PEITHO: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONCEPT.

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This thesis does not contain any material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any University and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Don Fenton

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INTRODUCTION

This Introduction will, first, indicate the subject of the inquiry, then briefly discuss the primary and secondary sources on this subject, followed by a discussion of my approach to it; finally the reasons for undertaking the inquiry will be stated.

The subject of this inquiry is the Greek word, Peitho. The meaning of this word is usually given as "Persuasion". Peitho as a concept bears on politics, religion, philosophy, and the erotic. The English word "persuasion" has no such immediate connotations. Therefore, the rendition of Peitho as "Persuasion" is doubtful. It is also of some interest to the student of political thought that a concept which was associated with the political business of the public assembly should be equally associated with the erotic activities of private life. This inquiry proposes to examine the context of the use of Peitho in order to explain this connection of the political with the erotic and to see how far "Persuasion" is an adequate rendition of Peitho. The chief aim of this inquiry is, however, to show that the meanings of words do not remain static, that the conceptual context of a word does shift over time, and that the meaning of a word can only be explicated within the terms of its own social, political, and historical context.

Contemporary scholarship on Peitho is scarce. Fränkel (1) has a footnote; Guthrie(2) gives us a page; Mourelatos

has a chapter(3) in which he attempts to assimilate Peitho to other concepts in the thought of Parmenides. All the above appear to be indebted to (though they do not specifically cite) the unpublished Ph.D. thesis of Pepe(4) who attempts to show Peitho to be a political concept. This view is criticized by Buxton in another Ph.D. thesis(5), later published as a book(6): he denies the political interpretation as the basic context of Peitho in favour of a view of Peitho as a basically erotic concept. Benveniste(7) provides a linguistic analysis of Peitho and its cognates. There is a small and highly specialized scholarship which focusses on the extant art portraying Peitho and its archaeological aspects with reference to the Peitho cult; While the dates are uncertain, this data appears to be too late in origin to be relevant to the present study.

The only written primary source for the Homeric period is the Homeric corpus itself. As these poems cannot be precisely dated, the archaeological record is no sure check on the data embedded in the Iliad and the Odyssey. The dating of the Homeric poems is a matter of some scholarly controversy, but this discussion is irrelevant to the present work, as the proposed dates generally fall within the period outlined below.

Likewise, the only written primary sources for the Hesiodic period are the poems of Hesiod. The dating of the Hesiodic poems is a matter of some controversy which will be referred to below.

Alkman's situation in the "order of events" of Spartan history is not a matter for controversy although the precise date is not known for certain. Our written primary sources for Sparta at this period are the poems of Alkman himself, and those of Tyrtaeus. The lyric poets in general - Theógnis, for example - form our written primary source knowledge for the Archaic period. The 5th century, especially at Athens, is much better known, although dating is often imprecise.

These writings, forming a part of the public verbal discourse of the societies which produced them - none are private communications - are taken, following Havelock(8) to be an affirmation and reinforcement of social mores, a reflection and representation of general societal attitudes. Such evidence is scanty, and often inadequate, but it is all that we have. The argument from silence is scarcely an ideal method or procedure, but in some cases it is unavoidable. For example, Homer's failure to stress agricultural poverty, juxtaposed with Hesiod's preoccupation with the possibility of food-scarcity, leads us to the conclusion that more individuals in Homer's period were better fed than in Hesiod's period.

Finley explains some of the difficulties facing the scholar:

> ... the lack of primary sources for long stretches of time and for most regions of the Mediterranean creates a block not only for a narrative, but also for the analysis of institutions. There are periods and places about which we have considerable knowledge ... this happy situation

> should not blind us to the inadequacy, often to the hopelessness, of the available evidence for the rest of Greece outside Athens ... A complicating factor ... is the random nature of the documentation that has come down to us ...(9)
>
> For the centuries before Alexander the Great, Athens was unique among the Greek city-states, 'publishing' a remarkable variety of documents - the survivors now number in the thousands - whereas Corinth, for example, has produced virtually none, the Greek cities of Sicily only a handful. That the contrast is nothing more than the result of archaelogical accident can no longer be maintained: classical Corinth, for example, has been thoroughly excavated down to virgin soil. It must follow that we have a reflection of Athenian democracy on the one hand, of Corinthian (and other) oligarchy on the other hand. I say 'Athenian' because none of the other Greek democracies followed Athenian practice ...(10)
>
> ... the epoch-making discovery of literacy was followed for centuries by the survival of a fundamentally oral non-literate society ... The verbal transmittal over many generations of detailed information about past events or institutions ... entails considerable loss of data ... For the great bulk of the narrative we are faced with the 'kernal of truth' possibility, and I am unaware of any stigmata that automatically distinguish fact from fiction.(11)
>
> The barest bones of any historical narrative, the events selected and arranged in a temporal sequence, imply a value judgment (or judgments) ... The study and writing of history, in short, is a form of ideology ... I speak of ideology ... roughly as defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary: 'a system of ideas concerning phenomena, esp. those of social life; the manner of thinking characteristic of a class or an individual' ... I retain a rather old-fashioned notion of history as a systematic account over a long enough period of time not only to establish relationships, connections, causes and consequences but also to show how change occurs and to suggest why.(12)

This study has attempted to balance 'Athenocentricity' by giving relatively greater attention to non-Athenian sources of data. By so doing, the inquiry has necessarily laid

considerable stress on what might appear to be very minor appearances and applications of the subject. I contend that these minor applications of Peitho are of major importance in that they form our only evidence for the pre-Classical - that is, pre-Athenian, - use of the term, and that without a thorough understanding of what early Greeks thought about Peitho, we cannot hope to comprehend the Athenian (Classical) meaning of the word. The purpose of this study is to provide "a systematic account over a long enough period of time ... to establish relationships, connections, causes and consequences"; given the paucity of the evidence, to try "to show how change occurs and why" would be an impertinence: although the evidence will imply that change in the way the word Peitho is used is the result of change in social and political mores, the evidence does not show that. We cannot, under the circumstances, show "how change occurs" or "why". What will be done is to show that change did occur, and that this change was accompanied (or preceeded) by changes in the economic, social, and political ordering of society. The implication that the thought of a society is determined by its economic base is there; the demonstration that this is the case is not. Frankly, I think that, given the current state of the evidence, such a demonstration is not possible.

The root of the present problem was exposed by Havelock.(13) Briefly, this amounts to an assumption, general in classical scholarship, that the ancient Greek

language is a system which is representative of a common culture; that Homer and Aeschylus would, hypothetically, have been able to converse with one another, and each with Aristotle, despite some obvious differences in their respective political cultures. Havelock attributes this assumption to the way in which Greek is formally taught: students learn Greek from passages chosen for relative and graded ease of translation, regardless of period of composition; in this way differences in language and expression come to be viewed, subjectively at least, as idiosyncrasies on the part of the composers* rather than as expressions of the culture of a specific historical period.

The texts which are to be examined were intended to be communications between the composers and a wider audience rather than "art" for the sake of the composers' personal self-expression. They formed a part of the public verbal discourse of the society. In no way were any of these texts private records or private communications. As public discourse these compositions were a part of the society's attempt to define itself.

Greek society was based on the oikos, "family". As Vickers explains

> The oikos, family, included father, mother, children, lands, possessions, animals, and slaves:

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*The word "composer" is used throughout in preference to "author", because all of the texts to be discussed were either created without the aid of the written word (Homer) or with writing serving merely as an aid to composition, or as a mnemonic aid, for the purpose of public performance. None was intended for an audience of readers.

> the "estate", kleros, plus the dead ancestors and the notions and rites which constituted the family cult; it looked to the future, to its continuance: marriage was subordinate to the needs of the oikos; even marriage of women to their nearest agnative relatives was permitted if this was necessary to ensure the continuance of the male line. Expulsion from the oikos would cut off the individual from the family worship and might call his citizenship into question.(14)

Thus the Greek citizen was an adult male member of an oikos. With the exception of founder-members of a colony or the very rare grant of citizenship for services to the state, citizenship was a function of birthplace; slaves or metics, resident aliens, could not be citizens as they were regarded as citizens of their own place of birth. Political rights, as distinct from citizenship, appear to have been a function of military usefulness, at least at Athens. The reforms of Solon, (see Chapter 4) which led to the establishment of the democracy at Athens, followed on the development of hoplite (heavily-armed citizen infantry) tactics, which broke the military monopoly of the aristocratic basileis; the extension of citizenship rights to the thetes (the poorest property class) in classical Athens followed on their military importance as rowers in the fleet. The military force of a polis was the assembly under arms; the assembly of a polis was the army in session to deal with civic matters. The new importance of rhetoric (and hence of the Peitho that rhetoric was designed to produce) in classical Athens, was co-incident with the extension of political rights to the whole male citizenbody.

It will be shown in Chapter 1 that Peitho in its primary meaning of "obey", was a word applicable to the response of the assembly to the exhortations of the basileis; Peitho was not applicable to relationships between persons of equal standing. The use of verbs from Peitho implied a dominance/sub-dominance relationship. Chapter 2 will show that, with the emergence of Peitho as a deity, the concept was personified as a goddess of erotic charisma and as a condition of human well-being. This change in the conception of Peitho was co-incident with changes in the economic, social, and political aspects of the society. Further economic, social, and political changes in Greek society, some specific to Alkman's Sparta, are shown in Chapter 3 to accompany the emergence of Peitho as a directly political concept, although as yet the specific application of this concept to political affairs is absent. Chapter 4 will show that, in the early 5th century B.C., alongside the by now traditional concept of an erotic and an undefined political view of Peitho, Peitho appears as a central concept in the philosophy of Parmenides, and its specific application to the achievement of political unity is promulgated by Aeschylus. Politically conservative Thebes was the home of Pindar, whose traditional concept of Peitho is contrasted with the innovative concepts of Peitho advanced by Aeschylus and Parmenides, both of whom lived in politically volatile situations. Continuing fierce political struggle is shown in Chapter 5 to be the

background for the work of Empedokles, whose concept of Peitho is shown to be essentially similar to that of Parmenides - the product of logical discussion. The political stresses, internal and external, to which the Athens of the later 5th century B.C. was subject, accompanied a variety of attitudes towards Peitho, as Chapter 6 shows. Peitho retains its erotic context with magical connotations, still has the basic sense of "obey", but is now seen as being produced in a number of possible ways, including speech, compulsion, reasoned discussion, falsehood, truth, and empirical evidence; different perspectives being the property of different individual composers. Peitho, however it is produced, was perceived in this period to be a morally superior means to achieve a given end as compared to Bia, "Force", even when the end was not itself regarded as desirable. Unlike the earlier 5th century, Peitho was not perceived to be a panacea for political disunity, but it was perceived to be a "best possible" means to achieve ends.

The present work relies heavily on the previous work by Buxton and Pepe. Buxton is a scholar of literature whose judgements are in line with his academic preoccupation with Greek tragedy of the classical period. In the introduction to his thesis he states

> I shall not be treating the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles as documents, as sources of evidence for what the Athenians in general, or Aeschylus and Sophocles in particular, might have thought about peitho... What will concern us is ... how a

> particular facet of human experience is realized in precise dramatic terms.(15)

In contrast, the present study treats all the primary source materials which are discussed as documents, as sources of evidence for what the composers and the people around them thought about Peitho. The present writer has no pretensions to literary scholarship, but is chiefly interested in the way in which people think, and in the connection between thought and environment. As is inevitable, where Buxton's analysis is lacking for my purposes, or when he seems to me to be simply wrong, I criticize the appropriate points; at other times, where I have no argument with his exposition, I rely straightforwardly upon him for textual sources, exposition and interpretation. It is more difficult to pin down Pepe, as his thesis lacks both introduction and conclusion, and the chapters are independent studies whose only connecting link is the subject, "Peitho". I have, however, a good deal of sympathy with Pepe's approach, which is generally similar to my own - an attempt to explicate meaning from contextual use. As with Buxton, I rely on Pepe, as the authority which he undoubtedly is, when I have agreed or at least have no argument with his exposition, and criticize (or, more often, add to) the exposition when I feel that I have some valid contribution to make to the point at issue.

Now I must answer the question: "why Peitho?" It is possible that any moral-emotive-ethical concept would have done as well to demonstrate the existence of a linkage

between environment and thought. However, earlier studies had indicated that Peitho was an important concept in the thought of Parmenides. And Peitho, being a concept which is at once erotic and political, is a concept of intrinsic interest to the student of political thought, offering as it does insights into the thought of the composers in whose work Peitho appears. This study has attempted to avoid the preconceptions of scholars such as Mourelatos, who states that Peitho

> appears as the patron of civilized life and of democratic institutions. Peitho in this context is the spirit of agreement, bargain, contract, consensus, exchange, and negotiation in a free polis.(16)

This study will show that this definition of Peitho does not hold for the period prior to the 5th century B.C.. Mourelatos has fallen into the trap, indicated by Havelock and referred to above, of perceiving the Greek language as a whole, rather than as an evolving system within which words shift contextually and meanings of words alter over time. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, Peitho is an important concept in the thought of both Parmenides and Aeschylus; their understanding of the concept can only be validly explicated by ascertaining the history of the concept up until their time, together with an analysis of their usage of the concept and that (if any) of their contemporaries. To look to the late 5th century or later still for evidence about the meaning of Peitho in Parmenides or Aeschylus would be quite anachronistic. Mourelatos' definition of Peitho

will be shown in Chapter 4 to be the concept of Peitho (or part of it) promulgated by Parmenides and Aeschylus; there is no evidence to suggest that such a conceptualization of Peitho was yet general. This study proposes to examine the evidence for the meaning of Peitho stage by stage, in chronological sequence, without anachronistic intrusions of evidence from one period into the explication of the evidence of an earlier period.

A NOTE ON SPELLING.

An older tradition of scholarship rendered Greek proper nouns in their latinized form, thus: Socrates. Contemporary scholarship favours direct transliterations of the Greek letters, thus: Sokrates. This practice is rarely followed with full consistency. It would be most unusual to find Platon for Plato in English-language scholarship. There was, and is, a practice of retaining what a scholar perçeives as well-known words in the latinized form and giving less-common words in their Greek form. In the present work the contemporary practice of direct transliteration of the Greek is generally followed, although force of habit may occasionally result in the use of the older form, thus: Athena rather than Athene. Quotations, of course, retain the original spellings of the passages quoted.

FOOTNOTES - INTRODUCTION.

1. Fränkel, H.F., Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, (Tr. Hades, M., & Willis, J.,) Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975, p.296.

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The Greek Concept of Justice, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1978.
The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982.

9. Finley, M.I., Ancient History: evidence and models, London, Chatto & Windus, 1985, p.12.

10. Ibid., pp.37-38.

11. Ibid., pp.15-18.

12. Ibid., pp.4-6.

13. Havelock, 1982, op. cit., pp.220-224.

14. Vickers, B., Towards Greek Tragedy, London, Longman, 1973, pp.110-113.

15. Buxton, 1977, op. cit., p.ix.

16. Mourelatos, op. cit., p.139.

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CHAPTER 1

PEITHO IN HOMER

I

INTRODUCTION

The study of Peitho, commonly translated as "persuasion", must begin with its earliest occurrence in Greek literature, in the Iliad and the Odyssey, the Homeric epics. Although a developed Greek-speaking culture, the Mycenaean, had existed in Greece prior to the Homeric period, its extant script - known as Linear B - conveys mainly lists and accounts, and is almost entirely confined to the receipt and despatch of goods. Account records are an unlikely place to find abstract nouns, and indeed the Mycenaeae Graecitatis Lexicon(1) does not list peitho in its vocabulary. In any case, the Mycenaean palace-culture appears to have been organized, politically and economically, in a fashion which was essentially similar to the organization of the other near-Eastern palace-cultures. Peitho, as a component of political discussion, may well have had little importance in such an autocractic governmental system. The management of public affairs portrayed in the Iliad and the Odyssey is a very different matter.

For the purpose of this study the Iliad and the Odyssey will be conventionally regarded as the cultural expression

of an historical period which will be called "Homeric". The question of whether the works assumed roughly the form in which we know them as the composition of one or of several persons is not relevant to this study as the answer - if such a question is answerable - would not affect the matters under examination here: the way in which the word peitho was used during the "Homeric period" will be shown to be much the same in both epics. It will also be assumed that the Homeric period is historically prior to the period of Hesiod and that the Homeric period was prior to the Greek expansion into the Western Mediterranean and the Balkans - that is, before 750 B.C. - as there are no references to Western Greek foundations in Homer. Hesiod's period can, on internal evidence, be taken as the period of population growth and expansion onto marginal land which preceded the migrations to the Balkans and the West.

II

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO HOMER(1)

Following the collapse of the Mycenaean palace-culture, Greeks had established foundations in the Eastern Mediterranean area, along the coasts of Asia Minor, an imperfectly known movement which is referred to as the early migration period and began c.1100 B.C.. Subsequently,

beginning circa 750 B.C., a second round of colonization took place which resulted in the Greek foundations in the Western Mediterranean area and in the Black Sea area, a movement which is known as the second colonization period. Homer's Greece is post-Mycenaean - there is no trace in the epics of the Mycenaean large-scale palace bureaucracies - despite the "Mycenaean memories" (boars-tusk helmets such as the one borrowed by Odysseus [Iliad, x, 261-265] are archaeologically known to be Mycenaean artifacts)(2) preserved in the epics. Homer's Greece is also post-early-migration-period: the "Catalogue of the Ships" (Iliad, II) appears to date from the Ionian period.(3)

The Homeric period can thus be roughly placed between 1,000 B.C. and 800 B.C. The society of Greece during this period is shown by archaeology to have been characterized by a settled village life, increased prosperity, and a rising population.(4) The grave of an Athenian aristocrat, dated to the middle of the 9th century B.C., is an example which demonstrates considerable affluence, as it contains fine pottery, imported jewellery, ivory, and gold jewellery made to local tastes by oriental techniques. The find indicates both the presence of a great deal of wealth in the society and "intimate association of Greek and Oriental".(5) Nevertheless, our knowledge of social structure and manners derives from the internal evidence of the Homeric epics themselves, as does our knowledge of the conduct of public

affairs. The following interpretation of social structure and manners is thus derived from the Homeric texts.

The forum for public affairs was the agora, "assembly", a term which came to mean the place of assembly and, much later, a marketplace. The participants in all the Homeric assemblies are mature males; "important" citizens are the heads of oikoi, "households", whose 'pedigree' is usually supplied. Such persons dominated the assembly by virtue of their social status; their wealth was the visible proof of their prowess in both peace and war. Persons without family ties did not take part in the assembly, were not citizens. The chief man of the community was the basileus ("king" is probably a mistranslation); his relatively greater wealth provided him with superior armaments, giving him greater confidence and making him more effective in armed conflict than his fellows. His status also gave him the confidence to speak fluently in the assembly. The assemblies of the Iliad are something of a special case, comprising as they did a number of basileis together with their followers, the whole forming a confederate army. Only the basileis speak in these assemblies - there is a possible exception in the speech of Thersites (Iliad, II, 212-242), but he is not specifically named as a 'commoner' - and they form a council separate from the assembly. In the assemblies of the local community the lesser dignitaries spoke in a agora which was presided over by the basileus. The absence of the Ithacan basileus, Odysseus, is given as the reason why there had

been no assembly held for twenty years (Odyssey, I, 26-27); assemblies were called, normally, at frequent but irregular intervals.

In the Homeric works, as will become clear, reported formal decision-making can hardly be said to have taken place at all. However, the focus of community political life was the assembly. In the agora opinions were aired on matters which were perceived to be of moment to the community, either immediately or possibly in the future. Buxton, perceiving the assembly and its conduct - as they are portrayed in the epics - as a literal account of normal procedure, follows the generally accepted view of the Homeric assembly. Simply put, this view asserts that the assembly was convened irregularly, in special circumstances; that it was summoned by 'important' people; that the assembly expressed its approval or disapproval of the views of 'important' people but did not vote; and, finally, that while intervention from the floor was abnormal it was not unknown.(6) However, Havelock asserts a rather different perspective on the operations of the Homeric assembly. In his analysis of the agora scene in Book II of the Odyssey, Havelock reveals that in Homeric society "the agora and council should meet regularly", and that

> any citizen may request an agora to raise a matter of public concern involving interests of either junior or senior citizens ... issues of public concern should be disclosed and then discussed, but ... a matter of purely personal interest can come before the agora.(7)

These rather different views of the evidence contained in the Homeric texts result from quite different perceptions of the nature of the texts. Buxton, seeing the texts simply as literature which co-incidently contains information about the nature of Homeric society, expresses a view derived from a surface reading of the incidents in the story; Havelock argues that the texts reveal the traditional ethical and moral norms of the society by showing incidents and behaviour which assert or contradict those norms. For example, when Aigyptios says:

> Never has there been an assembly of us or any session since great Odysseus went away in the hollow vessels.
> (Odyssey, II, 26-27, Lattimore)

the surface reading - when combined with the odd intervals at which assemblies are convened in the Iliad - is that assemblies are unusual and irregular events. Havelock's reading is that the irregularity of convening the assembly at Ithaca is not regarded as a good thing or a normal circumstance. The passage points up an unusual and parlous state of affairs. The truth would appear to lie between the two interpretations. Regularity in the calling of assemblies is not what is called for but frequency is; since the regrettable and unusual period which has elapsed between assemblies is imputed to the absence of Odysseus, it would seem that, in Homeric society, it was customary for the chief man of a community to preside over the assembly.

In the passage from which the last quotation was taken, Telemachos, the son of Odysseus, calls an assembly. As a

youth who has not yet come into his full manhood - he is "clinging to childhood" (Odyssey, I, 297, Lattimore) - Telemachos can hardly be regarded as an 'important' person. It is plain that in Homeric times even 'junior citizens' could call an assembly. From such data one concludes that during the Homeric period assemblies were normally called at frequent, if irregular intervals, and could be called by any citizen; such assemblies were presided over - again, normally - by the local basileus.

When the Homeric citizens meet in the agora, no formal vote is taken. The texts reveal that the assemblies which are portrayed in the Homeric epics operate on a basis of consensus, "the sense of the meeting", public opinion expressed by acclamation of the words of one of the speakers, so that no formal vote is required. It must be pointed out that, as will be shown in the epic portrayals, when the assembly witnesses an altercation between citizens "the sense of the meeting" is not binding on the protagonists. Since the result of ignoring "the sense of the meeting" is always disastrous, it can be concluded that the intent of such portrayals is to reinforce a norm of obedience to "the sense of the meeting". It must also be stressed that the attempt to persuade is not a feature of the Homeric assembly. The speakers simply state their position on a matter and the assembly may register its approval of the position of one of the speakers; attempts may later be made - in the case of an altercation between

speakers - by other individuals to reconcile the protagonists privately. These points will be explicated in the next section.

The two Homeric epics are very different in character. The Iliad is about an incident (the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon) which the Greeks believed to be historical, in a war (between a coalition of Greeks and a coalition of Trojans and their allies) which was believed to be historical, involving personae who were believed to be historical. On the other hand, as Page has shown, the Odyssey is a collection of folktales which are reported from many countries in many languages and given unity by the introduction of a single main hero, Odysseus, and a single theme.

> The theme of the Odyssey itself is an adaptation of a folktale - the common and widespread tale of the husband who returns home after many years; finds that his wife has been faithful despite trials and temptations; and is now so changed in appearance that he must prove his identity by tests and tokens ... but that folktale is adapted to persons believed to be historical. It is consequently set in the real world, and blended with past and present realities. Supernatural elements are, for the most part, either suppressed or so modified as to seem credible. The world of the Odyssey is largely a world within the experience and knowledge, or at least the belief, of its audience.(8)

Because both of the Homeric epics are taken to be set in a social context which reflected the realities of Greek society at the time of their composition it is not necessary, for the purposes of this study, to distinguish between them as regards the evidence which they present.

III

THE USE OF PEITHO IN HOMER

Peitho appears in Homer only in its verbal forms. The evidence for the Homeric usage and meaning of peitho in the context of public affairs will be examined by studying its function in the assembly and council. The embassy to Achilles will also be examined because it is the result of a council decision. The relevant incidents will be presented in the sequence in which they appear in the epics, beginning with the Iliad and proceeding to the Odyssey. Following the presentation of the evidence its interpretation will be discussed.

At the beginning of the Iliad, the Achaians - it is not clear from the text if they are in assembly or not - express support for the supplicant Chryses but Agamemnon ignores public opinion and drives the old priest from the camp:

> harshly he drove him away with a strong order upon him
> (Iliad, I, 25, Lattimore)

If Agamemnon had followed "the sense of the meeting" when, after hearing the plea of the supplicant

> then all the rest of the Achaians cried out in favour that the priest be respected and the shining ransom be taken
> (Iliad, I, 22-23, Lattimore)

there would, presumably, have been no story, but the incident cannot be seen as merely a dramatic device. If an

individual could be forced to obey the constraints of public opinion this incident would have been unacceptably unrealistic to Homer's audience. Conversely, since an individual was not forced to obey the constraints of public opinion, public opinion must normally have been sufficient in itself to control behaviour. The action of Agamemnon, however, demonstrates plainly that the individual is not bound to follow "the sense of the meeting" in the Homeric assembly:

> So he spoke, and the old man in terror obeyed him
> (Iliad, I, 33, Lattimore)

The word for "obeyed" is ἐπείθετο. "The Greek verb means orignally 'to cause another to obey'" as Pepe asserts.(1)

The second assembly in the Iliad is more detailed in its portrayal: Achilles calls an assembly; expert opinion is sought; Agamemnon agrees to bow to public opinion and expert opinion only if he can be seen not to lose by his complaisance. Achilles - quite reasonably if, perhaps, insultingly - offers possible future recompense for Agamemnon's loss; when Agamemnon refuses to be "persuaded" by Achilles, he uses the word πείσῃς, in the sense "dominate", and equates it with "deception":

> Not that way, good fighter though you be, godlike Achilles, strive to cheat, for you will not deceive, you will not dominate me.
> (Iliad, I, 131-132, adapted from Lattimore)

This reaction to the proposal of Achilles will be further examined below. At this point it is sufficient to note that Achilles was proposing, in the agora, a solution to a public

problem; but the proposal itself has created another public problem. Nestor now attempts to resolve the second problem, the quarrel between two of the army-community's leading men. The argument, such as it is, is extremely crude; it amounts to: (a) better men than you, in the past, did what I told them to do, (b) therefore you should obey my instructions (c) because obedience to the counsel of a proven wise adviser is better (than other possible courses of action), and (d) the antagonists are both instructed to relinquish their intransigent positions. No decision is made, no vote is taken; Nestor's advice is partially followed: Achilles agrees to give up his prize to Agamemnon but announces his refusal to follow the commander-in-chief's orders any further. The two stop arguing; the assembly breaks up; and Agamemnon, his honour satisfied, prepares to return the priest's daughter to her father; but the quarrel continues (Iliad, I, 54-344). The implication of the action of the story is that "the sense of the meeting" accords with Nestor's opinion, but the position of the assembly is disregarded by the protagonists: Agamemnon takes Achilles' prize in recompense for his own loss, and Achilles, in consequence, withdraws from active service.

Nestor's use of verbal forms of peitho in his speech - πειθοντό, πίθεσθε, πείθεσθαι - has the sense of "pay attention to", "obey". Nestor attempts to dominate the assembly by virtue of his age, experience, and record; his use of peitho-words has the same sense of the domination of one party by another

as Agamemnon's. The "persuasion" that Nestor employed was to convince the contending parties of his own superior status as an adviser. From this presumptive position of dominance he then instructed the two antagonists as to their "best" course of action.

Further instances of the use of peitho-words in public affairs are to be found in the next assembly, which is called by Agamemnon. After a council, which is convened to outline the strategy to be followed in the assembly, the assembly is "tested" by the suggestion that the army should forsake its project of sacking Troy: "the sense of the meeting" is in accordance with this suggestion, the assembly breaks up in order to comply with the suggestion and has to be forcibly re-convened. This forcible re-convening of the assembly of the Achaians by Odysseus (Iliad, II, 175-210) is necessary because the assembly has not yet heard all of the prospective speakers; "the sense of the meeting" which caused the assembly to break up had been premature. The alternative course of action had not yet been put to the meeting.

At Iliad, II, 85 πείθοντο has the sense of "obeying", πειθώμεθα Iliad, II, 139, also has the sense of "obey". The passage cited above which describes the efforts of Odysseus to persuade the assembly to reconvene contains no peitho-words. In his subsequent speech to the assembly, Nestor uses the word πείθεό in the sense "pay attention to":

> Come, my lord: yourself be careful, and listen to another.
>
> (Iliad, II, 360, Lattimore, my emphasis)

The imperative mood indicates a sense of command. Nestor goes on to use πείθωνται to mean "obey". Agamemnon concurs with Nestor's advice, as does "the sense of the meeting", as "the Argives shouted aloud" (Iliad, II, 394, Lattimore) in approval.

At the end of Book VIII, Hektor calls an assembly of the Trojans to propose resting from battle for the night. He uses the word πειθώμεθα in the sense of "obey":

> But for now, let us obey black night
> (Iliad, VIII, 502)

"The sense of the meeting" is in accordance with this proposal: "the Trojans shouted approval" (Iliad, VIII,542, Lattimore).

At the opening of Book IX, a parallel scene takes place among the Greeks at an assembly called by Agamemnon. The phrase of Hektor's, quoted above, reoccurs, spoken by Nestor, who also taps "the sense of the meeting":

> So he spoke, and they listened hard to him, and obeyed (ἐπίθοντο)
> (Iliad, IX, 79, Lattimore)

Earlier in the scene, Agamemnon had proposed fleeing in the ships (again!) to πειθώμεθα , "obey", the will of the gods (Iliad, IX, 26). "The sense of the meeting" had been in favour of Diomedes' counter-proposal to stay and fight:

> ... and all the sons of the Achaians shouted acclaim for the word of Diomedes, breaker of horses.
> (Iliad, IX, 50, 51, Lattimore)

We come now to the private council of the Achaians in the early part of Book IX, where the basileis discuss bringing Achilles back into the fighting-force. Here, at a "cabinet" meeting which is outside of the formal procedures of the assembly, Nestor says to Agamemnon of Achilles

> ... But let us
> even now think how we can make this good and persuade him with words of supplication and gifts of friendship
> (Iliad, IX, 111-113, Lattimore)

The word translated as "persuade" is πεπιθωμεν . It is important to note that this occurs in a private council, not in the public arena: it is the only unambiguous use of the peitho-word in Homer to mean "persuade" in the sense of "talk (someone) over" in the context of public affairs and the word is not used directly to Achilles himself. The following passage, in which Odysseus, Aias, and Phoenix attempt to carry out the decision of the council by trying to persuade Achilles to return to the fighting, contains only one peitho-word: it does mean "persuade", but it is used indirectly: Phoenix uses ἔπειθον (Iliad, IX, 587) in a story told by way of parallel example; the context of the word is thus indirect; it is not directly suggested to Achilles that Achilles should be "persuaded".

The next scene in the context of public affairs is the Trojan assembly subsequent to the fight over the body of Patroclus: Poulydamas, urging retreat, uses the word πιθώμεθα in the sense "pay attention to" (himself) (Iliad, XVIII, 273). Hektor, taking the contrary position, uses

ἐπιπείσεται in the same sense (Iliad, XVIII, 296) followed by πειθώμεθα , meaning "obey" (himself) (Iliad XVIII, 297). "The sense of the meeting" is with Hektor, "and the Trojans thundered to hear him" (Iliad, XVIII,310, Lattimore).

Turning next to the assembly in Book II of the Odyssey, which has been called by Telemachos to complain publicly about the behaviour of his mother's suitors and seek aid and support from the community, the suitor Antinoös uses the word ἐπεπείθετο to mean "persuaded" in an ancedote, followed in the same anecdote by ἔπειθεν , "persuading" (Odyssey, II, 103-106); that is, neither usage is directed at a person present. Telemachos, referring to his own possible future course of action, uses πείσομαι meaning "shall decide to" (Odyssey, II, 134). No "sense of the meeting" emerges from this assembly: the passage contains no reference to the general mood of "the people".

The final passage of the Odyssey describes the assembly following the battle between Odysseus and his partisans and the suitors. Halitherses uses πείθεσθ' (Odyssey, XXIV, 456) and πίθεσθε (Odyssey, XXIV, 461) in the sense "pay attention to" or "obey". The description of "the sense of the meeting" has the assembly πείθονθ' ,"pay attention to" the proposal to take vengeance for the dead suitors (Odyssey, XXIV, 466).

IV

THE INTERPRETATION OF PEITHO - USE IN HOMER

The evidence of the use of peitho-words which has been presented above is sufficient to indicate that, in the context of public affairs, the basic, or "core" meaning of peitho is "obedience", perhaps even "obedience to 'authority'". The "authority" of the speakers who use the word is not formal, but assumed: assumed by an individual who is attempting to take control of a situation involving a group of people. Each of the speakers is a basileus, a community leader who owes his position to the tacit acceptance of the assembly rather than to any formal process - and the assembly could revoke this position. The 'aristocratic' suitors of the Odyssey

> ... fear they (the community) will work some evil on us, and drive us from our own country, so we must make for another community
> (Odyssey, XVI, 381-382, Lattimore)

The epics give the impression that the basileis owe their positions to their capacity for leadership in war - attested by the famous speech of Sarpedon (Iliad, XII, 310-321) - and their ability to lead in the assembly. Such a person must seek constantly to stay the centre of attention, to allow himself to be excelled by no-one. The assembly is the arena where those with sufficient self-confidence to

speak in public strive to excel with words in the same way as they strive to excel with weapons on the battlefield. Each basileus exhorts the assembly to "pay attention to" and "obey" his words as he attempts to focus the attention of the meeting on himself. But - with the single exception of Nestor - none of the basileis uses a peitho-word to another, that is, attempts to dominate another. The advanced age and consequent experience of Nestor give him licence to directly use peitho-words to Agamemnon. Nestor's age prevents him from being a physical threat and he is careful to address Agamemnon as wanax, "king"; Nestor's counsel is consistently admired (Iliad, II, 370-372, for example). Nestor possesses the 'authority' of an 'elder'. No other character in the Homeric epics attempts to assert this kind of authority over another individual in the public arena.

In the private council of the Achaian leaders where it is suggested that Achilles be persuaded (Iliad, IX, 111-113), Achilles is not present. When the word ἔπειθον is used in the actual attempt to persuade Achilles to return to the fighting (Iliad, IX, 587), it is used in the context of an illustrative warning: no-one directly uses a peitho-word to Achilles such as "be persuaded", or "let us persuade you". This curious diffidence about using a peitho-word directly to an individual is highlighted by the outrage of Agamemnon when he tells Achilles: "you will not πείσεις me". (Iliad, I, 132) These last three examples give the impression that in the Homeric world the direct attempt to persuade an

individual in public was highly offensive. The action of the epics shows, of course, that indirect persuasion of an individual by means of the giving of presents was quite acceptable.

Most of the occurrences of peitho-words in the epics, where they appear in the context of public affairs, carry the sense to "pay attention to", "obey". Of the other examples cited, some carry the sense of "persuade". Telemachos, at Odyssey, II, 134, uses πείσομαι to refer to the process of coming to a decision, persuading oneself. As this act is both personal and private, involving only one individual acting on himself, the usage has no significance in the context of public affairs despite the public scene in which it appears and so is not directly relevant to this study. The two examples cited from the speech of Antinoös at Odyssey, II, 103-106, refer to the past actions of a party not present (Penelope) which were committed in a private, not in a public, context and could easily bear the sense of "obey". These two examples can likewise be dismissed as not relevant to this study. The use of πειθώμεθα in a formulaic phrase at Iliad, VIII, 502, and Iliad XI, 65 (cited above) has no special significance, as it appears to be merely a colloquialism meaning "let's take a break". These examples, likewise are not relevant to this study.

However, the response to Nestor's suggestion:

> So he spoke, and they listened hard to him, and obeyed him,
> (Iliad, IX, 79, Lattimore)

is pertinent and shows that a positive response to an exhortation given in the assembly is perceived as obedience. All the examples of peitho-words cited above and not specifically discussed are either addressed to an assembly or describe the assembly's response, and the sense of the word is consistently "pay attention to" or "obey". One can only conclude that "persuade" is a peripheral sense of peitho and that the chief sense of the word is "pay attention to", "obey". The way in which peitho-words are used in the epics demonstrates that the Homeric Greeks perceived them as descriptive of a dominant/dominated relationship. The capacity to dominate and lead the assembly conferred high status. Fluent oral communication was greatly respected (Iliad, III, 200-224) because such ability resulted in the capacity to dominate the assembly.

In a highly competitive society such a dominance relationship was totally unacceptable between individuals who were equals or near-equals: hence Agamemnon's anger at what he perceived to be an attempt to "dominate" him in public. This hypothesis also explains the indirect approach of the council's embassy to Achilles through the giving of presents and the stress laid on the presents by all concerned. When Achilles decides, following the death of Patroclus, to return to the fighting, Agamemnon and Odysseus insist, against Achilles' wishes, that Achilles should accept, and bear witness to his acceptance of, the presents, before he begins to fight. Only thus can the status quo

between Agamemnon and Achilles be restored: the act of giving presents puts the persuader in a position of suppliance vis à vis the persuaded, thus nullifying the dominance relationship inherent in an act of persuasion. Agamemnon, in his quarrel with Achilles, equates what he perceives to be an attempt on Achilles' part to dominate him in public with an attempt to deceive. To set out to change an individual's mind covertly, without the giving of presents - which both announces the intention of persuasion and rewards the act of changing the mind - is to cheat that individual out of his due reward, as well as to assert dominance over that individual. To comply with a suggestion made by another person, to follow another's wishes, is to show oneself to be obedient to another's will.

To dominate the assembly is an act of a different quality. Those individuals whose status gives them sufficient self-confidence to speak in the public forum state a personal position: "this is what I think should be done". The assembly may indicate, by acclamation, its approval of the position of one of the speakers. The assembly is not urged to do something against its collective will; the agora is called to decide what its collective will on a certain matter is, e.g., the assembly of the Trojans Iliad (XVIII, 245-309), where Poulydamas and Hektor speak and the Trojans acclaim Hektor. The assembly approves the speaker whose words most closely accord with "the sense of the meeting": the successful speaker becomes the voice of

the assembly. Peitho-words are typically used, in the context of public affairs, when a speaker exhorts the assembly to "pay attention to (me)", or to "obey (me)", when he proposes a course of action. The word is not used, in, such a context, to mean "persuade" in the sense of "talk (someone) over". As a warrior strives to excel his comrades in dominating the enemy on the battlefield, so the public speaker strives to excel his peers in dominating the assembly. The public speaker boasts, he exhorts, he orders; he attempts to establish himself in a position of dominance over the assembly. If the speaker is successful in gaining the acceptance of the assembly for his proposal, the assembly is perceived as being "obedient" to the speaker's will. The Homeric verbs from Peitho express this idea of dominance and, in the context of public affairs, mean "pay attention to", or "obey". The voters in a modern (Australian, for example) election might be regarded as having been "persuaded" by a successful candidate; they would not normally be perceived as being "obedient" to the candidate's will. Peitho-words, in Homer, do mean "obey", and do not normally mean "persuade".

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 1

I

1 Morpugo, A., Mycanaeae Greacitatis Lexicon, Romae in aedilus Athenaei, 1963.

II

1 Scholars give very different interpretations of the "Homeric period", but the data which informs these interpretations is generally the same: the Homeric epics themselves, supplemented by such archaelogical data as can be dated to the time in which the individual scholar places Homer. Three works (out of hundreds of available surveys) which, despite very different perspectives and themes and some lack of agreement on specific issues, give a good general account of homeric social conditions when taken together, are:

Donlan, W., The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece, Lawrence, Coronado Press, 1980.

Finley, M.I., Early Greece: The Bronze and Archaic Ages, London, Chatto & Windus, 1977.

Thomson, G., Aeschylus and Athens, (4th Ed.) London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1973.

2 Luce, J.V., Homer and the Heroic Age, London, Thames & Hudson, 1975, pp.103-104.

3 Havelock, E.A., The Greek Concept of Justice, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1978, p.63.

4 Kelly, J., A History of Argos to 500 B.C., Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1976, pp.35 & 37.

5 Smithson, E.H., "The Grave of an Early Athenian Aristocrat", in Archaelogy, Vol. 22, No. 1, Jan. 1969, pp.18-25.

6 Buxton, R.G.A., Persuasion in Greek Tragedy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p.6.

7 Havelock, op. cit., pp.119-121.

8 Page, D., Folktales in Homer's Odyssey, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1973, p.4.

III

1 Pepe, G.M., Studies in Peitho, Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1966, p.6.

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CHAPTER 2

PEITHO IN HESIOD

I

INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews the early use of the Greek word "Peitho" by Hesiod. Unlike other Greek words which are sometimes translated as "persuasion" - such as pisto, "trust", and paraphasis "to beguile", "to cajole" - Peitho was perceived as a deity and became a political concept of some importance in the classical period. Personified Peitho appears for the first time in Hesiod. The present chapter will examine the use of the word "Peitho" in Hesiod.

Hesiod was a didactic poet, that is, he was a teacher concerned to instruct his audience through the medium of his poetry. The topic of Hesiod's instruction was "right behaviour". The moral, social, and economic norms of the society are expressed from the particular perspective, and with the special bias, of the composer. Therefore some aspects of the economic, social, and political background of that society will be outlined in order to place the conceptualization of Peitho which is characteristic of the period in historical perspective. The general historical background of the Hesiodic and Archaic periods, however limited, is outlined in

numerous published surveys of early Greek history and needs only passing reference here.(1) Some special perspectives on the period peculiar to this study are derived from the Hesiodic texts, our only written primary source for this period.

II

HESIOD: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND(1)

This section will show that social and economic conditions had changed in the time which had elapsed between the period of Homer and that of Hesiod. In the Homeric epics trade appears to have been in the hands of the Phoenicians and the sea-trade was not a highly-regarded occupation:

> There came Phoenician men, famous seafarers, gnawers at other men's goods, with countless pretty things stored
> in their black
> ship (Odyssey, XV,415-416, Lattimore, emphases added).

By the period of Hesiod, Greeks were at work in the sea-trade, driven by economic want:

> and yourself wait for the time to come when a voyage is in season
> Then drag your swift ship down to the sea,
> and put in a cargo
> that will be suitable for it, so you can bring home a profit,
> as did my father, and yours too, O Perses,
> you great fool,
> who used to sail in ships, for he wanted to live well for his status.

(Hesiod, Works and Days, 630 f.f., adapted from Lattimore)

Archaeology shows that with the collapse of the Mycenaean palace culture, the population declined drastically.(1) Thus, in the early "Dark Age", the Iron Age society depicted by Homer did not suffer from land-shortage. Homer's heroes regularly feast on cattle (Odyssey, III, 430-463; IV, 65; VIII, 60-61; Iliad, II, 402-431). Even allowing for poetic exaggeration this image suggests that quite extensive grazing lands existed, and there is no mention of poor soil under cultivation. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a tentative conclusion is that the food-supply in normal seasons was adequate, and the population had not yet risen to the extent that grazing lands had gone under the plough. Even a slave could offer meat to a guest (Odyssey, XIV, 425-439). But Hesiod's father was not so fortunate.

> ...once on a time, leaving Kyme of Aiolis,
> he came here
> in his black ship, having crossed over
> a vast amount of water
> and it was not comfort he was fleeing, not wealth,
> nor prosperity,
> but that evil poverty that Zeus gives men
> for a present;
> and settled here near Helikon in a hole of a
> village,
> Askra, bad in winter, tiresome in summer,
> and good at no season.
> (Hesiod, Works and Days, 635 f.f., Lattimore)

That is, Hesiod's father had left a rich and powerful Greek foundation in Asia Minor - where he had been forced by "evil poverty" into the sea-trade "for he wanted to live well for his status" - for a hillside farm in Boeotia on the Greek mainland. By the early half of the 8th century B.C. a general increase in population is evident in the archaeological record, together with some indication of population movement.(2)

It would appear from the last two passages quoted, assuming the case of Hesiod's father is not untypical, that rising populations had forced some people into the cultivation of marginal land, where even unremitting toil was often insufficient to gain subsistence, forcing some individuals to supplement their incomes by risky trading ventures. Poverty was the spur which drove the poor to embark on trading activity. As De Ste. Croix reminds us:

> Hesiod had represented trade as a pis aller for the peasant who was unable to make a living from the land...(3)

and even much later, c.594 B.C.

> ...in Solon trade heads the list of activities to which a man may be driven who is propertyless (achremon) and under the compulsion of poverty...(4)

The surplus traded by these impoverished peasants was wine and oil. Their marginal hillside farms, rocky and with poor soil, were not suitable for the cultivation of wheat. The basileis, the "aristocrats" who owned the best, the wheat-producing, land, did not need the produce

of the hillsides, as they could grow sufficient olives and vines for their household needs on their own land. For wheat, the hill-farmers had to look abroad or go into debt to the basileis. Olives and vines need minimal attention: from the time of the winter pruning until the late-summer harvest the sparse weed-growth - starved of light by the height of the mountains and the foliage of the cultivated plants - could easily be controlled by junior family-members and the household goats. The householder was free to join short trading ventures. But some small-holdings were too small to accommodate increasingly large families. Population movement had begun, as poverty forced people to seek for a place where they could find a sufficient livelihood, with some eastern Greeks moving to the mainland in search of a living. However, Hesiod's advice on how to be economically prosperous, while it includes references to the sea-trade, does not refer to the possibility of joining a colony. It may be concluded that the second colonization movement, which is generally agreed to have started c.750 B.C., had not yet begun. Hesiod's emphasis on unending agricultural toil to gain a living, if necessary supplemented by an income from trading, when combined with his failure to mention colonies, suggests that the works of Hesiod were composed immediately prior to 750 B.C.. This was prior to the period when rising

populations and the failure of marginal cultivation created the conditions which gave rise to the colonization of the Western Mediterranean and the Black Sea areas.

Against this view, some scholarship(5) has it that Hesiod's attendance at the funeral games for Amphidamas (Works and Days, 651-659) dates Hesiod to c.705B.C. This argument assumes that the Amphidamas who figured in the Lelantine War was the same person as the Amphidamas mentioned by Hesiod. There is no internal evidence in the Hesiodic corpus to support this identification. On balance, Hesiod's failure to mention colonization would appear to support the earlier date. Given the paucity of evidence, the controversy is probably unresolvable.

Hesiod's Works and Days is a hymn to the necessity for hard work and thrift, and to the value of Justice (Diké). It is claimed by Fränkel that Hesiod confines his moral comment to personal relationships:

> If Hesiod, who has so much to say of divine order, is so utterly silent on political order, we may infer that in his world the state functioned hardly at all.(6)

To be sure, Hesiod does not speak of poleis, or states, only of geographical places, and makes no mention of relations between the individual and the polis, or of relations between poleis. However, Hesiod is not silent on "political order". As politics, religion, law, morality, tradition, and ethics were as yet

undifferentiated categories, Hesiod's "divine order" is a political statment.(7) Hesiod's direct comment on public affairs is confined to the life of the agricultural village community, to relations between neighbours and kin, and to relations between villagers and the local basileis. Mention of public affairs only intrudes directly in Hesiod's work in the shape of religious festivals and the administration of justice. And Hesiod is not happy with the administration of justice:

> ...those barons
> who eat bribes, who are willing
> to give out such a decision.
> (Hesiod, Works and Days, 38-39,
> Lattimore)
> ...the profligacy of their rulers,
> who for their own greedy purposes
> twist the courses of justice aslant
> by false proclamations.
> Beware, you barons, of such spirits.
> Straighten your decisions
> you eaters of bribes. Banish from your
> minds
> the twisting of justice.
> (Hesiod, Works and Days, 261-264,
> Lattimore)

The administration of justice which Hesiod portrays is institutionally the same as that portrayed by Homer. Judges are offered gifts in return for their services:

> ...the elders
> were in session on benches of polished stone in the
> sacred circle
> and held in their hands the staves of the heralds
> who lift their voices.
> The two men rushed before these, and took turns
> speaking their cases,
> and between them lay on the ground two talents of
> gold, to be given

to that judge who in this case spoke the straightest opinion.
(Iliad, XVIII, 503-508, Lattimore)

It can be inferred that the forms and institutions of public affairs were unchanged in the time-span from Homer to Hesiod, despite the changes in social and economic conditions noted above. However, since there are no portrayals of assemblies in Hesiod which can be compared to the portrayals of assemblies in Homer, further comparisons cannot reasonably be made. Hesiod is largely concerned, in the Works and Days, to give advice regarding the daily round of the peasant-farmer.

Hesiod does, however, refer to

...temperate barons,
because for their people
who have gone astray in assembly these
lightly turn back their actions
to the right direction, talking them over*
with gentle arguments.
(Hesiod, Theogony, 88-90, Lattimore)

III

THE EVIDENCE IN WORKS AND DAYS

In the story of Pandora (Works and Days, 60ff.) when the woman is made by the gods to be "a plague to men who

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* The word translated as "talking over" ("persuading" in Loeb) is not a peitho-word, it is παραιφάμενοι. Peitho has different rôles in Hesiod. These matters will be further discussed below.

eat bread", the gods work to maximize her attractiveness at the behest of Zeus:

> He told glorious Hephaistos to make haste, and
> plaster earth with water, and to infuse it with a
> human voice and vigour, and make the face
> like the immortal goddesses,
> the bewitching features of a young girl;
> meanwhile Athene
> was to teach her her skills, and how
> to do the intricate weaving,
> while Aphrodite was to mist her head
> in golden endearment
> and the cruelty of desire and longings
> that wear out the body,
> but to Hermes, the guide, the slayer of Argos,
> he gave instructions
> to put in her the mind of a hussy,
> and a treacherous nature.
> So Zeus spoke. And all obeyed Lord Zeus,
> the son of Kronos.
> The renowned strong smith modeled her figure of
> earth,
> in the likeness
> of a decorous young girl, as the son of Kronos
> had wished it.
> The goddess gray-eyed Athene dressed and arrayed
> her;
> the Graces,
> who are goddesses, and hallowed Persuasion
> put necklaces
> of gold upon her body...
> (Hesiod, Works and Days, 60-74, Lattimore)

Buxton tells us that 'golden necklaces' were traditional "magical" instruments of erotic enticement(1) and demonstrates their particular erotic significance in archaic Greek thought, as does Pepe.(2) Peitho has been personified in the last-quoted passage as a goddess of erotic enticement. This conceptualization of Peitho was to remain important right through the Archaic period and beyond. The fact of a connection between Aphrodite and

Peitho in Greek thought is here made plain; the nature of this connection requires explanation.

Zeus has ordered Aphrodite to perform a certain function; the function is, however, subsequently carried out by Peitho (and the Graces and Hours). As Pepe remarks: "commentators have found these lines charming but irrelevant"; he ably summarises the arguments and concludes that Peitho

> ...is part of an erotic hierarchy ruled by Aphrodite...
> In a sense she is an extension of Aphrodite and can perform the goddess's tasks without impairing her own individuality.(3)

While undeniably correct in substance, this conclusion over-stresses Peitho's conceptual independence in this case. It would be more to the point to suggest that Peitho was not, in some erotic contexts, conceptually differentiated from Aphrodite. The problem of conceptual differentiation in Greek thought, and its importance to an understanding of Peitho, will be further examined in subsequent chapters. Seduction involves a strong element of non-violent inducement; in such a context Aphrodite and Peitho become virtually interchangeable concepts. It is possible to speak of Aphrodite-Peitho. It will become apparent below, in the discussions of the work of Parmenides and Empedokles, that a recognition of this linkage is important to an explication of their thought.

IV

THE EVIDENCE FROM THE THEOGONY

In the Theogony Hesiod gives Peitho a genealogy which may provide some indication of how he perceived the concept. In referring to the offspring of Okeanus and Tethys, Hesiod says:

> She brought forth also a race apart
> of daughters, who with
> Lord Apollo and the Rivers have the young
> in their keeping
> all over the earth, since this right
> from Zeus is given them.
> They are Peitho...
> (Hesiod, Theogony, 346-349, Lattimore)

Peitho is the first-named of the "race of daughters". Okeanus is the primeval water, the source of waters; Tethys is the sea. There are two lists of offspring born to Okeanus and Tethys in the Theogony: the males (336-345) and the females (346-370). Pepe explains that the females

> fall into two distinct groups: names relating to the sea, especially its aspects, which dispose it to man's use, and names signifying various qualities and processes which are beneficial to man's existence in general, especially his political life. This second group implies ... a theological system in which the origin of all things and of all divine forces, intellectual and ethical, are derived from water... Okeanus is the common denominator, the source and joiner of all multitudinous facets of the world.(1)

The second group can be divided into two sets, one

> refers to benefits which...are part of and central to a larger aspect of human prosperity...such figures as Wealth, Good Giver, Generous Giver...

the other

> contains more abstract qualities which center mainly about human leadership and the course of man's activity. Members of this group are Persuasion, Wisdom, Knowing, Success...(2)

Subsequent to the defeat of Kronos, the new rule which Zeus has established over the cosmos is characterized by Peitho and other personified concepts whose names both distinguish the rule of Zeus from the violent rule of Kronos and express conditions and processes desirable for human existence.

V

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON HESIOD'S USE OF PEITHO AND PARAPHASIS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HESIODIC PERIOD

When Hesiod uses the word παραιφάμενοι in the sense of "persuading" at Theogony, 90, in a passage which is directly descriptive of an idealized political process, he uses a word which has none of the dominance/obedience connotations of Peitho. This "persuading", this "talking over", has connotations of seductive, gentle beguilement. In Homer, this persuasion-word is used in an erotic context (Iliad, XIV, 216-217); in no case does Homer use a peitho-word in a portrayal of an erotic situation. With Hesiod the position is reversed: παραιφάμενοι means

"persuading" in a political context while Peitho is an erotic figure. This reversal in the use of these words requires some explanation.

In the general uneven expansion of wealth which accompanied the increased trading activity taking place in Hesiod's Greece, some individuals doubtless improved their economic status considerably while others sank into poverty.(1) The social and political dominance of the basileis appears to have been threatened: certainly Hesiod's fulminations against "bribe-devouring princes" attest to some dissatisfaction with the basileis' conduct of their office. By contrast, the Homeric heroes displayed a swaggering bravado, being sure of their prowess and their consequent status. "The Greek verb (peitho) means originally 'to cause another to obey'".(2) In Homer, as was shown in the previous chapter, the verb typically means "pay attention to (me)" or "obey (me)". In a social climate of general dissatisfaction, clearly attested by Hesiod (Works and Days, 38-39, 261-264, quoted above) the Hesiodic basileus is depicted as "beguiling" (παραιφάμενοι) the assembly; he does not instruct the agora to "obey me". "To pay attention to" had given way to "to beguile" because the assumption of authority by the basileis was no longer taken for granted (Hesiod, Theogony, 88-90, quoted above).

The intrusion of Peitho into the erotic sphere is more difficult to explain than the intrusion of παράφασις "beguile", into the political sphere. In the Homeric epics the dominance/obedience relationship as expressed by peitho-words is absent from erotic contexts: in Homeric erotic contexts παράφασις is used to denote the "beguilement" of a stronger party by a weaker. To express the erotic power of attractiveness inherent in a woman in terms of her dominance in the relationship, as Hesiod does in the passage quoted above from the Pandora story, is a new development. This change is not to be glossed over by regarding παράφασις as a mere synonym for Peitho as Buxton and Pepe do. For Hesiod, the woman has become the dominant partner in a heterosexual relationship.

The reason for the change which resulted in Peitho being used to express this kind of erotic relationship may lie in the historical background of the period. It was noted in Section II above that population movement had begun within the Greek world. It would seem reasonable to argue that such movement would have increased the frequency of contact between strangers. In pre-industrial agricultural village life such contact would have been rare, warfare and raiding excepted. Within the confines of such communities the opportunities for "legitimate" erotic relationships would be quite

restricted, often to a single person who had been a close acquaintance since childhood. There would be very little mystery in such a relationship. The arrival of a stranger, or strangers, in a small community offers the possiblity of exotic erotic contact with a disturbing element of the unknown. For the (male) traveller, coming probably from a similarly socially confined community, such meetings were more frequent. In the Pandora story quoted above, Peitho is the power of attractiveness inherent in the object of erotic interest; the dominance in this relationship lies in the beloved.* It is possible that the connection of Peitho with the erotic has to do with the power of sexual attraction felt between persons who had not known each other from childhood: a circumstance which is likely to have been uncommon before the Hesiodic period. But this is mere supposition: there is no evidence upon which a firm hypothesis may be based. Other students may offer a better explanation.

Given that these writings reflect and represent social attitudes, the Pandora passage does, especially if read in conjunction with other relevent passages, provide

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* In the English-language oral tradition, folksongs which attest to the erotic attraction of a stranger are legion: examples are Lady Isabel and the Elf Knight (Child No. 4); Bonnie Annie (Child No. 24); Thomas Rymer (Child No. 37): note that the stranger, whether male or female, is often characterized as being of supernatural origin. (See Child, cited in the Bibliogrpahy).

some specific information about the society's view of women. Passage of particular interest are:

(a) Do not let any sweet-talking women
beguile your good sense
with the fascinations of her shape. It's your barn
she's after.
Anyone who will trust a woman is trusting flatterers.
(Hesiod, Works and Days, 373-375, Lattimore)

(b) First of all, get yourself an ox for plowing,
and a woman -
for work, not to marry - one who can plow
with the oxen,
and get all necessary gear in your house
in good order
(Hesiod, Works and Days, 405-407, Lattimore)

(c) (Boreas, the winter wind)
It does not blow through the soft skin
of a young maiden
who keeps her place inside the house
by her loving mother
and is not yet initiated in the mysteries of Aphrodite
the golden, who, washing her smooth skin carefully,
and anointing it
with oil, then goes to bed, closeted
in an inside chamber
on a winter's day
(Hesiod, Works and Days, 519-524, Lattimore)

(d) (In Autumn)
... look
for a serving-maid
with no children, as one with young
to look after's a nuisance
(Hesiod, Works and Days, 602-603, Lattimore)

(e) You are of age to marry a wife and bring her
home with you
when you are about thirty, not being many years
short of
that mark, nor going much over. That age
is ripe for your marriage.
Let your wife be full grown four years,
and marry in the fifth.
Better marry a maiden, so you can teach her
good manners,
and in particular marry one who lives close by
you.
Look her well over first. Don't marry what will
make your neighbours
laugh at you, for while there's nothing better
a man can win him
than a good wife, there's nothing more dismal
than a bad one.
She eats him out. And even though her husband
be a strong man,
she burns him dry without fire, and gives him
to a green old age.
(Hesiod, Works and Days, 695-705,
Lattimore)

The Pandora passage characterizes Woman as inherently prone to "lies, and wheedling words of falsehood, and a treacherous nature" (Works and Days, 78, Lattimore), with a sexuality that debilitates man; the power of Peitho is in her. Passages (a) and (e) above reinforce this conception. Passages (c) and (e) indicate that only a young virgin can be trained to be a good wife: "Better marry a maiden, ("not yet initiated in the mysteries of Aphrodite") so you can teach her good manners"; such a potential wife should "live close by you": that is, her character should have been known from childhood by the prospective husband. Passages (b) and (d) imply that the only relationship with a woman which

is prudent for a young man is an overt master/servant relationship. Taken together, Hesiod's references to women betray a large degree of fear and awe of the power of female sexuality to influence male behaviour. One of the characteristics of that sexuality is Peitho: that power which, inexplicably, without physical coercion, compels obedience to the lure of the beloved.

The ordering of the cosmic* powers found in Hesiod is, as with later Greek thinkers, an attempt to describe a relationship between such powers. For example, when Hesoid portrays Zeus as swallowing his wife, Metis (Theogony, 886-900), so that he, rather than his wife, should give birth to Athene (Theogony, 924-926), the act shows Zeus taking into himself the capacity for acting wisely through foresight: what Venant calls "cunning intelligence".(3) The act also shows "the takeover of the male god ... (and) his assumption of the power of procreativity",(4) by implication justifying patriarchal dominance of the family unit. The birth of Athene, goddess of the polis and hence of both politics and of war, shows the polis as generated from wisdom by the dominant male. While the personification of abstract qualities stems from the need to describe qualities that

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* "Cosmos", following the Concise Oxford Dictionary, is used in the sense of "The universe as an ordered whole"; a "cosmic power" is a power which has a part in such ordering.

were both non-material and non-representational, the genealogies of these personifications were attempts to express relationships between these qualities. As will be seen as this study progresses, such genealogies did not form an immutable religious canon, but were individual expressions of perceived connections between ideas.

The quality that is expressed by the noun Peitho is the ability to cause obedience without coercion. Verbs from Peitho express, in Homer, a dominance/obedience relationship, and mean "obey" or "pay attention to". Yet the personified Peitho in Hesiod is always, dubiously, translated as "Persuasion". If the noun Peitho was formed from the Homeric verb, it follows that the meaning of the noun would have derived from the verbal usage. Following Homeric usage, "She-who-causes (one) to pay attention", or "She-who- causes (one) to obey", in short, "Obedience" should be the meaning of Peitho in Hesiod. There is no evidence prior to, or contemporary with, Hesiod, to justify reading "Peitho" as "Persuasion" in Hesiod. It will be shown below that Peitho does not have the sense of "Persuasion" before the 5th century B.C.. Peitho in Hesiod represents a dominance phenomenon, a specific type of dominance, a type which engenders obedience without physical coercion or the threat of physical coercion. Peitho in Hesiod means "Obedience".

In Hesiod's thought, Peitho is a cosmic power of equal status to Metis, "Wisdom", Tyche, "Success", Pluto, "Wealth", and other conditions and processes which, being perceived as beneficial to human existence, were conceived as divine forces. In the Works and Days, Peitho shares with other cosmic forces, such as Aphrodite and the Charites, a part in the complex activities of the erotic sphere. However, because Hesiod only shows Peitho as acting within the erotic sphere, as performing a specific function within the erotic sphere, as a complementary extension of A phrodite, Peitho must not be perceived as being specifically confined to a rôle in the erotic sphere. Hesiod's depiction of Peitho as standing in some relationship - which he unfortunately does not specify - with Metis, Tyche, Pluto, and other cosmic powers is indicative that Peitho was perceived as having a wider rôle than the erotic in human affairs. Peitho has a general function in Hesoid, being linked with other deities to conditions of human well-being.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 2

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Despite the very different themes of these works, despite specific disagreements about particular issues, and despite the specific application of Kelly's book to Argos, when taken together, these studies give a good general account of the periods surveyed in this study.

II

1. Kelly, ibid, p.35.

2. Ibid. p.37.

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4. Ibid., p.94.

5. Fränkel, op. cit. p.95.

6. Ibid., p.131.

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3. Ibid.

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V

1. Forrest, W.G., The Emergence of Greek Democracy, London, World University Library, 1966, pp.74-75.

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CHAPTER 2

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CHAPTER 3

I

PEITHO IN THE ARCHAIC PERIOD

The archaic period will, for the purposes of this study, be considered to begin in the second half of the eighth century B.C., and to be immediately subsequent to the period of Hesiod. The archaic period was characterized by rising populations, the emergence of the poleis as political entities, the development of hoplite warfare, and the second colonization movement.

An increase in the volume of trade had resulted in a general, though uneven, expansion of wealth. Associated with these changes the development of iron and bronze tool-forging resulted in a large section of the male population being able to purchase arms, previously a prerogative of the wealthy.(1) Hoplite tactics began to appear in warfare at about the same time. These circumstances, taken together, ensured that a high proportion of Greek men had both the weapons and the fighting experience to enable them to challenge the established order, as represented by the basileis, for a greater share in political and legal decision making.

Populations had for some time been rising above the carrying-capacity of the land. As the marginal cultivations failed, the areas in the immediate vicinity of easily defended geographical locations - where the dominant

landowners, the basileis, lived - began to gain in population as destitute farmers looked to the market and political centres of their communities for a livelihood. The polis began to develop. The polis was, essentially, a political foundation where the heads of oikoi, families, manoeuvered for social and political status. The presence of a surplus population of armed, trained, fighting men, who often demanded a redistribution of land or otherwise challenged the existing order, created pressure on local resources and political institutions. The Greek answer to the problem was colonization. The focus of colonization was arable land; the centres of settlement were the Black Sea area and Magna Graecia.

Athens took no part in this colonization, possibly partly because its larger-than-usual land area could continue to absorb some agricultural population and partly because its developing pottery industry and trade, as well as its silver mines, could continue to absorb manpower. Sparta founded only one colony, having found an alternative solution to its internal problems: conquest. The conquered district of Messenia and the helots of Laconia required all the available Spartiate manpower to police. The period of peace which followed the Second Messenian War saw the usual protests against economic and political inequality. At this time

> It is well known, and clearly attested by Alcman himself, that during the seventh century Sparta had moved away from the Lycurgan State...(2)

prior to the change to the "new and more rigid form" which is the familiar image of Sparta. But the process of this change was still in progress during the period of Alkman. It is inappropriate to view the Sparta of Alkman as being too similar to the Sparta of Classical or later times. Our sources for early Spartan history are few, and often of doubtful reliability. None is contemporary.(3)

II

THE EVIDENCE FROM ALKMAN

Alkman was a lyric poet who composed choral odes in the Sparta of the later 7th century B.C.. He was

> ... a paid professional artist who possessed the gift of writing and composing new songs ... Alcman himself was perhaps no Spartan, though he was fully acclimatized in Sparta, and at home in her dialect. He was probably ... from Sardis in the interior of Asia Minor ...(1)

One of the fragments of Alkman's poems mentions Peitho; it refers to the genealogy of the goddess Tyche, "Success":

> Sister of Eunomia
> and of Peitho
> daughter of Promathia...
> (Alkman, 21, Lyrica Graeca Selecta)

The period of the Second Messenian War, or its immediate aftermath, is probably when the Spartans reorganized their society as a military camp under hoplite government. These political events are the possible background of Alkman's fragment (the chronology for this period is unclear) which states that "Success", "Good Order", and "Persuasion" (or is

it "Obedience"?) are the offspring of "Forethought". In Pepe's interpretation

> The key element is undoubtably forethought; without it there is literally no generation of the other factors.
> When intelligent planning employs persuasion as a political tool within a society enjoying the rule of the law, then a state of political stability can arise and endure.(2)

However, Buxton warns us that

> Politics is...in Alkman, not a separate conceptual area: it is rooted in, and imagined in terms of, a world of natural growth and human relationships. Thus if we say that the Alkman lines present us with a 'political' Peitho this must be taken as implying no radical break with Peitho's role in the area of love between individuals. At most it represents a shift of emphasis.(3)

But Buxton also says

> To most Greeks, at any rate until the middle of the fifth century, the word (Peitho) would have connoted primarily a goddess whose special province was the alluring power of sexual love.(4)

That is, Buxton argues that Peitho is basically an erotic concept while Pepe views Peitho as, at bottom, a political concept. This study will, on the other hand, argue that Peitho was not, at this time, so specialized an idea as to warrant either interpretation, but was a cosmic power (as defined in the previous chapter) of unspecialized function.

III

THE INTERPRETATION OF ALKMAN'S PEITHO

This fragment is too short to allow of much explanation: there is simply not enough valid evidence to bear definitive interpretation.

To say that "Forethought" generates "Persuasion" is to say that thinking ahead can avoid the use of acts alternative to the act of persuasion: the use of force and coercion with violence to obtain compliance. To say that "Success", "Good Order", and "Persuasion" are correlated is to imply that they are mutually interdependent conditions. But is Peitho to be translated as "Persuasion"?

Ehrenberg cannot accept "Persuasion" in this context:

> It is perhaps more difficult to understand the part played by Peitho...I cannot think of any section of the Sparta of the seventh century which had not yet the rigidity of the post-Chilonian State, that could be governed by Persuasion... Sparta rested on the obedience of her citizens, and obedience would follow a command, not mere persuasion. Obedience is a second, legitimate translation of Peitho; it must have been the meaning of Alcman's goddess."(1)

In reply, Buxton asserts that

> the meaning 'obedience' is very much rarer in Greek than Ehrenberg suggests...the only known classical instances are in Xenophon, a writer much influenced by Sparta. On the other hand, Alkman's own Parthenion shows us a world so apparently unlike the later 'obedient' Sparta in atmosphere that we cannot be confident that Ehrenberg has the truth. In any case our passage remains an oddity, since everywhere

> else in extant lyric Peitho's function is unambiguously erotic.(2)

Buxton is certainly correct to point out that little is known about the Sparta of this period. However, to cite Xenophon, who lived some two hundred years later amid vastly different economic, social and political circumstances, is both irrelevant and anachronistic. Buxton is simply inaccurate when he states that all lyric portrays Peitho with an unambiguously erotic function.*

Buxton is, however, quite right to warn us that too little is known of Spartan society at this period for firm statements about its nature to be tenable. But while Ehrenberg's argument may be faulty, his conclusion may be correct. In examining the use of Peitho in chronological sequence, it has been noted above that no evidence was available to allow us to read "Persuasion" for Peitho in Hesiod. There is still none for such a reading in Alkman.

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* Sappho and Anacreon.

Sappho's use of πειθώ appears to be specifically erotic; the relevant poems are fragmentary, too much so for the purposes of this study.

Anacreon, an Ionian from Teos, was a refugee from the Persian expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean. Living in a period, the mid-sixth century B.C., subsequent to the introduction of coinage "he draws a picture of a good old time"

> when Peitho did not dart her rays from a flash of silver

and portrays Peitho as one "who operates simply with 'silver', i.e. hard cash"(3). There is no particular reason to assume that this Peitho is erotic, that is, a reference to prostitution, and no evidence to allow further analysis.

In the Pandora story told by Hesiod, referred to in the previous chapter, Peitho was shown to be "She-who-causes (one) to obey": "Obedience". In the absence of contemporary or earlier evidence to the contrary, Peitho must be read as "Obedience" in Alkman.

Alkman's fragment shows Peitho in a relationship with Eunomia, Tyche, and Promathia. "Promathia" is merely the Doric feminine form of "Prometheus", and appears to mean simply "Forethought". Tyche is "success and good fortune"(4) Eunomia is more complex:

> the word...denotes not the presence and observation of good laws in the community but rather sound moral conditions, respect for the right of others, moderation, and an orderly and restrained behaviour.(5)

Ehrenberg adds that Eunomia is

> the exponent of the forces of tradition, representing the conception of a human order, 'willed by Zeus'(6)

while Buxton points out that

> εὔνομιη is contrasted with anti-social violence, and presumably has the sense of 'orderly behaviour' such as would imply respect for vital customs like hospitality... though on vases she is usually in the company of Aphrodite and other erotic figures, Eunomia has wider implications than such colleagues might imply.(7)

In Hesiod, Eunomia is the sister of Dike, "Justice", a concept which will not be examined here, and Eirene, "Peace". (Hesiod, Theogony, 901f.f.). That is to say, Eunomia, like Peitho, is a cosmic power, representing "good

order" in the universe, in community affairs, and in sexual matters. Her function is not exclusively specialized to political "order", although the concept has particular application in this sphere.

The question raised by the fragment is whether it contains a 'political' statement or is perhaps a more general 'cosmic' observation. It is clear that these concepts, grouped as a family unit, have a particular application to human affairs. "Forethought" results in "Success", "Good Order", and "Obedience". By implication, forethought avoids failure, disorder, and violence. The key concept here is "Forethought": given Promathia, the other three conditions will follow and, as sisters, they are interdependent, each appearing only when the others are present. As a prescription for proper conduct, the statement appears to be as applicable to individual affairs as it is to community affairs. However, since the individual who followed the prescription would be a good member of the community, a good citizen, the distinction between public and private disappears. Peitho, in Hesiod, is a cosmic concept, having a general function in combination with other conditions of human well-being: she represents the power to compel obedience by non-violent means. This meaning of the concept remains true for Alkman, but Alkman applies the concept to human affairs. That is, in Alkman, Peitho has become a directly political concept. But Alkman gives no indication of how Peitho does, or

should, function specifically in political affairs. Indication of the specific application of Peitho to political affairs does not appear before the early 5th century.

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CHAPTER 3

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CHAPTER 4

THE APPEARANCE OF PEITHO IN POLITICAL THINKING.

INTRODUCTION

I

This chapter will examine the way in which Peitho was perceived by three composers whose lives spanned that point which is conventionally regarded as the junction of the Archaic and Classical periods of ancient Greece: the Persian wars. The three persons whose work will be examined are Parmenides, Aeschylus, and Pindar. Pindar was a poet, Aeschylus a playwright, and Parmenides was a philosopher. The works of all three were presented in poetic form. The poem of Parmenides will be examined in some detail, as it will be claimed that Peitho is a concept which is basic to his philosophy. Only the Oresteia of Aeschylus' surviving works will be examined. The Suppliants, the other play of Aeschylus in which Peitho appears to have been important, lacks the other plays of its trilogy in the fragmentary form in which we have it, thus depriving us of the playwright's conclusions about the subjects which he wished to highlight to his audience. The few occurrences of Peitho in Pindar will be examined with a view to explicating his perceptions of the concept.

Some general historical background will be presented so as to put the work of these composers into a common historical, social, and economic perspective. The peculiar

historical circumstances of each of the composers will then be noted in accounting for any differences in the particular conception of Peitho expressed by each of them. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn about the conception of Peitho that the work of the three composers indicates was general in the early 5th century.

II

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LATE ARCHAIC AND EARLY CLASSICAL GREECE.

The pattern of political change from the "aristocratic" government portrayed in Hesiod to other governmental forms is known to have been common to most of the Greek world, although the changes took place at different times at different places. Government by the basileis, who applied an orally-transmitted traditional law-code, was open to abuse, and created dissatisfactions which, as was shown in Chapter 2, were expressed as early as the Hesiodic period. One expression of this dissatisfaction was the demand for a written legal code - subsequent to the introduction of the technique of alphabetic writing which provided the means for codifying traditional law - which would protect the populace against arbitrary political and legal decision making by the basileis.

As Buxton reminds us

> ... in archaic Greece a challenge was offered to the powerful word of the noble, a challenge whose practical results was widespread codification of the laws in many parts of colonial and mainland Greece.(1)

Shortage of land, a consequence of the rising population, and the poverty of the marginal cultivations, gave rise to demands for a redistribution of land: such demands were another attack on the privilege of the basileis, who owned the best land.

Thomson, writing in a tradition of scholarship which translated "basileus" as "king", tells us

> Royal honours were the gift of the people in recognition of military service.(2)
>
> The Homeric evidence shows clearly that, while power or privilege was in the gift of the king, land was in the gift of the people, who bestowed on their leaders, in reward for military service, estates which differed from the others in that they were not assigned by lot to tribe or clan, but by special gift to an individual ... The Homeric témenos (portion of land) represents the germ of private property in land developing within a collective tribal system.(3)
>
> The small man could not hope for a témenos, but he could clear and enclose a piece of waste land, which became his by acquisition, ... It was ... only a matter of time before this process of expansion reached its limit, and then the ownership of land began to concentrate. By loans of seed and stock after a bad season, the big landholder became a creditor of the small, and after a succession of bad seasons the smallholder reached the point at which he could only redeem his debt by surrendering his holding or tying himself to his creditors by some system of annual tribute.(4)
>
> ... when the dispossessed Attic peasants at the time of Solon demanded a redistribution of land,

> their demand was an appeal to ancient tribal practice.(5)

Land in this ancient practice was traditionally divided by lot between tribes.

Some magnates ("basileis" became a formal title for certain magistracies) in their efforts to increase their personal social and political status, offered themselves as "leaders of the people" and championed the cause of those sections of the populace which were disaffected from the current state of political affairs. Thus, in 6th century B.C. Athens

> Megakles, son of Alkmaion, organized the merchants and artisans of the ports, Peisistratos the mining population. They were both opposed by Lykourgos of the Eteoboutadai, at the head of the big landowners, and at the same time they were in competition with one another.(6)

If sufficient popular support was forthcoming, such "aristocratic" individuals would establish themselves as "tyrants", autocratic rulers, and, by such means banishment and the confiscation of land, break the power of those magnates who were not allied to them. The despotic rule of the tyrants invariably gave rise to revolution.

In some cases the wealthy, "aristocrats" and/or trade-enriched "commoners", would seize power and form a governing oligarchy. In other cases the hoplite class, those who could afford the basic hoplite panoply and who were probably the largest section of the male citizenry, would form a broader-based system of government, a "democracy". The continuing struggle between the proponents of government by

"the better sort", the oligarchs, and the proponents of government by "the people", the democrats, was a fundamental internal problem of the Greek poleis, a circumstance which contrasted the disunity of the polis with the harmony, or unity, which Greek thinkers perceived in the cosmos.

The rivalry which characterized the internal affairs of the poleis was mirrored in the external relations between poleis. And the vast power of the Persian Empire loomed as a constant threat to the independent existence of the Greek world and, indeed, did upset the nature of the Greek inter-poleis arrangements. The Greeks saw warfare as the normal expression of rivalry between states:(7)

> ... in their very confrontations with one another, cities were brought together in a community united by its language, religion, customs, forms of social life and ways of thought ... The xenos was a partner in social intercourse.(8)

> The enemy is the stranger, ξένος . Yet this term also applies to the guest who is welcomed to the hearth to establish a link of hospitality between one house and another.(9)

This community of strife, this unity in and through rivalry, was upset by the pressure exerted from outside the Greek community by the Persian Empire.(10) Some poleis, such as Pindar's Thebes, surrendered in the face of the Persian invasions. Relations between these medizing poleis (those who joined the Persians) and those that carried out the successful struggle against the most powerful empire known were to remain strained for many years. Of equal importance, the success of such a large-scale inter-polis alliance as that which defeated Persia paved the way for the

alliances, hegemonic or voluntary, which thenceforth tended to dominate warfare within Greece. And even after its defeat by the Greek alliance, the sheer size and wealth of the Persian Empire continued to threaten the Greek world.

The three composers to be discussed in this chapter produced their work against this background of political instability, where within the polis faction was pitted against faction, and the scale of conflict between poleis was escalated. Yet the success of the struggle against the Persians engendered a euphoric self-confidence, particulary at Athens. The Greek capacity to control events appeared to have been demonstrated by the victory over the Mede (Persians).

III

SOME REMARKS ON PINDAR.(1)

Pindar, a composer who produced victory odes to celebrate the successes of aristocrats and tyrants, was born in Boeotian Thebes c.518 B.C.. An oligarchically-governed polis normally at emnity with Athens, Thebes medized before the battle of Salamis and fought against the Greeks at Plataia. During this period of Theban disgrace, Pindar sang the praises of Athens and its part in the defeat of the Persians. For this his fellow citizens fined him heavily. But Pindar also sang the praises of oligarchic Aigina, ally of Thebes and bitter enemy of democratic Athens, as well as

those of his own countrymen, while his most powerful and famous patrons were the Sicilians tyrants Hieron and Theron. Pindar's odes were celebrations of real events, written for perfomance. Most of the events singled out for his praise were the victories of aristocratic competitors in the various contests of music and athletics held at the religious games of Greece: the Olympic, Pythian, Nemean,and Isthmian games.(2)

If it were not for his praises of democratic Athens, Pindar could be presented as an unambiguous supporter of the traditional aristocratic élites. This may, in fact, still be the case, as the leaders of the Athenians during Pindar's lifetime all appear to have had aristocratic connections. The most we can say, given the evidence, is that Pindar praised forms of excellence and traditional notions about forms of excellence which appear to be more in tune with aristocratic values, as well as more achievable by aristocrats, than are compatible with the possibilities open to the "common people".

IV

SOME REMARKS ON THE BACKGROUND OF AESCHYLUS' ATHENS.(1)

"Aeschylus was a democrat who fought as well as wrote".(2) Born in Athens under the tyranny c.525 B.C., Aeschylus fought against the Persians at Marathon - and possibly at Salamis, as well - and is the earliest

playwright whose works have come down to us. He is said to have died in Sicily c.456 B.C.

As was noted in the previous chapter, Athens took no part in the early colonization of the Western Mediterranean and Black Sea areas. A probable cause for this lack of outward population movement was, in earliest times, the internal consolidation of the Athenian territory, Attica. Such a large land area was able to absorb a good deal of manpower, and there was silver to be mined in the hills to delay the ill-effects - social, economic, and political - which overpopulation created earlier in the rest of Greece. But eventually Athenian society, too, was on the brink of revolution. In 594 B.C., Solon, a eupatrid, "well-born", an "aristocrat", was appointed to devise means of bringing about a state of peace and order in the society. He is said to have cancelled debts, which may mean that he abolished the tributary status of the poorest smallholders to the large landowners.(3) Solon established the concept of isonomia, the equality of all citizens before the law, and divided the citizens into four income-based classes. The two highest classes could become archons, magistrates who were chosen by lot from an elected panel of candidates.(4) Ex-archons who satisfied the Heliaea, the popular court, as to their conduct in office, became life-members of the Areopagos, the governing body of the state.(5) A council of 400 members, the boule, from which the thetes, the lowest property class, was excluded,(6) prepared the business of

the ekklesia, the assembly of the whole citizen body.(7) The Heliaea was established to hear appeals from Areopagos decisions, appoint magistrates and judge their conduct.(8) By defining the political and legal rights of the non-eupatrid citizens, Solon had admitted an element of class-factionalism into the political life of the state.(9) By taking part in the government of the polis, the citizen body developed political skills and increased political responsibility and self-confidence.(10)

However, Solon's reforms did not heal the breach between the various factions. After a period of unrest (see above section 1) Peisistratos usurped the government and established a tyranny in 540 B.C.. Only the eupatrids lost political independence under the Peisistratids; Solon's constitution was maintained, and the demos, the citizen body, gained continuing political experience and confidence by their management of the ekklesia and the Heliaea.11 With the fall of the Peisistratids in 510 B.C., an eupatrid of the Alkmeonid clan, Kleisthenes, reorganized the state institutions. The new arrangements divorced most eupatrid families and their cult centres from their erstwhile clients in the voting political units.(12) Athenian successes in the Persian wars, particularly at Marathon (490 B.C.) and Salamis (483 B.C.), legitimated the "democratic" government and raised Athens to a status which rivalled Sparta's as the most powerful polis in Greece.

The plays of Aeschylus are a celebration and legitimation of the Athenian democracy and its institutions. It is in the work of Aeschylus that Peitho first appears in specific political contexts.

V

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PARMENIDES.(1)

The information that we possess for the life of Parmenides is scanty and derived from later sources: Plato, Parmenides, 127A; Diogenes Laertius, IX, 21-23; Strabo 6, (DK 28A12). Parmenides appears to have been born c.515 or 510 B.C.; he is said to have been taught by the poet and philosopher Xenophanes and one Ameinias, an otherwise unknown Pythagorean. Parmenides is said to have been a citizen of Elea, on the West coast of South Italy, and to have been its lawgiver.(2)

The population of Elea were Phokaians from Ionia. When the Persians subjugated the Ionian Greeks, the Phokaians fled to the west, where they found themselves facing similar aggression from the Etruscans and Carthaginians. Elea (Velia) was founded c.535 B.C. on the west coast of Italy south of modern Pompeii by Phokaian refugees from the Etruscan-Carthaginian alliance. Relatively isolated from the rest of the Greek world, possessed of little agricultural territory and at enmity with its neighbour, Paestum, Elea depended on its maritime trading interests for

prosperity and was under constant perceived threat of Lucanian encroachment.

Phokaia, the polis from which the Eleans derived, had originally been an ethnically-mixed population of traders. This ethnic mixture must have imposed restrictions on kinship alliances; such restrictions would have tended to keep the ethnic groups separate. Social tensions must have run high in a polis which lacked an interlacing kin-structure to channel them.

Born in the face of continual external aggression, Elea was set on the cultural frontier of the Greek world, without either the agricultural base or the traditions to support a landed aristocracy and a substantial peasantry. Threatened on one side by the Etruscans, on the other by Sybaris and, later, Kroton, it seems highly likely that pressures against the maintenance of the traditional Phokaian oligarchy would have been great, and the need for socio-political unity highly visible. It will be argued that the problem of containing violence, both internal and external, provides a key to the understanding of the philosophy of Parmenides.

VI

THE EVIDENCE IN PINDAR.

When Plutarch quoted the fragment from Alkman(1) which was discussed in the previous chapter he was discussing

the Roman goddess Fortuna, "Fortune", which he assimilated to the Greek Tyche, "Success". Plutarch contrasts Alkman's view of Tyche as a "sister" of Peitho - that is, as mutually interdependent conditions - with that of Pindar, to the effect that for Pindar Tyche is beyond Peitho: as Tyche is an arbitary and uncontrollable force it drives the ship of state wherever it will. Pepe's analysis of this passage asserts that in Pindar's thought

> It is precisely because fortune does not respond to persuasion that it is beyond the control of man. Persuasion is thus implicitly one of the chief means man has at his disposal to influence the external world.(2)

Pindar's extant work refers to Peitho four times. Fragment 122 refers to

> Oh, girls so kindly to all comers,
> Ministrants of the Love-Goddess Persuasion in rich Corinth,
> (Pindar, 122, Farnell)

Buxton, in reference to this passage, explains

> The allusion is to sacred prostitution in the temple of Aphrodite at Corinth. Erotic persuasion of the man by the woman is again under Peitho's tutelage.(3)

Pepe's analysis tells us

> there is not yet a clear distinction between the concept peitho and its personified verbal equivalent. These girls dispense peitho in that they arouse desire in men; they are servants of Peitho, since the goddess is the source of this power ... these girls attend on Peitho because they are prostitutes ...(4)

It is necessary to query Pepe's use of the word "dispense". It is not at all clear how Peitho can be "dispensed"; at any rate that is not what they are dispensing! Peitho is for

these prostitutes what it was for Hesiod's Pandora: the power to compel men to succumb to the girls' attractions.

Farnell's archaizing translation of Fragment 123 ends

> Meseemeth, then, that in Tenedos withal the
> Goddesses of Persuasion and of Grace have
> their habitations,
> Even in the son of Hagesilas.
> (Pindar, 123, Farnell)

In his Commentary, Farnell expresses the idea more prosaically

> ... "Persuasion and Charm have their abode in him". Peitho was the handmaiden of Aphrodite; and to say that Peitho as well as Charis dwells in Theoxenes is only to say that he persuades every one to love him ... it is consonant with Greek feeling to speak of divine powers that are personified abstractions taking up their abode in a man.(5)

Pindar wrote the poem as an expression of his love for the boy, Theoxenes, and as Buxton tells us,

> Peitho is a quality displayed by the boy: it describes an aspect of the influence he has over his older lover.(6)

while Pepe points out that Peitho is the power to arouse love in all but those who are impervious to love:

> Thus Peitho is an interior quality, residing in the person of extreme physical beauty and performing an erotic function(7)

Pindar's Pythian IV tells us how Aphrodite instructs Jason in magic

> that so he might rob Medea of her reverence
> for her parents, and that a longing for Hellas
> might lash her with the whip of Suasion,
> while her heart was all aflame.
> (Pindar, Pythian IV, 217-218, Sandys)

The "lash of Peitho" is a particularly vivid expression which prompts Buxton to say

> This is poetic imagery rather than an allusion to a traditional inconographical appurtenance of Peitho's; and it generates the satisfying frisson of oxymoron, since Peitho is normally opposed to force-compulsion.(8)

On the other hand, Pepe sees more in the passage than mere metaphor: the magical context highlights an irrational element in the conceptualization of Peitho.

> Another important aspect of Peitho in this passage is the total range of her powers; she is almost irresistible. ... There is an almost physical compulsion present as is indicated by the metaphorical whip of Peitho; Medea is driven by the power of an external force.(9)

In his Pythian IX, Pindar asserts, in reference to the proposed seduction of Kyrene by Apollo

> The keys to skilled persuasion
> in the sacred rites of love
> are secret ...
> (Pindar, Pythian IX, 39, Nisetich)

Again Buxton's analysis suggests mere literary imagery:

> The image, again poetical not iconographical, evokes the sense of intimacy where Peitho is at home.(10)

Pepe looks for the idea behind the metaphor:

> In this role Peitho is the custodian of love; it is her power which makes love possible.(11)

On balance, it would appear that Buxton is satisfied to take Pindar's use of Peitho as either obvious description or poetic imagery, without any attempt to extract further meaning from the context, as Pepe does. Although Pepe has managed to find a richer spectrum of meanings in Pindar's Peitho than Buxton, Buxton would surely not disagree with Pepe's conclusion:

> For Pindar, Peitho is still the personified goddess whose power is limited to an erotic context.(12)

This conclusion is somewhat surprising considering Pepe's comment on the Plutarch passage referred to at the beginning of this section.

VII

PEITHO IN PINDAR.

The similarity between Pindar's conception of Peitho and that concept of Peitho displayed by Hesiod in the context of the Pandora story is obvious: in erotic situations Peitho is the power, inherent in the object of love, which renders the subject obedient to the attractions of the object. Pindar does, however, provide, through the variety of his examples of Peitho-usage, a wider contextual background for Peitho than does Hesiod.

The Pythian IX passage - "wise Peitho's secret keys" - states that the capacity of possessing the power of Peitho is not to be used openly in erotic situations. It is noteworthy that on this occasion Peitho is not perceived as a characteristic of the object of love, but as a means of attaining that object. It may be that the sense of "Persuasion" for Peitho is stronger in this passage than in any of the examples so far examined.

"The whip of Peitho" in Pythian IV presents the Hesiodic perception of erotic Peitho in exceptionally strong

terms. The power of Peitho is again inherent in the object of love, in this case a man, Jason - note that Jason is for Medea a stanger with magical powers to arouse erotic interest* - and the power of Peitho is presented as an irresistible compulsion. The sense of "Persuasion" is subordinate to the sense of "Obedience".

Peitho is a quality inherent in the person of Pindar's beloved boy, Theoxenes; no action, no "persuasive" action, is performed. The poet is "obedient" to the attraction of the object of his love in Fragment 123.

The Corinthian prostitutes of Fragment 122 are also possessed of the power of Peitho, to whose cult they are professionally attached. Again, the power is inherent: the male customers are "obedient" to the power of the girls' erotic attractions.

If Plutarch's reading of Pindar in the comparison with Alkman (noted at the beginning of Section VI) is correct, it is plain that in Pindar's thought Peitho is not merely an erotic concept, but has a function within the state. It is also plain that for Pindar all the power of Peitho does not guarantee "Success".

To conclude, Peitho was perceived by Pindar as a quality to command obedience which is inherent in certain persons of either sex. Although this quality, this

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* As hypothesized in the observations on Hesiod's Peitho in chapter 2.

power, Peitho, may appear to those subject to its influence as an irresistible compulsion it is not infallible, being subject to the whim of Tyche, "Success". Peitho is also a power which can be deliberately exercised as a means to an end: a "persuasive" power.

VIII

THE EVIDENCE IN PARMENIDES.

The fragments of Parmenides' poem - there are 19, or 20 if Conford's fragment is accepted - are conventionally divided into three sections: the proem, or introduction, the "Way of Truth", and the "Way of Seeming". The proem describes Parmenides' journey in search of truth; the 'Way of Truth' describes the revelation of that truth, that is, the cosmos as it is perceived by the mind; and the 'Way of Seeming' describes the application of the revelation to the valid perception of the cosmos as it is perceived by sense-perception.

"The proem presents a revelation process with three stages",(1) as Miller tells us. The stages are the journeying, the passage through the gateway, and the reception by the goddess.

The proem begins with "the-man-who-knows" (Parmenides himself) mounted in a chariot which is carried by mares "on the much-speaking road of the goddess" "through all places".

The epic imagery used, which is derived from the Homeric vocabulary, invokes memories of the wanderings of the polymath, Odysseus, and the courage of Achilles. By means of "Odyssean and Achillean motifs" "a far-ranging quest for knowledge"(2) is described. Polypharnon, "much-speaking", is often connected with the assembly of the polis. The phrase "the much-speaking road of the goddess" can be interpreted in a number of ways. The quest for knowledge by means of speech might suggest that Parmenides developed his wisdom by observation of, and participation in, the assembly. It could refer to a long course of oral instruction with his (traditionally Pythagorean) teachers. The sense can also bear the interpretation that Parmemides was a bard who performed

> ... the epic recital being given in a city square as a regular civic performance attended by the populace who in the intervals of the recitation discuss the performance ... (3)

All three of these interpretations could be valid; they are not mutually exclusive. The journey "through all places" depicts the travels of an itinerant who taught at a number of poleis, was taught at a number of poleis, or took part in the assemblies of a number of poleis. The last possiblilty must be discarded: a person could only take part in the assembly of the polis in which he had citizenship. The second possibility does not accord with Parmenides' depiction of himself as "the-man-who-knows" while still on his journey. It is most likely that Parmenides was a

travelling teacher or bard who regarded his physical travels as being simultaneously a spiritual journey.

Guided by the Heliades, the philosopher reaches the gates of Day and Night, which are guarded by Dike, usually translated as "Justice". This latinization, which carries a notion of equity, obscures the Greek meaning of "Custom", in the sense of "Right","Normal Usage", or "in the natural manner of". Judgements in disputes were arrived at by ascertaining customary usage and applying it to particular circumstances. Parmenides' conceptualization of Dike has, however, some of the reciprocal notions of the English "justice": he tells us that "Dike, of much vengeance, holds rewarding keys" (Parmenides, 1,14) to the gates. The personification in this instance carries an emphasis on punishment for wrong-doing and also lays some stress on the notion of reward for merit. The Heliades persuade Dike to open the gates: "Right-Usage" rewards Parmenides' merit by permitting him to pass: Parmenides' quest is not frowned on by "Custom".

The gates of Day and Night are described with imagery recalling Hesiod's description of the gates of Tartaros (Hesiod, Theogony, 740 f.f.): the opening of the gates reveals a "gaping chasm". For Hesiod, the "chasm" revealed by the opening of the gates was an unintelligible, untrespassable limit; in Parmenides the gates "produce" the "chasm" - the gap between the twin doors - by their opening. The original epic formula - Hesiod's or a common source - is

used because of its poetic associations, but the term "chasm" now describes, not the region beyond the gates, but the space between the two open gates. Dike's function is to guard "the gates of the paths of Night and Day". (Parmenides, 1,12) Day and Nights are opposites. Their opposition is fundamental: one calls to mind the other. The two concepts are joined by their opposition. Day and Night, together in their opposition, fill the physical cosmos. The opposite of the cosmos is nothing: the "chasm". Parmenides dares the "chasm"; he passes through the gates and finds himself on a "broad way". (Parmenides, 1, 21-22). The "chasm" of Hesiod does not exist. The region beyond the gates is not nothing, it is the fundamental unity of Night and Day, set in the region beyond the physical cosmos. Dike is the guardian of the gateway between the sensible cosmos of appearances and the truth beyond. It is by means of Peitho that the Heliades obtain Parmenides' passage through the gates.

Beyond the gates Parmenides is greeted by an anonymous goddess. She states that Parmenides was sent on his journey by Themis, "Right Ordinance", or "Customary Law", and Dike, "Custom"; that is, Parmenides is the emissary of "Law" and "Justice", a judge or lawgiver. The goddess informs Parmenides that it is necessary for him to learn "all things", (Parmenides 1, 29) "truth" as well as "opinions". The coupling of "truth" and "opinions" with the adversitive emen ...ede, "as well as", indicates the same kind of

opposition and complementation between "opinions" and "truth" as between Day and Night: the two notions share a fundamental unity. Parmenides must learn "how seeming things it was required acceptably that they be all indeed being" (Parmenides 1, 31-33). That is to say that appearances, even apparent illusion, must have reality; the word "acceptance" has the sense of "conforming to what is considered to be a norm".

The pivotal position of Dike as the controller of the link between the sensible cosmos and the truth of revalation shows Dike in the rôle of guardian of the unity of the cosmos, a proposition which may be re-stated as "justice is unity", and also that it is "just" that the road from sense-perception to mental perception be travelled. When the Heliades "beguile" Dike and use "skilful persuasion" - perhaps "skilfully cause obedience" - to cause Dike to open the gates, Dike is shown as being subject to Peitho. The passage also shows the act peitho as the result of the act "beguile": peitho and paraphasis, beguilement, are not synonymous. (See Chapter 2).

Parmenides' goddess states in Fragment 2 that the "chasm", the "not-is", is impossible. The opposite of a truth is another truth which both opposes and complements it, just as Day and Night are complementary opposites. There is no "false"; only "is" can be thought. Peitho, which had earlier caused Dike to open the way for Parmenides, is, in Fragment 2, asserted to "follow on truth"

(Parmenides 2,5), or "attends on truth". Mourelatos has shown that "attends" has the sense of "favours".(4) Truth is favoured by Peitho; that is, truth is persuasive. Truth, for Parmenides is the result of the investigation, and logical consideration, of data, produces Peitho. Peitho is, by definition, the product of reasoned argument.

An unnamed goddess is again introduced in Fragment 12: "the goddess who steers all things" (Parmenides 12, 3-4). The steerswoman may, perhaps, be identified with Aphrodite, on the evidence of her generative functions and because "Eros she devised, first of all the gods" (Parmenides, 13): Aphrodite is traditionally the mother of Eros. The steerswoman is the prime-mover of the sensible cosmos: "Parmenides sees it as a kind of aphrodisiac compulsion"(5), a description which is appropriate to Peitho as conceived by Hesiod and, in Parmenides' own time, by Pindar. The governor and moving principle of the sensible cosmos is the principle of commingling.

> In a similar vein Hesiod had made practically everything arise from matings and births, and had set up Eros as the great creative force. Next to the goddess of sexual union Parmenides places the god of sexual desire.(6)

The express identification of the steering-goddess is a problem, as is the identification of Parmenides' tutelary goddess. Two anonymous goddesses in one poem seems a little excessive: it would seem reasonable that we are meant to perceive only one deity, that Parmenides' instruct ress and the steerswoman are the same goddess.

The "much-speaking road of the goddess" leads to the gates of Day and Night, where Dike is "beguiled" as a precondition for becoming subject to Peitho. The goddess' account of the nature of the cosmos as it is perceived by the mind is specifically said to be "trustworthy", (Parmenides 8, 49) that is, truthful. "Peitho attends on truth" (Parmenides 2, 5). It does not seem unreasonable to identify Parmenides' goddess as Peitho. However, if the goddess is Peitho, why is she not expressly named, and what is her connection with the steerswoman? Why is the steerswoman also not expressly named, since she is evidently intended to be perceived as Aphrodite? Parmenides' precise use of language is abundantly evident, and two distinct unnamed deities in the same poem would be remarkably imprecise for any composer. To conclude that the goddesses are to be identified as one goddess seems justifiable. If the goddess is not expressly named we may conclude that this factor was intended to preserve some ambiguity. The ambiguity which springs most readily to mind is that between the functions of Aphrodite and Peitho in Hesiod's Works and Days, detailed in Chapter 2: Peitho is sometimes an aspect of Aphrodite. Parmenides' goddess is Aphrodite in her compulsive aspect, Aphrodite-Peitho, in fact. And for Parmenides, Aphrodite-Peitho has the dominant place in the ordering of the cosmos.

IX

PEITHO IN PARMENIDES' PHILOSOPHY.

The poleis of Magna Graecia were composed of citizens drawn from different parts of Greece as well as those of other ethnic origins; it seems reasonable that differing legal, social, and political mores would have provided causes for civil friction in addition to those occasioned by an unequal distribution of wealth and political power. And the poleis of Magna Graecia were constantly prey to civil violence.

Parmenides was a travelling teacher whose doctrine appears to be an answer to these problems. But first he has to establish his credentials. He travels "on the much-speaking road of the goddess"; that is, Parmenides claims religious sanction for his odyssey. The journey is not contrary to custom, as Dike permits Parmenides to pass the gates of Day and Night. Parmenides, in fact, claims to be the emissary of Law and Justice.

When the Heliades use peitho to cause Dike to open the gates of Day and Night, the sense of the passage bears the meaning "persuade" for Peitho: words are used to "talk over" Dike; since Dike does what is required, the sense of "obey" is still present. Importantly, the passage shows "Customary Justice" as subject to "Persuasion"; it is legitimate practice to use persuasion to influence the way

in which custom operates. And Peitho favours truth, that is, true arguments are persuasive ones. The denial of falsity, of the "not-is", coupled with the complementary-opposite status of "truth" and "opinion" implies that varying opinions are merely various versions of the truth; this relativity seems to mean that a common denominator can always be found to reconcile different opinions. "The-man-who-knows" has seen truth; he understands the fundamental unity which underlies differing opinions: the philosopher-lawgiver can reconcile opposing political positions and differing customs by demonstrating their basic unity. The true governor of the sensible cosmos is Aphrodite-Peitho, "she-who-causes-apparent-opposites-to-commingle". The way to social and political unity is Persuasion.

X

PEITHO IN THE ORESTEIA OF AESCHYLUS

The subject of this section is the rôle of Peitho in the three plays which comprise the Oresteia of Aeschylus: Agamemnon, Libation Bearers, and Eumenides. The study limits itself to an examination of the Oresteia because this trilogy is the only extant trilogy of Aeschylus that we have. Because the Aeschylean trilogy was a complete dramatic cycle, a study which focusses on a play such as Suppliants - which is the only surviving play of another trilogy - must inevitably leave us with the feeling that,

lacking the complete cycle, we may well have missed the point of the whole, or at least be coming to a conclusion from insufficient evidence.

This study will follow the assumption of Beck about the form of the Aeschylean trilogy. Beck claims that in

> the first play of an Aeschylean trilogy ... the code (the Greek moral code) always was violated(1)
> The second play of the trilogy, the play of punishment (of that transgression) ... also introduced a potential transgression, whose assessment set up the judgement scene of the third play(2)
> Both a judgement on the morality of the punishment and, at the very end of this third play, a 'harmony' prevails.(3)
> The persuasion to which oratory was host made a highly effective tool (for teaching the moral lesson) which always was the prelude to the homonoia and harmonia of his third play(4)

Beck claims that Aeschylus thought in a pattern in which homonoia - sameness of mind, agreement in sentiment, unity, unanimity - is achieved by persuasion.(5)

In the version of the story of Orestes told by Aeschylus, the death of Pelops had left two sons, Atreus and Thyestes, to dispute the succession. Pretending reconciliation, Atreus invited Thyestes to a feast, where Thyestes was served the flesh of his own murdered children. On discovering the crime, Thyestes cursed the House of Pelops. With the death of Atreus, the succession passed to his sons, Agamemnon and Menelaos, who were married to sisters, Helen and Klytaimestra. Paris, son of Priam of Troy, met Helen while visiting Menelaos and eloped with her, provoking the Trojan War. The Greeks, under Agamemnon's leadership, assembled at Aulis, but were delayed by a storm.

To abate the storm and procure a fair wind, Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter, Iphigeneia, whereupon the Greeks sailed for Troy. Klytaimestra began an affair with Aigisthos, a surviving son of Thyestes, sending her son, Orestes, out of the way to Phokis. The Greek sack of the Trojan temples on the successful completion of the ten-year Trojan War angered the gods. The Agamemnon tells the story of Agamemnon's return and murder by Klytaimestra and her paramour, Aigisthos. The Libation Bearers tells of Orestes' return and revenge-killing of his mother and Aigisthos with the assistance of his sister, Elektra. The Eumenides follows Orestes, pursued by his mothers' avenging spirits, the Erinyes, as he flees to Delphi for purification; regarding the purification as invalid, the Erinyes continue to har ass Orestes until, at the Athenian court of the Areopagos, founded at this instance by Athena, he is tried for matricide and acquitted.

The first use of Peitho in the Agamemnon is at line 86. In response to the beacon which signals the return of Agamemnon, fires of sacrifice have been lit at the altars of the gods. The Chorus asks Klytaimestra

> What message used its Persuasion to make you
> order sacrifice throughout the city?
> (Agamemnon, 85-87, Lebeck)

The lines imply the possibility that the message is false, and the "persuasion" may therefore be towards an end-result which is unwarranted by the "true" circumstances.

At 105-106, the Chorus, referring to itself, explains that, to quote Thomson,

> an old man cannot fight, but he can sing
> ... Hence his prowess is prowess, not in fighting,
> but in singing; it consists, not of Bia,
> but of Πειθώ (6)

They sing:

> since still my age, inspired of the gods, breatheth
> upon me Persuasion, the strength of song
> (Agamemnon, 105-106, Smyth)

That is to say that the quality, which is inherent in a song, that moves an audience, is the power of Peitho.

Pepe says of our next example

> In the Agamemnon there appears for the first time a definitely bad type of peitho, i.e. the factor of persuasion enters into the psychology of human evil. This does not mean that the previous literary treatment of peitho had envisioned it as a completely beneficent phenomenon. Removed from an active context, peitho stands as a bascially undifferentiated and ambivalent concept. Although it was a divine person, its efficacy and direction were at the discretion of individual thinkers who did not feel themselves constrained to embrace any canonical form of the idea.(7)

In short, Pepe asserts Peitho to have been, before Aeschylus composed the Agamemnon, a value-neutral concept. This matter will be taken up below. Pepe's statement refers to lines about Paris of Troy and his abduction of Helen: Pepe gives the relevant lines as

> Force is employed by Peitho the persistent,
> irresistible child of her whose planning
> brings out the preliminary decree, Ate. ("Ruin")
> All remedy is in vain.
> (Agamemnon, 385-387, Fränkel)

The Loeb edition gives

> No, he is driven on by perverse Temptation, the

> overmastering child of designing Destruction;
> and remedy is utterly in vain.
> (Agamemnon, 385-387, Smyth)

Buxton provides

> Baneful Peitho, irresistible child of Ruin-who-plans-beforehand,
> forces him.
> (Agamemnon, 385-386, Buxton)

"Temptation" is a common translation for Peitho in these lines. Buxton would have it that here we have "deception masquerading as peitho".(8) Pepe, more perceptively, connects this new genealogy for Peitho with

> the fragment of Alkman which made Peitho a daughter of Prometheia. In one case she is the child of forethought, in the other of fore-planning infatuation. In both cases she is subservient to a power which charts the course of the future, selects a course of action, and entrusts its execution to Peitho.(9)

To sum up the argument, Smyth implies, by translating Peitho as "Temptation" rather than the conventional "Persuasion", that we have a different concept here; Buxton sees the passage as "an exemplification of the divine power of Ate" ("Ruin")(10) and "Peitho the child of Ruin" as a different concept from "healing Peitho"(11); Pepe settles for a value-free Peitho, a persuasive act between two individuals which can be for good or for ill, where the act of being persuaded, of allowing oneself to be persuaded, is undertaken from a moral choice.(12)

In Hesiod, Peitho has a general function, being linked with other deities to conditions of human well-being; Alkman's Peitho is essentially similar; in Anakreon (noted in Chapter 3) Peitho may not be a force for good, but the

context of the fragment is lost. Contemporary to Aeschylus, Peitho is a force for good in Parmenides, and has no unfavourable connotations in Pindar. There appears to be little basis for Pepe's "bascially undifferentiated and ambivalent concept". On the other hand, it seems fair to assume that when Aeschylus says "Peitho" he does not mean "Deception" or some-such - for which there are other words in Greek - but means to use the word as it was generally understood. On balance, Pepe would appear to have the right of it: a person can be "persuaded" to do good or to do wrong; Peitho can act at the behest of either Promathia or of Ate, as well as of Aphrodite.

At 942, Klytaimestra is attempting to talk Agamemnon into an act of hubris: entering the palace over a "red carpet" of purple fabrics, thus treading valuable cloths underfoot. She says: pithou, "obey", "be persuaded". Agamemnon chooses to give way. The usage here follows the Homeric meaning of peitho-words.

In the Libation-Bearers, the chorus, in alliance with Orestes in the deception of Klytaimestra and the Nurse, calls on various powers:

> Now is the time for tricky Peitho to join in the contest,
> and for Hermes, god of earth's depths and of the night,
> to watch over these struggles with a sword.
> (Libation-Bearers, 726-729, Buxton)

Again Peitho is used to cause someone to act against their best interest: the Nurse delivers a misleading message and Aigisthos and Klytaimestra die at the hand of Orestes.

Orestes, fleeing his mother's Erinyes, the "Furies" who pursue kin-slayers, takes sanctuary at Delphi at the temple of Apollo, who instructs Orestes to go to Athens. The Court of the Areopagos is founded by Athena for the purpose of trying Orestes - and subsequent murder cases - and Orestes is acquitted of matricide on the grounds that the killing of Klytaimestra was justifiable retribution for the murder of Agamemnon and that there is no kin-relationship between mother and child. The Erinyes stand for the rule of vendetta, the blood-feud; Athena stands for trial by jury, the democratic administration of justice. Aeschylus uses Peitho to reconcile the two principles.

The Erinyes are outraged by Orestes' acquittal, claiming that traditional laws have been dishonoured. Athena promises the Erinyes a place in the new order as the retributive principle underlying the justice of the polis. Blinded by their anger, the Erinyes threaten the sterility of the land which is the traditional consequence of the failure to observe traditional law. Athena enjoins them to "be persuaded by me" (794 and again at 829). Finally Athena invokes Peitho directly:

> But if thou holdest sacred the majesty of Suasion,
> the soothing appeasement and spell of my tongue
> (Eumenides, 885-886, Smyth)

The Erinyes are persuaded, and become the Eumenides, the Kindly Ones. Athena, in gratitude, cites the power that enabled the conversion:

> I am grateful to Suasion that her glance kept
> ever watch o'er my tongue and lips when

> I encountered their fierce refusal.
> (Eumenides, 970-972, Smyth)

Peitho has successfully reconciled the retributive principle of personal vendetta with the deliberative ascertainment of guilt or innocence of the democratic jury.

XI

COMMENTS ON THE CONCEPTION OF PEITHO IN THE ORESTEIA.

Beck tells us

> ... Peitho (Persuasion), who was entirely evil and deceitful in the Agamemnon, becomes in the Eumenides a beneficent and wholesome power wielded by Athena ...(1)

This is something of an oversimplification. The first occurrence of Peitho in the Agamemnon (85-87, cited above) implies that Peitho does not always attend on truth, that one could be "persuaded" of something which is false. The second occurrence (Agamemnon 105-106, cited above) is value-neutral, merely telling us that Peitho is what makes a song's "message" convincing. At Agamemnon 385-387 (cited above) we do find Peitho being used for evil and deceitful ends. The irresistible compulsion attributed to Peitho recalls Pindar's "lash of Peitho" (Pindar, Pythian IV, 217-218); the genealogy, descent from Ate, when one recalls the other genealogies attributed to Peitho, tells us how the Greeks at this period regarded their deities.

The genealogy given to a deity is an attempt to describe a relationship between that deity and the other

deities cited in the genealogy. Greek deities were conditions and processes which were perceived as affecting the human condition: Zeus, the storm-god, Poseidon, the earthquake-god, Aphrodite, the goddess of sexual conjunction - and, by extension, of all joining and mixture - are examples. Since the deities were often concepts, such as Metis, "Wisdom", or Dike, "Justice", the genealogies of these deities did not form an immutable religious canon, but were perceptions of relationships between such concepts. Peitho the child of Promathia, "Forethought", and Peitho the child of Ate, "Ruin-who-plans-beforehand", and Peitho the attendant of Aphrodite, "Joining through Intercourse" is always still Peitho, "She-who-causes-one-to-obey-without-physical-coercion". Where Aphrodite operates through Peitho, the conjunction of different bodies is accomplished without Bia, "Violence": in erotic context, without rape. Where Promathia operates through Peitho, the premeditated course of action is accomplished with "good order" and "success". Where Ate operates through Peitho, the premeditated course of action results in disaster for the one on whom Peitho operates. But whatever motivates Peitho, Peitho is perceived as a powerful process affecting the human condition. Beck is simply wrong: Peitho is not entirely evil and deceitful in the Agamemnon, but is used for evil ends at 943 (cited above) subsequent to having been characterized as capable of being so employed at 385-387 (cited above).

When Peitho is invoked in the Libation-Bearers, (726-729, cited above) she is deceitful but used to accomplish a justifiable end: retribution on the murderers of Agamemnon. If the act of retribution had been finally judged to be a transgression of the moral code - as it was not - then the means to attaining the act, Peitho, might have been characterized as "evil"; as the text stands, Peitho is here said to be merely "tricky", value-neutral because the moral validity of the retribution is not, at this point in the trilogy, clear. The clarification comes in the Eumenides.

In the Eumenides the moral validity of the act of retribution of the Libation-Bearers is justified. Subsequently, the political control of the administration of justice in a democratic polis is reconciled with traditional retributive justice by means of Peitho, who is fêted by Athena (Eumenides, 970-972, cited above). Peitho is portrayed as a force for positive good, in resolving potentially agonistic situations.

XII

CONCLUSION.

In the early-fifth-century compositions of Pindar, Parmenides, and Aeschylus we have, for the first time, a basis for comparing the concept of Peitho expressed by three contemporary composers with each other and with earlier tradition.

Pindar's conception of Peitho is, in essentials, that of Hesiod, showing that the traditional conception of Peitho was still a conventional view at this period. Pindar was a performing poet who promulgated the traditional values of his society; he does not appear to have posed questions, or provided answers, about how the cosmos was organised, or how society should govern itself. He was content to express the mores which were accepted as norms by his patrons. Pindar perceived Peitho as an inherent quality of certain persons to command attention, a "charisma,"* an ability to compel obedience in those persons subject to its influence. To the person who is the object of Peitho's power, Peitho is perceived as an irresistible compulsion, although it is not, in fact, necessarily successful. And in Pindar we meet with Peitho as a means of achieving a desired end: a "persuasive" means.

In Parmenides, too, Peitho is a deliberately-exercized means of achieving an end: justice can be influenced by persuasion, which is the power inherent in truth. Following Hesiod, Parmenides portrayed Peitho as a cosmic power beneficial to mankind, but Parmenides raised Peitho to the status of the overall governor of the sensible cosmos; Peitho causes the things of the sensible world to have

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* Following The Concise Oxford Dictionary: "a divinely conferred power or talent; capacity to inspire followers with devotion and enthusiasm".

the appearance that they do. Peitho is a universal principle governing the physical world and the affairs of humankind. This appeal to an overarching norm of "persuasion" was probably a response to the omnipresent bia, "violence", in Magna-Graecian political life. Parmenides' emphasis on Peitho is certainly in contrast to the absence of concepts involving violence or the implication of violence in his work.

The place of Aphrodite-Peitho as the dominant deity of Parmenides is taken by Zeus in Aeschylus, and Athena is, in the Oresteia, the representative of Zeus. Peitho is the means by which Athena operates. Aeschylus attempted to reconcile the opposing values of a society which was changing its political and social norms and knew it. Within a period of 100 years, Athens had moved from traditional aristocratic rule to "popular" aristocratic rule (tyranny) to middle-class democracy. Peitho, in Aeschylus, is the means by which opposing claims about how the society should conduct its affairs can be reconciled. Which brings the Peitho of Aeschylus very close indeed to the Peitho of Parmenides.

It is in the early 5th century that Peitho has become a political concept, a means of solving political problems. It is in the early 5th century that Peitho is first used in contexts which consistently allow the word to be rendered as "Persuasion" in English. This meaning co-exists with the older meaning of the power to command obedience which is an

inherent quality of certain persons. There is a serious problem involved in these conceptualizations:

> If nothing can be denied to Peitho, how can the person who acts under persuasion he said to act willingly? This problem ... was picked up by Gorgias and became one of the seminal ideas of his own theory of rhetoric.(1)

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 4

II

1 Buxton, R.G.A., Persuasion in Greek Tragedy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p.16.

2 Thomson, G., Aeschylus and Athens, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1973, p.42.

3 Ibid., pp.40-41.

4 Ibid., pp.71-72.

5 Ibid., p.40.

6 Ibid., p.90.

7 Vernant, J.P., Myth and Society in Ancient Greece, (Tr. Lloyd, J.) London, Metheun, 1982, p.19.

8 Ibid., p.30.

9 Ibid., p.20.

10 Ibid., pp.32-33.

III

1 This section is based on the account given in - Nisetich, R.J., Pindar's Victory Songs, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1980, pp.7-12.

2 For a description of this type of festival see - Finley, M.I. & Pleket, H.W., The Olympic Games. The First Thousand Years, New York, Viking Press, 1965.

IV

1 This section is indebted to a large number of general histories of Greece, all of which rely on the same sources and are too numerous to cite here. Particularly useful for its critical outline of the sources, was - Sealey, R., A History of the Greek City States

ca. 700-338 B.C., Berkely, University of California Press, 1976, pp.89-92.

2 Thomson, op. cit., p.1.

3 Forrest, W.G., The Emergence of Greek Democracy, London, World University Library, 1966, p.168.

4 Bury, J.B. History of Greece, London, MacMillan, 1951, p.186.

5 Woodhead, A.G., "ΙΣΗΓΟΡΙΑ and the Council of 500" in Historia, V.16, 1967, p.131.

6 Bury, op. cit. p.185.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., p.184.

9 Burn, A.R., The Pelican History of Greece, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974, p.123.

10 Forest, op. cit., p.172.

11 Ibid., p.182.

12 Ibid., pp.198-200.

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Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E., & Schofield, M., The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp.263-265.

VI

1 Babbit, F.C., Plutarch's Moralia, Vol. IV, "On the Fortune of the Romans", London, Heinemann, 1936, p.331.

2 Pepe, G.M., Studies in Peitho, Ph.D thesis, Princeton University, 1966, p.148.

3 Buxton, op. cit., p.37.

4 Pepe, op. cit., p.150.

5 Farnell, L.R., Critical Commentary to the Works of Pindar, Amsterdam, Adolf M. Hakkert, 1961, p.443.

6 Buxton, op. cit., pp.39-40.

7 Pepe, op. cit., p.149.

8 Buxton, op. cit., p.40.

9 Pepe, op. cit., p.154.

10 Buxton, op. cit.

11 Pepe, op. cit., p.152.

12 Ibid. p.154.

VIII

1 Miller, M.H. (Jr.) "Parmenides and the Disclosure of Being" in Apeiron, Vol. XIII, No. 1, 1979, p.13.

2 Ibid.

3 Havelock, E.A., The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences, Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp.243-244.

4 Mourelatos, A.P.D., The Route of Parmenides, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970, pp.158-160.

5 Fränkel, H., Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, (Tr. Hadus, M., & Willis, J.) Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975, p.362.

6 Ibid.

X

1 Beck, R.H., Aeschylus: Playwright Educator, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, p.17.

2 Ibid., p.20.

3 Ibid., p.XII

4 Ibid., p.40.

5 Ibid., p.143.

6 Thomson, G., The Oresteia of Aeschylus, Amsterdam, Adolf M. Hakkert, 1966, p.17.

7 Pepe, op. cit., p.192.

8 Buxton, op. cit., p.105 f.f.

9 Pepe, p.193.

10 Buxton, p.108.

11 Ibid., p.113.

12 Pepe, p.199.

XI

1 Beck, op. cit., p.39.

XII

1 Pepe, op. cit., pp.173-174.

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TRANSLATIONS:

Translator's names are given where the lines are quoted in the chapter. Publication details may be found in the Bibliography. For Parmenides, so much controversy surrounds the translation and explication of almost every word, that I found that I could not accept any English version in its entirety, and so presumed to do my own translation of the appropriate lines.

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The sections on Parmenides draw heavily on this previous work. However, reflection on the problems over time has altered my perspectives, amplifying some points and changing others. For example, a crucial issue: in the 1985 work I denied the assimilation of Aphrodite and Peitho in Parmenides' thought; I now argue for Peitho, in some contexts, to be an aspect of Aphrodite rather than a distinct phenomenon. In effect, working from the same data, I now reach different conclusions.

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CHAPTER 5

SOME COMMENTS ON EMPEDOKLES.

I

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Empedokles was a Sicilian Greek, a somewhat younger contemporary of Parmenides, whose pupil the tradition asserts him to have been. The traditional biography of Empedokles is ably summarized by Guth rie, Kirk and Raven, and Wright.(1) Briefly, the tradition informs us that Empedokles was a philosopher-sage, seer, wonder-worker, and a democrat involved in the struggle against tyranny and oligarchy.

Magna Graecia generally, including Sicily, was politically unstable in the 5th century B.C. Tyrannies rose and fell, being replaced by oligarchies or democracies. The internal political tensions created by the constant manoeuvering of would-be "leaders of the people" to attain autocratic political power in conflict with both the proponents of oligarchical rule and the supporters of democracy exacerbated the tensions between the various sections of the community. The inter-polis connections of the aristocracy and the increasing gulf between rich and poor in these economically prosperous communities probably contributed to the endemic political instability.(2)

II

THE LIFE OF EMPEDOKLES.

Kirk and Raven provide a most concise summary of the tradition which surrounds the life of Empedokles:

> Empedocles, like Pythagoras and Heraclitus, was a favourite subject for apocryphal biographical tales. A considerable number of them, drawn from numerous sources, are preserved by Diogenes. For the most part they are concerned either with his political activities or with his death, and it is the former group alone which may perhaps contain a germ of truth. He is said to have been an ardent democrat, to have broken up some otherwise unknown organization called the Thousand, and to have refused the king-ship of his city (see Diogenes Laertius VIII, 66 and 63, DK31AI). Here at least we do seem to have something other than a misguided embellishment of his own words in his poems; indeed we might almost conclude from his poems that his views were aristocratic rather than democratic. It would be unwise, however, to accept even these stories at their face value; they do no more than testify to a probably genuine tradition that as a democrat he took a leading part in the politics of his city. He was evidently also an accomplished orator: Aristotle, in his lost dialogue Sophist, apparently called him the inventor of rhetoric (Diog. L. VIII 57, DK31AI), and Gorgias is said to have been his pupil. Finally, his fame as a doctor, which is suggested by his own words in fragment 112, is proved by the numerous references to him in later medical writings.(1)

Empedokles' floruit was probably about the middle of the 5th century B.C.

III

THE POEMS OF EMPEDOKLES.

Fragments of two of Empedokles poems survive. The poem conventionally entitled On Nature is a cosmology, while that known as the Purifications is concerned with the soul. There is considerable scholarly conflict about the relationship between the thought of the two poems, a controversy which is effectively outlined by Guthrie(1) and summarized by Kirk and Raven:

> On the basis of the fragments alone it is possible to reconstruct the system of Empedocles with greater confidence than most of the Presocratic philosophers allow. The chief difficulty in his case is of quite a different order. Whereas the poem On Nature is primarily concerned to give a physical explanation of the universe and its contents, and in the process seems to leave no room for an immortal soul, the Purifications is based upon the Pythagorean belief in transmigration. The resulting conflict between the two poems has been resolved, in modern times, in a variety of ways. While some scholars, including both Zeller and Burnet, are content to conclude that Empedocles held simultaneously beliefs that are not only incompatible but actually contradictory, others have argued that the two poems must belong to separate stages of Empedocles' life ... while the former of these two views is far preferable to the latter, it still lays undue stress upon the alleged incompatibility of the two poems.(2)

The dependence of Empedokles' work on the thought of Parmenides is well-displayed by Guthrie(3) and concisely expressed by Kirk and Raven:

> ... Empedocles was not only complying with the Parmenidean canons but doing so consciously and deliberately. It might even be maintained that

> this compliance is the basis of Empedocles' system; for these few fragments, besides affording an eloquent indication of Empedocles' dependence on Parmenides, can be made to serve also as an introduction to his cosmology.
>
> Parmenides had maintained that reality cannot come from unreality nor plurality from an original unity. Empedocles meets both demands simultaneously. There never was, he replies, an original unity; there were rather four eternally distinct substances, Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis, or Fire, Air, Earth and Water. These between them fill the whole of space, leaving no place in the universe for the non-existent void. All things consist of these elements, or irreducible forms of matter, in various proportions. When a thing is said to come into existence or to perish, all that has really happened is that one temporary combination of these indestructible elements has been dissolved and another been established. Change in fact is nothing but a re-arrangement; and to account for the motion in space which alone could effect such a reshuffling, two motive forces, Love and Strife, take their place along with the elements as the only ultimate realities. So all four of the Parmenidean demands are duly met, and already, in meeting them, Empedocles has evolved the essentials of his system. In following his cosmology through the peculiar cycle which he imposed upon it, we shall be merely filling in the details of an outline that has already emerged.(4)

This study will accept the view of Kirk and Raven that there is little, if any, "incompatability" between the two poems. The study will assert that Empedokles is concerned, in part, to re-state and clarify Parmenides' views as expressed in the "Way of Seeming".

Empedokles wrote in the epic tradition, in epic hexameters. His composition is, however, freer and less forced than Parmenides'; the sage appears to have had less difficulty in expressing himself than Parmenides, whose language is notoriously difficult and obscure.

IV

EMPEDOKLES AND PARMENIDES.

Contemporary scholarship is unanimous in ascribing, as a fundamental difference between Empedokles and Parmenides, the former's faith in the validity of sense-perception as a reliable guide to the truth and the latter's supposed rejection of that path to knoweldge. So, Guthrie:

> Parmenides' outright condemnation of the senses is countered by the claim that all alike are aids to knowledge and none is to be preferred.(1)

Also, Kirk and Raven:

> One of the first questions Empedocles had to tackle was whether or not the senses are a reliable guide to the truth. In these important verses, which are shown by the rest of the fragment to come from the introduction to the poem, he is as deliberately contradicting Parmenides as he is elsewhere obeying him. Clearly the sort of cosmology on which he is about to embark demands, as indeed any cosmology must, faith in the validity of sense-perception. So far, therefore, from following Parmenides in his condemnation of the senses, he instructs his readers to make full but discriminating use of them, taking care to employ each sense for the appropriate purpose.(2)

This assertion of a contradiction of Parmenides by Empedokles is open to some criticism: it will be remembered that it was shown above that Parmenides did not reject the validity of sense-perception. When Parmenides spoke of "how seeming things it was required acceptably that they be all

indeed being" (Parmenides 1, 31-33) - that is, appearances must have reality - he was asserting the validity of sense-perception. Parmenides merely asserted that the intellectual perception of "is" was a necessary condition for an understanding of the sensible cosmos. When Empedokles states that

> It is impossible for there to be a coming into existence from that which is not, and for what exists to be completely destroyed cannot be fulfilled, nor is to be heard of; for when and where it is thrust, then and there it will be.
> (Empedokles, 12 (8), Wright)

he is affirming Parmenides' conclusion about the nature of "is" in the "Way of Truth". Since scholars who have asserted that Parmenides denied the validity of sense-perception are manifestly incorrect, it is also manifestly incorrect to perceive Empedokles' positive assertion of the validity of sense-perception as a contradiction of the Parmenidean position. Empedokles is re-stating the Parmenidean position in terms which are less difficult and obscure than Parmenides' own compositions. Where Parmenides - as is affirmed by the scholarly consensus on his style - was dependent on traditional epic imagery, or re-workings of it, for his composition, Empedokles appears to have been relieved of many of such formal constraints on the langauge available to him, possibly by the increasing use of written language by the time of his floruit.

Empedokles was less concerned to explain the intellectual perception of the cosmos, Parmenides' "Way of Truth", than he was concerned to explain the cosmos as

perceived by the senses: Parmenides "Way of Seeming". And here Empedokles does differ from Parmenides, in that he replaces, as the basic stuff of the cosmos, Parmenides' phenomena, "Light" and "Night", with the substances, "Fire", "Water", "Earth", and "Air". For Parmenides, the proposition that the cosmos was an unchanging unity would only be maintained if the changes which are perceived in the sensible cosmos were only apparent, a function of phenomena rather than substances. For Empedokles, the essential unity of the physical cosmos could be maintained if his four elements could be shown to be indestructable, neither perishing nor coming-into-existence; as Parmenides had shown that becoming and passing-away were logically impossible, Empedokles had merely to re-state Parmenides' proof:

> A twofold tale I shall tell: at one time it grew to be one only from many, and at another again it divided to be many from one. There is a double birth of what is mortal, and a double passing away; for the uniting of all things brings one generation into being and destroys it, and the other is reared and scattered as they are again being divided. And these things never cease their continual exchange of position, at one time all coming together into one through love, at another again being borne away from each other by strife's repulsion. (So, insofar as one is accustomed to arise from many) and many are produced from one as it is again being divided, to this extent they are born and have no abiding life; but insofar as they never cease their continual exchange, so far they are forever unaltered in the cycle.
>
> But come, hear my words, for learning brings an increase of wisdom. Even as I said before, when I was stating the range of my discourse, a twofold tale I shall tell: at one time it grew to be one only from many, and at another again it divided to be many from one - fire and water and earth and measureless height of air, with pernicious strife apart from these, matched (to them) in every

> direction, and love among them, their equal in length and breadth. Contemplate her with the mind, and do not sit staring dazed; she is acknowledged to be inborn also in the bodies of men, and because of her their thoughts are friendly and they work together, giving her the name Joy, as well as Aphrodite. No mortal has perceived her as she whirls among them; do you though attend to the progress of my argument, which does not mislead.
>
> All these are equal and of like age, but each has a different prerogative, and its particular character, and they prevail in turn as the time comes round. Moreover, nothing comes to birth later in addition to these, and there is no passing away, for if there were continuously perishing they would no longer exist. And what would increase this whole, and from where would it come? How would it be completely destroyed, since nothing is without them? No, these are the only real things, but as they run through each other they become different objects at different times, yet they are throughout forever the same.
> (Empedokles, 8, 17, Wright)

That is to say, all perceptible things are composed of the four elements, each thing being composed of these elements in differing proportions. The four elements together, in their entirety, form the one, the cosmos. The cosmos cannot, following Parmenides, increase or decrease, it cannot become greater or less than itself, so neither can its constituent elements come-into-being or pass-away.

It is necessary to note that the prime movers of the sensible cosmos were conceived by Empedokles to be Aphrodite, "Love", and Neikos, "Strife". Aphrodite is responsible for the mixture, or joining-together of the elements in order to form the objects which are perceptible in the sensible world, while Neikos is responsible for the disintegration of the objects of the sensible world into the

basic elements. In other words, Aphrodite is responsible for apparent coming-into-existence, while Neikos is responsible for apparent passing-away. There is, in Parmenides' thought, a complete absence of concepts involving violence or the implication of violence. For Empedokles, Neikos is as necessary to the function of the sensible cosmos as is Aphrodite. For Parmenides, all the appearances of the sensible world are the responsibility of Aphrodite-Peitho: "the goddess who steers all things" (Parmenides, 12). Compare Empedokles:

> ... from the combining of water, earth, air and sun came the forms and color of mortal things which have now arisen, fitted together by Aphrodite.
>
> (Empedokles, 60, (71) Wright)

It is apparent that Parmenides' steerswoman and the Aphrodite of Empedokles are the same figure with the same general functions, except that Empedokles has added Neikos to his schema to explain death, decay and dissolution. The Aphrodite-Peitho of Parmenides is the Aphrodite of Empedokles. For Parmenides, one prime mover is sufficient for the sensible cosmos and the objects of the sensible cosmos are mere appearance caused by the mixture of the phenomena, "Light" and "Night". Empedokles, however, held that his cosmos, where

> There is no part of the whole that is empty or overfull
>
> (Empedokles, 10 (13) Wright)

and the elements, themselves neither coming-into-being nor passing-away,

> When they have been mixed in the form of a man and come to the air, or in the form of the race of wild animals, or of plants, or of birds, then people say that this is to be born, and when they separate, they call this again ill-fated death ... (Empedokles, 13 (9), Wright)

fulfilled the conditions of the Parmenidean "is". The addition of a second prime-mover does not affect the integrity of Empedokles' model and explains, in terms at once physical and moral, how the substances of the elements act together to produce the formation and dissolution of the things of the sensible cosmos. Parmenides held that "persuasive truth" was a sufficient condition for unity and "Strife" has no place in his cosmos. For Empedokles, the function of "Love" is to join things; the function of "Strife" is to force things apart. Aphrodite, the Aphrodite-Peitho of Parmenides, is responsible for unity; Neikos is responsible for disunity. Both are motivating forces in Empedokles' cosmos. And these motivating forces are not value-neutral: the sage refers to "strife's hates" (Empedokles, 16, Wright), "evil strifes" (Empedokles, 26, Wright), "perfect love" (Empedokles, 47, Wright), "baneful strife" (Empedokles, 77, Wright), "the perfect harbours of Aphrodite" (Empedokles, 83, Wright). Neikos is the "bad" principle of the cosmos, Aphrodite is the "good" principle.

Against Parmenides' notion that "persuasive truth" could bring "justice and law" to men, Empedokles, more realistically, regarded "Strife" as a necessary evil. Both, however, celebrate the positive power of Aphrodite-Peitho.

V

CONCLUSIONS.

There is only one reference to Peitho in Empedokles:

> It is not possible to bring (the divine) close within reach of our eyes or to grasp him with the hands, by which the broadest path of Persuasion for men leads to the mind.
> (Empedokles, 96 (133) Wright)

Here Empedokles states that the divine can only be grasped intellectually, unlike other knowledge, which is more easily comprehended, as it is based on data provided by sensory perception. "Peitho" is used to describe the process of coming-to-understand. This view of Peitho recalls Parmenides: "Persuasion attends on truth" (Parmenides, 2, 5): it demonstrates that for Empedokles, as for Parmenides, Peitho is the power to convince by logical argument. Since for the Greeks at this time, it was not regarded as possible to "know" a falsehood, as Guthrie reports(1), Peitho is connected only with "true" propositions for Empedokles. Of Aphrodite, Empedokles says:

> ... Contemplate her with the mind.
> (Empedokles, 8 (17) Wright)

That is, Aphrodite is the divine, unknowable by sensory perception. Peitho is "true argument" by means of which "truth" is grasped, or an aspect of truth; the relationship is similar to Peitho as an aspect of Aphrodite in Hesiod. And it was shown above that the Aphrodite of Empedokles is

to be identified with the "steerswoman" of Parmenides. The Hesiodic Aphrodite-Peitho is the prime-mover of Empedokles' cosmos. However, it must be stressed that Peitho is an aspect of Aphrodite. Perhaps the notion should properly be expressed as, Peitho is the way in which Aphrodite acts: Peitho is not a synonym for Aphrodite. Empedokles employs a number of synonyms for Aphrodite: Kypris, "Cyprus" - Aphrodite's traditional place of origin; Philotes, "Friendship"; Gethosuné, "Joy"; and Harmonia, "Union". Peitho is conceived as a power inherent in the concept of Aphrodite. It may, then, be concluded in summary, that the prime-mover of Empedokles' cosmos is to be identified with the prime-mover of Parmenides' cosmos, and that Peitho is an important characteristic of that prime-mover.

It remains to discuss the political implications of Empedokles' philosophy, bearing in mind the received tradition that Empedokles had a bias in favour of democracy, and also recalling that, as Guthrie says:

> ... for Empedokles the moral and religious order was as important as the physical ...(2)

It was shown above that Empedokles' prime-movers. Aphrodite and Neikos, are far from being value-free concepts: Aphrodite is "good"; Neikos is "bad". Applying these concepts to the political institutions of Empedokles' period, it is possible to reconstruct the reasoning behind his political attitude.

Tyranny and oligarchy are politically divisive: in a tyranny the full means to political decision-making are

restricted to one person only, the tyrant, while in an oligarchy the full means to political decision-making are monopolized by an élite group. Under both systems of government the bulk of the populace are excluded from the means to political decision - making. The polis is divided into those with political power and those without: the polis demonstrates a state of political disunity. The underlying fundamental power causing disunity, Neikos, is "bad". Therefore, tyranny and oligarchy are "bad". On the other hand, democracy gives full political rights to all citizens*, and no citizen is excluded from the means to political decision-making. All citizens are politically equal; there is only one political class: the polis exhibits a state of unity. The underlying fundamental power causing unity, Aphrodite, is "good". Therefore, democracy is "good". In practice, Aphrodite is at work in the non-democratic polis, causing a tendency towards democracy, towards unity, while Neikos is at work in the democratic polis, causing a tendency towards oligarchy or tyranny, towards disunity.

Now, Empedokles clearly asserts that understanding the nature of the cosmos brings with it the power to manipulate phenomena(3):

> You will learn remedies for ills and help against old age, since for you alone shall I accomplish all these things. You will check the force of tireless winds, which sweep over land and destroy

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* The Greek concept of citizen is discussed in the Introduction.

> fields with their blasts; and again, if you wish, you will restore compensating breezes. After black rain you will bring dry weather in season for men, and too after summer dryness you will bring tree-nourishing showers (which live in air), and you will lead from Hades the life-force of a dead man.
>
> (Empedokles, 101, (111) Wright)

It is therefore clear that Empedokles asserts the possibliity of resisting, or defeating, Neikos, which is responsible for death. As this is so, the anti-democratic force for disunity in the polis can be combatted, and pro-democratic political action is legitimated.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 5.

I

1. Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp.129-132.

   Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E., Schofield, M., The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd Ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.321.

   Wright, M.R., Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981, pp.3-21.

2. For a general survey of the history of Magna Graecia, see:
   Dunbabin,. T.J., The Western Greeks, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1948.

II

1. Kirk et al, op. cit., p.321.

III

1. Guthrie, op. cit., pp.124-128.
2. Kirk, et al, op. cit., pp.322-323.
3. Guthrie, op. cit, pp.138-143.
4. Kirk, et al, op. cit., p.324.

IV

1. Guthrie, op. cit., p.139.
2. Kirk, et al, op. cit., p.325.

V

1. Guthrie, op. cit., pp.17-18.
2. Ibid. p.182.
3. Wright, op. cit., p.262.

CHAPTER 5

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CHAPTER 6

PEITHO IN LATE 5TH CENTURY ATHENS

I

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine the conceptions of Peitho expressed by a number of composers who were contemporaries in the 2nd half of the 5th century B.C. at Athens. They are the playwrights Sophokles (495-406) and Euripides (480-406); the historians Herodotos (484-424) and Thoukydides (471-401); the philosopher Demokritos (406-361); and the sophist Gorgias (480-385).(1) It is intended to present a representative selection of the occurrences of peitho-words from the extant works of each of these composers in an effort to discover how each of them perceived Peitho. A general view of the way in which Peitho was perceived in this period will be deduced, and the reasons for this perception will be related to the historical context of the latter half of the 5th century B.C.

II

A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ATHENS IN THE 5TH CENTURY B.C.

The Greek defeat of the Persians, and the pre-eminent part played by Athens in that defeat, changed the nature of political relationships in Greece generally, and in Athens in particular. The unity of the Greek world had been expressed in rivalry both in peacetime, for example, at the various religious games, and in warfare. The Persian invasion changed the workings of this rivalry by provoking a large-scale alliance to resist it, and paved the way for the Athenian hegemony.(1) The military successes of the fledgeling democracy at Athens legitimated the democratic form of government. Military usefulness in effect defined citizenship: the military was the assembly under-arms. The citizen was, by definition, a warrior; the warrior was, by definition, a citizen. As Vernant puts it:

> Military organisation is continuous with, and an extension of, civic organisation ... the city is a community of warriors(2)

This community arrived at political decisions collectively. For some time, until the rise to influence of Kleon in 429 B.C.,

> The nobles remained the sole repositories of prestige and power, but from the time of Kleisthenes onwards they had to win support by arguing for it against their rivals in front of

> the people rather than being able to count on support automatically(3)

from a clientship. Thus the voting on Athenian policy decisions, including decisions about war and peace, was determined by the rank and file of the polis' armed forces, including, by the late 450s B.C., the thetes, the lowest income class, who served as rowers in the navy.(4)

From this time until the Spartan victory over Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 B.C. (5), the Athenian assembly consistently voted in favour of the expansion and maintenance of Athenian hegemony, by warfare if necessary. Active service provided the poorer citizens with an income, and the fruits of victory were profitable. The wealthier citizens and the older families, the would-be oligarchs, on whom the burden fell of providing liturgies, capital levies for warships and other community needs, tended to be anti-war and pro-Spartan. The conflict between rich and poor within the polis had developed another dimension, involving external policies as well as internal politics.

The growth of democracy led to increasing importance being placed on success in public debate, on the ability to sway the assembly towards a particular decision. The sophists began to teach the techne, skill, of effective public speaking. The informal élite who dominated the Athenian assembly depended for their prestige and influence in the community and the assembly on their ability to persuade the assembled populace. As Buxton says

> Faith in public argument lay at the root of the Athenian democracy. It is no coincidence that the short-lived law forbidding the teaching of the art of words (λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν) was passed not under the democracy but under the brief regime of the Thirty Tyrants.(6)

The importance of public debate meant that the ability to succeed in public debate was highly prized. If the technique of succeeding in public debate could be taught, numbers of men would willingly pay to learn it. The élite, who tended to depend on their established status and prestige to give weight to their utterances, resented the effective use of the new technique, which put political status within the power of anyone with the ability to pay for instruction in rhetoric so long as Athens remained under democratic government. The teaching of rhetoric itself became a subject for political debate. And Peitho, the power which gives rhetoric its effectiveness, gained in importance.

III

PEITHO IN SOPHOKLES.

Of the few occurrences of the noun Peitho in Sophokles, two appear in fragments quoted by Plutarch. Taken out of their intended contexts, it is uncertain how these fragments were intended to be understood within the plays (whichever they were) that they came from.

> the Peitho of evil deeds makes its way quickly
> (Plutarch, Life of Ataxerxes, 28, FR.870)

as Pepe explains

> The Greek stresses ... the evil itself not as the end but as the source of persuasion ... This is ... a ... general notion, the attraction of evil itself, an attraction which was seen to function in terms of πειθώ (1)

The second fragment states

> Awful is the face of Peitho
> (Plutarch, De Herodoti Malignitate, 854)

and apparently tells us nothing more than that Peitho is impressive.

Erotic Peitho figures in the Trachines within a magical context. Deianira, the wife of Herakles, finding that her husband has fallen in love with Iole, sends him a robe steeped in what she believes to be a love-charm: the liquid is in fact a poison. The chorus, unkowing of the mistake, declares its approval:

> Thence may he come full of desire steeped in love by the specious device of the robe on which Persuasion hath spread her charm.
> (Sophokles, Trachiniae, 660-662, Jebb)(2)

As Pepe says, "Peitho here contributes to the magical aspects of love",(3) met with in Pindar's Pythian IV (Chapter 4, Section VI) and the magical necklace presented to Pandora by Hesiod's Peitho (Chapter 2, Section III).

The Elektra presents us with another type of Peitho. Klytaimestra has claimed that Agamemnon's death was accomplished with the aid of Dike, "Justice". In her response, Elektra asserts:

> There was no justice in it;
> 'twas the lure (Peitho)
> Of a vile wretch that hurried thee along -
> Thy lover's.
> (Sophokles, Elektra, 561-562, Storr)

Erotic Peitho is here conflated with Peitho as the result of persuasive speech. The relationship between Klytaimestra and Aegisthus was an erotic, adulterous union; as a product of this relationship Klytaimestra is responsive to the verbal suggestion of her paramour. "Thus she was not an agent of justice but only responding to her own psychological state".(4) Peitho is not here presented as an irresistible force, but as a power to which response is voluntary: the person persuaded is held to be responsible for his or her actions.

Philoktetes is a play "in which Sophokles explores the various means ... which men can adopt to secure the ends they desire".(5) The means highlighted are Bia, "Force"; Dolos, "Deceit", and Peitho, "Persuasion". Philoktetes, the custodian of the bow and arrows of Herakles, had been marooned by the Greeks when en route to Troy. An oracle tells the Greeks that without Philoktetes and the bow Troy will not be taken. Odysseus and Neoptolemos, the son of Achilles, are sent to bring Philoktetes to Troy. Odysseus outlines their strategy:

> Entangle Philoctetes by deceit.

Neoptolemos replies:

> Why not persuade him rather than deceive?

To which Odysseus responds:

Persuasion's vain, and force of no avail.
(Sophokles, Philoktetes, 101-103, Storr)

Bia is useless because Philoktetes possesses the bow: no explicit explanation is given in the play for the rejection of Peitho. In the event Dolos, Bia, and Peitho are all resorted to in the course of the action of the play. The "distinction between peitho and dolos is maintained throughout the play."(6) Peitho is apparently rejected as a potentially successful strategy by Odysseus because

> Peitho is the result of a straight-forward presentation of a case ... A person is persuaded when he is told the truth and responds to it without any physical coercion ... The Philoctetes like Parmenides' "way of persuasion" recognizes only one kind of peitho, viz. influence obtained by truthful language.(7)

Because Philoktetes has been maltreated by the Greeks, Odysseus regards him as not amenable to Peitho, which is treated as strictly distinct from Dolos throughout the play. The play ends with the deified Herakles appearing to enjoin Philoktetes to go to Troy; Philoktetes responds:

Thee I cannot disobey (ἀπιθήσω)
(Sophokles, Philoktetes, 1447, Storr.)

Peitho has been shown, by way of the failure of both Bia and Dolos, to be the only valid means to influence ends. Response to Peitho is a voluntary decision based on the truth of a case. Concurrently, the last-cited quotation demonstrates that the Homeric sense of "obey" is still present in the use of peitho-words.

IV

SOPHOKLES' CONCEPTION OF PEITHO

It can, then, be concluded that Sophokles conceived of Peitho as a powerful force, and not always a force for the good: a force which can be magically* induced. The response to Peitho is voluntary and requires a predisposition to be influenced by Peitho. Peitho is a form of obedience for which one is personally responsible; when produced by a knowledge of the true facts of a case, it is the best means of influencing persons to a desired end.

Clearly, Sophokles distinguishes between Peitho induced by evil itself or for evil purposes and Peitho which follows on truth. The latter, "good", Peitho is not, however, the all-powerful governor of the cosmos of Parmenides, but a "best possible" means to an end.

V

EURIPIDES' USE OF PEITHO.

Buxton tells us

> Euripides is a dramatist of bewildering variety and puzzling contradictoriness. Far more than Aischylos or Sophokles, he defies reduction to a simple formula.(1)

---

* Magic: following Lessa & Vogt, "a variety of ritual methods whereby events can be automatically or mechanistically influenced by supernatural means".(1)

There are, however, consistencies in Euripides' thought as expressed in his plays. Euripides' consistently unfavourable depiction of Peitho, may, as Pepe suggests,

> indicate a growing dissatisfaction not only with that traditional idea of peitho but with the new prominence attached to it by fifth century thinkers.(2)

Despite the uniformly disapproving depictions of Peitho in Euripides' work, there are differences in the way in which Peitho is portrayed. In the Helen, Menelaus says that he cannot know if Helen has remained chaste while residing in Egypt. Helen asserts:

> Rest sure, unsullied hath my couch been kept

Menelaus replies:

> Of this what proof? (Peitho)
> (Euripides, Helen, 795-796, Way)

This bantering reply implies that Peitho cannot function without empirical evidence. There is no way by which Menelaus can verify the truth of Helen's statement, therefore he cannot be persuaded of its veracity. Again Peitho is portrayed as a characteristic of truth, where truth can be understood as 'empirically verifiable fact'. The passage highlights a type of case where Peitho cannot function, a limitation of Peitho's power and usefulness.

Agamemnon, in the Iphigeneia at Aulis, is induced to sacrifice his daughter, Iphigeneia, to appease the wrath of the goddess Artemis. To bring Iphigeneia to the place of sacrifice he writes a lying letter to her mother

Klytaimestra, saying that Iphigeneia is to be married to Achilles. Agamemnon says

> Yea, this I counted should persuade my wife
> Such framing of feigned spousals for the maid.
> (Euripides, Iphigeneia at Aulis, 104-105, Way)

Pepe claims that "Peitho is here equivalent to delusion since it is achieved by outright falsehood".(3) Peitho is, in this passage, based, not on empirically verified facts, but on a deliberate lie.

The Troades presents us with another significance of Peitho. After the capture of Troy, Helen has spoken in her defense to Menelaus; the chorus of Trojan women calls on Hekabe to speak against Helen:

> Shatter her specious pleading (Peitho); for her words
> Ring fair - a wanton's words; foul shame is this.
> (Euripides, Troades, 967-968, Way.)

Peitho is here the power of winning speech, the consequence of the operation of effective rhetoric. Pepe tells us that the lines "accept as a matter of course that Helen can both speak persuasively and be morally bankrupt."(4) This may be true; the context does not make this clear. The lines certainly express outrage at the apparent contradiction between persuasive speech and the alleged moral faults of the speaker. In much the same way a person might take the existence of corruption for granted but be outraged on encountering a particular instance of corruption.

The Hekabe presents us with an explicit, rather than implicit, perception of Peitho when Hekabe seeks leave to

exact retribution for her son's murder. Doubting the success of her plea, she invokes Peitho:

> Wherefore, O wherefore, at all other lore
> Toil men, as needeth, and make eager quest,
> Yet Suasion, the unrivalled queen of men,
> Nor price we pay, nor make ado to learn her
> Unto perfection, so a man might sway
> His fellows as he would, and win his ends?
> (Euripides, Hekabe, 814-819, Way)

As Pepe has it,

> This paean to πειθώ centers on only one aspect of it, - the power it exercises in the affairs of men since it transforms desire into accomplishment ... There is no question of good and bad sorts of πειθώ ... With them (these lines) she (Hekabe) abandons her previous moral standpoint and proclaims the autonomy of the will in human affairs. It is from this standpoint that Hecuba lionizes πειθώ since it permits the freest and surest exercise of the will.(5)

With the power of Peitho, one can influence others in order to achieve desired ends; the matter of value-judgement of those ends is not in question.

The Orestes asserts a view of Peitho as mere manipulation of the demos:

> For when an evil heart with winning tongue
> Persuades the crowd, ill is it for the state
> (Euripides, Orestes, 907-908, Way)

Political Peitho is here presented in a distinctly unfavourable light.

VI

THE EURIPIDEAN VIEW OF PEITHO.

Euripides' view of Peitho is ambivalent; he accepts the Parmenidean perception of Peitho as a product of the demonstration of the truth of the case, but shows, in the Helen (795-796, quoted above), that this type of Peitho has limited applicability. Peitho is shown as able to be generated by deliberate falsehood in the Iphigeneia at Aulis (104-105, quoted above), while the moral probity of the persuader is portrayed as irrelevant to the effect of the persuader's words at Troades, 967-968 (quoted above). Peitho is asserted to be merely a means to achieve an end in the Hekabe (814-819, quoted above), and those ends are not always to the good of the community (Orestes, 907-908, quoted above).

Euripides is, as implied by the way in which he portrays Peitho, highly critical of the older view - espoused by Parmenides, Aeschylus, Empedocles and Sophokles - of Peitho as either a definite force for good or at least a "best possible" method of procedure. In fact, Euripides may even be suspected of having consistently portrayed exceptions to the rule, of Peithos' beneficent influence, in order to demonstrate that Peitho is value neutral, able to be effective regardless of the moral probity of the

persuader, the means of persuasion, or the end toward which the persuasion is directed. Euripides had little faith in the moral efficacy of public debate.

VII

THE USE OF PEITHO - WORDS IN HERODOTOS

Herodotos is the first prose-writer to be discussed in this study. A citizen of Halicarnassus (an ethnically mixed - traditionally Dorian - foundation on the Carian coast of Asia Minor which was dominated by Persia until its liberation by the Greek coalition in the course of the offensive against Persia) Herodotos resided at Athens for some time before his migration to the Athenian foundation of Thuria in Magna Graecia. The theme of his Histories is the conflict between Greece and the East.(1)

Herodotos tells us that after the Persian defeat at Salamis, the Athenians set out to raise monentary and military support from the as yet uncommitted poleis. Andros was the first to be approached, and refused. The Athenians asserted that they had the aid of two great gods, Peitho and Ananke, implying that if the Andrians could not be persuaded they would be compelled. The Andrians replied that they had their own gods, Penie and Amechanie, "Poverty" and "Impotence", and were thus unable to pay. (Herodotos, 8.111) Buxton's superficial comment on the passage states:

> Peitho is identified with a mode of political behaviour, the use of spoken arguments as opposed to compulsion.(2)

Pepe's more thoughtful analysis tells us

> Ananke represents the necessity of force ... Peitho signifies the avoidance of Ananke ... The Peitho of this scene is really the peitho of ananke ...its effectiveness can only result from the power of ananke.(3)

Peitho is the product of another power, in this case Ananke. Ananke is "Necessity", with connotations of force, and is related to Bia, "Force", which has connotations of violence. As was shown above, (Chapter 4, Section X) Peitho can result from the influence of Aphrodite, of Promathia, or of Ate. "Persuasion" is hardly an appropriate sense of the Peitho that results from Ananke: one "obeys" the force of necessity, one is not "persuaded" by it. The Peitho of Herodotos 8.111 is "Obedience" rather than "Persuasion".

Other than in the above passage Peitho only appears in Herodotus in its verbal form. Pepe has categorized the occurrences of verbal forms of Peitho in Herodotus as "types". "Successful Persuasion" functions because the subject is predisposed, either by conscious desire or emotional state, to act in accordance with the prompting of the persuader.(4) An example of this general type of successful persuasion is at 6.35, where Miltiades, "impatient of the rule of Pisistratus", was easily persuaded by the Dologkoi to assist them. This predisposition to be persuaded is so dominant that even persuasion "founded on deceit and lies" is successful.(5) Examples of successful

persuasion with intent to deceive are at 5.97, where the Athenians, having been ordered by the Persians to restore the tyranny, were easily persuaded by Aristagoras ("there was nothing that he did not promise in the earnestness of his entreaty") to support the Ionian revolt; and at 8.110:

> Thus spoke Themistocles with intent to deceive, and the Athenians obeyed him; for since he had ever been esteemed wise and now had shown himself to be both wise and prudent, they were ready to obey whatsoever he said.
> (Herodotos, 8.110, Godley)

Note that peitho is translated as "obey": to be persuaded is still perceived as being "obedient" to the will of the persuader.

Unsuccessful peitho as an attempt to avert evil is protrayed in a number of episodes. Pepe explains:

> There is a definite pattern to these episodes. A person decides on a certain course of action. Before he actually performs it, there appears a friend or counsellor, who attempts to persuade him against the action by warning him of its ruinous consequences. The warner fails to persuade and the predicted disaster ensues.(6)

There are numerous examples of this category; some are at 1.8; 1.71; 4.83; 9.109. The point of these episodes is the moral culpability of the person who refuses to be persuaded.

Parmenides' Peitho which "follows on truth" also appears in Herodotos; persuasion of the truth of a case on the basis of empirical evidence is found at 2.150 and 3.12. At 2.150 Herodotos accepts the Egyptian explanation for a movement of earth because he had heard of a similar instance in Assyria. The reason given for the weakness of Persian skulls relative to Egyptian skulls is "readily believed"

because the difference of skull-strengths was empirically verified (3.12). Herodotos also has numerous examples of peitho as persuasion to commit a wrong action: some are at 3.74; 6.66; and 9.116.

VIII

HERODOTOS' PERCEPTION OF PEITHO

Herodotos follows two of the received perceptions of Peitho: the traditional view of Peitho as "Obedience" and the Parmenidean view of Peitho as the product of empirical investigation. The two views are not incompatible: taken together, they could be expressed as "one who is persuaded is obedient to truth". Whereas Parmenides only recognized as Peitho the Peitho which results from an investigation and logical consideration of data, Herodotos accepted that Peitho could be the result of a number of motivating forces.

Ananke, Dolos, and the attractions of an end to be achieved by wrongful actions result in Peitho, and the most important precondition for the success of Peitho is, in Herodotos' view, the subjective disposition of the person to be persuaded. However, Herodotos makes it clear that he regards that Peitho which is founded on truth as intrinsically preferable.

In 6.6, Xerxes is persuaded to undertake the invasion of Greece, by means of deceit, by those who had personal

advantage in mind. At 6.10, Artabanes attempts to persuade Xerxes to abandon the invasion. The gist of the argument is first, caution of persuasion founded in deceit, and second, caution in accepting persuasion before examining the data; the careful examination of contrary opinions is the best method of deciding a course of action.

The examples cited from Herodotos clearly show that the subject of Peitho is regarded as morally responsible for the decision to accept or reject Peitho. Peitho founded on carefully examined data minimizes the chance of coming to a wrong decision. While there are many kinds of Peitho, that Peitho which is founded on truth is preferable.

IX

PEITHO-WORDS IN THOUKYDIDES

Thoukydides' prose History of the Peloponnesian War has only one instance of the noun Peitho:

> But we find ourselves confronted by a further difficulty,
> in that we have to convince (Peitho) you.
> (Thoukydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.53.4, Buxton)

> "... peitho appears to be used as what we should call an abstract noun."(1)

This occurs in the speech of the Plataeans before the Lakedaimonians, and will be further examined below. Otherwise, Peitho appears only in its verbal forms. In Pepe's description:

> Thucydides ... limits (his use of verbal forms of Peitho) in the main to the context of politics; states attempt to persuade one another and the statesman attempt to persuade the people to a certain course of action.(2)

Unlike the "types" of Peitho which can be generalized and categorized from Herodotos, Thoukydides uses Peitho to explain the causes of particular historical events.

For example

> the Athenians ... built their fleet, at the instance (ἔπεισεν) Themistocles ...
> (Thoukydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.14, Smith)

> Themistocles, moreover, persuaded (ἔπεισε) them
> also to finish the walls of the Peiraeus ...
> (1.93, Smith)

> They blamed Pericles for having persuaded (πείσαντα) them to go to war ...
> (2.59, Smith)

> So the Mytilenaeans ... sent envoys to Athens ... in the hope that they might persuade (πείσειαν) them to recall their fleet ...
> (3.4, Smith)

> The Syracusans ... sent envoys ... to persuade (πείθωσι) the Lacedaemonians to prosecute the war with the Athenians openly in their behalf...
> (6.73, Smith)

Thoukydides gives no psychological explanations about the way in which Peitho was achieved, and he gives no reasons for the success of Peitho or reasons why it was hoped that Peitho might be successful. There are no statements about the nature of Peitho and the mode of reportage adopted by Thoukydides does not describe the act of Peitho. Therefore the above examples of Thoukydides' use

of Peitho-words do not permit the kind of analysis of the conceptual framework within which Thoukydides perceived Peitho that has been undertaken in previous sections of this study.

It can, however, be noted that the first three of the above examples refer to instances where a high-status individual has advocated a course of action before an assembly which has acted in accordance with his wishes. These instances call to mind the Homeric assemblies and the dominance/obedience sense which was shown above (Chapter 1) to obtain in peitho-usage there. Seen in this light, the first example quoted in this section (3.53.4) will bear further examination. The Plataeans were a defeated polis: if the word Peitho is being used in a dominance/obedience sense, it would certainly be "difficult" for the Plataeans to Peitho an enemy that was so clearly dominant. It was shown above (Section III, on Sophokles and Section VII, on Herodotos) that the Homeric usage of Peitho to mean something like "obey" was still current amongst Thoukydides' contemporaries. It appears that in Thoukydides this meaning of "obey" is the primary sense of Peitho-words.

X

PEITHO IN DEMOKRITOS

Demokritos came from Abdera, a Thracian polis which was also the birthplace of Protagoras,(1) and travelled widely in the Near-East. He was the pupil of Leukippas, and the tradition adds other teachers, including Zeno, the pupil of Parmenides. This section does not propose to deal with the philosophical system of Demokritos but only with the two fragments that refer to Peitho.

The shorter of the two fragment tells us

> Often Logos is more productive of Peitho than gold is
>
> (DK 68 B 51, after Pepe)

Logos is "the word by which the inward thought is expressed" or "the inward thought or reason itself".(2) Guthrie renders it as "deductive reasoning", while warning us that the word "does multiple duty in Greek and cannot be adequately represented by a single English equivalent".(3) Pepe explains: "The meaning of logos in conjunction with peitho seems to be reasoned, enlightened discourse as in fr.181"(4)

> The man who employs exhortation and the Peitho of Logos will turn out to be a more effective guide to arete than the man who employs Nomos and Ananke. For the man who is prevented by Nomos from doing wrong will probably do wrong in secret, whereas the man who has been led toward duty by Peitho will probably not commit a wrong either secretly or openly. Therefore the man who acts

> correctly through understanding and knowledge becomes at the same time brave and right-thinking. (DK 68 13 181, after Pepe)

Nomos is "an usage, custom, convention,: a positive enactment, law ordinance".(5) Guthrie tells us

> a new generation (5th century thinkers) has divorced nomos from physis, (nature, reality) as what is artifically contrived from what is natural, and sometimes what is false [though commonly believed] from what is true ... its more important uses are two: (i) usage or custom based on traditional or conventional beliefs as to what is right or true, (ii) laws formally drawn up and passed, which codify 'right usage' and elevate it into an obligatory norm backed by the authority of the state.(6)

Pepe's analysis of these Demokritean fragments asserts

> In both fragments peitho is the product of logos ... This reasoning seems to parallel the Socratic postion that virtue (arete) resides in knowledge. Democritus does not maintain that the agent who knows the right action will inevitably perform it. His emphasis is in the other direction, that there can be no sure guarantee that the agent will perform the right unless he understands why he is to do it, and furthermore that the agent in possession of this knowledge is not likely to commit a wrong.(7)

Fragment 51 tells us that Demokritus recognizes a various causality for Peitho, and clearly indicates his opinion that reasoned argument is the preferable mode of achieving Peitho; the fragment also implies that Peitho is a goal worthy of achievement. Fragment 181 is a quite explicit re-statement of the Parmenidean position: law, in the sense of codified custom, is an insufficient basis for civic morality and the authority of the state does not make it so; one cannot compel people to act rightly. But one can show, via that Peitho that "follows on truth" - remember

that Dike is subject to Peitho - that there is a fundamental unity (of reason or purpose) beyond differing opinions which underlies varying attitudes to "Custom", and to follow this unity, rather than the superficial rules of Nomos backed by Ananke, is desirable. This "unity", the reason why people have, or should have, a basic purpose which can underlie a variety of behaviours, can be demonstrated by reasoned discourse: once this "truth" is shown, Peitho will follow: the basic purpose of a particular cluster of behaviour patterns - for example, varying forms of worship of a particular phenomenon - will be perceived and followed and the opposite "opinions" about the ways of behaviour disregarded. Peitho based on reasoned discourse, rather than Nomos backed by compulsion, is a basis for right behaviour and political unity.

However, Parmenides, by means of his stress on Peitho, only implied the irrelevance of Ananke for moral behaviour; as Pepe says

> what is unique in the Democritean usage is the significance of this contrast (between Peitho and Ananke) for moral behaviour and the reliance [and consequent weakening] of νόμος on ananke.(8)

XI

GORGIAS AND PEITHO

Kennedy provides a most concise summary of the life of Gorgias:

> Gorgias was born shortly before 480 B.C. in Leontini Sicily and lived there for much of his life. He may have studied with Empedocles and certainly was familiar with the philosophy and rhetoric of the time. His only definite philosophical work, On the Nonexistent or On Nature, is to be dated to the late 440s. In 427, he was sent as an ambassador by Leontini to Athens, and subsequently he seems to have visited the city repeatedly or even to have settled there. His extant rhetorical pieces and fragments date from the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Sometime after 380, he removed to the court of Jason at Pherae in Thessaly, where he died at the age of at least one hundred and five.(1)

Guthrie adds a little more detail.

> Tradition says he was a pupil of Empedocles, and this is likely, though he could have been only a few years younger. Plato (Meno 76C) connects his name with the Empedoclean theory of pores, and he would also owe to Empedocles an interest in the arts of persuasive speech and of medicine.... When he came to Athens in 427, on an embassy from Leontini, he was already about sixty, and took the city by storm with his novel style of oratory, as well as earning large sums by special performances and classes for the young.(2)

Gorgias was, then, the pupil of Empedocles, who was the pupil of Parmenides. It is to be expected that his thought will have strong connections with the thought of Parmenides. In accordance with the scope of this study, the evidence of Plato and other later commentators about the thought of Gorgias will not be taken into account. Evidence for the

thought of Gorgias about Peitho will be restricted to his ipsissima verba. Following Pepe, the work of Gorgias which will be discussed will be the Helen, because of its general and theoretical nature,(3) and only the use that Gorgias makes of Peitho will be discussed.

Pepe's summary of the argument of the Helen is succinct:

> Helen has been severely criticized for deserting home and husband to follow her paramour to Troy. Such criticism is not justified, since Helen cannot be adjudged responsible for this act. This claim is substantiated by a fourfold, all-inclusive scheme of possible sources of motivation:
>
> (A) She acted under the influence of divine fate.
>
> (B) She acted under the compulsion of bia.
>
> (C) She acted under the peitho of logos.
>
> (D) She acted under the influence of eros.
>
> All four cases preclude the personal culpability of Helen, since in each case an irresistible, external influence is ultimately the cause of her desertion.(4)

That part of the speech which deals with the Peitho of Logos is as follows:

> (8) But if it was speech which persuaded her and deceived her heart, not even to this is it difficult to make an answer and to banish blame as follows. Speech is a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most invisible body effect the divinest works: it can stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity. I shall show how this is the case, since (9) it is necessary to offer proof to the opinion of my hearers: I both deem and define all poetry as speech with meter. Fearful shuddering and tearful pity and grievous longing come upon its hearers, and at the actions and physical sufferings of others in good fortunes and in evil fortunes,

through the agency of words, the soul is wont to experience a suffering of its own. But come, I shall turn from one argument to another. (10) Sacred incantations sung with words are bearers of pleasure and banishers of pain, for, merging with opinion in the soul, the power of the incantation is wont to beguile it and persuade it and alter it by witchcraft. There have been discovered two arts of witchcraft and magic: one consists of errors of soul and the other of deceptions of opinion. (11) All who have and do persuade people of things do so by moulding a false argument. For if all men on all subjects had <both> memory of things past and <awareness> of things present and foreknowledge of the future, speech would not be similarly similar, since as things are now it is not easy for them to recall the past nor to consider the present nor to predict the future. So that on most subjects most men take opinion as counselor to their soul, but since opinion is slippery and insecure it casts those employing it into slippery and insecure successes. (12) What cause then prevents the conclusion that Helen similarly, against her will, might have come under the influence of speech, just as if ravished by the force of the mighty? For it was possible to see how the force of persuasion prevails; persuasion has the form of necessity, but it does not have the same power. For speech constrained the soul, persuading it which it persuaded, both to believe the things said and to approve the things done. The persuader, like a constrainer, does the wrong and the persuaded, like the constrained, in speech is wrongly charged. (13) To understand that persuasion, when added to speech, is wont also to impress the soul as it wishes, one must study: first, the words of astronomers who, substituting opinion for opinion, taking away one but creating another, make what is incredible and unclear seem true to the eyes of opinion; then, second, logically necessary debates in which a single speech, written with art but not spoken with truth, bends a great crowd and persuades; <and> third, the verbal disputes of philosophers in which the swiftness of thought is also shown making the belief in an opinion subject to easy change. (14) The effect of speech upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the power of drugs over the nature of bodies. For just as different drugs dispel different secretions from the body, and some bring an end to disease and others to life, so also in the case of speeches, some distress, others delight, some cause fear,

> others make the hearers bold, and some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion.
> (Gorgias, Encomium on Helen, Kennedy)

As Pepe points out, there already existed a traditional account that attributed Helen's action to Peitho,(5) the Aphrodite-Peitho which will be familiar from the work of Hesiod. "For Gorgias, peitho is associated exclusively with logos".(6) Gorgias has taken this erotic Peitho and assimilated it, with all its erotic and magical connotations, to his own context. De Romilly points out

> The influence of poetry, as Gorgias describes it, is ...of a magical nature.(7)
> Gorgias, in the Helen, insists on the wonderful power of speech, and he does so by using two similes comparing speech with poetry on the one hand and magic on the other ... speech is close to poetry: 'Poetry I consider and call speech with rhythm ...' he combines all the expressions that can be used for magic and witchcraft ... the spell of words is firmly assimilated to witchcraft.(8)

Gorgias begins his analysis of the Peitho of logos by asserting its power and claims that this power derives from its capacity to manipulate human emotions. He then assimilates this capacity to the capacity of poetry to emotionally sway an audience. Turning to magic and witchcraft, Gorgias identifies the supernatural power of the words of the incantation with the power of the arguments of rhetoric: the magico-erotic Peitho of Hesiod is assimilated to rhetoric by way of the words of incantations

> to restrict the functions of peitho within logos and to retain the full erotic panoply of peitho together with all its transcendence and irreversible power.(9)

Now, Gorgias denied the possibility of objective knowledge or truth in his On the Nonexistent or On Nature, and this conclusion reappears in the Helen, at Chapter II where he says

> All who have and do persuade people of things do so by moulding a false argument.

Doxa, "opinion", is all that we have to base our arguments on, so that all arguments are based on the opposite of truth and knowledge, on Doxa. In the absence of perfect knowledge, action is based on opinion, not on knowledge, therefore to persuade someone is to convince them of the validity of an opinion. It can be seen that Gorgias does not accept Parmenides' assertion that the fundamental truth which underlies differing opinions is knowable: all Gorgias leaves us with is opinion. The power of Peitho is based on the improbability of objective knowledge

> So that on most subjects most men take opinion as counsellors to their soul

and as opinion is of unreliable validity, so is the resultant Peitho. Peitho, for Gorgias, does not "follow on truth", but follows on speech.

Gorgias goes on to assimilate the irresistible force of Peitho to that of Ananke

> Persuasion has the form of necessity but it does not have the same power.

That is, the subject of an act of persuasion is convinced that the thing that Peitho motivates the subject to do is necessary, whereas this may not be the case. Compulsion and persuasion are equated because the result of these forces is

the same: the subject is constrained to a course (of thought or action).

The power of Peitho to change opinion is demonstrated with examples from science, rhetoric, and philosophy. The natural scientists are able to persuade people to substitute one opinion for another; the opinions of the natural scientists are merely opinion in the guise of truth, which people are persuaded to accept as truth. The cleverly-formed logical arguments of the rhetor ician persuade their audience by means of the art of composition regardless of their truth or value. In the oral debates of the philosophers, changes of belief are wrought by a Peitho which results from the philosophers' quickness of intellect. Successful Peitho is based, therefore, on the appearance of truth, technical excellence of composition of words, and intellectual agility.

The power of Logos to produce Peitho is compared with the power of drugs to affect the body

> The effect of speech upon the conditions of the soul is comparable to the power of drugs over the nature of bodies.

Just as different drugs have different effects, so do different forms of speech. Since Peitho is the result of speech, the result of some logoi is to

> drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion.

According to Pepe, the association of Peitho with enchantment, bewitchment, and drugs is designed to

> delineate a form of covert, irrational influence, clearly separate from compulsion. In this way, logos and peitho both remain ambivalent and amoral.(10)

That is, because Gorgias has shown a bad Peitho amongst his examples he needs to separate it from that Peitho which has the form of Ananke in order that the Peitho of Logos can be still perceived as morally neutral. Against this view, de Romilly asserts

> Gorgias' magic is technical. He wants to emulate the power of the magician by a scientific analysis of language and of its influence. He is the theoretician of the magic spell of words.(11)

Now, in the first sentence of the Helen, Gorgias aver s that Aletheia, "truth" is a desirable attribute of Logos. Yet he goes on to claim that all Peitho results in Doxa "opinion", an apparently irreconcilable contradiction. In likening the action of Peitho to the action of drugs, Gorgias pointed out that the action of drugs is sometimes good, sometimes bad. If we assume that Gorgias held Aletheia to be a good, then it follows that when Peitho induces a Doxa which is close to Aletheia, that Peitho is good; and if Peitho induces a Doxa which has harmful consequences, that Peitho is bad. Pepe is simply wrong to state that Gorgias tried to hold Logos and Peitho to be ambivalent and amoral. On the other hand, in asserting that the magic of "sacred incantations", as a method for influencing events by supernatural means, is a kind of Peitho, by equating the power of a magical spell with the power of rhetoric, Gorgias is not saying that "he wants to emulate the power of the magician", he is claiming

that Logos possesses that power. Gorgias perceived Peitho within a magical context because Peitho had traditionally been perceived in a magical context, at least since Hesiod's period some 400 years earlier: magic was simply one of the ways in which Peitho functioned.

XII

THE CONCEPT OF PEITHO IN GORGIAS

Whereas Parmenides had isolated the persuasive power of "truth" - logical argument or empirical demonstration - and raised this power, Aphrodite-Peitho, to the position of governor of the sensible cosmos, the cause of cosmic unity, and Empedokles essentially maintained this position, Gorgias perceived Peitho, not as a power inherent in all nature, but as the product of effective speech.

Truth, for Gorgias, is merely a desirable attribute of speech; persuasion is the product of effective speech. Gorgias makes no connection between truth and persuasion. Persuasion is the purpose of speech, and is the result if that speech is effective. Effective speech combines the appearance of truth with intellectual power and skilled composition and is of a magical potency in inducing, changing or modifying opinion. Truth is a desirable, but not necessary, condition for effective speech.

The power of Peitho is the power to constrain the soul to believe certain things said or to approve certain things done. Peitho induces the subject to a course voluntarily; Ananke induces the subject to a course by compulsion: Necessity and persuasion are equivalent powers, but of different natures; Peitho is, like Ananke, an irresistible force. "Obedience" is a sense of Peitho applicable here.

While Peitho can be good or bad, and always induces a Doxa, that Doxa which is closest to Aletheia is to be preferred. Parmenides' Peitho that "follows on truth" has not been entirely discarded, but it has become a 'best-possible' case. The phenomenon of Peitho can be good or bad according to the means by which it is gained or the end to which it is employed.

XIII

CONCLUSION

The evidence presented in this chapter has shown that the later 5th century B.C. in Athens saw little consensus about the place of Peitho in the life of the citizen, although some traditional ideas about Peitho were still current. "Obedience" remained a common sense of the word, in the context of obedience to the will of a persuader; indeed the stress laid by Gorgias on the irresistibility of

Peitho might encourage the notion that this was still the primary meaning of the word.

Peitho succeeding as a result of the operation of magic was still a common conception, judging by its appearance in both Sophokles and Gorgias. This kind of Aphrodite-Peitho, imposed by magical power, is only met with in erotic contexts in the work of the composers examined in this study, although Gorgias attempted to narrow its application by applying it to persuasive speech in a general sense. Gorgias retains the conception of Aphrodite-Peitho in the tradition of Hesiod, Parmenides, and Empedocles, but constrains it within the realm of Logos.

The assertion of Parmenides that "truth" resulted in Peitho was still accepted, although the Parmenidean implication that only the kind of Peitho that "followed on truth" was true Peitho was no longer regarded as valid in the second half of the 5th century. That Peitho which was the product of "truth", that is, resulted from logical deduction or empirical investigation, seems to have been regarded as a morally superior, "best possible" case, even though Euripides portrayed the idea as one of limited applicability.

Peitho was sometimes regarded as the product of Ananke; that is, persuasion was perceived as sometimes being effected by means of the threat of compulsion. Yet Peitho was also held to be opposed to Ananke, a contradictory opposite means to the achievment of ends. The view of

Gorgias, that Peitho and Ananke were similar but distinct powers does not appear to have been general.

Another contradication in the ideas about Peitho which were current during this period was the contradiction between the assertion that a person had moral responsibility for having been persuaded and the assertion that Peitho was irresistible. This problem does not appear to have been resolved. A related problem was examined by Gorgias: if Peitho is irresistible, how can the subject of Peitho be considered a willing agent? Gorgias asserted that the action of Logos on the soul not only persuaded the subject to believe the words of the persuader or to commit the act suggested by the persuader, but constrained the subject to approve the belief or the act: therefore the subject was willingly persuaded and the irresistibility of Peitho maintained.

Peitho was generally accepted as often produced by undesirable means, or directed to the purpose of undesirable ends, or both, but was still regarded as being morally preferable to Ananke as a way of achieving ends. That is to say that, despite persuasion being sometimes effected by means which were regarded as undesirable, or for ends which were regarded as morally reprehensible, it was still preferable to compulsion. Peitho was not always regarded as value-neutral. Ananke, "compulsion", and Dolos, "deceit", for example, were regarded as morally negative means to achieve ends. Sophokles regarded Peitho as a "best

possible" means to an end; Euripides portrayed Peitho as value-neutral; Herodotus perceived Peitho as value-neutral unless based carefully examined data, when he saw Peitho as morally positive; Demokritos asserted Peitho to be morally positive; for Gorgias, Peitho is value-neutral. Taking the work of the composers discussed above overall, the general view of Peitho held in the latter half of the 5th century was that Peitho was value-neutral, in that it could be wrongfully produced or used for wrongful results as well as desirably produced for desirable results, and that Peitho was morally positive, in that it was always preferable to Ananke, Dolos, and Bia as a means to achieve ends.

The power of the archaic aristocracy had expressed itself in high status which implied the power of compulsion as a means to achieve ends. The tyranny had been installed by armed force, maintained by armed force, and overthrown by armed force. The oligarchy which had attempted to gain control after the defeat of the tyrant attempted to achieve its ends by means of compulsion. Under the democracy political ends could be achieved by means of persuading the assembled citizen body that those ends were desirable. During the first half of the 5th century, the distribution of magistracies by lot and the continued operation of government by democratic means accustomed increasing numbers of non-aristocrats to participation in public affairs. With the advent of the Sophists, those citizens who could afford to pay for instruction by Gorgias and other rhetoricians

were able to acquire by study that facility in oral communication which had previously been the product of a lifetime of leisured familiarity with the oral tradition. This broke the monopoly of effective public-speaking previously held by the eupatridae. Disagreements about the personal morality of those who had become effective public speakers, the moral value of the means by which they persuaded the assembly, and the morality of the ends towards which that persuasion was bent, led to some dissatisfaction with Peitho as a mode of political operation. Peitho was, however, despite its alleged shortcomings, generally regarded as preferable to compulsion as a method of achieving political ends. And despite its alleged shortcomings, the power of Peitho to affect human affairs was unquestioned. Peitho was an important moral factor in political life and thought in 5th century Athens, an integral part of the democratic mode of government.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 6

I

1 Dates for the ancient world, which are arrived at mainly by the interpretation of often unsatisfactory ancient records, are frequently subject to scholarly controversy, and can rarely be regarded as "settled". This chapter follows those given in

Mellersh, H.E.L., Chronology of the Ancient World, London, Barrie & Jenkins, 1976.

II

1. Vernant, J-P., Myth and Society in Ancient Greece, (Tr. Lloyd, J.) London, Methuen, 1982, p.32.

2. Ibid., p.26.

3. Buxton, R.G.A., Persuasion in Greek Tragedy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p.12.

4. Roebuck, C., The World of Ancient Times, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966, p.259.

5. Sealey, R., A History of the Greek City States, ca. 700 - 338 B.C., Berkeley, University of California Press, 1976, 195-385, provides a satisfactory account of the political history of Athens and Sparta from the Persian Wars to the end of the Peloponnesian War.

6. Buxton, op. cit., p.16.

III

1. Pepe, G.M., Studies in Peitho, Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1966 p.229.

2. quoted by Pepe, Ibid., p.231.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p.231.

5. Buxton, op. cit., p.118.

6. Pepe, op. cit., p.237.

7. Ibid., pp.237-238.

IV

1. Lessa, W.A., & Vogt, E.Z., (eds.) A Reader in Comparative Religion, Evanston, Row, Peterson, 1970, p.245.

V

1. Buxton, op. cit., p.148.

2. Pepe, op. cit., p.257.

3. Ibid., p.249.

4. Ibid., p.251.

5. Ibid., p.252.

VII

1. The life of Herodotos, and some of the controversy which surrounds the interpretation of the tradition about it, is covered by

Roebuck, op. cit., pp.250-252 and the introduction of

Godley, A.D., Herodotus, London, Heinemann, 1926.

2. Buxton, op. cit., p.42.

3. Pepe, op. cit., pp.211-212.

4. Ibid., pp.214-215.

5. Ibid., p.215.

6. Ibid., p.220.

IX

1. Buxton, op. cit., p.31.

2. Pepe, op. cit., p.223.

X

1. The tradition about the life of Demokritos is given in

   Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp.386-389.

2. Liddell and Scott, A Lexicon, (Abr.) Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1944.

3. Guthrie, op. cit., p.51 n.1.

4. Pepe, op. cit., p.258.

5. Lexicon, op. cit.

6. Guthrie, op. cit., Vol. III, pp.56-57.

7. Pepe, op. cit., p.260.

8. Ibid., p.259.

XI

1. Kennedy, G., "Gorgias" in Sprague, R.K., (ed.) The Older Sophists, Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1972, p.30.

2. Guthrie, op. cit., Vol. III, pp.269-270.

3. Pepe, op. cit., p.271.

4. Ibid., pp.271-272.

5. Ibid., p.275.

6. Ibid.

7. Romilly, J. de, Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece, Cambridge, Harvard Univesity Press, 1975, p.4.

8. Ibid., p.3.

9. Pepe, op. cit., p.276.

10. Ibid., p.284.

11. Rommily, p.16.

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RECAPITULATION.

This study has shown that Peitho was a concept which clearly evolved over time. By rigidly excluding evidence which is not contemporary with each text examined, the stages in the development of the concept "Peitho" have been highlighted. These stages have been shown to be co-incident with changes in the social, economic, and political factors existing in Greek society. Although it has not been possible to show a direct cause-and-effect relationship between changes in the use of Peitho and changes in the society, it is clear that as the political institutions of Greek society changed, so did the way in which Peitho was perceived change.

In the Homeric period, the decisions of the assembly are reached on the basis of the status and experience of the speakers, rather than on the basis of the content of their speech. The assembly is depicted as "obeying", or "paying attention to" high-status speakers. Peitho-words are not used directly by one individual to another as this usage, implying as it does a dominance/obedience relationship, is regarded as an affront when applied by one individual to another, because the word means, primarily, "obedience". In this warrior-society the implication of "obedience" to another individual was an insult to a high-status male.

The noun Peitho first appears in Hesiod, where it occurs twice as the name of a goddess. It has been shown that this goddess is "Obedience", characterized as both an

aspect of Aphrodite and as a sibling of a number of deities which personify conditions and processes desirable for human existence. One striking factor in Hesiod's characterization of Peitho as an aspect of Aphrodite is its connection with magic: the magical "golden necklace" presented to Pandora. This association of Peitho with magic was to persist, becoming an integral part of Gorgias' conception of Peitho. Another point of interest in Hesiod's characterization of Peitho is its depiction of Peitho as a quality inherent in certain individuals, a "charisma". This perception of Peitho as an inherent quality reappears in Pindar, but does not appear to have been a part of the perception of Peitho current in the later fifth century.

The period of Hesiod was distinct from the period of Homer. Economically, food-supplies were at least adequate in normal seasons in the Homeric period, while the Hesiodic farmer was often forced to scratch out a living on marginal land and still often have to supplement his income by means of trading activities. Socially, population movement increased the frequency of contact with strangers in the Hesiodic period. Politically, the swaggering, self-confident bravado of the Homeric basileis had given way to the temperate, "beguiling" speech of the Hesiodic basileis, while the gifts offered to the Homeric basileis as a mark of respect and gratitude for wise judgement had become bribes paid to corrupt judges in the Hesiodic period. New deities, unknown as such in the Homeric period - Peitho itself is one

example - appeared in the Hesiodic period, as the Greeks attempted to conceptualize abstract qualities and express relationships between such qualities. The appearance of the new deities was a probable response to a general sense of unease resulting from the unsettled social and political relations of the period.

For Hesiod, sexuality was a force to be feared; Peitho was a characteristic of that force. However, unless Hesiod was involving himself in a contradiction, Peitho as such was not feared, being perceived as a power beneficial to human existence.

The early Archaic period, characterized as it was by increased social change and political unrest, saw the introduction, in Sparta, of the social and political order which was to become familiar from the Sparta of historic times. During this period of political disruption Alkman composed his prescription for proper conduct. Peitho, as an integral part of that prescription, had become a directly political concept. "Forethought" generates "Obedience", "Good Order", and "Success", although the way in which Alkman perceived Peitho as operating in the political process escapes us.

The late archaic/early classical period saw political conflict within poleis become more defined than it had been in the early archaic period, when the political struggle had been perceived as involving "the people" against the "aristocrats". Now the aristocratic elite was being

chall nged by an elite of wealth, the "oligarchs", both of which opposed, and were opposed by, the demos. Although, as has been shown, Peitho was not only an erotic concept for Pindar, his political conceptualization of Peitho was not defined. Pindar, the friend of powerful "aristocrats", was an upholder of traditional, "aristocratic" values, and his perception of Peitho was in the tradition which for us begins with Hesiod. Peitho is a (usually erotic) form of charisma. But the political turmoil of the period reacted in the thought of Parmenides to produce a concept of Peitho as the product of logical argument and the way in which the cosmos functioned, while Peitho was, more prosaically, for Aeschylus, a powerful but non-violent method for solving political conflict, a "persuasive" method.

The second half of the 5th century (the "classical" period) had seen the frequent failure of political Peitho to produce what was perceived to be desirable results. Political "persuasion" had been successfully applied by persons perceived to be unworthy, by means sometimes perceived to be contrary to conventional morality, and for ends which were often perceived to be undesirable. Yet the Parmenidean tradition of an all-powerful Peitho continued through Empedokles to Gorgias, and the Parmenidean concept of Peitho as the product of empirical investigation and logical argument was still important in the ideas of Herodotus and Demokritos. The action of Peitho was still perceived as magical in its effect. It had been discovered

that the ability to apply Peitho was a skill which could be taught and learned, and the perception of Peitho as a form of charisma, an inherent quality, is absent from this period. Peitho was generally perceived as a morally positive force, if only because it operates without violence, but it was clearly perceived that Peitho was not always a force for good. This is not a contradiction; Peitho towards a harmful end, or one which is perceived to be undesirable, was perceived to be morally preferable to coercion towards that same end.

This study set out to examine the word/concept "Peitho", rather than the more general topic of "persuasion". Persuasion can take many forms; one may be persuaded through flattery, seduction, logical discussion, by threats, or empirical evidence, and so forth; all of these modes of persuasion are attested in the ancient literature. However, the topic of this study, with its focus upon a particular word, can only be pursued by examining passages where that word actually appears. One can only examine the meaning of a word in the context of the use of that word. So no attempt has been made to examine instances of "persuasion" in ancient Greek literature. Only Peitho, and some instances of the use of its verbal forms, has been examined. The results of this study have shown that the ancient Greeks, in the periods examined, perceived Peitho to mean rather more than is conveyed by the English word "persuasion", and that this perception of Peitho was

not static, but changed as the political and economic circumstances of the society changed. Peitho evolved from its beginnings as a Homeric status marker - only those with high status could dominate the assembly; through its conceptualization as a general religious notion with particular references in magico-erotic life; its early 5th century conception as an end of political action, in the sense of reconciliation between opposing social and political factions; to its "classical", late 5th century conception as a learned skill with words applied to achieve a particular end.

The primary meaning of Peitho appears to have been "Obedience" in the sense of induced obedience as contrasted with compelled obedience. At different periods in the history of the word this primary meaning was overlaid with various senses of meaning as the social and political context of Greek society changed. By the end of the 5th century Peitho had become the method by which free citizens reached agreement with each other, rather than obedience to a acknowledged superior.

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