti-ISIL coalition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Arab League</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Kingdom of Bahrain</th>
<th>Kingdom of Belgium</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Cyprus</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Republic of Iraq</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The US Department of State, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL webpage, Washington, DC, USA.

Table 15. Top ten affiliations of US foreign fighters, 1980-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Express ed interest (did not travel)</th>
<th>Unsuccessful attempt (failed to reach conflict)</th>
<th>Unsuccessful attempt (arrested during or before attempt)</th>
<th>Successfully travelled (did not return)</th>
<th>Successfully travelled (returned to US)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda core</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples Protection Units (YPG)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabhat al-Nusra</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Mujahideen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


268
Polity IV Dataset Users’ Manual assesses a country’s quality on democracy and autocracy using an eleven-point scale (0-10) based on indicators of general qualities of political institutions that include competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraint on executive action, and competitiveness in political participation (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2011, pp. 14-15). Score ratings of governing authority are assessed as: fully institutionalised autocracy (10); democracies (+ 6 to +10); anocracies as middle range categories. Open anocracy (1 to 5), closed anocracy (-5 to 0); and autocracies (-10 to -6) (Marshall & Cole 2014, pp. 20-22).

Figure 6. Trends in global governance 1800-2015

Figure 7. Governance trends in Arab League countries, 1946-2013

Bibliography


271


Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) 2003, Counter-terrorism and Australian aid, Commonwealth of Australia 2003, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, ACT.


Benjamin, D, Kirby, A & Smith, J 2006, Currents and crosscurrents of radical Islamism, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, USA.


276


Brachman, JM & McCants, WF 2006, Stealing Al Qa’ida’s playbook, Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York.


Campbell, KM & Darsie, W 2006, Mapping the jihadist threat: the war on terror since 9/11, Aspen Strategy Group Report, The Aspen Institute, Queenstown, Maryland, USA.


Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 3-0-1, Counterinsurgency, 16 December, Land Warfare Development Centre, Canberra.


2010, Counter-terrorism white paper: securing Australia, protecting our community, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra.


Cordesman, AH 2006, ‘The Iraqi insurgency and the risk of civil war: who are the players?’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, USA, pp. 1-20, revised draft.


______ 2000, 'The psychology of terrorism: an agenda for the 21st century', *Political Psychology*, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 405-420.


284


El-Affendi, A 2008, Who needs an Islamic state?, Malaysia Think Tank London, United Kingdom.


Fishman, B 2009, Dysfunction and decline: lessons learned from inside Al Qaeda in Iraq, Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, West Point, New York, March 2009.


287


_______ 2016, ‘Resistance groups in Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet conflict’, Alexandria, VA. Viewed 20 June 2016,
Goldman, J 2015, *The central intelligence agency: an encyclopedia of covert ops*, intelligence gathering and spies, ABC-CLIO.


Gunaratna, R & Woodall, D 2015, Afghanistan after the western drawdown, Rowman & Littlefield.


Hafez, MM 2007, Suicide bombers in Iraq: the strategy and ideology of martyrdom, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, USA.


______ 2005, Does our counter-terrorism strategy match the threat?, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, September, CT-250, Testimony.


______ 1993, Holy terror: the implications of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California.


_________ 2015, ‘Foiled militant attack in Malaysia exposes domestic IED capacity’, 27 April.


Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor 2012, ‘Al-Qaeda under Zawahiri’, vol. 12, no. 6, 1 June.


Kaplan, L 1992, *Fundamentalism in comparative perspective*, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, MA.


Kelsay, J 2007, Arguing the just war in Islam, Harvard University Press.

Kenney, JF 2006, Muslim rebels: Kharijites and the politics of extremism in Egypt, Oxford University Press.


______ 2009, The accidental guerrilla: fighting small wars in the midst of a big one, Oxford University Press.


Kruglanski, AW, Gelfand, M & Gunaratna, R 2010, Aspects of de-radicalisation, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict (ISAC), North Carolina, USA.

Kushner, HW 2003, Encyclopedia of Terrorism, SAGE, California.

Lambert, SP 2005, ‘The sources of Islamic revolutionary conduct’, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, DC, USA.


Lungu, E & Gökçel, R 2011, ‘Pan-Arabism and the Arab Spring, ambiguity of the Arab unity issues’, Romanian Military Thinking, April, no. 2, pp. 120-137.


McLaughlin, P 2007, Anarchism and authority: a philosophical introduction to classical anarchism, Ashgate.


Neumann, PR 2015, ‘Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan in the 1908s’, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, United Kingdom.


Nyrop, RF & Seekins, DM 1986, Afghanistan: a country study, Foreign area studies, The American University, Washington, DC, USA.


Olsen, JA 2009, Roads to militant radicalization: interviews with five former perpetrators of politically motivated organized violence, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, pp. 4-61.


O’Neil, BE 1990, Insurgency and terrorism: inside modern revolutionary warfare, Herndon, VA, Brassey’s Inc.


309


Piazza, JA 2003, ‘Rooted in poverty?: terrorism, poor economic development and social change’, Mimeo, Meredith College, Raleigh, North Carolina, USA.


Rippin, A 2005, Muslims: their religious beliefs and practices, Psychology Press.


____ 2015, Religion and violence: an encyclopedia of faith and conflict from antiquity to the present, Routledge.

Ross, JI & Gurr, TR 2004, Violence in Canada: sociopolitical perspectives, Transaction publishers.


Sageman, M 2004, Understanding terror networks, University of Pennsylvania Press.


______ 2010, Confronting Al Qaeda: understanding the threat in Afghanistan and beyond: Congressional Testimony, DIANE Publishing.

______ 2011, ‘Ripples in the waves: fantasies and fashions’, in Rosenfeld, JE (ed), Terrorism, identity and legitimacy: the four waves theory and political violence, Taylor and Francis, pp. 87-93.


314


Silber, MD & Bhatt, A 2007, *Radicalization in the west: the home grown threat*, New York City Police Department, USA, pp. 1-90.


Stefanik, CL 2009, ‘West German terror: the lasting legacy of the red army faction’, MA thesis, Bowling Green State University, Department of Political Science, Bowling Green, Ohio, USA.


319


323


Wesley, M 2004, ‘The emerging security environment in the Asia Pacific’, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia, Regional Outlook 23.


Syria’s war, Why Bashar Assad is still in change, The Economist, 7 June 2014.

Yasmeen, S 2008, Understanding Muslim identities: from perceived relative exclusion, Centre for Muslim States and Societies, University of Western Australia, Crawley WA, pp. 1-83.


Yin, RK 2003, Case study research design and methods, (3rd edn), London, Sage.

______ 1984, Case study research: design and methods, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage.


Transcripts


