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The Development of a Theory of Life-Environment Disruption to
Account for the Phenomenon of Premature Morbidities and Mortalities
Associated with a Radical Change in a Person's Living Environment.

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

The thesis originates in an unresolved phenomenon associated with moving into a nursing home and concerns the reports of emotional distress, depression and increased risk of morbidity and mortality associated with the move; shedding-life is used to capture the broad character of this phenomenon. Shedding-life has been the subject of scientific inquiry for seventy years and yet the phenomenon is still not understood and, possibly because of this, there appears to be no generally accepted approaches to ameliorate this harm. This thesis inquiries into the genesis of shedding life and presents a theory to account for it.

The failure of existing research to account for shedding-life indicated an alternative approach was required. As shedding-life arises in the context of a significant change in a person's living-environment it was surmised that the phenomenon involves the relationship between the person and the changing environment in which they live. Based on this, the approach taken was to use the philosophical research of Martin Heidegger concerning the structural relationship between the person and their living environment, an approach not previously explored.

Heidegger's research, undertaken within the empiricist tradition, identifies and describes the structural processes by which the person is both constituted by its formative socio-cultural environment and bound to it as the locus and source of its ongoing existence. This means that who the individual human person becomes is both contingent and dependent upon the living environment into which it is born and raised, where the concept of living environment is understood in terms of possibilities for a meaningful life. On this account if a person's access to their living-environment is materially disrupted they are at risk of experiencing a decline in the meaningfulness of their existence. As this is a naturalistic account, founded on the biological processes of the body, the loss of an appropriate living environment is reflected in psychological distress which in turn is frequently manifested in bodily morbidities; this is the basis of shedding life, a structural rather than a psychological phenomenon.

This contingent account of the person is in stark contrast to the materialist approach that posits the person as essentially the biological body, independent of its environment. The materialist view informs the design and running of nursing homes resulting in a significant disruption to a person's life-environment contributing to

rather than ameliorating shedding-life, as such nursing homes are iatrogenic, i.e. cause harm. Left unaddressed nursing home environments will continue to cause harm and fail to assist older people live a meaningful life in their remaining years.

While the thesis commenced from a concern about nursing homes, the phenomenon of shedding-life is a much broader phenomenon. The Theory of Life-Environment Disruption, derived from the structure of being a person, provides an account of shedding-life by identifying the essential relationship between the person and their life-environment. The theory predicts that whenever there is a material disruption to a person's life-environment they are at risk of shedding life and as such the theory has broad applicability for human affairs more generally.

THESIS DECLARATION

I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in my name, in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name, for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree.

I give permission for the digital version of my thesis to be made available on the web, via the University's digital research repository, the Library Search and also through web search engines, unless permission has been granted by the University to restrict access for a period of time.

I acknowledge the support I have received for my research through the provision of an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship

Stephen Richards

12 May 2018

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Marion Miller, Mary Guy and the countless number of wonderful people I have met over the years living and working in nursing homes who have taught me so much.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people who have been supportive in the long process involved with production of this thesis.

Professor Alan Pearson who provided the space, support, and confidence in me to undertake this thesis.

Peter Willis who provided a friendly sounding board on numerous occasions as I struggled to make sense of Heidegger's work.

To various senior academics around the world who readily responded to my emailed questions seeking clarification of their published work. To dtSearch Software for donating a license for their document search software to help with the thesis. To the editors and publishers of *Seven Dying Australians* for permission to include in the thesis Marion Miller's story "You Just Shed Life".

To my family, especially my wife Anne, for their ongoing support, tolerance, and perseverance through my Heideggerian indulgences as I worked through the thesis.

REFERENCING AND TRANSLATIONS

The APA referencing system is primarily used in the thesis. A number of texts referenced are published on the Kindle platform and in these cases often a Kindle location rather than a page number is provided. In these instances where quotations are referenced the Kindle location is indicated by “k.” in the citation. Thus (k, 2350-56) refers to the Kindle location 2350 to 2356 in the Kindle edition of the text.

In the thesis, particularly in Chapter 6, there are a number of quotations from the works of Aristotle. In keeping with accepted practice, in addition to the APA reference I have included referencing to the Greek text. The references relate to the edition of the Greek text of Aristotle prepared by Immanuel Bekker and published in 1831. The reference is in the form “(1033b15)” and refers to a page number (1033), column letter (b) and the nearest line number, provided at 5 line intervals (15).

Texts authored by Martin Heidegger are excluded from the APA referencing approach and are not contained in the reference list. The approach taken is to provide an abbreviation to the relevant text together, where appropriate, a page number. A list of texts authored by Heidegger referenced in the thesis, together with the abbreviation used is provided below. These references are provided in square brackets, e.g. [BT]. The primary translation of *Being and Time* used in the thesis is the Macquarrie and Robinson translation. A reference to a quotation from this text will include the text abbreviation, a reference to the page in the English translation and in keeping with accepted practice, a reference to the page of the German translation, e.g. [BT 29/9]. Occasionally reference is made to a section number within the text, this is indicated by §, e.g. Section 14 is referenced as §14. In all other texts reference is made only to the English translation page number.

Texts Authored by Martin Heidegger Referenced in Thesis

- AM *Aristotle’s Metaphysics: On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, translated by Walter Brogan and Peter Warneck. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- BCAP *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, translated by Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.
- BCArP *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, translated by Robert D Metcalf

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- and Mark B Tanzer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.
- BH *Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of his Early Occasional Writings, 1910–1927* (second edition), edited by Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan. London: Routledge. 2014
- BPP *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, translated by Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
- BPPg *Die Grundprobleme Der Phänomenologie* (Zweite Auflage). Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann. 1989
- BQP *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected "Problems" of "Logic"*, translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.
- BT *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Rowe, 1962.
- BTg *Sein und Zeit*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann. 1977.
- BTs *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh and revised by Dennis J. Schmidt. Albany: State University New York Press, 2010.
- CPE *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth May. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999
- CT *The Concept of Time: The First Draft of Being and Time*, translated by Ingo Farin. London: Continuum, 2011
- EGT *Early Greek Thinking*, translated by David Krell & Fran Capuzzi. New York: Harper & Row. 1984
- EHF *The Essence of Human Freedom*, translated by Ted Sadler. London: Continuum, 2002.
- FCM *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- HCE *Hegel's Concept of Experience* translated by Kenley Royce Dove. San Francisco: Harper & Rowe. 1989
- HCT *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, translated by Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- HHI Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister", translated by William McNeill and Julia Davis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
- HPS *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth May. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988
- HS *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67* Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, translated by Charles Seibert. Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1976.
- IM *Introduction to Metaphysics* Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, translated
-

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- by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Have: Yale University Press, 2000.
- IPR *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005.
- KPM *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (fifth edition), translated by Richard Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997
- LH *Letter on Humanism*, translated by Frank Capuzzi in *Basic Writings* (revised edition) edited by David Krell. New York: Harper Perennial, 2008.
- LQT *Logic the Question of Truth*, translated by Thomas Sheehan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
- MFL *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, translated by Michael Heim. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- MWP *My Way to Phenomenology*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, in *On Time and Being*. New York: Harper & Rowe, 1972.
- N(3 & 4) *Nietzsche (Volumes Three and Four)*, translated by David Farrell Krell. San Francisco: Harper & Rowe, 1982.
- OEG *On the Essence of Ground*, translated by William McNeill in *Pathmarks* edited by William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998
- OHF *Ontology - The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, translated by John van Buren. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.
- OWA *The Origin of the Work of Art*, translated by David Krell, in *Basic Writings* edited by David Krell. New York: Harper & Rowe, 2008
- PIA *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, translated by Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.
- PIE *Phenomenology of Intuition And Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation*, translated by Tracy Colony. London: Continuum, 2010.
- PIKC *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth May. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997
- PS *Plato's Sophist*, translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003.
- QCT *The Question Concerning Technology* translated by William Lovitt, in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* edited by William Lovitt. New York: Garland Publishing. 1977.
- QTOE *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* translated and edited by William Lovitt. New York: Garland Publishing. 1977.
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- STHF *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom* translated by Joan Stambaugh. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1985.
- TT *The Thing*, translated by Albert Hofstadter in *Poetry, Language, Thought* edited by Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper Perennial. 2001.
- WCT *What is Called Thinking*, translated by Fred D Wieck and J. Glen Gray. New York: Harper & Rowe. 1968.
- WPF *What are Poets For?*, translated by Albert Hofstadter in *Poetry, Language, Thought* edited by Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper Perennial. 2001.
- WT *What is a Thing?*, translated by W.B. Barton Jr and Vera Deutch. South Bend: Gateway Editions, 1967.
- ZS *Zollikon Seminars: Protocols, Conversations, Letters*, edited by Medard Boss, translated by Franz Mayr & Richard Askay. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 2001

Alternative Translations

For the most part the English translations provided in the texts have been used. In some instances, alternative translations were investigated and adopted where I believed the English translation did not reflect the intent of the German and may hinder an understanding of the text.

Before adapting an alternative translation, consideration was given to the context of the passage and the phenomenon that Heidegger is describing. The relevant German word was identified in the German version of *Being and Time* [BTg] and then alternative English translations of the German were then considered. The endeavour was made to use an English word that both reflected the German word and the phenomenon. My interpretative position was that Heidegger typically sought words the meaning of which reflected the phenomenon.

The main source used for translation was the *Beolingus* German-English online dictionary (<https://dict.tu-chemnitz.de>) published by the Chemnitz Technical University, Germany. This was supplemented by translations from the German-English online dictionary *dict.cc* (<https://www.dict.cc/>) published by Paul Hemetsberger. On various occasions, I explore the meaning of English words to gain a better understanding of their meaning. For the most part I use the *Online Etymology Dictionary (OEA)* (<http://www.etymonline.com/>) which is compiled and

published by Douglas Harper.

An example of this is the German word *Zeugganzheit* which the translators of *Being and Time* translate as “a totality of equipment” [BT 97/68-9]. The relevant word segment *ganz* is typically used in the German to refer to a whole or unity and accordingly I translate this as “a unity of equipment”. This may sound like a minor change but in the context of my interpretation of Heidegger’s approach it is a crucial difference. Important changes in translation are accompanied by a discussion, and the change to *Zeugganzheit* is discussed in Chapter 14. The following translations changes are made as a matter of course when quoting passages and no further comment is made:

Sein: This is translated in BT as Being. In German all nouns are capitalised and there is no reason to capitalise Being, just as there is no reason to capitalise Entity. Accordingly, I translate *Sein* as being.

Woraufhin: This is typically translated in the text as “upon-which” which is misleading and has connotations of an entity. Heidegger generally uses the term to refer to something as being ‘based on’ some aspect of the ontological structure. My preferred translation is therefore “on the basis of which”.

Das Man: This is translated in the text as ‘the They’. The term is used in reference to the average everydayness of the culture in which Dasein lives. This translation is misleading as it suggests a separation of the individual from the culture whereas Heidegger is arguing the individual is part of the culture. I follow Dreyfus and translate this as the ‘One’ (Dreyfus, 1991).

Seinkönnen: This is translated in the text as “potentiality-for-being” and refers to Dasein. The German word *können* is more typically associated with being able or ability. In the thesis I develop the concept of a reciprocal relationship and apply it in a number of situations. I translate *Seinkönnen* as ability-to-be which is an aspect of Dasein’s structure which has a reciprocal relationship with its environment which offers ‘possibilities-for-being’. The reciprocal relationship is thus, (Dasein’s ability) \leftrightarrow (Environmental possibilities).

This is the account of shedding life written by Marion Miller that inspired the title and theme of the thesis. It is from a piece she wrote simply called *You Just Shed Life*¹ concerning her experience of moving into living in a nursing home.

I am indebted to Prof Pearson for the suggestion of including a small piece that describes the phenomenon this thesis addresses from a older person's perspective.

YOU JUST SHED LIFE

By Marion Miller

My name is Marion Miller. I'm eighty-seven. I worked all my life in publishing, public relations, and I was a municipal councillor after I re tired. I had a husband who died about twelve years ago. And I have two clever daughters, five grandchildren and two great-grandchildren. I have been at this nursing home for nearly a year. I came to be here because I had to face the fact that I couldn't live alone any more. And my daughters are both career women. They have no time. Anyway it's a burden to them that neither I nor they would have enjoyed! But it was a hard decision.

My world closed in gradually. In the last few years that I was at home I could still walk, but the distances gradually shrank. First I had to give up the park. Then I had to give up going to the end of the road. And by two years before I came into the nursing home I could only go out to my letterbox. I had a home help who came to shop once a week. I didn't go with her but she knew what I wanted and took a list. She had been with me a long time. And I had someone to come in and clean the house for me, too. I did all my own cooking at that time, although I realised at the end I wasn't doing such good cooking. And people were very kindly bringing in food for the microwave. But I was still living alone. But then the day came of course when I had a fall.

Walking from my chair in the back room to the chair in the front room – which is not a great distance – I knew I wasn't going to get there. But there was nothing I could do. And I crashed over with my walking frame on top of me. Don't ask me how. But ten years ago I fitted an alarm system which I wore around my neck – I never had to use it. By pressing a button on that alarm, people at the central control area would

¹ The story appears in a collection of short stories called *Seven Dying Australians* published in 2003(Kellehear & Ritchie, 2003). Marion's story appears with permission of the authors and the publishers.

alert people close by and they would come and check on me immediately. I had to have four people in my immediate vicinity who would come to me if I called. But I never had to press it in all that time. Once or twice I have accidentally pressed it. I had a thing that I had to press once a day as well, and after that immediately a voice coming from an intercom system would call out, 'Are you alright, Mrs Miller?'

Anyway, on this awful day I crashed over. So all the while I was on the floor – well, not quite on the floor, I got as far as the chair... had my face on the chair – I was able to reach and press it. And immediately I heard someone saying, 'Are you alright, Mrs Miller?' And all I could say was, 'Help, help.' In no time a neighbour from a few doors away arrived, and quite by chance my daughter arrived as well and they couldn't get me out. So they had to get a man – another neighbour – and they got me into my chair. Well, the rot set in from there, really.

I battled on a big longer. I had a chair put in halfway in between my front chair and the kitchen one. And I spent a lot of time on the chair in the front and so on. Not long after that incident I went into St Vincent's Private Hospital. The prosthesis in one hip had gone right through the pelvic bone.

In St Vincent's Private Hospital I met one of the nuns there who was a retired nun, and who was also a counsellor. It was a great help to me because I could talk frankly to her where I couldn't with my children. So I told my children that I knew I had to go to a home. They didn't push me to come here – an experience some people have. And so the hunt for a suitable nursing home began. My daughters saw ten nursing home altogether. You know, more or less in the city – because I lived in the Melbourne suburb of Clifton Hill. At a lot of homes the smell was so bad they need not have bothered to have gone past the door. But this nursing home was, without a doubt, the best. So they applied and I got in. I was very lucky because it's very good here.

I couldn't walk any more, and Dr Perry, who advises about people in my situation, said that I was not mobile enough for a hostel so it had to be a nursing home.

This is largely because my hips were collapsing and in the end I couldn't walk very far any more. I am now basically confined to a wheelchair. And that's terrible. I mean I've always been a very self-sufficient, independent person. I left home at eighteen and came out to Australia from England when I was twenty-three.

Now the only thing that I still can do is wipe my bottom! That's my one little independence. They even need to put me on the loo.

When I worked in publishing I worked mainly in the production department, because in those days production tasks didn't go through outside agencies. They did everything inside, in-house. We had to do the dust-jacket designs, do the publishing blurbs, everything, really. And it was a very exciting time to be in London. It was in the 1930s, and I met some very interesting people.

I came out with some of my Australian friends. Angus and Robertson were the only publishers, but they had nothing to offer me. So I went from job to job for a while and that puts you off after a few years. Well, I mean I had no idea how publishing in Australia was, you see? It is quite different now, over fifty years later.

I began life travelling on an English passport. I went overseas with my husband once and I had to hang about while he got through customs, you know. When I hoped the Republicans would win during the recent referendum I thought that I'd better apply for citizenship before they deported me! So I rang them up, and they asked me when did I come to Australia. So I told them I was here in 1936. They said if you were English you would have automatically become an Australian citizen. I think I was made a citizen in 1946 when everyone from the UK was automatically given nationality. I had voted from the time of my arrival. Anyway, I felt more secure if I had a bit of paper, so I requested a certificate for proof. So I got a certificate that cost me \$50 and I showed it to my home help, who's Sri Lankan, and she said, 'Oh, it is not as big and as good as mine.' We both laughed.

Since coming to the nursing home my life has changed completely. As long as I lived at home – I lived there for thirty years, was a councillor for eight years – so many people I knew dropped in, or rang me up to consult me. I was also writing letters to the papers all the time. And leading a normal life where you can come and go as you please. You know what I mean?

There is much less social life here. My friends are very good about coming to see me but I get very tired after a while. Another change in my life since coming here is my diet. I was a vegetarian all my life – always. But they have no idea what vegetarians eat, here. I mean, they have tried. And I find that I have put on so much weight so I had to stop eating all the uninspired vegies.

They shut the doors to the public at six o'clock here, so people who can only come in the evening I don't see as much of. But thankfully, most people I know can get around to see me during the day. And I get tired. I'm up at seven, at my request, you see. I think I'm probably gradually getting more tired. I wonder whether it is psychological. I mean, I'm quite happy to get into bed at six pm. Well, partly because I've been sitting all day, you see. I listen to the ABC – try to stay awake for Philip Adams at ten.

When I lived at home I had a dear little garden, but in the end I couldn't look after it myself. But I had a lovely girl with whom I became great friends and I always had a cat. Fortunately Buffy, my last cat, died before I had to come in.

Every day I hope that I won't wake up in the morning. I want to die. Sorry, but I do. This will be the end. And I don't expect anything beyond 'the end' either. I'm not religious. They have a very nice woman here, not Church of England, which I was brought up in, of course. It's Uniting Church. She comes to check on me and have a bit of conversation, but I have convinced her that it's too late but she still comes to see me for a general chat. But my views about death have not changed. Let me give you an example.

The nursing home has this monthly discussion group called the 'Chatterly'. It's often boring. But they say to me, 'Oh, you are such a contributor', because I've got the gift of the gab, you know. The topic of the discussion was: What would you do if you won a million dollars? Anyway, I was twelfth person in the group one day and we went round the table. One lady, she'll go to the Begonia Festival in Ballarat. Another person was going to give a large dinner party. And this with a million dollars! I mean. 'Well, I wouldn't give the money to my grandchildren. I don't believe in them having a lot of money,' said another.

So when they got to me I said that if I had a million dollars I'd get a ticket and go to Amsterdam. And I'd pay to have euthanasia. Well! That went down like a lead balloon. It just did. Well, of course I had enough of this and so I got myself out straight after this in my pump-handle wheelchair. Anyway not long after this incident they bring the minutes of the meeting for me to see. And when you read about my suggestion (no names appeared for anyone), it simply read: one lady said that she would take a trip to Holland! So I mean they couldn't even put it on paper! That happened last month.

The main lesson in life that I have learnt in the last nine months is: I've learnt to try and be patient. 'Try' is the word.

You know that my nun friend gave me the prayer that I think people at Alcoholics Anonymous have learnt: 'We should have the serenity to accept what we cannot change and have the courage to alter what we can.' I think that that's awfully true. I hope I have learnt a lot of tolerance. I realise now that in my adult life I lived in my own world. I suppose we all do. I mean if you were a footballer, you mixed with that kind of crowd. I've always been interested in politics and literature, and because I married a journalist, we always knew a lot of journalists who are good people for arguments. And although I met people from all walks of life as a councillor I brushed them off. Most women of my age are only interested in their grandchildren. I think that's extraordinary. They seem to have no other interests. I have always been interested in books. But here I've learnt a lot of PR and... being a bit of a bullshitter, that's very useful here, because it's extraordinary the people who live here.

There are some things that I feel I just can't tolerate and so I complain. I'm sorry. But I just complain. I write complaints. And they are very good and they listen to me. But... I just have to learn to be very patient. It's the hardest thing, patience. I still write pertinent letters.

For example, when I go back to my room I may have to wait quite a while before someone can come and put me into my other chair. You know, that sort of thing. Seems small, but I'm more comfortable in the armchair.

Two other things have also happened. One, I have an eye condition so I can only read big print now. Which means I can't read a lot of current books, so to speak. That's one thing that has happened. And another is my hearing is not as good as it was. My daughters had been telling me for years that it was deteriorating. I didn't believe them. But now I do. Those are rather isolating things now. And the rooms! Well, all I have got is a wardrobe and a chest of drawers where I can put things on top. Of course there are four of us in the room – and the room is so cramped. I brought my own chair with me. They have given me a little thing on wheels, you know, which I have beside my chair, on which I keep my things I really need. I got my box of writing stuff, and brandy and lots of odds and ends and I get furious if anyone touches them, because I know from feel – rather than by sight – where they are.

I used to collect lustre china. But I have given that all away. But fortunately I have grandchildren who are just starting out in life. And they went through a lot of my possessions and I said anything that they didn't want, get rid of them to the Brotherhood or Salvation Army. Because that was a different life. And there is no good hankering over it, is it? No, it is not. Because I know I'll never get back. I don't believe in miracles – I'm here for life. I'm here till I die, which I hope won't be long in coming.

Well, the nursing home experience is all new. I have never been to boarding school or anything. They were very nice to me. They have always been nice to me, but particularly very nice to me at the start. They spent extra time with me, I realise now. And of course, my wonderful daughters are very supportive. So I think the nursing home experience has been largely what I expected it to be.

But I've lost privacy. Good God, you've got no privacy, although they put curtains around you before they do anything. Then I've got nowhere to keep anything. So I got rid of all my treasures, all my presents. Fortunately, I got grandsons setting up a house and a granddaughter. You know kids. I gave away all my books and my pink lustre china. I gave that all away. You just shed life, you do.

People should know that if you find yourself in a place like this that they should not brood about it. Wait till it comes – and then just face it as best as you can. What else can you tell them? It's no good thinking about it ahead.

I mean, in my case, I was old. I mean I've been old quite a while – when I came here I was eighty-six. But I hadn't felt old. When I close my eye, I'm twenty. That's what I feel inside – twenty! And I've obviously kept my younger attitudes because the kids here talk to me about things. And I'm always interested in politics – all the things that I've always been interested in.

Nothing has changed inside. It's only the outside.

I never thought this would happen to me. If I'd known in time I would have done something about it. I hate to think beyond each day. And though there are worse places, the fact is that when it comes to institutional living, there is no good place. No good place.

PREFACE

When the Caring Response Over-Reaches: Responding to the Iatrogenic Effect of Nursing Homes

Communities of people throughout history have developed ways of caring for others in their community who are injured, sick or frail. Regardless of whether this caring response is based on herbs and potions, bloodletting, driving out evil spirits, or the latest in chemo-therapy, across cultures and over time it has typically been based on the best available *understanding* of what works. This basic humanitarian concern is reflected in today's medical, nursing and allied health professions and the basic approach taken continues to reflect the desire to apply the best *understanding* of what works. Over the course of the last hundred years, the medical sciences have made advances that would be unimaginable to peoples of earlier times concerning the understanding and application of knowledge of what works to an increasing range of illnesses and severity of injuries. What we can now do is truly remarkable.

What if, however, the 'best understanding' results in harm that is as significant or greater than what is being addressed by the act of caring, i.e. the act of caring is iatrogenic²? The concept of risk is well known in medicine, identifying and managing risk does not mean that the actions are iatrogenic, even if someone dies. Surgery, for example, has inherent risks but, on balance, the potential benefits outweigh the risk of adverse consequences and as part of this approach the risks are generally identified and ameliorated.

However, this is not always the situation. For example, Hoffman and Welch report on the incidents of surgical interventions for kidney cancers identified following CT scans for other purposes. They found that the risks of the surgery were significant with death rates of 1:50 within a month following surgery, and yet the type of cancers involved were typically not life-threatening (Welch, Skinner, Schroeck, Zhou, & Black, 2018). It is clear that from an objective perspective, that here the benefit/risk characteristic of surgery does not outweigh the benefits being sought. Their findings are part of a growing body of literature raising significant concerns that people are being "overdosed, overtreated and overdiagnosed" as the rapid increase in the

² Iatrogenic is a compilation of two Greek words; *iatros* meaning healer or physician and *genos* essential meaning origins.

sensitivity of screening tools are detecting anomalies that will never cause the person to “experience symptoms or early death.” (Moynihan, Doust, & Henry, 2012, p. 1). This is when the caring response shifts to being iatrogenic, when the desire to apply the best understanding of what works overreaches and harm results.

There is another field within health services where there is significant concern that the caring response is iatrogenic. However, it is one that does not have the same profile as overdiagnosis and overtreatment and largely flies below the radar. It is the use of nursing homes for the provision of care to older people who, due to a chronic illness or age-related frailty, are deemed to be at risk when living at home.

There is now a significant body of literature, extending back over seventy years, that entering a nursing home is associated with an increased risk of premature morbidities and mortalities, emotional distress and depression, even when accounting for the health status of the person. The difficulty is that unlike overdiagnosis, which is understood, at least conceptually, the view of researchers concerning this phenomenon, often called by such names as relocation trauma, or similar, is not understood (Danermark & Ekström, 1990; Ferrah, Ibrahim, Kipsaina, & Bugeja, 2018; Lieberman, 1969). It is, possibly, this lack of understanding that contributes to there being no evidence of any generally accepted and applied formalised interventions designed to prevent, ameliorate or manage the risk associated with this phenomenon of shedding life associated with nursing home care. In the absence of an understanding of the phenomenon and of appropriate risk management, that the research findings indicate moving into a nursing home increases the risk of premature morbidity and mortality for the person, then, in their current form, nursing homes are iatrogenic.

This thesis does not present a detailed review of the literature associated with premature morbidity and mortality associated with moving into a nursing home as this has now been undertaken many times over the decades (Coffman, 1983; Danermark & Ekström, 1990; Ferrah et al., 2018; Holder & Jolley, 2012; Kasl, 1972; Lee, Woo, & Mackenzie, 2002; Lieberman, 1969; Richards, 2011; Sullivan & Williams, 2017). What is provided is a brief overview to ensure the character of the phenomenon (which I term ‘shedding-life’) is brought into view; this is provided in Chapter 1.

That the phenomenon is still not understood, (Danermark & Ekström, 1990; Ferrah

et al., 2018) despite decades of research has been attributed not to the lack of research but the absence of a theoretical framework within which to understand the phenomenon (Danermark & Ekström, 1990). This thesis is a response to that call. The primary aim of the thesis is to develop a theory that can account for the phenomenon and provide a basis for progressing the research, such that we can significantly improve our understanding of what works for older people and do so in a way that minimises the risk of harm.

Given that there has been no material breakthrough in the research for over seventy years, the approach was to re-think the basic relationship between the human person and their environment. The person-environment relationship as a starting point was my best intuitive sense of where a solution was to be found based on my experience of working in the aged-care health sector for almost thirty years. It was also suggested by the characteristics of relocation itself, understood as a move from one environment to another. The approach to investigating this relationship was based on the philosophical research of the German philosopher, Martin Heidegger, who had published his findings concerning the ontological structure of the person in 1927 in his seminal book, *Being and Time*.

Heidegger's work disclosed an inherent structural relationship between the human person and their living environment, such that what this environment provides in terms of meaningful activities is of critical importance to the person in sustaining their wellbeing, or sense of self. This structure indicates that a radical adverse change in the person's life-environment increases the risk of adverse consequences to the wellbeing of the person. This structural phenomenon is universal, it applies to all people, all the time and it has a profound effect on the lives of people. The implication is that adverse or inappropriate life-environments can inhibit or prevent a person from continuing to live a meaningful life, which in turn is manifested in various psychological conditions and other serious health consequences. If this is indeed the case, then the nursing home would be one such example of an inappropriate life-environment for many people.

The result of the thesis work is the articulation of this structural phenomenon in the form of a *Theory of Life-Environment Disruption* which argues that the phenomenon of 'shedding life' is a universal phenomenon, not one confined to a move into a nursing home. It is part of a broader phenomenon that is related to the very character of being human. In that the design and running of the nursing home

largely ignores the necessity of a living-environment appropriate for the ongoing life (meaningful existence) of an older person, the caring response becomes iatrogenic, it causes harm. The *Theory of Life-Environment Disruption* states that if a person's access to the active involvements which constitute their meaningful existence is disrupted then they are at increased risk of psychological and somatic illness and death. The source, character and duration of the disruption will have differing impacts on the risk for each individual person contingent on what constitutes a meaningful life for the person.

The *Theory of Life-Environment Disruption* is grounded in the ontological structure of the person which is its fundamental strength. In terms of its applicability as a theory within the human sciences its general structure satisfies the basic criteria for a theory: it has explanatory power, it has logical consistency with observed empirical observations, it has general predictive powers, it provides a means to identify factors which can be controlled to influence outcomes, and it is verifiable/testable. In its current form, it is a high-level theory, and further work needs to be done to refine it for specific research, policy and practice applications. However, to demonstrate its usefulness, one possible method which can be used immediately within nursing homes has been developed and demonstrated in the thesis (Chapter 21).

In summary, it is recognised that the development and running of nursing homes is motivated by the compassion to implement a caring response based on the best understanding of what works. However, from time to time, such understanding over-reaches or is blind to the consequences, and when this occurs harm may result, the caring response becomes iatrogenic (harmful). It is argued that this is the case with nursing homes which have, by and large, failed to adequately consider the necessity of living a meaningful life. The *Theory of Life-Environment Disruption* has been developed to provide a framework by which the phenomenon of shedding life can be better understood with the hope that nursing homes are transformed such that older people entering them have the possibility of living a meaningful life, and the risk of premature morbidity and mortality is reduced.

More generally, while the thesis commenced from a concern about nursing homes, the phenomenon of shedding-life is a much broader phenomenon. The *Theory of Life-Environment Disruption*, derived from the structure of being a person, provides an account of shedding-life by identifying the essential relationship between the

person and their life-environment. The theory predicts that whenever there is a material disruption to a person's life-environment they are at risk of shedding life and as such the theory has broad applicability for human affairs more generally.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: THE THESIS PROJECT

This chapter introduces the thesis project and provides the context for the project, the strategic approach taken and the research structure of the thesis. Because of the character of the thesis project, Chapter 2 is presented as both a descriptive overview of the thesis findings and an introduction to the thesis content. This approach has been taken to provide an understanding of the thesis as a whole as soon as possible to establish a contextual framework for the work presented in the thesis chapters.

A Brief Account of the Thesis Project

The thesis originated from a desire to understand what was happening with people such that a move to a nursing home, for many of them, resulted in a decline in quality of life, and in some instances premature morbidity and mortality.

I have worked in the aged care sector as a senior executive for almost thirty years, and Marion's account, presented at the beginning of the thesis, has become my paradigm case for the phenomenon of shedding life. The term 'shedding life' captures the essence of much of what I have observed, and reflects, in part, what can be easily found in the research literature, that relocation to a nursing home risks a range of adverse outcomes, including premature morbidity and mortality. At this stage 'shedding life' was a specific phenomenon related to nursing homes.

There is a significant body of research literature, quantitative and qualitative addressing with the problems arising out of relocating into a nursing home and I had explored this as part of earlier research (Richards, 2011). While there is now a general view, albeit by no means a universal consensus, that there is a problem, there is no theoretical explanation to account for problems, and no indication of a systematic response to address it. This project aimed to come to an understanding of what is occurring to people as a result of the relocation, to identify if it accounts for 'shedding life' and if so propose a theory to account for it.

I had naïvely chosen the early philosophical work of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) as the basis of my research. It was naïve because the choice was made based on accounts given in a few social science phenomenological research papers I had read. From these brief encounters I picked up the notion that Heidegger's work provides an account of our relationship

with the world and the initial idea was that if I could learn about Heidegger's work then, perhaps, I could identify some characteristic of that relationship that contributes to 'shedding life'. In that a relocation into a nursing home is a significant change in world, this seemed a reasonable approach. Virtually all the underlying presuppositions I held concerning that choice were wrong.

As I came to understand Heidegger's work as ontological research I recognised that 'shedding life' was grounded in the person's ontological structure, i.e. what constitutes the person, and as such it must, of necessity, be a more general phenomenon and relocation to a nursing home is just one instance. If this is the case then understanding the ontological structure of the person should have applicability more generally, and the phenomenon of 'shedding life' should be evident in other instances of a significant adverse change of world, or disruptions to the life-environment as I have come to name the phenomenon. By way of a preliminary 'proof of concept,' I explored both these aspects and confirmed both the broader applicability of the structural model and other instances of life-environment disruption leading to 'shedding life'. I report on this in Chapters 20 and 21 and cite evidence associated with unemployment, imprisonment of refugees into detention centres, and concentration camps. All these situations share the same basic structure as the relocation to a nursing home and share the same broad range of adverse outcomes. This recognition was a change in understanding concerning the phenomenon and shifted the nursing home relocation to the status of an exemplar case, rather than the primary phenomenon. I readily acknowledge that more research will be required concerning these other cases; however, on the face of it, the basic structure of the phenomenon is applicable and fits the life-environment disruption theory. For the thesis, the nursing home relocation remains the primary example.

In the research literature associated with nursing home relocation, the phenomenon of premature morbidity/mortality has a range of different names. Relocation stress, relocation syndrome, relocation trauma, translocation syndrome, translocation trauma, transplantation shock, transition shock, transition trauma, transition stress, transfer trauma, etc. have all been used (Barnhouse, Brugler, & Harkulich, 1992; Booth, Simons, & Booth, 1989; Choi, Wyllie, & Ransom, 2009; Coffman, 1981; Hodgson, Freedman, Granger, & Erno, 2004; Stones & Gullifer, 2016; Walker, Curry, & Hogstel, 2008). These names all have the same elements; firstly, a move

(relocation, translocation, transition, transfer) and secondly, an adverse consequence associated with the move (trauma, stress, shock, syndrome). While I had no difficulties with these terms when I considered them against the broader phenomenon they did not quite fit. When I researched the qualitative research literature (Richards, 2011), there was clear evidence of a greater range of adverse outcomes than is covered by trauma, stress, shock, etc. and it is for this reason I chose the term 'shedding life', inspired by Marion Miller's description.

Initially, I used 'shedding life' as a 'working title' for the entire phenomenon of the move and the adverse consequences and still do at times. More recently I have introduced the term, 'life-environment disruption' and when I use it with 'shedding life', the latter specifically covers only the adverse consequences that may arise from such a disruption.

In that the concept of life-environment disruption is ontologically based, I would expect it to apply to any situation where there is a significant disruption to one's life-environment. For example, I would hypothesise, that 'shedding life' will be observed among elite athletes who have dedicated their lives to a sport then suddenly it's over, as well as among people who are forced out of their chosen career or life path as a result of a sudden traumatic illness or accident. The concept of a 'disruption to life-environment' is meant to cover all these types instances, i.e. it is not limited to relocations. This does not mean that all people who experience a life-environment disruption will experience 'shedding life', nor does it suggest that when experienced it is permanent or necessarily severe or fatal. Variability will occur based on the extent of the disruption, and the importance of what is disrupted, the capacity to access alternatives (e.g. a new job in the same field), capacity to respond to a new life-environment, ability to project beyond the current situation, and so on. Understanding what contributes to this variability will help map out the determinants of 'shedding life', and the ameliorating factors and enable it to be applied more generally; this is a post-doctoral research program.

Why a Theory is Needed

In 2015 there were approximately 7,000,000 older people in nursing homes in OECD countries (OECD.Stat, 2018; Wilson, Brow, & Playfair, 2017) and with the ageing of the world population expected to continue for many decades (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2015) the

demand for nursing home care is anticipated to steadily increase (World Health Organisation , 2011). Perhaps surprisingly, for over seventy years there has been a consistent stream of research reporting on the harm associated with a move into a nursing home and yet despite this plethora of research this phenomenon of harm remains unexplained. Kant famously commented that the situation in which we must accept the existence of things outside of ourselves on the basis of belief rather than proof is “a scandal to philosophy”³. What I ponder is how much more scandalous that tens of millions⁴ of older people pass through nursing homes and yet we have failed to address the issue of harm that nursing homes may be causing.

Over forty years ago, in 1969 Lieberman, published(Lieberman, 1969) one of the first literature reviews, covering over 50 papers from the 1950s and 1960s, on the effects of institutionalization on older people and noted that the ;

effects of institutionalization on the psychological well-being and physical integrity of aged adults had been a question of humanitarian interest since the late nineteenth century and of scientific inquiry for 30 years” (Lieberman, 1969, p. 330)(my underlining).

Leiberman’s work was motivated by the results of a number of research studies which suggested that mortality rates following a move to a nursing home were higher than expected for older people (Aldrich & Mendkoff, 1963; Camargo & Preston, 1945; Kay, Norris, & Post., 1956; Whittier & Williams, 1956). Perhaps the first of these studies, that by Camargo and Preston published in 1945 (Camargo & Preston, 1945), reported mortality rates 2½ to 11½ times the rate in the general population for people aged over 65 during the year following admission to 'mental hospitals' while Aldrich and Mendkoff (Aldrich & Mendkoff, 1963) reported that the “social and psychologic effect” from relocation can be “lethal”(p192).

Lieberman observed that the common-sense view that institutions had adverse effects on the psychological well-being and survival of people appears to be supported. He reached this conclusion citing a number of studies indicating that older people in nursing homes shared a range of characteristics such as;

- poor adjustment
- depression and unhappiness

³ The comment appears in a footnote within the Preface of the Second Edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*. (Kant, 1998, k. 2887)

⁴ Will the current number of places is around 7,000,000 (excluding all non-OECD countries), this is a snapshot and does not account for the ‘turn-over’ or older people entering and dying in nursing homes over the years.

-
- negative self-image
 - feelings of personal insignificance

Further, he reported, the people tended to

- be docile and submissive
- show a low range of interests and activities
- to live in the past rather than the future
- show signs of increased anxiety which at times focuses on feelings of death.

Drawing from the research literature Lieberman states that it was clearly demonstrated that older people living in a range of institutional settings *were not only worse off psychologically but likely to die sooner than older people living in the community*. He adds, however, that "without additional information, all of this research is worthless ... in determining whether life in the institutions induces such effects." (p. 332) Lieberman noted that in the research concerning this phenomenon that there was a range of methodological challenges to overcome before any conclusions could be reached, including the need for more longitudinal studies, consistent use of more sensitive assessment instruments, more comparative analysis between institutions and so on. One of the summary findings he made heralded a new focus in studies as he noted that there

... appears to be considerably more destructive effects associated with radical environmental change (*entrance* into institutions) than the residence in an institution. (p. 336).

The interesting thing to note was the emphasis on the radical change in environments. This was the first time that it is suggested that the change to (or disruption) from the home environment itself is what does the damage. Lieberman indicated that if you survive this change without any adverse impact on your health and wellbeing, you may be all right. However, as this thesis highlights, this is a significant barrier to pass through, and the risks are extremely high, with, perhaps, the vast majority failing to pass safely.

In 1990, twenty years after the Lieberman review, Danermark and Ekström published a review (Danermark & Ekström, 1990) of the health effects on the elderly associated with the relocation into, within and between nursing homes and to another community-based home. In the intervening period since the Lieberman review, they found research reports publishing inconsistent findings as to the adverse effects of relocation. In studies identified as having a good methodological

quality, they identified reports of increased mortality and adverse health outcomes while in others no such effects were noted. Danermark and Ekström observed that, in the main, due to differences in methodological approaches and a lack of a common, if any, theoretical basis, it was not possible to draw any general conclusion. They did conclude, however, that

... there is good reason for assuming that relocation under certain circumstances and for certain groups **does lead to ill health and to an increase in mortality.** (p. 44). (my bolding)

Since this review there continues to be a steady stream of research findings reporting various adverse effects arising from the relocation of older people into nursing homes. The variety of negative consequences include depression, increased sense of loneliness and alienation, decrease in functional competence, cognitive decline, decline in general condition, increases in falls, injuries, behavioural problems and premature morbidity (Aneshensel, Pearlin, Levy-Storms, & Schuler, 2000; Castle, 2001; Ferrah et al., 2018; Mantey et al., 2012; Mezuk, Rock, Lohman, & Choi, 2014; Scocco, Fantoni, Rapattoni, De Girolamo, & Pavan, 2009; Scocco, Rapattoni, & Fantoni, 2006; Tuckett, 2007).

In 2011, some forty years after the Lieberman's study, I completed a literature review of the quantitative research literature (Richards, 2011) on the effects of relocation into a nursing home and the results were similar to those of Danermark and Ekström. The literature review was part of the preparatory stage for a systematic review of the qualitative research literature reporting on the experiences of older people relocating into nursing homes. The main research approach in the field has been the use of quantitative research methodologies, however commencing in the 1980s there have been a small, but gradually increasing number of research projects using a qualitative approach, and it was on this body of research that the systematic review was focussed. While there are sufficient inconsistencies in the quantitative research to prevent any conclusive findings concerning the adverse outcome of relocation to a nursing home, the results of the systematic review focusing on people's reported experiences were unequivocal as to the significant psychological and emotional harm,

While the clinical and personal care aspects of the services in nursing homes⁵ appear satisfactory there is a failure to recognise the significant psychological and emotional issues

⁵ The abbreviation LTCF was in the quoted passage standing for long term care facility. This has been changed to nursing home for consistency.

faced by older people as they relocate and struggle to adapt to new environments, develop new relationships, learn a new set of rules to survive, create a sense of place, establish new identities and create new meaning for their lives. The review indicates there is little in the way of support for these life transition processes and many people fail to make a successful transition. (Richards, 2011, p. 4)

That review was the first of its kind and incorporated 14 studies, covering a period of 25 years and 6 different countries. The accounts of the significant emotional and psychological harm echoed consistently from these reports, regardless of the date or place of the study. These reports were of the 'shedding life' phenomenon and are perhaps best summed up by the comments of a participant in a 2006 study contained in the review:

Regina, an 85-year-old woman with expressive aphasia, tried hard to describe what it was like for her to be at the facility. She cried out, "They don't know the meaning of me! They don't know the meaning of me." Her comments reflect being unknown in an unfamiliar new neighborhood. (Heliker & Scholler-Jaquish, 2006, p. 38)

The experiences reported are not those of everybody entering a nursing home, and I have known people who have thrived. However, those that do well and whose quality of life improves on entering a nursing home *are a minority*. There are many who seem to accept the inevitability of it, resign themselves to their fate and begrudgingly put up with it, while another significant group simply withdraw. Marion Miller is a rarity, not in terms of her experience, but in terms of ability to articulate what was happening to her and her preparedness to write down those experiences with such clarity. This is why her account is the one I use as my paradigm case.

The above is far from an adequate historical review of the research, that is not the intent. The purpose is simply to highlight that from the time of the first reported research findings by Camargo and Preston published in 1945 (Camargo & Preston, 1945) there has been an ongoing stream of research focusing on the harm associated with a relocation into a nursing home, that continues through to today. For example a systematic review of this literature was published early this year (2018). The review reported mortality rates within the first six months of moving into a nursing home of up to 34% and that while some of this was accounted for by existing morbidities, the report concluded that "mortality in the immediate period following admission may not simply be due to an individual's health status" (Ferrah et al., 2018, p. 584).

However, despite seven decades of inquiry researchers are still acknowledging that

the phenomenon of premature morbidity and mortality remains not well understood (Ferrah et al., 2018; Sullivan & Williams, 2017). Repeatedly over the decades, this lack of consensus in the research literature has been attributed to the diversity of methodologies and various methodological problems (Coffman, 1981; Danermark & Ekström, 1990; Ferrah et al., 2018; Gutman & Herbert, 1976; Thorson & Davis, 2000). As if to underscore this Ferrah et al. recently noted that in this field, “[b]etter empirical evidence is required, to determine how and to what extent the process of transition into long-term care influences subsequent mortality.” (Ferrah et al., 2018, p. 598) To be very clear, they are saying that notwithstanding more than *seventy years* of empirical research that even in 2018 we don’t have sufficient empirical evidence to understand what is going on and we need more research! Yet older people are still entering nursing homes and still experiencing unexplained deaths and illnesses.

In 1990 Danermark and Ekström (Danermark & Ekström, 1990) noted that a significant majority of the empirical research, which has only grown in volume since 1990, has been atheoretical, and mainly of an exploratory character. They concluded that it is the lack of theory that stands in the way of developing the necessary common methodologies and approaches necessary for the development of a cohesive body of knowledge in the field necessary for understanding and subsequent action. Arguing against the recent call by Ferrah, et al. (Ferrah et al., 2018) for more research, in 1990 Danermark and Ekström noted;

Our survey of more than three decades of research in this field demonstrates with great clarity that there is very little new knowledge to be acquired from a continued atheoretical gathering of data with the aid of quantitative methods. (Danermark & Ekström, 1990, p. 36) (my underlining)

Their prediction, made over a quarter of a century ago, that “very little new knowledge” will be acquired by ongoing “atheoretical” quantitative methods has proven to be correct⁶.

⁶ I am referring specifically to a theory that accounts for the ‘shedding of life’ phenomenon. There have been studies that have used a theory as part of their research. By way of example, McKenna used the concept of the social construct of ageism in relation to an older person’s self-perception (McKenna & Staniforth, 2017), in a review of the literature Holder and Jolley make reference to Social Selection Theory, i.e. essentially people with poorer health move into nursing homes therefore are at higher risk of mortality (Holder & Jolley, 2012), Meleis’ transition has been applied within the literature but more by way of classification of the stages of transition (Sullivan & Williams, 2017) and the Moos & Shaefer’s model of life crisis and transition has also been used (Komatsu, Hamahata, & Magilvy, 2007). The latter two tend to normalise adverse effects of transition and flagging a need for nurses to monitor and provide interventions to assist the transition. None of the theories used that I have identified attempt to provide a theory as to why the adverse outcomes occur and/or they are

Unlike the quantitative empirical research, there is almost a unanimous consensus in the qualitative literature that relocation to nursing homes is associated with significant adverse emotional and psychological experiences as two recent reviews of this literature report (Richards, 2011; Sullivan & Williams, 2017). However, this body of work is typically descriptive and not theoretically based. While useful in understanding the qualitative characteristics of the phenomenon, it typically does not drive change in policy or practice, notwithstanding it is strongly suggestive that something is indeed seriously wrong.

In that change can be typically driven more readily by quantitative research, in this instance, there is a problem. Such research needs to identify a theoretical framework for understanding the problem, to be able to identify contributing factors and offer ways of mitigation and so on. Unfortunately, the empirical, qualitative research in this field ended in a cul-de-sac long ago having failed to propose a satisfactory theoretical framework. As Danermark and Ekström noted decades ago, we don't need more research we need a theory. This thesis is a response to this call, motivated, to misquote Leiberman, by humanitarian concern.

The Structure of the Phenomenon

The term 'shedding life'⁷ is adapted from the autobiographical account by Marion Miller she titled *You Just Shed Life* (Miller, 2003). In it, Marion describes the impact on her life of increased frailty which eventually resulted in a fall, broken hip, and a move to a nursing home. The term 'shedding life' comes from the following passage of Marion's account;

I think the nursing home experience has been largely what I expected it to be.

But I've lost privacy. Good God, you've got no privacy, although they put curtains around you before they do anything. Then I've got nowhere to keep anything. So I got rid of all my treasures, all my presents. ... I gave away all my books and my pink lustre china. I gave that all away. **You just shed life, you do.** ...

I mean, in my case, I was old. I mean I've been old quite a while – when I came here I was eighty-six. But I hadn't felt old. When I close my eye, I'm twenty. That's what I feel inside – twenty! ... Nothing has changed inside. It's only the outside.

... I hate to think beyond each day. ... there are worse places, the fact is that when it comes to institutional living, there is no good place. No good place. (Miller, 2003, pp. 36-7) (my

aged care specific whereas I am arguing that it is a more general phenomenon.

⁷ The reference to loss and shedding is typically used in aged care with reference to the various possessions that must be given up. What struck me in Marion's use was the linking of the term to her life.

bolding)

Three key observations can be made concerning Marion's account. First is the linking of the loss of important things to shedding life. I take it that it is not the loss of the physical objects themselves that is the shedding, it Marion's life. In some way, her life was connected to these objects and when they went so did the possibilities of her living a life that involved them. Marion is not using the term life in the sense that a biologist would use the term, e.g. in referring to all the forms of life on earth. She is referring to life in the sense of something she lives; the same sense Frank Sinatra famously sang in the Paul Anka song *My Way*(Anka, 1968);

I've lived a life that's full
I travelled each and ev'ry highway
And more, much more than this, I did it my way

For Marion, living a life occurred along the 'highway' associated with books, as a collector of pink lustre China and as a social activist; then all these possibilities vanished. Nothing meaningful to Marion, in term of her life, has replaced them, and she was left with very few 'roads' to travel that hold an interest for her; her life has shed.

The second point of note is Marion's reference to two distinct aspects of herself. The inside, which I take to be Marion's reference to herself as a person and the outside which is a reference to her body. Notwithstanding the chronological age of her body being in the late 80s, her experienced self is 20. This difference in chronological age and experienced age has been widely observed and commented on in the literature(Chopik, Bremner, Johnson, & Giasson, 2018). Interestingly, the almost seventy-year difference Marion speaks of is significantly larger than the 20% younger than chronological age that has been reported(Rubin & Berntsen, 2006). However, it is not the age difference per se I am interested in, it is the phenomenon of the self as a distinct, even if related, phenomenon to the body; this is the aspect with which I am interested. This in no way indicates support for some metaphysical understanding of the self, and it accepts that there is a relationship between self and body, just a complex one that science has yet to uncover. This concept of the self as being a separate entity capable of being investigated in its own right is crucial to the thesis. It is this entity that I take Heidegger to be researching, and it is this entity that the project seeks to clarify as to its ontological structure and the relationship with its life-environment.

The third point is the obvious distress Marion experiences in living in the nursing home; she hates to think beyond each day, and she would rather be dead. I take this distress as one way in which shedding life is experienced. As indicated, I apply the term not just to this type of distress but also to premature morbidity and mortality generally when it is associated with a life-environment disruption.

In understanding Marion's' life-environment it can be seen in terms of the tangible assets and people that have meaning for her. However, it can also be understood in terms of the unique set of possibilities for expressing her existence, for allowing Marion to be Marion. The loss of books and pink lustre china cut off one set of possibilities, the loss of access to her friends and contacts cut off another set of possibilities. It is the loss of the possibilities that prevents Marion doing the things that relate to being Marion; this is the shedding of life that is then manifested in distress. One can almost hear Marion saying, "I no longer have the possibility to be who I am, and there is never going to be such a possibility in this place ... there is no longer anything for me to look forward to as Marion." Put another way Marion sees her life is over. The distress that is evident in Marion's account does not reflect the distress of the body, albeit it can manifest signs of the distress, it is Marion herself who is distressed.

Marion's account does not mean that her bodily frailty did not contribute to a decline in possibilities within her life-environment, I suspect it did, but the final blow was the nursing home, which literally left Marion wishing for a *coup de grâce*. There appears to be a disruption arising from the initial frailty at home and then a second disruption arising from the move to the nursing home. However, Marion's account suggests that she was able to adapt to many of the initial losses and that until the moment she moved from her home there appeared to be some residual core of possibilities that sustain and nourished who Marion was. It was this core that vanished on the move to the nursing home which is why I suspect she targets the nursing home as delivering the final, and mortal, blow to her life.

By way of note, to date, I have found nothing in the research literature that addresses the changing nature of life-environment possibilities and associated adaption strategies related to sustaining a sense of self as an older person moves from fit and active at home to frail in a nursing home. This is in part, I suspect, a product of 'naming' the phenomenon as 'relocation stress', etc., which focuses the research on the relocation itself, something the 'disruption' theory overcomes.

Researching this phenomenon and understanding what constitutes 'core' life-environment possibilities and how to recognise them is essential if supportive strategies are going to be implemented to care for the 'person' as the body ages and becomes frailer. This will be a post-doctoral research project, and one that I suspect will also assist in better understanding the characteristics that are associated with person-centred care.

Based on the Marion Miller case we can thus tentatively identify that the phenomenon of shedding life is one that is primarily associated with the self, and the relationship between self and possibilities for being oneself that are accessible in the environment. Even though the phenomenon is associated with the self, it may manifest in the body, and this needs to be addressed.

The basic structure of the phenomenon⁸ that this thesis is addressing in terms of the life-environment disruption theory is as follows:

A disruption to accessing possibilities for involvements in meaningful activities in one's life-environment such that being one's self, in whole or in part is no longer possible, resulting in a range of adverse consequences (i.e. shedding life).

The challenge then is to find a theory that has the following elements;

- takes seriously the concept of the person (or self) as an entity,
- that in some way links self and the life-environment in some dependent way, such that,
- a disruption to the access of possibilities in the life-environment results in a disruption to the self; and finally
- posits a relationship between the self and the body such that disruptions in the life-environment flow through as adverse consequences experienced both psychologically and somatically.

I would add that when first mapping this out, my notion of the self was vague and ill-defined as was any sense of the relationship between self and body and more importantly self and life-environment. While I had no idea how to conceive of any of this, it was my starting point, a rough outline of the project.

There is nothing profound in any of this; there is no ground-breaking insight. I

⁸ While not in these precise words or with this clarity the view that the environment matters in terms of a sense of wellbeing and quality of life is one that I have held and based my practice on for many years; this can be seen from the briefly account of my aged care background (refer Appendix 1).

suspect that most people would accept points 1,3 and 4 and when I have spoken with indigenous Australians and people born and raised on the land in rural areas they seem to articulate a resonance with 2.

By and large, the health sciences, inform the understanding of the basic design and running of nursing homes works, and the health sciences typically operate within the materialist paradigm⁹. Under this paradigm, the self is typically associated with conscious awareness and psychological characteristics such as emotions, and so forth. This aspect of being human is not the primary concern of health sciences as their remit is primarily concerned with tending to the body. This doesn't mean that 'feelings' and experiences are unimportant, just that they don't count in providing explanatory accounts behind such things as morbidity and mortality, which are seen primarily as bodily concerns. Consequently, there is, I suspect, a deep-seated reluctance to be open to the possibility that phenomena as a relocation to a new environment can be having these adverse effects. Even for felt experience and conscious awareness, there is a belief that these have a neuronal basis and will eventually be explained by understanding the neuronal activity of the brain¹⁰. The idea of taking the self seriously as causally linked to the phenomenon of shedding life, while possibly having some broader cultural support runs contrary to currently accepted thinking.

This doesn't mean that I wasn't a materialist in the general understanding of the term, I was. However, based on my own experiences and my shared sense of the 'humanitarian' imperative to better understand the phenomenon of 'shedding life' I couldn't so readily ignore the experiential aspect of the phenomenon. I just had a dogged intuitive view¹¹ that we are somehow missing something, that there must be a way of accounting for the phenomenon that takes into account both the material

⁹ I will discuss this in more detail below.

¹⁰ . That this is a view still prevalent in science is reflected in the comments of the contemporary neuroscientist Susan Greenfield (1950 -), who, in a recent lecture tour of Australia, commented that neuroscience research into consciousness is still looked upon with suspicion and is still regarded as a "career limiting move" (Huntington, 2012). This perspective is also held by the Christof Koch (1956 -) who recounts that his colleagues thought he was "crazy" when he mentioned he was going to research consciousness with Francis Crick(1916-2004) (Burkeman, 2015)and that even a "few years ago one could not use the word 'consciousness' in a paper, for, say, Nature or Science, nor in a grant application"; albeit Koch believes this is slowly changing(Koch, 2004, p. xiii-xiv).

¹¹ I now recognise that my pathway into this research helps to explain this 'doggedness'. My initial education and professional experience is outside the world of science, so I lacked the inculcated 'scientific' world-view that the experiences expressed in the above points could form part of any theoretical causal account involving the material. I was, in a sense, free to think otherwise.

and the experiential.

It is the structure of the phenomenon and the indicative characteristics of a theory to explain it that suggested the strategic approach for the research.

Strategic Approach Taken

Arising out of the structure of the phenomenon the strategic position adopted for the thesis research was to accept that the evidence from both the quantitative and qualitative research were *both* presenting different aspects of the *same 'truth'* concerning what was occurring in relocations to a nursing home. When I commenced, I held the view that pursuing one of these perspectives could lead to an understanding of what was happening, (a view that has since changed¹²). Based on my background and the strength and characteristics of the evidence from the qualitative literature this was the path I chose. Perhaps more pragmatically, the approach was also informed by my lack of the necessary detailed understanding of human physiology to pursue the alternative path. There was, as such, a historical bias to my choice.

However, to be clear, I did not rely on the qualitative research findings as given but surmised that these findings arose out of some fundamental and common characteristic of being human that gave rise to those expressed experiences. In other words, the qualitative accounts only indicated the direction that I would pursue, i.e. the way not the means; this was the first major decision regarding the strategic approach.

It was an openness to qualitative aspects of the phenomenon that led me to the work of Martin Heidegger and his research into the ontological structure of Dasein, his name for the person. This was the second major decision and determined the strategic approach to 'means'. It was in the implementation of this second strategic decision concerning the use of Heidegger's research that led to the research taking

¹² This view that either path would lead to an understanding I now believe to be mistaken. I think it is highly dubious that I would have reached an understanding of the ontological structure of the person via a path suggested by the quantitative research. This does not mean that another theoretical explanation was precluded by this means, nor that 'a solution' was unobtainable along this route. All that is required is a sufficient large-scale investment of funds into the appropriate research using various cohort research approaches, longitudinal studies, etc. Just as this type of approach has disclosed the social determinants of health, I am highly optimistic that appropriate research would disclose the relevant determinants of premature morbidity and mortality. Why such funding for research has not been provided is itself an interesting topic for research.

the direction it did.

While both challenging and demanding of perseverance, coming to understand Heidegger's body of research proved fruitful both in accounting for the experiences reported in the qualitative research and in providing a link to explain the physiological basis of the adverse effects of relocation. However, this came at a cost, and the major emphasis of the thesis now concerns this encounter with Heidegger's work, making it intelligible and ensuring its applicability. This requires a few remarks to clarify the nature of the challenge.

Starting out researching information on Heidegger it doesn't take long to find that he is regarded as one of the major philosophical figures in the twentieth century. Dreyfus and Wrathall comment that his work has "been appropriated by scholars in fields as diverse as philosophy, classics, psychology, literature, history, sociology, anthropology, political science, religious studies, and cultural studies" (Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2005, p. 1). This information provided some comfort, seeming to confirm my choice. The picture this initially painted supported the notion that there would be ample material from which to, relatively easily, 'learn' the necessary ontological structure of Dasein and, from there, explore its implications to the life-environment and the relationship to 'shedding life'; this did not happen. As I delved into the literature, I quickly learned that 'appropriating' Heidegger's work often meant being influenced by an interpretation of some of his concepts, rather an appropriation based on a deep engagement with his philosophical research and findings. In the field I was interested in, nursing research, there is still an unresolved controversy in this literature, over the very legitimacy of it as 'Heideggerian' (Crotty, 1996; Paley, 1998; Petrovskaya, 2014b). In the field of philosophy, I discovered that most "philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition seem to think that Heidegger was an obscurantist muddlehead at best" (Searle, 2000), largely I take it, due to Heidegger's approach, writing style and subject matter. But worse than this, there are Heideggerian scholars with an even more worrying view in the context of my work. Sheehan, for example, remarks that often Heideggerian scholars continuing to use Heidegger's language in an uninterpreted way and in so doing are engaged in "narcissistic babbling", that it is simply "*Heideggergack* (Heidegger cackling)"¹³ (Sheehan, 2015, kl 239). Others note that his work is such that there is little

¹³ He was endorsing comments by one of Heidegger's contemporaries, Karl Jaspers.

consensus among Heideggerian scholars on many aspects of his work, or how to deal with it (Faulconer & Wrathall, 2000). Perhaps, given this, it is not surprising that I failed to find an accessible account and explanation of Heidegger's work, as a basis for 'learning' about the structure of Dasein in either the social science literature or the philosophical literature. I provide a more detailed account of this in Appendix 3, Finding Heidegger.

Given the research approach I had chosen, my only alternative was to engage with Heidegger's work directly, which, as indicated by the above comments, presented its own problems. Even among professional philosopher's Heidegger's *Being and Time* is viewed as a notoriously difficult book to understand (Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2005; Gorner, 2007). Kisiel notes that the difficulty of comprehending it is legendary (Kisiel, 1995) and Guignon observes that its accessibility is not assisted by its "heavy Teutonic tone and tortuous style" (Guignon, 1986, p. 4). Even without this, like all technical books written within a scholarly discipline, it contains specialised philosophical terminology that needed to be decoded, and an assumption of a reasonable level of understanding of philosophy and the history of Western thought (Polt, 1999). Having now spent a couple of years focused on understanding Heidegger's work, I can only concur with these observations. *Being and Time* is a difficult book and it was the necessity to engage with it directly, to wrench from it Heidegger's account of Dasein's structure that directly accounts for a substantial part of the thesis. Rather than a few chapters presenting the structure of Dasein and its interrelationship with world, gleaned from sources presenting a common view, and simply confirming this with *Being and Time*, I had to work through and carve out my interpretation. Heidegger's work is neither speculative or theoretically based, it is empirically based philosophical research, and as such *Being and Time* is his research report, presenting his findings from an inquiry into Dasein's ontological structure. It was the allure of understanding this structure as something 'real', that appealed and provided the motivation to continue. This was a long and laborious task as I struggled to make sense of what Heidegger was presenting, and accounts to a large degree, why the engagement with Heidegger's work came to dominate the thesis. Had I been aware of the time and cost involved at the beginning of the project I doubt I would have pursued this course.

While Heidegger uses a phenomenological methodology in his research, I take his

research approach to fit within the larger family of empirically¹⁴ based approaches (addressed in Chapter 10). While difficult, Heidegger's approach can be summed up relatively simply; he makes observations at the entity level, classifies them according to basic common characteristics, extracting their defining characteristics (this is the ontological step) and then based on logical analysis, orders them, typically in a sequential (hence time) relationship. The difficulty arises in understanding what it is he is observing and how he is applying his logical analysis. He never makes any of this clear, and his descriptions, naming practices of the different classifications of observations, the language issues and so on, all work together to make his approach seem rather opaque. However, once I understood his work as empirically based it meant that *I* should be able to observe what *he* is observing, and this became one of my key strategies, to learn by doing. Often once I could 'see' the phenomenon I was then better able to understand his account. Perhaps the best example of this is given in Chapter 13 when I present a series of mini-experiments aimed at demonstrating that when we see something, the understanding of what it is, is not in the 'physical' appearance of it.

The shift from trying to understand Heidegger's work as a difficult topic in a theoretical sense, to one based on observations of 'real' world phenomena was critical in eventually understanding his work. This also shifted the research from simply commencing with learning a plausible theoretical account of being a person, to actively being engaged in confirming Heidegger's observations and logical analysis. Having claimed my own experiential based understanding of the structure of Dasein, I would be in a far better position to apply it.

In summary, the strategic approach for my inquiry shifted slightly, from reaching an understanding of Heidegger's work to using this work as *a way to* obtain a direct understanding of the structure of the person. As part of this, I would carry out some basic exercises to 'test' the understanding. I left open the possibility that I may not gain a sufficient understanding to complete the task, or that I could not support Heidegger's account, in which case the attempt to establish a life-disruption theory grounded on the structure of the person fails on this attempt.

¹⁴ While I claim Heidegger's, work is empirically based this should not be confused with the theory of knowledge known as empiricism, as for example, reflected in the work of the British empiricists, which has inherent in it presuppositions concerning the nature of the world and mind which Heidegger rejects. My account of Heidegger's empirical approach is addressed in Chapter 10.

Basic Structure of the Research Approach

Following the strategic approach, the basic structure of work followed;

- Identify the ontological structure of Dasein guided, primarily, by Heidegger's research findings presented in *Being and Time* with a particular emphasis on the self-world relationship.
- Interrogate the structure to determine in what way, if any, a breakdown in the self-world relationship may adversely impact on Dasein's (the person's) life. If there is such an adverse impact then,
- Articulate a theory of life environment disruption.

As discussed above, Heidegger's work presented in *Being and Time* is abstract and philosophical, but one of its appeals is that it is based on real' world observable phenomenon of people going about their average daily activity. Given that this is his approach, I was determined, at least to a sufficient degree, to ensure my understanding was not based on a convincing theoretical account but grounded in my observations and analysis. In many instances, the observational part is relatively straightforward, for example, at one point in talking about a room he simply lists everything. " ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room." [BT 97/68]. Where the challenge comes is what he says about these observations, for example, this list was given to illustrate the point that "Equipment - in accordance with its equipmentality - always is *in terms of* its belonging to other equipment." He then goes on

These 'Things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of *realia* and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something 'between four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the 'arrangement' emerges, and it is in this that any 'individual' item of equipment shows itself. [BT 97-8/68]

Initially, as hard as I tried, I could not 'see' what he was describing. For several years the pen, paper, desk and so forth showed themselves as individual objects in themselves. Sure, I knew the pen writes on the paper, and the paper is on the desk, etc. but this is not the arrangement Heidegger is talking about. It is essentially a relational network that exists between the way of being of these entities that forms a unified space in which we reside, in this case, a study. I provide an introductory account of this concept in Chapter 2. In other words, Heidegger is giving a

descriptive account of what he is 'seeing' but what he is 'seeing' is not the physical aspect of the entity, it is their being. This is the reduction aspect of his phenomenological method which I also discuss in Chapter 2. I eventually understood that Heidegger rejects the materialist account of things, which started to make room for an alternative account of what things are.

I would suspect that the passage and my comments are incomprehensible to anyone first reading them or without a grounding in Heidegger's phenomenology. The point I am illustrating is that although his approach can be simply stated, the difficulty arises in what he is doing, it is not observing in the way we would typically understand. However, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger never makes any attempt to set out in an intelligible way what he is doing. Passages like the one above are presented without any further explanation or guidance. For me, it took a long time gathering pieces from different parts of Heidegger's work and then re-reading passages such as the one above till I had a coherent understanding of what he is describing. So when I talk about attempting to observe the phenomena he is describing it is not that straightforward.

I mentioned that Heidegger moves from observation to describing ontological structures, and I want to give a simple example to illustrate this. An ontological structure refers to the essential defining characteristics applicable to all individual things (entities) of the same type. A very simple example relates to a circle; its ontological structure can be described as a figure on a plane, such that all the points on its boundary are equidistant from a fixed point. To arrive at this many different circles can be observed as to their characteristics, and from this, the ontological structure identified from the observations and applying some basic analysis. It works because all circles must have this defining characteristic as part of their structure *to be* a circle.

Heidegger is attempting to find the ontological structure that determines what it is *to be* a person. To be a person, everyone must have the same essential structure and so, just as in the case of the circle, Heidegger gets to the ontological structure by first making observations at the individual level and then analysing them. There is a catch. A circle is a mathematical object, a geometric shape, and for this class of entities, I don't think Heidegger has difficulty in using observations based on measurements of the entity itself. However, this would be akin to trying to measure, or describe the characteristics of the human body, Heidegger rejects this. The

essential characteristics of the person have nothing to do with the body. The way of being human, for Heidegger, is found, primarily, in the character of our relationships with other people and our relationships with the things we put to use in our lives. It is the characteristics of these relationships he observes, and the analyses to determine the necessary basis by which they can occur. By way of a simple example, to be able to use a hammer (an observation of a type of relationship), we must first know-how (a category of understanding); part of the structure for being human therefore must be associated with the capacity to know-how, to use tools. As mentioned, this is a very simple example, and the complexity of Heidegger's observations and analysis rapidly increases.

My approach then, was on the view that if I was able to follow his work through to the ontological level, and if my analysis was correct I should be able to apply it to a range of research inquiries concerning Dasein. It follows naturally from the fact that an ontological structure is universally applicable to any human person. The idea was to undertake a 'proof of concept' by applying my analysis to several different areas, and I present this in Chapter 20. The idea for this comes from Heidegger's work in which he claims that his analysis of Dasein's structure is an essential precursor for a range of scientific endeavours involving Dasein, e.g. biology, psychology, history and so on [BT] (discussed further in Chapter 11).

Having 'tested' the structural analysis in a general way the final task would be to identify if the structure could be used to account for a disruption in the life-environment and then apply it to the Marion Miller case; I undertake this in Chapter 21. If this proved to be the case, then there would then be a clear link between the ontological structure of Dasein and the three-part structure of the life-environment disruption problem set out earlier. This would then be sufficient to articulate a theory, based on the ontological structure of the person, in such way as to account for the phenomenon of shedding life and as the basis for future research.

In light of the above this then gives the following complete program of work for the thesis project;

- Identify the ontological structure of Dasein guided, primarily, by Heidegger's research findings presented in *Being and Time* with a particular emphasis on the self - life-environment relationship.
- Ground the claims concerning the various phenomena associated with the structure in my own empirical based observations (i.e. my confirming experience

of the phenomenon).

- Undertake a 'proof of concept' as to my understanding of Dasein's structure to a small range of 'academic' subject of areas in line with Heidegger's claim of the applicability of his analysis.
- Based on Heidegger's work reach an understanding of how a disruption in the self - life environment relationship can lead to 'shedding life'. Present this understanding as a theory.
- Develop a preliminary method to apply the theory as a basis for analysing Marion Miller narrative as a case study

Conceptual Challenge

In describing aspects of Heidegger's approach, I gave the impression that it is relatively straight-forward once what he is doing becomes clear. There is substantial truth to this. However, in getting to the point of being 'clear' about Heidegger's approach, there is an enormous struggle, as reflected in the comments as by the professional philosophers have. There are difficulties at every turn, not just the ones I have mentioned earlier. To name a few more, there is his use of made up words or neologisms, the changes he makes to the meanings of existing words, his use of concepts developed in earlier lectures and introduced into *Being and Time* with little explanation, his lack of consistency, some say sloppiness (Sheehan, 2015, p. 128), in the use of key terms, particularly being (Sein), there is the lack of explanation as to what methods he is applying and then there is the inconsistency that English translators display in translating his technical words from the German.

On top of these, there is an even bigger challenge. It is a conceptual one that unless one is aware of it makes Heidegger's work unintelligible. I mentioned the point earlier, it relates to Heidegger's rejection of the materialist position, a point that is easy to miss or gloss over. The main, but serious, implication is that what he is presenting is incommensurable with a materialist account, from start to finish. I will touch on this briefly as I deal with it in more detail in the next chapter.

Briefly put a materialist position states that if we take any physical entity, it can be broken down into simpler less complex entities, we can repeat this until we get to the most fundamental entities, currently various sub-atomic particles, that make up all other entities. Human or hammer both are essentially sub-atomic particles, differentiated by differing levels of complexity in their arrangement. In other words, to be an entity is *to be* a combination of other entities. Even though science does

not yet know how inanimate matter becomes living organisms, the answer somehow lies in the way the material stuff is combined, a matter for physics, chemistry and biology to sort out.

Heidegger would agree that all the physical stuff can be broken down into more basic components. That is not the problem, nor is it what makes a materialist. The materialist claim is that what it is *to be* an entity, is *based on* it being a material thing, and as such that it must come into being by a combination of other entities. A hammer, for example, is a hammer because it is a material thing that has been made (from other material things) into a certain shape having characteristics applicable to being a hammer. While far more infinitely more complex, and a product of nature, not human doing, the same applies to a human. Following on from this is accepted that we can recognise what things are based on how they appear to us, i.e. the physical characteristics. This materialist account of what things *are* is the dominant one in the Western tradition both in philosophy and science and has been for centuries.

The term *being* is used in philosophy in a broad way to refer to this idea of coming into *being*. So, in the materialist position *being* always refers to entities, this follows from the above example. It also follows that we understand an entity based on its being, i.e. the basis of it coming into being. Being is a subject area for philosophers, and this is called ontology, from the Greek words *onto* meaning being and *logos* meaning study. When a philosopher is inquiring into the structure of what it is *to be* something, it is an inquiry into the being of the entity, or its ontological structure. Heidegger's work in *Being and Time* includes an inquiry into the being of Dasein, and he presents his findings by way of the ontological structure of Dasein. Having clarified the terminology, we can now move to a critical statement in *Being and Time*;

Being – that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are understood ... [BT 25-6]

With this Heidegger seems to be agreeing with the materialists as to the dual role played by being, 'determining' entities and the basis by which we 'understand' entities. All seems good. However, then Heidegger drops a bombshell,

The being of entities 'is' not itself an entity. [BT 26]

When reading *Being and Time*, one is not aware of the technical understanding of being the implications of this can be lost. It certainly caused me grief for a long time.

To put the implications simple, Heidegger is rejecting the most fundament premise of the materialist position, the position that underpins both philosophy and science. He is denying that what accounts for things coming into being (i.e. being) is an entity, i.e. it cannot be any form of matter.

To put this in simple terms if we think that a hammer is a hammer because it is made into a certain form by bringing together different materials, then we are in radical disagreement with Heidegger and will never understand his work. His claim that being is not an entity is a universal one it applies to every entity, including what it is *to be* a human person.

The implications for the thesis are dramatic. What Heidegger is claiming is that the *way an individual human person comes into being* is not on the basis of material entities. What Heidegger is claiming is that *what it is to be a human* is not on the basis of the material. What Heidegger is claiming is that *the ontological structure of the person* is not material. The same thing applies to even the humble hammer! Heidegger does not deny that the material aspects that we see are required for an entity to become manifest, it's just that *the material is not to be confused with what the entity is*.

Part of the difficulty is that if we let go of the material account what replaces it? The answer to this is not easy to grasp from Heidegger's work. It was not until towards the end that I started to piece together an alternative account of how to depict his ontological position and have come to frame it within the broad camp of emergence, and I discuss this in Chapter 19 and Chapter 22. Materialism is also associated with reductionism, for obvious reasons, and the methodologies associated with reductionism have accounted for much of the advances of science. However advances in understanding from a scientific perspective do not automatically translate to an understanding of being, how things come into *being* and hence what things *are*, this is Heidegger's point. In the decades leading up to the time that Heidegger wrote *Being and Time*, there were various other philosophers seeking alternative accounts to the materialists, for example, Alfred North Whitehead and his process philosophy (Whitehead, 1978), and the British Emergentists (O'Connor & Wong, 2015). Over the last couple of decades as science delves deeper and deeper into nature, they are increasingly finding that the reductionist account does not work, that there are properties of complex systems that cannot be explained by recourse to the constituent parts. This has given rise to the sciences of complexity

and includes subjects such as “chaos theory, network theory, nonlinear systems, and self-organizing systems.” (Clayton & Davies, 2006, p. xi) and they have some ‘family resemblance’ to what the philosophers were attempting to get at a century earlier. One of the core ideas is the concept of emergence; that it is the relationships of underlying complexity that gives rise to new arrangements of things exhibiting properties that cannot be otherwise be explained except by reference to the complex relationships themselves (Clayton & Davies, 2006). The basic ideas behind complexity have a remarkable similarity to the ideas underlying Heidegger’s work. However, it was not until I had managed to gain a sufficient grasp of Heidegger’s work that I started to see the ‘family resemblance’ between his work, that of the complexity sciences. This is why it does not surface until the very end of the thesis, and even then, only in a preliminary way. I might add that the scientists that adhere to what is called a strong view of complexity, i.e. that it accounts for the being of some entities, is still a small number, but it is growing (Clayton & Davies, 2006).

When Heidegger rejects the materialist account of being this then needs to be heard carefully. He is not rejecting the obvious fact that both the hammer and the human person have a material form, that would be absurd. He is rejecting the view that they can be understood as coming to be a hammer or a human person by reference to the material. The other take away point is that there is now a small but growing number of scientists working in the area of complexity sciences that agree with the concept, that at least in some areas of nature, things cannot be understood as a mere composition of underlying matter, that it is the character of the complex underlying relationships themselves that is determinate. A future project is to apply complexity theory to Heidegger’s account of Dasein, world and the ready-to-hand; based on my current understanding I think there will be a remarkable fit!

Notwithstanding the above comments on complexity, Heidegger’s rejection of the materialist position regarding being is the biggest conceptual challenge associated with the thesis. In that the Western intellectual tradition holds, almost universally, the materialist position, or some version of it, then most people on first encountering Heidegger’s work will also hold this view; the same applies when encountering this thesis. It was responding to this challenge that resulted in the final structuring of the opening introductory two chapters. This one focusing on setting out the project itself and its structure, and the second introduction, Chapter 2 provides a detailed summary of Heidegger’s account of the structure of Dasein, world and what he calls

the ready-to-hand, the useful things we use such as hammers, and their inter-relationship. The aim, having ruled out the materialist account, is to provide a preliminary account of Heidegger's alternative to provide an overarching context for the remainder of the thesis. This is particularly important as the thesis unfolds tackling one subject after another relating to Heidegger's work and does not come together as unified account of the various structures until late in the thesis.

Summary

In this chapter, I have introduced the thesis project, presented an account of the phenomenon of life-environment disruption and shedding life, established the criteria for a theory to account for the phenomena, explained the basis for the strategic approach for the thesis and the schedule of work undertaken. I have also introduced the basic concept associated with the project, that of being, which reflects the field of scholarship in which Heidegger is working. Finally, I have identified perhaps the biggest conceptual challenge in understanding Heidegger's work, his rejection of a materialist ontology.

Discussing the ontological structure of Dasein and the implications of Heidegger's rejection of a materialist ontology seems a long way removed from the realities that Marion Miller faced in a nursing home. The two, however, are closely linked. The situation that faced Marion, and faces all people entering a nursing home is one of wrong ontology, and this, to a large extent explains the significant emphasis on the care of the body in nursing homes, and, at the same time the neglect of the person.

Accordingly, the emphasis of this thesis is not nursing homes, nor a greater understanding of 'shedding life' as such. It is the grafting out of an alternative ontological understanding of what it is to be a human person, one that can provide an explanatory account based on what is inherent in the structure of the human person that gives rise to the phenomenon in the first place. The result of the thesis work is to identify such an alternative account, and this is expressed in the theory of life-environment disruption.

Based on this theory nursing homes create the circumstance for a radical disruption to the life-environment for people such as Marion, denying them the possibility of *being* who they are, which in turn leads to shedding life. Shedding life, which presents in many forms including pre-mature morbidities and mortalities, is thus a

phenomenon that arises out of the very structure of being a human person. It is not a psychological problem situated in the person, something to be diagnosed and addressed as yet another medical problem.

Until the wrong ontology is rectified, either formally or informally, current practices will continue and the phenomenon of 'shedding life' which has been recognised for more than a hundred years, subject to inconclusive research for over sixty, will continue. This is why this thesis spends so much time on 'getting at' this alternative ontology of the person that seems so deeply buried in Heidegger's dense and opaque writing; it is a matter of humanitarian concern.

Thesis Chapter Summary

The *Theory of Life-Environment Disruption* is grounded in Heidegger's analysis of the basic structure of a person. While there was an intuitive sense of a connection between the person and their environment, the structural relationship did not emerge until the towards the very end of the thesis work. The work involved a steady and persistent series of tasks as Heidegger's work was gradually understood as a logical and coherent whole. The thesis is structured as a research report detailing the series of tasks undertaken.

Because the theory does not emerge until the end of the thesis, there may be an initial challenge in situating the individual chapters of the thesis as part of the theory. To avoid this the decision was made to place a detailed descriptive summary of the key interpretive findings of Heidegger's work at the front of the thesis, this is presented in Chapter 2. This chapter forms both a descriptive conclusion of the thesis (which is not repeated at the end), as well as an introductory summary. The objective is to provide a sense of the whole, against which the chapter structure and content gains its intelligibility.

The remaining chapters can be understood as falling within different phases of the work as follows:

Phase 1 Working out a methodology congruent with the project.

Chapter 3 Methodology

Phase 2 Resolving the problem of being and Dasein.

While reading Heidegger's work, it becomes evident that there are certain

conceptual challenges in understanding *Dasein*, and a need to clarify the various ways in which the term *being* is applied. This phase explored Heidegger's use of these concepts. In relation to being, it was necessary and useful to go back and understand how being was used by the Greek philosophers and Heidegger's engagement with them;

Chapter 4: The Problem of Being and Dasein

Chapter 5: Being - Heidegger's Project

Chapter Six: Stepping Back into The Tradition

Chapter 7: Heidegger, The Greeks And Being

Chapter 8: Clarifying Dasein The Entity

Chapter 9: How to Conceptualise and Investigate Dasein

Phase 3 Heidegger's Empiricism and Links to Science

The aim of the thesis was not to engage in Heidegger's work purely as philosophy. This phase establishes a link between his work and the work of the sciences. If the Dasein analytic could not be applied in the sciences it would be pointless.

Chapter 10: Heidegger's Empirical Approach

Chapter 11: Heidegger's Work – The Link to Science

Phase 4 Essential earlier Work that Leads to Being and Time

In reading Heidegger's lectures around the period *Being and Time* was written it is evident there are important concepts he has worked through and applied but which are not readily evident in *Being and Time*. For example, the concept of *intentionality* is barely mentioned in *Being and Time*, however in Heidegger's lecture courses around the time the book was written it is clear intentionality is an important concept that has influenced his thinking. Heidegger adapts the structure of intentionality and applies it at both the ontological and individual Dasein level. Understanding the structure of intentionality provides important insights into the concept of existence as lived experience, and of the relationship between Dasein's structure of understanding and receptivity. Heidegger's claim that Dasein's understanding of things is based on the underlying structures of being and not their visual appearance has its initial origin in Husserl's work on categorial intuition. Exploring categorial intuition helps to clarify and affirm Heidegger's claim.

Chapter 12: Intentionality: The Structure of Lived Experience

Chapter 13: Husserl, Heidegger & Understanding

Phase 5 Understanding the Dasein Analytic

Building on the work done in the preceding chapters, this phase follows Heidegger work in *Being and Time*, progressively developing a coherent interpretation of Heidegger's descriptive account of the analysis of Dasein's structure.

Chapter 14: The Worlding of the World

Chapter 15: The Worldhood of The World

Chapter 16: Culture and Being-With

Chapter 17: Being-In: Receptivity and Understanding

Chapter 18: Care: The Being of Dasein

Phase 6 Does Heidegger's Account Make Sense

Heidegger claims that his descriptive analysis is an account of the ontological structure of Dasein and has applicability to the sciences. It should then be possible to make sense of the work when considered against the work of scholars in other fields. Heidegger's claims of the wide applicability of his work was explored and found to be relevant in the diverse fields of history, and cultural understanding, in childhood development associated with impoverished environments and the impact of radical changes in life-environments on the health and wellbeing of people. In all cases, there was a congruence between the model and the phenomena explored.

Chapter 19: Interpreting Heidegger Within an Emergentists & Complex Systems Framework

Chapter 20: Application and Relevance of Dasein Analytic.

Phase 6 Shedding Life and Final Chapter

Having secured an understanding of the structure of Dasein and satisfied that it had the general applicability one would expect of an account of Dasein's ontological structure the next step was to develop an understanding of how shedding life and how this related to the structure of Dasein. This was undertaken based on an inquiry into Heidegger's account of anxiety/depression and demise and death. The next step was to articulate the relationship of shedding life and the structure in the form of the Theory of Life-Environment Disruption, develop a preliminary method for its application, and then apply it with respect to the Marion Miller case study. The final stage was, to sum up and identify the thesis limitations, future research and policy

implications.

Chapter 21: Shedding Life

Chapter 22: Final Chapter

CHAPTER 2: SECOND INTRODUCTION: THESIS SUMMARY

Introduction

A Preliminary, Non-Technical Account of Shedding Life

The *Theory of Life-Environment Disruption* states that if a person's access to the activities which constitute their meaningful existence is disrupted then, they are at risk of increased psychological and somatic illness and death. The source, character and duration of the disruption will have differing impacts on the risk for each individual person contingent on what constitutes a meaningful life for the person.

The theory is based on the ontological structure of the person researched and described by Martin Heidegger and presented in his book *Being and Time*. The structural model is a dynamic one and describes the essential characteristics of what it is *to be* a person. Put more starkly, if the structural elements described in the model are not present, then there is no person as would be commonly understood. Heidegger's name for the person is Dasein, and the rationale behind the name is discussed in Chapter 8.

Dasein's ontological structure constitutes the individual Dasein in a process that binds it relationally to the world into which it is born and raised, typically understood as inculturation. While Dasein may understand the wider world in a broad sense, the binding is only to those entities and associated activities which are significant for Dasein. It is the ongoing involvement in those bound activities that gives rise to Dasein's lived experience or existence, that reflects the self-understanding of who Dasein *is*. This binding thus mutually defines both the individual person and the person's unique life-environment. In this model, Dasein's life is not understood as something biological but rather as the flow of lived experience emerging from its significant involvements.

The full spectrum of the lived experiences arising from the significant involvements is Dasein's experience of living a meaningful life. Over time Dasein typically drops some existing significant involvements, and take up new ones, resulting in changes in its life-environment and of the life experienced by Dasein. Due to the sustaining nature of the relationship between Dasein and its life-environment, a disruption to the possibility of engagement in the significant involvements constitutes a threat to

the sustainability of Dasein's existence. Collectively, the activities of all Daseins that arise from their individual significant involvements creates the socio-cultural world in which Dasein lives. This process establishes a reciprocal, constitutive and mutually dependent relationship between the structure of world and the structure of Dasein.

Heidegger's approach to the description of the structure of Dasein is a naturalistic account. While he does not attempt to explain the mechanisms, he does assume that there is a biological structure that is essential at the individual level that supports Dasein's structure. However, the biology itself should not be confused with the structural processes that constitute Dasein. By way of analogy, there is a fundamental difference between a bunch of electronic parts used to make a television, the processes that emerge from those parts appropriately assembled when electricity is turned on and finally a difference between the processes and the television picture that emerges. Similarly, there is a need for a properly functioning biological system, and damage to this system is reflected in damage to the structure of Dasein, and in turn, to the Dasein's capacity to live its life. This is what happens with brain injuries and dementia. Conversely, a removal of possibilities for significant involvements from the life-environment is manifested as an increased risk of psychological and somatic illness and death, there is an impact at the biological level; this is the basis for the theory of life-environment disruption as an explanatory account for shedding life.

The above descriptive account is intelligible at a *non-technical* level but provides no concrete information concerning the specifics of Dasein's structure, what Heidegger calls *being-in-the-world* or *care* [BT]. What this thesis presents is a technical understanding of the phenomena. The validity of the theory is not that it provides a descriptive account that *accords* with the observed phenomena but rather that it is *grounded* in the ontological structure of Dasein derived from empirical observation and logical analysis. The implication of this is that the issues of emotional distress, morbidity and mortality do not arise out of a psychological problem that Dasein has, but rather it is a structural issue. A psychological perspective, even if one accepts a psycho-somatic link, suggests that 'shedding life' could simply be attributed to 'wrong thinking' or 'wrong attitude', and fixed "If only Mum would change her

attitude!¹⁵". *This account is rejected.* To repeat shedding life arises because of the very structure of Dasein itself; it is not a psychological issue.

The Conceptual Challenge

Presenting an account of Dasein's structure is a challenge in that the intellectual framework which situates it is so radically different from what is the norm; this associated with Heidegger's rejection of the materialist account of being. In responding to this challenge, there is the risk of failure in articulating the work in an intelligible manner. This problem is well known and reflected in Kuhn's problem of incommensurability(Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012)and Gadamer's fusion of horizons(Gadamer, 1989). The intellectual framework, or the network of related understandings, that we possess is the basis on which ideas and concepts within the framework are comprehensible. While we are typically unaware of it, this framework is mainly acquired from the cultural environment into which we are born and raised. For those in the West, it accounts for the fact that when asked to describe how something comes into being, we would usually refer to the material origin of things. This is the materialist position used to explain something as simple as water, or a hammer, or something unimaginably complex such as the human person. Water (H₂O), for example, is the combining of hydrogen and oxygen in the ratio of 2:1.

Within the materialist account, also called reductionism, one of the tasks of science is to probe each different type of thing (entity), understand what 'makes it up' and how it relates to other entities. Notwithstanding the level of complexity, within the health sciences, this is the standard model that applies to the human person; it is the intellectual framework within which all else is to be understood and accounted. The work of Martin Heidegger, the basis for this thesis, *rejects this model*, describing a different framework within which things are understood, as such there is a problem of incommensurability at the most fundamental level, and why there is a challenge in setting out this thesis.

Ontology and Being

This thesis argues that Heidegger's descriptive account of the ontological structure

¹⁵ This view that the problems of adjusting to a new environment is simply a matter of attitude is not uncommon. Over the years I have heard this spoken in various forms by both concerned family and concerned staff as an older person clearly struggles with life in a nursing home. It places the responsibility for adjustment to a new environment onto the person.

of Dasein is presenting an emergentist ontology. This will be addressed later in the chapter. Ontology¹⁶ is the subdiscipline in philosophy that studies being and being is the name given to the whatever is responsible for the coming into *being* of an entity. For the materialist, the being of an entity is simply another, less complex entity, i.e. something material. For the emergentist, the being of an entity is something unseen, not material, from which it emerges. What defines a specific type of entity as the entity it is, is typically called an ontological description or ontological structure. For the materialist, this relates to the characteristic properties associated with the material structure that gives the entity its observable form. For Heidegger, the structure will be based dynamic processes that account for the observable ways of being as well as the material form.

Heidegger uses the language of ontology and the name on Heidegger's seminal text, *Being and Time*, uses *being* in the sense just explained. As the focus of this thesis is working to clarify Heidegger's account of the ontological structure of Dasein, it is dealing with issues of ontology. While Heidegger is working in a well-known and accepted field and using language familiar to that field, because he rejects the standard account, what he means by these terms is significantly different. It is therefore important to clarify the traditional account, at least in its elementary form, so it is clear what he is rejecting.

Rationale for the Second Introduction

As the thesis work progressed the full implications of Heidegger's claim that "being is not an entity"¹⁷ [BT 25/6] made early in *Being and Time*, was not readily evident and the identification of Heidegger as describing ontological structures within an emergentist ontology arose only late in the thesis. It is not that it wasn't present in the work I undertook in developing an interpretation of Heidegger's work and of Dasein, it was. I just didn't see it straight away. How is this possible? It is a bit like a blind person encountering a large woolly mammoth for the first time not previously being aware of its existence. First one bit is encountered by feeling one's way around it and then described, then another and so on. Each aspect has a 'correct' descriptive account, the woolly mammoth is there, but how the separate pieces work together as a unity such that the woolly mammoth itself is disclosed does not occur

¹⁶ From the Greek *onto* meaning being and *logos* meaning an account or study.

¹⁷ This is Heidegger's rejection of the materialist account of being. This is discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

until all the essential parts are described. In that, it is a strange 'beast' not previously encountered it is not possible to intuit an understanding on only a few pieces. So, it is with the structure of Dasein.

The chapters of the thesis are a report of the research work undertaken presented in a logical sequence. However, while each chapter reveals an essential piece of the puzzle, on first encountering them, placing the chapter structure and content in the context of the whole thesis is problematic, a little like the woolly mammoth problem. This is made more challenging because of the emergentist ontology. In thinking through this problem, I was of the view that one way to resolve this was to provide a 'sense of the whole' from the start; to describe the 'woolly mammoth' in enough detail so that the parts are recognisable as they are encountered. There are two parts to this, having a firm grasp of the concepts of being and what Heidegger is rejecting and secondly providing an account of the structure of Dasein. I have already provided a very cursory introduction to these components in the opening paragraphs. In the following sections, I go over these in more detail. Firstly, an account of being from the materialist account to be very clear what Heidegger is rejecting followed by a stripped back descriptive account of Dasein's structural model based on Heidegger's research. In this there is no attempt to present Heidegger's difficult technical language or supporting evidence, that work is present in the following chapters. The aim is to provide a 'sense of the whole' and its primary structural components.

The Standard View of What Things Are: The Materialist Ontology

In this section, I set out an account of the standard view of what things are, to introduce the terms but more importantly to identify what it is that Heidegger is rejecting.

The typically held understanding in Western thought is that all the various types of entities that we encounter in the world, whether inanimate or biological¹⁸ are various assemblages of other less complex material entities. If any entity is broken down into its less complex parts, then these broken down and so on, we find the common

¹⁸ In the thesis I am addressing entities of the type we typically encounter in our average everyday activities dealing with things. It is accepted that numbers and imaginary creatures can be understood and explored as entities, however these are not the topic of this thesis.

stuff from which everything is made; everything is stardust¹⁹. Even if science does not yet know how inanimate matter comes together to form biological life, or how biological systems somehow produce 'experiences' the fundamental position is that the answer is somewhere in the complex arrangement of inanimate matter.

Under this model, to know what something *is*, is to know the material and structure of the assemblage. For example, in the case of an everyday item such as a hammer, what it is *to be* a hammer is found in the physical structure of the hammer itself, the arrangement of suitable material constructed into a certain shape. The constituting process of the human body is extremely complex, in that it is biological and evolved over millions of years, and yet the hammer and the human share the commonality of being an assemblage of matter. Should one hold that a person is a soul in a body, the basic model is the same. A composition of entities, the body which has its origins in stardust and the soul, made, one presumes, by a god; the soul is just a different type of entity.

In this view there can be identified four key concepts concerning all entities;

1. what it is to be an entity originates in the basic material stuff of the universe;
2. individual entities come into being (produced or made) by assembling less complex material (entities) into more complex entities;
3. entities require nothing more than what constitutes them, to be the entities they are, i.e. entities are independent, self-sufficient things; and
4. in that what constitutes entities is of a material nature, there is a certain stability in the structure.

These four points get us from stardust to humans and all things in between, and the grand project of science is to account for how this occurs for all the various types of entities. Implicit in the above points is that there is only one class of being, the material, and everything else is a sub-classification of this one class; including the most basic classification of inanimate entities from living entities.

Granted this is a simplified description of the what constitutes entities, but it will suffice, and it does reflect the almost universally accepted explanation of what things are in science, philosophy and Western culture more generally. It is the view I held

¹⁹ The term stardust is used to represent the smallest possible entities from which all things are compiled. These are, to the best of current scientific understanding, various forms of subatomic particles such as protons, muons, neutrinos, electrons, quarks and so on. The term stardust captures all of these.

when I commenced this project; it will be the view of most people when first encountering this thesis; *it is the view that is rejected by this thesis.*

Heidegger Accepts Same 'Role' for Being: Rejects Meaning

Martin Heidegger's rejection of the standard account is stated quite simply, and without fanfare in *Being and Time*;

The being of entities 'is' not itself an entity. [BT 26/6]

Heidegger does not reject the understanding that when we reach out to pick up a hammer that it is a physical hand, made of material stuff, reaching out to a physical thing also made of material stuff; he accepts this. His rejection relates to the account of how entities come into being. If we take a materialist account, then the structure of an entity relates to its physical characteristics. However, by rejecting the materialist account, the structure of the entity must be based on something else, and the material aspects are secondary. One of the challenges of the thesis is to come to terms with a new way of thinking about structures and how the material fits in.

In philosophical language "that which determines entities as entities" [BT 25/6] is referred to as the *being* of that entity. This quote comes from Heidegger and it accords with the tradition. In the standard account, this can be understood as *being* an entity is *to be* a certain assemblage of various less complex material entities, or more fundamentally, *being* an entity means *to have* originated in stardust. In this account, the *being* of any entity is determined solely by the character and arrangement of other entities; this is what Heidegger rejects. He thus agrees with the tradition as to the 'role' of being, his rejection of its means; he rejects the *meaning* of being held by the tradition.

However, what being specifically means from Heidegger's perspective is not easy to answer. One way of gaining an insight into a possible understanding is to ponder the question: "Out of the chaotic motion of entities, what is it that gathers it together in one form and not another?" Whatever the answer to this question it satisfies the broad definition of being mentioned above, but it specifically rejects being as an entity, thus satisfying Heidegger's only restriction as to what being can be. However, all I have done is substitute 'determines' with 'gathers', based on Heidegger's use of the term in various texts [e.g. IM, CPE, AM]. However, even this simple switch in terms gives us a sense that there is a dynamic element to Heidegger's account,

even if we do not initially know what it is that gathers.

Heidegger's claim is a universal one covering all entities. The first point to note is that he identifies that there is more than one way for an entity to come into being, what I call classes or domains of entities, each reflecting a distinctive mode of being. In *Being and Time*, he addresses in detail only three domains of entities; the human person (referred to as *Dasein*), the world in which *Dasein* lives (referred to as world, and *Dasein*'s domestic environment) and the things *Dasein* puts to use in its world (referred to as the ready-to-hand). Focusing primarily on the person (*Dasein*) was my initial approach, and it failed because I had not initially recognised the inter-related and mutually determining character of these three entities. I ended up following Heidegger's layout in *Being and Time* in unpacking the complex relationship that binds these three entities together; first understanding the ready-to-hand, then world and then *Dasein*. The theory of life-environment disruption 'falls out' of the inter-relational structure of these three entities.

Being

A Little More on the Concept of Being

The topic of being in Heidegger's work is discussed in a couple of early chapters. The aim of this section is to provide an introductory account of being and how we use it in everyday life, even though it may not be known by name. This is followed by a potted history of being, tracing it from the early Greek through today. The history highlights the puzzle of being for the Greeks, how this was lost, which in turn is Heidegger's point of entry for his research.

When we look around at things, there is a certain constancy. We can recognise a person, a tree, a house, a coffee cup and so on despite the significant variability between members of each of these types of entities. There seems to be a constancy within the variability that lets us know what things are, e.g. a coffee cup. It is this relative stability of what things are that enables life as we know it to happen, the basis for the world's intelligible. Whatever is responsible for this stability is being.

In that there is a certain variability between individual things of the same type and yet a constancy as to what they are, it has long been held that the constancy comes from common physical characteristics shared by all members of the same type of entities. Because of the variability, it is also accepted that there can be a certain

range within which those properties can appear, and the entity still *be* the same type of entity. Because of this, we can recognise a table as a table even though we may never have encountered one of a certain shape, material, colour and so on; we have learnt the defining characteristics that a table must have to be a table and the leeway in which the properties may appear.

By and large, in our everyday activities, we do not go around defining the ontological structures that define each type of entity, it is something we learn informally. However, within science, there is a need to formalise this process to assist in identification, classification communication and so on. When this occurs scientists develop taxonomies, schemes for systematically classifying things. Perhaps the best known is that associated with biology which classifies things into a hierarchy that includes kingdoms, classes, families, genus and species. Whether we are talking about such things as tables and hammers or classifying a bird as a Rainbow Lorikeet, we are engaged in activities concerning the being of things, i.e. what things are. In the traditional account, we understand what these things are by the observed characteristics of the physical form of the entity, which in turn relates to the material origins of the being of the entity.

At a highly abstracted level, Heidegger holds the same understanding of being as does the tradition, that it determines entities, that it is the basis of our understanding, that it is associated with ontological structures and so on. I therefore use the familiarity of the traditional account to introduce the concepts by way of concrete example, then kick away the example, hoping that only the hollowed out abstract concept remains. The idea is to eventually fill in these concepts with Heidegger's understanding of them.

A Quick and Selective Account History of Being

The account that I present below has the aim of providing a sense of the flow in the history of the study being from the Greeks to today. It is written in the style of a popular historical account, presenting a broad overview only, but hopefully sufficient to give the 'sense of flow' of the history of being I am after.

The role of this section is threefold. Firstly, it gives a context for Heidegger's research presented in *Being and Time*, this assists in understanding what he is doing and why. Secondly, it provides an account of why the contemporary Western tradition has a materialist world-view and in so doing presents the challenge that

this may be mistaken, opening a space for alternatives. Thirdly, following on from the first two, this thesis, in providing an alternative view of what it is to be a human person moves in the space opened up by the possibility that the current normative account is mistaken, and that movement follows Heidegger.

The Greeks

The investigation into being stands at the very beginning of the Western intellectual tradition when Thales (circa 624-546 BCE) rejects the accounts of mythology as to the origin of all things. Thales hypothesised that there was a unity in nature based on a single originating principle, that everything is made from some single, fundamental type of matter and, for Thales that was water. In Western scholarship, this is the first time that the attention is shifted from the gods to nature itself as the domain of inquiry to understand the world. Over the next several centuries there were debates as to the nature of the most fundamental material, whether it was of one type or many, the characteristics and so on; these were debates about being and within a materialist ontology.

The debates moved from a focus on the fundamental material things (entities) were made from, to how the fundamental material *becomes* the various entities we see around us; these were debates about *becoming*. These debates challenged the simplistic notion that entities could be understood as matter coming together. The main puzzle for the Greeks was the source of constancy that is observed all around us, what it is that is behind the material coming together such a constant manner. These debates were, for the most part, highly abstract, as generations of philosophers variously applied both observations of what they saw in the world and rational argument to work through the various concepts. The pinnacle of these inquiries was the work of Plato (circa 428-423 BCE) and his most famous student Aristotle (384-322 BCE). Plato argued there was a world of Forms, in which existed the perfect form, or template, for every type of entity on earth; these forms were real but non-physical and accounted for the constancy. The Earth was always in a state of *becoming*, of change, with individual entities coming into and out of existence whereas the world of Forms represents being or constancy. Aristotle rejected Plato's world of Forms but did argue that when accounting for an individual physical entity, that there was more happening than just the material stuff coming together, there is some organising principle involved. Aristotle argues that the material used in making an entity could have been made into many different things, what the entity

is must be associated with an organising principle used to assemble the material; this is the source of constancy. The nuances and complexity of these debates commenced long before Plato and were driven by a common theme, what entities *are* cannot be determined by the material stuff that creates them, something else is accountable for this organisation and whatever it is, is being. I give an account of some of these ideas in Chapter 6, as the thinking of some of these early philosophers influenced Heidegger.

The Question of Being Remains an Issue

What the Greek philosophers were troubled by was the phenomenon pointed out earlier, that individual thing can both change and remain the same, and this led to the conundrum of how to understand the being of things (the constancy) as well as the change (the coming into and out of being). In Heidegger's view, they never completely resolved this issue, but the critical thing is that they were bothered by it and yet we're not. This very point is what Heidegger chose to make in the opening paragraphs of *Being and Time*;

Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'being'? Not at all. So, it is fitting that we should raise anew *the question of the meaning of being*. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression 'being'? Not at all. [BT 19/1]

This one passage sets our Heidegger's research agenda and what has provoked it. Unless we can, at least in the first instance, read Heidegger's work sympathetically, to be open to the possibility we are part of a tradition that has not only forgotten the question of being but thinks, mistakenly, that it 'knows' what things are, then Heidegger's work will remain inaccessible. Next, I continue the 'quick and selective history of being' tracing how the rise of Christendom returns the West to a materialist account of being, a position that modern secular science has yet to free itself.

The Emergence of Christendom and Shutting Off the Question of Being

After Aristotle, philosophical inquiry into the nature of things declined in Athens, the centre of Greek philosophy. There is conflict, first with the Macedonians and then the Romans and within two centuries of Aristotle's death, Athens is under Roman control. The Romans were not just empire builders, they were great engineers and administrators, essential for running a vast Empire, but there is little evidence of any serious inquiry into nature of the type undertaken by the Greek philosophers. In the centuries that follow, the Roman Empire continues to expand, breaks into two

halves, and slowly Christianity becomes a significant religious influence. In 380CE Theodosius I (347-395CE), the last emperor to rule over both the western and eastern halves of the Roman Empire made Christianity the official State religion of the Empire and the era of Christendom had formally commenced. By the end of Theodosius' rule, the Western half of the Empire was already in decline, having lost significant territory to several different 'barbarian' invaders and within another hundred years, the Western Roman Empire ceased to exist in any meaningful way. The Eastern half of the Roman Empire (the Byzantine Empire) continued for another thousand years.

After the fall, Christendom provided a significant defining motif shaping many critical aspects of life in the 'West' and the Church became both a controlling authority for religious belief and practice as well a major player in secular politics. Importantly the Church was also the place where scholarship occurred. There were no other independent places for learning, and this shaped the understanding of the world and everything in it as part of God's creation, i.e. a theological determined understanding. Under this view, the world was the way it is because that's the way God made it. The thinking about what things are had come full circle, and returned to a mythic explanation, the very position from which Thales and the early Greeks had struggled to free themselves. The source of the order in the world originates in God. God is the fundamental entity from which all else arises; God is the fundamental being.

Under Christendom God is the *maker* of all things. Over the centuries this has taken various forms, for example, God as the creator of the Universe and all things in it (creationism), or God who creates the Universe and the set of 'rules' by which it operates in a constant, regular way (watchmaker or intelligent design). This is an oversimplified account, but the idea is clear enough. What these accounts do is get rid of the Greek mystery concerning being and becoming. God is the being of all things (the most fundamental origin), and God is responsible for entities becoming what they are. The Nicene Creed, the defining statement of Christian core beliefs, states this very clearly, with the affirmation of a belief in "one God maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible." The concept of *maker* is very important, as it posits an intelligence and deliberateness in the *making* of the world as we see and experience it. The world and its creatures can thus not be the product of chance events, for example, it could not have arisen out of the chaos of 'atomic' particles in constant motion as the Greek philosopher Democritus (circa 490 BCE)

argued.

While the Greek philosophers typically had a conception of a deity, they did not assign to it the role of benevolent designer-maker, who constructs a world for humans; humans are understood as part of nature itself. This approach opens the possibility of alternative ways of thinking about being and becoming, as is evident in the differing accounts of Plato and Aristotle, but this possibility is something removed by the Christian approach. Because of the historical events associated with the Western Roman Empire and its fall, much of the work of the Greek philosophers was lost for many centuries, only slowly finding its way back from the East almost a thousand years later, in 12th and 13th centuries. Interestingly this was after the fall of the Eastern Empire to the Islamic Empire, and the transmission was facilitated, primarily, by Arabic scholars. From this time onwards, the works of Aristotle became extremely influential in Western scholarship. His system of logic and his method of inquiry into the natural world, together with his 'research' findings dominate Western scholarship for most of the next millennium. However, his account of being and becoming does not accord with Christian theology and all his works initially teetered on the edge of being banned as heretical. It is Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), a Dominican Friar who sees the value of Aristotle's work and sets about interpreting it and developing a synthesis between Aristotle and Church theology, which transforms an understanding of Aristotle's account in a way that conforms with the Christian world-view. While not immediately accepted, this work, among others, eventually elevated Aquinas to the status of a church Father and recognition as one of the Church's greatest theologians and philosophers.

Aristotle's legacy becomes entrenched in the West, but at a cost, his puzzlement over being and becoming is written over. This was the period of the Late Middle Ages (circa 1300-1500) and the period of scholarship known as scholasticism (circa 1100 – 1700), a method of critical thought and inquiry, which dominates Church scholarship. While there are no material developments in the inquiry into being and becoming, slowly the inquiries in the natural world are expanding, albeit within a Christian framework; we fast forward to the beginning of the modern era.

The Scientific Revolution: Scientific Progress Within a Christian Concept of Being

In 1543, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) published his book, *On the Revolution of the Celestial Spheres*, setting out, with observational and mathematical support, that the Sun and not the Earth is the centre of the universe. This precipitates the

period now known as the Scientific Revolution (1543-1700) which saw unprecedented discoveries by natural philosophers²⁰ and lays the foundation for modern science as we know it. Not unsurprisingly this also sets in train a struggle to explore the world free from the constraints imposed by Church teaching. This is seen, for example, in the work of Descartes (1596–1650), one of the seminal figures of the Scientific Revolution, who makes significant contributions in philosophy, mathematics, physics and the development of scientific methods.

Descartes put forward a rationale for carving the domain of nature out from theology, to free up the natural philosophers to explore the natural world free from Church intellectual and political interference. The personal risks were real, and Descartes was aware that Galileo Galilei (1565-1642) was eventually tried and found guilty of heresy for publishing a book *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems* in 1632 which defended the Copernican view; Galileo spent the remainder of his life under house arrest²¹. Copernicus had avoided a clash with the Church as the book was withheld from publication until just before his death.

Descartes maintained that while God made the world, it was legitimate for scholars to explore the world to ascertain the rules of nature that God had used²². Descartes proposed that the Universe and everything in it, including the human body, was made up of small indivisible particles of matter in continuous motion that God formed into complex mechanisms. The task of the natural philosopher was to understand how the various mechanisms work, whether it be the human body or the solar system; this posits God in the 'watchmaker' category. For the Church and the theologians, Descartes formalised the view that the soul was a separate substance altogether from that of the material world, having different properties, including that it could not be seen, as it had not physical dimensions. This could not be studied by the natural philosophers and was the proper domain of the Church. The material

²⁰ It is not until the nineteenth century that the science formally splits from philosophy. Until this time, it was the discipline of natural philosophy that undertook investigations into nature.

²¹ Viewed from the perspective of modern science, the work of Copernicus and Galileo demonstrate that the movement of the Earth around the Sun is possible but does not show that it is necessary. It is thus a theory, and one that defies the experiences of the average informed observer standing on Earth. His work was far from being generally accepted by other mathematicians and astronomers as an account of what 'really' happens. Galileo runs foul of the Church not because of the work per se, but that he claims that this is the way the universe is. At the time the Catholic Church was in the midst of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) against, mainly Protestant forces, and fighting for its existence. Not a good time to challenge core Church theology!

²² This was not a completely novel idea. For example, Adelard of Bath (1080-1152) from the English city of Bath, held a similar view, that it was one thing to know God made the things of nature, but it is quite another to know what these things are.

substance of the world he calls *res extensa* and the soul substance he calls *res cogitans*²³, and both types of entities have their origins in a more fundamental entity, God. His solution for both the 'material' world and the 'spiritual' world maintained their origins in the most fundamental being, God, and as such the structure of being and becoming conforms with Church dogma as presented in the Nicene Creed. Descartes' approach, while not universally accepted in its details, is still extremely influential as it presents the first formalised structure that allows for the inquiry of the world as it is, but in a way that leaves it part of God's creation. Descartes' work is a significant part of the of the end of the Church monopoly over the control of the study of nature.

However, what is evident is that Descartes is offering a materialist solution to the question of *being*, with the caveat that God is behind it all. Almost every major figure in the Scientific Revolution understood what they were doing as investigating a God created Universe. Even the most recognised and lauded of the natural philosophers, whose work is typically taken as defining the end of the Scientific Revolution, Isaac Newton (1643-1727), had this view. The works of these pioneers of science were often sprinkled with references to God, as they struggled to hold a place for God in an increasingly secularised understanding of nature.

Modern Science: Still not Free of Christendom's Account of Being

Today, while Western science and philosophers have pushed God out of the picture, what has remained is the view that everything is material, *res extensa*. Rather, than God causing the material aspects to form into various entities, we now have theories such the Big Bang, the Standard Model of Particle Physics, Evolutionary theories and so on; this is equivalent to the concept of becoming. But we need to note what has happened. The work of modern scientists has continued in an unbroken line from the natural philosophers of the Scientific Revolution, with improvements in methodologies, inventing remarkable new instruments with which to 'observe' nature in finer and finer detail, and continuing to make startling progress, and so on. However, all of this has happened without challenging the inherited concepts of being and becoming from these natural philosophers, and these concepts provide the broad intellectual framework within which they carry out their work. What has

²³ *Res extensa* is Latin for extended thing, referring to something that has a physical presence in space. *Res cogitans*, is Latin for thinking thing, referring to the principle characteristic of the soul as Descartes understood it.

been ignored is that these natural philosophers of the Scientific Revolution accepted an understanding of being and becoming that had been maintained by more than a thousand years of Christendom, and this view was established for theological and not scientific reasons. Arguably it is only during the last century that the lingering influence of Christian thought in science is in serious decline, demarking a remarkable longevity of influence. On this basis, it is not unrealistic to be alert to any enduring legacy of this influence today, Heidegger's view is that the concepts of being and becoming are one such case.

Why the Potted History is Important?

This potted history is important. The thesis is questioning what it is to be a human person which falls under the heading of being as a field of inquiry, i.e. what we think things are. To a significant extent, how we think about things is culturally acquired²⁴, i.e. inherited from our tradition. On the account I have provided, today we have only recently emerged from a continuous tradition of more than 1,500 years that has held, by and large, a materialist²⁵ understanding of what things are. The question is, "What if this is wrong?" This position was first articulated by Thales at the very beginning of Greek philosophy but was understood as being inadequate by later Greek philosophers and they started to explore sophisticated alternatives. For the Greeks, we needed to answer the question of constancy, to account for the order that is evident in the world. It doesn't mean they were right concerning their solutions, the better question is, were they right to raise the question? If two of the greatest intellects of our tradition, Plato and Aristotle, untainted by the tradition established by Christendom, thought there was a problem, something else was at play shouldn't we listen?

This is the point Heidegger makes. He acknowledges the incredible advances of science [BT 127] but when it comes to a fundamental understanding of how things come into being he argues that we are no smarter than the Greeks. Indeed, our understanding may not be as good.

From the standpoint of historical reflection, the advanced modern science of nature is not a whit more true than the Greek; on the contrary, at most it is more untrue, because it is altogether caught in the web of its own methodology, and, notwithstanding all its discoveries,

²⁴ This is accepted in many fields of scholarship and is art of our inculturation. I address this in more detail in Chapter 16.

²⁵ Technically it is known as substance ontology, but provided as common, rather than technical understanding of materialist is held, there implications of the argument hold.

it lets escape what is genuinely the object of these discoveries: namely nature, and man's relation to it, and man's place in it. [BQP 48].

The crux of Heidegger's argument is that we have a wrong understanding of being and that this has important implications for understanding our place in nature. For Heidegger, we need to re-open the question as to the meaning of being, and that is why he opens *Being and Time* the way he does.

Implications of a Wrong Account

An example of the implications of a wrong understanding of being is reflected in this thesis and concerns the way we design and run nursing homes. This current model, whether we appreciate it or not, is based on a materialist ontology. If it is the case as Heidegger argues that the being of the human person is not based on a materialist ontology, then life-environments such as nursing homes into which vulnerable people are placed run the risk of being inappropriate for human habitation, with adverse consequences. The indisputable facts are that unexplained adverse consequences do arise in relation to nursing homes, as attested by more than half a century of research. This research is based on the normative ontology and the standard account of what it is to be a human person and has failed in its attempts to account for the phenomenon; hence the dead-end in the research. If Heidegger's account is correct, and at the very least this thesis argues it provides a better theoretical framework, then the implications of a wrong account of being have a human toll, seen in the decades of premature morbidities and mortalities that are continuing to accumulate in nursing homes.

What Heidegger is arguing is that science is still not coming to grips with the question of being, has bought, unquestionably, into a materialist conception and sustains this because it has woven a web of beliefs reflected in its practices (methodologies). This argument is essentially the same put forward several decades later by Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996). Kuhn argued that scientists are indoctrinated into a way of thinking about things that arise out of their adopted methodologies and their paradigm case examples. (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012) Put more starkly scientists reify the objects of their inquiry, i.e. believed it represents reality. Heidegger makes this point a number of times, for example, is in 1967 as part of the Zollikon Seminars when referring to psychology;

Psychological theories arise under the pressure of tradition because tradition does not know

anything else than the character of being as substantiality, objectification, and reification. [ZS 216]

Both Heidegger [BT] and Kuhn acknowledge that for the most part science works. But they both argue, in different ways, that the progress science makes continually reaches limits in solving problems because the theoretical frameworks in which they work become inadequate and need to be recast, albeit within the materialist framework. While Kuhn and Heidegger share a common view as to why this happens, I do not want to suggest Kuhn shared Heidegger's ontological perspective; he didn't. Kuhn understood that the entities that science studied were often hard to access in terms of their material structures (the real) and so they put forward theoretical constructs to explain the observed phenomena (what was experienced). Typically, these constructed theories worked for a certain range of problems, but eventually, they reached the limits of their explanatory power at which time the theoretical construct needed to be rejected and replaced. This is the basis of what he termed a scientific revolution (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012). Perhaps the best-known example is the replacement of the Newtonian account of gravity by Einstein's account. Kuhn identified that when this occurs scientists wedded to the old construct had difficulty changing, partly due to the fact they had reified their theories, i.e. as they believed it represented reality it could not be abandoned.

Heidegger had, before Kuhn, understood the problem of reification, but his critique goes deeper and identifies the more fundamental issue as the reification of the concept of being in terms of a materialist ontology. Kuhn does not address this. If Heidegger is correct, then his understanding of being has significant implications for science. I provide an example of this in Chapter 20 when I discuss how the phenomenon of depression, an important issue in nursing homes, is conceptualised and reified as an 'illness' or a 'disease' in the health sciences. However, if, as I am claiming, the concept of being is reified in terms of the material, and this is associated with the broad intellectual framework in which science works, then dislodging it will be a formidable task.

Modes of Being, Classification and Understanding

Having introduced the basic concept of being and becoming and a little of its history, I now want to turn to the concept of modes of being, classification and understanding. All of these occur in the ongoing discussions in this thesis.

Modes of Being

The concept of being can be heard in two ways, as applying to the entity, i.e. the being of a hammer, or as that which underlies all the different types of entities. When being is investigated in this latter sense, it is referred to as fundamental ontology. Notwithstanding this, in the tradition, there remains only one mode of being, the material, and the differences at the entity level are matters of classification. For Heidegger, however, there are multiple modes of being at the entity level. His claim is that the human person, for example, comes into being in a different manner to, say, a hammer, i.e. they have different modes of being. However, behind the different modes of being at the entity in *Being and Time* Heidegger argues there is one common mode of being, and inquiring into this is, as per the tradition, is fundamental ontology. For Heidegger, this most fundamental level of being is connected to time, and it is this level he was attempting to substantiate in his research. Understanding the mode of being in relation to three types of entities (Dasein, world, and the ready-to-hand) is the main task of this thesis. I will address the traditional approaches first.

Classification

To be a house, there must be some common structure, within some acceptable leeway in design, that accounts for it being a house. Within this broad understanding of what accounts as being a house, certain essential characteristics can be identified that further classify a house as a bungalow, semi-detached, etc. This is a basic approach to classification found in all areas of human activity.

The component parts of the house can also be identified and classified, e.g. we can group them into doors, windows, lights, etc. Just like the houses themselves, members of each of these groups can be classified as different types, e.g. the windows can be double sashed, fixed, awning, and so on. In turn, each window can then be broken down into parts and each part identified and classified, e.g. window panes, sash, jams, sill, etc. This process can continue until the fundamental level is reached, stardust, which is the same for all entities. In all of these categories of entities, from houses to window jams, the material from which they are made can differ, the physical sizes can differ, the colours can differ, and so on, but this does not change what the things are. This basic approach can be applied to anything, cutlery, books, motor vehicles, and so on. In biology, it is used to classify all living things. This approach to classifying things underscores the use to which we put the

basic ideas of philosophy, in this case, associated with a materialist ontology, into everyday use.

Under this model there is relatively little for the philosopher to do, the work is left to science to work out how the fundamental elements come together in every increasing complexity to produce (make) all the varieties of inanimate and animate entities, including both hammers and the human person. In this model, if we know how something is made, can pull it apart, reassemble it, replace defective or broken parts and so on then this 'proves' that we have the knowledge of what things 'truly' are, of how they come into being. This gets back to the four key concepts underlying the contemporary understanding of what entities are as discussed earlier in the chapter. It is this approach that leads us to the belief that we have a sufficient understanding of what a human person is such, that when old and frail they can be placed in a nursing home.

While classification on the basis of observing physical properties may be a useful and productive methodology, the error is confusing a methodology with ontology. This is what Heidegger was pointing out in the earlier cited passage.

Understanding

By and large, the claim associated with this traditional approach is that we recognise and understand what something is by observing its physical characteristics, we can simply say something along the lines "I can recognise a table when I see one because I know what it looks like." In this account, there is a beautiful simplicity that applies to all things, a congruence between being, classification and understanding, and an unusual agreement between the common-sense view, the view of science and the view of philosophy. While the level of technical level of understanding may vary significantly between different groups, the basic uniformity in worldview is clear enough.

Heidegger's Rejection

I am labouring this point because it is so important to understand the intellectual framework in which the modern tradition is based. Even though we may not understand it at a technical level, it is the way we typically try to account for things in the world when we want to understand what it is and how it works. This includes, for example, frail older ladies such as Marion Miller and the nursing homes into which they are placed.

Once we understand the concepts of being and becoming and how they are understood in the tradition then we are open to being shocked by the revelation that *Heidegger rejects this entire approach*. The most dramatic claim is that he denies that the physical appearance is the basis of our recognising and understanding of what things are; this follows logically from the earlier discussions concerning Heidegger's approach. If being is that which determines entities and is the *basis of our understanding of entities*, but, and it is a big but, *being is not an entity*, then the conclusion is simple, we cannot understand the entity based on its physical appearance; something else is at play, and that something is being!

Given the powerful evidence that we experience 'knowing by looking' I take this as a critical issue to address in this thesis as Heidegger's claim is denying this obvious and common experience that we all have. In many ways, this is the critical phenomenon that must be dealt with if the theory of life-environment disruption, based on Heidegger's work, is to be taken seriously. Investigating this phenomenon is the primary focus of Chapter 12. As mentioned Heidegger also rejects there is only one mode or domains of being that determines entities. While he names several different domains of being in *Being and Time*, the three that he specifically addresses are Dasein, the world in which Dasein lives and the entities Dasein puts to use, the ready-to-hand.

In summary, between Heidegger and the tradition, there is agreement on the most abstracted conceptual understanding of being, i.e. it determines an entity as the entity it is, and it is the basis of understanding entities [BT 25/6], beyond this there is a radical difference as to what these means. This is behind his research question "to work out the question of the meaning of *being*" [BT 19/1]

Having laid out the basic terminology concerning being, identified the typical understanding of the terms in the tradition and highlighted what Heidegger rejects, I now turn to a descriptive summary of Heidegger's account in *Being and Time*

Heidegger's Account of the Structure of Dasein

Heidegger's Starting Point

The Greek philosophers could see and experience the world just as well as we could. From the very beginning, they accepted the concept that there are very small fundamental elements that we could not see that make up the complex things we

could see. So conceptually, there is no difference between then and now on this point. That we have more knowledge as to what the character of the 'invisible' small stuff is, in this regard, is irrelevant. It is only a matter of scale as to how far down we can probe the character of the small units of material things. The Greeks recognised that the issue of being and becoming, of change and constancy, were critical issues to resolve if they were to understand how nature works. They accepted that what we see *does not* reflect the being of things, that there is something else that accounts for the constancy of the order in the universe. Something else is going on, and they struggled to understand what.

Because the question of being has largely been ignored since their time, Heidegger wants to "raise *anew the question of the meaning of being.*" [BT 19/1] (italics in the original). He does not necessarily think they arrived at the 'correct' answer, but he does accept that it was right to ask the question. From this perspective, it is the later Greeks who reject the materialist account and Heidegger is picking up the threads of their inquiry.

As soon as we reify a materialist understanding of the being of things, we ask the wrong questions, e.g. "What is it made from?", "How is it assembled?", "How does it work?" Heidegger does not reject these as legitimate questions; they are relevant to understanding the material aspect of the entity, they just don't get at the heart of the matter concerning what things are. To properly understand an entity we must first understand its mode of being and then how the material aspects relate to this.

Once we put aside the materialist presumption, we can ask the more pertinent question, e.g. "What accounts for this entity coming into being as the entity it is?" It is like the other questions, but it opens the possibility for different responses to the question. For centuries inquiring into entities has been based on them being material beings and so if we put aside the presupposition, we must also put aside the associated methodologies. Heidegger recognises this, and his response is the methodology of phenomenology; I will address this below.

Reading Heidegger's work is difficult. One way of orientating oneself while reading *Being and Time* is to keep in view the question, "What accounts for this entity coming into being as the entity it is?". This helps in understanding what Heidegger is doing, in the first half of *Being and Time* as it is here he describes what is happening in relation to the three inter-related entities, Dasein, Dasein's world and the things

Dasein uses in going about its activities. It is the answer to this question for these three entities that, in my view, revolutionises our understanding of what it is to be a human person, and forms the basis of my Theory of Life-Environment Disruption.

Heidegger and the Question of Being

Being and Time is essentially a 'research in progress' report concerning Heidegger's inquiries into being, and he continues inquiring into being for the remainder of his life. Heidegger shared with the Greeks the idea that there is some fundamental principle that accounts for the constancy we see. In *Being and Time*, he thought that what underlies all the modes of being was time, hence the title of his book. This is not time as typically understood but time interpreted as a dynamic movement, whereby past, present and future cannot be understood as discrete 'chunks' of time but are aspects of the same temporalizing structure. This gets complex and extremely abstract, however, at a concrete level, it can be glimpsed in contemporary thinking. For example, in evolutionary theories the biological species we see today are not discrete and independent of time, they can only be understood from an evolutionary (in time) perspective. Similarly, societies are not discrete entities separate from time (understood as history), they are continually evolving out of history and are, in a sense constantly moving into history.

Understood in this way species and societies are the product of a dynamic temporal process and what they are (how they come into being) must be linked structurally to the past and to the future. If we view species and biological species as material entities, then we have ignored the dynamic structural aspect and are simply getting a frozen snapshot. If we then take this frozen snapshot and view it as an assemblage of material entities, then we have failed to see the basis by which they come into being.

For Heidegger, at each moment in time, entities are in a structural relationship with other entities forming a complex relational network (this is discussed in detail in the next section). It is the changes in the unified network, arising from the dynamic inter-relationships between entities functioning in a temporal structure (i.e. time) that accounts for the coming into being of entities. In a nutshell, the dynamic structural unit we call society changes, and there is an adaption to the change in the form of new entities coming into being and old ones passing away, reflected in our changing practices. What we have is a spatial dimension, the relationship between things in the network, and a temporal dimension, the movement through time, and the two

cannot be ignored if we are to understand how things come into being. Understanding the details of the temporal of this is outside the scope of the thesis, and so I will not continue further.

If we can tentatively grasp a sense of a dynamic relationship that holds past, present and future, as part of the same structural process, regarding the coming into being of things such as societies and biological entities we are starting to be open to the possibility of viewing the various phenomena as Heidegger is describing it. While I do not go into the details of Heidegger's structural analysis of time, the basic idea will be important when the details of Dasein's structure come together later in the thesis (Chapter 18).

In that Heidegger accepted the idea that being, that which gathers and determines entities, lies behind all entities, his research strategy in *Being and Time* is to pick an entity, inquire as to its structure, and from there to being. The entity he chose was Dasein, and his work becomes the basis of this thesis.

Dasein's Intuitive Understanding of Modes of Being

As previously discussed Heidegger accepts the basic, abstract, understanding of the key concepts such as being, becoming and ontological structures which in all cases applies to entities²⁶; it is the specific interpretation as to what these mean that he has an issue.

In that, the being of entity is also the basis of our understanding of the entity the implication is that we cannot distinguish between what a rock *is* (something present-at-hand), what a hammer *is* (something ready-to-hand) or what a person *is* (i.e. Dasein) based on the physical appearance. But, Heidegger argues, that in fact, we do understand the difference, that this is evident in the way we relate to these three different types of entities; we do not typically treat people like rocks or mere tools²⁷. In that we tend to deal with things appropriately, i.e. roughly in accordance with their mode of being, Heidegger claims that this reflects an understanding, but a "pre-ontological understanding" [BT 33/13] of what things are, and we do this naturally. By "pre-ontological" Heidegger means a non-formalised understanding, and it is

²⁶ The terminology can get a little more confusing because in the English language literature entities are often referred to as beings! This results in statements such as "The being of beings is the basis on which beings come into being." In other languages, e.g. Greek, Latin and German there are different spellings of these differing uses of being which assists in the reading. In this thesis I use the term entities.

²⁷ This does not mean that we cannot objectify another person and treat them as a non-human commodity. Heidegger is not interested in these exceptions, he is exploring the usual and typical mode of being a Dasein.

when we formalise out understanding that things go astray. It is the natural, “pre-ontological” understanding, revealed in the way we deal with things, i.e. our relationship with things, that Heidegger uses to launch his inquiry.

Heidegger is claiming that if you look at the way we typically go about the world using things, then this discloses an innate understanding of what things are. It is when we apply an intellectual analysis to the question of what things are that we suddenly stop using it and shift our focus to how things look. We have shifted focus. It is this shift of focus that is key in understanding Heidegger’s way of analyzing things.

Our Average Everyday Way of Being Unlocks Heidegger’s Approach

Heidegger shifts the focus we typically take in understanding what things are away from how they look (i.e. a static and material basis) to a focus on the relational interactions between entities, for example how we deal and interact with things (i.e. a dynamic relational basis). The basic relationships that one entity has to another may have different characteristics, and it is these characteristics that Heidegger will focus on. For example, ‘involvement’ is a general term referring to the way an entity is typically related, e.g. when we use a ‘hammer’, “there is an involvement in hammering” [BT 116/84]. Involvements typically have a function or outcome associated with them, e.g. “with hammering there is an involvement [with a nail] to make something fast.” [BT 116/84]. Heidegger refers to the purpose that something is done (e.g. to make fast) an “in-order-to”. In *Being and Time*, he does not refer to the nail, that was added for clarity, but it emphasises that what Heidegger is doing is always focussing on describing the characteristics of the relationships between entities, not their physical characteristics.

Heidegger’s method is to observe, analyse and classify the relationships between ready-to-hand entities from different perspectives and from this he identifies that there is a larger unified (interconnected and interdependent) dynamic relational network within which individual useful things sit. This relational network is what he refers to as world. It is the ongoing (hence dynamic) character of the relationships that are the structure of world, and within world the structure of the individual useful things we use. Heidegger then analysis the nature of the relationship between Dasein and useful things (entities) and world to arrive at the structure that defines Dasein’s way of relating to the world which he calls being-in-the-world. Heidegger also describes the modes of relationships between Daseins; I am not going to go

into this here as the idea of focusing on relationships is the main point I wanted to bring out (these relationships are discussed in Chapter 16.) The three essential structural components for Dasein will turn out to be our modes of receptivity, responsiveness and understanding.

In summary, for Heidegger, it is an entity's characteristic ways of being in relationship that *indicates what the entity is*. The underlying relational structures that are the basis for these ways of being in relationship are the entities ontological structure, i.e. *determine what the entity is*. The physical form we see is a response to this structure it does not determine it; this will be discussed later in the thesis. It is the dynamic relational structure of world that accounts for an entity, including Dasein, coming into being. A result of Heidegger's analysis is that an individual Dasein is only intelligible within the context of the relational structure associated with its coming into being as the individual Dasein it is; disrupt those relational structures and Dasein can no longer function in terms of its relational modes of being.

The above three paragraphs are a very pithy summary of Heidegger's approach and how he views the world. While he changes his descriptive language over the course of his career, this approach and understanding of the dynamic "worlding of the world" [TT 178] does not change. This is the constancy and variability of Heidegger. As can be seen Heidegger's approach is on the one hand radical departure from the materialist account of things, but on the other reflects a simple change in focus while observing and seeking to understand the same world.

To 'flesh out' this cryptic account, the remainder of this Chapter is the promised summarised, descriptive account of his work in *Being and Time* developed based on the work undertaken and presented the succeeding chapters of the thesis.

Example: Chariots and Togas Through Time

I want to introduce two concrete examples that can be used to illustrate Heidegger's concepts. Chariots and togas are two entities commonly understood, and I want to explore how the meaning of what they are changes when considered from the perspective of two separate periods in time, ancient Rome, say 118CE and Rome in 2018CE. In *Being and Time*, the category of ready-to-hand covers a range of entities, all of them in one way or another used by Dasein. Chariots and togas are ready-to-hand of the type called equipment, the product of some manufacturing process and used for the purpose for which they were designed.

While chariots and togas can be constructed from the same material, look the same and even carry the same name in 2018 today as they did in ancient Rome, if we were to say they are the same entity, because on these aspects, then we are basing this assessment on a materialist account. If we observe how these things are used, it is quickly apparent that while they were useful everyday items of equipment in ancient Rome, today they are mere curiosities, items used in re-enactments or as fancy-dress props. In other words, they are understood and used differently. Today an army General is not going to ride in a chariot to review the troops, and a modern politician would not dream of wearing a toga to parliament as the standard form of dress. In ancient Rome these things would have appeared natural as familiar, today these practices would appear strange and out of place. The network of relationships between politician (Dasein), appropriate clothing to wear (practice or involvement), while undertaking parliamentary duties (more involvements) has fundamentally changed. The toga and chariot can still be understood as useful equipment, but because of the changes in the underlying relational structure, the type of equipment they are has changed. If togas ceased to be used for any purpose whatsoever then would be relegated to an illustration in a history book.

The underlying relational structures that were the basis of ancient Rome (i.e. the world of ancient Rome) is now so radically different than today, that there would be relatively few things between the two Romes that have the same structural meaning. Again, Heidegger is not arguing that we would not recognise a chariot or toga today, there is enough residual structure remaining for this, but he is arguing that we would not have access to the full richness of what it *means* to be a chariot or a toga in Roman times. Similarly, in that the individual Dasein comes into being based on its structural relationship to its world to be a Dasein living in the Rome 118 means something radically different to being a Dasein in the Rome of 2018.

In this example, it is the same *basic* ontological structure that underlies the equipment (togas and chariots), world (ancient and modern Rome) and Dasein; it is the character of the relationships that have changed. The best way to understand this is by way of a very simple example. A cubed box is one with all sides being a square of equal dimensions; this is its basic structure. However, we can have a cubed box with 2cm sides or 6cm sides, one painted white and another red and so on. By maintaining the basic structure (the square sides) but changing the dimensions and other non-essential characteristics we have different individual

specimens of the same species, cubed box. This reflects the idea of constancy and change but from a materialist perspective. Now we need to jettison the use of the cubed-box example but hang onto the notion that there are ways of describing common structures. For Heidegger in describing the common (ontological) structure of the relational network that is world, he uses terms like involvement, and in-order-to. These are abstract placeholders (like all sides are squares), that have no specific content but does define the necessary structure of the entity. Just as the term cube indicates a particular structural type without saying any more about a specific cube. Heidegger's placeholders though must be understood as relationships. If we hear this in the right way, we can hear the idea of constancy (the same basic relational structure) and variability (the individual character of the structure).


We can now flesh out Heidegger's research method a little more. If all individual entities (what Heidegger refers to as the ontic level) such as Dasein and equipment exhibit the same basic ontological structure, just expressed within a certain variability then this points to a way of accessing the ontological structure. All Heidegger has to do is identify the sufficient and necessary structural components that define the entity at the ontic or individual level and then 'remove' the variability to abstract the common ontological structure. To bring back to the cube example: we observe ten cubes of various sizes colours and materials and note that in relation to each one that regardless of the materials it is still a cube, regardless of colour it is still a cube, and regardless of size it is still a cube. All these are thus jettisoned as defining the cube. What we note is that the essential common feature is that in every case it is an object with six faces, each face being a square of the same size. This provides the defining characteristics or ontological structure of a square.

This method is one that Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), the founder of phenomenology, developed (discussed in Chapter 13) and it was from Husserl that Heidegger learnt it [MWP]. But Heidegger *rejects* Husserl's materialist stance and applies it the observed was of being (relational aspects) of entities. So, while understanding Husserl's method as applied to a material object is useful in grasping the concepts of the method, we must never get caught in the trap of confusing the material aspect of the entity with what it *is*. Put another way, we must remember that for Heidegger, being is understood as a verb, not a noun. As will be seen in the following discussion, the focus of Heidegger's attention will be on the 'ways of being' that are associated with the relationships between entities.

Relational Systems and Networks to Understand World

In this section, the idea of relational structures is extended to describe world.

Heidegger makes it abundantly clear that the way in which he uses the term world is not as the collection of entities (the ones that are not Dasein), that can be encountered “within-the-world but rather as the ‘*wherein*” [BT 93/65] that Dasein lives its life. This sounds confusing. A way to think about this is to imagine a very large three-dimensional space with thousands of points randomly scattered in the space, then further imagine that these points are variously interconnected, some to many other points, some to fewer (Image 1 is an example). Typically, we will think of the dots and lines as something solid and static, i.e. in a materialist manner, however, imagine the lines as dynamic relational connections and the points as junctions of where various sets of relationships meet. These relational junctions are the points where the ready-to-hand equipment emerge in response to the underlying



structure. This network of inter-dependent, inter-connected dynamic relationships is a depiction of Heidegger’s world, it maps out a ‘space’ that is the basis of the ‘wherein’ Dasein lives.

If the chariot in both Romes looks the same, why is it a different type of ready-to-hand entity? The answer is in the underlying relational structures associated with the chariot, i.e. the junction of all the associated relationships. For example, there are the roads on which the chariot is driven, and the rules associated with driving a chariot; the use to which it is put in warfare, games and ceremonies; there are stables for the horses and the garaging of the chariot; there is the 'factory' in which the chariot is made, and the associated tools used in the making and maintain the chariot and so on. For a chariot to make sense in this complex network, all these relational links need to be in place, reflecting the interdependent nature of the links. Roads are not just used for chariots, but transporting goods in wagons, messengers on horseback and people moving around on foot. The carpenters and the blacksmiths don't just make chariots they make all types of wagons, tools, buildings and so on. The relational network incorporates all connections associated with these entities as well. In other words, we need to incorporate all the relational connections for every item every item used in Rome, and only then does this densely inter-connected web of relationships provide a specific instance of the world of Rome. Of course, ancient Rome was a diverse trading empire and so the relational network associated with, for example, wine, extends to the regions where the grapes are grown and processed before being shipped to Rome; In this manner, the world of Rome extends out to the Empire itself. Putting aside the impossibility of capturing all of this in some, say, advance computer model, it would be outdated, for there will always be relational connections being established and old ones disappearing.

The chariot then is just one set of inter-connecting relationships within the myriad that forms a world. In imagining this we need to keep in mind that the inter-connections are a form of relationship, and the entities themselves should be understood in terms of what they contribute to or offer the network (i.e. their way of being); they should be viewed in terms of their functional contributions and modes of relating, not as static material entities. Heidegger's name for these entities that we use even has this concept built into the name, the *ready-to-hand*; these entities stand 'at the ready' to be used.

Worlds Change

From the perspective of ancient Rome, over time the character of warfare changes, the games in which chariots were used no longer occur, and the ceremonial roles fade with the changing of the Empire. While the roads, workshops and so on remain,

the functional relationships associated with the chariot gradually disappear. This disappearing gradually thins out the dynamic set of relationship connections associated with chariots from the sourcing of materials, to manufacture and so on; until finally only remnants or perhaps nothing at all is left. As the relational structures associated with being a chariot in Rome disappear, so does the structural meaning of chariot.

Carts, wagons, buggies and so on will continue to be made for the next fifteen hundred years because they are the best way to move goods and people. But then first the steam engine and then the combustion engine is invented and soon trains, and automobiles enter the network. Factories for one task close (e.g. wheelwrights) while factories for other purposes open (e.g. automobile construction), the concept of the road is applied to railroads for trains, and even the dirt cart roads, too rough for automobiles, become first macadamized²⁸ constructions, then bituminised or concrete roadways. These changes reflect shifting networks of relationships, with one part of the public world changing in various ways in response to changes in another part. The world called Rome of 118 has morphed into the unrecognisable world called Rome in 2018. Viewed as a snapshot they now appear as two different entities, because of the radical change in structure, but nonetheless connected in time²⁹. An interesting puzzle, not to be addressed in this thesis, is whether they are indeed two entities, or two temporal phases of the same entity.

In summary, Heidegger sees world as the unified interconnection of interdependent relationships which must exist prior to and in order for an individual ready-to-hand entity to exist. This is why a computer, even if transported back in time, a computer could not exist as an entity ready-to-hand in the early Rome, there is no relational network into which it fits; the worlds are different. The computer would be an entity, but what Heidegger calls present-hand, something there but devoid of any functional relationship within world, i.e. it serves no purpose. This is why Heidegger says that "Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as *an* equipment" [BT 97/68], i.e. all equipment only exists in relationship.

²⁸ This is a process of using small, angular and uniformed sized crushed stone, with a binding layer of compacted stone dust.

²⁹ A certain license has been taken in this example and it ignores the forced changes arising from invasions by enemies, the rise of the Church and so on, but the idea of an adapting network, based on changes in the changing relationships is what I am conveying.

What Does it Mean to be Within the World

Heidegger regularly uses the phrase “ready-to-hand within-the-world” [e.g. BT 106/76, 109/78, 116/84] and this can now be understood not as some material object in another, but literally as ‘in’ the world itself. A ready-to-hand entity is the meeting point of a set of relational structures of world itself. In that this is the case then one would expect that the entity of world has a similar character as the ‘individual’ entity ready-to-hand, just on a larger scale, and this proves to be the case, and while Heidegger tends to skip over this at one point he describes the “*current world authentically ready-to-hand*” [BT 141/106].

Worlds Within Worlds

When looking at the network of relationships that encompasses an entire public world, it is easy to imagine a small segment that relates to the world of the theatre, the world of commerce or the world of the coffee shop within this larger world. Further, it is also possible to come down to an even smaller scale, the world of one’s home, workplace, workshop or even as a study. The sense of this first appears when Heidegger refers to the larger, all-encompassing network of relationships as the “‘public’ we-world” whereas the small aspect with which a person may be familiar and ‘within which’ they live, as “one’s ‘own’ closest (domestic) environment” [BT 93/65]. The latter is the most important for Heidegger’s analysis and I refer to it as the ‘living-environment’.

Essentially each of these is a relational network that has some coherence as offering a place for Dasein to dwell, i.e. carry on its life, utilising the ready-to-hand equipment that shows up in these ‘spaces’ (worlds). This can be seen in the following passage;

Equipment -in accordance with its equipmentality - always is *in terms of* its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These 'Things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of *realia* and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something 'between four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the 'arrangement' emerges, and it is in this that any 'individual' item of equipment shows itself. [BT 98/68]

In this brief passage, we have the idea of the idea of a room as a place for residing, i.e. a ‘small world’. However there are also every other material aspect that has been discussed to date; equipment understood in terms of its functionality (called equipmentality here); the necessary relationship between equipment; the rejection

of the world (here the room) as a collection of material things; the concept of world as a relation 'space' for residing, rather than a physical (geometric) space; world as equipment (ready-to-hand); things never showing up not on the basis of their material appearance and so on. This passage occurs towards the beginning of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's domestic world, its living environment, and while Heidegger's account of the study is an accurate description based on his research, it is difficult to see how it is comprehensible when first encountered. It took several readings of *Being and Time*, each time reading back into passages such as this what had been gleaned from prior readings of the book before it became intelligible.

Summary

In summary, what it is to be a ready-to-hand entity emerges out of the underlying structure of world, and the physical characteristics that make manifest the entity are designed and produced in response to a functional requirement which has a structural context. In other words, while the physical appearance may be associated with a certain ready-to-hand item, it is the underlying structure that is the basis of it being what it is. As the underlying relational network of world changes, then either new ready-to-hand entities come into being or existing ones 'fade' away. Does this mean that the ontological structure of world is a composite of the ready-to-hand? No! As will be seen in the next section the structure of world is linked to that of Dasein.

Dasein

Heidegger's account of the ontological structure of Dasein is far more complex than world and the ready-to-hand and not as well presented. Many of the rudimentary concepts he identifies as important are familiar to scholarship; Heidegger's genius is applying them differently. Following on from the previous section, the way to understand Dasein is as an entity in a dynamic relationship with its world.

My reading of Heidegger's account of Dasein is a naturalistic one, i.e. that what Heidegger is describing is the ontological description of a living natural entity in terms of its relationship to its living environment. If we can envisage all the various forms of biological organisms as having a certain adaptiveness to their environment, and arising out of this, a range of receptive and response capabilities, then we have the basic structure of Dasein itself, which after all is just another biological organism!

The essential difference is that Dasein has the capacity to understand its world, and instigate changes that, within a certain leeway, involves changes to the living environment itself, i.e. rather than a slow evolutionary adaption to an environment. This is a remarkable adaptive strategy, and the way I read Heidegger, it is one that arises from the underlying structures of nature itself.

In the following, I will sketch out this rudimentary account of the ontological structure of Dasein and its connection to world sufficiently to get an insight as to the structural basis for the theory of life-environment disruption.

Historical, Cultural Environmental Determinant of Dasein

One way to envisage the idea of Heidegger's Dasein is through a thought experiment.

Imagine that the instant a baby is born it is transported simultaneously into several radically different cultures, say a 9th century 'Viking' village, 18th century Mississippi, USA and 21st century Gaza. For consistency, further imagine that in each case the family in which the baby is projected is a well-off, respected family with an identical family structure. The baby is loved, cared for and raised in a typical everyday way, experiencing no material adverse events. By the time the baby is an adult the differences will be immense and seen in such things as; the languages used in both speech and thought; the understanding of god or gods and the associated religious practices; the culturally acquired likes and dislikes in relation to food, dress, entertainments, etc; what it is to be a good member of the society; the appropriate roles taken up as part of their day to day activities; the skills sets acquired in relation to the differing tools and equipment employed in the culture; the culturally acquired emotional responses to things; how to view and respond to people not part of the main community; and so on. The role that culture plays in determining Dasein is discussed in Chapter 16. The idea of a nascent Dasein being thrown into a world and then being constituted by that world in almost every aspect of their experienced personhood I think can be gleaned sufficiently well from this thought experiment. This account reflects Heidegger's account of what happens when a Dasein is 'thrown' into a world.

This idea of 'inculturation', essentially what I have outlined above, is not new and has been observed and commented on by scholars for centuries. The seventeenth-century French polymath Blaise Pascal(1623-1662) had a similar

notion(Pascal(Author) & Elliot(Introduction), 2013), and it is a common position with scholars in the field of sociology(Augoustinos, Walker, & Donaghue, 2006; Fiske & Taylor, 2013) (Discussed in Chapter 16). What is different, is what Heidegger does with the phenomenon. Perhaps a contentious point in Heidegger's descriptive account is that our individual affective capacities (e.g. emotions, feelings, etc.) are shaped by culture; this is part of the structure of receptivity. However, even this is not as controversial as it seems as there is contemporary research support for this view. This research indicates that not only are our affective responses to the various things in our life-environment shaped by culture (what we like, dislike, etc.) but that the character of the emotions themselves are shaped (Izard, 2010; Keltner, Oatley, & Jenkins, 2014; Lutz, 2011; Nuckolls, 1996; Nussbaum, 2001).

However, Heidegger goes further and claims in *Being and Time* that our various affectivities play a role not only in how the world shows up for us but what shows up as significant for us. This is reflected in the examples of the music at the party, and the person afraid of dogs described earlier. In effect, he is claiming that our emotional capacities direct our cognitive capacities, a seemingly radical claim, but here too this is gaining stronger support(Damasio, 2018; Nussbaum, 2001). The linking of our affectivity to how the world shows up for us is a structural aspect of Dasein which Heidegger calls receptivity (refer Chapter 17). The connection between emotions (receptivity) and behaviour (responsiveness), however, has been well researched for almost a hundred years. Perhaps the best-known example being the arousal-response process associated with the fight or flight response first developed by Walter Cannon (1871-1945) (Cannon, 1927; Jacobs, 2001). There is nothing new here, except that Heidegger puts these various phenomena together as indicative of the very structure of Dasein, not as something possessed by Dasein.

In summary, while there may be certain sameness associated with the genetics of the person, e.g. the physical appearance of the adult baby, and perhaps aspects of personality, in almost every other material respect the lives of the person in our thought experiment will be radically different. The very existence that the person will experience in thought, word and deed will have been determined by its historical-cultural setting into which they were thrown. What Heidegger extracts from this is that the modes of understanding, receptivity and response shaped by this cultural thrownness are the basic structures that determine Dasein.

What Makes a Person a Person is Not the Physical Body

The question then arises, is this the same person given that the starting 'genetic bundle' of the baby is the same? In other words, does the physical aspect of the person determine who the person is? For Heidegger, the answer is no.

Heidegger argues that the ontological structure of Dasein, what he terms being-in-the-world, binds to the world in which it is thrown forming a mutually dependent relationship, and it is out of this relationship the individual Dasein emerges. This is summed up by his comment that "being-in-the-world is the basic constitution of Dasein" [MFL 169]; being-in-the-world is thus the common ontological structure applicable to all Daseins. The individuation of each Dasein occurs with Dasein's thrownness into a world. This binding that arises is not the thrusting of some preformed entity onto some other material entity, like gluing a model together; as described above world cannot be understood in this way. In its thrownness into a world Dasein develops an understanding of itself in the context of an understanding of the world and in turn this becomes the 'wherein; Dasein lives or dwells as previously indicated. This is the 'being-in' part of the structure of 'being-in-the-world', and the 'being-in' must be heard in not as some geometric space such as the study, but rather as 'within-in' an understanding of a part of the structure of world itself, which become the Dasein's life-environment. If Dasein is constituted relationally then clearly it cannot be understood as simply a specific instance of biological material, i.e. the body.

Understanding as a Structure

In the section on world, ready-to-hand entities were in terms of what they offered (i.e. a form of relationship) the structure. While Dasein was not specifically mentioned, it is self-evident that they are somehow present. We now move to the relationship between ready-to-hand entities and Dasein.

By way of example, a carpenter can be understood based on their involvements (practices) with a set of ready-to-hand items that constitute the functional (in-order-to) structure of world. The involvements with that set of ready-to-hand items essentially map out the relational structure that constitutes what it means to be a carpenter. A carpenter will be involved with such ready-to-hand items as hammers, nails, saws, timber, door frames, house frames and so on. The similarity between understanding a chariot and the role of a carpenter is evident but potentially misleading; this will become evident shortly.

For each item the carpenter is specifically engaged with, the relational network can be viewed from the perspective of various other Daseins engaged with these items, e.g. the hardware store clerk, the lumber yard worker, the householder for whom the work is done and so on. The world of the carpenter is thus a shared world with other Dasein. While the world can be understood as a unity of functional (in-order-to) relationships, it can also be viewed in terms of the collective involvements of all the Daseins in the culture. This perspective Heidegger also calls the “we-world” and is the same as the “public-world” [BT 93/65].

When a Dasein is thrown into a world, its structure establishes an understanding of itself in the context of the world into which it has been thrown. The Dasein has no control over this process, and the quality of the world into which Dasein is thrown is irrelevant to the structural process. Whatever the ‘quality’ of ‘appropriateness’ of the aspect of world into which Dasein is thrown, this is what is taken up by the structural process. As such a Dasein that emerges from an impoverished environment in the first years of its life will develop in such a way that there are lifelong, potentially adverse consequences (this is discussed in Chapter 20). However, in a typical situation, the Dasein will acquire a self-understanding from the rich variety of possibilities available in the culture. For example, a person today can become a carpenter as this has structural meaning in the cultural world, but they could not become a gladiator as understood in Rome; it is not structurally supported. This does not rule out that a person may have a mental illness and understand themselves as a gladiator; however, this arises as a breakdown case, not the normal functioning of the structure. There are also different ways a person can take up a role, for example, a mother can be a ‘helicopter mum’, a ‘sacrificial mum’, and so on, all of which are an expression of the person’s structural relationship to the world as reflected in the role of Mum. Dasein is therefore structurally involved with two broad classes of entities the ready-to-hand and other Dasein. These are two distinct classes of entities, and thus are understood differently, and this is reflected in the character of our relational structure with each entity type. Heidegger refers to the relational structure with the ready-to-hand as ‘concern’ (Discussed in Chapter 14 & 15) and the structure relating to other people ‘solicitude’ (Discussed in Chapter 16).

In the above case, the Dasein understands themselves as a carpenter, but they could also be a soccer coach, poker player and Mum. In other words, the self-understanding can be multi-faceted and mark out involvements with different sets

of ready-to-hand equipment and other Daseins in differing roles. All these specific involvements which reflect a person's self-understanding come together in what Heidegger calls a person's domestic world or environment, which in turn are aspects of the larger public or we-world.

In summary, Dasein is constituted (its self-understanding) in the context of the world into which it is thrown, and this understanding is reflected in the involvements that Dasein takes up. Returning to the thought experiment, while there is certainly the same starting point in terms of the base genetic characteristics, whether it be skin colour, sex, basic disposition (perhaps), overall body shape and so on, the individual Dasein that emerges from the interaction between its structure and specific cultural world is different in each case, and relationally binds them to their life-environment.

Rejection of the Person 'inside' model

Heidegger is interested in identifying the constitutive structures of the human person, i.e. what it is to be a person, and in so doing he rejects presuppositions such as the person is a soul, or as some already determined 'mini-person' that simply grows up, or is a co-ordinating ego, or is the functioning brain or any other entity 'inside' the body [Discussed in Chapter 4 and 8]. All of these are various forms of entities, and none of them accounts for the coming into being of an individual Dasein.

Under existing approaches, the experiences acquired from the culture are in some way added to the existing Dasein, 'feeding' it grows. Experiences are like water, sunlight and nutrients feeding a plant. In this account, the ontological structure of the plant is already complete and self-contained within the plant, and the environmental nutrients simply account for the success or otherwise of the growth but adds nothing to what it is to be the plant. This view is also reflected in the view that children are 'resilient', i.e. they can spring back from adversity in their living environment by improving the environment, i.e. their 'growth' (development) can be brought back on track, but through this what it is to be that individual child remains unchanged. This view is demonstrably wrong and is discussed in Chapter 20. Another view is what I call the 'cultural accoutrement' approach to explain cultural influences *on* the person; culture is something taken up and worn. If we take the thought experiment, under this approach, the person is really the same person 'underneath' expressing themselves in the acquired cultural 'accoutrements'. The 'environmental nutrient' model and the 'cultural accoutrement' model both posit a

'real person' already ontological determined and somehow 'inside' a body, which in turn is a separate entity in a world. These understandings of the person are *utterly rejected* by Heidegger. There is no pre-existing individual person inside, just a possibility based on the ontological structure being thrown into a world.

If No Person Entity Inside What is Heidegger Researching?

Perhaps because of the tradition and its adherence to the material concept of things, there is a pull to 'see' what we are dealing with, to bring it into view. This is understandable to some extent. When talking about a hammer, we can bring the entire physical entity into view, and there is a strong correlation between the appearance of the hammer and what it is to be a hammer. In the case of the hammer, we can be sure we are talking about the same entity and discuss Heidegger's account of its structure compared to tradition's account and slowly identify the differing accounts. In this way, we can even grasp how Heidegger accounts for the physical presence of the hammer, as distinct from its structure. For a hammer, we can envisage the dynamic relationship of world and have some sense of how the material aspect arises to provide the functionality (in-order-to) demanded of it by its place in the relational network. In other words, we can grasp the coming into being of the hammer as a species of tool at the relational structure level, and then we can trace this to the production of an individual hammer. In so doing we have an insight as to the relationship between what it is *to be* a hammer and the material body of the hammer. This larger picture is missing from *Being and Time*. Heidegger simply says that Dasein's "'bodily nature' hides a problematic of its own" and will not deal with it in *Being and Time* [BT 143/108]. The question is that we can see the connection between the physical aspect of the hammer and what it does, but if there is ultimately a material aspect that responds to and accounts for the functioning for the individual Dasein, where is it? How do we see it? There is no doubt that there is a connection between the body and Dasein, for Heidegger simply states, "How else could it be possible to grasp, to form, and to transform other animate or inanimate "material" things which are encountered?" [ZS 231]. The ontological structure of an entity and the body belong together, Heidegger is very clear about that.

Decades later Heidegger acknowledged that in *Being and Time*, while Dasein cannot be understood as being the body (just as a chariot or a hammer cannot be understood as *being* the material from which they are made) the problem of the

relationship between Dasein and its body was just too hard to address[ZS]; but he never returned to address the problem. In *Being and Time* Heidegger does describe how the 'material body' of equipment Dasein makes comes into being, and conceptually this may be useful in thinking through the Dasein-body problematic; however, this is outside the scope of the thesis.

If the human person is not in the body how is it to be conceptualised for research purposes? Of Dasein Heidegger simply says that the term refers to the "entity which each of us is" [BT 27/8] and what he means by this is somewhat opaque. However, based on his work, I take it he means the human person understood as the unified phenomenon of everything that it experiences by way of understanding, emotions, and various motivations as reflected in the activities (involvements) that the person takes up, avoids or simply passes over in various ways; i.e. its receptivity and responsiveness to its living environment. While this occurs through the body, that we have a sense that there is a bodily relationship and have a familiarity with the body is sufficient, as understanding the body problematic is not required to understand the ontological structure of Dasein. Who Heidegger's Dasein *is*, i.e. us, is simply conceptualised in terms of the character of our receptivity and response to our living environment. This approach has interesting and very relevant implications.

The way I read Heidegger is that this his is a naturalistic account. The basic structure of Dasein, the human person, understood as a living entity that is structurally integrated into its environment based on its modes of receptivity and response is the same basic structure applicable to any living organism in Nature. This interpretation also helps to make sense of the earlier cited passage when Heidegger acknowledges the advances of science but says that it,

... lets escape what is genuinely the object of these discoveries: namely nature, and man's relation to it, and man's place in it. [BQP 48].

Given Heidegger's ontological position, i.e. as dynamic structures, then this refers to the human person not as an object in nature, but as a structural part of nature itself. This is what science is missing.

Another, related, implication is that Heidegger is claiming that this unified phenomenon of structures of receptivity and response refers to what the person *is*, and not characteristics *possessed by* the person; this is a critical point to understand

in Heidegger's work. To repeat, Dasein is its mode of receptivity and responsiveness to its environment. There is no Dasein preformed 'inside', it is found in the structural relationships it has as part of its environment and is why Heidegger calls the ontological structure being-in-the-world. Following the previous point,

Yet another implication is how we 'fix' things. If we take the hammer example, if the head comes loose from the shank it can no longer be used as a hammer, it is no longer suitable to offer the functionality of hammering, i.e. to be *ready-to-hand*. When we reattach the head to the shank, we are restoring the material aspect to a point where it can again offer the required functionality of *being* a hammer. Through this repair process, what it is to be a hammer remains unchanged. Extending this to the human person, if the body 'breaks', it may lose some of its appropriateness for the task of being the individual Dasein it is. 'Fixing' the body restores the suitability of it to serve the structural requirements of being that Dasein. Medical science thus does not 'fix' Dasein; it can't, this is a relational structure, it fixes the material body in which those relation structures are manifest. The consequences of this 'division' are typically not noticed in short-term acute incidents, however in chronic conditions, including age-related frailty, dementia and so on, understanding the distinction can be crucial.

Investigating the structure of an entity such as Dasein when the body has been removed from the equation at first seemed alien, almost incomprehensible, reflecting the pull of the materialist understanding of the world. However, there are other instances of this, for example in the domain of natural science this same dilemma arises concerning the research of gravity. As Peirce notes all that is required in the study of gravity is to understand all the effects of gravity that have "practical bearing"³⁰ (Peirce, 1955, k. 743) Put another way gravity can be understood by focusing on its relationships with other entities, we never need to bring gravity itself into view. This is essentially this approach that Heidegger is taking concerning Dasein. When understood in this light it starts to make sense, all that is required to understand what Dasein is, is to focus on the aspects that have 'practical bearing', the way this is supported by the materiality of the body is a later problem to be solved (This approach is discussed in Chapters 8 and 9).

³⁰ I discuss the how coming across the work of Charles Saunders Peirce helped me to understand Heidegger's approach in Appendix 3.

The Interrelatedness of Dasein and World

So far, the structure of world has been discussed, and some key elements of the structure of Dasein have been identified. In this section, the structural relationship between Dasein and world is described.

The Complex Dynamic Character of the Network of Relationships

The network diagram is conceptually analogous to the relational unity of world, but in a very simplified way, and once the concept of the world as a dynamic complex network has been grasped it is best to let it go.

In a world, the character of the involvement relationships between a Dasein and the ready-to-hand in the world is both dynamic and multi-faceted. Take, for example, a pair of handmade shoes. The shoes are something that a cobbler makes, a product for sale by the shoe store clerk, a present that someone may buy and something to wear for the end user; the same pair of shoes but appearing in the relational network of four different people in different ways, reflecting different relational involvements. This will be reflected in the domestic world of the cobbler which will have structurally different characteristics to that of the shoe store clerk notwithstanding they are both structures within the same larger public world.

The same observation can be made for any useful entity (something ready-to-hand) moving through the world, for example, the leather used in the shoes will have a different set of relational structures when in the tannery, compared to the cobbler's workshop. In that, it is the structure in the world that gives something its meaning, the same ready-to-hand entity can have *different meanings* when viewed from the perspective of the involvements of different Dasein. The shoes in the cobbler's workshop have a different meaning to the cobbler than the meaning of the shoes to the person who wears the shoes; these different meanings reflect the different life-environments of the people. However, from the perspective of the public world, *all these meanings* (understood as structural), are necessarily in the world to provide the ontological structure of the shoes; this refers to the idea mentioned earlier that anything ready-to-hand emerges at the junction of relational connections. (This has implications for any form of qualitative research inquiring into the meaning of something, understanding the critical meanings (structural) that sustains it, and so on. This is not pursued in the thesis.)

There is no doubt that each person understands what shoes are, in the sense of

shoes *are* for wearing. However, it is more complex than this as the shoes have different involvements with the different people. To understand the differences in more detail, we would need to understand such things as the structure of *being* a handmade object, *being* an item for sale, *being* a gift for someone, *being* a gift from someone, *being* a pair of special shoes, and so on. All of these have their own relational structure which gives them the meaning of what they are in a specific public world; remembering that *every* relational structure is *already* present in the world.

Each Dasein is determining (again, typically not consciously) which aspects of the structure are significant for them, and it is the identification of what is significant that emphasises one meaning over another, for that Dasein. The deliberate identification of structural relationships in the world that gives something meaning is what Heidegger refers to as hermeneutics; i.e. it is a process by which a person seeks to reach an interpretation of something in terms of its structural meaning in the world, based on its observable ways of being. This is reflected in Heidegger's strange phrase that phenomenology means to "let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself" [BT 58/34]. The implication of this is that free-floating interpretations imposed on a world, unsupported by reference to the underlying relational structure are rejected as an approach for ascertaining the meaning of things. So, while Heidegger accepts that entities have meaning relative to a certain world, he is not a relativist in the sense of accepting that everyone has their own 'truth' when they articulate what things are; their understandings and opinions may be wrong.

Every ready-to-hand entity has its own complex set of involvements with differing Dasein that gives a deep richness to the meaning of what an entity is within the context of world and mapping out all the relationships would be an impossibly complex task. However, it should be evident that there must be a necessary and sufficient set of structural relationships within a world associated with any given entity to bring it into being and sustain it such that it does not pass out of being; this is evident in the example of the chariot. Understanding this minimal set of relationships would vary depending on the entity, however exploring this is outside the scope of this thesis.

When considered as unity, of all the complex relational structures with all the ready-to-hand entities, this entire dynamic relational world is what Heidegger calls the

'public world', and it is *already in place* when Dasein is born into it. Dasein's structure (being-in-the-world) then take up its various understandings and ways of responding in its world (its life environment) that gives the Dasein the capacity to be a Dasein in its world; this is the basis by which Dasein is constituted as a Viking, Southerner etc.

Dasein assigns itself

Modern public worlds are too large and complex for any Dasein to have an understanding or even an awareness of the richness of meaning of all the ready-to-hand entities in the world. A Dasein is typically thrown into a part of the world, will gain a certain understanding of itself from that context and then gradually take up certain ways of being that reflects that self-understanding; as mentioned this is not initially a conscious process. What are all the biological supported mechanisms by which this occurs? No one knows. Heidegger simply accepts the phenomenon and sets about describing the structural basis by which it occurs from the perspective of the observable phenomena, i.e. Dasein gets involved with those things that have *significance* for its self-understanding, and the 'process' by which this happens Heidegger refers to as *Dasein assigning* itself.

When Dasein involves itself with things, Heidegger describes this as occurring based on Dasein's understanding of the for-the-sake-which the Dasein exists (lives). Put another way, Dasein's actions understood as a unity, reflect what is most significant for expressing its self-understanding of who it is. That Dasein will assign itself to things that have significance and then get involved with them, reflects three different relational processes (structures) that describe the basis Daseins' actions. Put another way, if we did not have these structural processes that supported our taking-up activities (involvement) relevant (significance) to who we are (our life) and to do this consistently (assigning), we would not be a person as we typically understand being a person. Accordingly, Heidegger names all three as, among others, part of Dasein's constitutive structure, i.e. they are ontological.

Assignments Large and Small

While the focus by Heidegger is on the main involvements, the structure applies to all our involvements large and small, both positive and negative. For example, imagine a party at a friend's place; one person may love the music and wants to turn it up, while another may dislike the music and wants to turn it down; these reflect

different assignments, with different significance resulting in differing possible involvements. In other situations, there may be a preference for blue stone-washed jeans rather than corduroy slacks, pasta dishes over rice, and so on. These are not material assignments in and of themselves, and perhaps not critical, however collectively they account for who we are. If they start to drop away and are not replaced with other significant assignments, then slowly our life loses its structural richness, its defining meaningfulness as to who we are. Not all things are minor in terms of significance. Some capture and organise a whole complex of other significant involvements, for example being a Mum or a teacher. As such, the 'importance' of what is significant will vary; some things are minor and are easily discarded, while others, define the essential aspects of our life; it is these defining aspects that are critical for us to maintain. If, for example, we are to enter a nursing home and remain the same person, we need to understand what significant involvements are critical to defining who we are, and seek to maintain them, or risk out life losing meaning.

Not all things having significance are positive, for example, a person afraid of dogs, spots one a long way down the street and moves to avoid it, while others barely, if at all, notice the dog even when it is a lot closer. The moving away reflects involvement as an active avoidance, indicating the way in which the dog is significant.

Whether it be dogs or music, the structure thus picks out things in the world on the basis on which they are significant to us, positive or negative, and discloses the possible involvement available to us. In this way, the structure discloses the world to us in terms of its significance to us, i.e. its structural-meaning to us. As such two people may walk down a mall together and a completely different set of things will show up for them, both in terms of significance and meaning, and conversely a different set of things will pass by unnoticed. The structure thus discloses some aspects of world to us while keeping other aspects, in a sense, hidden.

Just because Dasein deliberately assigns itself to a certain set of involvements, e.g. being a nurse, doesn't mean the right decision was made in terms of self-understanding. Having graduated as a Registered Nurse a Dasein may find that working as a nurse is not for them, and they may choose to either put up with it for the sake of other aspects of their life, e.g. being a parent, being a mortgage owner, etc. or they change their assignments to another set of involvements. Alternatively,

the assignment may have been made on a wrong understanding of what being a nurse means, or Dasein's self-understanding changed and being a nurse is no longer significant. This changing in significance reflects a certain range of possibilities in which the dynamic nature of individual Dasein's structure changes and adapts with respect to its life environment

The unity of all the things to which Dasein has assigned itself Heidegger calls *worldhood*. While we may have a 'rough' understanding of the wider public-world most of it will not be significant to us, and it is only to that part of the world to which Dasein assigns itself Heidegger calls Dasein's 'own' or domestic environment [BT 93/65], our living environment. *Worldhood* is not only a structural aspect of Dasein but because of the resultant relational involvements, it also forms the ontological structure of world. This needs some explaining.

Dasein's Worldhood and the Structure of World

The individual adult Dasein will typically know-how to navigate around the world in general and will take up specific involvements in activities which have significance for its own existence. As indicated, today it could be associated with being a carpenter, nurse, lawyer, sports coach, chess player, mother, and so on. Each of these 'roles' reflects a separate set of activities (significant involvements) with entities in different parts of the public world. It is the engagement in those activities (or cultural practices) by individual Daseins that sustain the ontological structure of those entities. This was seen in the case of the chariot, where it slowly disappears as something meaningful as understood in ancient Rome.

However, one person cannot sustain a structure on their own. A hospital, for example, is the relational junction that links many people engaged in different but related significant involvements associated with what it is to be a hospital. But, it is each individual person's *worldhood* that is the structure that determines the significance of their involvement with the hospital. It is thus the *collective worldhood* of all Dasein that is the basis for the dynamic ontological structure of world. World as such is a dynamic relational network or system that emerges from the collective action of all the Daseins in the world. At the ontological level, Dasein and world are structurally linked, at the ontic (individual entity level), Dasein takes up its self-understanding from world, but then by its assignments, sustains the very world necessary to provide its existence.

The implication of this is that as things in the world 'lose' their significance for a growing number of Dasein and they assign themselves to new involvements, the world structures gradually changes and adapts. The even greater implication is that collectively, Dasein has the power to determine its world because ultimately world reflects the self-understanding of the collective Dasein.

Worldhood and Structure of World Related but Not the Same

Ontically Worldhood and the Structure of World are Related but not the Same

Dasein's *worldhood* is based on Dasein's *understanding* of what it *means* to be something the ready-to-hand in the world, and what involvements it has to offer the Dasein. *Meaning* belongs to world and *understanding* belongs to Dasein. As was seen in the case of the nurse, this understanding of what something means could be wrong.

As discussed earlier, the structure of world is the basis by which the ready-to-hand gets its meaning, i.e. meaning is in the world. What the individual Daseins have is an understanding of what things mean; understanding and meaning are different. By and large the understanding Dasein has of the world is right, especially in those areas in which it has already assigned itself and is involved. By way of example, a carpenter who has a wrong understanding of a hammer, exhibited in how it is used, would soon be put straight; this is part of the socialisation process. This is true in almost every aspect of our life from driving a car, to ordering a meal at a restaurant, to how a surgeon learns their craft. By and large, if our know-how was materially out of kilter with how the world 'works' we get feedback, there is as such a self-correcting mechanism in the world, that aligns our understanding (i.e. our understanding of know-how, i.e. the capacity to be involved). This is not unexpected; if the human Dasein could not gain and maintain an understanding of 'what works' it would not have survived as a species.

Different Modes of Understanding: Know-How and Know-What

However, if the carpenter walked into an electrical engineering workshop the level of understanding of what things mean, may be minimal with few of the entities (pieces of equipment) showing up as usable, a prerequisite for an involvement. It is also very possible that there may even be wrong understandings where the carpenter believes equipment x does one thing when in fact it does something completely different.

Roughly speaking we have several different elements at play; the structural working of the world and its meaning structure, Dasein's know-how understanding of how the world works (practical involvements) and Dasein's theoretical understanding providing an account of the working of the world. In that know-how is a practical understanding based on active involvement in the world this is the aspect that is of prime importance and which feedback mechanisms guide. By way of extreme example, if eating a red berry from a certain bush results in illness or death, then others don't repeat the mistake; we don't need any theoretical explanation, albeit one can be fabricated.

Priority of Know-How over Know-What in Constitution World and Dasein.

Heidegger points out that there are differences in the way we understand things, this is reflected in the above discussion. We can have an understanding that simply indicates we know-what something is, i.e. a basic theoretical understanding what something is and how it works. We also have a know-how understanding, i.e. be able to use something and put it use. Know-how is essential if we are to be involved, however, know-what does not necessarily lead to know-how. Crucially, without know-how, there are no involvements and hence no world, and there is no Dasein, i.e. no human person as we understand it. There is a clear priority in Heidegger's work for know-how over know-what, and this even applies to universities and his own profession of philosophy. Heidegger was highly critical of philosophy courses that focussed on discussing and debating the ideas of earlier philosophers as the primary content (i.e. know-what) over the teaching of doing philosophy (know-how)³¹.

We can thus have a know-how understanding of what works and yet our theoretical understanding expressed as an explanation of why it works is wrong. For example, the Ptolemaic explanation of the workings of an earth-centric universe was wrong, and yet the mathematical tools to describe and predict the movement of the stars and planets as observed from earth were remarkably accurate. This was reflected in the know-how of preparing calendars, predictions of movements of 'heavenly' bodies and navigation, all of which worked sufficiently well pragmatically. In other words, there was a discrepancy between the know-how of doing things that worked

³¹ For example, in his course *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy* (BCAP) presented in 1926, the same year he finalises *Being and Time*, where he comments that the view held of philosophy as something universally edifying and of general cultural value rather than a discipline that is difficult and rigorous is "truly appalling" [p. 2]

and a theoretical understanding that was wrong. This is not uncommon. By and large, in the sciences we strive for explanations (know-what understanding), and typically express this as a hypothesis and use evidence derived from the hypothesis predicting what-works to validate our theoretical accounts of the explanation. This is a well-known formal logical fallacy called affirming the consequent³². and even though, for example, scientific methods try to overcome it, it is not that easy. This is a fundamental aspect of Kuhn's theory of paradigms accounting for why scientists tend to reify the objects of their theories. They become convinced that the theories are describing the world as it is based on correlations between theoretical prediction and evidence from what-works. As Kuhn points out this reification often occurs among many of the scientists, and I would add practitioners, working in a field. A more recent example of the collective know-what of understanding being wrong, and yet having a practical understanding of what works concerns diseases.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, some diseases were thought to be spread by bad air, a theory called miasma, and practices were developed, based on this understanding of how to deal with miasma. The understanding persisted because there was both a certain level of efficacy in the practices, i.e. a logical coherence, and the understanding of this was passed on by the inculturation process of the health discipline (Halliday, 2001; Vandenbroucke, Rooda, & Beukers, 1991). Miasma as such did not exist but that there was sufficient coherence between know-how (involvements) and wrong know-what (theory) for the belief in its existence to be sustained. While Miasma was a plausible theory, the problem was that the idea became reified, i.e. to a belief that it was an entity in the world and this lead to significant difficulty in changing practices associated with this understanding. When it was proposed that cholera was spread by contaminated water, for example, the idea was initially rejected by many influential people, including Florence Nightingale, as they believed in the existence of miasma. Consequently, there was slow acceptance of the transmission of cholera by

³² In science when an experiment based on a theory produces results predicted by the theory, the fallacy of affirming the consequent, refers to the belief that the results (i.e. the consequent) affirms the 'truth' of the theory. The fallacy also applies to disciplines such as medicine where actions taken are often based on an understanding of what it is that is being treated. Often the 'what is being treated' is not held as something theoretical and possibly wrongly, but is reified as something definite, this then becomes a barrier to new practices based on significantly different understandings of 'what is being dealt with'. Miasma is one example, the more recent challenges in changing the practice in the treatment of peptic ulcers (discussed in Chapter 16) is another and the current ongoing debate over the nature of depression and even more pressing example (discussed in Chapters 18 and 20.)

contaminated water, and practices to address polluted water were initially impeded, as wrong thinking (Halliday, 2001). Another more recent example concerns the difficulty in changing practice associated with peptic ulcers after the discovery of the bacterium *Helicobacter pylori* as a primary cause of ulcers (Discussed in Chapter 16) and the debates over the nature of depression (Discussed in Chapter 20.). These three cases all involve a reification of a theoretical object. One of the arguments in this thesis is that the concepts of what it is to be a human had been reified (i.e. the materialist account) and this is standing in the way of change in our design and running of nursing homes. If this is the case, then a wrong theoretical understanding is standing in the way of changes in practice that may result in better outcomes for people. In all these cases it is the worldhood of the person imposed upon the world that is that is the source of the reification.

As can be seen, the relationship between Dasein's understanding and worldhood and the structure of world and meaning is complex and made more so by the different modes of understanding Dasein has. Regardless of whether a 'right' or 'wrong' understanding of what something *is*, when the understanding takes hold, this is the basis by which something shows up; it is what is 'seen'. This phenomenon is associated with the structure of understanding as projection which is address next.

Understanding as Projection

Once we have assigned ourselves to certain involvements based on their significance to us, how do we know when there is a possibility to be involved? Heidegger's account is that the structure of understanding projects out onto the entities in the world which in turn show up for us in terms of possibilities to be involved. If we recall the example of the person afraid of dogs, this is an example of our understanding projecting out into the world and showing up 'a dog', but a dog (understanding of what something is) about which we are afraid (significance) and which we must avoid (nature of involvement).

In that we have taken up an understanding of our self (assigned) that is reflected in the things that are important for us (significance) to be involved with (involvements) these involvements will typically be in our living environment. But as discussed, this living environment is one perspective of the rich structures that abound in the public world. From all the possible involvements that are in the public world what is the basis by which those relevant to us are identified and show up for us; recall the

example of walking down the mall, some things show up as offering possible involvements, most things we pass over. We don't have to look at everything single thing in the world around us from multiple perspectives and sort through those which are significant for us from the majority which are irrelevant. So, what is happening in this phenomenon?

Heidegger's account is that our structure of understanding projects out onto the world and from this *possibilities for involvements* show up for us. Projection needs to be heard more as the overlaying of a blueprint for Dasein's possible involvements on the world, not the projecting of some image on a blank canvass. That blueprint is our worldhood (the structure of our understanding of the world based on significant involvements) and the projecting or casting out acts to highlight for our attention those things that are significant for us, while others remain in the dimness of the background. Put another way this is an account of the process that is the basis of our selective attention, except we do not do it, the process belongs to our structure.

The basis for projecting onto possibilities is thus a combination of an understanding of self, and an understanding of things in the world that are significant to that self-understanding. If, however, those possibilities necessary for Dasein's continued existence are not present in the world then there is nothing for the projection to highlight, indicating that there is nothing of significance in the world for Dasein. There is then a disjunct between Dasein's worldhood and world, and the flow of significant involvements that are the lived experience of Dasein's life is disrupted; Dasein's life has lost meaningfulness, understood both structurally and as experienced. This may occur with a sudden and significant change in a person's life-environment, such as being placed in an immigration detention centre for an indeterminate time, or a move into a nursing home. In other cases, it is unlikely that all the possibilities significant for a Dasein will suddenly be removed from an environment, there may be a gradual demise. This concept of a structural disjunct between Dasein's worldhood and world is the basis of shedding-life.

Summary

What has been outlined is that Dasein's dynamic structure is thrown into a world, and it then develops an understanding of itself in the context of its understanding of that world. That aspect of the world that Dasein both understands and takes up (assigns) as an expression of its self-understanding Heidegger calls *worldhood*.

Based on worldhood, Dasein's understanding structure projects into the world to disclose for Dasein those possible involvements with entities that are significant for its existence as the Dasein it understands itself to be. Dasein's meaningful existence thus takes place inside the relational structure of its life-environment, which is disclosed by the projection of its worldhood. Late in *Being and Time* Heidegger sums this up in a brief passage as follows:

In existing, [Dasein] has been thrown; and as something thrown, it has been delivered over to entities which it needs *in order to* be able to be as it is—namely, *for the sake of* itself. In so far as Dasein exists ... it understands itself in the way its "for-the-sake-of-itself" is thus connected with some current "in-order-to". *That inside which* existing Dasein understands *itself*, is 'there' along with its ... existence. That inside which one primarily understands oneself has Dasein's kind of being. Dasein *is* its world existingly. [BT 416/364]

The Heideggerian terminology in the passage has been described earlier in more accessible terms. The concept of being is tied to the ontological structure, and the concept of coming into being of the individual entity is tied to the notion of 'something thrown' and 'delivered over to entities'.

The major point of departure between Heidegger's account and traditional philosophy and science is not that we have a material body or that hammers, chariots and houses are constructed from material things, Heidegger accepts all this. The difference is that Heidegger argues that the material aspect of these entities arises as *a response* to the dynamic character of a network of interdependent and interconnected relationships. As such entities are not self-sufficient, independent things understood based on the material form.

Heidegger is providing a naturalistic account of Dasein and its world. On the phenomenological description that he provides, an individual Dasein comes into being structurally linked to its life-environment, notwithstanding a certain leeway in which Dasein's self-understanding changes over time, with some assignments dropping off and new ones taken-up; this simply reflects the dynamic nature of the structures. At all times, however, once the self-understanding has been taken up the Dasein requires its world. This is the 'wherein' the possibilities for significant ongoing involvements show up based on the projection of its worldhood. However, what if Dasein finds itself in an alien environment, one devoid of the possibility of meaningful involvements? In this case, the understanding protection fails to disclose the significance of the world; this is the basis for disruption of the life-environment which is discussed below.

Support for Heidegger's Work

There are three separate streams of scholarly work that can be interpreted as supporting the approach taken by Heidegger; they are research findings confirming the phenomena he draws upon, other philosophical attempts to overturn the materialist account of being, and the relatively new field of complexity and chaos theory. The latter is the most compelling, so I will only briefly touch on the first two and then introduce complexity theory in a way that the connections can be seen.

The existence of research findings supporting the observed phenomenon that Heidegger draws upon is not unexpected and I have already referred to some of these, e.g. in relation culture and emotions. This merely confirms the view that Heidegger is using empirical observations as his starting point. Numerous instances of this type of confirmation are presented in the thesis and so I am not going to dwell on this point. That Heidegger's work is demonstrably empirically based, supports the claim that his account of Dasein's ontological structure is a naturalistic one. The basic structure Heidegger describes is one of receptivity and responsiveness to the environment, the same basic structure that is accepted as applying to all living organisms and is one of the key concepts of evolutionary theory.

Philosophically Heidegger's work did not appear in a vacuum, and other attempts to overthrow the strict materialist account of what things are can be found in the work of Georg Hegel (1770-1831) and Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854). Heidegger was very familiar with the works of these German philosophers presenting lecture courses on the work of both these philosophers [HPS, STHF]. In Heidegger's era there was also the work of the philosophers known as the British emergentists (Clayton, 2006; O'Connor & Wong, 2015) and most notably the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (Whitehead, 1978). The common thread running through the work of all these philosophers was that the entities we see emerge (are accounted for) based on some underlying structure that we don't see. Apart from Heidegger, these various philosophers put forward various theoretical accounts to support their view. There are two aspects that mark out Heidegger's work. Firstly, that he is the only one that grounds his work in a strict empiricist methodology, relying on a descriptive approach combined with logical analysis, eschewing theoretical suppositions. Secondly, and more importantly, he abandoned the connection between the individual entity itself and a self-contained ontological structure. Exploring, these other philosophical accounts is not very productive in

understanding Heidegger, and so I do not go down this path in the thesis.

The final, and perhaps, major source of support for Heidegger's account comes from an unexpected source, the relatively new discipline associated with complexity, emergence and chaos theory. It was reading accounts of complexity and emergence that assisted in bringing what Heidegger was describing into some cohesive and intelligible order. This did not happen until the very end stages of the thesis when I had a sufficient grasp of Heidegger's work to start to see the similarities. The discussion of Heidegger's work within the context of emergence and complex systems framework is presented in Chapter 19, albeit the discussions are still only in its early stages³³. The concepts of complexity and emergence have been used primarily as an interpretive device and a detailed investigation of the field and subsequent reading back into Heidegger's work is for a later project. The following few paragraphs are just to indicate some aspects of this new scientific field that opened the interpretive approach I have taken.

The terms complexity and chaos are both used to describe the field and both refer to the idea of the apparent randomness or chaotic behaviour of dynamic complex systems. The information is accessible from any number of the introductory accounts in the field and I have drawn the following from a cursory reading of only a few (Gleick, 1990, 1996; Hall, 1992; Holland, 1995; Mitchell, 2011; Smith, 2007; Strogatz, 2004). The field is diverse and I am not going to attempt to discuss it in any detail. The approach I take is to provide a very simplified account of key concepts and then point out how they appear to be reflective of what Heidegger is describing in *Being and Time*.

The main view in science has been that the universe is deterministic, conforming to fixed laws of nature, with the principal aim of science being to 'discover' those laws. In science this is understood in terms of some antecedent event or state that together with the applicable law of nature will result in a predictable outcome. In other words, there is a cause and then an effect that can be determined because of the regularity of nature's laws. Inherent in this view is the concept of the 'clockwork' universe and the outstanding exponent of this approach is Isaac Newton and his discovery of the laws of motion and gravitation with which he was able to very

³³ This Chapter was written after the completion of Chapter 19. In the intervening period my thinking, while consistent, has progressed. This chapter reflects, a little of this development in thinking.

accurately describe and predict the motion of the planets. The laws of nature are presented using mathematical formula, typically differential equations, which described the relationship between entities such as to derive a rate of change of some attribute of the entities, e.g. motion, rate of heat exchange and so on. The belief was that all natural systems behave in a constant manner and if there was a difficulty in determining the law (as a mathematical description) it was as a result of the limitations of accessing and measuring the components parts, the availability of mathematical techniques and so on. This view has been shattered by the discovery of chaos.

The concept of chaos refers to the phenomena of some dynamic systems, which although comprising determinant parts, reaches a point of complex interactions such that that the behaviour of the system is no longer predictable. i.e. it appears chaotic. This unpredictability is not related to the difficulty of developing the mathematical equations, but rather it relates to the very behaviour of the system itself. On this account, there is the emergence of apparent chaotic, or random, behaviour emerging from a deterministic system without an external cause fo the random behaviour.

In modern science, the phenomenon was first described by the French polymath Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) when attempting to develop the mathematical functions to describe the motion of three bodies in space moving in relation to each other. Poincaré failed in his attempts and it was only later that it was recognised that he had stumbled on the problem of chaos. The phenomenon of chaotic behaviour in complex systems was first identified and described in contemporary times by Edward Lorenz (1917-2008) in the late 1960s when he was researching weather prediction methodologies.

While the behaviour of complex systems appears chaotic and the detailed behaviour of such systems cannot be predicted subsequent research has discovered order hidden in the chaos, and it is here that the similarities with Heidegger's descriptions of world are, at least superficially, evident. This hidden order includes such things as self-organization, feedback mechanisms, fractal structures and strange attractors. Example of complex dynamic systems exhibiting chaotic behaviour and yet containing ordering principles have been found in almost every field of science including meteorology, computer science, mathematics, biology, ecology, physics, chemistry, art, etc.

What is clear is that self-organizing complex systems that exhibit chaotic behaviour are ubiquitous in nature. Based on this, if it is accepted that humans are a species that have emerged as part of the dynamics of nature itself is it not conceivable then that their behaviour reflects at least some of the characteristics of self-organising complex systems found elsewhere in nature? It was this line of thinking that arose out of the fusion of engaging with Heidegger's work and complexity. Interestingly the interactions between Dasein within a world has similar characteristics to what would be expected of a complex chaotic systems, I will touch on these below. Heidegger explicitly regarded what he was describing as a system of relations, not in a deterministic sense, but rather as something that would "resist any sort of mathematical functionalization"[BT 122/88] because of its dynamic character. In that Heidegger was a competent mathematician, I suspect he understood the unpredictable nature of the system he was describing. In that Heidegger's method is one of strict empirical description at the 'systems' level rather than at the individual agent level, then his approach must result in a descriptions of the various features of complex systems, even if he was unable to recognise what it was he was describing; recall the case of the woolly mammoth. I want to touch on several of the key similarities between Heidegger's account and complex systems.

Self-organisation refers to the phenomena whereby order arises from the interaction between individual entities without the need of an external influence. This is sometimes referred to as bottom-up self-organisation as opposed to top-down ordering. Self-organization has been observed in animal swarming, biological neural networks, geology, etc. The variety of ways in which human societies exhibit this self-organization is self-evident.

Fractals are a structural phenomenon that have now been identified in many areas of nature. This phenomenon is found in geology (e.g. rock formations, river systems, mountain range structures), biology (e.g. lichen formation, the structure of Romanesco broccoli, structure of circulatory systems, etc.), mathematics (e.g. Mandelbrot sets) and so on. A fractal structure occurs when the structure of a larger entity can be repeatedly split into parts, where each part has a structure that is similar to the whole. This reflects Heidegger's description of world, where the very same structure is present in the larger public world, a workshop or a study. The structure of each of these entities emerges from the character of the relations between the entities. A glimpse of this is evident in the discussions on the relational

network of world and Image 1.

Emergence is the name given to phenomena whereby a property emerges from the dynamics of a system whereby that property cannot be attributed to, or predicted from the properties of any component part of the system. Common examples are of life emerging from complex, non-living entities, conscious awareness emerging from neural networks, hurricanes emerging out of certain weather pattern, ant colonies, and common salt³⁴. From Heidegger's work the ready-to-hand are emergent entities that arise from dynamic functioning of the world system. On my reading, the individual Dasein is also an emergent entity that arises out of the interplay between the biological structures of the nascent Dasein and its world. The bi-directional nature of the feedback systems between Dasein and its world are evident from the earlier descriptions. These feedback systems order Dasein within the context of its world and then order the world on the basis fo the collective actions of Dasein.

Within complex systems it has been observed that certain patterns emerge based on what has been termed strange attractors. The name derives from the fact that, at least at the moment, no-one knows what they are. The term strange attractors is given to this mysterious phenomenon that appears to 'attract' the entities moving in a chaotic system to form complex patterns (structures) discernible, but still not predictable, within the chaotic behaviour. The phenomenon is the least understood phenomenon associated with complex systems. While the leap is, at this stage, a large one, I suspect that ultimately Heidegger's concept of being as it applies to the ordering of human cultures, relates to this concept of strange attractors, i.e. it is an organising principle that is ultimately responsible for how the structure of a human society self-orders. For example, when Christendom emerged, the concept of being was as of things produced or made, with God as paradigm creator or maker. From this then flows the various actions that structure the human society in a particular way, different to the preceding way of the Romans or Greeks. In other words there are the same basic relational (structural) components, but they get 'attracted' into a different configuration by the being of the culture (i.e. the strange attractor). The West has long since drifted from the attractor of the creator God, the question is what is it that is influencing (strange attractor) the current structure of Western

³⁴ Common table salt (NaCl) is produced from the chemical bonding of a sodium (Na), metal that explodes on contact with water, and chlorine (Cl), a poisonous gas. The properties of the compound (table salt) are not predictable based on the properties of the components.

societies? It is not possible to address this question in this thesis, but the idea is enticing. (I touch on the topic a little more in chapters 11 and 14). The idea of being as an attractor should not be confined to the level of human societies, this just happened to be Heidegger's area of interest. If the concept has merit, then it also relevant at 'lower' levels within a world. In that being is a one way of describing a mutual held understanding in a group such that it 'silently' filters judgement and directs actions, then the materialist account fo the human person is possibly another example. The ordering of the activities within the health sciences on the basis of this understanding of being is no more evident than in the construction and running of nursing homes. This line of thinking about being is a radical interpretation of Heidegger's work and I do not pursue it further in the thesis. However, it should be able to be investigated from a research perspective through paradigm cases such as the nursing home; again this is a post-doctoral project.

A final concept I want to raise is the concept of downward causality, specifically within biological systems. This concept refers to the phenomenon whereby an entity that emerges from a complex system can act causally on the very system from which it emerges(Campbell, 1974; Davies, 2006b; Feltz, Crommelinck, & Goujon, 2006). The relevance to Heidegger's work is clear enough, the individual DAEin emerges from a certain world, but later its actions can shape that world; a ready-to-hand entity can also emerge from with the world, and in turn, the relationships with the entity reshape the world.

While the labelling of these ideas under the heading of complexity theory is relatively new as is the formal discovery of such things as chaos and strange attractors, the concept of emergence is not, and this has a long history within philosophy, a point I mentioned above. A brief account of this history is provided in a book co-edited by the physicist Paul Davies, *The Re-Emergence of Emergence* (Clayton & Davies, 2006). In its strong version, the emergentist account of new phenomena is rejecting a materialist ontology and claiming that it is the interaction dynamics of the system itself that is giving rise to the new phenomena (entities) (Clayton, 2006; Davies, 2006a). As Davies indicates, the numbers of scientists adopting complexity theory and emergence as a plausible account of reality are still relatively small but growing(Davies, 2006a), suggesting that there may be a Kuhnian revolution underway; we will need a longer historical perspective before assessing if this is the case.

Heidegger did not have access to the ideas recently developed in relation to chaos, fractals, strange attractors and so on, for when he was writing *Being and Time* the concepts of complexity theory had not been developed, and would not be for another fifty years. On my reading, what Heidegger is struggling to do is describe Dasein and its world as a naturally occurring, dynamic, complex and self-organising system moving through time, whereby the unity of the system (public world), is characterised by interacting and interdependent aspects (worlds within worlds, down to the level of workshops and studies) similarly structured to the larger unity. The driving agent in all of this is Dasein, and it is from the interactions of Dasein as a collective, based on its structure of receptivity and responsiveness, that emerges the structure of world. It is into this 'worlding world' travelling through time, that an individual Dasein is thrown, becomes part of, for a while, then leaves. The 'worlding world' moves through time, morphing from one form to another sustained by the relational involvements of succeeding generations; first hundreds, then thousands and now millions of Daseins, each of whom only appear for a brief moment, each generation contributing to the increasing complexity of the large public world. From a philosophical background, and struggling to find the language to describe what he was seeing that was untainted by old understandings, it is no wonder that Heidegger first used his 'invented' language evident in *Being and Time*, and later shifted to using a more poetic language, abandoning the constraints of metaphysics.

To the best of my knowledge, the naturalistic reading I am applying to Heidegger with a relational systems approach is outside the mainstream of Heideggerian interpretations. I am not making any definitive claims about the specifics of what is being discovered in the sciences of complexity, chaos and emergence and Heidegger's work. My main aim in presenting the above is to outline the 'inspiration' of my current interpretive account of Heidegger. Additionally, it is offered as a tentative, but plausible interpretive theory, given that Heidegger's empirical and naturalistic stance of inquiring into the Dasein's structure, understood as a part of nature. The very same approach of the new generation of scientists inquiring into the structures of chaos, complexity and emergence as a broader natural phenomena. There is, however, a lot more work to be done.

Life-Environment Disruption

My theory of life-environment disruption virtually falls out of an understanding of the

dynamic structure of Dasein. In that we are concerned about the life of the individual Dasein (i.e. at the ontic level), that life has meaning as reflected in the significant involvements to which Dasein has assigned itself. The possibility of accessing those involvements are only available in a life-environment appropriate to the Dasein. If Dasein is separated from an appropriate life-environment, then there is the possibility of anxiety/depression (discussed in Chapter 18) and even the death of Dasein (Chapter 21). Heidegger discusses both these phenomena and in so doing the crucial relationship between Dasein and its world are highlighted.

Heidegger discusses the phenomenon of depression/anxiety to demonstrate the relationship between Dasein and world by way of a breakdown case. By doing this, the critical necessity of having the possibility of significant involvements show-up in one's life-environment is illustrated. This is summarised by Heidegger when he says that in the experience of depression/anxiety "the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand ... discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking meaningfulness" [BT 231/186] (my underlining). The word "discovered" indicates the initial understanding of the meaning of the entities in terms of their involvements. In anxiety/depression, these involvements have no consequence, i.e. devoid of significance, to Dasein. The world itself is still intelligible, however, the structure between Dasein and world has broken down, it no longer holds meaningfulness for Dasein. There is no basis for Dasein to be involved, a phenomenon characteristic of depression. Heidegger does not explore the phenomenon of anxiety/depression in detail, he simply uses it to illustrate the existence of Dasein's structure.

The second phenomenon that highlights the structural relationship between Dasein and world is death. Not unsurprisingly Heidegger rules out death as referring to the biological aspect of Dasein, he refers to this as perishing, and as such Dasein "never perishes" [BT 291/247]. That which occurs to Dasein at the time of the body perishing Heidegger calls demise, indicating there are two related phenomenon that must be held distinct; the biological aspect of the perishing of the body which is attended to from a medical perspective and there is the 'demising' of Dasein. It is, therefore, possible for a person to be sick and indeed 'dying' from a biological perspective but not demising as a Dasein, but then when the body ceases functioning there is also the demise of Dasein; the end comes abruptly so to speak. This interpretation only makes sense if we understand Dasein as an entity that is in

some way distinct from the biology of the body. On my interpretation, this Dasein is a relational entity and as such, providing the underpinning organic aspects that facilitate the structural processes are intact, other aspects of the body may be in decline, but Dasein itself continues. This points to a need for a radical change in understanding and the care that is on offer for those terminally ill, or those facing demise in a nursing home. The challenge is to support the ongoing existence of Dasein in the face of perishing

There is another twist in Heidegger's analysis and is highlighted by his observation that while demise as an event is "empirically certain" this is not "decisive as to the certainty of death" [BT 301/257]. He is not denying that the death of Dasein as something that accompanies perishing and demise, but that there is another aspect to the phenomenon of death, and this is the one of prime interest. There are several indications as to the character of death but they all point to it as a possibility of the impossibility of being Dasein [BT 241/250]. While this has its grounding in the structure of Dasein, it is a phenomenon concerning the individual Dasein (what Heidegger terms an existentiell possibility [BT 311/266]. For the individual Dasein, that is structurally bound to a life-environment (world), death occurs when, firstly, there are no more possibilities for involvements, and secondly, there will never be such possibilities again. Heidegger frequently refers to Dasein's world as the wherein or as the 'there', which is the relational concept described above, and as such we can understand death as the possibility of Dasein "no-longer-being-able-to-be-there." [BT 241/251] or as the "the possibility which is non-relational." [BT 354/307]

It is then possible to experience death without demise. If the world of a Dasein collapses completely with respect to all necessary meaningful aspects, then with that collapse goes the relational structure that constituted the individual Dasein. There is no more world upon which its understanding projection can occur, and with this, no more 'there', the wherein the Dasein can be the Dasein it understands itself to be. There is no more possibility of possibilities for involvement with things that give Dasein its meaning. When Dasein ceases to be the individual Dasein it is, it has, essentially, died. Is this really a possibility? In Chapter 21 the case of world collapse of the Crow Indian is discussed, a situation that arose when the Crow lost the battle against the invading Europeans, exiled from their lands and confined to a reservation. Denied access to the Great Plains and the vast buffalo herds they were

cut off from the defining practices (involvements) that constituted them as Crow. In recounting the story of the Crow up until this point of their history the last Crow chief, Plenty Coup, refused to talk about what followed;

... when the buffalo went away the hearts of my people fell to the ground, and they could not lift them up again. After this nothing happened. (Lear, 2006, p. 2)

“Nothing happened”, if we hear this literally, as I think we should, we have the end of the Crow world, there was no longer a place, a ‘there’ in which it was possible for things to happen as a Crow people.

The account of Marion Miller is not a collapse of world of entire people, but it is an account of the collapse of world for her. Even though frail, while she was at home she had the possibility of meaningful involvements, all this went when she entered the nursing home. As Marion summed up, “You just shed life, you do. ... though there are worse places, when it comes to institutional living, there is no good place, No good place” (Miller, 2003, pp. 36-7).

The question that arises from Marion's situation is whether there is a plausible link between feeling that one is experiencing shedding life and actual illness. Many aspects of Dasein's structure appears to relate to what we would term mind or consciousness. That science does not yet know the character of the relationship between our conscious awareness, brain functioning, and other bodily processes is no reason to discount there is such a relationship and that there is downward causality. The disease model of illness is still evident in medicine and accompanying this is the denial that something experienced can have a causal attribution to illness (Hyman, 1994). This view is reflected in the rejection of psychosomatic medicine, i.e. the view that physical illness can have its origins in the psychological aspects of a person (Fava, Belaise, & Sonino, 2010). From a complex systems perspective this relationship between Dasein and the body can be accounted for by the concept of downwards causality. Additionally, there is now a growing acceptance that stress, for example, is both related to our awareness of what is happening in the world (how things show up) and to a raft of adverse morbidities and even mortality³⁵ (This is discussed in Chapter 19 and 20). Similarly, there is a view held within social psychiatry that depression should not be understood as a disease but as something that arises out of the interactions

³⁵ A detailed account of the relationship between stress and illness is provided by Robert Sapolsky in his book *Why Zebras Don't Get Ulcers* (Sapolsky, 2004).

between the person and their social environment (Discussed in Chapter 20). In the field of early childhood development, research findings support the view that a young child's experienced of an adverse social environment has a permanent impact on the development of the child's brain, with lifelong consequences for child's life (Chapter 20). This suggests that not only is the material aspect of the body involved in the structural dynamics from which Dasein emerges, but that functioning of these processes, which we experience as Dasein, has a downward causality on the material aspects of associated with the structure. This can manifest as stress and depression, both of which have been linked to a range of morbidities and mortalities.

The concept of shedding life is discussed in more detail in Chapter 21 but the sense of the relationship between shedding life and one's life-environment is evident in these examples, and it is grounded in the ontological structure of Dasein.

Despite Heidegger's difficult language, given that I read Heidegger's work within the broad camp of emergence and complexity theory, there is strong conceptual support for the descriptive account of the emergent character of Dasein, its world and the useful things Dasein develops and employs. This is the basis for the *Theory of Life-Environment Disruption* and the associated phenomenon of shedding life, and it satisfies the criteria for the theory set out in Chapter 1 in that it has the following elements;

- takes seriously the concept of the person (or self) as an entity,
- that in some way links self and the life-environment in some dependent way, such that,
- a disruption to the access of possibilities in the life-environment results in a disruption to the self; and finally
- posits a relationship between the self and the body such that disruptions in the life-environment flow through as adverse consequences experienced both psychologically and somatically.

This completes the descriptive summary of the *Theory of Life Environment Disruption*

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the methodology I have adopted for this thesis project, which I have termed a Discursive Heideggerian Inquiry. It is a methodology that evolved out of my engagement with Heidegger's work and after considering the nature of methodologies and methods in research. I first address the relationship between ontology, methodology, and methods and then apply this to Heidegger's concept of phenomenology. Following this, I discuss my meaning of a Discursive Inquiry and how this then developed as a Discursive Heideggerian Inquiry by incorporating Heidegger's formal structure of inquiry.

The Relationship of Ontology, Methodology, and Methods

Getting a precise handle on what is meant by a research methodology is not easy. There is a view that there is no consensus as to a definition (Sarantakos, 1998; Somekh & Lewin, 2005) and it is variously referred to as; simply the choices made covering the differing aspects of the research from planning, to methods of data collection and analysis, what cases to focus and so on (Silverman, 2005; Somekh & Lewin, 2005), as a system of principles, theories and values that underpin an approach to research (Somekh & Lewin, 2005), as the science or theory of methods (Sarantakos, 1998), a research model (Blaikie, 2000; Sarantakos, 1998) and as the principles of research entailed in a paradigm (Sarantakos, 1998). Typically, there is an accepted view that methods refer to the specific instruments used in data collection, the specific way data is categorised and analysed and so on (Blaikie, 2000; Sarantakos, 1998; Silverman, 2005; Somekh & Lewin, 2005), i.e. the various tools and procedures actually used in research. Putting aside the understanding of methodology as simply a collection of methods, which seems unhelpful, the other approaches all indicate that in some way the determination of the methodology will influence the choice of methods.

A research project has the same basic structure as any project and as such a practical example outside of research helps to clarify the relationship between methodologies and methods. If I am to build a house, I must decide on the basic approach I am going to take, e.g. rammed earth, timber or steel frame construction, concrete tilt slab, solid brick, brick veneer, etc. These basic approaches are the


various methodologies for house building, and the choice will constrain the choice of materials, the construction techniques, the tools used and so on. All these basic decisions that are required to be made within the framework of the chosen methodology can be designated as the various methods that relate to the actual process of construction. However, this does not mean that there is an exclusive one-to-one relationship between methods and methodology as some methods may be incorporated within more than one methodology, e.g. a concrete slab floor can be used in a solid brick construction or a rammed earth construction. The choice of which methodology to use in constructing a house will be based on many factors such as energy efficiency, aesthetics, cost, time to build, legal encumbrances to do with building design in certain places and so forth. There is a sense then that a methodology is not something that is prescriptive in all aspects of the project but rather defines the essential, defining characteristics of the approach. A methodology for building a house cannot be based on a rammed earth construction if the methodology has been determined as a tilt slab construction. Both construction methodologies will have, however, electrical and plumbing but the methods of installation will differ because of the characteristics of a tilt slab versus a rammed earth construction.

Reflecting on this example, it is easy to see how methodology can be described in the different ways in the research methods texts. I take methodology to define the essential defining characteristics that determine the basic framework of decision that shapes the conduct of the project. A house may have a basic methodological framework based on a rammed earth construction, but then a subset of methodologies such as energy efficiency, affordability and so on. The designation 'energy efficient' does not specify an approach as clearly as 'rammed earth' but it does designate an overall approach that constrains and gives direction to the methods associated with such activities as heating and cooling choices, the orientation of the house to the sun, window design and so on. It is, for this reason, it falls within the ambit of the overall methodological framework. A decision to a build house using a rammed earth methodology is thus sufficient to define the basic structure but is insufficient to determine the methodological framework with sufficient detail to ensure the outcome desired. Ensuring the adequacy of the decisions around methodology are thus essential in determining the conduct of the inquiry.

Each methodology for house building has, however, one thing in common. They all


contain the same assumption as to what a house 'is'. The ontology of the house, what it is to be a house, is already assumed and is probably never clarified in any discussions with the architect or builder, and perhaps never needs to be. Heidegger recognises, for example, that within a culture we will typically have a common understanding of what things are without making that understanding explicit, i.e. defining what we mean.[BT33/13] So if I go to an architect or builder and say I want to build a house I do not need to define a house (make it explicit as to what I understand by a house), rather what I do is articulate what 'house' characteristics I want in the one I am seeking to have built. All the different house building methodologies work because there is an underlying relationship of the ontology to methodology and the methodology to methods, it is just that the outcome or 'style' and characteristics of the house will be different, depending on the choices. Methodologies and/or methods that would fail to build a house (the outcome) are typically not ruled out of contention deliberately as they are not considered in the first place.

We can represent this as follows (Figure 1)



What is clear from this is that the project requires a sufficient understanding of the outcome of the project even before it commences. While there may be changes in decisions along the way from what was originally envisaged what cannot change is the understanding of 'house'.

The same basic project relationship can be applied to project concerning research or inquiry (Figure 2);



In undertaking any form of inquiry, we are typically asking about some characteristic of some-thing, an entity. It may relate to a characteristic of the entity, behaviour under certain circumstances, a judgment of a person concerning a situation, and so

on. Even in relation to historical inquiries we are, in effect, putting certain questions to a document, artefact and so on. What changes is the nature of the entity investigated and in turn the type of inquiry that can be made concerning the entity. It is not possible to ask a piece of carbon its view of the current climate debate for example. There must be a logical coherence in the structure of any inquiry.

Linking to Heidegger's Approach

That there is a relationship between the task, subject matter and the methodology is specifically addressed by Heidegger. He comments in the *History of the Concept of Time* that in relation to methodology that philosophy should

... proceed ... as the natural sciences do in their field - with a fundamental regard for the character of the subject matters in question. [HCT 20]

By 'the character of the subject matter', he is referring to an understanding of what it is, i.e. its ontology. In other words, in the natural sciences, they proceed (methods) based on the nature of the subject matter, i.e. the entity as already given. In other words, the understanding of what the entity is determines how the sciences proceed. However, Heidegger argues that the task of philosophy (and he is referring specifically to metaphysics) is the study of being, i.e. to research what entities are;

... *being of the entities* which constitutes the object of philosophy. [OHF 60]

In other words, he is arguing that there is first a philosophical research task to establish the being of an entity which implies that this task must occur before the tasks undertaken by science.

He then makes the assertion that the only method applicable for this philosophical research is phenomenology (as he understands it);

Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible. [BT 60/35]

There is no ontology alongside a phenomenology. Rather, scientific ontology is nothing but phenomenology. [HCT 72]

This may suggest that the basic structure of inquiry is somehow changed, not so. The reason is that;

Being is always the being of an entity. [BT 29/9]

However, there is a problem that quickly arises in understanding this, as contrary to the tradition, discussed earlier,

The being of entities 'is' not itself an entity³⁶. [BT 25/6]

Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains to every entity. [BT 62/38]

The essential relationship between being and entities is given by Heidegger as follows;

Being - that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood. [BT 25-6/6]

To make matters even more difficult from an understanding and research perspective, while we can typically see entities, we cannot see the being of entities. It is something that remains hidden;

Manifestly, it is something [being of the entity] that proximally and for the most part does *not* show itself at all: it is something that lies *hidden*, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself [the entity itself]; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground. [BT 59/35] (my gloss)

I have already mentioned that the phenomenon of Heidegger's phenomenology relates to the being of the entity and not the entity itself. It thus refers to what is hidden, and phenomenology is about disclosing this hiddenness, to disclose being. We know then that being is not another entity and as such is not a 'thing' that stands behind, or is the foundation, or some other 'smaller' entity from which it is comprised. In this following passage Heidegger is as clear as he ever gets about the nature of the phenomenon he is pursuing in phenomenology;

Phenomenology ... never has anything to do with appearances and even less with mere appearances. It is phenomenologically absurd to speak of the phenomenon as if it were something behind which there would be something else of which it would be a phenomenon in the sense of the appearance which represents and expresses [this something else]. A phenomenon is nothing behind which there would be something else. More accurately stated, one cannot ask for something behind the phenomenon at all, since what the phenomenon gives is precisely that something in itself. [HCT 86]

As Heidegger regularly does, in this statement he is ruling out ways we may conceptualise the phenomenon, he is telling us what it is not. He then goes on to describe the type of phenomenon he is looking for,

The term 'phenomenon' however says nothing about the being of the objects under study, but refers only to the way they are encountered. The *phenomenal* is accordingly everything

³⁶ The reason Heidegger places 'is' in quotes is that the word is part of the verb to be, which always refers to an entity. Being is a 'non-entity' but there is no other word in the language with which to refer to 'non-entities', so Heidegger uses 'is'.

which becomes visible in this kind of encounter and belongs in this structural context of intentionality. We therefore speak of 'phenomenal structures' as of what is seen, specified and examined in this kind of research. *Phenomenological* signifies everything that belongs to such a way of exhibiting phenomena and phenomenal structures, everything that becomes thematic in this kind of research. The *unphenomenological* would be everything that does not satisfy this kind of research, its conceptuality and its methods of demonstration. [HCT 86] (my underlining)

I did not realise the significance of this passage until recently when I 'rediscovered' it. In the passage, Heidegger is giving us one of his key 'methods', albeit in a general way, and that is to observe the way in which entities are encountered. The encounter occurs as part of the intentional structure associated with Dasein. I am not going to describe the intentional structure here; I will do that in Chapter 12. The importance of this passage is not just that it points to a method but also to the way in which he deals with entities. Later I will discuss a statement by Heidegger in which he states that he makes no claim about the entity of Dasein itself. This claim startled me at the time³⁷, but it fits with the above statement that he is not dealing "with appearances" and his emphasis on how entities are encountered rather than the entities themselves. This will prove to be an important clue in how to understand Heidegger's work.

I am aware that this possibly sounds obscure, but it will become clearer as the thesis develops. When Heidegger talks about 'exhibiting' structures or 'seeing' structures he is talking metaphorically as in "I see what you mean". By way of analogy, we can 'exhibit' the grammatical structure of language, verbs, nouns, and so on, through observing words in the language, not by looking at their physical presentation, but by observing and analysing what they do and then bringing them into thematic groups based on that analysis. For example, the words cat, dog and tree are all naming things, and words that do this we call nouns. We can't see 'noun', but we understand it as a structure of language.

The encounters with an entity that Heidegger has in mind are quite diverse, but in each case, they are always dealing with an entity as it is normally understood and used. An encounter with a hammer, not as a random object, but as an entity that is typically used for pounding in nails, i.e. for hammering. Similarly, when encountering a house in planning its construction, we would have in mind the structure in which we will dwell, in which the family will live, i.e. a house as understood in the culture.

³⁷ φ

This gives a general idea, and I will come back to it in greater detail later.

Given that being is always the being of an entity and that his 'method' is to observe encounters with entities it follows that Heidegger must specifically designate an entity to be the focus of his research inquiries. This is what he does, and the entity that he selects in *Being and Time* is Dasein, his name for us, and the first half of *Being and Time*, Division I, is an account of his inquiries concerning the structure of Dasein. As mentioned, conceptualising what Heidegger means by Dasein is problematic, and I deal with this in Chapter 8, *Clarifying Dasein*, and Chapter 9, *How to Investigate Dasein*.

Heidegger discusses his phenomenological method with a little more clarity in the *Basic Problems with Phenomenology*,

... three basic components of phenomenological method – reduction, construction, destruction - belong together in their content and must receive grounding in their mutual pertinence. [BPP 23]

In the lecture course he expands on this. By reduction, he means nothing akin to the Husserlian reductions, he uses an older understanding of the word as meaning a turning back, and he applies it to mean a turning from the entity as the object of the inquiry to the being of the entity. As per the above discussion, the subject matter of the inquiry is thus not the physical appearance that presents itself but that which gives the entity its meaning. Destruction refers to the identification of the accepted ways of understanding 'being' in the tradition which are wrong, having been derived from theory, or accepted in an unquestioning way from the tradition. The idea is to critique these positions and show how they are not grounded in the phenomenon itself thus clearing the way for a new understanding of being. Destruction is thus not a negative process, but a way by which new understandings can be established, this is the construction phase. One of the approaches that Heidegger takes throughout *Being and Time* is to clearly rule out common ways of understanding something that he believes are wrong and will get in the way of a proper understanding of the concept; I take this as part of his method of destruction. I have learnt that it is important to pay careful attention to these 'ruling outs', as when taken seriously they cause a disruption in our way of understanding and force us to seek and construct alternatives. The most obvious example of this is the number of 'ruling outs' as ways of understanding Dasein that Heidegger includes in *Being and Time*, e.g. biological life [BT 75/50], the aggregation of body, soul and spirit [BT 74/47]. I


discuss this in relation to Dasein in more detail in Chapter 4 and 8. Construction, is the primary task, the identification and description of the ontological structures and the interpretation of being.

To summarise, for Heidegger, the research task of philosophy is the being of entities, and this is Heidegger's declared project in *Being and Time* as set out on the first page;

Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of being and to do so concretely. [BT 19/1]

... and his declared methodology is phenomenology.

Heidegger's project can be structured as follows (Figure 3);



Unlike building and research where there may be differing methodologies, Heidegger tells us that to investigate being there is only one methodology, phenomenology. There is an important difference that is not readily evident in the structure of Heidegger's project compared to others; it is to do with the subject matter. In the non-philosophical examples, the ontology, what it is to be an entity, is assumed, but in Heidegger's philosophical research, it is the ontology itself that is the task of the inquiry. In that Heidegger believes we have a wrong understanding of the being entities (ontology) he also holds that this philosophical research into being *must* precede the research carried out by science, especially when it comes to Dasein. This thesis is based on this very point, i.e. the clarifying being of Dasein. I discuss the link between ontology and science in Chapter 10, *Heidegger's Empiricism* and Chapter 11, *Heidegger's Work and the Link to Science*.

Another difference in the structure is that whereas the entity determines the methodologies of the natural science, philosophical research is not so constrained. Philosophy investigates the being of entities and not the entity themselves, and as such phenomenology, the methodology does "not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter".[BT 50/27] For Heidegger phenomenology "signifies primarily a methodological conception and he suggests that this "determines the principles on which [phenomenology] is to be conducted"

which is "rooted in the way we come to terms with the things themselves", [BT 50/27], i.e. by our mode of encounter with them. Phenomenology then, as Heidegger understands and applies it, is a universal methodology concerning the investigations into being. As he succinctly puts it,

There is no ontology *alongside* a phenomenology. Rather, *scientific ontology is nothing but phenomenology*. [HCT 72]

I mentioned above that Heidegger's project is to work out the "question of the meaning of being" [BT 19/1] and that he believes this project is essential because within the philosophical tradition,

... idea and constitution of the subject and what philosophy itself has hitherto defined ontologically in an utterly deficient way and left in the dark. [BPP 65]

This is a significant claim with radical implications, and I enter this thesis project starting from the premise that his claim should be accepted at face value and tested on its merits. My conclusion is that his claim has merit and not only helps in the understanding of 'shedding life' but has important implications for the construction and administration of nursing homes, and the human and biological science more generally. However, this is for later in the thesis.

Before continuing, Heidegger's project needs to be clarified a little further, as Heidegger does not resolve the question of the meaning of being either in *Being and Time* or his other works, albeit his inquiries into different aspects of being remains the central focus throughout his career. It is his work in *Being and Time*, however, that opens up a radically new way of understanding the being of entities, including Dasein, and it is this aspect of his work that has relevance to this thesis and I will briefly outline the connection between Heidegger's main project and his work on Dasein.

Within the tradition and our culture more generally the normative view is that there is only one mode of being, understood philosophically as substance ontology, the idea that every entity is constituted from other entities. The science equivalent of this is can be thought of as materialism. I will briefly explain this as it is the primary position that Heidegger is attacking.

The standard account in scholarship is that being of entities, literally what things are in terms of what constitutes them, are other entities. For example, the most fundamental entities in the universe are generally taken as various types of sub-

atomic particles, and everything else in the Universe is constituted from these. While there is no agreement as to how these fundamental particles formed, i.e. what constituted them, physicists believe that this puzzle will be eventually resolved and a 'natural' explanation will be found³⁸. The general idea is that biology can be explained by chemistry, chemistry can be explained by standard physics and standard physics can be explained by quantum physics. This is a reductionist view associated with materialism. An alternative view, one held throughout most of the Christian era, is that it is God who constituted everything, a view known as Creationism. While many Christians no longer hold this extreme view, it is still a common belief that God is, in some way, responsible for the creation of the Universe, e.g. the fundamental particles and the laws of nature from which all else is created. Regardless of which view is taken the accounts posit the being of all individual entities as other entities. In other words, the ultimate source behind all entities, the most fundamental being, is still an entity. In addition, whereas physicists view all entities as being comprised mass and energy, various theologies allow for entities made of other 'spiritual', non-worldly substances. Both views can be brought together under what is called a substance ontology, i.e. all entities are made of some form of substance. In one form or another, the substance ontology approach to the being of entities is the overwhelmingly dominant view in Western culture, the almost exclusive view in Western science and the one I held before and during most of this thesis project³⁹.

It is critical to understanding Heidegger's work that one recognises that Heidegger rejects this normative account of substance ontology. The corollary to this is that if one is undertaking a Heideggerian inquiry, Heidegger's account of being must be what is in focus and cannot be ignored. This is what I finally accepted just a few

³⁸ For the majority physicists, everything starts with the Big Bang followed by an exponential expansion of the universe that happened during the inflationary epoch that lasts from 10^{-36} seconds after the Big Bang to around 10^{-32} seconds after which the Universe expands at a less rapid rate. Once scientist understanding how the Big Bang itself occurred they have found the source of all matter in the universe, the source from which all things that are, arise. Under this model everything we see around us, including us, is made up of the material of the Universe

Cosmologist Stephen Hawking has theorized(Hawking, 2003, 2011) that there was a spontaneous separation of matter and antimatter (known as M-Theory) and the mathematics behind the theory, to the extent it has been developed, is in accord with much of existing theories in physics. This explanation solves the problem of the initial cause, removes the need for God and still stays within the materialist account given that it accounts for all matter (including anti-matter) and the various forces that bind them. The ultimate source of being is thus grounded within a materialist or entity based framework, and we understand things based on the characteristics manifested from the physical stuff of which they are made.

³⁹ ϕ

months ago, and that resulted in a re-writing of the thesis! However, to put this very bluntly, what it is 'to be' a Dasein is not 'flesh and blood'! Already this starts to bring into question the premises on which nursing homes are established and run.

Heidegger believes that the normative account is wrong on two accounts, firstly that there is more than one way in which an entity can be constituted and secondly, more devastating, that being is not an entity.

Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains to every entity. Its 'universality' is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. [BT 62/38]


Being is something that not only does not belong to entities, but it is also something that comes *before* (higher), and further, it is something that does not typically reveal itself [BT 59/35]. How this can be the case will be shown in the later chapter on being and then towards the end of the thesis in the discussion on emergence.

Heidegger's project was not simply to go around identifying the modes of being of different classes of entities, what is called regional ontology. What he was after was the meaning of being that pertains to all the different modes of entities, i.e. fundamental ontology. To explain; different classes of entities have different modes of being, for example, if there is a class of entities x such that it has the mode of being x, a class of entities y with the mode of being y and a class of entities z with the mode of being z. What Heidegger's project, as stated in *Being and Time*, was about is to ascertain the meaning of being as it applies to x, y, and z. It is this final step that is his primary project, and he believes that somehow the meaning of being is to be found in temporality. I will not be following Heidegger this far as it is unnecessary for this thesis, but it is important to understand the structure of his inquiry in *Being and Time*.

In *Being and Time*, his research strategy is to begin with the entity he calls Dasein. One reason he starts with Dasein, i.e. us, is that we have an un-thematized understanding of what things are, which is reflected in our appropriate use of things, e.g. we know what a coffee cup is, we drink from it; we know what a hammer is, we use it to drive in nails, and so on. For Heidegger it is this obvious, everyday proficiency we have of things in our everyday life that provides the evidence of our intuitive understanding of what things are, i.e. their being. Heidegger believes that because of this he can analyse how we engage (encounter) things in terms of what they are (their being) and from this develop a thematized understanding of their

being. i.e. understand the structure of being. Most of Division One of *Being and Time* is taken up with an analysis of the structure of the being of Dasein, which he calls being-in-the-world, and this leads him to an account of the being of Dasein which he calls Care.

Heidegger's preliminary project concerning Dasein can be structured as follows (Figure 4):



As part of this project, Heidegger not only investigates the being of Dasein but also of the being of Dasein's world and of the entities with which Dasein engages in pursuing the activities of living its life, what Heidegger terms the ready-to-hand. World and ready-to-hand are technical terms in Heidegger's lexicon and do not lend themselves to a ready understanding; I will discuss them at length later in the thesis.

In the above, I have discussed Heidegger's research project in general terms and placed it within the structure of a research project. Also identified are the differences in the structures between a typical project in science or an applied discipline and a Heideggerian philosophical project. The difference being that the former necessarily assumes the nature of an entity, its being, as the subject of the inquiry, whereas, for the latter, determining the being of the entity is the task of the inquiry. I also discussed the nature of Heidegger's methodology, what he terms phenomenology and identified some of his methods. I now want to discuss the development of my methodology and how it has been informed by Heidegger's technical structure of inquiry.

Introduction to the Thesis Methodology

As discussed in the introductory chapter this thesis is not within the genre of a natural or social science research project, what Kuhn calls normal science (Kuhn (Author) & Hacking (Introduction), 2012). It is a project deliberately aimed at identifying a new theoretical framework to be applied within the sciences, albeit one based on the philosophical research of Martin Heidegger. The project involves two steps; the first is to gain an understanding of Heidegger's work, and

the second is to apply that understanding in a way that meets the thesis goal, understanding the meaning of shedding life. The first step is by far the most challenging and once completed the second follows in a relatively simple and straightforward manner. Most of the thesis, then, is an account of my interpretation of Heidegger's account of his research into the structure of Dasein.

As Kuhn has pointed out (Kuhn (Author) & Hacking (Introduction), 2012) there is no guaranteed way for a person to gain a radically new understanding of a situation. There is no defined set of steps that if followed will ensure the shifting from understanding a situation under one paradigm to understanding it from another. This does not mean that in attempting to gain an understanding of something new that there is an absence of approach. I initially named the approach I took as *Goal-Directed Discursive Inquiry*, which I subsequently deemed a tautology and renamed it a *Discursive Heideggerian Inquiry*.

The section is divided into two sections. The first deals with how I intend the term Discursive Inquiry to be used and the second discusses Heidegger's structure of inquiry and how I apply it to this thesis.

Discursive Inquiry

In a broad sense, the methodology that I am using can be best described as a *Discursive Inquiry*, and in this section, I discuss what I mean by this term. The approach I take is to first look at the concepts of 'discursive' and 'inquiry' separately and then to summarise the term as a unity.

Inquiry comes from the Latin *inquerere*⁴⁰ meaning 'to seek after, search for or examine' and derives from the Latin *in-* meaning 'into' and *quaerere* 'ask or seek'. The way I mean the term is to reflect the notion of an 'asking about' which implies that there is both something sought and a direction in which the seeking takes place. What is sought is the phenomenon of interest that guides the inquiry which in this case is the meaning of 'shedding life' and the direction is indicated by the philosophical research findings concerning the Dasein analytic published by Martin

⁴⁰ The primary source I use for all English language etymologies in this thesis are provided by the *Online Etymology Dictionary* (OED) compiled and published by Douglas Harper. It is accessible at <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php>. I regularly check alternative sources and rarely find any dispute. Wherever I refer to an English language etymology it should be assumed that the OED is the source and I indicate, by way of reference, when alternative sources are used,

Heidegger.

Inherent in the idea of seeking is that what is sought after is somehow hidden and must be disclosed. The seeking out also indicates that what is sought is not readily accessible, it involves an effort in the discovery process and the disclosing. As in all seeking, there is the risk of failure and so *inquiry*, as used in this thesis, is not a methodology for puzzle solving, where the notion of a puzzle is something for which there is a solution if the right methods are used and the puzzle solver clever enough. This form of 'puzzle solving' relates to normal science (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012) and not to project of the type being undertaken in this thesis.

The understanding that arises in the disclosing belongs to the inquirer, and as such the path taken on the journey of seeking and disclosing must also relate to the inquirer. However, the phenomenon of interest must be such that it remains accessible to any other who seeks. Accordingly, in a discursive inquiry, the account of the seeking, disclosure and what has been disclosed should provide an intelligible account of that seeking and disclosure. The account should also provide for those who have made the disclosure beforehand sufficient grounds for affirming that indeed the same phenomenon has been disclosed. The account may also act as an exemplar guide for others to repeat the journey in their way, albeit hopefully with greater ease. In the case of this project, I take Heidegger's *Being and Time* as such a guide.

The 'scientific' merit of such inquiries is the possibility of a shared and mutually agreed understanding of the disclosed phenomenon which then forms the basis for collective action concerning the phenomenon, whether that be by further research, changes in policy and practice or some other action or deliberate non-action. This understanding of inquiry flows through to the way I am using *discursive*.

I am using *discursive* as the adverbial form of the verb *discourse* which derives from the Latin *discursus*, *dis-*, 'apart' and *currere* 'to run'. Run can be used in a number of ways, but here it denotes a sense of moving past specific things, as in the path of the Heysen trail runs past our house. It thus denotes a movement in the sense of a journey.

Discursus in Latin came to mean 'conversation' in English, and discourse has a related sense in that it typically refers to the discussion, conversation or debate

about something in particular. However, in going back to the origins of the word discourse can mean to "take apart" as in to discuss the topic via the parts. Discourse as I am intending it has the sense of a dialogue concerning the focus of the inquiry in which views are exchanged, questions put and answered and so forth about differing aspects or parts of the topic. A discourse aims to ensure an exploration of all key aspects of the topic, to bring it fully into view.

The topic, or the phenomenon that is the focus of a discourse, thus constrains the scope of the discourse. The exchanges that form the discourse can occur in person, with what a person has presented in writing, in dialogue with oneself or between the inquirer and the phenomenon that is the focus of the inquiry. Of primary importance in these exchanges is what is disclosed about the phenomenon to the inquirer, the understanding of others relating to the phenomenon is relevant only in so much as it leads to such disclosures.

For the inquirer, the phenomenon of interest must always be present in the discourse. What is exchanged does not gain its validity or value by sitting in a framework of rational argument and much less by persuasive rhetoric but rather in its usefulness in disclosing the phenomenon itself, as it is in itself. The aim of engaging in discourse as part of an inquiry is to assist in the pointing out of the phenomenon, which leads to understanding by the inquirer. Such pointing out is reflected in the idiomatic use of phrases, such as "I see". There is always the risk that what appears as a disclosure of some aspect of the phenomenon has been 'viewed' as something that it is not, i.e. misunderstood and thus misinterpreted. Aspects already disclosed are therefore always subject to further inquiry, and must be checked against the unity of the phenomenon as progressively disclosed and understood. This points to the iterative nature of such a discursive approach.

A *discursive inquiry* is one that identifies an area of interest and attempts to disclose something unknown, which becomes the focus or phenomenon of interest to the inquiry. The process is a progressive revealing, aspect by aspect, until that which was hidden comes sufficiently into view as to be understood as a unity. The seeking of a discursive inquiry thus proceeds, guided by what is to be disclosed in the seeking, from what has been so far disclosed to the inquirer and to where the inquirer next seeks. While the inquirer always remains focused on the phenomenon, the nature of discourse is that they may often be guided by others who assist by way of a pointing out.

This is a general description of what I mean by a *discursive inquiry*. I make no claims to originality, and this basic structure is present in other methodologies. My aim is simply to ensure I have made clear how I am using the term *discursive inquiry*. An important claim of the approach is that there exist phenomena capable of investigation by different inquirers, such that the understanding of the phenomenon arises from the phenomenon itself and not 'hearsay' or 'authority' and that this is the basis of a shared understanding of the phenomenon. I take 'shedding life' to be such a phenomenon.

As I have described it, discursive inquiry covers a broad range of inquiries and may equally apply to a detective seeking the identity of an unknown suspect in a crime, to the asking of directions to a particular location or as in this case to the nature of a phenomenon appearing to be affecting many people, the shedding of life. The specific methods of the discursive inquiry will thus vary based on the nature of the phenomenon that is the focus of the inquiry.

A thesis is a narrative account and summary of the discursive inquiry and does not try to recount all aspects of the journey. It is in the nature of a discursive inquiry, however, that the writing of the thesis itself, forms part of the discourse and may lead to further disclosures of the phenomenon to the inquirer. This has occurred many times in the process of writing this thesis. Initially, this would result in significant changes in understanding requiring a radical reappraisal of all that had gone before. Eventually, new disclosures left the basic unity substantially intact and aided in understanding the finer details of the parts. Having said that it was just eight months ago, when I had nearly completed the writing of the thesis, that a major change occurred in my understanding of 'being' that resulted in a complete re-write. It changed how I understood the unity of the phenomenon. This led to a new section, on the Greeks, and to the insights concerning emergence which I discuss later in the thesis. I am also conscious that there are new aspects which have revealed themselves since that time but, thankfully, they are at the level of detail of the parts and do not change the understanding of the unity itself. Even so, these new disclosures would, if I was starting afresh, result in some restructuring of the thesis, this, of course, is impractical. While I have 'tinkered' around the edges, the thesis has been left 'as is' which I think does give the sense of both the iterative and progressive nature of disclosure of a project such as this based on discursive inquiry.

Discursive Heideggerian Inquiry

The methodology as I am presenting it here is not that which was envisaged in the research proposal and original research topic. The changes came about as a result of the engagement with Heidegger's work. The original thesis title was

Towards the development of a 'living environmental stress' theory to describe how the environment of a residential aged care facility may be toxic, resulting in an increased risk of premature morbidities and mortality in older people.

which shifted to,

A Heideggerian Inquiry into the Meaning of Shedding Life

before finally settling on the current title. The change in titles reflected my increasing absorption in Heidegger's work before pulling back with a greater sense of clarity vis-a-vis the thesis aim. While I do not address the progressive nature of the change, I have written about the source of the concept of shedding life, and the relevance of a Heideggerian understanding of Dasein will become apparent as the thesis unfolds. In the original research proposal, I had indicated I would be using a Gadamerian methodology, but as I delved deeper into Heidegger's work, Gadamer fell by the wayside. To be frank, it was difficult enough to come to an understanding Heidegger's work without adding the complexity of Gadamer. The decision was reinforced as I recognised that Gadamer was heavily influenced by Heidegger's philosophy (Gadamer (Author) & Schmidt (Introduction), 1994).

There has been an ongoing development of my methodology that reflects the changes in understanding of Heidegger's work and what is presented in this section is my current position. Initially, I had envisaged 'going after' the meaning of 'shedding of life' directly whereas now, while this remains the goal, the path is via an understanding of the nature of the person (Dasein) and the conditions for the possibility of living a life, what Heidegger terms our existence. It was only once those 'conditions' were understood that the nature of 'shedding of life' could be disclosed in terms of a breakdown of those conditions.

The approach to structuring this inquiry comes from Heidegger, and he introduces his discussion on the structure of his inquiry in *Being and Time* (§2) as follows;

Every inquiry is a seeking. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought. Inquiry is a cognizant seeking for an entity both with regard to the fact that it is and with regard to its

being as it is. This cognizant seeking can take the form of 'investigating', in which one lays bare that which the question is about and ascertains its character.[BT 24/5]

Reading carefully, we note that the comments "Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought." and "with regard to the fact that it is ...". Here Heidegger is making the self-evident claim that, no matter how empty, that there must be some pre-existing understanding of something before an inquiry can commence⁴¹. To paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, one cannot inquire into unknown unknowns! Note also that an inquiry is "a seeking" which reflects a certain disposition towards what is being inquired into. If there is no disposition to seek, then the inquiry cannot even be conceived, and any understanding that may arise from the seeking thus remains hidden. My disposition to seek was outlined in Chapter 2 which outlined my background and motivation. This notion of a disposition will be discussed later under the heading of affective-attunement, one of the two key aspects, along with understanding, that holds open our world.

Heidegger identifies three parts to his structure of inquiry, *Befragtes* or the object of inquiry, *Gefragtes*, that which is asked of the object and *Erfragtes*, a preliminary indication of what is to be found in the asking. I will briefly discuss these concepts, show how they relate to Heidegger's inquiry and then how I have applied them to this thesis.

Befragtes - this is the object of the inquiry, the entity or thing placed under investigation, "*that which is to be interrogated.*"[BT 24/5] In German⁴², *Befragtes* literally means respondent, answerer or the object of an interrogation, i.e. that which is understood to hold the answer. One of the important aspects of this part of an inquiry is to make sure that the "what" of the inquiry has been appropriately clarified. Clarifying the "what" does not mean that it is already understood. In the case of inquiring into what a shadow on a dark night 'is' simply means holding the 'perceptual image' (the 'what') of the shadow in view such that this becomes the

⁴¹ While I do not discuss Heidegger's work in relation to the structure of understanding in this thesis, it was one of the topics that had to be dropped due to space constraints, this idea relates to the notion of the fore-structure of understanding. Refer *Being and Time* 146/155 ff.

⁴² While I generally stay with the standard English translations of *Being and Time* I have often found it useful to explore other sources concerning German translations. My primary source is the German-> English translations provided by the website *Beolingus* (<http://dict.tu-chemnitz.de/dings.cgi?lang=en;service=>) which is published and maintained by the University of Chemnitz. The main secondary source against which I check translations is *dict.cc* (<http://www.dict.cc/>), which also uses the Chemnitz word base but is also supplemented, via a user forum. Additionally, I occasionally use the Wikipedia project which provides translations and information on German words (among other languages) as well as the meanings of prefixes and suffixes which assist in translation.

focus of the inquiry, putting aside any unfounded interpretations, i.e. 'it is the shadow of a man'. Another example relates to the scientific investigations into heat in the eighteenth century. Heidegger's approach would mean focusing on the phenomenon of 'heat' itself and not positing, as was the case, unsubstantiated metaphysical entities such as phlogiston or caloric fluid, both of which were subsequently found to be non-existent. This last example will become relevant in the investigation of Dasein, in that Heidegger makes no claim about the physical or perceptual characteristics of Dasein! The question that arises from this is: How can he then, hold Dasein in view as the object to be interrogated? I deal with this question in the following chapters.

Gefragtes - this is what is asked about or more literally what is sought after from the object of inquiry. We can think of this as the nature of the information that we are looking for in an interrogation or inquiry. The *Gefragtes* thus frames the inquiry concerning the entity and sets the bounds for the questions that are asked. For example, I may want to know about the education of a group of people employed in certain roles within an organisation. The *Befragtes* or what of the inquiry is the specific group of people, the *Gefragtes*, what is asked about, is education attainment of the members of the group, which may have a broad or narrow focus, which in turn determines the nature of the questions concerning education. This aspect of the structure frames the direction of the inquiry. In Heidegger's work, the *Befragtes* is an entity, and the *Gefragtes* is the being of the entity.

Erfragtes - is the preliminary designation of "what is to be found out by the asking; this is what is really intended"[BT 24/5]. This refers to the information we expect to obtain from the inquiry. Heidegger rightly points out that there must be some way of determining if the information we gain from the inquiry answers the question. If we have no way of ascertaining the appropriateness of the results of an inquiry, the inquiry is pointless. In most cases this is straight forward, e.g. in looking as to what is causing the shadow on a dark night, we know that it must be an object within a certain size range and be in the vicinity of the shadow itself. To use an extreme contra example, the answer will not be the sound of a melody drifting across the paddock, it must be something that accounts for the phenomenon of the shadow.

By way of example the structure of inquiry looks something like this when put together:

I am in Adelaide going to the Arts Theatre, but I do not know where the theatre (*Befragtes*) is located (*Gefragtes*). I ask someone (also a *Befragtes*), and an appropriate response will be one that gets me from where I am standing to the location of the theatre (*Erfragtes*). If the response is "There is a great Thai restaurant on Gouger St you go" or "Port Power is the best football team in South Australia" I know from the answer that it does not belong to my inquiry.

If the response is "It's on Exhibition St, continue down Lonsdale St and turn right at the next set of lights after Russell St.", then the answer has the right structure. However, these are directions that relate to a different city, Melbourne, not Adelaide. If I did not know this, I would say "thank you", and walk in the direction indicated, but I would have been led astray. To confirm the answer to my inquiry I seek confirmation that I am on Lonsdale Street, either by looking at street signs or asking another person. I would soon establish that there was a problem with the answer I had received. I had put the inquiry to the wrong person, and so I would try again.

In this example, the *Befragtes* (the theatre) cannot, initially, be interrogated directly. There is a secondary inquiry; we inquire of a person (also a *Befragtes*) and what we ask about concerns their knowledge of how to get to the theatre (*Gefrates*). However, the primary focus is always the location of the theatre itself, and this is confirmed should we reach the destination at which point the entity itself discloses its location. This is the final confirmation. I now have an understanding derived directly from my first-hand encounter with the entity.

In an inquiry then we may be reliant on others, or other entities (e.g. a street sign) to point us in the right direction and as such part of the process is to clarify our progress, but this is no guarantee. There are always other factors that can influence any of the steps in this process. The final confirmation comes, ultimately from the entity itself.

I will now present Heidegger's inquiry concerning being in terms of Heidegger's formal structure of inquiry.

Applying Heidegger's Structure of inquiry to Heidegger's work

Heidegger's project in terms of his structure of inquiry can be set out in tabular form (Table 1). Note that it is a two-part structure, and this follows the explanation of his project that I provided in the preceding section. The English terminology substituted for the German terms for the structural components follow Sheehan's⁴³ account as

⁴³ I have found Thomas Sheehan's discussion on Heidegger's structure of inquiry in his book *Making Senses of Heidegger* (Sheehan, 2015) helpful in understanding the structure, albeit Sheehan only focuses on column 1.

I see no value in adding to the diversity of translations unnecessarily.

Structural Parts	Primary Main Project	Preliminary Project	Heidegger's terms in relation to Dasein
Field (Object or what of inquiry) (<i>Befragtes</i>):	Being itself	Dasein	Being of Dasein: <i>Existence-->Care</i>
Focus (What it is about the field that is asked about) (<i>Gefragtes</i>):	Meaning of being or what is the basis on which being is possible	Being of Dasein	Constituted by the structure of <i>being-in-the-world</i>
Final Outcome (Indication of outcome) (<i>Erfragtes</i>):	That which determines any entity as the entity it is.	Meaning of the being of Dasein - formally indicated as existence	Meaning of being: <i>Care structure</i>

Table 1 Heidegger's project

The structure of the inquiry is a relatively straight forward as I demonstrated in the example on asking directions. The complexity arises in more difficult scholarly inquiries where there is a lack of clarity around the constitutive aspects of the inquiry, particularly in the lack of clarity around the entity. It is for this reasons that Heidegger notes;

When one makes an inquiry one may do so 'just casually' or one may formulate the question explicitly. The latter case is peculiar in that the inquiry does not become transparent to itself until all these constitutive factors of the question have themselves become transparent. [BT 24-5/5]

The asking for directions was an example of a casual inquiry. We engage in these forms of inquiry every day, and the three parts typically operate in a concealed manner. However, we do seem to proceed on some vague understating of this structure without acknowledgement or a thematic understating that this is what is guiding us.

More formal inquiries are typically more complex, and the constitutive aspects may not be clearly defined or are based on presuppositions that may not have been properly supported. We must bring to the surface, or make transparent, each aspect of the inquiry structure to be guided in the right manner⁴⁴ or risk the inquiry going astray. In laying out the structure of an inquiry and then specifying the necessity of

⁴⁴ Heidegger talks about entering the 'circle' of inquiry the right way [BT 195/154] and it is this establishing of the structure of inquiry and clarifying its components to which he is referring. As is generally the case when reading Heidegger, however, one has to be careful of this notion of 'circle' as he uses it to designate more of an iterative movement rather than the geometric concept of a closed loop.

the steps for clarifying the various components of the structure Heidegger is, even if rather scantily, outlining details of a basic method. I will follow Heidegger through the first few steps of his 'method', and in so doing, this sheds further light on the project of *Being and Time*.

Firstly, he addresses the 'what' of the inquiry, being, and he formally indicates⁴⁵ what he means by being;

In the question which we are to work out, *what is asked about* is being that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. The being of entities 'is' not itself an entity. [BT 25-6/6]

The 'what is asked about' (*Gefragtes*) is clear enough; it is 'being'. What Heidegger is also doing is specifying the *Erfragtes* of the inquiry, which he specifies with two characteristics that being must satisfy to 'be' being, i.e. it is whatever "determines entities as the entities" and secondly it is whatever "that on the basis of which entities are already understood".

I will not discuss this further as the content of the table is consistent with what I have discussed in the previous section.

Excursus

Heidegger's inquiry into the meaning of being seems to be addressing an esoteric philosophical issue of little concern to everyday life and in the process engaging in a debate with other philosophers. For me, I didn't even know there was a problem concerning the meaning of being⁴⁶, and nor did others I have asked since becoming aware of the issue! Initially, I didn't even understand what he meant by being! Technical questions concerning being are not the sort of problem that is going to be an obvious intrusion into our lives, albeit I will argue later that it is more of a problem than we think. As Heidegger acknowledges, for the most part, we all have an unthematized understanding of what things are, whether we recognised it or not. It is the basis by which we get on with our life, that societies developed, science discoveries are made, and so on.

The difficulty arises in the relatively uncommon case when there is a 'breakdown',

⁴⁵ Formal indication in a technical term in Heidegger referring to way he specifies phenomenon about which we have an unthematized but not conceptually clarified understanding. It is part of his method and an innovative technique that enables discussion to take place around otherwise undefined concepts. I will expand on this on the section below dealing with Heidegger concepts.

⁴⁶ φ

and our unthematized understanding is either insufficient or wrongly grounded. When this occurs, and we have, unknowingly, a wrong understanding of being, there is the risk of getting the solution wrong! One of the classic examples of this in Western history is the witch-hunt. People believed they knew that witches existed and how to identify them. One of the most well-known cases was the Salem, Massachusetts witch trials in 1692. This was not just a simple matter of mass hysteria. When men and women were charged with witchcraft, they appeared before a court presided over by Chief Justice William Stoughton, an eminent jurist and legal scholar. The trials ended up with thirteen women and five men hanged as witches before the court was disbanded on the order of the Governor (Schiff, 2015). Even today the United Nations Human Rights Commission reports that throughout many parts of the world people are killed, brutalised and imprisoned on the basis that they are 'witches'. (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009) *The issue of 'being' is not some esoteric philosophical issue to these victims it is of critical, life determining importance.* My argument in this thesis is that this is also the case for many older people confined to nursing homes.

For most issues resulting in a visit to a health professional, what matters is that they 'fix' what's wrong. That they may have a wrong understanding of the being of the person doesn't generally matter. Of concern is that they understand the body and know how to fix it. However, when we think we know what a person is, and on this basis, we construct and run nursing homes to meet the needs of older frailer people, then it does matter that the understanding of what it is to be a person, a Dasein, is appropriately established. One way to understand this thesis is as an inquiry as to whether that understanding is correct. For the hundreds of thousands of older people around the world currently living in nursing homes, being matters! This is why the focus on being and why Heidegger is important, for he is challenging the traditional, normative view. If he is right, then, we have made an incredibly serious mistake that is harming the most vulnerable. I now return to applying Heidegger's structure of inquiry to the thesis project.

Application of Heidegger's Structure of Inquiry to The Thesis Question

Having established the basic structure of a Heideggerian inquiry, it is a relatively easy process to apply this to the thesis project, and this is provided in Table 2.

The structure is straight forward and similar to the example I provided in relation to finding directions. The initial project is to understand the structure of the being of Dasein. This work has already been done and reported on by Martin Heidegger. My objective is not to gain an understanding of Heidegger's work as such; rather it is to gain an understanding of the structure of the being of Dasein via Heidegger's work and do so by using Heidegger's work as part of my Discursive Inquiry. Using the previous example, I want to get to the Arts Theatre, and so ask someone that I believe to have that knowledge. However, I do not want to accept the directions and do nothing with them; I want to walk to the theatre and will, therefore, test the knowledge along the way until I am standing before the theatre. Similarly, I will 'listen' to what Heidegger is saying, and then apply this as I focus on the task associated with the disclosure of the being of Dasein. I will continue to do so until there has been a sufficient disclosure of the being of Dasein that I feel comfortable standing alongside Heidegger looking at the same shared phenomenon he is

Structural Parts	Project Goal	Initial Project
Field (What of inquiry)	The structure of life we live, what Heidegger calls existence.	a. Heidegger's work b. Dasein
Focus (What is asked)	Question: Is there a basis by which the existential structure of Dasein can 'breakdown' and so interfere with our living a life, our being who we are	a. Dasein analytic b. Structure and being of Dasein
Final expected outcome	Meaning of 'Shedding Life'	Shared understanding with Heidegger of the being of Dasein (care structure) and how it gives rises to our existence.

Table 2 Thesis project - structure of inquiry

pointing out! This is why in the tabular column with the heading of 'Initial Project', there are two streams occurring. Having understood the being of Dasein, this

clarifies the structure of the entity of Dasein, and from this, the conditions leading towards an understanding of the shedding of life can be disclosed. This is what is described in the column labelled 'Project Goal'.

In that this is a Heideggerian inquiry, there are key aspects I have incorporated into my approach. Firstly, there must be a focus on the way of being of Dasein, what Heidegger refers to as the reduction, a move from the entity to the being of the entity. This is the 'phenomenon' of a Heideggerian phenomenological inquiry, and in designating being and not the entity itself, it is a radical departure from, for example, the phenomenology of Husserl. Understanding what this entails was quite a late development in my work as I found it difficult to grasp, primarily, I suspect because Heidegger's understanding of being is so radically different to other scholars and what I had taken for granted as part of the culture. Heidegger's concept of destruction is primarily aimed at investigating key moments in the tradition where the work of influential philosophers failed to recognise the true nature of being and as a result posited misleading concepts. The basic idea is that Heidegger not only presents his understanding but points out where the tradition has gone wrong and why. This is a remarkably robust way of approaching his work, albeit there is little evidence in the scholarly literature that philosophers have taken up the challenge in any serious way to refute his work. This is the second aspect of his phenomenology and can be undertaken at two levels. Firstly, to identify previously taken for granted ways of understanding that I need to be challenged when considered in the light of what Heidegger is proposing. As previously indicated, I have used the ϕ mark to denote areas in which there have been material changes in understanding as a result of this process. The second level is to identify in the medical/health professions the origins of a focus on life as a biological rather than an existential phenomenon and to provide a critique of this position. While I have commenced work on this aspect, it is outside the scope of the thesis and not included in any material way. It is a project that needs to be addressed in detail at some future time. The final aspect of Heidegger's phenomenology is construction, the development of an understanding based on the inquiry. In this thesis, construction refers to the development of an understanding of the meaning of shedding life.

My methodology then is not just a discursive inquiry; it is a discursive Heideggerian Inquiry. This concludes my discussion on methodology.

CHAPTER 4: THE PROBLEM OF BEING AND DASEIN

Introduction

Central to Heidegger's work and hence the thesis project are two concepts, being and Dasein and these were, oddly enough, the last two key concepts I managed to grasp fully. How Heidegger conceptualises being and the nature of Dasein the entity is problematic and yet if Heidegger's work is to be understood these key concepts need to be clarified.

It is the nature of some journeys towards understanding that we must learn to hold things in our grasp only tenuously and often with ambiguity, to trust that as we proceed the understanding is somehow fleshed out and clarified. It is this approach I took with the concept of being. However, I became so used to doing this that a feeling of familiarity, of being at home with the term developed and there descended a forgetfulness, that I did not understand being at all. I had always intended to write a section on being for this thesis, and I was jolted out of my complacency when I attempted the section. What Heidegger meant by 'being' continually eluded me. His formal indication of being is so broad as to allow for the materialist account of being, except he specifically rules this out by saying that it is not an entity. He also seems to change the way the term is used, and I struggled to hold these different uses together in any sense of cohesive intelligibility. I was forced back towards Heidegger's work in this area, to wrestle with him once more, to prise out of his work what it is he 'saw' and I was missing.

In the case of Dasein, again there was a sense of familiarity, in that I 'knew' what Dasein was, it referred to me. Whereas in the case of being I became familiar with my 'not knowing', in the case of Dasein I became familiar with my 'wrong knowing'. Although I had read and 'understood' all the injunctions Heidegger gives about how not to regard Dasein, I had not quite dispelled them all. The reason, I suspect, is that I hadn't understood in what way Heidegger was dealing with Dasein as an entity, and as such, I had nothing to replace what Heidegger has ruled out! I alluded to this in the last chapter. I was jolted into confronting my ignorance when I read in Heidegger's Summer 1928 lecture series, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, the last given at the University of Marburg.

... the statement, "Dasein is, in its basic constitution, being-in-the-world," is not an affirmation of its factual existence; **I do not, by this statement, claim that my Dasein is in fact extant,**

nor am I saying of it that, in accord with its essence, it must in fact exist. [MFL 169] (my bolding)

The first thing that crossed my mind when I read this, something he wrote almost immediately after the publication of *Being and Time*, was something along the lines of “Aaagghhh ... What? Is he for real? Is it all speculative? What does this do to my thesis?” However, reading Heidegger is never straight forward. This unexpected encounter sent me off to explore the ‘Dasein’ problem and I subsequently ‘discovered’ a new way to understand Dasein which had implications as to how to explore Dasein.

This chapter focuses on bringing the problem of Dasein and being clearly into view, for even understanding the problem can be a problem. Chapter 5 discusses the concept of being in terms of Heidegger’s project and the different ways in which he uses the term which leads to a deeper puzzle over being. In Chapter 6 I take a step back and explore the concept of being within the Greek tradition to provide some background context for Heidegger’s work. This discussion uncovers similarities in approach between the Greeks and Heidegger and aids in bringing some conceptual clarity. With the aid of the work completed in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 completes the discussion on being by examining aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Greeks which provides the missing aspects of his concept that prove key to solving the puzzle of being. Chapter 8 clarifies how to understand Dasein the entity in the context of Heidegger’s work even though he makes no claims concerning the entity. Chapter 9 extends that discussion by examining the way Dasein is investigated in *Being and Time*.

The Problem of Being

In reading a research report from the sciences, it would be unusual not to have a clear setting out of the methodology and the methods used. It is accepted that a reader needs to know how the researcher went about their work to be able to form a view as to the quality of the research, e.g. to be able to form an assessment as to whether the stated methods were appropriate for the nature of the inquiry and subject matter. (Silverman, 2005) This consistency between inquiry topic, ontology, methodology, and methods was discussed in the previous chapter.

Granted a philosophical research report is somewhat different to a science-based report. However, it is still typically possible to ascertain the nature of the

philosophical inquiry. By way of example, in the book *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* the philosopher Martha Nussbaum lays out an argument that we have not properly understood the role of emotions in our lives. She does so by making specific points supporting her argument and illustrating them with examples from her own experience and the work from other scholars, both ancient and modern. (Nussbaum, 2001) This approach is laid out in her introduction. In Nussbaum's work, she is not engaged in an exploration of the nature of what it is 'to be' an emotion or 'to be' a person. This level of understanding is taken for granted and seems consistent with anyone would typically understand these entities. This makes her work relatively easy to access.

When reading Heidegger's description of what he is doing it initially sounds reasonable and gives some suggestion that it should be, like Nussbaum's work, accessible, even if with a little more work. This is the case even though Heidegger is engaging in a different type of philosophical inquiry to that of Nussbaum, and this is captured in the following,

Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible. In the phenomenological conception of "phenomenon" what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the being of entities, its meaning, its modifications, and derivatives. [BT 60/35]

Any sense of the accessibility of Heidegger's work, however, quickly vanishes. Part of the problem is that, unlike Nussbaum, what Heidegger means by his basic concepts cannot be assumed. I have already discussed Heidegger's phenomenology, and I do not want to cover that ground again unnecessarily. However, some discussion, from a slightly different perspective, will prove helpful, in illustrating the problem about being.

In the BT §7, he indicates that part of the methodology is to focus on "the things themselves" [BT 58/34]. Despite this suggesting that the inquiry will be investigating an entity, a "thing", this should not be taken literally. In *Basic Problems*, he makes it clear that this is part of the reduction aspect of the phenomenological method, meant as a turning away from the entity towards the being of the entity.

We call this basic component of phenomenological method-the leading back or re-duction of investigative vision from a naively apprehended entity to being-*phenomenological reduction*. We are thus adopting a central term of Husserl's phenomenology in its literal wording though not in its substantive intent. [BPP 21]

As a side note, the reference to Husserl is interesting in itself as it highlights

Heidegger's usurping of the term "phenomenological reduction" from Husserl, he gutting its original meaning ("substantive intent"), filling it with his own. This points to the fact that Heidegger's and Husserl's phenomenology are two different creatures. Something that is hard to tell when reading overviews in some texts on phenomenology.

The focus of the inquiry is however bound to entities in that the 'phenomenon' that is focused on, as mentioned above is

... that which shows itself is the being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives. [BT 60/35] (my underlining)

However, the phenomenon, being, is "something that lies hidden". [BT 50/35] What "lies hidden" is not like the object in a game of hide-and-seek, where a thing is concealed behind, under or in another thing. This would make what is concealed an entity and 'being' is never an entity. How then are we to understand the concept of being as something that "shows itself" in phenomenology? As I thought deeper, everything I 'see' is in some way an entity, and yet, being is not an entity. This was the puzzle.

Heidegger notes that while the term 'descriptive phenomenology' is used it is "at bottom tautological" [BT 59/35] because the method of phenomenology is descriptive. However, the concept of description is not like that which we would find in a "botanical morphology"[BT 59/35] because this approach to description focuses on the characteristics of how the entity itself presents to us. In that being is not an entity, the concept of description must be different when used in phenomenology. Later in the section Heidegger states,

the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation. [BT 61/37]

The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting. [BT 62/37]

Heidegger goes on to say that as the being of an entity is exhibited by way of an interpretive description, the interpretative approach must be,

... opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated; it is opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as 'problems', often for generations at a time. [BT 50/28]

In other words, there must be no assumptions made concerning what is exhibited and no untested interpretive tendencies applied to the observations, regardless of

the source. The interpretations must be derived solely on the basis of what has been exhibited or on the basis previously completed philosophical research.

As I read these and other statements concerning being and phenomenology some seemed straight forward, others a bit puzzling, but overall, I just kept reading, ploughing on. When I initially sat down to write the section on being, I drew up a list of characteristics from my considerations of his phenomenological approach and his definition of being. My understanding of Heidegger's account of being was⁴⁷;

- that it is something hidden but can be disclosed,
- when disclosed it is not by way of an appearance, as in the case of an entity, but by an interpretative description,
- it is not an entity but belongs to the entity in such a way that it both determines and makes intelligible the entity to which it belongs.

I had written other sections concerning *Being and Time*, and overall, I thought I had reached an understanding of being, such that the summarised list made sense. However, as I pondered the list and tried to give an account of being by way explanation and illustration of what was on the list, I found that I couldn't. While many of the pieces of his work seemed to have come together, I recognised that I had assembled those pieces in such a way that excluded a proper understanding of being! My conclusion was simple, if I could not give an adequate account of being then I did not have an adequate understanding of the subject matter of Heidegger's project. If that was the case then the way the understanding of Heidegger's work had been 'pieced together' was in jeopardy of being wrong. The more I pondered the list, the more it seemed like some impenetrable riddle.

By way of example, if I went into a laboratory and inquired of a scientist what she was doing, and was told "decombulating the ionized structural elements of the retrotransposons" I would still have no idea, despite the description. To know what she is doing I would need some understanding of the subject matter (the ionized structural elements of the retrotransposons) and the nature of the task (decombulating). I could listen to her. I could even see the equipment. I could understand that some form of activity was going on. However, that is the extent of my understanding. In this case, the sentence is a piece of nonsense, I have made

⁴⁷ These points were identified before I had developed my view that 'Dasein' is an emergent entity and its dynamic structure is described as being-in-the-world (i.e. its being). This account fits with these three key characteristics of being.

up. However, the point is I think clear. Unless I could make sense of 'Heidegger's list' concerning the characteristics of being, then there is no sure ground to the thesis.

Being - against the tradition

Outlining the contemporary, normative account of being.

Heidegger's field of philosophical research is ontology which has, as its primary theme, the question of what it is to be something, what is called 'being'. The standard account of 'being' or what constitutes an entity as the entity it is has remained essentially unchanged since Aristotle's time⁴⁸, and today this is a physicalist account of what things are and is the normative view in science, including the medical sciences. (Gillett, 2002; O'Connor & Churchill, 2010; Stoljar, 2016)

To use a simple example: The ruler (entity) on my desk is made from plastic (entity) with paint marks (entity) printed on it to indicate centimetres and millimetres. The plastic and paint are constituted from molecules (entities), and the molecules are a chemical bond formed from atoms(entities) and so on. I understand what a ruler is by reference to its shape, markings, how the ruler is positioned on objects to be measured, and so on. I understand the ruler by reference to its physical characteristics and learning how to apply them to the task of measuring.

In the case of a person, the biological and medical sciences, for the most part, understands the person as being the physical body. The body is a biological mechanism comprising various organs (brain, heart, kidneys, legs, etc.), arranged into different functional systems (nervous, digestive, respiratory, etc.), with the organs and other 'parts' comprised of cells, and below that molecules, atoms, etc. Just as the ruler has a function of 'measuring', the parts of the body have a wide variety of functions, including complex tasks such as perception, thinking and so on. In these accounts what is to be a body organ is determined by the assemblage of the physical matter arranged so as to provide the function, even if it is very complex. A human is, then, a particular assemblage and integration of these complex organs. This is the physicalist account of what it is 'to be' a human which pervades the medical sciences. This is the account that Heidegger rejects.

A standard approach in science, when faced with complexity, is to break something

⁴⁸ Aristotle (384-322BCE)

down into its component parts or by function and then 'assign' different science disciplines or sub-disciplines to study the parts. The idea is that when we 'reduce' a thing to its parts, understand the parts and then we eventually understand the complexity of the whole because we know how all the parts work. The whole is no more than the sum of the parts and is constituted by the assemblage of those parts. Again, the understanding implicit in this approach is rejected by Heidegger.

That this account is held within the medical sciences is readily demonstrated. For example, one text book, *Neuroscience* (Bear, Connors, & Paradiso, 2007) declares that due to the complexity of all the mechanisms associated with the functioning of the brain the field of neuroscience takes "a reductionist approach" and carries out its investigations based on different "levels of analysis" (p. 13):

1. Molecular neuroscience - study of different molecules, how they function and their role.
2. Cellular neuroscience - how the molecular network works together to form neurons, the functioning and the interaction between neurons
3. Systems neuroscience – studies how the constellations of neurons form systems, e.g. vision system, motor system, and how the systems receive, process and response to information, etc.
4. Behavioural neuroscience – studies how systems work together to produce integrated behaviour, e.g. how memory and moods work and result in various behaviours, what accounts for gender-specific behaviour, etc.
5. Cognitive neuroscience – studies how we get to higher levels of cognition such as self-awareness, mental imagery & language.

The eventual aim in such an approach is to be able to explain higher order levels in terms of the lower order. i.e. eventually to be able to move smoothly from level one through five.

In summary, from the view point of science what it is to be an entity is a combination and arrangement of other entities. It is the job of the natural sciences to discover how these parts(entities) variously combine, interact behave and so on, to solve the puzzles associated with each scientific discipline. The various natural science disciplines are, primarily, formed based on the entities they research (e.g. biology, herpetology, geology, seismology, meteorology, enzymology, astrology, virology, ethology, psychology, neurology, etc.), with each discipline further divided into sub-disciplines as in the case of neuroscience.

The nature of the entities which a field of science studies, in turn, determines the mode of investigation. Inquiring into the makeup and movements of tectonic plates requires a different body of knowledge, different approaches, different instruments, etc. to investigating subatomic particles, viruses, the human body or mycelium⁴⁹. All the objects of study in these fields, however, have the same thing in common, they are entities understood in terms of a physicalist account, i.e. ultimately everything is comprised of the same fundamental particles held together in the same four standard fields of force disclosed by physics⁵⁰.

During the twentieth century a view, not surprisingly, called reductionism, held that eventually, all sciences would reduce down to down to physics. That that would be a sufficient understanding of the interaction of atomic and sub-atomic particles to explain chemistry, and that a sufficient understanding of chemistry will explain molecular biology, which in turn explains biological life, and so on. This project has ostensibly failed, and the failure has typically been put down to complexity rather than the actual validity of the concept. (van Riel & Van Gulick, 2016)

Running through all this is the understanding that there is only one way for an entity to be constituted as the entity it is. All entities are constituted by commencing with the most fundamental elements of the universe then building them up in ever increasing complex combinations and arrangements. If being is understood as that which constitutes an entity, then being is an entity. Under this approach a person is, essentially, just matter in motion combined and arranged in a particular complex manner; there is nothing else!

Heidegger's Claim – Against the Normative Account

I want to make Heidegger's claim as explicit as I can. Heidegger's claim is that notwithstanding that being is always the being of an entity, an entity and its being are separate. This is what Heidegger calls the "ontological difference" [e.g. BT, BPP, HCT]. This also leads Heidegger to make a remarkable claim about science in *Basic Questions of Philosophy*,

From the standpoint of historical reflection, the advanced modern science of nature is not a whit more true than the Greek; on the contrary, at most it is more untrue, because it is altogether caught in the web of its own methodology, and, notwithstanding all its discoveries,

⁴⁹ Mycelium is the name given to the fine thread like structures which connect the root systems of plants.

⁵⁰ There are only four fundamental forces in physics: gravitational, electromagnetic and the strong and weak magnetic force.

it lets escape what is genuinely the object of these discoveries: namely nature, and man's relation to it, and man's place in it. [BQP 48] (my underlining)

This is a remarkable claim as it is saying that despite all the new knowledge, the discoveries and so on modern science had not moved closer to discovering the 'truth' of nature but has, in fact, moved further from the 'truth'. From Heidegger's perspective, this is because of modern sciences' failure to understand being, reducing everything to 'being' simply the material. At the risk of over simplification, I take the claim to mean that in that science does not understand the proper character of being it is not adequately addressing the way entities come into being⁵¹. This is certainly the case in relation to the entities discussed in this thesis, Dasein, the ready-to-hand and world. The claim also requires an understanding of Heidegger's concept of truth, as a revealing, which is not discussed in any detail in the thesis.

This physicalist account of being is the view that Heidegger is 'attacking'. His life-long body of work can be seen as a battle to overcome this view (destruction) and to put in place what he claims is an alternative and more accurate understanding (construction) based on his approach of focusing on the being of entities and not the entities themselves(reduction). [BPP 23]

Heidegger's claim concerning the separation of entities and being, and the associated claim that being is not an entity, is stunning and audacious, as is the implication, over two thousand years of scholarship is wrong!

Puzzling

However, this just brings us back to the puzzle, what is being? If the tradition has been so wrong for so long, there must be some complex puzzle that Heidegger has discovered and solved. This is the sense given in 'the riddle' like list of qualities about being that I provided above.

However, no, this does not seem to be the case. As if in direct contradiction to earlier remarks about 'hiddenness' Heidegger says,

Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way, is being. [BT 26/7]

How can being both be hidden and be that which we have in view all the time? How can the tradition be so wrong about something that is so common-place and in plain

⁵¹ This concept is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

sight?

Elsewhere Heidegger states that while science does "examine entities as entities" that they do so already operating with "an understanding of being"[BT 31/11] and that this understanding is a defining characteristic of Dasein in general. [BT 33/13] But this simply raises another puzzle how can science both operate within an understanding of being, which Heidegger indicates is correct and yet science also has a wrong understanding of being?

I am sure that if I push hard enough, I could name other puzzles relating to Heidegger's comments on being, but I think that I have identified enough, to make the point. To me, the more I thought about it, the more mysterious being sounded and was certainly outside any understating that I had at the time. However, Heidegger is very grounded. He insists that being is not "supersensible" or "metaphysical" [BCAP] and strongly indicates that his work must precede and is essential to that of the sciences [BT 714/5]. I discuss this aspect in a later chapter.

Why the Question is Relevant

If we take the physicalist approach, Marion Miller is simply a mind-boggling, complex arrangement and functioning of cells, not just those associated with neuroscience but incorporating all the other aspects of the body. There is no question that Marion's body is failing and in need of care, but if the physicalist account is correct, then to treat Marion's body is the same as treating Marion. However, if Heidegger is right, then Marion should not be understood in terms of her body. If this is the case then what is it to be a person, a Dasein? Heidegger, as I will argue, does not deny that the body is a required aspect for Marion to exist, to be a person. What I will need to address is in what way the body is required, but also explain how this can be the case such that the body, i.e. an entity, is not the being of, say, Marion. This all sounds reasonable, but it first requires a sound grasp of what Heidegger means by being.

What is Dasein the entity

The main task in Division I of *Being and Time* is the undertaking of what Heidegger refers to as the analysis of Dasein with the goal of disclosing the being of Dasein. Dasein then is the entity he is investigating, and he makes it clear that we are Dasein.

This entity which each of us is ... we shall denote by the term "Dasein". [BT 27/7]

Dasein is not only close to us ... we are it, each of us, we ourselves. [BT 36/15]

In that Dasein is the object of Heidegger's inquiry it is important that we clarify our understanding of Dasein. In that, by and large, our understanding of things arises out of our cultural context, then just as it is for being, the understanding we have of Dasein, what it is to be a person, will in some way be grounded in the culture.

While I have identified that in the sciences there has been a reductionist account of the person, this is not the case in the culture at large. In this section, I provide some background as to how what it is to be human has been conceived by philosophers throughout the Western tradition, introduce Heidegger's concept of Dasein and then raise a fundamental problem in thinking about Dasein from a Heideggerian perspective.

A (Very) Brief Survey of the Tradition

In many ways, a human is indistinguishable from other animals. It is therefore not surprising that identifying precisely what unique characteristics separates us from other animals has been considered by the great philosophers in our tradition. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristotle, 2004) Aristotle identifies both the main similarities and differences between human and other living things. Humans, Aristotle tells us, have a "life of nourishment and growth" shared with plants, and "some sort of sentient life" (pg12/1098a) shared with animals. What uniquely reflects human life is our reason or a rational capacity with which to conduct our lives, so for Aristotle we are "*zoon logon echon*", or as typically translated 'rational animal'⁵².

⁵² In *Being and Time* [BT 47/25] Heidegger refers to this:

"In both ordinary and philosophical usage, Dasein, man's Being, is 'defined' as the ζῶον λόγος ἔχων (*zoon logon echon*)-- as that living thing whose being is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse." (my gloss of the Greek).

He translates λόγος (*logos*) as discourse which is an alternative translation, refer note 3 on BT 47. In later chapters of *Being and Time* Heidegger translates λόγος (*logos*) to the German *Rede* which is translated into English as discourse or talk.

This emphasis by Heidegger on *logos* as 'talk' rather than 'reason' is crucial to his conception of the being of Dasein. Talk is not an isolated attribute or skill, it is based on an understanding of the being of things, which in turn means it is related to the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Heidegger thought that Aristotle was closer to his understanding of the meaning of the being of Dasein than as understood by the tradition and *logos* as talk is thus a better interpretation of Aristotle's understanding. This is approached by Heidegger can be seen in the following from *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* (§ 6). When Heidegger is discussing the meaning of λόγος (*logos*) he incorporates his own terminology to explain Aristotle:

"Self-expressing as speaking about . . . is the basic mode of the being of life, namely, of being-in-a-world. Where there is no speaking, where speaking stops, where the living being no longer speaks, we speak of "death."
"[BCArP 16)

In early Christianity, the idea of the human as an animal is replaced by the understanding that we are constituted in the image of God, 'imago Dei'. This concept can be traced back to the first chapter of Genesis, "Then, God said. 'Let's make man in our image, in our likeness ...'" (Gen 1:26). This approach was taken by Augustine of Hippo(354-453CE) (McGrath, 2013) and in so doing jettisons the notion of animal while retaining the link to reason.

As God is not of the flesh but is understood as the Trinity (Father, Son, Holy Spirit), Augustine interprets '*imago Dei*' as the Trinity being instantiated in us as memory, intellect, and will. (Sepper, 2002) This is largely a Platonic approach and centuries later it caused difficulties when the works of Aristotle were re-discovered by Western scholars.

Throughout the Scholastic period (1100-1700) Aristotelian and not Platonic concepts came to dominate scholarship, based not only on his metaphysics but his writing on logic and in the natural sciences. Aristotle rejects Plato's account of being which was based on ideal forms and the concept of a separate perfect world of forms, which was part of the appeal to the early church. Scholarship was church-based, and the embracing of Aristotle's ideas leads to the need to reconcile Aristotle with church theology a task undertaken by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and presented in his highly influential work *Summa Theologica*(Aquinas(Saint) , 1972).

Aquinas shifts from attempting to align the Trinity with the constitutive elements of being human and argues that '*imago Dei*' existed in the very *nature* of a person's reason and it is this that distinguishes humans from other creatures. (Kenny, 2004) In his theology, he also 'brings back' the body as an important aspect and discusses the emotions. He regarded the passions as 'lower powers' separate to the body and that both the passions and body, rebelled against reason leading to our fall;

Man's mind by sin abandoned subordination to God, with a consequence that now his lower powers were no longer wholly responsive to his reason; and such was the rebellion of the flesh against reason that the body as well was no more wholly responsive to the soul: hence death and other bodily defects. (Aquinas(Saint) , 1972, p. 167)

In Aquinas account, we see the clear separation of the passions from reason, the formulation of reason as the seat of the 'true -self' and the need to place the passions under the control of reasons. With the re-discovery of Aristotle and the work of Aquinas, the concept of human as 'rational animal' instead of '*Imago Dei*' makes a regular appearance in Scholastic writing. (Kenny, 2004; McGrath, 2013)

The last of the main reformulations was by Descartes, who in the second of his *Meditations on First Philosophy*⁵³ (Descartes, 2012) rejects the notion of the person as a rational animal,

What then did I formerly think I was? A man. But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No; for then I should have to inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead me down the slope to other harder ones, and I do not now have the time to waste on subtleties of this kind. (Descartes, 2012) (p. 17)

It is in the *Meditation* that Descartes introduces the notion that we are a soul, made of an ethereal, non-worldly, substance he calls *res cogitans*, literally thinking thing, which he identifies with all our various cognitive abilities (e.g. thinking as well as the capacity for awareness of sensations, etc.). The body is made of the same substance as all the rest of the universe, it is inanimate, physical matter, what he calls *res extensa*, literally things that have extension⁵⁴, which he often translated as corporeal thing. The soul is neither in the body nor in the world; it is a completely separate entity.

The definition of human as linked to our mental attributes remains, and Descartes resolves the problem of how a non-material soul substance (*res cogitans*) can have two-way communication with inanimate, material substances (*res extensa*) by identifying the pineal gland, situated in the brain, as the link. (Descartes, 2004; Shapiro, 2011) It is from Descartes that we have, in its modern understanding, the notion of substance dualism and closely associated with this the duality of subject - object.

What all the philosophers appear to be doing, at least in part, is taking the everyday experiences of real phenomena associated with our various modes of cognition and conscious awareness, and attempting to make sense of them by placing the experiences within the context of a broader understanding of the world as they understood it. Throughout the Christian era, the understanding that framed everything else was that God was the creator of the Universe and all it contained. While Augustine, Aquinas, and Descartes all had different formulations concerning what it is to be human, they all provided accounts that fitted within the dominant Christian theological framework of God the creator.

⁵³ Descartes' *Meditations of First Philosophy* was first published in 1641.

⁵⁴ Roughly put, the idea is that things that have extension, i.e. length, breadth, depth, take up space and must therefore be comprised of some 'solid' material.

While modern scholarship has rejected many of Descartes' ideas, especially that of the separate soul-substance, the phenomenon he was describing, which is taken as the consciousness or mind, and the questions that arise out of his work form the basis of much of contemporary philosophy. These questions include: How does a 'mind' 'inside' the physical body gain access to information of the 'outside' world that is 'true'? How does the 'mind' not only get information about the 'physical' body in which it resides but how does it 'direct' the body? How does the 'mind' inside one body know there are 'minds' in other bodies? If the 'mind' is not physical, it is essentially our thoughts, experiences of sensations, memories and so forth how does it arise from the physical body? These and other problems exist regardless whether one thinks of us as soul or a mind and they form part of the main problems addressed as part of the sub-discipline of Philosophy of Mind. (Chalmers, 1996; J. Kim, 2011; Searle, 2004)

In terms of how the mind works, perhaps the most significant development following Descartes was by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In *The Critique of Pure Reason*(Kant, 1998), Kant argued that the mind is not a passive recipient of 'sense data' from the outside world but actively arranges and constructs the data into the experiences of the perceptions of the world that we have. For Kant, we do not have access to the actual real-world as it is, rather we have access only to the experiences of the world as presented to us as part of the innate processes of the mind. In one form or another, this basic Kantian idea that the mind is active in forming our experiences of the world is the normative view today. It underlies representational theories of consciousness(Lycan, 2015) and of the constructivist theories which assert that scientific knowledge is 'socially constructed' and not knowledge of the real world(Applefield, Huber, & Moallem, 2000).

Kant restricts knowledge to what can be experienced, which includes the possibility of gaining knowledge of the natural world but excludes knowledge of God and the soul which he viewed as beyond our experience. He, therefore, puts out of play as legitimate subjects of inquiry for the sciences any speculation as to the nature of the soul and God. Kant does address the 'self' of which he argues we do have experience. The consciousness of oneself, the "I of reflection", occurs through what he calls acts of apperception, which relate to the unification of our experiences. (Brook, 2016) This move helps to push aside the need to address the soul when considering how the mind 'works' but does leave open that there is 'something'

working to unify our experiences, some I or self. Edmund Husserl introduces a similar concept to account for the apparent unity of the various experiences we have that form the unified stream of our conscious life; he refers to it as the ego. (Husserl, 1989)

As Descartes identified, the concept that we are a mind or consciousness 'inside' the body accessing objects in the 'outside' world raises the problem of how we determine we have 'true' knowledge of the 'outside' world. Simply put, how can we, the subject, who only receive experiences via our senses from the outside world be sure that those experiences are accurate? How can we be sure that the very processes by which the sense data are received, transmitted, and interpreted are accurate? This problem splits philosophy, broadly speaking, into two camps, the Rationalists and the Empiricist. The Rationalists, the contemporary founder being Descartes, believe that reason is the primary source and basis for judging knowledge. Descartes argued that we can't trust the senses and that everything must be founded on 'rationally' derived positions and from these we can then make judgements about our experiences of the world. The Empiricists, the contemporary founders being John Locke(1632-1704), Bishop George Berkeley(1685-1753) and David Hume (1711-1776), argued that our primary source of knowledge are our experiences of the world and to these, we must then develop and apply logical and rational processes in developing that knowledge. While the rationalist and empiricists approach both put forward various ways to address the problem of ensuring 'true' knowledge of the world no satisfactory solution to the problem has yet been found. (Steup, 2016) Both these groups hold the view that we are somehow 'minds' inside the head, separate from the world and this is the fundamental source the 'true' knowledge problem.

This very brief overview of the philosophical tradition identifies some of the key ideas in the tradition that Heidegger is arguing against. As part of his work he engages with those he regards as the most important philosophers associated with these various positions throughout his career, for example Aristotle [BCAP, BCAP, PS, AM, FCM, IPR], Aquinas [FCM, IPR, BPP, MFL], Descartes [IPR, N(3 & 4), HCT, BT, MFL] and Kant [PIKC, KPM, LQT, BPP, WT, BT, EHF]. By way of example, in the case of the knowledge problem, he argues that it is not a problem at all but rather a case of having the wrong ontological understanding. He argues that far from being an isolated entity locked inside our head, separated from the world our basic

constitution is as 'being-in-the-world' and as such already in the world.[BT] His account of Dasein dissolves one of the fundamental problems that has plagued philosophy since Descartes. His solution, however, raises the problem concerning how we understand the entity Dasein as being "already in a world"[BT 144/109] as part of Dasein's constituting structure (i.e. Dasein's ontology). My existing view was that my brain is in my head, this is the source of my consciousness, and this seems to align with the normative view⁵⁵. How is it possible to conceive of myself in such a way that 'I' am already in the world in such a way that this is constitutive of who I am? This was for me one of the fundamental puzzles of being a Dasein.

Heidegger never engages in a detailed and direct critique of Husserl's philosophy as it relates to Husserl's ontological position, probably because Heidegger recognises that Husserl is not a major player philosophically in this area. However, in Heidegger's view, Husserl's phenomenology is underpinned by his embrace of Descartes' subject-object ontological position, and as such Husserl's philosophy is a target for critique. As Philipse notes, Heidegger's *Being and Time*,

... may be read as an implicit polemic against Husserl, as many commentators have observed. When Heidegger attacks Descartes, he always has Husserl in mind as well, because Husserl explicitly situated his work within the Cartesian tradition. (Philipse, 1998, p. 404)

Heidegger himself was quite clear that he was attacking Husserl. In a letter to Karl Jaspers written on the 26th December 1926 while *Being and Time* was still in the final stages of preparation he writes that,

If the treatise is written 'against' anyone, it's against Husserl ... (Carman, 2003) (p. 59)

Excursus – the problem of knowledge and the outside world

The problem of knowledge and the outside world has been accepted as a fundamental problem in modern philosophy since the time of Descartes (Searle, 2004). This is an important issue to understand as Heidegger sees his work as not just attacking this problem, but dissolving it as a non-problem[BT]. Understanding the issue helps to understand Heidegger's position in *Being and Time* and I will outline it briefly before continuing.

The problem can be described as follows: that there is an independent and self-sufficient entity we call the subject or person, and there are other self-sufficient and

⁵⁵ φ

independent entities in the world we call objects. The problem is how the subject, confined 'inside' gains knowledge of the 'objects' outside in the world. We may conceive of the subject as a self, ego, I, consciousness, mind, soul or even a function of the brain, but regardless of what we propose as the nature of the entity that constitutes the subject we still have the same problem. How does an independent and self-sufficient subject (entity) gain knowledge of independent, and self-sufficient objects (also entities)?

As soon as the problem is put in this form, it can be seen that there are fundamental assumptions being made about the entity that is the subject and the entities that are the objects. We are assuming that in each case they are separate and independent things. To put this more starkly, the view holds that the subject (who we are) is not dependent on the entities in the world in order 'to be' a subject. Similarly, the entities in the world, the objects, are not dependent on 'being' the objects they are on the subject. In each case 'being' what they are is independent of each other. This is the fundamental ontological position that underlies the knowledge or epistemological position. This is the view that I held⁵⁶, and is the dominant position in our culture. It is a view that follows logically once a substance ontology is adopted.

On Heidegger's account, there is no knowledge problem because the assumed ontology *is wrong!* In *Being and Time*, Heidegger notes Kant's view that it is a "scandal of philosophy and human reason in general" [BT 247/203] that the problems of knowledge of things 'outside' had not been resolved. The comment concerns an extreme form of the knowledge problem, known as scepticism, which questions if we can even prove the existence of the world and what it contains, in that all we have are experiences and cannot prove the origins of those experiences. The empiricist, Bishop Berkeley took this view to its logical conclusion and argues that the physical world does not exist and that all experiences of the world are in fact experiences arising from God.

Heidegger's response is to attack the source of the problem, the ontology,

The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that *such proofs are expected and attempted again and again*. Such expectation, aims, and demands arise from an ontologically inadequate way of starting with *something* of such a character that independently of it and 'outside' of it a 'world' is to be proved as present-at-hand. It is not that the proofs are inadequate, but that the kind of Being of the entity which does the proving and

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makes requests for proofs has *not been made definite enough*. [BT 249/205] (my underlining)

Kant does not successfully 'solve' the problem, and so Heidegger argues that if we only understand things as being present-at-hand, then we must,

... conclude that since the being-present-at-hand of Things outside of us is impossible to prove, it must therefore 'be taken merely on *faith*' [BT 249/205]

As long as the problem of knowledge of the 'outside world' is posited in terms of the underlying constraints imposed by the assumed ontology the problem will exist. Heidegger argues that we will continue to believe "it must still be possible to carry out such a proof." [BT 249/205], but that "the question whether an external world is present-at-hand and whether such a world can be proved ... [is] an impossible one" [BT 250/206]

Heidegger's response is that if we properly understand the nature of the being of the entity that is asking the question concerning knowledge of the outside world, i.e. Dasein, then we would understand that the question is nonsense. Heidegger argues, and this will be addressed later in the thesis, that entities within-the-world are only intelligible on the basis of the phenomenon of world, which in turn is an essential aspect of the structure of Dasein itself, i.e. being-in-the-world. [summarise in BT 252/209] As such there is no external world problem.

Roughly speaking, each Dasein, is constituted by its encounter with the world, which also is the basis for entities in the world being "ontologically conceivable". Dasein is always already in-the-world and does not need to 'get out' from the 'inside' to the 'outside' to access thing in the world. There is no independent, self-sufficient subject dealing with independent, self-sufficient objects! It is this work of Heidegger's concerning the ontology of Dasein that is the basis of his attack on the ontological presupposition underlying the 'knowledge problem'.

Again, I would point out that this is not some rarefied argument pertinent only to philosophers. Although it is philosophers that engage in technical descriptions, proofs, and so on, it is the way these issues are conceived and adopted as the normative accounts that inform our culture more generally and the sciences in particular. It is therefore important that if I am developing an understanding based on Heidegger's work that I am also able to bring to the surface the position that is to be overturned.

Heidegger's argument as I have briefly summarised it requires substantial work to

make intelligible. Every aspect of it requires careful exploration and finally embracing Heidegger's account requires the letting go of the assumed presuppositions that the only way of 'being' an entity is based in some way on substance ontology.

Heidegger's Dasein

Just as earlier philosophers identified a name which captured what they thought to be the essence of being human (rational animal, imago Dei, res cogitans) so does Heidegger. Heidegger's name for us is Dasein, and it makes its first substantive appearance in a lecture course given in the Summer Semester of 1923 called *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Just as the previous names do not capture everything about the entity with which it is dealing, whether body, soul or mind or some combination, nor does Dasein, it does, however, attempt to identify the essential defining feature.

In German Dasein is a compound word that when taken together means existence, but when broken down into its parts (Da + Sein) means 'there being', which is Heidegger's intent. However, great care needs to be taken in how this is understood. When we hear 'rational animal' we have an idea of what is being referred to, it is those cognitive aspects which are supposed to define us a species. If we take 'being there' as somehow indicating a 'there' is a spatial sense we will have completely misunderstood Heidegger's intent and with it his philosophical position. In my initial readings of *Being and Time*, I found what Heidegger means by Dasein as incomprehensible. This is how Heidegger explained Dasein in 1965,

In the philosophical tradition, the term "Dasein" means presence-at-hand, existence. In this sense, one speaks, for instance, of proofs of God's existence. However, Da-sein is understood differently in *Being and Time*. To begin with, French existentialists also failed to pay attention to it. That is why they translated Da-sein in *Being and Time* as *être-là*, which means being here and not there. The Da in *Being and Time* does not mean a statement of place for a being, but rather it should designate the openness where entities can be present for the human being, and the human being also for himself. The Da of [Dasein's] *being* distinguishes the humanness of the human being. [ZS 120]

The French existentialist that Heidegger particularly had in mind was Jean-Paul Sartre[ZS]. I would argue, however, that a proper understanding of Dasein, as Heidegger intends it, is impossible until a full understanding of being-in-the-world is achieved. On this basis, it is another example of having to use terms whose meaning is only clarified as the inquiry unfolds. This is the case in both *Being and Time* and

in this inquiry.

In the passage, Heidegger explicitly rules out understandings of Dasein that may typically arise if one looks at the common usage of the word or even the etymology⁵⁷. For a long while, I was thinking along the lines of the "French existentialists" that the world was the 'space' we inhabit, or at least our understanding of the things, etc., in this space⁵⁸. When looked at carefully his remarks give us no real clue as to what he means by the "openness where entities can be present". The "openness" sounds like it has nothing to do with us at all, yet the term Dasein is supposed to be naming something crucial to the understanding of his conception of Dasein. The puzzle of the "openness" being our defining aspect and yet seeming to be something separate to us needs to be clarified if we are to make sense of Heidegger's work.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger introduces the term, Dasein, as follows;

This entity which each of us is himself ... we shall denote by the term "Dasein". [BT 27/7]

This makes it clear to what entity he is referring to; it is us, it is me. If we take Heidegger's idea of not taking any pre-conception to things unless they have been clarified, the question we must put to our self is: What are we supposed to understand by the entity designated by "each of us is"? While we may not typically ask our self this question in the ordinary course of our affairs, I suspect most of us would most likely have an answer, even if in a non-specific way. That answer would variously include the body (and I include the brain in this), consciousness, mind, a soul or spirit or some combination. All these answers are consistent, in a broad sense, with the various answers which have been posited by the philosophical tradition.

The idea of putting aside presuppositions for Heidegger is not a simple, methodical device. Presuppositions form part of our understanding, and as such to the extent that presuppositions are wrong or untested then our understanding is tenuous. However, Heidegger often takes a much stronger stance and declares some understandings to be wrong. Typically, this is when he knows that there are views held that must be shaken free if we are to understand his work. This is the case

⁵⁷ This ruling out common or alternate meanings which are contrary to Heidegger's intent is a very common practice in *Being and Time*. In a broader sense, it can be understood as part of the method of 'destruction'. By specifically removing contrary meanings to that which Heidegger intends, one is forced to keep inquiring as to what Heidegger means by a word.

⁵⁸ φ

with Dasein, and he gives a comprehensive list of what Dasein is not. Heidegger rejects any notion that we are body or soul. [BT 74/47] He rejects the notion of Dasein as some equivalent to our consciousness or some form of conscious-self [ZS 120]. He doesn't, however, reject the notion of consciousness which he regards as a legitimate phenomenon [BT 151/116], just one not to be confused with Dasein. If we think in biological terms and suggest that we are some form of biological life, then this too is rejected [BT 75/50]. He rejects "ego-thing" or "person-thing" and with this Husserl's concept of the ego [HCT 247], together with the idea of an "I" or a subject [BT 72/47]. If we think of Dasein as some "epiphenomena", again rejected [HCT 248]. He rejects any notion of us that involves an understanding based on substance ontology (present-at-hand) whether the substance is physical (e.g. body), metaphysical (e.g. spirit, soul, or ego) or even epiphenomenal entity (e.g. perhaps consciousness).

Heidegger in effect rejects any understanding of us that has hitherto been presented in the Western scholarly tradition! If any person holds any of these views concerning what it is to be a human, then they do not have Heidegger's understanding. By specifically clearing away, not simply putting them aside for the moment, all these possible understandings of being human Heidegger places before us a significant challenge. We must not simply think in a new way about the same things, something akin to imagining a new order or arrangement, of previously understood things. We must think something new.

By removing every other way of thinking about Dasein that has been present in the culture Heidegger does not have in mind some way thinking that has been present but not understood. Rather it is that Heidegger's Dasein has been absent from the culture itself, and to a significant extent remains absent. I suspect that this is why I had so much difficulty in understanding Heidegger's work and then seeing the world, even if dimly, as Heidegger sees it.

The Problem of Dasein

When I think logically through Heidegger's assertion that being of an entity is itself not an entity, the rejection of any concept of being human as an entity automatically follows. I could follow Heidegger's logic but not its implications. Before this, I would have said that to be a person, a human being, was to be a member of the species

homo sapiens⁵⁹. Following this, I would have proceeded to consider characteristics that defined our species from others, e.g. consciousness, cognition and so on. However, all these ways of thinking have been ruled out. Neither is Heidegger thinking of something metaphysical in the sense of other worldly; he is making 'real world' claims about Dasein. Dasein is an entity, and further, this entity is something that is the proper object of scientific inquiry. [BT 71/46] I struggled to conceptualise Dasein in a way that met all these criteria. Like being, this presented another key puzzle.

It took a long time to recognise that the issue of the nature of the entity of Dasein was an essential question to answer. It was always there in Heidegger's work, but it drifted in and out of view. There is a tendency to keep falling back to equating Dasein to something familiar, some similar but alternative take on what is already known; a powerful pull that is hard to overcome given my cultural background⁶⁰. In reading Heidegger, you cannot dwell on the puzzling parts, as the solution is only accessible when the puzzle as a whole is solved. Content with the sense that Dasein 'is us' I suspect, in a similar way to the term being, Dasein became a familiar term of use and that it remained unclear tended to fade into the background, a dangerous tendency in scholarship!

The understanding of the entity Dasein was suddenly and unexpectedly brought into focus after stumbling across a passage while undertaking another task. In the passage, Heidegger specifically addresses the nature of the entity of Dasein, and subsequent searches have failed to uncover similar comments. The remarks, quoted earlier, come from the Summer 1928 lecture series, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, the last given at the University of Marburg, and not long after the publication of *Being and Time*.

If I say of Dasein that its basic constitution is being-in-the-world, I am then first of all asserting something that belongs to its essence, and I thereby disregard whether the entity of such a nature factually exists or not. In other words, the statement, "Dasein is, in its basic constitution, being-in-the-world," is not an affirmation of its factual existence; **I do not, by this statement, claim that my Dasein is in fact extant**, nor am I saying of it that, in accord with its essence, it must in fact exist. [MFL 169] (my bolding)

With every typical way of considering Dasein as an entity ruled out, but always

⁵⁹ *homo sapiens* is from Latin and is literally translated as 'wise' man, again identifying what is understood as a defining characteristic of what we are.

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hopeful that some glimpse of Heidegger's conceptualisation of Dasein would come into view this passage was devastating. Apart from the difficulties it posed for me regarding my grasp of Dasein, I failed to understand how Heidegger could argue that the sciences deal with entities, that his work on Dasein *necessarily* precedes the sciences [BT 71/45] and yet he makes no claim about the existence of the entity! If we combine this claim with the earlier point, that somehow Dasein is already 'in the world', then understanding what Heidegger means by Dasein as an entity becomes a significant problem.

In *Being and Time*, given that Dasein is the entity that is the subject of inquiry using phenomenology, how can such an inquiry be undertaken if Dasein itself cannot be brought into view? This question is addressed in Chapter 9.

Summary

Fundamental to this thesis, and any attempt to understand Heidegger's work, are the concepts of being and Dasein and this chapter has set out the difficulties in grasping, these concepts from what Heidegger presents in his work.

The chapter also provides a summary of the account from the Tradition concerning being and Dasein. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, having some basic knowledge of the Tradition assists in understanding Heidegger's work as it is this position he is attacking, and he refers to it throughout his work. Secondly, to give proper consideration to Heidegger's account, this should be against the background of a reasonable understanding of the alternative. Thirdly, our initial understanding of the nature of being human and the being of things typically come from the normative accounts within the Tradition. These understandings may not be explicitly recognised, and so covertly inform our views. Some familiarity with the tradition helps to identify these hidden understandings and is an important part of being open to the possibility of new ways of understanding.

There is a certain necessity for the initial engagement with Heidegger's work to occur with a lack of clarity concerning the meaning of key concepts, to hold the need for understanding at bay. Heidegger is presenting a radically new approach, and the 'unity' of his account emerges only slowly as the various, seemingly disconnected pieces merge, shaped by the very unity they are forming. Wittgenstein's metaphor of 'light dawns gradually' is apt in this regard.

This chapter presents the puzzle and problem encountered in grasping Heidegger's meaning of Dasein and being. For me, the puzzle remained, but lying dormant, even after engaging with Heidegger's work for several years. The puzzle awoke when I found it difficult to provide a coherent account of the concepts for the thesis. If Dasein and being should be intelligible if the 'unity' of Heidegger's work were sufficiently well understood then it was clear that my fundamental understanding was lacking, and worse, may be errant. This is what forced me back to reconsider the concepts of being and Dasein.

Being and Time is a large dense work and understanding its thesis is made difficult because there are concepts that are not only helpful but in my view essential to making sense of *Being and Time* which are not covered in the book. Heidegger deals with these concepts in his lecture courses⁶¹, but they are often left out of *Being and Time* or reduced from lengthy discussion down to a pithy sentence; perhaps due to the already lengthy nature of the book. There is certainly plenty in *Being and Time*, as published, to provoke new thinking but there is the substantial risk that it is misunderstood, as is the famous case of Jean-Paul Sartre's interpretation.

It was when I went back to solve the puzzle of being and Dasein that I came to appreciate the value of Heidegger's published lecture courses as important supplements to *Being and Time*. As a result of going back to these other works, I reconsidered the structure of the thesis. Initially, I had planned and was 'writing towards' an interpretive account that focused on the structure of *Being and Time*, this was abandoned.

As I worked towards understanding Heidegger's being and Dasein, I found myself re-tracing aspects of Heidegger's intellectual journey, first with the Greeks, then with Husserl. I discovered a rich source of ideas and concepts that seem to inform and influence Heidegger's position but are barely discernible in *Being and Time*. The conclusion I reached was that if the background concepts that inform *Being and Time* could be adequately presented, then the work in *Being and Time* becomes,

⁶¹ The 1927 publication of *Being and Time* was the only publication by Heidegger for around a decade. Most of the books authored by Heidegger that have been released were never written as books, they are transcripts of his lectures or seminars. The release of these lectures in book form did not start to occur until the 1970s in any substantial manner. In the thesis when I first refer to a book I have generally given an indication if it relates to a lecture course. Heidegger's lecture courses are not merely presentations of a fixed course content, that was simply repeated and updated year after year. Heidegger used his course as part of his research. The lectures were, in effect, the report of his current research into an area that typically covered Heidegger's exploration and critique of the background philosophical positions as well as his own position.

not just more accessible, but in my view intelligible.

Rethinking the problem of Dasein and being, resulted in including in the thesis the discussions concerning these two important concepts. In the rethinking, however, it forced me to consider what other important concepts Heidegger brings to *Being and Time* without much disclosure. This led to the chapters on linking Heidegger with science (Chapters 10 and 11), on intentionality and lived experience (Chapter 12), lessons from Heidegger's encounter with Husserl (Chapter 12 and 13) and a different approach to engaging with his concept of the ready-to-hand and world (Chapter 13). Perhaps the most significant change that resulted was re-thinking Heidegger's work in terms complex systems theory and emergence (Chapter 19) which in led me to a more radical view of my understanding of Dasein as an emergent entity.

In summary, confronting the problem of being and Dasein drove me back to revisit previous work and to explore different avenues to find the clarity I sought. This work not only led to clarifying these concepts but to a radically new understanding of Dasein and being-in-the-world. The concern that a lack of clarity around these concepts may indicate something missed proved well founded. The discovery of the problem occurred as I was completing the penultimate draft of the thesis, which has only a distant resemblance to what was finally produced. Such is the iterative nature of encountering new understandings!

The next chapter starts the exploration of being by considering it in the context of Heidegger's project.

CHAPTER 5: BEING - HEIDEGGER'S PROJECT

Introduction

An entomologist sets off to a newly discovered jungle location. The area has been geographically isolated for thousands of years, and the goal is to discover and document new insect species. This task requires that the entomologist has a prior understanding of the concept of 'insect' and can apply it to specific instances. Only then can a little 'critter' be 'spotted' as a potential insect, examined to confirm the classification, and then further examined to see if it is a new species. Heidegger's declared project concerns being and it is inconceivable that he didn't have a reasonably well-formed conception of being as he commenced writing *Being and Time*. Heidegger had explored much of the area contained in *Being and Time* before its writing, and while new material is evident the conceptual framework of being does not change. (Kisiel, 1995) In this and the following chapters it will become evident that such a framework existed, he simply chose not to make it explicit in *Being and Time*.

I had read *Being and Time* several times, making extensive notes and marking up the text with underlines, colour highlights and comments. As covered in the last chapter, my view that I had a sufficient grasp of the concept of being for the thesis was overturned, and this sent me back to the texts. The approach was simple, I went back for a closer look at Heidegger's project in the context of *Being and Time*, with a specific focus on examples of how he uses the term being. This not only failed to achieve the necessary clarity but resulted in a deepening of the puzzle. This work is summarised in this Chapter 2.

My next step was an exploration of the early Greek concepts of being, particularly the ideas of Aristotle, on the premise that Heidegger believes that progress towards an understanding of being goes astray after Aristotle [FCM]. This proved very helpful and revealed useful similarities between the Aristotelian and Heideggerian accounts. Chapter 6 summarises this work. With the aid of the knowledge gained from reading the Greek accounts of being, I identified an important section in one of Heidegger's interpretations of the Greek understanding of being. This proved decisive, and I identified a key aspect of Heidegger's concept of being that helped bring all the other aspects together. This account is contained in Chapter 7 of the thesis, together with my interpretation of Heidegger's conceptual framework for

being as it applies to *Being and Time*.

In the following I explore in more detail Heidegger's project concerning being, the various ways that he applies the term being and the constitution of the structure of being.

Heidegger's Project

Heidegger opens *Being and Time* with a quotation from Plato's *Sophists*,

For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression "being". We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.
[BT 18/1]

This is a clear marker for his work, commencing his treatise by pointing out that even at the commencement of the tradition one of the giants of philosophy, Plato, acknowledges that he is 'perplexed' by the question of being. Heidegger then immediately observes that even in his day there is still no answer to the question of what we mean by 'being'; a position that still stands. However, Heidegger notes a difference between the contemporary situation and that of the ancients. Whereas the question of the meaning of being provided the "stimulus for the researches of Plato and Aristotle" since then the question of being itself since been forgotten by the philosophical tradition and subject to "complete neglect".[BT 21/1] Heidegger thinks this has happened because it is such a "universal and emptiest of concepts" that it "resists every attempt at definition".[BT 21/1] He then argues that notwithstanding the lack of a definition of being in scholarship that "everyone uses it constantly and already understands what he means by it", and as such no clarity in definition was thought necessary, it was, as it were, "superfluous".[BT 21/1]

So it came to pass that,

... that which the ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of method. [BT 18/1]

This is quite a claim! It is against this background, of not just a neglected question but one the Tradition does not believe worth pursuing that Heidegger's philosophical inquiries take place. His declared project in his most famous work, *Being and Time* is "to work out the question of the meaning of *being*" [BT 19/1].

Heidegger is referring to a *technical understanding* of being, and despite this lack at

the technical level he takes as given that we have a *general understanding* of the meaning of being, of what it is "to be", to exist⁶². This is evident whenever

... one cognizes⁶³ anything or makes an assertion, whenever one comports⁶⁴ oneself towards entities ... some use is made of [an understanding of] 'being' ... this expression is held to be intelligible ... just as everyone understands 'The sky is blue', 'I am merry' and the like." [BT 23/4]

Here Heidegger is pointing out the self-evident. Whenever I use a computer, a car, a coffee cup or even eat a piece of toast, I am exhibiting and understanding of what these things *are*. If a computer, a toaster, a log and a coffee cup are placed in front of my dog Rogan, he would understand them as objects that he must walk around (or over!), but not as the entities they *are*. This is evident by the way Rogan encounters and deals with them. Even a young toddler has a rudimentary understanding of the difference between entities encountered in the home. This is the *general* understanding of being. A *technical* understanding requires that we know what it *means to be* a toaster or a coffee cup. It is this technical level of understanding that Heidegger argues that the tradition has not properly grasped. Being then, is used in two ways by Heidegger. I have a general understanding of the *being* of a hammer when I recognise it as a hammer and use it as a hammer. I do not have a technical understanding of the *being* of a hammer unless I can account for what it means *to be* a hammer. We can have both an understanding of being (general) and a lack of understanding of being(technical)!

In these examples, the words *is*, *am*, and *are*, often appear. They are all forms of the verb *to be*. The very language we use contains a recognition of our general understanding of 'being'. i.e. what it is to be something. Heidegger regards it as self-evident that from an early age we go about the activities of our daily life using various things (entities), talking about them, thinking about them and so on. Typically, and for the most part, we do this in a manner that indicates we know what the various things we engaged with (what Heidegger refers to a comport) *are*. It is

⁶² I have used the term 'exist' in its every day usage and will continue to do so throughout this chapter. However, in the context of *Being and Time* it is used as a defined technical term by Heidegger with a different meaning. Existence will refer to the mode of Dasein's being.

⁶³ Cognizes - think about in any way.

⁶⁴ Comport - Macquarrie and Robinson in their footnote to this word (note 1 p 23) explain that the German verb *verhalten* can refer to "any kind of behaviour or way of conducting oneself, even to the way in which one relates oneself to something else, or to the way one refrains or holds oneself back." It is in effect any way one deals with something.

impossible to conceive of human existence without this understanding of being, understanding of what things *are*.

While the observation that we have a general understanding of being does not seem like a profound insight, it does lead to the core question of Heidegger's work, the difference between understanding what *is* a hammer and what it means to be a hammer. It is this difference between knowing what something *is* and knowing what it means to be something that Heidegger is concerned with. When we think about this concept of what it '*means to be*' we are asking questions about *being* and have entered the realm of ontology, the name given to the study of being. Ontology is part of the sub-discipline of philosophy called metaphysics, and this is the field in which Heidegger's inquiries take place.

Another point associated with the observation that we have a general understanding of being is that we must, in some way, be given the correct basis for understanding entities as the entities they are; otherwise, we couldn't understand them. Heidegger seizes upon this point and takes our 'average everyday' understanding of things (general) to work out formally (technical), the basis of our understanding. While he doesn't make it explicit, he is arguing that because we are given a general understanding of being, then whatever the technical basis for that understanding it must also be the meaning of being for the entity concerned.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the general, contemporary understanding is that the being of a hammer refers to the material from which it is made. In that the material aspect of an entity has particular characteristics, size, colour, shape, feel and so on, we can then judge what the entity is. At one level this satisfies Heidegger's requirement that the being of the entity (the physical characteristics) is also the basis of our understanding the entity. However, we know Heidegger rejects this because 'being is not an entity'. The challenge of breaking the connection between visual appearance and the being of the entity will be a recurring theme in the thesis.

It is because "we already live in an understanding of being" [BT 23/4] (general), that it is such a defining characteristic of human existence, that the question as to the meaning of what it is to be something (technical) is so important. Yet, according to Heidegger, a formal, thematized understanding of being is "still veiled in darkness"

and because of this "it is necessary in principle to raise this question again" [BT 23/44]. However, Heidegger doesn't believe we even know the proper way to ask the question of the meaning of being. This is reflected in the earlier discussion on the structure of his inquiry and is the basis of his articulation of his project in *Being and Time*;

... first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of being and to do so concretely. [BT 18/1]

Working in various ways to understand the meaning of being, after some two millennia of neglect, was to become the project that defines Heidegger's philosophical career (Guignon, 1993) and was the basis of his fame. Heidegger had been pursuing his project via his lecture courses at the Universities of Freiburg and Marburg for some years before the publication of *Being and Time* in 1927. Prior to this, he was relatively unknown as a philosopher of note outside a small circle, but with *Being and Time*, his first publication of any sort in over a decade, Heidegger is elevated to international prominence as a philosopher, and this status continues through to today.

The following passage is a compact summary of Heidegger's project. It sets it out in the form of the structure of his inquiry discussed in Chapter Three, contains the critical assertion that being is not an entity and indicates the key point on which he leverages his inquiries, i.e. that we already have an understanding of being:

In the question which we are to work out [previously mentioned, this is his project or *Gefrates*], *what is asked about* is being [Befragtes] - that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood [Erfragtes – formal indication of answer], however we may discuss them in detail. The being of entities 'is' not itself an entity. [BT 25-6/6] (my gloss in square brackets)

Fundamental and Regional Ontology

While I have been using hammers, etc. by way of examples to illustrate what is meant by being, the examples are misleading regarding Heidegger's project. Concerning his investigation, his project, he states,

Its aim is one of fundamental ontology. [BT 170/132]

This requires some clarification.

Within ontology, the question concerning being is known as fundamental ontology,

and its goal is to understand the most fundamental building blocks for entities within a particular metaphysical system. In contemporary physicalist account, this would be the most elemental sub-atomic particles, for the very early Greeks, as I will discuss next chapter it was called the first principle or first element and was typically identified by many of the Greek philosophers as either water, fire, air or earth and for Plato, it was the 'forms'. In Christian theology, the most fundamental source of all entities is not a physical element it is God the creator. In all these systems the most fundamental element is an entity, different types of entities, but entities nonetheless and as such Heidegger discounts these systems. So, when Heidegger states "*what is asked about is being*" it is being as fundamental ontology. At the beginning of *Being and Time* Heidegger provides a provisional indication of what he regards as the answer to the meaning of being as fundamental ontology, it is an

... interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being.
[BT 19/1]

Heidegger believed that what it means to be anything, this is what fundamental ontology addresses, is ultimately not based on a fundamental entity, it is time, hence the title of the book, *Being and Time*. Heidegger never managed to successfully demonstrate this point. *Being and Time* was never published in full in according to his plan, and what was published is only a step along the road of his master project. *Being and Time* as published is a regional ontology and 'being' thus has a different, but related meaning. As to Heidegger's thesis of time as the fundamental meaning of being, while this is an uncommon position both philosophically and within theoretical physics, it is not without some support. For example the contemporary philosopher of science, Tim Maudlin, argues that "it is possible to regard the whole of physical geometry—the whole geometrical structure of the physical universe—as determined by the temporal ordering of events". (Maudlin, 2012, p. 215) He argues this position based on the development of a new foundational approach to understanding physical geometry he calls the Theory of Linear Structures. (Maudlin, 2014) Whether Maudlin's ideas are eventually accepted or not is irrelevant for this thesis, the point is that they are being taken seriously. Heidegger's project fits within this broad heroic tradition of trying to think through the most fundamental foundations of 'what is' in new ways. Having made the point that Heidegger's main thesis concerning time is within the domain of accepted scholarship, even if it is at the periphery, I do not pursue this any further.

In a materialist approach, we can, for example, given an account of the body as an integration of the various physical and biological systems, an account of the systems in terms of their parts and so on down to sub-atomic particles. The same applies to any physical entity no matter how complex and makes fundamental ontology a rather straight forward affair and hardly worth the bother. Heidegger's remarks reflect this state of affairs. Unlike the materialist account, where there is just one region containing all entities Heidegger argues that there are multiple regions, each characterised by a unique mode of being, each associated with a different class of entity. In *Being and Time* Heidegger identifies five different regions or classes of entities; Dasein [BT 27/8], entities ready-to-hand [BT 114/83], world [BT 81/54], entities that are present-at-hand [BT 79/54] and Nature [BT 92/63]. The study of being in each of these areas Heidegger calls regional ontology as opposed to fundamental ontology [ZS, PIKC]. However, Heidegger argues that, although there is a mode of being that can be exhibited and described based on our encounter with each class of entity, he can explore deeper and disclose time as the basis for being in each case. If he can demonstrate this, then he has disclosed time as the meaning of being, i.e. at the level of fundamental ontology [BT, ZS].

Understanding the nature of Heidegger's project helps in differentiating between being as fundamental ontology and being as regional ontology, what he sometimes refers to as modes of being. In turn, this helps to clarify passages in which Heidegger uses being with different referents, and the context in which he applies the concept of time, e.g.

Thus the way in which being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning determined primordially in terms of time, [BT 40/19]

... the being of Dasein has thus been distinguished from modes of being (readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, Reality) which characterize entities with a character other than that of Dasein. [BT 273/230]

Because Dasein has an innate understanding of being he argues that he must start his investigation with Dasein;

Therefore *fundamental ontology*, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the *existential analytic of Dasein*. [BT 34/14]

Being and Time was initially conceived as a project of two parts.[BT § 8] The first part being of three divisions; Division I, the preparatory fundamental analysis of the being of Dasein, Division II, an interpretation of the being of Dasein in terms of

temporality (time) and finally Division III, the conclusion of his thesis, time as the meaning of being. The second part, also of three division was to comprise critiques of Kant's, Descartes' and Aristotle's account of being and time based on his findings from part one.

Being and Time, as it is published, is only the first two divisions of part one and Heidegger never publishes the remainder of the promised work, as Spiegelberg comments, *Being and Time* "was and will remain a torso" (Spiegelberg, 1994, p. 336). Not long after the publication of *Being and Time* there is a shift in Heidegger's approach, that he calls 'the turn'[MWP], and while he still pursues the questions concerning the meaning of being throughout his career, he ceases to do so as a fundamental ontology. (Korab-Karpowicz, ; Sheehan, 2015; Spiegelberg, 1994) In this thesis, my discussions concerning Heidegger's work will be confined, for the most part, to Division I, Part I, of *Being and Time* what Heidegger called the *Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein*. The level of analysis that follows in Division II, which addresses the being of Dasein on the basis of temporality, is, in my view, too abstract to address the thesis question. However, even the analysis in Division I gives a clear indication of the temporal ordering evident in Dasein's structure.

In summary, being has another layer of meaning in Heidegger's work. It can refer to being as fundamental ontology or being as a mode of being (regional ontology) associated with a class of entities. The basic conceptual framework of being remains the same and refers to whatever it is that determines entities as entities. However, the specific character of being will depend on whether the term is applied at the fundamental level or the regional level. At the regional level, being will refer to something different depending on the region.

Naming the regions or modes of being

Regional ontologies reflect different modes of being, but in each case, the basic concept of being must remain the same, i.e. determine the entities as entities. However, in that the entity and its being are not the same Heidegger gives each class of entity a distinctive name and gives a separate name for the mode of being associated with the class. The exception is Dasein, for which there are three terms all referring to Dasein's being. In the following I introduce the naming;

Dasein

The first and most basic name Heidegger uses to indicate the being of Dasein is 'existence', and it is introduced by way of a formal indication;

The essence of Dasein lies in its existence.[BT 68/42, BT 275/231]

The second name refers to existence in its structural form, which Heidegger names being-in-the-world. It is investigating this structure that is the starting point of Heidegger's project concerning fundamental ontology;

... we have fixed upon for starting our investigation, we must lay bare a fundamental structure in Dasein: being-in-the-world [BT 65/41]

The third and final term is "care",

Dasein's being reveals itself as *care*. [BT 227/182]

Care is just a deeper analysis of the structure, being-in-the-world.

... the basic constitution of Dasein, being-in-the-world; and this in turn has care as its even more primordial constitution of being [BT 246/202] (translation modified)

That these three concepts are referring to the same phenomenon is evident in the following passage;

The totality of being-in-the-world as a structural whole has revealed itself as care. In care the being of Dasein is included. When we came to analyse this being, we took as our clue existence, which, in anticipation, we had designated as the essence of Dasein. [BT 274/231]

Names for the Other Modes of Being

The mode of being associated with the entity world is called 'worldhood' [BT 93/65], for entities ready-to-hand the mode of being is called 'readiness-to-hand' [BT 99/69], for entities present-at-hand the mode of being is called 'presence-at-hand' [BT 104/74].

Before the two basic concepts of the separation of entity and being and of regional ontologies is grasped the naming convention can be very confusing. This is made more difficult because once he establishes that, for example, readiness-to-hand, refers to a mode of being the term being typically drops away. This passage from Heidegger's discussion on equipment is an example;

.. as an equipmental Thing which looks so and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been present-at-hand too. Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment, but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself ... [BT103/73]

In the passage, he is talking about circumstances in which an entity can shift

between being understood as a piece of equipment (something ready-to-hand) to something that is an object with no use (something present-at-hand), and then back. It does this by a shift in its mode being. The idea of entities shifting from one mode of being to another is complex enough, but if the terminology is not properly understood Heidegger's description is impossible to grasp. It took some time before I could read something like, the 'readiness-to-hand of something ready-to-hand' and understand what he was saying, i.e. referring to the mode of being of a class of entities.

Heidegger tells us that while we can encounter nature, and understand it as something ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, that the being of nature qua nature is different,

The 'Nature' by which we are 'surrounded' is, of course, an entity within-the-world; but the kind of being which it shows belongs neither to the ready-to-hand nor to what is present-at-hand as 'Things of Nature'. [BT 254/211]

There is no name for the being of nature given in *Being and Time*.

Limitation of inquiry in Being and Time

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger provides an interpretation of the being of Dasein, world and the ready-to-hand and this will be discussed later in the thesis. However, he does not provide an interpretation of the class of entities he calls present-at-hand and simply indicates that the presence-at-hand of such entities would need to be fixed "in concepts which are categorial" [BT 91/63]. By way of a specific example, I take this as meaning, for example, that to determine what the being of gold is would be to do so in a way that accounts for its colour, malleability, mass, shape and so on. This would, I assume, apply to anything present-at-hand. Heidegger does not inquire into the being of these entities in *Being and Time*, and it is not relevant to this thesis. Nor does Heidegger inquire into the being of nature qua nature, again because it has no direct bearing on the Dasein analytic. However, he does discuss the situation when nature is understood as something ready-to-hand, and this will be discussed briefly Chapter 14.

Modes and Clarifying Being

The touchstone I keep coming back to is Heidegger's formal indication of being;

Being -- that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood...[BT 26/6]

This formal indication must be applicable at the fundamental level and for each of the regional ontologies. This suggests that while being determines entities it must, in some way, do this differently in each case, which in turn is the basis for distinguishing the differing ontologies. In *Being and Time*, each class of entity investigated in terms of its being will thus have a different being. All this sounds reasonable, but it brings us no closer to understanding what is meant by being as something that ‘determines’ an entity, especially given the restriction that being is not an entity and is separate to the entity.

Exploring how the term ‘being’ is used

While Heidegger’s primary research goal is stated as fundamental ontology, the work concerning Dasein is regional ontology and once this is clarified the basic structure of his inquiry is relatively easy to understand, at least in principle. The next task was to bring more clearly into view what Heidegger meant by being.

If a way a term has been defined does not shed sufficient light as to its meaning, another approach is to explore the various ways and the context in which the term is used. To make the term a specific focus of inquiry rather than passing over it in a more general way as occurs when typically reading the text as a whole. This was the approach taken and rather than moving towards clarity, the concept of being became even more obscure. Part of the reason for this is that Heidegger appears lax when it comes to consistently applying his terms, but the other reason is that being seems to be used in ways that are not related to the concept of ‘determining’. In the following, I provide some examples to illustrate this.

Heidegger indicates early in *Being and Time* he is dealing with “being and its modes” [BT 40/19] (refer above discussion). This suggests there is a difference between being and a mode of being. However, Heidegger regularly drops the ‘mode of being’ in favour of simply using being. Examples of this are;

... an entity whose being is defined as being-in-the-world. [BT 116/84]

... the being of what is ready-to-hand [BT 105/74]

... the being of those entities which are present-at-hand[92/63]

At other times, he introduces the designation “kind” rather than mode e.g.

The kind of being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand.[BT 101/71]

Yet presence-at-hand is the kind of being which belongs to entities whose character is not

that of Dasein. [BT 150/115]

Initially, I thought it might be a variation in the way the German words are interpreted, but this is not the case. In the following which I cited earlier,

the being of Dasein has thus been distinguished from modes of being (readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, Reality) which characterize entities with a character other than that of Dasein. [BT 273/230]

In this passage, the German translated as modes of being is “Seinsmodi”, whereas the German translated for kind of being is “Seinsart”.

Yet another term Heidegger uses to identify the mode of beings is “way of being”, e.g.

... the entity [Dasein] which has being-in-the-world as its way of being. [BT 174/135] (my gloss)

A similar usage is found in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*,

Every entity has a way-of-being [BPP 18]

The German word translated as way is both cases is “Weise”.

All the translations are relatively straightforward and reflect Heidegger’s inconsistencies in designating regions of being. It could be argued that this is being overly pedantic. However, it must be recalled that initially, the structure of the regions of being versus fundamental ontology is not clear. Additionally, Heidegger regularly explores the etymologies of words to make clear in what sense he is using them, and consequently, I was looking for precision and consistency. That said, once the basic ontological structure (fundamental versus regions) is understood, most of these uses start to make sense, except for ‘way of being’. Mode, kind, or simply being seemed interchangeable but ‘way of being’ didn’t seem to fit. I will return to this shortly.

Then comes the next problem. Even if some grasp is had that mode of being, being and kind of being may all refer to a class of entities, we are then confronted with passages such as the following;

Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it - all these ways of behaving ... are modes of being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. [BT 26-7/7] (my underlining)

Mode of being has become associated with the behaviour that Dasein typically exhibits. Then we have,

... in every kind of being that factual Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the character of its being. [BT 38/17]

Not only, however, does an understanding of being belong to Dasein; but this understanding develops or decays along with whatever kind of being Dasein may possess at the time .. [BT 37/16] (my underlining)

Kind of being no longer seems to be a general name for being, as something that determines, but in something that can be multiple in type and possessed!

In making sense of these passages, a number of questions immediately arise; Doesn't Dasein only have one kind of being? How can it have multiple kinds of being that are determinative of its being? Is this another type of being? How can being be determinative and separate and yet be the name given to the various behaviours of Dasein? What does it mean for Dasein to possess different kinds of being in a transient way?

Then there is yet another way the term is used that is problematic;

That kind of being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call "existence" [BT 32/12] (my underlining)

In this passage the phrase, "towards which Dasein comports" presents something as separate to Dasein. This is consistent with Heidegger's basic descriptions of being. But it raises another problem interpreting the meaning of being. How is it that something separate, something which determines Dasein can at the same time be something towards which Dasein comports?

And yet another way of using the term;

Our investigation takes its orientation from being-in-the-world -- that basic constitution of Dasein by which every mode of its being gets co-determined. [BT 153/117] (translation modified)

The phrase "every mode of its being" is problematic. Heidegger has already indicated that Dasein's mode of being is being-in-the-world. Essentially this is saying that Dasein's being co-determines every mode of its being. Again, there is nothing wrong with the translation. The only conclusion is that being must be used in two different senses.

I am not going to push this further; the aim is to indicate the difficulty encountered in trying to grasp the intent of being as something that determines entities as entities. The understanding of the differences between fundamental and regional ontologies helps to clarify his different naming approaches in designating modes of being.

However what Heidegger has in mind by being in terms of being as that which 'determines entities', has slipped further away. The closer I looked, the more acutely aware I became of the different ways he uses being. I held to the notion that there must be some consistency, but I couldn't see it. I would have to try another approach, and that was to go back to the tradition and the Greek understanding of being. This is discussed in the next chapter.

Being has Structures

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger indicates that the various modes of being each have a structure, e.g.

... those structures of being which belong to the entities we encounter. [BT 47/25]

... a primordial structure of Dasein's being [BT 81/54]

... the structure of being-in-the-world. [BT 134/101]

... the structure of worldhood [BT 94/66]

The structure of the being of what is ready-to-hand [BT 105/74]

The concept of structure contains the idea of something being 'built' or constructed, and the image of some building initially comes to mind. This, of course, cannot be right as this would infer that being is an assemblage of entities; this has been ruled out. The best example I could think of involving non-physical structures was the game of chess. The game is based on the set of legal moves the different pieces can make. The game itself is not the physical board or pieces, these are more for convenience, and there are many games played between chess masters without the use of a board. However, chess is an entity, and I could not see how some other structure associated with being, determines chess.

Notwithstanding this, the concept of structure is useful. Whatever I am seeking to understand by the characteristic of being as that which determines, it is somehow comprised of different aspects. I take structures to be an important concept and somehow linked to the determination of the entity. So, while each of the modes of being is different, they are all structures.

Structures Constitute Being

At times Heidegger uses the word 'constitution' to designate being rather than structure. For example, he talks about domains (as opposed to regions) of entities

that the sciences investigate and argues that prior to those investigations, there should be

... an interpretation of those entities with regard to their basic constitution of being. [BT 30/10]

And in relation to Dasein,

Our investigation takes its orientation from being-in-the-world - that basic constitution of Dasein by which every mode of its being gets co-determined. [BT 153/117]

By way of note Macquarrie and Robinson[BT] translate the German word *Verfassung* as 'state', whereas Stambaugh[BTs] uses constitution. While both are acceptable 'state' gives the wrong sense, and I hear either a reference to an entity, or a particular 'state' an entity is in. Both are wrong. When I hear constitution, e.g. as in the constitution of a state (i.e. country) there is the notion of constitution as determining. This fits better with Heidegger's description of being. I change the translation of state to constitution when citing passages from Macquarrie and Robinson's translation.

The link between constitution, structures and being is evidenced by the following passage,

The question about ... structure aims at the analysis of what constitutes existence. [BT 33/12]

This also provides some insight into another key passage,

Because phenomena, as understood phenomenologically, are never anything but what goes to constitute being ... [BT 61/37] (translation changed)⁶⁵

This passage provides a useful insight into Heidegger's method. Whatever being is, it is constituted by certain structures. The phenomena that Heidegger indicates he is interpreting phenomenologically is the structure that constitutes being. In other words, to describe the structures of a particular mode of being is to describe the being of that mode. Rather than saying that being determines an entity, we could just as correctly say the being-structure determines the entity. For example, the being-structure of Dasein is called being-in-the-world, it is this structure that determines Dasein. (Remembering that the structure is never an entity, and it is separate to Dasein!)

We now have the sense that there is some being-structure, that is different for each

⁶⁵ The German word for constitute in this instance is *ausmacht*. Macquarrie and Robinson use the English 'make-up', again, I have followed Stambaugh and used 'constitute'. This translation is also what is indicated in the German-English dictionaries.

class of entities, that determines the entity. There is clearly a difference between something being constituted by way of a structure (being) and something that is determined (entity) by being. The German word translated as determines is *bestimmt*, and there no difficulty or material issues with this translation. There is one way to hear determines, and that is as some form of final decision. Another way to hear it is as some necessary antecedent to something happening, for example in economics it could be said that it is the buyer that determines the price. If we take the following;

... existence (Dasein's being) is the determining character of Dasein.[BT 33/13]

The phrase suggests that an understanding of determines closer to that of a necessary antecedent is more appropriate than some form of declaration or decision. We have then a being-structure that is an antecedent to the entity. This phrasing supports the view of being as something separate to the entity but what it means to say that existence (existence) determines Dasein (entity) is still very opaque.

Way of Being

I want to return to one of the phrases that in exploring Heidegger's use of being was particularly puzzling, the idea of 'way-of-being'. There is no doubt that the concepts are connected but in what way is not clear. In *Being and Time*, the phrase tends to be used almost exclusively with Dasein and the only exception I identified was the following which suggests that all entities have a way of being;

... the perception of the simplest determinate ways of being which entities as such may possess [BT 57/33]

In this passage, Heidegger indicates that "ways of being" are "determinate" of the entities. The ideas of 'way of being' is suggestive of an action or behaviour and this is the strong sense one gets from the following passage;

... producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining All these ways of being-in ... [BT 83/56]

The term being-in in this instance refers to the underlying structure that enables us to comport to entities in the world. This aspect of the structure is discussed in Chapter 17. The idea that way of being relates to behaviour is contained in the following,

Sciences are ways of being in which Dasein comports itself towards entities which it need not be itself. [BT 33/13]

The implication here is that the sciences are defined by a particular set of behaviours. The term 'way of being' in *Being and Time* is almost exclusively used in relation to Dasein, not surprising given the focus of the inquiry. However elsewhere it applies to the other classes of entities. In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, we have the following;

The being of something we use, for instance, a hammer or a door, is characterized by a specific way of being put to use, of functioning. [BPP 292]

The suggestion is that it is the use, or behaviour, of the entity that determines the entity.

Following the concept that the different classes of entities have different ways of being, if this means some sort of behaviour, is easy enough. An entity that is ready-to-hand is one that is in some way useful, has a function. Dasein's diverse ways of behaviour have a distinctively different character to, for example, a hammer, and so is a different class of entity. The entities that are present-at-hand are neither of the other two, they essentially just 'present' themselves to us. What Heidegger seems to have done is simply classify entities according to distinctive ways of acting, behaving with respect to Dasein, i.e. different ways of being. If this is the case, then such things as possessing a 'way of being' is understandable.

However, this only adds to the puzzle. Some key characteristics of being identified to date are; it determines an entity, it is both separate, and prior to the entity, it is not an entity, it is something hidden, and it has a structure. If, for example, a hammer is for hammering, how does this satisfy all these characteristics? I even used a hammer to try to breakthrough this conundrum.

The Being of a Hammer

I go to the shed, bring back a hammer, place it on my desk and look at it. I tell myself that to be this hammer is not based on the entity I see before me, for being is not an entity. The way of being a hammer is to drive in nails, which must require a solid, physical entity. I know I need a hammer in my hand *before* I can drive in a nail. But Heidegger says that driving in nails as the way of being of a hammer *is* the being of the hammer. The being of the hammer is not the entity, so it must be its function. When I look at the hammer, I put aside the visual image and consider that

I know that this object is 'for hammering'. But being has a structure and is something that is *before* the physical entity. How can hammering exist before the hammer, if hammering is something that only a hammer does? This gives the general idea of the stream of thought that only ended up going around in circles.

In a materialist account, what it is 'to be' a hammer is 'to be' the physical entity I see in front of me that has the appropriate characteristics (shape, rigidity, etc.) and is suitable for the function of driving in nails. Frankly, at this moment, the materialist account seems far more plausible.

Conclusion

In the beginning, as I read Heidegger's work I recall the frustration of trying to understand what he meant by being, even in a relatively empty conceptual sense. Somewhere along the way I became familiar with the term and thought I had managed to gain a sufficient understanding of being for the purposes of the thesis. This proved false and came to light in the manner I discussed in the last chapter when I tried to write about being.

I went back to examine the concept of being in Heidegger's work in more detail, and the above reflects that activity and captures a sense of the re-awakened frustration.

One of the fundamental premises that I have as I approach this work is that even if I can't grasp what Heidegger is presenting there is, nonetheless, a cohesive intelligibility that is there to be discovered. Based on this premise, I was missing something in my understanding of being that would provide this cohesiveness. If I could not find this in Heidegger's work, then I needed to take a step back and look at the background to the concept of being. Heidegger indicates that the tradition goes astray following Aristotle[FCM] so I went back to the early Greeks with a focus on Aristotle. This is what I present in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6: STEPPING BACK INTO THE TRADITION

Introduction

In a lecture course called *What is Called Thinking?* given during the Winter and Summer semesters of 1951-52, the last before his formal retirement, Heidegger is discussing Nietzsche and tells his students;

From all that has here been suggested, it should be clear that one cannot read Nietzsche in a haphazard way; that ... the most important works ... make demands to which we are not equal. It is advisable, therefore, that you postpone reading Nietzsche for the time being, and first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years [WCT 75]

Nietzsche was writing within the Western tradition of metaphysics and, in Heidegger's view, his writing reflected a deep understanding and profound engagement with Aristotelian philosophy. However, the Aristotelian side of the engagement is not readily apparent, but it is, according to Heidegger, what provides the necessary context for understanding Nietzsche. Unless Aristotle's position was thoroughly understood, he is overlooked as Nietzsche's interlocutor, and by implication, Nietzsche's work cannot be properly understood. What takes one back is Heidegger's claim that this will take 'ten or fifteen' years of studying Aristotle's work! While there is an element of impracticality in the comment, it has remained a salutary reminder of the investment necessary to come to terms with the ideas of thinkers as profound as Aristotle, or Heidegger.

Initially, I had thought an understanding of Heidegger's work would be gained from just a couple of readings of *Being and Time* and some supplementary texts. It should be clear by now that this view was misguided. On first coming across the above passage, I was a little amused and surprised but thought nothing more until later when struggling with the concept of being. Subsequent reflection on this and other passages brought home the significance of writing within a tradition⁶⁶. What I suspected was that Heidegger's remarks about Nietzsche apply to Heidegger, in that there was a context within which he was writing that was not readily discernible. I have since concluded that while Heidegger's interlocutors include, at different times all the key figures in the philosophical tradition involved with ontology, the main figure is Aristotle.

In the previous two chapters, I have laid out the difficulties encountered in gaining

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purchase in Heidegger's conception of being. I concluded that part of the difficulty, especially for a non-philosopher, is that the concept of 'being' is one that is deeply embedded in the scholarship of philosophy and the term carries with it a significant body of knowledge that embraces discussions from the Pre-Socratic Greek philosophers through to the present day. (van Inwagen & Sullivan, 2017) I suspected that lurking in Heidegger's account were parts of the tradition he accepted and others, perhaps the majority, that he rejected. It was, however, the threads of what he accepted, chose to pick up and follow that I was interested in.

While I had engaged in a reading program that covered various aspects of philosophy, including metaphysics, it proved to be insufficient. While I had attained a reasonable understanding of 'what things are' in terms of general contemporary scholarship, i.e. a materialist account, I had failed to appreciate the complexity of 'being' within the context of its history. I suspect that I had mistaken my understanding of an account of being for the phenomenon of being itself and there is a difference. To explain, take for example, the phenomenon of thunder. If I want to form a technical understanding of what thunder is, I must ensure that it is the phenomenon of thunder that I have in view when I seek the explanation. Regardless of whether I hold it to be associated with the thunderbolts of Zeus or a 'natural event' that is a consequence of lightning, what I must first have 'in view' is the deep rumbling sound we call thunder, i.e. the phenomenon. If I pursue thunder based on the accounts of thunder, e.g. Zeus' thunderbolts, I will not get very far. I had been looking at the contemporary accounts of being, of Heidegger's descriptions, but I had still not managed to bring the phenomenon of being itself, or perhaps better put, Heidegger's conception of being, phenomenon, into view.

Yes, I did have a vague notion that in the thesis I was exploring what it is 'to be' a Dasein and this has guided my inquiries, but I did not bring sufficiently into view what it meant 'to be' Dasein. What does 'to be' mean? I had recognised that it was somehow connected to 'determines' but I still had no idea. What I was attempting was an engagement with Heidegger's writing, primarily *Being and Time*, without having the phenomenon of 'being' properly in view. The upshot was I didn't really understand what it was I was trying to understand, and by implication didn't really understand what Heidegger was doing. This thought had troubling implications for the thesis.

From a historical perspective, Heidegger claims that the inquiry into an

understanding of being goes astray after the Aristotle [FCM]. He is not saying the Greeks reached any finality in their inquiry but rather that they were making progress. It is also evident from the earlier discussions that he rejects every conception of being post this time. On this reading of Heidegger, he goes back to the Greek investigations of being to 'pick up' useful threads and continue where they left off. If then he is 'picking up' the threads of inquiry of the ancient Greeks, my approach was to see if I could identify some of those key threads in a way that throws light on Heidegger's work. In this chapter, I present an account of this work, undertaken without Heidegger's guidance. In the next chapter, directed by what I had learnt, I engaged with a key illuminating aspect of Heidegger's account of the Greeks. This work proved remarkably beneficial, first in clarifying for me some of the roots of contemporary, and my own, ways of thinking, but more important in thinking in new ways about being (the threads) which I was then able to carry into understanding Heidegger's work.

Early Greeks – Two Fundamental Approaches.

The study of what it is to be an entity, i.e. being, does not relate to accounting for a specific instance of an entity, but rather to account for what it is to be any entity. As discussed, for Heidegger this is either at the level of fundamental ontology (all entities) or regional ontologies (classes of entities).

While entities, understood as anything that is, can be in many forms such as, chariots, cows, colours, numbers, or imaginary, e.g. Santa Claus, in the Tradition the investigation into being primarily deals with the being of entities in the real world which we 'see' and with which we engage. I will first provide a simple example and then identify two fundamentally different approaches concerning what it is to be an entity that was evident among the ancient Greek philosophers; then I will move to the views of some of the very early Greek philosophers and end with a more detailed discussion of Aristotle's views.

The Simple Example

I am sitting on a chair at my desk, typing on a keyboard as I use the computer. In each case, chair, desk, keyboard and computer, are separate, individual physical entities. If I go into the office area of the university, I sit in a different chair, at a different desk, using a different key board and a different computer. These also are

separate physical entities. If I go into the dining area of my home, again, there are different chairs and a different table. Desks, chairs, keyboards and computers come in all shapes, sizes, colours and configurations and, yet each is still a desk, a chair, and so on. I can take my desk and chair and throw them on the fire destroying them. Every desk and chair in the world could be destroyed, so that none remains in existence. I could have a desk and chair built bringing them back into existence. Entire categories of entities can come into existence, disappear and reappear, just any particular instance can do the same. This coming into and out of existence applies to animals and plants and given enough time, also applies to mountains, cities, rivers, etc.

The First Approach

This simple example points to two important questions for the Greeks. The first is that the things 'that are', the entities that I and see and touch seem to come into and out of existence. It was this seemingly endless change of things coming into and out of existence that the very early Greek philosophers were interested in. Their view was that there must be some order, some constancy, 'behind' this seemingly endless cycle of change otherwise there would only ever be chaos. The entities we see and deal with were understood to arise out of and return to some fundamental material, a first principle or element. Their interest was to account for things at this fundamental level, and as such to be an entity was to be a certain arrangement of these more fundamental elements. This was a robust materialist view of things. The questions pursued concerned, primarily, the nature of the first principle, the most elementary material building block of everything. From this, all else flowed. Not unlike modern materialism.

The Second Approach

By the time of Plato and Aristotle, around two hundred years after the beginnings of Greek philosophy, a second line of thinking had emerged. Plato and Aristotle identified that when we see a desk, there seems to be something else we could not see, that accounts for the entity being a desk. The physical material we see that has been made into the desk was not the *being* of the desk, being lays elsewhere. Being was understood in a way not dissimilar to Heidegger, i.e. it is what determines the entity as the entity it is and is basis of our understanding. In other words, apart from the material aspects, something else was going on.

Plato proposed that for each entity there was a separate ideal form located in a separate world of forms, and that a, typically imperfect, version of this form was instantiated into physical material thus resulting in the entity we see. The concept is a little broader than this and I will touch on it further in the following section. Aristotle agrees that there is something other than the material responsible for entities coming into being and was happy to use the term form, however he rejected the mystical world of forms and develops a more grounded approach. Already it is possible to see the issues that I have been struggling with concerning Heidegger's work reflected in the thinking of the Greeks.

Heidegger accepts much of Aristotle's account, reformulating it and then extending it, pushing further into the investigation of being in areas not pursued, as far as we are aware, by Aristotle. As part of his work Heidegger also identifies in the thinking of earlier Greek philosophers the concept of 'prevailing'⁶⁷, what I will later refer to as emergence, and combines this with Aristotle's concepts as he developed his own thinking.

In the following I provide a potted history of the Greek's encounter with being. This discussion is, of necessity brief, and I only present the main aspects that helped in shifting my understanding of being. In that it is Aristotle's account that is most informative for understanding Heidegger's work this is where I will focus most of the following discussion.

The Beginning, Thales of Miletus

The Pre-Socratics⁶⁸ were fascinated by the observation that in Nature everything seemed to be changing and the concept that there must be, nonetheless, something that is unchanging in the universe upon which change was predicated. What they observed is that there is a basic three-part structure that seemed to apply to the things they observed, they came into being, changed in some way and then passed 'out' of being. It was this coming into and out of existence that gave the appearance of a constant state of change. The puzzle was how were the concepts of constancy and change to be brought together.

⁶⁷ The concept of prevailing will be covered in the Chapter 7.

⁶⁸ This is the term used to classify all the early Greek philosophers before Socrates (469-399BCE), commencing with Thales of Miletus. The term is a little anomalous as the lives of a number of these philosophers overlapped that of Socrates.

Thales of Miletus (624-546BCE), generally regarded as the founder of Greek philosophy lived in the Greek city of Miletus, what is today known as Milet in modern Turkey. Reputed to be a mathematician, astronomer, and philosopher, Thales argued that there must be a first principle⁶⁹ of everything. The characteristics of this first principle must be that it is unchanging in all aspects, i.e. it had no beginning (i.e. no creation), is eternal, is stable, is indivisible and is the unifying basis of all reality.

Before the time of Thales four distinct elements had been identified (fire, air, water, earth⁷⁰) but these elements were not seen as the origins of the world⁷¹. Creation was the stuff of myths and attributed to the actions of a pantheon of gods. An account of this world view survives in the form of a poem, *Theogony* (Hesiod, 2006), attributed to the poet Hesiod (c.750-650BCE). It is Thales, for the first time in known history, that rejects the account of a divine origin of all that is in the world and argued that the world arises from the actions involving some fundamental element, what was called the first principle.

For Thales, water is the eternal first principle from which all else springs and to which all eventually return. Thales argues his case for water as the first principle based on his empirical observations. All living things required water to live, water seemed to be part of that which gives us life (blood), water can change from solid to liquid to gas and lastly the very earth itself seemed to float on water; surely, water is the foundation of all else (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 2007). It is not possible to know exactly how Thales conceptualised his idea of water, but the general idea is clear enough.

Thales and those that followed him up until Parmenides are not typically regarded as philosophers, but as an early form of 'natural scientist' in that they were inquiring into the physical aspects of nature. However, without Thales and his early followers, there is no Greek philosophy as it was in response to this early scholarship that Greek philosophy emerges (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 2007; McKirahan, 2010).

⁶⁹ The term first principle means origin, primordial source or beginning.

⁷⁰ These elements should not be taken literally as in a hand of earth, glass of water and so on. They represented whatever it was that provided the quality of heat, of fluidity and so on. Fire itself thus represented something that contained 'pure' form of the element, but it is also present in a living body as indicated by the warmth of the body, in rotting hay also indicated by heat and so on. Blood thus contained 'water' which gave it its fluid nature. The belief that there were these four basic underlying elements that constituted everything else persisted into the seventeenth century.

⁷¹ The term world here denotes the idea of the earth and all material things there on. This is not how Heidegger uses the term, a point that will be discussed in detail later.

The Pre-Socratics

Apart from two short writings by Gorgias(483-375BCE), there are no surviving texts, either original or copied, from the Pre-Socratics and what we know of them comes from quotes contained in the works of scholars who lived, often centuries later. (McKirahan, 2010) Aristotle, in his book the *Metaphysics* (Aristotle, 2014b), provides a potted history of Pre-Socratics that followed in the line of Thales, a period, covering some three hundred years;

Of the first philosophers, most thought the principles which were of the nature of matter were the only principles of all things; that of which all things that are consist, and from which they first come to be, and into which they are finally resolved (the substance remaining, but changing in its modifications), this they say is the element and the principle of things, and therefore they think nothing is either generated or destroyed, since this sort of entity is always conserved ... Thales ... says the principle is water. ...

Anaximenes and Diogenes make air prior to water, and the most primary of the simple bodies, while Hippasus of Metapontium and Heraclitus of Ephesus say this of fire, and Empedocles says it of the four elements, adding a fourth— earth— to those which have been named; for these, he says, always remain and do not come to be, except that they come to be more or fewer, being aggregated into one and segregated out of one. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, who, though older than Empedocles, was later in his philosophical activity, says the principles are infinite in number; for he says almost all the things that are homogeneous are generated and destroyed (as water or fire is) only by aggregation and segregation, and are not in any other sense generated or destroyed, but remain eternally. From these facts one might think that the only cause is the so-called material cause...(983b5) (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 43663-86)

Looking closely at Aristotle's account there are two different lines of argument. The first is that the only constancy is material first principles. The second, expressed by Anaxagoras, is that the constancy is not to be found in the principle elements, for there is an infinite number of them, but rather the only constancy is change itself. However, Aristotle lumps both of these positions together as arguing for a "material cause" of everything.

There was an alternative account to the view that the first principle must be associated with one or more of the elements. This approach proposed that the basic elements were 'atoms' and the main proponent was Democritus (460-370BCE) who argued that the basic elements were minuscule, indivisible particles of matter that were in constant motion in the void. Specific entities arose because of various combinations of the atoms coming together as a result of random motion, some surviving, most not. He also argued that while we may feel hot and cold, these were sensations that arose because of certain arrangements of the atoms interacting with

us, i.e. heat and cold were not a characteristic of the atoms themselves, but our response to them. Aristotle rejected the atomist account which probably accounted for its failure to gain any significant traction in subsequent generations, eventually re-appearing in name only in the modern era. Aristotle held that the fundamental elements were the four principles, but that they were not what determined entities.

What is remarkable about this position of 'material causality' is that in one form or another it has endured. For example, in Descartes' account of physics, he proposed that there were minute particles he called corpuscles in constant motion, filling all of what we call space, and it was from these particles that everything else was formed (Descartes & Gaukoger (editor), 2004). He rejected atomism because under this view the smallest particles, atoms, were indivisible and for Descartes, this was untenable as God had the power to infinitely divide! (Slowik, 2014)

While the knowledge of processes and the makeup of the fundamental elements has advanced significantly, for the most part, the contemporary understanding of things would fall within the broad family of what Aristotle has called 'material causality'. There are other aspects that are also similar, for example, Descartes and Democritus both accepted the principle of the conservation of matter, i.e. the sum of all the basic stuff in the universe remains unchanged. It simply gets re-ordered in various ways. Considering that the contemporary materialist account also ascribes to the fundamental tenant of the conservation of matter, albeit as matter+energy⁷², we see that the family resemblance is based on a number of points.

Parmenides

The early Pre-Socratic philosophers were not addressing the question of being; they were seeking to identify the most fundamental element that constitutes the basis of the world. Not that much different to what is driving the scientific endeavours using the Large Hadron Collider at CERN. It is Parmenides (c.515-460BCE) who formally introduces the question of what it is to be something in a systematic way (Barnes, 2005). Parmenides is a profoundly important figure in the history of Western thought (J. Palmer, 2012) for as a result of his ideas philosophy is changed forever (McKirahan, 2010). Parmenides was from Elea, now called Velia, in Southern Italy

⁷² In modern physics, it is accepted that matter can convert to energy and vice versa. This is captured in Einstein's famous equation $E=MC^2$.

a region that was part of Magna Graecia, or Greater Greece and it is Parmenides who was the first to give serious thought to the question of what it is *to be* something (the question of being) and the first to use the powerful logical tools of deductive argument to support his case (Barnes, 2005; McKirahan, 2010). Such was the power of his arguments that all the major Pre-Socratics that followed him were compelled to develop more sophisticated theories in response to his arguments. He was also extremely influential on the thinking of Plato and Aristotle, is a precursor to Plato's forms as well as Aristotle's logic, and through them, Parmenides has had a significant influence on the Western tradition (J. Palmer, 2012).

Parmenides fame comes from just one written work, composed in the style of an epic Greek poem using hexameter verse (J. Palmer, 2012). The poem is an account of Parmenides' encounter with a goddess who reveals to him, in part one of the poem, the true path of knowledge. All that is known of the poem comes from textual references by other writers covering only about twenty-five percent of the work. It is thanks to the sixth century Neoplatonist Simplicius (490-560 CE) that we have Parmenides' entire metaphysical argument on the attributes of the real or 'what is' and it is this fragment that has been the most influential.

I am only going to summarise one line of argument of the poem to indicate the approach Parmenides is taking. Parmenides makes the basic assertion that something (what is) cannot be created out of nothing (what is not), and the corollary that nothing (what is not) cannot be created from something (what is). The 'what-is' refers to what is real, i.e. what constitutes reality.

However, he says, people believe, based on their senses, that entities are both real and come to be and then perish. This belief is in direct contradiction to his basic assertion because it implies that what is real, before coming into existence didn't exist, i.e. something (what-is) has been created out of nothing (what is not), and similarly, that when it perishes something returns to nothing.

Parmenides has shifted the focus from the issue of first principles to questioning what it means to be an entity. We can summarise the argument by using the example of the chair. If we claim that the chair is real, that it exists, then Parmenides asks, where did it come from? If it exists it must always exist; something can't be created from nothing. That the chair comes into existence means it is not real, it does not exist. If it does not exist, but we experience the chair with our senses, it

must be an illusion. If we argue the chair didn't come from nothing it was made from wood, then where did the wood go? If the wood is still there, then we have both the wood and the chair, whereas we originally only had wood. So where did the chair come from? If we simply see the arrangement of the wood as a chair, then the chair itself is not real, it is an illusion. This argument can be applied to any entity we encounter, including that wood from which the chair is made.

Parmenides is the first known example where rational argument has been prioritised over experience as the basis of knowledge. Once his premise that the real (what-is) cannot come from nothing nor return to nothing then any claim that the entities we deal with are real is subject to his argument. The question then of what it means 'to be' a chair or any entity becomes a serious problem. Subsequent philosophers, particularly Plato and Aristotle felt the force of Parmenides argument, and their approach, at least in part, can be seen as a response to it.

Based on his premise Parmenides extends his argument to exclude any possible notion of change associated with the real or 'what is' and develops a list, supported with arguments, as to characteristics of the real. These characteristics include timeless or uninterrupted existence, whole, uniform throughout, not divisible, motionless, perfect (J. Palmer, 2012, p. 10), imperishable, ungenerated, unique and unchanging (McKirahan, 2010, p. 159). In Christian theology, this list will be familiar as it reflects the essential characteristics ascribed to God as *ens realissimum*, the most real being. (Biard, 2003)

Plato

When Plato (427-347BCE), writing a generation after Parmenides, provided his account of what things are, it is possible to see the influence of Parmenides in his work. In the *Timaeus* (published circa 360BCE) Plato presents the idea of creation as comprising two parts. The World of Forms in which there exist perfect, immutable (unchanging) forms which act as a type of master template for everything 'that is' on earth. There are forms for every tangible object such as humans, trees, wheels, houses and water as well as for every intangible thing such as red, love, bravery, soft, bright and so on. On Earth, every entity is the entity it is because it reflects the perfect form in the World of Form. For Plato, what determined what it is to be an entity has nothing to do with the physical material from which it is made it is the form. To go back to the chair. For a particular object to be a chair is to possess the form

of a chair which is based on the 'ideal' form in the World of Forms.

Our world Plato named the 'world of becoming' because things were always coming into existence, changing, and becoming extinct. The world of unchanging forms he named the 'world of being' or the 'world of forms' because it has always existed, is unchanging, is eternal and is perfect and its characteristics tick off the attributes that Parmenides laid down for 'the real'. This approach by Plato is deceptive in its simplicity, but it provides solutions for the issues of truth, knowledge and existence because all these are based on the forms. The form of the chair, for example, is eternal, unchanging and universal and having knowledge of what a chair 'is', is actually having knowledge of the 'form of a chair'. According to Plato we all have knowledge of the world of forms, just not consciously, but can access this true knowledge through proper training in rational thinking, i.e. philosophical training. True knowledge for Plato is thus based on proper thinking and accessing the ideal forms and not based on observations of the world, which only presents an inferior version of the forms. It is not hard to see from this that Plato is regarded as the founder of rationalism, and he stands in stark contrast to Aristotle, the founder of empiricism.

Aristotle

Introduction

Aristotle was born in 384_{BCE} in the Macedonian city of Stagira, in the north east of modern Greece. He moved to Plato's school, the Academy in Athens, to further his education when he was around eighteen and stayed there until Plato's death, leaving the school and Athens at the age of thirty-seven. Aristotle returned to Athens in 335 BCE, rented space in the Lyceum and set up his own school. At the Lyceum school he is reputed to have established one of the first great libraries of the world and where he is thought to have written an estimated two hundred works as part of his research and for teaching purposes. Aristotle was forced to flee Athens in 322 BCE due to the anti-Macedonian sentiment that was unleashed following the death of Alexander the Great in 323_{BCE}, and he died the same year. Today, only a fifth of his original writings survive, with most of the original works lost through various misadventures and neglect in the several centuries following his death.⁷³

⁷³ In terms of the transmission of Aristotle's works, his teachings suffered two major blows. The first occurred

It is hard to overestimate the influence of Aristotle on Western thinking. His work in the area of natural sciences remained influential until the Scientific Revolution in the seventeenth century. Aristotle's system of logic was the only system used in Universities until the nineteenth century. The Aristotelian philosophical texts are still studied, and his system of classification is still evident in the approaches we use today.

I originally understood Aristotle only as a philosopher, but he was much more than this. Recognized as the originator of the 'scientific' study of life (Lennox, 2014) much of his work involved investigating living things, particularly mammals. His zoological writings, make up roughly 25% of his surviving oeuvre, and they provide a

.. record of the first systematic and comprehensive study of animals. There was nothing of a similar scope and sophistication again until the 16th century. (Lennox, 2014)

Aristotle's studies in zoology were diverse covering the anatomy of octopus, cuttlefish, the development of the embryo of chicks, describing the social organisation of bees and so on. He is the first to work out and describe the hydrologic cycle (water evaporating, condensing into clouds and then rain), and addresses issues such as the movement of the earth surface, observing, for example, fossils of sea dwelling creatures located on inland hills. He was not, however a scientist as we would understand the term. His work was often a mixture of observation and theoretical speculation, and there is no evidence that he felt

approximately fifty years after his death when as a result of a dispute, one the leaders of the Lyceum, Neleus of Scepsis, removed the library, reported to have consisted of some 10,000 scrolls, from the Lyceum, including many of the works of Aristotle. Not much is known of the fate of the library until a part of it finds its way back to the Lyceum School in the early first century BCE. It was later discovered that many of the scrolls had been sold to the great library of Alexandria, and subsequently lost when that library was destroyed. The scrolls returned to the Lyceum were taken by the Roman General Sulla following his sacking of Athens in 86 BCE, and sent to Rome. The surviving scrolls of Aristotle's work were collated and edited in Rome by members of the Lyceum, and it is from this work that we have access to Aristotle's work.

Apart from the loss of the scrolls there was the eventual closure of the school. Following Aristotle's death, the school continued in various forms, with fluctuating popularity. It survived two major sackings of Athens, the first in 86 BCE by Sulla, and the most devastating in 267CE by the Goths. After both sackings, the school eventually re-established. However, all Greek philosophical schools, including those established by both Aristotle and Plato, were finally closed, and the associated philosophers/teacher persecuted by the Roman Emperor Justinian I in 529CE. Justinian was attempting to resolve dangerous religious tensions in what was now a Christian empire. He enforced the acceptance of the theological position agreed at the 451CE Council of Chalcedon and there was no tolerance for the Greek philosophers who were seen as teaching heretical ideas and paganism incompatible with Justinian's goals of a united Christian empire.

The works of both Plato and Aristotle were subsequently lost to the West although both Greek and Latin version were preserved in the East and highly valued by Islamic scholars who discovered them following the fall of the Byzantine Empire. The works of Aristotle eventually found their way back to the West throughout the twelfth and thirtieth centuries and the surviving works of Plato followed suit some two hundred years later, during the Renaissance.

compelled to confirm his theories, even when this was relatively easy to do. It was Aristotle's work in these areas that make him a key figure that shifts philosophical thinking from grand ideas about the cosmos to make a systematic study of entities, what he calls ἐπιστήμη φυσική (epistḗmi fysikí) the study of nature.

While at risk of being too simplistic I take Aristotle's philosophical work to complement his studies into nature in two broad ways. Firstly, as represented by the *Categories* (Aristotle, 2014a), he provides a framework by which those inquiring into nature can define and categorise the entities which are the objects of inquiry, an essential part of any research. Secondly, and more abstractly he inquires into what it means to be an entity and this is reflected in works such as the *Metaphysics* (Aristotle, 2014b). While the potted history of the Greek's inquiry into being before Aristotle provided some context, it was reading Aristotle's work that opened a better understanding of being and provided insights into Heidegger's approach. While my initial starting point was as a materialist,⁷⁴ it was Aristotle rather than Heidegger that help disturbed the hold this approach had on me sufficient to see Heidegger in a new way. Working through the *Categories*, I could see that the way I understood entities was reflected in this work. The materialist account of what it is 'to be' something is no more than the properties, what Aristotle calls categories, which defines the entity. It was a revelation when I read that Aristotle did not regard his work in the *Categories* as determinative of what it is 'to be' an entity and he specifically addresses this in the *Metaphysics*. This difference between the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics* I take to reflect Heidegger's view that philosophy, understood as the discipline that studies the being of entities, necessarily precedes the work of science (refer Chapter 11).

The Categories - An account of the entities that are

Aristotle approaches the study of being in different ways over his career and each, in their own way, is influential. In the *Categories*(Aristotle, 2014a) he gives an account of all the different types of things 'that are' and classifies them into ten groups. The Greek phrase for the 'things that are' is τὰ ὄντα (*tà ónta*) which literally means 'the beings', which often ends up in English translated as entities⁷⁵ which is

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⁷⁵ While not obvious there is a strong etymological link in the word entity with the original Greek formulation of beings. Entity derives from the Latin *entitatem* (being) which is a from the present participle *esse* (be), which in turn was the Latin interpretation of the Greek philosophical term *to on*, 'that which is'.

the word used in the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Being and Time*⁷⁶.

We are identifying 'things that are' (entities) every time we use the verb 'to be' in its various forms, for example in such statement as, that *is* a cat, the sky *is* blue, I *am* happy, there *are* four of them, etc. Humans have the innate ability to differentiate between and identify entities and our language reflects this. On the basis of this ability, Aristotle examined the different types of 'things that are' (entities) and ordered them into ten groups called categories and introduces them as follows;

...each [individual category] signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being in a position or having or doing or being affected. To give a rough idea, ideas of substance are man, horse; of quantity: four foot, five foot; of qualification; white, grammatical; of a relative: double, half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in the market-place; of when: yesterday, last year; of being in a position: is-lying, is-sitting; of having: has-shoes-on, has-armour-on; of doing: cutting, burning; of being-affected: being-cut, being-burnt. (1b25 - 2a4) (Aristotle, 2014a, k. 250-4)

The following better explains the categories by way of examples;

5. Substance: In this use of substance it applies to a particular entity as in Socrates the Philosopher, Phar Lap the horse, or the apple tree in the back garden and so on.
6. Quantity: This is the extension of an object. If it is a box, it may be 1 metre high, 2 metres long and 1 meter deep. If a circle, 10 cm in diameter.
7. Qualification: Includes descriptions of the qualities of the object, so red, soft, odorous, etc.
8. Relative: This is how one object is related towards and other, e.g. larger than, closer than, double in size.
9. Where (or place): This refers to how the object is situated in its environment and would include such descriptions as Adelaide Hills, in the laundry cupboard, on top of the shelf.
10. When (or time): Relates a thing to the flow of events through time. Yesterday, in three months and five minutes are all examples for this descriptor.
11. Position: Based on Aristotle's examples this seems to refer to a stationary position reached after an action, for example, is leaning, is sitting, is lying, standing and so forth.
12. Having: This relates to the condition of something after it has been affected or acted upon by something else. Aristotle's examples include shod, to have shoes placed on, or armed as in to have armour placed on, but it would thus include clothed, painted, covered, and so on.
13. Doing (Action, to make or do): This refers to the action undertaken by something on something else, so producing, cutting, folding, burning, repairing.
14. Being affected (to undergo or to suffer): This may be seen as the passive (i.e.

⁷⁶ In their translations notes [BT22/3] Macquarrie and Robinson point out that the German they translate as entity is *ein Seiendes* which literally means 'something which is' and can be translated as being, or beings for the plural, however they opt for entity as it is less confusing. The German word *Sein* is translated as being. By way of example of the confusion that can arise, especially in the English is Heidegger's phrase, "Das Sein des Seienden »ist« nicht selbst ein Seiendes." [BTg 8/6] This is translated as "The being of entities 'is' not itself an entity" [BT 26/6] by Macquarrie and Robinson but as "The being of being 'is' itself not a being" by Stambaugh [BTs 5/6].

no action on the part of the object) involvement in being impacted on or changed by another object. It can be seen as the pair to 9. in that it is the thing that is cut, is burnt, is made and so on.

In Aristotle's analysis, the most important category is that of *substance* which refers to the independent material entity that must exist for the others to exist, i.e. categories two through nine are dependent on one. If there is a red box, for example, red cannot exist unless there is some substance, box. The same is true for all the other categorial properties associated with the box. As such we never perceive the substance itself, and we recognise the red box by way of all the other characteristics. Note however that in this approach Aristotle is making no claims about what it is 'to be' a box. This is dealt with in the *Metaphysics*. However modern science 'stays with' the concepts of the Categories, and understands, for example, a red box, to be a particular arrangement of molecules that exhibit certain qualitative characteristics (shape, colour, rigidity, etc) and quantitative characteristics (mass, length, breadth, etc).


Having identified the categories and the relationship *between* them, Aristotle then examines the relationship that exists *within* each category. He points out that when talking about Socrates that it can 'be said of' Socrates that he is a man, and further, it can 'be said of' Socrates that he is an animal. When we say some x is y, then we are indicating that in some way 'y' exists and further that y is predicated (based on) x⁷⁷. However, when we say Socrates is a 'man' or is an 'animal' Aristotle points out that this represents a different mode of existence to Socrates himself. Man and animal reflect more general or universal concepts than any individual thing, and on this basis, he develops a hierarchical level of description *within* each category. He calls these universals species and genus.

Under Aristotle's hierarchy, Socrates (individual or particular instance) belongs to the grouping of man⁷⁸ (species) which belongs to the larger grouping of animal (genus). The same structure applies to all the categories such that we can have a colour (genus), red (species) and the red of that fire truck (particular). We can

⁷⁷ This also applies between categories. For example, when we say, 'red box' it is the same as saying that in some way red exists, but it is predicated, based on, the box.

⁷⁸ While I would normally use gender neutral language, the use of man as reflecting all human kind is reflective of Aristotle's usage and examples.

represent this structure in a diagram, for example, in relation to some entities that exist at my place (Figure 5).



In order to get from genus to species, Aristotle identifies a unique, essential, defining characteristic, an essence, associated with the entities that must be possessed by an entity to be a certain species. This is the basis of his defining a human as *zoon logon echon*, or an animal having a rational principle. This basic approach to setting up a system for classifying things, called a taxonomy, is still used today. An example is in biology and although there is a far greater level of differentiation as indicated by the number of hierarchical levels in the classification systems. Under this scheme, a human, *homo sapiens* (wise man) is classified as indicated in Table 3 .

HIERARCHICAL LEVEL	GROUP RELATING TO HUMANS
Domain:	Eukaryota
Kingdom:	Animalia
Phylum:	Chordata
Class:	Mammalia
Order:	Primates
Suborder:	Haplorhini
Family:	Hominidae
Genus:	Homo
Species:	Homo sapiens

Table 3 Taxonomy of homo sapiens

Aristotle stipulated that the lower order (species) be defined by identifying unique characteristics that differentiate it from within the higher order (genus). This same

principle is applied today when moving from one level to the next. For example, the domain of *Eukaryota* is differentiated from the group containing all living entities by stipulating that anything in this domain must have the complex eukaryotic cells as part of their makeup. This then *excludes* life forms such as the bacteria but *includes* all plants. Animals are distinguished from plants at the level of *kingdom* by reference to characteristics such as being heterotrophic (typically digesting food in an internal organ), motility (being able to move itself), and the blastula stage of development of the embryo. I think the general idea is clear enough as is its connection to Aristotle's classification framework.

In Aristotle's scheme, just as there is a dependent relationship between categories two through ten on the category called substance, there is also a dependent relationship within categories in that the universals are dependent on the individual. So for example, there would be no sense in the universal called colour if there were not particular instances of colours. Within the substance category Aristotle calls the universals 'secondary substances' and the individual extant entities he refers to as 'primary substances'. In Aristotle's account, the most important classification is thus 'primary substance' as everything else depends on its existence. One way of looking at Aristotle's system is that we have a world full of individual entities. It is entirely impractical if we are going to research nature just to group everything together. What Aristotle does is develop a classification system that is based on identifiable characteristics observed in the entities themselves and does so in such a way that all entities in nature are captured by the approach. Essentially what Aristotle has done has exploited our ability to differentiate entities and formalised it.

In Aristotle's time, the investigation of nature was confined to what we may typically encounter, e.g. animals, insects, plants, rain and so on. This is reflected in the nature of research Aristotle undertook. At this level, there are no considerations given to the first principles, i.e. the most basic elements of which things are made. There is not much difference in approach today, except that with the aid of microscopes, telescopes and so on, there is a greater range of entities that can be investigated. In the *Categories*, Aristotle acknowledges that the four elements of fire and water, etc. comprise the entities we see, but they play no further part in his analysis of describing the 'things that are', i.e. entities.

In the *Categories*, the question of what it is 'to be' an entity is not asked, this is left to the *Metaphysics*. Sometime late, after I had initially written this and subsequent

chapters, the significance of this point struck me. For my entire career, I had been confusing the visual presentation (roughly speaking the present-at-hand characteristics) by which entities are classified with the separate issue of what it was to be an entity⁷⁹. What it meant to be an entity, the basis by which I understood it, is smuggled into my perceiving. I am sure that in some way my previously unidentified misplaced understanding and the failing to clarify the nature of the smuggling was part of my problem in working with Heidegger. It was Aristotle's *Metaphysics* that was one of the decisive pieces that helped bring about a new way of understanding.

The Metaphysics – Exploring what it is to be a particular entity

In the *Metaphysics*(Aristotle, 2014b) Aristotle addresses, among others, the question as to what is the substance of an entity, i.e. that which determines the entity as the entity it is. Aristotle comments that the *Metaphysics* should be tackled only after the earlier works, which includes the *Categories*. Aristotle tells us that the *Metaphysics* deals with “the first principles and the causes” (982b1) of things, which are “the most universal [and] on the whole the hardest for men to know, for they are the furthest from the senses”. (982a25) It is as if he has set out in the *Categories* a sufficient framework for the conduct of inquiries into the natural world as it appears to us, but here, in the *Metaphysics* he is now going to delve deeper. This is also suggested by his comments that the “knowing” that is associated with the *Metaphysics* does not seem to have any practical knowledge, as would be the case in inquiring into the natural world of individual entities, the *Metaphysics* is for those who chose “to know for the sake of knowing” (982b1).

In the *Metaphysics*, while Aristotle uses existing entities, what are called primary substances in the *Categories*, as the basis of his inquiry, he shifts the way in which he is using the term substance. In the *Categories*, he just accepts when we look at an entity the substance of the entity is present, given to us in the perception, whereas in the *Metaphysics* he asks the harder question, “What is substance?”. To understand this shift, before proceeding with the *Metaphysics* we need to look at Aristotle's concept of hylomorphic compounds.

In the *Physics* (Aristotle, 2014c), Aristotle introduces the concept that the primary substances of *Categories* are hylomorphic compounds, a combination of matter

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(*hyle*) and form (*morphē*). By way of example, the same piece of clay (matter) may be made into a jug (the clay in the form of a jug) or a pot (the clay in the form of a pot), and similarly, the same wood may be applied to building a table or a chair. He uses this idea that matter takes on different forms in the *Metaphysics*. In the *Categories*, primary substance refers to the hylomorphic compound, i.e. matter+form. In the *Metaphysics*, as part of his analysis, he treats these components separately as he undertakes his investigations to identify the substance of the entity. Because Aristotle is asking, in the *Metaphysics*, what is the substance of an entity this term needs to be clarified as it is different to typical modern usage.

The term substance derives from the Latin *substantia*, which in turn was a translation of the Greek *ousia*, for 'being'. The Latin literally means something that stands under or grounds something and the philosophic sense of the word is that it refers to the fundamental units of reality used in any particular theory. Hence for Thales, it is water, for the atomists, atoms and for Plato it is forms. In Aristotle's *Categories*, he has primary substances as the most fundamental unit. There is a suggestion in Aristotle that indicates (Aristotle, 2014b) the *Categories* is to be primarily used in exploring nature, i.e. entities, and there is no need, at this level of inquiry, to pursue the notion of substance further. In *Metaphysics*, however, he is pushing deeper to understand what it is to be an entity. This would equate to the view of Heidegger discussed earlier that science deals with entities whereas philosophy deals with being. The Greek *ousia* (substance) thus refers to the idea of what it is to be the entity and not to the entity itself and this is the sense in which Aristotle is now using substance. From the early discussion, it can be seen that it is also the sense in which Heidegger uses the term *Sein* or being. So, for Aristotle, *ousia* even though it comes to us via the Latin as substance, relates to being not to the material aspect of the entity. Thus in the tradition substance ontology which is understood in terms of a fundamental entity has parted from Aristotle's understanding! In both Aristotle's and Heidegger's work there is the notion that we can talk about *ousia* (being) as separate to the entity, but that in each case *ousia* relates to an entity. Aristotle refers to this concept that being is only separate from an entity 'on account'.

In the *Metaphysics*, then, Aristotle is asking the question as to what it is in the entity as we perceive and understand it that is the basis of it being that entity. The "what it is" is the substance of the entity. He considers some alternatives previously put forward including the 'unity', basic elements, and change. I will only deal with his

discussion on essence which leads him to his answer.

The Greek phrase translated as essence is *to ti ên einai*, which is literally translated as “the what it is to be”. However, the phrase was condensed by the Romans into the Latin *essentia* which is where we derive the word essence. For Aristotle, the essence is something that can be ‘said of’ an entity and identifies the something about the entity that determines “what it is to be” that entity. As we saw above, he uses the concept of essence in conjunction with genus to define a species. However, the concept of essence applies to all ten categories, defining species from a genus, and so Aristotle adds a qualification that in the *Metaphysics* it is only the essence associated with the ‘primary substance’ about which he is inquiring. This makes sense as under his analysis all other categories and the universals are dependent the existence of entities as ‘primary substances.’ So in the *Metaphysics*, when he is asking about the defining essence (the what it is to be) he is confining the use of essence to the category of primary substance. With the understanding of this restriction, he can thus use essence and substance interchangeably, remembering that substance is the Greek *ousia*, i.e. being.

While the ‘primary substance’ of the *Categories* for an extant entity that is a hylomorphic compound comprises matter+form, Aristotle quickly dismisses matter as being the essence. If we take the example of the clay pot and the clay jug, the same lump of clay can be made into either. If the clay is the essence, then we have the situation that the same lump of clay can define what it is to as the jug or as the pot. Clearly there is a problem with this, and accordingly, Aristotle rejects this option. He concludes that the essence must be the form. It is the form of the pot or jug that when, in some way, combined with the clay is the basis on which the extant jug or pot is ‘what it is’.

If we drop the pot and it breaks, what breaks? It is the clay or matter, that breaks, and it no longer holds the form of the pot. We typically assign the name of the physical object after the name of the form(1033b15) (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44684-5), and on this basis, we say the pot has broken, in fact, the essence of the clay pot, the form, has not broken. To step through this carefully again: A compound entity is made of ‘matter’ plus ‘form’ as two different things. The essence that which determines the entity is the form, not the clay. The clay can be understood as, in some way, ‘holding’ the form. When the clay breaks, we may say that entity ‘clay pot’ is broken but what has happened is that the clay no longer holds the form.

Shortly I will discuss the notion of form as 'formula' at which time it will become apparent that it is nonsense to talk of the form breaking. By way of another example, several years ago, I worked with a person who had had heart replacement surgery. While he was thankful for the surgery as he recognized that without it he would have died, he did not regard the 'new' heart as somehow replacing part of 'him'. To be a person is not to be the physical material from which the person is made. In other words, the essence of the person is not in the material from which the body is made. This is also Heidegger's point, and so if the idea of form can be better understood this may open up space in which Heidegger's concepts can be understood.

In the *Categories*, the word 'eidos' or species is used to define the type of thing an entity is, but as noted this doesn't address the issue of being. In the *Metaphysics*, the defining aspect is such that it means form as contrasted to matter. (Cohen, 2016) Similarly in *Categories* the concept of 'primary substance' reference to the hylomorphic compound, but in the *Metaphysics* substance means that aspect of the entity that is its essence, i.e. just the form. It is as if Aristotle accepts that we take as a shorthand the appearance of something (i.e. matter plus form), as the basis for distinguishing one entity from another, of being able to classify entities and so on. However, what this level of understanding masks is that it is the form that determines what it is to be the entity and not the hylomorphic compound itself. This is reflected in the *Metaphysics* when Aristotle remarks that

Callias or Socrates ... are different in virtue of their matter (for that is different), but the same in form; for their form is indivisible. (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44700)

The concept of species from the *Categories* and the concept of form from the *Metaphysics* are related, just viewed from different perspectives. One from the perspective of classifying and identifying what something is, the other from the perspective of identifying what determines something as the entity it is. If this is the case then we have a clear resonance to Heidegger's formulation for being, i.e. it is that which determines the entity as the entity it is *and* is the basis by which it is understood. I am not saying that Heidegger holds that 'form' is the essence of something, I am simply pointing out the similarity. If this is the case, Heidegger is saying that we recognise things because being (his terminology) is somehow instantiated into the extant entity. If this is the case, then it starts to clarify the puzzles from the last chapter whereby being can be something that determines the entity, something that is before the entity and something that is possessed by the

entity or can be said to be in the entity. Being then can be understood as a universal that defines the particular. While aspects of this were grasped before this, it is Aristotle's framing that is bringing it more clearly into view.

I am not going to explore Aristotle's account from this perspective any further. Cohen provides a succinct summary;

The essence of... a hylomorphic compound is evidently its form, not its matter. As Aristotle says "by form I mean the essence of each thing, and its primary substance" (1032b1), and "when I speak of substance without matter I mean the essence" (1032b14). It is the form of a substance that makes it the kind of thing that it is, and hence it is form that satisfies the condition initially required for being the *substance* of something. The substance of a thing is its form. (Cohen, 2016, p. 19)

The naming conventions can be confusing but in summary:

- Primary substance – refers to an individual extant entity as a hylomorphic compound, i.e. matter plus form.
- Secondary substance – in the *Categories* refers to the universal or species to which individuals belong.
- Essence – is the defining characteristic within *any* category and determines the species (e.g. the specific type of entity) from the genus within that category.
- Essence in the substance category – is whatever determines the entity as the entity it is. For primary substances, it is the hylomorphic compound less the matter, i.e. the form. For secondary substances, it is simply the form.

So, what it is to be an entity is called 'substance', within the substance category 'substance', and 'essence' refer to the same thing, for Aristotle this is the form.

Form as Formula

What Aristotle understands by form needs to be dealt with carefully. By form as I have presented it, I would typically think of as shape as in a template, such that a certain shape is stamped onto matter to produce the primary substance but this not quite right. In the *Metaphysics*, we find the following;

The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing. (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44011)

What is different in this is that the word 'form' has been replaced by 'the formula of which is a definition'. Stepping through Aristotle's example of the manufacture of a bronze sphere we can see more clearly what Aristotle is intending;

But that there is a bronze sphere, this we make. For we make it out of bronze and the sphere; we bring the form into this particular matter, and the result is a bronze sphere. (Aristotle,

2014b, k. 44679-81)

The important point to note here is that the bronze sphere is produced. It is made by bringing a sphere (understanding sphere as form) *into* the bronze matter, and the result is the hylomorphic compound bronze sphere. He then points out that the sphere as form is not produced;

It is obvious then from what has been said that the thing, in the sense of form or substance, is not produced, but the concrete thing which gets its name from this is produced (1033b15) (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44684-5)

Aristotle has thus differentiated between the extant entity coming into being, and the being of the extant entity, the form or in this case the sphere. Aristotle elaborates this in the following way,

... we bring the form into this particular matter, and the result is a bronze sphere. But if the essence of sphere in general is produced, something must be produced out of something. (1033b10) (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44680-1)

From the above two passages, recalling the earlier discussion on Parmenides, Aristotle has addressed some important characteristics of what it to be something (form), in that it is not created, and that something produced is always produced from something.

We now come to Aristotle's comment of essence as formula;

The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing. (1017b20) (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44011) (my underlining)

The question is, what does he mean by formula, and this is unambiguously indicated by the description contained in the following description;

... a sphere is the figure whose circumference is at all points equidistant from the centre.(1033b10) (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44682-3)

The essence of the sphere is given, literally as a formula⁸⁰. If you specify any point in three-dimensional space at a specific location and then draw a figure covering every point that is 'r' distance from this point you end up with a sphere. Elsewhere Aristotle uses the formula 2:1⁸¹ to stipulate the essence of an octave (195a30)

⁸⁰ The Wolfram mathematics website defines a sphere as "as the set of all points in three-dimensional Euclidean space \mathbb{R}^3 that are located at a distance r (the "radius") from a given point (the "center"). (<http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Sphere.html>) (Accessed 25/08/2017)) This definition is identical to that provided by Aristotle.

⁸¹ If the frequency in an octave is x , the frequency of the same note one octave higher is $2x$, in one octave lower is $\frac{1}{2}x$, i.e the ration in moving from one to the other is 2:1.

(Aristotle, 2014c, k. 9464). In his discussion on the causes of entities coming into being, discussed below, Aristotle also indicates the plan for building a house satisfies the idea of 'formula'.

The concept of formula is thus a very broad notion, and form therefore has both a 'universal' meaning and a specific meaning. For example, Aristotle's definition of sphere includes all possible spheres, whereas the sphere for a particular entity will have a set radius. The same thing applies to the concept of 'plan' for a house. When we think of a formula then we must be clear that we are not referring to the written representation of the formula, e.g. the sphere as something with the surface equidistance from the centre, or a drawing setting out the plan of a building, these are simply representations of the form. An analogy is the concept of numbers in arithmetic; no matter how we may write the number 'three', either in letters as I have just done or as III, iii, 3, etc. we are not writing the number itself, they are representations of the number. Similarly, we do not 'see' the form itself, neither as a general concept nor a sphere of a certain radius. When we see the bronze sphere, we are seeing the bronze in the shape of a sphere. The confusion arises because of the habit, which Aristotle points to, of naming the extant entity after the form!

In this discussion, it becomes apparent that the entity we see and what it is to be the entity, i.e. what it *is*, its essence or substance, is not the same albeit there is a relationship. This is what Aristotle is referring to when he says in relation to the essence, that what he is seeking is "furthest from the sense" (982a25)⁸². In other words we do not see the form or the substance of what it is to be a certain entity, it can only be represented by way of a 'formula'. There are clear parallels to Heidegger's phenomenology. Heidegger's method concerns the disclosure of the hiddenness of being (Aristotle's essence or form) by way of hermeneutic interpretation. In other words, he is providing a descriptive account or representation (the formula) of being and is not talking about any actual seeing of something that is typically hidden.

The idea I am presenting in relation to Aristotle's 'formula' is supported when we look at the Greek word translated as 'formula', λόγος (logos). The is a difficult word to translate into the English. At one level, it is translated variously as word, reason,

⁸² This is reflective of Heidegger's comment that the being of Dasein is farthest from us; "Dasein is ontically 'closest' to itself and ontologically farthest." [BT 37/16]

cause, speech, and so on, but these do not have the same import as in the Greek. Cohen (Cohen, 2016) in his discussion of Aristotle's metaphysics gives examples of the different uses. In the *Topics* Aristotle links the word λόγος with the idea of giving an account, "a definition is an account (*logos*) that signifies an essence" (Cohen, 2016, p. 16) whereas in the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle links it directly to essence, "there is an essence of just those things whose *logos* is a definition" (1030a6), "the essence of a thing is what it is said to be in respect of itself" (1029b14) (Cohen, 2016, p. 16). Recently I worked with my son to assemble a model of a four-cylinder combustion engine. The kit came with a set of instructions which guided us in the assembling of the model. In this case, the description or instructions of the motor existed separately to the motor. We clearly cannot think of Aristotle's formula in this way. Aristotle's formula is not a set of instructions; it is an account of the thing itself. However, it is an account, and not the thing itself, and it is on this basis that we can describe the sphere in the manner he has.

Relationship Between Form and Matter

Many aspects of Aristotle's work on form and matter have not been covered, and so this discussion should not be regarded as a comprehensive account. I will briefly touch on just one other point, without much discussion as it sheds light on a key passage in Heidegger's work which will be discussed later.

When considering matter, there must be some substance that determines 'what it is' and this is different to the substance of a hylomorphic compound. Aristotle argues that a characteristic of the substance of matter is that it is 'potential', i.e. a piece of clay is potentially a pot, a jug, a plate, and so on. An important characteristic of form is that it is 'actual'. While form does not exist as a separate entity outside of a hylomorphic compound, it is what the entity 'actually' is. The 'actuality' of the entity is produced from the 'potentiality' of matter as a result of the form ('actuality') being worked into the matter. The point being, however, that for Aristotle 'actuality' is always the critical aspect of the being of entities and is what they factually are. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger reverses this priority in relation to the being of Dasein.

Yet as being-possible, moreover, Dasein is never anything less; that is to say, it is existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-being, it is not yet. Only because the being of the "there" receives its Constitution through understanding and through the character of understanding as projection, only because it is what it becomes (or alternatively, does not become), can it say to itself 'Become what you are', and say this with understanding. [BT 185-6/145] (my underlining)

There is a lot in the quote that needs to be unpacked, at this stage, it is important only to note that Heidegger regards the being of Dasein in such a way that it is Dasein's potential for being that determines Dasein. The question that this immediately provoked for me is what is the potential for being in a nursing home as they are currently operated. How Heidegger argues his case as summarised in the above passages is the underlying theme of this thesis.

Causes of an Entity to Come into Being

The next step in following Aristotle in his exploration of what it is to be an entity is to discuss what is called his four causes for an entity. For Aristotle, we do not properly understand an entity until we can account for its coming into being, and this is as a result of four causes. The idea behind this is straight forward. In that, the essence of an extant entity is the form, and this is prior to the entity coming into being, then Aristotle is simply saying that to account for the extant entity we have to account for how the 'form' comes into the matter. He recognises that living things are different to, say, pots, and accordingly he provides different accounts, but they all comply to the basic structure of the four causes. It would not have escaped notice that this reflects another aspect of Heidegger's work, that of regional ontologies!

We need to be careful with the term 'cause' as it has a broader and different sense in the Greek than in English. The Greek word translated as cause is *αἰτία* (*aitia*) but can also be translated as reason, explanation, or sake and Aristotle seems to have this broad intent in mind. He discusses his theory of causes in his books *Physics*(Aristotle, 2014c), *Metaphysics*(Aristotle, 2014b), and *Posterior Analytics*(Aristotle, 2014d) and the following is a summary from those books:

- Material "cause": the matter or material necessary for the entity to come into being. For a table this may be wood, for a statute bronze or marble, form an animal flesh and blood. An important requirement, however, is that the material must be applicable to what is being produced.
- Formal "cause": the refers to the form, discussed above. It determines how the material will be worked such as to produce the predetermined form. I have discussed the formula associated with a sphere and octave. For a statue or a house, it is the plan that the sculptor or builder has.
- Efficient or moving "cause": the things apart from the material which brings about the change. The efficient cause of a table is a carpenter, of the house it is the builder, and, for Aristotle, the efficient cause of a son is the father.
- Final "cause": is that for the sake of which or the end (teleo) purpose for which

the entity is produced. For a table, this could be for eating; for a chariot, transport; for a seed, the tree.

If we take the example of a house, the final cause or the for-the-sake-of-which the house is built is for a family to live in, the efficient cause is the builder, the formal cause is the plan for the house and the material cause is comprised of the various bits of timber, bricks and so on from which it is made. If any of these causes are removed, then the entity does not come into being.

Aristotle points out that the four causes do not need to be four discrete causes as in the house example. In the *Physics*, he provides the following example;

Some things cause each other reciprocally, e.g. hard work causes fitness and vice versa, but again not in the same way, but the one as end, the other as the principle of motion. (195a5) (Aristotle, 2014c, k. 9451-3)

In other words, hard work is the efficient or moving cause of fitness, but we engaged in the hard work for the sake of getting fit. By way of another example Aristotle points out that a cause need not be present, but can be a cause due to its absence;

For that which by its presence brings about one result is sometimes blamed for bringing about the contrary by its absence. Thus we ascribe the wreck of a ship to the absence of the pilot whose presence was the cause of its safety. (195a10) (Aristotle, 2014c, k. 9453-4)

I am not going to follow Aristotle's discussion on the causes any further, it is sufficient that the basic concept has been grasped.

How to Ask the Question

We now come to the last point I want to make in relation to Aristotle's examination of what it is to be an entity, and this relates to the nature of the question we should ask.

Later in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle continues his inquiries into what the substance of an entity is. This time he takes "another starting point" to "get a clear view also of that substance which exists apart from sensible substances" and since "substance is a principle and a cause⁸³, let us attack it from this standpoint." (1041a5) (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 44990-1) He suggests that we often ask the question concerning the substance of something as follows:

The 'why' is always sought in this form -- 'why does one thing attach to another?' For to

⁸³ Aristotle is here using the term principle in the same sense as the term 'first principle' was used earlier, i.e. it is the most basic, unchanging thing that accounts for an entity being the entity it is. The substance must, of necessity, be a cause, e.g. in the discussions of form as both substance and the formal cause.

inquire why the musical man is a musical man, is either to inquire— as we have said— why the man is musical, or it is something else. (1041a10) (Aristotle, 2014b, k.44991-3)

Aristotle argues that this is the same as asking, firstly why a ‘man is a man’ and secondly why ‘musical is musical’ and he goes on asking,

... why a thing is itself’ is doubtless a meaningless inquiry; for the fact or the existence of the thing must already be evident. (1041a10) (Aristotle, 2014b, k.44993-4)

As Cohen points out the “only thing that can be a man is a man.” (Cohen, 2016, p. 29). Aristotle then argues that we must ask the question differently,

... why are certain things, i.e. stones and bricks, a house? (1041a25) (Aristotle, 2014b, k.45000-01)

He reiterates this a little later by way of a summary,

Since we must know the existence of the thing and it must be given⁸⁴, clearly the question is why the matter is some individual thing, e.g. why are these materials a house? Because that which was the essence of a house is present. And why is this individual thing, or this body in this state, a man? Therefore what we seek is the cause, i.e. the form, by reason of which the matter is some definite thing; and this is the substance of the thing. (1041b5) (Aristotle, 2014b, k. 45006-10) (my underlining)

The argument is simple. That things exist is self-evident, just have a look around. From a scientific or philosophical point of view, asking why things exist is meaningless because even if we knew, e.g. God created everything, it still does not answer questions concerning the entities that exist.

It was when I read this account I recognised another aspect of my problem in dealing with Heidegger’s being.⁸⁵ When I was puzzling through the question of being there was always the nagging question, “Why do human beings come into existence?” It may not have always been present, and it may not have always have been clearly articulated, but I recognised it nonetheless.

Aristotle accepts two things firstly the existence of different types of entities and secondly that it is given to us that we can distinguish one type from another. Based on this his inquiry is simple and can be illustrated by way of example. If all these objects in front of me in one group are of different shapes and sizes but are all chairs, and in another group, are people of differing gender, occupation, age and so

⁸⁴ This is another link to Heidegger, as one of the premises from which he starts of that we know what things are, i.e. have a pre-ontological understanding of being.

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are people, what is it that determines the first group as chairs and the second group as people? It doesn't matter what name we give to entities, they could be called anything.

Because it is given to us know the differing types of entities, Aristotle holds that whatever determines a chair a chair or a person as a person must be evident in each particular instance of a chair or person. There should be something that is both discernible and common in each chair as the basis of it being a chair and within each person that determines it as a person. Further, if the essence of chair and person are understood, then we should be able to account for how this *particular* chair or particular person came into being. In a nutshell, this is one of Aristotle's main projects. The similarity with Heidegger's project is evident.

Putting this approach together with Aristotle's concept of 'formula' opened up a new way of thinking that moved passed my simplistic materialism. I did not buy into Aristotle's account of form, but nor could I reject it completely. However, it was the basic structure of his solution that was important.

Summary

We can then summarise the aspect Aristotle's work I have been discussing as follows: Aristotle is not inquiring into why anything exists, this is a meaningless question for the level of inquiry he is undertaking. For Aristotle, we start from the premise that we know that different types of entities exist and as such the basis of discerning this difference of one type of entity from another must, somehow, be given to us. A fundamental question then is: What is the basis by which we can tell one entity from another? The answer to this question for Aristotle must lie in the entity itself because every instance of the entity must have within it the same essence that all other entities of the same type. This essence must be what determines the entity as the entity it is. For Aristotle, the answer is that it is 'the form' of the entity. And 'form' cannot be material, it is not produced, and it cannot be something that our senses perceive; it is the 'formula', broadly understood. This approach sounds remarkable Heideggerian!

This then leads to two aspects of an inquiry concerning what it is to be a certain entity. Firstly, to give an account of its essence (formula). Secondly, to provide an account of how a specific entity comes into being and regarding this account, Aristotle has identified the four causes as the basis of and to guide such an inquiry.

There is much more in Aristotle's work in that he explores various nuances of his argument and covers a far greater range of topics, but what I have outlined is sufficient to grasp the basic ideas he is putting forward on the topic of being, i.e. regarding the inquiry into what things are.⁸⁶

What was surprising to me is that the summary of the Aristotelian project as I have outlined it is essentially Heidegger's project, as are the fundamental premises, that things exist and the basis of determining the types of entities is given to us.

Conclusion

This completes my introduction of an account of being in early Greek philosophy. The aim has not been to give a full exposition but to provide a sufficient account so that the nature of the inquiries into the 'things that are' by different philosophers could be understood, if only in a rudimentary way.

The reading of the accounts of being by the early Greeks brought to light many aspects of how being is understood, even today. The reading of Aristotle proved to be more of a revelation than initially anticipated. What was discovered is the same basic project that Heidegger is engaged with, similar views about the materialist account, and other similarities into the basic aspect of being, for example its hiddenness, and a research approach based on the premise that and understanding of being must be given to us.

Having gained a basic foothold on the topic, I returned to an aspect of Heidegger's encounter with the early Greeks that showed some promise of shedding even more, light on Heidegger's conception of being. This is the subject of the next chapter.

⁸⁶ In the discussion concerning Aristotle I have not mentioned the basic elements of air, fire, water and earth. While he rejects these elements as being the substance of what things are, he accepts they are in some way a cause of what he terms matter, which may be flesh, timber, clay and so on. However, he does not think that matter is a simple combination of these basic elements, there is something else, e.g. "... the flesh is not only fire and earth or the hot and the cold, but also something else." (1041b15) (Aristotle, 2014b, k.45014-5)

That something else is the "cause which makes *this* thing flesh." (1041b25)(k. 45019), i.e. fire, earth, etc may be the material cause, but there are other causes. In his surviving texts, there is not a detailed account concerning the nature of matter.

CHAPTER 7: HEIDEGGER, THE GREEKS AND BEING

Introduction

The previous chapters introduced the concept of being, discussed Heidegger's puzzling account of being in *Being and Time* and presented an account of being by the early Greek's which shed some light on the puzzle. This chapter presents another aspect of being from the Greeks, this time from Heidegger's interpretation, that of prevailing. It was discovering this aspect in Heidegger's account that provided the missing piece necessary to develop a sense of cohesive intelligibility as to Heidegger's concept of being.

Heidegger gave many courses on the metaphysics of the Ancient Greek philosophers over his career. It was not practical to read them all and nor was it necessary as much of the content was not directly relevant to the issue I was pursuing. The approach taken was to quickly scan the books, dipping into various chapters that looked promising. One of the added challenges that quickly became apparent is that Heidegger leaves the Greek untranslated and this carries through to the English translations of his work. For the key words I have followed suit and used the Greek, but also include the English translation in most instances.

The 'missing' aspect of Heidegger's interpretation of being was found in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* [FCM], a lecture course given in 1929-30. The topics covered in the lecture course are wide ranging and included Heidegger's analysis of boredom, his discussion on the biological sciences and how they related to his work and a summary of his conception of metaphysics at the time. In the section on metaphysics, he provides an account of the relationship between φύσις (fýsis⁸⁷), nature, and λόγος (logos), word, and how the understanding of this relationship changes in the work of the Ancient Greeks. It was the change in the understanding of φύσις (nature) as it split into two aspects of the same underlying phenomenon that proved decisive. Heidegger describes these two understandings as nature that which prevails, and nature as the prevailing. In the chapter, I do not critically assess Heidegger's interpretation of the Greek accounts; the goal is simply to grasp how Heidegger interpreted the Greeks.

⁸⁷ When I first introduce a word in the Greek script I will also give the Latin script. I will also provide the English translation. In that Heidegger thinks it is important it use the Greek script I will follow suit for the key words, however I will typically include the English words in brackets.

Lessons from the Early Ancient Greeks, the Pre-Socratics

During his lecture course on the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger tells us that the term metaphysics goes back to the ancient Greek term, μετὰ τὰ φυσικά.[FCM 25] The phonetic form of the Greek is μετά τά φυσικά, which is the origin of the English word 'metaphysics'. The origins of the English word 'physics' is also evident. The term μετὰ τὰ φυσικά literally means 'after the physics', and the original application of the term was a reference to the works of Aristotle coming after his works on physics or the study of natural things. From here it gave its name to the branch of philosophy that addresses the topics covered by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, i.e. the nature of being, and the term also came to refer to things not found in nature, i.e. metaphysical. In each of the ways the term is used, there is a sense then of a divide between the study of nature and things studied in metaphysics, or study of science compared to the study of philosophy.

This division between inquiries into nature as opposed to what it is 'to be' a thing of nature, i.e. metaphysics, is evident in the standard view of the first of the early Greek scholars such as Thales and Anaximander. While they are typically included in any account of Pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, they are often regarded more as early 'scientists' or naturalists making inquiries into nature as an entity rather than as making philosophical inquiries into 'being'. (Blackson, 2011) Heidegger explores the early understanding of φύσις (nature) and challenges the way this divide is understood.

From the term μετὰ τὰ φυσικά (metaphysics), Heidegger draws the connection between the term φυσικά (fysiká) from this term and the Greek word for nature, φύσις (fýsis). The common etymology can be seen in the Greek script. In discussing the meaning of the word, 'nature' Heidegger points out that the word (which in German is *Natur*) comes to us from the Latin *natura-nasci* which means to be born, to arise and to grow. The Latin, according to Heidegger is meant to capture the meaning Greek φύσις. We are to understand φύσις (nature) as having an emphasis on growth in the sense of that which comes into being, grows and then dies, the natural cycle in nature. Already here we can see the similarities to the early Greek concepts discussed in Chapter 6.

Heidegger then expands this,

We here take growth and growing, however, in the quite elementary and broad sense in

which it irrupts in the primal experience of man: growth not only of plants and animals, their arising and passing away taken merely as an isolated process, but growth as this occurring in the midst of, and permeated by, the changing of the seasons, in the midst of the alternation of day and night, in the midst of the wandering of the stars, of storms and weather and the raging of the elements. Growing is all this taken together as one. [FCM 25] (my underlining)

Nature is not understood as the collection of the things in nature. Heidegger is presenting a concept of nature as a dynamic unity, encompassing everything, a unity in which things come into existence, change and pass away and in so doing “irrupts” or breaks into our most fundamental experiences of existing. The individual instances we experience are experiences of nature itself. However, we should be careful not to think of nature as change, rather nature is,

.. the self-forming prevailing of entities as a whole. [FCM 25]

Heidegger's interpretation is that what we see, and experience *is* nature it *is* one entity, a unity. The Ancients understand this prevailing not as nature separate to human, but one that incorporates humans as part of nature;

The events which man experiences in himself: procreation, birth, childhood, maturing, aging, death, are not events in the narrow, present-day sense of a specifically biological process of nature. Rather, they belong to the general prevailing of entities, which comprehends within itself human fate and its history. [FCM 26]

Heidegger is claiming that the Ancients understand both the entities that are seen ‘in’ nature and human kind as somehow not just dependent on the prevailing of nature but as the prevailing of nature. The prevailing however is not one of producing separate natural things; the entities are themselves nature itself in its prevailing, there is only unity. The extent to which things of nature *are*, they are sustained in the very prevailing of nature. The radical early concept of φύσις (nature) then, is as a prevailing whole which brings human kind into being, sustains it and is that back into which it passes when it dies.

This picture presents a radically different understanding that has come to us whereby we see human kind as somehow separate to nature, as having dominion over nature. Modern science, for example, is often portrayed as an endeavour of human kind that has the goal to understand nature in order to predict and control. To the extent we do see ourselves as part of nature, it is as one thing among others which collectively add up to nature; which is simply another version of the materialist account. It is because of the pervasiveness of this view that Heidegger is at pains to make the point, and repeats it several times, that the Greek concept of φύσις

(nature) cannot be understood in modern terms. [FCM]

It is out of this whole, Heidegger argues, that the Greeks had a notion of λέγειν (légein) which has a literal translation of 'saith'. Λέγειν (saith) had the meaning of 'coming to word' or speaking, and its function was to take something out of concealment, literally to let something be revealed from out of the whole. If λέγειν (saith) is the speaking, then λόγος (word) is what has been spoken-out, and so in λόγος (word) the prevailing of beings becomes revealed, becomes manifest. [FCM 27] The import of this is that we are able to distinguish one entity from another. There is a significant difference between noticing that there are numerous objects in front of you, perhaps how a very young baby initially sees things and recognising that distinct nature of each entity. We thus have the ability to speak out and name the existence of different things. There are thus two sides to what is happening. There is the prevailing of nature, and there is the naming of the distinct entities that arise from the prevailing. It is because of this innate ability that we can be said to name our world into existence. This also reflects Heidegger's account of being as that which determines entities (the prevailing) and the basis by which they are understood (logos).

This idea of naming is captured and extended in early Christian theology and helps to illustrate the power of the concept of speaking that Heidegger is describing. The Gospel of John in the New Testament was originally written in Greek. In the opening verses of the Gospel, John declares that the God is the word (logos) and through him, all things come into being⁸⁸. The idea that it is the power of the word that brings things into being is the Greek concept I am describing. However there has been a subtle, but significant change. In the Christian theology, there is no longer a prevailing of nature; there is just the power of the word (God) bringing things into being with the power of logos. As can be seen in the era of the Greek philosophers, and early Christian theologians the concept of λέγειν (saith) and λόγος (word) is far more dynamic than we would appreciate, it is this active sense that Heidegger is describing.

⁸⁸ From the Book of John in the New Testament (Wansbrough, 1985):

In the beginning was the Word:

and the Word was with God

and the Word was God.

He was with God in the beginning.

Through him all things came into being,

not one thing came into being except through him. (John1 1:3)

Heidegger notes that if there is an unconcealing, there must first be something concealed. Heidegger believes that this is evident in early Greek thinking and translates a fragment from Heraclitus(c.535-c.475 BCE), a Pre-Socratic philosopher in support of this;

The highest that man has in his power is to meditate [upon the whole], and wisdom [lucidity] is to say and to do what is unconcealed as unconcealed, in accordance with the prevailing of things, listening out for them. [FCM 28] (gloss in the original)

Heidegger places the concepts of concealment and unconcealment in tension, and that which λόγος (logos) says is thus ἀληθεία (aletheia), which is that which is unconcealed. In *Being and Time* Heidegger translates 'aletheia' as truth, and his concept of truth is thus the unconcealing of that which is concealed. For Heidegger, this does not mean we see nothing then suddenly an object appears out of nowhere. We see an object, a thing, but when it is seen as the entity it is, it has been disclosed to us. We understand the object *in its being*. In other words, the truth of what the entity is has been revealed. There is no judgment we make then apply it to the object; this emphasizes the human side. *We are given* the truth of the object in the disclosure. This approach to truth is a radical departure from the view of truth in modern philosophy and is one of the threads that Heidegger has picked up from the ancient Greeks. Discussing the Heideggerian concepts of truth in comparison to the tradition and considering its implications is outside the scope of the thesis.

In summary, the highest thing that is the power of a person to do is "to say what is unconcealed" within the context of the entire prevailing of things, i.e. of φύσις (nature), the same context in which the person exists. Heidegger summarises the position of the early Pre-Socratics as follows;

... φύσις, the prevailing of what prevails; λόγος, the word, that which takes this prevailing from concealment. Everything that occurs in this word is a matter of σοφία[sofia, wisdom], i.e., for the philosophers. In other words, philosophy is meditation upon the prevailing of beings, upon φύσις, in order to speak out φύσις in the λόγος. [FCM 28] [my gloss]

In the above passage note that Heidegger is indicating that something is happening "in this word". Heidegger's view is that it is the role of the philosopher to understand what is the basis by which we understand an entity as the entity it is. To understand the nature of the prevailing that enables us to bring it out of concealment is what he refers to as being. It is the 'basis for understanding' that is occurring in the word that is the subject of inquiry by the philosophers, and of course, this means it is an inquiry into φύσις (nature) in its prevailing. Again, truth is not about judgment it is

about understanding the basis of unconcealment. In this discussion, there are two uses of unconcealment at play. There is the level at which things are unconcealed to us in the normal course of events. For example, we see the trees from the bush and can name them. I take this to be the level of inquiry I discussed earlier in relation to Aristotle's *Categories*. Then there is the level of inquiry for the philosophers which involves the disclosure of being itself.

For Heidegger, what the Pre-Socratic philosophers were attempting to do is understand things as a prevailing whole and how it was that entities we see come into existence, have their time and pass back into the unity. To put this another way the focus in on the underlying unity and the way this unity manifests itself as the entities we see and sustains them. The Greeks saw the whole or the unity as in some way determining what emerged into the world. To put this in more contemporary language, one view is to see the whole as an assemblage or sum of the parts; the alternative view is to see the parts as being determined by the unity (whole) in which it is contained. Husserl has a version of this principle, generally associated with the Gestaltists, and Heidegger takes it over and adapts it as part of his work; this is discussed later in the thesis.

When Aristotle talks about these earlier philosophers, he uses a conjunction of φύσις (nature) and λόγος (logos), to give the term φυσιολόγοι (fysiológoi). This translates as 'physiologists', philosophers of nature or as they became known, natural philosophers⁸⁹, and refers to those who inquire into the things of nature. Heidegger finds this understanding of φυσιολόγοι (natural philosopher) misleading as it indicates someone who studies a part *within* the unity of nature. Heidegger argues that φυσιολόγοι (natural philosopher) is a title for those who questioned entities *as part of the unity*, the prevailing of nature itself, and spoke out, literally disclosing what they found, bring it into the truth. In other words, things of nature were investigated in the context of being part of the unity of nature and not as disaggregated entities.

In the discussion on the Pre-Socratics in the previous chapter, it was evident that, for the most part, scholars were trying to make sense of their experiences in terms of some underlying unity. That unity was comprised of unseen fundamental

⁸⁹ The term, natural philosophers, continued to be applied to scholars inquiring into nature until the nineteenth century when it was replaced by the term scientist, a term coined by the Cambridge University philosopher of science William Whewell in 1833.

elements from which the visible world comes into being only to return eventually. While there were differences among the philosophers, typically the same broad concepts were still evident. This can be seen even in the work of Xenophanes(c570-c475 BCE) who proposed that the universe as created by one god more powerful than all the other gods. The fundamental units in the creation are, however, water and earth, and for Xenophanes, this god thinks things (not dissimilar to saith) into existence, but "God thinks and perceives 'as a whole' "(Barnes, 2005, p. 65). Xenophanes, by putting forth a god created universe does not need to account for the creation of the universe itself, a cosmology, and "needs only to account for how the world functions". (McKirahan, 2010, p. 64) This is no different to the approaches taken by the scholars who shaped the beginnings of modern and philosophy and science such as Descartes and Newton.

The disclosing of things, in a philosophical sense, from the whole is not an easy task, it is not a simple pointing to entities and uttering "tree", "spear", "wine" and so forth. As Heidegger comments,

... the Greek expression for truth is not as harmless as people believe and have hitherto taken it to be. Truth itself is something stolen. It is not simply there; rather, as a revealing, it ultimately demands the engagement of man as a whole. Truth is in part rooted in the fate of human Dasein. It itself is something concealed, and as such is something higher. [FCM 29]

In this passage, Heidegger aligns himself with what he has been discussing concerning the Greeks. If we are to discover the truth of things, i.e. the basis by which they are unconcealed, then we have to acknowledge that, as part of the prevailing, our 'being' is also concealed. The inquiry into truth, into unconcealing, cannot avoid involving the truth of Dasein itself.

Heidegger quotes from Heraclitus,

Higher and more powerful than the harmony lying open to the day is the harmony which does not show itself (is concealed). [FCM 29] (Heidegger's gloss)

He interprets this passage from Heraclitus as indicating that the early Greeks had the understanding that the proper function of the φύσις(nature) lies in what it does, (the prevailing) but that this occurs in a way that does not show itself. There is no intent to conceal; it is just what is proper to φύσις(nature) such that λόγος (logos), understood as that what philosophers engage in,

... has the task of compelling the ἀφανής (inconspicuous)⁹⁰, that which conceals itself and does not show itself (that which is not self-showing), to show itself, the task of making it manifest. [FCM 29] (first gloss is mine)

Heidegger concludes

The Greek concept of truth presented here manifests to us an intimate connection between the prevailing of entities, their concealment, and man. Man as such, insofar as he exists, in the λόγος tears φύσις, which strives to conceal itself, from concealment and thus brings entities to their truth.[FCM 29]

Heidegger reads into these ancient philosophers a basic insight concerning the nature of our existence. Of all Earth's creatures we have an innate understanding of what things are, we can differentiate entities one from another and understand what they are. More than this we have been pursuing the basis of that disclosure for over two and a half thousand years. He is not claiming that their detailed explanations are correct just their intuitive insights.

For Heidegger, and on his account the Ancient Greeks, truth is not based on the ability to correctly judge, i.e. a cognitive skill. Truth concerns unconcealment. It is the basis by which an entity is determined as the entity it is, i.e. being. It is this idea of truth as unconcealing that Heidegger is drawing out of this early Greek work. He makes it clear that this account is in the ancient Greek writings and is not an "artificially playing around with etymologies"[FCM 30]. This approach is a radical departure from the contemporary philosophical tradition, and from the materialist account.

This approach is the basis of Heidegger's explanation of his phenomenology presented in *Being and Time*, albeit less dense and with far more context. His methodology is about the unconcealment of being, that which determines entities as the entities they are, i.e. being. Heidegger has gone back to the Greek conception of philosophy, to pick up the threads and start from where he thinks were last on the right track before things went 'astray'.

Two meanings of φύσις (nature)

The meaning of φύσις (nature - the prevailing whole) develops within Greek thought, and Heidegger traces its history as it splits into two related and intertwined meanings. The first sense is as an all-powerful presence,

⁹⁰ ἀφανής translates as inconspicuous, which becomes an important concept in *Being and Time*

... the vault of the heavens, the stars, the ocean, the earth, that which constantly threatens man, yet at the same time protects him too, that which supports, sustains, and nourishes him; that which, in thus threatening and sustaining him, prevails of its own accord without the assistance of man. [FCM 30]

While still broader than a modern understanding it is a narrowing of the original conception. Φύσις (nature) is that which is always present in its continual coming into being and passing away, but it is seen as a

... distinct from that which is of human making, that which springs from τέχνη (téchni), from skill, invention, and production. [FCM 31] (my gloss)

It is with this the Greeks start to distinguish between φύσις όντα or the things that exist in nature and things that are τέχνη, i.e. things that

... arise on the basis of preparation and production, of a meditation proper to man. [FCM 31]

This concept enters *Being and Time* with Heidegger's identification of the Greek concept of πράγματα (prágmata) or 'things' understood as those things that we have to deal with in our day to day undertakings. Heidegger stipulates these as referring to what he terms as "equipment" [BT 96-7/68].

With this shift, according to Heidegger φύσις (nature) as a prevailing whole has now changed and the concept of regions of entities enters Greek thought, e.g. things of nature versus things produced by people. This is a significant move by Heidegger as in his work he is claiming, that there are regional ontologies, and each region designates a different mode of being. This is another one of the dropped threads that he is picking up from the Greeks.

The second sense of φύσις(nature) that emerges is of φύσις(nature) as designating the prevailing of that which is or that "which lets everything that prevails be" [FCM 31]. In other words, it does not refer to one of the regions of entities but to the essence of the entities,

We speak of the nature of spirit, of soul, of the nature of the work of art, of the nature of the matter. Here φύσις does not mean that which prevails itself, but its *prevailing* as such, the essence, the inner law of a matter. [FCM 31]

The shift is subtle. Initially, we have nature as prevailing, and the entities and nature are still understood as one and the same. We now have regions. Within the regions, we have nature as prevailing, but it is prevailing in different ways in the different entities. Nature as that which prevails has shifted to refer to that which is prevailing in the entities. The grammar is informative if entities are a specific *prevailing* of

nature then while we may name the entities, i.e. classify them as nouns, their being is a *verb*. This is, of course, indicated in the very word *being*. If Heidegger is linking prevailing, that which must be disclosed, with being, and I think this is obvious from what I have outlined, then being or the essence of an entity is dynamic, it is a verb.

Note however that there is still the sense of unity. There is still the concept a prevailing whole and now within this, regions of difference, each with a different mode of being and within regions different type of entities. I take these types of entities to relate to Aristotle's concept of form and species. An important shift has indeed occurred if essence is a verb. If this is the case, then it addresses the issues of being (essence) not itself being an entity, but it raises the question as to what is it that is doing the prevailing? Heidegger's answer is that it is time, or more precisely the temporalizing of time.

With this second understanding of nature, Heidegger argues, the Greeks are concerned with the essence of entities as things as "constant presence" [BQP 76], an idea Heidegger turns into the 'present-at-hand'. The Greeks had no particular interest in a "particular individuation of the essence"[BCP 67] but rather how in general the "present-at-hand comes forth into unconcealment" [IM 203], i.e. into presence, i.e. it is a concern directed to the regional level. The idea of 'constant presence' is simple enough. If there is nature as this unity, the prevailing is that which underlies the entities we see or is present to us in a 'stable form'. For the Greek's the two meanings of φύσις (nature) are thus inseparable and open up two lines of questioning into φύσις, "which intrinsically belong together and continually challenge one another." [FCM 32]

What Heidegger recognises is that the early Greeks are wrestling with very fundamental issues based on what they are observing and then thinking logically through the implications of what they see. While there are criticisms of Heidegger's interpretations of the early Greeks (Most, 2002), I do not take Heidegger as being that interested in a 'correct' translation of their work. For the most part, I do not think he is even after any particular 'theory' the Greeks may document to explain what they are observing. Rather I take Heidegger as primarily interested in their descriptions of how they 'see' the world free from the incumbencies of the Western Tradition and the constraints within which modern science works. In other words, he was inquiring into the phenomena they had in view about which they were providing an account.

Excursus - Heraclitus

This previous discussion is critical as it starts to reveal the links between Heidegger's conception of being and that of the early Greeks. I believe that the notion of the unity and the prevailing of the unity in the various regions is becoming increasingly important in grasping Heidegger's broad concept of being. It seemed to pull things together. However, while confident I had the overall sense of Heidegger's interpretation of the early Greeks, I felt that because of the critical importance of this section I needed some confirmation, perhaps comfort is a better word, as to my reading of Heidegger's interpretation. This was particularly so because aspects of what Heidegger presents I did not originally see and as a result is absent from the previous chapter. Consequently, I aimed to find a source that at least reflected the same themes, not necessarily the same precise interpretation, which I discerned in Heidegger's work. To do this, I turned to McKirahan's *Philosophy Before Socrates* (McKirahan, 2010) which provides both a translation of key passages from the fragments of the main Pre-Socrates philosophers and a detailed commentary. The following is from the chapter on Heraclitus of Ephesus (c.540-c500BCE) in McKirahan's text. The citations I use to Heraclitus' fragments are the reference numbers assigned by McKirahan, such that (10.77) refers to Chapter 10, on Heraclitus, and fragment 77 translated by McKirahan.

Heraclitus describes the *kosmos* as being eternal (10.77), with the basic elements of fire, water, and earth which are in a continuous state of systematic change (10.75). Heraclitus identified fire as the most important of these elements, but this is not important to his overall structure. For Heraclitus, it is the constant and regular change that guarantees stability, i.e. change is what is stable (10.64), and the very *kosmos* is dependent on change. The example is the river, if it stopped flowing, it would no longer be a river, but change its identity to that of a lake. Heraclitus applies this principle to the entire *kosmos*, such that if "the basic forms of matter stopped changing, the stable, ordered, regulated *kosmos* would cease to exist." (McKirahan, 2010, p. 134) The *kosmos*, as a single unity, is "ever-living" (10.77) but within this "individual parcels of fire, water, and earth come to be and pass away, are born and die(10.74)"(p.135). These individual parcels are the combination of elements that form into the entities we see.

One of Heraclitus' fundamental principles is that "all things are one"(10.47). He recognises that what we are confronted with is diversity and the challenge is to find

a way to identify the underlying unity. McKirahan summarises Heraclitus recognition of the difficulty of this task;

This task is also the most difficult because it requires us to learn new ways of perceiving and thinking. Once it is accomplished, we can use the same tools to unpack the unity, to understand how the diversity exists and functions within it. (McKirahan, 2010, p. 130)

The unity then, that underlies the diversity of what we perceive is, in some way concealed but is accessible. We see in the above account of Heraclitus the shift from the importance of the elements themselves to the process of change, what Heidegger calls the prevailing, but also the concept of concealment and the possibility of unconcealment. All this aligns with Heidegger's reading, but the concept of *Logos* has yet to be addressed.

Heraclitus is the first to introduce the concept of the *Logos*, and this is his great discovery. (McKirahan, 2010) Heraclitus goes behind the basic concept of change, which has been evident in many of the accounts of his predecessors, and argues that there is a general unifying principle behind the change itself, this is the *Logos*, and the "*Logos* holds always ... for all things come to be [or, "happen"] in accordance with this *Logos*,"[10.1]. The concept of "all things" needs to be heard in a very broad way as Heraclitus makes a significant leap and argues that the *Logos* not only applies to the physical world but the "practical world of ethics and politics, religion and some more strictly philosophical realms." (McKirahan, 2010, p. 127)

Because the nature of the *Logos*, is that which is common to all [10.2] and is consistent, it is also available to all humans. McKirahan draws the connection between *Logos* and human activity;

This amounts to a claim that the world is governed by a rational principle which humans can come to comprehend. We can comprehend it because we are rational as well, and our rationality is related to the universal rational principle of the *Logos*. A noun related to the verb *legein*, "to speak," *logos* is a thing said, and hence a word, statement, or story. The close connection between what we say and what we write or think accounts for a further range of meanings: account, agreement, opinion, thought, argument, reason, cause. Perhaps from these last two meanings, it gets other senses: relation, ratio, proportion. All these meanings were current in the fifth century. (McKirahan, 2010, pp. 128-9)

We have thus have two notions, the *Logos* as the general principle behind Heidegger's prevailing and the same term referring to the speaking of the things that arise out of the *Logos*. Heraclitus' *Logos* is presented in a very abstract way as a "general principle." The puzzle then is everything from the *kosmos* itself to human behaviour arises out of this single principle, and McKirahan concludes,

.. if everything happens because of a single principle, that principle must function or be displayed in many different ways. (McKirahan, 2010, p. 129)

This is captured in the following;

For although all things come to be in accordance with this *Logos*, humans ... distinguish each in accordance with its nature and saying how it is. [10.1]

We can observe the *Logos* at work in different things “according to its nature.” and, drawing on McKirahan’s analysis, that according to Heraclitus’ view,

... that when properly used, language represents (or re-presents) reality in the sense that a correct description or account of anything accords with that thing’s nature and says how the thing in question is, in that the account itself reflects the nature of that thing. (McKirahan, 2010, p. 129)

This again reflects the two concepts of *Logos*, that which is prevailing and the speaking of that which prevails in the prevailing. Additionally, what is evident is the notion of regions, in that the *Logos*, while retaining a common nature, is functioning differently in different types of entities in causing them to come into being.

In Heraclitus’ work, we need to be careful how we understand *kosmos*. The Greek for *kosmos* is σύμπαν (*sýmpan*) and is generally understood to refer to the entire universe. This is the sense in which the earlier Greeks understood what they were investigating. This is the first sense of φύσις (*nature*) to which Heidegger refers. However, this is not the main focus of Heraclitus, it is what he refers to as *Logos*, that which is prevailing in the *kosmos*, and in human behaviour. Heraclitus uses the term nature to refer to the *Logos* and the activity of the *Logos*, e.g. “Nature likes to hide”[10.47]. I take Heraclitus’ *Logos*, to be the type of understanding to which Heidegger’s second meaning of φύσις (*nature*) refers.

There are many other interesting points in the work of Heraclitus that seem to have a resonance in Heidegger’s work. However, the above is sufficient to confirm that Heidegger’s interpretation of the early Greeks appears to be a valid interpretation, without making claims that it is definitive. More importantly, it provides some confirmation that my interpretation of Heidegger’s work is sufficiently accurate as to his intent and so I can move on.

Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristotle

There was then, according to Heidegger, a discernible development in thinking such that one unified understanding of φύσις (*nature*) evolves to an understanding of

φύσις (nature) on a regional basis within the unity, and a shift from the emphasis on the basic elements to a focus on change or prevailing. It is within the regions that entities become manifest and the subject of investigation, first as regional philosophies and later as what we now call sciences.

There is another decisive shift that needs to be considered, the change from the higher order, abstract, thinking about the workings of nature as a whole to an investigation of entities. A shift that sought to understand what it is that is specifically made manifest, and the inquiries are what we may roughly understand as the activities of natural 'science', albeit not in the form of a 'scientific method' as we understand it. The key figure in this shift is Aristotle. I have already provided an outline of Aristotle's work and highlighted how, regarding his inquiries into nature, it could be understood as both natural philosophy (e.g. the *Categories*) and an inquiry into the being of entities (e.g. the *Metaphysics*). Heidegger's comments about Aristotle are provided against the backdrop of this earlier discussion.

The Greek word for science is ἐπιστήμη (epistími⁹¹) which according to Heidegger means

... approaching a matter, knowing one's way around in it, being in control of it, penetrating the contents of the matter. [FCM 32]

As Heidegger interprets the history, it is only with Aristotle that the concept of ἐπιστήμη (epistími) takes on a meaning of science in the sense of a theoretical investigation. With this shift to ἐπιστήμη φυσική (epistími fysikí), natural science or what becomes known as natural philosophy embraces an investigation into all natural things including those within the domain of biology. (FCM) This shift changes the focus from an exploration into the being of an entity into investigations in the entities as they present to us, or to use Heidegger's term, in their presence-at-hand. This dichotomy was reflected in the previous chapter in the differences in emphasis between Aristotle's work in the *Categories* compared to that in the *Metaphysics*.

Heidegger then recognises Aristotle as the key figure that shifts philosophical thinking from grand ideas about the cosmos to making a systematic study of entities, i.e. ἐπιστήμη φυσική (epistími fysikí) the science of nature. However, in this aspect of his work Heidegger argues that his investigations as ἐπιστήμη φυσική (epistími

⁹¹ This is also the origins of our word epistemology or the study of knowledge

fysikí) are not just investigating the natural entities as entities but the entities as part of the larger domain itself, φύσις (nature as region). For Aristotle, how things arise and pass away, the nature of space, time and movement, the nature of the soul and so forth are all areas for investigation, as φύσις (nature as region). For Heidegger, Aristotle was concerned with the prevailing of entities, and he clarifies this in the following way,

The prevailing of what prevails here can be grasped as that which determines whatever prevails as an entity, that which makes entities. [FCM 33]

In the previous chapter, I drew attention to the seeming similarities between Aristotle and Heidegger and here we have it clearly evident in Heidegger's own words. Heidegger's definition of 'prevailing' is the same as his definition of being as "that which determines entities as entities"[BT 25/6]

Heidegger argues that for Aristotle οὐσίᾱν (οὐσίᾱν - 'to be it' - the essence of entities) is still called φύσις (nature as region), in other words at the level of regional ontology, not of the specific entity and this reflects the earlier discussion that the essence refers to form or species. For Aristotle, the study of entities (natural philosophy) and the study of being are not two distinct and separate lines of inquiry but are just two sides of the one coin φύσις (nature as region). Both lines of inquiry form part of what Aristotle called πρώτη φιλοσοφία (próti filosofía), First Philosophy [FCM].

Within Aristotle's work, we have the clear distinction between the essence of an entity (form) and its physical presence, and this makes its appearance in Heidegger's work as the ontological difference, albeit the concept of form is replaced. This provides one link between natural philosophy and metaphysics. However, we are still left with a problem according to Heidegger, and that is whether Aristotle did not address, or the extant texts do not address, how these two lines of questioning related to each other more generally. One of the key aspects missing from the Aristotelian account is how he understands the regional ontologies as part of a unity. It was this precise issue that was apparently responsible for Heidegger developing an interest in 'being' as a philosophical question. This from Heidegger's autobiographical essay *My Way to Phenomenology*,

Ever since 1907, Brentano's dissertation "On the manifold meaning of being since Aristotle" (1862) had been the chief help and guide of my first awkward attempts to penetrate into philosophy. The following question concerned me in quite a vague manner: If being is

predicated in manifold meanings, what is its leading fundamental meaning?[MWP 74]

Certainly when *Being and Time* was written Heidegger thought he could resolve the issues in terms of time, or rather what he called the “temporalizing of temporality”[BT 278/235]⁹².

In that in *Being and Time*, Heidegger not only presents the regional concept of being as a unity which gives rise to entities in the region, but also proposes time as the unity of being underlying all regional ontologies Heidegger can be understood as attempting to complete the Greek project. However, as I have commented, he only completes his ontological investigations in relation to Dasein, the ready-to-hand and world and even here there is debate over his success in determining time as the underlying unity of being.

This completes my exploration of the Greek concept of being and of Heidegger’s summary of the Greek concepts of nature.

A Heideggerian Account of Being

When exploring the Greeks, it was possible to identify the issues and puzzles they were wrestling with as some of the same that are evident today. If I take a piece of equipment that I am familiar with and look at it, I have the experience that I know what it is by its appearance. This is a powerful pull. An example is this image of a chair⁹³.





Figure 6 A chair

The very early Greek account simply understood this as a particular arrangement of

⁹² If we consider the concept of change then change can be described as occurring against the background of time, i.e. if there is no structure of time there is no change. I am not going to pursue this aspect further as Heidegger’s concept of time is a difficult philosophical one to grasp and there is considerable debate as to how successfully he makes his argument(Blattner, 1999).

⁹³ While it is an image of the chair, it still presents the form. There is another level of analysis concerning images as representations and the relationship to the physical object. For a discussion on this refer to Heidegger’s *History of Concept of Time*, [HCT 47ff]

fundamental elements. If we imagined that the most fundamental element was as



per Figure 7, then we can imagine masses of these elements in random order within the cosmos, Figure 8. The very early Pre-Socratics recognised that there needed to be a natural explanation to get from the random order to the chair. The emphasis was on natural explanation as the Greeks, at least among a handful of Scholars, had put aside the explanations previously offered by the tradition that the Gods created everything. This question of “How things come together?” is still alive in science today at a basic level, for example recent studies are investigating whether Earth was formed by a “sudden collapse of dust, rather than the slow build-up of space rocks” (Crane, 2017, p. 8) While we have a lot more knowledge today, the structure of this question reflects the same basic inquiry the Greeks were making!

Modern science proposes the ‘Big Bang’ as the genesis of the most fundamental particles, which then progressively combine as a result of the fundamental forces of nature, forming complex elements, compounds and so on. While the understanding of how this happens is certainly not that of the Greeks, at a higher order, there must be some explanation of moving from simple to complex entities; this is the idea the Greeks were pursuing. The main point of difference is that the Greeks, as did the majority of Western scientists until at least the eighteenth century, had a god as the initial origins of the cosmos and not the ‘Big Bang’.

Greek thinking was diverse, and while they were struggling with the same questions, the approaches were divided. One line of thinking that developed was reflected in

the work of Heraclitus that it is not the fundamental elements themselves that should be the focus but what it is that is creating the order, and the name he gave to this 'what it is that creates order' was the *Logos*. While Parmenides challenges the notion of what is real and brings to the fore the question of what it means to be an entity, e.g. a chair, one main response to the Parmenidian question can be traced back to Heraclitus, that whatever it is to be something is found in the *Logos*.

In trying to explain the chair, the Greeks understood that at one level it was simply a certain arrangement of matter. If we look at Figure 8 and Figure 6 then what is the difference? If we consider it only at the level of the material then there is no difference, it is the same material, just differently arranged. The Greeks, at least a significant part of the tradition within Greek philosophy, rejected this and recognised that something else is going on.

Plato's solution was to invent the concept of forms located in the World of Forms and this somehow fused with the material to 'form' the chair. He applies this same principle to all entities on earth. Aristotle rejects Plato's conception of form but holds to the idea that for some types of compound entities, what he called hylomorphic, there is indeed something in addition to the simple physical material. Following Plato, he uses the term form, but it takes on some of the characteristics of Heraclitus' *Logos*, i.e. the form appears to be a predictable organising principle. This is reflected in Aristotle's description of form as a formula. For the same type of entity, there is the same organising principle⁹⁴ or formula. In other words, it is the constancy of the organising principle that ensures the constancy of the entity! Aristotle also clarifies the question concerning 'being'. Rather than asking why this entity exists, he takes for granted that it exists and instead asks two related questions, what is the organising principle (essence or form) of this type of hylomorphic entity and how does the organising principle and matter come together to result in the physical entity we see. Aristotle's basic structure for answering this second question is provided by his concepts of the four causes.

⁹⁴ Note while I am applying the term 'organising principle', it is not, to the best of my knowledge, Aristotle's term. The idea of organising principle jettisons the baggage of 'form', retains its link to Heraclitus and Aristotle but, as I will discuss, also links to Heidegger.

While my use of organising principle is not the same as a natural law there is a relationship. At one level the natural laws can be understood as describing aspects of the organising principle. Similarly, Darwin's theory of evolution is an attempt to approach the concept of what brings entities into being from the perspective of an organising principle. There are, however, differences in how it would be applied in evolution, but the idea is there.

In Heidegger's understanding of Aristotle, the first question is the metaphysical one and the second is the scientific question. Science, for Heidegger, only properly starts when the essence, or what I am calling the organising principle, is understood and properly brought into view. I will address this in Chapter 11 when I discuss Heidegger's intent that his work link to science. This is an important point for this thesis as my claim is that Heidegger's phenomenology should be understood as preceding and being relevant to both the social and the biological sciences. It can be seen as the common link or basis for both.

As we saw, Aristotle identified that while there is an organising principle in living things as well as the practical things we use, they differ as to their nature as does the means by which the specific entities come into being. In addition, he also identifies a fundamental difference between the structure of hylomorphic entities and the simple entities such as matter. I have not read Aristotle's writings that address human behaviour but, in the writings of Heraclitus he regards, humans and their behaviour as being governed by the *Logos*.

A case can be made then, that within Greek thinking there had emerged an understanding of what things are not based on physical appearance but based on some underlying organising principle, what Heidegger calls being, Aristotle calls essence, substance or form depending on its application and what Heraclitus refers to as *Logos*. Further, that this organising principle is in some way different for different classes of entities. Heidegger calls these areas of difference, at least in some of his works regions, and in *Being and Time*, he refers to them as modes or ways of being.

Heidegger explored the Greek idea of prevailing, that is that there is some unity, that which prevails, but that it is dynamic, i.e. there is a prevailing. It is out of this prevailing that entities emerge. The implication of this is that there must be *some unity that is prior to the entity*, that this prevailing has different modes, with each mode reflecting a different entity. Putting this another way, there is some unity that has consistent ways of structuring (the organising principle) aspects of itself such that entities emerge. This idea has links back to views of Heraclitus discussed earlier. It also has a resonance with the concept of self-organising systems which is a field of contemporary research (Feltz, Crommelinck, & Goujon, 2006).

Taking this into Heidegger's work, he identifies a number of different classes of

entities that appear to have different organising principles. In *Being and Time*, there are six such classes

CLASS OF ENTITY	NAME MODE OF BEING (Region of Being)
Dasein	existence, being-in-the-world, Care
World	worldhood
Ready-to-hand	readiness-to-hand
Present-at-hand	presence-at-hand
Life	not named
Nature	not named

Table 4 Modes or regions of being mentioned in Being and Time

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger only presents an account of the first three.

Based on what I have presented, Heidegger's approach will be to identify what he regards as the essence, or organising principle in each of the three classes of entities and then describe what he calls the structure of that organising principle. It is not identical to Aristotle's formula, but it is similar conceptually. Heidegger claims that each mode of being has a structure [BT 44/22, 48/26, 60/36] and it is this structure he will be describing. The structure is however not static and must reflect a 'prevailing', and as such is dynamic. Once understood in this way, a passage in *Being and Time* that describes the worldhood of the world becomes clearer

The context of assignments or references, which, as significance, is constitutive for worldhood, can be taken formally in the sense of a system of Relations. [BT 121/88]

Note must be taken of the phrase "constitutive of worldhood", this is Heidegger's reference to 'being'. In other words, there is a system (unity) of dynamic relationships (the assignments and references), what I refer to as the organising principle, that determines (being) of world. As I read Heidegger, the ready-to-hand entities, are just a particular arrangement of references and assignments within the world. The structure (organising principle) of each of these individual entities is a microcosm (prevailing) of the larger entity of world (unity). It is then possible that within a world, there may be changes that see entities come and go without changing the structure of worldhood [BT Ch 3].

In Aristotle's work we can understand the entity jug as matter+'form-of-jug' or just

as 'form-of-jug'. When we talk about it as just 'form-of-jug', it is rather abstract, but it is none the less what Aristotle means by 'jug'. We should hold back from thinking about a specific manifestation of 'jug' as it is possible to have 'jug' in many sizes, varying shapes and materials. The same goes for Heidegger. When he talks about world, he is referring to a possible extant world that has as its organising principle 'worldhood'. When Heidegger talks about 'worldhood', he is simply referring to the organising principle without reference to a particular world. This is reflected in the earlier passage I cited from Cohen,

The essence of... a hylomorphic compound is evidently its form, not its matter. As Aristotle says "by form I mean the essence of each thing, and its primary substance" (1032b1), and "when I speak of substance without matter I mean the essence" (1032b14). It is the form of a substance that makes it the kind of thing that it is, and hence it is form that satisfies the condition initially required for being the *substance* of something. The substance of a thing is its form. (Cohen, 2016, p. 19)

While it is a difficult and abstract way of discussing things, it would be possible to disregard any references to specific entities and only refer to the structures of the organising principles! This would, however, be difficult to follow without substantial preliminary work.

Earlier in the discussion of Aristotle, I present an example whereby there is a reciprocal relationship between things;

Some things cause each other reciprocally, e.g. hard work causes fitness and vice versa, but again not in the same way, but the one as end, the other as the principle of motion. (195a5) (Aristotle, 2014c, k. 9451-3)

As Heidegger explores the structure of Dasein, being-in-the-world, what he gradually reveals is what could be referred to as a reciprocal relationship between Dasein and world, or perhaps better described as reflexive. The dynamic structure that constitutes worldhood depends on the compartments of Dasein, but in turn, it is Dasein's understanding of worldhood that is, in part, determinative of Dasein.

Solving the Puzzle of Being

We are now in a position to solve the puzzle surrounding Heidegger's conception of being. I have identified several passages that when combined account for the main aspects of the puzzle, I outlined earlier. I provide brief comments on each passage that help to clarify the puzzle in a consistent way.

Passage 1:

In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is being - that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. The being of entities 'is' not itself an entity. [BT 25-6/6] (my underlining)

Comment:

It is self-evident that we understand the difference between entities. We know that humans are not the same type entities as jugs and deal with useful things differently to mere objects. The difference arises out of alternate modes of being or organising structures that determine the type of entity we encounter. If being is an organising principle or determining the structure of relationships, it is not an entity.

Passage 2:

Being is always the being of an entity. [BT 29/9] (my underlining)

Comment:

Simply put, all classes of entities have some organising principle that accounts for the consistent way in which individual members of that class come into being. When referring to being, we are talking about that organising principle and nothing else.

Passage 3:

Being in general lies beyond. This lying beyond of being and of the determinations of the being of entities, over and above entities as such, is transcendere-"to surpass," transcendence. Not as supersensible, metaphysical in a bad sense, whereby what is meant is still an entity. [BCAP 7] (my underlining)

Comment:

The organising principle must precede the entity and is part of some underlying unity. In this respect, it "lies beyond". However, not in the sense of Plato's forms. The organising principle is a description of the structure of the various ways in which nature operates. It is a 'real' world phenomenon.

Passage 4:

What is it that must be called 'phenomenon' [i.e. being] in a distinctive sense? ... Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground. (my gloss) [BT 59/35] (my underlining)

Comment:

What lies hidden is what I am referring to the organising principle or being. It is not possible when looking at the entity to observe the organising principle that is the structure of its being, or essence. It is disclosing and describing of the organising principle or structures (i.e. being) that is the aim of phenomenology. What does show itself as a result of the organising principle is the various ways of being of the entity.

My comments in relation to the above passages should be seen as summaries only and read in conjunction with the preceding chapters. Other aspects of the puzzle, for example, Heidegger's inconsistencies over language resolve, not by removing the inconsistencies but by understanding Heidegger's overall approach. An entity is then determined by being, possess being and reflects a way of being, for example, and each phrase is stating the same thing from a different perspective.

What I have presented is based on an iterative process that involved reading Heidegger, puzzling over his work, reading the Greeks, seeing how Heidegger interprets the Greeks and then applying this back to what I understood about Heidegger's work. While I understood parts of the puzzle it was this process that pulled it all together. While the above provides my interpretation of Heidegger's concept of being, it is at, by necessity, a rather abstract level. It is hoped that this will be fleshed out in more detail over the remainder of the thesis.

Heideggerian Decision Points

What became clearer is that there is a major decision point in following Heidegger. Either one stays with a strict materialist account of what brings entities into being, in which case Heidegger's account is rejected, or one is open to the idea that there is some organising principle at work within a unity.

In Chapter 19 I take the idea of the organising principle and re-interpret in the light of contemporary thinking around emergence theory which is starting to influence various areas of science, particularly the biological sciences. This then leads to a radical new understanding of Dasein, a possibility that is closed off if the materialist account is followed.

The second major decision point concerns the organising principle for being human. Heidegger argues that for a human, what he terms Dasein, the organising principle is our existence, the unique way in which we understand the world and interact with

(his term is *comport*) the entities within it and the other *Dasein*. He not only provides an account of the structure of existence (*being-in-the-world*) but gives an account of how an individual *Dasein* comes into being. I am not aware of any other alternatives proposed by other scholars as the organising principle (*being*).

For this thesis, I accept both his approach and his identification of existence as the essence of *Dasein*.

Overcoming the Power of Experience

When I look at the chair (Figure 9 below), I see a chair. I understand it to be chair. This is my experience. At one level my experience is right, it is a chair. The problem, if following Heidegger's account, is not the experience of recognising the entity as a chair. The problem arises when we attribute the basis of this entity as being a chair to its appearance, i.e. our experience.




Figure 9 A chair

Earlier I drew attention to the fact that the chair could be understood simply as an arrangement of the underlying elements. This view was held by the Atomists, Democritus, and Blackson summarises this view:

The only objects are ones that exist eternally. They do not come into or go out of existence. They become arranged in various ways, but nothing comes into or goes out of existence because arrangements of objects are not themselves objects and hence are not objects that come into or go out of existence. (Blackson, 2011:27)

I am not going to go over this, that ground has been well covered, but what is of interest is the comments by Sextus of Cilicia, the sixth century C E philosopher, about the views of Democritus, concerning true knowledge;

Of these he calls the one through the intellect 'legitimate', attesting its trustworthiness for the judgement of truth, and that through the senses he names 'bastard', denying it infallibility in the discrimination of what is true. To quote his actual words: 'Of knowledge, there are two forms, one legitimate, one bastard. To the bastard belong all this group: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 2007, k. 11207-9)

Branding knowledge attained through the senses as ‘bastard’ knowledge leaves no doubt where he stands. Regardless of the conceptual framework, he puts forward in addressing what things are, Democritus, was arguing that something is going on that we do not experience. The world of our experience is a product of “what is going on”, but they are not the same.

This debate, commencing with the Pre-Socratics, over the appropriate basis for accessing ‘true’ knowledge of nature is still evident in the modern era as exemplified by Cartesian Rationalism versus Empiricism. It is also at the heart of whether science accesses knowledge of nature itself, or simply is reporting on experiences. This aspect is reflected in Kuhn’s thesis concerning scientific revolutions (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012) and is central to understanding the science wars of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century (Baldwin, 2015; Goldman, 2006a, 2006b; Gross & Levitt, 1997).

It is one thing to accept the position of Heidegger and the Greeks that there is “something going on” in our experience of what things are that is separate to the visual experience, it is quite another to support the position. This very point is at play when we consider Marion Miller, is she in some way determined by the physical body, that which we can experience, or is there something else at play. There must be some way of specifically thinking through and addressing this very point. Of demonstrating that two things are happening in the experience. If this can be done, then the idea of being as some organising principle will have some traction. It is on this point that Heidegger draws on the work of Husserl, published in the *Logical Investigations* (Husserl, 2001a, 2001b). Key areas of Husserl’s work he calls upon are Husserl’s inquiries concerning mereology (the study of parts and wholes), categorial intuition (roughly understood as meaning and perception), the apriori (the sequence of structures necessary for meaning) and intentionality (the structure of lived experiences). Heidegger takes this work, reinterprets in the light of his project, which includes the approach I have outlined above, and then proceeds to *Being and Time*. Just as exploring the work of the Greeks helps in understanding Heidegger’s approach the same is true of his encounter with Husserl. I explore this in Chapter 12 on Intentionality and Chapter 13 which deals with the relationship between being and the experience of things.

Note: This chapter was one of the last written in the thesis. The terminology of ‘organising principle’ was developed during the writing as a way of conceptualising

an understanding 'being'. While I have occasionally 'inserted' the term as part of the editing process, I have not re-written the thesis to incorporate the terminology of 'organising principle" throughout the thesis. However, this should be held in mind when considering the idea of being. This also reflects the ongoing and iterative process of understanding.

Conclusion

This concludes the discussion concerning the puzzle of Heidegger's concept of being. In the next chapter, I address the puzzle of Dasein.

CHAPTER 8: CLARIFYING DASEIN THE ENTITY

Introduction

This section aims to gain some clarity in the way of conceptualising the entity, Dasein, as presented in *Being and Time*. That this needs to be done is in response to the puzzle concerning Dasein that was raised in Chapter 4 over Heidegger's statement he makes no claims concerning the entity of Dasein. In this chapter, I look at various of Heidegger's comments concerning Dasein as an entity, including comments about the body and put forward a way of thinking about Dasein that makes no assumptions concerning the body.

Dasein, Existence and Structure

Heidegger dismisses any notion that Dasein's being can be understood by reference to a soul, body, ego or any other form of 'thing'⁹⁵. If we are to understand Dasein, what it is to be a Dasein, then it is by reference to Dasein's existence.

... man's 'substance' is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather existence. [BT 153/117]

Dasein's 'Essence' is grounded in its existence. [BT 152/117]

While the term existence as used in ordinary language refers to something being 'real', e.g. my coffee cup exists, this is not how Heidegger uses the term. Existence is Heidegger's technical term referencing Dasein's way of being and in *Being and Time* "will be allotted solely to Dasein"[BT 68/42]. Used in this way Heidegger can say something along the lines of 'only Dasein exists' which may sound confronting unless we keep in mind that it is a terminology issue only. Other entities are just as 'real' and Heidegger refers to them as, for example ready-to-hand or present-at-hand.

Existence is the name that encompasses all the different ways of being that Dasein has related to its living a life. Without limiting the ways of being examples include walking down the street, carrying out a research project, having an understanding what things are, having moods, talking, solving a maths problem, opening a door, eating a meal, enjoying the garden, loving others, tending to the care of others,

⁹⁵ This is an example where understanding being as an organising principle assists as it is clear that an entity cannot fill this role.

hammering in a nail, running along the beach with the dog, reading a book, playing video games, listening to music, etc.

All the ways of being of Dasein are what they are because Dasein exists in the way it does. No other entity exhibits these ways of being which is why Heidegger is arguing that Dasein's being is unique. If Dasein's way being is unique and he calls this existence, then it logically follows no other entity has existence as its way of being! i.e. no other entity exists. As I have mentioned though, this statement only makes sense in the context of Heidegger's use of existence.

Understanding the Structure Before Science and Healing

In *Being and Time* Heidegger is analysing Dasein's way of being, existence, with a view to identifying and describing the structure that enables Dasein to have an existence. He designates being-in-the-world as the name of that structure [BT §12]. This understanding of existence can be seen in the following passage in which Heidegger critiques the approach of the positive sciences,

... psychology merely dreams about man and human existence, because it must necessarily make presuppositions about the constitution of the being of the human Dasein and of its way of being, which we call existence. These ontological presuppositions remain closed off for all eternity to psychology as an ontical science. Psychology must let them be given to it by philosophy as ontology. The positive sciences, however - and this is what is remarkable - arrive at their results precisely while dreaming in this way. [BPP 54]

The critique is clear, if the sciences make 'presuppositions' about the being of Dasein then much of what they are doing is based on 'dreaming'; a proper account of being is only available through philosophy. A harsh judgment. I might add he never states that scientists cannot engage in philosophy.

In Heidegger's view, the positive sciences should have an understanding of the structure of Dasein's existence before they do their research, in other words, know what it is they're dealing with.

The existential analytic of Dasein comes *before* any psychology or anthropology, and certainly before any biology. [BT 71/45]

In the order which any possible comprehension and interpretation must follow, biology as a 'science of life' is founded upon the ontology of Dasein, even if not entirely.[BT 75/50]

This view is even reflected in his investigations concerning the nature of death;

Methodologically, the existential analysis is superordinate to the questions of a biology,

psychology, theodicy, or theology of death. Taken ontically, the results of the analysis show the peculiar formality and emptiness of any ontological characterization. [BT 292/248]

Medard Boss, a Swiss psychiatrist, and long-time post war friend and supporter of Heidegger's work took the same view concerning healing, this from a letter Boss wrote in Heidegger in the 1960s;

In the basic structures of the way of human existing which you elaborated, I recognized the most reliable outline of an art of healing ... you have also become the most genuine representative of basic research in medicine for me. It is only with the background of your thinking that the results of modern biology, anatomy, physiology, psychology, and pathology can be understood in their essential significance. [ZS 294] (my underlining)

It is in the sense that Boss found something in Heidegger's work that I too approach his research findings. Ultimately the healing sciences are about supporting the existence of Dasein, even if tending to the body. Unless we know the basis for that existence how can this work be done effectively? I believe this to be the fundamental problem underpinning modern nursing homes, the link between tending to the body and the existence of Dasein is formally missing.

Dasein's Body

The almost complete lack of references to the human body, or more particularly to the relationship between Dasein and the body in *Being and Time* is a common observation. (Aho, 2009) The body is of course always present in *Being and Time*, after all, every reference to seeing, hearing, or any other comporting is a reference to the body. Nonetheless, it is a silent body for the purposes of *Being and Time*. Heidegger simply notes that there are problems in dealing with the body which he is not going to address,

This 'bodily nature' hides a whole problematic of its own, though we shall not treat it here. [BT 143/108]

There is a small section dealing with the nature of organs in *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* and other than this Heidegger never "treats" the "problematic" of Dasein's "bodily nature". During the *Zollikon Seminars*, it is evident that I am not the first to be puzzled by the Dasein-body relationship. Boss raises the issue and Heidegger, for the first time in any detail, responds. While Heidegger's responses are not an in-depth analysis, they are enlightening nonetheless. Heidegger's comments follow an admonishment of sorts from Boss:

MEDARD BOSS: The earlier seminars of 1965 about the body and the psyche were rather

unsatisfactory for the participants. They want to be better oriented about where their limitation lies if they are always to understand the relationship between the bodily and the psychic only as simultaneous. Otherwise, it is clear to everyone that there cannot be any talk of causality. No one believes any longer that psychological perception—for instance, [perceiving] a butterfly in its significance as a butterfly—can be positively determined by the electric nerve impulses in the back of the head. Other [people] took up the reproach of Jean-Paul Sartre, who wondered why you only wrote six lines about the body in the whole of *Being and Time*.

MARTIN HEIDEGGER: I can only counter Sartre's reproach by stating that the bodily is the most difficult [to understand] and that I was unable to say more at that time. [ZS 231/292],

A short but honest answer from Heidegger that merely supports the point of the silent body in *Being and Time*, a silence that was never broken in any material way. As an aside, the comment by Boss concerning the butterfly is puzzling as it is a reference to a reductionist account of experience to mere brain activity. His understanding that “no one believes [this] any longer” is demonstrably wrong. There were systematic attempts to reduce 'the mental' to the physical coming from supporters of logical behaviourism by such well-known philosophers as Rudolf Carnap(1891-1970), Carl Hempel(1905-1997) and Gilbert Ryle(1900-1976) dating back to the 1930s and 1940s (Chalmers, 1996, 2002). This carries through to the present with materialists such as the Churchland (Churchland, 1999) who argues that our conscious awareness is nothing but brain activity.

Heidegger, as indicated by his views on being, is not a reductionist and this is clear from a statement Heidegger makes earlier in the *Zollikon Seminar* series in 1965. In the statement he makes his position clear, sets out part of his argument for his position and then fires a broadside at the inconsistencies, if not hypocrisy, that is evident in some approaches taken by the research community;

When, for instance, the assertion is made that brain research is a fundamental science for our knowledge of the human being, this assertion implies that the true and real relationship among human beings is a correlation among brain processes. Indeed, it implies that in brain research itself all that happens is that one brain, as the saying goes, "informs" another brain in a specific way, and nothing more. Then, when one is not engaged in research during semester vacation, the aesthetic appreciation of the statue of a god in the Acropolis museum is nothing more than the encounter of the brain process of the beholder with the product of another brain process, that is, the representation of the statue. Nevertheless, if during the vacation one assures oneself that one does not mean it that way, then one lives by double - or triple-entry bookkeeping. Of course, this does not coincide very well with the claim made elsewhere for the rigorous nature of science. This means that one has become so undemanding regarding thinking and reflecting that such double bookkeeping is no longer considered disturbing, nor is the complete lack of reflection upon this passionately defended science and its necessary limits considered in anyway disturbing. **It seems to me that we**

should be allowed to demand from science, which attaches decisive importance to consistency, this same claim to consistency, especially where the meaning of the human being's existence is at stake. [ZS 95] (my bold)

The description of scientists adopting one view towards Dasein's existence when they are on holidays and another when in the laboratory is contradictory, but the basis of it runs deep in the culture. The same inconsistencies are observable in the running of nursing homes. I suspect if the owners of nursing homes were asked to design and run such a facility into which they would be happy to live I doubt we would have the same facilities that currently exist. If this is the case, then it appears that the standards and expectations that the nursing home service providers have outside the nursing home relating to living a life seem to be put on hold within the nursing home when caring for others.

The question that Heidegger's response provokes is, "If we are not brain processes, etc. is the body involved at all?" Yes, according to Heidegger, this from a discussion on mood in the *Zollikon Seminars*

If electrical impulses were really able to cause moods, then a machine alone and by itself should be able to produce moods. It can only be said that when electrical impulses are present this or that mood appears. However, this is still far from meaning that an electrical impulse can produce a mood. **Mood can only be triggered. A certain brain state is correlated with a particular mood. Nevertheless, the brain process is never sufficient for understanding a mood;** it is not sufficient even in the most literal sense because it can never reach into the mood itself. [ZS 196] (my bold)

Heidegger couldn't be clearer. He acknowledges that brain processes are involved but are never sufficient. Several years later, in 1972, not long before he died, in a lengthy exchange with Boss, he makes perhaps one of his clearest statement about the relationship of body and our existence;

... everything we call our bodiliness, down to the last muscle fiber[sic] and down to the most hidden molecule of hormones, belongs essentially to existing. Thus, it is basically *not* inanimate matter but a domain of that non objectifiable, optically invisible capacity to receive-perceive the significance of what it encounters, which constitutes the whole Da-sein. [ZS 232] (my bold)

However even though Heidegger accepts that Dasein has a "bodily nature"[ZS 231] the body should not be considered as something present-at-hand, like some inanimate thing, this only happens at death,

... in dying this bodily domain changes its way of being into that of an inanimate thing, into the substance of a corpse, which drops out from existence [ZS 232]

In other words, the body is no longer "in the service" of Dasein's existence; it has changed its way of being to simply being an object. The biological body then needs to be understood on the basis of Dasein's existence, however as previously noted this is an area that Heidegger never addresses in any meaningful way, an issue specifically addressed in Aho's book, *Heidegger's Neglect of the Body*. (Aho, 2009)

It was this exchange that was decisive in informing my view of the essential nature of the receptive/perceptive-responsive nature of our relationship with the world. This can be viewed from a contemporary evolutionary perspective, in that our 'evolution' is shaped by the very nature of our receptivity and responsiveness to the world based on the type of being we are, and as such our entire bodily nature serves that end⁹⁶. If this is the case, then this would fit in with Heidegger's view that it is the being of the entity (essentially its particular receptive/perceptive-responsive nature) that is responsible for determining the body. This can be seen in his remarks on the nature of bodily organs made more than thirty years before the *Zollikon Seminars* that I cite below. While I am not going to pursue it here, these comments of Heidegger's can be developed into an understanding of the biology of living things as having an intentional structure at their very core. This would open up a way of researching the 'life domain' in terms of the varying modes of receptive-responsive modalities and tracing evolutionary lines on this basis.

In the 1929 Freiburg course, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* Heidegger addresses several seemingly disparate topics from a phenomenological investigation into boredom, the relative 'poor in world' status of animals other than humans to the thesis that "man is world-forming"⁹⁷. In the lecture course, he also addresses several topics concerning the animal body in general, as distinct from

⁹⁶ This is an interesting line to pursue. The typically picture within evolution is that it is ongoing in and of itself. The view hinted at by Heidegger would suggest that there may be a point that evolution for a particular line of animal life may reach an optimum point if its environment is relatively stable. Such animals have been found to exist and are called 'living fossils', a term applied by Darwin in *The Origin of Species* originally published in 1859;

“.. in fresh water we find some of the most anomalous forms now known in the world as the *Ornithorhynchus* and *Lepidosiren* which, like fossils, connect to a certain extent orders at present widely sundered in the natural scale. These anomalous forms may be called living fossils; they have endured to the present day, from having inhabited a confined area, and from having been exposed to less varied, and therefore less severe, competition.” (Darwin, 2013. k. 1548-51)

The *Ornithorhynchus* is better known as the platypus and the *Lepidosiren* and the lungfish. This does not mean that there is no change in the species, just that there is no material change such the species evolves into something different over a period of time.

⁹⁷ World as Heidegger uses it is not as it is typically understood in science or in common usage. This is to be addressed in Chapters 14 and 15.

Dasein's relationship with its body. I am not going to go into much detail, however, I do want to address the concept of the body serving the being of the animal as was touched upon in the above quote. This will then be taken up later in the thesis.

Since Descartes, the image of the body, indeed of the universe, as some form of a clockwork mechanism, an instrument of some sort governed by the regular workings of the parts described by way of the laws of nature, has been widely adopted. Within the world of nature, Descartes was a materialist to the core! If the body is broken, we attempt to fix it and this instrumental approach has now extended to being able to replace a broken part of the mechanism through either a mechanical or a transplanted organ. There is much to celebrate in this approach, but there also lurks the possibility of misunderstanding, especially about the nature of specific organs.

Heidegger acknowledges that when we consider various organs of the body, it is easy to conceive of them as instruments,

The organ, the eye for example, is surely for seeing with. This *'for seeing'* is not some arbitrary property which happens to apply to the eye but is the *essence* of the eye. The eye, the organ of sight, is for seeing.... Is the eye then some kind of equipment, equipment for seeing with, even though it does not seem to be an instrument since it does not help to produce anything? Or is it not indeed true that it does produce something? Can we not say that the eye produces the retina and along with it what is visible and seen? The eye is for seeing. Is seeing produced by the eye? [FCM 218] (my underlining)

He then adds,

We must frame our question more precisely if we wish to decide about the instrumental character of the eye: *Can the animal see because it has eyes, or does it have eyes because it can see? Why does the animal have eyes? Why can it have such things? Only because it can see. Possessing eyes and being able to see are not the same thing. It is the potentiality for seeing which first makes the possession of eyes possible, makes the possession of eyes necessary in a specific way. Yet in what sense can the animal see and upon what basis can it do so? Where can we find that which makes possible this *possibility*, this *potentiality*? [FCM 218] (my underlining)*

Heidegger is a keen observer and asks questions with subtle variations that are aimed at uncovering details or ways of thinking about things that have often been overlooked. Here, as a standard part of his approach, he starts by acknowledging the view of an organ of the body as being equivalent to an instrument or piece of equipment we put to use. Then from that perspective raises questions that lead to examining fundamental differences between an instrument and how it is applied and what an organ does within the body. He then proceeds by making a series of observations that slowly pull apart the differences; I will provide his first step by way

of example,

The pen is an *independent* being, something that is to hand for use by *various different* human beings. The eye, on the contrary, as an organ is *never* present at hand in *this* way for those entities that need and use it. Rather, every living entity can only ever see with *its* eyes. These eyes, like all organs, are not present at hand independently in the way in which an object of use or a piece of equipment is present, for they are incorporated into the entity that makes use of them. Thus we can recognize an *initial distinction* by saying that the organ is an instrument which is incorporated into the user. [FCM 219]

Heidegger goes on to argue that the eye does not in and of itself have a capacity to 'see' and if the eye is for seeing and then

An eye taken independently is not an eye at all. This implies that it is never first an instrument which subsequently also gets incorporated into something else. Rather, the eye belongs to the organism and emerges from the organism, which of course is not the same as saying that the organism makes ready or produces organs. [FCM 221] (my underlining)

The concept of the eye (part) emerging from the organism (the whole or unity) is very clearly stated. This same argument applies to other organs. If I understand Heidegger correctly what he is arguing is that the animal (and this includes human) organism as a whole sees or hears and the specific organ emerges from the organism based on the way of being of the organism. This turns the thinking about the relationship between capacities and organs on its head, and this is what Heidegger concludes,

One thing is clear: we cannot say that the organ has capacities, but must say that *the capacity has organs*. [FCM 221]

So, unlike a piece of equipment which has a particular

... *readiness for something* and *possesses* this readiness. *The organ*, on the other hand, is *in the possession of a capacity*. It is the capacity which possesses here rather than the organ. It is the capability which procures organs for itself, rather than organs coming to be equipped with capacities, let alone with forms of readiness. [FCM 221]

This idea that it is the capacity that "procures organs for itself" seems at first nonsensical and yet what is emerging in science, I would argue, is just this. While still in its developmental infancy 'bionic eye' implants "are able to restore some visual function in blind patients with hereditary retinal degeneration" (Hafed, Stingl, Bartz-Schmidt, Gekeler, & Zrenner, 2016, p. 119). In so doing they seem to be exploiting Heidegger's notion of capacity.

The 'bionic eye' comprises a small external camera which sends images to a small device which simplifies and converts the images to fit a small pixel array built into a

microchip inserted into the brain. After some training, the person can see the simple images 'coming through' the artificial eye (Hafed, Stingl, Bartz-Schmidt, Gekeler, & Zrenner, 2016). The capacity of the entity (of which the brain is a part) to be able to do this is known as plasticity and refers to how "neural networks in the brain reorganise in response to new experiences".(Buss, 2016, p. 10) The question of course is what is the organising principle behind the movement captured in the word plasticity? This is not a question that can be answered in this thesis.

In this example, it is not the simple microchip that sees, and it is not the electronic stimulation that sees rather it is how the organism itself adapts the input based on the "possession of a capacity". [FCM 221] All that the device is doing is sending a regular pattern of electronic stimulus to the brain, no more than this. It is the entity that does the rest, and we do not know how! Martin Heidegger provided his account of this structure more than seventy years before the application of the 'bionic eye'. The fundamental difference between the nature of an instrument and an organ thus highlights a basic flaw in the Cartesian clockwork metaphor of the body. If we extend discussion on the organ to the body as a whole, then it is the body that is in service of the capacity for existence, it is not the body that has existences as its way of being. If this is the case, then the reduction of the person to the body in medical science is seriously flawed.

Dasein and World

Heidegger makes numerous references (pp. 192, 215, 224, 241, 251, 261, 263) in *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* to the work of influential German biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944), whom he regards as "one of the most percptive of contemporary biologists"(p. 215). Of particular interest is Uexküll's work on the environmental world of animals, the *Umwelt*⁹⁸, and while not agreeing with all his conclusions Heidegger seems to have been influenced by his work. One of the

⁹⁸ Uexküll's conception of an animal's *Umwelt* is different to that of an ecological niche which relates to the habitat necessary for an organism's survival. Rather, as de Waal explains,

"Umwelt stresses an organism's self-centered, subjective world, which represents only a small tranche of all available worlds." (de Waal, 2016, k. 136-7)

We can thus determine an organism's *Umwelt* by focusing on its mode of behaviour in terms of its interactions with its *Umwelt* and in turn come to understand more about the animal itself. The *Umwelt* basically defines those complex relationships within an ecological system that show up as having possibilities for the animal's life.

Thus, a particular eco-system may look healthy overall, but there may be an aspect where one element relevant to one species *Umwelt* has changed and as a consequence that particular species can no longer survive. Not dissimilarly a human world may look intact and functioning well but an aspect of the environment for some may have changed and their life is diminished.

notable similarities is the idea that there may be many different animal *Umwelts* operating within the same ecological environment. As will emerge there is a similar notion in Heidegger's work in that two people may have a common public world but within this, there are different domestic or work worlds (using the same term as Uexküll, this is what Heidegger calls environments, *Umwelt*.) whose significance in terms of offering possibilities for living their life is radically different. This thesis claims that this is the case in the world of the nursing home. The nursing home provides part of the living environment for the workers, but not for the majority of the people living in the nursing home, and that this has disastrous consequences.

What Heidegger seems to be drawing from this is that there is an innate capacity in the animal to draw from the general environment aspects that are significant for them. The aspects they pull together is their Umwelt. While individual animals of the same species have the same Umwelt, for humans it is on a case-by-case basis, within a broader culture. It is this capacity for individualisation that is distinctive about human beings and is, I would argue, essential to the adaptability of the human species to diverse 'natural environments' around the globe.

Each of us as a person finds meaning in an Umwelt that is significant for us personally. So, for example, the same common public world of a large city provides many different smaller Umwelts. There is the Umwelt of the solicitor, of the chocolate store owner, the shoe repair specialist, the coffee shop work, the lecturer and so on. For Heidegger, a person's Umwelt is one which is meaningful for them, one that has possibilities for living their life as they understand it.

In the context of this thesis, the general environment of the nursing home may provide an Umwelt for some groups but not others. The attaching of significance to an Umwelt is not necessarily something we do consciously, nor are we necessarily conscious of deficits within the Umwelt, this just forms part of our receptive/perceptive - responsive capacities. In effect, our being-in-the-world structure works without us being aware of its working.

In *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, it is evident that Heidegger is familiar with the work of Darwin and of what he calls Darwinism. In contrasting the approach by Uexküll Heidegger notes that the concepts of Umwelt,

... signifies the investigation of where and how animals are at home in the world, of the way in which they live in relation to their environment. [FCM 263]

However Darwinian investigations, from Heidegger's perspective, are based on adaptation and survival, of the fitting of one material thing (i.e. present-at-hand) into another;

In Darwinism, such investigations were based upon the fundamentally misconceived idea that the animal is present at hand, and then subsequently adapts itself to a world that is present at hand, that it then comports itself accordingly and that the fittest individual gets selected. [FCM 263]

Heidegger accepts that there is a task of identifying the conditions of the material sustenance of the material body, but this is not sufficient,

Yet the task is not simply to identify the specific conditions of life materially speaking, but rather to acquire insight into the *relational structure between the animal and its environment*. [FCM 263]

It is worth noting that since Heidegger's comments significant work has been done on the role of genetics in evolution and there is an ongoing debate as to whether evolution occurs at the genetic, individual or species level. I suspect that Heidegger would argue that a systems approach needs to be taken, i.e. look at the way of being of the individual animal in the context of the environment, then form an understanding of how mutations either enhance or detract from that particular way of being in that particular ecological context. In other words, yes, the genetics produces changes in form, but being selects which form survives, not the environment, i.e. being determines the bodily entity.

Heidegger's criticisms in 1929 seem to be just as relevant to the medical sciences with respect to the design and running of nursing homes today. It is not just a simple matter of providing material sustenance and shelter. We need to understand the structural relationship between the being of the animal (the person) and the environment (Umwelt or world) that sustains the way of being. This approach requires that we first understand the way of being of Dasein, understanding that is not evident in contemporary practice in nursing homes.

By way of note, the approach of studying animals pioneered by Uexküll heavily influenced one of the founders to ethology, Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989) (Lorenz, 1981). Lorenz was awarded the Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine in 1973 for his work, and the work of both Uexküll and Lorenz have been influential in the work of contemporary ethologist Frans de Waal(1948-) (de Waal, 2016). Lorenz and de Waal both support the views being expressed by Heidegger that to understand an

animal such investigations are best done by understanding the animal in relationship with its natural environment(Lorenz, 1981; de Waal, 2016). This is reflected in Heidegger's naming of the being-structure of Dasein, being-in-the-world.

The Problem of Shifting from Body to Existence

The above discussion suggests that when Heidegger understands Dasein, he does so on the basis of incorporating

everything we call our bodiliness, down to the last muscle fiber and down to the most hidden molecule of hormones... [ZS 232]

We should not, however, consider this in terms of reducing the person to the body for Heidegger then adds that all of this "belongs essentially to existing", in other words, the body serves the perceptive/receptive - responding capacity of Dasein in terms of its way of being, which is to live a life, i.e. its existence.

In the two examples of mood and seeing, it is evident that for Heidegger that the electrical activity in the brain does not equate to mood and that the eye is not an instrument that 'sees'. There is something else at play, some capacity we have that gives us the awareness of what is happening around us. Heidegger concludes that it is not the material body that is of primary concern in understanding what it is to be a human, it is in that capacity that translates such things as electrical impulses on a microchip into the experience of sight and on a larger scale that gives us the capacity for existence. It is investigating Dasein at this level that is Heidegger's primary concern, as he puts it;

Thus, it is basically *not* inanimate matter but a domain of that non objectifiable, optically invisible capacity to receive-perceive the significance of what it encounters, which constitutes the whole Da-sein. [ZS 232]

Even today, science has no idea how the functioning of the human body, something physical, gives rise to conscious awareness, to the experience of emotions, to the ability to process and find the answer to even simple problems, to experience motivation to do one thing and not the other, to have memories, or even how we understand what a coffee cup is let alone to manage highly abstract understandings such as quantum physics. In short, science does not understand existence, so it ignores it and studies human life at the level of the physical.

There have been significant advances in identifying which parts of the brain are involved in different cognitive activities, and in identifying the sequence by which

multiple areas of the brain may come into play in processing some cognitive activity. However, this is a long way from understanding how this translates into the rich complexity of experiences that constitute our existence. There is, in other words, a significant explanatory gap between the activity observed in the functioning of the body and our experienced existence. This does not mean we cannot have a scientifically based understanding of what it is to be Dasein, just as it did not mean we were precluded from a scientific understanding of heat or gravity, it is just more complex. From Heidegger's perspective, the first step is to have a sufficient understanding of the being of Dasein and that this should then guide the science[BT].

How to think of Dasein

In effect there is a gap, on one side there is Dasein's existence and on the other the body. The emphasis in contemporary science and philosophy is that the experiencing side of the gap arises solely from the body side. The above passages from Heidegger would indicate that he has no difficulty with the concept that the body is somehow involved. However, the approach by science is that the body, as understood, is sufficient for the lived experiences that form the basis of our existence, and this is the Heideggerian point of departure. Heidegger's argument is thus with those who want to either discount the experiencing side or to simply explain it in terms of the body side of the gap. He will have none of this as I have discussed.

At one level, I had a sense for what Heidegger is saying, but when I tried to pin it down then problems arose. Roughly speaking, the general approach by science is to subject an observable, independent entity to scientific scrutiny, using robust methods to establish 'scientific' knowledge about the entity. When a 'living' person is placed in a fMRI or similar, and the brain is scanned, there is evidence of activity of the physical brain. When a person dies, the activity stops. When the body and the brain are dissected there is only material substance. Given that science has ruled out 'spirits' and 'souls' the conclusion is clear, Dasein cannot exist as something tangible, it is an activity of the body. Just as we understand the ticking of the clock and the movement of the hands in terms of the functioning of the physical mechanism of the clock, similarly we should understand Dasein by way of an understanding of the body. Put like this it is not difficult to understand why

Dasein, understood as consciousness, lived experience and so on, has not been the subject of normative scientific inquiry.

For Heidegger who we are lies in the, so far, scientifically unfathomable side of the explanatory gap. We can identify this unified sense of existence so compellingly that we have over the history of the tradition called it by such names as the soul, consciousness, the 'I', ego, the 'self' and so on. For Descartes, as an example, it was the soul made of a substance he calls *res cogitans* (thinking thing), which is separate to the body and lives on after the death of the body. Still a view many have. Heidegger rejects all of these ways of thinking. Indeed, even to think of a gap is to suggest there is the body on one side and Dasein on the other, a view not consistent with Heidegger's account.

A list of characteristics that have been touched on so far in the discussions concerning Dasein would include, in no particular order, the following:

- Dasein is an entity.
- Receiving-perceiving characterizing the basic constitution of Dasein.
- Dasein must be understood in relationship to its world.
- There is a structure, being-in-the-world that can be identified as the structure of the receiving-perceiving characteristics.
- Dasein is us. We experience Dasein as 'ourself'.
- We experience Dasein in terms of the life we live, what Heidegger calls 'existence'. This is our way of being.
- Dasein is not the body, soul, or any other form of 'thing'. Dasein cannot be equated to our brain processing.
- The body serves the being of Dasein.
- We do not know from where the receiving-perceiving capacity arises.

In the previous Chapter, one of the conclusions was that an entity could be discussed at an abstract level, in terms of its being. To use Heidegger's jargon, this is to talk in general terms at the ontological level, what it is that, determines the entity. However, when we talk about the individual entity there is the physical presence of the entity, and Aristotle argued that the material which is used to produce the entity based on the form must be appropriate. I do not doubt that this correlation between appearance and suitability contributes to the problem of understanding being. In Heidegger's discussion on equipment, in *Being and Time*, he argues this same principle, that the material from which the entity is made must

be appropriate [BT §15]. When I think about Aristotle's bronze sphere or Heidegger's famous example, the hammer, I can bring to mind specific images of these entities. Now, when I hold those images, I can distinguish between the physical presence and the 'being' of the entity. Using Aristotle's approach, the hammer or sphere *are* (being+material). The same formula holds even if Heidegger and Aristotle have different understandings as to what constitutes being. Does this apply to Dasein?

The extension of this approach is to look at a person and understand not just that it is a specific instance of the entity Dasein, but in some way as a compound, (being+something else). When first doing this I filled out this formula as corporeal body+(being-in-the-world) = Dasein. Even much of the discussion I have touched upon above would suggest this. But it is wrong! This is to conceive of Dasein in the same terms as other entities.

Heidegger differentiates two different

... ways in which the nature of those entities which can be addressed and discussed in a λόγος (discussion) may be determined *a priori*. *Existentialia* and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of being. ... any entity is either a "*who*" (existence) or a "*what*" (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense). [BT 70-1/45]

He also states that

Because Dasein's characters of being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them "*existentialia*". These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call "categories" characteristics of being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein [BT 70/44]

When we are talking about an entity that is present-at-hand we can see it, we can talk about it in terms of the categories. This is consistent with the Aristotelian view, and Heidegger agrees,

The *κατηγορίαι* (categories) are what is sighted and what is visible in such a seeing. [BT 70/45] (my gloss)

However, Dasein is not simply a different type of being that is somehow merged with a body to produce the Dasein entity. This would still make Dasein an entity, a 'what'. Heidegger is claiming that not only does the being of Dasein represent a different class of entity as defined by its being, but he is also saying that Dasein as *an entity* is also radically different. Dasein the entity cannot be characterised as a 'what' it cannot be discussed in categorial terms.

Heidegger accepts that there is a connection between these "two modes of the

characters of being” [BT 71/45] but that it cannot be dealt with until he completed his project. As is well known, this never happened, and so we are left with the recognition of a problem but never a resolution.

From the previous discussion, it was identified that the inquiry into the being of an entity involves two key questions, firstly the clarification of being of the entity and secondly an account of an entity comes into being. For a ‘what’ type entity, e.g. a hammer, this is straight forward. Whatever the being is, suitable materials are crafted in accordance with the requirements of its being. When the entity has been produced, we can look at it, e.g. at the hammer, and describe it categorially. What is the case for a ‘who’ type entity? What is crafted together with the being, to produce the entity? Given the body is ruled out, how do we even conceive of the entity in order to give an account of it coming into being?

The problem seems to be that, perhaps, as a result of my culture, I find it difficult to conceive of an entity in other than physical terms, e.g. even wind is a movement of the air particles⁹⁹. This gets us back to the problematic comment by Heidegger raised in Chapter 4;

If I say of Dasein that its basic constitution is being-in-the-world, I am then first of all asserting something that belongs to its essence, and I thereby disregard whether the entity of such a nature factually exists or not. In other words, the statement, "Dasein is, in its basic constitution, being-in-the-world," is not an affirmation of its factual existence; I do not, by this statement, claim that my Dasein is in fact extant, nor am I saying of it that, in accord with its essence, it must in fact exist. [MFL 169]

The statement can be read as a strong stance concerning Heidegger’s phenomenological method, the shifting of focus from the entity to the being of the entity. However, this would be inconsistent with his approach concerning his inquiries into the ready-to-hand in *Being and Time*. Here Heidegger makes observations of the entities in order to disclose their being. He even describes the characteristics that the physical entities must possess to be equipment [BT]. Further, in *History of the Concept of Time* he notes,

The worldly as already extant is put to use not only in the work itself but also in tools like hammers, tongs, nails: steel, iron, ore, minerals, wood. [HCT 193]

Heidegger has no difficulty in referring to entities other than Dasein as extant and making claims as to their existence. I do not doubt that Heidegger accepts that

⁹⁹ φ

Dasein exists, his entire career is based on Dasein's existence, so I discount the claim as to existence as academic sophistry. However, what I do accept is that Heidegger has no way of clearly defining the entity other than in terms of its being! However, this is itself problematic. In his methodology he is required to bring the entity into view in order to make the shift from the entity to being, this was discussed in the earlier Chapters. An example of this is when he is investigating world, which is an entity;

... something like the world must come into view. [BT 94/66]

He even talks about bringing Dasein into view;

Has our investigation up to this point ever brought Dasein into view *as a whole*? [BT 273/231]

After exploring different characteristics of Dasein and its various relationships what I am left with are three points; firstly the concept of Dasein as a 'who' entity rather than a 'what' entity; secondly that when I observe people, I am neither looking at their being (which is hidden), nor the entity Dasein; and thirdly when I observe people I am observing their way of being. To illustrate this point. When I see a hammer sitting on the bench, I understand the entity to be a hammer, and I perceive the hammer. When I see the hammer being used for hammering I not only have in view the hammer as an entity, but also an instance of its way of being, hammering. All this holds true for Dasein, except the entity itself is not in view!

Summary

In trying to grasp Heidegger's conceptualisation of being, a problem was first identified and further investigation into Heidegger's account of being only added to the confusion. There was a solution, but it meant stepping back to explore the understanding of being from the perspective of the Greeks, and slowly shifting my understanding.

The same impasse has been reached in relation to Dasein as an entity. A problem was identified, and further investigation into Heidegger's account has only made things more opaque. This is not a trivial problem. Even if the being of Dasein is grasped, which is the first of the two fundamental questions concerning any entity if the entity itself cannot be conceptualised then how can the second question be answered, an account of the entity coming into being. From my perspective, it is this second step that is the most critical as it relates to the circumstances on

individual Daseins, and if this cannot be addressed, then this thesis fails. Thankfully this does not eventuate! As argued later in the thesis, Dasein comes into being in the context of its environment and can be thought of as a particular combination of understanding and receptivity.

As in the case of being, my working assumption is that Heidegger has a way through this impasse, I just couldn't see it. In the case of the being, I found it among the Greeks, in the case of Dasein I found it in some case studies in science. It is to those I now turn.

CHAPTER 9: HOW TO CONCEPTUALISE AND INVESTIGATE DASEIN

Introduction

In the previous chapter, the problem concerning the conceptualisation of Dasein was set out. There are two concerns associated with this inability to conceptualise Dasein. The first is how to follow Heidegger analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time* with any surety if there is uncertainty as to what phenomenon he has in view. The second is in the application of Heidegger's work. Without a conceptualisation of the entity, I struggled to understand the relationship between structure and being and how the entity itself could come into being. This aspect is critical for the thesis. The root of the problem is that Dasein has no physical or descriptive presence in *Being and Time*. The question then arises, that in such circumstances is it even possible to investigate Dasein. Given Heidegger's work, there must be a solution to this dilemma; it is just a matter of 'finding' it. This chapter addresses how I 'solved' the problem of Dasein and then presents a brief description, based on that resolution, of Heidegger's approach to investigating the structure of Dasein.

Conceptualising Dasein

The previous chapter sets out the nature of the problem, and on reflection, the issue was the tension associated with the pull to conceptualise Dasein on the one hand and the presumption of having nothing with which to conceptualises on the other. The breakthrough came from the philosophy of science and reading about the investigations into heat, Einstein's approach to the special theory of relativity and comments by the U.S pragmatist Charles Peirce.

In this chapter, I give a brief account of these stories and indicate how they help to release the tension by revealing a new way of conceptualising entities.

*Heat*¹⁰⁰

As a boy, I would often sit around a campfire and see the flames leap about in a

¹⁰⁰ The history of science concerning the discovery of the nature of heat has been well documented. I used a number of sources (Allchin, 1994; Chang, 2010; M. G. Kim, 2011; Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012; Woodcock, 2005) and the account reflects the generally accepted view of the main developments. There are differing interpretations of the speed of the shift from one theory to another and so on, however I am not concerned with these aspects in this thesis.

mesmerising fashion. What was intriguing was the nature of the flame and heat. Above the fire, the heat shimmered in the air, like a stream of ephemeral, translucent, patches of fluid escaping upwards. It is perhaps then not surprising that when the scientists of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries turned their attention to the investigation of heat, they developed the theory of phlogiston (from the Greek *phlogistos*, to burn or inflame).

Phlogiston was understood as some type of element. In some respects, this was similar to the Greek conception of fire as one of the basic elements. Variations of the Greek account of the four fundamental elements were still evident at the time, perhaps explaining why the phlogiston theory was adopted. Phlogiston was understood to be present in all substances, and when the substances were burnt, the phlogiston was released. The release of phlogiston was the source of heat, as heat was its defining characteristic.

The theory was not the product of a fringe element in science pursuing some alchemical belief. Eminent supporters including Henry Cavendish(1731-1810) a pioneering experimental and theoretical scientist in both chemistry and physics and the discoverer of hydrogen, and Joseph Priestley(1733-1804) another pioneering scientist who, among other things, discovered oxygen (which he had named dephlogisticated air). There was also ample research evidence for the phlogiston theory. For example, when we breathe out, heat can be felt on the outflowing breath and from this respiration was understood as a form of combustion. The theory of combustion stated that combustion could only occur if there is the possibility of the release of phlogiston. It was believed that air absorbs phlogiston but has a limited capacity to do so, consequently when air is saturated with phlogiston no more burning can occur. This is demonstrated by putting a lit candle into a bell jar; it goes out when the air can absorb no more phlogiston. Another experiment that demonstrates the theory is to put a mouse in a sealed container. Because respiration is a form of combustion, respiration stops when the air is so saturated with phlogiston that no more respiration can take place. Priestly identified one gas that was so devoid of phlogiston that combustion occurs very readily and rapidly, indicating there is no initial impediment to the releasing of phlogiston into the gas. He gave the name de-phlogisticated air to this gas he had discovered; it was subsequently renamed oxygen.

An alternative theory to heat was developed by Antoine Lavoisier (1743-1794) who

is credited with ushering in the era of modern chemistry. He identified the role played by dephlogisticated air as one involving a chemical reaction and it was Lavoisier that named the gas oxygen. Lavoisier argued that the phlogiston theory was not supported by his experimental data and instead argued for a free-flowing substance, 'caloric', that moves from warmer to cooler bodies and was responsible for 'heat'. Note that both accounts, the phlogiston and the caloric involved the understanding of heat as an entity. However, the characteristics associated with caloric did have better explanatory power than phlogiston when considered against a wider range of experimental results.

The scientific debates between the supporters of the opposing theories continued from the late eighteenth century into the nineteenth century with support slowly shifting to Lavoisier's position. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, in 1798, a mechanical theory of heat was proposed by Count Rumford (Benjamin Thompson 1753-1814), but the account was speculative and rudimentary. Numerous experimental approaches and developments occurred in the first half of the nineteenth century leading to the development of the First Law of Thermodynamics, a version of the law of the conservation of energy, in 1850 by Rudolph Clausius (1822-1888) and William Rankine (1820-1872). In 1853 William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) (1824-1907) published an article in a journal of the Royal Society of Edinburgh where he stated: "Heat is not a substance, but a dynamical form of mechanical effect." (Thomson, 1853) This description presents an account of heat in its modern understanding and a short time later he coined the term thermodynamics which was adopted as the name for the branch of science that studies heat and its relationship with work and energy. The thermodynamic account of heat was understood as the release of energy associated with the interaction of microscopic particles that constitute the various materials we use and today four basic laws of thermodynamics are commonly recognised, the last being discovered in the early part of the twentieth century. The displacement of the caloric theory was a slow process, and even at the end of the nineteenth century Brewer's influential science text *A Guide to the Scientific Knowledge of Things Familiar* in its 1880 edition (the thirty-eighth) (Brewer, 1852) still described heat in terms of the caloric theory. This slow shift in acceptance of changes in understanding of the basic constructs of scientific theories that is the central topic of Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* that I have previously referred to.

The story of the development of the understanding of heat is an important one in the history of science and the above is by no means a sufficient account to comprehend the nature of the journey, but the journey itself is not what attracted my attention. The story can be understood not as a change in knowledge, but as change in ontological understanding revolving around the question 'What is heat?'. Faced with the phenomenon of heat, neither the supporters of the phlogiston or the caloric theory could conceptualise a solution that did not involve positing heat as an entity understood as some form of 'material' substance. We may look back and wonder how these scientists could have been so fixated on this conception, but this would be wrong, for it carries with it the hindsight contained in the breakthroughs in understanding that have since been hard won. The likes of Cavendish and Lavoisier were brilliant, influential, and highly respected scientists and while they argued for opposing theories of heat both were convinced that heat was a 'material' substance. This pull to conceive of natural phenomenon in 'material' terms is the very same struggle I was encountering in relation to Dasein. It was the chance discovery of a small and often overlooked chapter of the 'heat' story that a breakthrough occurred.

In 1822 Joseph Fourier (1738-1830) published a book (Fourier, 1878) based on a mathematical theory that specifically rejected taking a position on the ontological 'material' nature of heat and described how heat behaved. When I initially encountered this approach, I immediately understood it in terms of Heidegger's terminology, the way of being of heat. It immediately grabbed my attention, here was an approach that did not envisage the entity in 'material' terms but incorporated the basis of scientific inquiry into the phenomenon!

Fourier conducted a series of experiments in which he measured the rate of transfer of heat from one body to another under various conditions. From these observations, he developed equations that could be used for the basis of accurate predictions concerning the change in temperature (heat) under different circumstance(Goldman, 2006b). Fourier's original article submitted for journal publication was obstructed for more than a decade by scientists on the panel supporting the caloric theory and he was eventually forced to publish his findings in a book. In the book *The Analytical Theory of Heat*(Fourier, 1878), Fourier argued that "the what" of heat is irrelevant. He pointed out that there had been debates going on for over two hundred years which had failed to reach any conclusion as to the 'what' of heat, rather what was important was to describe and account for the

behaviour of heat. Goldman describes the approach;

Suppose we have an iron bar and I put one end of it on a hot plate that is at one hundred degrees Celsius and you want to know at what time will any point on the bar reach any temperature you particularly want until it should all reach one hundred degrees Celsius ideally, then my equations will tell you that. What else do you want from a theory of heat? Who cares what heat is? Let's bracket that question. (Goldman, 2006a, p. 140)

The issue of whether a theory needs to correspond to 'reality' in terms of the 'what' of the entity was shown by Fourier to be largely irrelevant. What did correspond to the reality was the changes in state, temperature and so on. When considered at the level of the phenomenon the theory works. As Goldman notes

Fourier was a breakthrough in uncoupling the success of a theory to explain, predict and control from the further claim that it corresponds to reality. (Goldman, 2006a, p. 141)

The correspondence to reality is a view that what the entity 'is' needs to be understood by science in order for the theory to be true with a capital "T". In this approach the 'what an entity is' is understood as something 'material'. This is the physicalist approach and harks back to Descartes mechanical account of the universe that everything in the Universe must be accounted for on the basis of matter and motion. In the case of heat, even when it was not known what heat 'is' Fourier's observations were still consistent with observed phenomenon, i.e. reality. This approach to solving scientific problems based on observed phenomena associated with the entity rather than disclosing 'reality' as 'what is' as a material account is still contested as being 'true knowledge'. (Goldman, 2006a)

Fourier's approach seemed to reflect Heidegger's approach; it was a focus on ways of behaviour of the entity, not the entity itself. It was reading about Fourier's approach that started to open up a different way of thinking about entities. Even though I had not grasped the idea of being as an organising principle at the abstract, ontological level, I was starting to understand that there was a connection between a way of being and the defining behaviour of an entity.

Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity

Often 'new' scientific theories arise in response to older theories that had ceased being useful in solving the various scientific problems in a field. This is one of the characteristics of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions. However, when Albert Einstein (1879-1955) published his theory of special relativity in 1905 the theory of motion that it eventually replaced, that of Isaac Newton(1643-1727), was not

contested, it worked just fine.

In 1905 Einstein published five famous papers, covering Brownian motion, the photoelectric effect for which he won the Nobel Prize, mass-energy equivalence ($E=MC^2$), a method to determine the size of molecules and the special theory of relativity (STR)¹⁰¹. The year is referred to as Einstein's *Annus Mirabilis* (extraordinary year) and each of the papers contributed to the foundations of modern physics, including quantum physics and lead to changing the understanding of space, time, mass and energy.

In the paper on STR Einstein was addressing the issue of the meaning of simultaneous events that occurred at different distances from an observer. At the time the prevailing view was that the speed of an object was relative to an observer. For example, if person A was travelling north at 10kph and overtaken by person B travelling in the same direction at 12kph, the relative speed of B from A's perspective would be 2kph. This idea of relative motion was accepted as a fundamental law of physics. What was puzzling physicists at the time was that various experiments had indicated the speed of light was constant regardless of the relative positions and movement of the observers. This was inconsistent with the accepted laws of physics indicated that the speed should be relative. The implication of the experimental results was that light did not behave in the same way as other objects moving relative to one another, something was wrong. The typical response at the time was to reject the experimental results.

What Einstein proposed was to accept both that the laws of physics for any two people travelling at the same speed and subject to identical forces will be the same and secondly, more controversially, that the observed speed of light is constant regardless of the speed of the observers. Einstein accepted the research results concerning the way of being of light and let go of any presuppositions that would have light behaving like other entities! He then worked through the logical implications of this decision. It is not possible to conduct experiments at the speed of light so much of what he did was by way of thought experiments.

When Einstein completed his work, what emerged from his thought experiments and the associated mathematics, was the Special Theory of Relativity. The conclusions from this and subsequent work were that space and time are not fixed, and separate

¹⁰¹ I give a more extensive account of this in Chapter 19.

entities, but are relational. This view overturned the understanding of time as a steady clock ticking off the passing of time at the same rate uniform throughout the universe. It also overturned the view, held for thousands of years, that space was independent of anything in space, that it is uniform in nature, a fixed, constant and invariable 'space' in which independent objects were contained. Einstein concluded that how we experience space and time is determined by the reference point of the observer and not absolute; however, this is only evident at very fast speeds, and not at the pace at which human life is normally conducted.

Einstein's STR was not met with universal acclaim, it was hotly contested by scientists and philosophers alike and took a number of years to gain the acceptance of the science community. In summary, Einstein put aside assumptions concerning the nature of the entities of light, space and time and stepped through the consequences of the observed behaviours, i.e. the way of being. It was this aspect that I took back to Heidegger's work. To take the observations as given, and then think logically through them and not be dissuaded by the pull of prior understandings, or the pull of the material.

Charles Sanders Peirce and Practical Bearings.

The third encounter that shifted my thinking was with the work of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). Peirce was a U.S. mathematician and scientist and the founder of the philosophical school of American pragmatism. For many years he worked in the office of the US Coast and Geodetic Survey which involved him in the investigation of the effects of gravity when taking various survey measurement. e.g. the impact of gravity on the instruments in different elevations such as sea level compared to a mountain elevation.

In an article published in 1878 Peirce stated that we could define something by reference to our combined conceptions concerning the "practical bearings" associated with the object, without taking into account the nature of the object itself;

Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (Peirce, 1955, k. 743-5)

His famous example was that all we mean by gravity is bound up by facts concerning its effects:

It is a fair question whether some particular facts may not account for gravity; but what we mean by the force itself is completely involved in its effects. (Peirce, 1955, k. 771-2)

Peirce, like Fourier, was differentiating between the ‘what is’ of the entity itself at the substance level (an “account of gravity”) with the what is relevant about the effects ‘of’ gravity, i.e. its observed, measurable influence on other entities. Again, when I read this, I was starting to ‘hear’ the concept of effects as ‘way of being’.

Interestingly when Newton first published his work on gravity there was a controversy in that Gottfried Leibnitz (1649-1716) accused Newton of claiming gravity was some quality of the bodies themselves, i.e. he was making claims about the nature of gravity itself. Newton eventually changed his view and agreed that his work only described the effect of gravity and made no claims about gravity itself. (Janiak, 2016) This goes to the heart of Peirce's view.

These accounts of gravity struck another chord. We cannot touch gravity, we cannot see gravity, and we only know of gravity through its interactions with the environment. However, we have a sufficient understanding of gravity that we can send satellites into space to sit in geo-stationary orbits above the earth, or to travel to the outer reaches of the Universe. In thinking about this approach, I recalled the debates over consciousness and the comments by Galen Strawson rejecting the commonly held view that consciousness was a mystery;

... we know exactly what consciousness is — where by “consciousness” I mean what most people mean in this debate: experience of any kind whatever. ... It is utterly unmysterious. (Strawson, 2016)

Thinking through Peirce’s approach into what Strawson was proposing had a particularly strong resonance as Heidegger’s work is typically associated with the philosophy of mind(Dreyfus, 1991).

A Different Way of Knowing

Reading the above accounts shifted my thinking about how to deal with the investigation of an entity where the understanding of the entity itself is unclear. What was decisive in this was the reading Heidegger in Aristotelian terms. I reframed the issue in Aristotelian-Heideggerian terminology, as concerning the problem of inquiry into an entity when the categorial understanding of the entity in the primary category of ‘substance’ is not clear, but access to its ways of being associated with the other categories is accessible.

In each of the cases I have described, presuppositions concerning the ‘substance’ category, were put aside and the focus was placed on the behaviour or ‘effects’

associated with the entities. In none of these examples were the scientists trying to understand the ‘being’ of the entity in a Heideggerian sense. However, if we follow Heidegger, and understand the ‘way of being’ as referring to the categorial aspects of the individual, perceived entity, then we are, observing the ‘prevailing of being’ within the entity itself. I need to account for how I drew this conclusion.

In the previous chapter, we saw that Heidegger proposes that the character of being of an entity can be either a ‘who’ or a ‘what’ and in the latter case the nature of these entities can be understood and discussed as categories [BT 70-1/45]. I had not previously given this much thought, until now. What I recognised was that I had held a very limited understanding of categories¹⁰². The way I had sought to conceptualise entities was very visual and focused primarily on Aristotle’s categories associated with extension, colour, and place. This approach was underpinned by a belief in the ‘materiality’ of the entity. These are all categorial ways of being of an entity, as is evident from the discussion on Aristotle, and simply reflect such statements as ‘the box *is* red’, ‘the box *is* a 6cm cube” and so on. However, these are not the only ways of being, there are other categories such as relative, having, doing or being affected. While there is some arbitrariness about how these categories are arranged, they are nonetheless a comprehensive account of the ways of being of an entity, and ways in which we understand entities.

When Heidegger refers to the categories, I take this to be referring to them in the same broad sense in which Aristotle intended them to be understood, as ways of being [AM, BCAP]. This support for the Aristotelian interpretation is explicit in the 1960s *Zollikon Seminars* during which Heidegger makes the following comment,

Predication belongs to something that I say something about, the subject of the proposition, what is predicated on the *κατηγορία* (category) is the predicate. For instance, in a predication, I can say something is such and such a kind. Kind is in the category of quality. Something is this high and this wide. The how much, as such, means the category of quantity. In Aristotle, the indication of the number of categories varies. In any case, these categories are not mere determinations of the faculty of understanding as with Kant, but characteristics of the being of entities as such. [ZS 122] (my gloss) (my underlining)

Recalling the discussion on Aristotle, a predicate refers to the categorial aspects of being that are dependent on the category of primary substance. They are ways of being (e.g. *is* red, *is* 6cm cube) that are predicated on ‘box’. For Heidegger that we

¹⁰² φ

have an understanding of being, is reflected when we make a statement about something, a proposition. The structure of the proposition itself reflects the “characteristics of the being of entities as such” and should not be thought of a “mere determinations of the faculty of understanding”. Heidegger is rejecting the Kantian reformulation of the categories and affirms the Aristotelian view. While not for this thesis, Heidegger is thus rejecting Kantian idealism, and if this is the case, then he is also attacking the Kantian foundations of the theories of social constructivism that have been so influential in the social sciences for over half a century.

While I am basing my interpretation on an Aristotelian interpretation of Heidegger, this is not to say Heidegger is uncritical of Aristotle. As I have argued he has a different answer to the being of an entity, proposes two fundamental modes of being (‘who’ and ‘what’) and in *Being and Time* makes comment that “even Aristotle failed to clear away the darkness of these categorial interconnections” [BT 22/3]. Despite this, Heidegger is applying an Aristotelian approach to categories, when it comes to entities that are characterised by a ‘what’ mode of being.

Going back to the above examples, regardless of what the scientists may think they are doing, from a Heideggerian perspective they are identifying aspects of the structure of entities in terms of their categorial ways of being, understood in the wide Aristotelian sense of categories. This is a significant change in thinking and contrary to the ‘narrow’ materialist approach of the culture, as reflected in the unfounded posting of theories of phlogiston caloric theories and in my struggle to conceptualise Dasein.

Reflecting on this, the more I recognised that we typically understand things in terms of categorial ways of being, it is just not recognised as such, nor is it, certainly in general discussion, labelled as categorial¹⁰³. However, what I observed in my own thinking was the insidious need to posit something material, even if it is not perceived. This is *not* the substance approach of Aristotle, as he understood substance as form, a formula, specifically rejecting the materialist account. I had the tendency to ‘want’ to ground things in something ‘material’, some fundamental element. I recognised that I was at heart an Ionian¹⁰⁴ revisionist, the materialist

¹⁰³ Aristotle, as discussed, proposed ten categories of being. Typically, when thinking about what things are we limit our thinking to the first three (substance, quantity and quality). When considering ways of being all of them are at play.

¹⁰⁴ Ionia is the name of the region of Great Greece located in what is now modern Turkey where Thales of Miletus and his early followers lived. The name is given to his ‘school’ which had a focus on the first principles

account rejected by Aristotle, and I suspect this tendency creeps through much of modern science. For example, even though I know that carbon dioxide (CO₂) is colourless, odourless and tasteless I take comfort in that it is 'material', there is something there. Whenever I understood things in terms of the various categorial ways of being, there was the comfort that 'something solid', 'something real' was necessarily there.

This very point was at the heart of the dispute between the supporters of Newton's work on gravity which argued it was a 'force' and the supporters of Cartesian mechanistic account of physics which argued that all there is, is matter and motion and everything must be accounted for on this basis. (Gaukroger, Schuster, & Sutton, 2002) The Cartesians argued that proposing of gravity as the action of a force at a distance was to re-introduce metaphysical 'entities', the very type of thinking from which scholars were trying to free themselves (Gaukroger, 2006; Janiak, 2016). Not only was I an Ionian revisionist I was a Cartesian mechanist!¹⁰⁵

What happens, however, in the absence of evidence concerning the materiality of the entity? If we simply put this aspect on hold and work with the other categorial modes of being for which there is evidence. This is precisely what Fourier does concerning heat, what Peirce is arguing in relation to gravity, and Strawson is suggesting regarding consciousness and what Einstein does in relation to time and space. If we put aside the strong pull to ground our initial understanding of things as 'material', we find that it is often the other ways of being that are most critical and determinative for understanding what the entity *is*. This is Pierces point when he says,

Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (Peirce, 1955, k. 743-5)

For entities which are obscure in terms of their material presence what we must do is suspend the material bias and reject unfounded presuppositions put forward to 'fill in' the obscurity which tends to lead the investigation astray. This then leaves the way open to pursuing the investigation in terms of the other categorial ways of being for which there is evidence.

of the Universe being an element, i.e. something material.

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This is not to say that the material aspect of entities is irrelevant. In the cases where this aspect is initially obscure should science uncover a 'material' structure then this structure must 'fit' with the account of the other ways of being. This happened with heat, which was eventually discovered to arise from the microscopic movement of small particles and resulted in the development of the theory of thermodynamics. To rephrase this in terms of the thesis, Fourier describes a categorial way of being of heat in mathematical terms such that we have an understanding of heat in the same sense as Peirce proposes about gravity. This is question one addressed. Subsequently, we have an account of heat coming into being as a result of the movement of microscopic 'material' entities. This is question two answered.

When thinking through the character of heat, another aspect became apparent. I had previously conceptualised heat as the movement of particles and had blurred the line between particle, movement and heat. Without being conscious of the process, I was reducing heat to a type of property of the particles themselves. This is the 'materialist' bias and is wrong. Just as the bronze was required for there to be a bronze sphere, and we need to grasp that the bronze is not the sphere, the particles are required for heat, but are not heat. I accept that heat exists, heat is, but it is self-evident that it is not a predicate of any of the particles. A particular instance of heat only exists as a consequence of the movement of particles within a given proximity and under certain conditions, i.e. there is an organising formula to extend the Aristotelian concept, or there is a prevailing of an underlying structure to use Heidegger's terminology¹⁰⁶. There is a complex relationship between the 'material' that is necessary to bring an instance of an entity into being, and the being of the entity and this relationship needs to be clarified and understood. This relationship lies at the heart of the Aristotelian and Heideggerian understanding of what things 'are'. It is a different way of 'knowing'. This led to a second significant breakthrough in understanding the being of entities.

While 'material' entities (particles) may be necessary for the emergence (coming into being) of other entities (heat) through being organised in a particular way (movement within a given spatial relationship), the 'material' entities (particles) should not be confused with the emergent entity (heat). This breakthrough immediately shed light on the passages cited in the previous chapter concerning the

¹⁰⁶ If we accept the heat 'is' and is not a property of the particles as material entities then we are already on the way to emergence, even if not named as such.

distinction between the brain and human communication [ZS 95] and the correlation between electrical impulses and mood, which I cite again;

If electrical impulses were really able to cause moods, then a machine alone and by itself should be able to produce moods. It can only be said that when electrical impulses are present this or that mood appears. However, this is still far from meaning that an electrical impulse can produce a mood. Mood can only be *triggered*. A certain brain state is correlated with a particular mood. Nevertheless, the brain process is never sufficient for understanding a mood; it is not sufficient even in the most literal sense because it can never reach into the mood itself. [ZS 196] (my underlining)

Heidegger accepts that in some way the brain and its processes are necessary to bring a mood into being, but it is not a sufficient to either account for what a mood is (question one) or how a mood comes into being (question two). If we accept that moods exist (i.e. that they are entities) then by researching moods in terms of their material presence without first understanding its various ways of being of mood will risk leading the inquiry astray, as was the case with heat and the phlogiston/caloric theories. What is required is a different way of knowing, or rather moving from the Ionian to the Aristotelian understanding. While I have focused on heat in the later part of the discussion the similarities with gravity and space-time¹⁰⁷ are evident.

In summary, there were two significant breakthroughs in thinking that arose out of the reflections of these case studies from the history of science. The first was to be able to conceptualise an entity in terms of its categorial ways of being without the necessity of a material conceptualisation. The second, which arose in part from the first, was that while a material entity *may* be necessary for an entity coming into being, this does not mean that the entity that comes into being is itself a material entity!

Conceptualising Dasein

The above discussion has focussed on entities that Heidegger characterises as 'what' entities and ties those back to categorial ways of being. What Heidegger

¹⁰⁷ In relation to gravity, Newton originally proposed that it was a property of the 'ether' that filled space and it was only in response to criticism from Leibnitz he changed the conception of gravity to a 'force'. Today there are two accounts of gravity, one in standard physics based on Einstein's theory of relativity, interprets gravity as a warping of the space-time dimension, while in quantum mechanics, quantum field theory hypothesized there exists a particle, the graviton, that mediates the force of gravity. It is the reconciliation of these differing accounts of gravity that is understood to be the key to unifying these two dominant, but separate theories in physics. The entities we understand as time, space and gravity are thus no longer understood as distinct, they are, in ways that are as yet unknown, believed to be bound together. They may yet prove to be aspects of the same underlying entity, an entity we are observing in terms of its ways of being which will eventually be understood as a single structure.

argues, however, is that there is a class of entities for whom the categories are not the appropriate way to understand and classify the ways of being, and that class of entities is one that is understood in terms of its existence, i.e. Dasein. Simply put, if I accept that “I” exist, and I do, while the categories may apply to my physical body they are neither appropriate nor relevant to understanding what it is *to be* a Dasein. Heidegger does acknowledge that Dasein

can with some right and within certain limits be *taken* as merely present-at-hand. [BT 82/55]

This is because of the necessity of the body which must be present in each case of Dasein. However, to regard Dasein as the body “one must completely disregard or just not see the existential” nature of Dasein. [BT 82/55] What Heidegger is pointing to here is the complex relationship between the necessary material underpinnings of an entity and the being of the entity itself.

To differentiate the two broad classes of entities, Heidegger refers to one as having a “what” character and the other a “who” character. Typically, we related the pronoun ‘who’ to an individual but in this case, Heidegger is using it in the general or universal sense. Whereas the ways of being of ‘what’ entities are accounted for and grouped by categories, Heidegger invents the name “*existentialia*” [BT 71/45] to serve the same role for entities with a ‘who’ character, or existence as their way of being. The singular is *existentialia* which relates to a specific of way of being. The grammatical link between *existentialia* and existence is self-evident. What this means is that just as we can describe a non-Dasein entity by reference to the categories, we should be able to provide a reasonable description of a Dasein by reference to the *existentialia*¹⁰⁸.

When we talk about a specific ‘red box’, ‘red’ is *not* a category, it is a specific instance of the colour red of the entity box. Red however falls under the ‘species’ colour within the category of qualities. Similarly, *existentialia* and *existentialia* *do not apply* to a particular Dasein, they are universal concepts. When a specific way of being is observed in a Dasein, Heidegger simply refers to this as an *existentialia* [BT 34/14]. Table 5 is a simple representation of Heidegger’s terminology.

¹⁰⁸ In the final review of the thesis it struck me that what Heidegger is doing is accepting the categories for non-Dasein, but is proposing the *existentialia* as the name for basic ‘categories’ for Dasein’s way of being. There is a need for *existentialia* because Dasein’s ways of being are radically different to non-Dasein entities. In that the categories have proved immensely useful in investigating and classifying non-Dasein entities, the prospect is that there is significant benefit in developing the *existentialia* along a similar line. Heidegger does not do this, and I am not aware of this being done by any other scholar.

Whereas Aristotle sets out his ten category groupings with clarity and some helpful descriptions, there is no such setting out anywhere in Heidegger's work. Unless one is familiar with the terms, even the shift between the plural and singular forms

DESCRIPTION	TECHNICAL NAME	'WHAT' ENTITIES	'WHO' ENTITIES (Dasein)
General structure applicable to all entities in class	ontological level	categories/ category	existentialia/ existentiale
Specific entity	ontic level	Specific entity Specific ways of being typically called predicates	Specific Dasein Specific ways of being called existentiell

Table 5 Terminology relating to being structure

of existentiale can be at first confusing. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger never makes explicit for the uninitiated the use of existentiell and the meaning of his term ontic. On entering the Heideggerian world, one must work hard every step of the way!

By way of example the following are examples of existentiale from *Being and Time*; being-in [BT 79/54], being-amidst [BT 81/55], concern [BT 83/57], worldhood [BT 92/64], the 'one' [BT 167/128], receptive-attunement [BT 172/134], understanding [BT 182/143], projection [BT 185/146], and meaning [BT 193/151]. For Heidegger all these are classifications (as well as structures) of ways of being that can be identified in every Dasein, however, how they manifest in each Dasein varies which is where the individuation of Dasein arises. An analogous situation concerns physical objects in that, for example, every such object must have, as part of its structure, three dimensions in space, however, there is an infinite variability in the actual dimensions exhibited by specific entities.

Whereas in the extant Aristotelian texts we have a declaration of the categories with no discussion indicating how he develops them, in *Being and Time* we have an account of Heidegger's progressive identification of the existentialia as he works through his Dasein analytic. This, perhaps, accounts for the lack of a concise summary.

One thing to note about Heidegger's existentialia is that they are dynamic, and are, by and large, relational processes. This is because our existence is a continual unfolding in the context of our world, a living of our life, and when the process stops so does our existence. For example; the existentiale, concern, refers to the way we

'deal' with things in the world relevant to our life; the 'one' refers to the process by which we are brought into being as the Dasein we are by virtue of the culture; receptive-attunement refers to how such things as our moods hold open our world; and worldhood is the structural process by which we assign our self to certain ways of being in the world. As can be seen, by this very scant introduction, Heidegger's existentialia are radically different to the categories. I suspect that this was one of the reasons why I had so much difficulty conceptualising Dasein.

As soon as I suspended the need to think in materialist terms and opened up to simply 'following' Heidegger's account of Dasein's ways of being my thinking was 'freed up'. Returning again to Peirce's account,

Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (Peirce, 1955k. 743-5)

Applying this to Dasein, if we consider what ways of being might have conceivable practical bearings in relation to an understanding of Dasein, then the whole of our conception of those ways of being is the whole of our conception of Dasein. If we think about our life, our existence, then surely the way we deal with things, our interactions with people, our various understandings, the influence of such things as mood and motivation, all fall within the ambit of things that have practical bearing for Dasein. All these are addressed by Heidegger's existentialia! All that was required was to think of an entity whose organising principle (structure of being) is process based, i.e. a prevailing centred around these key aspects of human existence; that is the conception of Dasein that I managed to grasp.

Understanding Structure

The examples from Fourier, Einstein and Peirce related to a phenomenon where science is seeking law like relationships and the work that the scientists produced can be subject to repeat tests 'to check' and confirm the outcome. In other words, at the ontic or entity level, one would expect the behaviour of heat in one piece of metal to be the same as in another identical piece of metal in identical situations. Further, the relationships between the characteristics of the material, the rate of increasing temperature and so on can be determined by reference to a specific formula (law) such that the behaviour of heat can be predicted with a degree of certainty in novel situations. This does not happen with Dasein. Heidegger

recognises this and comments that the being of Dasein will not be “entirely absorbed” and subject to “rational acts which follow certain laws.” [BT 73/47] But even the range of individuated behaviour of Dasein, can be understood, according to Heidegger, as having a certain commonality in structure. A structure based on the existentialia rather than the categories¹⁰⁹.

Heidegger's premise is that all human Dasein's have a common way of being that arises from a common structure, being-in-the-world. What then does Heidegger mean by structure? We cannot think of structures as entities, for example, the timber frames that form the structure of a house, Heidegger repeatedly rules this out. I will use a metaphor associated with language to illustrate¹¹⁰ and then point out the deficiencies of the metaphor to avoid the ‘entity’ trap.

Assume that nobody has hitherto examined language to determine its structure and that this is the task of a scholar. The scholar places before themselves three simple sentences by way of a start,

- A black cat sat on the mat.
- The wind is blowing hard.
- The old lady spoke softly.

In looking at each sentence, they seem, at first, quite diverse. The sentences refer to black cats, sitting, a mat, wind, blowing, a lady and speaking and there appears to be nothing in common about these things.

The scholar then recognises that there are broadly two aspects in each sentence, there is a thing (cat, mat, wind, lady) and there is what the thing is doing (sitting, blowing, speaking). This suggests a structure. Each simple sentence has thing + thing doing something.

Like all good scholarly approaches each aspect is labelled. The scholar realises that the set of things (cat, wind, mat, lady) are names of objects. A quick check with an etymology dictionary reveals an old English word for name is *noun* which comes from the Latin word *nomen* meaning name. Convinced that the right word with the right pedigree has been found the scholar decides to call the words that name

¹⁰⁹ Earlier chapters pointed out that Heidegger refers to being as having structures, e.g. “Being and the structure of being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess.” [BT 62/38]

¹¹⁰ I have no idea how the structure of language came about. The example has been designed for illustrative purposes only and I am making no claim that this is how the structure of English was determined.

objects “nouns”.

The scholar then turns to the something that thing is doing, the sitting, blowing, talking, etc. This is another group of words forming a similar and distinct function. The name chosen for this group is *verb* from the old Latin word, *verbum*, a command to do something. The most basic structure of the sentence is thus:

noun (the thing) + verb (what the thing is doing)

Over time the scholar identifies, categorises and names other sets of words and slowly the language is understood as comprising different types of words with particular relationships between them, i.e. a structure. Having identified the structure, the ‘rules of grammar¹¹¹’ are then developed. For example, the order of the words ‘black the on sat cat mat’ makes little sense indicating that there must be some order (rule) to structure.

Before proceeding there are a number of points worth noting: Firstly, whatever the structure of the language it was there before its identification within the language. We can use language without the technical understanding of the structure. Heidegger identifies this as the difference between having a pre-ontological understanding of being compared to an ontological understanding’ [BT]. Secondly, the various word groups can be understood as various ways of being of the language and as such is the structure of language. This is what Heidegger is getting at concerning Dasein, its various ways of being constitutes its structure. Thirdly, the investigation approach to disclosing the structure moves from the ontic (words in use) to the ontological (the ontological structure). This is the same procedure Heidegger uses in *Being and Time*.

If we substitute Dasein for language Heidegger will be observing the various ways of being at the ontic level, identifying commonalities and classifying them as different types of existentials. Perhaps the simplest example is the existentials grouping he names concern. Heidegger observes at the ontic level (what Dasein does) that we have a broad multi-facet way of dealing with things as we go about our life;

The multiplicity of these things is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing,

¹¹¹ Originally from the Greek *grammatike*, the ‘art of letters’.

interrogating, considering, discussing, determining ...[BT 83/56]

Heidegger simply pulls this multi-facet way of dealing with things together under the one group and names it “concern” [BT 83/56]. There is nothing hidden or mysterious in this. It is a simple observation that a key part of our existence is made up of engaging or being ‘concerned’ with things. We also have various behaviours associated with our dealings with people. In that people are different to objects those dealing have a qualitative difference, and he groups them under the heading “solicitude”. [BT 157/121]. In other words, Heidegger is identifying what Peirce referred to as those aspects that are evident in our life that have ‘practical bearings’ to that life. Heidegger will proceed on this basis, and as he proceeds he will analyse the relationship between the structures.

In language even when the structural elements of the language are identified there is still need to understand the way the structural elements are ordered. In considering the ways of being of Dasein, there also appears to be an ‘ordering’. For example, before I use a phone I first need an understanding of what a phone *is*, I have to have the ‘know how’ to *use* the phone and I have to have a reason to use it. This basic structure applies to most things with which we are engaged. Heidegger refers to any necessary ‘ordering’ of one structural component before another as ‘*a priori*’.

In summary Heidegger’s approach to investigating the structure of Dasein is to identify ways of being observed at the ontic level (individual Dasein), and classify them as ontological structures, and then analyse those structures and determine an ordering or priority between the structures. Listening to this description carefully it is possible to hear the elements of time starting to emerge. If we must first have an understanding of something (past), in order to use it now (present) but in using something, we must first have a purpose (future) then there is a temporal structure that is associated with our engagement with things.

I mentioned earlier there is a problem with the analogy of language. While it is helpful in understanding the concept of structure, it is flawed in that the elements, when we look at them on the page appear static. This relates to my earlier comment that we need to think of Dasein’s structure more as a dynamic structure, it is a constant prevailing within each Dasein. Dasein has more of the characteristics of a verb than a noun!

A final point to note in relation to the disclosure of the structure of Dasein is that once identified, the structure of Dasein's being, i.e. being-in-the-world is not the being of the entity. This was made clear in the previous sections. To use the language of the Greek chapter, it identifies the structure of the prevailing in Dasein but does not identify that which prevails. This is the idea that an entity cannot bring itself into being and as such there must be some larger 'system' or 'relational totality' which is responsible. Hence Heidegger's comment,

Being-in-the-world is the necessary *a priori* constitution ¹¹²(condition) of Dasein, but by no means sufficient to fully determine its being. [BTg 53] (my translation)

Even though Heidegger is describing the structure of Dasein's way of being (what he calls being-in-the-world), he recognises that there is still something else beyond this. In *Being and Time* he first tentatively describes the being of Dasein as Care (BT Ch 6) and then attempts to provide a detailed analysis of Care in terms of temporality. For this thesis, the primary task is to clarify the structure of Dasein's way of being and to consider the practical implications. Understanding Dasein's being beyond this is interesting but not necessary for the understanding of the meaning of shedding of life at the ontic level.

This concludes the chapter on an approach to conceptualising Dasein as an entity and an approach to investigating the being of Dasein.

Summary

In this chapter, I addressed the challenges associated with conceptualising and investigating Dasein. Drawing on case studies from the natural sciences, Peirce's pragmatism and Aristotle's categories I identified that it was possible to understand and investigate an entity without recourse to a material based conceptualisation. Further, I showed that it is possible to conceive of an entity that, while requiring material entities to bring it into being, is itself not a material entity. Lastly, I have illustrated a way of understanding an investigation into an entity by observing its way of being at the ontic level and then moving to identify the common structure behind the ontic. It needs to be understood that these are descriptive accounts and

¹¹² The German word I have translated as constitution is *Verfassung*. This can be translated as state, condition or constitution. Constitution is used in the sense that it is the constitution of a country that determines the characteristics of the Country. Condition and state are both used in the sense of describing the particular status of something. The structure of being-in-the-world exists prior to, and in such a way that it is constitutive or the basis on which or the necessary condition on which Dasein is Dasein.

not causal. There is no claim that the structures cause, or are the why, of the entity, they are merely an account of what the entity is.

In the next two chapters, I will present the case for considering Heidegger, not as phenomenologist but rather an empiricist using phenomenology as a methodology. This understanding helps to place Heidegger's approach in a closer and very relevant relationship with the sciences, and points to a usefulness of Heidegger's research, as is, and not as mediated through social science methodologies.

CHAPTER 10: HEIDEGGER'S EMPIRICAL APPROACH

Introduction

I take Heidegger to be a strict philosophical empiricist using phenomenology as a methodology. In this Chapter, I set out my reasons for the approach.

Thomas Sheehan in his book *Making Sense of Heidegger*(Sheehan, 2015), opened by declaring that he reads Heidegger's work strictly as what Heidegger “declared it to be – namely, *phenomenology*” and accordingly he regards Heidegger as a phenomenologist. I think there is a lot going for this approach and it accords with my initial reading of Heidegger. It is indubitable that Heidegger described his methodology as phenomenology; however, I want to interpret his work as philosophical empiricism using phenomenology as the methodology. In *Being and Time* Heidegger comments;

Edmund Husserl has not only enabled us to understand once more the meaning of any genuine philosophical empiricism; he has also given us the necessary tools. [BT 490]

Based on this comment I take Heidegger to be indicating that he is within the broad camp of empiricism and is probably best understood as an empiricist using a phenomenological methodology. This is contrary to my initial understanding as influenced by the social science interpretations of phenomenology whereby I had somehow envisaged his work as somehow in a different 'school'.¹¹³ The link to empiricism had two puzzles for me, firstly, it seems to align him with the British empiricist of whom he seems critical, and secondly it seems to align him with the natural sciences which place physical objects at the centre of their inquiries. I will address both these issues and in so doing clarify in what way Heidegger sees himself working within the empiricist tradition which, in turn, reveals a little more about Heidegger's approach.

The Empiricism – Phenomenology Link

By and large philosophical empiricism is synonymous with the term British empiricism as Scruton explains in his *Short History of Modern Philosophy* (Scruton, 1995) notes,

It cannot be said that philosophical empiricism is either peculiar to Britain or predominant

¹¹³ φ

there. Nevertheless, it is a fact worth remarking that, since the Middle Ages, there has been a succession of gifted British writers who have defended a version of the empiricist outlook, so that 'British empiricism' is now the name of a recognised strand of philosophical history. (p. 79)

The three main formative British philosophers in philosophical empiricism are John Locke(1632-1704), Bishop George Berkeley(1685-1753) and the most influential, David Hume(1711-1776) and regarding an empirical account of logic John Stewart Mill(1806-1873). When referring to these philosophers Heidegger, will typically just refer to British empiricism [e.g. HCT, PIK], supporting Scruton's account.

In the development of phenomenology, the empiricists have been very influential. Moran in his *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Moran, 2000) notes that Husserl's teacher and the 'discoverer' of intentionality, Franz Brentano (1838-1917), "championed the British empiricists, especially Hume and Mill" (p. 34) as well as other leading positivists against what he regarded as the mysticism that entered German philosophy via Kant and Hegel. Brentano's work on intentionality becomes influential in both continental philosophy via Husserl's development of phenomenology which develops and significantly extends Brentano's intentionality(Moran, 2000; Spiegelberg, 1994), and in analytic philosophy, particularly in the area of philosophy of mind (Dennett, 1989; Searle, 1983). Edmund Husserl is not only influenced by Brentano but certainly in his early period influenced by the British Empiricists (Moran, 2000; Spiegelberg, 1994), particularly Hume with whom he had an "obsession" and regarded as a "practitioner of phenomenology" (Moran, 2000, p. 69). Husserl's regard for the empiricists is something also recognised and acknowledged by Heidegger [ZS 142].

While philosophers and scientists alike may be regarded as working within a particular 'school', this does not mean that this precisely defines their positions and scholarship often progresses by engaging with and critiquing those who have gone before within a school. So, for example, Husserl accepts Brentano's basic insights regarding intentionality, but critiques aspects of Brentano's analysis of it (Moran, 2000; Spiegelberg, 1994) and in turn Heidegger accepts some aspects of Husserl's development in intentionality but critiques and rejects others(Moran, 2000)[BPP]. Husserl's connections with empiricism then should be understood in a broad sense.

Puzzle 1: Heidegger is Critical of the British Empiricists.

When reading Heidegger's work the passing remarks about the Empiricists are generally critical. His critique is primarily grounded in their Cartesian stance, particularly their positions on topics such as representationalism [BPP], seeking immanent perceptions through a reflection of consciousness [HCT], splitting of primary and secondary qualities of sensation [HCT] and the Cartesian sense of the self as consciousness [ZS]. For Heidegger, these are serious criticisms and are what his structural account of being-in-the-world is designed to overcome. How then can he be so critical of such basic issues on the one hand but classify himself as an empiricist on the other? The answer can be gleaned from Scruton's definition of empiricism,

Empiricism sees human understanding as confined within the limits of human experience, straying outside those limits only to fall victim to scepticism or to lose itself in nonsense. (Scruton, 1995, p. 79)

By nonsense, he is referring to the risk of positing theories and adopting ideas for which there is no observable evidence, i.e. empirical evidence. This approach is in direct contrast to Descartes rationalism which argues that the senses cannot be trusted and as such, all knowledge must first be anchored in our innate rational capacities.

All the empiricists held that sense data from the outside world entered the mind or consciousness and then became the basis for knowledge of the world. There were variations as to how the empiricists thought this process occurred, but the crucial point is that for all the British empiricists the sense data was a direct experience of the world and this was the only source of 'true' knowledge of the world that we could have.

However, the empiricist's distinguished the objectivity of the entities within the world and what was presented in our mind or consciousness based on those experiences, i.e. the subjective entity. The theories of the different empiricists were, in part, differentiated by how they addressed the link between the objective and subjective aspects of the entity. It was the adherence to the subject-object divide which reflected the view that we are somehow locked 'inside' separated from the world 'outside' that places them in the same broad camp as Descartes, notwithstanding the differences in terms of prioritising the source of knowledge, i.e. rationalism versus empiricism. The one primary difference was that Descartes was a sceptic in

terms of accepting the 'true' nature of any experience unless it was rationally justified. In summary, empiricists will ground all knowledge in experience and apply our rational facilities to that knowledge to extend it, Cartesians will use rationally derived principles for determining the basis for knowledge and apply it to experience.

Heidegger's criticism of both empiricism and rationalism is that they assume the nature of consciousness and all that follows [e.g. BPP, HCT, ZS]. If we strip out these aspects of British empiricism, we are left with dealing with the experiences themselves on their own terms and not mediated through assuming a mind or consciousness. It is in this sense that I take Heidegger to be an empiricist strictly in the sense of Scruton's definition as I have presented it. Consistent with what has been discussed to date, Heidegger rejects any formulations or interpretations that assumes the existence of entities for which there is no evidential support and rejects the basis of the subject-object divide. This is the rejection of what I have termed the Cartesian stance.

This approach is also consistent with the discussion in the previous sections in which I support the view that we can come to understand what something is based on understanding its 'practical bearings, i.e. through empirical observations of ways of being.

Hume Sans Consciousness Towards Heidegger

Hume is regarded as the most influential of the empiricists; it is, after all, Hume's work that awakens Kant from his "dogmatic slumber" that results in one of the most influential books in philosophy, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (De Pieeris & Friedman, 2013).

Understanding Heidegger as an empiricist can be seen in the similarities in the approach that Hume takes, his subsequent influence on phenomenology and in particular Heidegger's recognition that Hume was a precursor to his attempts at investigating the structure of lived experience. To illustrate this connection, I will consider one important account by Hume, his investigation into the self.

David Hume's inquiry into the nature of the self is contained in his book *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Hume, 2006), and includes one of the most famous passages in the history of philosophy. In the passage below Hume, an empiricist, is reviewing

his experiences to identify an experience of self. He concludes that he has no such experience. In the passage Hume uses the term impression, which is a sub-category, together with thought, of what he terms perceptions;

By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned. (Hume, 2007, p. 13)

For Hume, all thoughts and ideas have an origin in impressions, i.e. the experience of things. To understand anything, we must have had an initial impression of it (experience), and this means that an understanding of the self must first be based on the experience of the self. This is Hume's description of his inquiry concerning the self;

THERE are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; ... The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely, and make us consider their influence on self either by their pain or pleasure. these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos'd to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv'd; and consequently there is no such idea. ... All these are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately consider'd, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing to support their existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it? For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound-sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. (Hume, 2006, k.4213-32)(my underlining)

Hume is arguing against those philosophers who say we are aware of "what we call our SELF", and his target is the Cartesian philosophers. There are a number of points from Hume's inquiry that have important touchstones with the work of Heidegger. Firstly, he is basing his work on what is experienced, not unfounded thoughts and ideas (presuppositions). Secondly, he denies we have experience of the self. Thirdly, that he differentiates between the types of perceptions, i.e. he categorises them. Fourthly, that each category can be separately considered

(investigate) and fifthly, that they may "exist separately". All these are significant aspects that are found, as I am discussing, in Heidegger's work. The fifth point is of particular note. It is the ontological claim as to their existence, i.e. it is not an epistemological claim. It is here we find perhaps the strongest link to Heidegger, as it is the ontological status of experience that Heidegger bases his inquiry into the Dasein.

I suspect that it is these core elements of Hume's work that Heidegger recognises early in his career when he comments;

Hume's brilliant Treatise already has the form of a rigorous and systematic structural exploration of the sphere of pure lived experience. Thus in a certain sense it [is] the first attempt at a "phenomenology." [BH 317]

The "structural exploration of the sphere of lived experience" is an early depiction of the Dasein analytic that reaches its culmination in the *Being and Time*.

In this, we also see a crucial difference in the Husserlian and Heideggerian projects. Husserl's work is focused on a methodology to ensure the securing of 'true' knowledge, and as such he saw it as a foundational project that could underpin all science. (Moran, 2000; Spiegelberg, 1994). It is epistemological in character, and it is on this basis Husserl was interested in the work of the empiricists. Heidegger's project is, however, ontological and this influences his reading of the empiricists as reflected in the above discussion on Hume.

Heidegger's critique of Hume and the other empiricists is grounded in the fundamental critique that he makes of Husserl and is summarised in the following;

The concept of consciousness has in fact been simply taken over by Husserl from Cartesian psychology and Kantian epistemology. Taken over with it is the entire set of the fundamental categories in which consciousness is characterized, categories which, for their part, do not owe their origin to an analysis of this being in the sense of an inquiry into its specific character of being. [IPR 208]

Husserl's early work was within the empiricist tradition, broadly understood. He placed a great emphasis on developing a methodology within this tradition designed to focus on the experience of whatever was the object of inquiry and to exclude any concepts from the investigation that were themselves not founded in experience, i.e. unfounded presuppositions.

It was Husserl's early achievements in this area that Heidegger used and is the basis of his comments to which I referred earlier, that Husserl showed the meaning

of "genuine philosophical empiricism" and provided the "necessary tool". Heidegger is referring strictly to Husserl's earlier work, before the introduction of various reductions and a shift to a form of Kantian idealism. It is these moves that Heidegger was openly critical as can be seen from the above extract from the 1923-4 Winter Semester lecture course *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*. Other comments in the course are far more direct and rather blunt, and Heidegger devotes an entire section (IPR §48) to "Husserl's mangling" of phenomenology.

By identifying the presuppositions surrounding the use of such concepts of consciousness, self, ego and sought and excluding them from his methodology Heidegger's approach is even more strictly empiricist than is Husserl's. Perhaps this is why he says, "Edmund Husserl has ... enabled us to understand once more the meaning of any genuine philosophical empiricism" [BT 490] which does not imply that Husserl himself implemented the genuine philosophical empiricist agenda, just showed the way!

This then solved my first puzzle. Heidegger can be interpreted as an empiricist, as I do, and yet critique the approach of those who preceded him in the tradition, which is a reasonably standard scholarly progression of a field.

Puzzle two: Empiricism and physical objects

The second puzzle was the close association between empiricism and physical objects as is evident in the following remarks by Giorgi concerning the science of psychology,

Physics, biology, and physiology were model sciences for psychology, when it began. However, what was not so clearly understood at the time was that in accepting the philosophical empiricism that drove the natural sciences, and in accepting its basic criteria, psychology was implicitly accepting physical objects as the model for psychical phenomena. (Giorgi, 2006, p. 46) (my underlining)

The puzzle here is that if philosophical empiricism implies accepting physical objects as the basis of an enquiry, then this is accepting a 'material' based substance ontology or physicalism which is clearly at odds with Heidegger's approach. Giorgi is referring to the bias in the natural sciences to understand things as physical objects which in turn typically means objects understood in a Cartesian sense, i.e. independent and self-sufficient and it is these objects that comprise what we understand as reality.

Scientific truth understood from this perspective is directly associated with knowledge of objects only as physical entities. This results in two problems firstly it limits an understanding of what things are to the material, and secondly, it results in the tendency to posit a material object as the cause of the phenomenon, even when no object is evident. This tendency was the main cause impeding an understanding of heat as discussed in the previous Chapter, i.e. heat was posited as either phlogiston or caloric fluid, and this assumed entity became the subject of the inquiry.

There is, however, an alternative conception of empiricism that is possible as the previous Chapter discussed. Peirce, for example, highlighted a line of empirical enquiry that puts aside any consideration of the material nature of an entity and pursues an understanding of that entity via the "effects which might conceivably have practical bearing". (Peirce, 1955, k. 743-5) To put another way, empirical investigation based on the behaviour or mode of being of the entity. This is also reflected in Fourier's approach, and I would argue that it is also the approach taken by one of the icons of modern science, Isaac Newton, who eventually described gravity as a force acting at a distance, i.e. in term of its way of being¹¹⁴. This is in direct contrast to the mechanical approach of Descartes' physics in which the universe is only understood mechanistically and based on matter in motion. As we recall, this was the basis of the Cartesian (materialist) attack on Newton charging him with re-inserting metaphysics back into science. I would argue that just in the case of Fourier, Newton's formula is a mathematical description of behaviour and not a causal explanation as he is not claiming anything about the entity 'Gravity' and is not explaining how the characteristics of the entity itself 'causes' the behaviour. In other words, there is an overlap, at least in part, between this approach and the stages of Heidegger's method involving ontic observation.

While the view put by Giorgi reflects the normative conception, perhaps even by most working scientists, there is a substantial body of scholarship that holds a contrary view. Briefly put, this view argues that what science is dealing with is typically an understanding that arises out of experience within a network or context of supporting concepts. To follow this line of inquiry any further takes us into the debate over what are the real objects of scientific inquiry, the nature of those

¹¹⁴ Newton describes Gravity in terms of its effects and his description states that the gravitational attraction between any two objects in the universe is directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. This description can be written mathematically as: Force of gravity = [(mass of object 1)*(mass object 2)] divided by (distance between objects)²

inquiries and the nature of the 'knowledge' gained. This is outside the scope of this thesis.

Within the history and philosophy of science, there is a view that there has been an underlying tension within science dating back to at least the time of Plato and Aristotle over this very issue. This tension is best summed up by the question: Is the knowledge that Newton and Fourier provide based on an understanding of the entity itself or is it based on our experience of 'practical effect' we assume is associated with the entity? From a Heideggerian perspective provided the experiences are properly attributed to what is observed about the entity the answer is both! His approach breaks the two thousand-year-old division.

I think the idea is clear enough. Pursuing the topic any further is outside the scope of this thesis, but it does suggest a potentially productive line of inquiry post thesis. A history of this tension in science, without the Heideggerian resolution, is presented in the lecture series by Prof Goldman from Lehigh University *Science Wars: What Scientists Know and How They Know It*¹¹⁵ (Goldman, 2006a, 2006b) in which he traces the history of this issue from the fundamental difference in approach between Plato and Aristotle through to today.

Material Empiricism versus Experiential Empiricism

To help distinguish the two lines of empiricism, I refer to that line of empiricism that insists on there being a physical object as the focus of inquiry as *material empiricism* and to the alternative approach that focuses on 'practical bearings' as *experiential empiricism* (this is, in a sense a tautology, but necessary to emphasise the difference). This approach also highlights that in the natural sciences there is a distinction between a descriptive and an explanatory methodology. If this is accepted, then the gap between some social science descriptive methods and natural science descriptive methodologies may not be as significant as is sometimes assumed. Again, this points to a possible line of research that develops a reconciliation between these two branches of science from a Heideggerian perspective.

¹¹⁵ The course is offered by the Teaching Company and is available at <http://www.thegreatcourses.com/courses/science-wars-what-scientists-know-and-how-they-know-it.html>. I took the course in order to gain additional background to understanding Heidegger's position within the intellectual tradition.

If one is a material empiricist as Giorgi is describing then the object of scientific inquiry is always a material or physical object, and the investigation is then typically constrained by any unarticulated presuppositions associated with what that entity is assumed to be. This line of inquiry typically seeks causal explanations between the assumed physical character of the entity and the phenomenon under investigation. The consequence is that if we want to understand the observed phenomenon, it must be as some form of mechanistic causal relationship. To achieve this, it is then necessary to discover the physical aspects of the entity responsible, investigate its physical characteristics and then establish the link between the object and the observed phenomenon on the basis of the object's physical characteristics. This is Descartes' clockwork, mechanistic view of the universe.

Under this model, if a physical entity is ruled out, then all that is left is some metaphysical object, and this cannot be the object of science, and any such inquiry is thus not science! Leading on from this given that consciousness cannot be found on the dissection table or made visible in a scanner it thus cannot be the object of 'real science' a view that has long prevailed and is only now showing signs of changing. It is also this view that underlies the understanding of depression as a disease, i.e. finding a specific material cause (Blazer, 2005). This approach typifies the current search for 'consciousness' and is getting nowhere.

Husserl then was trapped. He thought of himself as an experiential empiricist (one of his reductions was to suspend belief in the actual physical existence of objects) but at the same time appears to have fallen into the trap of assuming the 'self-evident' nature of consciousness and ultimately of some ego. He is positing an entity with presumed characteristics which then influence his investigation. i.e. he has not rid himself of material empiricist tendencies. Husserl was looking for phlogiston! This is the basis of the early comment by Heidegger that Husserl ended up mangling phenomenology.

Summary

In this chapter, I have outlined the case for understanding Heidegger as a strict empiricist. He criticised the British empiricist on the basis that they breached a basic axiom of empiricism by assuming facts not supported by experience.

Empiricism is typically associated with focusing on physical objects so as to

establish what I would typify as ‘mechanical’ based, law like causal relationships. I call this ‘material empiricism’. An alternative empirical approach is to focus on the ‘practical bearings’ of the entities under investigation, essentially to gain a descriptive understanding of the entity based on the categorial ways of being of the entity. I call this ‘experiential empiricism’. Experiential empiricism thus has the two benefits of providing a means of investigating an entity by way of its ‘way of being’ or ‘practical bearings’ and of focusing on the aspects that emerge out of the relationships between entities (even in terms of the relationship between two ways of being!). It is on this basis that I refine my interpretation of Heidegger as a strict experiential empiricist. This stance does not preclude the work on the material aspects of an entity. Heidegger, for example, uses his approach to develop an understanding of the being of an entity (what I have previous called question 1), and also provides an account (Chapter 3 of BT) of how specific pieces of equipment are brought into being at the ontic level, which clearly involved the material, or present-at-hand (what I previously termed question 2).

In the next chapter, I claim that Heidegger’s work should be understood and was intended by Heidegger to be so understood, as part of the endeavours of normal science in the form of a productive relationship, but one that comes prior.

CHAPTER 11: HEIDEGGER'S WORK – THE LINK TO SCIENCE.

Introduction

Heidegger's view was that sciences always hold some understanding of what as an entity *is before* they commence their inquiries. In that the Tradition has gone astray and understands entities only as 'material' he argues that contemporary science is fundamentally flawed. It simply accepts this default position without question. The exemplar case for this in the thesis is the story of heat for 'what' entities and Dasein for 'who' entities. Heidegger claims that the ontological approach he is proposing is not just an interesting intellectual exercise but a necessary precursor to the work of science. In this chapter, I make and support the claim that Heidegger intended to have his research work concerning the ontological structure of Dasein to be applied by the natural and biological sciences. It is understanding this claim that links the work in this thesis to the practices associated with the design and running of nursing homes.

My position is that if this claim has merit, then Heidegger gives us a descriptive account of the functioning of the living human entity in terms of its existence and should be taken as seriously as work such as Fourier's account of heat or Newton's account of gravitation and motion. As such if the conditions that lead to the phenomena of shedding life can be drawn from Heidegger's account then this should be viewed as having a 'scientific' basis. It should, as such, be treated and subject to the same objective scrutiny as any other similar claim associated with the application of other forms of scientific ontologies. Put more starkly, if my claim and work are sound, then the current structure and running of nursing homes is flawed, and this can be demonstrated through scientific analysis based on a sound understanding of the entity involved, the human Dasein.

There are three parts to this claim, firstly Heidegger's work is ontological, secondly, his methodology is consistent with the empiricism in ascertaining what an entity 'is' and thirdly Heidegger makes it clear he sees his work as having such applications.

That Heidegger's research is ontological is indubitable. The aim of his project is stated on the first page of *Being and Time*

Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of *being* and to do so concretely. [BT 19/1]

While his project is fundamental ontology as part of this overall project he declares and carries out an ontological inquiry into Dasein;

So far as existence is the determining character of Dasein, the ontological analytic of this entity always requires that existentiality be considered beforehand. [BT 33/13]

That Heidegger's work is consistent with the empiricism has been addressed at length in the previous chapter, in which I support my claim that Heidegger can be understood as a strict experiential empiricist and that his focus on Dasein's 'way of being', i.e. what he calls existence, is consistent with approaches in the natural sciences.

I now turn to the third part of my claim, that Heidegger understood his work as having application to science.

Crisis as the Genesis of Scientific Progress

Heidegger's view of science is that each discipline sets out its basic understandings concerning the science work to be undertaken by the discipline. In so doing it determines how the subject matter of that field is to be understood, the nature of the inquiries, how results are to be interpreted, i.e. what constitutes success, and so on.

Scientific research accomplishes, roughly and naively, the demarcation and initial fixing of the areas of subject-matter. The basic structures of any such area have already been worked out after a fashion in our pre-scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting that domain of being in which the area of subject-matter is itself confined. The 'basic concepts' which thus arise remain our proximal clues for disclosing this area concretely for the first time.[BT 29/9]

The science project of the field continues until progress is no longer being made, and it becomes evident that how the discipline has conceptually understood the object of it inquires and the object of inquiry itself do not match. This results in a crisis,

In such ... crises the very relationship between positively investigative inquiry and those things themselves that are under interrogation comes to a point where it begins to totter. [BT 29/9]

Progress in a science discipline is only possible if it recognises that it has reached a crisis and then has the capacity to radically revise its basic concepts concerning the being of the object of inquiry. Heidegger considers the work of radically revising the conceptual understanding of the object of inquiry as the real progress or movement in the science.

The real 'movement' of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. [BT 29/9]

I take this idea of 'radical revision' to be what Kuhn refers to as a scientific revolution almost forty years later.¹¹⁶ In other words, real progress depends on the extent to which a scientific discipline is capable of experiencing a crisis in its basic concepts;

The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is *capable* of a crisis in its basic concepts. [BT 29/9]

If we accept this as a model of scientific progress, we are also accepting that,

Basic concepts determine the way in which we get an understanding beforehand of the area of subject-matter underlying all the objects a science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided by this understanding. [BT 30/10]

These basic concepts are the basis by which the science proposes that the subject-matter of the inquiry should be understood, i.e. it is an ontological decision even if not cast in these terms. The progress in science then depends on the robustness of its ontological framing of the entities it is studying. This does not have to be explicit, it can be an implicit framing, as in the case of Cavendish and Lavoisier.

Heidegger's Work is Designed to Provide Basic Concepts for Science

Heidegger holds that any inquiry is iterative in character [BT] and from this, he establishes a formal structure for inquiry; I discuss this in the methodology chapter. Roughly put any inquiry posits initial basic concepts which may be based on simple axioms, postulates, or hypotheses sufficient to gain some initial clarification concerning the field of inquiry. Inquiries commence and continue based on these basic concepts until results from the inquiries themselves force a revision in the concepts. This construct can be applied to almost any inquiry. For example, if looking for a pair of glasses in the lounge room (basic concept) and searching does not disclose the glasses, one can look harder (not change the basic concept) or look elsewhere (change). In scientific inquiry, cycles involving changes in basic concepts can take place over hundreds of years as the case of the inquiry into heat and gravity

¹¹⁶ On my reading of Thomas Kuhn's theory of normal science and scientific revolutions (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012) the model outlined by Heidegger are structurally identical. How they fill in the detail varies in detail, but not materially. Additionally in his account Kuhn provides many detailed examples supporting his approach whereas Heidegger simply makes a few sparse references. Kuhn's normal science equates to Heidegger's on-going inquiry under a particular set of basic concepts, and his scientific revolution is Heidegger's crisis and radical change in basic concepts. Interesting Kuhn continually refers to the breakdown in the ability of a paradigm to address the problems it is facing as a 'crisis'. Heidegger's work was however published more thirty-five years before Kuhn's book.

demonstrate.

Basic concepts should not be grasped out of 'thin air' nor founded on untested and accepted 'truths' but rather the field must be explored "beforehand" such that the basic concepts "become genuinely demonstrated and 'grounded' ". [BT 30/10] For Heidegger this means 'grounding' the basic concepts in some, even if preliminary and vague, understanding of what the entity *is* , and this can be achieved by inquiring into its mode of being, its 'practical bearings'.

This preliminary research needs *to precede* the normal work of science, and for Heidegger, this approach extends back to the ancient Greeks. He states that the preliminary research involves

... an interpretation of those entities with regard to their basic state of being. Such research must run ahead of the positive sciences, and it *can*. Here the work of Plato and Aristotle is evidence enough. [BT 30/10]

The role of philosophy in relation to science then is one of a productive partnership,

Laying the foundations, as we have described it, is rather a productive logic-in the sense that it leaps ahead, as it were, into some area of being, discloses it for the first time in the constitution of its being, and, after thus arriving at the structures within it, makes these available to the positive sciences as transparent assignments for their inquiry. [BT 30/10 (my underlining)]

It is for this reason that

The existential analytic of Dasein comes *before* any psychology or anthropology, and certainly before any biology. [BT 71/45]

What Kuhn refers to as the scientific revolution is the change in the basic concepts of a scientific field, he initially called these basic concepts a paradigm and as such the scientific revolution is a paradigm change. He later changed the term to the disciplinary matrix. (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012)

It's clear that Kuhn views what happens in these paradigm changes as philosophical in character and not scientific;

It is, I think, particularly in periods of acknowledged crisis that scientists have turned to philosophical analysis as a device for unlocking the riddles of their field. (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012, p. 88)

It is no accident that the emergence of Newtonian physics in the seventeenth century and of relativity and quantum mechanics in the twentieth should have been both preceded and accompanied by fundamental philosophical analyses of the contemporary research tradition. (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012, p. 88)

For Kuhn, as for Heidegger, once the philosophical task has been done, it needs to stand back in order for normal science to get on with it;

Indeed, normal science usually holds creative philosophy at arm's length, and probably for good reasons. (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012, p. 88)

Heidegger thus sees his work in *Being and Time* as not just being relevant but essential to the sciences. The structures of Dasein which he identifies and lays out in *Being and Time* must, therefore, be capable of being used in a way that is meaningful for the sciences. This includes those sciences dealing with the human being in terms of the cultural aspects, i.e. anthropology (psyche side) and the biology of the body (the somatic side).

Heidegger not only intends his work to be used by science, but he also views his contribution as part of the normal part of scientific progress and links this view back to the Greeks, another indication he is continuing the Greek project.

Heidegger Intends Later Work to Be Similarly Applied

Later in his career, Heidegger shifted his focus to a broader perspective involving society itself. Rather than his work being aimed at a productive partnership with science, his focus was more in the prophetic nature of warning of the risks we face if society continues in the direction it is heading with regards to its relationship with technology. The productive relationship is thus with society as a whole.

He is warning not so much of the dangers of technology itself; it is not anti-technology as some have cast him(Dai, Jian-ping, 2008). His work and warning relate to the blind way we are drawn into the way of being of technology, and in turn, are being shaped by it rather than understanding and applying technology in the service to our own way of being. For example, these extracts from two of his later essays,

... the nature of technology is established in the objective character of its raw materials. Even this, that man becomes the subject and the world the object, is a consequence of technology's nature establishing itself, and not the other way around. [WPF 101]

and again,

Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve. [QCT 17]

This phenomenon is evident, for example, when the wilderness of Tasmania is seen

as valuable as timber (material) for production, and on this basis clear felled and converted into plantation forests that are better suited to production. This is turning trees from things of nature into raw materials, "standing-reserve".

When we see and understand things in the world only on the basis of standing-reserve to be applied to our purposes, this then demands a move towards more and more efficient ordering of things. It is a particular framing of the way the world 'works' [basic concepts] that determines how the world and as a consequence, everything will show up in the world in its light, what Heidegger calls *Gestell*, enframing. As Lovitt notes in his introduction to the essay *The Question Concerning Technology*,

Enframing is a mode of revealing, a destining of being. Yet precisely under its dominion nothing whatever, including man himself, appears as it intrinsically is; the truth of its Being remains concealed. Everything exists and appears as though it were of man's making. [QTOE xxxiv]

Heidegger is not concerned with technology as such. It is using and applying technology such that the way we are caught by a particular understanding of the world pushes out every other way of understanding. Not just the understanding of other things but of our self, as Lovitt continues

This entrapping disguises itself, in that it develops into the setting in order of everything that presences as standing-reserve, establishes itself in the standing-reserve, and rules as the standing-reserve". In this "oblivion" that blocks the self-manifesting of being, man's danger lies. The danger is real that every other way of revealing will be driven out and that man will lose his true relation to himself and to all else. [QTOE xxxiv]

In Heidegger's understanding, being is that which determines the structure of the entity itself and Heidegger identifies the being of technology as this process of enframing, of ordering, standardising, making ready in an efficient manner for processing to meet some end. It is hard not see the way in which economic rationalism is influencing this as part of this basic framework that is now driving everything in terms of efficiency. Once we have this particular understanding of being, and we do not as a culture need to be explicitly aware of this, then we make our technology more and more efficient, driven by this underlying, typically unspoken understanding of it.

In principle, there is nothing wrong with this, unless we start to see this is as the *only* way things work, that this is the only understanding of the world that is valid, the way the world has to be. Then we interpret, wrongly, the way being of all other entities within this overarching framework and deny the being of entities to be what they

truly are. For example, human Dasein is understood only in terms of productivity as a contributor to economic well-being or a cost and thus a drain on economic well-being. The well-being of humans is then made subservient to the well-being of the economy, an inversion that Heidegger rejects. Discussions around the cost burden of an aging society would form part of this understanding.

While I will not pursue it in this thesis, there is a strong argument that the current conception of the 'free market' is a reflection of the era of enframing, when everything has a value in monetary terms and decisions are made within this context. Workers used to be people, part of the company and the company part of the community. Workers are now labour units that are ordered and utilised in the most efficient manner. Consequently, when labour units in one country can be utilised more efficiently than labour units in another, there is a simple exchange, the cheaper unit for the dearer. In other words, workers are no longer seen as people but as 'standing-reserve'.

My claim is that part of the issue in nursing homes is that the understanding of the being of the person has been reduced to a physicalist interpretation. If we add an overlay of enframing, we should expect to see a push for increasing efficiencies in the care delivery associated with the body, a re-organising to reduce costs and increase income. This would mean that as part of the management of the nursing home we would witness practices that understand people being cared for in terms of income, occupied bed days and costs centres, i.e. maximising income and reducing costs that are not associated with income revenue. This would also include the design of the building themselves with a view to 'ordering' the spaces in the most efficient way associated with the task of physical care, and cost reduction, i.e. removing any 'unnecessary' space and focusing on the efficiency aspects of 'production'. It will also see changes in the way labour is conceptualised, looking to reduce costs not directly associated with delivering the 'care of the body', substituting lower cost for higher cost labour and so on. All these things are indeed happening! Not only is the being of the person misunderstood but support for that being even at a rudimentary understanding of being is being pushed aside by enframing. Pursuing this line of investigation associated with Heidegger's productive relationship with society is outside the scope of this thesis, but is an essential line of inquiry to pursue. Even if the thesis is successful, it will come up against 'enframing', and this needs to be investigated, named and the

consequences highlighted. This will be an interesting aspect to explore post-thesis!

Heidegger's analysis then is that the technological understanding of things fashions the living environment in a way that is toxic to the being of Dasein. In that we have forgotten the nature of who we are we are paying the price, this is Heidegger's point. He writes for us to take heed, he wants us to change our awareness, not to blindly discard technology, but to apply it to support the being of Dasein, as properly understood. Heidegger then is a social activist, or at least he is providing the necessary understanding in his work for such activism. His intent is to have his work applied, not just scientifically but at the social level.

Summary

In this section, I have argued that Heidegger intends his work to be used not just at the scientific but the social level. In *Being and Time*, he understands his work as being a productive partnership with normal science as providing the necessary foundations that are essential for normal science to carry out its work. This model is one that is consistent with the approach adopted by Kuhn and is consistent with the way in which scientists typically carry out their work. This intent to have his work applied is also evident in his later writings, just on a larger scale.

My approach in this thesis is based on understanding Heidegger as argued in this chapter, as in a productive relationship with normal science and society. My view is that the science on which nursing homes is based has reached a crisis. The stated aim is to support the person in terms of their frailties in a way that people can experience an improved quality of life and in this they are failing. The crisis is founded in a failure of the basic concepts associated with what it is to be human that inform both science and practice. While this thesis does not address the issue, the current mode of understanding and applying technology (broadly understood to include economics) is closely associated with this failure and is adding to problems. This is yet another project post-thesis based on Heidegger's philosophy.

This thesis takes the stance that Heidegger's work is ontological and provides a descriptive account of the person from the perspective of a strict experiential empiricist and not a material empiricist. It is as such a legitimate and repeatable research inquiry, and it is sufficient to be the basis for normal science.

Having brought Heidegger's understanding of being and Dasein into view and

identified Heidegger as a strict experiential empiricist working on projects in a productive relationship with normal science the next section moves to explore the basic concepts Heidegger uses in his research approach. The first and perhaps most important of these, the intentional structure of lived experience, is addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 12: INTENTIONALITY: STRUCTURE OF LIVED EXPERIENCE

Introduction

In previous chapters, I have clarified the character of Dasein conceptualised as a 'way of being' and identified the relationship between 'way of being' at the ontic or entity level and the structure of being at the ontological level. Further, based on this relationship I have outlined an approach for disclosing the structure based on the observation and analysis of Dasein's way of being.

In this chapter, I investigate more closely Heidegger's approach to investigating Dasein and how the concept of intentionality unlocks an understanding of this approach. Intentionality is a concept acquired and adapted from Husserl and Brentano, but in Heidegger's hands, it is transformed from the characteristic of the 'mind'¹¹⁷ directed at or about something, of linking 'mind' to world, to be the key to understanding Dasein's existence and the structure of being-in-the-world. Based on this inquiry Heidegger's key concepts of comportment and lived experience are understood as complex structural relationships. One of the surprises of this chapter was the unexpected insight into the phenomenon of Dasein as 'dwelling' among the extant which will be covered later in the chapter.

In *Being and Time*, the word intentionality/intentional appears only a few times, mainly in the notes or the index and only twice in the main body of the text, and then in the discussion of the views of other scholars. On this basis, one could be forgiven for thinking that it is not a relevant concept, perhaps something used earlier but later dropped. However, this is not the case as Heidegger deals with intentionality at length in the *History of the Concept of Time* [HCT], the lecture series given just before *Being and Time* is published and again in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* [BPP], the lecture series given just after the publication of the book. Between these two courses, there are well over 300 references to intentionality. Intentionality is the structure that underlies every receptive-responsive interaction between Dasein and the world, and between Dasein and itself, it is the structure of lived experience [HCT, BPP]. Reading and understanding *Being and Time* without an insight into how Heidegger conceives the structure of such basic concepts as comportment and

¹¹⁷ Mind and consciousness are used interchangeably in this chapter.

solicitude on the basis of intentionality is, in my view, an almost impossible task and one can only wonder why Heidegger omits it from *Being and Time*.

In this chapter, I commence with a basic introduction to the concept of intentionality as introduced by Brentano and then move to explore how Heidegger transforms intentionality into the structure of lived experience, i.e. of Dasein's existence.

Intentionality

Franz Brentano (1838-1917) was a Prussian born philosopher, pioneering psychologist and at one time a Catholic priest, whose work was influential during the latter part of the 19th and early 20th century, particularly in continental Europe. One of the developments that Brentano introduced into contemporary scholarship was intentionality, the name given to the basic idea that a defining characteristic of the mind is that it is always directed towards or to be about something, as Crotty explains

It is the idea that, as Brentano pointed out, every thought is thought *of something*, every desire is a desire *of something*, every judgement is an acceptance rejection *of something*. Consciousness is always an essentially related to objects. In short, there is an indissoluble union between subject and object. (Crotty, 1996, p. 39)

Contemporary discussions in continental and Anglo scholarship on intentionality commence with the publication of Brentano's book *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (Brentano, 1995) and the following two famous paragraphs (Jacob, 2014)

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.

This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves. (Brentano, 1995, p. 68)

There is some debate concerning the Scholastic term inexistence as to whether it refers to existing within the mind or something which does not exist ('in' is a suffix indicating a negative). (Jacob, 2014) This debate is of little consequence here for it

is generally accepted that Brentano is referring to an object within consciousness. Brentano followed the accepted view that, that of which we are aware is presented to us as a 'mental phenomenon', i.e. within our conscious mind and that problems to be solved included how this occurs and the status of knowledge that is gained through such experiences. As was indicated in the section on Heidegger's empiricism Brentano supported the empiricist stance, but he is not a 'strict' empiricist in the sense that I have defined Heidegger.

Brentano divides the intentional phenomena into three classes

To state our view at the outset, we, too, maintain that three main classes of mental phenomena must be distinguished, and distinguished according to the different ways in which they refer to their content. ... we designate the first by the term "presentation," the second by the term "judgement," and the third by the terms "emotion," "interest," or "love." (Brentano, 1995, p. 152)

In this division, there are clear echoes of Hume's comments about perceptions being "different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other" (Hume, 2006, k.4213-32). However, what Brentano has done is to analyse 'perceptions' in terms of its two components, the type and the content, or object. Consistent with the British empiricists these are experiences within consciousness, and Brentano's development is to identify a way of structuring these experiences to allow for more detailed analysis. Brentano does not develop or exploit his concept of intentionality to any significant extent. Husserl takes over the concept of intentionality, and it becomes a central part of his phenomenology, and in turn, Heidegger develops his own take on intentionality [HCT, BPP], and I will come back to this shortly.

The basic outline of intentionality as I have provided so far is sufficient for this discussion, and I am not going to address the specific details of the progress of the development of intentionality from Brentano, to Husserl to Heidegger¹¹⁸.

Using Intentionality to Study Consciousness

In this section, I adopt the standard interpretation of intentionality as the connection between mind and world, i.e. there is a subject-object divide. One of the benefits claimed for intentionality is that it provides a way to study 'consciousness' and a simple example will suffice.

¹¹⁸ In the *History of the Concept of Time* Heidegger provides an account of the history of intentionality.

Should I see a dog approaching and say, "I am fearful of that dog" then I am stating that I am experiencing fear and that the object of my fear is the dog. This is the basic structure of an intentional act. At the same time, there is also the intentional act of perception, whereby the object of perception is also the dog, the intentional act of hearing and perhaps the intentional act concerning thoughts about avoiding the dog. At any one time, as this example demonstrates, there are numerous intentional acts connecting mind to world which are continually changing in type and content. Part of the phenomenon is that as the numerous intentional acts are experienced as an overall unity, and that sense of unity remains even though the intentional acts change. In that each event, even seeing a scary dog, involves numerous intentional acts occurring at the same time, the concept of intentionality enables us to break down this complex event into the separately identifiable intentional acts that each share the same object. This makes possible the isolation of each type of intentional act in a way that it can be investigated, fear is an example.

A starting point in investigating fear is to commence with the simple question, "Does 'fear' exist?". If the answer is yes, something Hume agreed with, then fear is 'something that *is*'. In the case of 'fear of the dog', fear then is something separate to the dog. It can thus be understood as an independent affective state that exists as a possibility within our consciousness, i.e. it is subjective. When we encounter a separate and independent thing in the world that is fearsome, then an intentional link is formed between the affective state of fear which is within us (subjective) and the scary dog outside of us (objective), and as a consequence, we experience fear of the dog. It is in this way that intentional states enable us to experience the world.

The intentional act of fear, like many others, is a transient state. We are not always experiencing fear of something, albeit fear is always a possibility. Some intentional acts are continuous with a changing field of objects, for example, perception. Nonetheless, we experience seeing something only because of our intentional capacity to perceive *and* there being objects in the world to perceive. It is in this way that intentional acts are, as Crotty put it "an indissoluble union between subject and object." (Crotty, 1996, p. 39)

In that the various 'mental states' constitute our consciousness, intentionality gives us the possibility to investigate the nature of consciousness itself. Taking the example of fear, people will report a variety of things they fear, e.g. heights, spiders, flying, a young son's future, and so on. For the concept of fear to be intelligible fear

must not only be something that exists but exists in a way that it is consistent and recognisable as fear by these different people. Intentionality enables each act to be identified and understood as a structure; however, it does not provide the basis of an accurate description, and there is always room for ambiguity over what one person experiences compared to another. This is one of the aspects that Husserl developed as part of his phenomenology, an approach that allows for more detailed investigation and description of intentional acts such that people who read a descriptive account can say "yes, that is what I mean when I say fear". Just how this is undertaken is not of importance here, the main thing is to understand intentionality as the linking mechanism between subject and object, and as a useful concept to identify and isolate individual mental states which can then be investigated.

I want to push the concept a little further to show how differences in the structure can be identified. From the above example, I could make the statement, "That dog is fearsome". This would be a judgment about the dog, a different type of intentional act. Someone else may make the judgement concerning the same dog, "That dog is friendly". Just as the intentional act of fearing the dog must have sufficient constancy to be intelligible as fear, so too judgment must have a constancy for it to be intelligible a judgement. The key difference is that within the constancy of judgement, there must be the capacity of having contrary content for the same object, i.e. the dog as fearsome and the dog as friendly. This difference is one based on the attitudinal stance of the individuals, and both views may be correct. This points to a possible difference in the structure of cognitive acts such as judgement compared to affective acts such as the emotion of fear.

There is a different aspect concerning the content of a judgement. If I claim the dog is a German Shepherd and the other person claims it is a Belgian Malinois, then both claims cannot be right. So, in this case, we have the structure of a judgement, variable content but both views cannot be correct. This point to a further division in the structure of judgement, that between judgements concerning facts relating to something objective, i.e. in the world, and judgements concerning assessments or opinions arising from the perspective of the individual. i.e. subjective.

Whereas there is no way of determining the validity of one opinion judgement over another, fact judgements are truth claims that have the possibility of being validated by reference to objective sources, i.e. independent of subjective opinion. In the case

of the dog species, perhaps by checking a recognised reference that describes both German Shepherd and Belgian Malinois. This aspect of intentionality leads into the field of epistemology which investigates what it means to be a true claim. Part of Husserl's project was to use intentionality and phenomenology as a way of achieving certainty over the objects of inquiry of science, i.e., so science does not confuse a 'German Shepherd' with a 'Belgian Malinois', as such his project was more to do with epistemology than ontology.

I am not going to extend the discussion on intentionality further. The aim has been to introduce a basic account of intentionality and to demonstrate that while it may appear a relatively simple concept, it increases in complexity the more it is explored. Additionally, since intentionality is understood in structural terms it also sheds a slightly different light on the concept of structures.

Mental States and Clarifying the Nature of Ontological Subjectivity

The discussion on intentionality leads to the issue of the nature of 'intentional or mental states' and objections that they cannot be studied as an object of science because they are subjective, not objective. This objection is based on the view that science is only interested in objective inquiry, and because intentional states are subjective, they are ruled out as legitimate objects of scientific inquiry. I want to address this issue by reference to work of the American philosopher John Searle and then by the material versus experiential empiricist perspective.

While not directly referring to intentionality¹¹⁹ in this instance, Searle addresses the difference between subjective and objective existence as opposed to subjective and objective claims to knowledge in a paper published in the journal of the Royal Society under the title *How to Study Consciousness Scientifically* (Searle, 1998). In the paper, Searle identifies nine theses used by the material empiricists as to either why consciousness can't be studied or must first be reinterpreted as something else, e.g. information processing. I am only going to address one of Searle's points where he attacks the argument that the subjectivity of consciousness means it cannot be investigated by science (what he terms Thesis 2). Searle's main claim is that it is possible for something to exist other than in a material form. This has a resonance with the earlier discussions in the thesis on different ways of being, and as I have

¹¹⁹ Searle's work in this area is, heavily influenced by his work on intentionality and he credits Brentano with its development. (Searle, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1990, 2007)

discussed, consistent with Heidegger's stance.

Searle uses two statements as examples for his argument; the first being "Rembrandt was born in 1606." Searle notes that the truth or falsity of this statement is not dependent on the attitudinal preference of the person making the statement. The truth or falsity is a matter of "objectively ascertainable fact", and as such, the statement is epistemically objective. The second statement, "Rembrandt was a better painter than Rubens" is of quite a different character. It is epistemically subjective because there is no independent, objective test that can speak to the truth or falsity of the claim. Why? Because the statement is a matter of individual, i.e. subjective opinion. This example is relatively straightforward and reflects a very strong axiom in science that science is about objective, independently verifiable claims and not subjective or opinion based claims. There is no disagreement on this point.

What Searle suggests is that there is a confusion between the epistemic understanding of the subject-object differentiation of a claim and the ontological subject-object distinction regarding the existence of things. It is the *ontological* aspect that needs clarifying. Searle points out that some entities have a subjective mode of existence in that they exist only within the person (subject) experiencing them. Searle gives the following example,

... my present feeling of pain in my lower back is ontologically subjective in the sense that it only exists as experienced by me. (Searle, 1998, p. 1937)

In this sense, all conscious states are then ontological subjective because "they have to be experienced by a human or animal in order to exist." (p. 1937) Entities that exist as subjective conscious states are thus different from entities that exist in a mode independent of human experience, for example, "mountains, waterfalls or hydrogen atoms" (p. 1937) which have an objective ontological mode of existence.

Science is about epistemically objective knowledge, but we can have epistemically objective knowledge about entities that are ontologically subjective. To continue with Searle's earlier example,

... in the epistemic sense, it is an objective matter of fact - not a matter of anybody's opinion - that I have pains in my lower back. But the existence of the pains themselves is ontologically subjective. (p. 1937)

While using slightly different language, Searle is arguing that there are intentional

objects (entities) within consciousness and that they can be studied objectively.

According to Searle then, there are different ways in which something can exist, and he rejects the reduction of such entities to simply a physical phenomenon. In his book *The Mystery of Consciousness* (Searle, 1997), he argues against the reductionists and materialists,

They end up by denying the obvious fact that we all have inner, qualitative, subjective states such as our pains and joys, memories and perceptions, thoughts and feelings, moods, regrets, and hungers.

I believe the urge to reductionism and materialism derives from the underlying mistake of supposing that if we accept consciousness as having its own real existence, we will somehow be accepting dualism and rejecting the scientific worldview. ... consciousness is a natural, biological phenomenon. It is as much a part of our biological life as digestion, growth, or photosynthesis.

We are blinded to the natural, biological character of consciousness and other mental phenomena by our philosophical tradition, which makes "mental" and "physical" into two mutually exclusive categories. (Searle, 1997, p. xiii-xiv)

In the above quote, it is evident that Searle holds similar views to that of the empiricists and Husserl¹²⁰, i.e. that consciousness exists in its own right, and it is what should be the focus of study in understanding our human mode of interaction with the world.

What is important in the above discussion to date is the notion of intentionality as a structure of experience, that the structure has two aspects (the act and its content), that there are experiential states that have an ontological existence and that the mode of existence of these entities is different to 'material' entities, i.e. there is more than one way to be other than as a material object. That Searle, a contemporary and influential, analytic philosopher is comfortable with this approach is important as he opens the door to the acceptance of the principle of multiple ways of being an entity.

Recalling the discussion on Dasein, if the various intentional acts are understood using Heidegger's language of 'ways of being' then there is a remarkable similarity in the understanding of intentionality, and I include Searle's account in this, and Heidegger's concepts. The most obvious points of difference are that this approach to intentionality is based on the subject-object divide or Cartesian stance and further

¹²⁰ Searle does not, however, support Husserl's phenomenological approach or his concept of ideal forms.

it is based on the concept of mind or consciousness, both are positions rejected by Heidegger in his considerations of Dasein. These points will have to be addressed if Heidegger's structure of Dasein is to be understood as intentional.

Dasein Understood as an Intentional Structure, Being-in-the-World.

The above account of intentionality reflects that basic idea as generally accepted and I have attempted to present it as convincingly as possible. There are two aspects of the above discussion that carry over into my account of Heidegger's work. The first relates to the idea that there are various modes of existence possible without resorting to materialist accounts. This accords with Heidegger's view and is clear in this quote concerning the existence of Dasein,

... Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand. To entities such as these, their being is 'a matter of indifference' ; or more precisely, they 'are' such that their being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite. [BT 67-8/42] (my underlining)

This idea is not only relevant to understanding Dasein as an entity but will also come into play in understanding such things as equipment and world. I discuss these entities later in the thesis.

The second point is that Heidegger accepts the broad notion of intentionality as a directedness as identified by Brentano, but not as one object directed to another. It is how Heidegger responds to this last point that results in a radical transformation of intentionality by Heidegger. His attack and response is summed up in a comment ridiculing the idea of intentional acts somehow reaching out into the world;

... furthermore, the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows remains outside, and it does so as Dasein.[BT 89/62]

His last point should not be simply passed over. He is claiming that as Dasein we *do not* exist inside our head with access to the outside world. He is making the strong claim that Dasein *is already* outside as Dasein. If conceptualising Dasein in non-material terms was a challenge, how is this claim to be understood? Understanding the basis of this critique and what Heidegger means by the "Dasein which knows *remains outside*" is the aim of this following section.

Heidegger shifts the understanding of intentionality from a connecting structure linking us to the outside world to intentionality as *the* structure of Dasein itself, as the structure of Dasein's existence, as the structure he names being-in-the-world. Grasping how Heidegger conceives of this radical change overcomes a major hurdle is understanding *Being and Time*.

It is not easy to follow Heidegger's account on intentionality from reading *Being and Time*. The terms lived experience, intentionality and comportment which are so visible in the lecture series both before (*History of the Concept of Time*) and after (*Basic Problem of Phenomenology*) the publication of the book are virtually absent from *Being and Time*. However, the concepts of comportment and intentionality infuse the book so deeply without being specifically named that Heidegger, in my view, gives himself an almost impossible task of making *Being and Time* intelligible. A point I have made several times on other topics. A significant part of my interpretation of what Heidegger is 'doing' in *Being and Time* is drawn from these other works.

Ruling Out Ways of Understanding Intentionality

As was seen in earlier discussions, e.g. concerning Dasein, Heidegger will rule out ways of thinking about a topic he rejects, typically because they are unfounded. This is in keeping with his strict empiricist's stance and method. In his discussion on intentionality he makes these clear declarations of how not to think of intentionality;

... one thing is already clear: before anything else, its structural coherence must be envisaged freely, without the background presence of any realistic or idealistic theories of consciousness. [HCT 36]

All theories about the psychic, consciousness, person, and the like must be held in abeyance. [HCT 36]

The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its own sphere and is not yet outside it but encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues the basic ontological structure of the being that we ourselves are. [BPP 64]

... intentionality must not be misinterpreted on the basis of an arbitrary concept of the subject and ego and subjective sphere and thus taken for an absurd problem of transcendence. [BPP 64]

The comment in the last quote, "absurd problem of transcendence", refers to the problem of how the world can be accessed from consciousness. The notion of 'transcendence' is evident in Kant's transcendental idealism (Stang, 2016), and

following Husserl's transcendental turn (Husserl, 1989) he introduces the transcendental reduction or *epoché* to focus only on consciousness. Heidegger rejects any notion of transcendence understood in this way. He argues that the very nature of Dasein is transcendent because of its intentional existence, i.e. already 'dwelling among the extant'¹²¹, i.e. there is no 'gap' to cross as Dasein's way of being is already as being-in-the-world.

An Account of the Intentional Structure of Dasein's Existence.

The steps involved in understanding how Dasein itself relates to intentionality, comportment, lived experience and existence are crucial to understanding Heidegger's work. The line of argument is complex, and so I will lay out these steps free of any textual support to make it easier to follow and then present the textual support for each step. This difficulty is not only my perception; it is one Heidegger recognised as well,

It should first be noted that this attempt to make intentionality clear, to see it and in so doing to apprehend what it is, cannot hope to succeed in a single move. We must free ourselves from the prejudice that, because phenomenology calls upon us to apprehend the matters themselves, these matters must be apprehended all at once, without any preparation. Rather, the movement toward the matters themselves is a long and involved process which, before anything else, has to remove the prejudices which obscure them. [HCT 29]

Heidegger advises, however, that it requires no special talent, just avoid any speculative considerations and stick to the phenomenon,

The following considerations call for no special talent. They do demand that we set aside our prejudices, learn to see directly and simply and to abide by what we see without asking, out of curiosity, what we can do with it. [HCT 29]

This comment is an unveiled criticism of the Husserlian approach and its technically difficult reductions. Taking into account Heidegger's advice what follows is a preliminary overview of his account of the intentional structure nature of Dasein's existence.

Dasein's way of being is existence. This is who we are and is the very basis of our self-understanding. Our existence is characterised by our various lived experiences,

¹²¹ Heidegger states his interpretation of transcendence, in opposition to Kant's, very clearly in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*,

"... the intentional constitution of the Dasein's comportments is precisely the *ontological condition of the possibility of every and any transcendence*. Transcendence, transcending, belongs to the essential nature of the being that exists (on the basis of transcendence) as intentional, that is, exists in the manner of dwelling among the extant." [BPP 65]

the expression of our various ways of being. The technical name that Heidegger gives to lived experiences is comportment and our comportments and hence lived experiences are structured by intentionality.

Comportments comprise all the numerous ways in which we can interact with any entity, i.e. other Daseins, entities that are not like Dasein and even ourselves as an entity. Comportments are a directing-towards and include all the things previously named intentionality in the earlier discussions, but also include such comportments as making things, dealing with things, talking about things and so on.

Lived experiences, as comportments are always expressed, i.e. when I look at something when I think of something when I desire something when I am making something and so on. Lived experiences arise in the 'doing', i.e. from the doing of a comportment.

All comportments have an intentional structure which is comprised of a movement, the comporting-towards (called the *intentio*¹²²) and that towards which the comporting-towards is directed (called the *intentum*¹²³). The structure of intentionality can be readily seen in this account. The next step is logical, but the realisation of the logical consequence is somewhat of a surprise.

The two moments of the comportment (*intentio* and *intentum*) are a unity, and the lived experience is constituted by the expression of this unity. The lived experience of perceiving a coffee only arises when the perception (a type of comportment) is actually expressed, i.e. it is a unity of both perceiving and the coffee cup. To put this another way perceiving does not exist as an actuality separately to the comportment, it only exists as a possibility. We must then have the possibility of perceiving before we have the actuality of a perception. (This is why bionic eyes are possible).

Our existence is manifested in lived experiences (comportments) which are constituted only when they are expressed, i.e. there is a unity of the *intentio* (the type of comportment) and the *intentum* (other entities, objects in the world, etc.).

Our *actual* existence is dependent on comportments which in turn are dependent of

¹²² *Intentio* refers to the type of comportment, in Latin it means intention, but this should not be understood in sense of common English usage.

¹²³ *Intentum* is the object of the type of comportment, in Latin it literally means aiming.

the *possibility* of the various types of comportment (intentio) and of the possibility of accessing entities necessary for those types comportments (intentum). If in part, my existence is constituted by my lived experiences collecting and tending (types of comportments) pink lustre china (the object of the comportment), then my lived experiences and hence existence is diminished if I am denied access to pink lustre china. This is the situation Marion Miller confronted on moving to a nursing home.

Our existence is the unity of the flow of all the lived experiences and is thus the present ongoing actualization of the structure of comportment taken up from the oncoming flow of possible comportments. The flow of possibilities thus maintains our existence. The quality and character of our lived experiences and hence existence rises and falls with the nature of those possible comportments, i.e. the future.

Limitations of Account

There are several limitations of the above account. The first is that it does not address the nature of the entities to which we comport. It is this step that will allow us to understand what is meant by world and the nature of being-in. I have tried to avoid any reference to world in the above account and address it in the coming chapters.

The second limitation is each Dasein is different, having a unique combination of likes, dislikes, desires, motivations, understandings and so on. It is these differences that determines what shows up as a possible comportment that is meaningful and relevant to the unique existence of the Dasein concerned. For example, I have no fondness for pink lustre china, whereas this was important for Marion Miller. This aspect will be addressed later.

Textual Support for Interpretation

Having laid out Heidegger's line of argument, I will now discuss the various steps in more detail linking it back to Heidegger's work. I will use the concept of comportment as the main entry point to this discussion.

Comportment and Being and Time

Comportment is an important technical term in Heidegger's work in this section I will describe what he means by the term, but first I want to address its lack of obvious presence in *Being and Time*.

In many English translations, comportment is the typical translation of the German word *Verhalten* and comport or comporting the translation for the verb *verhaltent*¹²⁴. In German, all nouns are designated with a capital letter, and it is not uncommon for the verb form to have the same spelling. In *Being and Time*, the translators note the following in relation to the verb form of the word *verhalten*,

... can refer to any kind of behaviour or way of conducting oneself, even to the way in which one relates oneself to something else, or to the way one refrains or holds oneself back. [BT 23, note 1]

The note goes on to say, “We shall translate it in various ways.” In relation to the noun, *Verhalten*, the translation note indicates that *Verhalten* can mean ‘behaviour’, ‘conduct’ or ‘relates to’ [BT 162, note 1]

These variations in translation help to mask the technical nature of the term. Despite the translation notes the translators do occasionally use comport for the verb *verhalten* or a variation of the verb, *verhält* for example;

Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport (*verhalten*) ourselves in any way, is being; [BT 26/7] (my gloss for the German)

In this case, the two variations of the verb *verhalten* and *verhält* are translated as comport;

That kind of being towards which Dasein can comport (*verhalten*) itself in one way or another, and always does comport (*verhält*) itself somehow, we call "existence". (my gloss for the German)

While the variation in interpretations does not help, by and large, the sense one gets is that a comportment is simply a description of a behaviour towards something, which is what the translators’ note identifies. In searching through *Being and Time*, where comport is used in a general way, there is no linking it to the concept of an existentialia, a structure. Yet in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* a search quickly reveals the following;

As structure of comportments, intentionality is itself a structure of the self-comporting subject. [BPP 61]

Moreover, in the *History of the Concept of Time*

By intentionality we do not mean an objective relation which occasionally and subsequently takes place between a physical thing and a psychic process, but the structure of a

¹²⁴ For examples of comportment as the English translation refer BPP, FCM, HCT, LQT, BCAP, ZS, POA

comportment as comporting to, directing itself toward. [HCT 37]

Not only does comportment refer to a structure, but it is somehow tied into intentionality. The problem in *Being and Time* is not one that arises because of the translation, the clarity of articulating the structural aspect and its relationship to intentionality is just not there in *Being and Time*. Given the two courses, I have referred to were not published until well after *Being and Time* and Heidegger had no other publications for the ten years before *Being and Time* it is puzzling why he chose not to make these connections clearer. I now return to the main discussion.

Comportment and Intentionality

Heidegger provides examples of comportments which provide both an indication of the nature of comportment and a link to intentionality;

The comportments of life are also called acts: perception, judgment, love, hate. [HCT 36]

Every lived experience, every psychic comportment, directs itself toward something. Representing is a representing of something, recalling is a recalling of something, judging is judging about something, presuming, expecting, hoping, loving, hating-of something. [HCT 29]

By intentionality we do not mean an objective relation which occasionally and subsequently takes place between a physical thing and a psychic process, but the structure of a comportment as comporting to, directing itself toward. [HCT 37]

As structure of comportments, intentionality is itself a structure of the self-comporting subject. [BPP 61]

In the above quotes Heidegger ties the concept of comportment and lived experience together, and while this is correct, there is a subtle difference which I will address below. The other point to note is that the examples of comportments are the same as those given earlier for intentionality, e.g. “perception, judgement, love, hate” [HCT 36], similarly the structure “recalling is recalling of something, judging is judging about something” [HCT 29]. We know Heidegger does not accept the traditional interpretation of the structure of intentionality and so he must have something else in mind. A clue to this is in the final quote, where intentionality is described as both the structure of comportments and of the “self-comporting subject” [BPP 61], i.e. Dasein. In some way, Dasein, lived-experience, comportments and the structure of intentionality are bound together. This is what must be unpacked.

So far, the concept of comportment may be understood simply as a replacement for intentionality, i.e. somehow related to mind. Heidegger certainly includes this

understanding appears to use the term “psychic comportment” [HCT 29] to capture this aspect. However, Heidegger radically revises the concept, and in *Being and Time*, Heidegger introduces different types of comportments, one of which is "concern", a specific classification of comportment which relates to Dasein's comportment to entities other than Daseins. Of these comportments, Heidegger tells us that

... multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining [BT 83/56]

However, there is also a deficient mode,

Leaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, taking a rest - these too are ways of concern; but these are all deficient modes, in which the possibilities of concern are kept to a 'bare minimum'. [BT 83/57]

'Concern' then is the name of a structural component, and *existentiale*, and relates to the ontological level and does not refer to a characteristic of an individual Dasein. As a structure, it indicates the possible range of relationship an individual Dasein may have and the examples indicate that it is meant to cover the whole gambit of such relationship both those we may think of in positive terms, but also negative and deficient. We must keep in mind at all times that Heidegger is providing a descriptive account of what he has observed, it is not a causal account. The question to ask is simply this; 'Does Heidegger's descriptive account capture the diversity of the ways in which Dasein can comport itself towards entities other than another Dasein?' If the answer is yes, then his descriptive account is confirmed, and the name he assigns this aspect of Dasein is 'concern.'

Heidegger's use of the word 'concern' has no relationship to common usage, i.e. "I am concerned about such and such", and he makes this quite clear in a detailed explanation having introduced the term [BT 83/57].¹²⁵

The term 'concern' has, in the first instance, its colloquial [signification, and can mean to carry out something, to get it done [erledigen], to 'straighten it out'. It can also mean to 'provide oneself with something'. We use the expression with still another characteristic turn of phrase when we say "I am concerned for the success of the undertaking." Here 'concern' means

¹²⁵ What is lost in the English is the connection between concern and the being of Dasein, care. The German for concern is *Besorgen* and for care is *Sorge*, i.e. there is an etymological connection as well as a structural connection. This is also true for the other major grouping of comportments, solicitude, which is translated from the German word *Fürsorge*.

something like apprehensiveness. In contrast to these colloquial ontical significations, the expression 'concern' will be used in this investigation as an ontological term for an *existentiale*, and will designate the being of a possible way of being-in-the-world. [BT 83/57]

This is a reminder that in every case the meaning of Heidegger's technical terms should *never* be assumed.

In *Being and Time* the mode of comportment that Dasein has towards other Daseins Heidegger names "solicitude" [BT 157/121].

those entities towards which Dasein as being-with comports itself ... are themselves Dasein. These entities are not objects of concern, but rather of *solicitude*. [BT 157/121]

Heidegger does not give the same comprehensive list of examples for solicitude as he provides for concern but does provide some examples of both the positive and deficient modes of solicitude;

Even 'concern' with food and clothing, and the nursing of the sick body, are forms of solicitude. [BT 158/121]

Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not "mattering" to one another-these are possible ways of solicitude. [BT 158/121]

Recalling the sense of structure from the example of language, and taking the lead from his account of concern then Heidegger is just providing another descriptive account of our structure, our way of being Dasein. In that he observes that we engage with people, when dealing with them as people, in a qualitatively different way than we deal with other entities, he has created another sub-category of comportments and named in solicitude. His rationale for the name is interesting but secondary to the identification of the distinct category of comportment.

In *Being and Time*, apart from these specific categories of comportment, the broad, general nature of comportment is indicated in various places by the fact that Dasein can also comport itself towards itself [BT 35/15], its being [BT 68/42], world¹²⁶ [BT 118/86], its possibilities [BT 237/193] and towards death [BT 298/254]. Comportments no longer have the narrow usage of intentionality as first conceived by Brentano, i.e. the structure of mind as psychical acts, it has been expanded to cover every conceivable relationship or 'directedness' that Dasein may have in the conduct of its life.

¹²⁶ World is a technical term used by Heidegger and at this stage no assumptions should be made as to what i.e. meant

In summary, comportment covers all the various ways in which we relate to virtually anything. The two main categories of comportments that Heidegger identifies in *Being and Time* are concern and solicitude. The structure of *any* comportment is referred to as intentionality, which has a direct link back to its historical roots;

Comportments have the structure of directing-oneself-toward, of being directed-toward. Annexing a term from Scholasticism, phenomenology calls this structure *intentionality*. [BPP 58]

However, if we consider the earlier cited passage, we also have intentionality as the structure of Dasein;

As structure of comportments, intentionality is itself a structure of the self-comporting subject. [BPP 61]

Based on this we have the idea developing that our existence is the unity of all the comportments with which we are engaged. As a descriptive account, this has a certain solid ring to it. If we take the reverse, i.e. remove every possible way in which we comport to anything at all, then can we be said to exist? I think not¹²⁷. If this is the case, then intentionality is indeed both the structure of comportment and as such the structure of Dasein. Just how this is the case needs clarification.

Heidegger's Intentional Structure.

That Heidegger regards intentionality as the structure of comportment is beyond doubt;

... because intentionality constitutes the very structure of comportment itself, ... [HCT 31]

To begin with, intentionality as a structure of the Dasein's comportments. [BPP 59]

The fundamental question is how Heidegger understands intentionality. Heidegger makes no other claim other than intentionality is a structure of comportment and leaves aside that it is a 'linking' structure;

In maintaining that intentionality is the structure found in comportments, we have in any case avoided the danger of lapsing into construction and into a theory which goes beyond what is before us. [HCT 37]

By not inserting unfounded presuppositions of the structure linking subject to object it leaves open other interpretive possibilities. This is in keeping with my claim that

¹²⁷ This is an alternative approach to the Hume passage quoted earlier in which he observes that we always have perceptions, and if we are absent any perceptions then we can be said to not exist. "When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound-sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist" (Hume, 2006, k. 4232)

Heidegger should be understood as a strict experiential empiricist.

The way intentionality is presented in the tradition is that there is the subject-person (self, ego, etc.), certain experiential capacities (love, desire, perception, etc.) and then there are the separate objects (entities). Under this model, the experiential capacities form a union between subject and object at which time we have the intentional structure. As I have indicated Heidegger specifically and *emphatically rejects* this view, and there are other informative passages in which this is rejected;

It is not the case that at first only a psychic process occurs as a non-intentional state (complex of sensations, memory relations, mental image and thought processes through which an image is evoked, where one then asks whether something corresponds to it) and subsequently becomes intentional in certain instances. Intentionality is not a relationship to the non-experiential added to experiences, occasionally present along with them. ... By intentionality we do not mean an objective relation which occasionally and subsequently takes place between a physical thing and a psychic process [HCT 36-7] (my underlining)

.. intentionality must not be misinterpreted on the basis of an arbitrary concept of the subject and ego and subjective sphere and thus taken for an **absurd problem** of transcendence ... [BPP 64] (my underlining and bold)

Heidegger describes the intentional structure of comportments in the following way:

Every comportment is a comporting-toward ... We call this comporting-toward in the narrower sense the *intendere* or *intentio*. Every comporting-toward and every being-directed-toward has its specific *whereto of the comporting* and *toward-which of the directedness*. This *whereto* of comportment and *toward-which* of directedness belonging to the *intentio* we call the *intentionum*. Intentionality comprises both moments, the *intentio* and the *intentionum*, within its unity ... The two moments are different in each comportment; diversity of *intentio* or of *intentionum* constitutes precisely the diversity of the modes of comportment. They differ each in regard to its own peculiar intentionality. [BPP 58]

All Heidegger is saying here is that the basic structure of intentionality includes an object that is the focus, the *intentionum*, and mode of comportment, the *intentio*. The intentional structure comprises both these aspects as a unity. In that there is an almost infinite number of things to which we can comport (*intentionum*) and a vast array of ways in which we can comport (covered by concern, solicitude and so on) then the possible combinations of these two is what “constitutes precisely the diversity of the modes of comportment” [BPP 58] and hence the diversity of our existence, one Dasein from another. Note, however, that he regards these as two moments, this will be important and will be discussed in a later chapter. By way of foreshadowing that discussion, Heidegger recognises that before we can comport towards anything (the *intentionum*), we must first understand what it is. This opens up a line of inquiry as

to the being of the ready-to-hand and world.

We have seen earlier examples of the diversity of the ways of comportment. It should always be noted that whenever Heidegger uses the term comportment, even if it is not explicit, it has inherent in it an intentional structure with *two* aspects as a *unity*. This point is crucial for the unity is the basis of the lived experience, i.e. of Dasein's existence. Heidegger repeatedly refers to being-in-the-world as a unity, one structure with different aspects and this approach comes from his analysis and interpretation of the structure of intentionality.

In the next step, I draw the link between Dasein and existence followed by establishing the link between existence and comportments.

Dasein understood as existence.

Establishing a link between Dasein and Heidegger's concept of existence is straightforward;

The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. [BT 67/42].

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence [BT 33/12]

As I have previously argued the idea of essence is interchangeable with being as such, combined, these two quotes also satisfy Heidegger's formal indication of being as that which determines an entity (quote 1) and is the basis by which the entity is understood (quote 2).

Having made the link between Dasein and existence, this does not tell us much. I now move to establish the link between existence and comportment where the real work is done.

Existence understood as comportment

In the lecture course *Logic: The Question of Truth* given in the winter semester of 1925/26 Heidegger makes the clear statement,

... comportments of ourselves, i.e., **comportments of the being that we are and that we call existence**. Therefore, these comportments are ways that existence can *be*, ways in which it is as it is and can be as existence. [LQT 176] (by bold)

There is perhaps no clearer statement in Heidegger's writing that comportments are our ways of being and are what he understands as our existence. The timing of the course is important. Whereas the *History of the Concept of Time* is the course given six months earlier, in the Summer of 1925, this course is the last Heidegger delivers

before he goes off to his cottage in Todtnauberg to commence writing the draft of *Being and Time*. It is highly unlikely that there is any material shift in Heidegger's understanding of comportment and existence from the lecture course to *Being and Time*.

In the 1927 Summer course of *Basic Problems* [BPP] there is also a clear link between comportment and entities;

To *exist* then means, among other things, to *be as comporting with entities*. [BPP 157]
(Heidegger's emphasis)

If we take this interpretation back into *Being and Time*, then there is the statement that Dasein understands itself in the way in which it comports with entities,

Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in *what* it does, uses, expects, avoids - in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally *concerned*. [BT 155/119]

I am interpreting "find 'itself'" as an alternate expression for understands itself, and the term "proximally *concerned*" refers to the comportments with entities that it most typically deals with. As an aside, in this statement, we have a strong suggestion as to how to go about investigating the being of a particular Dasein. i.e. analysis the person's comportments with which it is primarily involved. I will take up this point later in the thesis when I propose a 'daisy petal' method to map the changing possibilities of existence.

Having established the link between existence and comportments I want to establish the link between comportments and lived experiences.

Comportments are Lived Experiences

When I drink from my coffee cup, it is both a comportment structured by intentionality and an experience. There are two ways of understanding experience; one is in the context of "What is the experience like in drinking from a coffee cup?" I could say such things as relaxing, satisfying, it picks me up and so on. Heidegger is *not* primarily interested in this type of experience. The other way to understand this, is as an alternate name for a comportment that is *enacted*, i.e. lived experience. I will discuss the difference between these two types of experience below in the excursus to the chapter. What needs to be clear is that Heidegger is interested in "lived experience" understood as an "expressed comportment".

... our comportments, lived experiences taken in the broadest sense, are through and through expressed experiences; even if they are not uttered in words, they are nonetheless

expressed in a definite articulation by an understanding that I have of them as I simply live in them without regarding them thematically. [HCT 48] (my underlining)

In the above quote and elsewhere in the lecture series *History of the Concept of Time* Heidegger links the two terms, comportment and lived experience, as synonymous by stating one and then repeating the other. An example of this type of phrasing is when I say, "I watched my favourite football team, Port Adelaide, play on television." The terms my favourite football team and Port Adelaide are interchangeable. This is how I take Heidegger to be using comportment and lived experience above and in the following examples,

We must learn to see the data as such and to see that relations between comportments, between lived experiences, are themselves not complexions of things but in turn are of an intentional character. We must thus come to see that all the relations of life are intrinsically defined by this structure. [HCT 36] (my underlining)

In a section where Heidegger is questioning Husserl's conclusions, he links the two again,

In what way, as *what* are lived experiences, comportments, the various modes of the consciousness of something, found in the natural attitude? [HCT 95] (my underlining)

In the next step, I confirm what should by now be obvious; intentionality is the structure of lived experience.

Intentionality as the Structure of Lived Experience - A Confirmation

Given that comportments are lived experience and given that intentionality is the structure of comportment then there should be references to intentionality as the structure of lived experience. If we find this to be the case, then it would strongly suggest that the interpretation that I have taken is correct. Heidegger makes these references,

... intentionality is a structure of lived experiences as such and not a coordination relative to other realities [HCT 29]

Acts refer to those lived experiences which have the character of intentionality. [HCT 36]

... that intentionality is a structure of lived experiences and not just a supplementary relation, HCT 37]

... the lived experiences themselves are as such intentional. This is our first specification, ... already important enough to provide the footing for holding metaphysical prejudices at bay. [HCT 37]

The last quote is perhaps the strongest and it also contains a reference that is staking out his strict empiricist credentials.

Having laid out the various relationships between the terms I know want to draw out the implications in term of an understanding of Dasein.

Implications of the Analysis

In *Being and Time* Heidegger briefly discusses the views of German philosopher Max Scheler (1874-1928) who adapted the early work of Husserl into his own variation of phenomenology (Spiegelberg, 1994). Heidegger noted that for Scheler an intentional act is only experienced in the performance of the act at which time it is given in reflection [BT 73/48] and Scheler's claim that the person only exists in the performance of intentional acts,

... the person exists only in the performance of intentional acts, and is therefore essentially *not* an object. [BT 73/48]

Moreover, this is understood by Scheler as

the person 'is' ... the *unity* of living-through which is immediately experienced in and with our Experiences". [BT 73/48]

This is a radical claim. Heidegger, however, identifies a problem with the claim in that it posits the person as both the performer of intentional acts and the unity associated with living through the experience associated with those acts. This raises the ontological question as to what is the meaning of 'performance' as distinct from 'performer'? Apparently, Scheler does not address this. Heidegger indicates, however, that Scheler is moving in the right direction by avoiding defining the person as a thing, physical or psychical. Scheler's approach points to the conceptual problem that arise if we are not clear about the nature of the experiences, the nature of compartments and the problem of conceptualising how Dasein is to be 'found' among all this. This is what Heidegger has discovered, a way through the apparent intertwining on the various aspects.

Heidegger's claim is deceptively simple, we are the unity of our expressed compartments, and the unity of our expressed compartments he calls existence. The compartments do not need to be things we do consciously. For example, a person with a fear of dogs may be hyper-vigilant concerning the presence of a dog, and spot one some distance down the road, well before their companion does. Neither the hyper-vigilance that results in perceiving the dog nor the anxiety and fear that suddenly rises to the surface in relation to the dog occur with any deliberateness, it just happens. As I sit typing, tapping the keyboard, watching the

words appear on the screen, checking the flow of my argument, hearing Anne tidying up in the next room, aware of the sounds of Mahler drifting in the background and so on, all these are *expressed* comportments. As we move through each day, from one location to another, from one encounter to another, our thoughts are drifting from one topic to another, and we engage in one activity after another. There is an endless procession of expressed comportments, of lived experience, of the flow of existence.

There is no doubt that we need a body to achieve all of this, and there is no doubt that the body influences the range of possibilities open to us, by Heidegger's claim is that what it is to be a human Dasein is not understood by reference to the body it is understood by reference to our existence.

With this as his starting point, Heidegger then starts to observe and analyse our existence. As indicated he notes that it is characterised by a relatedness, whether in thinking, feeling or doing we are in relationship to other entities. This relationship is what is called a comportment. When present in an individual Dasein a comportment only occurs when it is expressed, i.e. it is a particular lived experience. A comportment is essentially a way of talking about lived experiences (understood in relational terms) in a more general abstract way.

Heidegger initially analyses comportments in two ways. Firstly, he identifies there is a structure to each comportment, and the name of that structure is called intentionality. The structure of intentionality always consists of two parts, there is the object that is intended, and there is the way in which it is intended. This simple two-part structure then leads to a large number of possible comportments. For example, the statements "I see my keyboard", "I touch my keyboard", "My keyboard is wearing out" represent three different comportments about the same object. Secondly, he divides comportments into two basic groupings, those dealing with other Dasein's, which he calls solicitude, and those dealing with entities, he calls, concern.

The reason he makes this division has not yet emerged in the above discussion, but it is easy to explain. Heidegger makes the general observation that the way we understand something (its being) is reflected in the nature of our comportments towards it. For example, I eat an apple, I drink from a coffee cup, I love my wife, I use the keyboard to write, and so on. He is not interested in aberrant behaviour or behaviour that lacks understanding; he is investigating the normal, day to day way

we deal with things as they are typically understood. He calls this, investigating things in their “average *everydayness*” [BT 38/16]. If our comportments with things reflect our understanding of being, then the qualitative difference in the way we comport to things like pieces of equipment compared to other Dasein means there is a fundamental difference between equipment and other Dasein. An investigation into these two classes of entities and Dasein’s relationship with them should thus disclose aspects of the structures associated with entities as well of the structure of Dasein itself.

Dasein then is understood as ‘lived experience’. This is the interpretative possibility that is made available by not assuming intentionality as a link between object and subject. Heidegger avoids the Scheler problem of separating performer and performance; he simply jettisons the performer as there is no evidence for such an entity. If we recall this is exactly what Hume concluded! For Heidegger Dasein exists in lived experience that has an intentional structure. This cannot be understood as the saying that Dasein lives in the moment, in the present, this would be a mistake. We always need to keep in mind the temporal structure referred to earlier.

The majority of what is discussed in this chapter takes place before what is written in *Being and Time*. In *Being and Time*, he puts on hold virtually all reference to the relationship between, intentionality, comportments and lived experiences. However I have demonstrated this is his understanding both before and after *Being and Time* and it is not possible to address why he puts aside this approach, and it is pointless to speculate. What I have outlined so far is however only rudimentary, and there are many outstanding questions, for example, what is the basis by which we understand the entities toward which we comport, what is the basis by which we do things one way and not another, and so on. It is in the Dasein analytic section of *Being and Time* that Heidegger progressively digs deeper into the very structure of intentionality and discloses the basis of the unique character of Dasein itself.

In summary, we are at this point:

1. Dasein is constituted and understands itself, primarily and for the most part on the basis of its expressed comportments, i.e. lived experiences.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ This is simply a restatement of: “Dasein finds ‘itself’ proximally in *what* it does, uses, expects, avoids - in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally *concerned*.” [BT 155/119]

2. Lived experiences have an intentional structure, a unity comprising two aspects, an entity and a mode of being towards that entity.

3. We comport towards things primarily based on our understanding of what things are, i.e. their way of being.

Finally,

4. If we are our lived experience and lived experience only arises out of the expression of a comportment with entities, then there is no separation between subject and object. To put it starkly no entities, no lived experiences, no existence - - no Dasein!

We thus end up in a similar situation faced by Einstein, either accept the evidence and follow where it leads or stay with the status quo and the unfounded presuppositions that shaped the understanding of the status quo. If we follow Heidegger step by step the inevitable conclusion is that whatever Dasein is it cannot have an existence that is independent of entities, there is no subject-object divide as is maintained by the tradition.

All these conclusions are consistent with or directly flow from the analysis of existence, lived experience, comportment and intentionality discussed above. It also addresses Heidegger's objections to the tradition, e.g.

The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its own sphere and is not yet outside it but encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues the basic ontological structure of the being that we ourselves are. [BPP 64]

and it means that in existing we are already 'in' the world, "dwelling" with entities,

The statement that the comportments of the Dasein are intentional means that the mode of being of our own self, the Dasein, is essentially such that this being, so far as it is, is always already dwelling with the extant. [BPP 64]

It belongs to the nature of the Dasein to exist in such a way that it is always already with other beings. [BPP 157]

The basis on which we can be said to *'be in'* the world as being-in-the-world does, however, need to be explicated and this is another task Heidegger completes as part of the Dasein analytic and is addressed in Chapter 17.

Summary

This completes this aspect of the analysis. In earlier chapters, I had identified a

problem in conceptualising Dasein other than as 'material' object. This has now been addressed in far more detail by way of understanding Dasein as 'lived experience', i.e., as its expressed compartments.

Regarding the thesis, the inquiry into the meaning of shedding life has now been provided with a more definite direction in that if Dasein's existence is constituted by its compartment with entities, then shedding of life (understood in terms of existence) must in some way be associated with compartments. How this is so will emerge with a better understanding of Dasein's world.

Excursus: Which Experience

In *Being and Time* Heidegger distinguishes between two German words which both refer to experience *Erlebnis/erleben* (noun/verb) and *Erfahrung/erfahren* (noun/verb) and they are translated as Experience and experience respectively [BT 72].

What Heidegger is interested in is experience as *Erfahrung* and not *Erlebnis*. If I take the example of my encountering the scary dog then this experience can be understood in terms of compartments (lived experience) (*Erfahrung*) or as an experience I live through (*Erlebnis*) and recount afterwards in terms of the 'frightening dog encounter' and tell of the circumstance, all my feelings, racing heart and so forth, in other words it has content derived from introspection.

Inwood explains (Inwood, 1999) that *Erlebnis* is the experience where one would say to another "That was quite an experience." (p. 61) while *erfahren* comes from *fahren* which has the sense of 'to go', 'to travel' or 'to go forth'. *Erfahrung* then has an external orientation; one is primarily focused on the experience that is arising from some objective, some external event, and the experiences one can learn from such events. The connection with compartment and lived experience is reasonably clear given that compartments have a 'comporting-towards' aspect. This is, Inwood says, reflected in the German word for empirical science *Erfahrungswissenschaft* as contrasted to an essay on a personal experience which is *Erlebnisaufsatz*. (Inwood, 1999, p. 61)

In *Age of the World Picture* and *What is a Thing* Heidegger gives a brief history of the word and Inwood summarises this;

1. Experience is at first passive: we come across something without going in search of it.

2. In active experience, we 'go forth' (er-fahren) to look for something.

3. We go to something to see (perhaps with artificial aids such as microscopes) what happens to it under varying conditions, either waiting for the new conditions to arise or intervening to produce them.

4. Experiment: we intervene in something to see what happens, if we do such and such, only now we do so in 'anticipation [Vorgriff, 'foreconception'] of regularity, e.g. when so much - then so much' (Inwood, 1999, p. 62)

Heidegger then is primarily concerned with the experience as understood from the perspective of an empirical investigation of comportments. Yes, we can experience fear as *Erlebnis*, but we can also understand the event as *Erfahrung*, to examine the event in terms of its experience of our relationship to the world, in other words, it has a disclosive aspect. The stance then, that Heidegger is taking as a philosophical empiricist is one of *Erfahrung*.

Regarding social science research, a phenomenological inquiry based on *Erlebnis* is thus of a different character to one based on *Erfahrung*. It would be questionable that one based on *Erlebnis*, for example, the experience of moving into a nursing home, that focuses on the former and fails to do an analysis in terms of *Erfahrung* could be termed Heideggerian. I am not aware of any social science methodology that takes an approach based on *Erfahrung*, understood in Heidegger's use of the term 'lived experience', i.e. as comportments with an intentional structure. Having highlighted the two ways in which experience can be understood I will not pursue this any further.

Hiddenness of Intentionality in Being and Time

The terms lived experience, intentionality and comportment are virtually absent from *Being and Time* albeit the concepts behind the terms are very much present.

To understand the concepts, I have referred to the lecture courses given immediately before and after the publication of *Being and Time* (published in 1927) and checked the consistency of use of these terms in the courses. The lecture course given at the University of Marburg in the Winter semester of 1925 was *History of the Concept of Time* and the course given just after the completion of *Being and Time* for publication was the Marburg University, Summer 1927 course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*.

While not too much can be drawn from it, I performed a search of PDF copies of the three works to determine the frequency of use of the words. This simply indicates

the extent to which the word, and hence the concepts, are present in the discussions. In *History of the Concept of Time*, the term comportment or comports occurs over 120 times, in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* the term is used over 320 times¹²⁹ while in *Being and Time* there are no hits for comportment and 48 for comports. The alternatives for comportment, solicitude and concern, appear in *Being and Time* over 340 times. The term intentionality or intentional appears in *History of the Concept of Time* approximately 330 times and in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* approximately 300 times while in *Being and Time* just over ten times and then mainly in footnotes and the indexes. The term lived experience appears in the *History of the Concept of Time* just over a hundred times but is dropped in *Being and Time* and *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* replaced with a different word, *Erfahrung*, which is translated as experience. I did not do a word count on the word experience as it is used in other contexts.

The word frequencies indicate however that Heidegger seems to be doing his best to re-word these important concepts in this published book, whereas at the time of the lectures I doubt that there were any plans to have them published. The result of this was that initially, I was oblivious to the influence of intentionality on Heidegger's work. Even in the lecture courses, Heidegger's line of argument is not clear although it can be slowly explicated by carefully reading. Without these texts, I doubt that I would have been able to make sense from *Being and Time* of the line of argument supporting the claim that Dasein is already 'dwelling' amongst the extant.

¹²⁹ These numbers are based on a search of PDF copies of the books. The search may not pick up all instances as a result of the vagaries of PDF documents, but the numbers are typically reliable indication of the occurrence of a word.

CHAPTER 13: HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER & UNDERSTANDING

Introduction

I have argued that understanding Heidegger's work as he presents it in *Being and Time* is greatly facilitated by having a prior understanding of key concepts that he worked through prior to the writing of *Being and Time*. This has been demonstrated in concepts such as being, intentionality, comportments and Dasein. When the work of the Greeks was discussed, there were two concepts that were touched upon but not developed in any significant way. The first is that when we see an entity, it is not the physical aspect of what we see that determines our understanding of it, something else is at play. This was evident in Aristotle's idea of a hylomorphic entity where it is the form and not the matter that determines the being entity. The second was the idea that in some way it is an underlying unity that constitutes entities; this was captured in Heidegger's discussion of the prevailing. Heidegger eventually unifies these two concepts as being, understanding how he does this is central to understanding his work. In this chapter, I come back to these two points and discuss them from the perspective of the work undertaken by Edmund Husserl. It was this work that influenced Heidegger and pointed him back towards the Greeks [MWP] as he strove to address his own project concerning the meaning of being. Understanding some of the Husserlian basic ideas assisted in understanding Heidegger and as such, some of these are discussed in this chapter.

Initially, while I could 'hear' the discussions, whether from Aristotle or Heidegger, as to the difference between the perceived entity and its being I found the concept very difficult to grasp fully. If I took it up, it would be on the basis of yielding to the argument rather than any deeper awareness. Two additional pieces of work assisted in closing the gap, reading Husserl's account and developing several 'experiments' as ways to demonstrate these points, to bring the phenomenon into view. This work proved decisive, not only in understanding 'the difference' but in understanding a number of Heidegger's concepts, particularly the concepts of worldhood and being-in-the-world.

The issue of 'seeing' the phenomenon is very important, but it is not an end in itself. It is linked, certainly from a Heideggerian perspective to the structure of understanding which forms part of Dasein, as well as opening up the access to the being of entities. The chapter has two sections, the first addresses issues such as

the risk of presuppositions in understanding, the necessity of understanding the basis of understanding, the difficulty of ‘seeing’ the ontological difference and Heidegger’s two meanings of understanding. The second section explores three concepts from Husserl’s work that are informative in understanding Heidegger’s approach. The three are ‘categorical intuition’ which is associated with the ontological difference, wholes and parts which informs the concept of being as a relational unity, and lastly, the concept of founded which clarifies the term in Heidegger’s work. It is in this section I introduce and discuss several illustrative examples or ‘experiments’ that were useful in demonstrating the phenomenon and which added an ‘experiential’ dimension to the understanding.

Section One: The Necessity of Understanding

Introduction – Functionality not Appearance

In the previous chapter, the structure of intentionality was indicated as consisting two parts, the object intended (entity) and mode of intending (perception, love, producing, etc.). When I initially studied this topic, I took for granted that we understood the entities towards which we comport. It didn’t occur to me to question the basis of this understanding¹³⁰. It was when I did think about this that I noticed that I was still struggling to avoid placing the determination of what entities are (i.e. their being) in the entities themselves. For example, the coffee cup¹³¹ looked like a coffee cup, and it was a coffee cup because of its various physical characteristics¹³². Associated with this I took for granted that I understood it as a coffee cup because this is what I had learnt growing-up in the culture¹³³ and as such I simply recall that learning when I see the cup. Husserl has no fundamental disagreement with the view of what it is to be a coffee cup, but he rejects the simplistic notion of learning and recall as the basis of knowledge about the cup. Heidegger rejects both the account of what a coffee cup is and how we know. Notwithstanding this rejection, Husserl’s work helps explain Heidegger’s and this is what is addressed in the chapter.

¹³⁰ φ

¹³¹ As this example of the coffee cup suggests, the entities I am discussing in this section are those that we use in some way as part of our own work or tasks. Unless otherwise stated I am not using the term entities to refer to things of nature etc.

¹³² φ

¹³³ φ

The first issue mentioned above, not recognising the need to identify ‘understanding’ as a separate aspect of the intentional structure I put down to inexperience. However, it becomes a crucial aspect of Heidegger’s analysis as he pulls this phenomenon apart and to do this, it is important not to overlook ‘the obvious’. When we understand what something is there must have been some time in the past when we didn’t have that understanding, and this points to a separate aspect of the basic structure of intentionality that is operative *prior* to our encountering the entity in a comportment. Heidegger comes to recognise this as forming part of a more fundamental intentional structure of Dasein itself he calls ‘being-in’ which I explore in Chapter 17. In relation to the second aspect, the basis on which we understand the entity, Heidegger recognised that in a comportment it is the way of being, or roughly put, what the entity does, in a particular context that is critical, not how it looks. Whereas Aristotle has matter+form = useful thing, Heidegger adapts this to present-at-hand + readiness-to-hand = useful thing. Just as for Aristotle the essence (or being) of the useful thing is in its form, for Heidegger the essence (being) of the useful thing is its readiness-to-hand (albeit to what this refers is yet to be established). Just as Aristotle argues that when we see the useful thing, we see the ‘form’, Heidegger argues that with the sight of circumspection when we see useful things we are seeing the readiness-to-hand. Whereas for Aristotle form is a type of formula understood as an aspect of logos, for Heidegger each useful thing’s readiness-to-hand can be roughly understood as its ‘functional fit’ in a relational network of other ready-to-hand things. It is this relationally based functionality, very broadly understood, that is the real target of understanding in a comportment towards useful things. So, while there may be a correlation between the basic physical characteristics and the functionality, it is the latter that is determinative for understanding the entity. This understanding is captured in the language in the saying “form follows function”¹³⁴. It is the correlation with the physical characteristics and our bias towards valuing what is physically seen that, I believe, is the basis on which we conclude that the being of an entity is posited in the material aspects. How Heidegger sees this operating will become clearer in the next two chapters. The above indicates why examining the intentional structure becomes important for Heidegger but the discussion needs to come back to looking at how I reached this

¹³⁴ In this context the term form is typically understood as referring to the physical aspects, albeit there is a direct connection from a Heideggerian perspective between this and the being of the equipment.

understanding, and that is through Husserl.

What sent me to Husserl's work was Heidegger's comments in the lectures on the *History of the Concept of Time* where he acknowledges Husserl's account of 'categorical intuition' as an important breakthrough in identifying that it is not the mere visual presentation of entity that is the basis of understanding of what an entity is, something else is involved. While Heidegger rejects Husserl's account as to what that something else is, he accepts the phenomenon, which Heidegger will interpret as being! This chapter primarily focuses on various aspects of Husserl's work that help to identify the phenomena that Heidegger then takes over, for it was being able to see the phenomenon Husserl was describing that became the bridge from my then way of thinking to Heidegger. Before I move on to Husserl, I want to provide a brief description of my then 'way of thinking' and how easy it is to be led astray, and then link this to Husserl's and then Heidegger's position.

A Brief Journey: From Old Thinking to Husserl and Heidegger.

If an entity moves from not being understood to being understood, there must be some basis for that shift, for the change in understanding. We could say that we simply learn to 'recognise' what something is and that when we then encounter the object again, we remember what we have learnt. If we then think about the 'mechanism' by which this occurs, we can posit that we receive the 'visual input' from the entity and this then evokes the memory of what has been learnt. The same logic then applies to things we hear, taste and so on, i.e. we receive some form of sense data which is then linked to the ability of the mind to 'process' this data from the world and make sense of it. It is this 'making sense' that is the basis of knowledge, i.e. knowledge of the world is grounded in the experience of the world itself. This is essentially an empiricist position which I came to recognise as my understanding of how we access the world¹³⁵ as contrasted, for example to Descartes' rationalism.

While there are differences, this account describes the basic model of British empiricists who developed various models of how we access the world through experience and then explored how we can have surety that the judgements we make with respect to that experience constituted 'true' knowledge of the world. The British Empiricists, however, had different metaphysical positions, for example,

¹³⁵ φ

Hobbes was a materialist, Locke a dualist and Berkeley, an idealist(Priest, 2007) albeit these are all variations of substance ontology. It is not hard to see how this account, then translates into a research project for science, e.g. the investigation of how the visual system of the body receives this sense data, passes it through to the brain, where 'memory' is stored, and how the sense data is matched against 'memory' to result in a recall of what something is, and so on.

Edmund Husserl's project focused on securing the basis of the knowledge of things by way of phenomenology. He accepts the basic approach of empiricism concerning the priority of experience as the basis of knowledge of the world and the concept of sense data, however, he rejects most other aspects of the British Empiricists' various models. Husserl argues that the human mind has an innate capacity to identify the essential ideal form that constitutes any entity and that this is the basis by which we understand entities. If we take as an example, a letterbox, there is a myriad of design possibilities that a letterbox may take arising from an unlimited combination of shapes, sizes, colours, materials and so on, such that a letterbox at one design extreme is hardly recognisable to that at another extreme. Under the British Empiricist account, there is thus a need to learn a range of examples of letterboxes and learn how they may vary. Husserl rejects this approach arguing that once the human mind recognised the basic essential form of what constitutes a letterbox that this is the basis by which we understand the entity, e.g. the letterbox. Every entity then, both tangible and intangible, has for Husserl an identifiable ideal form as part of being the entity it is.

Put another way; there must be some essential constancy that is associated with each entity being the entity it is, otherwise, there is no stability of 'things' in the world, and there is only chaos. For Husserl, this constancy is associated with the concept of ideal forms, which, because humans have an innate understanding of what things are, must be the basis of our understanding things. For Husserl, these ideal forms must, therefore, be able to be identified and described from the things themselves as they show up in our consciousness and we do not need to rely on any presuppositions as to what things are. The methodology he developed for this project was phenomenology and developing and refining this phenomenology as well as carrying out phenomenological research became his lifelong project. By this description it is clear that Husserl's work was not addressing any fundamental concerns about ontology (what things are), it was philosophical research into

knowledge (epistemology), and his primary concern was to secure, for science, a basis for the certainty of knowledge. His approach did not challenge the accepted model of the Cartesian subject-object divide.

What is of interest is that Husserl's starting position is that we have an innate understanding of what things are. He then assumes the ontology, which is a substance ontology and links this to the concept of ideal forms as the basis for understanding. Heidegger takes the same starting point, that we have an innate understanding of what things are, but he *does not* assume the nature of the ontology. Instead, he argues that if we can establish the basis of our understanding of entities, then this is the ontological basis of the entity. He effectively takes the same starting point as Husserl, and then turns Husserl's approach on its head! In that our comportment (which has the structure of intentionality) towards useful things is based on our understanding of their 'functional fit', it is thus the functionality and not appearance that is the key to unlocking understanding the ontology of the thing!

Heidegger and Husserl

Husserl's, approach requires a fundamental presupposition, that what entities are, its being, is based in the entity itself. This is the standard position in the Tradition and is in contrast to Heidegger's view that the entity and its being are different. This leads Husserl to his theory that what is exhibited in each type of entity is a unique ideal form that humans have the innate ability to recognise. Because the form can only be discerned from the entity itself, his methodology only allows descriptions of the form to arise from direct experiences of the entity itself. Those experiences are, according to Husserl, what we encounter in our consciousness, and as such his phenomenology was focused on the experience of our encounter with entities as they showed up in consciousness.

This approach has merit in that it puts boundaries on what can be known in determining an entity and rules out considering unfounded presuppositions in reaching a fixed view as to what an entity is. If the approach were applied to, for example, the investigation of heat, it would have prevented scientists from positing heat as either phlogiston or caloric and left open alternative ways of investigating this entity. There are also some similarities with Peirce's concepts, albeit Peirce never develops a methodology based on his ideas as the basis for research.

Heidegger recognised in Husserl's work however that despite his injunction against

presuppositions, Husserl held some unchallenged presuppositions that impacted the direction of his research. The two most important are Husserl's acceptance of the basic character of consciousness and the concept of ideal forms. In Heidegger's view, both of these were in line with the traditional thinking typified by both Descartes and Kant. Husserl's holding to these presuppositions shaped his research in directions that, according to Heidegger, take him fundamentally in the wrong direction and was responsible for Husserl's "mangling" of phenomenology [IPR]. In other words, untested presuppositions are evident in Husserl's work notwithstanding it is this type of risk he was developing his version of phenomenology to address.

In Husserl's work, however, Heidegger also recognised that Husserl had identified an important phenomenon and had carried out important research associated with it. That phenomenon was that there is a difference between that which is given to us by way of perceptual experiences of an entity¹³⁶, what Husserl called the sensuous intuition and that which is the basis by which we know what the entity is, which Husserl named the categorial intuition [HCT]. The name indicates that we somehow know what entities are based on their categorial presentation within consciousness. Husserl believed that within our consciousness we were able to discern the ideal form of each entity and then apply this to any actual instance of that entity. A concept not all that dissimilar to that of Plato!

Heidegger recognises that the phenomenon is important, but rejects that it is based on categorial representation, this is yet another presupposition. If we recall the discussion concerning Aristotle, there is a difference in the application of his work in the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics*. The *Categories* is a useful way for 'natural scientists' to recognise, describe and classify entities, but it is not the basis of initially determining the being of entities. Aristotle argued, as does Heidegger that the determination of what entities are is a different question and must be addressed prior to work of the 'natural scientists'. There appears to be in Aristotle's work a recognition that there is a correlation between observed ways of being (categorial) of the entity and the basis of what an entity actually is (form). In other words, 'science' deals with the entity once it has come into being, which means once it is instantiated into matter, i.e. the physical. On this basis understanding the categorial aspects of the physically instantiated entity is a legitimate task for 'science'. This

¹³⁶ This is the same stance held by Plato and Aristotle.

relates to Heidegger's view of the relationship between his work and that of science as discussed in Chapter 11.

A fundamental mistake in applying Aristotle's work in science is to confuse the identification of an entity based on the categories with its form or essence. An even greater mistake, at least from a Heideggerian perspective, is to focus primarily on those categories that relate to the physical aspects of the entity and overlook the relational and functional aspects that are essential to its being. If we recall the discussion on biology, this is the mistake biologists make when looking at animals in isolation and why Heidegger was supportive of the approach of Uexküll, and why I introduced the work of the ethologists Lorenz and de Wall. As will become evident in the next chapter, Heidegger, when investigating the ready-to-hand, actually disregards the physical aspects of the entity and focuses on their relational aspects. A radically different, but appropriate, application to the Aristotelian categorial concept.

Husserl rather than exploring and applying Aristotle's concepts of form adopts the concept of Plato's forms, rejected by Aristotle, to support his approach. He does, however, reject the notion of the world of forms. Holding that the ideal form is present in the entity itself and that this is what we perceive in consciousness. As Husserl progressed in his work, he became increasingly focused on identifying the ideal form of things in our consciousness which he thought must be the basis of our understanding. At no time, so far as I am aware, does Husserl undertake any rigorous philosophical research concerning the metaphysical position that he is assuming, and he appears to end up with a hybrid form derived from Aristotle and Plato. This lack of philosophical rigour in Husserl's work exasperated Heidegger, which is evident in a letter he wrote to a friend, Karl Löwith dated 20th March 1923, he makes the following statement in recounting a seminar he has given on Husserl's *Ideas* (Husserl & Moran(forward), 2012)

... In the final hour of the seminar, I publicly burned and destroyed the Ideas to such an extent that I dare say the essential foundations for the whole [of my work] are now cleanly laid out. Looking back from this vantage to the Logical Investigations, I am now convinced that Husserl was never a philosopher, not even for one second in his life. [BH 374]

Husserl had moved to Freiberg in 1916 and Heidegger work as his assistant from 1920-1923. While Heidegger acknowledges the early work of Husserl and the influence of *Logical Investigations* (published in 1900-01), Heidegger's

disillusionment with Husserl's journey since *Logical Investigations* is evident. In part, I suspect because of Husserl's failure to follow through on his research program as outlined in the *Logical Investigations* and maintain a strict empiricist stance, instead drifting off into a form of transcendental idealism.

It was in the phenomenon associated with Husserl's discovery of categorial intuition that Heidegger recognises the possibility of a methodology to investigate being. This is the work published in the *Logical Investigations*. He also recognises the phenomenon as the same one that is evident in Greek philosophy in their quest to understand being and it was this recognition that Heidegger credits with sending him back to study the Greeks once more, but from this new perspective. [MWP].

While Husserl pursues his methodology as a program aligned with epistemology, Heidegger recognised in Husserl's work possibilities for investigating being, in other words it has applications for ontology. I suspect that seeing the possibilities associated with Husserl's early work is Heidegger's major breakthrough in his own project. While Heidegger specifically mentions[HCT] three key aspects of Husserl's work, categorial intuition, intentionality and the a priori, I also suspect that his work on mereology was also significant, and I address this later in the chapter. Heidegger takes this work then adapts, extends and applies them to his own work, without the constraints of Husserl's presuppositions and comes up with a radically new account of being. This is what is presented in *Being and Time*. Heidegger's stance on presuppositions is thus the most demanding and severe of all the empiricists.

Comportments Require an Understanding of Entities

Comportments are always comportment towards entities, however, what was not discussed earlier is that such comportments require an understanding of what the entity 'is'. This is what Hofstadter, the translator, of *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* is getting at in his introduction,

We cannot encounter entities and behave suitably toward them unless we understand them - in our very encounter and comportment - as being, in their being. The understanding of the being of entities is necessarily antecedent to the experience of them as entities. I cannot use a hammer as an instrument unless I already beforehand understand the instrumental functionality that is characteristic for hammer and hammering ... [BPP xviii]

In Heidegger's work what it is to understand something is a complex and difficult concept to grasp. This chapter aims to explain Heidegger's notion of what it is to understand something and his concept of 'phenomenological seeing'. As part of

this, I will explore the relationship between the entity as it is 'perceived' and the being of the entity as well as bring into view the two distinct components.

Because these two aspects of visual presentation and understanding are unified in our perception¹³⁷, they are not 'seen' as two aspects, and therefore we tend to attribute the understanding component (i.e. meaning) to what is visually presented. This results in an interpretative approach as to what things are based on the material characteristics of the entity which is responsible for that visual presentation. This is the reduction that is associated with the materialist or physicalist position as to what things are. Recalling Heidegger's reduction as part of his phenomenological method, he deliberately turns from the entity as given, to being, i.e. the basis by which we understand the entity. If we fail to recognise the two aspects of what is given to us when we perceive and understand an entity, then it is *impossible* to undertake phenomenological research based on Heidegger's method.

The Material Aspect is Not Denied

Heidegger does not deny that all entities are in some way founded on the material (what Heidegger calls present-at-hand) and further that there are entities that can be understood as the entities they are in terms of their simple presentation, i.e. categorial, for example, a rock¹³⁸ [BT 79/54]. This is simply a statement concerning the basis of understanding and not an articulation of the structure of being of these entities. Heidegger is indicating that in these cases this will be related to whatever it is that 'produces' the categorial aspects, he does not explore this. In the case of entities understood in their 'present-at-hand' mode science typically has a 'correct', if not technically specific, understanding of being and proceeds accordingly [BT]. This is not to suggest, as has been previously indicated, that science has a correct understanding of the being of nature[BT].

The distinction between understanding material 'stuff' as material 'stuff' in its own right, and when the material is used to produce something else is the same phenomenon that Aristotle is getting at in his distinction between simple entities and compound or hylomorphic entities. Similarly, Heidegger does not deny that those

¹³⁷ I have already discussed intentionality as a unified phenomenon. What this indicates is that there is an associated unified phenomenon, that of understanding-perceiving.

¹³⁸ Even here there are some complexities with how we understand the present-at-hand. However, by and large Heidegger accepts the traditional view for basic material objects, so long as they are not incorporated into our life and have not become an object of our comportment.

entities to which we comport, what he calls the ready-to-hand, have what he calls a foundational relationship with the present-at-hand, it is simply that the present-at-hand is not what determines the ready-to-hand entity as the entity they are as the ready-to-hand. This is no different to Aristotle's claim that the bronze is not what determines the sphere when we see a bronze sphere. There is something else at play.

That Heidegger accepts the material basis of things is easily demonstrated. For example, in relation to Dasein, he accepts that there is the body,

... for even entities which are not worldless - Dasein itself, for example - are present-at-hand 'in' the world, or, more exactly, *can* with some right and within certain limits be *taken* as merely present-at-hand. To do this, one must completely disregard or just not see the existential state of being-in¹³⁹. [BT 82/56]

Heidegger's reference to "wordless" will be addressed in the next few chapters. About those entities to which we comport (the ready-to-hand) Heidegger makes it clear that

... only by reason of something present-at-hand, 'is there' anything ready-to-hand. [BT 101/71]

In other words, the material is required to bring something ready-to-hand into being, and in this the Aristotelian bronze sphere is a good example. Care must be taken with these statements otherwise traditional ways of thinking keep creeping in, a difficulty I still have¹⁴⁰. That physical stuff is present (present-at-hand) *does not mean* that this is what is responsible for bringing these entities into being, what constitutes them. Heidegger makes it clear, for example, that even though "only by reason of something present-at-hand, 'is there' anything ready-to-hand" this does not mean it is "ontologically founded" (how the entity is constituted) upon the "presence-at-hand" [BT 101/71].

One of the reasons that I am focusing on this point is that it is essential for the understanding of caring for people in any health setting, particularly nursing homes that we distinguish between the body and the person. While the body is essential for bringing the person into being, *the body is not the person*, and yet the preponderance of activity in a nursing home is in addressing the needs of the body. Even if there is a unthematized understanding of this fact, there will be some

¹³⁹ Being-in is part of the structure of being-in-the-world which is the structure that constitutes Dasein.

¹⁴⁰ φ

presupposition of what the person is that creeps in and informs the way we engage with them. In other words, how we understand the person in the nursing home will be reflected in our comportments towards them! In itself, this is a topic future Heideggerian research. However, unless we have a thematic understanding of what it is to be a person, properly grounded in the being of the person, we are at risk of causing unintentional harm. My claim, and it is the motivation for this thesis, is that this is what is happening. Clarification is therefore needed. Understanding the difference and the relationship between the present-at-hand, the ready-to-hand and Dasein is critical.

'Phenomenological Seeing' is Hard

One of the significant challenges that I have been attempting to point out is in overcoming the pull of seeing things only in terms of the physical so as to 'see' what it is that contributes to our understanding. Heidegger calls this 'phenomenological seeing' [MWP, ZS]. Reiterating the prior discussions, the 'focus' on that which contributes to our understanding is the same that determines entities as the entities they are, namely being. My stance in Heidegger's work is that we should *never* regard being simply as the basis for the intelligibility of entities, i.e. understanding. Intelligibility for Heidegger has the same basis as that which determines entities as the entities they are, i.e. the being of the entity. This is why Heidegger's work is ontological.

Heidegger recounts the difficulty in grasping the mode of inquiry based on phenomenological 'seeing' in his autobiographical essay, *My Way to Phenomenology*. In the essay, he talks of how he repeatedly read Husserl's *Logical Investigations* during his university years to understand Husserl's methods but that all his "efforts were in vain"[MWP 75]. It was not until Husserl moved to Freiburg University, where Heidegger was working, that, as he recounts, he "met Husserl personally in his workshop" following which "my perplexity decreased slowly, my confusion dissolved laboriously". [MWP 75] Heidegger then goes on,

Husserl's teaching took place in the form of a step-by-step training in phenomenological "seeing" which at the same time demanded that one relinquish the untested use of philosophical knowledge. But it also demanded that one give up introducing the authority of the great thinkers into the conversation. [MWP 78]

As indicated, the central point of this phenomenological 'seeing' is to be able to separate what I call the 'raw' perceptual or visual presentation of an object from what

it is that gives the object we see its meaning as the entity it 'is'.

Not dissimilar to Heidegger's experience I read his text many times and did not fully grasp what this point was getting at. When I saw a coffee cup, all I saw was a coffee cup! No matter how hard I tried what stood before me was a coffee cup. It took me several years of reading, identifying and removing the influence of other ways of understanding and of constructing examples and thought experiments until I finally 'saw' and understood. Even when I could experience the phenomenon, it was not until I took what I had acquired into my reading of Aristotle's work that the understanding started to consolidate. This does not mean that I have learnt and mastered all the tools, far from it, but I do believe I am on 'my way'.

Comportments¹⁴¹ and the priority of Understanding

In the previous chapter, the concept of lived experiences as comportments was discussed and the intentional structure of the comportment was outlined which described the two aspects of a unified phenomenon. As I have been discussing implicit in this is the necessity of first understanding the entity as the entity, it is in order to comport towards it. This is the thrust of the following key passage from *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*;

Something like being reveals itself to us in the understanding of being [Seinsverständnis], it is an understanding of being [Verstehen von Sein] that lies at the root of all comportment towards entities. Comportments toward entities belong to a particular entity, which we are ourselves, the human Dasein. It is this understanding of being which first of all makes possible every comportment toward entities. [BPP 16] (Translation modified)

This passage is restating one of the main points of the last chapter, that the comportments are part of us as an entity. However, it is making two additional and related points about Dasein. Firstly, that an understanding of the being of entities (what an entity is) is what makes comportments possible and secondly, that the understanding of being, and hence any structure that supports it must come before comportments. While not of significance to this thesis, this very point is part of Heidegger's criticisms of Husserl. A central plank to Husserl's theory is that we have an intentional relationship with things in the world, and his method involves

¹⁴¹ In these comportments Heidegger is taking the average everyday situation in which we are dealing with things familiar to us, not unusual cases when we encounter strange objects. The sort of entities Heidegger is referring to the common everyday items we use, e.g. coffee cups, pens, desks, chairs and so on. These are the exemplar case in which he explores understanding. We do encounter strange and unfamiliar objects and there is certainly some understanding present in those encounters, but it is a derivative mode of understanding and not typical of our normal encounters and as such are not good objects for investigation

investigating and applying an understanding of intentionality itself as the basis of 'true' knowledge'. Heidegger points out that there is a prior task to be done, investigating the nature of being of entities prior to undertaking the type of research in which Husserl is engaged.

From a Heideggerian perspective, whenever we comport ourselves towards an entity there is implicit in that comportment an understanding of what the entity is, its being. If we did not have any understanding of what entities are then, we could not engage or relate to entities appropriately and as such this understanding of being thus "lies at the root of all comportment".¹⁴² In that comportments are the basis of our way of being Dasein (refer the last section) and given that an understanding of being is the basis of comportments, then the conclusion is

Understanding of being is itself a determination of being of Dasein [BTs 11/12]¹⁴³

Understanding then is a 'structural' aspect, i.e. it is an *existentiale* [BT 182/142], and Heidegger names it as a part of the structure of being-in-the-world, specifically part of being-in (BT Ch 5). Given that having an understanding of being is constitutive of Dasein it is ontological. However, at the ontic level we have an understanding of being as part of our daily lives, hence Heidegger's conclusion;

Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it *is* ontological. [BT 32/12]

This follows from the following:

- Dasein's essence (existence) is its comportments (lived experiences) towards entities
- Comportments are constituted on the basis of our understanding of the being of the entities to which we comport,
- The understanding of the being of entities is thus constitutive of the individual Dasein.

This is reflected in various comments Heidegger makes about Dasein, e.g.

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence [lived experiences of

¹⁴² In other words, as humans we are able to understand what an edible red berry is from a poisonous one, a chair from a table, a pen from a screw driver, and so on and on the basis of this understanding deal with (comport) with these entities appropriately. If the human species did not have this understanding of the being of entities we would not have developed the various cultures we have throughout history, we would not be the human creatures we are!

¹⁴³ The passage is from the Stambaugh translation as the Macquarrie and Robinson translation does not capture this important constitutive aspect of understanding of being: "*Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being.*" [BT 32/12]

comportments] [BT 33/12[(my gloss)

Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids - in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally concerned. [BT 155/119]

It is based on this unique, defining character of Dasein as being ontico-ontological that Heidegger selects Dasein as the entity with which to commence his main project, the meaning of being in its most primordial sense (refer earlier discussion). As Heidegger presents it,

If to Interpret the meaning of being becomes our task, Dasein is not only the primary entity to be interrogated; it is also that entity which already comports itself, in its being, towards what we are asking about when we ask this question. [BT 35/15]

Heidegger's strategy then is to use the fact that we are determined, in part, by our understanding of being as the basis of his inquiry into the meaning of being.

Two Meanings of the 'understanding of being'

Before proceeding I want to clarify two ways in which Heidegger uses the term 'understanding of being', and I repeat the quote from *Basic Problems* used above,

Something like being reveals itself to us in the understanding of being [Seinsverständnis], it is an understanding of being [Verstehen von Sein] that lies at the root of all comportment towards entities. Comportments toward entities belong to a particular entity, which we are ourselves, the human Dasein. It is this understanding of being which first of all makes possible every comportment toward entities. [BPP 16] (I have added the German) (Translation modified) (my underlining)

In the English translation, Hofstadter does not include the German words translated as 'understand of being'. It was the repetition of this phrase that sent me to the German edition [BPPg] to clarify what Heidegger was getting at.

The German translated as 'understanding of being' in the first instance is *Seinsverständnis* and in the second, *Verstehen von Sein*. In both cases the translation is correct however Heidegger is differentiating between two uses of 'understanding of being' that does to come through in the English.

In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger explains,

... the conceiving of an entity; or, more generally and cautiously, ... the apprehending of an entity ... is what we call, among other things, Seinsverständnis, the understanding of being, which we shall now be investigating more minutely. We say "understanding of being," "Seinsverständnis," because this understanding is not necessarily an explicit concept. [BBP 83]

However, this is to be distinguished from *Verstehen von Sein* (understanding of being) which Heidegger explains

... is that which, in apprehending and in grasping, is thrown over against, lies over against as the graspable, more exactly, ... that which is conceived as such in the conceiving [i.e. comportment], the conceptual contents or, as is also said, the meaning. [BPP83-4] (my gloss & underlining)

The Verstehen von Sein (I call this understanding of being 1 as it is prior to 2) is the deeper understanding of the meaning of being itself. It is that which constitutes the entity as the entity, whereas *Seinsverständnis* (understanding of being 2) is the application of this understanding in the understanding of the object as the object it is.

We can thus only understand entities as the entities they are (2) because we have this ability as Dasein to understand being, i.e. what constitutes entities (1). Understanding (2) can only occur on the basis of understanding (1). This does not mean we are aware of the basis of (1), we are not. This is Heidegger's point. It is an unthematic understanding, what he calls pre-ontological.

So whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of being is other than that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein's own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological understanding of being is comprised as a definite characteristic. [BT 33/13]

This pre-ontological understanding is not cognitive; it is not an ability we acquire, it is *who we are*. It is when we attempt to formalise the what it is to be an entity and do so in simplistic materialist terms that things go astray. Further, this 'going astray' has repercussions when we trust the formalised account rather than the intuitive account. For example, we have constructed nursing homes on the 'formalised' 'materialist' account of being, and yet the evidence is clear that the 'person' is suffering. Based on hundreds of conversations over the years, there are many nurses and care workers who sense that there is something wrong, cannot precisely identify the problem but feel powerless to do anything. Marion Miller's story points to the same phenomenon.

Heidegger's research is to use our ability to understand what things are (2) to get at the deeper level (1) Hofstadter, the translator of *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* spells this out more clearly in the introduction,

... the human Dasein always already encounters entities in terms of a pre-ontological, pre-conceptual, non-conceptual grasp of their being. Ontology as a scientific discipline is then

nothing but the unfolding, in the light proper to thought and therefore in conceptual form, of this pre-conceptual understanding-of-being, Seinsverständnis. It is the ... conceptual comprehension, of what earlier was grasped only in the immediateness of the living encounter. [BPP xxiii]

In *Being and Time* Heidegger repeatedly states we have this pre-ontological understanding, but it is expressed in its most emphatic form when he states,

But this vague average understanding of being is still a Fact. [BT 25/5]

He describes this pre-ontological understanding in a number of ways, all in the same paragraph, as “average”, “unilluminated”, “obscured” and “vague” [BT 6/25] all referring to the fact that we do not know the basis of this understanding, and this gives him his project;

The very fact that we already live in an understanding of being and that the meaning of being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again. [BT 23/4]

Verstehen von Sein (understand of being 1) is not only that on the basis of which an entity is what it is, i.e. being, but it is clear that this is the source of the *meaning* of entities. The critical implication of this is that the basis of the meaning (i.e. being) of a perceived entity is not found in the entity itself as understanding (2), it is found elsewhere, in whatever is the source of being.

This has implications for Heideggerian based social science research that is seeking to investigate the meaning of particular lived experiences. It is not found in the lived experiences themselves, the understanding of being (2), it has to be gleaned from an understanding of being (1). This thesis is exploring the meaning of ‘shedding life’. I started on the basis that the answer was to be found in a close examination of lived experiences (based on understanding 2) it took me some time to recognise I needed to have a deeper understanding (1) which meant having an understanding of Heidegger’s being-in-the-world. Hence the heavy emphasis placed on explicating *Verstehen von Sein*.¹⁴⁴

If we go back to the earlier discussions of Heidegger’s understanding of being as an underlying organising principle, then in relation to Dasein Heidegger is claiming we are accessing this via our understanding of the structure of being-in-the-world. Being, as the organising principle, that which is prevailing in entities, that which determines the entity as the entity it is, is formal understood as *Verstehen von Sein*

¹⁴⁴ φ

(understanding).

This also applies to the understanding of present-at-hand entities. As I have previously pointed out, the being of gold is not found in its categorial description; this is the basis by which we understand gold as a certain metal (understanding 2). The being of gold (understanding 1), that which determines gold as gold, must be sought in the organising principles that 'produce' the entity with the particular categorial characteristics we observe, but, in turn, the organising principles must be consistent with all the other base elements. When we find this, we have an understanding of the being (1) of the class of entities, base elements, and we will have an account of how the organising principles bring each base element into being, i.e. the elemental entity we perceive. This is the fundamental takeaway lesson from Parmenides; entities do not fundamentally erupt into being out of nothing, there must be some *a priori* happening.

We are thus *not creatures who make meaning* we are creatures who by the very nature *are compelled to understand* meaning, because of

.. the average understanding of being in which we always operate and which in the end *belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself.* [BT 28/8]

However, as already indicated, this does not mean we get it right all the time, or that it is always a complete understanding as

Not only, however, does an understanding of being belong to Dasein; but this understanding develops or decays along with whatever kind of being Dasein may possess at the time [BT 37/16]

Heidegger's practice typically, but not always, entails him using the same or similar words to describe the ontological structure he is talking about (e.g. *Verstehen von Sein*) and to describe the experience at the ontic level (e.g. *Seinsverständnis*). While there may be subtle differences in the German, as in the case of understanding, this is often lost in the English. As I have demonstrated identifying the way in which Heidegger uses words and applies them at the ontological and the ontic level is of significant benefit in understanding Heidegger's *Being and Time*. This is a hard-won lesson.

Section Two: Understanding 'understanding of being'

In this section, I explore the idea of the 'understanding of being' (*Seinsverständnis*) that we have as Dasein. The direction of inquiry for this section is provided by

various comments made by Heidegger in the *History of the Concept of Time* concerning categorial intuition which he acknowledges as a genuine discovery by Husserl and which he adapts and extends as part of this understanding of being. In this section, I will discuss not only the concept of categorial intuition but also the theory of wholes and parts and Husserl's idea of founding. All three of these concepts appear in Heidegger's work, albeit significantly changed regarding their application. My aim is not to give a rigorous account of Husserl's work and then trace its adaptation and development by Heidegger, that is a different project, it is simply to introduce the concepts and to demonstrate them.

Much the initial phenomenological research of this work is carried out by Husserl in his seminal works called *Logical Investigations* (Husserl, 2001a, 2001b) It was in reading the relevant sections of this work to gain a better understanding of categorial intuition that I discovered Husserl's work on wholes and parts (the study of which is called Mereology). It is clear that Heidegger has been influenced by both the broad concept of categorial intuition but also aspects of Husserl's work in mereology.

My account has drawn on various works in including those by Husserl (Husserl, 1989, 2001a, 2001b) Heidegger [HCT] and others (Moran & Cohen, 2012; Moran, 2000)

Edmund Husserl - Background

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) initial education was in mathematics gaining his PhD in Mathematics in 1883. He commenced a long teaching career in philosophy commencing at the University of Halle in 1887 and ending with his retirement at the University of Frieberg in 1928. During the latter part of the nineteenth century through to the early part of the twentieth century, science was going through a tumultuous period. A number of events had raised serious concerns over knowledge and challenged the idea of the certainty of knowledge and the basis by which knowledge could be accessed. Aristotelian logic, the bedrock of 'logic inquiry' for over two thousand years was being replaced by developments of Gottlob Frege (1848-1925). The certainty of Euclidean geometry as *the* way to understanding space was shaken by hyperbolic geometry developed concurrently by János Bolyai (1802-1860) and Nikolai Lobachevsky (1792 -1856), followed by Bernhard Riemann's (1826-1866) Riemannian geometry. In both cases, the new geometries were developed after casting aside a central postulate Euclid had set down and, in part, was the basis of his system. There was also the debate over the nature of heat

to which to which I have already referred, the cascading impact of the Darwin-Wallace theory of evolution published in 1858 and many others. The upheaval continued well into the twentieth century with Einstein's theories of special and general relativity which emerged, in part, because Einstein relinquished presuppositions concerning both the nature of time and space and the accepted character of matter itself was being questioned by the new field of quantum mechanics.

Husserl's philosophical project can be understood as a response to this perceived crisis concerning the nature of knowledge and the need to anchor knowledge in certainty. This is evident in his *Logical Investigations* published in 1900-01 through to the publication of one of his last books *The Crisis of European Sciences and a Transcendental Knowledge* (Husserl & Carr (Introduction), 1970) originally published in 1936. During this period, there was also a debate concerning how we access knowledge, and a strong view was contained in the form known as psychologism. This is the view that we do not have direct access to nature, and what we experience is determined by our psychology as such the knowledge and associated laws of nature are either grounded and/or explained by reference to our psychology, not by access to the 'real' world. Husserl's project can also be seen as an attack on psychologism. While still maintaining an anti-psychologistic stance, Husserl's views shifted significantly from the *Logical Investigations* (Husserl, 2001a, 2001b) which reflects a realist position, to *Ideas* (Husserl & Moran (forward), 2012), where he takes up a Kantian stance and argues that understand based on ideal forms. Husserl's work shifts to a form of transcendental idealism as the basis of knowledge.

The influential aspect of Husserl's work for Heidegger comes, as is probably evident, from *Logical Investigations* and he rejects Husserl's later developments. Before moving on to these aspects, I will give a rudimentary account of Husserl's method concerning the acquisition of knowledge.

An Husserlian Approach to Describing What an Entity Is

Husserl's fundamental premise was that the experiences we have are of the 'real' world things themselves and moreover, we all have the same innate capacity to have the same experiential understanding of the entities. Properly understood and interpreted these experiences can thus provide the certain basis for grounding knowledge, a necessary condition, from Husserl's perspective, for any science. Put another way, science should not and need not 'guess' or put forward unnecessary

presuppositions as to its knowledge of an entity. We can determine this by a phenomenological interpretation of our experiences of the entity as presented to consciousness.

Husserl's approach was to identify and describe the essence of an entity, and by essence, he meant whatever was the categorial aspect necessarily present in each instance of the same type of entity that accounts for our knowing it as the entity it is. He called this the ideal form. By way of a simple example, I will give an account of how to describe the essence of a letterbox, the example I introduced in a preliminary manner earlier.

An important method in Husserl's approach is what he calls 'eidetic variation'. These are essentially a series of thought experiments that are carried out to isolate the essential categorial components of an entity such that a descriptive account of its essence is then possible. In relation to a letterbox, it involves first identifying all the various categorial properties associated with a letterbox and then subjecting them to variation. For example, if all other categorial properties are held consonant and the colour is changed it is still understood as a letterbox, and so colour can be ruled out as an essential feature. The size can be varied, either reduced or increased, and there will be a point where it is either too small or too large to be understood as a letterbox. Likewise, the shape can be varied, perhaps considering shapes such as a cylinder, a cube, a rectangular box shape and with each change consideration is given to its intelligibility as a letterbox. This process is continued through all relevant categorial properties until the sufficient and necessary determinants are identified and described. At this point the basis by which we understand a letterbox has been identified and described, i.e. we have our definition as an ideal categorial description.

Common physical objects are reasonably straightforward, but then there is the challenge of determining the essence of such things as a musical note, desire and so on. In that, each of these entities is capable of being understood as the entity Husserl claims that in each case there must be some defining essential categorial 'definition' that we intuit, which gives us knowledge. He saw the task of his phenomenology to identify and describe the essences for all the entities relevant to the various sciences. Certain knowledge of things is thus based on knowing the essential definition or form applicable to each entity. In effect, the knowledge we carry around is not the memory of the countless thousands of varieties that may

exist for each species of entity; it is the knowledge of the categorial form.

For Husserl, then we perceive something, say a coffee cup, there are two aspects in the perception, there is the *sensuous intuition* of the object and what he calls the *categorial intuition* which gives us the meaning of the object of the coffee cup. Intuitions are Husserl's names for what is experienced in consciousness. The categorial intuition is something not given by the senses but is rather what occurs in our consciousness.

On this basis, Husserl is relatively consistent with the tradition from an ontological perspective. His innovation is the epistemological approach he brings to it, based on having a categorial intuition of what things are (Husserl, 1989, 2001a, 2001b). This is not unlike Plato's ideal forms except that Husserl places them in consciousness whereas Plato had them in the world of forms. In Husserl's work, we thus see the way in which insights from previous philosophers can be pulled together. He synthesises various aspects of Plato (ideal forms), Aristotle (categories), Descartes (mind/world subject/object) and Kant (the active role of the mind in determining perceptions, transcendental idealism) into phenomenology as a way to explore the essence of things as part of a theory of knowledge. As mentioned this does not mean he takes over the explicit accounts and detailed theories of these philosophers, it is more the fundamental insights which are then applied in a novel way.

While *Logical Investigations* was marked by a realist ontology, Husserl moved progressively into transcendental idealism in his pursuit of a "pure phenomenology" and added increasing complexity to his methodology, e.g. the transcendental reduction, and in so doing became increasingly isolated from most of his former students and followers. (Crowell, 2009; Moran, 2000; Spiegelberg, 1994) It is this turn towards idealism that takes Husserl on an investigative journey deep into the workings of consciousness in pursuit of the pure ego as the source of the unity of our experiences. (Husserl & Moran(forward), 2012; Husserl, 1999) It is this development in Husserl's work, which started to emerge after *Logical Investigations* and before Heidegger's encounter with Husserl at Freiberg, that leads Heidegger to talk about "Husserl's mangling" of phenomenology[IPR]. For Heidegger, the active role of the mind in determining knowledge places Husserl in a direct lineage from Descartes and Kant;

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant subsequently undertook for the first time a systematic analysis of Descartes's starting point regarding the determination of the objectivity of the object. With his phenomenology, Husserl defined, unfolded, and gave a foundation to Kant's position on this [matter] [ZS 119]

Demonstrating Categorical Intuition

Without addressing Husserl's theory, it is important to have a grasp of the phenomenon he has in view when he talks about the difference between sensuous and categorical intuition, remembering that it is this discovery that was crucial for Heidegger in his work. It is the phenomenon itself and not Husserl's theoretical understanding of it that is important.

To demonstrate the difference between sensuous intuition and what he terms categorical intuition it would be preferable to have some familiar and unfamiliar objects to physically present, however, this is not possible in a written work. Instead, I will initially use some words which are not in common uses, words in differing scripts and then some photographs of (hopefully) unfamiliar objects. The aim is to create a situation in which the experience of seeing a sensuous intuition and not knowing its meaning (categorical intuition) and seeing the same sensuous intuition and knowing the meaning can be contrasted.

Example 1: Unfamiliar words

By way of note, the use of words in this way is not quite the same as a physical object because there is a sense in which the word itself interposes itself between us and the object it 'represents'. The use of words as object thus results in some blurring of the phenomenal experience, but I think the example will suffice.

When reading a word, we typically do not distinguish between the visual presentation of the word itself and the meaning that accompanies that word, it simply shows up as a word that is familiar, something we understand, but the two components are there nonetheless. This can be demonstrated by looking at words with which we are unfamiliar. We recognize the visual presentation as a word (a very deficient level of understanding) but not the meaning. For example, the words¹⁴⁵ given in the box below will present as a possible word, but I suspect at least one will have no meaning. The idea is not to ponder over them but to simply look at them and in that moment of initial looking check your experience. It could

¹⁴⁵ All the words are found online and checked with The Free Dictionary (<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/>) as at 19 May 2017

be 'I know the word', 'It looks like a word, but I do not know its meaning' or perhaps 'Just a few meaningless letters';

crepuscular, tmesis, nebbish, schwa, zeugma, paralipsis, oenophile.

The word meanings are presented in Appendix 4. Take one word that was previously unfamiliar, read the meaning and apply it in a few sentences. Now re-look at the word in the list. There is probably a slight shift in the experience. It has now become a little familiar. As the words are understood and used they become more and more familiar, the acquisition of the meaning changes the experience with the word of how the word is perceived. However, the actual 'visual' presentation of the word does not change. Something has been added to the experience. The phenomenon I am attempting to isolate and demonstrate is the shift in the experience of understanding, given that the sensual perception remains constant.

Example 2: Unfamiliar script

The example can be pushed further by altering the visual presentation. Have a quick look at the words in the following box;

बिरालो; القط ; แมว; 貓

I suspect that at least one of these scripts will not mean anything. The sense of familiarity that was present, even when seeing an unfamiliar English word is even further diminished. Even in an unfamiliar English word we recognise the letters and have a sense that a word is being presented. Changing the script removes this. The identification of each script and the meaning of the word is given in the footnote.¹⁴⁶

While the markings look like a script, it would not be hard to convince someone that I have made them up mimicking the script of a foreign language. The visual presentation which has a vague sense of a foreign language and thus *possibly* means something then becomes nonsensical markings, meaningless pattern. This would be the equivalent of me presenting the markings 'xzwqtg' to an English reader for whom it would show up as nonsense, whereas to a non-English reader familiar only with, say Arabic script I suspect that 'xzwqtg' may show up as *possibly* meaning

¹⁴⁶ Each visual presentation represents the same word in Nepalese, Arabic, Thai and Chinese --cat.

something; it would be an interesting experiment.

However, in each case, the 'raw' visual presentation of the English words or the foreign language script is identical regardless of our understanding of the meaning. A Nepalese or Arabic reader, for example, sees *exactly* the same markings on the page; it is the meaning that has changed. The experience of unfamiliarity is associated with 'not understanding' the meaning, not in any failing associated with the visual representation. This difference in experience is attributed to the 'categorical intuition', not the sensuous intuition. This notion of familiarity is used by Heidegger in *Being and Time*, for example

Dasein ... is 'in' the world in the sense that it deals with entities encountered within-the-world, and does so concernfully and with familiarity. [BT 138/104]

In this passage, the reference to "concernfully" addresses the structure of a comportment and "familiarity" addresses the pre-ontological understanding that Dasein has. I think Heidegger has accurately identified and named the phenomenon associated with this mode of understanding; it reflects knowing something so well we are comfortable with it, it 'feels' familiar.

More Complex Examples

On the following two pages, are photographs of four unusual objects. When looking at the objects, without trying to guess what they are, simply observe if they are familiar or not. This will occur immediately the object is perceived. As in the case of the unfamiliar words, there will already be some minimal understanding, i.e. it is a tool of some sort, it is manufactured, it is used for something, etc. It is not possible to present a 'tool' to someone in the culture without there already existing this minimal level of understanding.

On the page following the photographs, I have given a brief description of each item. When the descriptions are read, and the objects are again looked at they are now seen 'as' something more definite. There still may be a sense of unfamiliarity, but the experience of perceiving the objects is now different. The objects could be presented again, this time with some variations to materials, colour and so on and it is likely that we would now recognise them.



Photograph 1 Object A

Description:
Glass Concave



Photograph 2 Object B

Description:
Length – approx. 18cm – Metal
body – wood top



Description:

Approx. 18cm long - Metal spikes each approx. 5mm

Photograph 3 Object C



Description:

Height - approx. 18cm – wooden base – metal concave top

Photograph 4 Object D

Object A:

A vintage Lillicrap Hone for sharpening razor blades. The blades were flat two-edged safety blades. The blade was placed in the hone and move back and forth, turned and the action repeated. The friction of the blade edge against the glass 'honed' the razor's edge, sharpening the blade. [photo:

(Lillicrap hone - Uranium Glass Razor Blade Sharpener. anon, n.d.)]



*Photograph 5 Razor blade used in hone
Image: (Gillette Platinum-Plus. anon, unknown date)*

Object B:

An early British Grenadier (soldier) match case. Grenades at the time were small, hollow metal balls with gunpowder and sealed with a wooden plug which contained the fuse. The soldier carried a piece of slow-burning cord called a slow match to light the fuses. The slow match was carried in the brass container attached to their shoulder belt. [photo: (Slow-fuse. anon, n.d.)]

Object C:

This is a tool that used to be used by sock/wharf workers to move burlap bales. The handle was held in one hand, and the spikes grabbed the burlap making the bales easier to move. [photo: (Dock workers bale hook. anon, n.d.)]

Object D:

This is a mould for lens making. The grinding paste is put into the mould, and the glass worked against the mould to form the shape. [photo (Mold for making glass lenses. anon, n.d.)]

For Husserl, once we have knowledge of a baling hook we can recognise the essential form in each of the baling hooks and on this basis know them as baling hooks! For Heidegger, the basis of what it is to be a baling hook cannot lie in the material from; it lies elsewhere. For Heidegger, as I will explore in the next chapters, it is the relational context in which the tool is used. This is a profound difference in understanding what things are. Even intuitively there is a sense in which Heidegger 'feels' right. As we read the descriptions of what the entities are we are placing them in context, a relational context with other entities, we try to understand how they fit in, i.e. their 'functional fit' in a relational network of other useful things.

Theory of parts and Wholes

Another aspect of Husserl's work that is informative and useful in understanding the concepts Heidegger uses in *Being and Time* is the third Investigation¹⁴⁷ of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (Husserl, 2001a, 2001b) titled *On the Theory of Wholes and Parts*. The study of parts and their relationship to other parts and the whole has been a topic that has attracted philosophical attention since the time of the ancient Greeks. However, it is Husserl's investigation published in *Logical Investigations* that is regarded as one of the first major studies in contemporary philosophy and established it as a field of inquiry. (Tieszen, 1995; Varzi, 2016)

The study of the relationship between wholes and parts is called mereology and in the *Mereology* entry in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* Varzi gives examples of ways in which parts can be parts of whole not just physically but spatially and temporally (Varzi, 2016);

Broadly speaking, in English, we can use 'part' to indicate any portion of a given entity. The portion may itself be attached to the remainder, as in (1), or detached, as in (2); it may be cognitively or functionally salient, as in (1)–(2), or arbitrarily demarcated, as in (3); self-connected, as in (1)–(3), or disconnected, as in (4); homogeneous or otherwise well-matched, as in (1)–(4), or gerrymandered, as in (5); material, as in (1)–(5), or immaterial, as in (6); extended, as in (1)–(6), or unextended, as in (7); spatial, as in (1)–(7), or temporal, as in (8); and so on.

- (1) The handle is part of the mug.
- (2) The remote control is part of the stereo system.
- (3) The left half is your part of the cake.
- (4) The cutlery is part of the tableware.
- (5) The contents of this bag are only part of what I bought.
- (6) That area is part of the living room.

¹⁴⁷ There are six investigations published in 2 volumes and they all related to phenomenology and the theory of knowledge.

(7) The outermost points are part of the perimeter.

(8) The first act was the best part of the play.

The concept also applies to such things as; an element in a mixture (flour in a cake), membership (e.g. goalie in a soccer team), geometry (e.g. arc of a circle), grammar (e.g. noun as a part of grammar, a letter as a part of a word), logic (e.g. sequences, relationship between propositions and conclusions), mathematics (e.g. set theory) and so on.

All the above aspects of wholes and parts are touched on by Husserl who understood

... the word 'part' in the *widest* sense: we may call anything a 'part' that can be distinguished 'in' an object, or, objectively phrased, that is 'present' in it. (Husserl, 2001b, p. 5)

The concept is extended to anything that can be considered a "predicate" of an object including its colour, shape and so on. Husserl was initially a mathematician and logician, and this is evident in his investigation of parts and wholes where he often set out relationships as laws, for example, this statement relating to non-independence,

A content A is relatively non-independent in regard to a content B (or in regard to the total range of contents determined by B and all its parts), if a pure law, rooted in the peculiar character of the kinds of content in question, ensures that a content of the pure Genus A has an a priori incapacity to exist except in, or as associated with, other contents from the total ranges of the pure Genera of contents determined by B. (Husserl, 2001b, p. 22)

As can be seen, the field of mereology is extensive and once it starts to get formalised in terms of logic and set theory can become complex very quickly. The above examples also indicate that the concepts of wholes and parts pervade every aspect of our lives in how we understand things and in the language we use, we are just not aware of it. Another thing to note is that mereology overlaps with a Categorial approach, it is examining a number of the same phenomenon but from a different perspective. Understood in this way, it is possible to see how Husserl used the concepts of parts and wholes as part of his broad account of categorial intuition. How Husserl applied the work is not of concern for the thesis. The aim is simply to bring the phenomenon into view.

One aspect that does not stand out in the above examples is the concept of meaning or understanding which was the aspect that Husserl was primarily interested in. For example, when we look at a coffee cup we see a unity, a whole, the coffee cup as one thing. However, it is possible for us to focus on the cup's colour, its shape, size,

components, contents and so on. However, it is also possible to understand any of these aspects separate to the cup and in relations to other objects. Echoes of Aristotle's analysis of the relationship between categories can be heard in this account, albeit Husserl is perusing the analysis with far more precision than is evident in the extant Aristotelian texts.

Seeing Things as Whole

In discussing the concept of wholes and parts, reference is often made to the Gestalt psychologists who investigated various aspects of how things show up for us and it was the Gestaltists who popularised concepts such as gestalt, figure-ground and the 'sum is greater than the whole'. The investigations by the Gestaltists were influential in the early twentieth century, and Heidegger attributes the credit for the initial discoveries that the Gestaltists built upon to Husserl, I provide a brief account of the relationship between Husserl and the Gestaltists in Appendix 5.

A simple everyday example of perceiving things as a whole is seeing a car. We see the car as a single unity and do not first identify wheels, doors, bonnet, headlights, bumpers, etc. and add them together. Our typical mode of encountering entities in the world is just to see the 'big green car'. On Husserl's account, the perception of the car is based on the combination of the visual intuition, and the categorial intuition (the categorial form of the car) and Husserl calls these 'moments of unity'.

We can, of course, identify parts in a whole and Husserl distinguishes two types, those parts whose existences are dependent on the car, e.g. the car is green, the car is a sedan, and those parts that can have a separate existence, e.g. the car doors, the car headlights, etc. All these parts are entities in their own right, indicated by being able to make statements such as "The car *is* green", "That *is* a door". Again, the similarities to Aristotle's categories is evident.

While there are some wholes that do not contain parts, for example, a spoon, Husserl calls these simple wholes, most entities are complex wholes comprising a number of parts, e.g. a car or a cutlery set. Wholes then can be parts of other wholes, e.g. a spoon as part of a cutlery set, or a door as part of a car. Cars can, in turn, be part of a whole, e.g. fleet. From this example, it is easy to see how this idea flows across to mathematics and set theory. There is the set of all spoons, the set of all cutlery sets, and the set of all spoons not part of a cutlery set and so on. By way of another example, I can see a whole bed, which is part of a whole bedroom

which in turn is a part of a whole house which in turn is part of the street and so on. Heidegger uses a very similar example albeit he does not use the language of parts and whole,

... desk in the classroom, the classroom in the university building, the building in the city of Marburg, Marburg in Hessen, in Germany, in Europe, on Earth, in a solar system, ... [HCT 158]

What I am doing at the moment is identifying the phenomenon, and what will become obvious later is that Heidegger interprets the phenomenon differently to Husserl. i.e. same phenomenon different understanding.

Husserl explores many different relationships between wholes and parts. For example, in some cases, it is impossible for two parts to be present at the same time which happens primarily in the case of non-independent parts, e.g. a car cannot be both red and green at the same time. As Husserl explains,

We cannot at will make the same content at one time part of one sort of whole, at another time part of another sort. To be a part, and, more exactly, to be a part of some determinate sort (a metaphysical, physical or logical part or whatever) is rooted in the pure generic nature of the contents in question, and is governed by laws which in our sense are *a priori* laws or 'laws of essence'. (Husserl, 2001b, p. 39)

There are also some wholes which cannot exist without parts and Husserl gives the example that there cannot be a king without subjects, master without servants or father without children. Similarly, one cannot be a servant without a master and so on. There is thus contained in this notion the idea of mutually dependent correlates in that each is a part of the others whole.

This last point is extremely important in Heidegger's work and is perhaps one of the pivotal concepts in the structure of being-in-the-world. As will be discussed in the chapter on worldhood, it is the mutual, necessary and dependent relationships between Daseins that is the base relational structure which determines world. Time and again aspects of Husserl's phenomenal findings crop up in Heidegger's work, but in a novel and reinterpreted way.

The Whole Determines the Part.

There is a common idea that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts and this is typically attributed to the founders of Gestalt psychology (see Appendix 5). An example is that the wall is more than just the sum of bricks and mortar. However, this understanding *is not* what the Gestaltists, nor Husserl, meant. Husserl understands the whole as determining our understanding of the part. Kurt Koffka

(1886-1941), one of the founders of Gestalt psychology goes further. Koffka explains that the idea is that *the whole* is not a mere sum of the parts, it *is prior to* the parts. Understood in this way it is *independent to that of the parts*, and a corollary that leads from this is that the parts are understood on the basis of the whole (Koffka, 2005). This particular concept can be seen in Heidegger's account of the present-at-hand, whereby anything present-at-hand is what it is only in the context of a world.

Parts and Wholes - examples

In the following, I will demonstrate the phenomenon of wholes determining what it is to be a part.

Example 1: One Mark and Multiple Meaning

I approached the development of this example on the basis that if the 'whole' determines the meaning of the parts, then there should be situations in which we could identify one object which has different meanings depending on the context (the whole). I found it difficult to find physical examples, however, I found using marks on a page demonstrate the same phenomenon.

The Multiple Meanings of X and O

In the world 'box' the letter 'o' is nothing more than a circle that we perceive as the letter 'o' because of the context. Similarly, the letter 'x' is nothing more than crossed lines. When we look at the visual aspect of these letters, it is their relationship as part of the word that generates the meaning that these are particular letters. Visual presentation and meaning have come together.

If a person signs a letter to a loved one "love you, xoxo " then we read (and see!) the 'x' and the 'o' not as letters but as hugs and kisses. Here there is the same visual presentation, different context, different meaning. In neither case do we see the 'x' as simply two crossed lines or the 'o' as a simple, symmetrical closed loop, which is all they are once stripped of meaning. It is actually very hard to see them in this way, but once we do it brings what it added to our experience by the 'categorical intuition' more clearly into view.

There are a number of different ways we can see or 'perceive' the humble 'o';

- 'o' as a letter

-
- 'o' as a number
 - 'o' as a hug
 - 'o' as a game placeholder (e.g. Nought & Crosses)

Similar the letter 'x.'

- 'x' as a letter
- 'x' as a kiss
- 'x' as a variable in algebra
- 'x' as a game placeholder (e.g. Nought & Crosses)
- 'x' as indicating a wrong answer

When we make the statement that we see 'x' as a kiss or 'x' as an algebraic variable, is a statement that enunciates the two aspects of the 'perceiving', the sensuous intuition and the *as* related to the categorial intuition. As we shift from understanding the 'x' as a letter, to say 'x' as indicating the wrong answer, the visual aspects of what we are seeing are the same, it is the understanding that has shifted. This is the phenomenon at work.

These examples apply to where something is being used by Dasein, as a particular thing, a ready-to-hand entity, and I want to stay within that constraint. On this basis, if we extend the basic idea then it applies to *anything* Dasein uses as something. Heidegger claims this very point;

In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it circumspectively, we 'see' it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge; [BT 189/149]

We do not need to make any explicit statement, an assertion, that we see something as something. If I am playing Noughts & Crosses and place 'x' in a square when it is my turn, I am applying my understanding of the 'x' as a game marker without any conscious interpretation going on. The same thing happens when I am eating my breakfast cereal and using a spoon; I am using the object as a spoon. Heidegger calls this phenomenon of understanding something as something, the *as*-structure of interpretation. [BT 190/150] It is the same phenomenon to which Husserl is referring to when he talks about the unity of perception as being comprised of the 'sensuous intuition' + 'categorial intuition'.

Once we understand what something *is*, then there is a powerful pull to always see it as this something. For example, when we understand what a coffee cup is, we no longer even have the sense that we are seeing this object as a coffee cup, the *as*

structure of interpretation takes over and we just see the coffee cup. This is what Heidegger is getting at when he says

When we have to do with anything, the mere seeing of the Things which are closest to us bears in itself the structure of interpretation, and in so primordial a manner that just to grasp something *free*, as it were, *of the "as"*, requires a certain readjustment. [BT 190/149]

He goes on,

When we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us *as a failure to understand it anymore*. This grasping which is free of the "as", is a privation of the kind of seeing in which one *merely* understands. [BT 190/149]

This phenomenon is, sadly, a common feature of some dementias, where there is a breakdown in the person's ability to recognise objects as the entity it is. There is a "failure to understand it anymore", in other words, the as-structure has come a part. Dementia is one of those breakdown cases that provides support for the phenomenon that Husserl and Heidegger are describing. It also points to the application of a Heideggerian understanding in dementia; this, however, is a project outside the thesis.

In that we cannot tell what a thing *is* merely by looking at it (i.e. without the as-structure or categorial intuition) reducing the meaning of something to its physical aspect is nonsense. Another illustration of this point is that the way we use the marking X as a letter is a contingent characteristic of our culture, it may have been otherwise. In the Greek alphabet for example, χ, is the letter 'chi' and is pronounced like the English k as in kite. In other words, in English, we may have used another mark altogether that has all the same meanings we now ascribe to X. Put another way, the visual presentation and the meaning are different, and it is the meaning we understand.

This concept that there may be different ways of arranging 'material' structures' that result in the same entity is known as 'multiple realizability'. From the 1960s the concept has been a significant feature in the debates within the philosophy of mind and used as an argument against the reductionist approach of reducing conscious experience to physical brain activity. (Bickle, 2016; Chalmers, 1996; Searle, 1997) This idea is present in Aristotle's work on hylomorphic entities. What a thing is, according to Aristotle is based on its form not matter, as such a bronze sphere and a marble sphere are both spheres because the essence of being a sphere is not in the material it is the form. Similarly, I have three calculators of different ages and

technologies. The material, structural arrangements of the material and the power source vary, but I understand, 'see' and use each of them as a calculator. This is an example of multiple realizability.

Summary

The aim has been to demonstrate that there is a difference between the 'physical' presentation of a thing and understanding the thing as something. I started demonstrating this is the first set of examples and in this set, the idea was extended to more clearly highlight that the seeing-as is based on a broader context, in which the entity sits. That it is in some way part of a large whole and it is this whole that determines what the entity is. What I am focusing on is the phenomenon and bringing this into view, not the account of the phenomenon. As was evident in the passage from Heidegger he uses a completely different language to Husserl and his account is radically different. Whereas for Husserl, the account of the phenomenon is based on the categorial intuition that operates on the basis of ideal forms, for Heidegger it is the structure of being.

Example 2- Dots, Lines and Faces

In this example, I want to demonstrate the power of the relationship of the whole to the part that determines the part that I want to bring more clearly into view with this example.

In Figure 10 four characters are presented placed along a line; a dot, horizontal dash, small vertical line and another dot. They may appear as either four separate objects, or perhaps as meaningless marks that could be the result of random 'doodling' or perhaps of something unfinished.



Figure 10 Dots, lines and dashes

However, if the four separate objects are rearranged in a certain way, as in Figure 11, they show up as a 'face', i.e. a single entity, a unity or a whole. This unity is designated in the very language we use, '**a**' face. We do not have to work at 'aggregating' the four separate markings and then identify them as a face; the face is what is given to us in perception, it is what shows up for us. The coming together of the marks and meaning as a face occurs as a unified experience, it is also called

a Gestalt.



Figure 11 Face

However, there is a lot more to be drawn from this. When we look at the face what we see are eyes, nose and mouth, not markings. We see the marks as an eye, as a nose and as a mouth. While they are parts, they are also 'wholes'. It is quite hard not to see a face and to resist the pull of seeing the small vertical line as a nose, or the dots as eyes. This is the same point Heidegger was making in the above discussion. What has happened is that the whole has given meaning to the parts.

The drawing looks nothing like the face of any animal, yet we see a face. Even if I slowly break the relationship of the parts, as in Figure 12, we still see a face, and on this basis, see the parts as eye, nose mouth. Even in the fourth arrangement of marks a face is trying to 'appear



Figure 12 Movement of face back to dots and dashes

The marks have to be moved quite some distances from where we would expect a nose, eye and mouth to be position before the marks show up merely as marks. Looking back at Figure 10 the marks themselves, free of the as-structure reappear.

This tells us nothing about what it is to be a nose or an eye, that is a different exercise. However, the same phenomenon is at play with ready-to-hand entities, and this is behind Heidegger's example of encountering a room;

Equipment-in accordance with its equipmentality- always is *in terms of [aus]* its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These 'Things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of *realia* and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken as a theme) is the room; [BT 97-8/68]

The phenomenon that Heidegger is referring to is the same. Just as we first do not see the eye, nose and mouth and then assemble these parts as a face, the same applies to the study. We do not first see all the separate pieces of equipment, things

ready-to-hand, in the room which then “add up to” a room, we simply encounter the room. Heidegger’s reference to equipment belonging to other equipment is part of his account of what things are, in other words, it is not just the basis by which we understand them it is the basis by which entities are determined, i.e. being. I address this in the next chapter

Example 3: Duck-Rabbit

I provide the famous example of the duck-rabbit¹⁴⁸, that demonstrates two points, firstly that the same visual object can be understood as two significantly different things, i.e. the same line drawing is understood as a duck and, at a different moment, as a rabbit. In that the line drawing itself stays the same, it is our understanding of the lines that changes. This is a more complex version of the ‘x’ and ‘o’ example. The second, associated, point is another example of the concept that the whole determines the part, but a more dramatic one, is that parts of the drawing are determined by how we understand the whole drawing, e.g. the ears becomes a beak and vice versa.

Joseph Jastrow (1863-1944), a pioneering American psychologist, famously used an adaptation of duck-rabbit illusion (Figure 13), in his work to argue that perception is not merely a matter of visual sense data but that there is also mental activity




Figure 13 Original Duck Rabbit

¹⁴⁸ The first known instance of the duck-rabbit which appeared as an anonymous drawing in the 23rd October 1892 edition of *Fliegende Blätter* (p. 147), a weekly satirical magazine published in Munich, Germany.

involved.(Jastrow, 1899)While the concept of ‘mental activity’ is an explanation more aligned with the Cartesian account than Heidegger’s it is the phenomenon I am focussing on. Looked at one way this drawing shows up as a rabbit, looked at another as a duck¹⁴⁹.

When the illustration shows up as a rabbit the protruding part of the drawing shows up as the rabbit's ears, whereas when seen as a duck, the same parts show up as the duck's beak. In both cases the visual stimuli, or sense data, on the retina is the same, but our understanding of the part (ears or beak) is determined by how the whole shows up for us. Another important thing to note is that the image cannot be seen as both a rabbit and a duck at the same time! If we have never had an encounter with a duck or a rabbit the drawing may only show up as that with which we are familiar, refer footnote regarding the influence of context¹⁵⁰.

Interestingly a contemporary philosopher to Heidegger, born in the same year, but in neighbouring Austria, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1952), uses a stylistic version of this drawing, Figure 14, in his famous *Logical Investigations* (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 204)



Notwithstanding its stylistic presentation, the ambiguity of the drawing still works. Wittgenstein was using the ambiguity of the duck-rabbit to support his argument that in perception we don't see that the drawing is a duck or rabbit, but that we see the drawing as a duck or as a rabbit. (Wittgenstein, 2009) In other words, the drawing

¹⁴⁹ When my wife was first shown this drawing, it showed up as a rabbit for a short while and the suddenly flipped, much to her surprise and delight, to a duck.

¹⁵⁰ In one study when children were tested on Easter Sunday, when the Easter Bunny comes to deliver the Easter eggs, the drawing was more likely to show up as a rabbit, when they were tested on a Sunday in October it was more likely to show up as a duck (Brugger & Brugger, 1993). The implication of this is that the understanding of something is also influence by the social context at the time.

is an interpretation. This distinction is one that is important to Heidegger and why he insists that we perceive something as something [BT]. Interesting Wittgenstein, along with Heidegger is one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. Whereas Heidegger stands at the beginning of what is referred to as continental philosophy, the early work of Wittgenstein stands at the beginning of analytic philosophy. However, later in his career, Wittgenstein makes a radical change in direction, and this is reflected in the *Logical Investigations*, and he starts to explore similar phenomenon to that which Heidegger was investigating; this is what is reflected in his account of the duck-rabbit example.

While the actual fact of the drawing, the markings on the page, is not dependant on us, that the drawing shows up as a duck or as a rabbit does depend on us. Heidegger makes this very point, albeit not specifically in relation to the duck-rabbit, on a number of occasions, for example;

It must be stated that the entity as an entity is 'in itself' and independent of any apprehension of it; accordingly, the being of the entity is found only in encounter and can be explained, made understandable, only from the phenomenal exhibition and interpretation of the structure of encounter.[HCT 217]

Entities are in themselves the kinds of entities they are, and in the way they are, even if, for example, Dasein does not exist. ... being "is" not, but being is there, insofar as Dasein exists. [MFL 153]

We need to be careful in understanding these comments. He is not claiming that being as determinative of entities vanishes, this is not possible. It is rather that the disclosure of being that is dependent on us, and this is clearer in *Being and Time*.

Entities are quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained. [BT 228/184]

This statement also makes clear that entities are not constructed, they exist separately to our understanding of them. This is further support for my reading of Heidegger that his work cannot be used to support the constructivist account of knowledge. There are other arguments to support this interpretation, but that is outside the scope of this thesis.

Example 4: Final Example

Below, I have included photographs of two different scenes. The first is an old church, looking towards the altar, with a chair either side of the altar, font, a serving table to the right and what looks like a possible incense holder. The second photograph is part of a country garden constructed mainly out of stone. There is the

stone retaining wall, the bird bath, the stone paving, and stone seat. Stop reading, look at the pictures for no more than a couple of seconds as if it were merely a passing scene. The idea is not to scrutinise the scenes, but simply observe what immediately shows up, like walking into Heidegger's study. Then return and start reading again.



Photograph 6 Old Church

Original Image: (Chapel - Fortaleza de Sagres, Portugal. Bradley, 2014)



Photograph 7 Irish Stone Garden

Original Image: (Irish Stone Garden. anon, n.d.)

Were the different elements I named observed? Do you recall the font and the bird bath? If so then this is an example of the same object but in a different context (whole) and it is seen as a birdbath or as a font depending on the scene. The objects were photoshopped into the scenes, and unfortunately, my skills are rather limited in this area, but I think the intent of the example works, even to a limited degree¹⁵¹. This is a similar, but 'real' world example to the same lines drawn on a page showing up as too different things. In this case it is the unity of the setting that influences

¹⁵¹ I have tried it out on several people and the phenomenon was observed. It failed with one person who is not, and has never been a church 'goer', and did not know what a font was.

how we see the object.

This concludes my examples on bring out the phenomenon concerning the difference between the visual presentation (understood as the present-at-hand) and understanding.

Founding

The last concept that I want to comment on is that of founded relationships. Heidegger regularly uses this term in *Being and Time*, and the translators note that a " 'secondary' or 'founded' phenomenon is one which is based upon something else" (BT 57 note 5) and that Heidegger took over the notion from Husserl. This does not quite capture Heidegger's intent, and it is this that I want to discuss. Heidegger uses it in a number of ways, for example;

.. biology as a 'science of life' is founded upon the ontology of Dasein, even if not entirely.
[BT 75/50]

Whenever something is interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. [BT 191/192]

Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon being-in-the-world.[BT 90/62]

To be clear what Heidegger is getting at it is worth understanding the technical meaning of this term as established by Husserl. As I indicated earlier, although *Logical Investigations* is important as the seminal work for phenomenology, it is also a work in logic. Husserl is engaged in the process of making empirical observations and from those observations using logical analysis to draw out what he regards as laws of essences, i.e. laws relating to the structure of consciousness that gives us access to the knowledge of things. This can be seen in his definition of 'founded' which I quoted in full.

If a law of essence means that an A cannot as such exist except in a more comprehensive unity which connects it with an M, we say that an A as such requires foundation by an M or also that an A as such needs to be supplemented by an M. If accordingly A_o , M_o are determinate instances of the pure kinds A or M, actualized in a single whole, and standing in the relations mentioned, we say that A_o is founded upon M_o , and that it is exclusively founded on M_o , if A_o 's need for supplementation is satisfied by M_o alone. (Husserl, 2001b) (p. 25)

The above definition is straightforward and demonstrates Husserl's intent regarding establishing laws of essences based on empirical observation and the application of logic. Like many logically based laws, it thus becomes accessible to a *a priori* proof, which Husserl provides. Simply put if object A cannot exist unless there is an existing object B then A is dependent on B. This, however, does not mean, albeit

there could be, a dependency of B on A.

One of the most important uses of a founded relationship by Heidegger is ruling it out; a technique encountered previously. He acknowledges that things present-at-hand (think material things) are necessary for there to be the useful entities he calls ready-to-hand. However, this is not a founded relationship.

Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially. Yet only by reason of something present-at-hand, 'is there' anything ready-to-hand. Does it follow, however, granting this thesis for the nonce, that readiness-to-hand is ontologically founded upon presence-at-hand? [BT 101/72] (Heidegger's italics)

The question is rhetorical, and the appropriate response is, no. There is thus a necessary relationship with the present-at-hand, but not a founded relationship, unlike, for example, knowing and being-in-the-world in the above series of quotes. If we recall the discussion on Aristotle, the same account is evident. In the example of the bronze sphere, the bronze is necessary as one of the causes to bring the sphere as an entity into being, but the bronze is not the basis by which the entity is a sphere. In other words the sphere is not founded on the bronze.

Heidegger and Natural Attitude

The starting point of inquiries for both Husserl and Heidegger is what is perceived in what is called the 'natural attitude'. This is the way we normally see things, i.e. I 'see' a coffee cup. However, after the *Logical Investigations* Husserl becomes more and more focused on exploring how it is that we know what things are and he was convinced that the answer was 'inside' our consciousness, i.e. the experience we have, of the object itself. In order to bring to the fore, with increasing clarity, the nature of the experiences he progressively introduces a series of what he calls reductions. The first is what he calls the epoché, whereby he puts aside any consideration questions concerning the reality of the entity that is behind the experience, essentially putting aside any existing biases or presuppositions that explain the phenomenon. The idea is to simply focus on how the object of investigation presents itself in consciousness. (Husserl & Moran(forward), 2012) The transcendental reduction is the process by which Husserl seeks the essence of a thing in terms of ideal categorial forms. This requires him to break with any 'sensuous intuition' that is given to us in consciousness associated with the natural attitude and isolate the categorial form within consciousness. This is only a basic

account of the reduction, but I think the intent is clear enough.

Heidegger rejects these reductions, and this is the nub of his critique,

Let us recall the sense and methodological task of the *phenomenological reduction*. It seeks to arrive at the pure consciousness starting from the factual real consciousness given in the natural attitude. This is done by disregarding what is really posited, by withdrawing from every real positing. In the reduction we disregard precisely the reality of the consciousness given in the natural attitude in the factual human being. ...The sense of the reduction is precisely to make no use of the reality of the intentional; it is not posited and experienced as real. [HCT 109]

The result of this is

The sense of the reduction involves precisely giving up the ground upon which alone the question of the being of the intentional could be based. [HCT 109]

All of Heidegger's work is based on the natural attitude. His basic premise is that the human Dasein has a pre-ontological, pre-theoretical understanding of being that is reflected in the comportments towards things *in the world*, and this is reflected in the 'natural attitude'. For Heidegger, our understanding of what things are is reflected in the way we deal with things, *in the world*, on an average everyday basis. In that our understanding is based on the same phenomenon that determined entities as the entities they are, i.e. the phenomenon of being, then being itself must be accessed in the world. This requires that we remain in the 'natural attitude' focusing the direction of our inquiry onto our dealings in the world, not the experiences of the transcendental ideal forms consciousness. This is in line with Heidegger's investigative stance as a strict experiential empiricist.

Summary

In the previous chapter, I discussed the intentional structure of comportments and the concept that our existence is the flow of lived experience that arise from expressed comportments. The phenomenon of directedness, of comportments, is one that is relatively easy to grasp. The idea that who we are, understood as existence, or the flow of lived experience is a little more difficult, and this aspect will be discussed in more detail in the concluding chapters.

However, in the intentional structure, Heidegger identifies a fundamental aspect of the structure that requires investigation, that of understanding. This was discussed in the first section of the chapter.

What is crucial to grasp is that when we see and understand an entity, there are two components, there is the bare physical intuition, and then there is the basis on which we understand the object. This is the phenomenon that Husserl calls categorial intuition, and it was, in part, the discovery of this phenomenon by Husserl and published in the *Logical Investigations* that Heidegger recognised as key to his project of investigating the meaning of being and which lead him back to the Greeks. This occurs notwithstanding Heidegger rejects Husserl's methodological development post *Logical Investigations*, and his account of how we understand entities, i.e. based on ideal forms. Heidegger's recognition and use of aspects of Husserl's earlier work was illustrated in the passages on the as-structure, and the encounter with the room.

Initially, I could not see the phenomenon. I just did not get what Heidegger was talking about when he spoke of seeing something as something, the relevance of the *as-structure*, or what he meant by seeing "something free, as it were, of the "as"[BT 190/150]. It was, for this reason, I turned to reading Husserl's accounts and developing various examples to 'force' the phenomenon into view. Even though I have used the terms 'sensuous intuition' and 'categorial intuition' at times in discussing the examples, this was only by way of convenience and a means of using Husserl's work to get to Heidegger's. They should now be discarded. They are Husserlian concepts rejected by Heidegger and, based on his interpretation of Dasein, I agree.

In one-way Heidegger and Husserl are close, in that they are dealing with the same basic phenomenon, but this closeness masks the fact that they are conceptually and philosophically miles apart in their understanding of the phenomenon, their method of investigating the phenomenon and the conclusions they reach as a result of their analysis. So, while reading Husserl has been of use in accessing and bringing into view the phenomenon, the rest of Husserl's concepts need to be abandoned if following Heidegger.

One of the most fundamental differences is how each conceptualises where the work of understanding takes place. For Husserl, it is in 'us'. We receive the 'sensuous intuitions', what he calls sense data, and then we somehow marry them up with the ideal forms so as to produce the experiences of seeing objects, hearing particular sounds and so on. It is not that we consciously do this, it is just part of who we are. This is in line with the accounts of the British Empiricist and part of the

traditional account of who we are.

Heidegger's stance is radically different, and the following is an example from the *Origins of the Work of Art*;

We never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in the appearance of things—as this thing-concept alleges; rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. [OWA 152]

In that Dasein's existence is the lived experience of expressed comportments it is *not* the intentional structure that underpins those lived experiences. Recalling that the being of the entity is *not* an entity, Dasein is the entity that is 'produced' by the functioning of the being-in-the-world structure in the context of a particular world. The interpretation of an entity as something, the as-structure, is a structural aspect of Dasein's being, not of Dasein. This view of who we are reflects, perhaps, the most fundamental difference between Husserl and Heidegger

This chapter completes the essential background work I found necessary in understanding Heidegger's account of being-in-the-world. In the next chapter, I discuss Heidegger's account of world.

CHAPTER 14: THE WORLDING OF THE WORLD

Introduction:

This chapter is an explication of Heidegger's concept of the classes of entities he calls world and the ready-to-hand. As indicated *Being and Time* is almost incomprehensible without a grasp of the prior understandings Heidegger brings to his analysis and accordingly this chapter uses the concepts previously introduced for interpreting the concept of 'world'.

The chapter has four distinct but related sections. The first discusses what Heidegger means by 'being-in' when he refers to 'being-in' the world. Heidegger's main method is ruling-out ways of thinking that are tied in with the wrong way of thinking about world. Part of the strategy seems to be to create room for considering alternatives approaches to understanding world. The second section explores the character of the ready-to-hand based on structural relationships and how Heidegger drives this analysis to a radical conclusion; the structure of the ready-to-hand and world are the same. Section three addresses ways in which we can 'see' the world. Section four is a discussion on Heidegger's concept of world as something that is exhibited in its 'worlding', and places this approach in the broad camp of scholarship that sees entities as dynamic relationships rather than as static material entities. Implications of this approach are also discussed.

A Note on Average Everydayness

Throughout the analysis of the structure of Dasein, Heidegger is considering Dasein only in the context of its 'average everydayness'. [BT 69/43] This is how the typical average person goes about their life, using equipment and conducting their affairs in a way that reflects the average understanding of the community. For example, chainsaws were developed for use outside, cutting down trees and then cutting them up into manageable pieces. This is the context in which we should consider chainsaws. If we entered a house and saw a person cutting up their furniture, we would immediately understand that something was odd, that this is not normal and appropriate behaviour or use of a chainsaw. Such 'abnormal' use is possible as a way of being of Dasein, but it is not typical 'average everydayness'. Unless stated otherwise, this 'average everydayness' is the context of all the investigation in Division I of *Being and Time*.

Section 1: Preliminary account of World and dwelling-In

Introduction


In this section, I commence the discussion by linking back to the previous chapter and the discussion on faces and the relational unity. I use this to extend the concept into Heidegger's discussion in *Being and Time* where he commences with the relational unity of a room.

Following Heidegger's line of inquiry, I will show that what underpins the relational unity of a room is the same as that underpinning world and that we can understand the room as a 'whole' in its own right or as part of a greater whole. i.e. world.

Using the understanding of the concepts of the previous section the inquiry also shows that equipment can only be properly understood as equipment for doing things on the basis of it being part of a whole. This does not mean it is devoid of understanding, but that it will seem, somehow inappropriate.

The Relational Unity

I want to represent the example of the faces, except this time I have included the dots, and dashes in a straight line to commence the sequence (Figure 15). This is



simply a reminder that there is a phenomenon associated with the way relationships are structured that determine what things are as both a 'whole' and a 'part'. In the 'face' example we do not 'see' the relationship, it is 'hidden'. This is the essence of the phenomenon I was drawing out in the last chapter. I am not making any claims that the structure underlying the phenomena of the face is the same as world, just that such a phenomenon exists and that it applies to world. There will be no more material discussion of this example apart for the odd reference.

This idea of a 'hidden relationship' of which we are somehow aware is what is behind Heidegger's unity of equipment presented in his example of seeing a room,

.... ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These 'Things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us is the room; and we encounter it not as something 'between four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. ... Out of this the 'arrangement' shows itself and in this each 'individual' item of equipment. Before this a unity of equipment has already been discovered. [BT 97-8/68-9] (translation modified) (see translation note below)

I am going to call this room *the study*. What Heidegger is pointing out is that when we first walk into the room, it presents as a study (think face), a unified whole, and this is based on the relational arrangement he calls the unity of equipment (think of the arrangement of eye, nose and mouth).

We could rearrange the pieces of equipment in this study in many different ways, and it would still show up as a study. There could also be a different desk, perhaps a library unit, the windows and doors in a different place and it would still show up as a study. If everything in the room was piled into one corner of the room before first entering it, then there would be a different encounter. We may not immediately recognise the room, then spot various items in the corner and reach a conclusion that this was the study, i.e. it is no longer. The room has shifted from being a study too was a study. This change is brought about not by a change in the equipment, it is the same equipment, but the arrangement of the equipment, i.e. the relationship that exists between the pieces of equipment.

If we entered a room and there were four walls, windows, doors but multiple desks each with inkstands, pen, ink, paper and so on (an early twentieth-century example!) Then when we first entered the room what would show up for us (what we encounter) is an office. Many of the same elements of the study are present but in different numbers and as such the relationship between things has changed. This showing up 'as' something, e.g. study, office, etc. is what Heidegger is focussing on.

Heidegger is *not* attempting to *explain* why this occurs; he is *describing the phenomenon*, something others can also observe and describe as I have done and as such his observations and analyses are replicable. Much of the science that goes on in the biological sciences is undertaken on the same basis, i.e. it is a description not explanatory.

So far, I have shown that somehow the arrangement of the equipment plays an important role in what shows up for us. Next Heidegger starts to pull this phenomenon apart.

From Room to World

So far it has been determined that for the room to be a study that it must have a particular arrangement of pieces of equipment. I now want to draw out and expand on some other points in the example.

To be a study then is not directly associated with any definite piece of equipment. It is not *this* desk, together with *this* inkstand and so on. It is the arrangement of any study desk, any ink-stand, any pen and so on. A desk may be in a study, office, classroom etc. it is not dependent just on being in a study. This reflects the idea discussed earlier of parts and wholes. A desk can be regarded as a whole, but it can also be regarded as part of a 'whole' office or a 'whole' study and so on. Additionally, whatever it is then that we understand or what it is that determines the desk as a desk is not defined at the individual, specific item level, it is at the higher, general level, i.e. at the 'a desk' level not 'this desk' level. Similarly, with the study, it is understood because 'studies' are understood. This doesn't mean that we do not identify a particular study as Mary's study, it is just a specific instance of a study. As to what constitutes equipment, i.e. the desk as a desk, I will come back to the question below.

Long before I first enter any study, the study as an entity must exist in the culture. It is not something I invent or construct in my head; it exists as a real entity in the world. Before a study can show up for me as a study, I must then first 'discover' what particular arrangements of 'a unity of equipment' are required for a study to be a study, hence, in part, Heidegger's comment "a unity of equipment has already been discovered." This understanding of something being what it is prior to our discovery will be important in a moment in understanding different aspects of world.

A particular arrangement of a unity of equipment can be understood in relational terms and as such called a relational unity. It is this relational unity that creates what could be understood as the 'relational space' which we refer to as the study. This 'relational space' is what Heidegger calls world; it is the " *'wherein'* a ... Dasein as such can be said to 'live' " [BT 93/65]. Heidegger applies the term to the larger public world as well as our own domestic environment [BT 93/65] as well as the workshop [BT 100/71]. This 'relational space' or world in which we live is a unity, a whole, and it has the characteristic previously discussed concerning wholes, in that they may belong to larger wholes. For example, my study is located in my house, which in turn is located in the area of Mylor in the Adelaide Hills and so on. These

descriptions, however, should *not* be heard as geographic locations when used in this way, they are all 'relational spaces' in which I live. This, of course, does not stop them being considered in purely ready-to-hand terms, and as having a definite location in extended space. The point to grasp is that study, workshop and world, when discussed in terms of a Dasein living its life, are all 'relational spaces', having the same basic structure that is in some way related to the ready-to-hand within those spaces.

From a Heideggerian perspective we thus have the following sequence;

1. Studies exist in broader world of a particular the culture
2. We learn (disclose) what a study is on the basis of the unity of relationships associated with a particular unity of equipment.
3. When we first enter, we see a study, based on the relational unity of equipment.
4. We then notice the arrangement of things in *this* study
5. Notice specific items in *this* arrangement.

In that a study is a world, then the same basic principles should apply to any world, large or small. This implies that the particular world or 'relational space' must be disclosed before we can enter it a carry out whatever it is we will be doing in that space. This is what Heidegger will claim, and I discuss this later in the chapter.

We need to keep in mind that Heidegger is making observations from the stance of 'average everydayness' not as a specific act of inquiry. Imagine visiting a friend, having not seen them for some time, nor having been to their current house. You meet at the front door, immediately start a conversation only old friends have and deep in conversation move through the house to the back sunroom. After an hour, suddenly realising you are late for some other appointment, goodbyes are said followed by a hurried departure, walking back through the kitchen and lounge to the front door. What would we recall of the house? Probably the 'kitchen' and 'lounge', but what was the specific arrangement of the various pieces of furniture and equipment? Chances are we would not recall any of these details, all that showed up was 'kitchen' and 'lounge'. We can typically navigate our way around the world without having a specific awareness of individual items. This is the phenomenon of understanding the 'whole' without having to be aware of all the details that are the parts in the 'whole'. I might add that if there were a chainsaw sitting on the kitchen bench as you went passed, this would stand out as it 'doesn't' fit what typically forms part of a kitchen. The same is true when we are walking around; typically, it is the exception that springs into view.

Translation and Interpretation Note

In the above discussion the passage I referred to was originally as follows:

Out of this the 'arrangement' emerges, and it is in this that any 'individual' item of equipment shows itself. *Before* it does so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered. [BT 97-8/68-9]

I modified the translations as follows¹⁵²;

... Out of this, the 'arrangement' shows itself and in this each 'individual' item of equipment. *Before* this, a unity of equipment has already been discovered. (my translation)

In the German, there is no reference to 'emerging'. The German is *zeigt sich* means to show or display itself, not emerge which is misleading in describing the phenomenon. The term is used only once not twice, albeit this is a minor point.

The phrasing in the original translation is ambiguous and can be read as the 'individual' item showing itself from the totality of equipment. This is misleading on two counts, firstly the word 'totality' can easily be misunderstood and secondly the two movements of the showing, the room and then the 'individual' equipment are dependent on the prior disclosure of the 'unity of equipment'. The shift from 'totality' to 'unity' needs elaboration.

In the original English translation, the term *totality* should not be understood as in the sense of a sum of things or a collection. The German word that is translated for 'totality of equipment' is *Zeugganzheit*, and the relevant word segment is *ganz*¹⁵³ which is a word to designate a whole. For example, *ganz Deutschland* refers to Germany as a whole, as the single entity. To refer to a collection of things, in terms of each member of a group, the German word is *alles*. e.g. *alle Deutschen* refers to every single German. To refer to all the equipment, a form of *alles Zeug*, all the equipment, would be more appropriate.

Consistent with the discussions in the previous chapter, Heidegger is indicating that we should understand the study as a unity of equipment, a whole. Just as we can assemble a car out of various parts, the car is not the sum of the parts, it is a separate whole, and so it is with the study. For this reason, I translate *Zeugganzheit* as a "unity of equipment", and we must remember that this "unity of equipment" is

¹⁵² The German reads:

"Aus ihm heraus zeigt sich die »Einrichtung«, in dieser das jeweilige »einzelne« Zeug. Vor diesem ist je schon eine Zeugganzheit entdeckt." [BTg 92-3/38-9]

¹⁵³ The other word segments are *zeug* which is a general collective noun used for equipment, things, etc and *heit* which simply designates a noun form of the word.

what it is because of the relational arrangement, that which is 'hidden'.

Note on equipment.

The German word translated as equipment is *Zeug*. It refers to 'stuff' or 'gear' that is in some way useful, e.g. fishing gear, all the household stuff and so on. It is thus a general collective noun. In some respects, the term 'equipment' is too grand and maybe a little misleading. Stambaugh, in her translation [BTs] simply uses the translation "useful things" which is perhaps a closer translation. For example, I refer to my 'fishing gear' rather than equipment, and yet the sinkers and hooks are meant to be captured by *Zeug*. In future work I will probably change to 'useful things', but I commenced the thesis by following the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Zeug* as equipment as so will not change. Equipment then should be understood broadly to include all 'useful stuff, gear and equipment'.

Anything we use and employ as something in the carrying on of our activities Heidegger designates as ready-to-hand. This includes equipment but also consumable items, and if we are employing the wind for sailing, then it includes this understanding of wind.

In the last chapter, there was the example of the foreign, unfamiliar objects. When the object was unfamiliar, it was *not useful* as we did not know its use. Even if its function is known and understood by others, for us, it was not. As such it was not a useful thing, it was not understood in the relational context in which it could be used. This state of understanding Heidegger calls present-at-hand, it is merely a thing. When we understand the function of a thing in the context of the usefulness of other things, then our understanding has shifted. This new understanding of the things is understanding it as ready-to-hand.

In this section, we are primarily dealing with equipment, i.e. things for which we understand their function, their usefulness.

Understood in this way just as a desk is a useful thing, something ready-to-hand, so is the study. However, the study is a type of place that is useful which is why Heidegger designates the study "as equipment for residing" and it is this idea of "residing" that I want to explore. Recalling the discussion on 'wholes' and parts, there is the concept that a 'part of a whole' can itself be understood as a 'whole'. The study can be understood as a 'whole' for residing, but in turn, it is also part of a 'house' which is a larger space residing, and the house is part of the town, and so

on.

From Dwelling in a Room to Dwelling in the World

We can only enter the room as a study if we understand a priori understanding of 'a study', this is self-evident. If walking through an unfamiliar part of the University, we stumble into some exotic physics laboratory we may not have a clue what it is. It is simply a room full of strange equipment whose use is veiled; we certainly could not use the equipment as such it is not a place in which we can 'reside', a place in which we could engage in activities associated with living our life. Even if we are told about the equipment's purpose, this gives us a partial understanding only. Because we do not have the 'know how' and access to the room as a physics laboratory we cannot properly enter it as something ready-to-hand. Put another way, the 'unity of equipment' has not been fully disclosed to us.

What can be seen emerging in this line of thinking is the understanding of particular 'spaces' that are the 'wherein' of the various useful things with which we engage as part of living our life. In a word, in which we "reside". The concept of 'spaces' should not be taken too literally. As Heidegger indicates, it is not the space demarked by the four walls of the study. It is the 'space' mapped out by the functional relationship between all the ready-to-hand useful things was access as part of our expressed compartments. If an architect is familiar with an old building, then as she sits in her office reflecting on the building as she prepares renovation plans, the 'space' includes that old building.

In other places Heidegger does not use the term residing, he uses the term dwelling or describes it as a place with which we are familiar. (e.g. BT CH 2)

... those entities with which Dasein proximally and for the most part dwells.[BT 92/63]

signifies "to reside with ... ", "to be familiar with ... ". [BT 80/54] (translation modified)

It is worth pointing out a gross error in the Macquarrie and Robinson translation concerning this concept. The last passage cited is translated in the book as,

"to reside alongside ... ", "to be familiar with ... ". [BT 80/54]

The word "alongside" is problematic. The German translated as "to reside alongside" is "*wohnen bei*" [BRg 73/54]. The verb '*wohnen*' is perhaps better translated as to live, e.g. "I live most of my life in the workshop". However, as long as we hear reside in this way, it doesn't matter. The word "*bei*" means at or with, as

in “I live with Anne”, or “at the workplace”. If we understand the concept of ‘equipmental spaces in which we live’ as being constituted by the functional relationships between them, i.e. as I have introduced the concept, we can *never* live alongside them. Even the Stambaugh translation of “to dwell near ..., to be familiar with” [BTs 55/55] is problematic.” Heidegger is talking from an existential perspective, i.e. in relation to our lived experiences, our existence. When we are ‘in’ these ‘spaces’ living our lives, it is the ‘spaces’ as constituted by the relational connections. Heidegger calls the way in which we ‘in’ these ‘spaces’ being-in and this is a structure of being-in the-world;

"Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression for the being of Dasein, which has being-in-the-world as its essential constitution. [BT 80/54] [Heidegger's italics]

From the previous work, this can be understood as saying that in describing the way Dasein lives its life, it has the ability to understand things based on relational unities. These relational unities are the present-at-hand structures that are the ‘spaces’ in which we dwell, in which we encounter the equipment we use to live our life. When we learn and have the know how to ‘dwell’, i.e. live our life by doing things, in these ‘spaces’, Heidegger says that a unity of equipment has been discovered.

Returning to the idea of a room as a complete whole, a unity in and of itself, this is better described by Heidegger in *History of the Concept of Time*. Heidegger also uses the term familiarity to indicate that we are dealing with something which we understand.

My encounter with the room is not such that I first take in one thing after another and put together a manifold of things in order then to see a room. Rather, I primarily see a referential unity as closed, from which the individual piece of furniture and what is in the room stand out. Such an environment of the nature of a closed referential unity is at the same time distinguished by a specific familiarity. The closed character of the referential unity is grounded precisely in familiarity, and this familiarity implies that the referential relations are well-known. [HCT 187] (translation modified)¹⁵⁴

In this section, Heidegger is using the term ‘referential unity’ rather than the ‘unity of equipment’. This is the same phenomenon described from a different perspective as will be addressed in a moment.

The phenomenon of familiarity is something we do not experience other than when

¹⁵⁴ I have changed the translation to reflect my interpretation of Heidegger's work. The German words related to the changes are *Verweisungszusammenhang* - which can also be translated as referential context and *geschlossenen Verweisungsganzheit* which translates as a closed referential whole.

it is absent. For example, we do not notice the light on in the room until the light is turned off. We may experience the lack of familiarity when moving to a new work environment. We do not know immediately where everything is, how this office functions and so on; it is unfamiliar. Within a week or two we are comfortable in the workspace; the experience of unfamiliarity has gone. However, we fail to notice the experience of familiarity because it is now so pervasive, it has become part of our everyday lived experiences. It is the familiarity with the 'referential unity' of all the useful stuff in this office that enables us to 'be in' the office, move around it, live in it as such. Before this occurs, we must have become familiar with the referential relations associated with *offices in general*, and with *this particular office*. For example, we may know there is a place for office supplies in *an office*, we just need to learn where it is in *this office*. However, a new employee fresh from school may not even know that any office has a place for office supplies.

When we enter the office or the study it is not entering it "in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for"[BT 98/68] living. In other words, it cannot be understood as a corporeal body entering into the three-dimensional space created by the walls. To speak of 'alongside' or 'near' in this context is thus a nonsense. However, this does not mean we cannot simply view the situation as a physical body entering physical space, but in so doing we have eliminated Dasein as an entity that dwells-in, and the office as a place for dwelling-in.

At this point, considering the two aspects of the phenomenon of understanding an entity may be helpful. If we consider the strange physics laboratory all that is presenting to us are objects as present-at-hand, this is the visual presentation devoid of the necessary understanding of what the objects mean, in Heidegger's terms, we do not understand their way of being. The example of the foreign objects was an illustration of this point. What we now have is this same phenomenon applied to 'spaces', not just to individual objects. To be able to enter a 'space' in which we can do things it cannot be in a "geometric spatial sense" but as a place with which we are familiar, a place in which we can 'live our life', to dwell, i.e. as ready-to-hand. That we can first enter a laboratory as 'present-at-hand', become familiar with its various workings and then later enter it as 'ready-to-hand' is the same phenomenon, indicating the two aspects at play. To put this another way, while the scientist can dwell in this laboratory, I can't.

When a carer, cleaner or a nurse enters a nursing home, it is a place which is familiar

in the sense that they understand how it works for them. It provides a place wherein they can engage in those expressed comportments, to have lived experiences that are meaningful in terms of who they are, their existence. For the older people 'living' in the nursing home, the question that arises is whether or not the nursing home offers the same opportunities to engage in the expressed comportments that are the lived experience of an existence that is meaningful, i.e. relevant to how they understand themselves. Put another way, is the nursing home a place where older people can reside, can dwell? We cannot yet answer this, but there is an intuition that the inquiry is heading in the right direction.

By way of a summary to date. In the last chapter, we have moved from understanding intentionality as a directedness, to intentionality being the structure of comportments, to expressed comportments being our lived experiences, our existence. We then progressed to understanding that comportments with entities are based on a prior understanding of the being of the entity. Now, what has been introduced is that the 'spaces' in which we dwell are the 'relational unities' or 'unities of equipment'. Depending on the particular 'relational structure' this could be a study, a kitchen, an office, a laboratory, or a nursing home, each of which may be part of a larger 'relational unity'. The character of these 'spaces' is one of ready-to-hand, of a useful space in which we do particular things related to our existence.

While we do not 'see' the relational structure when we are working (concernful comportments) in the study we are dependent on this structure with which we are somehow familiar. In that our life is an unfolding of lived experiences (expressed comportments) to live a life thus requires familiarity with the various environments such that they provide a habitat in which to dwell, to live our life.

The Move from Rooms to World

To date, I have introduced the phenomenon that there are relational unities. This was demonstrated in the examples given in the last chapter. This phenomenon has been employed in this chapter by indicating that it is the particular arrangements of equipment that determines if the room is a study, kitchen or office. In this the character of the 'relationships' that form that unity have yet to be clarified, this will be the task of the next section. The aim at the moment is to provide an overview of the basic Heideggerian concept at play.

Heidegger considers the study to be a whole, and thus an entity in its own right.

However, following the previous discussion on wholes and parts, the study, while understood as a whole can also be part of a whole, in this case, a house. I have already touched on this. However, we must not slide back in understanding the house as a collection of geometric spaced filled with objects which are used for different things. The house, in turn, must be understood as a 'unity of equipment', a relational whole. It is because we understand the 'unity of equipment' that is the house that we can comport towards the entity that is understood as 'house', i.e. we can dwell in it, it is a place wherein we reside, live our life.

Where this is heading is now perhaps becoming clear, the house is part of the street, the street forms part of the city and so on. To be familiar, with a city is to have a prior disclosure of the relational unity that constitutes a city, and when we comport our self to parts of the city, we can be understood as 'dwelling' within the relational unity of equipment that constitutes a city. Once we have this concept, then we have now moved to Heidegger's idea of world. While Heidegger typically reserves world for these larger structures, the same structure applies to "one's 'own' closest (domestic) environment" as well as the larger 'public world'. [BT 93/65]. It can thus be the world of New York, the world of the university or the world of the nursing home, the world of the workshop or the 'study' world. They all have the same basic structure [BT 93/95] and have relationships one to the other that can be understood in terms of wholes and parts. Metaphorically, this can be envisaged as a giant networked cobweb that is structurally the same no matter where you look, but the structural arrangements in one part may be different to another, giving each region of the cobweb a unique character within the whole.

Heidegger's concept of world can, on a preliminary basis, be thought of as this relational unity of equipment. Heidegger progresses this idea to the concept of a *referential unity* which has a related, but slightly different meaning, which I address below. Given that compartments have the structure of intentionality, they require an understanding of the entities ready-to-hand prior to any compartment. In that a specific piece of equipment can only be understood in the context of a unity of equipment, i.e. a referential unity, then Heidegger is arguing that the disclosure of a world (a referential unity) must occur before compartments are possible.

While there will be some obscurity in the concept, what should be emerging is that there is a linking of the idea that the relationships between equipment (referential unity) that constitute the 'spaces' in which we dwell, and the idea that Heidegger

calls these 'spaces' worlds or environment. What has to be clarified is the aspect of the phenomenon discussed from the previous chapter that it is the whole that determines the part. If this is to apply, then it must be demonstrated that it is the relational unity that determines the equipment. Additionally, the nature of the relationship needs to be brought into view. This is the task of the next section. First, I want to take a closer look at the phenomenon of 'dwelling' or being-in.

Clarifying Being-in (dwelling) the World

The concept of being-in can be heard as 'residing-in' or 'dwelling-in', and it relates *only* to Dasein. Heidegger goes to great lengths to point out that when he refers to being-in, he is not meaning 'in' in the sense of one object inside another. As Heidegger is intending the idea of 'in', entities other than Dasein cannot be 'in' a study, a kitchen, or an office in the sense of dwelling, they can only be 'in' in a physical way. This is also true when considering the physical human body of Dasein [BT 79/54]. Heidegger explains, that when we hear "being-in 'in the world ... we are inclined to understand" it as the same relationship entities that are physically present, extended in space, "have to each other with regard to their location in that space." [BT 79/54]. Heidegger gives the example of water in a glass, or clothes in a cupboard as ways we understand 'in', and pushes the point saying that this relationship

... can be expanded: for instance, the bench is in the lecture-room, the lecture-room is in the university, the university is in the city, and so on, until we can say that the bench is 'in world-space'. [BT 79/54]

In this last set of examples, Heidegger deliberately introduces the term " 'in world space' " to emphasise the point he is making; that this is the way we are "inclined to understand being-in" in the world. For all these examples Heidegger agrees that there is a "being 'in'" relationship between these entities. When we are referring to these entities in this way, it is as present-at-hand entities whose ontological characteristics are "categorical" [BT 79/54]. In other words, Heidegger does not deny that when we are considering the physical aspects of entities that they can have the type of 'in' relation we understand them to have, even to the extent of being 'in' the 'world'. The point he is driving home is that Dasein is not its body, it cannot be thought of in the same way as a physical object because it is ontologically different. What constitutes these entities, their categorical ontological characteristics "are of such a sort as to belong to entities whose kind of being is not of the character of

Dasein" [BT 79/54].

So, yes, these other entities can be thought of as being 'in', but this is not what Heidegger means when he is referring to 'being-in' as this term only refers to Dasein. To push the point again, just after he emphatically states that 'being-in' is constitutive of Dasein's being, "it is an existiale", he reiterates that we cannot think of any "corporeal Thing (such as the human body)" as being-in [BT 79/54].

While elsewhere Heidegger uses the technique of ruling out ways of thinking concerning how his concepts are to be understood, nowhere else does he go to such lengths to rule out a way of thinking as he does with being-in and Dasein. This approach forces us to consider other ways of thinking and warns us that if we drift back to thinking in this way we have gone astray in our understanding. This was, for example, part of the challenge in thinking about or conceptualising, even if initially in general terms, the concepts of being and Dasein as intended by Heidegger. In thinking about what it is the Heidegger means by 'being-in', part of the elements have already started to emerge, even though they may appear only in a vague way. These elements include being-in as a structural aspect of Dasein (an existiale) that describes a common and essential characteristic of our existence and that somehow it is to do with an understanding of the relational unity of 'equipment' that determines the 'spaces' in which we live. Just how is yet to be explored.

In the section in *Being and Time* [BT §12] where Heidegger rules out the way of thinking that should be applied to 'being-in', he goes into the etymology¹⁵⁵ of the word 'in' to orientate our thinking in the 'right' way before he proceeds with his analysis Dasein's structure. Given the importance Heidegger places on this, I will briefly discuss what he appears to be emphasising and the direction he seems to be pointing us.

Heidegger suggests that the word 'in' derives from the older German word "*innan*"¹⁵⁶ which has the meaning of "*wohnen*", which, as pointed out translates as 'to live' or

¹⁵⁵ I will briefly go through the explanation that Heidegger provides. Whether his analysis of the etymology is correct or not is irrelevant. What is important is that it sheds light on one of the most important terms in *Being and Time*, being-in-the-world.

¹⁵⁶ In a footnote to this section Heidegger makes reference to Jacob Grimm's (1785-1863) collection of essays *Kleinere Schriften*. In the English translation, Macquarrie and Robinson [BT 80 note 1] advise that the essay to which Heidegger refers is a discussion on a number of archaic German words associated with the concept Heidegger is getting at, i.e. dwelling, residing, etc.

as Macquarrie and Robinson prefer "to reside". This is followed by " "*habitare*¹⁵⁷", "to dwell" ". [BT 80/54] Heidegger seems to be pointing us towards understanding this as a 'living-in' which is a dynamic concept and far removed from the way that a pen or my computer can be understood as being in the study. Heidegger then turns back to '*innan*' and discusses the suffix 'an';

'An' signifies "I am accustomed", "I am familiar with", "I look after something". [BT 80/54]

This aspect picks up the phenomenon of familiarity that was discussed in the earlier chapters. The idea of looking after something is a comportment and as such has an intentional structure, and whatever the 'something' is requires understanding which in turn has the two aspects referred to earlier. The concept of being-in is thus rich with all these aspects that have been touched upon to date. Understood in this way, when Heidegger refers to dwelling in a study or the world, one can start to grasp why it only refers to Dasein as it relates to characteristics of the way a Dasein lives its life. There is no sense in which my pen has familiarity with the study!

This takes us to Heidegger's next point of discussion. The German word for the English word 'am', as in 'I am', is '*bin*'. Heidegger says that '*bin*' is connected with '*bei*' "[BT 80/54]. In *Being and Time* Heidegger does not expand on the word '*bei*', and so the connection is not clear. It is a German word used as a locative preposition, i.e. at, in, upon and so on. I take it however that Heidegger is using it in the sense of 'I am at home' or 'I am at work'. The German word phrase '*ich bei*', which Heidegger does not elaborate on, has the sense of placing oneself within a locational sense, but in an abstract, not physical sense. For example, the German musical *Ich bei Tag und du bei Nacht* translates into English *I by Day and You by Night*. Heidegger draws the connection by saying that *ich bin* ('I am') is connected to *ich bei* and that this,

... means in its turn I live, keep myself in the world as something familiar in such and such a way. [BTg 73/54] (my translation)

On this reading, President John Kennedy's famous 1963 phrase "Ich bin ein Berliner" would be to understand oneself as a Berliner by virtue of the way of life of a Berliner and not simply by locating oneself in Berlin. Indeed, it was the

¹⁵⁷ "*habitare*" is in the German and is left untranslated. It is unclear how this is to be 'heard' as there is no direct equivalent in modern German. The modern German *Habitat* has the sense of a living environmental habitat. However, if the word is the Latin *habitare*, and Latin etymologies are referred to in the discussion, then the meaning incorporates the sense of 'living'.

identification with *the life* of the West Berliners, subject to the embargos imposed by the East German communist authorities to which Kennedy was referring. I take it that this illustrates Heidegger's intent by relating 'ich bin' to 'ich bin' and as such, there is support for Heidegger's interpretation.

Heidegger then draws the link between 'I am' (*ich bin*) to the infinitive form of the verb, which is 'being' (*Sein*), and concludes that when 'being' is used in conjunction with Dasein, it

signifies "to live in ... ", "to be familiar with ... ". [BT 80/54]

Accordingly, we reach a formal understanding of the being of Dasein,

"Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression of the being of Dasein, which has the essential constitution of being-in-the-world. [BTs 55/54]¹⁵⁸

The constitutive structure of Dasein thus comprises two key aspects "being-in" and "the world". As we have seen 'being-in' is dwelling-in and is based on a familiarity with the world of which Dasein has disclosed beforehand. Drawing upon the previous work addressing the structure of intentionality we can see that Heidegger has significantly transformed Brentano's concept into the very structure of Dasein. The intentional structure is not one that directs and connects our mind to the world; it is the structure of living (the mode of comportment) in the world (the entity). As this is what is common to all Daseins, Heidegger has identified a structure associated with our way of being and then classifies it ontologically. It becomes 'being-in' as a structure associated with 'the world'. While the structure of the world is yet to be described, once it has, it is easy to see the intentional structure that is informing the unified phenomenon Heidegger calls being-in-the-world.

Once we are at the ontological level, it is a very 'high level' of abstraction as it covers all the various modes of expressed comportment exhibited by all Dasein. It must be remembered that world *is not* the physical stuff, it is the 'space' created by whatever 'relational unity' in which a Dasein dwells.

Translation and Interpretation Note

I have made a material change to the standard translation in the above discussion,

¹⁵⁸ As indicated by the reference I have used the Stambaugh translation. The Macquarrie and Robinson translation does not provide the proper sense of what Heidegger is getting at; " "Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state. " [BT 80/84]

and the following is my rationale for the change.

German Text

Der Ausdruck »bin« hängt zusammen mit »bei«; »ich bin« besagt wiederum: ich wohne, halte mich auf bei ... der Welt, als dem so und so Vertrauten [BTg 73/54]

Original English translation

The expression '*bin*' is connected with '*bei*', and so '*ich bin*' ['I am'] means in its turn "I reside" or "dwell alongside" the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. [BT 80/54]

Comment:

My concern in this passage is the "dwell alongside ... the world"" which is translated from, *halte mich auf bei .. der Welt*

The standard translation is misleading. The translation of 'alongside' has too strong a link to the one present-at-hand entity being 'alongside' another. Further, the term 'dwell', does not appear, it appears as a variation of the phrase "I reside". I translate the phrase "*halte mich auf bei ...* "as keep myself in" or "maintain myself in".

This gives us

The expression '*bin*' is connected with '*bei*', and so '*ich bin*' ['I am'] means in its turn I reside or I keep myself in... the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. [BT 80/54]

If we hear 'keep' or 'maintain' not in the sense of physical, but as tending to or caring then we have a direct link to Heidegger's name for the Dasein's being, Care.

Absorption in And Disclosing the World

In this section of *Being and Time*, there is a difficult to translate but very informative sentence that illustrates both Heidegger's concept of Dasein and one of his methods. I will present the German and then the two standard English translations followed by my comments.

German:

Das »Sein bei« der Welt, in dem noch näher auszulegenden Sinne des Aufgehens in der Welt, ist ein im In-Sein fundiertes Existenzial. [BTg 73/54]

English Macquarrie & Robinson

'Being alongside' the world in the sense of being absorbed in the world (a sense which calls for still closer interpretation) is an *existenziale* founded upon being-in. [BT80-1/54]

"Being together with" ["Sein bei"] the world, in the sense of being absorbed in the world, which must be further interpreted, is an existential which is grounded in being-in. [BTs 55/55]

Comments and Discussion

Heidegger has gone, as I have argued, to great lengths to avoid any understanding of Dasein in the world in other than as the 'relational space' in which it lives. Here, however, Heidegger has not used words that can be translated as 'living', 'dwelling' or 'residing' but given the context, this is the what he is expressing in his term "Das »Sein bei« der Welt". This phrase is literally translated as " 'being in' the world", where *Sein bei* is translated as 'being in' and it refers to the way a Dasein, as an entity, is in the world, i.e. it is an observation concerning the entity or the ontic.

In the earlier discussion on structures, I pointed out that what Heidegger is doing is moving from observations at the entity/ontic level to describing 'structures' at the ontological level that capture and describe the commonality observed at the ontic level. This method is simply providing a descriptive account of what things are is the investigation approach that was first identified by Aristotle and to which I referred in Chapter 6. What Heidegger is expressing in this sentence is that there is an essential characteristic that is part of every Dasein existence that he has observed, and he is pointing it out, it is our way of 'being in' (*Sein bei*) the world. Having identified the common characteristic at the ontic level, he then names it as an existentielle, an ontological structure. The name he attributes to this is "*In-Sein*", or in English "being-in". Heidegger will frequently use similar, and sometimes the same, German word to describe the phenomenon at the ontic level and the name he is giving to the structural element. This is what is happening with the use of the terms "*Sein bei*" (being in) describing the ontic level phenomenon and "*In-Sein*" (being-in) being the name he is giving to the ontological level 'structure'.

While I think the translations of "being alongside" and "being together with" are problematic they are trying to present an alternative to "being in" which lacks the differentiation of the German. Wherever possible, I think it is preferable to find an English word that tries to reflect what Heidegger is doing but also helps to differentiate the terms. This is not always possible, and the translators will sometimes use a capital letter at the beginning of the word to indicate a different usage, e.g. articulate and Articulate [BT 195 note 1]. In relation to *Sein-bei*, my

preferred translation is 'being amidst', and this should be heard as 'being in' as per the discussion.

Being Absorbed

This brings us to the next informative aspect, the German phrase *Sinne des Aufgehens in der Welt*. This is a description of the ontic way in which Dasein, the entity, is in the world; the description is "being absorbed in the world", the translation is fine. The idea is to reflect that most of the time (our average everydayness) we simply go about our activities of living not paying particular attention to the 'things' we are using as part of what we are doing. We typically do not notice the floor, the doors, desk, chairs, the keyboard, coffee cup and so on. When someone is so immersed in work they may fail to notice what is going on we say they are "deeply absorbed in their work", this is similar sense to what Heidegger intends.

Whatever we are doing requires our engagement with entities ready-to-hand, which in turn forms part of the unity of equipment or the referential unity that has been discussed. There is a sense then, that as we go about our work we are 'absorbed' not so much in the work but in the relational unity, what I have been referring to as the 'relational space' what Heidegger refers to as world. That this is the case becomes apparent a little late in *Being and Time* when Heidegger states that the "world does not 'consist' of the ready-to-hand" [BT 106/75], rather the world, at the ontic level is "that 'wherein' a ... Dasein as such can be said to 'live' "[BT 93/65].

Summary

This section has introduced two concepts. Firstly, informed by the previous chapters, that world should, in some way be understood as a relational unity. The nature of this relational unity has also been discussed, but as yet only in a vague way as, in some way, connected to the ready-to-hand. The aim of the next section will be to bring the character of the relational unity more clearly into view. The relational unity is a flexible concept, and Heidegger calls this structure world, and makes it clear that it is the same basic structure regardless if it is the 'world' of the workshop, what he calls a domestic environment or the wider 'public world'. In that, he applies it to a workshop it also applies, for example to my study area where I carry out the work of researching and writing this thesis. It is for this reason that I introduced the term 'relational space' to describe this same phenomenon, i.e. it is the 'relational space' that determines the 'wherein' that I live my life. Different

'relational spaces' or worlds may have specific names in the culture; study, office, city, nursing home, world of the theatre, and so on. All of these are unities, or 'wholes' and are entities. Secondly, the nature of being-in the 'relational space' or world is not and should never be understood as my bodily presence inside a prescribed space. Being-in relates to the way we have an unthematized understanding, what Heidegger refers to as our being absorbed, in the relational unity associated with the ready-to-hand of the particular 'space'. It is the way in which we are familiar with the 'space' in this way that is the basis by which we can engage in the activities that form the expressed compartments, the lived experiences that constitute our existence.

The next sections discuss how Heidegger explores our relationship with a class of entities within the ready-to-hand, what he refers to as equipment or useful things, and then identifies and describes the characteristics of the relational unity.

Section 2: From Equipment to the Relational Unity of World

Introduction

The various ways in which the term being is used can lead to quite a lot of confusion and even Heidegger moved away from using the term later in his career (Sheehan, 2015). This is associated with the different uses of being discussed in Chapter 5. To help avoid this confusion, I will occasionally use Peirce's term, practical-bearing when an entity's way of being is referred to.

Different classes of entities have different ways of becoming the entities they are and as a consequence have different ways of being. Dasein, world, ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand are the main classes of entities discussed in *Being and Time*. Each has unique ways of being which are determined by its being. In this section it is the ready-to-hand entities that will be discussed.

Sub-Classes of Ready-to-Hand

The entities, other than Dasein that are incorporated into the activities of Dasein's living, either positively or negatively, have a structure of practical bearings understood in terms of their typical relational involvement with each other. They are also understood on the basis of how they fit-in, one with the other. These entities

are known as the ready-to-hand (*Zuhandenheit*¹⁵⁹), and their way is called readiness-to-hand. (Note again the similarity of names between the ontic level and the ontological!) There are various sub-classes of entities within the broader class of ready-to-hand including equipment [BT 98/69], materials [BT 100/70], natural products [BT 100/70], environing Nature [BT 101/71], work or product [BT 100/71], signs (e.g. stop signs) [BT 109/78] and so on. The reference to Nature is in the way it breaks into and impacts on our lives or the way we harness Nature for our purposes. It is not referring to Nature understood qua Nature.

Because all these sub-classes of entities are designated as having a way of practical bearing that is called readiness-to-hand means that the same basic ontological structure constitutes them. The class of being that Heidegger chooses to explore to determine the structure of the ready-to-hand is equipment. It is equipment that we primarily use in our concerned comportments to get things done; it is the most common class of entities with which we engage.

Heidegger's Method

The workhorses of Heidegger's method are observation and logical analysis, and in investigating the being of equipment, this is the approach he takes, initially focusing on what we do with equipment (practical bearings). The same ontological structure underlies both complex and simple things and as such Heidegger typically uses easy to access examples; his famous example starts with a hammer. While such observations are necessary, he warns that by themselves such observations, if focused on the wrong things, will not show what constitutes equipment.

Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure (hammering with a hammer, for example); but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not *grasped* thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using. [BT 98/69]

The method involves not looking at the equipment (hammer thing) itself but rather to focus on what it is doing, the way it is related to other entities via these 'dealings'; this is the reduction. In that, we are observing what the entity is doing in relation to other entities we are observing 'categorical' characteristics [BT 184/144] generally overlooked in the materialist approach. That Heidegger refers to the characteristics of the way of being of the present-to-hand as categorical has resulted in objections

¹⁵⁹ The German word *zuhanden* simple means something close at hand, in readiness, at one's disposal and it is this sense that Heidegger is trying to capture. The suffix '*heit*' simply indicates a noun form of the word.

from some Heideggerian commentators, e.g. Dreyfus (Dreyfus, 1991) in that he also applies the term to the present-at-hand [BT 91/63]. However, if we recall Aristotle's categories (Chapter 6), then such things as the way in which one entity 'bears' on another or is impacted by another are categorial concepts, just as the physical characteristics are. Heidegger is correct in applying the term categorial in both cases; it is simply that the broader set of categories does not apply to the present-at-hand. It would be useful to clarify this in more detail; however, this is not required for this thesis and as such not addressed.

In the earlier examples of the unfamiliar tools (e.g. the slow match container), it was not possible to understand what the thing was simply by looking at the physical characteristics of the object itself. Heidegger makes the same point,

No matter how sharply we just *look* at the 'outward appearance' of Things in whatever form this takes, we cannot discover anything ready-to-hand. [BT 98/69]

The way of being of the 'slow match' is reflected in the categorial characterises other than the physical (i.e. substance, quantity, quality) and unless we have access to them the being of the 'slow much' remains hidden. Heidegger's use of 'discover' should be noted. This was first encountered in relation to understanding the relational unity of equipment associated with being a study. 'Discover' is a technical word for Heidegger and so it suggests something similar may be happening here. Recalling Aristotle's categories, the last two were 'doing' and 'being affected'. These were complementary, whereby 'doing' indicated some form of action or behaviour on the entity in relation to another and 'being affected' refers to the involvement with the entity 'doing', and reflects how it is being affected. Neither of these ways of being is evident simply by looking at the entities. Further, if we recall the discussion on Husserl's mereology, he identified there were certain reciprocal relationships that determine each entity, e.g. king and subjects. This same phenomenon seems to be at play here, and so we have the being of the hammer being disclosed when we put it to use, i.e. hammering. What Heidegger has not yet discussed is that when we hammer we are doing something to something; this is the relationship.

Theoretical versus Practical Behaviour

Heidegger distinguishes between two types of behaviour, " 'practical' behaviour" and "theoretical behaviour". What he claims is that we are not going to "grasp" anything ready-to-hand theoretically [BT 99/70]. Simply put if we want to understand what a piece of equipment properly 'is' then we must use it, and the more we use it, the

better we understand it¹⁶⁰. In doing this we do not understand the hammer as a shank and metal head, we understand it in terms of its practical-bearings. For example, we have to learn to properly 'do' with a hammer so that it produces the required 'effect' on the nail. This is true even concerning the 'slow match'. Even though we may never have seen one working, we bring to bear a body of practical knowledge from prior experience. Simply explaining what a technical piece of physics equipment is would give me some insight, but I could still not use it. I could not grasp what it is in terms of its functioning; I do not have the practical know-how.

The Structure Revealed

The 'in-order-to' Structure

Heidegger's starting point is the observation that as we go about our daily life we are engaged with various useful things, what he calls equipment, a sub-class of the ready-to-hand. Recalling the previous discussions, our engagement with things is a comportment, and the specific name Heidegger gives to comportments towards entities is concern.

We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern 'equipment'. In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement. [BT 97/68]

I have already discussed the wide scope that the concept of equipment covers. The clothes I am wearing, the desk and chairs I am using, the music player I am listening to, the jug that boils the water for my coffee, the tin I store the ground coffee in, and so on all fit under the category of equipment.

His next step is to identify that equipment is "essentially 'something in-order-to' ...". In that equipment should be heard in a very broad way so to should 'in-order-to' and the related concept of 'dealings'. There are two ways in which 'in-order-to' can be taken. The first is to focus on what the equipment does, e.g. we use the hammer 'in-order-to' hammer and the other way is to focus on the relationship between the equipment and what it is doing in relation to other equipment. E.g. the hammer is used 'in-order-to' drive in nails. Heidegger specifically rules out the first consideration as the way to disclose the structure;

Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure (hammering with a hammer, for example); but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not *grasped*

¹⁶⁰ In Chapter 17 I illustrate this point by descriptions of a cook and carpenter taken from the Chinese Daoist literature.

thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using. [BT 98/69] (my underlining)

While Heidegger gives the example of ‘hammering with the hammer’ this must be read in conjunction with the underlined section, i.e. the focus of hammering is not the hammering as such, it is what the hammering is doing¹⁶¹. This can be seen a few lines further down when Heidegger comments;

In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the "in-order-to" which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time. [BT 98/69]

If we take the hammer as something ‘in-order-to’ drive in the nail, we can see that the focus of Heidegger’s attention is once more informed by the Aristotelian categories, in this case, ‘having an effect’. A hammer then is essentially something that has an effect on something else, i.e. nails, and the effect is to ‘drive them in’ or to use Heidegger’s term ‘in-order-to’. We can then consider the nail and look at it the same way. The nail is something ‘in-order-to’ make fast. This link continues, for example we ask, why do we want something to be ‘made fast’, and the response needs to be framed as an ‘in-order-to’. Depending on what is being produced it could be ‘in-order-to’ provide storage, e.g. shelves for books, protection from the elements, e.g. in the case of a house. This chain ends in a final ‘in-order-to’ either to provide care of and easy access to the books for Dasein or perhaps shelter for Dasein. Heidegger refers to the essential relationships that are constituted by the ‘in-order-to’ aspects as a structure. Equipment then, understood as something ‘in-order-to’ as part of the structure can never be properly understood by itself, hence, taken “strictly, there 'is' no such thing as *an* equipment.”[BT 97/69]

As in most things in Heidegger’s work, there are sub-classes. In the case of the ‘in-order-to’, the nature of the relationship can be classified in different ways. In the section on equipment in *Being and Time*, he provides four examples, “serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability.” [BT 97/68] and later in the chapter, he adds “detrimentality” [BT 114/83]. Understanding precisely what Heidegger means by some of these terms is difficult. In summary, they can be understood as follows:

Serviceability (*Dienlichkeit*) and usability(*Verwendbarkeit*) are the two most frequent

¹⁶¹ Recalling Aristotle’s ten categories of ways of being, category 9 is ‘Doing’ which is the action of something doing something to something else. The reciprocal to this is category 10 ‘Being affected’ or being impacted or changed by something else. Heidegger is thus making categorial observations, just not the ones typically used in a materialist account in determining being.

types of 'in-order-to' that Heidegger refers to and they are often paired together, for example;

The "towards-which" of a serviceability and the "for-which" of a usability prescribed the ways in which such a reference or assignment can become concrete. [BT 114/83]

It is not easy to clarify the difference between serviceability and usability in the way, but they have different and important roles. The usability of the shoe is in the wearing [for-which], whereas the serviceability of the shoe is the service it offers towards wearing [towards-which]¹⁶². I may have a good pair of walking shoes this is the serviceability that it offers. I put them on (wear them) and want to go for a run and find they are not very useable for this purpose. The serviceability can be thought of as being in the offering, and the usability in the receiving. The in-order-to structure can be imagined a series of relationships the quality and nature of which is determined by the interplay of the serviceability offered and the usability required.

Conduciveness (*Beiträglichkeit*) relates to the work itself. For example, the way in which the shoe is made must be conducive to the serviceability it will offer and hence the usability required. This is evident in the following passage;

... the work, in accord with the kind of being it has, is itself in the character of 'conductive to.'
The shoe is for wearing, the table for use, the clock for telling time. [HCT 192]

Here the phrase "the shoe is for wearing" should be heard as "the shoe is conducive for wearing", etc.

Manipulability (*Handlichkeit*) is determined by the serviceability requirement. For example, a screwdriver may offer the right serviceability to unfasten a particular screw. However, if the screw is in such an awkward location the screwdriver cannot be used; it does not have the appropriate manipulability. In other words, within this particular equipmental set of relationships, it doesn't fit. A special screwdriver is required 'in-order-to' access the screw. In *Basic Problems*, *Handlichkeit* is translated as 'handy quality', but the intent of what I have explained is evident;

The place of a piece of equipment within an equipmental contexture is always determined with regard to the handy quality ["Handlichkeit"] of the handy thing prescribed and required by the functionality totality. [BPP 310] (my German gloss)

In that all of these are types of "in-order-to" there is a relational aspect that should

¹⁶² Again, this description, as is the case for the other types of in-order-to, can be understood in terms of Aristotle's broader list of categories.

be evident. Serviceability only applies to finished equipment and relates to the way it can 'have an effect' on something. Usability relates to how something is affected by the serviceability; something can thus be more or less serviceable for a particular use. Conduciveness relates the relationships between the work (equipment) as made and the serviceability it then offers; equipment made in different styles and with different materials can thus be more or less conducive for the serviceability required. There is a dynamic tension in 'in-order-to' structure as the most appropriate serviceability is sought in equipment to meet the usability requirements. In designing the equipment to offer a particular serviceability, consideration is thus given to what is most conducive to that serviceability in terms of design, materials and so on. This can be represented as follows: (conduciveness \leftrightarrow serviceability \leftrightarrow usability). Understood in this way the 'in-order-to-structure' is a dynamic set of relationships where ultimately the equipment is determined by the relational structure itself. In other words, the structure is the basis for any piece of equipment coming into being.

Approaching the Structure from a Focus on the Work

When we have reached a certain level of competence with a piece of equipment, often the 'awareness' of the equipment itself disappears, in Heidegger's terms it "withdraws" when we are using it; we focus only on the work being produced. People who touch type will often have this experience, the keyboard disappears, and there are only the words flowing into the screen. Heidegger tells us that this is phenomenal support for the fact that what we are primarily focused on is the work, not the tools;

The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work-that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. [BT 99/70]

This then points to a relationship,

The work bears with it that referential unity within which the equipment is encountered. [BT 99/70] [translation modified]

From here Heidegger masterfully pulls out this referential unity;

The work to be produced, as the "towards-which" of such things as the hammer, the plane, and the needle, likewise has the kind of being that belongs to equipment. [BT 99/70]

In other words, there is a sense in which these tools are 'linked' in some relationship to the work being used. Heidegger calls this the 'towards-which'. If we think back to Aristotle's four causes, this has an echo of the 'final cause' or better put the 'for-the-sake-of-which' the activity is undertaken. This is evident in the next step; the work that is produced is something that has practical-bearing, it is equipment 'for something'.

The shoe which is to be produced is for wearing (footgear); the clock is manufactured for telling the time. [BT 99/70]

All our tools then, are in some way directed towards the work, and the work we produce is then directed towards its use, which indicates a reference from the tools through to the end use of the work. However, it is not the tool itself that is of importance it is the specific usability of the tool,

The work which we chiefly encounter in our concerned dealings - the work that is to be found when one is "at work" on something - has a usability which belongs to it essentially; in this usability it lets us encounter already the "towards-which" for which *it* is usable. [BT 99/70]

Having traced the linking relationship towards the end use, Heidegger then traces the linkages back the other way, to the source of what is used in the work, the material as the " 'whereof' of which it consists"[BT 100/70]. This points to an entire chain of things, all of which have their mode of practical-bearing, and hence are constituted by the structure of readiness-to-hand.

In the work there is also a reference or assignment to 'materials': the work is dependent on leather, thread, needles, and the like. Leather, more-over is produced from hides. These are taken from animals, which someone else has raised. Animals also occur within the world without having been raised at all; and, in a way, these entities still produce themselves even when they have been raised. So in the environment certain entities become accessible which are always ready-to-hand, but which, in themselves, do not need to be produced. Hammer, tongs, and needle, refer in themselves to steel, iron, metal, mineral, wood, in that they consist of these. In equipment that is used, 'Nature' is discovered along with it by that use - the 'Nature' we find in natural products [BT 100/71]

Having first identified a structure based on the 'in-order-to' relationships, he then refines this by identifying and classifying different types of 'in-order-to', primarily serviceability-usability. He then identifies that these aspects act as a series of points in a dynamic set of relationships that provide references or assignments one to the other. These provide a sense of directionality, destination and purpose establishing the dynamic relationship between the different aspects of structure (conduciveness \leftrightarrow serviceability \leftrightarrow usability). This determines how the equipment comes into

being in terms of its design and material, i.e. the structure becomes concrete. This is given in the following;

The "towards-which" of a serviceability and the "for-which" of a usability prescribed the ways in which such a reference or assignment can become concrete. [BT 114/83]

What Heidegger has laid out is the being of equipment (the referential unity of relationships) which is the basis by which equipment is determined as the equipment it is. This is the Aristotelian question 1. He has also specified the way this referential unity is responsible for the entity itself coming into being, i.e. materials are chosen and manufactured on the basis of conduciveness to the needs of serviceability, etc. This is the Aristotelian question 2.

In relation question 2, Aristotle argued that we need to account for the entity coming into being by reference to what he called the four causes of change. Heidegger has rejected Aristotle's account of the essence of equipment as being the form, even if understood as a formula, however, he has retained the notion of the organising principle, and this arises out of the dynamic nature of the referential structure. We thus have Heidegger's account of a piece of equipment coming into being as follows,

Material: The material from which things are made.

Formal: The organising principle is the unity of the relational structure

Efficient: The production processes

For-the-sake-of-which: The 'towards-which' of usability

Based on this analysis my claim is that this Aristotelian-Heideggerian structure applies to all equipment and is the basis by which such entities come into being. In relation to this thesis, this structure accounts for the design and construction of contemporary nursing homes. The organising principle associated with the structure can be understood in terms of the usability of the nursing home, which in turn is reflected in the serviceability that is provided by the physical form, i.e. what has been constructed.

The 'usability' of the nursing home is the 'care' of older people with a range of frailties of the body. The 'care' is thus the organising principle of this particular piece of equipment within the larger context of the culture. How care is understood will thus be evident in the physical design and construction of the nursing home and in the practices involving the nursing home. I contend that 'care' as understood within a

nursing home is based on a basic understanding that relates almost exclusively to the body and not to supporting the person having a life, as such this should be evident in the conduciveness and serviceability of the nursing home construction. This line of research is outside the scope of the thesis, but the work of the thesis points to this as an informative line of research.

It is possible that the same building fabric can be used in different ways to serve different 'usabilities'. Heidegger acknowledges this basic principle in that some equipment is specialised and some has flexible use,

The tool has the character of being of *'in-order-to.'* The range of usability of a tool is narrower or wider. A hammer has a wider range of usability than a watchmaker's instrument, which is tailored precisely to his particular kind of concern. The narrower the sphere of use, the more unequivocal the reference. [HCT 191]

There is then the possibility that a constructed nursing home may be applied to more than one conception of 'care' or 'usability' however this can be relatively easily confirmed by observation of the practices within the 'referential space' of the nursing home. As part of this, it must be remembered that a nursing home is something ready-to-hand as both a world and a piece of equipment. This is in accordance with the above discussions.

In observing this account carefully what we see is that a specific piece of equipment is neither determined nor understood as the basis of its physical form, but rather its part in a larger unified structure. Indeed, the physical form arises in response to the structure. This larger structure is the structure of 'world' viewed from the perspective of equipment, not Dasein. This structure is the same that Heidegger identified in the Greek account of being in terms of nature as the prevailing. The equipmental unity is world viewed from a particular perspective, we thus have the concept of world as that which prevails, and in its dynamic prevailing, it gives rise to entities. World as such is prevailing in the equipment, hence the commonality of structure.

Nature as something useful

In the above discussion, reference was made to Nature in terms of being a source of materials to be used in the referential unity. Heidegger points out that when we understand things of Nature in this way it is

The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, the wind is wind 'in the sails' [BT 100/70]

Notice it is *not* the forest as forest. What has happened is that we have transformed

these entities from what they are in themselves (nature qua nature), into materials for a 'use' for Dasein.

Things of nature that have the misfortune to have characteristics that can be 'used' as materials get transformed from Nature qua Nature to Nature qua ready-to-hand, pulled into the structure that is 'producing' things for use. Once this occurs, it is doubtful if many Dasein's can ever see Nature qua Nature and what shows up for them is, a resource to be exploited. For example, a forest as wood chips, a river to be dammed for power. From being a tree as part of a wilderness eco-system to being a woodlot for the mill and planks and lengths of timber for building a house. There is no way that the tree that shows up as part of Nature, and a tree seen as suitable for milling are the same tree; even if physically (present-at-hand) they are one and the same. I suspect that this is a significant part of the environmental activism that was so much part of Tasmanian life over the last four decades. What has transformed them, is the dynamics of the relational structure!! This is Heidegger's point. Heidegger is thus saying that Dasein (not necessarily all) will often see things in nature not in terms of Nature itself, but in terms of how it can be adapted for our use. While not for this thesis exploring the implications of this way of understanding has implications for the environmental movement and even the debates on global warming.

From the Work to People – The Public World

The work that is produced therefore refers to the "whereof" from which it is produced, the "towards-which" of its usability through to the "the person who is to wear it or use it." [BT 100/71]. This type of reference can occur when something is ordered or produced for someone specifically. For example, when I take my car to a local mechanic there is a direct relationship between my need to have the car attended to, the work required on the car itself, the tools and materials needed to do the work, the doing of the work by the mechanic, the garage space, the consumable material used and so on. They all need to come together as part of a referential unity. Apart from this jobbing situation there is also the case of mass-produced goods;

Even when goods are produced by the dozen, this constitutive assignment is by no means lacking; it is merely indefinite, and points to the random, the average. [BT 100/71]

Now comes the critical step,

Thus along with the work, we encounter not only entities ready-to-hand but also entities with Dasein's kind of being entities for which, in their concern, the product becomes ready-to-

hand; and together with these we encounter the world in which wearers and users live, which is at the same time ours. Any work with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand not only in the domestic world of the workshop but also in the *public world*. [BT 100/71]

In other words, there is the place in which we work, our workshop, a place in which we understand how everything works, where we can use the various pieces of equipment to go about our daily activities, a place in which we are familiar. This is the place wherein we dwell. However, from the domestic world of the workshop, we are also connected, whether we recognise it or not to the activities of the far broader world, the public world. Even if we have some knowledge of this broader world, we will probably not be familiar with the domestic words in which our customers, and suppliers and so on work and live, i.e. dwell; we are connected to them nonetheless. The 'public world', which is a ready-to-hand entity, *is*, regardless of whether or not a particular Dasein has knowledge of it. From my perspective, this makes Heidegger a realist.

One of the things to notice is that the relational network is not static. It is the antithesis of materialist structures. If we include every aspect, follow every linkage through to its source, it is a dynamic, immense and unknowable network of flowing 'froms' and 'tos' that pump through the referential unity. Little wonder that later Heidegger will talk of the 'worlding of the world'[TT]. This, of course, is the nature of the modern world. If I follow the linkage relationships just from the parts of my computer, then based on the various stamps on the component parts, the links extend to China, Singapore, Japan and Philippines. These linkages include the means of transport, the means of distribution of the parts, the factories, the material sources for each of the parts, the resources used in the factories, the workers in the factories, the clothes the workers need to work, and so on. Each point along the way will have relational links that extend out in a multitude of other directions. In the early 1980s I travelled to a remote area of Papua New Guinea when people were still living in a way that had, for the most part, been unchanged long before Europeans arrived. There was little sign, then, of European influence. The domestic and public world of these villages was radically different. If Heidegger is right, then the more that a domestic world links to a public world then the more the public world determines the character of the domestic world. From an anthropological perspective the change in relational linkages in the public world, resulting in the transformation of the domestic world would be of significant research merit. However, it may be too late; the world may be too connected. The same

phenomenon should be evident in any other ways. For example, the functioning of all nursing homes in Australia is now determined in important ways by the same aspects of a wider world (e.g. federal compliance, funding schemes, building codes, medical best practice, etc.). The more uniform the structural way of being of the nursing home, the less capacity there is for significant innovation and change that may require structural reconfiguration. It does not necessarily preclude innovation, but if all material resources are consumed to support a structure determined by the wider world, then significant innovation becomes difficult. The other impediment to change which will emerge later is that the need for such material innovation becomes concealed. These are areas of future research from a Heideggerian perspective.

Envirning Nature Accessible to All

We all have our different domestic worlds in which we dwell, in which we have meaningful compartments, but each of our domestic worlds is part of the public world in some way. There will always be part of the public world for us to discover, there will always be other possible domestic worlds for us to discover. No one person knows all the public world and by implication all the domestic worlds. World then is a collective undertaking of all people interconnected via their public worlds through to their domestic environments. There is, however, a place that is accessible to everyone, *envirning Nature*.

Along with the public world, the *envirning Nature* is discovered and is accessible to everyone. In roads, streets, bridges, buildings, our concern discovers Nature as having some definite direction. A covered railway platform takes account of bad weather; an installation for public lighting takes account of the darkness, or rather of specific changes in the presence or absence of daylight ... [BT 101/71]

Regardless of our awareness of the relationships when we are engaged in our work all the other entities involved in the work are brought along with it;

Our concerned absorption in whatever work-world lies closest to us, has a function of discovering; and it is essential to this function that, depending upon the way in which we are absorbed, those entities within-the-world which are brought along in the work and with it ... remain discoverable in varying degrees of explicitness. [BT 101/71]

This concludes the setting out of the relational structure of the world. However, this setting out has not brought 'world' into view; it has simply pointed to relationships. The next section brings the world 'into view'.

Heidegger's Four Worlds

For the sake of completeness, I want to briefly touch on Heidegger's four uses of the term world presented in Chapter III of *Being and Time* [BT 93/64-5]. I am simply going to present them without any detailed discussion as the meanings are self-evident based on the discussions to date.

1. World can be used to refer to all the entities with the world, or the universe understood as present-at-hand entities. This is an ontic concept. This is the physicalist or materialist conception. It is also possible to have a specific 'realm' for example all the "possible object of mathematics."
2. World can function as the ontological term associated with the being of the entities mention in 1.
3. World can be understood in another ontical way, as an entity that "wherein" Dasein dwells, i.e. on the basis that has been discussed in this chapter. This is world as referential unity.
4. World is also understood as what Heidegger calls an ontologico-existential concept he designates worldhood. Essentially this is the ontological structure for world in 3 and is also an existentiale of Dasein. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

Heidegger will occasionally refer to world understood as 1. and indicates that when he does, he will place it in quotes, i.e. 'world' to make the use clear. The term world is reserved by Heidegger for the third expression of world.

Section 3: 'Seeing' the World

Introduction

There are two key points to draw from the analysis so far. The first is that we understand equipment in terms of what it does, its usability, and its usability is determined by the requirements of the referential unity. It is this aspect of 'usability' that ties in with Heidegger's name for this class of entities, the ready-to-hand. This understanding is different to understanding a thing just as present-at-hand. This was demonstrated earlier when looking at the unfamiliar equipment. The difference is not simply that we understand 'a function' that is attached to the present-at-hand object, rather it is because we have been able to grasp the usability of the equipment in terms of its fit with other equipment and to some end purpose, the for-the-sake-of-which. The glass hone has a towards which of sharpening razor blades, the blade for shaving, the shaving for a Dasein to have a neat or groomed appearance. The slow match container, for holding the device for lighting fuses, which detonates a bomb, which destroys or kills to help win the battle. Notwithstanding the slow match

holder is no longer used, it gives us an insight into a world, even if the world has passed. Heidegger uses this approach when analysing a painting of an old pair of work boots in *The Origin of a Work of Art*. [OWA], i.e. his analysis disclosed a different world.

The second point is that there are relationships between the ready-to-hand entities based on those aspects associated with them being ready-to-hand. It is the usability of the equipment that is important in making the shoes; it is the suitability of the leather that enables it to be worked into shoes, it is the usability of the shoes as something to wear and so on. All these aspects come out only *in the relationship* in which they are used. I will expand on these in the next section.

There is then a unity of equipment, constituted by a network of references (Heidegger also uses the term assignments) that is required for any single ready-to-hand entity to be (function, be usable, be suitable, etc.) the thing it is. This is basis behind Heidegger's comment that,

Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as *an* equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. [BT 97/68]

This unity of equipment is also called world and has readiness-to-hand as its way of being.

Being-in-the-world, according to our Interpretation hitherto, amounts to a non-thematic circumspective absorption¹⁶³ in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a unity of equipment. Any concern is already as it is, because of some familiarity with the world. [BT 107/77]

If we recall the early Greek idea of Nature as that from which things emerge, we see the same idea here in that it is only possible, on the basis of world for there to be a specific type of ready-to-hand entity in the world.

There are two things happening; firstly, the world is that which determines the ready-to-hand entities within the world and secondly it is our familiarity with the world that enables us to understand these entities as such. Again, this is the two parts of Heidegger's formal indication of being. For example, to understand the slow match container one has to understand, fuse, burning, bomb, detonate, explosion, war and

¹⁶³ Note that the German word here is *Aufgehens*. Earlier I translated this as disclosure as it was at the ontological level. Here Heidegger is describing the ontic level and as such I have left it as absorption. This is another example of Heidegger playing with words. In this case the same word is used but slightly different uses of the word are applied at the ontological level and at the ontic level.

so forth. To understand war is another complex set of relationships, and so on. To repeat, "Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as *an* equipment. "[BT 97/68]

Each piece of equipment has its own unity of equipment, which in turn will typically belong to a larger unity of recall study, house, street, city. However, not only does the unity cascade out in this locational sense, there is a unity around the desk, the chair, the ink and so on. For the chair, there is the shop from which it came, the workshop, the timber suppliers, the glue suppliers, and on and on. The relational network is pervasive; this is the worlding of the world. The relational unity of the study and the chair must *both* be disclosed beforehand. If we recall, the concept of a part also being a whole, this is what is happening in the relation of the chair and the study.

Similarly, we can think of the increasing unities such as bank account, bank, world of banking, world of finance, world of commerce, country economy, each with the interlocking unities for each piece of equipment. These expanding unities are then not sharply defined. A motor vehicle, for example, is a unity. However, it can be understood as part of the petroleum industry, the road system, the motor vehicle fleet of a company, the asset of a family, manufacturing industry, and so on. What it is to be a motor vehicle is determined by its relationship to all these separate worlds, i.e. a larger set of reference, a larger unity of equipment, a larger understanding of world.

'Seeing' the world

It may seem obvious, but it is easy to overlook, if we consider the concept of wholes and parts, a whole can never be part of 'it' itself while at the same time the whole is constitutive of the parts. This is what Heidegger is getting in the following;

The world itself is not an entity within-the-world; and yet it is so determinative for such entities that only in so far as 'there is' a world can they be encountered and show themselves, in their being, as entities which have been discovered. [BT 102/72]

In that there is a world first then entities in the world, the same applies to our understanding. We must first disclose (understand) a world before we discover (understand) the entities within the world [BT].

The question then arises that given we do not see the structure itself, that the entities are within the world and we dwell within the world is it then possible to 'see' the world. Recalling the earlier discussion on gravity and Peirce, it is not necessary for

an experiential empiricist to have sight of a physical object, it is possible to bring it into view in terms of its 'practical bearings'. However, there lies a problem, for the world to function as a world, it must remain unnoticeable. An analogy is turning on the light in a dark room. We see all the contents in the room because of the light, but we do not notice the light itself. We 'see' the role of the light by way of a breakdown case, we turn the light off! Similarly, Heidegger's method of 'seeing' the world is to look at the boundary or breakdown cases.

Once we are absorbed into our world and have a familiarity with it, we typically engage with things in their 'worlding', of everything functioning. In this circumstance, we see the equipment we are dealing with in their ready-to-hand mode, as a hammer, for example. The alternative is when we see them either as something with which we are unfamiliar or as something that doesn't 'fit' within the referential unity and offers no possibility for being useful. In this case, we experience them as just objects, present-at-hand. A boundary or breakdown case occurs when we experience the 'cross-over' from ready-to-hand to present-at-hand or the reverse. This occurs when the referential unity is disturbed, and the entity actual changes mode *and* we understand that it has changed mode. The earlier example of the unfamiliar objects related to a move from the present-at-hand, to the ready-to-hand, even if the shift was only to a vague understanding of its readiness-to-hand. This is a shifting into a referential unity and is a way of 'seeing' the world at work. Most of the examples that were provided in the previous chapter were aimed at showing the phenomenon of a relational structure of a unity determining the understanding of the parts. Not all of them were related to the concept of world, but the general principle was evident enough.

Examples of the 'World' at Work

I experienced a real-world example a couple of years ago when we were having our house renovated. The carpenter was working with lengths of timber, a couple of saw horses, saw, nails, screws, hammer, etc. I understood he was making something but not what. I watched as he cut some of the timber to specific lengths. Some were approx. 2 metres in length others around a metre. An end of some lengths was then cut to give what looked like a 45° mitre cut. Having mitred the ends, a longer piece and a shorter piece were joined using the mitred ends to give the appearance of a large timber 'L' shape. I still had no idea what he was making. To this 'L' section was added another longer piece to give a large 'U' shape. The

'U' shape was just over 1800mm high, what seemed to be a metre wide and each piece was around 100mm wide. Then he added a narrower piece of timber, around 30mm wide and 10mm thick to the centre of the inside edge of the three pieces of the 'U'. The 'penny dropped', my world kicked it, he was making a door frame. What I had initially seen as just pieces of timber had changed and once I saw them as a door frame, I could not 'unsee' it. The carpenter had to make another, and this time almost from the start what I saw was a door frame being made.

The frames were installed later in the day, and I now use these frames in situ, and most of the time I do not even see the frames. I just go in and out, and I certainly never see them as a particular arrangement of painted timber. This was a transition of timber pieces seen as present-at-hand, to switching over to ready-to-hand, to the door frame as a 'piece of work', to the door-frame as a piece of completed equipment, to the door frame as part of the house; from present-at-hand objects to various stages of ready-to-hand. This experience of suddenly understanding, of experiencing the 'switchover' is 'seeing' the world 'at work'.

An older door frame had been removed, and I experimented by slowly dismantling it. As I pulled it apart, the pieces of the door frame showed up as a door frame until almost the end, what then happened was that I saw the longer pieces of timber as the sides of the door frame, i.e. as material for a door frame. Even now when I see one of the remaining pieces among my timber supply, I tend to see it as 'the side of the door frame'. They are not experienced as equipment, as something completed, rather they are still experienced as what they are, material that could be reassembled as a doorframe, they still hold within them this potential and as such they are still understood as a mode of ready-to-hand. It is very much like the example the faces as I presented one image after another, slowly pulled apart, the pull to see a face is very strong. In this case is the worlding of the world, working to understand the pieces as material for a door frame.

Heidegger's 'Breakdown' Example

Heidegger uses three 'breakdown' cases for his examples. When something suddenly breaks, when something is missing and when something stands in the way. In each case, an unexpected stop to the flow of work occurs. I will only address the equipment breakage case to demonstrate.

Imagine using a piece of equipment, say an electric saw. The timber is carefully

measured, the guideline marked, the timber clamped, the saw started, and the cut is underway. The concentration is on the guideline, moving the saw through the timber and the cut. Suddenly there is a loud noise, and the saw just stops. Heidegger describes this moment of surprise when suddenly the saw is doing nothing. At that instant, just for a moment, we are bamboozled and do not experience the saw as equipment, but as "pure presence-at-hand" [BT 103/74] This lasts only a moment. Very quickly we refocus and determine that the saw is broken. Our experience has passed through the saw as ready-to-hand performing the work, then in a 'What the?' moment it is experienced as present-at-hand, then as equipment ready-at-hand, but broken, something in need of repair. Heidegger calls this mode the "un-readiness-to-hand".

When something is un-ready-to-hand it is in limbo, it is not fully ready-to-hand but can be. It is not working, and we know it is not working, but it holds the promise of something that once worked and may work again. In the repair workshop, the status changes again when the broken tool becomes the 'work for repair', i.e. it is now something ready-to-hand again as part of a process, it is similar to materials in this regard. The possibility is that after the repair it returns to its status as equipment, or is unfixable and drifts to something just present-at-hand; a tool with a past but no usable future.

The world 'at work' shows itself initially not by looking at the tool but in the breakdown. It is in the rapid switch from ready-to-hand, to present-at-hand to un-ready-to-hand and in the change in the status of the saw from equipment to an object of work and back to usefulness that world is revealed. It is in these crossover or breakdown cases that Heidegger indicates that the structure of the world, the references or assignments become evident,

When equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive assignment of the "in-order-to" to a "towards-this" has been disturbed. The assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather 'there' when we concernfully submit ourselves to them. But *when an assignment has been disturbed - when something is unusable for some purpose - then the assignment becomes explicit.* [BT 105/75] (my underlining)

Another Example – Something Missing

Another example is the situation when something we take for granted and regularly use in carrying out a task is unexpectedly found to be missing, preventing us from doing a task. Imagine coming home late after a long day at work, quickly preparing and having a meal and attending to some necessary family activities. Tired and a

little weary you then set about making your speciality cake promised for a function the next day. All the basic ingredient needed are in the pantry, you have brought a decoration for the top of the cake, everything is planned and ready. You go to the pantry, reach for the icing sugar, and it's not there, it's missing. Our looking for icing sugar comes

... up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time *what* the missing article was ready-to-hand *with*, and *what* it was ready-to-hand *for*. The environment announces itself afresh. [BT 105/75]

The icing-sugar, that which is missing, is understood as ready-to-hand, but it is not there, not available for use, there is just the sense of unfulfilled need, this is the emptiness of encountering the un-ready-to-hand. Heidegger senses that the more urgently we need what is missing, the more that which we are working on, the cake, "seems to lose its character of readiness-to-hand",

It reveals itself as something just present-at-hand and no more, which cannot be budged without the thing that is missing. The helpless way in which we stand before it is a deficient mode of concern, and as such it uncovers the being-just-present-at-hand-and no- more of something ready-to-hand. [BT 103/74]

What seems to be happening is that there is a flow in the processes, the linking relationships are not static they are dynamic, the world is 'worlding'. When there is a breakdown in the dynamic nature of the relationship, this process structure becomes evident. The particular worlding we are engaged with stops. The more entrenched the stoppage against the urgency we need to proceed, the more the work in front of us 'feels' useless in its incomplete mode. Stripped of the dynamic relationships, in a word, de-worlded, it has shifted from ready-to-hand to present-at-hand. When we are aware of what is happening, we are 'seeing' the world in the same way we see the role of the light when we turn it off.

The dynamic nature of relationships is there even if not noticed. When two pieces of timber have been nailed together as part of a frame or a larger piece, the nails are 'holding' things together. This holding is dynamic; it is 'holding' the timber together. If the nails 'give way' the relationship is broken, and an aspect of the worlding of the world stops or is reduced. For example, if it were a bookcase, and the shelves collapse, the bookcase no longer holds books.

More importantly and critically, these breakdown cases presented examples for us that the normal flow of our activity, the expressed compartments associated with our

lived experiences stop. At that moment, for that which we were engaged, the world stopped worlding!

Summary

The world is made up referential unities, of assignments, and it is these that constitute the ready-to-hand, these that are the basis on which things can be useful. We can identify such references and assignments when they are 'lit' up in breakdown or crossover cases; when we notice the 'worlding' stop or start. Just as surely as the Swiss movement of a watch stops when a small cog loses its relationship with another cog, so too does the 'worlding stop' when the structures are 'broken' or 'missing'.

Not only does the work with which we are concerned stop because of the breakdown, but we experience a change in understanding associated with the event. The breaking of the references that constitute the unity of a particular ready-to-hand entity can be thought as a de-worlding or loss of worldhood.

That the world does not 'consist' of the ready-to-hand shows itself in the fact (among others) that whenever the world is lit up in the modes of concern which we have been Interpreting, the ready-to-hand becomes deprived of its worldhood... [BT 106/76]

However, if the world can be 'lit' up in this way then it is something that already is,

But if the world can, in a way, be lit up, it must assuredly be disclosed. And it has already been disclosed beforehand whenever what is ready-to-hand within-the-world is accessible for .. concern. The world is therefore something 'wherein' Dasein as an entity already was, and if in any manner it explicitly comes away from anything, it can never do more than come back to the world. [BT 107/76]

Simply put, if the breakdown in the relationships stops what is happening, then the relationships must be essential to what is happening. Those relationships form an integrated unity that Heidegger calls world. There is also the implication that if going into a nursing home requires the jettisoning of all the things that we need to keep our world worlding through our engagement with them that our world has effectively stopped.

Section 4: Discussing the Concept of World

Some Clarification

The first point to emphasise is that world is not a fixed term relating to a specific entity. The term world in the sense Heidegger is using it is a 'common noun' and

can refer to any referential unity and as such we can talk about “The world of ‘the theatre’ or ‘academia’”, “The world of the nursing home or the aged care industry”, “The world of stamps or cars”, “The study was her world”, or “He spent his life in the world of football” and so on. While “a world” can be understood as a whole or a unity, it can also be understood as part of a larger whole. So, for example, there may be the ‘world of the radiography department’ which in turn is part of the ‘world of the hospital.’

A world can be understood as a world and as an entity ready-to-hand, e.g. as in a hospital. When we are considering the hospital as a ready-to-hand entity, something useful, we must then consider the larger public world which determines the hospital as a hospital. There are then different levels of analysis that can take place and care must be taken in defining the entity-world relationship in this regard. For example, hospitals are part of a country’s health system, but this is the wrong level of analysis if we are considering the nature of activities and equipment used in a neo-natal ward. That Heidegger considers worlds as ready-to-hand is evident from the following quote:

... the product becomes ready-to-hand; and together with these we encounter the world in which wearers and users live, which is at the same time ours. [BT 100/70]

This quote also indicates the different perspectives used in talking about world.

A world must exist prior to a Dasein discovering the world. We can discover a world in a general sense and have an understanding of it in a deficient mode as a place in which we barely function, where we have little ‘know-how’. For example, we go into the accountant’s office on some tax matter, and we see the desks, the computers, the files on the shelves and so on. We know broadly speaking what the accountant’s office *is* sufficiently well that we can engage the accountant to do work for us. However, do not have the ‘know how’ at the level required to be able to work in the office and as such it holds no possibility for us to engage in compartments (lived experiences).

The world outside of our domestic world is typical of this type, remembering that our domestic world is a part of the larger world. In the above quote then, we can encounter the “world in which the wearers and users live” but only in the general sense of world. In summary, as Heidegger notes world them may be understood in different ways,

Here again there are different possibilities: "world" may stand for the 'public' we-world or one's 'own' closest (domestic) environment. [BT 93/65]

All these different possibilities have one thing in common; they have the same structure which is why they are a world.

It is worth mentioning that because a spatial area does not define world, there may not be an alignment between a specific geographic spatial area and a person's domestic world. Take a person living in the suburbs travelling to work, say, at a university campus. They may be familiar with their home, the nearby shops, and sports ground, not familiar with most of the area along the journey to the university and then at the University they may only be familiar with the area of their department, specific lecture rooms, the library, cafeteria and so on. The geographic area over which they might travel is quite larger, and yet the world with which they are familiar is still a unity, but this domestic world comprised of different aspects does not correlate with the broader geographic world over which it is spread. A common example today would be fly-in-fly-out workers for a mining company.

A word of caution is needed at this point. It sounds like a person's world is one in which they are familiar and have sufficient competency to do things, and this means that this is sufficient to provide the possibilities for compartments (i.e. lived experiences), i.e. to have an existence. There is still a missing piece, what makes specific compartments meaningful for us. I will come to this shortly.

A Radical Understanding of World is Revealed

For Heidegger, when we make a statement such as "that is a workshop" or "that is a study" of "that is a nursing home" he is making a strong claim that these are entities that *are*, i.e. they are real. This part of his claim is not that controversial. However, what he is arguing is that these entities are not and should not be understood as a collection of present-at-hand things. They are not a specified arrangement of certain physical things that are assembled to produce a workshop, a study, or a nursing home. As I have presented, Heidegger specifically rejects this account. This is the substance ontology approach, what the tradition accepts. It is also the normative view in scholarship today. It is what Husserl accepted, and it was on this basis that he developed his account of knowledge based on ideal forms.

Heidegger accepts that what we see is physically there. The error occurs when we base our understanding of what things are based on the physical characteristics of

what we see. There is something else going on. This is what Aristotle understood when we rejected the accounts of the first Greek thinkers, calling them 'materialists'. It was what Husserl understood, but he couldn't break free of the Cartesian metaphysics. To demonstrate that something else is going on was the purpose of the previous chapter and the examples I presented. This chapter presents Heidegger's account of what is 'going on' in relation the ready-to-hand entities.

From the time of the ancient Greeks, things were understood, broadly speaking, in one of two ways. There was the substance ontology of the early Pre-Socratics and even Plato. While there are variations between them, broadly speaking, this group argued that the only real things are those that are accounted for strictly in terms of some basic substance. This is what could be termed the 'Lego' view of the world, where things are progressively built from the bottom up. Heidegger described the alternative account, that Nature is a prevailing whole from out of which entities come into being and pass away; that these entities are the prevailing of Nature. In other words, Nature, as that which prevails in its prevailing is evident in these entities. Heraclitus, for example, argues that the only constancy is change.

If we focus on Heidegger's account of the Greeks, what we see is that Heidegger has taken the principle of the prevailing and applied it to world. World is that which prevails, and its prevailing gives rise to ready-to-hand entities such as the equipment we use. Understood in this way the workshop has the structure of world, however, the workshop is itself a prevailing of a large context, a larger world, and so on. In other words, if we 'stand back', there is only one world, with a common structure. However, we can 'drill down' and examine the world more closely, and we see the same structure of the world prevailing. Closer still and the same structure is evident until we come to the equipment and tools we use in the world, and lo and behold the same structure has brought them into being. The 'relational space' that is the study, the workshop or the nursing home can thus all be understood as 'world structure' and it is because we can 'be in' this 'relational space' or 'world structure' that we have the possibility of the living the life we do. Each 'relational space' can be understood in either general terms, or we can have a far more detailed, 'a fine grain' understanding of a 'relational space'. The character of that understanding can also vary from 'theoretical' knowledge to having 'practical knowledge' that enables us to participate in the worlding of the world in an area. Within Heidegger's work, while there is an acknowledgement of the role of the 'theoretical' it is 'practical' knowledge

that is at the heart of 'worlding'. Daseins' world is formed and maintained by the various Dasein's being actively engaged with things, this is the worlding and it requires know-how, or technical skill. If there is no worlding then there is no basis for theoretical or know-what understanding.

When we look around us what we are witnessing, without the awareness of what is happening is the "worlding of the world" [TT] or using the description from the Greeks, what is happening is the 'prevailing' of the world. Rather than a bottom-up Lego approach focusing on the material, Heidegger's account is a top-down, a dynamic approach focusing on relationships. In his account, the 'material' aspect represents what has been employed in response to a particular 'worlding' that is occurring.

This account of what things *are*, as a dynamic concept based on the relationships, has significant implications. Change the relationships, and you change the nature or the characteristics of what things are, even the character of a specific world. Imagine if at the same instant, every person stopped participating in the 'worlding' of this world as is currently understood, i.e. doing the things we do, with the equipment we do, for the purposes we do them, in a phrase 'cultural practices', and did something radically different. If the relationships between things are changed, then a 'new world' emerges. This may seem far-fetched but consider the following thought experiment. At the moment, the organising principle of the capitalist world appears to be a combination¹⁶⁴ of profit maximisation, tax minimisation & individualism and this, in turn, leads to a valuing and reinforcing of one style of relationships over another, this was discussed in Chapter 11 together with Heidegger's concept of enframing. If the organising principle becomes, as the Dalai Lama, suggests, compassion (His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama, 2001), then the world gets re-organised with a different set of relationships being valued. If this occurs, many of the same relationships will remain the same. However, the ones that are highly valued for 'maximising profit' and everything that flows from that organising principle are subject to revision, and the relational practices associated with active compassion get highly valued and supported. Old relationships will disappear, and new ones would take their place. Exploitive corporate practices get

¹⁶⁴ For the purposes of the thought experiment the precise identification of the organising principles is not essential, albeit those I have named are around the mark. Nor does it matter that the organising principles have permeated the entire culture. The organising principles are ones that are currently dominant and responsible for bringing about change to the basic structures of the culture.

replaced. Wage exploitation disappears. The devastation of remote habitats for minerals, timber and food crops that displace hundreds of thousands of indigenous peoples stop. The resources of a community are restructured to enable the frail to be supported with a life of dignity. The ways in which the world fundamentally changes are not insignificant. From a Heideggerian perspective, this is not a rejecting of technology it is changing our relationship to it; this was part of the conclusion of the discussion in Chapter 11. Nor does it mean forsaking an attention to economics, it simply transforms it from an 'ends', i.e. Aristotle's 'fore-the-sake-of-which' to a means, with, I would suggest powerful consequences; it creates a 'new world'. In practice, most of the equipment and know-how we have remains, it simply gets rearranged into a new set of relationships. I have suggested the Dalai Lama's concept of compassion as an organising principle, properly understood the same organising principle is contained in the writings of the Gospels of the New Testament. One does not need to subscribe to the dogma of Church theology to embrace the concepts as organising principles.

What is important to understand is that just because there would be a 'new world', this is a new 'whole, a new 'entity' it is, however, the *same ontological structure* in both the 'old world' and 'new' world. This is the transformative power that is unleashed from Heidegger's analysis.

If this understanding is correct then for the nursing home to change its outcomes it must change its organising principles and from this changes in the ready-to-hand entities and associated practices will flow. This must be understood as a change in the 'structure' of relationships that constitute the nursing home. Going back to Aristotle provides the key, as I demonstrated in the above example. It is the 'for-the-sake-of-which' that drives the bringing of an entity into being. At the moment, the 'for-sake-of-which' of the nursing home is the care of the frail body, and this has structured the relationships. This is the organising principle. If then a change in outcomes from a nursing home is what is required, this means a change in how the nursing home 'worlds, ' i.e. the relational practices. However, this requires that a new 'organising principle' is established, a new 'for-the-sake-of-which'. However, the work of the nursing home is intrinsically bound to an understanding of Dasein, and this has not yet been answered from a Heideggerian perspective. Putting forward a new organising principle will thus have to be deferred until the being of Dasein is brought in to view.

The account I am presenting of Heidegger is not meant to portray Heidegger as the only person to think in terms of emergence, he is not. This approach extends, as I have indicated, back to the Greeks and from the mid-nineteenth century, there is evidence of this approach developing to the point that there is now a significant body of scholarship supporting this approach. It is evident in the areas that carry names such as complexity theory, self-organising systems, chaos theory, systems theory, process philosophy, and process theology. Even though such approaches are now an important part of science from meteorology to quantum physics, this does not mean that there is cohesion in this broad 'camp'. Heidegger's account, while sitting in the 'camp' is still a radical account of the ready-to-hand and Dasein and nowhere could I find the type of systematic analysis that Heidegger applies. In Chapter 19 I provide my interpretation of Heidegger's account of Dasein within this broad approach.

Within Heidegger's work, while there is an acknowledgement of the role of the 'theoretical' it is 'practical' knowledge that is at the heart of 'worlding'. Dasein is a creature whose way of being is to participate in 'worlding', and if understood in this way then questions start to emerge as to the role of nursing homes. If we are to care for the person, should not the emphasis be to support their engagement in 'worlding', which means tending to the frailty of the body in such a way that encourages and supports this participation. This accepts the role for bodily care, but in a subordinate role to 'worlding'. Placing the primary emphasis on the care of the body and sacrificing the participation in 'worlding' essentially denies the character of Dasein. It compounds the problem of the frail body. Indeed, if the understanding of Dasein is as radical as the understanding of world, then Dasein needs to participate in 'worlding' in order to continue to be Dasein it is. To stop the 'participation' may be to stop Dasein being Dasein, it is then, to slightly misapply Wolfensberger's term, 'death-making'(Wolfensberger, 1992) for Dasein. This is still speculative as, to reiterate, there is no evidence from Heidegger's work for this as yet.

The priority of the 'practical' over the theoretical also has significant implications for professions and trades who are directly connected to participation in 'worlding'. The fundamental guiding principle must be on the evidence of 'what works', and not persuing practices driven by theoretical based knowledge or even habitual practices that continue in the face of evidence to the contrary. This seems to be the current

situation in nursing homes given the evidence of the experiences of the person presented earlier.

Summary

This chapter has brought the various discussions from the previous chapters to inform an interpretation Heidegger's account of world and the way we dwell 'in' the world'.

It inverts our understanding of things from a bottom-up approach to a top-down approach, from a focus on the material as primary, to the material as a response, from a view of things as static, to one in which they are understood as dynamic.

This account starts to bring into focus the nursing home which has a structure of world. As large and diverse institutions they have the character of both public world and a domestic world for most people who dwell 'in' them. In considering our expressed comportments which reflect our 'know how' in the participation of 'worlding', the important aspect is the domestic world; this is the 'space' associated with such dealings. These are the lived experiences that constitute our existence. For example, the nursing home is specifically designed as a work environment for the nurses, such that they can engage in dealings which allow them to exercise their 'know how', those expressed comportments that result in lives experiences of being a nurse. The same is true, perhaps for an office worker, maintenance staff and so on. For this thesis, the question is, does it provide such an environment for the older people living in the nursing home? This cannot be answered as yet, but the thesis is steadily moving in a way that can address this question.

In the next chapter, I discuss the ontological structure of world, what Heidegger calls worldhood.

CHAPTER 15: THE WORLDHOOD OF THE WORLD

Introduction

This is the longest and the most difficult of the chapters in the thesis. The previous chapter discussed the world as an entity, and in this chapter, the transition is made to linking the structure of world with the structure of Dasein. In Heidegger's formal indication of being there are two parts, being as determining the entity and being as the basis of understanding of an entity. These two aspects collide in this chapter at both the ontic and the ontological level. At the ontological level worldhood in both the structure of world and constitutive of the structure of Dasein and this is what is termed worldhood. At the ontic level, each individual Dasein's understanding of world is constituted by its understanding of self, and this understanding, in turn, provides the basis of a way of being-in-the-world. It is, however, the collective understanding of Daseins reflected in their individual ways of being that brings a world into being. The conclusion from this is that collectively Dasein has the wherewithal to change the ontic worlds in which it lives, notwithstanding it cannot change the ontological structure!

All the concepts previously discussed are evident in this chapter, and it is not possible to comprehend what Heidegger is discussing without them. Already mentioned are the two aspects of being, there are also the two aspects of perceiving and understanding an entity, the concepts of mereology, an understanding of being as structural and as a way of being, and so on. For Heidegger to describe the phenomena he finds in the structure, he introduces new terminology the most important being projection, assignment and meaning-making, all of which require a firm grasp of the prior concepts.

Key to understanding the chapter is Heidegger's shift of perspective from describing the phenomenon of world in general to the understanding of world from the perspective of a Dasein. We essentially have at play in the chapter both the entity world and a Dasein's understanding of world, and they need not be the same. Heidegger does not specifically draw attention to these two perspectives and at times switches rapidly between them.

In discussing and drawing out Heidegger's descriptive account, I have tried to present and make clear all the key concepts carefully, and then to progressively

bring out the description of the ontological structure of worldhood. In doing this care has been taken to clarify which perspective of world is being addressed and examples are used to illustrate the phenomenon. The understanding of the structural relationship between Dasein and Dasein's envrioning world is critical to understanding the 'shedding of life' both ontically and structurally.

One entry point into the chapter is the recognition of the puzzle of the dual role of worldhood that is present in Heidegger's introduction of the term and it is with this puzzle that the discussion commences.

The Puzzle of Worldhood

There is a puzzle associated with understanding the concept of worldhood. First, it is the name of an existientiale aspect of Dasein's structure [BT 92/64] however there is also the suggestion that it is, in some way, the ontological structure of world. In the setting out of the four concepts of world (refer the last chapter), there is a pairing of the ontic concept and the ontological concept of the present-at-hand version of the world (numbers 1. and 2.). It is reasonable to assume that the same pairing relationship between the ontic concept of the world as the 'wherein' Dasein dwells and the ontological concept that immediately follows (numbers 3. and 4.). The introduction of Worldhood in point 4. reads as follows;

4. Finally, "world" designates the ontologico-existential concept of *worldhood*. Worldhood itself may have as its modes whatever structural wholes any special 'worlds' may have at the time; but it embraces in itself the *a priori* character of worldhood in general. [BT 93/65]

Just as there are different modes of world, we would expect the ontological account to reflect this, and this is the case. Further just as I argued that the various modes of world should be understood within the unity of a larger world, this is reflected in the account of worldhood, in that its various modes have the single "a priori character of worldhood in general". All this point to worldhood being the ontological structure of world. However, the term ontologico-existential, which is only used about half a dozen times in *Being and Time*, is used in reference to structural aspects of Dasein's existence, e.g. discourse [BT 206/163], falling [BT 220/176], fleeing [BT 229/184], care [BT 237/192] which supports the statement that worldhood is an existientiale. There is then the suggestion that worldhood is part of the ontological structure of two entities, world and of Dasein.

A world exists prior to a particular Dasein, and if this is the case how can a structure

of one entity also be the structure of the other? Unpacking the apparent dual ontological role of worldhood and the relationship at the ontic level between world and Dasein will be critical to understanding the structure of worldhood as an existentials. Certainly, even in this brief setting out of the puzzle, there are indications that Dasein and its world are intrinsically bound together, not just ontically, but ontologically, just how is still obscure. If this is the case, then given that at the ontic level Dasein's existence is understood as lived experiences suggests that changes in the environment (Dasein's domestic world) *will* impact on Dasein's existence. If the changes lead to an adverse impact, this may account for the lived experience of 'shedding life'. For this to be demonstrated the structural relationship between Dasein's existence and world needs to be disclosed. This is the aim of this chapter.

Part of the answer lies in Heidegger's formal indication concerning being. The entity of world can be understood as both an entity that exists independently of Dasein and in terms of Dasein's understanding of world. While there will be substantial alignment, there is room for discrepancy, leeway for misunderstanding. This would suggest that there are two worlds, the entity itself and the one Dasein interprets, the later I take as worldhood. This approach provides a way of accounting for Dasein's dealings within the world in appropriate ways, and hence participate in the 'worlding of the world' but also how things go astray. 'Worlding' gets determined by the average everyday understanding of *all* Daseins, what Heidegger refers to as *Das Man*, or the 'One' [BT Ch IV] and not the misunderstanding or variant interpretation of any particular Dasein. I discuss the 'One' in Chapter 16. In that Dasein's understanding of world must be structurally equivalent to the being of the entity, his accounts for Heidegger's comments that worldhood has the same 'modes' as world.

In the previous chapter, the description of the world and of the ready-to-hand has an objective character about it. It is from the perspective of the detached observer. The discussion on worldhood changes the perspective, it shifts from the entity of world to the entity of Dasein and starts to describe the encounter of world from a Dasein's perspective. The phenomenon associated with Dasein understanding a 'relational space' (a world or the wherein) such that it can live its life in the space Heidegger calls familiarity. In turn, familiarity is constitutive of Dasein¹⁶⁵, and

¹⁶⁵ As I am interpreting the structural aspects of Dasein, this simply means that familiarity is a necessary and essential characteristic of Dasein's existence. See previous discussion on the

Heidegger's strategy is to analyse and describe the structural aspect of Dasein associated with familiarity. This is given in the following passage;

... familiarity with the world does not necessarily require that the relations which are constitutive for the world as world should be theoretically transparent. However, the possibility of giving these relations an explicit ontologico-existential Interpretation, is grounded in this familiarity with the world; and this familiarity, in turn, is constitutive for Dasein, and goes to make up Dasein's understanding of being. [BT 119/86]

Familiarity is the name given to the ontic phenomenon, and the results of this analysis is a description of the existentielle structure Heidegger calls worldhood.

Following this line of argument then it is Dasein's understanding of world that is constitutive of its existence, and this is what Heidegger repeats in several different ways. This chapter sets out my argument for the interpretation of worldhood and the relationship between world and Dasein as outlined above and I commence with Heidegger's remarks that Dasein is its (understanding of) of world.

Dasein is its World Existingly

In the following, I lay out what has been developed so far and then extend this to make the descriptive claim that Dasein can be said to be its world, by which I mean its interpretation of the entity world. I then use the section to clarify some of Heidegger's other terms for world, 'there' and 'clearing' which in turn sheds light on Heidegger's intent of connecting the name attributed to us, Dasein, and the phenomenon of world. I then introduce a new concept by Heidegger, that of projection, which is a structural element of being-in-the-world. This structure can be understood as projecting the 'blueprint' representing Dasein's interpretation of world (i.e. 'its world') onto 'the world'. The concept of projection is then carried over into subsequent discussions.

Summary to date:

- Existence can only be understood in terms of our lived experiences or expressed compartments towards entities.
- A Dasein's compartments are based on its understanding of what entities are in terms of their practical-bearings (what we do with them, what they do)
- Entities are understood on the basis of the referential structure by which they are constituted (i.e. world)

example of describing the structure of language.

-
- Dasein's familiarity, understanding, of a particular set of referential structures define *its* world.

Another way of saying this is that Dasein's understanding of 'the world' determines 'its world'. In that, it is Dasein's understanding of world that it the 'referential space' or world in which it dwells, then it can be said that Dasein is its world, or it brings its world with it, etc. This is the way in which Heidegger occasionally describes it in various texts;

Dasein is its world existingly [BT 416/364]

Dasein brings its there with it ... [HCT 253]

Dasein ... brings along with it the projection of world ... [OEG 128]

In these quotes, two new terms have been introduced 'there' and 'projection'. The arrangement of the quotes suggests that they are essentially saying the same thing, indicating that the 'there' and world are equivalent and the way in which Dasein brings its world is as a projection. This proves to be the case, and the following sections discuss these concepts in more detail, shedding light on Heidegger's approach and terminology.

Understand World in Terms of the 'There'

The term 'there' is another name for 'referential space', 'world' or the 'wherein' that is opened by familiarity. In the following exchange from the 1966/67 *Heraclitus Seminar* Heidegger specifically addresses the concept of the 'there' and how it should not be understood. In his explanation, he uses the misunderstanding of the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre to help make his point. The extract also sheds light on Heidegger's intent in designating our way of being Dasein.

PARTICIPANT: The hermeneutic in Being and Time sets out from Dasein, whereby it does not understand Dasein in the customary manner as present at hand.

HEIDEGGER: In French, Dasein is translated by être-là [being there], for example by Sartre. But with this, everything that was gained as a new position in Being and Time is lost. Are humans there like a chair is there?

PARTICIPANT: "Dasein" in Being and Time does not mean pure human factual being.

HEIDEGGER: Dasein does not mean being there and being here. What does the "Da" mean?

PARTICIPANT: It means what is cleared in itself. Human being, like Dasein's being is no pure thing present at hand, but a cleared being.

HEIDEGGER: In Being and Time, Dasein is described as follows: Da-sein. The Da is the

clearing and openness of what is, as which a human stands out. Representation, the knowledge of consciousness, is something totally different. [HS. 126] (my underlining)

The literal translation of the German *Dasein* is 'there-being', *Da* is the German term for there. In this exchange, Heidegger specifically rules out *Da* being understood in a physical spatial sense (we are not chairs) and provides the equivalent meanings of *Da* (there) as the "the clearing" and "the openness". As Heidegger uses the terms 'world' and 'there' are equivalent and as such *Dasein* means, being-in-the-world. He has given us a name that reflects our essential defining characteristic, just as Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes have done.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger introduces the notion of the 'there' and 'clearing' in a later section;

... as being-in-the-world [*Dasein*] is cleared in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its very nature, *Dasein* brings its "there" along with it. If it lacks its "there", it is not factually the entity which is essentially *Dasein*; indeed, it is not this entity at all. *Dasein* is its *disclosedness*. [BT 171/133] (my underlining)

That the 'there' is an essential defining characteristic is clear; no 'there' no *Dasein*. The terms 'world', 'there', 'clearing', 'openness', and 'wherein' are all ways of describing the phenomenon of understanding that I have called the 'relational space', and the structure of this understanding is part of the overall structure of being-in-the-world. The ontological structure Heidegger names worldhood. It is the unthematized understanding of this structure (familiarity) that enables us to walk into a study as a study, a nursing home as a nursing home, to be-in our world. Without this understanding, every place we found our self would be even more unintelligible than the strange physics laboratory. Things would be just present-at-hand devoid of any meaning in a worldly sense. Hence, *we bring with us* the understanding to enter the study as a study; we bring our "there" with us!

Heidegger's technical term for this is that we "disclose" the 'world' as the world it is. To enter a kitchen as a kitchen does not mean that we must understand every version of a kitchen. The being of the kitchen is determined by a set of the necessary, essential and unified involvements that constitute the 'relational space' or structure of a kitchen. It is thus a flexible and abstract concept at the ontological level, but it is made concrete at the ontic or entity level. The ontological structure of kitchen can thus be present in a myriad of ontic examples. Providing that a room

has the structure of kitchen, and further, that we have a prior disclosure(understanding) of kitchen we can thus enter the kitchen as a kitchen. The phrase entering a kitchen as a kitchen reflects the two aspects or roles of being, the entity and the understanding. The phrase, when unpacked, is saying that we can enter the kitchen (the entity it is as determined by being) as a kitchen (our understanding of the being of a kitchen). Hence, we bring our 'there' with us. The same basic concept applies to every 'relational space' or world.

At this point, the similarities with Husserl are evident as are the differences. Husserl claimed that we have access to ideal categorial forms that match up with the representation of the object to give us understanding. Heidegger's version seems to be that we have an understanding of 'ideal relational patterns' which we match up to what we are perceiving. Heidegger would reject this on two counts, both based on the perspective of a strict experiential empiricist. Firstly, there is no evidence of 'ideal relational patterns', all we have is the experience of the 'there'. Secondly, there is no evidence that we have access to whatever it is that is projecting the 'there', all we experience is what is 'projected,' i.e. the 'there'. For Heidegger, Dasein, as existence, *is constituted by* the structure of understanding. Dasein *does not first exist and then possess* understanding. This does not preclude the possibilities of neuroscience finding that the brain has some mechanism for identifying, storing, retrieving and applying such relational patterns as part of the structure of Dasein. This is a different level of inquiry, but one that would ultimately need to account for the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. At all times we must keep the various different aspects of the phenomenon in view and not insert unfounded presuppositions.

This approach accounts for why Heidegger will talk about understanding as a structure. However, it can get confusing, for at the ontic level, the structure of understanding does give Dasein the ability to understand things. Heidegger uses understanding in both these ways in *Being and Time*, particularly in the chapter addressing understanding (Chapter 5). This is part of the difficulty of his naming strategy that I have previously commented upon. Understanding is briefly discussed in Chapter 17 of the thesis.

For Dasein, no other entity, neither another Dasein nor even a god (this is the "not through any other entity" underlined in the above quote) gives us this world, gives us our "there". There is also the point that if Dasein "lacks its "there", it is not

factually the entity which is essentially Dasein". The short version of this is 'no world – no Dasein'. There are three ways in which this can be understood. Firstly, if an entity does not have a structure such that it has a 'there' then it is not a Dasein, secondly, if the structure is damaged so the 'there' is only partially established or fails to be established, Dasein as an entity is destroyed, or significantly damaged or impaired or thirdly, while the structure is intact the Dasein's world has been removed. In the latter case, the structure of Dasein must 'work' to disclose new worlds based on its understanding of self, and establish a new way of being (involvements) in the new worlds. In this case, ontically the 'new' Dasein is different to the 'old' Dasein.

In relation to the 'no world-no Dasein' claim, I take Heidegger to be concerned with the first interpretation as this is all he needs for his inquiry. However, the second interpretation has application to understanding what is happening in a certain situation that impacts on a Dasein, e.g. brain injury, dementia, and the third contributes to an understanding of what is happening in relocating a Dasein into an alien environment. It is this last point that may be informative in understanding 'shedding life'. All three interpretations derive from the same understanding of the ontological structure.

The picture that is emerging from a Heideggerian perspective is that we are born into a pre-established world of which we initially understand nothing. We have a dynamic structure that slowly discloses aspects of the world such that the ready-to-hand entities in the world become accessible. Even when we are older, we can disclose new environments, and before we can use the equipment (ready-to-hand) within these environments, we must gain the necessary know-how. The process of establishing and maintaining our familiarity with a world is thus ongoing and, to reiterate, a world is understood at a technical level as the 'relational unity'.

Heidegger's approach in addressing the phenomenon of why we can enter a study as study is, using Aristotle's language, that we have an understanding of the study as a species and can recognise a specific instance or member of the species. What Heidegger does *not* address is that being familiar with a lounge room and being familiar with my lounge room are two different, but related phenomenon. This is why, for example, a person with dementia may understand they are in a lounge room but cannot recall that it is their lounge room. Heidegger does not address this aspect of the phenomenon in *Being and Time*, and I am not aware that he addresses

it elsewhere. I suspect that the recognition of 'my lounge room' has two aspects, one dealing with understanding of the being of 'lounge room' which is related to the structure of the ready-to-hand and the other dealing the unique categorial characteristics of the present-at-hand aspects of the furniture in the room. There may be a third, that of 'belong -to'. If this is the case, the 'myness' is constituted by three aspects indicating that it is a quite a complex structure. This would account for some people being in a room, recognising it as a lounge room but not recognising it as 'their' lounge room. I have also encountered situations where people with dementia see an item, not belonging to them and not looking like something they own and yet claiming it as theirs (i.e. mine or belonging to). This would suggest that the only aspects of the complex structure of recognising something as belonging to them is operative. If the specific areas of the structure which are presenting as being damaged can be identified, then responses to support the person could be individually tailored, rather than the group communal approach that is the norm. I do not comment further on this aspect of Heidegger's work, and the research possibilities are more by way of indicating a future research agenda.

Understanding the Multiple uses of World and 'There.'

Heidegger uses the term world in at least three different ways and following this is not easy. I attribute the problem to Heidegger's naming convention to which I have previously referred. I will unpack this different meaning by using Heidegger's formal indication of being, i.e. as "that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood" [BT 25-6/6] I will use the example of a specific world, my workshop:

I can go into my workshop, and it is intelligible to me. At the ontic level, the workshop as an entity has a certain place; it does not move. As a workshop, this entity is independent of me. When I enter the workshop, I do so based on my understanding of it as a workshop. The workshop I understand also has a place, it does not move. This can be presented by adapting the Aristotelian formula;

- The workshop as the entity it is = (material + being)
- The workshop as understood = (material + understanding of being of workshop)

There is a relationship between the material (or in Heidegger's terms, the present-at-hand) aspects of the entity and the specific location of the workshop in geographic space. This has been discussed. It is also why the workshop world does not 'move'.

However as has repeatedly been argued it is not the material that makes it a workshop, it is just the material is part of what is required to bring it into being. What makes it a workshop is the 'relational unity' that is associated with it. All this was covered in the last chapter.

World can thus be applied in two ways at the ontic level, to the 'relational space' that is the workshop, independent of me, and my understanding of the workshop as a 'wherein' I dwell. It is important to differentiate between the two. Regardless of what the entity is, it is my understanding that is relevant to me, and it may be wrong. Recalling that Dasein's understanding of things is reflected in what Heidegger calls familiarity;

... familiarity with the world ... is constitutive for Dasein, and goes to make up Dasein's understanding of being. [BT 119/86]

This capacity for familiarity to be based on a wrong understanding of being, is I believe, what is happening in relation to nursing homes. Even though it is a wrong understanding, it is still "Dasein's understanding of being".

The third way in which world is used is applied to just the understanding of being; this is behind the phrase cited above "Dasein is its world existingly" [BT 416/364] When used in this way it is referencing the unthematized familiarity we have in general. Providing we understand these different but related ways that Heidegger uses 'world' everything is fine, but getting that clarity can be a struggle; Heidegger doesn't make it easy.

The term the 'there' seems to be used by Heidegger only in sense two and three, i.e. as a 'relational space' opened up in which we may dwell and in a more general sense as a reference to the fact that Dasein always has 'its there'. This was reflected in the above passage from the *Heraclitus Seminar* which Heidegger repeats in a different way in 1965, where Heidegger makes the following comment concerning the meaning of Dasein;

To begin with, French existentialists also failed to pay attention to it. That is why they translated Da-sein in *Being and Time* as *être-là*, which means being here and not there. The *Da* in *Being and Time* does not mean a statement of place for a being, but rather it should designate the openness where beings can be present for the human being, and the human being also for himself. [ZP 120]

In other words, world or 'the there' can apply to the name of the structural aspect of Dasein, i.e. as an existentiale at the ontological level, or it can apply to the

'openness' in general experienced at the ontic level. This is consistent with Heidegger's approach to establishing the structure of Dasein which I have previously addressed.

Disclosure, Discovery and Truth

This discussion helps to clarify two of Heidegger's terms, at least in a preliminary way. Even though we have a pre-ontological understanding of being there is always a possibility that in relation to specific entities this may be wrong. In his phenomenological method, Heidegger is inquiring into entities and describing their being, based on the entity and not presumed understandings. The investigation into the being Heidegger calls the disclosing or disclosure of being [e.g. BT 32/12 34/14 49/26]. Being used in this way relates to whatever it is that is prevailing, so in relation to an entity ready-to-hand it is the structure of world. Heidegger also refers to Dasein's initial understanding of being of a world as disclosing, albeit this is an unthematized disclosure [e.g. BT 118/86] When a world has been disclosed, and Dasein subsequently understands something as something in that world, e.g. the object as a coffee cup he refers to this as discovering [e.g. BT 57/34 84/54 89/62]. The concept of disclosure thus applies both to the unthematized and formal approach to understanding being.

For the most part, Heidegger accepts that in the average everydayness of the average Dasein, for the most part, our understanding of world is a 'true' understanding. This is the basis on which we have a functional society. In that our understanding is constitutive of the world and Dasein and as such the 'there' in which we dwell it can, therefore, be said that we live in truth. This is why in the *History of the Concept of Time* when discussing the phenomenological study of the intentional comportment of perception he comments,

... the phenomenological sense of saying that in evident perception I do not thematically study the truth of this perception itself, but rather live *in* the truth. [HCT 52]

If we live in truth, then truth is grounded in being, and a formal inquiry into what is true is thus a disclosure of being. This direction of discussion moves towards a detailed look at Heidegger's conception of truth and his critique of the various theories of truth in the tradition. While he covers this in *Being and Time* a discussion on truth is outside the scope of this thesis.

Understanding Projection

The next concept I want to address is projection. In the discussion on Husserl's work what came to light is that we experience an entity as a unified phenomenon of (sensuous intuition + sensuous intuition). Heidegger accepts the phenomenon but rejects Husserl's account. In the previous section, the concept that Dasein brings its world or 'its there' with it was discussed, and this is somehow constitutive of 'relational space' or world at the ontic level in which Dasein dwells. What was also pointed out was that the phenomenon seems to comprise the present-at-hand plus the understanding of being, or familiarity. Heidegger provides a descriptive account of this two-part structural phenomenon 'coming together', and the name he gives to it is 'projection.' Again, this is a phenomenon associated with the structure, not Dasein as such.

Projection (*Entwurf*¹⁶⁶) is an existentiale [BT 185/145], a structural aspect of being-in-the-world. As an existentiale the term must be heard as a descriptive account of what is happening and not an explanation or inference as to why or how it happens; this is part of the method. In German, *Entwurf* means among other things a draft, blueprint, a sketch, model or a projection. Projection should not be heard in an illumination sense but as in lines drawn by a projector. However, there is another overlay to this phenomenon that Heidegger is describing that is mentioned in the translators' note (BT 185 Note 1). In Heidegger's German, there is the sense of 'throwing' in the word, and there is thus a sense that understanding somehow casts its understanding onto the world, allowing the world to show up in accordance with that projection. As a rough analogy, I take it that the relational frame-works that are understood as various worlds (study, kitchen, workshop, city, etc.) are projected onto to the present-at-hand by understanding and from this Dasein then perceives not the present-at-hand, but the ready-to-hand based on this relational structure of involvements. The underlying presents-at-hand is still there which is why it can 'poke through' when there is a breakdown in the structure of understanding. This happens as part of our structure, it is not something we have control over, it is not something that we even notice occurring, and it is certainly not a cognitive skill that we acquire. It is part of what constitutes Dasein. This is the sense we have in the following quotes relating to projection;

¹⁶⁶ Remembering Heidegger typically names the structure with the same name as the function of the structure, He does this with projection, *Entwurf* as the noun for the structure, and *entwerfen* as the verb.

As the respective wholeness of that for the sake of which Dasein exists in each case, world is brought before Dasein through Dasein itself. ... that which has been projected, this projection of world also always casts the projected world over entities. This prior casting-over first makes it possible for entities as such to manifest themselves. [OEG 121] (my underling)

The character of understanding as projection is constitutive for being-in-the-world .. [BT 185/145] (i.e. it is part of the structure of who we are) (my underlining)

The structure of being-in-the-world makes manifest the essential peculiarity of the Dasein, that it projects a world for itself, and it does this not subsequently and occasionally but, rather, the projecting of the world belongs to the Dasein's being. In this projection the Dasein has always already *stepped out beyond itself*, ex-sistere, it is *in* a world. [BPP 170]¹⁶⁷ (my underlining)

In the first quote, the description is from the perspective of Dasein. In this case 'projected world' refers to the casting of the understanding of the referential structure, not literally the world. It is the casting that brings world before Dasein. Albeit as I mentioned the language gets frequently blurred in Heidegger's work. In the last quote, we get a clearer insight into Heidegger's intent concerning the description. With the projection, Dasein has "Stepped out beyond itself ... it is in the world" [BPP 170]. As I stop writing and look around all I see is my familiar world. From the stuff on the desk in front of me to the left are the printers, to the right the bookcases and behind me, a lounge chair and door leading to the kitchen. The projection operates in all directions; I am in a 3D world, this is the space in which I dwell. I am in the world courtesy, in part because of the structure of projection. This is what Heidegger is getting at.

I mentioned earlier that the nature of the structure allows for a misunderstanding of being, in this case, the projection is cast and what shows up as an entity is based on the wrong understanding of being. The example of phlogiston is a case in point. However, it is possible to have the right understanding of being, but it is misapplied (wrongly cast) because what we are trying to grasp is in some way hidden or obscured. For example, we see something in the distance. The projection is cast; it shows up as X. As we walk closer, we discover that the entity is not an X it is a Y. The casting is ongoing and has the capacity to self-correct, albeit this does not necessarily happen. We may hold on to X by way of a presupposition and turn away, ignoring the conditions under which X showed up, and failing to seek clarification.

¹⁶⁷ *exsistere* is Latin for existence from *ex* meaning forth + *sistere* meaning cause to stand. The purpose behind Heidegger presenting the word as *ex-sistere* seems to be highlighting the root of the word, existence is to cause to stand forth.

Understanding the character of projection is a pointer to Heidegger's methodology, in that it is designed to disclose the being of entities based only on what shows itself from the entity itself and not what is projected onto the entity.

We Exist in the Projection – Already Outside!

From the above, the experience of perceiving something as something *only* occurs when understanding has been projected upon the entities present-at-hand. Remember that perception is an expressed comportment (i.e. it is in the doing) and this is the basis of our lived experience of what we perceive and as such forms part of our existence. I suspect, albeit I have not pursued the point, that in breakdown cases (refer the last chapter) the understanding of what something should be, compared to our experience of what is happening, is disrupted, and the projection is ruptured, allowing the present-at-hand on which the world is founded to show through. This is not addressed in Heidegger's work and would be an interesting piece of work to pursue at a later date.

Within the constraints¹⁶⁸ of what Heidegger is considering, any expressed comportment towards the ready-to-hand requires a present-at-hand object that is subject to a projection. It is important to note that the nature of the projection is not like a visual overlay, it is placing the understood usefulness of the object within the context of a referential unity and from this we see the entity as something; recall the example of the font and the birdbath. The lived experience occurs because of this combination of the object and the projection brought together as a unified expressed comportment. The lived experience can only occur in the 'relational space' constituted by the casting of a projection. This is why Heidegger makes the comments that Dasein is not,

... encapsulated as something 'internal' over against something outside, ... because as being-in-the-world it is already 'outside' when it understands. [BT 205/162]

The same objection if presented in *History of the Concept of Time*,

In directing-itself-toward and apprehending, Dasein does not first get out of itself, out of its inner sphere in which it is encapsulated. Rather, its very sense is to be *always already 'outside'* in the world, in the rightly understood sense of 'outside' as in-being and dwelling with the world, which in each instance is already uncovered in some way. [HCT 164]

¹⁶⁸ He is not dealing with the understanding of mythical creatures or abstract numerical concepts, etc

This approach destroys the whole basis of the subject-object division between self and world and with it the fundamental premises operating with much of the psychological and neurological sciences.

This concludes this aspect of the discussion, and it is a useful segue to the discussion on worldhood.

Free for Us

Heidegger uses the term 'dealing' [*Umgang*] to refer to general interactions we have with the ready-to-hand entities in the world;

The being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be exhibited phenomenologically if we take as our clue our everyday being-in- the-world, which we also call our "*dealings*" in the world and *with* entities within-the-world. [BT 95/67]

When we perceive equipment, we don't see it as present-at-hand, it shows up for us on the basis of an understanding projection as equipment ready-to-hand. This is already well explained. There is another aspect. We can look around and perceive various pieces of equipment, all of them intelligible as equipment. However, they are not of interest to us now, and accordingly, they are hardly noticed, if at all. However, when we are undertaking a task, dealing with things, we are perceiving things or looking for things to be used, i.e. on the basis of wanting to deal with them in-order-to-do something. When we are looking around in these circumstances, the equipment we need shows up for us, often very clearly, even if just poking out from somewhere. The name that Heidegger gives to this type of 'looking around' or 'seeing' is circumspection [*Umsicht*].

Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to'. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is *circumspection*. [BT 98/69]

As Heidegger indicates, our dealings with equipment are typically understood as part of an 'in-order-to' structure, roughly understood as part of a sequence of things to be done; I will come back to this point. When I go into the shed to find the fencing pliers to fix the fence, I may be perceiving the various things in the shed, but my circumspection is focused on the pliers. I hardly notice any specific piece of equipment unless it is in the way, has to be moved and so on, but the plier shows up for me lying 'over there' on the bench. This is circumspective sight at work. We direct this sight towards anything we are interested in as part of an in-order-to

structure, and this is quite broad. We look up in-order-to see what caused the noise, I search around the desk looking for my notes on a certain topic, I stop at an intersection and look for obstructions that may impede my progress, and so on. All this is circumspection¹⁶⁹.

In the way Heidegger is using the word the connection with the in-order-to structure and with understanding is thus built in. When the fencing pliers show up for me, I do not see them as a bare present-at-hand object; I see them as fencing pliers in terms of the serviceability as 'for mending fences' and this is only possible on the basis that a world has previously been disclosed.

When Heidegger commences his discussion on worldhood he says,

Our analysis hitherto has shown that what we encounter within-the-world has, in its very being, been freed for our concerned circumspection, for taking account. [BT 114/83]

It is the question concerning 'being freed' that Heidegger pursues as a way of getting at the constitution of the world. While there are several related questions the primary one concerning equipment seems to be

How can entities with this kind of being be freed by the world with regard to their being? [BT 114/83]

The German word translated as freed is *freigegeben* which is a verb that can mean freed, released, unlocked, enabled and so forth. There appears to be the notion of something bound up and not available that is then somehow released for us. I take this to mean that prior to understanding a piece of equipment, it just shows us as present-at-hand, notwithstanding the equipment already exists as equipment in the culture as part of the referential unity of a world. The hammer is a hammer, and the pliers are pliers long before I understood them, however until understood the equipment nature (i.e. readiness-to-hand) is concealed from me. The equipment cannot come out of 'hiding' by itself; it must first be freed and only then is it accessible to me as equipment.

Heidegger is now approaching his analysis of the world from the perspective of a Dasein dwelling in the world, and it is on this basis this 'freeing' occurs for Dasein. As will be discussed in the next section, however, being freed means being freed

¹⁶⁹ The translators make the note that *Um* may mean either 'around' or 'in order to' while *Sicht* means sight and such *Umsicht* "may accordingly be thought of as meaning 'looking around' or 'looking around for something' or 'looking around for a way to get something done'." [BT 95 note 2] AS I am interpreting it, the sight is one that occurs both in the basis of projecting-understanding and in the context of our activities.

for involvements, i.e. we have to be able to deal with them. The meaning of involvements is discussed in the next section.

World from a Different Perspective - Involvement¹⁷⁰

By way of summary from the previous chapter, Heidegger approaches the description of the structure of the world from a number of perspectives, as

- a “unity of equipment” [97/68]
- an ‘in-order-to-structure [97/68]
- “the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to' ” [BT 98/69]
- “referential unity within which the equipment is encountered” [BT 99/70] (translation modified)

All these are describing the phenomenon of world from different perspectives, the unity of equipment being the most elementary. In terms of understanding the world as an ‘in-order-to’ structure the two most important types are ‘serviceability’ and ‘usability’ which, as ‘in-order-to’ contain within them what Heidegger calls an “*assignment or reference of something to something*” [BT 97/68].

The sequence then, as has been discussed is first world disclosure, then discovering the equipment and only then can we encounter it as equipment;

In anything ready-to-hand, the world is always 'there'. Whenever we encounter anything, the world has already been previously discovered, though not thematically. [BT 114/83]

World as a structure of references and assignments is thus also the structure of the ready-to-hand within the world. This is the concept of the prevailing of the world. Heidegger expresses it as follows.

We have indicated that that which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand as equipment is one of reference or assignment. [BT 114/83]

The above few paragraphs are essentially Heidegger’s summary of the analysis to date presented in the opening of the section on Worldhood [BT §18]. However, he has expressed it specifically in terms of references and assignments and from this

¹⁷⁰ The German word translated as involvement is *Bewandtnis*. The translators of BT have an extensive note [BT 115 note 2] on the difficulty of translating this word into English for which there is no English equivalent. After explaining the root of the word the translators settle on involvement, the translator of BTs notes [BTs xxv] that the word could be translated as "relevance" or "situation" and opts for "relevance". The University of Chemnitz online German-English Dictionary, *Beolingus*, as 'background' or the 'story behind', while the Google Translation service translates it as 'explanation'. All of these have some aspect in common. I have chosen to stay with the BT translation. What needs to be underscored however is that involvement used to refer to a particular activity that is relevant to the entity, it tells what the entity is doing now.

aspect, he makes the move that leads to the account of worldhood as part of the structure of Dasein. First an observation concerning assignments:

To say that the being of the ready-to-hand has the structure of assignment or reference means that it has in itself the character of *having been assigned or referred*. {BT 115/83-4}

Now comes the next step;

An entity is discovered when it has been assigned or referred to something, and, referred as that entity which it is. [BT 115/84]

We have now switched over to the perspective of a Dasein. Remembering that an entity already exists in the culture as the entity it is. It already has relational connections as part of the structure. This was part of the descriptive account of the entity called world from the previous chapter. However, for Dasein to discover an entity as the entity it is, it must make the assignments. I take this as Dasein 'understanding' the assignments that constitute the entity and thus understanding the entity as the entity it is. Discovery is thus a mode of understanding. Put colloquially; we discover what the character of equipment by determining how it 'fits in' with other equipment to which it relates. The examples of the unfamiliar equipment from Chapter 13 demonstrates this phenomenon.

The following sentence follows on immediately, and with it, Heidegger introduces the new terminology,

With any such entity, there is an involvement which it has *in* something. The character of being which belongs to the ready-to-hand is just such an *involvement*. [BT 115/84]

We have switched back to the entity perspective! He is now describing the being of the entity reflecting the more dynamic language of involvements. Any suggestion that the structure of world is static is now abolished!

We now switch back to the perceptive of Dasein;

If something has an involvement, this implies letting it be involved in something. [BT 115/84]

The idea of "letting be involved" is related to "freed" and this relates to Dasein's structure. The language is awkward, but the intent is clear. Even though there is a piece of equipment in the world, we cannot use it; we cannot access it until we have discovered it. To use Heidegger's other language, the equipment must first be freed for involvements as the entity it is, i.e. based on its being (place in the referential unity). As the page is turned in *Being and Time* this is exactly what we find Heidegger saying;

When an entity within-the-world has already been proximally freed for its being, that being is its "involvement". With any such entity as entity, there is some involvement. The fact that it has an involvement is *ontologically* definitive for the being of such an entity, and is not an ontical assertion about it. [BT 116/84]

In that this reference concerns something "proximally freed" it is from the perspective of Dasein. In that Heidegger is carrying out his analysis from the perspective of Dasein's average everydayness, then Dasein's understanding of an entity will typically be based on the 'right' understanding of the being of the entity. As mentioned before, if this were not the norm, then the society could not function. From this perspective, freeing an entity for involvements is a possibility that is ontologically grounded.

Examples will illustrate the idea that involvements are ontologically determinative. The structure allows for the possibility of error and as such a piece of equipment used for involvements type X may be misunderstood, and a Dasein happily applies it towards involvements type Y. At that moment, this Dasein's world has taken on a minor variation from the norm of the culture. Should others follow the example and the normative involvement of the equipment shifts to involvement Y, then the being of the ready-to-hand has changed. In other words, the involvements are ontologically determinative of the entity. This change in the being of a ready-to-hand entity occurs in medicine when a drug originally designed for use in one application is used in for a different purpose¹⁷¹, e.g. minoxidil was developed as a blood pressure medication but has become the hair regrowth treatment called Rogaine (Loftus, 2015). Another example involves the popular Slinky toy; this was originally used as a stabilisation device for fragile equipment on ships. An engineer, Richard James, knocked one of the springs from a shelf and noticed its 'walking' behaviour and the observation led to the Slinky. (Townsend, 2011) Of those who have purchased or played with one of the hundreds of millions Slinky's since sold, few would understand it as a piece of stabilization equipment; its being has changed. These examples, illustrate what Heidegger is getting at when he says that "involvement is *ontologically* definitive for the being of such an entity". Care needs to be taken in interpreting this, as at the ontological level each of the uses of the drugs or the spring still has the same basic structure of the ready-to-hand. The

¹⁷¹ There are a number of examples, perhaps the most famous being a treatment for pulmonary hypertension becoming and treatment for erectile dysfunction known as Viagra. Loftus' article, *Old drugs, new uses* in the Spring 2015 Edition of *Emory Medicine* provides eight examples of this shift in the being of a drug. (Loftus, 2015)

structure is just made concrete in different modes (specific instances) due to the changes in the structure of involvements, i.e. a 'reposition' within the world. The application of this Heideggerian concept in areas of research and inquiry by disciplines such as cultural anthropology and ethnology are self-evident. I do not pursue this line any further in the thesis.

Having switched the language from references and assignments to involvements Heidegger next links the assignments to the 'in-order-structure and then links involvements with world.

With the involvement of equipment, there are two aspects, what it is involved *with* and the circumstances *in* which it is involved. Heidegger names this the "relationship of the with ... in". This relationship will change depending on the equipment and the circumstances and that change will be reflected in the references or assignments or the nature of the 'in-order-tos'. The conclusion then is that with any equipment;

That in which it is involved is the "towards-which" of serviceability, and the "for-which" of usability. [BT 116/84]

The discussion in the previous chapter concerning one set of Heidegger's descriptors of world consisted of the 'whereof', 'towards-which' and for-which'. Heidegger now presents the description in the language of involvement;

That in which it is involved is the "towards-which" of serviceability, and the "for-which" of usability. With the "towards-which" of serviceability there can again be an involvement: *with this thing*, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a "hammer", there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection 'is' for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein-that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein's being. [BT 116/84] (my underlining)

Together with this change, we should see a shift in the language concerning world, and this is what Heidegger next introduces, the "unity of ... involvements"

Whenever something ready-to-hand has an involvement with it, *what* involvement this is, has in each case been outlined in advance in terms of the unity of such involvements. [BT 116/84] (change in translation)¹⁷² (my underling)

In the following page, Heidegger switches the term from unity to "structure of

¹⁷² The translators interrupt the German word *Bewandtnisganzheit* as "totality of involvements". *Bendtis* involvements, *ganz*, to be consistent with prior interpretations I translate as unity, and *heit* indicates a noun form of a verb. Hence I translate this as "unity of involvements".

involvements" [BT 117/84]. This just reflects the interchangeability of unity and structure which is evident in previous passages.

In the example that Heidegger provides, keeping in mind that an involvement is something that Dasein initiates, then we have a Dasein 'initiated' structure that leads to one of Dasein's way of being, in this case providing shelter. Heidegger's next step is to link the structure not just to a way of being of Dasein, but its being.

Grounding the Ready-to-Hand in Dasein's Being

Now comes Heidegger's decisive move.

If we accept that the structure of world can be described in terms of the 'in-order-to' linkages that be traced between all the various ready-to-hand entities from materials through to 'products' and the way these interconnect, and if we then accept that we can understand and describe this same structure in its dynamic, active mode in terms of involvements then we must accept the conclusion that in each case,

... the unity of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a "towards-which" in which there is *no* further involvement: this "towards-which" is not an entity with the kind of being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose being is defined as being-in-the-world, and to whose constitution of being, worldhood itself belongs, [BT 116/84] (my underlining)

All this is saying is that structure of involvements for anything ready-to-hand ends up Dasein. Given the earlier illustrative examples, it is Dasein's letting things be involved that is constitutive of the unity of involvements, i.e. world.

Looked at another way, if there are no Dasein interested in using a piece of equipment, then the practice around it (involvements) will die out. The equipment ceases to be part of the structure of involvements. In that equipment is understood in terms of its involvements as part of the structure of involvements it will cease to exist as equipment. In practice, this would typically mean that it will also cease to be manufactured, i.e. brought into being. All that will be left will be remnants, memories, and museum pieces; VHS players are a recent example¹⁷³.

¹⁷³ An example of this is the VHS format video tape players are now no longer in production anywhere in the world (Pressman, 2016). The practices (involvements) around using VHS tapes have rapidly died out replaced by a combination of DVD formats, on-line storage and internet streaming to various devices including TVs, tablets, and smart phones. With minimal demand for new VHS equipment manufacturing has ceased. At the same time Dasein's involvement with internet and associated Bluetooth and Wi-Fi equipment has increased and a raft of new products have come into being as part of the unity of involvements as a result; in response to Dasein's way of being!

It must always be remembered that Heidegger's method involves identifying the common, essential ways of being associated with Dasein at the ontic level, and then classifying them as part of the basic structure he has named being-in-the-world. Heidegger started by examining the structure of world as the 'in-order-to' structure this shifted to examine the same structure from the perspective of involvements. The structure of involvements only occurs because of an essential and necessary activity (way of being) of Dasein, i.e. letting something be involved and constitutive of Dasein's understanding of world. This is what qualifies this aspect as an existentials, part of the structure of Dasein. This aspect of Dasein's structure he calls worldhood.

Coming into Being of an Entity

Based on the concept of involvements it is now possible to revise the Aristotelian-Heideggerian account of an entity coming into being given in the previous chapter. In the previous chapter, the structure of world and the ready-to-hand were described in terms that did not specially refer to Dasein; the end point of the 'in-order-to-structure' was defined in terms of the usability of equipment. Now the end point is Dasein, specifically a 'fore-the-sake-of' one of Dasein's needs or wants, in the example shelter (entity) to provide protection (serviceability) from the weather. The revised account is as follows;

Material: The material from which things are made.

Formal: The organising principle is the unity of the relational structure understood as a **structure of involvements**.

Efficient: The production processes

For-the-sake-of-which: ~~The 'towards-which' of usability~~ **Dasein's for-sake-of-which.**

On this basis, the primary cause for anything ready-to-hand coming into being is Dasein, and the organising principle (being) is the structure of involvements as understood by Dasein. This is why it is Dasein's understanding of world, structurally called worldhood, that is the being of world.

If we apply this to a nursing home then regardless of what is stated as the 'for-sake-of-which' from the perspective of those responsible for constructing and running the nursing home, the actual 'for-sake-of-which' is reflected in the 'structure of

involvements'. This suggests a way of researching the 'being' of such entities that addresses the presuppositions and biases that may be associated with qualitative research approaches relying predominantly on interviewing participants. A line of research that would be promising is inquiring from an older people living in nursing homes what type of involvements they would prefer in an 'ideal' environment¹⁷⁴. My own experience would indicate that it would present a different 'structure of involvements' and as such a different nursing home entity.

This linking of the structure of involvements back to Dasein's way of being ends this stage of the argument and there is now a need to go back and clarify precisely what is meant by involvement.

Understanding Letting Something Be Involved as a Structure (Ontologically)

The key step in the above line of argument was in viewing the references and assignments in terms of involvements and then highlighting that this requires letting something be involved. The question that was not addressed is what is meant by 'letting something be involved'. This is what is discussed in this section.

As has been described several times Heidegger's approach is to first make observations at the ontic level, identify common aspects that appear to be essential requirements of Dasein's way of being. He then classifies and extracts these common aspects to an abstract level (what he calls ontological or structural) and analyses the structural relationships between them. Along the way, he assigns names to the structure which often related to the ontic observation of the phenomenon. He undertakes a similar approach to the ready-to-hand as has just been demonstrated. This approach is also taken in understanding 'letting be involved' ontologically.

Everything that Heidegger describes should be able to be identified at the observable, ontic, level; this is part of his approach. In the example with hammering, there is an involvement with hammering, the involvement with making fast, etc. and all these involvements are observable. At this ontic level, Heidegger defined 'letting

¹⁷⁴ Similar research may have been undertaken, however I am not aware of this line of research being undertaken with a strict Heideggerian framework, by which I mean based on the interpretation of Heidegger's work as I am presenting.

something be involved' as

... within our ... concern [comportments] we let something ready-to-hand *be* so-and-so as it is already and *in order that* it be such. [BT 117/85] (my gloss)

While this is an abstract description, it simply means to use a hammer as a hammer to get the job done, but is an observation focused on the what the hammering is doing, not the hammer nor the function (hammering) as such. It also means to sit on a chair *as a chair*, to walk through a doorway *as a doorway* to leave a room, to wear shoes *as shoes* for walking, smash with a sledgehammer *as a sledgehammer* to break down a wall, etc. We use the ready-to-hand entity on the basis of its 'position' in the structure of involvements.

With everything we use we are letting it be involved. We need to keep in mind that Heidegger is talking about the typical everyday use of things. It is possible, for example, to use a long-handled screwdriver to mix a tin of paint but this is not the typical use, and Heidegger is not concerned with it. He focuses on how we understand the screw-driver as a screw-driver in the first place.

It is not the ontic level (i.e. using the entity) but the ontological level of 'letting be' that we need to understand. In moving towards the ontological level Heidegger repeats what we have seen before, he peels back the sequence of events that must have happened to be able to use the entity, to 'let it be involved'. He does this in three steps.

Step 1: He spells out what 'letting be involved means' and this is derived from the ontic level of the phenomenon.

Ontically, "letting something be involved" signifies that within our factual concern we let something ready-to-hand *be* so-and-so as it is already and *in order that* it be such. [BT 117/84] (my underlining)

This is the initial step when we *first* understand the entity in terms of its involvements. For example, when we have learnt what a hammer is, such that we can use it as a hammer. When this occurs, the hammer is now understood as part of the structure. This of course does not mean that a specific Dasein needs to know the entire structure from go-to-woe such that it can let something be involved at every step of the way. It is more by way of understanding the particular 'link' in the structure. This is part of the differentiation between Dasein's domestic or work world, e.g. the workshop and the larger public world.

The phrase “we let” is underlined and Heidegger explains that it means that,

... something which is already an 'entity' must be discovered in its readiness-to-hand, and that we must thus let the entity which has this being be encountered. [BT 117/85] (my underlining)

The ‘must’ is important; it indicates that Dasein has no choice. Once something is discovered, this is the basis on which it shows up for us. Note also his comment that “something which is already and ‘entity’” as this supports my interpretation that a hammer or screwdriver is already an entity in the culture and as such is an entity independent of the individual Dasein.

Step 2: Heidegger then extends this observation and draws the general principle that;

This '*a priori*' letting-something-be-involved is the condition for the possibility of encountering anything ready-to-hand, so that Dasein, in its ontical dealings with the entity thus encountered, can thereby let it be involved in the ontical sense. [BT 117/85]

Regardless of the ready-to-hand entity, before we can use it (deal with it) we must have first of all ‘let it be involved’. This is simply stating that we have to learn how to use it appropriately, or to use Heidegger’s previous language, free it for involvements.

Step 3: He now performs the analysis and extracts the ontological aspect.

When the in-order-to structure was discussed using the shoe-maker example, he identified the ‘in-order-to’ structure leading back to the farmer and tanner, to the needle maker, steel mills and mines and forward towards the users. The conclusion was that the work (shoes) *only is*, in terms of the context of the structure of reference and assignments. In this current section, Heidegger has switched his language to involvements, and we would expect something similar using the new language, and this is what we find. In any prior 'letting-be' then,

... if letting something be involved is understood ontologically, what is then pertinent is the freeing of *everything* ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand, no matter whether, taken ontically, it is involved thereby, or whether it is rather an entity of precisely such a sort that ontically it is *not* involved thereby. [BT 117/85]

This is straightforward if we consider Heidegger’s method. For the shoemaker to be involved in making shoes, there must be Daseins involved in all aspects of the structure that have ‘freed’ the entities with which they are involved. This is true for any involvement structure associated with a ready-to-hand entity, and on this basis,

Heidegger lifts it out as part of his ontological description. The same process he employs for Dasein.

We then have the conclusion that in a structure of involvements before a Dasein can let the particular ready-to-hand entities be involved, then all the entities ready-to-hand in the structure must have been freed, so as to constitute the structure of involvements! In other words the world must already exist, the worlding of the world must already be in place.

Apart from the logic behind the statement, it is also made clear by Heidegger's reference to ready-to-hand entities not involved "nearby" that this does not just apply to equipment but to anything on which we may be working [BT 117/85]. He has completed his task, the ontological understanding of letting something be involved has now been described.

Implications of Understanding Based on Structures of Involvement

The implication of the analysis is that in a complex structure of involvements, what one Dasein frees for involvement is, by and large, dependent all the structurally connected involvements having been freed and remaining free for involvements. In that letting something be free for involvements, in a complex society, this requires the 'know how' of tens of thousands of Daseins in various jobs. By way of example, consider just one job, say a registered nurse in a nursing home. Prior to a nurse commencing work the nursing home has to be constructed which is a significant and complex project. In the construction, every type of material and equipment that has gone into the building leads back to other business and have associated structures of involvement. The infrastructure system (water, power, gas, communication, transport) required to operate the nursing home lead to other networks of involvements and so on. In the running of the nursing home every piece of equipment, all chemical supplies, the consumables all lead somewhere and branch out to other structures of involvements. When fleshed out with even minimal detail from the perspective of, say, a score of diverse of jobs then what would start to emerge is a complex web of involvements linking the entire public world. Some involvements, e.g. infrastructure, will be present in all areas of the web, others will be common, e.g. office supplies, furniture, while others may have minimal direct involvements, e.g. specialist ophthalmology equipment.

While it is at a high level of abstraction, what Heidegger is describing is the dynamic

structural web of involvements that addresses the interplay of people (Dasein), their wants and needs (for-the-sake-of-which), the equipment and artefacts used (ready-to-hand), the materials incorporated into various work activities (ready-to-hand) and the associated relational linkages (involvements). This is a description of the basic dynamic structure of a society, from the perspective of the multitude of involvements present in the society. At this level, it is the structure of the public world. This view takes the position that it is not what a society says about itself that is the proper basis for understanding. The structure of involvement is its ontological grounding, and this is reflected in what it does! Another way of saying this is to base your knowledge based on the 'fruits' produced (Matthew 7:16).

We can apply this analysis to examine what is happening within a society. For example, there has been a closure of a significant proportion of the manufacturing industry in Australia in last few decades. The result is that the manufacturing industry has lost 270,000 jobs since 1989 and the progressive closure of all motor vehicle manufacturing plants due in 2017 with a loss of up to 200,000 more jobs. (Dennis, 2016) On the other hand, the aged care sector has grown from 262,000 in 2007 to 352,000 workers in 2012 and is continuing to grow rapidly. (Deloitte Access Economics, 2016) Viewed from this perspective, something is fundamentally changing the character of Australia (the unity) which is flowing through to changes in the structural nature of involvements (the structure of the unity) which is seeing some involvements pass out of existence (car manufacturing jobs) while others increase in quantity (aged care). The specific nature of involvements that are therefore available for a Dasein to discover in Australia have thus significantly changed. I raise this as an example to demonstrate that Heidegger's approach and way of describing worlds have 'real-world' applications and relevance¹⁷⁵.

An interesting insight that comes with this approach is that the 'relational space' that is the modern world is vast and complex and if we compare this to the 'relational space' that was the world of a villagers deep in the Papua New Guinea Highlands in the early twentieth century, prior to contact with Europeans, the difference is

¹⁷⁵ A dramatic illustration of the web of interconnectivity associated with infrastructure occurred in 2016 in South Australia. As a result of one electricity connection with other States being damaged during a storm almost three quarters of the State lost electricity and power was not fully restored for a number of days. (Australian Energy Market Operator, 2017) Given the dynamic nature of the involvement structure this meant that many other parts of the 'in-order-to' structure came to a halt. In this case a significant part of the wording of South Australian world ceased. While this is intuitively understood, Heidegger's analysis provides a way for understanding the complex structures of societies from many different perspectives.

stunning.

It needs to be remembered that Heidegger is not inventing anything, and his approach is not hypothesising how societies 'works'. Neither is he making causal claims that the structure causes a thing to be what it is. He is focusing on the observable phenomenon of the ways of being and then identifying and describing the underlying structure that is evident (the phenomenon associated with the structure of being). If we accept this approach then it can be applied as a powerful research tool, not just in qualitative research but in government level planning, as an underlying structure of economic analysis, and so on. This is associated with my claim discussed in Chapter 11 that Heidegger understands his work as having relevance to the sciences.

The Connection Between Know-How and Circumspection

What comes out of this discussion is that there is a progression of understanding, albeit this is not that clear from *Being and Time*. We can progress from having no understanding of what an object is, to having some awareness (understanding that is primarily cognitive) of the object in its ready-to-hand mode but lacking the know-how to free it for involvements, and finally, to having that understanding of the necessary know-how. What is also evident it that we may commence with a rudimentary know-how that only allows a minimal involvement, and this progressively changes with advances in our 'know-how' understanding. My son has been learning the guitar for several years, and the know-how he currently possesses in letting the guitar be freed for involvements with the production of music bears little resemblance to the first hesitant bars of his first piece, Beethoven's 'Ode to Joy'.

We can thus discover something as ready-to-hand, for example, the lens grinding mould, but this does not mean that we have sufficient understanding to let-it-be what it is by 'involving' it in the task of lens grinding. This points to understanding as having two aspects know-how, or practical knowledge, and know-what or theoretical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge is important, for example using Heidegger's work I may be able to research and gain a 'theoretical understanding' of a particular world, this doesn't mean I have the know-how to be involved in that world in a competent way. Theoretical knowledge can be broader than this, but the difference is evident enough, and it is this difference that is behind Heidegger's comment that;

'Practical' behaviour is not 'atheoretical' in the sense of "sightlessness" . [BT 99/70]

The sight metaphor usually relates back to the Cartesian concept of *lumen natural* [CPE, BT] and preferences and values knowledge that is acquired by reason over experience. It is also a general view that preferences cognitive (theoretical) knowledge over practical (know how) knowledge. Even today this priority and valuing of 'know-what' over 'know-how' is evident it in the way Australia is structuring its education system and the emphasis on a University education based on 'know-what'. There is little evidence, from a policy perspective, that there is an awareness of the necessity to ensure this translate to quality 'know-how' knowledge that is relevant to the Australian society from a long-term perspective. A failure of 'know-how' in the larger context of a global 'relational-space' will have significant consequences at the individual Dasein level within the Australian 'space' of that global web. This is another example of a line of inquiry that arises from a Heideggerian perspective, again outside the scope of the thesis.

In that Heidegger recognises the importance of know-how he argues that there is a 'sight' associated with 'know-how'. This type of sight will become increasingly relevant as the thesis progresses and will have a direct bearing in understanding Marion Miller's circumstance! As discussed earlier in the chapter, Heidegger names the 'sight' associated with know-how *circumspection*.

If we note the connection between 'dealing', the 'in-order-structure' and the context of the discussion in terms of 'involvement', then the phenomenon Heidegger is describing becomes evident. The 'sight' must have the 'know-how' as part of its structure and that 'know-how' is associated with the freeing of the equipment for involvements which are made concrete in our actual dealings with them. This occurs within the structure of involvements or as indicated here, the "manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to'".

When we comport towards something (e.g. dealings) that is ready-to-hand, we must first understand what it is. When we 'see' something as something it will be recalled that while it is a unified phenomenon, there are two aspects. There is the ready-to-hand, and there is the projection of understanding. It is the later that results in an object showing up for us as something ready-to-hand, as something with which we can have dealings, and we have no choice in this 'showing up as'. This is the structure at work; recall the 'must' mention above.

The circumspection is functioning all the time. It is not just doing complex tasks such as playing the guitar, it applies to even the simplest of things, sitting on a chair, walking through a door, putting on socks, and so on. It is so pervasive that although we can direct it when specifically looking for something, typically we are not even aware of it as it guides what we do. This every present character of circumspection as it applies to ordinary, everyday things is evident in the following passage from *Basic Problem*. Heidegger is delivering a lecture and uses the environment in which the lecture as an example;

The *equipmental contexture* of things, for example, the contexture of things as they surround us here, stands in view, but not for the contemplator as though we were sitting here in order to describe the things, not even in the sense of a contemplation that dwells with them. The equipmental contexture *can* confront us in both ways and in still others, but it doesn't have to. The view in which the equipmental contexture stands at first, completely unobtrusive and unthought, is the view and sight of practical *circumspection*, of our practical everyday orientation. "Unthought" means that it is not thematically apprehended for deliberate thinking about things; instead, in circumspection, we find our bearings in regard to them. Circumspection uncovers and understands beings primarily as equipment. When we enter here through the door, we do not apprehend the seats as such, and the same holds for the doorknob. Nevertheless, they are there in this peculiar way: we go by them circumspectly, avoid them circumspectly, stumble against them, and the like. Stairs, corridors, windows, chair and bench, blackboard, and much more are not given thematically. [BPP 163]

When we are typically just going about our daily activities, we are not thinking "this is the doorknob I need to grasp and turn in order to walk through the door". We simply walk through the door, not even particularly being aware of the door as a door. This is what Heidegger means by 'unthought'. We simply walk through the door. This can be understood as 'dealing' with the door purely on our 'unthought' involvements with its serviceability and is behind the passage;

The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. [BT 99/69]

The serviceability of the door is the relational structure that allows us to pass from one space to another. We are, as such, not interested in, nor are we really dealing with the door as an entity; it is the 'to pass from-to' of involvement that arises as a consequence of the relationship of the door and the rooms that shows up for us in circumspection and with which we are involved. This relates to Heidegger's comment concerning 'withdraw' in the above quote; we don't even notice the entity itself, it is the involvement with which we are concerned!

This is a radically different way of understanding our relationship with our enviroing world and the ready-to-hand with the world. I recall having a conversation with a person with dementia. I picked up a piece of equipment. The person named it as a control for the TV, indicating one level of relational understanding in terms of the ready-to-hand, however when we spoke further there was no recall of how the control was to be used. For this person with dementia, the control had 'lost its freedom' to be involved, his circumspective sight was failing.

Circumspection is often misunderstood, for example, Ridling refers to it as "that sight with which *Dasein* in its mindful dealings with equipment holds the equipmental totality in view." (my underlining) (Ridling, 2001, p. 246) The primary misunderstanding here is the concept of "mindful"; this is contrary to Heidegger's account. Gerner suggests that circumspection relates to *seeing* the "the 'in-order-to' of things and its connection with the 'in-order-to' of other things" (Gerner, 2007, p. 43). This implies that a theoretical understanding is sufficient for circumspection and misses the importance of the 'know-how' that frees things for involvement. Additionally, as will be seen shortly, this is explicitly denied by Heidegger. Inwood in his *Heidegger Dictionary* says that circumspection "is looking 'around' to see what one needs, etc. 'in order to' get something done" (Inwood, 1999, p. 194). While this can be the case, there is too much deliberateness in this understanding as a general description. Inwood takes the notion of 'looking around' based on one interpretation of the German translated as circumspection, *Umsicht*, and it is to that word I now turn,

Umsicht is a German compound word comprising *Um* + *sicht*. The word *sicht* is straightforward and means sight in English. To get an idea of Heidegger's intent we need to understand the prefix "um-". This prefix is typically a directional prefix meaning something like around, e.g. to drive around the house is *umfahre das Haus*; to walk around, or bypass, the dog is *umgehen der Hund*. One could then understand *Umsicht* as looking around. There is an element of this at the ontic level, however as mentioned it is generally not a deliberate looking around. Another way *um* is used is in the context of something placed 'over' something else, and doing so in some way changing it. One example should suffice to illustrate this; paint the fence green is said in German as *ummalen den Zaun grün*. The original fence is still there, but the paint over it has changed it. This is the way I believe that *Umsicht* should also be heard. In other words, it is the ontic version of projection.

If we consider the previous discussions on projection and on 'freeing' equipment for

involvement, then once this has occurred this is how the equipment must be encountered. *Umsicht* is experienced ontically and describes the phenomenon of seeing the entity as the entity in terms of its involvements. It does not have any awareness or access to the structure itself (recall Gorner's comment above!). This is clear from the following

[the world or the 'there'] .. is itself inaccessible to circumspection, so far as circumspection is always directed towards entities; but in each case it has already been disclosed for circumspection. [BT 105/75] (my underlining)

At one level then we must understand circumspection as seeing entities as something ready-to-hand in terms of their involvements. Circumspection is a lived experience, and as such it has an intentional structure which involves the understanding of the entity. At the technical level (ontological) the structure of the understanding of the entity has two aspects; the entity and the basis by which we see the entity as something. This was discussed in earlier chapters. *Umsicht* is a carefully chosen word that captures both the ontic and the ontological, just as the carefully chosen word, *Dasein*, captures both aspects.

Our dealings thus subordinated themselves to circumspection (refer above quote) because circumspection is what reveals the ready-to-hand *to us* as things with which we can be involved, i.e. dealings. Rather than circumspection being a description of *Dasein* looking around, i.e. the emphasis on *Dasein*, circumspection is a gift to *Dasein*. It is the ontic manifestation (lived experience) of the underlying intentional structure of 'perception'. This interpretation is not evident in most commentaries, even if hinted at. The tendency is to talk about circumspection only in terms of the ontic phenomenon. (Dreyfus, 1991; Gorner, 2007; Mulhall, 2005; de Beistegui, 2005) Blattner in his introductory text on *Being and Time*, makes the observation that by circumspection "Heidegger does not mean visual perception" (Blattner, 2006, p. 56), and by this I take it he means something similar to Husserl's sensuous intuition, and in this, I agree. However, he then goes on to say with reference to circumspection that he uses "sight as a metaphor for intelligence". On this point I disagree, it strips the term of its ontic intent. If I were to characterise the term in another way, I would say that it is 'the sight that understands' and this is significantly different to sight as a metaphor for intelligence.

I have spent a significant time on circumspection because I want to set up an understanding of the phenomenon as a 'sight' which *delivers to us* an understanding

of the world in terms possible involvements. In Marion's case, for example, it is clear from her account that the nursing home did not show up in this way. There is still more of the structure of Dasein to disclose that accounts for why this is the case, this will be discussed in the next two chapters.

In the next chapter, I want to tease out some more aspects concerning the progressive nature of understanding and then discuss Heidegger's final change in orientation in describing the structure of world, that of assignment.

Progressive Nature of Understanding

In the previous section, I briefly touched on the concept of the progressive nature of understanding. This is the concept that Dasein's understanding can move from encountering something just as an object present-at-hand to being something ready-to-hand and used with some skill, i.e. it is freed for us so that we can let it be involved. The following is a simple example to illustrate this concept more clearly.

A young child, through many interactions with others gradually comes to understand 'ball' as something to play with, throw, catch and so on. This shifts to understanding the difference between small round balls with which the child can do certain things and, say a football¹⁷⁶. Games of 'marking the ball', 'handball' and kicking the ball around¹⁷⁷ in the backyard move to the child playing in the local junior 'Auskick' competition¹⁷⁸. By this time, basic language has been acquired, very rudimentary skills (know-how) learnt, and by watching a favourite team play on the television, a simple structure of involvements developed. There is no need for a 'sophisticated' understanding of rules. The child has 'freed' the football, the game of football, the football boots and so on, sufficient for the involvements required for the participating in the 'Auskick' competition. All these are entities ready-to-hand within the world of football.

As the child grows older and continues to play, the skill level increase. At the risk of stretching the metaphor too far, the more skill the footballer acquires then more fully is the football released (freed) into its potential of being a football. When we

¹⁷⁶ By which I mean Australian Rule Football.

¹⁷⁷ Marking (catching a kicked ball), handball (the style of passing the ball) and kicking are all skills required to play football.

¹⁷⁸ Auskick is the name given to the formally organised level of completion for young boys and girls involving modified rules.

watch any world-class athlete, we will occasionally experience moments when we see something so far beyond what a 'normal' person can do we are in awe, "How do they do that!". This is an acknowledgement that the 'involvement' the athlete is able to achieve is on a level of 'know how' far in excess of what we can comprehend. The way in which the athlete sees, for example, the involvements unfolding on the football field is on the basis of circumspection. For a highly trained athlete, this is 'unthought' circumspection in which involvements just show up as possibilities, and they respond, without deliberate thinking, just like I can walk expertly through a door!

Because this level of proficiency with the world is not cognitive it is not something that can be put into words; it is not something that can be taught. This is the phenomenon of mastery and was recognised and described by the ancient Daoist Chinese philosophers as can be seen from the following account from the Chuang-Tzu a highly influential text that dates to around the 3rd century BCE;

When I chisel a wheel,' says the carpenter ... 'if the stroke is too slow it slides and does not grip, if too fast it jams and catches in the wood. Not too slow, not too fast; I feel it in the hand and respond from the heart, the tongue cannot put it into words, there is a knack in it somewhere which I cannot convey to my son and which my son cannot learn from me. (Zhuangzi, 2001, p. 6)

In mastery, there comes the point when the understanding is beyond know-how or skill in that we do not 'know-how' we are doing what we do. The skills we have deliberately learnt and practised are eventually transcended. This is the point behind the description of Cook Ting carving an ox, in the Chuang-Tze;

Cook Ting was carving an ox for Lord Wen-hui. As his hand slapped, shoulder lunged, foot stamped, knee crooked, with a hiss! with a thud! the brandished blade as it sliced never missed the rhythm, now in time with the Mulberry Forest dance, now with an orchestra playing the Ching-shou.

"Oh, excellent!" said Lord Wen-hui. 'That skill should attain such heights!'

'What your servant cares about is the Way, I have left skill behind me. When I first began to carve oxen, I saw nothing but oxen wherever I looked. Three years more and I never saw an ox as a whole. Nowadays, I am in touch through the daemonic in me, and do not look with the eye. With the senses I know where to stop, the daemonic I desire to run its course. I rely on Heaven's structuring, cleave along the main seams, let myself be guided by the main cavities, go by what is inherently so. (Zhuangzi, 2001, pp. 63-4)

The above two examples are from a carpenter and cook, to illustrate that the concept has broad application. However, as I have indicated, it does apply to athletes, as Larry Bird (1956 -) describes. He was an elite professional basketballer, now retired, for the Boston Celtics team in the USA National Basketball Association and provided the following observations in relation to playing;

[A lot of the] things I do on the court are just reactions to situations I don't think about some of the things I'm trying to do A lot of times, I've passed the basketball and not realized I've passed it until a moment or so later. (Levine, 1989)

The understanding associated with 'know-how' of freeing things for involvements is therefore progressive and guided by circumspection. The more mastery (know-how) we have, the freer the entity for involvements, the more possibilities are revealed for us in circumspection. When we are engaged in dealings at this level, then we 'just do it', the entities themselves withdraw, we are engaged in 'unthought' interactions with the involvements themselves. Even walking through a doorway reflects this level of proficiency!

Basic and Primary Involvements

In the previous discussion on the progressive nature of understanding what became evident is that Dasein has 'mastery' in a wide range of areas. However, the discussion is also suggestive that the things that Dasein is proficient at are not all qualitatively the same, some are basic competencies, and some are primary.

Our existence is made up of many different types of involvements, some basic and apply to almost anything we do, walking on floors, getting dressed, eating, walking through doors, drinking coffees and so on. These are among the basic tasks with which one must have proficiency to navigate around most aspect of the public world, and thus all environments. Other involvements have a character that suggests they are of primary concern to Dasein, they reflect who we are in a more specific way other than just belonging to a larger public world. For Bird it is basketball, for Ting, it is cooking, and for Marion Miller, it is such things as social and political activism and collecting pink lustre China. Not all Dasein's reach mastery in the primary involvements, but typically have a sufficient proficiency 'to be involved'. Heidegger makes no mention of a distinction between what I am calling basic and primary involvements, but it is important for the thesis.

While walking through a doorway, getting dressed and so on are involvements in their own right they are typically things we do as part of doing something else. We are not simply going to walk through a doorway as an end in itself. If we lose our job, for example, there are a number of subordinate and basic involvements we would cease, e.g. driving to work or catch the bus, getting coffee in the staff room, and so on. There are thus two involvements structures around these primary

involvements. The first has been discussed and relates to the integration of, for example, making shoes, within the broader public world. The second is the involvement structure that is of a different character and relates activities that while not essential to the primary involvement itself, are necessary for a Dasein to be engaged in the primary activity, these are what I term subordinate and basic involvements, and each requires a certain know-how. There is a lot more work to analysis the character of basic and subordinate involvements and the nature of their structure. This is outside the limits of the thesis, and it is sufficing to have brought this structure into view.

Once discovered, for the most part, these basic involvements are taken for granted and they only come to notice if they disrupt a primary involvement. On the way to work, should the car fail to work we may take a bus, or seek a ride with a friend. While inconvenient, the breakdown of the car was not a material impediment as alternatives were available. This indicates the less critical nature of these subordinate involvements.

In the case of Marion Miller, it is her body that is 'breaking down'. Marion tells of how she addressed this by having someone come in and do the basic tasks that needed to be done. She still directed what was to be done; it is just that there was an alternative method. Marion's 'directing the work' required a certain know-how which she possessed. With the basic or subordinated activities addressed she remained living in her home and was able to continue her dealings in the primary activities. By way of summary, in her home environment, her circumspection showed up for her basic involvements (e.g. cleaning) which *she* addressed via the home help, and the possibility for involvements associated with the primary activities continued to show up, and she continued with them. The move to the nursing home affected both the basic and primary aspects of her involvements structures. In relation to the basics involvements (e.g. bathing, cooking, dressing, etc.) these still show up in circumspection, however, she no longer can direct what occurs in an immediate sense; they are otherwise attended to. The main loss is in the area of primary involvements. The entities required for Marion to engage in these activities are simply not there. The structure has collapsed. Her circumspection cannot show up for Marion possibilities for engaging in the activities that give her meaningful lived experiences because those possibilities are no longer present in her world.

There seems to be a relationship between a Dasein's ontic world which is

determined by the structures of involvement established by a Dasein's developed know-how and Dasein's existence, the life Dasein lives. Further, the structures of involvement that determine a particular Dasein's world, and hence its existence, has basic or subordinate involvements aspects and primary aspects. This would suggest that while the basic aspects are ways of being of Dasein, it appears to be the primary aspects that are of main concern to the being of Dasein. The question then arises as to what is the basis by which Dasein takes up certain involvements and not others. This is addressed in the following section called the assigning of Dasein.

Rompol World Example

A lot of ground has been covered. Before proceeding to the next step, I want to pause and give an example to illustrate the concept of worlds as discussed to date. A world can be understood as a system comprising a network of interconnected in-order-to linkages (references, the 'towards-which', involvements, etc.). We can describe the relational system in terms of 'this is what this does' (serviceability) because 'this is what we need it to do' (usability) or we can describe it in a similar but more dynamic way, involvements.

Once we understand the structure of worlds, we are then able to play with it and come up with different arrangements that are essentially the same ready-to-hand entity. There are, for example, many arrangements of furniture and office equipment that can be combined to make a study. There will be thousands of differently looking studies, but they are all studies by virtue of the structure of involvements that constitute a study. This is why if we walk into a kitchen and see a chainsaw sitting on the kitchen bench it looks out of place. What a chainsaw *is* doesn't fit the relational structure that determines a kitchen. What determines a study, or a kitchen is, in turn, determined by the larger world structure in which they fit. A house designer may play with the concepts of the spaces we call 'study', 'kitchen', 'bathroom', 'bedroom' and consider combining them in different ways. Houses with 'open plan' living probably arose in this way. Either the new 'spatial' arrangements work and are successful, or they fail, the success of the 'innovation' will depend on the circumspection of the potential buyers. A buyer's circumspection must show up possibilities for living that are intelligible (linked to understanding) and desirable for the buyer (linked to the being of the buyer). This is true for all new innovations that

involve restructuring the world by either rearranging the structure of existing involvements or by introducing new involvements. This is demonstrated in the Rompol World, an example of the bring into being of a new world.

The Rompol World

Person A is visiting some friends, one of their older children, Person B, says "Goodbye I'm off to the *Rompols*¹⁷⁹. The word is a complete puzzle to A and on inquiring it is disclosed that it refers to a gaming tournament association for robot wars. The idea is to have self-directed robots that compete against each other in much the same way as the 'smash-up derbies' work at the speedway. The last operational robot wins. The competition started between the engineering sections of Universities as a way of developing know-how in robotics and has now spread so that there are local games and annual national tournaments.

When a 'new' world has been 'found' Heidegger uses the terminology of 'disclosed' [BT 176/137] and when new entities in a world have been 'found' he uses the terminology of 'discovered' [BT 84/58].

We then have the following:

Person A - the *Rompol* world is initially unknown, but there is such a world.

Person A - the *Rompol* world gets disclosed to A

Person A - has a 'vague' discovery of entities, the robots, little else.

Person B - has previously disclosed the *Rompol* world

Person B - has previously discovered the robot entities in the *Rompol* world. Based on B's know-how they have been freed for B for involvements in the robot war games.

Before B could disclose *Rompol* world, it had to have been previously 'freed'. The *Rompol* world is not just a world it is an entity ready-to-hand in a larger world. At one stage, the *Rompol* world did not exist. It came into being, at first conceptually, the instant the Daseins from the various Universities met and agreed to establish the *Rompol* competition and specified the basic character of the entities that will be-

¹⁷⁹ This is a plausible but fictitious account with a made-up word. The name comes from bringing together parts of two Greek words meaning robot wars; ρομπότ (rompót) translated as robot and πόλεμος (polémos) translated as war.

in the *Rompols*. In the specifying, it is the involvement structure that is being established, guided by the concept 'robot war games'.

Having developed the *Rompols* conceptually, the group can plan, design and establish the *Rompols*; the Rompol World is brought into being. From previous discussions, all these activities will be seen as various forms of comportments towards the *Rompols*. The group gradually develops the skill in running the *Rompols*, and prior know-how is applied in the development of the war-robots, arranging venues, setting up the organisation, and so on. New know-how emerges, and existing know-how is increased as the war robots battle one another, and different types of materials, weaponry, tactics, control systems and so on are developed. The nature of circumspection, involvements and dealings are all present, these aspects have been adequately covered and are easily applied to the *Rompols*.

As in the case of any entity ready-to-hand, the structure of involvements for the *Rompol* world ends in the for-sake-of-which of Daseins. War robots are a new entity that has been designed and created to 'fight' within the rules of the *Rompols*. This determines their involvement within the context of the structure of involvements of the *Rompol* World, what they *are* (as entities) only make sense in the context of the *Rompols* (world). Should Person B and all the other Daseins involved stop playing *Rompol* then, the world collapses. A world only *is* in its dynamic form. Like the *Rompol* world, any world and even large worlds such as civilisations can collapse. All the while there are other people (Person C, D, etc.) who are not aware of the *Rompol* world. The world exists independently of these people.

The Daseins involved in the *Rompol* world may make changes, e.g. they may introduce a new class of entities, the remote-control robot or robot teams. These new entities will have a mode of functioning and behaving on the arena that is determined by the manner of their involvements which is determined by Dasein. These changes occur within the broader concept of 'robot war games' and as such the basic character of the *Rompol* world has not changed and still 'guides' the development of the world. If a new committee introduces the idea of 'competitive soccer' as the basis of the *Rompol* world and stops the 'war games' then while there are many similarities, the old world has gone, and a new world has come into being. This is the idea captured by the saying "It's just not cricket" when proposed rule changes or new modes of involvement are introduced that fundamentally change

peoples' understanding of what it is to be, in this case, cricket.

The *Rompol* world exists with the larger public world, and I have previously discussed how they are interwoven as part of the same web. The richness and complexity of the integrated system that is, for example, the modern city, is almost unfathomable, and yet the same structures are evident in the *Rompol* world. Thanks to Heidegger, however, we can understand, describe its fundamental structure at the ontological level and thus apply it at the ontic level!

Initially, when Person A has the *Rompol* world disclosed to them, it has the characteristic of the public world. This is a derivative mode of understanding. Person A can go and watch and have an understanding of what is happening and gain a deeper understanding. This process can continue, for example by joining a team and so on. Progressively the nature of understanding changes until A has freed the robots for involvement in the games. As a spectator, there is a certain level of 'freeing' otherwise A could not be involved as a spectator. However, this level of 'freeing' is insufficient for the *Rompol* world to survive. There is no *Rompol* world if the only level of 'freeing' is that belonging to the spectator. This is also true on a larger scale.

For Person B, because they are actively involved in letting the robots be involved in *Rompol*, this world is an environment or environing world, an *Umwelt*. It is the environing world on which Heidegger is focusing his analysis. For B, their environing world comprises the *Rompol* environment and any another world in which they are letting entities be involved as the entity they are. Without environing worlds of each Dasein, there is no public world, e.g. without people actively engaged in coffee shops, there are no coffee shops in the city for me to go to, and so on. However, the public world is the basis on which the domestic environing worlds come into being; this is the relationship between 'wholes and parts' which threads its way through all of the analysis.

Considering the *Rompol* world from the perspective of A and B not only assists in understanding the character of worlds but of the inter-relationship of a world being understood as both public and environment. This distinction between a public world and the environing world is very, very important not only in understanding how worlds are sustained, but also how a Dasein is sustained. The question that arises and must be addressed is to what extent a nursing home is a public world or an

environing world for the older people living in them. The answer will be based on the extent to which the nursing home world has entities within it that can be or have been freed by an older Dasein for their 'for-the-sake-of-which'. In the case of Marion, such entities do not exist in the nursing home, it is, as such a public world for her and not an enviroing world. In that the enviroing world is the 'wherein' Dasein exists, the nursing home is not a world in which Marion can exist as Marion. Note, I am identifying primary involvements as being the defining characteristics of an enviroing world. This is based on the previous discussions and supported by the nature of Heidegger's examples (e.g. the workshop as enviroing).

There is, however, one aspect to be addressed, and that is the basis on which a Dasein 'selects' its involvements such that it acquires the know-how to 'let' certain entities be free for the Dasein to be involved with them. This is addressed in the next section.

The Assigning of Dasein

In this section, there is another change in perspective. Heidegger's analysis has progressively moved from a unity of equipment to the 'in-order-to-structure', to the referential unity of assignments and references, to the structure of involvements. The shift has progressively moved from an analysis of world in an 'objective' sense to slowly disclosing the intrinsic relationship between world and Dasein. In Heidegger's final shift he analyses the basis by which Dasein takes up the involvements it does, he calls this an assignment. Together with the new but related phenomenon he also has, as may be anticipated, the phenomenon of the unity of involvements, which turns out to be the worldhood of the world. Worldhood is disclosed as part of the ontological structure of Dasein *and* of world, solving the puzzle identified at the beginning of the chapter.

Before we can have dealings with things ready-to-hand we must first have learnt how to use them, this know-how frees the equipment for involvements. Before this, there must also be a disclosure of the various involvements relevant to the dealings with a "certain intelligibility" [BT 118-9/86]. Heidegger's use of the term "certain intelligibility" is instructive. It suggests that extending out from what we are directly involved in, while we have to understand how it fits in, we do not need the same level of know-how. To use a nail, for example, we must have the know-how of hammering, and of the uses for which nails provide the necessary survivability. We

don't have to understand the manufacturing of hammers. Similarly, the carpenter on a building site needs to be proficient in what they are doing, but only requires a "certain intelligibility" in relation to how the work fits in with the electrician, plumber, plasterer and so on. Further out, the carpenter needs to know very little about the local council processes that administer the building approval process. This is the interplay between a Dasein's envioning world and the public world referred to earlier. Here Heidegger's perspective is firmly on Dasein, because for the carpenter to do their work the entire 'in-order-to-structure' must have first have been freed for involvements; this is the world perspective.

Heidegger is pointing out that while we may have sufficient know-how to let things be involved in activities within our environment, we do need a "certain intelligibility" to apply that know-how. For example, we may not have sufficient know-how of the envioning world of a mechanic's workshop to make this a place to dwell (be involved with it as a mechanic) but we do have to have a 'certain understanding' in-order-to take our car to the mechanics to get fixed. The shoemaker will be proficient in sourcing supplies but does not need a detailed understanding of the suppliers envioning world, nor of how the needles are made and so on. Dasein's world is one of proficient know-how in all relevant areas, and this level of understanding typically tapers off as the structure of involvements moves further away, either back towards the source of the basic supplies or in the direction of the for-the sake-of-which. This is further support for my interpretation of the envioning world being 'aligned' with primary involvements.

In the writings of the U.S. cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1926-2006) comments in his essay on *Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture* that

Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning. (Geertz, 2000, p. 5) (p. 5)

I take the phenomenon of the relational nature of world that Heidegger is describing to be roughly similar in a phenomenal sense to the 'webs of significance'. I raise this because I want to borrow from Geertz the notion of thick and thin, but apply it to the 'certain intelligibility' we possess. I call the 'certain intelligibility' that we need to navigate the public world a 'thin intelligibility or know-how' and the intelligibility we

need to let entities be involved in our activities a 'thick intelligibility or know-how'. The concept of 'thick' and 'thin' is clearly a metaphor but it does give a way of describing what is required, and a way of qualifying the concept of 'know-how'.

A question that can then be asked is: "What is the thick intelligibility we require in a specific envioning world and what is the necessary, thin intelligibility required to support the effective linkages between envioning and public world?" This line of analysis would be beneficial, for example, in determining what thick intelligibility is required to carry out the work in a trade or profession versus what thin intelligibility is required to embed the functioning in a broader environment. A few years ago, I was tutoring in an accounting course at a University. As a former CEO, what struck me was the course was so loaded with 'thick intelligibility' concerning accounting and finance there was virtually no "thin intelligibility" taught. While there are many exceptions, observing the behaviours of accountants over many years in an organisational setting, they appeared to operate from the perspective of "thick intelligibly" of accounting but very little of the necessary "thin intelligibility" to relate to the broader world of the organisation, sometimes with disastrous results. Perhaps this all starts with the education. This silo mentality is not limited to finance departments and is still a common structural approach for organisations, i.e. they can be viewed as pockets of thick intelligibility with insufficient overlapping thin intelligibility to make them a properly cohesive unity. Management approaches such as the Balanced Scorecard have been developed to address this structural deficiency by shifting the focus to the processes (the involvement structures) in an organisation that run across departments and that link the organisation to the customers (for-the-sake-of-which) and back to the suppliers (the where-of) (Kaplan & Norton, 2006; Niven, 2006; Rohm, Wilsey, Perry, & Montgomery, 2013). This approach can be seen as reflecting a 'Heideggerian' understanding as it argues that organisations (envioning worlds) should be arranged on the basis of the various involvement structures within the organisation that align the organisation within the broader world. This line of discussion, while useful in illustrating the concept of thick and thin intelligibility and a broader application of Heidegger's work, will not be discussed further as it leads to topics outside the scope of the thesis. It is, of course, relevant to the structuring and running of the nursing home and will be relevant to future inquiries.

All Daseins have a familiarity with their domestic world; this implies a certain level

of thick intelligibility. The question that then arises is on what basis does a Dasein have the thick intelligibility it does? Why does Dasein as a Dasein do certain things, play football, become an architect, a carpenter, a nurse or collect pink lustre china? It is in addressing this that the approach of the experiential empiricist approach is again essential. There are some things for which we cannot answer the “why question” in a strictly causal sense. For example, we do not know why the speed of light¹⁸⁰ is what it is. All that is available to science in these cases is to *describe* the law like relationships (e.g. $E=mc^2$) or describe the ‘practical bearings’. This method is reflected in Heidegger’s approach;

... understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an “in-order-to”, and it has done so in terms of an ability-for-being for the sake of which it itself is -- one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly. [BT119/86] (translation modified)¹⁸¹

The term “for the sake of which” needs to be heard in the right way. It should not be heard in a causal sense. Recalling the discussion on Aristotle, while the term ‘causes’ is typically used Aristotle does not use it in the way that stipulates an answer to a ‘why’ question. Aristotle is giving a descriptive account of the essential requirements, as he understood it, of an entity coming into being. His final cause is also referred to as ‘for-the-sake-of-which’. In relation to the compound entities produced by people, i.e. not ‘naturally’ occurring entities, this related to the purpose required of the thing being made. Heidegger takes over Aristotle’s terminology of the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ and its intent. Ultimately the ready-to-hand, which includes worlds, come into being because of the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ of Dasein.

In Heidegger’s description of the ‘in-order-to-structure,’ he traces the structure back to a ‘for-the-sake-of’ related to Dasein. However, what is easy to miss, largely due to the English translation is that he presents this twice, with subtly different meanings. Understanding this is essential in understanding the above passage. The first description has been presented before and concerns the hammer;

... there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making

¹⁸⁰ The speed of light is 299,792,458 metres/second, just under 300,000 kilometres/second or 1,080million kilometres/hour. We can measure it but to date science has not been able to give an account of why it is this speed, and not some other speed.

¹⁸¹ The German word that has been changed in translation is *Seinkönnen*. The translators have translated this as potentiality-of-being, which does not capture the same sense as my interpretive approach to BT. The word root *können* has, according to the German-English dictionary Beolingus, meanings of ‘to be able’ and ‘may’. The sense of this passage is that Dasein is able to assign itself in a way that is for-the-sake-of itself. It is something done, not a potential waiting to be expressed.

something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection 'is' for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein-that is to say, for the sake of an ability of Dasein's being. [BT 116/84] (translation modified) (my underlining) (German in the English original)

The second description is;

In a workshop, for example, the totality of involvements which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand in its readiness-to-hand, is 'earlier' than any single item of equipment; so too for the farmstead with all its utensils and outlying lands. But the unity of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a "towards-which" in which there is no further involvement: this "towards-which" is not an entity with the kind of being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose being is defined as being-in-the-world, and to whose constitution of being, worldhood itself belongs. This primary "towards-which" is not just another "towards-this" as something in which an involvement is possible. **The primary 'towards-which' is a "for-the-sake-of-which"**. [BT 116/84] (translation modified) (my underlining) (my bolding)

In the English text, there is a footnote at the end of the second passage which indicates that the German word translated as "for-the-sake-of-which" is *Worum-willen*. In the first passage, the German word translated as "for-the-sake-of" is *Um-willen*. We thus have two accounts of the final "towards-which" and understanding the difference is instructive.

The second account refers to the unity of involvements itself, i.e. world or the 'wherein' Dasein dwells. This does not go back to an *Um-willen* it goes back to a *Worum-willen*. Following straight after passage 2 Heidegger then tells us,

But the 'for-the-sake-of' [*Um-willen*] always pertains to the being of *Dasein*, for which, in its being, that very being is essentially an *issue*. We have thus indicated the interconnection by which the structure of an involvement leads to Dasein's very being as the sole authentic "for-the-sake-of-which" [*Worum-willen*]. [BT 116-7/84] (my gloss) (Italics for issue in the English but not in the German)

What we have is world (unity of involvements) connecting to Dasein's being (the primary for-sake-of-which) (passages 2/3) and the involvements of entities within the world connecting as an ability of Dasein's being, i.e. way of being-in-the-world (passages 1/3).

The way we can understand this relationship is by thinking of a concrete situation. One of my sons wanted to be an electrician, this reflects an aspect of his being (*Worum-willen*). In order to be an electrician, the world of electricians had first to be disclosed (passage 2). He then develops the know-how, freeing all the relevant ready-to-hand items *within* the world of the electrician. Once acquiring the various

know-hows to be an electrician (*Um-willen*) he goes out on a job and installs some electrical fittings. The in-order-to structure (or structure of involvements) that is associated with this task goes back to a for-sake of him being an electrician (*Um-willen*), this, in turn, leads to an aspect of who he is, an aspect of his being. The work is thus structurally connected and undertaken for the sake my son's being (*Worum-willen*). Therefore, what is essential to his being who he is, is the ability to undertake work associated with his *Worum-willen*, i.e. his self-understanding. The precise nature of the work he engages in will have varying in-order-to structures and led to various ways of being an electrician (*Um-willen*). Ultimately, however, there must be a connection between the way of being an electrician and my son's understanding of what an electrician is (being) otherwise there becomes a disconnect. Since he started as an electrician my son has changed what he does, in that he has moved from being a 'hands-on' electrician working for somebody to now being the owner of an electrical contracting firm. He is still working in the broad world of electrical contracting, but his structure of involvements has changed. I am not going to continue the analysis of this example, the differences between *Um-willen* and *Worum-willen* have been sufficiently illustrated. This is only one aspect of my son's understanding of himself; he is also being a husband, being a father, being a friend, being a son and being a homeowner. All these are aspects of his *Worum-willen* (primary for-the-sake-of) which gives rise to various ways of being who he is (*Um-willen*).

If there was no world of electricians, or if this world were not disclosed by my son, he could not *be* an electrician. This is the case for all the other aspects of being who he is. It is the same situation for any Dasein. Dasein's disclosure (understanding) of a world is thus a necessary structural element of Dasein as is Dasein's discovery of entities in that world. Understanding is not sufficient. In that our existence is *the lived experience of expressed compartments*, it is experienced in the things *we do* within the world, i.e. our dealings with the ready-to-hand. For the sake of my son being an electrician there is thus the prior condition of disclosing a world and discovering entities, then there is the on-going condition of access to the world itself, i.e. access to all the ready-to-hand entities and the 'in-order-to' structures that allow the involvement of those entities.

If my son is suddenly denied access to the world of electricians, then his understanding of himself is still that of an electrician (ontological), but he has no

opportunity, at the ontic level, to be an electrician. There would then be a tension between his *Worum-willen* (for-the-sake-of) and his world which can only be resolved by a shift in one or the other.

While I have used a case where someone made a deliberate choice, my son becoming an electrician, this choice in itself was an expression of his understanding of himself. Earlier Heidegger used the language of references and assignments in relation to the ready-to-hand and in this he spoke about the 'in-order-to' structure and the relationship between serviceability and usability. The sense is that a certain serviceability is assigned in to order to achieve a certain usability. This relationship between serviceability and usability passes along the entire 'in-order-to-structure' it finally ending with Dasein, either as a final 'in-order-to' or a 'for-sake-of-which'. The language of the 'in-order-to' now comes back. In this case, there is not an assignment establishing the relationship pairing of the usability and serviceability of two ready-to-hand entities; there is an assigning of Dasein to world. This can be understood in a similar vein to the discussion surrounding the rest of the 'in-order-to' structure. In order to give expression to its understanding of self (i.e. its being), Dasein requires a particular 'usability' from its world that allows this expression to occur, it thus assigns itself to the world that will provide the necessary serviceability. This can be understood as follows;

Dasein's being needs a world with particular characteristics (usability required) ← assignment → world understood as having those characteristics (serviceability offered)

Having made the assignment to a world, Dasein then assigns itself to various 'in-order-to' structures in that world that further reflects an understanding of itself. This is the meaning of the passage given earlier;

understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an "in-order-to", and it has done so in terms of an ability-for-being for the sake of which it itself is - .. one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly. (translation modified)
[BT 119/86]

Within the broader world of electrical contracting (a public world) my son has taken up specific assignments within that world. While I have used the specific world of electricians, the concept applies to any specific 'in-order-to' and must be understood broadly. For example, a person buying particular style clothes may be doing so in-order-to 'look fashionable', 'have sturdy work clothes', 'go bushing walking', etc. All

these reflect different possible ways of being and hence different understandings of being. As mentioned earlier, assigning is not a causal phenomenon it is a descriptive account of what Heidegger has observed happens.

A point that comes up in the next chapter is that a Dasein is born into a particular culture and the sub-worlds it contains. There is no initial choice of where or when a Dasein is born. A world of an electrician could not have been disclosed in the fifteenth century! There is thus a significant contingent aspect to world disclosure. While the world that is disclosed to a very young Dasein happens tacitly as a consequence of birth, there is a time at which Dasein may make a deliberate choice concerning assignments. This is what Heidegger is referring to when he says the assigning is either explicit or tacitly.

Why does one person become an engineer, another an athlete or yet another a little league coach? It is possible to say that they followed what was of interest to them, but this is not a real answer to why. It merely pushes the question back one level. We could say they were influenced by the family situation and followed into the family business. Again, it is not a real answer to the why question. There was no answer to the “Why?” question in terms of causality in Heidegger’s day, and the various contemporary neurosciences and cognitive sciences still have no answer to this question. Heidegger thus puts all speculation concerning why out of court and simply refers to ...

.. the being of Dasein, which is of concern for Dasein in its very being. [BT 160/123]
(translation modified)

Why does Dasein make one assignment in preference to another? Who knows! There is no law like relationship that can determine how Dasein will assign itself on the basis of its understanding of self (being) to a certain way of being. Heidegger is not concerned with why, but with description. There is an assignment made from among different alternatives within the world which implies a choice, but it is not an unencumbered choice, it is made by Dasein out of concern for its being. To put this another way, who we are matters to Dasein even if Dasein is not explicitly aware of the structural processes associates why the mattering takes the specific form it does.

Marion Miller just is Marion Miller. There is no why! Who she is, finds expression in the assignments to certain ‘in-order-to’ structures, and at the ontic phenomenal

level, her existence is experienced in terms of the expressed comportments towards the entities that are determined by those structures. This means that who Marion is, is determined by such things as know-how and comportments towards pink lustre china collecting and a concern with political and social activism. Just as worlds collapse if the dynamic nature of involvements ceases, Dasein's existence, understood as the concrete expression of Dasein's way of being, starts to collapse when its primary involvements cease. The structural connection between these two forms of collapse is revealed in the following section.

Heidegger's Conclusion Worldhood as the Structure of World

Now comes the concluding step in Heidegger's line of argument. Firstly, a restatement:

Dasein always assigns itself from a "for-the-sake-of-which" to the "with-which" of an involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be encountered as ready-to-hand. [BT 119/86]

Heidegger, by and large, is talking about a Dasein¹⁸² in its ordinary everyday dealings. In other words, it has already disclosed a world on the basis of a "for-the-sake-of-which" and it is from this that it assigns itself to involvements such that it can encounter the ready-to-hand in the world. This has been explained in detail above.

This leads Heidegger to conclude;

The "wherein" of-understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that on the basis of which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of being that belongs to involvements; and this "wherein" is the phenomenon of the world. [BT 119/86] (translation modified)¹⁸³ (Heidegger's italics)

To reword this in a less compact way: The dynamic structure of being-in-the-world which is determinative of any Dasein's being, has as part of that structure a process of assigning itself to involvements (i.e. 'in-order-to-structures') based on its understanding of self (what it requires in order to give expression to itself) and

¹⁸² He is referring to a person who has already developed sufficient thick intelligibility to have an environment on an ordinary everyday basis.

¹⁸³ The German word the translators have translated as "act of understanding" is *Verstehen*. This is a noun that means understanding and there is no 'act'. The term act is a technical term used by Husserl and refers to an act of consciousness. The term act also implies an actor. On both accounts this interpretation would not fit with Heidegger's approach. All that can be said is that the assigning occurs within an understanding. The BTs translation has understanding and not act of understanding.

understanding of world (what will enable the expression of self). The unity of the involvements to which Dasein assigns itself is Dasein's world, the 'wherein' it lives its life. This describes the phenomenon of world.

The second part of his conclusion is;

... the structure of that on the basis of which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world. [BT 119/86] (translation modified)

It is the structure itself that is the basis by which the assignments take place that Heidegger calls worldhood. This is part of Dasein's structure, it relates to the world part of being-in-the-world. For a particular Dasein, we thus have the case that if there is no structure of assigning (worldhood), there is no assignment to a world. If there is no assignment, there is no basis for dealings with things in the world; there is then no existence. On this basis, as previously indicated, there is no Dasein. However, if we extend this to all Daseins, if there are no longer assignments, there are no longer any dealings by any Dasein, there is, as has been previously laid out no world. Worldhood is not only the structural basis by which an individual Dasein gives itself *its world* but collectively, it is the structure which is determinative, on the basis of Dasein's collective activity, of *the world*. There is a reflexive relationship between the Dasein and world; they require each other!

The preceding is a technical description of why worldhood is both determinate of Dasein's world and of the world in general. This is an account that I have developed as Heidegger does not address this relationship explicitly in *Being and Time*, and I have not found it addressed in other of his works. The following is a more generalised account of the dual role of worldhood. Dasein is born into an extant world understood in the broadest possible way as per Chapter 14. As Dasein grows into the culture 'sub-worlds' are disclosed on the basis of its 'for-the-sake-of-which'. In turn, assignments are made, and with them, ready-to-hand entities are freed for involvements. Dasein engages with these entities (dealings) as part of who it is. The dealings are made possible because of Dasein's thick intelligibility, or know-how that it has acquired as part of how Dasein understands itself. These 'wherein' where these dealings occur is the world Dasein is familiar with, its environment as opposed to the public world. However, Dasein's active dealings in its world contribute to and maintain that part of the broader world into which it has been born and this process is happening tens of thousands of times across the broader world. The structure that is the basis by which Dasein assigns itself and in so doing gets its world is the

same structure in every other Dasein! World in the broader sense thus arises from the interactions of all the Daseins in the world, all of whom have the same common structure. Hence worldhood is both the structure of Dasein's world (singular) and on a collective basis the structure of the broader world.

Heidegger's language of assigning is a technical language and just because a Dasein may be attracted, say to an aged care job, does not mean that they are aware of the structure of the world;

This familiarity with the world does not necessarily require that the relations which are constitutive for the world as world should be theoretically transparent. [BT 120/86]

The structure of worldhood is active even at an early age, and this was illustrated in the example of the young person assigning themselves to the world of football.

This completes the discussion on worldhood.

The Context of Dasein's Assigning Itself – Meaning Making

There is one final step that Heidegger address, that of assignment as the basis of meaning-making.

As I look around my workspace, where I am writing this thesis, there is a deep sense of familiarity. I have spent hundreds of hours here. I know exactly where everything I use is located. I know exactly how to use them and to what end they should be applied. On the computer, I can pull up the various software programs and move around them almost without looking. Each software program is a ready-to-hand piece of equipment, and I have the know-how to let it be involved as I go about my work. There are also the more mundane things, the desk, chair, the desk lamp, the pens and so on, I am familiar with them all. All of these things are part of my assignments, assignments made for the sake of my understanding of who I am.

There was a time when I was not familiar with all these things. There was a time, maybe long ago when I first had to acquire the understanding of 'study space'. There have been more recent changes to my world, for example, I now use the program 'Evernote' to keep track of incidentals things, this is a new addition. But it is something that makes sense to me in this space; it fits within my workspace, it has a place within my world.

Having disclosed the world of my study space what keeps it 'open' for me? Why

doesn't it just close up, become alien, unfamiliar? Why don't I have to re-learn this every time? For Heidegger, it is understanding that must hold open all these relationships.

... understanding holds [these relationships] in this disclosedness. It holds itself in them with familiarity; and in so doing, it holds them *before* itself, for it is in these that its assignment operates ... [BT 120/87]

What is important in this passage is that the assignments take place within our *understanding* of the world. While the entity of *the world*, understood in the broader sense, may remain relatively constant, at least in the short term, Dasein's understanding of itself may change, this, in turn, may result in a change in the assignments. This results in a change in *Dasein's world*. I recently met a young lawyer who started out as a defence attorney in criminal law and found he did not like it (too many crooks he told me). He shifted to employment law. This requires a new set of assignments and the relinquishing of old assignments. Dasein's world has changed but changed as a result of either a clearer or a new understanding of self. *The world* of criminal law is still there, but the understanding of this world in terms of his understanding of being has shifted.

Breakdown examples are found concerning people with dementia. Sometimes the complex understandings of things remain, but little is left by way of assignments. One of the people living in the 'dementia' area of a nursing home I once managed used to be a professional singer, but there was little evidence of this know-how. One day some music came on triggering this skill, and she burst into song! Similar things have happened with people who played the piano. A person regularly passed the piano and appeared to have no interest in it. One day they were attracted to it by someone playing the piano, and with a little encouragement, sat down and played. But when they walked away there was no recognition of what a piano was! It was as if the involvement itself was the basis of understanding, and this showed up in the playing, not the entity itself. In this case, the person's circumspection was not operative (not recognising the piano by its appearance) pointing to the role of both the present-at-hand and the structure of involvement in circumspection. As Heidegger noted, the structure of understanding holds open the understanding of Dasein's world and I would suggest, that when this structure is damaged, the world is no longer held open. There are fragments that remain, triggered in other ways and this is what is witnessed in the above examples. At the moment when there was an expressed comportment (singing, piano playing), these lived experiences

resulted in expression of delight and joy. There is much to commend itself to research that results in supportive strategies that result in identifying and enabling a higher incidence of these “fragments”. Another indication of the way understanding holds open the world by way of a breakdown case also come from my experience with people who have dementia. Often, even cutlery and other common everyday things became mere present-at-hand objects as the understanding drops away. However, in some instances, once a person is placed at the table with a meal and the cutlery, the small contained set of relationships thus revealed is enough for the person to eat their meal with the cutlery.

Bound up, with the structure of involvements, understanding and the assignment is the concept of meaning:

The understanding lets itself make assignments both in these relationships themselves and of them. The relational character which these relationships of assigning possess, we take as one of *meaning-making[be-deuten]*. [BT 120/87] (translation modified, see note below)

What something means then is based on its place in the referential unity, and the understanding we have of it reflected in the assignments, i.e. the basis on which entities are freed for us for our involvements. This process is what gives the meaning of the entity to us. Again, this opens the way for room for error, in that we may have the wrong meaning compared to the rest of the culture. It is also the basis by which the meaning of an entity may change in the culture or the basis by which a ready-to-hand entity may have one meaning in culture A, but a different meaning in culture B. Within a culture, the meaning of something will then be reflected on the basis of its involvements in the referential unity.

Translation and Interpretation Note

In the English translation, the term signifying is used rather than meaning-making. To explain why I have made the change to this important concept I need to address the German word that is being translated, *be-deuten*.

Typically, the German word is presented as *bedeuten*, but Heidegger hyphenates the word in this instance, he doesn't elsewhere, i.e. *be-deuten*. *Bedeuten* can mean 'to mean', 'to signify', 'to stand for', etc. However, the word is a composite of *be* + *deuten*, and it seems to be that this is what Heidegger wants to emphasise. The prefix '*be*' typically indicating a working on something, changing something or touching something in a manner indicated by the verb; roughly understood there is a sense of 'inflicting' something on something. By way of example, the verb *malen*

means to paint so,

- 'Ich male mein Haus' is translated as 'I paint my house.' but in the sense of doing a painting of my house, whereas
- 'Ich bemale mein Haus' is also translated as 'I paint my house.' However, this means that I put paint on my house.

The verb *deuten* can mean 'to indicate', to point to [something]', 'to construe', 'to interpret' e.g. *ausdeuten* means to translate and can be used in the same sense as *verstehen*, which is to understand.

The word *be-deuten* can thus be understood as 'imposing or inflicting' meaning on something, and it is in this sense that I take Heidegger to be using the word. The crucial German sentence;

Den Bezugscharakter dieser Bezüge des Verweisens fassen wir als be-deuten. [BTg 116/87]

Which is translated in the English translation as

The relational character which these relationships of assigning possess, we take as one of *signifying*. [BT 120/87]

does not reflect this active sense of imposing meaning and so I translate this passage as¹⁸⁴

We take the relational character of these relationships of assigning as meaning-making. [BT 120/87](my translation)

When Heidegger uses the German word *bedeutet*, I typically translate this as signifies for the sake of simplicity in terms of sticking with the standard English translation. It does have the meaning of implies, signifies, meant and so forth.

Meaning and Meaning Making

The conclusion of the above analysis of what I have identified as a key passage is that it is in the assigning that meaning arises. **This is the basis of Dasein's existence as meaningful.** If we take the assignments of all the various Daseins, then, of course, we have all the networks of interrelationships that give rise to entities ready-to-hand; but it is the structure of Dasein that gives meaning to the world. In discussing meaning, Heidegger says a little later in *Being and Time*,

¹⁸⁴ The word "possess" which is the BT translation is not indicated in the German. The BTs translation also, in my view misses the point:

"We shall call the relational character of these referential relations signifying [be-deuten]." [BTs 85/87.

The *concept of meaning* embraces the formal existential framework of what necessarily belongs to that which an understanding interpretation articulates. *Meaning is the "upon-which" of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; [BT 193/151]*

Remember the *Rompol* world example, if everyone stops playing and does something else, i.e. there are no longer assignments, then the world collapses. The assigning is thus meaning-making for the Dasein as it is the basis by which it understands itself, and it is meaning-making for the entities in the world and hence, ultimately for any particular world. Towards the end of *Being and Time*, this is what Heidegger is getting at when he summarises,

Taken strictly, "meaning" signifies the "upon-which" of the primary projection of the understanding of being. When being-in-the-world has been disclosed to itself and understands the being of that entity which it itself is, it understands equiprimordially the being of entities discovered within-the-world ... [BT 372/324]

Meaning then arises with the projection of understanding. In the disclosure of world that accompanies projection Dasein's being and the being of world are discovered at the same time. Simply put we can only understand our self as the being we are on the basis of our assignments to the involvement structure (world) whose meaning is disclosed in the projection of understanding.

It is thus as a result of its familiarity with the relationships that Dasein "gives itself" its individual way being Dasein. This is the way Dasein gives meaning to itself. Within the *Rompol* world, Person B can understand themselves as a robot war gamer through its assignment to various involvement in robot war tournaments, etc. and can do this because Person B has a familiarity with the *Rompol* world, i.e. as being-in-the-*Rompol*-world. In the assignment, B gives meaning to itself and the entities in the *Rompol* world.

Heidegger brings all this together in a pithy summary;

The "for-the-sake-of-which" signifies [bedeutet] an "in-order-to"; this, in turn, a "towards-this"; the latter, an "in-which" of letting something be involved; and that in turn, the "with-which" of an involvement. These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial unity; they are what they are as this meaning-making [Be-deuten] in which Dasein gives itself beforehand its being-in-the-world as something to be understood. The relational unity of this meaning-making we call "*meaningfulness*". [BT 120/87] (translation modified)¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ The German word translated as meaningfulness is *Bedeutsamkeit*. In the English text this is translated as significance. Support for this translation can be found in the English translation of *History of the Concept of Time* translated by Theodore Kisiel.

Meaningfulness¹⁸⁶ then represents the unity of all the involvements to which a particular Dasein has assigned itself, and this reflects the understanding Dasein has of itself, at that time, and is the basis by which Dasein gives meaning to itself.

If then an assignment is meaning-making in terms of the existence of Dasein this is the key to understanding the shedding of life. In Marion Miller's world within the nursing home, there appears to be nothing to which she can assign herself that reflects her understanding of who she is. At home, her life had meaning. In the nursing home, her life has lost meaning. This I take as a preliminary understanding of the of 'shedding of life'.

Summary

This ends the inquiry and discussion into the worldhood of the world. The interconnected character of Dasein and world at the ontological and ontic level have been brought into view.

Dasein's structure is meaning-making, in terms of its self and world. In average everyday situations, this is based on the possibility of involvements with the ready-to-hand that show up in circumspection as meaningful. In the case of a move into a nursing home, a Dasein has typically already made assignments within a different world. It is not surprising then that for many people the world of the nursing home is shown up by circumspection as being meaningless.

If Dasein is to continue with its existence, then after the relocation the environment must contain possibilities for involvements reflecting Dasein's prior assignments. To live meaningfully, Dasein needs the possibility of meaningful involvements where meaningful is understood as having meaning to Dasein's existence. The connection between the lack of opportunities for involvements relevant to a person's life and the shedding of life have been made on a number of occasions, and this has now been brought to light structurally.

The discussion to date has focused on Dasein's dealings with the ready-to-hand.

¹⁸⁶ In the *History of the Concept of Time* Heidegger acknowledged that using 'meaningfulness' in this way leaves the term open for misunderstanding. He specifically states that it "says nothing about meaning in the sense of value and rank" and is not to be understood as the "meaning of a word" albeit he acknowledges there is a connection. That he has to make such delimiting comments he recognises points to a, "... certain embarrassment in the choice of the right expression for the complex phenomenon which we want to call meaningfulness. And I frankly admit that this expression is not the best, but for years I have found nothing better ..." [HCT 202]

The next chapter discusses the way in which Dasein is in the world with other Daseins.

CHAPTER 16: CULTURE AND BEING-WITH

Introduction

To this point, I have gone into considerable detail enquiring into the basis of Heidegger's work and into his analysis of worldhood. Once this is grasped together with Heidegger's basic methodology the remainder of the Dasein analytic becomes a little more, albeit still challenging, accessible. While it is possible, on the framework I have presented to date, to undertake a preliminary analysis of the shedding of life the analysis would be deficient without first understanding Dasein as part of the culture and its relationship with other Dasein's which I address in this chapter, of understanding the character of being-in the world in terms of Dasein's understanding and receptivity which is discussed in the next chapter.

In the previous chapter concerning the worldhood while other Daseins are evident in the analysis they do not have a prominent role. It was clear that in some way it is the collective action of many Daseins that brings a world into being, but there was no account given of the relationships between Daseins that could account for this. In Chapter 4 of *Being in Time* Heidegger discusses the nature of the relationship with other Daseins and addresses what he calls 'the who' of Dasein. The 'who' of Dasein refers to the source of Dasein's understanding of itself and world. To put simply, Heidegger indicates that we can think of the culture as being the 'average everyday' way that the Daseins in a particular cultural world understand things and on the basis of that understanding that the ready-to-hand shows up for involvements and so on. When we grow up in a culture, it is this average everyday way of understanding and being involved that we learn as a functional member of the culture. While we may have some different understandings, by and large, when we grow up in a culture we reflect aspects of the cultural norms. Heidegger refers to this average everydayness as the 'One', and his conclusion is that, by and large, who we are is the 'One'. Heidegger then identifies practices in the culture that operate to 'enforce' conformity with the 'One'. Heidegger recognises that the 'One' and its way of being has positive aspects, for without it there is no world. However, he also points out downsides in that Dasein can become absorbed in the understandings of the 'One' and not seek to pursue its own understanding of self, nor its own understanding of world. The first section of this chapter addresses the concept of culture and the power of the one.

The second section of the chapter discusses the concept of Dasein-with and being-with, and this addresses more directly the interactions between Daseins. In this section, I also discuss the concept of “leaping in” and “leaping ahead” which is a rare example where Heidegger introduces a topic that could be considered to have ethical import. This discussion has implications for the running of nursing homes as the discussion concludes that the way nursing homes are currently run is a taking away of a person’s being.

In this chapter, I do not follow Heidegger’s discussions as closely as I have in the preceding in two chapters. The phenomenon of culture is one that has been widely studied and in bringing this phenomenon into view I rely more on the work of other writers and examples than on Heidegger’s account. His main technical areas are around the power of the ‘One’ to enforce conformity, and even here it is almost treated simply by listing the practices. I follow suit as it is not critical to the thesis to fully investigate and discuss this aspect of his work. A discussion on the concepts of Dasein-with and being-with provides a basis for discussing how the self-understanding of a nursing home¹⁸⁷ can lead to an impoverished environment lacking the wherewithal for an older Dasein to live their life. This is related to a mode of care delivery, leaping-in, which exacerbates the impact of the environment by creating the conditions for institutionalization. Once the impacts of that arise from the structural relationship between the nursing home and the older person are clarified, then this provides the basis for a change in practice based on reconceptualising the role of care workers in a nursing home.

Section 1: Culture – The Power of the ‘One’

Acquiring an Initial Understanding

Heidegger’s starting point in *Being and Time* is a normal, fully functional Dasein doing average everyday things. In Chapter IV of *Being and Time* Heidegger is addressing ‘the who’ of Dasein, i.e. who is the Dasein that is “in-the-world”. Almost immediately, one is confronted by what appears to be some outlandish statements, denying that it is itself but rather is ‘the other’, e.g.

When Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern—that is, at the same time, in its being-

¹⁸⁷ The nursing home understood as a unity of ‘behaviours’ has the same manner of being as Dasein. This claim is made on the basis of a similar assertion by Heidegger in relation to science; “As ways in which man behaves, sciences have the manner of Being which this entity - man himself-- possesses. “[BT 32/11]

with towards Others - it is not itself. [BT 163/125] [my underlining]

Proximally, factual Dasein is in the with-world, which is discovered in an average way. Proximally, it is not 'I', in the sense of my own Self, that 'am', but rather the Others, whose way is that of the "One". In terms of the "One", and as the "One", I am 'given' proximally to 'myself'. Proximally Dasein is the "One", and for the most part it remains so. [BT 167/129] [my underlining]

What Heidegger is doing is his standard approach of ruling out the most likely common understandings that may be present when one is engaging in *Being and Time*. We are forced then to put on hold any presuppositions and keep an open mind to what he is going to present by way of the identification of phenomenon and analysis of structure. This approach has been encountered before; it is part of his method. Similarly, we have to work hard at bringing into view what he means by the 'One'.

I have already indicated in the introduction that this chapter deals with the Culture and the way we acquire the cultural norms. The cultural norms are described as the 'One', and in a real sense, we become part of the 'One' by becoming part of the culture. This is the phenomenon that Heidegger is describing. The German translated for this term is simply *Das Man*. *Man* is the plural form of a personal pronoun that can mean you, we, they, or one. The English text translates it as "the They" but this does not feel right. Every Dasein is part of the culture, and so the translation should be either "the We" or the 'One'. There is an expression in the language, to the effect that we do something because it is what "one does" and this reflects the 'proper' way things are done in the culture. In that this captures a sense of what Heidegger is after I interpret the expression as the 'One'.

Heidegger's analysis commences from the perspective of a Dasein already going about its affairs in the culture. He says very little concerning the way in which we are socialised into a culture, and the most we get are along the following lines;

Dasein, which 'has come into the world' through birth, grows up in and grows into such interpretedness. This interpretedness entails a self-interpretation of Dasein. It delineates 'what is appropriate', 'how to behave', 'what one has to do in particular situations'. Inscribed in the public realm are instructions for encountering the world in a particular way. . [CT 28] (my underlining)

We grow up within such a world-view and gradually become accustomed to it. Our world-view is determined by environment - people, race, class, developmental stage of culture. [BPP 5]

This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown

in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed. In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a 'world-in-itself, so that it just beholds what it encounters. The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the ... basic way in which Dasein lets the world "matter" to it. The "One" prescribes one's disposedness, and determines what and how one 'sees'. [BT 213/169-70] (my underlining)

When the passages are read together, the descriptions provide a strong claim that as we grow up and into a culture, the culture (or the 'One') determines our understanding of the world. This means, based on the last chapter, that it also determines how the things in the world show up for us in our circumspective concern; hence "determines what and how one 'sees'". These statements simply place before us the logical conclusions of the last chapter. When we grow up into a particular world, it is the only world our structure has as the basis for understanding and assigning itself. What is perhaps most surprising is that Heidegger claims that it prescribes our "disposedness". I address this concept in the next chapter and translate it as affective-attunement. This concept covers our affective responses to the world, and so Heidegger is claiming the 'One' also shapes our emotions! I do not address this aspect in any detail in this chapter, but I do discuss and support the claim in the next chapter.

Apart from the claims concerning "disposedness" Heidegger's claims are consistent with accounts given by other scholars. The main aspect of the concept of the 'One' is that the socialisation that occurs to us is an all-pervasive one that covers ways of being of Dasein in all its aspects, small and large. In the following, I will provide some descriptions of the phenomenon from the accounts of other scholars that I believe are consistent with Heidegger's view.

There is an example of child rearing that was introduced into this literature by Dreyfus (Dreyfus, 1991) and now used more widely as the case example (Aho, 2009; White & Dreyfus (Forward), 2005)

A Japanese baby seems passive He lies quietly ... while his mother, in her care, does [a great deal of] lulling, carrying, and rocking of her baby. She seems to try to soothe and quiet the child, and to communicate with him physically rather than verbally. On the other hand, the American infant is more active ... and exploring of his environment, and his mother, in her care, does more looking at and chatting to her baby. She seems to stimulate the baby to activity and vocal response. It is as if the American mother wanted to have a vocal, active baby, and the Japanese mother wanted to have a quiet, contented baby. In terms of styles of caretaking of the mothers in the two cultures, they get what they apparently want A

great deal of cultural learning has taken place by three to four months of age ... babies have learned by this time to be Japanese and American babies. (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 17)

In this description, we have an account of how a baby born into a Japanese culture becomes a passive baby or that born into American culture an active baby and in so doing the baby is already reflecting being Japanese or being American based on the interactions with their mother¹⁸⁸. The process starts young!

The anthropologist, Jared Diamond, in his book *The World Until Yesterday*, gives similar examples, first citing Nurit David Bird,

At a time where in modern societies children begin schooling, say at age 6, Nayaka children independently go hunting small game, visiting and staying with other families, free from supervision by their own specific parents, though not necessarily from adults.... Teaching, additionally, is done in a very subtle way. No formal instruction and memorising here, no classes, no exams, no cultural sites [schools] in which packages of knowledge, abstracted from their context, are transmitted from one person to another. Knowledge is inseparable from social life." (Diamond, 2012, p. 205)

Then citing the work of Colin Turnbull concerning Africa's "mobile pygmies",

For children, life is one long frolic interspersed with a healthy sprinkle of spankings and slappings.... And one day they find that the games they have been playing are not games any longer, but the real thing, for they have become adults. The hunting is now real hunting; the tree climbing is in earnest search of inaccessible honey; their acrobatics on the swings are repeated almost daily, in other forms, in the pursuit of elusive game, for avoiding the malicious forest buffalo. It happens so gradually that they hardly notice the change at first, or even when they are proud and famous hunters their life is still full of fun and laughter. "(Diamond, 2012, p. 205)

These examples highlight that becoming a Nayaka adult or an African hunter is not one of specific acquisition of knowledge determined by a curriculum of formal study, it is the inculcation of a way of being that commences from the time they are babies. They are acquiring know-how, the ability to use the various tools of the culture so as to participate in the various involvements that form the cultural practices. The children are learning to understand their world based on the underlying, hidden structure of involvements relevant to their specific cultures. However, as earlier discussed, there is a complex set of interconnections that mesh together to form the cohesive unity of the cultural practices, the unity of involvements, which is world. However, we typically are not aware of this 'unity', and it is not, as was addressed last chapter, accessible to circumspection. Sometimes Heidegger refers to this as

¹⁸⁸ Whether this is an accurate depiction concerning Japanese and American child rearing is, to a degree, irrelevant. It is the account of the phenomenon that is important in this example.

the background;

The ready-to-hand is always understood in terms of a unity of involvements. This unity need not be grasped explicitly by a thematic interpretation. Even if it has undergone such an interpretation, it recedes into an understanding which does not stand out from the background. [BT 191/150] (my underlining)

Being-in-the-world. We had to assure ourselves in the beginning that the structural unity of this phenomenon cannot be torn apart. The question of the basis which makes the unity of this articulated structure possible, remained in the background. [BT 402/351] (my underlining)

The German sociologist, Max Weber (1864-1920) in describing the phenomenon that is the basis of culture commented:

"Culture" is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance. (Weber, 2015, k. 1897-98)

The transcendental presupposition of every cultural science lies not in our finding a certain culture or any "culture" in general to be valuable but rather in the fact that we are cultural beings endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance. Whatever this significance may be, it will lead us to judge certain phenomena of human existence in its light and to respond to them as being (positively or negatively) meaningful. (Weber, 2015, k. 1902-07) [my underlining]

It is clear from these remarks by Weber that he regards the background of the "infinity of the world process" as something meaningless against which the person carves out meaning. Weber concludes that whatever this "significance may be" it is what results in our making judgements "in its light". While there are some similarities to Heidegger's position there is an important difference in that for Heidegger "only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless" [BT 193/151]. Given the importance of Weber in the development of sociology, exploring the relationship between Weber's and Heidegger's positions on culture, meaning and on such common views that we have the "capacity and the will to take deliberate attitudes"¹⁸⁹ would be of interest in terms of researching the philosophical foundations of sociology.

The power of culture to shape us was identified, albeit not developed, over two hundred and fifty years ago in the work of Blaise Pascal¹⁹⁰ (1623-1662) a French philosopher and polymath. Contrary to the thinking of his time for Pascal we are not shaped by some innate human or 'natural' nature (e.g. rationality) but that "custom

¹⁸⁹ This remark by Weber reflects Heidegger's comment that: "Factically, Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods ..." [BT 175/136]

¹⁹⁰ Pascal was a contemporary to René Descartes (1596-1650) but unfortunately his philosophical insights were not published during his life time nor were they presented in the systematic way that Descartes presented his influential philosophical ideas.

is our nature"(Pascal(Author) & Elliot(Introduction), 2013, k. 957). As such, rather than making decisions based on rational judgement, or on revealed truth, it is custom that determines the truth of a person's faith and so. In his Christian world environment, it is because of custom, and by implication, not the grace of God arising out of faith that people "no longer fear hell" and on the other hand are unable to believe in anything else (k. 958). However, it is not just religious 'truths' that are determined by custom, but even "natural principles":

What are our natural principles but principles of custom? In children they are those which they have received from the habits of their fathers, as hunting in animals. A different custom will cause different natural principles. This is seen in experience; and if there are some natural principles ineradicable by custom, there are also some customs opposed to nature, ineradicable by nature, or by a second custom. This depends on disposition. (Pascal(Author) & Elliot(Introduction), 2013, k. 969-71)

In a move that is reflective of Heidegger's account, which I will address shortly, but one which is still contested, Pascal goes further and states that it is not just our understanding but our emotions that are shaped by the company we keep. For Pascal, even "[m]emory, joy ... even mathematical propositions" are intuitions that are determined and erased by education. (k. 981-2)

The Austrian born philosopher and contemporary to Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889- 951) claimed that human behaviour in its broadest sense is only intelligible against the incredible intertwining complexity of collective human action, what I would take as being in a similar vein to Pascal's reference to culture:

How could human behaviour be described? Surely only by showing the actions of a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. Not what *one* man is doing *now*, but the whole hurly-burly, is the background against which we see an action, and it determines our judgment, our concepts, and our reactions. (Wittgenstein, 1980b, p. 108e)

For Wittgenstein, it is the "whole hurly-burly" of the background in which we are raised and live. It is the 'whole hurly-burly' that is the basis on which we understand the world and respond to it, however, Wittgenstein never presented an analysis of this background, notwithstanding its importance. This background is so pervasive that it simply becomes so familiar to us that we do not see it, it is literally hidden in plain sight, as Wittgenstein comments elsewhere,

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of their enquiry do not strike people at all. Unless *that* fact has at some time struck them. And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking

and most powerful. (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 56) [underlining mine]

Again, notice the similarity with some of Heidegger's language, and the way Wittgenstein, perhaps the most influential philosopher in the Anglo-analytic tradition of the twentieth century, is describing the phenomenon. This description could almost have been written by Heidegger. As Dreyfus notes (Dreyfus, 1991), Wittgenstein does not believe that this background can be explicated commenting that "Not to explain, but to *accept* the psychological phenomenon - that is what is difficult." (Wittgenstein, 1980a, p. 97)

I have drawn on these accounts from anthropology, sociology, and philosophy to demonstrate as forcefully as I can that the phenomena that Heidegger is describing are and have been acknowledged in various ways by highly respected and influential scholars extending back over 200 years. Clearly, there are differences in accounting for the phenomenon as was seen by the remarks of Weber. Interesting whereas Wittgenstein recognised that this phenomenon could not be explained, but must be accepted, Heidegger's approach as a strict experiential empiricism also discarded the explanatory approach but manages to describe in extensive detail the structure associated with the phenomena of the background, i.e. world.

Heidegger calls the collective practices of the culture, the 'One' (*Das Man*) and we can think of the way this is maintained is akin to somebody chastising a child saying, "That is not what one does!". It might be observed that my actions are not precisely the same as everybody else's, but it is the averageness Heidegger is concerned with and with this averageness there is a certain tolerance,

One' is the subject of everyday being-together-with-one-another. The individual differences that persist in this situation exist within a certain average set of customary practices - the done thing, that which one does or does not tolerate. This well-worn averageness, which, as it were, quietly keeps at bay any exception or originality, pervades the 'one'. It is within the 'one' that Dasein grows up. [CT 20] (my underlining)

One gets the impression that Heidegger is not worrying about trivial differences, for example how I make my bed. If I reflect on my circumstance we can get at the level of the phenomenon that is important: I speak the language of the culture, I drive cars in the same way, on the same side of the road with the average understanding and compliance to the accepted rules and protocols for driving, I use shops and lawn mowers, phones and televisions, stoves, and bedrooms, and so on, all within this averageness as exhibited in the culture. My cultural proclivities as a South Australian are reflected in my liking Australian Rules football rather than rugby, albeit

like other Australians I like sport in general, although I don't watch ice hockey. I prefer our country's governance system to that of the USA, Russia or China and so on. While I have an adventurous diet, I do not regard fried tarantulas a delicacy, and cannot stand Chinese opera. The list of preferences and the way I do things has a remarkable similarity to other Australians of my vintage, and this is what Heidegger is getting at.

Heidegger's claim that our "disposedness" is determined by our cultural or social context is supported by work over the last few decades in philosophy (Appiah, 2011; Nussbaum, 2001), anthropology (Lutz, 1982; Silva, 2012) and psychology (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner, Oatley, & Jenkins, 2014). This body of work is indicating that at least to a certain extent even the emotions we exhibit are determined by our social context and, further, that they play a role in cognition. While there may be a base set of core emotions that are cross-cultural, (Ekman, 1992), the research indicates that there are distinct cultural differences. Both the cultural influence and the role of emotions in understanding are recognised and addressed by Heidegger (refer specifically Chapter V of *Being and Time*) and I discuss this further in the next chapter.

Establishing Cultural Norms

Without normative behaviour, there is no culture, nor functioning society. This normative behaviour is based on the way in which we conform to the understandings, practices and disposedness of the group in which we are born and raised. Heidegger's view is that the conformity we exhibit is not something that we simply decide to take up it is part of our structure. Heidegger calls this structural or ontological aspect of Dasein "the 'One'". At the ontic level "the 'One'" refers to the normative practices of the group which each Dasein also exhibits. (This is another example of the practice of labelling the ontological structure and the ontic manifestation of that structure by the same name.).

The "One" is an existentiale; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution. It itself has, in turn, various possibilities of becoming concrete as something characteristic of Dasein. The extent to which its dominion becomes compelling and explicit may change in the course of history. [BT 167/129]

Just as the world¹⁹¹ and its ontic structure can change over time so too can the

¹⁹¹ World must always be understood as the 'wherein' Dasein dwells. It is the 'referential space' associated with the ready-to-hand.

various aspects of the culture, as is reflected in the above quote. The reason should be clear enough by now; they are simply different aspects of the same structures. In view of this, underlying Heidegger's approach is the same basic understanding that he applies to world. There is a unity, in this case, the 'One' and this is determinative of the individual 'parts' of the 'One', in this case, each ontic Dasein. The basic structure of the 'One' must, therefore, be evident in each Dasein. The principles that are evident in both world and the 'One' are consistent with those identified in the earlier discussions concerning Heidegger's interpretation of the Greeks and the concept of nature as prevailing.

The implication of this is that Dasein can never come into being as an individual by itself, it requires a cultural group to bring it into being. To be clear, this is a structural claim about Dasein. If this is the case, then what research should find is that adult Daseins will reflect the environment into which they are born and raised. As such, by and large, children raised in dysfunctional families where they are subject to neglect and abuse *will* develop understandings of self and their world that reflects their upbringing. The comportments they exhibit towards things (concernful dealings) and towards others (solicitudinous behaviour) will be based on the understandings shaped by the initial environment. Under Heidegger's descriptive account of being Dasein, it is *the community* (the 'One') that is responsible for determining the outcome of child raising, *not the child*. Holding the child accountable for the understandings acquired as a result of being a structurally normal Dasein growing up in a detrimental environment is nonsense. It is then equally nonsense to hold the child solely accountable for the actions and behaviours that flow from that understanding. The conclusion then, is that if there is a perceived social issue with 'problematic behaviour', juvenile delinquency, youth gangs and so forth seek answers in the structure of the 'One' in which the young Daseins were raised and not in their 'psychology'. This is a radically different approach to that reflected in contemporary Australian culture. The 'One' is complex and is not uniform across a large society, and further work is necessary to identify the relationship between the 'One' and the child. As a rough indication, I would expect the aspects of the 'One' most relevant to a child to be found where the child's 'thick' intelligibility is acquired. I come back to this concept in Chapter 20 where I discuss some applications of Heidegger's work.

In the discussion of world there was then the notion of the larger public world that

when viewed from one aspect was a 'unity', but when viewed from other aspects reflected variability within the 'unity'. The same basic structure, however, is applicable across the unity and thus within its variability. This is the concept of prevailing discussed earlier. The same applies to the 'One'. Within Heidegger's account, based on his methods, we should then find generalised ontic observations that are applicable to the way of being of the 'One'; this is what we find. Throughout the chapter are scattered observations concerning the practices of the 'One' that related to establishing and maintaining conformity with the 'One'. The following is a list of such practices from the chapter [BT Ch IV]. I have provided examples to illustrate each practice as there are none supplied by Heidegger;

- Determining what is valid behaviour and what is not. (e.g. being openly gay vs heterosexual)¹⁹²
- Determines what constitutes success in the culture and what is to be denied success. (e.g. Achievements by sports people abound, readily identified, and lauded, those of the local church minister overlooked.)
- Determines priorities in terms of what can and must be undertaken (e.g. Funds must go to the military, and reduced in the area of arts and welfare).
- Keeps watch over anything exceptional that thrusts itself above the norm (e.g. Called the 'tall poppy' syndrome in Australia)
- Quickly absorbs and diminishes anything original, treating as common knowledge (e.g. Many decades of scientific effort finally confirmed the existence of gravitational waves in 2015. Within the larger community, it quickly becomes another science fact; 'gravitational waves exist'. There is little accompanying understanding of what gravitational waves are.)
- Everything gained by struggle quickly becomes something to be exploited and used (e.g. The internet has been rapidly absorbed into the culture and exploited by those whose actions could previously be controlled, e.g. purveyors of pornography, gambling, violence and destructive gossip.)
- Suppresses priorities not those of the group (e.g. Action to reduce global warming was not seen as a priority for many decades.)

It is easy to get a jaundiced view of culture from the above list or when Heidegger says such things as

... the real dictatorship of the "One" is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *One* take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *One* see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as *One* shrink back; we find 'shocking' what

¹⁹² The examples are mine not Heidegger's.

One find shocking. [BT 164/127] (translation modified) (my underlining)

Earlier Heidegger talks about the “dominion” [BT 167/129] of the ‘One’, and here it is the “dictatorship”. However, in amongst the chapter, he talks about such things as using “public means of transport” and “in making use of information services such as a newspaper” [BT 164/ 126] and earlier Heidegger calls the ‘One’ part of Dasein’s “*positive constitution*”. The section [BT §27] seems to be conflicted between recognising the structural necessity of the ‘One’ in determining Dasein, the benefits of the conformity for such things as transport against the consequences of the ‘dictatorship’ of the ‘One’. I don’t want to underplay the negative aspect of the ‘One’, and there are dramatic examples in history where the ‘One’ exhibits its dictatorial character. I include examples related to recent honour killings and the hanging of African Americans early last century in the following chapters. While I have used these examples to illustrate different aspects of Dasein, they are equally illustrations of the ‘dictatorship’ of the ‘One’.

While Heidegger acknowledges that the ‘One’ is what gives us our everyday possibilities of being [BT 164/126] he does not highlight in *Being and Time* that which gives us culture is the basis of being able to create, to build, to do science and so on. There is acknowledgement of this in a passage from Heidegger’s discussion on Hölderlin’s poem *The Ister*;

..... humans indeed dwell. In what they effect and in their works they are capable of a fullness. It is almost impossible to survey what humans achieve. The way in which they establish themselves upon this earth in using and exploiting and working it, in protecting it and securing it and furthering their "art," ... none of this reaches into the essential ground of their dwelling upon this earth. All this working and achieving, this building and cultivating is merely ... culture. Culture is always already only the consequence of a "dwelling" ... [HHI 137]

In this passage, he is identifying culture at the ontic level but emphasising that what is of importance is the ‘dwelling’. The lecture course on Hölderlin’s poem from which this passage was taken was given in the Summer of 1942, by which time Heidegger had shifted the way he was investigating being. This was as a result of what Heidegger called the ‘turn’ [MWP], which saw him leaving behind the constraints of philosophical metaphysics. The term ‘dwelling’ still relates to the dynamic structure of Dasein’s being-on-the-world. Unfortunately, however, perhaps because of the historical era in which he was writing *Being and Time*, the attention Heidegger places on the negative, without emphasis on crucial and cultural creating positives, leaves his analysis lacking and more than a little confused. This, however, does not

negate the thrust of his argument in terms of the role of culture.

Heidegger recognises that the 'One' creates a tension for Dasein in that while it is constitutive of Dasein, it also continues to 'pull' Dasein into conformity with itself in all aspects, and this 'pull' is also part of Dasein's structure. In a later chapter Heidegger associates, this with what he calls 'falling' [BT Ch 5]. When the 'One' exerts its full influence, it determines the being of the individual Dasein (i.e. at the ontic level) in virtually all respects. This is the dictatorial tendencies of the 'One'. However, Heidegger also recognises that Dasein has, also as part of its way of being, the potential to throw off the interpretations of how the world 'is', as determined by the 'One', and arrive at its own disclosures, both in terms of itself and world. Heidegger calls the taking up, in an unquestioning way, the understanding of being established by the 'One' as an "inauthentic" mode of being for Dasein, and where Dasein determines its own understandings an "authentic" mode of being. This, in turn, will be reflected in the way Dasein assigns itself to an 'in-order-to';

In understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an "in-order-to", and it has done so in terms of an ability-to-be for the sake of which it itself is--one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly, and which may be either authentic or inauthentic. [BT 119/86] (my underlining) (translation modified)

This does not mean that Dasein takes a stand that automatically rejects the understandings of the 'One', rather it means that Dasein exercises its own judgment. When this is done, Dasein is being 'authentic'. Nor does this mean that the Dasein acting in an 'authentic' way is doing so on the basis of a 'correct' understanding of being, this is made clear by Heidegger;

... authentic understanding, no less than that which is inauthentic, *can* be either genuine or not genuine. [BT 186/145]

This has a direct relevance to this thesis. Every time an aged care organisation, teaching organisation or a health professional simply takes over the understanding of being of Dasein from the culture it is acting in an inauthentic manner. This thesis is motivated by the observation that 'something is wrong' in the way aged care is conducted and further, that this 'something wrong' is grounded in a wrong understanding. To this extent, the thesis is an expression of an authentic mode of my being. The 'genuineness' of the findings of the thesis is a different issue. My claim is that at the very least it moves understanding to a 'more' genuine understanding of Dasein's being and that practices based on this understanding will thus result in less harm and better outcomes. The challenge for others is to consider

the findings compared to the account of the 'One' in a robust manner and derive their own understanding, and structure their 'assignments' accordingly. If this occurs, then they are acting 'authentically' from a Heideggerian perspective.

Consistent with his method, Heidegger develops a three-part structure based on his observations, and with it a technical language to describe the structure. The first aspect is the structure relating to the "everyday undifferentiated" character of the 'One', the cultural norms, which he calls "averageness" [BT 69/43]. This next aspect is the concern that is exhibited by the 'One' in variations by others from averageness, which he calls "distantiality" [BT 164/126] and finally there is the action to bring behaviours that are too far (i.e. too distant) from averageness back to averageness, Heidegger calls this "levelling down" [BT 165/127]. This three-part structure constitutes what Heidegger refers to as 'publicness';

Distantiality, averageness, and levelling down, as ways of being for the "One", constitute what we know as 'publicness'. Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted, and it is always right-not because there is some distinctive and primary relationship-of-being in which it is related to 'Things', or because it avails itself of some transparency on the part of Dasein which it has explicitly appropriated, but because it is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and thus never gets to the 'heart of the matter' [BT 165/127] (my underlining)

Publicness is part of our structural relationship with other Dasein and at the ontic level manifests as what could be termed 'group think'. In this mode of being the main focus is maintaining the averageness of 'group think' and it, for this reason, it is "insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness" in relation to understanding. The term "levelling down" is interesting in that Heidegger is suggesting that while the group will focus on bringing down those who stray outside the group norms in terms of improving themselves, including improving their understanding that the group will not, by and large 'level up' those who are below the group norm. Heidegger does not engage in an extensive discussion on the various aspects of 'publicness' and does not address the absence of 'levelling up'. There is more work to do on these phenomena from a Heideggerian perspective; however, it is not required for this thesis.

A simple example of the functioning of publicness was seen in the above example relating to the African children, where for these "children, life is one long frolic interspersed with a healthy sprinkle of spankings and slappings" (Diamond, 2012, p. 205). Road rules are another example. The specification of acceptable

behaviour, the speed past school crossings, etc., (averageness), monitoring by police (distantiality) and fines (levelling down). Other examples include organisational policies and procedures and even quality assurance programmes. The three aspects, setting the norm, monitoring variations from the norm, and corrective action to bring behaviour back to the norm are ubiquitous in all aspects of our life in both informal and regulated modes, it just that most of the time we do not notice it for what it is, e.g. when a mother corrects a young child's pronunciation of a word.

These are structurally part of who we are. To varying degrees, we have already been absorbed into the cultural norms as we grow up, and in order to continue as a functional member of the society, we must continue to conform to much of what our culture has determined. So, while there are negative aspects, it is the very basis of the average everydayness by which societies function. On a broad scale, there is only the world in which we live and to this extent, there is a sense in which the 'One' "is always right" [BT 165/128]. Again he is not saying the 'One' is right in terms of having a 'true' understanding of 'Things'. For example, ancient cultures that made human sacrifices to the gods to appease them did not necessarily have a 'true' understanding of nature, but in that the norms determine what is 'right' as characteristic of that culture, there is only one 'right way' for that culture to be the culture it is. Otherwise, it is a different culture! The issues concerning the 'One' changing the understanding of itself is another topic that is worth exploring from a Heideggerian perspective.

The question that this thesis is raising and addressing is whether the existing culture of aged care is founded on a 'genuine' understanding of what it is to be a person, or on unfounded presuppositions. If not so founded, and the aged care culture subsequently embraces change based on a new grounded understanding it does so by a change in its culture.

Research: The Cultural determination of Emotions

As part of Heidegger's description of the 'One', there is a strong claim that it even determines the character of our emotions. There is now a significant body of research supporting the view that many of our emotions are culturally determined. Cathy Lutz, an anthropologist, investigated the structure and meaning of emotions among the Ifaluk, who live on a tiny atoll in the Pacific (Lutz, 1982; Nuckolls, 1996). For the Ifaluk the most valued emotion is *fago* which appears to have elements of

love, compassion and sadness and relates to the emotion one feels towards a loved one in need and acts in a way that binds the people and promotes harmony. The Baining people of Papua New Guinea who live in the rugged and almost impenetrable highlands, experience *Awumbuk*, an oppressive heaviness when visitors depart. *Awumbuk* is understood as a heaviness shed by the visitors so that their travels are lighter. The experience may linger for up to three days with such intensity that the family is unable to tend to its normal tasks, tending crops, and so forth. The remedy is a simple ritual of placing a bowl of water near the door overnight and ceremonially throwing the water away. (Fajans, 1983; Smith, 2015) In *The Book of Human Emotions* (Smith, 2015), Smith provides many such examples of mood and emotions that appear to be shaped by culture and in turn influence behaviour. In summary, there is mounting support in the research literature in relations to this aspect of Heidegger's work.

Section 2: Dasein-With and Being-With

The more original part of Heidegger's analysis in this chapter of *Being and Time* is § 27 which describes what he calls the structure of *Dasein-with* of Others and everyday *being-with*. *Dasein-with* of others is how we see, i.e. understand the way of being, of the other in our dealings with them, while *being-with* is the basis on which we are relating to others.

In introducing the discussion on *Dasein-with/being-with* of others, Heidegger goes back to a description of the work world (i.e. the environment), this time from yet another perspective:

In our 'description' of that environment which is closest to us - the work-world of the craftsman, for example, the outcome was that along with the equipment to be found when one is at work, those Others for whom the 'work' is destined are 'encountered too'. If this is ready-to-hand, then there lies in the kind of being which belongs to it (that is, in its involvement) an essential assignment or reference to possible wearers, for instance, for whom it should be 'cut to the figure'. Similarly, when material is put to use, we encounter its producer or 'supplier' as one who 'serves' well or badly. When, for example, we walk along the edge of a field but 'outside it', the field shows itself as belonging to such-and-such a person, and decently kept up by him; the book we have used was bought at So-and-so's shop and given by such-and-such a person, and so forth. The boat anchored at the shore is assigned in its being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes voyages with it; but even if it is a 'boat which is strange to us', it still is indicative of Others. [BT153-4/118] (my underlining)

What he is doing here is indicating that in the various activities which we are typically

engaged we encounter other people. Previously Heidegger had referred to the 'for-sake-of-which' of Dasein, and so in one respect people were present in the previous discussion. However, here he sharpens the focus, we encounter other people from a particular perspective, as a customer, as a supplier and so on. Again, his examples are only indicative, and he could have expanded this even more. What Heidegger is indicating it that we tend to understand other Dasein in terms of what they do in the world, and then from the perspective of how we encounter them. Because of our understanding of world, other Dasein become intelligible to us in their various roles and thus available to us to interact with them, or in Heidegger's jargon, they become freed for us;

Dasein's world frees entities which not only are quite distinct from equipment and Things, but which also-in accordance with their kind of being as *Dasein* themselves are 'in' the world in which they are at the same time encountered within the-world, and are 'in' it by way of being-in-the-world. [BT 154/118]

Just as in the earlier work there are two levels of the analysis, the ontic and the ontological, the same approach is reflected here. Once we understand what an "owner of a farm" or supplier or customer, *is* in terms of those structural relationships (ontological), we can apply the concept to individual Daseins (ontic). From this perspective, the world is not described from the perspective of involvements with entities ready-to-hand but rather as the relationships between Daseins; it is a *with-world* [BT 155/118]. Being-in which is the mode of projected understanding of equipment becomes *being-with*, the mode of projected understanding of the social interconnections that form the with-world, and the specific way that a Dasein is encountered is as *Dasein-with*. [BT 155/118] This, of course, is not describing two different worlds, it is one world from two different perspectives.

Individual Daseins will have many possible ways of Dasein-with for example, a parent, life partner, soccer coach, music lover, bookkeeper, car driver, shopper, scientist, Internet user, movie go, homeowner, reader, nurse, 'exerciser' (e.g. walking for fitness), dog owner, football club member, restaurant diner, radio listener, and so on. By way of example, while Person A may have a number of modes of 'Dasein-with', other people will typically encounter Person A in just one or two of these modes. Our understanding of others is thus typically deficient, and we never really know the 'whole' person. This point will be of critical importance later in the chapter when the encounter of the older person with the nursing home is discussed. We tend to know when we are not understood, and this is reflected in

Regina's cries reported in the introduction; "They don't know the meaning of me! They don't know the meaning of me." (Heliker & Scholler-Jaquish, 2006, p. 38)¹⁹³

Shifting the focus back to Dasein, from the perspective of the analysis that Heidegger is undertaking a Dasein can only properly understand who they are,

only when it *looks away* from 'Experiences' and the 'centre of its actions' [BT 155/119]

This is because,

Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in *what* it does, uses, expects, avoids -- in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally *concerned*. [BT 155/119]

To understand this passage, we need to recall the discussion in Chapter 12 of the thesis concerning the two meanings of experience. He is not interested in "inner experiences" that are the focus of Husserl's research, nor is he interested in the location of some inner self, a "centre of action" that is responsible for what we do. This is the Cartesian perspective that Heidegger is seeking to overthrow and is a position for which Heidegger claims there is no phenomenal evidence[BPP]. For Heidegger, we find our self in the expressed comportments that constitute our existence. While we may often identify particular "felt experiences" we rarely have an understanding of what motivates us, what drives us to do the things we do, as Heidegger notes we do "not ... 'see' them at all" [BT 115/119]. All these things are, nonetheless, part of the structure of our individual Dasein and it is out of all of these, not just the 'felt' experiences, that what we do, use, expect, avoid and so on emerges.

This approach is reflective of the approach by Peirce that all that is required to understand something is to know all the modes of behaviour that have 'practical bearing'. Heidegger's claim concerning Dasein is the same. He is not concerned with how we scratch our self, that has little 'practical bearing', but if we pay attention to our various ways of being-in-the-world, we will 'find' our self. For Heidegger, the starting point for any Dasein to understand itself is thus to observe its actions and non-actions in the world. This approach follows on from the previous chapter, and the discussion that Dasein assigns itself to an in-order-to is based on its understanding of self. This assigning was not, however, necessarily explicit to

¹⁹³ Regina, an 85-year-old woman with expressive aphasia, tried hard to describe what it was like for her to be at the facility. She cried out, "They don't know the meaning of me! They don't know the meaning of me." Her comments reflect being unknown in an unfamiliar new neighbourhood. (Heliker & Scholler-Jaquish, 2006, p. 38)

Dasein. By focusing on the 'in-order-tos' to which we have assigned our self, we can work backwards to interpret that understanding of self that accounts for these assignments, or lack of assignments, i.e. find out who we are. This points to an important aspect of interpreting Heidegger's work. His Dasein analysis is a description of a unified phenomenon and is undertaken from different perspectives, and this indicates a way of 'testing' one's interpretation of different sections. If an interpretation of one perspective of the phenomenon 'fits' with an interpretation of another perspective, then it is an indication that it may be fair interpretation. If the interpretations conflict it is an indication that there is, perhaps, more work to do.

Reciprocal Relationships

The structure of the with-world has reciprocal relationships just as the structure of the unity of equipment has reciprocal relationships associated with serviceability – usability. When we go to a restaurant, we encounter the Dasein-with of others as other diners, waiters, chefs and so on. We see these reciprocal relationships more clearly when we think of such pairings as doctor-patient, teacher-student, mother-child, police officer-wrongdoer, entertainer-audience, shopkeeper-customer and so on and on. There is no need to go into detail as to how this constitutes the with-world as it is essentially the same line of argument as is applied to the constituting the world in terms of the unity of equipment. The nature of the reciprocal relationship is such that in the structure of being-with has the character of "being-with towards Others". [BT 163/125]

Heidegger's terminology of our relationship with others is similar to that of our relationship towards the ready-to-hand, albeit this is not noticeable in English. Whereas Heidegger calls the various ways in which we can interact with equipment concern(*Besorgen*), the name for the various ways in which we can interact with people he calls solicitude(*Fürsorge*) [BT 159/121]. The relationship between the terms is evident in the German suffixes. The German word *Sorge* means care, which is Heidegger's name for the being of Dasein, and the being of Dasein is reflected in its ways of being towards the ready-to-hand (*Besorgen*) and towards other Dasein (*Fürsorge*). Understood in this way Heidegger's device of linking concepts at the grammatical level by his choice of words becomes more readily evident. The same device is also evident in Heidegger's careful choice of the word Dasein, the meaning of which has already been discussed.

Another similarity that we need to bring across from this previous discussion is the

way people show up for us. For the most part, we will see people as people and not as objects present-at-hand. This is true even though we have little knowledge of the majority of people whom we pass-by and in whom we have no interest. Heidegger calls this a deficient or indifferent mode “that characterize everyday, average being-with-one-another” [BT 158/121]. When we have specific encounters with people this changes. Even if we do not know somebody personally, when we enter a shop we will look around to identify the shop assistant and will then approach them on this basis. On occasions, our projecting/understanding of a particular person as a shop assistant may be wrong, causing a little embarrassment. I recall approaching a person in a department store dressed and groomed similarly to the way the staff of the store typically presented. When I asked for assistance, he politely responded that he will if possible, but he doesn’t work in the store! On another occasion when walking down the street with my son, all I saw was a bunch of other people, he, however, saw his “teacher”. This reflected the ‘Dasein-with’ relationship that existed between student and teacher.

In the earlier discussions, Heidegger talks about, the prior disclosure of world, subsequent discovery of the ready-to-hand and the progressive nature of understanding that frees the entity for our involvement. These same elements are present in the structures of Dasein-with and being-with. Heidegger does not go into any detail in relation to these aspects; I presume because it is self-evident and repetitive. There are however subtle differences. The main one is that whereas a ready-to-hand entity will typically have one meaning in a culture, this is not the case with Dasein. Dasein may have multiple meanings reflected in the various modes of ‘Dasein-with’ and while this aspect has been touched upon, I want to present a case study by way of illustrative example.


Jesse & Frank James (ontic) example¹⁹⁴

Other people show up for us on the basis of our understanding of their Dasein-with based on our understanding of the with-world. We do not encounter the person based on understanding the rich complexity of the various modes of the Dasein-with of the person. For example, Person A is perceived to have done the wrong thing to Person B, with serious consequences. From that time on A is understood in a ‘dark

¹⁹⁴ This account is compiled from a range of sources and what is presented is generally consistent with the historical facts as known. My intent, however, is not to present an historically accurate account but rather a plausible set of circumstances so as to illustrate the flexibility of Dasein-with.

light' by B and perhaps others, notwithstanding it may have been an aberrant event or A has subsequently changed. There are many other aspects to Person A (Dasein-with ways of being) to take into consideration before forming a judgment on 'all of' A, but this rarely happens. There are others who may hold Person A in high regard for various reasons, either with or without the knowledge of A's involvement with B. A striking real-life example of the phenomenon of Dasein-with and being-with is the story of Jesse James and his brother Frank James.

Jesse James (1847-1882) and his brother Frank James (1843-1915) were notorious outlaws operating for a brief period mainly in the West Missouri, Kentucky region following the Civil War. The James Brothers were ex-Confederate 'guerrillas' who



rode with the notorious Quantrill raiders, a unit of Confederate soldiers who were responsible, as were similar units on the Union side, for brutal raids and massacres of opposing forces and civilians. After the war the James' gang, led by Jesse, committed a number of bank and train robberies until Jesse was shot in the back, while unarmed, by a recently joined gang member, Robert Ford (1861-1892); allegedly after the reward money. Frank ceased his outlaw ways and lived a law-abiding life until his death at the age of 72.

The James Brothers eluded capture for so long with the help provided by ex-Confederate soldiers and people in the 'South' still sympathetic to the idea of secession. A 'Robin Hood' forced to a life of crime by the occupying oppressors was the image developed around Jesse James thanks, in the main, to the newspaper editor John Edwards, the founder of the Kansas City Times, former Confederate Cavalry Officer and a secessionist. At one stage, the local legislature even restricted the amount of the Government reward offered for Jesse James, and

the railways had to subsidise it.

In 1876 Jesse and Frank James settled down in Nashville, Tennessee with their families (both were married, Jesse had two children, Jesse jnr and Mary) under the names of Thomas Howard and Ben Woodson respectively. Frank took up farming, and Jesse is reported to have successfully raced horses and become a Methodist Sunday School teacher. Both lived a life as a respectable citizen and were acquainted with a number of the town's leading citizens including magistrates and a law officer, all of whom were oblivious to their backgrounds. This ended in early 1881 when a former gang member who did some occasional work for them on the farms had too much to drink, talked about the past and was arrested. Taking no chances, the James brothers left town. Frank went on to a law-abiding life, tried for some of his crimes, but never convicted. He died at the age of 72 in 1915. Jesse started a new gang and two years later, in 1882, was murdered, shot in the back, by Robert Ford, aged 34.

In considering this account, we can ask, "Who is Jesse James?" When viewed from the perspective of encounters of the Dasein-with of others, he is a brutal murder, a thief, a hero, a father, a Sunday School teacher, respectable citizen and so on. For ex-Confederate supporters, the knowledge of his robberies, etc. makes little difference, whereas for the Sunday School the understanding of his past may thrust him into a new light. Frank moved on to various jobs, and his past eventually became more something of a novelty, a curiosity. The way in which the James brothers show up is determined by the nature of the understanding of the Dasein-with relationships, which in turn, prescribes the appropriate responses to them, i.e. ways of being-with.

The Sight by Which People Show up For Us: Considerateness & Forbearance

As we move about our world what enables things to show up for us as the entities they are (ready-to-hand) such that we can have concerned dealings is circumspection. This is how Heidegger relates this structure to people;

Just as circumspection belongs to concern as a way of discovering what is ready-to-hand, solicitude is guided by *considerateness* and *forbearance*. Like solicitude, these can range through their respective deficient and Indifferent modes up to the point of *inconsiderateness* or the perfunctoriness. [BT 159/126]

Rather than just one mode of 'seeing' in relation to Dasein-with Heidegger

introduces two, considerateness (*Rücksicht*¹⁹⁵) and forbearance (*Nachsicht*). We need to recall the earlier discussion concerning the two aspects of the phenomenon of circumspection (*Umsicht*), the sight which presents the ready-to-hand to us on the basis of their involvements. Considerateness and forbearance refers to the sight that 'sees' Dasein on the basis of a certain being-with (equivalent to involvement) with the context of Dasein-with (equivalent to the structure) Accordingly, a Person A may show up completely differently for two other people because of a difference in the 'sight' with which they see A.


The German word *Rücksicht* (considerateness) has the sense of respect or regard, whereas *Nachsicht* (forbearance) a sense of allowance or leniency. It is not clear why Heidegger splits this concept into two, and he offers no clear examples to illustrate the difference nor any elaboration. Following on from the earlier discussion it may be that considerateness relates to people with whom we are familiar in terms of one or more Dasein-with aspects whereas forbearance relates to people for whom we have no clear understanding of their Dasein-with, i.e. a deficient mode. If this is the case the considerateness should not be heard solely in a positive light but refers to the various ways in which we may understand a Dasein-with; the James case study is an example of this.

Just as circumspection relates to the ready-to-hand, considerateness and forbearance are related to ways in which we can deal with Dasein. As such, the deficient and indifferent mode seems to indicate that while we see people as people, nothing shows up for us in any definite way concerning a being-with, or a comportment with them. This does not mean an absence of comportment, for we may move out of the way, pick up a dropped item for another and so on. The comportments are only of a trivial nature and not reflective of a specific Dasein-with understanding that in turn would inform a specified set of being-with behaviours associated with that understanding. The similarities in the structures of concern and solicitude are mapped out in Figure 16.

Just as our comportments with equipment first require that we understand the entity as what it is and then develop the know how to let it be involved, there is a similar structure in terms of dealing with Dasein-with. Just as the nature of the entity as

¹⁹⁵ The German *sicht* means sight, and the connections between the words as different modes of 'sight' is easier to observe in the German.

the entity it is, is determined by the relational network which in turn is determined by the nature of involvements so to the Dasein-with. We can, for example, have a certain understanding of what a Sumo wrestler *is* even if we do not live in Japan, but to fully comprehend the nature of Sumo we would have to know-how it fits into the culture and we would certainly not be able to be a Sumo wrestler in Australia, where there is not the referential context (with-world) to support the Dasein-with of a Sumo wrestler. Put another way, the Dasein-with of Sumo has not been fully freed



for us.

Not only is a particular Dasein-with, determined by its place in a with-world, that with-world also determines what the range of the appropriate behaviour (concernful solicitude) is towards particular Dasein-with. This is what is discussed in the first part of this section concerning the 'One'. We can see this in relation to the James example where the range of behaviour towards Frank is, by and large, determined by his Dasein-with. Frank James, born and raised in Missouri, surrendered himself to the Governor of Missouri, a State in which he was considered a 'war hero' by many. Frank had a 'show' trial during which he faced only a few charges. A character reference was provided by a former Confederate General, support was given by the local media and Frank was found not guilty. The Missouri State also refused to allow him to be extradited to other jurisdictions. It was how the Dasein-with of Frank James was understood by those in Missouri that resulted in this outcome. Had he

been captured in another State, then his Dasein-with understood in terms of robbery and murder would have resulted in the appropriate response from that perspective and he would have been tried, and no doubt found guilty and executed. The way in which Frank was 'seen' by the residents of the various States was different, and the 'sight' which is the basis on which Frank was 'seen' sight [considerateness] also 'showed' the possible ways in which it was appropriate to deal [solicitude] with Frank.

Nursing-homes

Within the world of a nursing home, the ways of dealing with older people living in the home will be determined by the understanding of the Dasein-with of the older people by those delivering care. The way in which older people are 'seen' will be based on 'considerateness'.

Regardless of the debates around the appropriate name to call the older people in nursing homes, e.g. patients, residents, consumers or care recipients, and I have heard all these terms used, as well as a host of others, it is the understanding of the Dasein-with that will determine how the sight of considerateness shows the older person to the care workers. A change of name may be motivated by the right intent, but unless the structure of involvements of the with-world of the nursing home is changed, there will be little impact from a name change.

If the Dasein-with of the older person is framed, even if tacitly, primarily as a 'frail-sick' old person in need of care and support then the nature of the concerned solicitude will be shaped by this understanding; as will the majority of the practices. This narrow framing of the older person on this basis places in front of itself a monocular vision that only allows the Dasein-with of the older person to be seen in one light, a person in need of care and support. It actively precludes seeing, for example Marion Miller, in the richness of her variety of Dasein-with modes. In turn, this means that the Dasein-with understanding of the nursing home can be framed such that its modes of being-with in terms of the provision of care can include, at the same time, ways of being that improve the efficiency of service delivery, e.g. reducing costs by streamlining services, using low-cost labour, cutting out activity in other 'non-related' areas. All this activity is consistent with a narrow understanding of the older person and the role of the nursing home that established the Dasein-with reciprocal relationship. While there is generally either individual or collective ability present on both sides of a reciprocal relationship to re-structure the modes of

being-with or even re-frame the Dasein-with, this is not the case in nursing homes. Nursing homes as currently determined have the support of the Government, the medical professions and the common understanding of the culture. There are virtually no alternatives for older people who because of their frailty, require a degree of nursing and personal care to get on with their life. As Marion Miller found, the ability to have 'a life' in a nursing home is virtually impossible and had she realised this she would never have moved in, preferring an alternative course of action; most probably ending her own life on her terms.

A nurse or a personal carer may have a different understanding of the person's Dasein-with and wants to interact with them on this basis, i.e. take more time with them, understand the nature of their other modes of Dasein-with, encourage people to be involved in activities based on their interests and so on. However, this approach is out of kilter with the culture and does not reflect 'efficient' care delivery and either the person will be brought into line ('levelled-down'), struggle or torn between compliance and understanding or leave. I have experienced and observed the actions of 'levelling-down' within both public company and non-profit owned nursing homes; it is not uncommon. In these instances, the organisations had structured their relationships with the older person based on the very narrow understanding of the Dasein-with of the person as 'in need of care' and was convinced it was delivering quality care in an economically efficient manner and had an explicit view that it was 'right'.

If then the structure of the nursing home is determined by the Dasein-with understanding of the operators of the nursing home then change will only come about with a change in that understanding. This, in turn, is tied to the broader understanding of the being of Dasein, such that Dasein is understood as having other important modes of Dasein-with.

***Leaping In and Leaping Ahead*¹⁹⁶**

The section on the concepts of 'leaping in' (*einspringen*) and 'leaping ahead' (*vorausspringt*) [BT 158/122] is brief and not well explored in *Being and Time*, and I

¹⁹⁶ The German word translated for 'leap in' is *einspringen*. In the translators' note #1 (BT 158) the comment suggests that in common usage this may be interpreted as 'intervene for him', 'stand in for him' or serve as deputy for him'. To this we could add 'to take somebody's place', 'to substitute for somebody' and so on. For the German word *vorausspringt* there is no common usage, it is Heideggerian neologism. Literally translated it means to leap/jump/spring forward. The translators note that to retain the German etymological connection they have translated *einspringen* the way they have.

have found little in any of Heidegger's other writings to clarify what he means. It is almost as if it is a throw-in titbit, a tasty morsel, to show how his work can be applicable, but we will never know. The basic intent, however, is clear enough and it has relevance to this thesis. This is how he introduces the concept;

Everyday being-with-one-another maintains itself between the two extremes of positive solicitude-that which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps forth and liberates. It brings numerous mixed forms to maturity; to describe these and classify them would take us beyond the limits of this investigation. [BT 159/122]

'Leaping in' is a mode of solitude that can "take away 'care' from the Other". [BT 158/122], i.e. take away their being. Heidegger does not introduce the meaning of the technical term 'care' until Chapter 6 but it is the name given to Dasein's mode of being. 'Leaping in', then, is to take over another person's life for them such that the

Other is thus thrown out of his own position. [BT 15/122].

As would not be unexpected if we take over from another those things which they should be dealing with for themselves, from the small and seemingly insignificant to the more significant, then they

can become one who is dominated and dependant, even if the domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him. [BT 158/122].

An example of this phenomenon has entered the common parlance such that there is an Oxford Dictionary entry for it: Institutionalized. The entry in the dictionary states that it refers to a person "adversely affected, especially made apathetic or dependent by prolonged institutional confinement."

Heidegger's comments in relation to 'leaping' in makes sense when we consider his descriptions of Dasein. Dasein's mode of being is existence, which are the lived experiences associated with comportments, those concerned dealings, with the things in the world, as part of letting them be involved in the various things we have assigned ourselves to, i.e. the things that matter to us. Our life then is in the doing of those things that are of concern to us. If somebody 'leaps in' and does things for us, they are literally taking our life away. Understanding 'leaping in' is thus crucial for any organization which is involved in 'caring for' others to ensure that they do not unduly infringe upon or dominate the very lives for which they are caring. This, of course, requires a profound understanding of what it is to be a person, the way of being of Dasein.

The idea of 'leaping ahead' is, as Heidegger suggests, the opposite to 'leaping in'. It is a mode of solicitude that moves to assist gain an authentic understanding of themselves. In this mode, we are assisting the other,

... not in order to take away his 'care' but rather to give it back to him ... This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care - that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a "*what*" with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and to become *free for* it. [BT 159/122]

The extreme mode of 'leaping ahead' is to help the person understand who they are in themselves so that they can become free for their own existence in an authentic way, rather than simply taking up the understanding of the 'One'.

As Heidegger mentions, these are the two extremes and clearly how one supports another depends on the circumstances. The implication however is pretty clear we should not just rush into 'leaping in' on the basis that it is more convenient for us, if we want to participate in "authentic care" our interventions must be measured at all times avoiding unnecessary 'leaping in' and acting in such a way that is more towards the 'leaping ahead' end of the spectrum. This is only possible if Dasein is understood, even if unthematically, as being-in-the-world.

This is virtually as close as Heidegger comes to making statements that can be interpreted on an ethical or moral basis. To take away the opportunities of a person to participate in the range of lived experiences, small to large, associated with their existence, is to take that very existence, the very life, from the person. It is a domination and is dependency creating. Heidegger's language indicates his position on this matter.

To be sure there are circumstances in which 'leaping-in' may be necessary, and in the discussion chapter, I explore the concept of the somatological contract that is entered into when a person requires hospital care. This contract gives permission, for a short duration, for 'leaping in' in order to 'fix the body', in return for the prospects of a return to one's life. However, the point I make in the discussion is the somatological contract entered into in relation to the modern nursing home, based on the hospital model, is fundamentally flawed.

Case Example: Power of Publicness to Impede Scientific Revolutions

The being of the 'One', publicness is a powerful structure that establishes and maintains with-worlds. All three descriptors I have covered in the discussion apply

to Thomas Kuhn's account of paradigms or the disciplinary matrix and are the basis, in my view of why scientific revolutions are so difficult. (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012) I do not want to go over this but do want to draw attention to one comment by Kuhn,

Though a generation is sometimes required to effect the change, scientific communities have again and again been converted to new paradigms. Furthermore, these conversions occur not despite the fact that scientists are human but because they are. Though some scientists, particularly the older and more experienced ones, may resist indefinitely, most of them can be reached in one way or another. Conversions will occur a few at a time until, after the last holdouts have died, the whole profession will again be practicing under a single, but now a different, paradigm. (p. 152)

An example of the difficulty in bringing about change, even in highly educated and professional areas occurred in relation to the treatment of peptic ulcers late in the twentieth century. The accepted genesis of the ulcers was a combination of stress and diet, i.e. lifestyle. It was believed that this led to an increase in the acidity of the stomach which attacked the lining of the stomach resulting in the ulcers, which could be life-threatening.

The accepted practice was to treat peptic ulcers with a range of interventions generally involving a radical change in a patient's lifestyle plus medications and in more chronic cases surgical interventions. In the mid-1980s Robin Warren and Barry Marshall discovered that rather than lifestyle causes, the bacterium *Helicobacter pylori* (*H.pylori*) was the 'cause' of most peptic ulcers and could be effectively treated (Marshall, 2002; Robin Warren & Marshall, 1983; Tan & Wong, 2011), a discovery for which they received the Nobel Prize in 2005.

The treatment for *H.pylori* related ulcers is now a course of antibiotics, and it has since been discovered that the reduction in stomach acid associated with previous treatments made the environment less amenable to *H. pylori*, reducing the aggravation. Notwithstanding that the treatment developed by Warren and Marshall was 'scientifically' supported in a relatively short time it took the medical specialists involved in treating the ulcers nearly two decades to fully accept the new approach and implement it. (Malfertheiner et al., 2002, 2007; Marshall, 2002)

The with-world of the specialists made it difficult to understand the Dasein-with of being a specialist within another structure. An acceptance of the 'discovery' would have entailed a change in understanding of 'ulcers', a change in understanding of treatments and a change in understanding of the being-with relationship with

patients. All this could only take place with a re-assignment to a 'different world. This proved extremely difficult. Exploring case studies such as this from a Heideggerian perspective may provide important insights concerning the implementation of significant changes in health care the fundamental change understandings.

Summary

The chapter commenced with a discussion of the phenomenon of the 'One' understood both as an ontological structure of Dasein and as the basis for culture. As part of the this the phenomenon of being born and raised in a culture was brought into view. The main aspects associated with the structure, the with-world, Dasein-with, being-with and the 'One' with its structure of publicness were then presented and discussed. It provides an understanding of the multi-faceted aspects of Dasein in terms of its rich mixture of modes of Dasein-with and how each of these makes sense and is sustainable only in the context of the particular with-world that sustains it.

Based on the discussion, the issue was raised that if nursing homes understand the Dasein-with of older people in the very narrow framing of 'sick, frail older people in need of nursing and personal care' then this establishes the nature of the reciprocal relationship. The nursing home then understands itself (Dasein-with) as the supplier of that care to the older person. This is the same basic structure that applies to the-ready-to-hand that establishes the in-order-to structure on the basis of serviceability-usability.

Once the relationship of

Older person as Dasein-with (in need of care) \leftrightarrow Nursing home as Dasein-with (provider of care)

is established then the character of the being-with (the ways of solicitude) between the two parts is defined.

The mode of being-with as determined by the reciprocal relationship of Dasein-with results in the removal of any non-essential ways of being of the nursing home as part of efficient care delivery. Because of the residential nature of nursing homes and the 'efficient' care delivery environment, the with-world of the older person in the nursing home has been effectively eviscerated of meaningful opportunities to

engage in activities reflecting their multiple modes of Dasein-with. Marion Miller is the example case for this evisceration of a living environment. In addition, based on my experience the nature of the care delivery services within nursing homes is characterised by 'leaping-in' and not 'leaping ahead', and this will have the mode of service delivery bring with it the negative consequences associated with institutionalisation.

In the next chapter, I address the way in which Dasein is in the world, which Heidegger identifies as being-in on the basis of receptiveness and understanding.

CHAPTER 17: BEING-IN: RECEPTIVITY AND UNDERSTANDING

Introduction

Chapter V of *Being and Time* finalises the substantive part of Heidegger's Dasein analytic, i.e. describing the structure of being-in-the-world. In the chapter, titled *Being-in as Such*, Heidegger returns to explore the phenomena of being-in, or the constitution of the 'there', in greater detail. The primary aim of the chapter is to describe what holds the 'there' open for us. To put it another way, to describe the basis on which things show up as mattering to us and in so doing provide opportunities for the things we do as part of our life, what Heidegger often calls our dealings.

He approaches the analysis in stages the first being to describe the constitution of the 'there' in terms of its three basic structural aspects (existentialia), receptivity, understanding and discourse. He illustrates receptivity using fear and then develops the concepts of interpretation and assertion as derivative of understanding. The second part is an enquiry into the structure of the everyday being of the 'there' discussing the phenomena of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity and their relationship to the phenomena of falling. Falling is the phenomenon previously described in the thesis as the 'pull' of the world and is associated with the structure of the 'One'.

The relationships between the different phenomena Heidegger is describing is not easily discernible and Figure 17 sets out the structure of the chapter and the relationship between the phenomena discussed. The chapter is the longest in *Being and Time* and comprises over sixty pages of dense description and logical analysis. Consistent with other chapters, the English translation, Heidegger's language and his naming conventions contribute to the challenge of understanding what he is describing.

This thesis chapter does not attempt a detailed explication of Heidegger's full account of *Being-In*. The guiding principle has been to identify and present those aspects that are essential for understanding the meaning of 'shedding life' and the

conditions that make it possible. Accordingly, the emphasis is on the structural aspects of understanding and receptivity and only a brief account of discourse. This chapter is divided into three sections, one for each of the three aspects of the




Figure 17 Structure of *Being and Time* Chapter 5

structure. Each section comprises two parts, the first describes the phenomenon, and the second provides illustrative examples. The first section introduces the first significant discussion on receptivity, the aspects of Dasein dealing with such things as mood, emotions, motivation and so on. This section is the most challenging as it addresses Heidegger's claim that understanding is inextricably linked to receptivity. While oversimplified, Heidegger's claim is that if things do not, in some way, matter to us then we do not have access to them. More time is spent in this section exploring Heidegger's language than in any other in the thesis, and this is directly related to the challenge associated with the character of the phenomena discussed. It is in this section that the structure of falling is also discussed.

The concept of understanding has already had a presence in the thesis via its incorporation into the formal indication of being and projection. The section on understanding adds clarity to the way Heidegger conceptualises the concept as a structural aspect of Dasein. What comes as a surprise in the chapter is the association between understanding and the being-possible of Dasein and this phenomenon becomes central to understanding the structural basis of 'shedding

life'. The section also sees Heidegger introduce the last of his ways of describing world, this time as the unity-of-meaning. As part of this discussion, Heidegger's concepts of meaning and interpretation are introduced and discussed. The section on discourse briefly discusses the structure and introduces the connection between meaning, discourse and language. The phenomenon of idle talk is discussed both as an essential mode of being associated with 'thin intelligibility' but also how it is the basis by which cultures can acquire a groundless intelligibility about things.

In the descriptions of all three aspects of the structure in this chapter, it can be difficult to follow the discussion, primarily because Heidegger does not move carefully and slowly from the ontic to the bare structure. In part, this is because the 'there' lies behind the compartments of daily life, but primarily it is due to Heidegger's approach. There isn't the same careful identification of ontic observations and then the slow process of identifying and classifying structures as is evident in the chapter on worldhood. The dense language and his shifting from one level of analysis to another, often within the same paragraph, makes following his work even harder. There are three levels of analysis for each structure, the same, as for world, and for some aspects of the structure, all three levels have the same name while for others the ontic name is different. The three levels of analysis are the bare ontological structure that is applicable to all Daseins, the ontological structure as 'filled in' for an individual Dasein and then the ontic expression arising from a particular Dasein's structure. I will make reference to this structure in each section.

As discussed in Chapter 12, one of the interpretive approaches of this thesis is that Heidegger's work in *Being and Time* is informed by the prior scholarship of Brentano and Husserl on intentionality. While the term is virtually absent from *Being and Time* and there is no hint of it in the chapter on *Being-In*, in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger describes the structure of the 'there' as a "more radical interpretation of intentionality" [BPP 161]. Having this understanding is useful and before commencing the discussion on the structural aspects of the 'there', the concept of intentionality is revisited, this time incorporating the framework from *Being and Time*.

Intentionality Revisited

As discussed in earlier chapters Heidegger transformed the initial conception of intentionality to the structure of compartments. In *Being and Time* the concept of

comportment is not as evident as Heidegger introduces two sub-classifications of comportments, concern and solicitude, and the general description of 'dealings'. It is from the basis of our 'concernful dealings' that he initially identifies and describes the structure of world and worldhood. The discussion progressed through descriptions of the unity of equipment, to the unity or the in-order-to-structure, to the unity of involvements and the connection between involvements and the for-the-sake-of-which of Dasein. Neither in *Being and Time* nor in the thesis discussion was this structure expressly related to the structure of intentionality. Based on these earlier discussions, the structure of intentionality is set out in Figure 18.




Figure 18 Intentional structure of lived experience

The structure is a unified phenomenon comprising two aspects, the mode of directedness, that is termed 'dealing behaviour' in the diagram and the understanding of the entity. The 'dealing behaviour' is to be understood very broadly and covers every way we can relate to an entity,

The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining, ... [BT 83/56]

Furthermore, these dealing behaviours have deficient and detrimental modes [BT 83/56]. The basis of understanding ready-to-hand entities was the subject of Chapters 14 and 15 on world and worldhood. Understanding as know-how is required to free the ready-to-hand for our dealing with them, and the type of know-how varies depending on the nature of the entity and dealing behaviour, e.g. the know-how to design a house is different to living in a house. Once freed, ready-to-hand entities are not understood as something categorial but on the basis our possible dealings (comportments) with them, which in turn is based on the unity of involvements. When we engage with something, there is an in-order-to structure that leads towards the final 'towards-which' which is a purpose of Dasein (*Umwillen*), e.g. providing shelter from bad weather. Dasein assigns itself to the in-order-to structure necessary to achieve what it wants as part of its understanding of its own being (self) (*Worum-willen*). Figure 18 provides a schematic presentation of the basic structure associated with Dasein's dealings with the ready-to-hand and how it connects to its understanding of being. The concepts of world and projection could be added, but this would make the Figure too confusing.

At the ontic level, our lived experiences are expressed comportments, i.e. they are dynamic. The conclusion is that if there are no expressed comportments, there are no lived experiences. In that, the "the unity of the understanding of being and the comportment towards entities" "belongs to the Dasein's existence" [BPP 319] the schematic can be taken as a depiction of Dasein's existence. In other words, Dasein's existence, as expressed comportments within the world has a basic intentional structure. However, this occurs within the 'there' and as such the structure is incomplete.

Recalling the discussion Brentano's depiction of intentionality, it was, roughly speaking, depicted as the way in which the mind is directed towards objects. The

directing of the mind was always guided by various mental phenomena, e.g.

In presentation, something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (Brentano, 1995, p. 68)


Brentano went on to classify three main classes of mental phenomena which he called presentations, judgements and the third by either emotion, love or interest (Brentano, 1995, p. 152). While Husserl develops and refines the concept of intentionality, this basic concept of a directedness remained.

While Heidegger's concepts of concern and solicitude are clearly within this broad depiction of intentionality what they contain are only behavioural responses, dealings, concerning the entities. What is missing from Heidegger's characterisations of concern and solicitude are the emotional aspects. The aspects associated with judgments are split out and incorporated as part of the structure understanding as something necessarily prior to a comportment, this has already been dealt with. In Chapter V of *Being and Time*, the aspects of 'emotions' are introduced, but not as in the work of Brentano and Husserl, i.e. as part of the structure of an intentional comportment, but as part of an even more basic intentional structure, which precedes the comportments he calls 'dealings'. For Heidegger, we are first receptive to things in the world showing up as frightening, desirable, curious, lovable, shameful, friendly, vulnerable, soft, loud, hot, and so on and then it is the mode of receptivity that determines the character of response. The mode of receptivity is how something shows up as mattering to us, and by and large, the 'One' has a significant role in shaping how things matter. Implicit in something mattering to us is that it has the possibility of becoming an entity with which we may have dealings. A holiday may show up as 'desirable', and we may then dream about the holiday, even though the holiday may never eventuate. The mode of 'mattering' is indicated by being 'desirable'.

However, as an intentional structure, these various modes do not stand alone and have an understanding of the entity with which it is associated. For example, a frightening dog, a huggable child, an evil outlaw, a heavy hammer, a hot stove, urgent work, and so on. The adjectives are not to be understood in these cases as attributes of the entity they are modes of receptivity. For example, of Jesse James shows up for us an 'evil outlaw' then implicit in this is the appropriate response to 'evil'. Similarly, when a loose screw shows up as in need of tightening 'loose' is not a predicate of the screw, it is a mode of receptivity that indicates a response because


'loose screw' matters to us. We can of course neglect the screw, and this then becomes a deficient mode of dealing as earlier discussed.

Receptivity is then a form of directedness, but, it is a directedness towards Dasein and opens up the possibility of a response (dealing) from Dasein to the entity. This bi-directional and sequential character of the structure of intentionality is presented in Figure 19.



However, the structure of receptivity is a little more complicated. For example, we don't just see a frightening dog, we experience fear, and it is the fear that then accompanies the comportments. The phenomenon that results in us feeling fear in response to something fearful Heidegger calls attunement. Thus, in the face of the fearful dog, we feel fear for our wellbeing, this is something that matters to us. In response to this we have a number of options, run away, cross the road and so on. A full description of this is given by Heidegger in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, the numbering relates to Figure 20.

I can comport toward entities only if those entities can themselves be encountered in the brightness of the understanding of being. This is the necessary condition. In terms of fundamental ontology it can also be expressed by saying that all understanding is essentially related to a receptiveness [1] which belongs to understanding itself. To be affectively-attuned is the formal structure of what we call mood, passion, affect,[2] and the like, which are constitutive for all comportment toward entities,[3] although they do not by themselves alone make such comportment possible but always only in one with understanding, which gives its light to each mood, each passion, each affect. [BPP 281] (translation modified) (my underlining and numbering)



When we perceive what is occurring around us through our various sense things are generally intelligible. However, we do not perceive just individual things. We see a field of intelligible things, and they present with varying modes of receptivity. For example, I am listening to music on Spotify, looking at the screen, sitting on the chair, aware of my wife at the desk next to me, the coffee cup and I can see the shed, the paddocks and the hills in the distance. They are all intelligible to various degrees. However, the perceptions, in being intelligible, all offer various modes of positive, detrimental and deficient modes of receptivity. This is the basic structure of the 'there'. Within this 'there', a tune comes on that I find intrusive, I hit the skip button. I've been sitting too long and feel uncomfortable, I move. I've made a spelling mistake (again!) and hit the backspace button. I glance at the coffee cup and am prompted to have another cup. These are all examples of comporments concerning entities that have an intentional structure as previously discussed. However, all this takes place within the broad structure of the 'there' which is an even more basic intentional structure. This is what Heidegger is getting at in the following passages


"I-here" does not mean a certain privileged point-that of an I-Thing - but is to be understood as being-in in terms of the "yonder" of the world that is ready-to-hand-the "yonder" which is the dwelling-place of Dasein as *concern*. 1[BT 155/119]

The entity which is essentially constituted by being-in-the-world *is* itself in every case its 'there'. According to the familiar signification of the word, the 'there' points to a 'here' and a 'yonder'. There 'here' of an 'I-here' is always understood in relation to a 'yonder' ready-to-

hand, in the sense of a being towards this 'yonder'- [BT 171/133]

The 'there' is thus constituted and held open by this 'more radical' structure of intentionality comprised by the structures of receptivity and understanding. Understanding and receptivity are, because of the nature of intentional structures, described as being "equiprimordial" in constituting the "there". This structure is presented in Figure 21. *Within* this structure, Dasein is then attuned to things in the 'there', and that attunement shows the entity as mattering to Dasein and indicates the appropriate responses; this is the phenomenon of being-in.

Having provided an overview of the structure of being-in and its relationship with intentionality I now shift to a more detailed discussion the structure of receptivity and understanding.



Section 1: Receptiveness

Heidegger opens Section 29, *Being there as Receptiveness* with the following;

What we indicate *ontologically* by the term receptiveness (*Befindlichkeit*) is *ontically* the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our affective-modes (*Stimmung*), our affective-attunement (*Gestimmtsein*). Prior to all psychology of affective-modes, a field which in any case still lies fallow, it is necessary to see this phenomenon as a fundamental *existentiale*, and to outline its structure. [BT 172-3/134] (German added)

This is a complex opening paragraph made all the harder by the choice of the

translators to interpret Heidegger's German name for the structure, *Befindlichkeit*, as "state-of-mind" and which I translate as receptivity or receptiveness. What Heidegger has outlined is the following;

- The structure of receptivity is an equiprimordial ontological structure (a fundamental existentielle) that constitutes there.
- At the ontic level, we experience it in terms of our various affective-modes, roughly understood as our moods and emotions.
- Our being is attuned to things by way of our affective-modes
- Scholarship at the time had not properly explored the field associated with moods.

Even if we are not sure what he means by 'attuned' these claims are stunning, even when considered within the context of contemporary scholarship. Heidegger's account of the ontological structures of the ready-to-hand and how understanding relates to these structures is already a radical departure from the tradition. However, this next step thrusts Heidegger into an even more radical position. The tradition has typically separated the concepts of cognition, our rationality and the various affective experiences we have (emotions, moods, desires, etc.). Typically, the affective aspects of being human have been identified as something to be overcome in that they lead us astray and are the enemy of a rational approach to decision-making. This approach is to be found in both philosophical and theological traditions of the West. Heidegger throws the approach out the window! Not only is our receptivity a necessary part of our ontological structure but understanding requires receptivity, this is the implication of the following;

Receptivity(*Befindlichkeit*) is *one* of the existential structures in which the being of the 'there' maintains itself. Equiprimordial with it in constituting this being is *understanding*. Receptivity(*Befindlichkeit*) always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its affective-attuning (*gestimmtes*). [BT 182/142] (German added)

In the above two passages, there are three key technical terms; these are indicated by the German words included in the passage. The translations of these words vary from the original English text. The following table (Table 6) shows the changes, and the rationale for the changes is discussed in a way that brings out the phenomenon being described and named. The approach taken in the interpretation is based on the view that Heidegger will typically try and capture in the German word for the structure a sense of the phenomenon experienced at the ontic level.

German		BT (English text)	BT (thesis)
<i>Befindlichkeit</i>	noun	state-of-mind	receptiveness or receptivity
<i>Stimmung</i>	noun	mood	affective-modes (when applied generally) mood (as case example)
<i>Gestimmtsein</i>	noun	being-attuned	affective-attunement
<i>gestimmtes</i>	verb	mood	affective-attuning

Table 6 Changes in translation.

The name of the basic structure is receptiveness(*Befindlichkeit*), and it has two aspects, the range of possible affective-modes (*Stimmung*) by which an entity can be encountered and the particular way an entity is being encountered, the affective-attuning (*gestimmtes*). The first term to be discussed is receptiveness (*Befindlichkeit*)

Interpreting Befindlichkeit as Receptiveness

Befindlichkeit is a Heideggerian neologism, and the difficulty of translating it into English is reflected in the range of English words used to capture their interpretation the world. Examples include

- attunement [BTs], (Polt, 1999),
- affective self-finding [BPP],
- state one finds oneself in [CT],
- ontological disposition [ZS],
- disposedness and disposition [HCT] (Blattner, 1999),
- situatedness [WM],
- affectedness (Dreyfus, 1991; Gerner, 2007), and
- state-of-mind [BT]

These various attempts indicate that *Befindlichkeit* relates in some way to how one is feeling in oneself or how one is currently disposed. “Situatedness” captures a sense of ‘there’ and being-in, while “attunement” carries a sense of ‘alignment’.

In the introductory passages quoted the structure of the ‘there’ can be characterised as being ‘intentional’ in nature, as is discussed above. This does not come through in most of the translations.

The German word *Befindlich* is a general locational term relating to being sited or situated and can be used in various grammatical modes, e.g. noun, verb, adjective. By way of example the phrase '*in der Luft befindlich*', is translated as 'in the air' or 'airborne', but its literal translation is 'situated in the air'. The common German greeting phrase '*Wie Befinden Sie sich?*' means 'How are you?', 'How are you doing?', etc. This is not an inquiry into the state of affairs of one's share portfolio, or what tasks one is currently engaged. The question is an inquiry into how one is experiencing the world at the moment in a global sense. Typical responses may be 'not bad', 'good', 'a bit challenging at the moment', 'on top of the world' and so on. These are all responding from the perspective of our 'feelings', how the world is showing up for us at the moment.

Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit* is one of his neologisms, and it captures two aspects of the phenomenon he is describing, the 'there' and the 'affective-attunement' with the world. I could think of no English word that captures this dual sense, and so a decision has to be made as to either emphasise one aspect or the other or perhaps develop some compound word that captures the dual notion.

When Heidegger is dissatisfied with the naming of a structure, he will often search for a replacement. This was illustrated in the discussion of meaningfulness. It would seem that Heidegger was dissatisfied with *Befindlichkeit* and following *Being and Time*, the term virtually disappears from Heidegger's lexicon. In the *Zollikon Seminars*, over fifty years later, it makes only a brief reappearance, where it is interpreted as "ontological disposition", but the term most commonly used in the *Seminars*, is *Vernehmen* (the capacity to receive-perceive) and this is how it is described;

... the basic constitution of human existence may be called *Da-sein*, or being-in-the-world. Of course, in this context the *Da* of this *Da-sein* certainly does not mean what it does in the ordinary sense—a location near an observer. Rather, to exist as *Da-sein* means to hold open a domain through its capacity to receive-perceive (*Vernehmen*) the significance of the things that are given to it [Da-sein] and that address it [Da-sein] by virtue of its own "clearing" [ZS 4] (my underlining – German added)

Heidegger, in looking for an alternative to *Befindlichkeit* he made his choice to emphasise the aspect relating to 'feeling', not situation. The term perception relates to all our experienced sensory modes, not just 'moods' and I will address this shortly. The idea of "receive" contains the directional aspect of intentionality. In view of this, I simply interpret *Befindlichkeit* as receptivity or receptiveness to indicate what

Heidegger had described in the *Seminars*. What should also be noted is that it relates to what is 'received from', and this will also be discussed.

The Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Befindlichkeit*, state-of-mind, is wrong on two counts. Firstly, it refers to an entity, mind, a position rejected by Heidegger's research stance and secondly, 'state' is a predicate of an entity and thus also rejected. The basis for this rejection has been covered previously. The term also fails to carry with it the sense of the phenomenon Heidegger is describing.

Receptiveness as a Broad Concept

In that *receptiveness* is one of the most basic structures constituting the 'there' suggests that it must refer to a broad classification of a certain type of capacity. This is consistent in understanding Heidegger's method as identifying, classifying and naming very broad structures which can then be further analysed as sub-classifications. This is the sense we get from Inwood's Heidegger dictionary in relation to *Befindlichkeit* when he refers to it as being affected in "certain ways".

Befindlichkeit attunes DASEIN to being affected by things and affected in certain ways. Unless I am in a mood I will not be 'affected', touched or interested ... by anything, nothing will 'matter' (*angehen*) to me (BT, 137). Only in a certain mood can I be affected in certain ways. (Inwood, 1999, p. 132)

This covers things that psychologists would normally attribute to such things as moods, emotion, motivation and so on. This range of the way in which we may be affected is described by Heidegger in *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*;

To be affectively self-finding¹⁹⁷ [*Befindlichkeit*] is the formal structure of what we call mood, passion, affect, and the like, which are constitutive for all comportment toward beings.... [FCM 281] (my underlining)

The broad nature of *receptiveness* is hinted when Heidegger notes that there are different modes of *receptiveness* [BT 178/138] that have been studied since antiquity under the ontic heading of "feelings and affects" [BT 178/138]. He later comments that they include moods that are "indifferent or fleeting" [BT 172/135], and I take 'fleeting' to refer to the short duration of emotions compared to moods. In his analysis of fear, he makes comment that it is because we have the capacity to fear that it can also be experienced in different derivative modes such as alarm, as dread, and as terror [BT 182-2/ 142].

¹⁹⁷ I have not changed the translation from self-finding.

The concept of *receptiveness* is, however, broader still, in that Heidegger refers, in *Being and Time*, to the capacity to be affected through the senses, i.e. to feel the warmth of a touch;

And only because the 'senses' [die "Sinne"] belong ontologically to an entity whose kind of being is being-in-the-world with a receptiveness ¹⁹⁸, can they be 'touched' by anything or 'have a sense for' ["Sinn haben für"] something in such a way that what touches them shows itself in an affect. [BT 177/138] (translation modified)

It is not physiological aspects of the sense of touch he is interested in. It is the capacity to sense our environment in various ways such that we can respond to what matters to us. This aspect is not elsewhere commented on in *Being and Time* but it is an indication that this view was present as he writes the book. I have pointed out and discussed passages from later works in which thesis ideas are present elsewhere in the thesis, e.g. Chapter 8 on Dasein.

The Whole Body is Engaged

Apart from the comment on 'senses' the extent of our receptivity is hard to identify in *Being and Time*. In the following account given by Heidegger in the *Zollikon Seminars* in March of 1972, he clearly states his support for the view that while the senses are founded on the body, they must be, can only be, properly understood with respect to the constitution of Dasein.

... everything we call our bodiliness, down to the last muscle fiber and down to the most hidden molecule of hormones, belongs essentially to existing. Thus, it is basically *not* inanimate matter but a domain of that nonobjectifiable, optically invisible capacity to receive-perceive the significance of what it encounters, which constitutes the whole Da-sein. This bodily [nature] develops in such away that it can be used in dealing with the inanimate and animate "material things" which are encountered. Yet, in contrast to a tool, the bodily spheres of existing are not set free [*entlassen*] from being-human. They cannot be cared for in a toolbox. Rather, they remain in the sway of being human, held in it, and belonging to it so long as the human being lives. Of course, in dying this bodily domain changes its way of being into that of an inanimate thing, into the substance of a corpse, which drops out [*herausfaUen*] from existence. [ZS 232] (my underling)

Heidegger is describing the human Dasein as an entity, not only founded on the human body but one whose *entire bodiliness*, is attuning it to its environment if the various capacities to receive-perceive. The vast scope of receptivity stays active, most probably, from before our birth until the moment the physical body ceases and involves *all* the body.

198 'befindlichen In-der-Welt-seins'.

If we are considering the range in which Dasein senses its environment, then we have to move past the five basic senses and include such things as equilibrioception (balance), thermoperception (temperature), proprioception (movement and relative position), nociception (pain), and chronoception (passage of time). There is also a range of senses that related to the internal states of the body known as interoceptions that are associated with the experience of hunger, thirst, respiration (e.g. suffocation), gag reflex, emptying the bladder and so on. All of these things have a role in orienting Dasein to its world, disclosing the world in a way that matters to it and eliciting an appropriate response. If we feel thirsty, we will start to look around for something to drink, and the thirstier we get, the more focused we will be on this behaviour and the mattering that discloses the world in other ways will drop away until the thirst has been satisfied. If I am tightening up a screw, it is the 'feel' of the screwdriver as it tightens the screw that lets me know if it is too loose or perhaps on the verge of being overtight.

The main thrust of this section has been to highlight the pervasive nature of the structure our receptiveness as something that shows up the world as mattering to us. While the examples of thirst and tightening a screw are part of the structure, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger's main emphasis is on the more substantive aspects that are associated with Dasein's primary involvements. It is on the basis of the structure of receptiveness that Dasein assigns itself to the various 'in-order-to' structures because these show up as mattering to Dasein.

Receptiveness is a far broader concept than is indicated by mood or disposition and this understanding should carry over into the ways the aspects of the structure are interpreted.

By way of note, this line of argument would suggest that simply equating Dasein with conscious or sub-conscious awareness, i.e. something that equates to mind, is, from a Heideggerian perspective, wrong. Dasein is a far more complex entity than this and must be understood in relation to our entire bodiliness. This would be an interesting area to explore post thesis as it pushes the boundary of how we understand being a person even further than is presented in this thesis.

Affective-modes and Affective- attunement

The German word *Stimmung* is typically used in two ways; in music to denote 'tuning' and as a 'tuning' metaphor referring to how people feel. This is captured by

a description of the word by German composer, Karlheinz Stockhausen, who commented that *Stimmung*

means "tuning," but it really should be translated with many other words because *Stimmung* incorporates the meanings of the tuning of a piano, the tuning of the voice, the tuning of a group of people, the tuning of the soul. This is all in the German word. Also, when you say: We're in a good *Stimmung*, you mean a good psychological tuning, being well tuned together. (Cott & Stockhausen, 1973, p. 162)

The idea of *Stimmung* is not the act of tuning something to something, it is a noun and refers to the tuning something has by reference to something else. For example, while there is a standard tuning on a guitar there are at least a score of alternative tunings such as 'Open D' tuning often used in Delta Blues and 'Dropped D' which is common in heavy rock music. When a guitar is tuned to 'Dropped D' the strings have been adjusted to take on the tuning of 'Dropped D'. The tuning is imposed on the guitar. In relation to people, the term relates to the current mood or temperament, either for an individual or a group as the above quote indicates. In that moods of crowds and individuals change there is also the sense that the mood is something taken up or imposed. Furthermore, in both examples, there is implicit in the concept that there is more than one tuning. Understood in the broadest possible way as indicated by the discussion on receptivity, *Stimmung* refers to the possible 'attunements' that may be experienced, and for this reason, I interpret the word as *affective-modes*.

Whereas I interpret *Stimmung* as affective-modes when used in a general sense, there are other places in the chapter where Heidegger is using *Stimmung* where it should be translated as mood. For example, he refers to bad moods (*Verstimmung*) [BT 175/136] and a mood of elation (*gehobene Stimmung*) [BT 173/134]. He appears to be using *Stimmung*, understood as mood as his case example. When mood is the case example, I will follow suit. However, this should always be understood as a case example of the broader concept of affective-modes.

The German word *Gestimmtsein* is a composite of *Gestimmt* + *sein*, where *Gestimmt* typically means 'in tune' and *sein* means being. The connection to *Stimmung* is self-evident. The verb *gestimmt* means exhibiting a tuning, for example, the guitar playing in accordance with a particular tuning, or a person experiencing a Christmas mood. An analogy would be a radio (which used to be called a radio *receiver!*). Affective-modes relate to the range of stations that the radio can receive. The affective-attunement is the particular station that it is

currently receiving. The response to this affective-attunement is to play the sounds associated with that station; the radio-receiver has no choice in this once the affective-attunement is determined.

Dasein has a receptivity that reflects the capacity to receive a broad range of affective-modes. For example, we experience a frightening dog and depending on the situation we may experience fear, anxiety or terror depending on the encounter. It is only a small dog on a leash, so we are attuned to the situation in the affective-mode of anxiety. In response, we steel ourselves, walk to the edge of the footpath and walk carefully past. If it were a large dog, the attunement might have been one of fear, and we respond by crossing the road to keep the source of the fear as far away as possible. The dog matters to us and the mode of attunement discloses in what form this mattering takes, and this, in turn, indicates a range of possible compartments we may take up in relation to the dog. If dogs do not matter to us, it may even pass without much notice.

Affective-Modes 'Happen' to us – But we can Control Them

Neither the radio receiver nor the guitar chooses its tuning from the various alternatives; this is imposed on them. Similarly, for the most part, we do not choose the *affective-mode* (mood, emotion, etc.) that we receive, it is something that just happens to us, and we have no notion of where they come. Heidegger describes this in the following way,

An affective-mode [e.g. a mood] assails us. It comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside', but arises out of being-in-the-world, as a way of such being. [BT 176/136] (my gloss)

The German word for assails is *überfällt*, and while assails is reasonable, it's more typical interpretation is more along the lines of attacks, assaults, mugs and so on. Heard against the background of these words, we have a more vivid description that typically these various affective-modes are aggressive, they are out of our control, and they win; the assault typically succeeds. We are literally tossed around by our various emotions, moods and so on. The most extreme case that Heidegger gives to demonstrate this is bad moods;

... *bad moods*. In these, Dasein becomes blind to itself, the environment with which it is concerned veils itself, the circumspection of concern gets led astray. [BT 175/136]

Anyone who has experienced being gripped by anger that lets loose, uncontrolled behaviour, at least for a moment, would relate to this description of Heidegger. We

are not only blind to our self, but to the things about which we are concerned, and in the grip of anger, we can do harm to both.

However, we should not think of affective-moods as only being unpleasant, the range of affective-modes includes joy and pleasure. These too, have the same character of being outside our control. This, however, need not be the case for Heidegger tells us that,

Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its affective-modes And furthermore, when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood; we are never free of moods. [BT 175/136]

Affective-modes are part of our very structure, and as such we cannot escape them, we can learn about them and then make decisions to be “in control” of them. This is similar to what was discussed in relation to the ‘One’, in that we either take over the way of being in an unquestioning manner or be more discerning in what we do and do not take over, i.e. be in either inauthentic or authentic modes. On this basis, Dasein has a way of understanding itself in new ways and the capacity to change its ‘there’ (the disclosure of the world) based on that understanding. At a collective level, this means that Dasein has the capacity to change the character of its world and this was evident in the discussion on Chapter 11 on Heidegger’s 1954 lectures *The Question Concerning Technology* [QCT]. This understanding of the relationship between affective-modes and behaviour and the ability to control behaviour by changing the affective-modes we experience is reflected in Tibetan Buddhist psychology where the emphasis is on cultivating ‘right thinking’ (“through knowledge and will”) to let go of negative emotions and cultivate a mode of behaviour characterised by compassion (His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama, 2001). I make this point only to highlight that this aspect of the phenomenon has been recognised and received considerable attention in other traditions.

Why the Word Affect?

In the above discussion, I did not address why I used the word ‘affective’; it comes from its use in psychology. The field of psychology is roughly divided into the study of affect¹⁹⁹, cognition and motivation. Within the field of the study of affects the ‘feeling’ realm is divided into fleeting changes at the autonomic level (e.g. being startled), emotions (from minutes to hours), moods (from hours to months),

¹⁹⁹ Affect comes from the Latin *affectus* "disposition, mood, state of mind or body produced by some external influence." [EOD]

emotional disorders (months to years), personality traits (years to lifetime) (Keltner, Oatley, & Jenkins, 2014). The way affect is used in psychology is incorporated within Heidegger's concept of receptivity, provided we let go of any psychological presumptions. There was no point in inventing a new word, and no existing word has this same meaning as such I use 'affect' roughly in line with this understanding but also to explicitly include the way we experience a 'hot' day, or the screw 'feeling too loose'.

Interpreting "matter" (angegangen)

Another word that needs to be addressed is 'mattering', which is the ontic level of the phenomenon. That something showing up (encountering) for us on the basis of mattering is indicated in the following example:

.... to be affected by the unserviceable, resistant, or threatening character of that which is ready-to-hand, becomes ontologically possible only in so far as being-in as such has been determined existentially beforehand in such a manner that what it encounters within-the-world can "matter" to it in this way. The fact that this sort of thing can "matter" to it is grounded in one's receptiveness ... [BT 176/137] (translation modified) (my underlining)

Heidegger is making the point that to be affected by an event at the ontic level it *must 'matter' to us*; otherwise, we would be completely indifferent. Mattering is the ontic phenomenon that is grounded in our receptiveness, the capacity to be affected in some way and reflects the broad understanding of receptivity. A good illustration of this is provided by Haugeland;

... Heidegger's contrived word "*Befindlichkeit*." This bizarre term names the feature of human life that it is always responsive to what *matters* in its current, concrete situation — it *finds* the situation as thus mattering to it. For instance, if I am absorbed in hammering, I will be responsive to the heft and recoil of the hammer, the fit and integrity of the boards, the position and angle of the nail; these all matter to the hammering. But I am likely to be oblivious of the sawdust on the floor or the flicker of the lamp (unless, of course, they interfere with the work). (Haugeland, 2013, k. 4797)

The German word translated as "matter" is *angegangen* which has various meanings such as tackled, approached, involved, concerned, accosted and so on. Mattering captures the same sense as 'assails'. It is something that happens to us, and in this, we have no choice; we may only choose how we respond to what matters. For example, while my wife doesn't get the broom the messiness of the sawdust still accosts/approaches/encounters her based on her receptivities and at that point in time she has no choice. The direction of mattering at the ontic level is the same as the structural level; it is towards Dasein.

In the phenomenon that Heidegger is describing it is not that there is an encounter and mattering is subsequently determined by Dasein. 'Mattering' happens to us, we are confronted by 'a mattering'. Dasein is confronted by a frightening dog, the annoyance of the machine breakdown and so forth, and the encounter calls from us a possible response. This is not dissimilar to the phenomenon the Gestalt psychologist Kurt Koffka is describing when he comments;

... in the prescientific stage man behaves in a situation as the situation tells him to behave. To primitive man each thing says what it is and what he ought to do with it: a fruit says, "Eat me"; water says, "Drink me"; thunder says, "Fear me," and woman says, "Love me." (Koffka, 2005, k. 234-6)

While Koffka is talking about the basic emotions (receptiveness) of 'primitive man', the phenomenal description still holds, the responses we make are in relation to the mattering that encounters us in a situation. When we enter the room of a dying friend, we typically encounter a sombre room which draws from us the appropriate behaviour. A few years ago, I entered the local library for the first time to pick up my son and was taken aback. I encountered a boisterous place with young children running around and calling out, whereas I was expecting a studious place where appropriate behaviour was characterised by quiet movement and hushed tones. The library was the same space, understood as a library by all, but it resulted in a different encounter for me than it did for the children and consequently resulted in different behaviours; the library 'mattered' in different ways.

In relation to 'mattering' I do not change the translation, I have been unable to find an alternative English word that captures this sense of 'encountering' Dasein. However, I make the strong point that when I use 'mattering', it should be heard in the way I have described; as *something that encounters Dasein*, not something that Dasein imposes on an object after some consideration.

Summary Description of Receptivity and the 'There'

Before discussing Heidegger's concepts of thrownness, facticity and fallenness a summary of the structure of the 'there' is set out, as the terms are used in relation to the 'there'.

When we look around, we see the world laid out before us in a rich mosaic of thick and thin intelligibilities and textured by various modes of mattering. What we are experiencing is our 'there'. Three of my children live with their families some distance from me. However, I am familiar with them, their homes and they matter to

me. Even at a distance, they are part of my 'there'. As I look out the window, I know there is a shed out of view, and I do not give it much thought; it is where we store our firewood for the winter. If it were to be destroyed by a tree branch falling on it, I would be troubled by the loss and need to do something. Out of view, out of conscious awareness, this shed is still part of my 'there'. We do not have to have things being present to us all the time for them to be part of our 'there'. They simply have to form part of our public world (thin intelligibility) or domestic environment (thick intelligibility) and be something that matters to us.

The 'there' is structured by our understanding and receptivity. It can be thought of as the unity of our world, as we understand it, that matters to us in various positive and detrimental ways. The possibilities of us doing things in our 'there' are, to a large extent *already* determined by *our* structure of understanding and *our* structure of receptiveness. Over time the structure of *our* understanding and receptiveness changes and when this does our 'there' changes. When this occurs, the range of our possible involvements also changes. While we cannot change the structure or the way it operates we can make deliberate changes in the content of our understanding and in the way things matter to us, albeit, for the most part, Dasein is oblivious to this possibility. When Dasein seizes hold of the possibility of directing its understanding and receptiveness on its own terms and not merely following the course determined by the 'One' Heidegger calls this an authentic mode of existence. However, Heidegger does not believe it is possible to do this in all aspects of understanding and receptivity, and so the normative mode for all Dasein is a normative one determined by the 'One'. The Dasein that operates within its 'there' is thus not an authentic self but, by and large, a manifestation of the 'One'.

Our 'there', the wherein we exist, is thus constituted by *our* ontological structure. It is determinative of what we understand, how we experience things in the world as mattering and determines, to a significant extent, the behavioural responses, large and small, material and insignificant, that we take up in our dealings. That existence is experienced in the expressed compartments associated with our various dealings in the world, the structure of our 'there' is the structure of our existence. The structure of the 'there', to give it its technical name is being-in-the-world.

This is a summary of the work to date. As we have seen in prior discussions, Heidegger will often come back to phenomenon he has previously described, but from a different perspective, to draw out new aspects and follow them. This is what

he now does, and this leads to several new concepts, thrownness, facticity and falling. These now become the focus of the discussion.

Thrownness and Facticity

Dasein's ontological structure and Dasein are not the same. This is no more than the restatement of the ontological difference [BPP, ZS, MFL] previously discussed. The ontological structure of understanding and receptivities is what determines the 'there', and this is the 'wherein' Dasein dwells. It is because of this that Dasein has no access to the source of the 'there' and simply finds itself in its 'there'. It is as if Dasein is arbitrarily 'thrown' into its 'there'. This is what Heidegger is getting at in the following;

This characteristic of Dasein's being - this 'that it is' - is veiled in its "whence" and "whither", yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the "*thrownness*" of this entity into its "there"; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as being-in-the-world, it is the "there". [BT 174/135]

However, we need to keep in mind that while an entity and its ontological structure are different, they are inseparable, just for the bronze sphere, the sphere cannot be separated²⁰⁰ out an examined as an independent thing. The same is true for Dasein, this would make it an entity and Heidegger, as has been discussed, rejects the notion of being as an entity. This is part of the challenge of an inquiry into being that was discussed earlier.

The term "that it is" needs explaining and Heidegger's use of it is instructive in terms of his approach. If we look at a tree, we can ask the question "What is that?". This is a question as to the nature of its being. A community of people can simply classify these types of entities in a certain way and call them whatever they like, in English it is trees. Anything that conforms with the classification is thus a tree. Naming allows us to talk with each other about entities and we can be reasonably confident we have the same entity in view. We can also ask "Why is it a tree?". This question can be heard two ways. Firstly, as a question of identity. This relates to the naming protocol, i.e. it is an entity that meets the characteristics that the community has decided will be called a tree. Secondly, it can be heard as "Why is that entity we are calling a tree, the entity it is?" or simply "Why is a tree a tree?". This question is

²⁰⁰ In Plato's philosophy the forms have a separate existence, this is not the case for Aristotle. In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle presents the form as a 'formula', what I referred to as an organising principle, and is separable only on 'account'. The same concept is present in Heidegger's work in that the ontological structure is a dynamic organising process that is responsible for the unique character of the entity, Dasein.

asking why do trees exist. Recalling the discussion on Aristotle, he dismissed this type of question as nonsense from the viewpoint of 'science' or 'metaphysical' inquiry. We cannot address the question of why 'trees' came into existence in the first place just as we cannot address why something didn't! To answer the 'why trees' question properly, we must be able to answer the 'why didn't' question and we can't. Even theories of evolution can't address this question; rather they give an account of the conditions and processes by which natural entities come into being.

Aristotle's starting position is to accept that the tree *is*. Further, there is the acceptance that a tree has to be a tree. If trees suddenly started being birds or rocks, then the world would be unintelligible. It is this acceptance of the constancy of being that underpins both Aristotle's philosophy and science. Aristotle addresses himself to three basic questions, determining the organising principle (the form) that determines the tree, accounting for how it comes into existence given the organising principle (the four causes) and how to properly classify a tree according to its categorial characteristics. That any entity simply is the entity it is, and that there is the constancy of it being this entity and no other is captured in the phrase "that it is and has to be".

Heidegger takes the Aristotelian position in relation to Dasein. He rejects the "why Dasein" question and simply states "that it is". There is, however, a significant difference, the characteristics of Dasein's being (the 'that it is') are not determined categorially but rather by the manner of the "*thrownness*" of this entity into its "there" "[BT 174/135]

Having linked the language of "that it is" to our thrownness into the 'there,' Heidegger then links the same language to Dasein's receptiveness, the structure of the 'there'.

The 'that it is and has to be' which is disclosed in Dasein's receptiveness is not the same 'that-it-is' which expresses ontologico-categorially the factuality belonging to presence-at-hand. This factuality becomes accessible only if we ascertain it by looking at it. The "that-it-is" which is disclosed in Dasein's receptiveness must rather be conceived as an existential attribute of the entity which has being-in-the-world as its way of being. [BT 174/135] (my underlining)

Heidegger is again reiterating that the ontological structure that is disclosed by receptiveness is not the same type of ontological structure associated with present-at-hand objects. We can determine the structures of the latter by looking at it and making judgments about its categorial properties. This approach *cannot* be taken with Dasein given its structure is being-in-the-world. To be able to talk about the

different types of characteristics associated with the being of the present-at-hand and the being of Dasein he introduces two collective terms. *Factuality*, introduced in the above passage, refers to those characteristics belonging to the present-at-hand and *facticity* applies to the characteristics of Dasein. This is how Heidegger introduces facticity,

The expression 'thrownness' is meant to suggest the *facticity of being delivered over*. [BT 174/135]

Then he clarifies the term,

Facticity if not the factuality of the factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein's being - one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximally it has been thrust aside. The "that-it-is" of facticity never becomes something that we can come across by beholding it. [BT 174/135] (italics in English text)

Whereas factuality refers to the phenomena that are categorial facticity refers to the dynamic phenomenon. Facticity relates to the way we are delivered over to the 'there', i.e. our thrownness. Again, Heidegger is using language that indicates that we are not in control of how the structure operates, we are "delivered over". This is a crucial aspect associated with the structure that we must take into consideration.

To be clear, there is *a lot of force* in what Heidegger is claiming. If we take a present-at-hand entity, say a cube of silver 3cm x 3 cm x 3 cm then it can be described by reference to its size, shape, colour, texture and so on. These characteristics related to its factuality, they are categorial in nature. This is an account of what the entity *is*, a silver cube. Heidegger's claim in relation to what Dasein is made with the same force, except it is a Dasein's facticity that determines the Dasein. The way in which the 'there' is opened for Dasein is an account of that particular Dasein! If one could set out a comprehensive account of a Dasein's thick and thin intelligibilities together with the positive, detrimental and indifferent matterings concerning those entities about which Dasein has an understanding then one has given an account of that Dasein.

If some external agent changes the factuality of the silver cube, say hitting it with a hammer, then the cube itself is damaged. If some external agent changes the physical environment in which Dasein is living such that its 'there' shows up fewer things that matter to it is a positive way, and more things that are either indifferent or detrimental then there is an impact of Dasein in terms of what and how things show up as mattering which leads to different possibilities. The ontological structure

is not damaged, it continues to operate normally, but the entity itself that is determined by the structure can no longer have lived experiences that reflect, in a positive way, the understanding of self. The nature of Dasein is revealed by the 'there' disclosing the deficient or detrimental nature of the circumstances Dasein finds itself. If Dasein, by virtue of an 'imposed' environment, is unable to be the Dasein it is, then this restriction, even if temporary, of the dynamic process of a Dasein being the entity it is, is damage caused to Dasein, just as surely as a hammer strike to the silver cube damages the cube. This is the conclusion of Heidegger's strong claim!

Accounting for Facticity

Dasein's facticity is by and large arises from another part of the being-in-the-world structure, the 'One'. While it is not clear from the previous chapter, the 'One' is not determinative for Dasein in a blanket uniform way, just in a structurally consistent manner. Otherwise, we would all be identical in terms of understanding and receptivity, and this is not the case in a modern society²⁰¹.

When Dasein is born, there are a number of characteristics that are given and can be considered as part of the factuality of Dasein's body. These would include such things as sex, height, skin colour, physical appearance, age, any innate dispositions and so on. The 'One' has established interpretations of these attributes in terms of the culture. For what it means to be a woman in a conservative area of Afghanistan is significantly different to the way of being a woman in a Scandinavian country. How the self and world are understood, and the receptivities will be different. (This is illustrated in the examples at the end of this section in a dramatic way.) This is what would be expected. However, there are cultural variations that play out based on the factuality of the body even in the same culture. For example, a white male in Sydney's affluent area will be interpreted differently by the 'One' to a dark skin indigenous woman born in a remote area of Australia. These different understandings of Australianness by the 'One' will influence how these two people will understand themselves. However, the variations in both inherited dispositions together with the inconsistencies in the immediate social and family surroundings will all result in significant variations in facticity. The averageness of the 'One' has

²⁰¹ A possible way to explore this would be to carry out anthropological research among small, isolated, traditional villages. My hypothesis would be that there would be a higher congruence among both understanding and receptivity in such groups and this would become more diverse the greater the interactions of the groups with others.

both local environment and a broader public way of being.

One way of understanding Heidegger's work on the 'One' is that this is his account of how a specific entity comes into being. The Dasein moves from having essential a bare structure when it is first born, and then this structure is filled out by the 'One' and the characteristics of this 'filling out', in terms of understanding and receptiveness, is Dasein's facticity. In this chapter, this is referred to as Dasein's thrownness.

Facticity, Finding Itself and Research

If the ontological structure of Dasein determines the Dasein itself, and further if the ontological structure is largely hidden from a Dasein, how is a Dasein to 'find' itself, to become aware at the ontic level of who it is? The answer lies in the connection between the factual character of the structure and Dasein's way of being in its 'there'. While Dasein does not have access to the structure, it does have access to the way the structure is exhibited in what it does. This is the basis of the following account by Dasein in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*;

Dasein finds *itself* primarily and constantly *in things* because tending them, distressed by them, it always in some way or other rests in things. Each one of us is what he pursues and cares for. In everyday terms, we understand ourselves and our existence by way of activities we peruse and the things we take care of. We understand ourselves by starting from them because the Dasein finds itself primarily in things. The Dasein does not need a special kind of observation ..., rather, as the Dasein, gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected to from things. This is not mysticism and does not presuppose the assigning of souls to things. It is only a reference to an elementary phenomenological fact of existence, [BP 159]

Heidegger, here, is again reiterating his basic research stance. Put aside presuppositions concerning what we think Dasein is, simply make the observations of the "elementary phenomenological fact(s)" associated with the type of entity it is, do the logical analysis and layout the findings. Treat Dasein with the same rigour as anything else. On this basis, Dasein can be understood in terms of what it does and the 'passions' with which it does them; remembering that Heidegger includes actions and 'passions' in all modes.

In the previous chapter, the distinction between primary and subordinate involvements (for-sake-of (*Um-willen*)) and the difference between the for-sake-of and the for-sake-of-which (*Worum-willen*) was discussed. In that "we understand ourselves and our existence by way of activities we pursue and the things we take

care of” [BP 159], then through carefully attending to these we can gain significant insight into “who we are”. This approach can disclose a rich understanding of those primary understandings of self and of our receptivities that organise other activities. It may also provide insight into those understandings and receptivities which, while important are largely subordinate in nature, as well as other things that matter in a significant way either positively and negatively. By and large, however, Dasein does not make such observations, and the understanding of self that is shaping their involvements remains hidden from them. For example, a person who, in a veiled way, understands themselves as a sacrificial mother may not be aware that this is shaping the way the world shows up for them and determining the what they ‘choose’ to do.

This approach also offers the possibility of a research methodology into understanding the basic characteristics of a person. Care would be required in developing the associated methods as often the understanding associated with the various ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ of a person is often veiled within the structure. Developing and refining the methods in a manner that they remain grounded in the philosophical research is a task post thesis.

Falling and Fallenness

To complete some terminology, Heidegger calls exhibiting the average every-day being of the ‘One’ ‘*falling*’ (BT §38). This is not a physical falling but rather,

... it has fallen into the world, which itself belongs to its being. Falling is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself. [BT 220/176]

This term was briefly touched upon in the discussion of the ‘One’ and the three-part structure by which the ‘One’ sets, monitors and enforces compliance with the norms of the ‘One’. Falling is characterised by fallenness;

“*Fallenness*” into the ‘world’ means an absorption in being-with-one-another. [BT 220/176]

Thrownness, as reflected in our facticity, is what we have taken up in terms of understanding and receptivity. In as much as this has been determined by the ‘One’, then our *fallenness* indicates the way this plays out in our daily lives. We do “what one does”, we “judge as one judges” we “desire and recoil” as ‘One’ desires and recoils and so on. The phenomenon of ‘mob’ rule and other crowd-based behaviours are just a small part of this phenomenon that is studied by sociology, particularly in the sub-field of social cognition (Augoustinos, Walker, & Donaghue,

2006; Fiske & Taylor, 2013).

Falling then describes that aspect of the structure that is associated with being absorbed in the world as determined by the 'One' whereas our thrownness, or facticity, relates to understanding and receptiveness. While different they are, as part of the same unified structure, closely related. This can be seen in the following quotes;

[Dasein] In its projection reveals itself as something which has been thrown. It has been thrownly abandoned to the 'world', and falls into it concernfully. [BT 458/406]

The being of Dasein is care. This entity exists fallingly as something that has been thrown. [BT 465/412]

The language reflects the nature of the phenomenon. Dasein is “something that has been thrown” and as such it “falls into” the world. Any process *must have* a temporal structure, and we see this starting to emerge. Thrownness reflects something in the past that has happened falling represents something that is happening now; i.e. past and present. All that remains the future aspect, and this will be discussed later in the chapter.

Summary: Receptiveness and Openness to the World

As I interpret Heidegger, there are three broad levels associated with receptiveness and the same would apply to understanding. The first is a basic formal structure applicable to any Dasein, regardless of culture. Heidegger refers to this as the primordial level²⁰² [BT 171-2/133] The second is how the structure is 'filled in' for a Dasein. Recalling the previous chapter on the 'One', it is this structural aspect that is responsible for this task and Dasein's receptiveness is largely determined on the basis of the culture into which it is born and raised [BT CH 4], and the third is the entity that gives ontic expression to the 'filled in' structure. It is the ontic level and the expressed compartments that give rise to the lived experiences of living our life. The first two are ontological levels, and the third is the entity level.

There are three key statements by Heidegger that sum up the structure of receptiveness (affective-modes and their tuning or affective-attunement).

The tuning of affective-modes is the existential constitution of Dasein's openness to the

²⁰² Heidegger will often the term primordial to indicate a basis level or terms such as “more primordial” [BT 50/27] to indicate a move to a more basic level. For example, even though he talks about a structure being primordial in Dasein, an even more primordial structure is based on time [BT 40/19].

world. [BT 137] (my translation)

An affective mode has already disclosed, in every case, being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something. [BT 176/137] (italics in English text)

Existentially, receptiveness implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matter to us. Indeed from the ontological point of view we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to 'bare mood'. [BT 177/137-8] (italics in English text)

There is an overlap in these three summary statements, but the two fundamentally points are that firstly the structure of receptiveness, together with understanding are constitutive of the 'there'. Secondly, it is our receptivity that makes possible the discovery of world and discloses things in the world as mattering to us and hence makes possible our directedness towards things. These characteristics can be illustrated by the breakdown case associated with serious clinical or morbid depression. In these circumstances, virtually nothing in the world matters to the person, and they find themselves confined to a bed or simply sitting in a chair at home, doing nothing. Incapable of doing anything. The world is still intelligible; it just doesn't show up as mattering. A necessary condition of a person's being-in-the-world, of having a 'there' has thus collapsed, and this structural breakdown has its ontic expression in what we observe as the clinical depression.

For Dasein, at the ontic level, receptivity discloses the 'there' in the way it matters to Dasein, notwithstanding the nature of the understanding and receptiveness may be concealed from Dasein. The mattering can be positive, negative, or deficient in terms of showing up things relevant to a person's existence and the person's structure is the sole arbiter in this regard. No other can determine what will show up as 'good for another'.

Earlier in *Being and Time* Heidegger describes this by simply saying that our being (who we are) is an issue for us [BT 32/12], this has now been filled out. Receptiveness then is Heidegger's technical term for the structure that grounds mattering or those things that are an issue for us. Receptiveness should be heard as a broad, all-encompassing concept that opens up *every possible way* in which something can 'matter' to us, including all the diverse ways we receive perceptions from the world from our diverse array of senses.

Examples of mattering include being bothered by a crooked wall hanging, the joy of a newborn and ongoing concern for its welfare, a frightening dog, desiring a

particular style of shoe, the dislike of brussels sprouts, the motivation to be a doctor, the interest in knowing something, the desire to change a Government policy, the love of one's partner, the worry about the looming storm, tightening a screw too much, and so on. How something matters to us then determines the range of our responses. The James case study illustrated this. Everything we do then, from assigning our self to meaningful in-order-structures, to ensuring we do not over tighten a screw can only occur because of the structure of receptivity by which things matter to us.

The way things matter to us (our affective-attunement) is outside our control. Mattering is given to Dasein in encountering things in the world; we have no choice. Nor does mattering and the associated response, if any, always happened with conscious awareness or direction; arriving home having little recollection of the routine journey from work is an example.

Individually Dasein assigns itself to an 'in-order-to' structure on the basis of mattering. If taken collectively, Dasein's mattering thus determines the structure of its world. By working backwards, examining the nature of the involvements and the associated modes of mattering it is then possible to gain an understanding of the Dasein, or for Dasein to 'find itself'. In that this would represent the full account of those matters which have a practical bearing for Dasein's existence, then from Peirce's perspective, there is nothing further to know concerning the Dasein that would have a material consequence.

The method of 'working' backwards applies to any world and as such also applies to the world of the nursing home. By observing the average, everyday activities of the nursing home, the way the entities in the nursing home are understood and show up as mattering will be disclosed. Specifically, the way in which the older people in the nursing home are understood in their Dasein-with and the mode of mattering in which they show up to the nursing home would be disclosed. The understandings and associated modes of mattering in relation to the Dasein-with of staff, the government (e.g. compliance requirements), shareholders and so on, as well as the money generated by the nursing home, would also be disclosed. This would then enable an analysis the character of the being of the nursing home and its primary for-the-sake-of-which, i.e. an understanding of what a nursing home *is*. This suggests another possible type of research that is applicable to any world. This thesis is not specifically addressing itself to this line of research and is something to

be pursued post thesis.

This ends the main discussion on receptivity, and in the next section, some examples and case studies are presented to illustrate the phenomenon in the lives of Dasein.

Receptiveness: Illustrative Examples

Case Study: Shame and Honour Killings

When read together the Sections on the 'One' and Receptiveness present a strong claim by Heidegger that the innate capacity for affective-modes is shaped by the culture which in turn determines in what way we encounter entities in the world, i.e. how they show up and matter to us. This is illustrated in the following account of an actual event, the honour killing of a daughter organised by her Mother (Appiah, 2011; Fisk, 2010):



*Photograph 9 Samia Sarwar
(Forsell, 1999)*

Samia Sarwar was born in 1970 into a wealthy and influential family in the Pakistan city of Peshawar²⁰³ and educated at the best private English school in the province. Samia's father was a university graduate, a successful industrialist and a President of the provincial Chamber of Commerce, and her mother was a doctor with a successful medical practice in Peshawar. This was a sophisticated, educated and influential family.

Samia had married a cousin, her Mother's sister's son, only to separate sometime later, apparently due to the husband's violence. Samia and her two

²⁰³ Peshawar, where Samia is born and raised, is the capital of the Pakistan province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, situated in the north-west frontier area of the country near the Afghanistan border. It is the administrative centre for what is known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas which lie between the province and Afghanistan. Peshawar has a history dating back more than two and half thousand years placing it among the oldest in the Asian region.

children were subsequently supported by her parents. Sometime later she wanted to divorce her husband to be free to marry another man she had fallen in love with, a Pakistani Army officer. She had the right to do so under both Islamic law and the laws of Pakistan. Her parents denied permission for the divorce, and on finding out about her relationship the parents, brothers and an uncle expressed anger and violence against her for bringing shame on the family.

Refusing to give up the relationship Samia fled with her lover, leaving her children behind. After a difficult period financially, during which her lover left to return to the Army, Samia ended up in women's shelter. Her mother contacted her daughter ostensibly to reach out to her and to express concern for her well-being. A meeting was arranged in the offices of Samia's lawyer, Ms Hina Jilani, on the 6th April 1999. Arriving late to the meeting, after normal office hours, her Mother entered the office together with her chauffeur. On entering the chauffeur drew a gun, shot and killed Samia.

The lawyer worked hard to have the chauffeur and Mother prosecuted for murder, but the case failed. Under various Pakistani laws murder is a crime against the family and not the State and there is the facility for the family to forgive 'the accused' or to receive recompense in lieu of prosecution. In this case, Samia's father, the head of the family, forgave the chauffeur and the Mother. The judge accepted the family arrangement and the case was then dropped. While there was public outrage and there was an attempt by a small group in Pakistan's national parliament to change laws surrounding honour killings it was not widely supported and did not succeed. In the parliamentary debate not only did most politicians support the status quo some "praised her family's sense of honour" (Appiah, 2011, k. 2381).

Samia's story is not an aberration, it is a not uncommon phenomenon of the power of shame to drive a parent to kill their child. Honour killings quite rightly attract condemnation, and there are attempts to stop them. However, they continue to happen in many parts of the world. In 2000 the United Nations issued a report which included a section addressing the issue of violence against women and girls in which it was estimated that across the world some 5,000 honour killings occur each year. (Chesler, 2010) Such killings are not confined to developing countries and there is an increasing numbers of such killings in both North America and Europe, including cases where the mother is involved(Chesler, 2010). Chesler makes the point that honour killings are a distinctive type of killing with a different genesis and should not

be confused with acts of murder, rage or domestic violence, even when masked as an 'honour killing'.(Chesler, 2010)

What it is to hold a daughter lovingly in one's arms as a parent and then within days that daughter shows up as the source of shame and dishonour in the face of which the appropriate response is killing her is alien to me, I belong to a different culture. However, if Heidegger's analysis is correct, then, as Dasein, our underlying structure functions such that a culture can shape the receptiveness of a person such that in one instance a parent would sacrifice themselves to help their daughter and in another the same parent would kill that same daughter. This seems unpalatable, but the phenomenal evidence and Heidegger's research supports the view. This example also sheds some extra light on what Heidegger means by the 'One' is always right.

In a 2016 Blog in the Pakistan Newspaper, *The Express Tribune*, a Pakistani-American psychiatrist discussed three honour killings that had occurred in Pakistan in the month prior to the blog post as well as the high-profile Samia killing. (Tariq & Bahatti, 2016) There was a tone of urgent outrage in the writing and a call to have 'honour killings' stopped, that "They must be exposed for the inhuman, senseless horror that they are" (Tariq & Bahatti, 2016) Again, if Heidegger is right, then such killings are not 'inhuman' but rather reflect the very fact that we are human, and that understanding and experiencing the world in this way is just one of the many possibilities of the human way of being. If we understand and accept this, then this provides a way forward for different cultures to choose a different way of being. In other words, honour killings must be understood and analysed primarily at the societal level, not the individual level. How the culture understands itself must first change if these killings are to stop.

A Lesson from Mary Guy

In 2003, I had an encounter with a remarkable woman, Mary Guy²⁰⁴, who opened my eyes, concerning the depth to which care services should understand a person's facticity. This example also illustrates the differences in care delivery between leaping-in and leaping ahead.

²⁰⁴ Mary Guy was inducted to the Tasmanian Honour Roll of Women in 2005 and died in 2010. The citation that accompanies her induction to the Honour Roll can be read at http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/divisions/csr/programs_and_services/tasmanian_honour_roll_of_women/inductees/2005/mary_phyllis_guy (accessed 16/3/2016)

Polio had profoundly impacted Mary's body when she was eight years old resulting in quadriplegia, confining her to a wheelchair and being dependent on a full-time carer. Notwithstanding this, she gained qualifications in several areas, became an advocate for change in disability services, served as Chairperson of a national disability organisation, was elected and served on her local council for almost twenty years and raised a family. I got to know Mary while I was working in Tasmania with Strathcare and it was as a result of that association that Mary accepted an invitation to join the Board of Strathcare. While we had numerous conversations about how communities, and institutions, can better support people with disabilities, including aged related disabilities it was one conversation in particular that forever shaped my understanding. We were discussing the model of care I had developed for Strathcare and how it could be improved. After a little while she leaned back and looked at me and said that this was all pretty good stuff (at which I was more than a little pleased as I regarded her views highly), then she said, "but you are missing something fundamental in your understanding". She tried to explain her point to me, but I missed it, so she said, "Let me give you an example." and this is the gist of what she said:

Everything you have said is O.K., but it misses something fundamental, let me explain it to you this way. I have considerable difficulty getting dressed. I cannot get up and go to the drawers and get my underwear or to the wardrobe to get the clothes I want wear. My hands and arms are such that I cannot even put the clothes on and do up the clips and buttons. When my carer comes in they can assist in getting me washed and dressed but it is in the way that it is done that makes all the difference. I have had carers who will come in, check what I want to wear and then proceed to dress me in a way that suits them. They quickly learn that this is not the way the relationship should be. People take for granted and do not recognise that even something as simple as dressing themselves is an expression of who they are. What I look for is someone who can help me even in this fundamental way. To ask me how I want to be dressed and to work with me so I can live my life in the way I chose to live it, even in these small, important things.

I am sure this is not a verbatim account, but I am sure that it is pretty close and every point in it is what Mary clearly and articulately made; more than once in subsequent conversations. Her words hit me like a sledgehammer! I had not even heard of Heidegger at the time, but Mary's account had nailed the concept of service delivery based on responding to a person's being, how they understood themselves, their facticity.

Mary went on to give me examples of how she had carers who, although good people and motivated to be a 'good carer', never got this fundamental point. They

would often make a lot of small decisions for her, without first clarifying with Mary *how she wanted* things done. One of her ‘pet peeves’ was when carers thought they could make decisions about the clothes that would be suitable for her to wear. They only made this mistake once! Her basic approach was to work with a carer, and all she asked was that the carer understood what her (Mary’s) routines were, how she likes to do things and then to support that where possible. Of importance to Mary is that they did not even take this routine for granted, and as they did things just to check, often with a subtle pause, or confirming question if the routine was to be followed or changed. This approach enabled Mary to have control over the “doing of her life” in much the same way as others who could tend to their own daily needs. To put this in the language of the last chapter, Mary was defining the *Dasein-with* relationship on the basis that the carer understood they were helping Mary with her life, that in their *being-with* Mary that carers avoided *leaping-in* and operated more from the perspective closer to *leaping ahead* in their *solicitudinous* actions with her. To respond to Mary’s facticity and not to respond to the factuality of her physical condition. Mary was highly skilled and very competent. She could stipulate the way care should be delivered, and she had the forcefulness of character and the skills to both ensure that a carer complied as well as to provide the carer with the skills and knowledge to do the work in the manner provided. As in any employment relationship, if the carer did not do what was required then the consequences were, eventually, loss of the job. What struck me at the time, and still does, is the utter simplicity of Mary’s request, the ease with which it could be fulfilled and the benefits that can flow. It is not, however, reflective of the normal approach taken in the delivery of services in either community or residential aged care.

Examples of the Range of Receptiveness

The Carpenter²⁰⁵

Honour killings are confronting examples of the way that our affective-tuning is such that even a daughter can be encountered as something shameful to be killed. However human receptivity is extremely broad, and I want to provide different types of examples to demonstrate this. In the early part of the chapter it was mentioned that all the senses are part of the structure of receptiveness and this example from

²⁰⁵ I have used the story of the carpenter and the cook earlier, but this time I am highlighting different aspects in the story relating to Heidegger’s work.

the writings of Zhuangzi²⁰⁶ (370BCE-287BCE), a Chinese Daoist, demonstrates this point;

When I chisel a wheel,' says the carpenter ... 'if the stroke is too slow it slides and does not grip, if too fast it jams and catches in the wood. Not too slow, not too fast; I feel it in the hand and respond from the heart, the tongue cannot put it into words, there is a knack in it somewhere which I cannot convey to my son and which my son cannot learn from me. (Zhuangzi, 2001, p. 6)

The thing to note is the descriptions associated with the 'sense'. In learning to use the chisel, to be a worker with wood, the skill is not cognitive; it is a know-how that is associated with how things 'feel'. Whereas we can 'teach' facts, transmit them so to speak, the 'feel' that is required to become a carpenter is not something that can be passed on or taught, it something that arises out of the engagement by the person themselves in the task and learning what the 'feel' is telling them. The skill itself is of value to the culture, it is needed to produce wheels and wagons. To be a carpenter is to be concerned about what is being produced and this, in turn, requires that how the chisel shapes the wood matters to the carpenter. This is an example of affective-tuning that arises between the carpenter and the wood. Together with the referential unity of equipment, there was the unity of involvements, and all of these have their 'mattering'.

The Cook

This aspect of affective-tuning can be extended into mastery in that striving to be excellent at something becomes part of what matters. Another example from Zhuangzi, this time a description of a master cook cutting up an ox;

Cook Ting was carving an ox for Lord Wen-hui. As his hand slapped, shoulder lunged, foot stamped, knee crooked, with a hiss! with a thud! the brandished blade as it sliced never missed the rhythm, now in time with the Mulberry Forest dance, now with an orchestra playing the Ching-shou.

"Oh, excellent!" said Lord Wen-hui. "That skill should attain such heights!"

'What your servant cares about is the Way, I have left skill behind me. When I first began to carve oxen, I saw nothing but oxen wherever I looked. Three years more and I never saw an ox as a whole. Nowadays, I am in touch through the daemonic in me, and do not look with the eye. With the senses I know where to stop, the daemonic I desire to run its course. I rely on Heaven's structuring, cleave along the main seams, let myself be guided by the main cavities, go by what is inherently so. (Zhuangzi, 2001, pp. 63-4) (my underlining)

²⁰⁶ Zhuangzi is also known as Zhuang Zhou and Chuang-Tzū

We see in this a phenomenological description that foreshadows the much later work of the Dreyfus brothers in describing the progress from novice to mastery in a skill acquisition. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980; Dreyfus, 2004) Cook Ting no longer needs to think about what he is doing; he proceeds by sensing, guided by the ox itself. However not only is there the receptiveness of the sense evident but the overarching affective-mode “cares about the Way” and the desire to let the daemonic in him “run its course”. In this example, receptivity and know-how (understanding) are very clearly inseparable, as Heidegger suggests should be the case. In mastery, the receptivity working with know-how shows up only the involvements as mattering, and the appropriate responses are drawn from Cook Ting without him having to make a decision. In other words Cook Ting responds without conscious thought.

The Soccer Player

Merleau-Ponty described the relationship of a soccer player while playing a game as follows;

For the player in action the soccer field is not an ‘object’. It is pervaded with lines of force (the ‘yard lines’; those which demarcate the ‘penalty area’) and is articulated into sectors (for example, the ‘openings’ between the adversaries), which call for a certain mode of action. The field itself is not given to [the player], but present as the immanent term of his practical intentions; the player becomes one with it and feels the direction of the ‘goal’ for example, just as immediately as the vertical and the horizontal planes of his own body...At this moment consciousness is nothing but the dialectic of milieu and action. Each manoeuvre undertaken by the player modifies the character of the field and establishes new lines of force in which the action in turn unfolds and is accomplished, again altering the phenomenal field (Merleau-Ponty, 1965, pp. 168-9)

While Heidegger splits his discussion on the two aspect that hold open our ‘there’, receptivity and understanding, he makes it clear at the beginning of the discussion that they are bound together, each receptivity has its understanding and vice-versa [BT 172/134]. Just as this ‘working in unison’ was evident in the Daoist examples it is also evident in Merleau-Ponty’s description of the soccer player notwithstanding his use of different metaphors.

Heidegger mentioned that we have a receptivity to all our senses and in the case of a professional soccer player at work are probably the senses of proprioception (spatial) and equilibrioception (balance) that are operating. We all develop these senses as we learn to walk and ride a bike. When riding a bike one of the things that matters to Dasein is staying upright, and our structure constantly adjusts the way

we are riding to ensure this occurs. Our body does this without any conscious effort on our part once we have learnt to ride; indeed, it is better if we do not consciously try to maintain balance, we are liable to fall.

Typically, once we have learnt to walk or ride 'mattering' is not readily evident to us, but it suddenly gets thrust to the fore if we become worried about tripping e.g. walking on a slippery, rocky path, or the bike moves awkwardly under us. As soon as we sense that our body is no longer responding appropriately to keeping us upright, we may throw our arms out, squat down or in some other way move our body because we sense the looming fall and staying upright matters.

Mattering Drops Away

We can occasionally observe the dropping away of mattering, and when this occurs, we can notice that the world that was once held open, is now closed off. The philosopher Havi Carel gives an account of her experiences after being diagnosed with Lymphangiomyomatosis (LAM) a degenerative lung disease. Confined to a wheelchair, she was forced to live only downstairs in her house. Not being able to access the upstairs she slowly lost interest in being able to go upstairs, and with this loss of interest, the upstairs ceased to matter to her. When going upstairs ceased to matter it then disappeared from her environment, and she hardly noticed its presence. (Carel, 2008)

Section 2: Understanding

This chapter is discussing the two equiprimordial structures that maintain Dasein's openness to the 'there', receptiveness and understanding.

In *understanding* and *receptiveness*, we shall see the two constitutive ways of being the "there"; and these are equiprimordial. [BT 171-2/133]

A receptiveness always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding is always affectively-attuned. [BT 182/143] (my translation)

In the previous section on receptivity it was identified that it could be considered at three 'levels', the bare structure of receptiveness (*Befindlichkeit*) that underlies all Daseins, the structure as it is made concrete in a particular Dasein, predominately through the actions of the 'One' and then when it is expressed, i.e. the basis for showing up an entity in the way it matters to Dasein. The structure of receptivity can also be considered from two perspectives, firstly the various modes of

receptivity that may impact on Dasein, the affective-modes (*Stimmung*) and the way in which Dasein is currently experiencing an affective-mode, Dasein's affective-attunement (*Gestimmtsein*). While receptivity embraces all types of affective-modes from feeling hungry, to feeling the tightness of a screw, to wanting to care for someone, or engaging in some pink lustre china, in *Being and Time* Heidegger is primarily concerned with the affective-modes that related to Dasein's primary ways of being, and his case example is what he calls moods. Heidegger's claim is that something must first show up for us as intelligible and in a mode of mattering to us before we can make any actions towards that entity. This is the case for both compartments towards the ready-to-hand (concern) and compartments towards other Dasein (solicitude). The confronting example provided that illustrates the power of receptivity was the case of Samia Sarwar's honour killing by her mother. In this section, the discussion shifts to the structural aspect of understanding.

What is essential to grasp that is contrary to the ordinary conception of understanding is that, as Heidegger uses the term, understanding reflects who we are. Understanding is therefore ontological, and should not be viewed as something we have. Heidegger makes this point very early in *Being and Time*,

The question of existence is one of Dasein's ontical 'affairs'. This does not require that the ontological structure of existence should be theoretically transparent. The question about that structure aims at the analysis of what constitutes existence. The context of such structures we call "*existentiality*". Its analytic has the character of an understanding which is not existentiell, but rather *existential*. [BT 33/12]

To put this a different way, Heidegger does not deny that we have the experience of understanding something, just that it is primarily an expression of who we are. How Samia's mother understood what was happening with her daughter was not something that existed separately to herself, it was an expression of who she was, based on the deeper understanding of the world in which she lives and her place in that world. The development of the understanding of world and self that determines who the Mother *is*, is a complicated process and making fundamental changes to that understanding essentially means a self-transformation, i.e. the structure of understanding associated with world and self must undergo a radical change. Along with this, the affective-capacities that accompany understanding must also change.

The same three levels of analysis that applied to receptiveness are applicable to understanding; understanding as the bare structure applicable to all Dasein, understanding as the structure 'filled in' or made concrete in a particular Dasein and

understanding expressed in a comportment. Similarly, to other concepts understanding must be understood very broadly and covers a range of modes which Heidegger designates as falling under this broader use of the term understanding, e.g.

If we Interpret understanding as a fundamental *existentiale*, this indicates that this phenomenon is conceived as a basic mode of Dasein's *Being*. On the other hand, 'understanding' in the sense of *one* possible kind of cognizing among others (as distinguished, for instance, from 'explaining'), must, like explaining, be Interpreted as an existential derivative of that primary understanding which is one of the constituents of the being of the "there" in general. [BT 182/143]

Heidegger's method, albeit not always clear, is to move from the ontic (existentiell) expression of a phenomenon to the ontological account. However, when he discusses understanding, it is often difficult to know which level he is referring. The following is an example;

Understanding constitutes rather the being of the "there" in such a way that, on the basis of such understanding, a Dasein can, in existing, develop the different possibilities of sight, of looking around, and of just looking. In all explanation one uncovers understandingly that which one cannot understand; and all explanation is thus rooted in Dasein's primary understanding.

If the term "understanding" is taken in a way which is primordially existential, it means *to be projecting towards an ability-to-be for the sake of which any Dasein exists*. [BT 385/336] (translation modified)

All the various 'levels' of understanding are displayed in this passage, and unless one grasps this in terms of Heidegger's basic approach, then it is almost incomprehensible. Heidegger will often use the designator "primordial" when referring to the bare structure, "primary" when referring to it at the Dasein-ontological level and simply as something understood, interpreting, explaining, etc. when it is an expression of an 'action' at the ontic level. As the above passage indicates, understanding is a necessary *a priori* structure for Dasein to have an existence; this will be addressed below.

In the discussion of being-there as understanding (BT §31), Heidegger's primary emphasis is the role structural understanding plays in the structure of existence of an existing Dasein and does not bother explicitly identifying when he shifts between the primordial and primary modes of understanding. Providing that there is awareness of this, it makes little difference to what he is presenting, and I will not comment on it specifically unless there is an essential point to make. Heidegger

commences his work on understanding where he left off in his analysis on worldhood. He equates being-there to being-in;

To say that in existing, Dasein is its "there", is equivalent to saying that the world is 'there'; its *being-there* is being-in. And the latter is likewise 'there', as that for the sake of which Dasein is. [BT 182/143]

We need to recall that Heidegger differentiates the entity that is world with Dasein's understanding of world which is the 'there' of Dasein. In that understanding is a structure of the 'there', Heidegger is clarifying that he is talking about Dasein being-in its understanding of world, its 'there'; hence the equivalence of the term *being-there*. Being aware of this shift is crucial to following his argument. Being-in-the-world, then, refers to Dasein's understanding of world.

In the prior analysis, Heidegger concluded that it was on the basis of the "for-the-sake-of-which" that a Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is disclosed and it is this disclosure that Heidegger calls understanding. [BT 182/143] Heidegger now restates this in a series of important points. Firstly,

In the understanding of the "for-the-sake-of-which", the significance which is grounded therein, is disclosed along with it. [BT 182/143]


He then makes a statement that summarises all his previous work on worldhood,

The disclosedness of understanding, as the disclosedness of the "for-the-sake-of-which" and of meaningfulness equiprimordially, pertains to the entirety of being-in-the-world. Meaningfulness is that on the basis of which the world is disclosed as such. To say that the "for-the-sake-of-which" and meaningfulness are both disclosed in Dasein, means that Dasein is that entity which, as being-in-the-world, is an issue for itself. [BT 182/143] (translation modified)

This can be mapped out as per Figure 22. At this level, we need to forget any notion of understanding pertaining to understanding anything in particular, e.g. understanding your way around the house. The function of structure understanding is to disclose Dasein's understanding of the world (meaningfulness) and its 'for-the-sake-of-which' at the same time. Using the language of the earlier section, Dasein assigns itself to involvements on the basis of what 'matters' to it, this is the relevance that Dasein's being-in-the-world is an issue for it, i.e. it is what it is concerned about, what matters to it. Again, recalling the above section, this typically has nothing to do with any conscious decision, albeit it could.

Quick Move to Ability-to-be

Recognising the possibility of confusion Heidegger clarifies the way he is using the



technical term 'understanding' compared with its common usage.

When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression 'understanding something' with the signification of 'being able to manage something', 'being a match for it', 'being competent to do something'. [BT 183/144]

However, he retains the essential meaning of the word when using it to describe the ontological or constitutive structure.

In understanding, as an *existentiale*, that which we have such competence over is not a "what", but being as existing. The kind of being which Dasein has, as an ability-to-be lies

existentially in understanding. [BT 183/144] (translation modified) (my underlining)

Even though we do have the ability (understanding or competency) to do something, this is not a possession, it is, along with all the other abilities, the necessary condition for Dasein's existence, its being. Heidegger is making the claim that understanding is determinative of Dasein, i.e. it is ontological. To test this, it can be asked if it is possible for Dasein to exist if it has absolutely no ability to involve itself with things ready-to-hand. In such a case the entity would not be a Dasein. This is the point made at the beginning of the chapter. If then Dasein is constituted, at least in part by understanding, then Dasein is definitely not ...

... something present-at-hand which possesses its competence for something by way of an extra ... [BT183/143]

This point is crucial. He is stating very clearly that we are not some entity (soul, ego, I, self, mind, body mechanism, etc.) that then learns to do various things. Along with this the idea that we are some 'seed' that tended well will grow into the full potential already in the seed and actualise into a person is also rejected; this approach assumes that Dasein is already in existence as potential. The similar notion that we are a *'tabula rasa'*, merely requiring the 'right' material to be 'written' within us, is also rejected. This is the model that Dasein and its understandings are two separate things. For Heidegger, as ability-to-be, Dasein finds itself in what it does, which arise from the involvements to which it has 'assigned' itself, which are on the basis of what 'matters' to it. Who we are is our ability-to-be.

From Ability-to-Be to Being-Possible

While the move to describing Dasein as ability-to-be is logical and flows from the preceding discussion, it is nonetheless swift and passes-by almost without notice. *It is the crucial move that allows Heidegger to take his descriptive analysis into a new direction, that of possibilities.* At any one time, as ability-to-be, Dasein has before it possibilities in dealing with people, equipment and so on that must be taken up in order for its ability-to-be to be expressed.

Dasein is not something present-at-hand ... it is primarily being-possible. Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility. The being-possible which is essential for Dasein, pertains to the ways of its solicitude for Others and of its concern with the 'world', as we have characterized them; and in all these, and always, it pertains to Dasein's ability-to-be towards itself, for the sake of itself. [BT 183/143] (my underlining)

Dasein turns the possibility-actualised relationship of present-at-hand entities on its head. When something is being built, the object shifts from being possible to being

actual and it is only the entity it is when completed. Even something like common salt only becomes useful when it's potential is actualised, e.g. when added to food. The priority of the present-at-hand lies in being actualised. *For Dasein to have an existence it must at every moment be-possible*, the priority lies in the potential for taking up possibilities. Once we have completed the current activity, we must always have something else to move on to, or else we cease being Dasein. Such is the nature of a dynamic structure.

Do we have before us a virtual smorgasbord of unlimited possibilities as the self-help books portray? No, Heidegger rejects this notion, what he calls a “free-floating ability-to-be in the sense of the ‘liberty of indifference’”. [BT 183/144] Where do these possibilities come from? The answer lies in our receptiveness,

In every case Dasein, as essentially having affective-modes, has already got itself into definite possibilities. As the ability-to-be which it *is*, it has let such possibilities pass by; it is constantly waiving the possibilities of its being, or else it seizes upon them and makes mistakes. [BT 183/144] (translation modified)

Things matter to us, and it is on the basis of mattering that we have already assigned our self to in-order-to structures. For example, Marion Miller was a collector of pink lustre china and before moving into the nursing home possibilities for engaging in the activities associated with being a collector would have shown up for her. But possibilities for being are broad. If a dog shows up as frightening, this opens up possible ways of comportment towards the dog. We can move away, or perhaps steel our self and walk past at a small distance and so on. This could not happen if we did not have an understanding of ‘dog’ and did not have ‘being frightened’ as the affective -mode associated with dogs, i.e. we could not be attuned to the dog in the mode of being frightened, the dog would not matter to us. If we are on the way for an appointment, we may see a friend who suggests we have a quick coffee, but we let this possibility ‘pass by’ because we have something of a more pressing concern. Whether it is being a collector, a person frightened of dogs, a friend and so on, possibilities for being the Dasein with these characteristics already exist because of the structure of Dasein’s ‘there’, i.e. understanding and receptivity.

We have a rich mixture of receptivities which determine how things show up as mattering to us, and it is because of that rich mixture that we will often have multiple and competing possibilities. It could be something as simple as waiting at the café counter trying to decide between two favourite menu items. A young person having

done well at high school may have multiple possibilities in terms of which university to attend and which course to study. In one's employment, there are choices between working late and spending time with the family. Because of our receptivities, a significant number of options that are more broadly available do not even show up as possibilities for us. What does show up are the "definite possibilities" that we have "already [got] our self into" because we have affective-modes associated with certain understandings. In making choices we have let other "possibilities pass by" and in those choices, we sometimes make mistakes.

In that our receptivity is the basis of our thrownness into the world, when described using the phenomenon of possibilities this means that

... Dasein is being-possible which has been delivered over to *itself - thrown possibility* through and through. [BT 183/144]

Because it is our receptiveness as affective-modes which allow what matters for us to show up as possibilities, then we are our self,

... the possibility of being-free for [our] ability-to-be. [183/144]

This is the same language that Heidegger used in relation to the ready-to-hand being freed for involvements and the Dasein-with of others being freed for our dealings with them. It is thus the structure of Dasein (ontological) that is the basis of freeing Dasein itself (as the entity) such that possibilities to be the Dasein show up and can be either seized upon or passed by. Whereas the entities ready-to-hand and the Dasein-with of others must be freed by Dasein before it can engage with them, Dasein is freed for its own being only as long as possibilities exist, i.e. possible involvements not yet taken up. Those possibilities are not just any possibilities they relate to its for-sake-of-which. Possibilities have a future orientation and completes the temporal characteristic of the dynamic process. Dasein's thrownness represents the past in which understanding, and receptivity are established, possibilities occur as a result of thrownness and represents the future, and fallenness is the taking up of possibilities and represents the present. For a Dasein to be itself, it must be continually moving into possibilities, based on its receptivity.

Heidegger's description relates to Dasein in its average everydayness. Dasein is, as thrown-possibility, going about its daily activities in an environment in which possibilities for being will be encountered, almost as a matter of course. By and large, as Marion Miller attests, this is not the case in a nursing home. Marion is still

structurally Marion, she has no choice in this, but to be Marion requires possibilities that can be taken up that reflect her primary understanding of herself. These possibilities are associated with such things as her social and political involvements, pink lustre china collection and so forth. The possibilities for these encounters do not exist in the nursing home, and the detrimental mattering arises from the absence of such possibilities. If this is the case, the 'shedding of life' that Marion describes is associated with the absence of possibilities for her to be Marion.

Ability-for-being-in-the-world and possibilities

As an ability-to-be, any being-in must be ability-for-being-in-the-world. Looked at from this perspective, then the entities that are ready-to-hand within the world and which are freed for Dasein when disclosed by Dasein's understanding, are

... freed for *its own* possibilities. That which is ready-to-hand is discovered as such in its serviceability, its usability, The totality of involvements is revealed as the categorial whole of a *possible* interconnection of the ready-to-hand. [BT 184/144] (emphasis in the English text)

This is another example of Heidegger cycling back to describe earlier dealt with phenomena from the current perspective. This time Heidegger emphasises explicitly the suffix, *-ability*, of these words drawing the connection with Dasein's own ability-to-be.

We need to be careful at this point for Heidegger is not referring to the world in a detached sense as he was when he was describing the unity of equipment and relational unity. Heidegger is describing the world, or more particularly the entities in the world from the perspective of an existing Dasein in terms of that Dasein's discovery of the entities such it can have involvements with them. In other words, Dasein's understanding of them in terms of being able to be involved with them; this is know-how not know-what understanding.

Just as we can understand Dasein in terms of its ability-to-be or it's being-possible we can understand ready-to-hand entities, from the perspective of Dasein, not in the language of involvements, but as abilities to be taken up as part of Dasein's ability-to-be. If we were to review the world of the nursing home in terms of its suitability to sustaining the worlding of the older Dasein's world, we could simply inquire from the perspective of each older Dasein as to the accessibility to ready-to-hand entities that match the ability-to-be of the older Dasein and that show up as mattering. I think the results of the review are self-evident for most of the older Daseins.

Proximally and for the most part things do not show up for us as mattering in terms of their abilities (e.g. serviceability) but rather in terms of their possibilities (i.e. usability). When I'm in my shed and the tools are lying around I tend to ignore the hammer until I need it. What I am engaged in at the time, (the 'in-order-to' for the sake-of), reflects who I am, (my for-sake-of-which) and this opens up the possibilities associated with that task. If that task does not require the hammer, it does not show up in terms of its possibilities, notwithstanding I understand what it is.

On this basis Heidegger observes that regardless of what is possible for understanding to disclose, it will "always press forward into possibilities" and it does so because of its existential structure "projection" [BT 184-5/145]. What was the projection of understanding in terms of involvement has now been clarified as the projection of understanding onto possibilities disclosed in the world on the basis of their mattering to us, i.e. receptiveness. At the same time understanding

... projects Dasein's being both upon its "for-the-sake-of-which" and upon meaningfulness, as the worldhood of its current world. [BT 185/145]

Understanding brings together for Dasein the understanding of Dasein's being-possible, which is based on its ability-to-be, and the understanding of the entities in the world as meaningful in terms of their possibilities for Dasein's being-possible. It is our 'understanding' (i.e. the structure as filed in) that understands what is meaningful for Dasein in terms of possibilities and projects itself upon these possibilities when they show up in the world.

Recalling the nature of the reciprocal relationship of serviceability and usability of the in-order-to structure and the reciprocal relationship of the Dasein-with structure, we have the same basic reciprocal relationship occurring with possibilities. Dasein is always being-possible understood in terms of its ability-to-be. Those possibilities must be expressed for Dasein to be the Dasein it is. Dasein, therefore, needs possibilities within the world that match its being-possible; this is the reciprocal relationship. Only insofar as understanding can project itself on possibilities that are in the world does Dasein have the possibility of taking them up or passing them over. If those possibilities are not in the world, then nothing shows up as mattering to Dasein in terms of how Dasein understands itself. In effect, its ability-to-be who it is remains un-expressed. If unexpressed then there are no meaningful compartments, no meaningful lived experience.

Because the projection of understanding can only take place on the basis of Dasein's thrownness,

And as thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of being which we call "projecting". [BT 185/145]

If the structure of Dasein is one of projection, then the following conclusion is reached;

.... any Dasein has, as Dasein already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities. [BT 185/145]

Heidegger has already used the concept of projection and understanding, that was in relation to understanding the ready-to-hand. This time he extends the idea. In that we are understanding, we project our self not onto the ready-to-hand entities as such, but onto the possibility that these entities hold for us and our ability-to-be.

We can only project our self onto possibilities on the basis of having already understood our self and assigned our self to the various in-order-to structures based on our concern for our own being. In other words, the possibilities onto which we will project our-self have already been determined. In effect, the projection has already occurred, it is not arbitrary.

This brings us back once more to the environment of the nursing home. The question to ask is: What are the possibilities that arise that match the being-projected of Dasein? The older Dasein can look around all it likes, in most instances, the projecting will fall fallow. Possibilities that allow the being-possible of Dasein will not show up. What Dasein's projecting reveals is a mostly meaningless world. In the main, the only substantial possibility is to take up an understanding of self (primary for-the-sake-of-which) as the Dasein-with of nursing home resident and the Dasein-with as a fellow resident. While some may do this, I suspect the majority do not. In that, the living environment into which the older person is thrust is almost exclusively determined by government regulation, the nursing home operators and staff, the moral and ethical question that arises is the sufficiency of that environment provided, such that this minimal mode being-possible is virtually all that is left to the older person.

Heidegger's work in terms of the Dasein analytic continues a little further, primarily exploring being-there as the basis for language, the derivative character of interpretation and the beginnings of an inquiry into logic, i.e. the basis of assertion.

I do not intend to follow the rest of the analysis in detail as my aim in laying out the basic structure such that a structural understanding of shedding of life is disclosed, and this has been achieved. In the following, I briefly discuss only those concepts that may be useful in filling out the Dasein analytic.

Interpretation

At the opening of the section on Understanding and Interpretation (BT §32), there is a useful summary

As understanding, Dasein projects its being upon possibilities. This being-towards-possibilities which understands is itself an ability-to-be, and it is so because of the way these possibilities, as disclosed, exert their counter-thrust [*Rückschlag*] upon Dasein. The projecting of the understanding has its own possibility - that of developing itself. This development of the understanding we call "interpretation". [BT 188/148]

There are two points in this I want to note, firstly the comment on counter-thrust and, secondly, the distinction between understanding and interpretation. The idea of a counter-thrust is that there is a projection from Dasein on to the possibilities and a movement from the possibility back towards Dasein. This is similar to my interpretation of 'mattering' as being a movement towards Dasein in the encounter and Heidegger's description that moods assail us. In this case, it is the phenomenal description at the ontic level that it is the things themselves that hold the possibility and 'offer' them to Dasein. Note, however, that the first movement in relation to understanding and possibilities is from Dasein's structure outwards.

Heidegger is not suggesting that somehow the hammer understands its own possibilities and then thrusts (projects) this possibility-for-being on us; this is nonsensical. As a philosophical strict empiricist Heidegger is not trying to account for the physical mechanism that does the work, he is describing the empirical observations in the context of the logical sequence of events that are occurring. In the description, there are events occurring at the ontological level and the ontic level. The ontological level involves understanding projecting itself towards possibilities, and this is "disclosed" to Dasein by way of experiencing the awareness of the possibility; such experiences appear to come from the world and not from its structure. By way of example: I am doing some woodwork and need to hammer a nail into the wood. I have the ability to use a hammer, and because of this, the hammer has been previously freed for involvements in hammering. However, in this section, Heidegger refers to this as the hammer now holds possibilities for me, in this case the possibility for hammering a nail. As I need the hammer, my (prior)

understanding (ability to use the hammer) projects itself onto the hammer understood as a possibility for hammering. This is the reciprocal relationship. This is then experienced as the hammer being-possible for hammering for me; this is the counter-thrust.

What Heidegger does not make clear is that all this may occur either below the level of conscious awareness or with varying degrees of awareness. For example, once when I was repairing a small wooden toy I needed to hold several things in place and then nail in a brad (small thin gauge nail). As I was doing this my hand reached out for the tack hammer, and I started hammering. The reaching for the hammer was done with no deliberation or conscious awareness; my entire focus was on holding the pieces together. The descriptions of the cook carving the ox have this element.

This example also illustrates Heidegger's two levels of intentionality. There is the more 'radical' intentional structure of the 'there' this time discussed on the basis of disclosing the possibilities being offered by the hammer, and the second level of intentionality, the concerned dealings with the hammer, i.e. the hammering. Unless there is the prior disclosure of possibilities, then there is no hammering!

If the idea of a 'counter thrust' is understood as experiencing opportunities (possibilities) of involvement with an entity, either as concern or solicitude, then this provides a way to gain useful insights for Dasein. If there is little or no positive 'counter-thrust' experienced by a Dasein in its environment, then what is being encountered holds little in the way of possibilities for Dasein's ability-to-be. In that in "every case Dasein ... has already got itself into definite possibilities" [183/144] if Dasein is to have the possibility to "be-itself" such a circumstance can only be addressed by a change in environment or by Dasein making a deliberate change in its understanding of self to match the possibilities for being offered by its environment. In the case of living in a nursing home, or any institution both alternatives are problematic. The latter option is one that I would tentatively associate with the phenomenon of "institutionalisation"; this would need further investigation to reach a more definite conclusion.

I now address the second part of the passage, understanding as interpretation. For Heidegger interpretation is the moment when the ontological understanding of an entity (at the abstract level) is applied to a specific ontic thing (the entity level);

The 'as' makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is understood. It constitutes the interpretation. In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it circumspectively, we 'see' it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge. [BT 189/149]

For Heidegger then an interpretation is not

... the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding. [BT188-9/148]

Interpretation then only occurs when we encounter (deal with) an entity and understanding it in terms of the possibilities it offers as the entity it is. In that Heidegger has already stipulated that our dealings can take many forms, e.g. planning, the entity does not have to be physically present. Given this, interpretation is grounded in understanding, not the other way around. To reinforce the point that we 'never' simply interpret something by 'adding' some function to an object Heidegger states;

In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'meaning' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation. [BT190-1/150] (translation modified)

This passage contains three ways in which 'involvements' is applied. The first is that before we are aware of an entity in the world it "already has an involvement". This is a statement of Heidegger's view that entities are what they are irrespective of an individual Dasein, i.e. it is a realist position. The second is the 'involvement' as "is disclosed in our understanding" and the third is this 'involvement' *as understood*, which "gets laid out by the interpretation". That we do not "throw a 'meaning' over some naked thing" is also a clear statement by Heidegger against understanding his work as a species of neo-Kantian constructivism. While Dasein is the only entity that can understand the meaning, the meaning is derived from the world, not imposed on the world. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility of error, however, by and large, as was discussed in the chapter on culture, the 'One' works in a way that tends to 'correct' wrong interpretations.

Interpretation occurs whenever we deal with anything as something. However, the last thing we need when interpreting a cup of coffee, a spoon, the table it is standing on and so on is to have all the 'inter-relationships' that constitute this particular unity of equipment to be glaring at us; we would never see the entities we are dealing with! From an ontic perspective, all this takes place in the background;

The ready-to-hand is always understood in terms of a unity of involvements. This totality need not be grasped explicitly by a thematic interpretation. Even if it has undergone such an interpretation, it recedes into an understanding which does not stand out from the background. And this is the very mode in which it is the essential foundation for everyday circumspective interpretation. [BT 191/150] (my underlining)

So just like the light in the room discloses what is in the room but in so doing recedes into the background unnoticed, so it is with our understanding of the background unity of involvements and interpretation.

Meaning

Once the structure of being-in-the-world is understood, Heidegger's concept of meaning is relatively easy to grasp. Heidegger's first step is to re-present a description that was used in the chapter on worldhood, i.e. that worldhood can be understood as the unity of what is meaningful to Dasein.

Entities within-the-world generally are projected upon the world - that is, upon a unity of meaningfulness, to whose reference-relations concern, as being-in-the-world, has been tied up in advance. [BT 192/151]

The next step is to indicate that when an entity is understood on the basis of being part of that unity, it is said to have meaning.

When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the being of Dasein - that is, when they have come to be understood - we say that they have *meaning [Sinn]*. [BT 192/151]

The phrase "along with the being of Dasein" refers to the basis by which Dasein assigned itself to a particular 'in-order-to' (meaning) structure in the first place, i.e. on the basis of its for-the-sake-of-which. Meaning then is the name attributed to the understanding of an entity in the context of its place in the referential unity of a world, i.e. its being.

It is at this point that Heidegger introduces another one of his wordplays that will carry over to another concept, discourse.

That which can be Articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, we call "meaning". The *concept of meaning* embraces the formal existential framework of what necessarily belongs to that which an understanding interpretation Articulates²⁰⁷. [BT 193/152]

There are two ways in which 'articulated' can be understood; the first is as a joint in

²⁰⁷ The translators note [BT 195 note 1] indicate the German words *artikulieren* and *gliedern* are virtually synonymous. The emphasis on *artikulieren* (Articulate) appears to be on the joints on which something gets divided, and *gliedern* (articulate) emphasis on the parts or members of the joint. However, the verb *artikulieren*, is also used in speech as in "He went on to articulate his position". It is this linkage that Heidegger is drawing.

some structure, e.g. the articulate joint of a skeleton, and the second is in speech. Heidegger will use this as a pun when he discusses discourse. In the case of meaning, he is applying the first use of the word. The meaning of an entity can be envisaged as the 'joint' at which the 'in-order-to's meet, e.g. the junction of a serviceability and usability. This is what gets "Articulated" in understanding, i.e. the emphasis is not on the 'connecting' aspects of the structure but rather the entity itself *understood as something*. The 'connecting' aspects are what recedes into the background. It must be kept in mind that it is not the physical present-at-hand aspect of the entity that gets 'Articulated' it is the entity understood in terms of its involvements, its serviceability or usability or its possibilities. What has been 'Articulated' can then be 'articulated' in speech; the pun laid out!²⁰⁸

Heidegger carries over the language of 'articulation' into his discussion on discourse which I address in the next section. He also uses the terminology of meaning and meaningful to describe the same phenomenon he has been addressing and describing in different ways throughout his analysis of Dasein's structure:

Meaning is the "upon-which" of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something [BT 193/152]

Meaning, however, is what is 'Articulated' by Dasein as part of the unity of meaningfulness, i.e. worldhood. In that worldhood is an *existentiale* of Dasein, i.e. part of Dasein's structure, then one would expect that meaning must also be understood as part of Dasein's structure, and this proves to be the case;

In so far as understanding and interpretation make up the existential constitution of the being of the "there", "meaning" must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness which belongs to understanding. Meaning is an *existentiale* of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, [BT 193/151] (translation modified)

In that understanding, along with receptivity, holds open the 'there', the structural process by which understanding discloses entities is called 'meaning'. So, while meaning may be derived from the world, meaning itself is something that belongs only to Dasein. The conclusion then is that Dasein itself

... only 'has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of being-in-the-world can be 'filled in' by the entities discoverable in that disclosedness. *Hence only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless*. That is to say, its own being and the entities disclosed with its being can be appropriated in understanding, or can remain relegated to non-understanding. [BT 193/151]

²⁰⁸ While it is a pun, it is also another example of Heidegger's use of the same or similar words or similar meaning words to describe different levels of Dasein, i.e. the structural and the ontic.

Dasein's meaning then is dependent on discovering entities in the world (the 'there'), and this only occurs on the basis of its own understanding of self (i.e. its being) which is the basis by which it assigns itself to meaning structures in the world.

If we place this in context of the rest of the chapter, then Dasein's meaning is found in its 'there', i.e. it is to be found in the way that entities in the world show up as mattering for Dasein. Dasein's meaningfulness can be envisaged as the articulation point between being-possible and the possibilities-for-being disclosed in the world. Dasein's meaning then is found in the unity of reciprocal relationships between Dasein's ability-to-be and those entities upon which Dasein's possibility-for-being are projected. In other words, there must be entities in Dasein's environment which can be "appropriate in understanding" for the sake-of-which Dasein is; only then is Dasein meaningful.

If we take "being meaningful" as a positive expression of Dasein's ability-to-be who it is, i.e. an expression of what it means to be a particular Dasein, then "being meaningful" is not a static characteristic, it is dynamic. This reflects the dynamic nature of Dasein's structure, being-in-the-world. In that Dasein has always already taken up a certain ability-to-be then there are two possible breakdown cases that are relevant to aged-care. Firstly a 'breakdown in world' and secondly a 'breakdown in Dasein's structure.'

I take a 'breakdown' in world to occur when entities which have the possibility for being "appropriated in understanding" for the sake-of Dasein's being are absent. This has already been discussed. However, in the language of this section, if entities do not show up as meaningful, then, in turn, Dasein does not have the possibility for "being meaningful", and as long as this circumstance prevails then Dasein is "meaningless". This is a structural description, not a value judgement. However, as a description of the structural aspect, it should have an ontic manifestation, and this becomes the experience of the world losing its meaning, or of life losing its meaning. I take this to be an alternative description of 'shedding life', the movement from "being-meaningful" to "being-meaningless". It is also reflected in Regina's cries quote earlier, "They don't know the meaning of me!" (Heliker & Scholler-Jaquish, 2006, p. 38)

A 'breakdown of Dasein' would indicate a breakdown at the structural level. For example, if a Dasein has dementia and consequentially, the ability to discover

entities in the world in their ready-to-hand mode is diminished, then the meaningfulness of lived experiences will also be diminished. The challenge for care providers then is to ensure environments contain the greatest chance of presenting possibilities for a person with dementia are created and sustained. Removing people to bland, institutionalised, 'safe' dementia units, heavily populated and devoid of meaningful entities for the person exacerbate the impact of dementia and do not support the person's residual abilities. Hope for a meaningful existence, even if not at the same level experienced in the past, is potentially crushed by such environments from a Heideggerian perspective. The same applies, of course, to people who retain their full capacity to project their understating in a meaningful way.

Heidegger's analysis of meaning has the potential for grounding the research that links a Dasein with its environment in terms of meaningfulness. This is an area of research that urgently needs to be pursued in relation to the provision of aged care services.

This completes the discussion of understanding, possibilities and meaning.

Understanding: Illustrative Examples

When unpacking Heidegger's work, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that he is presenting a description of a person engaged in the activities of life, i.e. their existence. This being the case at every point we should be able to identify examples or provide ways of illustrating the phenomena that Heidegger is presenting. I have been doing this periodically, and the following are provided in relation to understanding.

Chinese room

In the discussion on understanding it can be difficult to grasp the idea of understanding at the phenomenal level. When we engage with the current computer programs such as Siri, it is easy to be seduced into thinking that the device 'understands' what it is being asked. That the computer, at least sometimes, understands is indicated by the circumstances when it 'misinterprets' a question and we judge that it has given the wrong answer.

This same point comes up in discussions concerning the games played between artificial intelligence (AI) machined and humans. In 2016 a computer developed by Google, AlphaGo, defeated the eighteen times GO world champion, Lee Sedol, in

Seoul South Korea in a five-game tournament. GO is regarded as the most difficult of all strategic board games to master and no previous computer had managed to win a game at world class level. The expected outcome was human 5 - computer 0. The outcome was 4 – 1 in favour of AlphaGo. (Zastrow, 2016) The question is, did AlphaGo understand?

A second, related, aspect is whether or not rule following constitutes understanding. When explaining a new concept, we would typically describe the parts that comprise the concepts and how they relate to each other. This general approach applies to such things as solving a quadratic equation in algebra or even tying shoelaces. The fundamental question is that if you can follow the instructions and do the work does this equate to understanding?

The US philosopher, John Searle, developed a thought experiment, 'The Chinese Room'(Searle, 1980) specifically to address the question concerning the nature of understanding by a machine and understanding as rule following. It also provides insight into the phenomenon of understanding as a lived experience.



Picture 1 Chinese Room (anon)

The Chinese Room has become one of the most famous thought experiments in contemporary philosophy(Cole, 2014). I am not going to go into the full details of the thought experiment, the many attempts at rebuttal and Searle's subsequent, and in my view, successful replies²⁰⁹. For the purposes of the thesis, a brief description

²⁰⁹ There are numerous articles and books on the debate that this thought experiment initiated. A good account

will suffice.

- A person who does not speak Chinese is locked in a room with a small opening to allow written questions to be passed in and written responses returned.
- All the questions passed into the room are written in Chinese.
- When a question is passed to the person, the marks (shapes) on the page look like, in Searle's terms, squiggles. (Recall the earlier examples of foreign scripts).
- There is an extensive rule book written in English that gives no indication as to the meaning of the squiggles but merely indicates that if a certain squiggle or series of squiggles is received then the person is to respond by drawing the designated squiggles (shapes) in response.
- The written response is then passed back out.
- A person who reads and understands Chinese does not know what is happening in the room, just that questions are written in Chinese and passed, and correct answers, written in Chinese, are passed out.

When the person inside the room leaves, those outside may very well say, "Wow, I didn't know you spoke Chinese so well!" To which the person simply responds, "I don't". This is the point. If the person does not understand Chinese nor does a computer!

The person inside the room may become so familiar with the squiggles, that on looking at them, they immediately go to the right page for the instructions. They may even 'memorise' the required responses alleviating the need to go to the book; a possibility allowed in thought experiments! They still do not understand Chinese.

For Searle, a computer is like the person in the thought experiment (Searle, 1980). It received symbols with no associated meaning. It follows externally given rules to produce the output of symbols to which there is no meaning. The computer is neither 'thinking' nor does it have understanding. It is blindly stepping through a logical set of rules, which could also be a set of mathematical functions.

From a Heideggerian perspective, the Chinese characters do not themselves contain the meaning. The meaning is located in an understanding of world, which in turn is based on the actual structure of world. For example, if the person in the room recognised the squiggles, 书桌²¹⁰ as 'writing desk', and he understood the

in the 2002 edited volume, *Views into the Chinese Room; New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence* (Preston & Bishop, 2002)

²¹⁰ Shūzhuō

writing desk on the basis of a referential unity, then he could be said to understand 书桌. Understanding language from a Heideggerian perspective is not having an understanding of the unity of the language itself but rather the relationship between the words and the unity of meaning by which the world itself is understood. The words are the way in which the meaning of the world is articulated. For the person in the room the squiggles are not attached to the associated unity-of-meaning, and as such, the person has no understanding of Chinese. The same thing applies to undertaking quadratic equations. If the meanings to which the algebraic expressions attach, even in an abstract way, are not understood then neither is the solving of the algebraic equation understood. Even if the teacher drills the students in solving algebraic equations until they follow the steps perfectly in each case this still does not mean the students understand. This is akin to the person in the Chinese room memorising the books. Following instructions and understanding are two different phenomena and two different experiences as demonstrated in the Chinese Room case.

The phenomena of meaning suddenly arising is reflected in the language when we say, “something clicked”, or “to fell into place” and similar phrases, this is when something acquires meaning for us, as opposed to merely being familiar. The idea of what is to be understood as having a place in a broader context is even present in these phrases we use to express the phenomenon.

When Heidegger had finished his analysis and description of world and worldhood, he acknowledges that structure

of assignments or references, which, as significance, is constitutive of worldhood, can be taken formally in the sense of a system of Relations. [BT121/88]

However, he warns that when we formalise it as such

the phenomena get levelled off so much that their real phenomenal content may be lost, especially in the case of such 'simple' relationships as those which lurk in significance. The phenomenal content of these 'Relations' and 'Relata' - the "in-order-to", the "for-the-sake-of", and the "with-which" of an involvement - is such that they resist any sort of mathematical functionalization; nor are they something thought, first posited in an 'act of thinking'. They are rather relationships in which concerned circumspection as such already dwells. [BT 121-2/88]

Heidegger is saying the same thing as Searle (only more than fifty years earlier and before computers), that converting something to “mathematical functionalization” does not give understanding. This is something that only belongs to Dasein. As the

Chinese carpenter said of chiselling wood,

... there is a knack in it somewhere which I cannot convey to my son and which my son cannot learn from me (Zhuangzi, 2001, p. 6)

Interestingly the case of tying up shoelaces is different. There is no symbolic representation standing between the person and tying up the shoelaces. When a child learns by following instructions, the child has 'hands-on dealings' with the entities in the world. The relationship between putting on shoes, shoelaces, the shoes themselves and walking are all transparent. When the child learns to tie their shoelaces, there is a direct world connection in that the child is freeing the shoes for involvements.

The Case of Dr P: When the sight belonging to circumspection breaks down

One of Heidegger's claims is that the way we see things changes when we have acquired the meaning of the thing. This was the phenomenon behind the examples given in Chapter 13. Heidegger calls the sight by which the ready-to-hand shows up on the basis of its possibilities circumspection and the sight that discloses the Dasein-with he calls *considerateness*²¹¹. One of the benefits of breakdown cases is that they help to identify essential elements of more complex systems. In the following, I present a breakdown case that illustrates the relationship between circumspection and understanding. The case study comes from the book *A Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat* (Sacks, 1985), by the US psychiatrist Oliver Sacks. In the book, Sacks describes the case concerning Dr P.

Dr P was a talented musician and music teacher who had lost the ability to recognise the meaning of objects that were previously understood. There was no indication of dementia or other cognitive impairment. Here is an account of Sack's initial meeting with Dr P, I take up the account towards the end of the meeting;

I tried one final test. It was still a cold day, in early spring, and I had thrown my coat and gloves on the sofa.

'What is this?' I asked, holding up a glove.

'May I examine it?' he asked, and, taking it from me, he proceeded to examine it as he had examined the geometrical shapes.

²¹¹ In writing this passage, it occurs to me that there must be two aspects of the meaning structure, one related to the ready-to-hand and on to Dasein. This is why they have two separate names. This is something I have not previously mentioned and will not pursue in this thesis. Heidegger has a heavy focus on the structures associated with the ready-to-hand and there is a need to develop a parallel inquiry into the structures of Dasein-with, unifying similarities and possible differences.

'A continuous surface,' he announced at last, 'infolded on itself. It appears to have' – he hesitated – 'five outpouchings, if this is the word.'

'Yes,' I said cautiously. 'You have given me a description. Now tell me what it is.'

'A container of some sort?'

'Yes,' I said, 'and what would it contain?'

'It would contain its contents!' said Dr P., with a laugh. 'There are many possibilities. It could be a change-purse, for example, for coins of five sizes. It could . . .'

I interrupted the barmy flow. 'Does it not look familiar? Do you think it might contain, might fit, a part of your body?'

No light of recognition dawned on his face.

No child would have the power to see and speak of 'a continuous surface . . . infolded on itself', but any child, any infant, would immediately know a glove as a glove, see it as familiar, as going with a hand. Dr P. didn't. He saw nothing as familiar. (Sacks, 1985, k. 298)

Another way of describing this phenomenon is that in some way the network of relationships that gave meaning to this object for Dr P had vanished, or at least receded. World is the unity of these relationships and part of Dr P's world had moved from discovered and returned to being concealed. The object as a ready-to-hand thing had lost its meaning (place in the referential unity) and was now a present-at-hand object that can be stared at, described but not understood. Sacks even used some of the same language as Heidegger in describing the phenomenon, "He saw nothing as familiar".

Dr P stared at the glove and could not see what a child saw, the "glove as a glove". This is reflected Heidegger comments in relation to the hammer,

... the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is - as equipment. [BT 98/69]

But the ready-to-hand is not thereby just *observed* and stared at as something present-at-hand; the presence-at-hand which makes itself known is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment. [BT 104/74]

As if to demonstrate this point Sacks adds a footnote to the above story,

Later, by accident, he got it on, and exclaimed, 'My God, it's a glove!' (Sacks, 1985, k. 298)

Dr P had rediscovered the meaning of the glove.

Dr P. was diagnosed with associative visual agnosia. With this impairment, people are able to see and describe objects in front of them, in their present-at-hand mode,

but they are unable to recognise what the object is as a ready-to-hand entity; even though at some time in the past they had such an understanding. In a person with associative visual agnosia²¹², there is no deficit in the vision system or evidence of any impairment in language or cognitive recall (memory). (Delvenne, Seron, Coyette, & Rossion, 2004)

That people can have associative visual agnosia demonstrates that there are two parts to our seeing, there is the aspect given by our visual apparatus and there is the meaning. This 'seeing as' that discloses the thing as something ready-to-hand, a glove, for instance, is what Heidegger refers to as circumspection. While not for this thesis this supports the view that our 'seeing' things (perception) has an intentional structure. The other aspect is that when the 'there' breaks down, demonstrated by the fact that the glove could not show up as a glove, then this rules out the possibility of comportments, dealings, with the glove as a glove. This support Heidegger's claim of the structure of the 'there' as being both essential and prior to any comportments.

To repeat the point, the failure, or break down, that leads to cessation or other change to an otherwise normally operating function indicates the existence and necessity of what has 'broken' down, even if we do not know how the system itself is constituted. Dr P's circumstance is such a breakdown case that illustrates circumspection, and more importantly the aspect of the 'there'. The holding open of the 'there' to allow comportments with the 'glove' has broken down. As indicated earlier, there are other break-down cases which can be used to demonstrate other parts of the being-in-the-world structure, for example aphasia and dysphasia, impairments associated with the comprehension or formulation of words and the connection between words and the meaning. These are important phenomena to understand and lend themselves to an inquiry from a Heideggerian ontological perspective.

Alice²¹³

When the being-in-the-world structure breaks down, something that typically

²¹² Two broad categories of visual agnosia have been identified, the associative visual agnosia that I have mentioned and apperceptive visual agnosia in which a complete visual perception of the object fails to occur. (Farah, 2004) It is possible that apperceptive visual agnosia lends support to Husserl's work, in that it suggests a separate system associated with perceptual object formation, i.e. seeing entities in their present-at-hand mode.

²¹³ Not her real name.

happens for people with dementia, the situation can be extremely frightening. One example that comes painfully to mind occurred when I was on a temporary assignment as a CEO in a small nursing home in the mid-north of South Australia a few years ago.

Alice was a lovely woman in her eighties, born and raised on the family farm in the northern counties of England. While she had been in Australia for many decades, her distinctive north country accent still shone through with an appealing lilt. Alice had a warmth and innocence about her. She also lived in a world that I cannot fully comprehend, that of deep dementia. Alice would navigate around the facility pushing a walker, the type with brakes, seat and a small storage area under the seat. On the walker, she carried her farm animals. To me, they were small plastic figurines, a cow, some sheep, a lamb and a horse. To Alice, they were her animals, *real* creatures for whom she cared with a deep affection that was moving. I remember once, when a staff member, probably out of fear and ignorance, cruelly took them from her, telling her they were not real, but that's another story.

As part of my regular walk around the facility, I would turn down the corridor towards her living area and usually see Alice sitting at a small table with a few others. When I first met her she was very reserved, but over time as we had small chats, spoke about how her animals were going, and so on, her disposition towards me changed. When she caught sight of me walking down the corridor, her face would light up with a magical smile, and I would get a coy little wave. Truth be known I think I walked down the corridor more frequently just to receive the blessing of that smile; it was a gift that used to brighten me up. I am not saying that Alice understood who I was as such, or my role, but she did include me as part of her world.

One evening, well after mealtime when most of the people who lived in the facility had settled into their rooms, I was walking down the quietly lit corridor. I saw Alice, her dressing gown held tightly around her and her pyjamaed legs scurrying on slippered feet towards me. A little moment of joy I felt was quickly whisked away, for as Alice approached, I could see she was clearly distressed, with an anxious look on her face. Moving rapidly towards me Alice grabbed my upper arms in a firm grip and stared straight into my face. I saw terror in her eyes. "Where am I?" she pleaded. "What is this place?" she begged. "I don't know where I am!" she said in such a distressed voice I still recall it. Alice had lost virtually all the meaning in her world, even the understanding that she managed to hang on to in her dementia had

fled from her. All that was left at that moment was the terror of being-in some alien place, not knowing how she got there or how to get out. Her 'there' had collapsed in terms of whatever familiar understanding she had. What took its place was some abyss which showed up as terrifying. I held her tight for a few moments, then talking with her and comforting her the terror receded. The next day walking down the corridor I got the smile and wave, but I have not, nor will ever forget the face of sheer terror when Alice's understanding failed to hold open her world in a meaningful way.

Section 3: Discourse

As has been discussed, Heidegger is often describing the same phenomena of being in the world from different perspectives, and this is the case in the section on discourse and language [BT § 34]. When we interpret something as something it is the 'meaning' of the entity that is being interrupted, and in relation to this, as noted, Heidegger introduces the term Articulation;

That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called "meaning". That which gets articulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call the "unity-of-meanings" [BT 204/161] (translation modified)

If we take the unity of the skeleton and see that it is something that can be broken down into meaningful pieces joined together we can point to both the joints and the parts and give them names, i.e. put them into words. Using this analogy, this is what Heidegger is saying in the following:

Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with receptivity and understanding. The intelligibility of something has always been articulated, even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it. Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called "meaning". That which gets articulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call the "unity-of-meaning". This can be dissolved or broken up into meanings. Meanings, as what has been Articulated from that which can be Articulated, are always meaningful. If discourse, as the Articulation of the intelligibility of the "there", is a primordial existentials of disclosedness, and if disclosedness is primarily constituted by being-in-the-world, then discourse too must have essentially a kind of being which is specifically worldly. The intelligibility of being-in-the-world- an intelligibility that goes with receptivity - *expresses itself as discourse.* [BT 204/161] (translation modified)

The clue to this passage is understanding discourse as part of Dasein's existential structure. It thus has the same three levels that I have previously identified in relation to other parts of the structure, that associated with the bare ontological structure, the ontological level of a Dasein as it gets filled out and then what is

expressed ontically by a Dasein. All Heidegger is doing is now describing the world a unity-of-meanings rather than, say, a unity-of-involvements. Just as an entity can be understood in terms of its involvements in the structure, it can be understood in terms of its meaning within the unity-of-meaning.

Something is intelligible when it is capable of being understood, i.e. having meaning. Meaning only arises when something has been Articulated, i.e. placed in the structure. At the structural level discourse is the placing of the entity in its Articulated context, which is the basis of its intelligibility. ("Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility.") Discourse then is the name that Heidegger gives to the basis by which we understand the structure of the 'there' in terms of its Articulated structure, i.e. on the basis of the 'meaning units' that make it up. In other words, at this level discourse is not referring to the ontic activity of discussing something. It is because of this that Heidegger identifies discourse as an essential part of the structure of Dasein;

Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with receptivity and understanding. [BT 203/161]

This leads Heidegger to his next step that our intelligibility of being-in-the-world is expressed in discourse, and it can be put into words. When we are in conversation, sitting on the chair and sipping from a cup of coffee, we do not need to be aware of the coffee cup or the chair. However, by merely sitting and drinking, we are expressing our understanding of the intelligibility of the cup and the chair. That intelligibility reflects their meaning in the unity-of-meanings. By sitting and drinking we are expressing our understanding of the intelligibility of the chair and cup and Heidegger calls this mode of expression discourse; it is not talking or putting into words.

Structurally, discourse involves the unity-of-meaning and the intelligibility of the various parts of the structure, in terms of involvements, etc. and the modes of engaging with them. At the ontic level, a discourse will involve a series of dealings with entities based on the intelligibility of the entities as disclosed to those involved. Two or more Dasein's can thus be involved in the same discourse without uttering a word. Words then follow;

The unity-of-meanings of intelligibility is *put into words*. To meanings, words accrue. But word-Things do not get supplied with meaning.

The way in which discourse gets expressed is language. Language is a unity of words - a unity in which discourse has a 'worldly' being of its own. [BT 204/161]

For Heidegger, words do not carry the meaning; this point was made earlier. The meaning is in the unity-of-meaning and words 'attach' to those meanings'. Our various dealings with the ready-to-hand entities and other Dasein is what Heidegger refers to as discourse, and in that the discourse can be broken down into meaning units, and words attributed to those units we thus have the basis for various modes of 'talk' that reflect our modes of discourse;

Such being-with-one-another is discursive as assenting or refusing, as demanding or warning, as pronouncing, consulting, or interceding, as 'making assertions', and as talking in the way of 'giving a talk'. [BT 204/161]

When we are talking with one another about something it is not in the Cartesian sense of transmitting something which is inside us to the inside of another (mind to mind),

In talking, Dasein expresses itself not because it has, in the first instance, been encapsulated as something 'internal' over against something outside, but because as being-in-the-world it is already 'outside' when it understands. [BT 205/162]

Furthermore, our understanding and affective-attunement, as being-in

... are made known in talk and indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk, 'the way of speaking'. [BT 205/162]

Language exchanges with others are comprised of far more than just words! This is only possible because of the underlying structure.

The relationship between things understood in their present-at-hand mode, ready-to-hand mode, in terms of possibilities for Dasein's being and language is a complex arrangement of structures comprising understanding, receptiveness and discourse. In observing people with dementia, breakdowns in each of these various structures can sometimes be identified, while at the same time the remaining structures are intact. For example, a person may not be able to recognise the present-at-hand presentation of an entity, and therefore it does not show up as holding possibilities as something ready-to-hand, however once engaged with the entity they use it appropriately. This is a promising line of research and inquiry to understand the various ways in which dementia can impact on somebody and in turn provide clues as to how best to support the person.

I am not going to pursue the discussion on discourse further. The overview provided is sufficient for the thesis. The only aspect of discourse to be explored further is 'idle talk'.

Idle Talk

As part of his work on understanding Heidegger briefly deals with the everyday being of the 'there' and the manner in which we are absorbed in our understanding of the world based on the disclosure of the 'One'. He deals with three aspects, idle talk, ambiguity and curiosity and I am only going to give a brief account of idle talk as it touches on the thesis.

Idle talk relates to the way we communicate with others and is primarily a "positive phenomena" which is constitutive of Dasein's everyday "understanding and interpreting". [BT 211/168] We have already seen in the chapter on the 'One' that approximately and for the most part our understanding and receptiveness are determined by the 'One', and Heidegger repeats this point here. [BT 211/168]

In an earlier chapter dealing with the background to Heidegger's work I presented, by way of a 'mini demonstration', some items of equipment most which would have been unfamiliar. When I described what these items were, my explanation probably made some sense, at least for a couple of them. On making sense, the meaning of the entity was disclosed. This is how Heidegger describes such circumstances

In the language which is spoken when one expresses oneself; there lies an average intelligibility; and in accordance with this intelligibility the discourse which is communicated can be understood to a considerable extent, even if the hearer does not bring himself into such a kind of being towards what the discourse is about as to have a primordial understanding of it. [BT 212/168] (my underlining)

A primordial understanding refers to having freed the entity for involvements, however when we do not understand or fully understand the entities we

... are listening only to what is said-in-the-talk as such. What is said-in-the-talk gets understood; but what the talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially. [BT 212/168]

This is the phenomena of idle talk. Note that in the first passage, the phrase "the discourse which is communicated", this is a reference to talking about the entity in terms of its intelligibility based on its place in the unity. In the passage, Heidegger acknowledges that this does provide a level of understanding, just not primordial. It is what I have termed a "thin" intelligibility.

By and large, 'idle talk' is an essential part of our everyday communication. When I take my car to the mechanic, and he tells me that there is a particular problem with the transmission we can have the same thing in view. I can understand, with a

certain averageness, so as to make a decision and perhaps communicate the problem to my wife. However, this level of understanding is far removed from having the same primordial understanding of the transmission as does the mechanic; I can't fix it. This type of circumstance repeats itself over and over again in our average everydayness. It is the way our understanding of the broader public world is filled out, and one of the ways our 'thin' intelligibility is established.

Idle talk, however, has a dark side, and this takes up most of Heidegger's discussion. For example, gossip, ungrounded explanations, get past along in "*gossiping and passing the word along*" [BT 212/168]. Whereas my understanding of the car transmission has a reasonable connection with the being of transmission, gossiping is the spreading of information that is groundless. Another common English term for this, other than gossip, is "hearsay". We hear something and mindlessly say it to someone else. It refers to the same phenomenon as gossip but catches aspects of the ontic phenomenon in its name. Tabloid magazines and social media are full of stories and accounts that have more in common with fantasy writing than actual events in the world, and yet they are typically reported and passed along as fact. Heidegger observes that this is a common trait in the culture and that gossip spreads in wider circles until it

... takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one says so. [BT 212/168]

We tend to believe what is continually circulated in the community, and fail to check the facts. Heidegger notes that this type of idle talk is not confined to gossip that it also spreads in what he calls "scribbling" which I take to be a veiled description to what I have referred to as tabloid magazines, but also includes radio talkback programs and so on. As Heidegger notes

The average understanding of the reader will *never be able* to decide what has been drawn from primordial sources with a struggle and how much is just gossip. [BT 212/169]

The recent debates that have arisen around social media and news reporting over allegations of "fake news", reports made without a basis in 'fact' would be a contemporary example. That idle talk is groundless, i.e. with no foundation in primordial understanding is no barrier to it entering the public domain. Heidegger notes that the ease with which idle talk can be listened to and passed on

is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own. [BT 231/169]

In idle talk, everyone can have an opinion on anything, and speak authoritatively because the opinion is based on 'what everybody knows'. One of the serious consequences of idle talk is that once something has been understood on the basis of idle talk, no matter how groundless, it closes off and covers up a primordial understanding of entities within-the-world.

... idle talk discourages any new inquiry and any disputation, and in a peculiar way suppresses them and holds them back. [BT 231/169]

It is however impossible in the complexities of today's world for Dasein to have the necessary primordial understanding ("thick" intelligibility) of the way the public world works and to a significant extent, Dasein must rely on idle talk ("thin" Intelligibility). Ontologically this means that much of the disclosed understanding of the world and the receptivity that goes along with it means Dasein is not grounded as such but rather "floating unattached" and by and large

the obviousness and self-assurance of the average ways in which things have been interpreted, are such that while the particular Dasein drifts along towards an ever-increasing groundlessness as it floats, the uncanniness of this floating remains hidden from it under their protecting shelter. [BT 214/170]

The way in which things have been interpreted is by the 'One'. This "floating unattached" can occur in any community of people even to the extent that what is understood, interpreted and agreed to by the community has no grounding whatsoever. The consequences of this can be tragic as the Salem Witch trials of the 1690s attest as does the contemporary vilification of people of perceived Islamic faith in some Western countries. Typically, however, there will be a mixture of grounded and ungrounded interpretations even within scientific communities, the issue, however, is whether or not those which are ungrounded are recognised as such.

Contemporary understandings about the nature of the person would be an example of ungrounded interpretations within the community where the community is oblivious to the ungrounded status of such interpretations. The interpretations have been passed down via the tradition and accepted without further question. For example, from discussions with a medical student in their final year, it is evident that no serious consideration was given in the curriculum as to the ontological nature of the person. A reductionist, materialist account is assumed and informs the teaching of the medical school.

While I do not think the labelling of this phenomena as idle talk is overly helpful, albeit it does suit Heidegger's negative commentary concerning it, it is a genuine phenomenon, and its implications, especially in professional and work-based communities are worth exploring.

Discourse: Illustrative Example

I am only going to give one example associated with Discourse, and it concerned the Dasein's ability to Articulate things, name that which is Articulated and then communicated what has been Articulated.

Naming Surgical Incisions


We can engage with things only on the basis that they have been identified as part of the referential unity and in the way they matter to us. Once they have been differentiated (Articulated) and placed into a context (discourse) they have meaning. To those Articulated meaning, words can then be assigned, and this forms the basis of communicating. The degree to which we are able to make such differentiations (Articulations) will depend on our familiarity with the referential unity out of which such a differentiation can be made. An example can be found in the field of surgery.

In surgery, there is a multitude of incisions that surgeons can make depending on the task at hand, the location of the body, the part of the body being cut and so on. In one article Patnik, Singla and Basal (Patnaik, Singla Rajan, & Bansal, 2001) discuss the anatomical basis of the choice of incisions in relation to the abdomen. They identified three key characteristics associated with an incision, accessibility, extensibility and security, which sound very much like they form part of an in-order-to-structure. The incision being part of the 'work' in-order-to undertake a repair of the body. Here is the description of one particular incision and the accompanying diagram;

Kocher subcostal incision: The subcostal incision is started at the midline, 2 to 5 cm below the xiphoid and extends downwards, outwards and parallel to and about 2.5 cm below the costal margin. Extension across the midline and down the other costal margin may be used to provide generous exposure of the upper abdominal viscera. The rectus sheath is incised in the same direction as the skin incision, and the rectus muscle is divided with cautery; the internal oblique and transversus abdominis muscles are divided with cautery. (Patnaik, Singla Rajan, & Bansal, 2001, p. 173)

For the Kocher subcostal incision to be meaningful as something ready-to-hand, there is a significant amount of other understandings that are first necessary. For

example, each entity named in the brief passage is intelligible only on the basis that it refers to a specific feature of the body. When I look at the abdomen, this makes



little sense to me, as I cannot see the differentiations being made. Even if I spent the time looking at my medical reference books and gained a certain understanding, it is the understanding that is gained only by way of reading a communication. What is missing is the primordial understanding that comes with years

of surgery. With this level of primordial understanding not only do the words have a different depth of meaning, but the experienced surgeon brings the understanding of ‘cutting flesh’, the tasks that are to be undertaken as part of this cutting and so on. From this perspective, the communication is grounded, and the surgeon is in a position to form a judgement as to the benefits of using the Kocher subcostal incision. If I were to pass along the information about the incision to someone else, perhaps in a BBQ conversation it can only be by way of idle talk.

This example illustrates the concept of naming and discursive text that can speak to another surgeon on the basis of a primordial understanding (thick intelligibility). When I read the text, however, it is idle talk, and if I start discussing these incisions, then all I am doing is engaging in gossip. Another aspect that is illustrated is that the meaning is not in the text, it is within the understanding of the reader²¹⁴, from which the Articulated interpretations concerning the incision are made. This leads to the area of textual hermeneutics and with this the boundary of the thesis scope has once more been reached.

This ends my discussion on understanding.

Chapter Summary

The chapter on *Being-In* [BT] is the longest and perhaps the most complex associated with Heidegger’s analysis of the structure of Dasein. The chapter presents a number of original positions that shake up traditional and long-held philosophical positions. For the first time in Western philosophy, Heidegger elevates our receptiveness, our affective-capacities, to a place of pre-eminence as part of the structure of the ‘there’. The reciprocal relationship between Dasein and its

²¹⁴ This is based on Heidegger’s position that “only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless” [193/151].

environment as the basis of its meaningfulness radically eliminates the subject-object divide that has plagued philosophy since Descartes. The two levels of the intentional structure, the first associated with the 'there' and the second associated with affective-attunements and comportments have pushed the initial formulation of the concept by Brentano almost beyond recognition. Putting forward the tentative beginnings of a theory of language based on the structure of world is also a position that went against the mainstream approach, mainly championed by analytic philosophy, that was dominant for most of the twentieth century. There are other points, but these four make this chapter alone a significant one.

It is easy to be seduced and focus on these scholarly innovations. However, this is not the point of the thesis. Of even more importance is that Heidegger is putting forward a radical new understanding of what it is to be something, it is a 'new' ontology. This was already seen in relation to the ready-to-hand and world, and now it comes starkly into view in terms of Dasein. In relation to Dasein any notion of Dasein *being* some static tangible entity, e.g. the body, has to be discarded. Heidegger's Dasein has several salient characteristics that make it distinctive from anything that has hitherto been proposed, all of which have been discussed in the thesis: Firstly, Heidegger rejects *any* conception of Dasein as something present-at-hand. Secondly, Dasein's ontological structure is dynamic. Thirdly, Dasein the entity is constituted by a complex unity of processes (the structure) that constitutes its meaningfulness only "within" a world meaningful for Dasein. Fourthly, related to the third point, Dasein's existence as the Dasein it is (i.e. being-meaningful) is dependent on its *movement into possibilities* for being itself. Fifthly, Dasein's ongoing meaningfulness requires entities in its world that offer possibilities for Dasein's ability-to-be the Dasein it *is*. Sixthly, Dasein ability-to-be is determined by its understanding and receptivity, which in turn limits the range of possibilities appropriate for Dasein's being itself. Seventhly, Dasein's understanding and receptivity are determined, to a significant extent, by the averageness of the social milieu in which it was born and raised. Eighthly, it is Dasein's receptiveness that is primary opening up Dasein's world and disclosing possibilities not understanding. Ninthly the structural processes that constitute Dasein, functions in a consistent and ongoing manner (this is the constancy necessary for being Dasein), albeit with "knowledge and will" [175/136] some mastery over such its affective-capacities can

be achieved, and in what Dasein understands²¹⁵.

While all Daseins have the same dynamic structure, the picture we have is that once a Dasein is 'thrown' into the world the functioning of the structure builds up a particular set of understanding and receptivities that gives the Dasein its meaning in the context of *that* world. This makes the Dasein species highly adaptive to a range of possible worlds, and this is what is revealed by even a cursory survey of the anthropology literature. However, once Dasein's facticity has developed in its world, it requires the ongoing possibilities in that world for Dasein to continue to be who it is. This does not mean that Dasein fails to adapt and change over its life, Heidegger does not specifically deal with this, but it is implicit in his description of the structure. Dasein's understanding and receptivities change over time, but the change arises from the possibilities taken up on the basis of the then existing understanding and possibilities. By and large, then change typically occurs at a pace determined by the rate of change in understanding and receptivity. In other words, once a Dasein is caught in the 'throw' of its facticity within its world, its scope for change and adaptation is typically restricted by its 'thrownness'.

Based on the structural analysis of Dasein, once Dasein has meaning in the world, i.e. who it is has been determined, then it must have an ability-to-be who it is. Dasein's meaningfulness arises from the taking up of possibilities appropriate for the expression of its ability-to-be, and those possibilities are provided by specific ready-to-hand entities²¹⁶. Dasein's being meaningful thus requires the *ongoing movement* into possibilities. If those possibilities are not present then Dasein is no longer meaningful in terms of who it is, Dasein becomes meaningless. This analysis relates back to the previous discussions in that Dasein can be said to assign itself to certain in-order-to structures for the sake-of-which it is; this is just another way of describing the structural process. Dasein typically is a mixture of meanings, i.e. it has a number of different aspects that constitute its for-the-sake-of-which or meaning. Should access to the entities that hold the possibilities for a Dasein's ability-to-be slowly be removed from Dasein's world then progressively Dasein's being-meaningful diminishes and its being-meaningless increases. I take this to be the structural

²¹⁵ This is summed up in Heidegger's phrase "that it is and has to be" [BT 174/135].

²¹⁶ What Heidegger does not specifically address in the chapter but is implicit from his previous discussions is that in accessing the possibilities associated with the ready-to-hand entities we are also encountering the Dasein-with of other Dasein.

account of 'shedding life'.

At the ontic level possibilities show up as part of Heidegger's concept of mattering. Mattering can be in a positive, detrimental, deficient or indifferent mode. When Marion Miller entered the nursing home, she had no control over the way she encountered the various situation in the nursing home as mattering to her. The receptivity that constitutes Marion is out of her control, and it presents what matters based on who Marion *is*. The nursing home did not show up as mattering in a positive way for Marion, it showed up, by and large, as mattering in a detrimental way. Marion chose behavioural responses that reflected who she was, writing letters of complaint seeking changes, and so on, but to no avail. To put this another way the nursing home environment was meaningless for her and as a consequence, her life continued its shift from "being-meaningful" to "being-meaningless". To use Marion's language, she 'shed life'.

The concepts of choice and autonomy are held to be important in the running of a nursing home. However, these concepts do not change what shows up predominantly as mattering in detrimental or indifferent ways into possibilities for being who one is, i.e. transform the world of a nursing home as mattering in a materially positive way. Marion exercised her choice to participated in the monthly discussion groups for example, but she would, instead, have been doing something different, something that 'matters' to her. There is implicit in the current approaches to running nursing homes that the agency of the person is maintained by such concepts as autonomy and choice. This stance reflects an adherence in the ontology of the person as being separate and distinct to the world in which they live, and the *exercise* of choice becomes a key defeminated of personhood in this model. If Heidegger's alternative ontology is a more accurate description of what it is to be a person, and I accept this, then choice in and of itself is insufficient. What is required is choice in taking up, or letting pass, possibilities appropriate to who Dasein is. Only then can choice contribute to the meaningfulness of Dasein. To construct and run nursing homes that are stripped of possibilities for Dasein to be meaningful is created environments that relegate Dasein to "being meaningless". It is to fail to care for Dasein, for the person, notwithstanding that the care of the body may be excellent.

This completes my inquiry into the Dasein analytic for the purposes of this thesis. In the next section, I will finalise this aspect of the work by linking the structure of

Dasein, to Heidegger's description of the being of Dasein, what he terms Care.

CHAPTER 18: CARE: THE BEING OF DASEIN

Introduction

In this section, I complete my enquiry and interpretation of Heidegger's Dasein analytic by addressing the being of Dasein, *Care*. The structure of Dasein's way of being is named being-in-the-world, and it is this structure that has been the focus of discussions. Having described the structure on the basis of its constitutive aspects Heidegger essentially stands back and interprets the structure itself as a unified phenomenon and the name he gives to this interpretation is *Care*. The structure of *Care* literally falls out of the work that has been done to date and other than presenting the structure little time will be spent pursuing Heidegger's various discussions concerning *Care* as they do not advance the aim of the thesis.

On first stepping back and looking at Heidegger's structure of *Care* there is almost a letdown, after all this work that's it! However, after a brief reflection, the implications are confronting, and this will be discussed in the final section of the chapter.

Evidence for the structure of being-in-the-world and evidence

At the beginning of his analysis of care Heidegger provides a succinct summary of the ordinary way in which Dasein is;

Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost ability-to-be is an issue, both in its being amidst the 'world' and in its being-with others. [BT 226/181]

This is a summary statement of all of Heidegger's preceding work, and every term has its specific meaning based on Heidegger's interpretation of being-in-the-world.

Before proceeding Heidegger presents a phenomenological analysis of the affective-capacity of *anxiety* as supporting evidence for this unitary structure. Heidegger's reasoning seems to be that if he can identify a breakdown mode that brings to the fore the phenomenon of world itself, then the very fact that this occurs supports the normative case. Heidegger uses a similar strategy in relation to world when discussing various ways in which 'break-downs'²¹⁷ with equipment disclose

²¹⁷ These were the phenomena of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy.

the referential totality by disrupting the dealings with the equipment.

There is some debate as to whether Heidegger is actually describing anxiety or depression (Blattner, 2006; White & Dreyfus(Forward), 2005) and Heidegger's description contains elements of both. In that both anxiety and depression are often present at the same time I take Heidegger to be describing the phenomena of anxiety and depression as a single affective-tuning and so there is no need to enter this debate. The key descriptive passage is the following;

That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite. Not only does this indefiniteness leave factually undecided which entity within-the-world is threatening us, but it also tells us that entities within-the-world are not 'relevant' at all. Nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions that in the face of which anxiety is anxious. Here the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking meaningfulness. In anxiety one does not encounter this thing or that thing which, as something threatening, must have an involvement. [BT 231/186] (translation modified) (my underlining)

When Heidegger analyses the phenomena more closely he identifies that there is no specific thing about which a Dasein is anxious

That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is *nowhere*. Anxiety 'does not know' what that in the face of which it is anxious is. [BT 231/186]

The nowhere to which Heidegger refers does not signify that there is nothing, but given that whatever it is that is causing the anxiety is in no particular place does mean that it cannot approach from a specific direction, and yet it is there nonetheless. Heidegger's conclusion is that in the face of the persistency of anxiety and

... of the obstinacy of the "nothing and nowhere within-the-world" means as a phenomenon *that the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety.* [BT231/187]

We are faced with the situation in which the entities within-the-world are still there but "are of so little importance in themselves" that rather than being faced with entities having meaning to us we are confronted with

.. the complete meaninglessness of what is within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself. [BT231/187]

We must always keep in mind that, by and large, since Heidegger completed his initial analysis of world from a detached standpoint that when he refers to world in the context of being-in-the-world, he is speaking about the world as it shows up for

Dasein and this is the case here in his conclusion;

Ontologically, however, the world belongs essentially to Dasein's being as being-in-the-world. So if the "nothing" - that is, the world as such exhibits itself as that in the face of which one has anxiety, this means that *being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious*. [BT232/187]

As the anxiety/depression descends upon Dasein

.... what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do entities within-the-world.²¹⁸ The 'world' can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of Others. Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the 'world' and the way things have been publicly interpreted. [BT 232/287]

My use of this case is simply to support Heidegger's work in terms of the structure of being-in-the-world. In the anxiety/depression that Heidegger describes the entities in the world are still there, they are still understood as what they are, i.e. the world is still there as the public world. But the entities in the world have lost their meaning in terms of the possibilities they hold for Dasein. They no longer matter for Dasein.

Just to be clear. To use the analogy of circumspection which had both the visual presentation of the object plus the meaning to give us the ready-to-hand, this is on the basis of world. Dasein's environment is the ready-to-hand as disclosed in the way it matters. This example also illustrates the importance of the structure of receptivity in holding open the 'there', Dasein's world, as something that matters to it.

In anxiety/depression, the world has become meaningless, and Dasein is no longer faced with the encounters that matter to it. The consequence of this is that Dasein itself become meaningless, in which case there is nothing 'to live for', a not uncommon response to depression. Just as visual agnosia reveals to us in our experiences the two aspects that makeup circumspection, anxiety/depression reveals for us the two aspects that makeup Dasein's environment, a pre-existing world and meaningfulness to Dasein.

I am not going to pursue Heidegger's analysis of anxiety/depression any further. He argues that there are modes of anxiety, albeit rare, in which Dasein's individualisation from the 'One' is disclosed to it. In these cases Dasein then has a

218 As a point of interest this is one of the few places in which Heidegger includes in the same sentence the concepts of environment and within-the-world more generally. This is the distinction between the public world and Heidegger's environmental world which holds meaning for it.

chance to claim itself, i.e. live in authentic existence on the basis of one's own understanding and affective-capacities as opposed to those dictated by the 'One'. Exploring this is outside the thesis boundaries.

Care structure

The ontological structural whole of Dasein's being, *Care*, is described as follows;

... the being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-being-already-in-(the-world) as being-amidst (entities encountered within-the-world). This being fills in the meaning of the term "*care*". [BT 237/192] (brackets in the English text)

Being-ahead-of-itself

This aspect relates to Dasein as ability-to-be in that it is always projecting itself onto possibilities which it does 'for-the-sake-of-which' it is.

Already-in

This aspect describes the fact that Dasein has already understood and been thrown into a world. This aspect also includes Dasein's falling in which it is part of the 'One'.

Being-amidst

This aspect refers to Dasein's concerned dealings with the entities present-at-hand and encounters with others on the basis of solicitude.

It does not take much to see that this condensing to a three-part structure has within it the structure of a temporal movement (refer Figure 24). Another way of presenting the diagram in the language of the earlier analysis i.e. thrown, projecting, falling is shown in Figure 25.

In my interpretation of being, this is the structure that every Dasein will have that determines it as an entity. Once a Dasein is born and being 'raised into' a culture the bare structure starts to fill out and provides the basis on which Dasein is able to live its life. This operative structure is shown in Figure 26.

A Dasein develops its understanding of world and self within the context of the culture. Its understanding then projects itself onto possible involvements that show up in the circumspection of concern with the ready-to-hand and the considerateness of solicitude towards other Daseins. Out of the things that show up as mattering

Dasein chooses which possible involvements are taken up in terms of dealing with those entities. This is the ontic level and is shown in Figure 27.




Figure 24 Care Structure (all Daseins)




Figure 25 Alternative Presentation





Figure 26 Structure – Operative in Dasein



Final Comments on Care Structure

In that the being of an entity is not itself an entity how then are we to understand the structure? An indication is how Heidegger treats the ready-to-hand. While the ready-to-hand is founded on the present-at-hand what makes it a ready-to-hand entity is its place in the referential unity, i.e. it is its place in the world.

On this basis, what an entity is physically made of and its form is contingent only on it being able to provide the necessary serviceability, usability and so on needed to satisfy the demands of the structure. This was covered at length in the earlier chapter on Worldhood.

It is thus possible for the physical aspect of an entity to be replaced by something radically new in terms of its matter+ form but still be the same entity. An example of this is the phone. When I was younger, a telephone was a large, black Bakelite looking object with the phone earpiece/microphone attached by a relatively short cord. Today I have a plastic and metal receiver in one room with several wireless handpieces in other rooms. Both are phones, both fill the serviceability – usability junction, but the later models have better manipulability and functionality. To be a phone is not determined by the physical aspect of the entity. The more radical change is, of course, the smartphone which is a device that contains not just the serviceable-usability of the phone but other ready-to-hand equipment as well, e.g.

camera, voice recorder and so on.

In relation to Dasein, if we push Heidegger's anxiety/depression demonstration a little further, we can ask what happens if other key facets of this unified structure collapse or breakdown, is there a Dasein as we know it? To put this another way, would Dasein, as we understand it, be Dasein if any of the following were not part of the structure:

- The ability to acquire an understanding of the practices of the culture including such things as language, basic know-how in terms of dressing, eating, social norms, and etc. (i.e. the 'One')
- The ability to understand ready to hand entities and to acquire the know-how to use them.
- The ability to understand itself in terms of its own for-the-sake-of which, not primitive reflexive responses, but what matters in terms of being a parent, looking after others and so on.
- The ability of the sight of circumspection which enables us to see things in terms of their being ready-to-hand and not just as mere objects.

The list goes on.

Our lived experience arises in the flow of encountering what matters to us, our concerned dealings with the ready-to-hand and our solicitudinous encounters with others. If you stripped all those lived experiences away in principle all that would be left is a poor version of an organic-based robot. Like the robot, we would be devoid of experience. I say poor version because without the gift of mattering what would direct our actions? At least a robot would be programmed to do things.

The being of Dasein, what constitutes Dasein, is not the flesh and blood of the present-at-hand body, it is not the *way of being* of Dasein that is observable and often reported on in qualitative research. It is the underlying structure that gives rise to all of this. The same structure is responsible for every Dasein. But the dynamic structure together with genetic bundle X in the social milieu of environment A will result in a Dasein that is in many ways different to the same structure together with genetic bundle Y in the social milieu of environment B and so on. What characterises the individuality of each Dasein as an entity is in each case is its facticity, and this will depend on the initial environment. What drives this dynamic ontological structure is most probably some aspect of the genetic structure itself, however, this is speculative.

In that Dasein is initially based on the 'One' (the average everydayness of the culture) and in turn becomes part of the 'One' there is a powerful reflexive feedback process occurring. The 'One' as the 'collection' of all Daseins determines world which in turn determines the individual Dasein and so on. This has all the hallmarks of a self-organising system, and if that is the case communities are not collections of independent co-operative individuals, rather Dasein is part of a *we-world*. It is an entity that is spawned and part of the group itself, and if it is to be-itself and not simply a representative of the 'One' it needs to differentiate itself to the extent possible, this is the thrust of Heidegger's concept of authenticity. For Heidegger, Dasein has the ability to be authentic, and this is the subject of the first part of Division II of *Being and Time*.

While its ontological origins are not necessarily understood thematically by an individual Dasein, Dasein emerges as part of a we-world that by and large determines the range of possibilities for a meaningful existence onto which Dasein projects itself in a way that matters to it. This is what it means to be a Dasein. Dasein is its understanding as disclosed in its receptive-capacities. In other words, Dasein is only in its various expressed compartments to a world of possibilities that has meaning it and in so doing sustains it. These expressed compartments are built on an intentional structure are the basis of the lived experiences that constitutes its existence. There is nothing more to being Dasein, and nor need there be. Almost in anticipation of the affront that this understanding presents Heidegger writes;

..... the ontical approach with which we have tried to Interpret Dasein ontologically as care, may appear farfetched and theoretically contrived, to say nothing of the act of violence one might discern in our setting aside the confirmed traditional definition of "man". [BT 227/183]

In the next section, I provide a brief introduction to how Heidegger's work can be understood in relation to contemporary work being undertaken in the field of emergence and complex self-organising systems. The aim of this approach is to help shift an understanding of Heidegger's work from his abstract level of thinking to something more concrete.

CHAPTER 19: INTERPRETING HEIDEGGER WITHIN AN EMERGENTISTS & COMPLEX SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK

Introduction

Heidegger's account of his analysis of the structure of Dasein is difficult to follow. As the discussion has revealed there are a number of reasons for this, he uses terminology associated with the discipline of traditional ontology, e.g. being; he assumes prior knowledge of the philosophical tradition, including the work of the ancient Greeks; his writing style is dense; the real-world phenomenon he is describing are often elevated to abstract concepts with very little in the way of explanatory examples; he uses concepts from previous work without any acknowledgement or explanation, (e.g. intentionality and mereology); he will often use the same name for the different levels of his analysis without making clear which level he is discussing, (e.g. understanding); he changes the typical meaning of words, (e.g. concern, care); neologisms are introduced without explanation, and his research stance is not clearly articulated. In addition, there is the challenge of accessing Heidegger's work via the English translation which inevitably throws up translations that do not quite capture in English what Heidegger may have been intending. Perhaps the greatest difficulty is that, as I interpret, Heidegger's ontology it is based on what I would term an emergentist ontology that has its nascent origins in the work of the Pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, certainly as Heidegger interprets them. This, however, is never addressed in *Being and Time*. The length of the thesis is, to a significant degree, shaped by these various challenges as I lay out and argue for my interpretation of his work in a way that tries to avoid replicating many of these same challenges.

In this section, I want to take a step back and place Heidegger's findings in the context of examples of contemporary scholarship. My claim is that Heidegger is a scholar engaged not in abstract thinking, with little relevance, but rather his work should be seen as having wide applicability as part of the gritty work of contemporary inquiry, science as broadly understood. My view has always been informed by this perspective. This being the case then the phenomena that Heidegger is observing, and interpreting must also be among the phenomena observed and interpreted by other scholars. The radical difference is not in what has been observed it is in the interpretation. This is no different to what happens elsewhere in science. If

Heidegger's reported observations are consistent with what is available for others to observe, if his interpretive account provides deeper insights into phenomena than existing interpretive accounts and further if they can form the basis of asking new questions about, for example, Dasein, then his account must be given serious consideration. My position is clear. I accept Heidegger's work as meeting all three criteria and as such is a viable alternative to the reductionist ontological account of the person. Indeed, it is the only serious alternative I am aware of.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first draws parallels with the work of Albert Einstein in his breakthrough work on Special Relativity. It argues that there are similarities in the approaches taken by Einstein in that he took observations that were readily available to others, but he put aside the restrictions of entrenched presuppositions and dealt in a logical manner with what was observed. The results were revolutionary and highly contentious and took decades to be fully accepted. The other significant similarity is that Einstein, as does Heidegger, ignores the physical aspects of the entity and focuses on the observed effects that have 'practical bearing' on the inquiry. Heidegger's work is just as radical and revolutionary as Einstein's, just in a different field. As part of this, I provide a summary overview of my interpretation of Heidegger's work and conclude that to embrace his work Heidegger is asking us to make a conceptual leap in relation to Dasein as significant as that of Einstein's leap that time is not a universal constant.

The second section is to consider Heidegger's work in terms of contemporary work on emergent, self-organising complex systems. I explored this line of thinking about Heidegger's work once I started to think about Dasein as a dynamic system. It was the interplay between my (limited) prior knowledge of emergence and chaos theory, the reading of Heidegger's account of the early Greeks and then revisiting my thinking around Heidegger's account of world and Dasein in *Being and Time* that shifted my interpretive stance of *Being and Time*.

In this section, I look at some of Heidegger's comments in relations to systems, introduce the concept of emergence and self-organising systems and indicate the relevance to Heidegger's work. I then look at a specific and widely used application of systems model developed by Argyris in the area of organisational learning and development and compare this to a Heideggerian model that I develop. I then propose an emergent model for the entity Dasein.

My conclusion is that not only should Heidegger be considered as a strict empiricist but that he should also be considered within the broad camp of emergence theorists. I present a schematic of an emergence model of Dasein that proposes the concept of considering Dasein as a higher level (emergent) aspect of a lower level biological system. I then apply this model in the final part of this section as a method of research and inquiry, within both the biological and social sciences. I provide examples of how Heidegger's work has applicability in various social-science areas in the following chapter, followed, in Chapter 21 by an application developed to investigate 'shedding life'.

Einstein, Time and Heidegger

I want to briefly revisit the scientific breakthrough that thrust Einstein into the spotlight as an innovative thinker of the highest order and draw some parallels between Einstein's approach to that of Heidegger's. Specifically, I look at Einstein's theory of special relativity which was published in 1905 as part of a series of five papers published by Einstein in that year that "changed the face of physics" (Stachel, 2005).

At the turn of the twentieth-century physicists held, and still hold, that the fundamental behaviours of present-at-hand entities in nature are constant in character and that the pattern of the those behaviours reflect what are often called the 'laws' of nature²¹⁹. The task of the physical sciences is to identify, at the appropriate level, these fundamental patterns of behaviours and describe them, typically as a mathematical formula. At the turn of the twentieth century physicist was facing a problem in relation to the speed of light. Given the acceptance of constant behaviour, the measurement of the speed of light should be constant, but constant relative to the position and speed of the observer. The problem was that the experimental results for measuring the speed of light (approx. 300,000 kilometres per second (kps)) held constant regardless of the point of measurement, i.e. the relative position and speed of the observer. It appeared to disobey one of sciences most fundamental axioms. The following illustrates this.

Consider the situation of person A moving in space at 100kph and they the shoot a bullet that travels at 200kph. For a stationary person B watching, they see A moving

²¹⁹ Laws of nature understood as descriptive not prescriptive.

at 100kph and the bullet moving at 300kph with the relative motion (between A and the bullet) being 200kph. Just to recap, for person A the bullet is travelling at 200kph, and for person B it is travelling at 300kph. This is presented in Figure 28

All this is straightforward and is predicted from the formula Speed = Distance/Time Interval. The time interval is simply the time period over which the distance travel by an object is measured, let's assume it is T_X or the difference in time between observation 1 (T_1) and observation 2, (T_2).

The speed as determined by A (S_A) = Distance travelled as measured by A (D_A) ÷ Time interval as measured by A (T_X). This is represented as follows

$$S_A = \frac{D_A}{T_X} . \text{ From A the speed of the bullet was found to be, } S_A = 200kph$$

Using the same approach for B and the same time interval as measured by B, we have,

$$S_B = \frac{D_B}{T_X} \text{ and the speed of the bullet was calculated as } S_B = 300kph$$

As can be seen, the distance travelled by the bullet as measured by A is less, because A is travelling in the same direction as the bullet. The smaller distance




Figure 28 Speed of bullet is relative to the observer

travelled over the same time interval accounts for the lower *relative* speed.

This is all consistent with the physics. Depending on the relative position from which the measurement is taken, the speed of the bullet is different. Speed is relative to the observer.

Just as the speed of the bullet varies relative to the point of measurement (i.e. 200kph vs 300kph scenario), the *speed of light should also vary*. Here is where the problem was discovered. Various experiments measured the speed of light from differing positions which should have resulted in different relative speeds. However, the speed of light, regardless of the relative position of the measuring point, remains constant at approximately 300,000kps. Applying the above equation, this is the result;

$$\frac{D_A}{T_X} = \frac{D_B}{T_X} = 300,000\text{kps}$$

The only way this result works is if the distances travelled by light in the time interval T_X are the same, i.e. $D_A = D_B$. This can only occur if A and B are in the same relative position to the light being measured, and this was not the case. The maths doesn't work!

The science community held that there must be some fundamental flaw in the way the experiments were designed and implemented or there was some other as yet unknown influence on the light. There was no other way to explain the results. One factor influencing this was that light was understood to be a wave and as such required a material substance to transmit it. Physicists believed that there was some undiscovered, imponderable substance that filled space which was called 'ether' by the science community, i.e. space was not empty. The search was on to discover 'ether' and then to investigate if there was something about this substance that was contributing to the findings concerning the behaviour of light. This hypothesizing of an unknown substance is no different to the concepts of phlogiston or caloric that were developed to explain heat, and like them the concept of ether was proved wrong.

Einstein's genius was to accept both the basic axiom and the results of the empirical findings concerning the speed of light but to jettison the assumptions concerning the nature of light itself and the existence of ether. He turned his attention solely on the observations concerning light. His approach was to ignore unfounded

presuppositions about the characteristics of the entities, light and time, regardless of how 'intuitive', or self-evident those presuppositions appeared.

Einstein accepted that the equation $\frac{D_A}{T_X} = \frac{D_B}{T_X} = 300,000\text{kps}$ may be correct and then followed the logical implications of this. Both these steps are similar to Heidegger's approach.

The next step, also similar to Heidegger's, is the one that seems to me to be the most difficult. For the mathematics to be correct, there must be some fundamental assumption being made about space (distance) or time that is wrong. Just how difficult the next step is can be gleaned by considering the following thought experiment: The instruments used to measure the distances and the time intervals are very accurate and checked such that there is no error in the taking of the measurements. Providing there is agreement on what constitutes a unit of distance or a unit of time what measurement system used is irrelevant. At the turn of the twentieth century everyone accepted space and time as constants. My question is that faced with the results, how would you change your understanding of the equation such that it is correct, and at the same time accept the legitimacy of all the measurements? This is the challenge that faced Einstein. His answer revolutionised physics.

Einstein's conclusion was that the time interval measured at A (T_X) was not the same time interval measured at B (also T_X) even though they were accurately measured by high precision instruments and there was no error in reading. Einstein argued that time itself slows down the faster you travel, and this slowdown is experienced by everything travelling at that speed, including the measuring instruments.

If you could stand back and observe both A and B, then the passing of time would be faster at A than B. The period of time, T_X , at A is not equal to the period of time at B, T_X . Time itself is relative. This change of time that Einstein 'discovered' is known as the 'time dilation' effect and has been confirmed by many experiments over the last century. The effect is not theoretical and has real-world implications. For example, it has to be taken into account in the GPS (global position system) network to ensure that the positions calculated by references to the various satellites moving in orbit are correct.

The presupposition that time is the same regular ticking-off of one second after

another at a steady rate throughout the universe regardless of where you are and how fast you are travelling was false. Time is not the universal constant in the universe, light is. The physics community did not recognise that they were holding fast to an assumption about time as a universal constant. I don't think I would have realised this either. It is an extremely difficult assumption to let go of, in the first instance because it is hidden or taken for granted presupposition²²⁰. There was significant opposition to Einstein's work when it was published and even as late as 1931 there was a book published in Germany under the title *A Hundred Authors against Einstein* (Goenner, 1993), however over time opposition died out as results of experiments confirmed Einstein's work and the explanatory power of the theory was recognised. This is another example of the difficulty of shifts in fundamental beliefs associated with Kuhnian scientific revolutions!

A critical aspect of Einstein's method relates to presuppositions. Even though the pull of the belief concerning the entities themselves is very strong, by putting aside unfounded presuppositions he frees himself up to play with different alternatives. In the above example, the constancy of time was relinquished, and soon after, as part of his work, the constancy of space itself is relinquished. This led to Einstein's Theory of General Relativity, and the concepts dealing with the inter-relationship of space and time, the warping of space around objects and so on. Describing this is not within the scope of this thesis.

There is another point worth noting. Recalling Peirce's injunction to look at the effects which have a practical bearing, what is important to recognise is that the experience associated with the perceived meaning/understanding of time itself is not an effect. It is something concerning the entity itself which had been assumed and not been conclusively proven. Yet, it had been taken up as part of our understanding based solely on its assumed self-evident character. By focusing on 'effects' and using mathematics and logic, Einstein was able to make his breakthrough.

In Einstein's 1905 work all the elements he used were known by science at the time. His genius was in his methodology and his willingness to take a different interpretive

²²⁰ It is of course possible that Einstein's view of space and time are wrong and will eventually be displaced by another descriptive account. This may occur when the riddle of dark matter and dark energy are solved or if quantum physics comes up with an account of gravity.

stance, and this brings me back to Heidegger.

From Einstein to Heidegger

Heidegger's methodology is similar to Einstein's except applied in a different domain. He accepts the basic axiom concerning constancy of being, he focusses on the empirical phenomenon, most of which were already documented, he discards long-held presuppositions, he discards prior attempts at interpreting the phenomenon, and he follows the logic.

That he accepts the basic axiom of constancy is implicit in his pursuit of ontological structures. One fundamental difference is that the natural scientists are looking for constancy that is timeless. In that Dasein is an emergent being and can become extinct, the constancy is relative to the ontological domain. This does not mean he must accept the dogma of the reductionist account. This is equivalent to the hanging onto the constancy of time because of its self-evident character and the support of the tradition. He jettisons the view of the natural sciences that 'constancy' must only be found in simple, measurable relationships between physical entities and that an entity must be constituted from the physical.

Some of the fundamental presuppositions Heidegger sets aside are the entrenched idea of a self as a substantial entity; the idea that entities are only understood in terms of their physical nature; that the person is understood in terms of its mind or consciousness; and that all entities are constituted in the same way. This is extremely hard to do, at least on a par with Einstein's leap concerning the nature of time. Even the founder of the phenomenology movement, Edmund Husserl, could not drop these basic presuppositions even though to do so was indicated by his methodology. Heidegger does acknowledge the phenomenon of consciousness but puts it aside for the purposes of his inquiry. He firmly rejects the concept of 'a self' that is somehow in control of our life because he concluded, there is just no phenomenological evidence for it; just as Hume had concluded.

In looking for ways to bring the phenomenon into view without the overlay of interpretations imposed by the culture Heidegger not only takes up the basic discoveries of Husserl but returns to the ancient Greeks for inspiration. His approach seems to be to engage with the brightest minds of this earlier era before the powerful influence of the later eras. He looks past the descriptive language used by the Greeks to try to interpret what it is they are 'seeing' and describing, not unlike

one must do with Heidegger. In other words, he was looking for, as much as it is possible, descriptions of phenomena themselves rather than theoretical accounts of phenomena.

As discussed, Heidegger's conclusion is that the being of the entity, Dasein, is the dynamic structural process he calls being-in-the-world and that while this may necessitate being founded on a physical body, it is the dynamic reflexive relationship of this process with the world and other Daseins that constitutes Dasein, not the physical. As discussed, if you take the same initial genetic bundle (*renata infans* or newborn baby) and place it from the outset in a different cultural context you get a completely different set of lived experiences based on different understandings and different affective-capacities: you get a different Dasein. The outcome of this is that not only does Dasein change depending on the circumstance but a different Dasein *will possibly see things differently* (circumspection and considerateness). They may not only see the entity itself differently as a result of differing understandings but in terms of how it matters. As a consequence, this influences our actions towards entities, even to the extent of killing a daughter! There is no sense in which Dasein acts as a rational agent in than manner, for example, assumed by traditional economic theory.

Dasein is neither the body nor the systems; these are the necessary aspects, the ontological structure, that constitutes Dasein. Dasein is the bundle of understandings and affective-capacities that determine its actions in the world that are the outcome of the dynamic nature of the structure, what Heidegger collectively calls Daseins facticity.

There are feedback elements all through this dynamic process. In becoming a Dasein, Dasein is first shaped by social milieu at the same time becoming part of the social milieu itself, in turn shaping other Daseins. Becoming part is not a part in the sense of one marble among many in a tin. Dasein becomes a constituting part of the culture itself. In taking up the practices of the culture Dasein becomes part of what sustains the culture. If this is the case, then there is a basis for arguing that the person is not an independent creature that grows up in a culture. Rather that cultures are self-organising entities of which Dasein emerges as a constitutive part. This is related to the earlier discussion on wholes and parts that the whole constitutes the part and Heidegger's notion of being.

Dasein is then a highly social member of the mob, and its sense of independence is, to a large extent, an illusion. The independent Dasein approach is one most notably adopted by Western cultures. Alternative understandings based on a sense of a cultural-unity, of one people, seem to be more the norm in many other cultures and this seems to reflect more closely the ontological structure than does the individualistic stance of the West. In that, the Old Testament had a 'one-people' view of community, and this is a fundamental part of the Western Christian heritage, an interesting line of research would be to trace the origins of the individualistic stance in the West and the manner of its split from its Judaic roots. I suspect it is with Paul's split with the founding group of apostles who retained an allegiance to the Judaic tradition while Paul relinquishes the hold on this tradition as part of his evangelical push into the Greco-Roman world, which subsequently embraces Greek philosophical concepts into its theology, rather than Judaic; but that is purely speculative. The point is that Heidegger's philosophical research has findings consistent with other significant traditions.

The stark conclusion to this is that the cultural environment, being the mix of the various overlays of country, ethnicity, social-economic, religious, immediate community, peers and family factors will shape the facticity of the young children and as such have a significant bearing on the nature of their future existence as a Dasein. Each Dasein, in turn, influences the future of the culture, and significant gatherings of new understandings of young Daseins will eventually flow through the culture. Cultural values and norms are inherited, moulded and 'bequeathed'. This approach has characteristics that are found in dynamic, complex, self-organising systems.

These are the conclusions Heidegger reaches by adopting a strict experiential empiricist approach. By observing, as far as is possible, the way in which Dasein interacts with the entities in its world (effects of practical bearing), putting aside unsubstantiated assumptions concerning the nature of entities, and following the logic. He is not, as he repeats several times, doing a philosophical anthropology of all aspects of Dasein's various ways of being, just the basic structural framework of what it is to be Dasein, being-in-the-world. That he has done this is quite an achievement; never before or since attempted in Western scholarship. In so doing he also establishes the possibility of a research agenda to finish the 'philosophical anthropology.' In my view, his achievement is as ground-breaking as Einstein's, just

in different domains. The question is, can we let go of deep-rooted beliefs about what we are as an entity, beliefs that have no basis in empirical evidence?

Systems Approach

In this section, I look at Heidegger's work from a systems perspective starting with Heidegger's comments that point to this understanding. I then consider his work in the light of the emergence and self-organising systems and learning systems. From this, I develop two key models as ways of understanding Heidegger's work and apply them to it. The account is only a basic and preliminary account so as to present the basic concepts. A more comprehensive account of complex systems theory and its relationship to Heidegger's work is outside the scope of this thesis.

Heidegger's Comments on Systems

Heidegger refers to his structure of worldhood as a system;

The context of assignments or references, which, as significance, 'is constitutive for worldhood, can be taken formally in the sense of a system of Relations. [BT 121/88]

He then clarifies what he means. He rejects the notion of a system as it applies to Dasein that can be understood mathematically,

The phenomenal content of these 'Relations' and 'Relata' - the "in-order-to", the "for-the-sake-of", and the "with-which" of an involvement - is such that they resist any sort of mathematical functionalization; [BT 122/88]

If this approach is taken aspects of Dasein existence is lost, this was discussed earlier. Instead,

They are rather relationships in which concerned circumspection as such already dwells. [BT 122/88]

As such this type of system is

... so far from volatilizing the being of the ready-to-hand within-the-world, that the worldhood of the world provides the basis on which such entities can for the first time be discovered as they are 'substantially' 'in themselves'. [BT 122/88]

The sort of system he is referring to is not that which constitutes 'systems of colours' or a 'system of philosophy' which refers to a cohesive set of ideas of principals. He is referring to a dynamic system, one that exists as a dynamic process. This is evident in that it is only the ongoing 'living' involvements of the many Daseins that constitute and maintain the world.

We can think of an electronic system, say an alarm system, which can be put down in a mathematical form which accurately represents the built form. Heidegger is not referring to this type of system either. He is referring to a system in which the 'signals' cannot be put into strict mathematical form without losing the basic character of the system itself, that which understands meaning. For example, a chicken casserole is in the oven cooking away in the family's favourite sauce. As you enter the front door the aroma strikes you, and a flood of affective-tuning passes over you, the sense of familiarity, the feeling of warmth, comfort and belonging, the anticipation of the meal and so on. How do you put this type of system into mathematical form and yet it has all the attributes of a system? Surely as signals are passed around an electrical system and can trigger responses, so in Dasein, there are signals initially picked up by the senses that are understood as having meaning, and show up as 'mattering', and in turn, there are responses. Both are systems, just different types. This is what Heidegger is getting at.

In an exchange in the Heraclitus Seminars, we also get the insight that Heidegger understands being-in-the-world as incorporating its environment as part of a living system. In this, his reference to Uexkülls' ecological work is particularly illuminating. Fink was Heidegger's assistant;

PARTICIPANT: Wittgenstein says an astounding thing in the Tractatus. Language is the extension of the organism.

FINK: The only question is how "organism" is to be understood here, whether biologically or in a manner that human dwelling in the midst of what is essentially determined and bodiliness.

HEIDEGGER: One can understand organism in the sense of Uexkülls or also as the functioning of the living system. In my lecture, which you mentioned, I have said that the stone is worldless, the animal world poor, and the human world-forming.

FINK: It is thereby a question whether the world-poverty of the animal is a deficient mode of world-forming transcendence. It is questionable whether the animal in the human can be understood at all when we see it from the animal's viewpoint, or whether it is not a proper way that the human relates to the dark ground.

HEIDEGGER: The bodily in the human is not something animalistic. The manner of understanding that accompanies it is something that metaphysics up till now has not touched on. [HS 146] (my underling)

The lectures being referred to are the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, in which Heidegger address the world of animals. Heidegger accepts that all animals are part of a living system. However, he differentiates between the living system for animals and that of humans, in that the world for the human is one that is meaningful

for Dasein in the sense that he uses the word. The idea that Dasein is world-forming relates to the idea that world is based on worldhood and hence Dasein's ongoing involvements. While animals have their ecological system, Dasein has its world.

The idea of systems, however, should not be understood as being one in which 'feelings' are substituted for some other form of information, or of understanding entities as things with functional relationships, this would still have the character of a mechanical system which Heidegger rejects,

The phenomenon of the body is wholly unique and irreducible to something else, for instance, irreducible to mechanistic systems. One must be able to accept the phenomenon of the body as such in its intact being. I cannot "understand" something merely causal. That means that I can have no insight into how one thing is derived from something else, that is, how it originates *out from* it [ZS 186]

It is a system whose constitutive aspects are essentially beyond our understanding. This, of course, does not prevent him from describing the characteristics of the system; it is just that all the individual, relational aspects cannot be comprehended, it is too complex. He also rejects the concept of a human as a complex system in equilibrium. In the Zollikon seminars he was commenting on a World Health Organization's report on psychosomatic disorders as reported by Schwidder in *Journal of psychosomatic medicine* (vol 11, no. 2 (1965): 146 ff.) The text reads:

The individual is to be understood as a complex, dynamic system in an unstable state of equilibrium, acting and reacting to changes in the environment and in its own system ...

If psychological and physiological processes are distinguished, one would be speaking about different aspects of one phenomenon...

.... the double meaning of the adjective "psychosomatic,"... On one hand, it refers to the basic conception in medicine that an interaction of body and soul is fundamental for the study of all diseases. On the other hand, the same adjective describes how the influence of psychological factors is predominant in certain disorders.

' "Stress". . . being burdened by events in the environment ... the decisive point is always *the relationship, which exists between being burdened and the individual's inner capacity to deal with it.* [ZS 199]

Heidegger's response is both decisive and informative,

In such a conception being human is not there at all. Everything is switched over to a system of processes, to a state of equilibrium of such processes, determined by the environment and by a so-called inner [subjectivity]. The relationship between the environment and one's own system is not reflected on. [ZS 199] (my underlining)

And the final quote;

In any case, one must by no means expect an understanding of the human being and his world from modern *systems theories*. In their essence, they all remain bound to the principle of causality, and thus they go along with the objectification of everything that is. In this way they have already blocked forever the view of the human being's proper being-in-the-world. [ZS 233]

On the one hand, while Heidegger acknowledges in *Being and Time* that what he is describing can be understood in some way as a system, and his various comments over the next fifty years clarified this.²²¹ On the other Heidegger is clear that it is not a mathematical system, it is not a mechanical system, it is not a closed bodily system reacting to the environment, and it is not some form of causal system.

It is not clear from Heidegger's comments to which 'systems theories' he was referring as even in the early part of last century the field was very broad. However, since Heidegger's time, there has been significant progress, albeit only among a minority of scholars and certainly not mainstream, in systems thinking that may be moving in a direction left open by Heidegger's prohibitions and it is to these I now turn.

Complex Systems: Emergence & Self Organisation

One area of systems theory that is coming back into vogue is that of emergence. The concept of emergence is that there are emergent entities that "'arise' out of more fundamental entities and yet are 'novel' or 'irreducible' with respect to them." (O'Connor & Wong, 2016)

While the idea of emergence is not new, it has generally received relatively little attention in the scientific or philosophic tradition. Aspects of emergence are however evident in the early work of Husserl under the concept of founded modes of existence and the idea that a part is determined by the whole. The language of Heidegger is also suggestive of emergence concepts. For example, in some of his descriptions of Dasein;

[Da-sein is] not something that could be simply found in extant man [CPE 207]

Does the realm of the extant, the at-hand, coincide with the realm of entities in general? Or

²²¹ In this discussion I have not included the work from Chapter 7 covering aspects of Heidegger's interpretation of the Greeks and the concept of prevailing, which I take as an early description of describing Nature in terms of emergence. Two relevant quotes are as follows;

"We speak of the nature of spirit, of soul, of the nature of the work of art, of the nature of the matter. Here φύσις does not mean that which prevails itself, but its *prevailing* as such, the essence, the inner law of a matter." [FCM 31]

"The prevailing of what prevails here can be grasped as that which determines whatever prevails as an entity, that which makes entities." [FCM 33]

is there any entity that, precisely due to the sense of its being, cannot be conceived as being at hand? In point of fact, the entity that can least of all be conceived as extant, at hand, the Dasein that in each instance we ourselves are. [BPP 119] [translation modified]

I take it that Dasein is an 'emergent entity' whose structure is being-in-the-world, which in turn is founded on the body. In the sense that emergence is understood there is no causal relationship, and Heidegger specifically talks about emergence in the sense I am using the term, for example, this from the Zollikon Seminars,

However, with all these statements, the phenomena of memory and recalling are not touched on. All these [chemical-physical] things are merely conditions for the emergence of the phenomenon. They are not *causes*, and surely not memory itself. [ZS 202] (my underlining)

An earlier type of emergence theory was known as process theory, and Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) was perhaps the best-known proponent in the early twentieth century. Hegel can also be interpreted as having a process view underpinning his concept of dialectics. (Seibt, 2016) Additionally, while not aligned with process philosophy, an emergence view appears in the work of the early atomists, and the concept of self-organization in nature is a philosophical position adopted by Kant. I discuss these views in more detail below. Heidegger is familiar with all these sources. He gave courses and seminars on Hegel's philosophy [HPS, HCE] as well as Kant's philosophy [KPM, PIKC], I have already discussed his knowledge of the early Greek philosophers, and he was also familiar with Whitehead's work referring to him in passing several times in his work [BH, WCT, BCAP]. It is inconceivable that Heidegger was not aware of and familiar with these ideas.

Seibt tells us that Process philosophy,

... is based on the premise that being is dynamic and that the dynamic nature of being should be the primary focus of any comprehensive philosophical account of reality and our place within it.

... While process philosophers insist that all within and about reality is continuously going on and coming about, they do not deny that there are temporally stable and reliably recurrent aspects of reality. But they take such aspects of persistence to be the regular behavior of dynamic organizations that arise due to the continuously ongoing interaction of processes. (Seibt, 2016, p. 1)

The process view of the reality of the world stands in stark contrast to the substance or materialist view of the world, and this process view has an intellectual tradition going back to Heraclitus (circa 560 BCE) (Seibt, 2016). Like most philosophical areas, there is no single agreed view concerning a process view other than the

common tenet that being is dynamic and that it is this dynamic nature that should be the primary focus of the way we understand the reality and our place in it. There is a strong resonance, at least conceptually, between the process view and aspects of Heidegger's work.

While the materialistic, reductionist approach has been dominant in most areas of scholarship during the twentieth century there is a contemporary resurgence occurring in the idea of emergence that is typified by the Philip Clayton and Paul Davies edited volume, *The Re-emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion* in 2006 (Clayton & Davies, 2006). Emergence can be understood as the 'scientific' version of process philosophy.

One of the leading scholars behind this re-emergence was Donald Campbell (1916-1996), and one of his influential papers was on the concept of downward causation in hierarchical systems published in 1974 (Campbell, 1974). The importance of this, is the idea that not only can one system emerge from another but that it can then influence the system from which it emerged (Campbell, 1974) a concept that is now generally accepted amongst emergence theorists (Clayton & Davies, 2006). Why is this important? To use a simple example, this argument supports the view that Dasein, as founded on the body can decide to raise its arm, and it goes up! In other words, Dasein, an entity with a mode of being that is not that of a material entity, is controlling the physical body! The relationship between Dasein and the culture is another example.

Paul Davies sets out the basic belief stance of the reductionists;

Many physicists are self-confessed out-and-out strong reductionists. They believe that once the final building blocks of matter and the rules that govern them have been identified, then all of nature will, in effect, have been explained. This strong form of reductionism is sometimes known as ontological reductionism: the assertion that the whole really is, in the final analysis, nothing but the sum of the parts, and that the formulation of concepts, theories, and experimental procedures in terms of higher-level concepts is merely a convenience. (Clayton & Davies, 2006, p. xi ff)

In contrast to this majority view, he comments that a minority of scientists, emergentists, are challenging this account of nature and that many are what he calls strong emergentists a position in

... which it is asserted that the micro-level principles are quite simply inadequate to account for the system's behaviour as a whole. (Clayton & Davies, 2006, p. xii)

This view recognizes that,

... in practice the only way that the behaviour of many complex systems may be determined is by direct inspection or by simulation. In other words, one may not deduce merely from the principles that govern a class of systems how a specific individual system will in fact behave. Human behaviour, and even the behaviour of a simple organism such as a bacterium, probably falls into this category. (Clayton & Davies, 2006, p. xii)

This sounds very much like Heidegger's view of Dasein. He is determining the behaviour of the complex system, being-in-the-world, by direct inspection, an approach that Davies recognises as appropriate.

A commonly accepted definition of emergence has developed by el-Hani and Pereira and includes four characteristics associated with emergent systems.

1. *Ontological physicalism*: All that exists in the space-time world are the basic particles recognized by physics and their aggregates.
2. *Property emergence*: When aggregates of material particles attain an appropriate level of organizational complexity, genuinely novel properties emerge in these complex systems.
3. *The irreducibility of the emergence*: Emergent properties are irreducible to, and unpredictable from, the lower-level phenomena from which they emerge.
4. *Downward causation*: Higher-level entities causally affect their lower-level constituents. (Clayton, 2006, p. 2)

Apart from the first point, this is consistent with Heidegger's account. The first point harks back to the very first Greek natural philosophers who argued from the position that all there is are basic elements. Heidegger's account supports the view that if something emerges, that is irreducible to and unpredictable from the lower level then this constitutes a genuine entity and not merely a property. As such it can be considered as having its own ontological basis. However, I suspect that the difference also relates to a different conception of ontology, in that Heidegger has split the entity from the ontological structure and conceives of the ontological structure as an organising principle, in line with the Aristotelian view.

Clayton and Davies argue that the physicalist or reductionist accounts fails to adequately address many questions that scientists are raising particularly in the biological sciences but also to some extent in the physical sciences, answers that seem to be open to an emergentists approach. (Clayton & Davies, 2006) . I would support this view and argue that the reductionist account fails to adequately address the phenomenon of 'shedding life', something that is accounted for in Heidegger's work.

I am not going to pursue this line any further. My aim was to raise the view of the

process philosophers, and the emergentists approach being adopted by some contemporary scientists and to indicate that Heidegger's position is not as radical as it may first appear, and that it is both a plausible and accepted approach, at least in principle by many eminent scholars.

Self-organising Systems

The 'One' can be understood as the cultural norms. It is not just the practices understood as the average everyday way of doing things, but it also refers to the averageness of the understanding and affective-capacities that underpins those way of doing things. In that Heidegger states that he is describing Dasein in its average everydayness this can be understood as Heidegger describing "Mr or Ms Average Dasein" or the culture itself. This is the approach taken by Haugeland,

We are at last in a position to address the fundamental question for any interpretation of Being and Time: What is Dasein? According to the text, the anyone (pp. 126-30), the world (pp. 64, 364, and 380), language (p. 166), and even the sciences (p. 11) all have "Dasein's kind of being." We can make sense of this astonishing diversity if we understand Dasein to be the anyone and everything instituted by it: a vast intricate pattern-generated and maintained by conformism - of norms, normal dispositions, customs, sorts, roles, referral relations, public institutions, and so on. On this reading, the anyone [the One, or Das Man], the (every-day) world, and language are different coherent "subpatterns" within the grand pattern that is Dasein; they have Dasein's kind of being because each of them is Dasein (though none of them is all of Dasein). Within the anyone and all it institutes, the science of chemistry is a coherent subpattern: chemistry is Dasein-and so are philately, Christmas, and Cincinnati. (Haugeland, 1982, p. 19)(my underlining & gloss)

In this account, the culture itself is Dasein and is a complex and vast self-organising system (a pattern "generated and maintained by conformism") and within this Dasein and its various worlds are different levels of sub-patterns or sub-systems that constitute the whole. This interpretation has much going for it, but in the end, I don't think it is valid, Heidegger, as I have shown throughout the work to date, makes too many references based on the actions of the individual Dasein. A better description, by way of analogy, is the relationship between the tribe or hive and the tribe member or individual bee.

What Haugeland's interpretation is suggestive of is the concept of self-organising systems, an approach now widely accepted in many fields of sciences, and one consistent with Heidegger's comments on systems and his description of being-in-the-world. Smith provides an introduction to chaos theory and self-organisation in his introductory book (Smith, 2007) and the following description has been largely drawn from this account. The general concept of self-organization is the emergence

of order from a disordered group or mass of interacting parts. The order arises as a result of the interacting relationships between neighbouring elements, which in turn effect other neighbouring areas. The self-ordering occurs spontaneously, often precipitated by a random event in that there is no outside agency, no central controlling element and the ordered system is maintained by feedback loops throughout the system. Once stabilised self-organising systems can be quite resilient with the system having a capacity to respond to damage by a 'repair' process that returns its stable self-organised state. Chaos theory describes initial chaotic (complex, non-predictable) circumstances in which an 'attractor' spontaneously forms and around this 'attractor' an organised structure emerges. This organised structure is the self-organising system.

This idea of order out of a sea of chaos is an idea that dates back to the early Greeks and is found in Heidegger's reading of them as I have previously addressed. Heidegger is not the only philosopher to be influenced by this aspect of early Greek thinking. Palmer(A. Palmer, 2012) has explored how the Renaissance thinkers read and were influenced by the work of the Roman philosopher and atomist, Lucretius(94-55/51BCE). His work *On the Nature of Things (De Rerum Natura)* is the largest and most complete surviving record of the ancient atomists theories that extends back to Leucippus and Democritus (460-370BCE) and was taught by Epicurus (341-270BCE). The atomists argued that the universe was comprised of an infinite number of small particles (atoms) in chaotic motion that, over time, arranged in various ordered forms some of which emerged as stable entities, without the need of a grand designer or God. This included the formation of a "wide variety of creatures, but that only those suited to their environments survived to the present" (A. Palmer, 2012, p. 395)

Descartes discusses the concept of self-organisation in his posthumously published book *The World*(Descartes & Gaukoger(editor), 2004)without specifically referring to the term. The phenomenon was first called "self-organisation" by Immanuel Kant (Keller, 2008) in his 1790 book *Critique of Judgment*. Kant was addressing the question of what is a living organism in terms of the special characteristics that distinguish them from inanimate objects. He established a maxim that defines an organism as follows:

... an organized natural product is one in which every part is reciprocally both end and means. In such a product nothing is in vain, without an end, or to be ascribed to a blind

mechanism of nature. (Kant, 2007, p. 376)

An important point in this maxim is that the end is not outside the organism, it is not serving some external purpose. This has important implications for science as he goes on to argue that in science teleology can only be considered a meaningful concept if it can be found in nature and that organisms provide such a case. They are beings,

... first afford objective reality to the conception of an *end* that is an end *of nature* and not a practical end. They supply natural science with the basis for a teleology .. a way of judging its objects on a special principle that it would otherwise be absolutely unjustifiable to introduce into that science. (Kant, 2007, p. 376)

In comparing the production of a natural product, an organism, to that of a tool, Kant argues that there is a fundamentally different process, and it is here that the term self-organising is introduced,

In such a natural product as this every part is thought as *owing* its presence to the *agency* of all the remaining parts, and also as existing *for the sake of the others* and of the whole, that is as an instrument, or organ. But this is not enough—for it might be an instrument of art, and thus have no more than its general possibility referred to an end. On the contrary the part must be an organ *producing* the other parts—each, consequently, reciprocally producing the others. No instrument of art can answer to this description, but only the instrument of that nature from whose resources the materials of every instrument are drawn—even the materials for instruments of art. Only under these conditions and upon these terms can such a product be an *organized* and *self-organized being*, and, as such, be called a *natural end*. (Kant, 2007, pp. 373-4)

Keller notes that on Kant's account an organism "is not merely self-steering, self-governing, and self-maintaining; it is also self-organizing." (Keller, 2008, p. 49) Not only are natural organisms things of this world, not requiring a creationist explanation, but they are also "both cause and effect of itself" (Kant, 2007, p. 370), in other words self-generating. Further, in the opening lines of the above-quoted passage, there is a description of the concept of the whole determining the parts. As such, what we have is a description of the being of living organisms with many of the characteristics that Heidegger calls upon in his account of Dasein.

In the generations following Kant, the phenomenon of emergence is evident in the work of a number of philosophers. O'Connor and Wong argue that the British empiricist John Stewart Mills (1806–1873), is referring to this phenomenon when he is describing the difference between living and nonliving things. The following is a passage from Mills from his *A System of Logic* quoted by O'Connor and Wong,

All organised bodies are composed of parts, similar to those composing inorganic nature, and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic state; but the phenomena of life, which result from the juxtaposition of those parts in a certain manner, bear no analogy to any of the effects which would be produced by the action of the component substances considered as mere physical agents. To whatever degree we might imagine our knowledge of the properties of the several ingredients of a living body to be extended and perfected, it is certain that no mere summing up of the separate actions of those elements will ever amount to the action of the living body itself. (O'Connor & Wong, 2016, pp. 2-3)

What is evident in Mills account is that he argues that all organised bodies are made of the same stuff, however, in the “phenomena of life” it is the arrangement of the material that produces life. However, what emerges in ‘life’ does not resemble the physical material from which it is comprised. It is not on the basis of a “mere summing up” the basic material from which the entities of living things is constituted. In other words, ‘life’ is founded on the ready-to-hand but the ready-to-hand cannot account for life. Mills position reflects Heidegger’s account that everything is founded on the ready-to-hand, but this is not an ontological founding.

It was a contemporary of Mills, the nineteenth-century British philosopher George Lewes (1817-1878) who first used the term emergent. Lewes first used the term when drawing the distinction between actions that produce a result (resultant) that is simply the sum of the acting forces and components and cases where the result cannot be explained by a tracing back (i.e. a reductionist process) to these components, in which case he refers to the result as an ‘emergent’;

Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum, when their directions are the same – their difference, when their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are homogeneous and commensurable. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference. (Blitz, 1992, p. 80)(my underlining)

In summary, the concepts of emergence, chaos and complex self-organising systems are not new and have a long intellectual heritage, grounded not in other world metaphysics but in serious scholarly attempts to make intelligible the processes of nature in a logical and coherent manner that reflects what is observed in nature. The issue is not the credibility of this line of thinking it is why it still continues to dwell outside, as Davies has indicated, the mainstream thinking of most physicists. Notwithstanding this, the approach is now widely used in areas of science where complexity and apparent non-linear relationships give rise to new

emergent phenomenon and where the characteristics of the phenomenon cannot be explained by a reductionist account based on the constituting elements.

Perhaps the most well know applications are in the development of neural networks in information technology which is now the main approach in artificial intelligence and in the study of weather formation and prediction (Smith, 2007), however the applications are found in almost every field of science, chemistry (e.g. formation of crystalline structures), biology (e.g. evolutionary biology, social behaviour of insects and mammals, population collapses, vision systems, etc), physics (e.g. thermodynamics, astrophysics), human behaviour sciences (e.g. market economics, crowd behaviour, culture, learning, etc), neuroscience (e.g. function of neural processes, consciousness), theology (e.g. process theology, divine action.) (Bedau & Humphreys, 2008; Clayton & Davies, 2006; Feltz, Crommelinck, & Goujon, 2006; Orsucci & Sala, 2009; Smith, 2007). There are many other examples, but this is sufficient to illustrate the relevance to these theories.

Using the concept of emergence and self-organising systems, it is possible to talk in broad terms of the higher emergent level and the lower or apriori level from which it emerges. An important aspect of the phenomenon is the notion of downward causality which is an essential feature if the system is to be self-organising. Downward causality refers to the phenomenon that not only does the higher level emerge from the lower level but that there are feedback mechanisms from the higher level back to the lower level which changes the functioning of the lower level, which in turn affects the higher level. Downwards causality has been the subject of scholarly inquiry, especially in biological systems, for more than forty years(Campbell, 1974). While this it is still outside the normative position of science understood strictly in physicalist terms, work is being done to understand the implications of downward causality in areas such as cancer biology(Soto, Sonnenschein, & Miquel, 2008)and its implications are being explored more widely in physics(Davies, 2006b).

Without reference to the concepts of emergent systems one aspect of systems theory that has been widely accepted and used, perhaps since before written history, is the idea of a feedback mechanism. A thermostat on any heating system is an example of a simple feedback mechanism. Any mechanism that regulates the functioning of a system in some way, based on monitoring an aspect of the system itself, or the status of the what the system is influencing (e.g. temperature, water

levels, price changed, pressure, etc.) are feedback mechanisms. An ancient flood irrigation system using water channels and sluice valves is another example. In this case, a human agent does the monitoring of the water flow and then opens or closes the valve to alter the flow of water. The concepts of system monitoring and regulation are ubiquitous in nature, and most of the human senses are designed for this purpose. Once understood along these lines, we are linking back to Heidegger's concept of the receptive-perceptive capabilities and the way he describes Dasein's relatedness to the world. The 'One' also acts as a feedback mechanism in Heidegger's work, maintaining a particular conception of world.

While the philosophers I have referred to identify the phenomenon, there was no substantial philosophical investigation carried out. One of the problems arising from Kant's work is that while it addresses the character of organisms and together with his earlier work in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it provides an account of living and nonliving entities it did not address the apparent difference between humans and other living things. The German philosopher Friedrich Schelling (1759-1805) identified this problem in Kant's work and referred to it as the problem of human freedom, and he sought not only to address this but the other great legacy problem from Kant, the nature of the relationship of the subject with the object world. Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1846), a German poet and friend of Schelling's, argued that this relationship could never be understood from only one side and that the subject-object relationship in consciousness is grounded in "a whole of which subject and object are parts" which Hölderlin termed 'being'. (Bowie, 2016) This idea remained influential for Schelling throughout his career.

Schelling's philosophy is almost as difficult to access as is Heidegger's but his argument, in simplified terms, is that all of nature is one unity within which all else are parts. It is the essence of nature itself that has produced human subjectivity that enables it to not only understand itself but other things in nature. In Schelling's work nature can be thought of as a form of 'super-subject' of which all else is a part.(Bowie, 2016)Bowie cites a passage from Schelling's work discussing the nature of human identity, and in it, we see similar ideas to that of Heidegger, "for being, actual, real being is precisely self-disclosure/revelation" (Bowie, 2016, p. 14).

In a 1936 lecture series on *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom* Heidegger clarifies Schelling's concept of human freedom;

Schelling's treatise has nothing to do with this question of the freedom of the will, which is ultimately wrongly put and thus not a question at all. For freedom is here, not the property of man, but the other way around: Man is at best the property of freedom. Freedom is the encompassing and penetrating nature, in which man becomes man only when he is anchored there. That means the nature of man is grounded in freedom. But freedom itself is a determination of true being in general which transcends all human being. Insofar as man is as man, he must participate in this determination of being, and man is, insofar as he brings about this participation in freedom. (Key sentence: Freedom not the property of man, but rather: man the property of freedom.) [STHF 9] (gloss in the original)

Reading this carefully, the way Heidegger is interpreting Schelling is that freedom is what constitutes the essence of 'man', and as such 'transcends all human being', and it is on the basis of participating in freedom that in turn, we experience our own freedom. This phenomenon is precisely the phenomenon that Heidegger is addressing in his Dasein analytic. Schelling never proceeded down the path of an analysis of the structure of freedom, this does not occur until Heidegger's work, and then with different labels and metaphors. What we have in Schelling is a clear transition from simply recognising the phenomenon of emergence as the basis for distinguishing the living (organisms) from the nonliving, he is applying the same idea to distinguish the human experience of living, from living things of nature. The link between Schelling and Hölderlin also helps shed light on Heidegger's engagement with Hölderlin in the later part of his career when he gave three separate lecture courses on Hölderlin's poems²²².

The two Kantian problems that Schelling is addressing are dealt with by Heidegger, not directly but as a consequence of his ontological research. His premise, as will be recalled, is that we first need to start with a clarification of the meaning of being. By being, he refers to whatever it is that both determines an entity as the entity it is and is the basis of our understanding entities. The results of his investigation into the being of Dasein also addresses the subjective-objective divide by demolishing the validity of the very question and putting in its place the unity of being-in-the-world, which on my interpretation is an emergent entity.

At the start of the thesis, it was evident that Heidegger is influenced by the Ancient Greeks, particularly Aristotle and the work of Husserl²²³. However, in terms of

²²² The three lecture courses are the Winter 1934/35 course on Hölderlin's hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine", the Winter 1941/42 course on the hymn, "Remembrance" and the summer 1942 course on the hymn, "The Ister". All courses explored Hölderlin's understanding of being as reflected in his poetry.

²²³ There are influences, for example Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Kant (Dreyfus, 1991; Kisiel, 1995) however there has been no need to explore these philosophers to shed light on Heidegger's work.

Heidegger's systems thinking it is evident that it is not only the Greeks that may have been influential. Heidegger was not working in a vacuum, and the concepts he has been drawing upon are evident in the philosophical literature with which he was familiar and with which he engaged. Like Einstein, his originality may not be in the observations or some of the concepts but the way in which he pulled them together and then pushed them to their logical conclusion using a robust strict empiricist method. This is not to minimise the intellectual effort involved; the result is remarkable and genuinely novel.

In this next section, I will discuss one example of feedback systems that introduce what is called a double loop mechanism. The example is Argyris' model of double-loop learning and its application to individual and organisational level behaviour. (Argyris, 2004; Argyris, 2004) I have chosen this example as it is a systems model that addresses the aspects of understanding and decision making and I can use the model to draw comparisons to Heidegger's account. Having described Argyris' model, I then present an alternative 'Heideggerian' model which I contend is a better descriptive account of the phenomena and has wider application. This model is one practical aspect of my interpretation of Heidegger's work. Following this, I present a simple schematic account of being-in-the-world from a higher-level – lower-level perspective which complements the more detailed model.


Learning Systems

The Argyris double-loop learning model is based on the premise that there are underlying values and beliefs, what are termed mental models or theories-in-use²²⁴, that inform decision making and behaviour. The idea is that decision making, and behaviour is based on the mental-models and will continue in the same consistent way (first loop) until there is some change in the underlying mental-model (second or double-loop). This is represented in Figure 29. To bring about conscious change in decision making so as to change (improve) the outcome of those decisions the second loop has to be deliberately initiated. In this model, the person is a self-contained and independent actor receiving information about the consequences of actions in relation to an independent world.

In Figure 30, I have presented a model based on being-in-the-world, a Heideggerian version. Significant differences include the addition of the influence of the culture

²²⁴ Sometimes referred to as the theory in action.

(the 'One), the inclusion of receptivity, the identification of possible responses (which



exist even within a given 'mental model'), and the removal of the concept of a model which Heidegger rejects. For Heidegger, the encounter with the world itself is the basis of 'the model'. Accordingly, Argyris' mental model (Figure 29 Loop 2) is removed and replaced by the structures of understanding and affective-capacities as part of the main Loop 1 (Figure 30). Based on Heidegger's analysis the process will include a review against the norms of the culture and is not one that typically takes place in a deliberate, conscious fashion (Loop 2). This reflects the conforming process of Dasein within a culture. Loop 3 relates to deliberate review processes which typically does not happen, but which Heidegger argues is essential in order to have an authentic response. There is in the system a tension between Dasein's current facticity (loop 1), the constant pull of conformity (loop 2) and any deliberate attempt to take action contrary (loop 3) to the other two influences. An example of this tension is the understanding of time as a constant in the earlier discussion concerning Einstein's work and in the emergent character of Dasein in Heidegger' work.




Figure 30 Heidegger's Triple Loop Model

I am not going to explore in any depth the similarities and difference between these two models; my intent is to show that Argyris and Heidegger both appear to be dealing with the same basic phenomenon notwithstanding they have different interpretations. The significant difference which is not easy to build into the depiction of the model is that for Heidegger, Dasein is not an independent, self-sufficient actor. There is a suggestion of this in my use of terminology and the use of 'projection'. Argyris' model is based on the standard Cartesian separation of subject-object or self-world.

In the Argyris model, the mental model or theory-in-use is what informs people in relation to their judgements, planning and ways of implementing and assessing or

reviewing outcomes of actions and is based on a mixture of knowledge, values and beliefs. (Argyris & Schön, 1974) What is more, according to Argyris few people are aware of these models or theories that determine how they behave. (Argyris, 1980) When we are called upon to articulate what it is we are doing, we typically, according to Argyris, present an espoused theory:

When someone is asked how he would behave under certain circumstances, the answer he usually gives is his espoused theory of action for that situation. This is the theory of action to which he gives allegiance, and which, upon request, he communicates to others. However, the theory that actually governs his actions is this theory-in-use. (Argyris & Schön, 1974, pp. 6-7)

This distinction between the theory-in-action and espoused theory allows Argyris to develop a research methodology that enables inquiries into the congruence between behaviour and espoused values. (Argyris, 1980) Argyris' field is organisational effectiveness and involves the study of the inter-relationship between the organisation and the individual and between individuals within the organisation so as to improve organisational performance. The implication of this model is that the 'real' person is not reflected in what the person espouses but in their behaviour. The similarities to Heidegger' view of the ontic phenomenon concerning Dasein are obvious enough.

One example of the application of this Argyris' model is the concept of self-fulfilling prophecy. Argyris (Argyris, 1976) gives the example of a teacher assigned a class of students, and the teacher believes that it is a class of 'stupid' students (theory-in-use). The belief is communicated to the students who in turn behave, on observation by the teacher, like 'stupid' students and so confirms the initial judgement. Argyris gives the example that one way this can occur is for the teacher to give a test that contains difficult questions that the students have difficulty with, the results confirm the original assessment. From the student perspective, the same mechanism works in that underlying beliefs concerning their ability to learn are confirmed by the teacher's actions. For Argyris, the teacher has failed to recognise the theory-in-use at work which is in contradiction to an espoused theory of good practice, etc. which is at odds with the behaviour. Argyris recognises the difficulty in identifying and then changing one's theory in use (Argyris, 1985) and as part of this, he advocates the use of 'hard data' (Argyris, 1985), critical observation of behaviour and so on.

Interestingly his example appears to be an attempt to explain how group conformity

arises. He is arguing that the students' own mental models are shaped by the action of the group 'norm' setter, in this case, the teacher. The phenomenon of conforming one's behaviour to comply with another's expectations is known as the Pygmalion effect (Fiske & Taylor, 2013) and the influence of the teacher expectation on student outcomes is a well-researched phenomenon (Rosenthal, 1997).

Heidegger's model applied to the above example accounts for the phenomenon and provides the opportunity for even deeper analysis. The initial level of analysis between the stated approach of the teacher and observed behaviour is available as in Argyris. Under the Heideggerian model, it is recognised that the teacher will be exhibiting behaviours (concernful and solicitudinous dealings) based on the teacher's existing understanding and receptivity. For most teachers, this is determined, within a range of averageness, as determined by the 'One'. This would include not only the general community but also the culture in which the teacher was educated, the local staff room culture and so on. While the person's teaching practice may be outside the normative range, it will still be influenced by these factors, and there will be a continuous 'pull' to conform. The origins of the 'stupid' student view may not just lie within the teacher but the 'One'. While it is possible for a single person to change, as Argyris is advocating, if the source of the understanding lies more in the 'One' then this is difficult. A culture change (i.e. change the 'One') is more likely to be the appropriate strategy. The Argyris model focuses on the independent individual; the Heideggerian model focuses on the person as part of a we-world. In the above example, the emphasis would include the 'One' that influences the teacher and the 'One' that influences the students.

Heidegger's approach also provides a basis for investigating the meaning of such concepts of teaching, teacher and student. In relation to the self-fulfilling prophecy while there is the possibility of, not deliberately, administering tests to produce the confirming results this is not required for a 'self-fulfilling' prophecy hypothesis. In that the teacher's affective-tuning is based on 'stupid students' then the focus of the teacher's attention will be on this aspect of student behaviour in general as it is observed in the class, not just based on tests. Even in ordinary everyday tests and assignments, attention will be drawn to what 'matters' for the teacher which is influenced by the affective-tuning of 'stupid students'. Consequently, the teacher's attention will be drawn to the deficits of the students' performance and not the positives, which will be either not seen or put aside as not typical. Every 'poor'

performance confirms the affective-tuning, it doesn't require the staging of 'hard' tests.

The Pygmalion effect functions within the students to modify their self-understanding and expectations (affective-capacities) to reflect the primary representative of the 'One' in the classroom, i.e. the teacher. Further comparisons against the 'brainy' kids confirm the status by exception whereas peer evaluation confirms the student as part of the mob. The Dasein-with of 'teacher of stupid students' will influence the development of the reciprocal Dasein-with of 'stupid students of the teacher'.

The difficulty in changing is not simply related to cognition as Argyris suggests. The students will show up as 'stupid' students to the teacher because of the sight associated with considerateness and forbearance [BT 159/123]. As discussed, based on Heidegger's work while a teacher may make such a change (loop 3 in Heidegger's model) the change would be extremely difficult and effective strategies would also require a change to the 'One', i.e. organisation culture. However, there is still the issue to clarify the meaning of teacher, student and the nature of understanding based on a being-in-the-world; the Argyris model does not address this. In summary, Heidegger's model would allow for the investigation of outcomes of teacher-student interactions at all these various levels whereas Argyris' model is designed for organisational effectiveness, which itself is determined by and within broader industry norms (Argyris, 2004).

I take Argyris' work in terms of his identification of various ontic phenomena as support for Heidegger's account. Argyris' model had far more detail than I have provided however I believe I have accurately presented the basic thrust of the model. Albeit additional work would be required, on the face of it Heidegger's 'model' is not only able to 'explain' the phenomenon that Argyris' model addresses but opens up greater lines of inquiry and questioning concerning the basis of behaviour and understanding.

The Heideggerian model that I have presented, I take as the basic model for Dasein's basic mode of dealing with entities in the world.

Application of Emergent Concepts

I read Heidegger as working within an emergentists framework and as such within a tradition that has an intellectual history extending back over two thousand five hundred years and one that is relevant to scholarship today. Heidegger's

description of being-in-the-world is consistent with this view.

There are two points that need to be raised. Firstly, in relation to the discussions so far, and this was exhibited in the Kant discussion, the self-organising approach was confined to the physical entity, the organism. There was an echo of the previously cited approach by Schwidder in *Journal of psychosomatic medicine* that Heidegger refers to in the Zollikon Seminars,

The individual is to be understood as a complex, dynamic system in an unstable state of equilibrium, acting and reacting to changes in the environment and in its own system... [ZS 199]

This is a view that reflects, for example, a holistic approach that incorporates 'the whole' person and makes room for psychosomatic medicine. However, Heidegger rejects it;

In such a conception being human is not there at all. Everything is switched over to a system of processes, to a state of equilibrium of such processes, determined by the environment and by a so-called inner [subjectivity]. The relationship between the environment and one's own system is not reflected on. [ZS 199] (my underlining)

His objections highlight two critical differences in Heidegger's work that are part of the innovations that Heidegger has introduced to the emergentists perspective. First, he differentiates between the physical processes and the 'being human' i.e. Dasein. Second, existing approaches ignore the way "one's own system" is in relationship with the environment, the very heart of Heidegger's approach. I take it that "one's own system" is whatever it is that is described by the structure of being-in-the-world. These objections are satisfied by understanding Dasein as an emergent entity arising from the "relationship between the environment and one's own system", Heidegger's great breakthrough!

An aspect in relation to the emergentists account that may arise relates to the question; "How?". What is the mechanism by which we get from the lower level to the upper level? This takes us right back to the nature of Heidegger's inquiry itself. The how is a causal question based on an understanding of the physical properties, the forces acting on them, the nature of the possible interactions and so on. While this is a legitimate line of inquiry, it is irrelevant from the perspective of Heidegger's methodology and 'good' science can be achieved using alternative approaches as has been illustrated by the cases of Fourier and Einstein and as argued by Peirce.

In Heidegger's work, the structures he develops acknowledges that there is a bi-

directional relationship that goes between the body's biological systems and Dasein; it is just that this is irrelevant for Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. Heidegger's methodology, therefore, addresses the fact that at the moment science has no idea how this interface occurs, and the puzzle is typified by what is called the 'the mystery of consciousness'²²⁵. Heidegger's approach is also consistent with Davies' comment that "in practice, the only way that the behaviour of many complex systems may be determined is by direct inspection or by simulation" and when it comes to predicting the behaviour of an individual in the system "one may not deduce merely from the principles that govern a class of systems how a specific individual system will in fact behave." (Clayton & Davies, 2006, p. xii)

That Dasein is regarded by Heidegger as an emergent entity is clear from his descriptions and discussions in various texts, for example, his comments in relation to Schwidder referred to above. But there are other clear indications. That everything on the higher level is founded on the stuff of nature is made very clear by Heidegger, he states that "everything is founded" on the substantiality "which belongs to Things of Nature" [92/63]. I have previously discussed that what Heidegger meant by founded was a necessary but not causal relationship, i.e. it is emergent. In the earlier discussions on Dasein and the body I pointed out, for example, that Heidegger acknowledged that there are correlates of brain activity associated with the experiences of Dasein, however, he denies that these are causally sufficient to account for the experiences. To put this in the language of emergence, the lower level organic processes are necessary for, the higher level lived experiences of Dasein, but those experiences cannot be reduced to the organic processes.

If it is accepted that Dasein is an emergent entity, then a key question that arises is; How can Dasein influence the body? The fact that we do not know 'how' is irrelevant to the consideration of Dasein as an entity. That the functioning of a Dasein at the higher level can influence the body, i.e. the lower level, is self-evident. Searle's example that when he wants to raise his arm, it goes up (Searle, 1983) is a very simple and elegant example of this principle.

Taking Heidegger's account as an emergentists description then this can be

²²⁵ This remains the case notwithstanding substantial work has been done in identifying correlates of neuronal activity and Dasein's functioning and lived experiences.




Figure 31 Heidegger's Emergent Systems

presented as a basic schematic (refer Figure 31). There is more work to do on clarifying these emergent relationships. However, the schematic is sufficient for the purposes of this thesis.

In the model, the lower level is a necessary condition of the higher level, but it does not cause the higher level to come into being, and that actions at the higher level can result in changes in the lower level.

This model is consistent with Heidegger's account and emergent/self-organising principles. It also provides the basis for reconciling apparently divergent views in different fields. For example, in the study of depression one account, the minority view, depression is seen a 'social' phenomenon concerning the person and their relationship with the world. (Blazer, 2005) The alternative normative account is depression as a disease or some other dysregulation of the biological system as indicated by such things as chemical imbalances. (Pescosolido et al., 2010) Under the Heideggerian emergent model, both accounts are combined and simply reflecting different aspects of the same phenomenon.

While the Heideggerian model does not rule out pathological aetiology for conditions such as depression it does open up the way of studying the phenomenon as

something that occurs at both levels. Allowing both aspects in an account of depression provides a far richer understanding and avenues for interventions. It may be that the aetiology of a depression can be at either level!

Summary

One of the themes that arises periodically in this thesis is that throughout history the same phenomena is observed by scholars and that these observations are then subject to differing interpretive and theoretical accounts. The work of Argyris is a case in point. Even the phenomenon of emergence and chaos theory have similarities to the descriptive accounts extending back to the earlier Greeks. The challenge is to be able to move past the challenges associated with language and metaphors used in interpretation in each prior era and bring into view the descriptions of the various phenomena themselves and identify possible new aspects that have not been considered. This is what I have attempted to do throughout the thesis and is the approach taken in this chapter.

In this section I have outlined an alternative way of interpreting Heidegger's work in terms of emergence and complex systems, but still within an empiricist framework. Taken from this perspective Heidegger's Dasein analytic is a plausible account of Dasein as an emergent entity, as is his concept of the ready-to-hand and world. It is acknowledged that the emergentists position and this would include Heidegger on my reading, is still not the normative position in science or philosophy. All that is required in accepting the Heideggerian position is to relinquish the dogmatic stance associated with physicalism.

In the next chapter, I look at some examples of the suitability and possible applications of the Dasein analytic.

CHAPTER 20: APPLICATION AND RELEVANCE OF DASEIN ANALYTIC.

In Chapter 11 I claim that Heidegger intended his work of the Dasein analytic to be used in research in a broad number of fields including history, biology, and psychology [BT 41/20; 71/45]. Based on my interpretation this claim should now be able to be explored. If the Dasein model proves, at least on a preliminary basis, to be suitable for such inquiries, then I take this as evidence for Heidegger's 'usefulness' claim and as evidence for the model itself. I have chosen two fields against which to apply the model, the first associated with historical studies and the second with the medical and psychiatric issues associated with neglect and abuse in early childhood. I then bring the thesis back to its starting point, the experience of shedding life.

In relation to the historical studies, my approach is to look first at my earlier view of historical studies and then at several historical texts with which I am familiar. This section does not present a critical discussion of the underlying theoretical positions in these fields, that is a more significant piece of work. It is an initial attempt to identify the connection between Heidegger's work and this field of scholarship and indicate that it holds possibilities as a useful interpretative approach. The emphasis in this part is on the application of the 'One' as the basis for interpreting history and contemporary events at the cultural level.

For the second area, the impact of abuse and neglect on the development of children, I use the work of Bruce Perry and a case study he presents in his book *The Boy Who Was Raised as a Dog and Other Stories from a Child Psychiatrist's Notebook* (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008). Heidegger's thesis is that the individual Dasein is determined by the interaction of Dasein and the environment in which it is raised and if this is the case then evidence for this should be available in 'breakdown' cases. I speculated that such a 'breakdown' case would be situations of material abuse and neglect in early childhood. This would be indicative of a deficient or abnormal environment during development which in turn should be reflected in the behaviour of the person. The Case study and research considered supports this account. The emphasis also discusses the possible correlative changes in the body, particularly the brain, that arises as a result of the early environmental conditions. This must be the case if Heidegger's claim of the applicability of his model to biology is to hold. This correlation is evident in the case studies explored.

The final part brings the thesis back to the impact of changes in the environment of adults and the experience of shedding life. Given that I commenced the thesis with this discussion I do not dwell on this topic but do extend it in the light of the thesis discussions.

This chapter completes the work on interpreting Heidegger' Dasein analytic for this thesis. In the next chapter, I apply this interpretation together with aspects of Heidegger's work on death to specifically address the phenomena of 'shedding life' in the context of the Dasein analytic.

Section 1: Dasein Model - History and Culture

Introduction

In the discussion to date, I have provided support for the concept that Dasein's cultural heritage will shape its understanding and affective-capacitates (e.g. emotions). This will determine the way entities are intelligible for Dasein, how they show up as mattering and this, in turn, establishes a certain limit on the range of responses available to Dasein. This was most dramatically illustrated in the case of honour killings.

In the following, I look at the relevance of the Dasein analytic to historical studies. This is not a detailed critical comparison, and I confine the discussion to accounts with which I am familiar. What emerges is a possible trend recognising the same phenomena Heidegger is addressing in historical analysis as well as highlighting ways in which an understanding of the Dasein analytic may enhance the nature of inquiry in this field. In summary, it supports the validity and usefulness of the Dasein analytic.

My Early Encounter with History

At school, I found history interesting, but more from the perspective of the story of adventure. The accounts we read were of great battles, conquest, and exploration, of heroic figures transcending impossible obstacles through sheer force of will, courage and inspirational leadership. At least that is what I saw on the pages. There was the occasional villain, England's King John for instance, but even this was a story that ended with the triumph of the Magna Carta and all that followed. History was the story of the 'big men' of history and dates, always the sequence of dates! History was an unfolding, almost inevitable progression and with few

exceptions, the heroes of this historical narrative were white, British, and male. This history was also reflected in the movies I would see, although by this time the English spoken was often with an American accent. Generally, history was portrayed as a clash between good and evil, of 'man' against the wilds of nature or of the civilised taming the savage. As I grew older, while still enjoying a swashbuckling yarn, this type history seemed thin and intellectually unsatisfying. It's not that I rejected this view, I didn't. I bought into it, even though I sensed an inadequacy of the accounts. At the time I did not even recognise one of the main premises, the superiority of enlightened reason over the primitive and ignorant rule of the passions. I am sure that the journals of professional historians took a more critical approach, but this was not reflected in the books, films and even documentaries I had access to all those years ago.

Over the years I retained a casual interest in history, but it was more in the direction of the history of science and my heroes, even now, became the conquerors of mystery using not the power of force but the power of the intellect. Without any deliberate intent, I shifted from understanding the world in terms of brute power to intellectual power with a shift of narrative from exclusively British to one of Western European. I understood the Scientific Revolution and the ideals of the Enlightenment as representing the emergence of humankind into a 'next' stage of a blossoming fulfilment of evolution's destiny, one that should, for altruistic reasons, be shared.

However, this posed a significant conundrum for me, for while I admired, and still do, the achievement of those pioneering scientists, I found aspects of European history deeply disturbing. The brutality, for example, of the 'conquests' of the Americas and the oppression that inevitably followed together with the propensity, exhibited most dramatically throughout the twentieth century, for inflicting mass death on each other by various means.

This was my relationship with history prior to studying Heidegger. I now turn to a specific aspect of history that I recently explored from a Heideggerian perspective, the response to African-Americans in some parts of the USA in the twentieth century.

***The Souls of Black Folks*²²⁶**

Over the years as my sense of social justice and fairness developed I also became aware of what seemed to be the hidden dark side of 'British' and Australian history, the treatment of people perceived to be 'non-white', the indigenous peoples of Australia and North America and African-Americans for example. What confronted me was both the treatment of the people and that such treatment stood in stark contrast to the Enlightenment ideals. I felt both a sense of deep sorrow for the pain, loss and dispossession associated with the treatment but also a sense of betrayal as none of this was disclosed in any meaningful way in the historical narratives of the culture. Indeed, it flew in the face of the nobility inherent in those accounts. None of the histories I read could account for what happened. Document yes. Give testimony to individual suffering yes. But provide an adequate account, no. The Dasein Analytic helps in both understanding these events and in possible intervention strategies for future consideration.

For centuries a significant proportion of white Europeans held the belief that people with 'black' skin did not have souls, were sub-human and effectively no different to beasts of the field and so could be treated as such. They were not 'persons'. This view helped sustain the involvement of European countries in the slave trade over the centuries (Cantor, 1963) until it was abolished by many countries in the nineteenth century.²²⁷ While the view slowly died out, it lingered. Even at the turn of the twentieth century this understanding was held by many in the white community within the United States and fed the racial divide, especially in the South. One observer recorded the following observations from the 1930's: (Logan, 1985)


The Negro is still regarded in most places in the South not as an individual but as a thing. White Christian ministers have not unoften preached from their sacred pulpits that Negroes have no soul and consequently have no right to the privileges which the Constitution [of the United States] prescribed only for human beings with souls. Taking the cue from the ministers, even the teachers in schools have been found to encourage their pupils to debate upon the question as to whether the Negroes are human beings at all. (Logan, 1985, p. 75)
(my underlining)

²²⁶ The heading comes from the title of the book written by the African-American scholar, William Du Bois (Du Bois, 2007).

²²⁷ While there had been active abolitionist movements in countries such as England since the eighteenth century, England did not abolish the slave trade until 1807 and slavery in 1834 and it took a Civil War in the USA before slavery was finally abolished in the Confederate States in 1867.

While reading this, even now, I have a sense of abhorrence. It is from the understanding that gives rise to such views that actions follow which can only be termed monstrous.

What is staggering for me is that even after my Grandmother was born, lynchings were still occurring, photographed and reported as a matter of course as the photo (Picture 2) from a 1916 edition of *The Crisis Magazine* (anon(Photographer), 1916) attests. Even more confronting is that the last recorded lynching of an African-American person in the USA was in 1981 (Gold, 2008) when I was still a young man enjoying my freedom in Australia!



Picture 2 Lynching of Six African-Americans in Lee County Georgia 20 Jan 1916

One of the insights that Heidegger provides to the analysis of such events is that this type of killing should not be confused with murders of anger or criminal activities. Rather they are based on the understanding and affective-capacities that shapes a particular way of seeing and responding to the world, in this case how certain communities of whites 'saw' and responded to African-Americans. Applying Heidegger's analysis, in seeking to 'understand' what was happening, the answer is not to be found in 'psychological aberrations' of individuals doing the lynching, but rather within the immediate environment in which they were raised and in which they live. The aim would be to investigate what are the many different

community practices from which these understandings an affective-capacities emerge. Based on the above quote, inquiring into what was preached from the pulpit would be an example of community practise to investigate. It is too easy to point the figure at the culprits saying they should have 'known' better, this is to ignore the pragmatic consequences of the power of the structure of being-in-the-world. Just as Samia Sarwar appeared to her family as an object of shame so powerful it could only be expunged by her death, so too for many Whites, African-Americans

appeared as non-human threats needing to be contained or killed. As difficult as it is for a culture raised on Enlightenment ideals, of reason and individual accountability there is first and foremost a community accountability.

I recently revisited a book of essays, *The Souls of Black Folks* (Du Bois, 2007) by the pioneering African-American sociologist and civil rights activist, William Du Bois (1868-1963), one of the most influential books in US history (Wilson, 1999). What struck me was the following passage;

After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son ... a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. (Du Bois, 2007k. 649-53)

There was a time when I was puzzled reading such views. Perhaps the writers were making some metaphorical reference, and if this is how people feel is it not just a matter of changing one's thinking? Looking at this account now, from a Heideggerian perspective one sees at play the deep influence of the 'One' that shapes not only how we see others but ourselves. There is the 'One' of the white world, the 'One' of the black world both contained within the 'One' of the shared world; this is captured by Du Bois' comment of the "peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness". Issues of racial divide become complex issues of competing understandings of the 'One', the dynamics of the reciprocal character of the Dasein-with relationships and the overlay of inequalities both in terms of resources and political power.

While Dasein can, with difficulty, change its understanding and receptivities to the world there are other considerations. If the Dasein is a black slave on a US cotton farm in the eighteenth century, while they may change their understanding and receptive-capacities, Dasein is still a slave. Even though slavery was officially ended in the USA on the 6th December 1865 when the 13th Amendment to the Constitution was ratified, African-Americans were still being lynched and murdered well into the twentieth century. Today, a hundred and fifty years after the end of slavery there is still a staggering gap in all wealth indicators between whites and blacks in America, with large percentages of blacks seemingly trapped by poverty (Jones, 2017; Pew Research Center, 2016). While the lynchings have stopped blacks are still more than 16% more likely to die when "all cause" mortality is

considered than whites (Achenbach, 2017). The cascading nature of the character of the inherited-bequeathed nature of the 'One' is a mechanism that contributes to this ongoing transmission through generations.

As unpalatable as it may seem the white folk that lynched and murdered the black folk did so because they were human, not some incarnation of evil; Just as Samia Sarwar was murdered by her mother because her mother was human. If such behaviour arises out of culturally acquired norms then in areas such as the historical Deep South of America and in conservative areas of contemporary Pakistan there is a significant challenge in bringing about change where the majority hold the understandings and receptivities that lead to the killings, even if many disagree with the killings themselves. In the USA it took a civil war to make slavery illegal and another hundred years for the lynchings to stop. The problem was recognised in the Old Testament, and the solution was not unlike the Civil War solution, the entire community, the guilty and the innocent were held accountable for when there were transgressions against God's will. These included the plagues inflicted on Egypt, the great flood, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the forty-year banishment in the wilderness for those escaping Egypt, and enslavement of the Jews by the Babylonians. I am not claiming these as historical events, just as reflections of the ancient Judaic understanding of collective accountability. Put another way; there is a recognition that all the people must accept the consequences as One, for the understandings, receptivities and resultant behaviour of the individuals. While this seems to be taken to an extreme in the Old Testament narrative, nonetheless this understanding seems to have been present, even if not formally thematised. Current Anglo-West views, particularly in America appear to be highly individualistic, with little recognition or acceptance of collective responsibility.

The current adverse situation facing black America is predominately an economic one and has its roots in the slave era. Given the nature of the disparity in economic wealth, income, and opportunity there will need to be a significant shift from white to black of economic resources to make a material difference across the racial divide over the next century. The only way this can happen is if there is a shift in the 'One' among the whites to allow such a shift, and secondly a shift in the 'One' of the African-Americans to capitalise on any change. Even should there be a sudden awareness across the population of the 'role' of the One, it is hard to envisage that the necessary changes in policy will happen without a considerable social

movement behind it, even then it will take at least a generational change. However, the 'One' of white folk has shifted considerably in terms of how black folk are viewed, and we are a long way from the times black folk were considered soulless. Freedom from structural imposed economic deprivation is yet a possibility.

While Heidegger provides a structure of Dasein, it is a bare structure. The challenge provided by Heidegger's account is that when undertaking either historical or social analysis is to be able to 'fill in' the structure relevant to the analysis. For example, to identify the main influential characteristics of the 'One' and the mechanisms by which by which way which meaning for a 'new' Dasein is developed. As was indicated in the case of some white folk raised in the South of the USA, part of this would relate to the beliefs held in relation to the 'souls' of black folk and the messages delivered from the pulpit. In the case of "honour killings" in, say Pakistan, this would require a similar approach. Once the beliefs and the associated mechanisms have been identified then target change can be commenced. However, the enormity and difficulty of such a task should not be underestimated. For example, to change the 'hearts and minds' of the established 'One' that accepts 'honour killing' may not be possible in the short term. In this case severe penalties and sufficient enforcement mechanisms may be necessary to support education, women's refuges, etc in order to shift practice. But it all starts from an initial Heideggerian analysis of the structure of the 'One'.

Another contemporary situation is the 'radicalisation' of a few young Muslim men in Western countries which occurs to such an extent that they align themselves with groups such as Isis and then commit 'acts of terror' in the community in which they lived. If exploring this from a Heideggerian perspective, the inquiry must consider the immediate community, the environment, into which these young men have grown up. What practices were they exposed to, what understanding and modes of affective-capacities were silently passed on to them, how where they taught. Is it a case of DuBois' "double-consciousness" whereby there is the "pull" of the 'One' associated with the broader community process the actions of exclusion by that same 'One'?

If meaning is not just denied in the broader community, but the person themselves is rejected, then, at least for some, meaning will be found in other ways that allow the sense of denial and rejection to be appeased.

As Heidegger has stated, Dasein 'is and has to be', it is not possible to stop the dynamic nature of being-in-the-world. Dasein must find meaning in a way that is intelligible to Dasein. If there is no place for a meaningful existence among the 'One' of the new culture, indeed if there is rejection, then Dasein will seek such meaning where it can. This is not a Muslim phenomenon it is a human phenomenon and plays itself out in other communities, for example, the street gangs of major cities in America. Looked at in this light, we all, as part of the 'One' have a shared a mutual accountability for providing a welcoming space in the 'One' and share accountability for the consequences of shutting off such spaces. This is the type of analysis becomes possible when we understand ourselves as Dasein.

Waking Up from the Enlightenment

I have gotten a little ahead of myself. As a child of the Enlightenment, I embraced the spirit captured by the French motto, *liberté, égalité, fraternité* and the view that we are all the same. We are all rational creatures who given access to sufficient and valid information will make the 'logical' right decision. Since rationality is objective and not subjective, this is the basis for agreement, cooperation and mutual progress. Underlying this view was two central assumptions, that everybody 'sees' the same world and that everyone has the capacity to transcend emotion, to make dispassionate decisions. The journey from this way of thinking to now has taken around thirty years. There are several streams feeding the change arising from books and personal experience weaving together. I will stay with the books and refer to just a few.

The first book that started to nudge me in a different direction was a book on marketing, I no longer remember the book itself, but it argued that while we are all capable of making rational decisions nearly all of us, most of the time, succumb to emotional decision-making and then justify the decision. In hindsight, this fits the Heideggerian account. The cultural view I inherited was that such emotional based decision making while it can be exploited by marketing and sales is something that needs to be overcome in rational decision making. Further, who we are is essentially rational and that we must overcome our lower, 'baser' self to which the emotions belonged, not only to make the right decisions but to become a good person. While I took this 'rational' account into my early career, what I could never reconcile was the range of very positive emotions including the acts of generosity and compassion that motivated many people's decisions, and often they seemed

far from rational. That marketing book created the first serious doubt that I held a wrong worldview. Slowly as the doubt grew stronger, I suspected that the marketers had a better understanding of being human than did those in the rationalist camp.

Around the turn of the century, I read *Guns, Germs and Steel* (Diamond, 1998) Jared Diamond's historical account of the differential development of cultures located in various parts of the globe. Diamond explores why certain Eurasian civilizations rose to become powerful and exercise a dominance over peoples in other continents. His conclusion that it is not that they were genetically different, more intelligent or had superior cultures but that the origins of the success traced back to the luck of geography. He argues that the vast east-west orientation of suitable arable land in Eurasia meant that as crops and animals were domesticated, they could spread across multiple regions with similar climate zones, something not possible in Africa or the Americas. As various diseases developed and spread because of living in higher density populations and in close proximity to animals the surviving populations developed an immunity to these diseases. Stable food supplies and exchanges of ideas between different groups leads to an escalation of tools and knowledge and eventually to the development of steel and guns. That various civilisations embarked on conquests was common, there was an inherent will to power in these endeavours. However, according to Diamond, it was the combination of guns, germs and steel that facilitated Western conquests, giving the necessary quantum of force motivated by the will to power. The force of the west being geographically determined.

This line of argument opened a different way of thinking. In that, we can't determine where we are born it is thus the luck of circumstance that plays a significant part in life, not just at the level of civilization, but even at the local community level. Luck in the genetic lottery, the family lottery and geography all play an influential part in the success one has. Born into a professional family in an affluent area with low unemployment or into an impoverished area with high unemployment while not predictive for any one individual, certainly has a bearing for many. There is nothing rational about luck!

I was brought up in a world where success was measured by achievement, and this meant, in the Western Protestant culture of which I was a part, that if I was successful and the success was a result of my effort, the product of my doing. Similarly, lack of success or failure was ultimately a matter of individual

responsibility. If a person was born into a poor neighbourhood, they could always better themselves, and the culture is full of 'rags to riches' stories to demonstrate this point. Conversely, the poor who stay poor do so because they are 'too lazy' or do not have the drive necessary to change. This analysis is still prevalent, and if listening to talkback radio or conservative politicians on these topics it is soon plainly visible.

While I was not stuck in this thinking by the time I read Diamond, the sheer magnitude of the impact of the 'luck of geography' did impact me. I understood Diamond's thesis to be saying that the luck of geography leads to ease of food production, increased disease immunity, advances in technology which combined with a 'will to power' resulted in a superior ability to implement and execute the activities of conquests. If the luck of geography had favoured Africa, then the history of the dominance of the White West over the last five hundred years would be different.

This account sounded plausible until I read the history of the Ming Dynasty expeditions that set sail on seven different occasions, under Admiral Zheng He, the first leaving in 1405 the last in 1431 (Menzies, 2003; The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2016b). The expeditions travelled throughout South-East Asia, India, Sri Lanka, countries around the Persia, and East Coast of Africa, including Egypt, Somalia and Kenya. On the initial voyage, there were over sixty main ships and a total crew in excess of twenty-seven thousand men, greater than many of the ports and cities visited. The larger ships

... had as many as nine masts and luxurious cabins with balconies, while his armada included troop and horse transports, patrol boats, warships, and tankers holding fresh water. (Lent & Capra (forward), 2017, p. 27)

By contrast, when Christopher Columbus set sail from Spain in 1492 (87 years after the first Chinese expedition) he had three small ships, each of which "could have fit ten times" into one of Zheng's larger ships. The technological difference between China and Europe at the time was considerable. The expeditions ceased with a change of Emperor, the fleet dismantled, and China never engaged in such outward engagements with the world for a further five hundred years. Reading the account of these Chinese expeditions raised some critical questions. The actions of the Chinese contradicted the Diamond thesis, why had they Chinese not embarked on conquest? The achievements of the Enlightenment and Scientific Revolution are

certainly profound but given the context of this earlier flourishing in China, they are not unique. The puzzle for me was why it had stopped.

One strand of historical analysis assumes, as I had, that human nature is human nature. This approach is taken by the historian Ian Morris in his 2010 book, *Why the West Rules – For Now* (Morris, 2010). Morris argues that conquest is driven by avarice, necessity, brute force, and strategic geographical advantage and that “culture, values, and beliefs were unimportant” (p. 28) as material factors in the historical analysis. This was in accord with the Diamond thesis. That human nature is human nature was a main tenant of the Enlightenment, view still held by many. If the West went on a rampage of conquest, it is not only because it could but because it is human nature to do so. The West was exhibiting normal human behaviour and had it had not gone on five hundred years of conquest and domination some other civilisation would have! To hold otherwise would be to accept that the West itself is a civilisation with a deep vein of violence pulsing through it that is absent from other cultures, at least to the same extent. While Morris’ account moves a little beyond that of Diamond’s having outlined his thesis he does not, just as Diamond fails to do, adequately address why China did not go on expeditions of conquest given the significant advantage of technology and resources at its disposal at the time.

I have still not resolved this question; however, I have moved away from the Diamond and Morris thesis that to pursue conquest is innate human nature. I suspect there is enough evidence in historical and anthropological studies to demonstrate either view. A Heideggerian line of inquiry would be to examine the cultural practices of the West over the five hundred years. In that practices can disclose both the understanding of the entity (including both the ready-to-hand and other Dasein) and the affective-capacities associated with those actions. i.e. the mode of mattering, this would disclose to the West how it understood Others²²⁸. In that this would reflect the understanding and affective-capacities of the culture itself or at least the ‘ruling elite’ it would reflect back to West an understanding of ‘who it is’.

It was around this time that my thinking had been strongly influenced by Heidegger’s work and this no doubt changed the nature of the books that drew my attention, and

²²⁸ This is consistent with the previous discussions and Heidegger’s comments that Dasein can find itself in its what it does.

this leads me to the next book.

Dominique Moïsi, a French political scientist, has taken a radically different approach to his analysis of world affairs. He takes the stance that emotions matter in trying to understand behaviour in terms of geopolitics. In his book, *The Geopolitics of Emotion* (Moïsi, 2009) he argues that trying to make sense of decisions on a rational basis from one's own perspective is not productive. It is, says Moïsi, possible to discern an overarching driving emotion that characterises cultural regions and if this is factored into the political analysis, then greater insights are gained from the actions and motivations of the other. Moïsi attempts to map cultural regions in terms of three basic emotions, hope which characterises the Asian world, humiliation for the Arab-Islamic world and fear for the Western world and he has chosen these three because of their association with confidence. This is how he explains it;

If one wanted to summarize these three emotions with three formulas, one would say that hope is "I want to do it, I can do it, and I will do it"; humiliation is "I can never do it" and may lead to "I might as well try to destroy you since I cannot join you"; and fear is "Oh, my God, the world has become such a dangerous place; how can I be protected from it?" (Moïsi, 2009k. 171)

Moïsi believes that notwithstanding

... we live in an information age, we do not understand the Other any better than we did in the past, in fact just the opposite, we are inundated by images and data that are obscuring rather illuminating our vision of the world. (Moïsi, 2009k. 2625)

As the world increases in complexity the threads of integration and interdependence associated with globalisation become far too difficult to grasp and the how or why of one's local living environment being affected by the actions of distant Others is simply unintelligible, and uncontrollable. It is in these circumstances argues Moïsi that when countries are trying to navigate this new globalised, integrated world, that we need to recognise and understand the driving nature of emotions, both in our own culture and in the culture of others. In this way, in our dealings and exchanges we are better placed to consider that which is concerning and motivating the other and from this position be better placed to have more mutually beneficial interactions. This is his recipe for a more optimistic future. In Heideggerian terms, Moïsi is arguing that the 'One' of the Other' culture will 'see' and understanding the world as disclosed to it in terms of its affective-capacities, and he has ventured to provide an analysis as to which of these he believes is currently dominant.

Regardless of Moïsi's analytical stance, his fundamental starting point is radically different. His premise that understanding emotions and what is driving them is crucial, even at the geopolitical level. What he is claiming is that different people see, understand, and respond to the world differently based on the current dominant emotional characteristics of the 'One', its culture. This is very different from the Enlightenment stance that everybody is the same and rational debate is the way forward. His position reflects the Heideggerian model on two counts firstly that one can attribute affective-capacities at the level of national psyches (the 'One') and secondly nations will respond based on their particular affective-capacities of the 'One'. This type of analysis applied to the USA following the 9/11 attack would, I believe, provide an interesting case study of this approach and disclose the nature of the affective-attunements of the USA towards Others and in so doing disclose an understanding of the 'One' of the USA.

The last account I want to look at is the 2017 book by Jeremy Lent, *The Patterning Instinct: A Cultural History of Humanity's Search for Meaning*, (Lent & Capra(forward), 2017). Lent looks at history through the lens of culture, discounting the assumption that human nature is human nature and moving beyond Moïsi's focus on emotions. Lent's thesis is that there is no common intrinsic human nature informing cultural responses, rather humans develop an understanding of the world based on what he calls "cognitive patterns" by which they go about as

.... humans living their day-to-day existence are continually affected by what goes on around them, and the consequent actions they take are continually affecting whatever is around them. It's a perpetual, bidirectional feedback loop. (Lent & Capra(forward), 2017, p. 20)

Lent draws on contemporary research in evolutionary biology exploring the relationship between species and their environments. This approach is not only in the sense that species evolved to be 'fit' for an environment with particular characteristics, but that the species becomes an essential part of the environment itself, shaping it and thriving in its particular niche. It was this thinking that animals not only survive as part of an eco-system but bring about changes in the eco-system itself that was behind the reintroduction of wolves into the Yellowstone National Park in 1995. The impact has been astonishing, resulting in a cascade of effects within the eco-system including an increase in beaver populations, changes in vegetation, alterations in elk herd behaviour which in turn has a positive impact on other parts of the ecosystem and so on. (Staff Reporter, 2011)

Many evolutionary biologists believe, according to Lent, that a similar thing happens with humans, except that the niches are initially constructed at a cognitive level, and based on collective agreement on how the environment should be manipulated. From these cognitive niches, cultures emerge

... as a set of shared symbols and practices that ties a group together and is passed down from one generation to the next. (Lent & Capra(forward), 2017, p. 21)

In that human societies develop in specific geographic areas, different collective niches emerge, and then cultures develop in which people have different roles. As new ways of doing things are developed, which may be in response to changes in the environment, Lent argues that these create feedback loops which change other practices, change the livelihoods available for people and hence change the cultural environment in which people live.

Lent draws on, much as I have, contemporary understandings of complexity and self-organising systems. He describes two levels, the tangible system and the cognitive system. The tangible systems being everything that can be

seen and touched: a society's tools; its physical infrastructure; and its agriculture, terrain, and climate, to name just some of its components. (p. 26)

Whereas the cognitive system

.... can't be touched but exists in the cognitive network of the society's culture: its language, myths, core metaphors, know-how, hierarchy of values, and worldview. (p. 26)

These systems are coupled together and influence each other with feedback loops and consequently shape the characteristics and direction of society itself. A young child grows up into a culture, 'learns' the necessary cognitive patterns and in so doing becomes part of the culture. Lent summaries the theme of his book as follows:

The book is based on a simple but compelling theme: culture shapes values, and those values shape history. (Lent & Capra(forward), 2017, p. 28)

Which is a shorthand description of aspects of Heidegger's view of the 'One'.

Having laid out this framework, Lent sets himself the task of researching what he calls the "cognitive history" of cultures by way of identifying the patterns that create the reality for each culture, the feedback loops that sustain them and how they change over time. He then applies this to identifying the Western pattern which results in a split cosmos (perfect heaven versus imperfect world) and split human (perfect soul versus imperfect body) compared to the Chinese understanding of a

“harmonic web of life” in which there is an integrated cosmology and how this influences a view of the world and subsequently behaviour.

Lent’s main aim seems to be to introduce his ideas of the ‘patterning instinct’ and his methodology of ‘cognitive history’. While there are many aspects that fit within a Heideggerian analysis Lent still fits within a cognitivist framework. The role of emotion that is recognised as the main determinant of behaviour in Moïsi’s work is absent as is the emergent nature of Dasein itself.

While Lent does not specifically address areas of geopolitics (Moïsi) or the rise of civilisations (Diamond) it is possible to see a clear progression from the older documenting of events which I encountered in my early education, through to looking at wider influences such as geography (Diamond), to expand this to incorporate geography plus theories of innate human nature (Morris), to recognising the role of emotions as a driver for State action and the discounting of innate human nature (Moïsi) to incorporating many streams of contemporary scholarship such as cognition, psychology, ecology and complex systems to develop a theory of culture development and change (Lent).

Summary

While this is only an indicative and selective survey of approaches to understanding historical events based on my own encounters one can see movement towards making history intelligible based on a more complex understanding of human existence. Scholars such as Du Bois started to provide accounts from voices not often heard in traditional approaches to history, and when looked from a Heideggerian perspective it is possible to see the phenomenon of the ‘One’ reflected in his comments and as the force maintaining practices such as slavery, ‘black’ lynchings and even the experiences of oppressed minorities. Heidegger’s work can then be applied to the analysis of the tensions between differing conceptions of the ‘One’ in the culture and the understandings and receptivities that underlie the behaviours that maintain the practices. In that there is often a dominant interpretation of the ‘One’ there can first be an analysis of the practices supporting that dominance, and then a deeper analysis of the presuppositions undergirding the beliefs (understandings) and the nature of the receptive-capacities being applied. These then can be articulated, challenged, debated and so on and in so doing open the possibility of change. Simple debating at the level of community practice will not get very far. This basic approach is relevant to both historical and social analysis.

In more recent times one can see scholars interpreting histories and contemporary cultures by applying the similar phenomenon that underpins Heidegger's phenomenon of world (e.g. patterns and cultures) and of intentional action (e.g. role of emotions). These changes reflect, in my view a gradual shift, in the understanding of being human. With these changes I am not surprised that we find scholars identifying and incorporating these observable phenomena, perhaps what is surprising is that they were ignored for so long.

What we are observing, I suspect is a movement from a reductionist account of history based on Enlightenment presuppositions of what it is to be human to a richer and more complex view. However, scholars are moving forward without first clarifying the nature of the entity they are dealing with, i.e. Dasein. While Lent has done an admirable job in developing his model and it is the closest that I have yet seen to the Dasein analytic it still falls short of the sophistication that Heidegger has applied to the task.

Given the direction these studies are moving a comprehensive Heideggerian model set out in an accessible way would greatly assist scholars such as Moisi and Lent by providing an account of the person based on a study of Dasein itself and not one thrown together, based on intuition, theories and hidden presuppositions. Nonetheless this movement in historical scholarship, in that it is applying observable phenomenon associated with Dasein in a manner consistent with Heidegger's findings I take as confirmation of Heidegger's work. While I believe there is support in the work of scholars of history for Heidegger's work, this is certainly a debatable view. There is no historian of which I am aware of that is using Heidegger's body of knowledge as a comprehensive framework, and Lent appears to come the closest. I suspect the same would be true if areas such as anthropology were reviewed.

Section 2: Dasein Model: Impoverished Environments

Introduction

One of the key points of this thesis is that Dasein and Dasein's environment are inseparable and that for Dasein to have a 'healthy' existence, then the environment in the initial stages of the Dasein's development of its understanding and receptivity must be considered.

Heidegger uses the breakdown case of anxiety/depression, described in an earlier

chapter, to bring to light the phenomenon of world. In this section, I will discuss breakdown cases from the work of Dr Bruce Perry, a clinical psychiatrist and neuroscientist who works with young children subjected to severe abuse or neglect, to illustrate the link between the early development of the young Dasein the environment. My rationale for doing this is that it is exemplar cases outside the average everydayness of the 'One' that can highlight the being-in-the-world structure by observing changes in the emergent Dasein as 'variations' against the norm. Perry's work also indicates the emergent nature of Dasein by identifying variations in normal neural development associated with the cases. I take Perry's work as support for Heidegger's model of being-in-the-world as a process that relates Dasein to its world and the founded relationship between the present-at-hand, the neural networks, and Dasein. Further, I take Heidegger's work as a basis to help understand what is happening to Dasein as a result of early abuse and neglect.

Bruce Perry's Background

From the USA, Bruce Perry is a clinical psychiatrist and neuroscientist who has pioneered new ways of working and treating children who have been subject to significant trauma. Prior to the early 1980's, there was little attention paid to the impact of trauma on adults and even less to effect of trauma on children. (Dyregrov & Yule, 2006) The strongly held view was that children are resilient and will bounce back on their own accord without specialist interventions. (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008) Thanks, in large part to the work of Perry, this resilience model is now understood to be wrong, and it is recognised that abuse and neglect can so impair the development of the child as to have lifelong adverse impacts.

My interest in Perry's work is because it provides strong support for my interpretation of Heidegger's descriptive account of Dasein, that the person develops out of a dynamic interaction between the developing Dasein and their environment and once developed is the basis from which the person understands their world and themselves. From a Heideggerian perspective, the child resilience theory is false because it is based on a wrong understanding of what it is to be a person, as constituted by the being-in-the-world structure. Being-in-the-world is a dynamic system that operates regardless of the environment to establish understanding and affective-capacities and once established tends to maintain itself. There is no automatic self-correction to bring the development back on course to a

predetermined model, no 'springing back' to some pre-existing self. This does not mean that change is precluded, just that it takes specific and deliberate interventions. This is also Perry's thesis.

Perry had noted in his early research as a psychiatrist and neuroscientist that animal studies had shown that even a modest amount of stress during the infancy of an animal could result in a permanent impact in the architecture and chemistry of the brain. These changes seemed to correlate with differences in observed behaviour. This learning carried through to his work as a child psychiatrist working with 'troubled children'.

Many of his patients had experienced significant trauma such as severe neglect, physical abuse, rape or witnessing horrific violence against or murder of their mothers and it was clear that these kids were not "bouncing back". What he found was that the medical treatment for these children focussed on the symptoms, and the trauma was generally ignored as irrelevant to addressing those symptoms. (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008) Perry shifted his focus to what I would call a Dasein model, focusing primarily on the person as part of their environment and not the deficits of the body.

The impact of trauma was only formally recognised in 1980 when Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was recognized and added to the *American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*. Prior to this, PTSD was largely seen as affecting a limited number of soldiers exposed to the horrors of war and even then the soldiers were typically labelled as "shell-shocked". Much of the public and many health professionals even questioned the validity of PTSD at the time.

As Perry started to work with 'troubled children' in the early 1990s, he noted that many of the symptoms reported by the children were like those of PTSD. Since then his research, and that of others, has now shown that the impact of trauma "is actually far greater on children than it is on adults." (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008, p. 2) The scale of the problem in the USA is immense, and estimates have been made that as many as eight million children in the USA "suffer from serious, diagnosable, trauma-related psychiatric problems." (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008, p. 3)

From a Heideggerian perspective if very young Dasein are exposed to an environment in which there is trauma and abuse then there is a likelihood that this

will impact on their developing understanding and their affective-capacities which in turn should be manifested in the observable ways in which they respond to the world, and this is what Perry's case studies describe. In that Heidegger's account is a description of the being of Dasein, there is nothing remarkable about this.

Perry's thesis is relatively simple to state: Childhood trauma, including both active maltreatment and benign neglect, will have adverse impacts on the developing brain which in turn contributes to lifelong mental health problems, adversely affecting their quality of life and impacting, in turn, the lives of those around them and this is evident in the case study I have chosen from Perry's 2008 book. It should be noted from this account that Perry draws a direct connection between brain health, mental health and quality of experienced life, there is no thematic analysis of Dasein as such. This is the space that Heidegger's work has the potential to fill.

The case study(Perry & Szalavitz, 2008, pp. 81-98) I have chosen is the story of a young woman, Virginia and her daughter Laura and describes the cycle of neglect and damage that these two-people experienced, neglect that was never deliberate. I was initially going to provide smaller extracts of a couple case studies, but this did not give the sense of the flow of time, of the history and various encounters of the people concerned. While I have heavily edited the story of Virginia and Laura and except where I have inserted Perry's name, it is Perry's work; I see no sense in rewording for the sake of it, albeit when I have edited out passages, I have altered the wording to ensure a sense of flow. When this has been done, I have endeavoured to do so without changing the meaning of work. Notwithstanding this, the case study is a little longer than I would have hoped, but to edit it further is to cut out key actors and their role in this story and the examples of being-in-the-world.

After the case study, I am not going to do a detailed analysis to draw out all the connections to the Dasein analytic; I think they are clear enough. What I will do is suggest three questions to have in mind while reading the case study: Firstly, look at the different scenes from the perspective of each actor and ask this simple question: *What does the action of this person or organisation say about their understanding of the person they are dealing with?* Secondly, ask: *What are the affective-capacities (mood, emotions, motivations, what matters, etc.) that are at play in the scene?* The third point relates to Heidegger's claim that

... everything we call our bodiliness, down to the last muscle fiber and down to the most hidden molecule of hormones, belongs essentially to existing. Thus, it is basically *not*

inanimate matter but a domain of that nonobjectifiable, optically invisible capacity to receive-perceive the significance of what it encounters, which constitutes the whole Da-sein. [ZS 232]

This fits with my claim that Heidegger is applying an 'emergentists' position. The structure of being-in-the-world, the structure of our existence, is based on integration with the environment and within the context of Dasein's bodiliness, it is 'shaped' by that structure. This means that the body is a servant of existence! For Heidegger there is no predetermined model for a particular Dasein, the process just plays out. This being the case then the third question to ask is: *In what ways does the physical behaviour of the body reflect the understanding that is emerging from the meshing with the environment?*

Case Study: Virginia and Laura

Four-year-old Laura had been brought into the special gastrointestinal unit of Texas hospital weighing just 26 pounds. By the time Perry saw her, a month later, she had no weight gain despite being tube fed on a high calorie supplement.

Laura had a long medical history reflected in the four-foot high stack of medical files containing details of a vast number of medical tests and treatments, thousands of pages of reports from endocrinologists, gastroenterologists, nutritionists, consulting physicians and other specialists, test results for bloodwork, chromosome tests, hormone levels, and biopsies, the results of invasive tests from scopes passed down her throat to examine her stomach and scopes inserted rectally to examine her bowels, the results of an exploratory laparoscopy where doctors scrutinise her internal organs and even the biopsy results from a snippet of the small intestine. No abnormalities were found that indicated a cause for the failure to put on weight

Laura's history of failure to gain weight together with the lack of obvious causal factors had led some earlier doctors to believe they had discovered a case of "intestinal epilepsy". More recently a psychologist, specialising in eating disorders had believed he had found the first documented instance of "infantile anorexia". He had requested a consult from Perry because of his experience with academic publishing and was sure this was a publishable case.

Reviewing her history for his first meeting with Laura, Perry discovered that the four-year-old had had 20 previous admissions, attended six speciality clinics and had been seen by a host of specialists who had all contributed to the substantial medical file. Entering her room Perry saw Laura, feeding tube in place, sitting quietly staring

at a plate of food. Virginia, her 22-year-old mother, sat about 5 feet from the child not interacting with Laura. Perry later learnt Virginia had been discouraged from interacting with Laura during mealtimes by the eating disorder psychologist. This, apparently, was to stop Laura from manipulating her mother around food and meals. The theory being that people with anorexia enjoy the attention they got when they don't eat and used it to control other family members. Denying them this reward was supposed to aid recovery. Perry simply saw a despondent, skinny little kid and disengaged mother.

The mother, Virginia, was a child of the foster care system. Abandoned at birth by a drug-addicted mother, father unknown. At the time, it was common for infants and toddlers to be moved within the child welfare system every six months to prevent attachment to any particular caregiver, and this had happened to Virginia. It has since been understood that an infant's early attachment to a small number of consistent caregivers is critical to the emotional health and even physical development.

Perry states that from the neurobiological research it is now known that the brain develops in a use dependent manner. The various neural systems that are used become more dominant while those not used grow less, shrink²²⁹. However, in this development, there may be critical windows where if appropriate stimulation and development have been missed the system may never reach its potential.²³⁰ The conclusion is obvious, as a child grows the array of systems in the brain require stimulation if they are to develop appropriately.

Unlike the areas for language and sight, Perry advises that we don't know if there is a fixed sensitive period for the development of such things as normal attachment. However, research suggests this may be the case as children not allowed to develop permanent relationships with one or two primary caregivers during first three years have lasting effects on their ability to relate normally and affectionately to others. Perry believes that this is what happened to Virginia. After five years of transient and fragmented caregiving, she finally had a stable home with foster parents who

²²⁹ This suggests that there is an initial framework already in place for development which is worth exploring.

²³⁰ Pioneering experiments by David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel in the 1960's showed that in newborn kittens if one eyelid was sutured shut for the first 3 months of life, they then remained blind in that eye for life. Macroscopic observations of the visual cortex showed that critical areas in the pathway for the eye that had been closed had shrunk, while in eye left open they had grown larger. They also found that suturing closed the eye of an adult cat for a year resulted in no structural changes. (Hubel & Wiesel, 2004)

were loving, attentive and provided a humane script for normal behaviour, together with the essential moral guidance and good manners to function socially. They taught her stealing was wrong, that drugs are bad for you and to work hard at school and Virginia followed these directions.

The State refused permission for the foster family to adopt her and when she turned 18, having graduated from high school, the State was no longer responsible. The authorities instructed Virginia to leave her foster parents and threatened the foster parents that if they had further contact with Virginia, they could no longer be allowed to foster children. Virginia lost the only parents she had really known.

Virginia went to live in a halfway house located in a low-income area set up for children "ageing out" of foster care. Isolated from the only family she had known, in a strange environment, facing an uncertain future, Virginia sought affection, fell pregnant, was left by her 'partner', becoming a single Mum.

Virginia wanted Laura, to love her and to do the right things by her as her foster parents taught her. She sought prenatal care, enrolled in a good program for high-risk mothers but as soon as Laura was born she no longer qualified for the program and was on her own again.

From his interviews with and observations of Virginia, Perry learnt she had no idea how to interact with the baby. There was no "maternal instinct" evident. Virginia had the knowledge of the basics and did them. She fed Laura, kept her clean, dressed her and so on, but emotionally she was unaware, lost. No one had thought to advise her, to instruct her how to provide the loving, physical interaction that infants need. Virginia just didn't feel compelled to do them on her own, and she got no pleasure from them.

Virginia was parenting in an emotionally disconnected way. She spent little time holding her baby, fed her propped up with a bottle not cuddled, didn't rock her, didn't sing to her, there was no frivolous kissing, staring into her eyes, the playing with toes and fingers or any of the other silly but hugely important things. All these interactions are what people with a typical childhood history do instinctively in their interactions with babies.

Virginia's approach was to do what she thought was right, not because she felt it in her heart and when Virginia got frustrated she either harshly disciplined Laura or

ignored her. Virginia simply didn't feel the contentment and joy from the positive caregiving interactions that normally help parents overcome the difficult emotional and physical challenges of child-rearing.

Without the physical and emotional signals that all mammals need to stimulate growth, Laura stopped gaining weight. Perry tells us that this phenomenon has been known for centuries and is commonly described as 'failure to thrive'²³¹. It refers to babies who albeit born healthy with no sign of disease or abnormalities fail to grow and put on weight, generally as a result of emotional neglect. He reports that in the past it has most commonly been reported in connection with young children raised in institutions where the care provided was insufficient and that in the 1940s a third of children in some institutional settings were dying before the age of 2. 'Failure to thrive' can thus be deadly. He notes the more recent cases of orphans from Eastern European countries, and I assume he is referring to Romania²³², where the surviving adults exhibit severe behaviour problems and have difficulty maintaining relationships with those who should be closest to them.

Virginia genuinely cared for Laura, first seeking medical attention for her just weeks after her birth. Laura was correctly diagnosed with 'failure to thrive', admitted to hospital, stabilised and on discharge Virginia was given nutritional advice but not advice on mothering. No-one explained the diagnosis to her. Ongoing social work contact was suggested but never put in place, and the issue of neglect was ignored by the medical team, largely because many physicians find "psychological" or social aspects of medical problems less interesting and less important than the primary "physiological" issues. Additionally, Virginia didn't seem like a neglectful mother; an uncaring mother wouldn't seek interventions for help

Perry describes the apparent mundane interactions that occur as a child is growing up. A toddler falls and knocks their knee looks to Mum, she looks back. If she doesn't look worried, the toddler quickly moves on not crying but if the toddler baby sees a look of concern the crying starts. This is how we learn. Repetition entrenches the learning.

A class of nerve cells in the brain known as "mirror" neurons²³³, Perry reports,

²³¹ For research literature examples refer (Block & Krebs, 2005; Cole & Lanham, 2011)

²³² Findings of research among Romanian orphans cared for in orphanages under the communist regime confirm this. I briefly comment on this later in the section.

²³³ Mirror neurons were discovered just over twenty years ago in the brains of macaque monkeys and have

responds in synchrony with the behaviours of others, and this capacity for mutual regulation provides another basis for attachment. When a baby smiles the mirror neurons in the mother's brain, usually respond with a set of patterns that are almost identical to those that occur when the mother actually smiles. This mirroring at the neuronal level typically leads the mother to respond with a physical smile of her own. It's not hard to see how empathy and the capacity to respond to relationships would originate here as mother and child synchronise and reinforce each other.

When a baby's smiles are ignored, if the baby is repeatedly left to cry alone, not fed, fed roughly without tenderness, or not held, then the positive associations between human contact and safety, predictability and pleasure may not develop

People are not interchangeable. As a baby Virginia began to bond with one person, she feels comfortable with a certain smell, rhythm and smile but is abandoned before a deep connection is established. The process repeats. The beginnings of familiarity, the beginnings of a connection and then separation. There is never enough time to consolidate the connection with any individual person. These early attachments between a baby and the first primary caregivers are not trivial.

Virginia knew that she should "love" her baby when she was born. But she didn't feel that love the way most people do. Virginia was unable to express it through physical contact, and for Laura the lack of stimulation was devastating. Her body responded with hormonal dysregulation which impeded normal growth despite receiving more than adequate nutrition. Laura didn't need to purge or exercise to avoid gaining weight, the lack of physical stimulation had programmed her body to do so. Without love children literally don't grow. Laura wasn't anorexic. Laura just wasn't receiving the physical nurturing her body needed to know that she was wanted, that it was safe to grow.

At one stage Virginia told Perry that if it would help Laura, then he should take her from Virginia. Virginia loved her baby so much she was willing to let go of her if that's what it took. With Virginia's consent, Perry contacted Mama P, a foster

since been discovered in other primates including humans. Observations of brain activity reveal that there is a class of neurons that fire both when an animal (including a human) performs an action and when the action is not being performed but observed being performed by another animal. The research is suggestive, but not clear, that these neurons are associated with the matching of observed actions and are part of the learning process in social animals based on observed imitation. (Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014; Oztop, Kawato, & Arbib, 2013) Should it be found that mirror neurons have this role in action learning then this would support Heidegger's claims about the function of the 'One'.

mother, who agreed to take Virginia and Laura and to show Virginia how to be a mother to Laura. Perry's program had access to private funds to allow this to occur which the foster care system was too inflexible to permit.

Mama P was a large, powerful woman who moved with confidence and strength, wore large brightly coloured muumuus, with a scarf tied around her neck. She was one of nature's natural mothers. She embraced, loved, and nurtured children back to health who had been battered by the world. Mama had discovered long before Perry and his team that many young victims of abuse and neglect needed physical stimulation, like being rocked and gently held, a type of comfort seemingly appropriate for much younger children. Mama knew you don't interact with children based on their age but based on their need. To respond to what they may have missed during sensitive periods of development. Almost all the children sent to her had a tremendous need to be held, touched, and loved.

Perry's paediatric colleagues were concerned for Laura given her weight and state of health. When Virginia and Laura moved to Mama P's, there was close monitoring of what Laura consumed. For the first month, Laura consumed the exact same number of calories she had in the prior month in the hospital, where her weight barely maintained at 26 pounds. In the first month at Mama P's Laura gained 10 pounds, growing from 26 to 36 pounds. An increase of 35% on the exact same number of calories that previously was insufficient to prevent weight loss.

Virginia learnt from Mama P what Laura needed and how to provide it. Before Mama P meals were a robotic chore, often with conflict, and constantly changing in response to the dietary instructions and advice given by different doctors at different hospitals. The advice, aimed at being helpful, just added to the confusion and helped to hollow out the experience of eating for Laura. This combined with Virginia's lack of understanding of a child's needs, swinging from being affectionate, to being tough and punitive, to simply ignoring her daughter had all contributed.

Mama P's warmth, humour and hugs also allowed Virginia to get some of the mothering she had missed, and in watching how Mama P responded to her other children, Virginia learnt to notice Laura's cues. Virginia could better read when Laura was hungry, when she wanted to play, or when she needed a nap. Laura had been stuck in the terrible twos, but now she began to mature emotionally and physically and as she grew the tension between mother and daughter during

mealtimes ended.

Virginia and Laura lived with Mama P for about a year and when she left Virginia moved into Mama P's neighbourhood, the two women staying in close touch having become tight friends. Laura became a bright little girl and like her mother a person with a powerful moral compass, strong positive values and at the same time a tendency to be emotionally distant.

When Virginia had the second child, she knew how to care for him appropriately from the start, and the growing baby suffered from none of the growth problems that Laura experienced. Virginia went on to college and both her children are doing well at school, they have friends an invested church community and Mama P down the street.

Laura and Virginia still bear the scars from their early childhood. Perry observed that if you secretly observe either mother or daughter, you might observe their facial expressions as vacant or even sad. On becoming aware of your presence, they would put on a social persona and respond appropriately to you. But if you pay close attention to your "gut" you may sense something awkward or unnatural in their interactions. Both Virginia and Laura can mimic many of the normal social interactive cues, but neither feels naturally pulled to be social, to spontaneously smile or to express warm nurturing physical behaviours.

On a "higher" cognitive level both mother and daughter are very good people who have learned to use moral rules and strong belief systems to tame their fears and desires. But in the relational social communication systems of their brain, the source of emotional connection to others, there are shadows of disruptive nurturing of the early childhood. The nature and timing of our development experiences shape us. Like people who learn a foreign language late in life Virginia and Laura would never speak the language of love without an accent. Perry observes that

The brain is an historical organ. It stores our personal narrative. (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008, p. 83)

Dasein and Its Environment

While Heidegger does not specifically address the phenomena associated with child development, the growing up in the culture, it is clear from the earlier discussions that he holds that it is from our social environment that our understanding and our affective-capacities are shaped. The example of the Japanese versus American

babies and the African child discussed in Chapter 16 were examples, and the outcome of this development is evident in the different structure of affective-capacities in the different cultures.

Heidegger rarely provides the fine grain detail of the structure he is describing; it is enough to provide the structure itself with broad examples and then it is up to other scholars to fill in that detail. Like an outline in a colouring-in book, we have to complete the detail and add the colour, guided by and consistent with the outline provided. This is typically how advances in scholarship work and he is not, as he tells us doing anthropology.

The primary operation of the 'One' during development is not found by looking at the most obvious practices and behaviours of the culture, albeit they play their part, it is in the small everyday things, being nursed and cuddled, singing of nursery rhymes, playing in trees, the small corrections to non-conforming behaviour, being tickled, laughing together, being responded to when in need, with warmth and love. All of these reflect a certain average, everydayness that the culture acquired over the generations, that is reflected in the understanding and affective-capacities of the people that are the 'One', and in turn reflected in their child-rearing practices. These are the things Perry observes are normally present, but these were also among the things that were missing from Virginia's parenting,

She didn't spend much time holding her baby; she fed the little one propped up with a bottle, not nuzzled close to her bosom. She didn't rock her, didn't sing to her, didn't coo or stare into her eyes or count her perfect tiny toes over and over again or do any of the other silly but hugely important things that people with ordinary childhoods instinctively do when caring for a baby. (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008, pp. 87-8)

To repeat what Heidegger tells us,

Then everything we call our bodiliness, down to the last muscle fiber and down to the most hidden molecule of hormones, belongs essentially to existing. Thus, it is basically not inanimate matter but a domain of that nonobjectifiable, optically invisible capacity to receive-perceive the significance of what it encounters, which constitutes the whole Da-sein. [ZS 232]

For Heidegger, we are engaged in our existence, not as a thinking organ mounted on a body, but the entire unity of the body functions (what he calls bodiliness) in a meaningful dialogue with its surroundings, learning, understanding and responding. In the very early stages of a baby's development that dialogue is not the language of words, it is touch, smell, sound, sight and these communicate warmth, love, nurturing, belonging and in so doing the foundations of the baby's understanding

and affective-capacities are laid down. As Heidegger suggests we interact with our environment with all our senses, our full capacity to “receive-perceive the significance of what it encounters”. These early interactions are all part of the way Dasein acquires a sense of meaning for itself in the context of its environment.

How this happens is still unknown, but one thing is clear, our environment matters, and its imprint will be left on us. This is what we see first with Virginia, then Laura and then the change in the young son.

The case study is filled with examples of understanding and receptiveness. Virginia understands her children, but her affective-capacities are deficient in relation to the baby. Laura shows up as mattering in the manner in which Virginia looks after her, feeding, being changed and taken to the doctors when needed. But Laura does not show up for Virginia as mattering in terms of someone to cuddle, nurse and play. Because this sight, ‘considerateness’, is deficient the possibilities of these types of solicitudinous dealings are not disclosed to Virginia. Virginia’s possibilities for ways of being, her existence, are shaped by these deficient modes, which impact the way she can be a mother, which in turn impact on baby Laura. I suspect that Virginia and the older Laura, know they are missing something, and this accounts for Perry’s comment that when you secretly observe either mother or daughter “you might find her facial expressions as vacant, or even sad” (Perry & Szalavitz, 2008, p. 98)

In the case study, there is the sense the understanding and affective-attunements of Perry, Mama P and Virginia’s foster parents towards Virginia and Laura is of a different character to the other medical professionals and the child welfare system. Perry has a more detailed and formalised understanding of what it is to be a person than, say Mama P but the understandings are the same nonetheless. It is responding to the person as Dasein and not the person as a physical entity, something to be fixed or kept from physical harm. As soon as the person as body becomes the primary understanding the true nature of being human is lost, Heidegger is clear about this;

Of course, during its lifetime the bodily [nature] of Da-sein already admits to being seen as a material, inanimate object and as a kind of complicated machine. Of course, for someone who sees it this way, the essential, unfolding character of bodily [nature] has already disappeared from view forever. Perplexed helplessness regarding all essential phenomena of the bodily [nature] is the result of such an inadequate view. [ZS 232]

This “perplexed helplessness” is what is exhibited in the deficient understanding of

the medical professionals who, when faced with the absence of any physical cause for Laura's condition grasped at implausible diagnoses such as "intestinal epilepsy" or the first documented instance of "infantile anorexia".

This case study thrusts before us, broadly speaking, two interpretative stances in terms of what it is to be a person, a human being. The first is the material reductionist account; the second is as a highly adaptive entity that responds to and integrates itself into and as part of the very environment in which it exists. The traditional medical understanding and response typify the first, the Heideggerian/Perry understanding the second. If interpretative stances should be assessed by the power of their ability to respond effectively the second, certainly in terms of the circumstances reflected in this case study, stands out as the most powerful, and yet it is still largely ignored.

Nowhere does Heidegger deny that the body can break down and require fixing, he does not exclude material causes for problems. We just need to have a far more complex and sophisticated understanding of what the body is and how it serves the unity of what it is to be a Dasein. It is time to move on from Descartes's clockwork understanding.

I am not going to explore this case study any further, albeit it is a rich field for exploring. My aim was to illustrate Heidegger's view of Dasein as being-in-the-world and how this can be seen in break-down cases, and this case study achieves this without the need, in my view, of further 'pointing out' of the links back to the points I have been raising in the thesis.

Dasein, its body and the brain

Part of my thesis is that Dasein's existence can be thought of in terms of emergence and this model incorporates the body. Heidegger refers to the way in which the body responds to Dasein's existence, as our bodiliness. For this to be the case, the physical body itself must somehow change, within a certain range, to allow for the variations in bodiliness that are evident in the ways of being of Dasein. As discussed earlier Heidegger makes this same point in relation to the development of body organs [FCM, ZS]. My point here is simply an application of the same principle. These changes in the body are consistent with the model of emergence and the effect of downward feedback.

In thinking through this, there is clearly a number of levels of biological processes

much as is evident in Heidegger's inquiries. For example, the process of receptiveness which results in the development of a range of affective-capacities which in turn are 'activated' as specific affective-attunements in encounters with entities. These disclose to us how things matter to us in particular situations and in turn reveal the possibilities open to us in the ways we can respond. That this can vary depending on our acquired facticity was well illustrated by Virginia's responses to Laura. Then, of course, there is the process of understanding what the entity is, the lived experience of the encounter as it unfolds, and so on. The structure of this encounter has been laid out in detail in this thesis as being-in-the-world.

How this happens as a result of the complex functioning of the many systems of the brain and body integrated as a unity is not known by science. There has been significant progress in terms of identifying regions of the brain involved in differing activities such as sight, hearing, the movement of varying body parts and so on. There has also been progress in mapping out some activities in terms of the sequence or flow of activity from one region of the brain to another as part of the process. But how this translates to the experiences of being Dasein is still as big a mystery as ever.

The scale of the task is immense. What we know is that the brain is currently thought to have approximately 100 billion neurons or nerve cells typically consisting of a cell body, dendrites and axons. Dendrites are projections from the neuron and are involved with *receiving* signals from other neurons. Each neuron has one axon which is a cell fibre *carrying signals away* from the neuron. The overall length of a neuron with its axon ranges from a millimetre to over a metre in length. The interconnection between neurons is via a structure called a synapse and the mode of communication in the synapse from one cell to another is via chemical neurotransmitters of which there are more than 100 known types (e.g. dopamine, serotonin). The chemical signal at the synapse triggers the electrical signal to the neuron body which is called a neuron 'firing'. Each synapse may have up to 1,000 molecular-scale switches that are triggered when the appropriated chemical signal is received. Each neuron only has one 'output' axon, but may have up to 10,000 dendritic projections and there are an estimated 1,000 trillion synaptic connections passing and receiving signals between neurons. In addition to the neuronal cells in the brain, there are also glial cells of different types of which there may be up to 10 times more in number than neurons. While originally thought to provide a support

and maintenance role for the neuronal based system they are now thought to play a more active role in communication and plasticity. This is a simplified description, but it gives an indication of the immense complexity. To give an idea it is estimated there are around 100 billion stars in the Milky Way Galaxy, the number of synaptic interconnections in one human brain is estimated at around 10,000 that number.

Following a review of the research literature associated with brain development Kolb and Gibb (Kolb & Gibb, 2011) describe the brain development process of going through a number of stages (neurogenesis, maturation and synaptogenesis), including a significant growth in neurons and the establishment of the interconnections followed by a period of pruning where the neural connections not used frequently are literally 'pruned'. This is followed by a period of myelin formation which is basically a coating around the neural pathways that are most commonly used to strengthen and make the communication more efficient along those pathways. This process is referred to as 'plasticity', and while there is never the same intensity or extent of activity in the brain as in this early growth phase, there is now evidence of the growth of new neurons (neurogenesis) in some areas of the brain in adults (Bonfanti, 2016), and new neuronal connections (synaptogenesis) continue to form throughout life (Bherer, Erickson, & Liu-Ambrose, 2013). There are some areas of the brain that continually reorganize structurally and functionally in response to its environment (Cai, Chan, Yan, & Peng, 2014) but why some areas seem to resist subsequent development after the critical early period is unknown. Kolb and Gibb report that there is research evidence that the development and function of the brain,

.... is influenced by different environmental events such as sensory stimuli, psychoactive drugs, gonadal hormones, parental-child relationships, peer relationships, early stress, intestinal flora, and diet. (Kolb & Gibb, 2011, p. 265) (my underlining)

And their conclusion is that,

The development of the brain reflects more than the simple unfolding of a genetic blueprint but rather reflects a complex dance of genetic and experiential factors that shape the emerging brain. Understanding the dance provides insight into both normal and abnormal development. (Kolb & Gibb, 2011, p. 265) (my underlining)

While the basic layout of each person's brain may be similar the neuronal structure, the nature of the interconnections, which pathways are stronger, which are weaker which have been pruned will vary from person to person. The emergent existential nature of Dasein is reflected in the architecture of the brain. We are

unique, and this uniqueness is reflected in our brain structure. This is reflected in the case study of Virginia and Laura.

Heidegger understands that if we are going to investigate Dasein from a biological perspective, then we must first understand the “existential analytic of Dasein” [BT 71/45]. It is Dasein in its bodiliness that is thrown up by evolution as part of the larger ‘environment’ and as such how can the biology of Dasein be understood if Dasein’s way of being in the environment is not first understood? This is the crux of Heidegger’s argument from Chapter 11, where I argue that he intends his work to be used by the social and biological sciences.

Having provided a brief introduction of the functioning of the brain and the results from research that the developing brain is shaped by its environment, I now want to come back to Perry’s work and other research evidence that supports the case that not only does abuse and neglect in early childhood impact the emergent Dasein but that it has empirically observable effects on the brain structure. I use this as evidence for supporting my claim concerning the emergent nature of Dasein and the founded relationship with the body.

Environments, the Emergent Dasein and Underlying Brain Structures.

Perry’s thesis is that trauma, including both active maltreatment and benign neglect, experienced by children will result in adverse impacts on the developing brain which in turn contributes to lifelong mental health problems adversely affecting their life and the lives of those around them. In the following, I provide evidence from empirical research supports Perry’s thesis., i.e. that adverse lived experiences such as abuse and neglect at childhood adversely affect the developing brain.

In 2014, Read, Fosse, Moskowitz and Perry publish a review of 125 papers published since 2001 (Read, Fosse, Moskowitz, & Perry, 2014). The review focused on papers relevant to the traumagenic neurodevelopmental model,

which provides a partial explanation of the link between trauma and psychosis, attempts to integrate biological and psychological processes. (Read, Fosse, Moskowitz, & Perry, 2014, p. 66)

This model proposes that early childhood trauma results in developmental changes to the brain structure when compared to normal children (the biological), that these changes are evidenced in changes in the psychological processes which in turn impact on the experienced quality of life. The review found “both indirect support

for and direct confirmation” for the model (p. 66). The authors point out that not every abused or neglected child ends up with abnormalities in brain development and resultant adverse impacts in life and there is much more work to be done in understanding the differences in outcomes. An earlier review of the neuroscience literature concluded that there is a general consensus as to the relationship between abuse and neglect in early childhood and more widespread effects on brain development and functioning arising out of deficits in stimulation, interaction and learning opportunities (Twardosz & Lutzker, 2010). Anda, et al. reported a striking convergence of findings from the neurosciences with those from a large epidemiologic study looking at the long-term effects of the cumulative exposure of adverse childhood experiences on the developing brain (Anda et al., 2006). The study found a correlation between adverse childhood experiences and impairment in multiple brain structures and functions (Anda et al., 2006). Hanson, et al. reported on a study using comparative research examining the properties of white matter and neurocognitive performance in children who suffered early neglect and those raised in typical environments. They concluded that for the children suffering early neglect there was material evidence that the white matter microstructure was adversely affected, and that neurocognitive performance was impaired (Hanson et al., 2013). In other research, the impact of childhood abuse and neglect has been found to impact on the child’s cognitive development (Mills et al., 2011).

The above is just a small selection of both primary research reports and reviews that are finding a link between early childhood neglect, alternations in normal brain developments, psychological performance and quality of life outcomes. The aim of this section of the thesis is not to do a comprehensive review, but to establish a sufficient case in the context of my emergence model. Perhaps the most dramatic example of the impact of impoverished and neglectful environments of children’s development and the brain is found among the survivors of the Romanian orphanages. This was as a result of a disastrous social experiment that ended with the overthrow and execution of the country’s dictator, Nicolae Ceaușescu, in 1989. At its peak, there were 170,000 children in the orphanages. Because of the importance of this research, I will briefly discuss some aspects before concluding this section. Marshall describes the living environment in which most of the orphans were placed;

Most grew up in a stunningly blank and unresponsive environment. Caregivers came and

went in three shifts, and a single staffer might watch over 10 to 15 children. Infants spent time staring at the walls and ceiling, and a child might come in contact with 17 different caregivers in a single week. (Marshall, 2014, p. 752)

Marshall cites one professor in paediatrics as calling it an “Experiment in zero parenting” (p. 752). In 2007 Nelson (Nelson et al., 2007) reported on findings from an ongoing randomized controlled trial involving the Romanian orphans. Following the fall of the Ceaușescu regime young children in institutional care were randomly assigned to foster care or left in the institution. A third comparative group of children raised by their biological families was established. All the children were assessed at various times over a number of years, with the same battery of tests. The children in the institution were initially assessed prior to random allocation to foster care. Nelson reports three main findings;

First: Children reared in institutions showed greatly diminished intellectual performance (borderline mental retardation) relative to children reared in their families of origin.

Second: As a group, children randomly assigned to foster care experienced significant gains in cognitive function.

Third: The findings suggest that there may be a sensitive period spanning the first 2 years of life within which the onset of foster care exerts a maximal effect on cognitive development. However, a closer reading of the analyses suggested a more parsimonious conclusion: That the younger a child is when placed in foster care, the better the outcome. (Nelson et al., 2007, p. 1940)

Marshall reports on more recent comments by Nelson, who has concluded that, based on these ongoing studies, “that early life without parenting can be “more disastrous for brain development” than living with an abusive caregiver” (Marshall, 2014, p. 752) A report by Sheridan, et al. using magnetic resonance imaging on Romanian children aged 8 to 11, found that the children raised in an institution had significantly less brain tissue, especially grey matter, than those who had never lived in an institution, while those placed in foster care showed a smaller deficit. (Sheridan, Fox, Zeanah, McLaughlin, & Nelson, 2012) . In 2017 Sonuga-Burke et al. reported findings concerning the impact on individuals who, from soon after birth, up to 43 months lived in the severely deprived environments of the Romanian orphanages and had subsequently been adopted in the UK (Sonuga-Barke et al., 2017). They found that UK adoptees who had spent more than 6 months in the

orphanages, compared to a UK control group,

... had early onset and persistently higher rates of symptoms for autism spectrum disorder, disinhibited social engagement, and inattention and overactivity compared with both the UK adoptees control group and the less deprived Romanian adoptees group. (Sonuga-Barke et al., 2017, p. 1544)

While a fifth of the group who had spent more than 6 months in an orphanage did not exhibit signs of a problem, most had one or more problems at significantly higher rates than the control group extended into young adulthood. Which was reflected in lower educational attainment, higher unemployment, higher utilisation of mental health services, relationship problems and inappropriate social engagements with strangers (disinhibited social engagement) (Sonuga-Barke et al., 2017). The researchers concluded that,

... extended early deprivation was associated with long-term deleterious effects on wellbeing that seem insusceptible to years of nurturance and support in adoptive families. (Sonuga-Barke et al., 2017, p. 1539)

The strong conclusion from this section is that environments matter in determining the constitution of Dasein, and it is how we understand this that is important. In the next part, this research is interpreted within a Heideggerian framework.

Interpreting Abuse and Neglect within A Heideggerian Framework

There is now a significant body of research, including the work of Perry and the studies of the Romanian orphans, that environments matter to the growing Dasein in a profound way. Chapter 16 discussed how the structural aspect of Dasein that Heidegger called the 'One'²³⁴ takes up the averageness of understanding and the receptivities exhibited in the culture. This is the basis of my claim that the same newborn raised in different cultures will result in different Daseins! That this does not imply a bland uniformity of understandings and receptivities but rather the typical, average, young Dasein will encounter other typical, average Daseins exhibiting the practices associated with the cultural norms. This is what is taken up. Applied more broadly I take this as describing a structure of the young Dasein that will, based on its capacity to receive-perceive, take up and "fill-in" as its own primary understandings and receptive-capacities from whatever is initially encountered in its

²³⁴ The 'One' is both the name of an existiale of Dasein, i.e. part of its constitutive structure [BT 167/129] as well as the name for the average understanding and receptiveness Dasein encounters among other Dasein which in turn is reflected in the averageness of the dealings exhibited by the others. It is this encountered averageness of dealings that I refer to as cultural practices or simply culture.

environment for this purpose. In doing so, this structural process makes no, indeed has no basis for, making judgements as what to take up and what to leave.

In that Dasein is an emergent entity, what needs to be resisted is the belief that 'little Laura' was born 'little Laura' and that the environment then caused Laura's developmental path to go astray somehow. As has been argued, firstly, if little Laura were born in Sweden she would be little Astrid. This is not just a change in name, but a *different* Dasein. Secondly, unless there was a biological abnormality, little Laura's development process is not deficient, it is doing what it should. Laura and the Romanian orphans became the Dasein they should, based on the environments in which they were raised. Newborns are not the potential 'mini' version of an adult self, that, all going well, will be actualised. It is this model that allows for a 'resilience' view of the child that imagines the child somehow springing back 'on course' to fulfilling the predetermined potential. Any 'resilience' that is evident arises from a change in environments. However, even here the research is suggesting that there may be critical windows in which the initial understandings and receptivities are 'filled in'. This then becomes the basis by which Dasein's world matters to it, establishing an iterative or reciprocating dynamic between the Dasein and world that determines the trajectory of future development. This results in, as Perry presents in the case of Virginia and Laura and as evident in the Romanian orphans, parts of the structure that is determinative of the of Dasein being stabilised and perhaps 'locked' in at an early stage for the remainder of their life.

Heidegger does not claim to identify the biological and psychological processes involved with the dynamic structure that constitutes Dasein. However, Heidegger is clear that the structural processes of Dasein are not mystical, they are founded on the body; it is a naturalistic account of being Dasein. As discussed in Chapter 11, Heidegger's stance is that the empirical, philosophical research he has undertaken in establishing describing the ontological structure of Dasein must precede the work of psychology and biology. The claim I make in this section is that the phenomenon that Perry and others are describing, and researching is the phenomenon of Dasein as described by Heidegger. In piecing together the relationship between the young Dasein, deficient environments, resultant brain development and psychological processes and lifelong impacts on the experienced quality of life, there is *no need for a specific traumagenic neurodevelopmental model*. All that is required is an understanding and application of the structure of 'being-in-the-world'. This model is

a little more complex than the traumagenic neurodevelopmental model, but it has the virtue of being applicable to all Dasein, and it is neutral concerning the 'quality' of the environment. It is just that the emergent outcomes vary based on the environmental 'inputs'.

The conclusion then is that there are biological processes associated with the primordial 'being-in-the-world' dynamic structure that is involved with 'sensing' (Dasein's capacity to receive-perceive) the early living environment. The understanding and affective-capacities that arise from this 'sensing' of the environment are reflected in the developing structures of the young brain. These emerging structures of understanding and affective-capacities are thus constituting the meaning of Dasein and its world; it is the basis on which the 'there' of Dasein is then held open. What is important to grasp is that it is not the brain itself or brain activity that is of primary concern, *it is what the biological processes are doing*.

However, science, certainly at the moment, cannot identify not describe the specific biological processes at the organic level whereby our lived experience translates to biological activity and then to physical structural change and vice versa. However, that such activity is occurring is now beyond doubt. Perry has accepted this and using it to better help young 'damaged' Daseins. Perry states(Perry, 2009) that his research program is to identify the regions of the brain associated with and necessary for good social functioning and are at risk of maldevelopment through neglect and abuse. The aim is to assess and to monitor the changes following targeted interventions using various therapeutic, enrichment and educational activities.

The approach Perry is taking is to use his traumagenic neurodevelopmental model, developed from his empirical observations, and then based on the model evaluate changes in brain activity and brain structure correlated with observed changes in the behaviour of Dasein arising from therapeutic interventions. However, Perry's ontology concerning Dasein is reflective of the traditional approach, and this requires him to develop a model that specifically addresses situations of neglect and abuse. My claim is that the Heideggerian ontological structure of Dasein is consistent with Perry's findings and as such is applicable to all Dasein's irrespective of the environment. Put another way; there is *no need* for a specific traumagenic neurodevelopmental model, what Perry is observing is the ontological structure of Dasein operating as it should. A model based on 'being-in-the-world' is not only

consistent with Perry's findings, but it is also universal in application and has a greater 'explanatory' power than the existing model, and on this basis, I would argue should be preferred.

Summary

Following Heidegger, it is my claim that Dasein can be understood as an emergent entity that is constituted, to a significant degree, by its primordial ontological processes operating in the context of the environments into which it has been born and raised. This places Dasein into a different relationship to its environment and its body than does the existing traditional ontological model allow. This was demonstrated most dramatically by Perry's account of the body of the young Laura failing to thrive as a direct consequence of the environment in which it found itself. In summary, environments matter to Dasein in a profound way, they shape who we are, and this is reflected in our underlying biological structures and processes. Based on the research I have been discussing this is now beyond doubt. All that is required is an appropriate account of the structure of Dasein and the how a Dasein comes into being based on this structure. Such an account is based on Heidegger's empirically based philosophical research and is present by Heidegger in *Being and Time*.

This concludes the discussion on this section.

Section 3: Adult Dasein and Changed in the Environment

Introduction

In the previous section, based on the structure of being-in-the-world, I have established that the environment counts in terms of our development and ongoing quality of life. This suggests that the environment may be important in our ongoing life and I now want to explore this aspect from the perspective of Heidegger's account.

Heidegger's thesis is that we grow up in a particular environment, that it is this environment that shapes our understanding of our self, and that it is in this environment we encounter the possibilities necessary for the lived experiences that make manifest our understanding of self. It is these encounters that make our life meaningful. In the following, I again use the method of breakdown cases to explore this. Two circumstances are considered where adults are forced by circumstances

into environments that no longer provide possibilities, or provide only significantly reduced possibilities, for meaningful encounters. The two circumstances are unemployment and moving into a nursing home. If the Heideggerian account of being human is correct, then this should be reflected in adverse psychological experiences. If, as indicated by the case of Laura, my emergent interpretation of Heidegger is correct, then there is also a possibility that this will be reflected in adverse indicators in the bodily aspect of Dasein, i.e. increased morbidities. The research evidence that is discussed is strongly suggestive that psychological and bodily distress does arise out of adverse changes to Dasein's environment.

Unemployment

One of the central aspects of Heidegger's description of Dasein is that in the normal course of things Dasein carries on with its existence within its familiar environment. This is the environment in which Dasein encounters the possibilities for engaging (concernful dealings) with things that are meaningful to how Dasein understands itself. If Dasein's environment changes such that significant possibilities are no longer available, then we would expect there to be adverse consequences. This is what we find reported in the research around unemployment.

In 2011 Roelfs, Shor, Davidson, & Schwartz reported on a systematic review and meta-analysis of unemployment and all-cause mortality in the USA. The review included 42 studies providing data on more than 20 million people (Roelfs, Shor, Davidson, & Schwartz, 2011). The conclusion was sobering

This study shows that unemployment was associated with a substantially increased risk of death among broad segments of the population. (p. 12)

The mortality risk was higher for people in early or mid-career and was such that the authors believed it to be consistent with a causal association. A 10-year cohort study (Mustard et al., 2013) in Canada covering more than 1.5 million people was published in 2013 concluded

... consistent with results from other long-term duration cohort studies, unemployed men and women in this cohort had an elevated risk of mortality for accidents and violence as well as for chronic diseases. (p. 1)

In an earlier UK study (Morris, Cook, & Shaper, 1994) of just over 6 thousand men aged 40-59 who had been continuously employed for more the 5 years before the study found that

.. men who experienced unemployment in the five years after initial screening were twice as likely to die during the following 5.5 years as men who remained continuously employed. (p. 1135) (my underlining)

In New Zealand unemployment has been associated with a two to threefold increase in suicide (Blakely, Collings, & Atkinson, 2003). There have also been findings of a causal relationship between late-life involuntary job loss and morbidity (a decline physical functioning and mental health) (Gallo, Bradley, Siegel, & Kasl, 2000).

The studies on the mortality and morbidity effects of early retirement are not clear as many studies do not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary retirements and health versus non-health related retirements (van der Heide, van Rijn, Robroek, Burdorf, & Proper, 2013). However, the 1994 study by Morris, Cook, & Shaper did not distinguish between involuntary retirement and unemployment, and the conclusion was that both were detrimental to health. Along these lines, a study based in Austria reported that involuntary early retirements cause a significant increase in the risk of premature death (Kuhn, Wuellrich, & Zweimüller, 2010). A 2005 report of a study of petrochemical workers found that early retirement at 55 increased the risk of mortality by 37% compared to workers retiring at 65 (Tsai, Wendt, Donnelly, de Jong, & Ahmed, 2005).

There is a substantial number of studies that go into detail as to the increased risks associated with various morbidities and unemployment. However, what I have present is sufficient to indicate that the change to one's meaning given environments arising from unemployment can not only make you ill it can kill you. There is, perhaps, no greater impact on the body than that leading to death!

Understood in terms of Dasein as structural connected to its world we would have expected to see adverse signs either psychologically or physically as a result of involuntary unemployment and retirements and this is the case. The mechanisms by which this occurs are irrelevant. What is more to the point is that the connection is accepted in the research literature. However, what is missing is a theoretical model that accounts for this phenomenon in a way that is consistent with an understanding of being a person. Again, I would argue that the understanding what it is to be a person on the basis of being-in-the-world provides such a framework. It would also form the basis of the necessary detailed research concerning those people who do and do not fall ill as a result of unemployment to identify differences in the characterises of these groups of Dasein. The criteria for

such a comparison would be based on both understanding and affective-capacities as well as the patterns of ongoing involvements.

Nursing Homes

At the beginning of the thesis, I included a short autobiographical account by Marion Miller of her journey into a nursing home in which she concluded

... I hate to think beyond each day. ... there are worse places, the fact is that when it comes to institutional living, there is no good place. No good place. (Miller, 2003, pp. 36-7)

When I listen to what Marion is saying I hear her talking about the living environment she has entered, and from which she will not leave. While she had increasing frailty, which had limited the things she could do I get the clear sense that she still had a life in her home which provided her with sufficient possibilities for her to be Marion. That changed after the fall, the broken hip and then the entry to the nursing home which required her to give up her home, access to friends, her books, her pink lustre china collection, and her privacy. While the nursing home was intelligible to her, it contained none of the things that offered Marion the possibility of meaningful involvements that would make manifest who she is as Marion. It was this loss of possibilities that I take Marion to be referring to when she said, "You just shed life, you do ..." (Miller, 2003, p. 36). Given her age and her circumstance, she could see no hope for returning to a meaningful existence, and she reflects that had she known what it was going to be like she would most probably have killed herself. In such a situation I take Marion's comments to indicate that she accepts her meaningful existence as Marion had already ended, and death was a more palatable alternative to living a meaningless existence.

In the introduction, I gave an overview of my earlier research on the experiences of older people relocating into a nursing home and include Lieberman's comments from his 1969 review of the relocation literature that the,

... effects of institutionalization on the psychological wellbeing and physical integrity of aged adults had been a question of **humanitarian interest** since the late nineteenth century and of scientific inquiry for 30 years. (Lieberman, 1969, p. 330) (my bolding)

The summary from the 1990 review by Danermark and Ekström was also cited;

... there is good reason for assuming that relocation under certain circumstances and for certain groups **does lead to ill health and to an increase in mortality**. (Danermark & Ekstrom, 1990, p. 44) (Danermark & Ekstrom, 1990, p. 44) (Danermark & Ekstrom, 1990, p. 44) (Danermark & Ekström, 1990, p. 44)(my bolding)

While the review that I completed in 2012 focused on the qualitative rather than quantitative research associated with relocation the conclusion was equally concerning;

While the clinical and personal care aspects of the services in nursing homes²³⁵ appears satisfactory there is a failure to recognise the significant psychological and emotional issues faced by older people as they relocate and struggle to adapt to new environments, develop new relationships, learn a new set of rules to survive, create a sense of place, establish new identities and create new meaning for their lives. The review indicates there is little in the way of support for these life transition processes and many people fail to make a successful transition. (Richards, 2011, p. 4)

The failure was captured for me by a quote from one of the research participants included in the review and to which I have referred several times;

Regina, an 85-year-old woman with expressive aphasia, tried hard to describe what it was like for her to be at the facility. She cried out, "They don't know the meaning of me! They don't know the meaning of me." Her comments reflect being unknown in an unfamiliar new neighborhood. (Heliker & Scholler-Jaquish, 2006, p. 38)

Marion and Regina express the human face of the failure of nursing homes. When we build the nursing homes and run them the way we do, it's in such a manner that we do not know the meaning of the people we bring in and care for, we shed life from them, and that is not just painful it causes significant damage and I believe, as do others, it also brings death to some.

In the introduction, I discussed research that was strongly suggestive of the association between morbidity and mortality and moving into the nursing home, and I have already addressed this in detail in the previous systematic review. In Chapter 18, I discussed Heidegger's view that he regards anxiety/depression as a breakdown case disclosing Dasein's structure was briefly discussed. In the next part, I look at depression within the context of nursing homes from this Heideggerian perspective.

Depression among residents of nursing homes

Depression is a significant illness and one of the leading causes of disability across the globe. (Baxter et al., 2014; Ferrari et al., 2013; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2013) The World Health Organisation summaries the impact of depression as being

²³⁵ The abbreviation LTCF (long term care facility) was in the original quote. This has been changed to nursing home for consistency.

... characterised by sadness, loss of interest or pleasure, feelings of guilt or low self-worth, disturbed sleep or appetite, feelings of tiredness, and poor concentration ... can be long-lasting or recurrent, substantially impairing an individual's ability to function at work or school or cope with daily life. At its most severe, depression can lead to suicide. (World Health Organisation, 2016a)

The concern regarding the prevalence and seriousness of depression is such that in October 2016 the WHO launched a one-year campaign to improve awareness of depression and encourage people to seek help. (World Health Organisation, 2016b)

Heidegger regards any affective-attunement as related to the mode of being of a Dasein and indicative of the structure being-in-the-world for that Dasein. He regards depression as indicative of a breakdown in the person's being-in-the-world, as indicative of the absence of meaningful possibilities showing up in the world upon which Dasein can project itself. This would relate to a breakdown in the receptivity aspect of the intentional structure. From this perspective, absent any organic genesis, depression is indicative of something 'missing' in the environment and not something 'wrong' in Dasein. As was commented in relation to the impact of abuse and neglect on young children, the outcome is a consequence of the proper functioning of Dasein's constitutive structures, not an abnormality within Dasein. From this perspective, the global prevalence of depression is telling us that there is something seriously wrong with the world Dasein is creating for itself! While I agree with this, this thesis is focused on people in nursing homes. I am arguing, that there is a problem with the nursing home environment and the research on depression as I will show, read from a Heideggerian perspective, supports this claim.

Prevalence of Depression in Nursing Homes

As at 30th June 2012, 52.1% of people living in a nursing home in Australia had a diagnosis of depression (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013). However 26% of the total population had no assessment noted, and given that the assessment is not mandatory, together with research indicating high rates of failure to diagnose depression in nursing homes correctly (Brühl, Lujendijk, & Muller, 2007; Snowdon & Fleming, 2008; Watson, Zimmerman, Cohen, & Dominik, 2009) the actual prevalence rate is most likely well passed 60%.

McCabe et.al. has found that staff are not clear in how best to respond to people with depression in nursing homes (McCabe, Davison, Mellor, & George, 2008) Davison et al. found that many aged care staff held false beliefs that depression is both a natural and expected phenomenon among nursing home residents (Davison,

McCabe, Mellor, Karantzas, & George, 2009). This being the case then part of the explanation of the under-reporting is that depression is simply not 'seen' by the staff. It has become part their normalised perception of what it is to be a nursing home resident.

Depression is regarded by many researchers as a common mental disorder among older people living in nursing homes (Drageset, Eide, & Ranhoff, 2011; Katz, Leshner, Kleban, Jethanandani, & Parmelee, 1989; Lin, Wang, & Huang, 2007; Meeks & Looney, 2011) and there is evidence that this is a global phenomenon among residents of nursing homes. In the USA Gaboda reported that among 5,455 facilities across eight states, 51.8% of people living in a nursing home had a diagnosis of depression (Gaboda, Lucas, Siegel, Kalay, & Crystal, 2011). This confirmed an earlier nationwide survey in the USA that found 54.4% of long-term nursing home residents had depression diagnosed during the first year (Hoover et al., 2010). A Taiwanese study reported that 81.8% of residents living in nursing homes were identified as being depressed (Lin, Wang, & Huang, 2007). Not all research findings disclose prevalence rates as high as these, for example, a small study in Australia Snowdon found depression rates of 40% among high care residents and 25% among low care residents (Snowdon & Fleming, 2008). The discrepancy between high and low care facilities may indicate that the level of acuity among residents may be a factor.

The rates of depression in nursing homes are higher than found among older people in the community. Djernes reviewed 122 research reports and found a high degree of variability in the reported levels of depression among community-living older adults with rates varying from 1% to 49% (Djernes, 2006). Reported variances have mainly been attributed to differences in methodological approaches including the choice of the diagnostic tool used, and population and sampling approaches (Beekman, Copeland, & Prince, 1999; Henderson et al., 1993; Pirkis et al., 2009). Despite this variance, studies of community as opposed to nursing home residing older adults generally report lower prevalence rates of depression (Fiske, Wetherell, & Gatz, 2009), with community rates tending to be between 10-15% (Haralambous et al., 2009) which is significantly lower than the reported prevalence rates in nursing homes. This is consistent with a survey of older community-dwelling patients from general practice from across Australia which reported a prevalence rate of 8.2% (Pirkis et al., 2009), and findings from rural India of 9.3% (Chauhan, Kokiwar,

Shridevi, & Katkuri, 2016) and in urban Turkey of 18.5% (Yaka, Keskinoglu, Ucku, Yener, & Tunca, 2014).

Notwithstanding that there has been evidence of improvement in diagnosing depression the research indicates that under detection and under treatment rates in nursing home facilities have been reported for almost thirty years, with rates varying from 20% to as high as 50% (Bagley et al., 2000; Cohen, Hyland, & Kimhy, 2003; Davison et al., 2007; Gruber-Baldini et al., 2005; Phillips & Henderson, 1991; Rovner et al., 1991; Shah, Schoenbachler, Streim, & Meeks, 2012; Snowdon & Fleming, 2008; Szczerbińska, Hirdes, & Życzkowska, 2012; Teresi, Abrams, Holmes, Ramirez, & Eimicke, 2001; Thakur, Blazer, & others, 2008). Underreporting and undertreatment have been identified as of particular concern for people with cognitive impairment or dementia (Davison et al., 2012; Leontjevas et al., 2013; Simning & Simons, 2016).

Drug Interventions Largely Ineffective and No Evidence of Alternatives

Aside from the reports of under-diagnosis and under-treatment of depression amongst Australian nursing home residents the dominant mode of treatment of depression in nursing homes is through the prescription of antidepressants (Shah, Schoenbachler, Streim, & Meeks, 2012; Snowdon, 2010). This is problematic as there is increasing, and significant evidence that such interventions are limited in their efficacy. In his report on *Depression in Nursing Homes* (Snowdon, 2010) Snowdon mentioned his knowledge of ten small trials of fewer than 500 participants in nursing homes (no details provided) where the results showed the antidepressants had little advantage over placebos. This is consistent with other research.

In 2010 Fournier, et al. reported (Fournier et al., 2010) on a meta-analysis of randomised placebo controlled trials published over the period from 1980 through to early 2009. The analysis of the 6 studies that met the study criteria, concluded;

The magnitude of benefit of antidepressant medication compared with placebo increases with severity of depression symptoms and may be minimal or nonexistent, on average, in patients with mild or moderate symptoms. For patients with very severe depression, the benefit of medications over placebo is substantial. (p. 47)

The study confirmed the findings of earlier similar studies (Khan, Leventhal, Khan, & Brown, 2002; Kirsch et al., 2008). These results have also been supported in research specifically looking at the efficacy of antidepressants in older populations

(Calati et al., 2013; Nelson, Delucchi, & Schneider, 2013). To compound the problem, there is evidence that a significant percentage of people are receiving medication at less than the recommended doses reducing the possibility of any benefit that may be provided (Brown, Lapane, & Luisi, 2002; Davison et al., 2012).

The concluding remarks in the Fournier, et al. study included a strong recommendation to provide advice to clinicians and prospective patient about the limitations of antidepressant medications (ADMs);

Pending findings contrary to those reported here and those obtained by Kirsch et al and Khan et al, efforts should be made to clarify to clinicians and prospective patients that whereas ADM can have a substantial effect with more severe depressions, there is little evidence to suggest that they produce specific pharmacological benefit for the majority of patients with less severe acute depressions. (Fournier et al., 2010, p. 52) (my underlining)

Despite the strong evidence as to the lack of benefit of pharmacological interventions for depression, except in severe cases, there is little evidence of any other forms of interventions implemented in a considered and systematic manner occurring in nursing homes. (Franck, Molyneux, & Parkinson, 2016; Meeks & Looney, 2011; Simning & Simons, 2016; Snowden, 2010; Stargatt et al., 2016)

Correlation Depression, Mortality and Morbidity

As indicated earlier depression is a serious condition that is associated with the experience of helplessness, self-deprecation, tiredness, inability to cope with and withdrawal from activities associated with work, recreation or daily living and so on. There is also a growing literature that indicates that the presence of depression is positively associated with premature mortality in general (Appleton et al., 2014; Katon, 2011; Lépine & Briley, 2011; Stek et al., 2005; Zivin et al., 2012) and increased mortality in conjunction with other conditions such as cardiovascular disease (Adams et al., 2012; Elderon & Whooley, 2013; Kerber & Rubenfire, 2012), and stroke (Ellis, 2010; House, Knapp, Bamford, & Vail, 2001; Towfighi, Valle, Markovic, & Ovbiagele, 2013) as well as increased risk of morbidity in general (Katon, 2011; Lépine & Briley, 2011) and specific serious illness such as cardiovascular disease (Carney & Freedland, 2008; Kerber & Rubenfire, 2012; Peters et al., 2010), and stroke (Chang-Quan et al., 2010).

In that I take depression as an affective-attunement indicative of a deficient mode of involvement with Dasein's world then there is substantial evidence linking this aspect of the being-in-the-world structure with increased morbidities and mortalities.

I do not exclude the possibility that significant illnesses may of themselves trigger depression, however, in that the emergent model I am proposing links Dasein's bodiliness and Dasein's experienced existence, the reduction in the meaningfulness of the environment would help to explain the increases in morbidity and mortality. This link was clearly evident for Laura as discussed in the earlier case study and was evident in the research on involuntary unemployment.

Correlation Depression and Quality of Life

The presence of depression has also been associated with reductions in quality of life of older people (Bakar & Asilar, 2015; Beekman et al., 2002; Hasche, Morrow-Howell, & Proctor, 2010; Lin et al., 2014; Naumann & Byrne, 2004; Sivertsen, Bjørkløf, Engedal, Selbæk, & Helvik, 2015). While the association of depression with quality of life has been researched there have been relatively few large population studies that attempt to assess the impact of not just diagnosed major depression but also what is often termed subsyndromal depression²³⁶ (i.e. mild and moderate); one such study is based on the *Denmark Suburban General Population Study* (Ellervik, Kvetny, Christensen, Vestergaard, & Bech, 2014).


In the study, Ellervik, et.al. used the Major Depression Index (MDI) to assess depression and the WHO-Five Well-Being Index²³⁷ (WHO-5) to assess wellbeing of 14,787 respondents. The results were that the WHO-5 score fell from an average wellbeing score of 70 (out of 100) for people with no depression, to a wellbeing score of 30 with mild depression, 24.5 with moderate depression and 16.0 with severe depression. These scores were presented as a graph (Ellervik, Kvetny, Christensen, Vestergaard, & Bech, 2014) which is represented below (Figure 32).

As can be seen from the graph what is notable is the drop-in wellbeing from no depression to mild depression. This reflects a drop of 40 points (70 down to 30) or 57.1%. The drop from mild to moderate is a further 5.5 points (7.9% from starting score) and from moderate to severe another 8.5 points (12.1% from starting score).

The Danish study was in the general population, however, the clear decline in wellbeing associated with depression is unequivocal. Of importance to note is that mild depression has the most dramatic effect on the reported quality of life as measured

²³⁶ Subsyndromal depression is the term used to indicate that the assessment for depression does not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of major depression.

²³⁷ For detailed information on WHO-5 refer to the WHO-5 website – <https://www.psykiatri-regionh.dk/who-5/Pages/default.aspx>



by the WHO-5. Confirming the studies already discussed, the report did not find that the use of pharmacology improved the reported level of well-being. An earlier cross-sectional study (Chachamovich, Fleck, Laidlaw, & Power, 2008) covering 4,316 respondents across 20 countries and five continents looked at older adults and the impact of both clinical and subsyndromal depression on quality of life. The study found that even relatively minor levels of depression are associated with a significant decrease in quality of life reflecting the findings of the large Danish general population study. It was depression and not the presence of other physical morbidities that accounted for nearly all the decline in the quality of life in this study.

Is Depression a Disease?

Typically, the literature on depression suggests that it is the depression itself that causes the decline in quality of life and the increased risk of morbidity and mortality. This is based on a disease model of depression, i.e. there is something wrong within the person, and this is causing the depression which subsequently flows through to

the other adverse impacts on their life. Fix the depression (the disease), and you improve the quality of life and health outcomes.

The literature overwhelmingly describes depression as a mental or psychiatric illness (Blazer, 2003; Davison et al., 2016; Fava & Sonino, 2005; Grabowski, Aschbrenner, Rome, & Bartels, 2010; Henshaw, Freedman-Doan, & Michigan, 2009; Palazidou, 2012) or a disorder, i.e. a depressive disorder (Davison, McCabe, Knight, & Mellor, 2012; Polyakova et al., 2014; Thakur, Blazer, & others, 2008), and at other times it is not characterised and simply referred to as 'depression' (Drageset, Eide, & Ranhoff, 2011; Stroud, Steiner, & Iwuagwu, 2008). This disease model is reflected in the almost exclusive use of anti-depressant medications as the preferred mode of intervention.

This disease model is the normative view held by the psychiatric profession (Blazer, 2005) however, as had been seen elsewhere in this thesis, the normative view is under attack by a small but growing number of psychiatrists. It is rare to get a succinct and clear insight into scholarly debates of this type, but one such occasion was provided by a televised debate in the late 1990s on the topic "Is Depression a Disease?" (Szasz, S et al., 1998) when six scholars and practitioners argued their position, three on each side of the debate. The normative view can be summed up by the comment of Donald Klein, then Professor of Psychiatry at Columbia University

... depression, clinical depression, is not unhappiness, it is an illness that is open to medication and can be medicated well. (Szasz, S et al., 1998) (my underlining)

The more recent research on the effectiveness of medication brings into question Klein's assertions, but that is not the focus of this debate. What is important is the view put forward arguing for a different understanding of depression. Thomas Szasz, Professor Psychiatry Emeritus, at State University of New York, argued that depression is not a disease;

A disease scientifically is defined as a biological abnormality that affects living tissues. Trees can be diseased, plants, animals, and humans. A real disease is typhoid fever, we call it a literal disease. Spring fever sounds like a disease but it is not a disease. The whale is a real animal, but it is not a fish, it is a metaphorical fish. So when we say depression is not a disease, we do not minimize the human phenomenon suffering. It exists like the whale exists but it is not a disease. Point number two: treatment has got nothing to do with disease. None of us object to psychiatry between consenting adults ... (Szasz, S et al., 1998)

Arguing a view that is similar to my interpretation of Heidegger and the emergent

model of Dasein, Ron Leifer, a practicing psychiatrist and campaigner against the disease model, argued that there are people who because of genetics or temperament may be predisposed to depression in certain circumstance but that this does not mean that the genetics or temperament caused the depression.

It means that people have a different physiological and genetic equipment to deal with life. (Szasz, S et al., 1998)

To put this in Heideggerian terms, people are born with different factualities, but these, together with the environment result in the facticity of Dasein, i.e. Dasein's understandings and affective-capacities. Leifer then gives an example of the inter-relationship between the experiences of life and the changes in the body,

Let me give you an example, it's the last second in a basketball game, my team scores a goal, I get very happy and excited, the catecholamines²³⁸ in my blood go up. Am I excited because of my catecholamines or am I excited because my team won the game? I think the analogy is exact, people become depressed because life doesn't go their way. Their serotonin level goes down. (Szasz, S et al., 1998)

One version of the disease model is that depression is as a result of a chemical imbalance. Leo and Lacasse report that this is a common perception,

In the world of American popular culture, the current view of mental illness depicts someone walking down the street, and everything is fine, life is good. Then all of a sudden, out of the blue, a chemical imbalance emerges. At the root of every twisted thought lurks a twisted molecule—so the thinking goes. (Leo & Lacasse, 2008, p. 25)

However, they argue against this and claim there is no empirical evidence to support the view,

... there is not a single peer-reviewed article that can accurately be cited to directly support claims of serotonin deficiency in any mental disorder. Based on our dialogue with the mainstream media, there appears to be no reason to alter this claim. (Leo & Lacasse, 2008, p. 45)

Dan Blazer, Professor of Psychiatry Emeritus at Duke University School of Medicine, is also an opponent of the disease model and argues in a manner that could well be straight out of a Heideggerian philosophy text,

Once psychiatrists construct major depression as a specific disease, that construction shapes and limits their explorations of its origins. In addition, when they make major depression a medical disease, they limit the range of interventions for treating and preventing

²³⁸ Catecholamines are a group of neurotransmitters that include epinephrine (adrenaline), norepinephrine and dopamine. When released they have an impact on the sympathetic nervous system, for example as part of the flight - fight response or when we get excited.

depression. (Blazer, 2005, p. 35)

From a Heideggerian perspective once the inter-relational concepts are established that form the understanding of depression as a disease, then when we see a person exhibiting the appropriate symptoms our understanding interprets what we are seeing as a 'depressed person who has a disease called depression'. Based on understanding, and based on our affective-attunement what matters to us is to 'treat' them and the range of possibilities that show up as modes of treatment is already determined by our understanding.

Blazer argues that;

Depression is, if nothing else, an emotion. An infirmed study of emotion is a key link between body and mind and society ... The empirical study of emotion buffer the tendency of the biological science to reductionism and the social sciences towards social construction. (Blazer, 2005, p. 16)

Blazer argues for a return of social psychiatry, not to replace, but complement current approaches. His view is that we are influenced by our interactions with our social environment and that depression is an emotion (i.e. and affective-capacity expressed as an affective-attunement) that indicates that there is a breakdown in the healthy, normal relationship between our self and our social environment. In that emotions have a biological basis then the depression will not only manifest as an expressed emotion but will be accompanied by physiological changes, and it is the unity of this complex relationship that needs to be better understood and should be the basis of interventions.

Blazer's account parallels that of Heidegger. Depression is not a disease it is an affective-attunement arising out of a breakdown between the person and their environment. It is the underlying ontological structural process of Dasein operating as it does and in this case, is responding to change in the environment. Everything is working just fine in Dasein; it is the environment!

Summary experience of Adult Daseins Moving into Nursing Homes.

Research such as that based on the Danish Population Study suggests that even mild or subsyndromal levels of depression are correlated with significant declines in quality of life. If the approach is taken that depression is a disease and that this causes the decline in quality of life, then the genesis of the 'problem' is centred in the person. Not only is the emphasis then placed on fixing the person by addressing the disease within, but it precludes alternative accounts.

If we approach depression as an emotion (an effective-attunement) as is suggested by Heidegger and psychiatrists such as Balzer, then an alternative interpretation is that people are experiencing some problem with their environment which in turn results in the experience of the emotion of depression. In that emotions are biologically based this does not preclude a medical based intervention to alleviate the depression, but it places the primary focus on the interplay of the person and their environment. While, in some cases, it may be that the person's understanding and affective-capacities towards their environment is what should be addressed, where there are significant numbers of people suffering from the same environment then the more likely issue is the environment itself. This is my claim in relation to nursing homes.

It is acknowledged, that different people have different innate coping mechanisms (factuality), and have developed different understandings and affective-attunements (facticity) with respect to the environment. Consequently, variations in the environment will result in differing responses among a population of Daseins. Some Daseins will have the affective-capacity to deal with significant changes in the environment while others will be adversely impacted by what may appear to be minor changes, albeit they are significant to the person. In either case, the structural aspects of Dasein respond as they should. The flow-through of the physiological changes will reflect the depth of the emotional experience and have cascading impacts on the rest of the body. Such cascading effects are well documented in relation to the adverse effects of stress on the body. (Fishta & Backé, 2015; Glaser & Kiecolt-Glaser, 2005; Kiecolt-Glaser, McGuire, Robles, & Glaser, 2002; Sandi & Haller, 2015; Sapolsky, 2004; Yashin et al., 2016) and I have already addressed the morbidity and mortality risks associated with depression.

The evidence from the research literature indicates that there are significant psychological distress and increased risk of mortality and morbidity for people entering into a nursing home. Almost thirty years ago Danermark and Ekström had concluded that

..... more than three decades of research in this field demonstrates with great clarity that there is very little new knowledge to be acquired from a continued atheoretical gathering of data with the aid of quantitative methods. (Danermark & Ekström, 1990, p. 36)

The quantitative research at the time was inconclusive and could not reach a consensus as to contributing factors, and they called for the development of a theory

that could be used to shape future research. The situation had remained unchanged until prior to this research, and I am not aware of any 'theoretical' model that could be used that fulfilled their requirement. My claim is that the Heideggerian Dasein analytic, i.e. Dasein understood as 'being-in-the-world' provides such a model and the general approach is supported, in broad terms, by psychiatrists such as Blazer, Szasz and Leifer.

As at 30th June 2016, there were just under 200,000 older Australians in nursing homes (Australian Government, 2016) and conservatively this would suggest that at least 120,000 (60%) are experiencing depression and associated with this a significant decline in their quality of life, with many at increased risk of morbidity and mortality. Current treatments, where implemented, are almost exclusively based on pharmacological interventions, antidepressant medications, which are largely ineffective, and there is little evidence of any systematic use of alternative approaches.

In that depression is an affective-attunement reflecting the deficiencies of the environment for Dasein, the current approaches to the design and running of nursing homes have failed the people they serve in that they have not addressed the significant issues identified in this thesis. The Heideggerian model provides the basis for an alternative approach based on an alternative account of being a person, one based on empirical, philosophical research and supported by a range of ontic research.

Illness and Disability Not Necessarily an Indication of Loss of Meaning.

Before moving on, I want to address a point concerning older people and illness. That a person has a chronic illness or disability is not indicative that they also have depression. However, neither is it indicative of 'unsuccessful aging'. In a report from one study (Montross et al., 2006) the older adult participants living in the community overwhelmingly (92%) regarded themselves as aging successfully. But of the participants, only 5% met the criteria for successful aging, e.g. absence from disease, freedom from disability and active engagement with life. These are criteria established as part of the successful aging model established by Rowe and Kahn (Rowe & Kahn, 1997) who define successful ageing as

... including three main components: low probability of disease and disease-related disability, high cognitive and physical functional capacity, and active engagement with life. (Rowe & Kahn, 1997) (p. 433)

If we consider Marion, prior to her fall, against the Rowe and Kahn criteria, I suspect she would 'fail' and yet like the participants of the Montross study I suspect she would have rated herself as aging successfully. There is something else at play and I suspect it is the role of meaning in the lives of people and meaning can overcome physical frailties. This is an area that is worth investigating at a later date in the light of a Heideggerian model.

Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, I have taken Heidegger's existential Dasein analytic and illustrated how it has real-world applications in terms of research and practice.

The Dasein analytic is the only comprehensive descriptive account of the person and is consistent with a range of research approaches in the fields of history, child development, depression research and aged care.


It is my claim that this model has greater descriptive power and applicability for research involving people than current approaches and that this has been illustrated in this chapter.

More importantly for this thesis, it provides an approach that makes intelligible the adverse experiences of the majority of people living in nursing homes, in excess of 120,000 people, and provides the basis for changes in research and practice that can be used to address these adverse outcomes.

CHAPTER 21: SHEDDING LIFE

Introduction

The thesis has progressively disclosed and described Dasein's constitutive structure. The structure is dynamic, establishing meaning for Dasein (in effect constituting Dasein) in terms of its understanding of world (worldhood). Based on this understanding, possibilities show up in Dasein's world as having the potential for Dasein's ability-to-be who it is. Dasein then chooses from those possibilities the dealings most appropriate for it at the time, and it is these dealings that form the basis of Dasein ongoing, meaningful existence. This structural process is hidden from Dasein and not under Dasein's control, this is the nature of the constitutive structure, of the ontological. What shows up for Dasein as mattering, as offering possibilities for being, is part of this dynamic structure, what Heidegger calls being-in-the-world; Figure 33 is one way of representing this structure.



Based on this interpretation, the claim was made that when there is a material change in a Dasein's environment, there is a risk of those possibilities essential for Dasein's on-going meaningful existence being absent. This absence of possibilities results in what I have termed 'shedding life', i.e. an actual decline in the experience of a meaningful existence resulting from an absence of possibilities. It is further argued that a move to a nursing home results in the absence, for many Dasein, of such possibilities. This is why, I argue, that the reports of what I have collectively

termed 'shedding life' in the early chapters, are so common in nursing homes. As this is a phenomenon associated with the ontological structure of Dasein, it is also a significant risk associated with occurrences such as involuntary unemployment as discussed in the last chapter. In that chapter, it was also argued that the structure is grounded in the biological processes of Dasein's bodiliness and that the consequences of a loss of meaningfulness is manifested in increased risk of psychological distress and increased morbidities and mortality. *In summary, being-meaningless makes you sick and increases the risk of death.*

Heidegger's thesis in *Being and Time* is that ultimately temporality is the most fundamental structure that determines everything, i.e. this is the meaning of the question of being from the perspective of fundamental ontology hence the title of the book. In the published section of *Being and Time*, he addresses temporality as the most primordial meaning of being for Dasein, but he never completes the project by publishing an analysis in relation to other regional ontologies, e.g. Nature. This is not a concern for the thesis.

In Division II of *Being and Time* Heidegger carries out an analysis of the structure of Dasein from yet another perspective. The basic structure disclosed in Division I remains unchanged. However, in Division II, he explores what Dasein needs to do in order to address the pull of the 'One', i.e. our falling, as the basis of our understanding and receptive-capacities (which in turn disclose possibilities). This relates to Heidegger's concept of authenticity briefly mentioned in the thesis. The analysis takes place over three complex chapters where Heidegger introduces his accounts of guilt, conscience, and death; none of which can be understood by reference to the typical usage of these terms. I am not going to deal with Heidegger's account of authenticity; however, there are aspects of Heidegger's account of Dasein's death that are useful for this thesis as they relate to the previous discussions concerning possibilities.

It should be clear by now that the dynamic nature of the structure of Dasein has a temporal aspect and this is important in terms of Heidegger's analysis of death. As Dasein, our understanding and affective-capacities are the basis from which (past) we project forward (future) onto possibilities that show up for us and from which we make choices about what to do now (present). This movement is a continuous one, and all three temporal perspectives are important. However, in that the past has already established the basis of a meaningful projection, and that we are always

already in the present it is the showing up of possibilities, i.e. the future, that energises this movement. Death is associated with the ending of this dynamic movement, i.e. the cessation of possibilities. This is what I discuss in this chapter.

The discussion on death completes the analysis of 'shedding life' from a Heideggerian perspective, grounding the phenomenon in the very structure of Dasein. On the completion of this account, I then propose a preliminary method for mapping 'shedding life', what Heidegger calls demising. This method is then applied to the circumstances surrounding Marion Miller's move into a nursing home.

Having provided the completed account of the meaning of shedding life I raise another related but urgent concern that follows on from this work. This concern raises the prospect that as one's life becomes being-meaningless in the context of the present environment, that it is, in turn, diminishing the experienced meaningfulness of the entire historical life. This is based on two concepts, firstly that Dasein's experienced life incorporates a continuity from the past into the present, it is not compartmentalised. As such any loss of meaning now relates to the entire temporal aspect of Dasein. Secondly, there is emerging research from the field of behavioural economics that suggests evaluations of prior events (in this case a Dasein's life) is heavily influenced by current experiences. If this is the case then the harm done to Dasein is not just the loss of meaning in currently lived experiences, but a loss of meaning for Dasein's existence, as a whole. This would amount to inflicting significant damage on Dasein. This line of inquiry is not pursued but raised as a pointer towards future research.

The aim of this thesis is to disclose the meaning of shedding life and not to explore the existing ontological structure (being) of a nursing home or the flawed nature of the nursing home that provides the conditions for 'shedding life'. While such an analysis is now possible based on the work done, it would involve a detailed research project that is outside the scope of the thesis. However, it is possible to make some preliminary observations, and this is what is provided in the final section of the chapter. As part of this, I put forward the thesis that the nursing home model is based on a somatological contract, notwithstanding that the character of the contract is not readily evident. This contract works for acute care hospitals despite the wrong understanding of Dasein. However, when the basic hospital-based model of care, even though modified, is applied to nursing homes, the wrong understanding of Dasein reveals the seriously flawed nature of this model for

nursing homes and the breaking of the somatological contract. The conclusion is that there needs to be another basis for the relationship that is established between a nursing home and the people it serves.

Section 1: Heidegger's Account of Death

In his definition of death Heidegger gives priority to the future, in that it is the absence of any possibilities for being Dasein;

With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost ability-to-be. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-longer being-able-to-be-there. ...

Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. [BT 294/251] (my underlining)

Heidegger's account of death is subject to considerable debate in the literature and Dreyfus gives an account (Dreyfus, 2005) of the various interpretations in his forward to Carole White's book *Time and Death, Heidegger's Analysis of Finitude* (White & Dreyfus (Forward), 2005). By way of summary, these include death as the end of human life, death as the closing off of one line of possibilities by choosing an alternative, death as world-collapse at either the individual or cultural level and finally death as a structural aspect of Dasein that compliments the world disclosing aspect of the structure. Heidegger's concept of dying varies in each of these alternatives and relates to how death is conceptualised. My interpretation falls into what I would term the structural interpretation, one that is favoured by Dreyfus (Dreyfus, 2005). However, whereas Dreyfus appears to interpret it primarily at the ontic level associated with an individual's potential loss of identity, my approach is to interpret Heidegger's account of death using the three levels previously discussed, i.e. the primordial structural process, the structural process associated with a particular Dasein and the ontic manifestation of the structure. If this approach is then overlaid with my emergent interpretation of Dasein, i.e. it is founded on the biological processes, then virtually all other interpretations can be accommodated; they each become an interpretation of death viewed from just one perspective. It is not my intent to survey in any detail these various positions as they are adequately described by Dreyfus. Nor is it my intent to provide a detailed analysis of Heidegger's discussion; while informative, it is an extensive task and not germane to the thesis. Rather I will simply present my interpretation of Heidegger's key concepts and then quickly move on to shedding life.

Death, as Heidegger defines it, is not like any conception that is commonly held. It is not something that ever occurs; it is not an event, it is always just a possibility, i.e. “the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein”. Recalling my emergent model for Dasein, in that there is the entity, Dasein, and that there is the entity upon which Dasein is founded, the body. The nature of founded relationships, as discussed in Chapter 13, is such that Dasein is dependent on the body for its existence; however, it is not determined ontologically by the body understood as present-at-hand. The end of life in the body will result in the end of Dasein, but just because the two events may occur at the same time, this does not mean they are one and the same event. This would be to thrust Dasein back as being understood as the body.

Heidegger thus has two separate terms to denote the separate ‘end of’ these entities. Firstly, in relation to the body, like any other thing that is alive, it can ‘perish’,

... Dasein's going-out-of-the-world in the sense of dying must be distinguished from the going-out-of-the-world of that which merely has life. In our terminology the ending of anything that is alive, is denoted as "perishing". [BT 284-5/240-41]

Further on Heidegger repeats this and then moves on to Dasein itself,

The ending of that which lives we have called 'perishing'. Dasein too 'has' its death, of the kind appropriate to anything that lives; and it has it, not in ontical isolation, but as codetermined by its primordial kind of being. In so far as this is the case, Dasein too can end ... though on the other hand, *qua* Dasein, it does not simply perish. We designate this intermediate phenomenon as its "demise".[BT 291/247]

Dasein's existence is grounded in the structure of care, and it is this that thrusts Dasein into its ‘there’, its understanding of what is meaningful in the world. In that Dasein is constituted, the possibility of its ‘ending’ is constantly present and this is what I take Heidegger to be referring to as the certain peculiarity in “death’s *certainty*” and this is “*that it is possible at any moment*.” [BT 302/258] This is a statement concerning our mortality, our finitude, something from which we cannot escape.

Heidegger's argument is that the constant possibility of death, essentially the end of our meaningful existence, is something that the ‘One’ constantly covers up in various ways. In that, we take over the way of being of the ‘One’ we too typically do not accept the possibility of death in anything other than a cursory way, if at all. Heidegger argues that if we fully accept our mortality and learn to live with the possibility of no more possibilities, then this will help us live a more authentic life, a

life on our own terms and not dictated by the 'One'.

In his discussion Heidegger recognises that it is impossible for an entity such as Dasein to embrace itself in terms of something completed, something finished, and in this sense, can never embrace its 'whole' life; we are, until death, work in progress. This is another essential difference between the characteristic of being human, and being something ready-to-hand, which must be complete for it to be useful. However, by accepting death (as a possibility), then Dasein can bring the whole into view and on this basis, live a 'whole' life. Regardless of our acknowledgement, death, as a possibility is always present and the *way we deal with it*, either accepting it or covering up, is what Heidegger calls 'dying'.

Let the term "*dying*" stand for that way of being in which Dasein is towards its death. [BT 291/247]

In that most of us share in the concealment of death as part of the 'One' it is easy to dismiss Heidegger's claims. However, there is substantial research to support this phenomenon, and one study by the American anthropologist Ernest Becker is presented in his book, *The Denial of Death* (Becker, 2014). Becker's thesis is that a basic motivation for human behaviour is our need to control our anxiety concerning death, to deny the terror of death, and that this is so overwhelming that we conspire to keep the fear unconscious.

The irony of man's condition is that the deepest need is to be free of the anxiety of death and annihilation; but it is life itself which awakens it, and so we must shrink from being fully alive. (Becker, 2014k. 1491-2)

While Becker's language is more dramatic than Heidegger's, it is a very similar line of argument based on the same phenomenon; albeit without Heidegger's ontological analysis.

Moving on from Heidegger's discussion on how to deal with the phenomenon, what I want to address is firstly his distinction between 'perishing' of the body and 'demise' of Dasein and secondly to consider 'death' from the perspective of the Dasein analytic, as an approach pointed out by Heidegger, i.e. when considering the manner

... in which the 'end' enters into Dasein's average everydayness. ... we must fully envisage those structures of everydayness which we have earlier set forth. [BT 293/248]

Just as Heidegger argues that the Dasein analytic comes "*before* any psychology or anthropology, and certainly before any biology" [BT 71/45] he makes the same

comment regarding demise,

Medical and biological investigation into "demising" can obtain results which may even become significant ontologically if the basic orientation for an existential Interpretation of death has been made secure. [BT 291/247]

Furthermore, in relation to the body,

The existential Interpretation of death takes precedence over any biology and ontology of life. [BT 291/247]

Further still in relation to other fields of study,

... it is also the foundation for any investigation of death which is biographical or historiological, ethnological or psychological. [BT 291/247]

These are, again, very clear indications the Heidegger expects his work on the Dasein analytic²³⁹ to be applied in these fields. This is the basis on which I am approaching my 'emergent' model of Dasein.

It should be noted that Heidegger refers to "demising" in the above quote concerning "medical and biological investigations" and not "perishing". I take this to mean that when these professions are investigating any phenomena associated with a person "no-longer being-able-to-be-there" then they should be guided by Dasein's ontological structure; how the dying of the body impacts on Dasein. This would lend support to Blazer's approach to depression and his urging for the adoption of social psychiatry as part of the therapeutic mix.

In terms of understanding such phenomena as death, dying, demise and perishing Heidegger then argues we must do so on the basis of Dasein's structure. However, in relation to death and demise, he never clarifies how these are to be fully interpreted, e.g. what conditions would bring about the "possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein", which would then also apply to the ontic occurrence of demise or demising. This is because Heidegger is undertaking a 'high level' interpretation for the purposes of ontology and not doing a detailed anthropology. It is in this space opened up by Heidegger that aspects of my interpretation fit.

Section 2: Demise – Shedding life

To refer to Dasein as "being-able-to-be-there" is another way of saying that Dasein

²³⁹ I make the point that he is not referring to his work as a social science methodology, albeit this does not preclude others from applying it in this manner.

is in its environment, Dasein is living a life that is meaningful to it, this is reflected in the above diagram (Figure 27).

In demise Dasein is “no-longer being-able-to-be-there” and I take any circumstance that brings about this condition as the cause of Dasein’s demise. Heidegger is rarely ‘black and white’ so although he speaks of demise, he also acknowledges that there is a ‘demising’. A parallel situation would be that the body can be “perishing” but that the interventions of doctors can address this and bring the body back to good health or they may fail, and the body ‘perishes’. Similarly, there are conditions in which Dasein is ‘demising’, which I take to be any progressive decline in Dasein’s “being-able-to-be-there”, and there may be interventions that bring Dasein back to its average everydayness or Dasein eventually ‘demises’ or experiences the ‘there’ in a very impoverished way. I take shedding life as another term for demising.

Taking for granted that ‘answer’ as to the conditions for demising lies in the structure then looking at it from the perspective of a Dasein in its average everydayness we need to look at the structure itself to see what changes would lead to demising. This is the approach I take in the following cases which are only presented as an indicative not exhaustive account:

Changes in World and Environment:

In that Dasein assigns itself to meaningful involvements within its world. A collapse in that world results in the cessation of possibilities.

This arises when the world that Dasein had as its environment no longer exists. As such the ready-to-hand in the world lose their meaning for Dasein, and the consequence is that possibilities for involvement by Dasein have gone. In that Dasein’s complete world may comprise regional worlds (work, home, community involvement, and so on) a world collapse may apply to one or all of these.

A very local collapse may occur if the local shop in which a Dasein works closes down. This may result in ‘demising’ for a short period until a new meaningful job is found. Of course, the Dasein may also have the view that a new job is imminent, in which case the possibilities of such a new job remain open on its horizon, within the context of the larger public world

The collapse may be on a larger scale. For example, the car manufacturing industry

closes across the country, and there is no more possibility of meaningful involvement in this world of motor vehicle manufacturing. If this is the world in which a Dasein found its meaning, then the shutting down of this world will have a significant impact on a Dasein; the possibility of retraining as an aged care worker may not be the answer! In that Dasein is a world discloser (this is the primordial level of the structure), it may be that the Dasein discloses a new world that is meaningful to it; there is no certainty in this. If this happens, it may very well be in aged care in which case Dasein has a new understanding of itself, a new identity in Dreyfus' interpretation. In both the cases, the world collapse is occurring within the same culture, the same larger public world.

The world collapse may be on a large scale still and involve the collapse of a culture. For example, when Western European countries invaded North America and following the subsequent devastating Indian wars of the nineteenth century, the possibility of ever living as a Crow (or any other group) in the context of the Crow 'world' disappeared forever. In his book *Radical Hope*, Jonathan Lear cites a passage from the Author's note at the end of the biography of Plenty-Coups by Frank Linderman


Plenty Coups refused to speak of his life after the passing of the buffalo, so that his story seems to have been broken off, leaving many years unaccounted for. "I have not told you half of what happened when I was young," he said, when urged to go on. "I can think back and tell you much more of war and horse-stealing. But when the buffalo went away the hearts of my people fell to the ground, and they could not lift them up again. After this nothing happened. There was little singing anywhere. Besides," he added sorrowfully, "you know that part of my life as well as I do. You saw what happened to us when the buffalo went away." (Linderman, 1962, p. 311) (Lear, 2006, p. 2)

Plenty-Coups was the last war Chief of the Crow nation and the last person to be honoured within the Crow nation with the tile Chief. The telling phrase in the above passage for Lear is "After this nothing happened". Lear interprets this as a recognition by Plenty-Coups (c.1848-1932), as a recognition that history as the Crow had understood it had ended. The defining Crow cultural practices centred around a semi-nomadic lifestyle on the great Plains of Central North America and their relationship with the buffalo herds and their adversarial relationship with other Plains tribes. This determined the rhythms of life for the Crow, the ways in which life stages were identified and celebrated, roles defined and so on. All this was lost when the access to this world was lost, and the Crow confined to an 'Indian Reservation', the buffalo all but exterminated and the concept of warrior, as it was

understood, made meaningless. In other words, virtually all the significant cultural practices that ‘formed’ and sustained the Crow world stopped, the worlding thus stopped and the world collapsed.

In Heidegger’s language, the meaningful world of the Crow was no more, and the being-meaningful as a Crow was no longer intelligible in the way once understood. Lear’s account is of a remarkable leader, Plenty-Coups, who accepted this reality and spent the majority of his adult life working tirelessly to work out a new way in which the Crow could once again have meaning as *Crow*, but in a world that was being shaped by Europeans.

The case of the Crow, illustrate that just as individual Dasein are adversely impacted



by world collapse, so too are communities of people. The difficulty facing many indigenous people around the world, including Australia is the same as that which Plenty-Coups recognised. History has ended (world collapse) and the challenge is to find a way forward that retains meaning as a distinct people from that of the dominant culture while *at the same time* through re-interpreting a new world (a new disclosure) in such a way that this distinctive meaning is possible. Dasein and its world must but be co-determined if the being-meaningful sought for is to be achieved. This is a formidable challenge in a world that is dominated by the ‘Other’, and in which the ontological understanding of Dasein is

based on Western concepts of the present-at-hand.

In summary, world collapses can occur at every level of world. In each case, such a collapse results in the removal of possibilities for Dasein’s ability-to-be. In some cases, a person may move from one collapsed world (e.g. shop closure) to another but undertake the same type of role, and in this case, the disruption would be minimal. The case of a collapse of an entire industry may mean that the person is

unable to continue in the same way and has to “reinvent” themselves elsewhere, turning an aspect of the larger public world into a new environment. In more dramatic cases there may be a collapse in the possibilities associated with the entire culture continuing in the same meaningful way, as in the case of the Crow.

In each case and in varying degrees, Dasein is required to become familiar with a ‘new environment’, acquiring new affective-capacities appropriate for the new environment and re-assigning itself to involvements in ways that are meaningful to Dasein’s understanding of itself. This is quite an ask! This process is essentially one of world disclosing such that the Dasein can have meaning within the world.

Removal from the World

A similar phenomenon to world collapse is the removal of Dasein from the world which offers possibilities for being-meaningful.

Elite athletes have reported experiencing mental health issues after retiring from sport (Watanabe, 2017) and I have already given examples of changes in the environment associated with unemployment and moving into a nursing home. Situations of demise would also be facing people who are placed in immigration detention centres. That this is the case has been widely publicised in reports concerning people seeking refuge in Australia from oppression in their home countries only to find themselves in offshore detention centres. Reported mental health issues include anxiety, depression, PTSD, self-harm and suicidal ideation are at significantly higher rates than in the Australian community (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2013; Newman, Procter, & Dudley, 2011) and suicide rates in detention centres are up to 10 times the rate in the Australian population (Steel et al., 2004).

An example where removal from an environment may result in unexpected adverse outcomes was discussed earlier in relation to the honour killings which take place among a very small minority of conservative Muslim families who have migrated to Western countries. The tragedy unfolds as the parents, and their young daughters are living in the same house but in different worlds.

Another instance involving separation from the meaning-giving possibilities of a world was associated with the European slavers who raided African countries and removed people from Africa and transport them to various other countries to work as slave labour. In addition to the sickness and death arising from maltreatment, it

has long been recognised that the act of dislocation and slavery were themselves causes of sickness and death (Kenny, 2015). Just as the collapse of world has continued to impact on generations of indigenous people so too has the removal from world due to the slave trade, and some researchers and authors are now exploring the legacy of slavery in the USA on the health of contemporary African-Americans (Cross Jr, 1998). This is expressed in Williams book, *Black Pain*.

... we are socially and economically haunted by the horrors of slavery, but my response to Janet and others who share her feelings is a simple one: Your great-great-grandmother was a slave; you not. But this still leaves two very important questions; Why do so many of us feel like slaves? And who – or what – are we slaves to? (Williams, 2009, p. 239)

Williams' questions cannot be answered in any causal manner. But if Heidegger is correct the answer lies somewhere in the 'One', the hidden meaning of being-black and being-white in the USA and the collective sense of understanding and receptive-capacities that are shaped by that meaning. There is no simple answer as the 'One' of being-black is associated with the Dasein-with of the 'One' of being-white. In Heidegger's work, the past is not merely the past of a particular Dasein; it cascades down through the generations as what he calls the traditions [BT], shaping understandings and receptive capacities and projecting onto the disclosed possibilities that arise. While things change, it takes a long time and as Heidegger noted in relation to something as fundamental as conceptualising what things are we have been locked into one dominant mode for over two thousand years. Change requires recognising the temporal nature of Dasein, exploring the characteristics of Dasein's meaning as reflected in understanding and receptivity that are currently present and taking deliberate steps to change; again, a formidable task.

Changes to Dasein's Ability to Access World

The previous examples related to changes in the world and environment. Similarly, there may be changes relating to Dasein such that Dasein may experience a permanent decline in health or physical ability that prevents it accessing aspects of its world. When Havi Carel contracted LAM, she was confined to the ground floor of her home, and the world of the upstairs was closed off to her. In relation to Marion Miller, she tells how her frailty gradually increased so that she could no longer walk to the end of the street, then no further than the letterbox until eventually she was confined to her house. For Havi, there were sufficient other meaningful involvements that presented as possibilities, so her existence still continued as she understood it. For Marion, before she moved to the nursing home, she accepted

her decline in physical abilities and implemented changes so as to continue doing the things that were meaningful to her, she was still able to be a householder, collector of pink lustre china, advisor to her political friends and so on. These were all significant, meaningful involvements for Marion. She clearly recognised the restrictions in her life and perhaps wished it was otherwise, but her life still had meaning, and this was sufficient. This changed when she entered the nursing home.

There are also situations whereby Dasein's basic understanding and affective-capacities are impacted by disease, for example, dementia. In such circumstances people lose a range of understandings, their affective-capacities change, and they may lose their ability to assign themselves in any meaningful way.

Changes to Relationships

Possibilities for Dasein's being-meaningful also arise from specific relationships with other Daseins that are not associated with vocationally type roles, etc.

A loss of a spouse, child or close friend may have a significant impact on being-possible as part of that relationship. Based on this, and the discussions to date the expected findings would be an increased risk of morbidity and mortality associated with such a loss. This was the reported findings from a study of over 300,000 elderly couples that concluded that the "death of a spouse, for whatever reason, is a significant threat to health and poses a substantial risk of death by whatever cause." (Elwert & Christakis, 2008, p. 2097) Another study investigating the consequences of the death of a child concluded that there is "evidence of lasting negative consequences of child death on bereaved parents'" health related quality of life (Song, Floyd, Seltzer, Greenberg, & Hong, 2010, p. 11) Outcomes for people in both of these studies were not consistent nor predictable at the individual level, there are too many other variables that are influencing a person's health outcome and source of meaning. However, in terms of the overall impact the results are consistent with what the being-in-the-world model is suggesting and consistent with findings in other circumstances in which possibilities for being-meaningful have diminished.

Demising – Time and Space

The degree of 'demising' experienced by the person will vary with the degree of diminution of possibilities within Dasein's 'there', the affective-capacities for the Dasein to cope with the changes and as well as to seek out new possibilities in new

worlds. In the above examples, there was an immediacy of time that was evident in relation to Dasein's relationship to possibilities for being-meaningful; this does not need to be the case. The main requirement is that *for Dasein*, the possibility of there being possibilities remains open. This was powerfully written about in the classic account of hope in the concentration camp by the Austrian psychiatrist Viktor Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning* (Frankl, 1984). Frankl was interned into Auschwitz during World War II and wrote the book in 1949 as part of his development of what he terms Logotherapy (logo understood as meaning). There are clear similarities between Frankl's and Heidegger's work regarding the importance of the future, and I will illustrate this with just a few examples from Frankl's book;

We can only live by looking at the future:

Any attempt at fighting the camp's psychopathological influence on the prisoner by psychotherapeutic or psycho-hygienic methods had to aim at giving him inner strength by pointing out to him a future goal to which he could look forward. Instinctively some of the prisoners attempted to find one on their own. It is a peculiarity of man that he can only live by looking to the future— *sub specie aeternitatis*. And this is his salvation in the most difficult moments of his existence, although he sometimes has to force his mind to the task. (Frankl, 1984, pp. 93-4) (my underlining)

This passage needs no comment, the relevance of linking the now to a future possibility is clear.

There were possibilities for meaningfulness even in the concentration camp:

Naturally only a few people were capable of reaching great spiritual heights. But a few were given the chance to attain human greatness even through their apparent worldly failure and death, an accomplishment which in ordinary circumstances they would never have achieved. ... most men in a concentration camp believed that the real opportunities of life had passed. Yet, in reality, there was an opportunity and a challenge. One could make a victory of those experiences, turning life into an inner triumph, or one could ignore the challenge and simply vegetate, as did a majority of the prisoners. (Frankl, 1984, p. 93) (my underlining)

This takes an extraordinary effort to overcome one's own affective-attunement and understanding and find meaning in such a place. In this, I am reminded of Paul, a retired chemist and university lecturer, who on moving into the nursing home set about to find a way to be useful. The nursing home library had been dormant for some time, and so he took it over, rearranged the books, set up a recording system and commenced as librarian, sourcing books from wherever he could. From a few users at the beginning, he ended up with a significant user group and a delivery service to those who could not come to the library.

Doom follows the loss of faith in the future

The prisoner who had lost faith in the future—his future —was doomed. With his loss of belief in the future, he also lost his spiritual hold; he let himself decline and became subject to mental and physical decay. Usually this happened quite suddenly, in the form of a crisis, the symptoms of which were familiar to the experienced camp inmate. We all feared this moment—not for ourselves, which would have been pointless, but for our friends. Usually it began with the prisoner refusing one morning to get dressed and wash or to go out on the parade grounds. No entreaties, no blows, no threats had any effect. He just lay there, hardly moving. If this crisis was brought about by an illness, he refused to be taken to the sick-bay or to do anything to help himself. He simply gave up. There he remained, lying in his own excreta, and nothing bothered him any more. (Frankl, 1984, p. 95) (My underlining)

While death was capricious in the concentration camps, Frankl witnessed time and time again that those who could find no possibilities for being who they are either amidst the horror of the camp or by focusing on reuniting with their families or extracting retribution for what had happened, died. While survival in the camps was far from guaranteed it, was seeing possibilities in the future, in a word hope, that sustained people. From Frankl's perspective, it was the loss of hope, of possibilities, saw them die.

Every prisoner would have experienced a 'demising' or shedding life as I am defining it. However, it was the power of the 'there' that when it was held open, even in the in the slimmest of possibilities of a future, by hope, that many survived. It was these accounts of the power of meaning that prompted Frankl to develop his Logotherapy.

These quote passages do not suggest that Frankl had the same ontological understanding as Heidegger, but he certainly had aspects of the same phenomenon in view. The recognition of similarities between Heidegger's work and Frankl's is not new (Lantz, 2000) and Frankl regarded Heidegger as a friend, having a framed letter from him on the wall of his study among his other mementoes (Scully, 1995).

The challenge facing those who have suffered a total collapse of their cultural world is that there is no hope of returning to the past, the future must be recast in the disclosure of a new world that offers the possibility for sustained being-meaningful. The challenge for those entering a nursing home is not in a distant future but finding meaning in the current environment. However, Frankl indicated, this is an option that few take up and in my experience, those who follow Paul's path are few. I also suspect that part of Paul's sense of meaning was in being-useful. Marion had not only moved into a nursing home that offered little possibility of being-Marion and further, her frailty made her not only dependent on others, but her eyesight

continued to decline to the point where she struggled to read and write, two abilities that were important to her. For Marion, there was virtually no possibility of 'reinventing' herself in the immediacy of the present, and there was no future. Marion was confronting the reality of the impossibility of any further possibility of being-Marion; as Marion, she had all but died.

This completes the section on demising. In the next section a preliminary way of mapping 'shedding life' is proposed followed by an application of the mapping using Marion Miller's circumstance.


Section 3: Mapping 'Demising' or 'Shedding life.'

While possibilities show up all the time for involvements in various activities some, as discussed are related to more crucial aspects of our sense of meaning, while others are what I have termed secondary or supplementary. The possibilities that I want to address are those associated with meaning, those that constitute a primary for-the-sake-of-which (F-S-W). For example, that a person can drive does not mean that a car will show up as offering possibilities for driving as part of defining meaning for the person. It may be important in support of being, for example, a football coach, or parent and so on. If the various F-S-Ws associated with the car no longer apply then the car does not show up as a possibility for driving, there is no reason to drive.

We can represent the small complex of important for-the-sakes-of-which (F-S-W) in a 'daisy' diagram (Figure 34) which is adapted from the earlier diagrams presented as models for Dasein. Each 'leaf' on the 'daisy diagram represents a meaningful F-S-W domain that is evident in the person's life. Each petal represents the projecting onto possibilities that show up in the environment and then the taking of up some of those possibilities by way of dealings; this temporal aspect is indicated by the direction of the arrow.

The number of domains will vary and accordingly so will the petals. Some people may have only a few; for example, an elite athlete may be dedicated to their sport spending most of their time training, planning for future events, monitoring their diet, attending to other activities around their sport and so on, and even if in a relationship the dominant and most important aspect is being an 'elite sports person'. In this case, there may only be two or three primary F-S-W petals and the petal representing being-a-sportsperson may be considerably larger than the others. In

this case, the risk is that the one way of being is so pervasive and important that when possibilities for being an 'elite sports person' are no longer there, the 'demising' of Dasein is quite significant.



Other Daseins may have an existence with a number of important ways of being, e.g. being a mum, being a doctor, being a wife, being an amateur 'chef' and so on. If there is a change in some aspects of their life, there may be sufficient other meaningful ways of being to keep the Dasein's 'there' open and possibilities for being-meaningful still show up. An event that results in a 'demising' of one aspect of life may thus be buffered by other ways of being-meaningful. This does not mean that people with a 'balanced life' are thereby always protected as there is always the possibility of a significant 'demising' event associated with aspects of their life that have long-lasting consequences, for example, a tragic loss of a child may have this effect.

Having outlined the concept, I will now apply it to Marion Miller.

Mapping Marion Miller's Life in Terms of Ways of Being

In the following, I use Marion Miller's autobiographical account to identify her important ways of being or 'for-the-sakes-of-which' and then prepare an environmental map (Table 7). I have identified three-time periods over which to do

the assessment, before the onset of frailty that impeded her mobility, after the onset of frailty but before the fall that initiated her move into a nursing home and finally after the move into the nursing home. This is an indicative example only, and in an

REF	BEFORE FRAILTY	BEFORE NURSING HOME	NURSING HOME
1	Activist (letter writer)	Yes	Still writes letters – to facility manager – comments edited in reports of meetings
2	Collector pink lustre china	Yes	No – given away
3	Politically aware	Yes	No – no access to valued radio program
4	Reader & book collector	Yes – difficulty reading	No – gave away books, going blind
5	Gardener	Yes – via employee	No – sold home
6	Advisor & social groups	Yes – phone and home visits	No - access problems in evening
7	Home owner	Yes – assisted by employee	No – sold home – no space
8	Vegetarian	Yes – had shopper and home help	No – nursing home couldn't provide diet
9	Independent, self-sufficient person, loss of mobility	Yes – directs care & environment, had choice, difficulty walking	No – dependent, loss of control over environment, confined to wheel chair, loss of choice & privacy

Table 7 Marion Miller: Environmental Mapping of Possibilities-to-be

actual situation, there would be methods established to identify and confirmed the assessments.

The colour shadings indicate an assessment of the available possibilities in her environment available for her ability-to-be. I then transfer the mapping onto a series of 'daisy' diagrams to give a visual depiction of the changes in her life²⁴⁰.

On the Environment Mapping I have used the colour shading to indicate as follows:


- Darker gold to indicate that in the domain of a 'for-the-sake-of-which' the environment still held possibilities for involvement.
- Light gold indicates that there has been a decline in possibilities, but some degree of involvement is still possible.
- White squares indicate an absence of possible involvements, but there is no indication of a sense of loss or harm.

²⁴⁰ This work on mapping is only a preliminary and indicative illustration of this approach and it will require further refinement. I have not attempted, at this stage, to place any weighting or priority on particular ways of being, this is an important aspect that will need to be addressed as part of the development. The weighting could be represented by variations in petal size. I have not done this in this example.

- Light red indicates that the environment is harmful, or in this case that the absence of possibilities caused by the environment is resulting in a sense of loss or grief.
- Dark red indicates that the environment is toxic or harmful in the domain.

In Marion's case, even though her frailty had increased long before the fall resulting in her inability to walk down the road or to the letterbox, she was still in control and engaged in what is meaningful to her, in part because she had the ability and resources to engage a personal shopper and housekeeper. In the table I have not included Marion's children and grandchildren as while she acknowledges them, they do not play a significant part in her narrative.


After Marion fell she battled on at home, but the pain and difficulty in walking had resulted in her going to the hospital where she received the diagnosis. The prosthesis in one of her hips had gone through the pelvic bone, and with osteoporosis, the doctors had advised there was no hope of any effective medical repair. Without adequate support at home, she made the decision to move to the nursing home. The above mapping under the column 'before nursing home' does not account for the aftermath of the fall as this was the event that led to the move into a nursing home.



There is no substantial difference before and after frailty, and so the 'Daisy'

diagrams (Figure 35 and Figure 36) are only provided for the second two columns.

The black arrows indicate that meaningful possibilities are showing up in the



environment for Marion in relationship to the F-S-W and she has involvements with them (dealings).

The absent 'petals' (the second Daisy diagram) indicate where there are aspects of Marion's way of being that are no longer of material significance and Marion, even if reluctantly, has let them go.

The red 'petals' indicate where the environment is either toxic and harmful to Marion's existence or has contributed to the absence of possibilities for Marion's way of being, possibilities which she still longs for.

While the nursing home may be providing good care for Marion in a physical sense, it has completely failed to 'see' Marion and care for her in terms of what it means to be Marion. The objective of the nursing home should be to stop as many 'petals' turning red, minimise the loss of 'petals' and to keep as many as possible as 'gold' as possible. If possible, there should also be an attempt to 'add' petals. Person-centred care, to live up to its name, is not one that focuses primarily on the physical care of the body, albeit this is important, it is one that focuses on the person in terms of supporting their personhood, which I interpret as their being-meaningful; from a

Heideggerian perspective that is a completely different thing.

If the above were 'animated' to reflect Marion being-Marion, then in the first diagram the arrows would be moving steadily around the petals to indicate the dynamic nature of being. Once the diagrams are understood and interpreted the dire consequences, Marion is facing in terms of her existence as Marion is evident.

Frankl provides more support for the role of meaning in supporting Dasein and the possible implications of the absence of meaning, death. This supports the description at the beginning of the thesis of older people in nursing homes 'facing the wall' and dying. As in Heidegger's work, for Frankl one's environment is not confined to the here and now. As I have discussed, possibilities for being are a future aspect of the being-in-the-world structure, and while the future may be moments or a few days ahead, the possibilities it offers may also be in some indefinite but *still possible* time in the future. The possibility of possibilities remains. This reinforces Heidegger's notion of death as the absolute possibility of no more possibilities, which includes the longer-term future.

Marion has confronted her death; there is for Marion the absolute possibility of no more possibilities. However, this does mean that just because one recognises that death is a possibility a person may want to die, this is to misunderstand Heidegger's work. Heidegger's intent is that people should embrace their mortality (their finitude) so as to make the most out of their life, to make decisions that enhance their own sense of being. Marion, however, is confronted with two situations, the perishing of her body and her demising as Dasein. Given her age and the rapidly perishing state of her body Marion accepts that the body will neither recover and probably stop functioning altogether in the near future. Given that a functioning body is the founded necessity for Dasein itself, she recognises that this means that as a person there is no hope, she dies with the perishing of her body. Secondly, Marion recognises that her life now, as Marion, has experienced a significant decline, she has experienced what she calls the shedding of life. Marion is unable to encounter possibilities in her environment that she can take up as an expression of who she is. The 'perishing' of her life is, in her view, irreversible and to such an extent that Marion meaningful existence as Marion has all but completed its demise! Faced with both the prospect of a body that is about to perish, a life that is all but completed its demise and no hope for a change in circumstance Marion makes the decision that she wants to die. Marion has been an independent person all her life and made

a deliberate decision as to the direction and purpose of her life. Making the decision to die is her final act of being Marion. This final act of being Marion is however denied to her as she is in a nursing home.

The response to a decline in possibilities within one's environment can be met with the affective-attunement of depression and with depression an increased risk of morbidity and mortality. Based on the evidence this is the most typical response; however, Heidegger indicates that it is possible to overcome this. The message from Frankl is similar. However, the response to a decline in possibilities in the environment is extremely difficult and all but impossible for many people, especially faced with the efficiency of the nursing home focussed on the care of the body. There is, however, no evidence that Marion was depressed. She wanted to be Marion to the very end, and her last act of being-meaningful would have been death on her terms.

It is hard to assess if actions by the nursing home focused on an authentic model of person-centred care for Marion would have made a difference. I suspect that at the very least it would have extended the period of time in which Marion experienced the being-meaningful as Marion, even if not in the full flowering of her younger years. The rest is outside the control of the nursing home; but is this not what should be expected from an industry that presents itself as providing quality of life, not just quality of care.

The thesis is a Heideggerian inquiry into the meaning of shedding life. The conclusion of that inquiry is that shedding life is a demising of Dasein's existence understood as a decline in the possibilities of being possible.

Section 4: Life evaluation

Heidegger's philosophical research in *Being and Time* lays out the constitutive structure Dasein in its average everydayness. This is the mode in which Dasein finds itself most of the time as it goes about the activities of its life as things show up as mattering. This basic structure is very broad, applying to something as simple as walking through a door on the way somewhere, to the subtle shifts in the chisel when carving, to taking up a doctoral research program. Experiencing a meaningful-life requires the possibility of continuing in all those activities that matter to Dasein's

understanding of itself²⁴¹. All this has been well covered.

The aim of the thesis is to investigate the shedding of life from an ontological perspective, to explore if there is a constitutive structural aspect to being-Dasein that can explain the phenomenon of 'shedding life'. The findings are that this is the case. In the thesis I do not explore Marion Miller's circumstances from the perspective of quality of life or well-being, the aim was to go deeper than this approach. However, I now want to briefly touch on this area with the aim of raising another area of deep concern, the risk of a loss of meaning for one's whole temporal or historical existence.

The area of subjective well-being is one that has relevance to understanding the experiences of people living in a nursing home. It is a complex area and must distinguish between two different concepts, emotional well-being and life evaluation (Diener, 2009; Graham, 2012; Kahneman & Deaton, 2010). Emotional wellbeing, which is also referred to as hedonic well-being or experienced happiness, is the emotional quality of a person's everyday experience and relates to the occurrence and intensity of experiences such "joy, fascination, anxiety, sadness, anger, and affection that make one's life pleasant or unpleasant" (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010). Life evaluation relates to the thoughts and reflections one has in relation to their life and is typically in response to questions such as "How satisfied are you with your life as a whole?" The reason that it is essential to separate these concepts is that emotional well-being and life evaluation have different correlates, notwithstanding there is overlap in contributing factors. For example, contributions to higher income are correlated to positive life evaluation, even for those already on high income, whereas there is little improvement in emotional wellbeing once annual incomes reach approximately US\$75,000 (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010).

The research in this field is predominately based on investigating psychological phenomena, and there is, as yet, no meta-theory providing a framework for the investigations; this is the same circumstance that was observed earlier in relation to the quantitative research investigating the effects of a relocation to a nursing home²⁴². In the case of Marion Miller, while she does not specifically address the questions, one could reasonably surmise that at the time she wrote her

²⁴¹ This refers to the average circumstances facing Dasein and not to meanings of self that have arisen out of, for example, neglect and abuse.

²⁴² Refer Chapter 1.

autobiographical account that her thoughts concerning her life-evaluation were rather low, as indicated by her desire to end her life and her view that institutional living was not a good place to live. Furthermore, I suspect that her experienced hedonic wellbeing had also declined.

The study of emotional wellbeing and life evaluation are both oriented to the present. However, there is a third aspect, and that is one's whole of life evaluation not considered as a snapshot of the present but over the whole history of one's life. The orientation to the 'present' in the research reflects the bias towards an understanding of Dasein as existing in a succession of moments of 'nows' which reflects the understanding as something present-at-hand. However, Heidegger views Dasein as something that is unfolding and can never be experienced as 'complete' by Dasein as this unfolding continues until death. This unfolding is temporal as has been discussed, and it incorporates the past. This would suggest that if there is a negative evaluation by Dasein of its life now, this will reflect on its entire life because they are part of the same unfolding; i.e. it is the same entity. While this temporal view of life evaluation is not one that is well researched there is some indication that this is what happens.

In 2001 Diener, Wirtz and Oishi reported on the results of three studies (Diener, Wirtz, & Oishi, 2001) exploring how the ending of a person's life influenced the desirability of that life. The studies examined whether or not the phenomena of duration-neglect and the peak-end-rule would apply in situations governing the evaluations of entire lives rather than specific events. I will first explain the concepts of duration-neglect and the peak-end-rule and then address the life evaluation study. The following describes a study that illustrates the two phenomena.

Participants were required to hold their entire hand, up to their wrist, in painfully cold water until invited to removed it, at which time they were given a warm towel. The participants recorded the ongoing level of pain experienced while the hand was in the cold water using the arrows on a computer keyboard. Each participant went through two trials. The first trial was a 60-second immersion at 14° Celsius which the participants reported as painful but tolerable. The second trial lasted 90 seconds. For the first 60 seconds of this, the water temperature was *identical* to the first trial. For the last 30 seconds the experimenter opened a valve permitting warmer water to enter the bowl, increasing the temperature by just 1°C, just sufficient for the participants to recognise a slight reduction in pain intensity. In other words, the two

trials were identical for the first 60 seconds.

The participants were advised that there would be three trials, each separated by seven minutes. Seven minutes after the second event, they were given the choice of selecting between repeating the shorter (first) or, the longer (second) trial for the third and final immersion. The aim of the study was to record this decision and so once given there was no third immersion. This was the conclusion;

Fully 80% of the participants who reported that their pain diminished during the final phase of the longer episode opted to repeat it, thereby declaring themselves willing to suffer 30 seconds of needless pain in the anticipated third trial. (Kahneman, 2012, p. 382) (my underlining)

The peak-end rule describes the phenomenon that we tend to rate or judge the outcome of an event based on the average experience at its peak experience and the experience at the end. In this case, the duration of each event was ignored (duration neglect) and in that the peak experience was the same, it was the end experienced that influenced the decision. When considered rationally, the decision by the 80% to repeat trial 2 does not make sense; it results in a greater duration of experienced pain. What this line of investigation is pursuing is the basis by which we actually make decisions and not the assumed model of decision making. In this case, if people are making a decision, in the main, to engage in trial 3 on the basis of experiencing the least amount of pain, i.e. what matters to them, then a rational evaluation of the two prior trials does not support the judgement made by the vast majority of people. Exploring possible reasons for this type of phenomena is not the objective of the research, what this research is doing is identifying and describing the ontic phenomenon associated with judgement and decision making.

The experience being considered may be either positive or negative, e.g. painful or pleasurable and a review of the literature around the peak-end rule reported that the rule “appears to be good at explaining how people construct retrospective hedonic evaluations in studies examining its effect over a short retention interval” (Geng, Chen, Lam, & Zheng, 2013, p. 225). However, the review concluded that after a lengthy period following the event people might use a different mechanism to form a hedonic evaluation, most probably due to the decline in intensity of the recollections concerning the events. In that one’s life is, from a Heideggerian perspective a single unfolding, in other words, it is not an event we can leave behind, as it is always in the throw of happening, this would suggest that the peak-end rule

and the associated phenomenon of duration neglect may be relevant. This brings us back to the research report by Diener, Wirtz and Oishi.

The study used a brief description of a fictional person, Jen, who was extremely happy throughout her life in all aspects of her life, enjoying work, the company of friends, taking vacations, and so on. Jen's life ends tragically in a car accident; in one scenario at 30 years and in the other at 60 years. These two basic scenarios were then varied by adding 5 additional years. The years, however, while pleasant, are less so than before. The study participants saw different combinations of scenarios and were then asked two questions, "Taking her life as a whole, how desirable do you think Jen's life was?" and "How much total happiness or unhappiness would you say that Jen experienced in her life?". For the participants that only saw the doubling of Jen's life (30 to 60 years) the increased life made no difference to the desirability of the life or the assessment of the experienced happiness. This is the duration effect. The quantity of the experienced happiness of Jen's life is not considered. There was no discernible difference between the peak and the end in each case and as such Jen's whole temporal period of life was assessed on the basis of a typical slice of that life. However, for those participants assessing Jen's life from the perspective of 30 and 35 or 60 and 65, the adding of 5 years additional "slightly happy" years resulted in a *significant reduction* in both the desirability of the life and the happiness attributed to the life. These assessments held for both participants who were young psychology students and for older friends and parents of the students recruited to complete the study. The conclusion is that in the evaluation of an entire life, the ends as well as the peaks matter (Diener, Wirtz, & Oishi, 2001).

These studies are taking place in the field that is, misleadingly, named behavioural economics which is investigating the way people actually make intuitive decisions and judgements. The classical model of economics proposes humans as rational, informed and considered decision makers and the work in behavioural economics is a serious challenge to this model. It was for this reason that Kahneman's work and its application to the field of economics lead to him being awarded the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences²⁴³. The research in this field is based on what 'shows up' in terms of our immediate intuitive judgement or assessment;

²⁴³ In 2017 Richard Thaler, received the prize also because of his work in the field of behavioural economics.

this is equivalent to Heidegger's average everydayness. The theory that is being proposed by Kahneman and others is that people have two modes of making judgments and decision making which Kahneman calls system 1 and system 2. Roughly speaking the two systems can be understood as following:

System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control.

System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration. (Kahneman, 2012, pp. 20-1)

Kahneman argues that our normal mode of function is System 1 and that System 2 only kicks in when faced with a more difficult or complex task; the field of behavioural economics is primarily concerned with System 1. While there is only a rough equivalence between Heidegger's mode of average everydayness and System 1, it is close enough to recognise the same phenomenon is being considered. From a Heideggerian view of Dasein, this is an area that needs further development as part of filling out a full 'anthropology' and the findings in the field is a valuable resource in this regard.

The relationship between system 2 and Heidegger's work is more problematic. Only some connections are evident albeit Heidegger recognises Dasein's ability to use other modes of cognition and adopt more authentic modes of being. Heidegger's descriptions of the structure of Dasein in terms of its ontological levels and the ontic manifestations is more nuanced than the current approach being used in behavioural economics. This simply indicates an opportunity of considering the findings of the science based research in the light of Heidegger's philosophical research and determine if there is a fit. My intuition is that there is; however, that is another project.

What is relevant to this thesis is the reading of the research in terms of life evaluation back into Heidegger's work. When this is done there is some reason to be concerned and peruse further research. The work on system 1 and the phenomena of the peak-end rule and duration neglect are presenting as a genuine phenomenon associated with Dasein's mode of being and it is able to be read, with little if any contrivance, as consistent with Heidegger's broad framework. If anything, the results of the work can be used, as mentioned, to 'fill out' a more detailed descriptive account of Dasein's being-in-the-world. If this is the case, then the entry into a

nursing home not only has a risk of contributing to the 'shedding of life' in terms of Dasein being-meaningful, there is also a risk that Dasein's entire temporal existence is diminished in terms of meaningfulness; this is the peak-end rule and duration effect at work. If this happens then Dasein's demise is total; the loss of a meaningful future, resulting in a decline in being-meaningful in the present, and the loss of meaning associated with the past. If this is the case, then the move to a nursing home is potentially even more damaging than just the 'shedding of life'.

Given the aging of the population and the increasing numbers entering nursing homes the impact on Dasein's meaningfulness, not just in the present, but its whole temporal or historical existence needs to be researched as a matter of urgency. Dasein is not some present-at-hand object, it is its existence, and if the meaningfulness of that existence is diminished, then this is diminishing of Dasein itself, i.e. a diminishing of the person. This is not trivial; the diminishing should be understood as a form of destruction. In this Wolfensberger's dramatic language that nursing homes are one of the forms of "death making" (Wolfensberger, 1992, 1994) in our society may not be far off the mark.

Should this be the case, for even a moderate percentage of the nursing home population then strategies are required to help address this loss of meaning. Kahneman suggests that we can make a deliberate shift to System 2 when making particular judgements (Kahneman, 2012) and Heidegger, as already discussed, indicates something similar. However, it is not as easy as this, for example, a person may have had an unpleasant life and the last couple of years were very happy resulting in the person having a positive sense of subjective wellbeing both in terms of life evaluation and experience hedonic well-being. They then enter a nursing home and experience a decline in subjective well-being. A 'rational' whole of life evaluation in this instance may well be entirely unproductive. In other words, people are complex. It may well be that the only 'safe' way to proceed is one that genuinely focuses on the person and driven by compassion and a desire for their wellbeing, in this model the challenge is how to create the possibility of 'ends' for older people that are positive and meaningful.

Given the significant evidence that loss of meaning and the manifestations of depression are commonplace in nursing homes, this is an area worth researching. In view of the inevitable perishing of Dasein's body, it may be that our 'modern' culture needs to find a way of moving towards the death of Dasein in a new way,

one that holds on to meaning.

Section 5: The Nursing-home

In that, a nursing home can be considered a world it is also something ready-to-hand [BT 141/106, 143/109] it has thus been brought into being in a broader in-order-to structure for the sake-of some understanding of Dasein. When reading in the area of the history of aged care, particularly that aspect dealing with the frailest, it is easy to see that the model adopted for the 'care' of the frail elderly was based on an already existing and successful model, that of the acute care hospital (Bengtson, Gans, Putney, & Silverstein, 2008; Moody, 2010; Thane, 2005; Thomas, 1996). In other words what brought nursing homes into being was the same compassionate desire to care for any person who was sick or injured, and it seems more than reasonable that we should take the same basic model, the hospital, and apply it to the care of the elderly.

The main focus of this thesis is the understanding of the 'shedding life', and this is not the place for a full inquiry into the origins and fatal flaw inherent in the nursing home as currently conceived. However, in that the inquiry of shedding life commenced in the context of a nursing home the following is put forward as a tentative account of the structural flaw. Researching and describing how nursing homes came into being, the being of a nursing home and the consequences of the wrong ontology on which they are based is a substantial body of work that would be worth pursuing at a later date.


One way of looking at the difference between typical health care, hospitals and nursing homes is through what I call the somatological contract²⁴⁴. This approach brings into view the fatal flaw of the nursing home.

There is a somatological contract that exists between the 'patient' and the medical or care provider. The somatological contract implies that if the 'patient' follows the instructions of the provider for a given period of time, then health will be 'restored'. In minor cases, a person may take a prescribed medicine, refrain from particular

²⁴⁴ I have coined the term somatological to emphasise that the nature of the relationship between doctor and patient is the body. The term soma, from the Greek *somatikos* 'meaning of the body' is understood in the scholarly tradition as relating to the body as distinct from the soul, spirit or mind. I had considered using the term psychological contract, but this is a specialised term in the literature referring to the relationship between employer and employee and social contract similarly has a prior well-established meaning, in this case in relation to political theory.


activities for a period, i.e. modify their life activities, and in return re-gain the ability to take up the possibilities associated with the living of their life. In these cases, the 'health' impediment to living that life is minor, and at times it is only by way of risk.

In more significant cases the person enters a hospital, complies with the institutional regime of the hospital and submits to the interventions required, in other words, there is to a lesser or greater degree, depending on the injury or illness, the suspension of living one's life. During this period the possibility of being possible for the patient is projected further out into the future than is typically the case, e.g. to a point beyond the hospital discharge date. During this period, however, the being-possible for the doctors, nurses and staff are brought into the present as being-meaningful because the 'patient' defers other modes of meaning and assumes, for a short time, the Dasein-with of 'a patient'. At risk of being overly simplistic, the somatological contract provides a way of doctors, nurses and so forth being-possible and being-meaningful by offering sick or injured Daseins a return to being-meaningful in the future. Crudely put, the health system is the basis for the ongoing possibility of being-meaningful by attending to the breakdown of Dasein's bodiliness which puts the possibility of being-meaningful at risk. For a visit to the doctor at the local clinic or even for significant surgery at the hospital the somatological contract generally works for all concerned. From the perspective of a Dasein entering a hospital this can be represented in the following diagram (Figure 37).



In this case, the collapsing of the understanding of Dasein into that of the body makes, for the most part, little difference. However, for many people, for example, when it comes to the chronic conditions associated with ageing the hospital can do no more, and so the person is transferred to a nursing home. The same basic health care model is applied with a simple shift in emphasis from a focus on repairing the body, primarily, to just tending to the body. The person, however, must put whatever

life they had in the world 'on hold' forever, there is no prospect of getting back in the world, only death. This can be seen in the diagram below (Figure 38).



Because of the collapsing of the understanding of Dasein into the body, the health system can understand itself as providing good quality care to the body and thus fulfilling its part of its somatological contractual obligation. However, the hidden nature of the somatological contract is that it is never ultimately about the care of the body, it is about being able to get on with one's life.

In the case of the nursing home, this somatological contract is broken. The failure is evident not only in the case of Marion Miller but in the results of more than half a century of quantitative and qualitative research and the current levels of untreated depression in nursing homes. The current state of the health discipline does not know how to deal with this failure, largely because it is blind to it and holds on to the view that it has honoured its contract. In so doing it fails to recognise that treating the body was never the basis of the somatological contract, it was the promise of getting on with one's life.

The various breakdowns of the body that leads to people moving into a nursing home are real and urgent. For the most part, if left unattended the person's existence will deteriorate along with that of the body. There is no easy answer. One thing, however, is clear, and that is the current model of nursing homes that are based primarily on the medical model and the tending to the body is insufficient. There is a need for good quality care, but there is also need to find a way that supports a person being-meaningful in spite the frailty of their body and as they approach the inevitable perishing of that body. It is time for a new understanding of what it is to be a person applied to the design and delivery of all aged care services and with

that new understanding a new contract formed. Until that time we are left with what are, perhaps, Marion Miller's final words as a social activist;

I never thought this would happen to me. If I'd known in time I would have done something about it. I hate to think beyond each day. And though there are worse places, the fact is that when it comes to institutional living, there is no good place. No good place. (Miller, 2003, p. 37)

Just as surely as history ended for the Crow when access to a world that held the possibilities for being-meaningful was denied, so to history, understood as the unfolding of the being-meaningful came to an end for Marion when she entered the nursing home.

This ends the inquiry into the meaning of 'shedding life'. The next section articulates a theory to account for this phenomenon.

CHAPTER 22: FINAL CHAPTER

Important to the understanding 'shedding life' and how it occurs is the concept of the individual Dasein as an emergent entity and I want to briefly revisit this topic before making some concluding remarks that summarise the work undertaken. Following these the thesis findings and theory are then stated, the main limitation identified and discussed and the primary recommendation for future research identified.

While the primary purpose of the following section is to emphasise the idea of the emergent character of the human person it also provides a very limited summary of the basic concept of shedding life as a disruption to one's living-environment. However, I do not attempt to summarise the main line of argument developed from the thesis here, that was provided in Chapter 2 which presented a detailed summary of my interpretation of Heidegger's work. The decision was taken, it may be recalled, to provide a combined summary and introduction at the beginning of the thesis because of the radical nature of Heidegger's work. The aim of this approach was to provide a preliminary 'sense of the whole' thesis to provide an overarching context in which to place the individual chapters. There is thus a certain circularity involved in the structure of this thesis, in that the end is folded back into the beginning.

The Person (Dasein) as an Emergent Entity

Shedding life, understood as a decline in the possibility of being engaged in the meaningful involvements that characterise one's self-understanding is only intelligible in the context of the dynamic structural character of the person Heidegger names as being-in-the-world. A person's ability-to-be a person as we understand the notion of a human person arises from the interaction between this structure and the world into which it is born. In effect what this means is that the human person, as a species, is extremely adaptable, being able to gain an understanding of itself and its world regardless of the diverse environments into which an individual person may be born. Whether it be an isolated village in Amazon jungle, the northern beaches of Sydney, the war-torn area of Syria or the West Bank of Paris a person will develop meaning for itself in the context of its environment. The human person, or Dasein, on my reading of Heidegger, is thus an emergent entity that will be defined by distinctive patterns of understanding and receptivities and contingent on

the circumstance of its birth and upbringing. While a human person may exhibit a certain degree of adaptability after it has grown into a culture, the evidence from the work of Perry and others suggests that there is a definite limit on the adaptability. By and large, then, the world in which a person develops a self-understanding is primarily the one that provides the possibilities for its ongoing existence. It must be remembered that it is not just anything in the world that is relevant to the person, but only that aspect which Heidegger calls the living environment. The living environment refers to the unity of potential involvements offered by the useful things and people that are meaningful for who the person is. This is disclosed by way of the structure Heidegger calls worldhood.

This process of becoming the individual person we experience our self to be is not mystical; it is a natural phenomenon associated with the structural processes of the human person founded on the biology of the body. However, the biology is not causally sufficient in and of itself to constitute the individual human person. That the biology is necessary but not sufficient is captured in Heidegger's comments concerning our memory and recall;

However, with all these statements, the phenomena of memory and recalling are not touched on. All these [chemical-physical] things are merely *conditions* for the emergence of the phenomenon. They are not *causes*, and surely not memory itself. [ZS 202]

Heidegger thus rejects the notion that the body is causally sufficient in and of itself to determine the individual human, rather it is the structural process that arises from the body, binding person to its world. This biological process occurs in such a way as to shape the development of the body itself as part of this constituting of the individual person. It is as though the development of the person is not completed until after it has encountered its living environment. This is the logical inference of the work of Bruce Perry and others concerning the research of abused and neglected children discussed in Chapter 20. In the chapter I argued that there is no need for a special theoretical model to explain what is happening to account for the adverse effects of being raised in deficient or malignant environments. Rather it is the natural biological structures (the biological equivalent to the philosophical terminology of ontological structures) that are operating as they should. There is no good or bad living environment from the perspective of the biological functioning, it utilises whatever is available. Recalling that the research in this field is finding that the brain develops in response to the encounters with the environment, this can be reframed from a Heideggerian perspective: The ontological processes of any

human person, constitute each individual through its interactions with the environment, and this constitution is reflected in the shaping of the physical structures of the body (e.g. brain) upon which the ongoing life of the person is expressed. In other words, there are fundamental aspects of who we are that are indelibly shaped by our early environment, and this was seen in the case study of Virginia and Laura as well as the research involving the Romanian orphans. From a biological perspective this would indicate the final development that determines the individual human person requires a living environment, the body is insufficient in and of itself. Heidegger takes this point and extends it even further arguing that as a human species all our various defining biological structures have developed in response to the way of being human. This view is stated in a passage from the *Zollikon Seminars*;

But the decisive point in our context is our insight into the immediate emergence of all of our so-called material, bodily nature from the physically intangible capacities for receiving-perceiving and for comporting oneself, in which our Da-sein in its unfolding essence consists. This insight allows us to grasp easily how immediately and how limitlessly all bodily nature belongs to the [human] way of existing and how it is, and remains, in this mode of *being* [*Seinsart*]. Therefore, this insight may also be called the fundamental philosophy of all psychosomatic medicine. [ZS 234]

There is implicit in this account of both the notion of emergence as well as what is termed 'downward causality' and his claim that the basic insight he refers to "may also be called the fundamental philosophy of all psychosomatic medicine" strongly reinforces this position. The insight Heidegger presents is of a complex relationship between the biological processes of the body constitutive of the person, the physical biological structures of the body upon which those processes are founded, the environment and the emergent character of the individual person. Heidegger is setting a direction for research that has yet to be explored from the perspective he is laying out. What is important for this thesis is only that part of his insight applicable to the emergent nature of the individual person.

There are three important implications for understanding the person as an emergent entity. The first is obvious, that the person is contingent on the character of the world into which it is born and as a consequence, at least to a certain degree, is constrained in its self-understanding (i.e. who it is) which is made manifest when taking up the possibilities for living a meaningful life in that world. Secondly, that a person's understanding and receptiveness is structural, i.e. it determinative of the person, and as such not accessible to the person's cognition and volition as

something that can switch on and off at a whim. Entities in the world *show up* for a human person as offering meaningful possibilities for living or they don't; this is not person's decision. This does not preclude the possibility of the person 'shaping' the future direction of what will be meaningful; this requires that the person work with the structure using their cognition and volition. Thirdly, if a human person is wrenched from its living environment and placed into a radically different one, then the possibility of the person living a meaningful life, is diminished because the possibilities of being engaged in things that matter to the person simply will not show up. Because this is a structural process it will be difficult for Dasein to overcome and because the structural process is founded on biological processes, such a dislocation will be manifested in the body. This manifestation may be as the felt experience of shedding life as in the case of Marion Miller, or the experience of hopelessness, depression and so on. While the mechanisms are not known the link between these events and the increased risk of a significant decline in well-being together with an increased risk of morbidity and mortality is now generally accepted in this field of research (discussed in Chapter 1). Put another way, being-meaningless, with no perceived hope of change, puts Dasein at risk of being unhappy, depressed, sick, and dying, i.e. shedding life. While Heidegger provides a structural analysis of this phenomenon, the Austrian psychiatrist Viktor Frankl came to the same conclusion from his observations and experiences imprisoned in the German concentration camps of World War II (discussed in Chapter 21). *It is my claim that these three implications of the emergent nature of Dasein account for the phenomenon of shedding life observed in nursing homes* by researchers, reformers and the accounts of residents such as Marion Miller.

There are other emergent entities described in *Being and Time*, i.e. world and the ready-to-hand. That these entities are emergent is not clear from this way this section of the thesis is written, albeit it is evident if one reads them from this perspective. This arose because my view of Dasein as an emergent entity did not develop until late in the thesis process and so was not applied to world and the ready-to-hand. In hindsight, it is now obvious that you cannot have Dasein as an emergent entity and not have world and the ready-to-hand as emergent entities. This does not detract from the analysis provided nor the conclusions concerning the aim of the thesis inquiry.

In Heidegger's analysis of world and worldhood, it is easy to miss this emergent

character and it only became evident for me when I understood the implication of his shifts from a description of world as an entity to the description of Dasein's involvement with the world on the basis of worldhood. When analysing Dasein's engagement with the world, Heidegger reaches a sudden and abrupt conclusion that "the structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the *worldhood* of the world." [BT 119/86]. Heidegger then very quickly moves on, and I have yet to find anywhere in his work where he develops and makes clear the dynamic relationship between worldhood as part of the structure of *Dasein* as an entity and as determinative of the separate entity world into which Dasein is born and raised. In that Dasein's worldhood is initially drawn from world there is thus a mutually sustaining structural relationship between Dasein and its world. Heidegger's observations concerning this are not unique and the reflexive nature of the relationship between people and their environments has been observed by others. For example, it is referred to by Winston Churchill when he remarked, on introducing the debate on the rebuilding of the House of Commons, destroyed in World War II by German bombing, "We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us." (Churchill(Prime Minister), 1943). This, of course, is the pre-ontological understanding of the phenomenon without the structural analysis provided by Heidegger.

Applying this insight to Heidegger's work, worlds emerge out of the practices of the people that are 'in the world' and in turn each 'new' individual person emerges from the worlds into which they have been born and raised, as discussed above. The result of this is that, once established, worlds tend to be self-organising and maintained through the dynamic collective cultural practices of the people in that world, what Heidegger calls the 'One' (refer Chapter 16). This concept, that human societies need no central controlling body, that it self-organises on the basis of interactions between the individual world members is now widely acknowledged as a common strategy accounting for various behaviours observed in other biological species(Davies, 2006a; Eldredge, Pievani, Serrelli, & Tëmkin, 2016; Feltz, Crommelinck, & Goujon, 2006). This should not be unexpected. In that the human Dasein is a species that has evolved as *a part of nature*, it is reasonable to assume that Dasein will exhibit evolutionary derived mechanisms similar to those found elsewhere in Nature, which by and large, determine its mode of receptivity and response to its environment. This is the very point Heidegger is referring to in the above quoted passage from the Zollikon Seminars. It is out of its species defining

mode of understanding, receptivity and behaviour that, collectively, Dasein is the structural basis for world and accounts for any specific ready-to-hand entities in a world coming into being (emerging) and pass away.²⁴⁵

Based on Heidegger's account, at the individual ontic level the material form which an entity takes (typically a design and manufacturing process), is a response to the underlying relational structure. As such it is the relational structure that determines what an entity *is*. This was evident in the discussions of entities such as the hammer in the earlier chapters. This is also the same principle discussed above and in Chapter 8 in relation to the animal organ. It is the failure to see the structure of the world and focus on the material form that Heidegger attributes to the tradition's mistaken understanding of being. Another important aspect of this approach is seen in Heidegger's method of inquiry. In that what determines the material is the underlying ontological structure, it is access to the structure that is important in understanding what an entity is, and not the material form. This is why, even though the biological structure of the person is not currently accessible Heidegger can basically ignore it (discussed in Chapter's 8 and 9). The common theme in all of this is emergence.

Heidegger does not name himself as an emergentist²⁴⁶, and this adds to the difficulty in understanding his approach. Even though *Being and Time* is clearly written against a materialist position, unless one has a sound and comprehensive grasp of the philosophical tradition, as Heidegger did, it is highly improbable that the family resemblance between Heidegger's approach and that other emergentists would be identified in his writing. Even then, the way Heidegger writes it is difficult to identify this perspective which may account for the absence of any discussion on emergence in the main commentaries on *Being and Time*.

²⁴⁵ The summary of Heidegger's work, presented in Chapter 2, was written after the completion of this chapter. In the summary I present Heidegger's work from the perspective of an emergent relational system and provide a discussion of this coming into being (emergence) and passing away of the ready-to-hand entities. Additionally, I introduce, in a cursory manner, the links between my interpretation of Heidegger and contemporary chaos and complexity theory, of which emergence is a part.

²⁴⁶ My interpretation of Heidegger as an emergentists came about as a result of my reading of his lectures on the Greeks. This initial view was not particularly well-formed and is still developing and consequently a detailed interpretation of Heidegger's work in the context of an emergentists framework is not reflected in the thesis. From this perspective it is also possible to identify a connection between Husserl's work on mereology and emergentist concepts. At the time I was not aware of any other writings that have developed this theme. However, I have recently identified a discussion linking Heidegger's account with an emergentist perspective in McDonough's book on *Being and Time*(McDonough, 2006). McDonough's approach is from a philosophical perspective and does not pursue the concept in any specific detail, whereas the initial origins of my perspective is from the work in science and the broader field of chaos and complexity theory.

One of the reasons for the lack of a clearer articulation of emergence in *Being and Time* may lie in the fact that Heidegger eschewed the idea of ‘worldviews’ or perspectives in his research work; it is contrary to his strict empiricist stance. As soon as one adopts a particular position (worldview) it is already framing the way observations are interpreted, i.e. worldviews carry with them embedded presuppositions. Heidegger’s approach is to make his observations, undertake the logical analysis and only take into consideration previously demonstrated results in arriving at his final interpretive descriptions. While this is acknowledged and accepted as part of his method, it should not have precluded, in my view, Heidegger from making his perspective a little more transparent in *Being and Time*, just as he does concerning the positions he argues against. There is no doubt that one can glean from various lecture courses, as I have indicated, Heidegger’s position. However, this work is contained in lecture courses, and at the time of the publication of *Being and Time*, there was no plan to publish these courses. Heidegger’s reasons for not making his overall approach clearer in *Being and Time* will probably never be known, just as his failure to adequately describe the use of prior work in such areas as intentionality and categorial intuition (refer Chapter 12 & 13) will remain a puzzle. Unfortunately, even for professional philosopher, *Being and Time*, as a standalone account of Heidegger’s research, is almost impenetrable. I think this point is well made in the thesis, and it accounts for why it takes so much work to extract from his work a understanding of his project as a logically consistent unity.

While the concept of emergentism is not new, in that it goes back to the Greeks, for most of the Western tradition it has, by and large, been ignored and it is only relatively recently that it has been the subject of renewed interest. By way of a reminder the three main characteristics that define this approach are firstly, that things in nature arise as a result of the workings of nature itself, secondly, that what emerges has characteristics that cannot be explained by reference to the material parts, and thirdly, that things emerge which are other than physical, e.g. emotions, culture and so on²⁴⁷. All these are present in Heidegger’s work. The recent publication of numerous books in the last decade specifically dealing with emergence is a reflection of the growing interest²⁴⁸ and the opening lines of the

²⁴⁷ This third point is based on the strong emergentist claim.

²⁴⁸ I have accessed just a small range of the available books (Bedau & Humphreys, 2008; Cahoon, 2013; Clayton & Davies, 2006; Eldredge, Pievani, Serrelli, & Tëmkin, 2016; English, 2017; Feltz, Crommelinck, & Goujon, 2006; Humphreys, 2016; Wimsatt, 2007)

preface from a book of readings on emergence edited by Bedau and Humphreys sums up the current position;

Thirty years ago emergence was largely ignored in philosophy and science. Its ethos ran counter to the reductionist views of the time, and it seemed to invoke mystical and unexplainable levels of reality. Things have changed. Emergence is now one of the liveliest areas of research in both science and philosophy. (Bedau & Humphreys, 2008, p. ix)

However, notwithstanding the growing interest in emergence as a field of interest this should not be taken to suggest it reflects the mainstream view, it has a long way to go for this to be the case. Interpreting Heidegger's account of the human person as an emergent entity thus suffers from a twofold burden, firstly it sits within the minority account of entities, i.e. it is not a materialist account, and secondly, it is not a common interpretation of Heidegger.

The account of Heidegger's work in this thesis provides a cohesive and accessible framework for making sense of the human person as a part of its world. The thesis is breaking new ground by taking an emergent understanding of Dasein and applying and demonstrating how it is applicable, as Heidegger intended, to a range of scientific fields (refer Chapter 11). More specifically, albeit the genesis of the thesis lies in the phenomenon of shedding life within a nursing home, it has been demonstrated that this is a structural phenomenon with far wider applicability. The nursing home is but one circumstance in which shedding life is likely to occur.

Penultimate Remarks

The primary approach I have taken is to accept Heidegger's statement that Division I of *Being and Time* is an account of describing the ontological structure of the human person (Dasein) in our average everydayness. From this perspective, I took the view that if the various phenomena he is observing and describing can be brought into view it should be possible to 'experience' or at least reflect on similar experiences associated with the phenomena. If I could do this, then it would provide phenomenal support for the interpretation. This was the basis of the methodology that I developed. Based on this approach, at various stages thought experiments and illustrative examples from other fields are used to help shift the thesis from merely a descriptive account of Heidegger's work to one that presented opportunities for 'testing' the various phenomena. These included the exercises developed as part of Chapter 13 to bring to the fore the key claim that when we see

something 'as' something that our understanding is projecting meaning. (This is the important lesson Heidegger takes from Husserl's work on categorial intuition). In Chapter 16 on culture and Dasein-with, I developed the case study around Jesse and Frank James as a way to see how even people show up differently based on our projected understanding. Additionally, scattered throughout the thesis are smaller examples that I have drawn upon from my own life. I have carefully investigated the important concepts of intentionality and categorial intuition that Heidegger adapts and builds on, but which lay outside of *Being and Time* and then carefully followed Heidegger's strict empiricist approach as he analyses and discloses the structures of the ready-to-hand, world and Dasein. On this basis, I believe that my interpretation of the Dasein analytic is not only consistent with Heidegger's but also now reflects my own understanding. I now stand beside Heidegger holding the same phenomenon in 'view', notwithstanding that my view is not as yet as sharp and well defined as that of Heidegger's!

My view was, however, that even though the interpretation of Dasein may be reasonable Heidegger's claim as to the broad applicability of his Dasein analytic to the various sciences (Refer Chapter 11) needs to be 'tested'. If this held up, then the 'model' that Heidegger is describing has, potentially more explanatory power than the current materialist model, based on the person as a physically based, rational, self-sufficient agent in the world. This 'testing' was undertaken in Chapter 20. I readily acknowledge that what I have undertaken in this chapter is more by way of a rough 'proof of concept' and certainly needs far more robust follow-up. However, I am satisfied that Dasein's analytic lived up to Heidegger's expectations to the extent that it was 'tested'. In the area of history, it revealed that taking one's own value judgements or contemporary cultural understanding of being human to a period of history does not disclose the conditions that lead to those particular defining characteristics of that period of history, e.g. the black lynchings in the US post-emancipation. Rather taking a perspective of the 'One' and researching the embedded cultural practices, both societal and local, is more likely to reveal the conditions that lead to the culturally sanctioned murders. Only in this way can understanding be disclosed that reveals the basis by which African Americans showed up as 'lynchable', or Pakistani daughters showed up as needing to be killed. This is a different approach to understanding history. Additionally, several approaches to history were also reviewed and the conclusion reached was that, at least in some quarters, there is a move to understand the 'Other' based on

receptivities and not theories based on humans as rational, self-interested decision-making agents. From a Heideggerian perspective, it was argued that these approaches are more likely to disclose the world of the 'Other' in a more intelligible way and provide the basis for appropriate actions based on those disclosures.

Case studies in the area of child development were also examined from the perspective of children raised in abusive or neglectful environments. The application of the Dasein analytic was consistent with the findings; however, there was an unexpected finding. Perry has developed what he calls the traumagenic neurodevelopmental model to help explain what happens to very young children exposed to deficient environments. My conclusion was that a separate model for child development is not necessary²⁴⁹. The dynamic structure of Dasein's being is, even in these cases, performing as it should. Dasein is gaining an understanding of being-meaningful in its environment, even if that environment is suboptimal for 'normal' development. From a policy and research perspective, this shifts the focus from the "traumagenic neurodevelopmental" which is the consequence, to a focus on the environment which is the primary contributing factor. The clear message of this work was that environments matter.

The area of depression in nursing homes was also discussed and evidence provided that even at mild levels depression is associated with a significant decline in wellbeing. Evidence was also discussed that depression was associated with significant increases in the risk of morbidities and mortalities. This evidence is consistent with the emergent model of Dasein and its founded relationship with the body. Two opposing models of depression were discussed, the disease and the social or environmental model. While initially in favour of the social model, by applying the Dasein analytic it was possible to reconcile both within the one model. In that Dasein is linked to its environment suggests that changes in the environment are associated with the onset of depression, however, that Dasein is founded on the body means that this should show up as a change in the body, this is the origins of the 'chemical imbalance' disease theory. There are, however, other aspects to consider, for example, an injury may bring on the conditions for depression to 'dampen' one's desire to be involved and thus assist healing. This is speculative

²⁴⁹ Perry's work has been of significant value. This claim is not to invalidate the Perry model, but simply to suggest that the traumatic impacts can be modelled *within* a broader model of Dasein, and not as a stand-alone model.

but is suggestive that loss of access to an environment can arise from a break down in the body itself. The research on the effectiveness of medication is revealing in that it suggests that it is only of minimal benefit and only then in more severe cases. This further suggests that the far more influential factor is associated with a sense of being-meaningful. The model provided by the Dasein analytic opens up avenues for researching this field that hitherto have not been robustly explored.

There were other examples used throughout the thesis, for example, a case of honour killing in Pakistan which was explored from the perspective of the power of the 'One' and the circumstances of the Crow people facing the daunting task of disclosing a new world in which being-meaningful as a Crow was intelligible. While these cases were used to explore particular aspects of Dasein's structure, applied more generally the Dasein analytic helps to disclose a new way of understanding these situations.

In Chapter 3 I set out the methodology for the thesis which I labelled a discursive Heideggerian inquiry. It had two stages, firstly to acquire an understanding of the structure of Dasein using Heidegger as a guide, and secondly to apply that understanding so as to disclose the meaning of 'shedding life', which was revealed as the decline in the possibility of being-possible or being-meaningful. These two aspects are clearly evident both in the thesis and in summary in the above discussion. As part of this methodology, Heidegger's three parts of the phenomenological method were also followed. There was a turn away from the physical presence of the entity towards its way of being (reduction), the identification of ways of thinking that impeded access to an understanding of being (destruction), these were, when identified, marked with ϕ , and finally, new understandings were developed (construction) which are presented in the thesis. The discursive character of the thesis is reflected in the extent of the work undertaken to investigate, disclose and report on all material aspects associated with the inquiry, even, for example, to frequently pursuing alternative German translations to ensure that a proper grasp was achieved of Heidegger's descriptive accounts.

From work done in accordance with the thesis methodology, I have reached the view that the Dasein analytic is both a reasonable and a plausible account of what it is to be a human person. Based on this account and informed by Heidegger's discussions on death it was possible to reach a substantive finding in relation to the thesis inquiry.

The thesis aim was to reach an understanding of shedding life and from that to articulate a theory to account for this phenomenon. A formal response to the first part *is that shedding life is a demising of Dasein's existence understood as a decline in the possibilities of being possible*. The articulation of a theory is presented in the next section.

Theory of Life-Environment Disruption

In Chapter 1 the basic elements that must be addressed by a theory to account for shedding-life associated with a relocation to a nursing home were set out as follows:

- takes seriously the concept of the person (or self) as an entity,
- that in some way links self and the life-environment in some dependent way, such that,
- a disruption to the access of possibilities in the life-environment results in a disruption to the self; and finally
- posits a relationship between the self and the body such that disruptions in the life-environment flow through as adverse consequences experienced both psychologically and somatically.



These points were drawn from observations of the phenomena as reported in the literature, my own experience and from what Heidegger calls a pre-ontological understanding. Such an understanding reflects an intuitive insight into the problem but is not based on a detailed understanding of the structure of the person, i.e. based on an understanding of what a person is, in other words an ontological understating.

While it would be possible to posit a theory to account for shedding-life without a proper ontological understanding this would lead to the possibility of the theory being inadequate and wrongly grounded. This has been explored and discussed throughout the thesis. That seventy years of research has failed to explain the phenomenon of shedding-life is an example of the problems involved in moving from observed phenomena to research, to explanation if the work is not adequately grounded.

Heidegger's approach is both deceptively simple and remarkably hard to grasp at the same time. It is hard in that it is founded on an approach that is outside the typical way our culture formalises its understanding what things *are*. It is easy, at least conceptually, in that once one looks at things from the different perspective described by Heidegger it is a matter of trusting one's empirical observations and

ability to think things through in a logical manner. This is evident concerning the phenomenon of shedding-life. The answer has been in front of us all the time, in the form of the various reports and accounts associated with people's life environments changing. Because the dominant thinking in the culture understands people as self-sufficient entities, the problem is framed as not being in the environment but in the person, as most likely psychological and related to a person's failure to adapt. This is often reflected in the responsibility for problem being situated with the person and reflected in comments typically heard in nursing homes such as "If only Mum (or Dad) would get out of their room."

Based on Heidegger's research the basic structure of the person can be abstracted to a model of how the person understands, perceives and responds to its environment. This was shown in Figure 33 at the beginning of Chapter 21. This figure puts in pictorial form the concept that one's meaningful life is experienced in the ongoing flow of making choices to be engaged with people (on the basis of solicitude) and with useful things (on the basis of concerned dealings) that are understood as being significant (i.e. they matter) to the person. If the things that are significant in a person's life are removed, then there is a cascading effect as represented in Figure 39. Once the possibilities are removed then meaningful choices no longer show up, and this removes the possibility of meaningful activities. However, this is not going to be experienced by the person as a 'crossing out' or a removal, but simply as a nothing meaningful. There will be an absence in terms of choice and so nothing worth (i.e. nothing meaningful) being engaged with. This is represented in Figure 40.



The things that the person encounters in the world will still have a certain intelligibility, it's just nothing shows up as worth engaging with. The diagrams represents an extreme case, but it is easy to imagine a phased situation in which most things holding meaning gradually disappear.

Heidegger accepts that a person can take conscious steps to change their relationship with the world such that a new sense of meaningful existence can be developed. This possibility for deliberate change is part of his analysis associated with a person gaining a genuine insight into who they are and living an authentic life. This part of his work is covered in Division 2 of *Being and Time* and is outside the scope of the thesis. This task is, however not easy. Within psychology there are now widely accepted therapeutic approaches based on Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT)²⁵⁰ that are designed to help people 'adjust' in a positive manner to the living environment primarily by addressing how people 'think' and 'feel' about things. Even if CBT could be used to help adjust to the nursing home environment, there are a number of challenges. Firstly, it requires the assistance of trained therapists, secondly it can take many months in dealing with issues such as depression and thirdly in the case of a nursing home the question is, "Adjust to what?". In the community CBT may be able to help a person reorientate to the world in a positive way in terms of recognising meaningful involvements, but, from the perspective of a 'resident' what would meaningful involvements look like in a nursing home? Given the extensive rates of depression evident among older people in nursing homes (estimated as in excess of 60%, refer discussion Chapter 20), Even if it were possible to make the sterile life environment of the nursing home show up as meaningful for older people, it is hardly feasible to have mass CBT interventions to address the problem.

Heidegger's research addresses the first three points of a required theory, and this is summarised in the above diagrams. The last point, the connection, between disruption to the life-environment and an increased risk in morbidities and mortality is not based on the ontological structure of Dasein, but rather the link between Dasein and its body. As discussed in the thesis this link is not well understood and while Heidegger accepts the link he does not explore it in any detail. The connection between a disruption to the living environment and the body was discussed from a

²⁵⁰ From a Heideggerian perspective I take CBT as operating at the structural level of the person, not the psychological content of the person's mind.

number of perspectives all of which are sufficient to posit the association sufficient for the development of a theory, satisfying the final point. A theory to account for shedding-life can now be articulated:

The *Theory of Life-Environment Disruption* states that if a person's access to the activities which constitute their meaningful existence is disrupted then, they are at risk of increased psychological and somatic illness and death. The source, character and duration of the disruption will have differing impacts on the risk for each individual person contingent on what constitutes a meaningful life for the person.

The theory of life-environment disruption is grounded in the ontological structure of the person which is its fundamental strength. In terms of its applicability as a theory within the human sciences its general structure satisfies the basic criteria for a theory: it has explanatory power, it has logical consistency with observed empirical observations, it has the potential for general predictive powers, it provides a means to identify factors which can be controlled to influence outcomes, and it is verifiable/testable. The explanatory aspects and the logical consistency with the observed phenomenon has been demonstrated within the thesis. Because of the variability of life-environments and of people's self-understanding more work is required in order to refine the predictive capacity of the theory. One approach would be to identify circumstance of radical adverse changes in environments and monitor the incidents of harm arising before, during and after living in that environment, e.g. in relation to immigration detention centres. Other opportunities for research exist by conducting longitudinal studies of older people in terms of their accessibility to meaningful involvements as their physical frailty increases and as they move through different phases of aged care support services. The testing of the theory in terms of the association between meaningful involvements and morbidities can be carried out in a number of ways. For example, one approach would be to provide interventions that change the character of meaningful involvements for participants within an existing nursing home and monitor the outcomes for people. A practical and useful approach will probably be in the development of an individual screening tool that identifies the potential risks of moving into a new living environment. This was behind the idea of the example of environmental mapping, and the Daisy Diagram applied to the Marion Miller case study (Chapter 21).

Like most nascent theories with potentially broad applicability it is recognised that

further work needs to be done to refine and test the theory in its various applications. Notwithstanding this the theory is the first significant response to the call made by Danermark and Ekström back in 1990 (Danermark & Ekström, 1990) (discussed in Chapter 1) for a theory that could be used to help break out of the cul-de-sac the research field has found itself. This call was one of the main provocations for undertaking this thesis.

In that the development of a theory to account for the phenomenon of shedding life was the primary goal of the thesis, the *Theory of Life-Environment Disruption* satisfies that goal.

Thesis Limitations

The primary limitation of the thesis is the possible misinterpretation of Heidegger's work and a misunderstanding of the structure of Dasein. This was addressed by an approach that used Heidegger's work not as the primary entity to be interpreted but as a guide to my understanding of Dasein. At each critical step, Heidegger's descriptions were clarified and tested against my own experience and analysis. By the end of the thesis, there was no material discrepancy between Heidegger's descriptions and my own understanding, as far as I am aware. However, there is always room for error. As a check I also applied the results of the Dasein structural analysis in a number of situations, the analysis was not only consistent with the situations examined but provided new insights. In that the only main alternative to the 'model' provided by the Dasein analytic is one based on a materialist account, my conclusion is that even if not entirely definitive it is a significant advance on the existing model, demonstrates theoretical parsimony and has broad applicability in terms of its explanatory capacity.

Future Research & Policy Implications

Throughout the thesis, I have identified future research possibilities in a diverse range of areas arising out of the Dasein analytic, and so I will not repeat them here.

While the *Theory of Life-Environment Disruption* as an account of the phenomenon of shedding-life has broad applicability the genesis of the thesis arose out of a specific concern in relation to nursing homes and it is to this focus I return.

The conclusion of the thesis is that nursing homes are designed and run on a flawed

understanding of being human. This is reflected in the misapplication of the medical model somatological contract, suited mainly for primary and acute health care (Chapter 21). The relational nature of person means that in a significant number of cases the move to a nursing home as they are currently typically run will result in shedding life which will be manifested in an increase in morbidities and mortalities, most commonly depression. A consequence, while nursing homes strive to provide good quality care of the body, they are ultimately failing in this goal as a result of the iatrogenic effect of the living environment provided by the nursing home. Shedding life will also be experienced as a loss of meaning in terms of one's life and a decline in experienced wellbeing and if the aim of nursing homes is to enhance a person's quality of life, then they are failing in this area as well.

The failure is a substantial one. The most current figures available indicate that in OECD countries there are currently in excess of 7,000,000 older people in nursing home (OECD.Stat, 2018; Wilson, Brow, & Playfair, 2017). Based on the available Australian and USA figures there is a prevalence rate of depression well in excess of 50% among older people living in nursing homes²⁵¹. We don't know how much of this depression is addressable by changing the living environment. We don't know what the correlation rates are between depression and mortality and other morbidities in nursing homes, yet we do know that such correlations are reported in the literature for other populations. We don't know the correlation between a decline in reported wellbeing and depression in nursing homes, but where reported in other populations we know it is significant. We do know that depression is underdiagnosed and undertreated in nursing homes. Using depression as a crude proxy for shedding life the numbers of people experiencing harm in nursing homes worldwide is staggering. If, as the *Theory of Life-Environment Disruption*, suggests that these depression levels are associated with a disruption in the life environment, then it points to a way to first better understand the phenomenon, but also to respond to it. This is the most immediate policy and practice implication of the theory. As Lieberman indicated over forty years ago it is a matter of "humanitarian interest" (Lieberman, 1969, p. 330).

While maintaining the necessary health care, new ways need to be found in providing meaning for people as *they* understand themselves, notwithstanding the

²⁵¹ This paragraph is a summary of the discussion presented in Chapter 21.

perishing of the body. This is a challenging and demanding task if the community is to respond in a compassionate manner that takes seriously the concept of the wellbeing of the person. The alternative is to continue unchanged and risk seriously damaging the very person that nursing homes have been established to serve.

This ends my thesis.

APPENDIX 1: MY BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION

In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of my aged care background and motivation for the thesis. The overview commences from the point that I enter the domain of nursing homes, with my appointment to Adelaide Central Mission in 1988. Before this, I was a Chartered Accountant working in both public practice and for commercial organisations. As the aim is to provide context, it is not a historical account but rather of the sort one may find in an interview.

Adelaide Central Mission

Adelaide Central Mission²⁵² (ACM) is one of the largest social service organisations in Australia and part of the Uniting Church. When I joined it had around 700 paid staff and five hundred volunteers, ran over forty community programmes including counselling services (e.g. family counselling, Lifeline), services for people who were homeless, disability programmes and, of relevance for this thesis, both residential and community aged care services. My initial appointment was as the Corporate Services Manager, and two years later I was appointed Chief Executive Officer.

The economic and political environment was at the start of the rational economic reform process, and associated with this, numerous challenges arose as the State and Federal Governments moved rapidly to a contracting and compliance mode of funding for social services²⁵³ moving away from the traditional grant or block funding models. It was during this period that Australia saw the first of a new wave of major reforms in the aged care sector with changes in funding towards a uniform approach across Australian with significant increases in quality compliance obligations.

The late 1970s and 1980s had seen a significant push for reform in the delivery of services for people with disabilities resulting in the progressive move from large scale intuitions to, predominantly, a group home model based in the community. The rationale for the reforms was that institutions were causing the people with disability significant harm and denying them a chance of experiencing a reasonable

²⁵² Now known as Uniting Communities (refer <http://www.unitingcommunities.org/>).

²⁵³ The approach was to establish quasi markets for the delivery of social services and together with this was the policy of separating the functions of service funding, service purchasing (on the government side) and service provision (on the community side) typically known as the purchaser-provider split, i.e. to set up 'customers' and 'suppliers'.

quality of life as part of the community. One of the intellectual forces behind the reforms was Wolf Wolfensberger (1934-2011) an American academic psychologist who was also lobbying strongly for reform in the nursing home industry. In the mid-1980s ACM did not have residential services for people with disabilities, but the rationale behind the reforms in the disability sector did not escape the attention of the Senior Executive responsible for ACM's nursing homes, Tim Horsnell. ACM had traditional style nursing homes based on an institutional model with multi-bed wards, reflective of the era. Tim saw the applicability of the issues raised concerning people with disabilities to the people living in nursing homes and became the initial driving force for reform within ACM.

ACM was steeped in the tradition of Methodist social justice but was not without its blind spots. However, on realising the inherent injustice of the nursing home model, with the full support of the Mission Superintendent, Rev Ivor Bailey, and the board Tim lead a significant reform program. The reform process had two main thrusts firstly changing the built environment and secondly establishing community-based aged care programmes to keep people out of nursing homes in the first place. Brian Kidd, a Melbourne architect, had pioneered group home building designs for people with disabilities and he was engaged to assist in designing and building a new style of nursing home. Kidd's approach was to design and construct nursing homes that had the look and feel of residential homes and were enabling in design, supporting rather than exacerbating the frailties of a person. While ACM had an initial attempt at a new style nursing home, the breakthrough experiment was a small cluster of three self-contained homes, each of just eight bedrooms with ensuite, kitchen, dining room, lounge room and a separate room for private family meetings and meals. From the street, they were indistinguishable from other suburban homes. They were opened in 1988, not long after I joined ACM. This was a radical change to the institutional looking, large scale designs of traditional nursing homes built for the efficiency of service delivery and not for living a life. Simply put the design prioritised the understood needs of the people who were to live there, and only then were the corporate functional and efficiency requirements considered. The pervading ethos was to provide an environment that focused on enabling the person to live as normal a life as possible. This inversion of priority was revolutionary.

ACM was among the first in Australia to place a priority on providing community-based in-home care services to older people and designed several innovative

programmes, negotiating funding to trial these new forms of service delivery²⁵⁴. The idea was simple, supporting people in their own home was a far better option for most people than living in an institution. The initiatives were driven by a deep sense of social justice that permeated ACM at the time, and this meant not just becoming aware of the adverse circumstances of people created by social and community structures but once aware working to address them. This is encapsulated in a paper by Horsnell and Fopp delivered at a conference at the time. Many people then, and still do, encourage, older people with frailties to enter a nursing home, but as Horsnell and Fopp observe;

Moving to a residential community is tantamount to shedding belongings which form an integral part of one's life. The process of growing old can be likened to the layers of an onion which are slowly but surely peeled; every time another move is made fewer cherished possessions can be taken. A lifetime, and the reminders of it, become flotsam and jetsam. A lifetime is squeezed into a small unit or contracted to a room number, or a quasi-patient or a potential patient.

... Fitting into residential services requires adapting to a new regimen, organizational timetables must be adhered to, staff become custodians, privacy is intruded upon, rules are made by others, and friends and family are less accessible. Consequently, at least for some, horizons diminish, residents become less active and more isolated. ... Such is the intensity of their estrangement from the community, that ... they appear to suffocate in their security ... (Horsnell & Fopp, 1988, pp. 30-1)

The similarities to what Horsnell and Fopp were describing from the late 1980s to the experience described by Marion Miller in 2003 are painfully obvious. The intervening years, the ongoing reforms, the shift into a new century have all occurred, and one has to wonder if there has been any fundamental change in mind set or just a surface change in building design to make them more attractive, more marketable. However, that is getting ahead of things.

ACM funded the rebuilding program mainly from its own funds. The new nursing homes were innovative both in terms of architectural and interior design, moving away from traditional medical ward models to facilities that were designed to present more with the look and feel of a large home both internally and from the street. The philosophy was predicated based on creating a home in which people lived and were supported rather than a building which gave every indication of one where patients, sick people, were treated and looked after. There was a strong view that

²⁵⁴ A brief account of this is contained in Horsnell and Fopp's 1988 article *Housing for the Elderly: Confronting Some Planning Issues* (Horsnell & Fopp, 1988)

how people felt about themselves and responded could be influenced by the built environment and we wanted the environment to create the sense of a person living in their home, not a patient in a medical institution. The approach also valued and held in high regard appropriate nursing and personal care; it was just that this should not be the dominant focus of an environment. I coined the term 'prosthetic services' to indicate that care services should help you get on with your life but in doing so the services should be provided as invisibly and with as little impediment to one's life as possible; not dissimilar to the aims of any prosthetic device. The new facilities ACM built were a radical innovation not just by Australian standards but internationally, and both Kidd and Horsnell spoke at conferences both nationally and internationally concerning the innovative designs and the thinking behind it²⁵⁵.

ACM also invested in changing its service approach based on Wolfensberger's work in disability services known as Social Role Valorization²⁵⁶, then called Normalisation. When I joined ACM, I quickly embraced the social justice perspective, and when Horsnell left not long after my appointment, I took over as the main driver for continuing the reform. This took the form of new building projects incorporating learnings from the earlier work, significantly expanding the community services, moving day care and therapy services from the aged care site to various locations within the community and re-engineering older and developing newer forms of social support for older people to help maintain them in their existing homes. The driving ethos was that just because an older person was frail or had developed a chronic condition should not mean that they had to surrender living a meaningful life. In other words, the focus was always how to design care services around maintaining the person's sense of quality of life rather than first prioritising the quality of care, with little attention to the quality of life. It is an approach I still maintain.

The role of CEO demanded a heavy time commitment. The Government economic reform agenda was rolling out, and with more than forty programs we were

²⁵⁵ Horsnell and Kidd were invited to and gave an address at the International Conference on Housing and Servicing for the Ageing, held in Jerusalem, Israel, in 1987 titled *A Story from Down Under: Nursing-homes or Nursing Hospital? - Changing the Image of Nursing-homes*.

²⁵⁶ It was previously called *Normalisation* to reflect delivering services based on the norms of the culture. However, the name was often mistaken to be referring to treating people with disabilities as normal, i.e. like full able body people. Wolfensberger recognised that to do so would be to entrench societal practices rather than changing them to enable and support people with disabilities. He made the change to Social Role Valorization as a neologism to try to stave off existing presuppositions around service delivery and attitudes (Wolfensberger, 1972, 2003)

continually facing the challenge of tendering or re-tendering for services, addressing new contractual compliance requirements, ensuring that we maintained effective relationships with the Government and so on. ACM had a strong public advocacy role that accompanied its social justice view of the world, and this work often fell to the CEO, and with a new climate of lower taxes, cost cutting to community and welfare support services, and so forth this aspect of the role became more demanding. Sadly, I became more remote from the day to day running of the aged care service, albeit not losing the zeal for ensuring the reform process continued. Reform was never the responsibility of just one person, and there was a brilliant team of managers at ACM full of enthusiasm and keen to push boundaries all equally driven by a sense of social justice and the desire to support people live their life as well as possible. Despite the challenges, it was an exciting time, in addition to service provision and we were able to significantly increase monetary resources through various initiatives which freed up our ability to innovate in a wide range of areas, not just aged care. The period, however, took its toll and after a decade as CEO, in 2000, it was time to step down.

Reflections

Notwithstanding my deep concern for improving the lives of people, I came to realise that the understanding that underlaid that concern was inadequate. Additionally, my approach to running the nursing homes, while innovative for its time was still tainted by a managerial mindset with too much focus on operational indicators, financial performance, and meeting compliance standards. These aspects are crucial, fail them, and ACM would cease operating, but the need to implement these changes took their toll regarding culture change.

While I was driven by my sense of social justice and the injustices I perceived, which were real enough, my understanding of what it was like to experience living in an aged care facility was, if I am honest, impoverished. I also became troubled by what became the apparent limitations of an architectural approach. The designs themselves were successful, more so than we had hoped with people reporting feeling more 'at home' in them and with the frequency of family visits increasing. As one family member noted, it is easier to visit because they don't feel as guilty about having their parent in a nursing home. While we paid much attention to the architecture, the interior design, awareness raising among staff, getting rid of institutional markers such as rigid uniforms and so forth we did not pay sufficient

attention, mainly out of ignorance, to the sustainability of the culture, to the embedded mundane practices that sustain and define any culture regardless of the changes in appearances. As some of the original senior staff left and with staff turnover, the replacement staff brought with them the 'external' cultural mindset. More rapidly than I would have imagined, the insidious creeping return of an "institutional" mindset occurred, just in a fancy new building. There was even a strong push to bring back uniforms, complete with the necessary differentiation to identifying nursing 'rank' and role. It became apparent to me that permanently changing the traditional institutional nature of nursing homes would require more than changes to architectural design, more than raising staff awareness, more than the introduction of 'respectful dialogue', 'autonomy', 'choice' and so forth, concepts which seem to be superficial in their application within aged care. The more I reflected, the more I understood that the reform process had to go much deeper.

Strathcare

I was appointed as CEO of Strathcare, a smaller Tasmanian Uniting Church aged care organisation in 2001. Operating solely in the aged care domain enabled me to have a single focus and be a lot closer to the people. My conviction remained that architecture counted as did the possibility of such things as meaningful engagement, independence and choice but these were tempered by a sense of unease that they were not sufficient nor properly understood. It was this deeper understanding that I pursued at Strathcare, and over the next couple of years, my life changed forever as I acquired and lost not residents but friends living in the facilities. With the generous help of a few people, I gained a deeper insight into the experience of living in a nursing home.

The pressures on a CEO and senior managers in a medium size aged care facility was just as relentless as in ACM. A new round of reforms was announced in the late 1990s introducing more demanding monitoring, and compliance requirements as well as new building certification requirements. The introduction of these reforms was still having an impact when I started with Strathcare. Additionally, during this period the Government announced further changes to funding²⁵⁷, which proposed a radically changing in the way nursing homes were to be funded. Not surprisingly

²⁵⁷ The funding system is referred to as ACFI which stands for Aged Care Funding Instrument. It was subsequently introduced and still provides the framework for funding today.

this was causing the sector considerable concern. At the time, I was President of the non-profit peak body of aged care providers in Tasmania²⁵⁸ and involved in the consultations with Government. Strathcare ran four mainly high care nursing homes and as such had limited access to capital funds via resident bonds (effectively refundable loans) which could only be charged to people moving into a low care facility²⁵⁹. The organisation had two relatively modern facilities, one designed, coincidentally, by Brian Kidd and a large older facility for which a new building programme had commenced. Sadly, the newly commenced building program was a return to a large institutional design, long corridors with a primary focus on the efficiency of services, its one redeeming focus was the emphasis of single rooms with ensuites.

Before I arrived, a couple of the existing managers had already embraced the idea of reforming the way aged care was delivered in their facilities and had commenced introducing changes, and I am sure that our initial conversations were just as much a combination of relief and excitement for them as it was for me. Following some discussions, the team started to introduce some wonderful innovative work pushing the boundaries of our understanding and the way we worked with people living in the facilities.

The changed approach revolved around key principles we developed, for example, one simple principle was to reimagine the boundaries of each facility as porous such that it invited a flow of activity between the broader community and the community within. We discussed this with as many residents and family members as we could and encouraged them to come up with ideas. The residents' committee at one facility, Strathglen, suggested allowing the facilities meeting areas to be used by the adult education organization that ran short vocational and recreational based courses. This was done, and several courses were run within the facility and attended by both community members and people living there! Another innovation at this facility was the recording of an hour long public radio program by people living in the facility with the help of a volunteer that was aired each week on a local public radio station. This continued until the University of Tasmania lobbied to take over the public radio license and once successful they declined to continue the program.

²⁵⁸ Aged & Community Services Tasmania.

²⁵⁹ It was to be more than a decade before the Government introduced bonds into high care nursing homes.

Following an earlier successful community arts project that I had established at Strathglen, I worked to set up a much larger and broader community arts program centred at Strathaven. This eventually involved the active involvement of over three hundred people coming from Strathcare, other aged care organizations and older people and volunteers from across the community. On the surface, the project was aimed at supporting the existing or easily acquirable skills of people, knitting! This, however, was not the typical knitting of scarves, squares or beanies. At a deeper level, the aim was to open the space between nursing home and community in a way involving cooperation and participation between the people living at Strathcare and others and in so doing create a project driven by the residents that would be seen as having high value by the community at large. The result was the development of *The Knitting Room* (albeit it should be the Knitting house!) which was the creation of an art installation from hand knitted craft work. The following photographs are some samples of the knitted art work from the exhibition at the Moonah Art Centre.

On completion, after two years of work, the installation went on public display at the Moonah Arts Centre in May 2006 breaking all attendance records at the time for an art exhibition at the Centre with over 12,000 visitors during the four-week display period. Many of the pieces were then featured on ABC television in their short promotional pieces for a few weeks, and the ABC flew a container full of the art works to display at their Sydney Ultimo ABC offices as part of their fifty-year celebrations²⁶⁰.

Throughout the project the impact on the lives of people involved was palpable, and one could often observe changes in demeanour, dress, the conversations and a sense of achievement in being part of creating something special. One morning I walked into Strathaven and near the door sat an elegant lady, dressed to the nines. She simply said that she was interviewed by a journalist about the Knitting Room the day before, had her photo and story in the paper and she was ready for autographs. Her face was lit up with a wide smile of delight and fun!

²⁶⁰ A basic overview of the project is available, and photographs can be accessed at <http://www.unitingagewell.org/Pages/The-Knitting-Room.aspx> and <http://www.abc.net.au/cgi-bin/common/printfriendly.pl?http://www.abc.net.au/tasmania/stories/s1212449.htm>. The descriptions, however, miss the import of the project both in terms of its motivating factor and the impact on the lives of people.



Photograph 11 Knitting Room photograph collage 1
(author's archive photo)



Photograph 12 Knitting Room photograph collage 2
(author's archive photo)

The entire project was achieved with minimal funding, an incredible team of volunteers and support from many staff. The project aimed to create a space where



people living in the facilities were in control, the nursing home boundaries collapsed, to focus on working with and extending people's abilities, to engaging in meaningful and high valued activities and

celebration. I appointed Robin Carney as the project coordinator to work with our team. Robyn, an arts graduate, quickly grasped the ethos behind the project and saw the participants as people co-creating the installation, not as 'frail old people in need of care'. Robin was an outstanding leader, and helped to provide an open, inviting, and supportive environment in which everybody's contribution was welcomed and valued that the project was so successful. This and other projects went on to win several national awards which further enhanced the esteem of the people living in the Strathcare community. It must be remembered that these were 'high care' aged care facilities.

I mention the Knitting Room project because it contains many of the elements that we were developing as part of a new and, for the time, progressive service model within nursing homes. Our general approach was based on a concept of well-being and focused on overcoming the psychosocial aspects of living in a nursing home as understood by motivated practitioners in conversation with Strathcare community members. I recognised, however, that to both improve and sustain what we were doing it had to be based on a firm theoretical underpinning that seemed to be absent from the sector. Attempts to identify an existing model failed, partly due to our inexperience in searching the literature, partly due to time and resource pressures but mainly, I now believe, because few such models existed. Discussions with

others in the industry also proved futile, and we were sometimes derided as misguided. On more than one occasion I was castigated for not understanding that older people in residential care need good clinical care not a 'social model', an attitude that still lingers on today, albeit not as dominant²⁶¹. In conversation with and with plenty of feedback from residents and staff I developed and wrote the *Strathcare Quality of Life Model* (Richards, 2002) that took into account our collective experience as well as the ideas of key reformers such as Wolf Wolfensberger, Brian Kidd and to a lesser extent Tom Kitwood. The model was kept relatively simple and became a framework to inform and develop all aspects of our work. A copy of the main schematic developed as part of the model is presented in Appendix 2 so as to give an idea of the scope of what was being considered. The model had five domains; opportunities to be and do, mutually supportive relationships, uplifting and enabling environments, exercise of choice and control and enabling support teams.

While always committed to the necessity of good nursing care I was, and even more so now, am committed to the understanding that while good nursing care is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condition for a person to experience quality of life, a sense of well-being while living in a nursing home. To put it another way, if nursing care is not done well it is a thief of well-being but done well it does not in itself deliver a sense of well-being, something else is at play. As such ensuring good nursing practice is not sufficient to fulfil our duty of care to people who move into a nursing home, a place designed, constructed, furnished, equipped, staffed, organised and controlled by the operators of the facility. Consideration must be given as to how the built environment and the service delivery impact on quality of life and this has been the constant concern that drives my work.

While there was a lot right about the Knitting Room project and even today it is an exemplar of what can be achieved, when I reflected back on the project it seemed to fit 'on top' of what was happening in the nursing home itself. While it was impactful in the lives of many, there was certainly a large group for whom it had no tangible benefit. While many of the staff embraced the project, many others were annoyed that it interrupted 'their work' and who viewed the assistance required by people to

²⁶¹ One of the innovations has been the introduction of the Eden Alternative into Australia. The Better Practice Conferences run by the Australian Standards and Accreditation Agency also regularly focus speakers talking about quality of life and wellbeing initiatives. All this had made the sector more receptive to these ideas.

attend the various knitting sessions as not part of their work! The challenge has always been to understand what worked, what didn't, why and how can we embed the learnings.

The Knitting Room was not the only project, albeit it was the biggest, and one of the key learnings concerned the temporal aspects of the activities. In addition to the activities themselves, we identified that there was a need to engage people with a sense of expectation for the future that drew people forward and to create a way to remember, a means of the recalling the past through stories of events captured in various forms to facilitate recall and dialogue with others. We aimed to create a meaningful present structured by the anticipation and expectation of the future and enriched by the past that flowed back into the present. This sounds a little too abstract. Practically it was about giving people something meaningful to them to plan, work and look forward to and then experience. Then to provide simple ways to record and share what had happened. This last step was useful for helping people share the experiences with family and friends, to be able to have something 'interesting and meaningful' to share about their life in the nursing home.

The approach recognised that for most people days are typically filled with the mundane routine of getting on with life. That life is then punctuated with variability and surprise at the small level arising out of the broad environment in which they move. There are also the cyclical events of either community nature, such as Easter, Melbourne Cups, Christmas Day, or the private events such as birthdays, holidays and so on. In a nursing home, most of this is stripped away, albeit cyclical events are typically arranged for people²⁶². There is mainly a dull, mundane routine over which the person has little control and is barely a participant. The environment itself is so predictable it offers very few opportunities of spontaneous encounter or surprise, and events as vehicles for engagement with family and friends are all but absent. There are the lifestyle programs, but these are, with few exceptions, underfunded, understaffed and restricted to offering limited opportunities for people to engage in activities that reflect who they are as people. The model we were slowly developing was to try to mimic the rhythm of events and activities within the broader culture. To structure the year by way of the main cyclical events, between these to have ad hoc events, dinners, and outings and so on. Over the top of this,

²⁶² The approach taken at Strathcare for these events was not to roll them out for people to attend but to actively involve as many people as possible in the planning and preparation.

the idea was then to have a project of a major focus such as the Knitting Room. Rather than these activities being fully planned, developed and delivered by staff for people, as much as possible the ideas and decisions were made by the people in the nursing home community, working days held for planning and preparation, family member encouraged to attend and so on. The lifestyle team worked to get to know the interests of people and wherever possible encouraging and facilitating opportunities around those interests. This is a little idealistic in the description, and there were often significant gaps between intent and fulfilment.

Working within the constraints of 'running' a nursing home as such, encouraging staff deeply entrenched in a medical culture to think differently and to support what was happening was hard work for all those committed to change. There was always that battle against the imperative of the day to day reality of nursing home life. Not the reality of life of the people living in the nursing home community, but the 'other life', that of the institution itself. What sustained us were the small victories, and when it worked well, the impact on people's lives was stunning. We had many 'successes' during this period with many people showing and expressing the delight and satisfaction in their life experiences as a direct result of the initiatives introduced by the team. Some that come to mind include:

- A lady suffering from dementia who never spoke and found her voice and smile again in the form of song.
- The man who had not stepped outside one of our facilities for several years rediscovering the joy of having a dog, Lady. He eventually took Lady on regular walks to the shops about a kilometre away.
- The crabby, angry man who regularly abused our staff discovering a new life as a radio host, and became quite the charmer!
- A remarkable man, confined to a wheel chair as a result of a vehicle accident, who became the nursing home 'postman', chair of the residents' committee and a community leader.
- The lady, with quadriplegia, who re-commenced painting, as a mouth painter, and made a number of trips to the local school to work with children.

While it is often the more dramatic changes that stand out, there were others whose life seem to reflect a sense of well-being that was related to their changed living environment. For example, the community members of one home organised and painted the common room, painted a mural on a drab concrete retaining wall and other projects. Again, I would point out that this was a high care facility. A little later

they initiated some fundraising to buy and install a large fish tank in an area of the facility that was a little gloomy to brighten it up for the people living in that section, a wonderful act of compassion and generosity. These examples reflected the change in approach of giving as much 'ownership' and control of the living environment to the people living in those environments as possible.

Notwithstanding the excitement of the changes, the planning and organising, the witnessing of the smiles, laughter and the new conversations, the way many people were reclaiming their lives, we were conscious that for many we were not hitting the mark. This was brought home to me in a conversation I will never forget. In the evening twilight, leaning against the handrail of a covered walkway at Strathaven I was chatting with Ilse²⁶³. She was a beautiful woman in her early eighties who always reminded me of a retired school teacher from the film *The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie*. She stopped talking, turned and looked soulfully into my face with her soft blue eyes. Speaking in a soft voice, she confided that she was so lonely that she just wanted to die. From my experience, I had learnt that a CEO typically only hears good news as they walk through a facility engaging in casual chit chat. In these exchanges typically everything is going 'all right', the staff are always 'wonderful' but perhaps something could be done about some of the meals! To hear an honest answer, you need to get to know a few people, spend time and talk with them in a genuine way. Occasionally you get a connection, people will trust you, and more occasionally still they will tell you how it is for them, how it really is. This was one of those occasions. It was a moment of vulnerability shared between two people, but it is a moment that lives with me and grounds me.

The reality was we were only touching the surface. Many of the people entering into the facilities did not thrive, did not enjoy an improved sense of well-being, and this still bothers me deeply. Wasn't the very rationale for the existence of a nursing home to enable people to have a life in which a sense of well-being could be experienced? There are people who not only failed to thrive but do not even survive. Some people declined, and their deaths appeared more to be related to their lack of desire to live than their frailty or chronic conditions. Work in a nursing home for a length of time and observe what is happening and it is almost impossible to miss the phenomena of the 'light going out' of peoples' eyes not long before they decline

²⁶³ Name has been changed.

and die. This for me has become a significant question: Why do the lights go out? In discussing this with colleagues over the years, the common 'folk psychology' answer is that they simply have no reason to live anymore or they have 'lost' the will to live. For me, this is not an answer that provides any form of understanding from which a better response can be developed.

A few years later Strathcare was merged, into a single large, multi-state organization ostensibly as part of the church's drive to improve efficiency and better manage risk. In a word, Strathcare was corporatized. Throughout the previous years the Board, led by Mr Noel Kerrison, was incredibly supportive and engaged while still providing the scrutiny and oversight one expects of proper Board Governance. This board was to be disbanded. The Board had played an important part in what was happening, and Kerrison had been a wonderfully supportive and encouraging chairperson as well as an insightful and effective leader. An example of the courage and leadership of the board was seen in the way they dealt with a new building project that was underway when I arrived. I explained my concerns with Kerrison and following broader discussions with Board members it was decided to bring the architect, Brain Kidd across to Tasmania to discuss his approach and possible new ways of continuing the project. This occurred, and Kidd ran a daylong seminar for the board, key managers and various members of resident committees. Not long after, based on the new insights gained from the seminar, the Board paused the project and commissioned a new architect, with Kidd as a consultant, to continue the project in a manner that incorporated more contemporary thinking. The courage and leadership exhibited by the Board in acknowledging that they had got it wrong in commissioning an institutional design nursing home and implementing a radical and major change in direction is one that is rarely seen in Governing bodies.

The discussions leading up to the merger were all about the Church and its need to manage, and little consideration was given as to what was working well, the people and what was being discarded at the local level. The loss of the board and the introduction of a layer of corporate managers (in another State) providing oversight to ensure compliance within the uniformity of organisational policies and procedures meant that the freedom to experiment, to innovate, to be spontaneous and to take risks was over.

Not long after I took up another role as CEO of a medium sized aged care organisation in regional NSW and while there were successes other pre-existing

local factors intervened, and it was not possible to establish a team with the same enthusiasm for change and innovation that existed at Strathcare. The next few years helped consolidate some of the learnings but did not progress them.

Reflection

Over the years while there have been reforms in the nursing home sector I retain a sense that something is still not right, that something is missing. A deeper understanding of what was happening in the lives of people in nursing homes was a necessary. One thing is very obvious; the answer is not in compliance. Compliance is not hard; it is basic good administrative practice. The teams I have worked with have always passed every Government compliance requirement and have been awarded National best practise awards. I have also led successful 'turn around' projects assisting other organisations facing sanctions because of compliance failures in the running of their nursing homes. My steadfast conclusion is that compliance requirements form a necessary part of the process to establish minimum levels of service delivery, especially around clinical services, personal care and administrative and financial integrity. However, compliance adds little to ensure that nursing home practices deliver possibilities for well-being. Something else is required.

Back in Adelaide

We returned to South Australia in 2010. My wife, then working as a Director of Care in aged care, generously and very supportively, encouraged me to undertake research at Adelaide University through the Joanna Briggs Institute (JBI) to gain a better understanding as to why people, moving into a nursing home, often have such adverse experiences. Since then, interspersed with consulting and work placements in aged care to earn money, that is what I have been doing. First, the required research based Masters and now the PhD.

This completes the account of my back ground and motivation for this project.


APPENDIX 2: QUALITY OF LIFE MODEL

Schematics of Quality of Life Model referred to on Appendix 1.

The main diagram (Figure 42) tried to capture the comprehensive nature of Strathcare's service planning approach. It was used in planning meetings, staff training and in planning changes to the service. It was also referred to when considering the service support requirements for individual people living within the facilities.

The Quality of Life Model was broken down into five domains, these were presented in a simplified form of the main schematic (Figure 41). This diagram was used in training, included in handbooks, and placed on posters in staff rooms.

SUPPORTING PEOPLE A LIFE QUALITY APPROACH




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Figure 41 Quality of Life Schematic 1

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LIFE QUALITY APPROACH



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Figure 42 Quality of Life Schematic 2

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APPENDIX 3: FINDING HEIDEGGER

This account provides some 'behind the scenes' background to what appears in the main chapters of the thesis, recounting some of my experiences in finding Heidegger. Here there is no attempt to explain any of Heidegger's concepts. It is an account of the struggle to come to terms with Heidegger's work, of how I initially undertook the task as a cognitive exercise, as just another learning challenge, only to fail abysmally. Essentially, I had to change the basic framework within which I learn in order for Heidegger's work to be intelligible and this section describes some of what was involved.

The choice of Heidegger's philosophical research occurred more by accident than design. I wanted the work I was to undertake to be overtly philosophically grounded to provide a rigorous intellectual base. During the extensive reading involved in the earlier systematic review, I had, for the first time come across phenomenology as a social science research methodology and this seemed to offer the possibility of that intellectual base. Broadly speaking phenomenology as a research methodology has two main schools, that based on the phenomenology of the philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and that of the philosopher Martin Heidegger who developed his own approach to phenomenology based on Husserl's earlier work in the area [MWP, HCT, BPP]. Notwithstanding Husserl was the founder of what is now known as the phenomenological movement (Spiegelberg, 1994), I naively leant towards the work of Heidegger primarily due to a few descriptions I had read in the research literature concerning Heidegger's conception of the person as being-in-the-world. My intuition was that the 'shedding of life' was somehow to do with the relationship between the person and their environment, their world, and it was purely on this basis that I leant towards Heidegger's work. This understanding proved to be both right and wrong. Wrong in that this conception of a person living in their world is not strictly what Heidegger is referring to by the term being-in-the-world, but right in that it refers to a structural phenomenon far more profound in its relevancy than I could have imagined.

This 'choice' of Heidegger was confirmed as I read a little wider and came to characterise Husserl as committed to the Cartesian notion of the independent, self-sufficient rational self as a distinct entity from the world of independent and self-

sufficient objects. For me this posited a view that the problem of relocation, therefore, lay with the person and their failure to 'adapt', this didn't feel right. For Heidegger, there is no notion of this radical independence, and although I initially (and wrongly) understood being-in-the-world in terms of some sort of co-dependency or interdependency. My initial view was that it was this co-dependency that was somehow breaking down, not dissimilar to polluted air causing health problems! My initial conception of Heidegger's work turned out to be just another variant of the Cartesian understanding. Being-in-the-world was to disclose an understanding of 'shedding life' far more relevant and dramatic than I could have conceived at this point.

I did look for other philosophers and found none at the time that held out the same promise as Heidegger's work in terms of offering an understanding of what it is to be a person actively engaged with their world. Later ((reference not available)) ((reference not available)) I did come across the book *Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilisation* (Searle, 2010) by the American analytic philosopher John Searle. While the book has merit in terms of my project, it seemed to be anchored in a Cartesian perspective in terms of the separateness of self and world, and it lacked a sufficient analysis of the nature of the interconnectedness of the person and their world for my purposes.

Cannot Access Heidegger as a Materialist

As part of my journey, what I discovered was that at heart I was both a Cartesian in the sense of holding to the subject-object divide and a materialist²⁶⁴. I was a typical product of my culture seeing things in terms of independent, self-sufficient entities. I suspect that even though I felt a resonance with some of things Heidegger was describing I was always, even if unconsciously, recasting it within a Cartesian worldview. Because of this there was always part of Heidegger's account that remained elusive.

While I accepted a notion of interdependency between self and social environment I failed to grasp that the very notion of interdependency denotes two entities coming together in some symbiotic relationship. I also did not understand, as part of this,

²⁶⁴ φ

that Heidegger was not inquiring into Dasein, his name of us²⁶⁵, as an entity in any way that I had come to understand such an inquiry. His basis of inquiry was into the entity understood in terms of its way of being, and for several years I did not fully appreciate the significance of this, nor exactly what he meant. Further, an understanding of 'world' as Heidegger used it was not initially within the possibility of my comprehension, so alien is the concept. It was only slowly that I commenced to distinguish between Heidegger's use of world as an entity, world as that projected by Dasein, the concept of worldhood and the fundamental difference between an environment (a domestic world) and a public.

By way of example there are many places where Heidegger talks about the nature of Dasein, and when I initially read this it was with my old understanding that was projected onto the words, for example in his famous *Letter on Humanism* published in 1947,

Are we really on the right track toward the essence of the human being as long as we set him off as one living creature among others ... We can proceed in that way; we can in such fashion locate the human being among entities as one entity among others. We will thereby always be able to state something correct about the human being. But we must be clear on this point, that **when we do this we abandon the human being** to the essential realm of *animalitas* even if we do not equate him with beasts ... even when *anima* (soul) is posited as *animus sive mens* [spirit or mind], and this in turn is later posited as subject, person, or spirit. [LH 227] (my bolding)

I felt a resonance with the sentiment of these passages, but I did not grasp the importance of what Heidegger was getting at for a long time. While we can separate living things from inanimate things, animals from plants, bacteria and other living things and even posit humankind as 'a more evolved' species of animal with mind or indeed spirit, as soon as we take this line of thought we are conceiving the human person as an entity whose being is substance, i.e. it is a materialist or physicalist account of things. This approach is the normative approach in contemporary scholarship and is certainly the case in the nursing home. It is also the position from which I continually tried to understand Heidegger's work ... and it is wrong²⁶⁶.

As Heidegger notes this approach will tell us some things about the human being,

²⁶⁵ While it is correct of describe Dasein as his name for us, what this means is problematic. He has different conception of 'us' than is typically understood. I specifically address the puzzles concerning Dasein in Chapters 4, 8 and 9.

²⁶⁶ φ

about the nature of the human body for example, but the price we pay is to "abandon the human being" as such, i.e. an understanding of the person of Dasein, the very thing I was seeking.

It was not until I was reading some work concerning the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) that I was able to reframe Heidegger's approach for myself. Peirce speaks about understanding gravity and argued that, even though we don't know what gravity is, all we really need to understand are the aspects that have "practical bearings" (Peirce, 1955, k. 743). From this I was able to relinquish the hold of the necessity to envisage the material aspects of Dasein and with this some of the puzzles associated with understanding Heidegger's work dissolved. Not long after reading Peirce's comments the structure of being-in-the-world started to come more clearly into focus and with it the idea that 'shedding life' has a structural and not a psychological basis. The relevance of Peirce's work is discussed later in this appendix and in Chapter 9.

Learning You Can't Just Learn Heidegger

My initial approach was based on the view that I had 'to learn' what Heidegger was on about and then 'apply it'. This approach assumed that my basic understanding framework of things was sound and that it merely needed to be extended, more finely differentiated, the gaps filled in and so forth, within that framework²⁶⁷. This approach is captured by Thomas Kuhn's (1922-1996) notion of normal science which advances within an existing paradigm as opposed to what he calls a scientific revolution which requires a complete paradigm change (Kuhn (Author) & Hacking (Introduction), 2012). What I had not considered was that what I was embarking on was a paradigm change, a complete shift in the way I understood what it was to be a person and the nature of worlds.

As I struggled with Heidegger's work, I came to recognise that what I was identifying was that the conceptual model based on physicalism, the framework or paradigm that informs me, and the culture more generally, as to what it is to be a person *does not work in the context of a nursing home*. We have continually failed to recognise the nature of the problem within nursing homes and the underlying cause because

²⁶⁷ φ

we are stuck within the current paradigm which determines how the current situation is interpreted.

Consequently, the change in understanding that I required was not one of tinkering and an increase in knowledge within the pre-existing conceptual framework, it was acknowledging that Heidegger's work is a radical new framework for understanding and then engaging in a deliberate process of change. At times it felt like replacing the hull on a boat while still at sea! However, it is only by changing the paradigm that new possibilities exist for scientific questioning and for fundamental changes in approach. To be able to address the phenomenon of 'shedding of life' what is required is a radically new way of understanding the person and this is what Heidegger offers. For me, this prospect was what guided the thesis journey.

I later discovered that decades prior to Kuhn, Heidegger had the same view. The following passage is an indication of this and is from his course on the *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy* given in the Summer Semester 1926 at Marburg University, as Heidegger was completing *Being and Time*,

Science is not the mere acquisition of cognitions [facts], the piling-up of material; on the contrary, new possibilities of questioning constitute the proper development of science itself. [BCAP 30] (my gloss)

The new possibilities Heidegger is referring to only arise as the result of the opening of a new 'self-world' for a particular scientific community involved. Kuhn's notion of normal science is roughly similar to Heidegger's "mere acquisition of cognitions" and his notion of scientific revolution I relate to Heidegger's opening up "new possibilities", i.e. a new way of understanding. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger puts it this way,

The real 'movement' of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is *capable* of a crisis in its basic concepts. In such immanent crises the very relationship between positively investigative inquiry and those things themselves that are under interrogation comes to a point where it begins to totter. [BT 29/9]

The similarities between this account of how science progresses and that of Kuhn's, given almost forty years later is striking.

Being able to make such a fundamental change is not easy, as Kuhn points out in his book by reference to a quote by Max Planck,

... a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it. (Kuhn(Author) & Hacking(Introduction), 2012, p. 151)

Clearly, my difficulty in first recognising the need to change and then bringing about that change is not something unique, but the passage does indicate the difficulty associated with such an endeavour. What started to become clear is that if paradigm changes are this challenging then it is going to be a demanding task to help facilitate change within a sector. It is not going to be a simple matter of 'rolling out' some new insight within the existing paradigm concerning 'shedding life'!

The difficulty of changing one's way of 'seeing' things, of understanding differently, should never be underestimated but when it comes to Heidegger, there is the added difficulty of the work itself. When I first attempted to read *Being and Time*, I found it impenetrable. I put it aside and started reading the introductory texts and articles to his work and soon discovered that among professional philosophers Heidegger's *Being and Time* is viewed as a notoriously difficult book to understand(Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2005; Gorner, 2007) that the difficulty of comprehending it is legendary(Kisiel, 1995) and not helped by its tortuous style(Guignon, 1986). For the novice, non-philosopher this difficulty is compounded in that Heidegger does not write for beginners in philosophy and assumes his readers have a reasonable level of understanding of philosophy and the history of Western thought(Polt, 1999). I was not a professional philosopher, did not even have a basic education in philosophy and nor had I any grounding in the history of Western thought. Additionally, I did not read German and so when I needed to consult the German text it was a laborious undertaking. As Falconer noted, it is perhaps the nature of *Being and Time* that accounts for the fact that there is little consensus among Heideggerian scholars on many aspects of his work or how to deal with it(Falconer & Wrathall, 2000). None of this I knew when I plunged into the project! Perhaps just as well.

The Failed Attempts at Understanding Heidegger's Work

The aim of this section is to provide some background detail of the journey to the point that the methodology and main work started to be documented in its final form. It provides background context to what appears in the thesis as well as forming part of the report of the thesis project as a whole.

When I commenced work on the thesis, I had a general understanding of the phenomenon and the approach I was going to take. The concept of ‘shedding life’ and the general direction were thus in place very early on. However, this is a long way from where I needed to be, and the extent of the distance almost became an insurmountable obstacle in itself in the early stages. It was akin to the late eighteenth century white settlers in NSW setting their ambition to discover what lay inland to the west (the focus) knowing that to fulfil that ambition they had to find a way through the formidable, and seemingly impenetrable, Blue Mountains (the direction/way). As is common in such endeavours there were a number of failed attempts before a successful crossing was actually achieved.²⁶⁸

My initial efforts at understanding Heidegger’s work all failed. My first reading of *Being and Time* was a failure from the start. I stopped after a relatively short time realising that I was reading the words but did not have a clue what Heidegger was on about. I found it too impenetrable. As I had ‘discovered’ Heidegger in the context of social science research literature, I turned to the texts²⁶⁹ in this field to gain a better understanding of phenomenology, Heidegger’s declared method, before tackling *Being and Time* again. This failed. It took me a while to fully appreciate that there was a disconnect between the aims of social science phenomenological research and my thesis. By and large, the social science research does not deal explicitly with the various aspects of the structure of Dasein as disclosed in Heidegger’s work and they gave me no material insights as to an understanding of the person from a Heideggerian perspective²⁷⁰. Having gone back and scanned

²⁶⁸ The crossing of the Blue Mountains was eventually made in 1813 by an expedition led by Gregory Blaxland, William Lawson and William Wentworth.

²⁶⁹ I read widely in this area both journal articles and texts. I have not included references to the various journal articles as there were too many. References to the main texts that I acquired and read are included. (Benner, 1994, 2001; Crotty, 1996, 1998; Finlay, 2011; Giorgi, 1985, 2009; Lewis & Staehler, 2010; Moustakas, 1994; Packer & Addison, 1989; Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009; Svenaeus, 2000; Toombs, 2001; Van Manen, 1990, 2005, 2014)

²⁷⁰ Phenomenological qualitative research claiming to be Heideggerian has been subject to sporadic criticism over the last twenty years as not properly reflecting Heidegger’s work (Crotty, 1996; Johnson, 2000; Norlyk & Harder, 2010; Paley, 1998; Petrovskaya, 2014a). This debate has never been resolved, primary because the criticisms are never responded to in a meaningful way, and the research practices go on oblivious of the concerns of the critics. Part of the difficulty is that Heidegger’s work is complex and, apart from Crotty’s work, most of the criticisms have been undertaken in article form which is too restrictive to provide a proper basis for argument. While I have some sympathy for both sides of the debate, I believe there are grounds of arguing that even among the critics there is an inadequate understanding of Heidegger’s work. Perusing this is outside this thesis, but it does indicate that there is a need for a presentation of Heidegger’s work that is accessible to social science researchers that eliminates the need for the philosophical background that Heidegger assumes, and presents it in a more contemporary language.

some of this literature again, I now find myself in significant disagreement with the way being-in-the-world is presented in many of these books.

Still influenced by the 'phenomenology' label and determined to find a way 'into' Heidegger's work I shifted my reading to the philosophical literature associated with phenomenology with the aim of gaining a better understanding of this field and Heidegger's place within it (Cerbone, 2006; Moran & Mooney, 2002; Moran, 2000; Smith & Smith, 1995; Sokolowski, 2000; Spiegelberg, 1994). This too failed as I found the texts to be too broad and general to provide meaningful insights into Heidegger's work. While the texts referred to Heidegger's phenomenology and made use of his terminology in referring to his approach nowhere could I find an account of what many of these terms actually meant. They seem mainly to repeat the Heideggerian language as if everyone could understand it.

My next approach was to take a step further back and read more generally about philosophy to understand the context in which Heidegger was working. What was helpful was reading several works on the history of Western thought as these did start to shift my understanding of what philosophy was about. (Garvey & Strangroom, 2012; Kenny, 2010; Magee, 2010; Trombley, 2011) While these works did not specifically address Heidegger's work or phenomenology they did provide an invaluable context for understanding *Being and Time*. I started to reframe Heidegger not as a phenomenologist but as a philosopher working within the philosophic tradition, and when, eventually, I started to come to terms with *Being and Time*, many of his references to the tradition made at least some sense. What I came to realise is that I had entered into the project with a particular understanding of phenomenology based on the social science literature²⁷¹. Once I understood enough to cast off this view, new ways of understanding started to open up. I eventually came to understand Heidegger as a strict empiricist (Chapter 10), and his phenomenology as something radically different to what is presented in social science.

Reading *Being and Time* was still, however, a stumbling block and so I commenced reading philosophical commentaries on *Being and Time* (Blattner, 2006; Dreyfus, 1991; Gorner, 2007; Mulhall, 2005; Polt, 1999; Wrathall, 2006). This helped but also

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had its limitations in terms of providing any real insight into Heidegger's concepts. Like the phenomenology texts, the commentaries often just repeated Heidegger's terms, trying to put it in a more accessible language. However, there is typically little in the way of illustrative examples to shed light on the phenomenon that Heidegger is describing. In some cases where descriptive accounts of the phenomenon were provided, I simply failed to get the connection with Heidegger's text. For example, in the opening section of Mulhall's introductory text on *Being and Time* (Mulhall, 2005) he quotes a passage from a novel, *The Spire*, by William Golding that includes imagery such as "a cloud of angels flashing in the sunlight" and "It was there beyond the wall, bursting up with cloud and scatter, laying hold of the earth and the air, a fountain, a marvel, an apple tree"(p.2). He then relates this to a "distinctive mode of existence or being"(p.2). This approach lost me. It gave me no insight into Heidegger's understanding of being nor of the structure of Dasein. While I can now see what Mulhall is getting at, I still struggle to understand how it is a good entrée for an introductory text on Heidegger's work. For me, Heidegger's hammer is a far better starting point. I suspect that the writers of many introductory texts cannot recall the struggle to understand Heidegger and often do not see they are using approaches that carry with them the understanding they now have. While, for the most part, I enjoyed reading them, and I certainly found them to be the most useful of the texts I read, they were still exasperating. Nowhere could I, for example, find an account of what Heidegger was actually doing! This sounds odd, but nowhere could I locate a clear account that takes the time to set out what Heidegger means by even the most fundamental terms, being and Dasein, nor what he means by a 'structure' and nowhere is there a setting out of his methods. All this is possible. Perhaps the various scholars have a clear idea of these very basic issues and do not consider them worth mentioning. However, when I read these various texts now I grasp what they are discussing and presenting, but rather than being a guide I read them as alternative interpretations.

Some Help from Hubert Dreyfus

It was around this time that I started listening to lectures on Heidegger's *Being and Time* given by Hubert Dreyfus (1929-2017) as part of a University course (Dreyfus (lecturer), 2007). It was these lectures more than anything else that gave me an initial foothold into the world of Heidegger. Sometime during this period,

with help from Dreyfus, I commenced another attempt at reading *Being and Time*. It was a very slow process, frequently stopping to research background concepts, stopping to go back to the German to clarify translations, thinking up thought experiments to test my understanding of the phenomena Heidegger was describing, etc. I have now read all the relevant sections of *Being and Time* at least five times and am still continually surprised at what I missed in the prior readings. Thankfully, however, the number of surprises is diminishing, and I read most sections with a flow that was inconceivable several years ago.

While the texts on the history of Western thought I had read proved useful it became apparent that there were specific aspects of the tradition that were relevant to understanding the context of Heidegger's research and that understanding these would be useful. These related to philosophical stances he was arguing against and philosophical accounts that seemed to have informed and influenced Heidegger in a positive way. As a consequence I supplemented my work with a small selection of readings that seemed to me to be most relevant to understanding *Being and Time*, namely Descartes (Descartes & Gaukoger(editor), 2004; Descartes, 2007, 2012), Aristotle (Aristotle, 2014e) and the Pre-Socratics Greek philosophers (Burnett(author) & Böer(editor), 2014; Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 2007). The reading of the Greek philosophers ultimately proved crucial to my interpretation of Heidegger, and the summary of this work is set out in Chapters 6 and 7.

Placing Heidegger Within the Tradition

In the first few readings of *Being and Time*, I also read and found helpful texts on the philosophy of mind (Chalmers, 2002; J. Kim, 2011; Searle, 2004, 2010) and philosophy of science (Goldman, 2006a, 2006b; Kasser, 2006). The works on the philosophy of mind helped to gain a better understanding of the crucial 'mind-world' problem, representationalism and the subject-object division, all variants of the philosophical stance Heidegger is constantly attacking. Without this reading, I am not sure I would have come to appreciate what Heidegger was attacking, and as such not sure I would have ever appreciated his position. What was clear from the readings was that my own initial stance was reflected in normative accounts of representationalism and subject-object divide and while I have made significant progress in transforming this way of thinking it is something with which I still

wrestle.²⁷² The works on the philosophy of science helped in clarifying the debate over scientific knowledge as the experience of reality versus knowledge of the reality itself. This last point may seem at odds with the thesis, but it shed considerable light on the difference between an inquiry into an entity and an inquiry into the being of the entity, something that had been puzzling me for much of the thesis work.

Other readings which proved useful were in the area of behavioural economics (Ariely, 2009; Chabris & Simons, 2010; Kahneman, 2012) as this field of psychology is starting to deal with and provide research reports on phenomena associated with human behaviour similar to phenomena referred to by Heidegger. In many ways, the work in behavioural economics is also attacking the normative account of being a person, and while the field is still focused on 'ontic' phenomenon, there are similarities with Heidegger's account. I briefly touch on this in the final chapters of the thesis.

I also read texts dealing with the links between consciousness, identity, biology and neuroscience (Cairns-Smith, 1996; Damasio, 2006, 2012; Greenfield, 2015; Noë, 2009; Siegel, 2009). These assisted in providing a broader context in which to understand Heidegger's research and his discussion concerning Dasein, the mind and body and would prove useful in developing the idea of Dasein as an emergence entity which I present later in the thesis.

Another area that proved particularly useful were texts associated with the emotions and various other affective dispositions. (Appiah, 2011; Keltner, Oatley, & Jenkins, 2014; Lutz, 2011; Nussbaum, 2001; Smith, 2015) This area was particularly useful as they shed light on an extremely important yet neglected area in Heidegger's work, the structure of receptivity and Dasein's affective-attunements. It is only in the last couple of decades that the role of emotions, etc., are starting to receive more research attention. While the Western tradition has long been suspicious of emotions, contemporary research is starting to reveal that they play an important part in shaping our understanding of the world and prioritizing our thoughts, goals and actions (Keltner, Oatley, & Jenkins, 2014), the very point Heidegger was making in *Being and Time* ninety years ago! When Heidegger was initially writing there was little work done in any of these fields, and although there is still no cohesive

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framework within which much of this research work is undertaken, from a broad perspective one can discern a commonality in the phenomenon they are addressing in terms of 'being human' and, not surprisingly then, linkages to Heidegger's work.

Same Phenomena Different Account

I came to this research largely from a pragmatic administrative and social justice background, and I was not familiar with either philosophy or the technical aspects of the social sciences. What slowly dawned on me as I engaged in this broader reading is that, by and large, many other disciplines are often dealing with the same presenting phenomena as addressed by Heidegger. It was that the mode of inquiry and theoretical explanation varied according to the dictates of the discipline. This proved to be an invaluable insight. With few exceptions, in *Being and Time* Heidegger's description of phenomena is rather scant, and it is often hard to grasp the actual phenomenon he is talking about and in reading more widely, I was better able to recognise far more of the phenomenon to which Heidegger was referring. I have come to the view that Heidegger's ontological account of the person is one that provides an overarching framework for many fields of science researching various aspects of the person, just as Heidegger had envisaged [BT].

Aim: Understanding the Phenomena Not Heidegger

At the end of the day it may be possible to make sense of Heidegger's work without direct reference to this contextual knowledge, I just never found that route. It is easy to get bogged down in the pursuit of 'Heidegger', but I was always clear that it was not 'Heidegger' I was after. I was pursuing an understanding of the structure of Dasein itself as the basis that this would then provide a way to determine the meaning of 'shedding life'. All my work had an iterative sense, always coming back to the phenomenon to test if I could 'see' it, to see if it had 'disclosed' itself to me. All my efforts were to this end. The broader reading not only helped in identifying the various phenomena but aided in keeping my endeavours to understand Heidegger within this broader context and to rescue me from becoming just another Heideggerian acolyte.

It should be clear that this thesis is not about exploring and presenting the 'subjective experiences' of shedding life based on the analysis of accounts provided by a range

of informants. This would have left the thesis in the realm of social science phenomenology. I was trying to move beyond the various quantitative and qualitative research approaches to the “relocation problem” because after more than seventy years of research it simply just kept telling us there is a problem. I wanted to find the basis of the problem. It is because of this one of my fundamental premises was to take Heidegger at face value, that *Being and Time* is a research report that sets out the ontological structure of Dasein. My intuition was that if this is the structure of our existence, of our experienced life, then this was the best place to look in order to understand ‘shedding life’. Hence the dogged determination to understand what Heidegger was describing, i.e. the structure he calls being-in-the-world.

Changing the Approach

Once I had sufficient background knowledge and insights gained from Dreyfus’ course I changed my approach. Rather than having the main focus on the text I envisaged myself standing next to Heidegger trying to ‘listen’ to his descriptions of what he was ‘seeing’ and pointing out. A little like the game of pointing out images in the clouds. Around this time, I also shifted my reading. I virtually stopped reading the secondary sources, and in other fields altogether, I was determined to understand Heidegger on his terms, from his words. I sourced copies of Heidegger’s published courses and other works and started cross-referencing his various accounts of the phenomena mentioned in *Being and Time* with references in these other texts. This helped, for occasionally in the lectures he provides more information and useful illustrative examples that are given in *Being and Time*.

I came to understand that a successful encounter with Heidegger does not concern debates over interpretive stances on what he presents, it concerns interpretations of the phenomena itself. To ‘disclose’ the phenomenon for oneself, to grasp it for oneself, that is the goal and as such, in the end, it is always a personal journey. Only once this is done are we in a position to debate with Heidegger concerning his interpretations of the phenomenon. Engaging in the debates between philosophers over what Heidegger meant without a grounding in the phenomena, is for my purposes, pointless. In some of his lecture courses, Heidegger makes this same point, that proper philosophy is not about learning the ideas of others simply to be

able to repeat and critique them. It is about learning to 'see' the world philosophically and for Heidegger that means being able to investigate entities with respect to their being, particularly Dasein[BPP].

Reading the Philosopher's that Influenced Heidegger

While reading Heidegger's various descriptive accounts of Dasein's structure helped, and certainly Heidegger's language was starting to become more familiar, there was still a sense that I hadn't grasped sufficiently well what Heidegger was trying to tell me. It was reading Heidegger's work more widely that I started to recognise that there was some important work that he had taken over and developed from Husserl and Brentano that is hard to discern in *Being and Time*, but is critical for a proper understanding of the work. There are the Brentano and Husserlian concepts of intentionality which refers, in their work, to the directedness of our mind towards things. In *Being and Time* it is incorporated as concern and solicitude at one level of Dasein structure, but more importantly, it is reflected in the basic structure of being-in, which is comprised of understanding and receptivity; I discuss the background to intentionality in Chapter 12. There is Husserl's categorial intuition which refers to the idea that there are two parts to perception, the first is the simple visual aspect of the object and the second is the meaning of what the object is. This is an important phenomenon, and I explore it in detail in Chapter 13 and provide examples as an aid to experiencing the phenomenon. This concept is taken over by Heidegger and is incorporated into the sight we have that applies to entities ready-to-hand which he calls circumspection, the sight related to people is considerateness and forbearance, and the sight relating to the whole of existence he calls transparency. Essentially it is the phenomena in which things show up differently once we have an understanding of them. Husserl's mereology or the study of parts and wholes incorporates the concept that it is the whole that determines the parts and I discuss this in Chapter 13. It was as a result of Heidegger's work with Husserl that he goes back to the early Greeks, perhaps having recognised similar concepts, and then undertakes a number of new interpretations of their work[MWP]. I discuss Heidegger's interpretation of the early Greeks in Chapter 7. It was in exploring Husserl's work on mereology, and Heidegger's interpretation of the Greeks that eventually lead me to understand Heidegger's work from an emergence perspective. This developed slowly in the

later stages of the thesis, and I present an interpretation of Heidegger's work on this basis, and the related complex systems theories, in Chapter 19.

A Stumble at the Last Hurdle

As can be seen from the above, coming to understand Heidegger's work has been somewhat tortuous. Just when I thought I had everything sorted, had most of the thesis written when I was writing up some details on perhaps the two most important concepts in *Being and Time*, i.e. being and Dasein. I had gone through all my notes, assembled all the various passages from Heidegger's work and was well into the writing when it struck me I still didn't have a clear grasp on these concepts. I had become so familiar with the terms that the familiarity had hidden the fact that I still did not have a good handle on the concepts. In relation to being, while I could recite Heidegger's formal indication and various characteristics, as I was writing the section I realised that Heidegger seemed to be using the term 'being' in a number of conflicting ways. What I had come to learn in relation to Heidegger was that if there is an apparent conflict, then there is probably something wrong with my understanding. Given the importance of being this had to be resolved. This is what sent me back to reconsider the concept of being and lead me to reading Heidegger's interpretation of the Greeks mentioned above. I experienced the same thing in relation to Dasein.

The main objective of Heidegger's inquiry is the meaning of *being*, not *entities*. However, because being "is always the being of an entity" (BT 29/9) he can only approach being via an entity and the entity he chooses is Dasein. His basic strategy is to determine the being of Dasein and then move on, how he was to do this is not important here. It was the work on the being of Dasein that was important for the thesis. The problem that arose in relation to Dasein was the sudden realisation that Heidegger does not deal specifically with Dasein as an entity in *Being and Time!* While he refers to Dasein over two and half thousand times in *Being and Time*, makes general comments about Dasein (e.g. BT 27/7, 28/8, 32/12) and at the beginning of the book he is clear that Dasein is the entity that is the subject of his inquiry (e.g. BT 34/13) he never actually tells us the 'what it is' of Dasein. You will never find a description of Dasein the entity, just of Dasein's way of being.

That Heidegger makes no material claims about Dasein as an entity at all in *Being*

and Time is stated explicitly in the 1928 lecture course *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* given at Freiburg University,

... the statement, "Dasein is, in its basic constitution, being-in-the-world," is not an affirmation of its factual existence; I do not, by this statement, claim that my Dasein is in fact extant, nor am I saying of it that, in accord with its essence, it must in fact exist. Rather. I am saying: **If Dasein in fact exists, then its existence has the structure of being-in-the-world**, i.e., Dasein is, in its essence, being-in-the-world, whether or not it in fact exists. (MFL 169) (my bolding)

This was the passage, read while I was writing what I thought was part of the final section of the thesis on Dasein, that made me realise I had no grasp on Heidegger's conception of Dasein at all; I was flabbergasted. This sent me back to rethink what Heidegger was doing. The answer came almost by accident. I was reading about the founder of American Pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). He was a mathematician and scientist who, as part of his work, was studying the effects of gravity. In relation to this work he commented;

Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (Peirce, 1955, k. 743-5)

Peirce had no idea what gravity is, and he didn't need to know! We can investigate and take into account the effects of gravity by consideration of the whole of its practical effects, no more is necessary. When I go out the back and throw a ball, I know it will have a certain trajectory because of gravity. I don't know the 'what' of gravity, but I know how to take account of its practical bearings. If I do this all the time with gravity, all I need to do is apply the same concept to Dasein. I re-read the various 'what Dasein is not' passages and recognised that my problem was I had been hanging out to find a physical conception of Dasein despite Heidegger's warnings²⁷³. I suspended all that and allowed myself to think about Dasein only in terms of its 'practical bearings'. In Heideggerian speak this means focussing on Dasein only in terms of its 'way of being'. It suddenly dawned on me that Heidegger has no interest in what Dasein is made from, this is a matter for the positive sciences, what he is concerned with is what Dasein *is*. This is akin to investigating what hammer is by having the physical aspect hidden but having access to what it does, the way it is used. This then led me to specifically address the question of

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how to investigate Dasein on this basis, which in turn led to insights concerning Heidegger's methods.

The work undertaken in relation to clarifying being and Dasein is set in Chapters 4 to 9. Chapter 4 sets out the problem of being and Dasein, Chapter 5 examines being in terms of Heidegger's stated project and Chapters 6 and 7 discussed aspects of the Greek tradition which leads to a clarification of Heidegger's concept of being. Against the background of the discussion of being Chapter 8 clarifies how to understand Dasein and Chapter 9 addresses the approach of investigating Dasein.

Science researches entities, and as such the entity is already understood as an entity before the project commences. It cannot be otherwise, as the nature of the entity, as understood, will direct the nature of the enquiry. This is, in effect what Heidegger says in the following passage;

Positive sciences are those for which what they deal with, what can become their object and their theme, already lies there. Numbers are already there, spatial relations exist, nature is at hand, language is present, and so is literature. All this is positum, it lies there. It is an entity; everything uncovered in science is an entity. Positive sciences are sciences of entities.
[BCAP 5]

For Heidegger, any entity can only properly be understood in terms of its being which is why he believes that philosophy's investigation and interpretation of the being of an entity must precede the work of the positive sciences [BT 77/52, BCAP 6]. In relation to the thesis, we can only understand the person if we understand its 'way of being' and it is the structure of this being that Heidegger describes in *Being and Time*.

The Dawn Finally Breaks

What was frustrating is that I had been dancing around this understanding for well over two years and it took the final challenges in clarifying being and Dasein for this to 'feel' right.

What I had been seeking was a new way of understanding, a new paradigm. The point is that there is no way to instruct a person, no method, that if followed, results in this new understanding. Further, understanding of complex things rarely happens in a flash but rather as Wittgenstein notes

Light dawns gradually over the whole. (Wittgenstein, 1975, No. 141)

What Wittgenstein failed to mention was that as the light dawns, the morning fog must also dissipate. And so, it was for me; understanding arose in a manner that was patchy and uneven as the dawn light revealed some parts, leaving others in darkness, shadows or concealed in the fog. As the sun rose further the darkness withdrew, the fog dissipated, and clarity started to emerge.

APPENDIX 4: MEANING OF WORDS

The following are the words present in Chapter 13

crepuscular: Of or like twilight

tmesis: Separation of the parts of a compound word by one or more intervening words (e.g. funda-*bloody*-mentally)

nebbish: A person regarded as weak willed or timid.

schwa: A central vowel in an unstressed syllable in English, e.g. 'a' in sofa or 'u' in circus

zeugma: The use of a word to modify or govern two or more words in ways that are deliberately inappropriate or different, e.g. To wage war and peace.

paralipsis: A rhetorical device in which an idea is emphasised on the pretence it is too obvious to discuss, e.g. The plan has many drawbacks, not to mention the cost.

oenophile: One who appreciates or enjoys wine.

Meanings are from the Free Dictionary (<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/>)

APPENDIX 5: HUSSERL AND THE GESTALTISTS

Prior to the research I was aware of the Gestaltists and at least some of their claims and was under the impression that they were the originators of their foundational ideas. However, while the Gestaltists clearly developed and extended the work around the relationship of whole and parts it is Husserl who made many of the important discoveries and developed the concept in the contemporary form, and it is Husserl's work that influence Heidegger.

It was Heidegger who alerted me to the Husserl - Gestalt Psychology link, one that I could not find in some of the main texts dealing with the history of phenomenology (Moran, 2000; Spiegelberg, 1994) nor is it mentioned in the Encyclopaedia Britannica entry on gestalt psychology (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2016a), nor the equivalent Wikipedia Encyclopedia entry (Gestalt psychology.) where Husserl's developments are seen as simply being a "similar concepts", i.e. independent.

The claim by Heidegger concerning Husserl's priority is in the 1925 course *History of the Concept of Time*,

I can in a single act of perception simply see a flock of birds or a row of trees. Such given wholes are self-contained. The unity of a row, a swarm, a flock of wild ducks is not based upon a prior act of counting. It is an intuitive unity which gives the whole simply. It is figural. Husserl saw the figural quite early in his mathematical investigations. It has now also entered psychology under the name of *Gestalt*. This discovery forms the basis for a new psychology, *Gestalt psychology*. It has already become a world view. [HCT p. 66]

There is strong circumstantial evidence to support Heidegger's claim, particularly since Husserl's work in *Logical Investigations* was published (1900 and 1901) before the Gestaltists were founded (circa 1912).

The term Gestalt derives from the German meaning 'shape, form, figure, appearance', etc and gives itself to the school of psychology founded in Germany by Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), Wolfgang Köhler (1887-1967), and Kurt Koffka (1886-1941) in 1912. These early experimental psychologists were initially interested in how it was that we managed to gain meaning from visual perception and their basic idea was that the mind tends to self-organise into wholes, not by the aggregations and assembly of the parts but that in some way the whole had a distinct existence to parts. Additionally, that it is within the whole that the part, as part of the whole, gains its meaning. (Koffka, 2005). The similarity to Husserl's work

as presented in Chapter 13 of the thesis, particularly in relation to categorial intuition and mereology can be seen in even this brief account.

There is a direct and close connection between Husserl and the Gestaltists and I have no doubt they were familiar with Husserl's work. All three of the founding Gestaltists were students of the psychologist and philosopher Carl Stumpf who, earlier, was Husserl's habitation supervisor and then a senior colleague at the University of Halle for several years.(Spiegelberg, 1994)

In an apocryphal story it is Stumpf who is reported to have physically removed the transcript of *Logical Investigations*, from Husserl's desk and sent it to the printers to rescue it from yet more editing by Husserl. (Moran, 2000) Husserl dedicates this seminal work to Stumpf in recognition of their friendship and philosophical contributions to the work.

Given the above I think there are strong claims for Husserl being recognised as the originator of key aspects of Gestalt psychology. An article on this topic would be an interesting follow up.

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