

BLINDED BY THE RISING SUN
JAPANESE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE FROM THE
FIRST SINO-JAPANESE WAR TO THE END OF
WORLD WAR II

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Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Politics
School of Politics and International Studies
University of Adelaide
December 2016

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	ii
<i>Glossary</i>	iii
<i>Short Abstract</i>	v
<i>Extended Abstract</i>	vi
<i>Declaration</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xii
Introduction	1
1 Japan's Post-Meiji Restoration Intelligence System	6
2 Japanese Intelligence and the Russo-Japanese War	27
3 Japan's expansion into Asia	62
4 Japanese machinations in post-revolution China	104
5 Japanese plans for Manchuria	135
6 The Establishment of Manchukuo	159
7 Developments in Japanese Intelligence following the establishment of Manchukuo	200
8 Japanese Intelligence following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident	226
9 The Pacific War	268
10 The <i>Tokumu Kikan</i> in Southeast Asia	315
11 Counterintelligence	347
Conclusion	377
<i>Bibliography</i>	384
<i>Appendices</i>	394

List of Figures

Figure 1. Cross-section view of a Trekhrech'e Cossack home	73
Figure 2. Organisation of the East Asia Economic Investigation Bureau c. 1940	77
Figure 3. Organisation of the Manchukuo Government	172
Figure 4. Lines of control for intelligence, policing, and propaganda in the government of Manchukuo (thought accurate through 1942)	173
Figure 5. Central Police Administration in Hsinking, Manchukuo, as of December 1940	178
Figure 6. Local Police Administration in Manchukuo as of December 1940	179
Figure 7. The position and function of 8 th Section in Imperial HQ	222
Figure 8. Organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 1942	276
Figure 9. Organisation of the Information Bureau, December 1940 to 1943	277
Figure 10. Organisation of 2 nd Section, Southern Area Army HQ, May to July 1942	297
Figure 11. Place of Intelligence, Southern Area Army HQ, September 1942 to March 1943	297
Figure 12. Indian National Army organisation under Lieutenant General Isoda	335
Figure 13. <i>Kempei Tai</i> organisation in Malaya as at January 1944	354
Figure 14. <i>Kempei Tai</i> organisation in Malaya from February 1944	355
Figure 15. Organisation of Singapore <i>Kempei Tai</i> from March 1945	356
Figure 16. Organisation of <i>Kempei Tai</i> HQ duties	356

Glossary

<i>Bōchō</i>	Counterintelligence/counterespionage
BIA	Burmese Independence Army
BNA	Burmese National Army
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CEF	China Expeditionary Force(s)
CO	Commanding officer
<i>Chōsa Han</i>	Counterespionage organ
<i>Dai Tōa Shō</i> /GEAM	Greater East Asia Department/Ministry
<i>Dai Honei</i>	Imperial General Headquarters
<i>Dai Ikka</i>	1 st Department/Bureau (Operations), IJA
<i>Dai Nikka</i>	2 nd Department/Bureau (Intelligence), IJA
<i>Gaimushō</i>	Foreign Office/Ministry
<i>Genyōsha</i>	Dark Ocean Society
<i>Gi Butai</i>	18 th Area Army
<i>Gunzoku</i>	Civilians in military employ
HQ	Headquarters
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IIL	Indian Independence League
IJA/ <i>Rikugun</i>	Imperial Japanese Army
IJN/ <i>Kaigun</i>	Imperial Japanese Navy
KAIG	Kwantung Army Intelligence Group
<i>Kantōgun</i>	Kwantung Army
<i>Kokuryūkai</i>	Black Dragon Society
<i>Kuomintang</i> /KMT	Chinese Nationalist Party
MA	Military Attaché
<i>Manshū Seinen Renmei</i>	Manchurian Youth League/MYL
<i>Manshūtetsudō</i> / <i>Mantetsu</i> / <i>Tetsudō</i>	South Manchurian Railway
<i>Naikaku Jōhōkyoku</i>	Cabinet Information Bureau
<i>Nampōsōgun</i> /SAA	Southern Area Army/Expeditionary Force

NCO	Non-commissioned officer
OC	Operational Commander
<i>Ōkawa Juku</i>	Ōkawa School
<i>Rakuzendō</i>	House of Pleasurable (or Unearthly) Delights
<i>Rikugunshō</i>	War Office/Ministry
<i>Sakurakai</i>	Cherry Blossom Association
<i>Sampō</i>	General Staff
<i>Senji Dai Honei/Dai Honei</i>	Imperial General Headquarters
<i>Shin Butai</i>	38 th Army HQ Saigon
<i>Taisei Yokusankai</i>	Imperial Rule Assistance Association
<i>Tōa Dōbunkai</i>	East Asia Common Culture Society
<i>Toa Dōbun Shoin Daigaku</i>	East Asia Common Culture University
<i>Toa Keizai Chōsa Kyoku/EAEIB</i>	East Asia Economic Investigation Bureau
<i>Tokumu Kikan/SSD/SSO/SSA</i>	Special Service Department/Organ/Agency
<i>Tsuyaku</i>	Interpreter/Translator
UK	The United Kingdom
US	The United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<i>Zaibatsu</i>	Corporate cooperative/financial clique

Short Abstract

This thesis examines the evolution of Japanese Intelligence following the Meiji Restoration to the end of World War II. In an area of increasing strategic importance, especially so given the influence Japanese Intelligence has had on the region and its own governance throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the thesis examines the danger of politicisation, both in terms of intelligence officers and the intelligence products they produce, and how this can have a detrimental effect on decision-making at the highest echelon. Utilising primary sources from the US and UK, predominantly interrogation reports, as well as translated accounts of key Japanese intelligence figures and US military assessments, the thesis further explores how such a prolific intelligence system spread throughout mainland Asia, yet remained ultimately inefficient and ineffectual. In an area not explored in great depth, and across a period clearly definable as Japan's period of modernisation, the thesis sheds light on the area in an objective fashion at a time that Japan seeks once more to develop its human intelligence apparatus and structure, of key import to its contemporary strategic partners.

Extended Abstract

Following the Meiji Restoration, Japan followed a policy of rapid modernisation, and increasingly deemed its national interest, in terms of economic and conventional security, lay in the Asian mainland; in particular, Manchuria, but later, in Southeast Asia. This would place it at odds, at least initially, with both China and an emergent Russia in East Asia, and later, the Allied powers. Beasley, Drea and others¹, against this backdrop, have focussed primarily on the orthodox political and military dimension of the interplay between these powers. Although integral to scholarly research, this leaves a dearth of understanding in just how Japan was able to instigate and exercise political control over occupied areas, through its intelligence services, and how this intelligence apparatus developed over time. Decidedly fewer authors address this area, and those sources that do exist tend to focus on a select time period, such as the Russo-Japanese War, or the Second World War. Nevertheless, primarily these works operate solely as an identification of Japanese intelligence operations.

Seth, Chapman, and a small number of others², identify key elements of the Japanese intelligence system, including the existence of informal intelligence networks established by Japan's patriotic societies³, the politicisation of intelligence⁴, politicisation of the intelligence corps⁵ and the

¹ Nish, I., *Collected Writings of Ian Nish, Part 2: Japan, Russia and East Asia* (Tokyo: Japan Library & Edition Synapse, 2001), Beasley, W.G., *Japanese Imperialism: 1894-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), Drea, E.J., *Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), Crowley, J.B., *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy 1930-1938* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966), Jansen, M.B., *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000)

² Allen, L., "Intelligence Services during the Second World War: Part 2", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Oct., 1987), Barnhart, M. A., "Japanese Intelligence before the Second World War: 'Best Case' Analysis", in May, E., *Knowing One's Enemy: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), Deacon, R., *Kempei Tai: The Japanese Secret Service Then and Now* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1990), Seth, R., *Secret Servants* (London: Victor Gallancz Ltd, 1957)

³ Norman, E.H., "The Genyōsha: A Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism" in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sept. 1944)

⁴ Nish, I., "Japanese Intelligence, 1894-1922" in Andrew, C., & Noakes, J., Eds., *Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945* (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1987)

⁵ Weland, J., "Misguided Intelligence: Japanese Military Intelligence Officers in the Manchurian Incident, September 1931", *The Journal of Military History* 58 (July 1994),

development of a culture of insubordination⁶, but again do so within somewhat narrowly defined time parameters, and without analysis of the intelligence system as a whole over a period encompassing the majority of Japan's modernisation and recent wartime history. The thesis argues that these elements were in fact major flaws, and draws these remote sources into a larger assessment of the evolution of Japanese Intelligence, placing each key element into an overarching analysis of the system as a whole.

There remain several important gaps in our understanding of Japanese Intelligence from the First Sino-Japanese War (Japan's first international conflict), through the Russo-Japanese War (arguably the first modern war), the First World War (wherein total war principles were first ascribed), to the end of World War II (known to the Japanese as the Pacific War). First, how did Japan first seek to modernise its intelligence system? Second, how did politicisation, both in terms of intelligence products and personnel, become a part of Japan's intelligence culture? Third, to what extent was Japanese intelligence involved in the political machinations of Japan, both at home and abroad? Fourth, why did such a prolific intelligence system ultimately lack efficiency and efficacy? In order to address these questions, research and analysis has been conducted using primary documents from Japanese, UK and US sources. Sources include, from the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey Reports of Interrogations 1945, the Bonner F. Feller Papers, 1904-1907, the Japan Subject Collection, the Transcripts of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East, and the Vladimir D. Pastuhov Papers. From the Cecil H. Green Library, Stanford University, the Wartime Translations of Seized Japanese Documents. From the Library of Congress, Washington DC, the US Army's "Japanese Special Studies on Manchuria" and reports of The United States Strategic Bombing Survey. From the National Archives at College Park (US), substantial information has been drawn from the Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Record Group 38), the Records of the Central

Kitaoka, S., "China Experts in the Army" in Duus, Myers and Peattie, Eds., *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989)

⁶ Tohmatsu, H. & Willmott, H. P., *A Gathering Darkness: The Coming of War to the Far East and the Pacific, 1921-1942* (Lanham: SR Books, 2004), Toland, J., *The Rising Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945* (London: Cassell & Company, 1970)

Intelligence Agency (Record Group 263) and the Records of the Office of Strategic Services, 1940- 1947 (Record Group 226). From the National Archives at Kew (UK), information has been obtained from the Records of the Security Service (KV Series), the Records of the War Office: Directorate of Military Operations and Military Intelligence (WO 106 Series), the Records of the War Office: Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence, and Directorate of Military Intelligence; Ministry of Defence (WO 208 Series), and the Records of the War Cabinet (CAB 24 Series). Japanese sources include several memoirs of those deeply involved in Japanese Intelligence at the time. Interrogations of key Japanese Intelligence figures and Allied military and diplomatic reports, found within the sources above, has allowed a comprehensive analysis not formerly undertaken in such depth, in an area of contemporary strategic importance and integral to Japan's modern strategic partnerships, at a time that Japan's seeks once more to develop its human intelligence system.

In Chapter One, the thesis argues that a disenfranchised samurai class, among other Japanese "adventurers", would in the final years of the 19th century and into the 20th century be integral to Japanese intelligence as a whole. Despite apparent political radicalisation, the informal networks developed by these men would be fundamental in Japan's early political and military machinations on the Asian mainland, including the First Sino-Japanese War. Chapter Two examines how the Japanese conventional military intelligence system was sufficient for what would amount to, essentially, a theatre-level operation (and thus limited in scope) - the Russo-Japanese War. Conventional military intelligence, however, relied on Japan's informal networks. As interoperability increased between informal and formal Japanese intelligence networks, so too did interchange occur between staffs, and early successes would develop within Japanese intelligence a complacency, and ultimately an inability to recognise, weaknesses in the system, including a reliance on talent rather than formal training. Politicisation of intelligence products would occur, information delivered in a subjective manner to meet the needs of a particular political agenda. Chapter Three looks at the use of the South Manchurian Railway, primarily an economic concern, as another informal intelligence network, identifying a

lack of an intelligence cycle in Japanese intelligence as a whole, and further misunderstanding as to what constituted a modern intelligence product. The chapter further explores the growing importance to Japan of political intelligence operations on the Asian mainland, particularly through the Siberian Intervention. Finally, Japan's *tokumu kikan*, or Special Service Agencies, are examined, an original development and integral to these operations and those undertaken later in China, Manchuria, and Southeast Asia. Chapter Four examines how politicisation of the intelligence corps as a whole would occur, and how a culture of insubordination would evolve. As key intelligence figures rose within the ranks of Japanese intelligence, a willingness of Japanese intelligence to become involved with, even drive, political intelligence operations in opposition to policy emanating from Tokyo would eventuate. As factionalism arose, a clearly defined policy as pertained to China would be increasingly hard to come by, and changing circumstances in China and Russia would increasingly wrong-foot Japanese intelligence, and Japan itself. Chapter Five investigates Japanese machinations in Manchuria, these leading to Japan's greatest success, the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. Against a backdrop of political insubordination, these actions would be undertaken (at least initially) in opposition to Tokyo by Japan's premier field formation, the Kwantung Army, through the use of what would amount to a prolific, but ultimately flawed, system of political intelligence operations and control. Chapter Six provides an examination of Japan's system of puppet-governance in Manchukuo. Chapter Seven explores Japan's early attempts to export its intelligence-driven system of puppet-governance to other regions. The chapter further provides an examination of later manifestations of Japanese patriotic societies and insubordination in Tokyo, demonstrating a closing of ranks and greater homogenisation of military thought at this time, the military now better able to present a united front, yet willing to continue its reliance on intrigue and political intelligence operations. Credible improvements in intelligence training and the intelligence system as a whole would come too late to influence what would later occur in China and Southeast Asia, where somewhat redundant intelligence systems would remain in place. Chapter Eight argues that as Japan became increasingly bogged down in China post-1937, Japan would

seek to transpose its formerly successful, if flawed, system of political intelligence (and control) to China, attempting to develop puppet regimes in what had hitherto been a political vacuum. Further weakness in Japanese intelligence is identified in the lack of communication and delineation of roles between intelligence organs, and further the dissolution of political intelligence units, diluting Japan's limited pool of experienced intelligence officers. Chapter Nine draws attention to Japan's lack of preparation in relation to its advance into Southeast Asia, leading to a reversion to information-gathering by the Foreign Ministry and other non-military intelligence organs. Chapter Ten examines belated attempts by Japan to engage with indigenous and separatist groups, under the guise of cooperation and liberation under Japan's proposed Co-Prosperity Sphere. These activities would lack a cohesive policy, and in time would prove cynical, given Japan's imperial aims, leading to minimal success. Finally, Chapter Eleven assesses Japan's final attempts to circumvent and overcome weakness in its intelligence apparatus, through the establishment of counter-intelligence units and attempts at better communication and cohesion between intelligence organs, and how these efforts would in the end be ineffectual, and too little, too late.

Declaration

I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or any other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree.

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Date: 16th April 2017

Acknowledgements

My thanks to my family and friends, who have been good enough to ask only rarely how I was faring.

My thanks also to the staff and archivists of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University's Cecil H. Green Library, the National Archives at College Park (US), the Library of Congress, and the National Archives at Kew (UK), for all of their kind assistance.

Finally, a special thank you first to my supervisor and friend, Allyson Sandham, who has endured more than any boss should ever have to do; second, Coby Fledderus, confidant and counsellor extraordinaire, for those most welcome talks at just the right times; and third; Sanjaya Kuruppu, for the invaluable assistance and counsel provided that was unavailable elsewhere.