The Stateless Bedoun in Kuwait Society

A Study of Bedouin Identity, Culture and the Growth of an Intellectual Ideal

Volume I

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Bachelor of Health Science (Hons)
Graduate Diploma of Education
Master of Education

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the School of Education
Faculty of Arts
The University of Adelaide

December 2016
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Abstract

This study is about the Bedouin of the main tribes of Kuwait, and the members of their tribes who have never received citizenship, who are called the ‘Bedoun.’ The study was framed within the theory of sociology, including the humanistic approach of Florien Znaniecki, and theories of ethnicity, identity and labelling. The methodological approach was inductive, involving a variety data collection methods including fieldwork in Kuwait, historical research, collaborative methodology, and thematic analysis. I argue that the Bedouin are a distinct ethnic group rather than merely a ‘social group’ in Kuwaiti society, and that the Bedoun are an emerging ethnic sub-group of the Kuwaiti Bedouin. The Bedoun hold multiple identifications, sharing ethnic identification within the same tribes as citizens, but they have also developed to form a new collective identity, characterised by social solidarity and unique national consciousness. This has occurred due to their historical, intergenerational absorption of the national identity as citizens of Kuwait in accordance with government policy, followed by their collective experiences of imposed, restrictive cultural re-organisation of the group since the 1980s, including administrative expulsion, ‘status adjustment,’ a form of identity erasure, and violent ethnic cleansing. The Bedouin have also developed an intellectual identity since their administrative expulsion, when they were expelled from schools and university. They have developed some degree of resistance to the attempt by Hadar intellectuals to prevent the group acquiring the education and political consciousness with which they could remedy their statelessness and deprivation of their human rights. The emergence of new forms of identity have assisted the Bedouin to rationalise their suffering and improve their capacity to articulate their collective experience. These changes indicate that creative, cultural re-organisation is taking place in the community, though they remain extraordinarily vulnerable. Cross-fertilisation has taken place with people from other cultures, especially for intellectuals and community leaders who have worked with international humanitarian agencies, journalists and scholars since the beginning of the Arab Spring. The Bedoun have also experienced marginalisation, stigmatisation and labelling in their daily social interactions with others, due to the prevalence of a deeply rooted nationalist ideology that denies the identity of all Bedouin as ‘Kuwaitis.’ Thus, the group has played a crucial, symbolic role in Kuwaiti citizen culture, and this role explains why statelessness has been imposed on them. The Bedoun population has been reduced by around two-thirds over the last twenty-five years. Without the intervention of international organisations and governments, their population and culture may be destroyed altogether. Recommendations include a call for the investigation of Kuwait’s official identity erasure policies and measures (‘status adjustment’), methods of criminalisation and intense cultural restrictions faced by the group, by the United Nations...
Rapporteurs on Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect. The study also suggests the establishment of genuine mechanisms of representation for the community within the United Nations framework, and the implementation of international development measures that would enable the UNDP and UNESCO to establish baseline population data on the group to preserve and protect their future development.
Thesis Declaration

I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in my name in any university or other tertiary institution on and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name for any other degree or diploma at any other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide.

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Signature of student:

Susan Kennedy

Principal Supervisor: Dr Margaret Secombe,
The University of Adelaide, School of Education

Co-Supervisor: Associate Professor Hossein Esmaeili,
Flinders University Law School

This thesis has two volumes. The second volume contains the Appendices. Additional materials will be stored online in the Bedoun Archive, at the Australian Data Repository, Australian National University, Canberra. This includes excerpts from the interview transcripts, and an archive of newspaper articles referenced in this thesis. The materials will become available from approximately June, 2018 or upon expiry of the thesis embargo.
Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge the contribution of the following friends, research collaborators, colleagues and organisations:

There are many friends who I cannot mention for security reasons. Among those who I can, M. M. al Anezi helped to initiate this project from Australia. I did not know what statelessness was before the Arab Spring. He has performed a fine service to his country. Imam Abdul Kader of the Darwin Islamic Society encouraged me to transform my experience in Australia into something that would benefit the whole community.

The twenty members of the Bedoun community who participated in this study and provided me with their personal data, have shared their extraordinary experiences for the benefit of their community. Their life stories will remain etched in my mind forever. No interviewee ever declined his or her material from being published for my research after our conversations. I thank them for their generosity, for expanding the boundaries of my thinking, and their patience in the ensuing years. I hope that their contribution will inspire others to provide them with Kuwaiti citizenship and its corresponding rights.

Mohammed al Anezi of London and Hakeem al Fadhli are the only two members of the Bedoun community in this work whose names are fully disclosed. This should not be interpreted as their endorsement of the interpretations herein but rather, they are mentioned as important cultural guides and contact points for future researchers in Kuwait and the diaspora. Mohammed was one of the first intellectuals and civil rights movement leaders who worked openly on the Bedoun problem in Kuwait, translating the seminal work of al Waqayan (2009) into English. He is a highly regarded leader of the Bedoun community.

Hakeem al Fadhli was as a leader of the Bedoun civil rights movement during the Arab Spring. He then emerged as a public intellectual, contributing as an interviewee, field guide, fixer and translator and interpreter, working on at least ten scholarly research publications, as well as countless news-media articles and human rights reports and his own report to the United Nations Committee for Human Rights in 2015. Many scholars who have described Hakeem as a 'protestor' have actually relied on him for his local knowledge, interview data, contacts and other practical help required for their research. Hakeem’s efforts were a major part of the Lund-Johanssen (2014) project which later won the UNHCR research prize on statelessness at the Masters degree level. His input was essential to my own theoretical development. Neither could have occurred without his efforts.

Hakeem worked with me on this research in various ways for around half the time this project took to complete, mainly helping me to understand various Bedoun claims against counter-arguments in scholarly circles. This work enabled me to break through the established nationalist ideology and to discover forgotten historical data. I will never forget
the day he asked me why, if I did not believe everything I read, did I believe everything I read about Kuwait? One of the most difficult aspects of this research was realising that the Bedoun were unaware of how negatively they had been represented in the academic literature. Hakeem had absorbed the disappointment of this realisation without prejudice, and remained open to the process of inquiry. His participation in this project helped me to realise the collaborative method. He gave me the courage to openly talk about the Bedoun’s indigenous claims, ethnic cleansing and the possibility of their genocide. He had asked to be acknowledged in this research, come what may. His contribution to the Bedoun community and to Kuwait has been unique, unselfish and heroic.

My third translator and interpreter was, and still is, the most reliable man in the field. He helped me understand the subtle details of Bedoun identity management so that I could make sense of my fieldwork observations. He kept second copies of all the research data as a community custodian. He helped me to accept my failures along the way, reminding me to keep looking forward right to the end. I offer him my deepest respect and gratitude. All of my fixers, translators, interpreters and cultural guides, including my husband Nour al Deen, were the glue that held my fieldwork, and sometimes my whole life, together. I was totally dependent on their unpaid work and expertise to obtain the in-depth interviews and photographs for this research, and much more.

Associate Professor Mohammed al Wuhaib and Professor Ghanim Alnajjar provided assistance and hospitality during my fieldwork. Professor al Najjar was not only one of the first social scientists to offer theorization of human rights in Kuwait (Alnajjar, 2001). He was one of few scholars to have explicitly theorized the Kuwaiti Bedouin as an ethnic group, and tribal ethnic minorities as cultural groups with political significance (Alnajjar, 1984, p.66, 79). Associate Professor al Wuhaib helped me to learn the Hadar way of thinking, and how Kuwaitis rationalise the situation of the Bedoun, which led me identify the nationalist ideologies essential to understanding the Bedoun’s statelessness.

Others who assisted me in a variety ways included Siri Gamage (University of New England), Karen Block (The University of Melbourne), Janet MacDougall (Australian National University), Sean Ryan (Batchelor Institute), Uttam Gaulee (University of Florida), Hadeel Borqais (human rights monitor), Mona Kareem (journalist), Rania Maktabi (University of Oslo), Scott Brown (George Washington University), Associate Professor Farah al Nakib (American University of Kuwait), Rashid Muddaffar (Majlis al Ummah), and Professor Abdullah al Moosa (Kuwait University) and Professor Abdullah Alhajeri (Kuwait University).

The American University of Kuwait provided a research fellowship during my fieldwork, in 2014. The Researchers for Asylum Seekers group at Melbourne University provided me with a forum to discuss my early research findings, including ethnic cleansing,
in 2015. The Australian Data Archive at the Australian National University has provided archive and data curation services site for the storage of all Bedoun community data collected in this project. Their appreciation of the nature of the project, and the value of the data into the future, is gratefully received. I thank Margaret Priwer and staff at the Law Library at The University of Adelaide for their assistance over the last four years.

My Supervisor Dr Margaret Secombe and Co-Supervisor Associate Professor Hossein Esmaeili provided patient supervision through this unexpectedly challenging and politically sensitive project. I am grateful for Dr Secombe's flexibility regarding my project design, which continued to emerge during the writing-up phase of the project. We could not have foreseen that the factor of educational development was so closely linked to the deprivation of the Bedoun's citizenship, nor that the population was being destroyed to prevent them developing an intellectual capacity and widespread political consciousness. She appreciated the importance of these aspects of the study and the need to document the historical background to the oppression of the Bedoun, making for an extended thesis length. To construct what I hope is a convincing case for the re-organisation of the Bedoun's culture and the substantial threats to their existence.

Associate Professor Esmaeili assisted me with strengthening the portion of the thesis documenting the involvement of international non-government organisations and appealing to processes and remedies in international law. His advice helped me to balance my argument between past approaches to the Bedouin in indigenous and minority rights law linked to self-determination, with the statelessness approach. I hope that this helps to provide a firmer direction for the Bedouin in international law claims in the future, so that they may be compensated for their suffering and be provided with the support they need to survive and flourish.

I am grateful to my examiners, Professor Elsbieta Halas (University of Warsaw) and Professor Damien Short (University of London), for pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of the thesis, their suggestions for my future work and especially, their support for the arguments put forward. I am very pleased to have encountered the 'plain-speaking' sociological theory of Florian Znaniecki that Dr Secombe has introduced me to, a grand theory that accommodated the realities of this research, and calls state oppression, physical and cultural destruction, and human suffering, what it really is.

Lachlan, Ben, Max kept their faith in my ability to complete this project – thank you for being there. I thank all my friends, family and teachers in Kuwait, Egypt, India, Nepal, Thailand, Indonesia, Switzerland and Australia, who helped me to get through to the end.

I miss my dear friends in Kuwait very much, and especially my husband.
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Dedication

For

Yhaya
Surah al Balad
The City

In the name of God,
the Gracious, the Compassionate.

I swear by this land.
While you are a legal resident at this land.
A father and what he begets.
We have created the human being to struggle.
Does he think that no one is able to best him?
He says: "I spent so much money!"
Does he think that no one saw him?
Did We not make for him two eyes?
A tongue and two lips?
We guided him to both paths?
He should choose the better path.
Do you know which the better path is?
The freeing of slaves.
Or the feeding on a day of great hardship.
An orphan of relation.
Or a poor person in need.
Then he has become one of those who
have acknowledged,
and exhort one another
to patience,
and exhort one another
to kindness.
Those are the people of happiness.
As for those who rejected Our signs,
they are the people of misery.
Upon them is a fire closed over.

In classical versions of the Quran, this verse is called 'The Land.'
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Chapter 1
Introduction

[Tribes are] Empty vessels - albeit important, symbolic ones…’ (Longva, 2006, p.182)

We have our home. But no one wants to talk about it: ‘They are natives, they are genuine, they are the people of Kuwait.’ (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015).

But what they say... They are hiding their nationality to get some [benefit] like Kuwaitis?... Then prove it. There is no difference, we are the same people, the Kuwaiti people, they are same people. (Participant 13, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 2 April, 2014)

As a Kuwaiti, you live in a situation there are Bedoun among you, and you don’t have the right to negate them…. their existence is not up to you… These rights come by existence. They were born on Kuwaiti land, in Kuwait, so you are not Kuwaiti more than them, they are Kuwaitis as much as you are.

They are Kuwaiti and you have to accept this if you want to live in a good and prosperous country. You have to accept this inside you, even if you don’t like their background. The only option you have is to live with them peacefully. (Participant 05, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

Why did all the academic studies till now… why are they coming to some kind of line, like a common idea…? Because the same [kind of] person that is supposed to be helping them to study, they feed it [the same ideas] to the people who come from all over the world, from the outside.

They don’t have… [the] mind to answer the question, because they are not from our society. We are the nation, we are the tribes.

If we are not from Kuwait and we are not Bedouin, then what are we? If we are not Bedouin and we are not supposed to be Hadar, then what are we? If we are not from Kuwait, then we are from where? This is the main issue, it is not academic… it is not analysis. It is pure racism. Nothing more. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 5 August, 2015)

They want to put you in the ground and you suffer. You cannot imagine the feeling. (Participant 08, interview in Ahmadi, March 23, 2014)
1.1 Background

This thesis explores the identity and culture of the Bedoun, who are part of Kuwait’s Bedouin community. The Bedoun are stateless, having never received citizenship from any country. They have demanded the restoration of their right to Kuwaiti citizenship, which was previously accepted by the state of Kuwait as a national policy (Stanton Russell, 1989; Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994) used to coerce the Bedoun to settle permanently in the country. They have also demanded that their human rights be restored, and in particular, their right to education (al Hajj, 2014; al Saadi, January 3, 2012; Borqais, November 19, 2014). The Bedoun population is believed to comprise around 110,000 people (‘Over 111,000,’ 2013; 80,000 Bedoons,’ 2016), although it is possible there are unregistered Bedoun in Kuwait who have not been included in this figure.

The term Bedoun means ‘without’ in Arabic. Sometimes the group has been referred to as Bedoun Jinsiya, meaning ‘without citizenship.’ However, this terminology appears to have been introduced by outsiders trying to explain the reasons for the Bedoun’s statelessness. The findings of this study indicate that the Bedoun are almost always, locally referred without the term ‘jinsiya.’ The term Bedoun is spelt in a variety of ways in English, reflecting the Arabic term. The first spelling used by Westerners was Bedoun (Fineman, November 8, 1992; Lorch, May 12, 1991; Murphy, May 2, 1991; Wilkinson, May 20, 1991). I discuss the different usage of names for the Bedoun in Chapter 2, and the reasoning behind the local use of terms in Chapters 5 and 6.

The term Bedoun is very similar to ‘Bedouin,’ and this point appears to have confused scholars in the past. I define the term ‘Bedouin’ as Stewart (2006, p.240) applies it, to refer not only to nomadic pastoralists but also to the sedentary descendants of nomadic Bedouin, who retain connections with their ancestral culture and identity in the present day. Some authors have distinguished between the terms ‘Bedouin’ and Bedoun to caution readers not to confuse the terms, implying that the meaning of two terms have little or nothing to do with each other (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Longva, 1997, p.72, n6). The persistence of this idea only creates further misunderstanding, as the notion that the Bedoun are not Bedouin has been used historically, to justify false claims that the Bedoun are citizens of other states. This distinction of terms has been quite unhelpful, because the Bedoun are very much Kuwaiti Bedouin people (I return to this point in Chapter 2).

The field of study of the Bedoun as a stateless population is still emerging, because prior to 1986, the Bedoun population was known as part of the Kuwait's Bedouin community. They were wholly integrated within the Bedouin community and were not regarded as stateless, because Kuwaiti citizenship was expected to be granted to them imminently, as a matter of public policy (Al Anezi, 1989, p. 257; Stanton Russell, 1989,
p.34). The policy was not retracted until 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan 1994), after the Bedouin had been ethnically cleansed.

In July 1986, after a parliamentary inquiry over whether or not the Bedouin of the northern tribes (the Bedoun) should be granted citizenship or not, the National Assembly was suspended (Proceedings of the National Assembly, July 1, 1986 in Human Rights Watch, 1995; n13). The population was administratively expelled in December, 1986 (Human Rights Watch, 1995; 'The Study,' 2003). This action confirmed the government of Kuwait's intention to make the Bedoun remain stateless. Between 1986 and 1995, the Bedoun were subjected to official policies of population eradication, violent ethnic cleansing and state-sanctioned killings (Appendix C, i, ii, iii, iv, v, Appendix D i, ii, iii, iv, Appendix E, i, ii, iii, iv, v, vi, Appendix G, i, ii, iii, iv). This led to profound cultural changes within the Bedouin community. For researchers, this has meant that the population has been hard-to-reach and vulnerable to retaliation from government authorities for virtually any kind of public activity. Although the Bedoun have formed a social and intellectual leadership group, this group is vulnerable due to their being targeted with punitive measures since the Arab Spring (2011-2012).

Evidence of the Bedoun's existence in Kuwait's history and culture began to be strategically de-emphasised after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, shortly after foreign correspondents had discovered the group's existence in Kuwait. The Bedoun have been subject to the casting of Kuwait's history in a mono-ethnic nationalist (Gross, 1978) narrative that favours the opposing group, the elite, metropolitan Hadar. A background of colonialist bias toward the Bedoun and their broader ethnic group, the Kuwaiti Bedouin, remains a strong theme in the scholarly literature from a variety of disciplines (Appendix C, vi-viii). This approach has undoubtedly had a long-term influence over public perceptions of the Bedoun in Kuwait and internationally.

Until 1986, the Bedoun were regarded as 'Kuwaitis,' reflecting the government policy and practice of granting the Bedouin citizenship on the basis of their tribal affiliations (Stanton Russell, 1989). The Bedoun were known to have not yet acquired citizenship from any state, and were chosen from particular tribes, for this purpose (Alhajeri, 2004; al Fayez, 1984, p. 248, n13, 257, 258). This may go some way to explaining why the group were successfully integrated into society and readily adopted the Kuwaiti national identity into their culture. The Bedoun were previously subject to special privileges signifying a pre-citizenship status, corresponding with the government policy to provide the group with citizenship (Al Anezi, 1989, p. 257).

The Bedouin of both northern and southern regions of the Middle East had been expected to be granted citizenship by the state of Kuwait according to public policy established in 1965, coinciding with the formal Bedouin settlement program (Stanton...
Russell, 1989, p.34). The program was part of a broader, regional program to permanently settle all of the native Bedouin of the Middle East, coordinated by sovereign states and international organisations including the United Nations. These practices were a feature of the early development of international law for indigenous people enshrined in the *International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations* (1957) (ILO), the first international convention for indigenous people (Bocco, 2006, p.306; Lenzerini, 2008, p.80). Clarifications regarding Kuwait's status as a protectorate rather than an independent state in regard to this Convention are presented in Chapter 2.

Due to the influence of the town-dwelling Hadar (the opposing social or ethnic group) in government policy and national affairs during the 1960s, at the same time as the commencement of the Bedouin settlement program in Kuwait, the Nationality Law (1959) provided citizenship for the Hadar, but disadvantaged the Bedouin. All Hadar received 'original' citizenship with full voting rights. Around half of the Kuwaiti Bedouin received citizenship without voting rights (Human Rights Watch, 1995). They were deprived of voting rights initially for twenty years, which was later extended to thirty years due to organised, political action by the Hadar (in Law 130/1986, in al Anezi, 1989). The other half of the Bedouin were deprived of citizenship altogether. Yet they were continually advised by government that the national policy was to grant them citizenship, that their citizenship grants were merely delayed, and would be forthcoming at some time in the near future. This latter group subsequently became known as the ‘Bedoun,’ because they never received citizenship documents confirming that status.

The Hadar believed that they had received ‘original’ nationality, including voting rights, as the mark of an 'elite' status (al Anezi, 1989; Human Rights Watch, 1995). This special status was written into the Nationality Law of Kuwait (1959). From the time of Kuwaiti’s independence, the Hadar influenced nationality policy in Kuwait, the manner in which it was implemented, and other national policies (al Anezi, 1989, p.175, para. 2). Their political interests aimed at preventing as many Bedouin as possible from receiving Kuwaiti citizenship. Their interests lay in a form of mono-ethnic nationalism (claiming their right to ‘original’ citizenship of Kuwait for perpetuity, to the exclusion of all others) and Arab nationalism (which regarded all Hadar of the Arab world entitled to share in the wealth of the Persian Gulf). Both sets of interests conspired to ensure the Bedoun were left perpetually stateless as a matter of nationalist policy, from 1965 (al Mdaires, 2010; Stanton Russell, 1989). This policy did not manifest formally within government ranks, until 1986 ('The Study,' 2003). However, government continued to claim that citizenship would be granted to the Bedoun (Appendix A, iii).

Decree 5/1960 (al Anezi, 1989) had been passed at the outset of Kuwait's independence. It enabled a small group of the Hadar to determine who would receive
Kuwaiti citizenship on utterly subjective and discriminatory grounds. This gave the Hadar virtually, total control over the process of citizenship distribution, which explains why Bedouin citizenship of the northern tribes seems to have not been delayed, but was simply never to be forthcoming. It is questionable as to whether some members of government were even aware of the specificity to which the counter-current of anti-Bedouin policy had been developed by the Hadar (discussed in Al Anezi, 1989). Decree 5/1960 could be implemented to exclude the existing Bedouin settlers from the nation by depriving them of citizenship, even if they had sufficient proof of identity and residence to be granted citizenship, or had performed sufficient service to the country, according to the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait). Alternatively, the Decree could also be implemented to enable all Hadar to receive citizenship whether they had appropriate proof of identity and residence in Kuwait, or not.

This point is an important, new finding of the study. Al Anezi (1989) believed the policy was used against the Bedouin by the Hadar. I explain further, that the Hadar could equally use the Decree to gain citizenship for themselves when they lacked documentary proofs of residence, to bypass the qualifying provisions of the nationality law. This helps to explain the continuing victimisation of the Bedouin since the 1980s (something Al Anezi could not have foreseen at the time), as it provides a motive for the abuse of the Bedouin’s human rights and political status. As I have mentioned, the targeting of the Bedouin for deprivation of citizenship affected the members of tribes from the northern regions more that the members from the southern regions, relative to each tribal dirah (territory).

The deprivation of education formed a crucial component of the plan to deprive the Bedouin of citizenship (Alessa, 1981, p.108-109; a policy later developed further by Al Naqeeb, 1990, p.129). The Bedouin were deprived of education and the capacity to develop intellectually as an ethnic collective, in order to prevent them from discovering knowledge and awareness of their statelessness, and human rights deprivations. It was believed that the indigenous culture was ‘barren’ (Stoakes in Alessa, 1981, p.109) unproductive (Alessa, 1981, p.2) and lacking in intelligible ideology (Al Naqeeb, 1990, p.135). It was believed that if future generations of the Bedouin who were deprived of citizenship (from 1986) found ways to access education, this knowledge would lead to their political participation in the state of Kuwait, and would undoubtedly lead them to seek to recover their promised citizenship and human rights (Alessa, 1981, p.109) that had been offered as conditions of their settlement.

In order to ensure that the group remained ignorant and easy to control, a policy was formulated to radically reduce, if not cease, expenditure on the Bedouin’s education (Alessa, 1981). The policy also involved depriving Bedouin citizens of quality education (Al Moosa, 1976), but not to the same extent as the Bedouin of the northern tribes, who were the main
ethnic target due to their statelessness (Alessa, 1981). This policy became reality just five years later it was articulated by Shamlan Alessa (1981, p.108-111), when the Bedouin were administratively expelled and banned form participating in education (‘The Study,’ 1986; a copy of the policy document, published in Arabic by al Talea, is provided in Arabic, Appendix E, ii). Four years later, Khalidoun al Naqeeb (1990) published an extended form of the anti-Bedouin doctrine, setting out the ideological rationale for the policy.

This previously hidden feature of the Bedouin story, underscores the salience of this inquiry into the education of the Bedouin, and the remarkable emergence of the group banned from education in the 1980s as the community’s leadership group in the Arab Spring. The community’s leaders could not have been aware of just how specifically their intellectual development as a whole group has been targeted, amidst their expulsion from the state in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003) and again in 1991 (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p.50). However, since the Arab Spring (2011-2012), they have certainly become aware that they have been targeted due to their intellectual expression (Amnesty International, 2015a; see Table 26). They have responded to the policy of Bedouin annihilation according to the initial warnings of one of its designers, Shamlan Alessa (1981, p.109), with an extraordinary degree of clarity.

This study reveals that the deprivation of education has led to the growth of an intellectual and educational ideal among the Bedouin interviewees. New values have supplemented their ethnic identity with an intellectual identity, and an increasingly shared sense of collective consciousness. In other words, the Bedouin have found the ideology that al Naqeeb (1990) accused the Bedouin of being incapable of developing due to their 'tribal consciousness' (p.128-127). This process of cultural change appears to have led the Bedouin to begin consolidating into a new sub-ethnic group within the existing, Bedouin collective. Despite the restrictive system of cultural re-organisation (M. Secombe, personal communications, January 22, 2016) and oppression faced by the group, research participants displayed a strong sense of social solidarity and inter-group cooperation with the Bedouin citizen community in Kuwait. Their culture showed signs of positive and creative, cultural re-organisation, despite the Bedouin having endured a decades-long program of ethnic targeting (including violent ethnic cleansing and ‘status adjustment’ – the erasure of their national and ethnic identity). Ultimately, the research explored the development of Bedouin’s increasingly public, intellectual engagement with their situation, as they began to expand their participation in citizen society and to more openly challenge the Hadar-dominated narrative of national identity.

**1.2 Gaps and Limitations in the Previous Research**

The field of study of the Bedouin as a population group is still developing, because prior to 1986, the population was part of the Bedouin community in Kuwait, and they
appeared in academic studies as the Kuwaiti Bedouin. Since then, the population has been hard-to-reach (Atkinson and Flint, 2001), because it has been subjected to violent, mass human rights atrocities (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992, 1993, 1994; Amnesty International 1992, 1994, 1996) and an unprecedented level of human rights deprivations experienced by a stateless group (Weissbrodt and Collins, 2002). Although they have produced social and intellectual leaders within their community, Bedoun intellectuals have been targeted with oppressive, punitive measures since the Arab Spring (Amnesty International, 2015a; see also Chapter 8, Table 25).

In the past, scholars have usually only written a few paragraphs or pages about the Bedoun, and have not studied the group in depth. The group has tended to be studied only very briefly by Western scholars, theoretically framed as a group separate to Kuwaiti society, as foreign migrants or citizens of other states. Since the Arab Spring, they have been theoretically framed as 'protestors' (Beaugrand, 2014a, 2015) and 'activists' (Abrahamian, November 10, 2014). This framing has mirrored government policy, and reflected previous the previous approach of 'othering' of the Bedoun according to myths about their origins that claimed the Bedoun were others who were criminal 'infiltrators' (such as Longva, 1997, p.51) with a false identity (Crystal, 1992, p.75-76), specifically an ‘Iraqi’ fifth column who were enemies of the state (Ghabra, 1997a, 1997b; Tétreault and al Mughni, 1995), wrongly blaming the Bedoun for not defending the nation during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (Alhajeri, 2004). Since the Arab Spring, researchers have limited their theorisation of the population to 'protestors' (Beaugrand, 2014a, 2015) and 'activists' (Abrahamian, November 10, 2014) in increasingly narrow representations. These approaches have obscured the identity of the Bedoun who are an indigenous, tribal people of the Middle East, intentionally settled in the state, by the state, of Kuwait. While their other family members and tribal kin were slowly granted citizenship over a number of decades, the Bedoun were left ‘without’ (Bedoun means ‘without’ in Arabic).

1.3 Aims and Purpose of the Study

The aims of the study were as follows:

- To explore the personal and cultural identity of the Bedoun, through their own eyes
- To discover experiences that have helped the Bedoun to form their identity and maintain their integration in society, and experiences that have involved social exclusion and/or barriers to participation in society
- To explore in particular, their experiences in education (especially post-secondary education), the benefits and challenges of participation, and the context in which they interact with other groups
To investigate the impact of their identity status, as ‘Bedoun,’ on their interactions with other groups, such as Kuwaiti citizens (Bedouin and Hadar) and other nationals

To discover thoughts and feelings of the Bedoun about their achievements, obstacles, rights, obligations and duties within their family, the Bedoun social circle and in citizen society

There were a number of purposes for the study. Most of the literature identified the Bedoun as having an identity that was not genuine. On the one hand, they were accepted as Bedouin people to a limited extent, but their relationship to Kuwait could not be pinpointed; on the other hand, they were concretely labelled ‘citizens’ and ‘infiltrators’ of other countries pretending to be stateless (Longva, 1997, p.51), and/or people who were not Bedouin, but pretending to be Bedouin (Shultziner and Tétreault, 2012, p.283 – 284). An academic consensus has formed around the notion that the Bedoun are criminals from ‘somewhere else,’ which conforms with government policy the group are ‘illegal’ due to their identity. Therefore, the main purpose of the study was to establish the identity of the Bedoun, through their own eyes (Znaniecki, 1982; Smollicz and Secombe, 1981).

One of the reasons that a cultural perspective was taken, was to learn more about the Bedoun as a whole group. A cultural perspective views people as usually identifying on the basis of their belonging to a cultural group (Znaniecki, 1952b) and with their local social groups rather than national or transnational cultural groups (Gross, 1978) although there may be exceptions to this in view of globalisation. The perspective is particularly helpful for framing a collective that has been expelled by the state in which they live and are therefore, are not defined as belonging to a nation by others. In Kuwait, the ‘official’ version of the national identity belongs to the dominant ethnic group, the Hadar. The Hadar oppose the presence of all Bedouin in Kuwait, and resent their participation as citizens in the state (al Anezi, 1989; Alhajeri, 2004; Dashti, Khandari, and al Abdullah, 2014). Therefore, another purpose of the study sought to better understand the Bedoun as part of the broader cultural collective in which they live, beyond the state’s attempt to sever the stateless Bedoun from the citizen Bedouin population.

Most academics writing about Kuwaiti society have only contributed a few paragraphs about the group, or they have not had direct or sustained contact with the Bedoun. Exceptions to this general rule include Abrahamian (2015), Beaugrand (2010), Lund-Johanssen (2014) who have had conducted field research. Only Beaugrand (2010, 2011, 2015a, 2015b) and myself (Kennedy, 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2015b) have attempted doctoral studies on the Bedoun. Alternatively, two humanitarian groups have been in contact with the Bedoun for some twenty-five years (Amnesty International, 1992; Human Rights Watch, 1991a), but these contacts have tended to have been disconnected by changes in staff and fieldwork respondents, and limited to the collection of data about human rights
violations. Human rights reports have performed a very important role to date, but they have not indicated the nature of the Bedoun’s everyday interactions in society with their own families, social circle or other groups, nor do they tell us why the Bedoun were mistreated, or how they came to be made stateless. Therefore, another purpose of the study was to better understand the nature of the Bedoun’s everyday social interactions through their participation in education, and to explore some of the deeper questions arising from their social exclusion and victimisation.

Another purpose of the study was the social justice prerogative, to help the Bedoun to voice the concerns they have about their capacity to survive as a cultural group, and as targeted individuals. This prerogative was aligned well with the final research question (see Chapter 4), which sought to explore the research participant’s social relationships, and to provide them an opportunity to speak about their experiences in social roles in everyday, ordinary contexts. This personal and nuanced data provided a counter-narrative to the recent, narrow framing of the entire Bedoun population as ‘activists’ and ‘protestors’ (Abrahamian, 2015; Beaugrand, 2014a, 2015b; Lund-Johanssen, 2014).

1.4 The Theoretical Framework
This thesis uses a sociological framework, principally based on the humanistic sociology and cultural theory of Florian Znaniecki (1924, 1952, 1952a, 1952b). The humanistic sociology of Felix Gross (1978, 1998) provided the framework for ethnic social structure, multiple identifications, tribal identity and tribal social solidarity. Nationalist ideologies formed an important aspect of theorisation (Znaniecki, 1952a; Smith, 1983, 1986, 1991, 1999), elucidating the nature of ethnic targeting of the Bedoun across multiple spheres, including at the social and intellectual levels. Znaniecki (1952b) and Gross (1978) framed the production of knowledge in a nationalist context, which was highly relevant to the Bedoun’s situation.

Znaniecki’s (1952a) theory of cultural disorganisation and re-organisation accounted for the processes of ‘othering’ expressed through the increasing value conformity of citizens, policies of prohibition and criminalisation, and specific population eradication practices. I drew on other theorists to support my explanation of stigmatisation and ethnic targeting in personal, social relations, including labelling theory and stigmatisation in addition (Becker, 1983; Ginsberg, 1996; Goffman, 1963; Sigona, 2005, 2009, 2011), and theories accounting for ethnic targeting, ethnic cleansing and genocide (Fein, 2007; Lemkin, 1944; Mann, 2005; Short, 2016). The reason for my applying the latter, was due to the gravity of the Bedoun’s collective history and ongoing experiences, which I believed, demanded theorization about the physical and cultural destruction of whole population groups, but also due to a desire to account for the social causes of the conflict that arose in personal interactions, that were related to and sustained the Bedoun’s statelessness, about which the interviewees provided rich data. The need to delve into interactionalist theories of social relations was evident from
the first days of my fieldwork, when I began to encounter the problem of the secluded Bedoun who consciously managed their identity and public exposure, due to the levels of stigma they faced. I selected interactionist theories (thus, compatible with Znaniecki, 1952a), informed by successful studies in the field of statelessness. Still, this new cultural pattern was inevitably tied to the broader sweep of historcial, ethnic cleansning and genocidal intent, which the theory of cultural systems (Znanecki, 1952a) might help me draw together.

Theory of creative re-organisation (Znaniecki, 1952a) framed the growth of the educational ideal, intellectual identity and the impetus toward self-education. These positive inputs into culture are an expression of the value that a cultural group holds for its own membership (Halas, 2010; Znaniecki, 1952a, 1986). Halas (1989, 2007, 2010) and Znaniecki (1939, 1952a, 1955, 2007) also explained the formation of new relationships within and between groups, including cross-cultural fertilisation as part of creative and innovative expansion within cultures, and communications between cultures. I engaged briefly with some additional ideas to speculate as to how these expansive influences might have been introduced into the local context, since the Bedoun’s description of social actions were characterised by an unspoken, non-violent philosophy and a flexible, cooperative attitude toward other groups, including their oppressors. I framed the group’s self-education and growth of collective consciousness in terms of their active citizenship (Bayat, 2012, 2013), true generosity (Freire, p.91, 120, 121), and steadfast perseverance (Shehadeh, in Said, 1986). These theories contain a good dose of idealism. The Bedoun interview data attests to role of idealism in the liberation of the mind and the strength of the human spirit.

1.5 The Methodological Approach

This thesis draws on multiple empirical research methods including fieldwork with the Bedoun in Kuwait, participant observation, photography and historical documents discussed in the previous literature. I used thematic analysis (Guest, et al., 2012; Guest, et al., 2013) to analyse the interview data, which formed one the key parts of the discussion. I also used thematic analysis to analyse literature from a range of primary and secondary sources. This enabled me to consolidate additional information spread across a number of disciplines and genres (in Appendices B-G), which I then used in the discussion to account for gaps in the literature and to support the interviewees’ accounts. There was a necessarily strong focus on fieldwork and access to the Bedoun population in Kuwait, which was characterised by being hidden (Spreen, 1992) and hard-to-reach (Atkinson and Flint, 2001) due to their marginalisation and intergenerational suffering. I interviewed respondents during fieldwork in Kuwait in early 2014, and until mid 2016. I sought to interpret the interviewee’s descriptions as the Bedoun’s ‘social reality’ (Halas, 2010) from their own
perspective, through the dynamic of the humanistic coefficient (Znaniecki, 1934; Halas, 2010, p.55).

1.6 The Findings and Main Contribution of the Thesis

The discussion of findings is set out in four chapters. Chapter Five sets out the results derived mainly from the interview data, but some participant observation data is also featured. The chapter is divided into two sections, the demographic data and the thematically analysed interview findings. The demographic data comprises new findings, as Bedoun data derived from interviewees does not seem to have been presented systematically in previous studies, beyond a schedule of interviews shown by Beaugrand (2010).

Chapter 6 concerns the ethnic identity and culture of the Bedoun, which is essentially a tribal culture, indigenous to the Middle East, but also uniquely 'Kuwaiti.' To some extent, the traditional cultural values of the Bedoun have remained preserved due to the Bedoun lacking in nationalist indoctrination as citizens participating in state institutions, and due to their integration in their tribal families and communities, which acts as a natural compensation for the absence of provision of state protection and state resources (Gross, 1998). I explore the processes of ethnic identity development and ethnic change and development described by the interviewees. This includes their absorption of the national identity and connections to the Bedouin community as a whole.

Chapter 7 describes the process of social exclusion and ethnic targeting of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society. I discuss the experiences of the interviewees gained in their social interactions in citizen society, and describe the cultural patterning (Znaniecki, 1952a) of these interactions. The interviewee data pointed to an anti-Bedouin ideology experienced by the Bedoun at the social level symbolized by Goffman's (1963) tribal stigma. The social environment generated an acute consciousness of identity management strategies required by the Bedoun interviewees, in order to avoid conflict. This was due to the vulnerability that their statelessness attracts in everyday social settings in citizen society.

As part of this chapter, also considered the program of government actions, prohibitions and punitive restrictions, including ethnic cleansing (1990-1995) and the ‘status adjustment’ program of identity erasure (1983-) in depth. These government actions were understood through the lens of local, nationalist ideologies that attempt to force an alternative identity onto the group, which can be observed in representations of the Bedoun produced by previous authors which stigmatised the group’s identity and promoted notions of cultural hygiene (see Chapter 2). I conclude that the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program is likely a program of incremental ethnic cleansing, or worse (I support this conclusion with in-depth data analyses, provided in Appendices).

Chapter 8 is concerned with the creative re-organisation of the Bedoun culture. It describes the growth of intellectual ideal and identity indicated in the interview data, and the
development of educational experience and intellectual leadership. The Bedoun’s ideal of
genuine citizenship is explored, including the research participants consciousness of their
collective oppression. I explain that the high value of the tribal, cultural collective persists
because it offers the group protection that the state cannot provide, and connects their values
based in traditional society with the universal values of human rights. I argue that this
process has given rise to a new vision of society.

Chapter 9 summarises the contributions of the thesis to a variety of disciplines and
areas of study, and recommendations for future researchers exploring the Bedoun
community in Kuwait and the diaspora. I suggest how the Bedoun can be included within
the United Nations framework to ensure their protection, including specific efforts to ensure
that the United Nations and Kuwait’s international partners begin to share some degree of
responsibility for the future social and cultural development of the Bedoun within Kuwait, as
other states have witnessed the breach of international norms of human rights norms by
Kuwait for decades, while the majority of the Bedoun population has been eliminated by the
state.

This study also contributes newly organised and synthesised secondary source
information in the set of Appendices. There has been very little sharing of raw data
collected from the Bedoun by previous researchers and/or investigating international
humanitarian agencies, particularly Human Rights Watch (1995) who claimed to have
conducted in-depth interviews with around five hundred Bedoun. For this reason, I included
the transcript data used for the thematic analysis in Appendix A. Cultural themes
representing the Bedoun can be found there.

Additional secondary data was collated attempting to establish a more detailed
collection of facts and analyses about the Bedoun population, required to substantiate the
historical accounts of interviewees and to develop my arguments. This provided new
findings separate to the thesis discussion, such as, demonstrating the entrapment of the
Bedoun by the state of Kuwait from 1965, confirming that the ethnic cleansing of the
Bedoun of the early 1990s actually took place, and that it was a staged implementation of
population policy rather than merely a post-war ‘reaction’ to the invasion by Iraq, as well as
my analyses of the ‘status adjustment’ program of identity erasure (administrative ethnic
cleansing: Weissbrodt, 2008).

This data may be of use to the community, future researchers and agencies,
particularly for future claims in international law. The background data from which I drew
this information was also collected and organised systematically, although some of it
reflected an in-progress status recommended by Guest, Mac Queen, and Namey (2012).
Data from this project, including the interview content used for thematic analysis, will be
archived at the Australian Data Archive at the Australian National University, after the thesis
examination. This will preserve the data and to prevent future loss of information about the Bedoun's cultural and physical existence (see the Acknowledgements section).

1.7 The Thesis Outline

The thesis is arranged according to the following Chapters:

Chapter One introduces the background of the topic, previous approaches by other authors, and the issues arising from that work. It describes the aims and purposes of the study, the theoretical and methodological approaches and the structure of the thesis document.

Chapter Two analyses the previous literature about the Bedoun. I analyse very briefly, some of the important definitions of the Bedoun, including representations of the group that may have mystified readers in the past, the settlement of the Bedouin and some aspects of international human rights law pertaining to this process, Bedoun segregation policies (depriving the Bedoun of land, citizenship and education), and destructive policies deployed against the group (including administrative expulsion and ethnic cleansing).

Chapter Three explores the different theories discussed above, in greater detail. I mainly utilise the humanistic sociology of Florian Znaniecki (1934, 1952a, 1952b), Elzbieta Halas (2006, 2010) and Felix Gross (1978, 1999), with the addition of some other theories to compare, contrast or reinforce these ideas in the discussion.

Chapter Four refers to the methods used in the research from the qualitative paradigm, including data collection via interviews, participant observation, photography and documentary research and the thematic analysis method.

Chapter Five included an overview of the results derived mainly from the interview transcripts, along with limited participant observation data.

Chapter 6 discusses the multiple ethnic identity of the Bedoun from the interview data. This included multiple levels of identification and an emphasis on traditional Bedouin values and strong family relationships. The Central Apparatus 'status adjustment' is introduced as a factor impacting the ethnic and national identity of the Bedoun.

Chapter 7 discusses marginalisation, social exclusion and ethnic targeting of the Bedoun. It focuses on the Bedoun's experiences of social interactions in Kuwaitis society, and the influence of anti-Bedouin ideology, government programs and restrictions on cultural patterning including 'status adjustment' as a form of administrative ethnic cleansing.

Chapter 8 discussed the growth of intellectual ideal and identity and the development of educational experience and intellectual leadership, pointing to the creative re-organisation of Bedoun culture. The emergence of a collective national consciousness and the Bedoun's awareness of their human rights deprivations through self-education, is also discussed.
Chapter 9 summarises the contributions and recommendations for future researchers, including the community in Kuwait and the diaspora.

Appendix A includes the thematic analysis data derived from the interviews. Appendix B-G includes consolidated historical information and additional data analysis. Appendix H includes photographs of the areas where the Bedoun have lived in Kuwait. Appendix I includes additional methodological data discussed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 2
The Kuwaiti Bedoun in the Literature

In the collective imagination as it is perceived through the documents available to the historian, the world of the steppe (and/or the desert) is opposed to the world of the city as nature opposes culture. No wonder that, since most of the documents appear to have been developed by and for "urban," the history of the steppe has always been considered as the point of view of the city: the man of the steppe is the wild one that is mobile with respect to civilized man, fixed on earth. This is the nomad, opposed to sedentary (Briant, 1982: 9-15). Like the territory it occupies, it inspires fear, a fear that is largely a fear of the unknown. (Nomad Magnified, the Nomadic Mystified: Views on the History of the Steppe, Aurenche, 1993, at para.3)

Introduction
This survey of the literature about the Bedoun of Kuwait briefly explores some different definitional terms used to describe the group, and the context of the Bedoun’s position in society as an expression of the Bedouin-Hadar social cleavage. Therefore, I also review literature about the alienation of the Bedouin (including both the Kuwaiti Bedoun and Kuwaiti citizens) in Kuwaiti society, and how the decision was made to ensure the Bedoun would be deprived of citizenship. In the absence of extended fieldwork with the group, the Bedoun have been represented by scholars in a variety of ways, most of them reflecting government policy, criminalizing and/or diminishing the authenticity of the groups’ identity (Kennedy, 2015a). The same themes used to disparage the Bedoun in scholarly definitions, have also been directed toward citizen Bedouin. Additionally, literature about the Bedoun in all fields has consistently (to my knowledge, uniformly) omitted knowledge of the regional strategies employed to settle all Bedouin of the Middle East during the 1950s and 1960s, and the recognition of their indigenous status since 1957 (International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations (1957) (ILO), in Bocco, 2006, p.306) which led to virtually all other Bedouin in the region receiving citizenship on permanent settlement.

Some social scientists have studied the development of thinking about the Bedouin who settled in other states in the light of this recognition, and found a great deal of resistance among metropolitan, Hadar scholars (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006). Additionally, most scholars who have specialised in studies of the Bedouin have often merely observed their societies at a distance, without considering the Bedouin’s values or opinions, or the complexity and subtlety of their cultural system (Lancaster and Lancaster, 1998; Alshawi and Gardner, 2014). In turn, this has negatively influenced representations of the Bedouin penned by academics (Lancaster and Lancaster, 1988). In this study, I discuss this problem in terms of regional (Middle Eastern) development models applied to the Bedouin, which contributed to the rise of anti-Bedouin ideologies related to settlement programs in Kuwait.
By examining this regional phenomenon at the local level, I reveal how discursive strategies shifted the collective identity of the Bedoun to a completely different population segment.

I also briefly describe key segregation policies focused on the deprivation of education and citizenship, and three of the major programs that were aimed toward physical and cultural destruction of the Bedoun population. The programs include the administrative expulsion of the Bedoun (1986) (‘The Study,’ 2003) and violent ethnic cleansing (1990-1995) (Fineman, November 2, 1992), which have reduced the size of the group by up to two thirds, over the last 25 years (Human Rights Watch, 1995; ‘Over 111,000,’ 2013). I also refer to the ‘status adjustment’ program (1983-) (the term used by the government of Kuwait, see ‘7,828 Illegal,’ 2016), which I previously discussed in a summary of my research findings in 2015 (Kennedy, 2015a). ‘Status adjustment’ erases the national and ethnic identity of the Bedoun via administrative procedures. It has accompanied 'adjustments' to the national census (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994) and has involved government pressuring the Bedoun to accept the attribution of false identities and false identity documentation (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006), making the Bedoun appear to be citizens of other states. The programs was actually commenced prior to the administrative expulsion, and has continued to be implemented as an incremental method of erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing: Weissbrodt, 2008).

2.1 Definitions of the Bedoun of Kuwait

Some degree of confusion has arisen over the similar spelling of 'Bedouin' with 'Bedoun,' and the use of multiple spellings in English, of 'Bedoun.' Human Rights Watch (1995) defined the group as:

The word ‘Bedoon’ is from the Arabic phrase ‘bedoon jinsiyya,’ literally meaning either ‘without nationality’ or ‘without citizenship.’ The term should not be confused with the English word Bedouin, from the Arabic word ‘badawi,’ meaning nomad (the plural is ‘badu,’ or the more colloquial ‘bidwan’). Although many of the Bedoons are of Bedouin origin, most of them have long settled in the urban centers of Kuwait, and many have never lived a nomadic life. (Human Rights Watch, 1995)

As I mentioned in the introduction of this research, the term 'jinsiya' is not usually attached to 'Bedoun' in common usage in Kuwait, based on my experience. Furthermore, despite the cautionary tone of the Human Rights Watch (1995) definition with reference to language terms, it is important to remember that the Bedoun are Bedouin. Longva’s (1997, p.72, n6) point that the term 'Bedoun' should not be confused with 'Bedouin' was provided out of the context of the passage above, from which it was derived. Her depiction of the group as imposters (Longva, 1997, p.51) was enhanced by this statement, rendering it somewhat
confusing and perhaps even misleading to readers. The Bedoun are Bedouin (I have never found an exception during my interactions with the Bedoun community), and therefore the terms have as much similarity as difference between each other, although it is merely a coincidence that the two terms have similar spelling.

In the first extended discussion of the Bedoun by an international humanitarian agency, Human Rights Watch (1991a, p.51) did not use the term 'jinsiya.' It appears that Crystal (1992, p.75, 1995, p.182) first used the term, followed by Human Rights Watch (1995) and later, Beaugrand (2010, p.18). The joining of the words appears to have been a Western scholarly construction rather than a term used in Kuwait; early Kuwaiti authors writing about the group such as al Moosa (1976) and al Anezi (1989), did not use the term Bedoun Jinsiya, although they used the term 'stateless' (al Anezi, 1989, p.255; al Moosa, 1976, p.158). The Bedoun refer to themselves simply as ‘Bedoun,’ ‘Kuwaiti desert-dweller,’ ‘sons of the desert,’ or other terms reflecting different phases of nomadism and settlement (Dickson, 1949, p.109; al Fayez, 1984, p.257-8; al Anezi, 1989, p.174-175; Al Waqayan, 2009). The status of the current generations having acquired no grant of nationality has been passed on from their descendants.

Aside from the similarity between 'Bedouin' and 'Bedoun,' and the use of the term 'Bedoun Jinsiya' there are also many spellings of the term ‘Bedoun.’ As I discussed at the outset of this thesis (in Chapter 1), in this research I have adopted the spelling first used by Westerns in Kuwait translating the term into English, used by foreign correspondents, the Arab Times, and the United Nations Security Council (July 2, 2004 and June 30, 2005), which is still used by the Arab Times in Kuwait. The spelling 'Bedoon' is used by the official government news agency, KUNA, and The Kuwait Times (also Gasperini, August 20, 1991 and Human Rights Watch, 1991, 1995). Other spellings are also used, such as Bidoun (Wilkinson, May 20, 1992) and Bidoon (Kohn, March 24, 2011; U.K. Home Office, 2016) and these spellings appear in quotes by different authors, throughout this thesis.

The term 'Bidun' with and without capitalisation (Amnesty International, 1992; Beaugrand, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Crystal, 1992, p.75, 1995, p.182; 2005, p.174) is also used, but it has a very different and distinct meaning. Human Rights Watch (2000, 2011, 2016) adopted the spelling after having used the term 'Bedoon' since 1991 (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1995). The term 'Bidun' does not refer to the term 'Bedoun' ('Bidoon' or 'Bedoon') meaning 'without,' but to bidunville or bidonville, a French term used to describe African 'slum-dwellers' of French Morrocco and Algeria who lived in homes constructed from oil drums (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009, meaning: 'tin can city'). The term has quite insulting connotations in Arab culture, because it implies the Bedoun should be known as 'slum-dwellers;' al Naqeeb, 1990, p.134, para 3, made an obtuse but especially derogatory reference). Most of the Bedoun are poor, but they do not live in 'slums.' 'Slums' is a word
usually associated with lack of cleanliness and order, as well as impoverishment. This certainly does not apply to Bedoun settlements, regardless of how impoverished the group may be. Additionally, the term 'bidun' has been applied to people of other cultures, but it does not seem to have ever been used to describe ethnic Bedouin in other settings. The persistence of the use of the French term in English academic literature appears to have similarities with the approach of some authors in the urban development paradigm, that is, scholars who argued for the eradication of Bedouin desert settlements by claiming the Bedoun lived in uncivilized, unhygienic, disorderly, slum conditions (see below, section 2.6.1 and 2.6.2).

In relation to the reference to nomadism by Human Rights Watch (1995), it is worth noting that Bedouin identity has never ceased due to permanent, urban settlement. Nor should settlement be conflated with nomadism per se (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014; al Rasheed, 2015). It is well established that Bedouins have retained their identity, including an interest in preserving their tribal heritage, in contemporary times (Cole, 2003; al Fahad, 2004, Marx, 2012, Alshawi and Gardner, 2014). This includes the stateless and citizen Bedouin who live in Kuwait (Kareem, March 10, 2013; al Rasheed, 2004, 2015). By tracing the Kuwaiti literature back to the time prior to the Bedoun being separated from the citizen Bedouin by virtue of their statelessness, it is quite clear that Bedoun were a sub-group solely derived from the Bedouin ethnic group, separated by carefully rationalised and planned segregation policies (see al Moosa, 1976). I test this idea via application of the ethnic theory of Felix Gross (1978) in Chapter 6.

The Bedou were also described as divided into sub-groups (Human Rights Watch, 1995), as follows:

1. Those who were unable to prove continuous settlement in Kuwait from 1920, as the law required
2. Those who could have registered but neglected to do so
3. Those who applied for nationality and were accepted for consideration but the case has never been acted on by authorities
4. Children of stateless parents including those with Kuwaiti citizen mothers
5. Those who migrated from neighbouring countries to work and lost links to their country of origin

This definition (Human Rights Watch, 1995) was never intended to be a sociological description of the group, but for the purpose of attracting attention to the deprivation of the Bedoun's human rights. Nevertheless, it was an in-depth and authoritative definition accepted by scholars. The key points were to a great extent, based upon arguments and materials in al Anezi’s (1989) work (though they were not referenced). However it is notable that regarding the last point – ‘those who migrated,’ the Bedoun were always
stateless, and had not been granted nationality by other states prior to their being recruited to live near to Kuwait City (al Moosa 1976, p.187).

The description above from Human Rights Watch (1995) was subsequently used as an authoritative definition of the social group by Alnajjar (2001, p.190, n3); Alhajeri (2004, p.87, n51); and al Nakib, F., (2014, p.12, n34). Longva (1997, p.72, n6) adopted sections of the text (‘not to be confused with Bedouins’); Shultziner and Tëtreault (2012, p.284) elaborated on it (‘those who had refused to register or came to Kuwait later remained bidun’). The Bedoun have become known by so many different terms, that scholars may have found their identity difficult to establish. What is undeniable however, is that the nature of the different terms used has tended toward making the group appear to be both unknown, and to no longer exist (see Appendix B, ii, Table B2 and Appendix C, i, Table C1 for lists of traditional referents and government-imposed labels that have been used by scholars).

The Kuwaiti Bedoun are the descendants of Bedouin tribes-people who settled permanently in Kuwait. They are native to the region (Weissbrodt, 2008). They include members of the main tribes of Kuwait whose traditional lands (dirah) stretch across vast regions of the Middle East (Raswan, 1930; see Appendix B, i). The Bedoun were never granted nationality after their permanent settlement in Kuwait. Therefore, some authors call them bidoun jinsiya, which means ‘without nationality’ or ‘without citizenship’ in Arabic (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

The Bedoun’s statelessness is the key factor that distinguishes the group from their ethnic majority, the Bedouin of Kuwait. Many of the Bedoun are family members of Kuwaiti citizen Bedouin and/or share the same tribal membership (Human Rights Watch, 1995). They were regarded as ‘Kuwaitis’ by the government of Kuwait, reflecting the policy to provide them citizenship, which spanned from 1965 until approximately 1985 (marking the introduction of ‘Kuwaitization policy’). Previous commitments the government had made to the Bedoun promising citizenship would be granted to them were numerous. I found reference to these commitments spread across many sources; they are listed Appendix B, iii. They were assumed to be members of the Bedouin tribes of Kuwait until 1983 (al Anezi, 1989, p.263) when measures to change their identity were first introduced. However, the policy was not officially ended until 1992 (Stanton-Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994), even though the government of Kuwait began to impose ‘status adjustment’ via national identity re-labelling from 1983 (Al Anezi, 1989, p.263, n132), and administratively expelled the group in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003).

The Bedoun are characterised by their tribal heterogeneity, although this has been used to imply that the group was diluted with a range of different kinds of people (Longva, 1997). Rather, the Bedoun comprise members of a range of many different tribes and tribal
confederations, including those known locally as the ‘Kuwaiti tribes’ (al Shayeji, 1988; Alhajeri, 2004). All of the tribes are transnational and there is no tribe that ever held land under customary law, exclusively in Kuwait. This can be seen in the tribal maps by Raswan (1930), who drew explored the area and detailed maps of the Arabian tribal lands for National Geographic. There are some tribes that have no stateless members at all, because all members received citizenship in Kuwait (Beaugrand, 2010). But most are mixed, comprising some citizens, and some stateless members, of varying proportions.

Citizen women who marry Kuwaiti Bedoun men have stateless children (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The children initially receive benefits equivalent to citizens, until they reach the age of twenty-one. The number of these pairings is not insubstantial. Al Mughni (1996) cited the number of citizen women married to foreign husbands at 7,000 in 1993; Human Rights Watch (1995, ‘Summary of findings, para. 5) cited around 30,000 Bedoun were spouses of Kuwaiti citizen women or children of Kuwaiti citizen women.

2.2 The Origins of the Bedouin-Hadar Social Cleavage

Only al Anezi (1989), and Alhajeri (2004) appear to have seriously questioned the role of Hadar nationalist narratives in the marginalisation of the Bedouin population, and for this reason, their contributions are crucial for gaining a balanced perspective of Kuwaiti society. Al Anezi (1989) described the Bedouins of the desert in Kuwait’s territory as one of the two groups of people ‘indigenous’ to Kuwait:

The indigenous Kuwaitis divided themselves into two groups, the merchants who had lived with in the enclosure of the old city of Kuwait (or within the ‘walls of the City of Kuwait’) and others, including Bedouins of the desert. (al Anezi, 1989, p.174)

Al Anezi (1989) described a deep cultural divide between the Bedouin and the Hadar (city-dwelling) groups. He pointed out that ‘those from within ‘the wall’ or ‘the fortress,’” (al Sour, which is Kuwait City) who called themselves ‘the elite’ (Al Anezi, 1989, p. 175, 248) were the Hadar, city-dwelling people who became the politically and economically dominant class in Kuwaiti society. The population of Hadar town dwellers within the wall were of mixed Arab-Asian-African-Persian heritage (Longva, 1997), immigrants who arrived after the Bani Khalid and the Bani Utub tribes, prior to Kuwait gaining British Protectorate status. According to al Anezi (1989), the Hadar elite used their power to influence the structure, purpose and implementation of the Nationality Law in 1959 p.175, para.2. The Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) was drawn up prior to the British conferring independence on the Protectorate in 1961. By the time it was produced, the British were losing their grip on the Arab world due to the regional assertion of Arab
nationalism, which flourished in Egypt (Houraini, 1991), from where the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) was imported (al Anezi, 1989).

Consequently, the rise of Arab nationalism had a substantial impact on the Bedoun, by way political pressure and the development of an intellectual milieu in Kuwait that was generally speaking, positioned toward rationalising the elitism and exclusive cultural membership of the Kuwaiti and other Arab national Hadar, and justifying the ethnic targeting and exclusion of the Bedouin, including the Bedoun. Unfortunately, the Hadar term (al hadharah) has sometimes been used to conflate ‘sedentary’ economic production with the terms ‘urban’ and ‘civilization’ and ‘civilized,’ which has fed the Hadar misconception that the group is more ‘civilised’ than others, by virtue of their self-identification as Hadar, but particularly in opposition to the Bedouin regardless of their location in urban, semi-urban or non-urban environments (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006).

2.3 The Alienation of the Bedouin in Kuwaiti Society

Alhajeri (2004, p.14, 34, n2) described the exclusion of the Bedouin from Kuwait City by the Hadar as represented by the symbol of the city wall, which had always been the basis of Bedouin-Hadar antagonism, citing, ‘The reluctance of the Kuwait hadhar [Hadar] to accept that application of Kuwaiti identity and nationality [could apply to] for the badu [Bedouin]’ (p.15) was responsible for the ethnic cleavage. He explained,

Those outside the wall were primarily the badu of the area, who have been seen by those who lived within the boundary of the wall that they are outsiders not and entitled to gaining a Kuwaiti nationality. Adding to this problem is the attribution of the name of the original town of Kuwait to the state of Kuwait. This increased the feeling of alienation of the bedu from their being unable to identify with the name [i.e. the fortress they were not allowed to enter]; while aggravating the possessiveness of urban Kuwaitis toward what they considered their own city with their active exclusion of the badu. (Alhajeri, 2004, p.33-34; parentheses added)

It is salient that both al Anezi (1989) and Alhajeri (2004) pointed out the rejection by the Hadar community of any Bedouin from outside the city wall. On the one hand, the actual identity of all Bedouin in the territory of Kuwait was never established for the purpose of including them in a national census, or providing them citizenship. The Hadar rejected the actual territory of Kuwait and its occupants (the Bedouin) as part of the nation-state or city-state to which they (the Hadar) controlled the distribution of citizenship. Additionally, it is also claimed that the Bedouin who arrived ‘later’ in Kuwait were given citizenship over and above the Bedouin who were already there (al Nakib, 2014), and it is well known that some of the tribal people who were given citizenship after Kuwait’s independence were already citizens of Saudi Arabia (al Haddad, 1981; Crystal, 1995). Some of the oldest
Bedouin families in Kuwait not granted citizenship (al Nakib, 2014), remain stateless, part of the Bedoun sub-group of the Kuwaiti Bedouin tribes.

The Bedoun have been implicitly rejected in the Hadar nationalist narrative of the *al Sour*, although this has not been openly acknowledged by previous authors. Examples of this approach include the recount of the *al Sour* narrative as part of the social context in which the Bedoun have become stateless while still referring to the Bedoun as illegal residents in a positivist fashion (al Anezi, 1989). It appears that al Anezi (1989) was trying to point out that the Bedouin who did not receive Kuwaiti citizenship (the Kuwaiti Bedoun) were overlooked *because* they lived in the desert territory of Kuwait, and not within the city wall. A legal scholar, he pointed out that cultural exclusion was the pre-requisite for the Bedouin’s exclusion in law. The Hadar were the principal architects delimiting the Bedouin desert camps on the perimeter and even within Kuwait City, and imposing the conditions of settlement on them (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). The expanse of the Kuwait desert and steppe was culturally disowned by the Hadar who feared the Bedouin (al Anezi, 1989) and thus, people from desert areas were excluded for the purpose of distributing citizenship, even notification about the opportunity. This knowledge helps to explain why the Hadar were first and most rapidly granted citizenship prior to the Bedouin, and why many Bedouin did not register (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

This state of cultural rejection of the territory of Kuwait and its people was expressed in ‘desertization’ (al Ansari, 1994, in Ghabra, 1997a, 1997b; also Tétreault, 2001, 2003; Shultziner and Tétreault, 2012, p.285). This may leave the Bedouin with a historical entitlement to claim belonging to their territory of the state and the benefit of its resources. The Bedouin were recognised as indigenous to the Middle East by the *International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations* (1957) (ILO) (Bocco, 2006, p.306). Their customary right is reflected in the names historically assigned to the Kuwaiti Bedouin (*Badiat al Kuwayt*) and ‘Sons of the desert’ (*Abna al badiyya*). A list of the collective names that the Bedouin have been referred to historically, can be found in Appendix B, ii.

### 2.4 Representations of the Bedoun

#### 2.4.1 The ‘expatriate’ Bedouin.

Crystal (1992, 1995) presented one of the first, very brief accounts of the Bedou after Human Rights Watch (1991a) and Lesch (1991) had located the group in Kuwait at the end of the Iraq war. At the time, the group had already been identified as victims of ethnic cleansing (Fineman, November 2, 1992) and ethnic purification (Evans, February 28, 1991), and were suffering from human rights deprivations of an extraordinary magnitude (see Human Rights Watch 1991a, 1992). Crystal (1992) was one of many international scholars who have argued carefully and circuitously to define the Bedou as citizens of other states. The researcher explained that the Kuwaiti Bedouin lived ‘on the edge of illegality’ and, ‘fell
through the cracks, becoming stateless bidun jinsiyah (without nationality)’ (Crystal, 1992, p.75). The author explained that the Bedoun:

> Includes at one end, people who would legally have received Kuwaiti citizenship but whose fathers or grandfathers never registered them with government and, at the other, expatriate workers who opportunely lost their passports and hoped to better their economic lot by blending into and hoping for eventual mass naturalisation of the bidun. (Crystal, 1992, p.75-76)

Crystal (1992) did not substantiate her claims about the Bedoun being expatriates from other countries hiding their identity, acting as imposters and pretending to be Bedoun. Her narrative about the Bedoun was unreferenced. Only one reference presented in her passage on the Bedoun (al Haddad (1981), actually referred to citizen Bedouin of the Ajman tribe, who were apparently granted dual citizenship by both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (no documentary evidence was shown by al Haddad (1981) either, but the thesis has been often-quoted as an authoritative work and the ethnographic narrative is convincing). Crystal’s (1992) Bedoun narrative reflected the government policy toward the Bedoun at the time. On the one hand, it elaborated one point of the multi-point definition that later appeared in Human Rights Watch (1995) about the Bedoun failing to register with government. On the other, the definition criminalized the group and questioned their collective identity. In the post-Iraq war years, Crystal (1995) tightened her definition to criminalize the group further:

> The catchall of the group also included the more opportunistic, who had discarded valid passports in the hope of becoming Kuwaiti in order to benefit from the state’s wealth, as well as others with no other home who considered themselves Kuwaiti. Those whose papers were not in order could not slip through the bureaucratic cracks created by the invasion. (Crystal 1995, p.167)

Rather than benefiting from the state’s wealth, the group had at that time been subject to violent ethnic cleansing and killing, as I have mentioned above. Crystal (1995) instead seems to have inferred the Bedoun would be busy using the war to dishonestly acquire citizenship. Once again, the claim about the Bedoun was purely speculative. Crystal’s (1995, p.167) portrayal of the Bedoun as ‘opportunistic’ was not unique – she also portrayed all Kuwaiti citizens as opportunists suffering from entitlement, specifically ‘Arab entitlement’ (Crystal, 1992, p.83, 85, 86, 134).

2.4.2 The ‘human pool’ and ‘Iraqi’ Bedoun.

Despite the lack of evidence for claims the Bedoun population being made up of expatriates and opportunists posing as stateless Kuwaitis (Crystal, 1992, p.75-6), Longva
(1997) appeared to take Crystal’s description as a reference point. In her anthropology, she proposed that the Kuwait Bedoun consisted of,

… A human pool into which Iraqi refugees, draft dodgers and infiltrators as well as absconding workers and illegal aliens could easily blend after getting rid of their identity papers. (Longva, 1997, p.51)

Crystal’s (1992, p.75-76) statement ‘expatriate workers who opportunely lost their passports... by blending in’ was almost identical in Longva’s (1997, p.51) ‘absconding workers and illegal aliens could easily blend after getting rid of their identity papers.’ Note also, that Longva (1997) finely tuned Crystal’s (1992) claim about expatriates, into claims of Iraqi infiltration (draft dodgers also being reference to ‘Iraqis,’ as well as refugees). The criminalisation of the Bedoun identity has had a lasting impact on Kuwait studies. Longva’s (1997) brief passage contained a number of crucial ideological themes about the Bedoun’s identity status that had been propagated to incite ethnic cleansing from 1990 to 1995 (see Appendix E).

2.4.3 ‘The nomad’ and mercenaries’ Bedoun.

Longva’s (1997, 2000, 2006, 2005) approach to the Bedouin in Kuwait has had broader implications for studies of the Bedouin, as well as for study of the Bedoun. There were some very basic flaws in the analysis of the origin of Kuwait’s Bedouin community. Longva (1997) began by stating there were two separate groups of Kuwaiti Bedoun: one group present in the territory of Kuwait prior to 1920 and one group arrived in Kuwait later. The first group were ‘nomads’ and the second group were ‘mercenaries’ (Longva, 1997, p.50). The Bedoun, she informed readers, ‘consisted of two main types of people: the nomads and the mercenaries’ (Longva, 1997, p.50). However, she also characterised the stateless ‘nomads’ who arrived prior to 1920 as mercenaries: ‘with their backgrounds as fighters and marauders from the desert…. willingly entered the armed forces’ (Longva, 1997, p.50). On the other hand, she differentiated the first group of Bedouin from the second group, ‘the mercenaries’ who arrived later as a separate group, on the basis that they were already ‘citizens’ of other countries, recruited to join the states’ security forces (Longva, 1997, p.51). That is, Longva (1997) employed virtually equivalent terms to differentiate her two categories of the Bedoun, such that the categories appeared to be same, and not different at all. The only other difference between the two groups was that Longva (1997) stated ‘the nomads’ ‘never had any formal citizenship previously’ but ‘the mercenaries were citizens from the surrounding Arab states’ (p.51).

It is difficult to see much categorical difference between ‘fighters and marauders’ from the desert, and ‘mercenaries,’ if all Bedouin were nomads and mercenaries (anthropologists and historians will be aware they come from the same tribes and are
overlapping categories; Houraini, 1991 provides a condensed, historical account). But Longva (1997, p.50-51) assured her readers they were ‘two different groups’ ‘lumping together’ into one stateless group. The inclusion of the second, different group was required to justify Longva’s (1997) criminalisation of the Bedoun as citizens of other states, as seen in her ‘human pool’ definition (above), which held the argument about Bedoun identity together. The Bedoun’s participation in the state’s police forces and defence forces, she quipped, was the ‘embarrassment’ of the Ministry of Defence, since they were really foreign-citizen ‘mercenaries’ (Longva, 1997, p.51).

Hiring Bedouin into the military forces was the normative process in the Middle East, reflecting the heritage of the Bedouin within the larger, tribal confederations (Marx, 1967, 1977). Justifying the Bedoun’s statelessness due to the ‘embarrassment’ of government employees, Longva (1997, p.51) did not acknowledge the similar pattern of Bedouin settlement (and citizenship and land grants) given to the Bedouin throughout the Middle East (Bocco, 2006). Strangely, Longva (1997) then conceded that government was unable to show that the ‘mercenary’ Bedoun were actually citizens from other states on the following page of her text (Longva, 1997, p.52), undermining her own claims and categorisation of the Bedouin.

It is difficult to know why Longva (1997) asserted the claim the Bedoun were nationals of other countries following Crystal (1995), because by the time she published her research, additional evidence was available to her, such as reports by Human Rights Watch (1991a, 1992, 1995) and Amnesty International (1992, 1994, 1996), showing that that the claim the Bedoun had citizenship in other states was associated with incitements to ethnically cleanse the Bedoun and other nationals, to kill them and drive them out of Kuwait (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992, 1995; Amnesty International 1992, 1994).

Additionally, a former Kuwait’s Minister of Defence and the Interior, Sheikh Salem, admitted that government was always quite aware that the Bedoun were stateless prior to their permanent settlement in Kuwait. They had never been Iraqi ‘nationals’ (al Fayez, 1984 in interview Sheikh Salem, January 6, 1982 (Al Fayez, 1984, p. 248, n13, 257, 258; see also Group 29, 2012, p.6).

2.4.4 The ‘invisible’ Bedoun.

In the light of the definitions above, I believe that the Human Rights Watch (1995) definition was the most suitable entry point for study of the Bedoun. The more recent work by Beaugrand (2010, 2014a) who appears to be the only scholar who has completed a doctoral thesis about the Bedoun as a stand-alone subject, positioned the Bedoun as one of many groups of migrants in Kuwait, without ethnic ‘issues.’ There are three problematic themes in Beaugrand’s work. First, a preoccupation with the notion that the Bedoun population is ‘invisible’ (Beaugrand, 2010, p.16, 17, 20, 140, 161; 2011, p.228, 237).
Second, persistent claims claim that government policy is ‘incoherent’ or has ‘zero coherence’ in place of interrogation of that policy (Beaugrand, 2011, p.236, 2014b, p.737; a similar approach has been taken by al Nakib, F., 2014, 2016). Third, an impression the Bedoun are not part of Kuwait’s Bedouin community but a distinct group, citing that there is little overlap between them (Beaugrand, 2010, p.17-18) which seems to be the basis for her claiming that ethnicity has no bearing on the Bedoun (Beaugrand, 2014a).

The inscription in Beaugrand’s (2010, p.14) introduction to her doctoral thesis was: ‘Open Secrets: Discernable but not Publishable (Khuri, 2007:120).’ This strange comment seems to explain the author’s reliance on invisibility and incoherence of government policy as explanations for the Bedoun’s situation. Beaugrand concluded in her advice to the Home Office, ‘as for the role of the nationality committees, [it was a] rather untidy process that led to nationality granting’ (Beaugrand, 2014a p.3; italics added). In this thesis, I explain the ‘rather untidy process’ that led to Hadar nationality grants and the Bedoun’s statelessness, via the nationality committees (Chapter 7, sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2). It was this very process that helps us to gain better understanding of the serious impact that ethnic differences have had on the deprivation of citizenship of the Bedoun.

2.5 Recognition of the Bedoun in International Law – Historical and Current Approaches

2.5.1 Regional recognition of the Bedouin of the Middle East.

The Arab League and the United Nations organized a seminar series called ‘Social Welfare in the Arab States of the Middle East (United Nations, 1956), run alongside a large research program for the ‘Arid Zones’ (Bocco, 2006). The seminar series brought together UNESCO, the World Health Organisation, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), along with the governments of the sovereign states of the region. The states were facilitated in order to conduct formal Bedouin settlement and research programs across the Middle East (Bocco, 2006, p.303-304; Massad, 2001, p.63; Cole and Altorki, 1998, p.97). Bocco (2006, p.306) explained the contribution of the International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations (1957) (ILO) under which most of the academic research on the Bedouin involved in the settlement programs for national development purposes, took place:

In 1957 the fortieth session of the ILO (attended also by FAO, WHO and UNESCO) adopted a ‘Convention for the protection and integration of aboriginal and other tribal and semi-tribal populations in independent countries’ (Convention no.107). This convention states that ‘governments will be principally responsible for undertaking a co-ordinated and systematic program to protect the concerned populations and to integrate them progressively in the life of their respective populations.’ (Bocco, 2006, p.306)
Bocco (2006) refers to the *Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations* (1957) (ILO) (Bocco, 2006, p.306). The Convention has since been replaced by the *Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention* (1989) (ILO). Although Kuwait was not an independent country at the time the first Convention was adopted, this does not diminish legitimacy of the Convention’s principles and aims.

Arab scholars from metropolitan backgrounds (the Hadar) received enormous power to influence Bedouin settlement through the research program coordinated by the ILO, and which extended to the development and monitoring of settlement programs in each sovereign state (Bocco, 2006). Kuwait was a member of these international organisations as a protectorate of the United Kingdom prior to independence (1961), while the United Kingdom had a major role in the development of these organisations, including the Arab League, in the first instance. Kuwait was never isolated from these activities. Issues pertaining to Kuwait were discussed in the fourth conference of the ‘United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States’ (United Nations, 1956), and it was included as an ‘arid zone’ in the UNESCO program. The designation of arid zones in the Middle East usually pertained to the occupation of land by the Bedouin as well as to other environmental issues (UNESCO, 1979). The state joined the ILO in 1961 and the United Nations in 1963 (United Nations Member States, 2006) after becoming an independent state. The state was also funded and assisted with its development programs for Arab Countries from 1959, including education from 1959 (UNESCO, 1959), linked to the regional policy of settling the Bedouin.

The Bedouin settlement processes included coerced and forced settlement (Bocco, 2006) which have been retrospectively analysed by some scholars as constituting an ethnocidal approach and itself (referring to 'cultural genocide'), even when referring to indigenous tribal people who received citizenship (referring to ‘cultural genocide,’ see Anaya, 2004; Lenzerini, 2008, p.74). In this thesis, I adopt a somewhat more cautious approach. Evaluations of the concept of 'indigenous' and the utility of indigenous people's rights in international law has been contested since its inception (Barsh, 1986; Kingsbury 2001). Nevertheless, these instruments were first applied to the Bedouin of the Middle East from the outset of the development of this area of law (Anaya, 2004: Barsh, 1986). The mere existence of the *Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations* (1957) (ILO), (Bocco, 2006, p.306), updated by the *Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention* (1989), challenges the notion still promoted by some scholars that the Bedouin are not an indigenous people, or a national or cultural collective (an ethnic group), but merely a 'social group' with an ahistorical 'lifestyle' (Fabietti, 1990, p.249 critiques this view).

Many scholars (such as al Nakib, F., 2014, p.6; Castellino and Cavanaugh, 2013, p.165-166; Cole, 2006, p.245) seem to remain entirely unaware of this regional history while
promoting the ‘social group’ concept of the Bedouin, or have found it entirely irrelevant to their studies. Bocco (2006), Fabietti (2006) and Lenzerini (2008) have provided a thorough account of the connection between the Bedouin and the development of international law instruments that were designed to protect them based on their status as indigenous people. Lenzerini (2008) also comprehensively addressed the right to compensation for indigenous people who suffered due to the processes of colonisation, including reparations for cultural loss (Vrdoljak, 2008, p.197-228). Novic (2016) addresses state responsibility for cultural crimes and reparations for intended cultural harm in the context of human rights violations and international criminal law (for jus cogens crimes against humanity).

In the light of the applicability of this part of international law to the Bedoun, the regional approach to statelessness in the MENA region and Kuwait in particular, represented by Mark Manly at the UNHCR, head of the UNHCR Statelessness Unit, is most concerning. He has set himself apart from international humanitarian agencies by endorsing the administrative erasure of the Bedoun's identity integral to the Kuwait government’s plan for mass identity transfer of the Bedoun to the Comoros Islands. In response to questioning about the legitimacy of the Comoros Plan, he said,

> Granting nationality to an individual of a state with which they don’t have any ties is not common. But the question is, is it permissible? Provided that it is voluntary, there is not in principle any obstacle to it. (Mark Manly, UNHCR Statelessness Unit, in ‘Kuwait: Commodifying,’ December 16, 2014)

Through this statement, Mark Manly of the UNHCR, ‘in principle,’ has given a green light to Kuwaiti authorities to implement the erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing: Weissbrodt, 2008) of the Bedouin. The Comoros Plan is discussed further in Chapter 8 and the Appendices C iii, iv, D iv, E vi, F i, iii, G iii of this thesis.

### 2.5.2 The indigenous Bedoun.

As I have mentioned, the notion that the Bedoun are indigenous to the Middle East, the Arabian Gulf and Kuwait, was a feature of unpublished scholarly work by Kuwaiti authors. Despite this, the concept does not appear to have ever been accepted discussion about the Bedoun at the international level. A crucial point that continues to be omitted from anthropological or sociological study of the Kuwaiti Bedouin (Longva, 1997, 2006) and findings about Bedouin settlement in Kuwait (such as Alissa, 2013, al Nakib, F., 2014, 2016, and Beaugrand, 2014b) is the fact that mass settlement of the Bedouin in Kuwait from the 1950s and 1960s, when they were first recruited for selection by the state (Alhajeri, 2004, p.93) was not unique or untimely, but conducted in the context of the settlement of indigenous Bedouin across the Middle East. It is likely that one of the reasons for the omission of scholarly discussion about the Bedoun as indigenous tribal people from the
1990s onwards (it is a feature of earlier Kuwaiti research), is that such dialogue actually points to the authenticity of the Bedoun’s human rights claims as a Bedouin cultural collective. Significantly, it might also point to the conceptual elements that lie beneath the ‘other national’ ideology that was disseminated into the literature, while the Bedoun absorbed the Kuwaiti national identity. That is, exploration of the concept of the Bedoun as indigenous tribal people, despite inherent difficulties (Barsh, 1986) helps to reveal, if not to deconstruct, political ideologies which have denied the Bedouin rights as an ethnic minority and as an indigenous group and as a stateless group since the 1960s.

Some examples of approaches to Bedouin statelessness in international law, bear this out. While a law student, Castellano (2008) produced an article summarising an extensive range of approaches that could be taken in international law to help the Bedoun, including addressing the illegality of their expulsion by the state, as well as cultural, land and resource rights connected to their indigenous status and right to self-determination. Alternatively, a number of scholars of international law have approached the Bedoun's situation from the point of view that the group are indigenous, and have then gone on to analyse the ramifications of the physical expulsion of the Bedoun (Doebbler, 2002; Weissbrodt, 2008). While their findings have been quite limited because there appears to have been little historical research undertaken by these scholars, and they have not explored the ramifications of their findings in the local community, they have quite clearly evaluated that the Bedoun are victims of physical and cultural destruction. I discuss these contributions further in section 2.7, below.

In another approach, Castellino and Cavanaugh (2013) have written one of the most comprehensive accounts on minority rights in the Middle East to date, but authors did not perceive commonality between the Bedouin in general (any Bedouin aside from the Negev - Palestine region) and/or stateless groups and indigenous groups. They authors were most perturbed by the potential for indigenous people in the Middle East to claim self-determination (p.53, para. 2), while they utilized particularly evasive language to describe stateless people, actually evading use of the term 'stateless' (p.52, para. 3). Ultimately, the work was highly conscious of the national security of Middle East states, emphasising territoriality over cultural collectivism. The work demonstrated the same conservative bias toward Bedouin tribal people reflected in the colonialist approach of days gone by (see Aurenche, 1993 and Lancaster and Lancaster, 1998, for critique of this approach). The Bedoun potentially fitted into a number of categories outlined by the authors: trapped minorities, ethnic and national minorities, and for the Kuwaiti Bedouin population as a whole, the problem of the majoritarian minority.

for the UNHCR, which blamed the indigenous Bedouin's statelessness on their 'way of life' that had the effect of 'leaving some stateless' as 'migrants' (p.3) – in their own lands. Fabietti (1990, p.249) has criticized such ahistorical, ‘lifestyle’ characterisations of Bedouin dispossession in the Middle East. Additionally, van Waas (2010) blamed 'a large, but unknown number of stateless children in the MENA region who failed to acquire a nationality' (p.5) amidst laws delimiting citizenship, rather than attributing responsibility to sovereign states who denied children citizenship by virtue of their enactment of laws discriminatory laws and failure to reform such law.

Thus, the UNHCR (van Waas, 2010) response has been disappointing, due to a preoccupation with attributing the cause of statelessness onto the Bedouin, while simply ignoring the evidence. A report commissioned for the UNCHR by Van Waas (2010) ignored historical data about the roles of the international organisations including the United Nations own agencies including UNESCO, the ILO, the Arab League, the World Bank (among others) who were involved in the early Bedouin settlement and citizenship programs established throughout the Middle East (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006; Gilbert, 2011). The development of international laws protecting the Bedouin's rights as indigenous, tribal and semi-tribal groups (Bocco, 2006), principally the International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations (1957) (ILO) and the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989) (ILO) was also ignored. Van Waas (2010) also ignored the work of other scholars of international law who had previously analysed the Bedouns’ situation and contextualised the deprivation of their human rights in terms of the targeting of their indigenous identity, heritage and restrictive controls diminishing their capacity to found families and sustain their populations, indicative of organised, systematic repression and cultural destruction (such as Doebbler, 2002; Weissbrodt, 2008). Van Waas (2010) lacked reference to academic research and did not conduct fieldwork with stateless people in their home countries (p.47-56).

The UNHCR Statelessness Unit has been unable to meaningfully incorporate of the sub-disciplines of indigenous rights, minority rights and statelessness protections to analyse the situation of statelessness in the MENA region. Other scholars who support the rights of indigenous people, do not seem to have experienced the same conceptual limitations. Thus, far more information about the Bedoun’s right to protection as a stateless, group can be found in the literature of international law concerning indigenous people and other ethnic minorities, including former United Nations staff, compared to efforts made to ‘solve the problem’ of statelessness in the MENA region that have addressed the Bedoun.

Former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People, S. James Anaya (2004, 2009) produced seminal texts on indigenous rights in international law, involving an integrated approach to the protection of indigenous people and minorities inherently
connected to the right to self-determination, with a focus on case studies. Texts by Anaya (2004, 2009) provide special insight into the interpretive models used by authorities and the situation of indigenous people that are sometimes not well understood by non-indigenous groups, such as limits to their ability to assert their claims imposed by outsiders due to long-term social and cultural criminalisation and oppression. Based on my limited reading, Lenzerini (2008) offers one of the most comprehensive and sophisticated accounts of the development of indigenous law including coverage of tribal and semi-tribal people (p.80) that was historically applied to the Bedouin of the Middle East (Bocco, 2006) in the context of their ‘development’ in the modern world (Fabietti, 2006). Such an approach might be a good fit for potential Bedoun claims in Kuwait, one which could help to educate the government and citizens of Kuwait, of the historical right of the Bedoun’s belonging to the nation.

To date, the international law protecting minorities from discrimination has been the main approach adopted by international humanitarian agencies in reports about the Bedoun to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights. The outcome of this approach has been disappointing as clearly, it has not produced any consistent, widespread improvement conditions for the Bedoun. I suggest that one of the major reasons for this is the weakness in conceptualisation of the Bedoun as a discriminated ‘social group’ or group of ‘stateless people,’ who have been subject to ‘racial’ discrimination from another group (of Kuwaitis) that is assumed to be of the same or similar ‘race.’ This conceptual approach is confusing; it has ignored analysis of the cultural differences between the Bedouin and Hadar and the influence of the ethnic conflict therein, on the Bedoun’s situation. Alnajjar (1984, p.66, 79) theorised the Kuwaiti Bedouin as an ethnic group which contained tribal, ethnic minorities who were cultural groups of political significance. Arguably, this framework could have served the Bedoun much better in the human rights context, as it would have minimised the ensuing vagueness about the Bedoun’s identity (Alhajeri, 2015; Kennedy, 2014, 2015a, 2015b).

Similarly, the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954) and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961) have also had little impact on the Bedoun’s situation. Additionally, Manly's promotion of the UNHCR's role in 'awareness raising' (Edwards and van Waas, 2014) belies the fact that the organisation has no relationship whatsoever with the Bedoun in Kuwait (H. al Fadhli, Ahmadi, personal communications, 17 November, 2014; M. al Anezi, London, personal communications, 26 December 2014; community representatives P09 and P12; this was confirmed at the UNHCR First Global Forum on Statelessness at The Hague, 14-17 October, 2014). The current position can be contrasted with the UNHCR’s practical assistance to Bedoun refugees in the 1980s after they were first expelled by the state (see section 2.5, below). For this reason, the
approach to Bedouin people and the Bedoun in particular demonstrated by the UNHCR (van Waas, 2010) and the UNHCR statelessness unit (Manly in Edwards and van Waas, 2014) since the Arab Spring (above) is especially instructive. It points to reasons the state Kuwait has never felt sufficiently pressured by the United Nations Human Rights Committee’s recommendations on the Bedoun over the past twenty-five years to move beyond it’s stance of rejecting the international law concept of statelessness as a priori to rejecting the Bedoun's claims (Appendices E, iii, iv), even though the Bedoun community has increased it's effectiveness in communicating the state's breaches in international law, to the international community.

Kuwait is a signatory but has not ratified, the Rome Statute the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010) (17 July, 1998). As I have mentioned, current frameworks used by international humanitarian organisations have resisted extended discussion of the Bedoun's indigenous status, likely due to the possibility that the Bedoun's claims may turn out to be sufficiently substantive enough, to be heard as an Advisory Opinion in the International Criminal Court (see Novic, 2016). Short (2010) has pointed out: ‘There is insufficient serious discussion of culturally destructive processes, which do not involve direct physical killing or violence, through the lens of genocide’ (p.831). The fact that the Bedoun have endured systematic killing and violence and the radical diminishment of their population, as well as the recasting of their identity via administrative ethnic cleansing, suggests that consideration of the Bedoun as at threat of genocide, is long overdue. Historical data collated in the Appendix as well as the qualitative interview analysis in this research should provide new opportunities to scholars to consider this possibility, and to challenge the complacency of the United Nations to the Bedoun's suffering (Doebbler, 2002) in light of this new information.

2.6 Segregation Policies

From the outset of the Bedouin desert settlement camps, segregation was viewed as required to prevent the Bedouin infiltrating the Hadar urban space with their social practices (al Moosa,1976), which might disrupt already-established Hadar culture and power structures in Kuwait. The state of Kuwait departed from the approaches of all other states in the region, under the pressure of Hadar and other Arab nationalists from 1965 (al Mdaires, 2010). Segregation would separate the northern tribes’ desert dweller from the urbanite permanently, symbolized by the city wall or fortress (al sour) dividing the desert dweller from the Hadar, who claim a distinctive cultural identity as ‘elite’ (al Anezi, 1989; Ghabra, 2014) liberal, ‘urbanite’ progressives (al Nakib, F., 2014; Ghabra, 2014). Segregation would ensure that the Bedouin would never be able to overcome their isolation. Physical segregation was established through the Bedouin settlement program and committees formed
to manage the population (Appendix D, ii), while the ideology of the Bedoun ‘foreigner’ and ‘other national’ became embedded in society (al Anezi, 1989).

The Bedoun and some citizens of the northern tribes were then physically separated from other Bedouin via the state housing program (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). Physical segregation was just the first step in Bedoun containment.

Hill (1969, 1973) was the first scholar who observed that Kuwaiti society had been subjected to physical segregation, through the alteration of commissioned city plans. The segregation policy was not a sign of mere bureaucratic ‘chaos’ (Alissa, 2013; al Nakib, 2016), but a carefully planned and organised interference strategy. Thus, the formation of the committees should be seen in the context of their long-running existence, rather as separate units. I have collated the series of committees beginning from 1962, in Appendix D, ii. The Municipality of Kuwait was one of the groups responsible for the surveillance of all Bedouin from 1962. The institution continued to be instrumental in the Bedouin’s surveillance and management after re-labelling of the Committee to ‘Shanty Clearance’ and ‘Illegal Dwellings,’ from 1974. Ultimately the Municipality of Kuwait gained sufficient power to operate independently from government, along Arab nationalist political lines (al Mdaires, 2010).

Where and when did the ideology of Bedouin segregation arise? The Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) gave the Hadar pre-eminence by limiting the right to vote to themselves, while limiting the admission of new citizens to the state. Naturally, this satisfied conservative, Kuwaiti Hadar nationalists. Vigorous dissemination and cross-fertilisation of political ideas and allegiances ideas took place among the more conservative Kuwaiti Hadar and those with Arab nationalist leanings, at this time (al Mdaires, 2010). Arab nationalists began to openly lobby for the exclusion of the Bedouin from Kuwaiti citizenship from as early as 1965 (al Mdaires, 2010), prior to the closure of the first round of citizenship grants being distributed from 1961 to 1966 (al Anezi, 1989). This political position involved arguments urging resistance to assimilation of the Bedouin into Kuwaiti society at the policy level, promoted by Arab nationalists in 1965 and 1971 (al Khatib, 1978 and al Nafisi, 1978, in al Mdaires, 2010 and al Qatami in al Tuwajrî, 1996) in particular.

The government program to distribute citizenship to the Bedouin in settlement programs also commenced in 1965, according to Zahir, 1985, p.53 (in Stanton Russell, 1989, p.34), reflecting the practice of the other Middle Eastern states to ensure the formerly nomadic, tribal Bedouin became permanently settled citizens and were not marginalised in the process. This was the UNESCO mandate, although it did not always manifest according to plan (Bocco, 2006). But regardless of governments’ attempt to settle the Bedouin in line with regional protocols organized by the Arab League, the Bedouin community were maligned by external, political influences from the Hadar (from the Kuwaiti and other Arab national populations). These influences were brought to bear on the ruling family and the
parliament, from the very beginning of the birth of the modern state. Finally, the Bedoun’s fate was sealed with al Gonaim et al., (1991) and a group of Hadar intellectuals, who introduced law to restrict the Bedouin ethnic group from receiving citizenship in Kuwait on the basis of their ethnicity (which I discuss further below). The Bedouin segregation policy was representative of extreme nationalist ideologies characteristic of ‘the destructive legacy of Arab liberals’ promoted under the guise of the called the ‘pro-democracy’ movement (Massad, March 30, 2015).

2.6.1 The Bedoun ‘illegal residents.’

Beaugrand (2010) has taken the starting point for the ‘illegal residents’ term to mean they are migrants from other countries, with Bedoun ‘illegality’ derived from the expulsion policy document that appeared in ‘The Study,’ (2003). Other researchers describe the government’s approach as a sudden and unexpected policy change (Longva, 1997, Alnajjar, 2001, Alhajeri, 2004). But the term ‘illegal residents’ was used describe the settlement of all Bedouin in Kuwait who relinquished their nomadic pattern from 1965 (Zhou, 1976, p.60). Zhou’s (1976) reference to the Bedouin population being ‘illegal residents’ dated back to 1965, the same year that Sharon Stanton Russell (1989) referred to as the beginning of the formal government settlement programs for the Bedouin, which included the mass naturalisation program (Zahir, 1985: 53 in Stanton Russell, 1989, p.34). This indicated that the Bedouin were subject to attempts to push them out of Kuwait, from the beginning of their participation in the government settlement program from 1965, when they were in the process of being naturalized en masse under government policy. Although this framing by Zhou (1976) may have been merely a perception of history, it was certainly aligned with the development of Nationalist bloc policies from 1965 until 1992, described above.

2.6.2 The Bedoun ‘squatter’ and ‘slum dweller.’

A major difference between settlement programs in the Middle East region generally, and those in Kuwait, appears to be that the Bedouin, and the Bedoun in particular, were relocated to housing projects that were unfit for human habitation (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). The conditions were described as so detrimental to human life, and the issue was debated by academics, planners and housing authorities from the 1960s (Hill, 1969, 1973; Shiber, 1964; Sholz, 1975) and in the Kuwaiti newspapers during the 1970s. The homes were equivalent to ‘graves’ that would kill their Bedouin occupants (quoted from al Talea, 1974 in al Zaher, 1990, p.201). They appeared to be intentionally planned leave their occupants with no choice but to vacate (Shiber, 1964, p.227) and return to their desert environs, which al Moosa (1976) later demonstrated was actually occurring. In contrast to the conditions for protecting the Bedouin agreed to by regional organisations and sovereign states (Bocco, 2006, p.306; Gilbert, 2011), influential Hadar bureaucrats and academics were openly hostile to Bedouin development and social inclusion, even though their merchant
families had historically profited from the Bedouin workforce and had been involved in their organised settlement in Kuwait (Alhajeri, 2004, p.38). They described government’s attempt to provide a legitimate development program for the indigenous Bedouin, impoverished and under-developed but more crucially, as pointless and a waste of Kuwait’s resources (Alawadi, 1980, p.339; Alessa, 1981, p.83). While this may have been true to some extent, the authors clearly blamed the Bedouin for the problem, on the basis of their cultural attributes.

Photographs taken at the time tend certainly never indicated the areas were ‘slums’ in the widely known sense of general impoverishment or disorganisation (see photographs taken by al Moosa, 1976, al Zaher, 1990, and as part of the fieldwork in this study, in Appendix H). But crucially, this portrayal was not a call for improved conditions for the Bedouin, but a positivist description of an entirely different population segment as illegal migrants (Zhou, 1976, p.57). It is arguable the approach formed a discursive strategy to justify removing the Bedouin from the state, using false labelling to change their identity from indigenous Bedouin to ‘illegal residents’ and ‘migrants.’ This form of labelling would ultimately lead to the shift of identity of the Bedouin to ‘non-Kuwaiti,’ other Arabs in the National Census (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994 in Appendix D, iii; see also Maktabi, 1992). This trajectory is illustrated in Appendices B, ii and C, i.

The term ‘illegal residents’ was applied to the Bedouin ‘who were ‘squatting’ in the country’s territory from 1965 (Zhou, 1976, p.60). In response, the Higher Committee of Shanty Clearance was established in 1970 to deal with the ‘illegal settlements’ (in al Zaher, 1990, p.203). It appeared to be the first government body established to manage the Bedoun as a separate group of the northern tribes (who would become Bedoun), in contrast to, or as a second-generation tier of, the 1965 Bedouin settlement program. A continuous chain of committees was formed thereafter, to control the population (see Appendix D, ii). Al Khatib (1978) had called for the ‘evacuation’ of desert settlements, their ‘eradication’ forever, complaining that the Bedouin shanty housing was disturbing the aesthetic ‘appearance’ of the nation (in al Zaher, 1990, p.192). The Bedouin ‘squatters’ became labelled as migrant ‘slum dwellers’ who lived in ‘slums’ (in Alawadi 1980, p.339). Note the conceptual shift in the portrayal of the Bedouin by these authors, from rejection of the Bedouin occupation of desert territory where the tribes were socially organised according to their own customary law, to rejection of temporary labour migrants who lived in a state of poverty and social disorganisation. In fact the tribal customary law had regulated their occupation of such lands for hundreds to years to the end of the Ottoman period (Abu Hakima, 1983). Kuwaiti law also respected this custom until 1987 (on the assumption that any Bedouin held has retained privilied access to their collective tribal lands), when the Bedouin were first prohibited from transitting freely between Kuwait and other states (al Anezi, 1989).
The Bedoun ‘problem’ of ‘illegal’ residents was constructed through developmental ‘urban planning’ discourse. The new language was changed to match developmental discourses about city slums, redirecting attention away from the indigenous Bedouin (and their rights to citizenship, land and access to public resources set out in regional agreements) and toward illegal migrant workers. The transition was described thus: ‘a particular class of migrant, the Bedouins, whom it [government] wants to settle’ (Zhou, 1976, p.59). This pushed the social problem into an entirely new area of scholarly study and policy discourse (including at the level of the United Nations, in Zhou, 1976, and Alawadi, 1980). The promotion of the Bedoun as a migrant ‘social problem’ obscured the Bedouin identity of the Bedoun, who were selected out of the desert settlements and subjected to physical segregation and hardship through this process. Hence, the Bedoun ‘problem’ seems to have been physically and conceptually constructed at around the same time, through political and ‘urban planning’ policy and practice initiated by intellectuals.

Recent academic work on the Bedoun in Kuwait has taken a similar approach (see also my discussion regarding the use of term ‘bidun’ in this chapter, in section 2.1, above). Beaugrand (2011) stated the areas where the Bedoun life are ‘typical of Third World slums’ featuring piles of refuse (p.239). Beaugrand (2010, p.163) showed two close-up photos of segregated Bedoun settlements in Kuwait, with no rubbish to be seen. Although there are areas of uncollected rubbish in these areas, this is due to lack of municipal rubbish collection, and it is certainly not spread throughout the streets. Alissa (2013, p.56) referred to the Bedoun as ‘squatters’ today, where some Bedoun have rented homes in Ahmadi since they were expelled from their homes (which they owned) (al Zaher, 1990) after the war. Alissa (2013) presented a view that no Bedouin – citizen or stateless – had a ‘right’ to live in Ahmadi, due to ‘cultural conservatism’ (p.57). She showed photographs of a present-day Bedouin home, comparing it with an expatriate home, to illustrate the Bedouin ‘problem’ (Alissa, 2013, p.56; Figure 10, right). The photograph by the author was taken from the back lanes, and simply showed trees that had not been pruned behind a fence. Furthermore, it was not indicative of typical homes which still have open yards and gardens, like the KOC Archive photograph on the left. I travelled around the suburb on a number of occasions during my fieldwork in 2014.

2.6.3 The strategy to deprive the Bedoun of education.

The work of Raphael Patai (1976) The Arab Mind, particularly the author’s negative regard for the ‘uncivilized’ Bedouin, seems to have made quite an impression on Kuwaiti scholars. Picking up on al Moosa’s (1976) concept of ‘the Bedouin personality,’ Alessa (1981, p.183) extended it to the ‘Bedouin attitude,’ the antithesis to education and learning. An adult literacy program was established in Kuwait in the 1960s (al Zaher, 1990) to teach the Bedouin, because generally speaking, they had never gone to school. They did not have
the same access to education as the Hadar city-dwellers, who could attend overseas universities as fee-payers courtesy of government.

Al Moosa’s (1976) study was ambivalent, however, for he provided material in his discussion that was contrary to his conclusions, showing the Bedouin had displayed a capacity for training, acquiring skills, self-education, and were capable of advancement in the workforce (p.43, 67, 149, 158, 170, 214-215, 254, 317). Some had successfully taught themselves to read and write in preparation for the police force entrance test, while others rose to supervisory level at Kuwait Oil Company. Alessa (1981, p.83) announced the program of adult literacy training a ‘failure,’ laying total blame on the Bedouin students. He announced, ‘One cannot change people’s behaviour and attitudes through building more schools and vocational centres – one must start with changing people’s attitudes’ (Alessa, 1981, p.83). The Bedouin children had never had access to primary schools from the desert settlements, due to lack of provision of public resources that would have enabled them to go to school nearby, or to travel to schools closer to Kuwait City (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990).

Some aspects of Alessa’s (1981) argument were reasonable: literacy training for children is more sensible for all parties, compared to literacy training for adults which is harder to achieve. But because Bedouin adults found it difficult to acquire literacy skills, Alessa (1981) argued that the Bedouin should receive no education at all, and that no further public spending should be wasted on educating their expanding population. Alessa (1981) was quite aware of the suffering that his suggestion would impose, because his work shows that he regarded himself highly as an effective education planner. He used the platform of Bedouin education ‘failure’ to promote his unique, monolithic bureaucracy (Alessa, 1981, p.83). The plan removed the prospect of citizenship – and public education – from the Bedouin. The plan proposed instead, to invest Kuwait’s resources in an extensive and fully funded primary school system for other Arab national children (Alessa, 1981, p.109 -111). Alessa (1981) attempted to set out his segregation plan logically and convincingly, but it was full of essential gaps that would ensure the Bedouin were not protected from his policy reforms, but targeted for exclusion. Furthermore, the approach was not aimed at the long-term development of everyone in Kuwaiti society, but for rushed segregation of the Bedouin of the 1980s. Alessa (1981) was unwilling to wait just one generation for every Bedouin child to receive primary school education, which would have largely overcome the community’s illiteracy thereafter.

Alessa’s (1981) policy was later crystallised into a racist, anti-Bedouin dogma, posing as a local, economic rationalist doctrine, on the eve of the Iraqi invasion. Arab nationalist al Naqeeb (1990, p.129) urged the international community to understand the ‘pathology’ of Gulf society as the Bedoun were about to be killed, tortured and driven out of
Kuwait (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992). Al Naqeeb (1990) explained why no Bedouin should be allowed to be educated:

> Whoever believes that the spread of education and mass media in the long run weakens tribal, sectarian or local geographical allegiances is mistaken, since the opposite is true. The spread of education in the Gulf and Arab countries leads to their becoming more firmly and deeply rooted in what we may call the tribal consciousness… All of this pours into the general channel of the structural crisis which reveals a number of pathological symptoms… undoubtedly the result of the decline of the socialist and Arab nationalist current… when society lost its spirit. (al Naqeeb, 1990, p.127-128)

The basic tenets of this political philosophy have continued to be repeated and recycled by authors such as al Ansari (in al Qatari, February 22, 2010), al Khandari and al Hadben (2010) in connection with the provision of education to the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) in Kuwait.

### 2.6.4 The strategy of depriving the Bedouin of citizenship.

Alessa (1981, p.106) warned that the Bedouin who had not yet received citizenship (the Kuwaiti Bedoun) would not be so ‘easily satisfied’ with their modest lifestyle after both parents and children were urbanised and educated (p.109). The Bedouin posed the danger of expanding the citizen base, while the government policy to grant citizenship to them was in place. Alessa’s (1981) approach was well aligned with Kuwaiti Hadar values, which sought to limit the citizen base at all costs (Alnajjar in Manea, 2011, p.149, interview with the author). In this equation, the Hadar elite perceived that the maintenance of their special status over the Bedouin in Kuwaiti society is worth oppression, loss freedom and lack of social equity for the whole of society (Alnajjar and Selvik, 2016), because the ‘elite’ suffer little from the oppression of the authoritarian regime, and nor do they consider themselves as gaining anything from equity with their fellow men and women under democracy.


After Al Moosa (1976, p.319) concluded that the Bedouin should be fully integrated into Kuwaiti society but that the policy to give citizenship should be reconsidered (p.321) (once again, put on hold at the political level). Alessa (1981, p.106) then refined the ideas: the Bedouin could not adapt to settled life (p.2) and citizenship should be withheld from them permanently (p.108, 109). Alessa’s (1981) suggestions for reform of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) was based on his overall assessment that the Bedouin were unfit for integration into Kuwaiti society, while other Arab nationals could take their place without the state having to educate them. Essentially, Alessa (1981) portrayed the ‘Manpower Problem in Kuwait’ as a Bedouin problem that would be ‘solved’ by making those remaining Bedouin who had not yet received citizenship perpetually stateless, simply ignoring the consequences.

Al Moosa (1976) and Alessa (1981) showed exactly how and where the line could be drawn, through the Bedouin population. Along with the carefully planned intervention of nationalist, intellectual-politicians to cease further mass grants of citizenship to the Bedouin (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994), the ‘Manpower’ policy, would ensure the Bedoun would never receive citizenship as a large group due to ethnic targeting. But the ethnic targeting policy was not the end of mass grants of citizenship in Kuwait. Citizenship would continue to be granted to en masse to thousands of others who were already citizens of other states, instead (Alessa, 1981, p.109-111). According to al Naqeeb’s (1990) nostalgic, socialist sentiments, such a strategy might restore the ‘spirit of society’ (al Naqeeb sought the Bedouin’s exclusion from his vision of the pan-Arab nation). Hence, in the academic arena, promotion of dual citizenship of Kuwaiti citizens was historically not a Bedouin concept (the ‘lost their passports’ stereotype of Crystal, 1992, p.75), but a Hadar concept envisioned for the benefit of the Hadar.

Through the administrative expulsion document (‘The Study,’ 2003), the policy to eradicate the Bedoun was shifted to immigration and population control, re-inventing the Bedoun’s identity as ‘illegal migrants,’ subject to heavier surveillance than ever before (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Al Moosa (1976, p.100) had suggested the possibility that government could shift the identity of the Bedoun from the ‘non-Kuwaiti’ and ‘other Arab national’ category in the national census, while aware that the Bedoun had no nationality at all. The expulsion from the census gave a sense of finality and closure, sealing the 1986 administrative expulsion with formal recognition that the Bedoun were no longer officially regarded as Kuwaitis, nor Bedouin.
The twin strategies were implemented as a national policy in 1992. The *Academic Team for Population Policy* (al Gonaim et al., 1991), a group of elite intellectuals that included Alessa (1981), introduced the ‘Supreme Planning Council Resolution No.11, 1992.’ It removed the ability of the Bedouin ethnic group to receive citizenship en masse from 1992 (see Appendix D, i). The national census was amended to list the Bedouin as ‘other Arabs nationals,’ but the shift was backdated to 1985, to prior to the administrative expulsion, coinciding with introduction of the nationalist economic policy, called *Kuwaitization* (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, see Appendix D, iii). The so-called ‘academic team’ accessed the Supreme Planning Council and the Prime Minister directly; the function of the team (to bypass parliament) was set out in the ‘Manpower’ policy (Alessa, p.111-116, including figure 5.1).

2.7 Physical and Cultural Destruction

2.7.1 The administrative expulsion of the Bedoun (1986).

Two factors combined to allocate the Bedouin to a deportable status. The policy paper in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003) shifted the Bedouin who had not yet received citizenship (the Bedouin) to the status of ‘illegal residents,’ implemented during a period of extra-constitutional rule. Combined with the program to change their nationality (‘status adjustment’) from 1983, the Bedoun could be exited from the country as migrants of other nations, recorded as ‘other nationals.’ The exit flow would be difficult, if not impossible, to trace on national statistics. The 1986 plan set out the process for government to withdraw public service employment, so that the Bedoun would then have no protection from deportation, rendering them ‘illegal’ in the absence of a work permit from a private sector employer (‘The Study,’ 2003). But the Bedoun were not expatriate nationals. Those who did not already work in the private sector for oil companies (prior to nationalisation of Kuwait Oil Company) were in virtually no position at all to acquire expatriate jobs, because they lacked formal education and had no access to other Arab expatriate job networks. But additionally, unionised Arab nationals for whom Arab nationalists lobbied for citizenship at the expense of the Bedoun (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1989), dominated such networks (al Najjar, 1983). Therefore, it was unlikely such networks would have any interest in supplying the Bedoun with jobs. Therefore, the Bedoun would not be inclined to receive private sector employment or work permits, enabling them to be removed from the country *en masse* along with their dependents.

A range of other expulsion measures linked to the 1986 policy document were introduced between 1983 to 1993, depriving the Bedoun of their human rights on multiple levels (Human rights Watch, 1991a, 1995; see also Appendix E, i). The strategy attempted to force the Bedouin to leave the country, by forcing upon them conditions that would make them unable make a living or to sustain family life. The problem with this aspect of the
1986 plan was that the Bedoun were stateless - there was nowhere for them to go after state borders were closed to nomadic tribes people across the Middle East in 1987 (Group 29, 2012) and this was one of the reasons why regional settlement of the Bedouin had involved grants of citizenship (Fabietti, 2006; Kark and Frantzman, 2012). The concept of the ‘Bedouin expatriate’ (discussed above) was projected onto the Bedoun through the 1986 plan. They were to be regarded not only as ‘illegal residents’ but specifically within the context of the illegal, temporary, foreign national worker, whether there was anywhere ‘else’ for them to be deported to as ‘illegal residents,’ or not.

The expulsion process placed the permanently settled Bedoun into a process of migration population planning that ostensibly sought to control expatriate foreign-national populations entering the country on temporary work permits. The administrative expulsion of the Bedoun was connected to a variety of ministries who coordinated their efforts - chiefly the housing planning bureaucracy, department of statistics, migration and labour affairs planning (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). The so-called policy change of 1986 was not a ‘secret decree’ (Beaugrand, 2010, p.150) or sudden, inexplicable policy change (Longva, 1997, p.51). It was a long-term project coveted by academics and ministry bureaucrats, headed by the Supreme Planning Council, which had begun at least as far back as 1974, when Kuwait’s Municipal Council set its sights on the eradication of Bedouin desert settlements (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). Beaugrand’s (2010, p.150) statement the Bedoun had to produce a ‘valid passport’ at this time was misleading; the type of passport that had to be produced, was any passport belonging to a foreign country (al Anezi, 1989) which, the author was aware, was likely to be fraudulent and obtained under duress and blatant government instruction (Beaugrand, 2010, p.154-156; WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006). Clearly, the difference was absolutely crucial, because the Bedoun were stateless, which government knew (al Haroon, 1976; al Haddad, 1981; Alshayeji 1988; Alhajeri, 2004). I believe that it is more likely that the policy document published in al Talea (‘The Study,’ 2003) was part of, or an annexe to, a national migration policy developed in a Cabinet report entitled, Government Agenda, Development Plan 1985/1986 – 1989/1990, Vol 1: General Framework (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, n11) than any kind of ‘secret decree’ (Beaugrand, 2010, p.150).

2.7.2 The ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun (1990-1995).

Some authors in the social sciences have argued that the Bedoun’s population reduction by some 150,000 from 1990 to 1995, was attributable to the population voluntarily ‘leaving’ Kuwait (Ghabra, 1997a; Tétreault and al Mughni, 1995, p.69). These authors presented the government view of the Bedoun, and were not concerned with providing any counter argument to discount the known ethnic cleansing (Fineman, November 2, 1992) and population purification including ‘loyalty tests’ (Evans, February 28, 1991). Some foreign

Furthermore, Mason (2010) pointed out that any notions of non-Kuwaiti citizens from the targeted ethnic groups ‘leaving’ Kuwait at this time (1990-1995) should be contextualised against the state’s ‘systematic campaign of terror’ (p.124) which was implemented in order to force those who were not killed, to exit the country (see also Gasperini, August 20, 1991; and Wilkinson, May 20, 1991). Lorch (May 12, 1991) appears to be the first Western source who discovered the Bedoun and observed that the Kuwaiti government had begun administratively expelling them prior to the invasion.

Henckaerts (1995) observed that the physical expulsion of the Kuwaiti Bedoun, Palestinians, Jordanians, and Iraqis was instigated by the state of Kuwait at the highest level of government. Weissbrodt (2008) acknowledged the indigenous status of the Kuwaiti Bedoun was responsible for their transformation into a contemporaneous stateless population due to the historical domination of non-indigenous arrivals (the Hadar), equating the expulsions with the ideological roots of ethnic cleansing (Schechler, 1993, p.239). Weissbrodt’s (2008) interpretation was comparable to the entrapment of Palestinians under Israeli rule. Conklin (2014) focused on the exclusion of the group as Bedouins. He focused on the strategy of denying birth registration as a form of administrative violence (Conklin, 2014, p.101) that was used to perpetuate statelessness and misery.

El Najjar (2001) discussed the expulsion of the Palestinian and Kuwaiti Bedoun population by Kuwaiti authorities, but his perspective was fairly limited to the Palestinian population. Alnajjar (2001) discussed the general decline in human rights standards following the war, citing the expulsions as one of three areas in need of attention, along with freedom of the press and the need to recover prisoners of war from Iraq. In their study on lost opportunities from the post-war reconstruction phase, Barakat and Skelton (2014) frequently referred to the Kuwaiti Bedoun. The authors (Barakat and Skelton, 2014) were critical of government and the political ‘elite’ who had undermined post-war reconciliation, but they did not address population ‘purification’ aspect of the national immigration policy or the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, at all.

Doebbler’s (2002) study was insightful, comparing the problem of the Kuwaiti Bedoun to the Kurds of Syria and Palestinians (p.540), emphasising the failure of regional attempts to resolve the issue (p.541), the failure of the government’s attempts to resolve the issue (p.543), and the inability of the UNHCR to help the collective via referral to other agencies within the United Nations, or to assist individuals when they attempted to flee
Kuwait. The UNHCR assisted 1,300 individual cases of Kuwaiti Bedoun refugees up to 1981, but the organisation has not acted to help the population as a endangered social group as a whole (Doebbler, 2002, p.544, n.128) likely because they are not displaced but in fact, resisting displacement. Crucially, Doebbler (2002) observed that while the Kurds and Palestinians had re-invigorated their populations in the wake of expulsion by having families, the Bedoun were demographically diminished by expulsion from which they had never recovered their population numbers (Doebbler, 2002, p.547). This issue is still one of the most serious problems still faced by the Kuwaiti Bedoun: the destruction of the population to the extent that it cannot replace itself. This problem warrants urgent consideration, including analysis within frameworks of ethnic cleansing and genocide (refer also to my comments about the UNHCR in section 2.5 above).

The Bedoun are marked out by the sheer scope of their oppression and suffering compared to all other stateless groups. Weissbrodt and Collins (2006, p.264) examined the obstacles and hardships faced by stateless groups. The Bedoun were unique compared to all other groups they compared, because they featured in examples in almost every type of obstacle and hardship experienced by such groups. Sokolofff and Lewis (2005, p.5, 6) explained that the persecution of the Bedoun after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was organised as an act of retaliation against the ethnic group. Various opinions about the numbers that need to be involved for an event or events to be called an ‘ethnic cleansing’ or ‘genocide,’ and the nature of subtypes of ethnic cleansing and genocides (such as ethnocide) are worth considering as far as they may apply to the Bedoun’s experience.

Such arguments are characteristic of theoretical diversity among scholars (Campbell, 2009; Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990; Fein, 2007), but the proportion of the population eradicated rather than the total number of deaths/transfers seems to be the more significant factor, with around fifty percent of the Bedoun population eradicated from the state between 1990 to 1995 (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Ghabra, 1997b) due to a single but protracted ethnic cleansing event (based on figures reported in Human Rights Watch, 1995; Ghabra, 1997a).

Today, the Bedouin citizens of Kuwait comprise some fifty-five percent of the citizen population in Kuwait (‘Insulted Kuwaiti,’ 2012). The Bedoun, who formerly around the same size as the Bedouin citizen population (Human Rights Watch 1995), now comprise only roughly ten percent of the Kuwaiti population overall. The current size of the population is estimated at around 111,000 (‘Over 111,000,’ 2013) or perhaps more (Human Rights watch, 2014; Maktabi, 2015), but any certainty about the population size is impossible to obtain because formal, national statistics on the Bedoun population are not reported nationally or internationally (Car-Hill, 2013). Overall, it appears the population currently comprises around just one third of its previous numbers prior to 1990, although it is
difficult to tell if the ‘official’ population numbers released by government include the administratively erased Bedoun, or not. This survey brings us up to the present-day situation of the Bedoun, in which some of the group still wait for citizenship to be granted to them, while others prepare for an uncertain future as the government of Kuwait continues with ‘status adjustment’ (Toumi, September 10, 2015), negotiates the sale of the Bedoun identity to up to three countries in the so-called Comoros Plan (‘80,000 Bedoons,’ 2016) and threatens to deport most (Comoros, Kuwait,’ 2014), or all, of the whole population (‘No Plans,’ 2014).

Scholars of international law have attempted to address the Bedouns experience of 1990-1995, but they have not used a framework that might theorize ethnic cleansing (Schechler, 1993, p.1) to date. Ethnic cleansing and genocide is very commonly found among indigenous populations (Anaya, 2004, 2009; Lenzerini, 2008; see also discussion of this issue as a form of cultural destruction by Davidson, 2012 and Short, 2010) which is one reason why indigenous law approaches may prove to be a highly useful framework for approaching the human rights deprivations and state-sanctioned violence experienced by the Bedoun. The reason may be that mass population transfer and deaths were not as well described by human rights observers compared to the acts of punitive violence. The information on deaths was also somewhat sketchy, due to incomplete death counts and also due to the merging together of attempts to enact violence, torture and killing, while deportations and mass encampments of the Bedoun also occurred, but the sites where this occurred were difficult to access (Gasperini, August 20, 1991).

For this reason, I analysed multiple sources about the events and attempted to delineate method of violence and killing (Appendix F, i, ii and iii) from expulsion and other forms of population eradication at the ‘policy’ and/or physical level (Appendix C, i, ii, iii, iv, v, Appendix D i, ii, iii, iv, Appendix E, i, ii, iii, iv, v, vi, Appendix G, i. ii, iii, iv) to establish that there were plausible grounds for claiming that ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun occurred between 1990 and 1995. Scherrer (2008) argued against the overuse of the term ‘ethnic’ to explain mass violence but Mann (2005) and Bell-Fialkoff (1999) also show that there is still much to learn from ethnic frameworks and this seems to be especially relevant to the Bedoun, considering the delay or reluctance of scholars to analyse the Kuwaiti Bedouin in particular, as an ethnic group.

2.7.3 Erasure of the Bedoun’s history and culture.

The Chairman of the Islamic Human Right Commission, Massoud Shadjareh, has stressed that the Comoros Plan points to the destruction of the Bedoun’s history and present-day culture (Hayden, November 11, 2014), which is tantamount to genocide according to definitions commonly utilized in the social sciences (Davidson, 2012; Fein, 2007; Lemkin, 1944; Powell, 2007; Short, 2010). The Commission never followed up on these concerns.
Studies of Arab states of the Persian Gulf are characterised by the self-styled academic school of Middle East ‘exceptionalism’ (Cole, 2006), but arguably, Kuwait studies suffers academic isolation more than other area studies. Highly regarded authors have created a very small, closed circle of thought in this corner of Middle East studies, one that exalts the exceptionalist paradigm exalting metropolitan elite (Gross, 1978) and repeats the ideas of a very few authors, narrowing interpretive possibilities and debate. Herb (2016) for example, selected just three authors worthy of analysis in his criticism of Kuwait’s political system that ultimately, he recommended for adoption by all other Gulf monarchies. Scholars who are not perceived to be part of this school of thought do not rate a mention. I believe interpretation, while it may be unpopular, explains why identity claims about the Bedoun by Crystal (1995) and Longva (1997) were accepted at face value by subsequent authors.

The voices of those academics who have provided far more rigorous, systematic scholarly efforts such as Sharon Stanton-Russell (1989) have been virtually ignored. Efforts among conservative thinkers to reduce healthy, intellectual counter-narrative in studies of societies local to the Persian Gulf are not unknown (al Rasheed and Vitalis, 2004). This approach has had great influence on the production of knowledge about Kuwait’s history and society to date, and this becomes patently obvious in comparison between the interpretations of Kuwaiti society offered by social scientists. They have offered a consistent Hadar nationality identity narrative that justifies omissions or rejection of Bedoun identity claims. Alternatively, scholars of international humanitarian law have observed the Bedoun are indigenous people, subject to attempts by Hadar settlers and government, to wipe them out.

Kuwaiti author Al Waqayan (2009, p.38) expressed concern about the lack of knowledge about the history of the Bedoun, their ethnic origins and their contemporary culture. He explained that this had resulted in the Bedoun not only being accused of being ‘illegal residents' according to the policy of the Ministry of the Interior, but also to being described as 'outside the category of Arab peoples' in blatant ignorance, and denial of their heritage (p.38). He explained that evidence of the erasure of the Bedoun's history and culture could be observed in government communications, such as a letter to the Arab Teachers Association, which claimed the Bedoun were not Arabs. He observed,

The majority of stateless persons belonging to the Arab tribes, known in the region and from the same fabric of ethnic and historical heritage of the tribes of Kuwait citizens… [the government of Kuwait] sets out in the letter that they are outside the category of the Arab peoples. (al Waqayan, 2009, p.38; translation by Mohammed al Anezi)

Those tribes were the Bedouin tribes of Kuwait, described by Kuwaiti scholars al Anezi (1989), Alshayeji (1988) and Alhajeri (2004) (listed in Appendix B, i). Al Waqayan
(2009, p.37-39) emphasised the danger that the historical origins of the group and their culture was in the process of being erased through the production of ‘official’ versions of knowledge, in intentional misrepresentations and also due to the ignorance, who made authoritative claims to ‘know’ about the group's history, identity and culture.

**Conclusion**

In this review of literature, I discussed some of the better-known definitions of the Bedoun of Kuwait. While the dominant view among social scientists has criminalized the Bedoun and omitted them from discussion or questioned their identity, scholars of international law have approached the group quite differently, regarding the group as indigenous people who have made valid claims about their identity and experiences of persecution (Kennedy, 2015a). I deconstructed some of the most widely regarded definitions of the Bedoun in studies of Kuwait to illustrate common ideological themes, beginning a ‘counter-narrative’ that challenges the ‘recycling of myths’ (al Rasheed and Vitalis, 2004, p.1) of Bedouin history. The existing social cleavage between the Bedouin and Hadar (al Anezi, 1989; Alhajeri, 2004), and the commonality of themes targeting the ethnic identity of both Bedouin citizens and the Bedoun, reveals the significance of these portrayals of Bedoun, as reflections of government policy and the values of the opposing group, the Hadar. I pointed out that these themes have historical antecedents to regional research approaches to the Bedouin, particularly among metropolitan, Hadar scholars (Bocco, 2006). Therefore, I argued that the domination of the Hadar over the production of scholarly knowledge in Kuwait, must be taken into account when analysing previous sources, and the omission of recognition of the Bedouin as an indigenous people (the **International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations** (1957) (ILO), in Bocco, 2006, p.306) in social science texts referring to the Bedoun.

The policies of segregation (separation of the Bedoun from the Bedouin citizen population) were discussed in the context of developmental models used to frame Bedouin society, which incorporated anti-Bedouin ideologies influencing settlement programs in Kuwait, the deprivation of education and citizenship. Strategic deployment of language was used to shift the identity of the group in scholarly work, simultaneously to changes made at the policy level. Finally, I described programs aimed at the destruction of the population. These included administrative expulsion (1986) (‘The Study,’ 2003), the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun (1990-1996) (Fineman, November 2, 1992) and the emergence of a third program of ‘status adjustment’ (1983), which is elaborated further in this study. This discussion illustrated that the statelessness of the Bedoun via the deprivation of citizenship, while a significant problem, was just one key element in a range of approaches used to eradicate the group to date. Overall this review underscored the need to consider historical and ideological factors in the production of knowledge about marginalized groups, and the
value of exploring research conducted by Kuwaiti scholars and sources beyond the social sciences, in order to expand on existing knowledge about the identity and culture of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society.
Chapter 3

Theoretical concepts

Sociology owns a proper place not only among the sciences but also among the arts that liberate the human mind. (Bierstedt, 1960, p.3 Sociology and Human Learning)

Introduction

In this chapter on theoretical approaches, I explain my choice of sociological theory, principally the humanistic sociology of Florian Znaniecki (1952a, 1952b) and Felix Gross (1978, 1998). I discuss this theory in the context of my reasons for my adopting a sociological approach to studying the Bedouin, who are Bedouin. The strengths of multiple identity theory in the context of ethnic theory (Horowitz, 1975; Gross, 1978) and humanistic sociology (Gross, 1978) are outlined. Themes of nationalist ideology and their underlying basis in social values (Znaniecki; 1952a, 1952b; Smith, 1996, 1991), including justifications of the cultural destruction of vulnerable groups (Davidson, 2012; Znaniecki, 1952b) are also discussed. The exceptionalist framework of ‘tribalism’ theory often applied to the Bedouin of the Middle East (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014; Cole, 2006; Tibi, 1990) is discussed in the context of anti-Bedouin ideologies that have promoted the social exclusion of the Bedouin in urban society.

These ideas help to frame the influence of nationalism, elitism and the metropolitan view (Gross, 1978) on the production of knowledge, with particular relevance to studies of Middle East society. Different conceptual approaches to marginalisation, stigmatisation (Goffman, 1968; Sigona, 2009), labelling and criminalisation (Sigona and Trehan, 2009; Znaniecki, 1952a), nationalism and cultural systems of exclusion (Gross, 1998; Znaniecki, 1952a, 1952b) and cultural destruction (Davidson, 2012; Halas; Mann, 2005; Znaniecki, 1952a) are also explored. I reflect on the observation by Guiberneau (2004) that not all social theories include stateless groups, while some resist their representation as a matter of theoretical positioning, as ephemeral ‘outsiders’ of the state. Stateless groups were accounted for in humanistic sociology, which promotes an inclusive, cultural approach to the study of nations (Gross, 1978, 1998, p.126-132; Znaniecki, 1952b, p.xvi, 21).

3.1 Ethnic Groups and Tribes

3.1.1 Ethnic groups.

Ethnicity is a major sociological category and a basic component of human identity (Smith, 1986, p.32, 1999). Gross (1998, p.88) used the term ethnicity to describe cultural collectives that had no central authority (government). Such groups had a sociological nature similar or identical to nationalities, but a social-political status of a minority group (Gross, 1978, p.6). According to Smith (1999, p.13) ethnic communities comprise
populations distinguished by shared ancestry, myths of common origin, histories and cultures. Ethnic groups may or may not have an association with a specific territory but a shared sense of social solidarity is present, at least among the group’s elites (Gross, 1998, p.6; Smith, 1999, p.13). Gross (1978) studied tribal communities in Africa and Europe. He believed that ethnic groups were characterised by sociological bonds and integration within other groups, including tribes, kinship groups and non-tribal groups (Gross, p.88). I was unable to find a precise definition of ‘ethnic groups’ in Znaniecki’s work (he tended to refer to social groups and social collectivities) and therefore, I have relied on the definitions given by Smith (1986) and Gross (1998), above. In this study, I frame the Bedouin as an ethnic group, and tribal groups as individual sub-ethnic groups, according to Gross’s (1978) theoretical models.

3.1.2 The tribal social bond.

The unique nature of social solidarity particular to tribes in the Middle East, and in the Gulf in particular, has been promoted by many scholars as the primary and distinguishing feature of the groups’ social organisation, and their collective identity (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014; Cole, 2003; Tibi, 1990). This concept is traditionally referred to as asabiya, which means unity among tribal people at the family and social level (Houraini, 1991, p.460). Tribal relations are no longer strictly endogamous, which has led some scholars to speculate about the weakening of asabiya; this seems to indicate that family inter-marriage was the basis for classifying asabiya as an exclusively tribal concept. However, Cole (2003, p.118-119) pointed out that Bedouin identity is now based less on allegiance to single tribes than to a general emphasis on tribal heritage and shared social bonds across different tribes. Other scholars believe the asabiya concept was always over-emphasised, due treatment of patrilineal cousin marriage as exotic (Khuri, 1990), but this anti-colonialist view tends to be less favoured in Middle East studies.

Gross (1998, p.91) described tribal societies as distinguished by common patterns of social solidarity, cooperation and common actions in society, but he believed that individuals tribes still exhibited unique patterns of social solidarity based on social dynamics exclusive to each group. Gross (1998) emphasised the practical function of the tribe in local conditions that challenged their survival. In historical times, it was the desert environment; in contemporary times, it comprises the unstable or undemocratic, authoritarian state structure. The family, clan and tribe protect and form a ‘protective, natural social shelter’ with mutual aid, solidarity and support (Gross, 1998, p.111). This function of the tribes arises especially in times of crisis and danger or chronic deprivation of resources due to lack of support from the state, and even due to the threat to the security of tribal people from the state itself (Gross, 1998, p.89, 111). This point explains the persistence of asabiya locally. It may also account for the persistence of transnational, tribal social networks that maintain
solidarity across nations, resisting the marginalisation of their stateless members excluded by
modern nation-states. In this study, I attempt to follow Gross’s (1978, 1998) approach,
which demystified *asabiya* as an exceptionalist explanation of Bedouin social solidarity,
shared exclusively among members of the tribes, and positions tribes as small social groups,
of which some (but not all) form a larger social collective called the tribal confederation,
while all tribes are members of the border Bedouin ethnic group.

### 3.1.3 Tribalism theory.

Historically, scholars studied the Bedouin as one tribal nation, as a group of nations,
and as a social collective resembling a state (Frantz, 2011, p.15-17). The dominant
anthropological approach to the Bedouin of the Middle East, taken by anthropologists, has
been to regard the Bedouin as a unique, stand-alone tribal entity (Cole, 2006) and not as an
ethnic group comprising of tribes. This is called the ‘essentialist approach’ (Cole, 2006).
Tribalism theory adopts a primordial approach, similar to those that ascribe race as a
biological determined, rather than as ascribed through processes of cultural meaning (Clarke,
2008). Thus, the cultural identity of the Bedouin has tended to be interpreted by
anthropologists as determined by their ‘race,’ and their capacity to adapt to urban life has
been seen as maligned by adherence to inward-looking cultural traditions.

For example, the highly regarded anthropologist Donald Cole (2003) claimed that
the Bedouin were experiencing an emergent ethnic identity after their permanent settlement
across the Arab world, but under his essentialist framework, he claimed that there were no
separate Bedouin or tribal societies within the Arab states, because ‘the existing societies are
state systems,’ (Cole, 2006, p.253). This tricky dialogue posits that tribes are cultural
systems of themselves (ethnic groups), accepting the fact that their citizenship is divided
across different countries within tribal ‘nations.’ But it ignores or minimizes attention to the
fact that some Bedouin have never received citizenship from modern states. This conception
of tribes avoids discussion of statelessness of the tribes based on underlying values that have
position the Bedouin as challengers of nation states, even enemies of modern states (Bocco,
2006). Therefore, some scholars have simply omitted all those have been marginalized by
the state, implying the tribal individual cannot be a ‘good citizen’ unless he/she has received
citizenship from a state – the statist view (Gross, 1978; Guiberneau, 2004; Znaniecki,
1952a).

This approach leaves out whole population chunks – the ‘missing millions’ (Carr-
Hill, 2013) who remain stateless, often by virtue of their ethnic identity, who have attempted
over multiple generations, to actually participate positively in those states. Their identity as
a ‘non-state actor’ is conflated as a threat. Their ordinariness and/or positive contributions to
the nation-state societies in which they live, tends to be omitted by researchers. Tribalism
theory has enabled the functional, social cohesion of the Bedouin (Alshawi and Gardner,
based on traditional values and social practices, to be interpreted as dysfunctional and divisive, a threat to all states in the region, and increasingly, the world (see for example, Salzman, 2007). The theory remains as popular in Middle East Studies as when Patai (1976) attributed all the deficiencies and dysfunction of the collective ‘Arab Mind’ to the Bedouin. The Bedouin remain interpreted as passive, illiterate and unproductive on the home front (Alnajjar and Selvik, 2016), but an active threat to all states (Salzman, 2008; Salzman, 2016). Certainly, it is a dominating view in studies of the Arab Gulf societies, due to a lack of published counter-narratives (al Rasheed and Vitalis, 2004; Little, 2008). In this sense, tribalism theory is anti-humanist, because it is deployed with a conscious purpose, to destroy the values of other cultures (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.214 in Halas, 2010, p.228).

3.1.4 A sociological approach to the Bedouin.

Gross (1978, 1998) offered an alternative sociological approach (1978, 1998). Sociologists regard tribal society exemplified by the tribal social bond called asabiya (social solidarity). Individual tribes are still regarded as sub-groups of larger tribal confederations (larger groups of multiple, tribes), which altogether, comprise the whole ethnic group. Each tribal group is distinguished by unique social patterns related to their lineage and other culturally patterned social characteristics, within the ethnic group (Gross, 1978, 1998). Sociologists attempt to find common patterns between social groups. Therefore, social solidarity among tribal people of a particular area is not regarded as exceptional but as normative, and comparable to other forms of solidarity shared among tribes from other regions and other kinds of social groups. Additionally, humanistic sociology (Gross, 1978, 1998; Znaniecki (1952a, 1952b) recognizes that different cultural groups have their own boundaries, and may exist beyond a state or across multiple states.

Gross (1998) had studied tribal, stateless groups that were not protected but targeted by the state powers under which they lived. Other scholars take a culturalist approach to excluded communities they describe as ‘stateless nations.’ Guibernau (1999, p.84) argued that indigenous groups are stateless nations. However the ‘stateless nation’ model is predicated on values of self-determination based on separatism (such as the Kurdish cause), which does not necessarily apply to all stateless groups. In contrast, humanistic sociologists accepted that the validity of the claim that such groups were already part of the nation, by virtue of their territorial presence, shared histories, social and cultural integration. Many theorists, including Smith (1983, 1991, 2002) assumed the communities of citizens were the only members of states or the only influences on national identity (Guibernau, 2004 p.133). Znaniecki’s (1952b, p.xvi) theoretical approach was a forerunner to the ethno-symbolist nationalism of Smith (1991), but also emphasised the study of stateless cultural collectives that co-existed within states, which may ultimately emerge as ‘stateless nations’ (Guibernau, 2004) due to their exclusion. One reason (among many) this may occur, is due to practices
of exclusion exercised by dominant ethnic and/or nationalistic groups (Znaniecki, 1952b; Gross, 1988). That is, nationalism practiced by sovereign states tends to endanger minority cultures, rather than the other way around (Gross, 1988). Edayat (2014) has argued that this is a major though not exclusive characteristic, of the modern, Middle East states, particularly owing to the rise of extreme forms of nationalism among the dominant social group, which is often an elite minority which enjoys disproportionate power over other groups (Kedourie, 1988; Massad, March 30, 2015).

3.2 Multiple Identification in Ethnic Theory

3.2.1 Self-identification and multiple identification.

Multiple identities (Gross, 1978, p.41) arise as a natural response to changing social contexts. The notion of identity is fluid and changes in response to different situations (Clarke, 2008, p.526; Gross, 1978, p.xv, 58; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.243-246). It is also influenced by a sense of belonging, identities acquired at birth or later in life, both imagined and performed through social roles (Horowitz, 1975). Gross’s (1978, 1998) theory of ethnic identity focused primarily on ethnic identity but also included other types of identities reflecting social, political and cultural structures. While different classifications of identity used by the theorists appear to be quite different, Gross’ (1978) discussion of his theory contained basic elements that were quite compatible with Goffman’s (1968, p.130) theory of stigma. For example, in Gross’ (1978) theory, the multiple identities were linked to psychological process (‘ego-identity’), the performance of social roles (‘personal identity’) and acceptance and rejection by other social groups (‘social identity’). They were also ‘managed’ by the individuals according to different social contexts, particularly related to the monitoring of others’ reactions to them, and foregrounded or backgrounded as desired, or required to avoid conflict (Gross, 1978, p.55-60).

Gross (1978) noted that identity crisis was less common than the uninhibited expression of multiple identities. As a ‘natural’ aspect of the human personality (p.55), identities were inclined to fuse or develop into higher-order, supra-ethnic collectivities, through which they are reconciled (p.59), similar to the concept of super-diversity (Vertovec, 2007). He emphasised that multiple identities are a normative feature of plural and multi-ethnic societies (Gross, 1978 p.64-66; 1998, p.122), representing the complexity of human personalities, and social situations in which we are called upon to play different roles. Znaniecki (1965) also believed that identity should be regarded as taking on multiple, somewhat overlapping forms (1952b, p.16-17; 1965, p.206).

Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) accounted for the rejection of individuals and groups as symptoms of social disorganisation (Cargan, 2007), but in this study I also draw on the ideas of Goffman (1963) and Ginsberg (1996) about stigma and the spoiling of identity, to explain some of the more subjective aspects of social ‘passing’ and labelling of groups as
‘foreign,’ leading to alienation. Classifications of stigma included those based on physical characteristics (abominations of the body, referring to disability and disfigurement), those based on personal characters (perceived ‘moral’ failings), and those based on basic social or cultural characteristics such as race, ethnicity and religion, called ‘tribal stigma’ (Goffman, 1963, p.4). This corresponds well with the problem of ‘exceptionalist’ bias in tribalism theory, which has attempted to ascribe pre-determined qualities to the Bedouin based on racial characteristics, which I described above.

Applying his theory to Western society, it is likely Goffman (1963) did not envisage his theory to literally represent the stigma of tribal belonging as a Bedouin might experience it, but the theory did not preclude it. The theory has been particularly useful for exploring the identity of the Rohingya and Roma, also stateless populations whose identities as whole population groups, are rejected (Redclift, 2013; Sigona, 2011). The theory captured the impact of alienation on identity, experienced by large groups as a form of dehumanisation, typically suffered by targeted groups of migrants (Goffman, 1963, p.6). Both labelling theory and theories of marginalisation have been criticized for limited account of the power relations that lie behind the process of stigmatizing target groups (Bayat, 2012, Clarke, 2008). However, this is a strength of Znaniecki’s’ (1952a) theory of social disorganisation (Cargan, 2007).

3.2.2 External factors influencing multiple identifications.

Some groups have been impacted by the formation and dissolution of the modern nation states that intersected pre-existing social and cultural groups collectives, which led them to be defined as ‘transnational’ groups (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.17) whose group membership is perceived as split across different nations. Gross (1978) addressed this problem in his multiple identity models. The approach is highly relevant to the Bedoun, because of the importance placed on transnational, tribal origins among the Bedouin in the Arab-ruled Middle East states, which gives rise to public debate about tribal and national allegiances. In democratic societies, the state respects the equal rights of all members while promoting an overarching national identity symbolised in citizenship. A diversity of ethnic and religious identities are tolerated. The individual’s need to retain their former national or cultural ties while absorbing a new national identity after migration may also be tolerated, even celebrated as culturally enriching the host society (Gross, 1998). However, cultural assimilation into the new national identity is still assumed.

Liberal ideologists may purport to tolerate cultural diversity, but nationalists usually demand visible assimilation of newcomers via their gradual relinquishment of national loyalty to their previous nation of residence, and development of personal identification with the new nation (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.127). Social identities that are perceived to be linked to other ethnic groups or states, may give rise to social tension and conflict, such as inter-ethnic
conflict or conflicted ideas over who belongs. Such factors can be provoked or exploited by nationalist ideologists to create social disharmony, to exclude or harm other groups. Yet individuals may have many different kinds of identity, including ideological and non-ideological, interest-based identities that represent the expression of a range of cultural values and interests (Gross, 1998, p.123).

A population that expresses dual or multiple identifications may be perceived as ‘threats’ to the state because ethnic identifications are often associated with the subjective measure of ‘loyalty’ to the state (Gross, p.1978, p.75). In conflict scenarios focused on nationalistic ideology, nationalist adherents project claims that ‘others’ do not belong, accusations of inherent ‘disloyalty’ attributable to identity, and worse, assumptions that others are ‘traitors’ (Gross, 1978, p.xv, 41, 55; 1998, p.122-125). This opposition to the ‘other’ social group may arise in response to any identity not perceived to conform with the dominant national identity narratives (Gross, 1978, p.xv, 41, 55; 1998, p.122-125). Stigmatisation may occur in such toxic social environments, provoking an inner identity crises (at the level of the ego-identity), that requires targets to carefully manage their identity in order to avoid persecution for who they are (Goffman, 1963).

3.2.3. Social identities and the role of education and the intellectual ideal.

Gross (1978, p.6-7, 60-63) referred to the growth of ideological, non-ethnic identities among individuals as they engaged in modern or urban life. He believed that ethnic bonds were naturally loosened by engagement with other groups in society and exposure to new ideas, if individuals were attracted to and identified with those new influences. Znaniecki (1952b, p.100) took this idea further, explaining that the development of the intellectual ideal, and the growth of intellectual leaders in society, was essential to the national identity of social collectives. Mass literacy, achieved through general education in schools, is required for populations to become fully aware of national, political ideals, to participate fully in society, and to fulfil the role of active citizens in the nation. This is part of the ‘civilizing’ function of education (Znaniecki, 1952b).

Bayat (2007, 2009, 2013) developed the term ‘active citizenry’ and ‘active citizenship’ in social movement theory pertaining to the Middle East, linked to theory of marginalisation and classical sociology of the Chicago School. The idea has since been expanded upon by social movement theorists seeking political explanations, but in concordance with the Chicago School, Bayat (2012, 2013) applied the concept as a normalizing function, to describe how ordinary people conceptualize social movement in order to change their lives in concrete ways. Other concepts also relevant to this study include sumud, a Palestinian concept (Shehadeh, in Said, 1986). Sumud (also spelled 'Samed' was a pen name taken by Shehadeh (p.146, in Moore, 2013). The verb means 'to
defy, brave, withstand, resist, oppose or hold out; to repair; and to apply oneself’ (Moore, 2013, p.44, n72).

Others have interpreted *Sumud* purely politically, as a type of social and political resistance that has been described in contexts of Bedouin ethnic cleansing and land confiscation in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, and more generally as a psychological and spiritual orientation (van Teeffelen, August 9, 2014). *Sumud* is translated from the Arabic as ‘steadfastness’ or ‘steadfast perseverance.’ Another concept is ‘true generosity’ from Freire (1970, p.91, 120, 121), which refers to the pedagogy of the oppressed, wherein the oppressed share positive sentiment with their oppressors, re-educating them, so that both parties may re-claim their humanity. These concepts are based on cooperative ideals of resistance, in which social identity embodies the intellectual ideal, collective consciousness, communalism, and liberation.

Social leadership can only be developed through education, and the nurturing of the individual mind through expression of the intellectual ideal (Halas, 2010, p.201). Occupied states or societies oppressed by authoritarian rule, nationalities or ethnic groups singled out for punitive repression, were often deprived of education, or only allowed education reflecting the cultural values the opposing nation (indoctrination). Such education was only provided in order to weaken the political resistance of those groups and to counter the spread of democracy (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.103). On the other hand, Znaniecki (1952b) also explained the rich history of self-education and community education conducted by those who sustained the intellectual ideal as a form of resistance and cultural defence in modern Europe. This included the Polish resistance movement in which he participated in a community education resistance movement during occupation (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.105, n16).

### 3.3 Nationalist Ideologies

#### 3.3.1 Destructive nationalist ideologies.

Cultural organisation at the national level necessarily engages nationalist ideology. Znaniecki (1952b) emphasised that national ideologies are consciously designed and disseminated by intellectuals, who seek leadership roles in society to promote their values. Davidson’s (2012) view is similar. Cultural prejudices can be greatly magnified if they correspond with intentionally implanted, nationalist ideologies that target others for exclusion and/or eradication (Davidson, 2012, p.10). These ‘thought collectives’ are, artificially created, community-wide points of view,’ of which is the nation-state is an example, invoking ‘**striking imaginings of fraternity.**’ (Anderson, 1991, p.203 in Davidson, 2012, p.9)
Znaniecki (1952a, 1952b) illustrated historical examples of programmed, collective targeting ethnic groups by states, and their methods of oppression. Cultural destruction is an essential component of, if not the underlying aim, of genocide (Davidson, 2012; Lemkin, 1944; Powell, 2007; Samson and Short, 2006; Short, 2010, 2012; Znaniecki, 1952a). Destructive acts, including the eradication of whole communities, are developed from a purpose to remove the ‘source’ of a perceived problem (Halas, 2007, p.151; Znaniecki, 1952b, p.214, 346). Despite this, positive or more constructive national ideologies are also created by intellectual leaders, which contribute to the expansion of national culture and cross-fertilisation of cultures (Znaniecki, 1952b).

Short (2010) urged that attempts to determine if mass violence and genocide has been inflicted upon one social group by another, should involve inquiry into the perspective of the research group: the definition of their situation (W. I. Thomas in Short, 2010 p.833, n19). Victims of cultural destruction are often social groups who shared a unified, collective consciousness; their group identity may itself become the target of annihilation (Fein, 1993, p.23-24, in Short, 2010, p.833, n20). Short (2010) also pointed out the usefulness of labelling theory (Becker, 1963 in Short, 2010, p.832, n17) in explaining the conceptual approach of perpetrator groups toward targeted groups.

3.3.2 Ideological narratives.

Some common, nationalist ideological narratives which project outsider status onto others include themes of defence against perceived aggressors, such as the myths of sins of the fathers; and defence against a common enemy, and myths of perfection, including the quest for purity and the myth of original perfection (Znaniecki, 1952b).

Sins of the fathers.

In this ideology, sins of omission are projected onto subsequent generations. In many societies, when an individual member of a social group is found to have committed a prohibited act, all members of the group are considered participants in the action. The ideology is transferred from the one to the many and to future generations (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.334). The transmission of the ideology to different ‘guilty’ parties spreads blame rapidly by generalizing it throughout the target population. The intergenerational ‘sin’ becomes impossible to escape.

Defence against a common enemy.

National solidarity is evokes by appeals to national independence against common enemies, real or imagined. The belief that one’s culture is superior to others may also be inflated, in order to justify the dominant group’s mass exclusion and eradication of weaker groups (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.99, 113). In the absence of real conflict, one may be created to pursue nationalistic missions of aggression to discover those of ‘true’ faith or the ‘right’ kind of social order (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.97). Leaders make rhetorical appeals to the masses,
labelling targeted groups and individuals as ‘evil’ and ‘enemies,’ and disturbing the ‘purity’ of the dominant group (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.98). Oppressors may claim they have been victimised, enabling them to establish programs of mass eradication of non-nationals or ethnic minorities (Mann, 2005, p.27). ‘Foreign elements’ are identified within the local, heterogeneous group.

The process is similar to stigmatisation (Goffman, 1963), as individuals are labelled for their specific characteristics as enemies of the state and prepared for elimination (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.347). This theme is manifested in a variety of self-righteous responses, including racial prejudice, economic exploitation of others, the use of violent methods of coercion, the limitation of the human rights, and the tightening of political controls (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.355 1952b, p.99). Self-defence against these ideologies is dangerous for minorities (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.99). Members of the dominant group may become labelled as transgressors due to a narrowing of norms and standards of belonging and become targeted as a defensive action (Znaniecki, 1952a).

Transgressors are rejected by the group and punished for the perceived effects (and not objective causes or causal relationships) of the transgression (Znaniecki, 1952a). Apart from settings of direct, intergroup conflict, the gradual penetration of a number of persons identified as ‘outsiders,’ ‘foreigners’ whose cultural patterns differ from those of ‘native’ participants can be perceived as ‘dangerous’ (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356). The identification of difference comes through recognition of the different cultural patterns inherent in the social actions.

*The quest for purity.*

The idea of the biological ‘purity’ of a whole society is expressed in the myth of perfection. This is a strongly held and effective myth that persists in culturally diverse societies, even when historical evidence challenges the myth. There is a general tendency to strive for conformity in the conservative re-organisation of the cultural system, in which members strive to restore it to mythical state of ‘original’ perfection which ties all members to a single point of origin, based on an ideologically constructed national memory (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356).

A dominant nationality may not wish to admit ‘foreigners’ as full members of the nation, but may admit some of the ‘natives’ they have conquered to facilitate rule and control, while still regarding the whole group as hereditarily unfit for full membership. In this instance, racial prejudice interferes with assimilative expansion. Separatism is then maintained to prevent full membership and to protect the ‘pure’ national society against dilution (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.131-132). Examples include mass expulsion (as official deportations and unofficial ‘migration,’ where the group is driven out and/or flees
voluntarily), genocide, or national assimilation that regards ‘unfit’ members as a lower hereditary class or caste (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.132).

The myth of ‘original’ perfection.

According to the myth of original perfection, a dominating group believes it is divinely or biologically superior to others (the ‘chosen ones’) and they seek return to their idealised, original status (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.87). When a national group dominates another nationality, any sign of active resistance or rebellion is interpreted as a challenge to its superiority, for which retaliatory measures are issued (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.355-6, 1952b p.86-91). Znaniecki (1952a, p.355) emphasised that the superiority of the dominant group had to be confirmed by winning results of some kind, as victory maintains social solidarity, validating the groups’ superiority and chosen path. This might constitute a gradual accumulation of small-scale-conquests and repression of minorities, or a large-scale victory over a well-defined aggressor. Smith referred to the cultural pattern of the ‘chosen’ ones (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.87) as ‘election myths’ (Smith, 1999, p.131).

3.3.3 Ethnic nationalism, expulsion, ethnic cleansing.

The process of ‘othering’ is developed along the lines of self-fulfilling cultural motifs, which are promoted as the perfect solution for all problems or the ‘right’ and only path. Ideologists create the arguments that justify violent acts in the name of righteous devotion to the cause (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.97; 1952b, p287). Ethnic nationalism features a dominant social group making a righteous claim to cultural superiority, racial purity and ‘belonging’ on the basis of myths of common racial descent. These myths provide the rationale for a group to justify their entitlement to eradicate others (Gross, 1998, p.75; Smith, 1999, p.195, p.131-135, 195; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.86-91, 1952b, p.356). Tribal nationalists seek a mono-ethnic state with a single, ruling nationality group to satisfy the myth of common descent (Gross, 1998, p.75). Less powerful groups of indigenous people and/or minorities may be expelled in a broader program in which expulsion is viewed as just one of many parts of the larger ideological system (Gross, 1978, p.7, Wimmer, 2002, p.222; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.355).

3.3.4 Nationalism, the intellectual elite and the ‘metropolitan’ view.

Znaniecki (1952b) and Gross (1978) emphasised the role of the intellectual in the production of knowledge about nations. Urban elitism has been a persistent theme in the studies of Middle East society since Ibn Khaldun (2004) put forward the first Arab social study, the Muqaddimah (Bocco, 2006; Houraini, 1991). Auremche (1993) discussed the impact of this approach in Middle East studies: the dominance or the ‘urban’ viewpoint had created a distortion of the history of the Bedouin which was inspired by fear of the unknown, because historians simply did not know their subject. Lancaster and Lancaster (1998) offered a similar perspective, noting ignorance and cynicism was rife among academics who wrote
about the Bedouin, but rarely interacted with them. Bocco (2006) noted the same attitudes had been expressed by Hadar researchers since the 1950s, impacting including the implementation of international law protections related to Bedouin settlement programs. Gross (1978, p.xxi) discovered that native and metropolitan constructions of reality were characterized by different perceptions of reality, based on different forms of ethnic identification and relationships to the political power structure. The metropolitan class included intellectuals and ideologists who represented their interests, ‘view nationality from the vantage point and from a personal [and] collective experience of a city or an urban community’ (Gross, 1978, p.xiv). He observed that academic notions of nations and national identity could be characterised by subjectivity, inconsistency and a desire to exclude:

Political theorists, philosophers, and social scientists told the people ex cathedra what a nation is. All those groups that did not fit into their categories were disqualified in their national existence. The definitions changed: once, it was race; other times it became territory or language that distinguished nationality from other groups. Still the visible ‘objective’ difference between nationalities was not solely, and was not always, language, but a distinct culture. This is the ‘objective’ perception of nation-cultures or nationalities. (Gross, 1978, p.xiv)

3.4 Znaniecki’s Theory of Cultural Systems

3.4.1 The ideology of the outsider or ‘other’ and a humanistic response

The notion of the ‘other’ was linked to studies of migration, race relations, criminalisation and impoverishment, established by the Chicago School sociologists such as Park, Thomas and Znaniecki (Calhoun, 2007), Du Bois and others (Morris, 2015). Social theorisation of the ‘other’ began with the studies of the immigrant, perceived as a ‘stranger’ (Simmel in Wolff, 1964, p.402-408; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1919). Park (1928, p.892 in Goldberg, 2012) introduced the concept of the ‘marginal man.’ The term ‘marginalisation’ was regarded as roughly equivalent to ‘exclusion,’ but expanded into a more complex network of ideas (Bayat, 2012, p.4). Theory of cultural disorganisation refers to the ‘outsider,’ ‘foreigner’ and ‘stranger’ to describe marginalized individuals and groups (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356). The ‘other’ ‘is a crucial symbol that we juxtapose against the definition of who ‘we’ are, to clarify our own identity’ (Clarke, 2008, p.519).

Even in peacetime, members of the community seek out ‘others’ as culturally different from within their own groups in order to validate their own belonging Znaniecki (1952b, p.97-100). The dominant social group makes a righteous claim to superiority, purity and ‘belonging’ through the objectification of the ‘other.’ ‘Othering’ makes the assertion of smaller, less powerful groups as the ‘natives’ fraught with difficulty, because their expulsion or eradication may be viewed as one part of a larger ideological system belonging to the
dominant group (Znaniecki, 1952a). Such systems of ideas emphasise racial and cultural difference to create social order, and are inherent in structural forms of discrimination (Douglas, 1966, in Clarke, 2008, p.519). Through ‘othering,’ the process of identifying, punishing and expelling ‘outsiders’ performs an important function, enhancing conservative social organisation within the dominant group (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.99).

Znaniecki’s (1934) ‘humanistic coefficient’ was an approach that addressed the problem of ‘othering,’ insofar as it regarded the data of research participants from their own point of view, as social facts (Smolicz and Secombe, 1981). The humanistic coefficient means ‘together’ and ‘do,’ in Polish (Znaniecki’s native language) and in Latin, means creating, building and achieving together (Halas, 2010, p.55). Halas (2010) pointed out that the term highlighted Znaniecki’s (1934) holistic vision of the human collective’s co-creation of cultural reality (p.55). Rather than observe research populations at a distance, subjectivity is embraced. The research participant’s ideas, values and attitudes are the focus of cultural inquiry: ‘The data belong to the experiences of people and are such as the experiences make them’ (Znaniecki, 1934, p.56 in Halas, 2010, p.56).

The humanistic coefficient was introduced by Znaniecki (1934) at a time when social scientists debated the value of subjective data, and the extent to which such data could be regarded as ‘scientific.’ The principles upon which the concept was based was essentially, Znaniecki’s (1934) response to the positivist paradigm (Halas, 2010, p.100; Szacki, 1986 in Halas, 2010; Szacki, 2010). These principles have since become mainstream among qualitative researchers, linked to classical sociology (Bierstedt, 1980; Cargan, 2007; Gross, 1978, p.xxii; Halas, 2006). The concept of the humanistic coefficient is compatible with, and should perhaps be considered as part of, social justice and participatory/collaborative research frameworks that have sought to address the marginalisation of minority groups through the production of knowledge. It is a means by which researchers may engage across multiple paradigms in sociology, but has special value as a participatory research approach (Costley, Elliott and Gibbs, 2010, p.86), orienting the researcher with the research group from an ‘insider’s’ perspective. Similar approaches are now taken in anthropology (Lancaster and Lancaster, 2008; Lee, 1999), sociology (Denzin and Giardina, 2016) and education. In the sociology of educational research, the approach has been further developed in studies of ethnic identity, language preservation, social equity and globalisation (Maniam, 2014; Secombe and Zadja, 1999; Smolicz and Secombe, 2003; Zadja, 2005).

3.4.2 Social actions and ideology in the conservative cultural system.

The origins of social actions are dynamic systems of values that contain characteristics of cultural patterning (Smolicz, 1999, p.286; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.311). The precursors of actions exist the ideational level. Complex models and systems of ideas
belong to the general category of cultural data (p.290) but their purpose differs from other
cultural products (p.282). They are simultaneously products past ideas and future actions.
Ideological systems contain standards and norms intended to guide the future actions
(Znaniecki, 1952a, p.290). They are initiated and developed by thinkers who wish to resolve
social conflict (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.283).

Through the design and implementation of ideological systems, social actions
isolating weaker groups may be engineered to increase conformity to the dominant regime.
Similarly, ideological conflict between expansionist groups could stimulate social conflict
(Znaniecki, 1952a p.295). National leaders may attempt to impose their ideals of social
order and cultural progress. These ideals are embedded in a variety of motifs of nationalist
themes linked to ideological models (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.132). Extreme forms of nationalist
ideology that seek to isolate and to harm whole social groups are typically found under
authoritarian and fascist nationalist movements (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.139). These ideologies
are characteristic of conservative cultural systems, which extend beyond conservatism, to
imposed, restrictive systems of oppression, harm and eradication. Znaniecki (1952b)
believed that active intergroup conflict could only be reduced by active, intergroup
cooperation, asserting that ‘Mutual isolation has no lasting effect and it impossible in the
modern world’ (p.141).

According to Znaniecki’s (1952a) theory of cultural systems, the process of defining
‘others’ as non-members of a social collective, in order to repress, exclude and eradicate
another group, is an expression of the ideological foundation and values held by the
opposing group (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.353). Their effectiveness is not measured by their
destructive effects on others, but according to the social control (conformity) they achieved
(Znaniecki, 1952a, p.353). Weaker groups are targeted with very specific and destructive
actions by stronger groups, until they no longer exist. They are cast out of the tribe or state,
killed, and/or their cultural products destroyed (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.346). Such processes
are consciously undertaken (Halas, 2010, p.228; Znaniecki, 1952b, p.214), involving the
targeting and criminalisation of identity or the social actions of particular groups, eradication
by removal (mass population transfer), killing and cultural destruction in ethnic conflict,
cleansing and other forms of violence, including genocide (Gross, 1978, p. xi; 1998, p.vii;
Mann, 2005; Short and Rashed, 2012).

During the process of social evaluation, the ideology has a reinforcing effect on the
social system, through affirmation of members of the group as insiders, or rejection of
members of the group as outsiders. It emphasises that those who are judged ‘non-
conformist,’ initially endure outsider status, but tend to gravitate to new systems of values.
Once an alternative ideology that aligns with the individual’s values is recognized,
individuals usually seek membership within the social or cultural system in which the
ideology is found. Acquiring membership in the new group is usually not difficult, as the individual’s existing values are likely compatible with the new system, but clearly, the evaluations of those in the receiving social group also have a major role in determining acceptance.

In the case of ethnic groups, membership is often but not always, based on birth; in these cases, entry of newcomers is limited to certain methods, such as marriage (Horowitz, 1975). If the system is dominated by conservative re-organisation, newcomers will not be accepted; the individual remains an outsider (Znaniecki, 1952a). In the case of non-ethnic ideologically-based identities (Gross, 1978) such as religious groups, political groups, or sub-cultures within the existing culture, acquiring membership is easier to obtain (Gross, 1978, Horowitz, 1975). Existing members of the new group usually recognize the alignment of the newcomer’s values, leading to their positive evaluation, which enables the newcomer to integrate and belong in the new social circle (Znaniecki, 1952a).

3.4.3 Criminalisation of identity.

The ideology of ‘othering’ explains how governments can control others via prohibitive rules (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.335). Categories of ‘other’ are invented by bureaucrats and legislators to distance or cast out certain groups in society by labelling them as deviant (Becker, 1963; Goffman, 1963; Short, 2010; Sigona and Trehan, 2009). These rules may reinforce existing boundaries of norms and standards that determine membership to the dominant social group, or introduce new boundaries to enforce exclusion. The boundaries of belonging are often characterised by their inconsistency and therefore, standards of criteria for membership are often changed arbitrarily (Znaniecki, 1952a). The special group of ‘insiders’ determining the rules (Becker, 1963) may elect a conspicuous identity-based attribute for which ‘outsiders’ can be recognised as deviating from their own norms, and judged as transgression that must be punished (Znaniecki, 1952a). The selection of these attributes facilitates targeting of specific groups (Stanton, 2004). Indigenous people and migrants are historically associated with high levels of stigmatisation and criminalisation by more powerful groups, which prevents their social adjustment and integration (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1919; Sigona and Trehan, 2009).

When stigma is reinforced over a period of time, labels become a powerful determinant of identity enforced by those outside the group. Such labels may significantly depart from a groups’ self-ascribed identity (Sigona, 2005, 2011). Those who fail to meet criteria for belonging are faced with punitive retaliation (Znaniecki, 1952a, 1952b). Their group’s identity may become ‘spoiled’ (Goffman, 1963) leading individuals to become automatically associated with the label, and evaluated negatively (Sigona, 2005, 2009, 2011). They may be faced with punitive responses or omitted entirely in social interactions with others, and forced to ‘pass’ as members of the dominant group to survive (Redclift,
At the official level, exclusion may entail using administrative laws to change the status of residency of the group to create an ‘illegal’ status (Znaniecki, 1952a). This criminalizes the identity of the whole group, reinforcing the group’s image as ‘deviant’ law-breakers. It may also condemn the group according to the new regulations, to sanctions such as expulsion, deportation and killing (Znaniecki, 1952a).

3.4.4 Increased conservatism among citizens.

Cultural reorganisation at the national level influences the general population by stabilising and increasing their conservatism and conformity, which reinforces collective solidarity (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356-7). Citizens must cooperate with these authorities, either actually or vicariously (Znaniecki, 1952a). They demonstrate their cooperation by displaying interest and support for the regime on the one hand, and by condemning the perceived transgressors on the other. At this level, ordinary citizens may take on the symbolic role of ‘guardians of order’ and dissociate themselves from criminals as inferior beings (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.357). They adopt a quasi-authoritarian role in maintaining cultural superiority and national order (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.358).

Additionally, some members of the group identified as outsiders, may adopt conservative values mirroring the dominant group in order to appeal to them for inclusion (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.357). Members of the targeted group may assist the dominating regime identify ‘the other’ in their society, and even contribute in some way to their punishment or eradication. This process is also known as ‘in-group policing’ (Mann, 2005, p.21), in which members of the targeted group facilitate the surveillance and reporting of their own group for the dominant, oppressor group, genuinely believing they are contributing to the good of the greater society (Mann, 2005, p.21). This pattern is illustrated in the system of cultural disorganisation and conservative re-organisation (Znaniecki, 1952a). A dynamic but conservative response to cultural difference, may lead to punishment via social controls (repression, exclusion), ‘foreign’ identification (leading to membership restrictions, revocation of citizenship) and expulsion (coerced, forced migration, deportation, killing and cultural destruction). The more positive aspects featured in the figure are discussed in the next section of this chapter.

As I have mentioned, the identification and exclusion of non-members has a reinforcing effect on the solidarity of the in-group. Active, collective repression makes the repressors more ethnocentric and sure of the validity of the cultural order they seek to restore (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356). Nationalist ideology is stabilised because members respond by increasing their own conformity in relation to accepted standards and norms. This process helps to explain why populations who were previously integrated members of society, may become stigmatised by members of their own in-group, without them having performed any social action that would warrant exclusion (Sigona, 2005, 2009, 2011).
3.4.5 Creative re-organisation and the expansion of culture.

Florian Znaniecki (1930, 1936, 1939, 1955, 2007) regarded human beings as ‘conscious, active beings,’ who develop active experience in the world as individuals and as collectives of consciousness (see also Halas, 1989, 2010; Hinkle, 1994, p.292). Creative reorganisation could be contrasted with conservative reorganisation (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.359). Creativity, innovation and leadership promote the perception that contributions to society are essentially, positive. According to Znaniecki (1952a, p.359-360), creative reorganisation involves expanding the positive functions of the nation, culture and society, to amplify its value to its members. Thus, creative cultural re-organisation introduces positive social bonds between members to increase cooperation and reduce conflict. Creative reorganisation is distinguished by the input of positive, conscious social actions into the cultural system, whereas conservative cultural re-organisation contracts culture through conformity, and is therefore more inclined toward ideological conversion and dogmatic adherence than innovation. In creative re-organisation, new common values, new relationships of functional interdependence and cultural patterns of action are introduced into society (Halas, 2010; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.359).

Thus, the collective consciousness is oriented toward inclusion and diversity. Standards, norms and values held by members of the society tend to be more flexible as cultural expansion takes place. Creative and innovative social action challenges conformity to existing standards and norms; transgressions of normative standards are a function of creativity and freedom (Halas, 2010, p.164). Such social actions which display minor variations to existing standards and norms are tolerated without conflict, allowing their incorporation into the cultural system (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.360). More radical change may require negotiation between social actors before being incorporated into the cultural system. In this context, cultural differences may be celebrated and exploited for their positive influence on culture.

Cross-cultural fertilisation of ideas leads to further differentiation, innovation and creativity between different cultural groups. Ideas and intellectual capital are fed back into the ideological system, invigorating culture and society. Those who find change and innovation undesirable or threatening, often attempt to obstruct manifestations of creative re-organisation with organised, cooperative repression (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.358). Znaniecki (1952a, p.359) believed that creative re-organisation was more difficult to achieve in society because it required the realisation of new ideals over time, contingent upon the cooperation of active leaders and growing circles of followers. Creative actions are transgressions of existing standards and norms; for this reason, they are more often prevented or repressed than stimulated, even in contemporary societies where creativity is more accepted more than ever before (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.208).
Much of Znaniecki’s (1952a) description of the creative processes was contained not only in his chapter on re-organisation (p.359), but also in his discussion of the formation of the ideal and the dynamic processes of ideological systems (p.270-275). This aspect of the cultural system was also discussed in his work on nationalism in relation to intellectual leadership, inter-group cooperation and education (Znaniecki, 1952b). Cultural difference is a dynamic factor in constant tension through both conservative and creative systems (Znaniecki, 1952a).

3.5 National Culture and Statelessness

In this study I adopted Znaniecki’s (1952b) cultural view of nationalism (Gross, 1998, p.81-82). Znaniecki (1952a, 1952b) addressed the ideological dimensions of nationals and nationalism, shown in the communications approach of Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983) and Smith (1991, p.11 in Guibernau, 2004, p.133). He regarded nations as socially organised collectives ‘with certain common and distinctive cultural characteristics (language, customs, historical traditions, etc.), sometimes also ‘racial’ traits and a definite geographical location’ (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.xiv). According to this view, people are organised according to their common cultures and solidarities with or without a common political government called the ‘state’ (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.xvi).

Some ethnic, cultural collectives have always been excluded from nationalist movements and state formation (Smith, 1998, p.125; 1999, p.101). Znaniecki (1952b) and Mann (2005, p.20) also observed that politicized narratives tend to promote the state as the only effective social unit. The perspective has often led to those people who lived outside the formal structures of the state being omitted from or misrepresented in research discussions, as if they did not exist at all (Znaniecki, 1952b p.ix; Gross, 1978, p.3). The perspective was applied to the Bedouin of the Middle East in Arab development theory such as Learner’s (1958) The Passing of Traditional Society and colonialist theory such as Coon’s (1961, p.8), which declared, ‘A culture in transition is hard to explain’ (in Bocco, 2006, p.322-323).

The nationalist approach implicitly marginalizes non-national social collectives from the production of knowledge concerning nationalist ideas and phenomena at the national level. Guiberneau (2004, p.131) pointed out that some theories (such as Smith, 1991, 2002) do not account for the emergence of social bonds and cohesion among cultural communities without states. She explained that in cultural collectives without states, cultural identity is amplified, emphasising ethnic roots - shared history that extends prior to state formation - attachment to the territory and explicit desire for self-determination (but not necessarily independence). Group identity is also defined by a lack of statehood (or it could be assumed, lack of membership in the state), ‘by an impossibility to act’ in political life (Guiberneau,
2004, p.132) and therefore, ‘It is based on the existence of a community with a stable but
dynamic core’ (p.132), which strengthens the social bonds of its members.
Therefore, one of my primary considerations approaching the study of a stateless
collective was choosing an appropriate theoretical orientation that would not merely
replicate challenges to the identity and culture of the group that was already found at the
political level, but account for dynamic social change and the cultural life of the Bedouin.
Znaniecki (1952b) recognised this problem related to the preoccupation with nation-state
building:

…students of nationalities have usually followed the example of political
scientists... They have consequently ignored the social influences of numerous
and diverse nationalistic groups which are not included in the formal political
structure of the state. (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.xvi)

Znaniecki (1952b, xi) found that among numerous nationality groups with distinctive
cultures, but not necessarily their own states, all could be characterised by some degree of
active solidarity and a specific social organisation irreducible to political structures.
Znaniecki (1952b, xvi) devoted his studies in Modern Nationalities to these groups. He
understood that stateless populations were not only excluded from the state, but that such
populations could also have rich a cultural heritage and social life.

Conclusion
In this chapter I reviewed the theoretical framing utilised in this study, including the
humanistic sociology approach of Florian Znaniecki (1952a, 1952b) and Felix Gross (1978,
1998), as well as ethnic, identity and labelling theories (Gross, 1978, 1998; Goffman, 1968;
Horowitz, 1975). I argued that while tribalism theory used in Middle East studies has
emphasised the Bedouin tribal social bond, it has also been associated with anti-Bedouin
ideologies that have marginalised the Bedouin in the production of knowledge, particularly
in colonialist and developmental models (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006). Ethnic theory in
sociology, on the other hand, has accounted for social solidarities and social change, as well
as multiple identities that have cultural and ideological bases (Horowitz, 1975; Gross, 1978).

Nationalist ideologies were briefly surveyed, illustrating how powerful myths can
nurture group solidarities but can also justify the physical and cultural destruction of weaker
groups (Znaniecki, 1952a, 1952b; Davidson, 2012; Smith, 1996, 1991). Different
conceptual approaches to ‘othering' and outsider status were also discussed, such as
marginalisation (Bayat, 2012, 2013), stigmatisation, labelling (Goffman, 1968; Sigona,
2005), 'passing' (Goffman, 1968; Ginsberg, 1996), deviance and transgression (Becker,
1963, Znaniecki, 1952a) and the criminalisation of identity (Znaniecki, 1952a; Sigona,
2011), and political forms of nationalist and ethnic exclusion (Gross, 1998; Smith, 1998,
1999; Znaniecki, 1952a, 1952b). I attempted to link these ideas theories that address more extreme forms of ‘othering’ and ethnic tension, such as ethnic cleansing, cultural destruction and genocide (Davidson, 2012; Halas, 2007; Mann, 2005; Znaniecki, 1952a) in the context of Znaniecki’s (1952a) theory of conservative, cultural re-organisation.

I also briefly surveyed the theory of creative re-organisation of cultural systems by Znaniecki’s (1952a, extensively reviewed by Halas, 2010), which explained the expansion of culture through positive forms of ideology that seek to solve social problems, such as ‘active citizenship’ (Bayat, 2013), ‘sumud’ (Moore, 2013; van Teeffelen, August 9, 2014) and educational theory in which the oppressed educate their oppressors in a pedagogy of liberation (Freire, 1970). Creativity, innovation, leadership and self-education aided the realisation of ideals and absorption of new ideologies. However, because these attributes tend to challenge existing norms and standards, they may be more difficult for others to accept (Znaniecki, 1952a). Guiberneau (2004) emphasised that cultural collectives without states experienced an increased importance of cultural identity and shared ethnic and social bonds among the collectives’ members. I emphasised that humanistic sociology adopts a culturally inclusive approach to the study of nations, which promotes the research of stateless groups from a sociological perspective (Gross, 1978, 1998, p.126-132; Znaniecki, 1952b, p.xvi, 21).
Chapter 4
The Methodological Approach

These people [academic researchers] who are supposed to be putting the structure, or the profile, the knowing [accumulation of knowledge], or… the demographic system of Kuwait… they are talking… and reading a lot … But they don’t know the people, they don’t move through the people, know the Bedouin. They did not go to al Jahra, they don’t sit with the Kuwaiti Bedouins, the Bedouin people… First, if you want to know, you must meet with the people and talk with them. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 5 August, 2015)

Introduction

This chapter considers the aspects of methodology for a research thesis in the qualitative paradigm (Creswell, 2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011), such as the aim of the research, the research questions and design within the qualitative paradigm, the exploratory and mainly inductive nature of the research, the use of empirical materials, each research method utilized, validity and reliability, ethical considerations, sample selection, fieldwork and data analysis. I explain how multiple methods of data collection were chosen in consideration of the population under study and the fieldwork component, characterised by relative social conflict and instability (Cohen and Arieli, 2011). The fieldwork focused on interviews with a marginalised and hard-to-reach population, in a politically sensitive environment (Atkinson and Flint, 2001; Clarke, 2006; Sulieman and Anderson, 2008); documentary analysis was also a major part of the study, which enhanced the reliability and generalizability of the interview findings to some extent (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997; Bulmer, 1984). I attempted to adapt the methods to reach a little known population and to adjust the study as the data emerged (Stebbins, 2001), including conducting documentary analysis to improve the reliability and generalizability of the interview data. I discuss generalisation in the context of attempting to apply the interview data to discussion about the Bedoun's culture, without obscuring the diversity of the data (Znaniecki, 1954; Guest et al., 2012; Mayring, 2007). I discuss the effort to balance the need for a transparent approach against the requirements for confidentiality and the sensitive nature of the data (Guest et al., 2012), through member checks with the research participation and in consultation with community leaders (Lassiter, 2005a, 2005b).

4.1 The Research Design

The research design was positioned in the qualitative paradigm, as an exploratory, mainly inductive study (Creswell, 2003, Denzin and Lincoln, 2011), drawing on sociological theory, and employing multiple qualitative, research methods (Znaniecki 1927, in Cargan,
2007) (see Table 1, on the following page). Initially the study was designed to focus on the Bedoun identity, culture and experiences of Bedoun students involved in higher education in Kuwait, after education reforms had been introduced during the Arab Spring (Decree 409/2011, see Appendix G, i), with the potential for political instability affecting the study kept in mind. Snowball sampling, a non-representative sampling method, was chosen due to the difficulties expected in reaching the marginalised population. Modifications were required to keep up with rapid changes in the field that took place during the study, such as access expanding the scope of the data collection techniques and the target population, in the case that interviews might not yield sufficient data.

A new dimension of the methodology emerged from my fieldwork, which was the need to collect and analyse historical information spread across a variety of fields. This information did not appear to have been consolidated before. This might appear to be a normal part of the literature review, but the process evolved into a more substantive research method. No book about the group has ever been published in English, and there has been no access to thick description (Geertz, 1973) or in-depth data to study the Bedoun beyond human rights reports, and a study by Beaugrand (2010). Beaugrand (2010) had access to two books in Arabic about the Bedoun by al Anezi (1989); one was his thesis, translated from English.

Therefore, I consolidated basic information spread across different sources and academic disciplines, to elucidate thematic patterns in the historical data. The process gave me a much broader set of historical and social facts which could guide my interpretation of the interview data, and on which I could base serious claims such as ethnic cleansing, or demonstrating the workings of the ‘status adjustment’ program. However, the information deviated from the research questions somewhat. Therefore, this analysis became an important part of the research design, but it was added as an appendage to the study, in Appendices B-G. I refer to these sections in Chapters 2 (the literature review), 6, 7 and 8 (the discussion). Thematic analysis of the interview data was provided in Appendix A. Visual data collected during fieldwork and photographs taken by other authors can be found in Appendix H. I set out all of the additional documents related to the methodology in Appendix I.
Table 1

*The Research Design*

**Research Topic**
The stateless Bedoun in Kuwaiti society
A study of the identity and culture of the Bedoun with a focus on education

**Research Questions**
Identity, culture and participation in society of the Bedoun in Kuwait, experiences in education and

**The Research Population**
The Bedoun, particularly those enrolled in post-secondary education courses
Those unable to access post-secondary education

**Literature Review**
The Bedoun
Kuwait area studies in the social sciences
Marginalisation in the Middle East, nationalism and statelessness

**Theory**
Humanistic sociology
Ethnic identity theory, marginalisation, nationalism, statelessness and cultural systems

**Methods**
Qualitative, explorative, inductive
Multiple, qualitative methods: Documentary research, fieldwork in Kuwait, loosely structured, in-depth interviews, participant observation, photography

**Fieldwork**
Hidden, hard-to-reach, marginalised and vulnerable population
Snowball referral (link-tracing) sampling, a collaborative approach

**Analysis of results**
Inductive, thematic analysis of interview data, photographs and documentary data
Codebook development, a typology, negative case comparisons
Themes evidenced by quotations, observation notes and photographs

**Discussion**
Ethnic identity, marginalisation and cultural change
Ethnic targeting, marginalisation and stigma
Intellectual identity, Education and Cultural Re-organisation

**Recommendations**
Research on the Bedoun
The United Nations Human Rights Committee, UNESCO and the UNDP
United Nations Special Rapporteurs on Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect
4.1.1 Aim of the research.

The aim of the study was to explore the personal and cultural identity of the Bedoun, the experiences that have helped them to form their identity and their participation in society in Kuwait. In particular, the study sought to discover the Bedoun’s experiences in education and ways in which they express their intellectual identity and capacity to contribute to society.

4.1.2 Research questions.

The key Research Questions were:

1. What are key aspects of the personal and cultural identity of the Bedoun?
2. What are some of the key experiences that have helped to form the identity of the Bedoun?
3. What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society? What are the challenges for those who are excluded?
4. What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of the stateless in post-secondary education? What are the challenges for those who are excluded?
5. What are the thoughts and feelings of the Bedoun in relation to their achievements, difficulties, their rights, obligations and duties as members of their families, the stateless community and as members of the student community alongside Kuwaiti citizens and other non-nationals?

A flexible approach was taken to the development of the research questions for this study. In consideration of the social context of the interviewees, the focus of the research questions shifted away from concentrating mainly on experiences in post-secondary education, and toward the interviewees’ experiences of their identity and culture. Although data was collected on participation in education, over the course of the study I realised that the ethnic identity of the Bedoun, and also of the Bedouin, had not been well established in the literature. Therefore, there was a more pressing need to focus on this gap in knowledge. Furthermore, as education reforms introduced in 2011 had begun to be reported as having failed only some months prior to the fieldwork, it was only during the fieldwork that I realised that the Bedoun’s identity and culture was ethnically targeted in a manner that actually prevented their participation in education, which increased the salience of research investigating identity and culture. This problem warranted education issues to be understood in the context of the Bedoun’s historical, cultural development. These changes were illustrated in the ‘Development of the research questions,’ shown in Appendix I i).
4.1.3 The qualitative paradigm.
Qualitative research in the social sciences investigates ‘the world of lived experience… where individual belief and action intersect with culture’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p.2). It is a naturalistic form of inquiry, a process used to understand social or human problems, often carried out as field studies (Burgess, 1986, Creswell, 2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). Such studies are characterised by interaction between the researcher and research participants, and therefore sample sizes tend to be smaller than those found in quantitative research studies. Qualitative research is often distinguished from the quantitative paradigm, which is based on the positivistic scientific framework (Znaniecki, 1952a). While quantitative researchers tend to makes claims to scientific objectivity and authority over knowledge (Denzin and Giardina, 2010), qualitative researchers have alternatively, articulated a different kind of worldview based on humanism, social justice and resistance to oppression (Abu-Lughod, 2008; Denzin and Giardina, 2016).

4.1.4 The inductive research process.
The inductive method generates new theory derived from empirical data (Burgess, 1986, Denzin, 1970). In exploratory, inductive research, social phenomena are studied without the a priori expectations that are typical of deductive studies (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This overall approach determined my selection of strategies of the research design: a multiple methods approach to provide more than one means of collecting data, fieldwork involved recording participant observations in a notebook or directly onto my computer, taking photographs during my excursions with fieldwork guides, and starting my code-book during the interview phase to help track emerging categories of data, which in turn guided the loosely structured interviews. The outcome of each new interview indicated the development of the categories of data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), although I did not formally analyse each interview in succession at that time. I retained negative cases during the thematic analysis. I explain the value of this strategy, below. Exploration was maintained from the conception of a project all the way through the writing up stages (Stebbins, 2001). I continued to refine the themes derived from the data as I theorised.

4.1.5 Empirical methods.
This research was grounded in the empirical approach since first, it comprised fieldwork study and second, it drew on the empirical materials collected from the field and documentary texts (Bruyn, 1966; Strubing, 2007; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1919/1927). Empirical investigation enables researchers to identify basic facts associated with the case at hand, aspects of the problem that need to be taken into account in order to reach a solution (Strubing, 2007 p.564). Empirical study may also involve the researcher interacting with participants as a means of gaining knowledge about them. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2011), without fieldwork, researchers might miss the relevant facts altogether, or overlook
important ones that become obvious only by being present in the field. Fieldwork provides the material from which researchers create their interpretive practices (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). I discuss my use of multiple, empirical methods below.

4.2 Data Collection Techniques.

The following categories of information and their sources were collected for use in this study:

- Documents analysed included books, academic journal articles, scholarly articles in intuitional publications, student thesis work, international humanitarian agency reports, reports of local civil society groups, newspaper articles (including online), ‘activist’ blogs, government policy documents, government migration and foreign policy documents, e.g. country advices, ethnic group ‘guidance notes,’ migration court transcripts, copies personal identity documents, WikiLeaks cables, U.S. Department of State reports, and submissions to the United Nations organisations such as the Council for Human Rights by local and international humanitarian organisations.
- Loosely structured interviews were conducted to collect data form the members of the Bedoun community in Kuwait, and two individuals who live permanently outside Kuwait but still have family residing in Kuwait.
- Participant observation notes were also gathered during fieldwork in Kuwait.
- Visual data was collected in the form of photographs taken in Kuwait, during my fieldwork from February to April 2014.

4.2.1 Researching documents.

Some researchers regard documentary sources of data as social facts in themselves (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997). Documentary sources common to sociological study include historical archives, newspaper files, court records, social agency records and other organisational documents (Bulmer, 1984). Thomas and Znaniecki (1927) conducted the first sociological study that drew substantially on different document types, such as a life histories, personal letters, identity records and government records. They duly defended the use of methods that collected evidence from the participant’s subjective point of view, as unique and important data representing the cultural group (Thomas in Blumer, 1979, p.84-86).

The range of documents I sourced for this research were listed under 4.2, above. Documentary research was undertaken throughout the study, commencing with the literature review and finishing with the final drafts of the thesis. Some of the most valuable documents featured in this study were the doctoral thesis works by Kuwaiti scholars, which I discussed in Chapter 2. Additionally, personal identity documents were provided by some of
the research participants, including national census documents, identification cards, birth certificates and hospital birth record papers. Some of the documents were sourced directly from research participants, including additional documents sourced in Kuwait by Mohammed al Anezi, of London.

4.2.1. Transliteration.

There were a number of linguistic reasons that I chose to present a ‘plain language’ use of Arabic terms. However, the main two reasons were to enhance readability of the research by others and to enhance the searchability of Arabic author names by respecting the spelling of those names in their original published work. I followed the straightforward approach of Plotkin-Boghardt (2007) to translation of Arabic in the Kuwaiti context:

To enhance the “user-friendliness” of Arabic terms in this study for non-specialists, Arabic is transliterated according to typical press usage (e.g. Shiite rather than Shi’i) and without diacritical marks (e.g. Shia rather than Shi’a). In this vein, most singular Arabic words are made plural by adding “s” rather than using the transliterated Arabic plural (e.g. diwaniyyas rather than diwaniyyat). Kuwaiti proper names are transliterated as they are by the individuals themselves, Kuwaiti English language newspapers, or other local sources. (Plotkin-Boghardt, 2007, p.xiii)

4.2.2 The interview process.

Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were the primary method of data collection. Guest, Namey and Mitchell (2013, p.21) suggested that interviews with semi- or unstructured approaches using open-ended questions was the main method of data collection in qualitative research. Kvale (1996, p.5) called this type of interview ‘the Conversation,’ featuring a methodological awareness of question forms, a focus on the dynamics of interaction between interviewer and interviewee, and also a critical attention to what was said. Patton (1987) captured the complexity behind the in-depth interview, which involves:

… asking open-ended questions, listening to and recording the answers, and then following up with additional relevant questions. On the surface this appears to require no more than knowing how to talk and listen. Beneath the surface, however, interviewing becomes an art and science requiring skill, sensitivity, concentration, interpersonal understanding, insight, mental acuity and discipline. (Patton, 1987, p.108)

Kvale (1996) and Patton’s (1987) acknowledgement of the ‘art’ of the technique of interviewing and behind-the-scenes elements point to the complexity of the process that takes place in the data collection phase. Guest et al., (2013, p.21) focused on the collaborative nature of interviews, and the explication of data through quotations. I found this approach to be quite similar to Znaniecki (1952a, p.253) and Gross (1978, p.xx), who
attempted to show that the research participant’s subjective viewpoint and their definition of their own situation, could be revealed through quotations derived from via conversation-style interview methods. Bhopal and Duechar (2016) called the very rich, autobiographical data arising from interviews with marginalised people, ‘dense life stories.’ The interview questions were considered prior to the fieldwork, and these are listed under ‘Main and supplementary interview questions’ in Appendix I, ii. These questions were compiled to help structure the interviews and to prompt interviewees if required (a loosely structured approach was planned).

Interviews were initially arranged to occur on a number of different university campuses in Kuwait City or other agreed locations nominated by interviewees. The respondents tended to chose the latter option, although a number of interviews took place at the American University of Kuwait in Salmiya, where I had secured a research fellowship in the Centre for Gulf Studies. Interviews were conducted in Kuwait in Salmiya, al Rai, Central Kuwait City, Taima and a few other locations that I am unable to disclose due to privacy concerns. Skype interviews were also conducted between myself in Adelaide, and participants in Taima, Sulabiya, Ahmadi (all in Kuwait) and London later in the study. I collated the basic information about interviews on the ‘Interview data sheet,’ such as the location (Appendix viii), the number of interviews conducted with each participant, and the language and translators utilised (see Appendix I, iii). Overall, I conducted interviews between February 2014 and February 2016.

Three participants jointed the study after my initial fieldwork. I discussed the issue of the need to take a slightly different approach for three participants who joined the study in late 2015 with my Principal Supervisor, who consented to the approach. Participant 19 joined the study in late 2015 and I conducted a formal interview with him, in early 2016. I recorded the interview and asked the research questions. Like the other participants, the data was rich and valuable to the study, but I did not conduct a thematic analysis on the interview data due to the time constraints. I expect to complete transcribing and analysing the data at a later date. The participant also provided additional and valuable assistance to me with clarifying language issues and updates on the local situation.

I adopted a different set of interview questions for two research participants who have lead the Bedoun’s civil rights movement in Kuwait and the diaspora, who I also discussed in the Acknowledgements section. Mohammed al Anezi, is a Bedoun who has since acquired citizenship of the United Kingdom and lives in London (Participant 20). I conducted an informal interview without a recording for Mohammed, which ran for around one and a half hours. Instead of the research questions, we discussed specific areas of knowledge, such as information about particular tribes, religious sects, the procedures of the national census and for acquiring personal documentation, and language terms.
Hakeem al Fadhli, is probably the most widely known social leader of the Bedoun in Kuwait (Participant 18). I found that he had already performed the role of a public intellectual, although he did not perceive himself in that way. He had engaged in rigorous debate about the Bedoun with Kuwaiti elites on television and in other forums during the Arab Spring, but unfortunately this work was never translated into English. His contributions to research had steadily accumulated in the meantime. I conducted two formal interviews after he had assisted me in a myriad of other ways. I did not have time to subject the data to a full thematic analysis prior to writing up the thesis, as the total interview time was four hours. I utilised the interviews and our many personal communications as part of the collaborative approach, to clarify, contextualise and theorize the data.

4.2.2 The use of interpreters.

Four out of twenty-five interviews required translation (see the ‘Interview data sheet,’ Appendix I, iii). Initial arrangements for interpreters to be sourced through a local humanitarian organisation in Kuwait, did not eventuate. This left me to locate interpreters myself. The interpreters comprised two citizen advocates and two Bedoun individuals. As often arises in fieldwork, the translators also acted as gatekeepers and cultural guides. One translator provided ongoing assistance in the field and became my most important cultural guide. Further notes on translation can be found in the ‘Transcription and data management protocol’ (Appendix I, vii).

4.2.3 Participant observation.

The participant observation method is known for revealing the depth of social life to a greater degree than interviews or other methods alone. Unique information that is unlikely to be repeated is documented, based on researcher observations from a distance, and researcher-participant interactions up-close. However, like collaborative research, participant observation may lead to stress between the researcher and participants (Tischler, 2014, p.33). Participant observation can also help to position the researcher as a familiar presence in the community and to enable him or her to make contact with, and establish rapport with, potential interviewees (Hennick, Hutter and Bailey, 2011). Observation was limited in my work with the Bedoun, due to their preference for non-disclosure in public spaces and the constraints placed on their participation in civil society, which leads to security concerns. As a result, my richest experiences gathering data tended to occur when trusted gatekeepers secured my interviews, and when I was chaperoned. Therefore, I came to appreciate and value my very real dependence on gendered social values and in particular, male and female cultural guides for providing access to the community. I visited al Jahra a number of times, and travelled from the north to (Abdali) to the south (Wafra), as well the Kuwait Oil Company and al Hamadi, which are inland. When it came to selecting which data to analyse for the results, I did not regard my participant observation notes as valuable
as the interview data, as I found the interview data as more representative of the Bedoun’s values. I regarded my observation notes as a closer reflection of my personal impressions, rather than theirs. Therefore, I did not conduct a thematic analysis on my observational data but used it to supplement just a few themes as required.

4.2.4 Photography.

Visual methods are not used frequently in sociology, but their use does have a long history, going back to the beginning of social inquiry (Bogdan and Biklen, 1992). Both Denzin (1970, p.215) and Becker (1981) promoted the use of photographs for inductive, qualitative research in sociology, and explained how to interpret them for qualitative, inductive inquiry. Denzin (1970) drew on the work of Collier (1967). Becker (1996) continued to promote the use of visual methods in sociology for many years.

I applied thematic analysis to my photographic images by treating the collection as a whole, and incorporating them into the existing theme of ‘marginalisation of identity’ influenced by poverty, as supplementary evidence of the theme. I did not analyse the photographs separately, which would have likely led to me exploring the concept of segregation in greater depth, as I regarded this as beyond the scope of the current topic. Instead, I presented a comparative visual record of Bedoun settlement over the last forty years in Appendix H, by combining my images with those of Professor al Moosa (1976) and al Zaher (1990).

4.2.5 Fieldwork access.

Fieldwork access issues were characterised by the population being hidden (Spreen, 1992) and hard-to-reach (Atkinson and Flint, 2001) due to their collective, contemporary history of expulsions and human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Fieldwork arrangements involved a full ethical review of the Human Research and Ethics Committee at the University of Adelaide (Appendix I, iv). I argued that the research was grounded in principles of beneficence, based on the Australian National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). This meant that the population’s relative level of social disadvantage, marginalisation and indigenous status warranted careful consideration, and that snowball sampling (also known as referral or link-chain methods) were the obvious choice.

Social science approaches to fieldwork in the Middle East such as Clark (2006), Suleiman and Anderson (2007) and specifically, explanations of how populations could be accessed in difficult circumstances (Cohen and Arieli, 2011) were especially helpful. I also had some degree of personally acquired cultural knowledge of the group prior to my fieldwork. Formal field access arrangements were made well in advance, but they all proved to be unreliable in Kuwait due to the stigmatisation of the Bedoun, and the nature of the surveillance culture. I obtained a research fellowship at the American University Gulf
Studies Centre, under Associate Professor Farah al Nakib. My fieldwork access issues became very much entwined with my observational experiences and interviews (described above), where informal access using the snowball sampling method was highly effective (discussed in the next section).

4.2.6 Sample selection.
Snowball sampling is also known as the referral method and link-tracing method (Spreen, 1992, Brackertz, 2007). It is a form of purposive sampling (Chilisa, 2011), used in exploratory studies (Guest, et al., 2012) or where random sampling is inappropriate (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003a, p. 713). Over time, a network of trusted contacts can be built up based upon the interest of those persons who have provided referrals, in maintaining relationships (Brackertz, 2007). Atkinson and Flint (2001) define snowball sampling as,

In its simplest formulation snowball sampling consists of identifying respondents who are then used to refer researchers on to other respondents. (Atkinson and Flint, 2001, p.1)

Snowball sampling is frequently used in the Middle East as a qualitative research method in general (Atkinson and Flint, 2001; Clarke, 2006; Sulieman and Anderson, 2008). In her survey of research methods in the Middle East, Clarke (2006) found that some 89% of researchers relied on snowball sampling methods. There may be a range of reasons why populations need to be accessed through this type of sampling, and this may include simply a lack of data available on the population under study, with which to establish a random sample (Clark, 2006, Cohen and Arieli, 2011). It is considered the method of choice by many researchers for accessing marginalised and vulnerable populations (Chilisa, 2012; Cohen and Arieli, 2011; Jacobsen and Landau, 2003). The method has also been used in conflict-ridden environments including war zones (Cohen and Arieli, 2011; Romano, 2006), with victims of violence, racial minorities, refugees, the chronically ill and the poor (Freimuth and Mettger, 1990), and with populations who are criminalized and socially isolated (Faugier and Sargeant, 1997). All of these factors applied in one way or another, to the participants in this study due to their identity and legal status.

This sampling method seems to be of particular utility for studying Middle East societies, because its basic principles, which rely on trusted relationships, reflect the concept of *wasta*, which is a culturally specific form of social networking among Arab men and women (Abalkhail and Allen, 2016; Weir, 2004). Additionally, the Bedouin remain predominantly an oral-based culture, and although this is changing over time, they are known to prefer face-to-face contacts (Abu-Lughod, 2000; Ingham, 1986). I also experienced some disadvantages of snowball sampling concerning attempts to secure access through more formal or publically ‘approved’ channels. Civil society organisations with
whom I had made arrangements over a year in advance pulled out of the arrangements or did not follow the agreed plans for access, recruitment and/or translation. In the field, this problem forced me to very quickly, seek other avenues for access using the snowball referral method. These avenues proved to be far more successful in any case, and provided me with a more diverse group of participants, and more durable relationships with the community. Once again, this process foregrounded the importance of shared trust, which is vital in research conducted in collaboration with marginalized groups (Bergold and Thomas, 2012; Lassiter, 2005b).

4.3 Data Analysis and Interpretation

4.3.1 Thematic analysis of interview data.

Thematic analysis was used in this study, according to the procedures described in Guest et al., (2012). Thematic analysis is inductive and exploratory in approach, which can be distinguished from classic content analysis, which is deductive and confirmatory in approach (Guest et al., 2012; Weber, 1990). The definition of thematic analysis varies somewhat between authors, but it is one of the most frequently and widely used methods in qualitative research (Boyatzis, 1998, Braun and Clarke, 2006, Guest et al., 2012). Braun and Clarke (2006) emphasised the utility and flexibility of thematic analysis, which is adaptable to a range of theories. They describe thematic analysis as,

A method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes your data set in (rich) detail.
(Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.6)

Thematic analysis was also recommended the as a key analytic tool that researchers should learn prior to taking on more complex methods, as it teaches novice researchers core skills that are transferrable across many other forms of analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.4).

Braun and Clark (2006) also emphasised the interpretive function, discussed in Boyatzis (1998), which might be suitable for the construction of an ethnography. However, Guest et al., (2012) suggested that the interpretive method should be balanced by a highly systemic, ‘scientific’ approach and I found this quite appealing when faced with the controversial nature of my findings. Ultimately, the degree to which the data is abstracted is dependent upon the choices of the researcher. Guest (et al., 2012) suggested that an Audit Trail could be used to trace the techniques and procedures implemented, in order to maintain rigour and enhance reliability (Appendix I, vi). After my first analysis gave rise to the problem that I had not reduced my data enough and some of my concepts seemed to be too vague for me to theorize confidently, I repeated the process, refining the thematic concepts further. This second attempt enabled me to show my links between the empirical data and
the abstracted levels with more clarity, while accounting for all data collected under the selected meta-themes.

**4.3.2 Codebook development.**

Znaniecki (Lapota in Znaniecki, 1965, xvii) believed that ‘sociology must proceed through induction to the analysis of the various forms of social systems, with a goal of developing a taxonomy of such systems.’ Taxonomies are used to map phenomena and to build interpretive models for theorisation (Alexander, 2012). I referred to taxonomies of social systems described by previous researchers (Gittus, 1972, in Burgess, 1986; Jenkins, 2008; Zetterberg, 1965; Znaniecki, 1952a) to help me develop the codebook typology, as there was no previous sociology study on the Bedoun that could provide me with clues as to how I should categorize my data (see Appendices I, ix, x). By tracking the development of codes in the field, I was able to explore unanticipated findings in some detail, such as the open acceptance of Bedoun identity as a high cultural value among the participants, including by formerly stateless citizens. Due to the unique context of the Bedoun’s situation, which gave rise to specific and unusual concepts and the use of English as a second or third language in the transcripts, I decided to manually code and analyse the data.

**4.4 Validity and Reliability**

Denzin (1970, p.234-5) believed that there is no longer a single, gold standard for qualitative work and that within qualitative research paradigm, methodological rules and interpretive guidelines are open to change and different interpretations over time. Guest et al., (2012, p.99-101) described techniques to enhance the validity and reliability of qualitative, which they also referred to as ‘credibility and dependability.’ The procedures for establishing reliability and validity in this study were discussed Appendix I, v and vi (the latter is a description of an analysis ‘audit trail’). They involved:

- The use of multiple methods and/or data sources
- Adjustment of the structure of instruments to fit the goals and structure of the study (e.g. included modifying the research questions)
- Monitoring data for theme development as they emerged, eliciting feedback from the participants after summarizing the interview
- Establishing the transcription protocol before transcribing, establishing translation expectations before commencing interviews (Appendix I, vii)
- Developing a precise codebook, creating an audit trail, (methodological) triangulation of data sources and negative case analysis supporting themes (see Appendix I, iv, ‘Techniques used to enhance validity and reliability’), and
- The use of quotations or other data points to enhance interpretation (Guest et al., 2012). This data will be placed in the Australian Data Archive, as I have mentioned.
Both Shenton (2004) and Guest et al., (2012) emphasised that reliability (or repeatability) was not necessarily a major concern for all qualitative research studies. Rather, the researcher should be able to communicate clearly to other researchers, what was done to achieve the outcomes claimed. For this purpose, I followed Guest et al., (2012), and included additional documentation of my methods, such as a sample of a transcript (Appendix I, xi), a sample of a data extraction summary used in the thematic analysis (Appendix I, xii), and a sample of my participant observation notes (Appendix I, xiii).

It is worth noting my approach to generalizing, as I have tended to generalise some of the results of this study to the researched population as indicative of collectivist values, actions and cultural patterns. In humanistic sociological analysis, the identification of an individual attribute can be interpreted as a reflection of the cultural values shared by the group to which the individual belongs (Znaniecki, 1954). For example, a person’s positive attitude to members of the extended family, no matter what their classification by the government might be, can be regarded as reflective of the groups’ collectivist family values. This interpretation is greatly strengthened when many (though not necessarily all) people from the same group included in a set of respondents, express the same attitude. It is then possible to legitimately interpret this widespread attitude as a cultural value of the group as a whole. Similarly, individual social actions may take on collectivist functions in society, which leads such social action becoming institutionalised (Znaniecki, 1954, p.23). However, there is one important exception, in the case of a Bedoun individual attempting to ‘pass’ as a citizen Bedouin and behave in ways expected by the Hadar, their attitude would not be regarded as reflecting the Bedoun’s values, but the values of the Hadar group with which he or she needed to be associated in that particular context.

Multiple research methods enabled me to enhance the interview data for the purpose of generalisation with additional data. Documentary research in particular provided an opportunity to verify data and confirm essential findings. This process was similar to ‘theoretical sampling’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987) that takes place during the inductive analysis process:

It is a form of argumentative generalisation in the process of data collection. The main idea is that from the beginning of data collection the material is analysed by coding ... [to guide] inductive theory development. The first results lead to considerations what further material (including new interviews, field observations, and documents) is needed to confirm or support or critical check the first results. This is an iterative process that comes to an end if sufficient evidence had been found (saturation). (Mayring, 2007, ‘Procedures of Generalisation’)

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4.5 Ethical Considerations

4.5.1 The principle of beneficence.

Bhopal and Duechar (2016) described the principle of beneficence to the researched population: any fieldwork with marginalised people should be characterised by equity, dignity and respect, and researcher analyses should help to dispel prejudicial assumptions of the participant population (p.268). The study was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Adelaide (a full committee of review) and granted Approval Number H2013 087 (see Appendix I, iv). As the study evolved, amendments were sent to the committee for approval according to University procedure. These included the expansion of the participant base prior to fieldwork to include Kuwaiti citizens and non-nationals, in the case that an insufficient number of individuals agreed to participate and the broadening of methods to include written documents as well as interviews, participant observation and photography.

A second amendment was submitted to enable Skype interviews and to open up the study to individuals not currently in enrolled in education, as by that stage, it had become clear that participation in post-secondary education was not as common as it had appeared prior to the fieldwork (due to failure of national policy reforms). I had envisaged that the study was as a high-risk project for the purpose of ethical review due to the marginality of the research participants and their lack of legal rights, and due to the nature of the government regime in place in Kuwait. The regime in Kuwait is not a democratic system of government and it has rejected and has criminalized en masse the population under study since 1986 (Human Rights Watch, 2011), but the impact of government actions on the research process was difficult to know in advance.

Crucial to the ethical considerations was the ability to maintain the confidentiality of most of the research participants, while balancing the need for an appropriate level of methodological transparency. Middle East research in the social science is characterised by small-scale, qualitative studies where real challenges exist as to methodological transparency, particularly in locations or social situations vulnerable to conflict (Clarke, 2006; Cohen and Arieli, 2011; Romano, 2006; Suleiman and Anderson, 2007). These issues are integral to the challenges of research in the Middle East, but they are not unique to the region. Some researchers assert that these challenges exist across the whole paradigm of qualitative research (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003, Rogers, 2004, Brackertz, 2007), especially with marginalised populations (Faugier and Sargeant, 1997). Others have argued against complete disclosure as a political and positivistic concern and promoted the need for respectful, professional discretion, required to maintain trustworthiness with participants and to protect their confidentiality (Denzin, 2009; Kaiser, 2009; Kaiser, 2009; Shaffir and Stebbins, 1991; Shenton, 2004).
In order to balance these needs, I consulted with the Bedoun community. In the end, I had to make a decision about providing sufficient disclosure of participants that would encourage future researchers and the community to communicate without citizen gatekeeper intermediaries who might hinder access to the population. For this reason, I made the decision with the consent of the individuals concerned, to disclose the names of two important leaders in the community Mohammed al Anezi (in the United Kingdom; P20) Hakeem al Fadhli (in Kuwait; P18). Both individuals assisted me a great deal in the middle stages of my project, specifically with my theoretical perspective. It is beyond the scope of the thesis to explore the nature of my collaborative relationships much further, but it would be remiss of me not to emphasise the essential roles of my research collaborators and cultural guides (Lassiter, 2005), some of whom I cannot name at this time.

**Conclusion**

This chapter outlined the methodological approach adopted for this study, which was positioned in the qualitative paradigm (Creswell, 2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). The study was designed as an exploratory, inductive inquiry (Stebbins, 2001; Znaniecki, 1952a). I discussed the adaptation of the research questions over the duration of the study, and the use of multiple empirical data collection techniques (Znaniecki, 1952a). In order to enhance the reliability and validity of the study, I incorporated additional checks and balances described by Guest et al., (2012), which are I documented in Appendix I. I discussed the validity and reliability of the data and generalisation in the context of the study (Guest et al., 2012), such as the Bedoun's local environment, the requirements for confidentiality and transparency regarding different aspects of the research. I consulted with the research participants and community leaders for member checks and to discuss my approach to the disclosure of sensitive data, in order to balance the need for transparency with confidentiality (Lassiter, 2005a, 2005b). The snowball sampling method was selected to cater to the field environment in the Middle East, the vulnerable population researched, and the sensitive political environment.
Chapter 5
Overview of the Results

Introduction

This chapter provides a summary of the demographic data of the interviewees and the thematic analysis of interviews. The demographic data includes gender, age, legal identity status, family data, tribal membership and religious affiliation, residential, employment and educational data. The thematic analysis is presented under three meta-themes: Bedoun identity, the marginalisation of identity and culture, education and the intellectual ideal. The data was analysed to a depth of six levels, comprising meta-themes, themes, sub-themes, minor sub-themes, minor sub-sub-themes and minor sub-sub-sub themes. Where relevant, some observations and explanatory notes have been provided, to explain points expanded upon in the discussion. Themes derived from the interview transcript data can be found in Appendix A. Note that a thematic analysis of the literature and other documents was also conducted to supplement the interview data. This information can be found in Appendices B-G.

5.1 Interviewee Demographic Data

A brief overview of the demographic data of individuals interviewed provided greater context for their responses. The total number of interviewees of members of the Bedoun community included in the study was twenty. The demographic data below refers to those individuals. The total number of interviewees whose data was included in the thematic analysis was seventeen. I discussed this rationale in Chapter 4 on methodological approaches.

5.1.1 Gender.

Twelve males and eight females were interviewed (see Table 2, below). Individuals were interviewed separately except for two groups of two females who were sisters, who were interviewed together for cultural reasons. Interviews took place in Salmiya and al Rai (Kuwait City centre), Ahmadi (south of Kuwait City) and Taima (in al Jahra, north of Kuwait City).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.1.2 Age.

The interviewees were aged between twenty and forty-four (see Table 3, below). Six individuals were aged between twenty and twenty-nine; eleven individuals were aged between thirty and thirty-nine; four individuals were aged between forty and forty-nine.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.3 Identity status and legal status (statelessness and nationality).

Interviewees’ legal identity status is shown below (Table 4). All respondents identified as ‘Bedoun’ people. Membership of the Bedoun community is based on ethnic and cultural identity, which is derived from one’s status at birth and ongoing cultural affiliations, rather than official legal status. The ethnic identity has endured beyond changes to legal status. I explain this point further in Chapter 6, the discussion. The legal status of Bedoun identity is observed by human rights organisations as arbitrarily assigned rather than an objective status (Human Rights Watch, 1995, 2000, 2011; Amnesty International, June 20 – July 15, 2016).

Sixteen of the Bedoun interviewees were stateless at the time of interview. One individual was a citizen mother who spoke for her stateless children, who were minors. Her husband was also stateless. Two individuals were citizens of Western countries, having been born stateless and having spent most of their lives in Kuwait without citizenship. Another individual was a citizen of Kuwait, having been granted citizenship within five years prior to interview. Three out of the fourteen stateless interviewees were ‘undocumented’ stateless people (United Kingdom: Home Office, March 5, 2009, February 3, 2014), having been subjected to erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing: Weissbrodt, 2008). The process of administrative ethnic cleansing via the re-allocation of individual’s records to ineffective nationality labels, called ‘status adjustment,’ is explored further below and in the discussion section.
Table 4

Legal Identity Status of Interview Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Identity Status</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stateless - ‘documented’</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless – ‘undocumented’</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Unknown/unidentified/nationality label affected by ‘status adjustment’)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formerly stateless</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Citizen by Kuwaiti nationality grant)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formerly stateless</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Citizen by immigration to another country)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwaiti citizen mother of stateless children, wife of stateless spouse</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.4 Family composition and legal status.

The family composition of Bedoun interviewees included other stateless members and citizen members. Thirteen interviewees had citizens in their immediate or close extended families, such as uncles, aunts or first cousins or siblings (see Table 5 below). Where aunts and uncles received citizenship, it was related to them receiving direct grants of citizenship over the last fifty-five years. This scenario may be regarded as quite typical of the integration of previous generations in the Kuwaiti Bedouin community in which families comprised of members with different degrees of Kuwaiti nationality status due to the inconsistent manner in which they were assessed for citizenship under the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) by the Nationality Committees who invoked Decree 5/1960 (Human Rights Watch, 1995) (see Chapter 7, section 7.3.1 and 7.3.2). Seven interviewees had siblings or cousins who intermarried with citizens, usually first cousins or relatives from the extended family. Traditional Bedouin patterns of family marriage persisted, including consanguineous and extended family marriage perpetuating Bedouin customary law practices, although new forms of partnerships were also regarded as desirable for both personal and health reasons (many participants were quite aware of the health toll of patrilineal cousin marriage upon their families, and wished to avoid it).

The composition of families in mixed stateless and citizen Bedouin family units, indicated the ongoing integration of the current generation, and the maintenance of Bedouin social solidarities and cultural practices between the Bedoun and citizens (first reported by
Human Rights Watch, 1995). It also suggested a relationship between the maintenance of customary social and cultural practices with the social problem of different citizenship status and statelessness shared within families. It appeared that family marriage (following the Bedouin traditional customary practice) served as a pathway for citizenship to be granted to some stateless family members, although this provided for quite different outcomes for males and females, due to the gendered provisions of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait).

On the other hand, the government practices of restricting and delaying official recognition of marriage to Kuwaiti Bedouin citizens and between the Bedoun, as well as between exclusively Bedoun partners (set out in the 1986 expulsion policy, see Appendix E, i), while preventing the founding of families, also appeared to reinforce the maintenance of customary social and cultural practices related to marriage, divorce and child birth for those who could marry. The connection between these results and culturally-patterened family values is discussed in Chapter 6.

Table 5

Family Composition of Interview Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family composition</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stateless with citizens in family</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siblings or cousins intermarried with citizens</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No citizens in family</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.5 Marital and birth data.

Table 6 and Table 7 show the marital and birth data of the interviewees. Six respondents were married; two were divorced (see Table 6). Eight of the respondents had children (six of these respondents were married, two were divorced). Twelve respondents were single, had never married and were childless (see Table 7). All but one interviewee reported that they had no plans for marriage due to lack of future prospects.
Table 6

Marital Data of Interview Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The birth rate among the Bedoun interviewees appeared to be in decline compared to previous generations. Some interviewees discussed the fact that smaller families were regarded as desirable among the current generation, but many interviewees also discussed their predicament of being unable to marry due to their social status and issues related to their statelessness, such as poverty.

Table 7

Birth Data of Interview Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status in relation to children</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Childless (never married)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children (married or divorced)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is not possible to generalize from such a small data set, a quantitative population decline in the general population. However, further information could be gained by comparing the birth data between the respondent’s and their parent’s generation. I compared the size of the respondent's families in the current generation, with the size of the family units in which they had grown up. Historically, state policies have appeared to target not only the Bedoun’s population growth, but also population maintenance.
Table 8

*Number of Children by Interviewee Respondents' Parents*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of children of respondent's parents</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-5 children</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 children</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15 children</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-20 children</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data are worth considering, in view of the fact that no such analysis appears to have been published previously. I did not collect data on this matter for six interviewees, as the seriousness of the issue only became apparent to me after I had already begun to collect my field data. As children, the respondent's parents had known larger families, with most interviewees raised in families containing eight or more members due to high birth rates (see Table 8, above).

The data in Table 8 above, can be compared to the relatively small family size of the interviewees themselves, listed in Table 9, below. Eight out of twenty interviewees were parents, with a maximum of five children in a family. This data was only an estimate of family size, because for example, I did not consider grandparents and spouses in a household, but focused on replacement of the population via childbirth. It should also be remembered that this sample was not a representative one. Due to the dominance of Bedouin cultural values, all those who had children, were married or divorced in heterosexual couplings.

Table 9

*Number of Children of Interview Respondents*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of children of respondents</th>
<th>No children</th>
<th>1-5 children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.1.6 Tribal membership and religious affiliation.

The research participants came from at least four tribes (see Table 10, below). Five individuals were from the al Aneza, four from the D’afiri, two from the Shammar and two from the Bani Khalid. Tribal identity proved to be one of the strongest qualitative themes in this study. I discuss this factor in more detail below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribal Affiliation</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Anezi</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D’afiri</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shammar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bani Khalid</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nine interviewees were Sunni and three were Shia. Eight chose not to disclose their religious affiliation (see Table 11, below). The results were characterised by a lack of strong sectarian sentiment among the research participants. Religious issues were discussed briefly. The themes arising are displayed below, under the meta-theme of ‘Bedoun identity.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.7 Place of upbringing and current residence.

Overall, the data indicated that the interviewee’s families had moved closer to the city while they were growing up. Therefore, I set out the data in two tables to illustrate the
demographic shift as families relocated from al Jahra in particular, closer to Kuwait City or to the south of Kuwait City. Twelve respondents grew up in al Jahra (north of Kuwait City), two in Sulabiya, one in Hawali (central Kuwait City), one in Ahmadi (south of Kuwait City). Four respondents did not disclose their place of upbringing (see Table 12, below).

Table 12

*Interviewee Respondents' Place of Residence as Children*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place where interviewees lived as children</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Jahra</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulabiya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawali</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regard to the current place of residence at time of interview, five respondents still lived in al Jahra, and two in Sulabiya (see Table 13, below).

Table 13

*Interviewee’s Place of Residence (at Present)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place where interviewees live at present</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Jahra</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulabiya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farwaniya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawali</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadi</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two interviewees lived in Farwaniya (central Kuwait City), one in central Hawali and six in Ahmadi, south of Kuwait City. One interviewee from al Jahra and one interviewee from Hawali had managed to leave Kuwait and acquire citizenship in Western countries, through the asylum process. The place of residence of two of the interviewees was undisclosed.

5.1.8 Educational data.

The interviewees had participated in education at a variety of levels of vocational and higher education. The data in Table 14 (below), indicated the interviewees’ highest level of qualifications completed or currently studying. All three individuals at PhD level had also completed Masters programs. Seven individuals had completed a Diploma level qualification and nine had completed a Bachelor degree.

Initially, interviewees were selected according to experience in tertiary (post-secondary) education. However, the study was broadened to include other types of students, to better account for the variety of experiences acquired by the Bedoun in education, and the barriers to education faced by the population from which the participants were drawn. Nevertheless, most students recruited for this study had completed or were completing, degree studies.

Most research participants attended (or were attending) private educational institutions (see Table 15, below). The higher education sector in Kuwait is somewhat more complex than table above indicates, because vocational and technical training institutes (also known as ‘colleges’ in Kuwait) and universities offer bridging programs, diplomas or degrees. Additionally, some individuals had studied more than one qualification and were not necessarily currently studying their highest-level qualification (in accordance with employment demands and patterns of life-long learning). Some interviewees had been admitted into public education facilities in previous years, when regulations regarding the Bedoun’s access to education were different. Some had accessed public education under temporary programs offered to the Bedoun by government, in order to fulfil local, labour market demands. Two respondents had studied overseas some years ago, when access to higher education was even more restricted to the Bedoun than it is at present, and they had been forced to make illegal border crossings in order to do so.
Table 14

*Educational Experience of Interviewees – Highest Level of Qualification*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualification type</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two respondents had not completed a formal post-secondary education qualification. One respondent had no experience in vocational training or higher education, and one other had completed work-based training in his profession, which may be regarded as an informal vocational program or a cadetship/apprenticeship. Some had also participated in formal and non-formal, on-the-job training.

Table 15

*Educational Experience of Interviewees – Institution of Qualifications*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational institutions attended</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public college</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public university</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private college</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private university</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten participants had acquired multiple, post-secondary qualifications. Twelve out of the twenty in the research group had been affected by education bans forcing them out of public schools during their secondary education, for different lengths of time, depending upon their family’s circumstances. Thirteen interviewees had been personally affected by bans on education which had interfered with their transition from secondary school to university.

The interviewees had studied a variety of subjects (see Table 16, below).
Table 16

*Areas of University and College Specialisation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject areas College</th>
<th>Subject areas University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nursing</td>
<td>Arts/Humanities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office administration</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business administration</td>
<td>Business management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer science</td>
<td>Computer science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>Law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

College subjects included computer science, office and business administration and nursing. University subjects included Arts/Humanities, education, computer science, business management, engineering and law. The Bedoun are currently prohibited from studying law in Kuwait, but one of the older participants was able to study law overseas and re-enter the country. Only one student was studying at Kuwait University; the others were studying at private universities.

5.1.9 Employment.

Research participants also engaged in a variety of types of employment (see Table 17, below). The numbers in parenthesis next to each job type refers to the number of respondents employed in that work type. Six interviewees were self-employed, eight held skilled and semi-professional jobs, and ten held professional positions. The interviewees’ work and study patterns were indicative of them seeking conditions in which they could be productive. The entrepreneurial nature of many of the interviewees was an unexpected and novel finding. Many worked in more than one area of employment, as well as attending college or university part-time. Only two respondents felt reasonably comfortable about the security of their employment. Generally speaking, the respondents felt that their employment was highly insecure due to their statelessness and this seemed to place pressure on them to be as productive as possible.
Table 17

*Types of Employment Held by Interviewees*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self Employed</th>
<th>Skilled and semi-professional</th>
<th>Professional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Street-selling (1)</td>
<td>Security officer (1)</td>
<td>Journalist (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market stalls (1)</td>
<td>Computer programming (1)</td>
<td>Translator (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer consultancy (1)</td>
<td>Computer illustration (1)</td>
<td>Law practice (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software engineering consultancy (1)</td>
<td>Video editing (1)</td>
<td>Line management (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community advocacy (2)</td>
<td>Writing and editing (2)</td>
<td>Teaching (schools) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Office administration (2)</td>
<td>Lecturing (university) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supervising university research (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Findings from the thematic analysis – Bedoun identity

A Thematic Analysis Chart has been provided to illustrate the themes visually, enabling a better understanding of the scope of the analysis overall (see Appendix A, iii, Table A7). Three themes arose from the meta-theme Bedoun identity, including tribal identity, personal identity and collective identity, which are listed in Appendix A i.

5.2.1 Tribal identity.

The theme of tribal identity featured sub-themes of tribal origins, Bedouin language and names, religious values and the Bedoun and tribal politics. All of the themes related to this meta-theme are listed in Appendix A i, Table A1. The tribal identity of the Bedoun was foregrounded as a primary identity. Often, the identity was somewhat implicit, for example, one respondent asked me about my tribe (P09), assuming I came from a similar type of society. The richest sub-theme under tribal identity was tribal origins, associated with six minor sub-themes, while the sub-theme itself was supported by data from sixteen out of twenty interviewees. It is noteworthy that tribal identity *per se* was not a major focus of the research questions.

The relevance of tribal issues emerged during my fieldwork in Kuwait. The self-ascription of Bedoun identity as native Bedouin of Kuwait was one of the strongest, qualitative themes in this study – many different terms and concepts were used to describe it, indicating a functional and rich tribal heritage persisted in the community. Other sub-themes added to the historical discussion of multiple layers of Bedoun identity, including local
concepts used to describe oneself and one’s worldview, or local identity and transnational identity, related to the Bedouin’s traditional tribal presence across the Middle East. Other sub-themes included tribal language and names, the northern and southern tribes, religious values and tribal political issues concerning the Bedoun. I will now briefly discuss some of the important findings in relation to the tribal identity of the Bedoun arising from this study, and explain their significance.

5.2.2 Self-ascribed terms for tribal identity.

I have listed the names of the tribes to which the individual respondents belonged, in Table 10, above. Rather than being characterised by ethnic difference from the Bedouin of Kuwait (Beaugrand, 2010, p.18), the results of the interview data indicated that the Bedoun may be characterised by their sameness to the Kuwaiti Bedouin, because they are members of the same families and tribal groups. The interviewees also explained the basis for the acute marginalisation of the Bedoun and the more general marginalisation of the Bedouin in Kuwait, which characterises their difference from citizen Bedouin. In other words, there appears to be different degrees of integration and marginalisation leading to complex, multi-layered identities shared by the Bedoun and their citizen tribal members. While they remain part of the Bedouin ethnic group in their traditional tribal collectives, their identity and affiliations are also influenced by their status and belonging to the 'Bedouin' collective. Ten different self-ascribed identity terms related to tribal identity discussed by the interviewees, are shown below in Table 18. I attempt to theorise the self-ascription of Bedouin identity terms within the Bedouin ethnic structure in Chapter 6, according to theory of multiple ethnic identity (Gross, 1978, 1998; Horowitz, 1975).

The theme of ‘native people’ predominated, with seven interviewees discussing this aspect of their identity. Their expression of being native was connected to the land, specifically the desert, and identification with traditional names for the Bedouin such as ‘Bedu,’ ‘Kuwaiti desert dweller’ (P08) and ‘Sons of the desert’ (P09) from the time of the Bani Utub. This term refers to the three tribal groups, including the ruling family, who settled in Kuwait (P09, P14). Note that the history of the Bani Utub was known by its members; and Lorimer (1915) had pointed out in his English text that the tribes lead by the Utub sheikhs, included ‘contingents of numerous tribes from the Arab mainland’ (p.839) referring to the region of the northern tribes. For others, an aspect of tribal identity such as being from the camel-breeding Bedouin tribes (P12) was part of an implicit identification. Interviewees also discussed the presence of their tribe in Kuwait prior to the formation of the modern state (P08, P12, P18, P19, P20). Transnational tribal origins and tribal alliances were discussed by some interviewees, including the relationship between these alliances and the status of the Bedoun in Bedouin society.
Table 18

References to Tribal Identity by Bedoun Research Participants

Self-ascribed Tribal Identity

1. *Bedu* or Bedouin
2. Sons of the desert
3. Desert dwellers of Kuwait
4. Native
5. *Usil*
6. First (arrivals)
7. Bani Utub
8. Individual tribal names
9. Northern and southern tribes (regional, transnational)
10. Northern and southern areas of Kuwait city (local)

Interviewees pointed out that the Bedoun and citizens of Kuwait are in many respects, culturally identical (P03, P06, P09) because they are members of the same families (P16, P17, P18, P19, P12). However, there have been some points of differences between citizens and stateless Bedouin developing during the present generation (P05, P08, P12, P18). Among the Bedouin, individual identity and tribal heritage could be fairly easily established by talking together (P12). The pastoral activities of their interviewees’ grandparents or great-grandparents included nomadic and semi-nomadic practices, involving sheep, cattle and camel herding. The Kuwaiti citizen was recognised by nomadic Bedouin not as ‘settled’ as scholars refer to the concept, since the Bedouin were also settled in Kuwait to varying degrees according to their tribes’ nomadic and semi-nomadic cultural patterns. The citizen was a person who had acquired their own house, while the Bedoun were desert dwellers and/or did not own property in Kuwait City (P12). The range of self-ascribed terms for tribal identity contributed to two concepts. The first, the notion of the Bedoun as a subgroup of the Kuwaiti Bedouin, belonging to the same tribal groups, to the extent that nuclear families integrated Bedouin and Bedouin citizens both historically, and contemporaneously. Second, the notion of the Bedouin as an ethnic group separate from the Hadar, due to the persistence of their own, distinctive tribal cultural traditions - and the Hadar's desire for the same (al Anezi, 1989, p.175).

5.2.3 The Northern-Southern tribal groups.

The tribes of Kuwait were recognised as having northern tribes or the southern tribal *dirah* (traditional lands). On this basis, the different members of each tribe were described colloquially as the 'northern tribes' and the 'southern tribes.' This complexity of this difference was demonstrated in the literature by Kuwaiti authors and others (al Haddad,
Some authors referring to single tribes as being 'northern' or 'southern,' and other tribes having members who were 'northern' or 'southern' relative to the location of their ancestors within the tribal dirah. For example, the Ajman were described as both 'northern' and 'southern' by different authors. But much tribal dirah crossed both northern and southern regions. The tribal dirah was described by Kuwati authors Alsheyeji (1998) and Alhajeri (2004) in their descriptions of the main tribes of Kuwait, their tribal units and territory (Appendix B, i). The literature was consistent regarding the designation of the Bedoun as the northern tribes by Kuwati authors, based on the tendency for the members of the state's security services – the military, national guard and police – to be drawn from those tribes (al Anezi, 1989; al Fayez, 1984; al Moosa, 1976; Alhajeri, 2004). Interviewees also referred to their tribal membership in this way. In the early 1990s, the northern tribes were also known to be Bedoun due to their association with 'Iraqi' identity. My research of the literature indicated that this concept was constructed after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. I discuss the social organisation of the tribes further in Chapter 6, section 6.1.

The northern-southern tribal dialect and accent recognised as a factor related to regional identity, as it indicated a difference between the members of tribes who could not be distinguished on the basis of appearance alone (P05). Two points arose in relation to the tribal accent. The experience of the interviewees was that the Hadar they met in social interactions were preoccupied with their accent, stigmatising it. The interviewees thought this was part of an attempt to attribute negative characteristics to members of the northern tribes in social interactions. The assumptions made by Hadar individuals about the origin of an individual based on their accent was regarded by the Bedouin as inaccurate (P05, P19). I found the perceived dialect or accent was more a vernacular with a wide range of expression.

Nevertheless, the northern-southern tribal accent was regarded as an important cultural difference, by the Bedouin themselves (P03, P05). According to the research participants, some members of the southern regions of the tribes, also stigmatise, the northern accent (P03, P05, P16, P17, P19). It was explained that anyone who believes they can hear a northern accent, then proceeds to judge the individual from whom it was heard, as an ‘Iraqi’ (P05). This problem is discussed further below, regarding themes of marginalisation. The finding about the Bedoun as members of the northern or southern tribes, strengthens the concept of the Bedouin as a separate ethnic group from the Hadar. Additionally, it helps to delineate the role of the Bedouin in Bedouin society in Kuwait, as predominantly people of the northern tribes or tribal dirah, or as assumed to be so, by others.
5.2.4 Ethnic targeting of families and tribes – family and tribal names.

Interview data and documentary research indicated that ethnic targeting of families and tribes occurred across a number of areas, on the basis of individuals' Bedouin identity. One of these areas was Bedouin family and tribal names (P08, P13). One interviewee had no tribal name or surname listed on his identification card, as the Central Apparatus had removed these. Despite this the individual identified closely with his family lineage; all other interviewees had their tribal names listed on their identification cards. It is worth noting that tribal identity was described in more specific terms in relation to marginalisation and stigmatisation, which connected tribal identity and culture to ethnic tensions and violent conflict at the levels of government, other institutions and in personal, social interactions with the Hadar in particular. I have analysed this data in greater detail under the second meta-theme ('marginalisation of identity and culture') below. Along with the data on stateless/citizen family integration, these results also strengthen the notion of the Bedoun as a sub-group of the Kuwaiti Bedouin. This functional social integration of Bedoun-Bedouin citizen families had become targeted by government in a variety of ways, discussed further in Chapter 6.

5.2.5 Additional data from the analysis of documents.

Data from the interviews, and a variety of literary and photographic sources indicated that the Bedoun have been ethnically targeted to prevent their participation in society, as well as to limit the population growth and development as a whole. In order to support my discussion of the results of the interview data, while attempting to remain focused on answering the research questions, it was necessary to collate additional information systematically and to present it in the Appendices. Until now, important information about the Bedoun's history, and particularly government policy toward the Bedoun, has been spread in a piecemeal fashion across a variety of fields and genres, making it difficult for scholars to substantiate Bedoun claims, build strong arguments and draw specific conclusions from the available knowledge. This limitation may have influenced the tendency of new authors studying the Bedoun to build on taken-for-granted knowledge claims about the Bedoun, that were not substantiated by scholars when the first claims were originally put forward, rather than questioning claims not substantiated by fieldwork historical data, attempting to consolidate the available data, and considering that perhaps previous findings were somewhat flawed (as I discussed in Chapter 2).

Overall, the documentary analyses presented in the Appendices illustrate how and to what extent, the Bedoun had been subject to a government policy of ethnic targeting and cultural reorganisation. I have attempted to arrange the Appendices thematically, each with a number of sub-sections, to illustrate the different aspects of how this has been accomplished by ideologists and intellectuals working with the government of Kuwait.
5.2.6 Personal identity.

Within the theme of personal identity, the sub-themes arising included personal evaluations of identity, the changing social roles of Bedoun women, Bedoun children with Kuwaiti citizen mothers, and the changing social roles of Bedoun men. The minor-subthemes related to this sub-theme are listed in Appendix A, Table A1. Note that Bedoun women who were married Kuwaiti citizens are usually granted Kuwaiti citizenship as a matter of course, and they tend to live with their citizen families. Therefore, I did not meet any Bedoun women married to citizen men during my fieldwork, although some interviewees had sisters married to Kuwaiti citizen men. On the other hand, the interview data included a number of themes related to the experience of a citizen woman married to a stateless man, and experiences of a child of a citizen women married to stateless man, and the experiences of a child whose parents were both stateless but late in their lives, received Kuwaiti citizenship. The results below contributed to the understanding of the personal identity of the Bedoun, as well as the influences of statelessness and marginalisation on contemporary gender roles and relationships within the community.

5.2.7 Collective identity and government interactions.

In relation to the theme of collective identity, sub-themes included family histories and citizen registration. There has been a large focus on problems related to citizenship registration, reflected in the Human Rights Watch (1995) definition of the Bedoun (discussed in Chapter 2). There was also the consideration that many Bedouin working men were unable to travel to the registration office in Kuwait City because they were working during office hours, and could not obtain permission to take leave from their posts. A second sub-theme concerned the experiences of the current generation of Bedoun who had been ‘waiting’ their entire lives for citizenship to be granted to their families, on the basis of government legislation and commitments (see Appendix B, iii) that should have enabled them receive citizenship, according to the Constitution of Kuwait (1992/1962) (concerning military servicemen: see Appendix B, v) and the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) for others (see Appendix B, vi). This was not only an expectation transmitted across generations by families, but continued to be perpetuated by government, including by staff at the Ministry of Interior’s Central Apparatus, where ‘status adjustment’ was also conducted (verified in announcements by government authorities in the media, see Chapter 7).

Additionally, a participant who acquired citizenship grant prior to the Arab Spring, provided rich data as a case example. The data illustrated the additional forms of systematic abuse adopted by the Central Apparatus, due to the participant’s ethnic and tribal identity. A third sub-theme revealed some of the official methods used to change the Bedoun identity according to the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program. The themes provided insight into the culture within the Ministry of Interior and the victimisation of the Bedoun.
In the case of the interviewee granted citizenship, his whole family unit was subjected to exploitative treatment during the administrative processes required to change his identity from 'non-Kuwaiti' to 'Kuwaiti.' The process took many years to complete and involved the isolation and interrogation of different sections of the family. The strategy of intimidation appeared to be deployed in an attempt to coerce the family into giving up on the process before each member had their citizenship grant finalised.

Three research participants had experienced ‘status adjustment,’ where the Central Apparatus changed their nationality on official records, along with one participant’s spouse (P10, P11, P14, P19). The process was described as presenting the following problems. First, the historical, cultural identity as Kuwaiti Bedoun was erased at the official level. The participants were aware of the historical and cultural implications of what was happening to their collective. Second, they had no power over their individual situation. They had been listed with an ineffective nationality label that did not belong to them, and which they could not use (that is, the word of a country other than Kuwait was used to state the nationality of the individual). They were still stateless, but the state had recorded them with a fraudulent identity. Third, the whole process of ‘status adjustment’ was undertaken without their knowledge, or participation. Their identity ‘status’ was ‘adjusted’ to Syrian and Saudi Arabian nationalities. The process removed official recognition of their ethnic identity as Bedouins, and national identity, as Kuwaitis. Any official documentation that they required forthwith, such as marriage certificates or birth certificates for their children, would state the new nationality label on the document. Thus, the identity of future generations of their families was also ‘adjusted.’

Other, minor-subthemes involved a general refusal by government to provide accurate identity documentation, because ‘status adjustment’ had already been or was in the process of being, enforced (the participant’s identity files held by government stated they were ‘illegal residents’ with false nationalities) and the refusal of authorities to process marriage certificates. The latter problem has been Bedoun policy since the 1986 administrative expulsion (‘The Study,’ 2003; see Appendix E, ii), which prevents many in the group from founding families. ‘Status adjustment’ was thus a problem not only for the individuals who was subjected to the process, but for all family members listed under the persons’ file, and for any new members of the family born subsequently. Thousands of men of previous generations had been coerced by government into participating in the process, and had signed documents stating a false nationality, or had purchased fake passports under instructions from Central Apparatus staff. Some of the research participants’ fathers were victims of this process.

Regarding the occupations of the interviewees' fathers, sixteen out of twenty were employed prior to the Iraq war either in the Ministry of Defence (in the military forces) or
the Ministry of the Interior (in the police force). The interviewee’s mothers were all homemakers and usually illiterate, except for one interviewee (P04), who stated that her citizen mother had worked in the government service prior to her having children. In the past, there were active recruitment programs that attempted to integrate Kuwaiti women into entry-level employment roles. These nationalistic programs no longer exist in a substantive form, due to the lucrative system of cash payments distributed regularly to citizens which is widely believed to purchase their political compliance with the authoritarian regime.

5.2.8 Other themes beyond the scope of the present study.

Other themes of Bedoun identity arising from the interview data related to a meta-theme of ‘family life’ analysed from the interviewees. This was beyond the scope of the present study, but are worth mentioning briefly. This included the childlessness of stateless women and men (all but one female respondent in this study was childless), the theme of professionalisation of Bedoun women and parents supporting stateless women’s careers and marriage choices. Another substantial portion of interviewee data was associated with the meta-theme of ‘employment,’ which also falls outside the scope of the present study.

5.3 Findings from the thematic analysis - Marginalisation of identity and culture

Three themes arose from the meta-theme of marginalisation of identity and culture, including ethnic targeting and social exclusion, stigma and stranger status and social integration. Themes related to this meta-theme are shown in Appendix A i, Table A2.

5.3.1 Ethnic targeting and social exclusion.

Sub-themes arising from the theme of ethnic targeting and social exclusion related to tribal identity and included ethnic targeting of the northern tribes. Other themes related to ethnic targeting and Bedouin identity, principally related to psychological pressures and encounters with ‘othering’ in social interactions, and the labelling of the participants by others, with other identities. In this area of the analysis, interviewees indicated that they were subject to concrete experiences of social exclusion due to being members of the northern tribes, or perceived as such, by others. They explained that the northern tribes were targeted over their perceived origins in relation to the desert and marshlands, and to their accent or dialect in particular. More specific themes of tribal marginalisation included the projection of the notion of ‘Iraqi’ and nebulous, ‘foreign’ identities onto the Bedoun, leading to stigmatisation. Other themes included religious affiliation (Sunni/Shia), and the Bedoun as a native person, a concept which was identified by the interviewees as a ‘difference’ that attracted mistreatment of the Bedoun by others.

The data also showed that most Bedoun were likely from the northern tribes, while others assumed these origins, in virtually any case. These results revealed a great deal about the nature of social interactions between the Bedoun and other members of Kuwaiti society, and illustrated how individuals managed their identity when faced with the pressure to
conform to social standards determined by the dominant Hadar. The Bedoun were always vulnerable to arrest due to their statelessness, which gave others inordinate social power over them in social transactions (if their identity was known to the other party involved in the social transaction). The interviewees also described homelessness and poverty as identifying markers of Bedoun identity, because the Bedoun existed for the most part, in a comparatively different economic class to Kuwaiti citizens (although there were some exceptions to the rule). As one of my Bedoun cultural guides explained to me, while not not all Bedoun are seriously impoverished, but most are, out all o those who are, are surely Bedoun.

5.3.2 Visual data of historical desert settlements, the segregated suburbs of Taima and Sulabiya.

In addition to interview data on poverty, I have included photographic evidence from Kuwait in Appendix H, showing a historical record of segregated, so-called ‘popular housing’ complexes in Taima, al Jahra and Sulabiya and photographs for comparative purposes to show city housing in impoverished areas of Salmiya in Kuwait City. These findings concern the contextual factors related to the Bedoun’s poverty and segregation in Taima and Sulabiya, and may be compared to other forms of urban poverty in Kuwait, contemporaneous and historical (al Nakib, 2016) as well as historical claims that the Bedoun were ‘squatters’ and ‘slum-dwellers’ (al Khatib, 1978; Alawadi, 1980, p.339; Alissa, 2013; Beaugrand, 2011, p.239, 2014, p.737; Zhou, 1976).

5.3.3 Stigma, stranger status and Bedoun identity.

Sub-themes arising from the theme of ‘stigma, stranger status and Bedoun identity’ included stigmatisation and the citizen population, the Bedoun as stranger and contradictions of the Bedoun-citizen stranger status. These themes were rich data, leading to my analysis of fifteen sub-subthemes and five minor, sub-sub-themes. Experiences of stigmatisation were intensified by mutual fears held by citizens and the Bedoun, connected to intense social demands for conformity and fear of reprisal from authorities. These results further reinforced the argument that the Bedoun were subject to ethnic targeting by the Hadar on the basis of their Bedouin tribal identity, but also demonstrated that the whole of Bedouin society was affected by the Bedoun problem and the prospect that Bedouin citizens could become stateless. This problem impacted social relations between the Bedouin citizen and Bedoun groups in the community. The Hadar were also affected, though they tended to be the aggressors (Znaniecki, 1952b) or to perform roles as ‘in-group police’ (Mann, 2005).

5.3.4 Social integration.

Sub-themes arising from the theme of social integration included social integration prior to administrative expulsion (1986), social integration in the present day, ‘passing’ as a citizen, friendship and the disclosure of identity. Both the social practices of ‘passing’ and
disclosing Bedoun identity were discussed, along with the adoption of different social strategies and the reasons for disclosure (Becker, 1983; Goffman, 1963). The impact of identity management in a stigmatising environment was discussed in relation to its impact on young Bedoun’s peer relationships with others. These findings tended to reveal more detailed information about interpersonal transactions than the previous themes, particularly regarding how the interviewees managed their identity faced with both subtle and overt forms of oppression and social conflict in public spaces.

The theme of social integration in the present day included some positive insights from the participants regarding their reflections on the social problems in Kuwaiti society, and in response to their experiences, learning how to think independently (individually and as a group). They had begun to create a new society, through their conscious participation and projection of inclusive values. Some participants attempted to follow their own life purpose, whether it required them to work toward integrating more deeply in citizen society, or to carve out their own life-path, living as independently as possible from citizen society, in order to avoid projected stigmas and other negative evaluations.

5.3.5 Other data beyond scope of the present study.

Additional data was collected pertaining to siblings as the primary friendship group but an in-depth discussion of this data is beyond the scope of the present study, as it is best discussed in the context of theorisation on family life. Therefore, I have limited the discussion of results to friendships with peers outside the immediate family.

5.4 Findings From the Thematic Analysis – Bedoun Education and the Intellectual Ideal

Four themes arose from the meta-theme Bedoun education and the intellectual ideal. These included institutional issues, access to education, positive experiences in education, the social and cultural purpose of education, marginalisation in education and social segregation in education. All of the themes related to this meta-theme are listed in Appendix A, i, Table A3.

5.4.1 Institutional discrimination.

Regarding the theme of institutional discrimination, sub-themes included issues with the Central Apparatus, schools, colleges and universities, and other institutions. My documentary research of institutional factors linked to the discrimination of the Bedoun in education proved to be so varied, complex and confounded by issues of data verification, that the matter extended well beyond the scope of this study. This is because the government of Kuwait does not publish data on Bedoun participation at the national level, and the Bedoun population is omitted from international developmental indicators (Carr-Hill, 2013). I have provided an analysis of some aspects of this problem in Appendix G, ii. Other themes of institutional discrimination tended to reflect both formal, institutionalised
methods of deprivation and more informal, social forms discrimination, connected to the theme of marginalisation of identity and culture (section 5.3) above, where the dynamics of social interactions were explored in greater detail.

5.4.2 Access to education.

In this section, I attempted to analyse how the Bedoun interviewees and other members of their community actually accessed education, rather than focusing on the limitations to that access (which I noted above). However, it is important to note that the Bedoun’s access to education was claimed to be provided via financial support distributed by the so-called Education Fund. Education of the Bedoun was only measured by the government of Kuwait as budget expenditure, rather than according to actual student participation, such as via enrolment numbers, or successfully completions of qualifications. A total of 15,105 Bedoun students (just over ten percent across the entire population) were claimed to have received funding across all levels of education in 2014/2015 (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015).

The number of Bedoun primary and secondary school students who are required to receive free education on a compulsory basis according to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948), and the number who do actually receive that level of tuition, was not disclosed in Kuwait's report to the United Nations (United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council, November 3, 2014, p.9). The Fund was promoted to the public as if it provided fully funded education to all Bedouin in Kuwait (‘Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015) either as a government funded or charity funded service, which was misleading. Overall, the Education Fund was characterised by a network of access restrictions, rather than provisions for access. Only two interviewees in this study accessed the Education Fund. Therefore, the Fund did not arise as a meaningful theme of qualitative data on participation in education for the Bedoun interviewees. I investigated the actual purpose of the fund, the functions it performs, and its more serious limitations along with other restrictions on education for the Bedoun, in Appendix G, ii.

Within the theme of access to education, sub-themes of informal system and the formal system of education arose, with the majority of interviewees accessing education via informal means. Only one participant had gained entry into Kuwait University through formal pathways, after he received citizenship. Some level of organised, informal access to education by the Bedoun does exist in Kuwait, arranged within the Bedouin community among well-known Bedoun social leaders and intellectuals and private citizen ‘sponsors’ in response to needs, at all levels of education (P09, P13, P15). The themes of access to education indicated intellectual idealism, altruism and communal values motivated and facilitated the participation of young Bedoun in education, where they otherwise might not attend school.
This area of the analysis also yielded valuable insights into the Bedoun’s integration in Bedouin citizen society. Research respondents tended to show patterns of education access featuring patchy and substantially interrupted participation in post-secondary education, and combined work with study. Older interviewees had accumulated multiple qualifications and a pattern of life-long learning (above) in response to the employment market in Kuwait and their marginalisation. For example, there were high employer demands due to the competitiveness of the local expatriate job market in Kuwait, while there was also pressure to achieve more to offer more to prospective employers to compensate for being a Bedoun, having low social status and virtually no negotiating power with employers due to the Bedoun’s legal status.

The Bedoun’s participation in post-secondary education had provided the basis for an expanded identity and life experience reflecting engagement with the intellectual ideal, which was highly valued by the interviewees. The growth in intellectual identity and new perspectives about the function of education appeared to be connected to certain aspects of their ethnic identity and culture, especially social solidarity and the sharing of resources. This identification was reinforced by the cultivation of contacts with international social networks, journalists, international human rights organisations, scholars, and for a few select individuals, participation in education overseas. These results also indicated the reality of abuse of Bedoun children in the education system in Kuwait. They revealed how imposed, bureaucratic marginalisation was intertwined with ethnic targeting in social interactions. My documentary research on the portrayal of the Bedoun and Bedouin by scholars at the local and regional levels suggested that the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun in the education may be endemic, not only in Kuwaiti society, but also among Arab expatriates in the private and public education sectors (see Appendix C vi-viii).

5.4.3 Positive experiences in education.

The research questions on this topic enabled the interviewees to elaborate on positive aspects of their identity as well as life experience, especially within the theme of ‘the social and cultural purpose of education.’ This theme led to a rich set of sub-themes and a range of minor sub-themes describing the growth of the Bedouns’ identity beyond ethnic and/or nationalist concepts, due to identification with the intellectual ideal. The intellectual identity was reinforced by formal and informal processes of learning, including self-education and the cultivation of strategies of persistence required to ensure completion of qualifications as well as high achievement against multiple obstacles. Interviewees described a desire to transcend the boundaries of their present situation, to become economically independent, to cultivate their life purpose, self-worth and self-awareness.

Some respondents identified education as a life-path that had enabled them to achieve a higher purpose in life, attempting to channel their own positive inputs into Kuwaiti
society in order to improve it. Others believed in the power of education to enable social transformation of all social groups. In other words, they believed that when the whole population was schooled, the Bedoun collective would be able to overcome their oppression and receive the recognition they were owed by the state. They regarded the segregation and ethnic targeting of the Bedoun as a burden and a stain on the whole of Kuwaiti society, and not only a problem for the community of the Bedoun or the State.

Positive experiences in education also led to the elaboration of ideas about the participation of the Bedoun in civil society, intellectual life and visions of a new society and aspirations for the future. The theme of the social and cultural purpose of education was an especially rich theme, with four minor sub-themes, fifteen minor sub-sub-themes and six minor sub-sub-sub-themes (see Appendix A, i). I elaborated on themes from this section in the discussion (Chapter 7, see Table 23 and Table 24, respectively), indicating a shift from ethnic identity to intellectual identity via the expansion of the intellectual ideal among the population, and the development of new, creative ideals about the role of education, self-education, innovation, the development of a young literary community (though a suppressed one) and new visions of society. According to these findings, the Bedoun’s participation in post-secondary education has provided the basis of an expanded identity and life experience reflecting engagement with the intellectual ideal and the positive expansion of culture within the Bedoun community. A growth in intellectual identity and new perspectives about the function of education appeared to be connected to certain traditional aspects of their Bedouin ethnic identity and culture, operating as an adaptive response to contemporary society and their extraordinary conditions of oppression, which I argue further in Chapter 8.

5.4.4 Marginalisation in education.

The theme of marginalisation in education, featured sub-themes related to experiences of overt abuse and experiences of stigmatisation. Four minor-subthemes related to overt abuse, and seven minor sub-themes related to the stigmatisation of students (see Appendix A, i). There was some overlap in themes related to stigmatisation and institutional issues concerning abuse of Bedoun students by teachers who were citizens or other Arab nationals. Generally speaking, the Ministry of Interior’s powers of oversight over multiple other Ministries, and especially the Ministry of Education, had resulted in direct interference in the interviewees participation in education. These results indicated the reality of experiences of abuse of Bedoun children, adolescents and adults in the education system. They revealed how imposed, bureaucratic marginalisation was intertwined with ethnic targeting in social interactions. They also indicated that there may be a connection between ethnic targeting by the Kuwaiti Hadar and other Arab national expatriates. My documentary research on the portrayal of the Bedoun and Bedouin by scholars at both the local and regional levels suggested that the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun may be endemic in Kuwait,
not only within Kuwaiti society but also among Arab expatriates (see Appendix G, iii). Such targeting appeared to function automatically as embedded, localised nationalist values and ideologies (as a ‘right’ or ‘need’ to exclude the Bedoun from educational settings, or to suppress their impetus to learn within educational settings), as much as it was attributed to personal prejudice of individuals abusing the Bedun in face-to-face interactions in schools and university settings.

5.4.5 Social segregation in education.

Regarding the theme of social segregation in education, sub-themes included the expulsion of the Bedoun from schools 1986-1992 and the unschooled Bedoun. In this section of the analysis, themes reflected highly personal experiences of the administrative expulsion during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the limiting of interviewees' life prospects. Nevertheless, some interviewees of this generation who received partial education have managed to compensate for their losses over time, and are arguably more highly, socially mobilized than the younger generations who have not been able to acquire a basic education. The theme of the unschooled Bedoun also featured examples from life histories of the Bedoun interviewees’ siblings, extended family members and friends.

The data indicated that there are many Bedoun who are completely cut-off from society due to government-imposed social segregation in education, which commenced during their school years. Important flow-on effects of segregation involving employment, marriage and founding families were also indicated, along with severe impacts on mental health and wellbeing. The impact of social segregation in education on the group’s long-term development and their capacity to sustain themselves economically cannot be over-emphasised. It comprised a downward pressure on the ability of the Bedoun to live meaningfully in Kuwait, to found families and sustain their existence as a population.

Conclusion

This chapter provided a summary of data collected from interviewees with the Bedoun research participants, including selected demographic information and a thematic analysis of interviews. Demographic data featured gender, age, legal identity status (statelessness and nationality), family data, tribal membership and religious affiliation, place of residence, employment and educational experience. The thematic analysis was discussed under three meta-themes: Bedoun identity, the marginalisation of identity and culture, and education and the intellectual ideal. The data was analysed to a depth of six levels: levels of meta-themes, themes, sub-themes, minor sub-themes, minor sub sub-themes, and minor sub-sub-sub-themes. I also included some relevant observations and explanatory notes to help elucidate the themes analysed, and brief comments on initial findings elaborated in the discussion. Appendix A contains data from the analysis of the interview transcripts.
Additional thematic analyses were conducted on relevant literature and other documents. I have included this information in Appendices B-G.
Chapter 6
Discussion of
The Ethnic Identity and Culture of the Bedoun

Yes, many people cross back and forward, back and forward… Yes, this was a normal way for desert people to live. (Participant 8, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 8 April, 2014)

So these are the effects of the tribe, of being native people… I haven’t forgotten that I’m Bedouin, I reflect about it all the time. (Participant 3, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 7 March, 2014)

Introduction

This chapter discusses the Bedoun’s ethnic identity and responses to social change. I apply theoretical modelling adapted from Felix Gross’ (1978) theory of multiple ethnic identification, and discuss this analysis in comparison with other theories of cultural systems (Znanicki, 1952a), ethnic change (Horowitz, 1975) and Bedouin social change in the Middle East (Marx, 1967; Stewart, 2012) and the Persian Gulf in particular (al Fahad, 2004; Khuri, 1990). The interview data indicated the Bedoun retained deep cultural ties to their traditional heritage, which was manifested in a variety of traditional names. These concepts were deeply connected to the participant’s personal and collective histories, their places of settlement, and different levels of the ethnic structure. They pointed to the integration of national identity by family members in previous generations, passed down to subsequent generations. Thus, many Bedoun expressed themselves as having developed a strong sense of Kuwaiti national identity, although they had been rendered stateless.

Gross’s (1978) ethnic theory helps to explain new concepts about the level of persecution experienced by the Bedoun on the grounds of tribal and ethnic identity. The ‘status adjustment’ program imposed a further level of ethnic differentiation over the Bedoun, in the form of false nationality labelling. The ‘adjustment’ process, introduced secretly from 1983 (Al Anezi, 1989, p.263, n132), changed the ethnic and national identity of the affected individuals in official documents, as well as that of their nuclear and/or extended families (those who had not yet become citizens of Kuwait).

The targeting of Bedouin names at every level of the ethnic structure revealed that the impact of an imposed, restrictive re-organisation (M. Secombe, personal communications, January 22, 2016) of the Bedoun, indicating the approach of oppressors was comprehensive and systematic, and likely designed by intellectuals. The self-ascription of tribal identity terms by the Bedouin respondents indicated a strong sense of ethnic belonging, the operation of multiple ethnic identities, and the threat of erasure of ethnic
identity via the ‘status adjustment’ program (administrative ethnic cleansing, in Weissbrodt, 2008).

6.1 Ethnic Identity and Cultural Change

6.1.1 Ethnic and tribal identity.

The prevalence of tribal identification led to me adopt Gross’s (1978) theory of ethnic identification. I analysed the various tribal identity terms used by the interviewees within the framework of the vertical ethnic structure (Gross, 1978, p.36). The framework conceptualises multiple identities expressed by members of ethnic groups at the local, regional and national level of identification. It accounts for functional relationships between different types of identities, such as those linked to ancestry and heritage, residency and sense of place, and imposed national-level political and juridical identities (Gross,1978).

Local identity includes personal identity, language, kinship relations, religion, and also native identity and micro-ethnic identity. My thematic analysis of the interview data illustrated that the Bedoun interviewee’s identity spanned local, regional and national levels. The analysis is shown in Table 19 below.

Table 19

*Tribal Identity Terms Reflecting the Ethnic Structure*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms used by research participants</th>
<th>Levels of ethnic identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bedouin <em>(Bedu)</em></td>
<td>Transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sons of the desert <em>(Abna al badiyya)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Desert dwellers of Kuwait <em>(Badiat al Kuwayt)</em></td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Native</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. First (arrivals)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. <em>Bani Utub</em> (comprising the al Sabah, al Khalifa, and al Jalahimah)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. <em>Usul</em> (Asil)</td>
<td>Local and regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Individual tribal names</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Northern and southern tribes and dialects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Northern, central and southern areas of Kuwait city</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* My use of Arabic terms is taken from Appendix B, ii including Lorimer (1915, p.829), Dickson (1949) and the term *Usul/Asil* from Khuri (1990).

Note that these terms were supported by context: they were used by the interviewees in long, complex conversations about their identity for the purpose of this research. Their elaborations from the interview transcripts will be placed in the Australian Data Archive.
after the thesis examination, to preserve a record of cultural heritage for the Bedoun (courtesy of the Australian National University in Canberra). Thus, the terms used by the Bedoun should not be understood as merely labels, but as cultural signifiers deeply rooted in historical meaning.

National-level terms referred to Bedoun of Kuwait. The term ‘native’ was employed in reference to belonging to the country, as ‘first’ arrivals, either before or after the Bani Utub tribes. Hakeem al Fadhli observed that human rights discourses on statelessness had directed the world’s attention to the statelessness of the Bedoun, rather than their indigenous status:

We have our home. But no one wants to talk about it, ‘They are natives, they are genuine, they are the people of Kuwait.’ (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

Many of the Bedoun rejected the notion that they were stateless, as they had assimilated Kuwaiti national identity and identified with Kuwait as their ‘home’ or ‘country’ (P12). Participant 12 explained,

P12: Yes, yes, yes, they make for your friend, you are different, different… he ask me… are you from where?

My father and grandfather from one hundred years here, in Kuwait here, and no exit. This is my country. (Participant 12, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 1 April, 2014)

Local terms included Asil, tribal names and groupings into northern and southern tribes or northern and southern members within tribes, and recent settlement in the state in certain parts of Kuwait city, associated with particular tribes. The main tribes of Kuwait have traditional tribal lands (dirah) that cover across most of the countries of the Middle East to varying extents, which were connected to complex customary laws regarding land access. This included land and resource access rules based on the principle of equity (Wilkinson, 1983). Each individual tribal name is linked to historical, transnational social collectives, expressed as group identities (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014; Cole, 2006). A list of the tribes and their dirah (from al Shayeji, 1998; Alhajeri, 2004) can be found in Appendix B, i. A colour map of the complex dirah published by the American Geographical Society, can be found in Raswan (1930): Tribal Areas and Migration Lines of the North Arabian Bedouins. Raswan (1930) drew the map himself.

I listed the groupings of the individual tribes, and their northern and southern members, at the local and regional (within the state) levels. The tribes tended to settle
together in particular parts of Kuwait City and its surrounding areas. Their settlement indicated Bedouin integration remains a feature of Bedouin society. For example, al Jahra is known as an area with a high concentration of Bedouin (Beaugrand, 2014b), but there is also a high concentration of Bedouin citizens living there. Ahmadi is known as an area with a high concentration of Bedouin citizens (Tétreault, 2003), but there is also a high concentration of Bedouin living there. Not all Bedouin live in the segregated compounds of Taima (al Jahra), but in other parts of al Jahra, while a number of citizens have always lived in the segregated compounds of Sulabiya along with the Bedouin (for photographs of these areas taken from 1974 to 2014, see Appendix H).

I discussed basic concepts about the northern and southern tribes in Chapter 5, section 5.2.3. The division of the northern and southern tribes has not been discussed in research a great deal, beyond general assumptions that the northern tribes comprise Bedouin (Beaugrand, 2010), and the southern tribes comprise citizens (Crystal, 1995). In this research, I attempted to provide a deeper analysis. The ethnic division was revealed to be of upmost importance, because the perception of the division appears to lie at the heart of justifications by others, including the government of Kuwait, for segregating the Bedouin and targeting them with punitive actions (discussed in the following chapter). However, cultural or social differences between northern and southern tribal people should be contextualised against the existence of the whole cultural system, regulated to varying extents by tribal law covering virtually all aspects of the Bedouin’s public life, which goes back hundreds of years (Raswan, 1930; Stewart, 2006; Wilkinson, 1983).

Additionally, the northern and southern Bedouin in Kuwait retain social integration through a range of key social practices in the present day. Despite this integration, tension in society within the tribes and between the Bedouin and Hadar in particular, worked against social integration of the Bedouin. One of three meta-themes in this study concerned the ethnic targeting, social isolation, and social exclusion of the Bedouin. The northern tribal identity was one of the strongest issues correlated with the theme. The participants discussed the northern tribal identity in the context of issues of ethnic conflict pertaining to language, dialect and inter-tribal and intra-tribal relations. This meta-theme was explored further below. Overall, the research participants appeared to identify primarily as Bedouin, and secondarily as Bedouin, although the order of identification could change, depending upon contextual factors (Gross, 1978).

My interviews and participant observation experiences led me to understand that the Bedouin do not always explicitly identify as tribal people, nor as members of the northern or southern tribal groups, even though they regard themselves as having a strong tribal identity. They assume that others are aware of their identity as a self-evident feature of their makeup.
Their self-identification is usually expressed implicitly, which may or may not be detectable to outsiders.

None of the Bedoun that I met in Kuwait or elsewhere, were aware of the manner in which the Bedoun’s identity has been portrayed published academic work, or of the influence of these interpretations over the thinking of scholars and international humanitarian organisations who visit Kuwait to study the Bedoun. This point demonstrates the relative isolation of the Bedoun within Kuwaiti society, but also, the fact that while academics have cast aspersions over their identity, even Bedoun intellectuals and human rights activists have very much been preoccupied with local attacks on their personal and group identity and basic survival needs. This has prevented most, but not all, from contributing to the development of scholarship, beyond the arena of short-term human rights reporting and international media reports which are published sporadically (the development of an intellectual class in the community is discussed further in Chapter 8).

6.1.2 The model of the ethnic identity structure

At the next stage of the analysis, I applied Gross’ (1978) model of the vertical ethnic structure to the different components of the national, regional and local/native identities, shown in Figure 1, below. This process enabled the position of the Bedoun in Bedouin society to be understood from the perspective of ethnic theory (Gross, 1978), after the analysis of individual terms for self-ascribed identity (Table 19, above). These classifications helped to conceptualise the depth of the vertical ethnic structure (Gross, 1978, p.39), based on the thematic analysis of interview data. The discussion continues by examining the Kuwaiti national identity (6.1.2.1), the Bedouin identity (6.1.2.2) the differentiation of the northern and southern tribal identity (6.1.2.3), the Bedoun identity (6.1.2.4) and the emerging Bedoun Bedoun (6.1.2.5) which signifies the erased identity

6.1.2.1 The Kuwaiti national identity.

The analysis of interview data indicated that the Bedoun interviewees had developed their own strong sense of tribal and national identity, despite their historical expulsion from the state (which had occurred in many of the respondent's lifetimes, which they remembered). These identities were differentiated, illustrated by the number of different terms used to describe the Bedouin tribal identity (shown in Table 19 below). Regarding the national identity, the interviewees used the term Kuwaiti in two main contexts. First, they referred to themselves as ‘Kuwaitis’ when expressing their belonging to the country (in common with the Bedouin and Hadar citizens), compared to expatriates with citizenship in other countries, including other Arabs. Second, the term Kuwaiti was used only to refer to the citizen community, in contexts where they emphasised their separateness as Bedoun. In this context, the term is used with outsiders to describe others, usually to distinguish between
Kuwaiti citizens and other Arab citizens, and the ‘Kuwaitis’ was virtually identical in meaning to the ‘citizens.’

The maintenance of the term Kuwaiti to refer to the Bedoun (the first meaning) reflected the participant’s absorption of the national identity, transmitted across generations. The ‘Kuwaiti’ identity was linked to the notion that one’s ancestors occupied the territory of Kuwait prior to the formation of the modern nation state and/or that one's father or grandfather was brought to the state by tribal sheikhs (Alhajeri, 2004, described the selection of tribal members for the public service by government committees, who eventually became the Bedoun). Given the strong historical roots expressed the Bedoun interviewee’s identity, and the persistent integration of Bedoun families with Bedouin citizen families with whom they had permanently settled in Kuwait (al Moosa, 1976; Human Rights Watch, 1995), it appeared that assimilation of the Bedoun into the Kuwaiti national culture had been complete prior to the Bedoun’s administrative expulsion in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003).

The roles of the Bedoun in government service would have undoubtedly reinforced their sense of national identity, since they were members of the state security services.

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**Figure 1 The structure of the Bedouin ethnic identity, based on the theory of multiple ethnic identity (Gross, 1978)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of ethnic identity</th>
<th>Level in the ethnic structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National level</td>
<td>Ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedouin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional level</td>
<td>Multi-tribe groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern and Southern tribes, tribal confederations –i.e. large tribal networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Level</td>
<td>Sub-ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual tribes, may include both Northern and Southern members</td>
<td>Comprise Bedouin citizens and stateless (the Bedoun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bedoun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bedoun Bedoun</td>
<td>A sub-group of the micro-ethnic group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(military, national guard and police). This was demonstrated by P15's father, who gave service in two Arab wars for Kuwait but whose family was later administratively erased by 'status adjustment' and reallocated as of 'Saudi Arabian' nationality. The Bedoun had retained this sense of identity. It had been transmitted to them by their Bedoun and citizen parents and relatives. They had absorbed the identity personally through their life experience despite their expulsion from the state.

Another factor in the absorption of national identity is the nature by which government misled the Bedoun for decades, that citizenship would be forthcoming to them, in recognition of the state's perception of their identity as Kuwaiti nationals. As I have mentioned, this was shown on the National Census documents officially published by the state (see Appendix B, iv), but also indicated by the fact that the documents were identical to those received by citizens. This was likely an essential factor placating the Bedoun while they waited for their citizenship applications to be duly processed, which simply never occurred. Additionally, authorities of the state repeatedly legislated and attempted to legislate for the Bedoun to be granted citizenship, and this national policy was reinforced by repeated reassurances of the same (see Appendix B, iii).

Thus, at the national level of identification (Gross, 1978), the Bedoun interviewees had developed and/or retained their sense of being ‘Kuwaiti’ as a national identity along with their ethnic identity belonging to the Bedouin ethnic community across multiple generations. This may be interpreted as a reflection of the tribal social order (Gross, 1998). 'Kuwaiti' is not an ethnic identity, but a national one. The national and ethnic identification at this level did not conflict or compete with each other (Gross, 1978), but were mutually compatible forms of identity. This aspect highlighted the Bedoun's ability to maintain their sense of identity and culture amidst the social and cultural forces of disorganisation (Znaniecki, 1952a), imposed by the government regime and experienced in social relations with others.

Reports by Human Rights Watch (1991a; 2000) indicated that the Bedoun had continued to refer to themselves as 'Kuwaitis' after administrative expulsion (1986) and during and after the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent period of ethnic cleansing (1991-1995). Bedoun expelled from Kuwait and not allowed to return after the war, were reported to have attempted to return to Kuwait in 2000, gathering at the border of Iraq. They still identified themselves as 'Kuwaiti' (Human Rights Watch, 2000). Therefore, this expression of national identity cannot be regarded as a product of the Arab Spring or a constructed identity arising from the political consciousness of just a few individuals. The community expressed an organic and natural identification arising from personal experience (Gross, 1978), enhanced via recognition of the shared ideals and value systems of that group (Znaniecki, 1952a), which spread en masse as a consciousness of belonging, leading to self-ascription of identity to a particular group (Gross, 1978; Horowitz, 1975).
In my personal experience, I have observed immigration court documents from the United Kingdom in which a judge deciding a case determined that a Bedoun who referred to himself as a 'Kuwaiti' and not a 'Bedoun' could not have 'really' been a Bedoun. This assumption was not based on research, but on the judge's opinion, influenced by the myth of the Bedoun's false identity, a government approach constructed in the 1980s and 1990s, promoted by Western scholars (as I discussed in Chapter 2). The idea was entirely mistaken, as the decision issued did not take into account the different functions of self-referents according to the different audiences to whom the Bedoun addresses himself or herself. On the other hand, this research shows that many Bedoun will never clearly state they are Bedoun to strangers, even if it is their primary identity, due to fear of stigmatisation and persecution. Al Moosa (1976) had discovered the Bedoun had already assimilated the national identity in 1974, after they had been living for decades in government-monitored, desert settlements. The interviewees indicated that the absorption of the national identity was maintained over generations within their families until the present day (national identity was expressed by P01, P02, P03, P07, P08, P09, P12, P13, P16, P17, P18, P19, P20).

6.1.2.2 The Bedouin identity.

At the national level, the over-arching ethnic identity was Bedouin. This identity was characterised by a number of different terms used by the research participants to refer to their ethnic, tribal identity, and their elaborations about that identity thematically analysed (Appendix A), and shown in Table 19 above (section 6.1.1). The northern and southern tribes were a regional designation, which held associations to different parts of the Middle East, as I will explain further below.

The strongest themes arising in this study concerned tribal identity and the marginalisation of tribal identity (shown in the interview themes listed in Appendix A). All of the respondents’ heritage was derived from tribes and/or tribal confederations, which were all locally recognised as the northern and southern tribes of Arabia (see Appendix B, i). Ten different themes relating to tribal identity are shown in Table 18, Chapter 5. Themes arising from tribal identity included cultural connections with the land itself, such as Bedu or ‘Bedouin,’ ‘sons of the desert,’ ‘desert dwellers of Kuwait,’ also the term ‘native’ of Kuwait. Bedu is a general term for the Bedouin, who are indigenous to the region (Cole, 2006). ‘Sons of the desert’ has been used continuously by the Bedouin in Kuwait (al Waqayan, 2009). All but one research participant came from families who identified with their family’s tribal origins. Some used more than one term to describe their tribal identity, while others made a singular reference. The only respondent who did not identify with tribal origins rejected the term ‘tribal’ although her father was a Bedouin, while her mother was a Kuwaiti citizen of migrant heritage. Due to her father’s transition to urban life, she no longer regarded her family as having tribal origins.
Table 19 illustrated different levels of ethnic identification applied to Gross’s (1978) vertical model of the ethnic structure, which I extended to include reference to transnational communities. This was because Bedouin’s historical occupation of the Middle East prior to the formation of the modern nation-state was transnational. I classified the terms ‘desert dwellers of Kuwait’ and self-identification as ‘native’ to the local level, as the terms were used specifically to reference belonging to Kuwait. These terms have been retained from the past (when the tribes were nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists) until the present day, long after permanent settlement in Kuwait.

Because these terms were transmitted to the participants by their elders after many generations of permanent settlement in Kuwait, we can no longer say such terms refer only to the transnational context in the present day. Rather, these concepts have become part of the contemporary tribal identity within the Bedouin community in Kuwait.

P09: The government knows we are the sons of this land. They know everything. But they didn’t want [us]. So we think the government must [give] back that [country to the] Bedoun now, for [it is] their country, because they need it now. (Participant 09, Interview in Taima, Kuwait, 26 March 2014)

The sense of belonging to the land characteristic of indigenous people, was inherent in the terms Desert Dwellers of Kuwait, or the Sons of the Desert, as one interviewee demonstrated when he referred to his identity status.

6.1.2.3 The northern and southern tribal identity.

The interviewees also described a regional level of identification, associated with belonging to the northern and/or southern tribes. All interviewees who discussed identification at this level, identified with the northern tribes. The importance of distinction between the northern and southern tribal groups lies in the fact that generally speaking (and there are exceptions to this rule), the southern tribal people are commonly known as the Bedu of Kuwait, while the northern people are also Bedu, but have become known as the Bedoun. The Bedoun are also Bedu, but they have been separated from the citizen Bedu over time due to their statelessness leading to ethnic proliferation. Thus, the Bedu of the northern tribal dirah had become known collectively as the Bedoun, which described their contemporary identity. The term Bedoun was first introduced by government for those marked out to be left perpetually stateless (which the community did not realise at the time), and then later banned by government (see Appendix B). However, all Kuwaitis had retained usage of the term Bedoun, reflecting the ongoing function of the term in Kuwaiti society, which points to the northern tribal identity. This is notwithstanding the common use of other
self-ascribed, traditional Bedouin identity terms that had also been retained by the Bedoun interviewees along with their citizen tribal counterparts.

An important factor that warrants special clarification, is that the northern and southern tribes are not necessarily separate tribal units, but in some circumstances, two parts of one tribal unit. They are grouped according to those members of the main tribes of Kuwait whose ancestors are derived from the northern (Middle East region including Jordan and Syria, for example) or southern regions (Arabian Gulf) relative to each tribes’ dirah (their traditional land boundaries). Most, but not all, of the main tribes of Kuwait feature members from both northern and southern ethnic sub-groups; others are known to be wholly northern or southern. This factor is somewhat confused by different authors referring to some tribal groups as specifically ‘southern’ or ‘northern,’ depending upon their viewpoint, while others refer to southern and northern areas within each dirah, just as the Bedoun do (I have already referred readers to the maps of Raswan, 1930, and Appendix B, i).

How has this problem arisen? I would suggest that academics have not yet become accustomed to the local vernacular of what could be called ‘Kuwaiti English.’ The English term 'tribe' is used interchangeably in Kuwait for the term 'tribal,' which is not used as a general descriptor as seen in the academic literature (al Naqeeb, 1990; al Khandari and al Hadben, 2010; al Ansari in al Qatari, February 22, 2010), but as a specific word referring to particular individuals. Thus, a member of the northern or southern tribes is also ‘a tribal,’ while a conservative, usually (but not always) older tribal person is known as ‘a traditional.’ Similarly, one research participant also used more general terms, 'the People of the north,' and 'the People of the south,' while the Hadar were called 'the People of the Sea' (by P05). Thus, when a Kuwaiti stated he or she was from the northern or southern tribes, they meant they are a tribal (person) of the northern or southern regions of their tribe, or they are from a northern or southern tribal unit that does not include dirah that is referred to as having northern and southern divisions. Ultimately, the importance of the distinction is maintained by each individual and their tribal collective, similar to the two different functions of the term ‘Kuwaiti’ used by the Bedoun.

6.1.2.4 The Bedoun identity.

The term Bedoun was used by the research participants to emphasise their primary identity and belonging to the cultural collective of the Bedoun, as part of the Bedouin ethnicity. One does not need to spend long among Kuwaitis including the Hadar, Bedouin citizens and Bedoun, to learn that the term refers to a fairly homogenous grouping Bedouins characterised by social and cultural solidarity, and that the term Bedoun Jinsiya is rarely, if ever, used (I discussed this aspect in Chapter 2). The term Bedoun reflected the research respondent’s situation of being targeted with deprivation of genuine, official identity
documents. The term was rarely used to emphasise the legal status of statelessness, without nationality (*Bedoun Jinsiya*). Many Bedoun do not regard themselves as stateless at all.

The Bedoun identity taken on far more holistic connotations of inclusion rather than exclusion, according to its use by interviewees in this study. For example, research participants who are no longer stateless but who were born and raised as Bedoun, and who subsequently acquired citizenship in Kuwait or another country, still referred to themselves as Bedouns (P03, P05 and P19), and felt they belonged to the group regardless of any new legal status they had required. This factor demonstrated the use of the term Bedoun as a self-ascribed identity, transcending a strictly legal meaning of the term, and a government-imposed identity. Among the interviewees, the identity was used to signify cultural membership, not legal exclusion from the state (although these circumstances certainly applied to them). Additionally, when among Kuwaitis and other Arab nationals, the term Bedoun is used strictly with meaning attached to the local context, and not with reference to other stateless people known as ‘Bedoun’ in other parts of the Middle East. If stateless people are referred to who are not also *Kuwaiti*, then the speaker will clarify this. Thus, among all Arabs in Kuwait, generally speaking, the Bedoun are recognised as *Kuwaiti* Bedoun.

The Bedoun identity has been influenced by the events from which it has arisen: expulsion, ethnic cleansing, ongoing criminalisation and so on. Thus, the Bedoun identity has been impacted by external circumstances to the extent that although it is generally speaking the primary identity, a Bedoun does not necessarily make this identity known to others. Thus, a Bedoun may not say he or she is Bedoun, but may simply emphasise another aspect of their identity in a social situation so as to make the Bedoun identity a secondary identity. This contextual shift is inherent to the nature of multiple identities (Gross, 1978), and although the degree to which the Bedoun manage their identity in response to social stigma (indeed, the tribal stigma) (Goffman, 1963) may be unusual, it is not unique.

Nevertheless, it would not be surprising to find that the self-managed suppression of the Bedoun identity may be more psychologically stressful for some individuals more than others, and this may be impacted by the individuals’ other personal identifications and behaviours (Gross, 1978), such as seclusion (a theme which arose in the findings, especially among young males). This issue is discussed further in Chapter 7, section 7.2, including Table 21). That the *Bedoun* identity was a signifier of cultural belonging rather than legal status, also appeared to be a reflection of the group’s unusual historical context. The identity had been retained by the collective despite the proliferation of alternative names and legal status used to refer to the group (see Chapter 7).

Thus, in summary of the regional identifications (the northern and southern tribes) and the local Bedoun identification, when the Bedoun refer to their membership of the
Bedouin tribes in Kuwait, they usually, also implicitly refer to southern and the northern groups which contain people of different tribes. The logic of this pattern is evident when one views the table of the main tribes of Kuwait and the areas of land across which their traditional tribal *dirah* was located. The individual tribes are sub-ethnic groups at the local, 'native' ethnic group. The Bedoun emerge at the level of a micro-ethnic group, as they comprise minority sub-groups of each, individual tribe. The importance of this distinction relates to the historical development of the Bedoun identity as members of the northern tribes and their persecution on that basis, which is discussed further in Chapter 8. It also reflects the nature of indigenous identity, which is constantly drawn to references to belonging to the land, and the marking out of locations therein.

6.1.2.5 The *Bedoun* (erased) identity.

The *Bedoun* identity was used by individuals who had been listed with a ‘security restriction,’ and/or their identity had been changed to another nationality label in the ‘status adjustment’ program (also discussed further in Chapter 7). Their identity had been erased (Weissbrodt, 2008), or they were undergoing the process of erasure. Such individuals were no longer issued with identity cards and they could not access public services. Usually, the erasure was also implemented across their nuclear family unit as an additional, punitive measure. Such individuals were no longer recognised as ‘Bedoun’ by the state. Locally, this is called the status of being ‘without’ among the ‘withouts’ (Bedoun means ‘without’ in Arabic) status, hence the repetition of the term. In this study, three participants had had their identity erased, while four were undergoing the process due to security restrictions, including community leader Hakeem al Fadhli.

The emergence of the *Bedoun* identity at the local level is an example of the way the Bedoun attempt to retain cultural belonging for the members of their own group, while also signifying the imposed restrictions on their identity status. The creation of the group arising from government actions appeared follow a similar pattern to the creation of the Bedoun ethnic sub-group. The latter identity had developed meanings associated not only with ethnic exclusion, but also the absorption of the national identity and a sense of cultural belonging to the state. That the Bedoun were *Kuwaiti*, was acknowledged in the National Census until 1992. The *Bedoun* group comprised individuals identified as belonging to a particular sub-group and split off from the larger group (the Bedoun collective) via criminalisation and segregation, characterised by the loss of access to recognition as a Bedoun on government records, and/or the menial level of state-provided resources that some Bedoun are allocated. This pattern reflected the previous separation of the Bedoun as a minority group from the Bedouin ethnic group, via the erasure of their ‘Bedouin’ and 'Kuwait' identity (shown in Table 20).
In the case of the Bedoun Bedoun, the group were segregated according to labelling introduced by the Central Apparatus in 2012, which coded the Bedoun population according to colour categories, loosely connected to the previous nationality re-allocation methods of the 'status adjustment' program. After the new population typing measures were introduced in 2012, the Ministry of the Interior applied additional, punitive targets and measures to the so-called 'security restriction.' Administrative erasure measures were henceforth imposed upon freedom of expression for human rights ‘activism’ and ‘protest’ that occurred during the Arab Spring. Affected individuals, and sometimes their whole families, were deemed 'not eligible' for citizenship (see Appendix D, iv, including Table D5). This created a new category of tens of thousands of Bedoun who had their new colour-labelled identity status stripped from them (Nacheva, April 6, 2014), no sooner than the system was publicised. The Bedoun Bedoun category was equivalent to the ‘red’ identity category, and marked out for mass expulsion from the state ('8,000 Bedoons' June 18, 2012 and June 19, 2012).

It is worth remembering that the Bedoun have also been known by many other names that reflect the traditional Bedouin identity (Appendix B, ii) and also by many other names signifying their progressive erasure by the state of Kuwait, particularly after the administrative expulsion of 1986 (The Study,' 2003) (Appendix C, i). Essentially, the Bedoun affected by the program of erasure (‘status adjustment’) used the term Bedoun Bedoun to acknowledge that their Bedoun identity has been confiscated and erased by the state on the Ministry of Interior’s Central Apparatus database (according to the agency itself), and as Bedouins, and as Kuwai, as all Bedoun were once officially recorded. They were listed as a citizen of another country, and referred to the immigration department, and/or are listed as a criminal identified by the Central Apparatus, labelled with the security restriction (a state security ‘offence’) issued by the Ministry of Interior. The ‘security restriction’ and identity change that accompanies the process of become a Bedoun Bedoun also happened to replace the necessity of a judicial or custodial, criminal sentence for the purpose of disqualifying a Bedoun of eligibility for citizenship under the Nationality Law, 1959 (Kuwait). The Bedoun Bedoun/erased identification class represented a major step in the evolution of the 'status adjustment' program of identity erasure, since the new colour-typing identity system was introduced in 2012, further streamlined the erasure, which international humanitarian agencies subsequently all but ignored.

In this discussion of the Bedoun Bedoun identification, I have attempted to show how the Bedoun's ethnic identity was consolidated (Horowitz, 1975) through the absorption and retention of the national identity wherein they became Kuwaiti, then proliferated (Horowitz, 1975) via the delay of citizenship then administrative expulsion from the state, and then further intentionally differentiated by government via new methods of segregation, leading to the emergence of the erased category, the Bedoun Bedoun. The Bedoun’s national
identity had been assimilated upon settlement prior to and up to the 1960s, long before the group was made aware they would be deprived of citizenship (some twenty years later), and so the identity has been retained and transmitted down through new generations.

The decision by government authorities to leave the Bedou without citizenship around 1985-1986, a process some authors have called ‘de-nationalisation’ (Human Rights Watch, 1995) has been presented as the major scandal in the government of Kuwait’s handling of the group. Yet, it just one of many stages of government-imposed social segregation forcing ethnic proliferation and pressuring the groups’ ability to maintain a consolidated collective identity. The program has included nationality re-labelling – erasing the Bedoun’s national and ethnic identity (‘status adjustment’ from 1983), the administrative expulsion (‘The Study,’ 2003) and further restrictions prohibiting citizenship solely on the basis of their ethnicity, introduced in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1992) after violent ethnic cleansing and killing organised by the state (see Appendix F) further mass deportations around 2000 (Human Rights Watch, 2000, 2001) followed by population typing, criminalisation and new procedures of erasure in 2012 (8,000 Bedooon,’ June 18 and June 19, 2012).

Hence, in this study I refer to the broader program of erasure, or administrative ethnic cleansing (Weissbrodt, 2008) associated with ‘status adjustment’ (Kennedy, 2015a), and not merely a single-event ‘denationalisation.’ The notion of de-nationalisation by the state of Kuwait underplays the complexity of the program which has sought to annihilate the numbers and culture of the population. The ethnic identity and nationality identity of the Bedoun in the process of being replaced with an enforced, false identity, that makes individuals (an eventually the whole group) appear to hold citizenship in countries that they do not. There is a tangible link between imposed ‘status adjustment’ and the proliferation of the fraudulent identity document industry in Kuwait, obstensibly managed ‘at a distance’ by the Ministry of Interior, which affects immigration flows throughout the world (WikiLeaks U.S. Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006).

The measures can also be linked to the removal of ethnic identity signified by the targeting of names across every level of the ethnic structure, based on Gross’ model (1987) (in section 6.1.5, including Table 20, below). When these known historical developments are simply collated and compared, the intention of government to remove the whole ethnic group from the National Census, becomes quite clear. The historical continuum of names indicates quite transparently, that the whole sub-ethnic group of the Kuwaiti Bedouin known as the Bedoun, is being made to disappear (Appendices B, ii and C, i). I discuss the program of ‘status adjustment’ further in section 7.4.2.

Overall, the research participants displayed a multiple identity profile linked to many different layers of tribal identity, similar Bedouin citizens in Kuwait (al Rasheed, 2015) and
other nations of the Gulf (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014). Similarities included carefully preserved family lineages to many different tribes, with extended family relations spread across a number of different states of the Middle East, including to the north of the region, and a cultivated national identity based on loyalty to the Emir of Kuwait, citizenship and participation in society. The research showed that such an identity could be interpreted as indicative of a complex, culturally enriched society that is normally regarded as desirable and benefiticient to the modern state (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014).

The persistence of the tribal social bond, asabiya (Gross, 1998, p.111) may help to account for the ability of the Bedoun to adapt and survive their administrative expulsion from the state and attempts to physically eradicate them, because the historical pattern shows they have ethnically differentiated or proliferated (Horowitz, 1975) from their individual tribes through the imposed force of government re-organisation, but then consolidated (Horowitz, 1975) into a sub-ethnic group, the Bedoun. The tribal social bond, featuring strong descent identity and social solidarity (Gross, 1998), remains a vital feature of tribal identity in states that were more oppressive than protective, in states characterised by corruption, and where communities cannot access their share of state resources (p.111). The social solidarity of ethnic collectives is often based on hundreds of years of shared history and culture, which strengthen cultural values and social bonds in ways that transcended the narrow definitions of culture that the modern nation state attempts to impose upon cultural collectives, for purely political purposes (Znaniecki, 1952b).

6.1.3 The Bedoun's perception of the term Bedoun Jinsiya ‘Without Nationality.’

Discovering subjective differences between individual’s perceptions of their identity and ascriptions used by outsiders has been important area of study for humanistic sociologists (Gross, 1978; Halas, 2010; Znaniecki, 1952b). The cultural data provided by the research participants points to differences in the construction of social realities between ‘natives’ and scholars. Exploration of the perspective of those studied helps to correct misconceptions in the existing corpus of knowledge created by scholar-driven descriptions of ethnicity and nationality, and to expand cultural knowledge (Gross, 1978, p.3, 7-6). It is derived through humanistic sociology (Gross, 1978; Znaniecki,1952a) particularly research work utilizing the humanistic coefficient (Halas, 1989, 2007, 2010; Smolicz and Secombe, 1981; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.132). In indigenous anthroplogy, this approach often manifests as the ‘collaborative’ methodology (Lassiter, 2005a, 2005b).

This study helped to clarify the meaning of the Bedoun identity for the interviewees, compared to the meaning advanced by outsider ‘experts.’ From the discussion so far, a much deeper understanding of the Bedoun’s ethnic identity and social integration in Kuwait has arisen from this approach, compared to past investigations. The main difference between the
Bedoun respondent’s definition of their identity in this study, and the frequently referenced definition stated in Human Rights Watch (1995), was that the Bedoun were quite consciously aware they were both integrated into the citizen population through their tribal identity as Bedouins, and had also absorbed the Kuwaiti national identity. One young man in his twenties responded to my question as to how he perceived his identity and culture as a Bedoun person:

P06: I would say that since I was born here lived here as a Kuwaiti but as long as I don’t have papers for it, we can’t get called that.

Actually we don’t call ourselves Bedoun, we call ourselves *Kuwaiti* Bedouns. We are from the north. You know how Bedouins live, they migrate from place to place for water and grass… as Bedouins they don’t have papers. (Participant 6, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

This emphasis on the meaning of the *Bedoun* as ‘without papers’ was repeated by other participants. Hakeem al Fadhli explained his interpretation of the general meaning of the Bedoun identity:

The Bedoun [are] the natives from Kuwait who [are] from the tribes, but they are without the documentation, the legal documentation to be recognised as citizen. So this is the difference between the Bedouin, the word itself is ‘without,’ it means you don’t have the documents.

The Bedoun, most of them belong to the tribes. And then [there] is something very important we have to remember, which is the northern tribes and the southern tribes. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

The distinction between the northern and southern tribes seems to have been not only been crucial in determining whether or not the Bedoun received citizenship, but it was also a key factor in ethnic targeting and ethnic cleansing, which I discuss further in Chapter 8. For the moment, note the similarity between the young man’s explanation above (Participant 6), and the description given by Hakeem al Fadhli, which I recorded one and a half years later. The young man had no familiarity with any Bedoun individuals in the social leadership group, and his cultural identity appeared to be transmitted almost exclusively by his parents and extended family members such as uncles and aunts. Both research participants provided a virtually identical perception of their name, ‘Bedoun.’ The meaning of the Bedoun in this study was therefore, somewhat different to how it has been portrayed in the international media, by scholars and government, but may well be quite consistent within the group itself – focusing on lack of genuine identity documents, but not lack of
identity. The notion of the Bedoun as people without documents will be revisited in Chapter 7, when I analyse Decree 5/1960 (sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2).

The meaning of the term *Bedoun Jinsiya* appears to have been first reported in English, in Human Rights Watch (1991a, 51, n193). The report claimed the term ‘Bedoun’ was derived from the Arabic phrase *Bedoun Jinsiya* to refer to anyone whose qualification for citizenship ‘was in doubt’ (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p.50-51). Later, the group was associated with ‘failure’ to register for citizenship (Human Rights Watch, 1995), then ‘refusal’ to register for citizenship (Shultziner and Tétreault (2012, p.284). As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the concept of Bedoun resistance to citizenship registration has been used as a rationale for the deprivation of citizenship, but this belief simply contradicts the use of an equation to determine the citizenship distribution in Kuwait, whereby half the Bedouin did not receive citizenship (one of the key findings of Human Rights Watch, 1995). This belief appears to have been acceptable to scholars likely because they linked it to the literature of tribalism theory, which has (and still does) characteristically associated the Bedouin people in general, with resistance to state-building and comprising ‘security’ threats to the state (discussed in Chapter 3).

I discovered that the Bedoun had been led to believe that citizenship had already been granted to them (al Moosa, 1976; al Fayez, 1984) due to their participation in the desert settlement program, which stipulated that citizenship would be granted on the basis of their tribal affiliation (Stanton Russell, 1989). It is beyond the scope of the present research to delve into the duplicity that ensued within the Municipality of Kuwait that led to the entrapment and manipulation of the Bedoun within the desert settlements, but it is worth noting that the Municipality was dominated by nationalist interests and was largely independent of government (Mdaires, 2010), and the settlements were carefully monitored and controlled, with regular home and document-checks taking place (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). The Bedouin were under constant surveillance from at least 1965. Thus, there was no flooding of the settlements with unwanted, unwelcome or unqualified Bedouin who were not recruited specifically to settle in the camps. Those who settled there were thoroughly vetted by tribal sheikhs and government authorities prior to entry, and they were accepted as selected citizens, on the basis that citizenship would be granted to them, prior to them being subject to constant, ongoing surveillance.

For those Bedouin in the camps who became the Bedoun, the identity meant ‘without papers,’ not ‘without nationality’ because the purpose of their submission to permanent settlement and camp life, was to receive those papers, which would confirm that the promise of citizenship of Kuwait had been delivered. Some of the Bedoun interviewees were still waiting for their citizenship to be granted to them (P04, P07, P08, P13). A female research participant explained that most Kuwaitis are aware of the Bedoun’s heritage in
Kuwait as among the first settlers (al Nakib, 2014, supported this view in one of her publications):

P08: People at here… they have family from same background. So they know the story, they know I have rights here. And they know I am Kuwaiti from where people have [come] from, where first. (Participant 8, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 8 April, 2014)

The context in which the term ‘Bedoun’ was used substantiated the Bedoun’s claim that they government was aware that the tribal groups had no other nationality prior to their permanent settlement in Kuwait (Al Fayez, 1984, p.257-8), while many had submitted their personal identity documents demonstrating they had already qualified for the citizenship grant under the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) of Kuwait (Appendix B, vii). The respondents' perception of their identity was aligned with previous field research conducted by Kuwaiti researchers (al Fayez, 1984, p.257-258; al Moosa, 1976) that indicated not only absorption of the nationality ideology, but also the possibility that citizenship had actually been granted to the group. This provides new insight into the contemporary history of the Bedouin in Kuwait, their social solidarity and conviction that they are living in their homeland. The notion that the Bedoun ‘failed’ to register or ‘refused’ to register for citizenship in large numbers should be disregarded due to lack of supporting of evidence beyond anecdotal comments and the presence of contradictory evidence (the use of a formula to distribute citizenship to only half the Kuwaiti Bedouin in the 1960s).

6.2 The Role of Theorisation of the Bedoun as an Ethnic Group

The discussion of the ethnic structure above, provides a stronger theoretical basis for understanding the Bedouin of Kuwait compared to the current status of knowledge, which positions the Bedouin adjacent the Hadar as two social groups within one nationality group, and not as an ethnic group (al Nakib, F., 2014; Alhajeri, 2015; Beaugrand, 2014a; Longva, 2006, p.175, 179), or as the whole nationality group of Bedouin and Hadar as one ethnic minority (Longva, 2006, p.181). The modelling of the ethnic structure (Gross, 1978) introduced a simple theoretical schema that can be used to explain the different degrees of the Bedouin’s ethnic exclusion leading to social isolation and identity crisis (al Waqayan, 2008). It focuses attention on who the Bedoun are, rather than who they are not (which was the focus of many previous definitions of the Bedoun, as I discussed in Chapter 2).

While at the academic level, the categorisation of the Bedouin and Hadar as different ‘social groups’ may be simply theoretical to academics, these unchallenged positions which have become regarded as authoritative knowledge, have had very real and practical consequences upon the Bedouin. On the one hand, this framing of the Bedouin in Kuwait has enabled scholars to distance the Bedouin from historical origins as Bedouin, it has also
enabled the state to continue ethnically targeting the Bedoun. This approach adopted in Western texts (see Chapter 2) has under- emphasised extent to which social conflict in Kuwaiti society, where the Hadar elite (al Anezi, 1989, p.272) have rejected all Kuwaiti Bedouin of both northern and southern tribal origins, incuding Bedouin citizens as well as the Bedoun, regarding them as non-members of their own state.

6.2.1 The impact the research findings on previous understandings of the Hadar and Bedouin as merely 'social groups,'

The theorisation of the Bedouin ethnic structure I have presented above, concurred with previous findings on the main tribes of Kuwait (Al Anezi, 1989, p.263; Alhajeri, 2004; Alshayjeji, 1988; see Appendix B, i). Most, but not all of the participants consented to having their individual tribes disclosed (Chapter 5, Table 10). This information confirmed the findings of Human Rights Watch (1995) that the Bedoun are drawn from a range of different tribes of Kuwait, connected by family relations. In Chapter 2 (section 2.5), I discussed the dual approaches to establishing grounds for breaches to the right of self-determination in international human rights law, minority rights and indigenous rights, both of which focus on discrimination as the limiting factors to participation in society. International law recognising indigenous tribal people attributes additional weight to historical processes of domination by colonisers (Anaya, 2004, 2009). Both approaches may be applied to the Bedouin, due to the domination of urban settlers, the Hadar, and the period of British control (under which Decree 5/1960 was adopted), while the Bedou were coerced to settle permanently in Kuwait under the promise of citizenship. I argued that while the Bedou could be viewed as an ethnic minority in Kuwait today, and that their discrimination as a 'social group' has been the predominant approach by international humanitarian agencies in their reports to the United Nations to date. Yet the historical development of the Bedouin's statelessness and deprivations of their human rights occurred because they were tribal people indigenous to the region, and were coerced to settle in desert camps in Kuwait with the corresponding promise of citizenship, for that reason.

Not only is this area of international law yet to be explored by the Bedou, scholars in the social sciences have avoided discussion of attempts to annihilate the Bedou to date, that have been have been overwhelmingly ethnic in orientation (I present additional data to support this argument in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8). For both of these reasons, I argue that the theorisation of the Bedouin as an ethnic group is not only essential for understanding of the group's perception by government (on the basis that the Bedou are targeted as part of the Bedouin ethnic group), it forms an essential approach for the group to be recognized as a persecuted ethnic minority in international law. In order for this to happen, in turn, the Kuwaiti Bedouin have to be accepted as an ethnic group. In the social sciences concerning Kuwait, they are not yet explicitly conceived of as such due to the limited state of theoretical
development. In order to establish this view, one must challenge Longva’s (1997) analysis of the Bedouin as a ‘social group’, which has become the standard academic frame of reference to the Bedouin in Kuwaiti society (see for example, Alshawi and Gardner, 2014). Therefore, in this section I will attempt to present a counter-argument to the current state of knowledge.

Longva (2006) claimed Kuwait was ‘ruled by an ethnic minority’ (p.179). Her theory that the ruling regime practiced ‘ethnocracy’ (ethnocratic rule) positioned the country ruled by a single ethnic minority group (p.181), but oddly failed to point out the name of this group (p.181, referencing p.187, n29 – Longva, 2005). Longva (2006) used clever wording to imply the Bedouin and Hadar might comprise different ethnic groups (p.175. 179), but did not commit herself to a transparent analysis by providing the name of the theorist from whose specific model she was applying and then adapting it to produce new insights.

Her own model (Longva, 2005) was an ‘ethnocracy’ that theorised the ‘Kuwaiti’ (citizens) against expatriates (the foreign workforce derived from multiple nationalities and ethnic groups) - as she had always done (Longva, 1997). The researcher seemed to believe the ‘Kuwaiti’ ethnic minority (one ethnic group) comprised the two social groups (Bedouin and Hadar). Thus, any clarification the two social groups were actually two ethnic groups (in conflict) undermined her theory of the ethnocracy as a single ruling ethnic group.

Her basic conceptual error was to claim the ‘Kuwaiti’ (national, citizen-only) model was based on an analysis of ethnic groups (‘ethnocracy’). This enabled her to avoid leading other researchers to rather significant insights about the Bedouin identity, such as theorising the Bedouin’s role in Kuwaiti society as part of the Bedouin ethnic group, and discussing the national identity of the Bedouin (which is the Kuwaiti national identity, as this study has shown), which would have challenged her ‘ethnocracy’ model both ways (there is no single ethnic group but two groups, and the ‘Kuwaitii’ is not a citizen-only identity in Kuwait). After all, Longva (2005, 2006) used the model to promote the concept of a unified, citizen-only, mono-ethnic Kuwaiti national identity. Indeed, she omitted the Bedouin from this extended discussion on the Bedouin (Longva, 2006), while promoting the new model.

Longva’s (2005, 2006) ‘ethnocracy’ was in fact, a nationalist model. In it, she referred only to groups defined by nationality and/or legal citizenship (bizarrely, this is very obvious from the titles of both the articles but I will try not to labour the point). She also avoided breaking down the foundation concept of the widely discussed Kuwaiti welfare state model - the historical Kuwaiti social contract comprising the dominant Hadar elites’ bargain with the Bedouin ruler, which ensured the continuation of Hadar power over the Bedouin (Crystal, 1992, 1995). The welfare state model was able to account for these local nuances (apparent contradictions) in Kuwaiti society by focusing discussion on state resources, corporate interests and materialist human motives. Longva’s (1997, 2005, 2006) theory
could not, because she was invested in presenting the Hadar and Bedouin as one unit. In other words, the theory always came before the data. Therefore, she did not need to tell her audience who she thought the ruling ethnic minority really was – the Bedouin (the ruler) or the Hadar (the ‘elite’). Instead, she repeatedly maintained they were one in the same, ‘Kuwaitis are a privileged minority’ (p.180).

Longva’s (2005, 2006) approach overlooked the gravity of ethnic conflict in Kuwait, manifesting as the ascendancy of Hadar mono-ethnic nationalism, the atrocities committed against the Bedouin due to their ethnic identity (expulsion and cleansing on ethnic grounds), and the consistency of Hadar intellectual thought that had supported Bedouin oppression due to ethnic difference and tribal characteristics. The notion of ‘ethnocracy’ was flawed to begin with as it was a nationalist model, as I have outlined. But additionally, the so-called single ruling ethnic group, ‘Kuwaitis,’ (a national grouping) and the two social groups, Bedouin and Hadar (the Bedouin an ethnic grouping, the Hadar type is perhaps more debatable) were never systematically tested against a theoretical model.

It is worth noting that many Kuwaiti authors have diverged significantly from Longva’s (1997) analysis. Kuwaiti authors consistently expressed a clear conviction the Hadar and Bedouin identity and culture were not remotely alike or compatible (for example, al Anezi, 1989; al Khatib, 1978; al Nafisi, 1978; al Najjar, 1983; al Naqeeb, 1990; Alessa, 1981; Khalaf and Hammoud, 1987; Ghabra, 1997a; al Khandari and al Hadben, 2010). The view that the Bedouin and Hadar were inherently different and unreconcilable ethnic groups was highlighted in local versions of tribalism theory, wherein Hadar scholars (of Kuwaiti and other Arab nationalities) sought to sharply differentiate their own culture from Bedouin culture. This approach was exemplified in a classic study by Khalaf and Hammoud (1987), The Emergence of the Oil Welfare State: The Case of Kuwait.

The notion of the Bedouin as a ‘social group’ was then adopted by al Nakib (2014, p.5, as ‘socially distinct’ groups) and Beaugrand (2014b). In the latter case, the concepts were already in use at the U.K. Home Office for Bedouin refugee claims. It enabled Beaugrand (2014b) to attempt to alter U.K. Foreign Office policy on the Bedouin, by attempting to remove reference to the definition of the Bedouin identity as an ethnic group (of Bedouins) from the very first point of the Kuwait country advice, to ‘stateless Arabs’ (Beaugrand, 2014b; U. K. Home Office, 2014, p.36) leaving them defined as a social group in the text. This was allowed despite that U. K. immigration case law established Bedouin identity on the basis of their having fled Kuwait to escape discrimination and persecution on grounds of their ethnic and tribal identity (Kennedy, 2015b). Ethnic persecution is a stronger claim than discrimination as a member of a social group. This strategy, if successful, would have limited the Bedouin’s ability to assert their claims in international law by shifting their recognition as an indigenous tribal group with a distinct ethnic identity, to a group of
unknown ‘other’ people – mirroring Kuwait government policy. Beaugrand’s (2014b) refutation of the definition of the Bedoun’s identity based on their ethnicity was later rejected and withdrawn, leading to a second version of the U.K. Home Office Kuwait (2016, July) published as Country Information and Guidance Kuwaiti Bidoon Version 2.0.

The ideas should not be regarded as plausible arguments for refuting Bedouin or Bedoun identity claims. Lack of theorisation or fieldwork conducted by scholars relating to the ethnic identity and persecution of the Bedoun, should not be used to support claims of the absence of ethnic identity and persecution. This applies to the so-called ‘documented’ Bedoun in particular. This strategy has been adopted by the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office in Kuwait, and the U.K. Home Office in London (F.C.O. Kuwait, 2007 in U.K. Home Office, 2009; U.K. Home Office, 2014), and other developed nations may have followed suit, in order to reduce the success Bedoun refugee claims. Instead, the approaches of analysing the Bedouin and Hadar as merely ‘social groups’ should be interpreted as indicative of lack of rigorous analysis of the ethnic tensions in Kuwaiti society, due to the politicisation of research efforts. Furthermore, I provide new evidence of the ethnic targeting and persecution of the Bedoun including the so-called documented Bedoun, in Appendix D, iv.

6.2.2 An example of ethnic targeting modelled with Gross’s ethnic theory.

As I have discussed in the previous section, the reluctance of scholars to theorise the ethnicity of the Bedouin as distinct from the Hadar in Kuwaiti society has meant that the extent of ethnic targeting of the Bedoun in Kuwait has remained largely unknown outside Kuwait. The following example demonstrates the value of using ethnic theory in illustrating the extraordinary extent to which the ethnic structure of the Bedoun has been systematically targeted by the state. In doing so, it also reveals the weakness of the persistent ‘social group’ model for theorising the historical and ongoing Bedouin and Hadar conflict in Kuwaiti society. The discussion so far, has revealed the system of social organisation of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society, which reflects the structure of national and ethnic identity drawing on Feliks Gross’s (1978) ethnic theory derived from humanistic sociology. Plotting the structure of the ethnic and the national identity expressed by the Bedoun interviewees according to this theory of (Gross, 1978), illustrated the point that the Bedoun were not a disconnected, isolated group of strangers, or ‘other nationals,’ but an ethnic group that had been socially integrated in Kuwaiti society until 1986, whereupon the group began to dynamically re-organise into a new ethnic group while retaining some degree of integration with the Bedouin citizen community.

After analysing the results in Figure 1, I observed that the historical removal of traditional names of the Bedoun had obscured the identity of the multi-tribal ethnic group to outsiders, as if the rationale to remove names had been carefully designed. For this reason, I
conducted further documentary research and analysis on the names used for the Bedoun in the literature, which featured the traditional names (Appendix B, ii) and contemporary, collective terms used by government to replace identity (Appendix C, i). The analysis demonstrated both a proliferation of names and a stage-oriented development of terminology, pointing to administrative erasure, also known as administrative ethnic cleansing (Dedic, 2003; Jalusic and Dedic, 2008; Weissbrodt, 2008). The structure provided an elaboration on the historical development of the names used to describe the Bedoun as increasingly conceptually, symbolically and legally separated from the group’s traditional cultural identity. I selected just one example from that analysis concerning the removal of names, to illustrate the systematic and all-encompassing nature of the approach.

In Table 20 (below), I have outlined government measures which have attempted to erase the Bedoun’s Bedouin ethnic identity through administrative procedures. Ethnic targeting developed historically, in a certain chronological order (refer to the left-hand column, showing the years that policies were introduced). The targeting conformed to a highly structured conceptual, sequential framework (refer to the central column, which shows a broad and general whole-group approach, and the right-hand column, showing the level of the ethnic structure targeted). The data shows that targeting of the whole group spanned all levels in the ethnic structure. The program was revived after the Arab Spring in 2012, with a new strategy that focused on individuals, removing their tribal names and family names. In 2014, Farah al Nakib asked, ‘What hindered the outcome… whereby the badu [the Bedouin] would be assimilated and the term no longer used to designate a distinct social group?’ (al Nakib, F., 2014, p.6-7; italics added).

The example illustrates what this sentiment looks like when it is implemented by the state. Ethnic targeting involved every level of the theoretical ethnic structure. It is difficult to imagine that the comprehensive method of ethnic targeting revealed in Table 20, was devised by bureaucrats. A more likely explanation is that the schema was planned systematically by intellectuals trained in the social sciences. The policy seems to have been designed to exclude the Bedoun from society by removing their collective, tribal and family names. The restrictions conformed to a predictable, pre-determined structure reflecting a framework of ethnic theory. The example suggests that the imposed, restrictive cultural reorganisation (M. Secombe, personal communications, January 22, 2016) of the Bedoun from at least 1983, did not merely come about due to the expansion of a government bureaucracy. The system appears to have been programmed by intellectuals familiar with ethnic theory in the social sciences. Multiple, theoretical levels of identity were perceived, including the social and/or cultural levels and the political-juridical and national levels (Gross, 1978).
Table 20

*Government Measures Removing the Bedouin Ethnic Identity from the Bedoun (1983-2012)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Term or type of term removed</th>
<th>Level in the ethnic structure targeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>'Bedoun'</td>
<td>The micro-ethnic level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>'Kuwaiti Bedouin'</td>
<td>The ethic level (Bedouin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Badiat al Kuwayt/Desert dwellers of Kuwait</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Removal of the term from official documents held by the Kuwaiti Bedouin in Emiri Decree 41/1987 (Group 29, 2012, p.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>'Kuwaiti'</td>
<td>The national level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Removal of whole Bedoun population in the National Census from the ‘Kuwaiti’ nationality group (backdated to 1985). Reallocation to ‘other Arab nationals’ of unspecified nationality (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, n32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Tribal names</td>
<td>The sub-ethnic level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Removal of tribal names required for citizenship and voter registration ‘CSRSIR to remove tribe, family names from Bedoun records,’ <em>Arab Times</em>, 7 April, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Family names</td>
<td>The individual level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Removal of family names, on basis that Bedoun attempted to obtain citizenship by changing their family names ‘CSRSIR to remove tribe, family names from Bedoun records,’ <em>Arab Times</em>, 7 April, 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The example illustrated that a systematic policy and program at the official level targeted all levels of the Bedouin identity and culture from the Bedoun, via the eradication of references to the Bedoun as *Bedoun, Bedouin and Kuwaiti*. The example supports the findings of BA and Others, UKIAT [2004] 00256 CG (in U.K. Home Office, 2014, p.7-8), which asserted that the ethnic and tribal identity of the Bedouin has been targeted and persecuted by the state of Kuwait. Moreover, the example underscored the persecution of
both so-called ‘documented’ and ‘undocumented’ Bedoun (a distinction used by the U.K. Home Office, 2009, 2014, 2016 pertaining to Bedoun refugee claims). Yet this was not the only example of highly organised, systemic ethnic targeting of the Bedoun by the state. Other examples can be found in the Appendices, such as the historical development of a system of committees used to study (conduct surveillance and exert control over) the Bedouin desert community, later narrowed to focus on the Bedoun exclusively (Appendix D, ii), other aspects of the historical development of labelling the Bedoun (Appendices B, ii and C, i), and a range of methods used by government to ascribe ‘other nationality’ to further conceal their identity, which it calls ‘status adjustment’ (Appendix E, v, vi).

**Conclusion**

In this Chapter, I have discussed the Bedoun’s ethnic identity and the group’s responses to social change. I argued that new knowledge about the ethnic structure (Gross, 1978) of the Bedoun within Bedouin society, and the Bedoun identity in relation to the state, could improve understanding of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society. The interview data indicated that the Bedoun retained deep cultural ties to their traditional heritage, which was manifested in a variety of self-ascribed identity terms. However, the Bedoun identity was also subject to dynamic cultural change, as in some cases, membership transcended legal identity and had expanded into the citizen population. Generally speaking, the Bedoun interivewees experienced a strong, multi-layered ethnic identity and sense of tribal belonging (*asabiya*, in Gross, 1998, p.111) as well as a unique form of national identity. Many interviewees were raised as Kuwaiti citizens as children, and received transmission of their national identity from immediate and extended family members.

Thus, statelessness was only one aspect of the Bedoun’s identity, and it was not usually the primary identity. Previous scholar’s lack of engagement with ethnic theory helped to explain why the Bedoun’s oppression has remained largely unknown outside Kuwait. The Ministry of Interior’s Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program imposed a further level of ethnic differentiation over the Bedoun, in the form of false nationality labelling. The ‘adjustment’ process changed the ethnic and national identity on official documents naming the concerned individuals, and their families, targeting terms of identity in particular. The state labelled the effected people with other nationalities and erased their identity as Bedouns, Bedouins and Kuwaitis, as well as tribal and family names, on official government documents. Thus, the theoretical modelling of the ethnic structure (Gross, 1978) revealed that the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun was more extensive and deliberately planned, than had been expected.

This analysis supported previous findings that the group are persecuted on grounds of their ethnic and tribal identity (BA and Others, UKIAT [2004] 00256 CG in U.K. Home Office, 2014, p.7-8), including both ‘documented’ and ‘undocumented’ Bedoun (F.C.O.
Chapter 7
Discussion of
Social Exclusion and Ethnic Targeting of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti Society

And yianni, Arabic man, not stupid, no, no, not stupid, but he is light, yianni.
No more think, not more idea, no, no, no for the future. My life, this is my
country, this is my camel, never mind, open. I don’t want hospital, I don’t want
schools… After petrol, no, no, no… and begin problems. Until this time, I am
without. [Bedoun]. (Participant 12, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 1 April,
2014)

Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the some of the processes of social exclusion and
ethnic targeting of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society. I explore the cultural patterning of
exclusion and persecution that arises is the Bedoun’s social interactions, and the role of
ideology in the social conflict. Two major themes of analysis arising from the interview data
are outlined, the targeting of the Bedouin due to their origins as desert dwellers, and the
ethnic targeting of the Bedouin of the northern tribes. The focus on the Bedoun's origins as
desert dwellers involves a discussion of the process by which attempts were made to exclude
the Bedouin from citizenship from 1961, through the operation of Nationality Committees,
which distributed citizenship. Specific procedures gave extraordinary powers to a very small
number of individuals to choose or to reject citizens.

Consideration of Decree 5/1960 suggests that it is almost certain that members of the
Hadar community, who received first-degree citizenship in the 1960s, did not have sufficient
documents to prove their identity for the purpose of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait)
while equally, Bedouin who did have appropriate documentation according to the
Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait), could be rejected by the same Committees on purely
discriminatory grounds.

The targeting of Bedoun due to their origins in the northern tribes is also discussed.
This theme was influenced by the ideological expansion of tribalism theory during the
invasion of Iraq and beyond, which impacted scholarly interpretations of the Bedou during
the 1990s. These themes have been absorbed by the general population and are still
experienced by the Bedouin today, via ethnic targeting in social interactions and through the
‘status adjustment’ program. This finding was supported by interview data as well as the
analysis of scholarly and public discourse. I discuss the distinction between the northern and
southern tribes, and key elements involved in the nature of ethnic targeting of the Bedouin
community as a whole, which although it sets out to divide the tribes’ solidarity, ultimately
defeats its own purpose and potentially, encourages greater social solidarity between both the stateless and citizen Bedouin Kuwait.

7.1 Ethnic and Non-ethnic Identities in Kuwaiti Society

My starting point was to model the ethnic and non-ethnic identities among the Bedouin and Hadar in Kuwaiti society derived from my analysis of the interview findings, on Gross’ (1978) models of ethnic identification. I devised a basic model incorporating the vertical model (political-juridical identification) (Gross, 1978, p.51, Figure 3) and the horizontal (parallel) identity model, (p.57, Figure 4). The model is shown in Figure 2, below. The Figure shows two basic types of identity derived from Gross (1978), the political-ideological and cultural-ethnic identities (p.50). It accounts for non-ethnic identities, including religious identities, as part of ideological, non-ethnic identities (Gross, 1978, p.63).

The model featured the main ethnic identities of Kuwaitis, comprising the Hadar, the Bedouin, and the Bedoun as a micro-ethnic group of the Bedouin. It included a capstone level of identity at the top of the structure, representing the collective or supra-ethnic identity. The religious identity was characterised by either Sunni or Shia muslims, who made up the vast majority of society (although there are some exceptions to this rule, such as Christians and Jews, who are permitted to practice their religion in Kuwait).

As a conceptual framework of Kuwaiti society, Figure 2 (below) also illustrated the Bedouin sub-groups of the northern and southern tribal identity (consisting of many individual tribes and larger groups of tribes, called tribal confederations), and the Bedoun, mostly comprising people of the northern Bedouin tribes. This is a simple model and it does not attempt to describe the complexity of inter-relations between the groups, which are considerable. Its purpose is to provide a basic sketch of the structure of Kuwaiti society and to illustrate the relative political, ethnic and social identities of the Bedoun in comparison with other groups, in order to enhance understanding of the following discussion.

7.2 The Cultural Patterning of Social Interactions

The process of social interactions was described in participant experiences in the interview data. The veracity of these experiences was supported with data from the analysis of both academic and public discourse in Kuwait. These cultural patterns of social interactions indicated two major themes, which form the major sections of this chapter (sections 7.3 and 7.4). These are the themes of ethnic targeting of the ‘desert dweller’ (badiat al Kuwayt) and the ethnic targeting of the ‘northern tribes’ Bedouin.

The accounts of two research participants were especially efficacious in highlighting two important cultural patterns associated with these interactional processes. Both processes were concerned with the discovery of the Bedoun’s ‘origins.’ One interviewee (P12) was a
traditional man who remained strongly connected to his family’s nomadic heritage, although he lived and worked in the metropolitan area. He discussed his interaction with citizen Bedouin whose families had more recently arrived in Kuwait. The newcomers directed questions to him to subtly inquire as to his origins in the desert, and then as to whether he was from the northern or southern tribes, prior to asking him directly if he was ‘Iraqi.’

The second interviewee (P05) was a younger man who had comparatively more frequent interactions in Hadar society. He emphasised the detail with which the Bedoun are scrutinized as members of the northern tribes, including the influence of accent and dialect (comprising the local vernacular) as social markers. He also described the transference of notions of criminality projected onto the Bedoun from the Iraq war period (the Iraqi ‘traitor’) to the Arab Spring period (as the destabilizing, criminalised, human rights ‘activist’ or ‘protestor’). Similar accounts were provided by the other interviewees, such as P13 and P17.

Figure 2 The structure of Kuwaiti Bedouin and Hadar ethnic groups based on the theory of multiple, ethnic identification Felix Gross (1978)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-ethnic Identification</th>
<th>Ethnic identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-ethnic Identification</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ethnic identification</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political-juridical identity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Religious identity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-degree nationality</td>
<td>Sunni/Shia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-degree nationality</td>
<td>Sunni/Shia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-degree nationality</td>
<td>Mostly Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless</td>
<td>Sunni or Shia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The social interactions outlined by the interviewees outlined a certain order of cultural patterning (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.271), which focused on the tribal identity of the Bedouin. The descriptions also highlighted an impulse among others in Kuwaiti society to discover the tribal identity of the Bedouin. Such people were quite motivated to distinguish the Bedouin from citizen Bedouin. According to the accounts, the basic cultural patterning of Bedouin social interactions with other groups may be characterised in four, sequential steps:

1. Identification by others as a Kuwaiti
2. Identification by others as a Bedouin
3. Identification by others as a Bedouin of the northern tribes
4. Identification by others and as a stateless Bedouin - a Bedoun

The pattern emphasised that the tribal identity of the Bedouin remained a major value influencing the attitude of the citizen population, both Bedouin and Hadar, toward the Bedouin. It pointed to the imposition of a social order upon the Bedouin, not unlike the restrictive re-organisation of the Bedouin at the bureaucratic level. Certain patterns of citizen inquiry seemed to play a significant role in determining the outcome of social interactions. That is, the procedure or order of inquiry appeared to be important in helping the other party to establish whether or not they could or would continue to interact further, or to exclude the Bedouin, and to what extent.

The term ‘desert dweller’ (badiat al Kuwayt) was derived from the traditional name for the Bedouin of Kuwait (Group 29, 2012, p.6). The ‘northern tribes’ was subject to the ideology of the foreign ‘other,’ a theme symbolising transgression of the Hadar in-group boundaries, whereupon the question of ‘origins’ comes into play in a more specific way. Thus, ethnic targeting tended to result in discrimination or more serious forms of persecution such as direct confrontation (noting here that I have limited the discussion to interpersonal social interactions, and not institutionalised levels of discrimination, although these may be inferred from the findings: Znaniecki, 1954). These themes and key concepts that were related to the themes analysed in the interview data, are shown below, in Table 21.

The themes listed showed that the Bedouin and Bedouin were subject to ethnic targeting or discrimination, on at least two bases. First, targeting was motivated by ideas related to the Bedouin being indigenous Bedouin, whose ancestors lived in the desert of Kuwait’s territory and traversed tribal dirah to the north and south of Kuwait. Second, ethnic targeting was motivated to isolate members of the northern tribes specifically, as so-called ‘nationals’ of a range of other nations, as inferior, uncivilised, undeserving of citizenship due to perceptions about their tribal culture, and so on. But this was not merely a perception held by interviewees. There were strong links in the literature and public discourse confirming the targeting of both the desert dweller, and the northern tribes (see my thematic analysis in Appendix C, vi-viii). The concept of ethnic targeting or discrimination
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The ‘desert dweller’</th>
<th>The foreign ‘other’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bedouin</td>
<td>Bedouin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Bedoun in particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern and Southern tribes residing outside <em>al Sour</em> (the city wall)</td>
<td>Northern tribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert dwelling culture</td>
<td>The ‘foreign’ other, the ‘other national’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native to the territory of Kuwait – those beyond the city wall</td>
<td>Fixation on transnationalism of tribes, questionable ‘origins’ transposed to ‘illegitimacy’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal culture, danger, threat</td>
<td>Iraqi – Iraq war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert-dwellers, Nomadic</td>
<td>Desert, steppe, river or marsh, nomadic, semi-nomadic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Conceptual correspondences between the two categories of themes are grouped into sections separated by the broken, horizontal lines.

The ‘desert dweller’ may tend more toward the southern tribes, due to the location of the southern tribal *dirah* over the desert of the *Najd* (Saudi Arabian), but this may be more of a conceptual distinction than a practical reality. Explicit reference to the northern tribes *per se*, is uncommon in the literature (in English) about Kuwaiti society, but reference to the Iraqi origins of the Bedoun, or to states from which the tribal *dirah* of the northern tribes are associated with (such as Jordan and Syria), is quite common, pointing to the contemporary construction of this aspect of identity related to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.

### 7.3 Ethnic Targeting of the Bedouin and the Origins of the Desert Dweller

The origin of the Bedouin as a desert dweller related to long-term historical presence of the Bedouin in Kuwait. The traditional name for the Bedouin (*Bedu*) was associated with negative, Orientalist motifs in the academic literature. The Bedouin were described by scholars as an inferior, dangerous and menacing tribal society (Bocco, 2006) (see Table 21, above). The concepts appeared to have been differentiated in contemporary academic writing, whereby the southern tribes were associated more positively and related to Hadar.
culture (in relation to the Ajman tribe being granted first-degree citizenship), while the northern tribes were demonised due to their proximity to Iraq. As I have mentioned, all of the Bedouin tribes of Kuwait had traditional *dirah* extending across multiple nations. The theme of targeting the Bedouin on the basis of their inhabiting the desert territory of Kuwait revealed more of a focus on the ‘evils’ of a foreign *culture* (perhaps because the target was merely outside the city wall), whereas the targeting of the northern tribes concerned the ‘evils’ of a foreign *nationality* (the former also elaborated ‘nationality,’ to a lesser extent).

The vigorous development of tribalism theory in Kuwait appears to have played a significant role in convincing others (intellectuals, and political and elite social circles), that the Bedouin were unfit for Kuwaiti citizenship and participation in society, in addition to any implicit level of social conflict or innate cultural incompatibility (as al Anezi, 1989, p.174-175, argued). My analysis of academic sources (Appendix C, vi-viii) indicated that tribalism theory was deployed in a relentless focus on Bedouin heritage by Hadar scholars in Kuwait. It provided ideological symbolism for the creation of cultural narratives over a number of decades that focused on the ‘other’ Bedouin while unselfconsciously omitting thoughtful analysis of Hadar society. Interviewees described stigmas projected onto them by others in Kuwaiti society that were the identical or very similar to at those cultural motifs that originated in tribalism theory promulgated by intellectuals at the local (Kuwaiti) and regional (Middle East) levels.

The cause of the feelings of ‘threat’ of the desert dweller may well have been connected to the concern among the Hadar ‘original’ citizens (the ‘elite’) over their own inability to prove their origins. The matter appears to have been concealed under distracting nationalist dialogues produced by Kuwaiti intellectuals which stigmatised the desert-dweller. In a nutshell, it appears that tribalism theory was expanded via the elaboration of anti-Bedouin sentiment in academic discourse for the purpose of distracting those desert dwellers and others, from discovering that the Hadar were no more deserving of ‘original’ citizenship than they were according to the *Nationality law* (1959). If the Hadar’s inability to prove their long-term residence in Kuwait had become widely known, the Bedouin might never have widely accepted the political justification for delaying, let alone excluding, half the Bedouin’s citizenship claims from the 1960s (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

The notion of the Bedouin as desert-dwellers, uncivilised natives, tribally dangerous and therefore a threat to national security, was part of a regional approach to the Bedouin throughout the Middle East from the 1950s (Aurenche, 1993; Bocco, 2006; Lancaster and Lancaster, 1998). These stereotypes informed and reinforced the outcomes of national settlement and economic development programs for the Bedouin (Fabietti, 2006). Research associated with policy that aimed to force or coerce the permanent settlement of the Bedouin
tribes in Middle East states, ‘officially’ perceived sedentarisation as enhancing the national security and economic prosperity of those states (Bocco, 2006, p.303-307).

Accordingly, it was the duty of sovereign states ‘to make the nomads evolve’ (Berque, 1959, p.515, 518 in Bocco, 2006, p.307), with citizenship distributed to Bedouin through the Middle East states as the major incentive for permanent settlement. But these development theories were expanded even further in Kuwait, to the extent that they were used to entrap the Bedoun (as I discussed in Chapter 2), but also to deprive them of citizenship. Therefore, the ‘Bedoun problem’ may also be seen as arising from the regional Bedouin ‘nomad problem’ (Bocco, 2006, p.302; Marx, 2006, p.88). Although the policies toward the Bedouin did not change remarkably during the Mandate period, a new ideology of Bedouin sedentarisation was introduced from the 1950s, which legitimised state policies as metropolitan Hadar researchers were given the task of studying and inventing planning regimes to settle the Bedouin. Bocco (2006) pointed out: ‘The divide opposing Western experts to Bedouin populations is mirrored in the gulf separating the Arab intelligentsia from the rural people in their own countries’ (p.303). Intellectuals and government regimes shared a common perception of the Bedouin: ‘Most international experts and Arab regimes stigmatised nomadism as a backward social condition and condemned tribalism as a hindrance to the ideal of a united nation’ (Bocco and Jaubert, 1994, p.17).

The re-organisation of social or cultural groups, including the exclusion of some groups and the criminalisation of the Bedoun’s identity, reflected the narrowing of conservative values among the dominant group (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.354-359), the Kuwaiti Hadar. Many authors have pointed briefly to the critical event of the Bedoun administrative expulsion in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003) as a pivotal dividing line in government policy between the Bedoun from the citizen society. However, al Anezi (1989) indicated that deep cultural patterns between the Bedouin and Hadar existed at the time of the implementation of the Nationality Law 1959 via the Nationality Committees, from 1960.

Alhajeri (2004, p.16) showed that these patterns had continued to exist in Kuwaiti society thereafter, spoiling the perception of the Bedouin cultural identity (as in the tribal stigma, in Goffman,1963). These patterns influenced ordinary Hadar citizens to assume or accept that the whole group was unfit and unworthy for participating in the modern state as ‘true’ or ‘real’ Kuwaiti citizens. The cultural patterns were reinforced by Hadar politicians and intellectuals united in anti-Bedouin nationalism (Stanton Russell, 1989, p.37, n13), deploying the same anti-Bedouin ideological themes over decades (Alhajeri, 2004, p.16). Both al Anezi (1989, p.174, p.272) and Alhajeri (2004, p.16) emphasised the social and cultural factors contributing to the Bedoun’s situation alongside the role of government. The convergence of these factors points to a conscious, organised effort among those who
recognised anti-Bedouin ideology in academic modes of thought, to see it implemented strictly as national policy in Kuwait.

In Chapter 2, I pointed out the development of nationalist thought in Kuwait from the 1960s via Kuwaiti Hadar nationalists and Arab nationalist thinkers who lobbied individually or together, even crossing party lines or forming new parties (al Mdaires, 2010), as they disseminated their policy platform to keep the Bedouin out of Kuwait (al Mdaires, 2010), eventually targeting the northern tribal origins (insomuch as this group were the assumed to be the Bedoun). Thus, the Hadar had squarely targeted the Bedouin in Kuwait from the time that the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) was first implemented. Such values were expressed through ‘tribalism’ theory in Kuwait over the ensuing decades (Appendix C, vi-viii), and reinforced practically via successive committees appointed to ‘manage’ the Bedouin population from 1962 (Appendix D, ii), leading to the long-term segregation of the Bedouin from the citizen population.

Znaniecki (1952a, p.335) explained that prohibitive rules and regulations were generated to create ‘outsiders’ independently of their social performance, in ways that changed the official definitions of identity determined by authorities. In other words, outsider status was not linked to what an individual did, but how he or she was portrayed and perceived by others (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356). This principle is also reflected in labelling theories, which others apply to stigmatize a person, regardless of the label’s actual correspondence to the individual concerned (Becker, 1963; Goffman, 1963). This process leads to the social construction ‘the other’ as enemies (Short, 2010, p.833), justifying the cultural destruction of other groups to the extent that they may be physically removed, killed (Davidson, 2012; Znaniecki, 1952a) or administratively erased on government databases via re-allocation to other nationalities (Sigona, 2005) so that traces of their existence are eliminated (Znaniecki, 1952a). Stateless groups have been particularly vulnerable to these practices, which culminate in administrative erasure of whole populations (Dedic, 2003; Green, MacManus, and de la Cour Venning, 2015; Sigona, 2005; Weissbrodt, 2008).

The Bedouin were confronted with two major types of stigma and labelling (Goffman, 1963) at the social/cultural and government/bureaucratic levels, emanating from the themes of the desert-dweller and the northern tribal ‘enemy.’ Both themes were elaborated with prohibitive generalisations about why the group were unsuitable for citizenship and inclusion in Kuwaiti society. Within each type of labelling, many inter-related labels could be found, connected to a complex system of ideas (shown in Table 21), which I have called an anti-Bedouin ideology (Table 21). Nevertheless, prohibitive generalisations cannot even be tentatively accepted as valid classifications of human actions, since they are based on judgements of the lack of an action and the non-existence of a fact (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.35). Ironically, the Bedoun were confronted with the tribal stigma
(Goffman, 1963, p.4) in the most literal sense, and labelled as enemies (Short, 2010, p.833; Znaniecki, 1952b, p.98) quite directly. Eventually, the ideology and prohibitions would manifest in the system of erasure (the ‘status adjustment’ program), not uncommonly experienced by stateless groups (Dedic, 2003; Green, P., MacManus, T. and de la Cour Venning, A., 2015; Redclift, 2013, 2016; Sigona, 2011). The former stigma represented the general prejudice against the Bedouin, and the latter stigma, narrowed the focus to the northern tribes. The targeting of the ‘northern tribes’ was more divisive, attracting defensive responses from Kuwaiti citizens including violent opposition (Znaniecki, 1952b) to individuals labelled ‘infiltrator,’ ‘fifth column’ and ‘disloyal.’ These themes included the projection of hate-speech in a historical context, and in the present-day (Appendix C, vi-viii).

Al Anezi (1989) indicated that the first critical event in this cultural pattern stemmed from the stigmatisation of the Bedouin as the desert dweller (p.174). The prohibition of cross-cultural communications between the two groups was described as part of customary cultural practices (al Anezi, p.175), rendering the Bedoun ‘outsiders,’ separated from the Hadar-controlled state. This cultural divide was expressed in Decree 5/1960. The Decree enabled the Nationality Committees to close off access to the various clauses in the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) according to which the Bedouin qualified for citizenship, by enabling them to choose from a list of alternative, subjective measures to justify exclusion. This practice was reflected throughout all of the government commitments to grant the Bedouin citizenship thereafter (in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, during the early 2000s and after 2010, as listed in Appendix B, iii), none of which were honoured. Commencing with distribution of citizenship in the 1960s, only half the Bedouin who registered were granted citizenship, all of the Hadar received citizenship (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

The existence of this equation used to enforce a prescribed, demographic composition on the state has always trumped all other arguments justifying why the Bedouin were not granted citizenship. The bottom line is that the proportion of the Bedouin permitted to become citizens was conjured and implemented artificially, as a sum (Human Rights Watch, 1995). The same formulaic approach was followed to remove the Bedouin from the Kuwaiti population as part of the population policy of the 1980s and 1990s, even though the state also claimed that those who had proof that their family had been counted in the 1965 census would receive citizenship (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). It is the nature of the cultural patterning in Kuwaiti society that has made both the artificial, formula-driven demographic policies and the subjective exclusionary measures used to implement the policy, acceptable to Kuwaiti citizens.

The use of arguments that the Bedouin ‘failed’ to register (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Longva, 2005, p.175) or ‘refused to register’ for citizenship (Shultziner, and Tétreault, 2012, p.284) to explain the cause of the Bedou’n’s statelessness have been used to avoid,
rather than to engage with, the issue of demographic engineering – by simply blaming the Bedoun. I have never located evidence suggesting any portion of the population consciously rejected the opportunity to register for citizenship, beyond just a few anecdotal accounts according to Human Rights Watch (1995), without disclosure of the actual number of interview respondents who cited non-registration. Such claims appear to have been motivated to distract from the politics of enforcement of the demographic formula.

Ultimately, the anti-Bedouin ideology of the desert dweller can be linked to the Bedoun’s encampment and entrapment (Rabinowitz, 2002; Redclift, 2013; Rosenfeld, 2002) in the desert settlements, the process by which their citizenship grants associated with the formal settlement program (according to Zahir, 1985, p.53 in Stanton Russell, 1989, p.34) were delayed from 1965 and eventually forgotten amidst anti-Bedouin ideology. The ideology was evidence in the administrative expulsion in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003; see Appendix E, i) and violent ethnic cleansing and killing of around half the population from 1990 to 1995 (Human Rights Watch, 1991a; see Appendix F, i-iii). The same small Nationality Committees remain responsible for citizenship grants today.

It is difficult to know where to draw the line between social and individual responsibility for mass human rights atrocities committed against the Bedoun that increasingly appear to be a crimes against humanity, but certainly these phenomena are not aided by government-blaming approaches (Mann, 2005). The Hadar elite were described by political scientists as having dominated and controlled every aspect of the country that would engender their personal profit (Alnajjar and Selvik, 2016; Stanton Russell, 1989, p.30; Tétreault, 2000, p.156). The political rhetoric and policy plans of Hadar individuals who expressed a desire to deprive the Bedoun of citizenship, basic human rights, education and access to land, who then set about implementing those policies through the government bureaucracy with little or no regard for the consequences of the Bedoun’s statelessness, are discussed herein. Their ideas can be read in the thematic analysis in Appendix C, vi-viii. Al Anezi (1989) pointed out that just a select few individuals controlled the Nationality Committees, and that those individuals hold more power than the ‘Supreme Committee for Nationality’ charged with supervising them. Hakeem al Fadhli explained the impact of the Hadar elites on the Bedoun’s situation:

There [are] two things. They are above the government or the authorities: they are involved. The second is the family [values] themselves, the environment, or the society of the Hadar. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

Ironically, Kuwaiti parliamentarian Saleh Ashour, reiterated precisely the same sentiment during parliamentary question time in the National Assembly on May, 17, 2016,
on the same day that both the front page of *The Kuwait Times* and the *Arab Times* named the interviewee as a politically targeted individual, along with a headline confirming the government's finalisation of the Comoros Plan, which was later proven to be a false report (requiring Kuwait's Foreign Minister to publicly clarify the government's position, in Toumi, June 20, 2016.). MP Saleh Ashour explained,

There is a group in the country that is more powerful than the National Assembly and which does not want bedoons to be naturalized… Can the government naturalize the 32,000 bedoons whom the committee said qualify for citizenship? No, because this influential group is more powerful than the government. (Ashour quoted in Izzak, May 17, 2016)

Finally, the role of the United Kingdom in enabling the promulgation of Decree 5/1060, which would ultimately determine the make up of the citizen population of Kuwait, is salient to the Bedoun's status as an indigenous tribal people in international law. The Bedoun experienced their first permanent settlement (relinquishing nomadic and semi-nomadic ways of life) to settle in the desert camps in return for citizenship. Decree 5/1960 was passed prior to Kuwait becoming an independent nation.

**7.3.1 The role of the *Nationality Law (1959)* Kuwait, in keeping the Bedouin out of Kuwait.**

The Bedouin had always been regarded as culturally incompatible with the Hadar due to their having occupied the territory of Kuwait beyond the city wall (*al sour*) (al Anezi, 1989, p.174-175). This was the basis upon which the Bedouin were regarded as ‘foreigners’ and excluded from citizenship due to their cultural differences (al Anezi, 1989, p.174-175, 272). The interpretation by the Hadar that the Bedouin who lived beyond the city wall were ‘foreign’ was then very easily transposed symbolically onto the notion they were ‘nationals’ of anywhere else, as long as they were not ‘nationals’ of Kuwait. The policy whereby government demanded the Bedoun cite a foreign nationality (that did not belong to them) on official identity documents was the ‘official’ policy in Kuwait from 1983 (al Anezi, 1989, p.263, n132) until 2011 (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7; see also Appendix, D, i, E, v, and vii).

The policy represents the heart of the ‘status adjustment’ program, which seeks to change the identity of the Bedoun as a cultural collective. Government had pledged it would retract or rescind the policy of citing the Bedoun had another nationality on official documents issued by government, and deliver genuine human rights reforms, during the Arab Spring via Decree 409/2011 (Amnesty International, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2014). However, external observers reported that very little had changed for the Bedoun as Decree 409/2011 reforms were never implemented in a plausible fashion (Appendix G, i).
This problem was expressed in the interview findings in this study (Appendix A), which were gathered while Human Rights Watch (2014) was in the field working with community leaders. Hakeem al Fadhli explained to me in September 2014, that since the policy of imposing ‘other nationality’ on the Bedoun (the 'status adjustment' program) had been carried out to the letter since 1983, it would be naive for agencies and researchers expect that the staff at the Central Apparatus who enforced the policy, could suddenly adopt a humanitarian approach to the Bedoun on receipt of a memo announcing Decree 409/2011, after some 28 years of systematic indoctrination under the previous policy.

A traditional man explained the process of his Bedouin’s family’s permanent settlement in Kuwait, which appears to have been an equally disturbing and difficult process for the Kuwaiti Bedouin as it was for the Hadar. The Hadar lacked the willingness, though certainly not the resources, to assist the integration of the Bedouin of Kuwait’s territory despite their cultural differences.

P12: You know the Gulf area, all the open for the Arab man. And this is moving, begin my father… But you know what the system for the Arabic people, he don't live in one area. Arabic Bedu with the camel, you know with the camel, where is that, what place the area, he live here, maybe one month, two month here, then another, and another and another [place]. Not live in one area.

You know since this time… no cars, no… no, no [not] anything, maybe one month from the desert not come in, maybe one year, one time to pay something to his family... This is Kuwait, this is Saudia, this is Iraq. Before that, open.

At the beginning the government from the U.K., you know, the British, halas, cutting [Kuwait’s Independence]. My father, go [in the 1960s] to government work in the forces, army... 1970 and 1980 fine. I am Arabic, I am Kuwaiti, I am… Not begin the problem, after 1985 begin the problems and looks…

Are you from camel? Are you from where?

And if I want nationality, it’s near – maybe I go and come back tomorrow and I can take nationality. (Participant 12, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 1 April, 2014)

This passage continued to include the quotation at the opening of this chapter. P12 emphasised the cultural predisposition of the Bedouin as 'light,' living in the moment, lacking in formal education, unhindered by doubt in their ruler, the al Sabah. But he was also aware that Hadar were positively discriminated for grants of citizenship because they
owened property in Kuwait City (he called these residents of the Kuwait Municipality, ‘Mr Plan’).

Al Anezi (1989, p.181) explained the role of the Nationality Committees in the implementation of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) via Article 21 of that law, which enabled the Hadar to rely on a range of stipulations that facilitated them to grant citizenship to members of their own group, but also facilitated them in blocking citizenship grants to the Bedouin on the basis of the desert dwellers’ cultural attributes. He showed that property ownership was indeed one of the criteria which could be met for a grant of citizenship (Decree 5/1960, Article 15), but it could also be over-ridden by the Committees members if they wished, by invoking other Articles (al Anezi, 1989, p.181).

Additional clauses enabled discrimination on the basis of property ownership in particular. The stipulation could also be over-ridden by the Committee members, by invoking the (hostile) witness statement, in Article 12, for example. In the case of an individual who did own property in Kuwait City and produced a title deed sufficient for a grant of citizenship, Article 12, the witness statement, was invoked to reject the application (p.183). Alternatively, Articles 13 and 17, where the accent and physical appearance of an individual, or their name, was deemed insufficient or unsuitable to be regarded as ‘Kuwaiti’ in the opinion of the Nationality Committee, their application for citizenship could be rejected. On this basis, anyone who looked like or sounded like, or even dressed like a ‘foreigner’ – a desert dweller - could have his (and his families’) citizenship application rejected without explanation. Only two committee members’ opinions were required for the grant to be approved or rejected.

The conditions of Article 11 were even more remarkable. Generally speaking, all other criteria listed under the relevant Articles of 1960 (including those just mentioned) could be over-ridden, as long as the Committee members were personally acquainted with the citizen applicant (Article 11). The procedures also stated that knowing a family name was sufficient to establish that such a personal relationship existed. This meant that Article 11, which ostensibly set out to require personal knowledge of an applicant, did not actually require it. All that was required was that the name of the applicant to be known by one member of the Committee, and for the member to acquire the agreement of one other Committee member, for a grant of citizenship to be awarded.

Thus, it is arguable that personal contacts were ultimately the key criteria that determined if citizenship would be granted, or not. Certainly al Anezi (1989, p.182) seemed to believe that this was indeed, the case. The focus on names is most ironic, since the Hadar have claimed the Bedouin have attempted to exploit that Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) on the basis of tribal names (Longva, 2006), when the Hadar used this as a method to facilitate their own grants of ‘original’ Kuwaiti citizenship. On the other hand, the Bedoun have been
subject to a policy promoting the systematic removal of their names indicating ethnic targeting for the purpose of cultural destruction) (see Chapter 6, Table 20, above).

Al Anezi (1989) emphasised the significance of Article 12 because the Explanatory Note in the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) referred to it directly, underscoring the Articles’ importance to the Nationality Committee. The Explanatory Note regarded the assessment of personal knowledge the applicant as grounds for a citizenship grant. A witness who ‘knew’ the citizenship applicant and his family was the evidence likely to be most relied upon,

Since most Kuwaiti people are known through their family-names and little doubt is likely to arise in such circumstances. Furthermore, if members of the Nationality Committees [were], themselves chosen from prominent Kuwaitis whose status had already been proved, were convinced of the nationality of the individual concerned as stated above, through their own personal knowledge of him, no further investigation would likely be needed. (al Anezi, p.182 n79)

While the researcher emphasised that, ‘No consistent criteria appear to have been adopted by the Committees in reaching their decisions’ (al Anezi, 1989, p.183, including n81), equally, this could also mean that if the Committees did not lean on the provision too much, obviously, proof residence in Kuwait was not ‘relied upon’ for ‘original’ citizenship, either.

The relevant provisions of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) and Decree 5/1960 are listed in Table 22, below. Al Anezi (1989) did not provide a specific reference to the Explanatory Note of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait), but Article 21 of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) established the facility of the Nationality Committees (1989, p.277, para. 1), while Decree 5/1960 set out the common criteria and procedures by which citizenship could be granted by the Nationality Committees, to all applicants.

7.3.2 The Hadar: citizens without documents.

The Hadar elite’s influence over policy determining nationality in general and specifically, the process of naturalisation (al Anezi, 1989, p.175, para. 2), empowered the group to ensure citizenship was received by their family, friends and those with familiar names (p.248). The procedures of the Nationality Committees also enabled a small group of Hadar elites who sat on the Committees to exclude the Bedouin on the basis of their ethnicity and indigenous status – for the fact that they were desert dwellers of Kuwait, regarded as a ‘foreign element’ (al Anezi, 1989, p.272). The Bedoun were forced to show their ‘original’ nationality although government was aware they are stateless (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p. 2-7, para. 2), due to the relentless ideology that deemed them ‘foreign’ (expressed in the demand in 1987 that they must produce foreign passports by any means, even if that means committing a criminal offence – see the ‘letters program,’
### Table 22

*Criteria Enabling a Citizenship Grant by the Nationality Committees (Decree 5/1960)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 11</td>
<td>Two members of the Committees’ personal knowledge of the applicant and his circumstances, ‘no further investigation was required’ (Al Anezi, 1989, p.182, n78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 12</td>
<td>Witness statements, including hostile witnesses over-riding the authority of a title deed proving property ownership, to deny a grant of citizenship (Al Anezi, 1989, p.183, para. 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 13</td>
<td>Accent and physical appearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 15</td>
<td>Ownership of a title deed for real estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 16</td>
<td>A valid Kuwaiti passport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 17</td>
<td>Family name</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note* This information is from Al Anezi (1989), p.182-193, *A Study of the Role of Nationality in International Law with Special Reference the Law and Practice of Kuwait.*

Appendix E5, Table E5). The so-called ‘foreign element’ symbolised the fear of the stranger (Simmel, in Wolff, 1964; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1919) for which government attempted to impose ‘other nationality’ of the Bedoun.

What was the reason that Article 21 empowered the Nationality Committees to examine citizenship applications (Al Anezi, 1989, p.279)? To facilitate grants of citizenship,

*Owing to lack of evidence in such matters,* a particular expedient was resorted to, and thus, Article 21 of the Law provides a pragmatic method for *proof of settlement* in Kuwait and hence of *original Kuwaiti nationality.* (Al Anezi, 1989, p.277, para. 1; italics added)

That is, the ‘original’ Kuwaitis were facilitated to receive ‘original’ citizenship in the first-degree (with voting rights), *without the documentary proofs* required in the *Nationality Law 1959* (Kuwait), such as title deeds demonstrating their settlement in Kuwait prior to 1920, or the Kuwaiti passport (which many Bedoun military servicemen held due to their carrying out service for the country overseas, prior to them being prohibited from travelling altogether). This point cannot be over-emphasised. Al Alanezi’s (1989, p.277) explanation of the need for Decree 5/1960 Articles enabling the Nationality Committee members to *grant citizenship* to their personal contacts, corresponds to the description of the
very reason why the Bedoun were deprived of citizenship. The ‘original’ Hadar citizens were without documents or without papers (which was the definition of the Bedoun given by interview respondents, in Chapter 6, section 6.1.3). According to this statement, the Hadar ‘original’ citizens did not have documentary proofs of citizenship set out in the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait): they were also Bedoun (without). These facts also explain the perfect record of the whole Hadar population being granted first-degree citizenship without exception. I have never located any journal article or newspaper article discussion that stated that any member of the Hadar, did not receive ‘original’ citizenship.

The focus on the subjective attributes mentioned in Decree 5/1960 remains so widespread in society today, that many Bedoun individuals assume purely social causes of discrimination, because the same themes of ethnic exclusion continue to predominate in their social interactions with others. Almost all interviewees appeared to be unaware of the provisions of Decree 5/1960, but they were highly aware of how ethnic targeting and discrimination due to their family’s supposed lack of documents (‘papers’), had harmed their lives. In the interviewee quote above, P12 seemed to possess some degree of local knowledge of the historical preference to grant citizenship to the individuals within Kuwait City who owned houses (to the exclusion of those who did not) and the tendency for those individuals to live within close proximity of each other, and the corresponding influence of personal relations on the members of the Nationality Committee’s ability to grant citizenship:

P12: I have paper, but I don’t have nationality. Because nationality in Kuwait, take it in nationality, all have city, all have house. I know you are near from me, same street, Mr Plan, Mr, Mr, Mr and finish. And if I want nationality, it’s near – maybe I go and come back tomorrow and I can take nationality, I can write my name, there is legnan [registration ledger], but where is my family? Not coming in the city, maybe come one year, one time. This is big issue for my family. (Participant 12, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 1 April, 2014; italics added)

Humanitarian organisations have consistently lamented that the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) has been applied arbitrarily. Al Aenzi’s (1989) account demonstrated the law was indeed applied arbitrarily, not in a secret or unpredictable manner, but in an official manner – it is written into Kuwaiti law, for all to read (for those who can read). The wording of Decree 5/1960 was set out intentionally, to enable arbitrary and subjective judgements to be implemented by law. The Decree allowed the Hadar to ethnically target the Bedouin for exclusion from the nation, and on the basis of their tribal identity, and to be systematically deprived of citizenship from 1960, virtually as soon as the Nationality Committees and the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait), came into effect.
This may explain why the state of Kuwait has rejected criticism of its treatment of the Bedoun, as government leaders may from their perspective, be quite satisfied that the law has been followed correctly. The problem for the Bedoun is that lack of public knowledge about these practices means that there has been no public debate (at least none that I am aware of in the academic literature in English, or human rights reports) about areas where domestic law reform might be introduced to diminish such ethnic targeting practices used against the Bedoun in Kuwaiti law. The same obstacle applies to Supreme Planning Council Resolution No. 11 of 1992, which removed the ability of the Bedouin ethnic group to receive citizenship en masse, introduced by the Academic Team for Population Policy without parliamentary discussion (see Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). Similarly, the provision that seems to be unheard of among other researchers, even those who are fluent in Arabic. Furthermore, because these laws seem to be unknown by the general public, scholars and humanitarian organisations, the result has been that Hadar intellectual and social leaders, as well as senior government officials, have remained free to continue these practices with little or no resistance (a similar law is Emiri Decree 58/1996, which enabled the Executive Committee for Illegal Residents’ Affairs to override the implementation of the Nationality Law 1959, Kuwait, for any/all individual Bedoun applications that qualified a person for citizenship, also on grounds of Bedouin ethnicity. Mdaires (2010) put forward a worthwhile interpretation of this decree named in Kuwait government’s response to Human Rights Watch (2011). Certainly it warrants further attention as a strategy of targeted, Bedouin citizen population reduction. See Appendix D, i.).

This example has shown that the mechanisms by which the Hadar privileged themselves in the matter of ‘original’ citizenship and had excluded a certain proportion (half) of the desert dwellers of Kuwait from 1960 (here, I refer to the very first citizenship application period for all Kuwaitis, which involved citizenship grants throughout the 1960s). Key to this process was the power held by just a few individuals over the population makeup of the entire state of Kuwait. The discrimination of the Bedouin desert dweller was carefully considered and indeed programmed through exclusionary social actions, into Kuwaiti law. As I have also pointed out, this has included the projection onto the Bedoun the notion that they have an ‘other nationality,’ which has formed a key ideological premise of the so-called ‘status adjustment’ program used to erase the group.

These conclusions also lead to the recognition of the significance of the suppression of intellectual development and education of the Bedoun by nationalists, promulgated by Alessa (1981). Alessa (1981) openly campaigned for the deprivation of education to the Bedouin, while implementation of the policy of Bedouin naturalisation was undermined. The Bedouin were then also prohibited from studying Law. Alessa (1981, p.109) expressed a desire to intentionally prevent the Bedoun from developing the collective knowledge and
political consciousness (al Naqeeb also expressed this desire, but did not target the Bedoun in particular, merely all Bedouin). After all, this would have enabled the group to pursue genuine law reform measures that could be taken to alleviate their situation, to stop their suffering, and achieve self-determination via citizenship under Kuwaiti law.

Many previous authors have drawn on al Aenzi’s (1989) work or his work in Arabic, but do not seem to have read or understood his commentary on Decree 5/1960. Curiously Aziz Abu Hamad, the associate director of Human Rights Watch who was responsible for compiling the research and writing the seminal Human Rights Watch (1995) report, wrote about the Decree according to al Anezi’s (1989) text, but overlooked its most crucial functions that al Anezi (1989) emphasised (which I set out in Table 22), the ability of the Committee members to grant ‘original’ citizenship on the basis of personal knowledge or familiarity with names, in the absence of documentary proofs. According to the accounts of Bedoun interviewees, the features mentioned in the Articles in Decree 5/1960, such as discrimination on the basis of personal appearance, clothing, accent and family name, are believed to enable individuals to discern ‘real’ Kuwaitiness in others. The belief was so deeply entrenched into Hadar society, the ideology appeared to form a continuous whole connecting social practices and government policy.

7.4 Ethnic Targeting of the Bedouin and the Origins of the Northern Tribes

The second major ideological theme arising from the interview data concerned the northern tribes distinguished from the southern tribes, and the northern tribes being subject to particularly acute stigmatisation and hate speech. The northern tribes were ethnically targeted through two main, inter-connected themes: the portrayal of the Bedoun as ‘nationals’ of other states, particularly Iraq, and the ‘status adjustment’ program, which is the administrative program that changes the Bedoun’s ethnic and national identity in order to erase the population on government records. Both aspects of the targeting had been used to implement administrative and physical ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, since 1983 (see Appendix E). Government’s assertion that the Bedoun hold citizenship in the northern Middle Eastern states was premised on their membership of the Bedouin tribes with northern dirah. The theme was associated with broader stigmatisation of the entire Bedouin community, similar to the notion of the Bedouin as the stranger, ‘foreign elements’ (al Anezi, 1989, p.272), but with an emphasis the Bedoun as ‘foreigners’ who are ‘disloyal’ to the nation (al Alhajeri, 2004, p.16; Dashti, et al., 2014) (see Chapter 8, Table 26).

The theme objectifying the northern tribes was more specific and more harmful than the theme of the ‘desert dweller,’ because the cultural attributes were interpreted as more threatening, entailing a more extreme response. The foreign stranger had become the foreign ‘enemy,’ which could be used to justify wholesale exclusion, eradication and killing (Znaniecki, 1952a, 346-350). The theme was amplified by regional political tensions
between the state of Kuwait and its neighbours during the 1980s and 1990s, with some
degree of cross-fertilisation with negative ideology directed toward the Shia community (a
Najjar, 2001). Incidentally, this tendency was also shown recently in hate-speech directed
toward the Bedouin and Shia (Dashti et al., 2014). The theme relates to the location of the
Bedouin’s tribal dirah across the Middle East, which determined the region that individuals
were assumed to come from – generally speaking, the north or the south – although many
dirah (tribal lands) stretched across countries both to the north and the south (see Appendix
B, i). While the distinction may not be clear to those outside the society, it is very clear to
local people, as the interviewee data illustrates below. Note that the ruling family, the al
Sabah, are also from the northern tribes.

Prior to their administrative expulsion of 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003), when the
Bedouin collective was still expecting to receive citizenship en masse as part of government
policy, the Bedouin population was accused of being ‘Iranian’ fifth columnists (Alnajjar,
2001). The accusation was based association with an attempted assassination of the Kuwaiti
Emir in 1985. The Bedouin were accused of being Iranian, Shia terrorists, even though a
Bedouin servicemen defended the Emir and lost his life in the incident (al Anezi, 1989;
Alnajjar, 2001; Alhajeri, 2004). Shia terrorist attacks in Kuwait occurred at that time in
relation to broader political issues characteristic of the era, which were not remotely related
to the Bedouin. Then, during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Bedouin population was
once again made the focus of accusations of being ‘fifth column’ traitors, this time as ‘Iraqi’
nationals (Human Rights Watch, 1991a).

But a critical feature of the timing of the attribution of the Bedouin as ‘Iraqi,’ was
that the propaganda reached its zenith after Kuwait was no longer in danger from Iraqi
forces, and while the government had initiated the policy prior to the invasion, and had
implemented it after the invasion (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1995; see Appendix F,
iii). The policy consolidated and capitalized on the outcomes of ethnic cleansing of both the
policy was referred to as ‘population restructuring’ implemented through the National
Council. Therefore, the ideology of the Bedouin as ‘Iraqi’ was not a defensive ideology that
had arisen under the duress of war, but one of aggressive, nationalist expansion (Znaniecki,
1952b) that just happened to consolidate the Hadar position. The suppression of information
about the Bedoun’s ethnic cleansing at this time has also helped to hide the realisation that
both Palestinians and Bedouins were viewed by intellectuals of mixed races (Hadar) as
Bedouins with the purest of Arab lineages. Ethnic hatred and/or racial prejudice had
reversed the country’s previous tendency toward assimilative (socially integrated) expansion
(Znaniecki, 1952b, p.132) of both the Bedouin and Palestinian populations in Kuwait.
The ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun (1990-1995) was promoted as a legitimate exercise of removing the ‘enemy’ after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, after Iraqi forces had been removed from Kuwait due to the intervention of Western, coalition forces. But the policy was promoted as concerning the arena of inward migration control, obscuring the identity of the Bedoun and government policy toward the group, as I discussed in Chapter 2 (I have provided a chronological analysis in Appendix F, iii). The population policy demographic measures, linked to Bedoun ethnic cleansing and killings, were initially called population ‘purification’ under ‘Kuwaitization’ policy (Evans, February 28, 1991; Fineman, November 8, 1992). But later, it was re-labelled as population ‘balancing’ and restructuring in the context of a post-war recovery phase (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.570, 572, 573, 574, 582, 583; al Ramadhan, 1995, n.p.; Crystal, 1995, p.182).

Stanton Russell appears to have been the only researcher attempting to point out that the ethnic cleansing was not only very closely linked to national policy development, but that the intervention of the so-called ‘Academic Team’ in what was normally ministerial business, produced specific, anti-Bedouin policy measures while the Bedoun were being killed and driven out of Kuwait (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1995). Crystal (1995, p.182) cited the post-war phase as ‘the new postwar demographic environment [that] gave Kuwait policy-makers an opportunity to rethink and reshape population policy.’ Al Ramadhan (1995, n.p.) claimed ‘this phase [was] characterized as having clearer vision and direction.’ In other words, academics aided the government of Kuwait in the cover-up of the ethnic cleansing. In response to the instructions from government to ethnically cleanse the population (Evans, February 28, 1991; Fineman, November 2, 1992; Gasperini, August 20, 1991; Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992; Wilkinson, May 20, 1991), approximately 150,000 Bedoun were eradicated (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Ghabra, 1997b based on the numbers implied by Ghabra, which put the pre-invasion population at around 300,000).

The ethnic cleansing involved methods of violence and killing (Appendix F, i), expulsion and other forms of population eradication (Appendix F, ii). Methods of eradication included shots to the head at point-blank range, beatings and starvations in prisons and torture for the purpose of obtaining confessions prior to show-trials. Others disappeared or were officially deported or otherwise ‘driven’ into Iraq: women and children were dumped in the night in mine-infested areas with no food, water or light (Amnesty International, 1992, 1994, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992, 1994, 1996). After the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the country, government officials informed Bedoun inhabitants of the Abdali border camp, along with the international media, that their identity was ‘Iraqi.’ The action served as an additional strategy to drive thousands of Bedoun from the refugee camps over the border into Iraq (Cushman, June 30, 1991, July 16, 1991; Gasperini, August 20, 1991).
Other Bedouin were accused of being Iraqi, or called ‘Iraqi’ in information releases, for example, prisoners who were dumped over the border into Iraq appeared to be for all intents and purposes, Bedouin, while family members from Kuwait City who attempted to collect their Bedouin family members from the refugee camps, were prohibited from taking them home (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992). In June, 1991, around eighty Bedouin mothers became so traumatised by the threats that they would hang, that their newborn babies died of failure to thrive syndrome (Cushman, July 16, 1991). Gasperini (August 20, 1991) revealed that there were more camps filled with Bedouin than reported; in one area, he was aware of three camps with around fifteen thousand inhabitants, whereas other reports cited just one camp, with one third of those numbers.

It was in this context that the notion of the Bedouin as ‘Iraqi nationals’ was invented as an ideology of retaliation against a hidden enemy of the state, after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. The notion of the Bedouin as ‘Iraqi’ drew on stronger associations for both Sunni and Shia Bedouin of Bedouin tribal descent, compared to the former accusation the population was ‘Iranian,’ which limited to the targeting of any Shia Bedouin. The power of the ideological motifs lay in the layering of meanings connected to historical and cultural data. This had great symbolic value at the grassroots level among Kuwaitis, and it would be reasonable to say that the provocation of these themes would make Kuwaiti citizens fear each other, and make even members of the same Bedouin tribes fear each other, knowing that the Bedouin had become the states’ kill target (those that killed the Bedouin and Palestinian populations worked for the State Security Investigative Police under special powers, and were recruited from returned Kuwaiti citizens; see Mason, 2010; see also Appendix F, i). For example, virtually all Kuwaitis would know the northern tribes were associated with traditional tribal dirah in Iraq, although members of the northern tribes may have never been to Iraq, nor had any relatives in Iraq, or any other present-day connection to Iraq. On the other hand, many Kuwaiti citizens, including the well-known Hadar merchant families of mixed Bedouin-Persian/African/Asian descent (Longva, 2006), maintained active connections in Iraq. The ruling family has maintained date gardens in Iraq for hundreds of years, while many other ‘elite’ Hadar families also own land in south Iraq, due to their own Iraqi heritage linkages. This is common knowledge in Kuwait.

The connection between the states of Kuwait and Iraq had always been close and somewhat complex, threatened by land and border disputes, but united as allies in the Iran-Iraq war prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Indeed, Kuwait’s citizen population remains characterised by shared ancestry with Iraq and Iran, across all levels of Kuwaiti society (al Nakib, 2014). But the targeting of the northern tribes was more specific, due to the war. The Bedouin members of the military services were wrongly blamed for the invasion (see Alhajeri, 2004). The members of the Kuwaiti armed forces at entry-level were Bedouin of
the northern tribes, mainly Bedoun but also some Kuwaiti citizens (Alhajeri, 2004). The Bedoun members of the northern tribes comprised the majority of the military personnel. The accusation that the Bedoun were ‘Iraqi’ was reinforced by accusing Bedoun civilians also, of being ‘Iraqi’ (that is, not merely collaborating with, but having Iraqi identity) such as refugees at Abdali, who were mainly civilian Bedouns (Cushman, June 30, 1991, July 16, 1991; Gasperini, August 20, 1991).

Any link between Bedoun ‘collaborators’ and Iraqi forces were so tenuous, that no organized form of collaboration was ever established (Human Rights Watch, 1995), and yet instructions to ‘cleanse,’ ‘cleanup’ and ‘purify’ the population (Evans, February 28, 1991; Human Rights Watch, 1991a) were issued on this basis. Furthermore, those who served in the police or armed forces were qualified to receive citizenship due to their service to the nation, in Article 4, paragraph 4 of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) (Appendix B, vi). Military and police occupations were explicitly cited in the explanatory note attached to the legislation (al Anezi, 1989, p.193). Military servicemen were also entitled to receive citizenship under the Constitution of Kuwait, (1922/1962), Article 25 (Appendix B, v).

7.4.1 Iraq is ‘stealing’ our identity – the ideological justification for ethnic cleansing (1990-1995).

The ideology that the Bedoun were from the northern tribes and were therefore ‘Iraqi,’ appears to have been deployed not only to justify ethnic cleansing, but actually to incite and expedite the process by assigning guilt to the targeted Bedoun. Similar (but not identical) strategies for allotting guilt to the Palestinian population, to expedite their exit from Kuwait, were also used (Mason, 2010). The Bedoun military servicemen were subject to prohibitive rules (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.335) during the invasion, prior to their expulsion from the military that also led to wrongful blame of the Bedoun.

The Bedoun military servicemen were prevented from taking defensive action during the invasion due to lack of military instruction as a prohibitory rule in military law. There were various reports of Bedou men attempting to take action to resist the invasion (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Levins, 1995). However, these attempts did not amount to a groundswell of resistance because there was no order for action, no instructions given to the Bedoun soldiers to tell them how to respond, and no organisation of the troops.

The reason that the military stayed in ‘stand down’ mode at the outset of the invasion was that they were abandoned by their commanding officers who fled the country, while they stood at their posts without military orders (Alhajeri, 2004, p.92). The senior-most officers who fled Kuwait (Alhajeri, 2004) were Kuwaiti citizens from the ruling elite, many trained at the prestigious British military academy, Sandhurst (al Fayez, 1984, p.252).

A second prohibitory rule was then issued to Bedoun military servicemen and others, in October 1990. The military resistance, in whatever form it comprised, was
instructed to cease its activities via a broadcast to the population inside the country, from the Minister for Information (Levins, 1995). The Bedoun military servicemen were then blamed for not preventing or halting Iraqi forces from invading Kuwait, and were dismissed from the services en masse prior to liberation – in the midst of the occupation (Alhajeri, 2004, p.94). Thus, the ideology was expanded to draw in a range of themes of ‘othering’ such as ‘disloyalty,’ being a ‘traitor,’ ‘collaborator/fifth columnist,’ ‘national security threat’ and so on, while the themes of ‘disloyalty’ and the ‘undeserving’ citizen were also inflated through tribalism theory in reference to the desert dweller of Kuwait (I discuss this phenomenon below, in the context of ‘Desertization.’)

The ideology of Iraqi ‘stealing’ Kuwaiti identity emerged on September 28, 1990, just days or weeks prior to the announcement of October 1990, advising any Bedoun military servicemen to stop resisting the invasion. The ideology was revealed by Wines (1990), writing for The New York Times, in the headline: *Confrontation in the Gulf: Iraq Seen Looting Kuwait of Identity.* The story claimed, ‘Iraq has embarked on a systematic effort to strip the nation of its very identity.’ The headline was issued around nine weeks after the invasion, prior to the Jeddah Conference (where Kuwaitis rallied in support of the Emir), within just a few days of the Free Kuwait movement conducting their first panel discussions (al Youisifi, 2012) and after they had hired the Hill and Knowlton public relations firm to publicize information on the invasion to persuade Congress to send American military forces intervene in the conflict (‘Deception on Capitol Hill,’ 1992; Doorley and Garcia, 2015, p.66; MacArthur, 1994; Secunda and Moran, 2007, p.134). Coalition forces did not enter Kuwait until January 16, 1991, while instructions to ‘cleanse’ the enemy, or those working for it (‘fifth columnists’), were issued in April 1991, after the coalition had removed all Iraqi forces (Human Rights Watch, 1992).

While Wines (1990) account may have been a plausible interpretation of the events that took place in the country during its occupation by Iraqi forces, its relevance to the program of Bedoun eradication, and the ideology that it was founded upon, is virtually undeniable. After all, the idea expressed in a nutshell, the basic principles upon which ethnic cleansing of some 150,000 Bedoun took place (under the observation of U.S. and Coalition military forces, see Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992), as well as the thinking behind the ‘status adjustment’ program first implemented in 1983. Political actors may influence collective attitudes using mass communications, public policies and nationalistic fervor. Decision makers, be they government or a ruling elite, may influence political behavior using techniques of social engineering. Such practices were honed by Western nations during the world wars. Methods may include directing hatred against definite targets, reinforcing or aggressively targeting selected national, ethnic or sub-ethnic levels of identity (Gross, 1978, p.162-163).
The sequence of events demonstrated a logical system of ideas: first, the idea of the *Iraqis stealing Kuwaiti identity* was issued in the media (Wines, 1990), then the Bedoun military were told to stop their resistance efforts (Levins, 1995), military and civilian Bedoun were then accused of being Iraqi (Alhajeri, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 1995), and finally instructions to cleanse the population - using a variety of metaphors - were issued (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992). Significantly, this included the Minister of Information suggesting the ‘cleanup’ of traitors should be completed prior to the National Assembly being reinstated (Evans, February 28, 1991), which in turn, was connected to the ‘population restructuring’ policy pushed through National Council. (I constructed a detailed timeline of this sequence of events in Appendix F, iii).

Prior to the reinstatement of the National Assembly, legislation was rushed through the National Council to shift the Bedoun from the ‘Kuwaiti’ to the ‘non-Kuwaiti, other Arab’ section of the national census (see Appendix D, iv), along with the prohibition on any further collective grants of citizenship to the Bedouin (Supreme Council Resolution No.11, 1992) (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). The links between the prohibitory rules (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.335) on the Bedoun, the blame allocated to them for the war, the incitement of ethnic cleansing and ‘de-nationalisation’ of the Bedouin (Human Rights Watch, 1995), show remarkable consistency with the broader ideological motif of the Bedoun of the northern tribes (many of whom were military soldiers) having ‘Iraqi’ identity (as expressed in the headline by Wines, 1990), while the dual policy objective of eradicating the Palestinian population ran alongside it (ostensibly the Shia element), at virtually every step (Amnesty International, 1992, 1994; Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992). The analysis of interview data in this study, and the quality of information provided by Bedoun respondents, demonstrates the enduring impact of the theme of the northern tribes.

The ethnic cleansing of the Bedouin was concealed and legitimised further, under the new national ‘population policy’ introduced prior to the resumption of the National Assembly, by the Academic Team for Population Policy, the National Council and the Supreme Planning Council while the ethnic cleansing was still taking place. The official discourse of population policy seems to have been designed to consolidate the outcomes of the ethnic cleansing as a ‘migration policy,’ through the introduction of the ethnic ban on Bedouins receiving citizenship. The discourse on immigration *in* to the state was used to cover up and at times to justify, the forcing of populations, principally the Bedouin and Palestinians, *out* of the state. As I have mentioned, scholars helped to further legitimise the ethnic cleansing based on the Bedouin being ‘Iraqi’ and/or criminal, other nationals who had infiltrated Kuwait, in the ensuing years.

Additionally, violence was reported to have escalated throughout 1992 (Brown, 1997), after Kuwaiti citizens had returned to the country. However, those who inflicted
violence against the Bedoun and Palestinian targets, as well as indiscriminately upon other Arab and African expatriate nations in Kuwait, were not attacked by mere ‘vigilantes.’ Brown (1997) downplayed the joint role of the State Security Court, State Security Police and State prosecutors managing key aspects of the violence, as reported by Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992). The resistance effort, which formed a second, distinct group, were described differently in media sources compared to the first resistance group. The first group appear to have been a genuine, self-organised civilian force. The second group carried out the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians (Mason, 2010) and also the Bedoun (Human Rights Watch, 1991, 1992). The second group was placed under the orders of Kuwaiti authorities, but many individuals appear to have been initially recruited by the CIA in the United States. The group became active after Kuwaiti citizens had returned to the country and were available to carry out the organised, state-sanctioned retaliatory violence (Mason, 2010).

Young, Kuwaiti Hadar males at university overseas were trained by the CIA to pursue and ‘identify’ ‘Iraqis’ (Chen and Lamb, 1990; Fialka, 1991), remembering that the Bedoun were accused of having ‘Iraqi’ identity as a matter of public policy, at the same time. Thousands of weapons and rounds of ammunition were left behind by coalition forces for civilians to access (Drogin, March 18, 1991; Hedges, August 2, 1991). It is likely this group has since ascended to power (see Appendix Fi). The sources cited indicated that the second resistance group were recruited specifically to hunt down and enact retributive violence upon Palestinians and Bedoun. Note that my analysis (Appendix Fi, ii) indicated that the Bedoun were targeted more intensively and had less opportunity to escape, and received substantially less external assistance from the United Nations, humanitarian organisations and others, compared to the Palestinian population. The possible links between this group of young, educated, Hadar elite residing in the United States trained by the CIA, with the intellectual elite who advised government to ‘restructure’ the Bedoun population (the so-called ‘Academic Team’) and intellectuals involved in misleading the US Congress at this time, warrants further research.

As I mentioned above, some years after the war, Ghabra (1997a, 1997b) became a key propagandist in this effort. The scholar carefully combined both the themes of the undesirable, uncivilized ‘desert dweller’ that polluted urban culture, together with the ideology of the northern tribes’ as ‘traitor,’ clearly implied the Bedoun were ‘Iraqi’ traitors (Ghabra, 1997b), as part of a historical accounting of this violent period of Kuwait’s history. Ghabra (1997a, 1997b) cleverly combined the dual motifs, stigmatising the Bedouin as desert dwellers and the Bedoun as members of the northern tribes, in his concept, ‘desertization.’ I refer to this concept as an example of the tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963, p.4) realised quite literally (see Table 21).
But Ghabra (1997a, 1997b) was not alone in his approach - his propaganda was part of a broader milieu of anti-Bedouin sentiment expressed in Kuwait studies in the 1990s. Crystal (2005, p.177) quoted an obscure reference to wrecklessly claim the Bedoun were a proxy army of Iraq, years after information disputing such flawed accounts was available to her. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, many Western scholars simply repeated the same ideology inscribed in government policy, portraying the Bedoun as ‘Iraqi’ national, criminal infiltrators in ethnographic narratives. Their first accounts of the Bedoun identity were either incorrectly referenced (Crystal, 1992) or unreferenced (Longva, 1997), and later, significantly downplayed or outright ignored, the mass human rights atrocities inflicted on the Bedoun (Crystal, 1995, 2005; Longva, 2005) that were known to have been carried out under the instructions of the invading Iraqi authorities, and then the returning Kuwaiti authorities (Amnesty International, 1992, 1994; Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992, 1993, 1994). The sheer physical impact of ethnic targeting of the Bedoun at this time is likely to have influenced the order of cultural patterning of social interactions between the Hadar, Bedouin citizens and the Bedoun ever since.

The exploitation of the ideology of the Bedoun as ‘Iraqi’ because they were members of the northern tribes, is indicative of political models where defensive consolidation is provoked among the dominant social group in order to drive out a weaker group. Ideologists attempt to destroy the weaker group due to existing ethnic hatred or racial prejudices (Znaniecki, 1952b). A Bedoun woman in her thirties explained her perspective on the ideology, which she knew from her own experience, denies her right to her own identity due to social causes:

P17: I have the right to be different. I don’t have to, we don’t all have to, look similar like copies, and repeating the same lies… I don’t have to lie about my background or my religion or my beliefs or my thoughts… I have the right to have my own things and you have the right to argue, to discuss this with me. You can [be] convince[d by] it, you can disagree with it, but you can’t force me to deny my identity. (Participant 17, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)

The passage illustrated the familiarity of the Bedoun with the ideology that sought to eradicate their identity and self-expression, such that it had become a familiar object of personal reflection, analysis and rationalisation.

Nationalist ideology interfered with the functional, assimilative expansion (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.132) of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society. Znaniecki (1952b) pointed out the danger to targeted groups living among a dominant group undergoing defensive consolidation. The target group may become vulnerable to retaliatory action if they attempt to defend themselves (p.99). It is not unusual for indigenous groups and/or minorities to be
accused of being associated with ethnic groups in neighbouring states and expelled en masse by states in the aftermath of war with those neighbouring states (Bell-Fialkoff, 1999; Mann, 2005). However, the administrative expulsion just a few years prior to the war, and the accusation the whole group were ‘Iranian’ fifth columnists prior to being accused of being ‘Iraqi’ fifth columnists, revealed the nature of the broader program to eradicate the Bedoun, of which the expulsion was merely one component part of a larger, ideological system (Gross, 1978, p.7; Wimmer, 2002, p.222; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.355).

7.4.2 The ‘status adjustment’ program – imposing any ‘other nationality’ but Kuwaiti.

As I have mentioned, the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program began to enforce ethnic change on the Bedoun from 1983 (see 6.1.2.5 The ‘Bedoun Bedoun’ – erased identity). Initially, the policy was implemented in relative secrecy (al Anezi, 1989, p.263, n132) in order to prevent the general public and international authorities, from realising that administrative erasure was in progress. Thus, the ‘status adjustment’ program had begun to change the identity of the Bedoun to a variety of nationality labels during and after public debates over Law 100/1980 and Law130/1986, some years before the government articulated (as far as I am aware) the notion that the Bedoun were citizens of other countries, but certainly after notable Hadar had open accused Bedouin citizens of having dual nationality. The invasion of Iraq was then used to legitimize ‘adjustment’ of Kuwait’s population (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994), and thus major population shifts and anti-Bedouin legislation that had introduced prior to the invasion, were rapidly expanded during and immediately after the invasion (Appendix F, iii), quietly ignored by the international community.

The program involved the collection of fraudulent nationality documentation from Bedoun individuals, which were then held by government in each individual's so-called ‘security files.’ Programs involved fraudulent passports from a variety of nations and affidavit declarations signed under coercion or force (Human Rights Watch, 2000, 2001; WikiLeaks U.S. Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006). The Ministry of Interior collected these documents as ‘proof’ of the Bedoun’s ‘other nationality.’ Government bureaucrats began recording the Bedoun under false nationality labels on drivers’ licences and identity cards from 1983, starting with military personnel and then all males requiring a licence (al Anezi, 1989, p263, n132). Some time later, the Ministry of Interior sent letters to all Bedoun government employees instructing them to supply ‘foreign’ passports of any kind - as long as they were not Kuwaiti - to the Ministry of Interior (al Anezi, 1989, p.266-267, n151, 152). Another part of the program was developed within the Ministry of Defence, which involved thousands of Bedoun servicemen, who were forced to sign affidavits claiming they were nationals of another countries (al Waqayan, 2009;
Beaugrand, 2010) (see Appendix E, v, vi). They had previously held Kuwaiti national passports, issued to them because they performed their military roles in Kuwait and overseas. This approach was then 'ramped up' after the war, as part of government's process of expelling the Bedoun military and police forces.

In the previous chapter, I discussed the role of the ‘status adjustment’ program in the collective ethnic and national identity of the Bedoun. The program had led to the proliferation of a new sub-group of people with erased identity, called the Bedoun Bedoun (section 6.1.2.5). These methods attempted to accumulatively cause the ‘disappearance’ of the Bedoun’s Kuwaiti identity on government records, via the use of a variety of different names for the whole group (Appendix C, i), as well as by changing individual’s family and tribal names (Table 20). I analysed the names against Professor al Waqayan’s (2009) developmental stages of Bedoun policy, which demonstrated how criminalisation was imposed through prohibitive rules and sanctions (Znaniecki, 1952a) in discrete stages (Appendix C i, ii). Criminalization was imposed not through identification of actual transgressions, but via simple labelling that transformed the Bedoun's collective identity into a transgression. The named ‘Bedoun’ was prohibited; the group were labelled ‘illegal residents.’ Later, the group were assigned ‘other nationality’ on their identity documents and government files, in order to logically justify their status as 'illegal residents.'

After the Arab Spring (2011-2012), the program expanded into a formal system of identity typing, which sorted the population into four categories of criminal types referred to as four different colours, formalising the programmed allocation ‘other nationality’ labels that had been in place since 1983 (Appendix C, iii, iv, v; Appendix E, v, vi). The policy and practices enabled population re-allocation on the National Census from ‘other Arab – unknown’ (Appendix D, iii) to other Arab – known (i.e. placement under individual, foreign citizen counts). I have not been able to establish whether the group is then actually redistributed on the National Census or are simply deleted from the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program as ‘closed’ files (see Appendix G, iii). Nevertheless, these policy developments alone are compatible with frameworks of population elimination (such as Stanton, 2004).

The procedure whereby the Apparatus and other government departments coordinated to pre-fill government-issued identity documents with the Bedoun’s ‘nationality’, was described by the Ministry of Interior in its correspondence with Human Rights Watch (2011):

The Central System, based on investigations and research, supplies the Ministry of Health (in the case of birth and death certificates) and the Ministry of Justice (in the case of marriage and divorce certificates) with an indication of the citizenship of the concerned parties. This information is recorded in the official
documents being requested. The statement of citizenship is essential on these documents and it must be supplied before they are issued. However, realistically, some individuals of this class refrain from collecting their documents as they object to the statement of citizenship found in them. The reality of the matter is that the denial comes from this class, not from the Kuwait government. (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011)

The ‘statement of citizenship’ refers to the parts on the forms which ask for the applicant to list their citizenship or nationality. The ‘indication of citizenship’ is not proof of citizenship, or a confirmation from another government’s offices. The research conducted by the Apparatus appears to be largely internal (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011), and its constant pressure on the Bedoun to procure false documentary evidence in the form of affidavits stating the signees had relinquished their citizenship rights as well as openly demanding the Bedoun aquire and submit to the Apparatus fake passports, to justify corresponding allocation of the country of the passport on registration certificates (for birth, death, marriage or divorce), attest to the fact that the ‘statement of nationality’ was a false declaration. The Ministry of the Interior’s procurement of fake passports has been a role relished by Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah in particular (see Appendix G, iii).

One of the most striking features of these actions by the government of Kuwait is that they have been rarely discussed in detail at the international level, although the practice has been frequently discussed in the Kuwaiti news media since 2012, particularly in relation to the Comoros Plan from 2014 (Sloan, November 11, 2014). The Bedoun are saturated with a steady, relentless stream of slogans by the Ministry of the Interior in Kuwait’s daily newspapers, to adjust their status, regularize their status, admit their status, or reveal their status. The newspapers have also fed progressive totals of the number of individuals who had adjusted their status from KUNA, the Kuwait government’s newsagency, to the population. The Comoros Plan has received a great deal of press, not only regarding resistance – a message that reached Western media cycle – but also many stories in which government authorities staked out the development of the program, as if to convince the Bedoun in advance, that mass identity erasure is a foregone conclusion.

According to interviewees who conveyed the accounts of their fathers, the affidavit program was implemented within a year or two after the Iraq war, after the most violent phase of ethnic cleansing had receded. The affidavit program required the Bedoun to sign affidavits declaring their nationality was not Kuwaiti (Human Rights Watch, 2000, 2001). It was also premised on the basis that individuals would submit to having their identity erased on government records and would be given a new identity to replace their ethnic identity as well as national identity. This phase of the program was organised as a citizenship
'registration' opportunity for all Bedoun, which was mixed with the official threat of mass deportation for those who did not qualify for citizenship according to the Ministry of the Interior (Human Rights Watch, 2001).

It is clear that the Bedoun did not initiate the supply of fraudulent identity documents, but were forced by government to supply them, preferably to match the nationality they had determined belonged to the Bedoun individual. The impact of the 1986 administrative expulsion and later government measures after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait (state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing) provided circumstances which made the Bedoun population easy to 'manage.' Not only were the Bedoun led into conditions in which male heads of household would relinquish their whole family's identity due to the pressures of homelessness, hunger and unemployment related to the administrative expulsion and postwar conditions (in return for meagre and humiliating handouts), but also the threat of death, heinous violence and extreme conditions of cruelty meted out by authorities, during the years of ethnic cleansing (1990-1995).

The Ministry of Interior seems to have perceived this strategy as enabling the state to actually blame the Bedoun for the state’s practice of administrative erasure, used to eradicate the population (WikiLeaks U.S. Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006). In fact, General al Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah recently affirmed his evaluation of the legitimacy of the program, specifically the element of fake passports, which he encouraged the Bedoun to hurry up and replace with new, fraudulent passports after the five-year expiry date had passed ('Bedouns to Get,' 2015). The instructions were issued because many Bedoun initially coerced or forced into submitting the fraudulent documents to the Ministry of the Interior, had since become aware of the true nature of the program and therefore, had not purchased replacement documents after the date on the first fraudulent passport they acquired, had run out. Two sisters in their thirties described their experience of having their identities officially erased by ‘status adjustment’ due to their father’s coercion by Central Apparatus authorities, to submit to the program. The first young woman was overcome with sadness in describing her seclusion from society:

P10: Its like you are a normal person. You live in this country, you love this country. But the government and some people… its like a demon. It’s really like a demon. You don’t want to interact with them about this situation. You feel you are Kuwaiti and you have the right to say you are Kuwaiti, even though the paper, the document… it says not, but you feel it. You are born in this country. It’s so emotional… like you do something wrong. I am stigmatised… I hate it. (Participant 10, interview in al Rai, Kuwait, 28 March, 2014)
Her sister, who carried the burden of financially supporting the whole family, was somewhat more resilient because she was tied to her social role through professional work and academic activities. She felt ashamed of being abused by others, as it reflected the low standard of society’s behaviour toward the Bedoun:

P11: It’s different for me because… if anyone asks me about my nationality, I answer ‘I am Kuwaiti.’ It’s different for me. Because no one has the right to take this, to take this from me. It’s no one’s right. So for me… I have feelings of shame of not being Kuwaiti because people, they treat me this way. (Participant 11, interview in al Rai, Kuwait, 28 March, 2014)

The fake documents demanded by the Minsitry of Interior for ‘status adjustment’ were either organised directly by bureaucratic staff, or by agents to whom the Bedoun were referred to by government authorities at the offices of the Central Apparatus (WikiLeaks U.S. Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006). The impact of this fraudulent document industry in Kuwait on international document and migration flows, for which Kuwait’s Ministry of Interior is responsible (see also al Waqayan in interview with Beaugrand, 2010, and Abrahamian, 2015), is worth considering. Affluent citizens and other nationals in Kuwait who can more readily access and use these documents due to their comparatively greater mobility and affluence than the Bedoun.

The most common nationalities related to the transnational tribal dirah in the Middle East. The nationalities all happened to be the areas of the traditional dirah of ‘northern tribes’ – covering tribal lands of the Middle East but omitting parts of Saudi Arabia and Yemen to the south, in relation to Kuwait’s geographical location. The countries in which these areas of land were located were emphasised as the Bedoun’s ‘original nationality’ by the Supreme Planning Council working with the special Academic Team for Population Policy. The ‘academic team’ comprised Hadar intellectuals from the ‘elite’ families, including those with both Kuwaiti nationalist and Arab nationalist interests, including Abdullah al Ghonaim and Shamlan Alessa (al Ramadhan, 1995).

The contribution of intellectual leaders is a necessary component of the development of new ideologies. These individuals design the systems of ideas that are then disseminated by professional propagandists until they are absorbed by the general population (Znaniecki, 1952b). The Academic Team for Population Policy held considerable influence over the National Council (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1995) during the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun and Palestinian populations involving hundreds of thousands of people. The development of the population policy by the Academic Team coincided with scripted ethnic cleansing propaganda issued by government authorities (see Appendix F, iii). The possibility that the ‘status adjustment’ program, the 1986 administrative expulsion
measures and the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun and Palestinians were all policies designed by the Academic Team for Population Policy seems quite possible. This area of anti-Bedouin policy and Bedoun targeting warrants further investigation in connection with to the overall population reduction of the Bedoun during last twenty-five years, as it appears that the policy was integral to the implementation of state crimes against the Bedoun.

7.4.3 The ideology of the northern tribes 'enemy' - everyday social encounters.

The findings of this study showed that ethnic targeting was linked to the ideological motifs of the desert dweller and the northern tribes’ Bedouin, although further research would be required to demonstrate to what degree the ideology has been adopted by the general population. A female interviewee in her thirties explained the how preoccupation with the northern tribes was experienced in social encounters,

P17: Because Bedoun must become from the tribal, still they coming to look at itself, look to itself as modern people and tribal people, like Bedouin people and civilised people.

And even the Bedu people they look which country, you are from this country, from the north or the south? And, if you are from the north, from which part?

… you are from the north, problem… they look to distinguish the Bedu, and then to distinguish you to the north. Then they relate it to your religious background… this is a problem. (Participant 17, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)

She described the impact of this criminalising form of marginalisation on the Bedoun as leading to lack of disclosure of identity in public, which accounted for the seclusion from society of many Bedoun, due to their feelings of stigmatisation. She explained the process she and others had experienced in interactions with the Hadar, who attempted to confirm whether or not they were from the northern tribes, through the individual’s accent or appearance. In turn, the impact on the Bedoun was for them to avoid social interactions altogether:

P17: I know because some people that try to hide this from others, they are pretending they are from different backgrounds… or from a different sect. They avoid going into situations that will deal with this thing. Because they feel maybe they will deal with them in a different way. They think like you, maybe you are from this background, maybe you don’t believe in God. Or if you are from the north you are not Kuwaiti, or there is nothing that makes you look like Kuwaiti. They will look at you… like you don’t have the full right because you have the north background, your roots are from the north.
So they… look to people with this conflict based on background.  
(Participant 17, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)

A member of a different northern tribe explained that accent and dialect remain extremely important markers of identity in Kuwaiti society, thought they were known by the Bedoun to be unreliable markers of identity:

P05: I have many friends who speak different dialects. Nobody can deny this, that we don’t speak the same.

SK: So it there a different dialect for each tribe? Is that how it works?

P05: No, no I wouldn’t say for each tribe. The southern tribes use the same dialect. The northern tribes use another same dialect.

SK: People of the sea, who live by the sea [as he had referred to them] use a different dialect?

P05: Yeah, yeah.

SK: You mean the Hadar, the people by the sea?

P05: Yes.

SK: They have their own? The Bedu, the ones who lived further out, they have their own?

P05: Yeah. Ah, even in the Badu there are different dialects but they are not that different from each other…

SK: So they are similar but just slightly changed among families?

P05: Yes.  (P05, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, March 15, 2015)

The interviewee linked the accusations of the Bedoun as ‘Iraqi’ nationals and wartime sympathisers with belonging to the northern tribes and northern tribes dialect (discussed above):

P05: Hadar always make comment, ‘Your language is Iraqi.’ It is not. It is not, it is just prejudice. It’s nothing wrong with the Iraq language, but they say this specifically about the language to discriminate against us.

When some Kuwaitis make these comments I think he is trying to prove from this comment that this person is not Kuwaiti he is Iraqi [and] he should not speak this way.
I have some friends who speak Kuwaiti dialect better than the Kuwaiti themselves. (Participant 05, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

The ideology appeared to have been absorbed in a very general way, across all sections of society, reinforced in the academic literature by scholars who later synthesized aspects of this propaganda into their writings about the Bedoun (see Chapter 2). Tensions between the northern and southern tribes over their own origins, were influenced by this ideology. Some interviewees explained that the attribution of the northern tribes was projected onto Bedouin individuals, regardless of whether or not such individuals were actually derived from the northern tribal groups, looked, or sounded like a Bedoun (P05, P13, P19). The absorption of the ideology of the northern tribes associated with the ‘enemy’ even by some citizens of the southern tribes, was explained succinctly:

P05: Because here you have the problem. If you are Bedoun from the Northern tribes, if you talk to the Kuwaitis from southern tribes, he will say, you know, ‘Maybe he is Iraqi.’ (Participant 05, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

The subjective nature of these markers goes without saying. Another example is the use of a stigmatising term for the northern tribes, the moaidi. Participant 19 introduced the term to me, in December 2015. The association was quite different to the war-related issues, but it still focused on the northern tribes and the area of Iraq nearby to Kuwait, around Basra, and a tribe with which many Bedoun are affiliated, the D’afiri. The example shows the way in which the ideology is informed by all manner of ideas that can be connected to the key, basic concepts through a network of local meanings that are known to insiders in the culture, while outsiders may not recognize them until the connections are explicitly drawn.

The Moaidi refers to village-dwelling tribes, or the Marsh tribes (also known as the riverine tribes) (Ingham 1986), who lived in southern Iraq. The D’afiri tribe were known to spend some part of their nomad route along rivers in Iraq where they watered their stock, then made their way to the grassland steppe and desert of the Gulf (Ingham 1986). Ingham (1986, p.1) found some relationship between the dialects spoken between the riverine Bedouin and the D’afiri. According to the interviewee (P19), this term was used in Kuwait to stigmatise the accent of particular northern tribes. The participant who described this motif was a member of the D’afiri tribes himself, but he was unaware that Ingham (1986) had referred to his own tribal background in connection with the example he provided to me. The term moaidi is socially powerful because it refers to a tribal group that was not regarded as transnational or desert-dwelling, unlike the tribes of Kuwait, but was regarded a tribe isolated in Iraq, with which the D’afiri mixed. It also disparages the pride of the desert-
dwelling Bedouin in their heritage (*Badiat al Kuwayt*, the ‘desert dwellers’ of Kuwait), by
implying they lived permanently on or near the water rather than in the desert.

In this instance, the demeaning meanings of ‘desertization’ (Ghabra, 1997a, p.61, 612, n20, 1997b, p.366-267; Tétreault, 2001, p.205, 208, 210, 214, 216; 2003, p.228) and
‘desert dwellers’ deployed by ‘elite’ Hadar merchant representative Walid Gharabally
(‘Mussalam al-Barrack,’ 2015) were inverted. The Bedouin are ridiculed for not being from
the desert, yet not ‘urbanised’ *enough* via their location in villages, to be acceptable (the
attraction of the term ‘urbanite’ to Hadar scholars comes to mind). Instead, the moaidi is too
close to the river lands, representing the semi-nomadic phase between nomadism and
urbanisation. Generally speaking, the Bedoun vernacular, is perceived to be equivalent to
‘Iraqi’ or even ‘you are only Iraqi,’ because in the Kuwaiti context, the term conveniently
*imagines* Bedouin ancestry exclusive to tribal ground in Iraq only, and not in Saudi Arabia or
any the other countries over which the tribe’s *dirah* was spread.

Through this meaning, the exclusive association with the northern tribal dirah is
invoked, with equivalence to ‘northern tribes’ or ‘only the northern tribes’ (Participant 19,
interview, 29 February, 2016), further reinforcing the idea that all Bedoun are, even today,
‘Iraqi.’ The theme of defence against a common enemy (Znaniecki, 1952b) is a form of
nationalist propaganda that promotes the dominant group as superior (p.88), ‘good,’ ‘true,’
and always ‘right’ (p.97). Defensive solidarity stimulates ordinary people to fear outsiders
and adopt increasingly conservative values and attitudes in response, which in turns
strengthens group solidarity and notions of superiority (Znaniecki, 1952a). These
characteristics of social reinforcement may help those who abuse the Bedoun to feel
justified, because they are able to rationalise their abuse within the logic of their own values,
which conform to ideological foundations of the conservatively organised cultural system.

7.5 The significance of the concept of northern and southern tribes

In Chapter 6, I theorised the multiple identifications of the Bedoun according to the
ethnic theory of Felix Gross (1978), which encompassed the Kuwaiti national identity
(section 6.1.2.1), the Bedouin identity (6.1.2.2), the northern and southern tribal identity
(6.1.2.3), the Bedouin identity and the Bedouin Bedouin (erased) identity (6.1.2.5). I indicated
that certain scholarly work discussed the southern tribes in contrast to the northern tribes,
some times explicitly, and sometimes implicitly. For example, as I have mentioned, Longva
(2006) omitted the Bedouin altogether in her article *Nationalism in pre-modern guise: The
discourse on Hadar and Badu in Kuwait*, while conveying a rather implicit representation of
the Bedouin of the southern tribes: ‘the term badu designates a specific group of newcomers:
these are immigrants, mostly from Saudi Arabia... they moved to Kuwait between 1960 and
1980.’ The general Hadar narrative typically portrays the deserts of Kuwait prior to 1920
(the cut off date for settlement in the *Nationality Law, 1959*) as *terra nullius*, or almost *terra
nullius in an attempt to exalt the mythological ‘city state’ (al Naqeeb, 1990; al Nakib, F., 2010, 2013) of those who lived behind the old city wall (the Hadar enclave) to mystical proportions. The motif is a well known symbol of nationalist ideology (Smith, 1986, 1991; Znaniecki, 1952a, 1952b). Clearly, this account does not sufficiently convey the complexity of the tribal origins of the Hadar themselves, and their subsequent ethnic differentiation, details which Hakeem al Fadhli emphasised in his interviews with me (see Chapter 8). Other authors have traced the history of the Bedouin ‘arrivals’ in Kuwait from the 1930s and 1940s (Asmar, 1990; Hill, 1969) but they did not discuss the northern-southern groups. Beaugrand (2010), discussed the northern tribes, but she failed to connect the significance of both the northern and southern tribes’ identity to Hadar nationalist ideology and aggression.

In Kuwaiti scholarly literature (most of it unpublished), descriptions of the southern tribes involved their taking up employment in Kuwait Oil Company, along with the northern tribes being brought to Kuwait by sheiks on behalf of government, and selected by government committee to join the military and police (al Fayez, 1984; Alhajeri, 2004). The difference between the two was not entirely clear, as some members of the southern tribes also appeared to join the public service (al Haddad, 1981). Members of the northern tribes were later moved to Taima and Sulabiya with citizens, and given contracts stating they were the owners of their houses, confirming their access to citizenship rights (al Zaher, 1990). Some of this group received citizenship, but it appears that the vast majority did not (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). Bedouin who lived at al Magwa (near Kuwait Oil Company) received citizenship at a higher rate than those at al Jahra, but still the majority appeared to be systematically deprived of nationality (al Moosa, 1976). On balance, it appears more likely that the majority of the Bedouin comprised members of the northern tribes, or at least one group in particular: the group of around 35,000 identified as qualified to receive citizenship in 1992 who are now designated as ‘green’ by the Central Apparatus (‘Color ID Cards,’ 2012; Saleh, May 2, 2012).

The difference between the northern and southern tribes was further elaborated during national debates over Law 130/1986, which were focused on the criminality of dual citizenship among existing citizens under the Constitution (al Anezi, 1989). According to al Anezi’s (1989) account of the national political debate that took place during the 1980s, the claim that the Kuwaiti Bedouin were citizens of other countries was directed at Kuwaiti citizens of the southern tribes prior to it becoming the dominant ideological motif directed at the Bedouin of the northern tribes. This factor provides new insight into the victimisation of the Bedouin. The matter of dual citizenship concerned grants received by the Ajman tribe, who share close family connections with the ruling families of both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (al Haddad, 1981). Ultimately the claim that they held citizenship in other countries was projected onto them through the ‘other national’ identity ideology, in order to prevent the
Bedouin from receiving voting rights equal to the Hadar ‘originals,’ extending their waiting period for voting rights thirty years after receiving second-degree citizenship (without voting rights). Citizens of the Mutairi tribe were also accused of the same during the Arab Spring (‘Insulted Kuwaiti,’ 2012).

This factor illustrates that the claim the Bedouin are not ‘real’ Kuwaitis is part of a continuously recycled ideology aimed at all tribes - including the largest, citizen-dominant tribes in Kuwait - and not just the Bedouin, as a stateless group, or ‘lower’ tribes (Longva, 2006). Additionally, Law 100/1980 concerned the Bedouin, and their unexpected submission of citizenship applications in response to a government pledge citizenship would at last be granted to them. The Bedouin were also accused of having citizenship elsewhere, mirroring the idea that the Bedouin citizens of Kuwait had citizenship elsewhere. Ultimately, it was shown that the Ministry of the Interior simply never processed Bedouin citizenship applications (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Thus, the use of the same ideology of ‘other nationality’ to target the Bedouin of any tribal ‘origins,’ from either the north or the south.

In other words, the ideology of the Bedouin as not ‘real’ or ‘true’ Kuwaiti cannot be separated from its application to the Bedouin community in general, as the ideology is deployed to target the Bedouin using both the contemporary (citizens and stateless) and customary (the northern and southern tribes) state frameworks. Crucially in section 7.3, we saw that this also applied to the concept of the ‘original’ Kuwaiti citizen. Essentially, the northern tribes have been generalised as the unwanted, perhaps even hated, ‘illegal residents,’ while southern tribes have been generalised as the naturalized citizens ‘undeserving’ of citizenship. Both are not ‘real’ Kuwaitis, according to Hadar public discourse. Suspicion of dual citizenship was not only attached to the Ajman tribe, which scholars have focused on (referencing just one study, al Haddad, 1981, as I explained in Chapter 2), overlooking the fact that this assumption is generalised in Hadar hate-speech directed to all of the southern tribes and all of the northern tribes.

These concepts linked to Bedouin identity in Kuwait has also formed a key source of propaganda in the Bedouin’s criminalisation, even though the notion first arose from Hadar attempts to exclude citizen Bedouin from receiving first-degree citizenship. Hate-speech has been deployed in very public demands that all Bedouin in Kuwait should be forced to have DNA tests to prove if they are ‘true’ Kuwaitis (‘Kuwaiti Bedouin,’ 2009; ‘Insulted Kuwaiti,’ 2012). The public questioning of all Bedouin’s right to citizenship in Kuwait is a virtually constant political strategy (Alhajeri, 2004, p.16) deployed to politically destabilize Kuwait. In August 2016, it was suggested that hundreds of thousands of the citizen population should be stripped of their citizenship (‘Tuwaijri: Hundreds,’ 2016).

From the 1990s, Western scholars have not explicitly acknowledged that the Bedouin were predominantly from the northern tribes, although it is likely that anthropologists and
political scientists in particular, were quite aware of this fact (since they consistently theorised the citizen Bedouin as southern tribal people). Instead, they cast aspersions on the Bedouin as *citizens or nationals* of other countries associated with the northern tribes’ traditional dirah, following government policy. The northern tribal identity of the Bedouin was omitted from references to the Bedouin, although it was conceded that some Bedouin were present in the territory of Kuwait prior to 1920 (Longva, 1997). A consistent analysis would have described the Bedouin as the northern tribal people and not as an ‘other nationality’ group (since there was no proof of this), just as the southern tribal group was described according to their tribal origins. Scholars have failed to acknowledge this factor - the similarity of the ideologies directed toward the Kuwaiti Bedouin, both citizen and stateless. One interviewee (P12) explained that the ideology was continually promoted in the media until it had saturated the citizen population, to the extent that some still accused the longest-standing indigenous desert dwellers of Kuwait of being imposters (al Nakib, F., 2014) who entered the country during the Iraqi invasion:

P12: Are you from, your father… maybe your father from the foreigners… soldier from Iraq and keep here [stayed in Kuwait], and [I say] ‘What?’ …[and they reply] ‘Maybe your father is from Iraq soldier and keep in Kuwait? … And because the government again and again in newspaper and media… (Participant 12, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 1 April, 2014)

Instead, portrayals of the Bedouin in the academic literature have been characterised by the representation of a 'social group' comprising a myriad of exceptional cases rather than general phenomena in the literature when authors attempted to explain the Bedouin's situation (Crystal, 1992, 1995; Longva, 1997; Beaugrand, 2014a). The Bedouin 'other' has therefore been emphasised, overshadowing the similarity of ethnic targeting strategies used against both the stateless and citizen members of the Kuwaiti Bedouin tribes. This has made the Bedouin group appear to be heterogeneous, isolated strangers, downplaying the fact that the Bedouin and citizens have been members of the same families since the time that the first citizenship distribution by the state left half of the Bedouin without citizenship (the Bedouin). Simultaneously, the southern tribes were described as a homogenous group of citizens whose origins were Saudi Arabian, who encroached upon the Hadar, taking up nationality though it was ‘undeserved’ and detrimental for 'urban' culture (al Naqeeb, 1990; Crystal, 1990; Ghabra, 1997a). The approach has de-emphasised the positive and constructive aspects of ethnic solidarity among the tribes, and functioned as a barrier to in-depth analysis of Kuwaiti society.

Scholars routinely observe Hadar concerns about the number of citizenship grants being distributed to the southern tribes after Kuwait’s independence, but discussion of the
northern tribes is omitted (it is virtually non-existent). According to the approach, the northern tribes need not be mentioned in the same context, because they are merely Bedoun who have already been cast out never to receive citizenship. Due to their perceived status, they may be described as strangers (for example, Longva, 1997), enemies (Crystal, 2005), members of inferior tribes (al Nakib, 2016) socially and culturally disconnected from the ‘superior’ southern tribal people (Beaugrand, 2010, p.18) and/or omitted from discussion of the Bedouin altogether (Longva, 2006). This research challenges the current paradigm used to describe Kuwaiti society. I suggest that Kuwait’s Bedouin population should be conceived of as a dynamic social and cultural system (Znaniecki, 1952a, 1954) including both northern and southern sub-groups that coexist within individual tribal units and confederations. The Bedoun were previously known as members of the main tribes of Kuwait (al Anezi, 1989, p.263).

Both individual tribes and confederations may be viewed as having dynamically blended to achieve a functional level of ethnic and social integration, with some tribal units achieving social integration at the level of the nuclear and extended family level. Others have increased their (ethnic) distance from each other at the intra-tribal level (among northern and southern tribal members of the same groups for example) and inter-tribal level (loosening bonds with other tribes within or between confederations and other units, for example). Without including the Bedoun in the social and cultural Bedouin population of Kuwait, the policy of segregation is realised in the academic discourse, re-created by scholars. This approach is becoming increasingly explicit, articulated in statements referring to the omission of Bedoun from research of the Kuwaiti Bedouin, and non-nationals (in al Nakib, F., 2014 and Shah, 2013, respectively) whereas in the past, the Bedoun were consistently included in Kuwaiti research in discussions of the Bedouin community.

Crucially, as Hakeem al Fadhli (interview, 3 August, 2014) pointed out, the current perspective on the northern and southern tribes of Kuwait explains very clearly why both groups are perpetually accused by local scholars and politicians of not being ‘real’ or ‘true’ Kuwaitis by the Hadar, despite the significant difference in legal and social status between the two groups (the southerners tend to be citizens, the northerners tend to be stateless Kuwaiti Bedoun). The Hadar do not accept either group. Overall, interviewee accounts given by Bedoun individuals who had no relationship to each other, were remarkably similar in describing the tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963, p.4) that was applied to them by others, in the most literal sense. The tribal stigma was associated with both the ‘desert dweller’ identity – the Bedouin in general (remembering the traditional term is the ‘desert dweller of Kuwait’) and also regarding the northern tribal identity. However, stigmatisation was intensified for the northern tribes, due to its conflation with the ‘Iraqi’ ‘other national’ identity. Additionally, the northern tribes identity had been clearly delineated in
stigmatizing government discourse (as the ‘cleansing’ and ‘purification’ ethnic target, discussed above) and academic discourse (see Appendices C, vi to viii).

This powerful, tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963) lies at the core of the anti-Bedouin ideology. Hakeem Al Fadhli described the division between the tribes wherein the southern tribes are assumed to be citizens and the northern tribes are assumed to be Bedouin, accounting for the local and historical context. He noted that this was a general and taken-for-granted assumption, emanating from the initial periods of recruitment of the northern tribes to the military and police services. However, while the assumption did not emerge until the 1990s, he also pointed out that scholars had not taken into account in any kind of detailed fashion, the positive social dynamics of the tribes over the last twenty-five years that pointed to their integration. Al Fadhli (interview, 3 August, 2015) confirmed this ideology predominated social relations for the Bedouin community and the Bedouin in particular, especially since the Arab Spring (2011-2012). First he responded to the notion the Bedouin are not ‘real’ Kuwaitis (Alhajeri, 2004, p.16):

Yes, first of all when we are, when we want to talk about this, it is an issue, it is true, it is there, especially for the last three or four years, it was here in the community. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

He provided an example the enduring Hadar nationalist perception of Kuwaiti society fed through the media, personified by the government-sponsored public figure Mohammed Juwaheil. The Hadar nationalist narrative is continually broadcast to provoke ongoing conflict between Hadar and Bedouin in Kuwait, and usually delivered in the most divisive terms possible. Juwaheil promulgated the nationalist narrative that set out the absence of the Bedouin as ‘real’ members of Kuwaiti society, the ‘originals,’ and the desirability of their exclusion from nation:

… the origins of the families in Kuwait and that there is no bedu, and he is against Bedu, and there is only families in Kuwait… which is inside… al Sour… the wall of Kuwait. And whoever is enclosed inside the wall, he is an original Kuwaiti.

And whoever is outside the wall, he is not a Kuwaiti, [but] is an outsider, an intruder.. And this [has] included the Bedouin tribes and the Bedoun. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

I have pointed out that ethnic exclusion of the Bedouin was integral to the nationalist policy platform in Kuwait from 1965 (al Mdaires, 2010). This factor may help to explain why ethnic hatred toward the Bedouin expressed openly in public forums by figures such as
Juwaheil (WikiLeaks U.S. Embassy Cable 09Kuwait1204 (2009, December 22), has become acceptable to the Hadar, reflecting the status quo of their political and social domination which can be contrasted with the oppression of freedom of expression of the Bedouin (see Chapter 8 for further discussion of this point). These hatreds continue to be circulated among the general public at the grassroots, including the persistence of the idea that the Bedouin are racially and/or culturally inferior to the metropolitan Hadar (Dashti, et al., 2014).

Arguably, the recycling of these ideas and their proliferation into new concepts, originating from the core set of concepts encompassing a specific anti-race and anti-cultural ideology (extreme nationalism and local anti-Bedouin ideology emanating from interpretations of tribalism theory), may be viewed as forming a continuum of violent language and negation signifying genocidal intent (Townsend, 2014), occasionally boiling over into a 'genocidal crescendo' (Arnaut, 2006) provoking protest or violent reactions among ordinary Kuwaitis. Arnaut (2006) emphasised that dehumanising hate speech is not only delivered via crass language but also appears in ‘well-crafted, reflective and even compassionate text’ (p.118). Herein lies the power of the Hadar domination over the production of knowledge about race, ethnicity and nationality in Kuwait (Appendix C, vi-viii):

When we survey modern literature about nationalities, we discover that many authors treat a cultural nationality as almost coextensive with a race, implicitly or explicitly assuming that a distinct culture must be the product of a distinct race… Apparently, those who use it are unaware that the identification of race was initiated by nationalistic ideologists who used the term ‘race’ with evaluative connotations, postulating the inequality of races and claiming that the people who belonged to their own nationality were racially superior to people of other nationalities. (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.88)

Znaniecki (1952b, p.88) referred to this phenomenon as the myth of racial unity and superiority. Gross (1978, 1998) drew the same conclusions regarding the concept of ethnicity, where one ethnicity was substituted for a national identification and other ethnic groups were expected to comply with it. This form of mono-ethnic nationalism permits ethnic domination and therefore, protracted social inequalities and gross human rights atrocities committed against minority groups (Edayat, 2014; Gross, 1998).

Hakeem al Fadhli (interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015) responded to the notion that the Hadar believed the Bedouin should never have been given citizenship grants from the government of Kuwait at all, regardless of their legal entitlement to it, which was documented by Abdullah Alhajeri (2004, p.16). The symbolic role of the Bedouin being deprived of citizenship is thus central to the broader ethnic conflict between Bedouin and
Hadar. As to the Hadar’s resentment of the Bedouin citizens participating in the state of Kuwait,

In general, I agree with Dr Alhajeri, his thesis, in general the idea itself… from my own experience, I can testify that there is discrimination against the Bedouin and it is, there is a dark feeling, which is the Bedouin should not come to Kuwait and this is a mistake to give us nationality… that feeling is there.

You should know something, that this discrimination in Kuwait it is in the core, in the core of society.

He added,

I believe that I am a citizen, that I am a national of my country, and I believe there is discrimination against the Bedouin... the tribal Bedouin. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

The sentiment toward not giving the Bedouin citizenship due to their tribal identity and culture, because giving any Bedouin citizenship was ‘a mistake’ in Kuwait (Alhajeri, 2004, p.16), has been widely articulated in Kuwait. The Bedouin were perceived as ‘undeserving’ due to their cultural inferiority, ‘disloyal,’ wartime ‘traitors,’ of ‘other nationality’ and so on (see Appendix C, iv-vii) making up the key features of a local, anti-Bedouin ideology.

Despite this, Al Fadhli (interview, 3 August, 2015) emphasised that beyond the strategies of political and social division that were undertaken at the elite level by the ‘original’ Hadar and their proxies, the tribal cultural system has remained relatively functional and unified. He pointed out that tribal relations between the northern and southern groups had remained characterised by social cooperation, resource sharing and a desire for stable social life respecting traditional cultural values, which is why social relationships, intermarriage and diwanniya still took place between them.

The interviewee explained that the basis of this system was founded on the tribes' equal status prior to the intervention of government in the modern era, which had led to the exploitation of both groups for different aims: one used for vote-casting (the southern tribes), and the other for public service, protecting the nation (the northern tribes). That is not to say that the picture was only one of positive integration, as the stigmatisation of the Bedouin and fear among citizens has created some degree of aversion of the Bedouin even among some family members, as well as within tribal social networks. But overall, the cultural system showed signs of being active, resilient and consolidating in new ways, despite the oppressive and destructive influence of oppressive social relations with the Hadar and imposed,
government restrictions which impacted the cultural system as a whole. To put it another way, the stigmatisation and fear of association of the stateless group which erodes social relations between some of tribal groups over time, was counterbalanced by integrative social practices among other tribal groups who consciously choose to continue or even to renew their positive relationships and to consolidate in solidarity with the Bedoun.

Conclusion

This chapter concerned the social exclusion and ethnic targeting of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society. Ethnic and non-ethnic identities and the cultural patterning of social interactions were discussed in the relation to the interviewee's descriptions of their social interactions with citizens. I set out the nature of cultural patterning that characterised these social interactions. In relation to discrimination of the Bedoun on the basis of their origins as desert dwellers, I discussed the role of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) and Decree 5/1960 in creating a social environment that enabled the Hadar to grant themselves ‘original’ citizenship and the Bedouin of the northern tribes (who subsequently became known as the Bedoun) to be deprived of citizenship, despite both groups not necessarily having sufficient documentation under the law to establish proof of residence in Kuwait. This crucial matter not only frames the Bedoun as targets of ethnic persecution, it may lie at the core of the ethnic conflict responsible for the state’s failure to provide the Bedoun citizenship.

I attempted to show that the ideology responsible for the persecution of the Bedoun have historically targeted the whole Kuwaiti Bedouin population, with the Bedoun becoming selected targets of more extreme forms of ethnic exclusion and violence after the 1980s. As I have indicated above, the two general themes targeting the Bedouin (section 7.2.1, Table 22) appear to have merged over time, to form a tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963) particular to Kuwaiti society. Importantly, these ideological themes were also linked to themes arising from academic and public discourses, especially the Orientalist and developmental theory approaches to the Bedouin, arising in tribalism theory (these findings are discussed in the following chapter, in section 8.4.1, including Table 26).

But I have also argued that the power of these themes or motifs is that they also feature important, localised historical and cultural content that increases their meaning and value to the actors involved, which have also influenced the way in which the Bedoun have been regarded and treated by others (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.245). The role of theorisation of the northern and southern Bedouin tribes of Kuwait in controlling perceptions about the Bedouin population, and in aiding the suppression of information about the central role of the Bedoun in ethnic conflict between Bedouin and Hadar was outlined in this context. The chapter concluded by emphasising that positive, functional social organisation persisted in the Bedouin community. The Bedouin retained relatively close, though gradually diminishing, social relations with citizens, and as peaceful co-existence as possible.
Chapter 8
Discussion of Intellectual Identity, Education and Cultural Re-organisation of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti Society

The new generation is different from the older generation. They want to change... they have visions outside. They are aware of what they should be.

(Participant 5, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the development of the intellectual ideal (Halas, 2010, p.201; Znaniecki, 1952b, p.100), which was highly valued by the research participants. Most of the research respondents had begun to articulate an intellectual identity, developed via their progression through advanced, technical and higher education studies or involvement in professional or other social leadership roles. Participation in post-secondary education fulfilled very personal and positive values and aspirations. I explain how creative, social organisation within the broader Bedouin collective has become evident in the community’s social actions, attempting to advocate for and to organise the increased activity of the Bedoun in society, especially toward the participation of all young Bedoun in education.

In this chapter, I also consider the issue of freedom of expression in Kuwaiti society, and the development of the Bedoun’s intellectual leadership group since the Arab Spring (2011-2012). The discussion focuses on the cultural context and nature of government restrictions that target the group on the basis of identity, including ethnic identity and the criminalised 'activist' identity associated by government with discussion of the Bedoun's human rights. It also focuses on the nature of restrictions on freedom of expression of the Bedouin as part of a continuum of extreme forms of ethnic targeting.

Despite restrictions on education, intellectual leaders in the community worked in a variety of areas, including creative writing, journalism, and research, among others. The targeting of Bedoun intellectual leaders and social activists due to their ethnic identity occurred in particular ways that set them out from all other groups. This emerged as a major problem for the Bedoun beyond generalised 'discrimination' related to their stateless status. This form of ethnic targeting was part of the historical repression of their intellectual growth as a collective, which was formulated as part of the 'manpower' policy of Alessa (1981). For example, they were most acutely targeted regarding their public communications of their own identity and culture. In contrast, the Hadar did not suffer from restrictions on their expression about the same topics, but were instead indulged with generous public acclaim (I provide examples below).

The expansion of the Bedoun's intellectual values and identification with new ideas and modes of thought was provoked by the Arab Spring. These new forms of identification
were linked to an awareness of the universal values of human rights, prompted by increased contacts with the international community. Contacts occurred via social media, international humanitarian organisations, journalists and academics. Consciousness of international human rights law had increased the interviewees’ awareness of that their collective oppression was considered as unlawful in other countries and cultural contexts. They had begun to develop a new vision for society, investing into their own cultural system through their personal growth, new identifications, and transmission of new systems of thought. Such new ideas could change their personal outlooks and ideological perspectives through cross-fertilization with the citizen society from which they were restricted, and the cultures transmitted by their new contacts situated in other cultural settings (Znaniecki, 1952a). Overall, the group experiences were indicative of the value of personal, intellectual growth leading to an expansion of culture, despite the extraordinary challenges they faced.

It would be premature to surmise that the participants’ intellectual identity had eroded or replaced their traditional, cultural identity. Rather, the Bedoun interviewees appeared to have identified with certain, complementary aspects of both forms of identity, which facilitated their integration of the intellectual ideal into the personality (Gross, 1978). The values of altruism, social cooperation, and solidarity were expressed readily in relation to the educational ideal and intellectual identity, through self-education and knowledge of the formal principles of universal human rights. Arguably however, these values were already present in their tribal culture, expressed as concern for others, collective aspirations and goals and wasṭa, the use of social influence to aid others. I briefly compare the intergenerational social solidarity felt among the interviewees to the Palestinian principle of sumud, which means ‘steadfast’ or ‘steadfast perseverance’ (Shehadeh, in Said, 1986). I also explain the special features of social participation described by the research participants as ‘active citizenship’ (Bayat, 2013, p.313) and the praxis of ‘true generosity’ (Freire, 1970) (in section 8.1.3).

According to Guibernau (2004), the importance of cultural identity, ethnic and social bonds tends to be increased among stateless collectives in the absence of government protections or victimisation. When we combine this factor with the characteristic tribal social solidarities (asabiya) of Bedouin communities in the Middle East (Gross, 1998), the increase in knowledge of concepts of human rights among citizen Bedouin (al Rasheed, 2015) and the (stateless) Bedoun members of their families, they may be regarded as having a mutually reinforcing effect on social cohesion.

8.1 The Growth of Intellectual Identity and the Ideal of Education

8.1.1 The historical, social context of the Bedoun in education.

Official information on the Bedoun’s participation in education, such as enrolment and completion numbers, is not published by the state. This is not because information is not
collected from educational institutions or students. Data on Bedoun participation in education and intellectual activity is rigorously monitored and collected by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Awqaf and the Central Apparatus, and collected from every educational institution in Kuwait. Government reports vaguely report on Bedoun education, offering data that obscures rather than clarifies, participation.

For example, internal transfer of monies shifted around various government departments are purported to be the direct indicators of public participation in education, in reports to the United Nations (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). I have called the fund the ‘Education Fund’ for the purpose of this study, although it is sometimes passed off as a ‘charity’ organisation, it functions under the auspices of government. The Education Fund was claimed to provide for education exclusively for the Bedoun population (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Despite this, it has historically funded all ‘needy’ expatriates of non-Kuwaiti nationalities in Kuwait (National Report on Education 2004-2008, 2008). The numbers of education ‘service’ users (students) are disproportionately low across the Bedoun population, with children’s schooling reported in interdepartmental reimbursements for ‘illegal residents’ (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015), indicating that much of the Education Fund is spent on the children of other national expatriates in Kuwait, while large portions of the Bedoun population appear to still be systematically deprived of basic schooling.

Mapping out quantitative data on Bedoun participation is complex and difficult, due to lack of data and the obscuration of real measures. Even local insiders with privileged access to the education system (Khandari, 2013) cannot obtain substantive, consistent internal reporting data from the Ministry of Education, upon which any kind of clear or consistent picture of what the public education sector is actually achieving, could be based. The limits of knowledge at the official level about the Bedoun’s participation in education were analysed in Appendix G, ii.

The historical background to this problem was also highly relevant to the Bedoun’s experience of participation in society as an indigenous group and as a minority group, in the present day. Khandari (2013) illustrated bureaucratic isolation within all government departments involved with the provision of education. Supreme Planning Council control had all but crippled the Ministry of Education’s management of the public education system, while most (but not all) Hadar have historically accessed an entirely different quality of education via private providers and/or overseas (Yanai, 2014). This has enabled the Hadar to consolidate on their unique, cultural privileges in Kuwaiti society, and reinforcing the group’s power to maintain ethnic boundaries. On the other hand, depriving the Bedoun of education was an integral aspect of the policy to deprive the Bedoun of citizenship, while inhibiting the growth of their collective, political consciousness, as part of the anti-Bedouin policy (Alessa, 1981, later expounded by al Naqeeb, 1990, as part of his philosophy of
distinguishing 'tribal consciousness'). The policy was designed not only to force as many Bedoun out of Kuwait as possible to leave Kuwait (depriving them of access to basic public resources), but also to ensure that those who remained would be maintained in the state as an illiterate masse. In turn, the Hadar merchant elite would be enabled to exploit the population economically and maintain their dominant position.

As I have already discussed, the ‘status adjustment’ program of identity erasure and ‘Kuwaitization’ policy were introduced in 1983 and 1985, followed by administrative expulsion in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003). The different policies were a natural fit, so to speak, as if designed to reduce the Bedoun into an underpaid, underemployed, unofficial, ‘illegal’ workforce, while boosting Kuwaiti nationalist sentiment (Stanton Russell, 1989). Thus, while the ideal of international-standard education was prized by nationalists of both Kuwaiti nationalist and Arab nationalist persuasion (al Mdaires, 2010), the deprivation of education was used as a weapon to cripple the Bedouin population in general, and the Bedoun in particular. In fact, scholarly dialogues issued at the time, indicated that this level of ‘expert’ thinking was involved in the policy planning to make sure that the Bedouin’s intellectual development would remain severely limited (Appendix C, vi to viii). This kind of planning appeared to be quite similar to the expert-level theoretical knowledge expressed in ethnic targeting policies such as the removal of the Bedoun’s names (see Chapter 6, Table 20).

Al Nakib, F. (2014) acknowledged that the first generation of the Bedouin broadly participating in higher education are still at university, at present. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later renamed as the World Bank) reported that in 1963, only thirteen percent of Kuwaiti civil service employees had completed primary school, less than five percent had completed secondary school, and less than 1 per cent had acquired a degree-level qualification (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1965, p.40 in Redman, 2014, p.43). While authors such as Crystal (1995) and Redman (2014) lamented the inefficiency in Kuwait’s bureaucracy, they merely blamed the Bedouin workers, but not the historical, political influences that lay behind the problem.

This research discovered that the Bedoun were excluded from developmental measures including the standard education monitoring programs managed under the auspices of UNESCO (see Car-Hill, 2013; Kennedy, 2015a). This included data collected by UNESCO (2015) for the Education For All Global Monitoring Report, 2000-2015 and data collected by the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (2015) reporting for Children Out-of School, the program that monitors critical gaps and omissions in Education for All reporting). In other words, there was no reporting on any Bedoun children as a population cohort to international development agencies by the state of Kuwait, including those who go to school and those who do not go to school (the same applies to other types of development measures, such as health, employment and economic wellbeing which are also unreported).
The Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program obscured participation in education due to government’s incremental erasure of the Bedoun’s Bedouin identity, Kuwaiti national identity, and/or false declaration of ‘other national’ identity of the Bedoun population in the national statistics. This was reflected in the omission of the Bedoun population from developmental measures at the international level (Carr-Hill, 2013). The ‘status adjustment’ program also targeted children and their parents, attempting to force young children to accept the assignment of a fraudulent nationality on their birth certificates, in order to secure enrolment in private schools (Kuwaiti MP Hassan Jawhar in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). The state also refused to pay the full costs for such schooling.

Universal (free primary-school level) education is provided for in the Article 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations 1948; Articles 13 and 14, International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (1966).

Participation was not wholly invisible (Beaugrand 2010) but subject to highly restrictive and oppressive state surveillance and information control. The omission of collected data demonstrated a particular aspect of control, increasing the difficulty for the Bedoun to assert their collective’s human right to receive education for every child without the pressure of submitting to ‘status adjustment.’ All Bedoun who attend educational institutions must be registered with government, and the institutions must report to the Ministry of Education. However, government did not disclose information on enrolments, student retention or other types of participation of Bedoun children in schools; nor has UNESCO demanded disclosure in Kuwait’s national reporting measures.

The Ministry of Information plays a role in managing and publishing information collected by the Ministry of Education (that is, limiting information disseminated about the Bedoun), under the instruction of the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of the Interior’s Central Apparatus maintained oversight over the group’s participation and instructed the Ministry of Education to permit Bedoun children to go to school, or not to permit Bedoun children to go to school, as it saw fit (al Hajji, October 14, 2014). This was because the Central Apparatus determined whether Bedoun are officially recorded as ‘documented’ or not recorded, and therefore ‘undocumented,’ on its ‘system.’ As a result, it controlled whether or not, if and when, Bedoun children could be enrolled in and attend, educational institutions. Similarly, it could ensure that the Bedoun were excluded from school, via placing restrictions on an individual’s government record preventing their enrolment or discontinuing their enrolment at any time, and through expulsion. Mass prohibitions on new primary school enrolments and threats of mass primary school expulsions occurred in September 2014 (al Hajji, 14 October, 2014). The problem was never effectively resolved despite claims from the US Department of State that it was (a detailed account of the issue can be found in Appendix G).
In Appendix G, ii, I explained how adequate disclosure of the Bedoun’s participation in schools was avoided with simple, discursive strategies and accepted without question, by the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the United Kingdom Home Office, and the U.S. Department of State. These extraordinary conditions, including bans on education that much of the population has experienced in their lifetime, have led to education taking on new meanings and increasing in value, to the group. Education was one the main means by which a Bedoun individual might acquire resources that would enable them to survive in the future, but it also provided personal meaning, and a means for cultural expansion (Znaniecki, 1952a).

The highest level of education achieved by the research participants was shown in Table 14 (Chapter 5). The institutions that they attended, was shown in Table 15 (Chapter 5). Their areas of subject specialisation were shown in Table 16 (Chapter 5). Some individuals excelled in vocational, technical or higher education and beyond, through the embodiment of the intellectual ideal, the cultivation of their aspirations, and the exercise of sheer determination and hard work. For the interview group, the intellectual ideal involved an awareness of their broader social context. They recognized that substantial social change was required in the near future, if they were to ensure the next generation of Bedoun children could uniformly complete their basic education, and that this in turn, was crucial to their survival as a cultural group. Therefore, the ideals of genuine citizenship, altruism and social solidarity were oriented toward the future development of the Bedoun’s culture, and this aim seemed to be virtually inseparable from their intellectual identity.

8.1.2 The development of the intellectual ideal.

As I have mentioned, the interviewees valued education highly. They associated the function of education with the ideals of intellectual and creative development and expression, and service to one’s family and society. Generally speaking, the purpose of education was associated with idealistic, non-material aims such as self-development, the cultivation of self-awareness and moral virtues, and the improvement of society, more than the a desire to fulfil discrete career goals or to acquire a high salary. Participation in education and intellectual development was clearly an area where the Bedoun research participants could experience the positive aspects of social participation and cultural organisation, personal growth and the expression of personal and group-orientated values.

Experiences associated with formal and informal education and training included intellectual stimulation, self-discovery and self-realisation, self-esteem arising from the acquisition of basic and specialised knowledge and skills, as well as from personal excellence and philosophical inquiry, the expansion of positive and cooperative social relations with others, including teacher-student, mentor-mentee and inter-collegial relationships, the personal rewards of helping others, improved understanding of a variety of
social, cultural, religious and secular values, and enjoyment and satisfaction from lifelong learning. A summary of themes related to positive experiences in education discussed by interviewees is shown in Table 23, below.

Table 23

Summary of the Theme of Positive Experiences in Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-themes</th>
<th>Other Themes (Participant Experiences)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive social relations</td>
<td>• Positive experience with peers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Good relationships with teachers/Professors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Part time study facilitates a larger and longer-term social network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistence, resilience and high achievement</td>
<td>• The impact of education bans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Returning to school to access Kuwait University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High achievement and lifelong learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Love of learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Family support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in civil society</td>
<td>• Giving back to the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Kuwait University activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The ‘khatatib school’ (community school) (October 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual life and visions of society</td>
<td>• Changing your ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Self-realisation of the scale of the Bedoun problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Suppression of Bedoun authors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Creating a new society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal aspirations</td>
<td>• I have ambition, I want a better situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• They are content with what they have. The new generation is not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• My biggest dreams are their basics in their life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• They want to study and finish university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• I want to be the good guy (resistance to criminalisation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This table shows analysis of a particular theme into sub-themes and sub-sub-themes. The sub-sub themes shown in the right column, correspond to one or more interview quotes.*

The question arises as to whether or not the Bedoun could be said to participate in an education system that was reflective of their own culture, or not. Overall, the groups’ experiences indicated some degree of cultural assimilation into the education system, even mastery over their environment (especially for P03, P05, P08 and P13). But generally speaking, the education system for all Arabs in Kuwait was either dominated by Kuwaiti
Hadar in public schools or other Arab Hadar nationals in schools for expatriates. The latter schools were often owned by Kuwaiti Hadar and managed by expatriates, for the purpose of transmitting home-country nationalistic values to the non-Kuwaiti student-body. This made the Bedoun outsiders in both of the major segments of the education system. The nature of the group as a sub-ethnic group of the Bedouin, was strongly emphasised through the education system, due to the structure of the private education system in Kuwait which had been developed around the exclusion of the Bedoun and other, non-Kuwaiti Arabs from the public school system. Ethnic tensions between other Arab Hadar teachers (with Arab nationalist leanings promoted by unionisation of the education workforce), and Bedoun students for example, were high. ‘Bedoun schools’ were those in which the student body was predominantly Bedoun, characterised by low quality education. They were so badly managed that the Ministry of Education had shut them down prior to the Arab Spring (P03, P09). At the time of this study, Bedoun children and youth mainly attended expatriate schools for other Arabs, although children of Kuwaiti mothers were allowed to attend public schools for Kuwaiti citizens. Bedouin citizens had filled the schools once attended by the Bedoun.

Nevertheless, the interviewees gained a great deal from their participation in the education system. The recognition of the intellectual ideal, the tendency for the individual to follow and expand it into a broader systems of ideas (ideology) (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.283), occurred due to engagement in the education system. But the intellectual ideal also appeared to have developed in response to self-education in formal and informal settings. This creative expansion of the education ideal into a positive system of ideas may be viewed as a counter-response to the oppressive public environment that the Bedoun confront every day, whereby freedom of expression and development of civil society has been limited by government restrictions (Amnesty International, 2013, 2015a, 2015b, June 20 – July 15, 2016). It may also been viewed as a counter-response to the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun in general and concerning education in particular.

Positive experiences in education and identification with intellectual roles in society arose along a number of lines involving social integration, contributions to society, and a new vision for society (Table 23, above). Some interviewees explicitly expressed their conscious identification with educational, intellectual and community leadership roles, inspired by the hardships faced by their family and community. This was an unexpected and refreshing difference between the findings of this study and previous accounts of the Bedoun that have been focused out of necessity, on human rights deprivations and social dysfunction caused by lack of education and employment (Beaugrand, 2011; Refugees International, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2011; Amnesty International, June 20 – July 15, 2016). Interviewees also identified strongly with the practical side of the education process,
embracing the experience of reading, writing, learning, and applying their skills in the public domain, via teaching, publishing, and presenting their work to professional audiences.

In other words, the interviewees had not only integrated the intellectual ideal into their identity through daily social action, it was regarded as a positive and expansive experience, rewarding, and deepening their processes of identity formation, in new ways. Among the many cultural factors that play a part in the Bedoun’s motivation for learning, personal expression and communications, there was a desire to transcend some of the traditional social values that tended to isolate young people of different genders prior to marriage. Again, this emphasised the liberating function of education, although it was just one of many factors, and should not be overestimated for its novel value or as a factor particular to the Bedoun compared to other Kuwaiti students. Education is typically a strong value in Kuwaiti society generally speaking, but for different reasons among different social groups. This is an important area warranting further exploration, beyond the scope of the present discussion.

Despite the positive expansion of experiences in education and intellectual growth, increased consciousness of their group’s social, political and legal problems introduced some measure of social or existential conflict for many of the interviewees. The three youngest of the interviewees (P05, P06, P06) valued the cultivation of their intellectual identity, but were also quite aware that it did not necessarily enhance their ability to form social relations with their student peers. They described intellectual values as the virtual antithesis of citizen society, because according to the interviewees, citizens tended to value higher education for different reasons to the Bedoun, mainly as a process for advancing opportunities for in-group socialisation and to secure material stability rather than intellectual achievement. Experiences described by the participants indicated that they were not only deprived or a range of basic human rights, but they were also deprived of the right to express their thoughts and ideas. This problem affected their ability to function socially in educational institutions while disclosing their identity, and was a source of potential conflict. Clearly, one was more likely to have intellectual and social currency if one ‘passed’ as a citizen. Alternatively, expressing oneself as an authentic human being via the honest disclosure of identity tended to provoke intolerance of intellectual expression by others, likely due to their discomfort with the Bedoun identity.

Interview participants at university perceived a general lack of value within the citizen population for intellectual development. Research respondents indicated that the issue was not only related to government restrictions on freedom of expression, but also to the increasing value of materialism within the (citizen) culture (‘where selfishness has become a social interest,’ Halas, 2010, p.143). These values emphasised education as a
consumer product to the extent that it could be a factor weighed into the marriage bargain (P08, P13).

An example of the immense personal struggles faced by the Bedoun participants who attempted to acquire higher education was provided by P05. It was just one of many accounts of the severe practical and psychological pressures faced by the Bedoun developing their intellectual identity. Like a number of interviewees, he described spending years of his life struggling with deep depression due to his life circumstances, which were directly and negatively impacted by his Bedoun identity, and which at the time, he had no power to change. His transformation into a young intellectual, once he was given the opportunity to learn, was remarkable. P05 had been introduced to alternative systems of thought through his studies at Kuwait University, after he acquired citizenship (in special circumstances that did not seem to apply to other respondents). His identification with the intellectual ideal was explicit:

SK: How did you develop this interest?

P05: [Laughs] It’s a long story. Because, I am very interested in the intellectual matters, you know. Because before I go to university I used to read a lot.

SK: Of books?

P05: I saw many lectures on the web… so I was very interested.

SK: What kind of things did you look at?

P05: Philosophical matters. I think because of my situation as a Bedoun. It determined this path for me. Because when we are living in a hard existential situation, when I, when you ask yourself why am I here? Why am I doing this? Why I can’t change my life?

SK: So you are looking at existentialism? John Paul Satre?

P05: Yes, but after you go to school, you have another [chance], may you continue…

SK: Who are your favourite thinkers?

P05: Well, I love Bertrand Russell.

And from ethics, I love Kant. I read for Kant. And the ethical point of view, I love Kant. But you know from the different fields, no I have many, many favourite philosophers.
SK: Can you give me examples?

P05: You know, I was interested in Hegel, but now Hegel does not make sense for me.

SK: As you changed your situation, your viewpoint changes?

P05: I tell you the truth, even your religious point of view… it determines the direction you go for in philosophy.

SK: Which means you are more interested in Muslim thinkers…?

P05: No. I will go to Satre.

SK: O.K… you have obviously read widely.

P05: Well, it was a struggle for me, it’s not easy to change your ideas.  
( Participant 5, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014 )

The alignment of personal identity reflecting educational aspirations and intellectual values was not limited to those young interviewees who found achievement at school more easily than others. P05 had returned to secondary school complete his final year as he entered his twenties. He had developed his interest in systems of thought by listening to lectures on the internet. He did not read books because he had gone blind. He was unable to access medicine to prevent the loss of his sight due to restrictions on Bedoun access to public health resources.

The re-alignment of identity toward the intellectual ideal was just as important to more mature participants who had struggled to achieve highly in education. For example, two sisters entered university after being deprived of the opportunity when they experienced bans on education in the 1980s and 1990s. Their family had made extraordinary sacrifices to ensure they had received basic school education in the hope they might eventually achieve a basic level of income. They were unable to attend college or higher education until after they had experienced many years of unemployment, and had worked their way through a number of menial jobs, leading up to receiving positions with sufficient security to save for tuition. They waited more than fifteen years to become capable of re-entering the education system as mature age students.

Like all but one of the female interviewees in this study, these women had never been able to marry or to have children due to the immense challenges of their life circumstances (see Chapter 5, Table 6 and Table 7). This problem for the Bedoun was a more serious sign of suffering for the community compared to Palestinians and Kurds. The latter have been recognised as at risk of genocide by the international community and
interventions have abled their populations to recover numerically, while the Bedoun population was diminished further after the radical post-Iraq invasion losses (Doebbler, 2002). When I interviewed them, they were both working full time and attended Arab Open University part time. They were conscious of the positive returns of intellectual growth, in view of their life challenges. The ideal enriched life their life purpose:

P16: You have to find out what you have as your interests. Your abilities will be not shown only by work or staying at home… it will be by development… by your [intellect], it open more and more and yourself, it opens more and more. So you have to know yourself more and more. (Participant 16, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)

P17: I will improve my English and I will have more confidence in myself, my abilities. And I can find that there is something important to look at… and make a difference in my life and I have a dream in my life… and having all my life not having to living, to get to eat and work and sleep, yianni, I feel that I have a goal, I have principles in my life and I gain, I gain, I am trying to, getting my life, you know? Improving myself, not like, I am useless. There is some point after that. It is not about getting the certificate itself, it is about myself, it is about how I look to myself. (Participant 17, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)

When I observed their excellent language skills, the two women informed me that they had educated themselves in the English language. But they also attributed their process of self-education and to interacting with people from other cultural backgrounds:

SK: I am always very impressed with the way you can express yourself in English.

P17: You can get the idea?

SK: It’s very clear.

P16: It’s self-learning. It’s not from high school, this is our self-learning.

P17: From TV.

SK: Your English?

P17: [And] maybe from people, because we work with all kinds, we work with people from different nationalities… Asian, and… and that maybe is also one of the things in Kuwait, that they refuse to mix with other people. We are Bedoun… sometimes they refuse to mix with others, with people similar to them. (Participant 17, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)
While online course delivery had also offered the Bedoun increased opportunities for study, such courses still needed to be paid for, while the group faced restrictions and insecurity in the employment sector. This meant that the return on the (privately funded) investment in education was not assured. Interviewees who took on the challenge of post-secondary education therefore, valued the opportunity while being careful not to put all of their hopes in a particular employment outcome related to their course of study. A third woman discussed her identification with the intellectual ideal, having gained numerous vocational, certificate-level qualifications, while she worked full time and was promoted into a management position. She was also unable to attend university when she completed high school because she was Bedoun, and had never married. Her mother was a Kuwaiti citizen. It was not until her school teachers informed her that she should not fill out an enrolment form for Kuwait University like her classmates, that she realised that she was not a Kuwaiti citizen.

SK: What’s motivated you to do that, for example to do two qualifications instead of one?

P04: I have always… I think I need to have a better [situation] than I have. I have ambition… I still want more, better [conditions] than now. I am starting to study being lawyer. It was my dream… when I finished high school – I wanted to study law but I cannot. At Kuwait University I could not enter, because my father was Bedoun. It is my dream. (Participant 4, interview in central Kuwait City, 13 March, 2014)

The most qualified of the interviewees had been able to leave Kuwait on a scholarship around 2000, prior to stricter border controls being applied to the group. He had subsequently received citizenship in a new country, where he became an Assistant Professor. He explained the way that his identification with the intellectual ideal, and a great deal of hard work, had propelled him forward in his life, toward achievement and leadership:

P03: I wasn’t one of those who would be depressed due to life’s circumstances. I would also take it as a force that would push my life forward. So, I don’t recall any negative impact on my education. I always took it as a force that would make me detach from everybody and everything, distractions, and just focus on my studies.

I found that this is me, this is my identity. I’m somebody who loves education and learning and identifies himself as a life long learner. I still take Coursera and MOOQ courses [online university course delivery] all the time. I spend most of my midnights and driving time listening to lectures…
I identify myself with research and learning. (Participant 3, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 7 March, 2014)

The interviewees’ expression of intellectual identity and value for education indicated that the intellectual ideal had influenced their social actions and motivated them to change their habits of thinking, and way of life. They were conscious that the ideal had changed the way they thought, viewed the world and acted in it. Their new vision of society (P09) was characteristic of the creative and expansive influence of ideals (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.201). This led them to participate in vocational and higher education despite considerable challenges, or to seek informal methods of self-education. According to Znaniecki (1952a, p.201), ideals are realised in the dynamic course of creative actions. Once realised, such actions may lead to cultural change (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.205; Halas, 2010, p.197). Creative actions that result in well-known contributions to cultural growth are characterised by the intentions of the individuals who make such contributions. They adopt a conscious purpose to produce something new, valuable and important – a contribution not only valuable to themselves, but to all those who could benefit from their actions (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.205).

It was clear that interviewees regarded the pursuit of the intellectual ideal and the development of their identity as new, valuable and important. These values enable ideals to be transformed and transmitted to others, giving birth to new ideologies, standards and norms (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.282-284). As long as they were involved in the process of education, it was a fulfilling and worthwhile endeavour. However, the question of whether they could benefit from the attainment of particular qualification and/or professional status in a normative fashion, remained a troubling, open question. This uncertainty also highlighted the importance of the mature role-models and high achievers to the community. Such individuals in the interview group were very conscious of their roles, and hoped to serve as positive inspiration to others.

8.1.3 The transformation of ideals into social actions.

The interviewees wished their personal development to inspire the younger and less fortunate members of their community and therefore, their participation could be viewed as a positive input into the cultural system, one that could lead to social and cultural change (particularly P03, P04, P08, P09, P13, P18, P20). A threshold for the interviewee’s creative actions influencing culture was their practical and effective utility for others. The intellectual ideal, once accepted, acted upon and disseminated to others, expands into a series of actions initiated independently by individuals. If successfully integrated, the ideal and the related systems of actions stemming from it, could lead to the development of a new ideology, expanding existing cultural patterns. While the intellectual ideal does not provide a fixed solution for each individual, it offers a general model of a ‘type’ that could be applied...
by others to their own situations (Znaniecki 1952a, p.204, 284). The flexibility of the ideal or ideology maintains an attraction for others as a continually evolving ideal, which can be adopted in an adapted form, to meet to different personal circumstances or worldviews (Znaniecki, p.284). Each individual responds to the ideology in slightly different ways, initiating their own particular set of social action, expanding the cultural pattern (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.205).

In theory, if individuals can readily adapt ideals or systems of ideas to their circumstances and benefit from them, they are more likely to promote this through social interactions (Znaniecki, 1952a). The ideal and any ideology that grows henceforth, must continue to change in order to remain its dynamic principle. It may be transmitted to others through the sharing of ideas, or leading by example, which inspires others to follow. This process of the expansion of the ideal, its absorption by others and implementation into new social actions, may introduce a new order into the cultural world (Znaniecki 1952a, p.284). As long as some members of the community were able to realise the intellectual ideal and reflect benefits to others by example of cultural leadership, or through the sharing of experiences, they could continue to inspire other Bedouns to follow their path. Some interviewees had served as examples to their brothers and sisters, who followed in their footsteps, either continuing with their education after secondary school or returning to education in adulthood.

Some individuals inspired members of the citizen community to assist the Bedoun financially to participate in higher education. They sought to expand their acceptance of the whole group as legitimate social actors in society, which in turn, might enable future generations to also transmit these values to others. According to the interview data, this was already happening in Kuwaiti society, via instances of cooperative organisation leading to the ‘sponsorship’ of students (financial support from a private source) by citizen benefactors who generously paid for some individual’s school fees, or the utilisation of citizen washta (personal networks of influence) to activate ‘connections’ to resolve bureaucratic barriers, for the purpose of enabling Bedoun students to enter schools.

Thus, the development of the Bedoun interviewees’ intellectual ideal, and its incorporation into personal values and identity, appeared to be aligned with the characteristics of creative cultural re-organisation (Znaniecki, 1952, p.359). For many interviewees, as I have mentioned, the purpose of education was personal, related to the positive psychological effects of intellectual growth and the expansion of relationships with others. The research participants desire to reconcile with other ethnic groups with whom they experienced social tensions, and to improve their society while avoiding social conflict, was revealed through open dialogue in interviews (P08, P09, P16, P17, P18, P19), as well as descriptions of in their identity management strategies (P03, P05, P06, P07, P13, P14, P15).
particularly among the younger interviewees, who explained their ‘passing’ strategies arising from the demands of their everyday participation in citizen society.

There appeared to be a strong but unspoken commitment to the philosophy of non-violent social solidarity. In Palestinian studies, this is called sumud, meaning ‘steadfastness,’ or ‘steadfast perseverance’ (Shehadeh, in Said, 1986). The interviewees did not explicitly discuss the philosophy and I am not even sure if any interviewee followed sumud. Rather, I am interpreting my analysis as sumud, as it arose through the quality and content of participant descriptions of ideas and concrete experiences. It was revealed through the strong value of altruism and sharing of resources, such as displaying an interest in social cooperation with other ethnic groups, and the de-escalation of ethnic conflict. Careful management of levels of personal frustration that could provoke aggression from others was key to this process. Bayat (2013, p.313) referred to this as ‘active citizenry,’ a form of resistance to social marginalisation, which moved beyond passive resistance into new forms of active social participation. There were many examples of culturally creative and expansive social experiences and actions discussed by the interviewees, related to the purpose of education. These are listed in Table 24, below. The sub-themes may be seen as the desired social action, while the minor-themes derived from them, may be interpreted as the values behind them.

Nevertheless, the research participant’s commitment to personal growth and social cooperation through education was not without its drawbacks. Aversion of social conflict amidst the constant projection of stigmatisation by others (discussed at length in Chapter 7), could lead to the breakdown of identity management and total seclusion (discussed in Chapter 6). Among positive experiences, the interviewees indicated that they had responded to the increased aggressive opposition from authorities and citizen ideologists since the Arab Spring by implementing their active, intellectual ideals into social action. They had increased their level of social participation in accordance with their ideals of citizenship and altruistic values. Mallat (2015), recently explored non-violent philosophy of the Arab Spring, focusing on political and religious desire for freedom in society. Interestingly, the work omitted social explanations that would account for altruism and social solidarity among Arabs, characteristically found in Bedouin communities. But additionally, Mallat (2015) did not account for the Bedouin culture, statelessness or dispossession in the Middle East.

Arguably, social solidarity stemmed from the tribal cultural aspect maintained among the Bedouin - sumud, or asabiya. The Palestinian concept of ‘sumud’ (Shehadeh, in Said, 1986) is more symbiotic for the Bedoun as a localised interpretative tool for describing the social solidarity and active citizenry derived from the traditional value base of Bedouins, than Islamic-socialist (Marxist) interpretations such as Mallat (2015) which have previously
Table 24

Summary of the Theme of the Purpose of Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-themes</th>
<th>Minor Themes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fulfilment of basic needs</td>
<td>• Poverty alleviation - family</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Productivity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Financial independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultivation of Self</td>
<td>• Hope</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Life purpose</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Self-worth</td>
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<td>o Self esteem</td>
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<td>o Self confidence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>o Self respect</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Self awareness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identification with a higher</td>
<td>• Intellectual growth</td>
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<tr>
<td>purpose</td>
<td>• Personal excellence</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Personal empowerment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identification with higher principles</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Transcend limitations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improvement of society</td>
<td>• Positive input into society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition and reconciliation</td>
<td>• The Bedoun identity is Kuwaiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with other social groups</td>
<td>• They must ask the Bedoun about their heritage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table shows analysis of a particular theme into sub-themes and sub-sub-themes. The sub-sub themes shown in the right column, correspond to one or more interview quotes influenced the development of the theory of social solidarity as asabiya, by theorists such as Cole (2006). This is especially so given developments in social movement theory, which has become quite dominated by Arab nationalist and Islamic socialist themes that as Mallat (2015) shows, are inherently disinterested or unsympathetic with Bedouin dispossession (noting that it was Arab nationalists who promoted the statelessness of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti politics from 1965, in Al Tuwaijri, 1996; al Mdaires, 2010). Sumud was elaborated from a poem by Raja Shehadeh:

Steadfastness, the non-violent resistance of the Palestinian against land confiscation and ethnic cleansing. Like an old olive tree deeply rooted to the ground, those practising sumud refuse to move away despite political, economic and physical injustice committed against them. (Shultz and Hamer, 2003)
In my own experience with members of the Bedoun community, what resonates strongly is their strength and generosity, both sumud (Said, 1986) and ‘true generosity’ (Freire, 1970). Some interviewees and their families had suffered a great deal while pursuing their goal to acquire education, such as economic strain, precarious border-crossings (and the risk of permanent expulsion accompanying it), and official sanctions imposed on whole families, such as punitive retaliation for talking about their identity and culture in public or online.

Identity erasure by the Central Apparatus was associated with the Ministry of Interior ordering the automatic cancellation of student enrolment, although education was hardly a main priority if erasure occurred. Other challenges faced by the respondents during their education included homelessness, severe illness and disability, loss of employment, high levels of surveillance and incarceration. Overt threats tended to be associated with blacklisting, then 'security restrictions' (experienced by P04, P09, P12, P18, P19). Having endured these constant hardships, the interviewees emphasised that they were the lucky ones, as they believed that those who suffered the most could not even reach a level of participation in society that would enable them to sustain themselves economically, psychologically or emotionally. In this context, the interviewees were not only speaking about members of the community in general, but referring to their family members, friends and neighbours.

Some interviewees also had faced challenges developing their capacity for intellectual leadership, but nevertheless they continued on this path. It was extremely difficult for interviewees to find or create environments that supported the development of their intellectual and creative abilities. But additionally, for those who had managed to develop their intellectual capacity through higher education, it remained very difficult to capitalize on their abilities and training to perform intellectual roles in society consistently over a long term. However, these challenges did not stop some of the interviewees from attempting to express their intellectual identity. The processes of negotiating their intellectual development in the context of their social relations with others are described in three interview excerpts, below. A young man studying at Kuwait University, explained the value of his relationships with his professors:

SK: So has friendship with these mentors helped you in relation to making you who you are?

P05: They gave me power to deal with the situation, the confidence, because our problem is with the confidence… we don’t have the confidence to stand for ourselves and speak for ourselves in the right way… but when we have an
academic person, who tells you this should be your point, go from there… you have something that other students don’t have, they tell me, ‘You came from an experience of hard life that will help you with your study… you will become a philosopher and you will understand the world.’ (Participant 5, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

A female interviewee explained her journey through to PhD study:

P11: Because, I was trying to prove to everyone, ‘This is me. This is me.’ And I can reach the best and I can be the best…

SK: Regardless of the circumstances?

P11: Yeah. So when I reached for example the masters, I was the first one in the family, or the child, who got… the Bachelor degree. And when I finished it, it was like, ‘Okay, now I have to push myself more. With the Masters and now the PhD, it’s like, ‘This is me.’ (Participant 11, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 7 March, 2014)

A male interviewee recounted his journey to PhD study, having been able to study overseas while concealing his identity:

SK: So you were very determined and resilient. You weren’t going to let anything get in the way?

P03: No. I really love and I still love education, that’s why nothing was able to distract me from it… because I value what the opportunities that were given to me to continue my education.

SK: You must have worked very hard.

P03: Oh, yeah, it was all my life you know, until now… I’m an Assistant Professor. So I have been studying all my life.

Higher education is about understanding life. Having a broad view of life. And being able to explore things deeply. And then come up with your own thoughts of how they should be.

Because whatever I succeed in, there are many people who are looking into hope you know, for their kids. Yes, the situation is very difficult, but you can succeed, you can be who you want, and you can make it. And it had positive effect on many families, many of my friends and of my cousins… So understanding that has been my highest achievement I think.

Nobody can constrain you, unless you accept to be constrained. And life can give you chances, so work hard now and don’t think about when you
finish school that there is no opportunities. Because if you succeed, doors will open to you.

So this is one of the things that also motivated to me to always excel and give these kids an example that they should never surrender to this situation. And to maintain good character and ethics and moral behaviour, because I am aware of the fact that when I succeed, it’s a responsibility, and many people are looking up to that. (Participant 3, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 7 March, 2014)

When the Bedoun interviewees spoke about their life experiences, or their society and culture from their own perspective, there was very little about their concrete experiences that did not involve the deprivation of their individual or collective human rights. Additionally, according to the interview data referring to the Bedoun participant’s experiences of intense stigmatisation and resistance to oppression in everyday encounters, it appeared that the disclosure of the Bedoun’s identity in public was interpreted by others as a disturbance of public order of some kind. Others seemed to associate the Bedoun with ‘criminal’ identity, based on similar beliefs expressed by academics such as Crystal (1992, 1995) and Longva (1997). In some of these cases, the interviewees had to defend their identity, manage aggressive provocation, or to leave the scene to avoid social conflict. This scenario applied to classroom settings, as well as other educational and public environments.

Accordingly, there was little opportunity for the Bedoun to express themselves intellectually in public spaces at all. Intellectual expression in public spaces was increasingly limited. Social communications had been largely transferred to the online environment due to the presence of police surveillance monitoring gathering in public, but online monitors, censors and trolls had since been deployed to increase internet surveillance and enforce new media laws in Kuwait (Amnesty International, 2015a, 2015b). Historical factors also contributed to the interviewees’ ability to express their intellectual identity, particularly their social segregation which had led to many having a lack of confidence in expressing their own ideas (P05) and speaking in public (P07). Additionally, the interview data indicated that once individuals became used to expressing their intellectual identity, the level of risk to themselves or their families also increased, due to ethnic targeting (P03, P04, P09, P12, P18, P19).

8.2 The Development of Intellectual Leadership

8.2.1 The path of intellectual leadership.

When evaluating the development of intellectual leaders in the community, it is worth considering that many of the parents of interviewees had never received any formal schooling. Bedoun mothers in particular, were unable to transfer literacy skills to their children to prepare them for school. This problem had been identified among Bedouin who
lived in desert settlements outside Kuwait City by al Moosa (1976), prior to the Bedoun’s administrative expulsion. Most of the interviewees pointed out that their parents were highly supportive of them, making every effort to obtain an education and often, older siblings who had been schooled first, took on the role of teaching their younger siblings at home, helping them to improve their results.

But there was sometimes an important exception to this approach concerning young men, where patriarchal values tended to influence their life direction. Some of the fathers of Bedoun sons did not approve of them pursuing higher education due to their family’s more pressing economic needs (P05, P13, P14). They had to work in order to fulfill traditional values which prioritised economic needs over personal expression and fulfilment. On the other hand, it is not well known that many Bedoun men who were at the peak of their working life at the time of the administrative expulsion (1986), had acquired basic literacy skills as part of their occupational training. Although they may not have acquired a general school education or an advanced level of literacy, basic literacy training was received by the Bedoun men recruited into the army (Alhajeri, 2004), the police force and oil industry (al Moosa, 1976).

Al Moosa (1976) emphasised that Bedouin men in the desert camps taught themselves to read and write to pass the police literacy exam in Arabic, required for entrance into the police force. Those men were from the northern tribes and later became known as the Bedoun (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). Al Moosa’s (1976) findings revealed that the Bedouin’s approach to education and employment was characterised by adaptability, innovation, hard work, and a tendency to seek out new opportunities (p.43, 67, 149, 158, 170, 214-215, 219, 254, 317). However, these positive inputs were almost entirely overlooked by the author in his study’s conclusions (p.166, 170, 317). The same kind of innovations, adapted to new circumstances, could be observed in many of the Bedoun interviewee’s strongly, largely self-taught, skills in English. These characteristics of ingenuity, industry and adaptation to new circumstances have been observed among the Bedouin in previous research (Marx, 2012). Unfortunately, not only was the potential for intellectual growth and leadership among the Bedoun repressed, evidence of it was omitted or repressed by researchers. Bocco (2006) and Eikelmann (2012) have discussed different aspects of self-censorship among social science researchers who study the Bedouin.

Up until 1986, in theory, the Bedoun were provided the same state-funded education support as all other Kuwaitis. But, it is important to remember the rates of access to education were already very low across the Bedouin population, due to their isolation in the desert settlements where they had been directed to settle, by the Municipality of Kuwait and the Ministry of Planning (al Moosa, 1976). The first Western publication recognizing the Bedoun (Human Rights Watch, 1991a) pointed out that although the vast majority of the
community had been impoverished, nevertheless there were a number Bedoun who had developed professional roles and become successful business people in Kuwait (p.51). A previous generation of older Bedoun managed to develop intellectual and professional roles in society prior to the Arab Spring, especially in the intellectual and literary fields.

Beaugrand (2010, p.167; 2011, p.245) discussed what she thought comprised an intellectual group within the Bedoun community that was educated prior to the new millennium, professionally engaged in education, journalism, literature and the arts. Some of these individuals featured in the early reports published by international humanitarian organisations, such as Human Rights Watch (1995), but they are no longer visible to outsider researchers due to oppression of freedom of speech and/or for personal reasons. They do not seem to publicly support the younger generation of Bedoun who emerged into public spaces during the Arab Spring, and pushed the state to provide basic human rights reforms in education and other areas (Decree 409/2011), along with international humanitarian organisations and the Bedoun diaspora (such as P20, Mohammed al Anezi, of London, who advocated for the Bedoun internationally for many years prior to the Arab Spring). The reason may be due to their experiences of the invasion by Iraq and the aftermath. Ann Lesch (in Lesch and Lustick, 1995, p.180, n66) observed that Palestinian intellectuals were targeted for torture and assassinations in the post-war ethnic cleansing. I argue that the Bedoun were very likely also targeted in this way, below (section 8.2.2 including Table 25).

This lack of support can be observed via the non-participation of more mature Bedoun intellectuals in the international media during the Arab Spring. The impact of government suppression of information, opinion and artistic expression among the Bedouin especially, means that the community has faced a deep problem as it attempts to re-build its intellectual capacity since the population was banned from schools in 1986. The nature of ethnic targeting of the Bedoun appears to have seriously diminished the ability of the community to transmit knowledge, skills and experience across generations. This might explain why the interviewees had increased their identification with intellectual values while drawing on the support of their immediate families, communitarian values and social solidarity networks, with other Bedouins and mentors of Hadar or expatriate backgrounds. They almost never described having any relationship with better-educated members of the Bedoun community as their mentors, even though those from older generations who were well-educated, obtained their education in a less restrictive environment than the one currently experienced (discussed by Beaugrand, 2010, p.167; 2011, p.245).

My personal observations in Kuwait and my interactions with members of the community since then, indicated that such individuals were embedded in Hadar society and comfortable in their professional roles, and did not wish to expose themselves to the risk of public association with other members of their community. They preferred conformity,
which provided them with a reasonable lifestyle, given that they had been able to build their lives when the Bedoun had better relations with the Hadar and government authorities. Their workplace peers were predominantly Kuwaiti or other Arab national Hadar. But, it is difficult to evaluate the constraints faced by this group of older, highly educated Bedoun without knowing their experience from their own point of view. They may also have feared that public associations with their own community would be interpreted as a transgression, a form of defensive solidarity (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.97) that threatened the Hadar or government authorities. Such activity could lead to sanctions such as blacklisting, ‘security restrictions,’ the loss of their job, and so on. These individuals had assimilated into citizen society and perhaps obtained a good degree of social mobility, but the benefit of their inupts in to Kuwaiti society appeared to have been largely lost to younger generations of Bedoun.

This problem reflected the lack of human security for the Bedoun (Sokoloff and Lewis, 2005), inhibiting the group’s ability to consolidate the social, cultural or material gains of previous generations. The situation also restricted their ability to invest back into the Bedoun community, in order to transmit improved education standards to future generations. The Bedoun were very limited in their capacity to develop their culture in ways that were acceptable to the dominant social and political powers. For this reason, identity management and ‘passing’ (Ginsberg, 1996) as citizens in citizen society, may have remained an important social strategy for older, more successful Bedoun who did not wish to see their fortunes reversed. For this older group who received the benefit of funded, government education by the state of Kuwait, the desire for personal security and materialism appeared to have overshadowed notions of social solidarity and cultural survival, leadership and ‘giving back’ to the community. These challenges raise broader questions about the outcome for the more ‘successful’ Bedoun who become assimilated into the national culture, and attempt to emulate mono-ethnic nationalism, elitist self-privileging and gross materialism reflecting dominant Hadar values, while they remain stateless.

8.2.2 The oppression of intellectual leadership roles and the conflation of ethnic difference.

I will attempt to briefly account for the oppression of intellectual identity and problems experienced by individuals as they became more accomplished in intellectual fields. Znaniecki (1952a) emphasised that punitive actions in all societies with a well-developed ideological base are culturally patterned (p.345). Bedoun intellectuals who participated in this research were somewhat overwhelmed by the suppression of their intellectual activities, which hindered the development of a publicly active, intellectual class in the population of over 110,000 (‘Over 111,000,’ 2013). They lacked institutional support, while faced with the historical targeting and limitation of their group’s intellectual development, social and political mobilisation. The community did not have the resources to
develop educational materials or systems for themselves, nor the ability to monitor their children’s participation or non-participation in school, safely due to lack of institutional support (H. al Fadhli, Ahmadi, personal communications, 24 November 2014; M. al Anezi, London, personal communications, 26 December 2014). Individuals who were capable of performing public roles and helping to resolve their community’s practical problems through rational analysis and cooperation with other social groups, were faced with ‘activist’ labelling. Such labelling diminished their ability to maintain and expand their professional or creative roles, and thus contribute to the organisation and development of their own culture.

Additionally, they were subject to ethnic targeting for their attempts to express their thoughts and actions. For example, one male interviewee (P09) was an author of once-published works including non-fiction literature about Kuwait and a collection of poems. He had once sold fruit on the street for his living. He established the Bedoun ‘I have a dream’ campaign during the Arab Spring (al Saadi, January 3, 2012; see also ‘Kuwait, the Other Side,’ 2016) and the Khatatib School (al Hajji, October 14, 2014) at Kuwait Teacher’s Society, which taught undocumented children prohibited from commencing primary school in September 2014. In his spare time, he also organised sponsorship from Kuwaiti citizens to privately fund some Bedoun students’ higher and vocational education. Despite his intellectual leadership and positive influence in the both the Bedoun and citizen communities, he felt despondent because he was unable to build upon his positive social actions. Whenever he attracted public attention to the Bedoun’s education needs, targeted, individualized oppression ensued. He had received ‘warnings,’ blacklisting, and multiple security restrictions. I discuss his vision of a new society, under section 8.4, below.

Such respondents appeared to be targeted by authorities due to their ability to articulate their intellectual identity with power (talent or charisma-based leadership, discussed in Halas, 2010). Such individuals attracted followers of their ideas, indicative of their intellectual and social leadership qualities (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.24). In turn, they were oppressed by laws prohibiting their freedom of expression and public gathering.

As I have mentioned, additional punitive sanctions such as blacklisting, multiple security restrictions and incarceration were regularly doled out by Central Apparatus authorities to the Bedoun for speaking publicly about their community’s situation (Amnesty International, 2015b). At least five individuals among the research participants had received multiple ‘security restrictions’ between 2012 and 2015 (P04, P09, P12, P18, P19), and many were subject to Central Apparatus and surveillance of their public activities. But additionally, other, specific measures controlling Bedoun intellectual activity through access to education were experienced. These included:
• Cancellation of access to education reimbursement (via the so-called Education Fund)
• Cancellation of enrolment in educational institutions (by the Central Apparatus)
• The requirement the Bedoun have a higher set of entrance marks across all areas of post-secondary school study for admission to educational institutions
• Blocks on access of the Bedoun to particular institutions
• Blocks on access within institutions, to student clubs, and particular disciplines of study, particularly law (see Appendix G, ii).

These prohibitive rules and regulations were aimed toward ‘non-action.’ The contents of the actions that transgress such rules have no bearing from the point of view of authorities. The point of their enforcement is the suppression of social actions (Znaniecki, 1952, p.335). The effect was to prevent the Bedoun’s participation in virtually all aspects of public life unless their identity was concealed, regardless of the value that any positive cultural content such actions could bring to society.

The standard of conformity required many of the Bedoun to adopt habits of social seclusion, non-action and/or ‘passing’ (Ginsberg, 1996). There is little doubt that these official, prohibitive strategies suppressing the intellectual and cultural development of the Bedoun were designed to eradicate the conscious awareness that the Bedoun existed in Kuwaiti society, among the citizen population. The targeting of intellectual content of public speech was clearly, designed to prevent others from gaining awareness about Bedoun thoughts, ideas, opinions and narratives. Obviously this could not be achieved at present within the Bedouin community, due to the Bedoun’s integration with the citizen Bedouin. But it could be achieved within the Hadar community. In fact, some Hadar intellectuals have already demonstrated how this is done, through their omissions, and rationales for omission, of the Bedoun from scholarly narrative (discussed in Chapter 2).

An example of the link between security restrictions and public intellectual activity can be drawn from one research participant’s experience (P12). He had acted as a key information source for the Human Rights Watch (2011) report on the Bedoun Prisoners of the Past (verified in the report). He was a key author of the Group 29 report Observing and documenting the violations of stateless (Bidoun) children’s rights (verified in the report), and submitted his own documentation to a United Nations Human Rights Council quarterly review on the Bedouin's situation. These were not merely the activities of human rights ‘activist’ defiance in protest (Beaugrand, 2014a), but a sustained pattern of intellectual activity arising from his self-education in international human rights law, an expression of practical experience with community leadership and concrete attempts to solve real-world problems. The research participant had provided highly detailed reports and analysis to
secondary organisations (both local and international human rights organisations) in service to his community. After he was named by Group 29 Kuwait, a local activist organisation, he was issued with security restrictions and required to report to the Central Apparatus regularly. His security card was adjusted to expire every twelve weeks, which required him to continually ‘renew’ the card, as part of a criminal, probation-like system. The ‘expiry’ of the card led to regular ‘security blocks’ being placed on his bank account leading to difficulties accessing his salary, while the need to spend inordinate amounts of time waiting at Central Apparatus offices to complete procedures to renew the card, impacted on his work in a managerial role where he was responsible for a number of staff. It is worth noting that these ‘security blocks’ also inhibited enrolment in schools, unless wasta (informal) solutions were found.

While the research participant (P12) had received multiple security restrictions for his intellectual activities researching and reporting on the Bedoun, the Hadar members of Group 29 such as Ebtihal al Khatib and Sheikha al Muhareb (whom I interviewed in Kuwait, see Chapter 4, Methodology) had been elevated to celebrity status in Kuwait and established their own television program as a result of exactly the same, or similar activities. In other words, Hadar members of Group 29 were rewarded for their advocacy of the Bedoun, while the Bedoun members of the same organisation were criminalized and punished. The bulk of the information-gathering research about human rights breaches produced by Group 29 during the Arab Spring (2011-2012) was carried out by members of the Bedoun community (personal communications with two Hadar, female members of the group in Kuwait, 28 March, 2014 and 2 April, 2014; altogether I interviewed six members of Group 29 during my fieldwork).

The hyper-surveillance and victimisation of the Bedoun members of the group, appeared to have no impact on the remaining Hadar members of the organisation. The latter had refrained from defending their own members while advancing their roles in society as community advocates and developing careers in television. Some Hadar members of the organisation, and all but one or two Bedoun, had left the organisation after the Arab Spring for this reason. This problem is an example of the infiltration of civil society organisations by government informants, which is a hallmark of Arab governance (Whitaker, 2009). But also note that the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun members of the group in this case, was not related to public ‘activism,’ (roles that the Hadar elite members of the group promoted to enhance their television celebrity), but behind-the-scenes research roles performed in service of the organisation.

Al Waqayan (2009, p.33-36) identified discrete stages of Bedoun policy development illustrating a conceptual structure of criminalisation over the Bedoun. This model went beyond the mere labelling of the Bedoun as ‘illegal residents,’ as it explained the
impact of criminal labelling as well as punitive actions upon the Bedoun, on the culture of the group. He believed that not only were the Bedoun suffering a collective identity crisis due to being stateless and deprived of human rights, the knowledge of the historical origins of the group and their culture had already begun to be erased (al Waqayan, 2009, p.38). As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the ignorance of others about the group, including those in government, meant that the Bedoun were not only accused of being 'illegal residents,' they were also accused in ignorance of their heritage, of being 'outside the category of Arab peoples' (p.38). Al Waqayan's (2009) evaluation of Bedoun culture was based on close observation of the community, and the development of Bedoun policy, through his parliamentary role. He emphasised the 'clear relationship between illiteracy and ignorance results from the deprivation of education' (al Waqayan, 2009, p.33). He pointed to the dual nature of the policy: intentional programmed deprivation of education of the Bedoun at the top-level (set out by Alessa, 1981 and the administrative expulsion document of 1986 in 'The Study,' 2003) along with the oppression of the Bedoun’s capacity to for development and expression at the grassrots.

This problem manifested in the Bedoun as community as illiteracy, lack of conscious awareness, a range of different expressions of suffering, which was observable through artistic and literary forms of cultural expression (al Waqayan, 2009, p.35, 36). Al Waqayan (2009) believed that petty criminal acts were undertaken for the purpose of survival or in resistance to oppression, and in response to the psychological pressure of the administrative program preventing active participation in society and fulfilment of basic human rights. He also believed that the consequences of the Bedoun's suffering led to collective symptoms of psychological disorientation due to loss of identity and diminishment of social status, depression, anxiety, pessimism, loss of confidence and self-esteem, paranoia, loss of hope, obsessive-compulsive disorder, aggressive behaviours, and other problems (al Waqayan, 2009, p.33, 35).

Al Waqayan (2009) went even further in arguing that there was a cultural crisis among the Bedoun was observable in the Bedoun’s social relationships, writings, biographical narratives, poems, and that certain cultural patterns of perception and cognition influenced by their protracted situation of statelessness and chronic human rights deprivations were revealed in their imaginative literary work. He referred to these expressions of suffering as a ‘culture of statelessness’ characterised by sadness, tragedy, the loss of all essential components of identity and citizenship (p.36), evidenced in a variety of types of intellectual and artistic expression. Al Waqayan (2009) provided previously hidden insights into the emotional aspect of the Bedoun’s collective consciousness, characterised by their suffering, as well as pointing to a little-known literary sub-culture among the Bedoun. A prominent feature of this literary activity was poetry, emanating from the tradition of
Bedouin poetry widely known among the Bedouin (Abu-Lughod, 2000). I observed this in my relationships with the Bedouin, who in times of grief and despair, express themselves in poetic form both individually and in small, group conversations. A research participant (P19) consented to my inclusion of one of his poems in this study, in which he expressed his feelings about his present conditions with visions of his childhood during the Gulf War:

Between heaven and hell is a stateless life
Hovering in haze, spirits with hopes
But by rusty chains are strangled to thrive
A childhood bypassed on a train of miseries
Heading to undefined destinations
All seen is a crushing fence of put-downs
    Cramming thoughts into the noose
How to fly with a pair of severed wings?
A question I asked myself repeatedly
I dodge through gloomy fumes
Blocking vision from grey
My lungs inhale stifling Oil-smoke
    Whose wealth is used to thwart and choke
A spirit fed up to the back teeth
Watching hopes become heaps of ash
My hear throbs like a drowning man in a bottomless gulf
Seeking a glow to get my ebullient self ashore
Where ways are paved to guide dupes out of the coop
    And fight to restore stolen dreams
An arduous way to challenge Satans and their loyal sons
Who have means to choose unshielded heads and rusty guns
My dream is to grow trees with seeds of love
The air grants life to all beings unbiasedly
The dark sky cannot veil a shining moon
    Sable clouds cannot defeat a dazzling sun
Fertile soils render life so heavenly
Nature’s charm is made of air, water and dust
Every grain of dust, drop of water or a waft of breeze
Is a unique universe full of love and life
It is just a call of time to please
Like Solomon’s wish for the queen of Sheba’s throne
    No matter how long or far it will take
We are just tenants and soon will end the lease
And power will be for no man or fiend
Between heaven and hell, life and death are shuffled confusedly
But high my voice will always remain – shrieking
Oh God! Free me or set my trapped soul free. (Participant 19, August 2, 2016)
Echoing al Waqayan's (2009) findings, the Kuwait Society for Human Rights (December, 2012, p.5) emphasised the connection between the restrictions on the Bedoun's freedom of expression and the group's inability to exercise 'the right of individuals to participate in cultural life' of the nation (Shadow report on the State of Kuwait's second periodic report presented to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). As I have mentioned regarding the analysis of human rights issues in the international law context, the analysis of such issues by international humanitarian organizations has tended to be have been restricted to 'discrimination' (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1999 in Kuwait Society for Human Rights, December, 2012). The broader, deeper ramifications of the Bedoun's restricted freedom of expression is better appreciated in the cultural context. It can be seen as one factor in a continuum of prohibitions, punitive restrictions and violent atrocities that have lead to the segregation of the Bedoun in education at all levels, the oppression of their intellectual development as a collective (due to ethnic targeting as northern tribes Bedouin) and the prevention of self expression and inter-group communications necessary for cultural expansion. This broader contextualisation has not been a strong theme in the literature of international humanitarian agencies, who focus more narrowly on topical human rights issues.

Another example illustrating the Bedouns' experience of oppression of intellectual expression and leadership, involved the plight of other Bedoun who worked in literary fields (P09). Again, the theme of erasure of collective identity emerged, experienced at the grassroots level of society (rather than in reference to government administration), pointing to an ingrained ethnic conflict between the Bedoun as Bedouins, and the Hadar arising in social interactions. The Bedoun’s professional contributions were trampled over by the power and ambition of Hadar citizens, who exercised their superior ‘rights’ as citizens in the abuse of power relations with other groups. This self-privileging of the Hadar which involved the abuse of the Bedoun, seemed to be a taken-for-granted assumption. Certain Hadar were identified as taking credit for the literary contributions of the Bedoun, due to a narcissistic conviction that Bedoun intellectual contributions existed solely for Hadar consumption and recycling in their names (T2 represents a second translator/interpreter, P09 is the Bedoun interviewee):

T2: He was talking about some famous… like, literatures [literary figures] and most of them are so isolated from the Kuwaiti community because they are want to represent the Kuwaiti upon them [replace their authorship with Kuwaiti names]. So they are not well respect[ed] and they are like, evaluating them better as Kuwaitis, they are not equals.
SK: So they can’t get the similar kind of work like he was saying, the similar kinds of challenges to getting professional work?

T2: They were representing their talents by social media, especially by writing, because we have here in the Kuwaiti community… the Kuwaiti community did not allow them to participate as a Bedoun community. So they [the Hadar management] are preparing to put Kuwaiti names up on the Bedoun names [i.e. to replace their names], although they are so talented. So that is why they went to the social media to represent…

P09: Themselves.

SK: Are they [the Bedoun writers] using their real names?

T2: Yes, if they are writers, they use their real names. (Participant 09, interview in Taima, Kuwait, 26 March, 2014)

Note that in the observation by the interviewee above, that the community’s contribution to society was soundly negated by the Hadar. The translator/interpreter was a Hadar of Persian origins, who also had also acquired professional background in the literary arts, and was therefore well acquainted with the professional environment discussed. According to the interviewee's account, the Bedoun were regarded as so unworthy, their names were replaced by Hadar operatives who stole their intellectual property. This attitude among the Hadar reflected the government action of replacing Bedoun names (discussed in section 6.1.5, Table 20; an approach rationalised by al Nakib, F., 2014, p.6-7), but in this instance, the was attitude extended to justifying the theft of cultural products from the Bedoun, as well as the erasure of their identity. It is not possible to know how widespread these attitudes and practices are, due to the limitations of this research. However, another participant explained this kind of treatment from a more personal standpoint:

P05: Most Kuwaitis [citizens] didn’t have any struggle in their life, no problems. They come to study and go home. But if I struggle in this world, I experience pain, they try to make my negative feelings a factor of power. (P05, interview in Salmiya, March 15, 2015)

The Bedoun have not developed a recognised body of national literature reflecting their culture, due not only to their late development as a literate population, but also to the lack of acceptance of their community as an ethnic group. This is likely because such cultural development would render literary development another ‘threat’ from a minority, tribal culture. Crucially, there has been a lack of attention given to the Bedoun’s cultural history by scholars in general, due to their adoption of conservative Hadar, pro-government perspectives, although al Anezi, 1989, Alhajeri, 2004 and al Waqayan are important
exceptions (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, the Bedoun have accounted for their own suffering in detail in the literature of international human rights organisations, which may serve as a concrete example of a broader, oral historical record of a population faced with cultural destruction by an oppressive, rival ethnic group (Gross, 1998). Clearly, the lack of academic work representing the population from a neutral or positive standpoint, has hindered the development of new roles for the Bedoun who might seek to represent their own culture, who would normally have access to creative works produced by members of their own cultural group, upon which they could build new contributions.

Despite these negative factors, some of Kuwait’s most accomplished writers and poets are Bedoun. Substantive literature by or about the Bedoun, including novels and poetry, is banned by the Ministry of Information (Trenwith, 2014). The reason for targeting Bedoun literature cited by the Ministry of Interior was that books dealing with the ‘sensitive’ period of the 1980s and 1990s are not permissible (Trenwith, 2014). This standard has not been applied to prize-winning books that account for the same era and the same kinds of topics, authored by the Hadar, such as a volume of short stories by Mai al Nakib (Banerji, 2014) and a novel, ‘The Bamboo Stalk,’ by Saud Alsanousi (Yassin-Kassab, April 15, 2015). These works were not regarded as morally or politically sensitive but as unexpectedly refreshing accounts of Kuwait’s contemporary modernity. Again, as I outlined in the example of Group 29 above, the Hadar - and particularly Hadar academic scholars - are publicly celebrated for precisely the same type of intellectual activity that the Bedoun are punished for.

Hadar scholars in these examples (Mai al Nakib and Group 29's Ebtihal al Khatib are from ‘notable’ Hadar families and professors of literature at Kuwait University) have the appropriate degree of social influence (wasta) to change these attitudes but instead, they can be found at the very centre of social activities that exalt the Hadar’s participation in the arts, while the Bedoun’s experience is diminished, which has the effect of affirming and re-affirming conservative Hadar values. The Ministry of Information's blatant privileging of Hadar academic scholars and literary personalities in relation to their freedom of expression, along with the targeting of their Bedoun literary counterparts, should be taken into account in any analysis of restrictions on personal expression, public activity, the role of civil society organisation, and information and media regulations in Kuwait.

A number of interviewees had cultivated or were in the process of developing formal intellectual roles for themselves by means of higher education through post-graduate study, teaching, lecturing and research. But they were challenged by marginalisation at every stage of the process, delaying their fulfilment of these roles. As individuals became more influential in society due to their intellectual input, or advanced in their scholarly careers, the more that they continued to face challenges related to their status. Alternatively, their
challenges escalated if they attempted to speak publicly about themselves or their community.

Over the long term, this became a strain on families and in some cases, deprived their achievements of meaning, because such individuals felt they could not put their intellectual capacities to effective use for the betterment of society. Some of the most intellectually gifted and accomplished individuals in the interviewee group spoke in the most detail about their situation of existential crisis. Some struggled with the desire to kill themselves due to their inability to control their own futures, or to improve the situation of their collective. Yet such individuals never lost sight of the collective struggle of their community is establishing harmonious relationships with those who would prefer to eradicate their population:

P05: As a Kuwaiti, you live in a situation there are Bedoun among you, and you don’t have the right to negate them…. their existence is not up to you. For their existence, they have rights. These rights… you don’t give them these rights because you are generous or you... have to, [or] by choice. These rights come by existence. They were born on Kuwaiti land, in Kuwait, so you are not Kuwaiti more than them, they are Kuwaitis as much as you are.

From here to one hundred years from now, you can’t do anything to change that. They are Kuwaiti and you have to accept this if you want to live in a good and prosperous country. You have to accept this inside you even if you don’t like their background. The only option you have is to live with them peacefully. (Participant 5, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

It is also worth noting that even Bedoun intellectuals who have fled the country and established themselves in teaching, research and entrepreneurial roles overseas, cannot simply transfer their skills to perform roles as public intellectuals who study the developments in their community from their second countries (M. al Anezi, London, personal communications, 26 December, 2015). Intellectuals who migrated to Western countries, as well as those in Kuwait, experienced inner conflict regarding their self-expression. They felt conflict about self-censoring their ideas in order to protect themselves and the whole group from further suffering and danger, and on the other hand, their need as intellectuals to analyse and evaluate the problem of their people, in order to solve it. The issue was not simply one of guarding their true feelings about their family’s situation, but even the release of basic information or neutral analysis was considered to be out of the question. The risk to their immediate families of being issued security restrictions or otherwise harassed by authorities was explained by an interviewee who no longer lives in Kuwait, whom I met while he was visiting his family in Taima:
P03: It is difficult, because… I felt freedom being a [country name deleted] citizen. I can’t go back and be constrained by families [compliant behaviours] or certain discriminatory laws. Or people not acting on whatever they talk about in the General Assembly, all these things. So I cannot accept it any more and I cannot tolerate it any more.

And if I come here [to return to Kuwait permanently], I will be a burden on my family because my family is stateless. And if I take any decision or make any voice because of my lack of tolerance [of the oppression of the Bedoun], this will affect their life, you know? Maybe even seriously. So if I come here to be silent, I just have to hide somewhere and not to be, voice my opinion, I cannot do that. Because I felt freedom.

So the best way for my family is for me to be away. And that was difficult too for me. I cannot live with them before because I cannot accept the way they are treated. I don’t know how I… I was tolerating it before, but now I can’t. And it’s not fair for them that I can express myself openly and affect them, not me. Because I am a… citizen [of a new country], the embassy can defend me. But them, nobody. (Participant 3, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 7 March, 2014)

The interviewee also hoped for the further positive development of the Hadar culture that would enable the creation of values that might help to reverse the damage of segregation policies:

P03: [When] they become independent [thinkers], I think they will be able to face the challenges and they will understand what they have done to us. Because I just don’t think they pause and ponder about it.

We are from the same country and from neighbouring tribes and everything, but we are discriminated [against] because our parents came at different times to the city.

But they can’t think about it, it’s not easy at all, because… of the collective, community-thinking mind. (Participant 3, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 7 March, 2014)

The interviewee had explained that he still suffered psychologically from the weight of his stigmatisation as a child, even after he had left Kuwait and very quickly achieved career success. Such individuals also required safe passage to and from Kuwait to visit their families (who cannot travel due to government restrictions), a factor that further limited their freedom of expression.

Intellectual leaders play a paramount role in the expansion and growth of culture (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.24-25). The intentional suppression of an ethnic group’s intellectual
development and leadership may be regarded as a type of cultural destruction. As I have mentioned above, the Bedouin population was chronically deprived of school education resources by the state during the settlement period up until at least the 1970s (al Moosa, 1976; al Nakib, F., 2014, p.14, 21, 22). Alessa’s (1981) efforts to dismantle public education resources for the Bedouin (including the Bedoun), particularly in vocational and technical education, were designed to cut off the group’s access to adult literacy training. This occurred while education policy had been skewed to skip over children’s school education and focus on adult males, in order that they would be trained only to perform tasks directly related to their employment (McLachlan in al Moosa and McLachlan, 1985). Thus, the Bedouin were perceived by Hadar intellectuals (policy makers and political influencers) as best controlled through the deprivation of all forms of formal education, or deserving only of the most narrow, functional type of instruction possible, best provided by the private sector, ‘free’ to the state.

The state was not viewed as a provider of education, or as having a civilizing or culturally enriching function. For example, al Naqeeb (1990, p.127) used the notion of primitiveness and lack of civility as a rationale for depriving tribal people of education. Alessa (1981, p.108-109) had already explained that the basis of this rationale was that it would have enable the Bedouin to become politically consciousness of their lack of citizenship and human rights deprivations. The development of intellectual leadership in the Bedoun population had been impacted by extreme marginalisation and social segregation due to government restrictions since 1986, but specifically, by lack of access to consistent, good quality schooling from the time of the Bedouin’s permanent settlement in Kuwait, until the present day. But moreover, this maligned view of the role of national education can be regarded as having ultimately harmed the state, as it contributed to crippling the state's social and cultural development via oppression of the Bedoun.

Virtually the same measures of punitive repression (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.103) were imposed on the Bedoun regardless of the type of intellectual leadership in which the Bedouin engaged. Taking these different areas of oppression into account, they may be interpreted as focusing on the intellectual leadership roles. I found at least six areas of intellectual activity were targeted. The activities and the punitive responses they attracted, are summarised below, in Table 25.

These measures existed in addition to prohibitions of children commencing schools unless they participated in erasure (‘status adjustment’: ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). Note also that the most acute target was personal conversation conducted between individuals about their own identity and culture. These factors added up to a broader movement of oppression of the Bedoun population as a whole, to an extent that has not been analysed to
Table 25

*Oppression of the Bedoun’s Intellectual Activity and Leadership in Society and Punitive Government Responses*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bedoun Intellectual Activity</th>
<th>Kuwait Government Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition of public speech (face-to-face communications) regarding one's own Bedoun identity or one’s own community</td>
<td>Security restrictions applied to individuals and whole families, criminal charges, incarceration, deportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition of the production of original creative literature, including poetry and novels</td>
<td>Intervention by the National Censor, publishing banned, an open environment of stealing of Bedoun literary ideas and content by educated Hadar working in the literary and media professions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition of journalists attempting to carry out their public, professional roles</td>
<td>Electronic media laws used to close of websites, blacklisting and security restrictions applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition of research roles, including behind-the-scenes technical research roles</td>
<td>Security restrictions applied to individuals and whole families, criminal charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of research information during legitimate United Nations processes (e.g. Human Rights Committee reviews)</td>
<td>Security restrictions applied to whole families, criminal charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar ethnic cleansing: Educated professionals appeared to be singled out for assassination and torture (Lesch, in Lesch and Lustick, 2005, p.180, n66). The Bedoun were one of, if not the most intensively targeted, group. See Appendix F, i.</td>
<td>Government appointed Abdhul Rahman al Awadi, whose role included regular reporting of the number of extrajudicial killings achieved to the Prime Minister of Kuwait, to the role of Head of the Bedoun Committee in 1991. Shamlan Alessa (1981) advised the Ministry of Information at this time. He had previously argued to prevent the Bedoun from becoming educated and developing an intellectual class.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* This data was derived from the thematic analysis of interview data and documentary research.

Date. While throughout this study I have highlighted the ethnic sameness of the Bedoun to the Bedouin citizen population, the interview data and other documentary data point to intellectual identity and leadership as particular areas of ethnic targeting and oppression, where the Bedoun are singled out for surveillance, control and punitive management.

With regards to the last section of the table which is likely to be the most controversial, a few points are salient. Ann Lesch (2005) focused on the Palestinian population in Kuwait, while I have generalised her findings to the Bedoun for what I believe
are good reason, which follow. As I discussed in Appendix F, i, both Lesch and Roth worked for Human Rights Watch. The organisation produced multiple, sequential reports citing Bedoun were equally or more highly targeted than Palestinians for ethnic cleansing. Roth (June 11, 1991), working for the New York Times, was later censored, to the extent that the Bedoun atrocities that he was well aware of, were omitted from print. This made the public unaware of the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun. Similarly, Lesch (29-31 May, 1991) did not extend herself a great deal, to coverage of the Bedoun. Palestinian accounts were characteristically recorded by other scholars or could document the atrocities themselves (in El Najjar, 2001 and Mason, 2010). The Bedoun ethnic cleansing was ignored, or inaccessible, although some foreign correspondents attempted to raise attention to the issues (see Chapter 2). In Appendix F, i, I also explained the greater political and practice support from external agencies and institutions received by the Palestinian population, compared to the Bedoun who received virtually no direct support whatsoever at this time. Nevertheless, the pattern of post-war methods for inflicting atrocities was remarkably similar for all Palestinians, Bedoun and Iraqis. My last point on this subject is that Beaugrand (2010) emphasised the existence of an intellectual class in the Bedoun population up until this time, largely involved with universities and the media. For these reasons, it seems quite reasonable to assume that the Bedoun were also targeted as Lesch (2005) described. I am suggesting that only reason the Bedoun were not discussed as targeted in similar or almost identical ways was due to censorship; the atrocities committed against the Bedoun were left for more limited circulation, in the humanitarian reports.

In Table 25, we see the policy of the eradication of the Bedoun expand from the initial focuses (already established in the literature) of the physical reduction of the population (through the administrative expulsion of 1986 repressing the ability to found families, followed by ethnic cleansing in 1990-1995). We might add the findings of chapter 6, such as the targeting of personal and historical ethnic identity (through re-naming vis a vis ‘status adjustment’), and marginalisation and stigmatisation related to the targeting of tribal origins that pertained to ethnic-sub-groupings of the Northern and Southern tribes, through specific nationalist motifs. These motifs were promoted in public and academic discourses.

Then, in the discussion above, I have illustrated the gross oppression of cultural expansion through education and intellectual development. This has included the inadequate provision of education that had commenced with discrimination against all Bedouin, but later manifested in policy directed toward the Bedoun. The specific targeting of the Bedoun’s intellectual development and leadership, at multiple levels: speaking in public about identity and community, producing different genres of literature about one’s own culture, journalistic roles, reporting on current events within one’s culture, and research roles and presentation of research to limit the development of knowledge about the community
and culture. All manner of education and intellectual activity among the Bedoun was targeted for suppression for the duration of their lives, for the purpose of quelling the development of intelligence, civil society, self-realisation and fulfilment, political mobilisation and the growth of national identity. Al Naqeeb (1990, p.127) warned that the Bedouin should not only be prevented from accessing education, but also from expressing themselves publicly, for fear that the 'pathology' of 'tribal consciousness' would spread via social media. Thus, the nexus of intellectual development and freedom of expression was the real target of anti-Bedouin propagandists who sought to suppress the Bedouin culture, and this ideology appears to be responsible for the restrictions on freedom of expression targeting tribal people in Kuwait today (al Rasheed, 2015).

Thus, we see the post-Arab Spring policy of the Kuwaiti government moving far beyond the targeting of ‘activists’ and ‘protestors.’ The broad and sweeping nature of the programmed eradication policy of the Bedoun, which is centred upon ‘status adjustment’ may begin to be appreciated for its overwhelming, extraordinary breadth and depth. Intellectuals introduced policy with a special interest in depriving the Bedoun of education and intellectual development, as well as citizenship, due to their Bedouin ethnic identity. Simultaneously, Hadar intellectuals and others operated in a regional milieu that stigmatised the cultural characteristics of ‘tribalism’ among the Bedouin, that was developed into an extreme nationalist ideology (see Appendix C-viii). The imposed, restrictive cultural re-organisation of the Bedoun appears to be an organised, decades-long program of eradication of the Bedoun population, aimed at total physical and cultural destruction of the whole population group. In the next section, the discussion moves from the development of intellectual leadership and the targeting of such cultural capacity, to the Bedoun's embodiment of the ideal of genuine citizenship at the grassroots of society.

8.3 The Ideal of Genuine Citizenship

8.3.1 Active citizenry by non-citizens.

Some interviewees were consciously aware that they had realised an ideal of genuine citizenship through daily social interactions with others. Others did not seem to be aware of this process, but their descriptions could still be interpreted as embodying or projecting the ideal of citizenship through values and actions, such as respect for others, cooperation and altruism. Their methods of managing their identity in complex situations revealed the practice of ‘active citizenry’ (Bayat, 2013). Interviewees described the performance of the role of citizen by deflecting or confronting marginalisation and stigmatisation during everyday social interactions and expressing themselves intellectually and creatively despite constant exposure to social and political oppression. As part of this practice, the interviewees not only strategically avoided or diffused stigmatisation and other forms of social conflict, they actively attempted to engage with those who directed stigmatizing
attitudes and values toward them. Some interviewees pointed out that the purpose of this approach was to correct misconceptions and to re-educate others, while others appeared to adopt such practices as part of a more innate urge to express their identity. This data reflected Znaniecki’s (1952a) description of social transformation in the process of creative cultural organisation:

New ideals are initiated by thinkers who become aware of persistent conflicts within and between human collectivities and believe that the realisation of their ideals would substitute harmony for conflict. And this is what creative reorganisation of cultural systems is intended to achieve. (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.371)

Active citizenry involved the sustained presence of individuals, groups and movements in everyday social spaces, asserting their basic rights and fulfilling their responsibilities (Bayat, 2013, p.313) - in other words, the resistance to oppression by simply being and acting in society. The similarity between Bayat’s (2013) concept and this common theme among interviewees who described their approach to social interactions, was an unexpected and novel finding. It revealed a creative impetus among the interviewees, including a drive for self-expression of identity and for understanding their oppressors. The practice was adopted by those brave enough to actually take risks and experiment with their social situations, urged by the desire to communicate with others in society as ‘normal’ people (the role of a regular citizen) rather than from the position of a stigmatised non-citizen. Znaniecki (1952a, p.393) believed that social activity and interactions among individuals and groups was the source of cultural participation and change. These findings extended Bayat’s (2013) theorisation of marginalisation in the Middle East, including the use of informal social networks by ordinary people to resist oppression from state powers hostile to them, as in this case, it may be applied to stateless communities within a dominant citizen society, in the Persian Gulf.

This practice seemed to be attractive to the interviewees because the ideal of citizenship was a cherished ideal and aspiration, associated with a desire for freedom and belonging, the sharing of ideas and participation in society. In this context, ‘citizenship’ represented a resolution of the Bedouns' existential predicament as non-citizens, and of the social and political oppression to which they were subjected. This oppression was symbolised in the stigma that was projected onto them by others in social environments where citizens, particularly the Hadar, mixed. Therefore, there was an inherent paradox in this process experienced by the research participants that was not faced by others to whom Bayat (2013) applied his theory (that is, to citizens). The Bedoun interviewees took ownership over their identity as stateless, non-citizens in the legal sense, in order to perform
as citizens in psychological and social roles. They had realised that their oppression was not merely a set of bureaucratic procedures, but was an expression of deeply rooted values held by others in society. They had also realised they could resist and potentially reverse this negative projection of social values in public spaces through their social interactions.

8.3.2 Empowered identity performance.

These interviewees had begun to consciously adopt a public persona as part of the inner cultivation of their intellectual identity and aspirational values, principally the concept of citizenship, universal values of human rights, respect for others, cooperation and altruism. They performed their identity via emulating the principles of genuine participatory citizenship. This kind of undertaking was not for the faint-hearted. The performance was not a form of passing, but of resistance and embracing the real meaning of what it is to be a citizen. Such individuals were not seeking to conceal their status as Bedoun, but to function as citizens regardless of their status. That is, they were attempting to fulfil the ideal of the citizen, through performative action. It required a certain level of social competency for the interviewees to define their situation in citizen social contexts (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.243-245) as fellow citizens, and to perform such social roles due to the risk of marginalisation, stigmatisation and attention from authorities. Due to their statelessness, the interviewees needed to manage the constant risk that social disharmony could lead to arrest (due to their status as ‘illegal residents’). Bedoun interviewees indicated that in order to participate in citizen environments, they had to delicately avoid escalation of conflict to unmanageable levels.

Thus, active citizenship necessarily involved an empowered identity performance particular to the interviewees’ situation as members of marginalised group (Bayat, 2013) but also one that accounted for their increased vulnerability due to being stateless. Therefore, active citizenship tended to be carried out by individuals with strong personalities who were willing to disclose their identity as Bedoun, or alternatively, it was carried out almost by accident - in rare situations where the individuals did not seem to have a choice but to perform a citizen role. In the latter case, the performance arose in confrontational situations where individuals were ‘exposed’ as Bedoun and compelled to defend themselves to aggressors. Ironically, they were called upon in those contexts to define their situation as ‘real’ citizens with all the attendant human rights such a status carried, and to perform in that role, in order to resist the oppression of the aggressors.

The flipside of active citizenry was ‘passing,’ where individuals concealed their personal identity in order to avoid social conflict (Ginsberg, 1996). This strategy was more, but not entirely, passive (Ginsberg, 1996) as it was linked to conscious strategies deployed for survival (Redclift, 2013, 2016; see also Beaugrand, 2011) and playing ‘the game’ to obtain certain things that one could not access with identity disclosure (Ginsberg, 1996) as a
Bedoun. If individuals maintained control of their identity performance and used it to achieve their own ends (such as attending classes without being stigmatised by students and teachers), passing could also function as an act of resistance, although a more subversive one. Some individuals used both strategies, guided by context (P08, P13); others used a particular strategy in all or particular social contexts, guided by a commitment to active citizen performance (P05, P07, P09) or their fairly fixed social environment that prevented authentic expression (P06, P15; also P03 prior to migration).

In active citizenry and passing, the Bedoun identity was fluid and responsive (Clarke, 2008, p.526; Gross, 1978, p.xv, 58; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.243-246), but mediated by individual and collective values. The complexity of the socialization processes shared by the Bedoun and their citizen relatives, whose status to each other was impacted by different roles in the family, tribe and state, should also be considered against the backdrop of historical and cultural forces influencing that development. My interpretation challenges the view of Longva (2006, p.182), that Kuwait’s Bedouin identity is ‘empty,’ because the group’s ‘cultural content’ is solely context dependent, moment, by moment. This seems to be a somewhat superficial view of human social life, conforming to the general trend of anti-Bedouin sentiment of tribalism theory.

A young, male interviewee explained the complex challenges for young people such as himself, who were emerging in public social spaces after the Arab Spring despite government repression. He had been part of the part of a new generation of young Bedoun who had discovered the notion that they could have ‘dreams’ during the Arab Spring.

P05: Because I am still searching for my place… in this world… what should I do… I am still at the beginning of the journey. Should I choose this point of view, or that? And to tell you the truth, it is so hard for me. So hard. Because of my background, I came from out of society. We are afraid to think. That was in the past. But I am talking about my place in my family, in my friends… it’s so hard to, it’s so hard to talk about these ideas… because they are afraid to think, afraid to live… (Participant 05, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

One of the reasons that the interviewee could speak so frankly was because he had received citizenship prior to the Arab Spring (2011-2012). This had enabled him to access university education. Despite this apparently successful outcome, his family had been subjected to years of manipulation and delays by Ministry of Interior bureaucrats, while they waited for different family members to receive their citizenship approval. One of his siblings was disqualified from receiving citizenship and had remained stateless. His discovery of the full potential of his social identity was accompanied by his citizenship grant. Thus, another paradox for the Bedoun, was that those who attained confidence to
speak out could often only do so after leaving the country and/or receiving citizenship (a similar paradox was expressed by P03, above). Resisting ethnic and cultural disconnection, they retained their Bedoun identity and very carefully and modestly introduced new cultural inputs into the community.

But as I mentioned above, the social practices of active citizenry and passing could sometimes enable the Bedoun to discover each other’s identity in public spaces (as well as online). Active citizenry involved a certain aptitude and audacity, because the confidence of oppressed people in public spaces is naturally low (Bayat, 2013, p.313). After he had adopted this strategy, P05 found that his act of identity disclosure also functioned as a signal for other Bedoun in the immediate social environment. His disclosure provided the ‘safe space’ for others to reveal their identity to him. In cases where other Bedoun had observed him disclose his identity then proceed to manage a harmonious social interaction with citizens, they would approach him afterward and disclose their identity. P05 believed that their purpose of revealing themselves was a gesture of mutual support and potential friendship. The participant explained how he processed revealing his identity in public spaces:

SK: Did you think about Kuwaiti friends?

P05: You know when I meet new friend it's, ‘I’m Bedoun,’ if I see their reaction, I want to see how they respond.

P05: My professors all know I am Bedoun, my friends and colleagues, everyone knows. This is a test I love to put through everyone I know. I don’t want to continue with people who are against Bedoun, so that’s the first thing I always do.

SK: You know what you are dealing with then?

P05: Yeah. Almost everyone. There were different reactions… it’s funny because some of them were Bedoun, but once they know I am Bedoun, they… confessed, they are Bedoun too.

SK: What was that like?

P05: I wondered why they were pretending they were Kuwaiti [citizens]… there is nothing to be ashamed of, so I wondered why were you a secret?  But I get it, maybe they were younger, they were scared of rejection, maybe I was older and I understood that. They are only 18, 19 [years of age]. They are my friends. (Participant 05, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)
In some examples, the Bedoun disclosed or confirmed their identity to others who were unlikely to tolerate their presence in the social environment, and proceeded to behave as if their interaction was perfectly normal, while observing the response of others. This process was described using empathetic language by a number of interviewees, as if the individuals concerned had chosen to educate the other social groups through real-time interactions, rather than choosing to challenge them out of frustration. The approach provided the other individual an opportunity to take in the information and to likewise, adjust their social response. Watchfulness was necessary for evaluation of the other party’s reaction, which according to the interviewees’ experience could be negative, characterised by verbal abuse and violence – or not. This process highlighted the complex and multi-level, meta-cognition that takes place when individuals are engaged in managing their personal and social identities (Goffman, 1963).

In social environments where Bedoun were not known to circulate, the interviewees could be very much on their own performing active citizenship, while other Bedoun remained hidden to avoid social conflict. Without accounting for the myriad of reasons why Bedoun do not participate fully in society, certainly it could be assumed that the vast majority of their encounters in mainstream society would involve interacting with citizens, because the Bedoun are a minority group. A young woman explained that she was aware of the ‘passing’ practice (Ginsberg, 1996) used by the Bedoun to avoid disclosure in mainstream society:

P07: There are many of them. [Name deleted]. She is hiding her identity. There is many people hiding... [their identity]... This people are shying or afraid of people making to away from them.

They don’t tell me... they shy from this thing. Because Kuwaitis don’t like these people. So I must be like, ‘Oh, I’m Kuwaiti.’

Actually I am saying the truth [disclosing her Bedoun identity].

They just want to know your nationality... They think like Egyptian and Indian people are stupid people.

SK: Who thinks that?

P07: Some Kuwaiti citizens... In the social media when they say a joke, oh, come on you look like Egyptian people, you look like Indian. They think like people [of other nationalities] are stupid people. (Participant 7, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 25 March, 2014)

The interviewee then provided a concrete example of how this occurred. She continued:
P07: Don’t judge people just [by their] nationality. Look at their personality how they talk, how they suffer… don’t be like I am the king here, because your rights… there are many nationalities in many countries… So this is ideas continue in our life, with this generation. (Participant 7, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 25 March, 2014)

These social interactions took place face-to-face and online. The interviewee described her online activities in public forums where she disclosed her identity and answered other people’s questions about being Bedoun, while attempting to teach them about the values of social diversity and inclusion. This activity also included responding constructively to online bullies and trolls who attempted to discourage her from participating in the forums, due to their prejudices about the Bedoun identity. I heard about this problem from many individuals, but because I was personally unfamiliar with this kind of online chat (trolling), I found it difficult to comprehend how serious it was. However, Dashti et al., (2014) described the prevalence of online hate-speech in Kuwait, featuring attacks on Bedouin citizens, along the same lines as the anti-Bedouin ideology that was described by Alhajeri (2004, p.16) that I later found in my analysis of tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963; see Table 21) and academic and public discourse on the Bedouin (see Chapter 8, Table 26). This verified P07’s experience, indicating that the top-down filtering of the anti-Bedouin ideology was widespread in Kuwaiti society, but her experience also suggested that it was likely experienced more acutely by the Bedoun, given the historical connection, where hate-speech was used in the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun after the invasion by Iraq (analysed in Appendix C, vi-viii).

Other examples of negative, even confrontational social interactions experienced by female interviewees included citizens in positions of authority asking everyone in a room if they were a Bedoun, and demanding them to declare this to everyone else, citizens openly declaring to all in the immediate environment that they refused to be addressed (spoken to) directly by a Bedoun, or to be served, touched or treated by a Bedoun (in healthcare environments). In other contexts, both male and female interviewees recounted being accused in public of being ‘imposters’ pretending to be Kuwaiti, or not ‘real’ Kuwaitis. When required, the interviewees responded to such claims by initiating conversation, calmly answering questions about their identity and elaborating about their family history in the country. Another approach cited included confronting such individuals with polite inquiries about their own identity. The latter strategy involved acting as if the inquiry was benign, even though such personal information would not normally be discussed with strangers in the cultural context.

Active citizenry was carried out in everyday situations that normally involved marginalisation and stigmatisation. In some examples, the Bedoun confronted citizens with
their own prejudices, challenging them to reflect on their approach, and sometimes they addressed citizens directly with statements of fact about themselves or the Bedoun in general, in response to comments directed toward them. The use of this type of performance was also notable because the interviewees had usually (but not always) chosen to consciously define these situations as interactions in which they could behave and function as citizens. The performance aspect involved the interviewees introducing their identity to others, projecting the value of self-inclusion into the social context in real time. This gave the interaction a somewhat spontaneous and unpredictable quality, which further heightened the need to analyse and manage the risk element. Individuals appeared to be usually, but not always, empowered through these interactions.

Empowerment was expressed poignantly by a woman who had conceptualised her value for universal human rights as an ideal and an attitude toward life. Having identified with the new principle and adjusted her expectations accordingly, she was not about to relinquish her respect for her identity, anyone:

P17:  Basically, [it is the] principle. This is the correct thing to do, whether you are gaining benefit from it or not. The basic thing is just to make sure people understand, ‘This is my rights. It is not your decision to take away my rights, it is my decision.’ And I am forced with that power, myself first then the others, to respect this life. (Participant 17, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)

The respondent’s approach pointed to the social performance aspect. If individuals could conduct themselves with confidence and self-respect, projecting some degree of the ownership over their ‘right’ to participate in society and the way they were treated by others they were more likely to be treated accordingly in social interactions. This assumption embodied the expectation that the human rights of all should be valued by others, regardless of their identity or social status.

The kind of social performance used to resist the tribal stigma, also took on more subtle forms, such as detaching from the negative projections of others, and consciously resisting the dominant social narrative through defensive non-conformity. Nevertheless, active citizenry seemed to provide a new method for the Bedoun to develop an alternative and more inclusive ideology, informed by knowledge of their human rights and traditional values, enacted though genuine participation in citizen society. In this sense, active citizenry provided practice at social problem-solving whenever the Bedoun encountered social opposition, which is the function of positive ideologies (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.205).

Znaniecki (1952) explained the desire to belong to a social group means that everyone wants to conform to the social system to some degree. When conforming to an existing social system becomes impossible due to rejection by others who remain in the in-
group, ‘othering’ does not usually lead to a solitary existence. Rather, those who are made outsiders by one group, seek out acceptance within a different social and/or cultural system. Many interviewees had spoken of their awareness that the oppression of the Bedoun was based on (a factually false) ideology that favoured the dominant group (the Hadar). They also believed that the Bedoun’s oppression was perpetuated by the conformity of all groups in society to the ideology including members of their own group. They understood these limitations, but continued to adopt social practices that could in theory provide them with a way to survive in the existing social system that rejected them. In other words, the performance of active citizenry was carried out in response to an ideal, as a new social system that provided for their acceptance as legal citizens did not yet exist. By developing social relations with others who held similar ideals, one could enter or establish an alternative social system. To this extent, some participants seemed to be aware that they were aligned with a new system of ideas. It one that contained an ideal vision of society, one that included the Bedoun as genuine citizens, and one to which they could successfully conform and belong (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.282-284).

8.3.3 Consciousness of the system of oppression.

The transformation of creative ideals into a system of underlying thoughts and action is indicated through its acceptance by a collective group (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.283). While intellectual development also held the promise of leading the Bedoun interviewees to solve their social and political challenges, a major shift had already begun during the Arab Spring (2011-2012), despite the gravity of the negative issues faced by the group. Some of the Bedoun interviewees had invested a great deal of time rationalising their situation, and reflecting upon ways they could improve their lives. They were aware of that their intellectual abilities could provide a pathway forward that could enable them to make sense of their collective experience. They sought to understand the causes of their oppression, their historical ethnic cleansing, homelessness, hunger and suffering after the Iraq war.

The interviewees expressed different levels of understanding of the purpose of the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program as a system of oppression and erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing), its potential impact on the collective, and the dimensions of its unlawfulness in international law. But certainly, they all understood equally, the impact of erasure on their own families. Some individuals were quite aware of the system of oppression, and could conceptualise it with clarity, including the role of Hadar nationalist ideology and Arab nationalist ideology in their predicament. A number of interviewees understood that the overall aim was to eradicate their population, and that the program could not be maintained unless there was a sentiment among a large proportion of the population for the program to be maintained. This understanding did not necessarily come from abstraction, but rather, from direct experience. P08 explained,
P08: They want to put you in the ground and you suffer. You cannot imagine the feeling. (P08, March 23, 2014)

The Bedoun were segregated in the education system in Kuwait. Not all of the student population were prohibited from attending public school, as there was an exception for children who had Kuwaiti citizen mothers and in previous years, for children of Bedoun military servicemen (which no longer applies). This provision was not as generous as it appeared, as once Bedoun children reached their majority age (at twenty-one years), they reverted to full Bedoun legal status. This meant that they were faced with the same limitations as Bedoun with two stateless parents, after they completed their schooling in the public education system (this exception was also complicated by widower and divorce statuses, but it is beyond the scope of this study to analyse these aspects further). Aside from this exception the other Bedoun were required to attend private schools that provided education to other Arab, expatriate children. It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to explore the effects on all students of the Bedoun attending these schools, although I touched on areas of cultural conflict in schools, in Chapter 7. In general, the consequences of removing the Bedoun from the public school system appeared to substantially but not entirely, disadvantageous.

The process of indoctrination into national culture usually takes place through the national education system, which trains students implicitly and explicitly, in the national culture (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.105). Without experience of full public schooling or private schooling within institutions promoting their culture (except for P04), the respondents lacked indoctrination (Znaniecki, p.1952a, p.290) into the official narrative of the national, citizen identity. That is not to say they had not absorbed the national identity, for clearly they had. But the influences were derived largely from their Bedouin culture including intergenerational, family transmission and broader social networks with communal (tribal) histories, as I discussed in the opening of Chapter 7. As an elder explained to me in Taima, al Jahra, through a translator (T4) his forebears had roamed across Arabia seasonally as nomads, but Kuwait was the only country they had ever known. Additionally, the interviewee's national sentiment was to different degrees, uniquely constrained, conflicted and wounded, especially through the absorption of their father’s experiences during and after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Their heritage informed them they had the right to belong to the land wherein they had settled, while forced to become legally stateless, they were rejected by the nation, but still entrapped within the state. Thus, their attachment to the national identity was complicated, but characterised by independent thought and reflection in the absence of systemic indoctrination.
It may be for this reason that the Bedoun interviewees were able to reason from their experiences and understand to some extent, the ideology that worked against them, that ‘made sense’ to the Hadar and Bedouin citizens, based on their particular vision of their own national identity. The responses from interviewees indicated that although there was a feeling that some citizens lacked compassion toward them, others did not. They recognised that materialism had cost Kuwaiti society dearly, if it was materialism that pacified the masses to tolerate the presence of the apartheid-like policies of segregation in their community. The Bedoun respondents did not lack awareness of the dulling effect of indoctrination of citizens through the education system and beyond, because many of their relatives and friends were citizens, and some worked alongside citizens in their employment roles. Hence, they had gained experience studying this aspect of Kuwaiti culture at close hand.

I believe that it was also partly due to lack of indoctrination, that many respondents were also aware of the true nature of the ‘status adjustment’ program and its accompanying ideology. They were aware that the ideology was little more than a self-justifying doctrine, unable to be proven in fact (I set out this argument in Chapter 2, attempting to deconstruct the ‘myths’ that had arisen about Bedoun identity and settlement in Kuwait). Both the intellectual ideal and the universal values of human rights seemed to have begun to be absorbed as a positive ideology for many of the interviewees, supporting their personal awareness that they were conscious, aware, knowledgeable human beings, capable of changing their lives. In other words, they were willing to take responsibility for their situations to the extent that they could access very limited freedoms, attempting to live out those limited human rights as active citizens as a means by which they emerged in public life, in the ‘dynamic of becoming’ in the cultural world (Halas, 2010, p.131).

Interviewees perceived the value of their lives as affirmed by the universal principles of human rights in the modern world, and as I have mentioned, this also resonated with key values of their traditional culture. As a result, through their intellectual development, they had come to understand that the universal principles of human rights law intrinsically made a great deal of sense to them. This connected them back to their own traditional culture of their parents and grandparents, providing the ‘protective, social shelter’ from the state of the tribal social bond (Gross, 998, p.111). But, on the other hand, their ability to deconstruct the ideology that positioned them as stateless in their own country, meant that they had to live with the burden of this knowledge, and the temptation to imagine that their oppression could end, but might not.

A young man who worked for an Islamic charity explained his perspective on the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program ideology, while addressing the government’s application of a system of typing comprising multiple levels illegality:
P13: You are talking about four or five generations… My grandfather is from Kuwait one hundred years ago… And before… [my father] he works for the government. He died… My father used to be in the military too, but he died very young.

… But you know forty years ago, there was no difference between Kuwaiti and Bedoun. So my parents start their life, they feel like working in the military… as I told you… so they didn’t care about nationality at that time, even passports, car licence they can get it… now, it’s become very hard.

… About the Bedoun… what the government said… there is thirty-five thousand of them deserve nationality, if you say they deserve, why you didn’t give it? That is the question.

And they say, some of them, they are not the same. Okay, give the people who deserve it, and judge that we deserve it, and that the [others] who didn’t have any nationality, they decide they are other people have nationality, they hide [it].

Okay, can I have something from the government [to prove this]? Nobody can hide anything about me.

If you say there is thirty-five thousand deserve nationality, just give it to them, then look after the peoples rights [those accused of being of other nationalities], send them to [a] judge, send them to court, send them to jail, send them to their countries. But what they say? They are hiding their nationality to get some [benefits] like Kuwait[is]?

… then prove it.

Only Allah can judge people. All people are the same, and what people didn’t get… they suffer from it. But there is no difference [the Bedoun] are the same people, the Kuwaiti people, they are same people. (Participant 13, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 2 April, 2014)

The interviewee highlighted the hypocrisy of the criminalisation of the Bedoun according to government policy, which was not merely based on a policy change, but upon the premise of accusing a population known to be stateless, of being legal citizens of other countries, as I pointed out in Chapter 2. In conformity with this policy, government officials had denied the concept of the Bedouin being a stateless population group, as well as the concept of statelessness itself, even defying the existence of this aspect of international law, in settings such as reports to the United Nations Human Rights Committee periodical country review (see Appendix E, iii, iv).
Consciousness of the system of oppression included consciousness of the group’s destruction at the levels of the individual, and the collective. The death of the Bedoun was described by a number of interviewees. At one level, they referred to individuals lacking access to basic specialist healthcare, which led to unnecessary or premature suffering and death (P12, P14, P20). This occurred in direct relation to the lack of consistent provision of public services to the community (and the failure of Decree 409/2011 reform). At another level, they indicated indirect losses, which could be interpreted as indicative of both physical and cultural death. They referred to mass suicides and disappearances, particularly of young adult men. Interviewees referred to suicide of others, and of potential suicide of themselves (P01, P05, P08, P09, P16, P17, P18). One interviewee summed up the scope of the problem for the collective. He told me: ‘They are killing us’ (P09, personal communications, 21 July, 2014).

During my fieldwork in Kuwait in 2014, another interviewee, Hakeem al Fadhli, was detained and subjected endured torture methods that could be interpreted as attempted murder, specifically attempts by authorities ‘acting out’ his suffocation (Amnesty International, 5 August 2016, para. 1, referring to his earlier detention from February 24, 2014). He recounted these methods to me in detail outside the formal interview process (H. al Fadhli, personal communications, Ahmadi November 24, 2015) shortly before he was incarcerated again in 2015 and 2016, for charges related to public gathering performed in the Arab Spring in 2012 and 2011. He had recalled that isolation was one of the steps in the procedures of torture by special authorities who functioned specifically to tortured him, while he was routinely denied medical treatment during periods of interrogation and torture, as this would enable authorities to ensure evidence of torture left on his body would not be recorded by medical staff. In October 2016, he was left indefinitely in an isolation cell with an untreated fever in Anbar 4, an isolated section of the prison (Front Line Defenders, July 15, 2016, October 21, 2016; Gulf Centre for Human Rights, March 13, 2017).

As this is a qualitative study, it is beyond the scope of the study to speculate as to whether or not the ideals of intellectualism and human rights for all people had transformed into a widespread ideology among the Bedoun group as a whole. However, I have attempted to point to some of the indicators of creative, cultural re-organisation achieved through intellectual leadership, social actions and solidarity. I also discussed some of the ways in which interviewees articulated their awareness of their own oppression contributing to a broader, collective consciousness of suffering that al Waqayan (2009) had described as characteristic of the Bedoun’s culture (this theorisation was discussed in section 8.2.2).

8.3.4 Active citizenry, dynamic ideals and the emergence of new ideologies

Active citizenry was also practiced by interviewees who were less aware of the principles of universal human rights and situated in a more traditional social setting. In these
examples, individuals felt solidarity with the Bedoun community in everyday contexts, and performed small acts of resistance to oppression out of necessity, in order to simply survive, responding to the external pressures of their circumstances (Bayat, 2013). Such acts involved merely staying in classes at university, or to continuing to seek out and participate in employment, while saving enough money to pay for books or a computer or a vocational education course. However, some traditional Bedouin values (Wilkinson, 1983) were naturally aligned with the universal values of human rights, such as social equity and the sharing of resources, and therefore, these values resonated strongly with the interviewees as they attempted to participate in society and build close social bonds and networks with people from diverse backgrounds.

Thus, traditional and contemporary Bedouin values (including universal human rights, see al Rasheed, 2015) were connected, through collective social solidarity. In one example (P14), where traditional values were found to be outmoded because they were no longer applied to the Bedouin by others (particularly in the tribal context), the identification with the tribe was weakened and the identification with the Bedouin was strengthened. The interviewee’s perspective showed an appreciation of the values of Bedouin social leaders that were aligned with the principles of human rights. He felt supported by the articulation of these values by Bedouin leaders during the after the Arab Spring. Knowing that he was surrounded by others who shared similar values, and with whom he could talk about his struggles, provided him with a sense of social solidarity. Although he did not have personal contact with the community leadership group, he explained:

P14: I chose the Bedoun community because… they are more feeling for each other more than tribals because the tribals are from more communities, maybe Kuwaiti, Saudi or something, but the Bedouns are the people from the same suffering, they face the same reality, the same destination, the same way.

Yes, I can discuss the situation of the Bedoun with my neighbours [in Taima, al Jahra]. Some people understand the situation but some peoples, they are against my rights and… maybe they are not from the same tribals. (Participant 14, interview in Taima, 9 April, 2014)

In another case, the alignment of the Bedoun with the universal principles of human rights and their choice of young people to assert those rights, was perceived by an interviewee’s parent as collusion with criminals, because the expression of such ideas were regarded as antagonistic to the authoritarian regime (P05, interview 15 March, 2014, Salmiya). The interviewee recognised that his father applied his traditional values only to those whom he perceived as his own group: the Bedoun and citizen Bedouin who did not challenge the status quo. He explained that this defensive posture was a product of the
climate of fear that existed among some in the community who had grown increasingly afraid that they or their family members would have their citizenship stripped from them.

Historically, the defensive posture toward outsiders had been a feature of tribal solidarity, necessary for survival in the desert. The participant explained that these values had since been sublimated to survival under the ruling regime. He emphasised that it had been extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the generation of military men who were blamed by the state for the Iraqi invasion (including his father), to risk further non-conformity (see P05’s quotation above, in section 7.3.2). The interviewee concerned recognised the re-direction of these values toward self-preservation, but he also appreciated that there were forces in society that exploited these values to increase social conflict and ethnic hatred (P05).

P05 wished to reconcile these conflicting forces, to maintain positive family bonds and to express social solidarity with the Bedoun’s value for universal human rights, in ways that would not be perceived as oppositional. His traditional values were understood as having limited application in sectors of society that could not universalise them to apply to all people. This was despite the promise held in these ideals and the international humanitarian law, that claimed that all human beings held these rights (vis a vis the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: United Nations, 1948). The realisation had led him to identify with the intellectual ideal. The universalisation of the interviewees’ values could be allowed to develop relatively unimpeded, reinterpreted through a philosophical, intellectual framework.

The process had helped the interviewee begin to process and resolve his inner identity conflict and to harmonize his social relations with others, while he also continued to practice active citizenry more explicitly with others in public spaces. This seemed to prompt an increased awareness of his capacity for autonomous action in society. Active citizenry was the process by which the Bedouin expressed their ideals in the social world through creative actions in response to their social contexts. They applied their collective values to obstacles arising in social interactions among a range of different social groups, in order to solve such problems (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.201). As such, active citizenry comprised a positive input into the cultural system. It enabled the interviewees to perform in positive, citizen-like roles and to lead others to interact with them in these roles, and represented a conscious effort to create a new cultural pattern: expansive, cooperative and altruistic.

This process is similar to the liberation theory of Paulo Freire (1970). The oppressed are often trapped between polarities, between the social roles of the oppressed and the oppressor. They have become dehumanized by their conditions, which produces an unjust order in society. Dehumanisation distorts their vocation of becoming fully human. Freire (1970) believed that eventually, due to the influence of the distortion, the oppressed tended
to see only one alternative to oppression, which was the role of the oppressor. In other words, the oppressed could themselves not see beyond conformity to the existing social roles which were the standards and norms imposed by the dominant social group and/or political authority (Znaniecki, 1952a). Participant 5 had recognised this aspect in his father’s generation.

For Freire (1970), the oppressed required liberation through education, including the leadership and intervention of outside agents. Znaniecki (1952b) on the other hand, placed more emphasis on the capacity of cultural groups to self-organize and to educate themselves from within (p.105). As I have mentioned, Znaniecki (1952b, p.105) had first-hand experience of this process within the Polish resistance and after their liberation. However, at this time, the population had access to highly trained intellectual class, including himself, participating in an underground education movement (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.104-105; see also Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918 for a survey of those who experienced this movement).

Freire’s (1970) point about the need for external support is particularly salient to the Bedoun. I set out two aspects of this problem above. The previous generation who had been highly trained no longer appear to publicly support the younger generation to resist systemic oppression or to increase their participation society. They appear to have ceased their public activity as representatives of the Bedoun. I also analysed the new and various forms of ethnic targeting and oppression of the intellectual leadership group that has emerged during and after the Arab Spring (2010-2012). This latter group was more vulnerable because members had not received the same level of intellectual training and mentoring as the previous generation. Moverover, just as the former generation had become targets of the 1980s expulsion and 1990s ethnic cleansing, the current generation of intellectuals, had lived though the same period as young children, and had then become targets of the criminalisation via the secret ‘security restriciton’ in the post-Arab Spring environment (see Table 25).

According to Znaniecki, (1952a, p.201), the basis of creative, cultural re-organisation is a dynamic course of creative actions, which once realised, could develop into dynamic ideals and new ideologies. A new ideology is a cultural product directed toward future experiences and the activities of others (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.282). Creative actions which result in well-known contributions to cultural growth are similar in that the individuals who make such contributions adopt a conscious purpose to produce something new, valuable and important - not only for himself or herself, but for all those who could benefit from the actions (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.205). Therefore, there are altruistic and collective values or motivations behind such actions, which emulate the dynamic ideal.

These characteristics enable the ideal and the creative actions that realise it, to be recognised as a cultural product (an object, system or value) worthy of being adopted by
The ideal of active citizenry fulfilled this criteria as a new ideology: the ideal was ‘dynamic’ because it was characterised by flexibility so that individuals from diverse backgrounds could adapt the ideas to their own situations, so that individuals could respond to real problems arising in social interactions. When the ideal grows into a system of ideas it contains a nucleus of principled standards and norms that are readily adopted by the masses and applied to different definitions of situations that make it beneficial to those who experience the same or similar social problem (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.292).

When a dynamic ideal attracts widespread followers, usually via the dissemination of the ideal by a social leader, the ideal begins to expand into an ideology during the process of it being accepted and applied by others (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.283). It is transmitted by the leadership to increasing numbers of followers through social interaction (p.283). An ideal lasts as long as it has active promoters who believe it can be universally accepted and realized, even if only in the distant future (p.285). The realisation of the ideal can be confirmed when it guides the standards and norms of others (p.283), and it can be regarded as a stabilized ideology when it is regarded as binding by its followers (p.285). Only when it loses active promoters and its realisation appears to be altogether impossible, does the ideal cease to function as an ideal (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.285).

These points clarify the development of the dynamic ideal into an ideology initiated by social actions and their growth into new cultural patterns of common values, relationships of functional interdependence and ultimately, creative cultural re-organisation (p.359). But note that Znaniecki (1952b) marked the transition point in the transformation of the ideal to an ideology as when the ideal was implemented on a collective scale (p.283), even among small groups (p.285). Because this is a qualitative study, it is not possible to speculate as to how widespread the practice of active citizenry has become. It seems reasonable to suggest that is has passed the embryonic stage, as the new system was no longer reliant on any particular leader to transmit it, but was embodied in the independent social actions of multiple individuals in this study. Traditional values embodying certain collective values aligned with the universal principles of human rights aided in the transmission of the value of these rights. However, a weak link in the community appeared to be intergenerational connections between intellectual leaders. Those Bedoun who took on intellectual leadership roles faced enormous challenges and vulnerability in modelling these ideals for the next generation, once their activities became visible to those social forces that opposed their cultural growth.

8.4 The High Value of the Cultural Collective

8.4.1 The historically, culturally patterned order of Bedoun values.

If dynamic ideals are ‘guiding principles’ introducing new order into the cultural system, can this order be identified in logically consistent way among the Bedoun
interviewees? The emergence of the dynamic ideals among interviewees discussed in this section can be characterised by a particular order, according to culturally patterned systems of values and actions. This latter principle is reflected in Znaniecki’s (1952a, p.311) concept of ‘functional interdependence.’ Functional interdependence is the general principle by which individuals are guided when they show a tendency to follow definite cultural patterns when dealing with the same value (or the same complex of values). The actions ‘become integrated in the course of their performance into an axionormatively organized, dynamic system of actions’ (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.311). This explains why we may see the same system of values applied across different stages of historical and cultural growth, systematically applied to a vast range of situations defined by individuals who apply these values independently.

This order would likely posit altruism and communal sentiment as the pre-eminent values of tribal society among the Bedoun, which reflect the historical cultural patterns of the Bedoun when they lived on their traditional dirah (tribal territories). The active values supporting the creative re-organisation of tribal communities in Kuwait, in which the Bedoun population was predominantly featured, existed prior to the Bedouin’s transition to contemporary society but additionally, remained active during the phase of transition to permanent settlement in Kuwait. This was demonstrated by the Bedoun’s gradual relinquishing of the nomadic pattern determined by the seasons, due to the incompatibility of nomadism with new forms of economic participation (al Moosa, 1976), in contrast to the consolidation of cultural patterns of organisation among their households in desert settlements (al Moosa, 1976), and later, urban household settlements among citizen Bedouin (al Haddad, 1981).

The development of intellectual and national identity (citizenship) is one of logical and ordered steps in the development of the group’s culture from a pre-literate to literate society (Znaniecki, 1952b) because its members had retained their tribal identity. Literacy is required to facilitate the preparation of young people for full participation in modern society (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.100; Halas, 2010, p.204) and to further enhance the development of culture and loyalty among the masses (Znaniecki, 1952b, p105). These steps are required for societies to develop technical functions, which require skill and conformity in the standards of production to sustain the state economically (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.206; 306). Accordingly, states throughout the Middle East implemented formal settlement programs, which addressed the social and economic needs of the Bedouin tribes and those states, during their transition to permanent settlement and mass nationalisation (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006), including land distribution and a ‘settlement annuity’ (Fabietti, 1993, at para. 12).

Thus, the development of the national identity assuming the Bedouin’s assimilation into the state of Kuwait by the early 1970s (al Moosa, 1976) was not surprising, because it
was planned by thinkers at the regional and national levels (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006). Note however that the genuine ideal of citizenship was always at odds with the Hadar conception, which viewed the Bedouin as ‘Other’ to their own cultural order.

Representations of the Bedouin at the regional level were characterised by ‘Othering’ from the 1950s and 1960s, when Hadar academics and experts conducted formative research on the Bedouin (Bocco, 2000, p.21). In Kuwait, objectification of the Bedouin was elevated to a more extreme level; the group became targeted as a symbolic ‘foreign’ element (al Anezi, 1989, p.174-176). The state, headed by the Bedouin tribal leader al Sabah, was perceived as the leader of both a multi-tribal social unit according to customary law (the Bedouin social contract) and the leader of a modernizing, sovereign state (the Hadar social contract). Thus, the national policy to extend citizenship to all Bedouin specifically recruited by the state to provide service to the nation (employment in the military, national guard and the police) was likely regarded by the Bedouin as the (paternal) expression of an altruistic value by the head of state in accordance with the modern law of the state. Clause 4 of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) is expressed as a reciprocal value: service to the nation was a condition for the conferral of nationality, which would be fulfilled by public servants, particularly those in the military and police forces whose function was to protect the nation.

The Bedouin were actively assimilated into the national identity via their performance of employment roles protecting the state (Alhajeri, 2004), as well as participating in self-education, government and private sector training to enhance their professional capabilities (al Moosa, 1976, p.149, 215), and via their participation in civic roles such as the census process as citizens (see Appendix B, iv for examples of original copies of national census documents issued to the Bedoun, and Appendix D, iii for the two statistical abstracts showing whole population transfer). They integrated their new, citizen identity and corresponding social roles into their existing tribal cultural patterns, while adapting to the contemporary values and regulations of the state.

Thus, the Bedouin’s integration into the state via the recruitment of the tribes by the state, and their service for the state, and participation with the state as citizens waiting for official recognition of their status to be conferred by the state's authorities, confirmed and reinforced their pre-existing, altruistic and communal tribal values. These activities promoted the adaptation and integration of the new value, citizenship in the sovereign state. The rapid historical adaptation of ideals and ideologies within the Bedouin community during the twentieth century, required them to relinquish their centuries-old nomadic and semi-nomadic practices. The process included the requirement that they be granted citizenship in order to function in the economy and in particular, to fulfil their roles in the public service and as workers for private economic projects of the Hadar merchant community (Alhajeri,
2004, p.38). The Bedoun were not yet segregated from the Bedouin community at this time, and therefore their historical, cultural development in Kuwait, was very much a shared history with the citizen Bedouin and the metropolitan classes. Altruistic values promoting service to society were passed on from fathers to sons:

P13: I want to be a good guy. Actually I want to serve my country, like my father and my grandfathers. But I look for the opportunity or the choice.

SK: I see that is a strong theme for the Bedoun, is contributing to Kuwait, serving Kuwait.

P13: Yeah. So of course everyone want to contribute to Kuwait. But we want to, this is our country. Even if they didn’t take us.  (Participant 13, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 2 April, 2014)

The absorption of the national identity signified by the self-ascription of the term ‘Kuwaiti’ transmitted in family and tribal social contexts, was discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.1.2.1. Thus, in the context that the term is used as a self-referent including the Bedoun identity, the term may be regarded as a contemporary referent to belonging to, and wanting to work in service of, the sovereign state (Gross, 1998, p.91, 111).

8.4.2 The transgressions of intellectual debate, creativity and innovation.

It appears that according to the dominant social order in Kuwaiti society, which is controlled by the Hadar, the Bedoun commit transgressions not only by virtue of their mere presence in the state, but also via the expression of cultural identity. Social order relies on conformity with a certain order of social actions. Regular conformity to ideological models is required for this order to be maintained. Transgressions are perceived as injuring the values of conformists or otherwise interfering with the realisation of their purposes (Znaniecki, 1952a, p. 337). The Hadar seemed to have perceived the ‘dangers’ of the Bedoun’s creative reorganisation, a positive, expansive input into the cultural system. Their cultural activity appeared to breach the normative standards of Bedoun segregation and cultural confinement, defined by Hadar values.

The Bedoun were therefore perceived as dangerous to the existing social order when they became publicly active and socially influential, as this had the potential to change the existing social order. Bedoun individuals may be perceived as being adherents of alternative, outsider, systems - possessing ‘uncivilised’ tribal values or alternatively (especially after the Arab Spring), adherents of universal, secular values that destabilise the privileged Hadar with the notion of social and political equality. They may be in the process of becoming members of social groups that support these new value systems, due to opposition and rejection within existing order. They may be faced with active opposition or
a revival of conservatism from adherents of the existing social order (p.360), defined by the Hadar as premised on membership to Kuwaiti society, by ‘original’ citizenship.

Through this point I attempt to illustrate the danger of creativity and innovation posed by the Bedoun as non-conformists, particularly threatening to authoritarian systems which rely on conformity and oppression to maintain their organisation of, and control over, society. The targeting of the Bedoun human rights ‘activist’ in this context may be interpreted as a response to the perceived danger of Bedoun non-conformists, signalled by the introduction of a new kind of intellectual content into the cultural system – one that could usurp the dominant sources of power. The new content would not only be perceived as a criticism of the status quo (human rights rhetoric circulated by the media), but embodied among ordinary people in society, threatening to introduce the possibility of new ideals, values and normative behaviours based on the principles of humanitarianism, peace and social cooperation, to the whole of society. Thus, an alternative framework could be adopted by the masses, such as the ‘pro-democracy’ sentiments expressed across the Middle East during the Arab Spring. Furthermore, this kind of positive, expansive cultural development would likely lead to the increased capacity of society to produce innovative leaders who can solve social problems via cooperation with different interest groups.

Such developments that could challenge the existing social order had been identified. Both the citizen and stateless (Bedoun) Bedouin leaders in Kuwait, Mussallam al Barrack and Hakeem al Fadhli, were incarcerated for exercising their freedom of speech and public gathering while this thesis was written. Bedouin leader Mussalam al Barrack had shown signs of the capacity to solve the Bedoun problem via his attempt to introduce humanitarian values at the parliamentary level, which was interpreted as an antithesis to the current power structure (al Rasheed, 2015). Al Fadhli served shorter, concurrent sentences, characterised by torture and threats to life (Amnesty International, et al., July 15, 2014; April 29, 2016; August 5, 2016; October 6, 2016). He was incarcerated in 2016 prior to my submitting this thesis, for public gathering in 2011 and 2012.

While commentators such as Chomsky (Chomsky, 2008, 2016; Chomsky in Hurwitz et al., 1977) view the overarching imperative of the Gulf governments (and their Western imperialist supporters) as the maintenance imperative of authoritarian governance in order to suppress general democratisation from taking hold among citizens, the situation in Kuwait is somewhat different. Despite their oppression and marginalisation, the Bedoun have maintained functional social relationships within the Bedouin community. The potential to destabilize Hadar domination (but not necessarily the ruling regime) if the Bedoun were granted Kuwaiti citizenship, is real. Thus, the imperative has been not only to prevent democracy spreading among citizens, but to violently suppress the aspirations for democracy that spread among Bedouin citizens, and sentiments of support for citizenship to be granted.
to the Bedouin. The largest protest movements of Kuwait's Arab Spring arose from these two ethnic sub-groups of the Kuwaiti Bedouin.

Historically, these values were not part of the so-called citizen-state ‘social contract’ in Kuwait, because it was essentially, a Hadar contract (al Anezi, 1989). Although all Kuwaiti citizens are distributed regular, lucrative lump sum cash payments to their bank accounts by the state (oil dividends), Hadar citizens remain structurally privileged to the detriment of the Bedouin citizens, due to the nature of resource distribution and infrastructure development (al Nakib, F., 2014). The nature of resource distribution and infrastructure development is in turn, built upon Hadar-dominated national policies and influence with the ruling family, including the manipulation of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) (al Anezi, 1989). The ethnic conflict between the Bedouin and Hadar has involved the suppression of social change initiated by Kuwait’s Bedouin population. The high value of self-centred materialism has bound the Hadar to the contract – they have rewarded themselves with the spoils of the state while the Bedouin are excluded and oppressed from exercising ‘real’ citizenship (one of the predominant themes of anti-Bedouin ideology, discussed in Chapter 7).

Hadar control has been so strongly premised on mono-ethnic nationalism, which has transformed Kuwaiti society into an apartheid state comparable to the entrapment of the Palestinians in Israel, to split and oppress the northern and southern Bedouin tribes. Recently, the go-ahead for the sale of the Bedouin’s collective identity to one of the most impoverished governments in the world (the Comoros Islands) was confirmed (Izzak, May 17, 2016). Hakeem al Fadhli explained the ideological stagnation and narrow-mindedness he believes is characteristic of the Hadar ethnic in contemporary society:

I believe that the Bedouin life right now… it is more advanced than the Hadar, themselves.

Why? Because we don’t have the same mentality as the Hadar. Their mentality is different right now. They don’t think of the Hadar as a weak people or just a stupid people… or a naive people. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 5 August, 2015)

Here, he referred to the fact that the Hadar think of the Bedouin as weak, stupid and naive. This tendency for the Bedouin to view the Hadar compassionately compared to the Hadar, who look down upon the Bedouin, was confirmed by my analysis of scholarly and public discourse on the Bedouin and Bedouin, particularly ‘developmental’ theories, which I discuss further below (Chapter 8, including Table 26).
Why, the Hadar, they having the same ideas before 100 years, and still the same now? They are thinking ‘Oh, he is a Bedouin, he should have a camel in his home…’

But it is not, it is different, totally different…

His opinion of the ideology:

It is a shameful thing, that’s what I think. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 5 August, 2015)

8.4.3 Challenging the dominant paradigm.

Znaniecki (1952b, p.24) emphasised that the birth of national culture society does not commence within authoritatively organised groups or association of members of the economically dominant class, but originates in the ideals proposed by individuals who are or become intellectual leaders:

It originates with independent, individual leaders in various realms of cultural activity, who gradually create a national culture in which a plurality of traditional regional cultures becomes partly synthesized…. As the national culture grows, these leaders, and their followers, and sponsors who participate in its growth form an increasingly coherent intellectual community activated by the ideal of a culturally united and socially solidary national society… (p.24)

The realisation of this ideal is expected to overcome the cultural isolation of local and regional communities, political divisions, religious differences, class conflicts… Throughout this process new social groups become organised and existing groups modified, either to promote further development and perpetuation of the national culture or to integrate, expand and defend the evolving society.’ (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.24-25)

Bedoun intellectual and social leaders have attempted to overcome their cultural isolation since the Arab Spring as I have mentioned, but their message has been interpreted through the narrow lens of political science and the limited scope of reporting by international humanitarian organisations. Broadly speaking, the consequences of the stigmatisation of the Bedoun ethnic identity, the targeting of intellectual identity and the policy of repressing the Bedoun's development of intellectual capacity, is that the group's intellectual identity and intellectual contributions have also been stigmatised, omitted or actively repressed.

This approach occurred at the same time as to academic researchers were interpreting information about the Bedoun’s administrative expulsion as a ‘policy change’ (Longva, 1997, p.51, 52), a ‘secret decree’ (Beaugrand, 2010, p.150) and a ‘subtraction’ of the population (Crystal, 1995, p.182) amidst a systematic series of official policies of
exclusion and expulsion, the physical ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun after the Iraq war (Fineman, November 2, 1992) and the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program, which has attempted to make the population appear to be nationals of other states since 1983 (al Anezi, 1989, p.267). This has contributed to a virtual academic silence about the Bedoun, influenced by local intellectuals who produced the local version of the tribalism theory, following in the footsteps of their European and American scholarly mentors (al Khatib, 1978; al Nafisi, 1978; al Naqeeb, 1990; Alessa, 1981; Khalaf and Hammoud, 1987; Ghabra, 1997a; al Khandari and al Hadben, 2010; al Ansari in al Qatari, February 22, 2010; al Jassem in ‘Kuwaiti academic,’ 2016), which has become the dominant ideology.

The administrative expulsion of the Bedoun (1986), post-war ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun (1990-1995) and the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program (1983-), all reflect a pattern of cultural destruction (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.213). The pattern has targeted intellectual leaders, limiting their development, social roles and influence within their own societies, as well as Kuwaiti society and beyond. As I have mentioned, the Bedoun’s intellectual expression of their identity and culture, which inevitably involves descriptions of human rights deprivations due to the Bedoun’s situation, is clearly regarded by the government of Kuwait as a challenge to the dominant paradigm and as a transgression that must be met with punitive action (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.336).

Al Rasheed (2015) described a similar approach to the Bedouin citizen community in Kuwait, and the same ideological themes have been repeated in regard to the ‘transgressions’ of both Bedouin citizens and the Bedouin stateless population (the Bedoun) for decades. For example, as I discussed in Chapter 7, the Bedouin and Bedoun are described as not ‘real,’ ‘true’ or ‘pure’ Kuwaitis in recurring motifs (Alhajeri, 2004, p.16; see also ‘Racial Tensions,’ 2010; ‘Insulted Kuwaiti,’ 2012), which may be linked to motifs of nationalist ideology held by oppositional groups, such as the quest for purity (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356) and the myth of ‘original’ perfection (p.87).

The Bedoun have been persecuted not only on the basis of their ethnic identity, but also in response to their intellectual development and public intellectual expression, which is a natural expression of their individual, social and cultural (ethnic and tribal) identities and experience in the social and cultural collective. Hakeem al Fadhli pointed out the risks of challenging the dominant paradigm which has criminalized the Bedoun as ‘other nationals,’ reflected in methodological issues and theoretical positioning:

Why, we are talking about humans, and we are talking about culture… and we are talking about… these people they are in this land for at least the last five hundred years.
These people [academic researchers] who are supposed to be putting the structure, or the profile, the *knowing* [accumulation of knowledge], or… the demographic system of Kuwait… they are talking… and reading a lot … But they don’t know the people, they don’t move through the people, know the Bedoun. They did not go to al Jahra, they don’t sit with the Kuwaiti Bedouins, the Bedouin people. They don’t like them. First, if you want to know, you must meet with the people and talk with them. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 5 August, 2015)

The Bedouin leader touched on the dynamic of the humanistic coefficient (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.132). He implored researchers to look beyond the dominant paradigm that segregated the Bedoun, to discover who the Bedoun really are. The dominant paradigm could only be properly understood in this context. His ideas followed the similar lines of argument that have been used in cultural studies by Znaniecki (1952a) and Halas (2010):

> Human beings create culture together. Therefore, it is not enough to study the continuation and development of culture from the point of view objective reality and structure of these systems… It is necessary to study the social organisation of cultural life of human beings. (Halas, 2010, p.165).

Al Fadhli pointed to the dominance of the Hadar over the production of knowledge about Kuwaiti society, including interpretations of the Bedouin ethnic identity, which has theoretically positioned the Bedoun as not genuine, criminalized, and ‘other’ than what it really is. He explained that Hadar intellectuals and gatekeepers were assumed to fulfil the role of interpreters of Kuwaiti society by international human rights advocates, scholars and journalists, although Hadar have been historically, politically opposed to the Bedouin:

> Why did all the academic studies till now… why are they coming to some kind of line, like a common idea… You know why? Because the same [kind of] person that is supposed to be helping them to study, they feed it [the same ideas] to the people who come from all over the world, from the outside.

> But I know they don’t have… [the] mind to answer the question, because they are not from our society. We are the nation, we are the tribes…

> If we are not from Kuwait and we are not Bedouin, then what are we? If we are not Bedouin and we are not supposed to be Hadar, then what are we? If we are not from Kuwait, then we are from where? This is the main issue, it is not academic… it is not [a matter of] analysis… it is pure, socially pure, racism. Nothing more. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 5 August, 2015)

Al Fadhli challenged the dominant paradigm that has questioned the origins of the Bedoun via criminalising tropes, built on the (incorrect) assumption they held citizenship in
other nations (Crystal, 1992, p.75, 76, 1995, p.167; Longva, 1997, p.51). He questioned why the Bedu should relinquish their collective identity simply because they live in urban environs (al Nakib, F., 2014, p.5). He also emphasised the gaps in academic rationale theorising the identity of the Bedoun and Bedouin in Kuwaiti society, which had lead to the incorrect assumption the Bedouen are not part of the Bedouin society or ethnic group (Beaugrand, 2010, p.18) or do not have an awareness of ‘ethnic’ issues that affect their situation (Beaugrand, 2014a, p.3).

Most of the interviewees identified the ethnic targeting and various forms of discrimination as racism, as this is the term in English that is used locally to refer to the social and cultural conflict experienced by the Bedoun and/or Bedouin (for examples in the local newspapers, see Abbas, April 22, 2014; Al Ansari in al Qatari, February 22, 2010; Darwish, October 20, 2015; ‘Kuwaiti Bedouin,’ December 10, 2009). Additionally for the Bedoun, it is a term they recognize from references to racial discrimination in the human rights context, via the lens of minority rights. The emphasis on the term has been developed by them in reference to their understanding of international law, and the interest of international humanitarian agencies' approach to Bedoun, which has been largely delimited by the concept of discrimination and minority rights (see my discussion in Chapter 2, section 2.5 and Chapter 6, section 6.2). Despite this, once interviews moved beyond dialogues of ‘rights,’ interviewees refer to a range of expressions of ethnic/cultural concepts, including their identity, tribal belonging, social relationships, ‘passing’ (Ginsberg, 1996) inside citizen society, conforming to social norms in Bedouin and Hadar society, stigma, humiliation, hate-speech, culture, nation, being ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the social group, and so on.

In this study I have attempted to outline the applicability of framing the Bedoun’s situation in the context of cultural systems and ethnic groups, while attempting to refer specifically to different types of social exclusion, discrimination, prejudice and so on, and being careful not to over-generalise terms such as ‘racism’ and ‘marginalisation,’ as specific reference to social actions was a strength of Znaniecki’s (1952a) cultural science theory (Bierstedt, 1981, p.213). I am not sure if my frequent use of ‘ethnic targeting’ helps to overcome the overuse of these other terms, but the factor of ethnic identity and persecution of grounds of ethnicity and tribal identity, is salient. Nevertheless, I have challenged the notion that the Bedouin and Hadar are one ethnic or national group (promoted by Longva, 1997, 2006), and attempted to show that the Bedouin-Hadar ethnic difference is, generally speaking, fairly clear at the grassroots level of Kuwaiti society. Although there are exceptions, the cultural differences and ethnic conflict emphasised by both the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) and Hadar can be read in Kuwait’s daily newspapers. Furthermore, I have also mentioned that Hadar scholars very clearly pointed out the ethnic differences
between their own group and the Bedouin, through their objectification and dehumanisation of the Bedouin in scholarly writings.

In Chapter 7, I surveyed a number of contributions to ideas that framed the Bedouin as culturally distinct, if not incompatible, with the Hadar, and I challenged the opinions of scholars that such ethnic distinctions were merely ‘popular discourse’ (Longva, 2006; al Nakib, F., 2014; Beaugrand, 2014a; Fletcher, 2015) because it was quite clear that these ideas have a strong, ideological component that has origins in, and is disseminated by, intellectuals through political and academic discourse (which is not ‘popular discourse’ in my view, but quite specialised dialogues) (see my analysis in Appendix C, vi-viii).

Specifically, language deployed to discuss the Bedouin and Bedoun in society have contained a nucleus of principles and values embraced by sociologists and anthropologists. For example, the notion that Kuwaiti Bedouin society and culture is inherently ‘anti-modern’ but should disappear upon complete assimilation into urban society was, developed by Learner (1958), and remains popular across disciplines (al Nakib, F., 2014, 2016; Alissa, 2013; Ghabra, 1997a, 1997b; Tétreault, 2001, 2003).

The more overtly anti-ethnic portrayals of the Bedouin ‘mind,’ adopted from Patai’s (1976) famous treatise on ‘The Arab Mind,’ seems to have been quite popular with Kuwait’s urban Hadar intellectuals (and many others). The treatise was projected onto the rural dwellers in the guise of tribalism theory (for example, al Khandari and al Hadben, 2010, al in al Qatari, February 22, 2010, al Naqeeb, 1990, Alissa, 1981, Khalaf and Hammoud, 1987 and al Jassem, in ‘Kuwaiti Academic,’ 2016). In the previous chapter, I also outlined some of the most potentially harmful, emerging themes in the literature, highlighting the trend toward casual eradication dialogues (Abrahamian, 2015), negative eugenics (Johns, et al., 2015) and dehumanisation (Beaugrand, 2010) (see Appendix C, vi-viii). Some of the other themes analysed (and this is by no means an exhaustive list) that reflect ideologies seeking to challenge or oppress the Bedoun’s capacity for intellectual development and expression, were clustered around the theme of ‘Developmental approaches to the Bedouin’ are shown in the Table 26 below. Quite often, these ideas were used in arguments promoting the segregation of the Bedoun.

Despite this troubling edifice of intellectual opinion, Bedoun intellectual and social leaders have continued to contribute to the growing literature on the Bedoun and Kuwaiti society since 1991 (Human Rights Watch, 1991a). They have contributed to the development of knowledge about their society by bypassing local gatekeepers, and communicating directly with the global community via social and news media, with journalists, international humanitarian organisations and researchers since the Arab Spring (2011-2012). Furthermore, this development has occurred as a result of self-education and self-initiated community education. It has occurred due to the deliberate, independent
Table 26

Summary of Themes of ‘Developmental’ Approaches to the Bedouin in Academic and Public Discourse

‘Developmental’ approaches (meta-theme)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The ‘psychological development’ approach (theme)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Intellectual and personality characteristics</td>
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<tr>
<td>o The Bedouin ‘mind’</td>
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<tr>
<td>o The Bedouin ‘personality,’</td>
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<tr>
<td>o The Bedouin ‘attitude’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Capacity for productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o The lazy, ‘underproductive’ Bedouin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o The ignorant, Bedouin ‘illiterates’</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The ‘cultural development’ approach (theme)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Misrepresentations of ‘dangerous’ social activities (examples confined to ordinary activities and normal behaviours)</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Cultural practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Recreational practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Educational practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Work practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cultural hygiene – ‘Deserti...nation’ and feminist critiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o ‘Deserti...nation’ - urban pollution and the ‘national security threat’ (examples confined to ordinary activities and normal behaviours)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ More ‘dangerous’ tribal activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Religious practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Personal appearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Scholarly, feminist critique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Bedouins with women’s representation are misguided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Bedouins won’t support purchase of weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Bedouins are religious fanatics and terrorists</td>
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<tr>
<th>The (deprivation of) ‘resources’ approach (theme)</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Deprivation of resources targeting Bedouin in desert settlements and popular housing areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Delay in state education expenditure on the Bedoun at all levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lack expenditure on Bedouin children’s education by design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Arguments for the withdrawal of the state education expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Arguments for the withdrawal of resources from civil society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table shows analysis of a particular meta-theme into themes, sub-themes, sub-sub-themes and minor sub-sub-themes. I have not provided every quote for this thematic analysis (unlike the interview analysis), but a referenced, detailed discussion of these themes can be found in Appendix C, vi).
actions of individuals, as a result of their active participation in society and of increasing innovation (Halas, 2010, p.200). Individuals who have accepted the duty to develop their own skills and generate innovations valuable to others, are regarded as fulfilling the role of creative innovators (Halas, 2010, p.200). Thus, the transmission the intellectual identity as an ideal may be regarded as having influenced the cultural expansion and creative re-organisation of Bedoun society. Until the Arab Spring, the group had been undergoing ethnic proliferation and consolidation in response to the expulsions of the 1980s and 1990s. Signs of cultural expansion were not known or seen by scholars prior to the Arab Spring period.

The expansion of the Bedoun’s culture has occurred via the interactions of Bedoun social and intellectual leaders with the global community in the spheres of activity I referred to above. The group’s attempt to restore their human rights led to engagement with the intellectual field of international humanitarian law, as well as social and professional engagement with international humanitarian organisations. Thus, the Bedoun’s intellectual engagement with human rights had provided the opportunity for cross-cultural fertilisation (Znaniecki, 1952a), while intellectuals in the social sciences had worked toward depriving the Bedoun of the capacity to develop intellectually as a whole group, and continued to manufacture ideologies that work contrary to these aspirations.

The Bedoun’s cultural expansion in relation to their human rights, had also been generated by ordinary Bedoun individuals in Kuwait, as indicated by the range of social and cultural activities and experiences recounted by the interviewees in this study. They persisted with ‘normal’ cultural activities such as vocational, technical and higher education and sought to normalise their social relations in public spaces through the ideal of genuine citizenship. Those Bedoun who are taking on intellectual leadership roles in their community have been being ethnically targeted as ‘activists’ of human rights; yet if their human rights and citizenship had been provided to them, they would have been more readily recognized for their alternative roles in other areas as innovators, intellectuals, community leaders and educators, which they currently perform.

The Bedouin community as a whole, does not yet appear to have reached its full intellectual ‘awakening’ as a result of mass education, though this threshold seems to be fast approaching (if al Nakib’s, F., 2014 comments are correctly timed). The Arab Spring marked the beginning of the Bedoun’s discovery their of role in creating and disseminating their own historical and cultural narratives that compete with the official, mono-ethnic, Hadar ideologies. By building on their intellectual capital, they hoped to find a way out of their oppression and entrapment in the state.
WHule Alnajjar and Selvik (2016) argue that the only political model capable of delivering the Bedoun a release from their situation is a ‘real’ democracy, which Kuwaitis don’t want (p.67), other channels in law may be pursued against individuals and corporations who have profited from the Bedoun’s murder, entrapment, ethnic cleansing, their physical and cultural destruction. Democracy is not a requirement for accountability to the crime of jus cogens.

8.4.4 A new vision of society.

The development of a unified, modern cultural identity and the production of cultural products which reinforce it, requires leadership in different areas of cultural activity (intellectual, social and technical) (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.24; Halas, 2010, p.191). Previously, the Hadar had adopted the role of intellectual leaders of the Bedouin ‘illiterates’ in Kuwaiti society, until the administrative expulsion of the Bedoun could be achieved (Alessa, 1981). The Bedoun were left without strong leadership after their expulsion, particularly due to the timing of the Iraq war (where their military leaders also abandoned them, see Alhajeri, 2004) and their ethnic cleansing immediately after the war. Various degrees of ethnic expansion and contraction (Horowitz, 1975), conservative and creative cultural re-organisation (Znaniecki, 1952a) likely occurred at this time, although this period was not accounted for in academic research.

The Bedoun began to assert social leadership roles within their own community commencing in the early phase of the Arab Spring following revolutionary activity in Tunisia (al Saadi, November 24, 2011; Davidson, 2013), and since then, ordinary individuals have consciously modelled genuine citizenship in their social interactions within and beyond the local community, a framework through which they perceive themselves as members of Kuwaiti society and in fact, as citizens of Kuwait. This ‘new order’ of society integrated the values of altruism (mutual aid) and communal sentiment into the cultural system in social interactions with other cultural groups. These values may be seen as a local expression of social values emphasised in Western societies: equality and social inclusion, which is also described by the Bedoun and Kuwaiti citizens as love, the ancient principle of universal love through which subjects seek social unification (Halas, 2010, p.120).

In this section, I focus on altruism expressed through the principle of universal education, which the interviewees identified with quite strongly. The value of the cultural collective expressed was ‘a new vision for society’ discussed by an intellectual leader (P09), based on the notion that Kuwait may only become a truly developed society when intellectual values are transmitted to all Bedoun through universal education, a value defined in international human rights law (Article 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations 1948; Articles 13 and 14, International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights). The notion that the Bedoun share values compatible with the goals of
mainstream Kuwaiti society would become more apparent to those social groups who oppose the Bedoun, if the Bedoun could access the resources to actually realize those values.

A large, public social gathering called *I Have a Dream* took place in Kuwait during the Arab Spring (al Saadi, January 3, 2012). Such public gatherings are rare in Kuwait. One of the purposes of this event was to stimulate the creative imaginations of the young Bedoun in order to give them hope and to encourage their increased participation in society, especially in education (al Saadi, January 3, 2012). The rationale behind the social event was that once young Bedoun had developed their intellectual abilities and confidence as a result of receiving college and higher education, they will be more likely to develop the capacity to articulate themselves among Kuwaiti citizens and other nationals in Kuwait (P09).

Young Bedoun’s self-empowerment and ability to think independently would be strengthened by the cultural exchange with others from different cultural systems. The rationale seemed to have a similar potential to affect cross-communications with other social groups, such as the use of strategies adopted by intellectual and social leaders who had bypassed Hadar gate-keepers and communicated directly with the international community. However, the *I Have a Dream* event was focused on developing positive relationships between groups locally, with Bedouin and Hadar citizens. Znaniecki (1952b) referred to this kind of positive and cooperative input into the cultural system through personal interactions as the part of the creative cultural expansion of cultures, which he believed was one of the most positive forms of cultural relations. This type of creative development could reduce aggressive tendencies within cultures and restore equilibrium to social relations (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.145).

In theory, the modelling of such behaviours by the Bedoun with other ethnic groups in citizen society could reduce aggressive sentiments toward the Bedoun. Znaniecki (1952b) called this type of social input from one culture into another, ‘cultural fertilisation’ (p.145). He believed that when both of the groups involved in such exchanges were able to use creative developments to promote the growth of their cultures, ‘cross-cultural fertilisation’ had occurred (p.145). This process occurred when national societies utilised the results of creative work done by other societies for their own development. The *I Have a Dream* event described above was created along these lines.

The event encouraged individuals to move beyond the boundaries of Bedoun and Bedouin culture and to aspire to increased social interaction and educational achievement. As a result of the event, many individuals came forward to offer financial support to ‘sponsor’ Bedoun to complete courses of higher education, which was organised by Bedoun social intellectual leaders. During my fieldwork in Kuwait, other Bedoun who
were not associated with the organisation of this event, verified the outcome of the event and the phenomena of resource-sharing in society for the purpose of education (see Table 24 and Appendix B, ii, where I discuss the failed Education Fund that was claimed to pay for the Bedoun’s education). These series of actions comprised positive inputs within Kuwaiti society.

This was the thinking behind the ‘I Have a Dream’ ideal (see al Saadi, January 3, 2012), work in the Khatahib school (al Hajji, October 14, 2014) and the efforts of mature members of the community encouraging young people not to give up on their situation, to resist the tendency toward seclusion and to remain active participants in society. P09 explained his hope of a new vision for society for Kuwait:

P09: We are trying to make a new society for Bedoun, new ideas, get them out from scared [living in fear], you know? There is some people trying to help Bedoun, somebody to give them hope… Now we are thinking young Bedouns who are studying at university, they are trying to think in a different way, not like another generation… for a lot of them, if they find another way to get to another country, they will not stay here.

So he is trying to make some plans, ‘When I finished I must find some places, not important is here. I want to have a good live, a happy life, I want to make my family, I want to work a good work and make something in my work.’

So the Bedoun generation now, the young, they have now… not like [before]… they are thinking to have a new dreams, the new dreams… because he saw his big brothers or his uncles or another people… they [government] destroyed their dreams. So they want to study and finish university, and that’s important to [them]…. So there are a lot of difference [between the generations].

I think they will not deny it, that, and they will remember us. We were the first guys who said ‘No, we must have a good future for the next generation.’ I think they will not forget us…. I hope that. (Participant 9, 26 March, 2014, interview in Taima, Kuwait)

Active participation in society by the Bedoun in education and employment in a new society in which the Bedoun had acquired Kuwaiti citizenship, would substantially diminish the perceived ‘threat’ of tribal culture promulgated in Hadar nationalist tropes aligned with tribalism theory (al Moosa, 1976; Alessa, 1981; al Naqeeb, 1990). The Bedoun collectivity would no longer be required to reinforce their tribal ethnic identity (as a primary identity) in defensive cooperation in order to access basic resources through wasta (informal networks). They would be free to express their identity in a plural society in which all social groups cooperated in solidarity with each other for the benefit of society, as members of one nation.
However, the notion of a ‘new society’ was focused on problem-solving by the Bedoun within the Bedouin community, within the scope of their very limited freedoms and resources. It was not intended to account for the underlying problem posed by the mono-ethnic ideology which formed the basis of Hadar national identity, which intellectuals had continued to elaborate, undermining the very cultural development within the Bedoun population that they had disparaged and lamented in their tribalism theories (al Khandari and al Hadben, 2010; al Ansari in al AQatari, February 22, 2010; Ghabra, 2014; al Jassem in ‘Kuwaiti academic,’ 2016).

According to this vision, mass education of the Bedoun was required for the population to participate in contemporary society, while citizenship was required to secure this right along with the removal of the specific and additional layers of restrictions on the Bedoun’s cultural expression. This conception was precisely the opposite to the nationalist agendas of key Kuwaiti intellectuals, which had constructed a nationalist vision for the cultural destruction of the Bedoun, premised on the deprivation of education (al Naqeeb, 1990, p.127-128; Alessa, 1981, p.108-109) as a necessary measure for to the suppression of ideas, *vis a vis* ‘tribal consciousness’ (al Naqeeb, 1990), specifically, the Bedoun’s awareness of their political and human rights (Alessa, 1981). The author of this new vision of society (Participant 9) was unaware of Alessa’s (1981) very specific policy design later realised in government policy expelling the Bedoun. He had formed his ideas independently on the basis of his experience as an intellectual with many years experience functioning in citizen society. According to social theory, the individual constructs the cultural world by participating in it. Through subjective experience the cultural world, it becomes integrated into the personality, and by social action, the individual co-creates the reality (Halas, 2010, p.131). P09 had consciously entered the process of becoming in the cultural world and affected social change that had touched the Bedoun society. By inspiring others with the reality of an alternative system of ideas, he had shown the community that social change was possible.

This new vision of society had the potential to address directly, the principles which had enabled the state to oppress the Bedoun and render them perpetually stateless, by targeting education (at all levels) and intellectual development of the whole group as part of the plans for administrative expulsion and deprivation of citizenship (in Alessa, 1981; ‘The Study,’ 2003). One young interviewee in his twenties questioned the national policy strategy of restricting education to prevent a whole population group from participating freely and effectively in the economy:

P13: … But the parents here cannot, cannot afford that [to pay for education]. Most of them cannot… get even food. No, their education, education is [a]
luxury, you know. They need more then 74% to get accepted into the university, but if they didn’t, they can’t [be admitted into university or college].

That is if they have a Kuwaiti mother they can, but if they didn’t they can’t. It is a very complicated situation and... most of them come from parents didn’t study. Most of them [the parents] in the military [and then] they didn’t work, they didn’t find work. And if they did find work it is only about 200 to 300 [KD per month]... it’s really hard to know their situation.

Most of the people didn’t go to study they went to work... [But they] cannot find work, because they are not [acquiring post-secondary] education and they don’t have a degree.

That is about the community, not the government. I don’t know how the government is thinking, what is the strategy. But you know, you can simplify it. If you put a slice of the community in one area, and you didn’t teach them, you didn’t give them work, what do you expect from them to be? What do you expect from them, exactly? Do you want them to be doctors, or nurses or what? Most of them will be criminals. They are uneducated...and you know that... it is a danger, if we didn’t teach those people.

SK: There are other people who have hadn’t had any education...

P13: Who haven’t had any school at all? They didn’t go to school before because they could not pay the fees. Before they have left school to work in the street, not official work or something like that....

SK: How many do you think are like that?

P13: Seventy percent of Bedouns.

SK: Seventy percent? So you are talking tens of thousands.

P13: About, more than fifty thousand.

I support uneducated people to get educated. I speak to them and I motivate them as I can. If some one I know, one of my friends, I support them to register at university. Sometimes I will help them with money, if I can.

But the more Bedoun works for Kuwait, the more it will benefit the country, not for the people. The country needs skilled people... and even getting a degree the Kuwait people, it is a selfish thing. They only want a degree, [their perception is] ‘I have it.’ [But] they didn’t use it... It’s about government strategy, I don’t know it... but... they are creating uneducated people [among the Bedoun]. There is a lot of conflict, maybe I don’t know
how many people… maybe the way of speaking: ‘You are Bedoun.’
(Participant 13, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 2 April, 2014)

The interviewees discussed a variety of experiences of belonging and marginalisation with Bedouin citizens, whereas during interactions with the Hadar citizen community they were faced with stigmatisation and almost wholesale rejection. Where individuals had a weak tribal affiliation or had been rejected by their family or tribe due to their statelessness, they felt crushed. This was because tribal solidarity was the one area regarded as the basis of social security and support expected by the Bedouin in environments where the state did not provide it, reflecting the values of traditional tribal solidarity, *asabiya* (Gross, 1998, p.111). This is why tribal communities persist in states with weak civil governance, in states which deprive a tribal group of public resources and which threaten such social groups (Gross, 1998). These individuals found comparatively stronger solidarity among the Bedouin, as I mentioned in regard to the discussion by P14 about his community in Taima. In particular, some interviewees had experienced abandonment by their extended families or tribal elders in times of need, which they attributed to their Bedoun status. In these cases, aspiration toward the ideal of universal belonging to the global community, embodied in the universal principles of human rights, compensated for the limitations of traditional culture, which was impacted by the tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963) of Bedoun identity.

Given these experiences, the Bedouin identified with the values of the Bedoun collective as a unique group characterised by multi-tribal membership, ethnic solidarity and common life experience that set them apart from Bedouin citizens. Some, but not all, felt solidarity with those in the Bedouin community in their local neighbourhoods, individuals whom they knew personally, or with whom they shared social media contacts, as well as Bedouin social leaders. This was shown in the discussion of the proliferation and consolidation (Horowitz, 1975) of the Bedouin sub-ethnic group at the beginning of this discussion, which demonstrated a shared consciousness of collective solidarity. Although they remained extremely vulnerable as a population group threatened by the state via the ‘status adjustment’ program, which imposed a system of oppression that enforced restrictive cultural re-organisation, the interview data indicated the some sections of group were undergoing creative re-organisation and cultural expansion, even participating in the discussion of humanitarian issues an international level, as they learned how they might adapt and survive into the future.

The repression of the Bedouin and Bedouin citizens in public speech indicates the active disorganisation of society. The most intense area of surveillance and perceived transgressions of the Bedouin regarded their expression of intellectual capacity and reference
to their own situation. This focus reflected Alessa’s (1981) preoccupation with the potential of the political power of the Bedouin ‘illiterates.’ In the Gulf, the assertion of Bedouin identity has continued to emerge since the Arab Spring (2010-2011) (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014; al Rasheed, 2015). The key values expressed by the Bedouin who have sought greater freedoms and equitable access to resources in the Arabian Gulf are compatible with the Islamic value of the \textit{Ummah}, the global spiritual community (Akram, 2007; see also Abdullahi an ‘Naim, 2008, in Edayat, 2014, p.21) and the awareness of human rights law and the roles, obligations and duties of citizens and the state (al Rasheed, 2015). Thus, a number of different modes of thought or spheres of social life to which the Kuwaiti Bedouin have limited access, appeared to be simultaneously converging to influence group social values, combined with defensive opposition toward the forces which seek to destroy Bedouin cultural values (al Rasheed, 2015).

Hakeem al Fadhli described the dual influences of Hadar dominance over government policy and processes along with the lack of cooperation of the Hadar with other groups in civil society. He believed this problem arose from the Hadar’s inability to identify shared values between themselves and other social groups, based on the ideology of elitism (similar to the description of Hadar social and cultural values set out by al Anezi, 1989, p.174-175). The ideology continued to infiltrate the youngest generations of Hadar. He also believed that the ideology had stimulated the progressive consolidation the Bedoun and the Bedouin ethnic group in cooperative defence since the Arab Spring (2011-2012).

I asked the participant about his opinion about future developments in social relations between the Bedoun citizen Bedouins, as a result of their increased participation in higher education. He elaborated by first referring to manner in which ethnic targeting, citizenship-stripping and restrictions on freedom of expression experienced by Bedouin citizens from 2011 to 2015 had highlighted the instability of their citizenship in the state of Kuwait, and just how close many were to losing their citizenship. In doing so, he affirmed the ethnic relations between the two tribal groupings. The Hadar citizenship, by comparison, had remained privileged, stable and taken-for-granted:

\begin{quote}
It is not now, but it is coming, on the way… Because just right now is happening to the Bedoun is happening to the Bedu….
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Second, because the closest group of the people… as like the ethnic… we are very close, even if we are talking about the tribes, it is very close. Even if there is some difference, between the northern and southern tribe, still there is some kind of [social] relations.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
The Hadar they have the problem, still they are seeing everyone else, is like someone who is less human and is down to them [inferior].
\end{quote}
They are no longer flexible any more. They are running out of ideas. They [the Hadar] think, ‘We have a disagreement, we cannot come to work on some kind of solution, no.’ Whoever does not like the way the country is running - outside, he has to go outside [outside the country: via citizenship-stripping and/or deportation].

Really, the Hadar they are becoming a very closed society, they are not open any more. Yes, we have some kind of social media like, twitter… but you can see, the same closed minds [expressed] in the diwanniya, you can see it on twitter on Instagram or Facebook. You can see the same mentality.

I can understand the old man, the old woman, sixty years old, who is thinking in the so racist and closed-minded way. But someone who is twenty or twenty-five years old, he is going to the university and he is supposed to have friends from all over Kuwait, and there is the social media, and there is a new world... And he is still thinking the same way that his family is thinking. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

Secondly, the interviewee had inadvertently but quite clearly, articulated the process whereby the Hadar ideology had begun to crystallise into dogma. He had noted the underlying rejection of all Bedouin (citizen or Bedoun), the influence of the ideology disseminated across multiple communications channels and audiences (physical and online communications, and intergenerational transmission), and the closing down of the dynamic system of ideas (the Hadar were unable to generate new ideas, the inflexibility of existing ideas, which would lead to repetition of the ideology in response to demands to solve new problems, and an incapacity to cooperate with other social groups) (Znaniecki, 1952a discussed this process in detail). Some of these characteristics can be seen in the variety of methods and target audiences used to suppress Bedoun intellectual activity, in Table 26 (above).

Furthermore, these are all tendencies which appear to be largely unchanged since the concept that citizenship could, and should, be withheld from the Bedoun was introduced as a general policy platform by Kuwaiti Arab nationalists around 1965 (Mdaires, 2010) and then emerged as a specific set of restrictions on the Bedoun's participation in the nation some ten years later, through the medium of urban planning and development theories absorbed by the Municipality of Kuwait and the Ministry for Planning (al Awadi, 1980; al Khatib, 1978; al Moosa, 1976; Zhou, 1976). Through this localised urban development paradigm, Hadar academics felt free to develop their vision of their city, explaining their need for segregation of the Bedouin who had not yet received citizenship (the Bedoun), through the dangerous, primordial ideal of cultural hygiene (refer to the analysis of academic discourse, Table 26, and Appendix C, vi). Znaniecki (1952a, p.286) referred to this problem
as the regression of dynamic ideals into dogma, which causes stagnation of culture and limits creative cultural development (Halas, 2010, p.164). A problem with such conservative organisation is that its adherents do not recognise the increasing conformity it requires to function (Znaniecki, 1952a). The ideal of cultural hygiene, frequently a component of extreme nationalist ideologies (rationalised as a return to ‘original’ perfection) expressed an innate drive for cultural destruction (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.87). This ideal has had an almost continuous life in Kuwaiti academic discourse, returning in the 1990s and 2000s as ‘desertization’ (see Chapter 7).

Alternatively, the Bedoun interviewees indicated that their ideological identification was directed toward new ideas, intellectual life and active citizenry, which embraced the ideal of genuine citizenship, was an innovative, novel and reformatory social practice. Active citizenry appeared to fulfill the function of the ideal of modern education, characterised by innovation, self-education and altruism (Halas, 2010). The interviewees had demonstrated they were capable of considering and articulating the dominating ideology which had enforced cultural destruction upon the families for generations, based on their lived experience and the knowledge passed on to them by their parents and grandparents. According to Znaniecki (1973, vol II, p.132, in Halas, 2010, p.199):

> Among social relations researched by Znaniecki, the educational relation that prepares an individual for a role of a creative innovator ranks first. Znaniecki understands the education relation as a specific interaction between an individual being educated and a person or a group that consequently tries to shape an individual according to a certain pattern (Znaniecki, 1973, vol. II, p.132). Znaniecki says that the social task of modern education is to overcome egoism for the sake of values of altruism through the development of creative participation in common tasks. Since it is not stability but the development of social groups and the development of culture that is the characteristic of modernity, Znaniecki considers the development of creative aspirations and the ability of social cooperation to be the modern education ideal. (Halas, 2010, p.199)

The dynamic process of cultural development in which the Bedoun were pressured by their extraordinary life circumstances to change and adapt to the 'new world' signified by the Arab Spring (Hakeem al Fadhli, in interview, 3 August, 2015), had led to the growth of the intellectual ideal, the practical realisation of self-education and assertion of identity within citizen society, among the Bedoun interview respondents. The larger task that still ahead of the community, involved the schooling of new generations of children, the cessation of the ethnic cleansing via the 'status adjustment' program and the 'Comoros Plan,' and the acquisition of Kuwaiti citizenship. Kuwaiti citizenship would always remain necessary for the Bedoun not only as it was their historical right repeatedly pledged by the government of
Kuwait, but also because it had become the necessary means of physical and cultural survival. The Bedoun perceived genuine citizenship as the only reasonable safeguard remaining for the Bedoun to acquire protection from ongoing ethnic conflict at the social level, and from the boarder policies that promoted the group's physical and cultural destruction.

Conclusion

In their discussions of identity and participation in education, the Bedoun research participants demonstrated the high value of the intellectual ideal (Halas, 2010, p.201; Znaniecki, 1952b, p.100) in their lives. Some had begun to form an intellectual identity, through advanced, higher education studies or via their professional or other social leadership roles in the community. The Bedoun’s participation in education fulfilled very personal and positive values and aspirations. The interviewees emphasised the integration of their roles as students, teachers, professionals and community leaders with their tribal identity and traditional cultural values. Social relationships and social solidarity among members of the group (the family, tribe and between tribes) was also highly valued, and illustrated by concrete examples. Creative social organisation was initiated by community leaders, to increase the participation rate of young people in education, as a part of a shared aspiration for a better life.

Brief exploration of the development of intellectual leaders in the community revealed the Bedoun functioned effectively in a number of areas. However, a pattern of targeting across a variety of levels of intellectual expression and areas was drawn from examples in the interview data and the literature. The pattern extended established ideas about education and freedom of expression in Kuwait. It pointed to the use of multiple strategies in the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun in particular, broadly preventing the group from establishing a literary history and culture, punishing the Bedoun for participation in intellectual activities and for the development of intellectual leadership. The most acutely targeted area was discussion of their identity and culture in face-to-face public, social interactions, a transgression that attracted incarceration and deportation.

The interviewee's experiences indicated an expansion of intellectual values and identification with new ideas and modes of thought emanating from the Arab Spring. These new forms of identification were linked to an awareness of the universal values of human rights, prompted by increased contacts with the international community via social media, contact with local and international humanitarian organisations, journalists and scholars. The nature of the intergenerational social solidarity felt among the interviewees was similar to the principle of sumud, ‘steadfastness,’ the social solidarity expressed by Palestinians (Moore, 2013; van Teeffelen, August 9, 2014). These values were also activated in personal interactions in citizen society, and could be regarded as expressions of ‘active citizenry’
(Bayat, 2013, p.313) and the practice of ‘true generosity’ as a pedagogy of resistance and social change (Freire, 1970, p.91, 120, 121).

The activation of these values signified the high value of the cultural collective to the Bedoun, as the positive, traditional values with which they chose to identify, were compatible with the universal principles of human rights. These new types of social encounters introduced new and creative inputs into the existing cultural system, recalibrating the Bedoun’s relationships with others in society. These activities indicated the positive expansion of the Bedoun culture including cross-fertilisation with other cultures. Despite encountering a range of barriers designed to block their participation in education, and the growth of an intellectual leadership group in particular, the Bedoun had developed a new vision of society, one which transcended the cultural barriers of Hadar ideology (for example, Alessa, 1981; al Naqeeb, 1990; al Khandari and al Hadben, 2010) that had once prevented the entire group from becoming educated, active citizens, in an attempt to distinguish the 'pathology' of tribal consciousness (al Naqeeb, 1990, p.127).
Chapter 9

Conclusions and Recommendations

This is a continual issue in our family and youths in the community, the consistent detainment, the unclear charges, the abuse and harassment.

The near future doesn't look promising. The government has no plan, and is only concerned about the public relations aspect of this issue, how this could affect the prestige of the country.

The authorities like to present themselves as supporters of international law and human rights, but they are not even implementing it in the country. (A Bedoun woman, in al Saadi, March 21, 2014).

‘... their importance to the state is too vital to ignore’ (al Anezi, 1989, p.188).

In this chapter I present my conclusions to this study, including new contributions and limitations. I also suggest recommendations for future researchers, the community and international agencies, including research with the Bedoun community in Kuwait, the Bedoun diaspora, and other areas of research, including areas for investigation by independent agencies. Much of this section presented somewhat more directly than other chapters in the thesis. This is due to the dire situation of the Bedoun, the profound lack of response in the social sciences to the group’s suffering, and the nature of the recommendations which call for international intervention and serious consideration that ethnic cleansing has occurred and is still occuring (Kennedy, 2015a), and genocide of the Bedoun also appears to be in progress. The urgency is also heighted because the Bedoun’s conditions may continue to deteriorate before social scientists pay much attention to the group, while international humanitarian organisations and scholars of international law may be better placed to undertake further studies in the immeida future. At the time of writing, the Bedoun were no longer unable to represent themselves as a collective, due to security operations in Kuwait including the incarceration of the Bedouin leaders. The group was slated for mass identity transfer to the Comoros, with threats of mass deportation emanating from the Ministry of the Interior from 2014-2016, the outcome of which is as yet, unknown.

9.1 Contributions

New contributions were made to understanding the Bedouin tribes as an ethnic group and a cultural collective in Kuwait, studies of citizenship, nationalism and identity, and the role of ideology in the criminalisation of identity in ethnic conflicts. The study contributed to understanding of the impact of colonialism on the Bedouin and developmental theories on contemporary society in the Middle East. It also contributed to knowledge of
labelling and identity erasure practices, ethnic cleansing and statelessness, as well as to theoretical areas in the sociology of knowledge and education.

This study appears to be the first doctoral research on the Kuwaiti Bedoun from a sociological perspective. Additionally, the field of Kuwait studies is quite small. The number of new findings should be weighed against these factors: in a larger field, there might be fewer new findings.

The research explained the apparent contradictions between the Kuwaiti Bedoun's identity and culture portrayed in the social sciences, compared to the field of international humanitarian law, and the grey-literature of international humanitarian organisations’ reports. This was done via careful analysis of the literature, identifying analytical flaws in analysis of Kuwaiti Bedouin ethnicity (in Longva, 1997, 2006) and Bedoun ethnicity (Beaugrand 2010; 2014a), and adding to that knowledge, with personal data from the Bedoun population, and analysis of historical data collected from secondary sources.

Firstly, study established that the Bedoun have formed a sub-ethnic group within Bedouin society, having proliferated and re-consolidated as a marginalized group drawn from members of multiple tribes, who were made stateless by the Kuwaiti government in 1986. Secondly, the Bedoun maintained their ethnic relations within their existing tribes, but also shared a collective consciousness and identification as Bedoun. Finally, I suggest that Bedoun does not mean ‘stateless,’ but is the name of a unique, cultural collective that are ‘without’ a legitimate form of citizenship and effective nationality, which has never been granted to them, by any state. The ‘economic citizenship’ plan linked to the Comoros Islands, certainly did not provide this, and should be regarded as merely a new step in a long project of ethnic cleansing.

The research dispelled the myth that the Bedoun had citizenship in other states, and were using a criminal, imposter identity. This was done by checking evidence (or for the most part, observing a distinct lack of evidence) provided by these scholars, and then deconstructing of how these ideas came to become taken-for-granted facts in the social science literature. I identified and explained the local ideology that was responsible for these ideas, and discussed its development in Kuwaiti politics and the academic literature in tribalism theory, since the 1960.

The research explained how the myth of the Bedouin as an ‘outsider’ was created and embedded in Kuwaiti society, via application of Znaniecki’s (1952b) theory of nationalism. Therefore, it builds on al Anezi (1989), Alhajeri (2004) and al Waqayan (2009), contributing to existing knowledge about the nature of the ethnic cleavage between the Bedouin and Hadar in Kuwait. However, I also extended my analysis to distinguishing between and comparing the concept of the northern and southern tribes. The study established that both the northern and southern tribal people were subject to anti-Bedouin ideologies, in both
different and similar ways. The Bedoun appear to have been more intensely victimized due to their comprising more people from the northern tribal dirah than those from the south.

It is the identity of the Bedoun of the north that has been the target of destruction. The administrative expulsion that made the Bedoun stateless 'illegal residents' in 1986 (The Study,' 2003), led to large-scale human rights atrocities and deprivations for the group particularly during the early 1990s, which continue until this day. Although we cannot confirm this in a definitive, quantitative sense for reasons explained in the discussion, it is reasonable to believe that the population reduction of the Bedoun, around two thirds over the last twenty five years (from around 300,000 prior to 1990 to 111,000 at present), occurred as a result of a national policy aimed at reducing the population size realised by ethnic cleansing, state-sanctioned ethnic violence including killings, and due to the population being unable to sustain itself due to human rights deprivations imposed since the 1980s.

In this thesis, misconceptions about the Bedoun identity, and the phenomena of contemporary Bedouin-Hadar ethnic conflict, was linked to their historical antecedents at regional level, in colonialist and development discourses adopted in relation to regional tribal settlement programs in the Middle East (Aurenche, 1993, Bocco, 2006, and Fabietti, 2006). This approach to the Kuwaiti Bedouin (including the Bedoun) does not seem to have been taken before. This approach stemmed from the discovery that interviewees encountered a set of ideological motifs quite often in their everyday social interactions with the Hadar, other Arab nationals and sometimes with people of various southern tribal dirah.

Secondary sources showed that ‘tirbalism’ theory had developed from the 1950s in a way that legitimised misconceptions created about the Bedoun identity and culture across the Middle East. The themes were expanded and elaborated by scholars and government propagandists, such that they continue to be the standard frame of reference for the Bedouin (as well as the Bedoun) in scholarly work. Overall, the themes analysed appeared to be academic elaborations on simpler symbolic representations that were more frequently used in public forums by, and/or for, ordinary Kuwaitis. For example, the notions that the Bedouin are not ‘original,’ ‘real,’ ‘true,’ or ‘pure’ Kuwaitis (nor ‘loyal,’ or ‘deserving’ of citizenship), were phrases commonly used by scholars and politicians (Alhajeri, 2004, p.16) that still frequently featured in online discussions among Kuwaiti citizens (Dashti, et al, 2014) in Kuwait.

Themes of ideological discourse took on extreme forms in the Kuwaiti context, such as texts indulging in the objectification of the Bedouin identity and demonization of tribal consciousness and culture, while urging Hadar cultural hygiene. Scripted forms of hate-speech used to incite violent ethnic cleansing showed signs of having been distributed to government authorities by intellectuals and/or propagandists. Dehumanisation, including reference to the Bedouin as animals and vermin, and the characterisation of mass identity
transfer as an acceptable, even desirable form of human trafficking and 'global citizenship,' arguably qualified as indicators of genocidal intent expressed in texts (Arnaut, 2006; Townsend, 2014, see Chapter 7).

The research demonstrated that the destructive impact of the ethnic conflict that has been driven principally by the Hadar (al Anezi, 1989), has negatively affected Kuwaiti society at a variety of levels: the Bedouin citizen community (Alhajeri, 2004), the Bedoun community (al Waqayan, 2009), and people of the northern tribal dirah in particular, have comprised the main targets. This approach tends to support the view that the Bedoun were not initially marginalized due to their statelessness, but that they were already ethnically targeted due to their tribal identity, prior to administrative expulsion in 1986 (‘The Study, 2003’). Therefore, I concluded that statelessness was not the initial cause of the Bedoun's marginalization, but merely one of many consequences of their marginalization by the Hadar and government authorities historically subject to Hadar influence (al Anezi, 1989).

Scholars in Kuwait studies have almost uniformly portrayed the policy to give the Bedouin citizenship as an anomalous national policy, conjured up to enable the ruling family to corrupt the National Assembly with tribal political representatives (e.g. Crystal, 1992; Longva, 1997; Têtreault, 2000; al Nakib, 2014). I arrived at a different interpretation which incorporated regional history. The government’s formal program to permanently settle the Bedouin for the purpose of distributing citizenship, commencing in 1965 (Stanton Russell, 1989, p.34), was aligned with the regional program to settle the Bedouin in the newly independent, sovereign states of the Middle East, during the 1950s and 1960s (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006).

While some Kuwaiti authors had pointed out that the settlement of the Bedouin had been systematically organized by government through Bedouin tribal leaders and Hadar merchants as part of a conscious, national plan (Alhajeri, 2004; Haroon, 1976 in al Haddad, 1989; al Fayez, 1984) this unpublished work does not seem to have been explored in depth by leading authors in Kuwait/Middle East studies. Yet this is an important aspect, because combined with knowledge of the regional Bedouin settlement programs, it challenges previous, government-blaming approaches of unwanted, 'chaotic' or disorganized mass Bedouin settlement (Alissa, 2012, 2013; al Nakib, 2014, 2016; Beaugrand, 2011, 2014b). It shows that the government’s previous policy to grant the Bedouin tribes citizenship, which catered for the Bedoun specifically as a condition of their permanent government employment and corresponding settlement in Kuwait (Stanton Russell, 1989; see also Appendix B, iii), was entirely consistent with the regional program coordinated by the Arab League, the United Nations, the International Labour Organization and other international agencies charged with assisting sovereign states to settle the tribes for the purpose of modernization (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006).
Thus, the analysis pointed to more complex causes and pressures on government and the ruling family directed by the Kuwaiti Hadar and other Arab national Hadar, regarding their role in the social segregation of the Bedouin and ultimately, the Bedoun's political excision from the state. It pointed to the opportunity for the Hadar to be analysed as an ethnic group and extreme nationalist movement. A strong mono-ethnic nationalist vision pursued by its privileged upper echelons includes the self-proclaimed economic ‘elite’ (al Anezi, 1989, p. 175, 248) determining who gets ‘precious’ nationality and who does not (p.189, 273), is supported by the ‘enlightened intelligentsia’ which positions itself and the ‘core’ of society (Ghabra, 2014, p.4) and controls the production of knowledge in Kuwait along with the Ministry for Information. These narcissistic tropes are commonly used by Hadar intellectuals and notables, who are invested in these nationalist motifs. This is why we see Western academics absorbing these same symbols in discussion with Hadar intellectuals but generalised to all of Kuwaiti society, as if their reality were the way things are (a point made by Hakeem al Fadhl in Chapter 8). Further research is required to establish if these ideas have filtered to or from the grassroots, or exist predominantly in the elite/intellectual classes.

This group has been willing to cripple the state of Kuwait by enforcing an ideology that has lead to extreme, prolonged ethnic segregation, violence and enforced, protracted statelessness of the Bedoun. This movement warrants framing as an active, ethnic nationalist movement emanating from an ethnic group that defines itself as culturally unique in quasi-metaphysical terms, rather than merely as a ‘social group’ (al Nakib, 2014, 2016; Longva, 1997, 2006; U.K. Home Office, 2014). Longva (1997) applied ethnic theory (Longva 1997) but then failed to theorise the Bedouin as an ethnic group even when all roads led to Rome (Longva, 2006, p.175). Her claims historical and cultural theorisation should be discarded in preference for studies of nationalism and the welfare state model (Longva, 2006, p.172, 184) confirmed a tendency to avoid the obvious, that Hadar etho-nationalism was extreme (ethnically cleansing the Bedoun), and that such nationalism could be traced to Hadar supremacy ‘even without the Badu’s presence’ (p.180-181).

The study also contributed to knowledge about Bedouin citizen society, beyond the integration of the stateless and citizen communities. I argued that the statelessness of the Bedou has also been used to intimidate, control and oppress the Bedouin citizen population since 1986, functioning as a symbol of Hadar ethnic hatred. Between 2014-2016, Bedou community leader Abdulhakeem al Fadhli and Bedouin citizen leader Mussallam al Barrack were repeatedly incarcerated, while the vast majority of Bedouin who had long proven their eligibility for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959), were criminalised with ‘security restrictions.’ These developments and others discussed in this researched, underlined a focus on criminalisation of the tribal social order (Gross, 1998). This cultural patterning
imposed and restricted freedom of expression across a variety of communications and literary genres (Chapter 8, Table 25). It reflected the order of discrimination and stigmatization of the Bedoun that occurred in social interactions in citizen society (Chapter 7, Table 21). Al Rasheed (2015) indicated that this was indicative of a post-Arab Spring regional approach to the Bedouin masses in the Persian Gulf. This research has begun to develop knowledge about the impacts of criminalisations on stateless Bedouin. Further research on the impact of the criminalisation of Bedouin citizen leaders on their communities is required, and the potential link to their ongoing deprivation of state resources due to Hadar monopolisation (al Nakib, 2014; Ghabra, 2014). This points to ongoing historical and cultural issues, social inequalities and conflict that are not addressed by theorisation of the welfare state or government-blaming approaches (al Nakib, 2014, p.7; Longva, 2006, p.172, 184).

The implementation of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) was analysed for its relevance to the Bedoun situation. Al Anezi (1989, p.182-193) observed that Decree 5/1960 was designed to compensate for the Hadar being ‘without’ documents (p.277). This mechanism enabled to the politically dominant Hadar to grant themselves ‘original’ nationality without having sufficient documentation to qualify according to the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait). Another provision (the Explanatory Note) enabled citizenship to be granted to personal friends and acquaintances of the individuals assessing the citizenship applications. Al Anezi (1989) ceased his analysis right there. I built on this analysis by observing that the law could be used not only to deprive the Kuwaiti Bedouin citizenship (making them into Bedouns), but that its wording also enabled it to be used the other way around: the grant ‘original’ citizenship. Thus, we can equally conceptualise the ‘original’ Hadar were ‘Bedoun’ – ‘without’ papers. This is a generalization, arrived at through abstract reasoning, yet it is a logical conclusion arising from the legal facts. In contrast, the lack of documents of the Bedoun (as the reason for their not being ‘original’ citizens), was never quantitatively established during the first period of citizenship processing (in the 1960s) due to government secrecy. I believe that this is one of the most significant findings of this study.

It has also been established that many of the Bedoun did actually have sufficient documents to satisfy the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) (Human Rights Watch, 1995; WikiLeaks Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006). Some Bedoun government service employees informed al Moosa (1976) they believed that they had already been formally granted citizenship by government, related to their military service (per Nationality Law, 1959 (Kuwait), Clause 4), but they were still waiting to receive the corresponding document. Field evidence in al Moosa (1976, p.94-96) indicated the Bedoun had been led to believe
they had received citizenship as early as 1969, in accordance with their classification on the National Census that stated they were Kuwaiti nationals.

Al Moosa’s (1976) narrative revealed an important stage of development of Hadar opposition to the national policy of naturalizing the Kuwaiti Bedouin, expressed in the construction of the Bedoun ‘migrant’ who had independently encroached upon Kuwait, contrary to evidence they were intentionally coerced to settle in return for citizenship. This provokes speculation as to whether or not some Bedoun had actually been received citizenship at that time (1969-1974), and as to the possibility that formal government records that would have confirmed this, were later removed as part of the administrative erasure practices implemented from 1983 (in al Anezi, 1989).

This finding has fascinating and serious implications, especially in view of the attempts by the state to ethnically target and eradiate the population on grounds they did not ‘qualify’ for citizenship, when the Hadar ‘originals’ may not have qualified for citizenship either, during the same historical period and in relation to the same law. Perhaps this finding represents the heart of the Bedouin-Hadar ethnic conflict in Kuwait, and accounts for the inability of the government of Kuwait and the ruling family to grant the Bedoun the Kuwaiti citizenship to which they are entitled overshadowed by the Hadar ‘elite’ (al Anezi, 1989). Certainly it would explain obsessive nature of the Hadar nationslit preoccupation with ‘pure,’ ‘real,’ and ‘true’ Kuwaitiness, due to a secret knowledge they are ‘undeserving’ of Kuwaiti citizenship according to their own standards. It also explains the careful alignment and coordination of anti-Bedouin propaganda used against all Kuwaiti Bedouin (Bedouns and citizens) in the production of public discourse disseminated to the grassroots of Kuwaiti society (where as scholarly inputs have gone some way to cover up similarities in these approaches, as I discussed regarding the perception of the northern and southern tribes).

A limitation of this finding is that quantitative figures representing those Hadar who did not qualify for citizenship but received it, and for those Bedoun who did qualify for citizenship but did not receive it, cannot be assured. However, the problem of insufficient documentation was significant enough that Decree 5/1960 was implemented to make up for the lack of proof given by the Hadar ‘originals’ that they qualified as citizens, and allowed the Hadar to grant citizenship to their personal friends and acquaintances regardless. The date of the implementation of Decree 5/1960 indicated the law was in place prior to the commencement of the very first citizenship grants in the state of Kuwait. I also extended al Anezi’s (1989) legal analysis to illustrate connections between specific articles of Decree 5/1960 with the existing anti-Bedouin ideologies, ethnic targeting of the Bedouin (revealed in the interview and documentary data), and the nationalist policy platform in Kuwait from the beginning of the state’s independence (al Mdaires, 2010; Stanton Russell, 1989).
This study identified that the approach used by social scientists to explain how and why the Bedouin community (Bedoun and Kuwaiti citizens) did or did not receive citizenship in Kuwait, has been flawed. There has been a lack of consideration of the history of the regions’ development involving Bedouin settlement (e.g. Aurenche, 1993; Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006; Kark and Frantzman, 2012) and analysis of the process of citizenship distribution, due to a preoccupation with the proselytisation of anti-Bedouin ideology. Additionally, the different analytical approaches to the northern and southern tribes used by academics indicates an intentional inclination to distract from some very obvious similarities in the strategies of oppression of the stateless Bedoun and Bedouin citizens in Kuwait.

One of the most glaring omissions by researchers commenting on Kuwaiti society has been the lack of genuine consideration of the Bedouin’s point of view (Lancaster and Lancaters, 1988), demonstrated by lack of researcher field data. For example, the Bedouin ‘are empty vessels – albeit important, symbolic ones’ in Longva, 2006, p.182. The author attributed the sentiment to Barthes. However, I would suggest that Longva (2007) derived this comment from al Naqeeb, 1990: 'the tribal majority does not possess, or show any inclination towards, an ideological affiliation' (p.135) despite the 'pathology' of ‘tribal consciousness’ (p.127). The soft analysis of the Hadar as a 'social group' is undoubtedly one factor that has led to a gross under-estimation of the ethnic cleavage interpreted as discrimination of undocumented Bedoun, and the gradual exclusion of 'documented' Bedoun (those registered with the Ministry of Interior Central Apparatus) from the concept of discrimination, in asylum claims (see the concept of documented/undocumented stateless Bedoun introduced in a letter from the F.C.O. Kuwait, 2007, in U.K. Home Office, 2009). The expressed aim to distinguish the 'pathology' of 'tribal consciousness' (al Naqeeb, 1990) as a rational doctrine leading up to the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, ought to be taken seriously in analysis of Kuwaiti society, but also in international law regarding Bedoun claims.

Explanations of the influence of the Kuwaiti Hadar on the victimization of the Bedoun as merely indicative of a problem of discrimination carried out by a social group (see for example, al Nakib, F., 2014, 2016; Beaugrand, 2014a; Longva, 1997; Peterson, 2014) may have also occurred due to the persistence of scholars in fields other than sociology, presenting definitional claims about sociological groups, in the absence of in-depth study or even reasonably substantive fieldwork evidence of those people (Kennedy, 2015b). These scholars have grossly under-reported the extent of ethnic targeting of the Bedouin (and the Bedoun in particular), that has occurred in Kuwaiti society, which has been studied more seriously by international humanitarian organisations and scholars of international law. Arguably this occurred due to the poor state of knowledge about Bedoun identity that we started with. This study has attempted to thoroughly address this problem
(Chapter 6, sections 6.1 and 6.2). This should lead to a reassessment of the state of knowledge by the U.K. Home Office (2016) and other agencies who deal with Bedoun refugees, who rely on the ‘social groups’ model to refute or water-down claims of persecution by the so-called documented Bedoun (U.K. Home Office, 2009, 2014, 2016; also BA and Others, UKIAT [2004] 00256 CG.). New evidence of the ethnic targeting and persecution of this sub-group Bedoun was also provided in Appendix D, iv.

I challenged the consensus among scholars that a radical and inexplicable policy position against the Bedoun was suddenly adopted, manifesting in the administrative expulsion of 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003). On the contrary, the policy to stop any Bedouin becoming a citizen of Kuwait was integral to the Nationalist Bloc and later the so-called Democratic Bloc policy platform, from the early 1960s, headed by Ahmed al Khatib (al Mdaires, 2010), applying intense political pressure to Kuwait's Bedouin settlement program and naturalisation policy. A continuous chain of administrative committees was established to control, monitor and segregate the population from 1965 until 2016 (Appendix D, ii) (noting that the Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Education operated quite independently of government and was saturated with nationalists according to Mdaires, 2010).

This is an important discovery because it re-orientates the study of the Bedoun deeper into the historical record, and (should) impact studies of the Kuwaiti national identity, Bedouin-Hadar social and political relations and bring new understanding to the Bedoun’s entrapment in the state (Rabinowtiz, 2001; Rosenfeld, 2002). Essentially, the Bedoun have been entrapped in the state of Kuwait since their permanent settlement, after having relinquished their nomadic lifestyle for the state, which sought their settlement for the purpose of fulfilling national and regional economic and social goals. This involved the settlement and protection of the indigenous Bedouin tribes of the Middle East, according to the International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations (1957) (ILO) (Bocco, 2006, p.306) and providing for the state of Kuwait's economic development during the oil boom, of which ultimately, the Hadar ethnic group, of whom the merchants elites (Crystal, 1992), notables (al Naqeeb, 1990; Yanai, 2014), urbanites (al Nakib, F., 2016) and enlightened intelligentsia (Ghabra, 2014) have been the main beneficiaries.

In return for their permanent settlement in Kuwait, the Bedoun (Bedouin of the northern tribal diraḥ) were also pledged citizenship. As I have already discussed, the Bedouin of the northern tribes, and/or those Bedouin perceived to be of the northern tribes, were under the attack of nationalist political ideologists from the very beginning of the state's independence. These ideologists seemed to have been incapable of perceiving the Bedoun as fellow citizens, due to a mono-ethnic vision of the nation. They aimed not only to deprive the Bedouin of their human rights, but also to undermine the social and cultural fabric of the state of Kuwait. The Bedoun collective was misled to the extent that they could
not have known they should leave Kuwait to secure citizenship in other states, and that they could have received citizenship in other states, if they wished to prevent themselves becoming stateless.

Bedoun intellectual activities and leaders have been ethnically targeted and persecuted with punitive actions since the Arab Spring (as discussed above). This appears to have occurred simply because the Bedoun identified themselves to the international community, and asked for the end of their suffering. I discussed this finding in the introduction of this chapter. The criminalization of the human rights ‘activist’ in relation to the prohibition of the ‘protestor’ was the most recent label used against the Bedoun to justify punitive targeting of individuals, especially those who showed capacity to lead society and generate solutions to overcome the Bedoun ‘problem’ (see Chapter 8, section 8.2.2). This study connected the production of anti-Bedouin ideologies to stigmatisation and labelling practices used at the social, cultural, political and bureaucratic levels. The Bedoun were confronted with the tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963) quite literally, due to their membership and perceived membership, of the northern tribes. This stigma manifested as hate-speech and eradication dialogues, and through the ‘status adjustment’ Program.

I analysed the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun (1990-1995) (Appendix F, i-iii) and the ‘status adjustment’ program (Appendices E and G, iii) in depth. This had not yet been attempted by scholars. The analysis of the ‘status adjustment’ program showed the program of identity typing introduced in 2012, was most likely a continuation of the incremental erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing: Weissbrodt, 2008) which commenced in 1983 to rid Kuwait of the Bedoun. Similar to the physical cleansing phase of the early 1990s, the program was linked to official, national population policy. Population policy itself, closely linked to ethnic cleansing (Appendix F, iii), was labelled ‘population balance’ (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994; al Ramadhan, 1995; Crystal, 1995). More recently it has been termed ‘commodification’ of citizenship (Beaugrand, 2015) and ‘global citizenship’ (Abrahamian, November 10, 2014, 2015) in constructivist frameworks.

The study also revealed that the Bedoun were intentionally deprived of education (al Moosa, 1976) in order to ensure the group remained politically powerless, deprived of citizenship and basic human rights (al Naqeeb, 1990, p.129; Alessa, 1981, p.109). Alessa’s (1981) manpower policy was as a perfect marriage between Arab nationalism and Kuwait’s Hadar merchant prerogatives, in ‘Kuwaitisation’ economic policy. It prevented the intellectual and economic development of the whole group, and robbed the group of the opportunity to receive citizenship indefinitely, justified by labelling the group as inferior and incapable tribal people and ‘Arab’ strangers (some Kuwaiti Hadar writings indicate that some do not view themselves as Arabs, but as an elite civilization of mixed races). The policy
rationalised the cultural destruction of the Bedoun, claiming to pave the way toward higher citizen productivity and citizenship for the most 'deserving.'

As I have mentioned, the Bedoun population has been reduced by around two-thirds over the last 25 years (see Appendix D, i). This appears to be a new finding, despite the information being relatively easy to access (Human Rights Watch, 1995, ‘Summary of findings, para. 4; Over 111,000,’ 2013). The size of this physical destruction of the population (being over 50%) indicates the group is at risk of genocide, as substantial destruction of the population has already occurred. The chairman of the Islamic Human Rights Commission, Massoud Shadjareh, has indicated that he believes that the Comoros Plan is also an indicator of cultural destruction and genocide (Hayden, November 10, 2014). The plan has this capacity whether or not mass deportation occurs.

I attempted to illustrate the depth of ethnic targeting, including specific policies and other findings of this study, in Figure 3 (which can be found at the end of this chapter). The population appeared to be unable to sustain itself over the long term given the large range of specific population reduction policies and methods imposed upon it introduced in ‘The Study’ policy document in 1986. It is likely that the group has been subjected to, and remains subject to, genocidal intent (Townsend, 2014); certainly this appears in hate-speech at the discursive level in the analysis of academic and public discourse, the administrative ethnic cleansing of ‘status adjustment’ (1983-) and physical ethnic cleansing and state-sanctioned killings (1990-1995). I have limited the thesis by not comprehensively analysing the available data against a particular genocide theory, but I would suggest that Gregory Stanton’s (2004) or Damien Short’s (2016) frameworks though they have different purposes, would likely both yield confirmatory findings. Here, I refer to Lemkin’s (1944) original conception of genocide discussed in Short (2016), which encompasses both physical and cultural destruction.

The research argued that restrictions on intellectuals were targeted toward individuals on the basis of their Bedoun identity (Chapter 8, Table 25). While the suppression of academic freedom by government seemed to be a genuine obstacle for many researchers of different backgrounds residing in Kuwait or in regard to Kuwait area studies, so too was Hadar domination of educational institutions, and the privileging of Hadar academic and intellectual activities, which has created and re-creates, the pro-Hadar, mono-ethnic, nationalist intellectual narrative. In Chapter 2, I explained that within the social sciences, there has been virtually no critical engagement with, or counter-narrative (al Rasheed and Vitalis, 2004) to this problem concerning the ‘Kuwaiti’ narrative, which is a Hadar nationalist narrative, and hence the proliferation of marginalizing and stigmatizing anti-Bedouin discourses in the social sciences regarding Kuwaiti society has been tolerated if not encouraged, by scholars internationally. That the presence of the Bedoun oppression in
Kuwait has not given pause for scholars to explore more deeply, the Bedoun ‘problem’ in their published work is worrying. Additionally, as I have mentioned, this problem has affected not only how the Bedoun are perceived in relation to their presence in Kuwait, but also in relation to how they are processed internationally when they flee Kuwait as refugees (Kennedy, 2015b).

Certainly there has been little if any, sustained, critical engagement regarding the development of knowledge about Kuwaitis society from post-colonial theorists who are generously funded and actively engaged in policing Middle East studies beyond the Gulf. Arabic-speaking capacity among some scholars has provided little increased value in expanding knowledge of Kuwait society, or diversifying influence over the field. This lack of critical engagement has impacted social sciences scholarship about Kuwait, demonstrated in the contrast between the interpretations of the Bedoun in the social sciences, compared to international humanitarian law. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the latter area of research does not show the same signs of being overwhelmed by Hadar ideological perspectives as the social sciences.

Foreign correspondents initially discovered the Bedoun after the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. They reported ethnic cleansing, ‘purification’ and state-sanctioned killings in progress accompanied by flagrant legitimization of these acts against the Bedoun by government authorities (Cushman, June 30, 1991, July 16, 1991; Evans, February 28, 1991; Fineman, November 2, 1992; Gasperini, August 20, 1991; Lorch, May 12, 1991; Wilkinson, May 20, 1991). This trend among journalists appears to be a new finding in the academic literature, as it was quickly followed by social scientist narratives which basically ignored or minimised these arguments as much as possible, commencing with Crystal (1992, 1995, 2005) (see Chapter 7, section 7.4 on the northern tribes) and this remains the dominant approach. The intense focus of the state on the intellectual activities which it sees related to the ‘Bedoun problem’ seem to be symptomatic of a broader problem regarding the production of knowledge in the region.

This study contributes to understanding of the purpose and function of education as a means of conservative cultural re-organisation (Znaniecki, 1952a), nationalist indoctrination, conformity and punitive oppression, as well as a means of creative cultural re-organisation, ideological expansion, cultural cooperation (Znaniecki, 1952b) and creativity. The research explored cross-cultural fertilisation (Znaniecki, 1952b) as a tool of political resistance, collective consciousness-raising and liberation. In particular, the research has emphasised the function of self-education in environments where public education is restricted, the limitations of access to formal systems of education for stateless communities, and the education policy-practice cleavage within Kuwait’s education system and within UNESCO regarding citizens and stateless groups who together comprise a
particular national culture. The study also contributed to the understanding of social justice issues in education, the impact of ethnicity, identity and minority status in education, and the use of education as a weapon of for dividing people by appealing to ethnic and political loyalties (Znaniecki, 1952b) among extreme tribal and ethnic-nationalist movements (Gross, 1998), in the Arab nationalist context.

I applied Znaniecki’s theory of cultural systems as a comparative framework for the study of political oppression and social control, social mobilisation through education, active citizenry and non-violent philosophies (Bayat, 2013). I briefly discussed the limitations of social movement theory and Islamic-socialist (Marxist) interpretations (such as Mallat, 2015) in studies of Arab societies in lieu of the damage done by Arab 'liberals' via extreme nationalist ideologies in the past, in the region (Massad, March 30, 2015) and to the Bedoun in Kuwait (Mdaires, 2010). The Islamic-socialist (Marxist) approach may be inherently impacted by the same anti-Bedouin sentiments as many scholars who have written about Kuwaiti society. On the other hand, Akram (2007), unlike Mallat (2015), was able to integrate the notion of the global Ummah with a holistic philosophy that was not incompatible with the traditional values of the Bedouin. I suggested that the Palestinian resistance framework ('sumud,' in Shehadeh, in Said, 1986) and community education resistance movements (in Znaniecki, 1952a) and critical pedagogy (in Freire, 1970) were more applicable to the situation of the Bedoun experienced by the interviewees.

9.2 Limitations

A major limitation of this study was the existing social attitudes toward the Bedoun, which has contributed to a wall of silence about the group. Additionally, many Bedoun experience understandable fear of speaking about their life experiences, which contributed to challenges with fieldwork. However, this was a mixed blessing, because the problem provided rich insight into the difference between cultural practices of voluntary Bedouin seclusion from outsiders and the practice of outsiders 'passing' among their privileged oppressors (Becker, 1983; Ginsberg, 1996; Goffman, 1963), as well as responses to imposed forms of suppression. This stimulated my interview discussions and enabled me to explore more deeply, the stigmatisation of the Bedoun by Hadar especially, and the social behaviours of the Bedoun in citizen society.

This study drew mostly on research in English. While there may be a great deal more that can be discovered about the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society through research of Arabic literature, the question arises as to why Arabic speaking researchers have not already found it. Scholarship in Arabic appears to have been very much invested in imported Orientalist tropes projected onto the Bedouin masses, as Bocco (2006) and Fabietti (2006) have pointed out. I would suggest that this remains a dominant approach in Middle East studies, and I am not alone in this view (Lockman, 2004; Turner, 2003). Some academics have already begun
to criticize my interview data because I do not speak fluently in Arabic, which is a requirement for credibility among many Orientalist anthropologists, and Middle East studies scholars of a variety of disciplines. This is a view which, while it has some positive points, lacks relevance to the current situation of the Bedoun, their language choices, and glosses over both my direct experience in the field, and the government of Kuwait’s use of English language mediums. I have discussed the more technical aspects of my methodological approach in Chapter 4, which counters these views in more detail.

Other limitations of the research included the size of the participant group, and the reliance on snowball referral sampling and the influence of self-selection. Comparison with Beaugrand (2010) against the number of participants who were actually Bedoun and who lived in Kuwait at the time of her study, shows that this study involved more Bedoun participants in Kuwait, and who were not refugees in Western countries. Additionally, this study demonstrated that the interviewees comprised a greater cross-section of the Bedoun community, in terms of age, gender distribution, employment and professional status, geographical location within Kuwait City and other forms of population diversity (such as participants with citizen spouses or parents or who had become citizens themselves).

Due to deteriorating conditions for the Bedoun in Kuwait, especially regarding restrictions on freedom of expression, the principle of self-selection now appears to be a more desirable one than prior to the fieldwork. I raised the issue of the exceptionally large number of interviews (over five hundred) conducted by Human Rights Watch (1995) in the discussion, concerning the lack of transparency of the data, considering that ethnic cleansing had occurred at the time the interviews were conducted, and the organisation did not conceptualise ethnic cleansing in international forums such as the United Nations, where they claimed to have presented such data. I have suggested that the transcripts should be made available to the community for future claims (obviously protecting confidentiality).

A minor limitation of the study was the lack of quantitative data located about the extent to which the Bedoun participated in the formal system of education in Kuwait. This was only a minor issue because the research was qualitative and did not rely on detailed government reporting, as much as the past reports of international human rights organisations in this area (e.g. Human Rights Watch, 1991, 1995, 2011). I discussed these limitations in depth in Appendix G, ii. The problem was exacerbated by tolerance of a thin, evasive reporting style on national education. I demonstrated that even local researchers experienced substantial barriers to accessing quantitative data on the formal education system, beyond what is made available in Kuwait's national statistics. I suggested that this limitation may be illustrative not only of the attitude of government authorities toward the Bedouin, but also more broadly, to limitations of knowledge and skills among those responsible for education policy and reporting in the state. Additionally, UNESCO has been
uncoperative with the Bedoun to date, concerning efforts to account for the group statistically. This provides little motivation for Kuwaiti authorities to do the same.

9.3 Recommendations for Future Researchers

Note that these comments below were written with the best case scenario for Bedoun participation in society, and the use of collaborative fieldwork methods, in mind. At the time of writing, such conditions seemed out of reach, but they may change in the future. Researchers should think carefully about how they enter the community. They should approach the community as an indigenous community, capable of participation in collaborative research methodologies, but vulnerable to research fatigue. The group seeks opportunities to be involved in the development of knowledge about their own culture, but their engagement in the research process is vexed by the challenges they face in everyday life and government targeting.

Collaborative frameworks supporting the local community that help to document their history and culture, would be beneficial to all parties. Research to date has tended to focus on community vulnerabilities, but statements of those vulnerabilities have tended to be repeated rather than explored further, due to the attempt of local people to attract attention to their human rights deprivations. This does not have to be the only approach, but it likely remains the most relevant. I would suggest that because intellectual expression currently attracts very negative attention from the authorities in Kuwait, that studies of educational processes and intellectual development would not be favourable for the group at this time, but they could be in the future, if the political climate eases.

I have attempted to compensate for this problem while filling in gaps in the literature, by constructing the Appendixes with summaries of factual data and analysis, and making available a large portion of my interview data for the Bedoun in the Australian Data Archive and compiling the photographic record in Appendix H, which may be valuable for future research and for the community itself. Additionally, the Australian Data Archive and the Australian National University has agreed to work with me after the submission of this research, to establish a Bedoun archive for the data I have collected.

Future studies of the Bedoun’s history in the military and police services (up until the invasion of Iraq), Kuwait Oil Company and other areas of the public service, as well as their experiences of communal life in the desert settlements (where they lived in tribal groups up until the 1980s), could draw on the experiences of local community elders through interviews. Such research would help to document the cultural history of tribal elders, and articulate their proven loyalty and service to the state of Kuwait. This could restore some pride to the community, which is desperately needed.

Due to the age of the generation I am referring to (those active in government service prior to expulsion in 1986), this research needs to happen soon, or a great deal of the
Bedoun's cultural history may be lost forever. This research could be a restorative cultural practise, if it were handled appropriately and without Hadar interference. This kind of work should be a UNESCO priority, but UNESCO seems to have forgotten the group since the Bedouin settlement programs era (Bocco, 2006). In the current climate, these kinds of efforts are not possible in Kuwait, but given UNESCO's ongoing funding of the state’s cultural development and the nature of their international mandate, it is possible that a more open environment that could support this kind of work, may become available in the future.

The issue of Bedoun’s national service during the invasion of Iraq and afterward until 1995 (until the closure of the State Security Court), warrants an independent, international inquiry. Inclusion in an investigation by the United Nations Rapporteur on Genocide would be more appropriate (see below). The period of 1990-1995 marks the period of physical ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun (population transfer and killing), when military servicemen were prevented from defending Kuwait. They and their other security forces counterparts (such as police and other government security forces) were then made the primary targets of killings until the State Security Court was closed and civil trials resumed (see Appendices F, i, ii and iii).

The management of the United Nations Compensation Commission claims (‘Late Claims’) process in relation to the Bedoun warrants re-appraisal in the light of the academic analysis of the Bedoun's ethnic cleansing and state-sanctioned killings discussed herein. Palmer (2015, p.126) briefly discussed the Late Claims process for the Bedoun but raised worthwhile and contestable points, while providing an extensive critique of the Palestinian Late Claims Process. Investigation into the process for the Bedoun should include investigation into the definitional terms used to identify payment recipients (conducted by the government of Kuwait), the level of compensation given (the minimum possible award for individuals was distributed to the government of Kuwait rather than directly to the individuals concerned) and the UNCCC's extraordinarily close collaboration with the government of Kuwait in the claims process for the Bedoun, which did not occur with claims for any other population type or class (that is, the government of Kuwait was enabled to retain exceptional control over the UNCC process for the Bedoun only). The award of compensation for the death on one individual (United Nations Security Council, June 30, 2005) in light of Bedoun population loss of around 150,000 during ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun during and after the war, is obscene (see United Nations Security Council, June 30, 2005).

There is a need for historical and policy research that does not require direct contact with the community, but this research should be provided to community leaders for their information. From another perspective, any researcher who has studied Kuwait’s history, society, politics and economics up to 1986, has actually researched the Bedoun, as they were
integrated into the Bedouin citizenry awaiting citizenship. They were not discussed as a separate group of the Bedouin ethnic group. Virtually all Kuwaiti researchers I have cited in this thesis discussed the Bedoun openly in their research if it was conducted in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, regardless of their position of the issue. Anti-Bedouin ideologies of this era were therefore clearly set out and are not difficult to identify.

The Bedoun were not omitted from these more recent research efforts because information about them did not exist. Generally speaking, there is a need to review past Kuwaiti research and develop fresh interpretations of the history of the Bedoun within the Bedouin community. Unbiased attention to the Bedouin community as a whole (who are now the majority of the Kuwaiti population) would likely transform Kuwait area studies.

Research on desert settlements and city planning ethnically targeted the Bedouin community, as the process of segregation (including citizenship and education deprivation) was accomplished as a practical reality through urban planning. The influence of Arab nationalists in this sector of government was well established (al Mdaires, 2010). A great deal of Hadar research activity has taken place around this topic over many decades. Systematic review of Arabic language research in this domain is likely to reveal new evidence of extreme, Hadar nationalist dialogue including the tribalism and cultural hygiene motifs (see Chapter 7).

The Bedoun diaspora has been neglected by both researchers and international humanitarian organisations. Questions about the diaspora’s identity are generally speaking, based on myths about collective identity generated in the social sciences (see Chapter 2), which has contributed to this neglect. The Bedoun are a genuine refugee community with unique characteristics and needs. Future research could analyse the proportion of these populations who have received refugee status, permanent residence and citizenship in new countries, compared to those who have been left perpetually stateless in those countries. This would be a fertile area for future research on statelessness. However, politicisation of the Bedoun 'problem' and suppression of genuine public discussion about the group occurs internationally, and this is already an issue for the Bedoun diaspora beyond the scope of the present study.

Small Bedoun communities and individuals in the diaspora have been left isolated, perpetually stateless and without resources. They are often prevented from working to support themselves by authorities in the countries where they resettle. Some have been abandoned completely by authorities and exist in a state of virtual destitution, their refugee claims rejected, with no resolution of their case available to them. In refugee receiving states that refuse to settle Kuwaiti Bedoun who are stateless, their right of permanent settlement and citizenship in alternative states could be investigated, such as exploration of appropriate social and cultural environments that could support Bedoun refugee's positive
adaptation. Their situation poses a genuine social problem for the Bedoun diaspora, while the receiving communities have little understanding of the extent of Bedoun suffering, especially the impact of historical prohibitions on employment and education.

This problem has markedly affected the outcomes for the Bedoun diaspora who seek refugee status. For example, authorities assume Bedoun applicants are ‘lying’ about their claims because their identity as a collective remains questioned in academic studies. This is ‘confirmed’ when Bedoun refugee applicants are inclined to fail ‘tests’ of Kuwaiti history, based on questions about the written Hadar narrative of history (that is, the history of the opposing ethnic group), even though the applicants state they are illiterate, may have never attended school, and have been raised in what still remains largely, an oral-based, traditional culture. Alternatively, other accounts of refugees are rejected by courts because they appear to be inconsistent or unbelievable to court authorities, even though their accounts are perfectly consistent with the Bedoun’s experience in Kuwaiti culture, and accurately reflect common experiences with authorities (I have developed this view from my reading of confidential case histories of Bedoun asylum seekers in Australia and the United Kingdom).

Individual case studies of Bedoun experiences in the refugee system, the claims of everyday life experience in Kuwait, and the perception of the receiving authorities (revealed in migration casework records and court transcripts), are yet to be researched by scholars.

Population monitoring and control of the Bedoun by Kuwaiti authorities warrants serious and deep investigation. The methods of recording the Bedoun as illegal residents and as other nationals in the ‘status adjustment’ program and the National Census, warrants urgent attention. This should involve scrutiny of the National Census data from 1985 until the present time (due to the date of the Kuwaitisation policy as 1985, the administrative expulsion policy as 1986, and back-dating of Census data in 1992, to 1985). A total population audit involving the National Census and the Central Apparatus (or the equivalent bodies shown in the Appendix), from 1985 until the present, is warranted. Every Bedoun individual who was recorded on the National Census from 1985 should have their identity investigated to establish if the government of Kuwait regards them as Bedoun or as 'other' nationals. This should include the content of their corresponding Ministry of Interior 'security' files after the first administrative expulsion, nationality transfer, file deletion, deportation, death and/or disappearance. This task should be carried out by an appropriate agency of the United Nations, such as the Special Rapporteur on Genocide or the UNESCO statistical division, in consultation with the community, in the context that such an investigation would be an examination of a state program of erasure that featured gross, systematic violence including killings never investigated by domestic or international authorities, and the dumping of innocent people across the borders of enemy lines during war.
Representations of the community through the United Nations review processes would provide a fertile area for future study. In particular, Kuwait’s historical participation in reviews of its performance at the Human Rights Committee, women rights, children’s rights, social, cultural, political and economic rights review processes, can be collated and analysed. The issues raised on behalf of the Bedoun community by international humanitarian organisations going back at least to 1991 (and perhaps further) and outcomes of those engagements within the United Nations framework, warrants investigation. The processes of representation should also be considered: the roles of the actors who select representatives and the representatives themselves who speak for the community at these forums (and not necessarily with the community's endorsement), warrants further inquiry.

The processes by which the state of Kuwait adjusted its population data with the United Nations and its organs from 1983, especially concerning the administrative expulsion of 1992, should be investigated. In particular, a time-line of events of the responses of UNESCO and the UNDP (including the UNESCO/UNDP statistical divisions) to the population ‘adjustment,’ can be established. The processes by which the United Nations funded and monitored the development of the Bedoun population as part of Kuwait's citizen population until 1986, and then ceased to do so, while exiting the population as Kuwaiti nationals on its population statistics, requires attention.

Mechanisms of self-representation for the Bedoun community within the United Nations framework needs to be established, as does measurement of the population group at the statistical level. This is not because the Bedoun have sought political recognition as a national group, like Palestinians or Kurds. Rather, recognition that the group that exists at all at the qualitative (self-representation) and quantitative (statistical monitoring of the population) levels is required as a preventative measure, as the group appears to be at substantial risk of total, physical eradication. UNESCO and the UNDP has allowed the Bedoun to be erased from their programs by the state of Kuwait. On the other hand, the Human Rights Committee has also been aware of the detrimental situation of the Bedoun population according to reports it has received regularly for many years without ensuring that the Bedoun can report regularly and directly to it (as I mentioned above, citizen proxies are installed by international humanitarian agencies to represent the Bedoun at this level; the practice has little justification). Additionally, the Committee has not sought to ensure the population group has been monitored by the population monitoring divisions within UNESCO and the UNDP after their expulsion from the state, despite the alarming population decline.

To date, the Bedoun have also been prevented from adequately representing themselves via the United Nations Human Rights Committee processes and other regular treaty review processes, due to their criminalisation and entrapment. In this study, I
discussed the Kuwaiti authorities’ response to a (citizen) human rights activist who claimed to represent the Bedoun to Geneva in 2015, who participated in the review process. The participant was met at Kuwait airport with an arrest warrant when he returned from attending the review (Amnesty International, 2015a, 2016a, p.222). The young participant was not a Bedoun, he was not experienced with formal human rights protocols and he was not formally endorsed by the community (I referred this issue above). The government has prevented the Bedoun from articulating their needs either directly, or through humanitarian organisation partners. Furthermore, members of the Bedoun community should be enabled in principle, to represent their own cultural collective directly.

The Bedoun do not appear to be mentioned in any reports published by the UNDP and UNESCO. Currently, the Bedoun population group is ‘missing’ and does not exist at the statistical level, in regards to any official statistical development measures, published by UNESCO or the UNDP (Carr-Hill, 2013). This is because their identity on official, statistical data in Kuwait has been systematically and progressively altered since 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994), so that it is impossible to tell if the population group of over 110,000 (Over 110, 000,’ 2013) are ‘counted’ as Arabs of different nations by being re-allocated on statistical data referring to expatriate Arab nationals, or have been deleted from national statistical data altogether (although the Ministry of Interior's Central Apparatus maintains heavy surveillance on the group, including the administration of the whole population’s ‘security’ files).

Therefore, in order to account for the actual existence of the group, both quantitative and qualitative safeguards are required. The quantitative safeguard should include the implementation of international development measures that would enable the UNDP and UNESCO to establish baseline data on the group (which does not exist at present). The qualitative safeguard of self-representation is essential to provide the group the capacity to receive appropriate training to conduct cross-checks to ensure that monitoring is genuine and taking place. The qualitative safeguard should also include the group’s self-representation, so that the group can report back to the United Nations and its organs, if the quantitative safeguard (population monitoring) is impeded. Both of these safeguards are also required to ensure that the groups’ future development is supported by the United Nations framework, is monitored accordingly, and involves the community’s active leadership.

The Bedoun appear to be subject to conditions that give cause for investigation by the United Nations Rapporteurs for Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect. A population reduction of around two-thirds over the last twenty-five years, as I have mentioned. This indicator of physical destruction that alone, should warrant investigation. The administrative expulsion of the Bedoun in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003) and the killing and physical expulsion (ethnic cleansing) of the Bedoun (1990-1995) are on record. These
factors also establish physical destruction, and also warrant investigation. Other nations and non-government agencies have historically expressed concerns through various United Nations forums that cultural destruction of the Bedoun has been taking place. These factors alone should also warrant investigation.

Wartime and postwar population losses require thorough investigation, but so too does the diminishment of the population since the early 1990s. I referred to the issue of wartime population reduction above. This sensitive area remains a collective cultural trauma. Population loss at this time was approximately 150,000 (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Ghabra, 1997b). Information provided in this study about erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing) via the program of ‘status adjustment,’ Kuwait’s manipulation of National Census data since 1985 concerning the Bedoun population, and the Comoros Plan, should also be investigated in this context.

The state of Kuwait's official program of Bedoun erasure called 'status adjustment' has been confirmed via reports of information held by the governments of the United States (WikiLeaks U.S. Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006) and the United Kingdom (U.K. Home Office, 2014, p.18, n62, 63, 64), as well as those involved in parliamentary life (for example, see MP Faisal al Duwaisan in ‘Government to Offer,’ 2014 and MP Hassan Jawhar in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014; research by Dr Faris al Waqayan, 2009). The existence of the program since 1983 (al Anezi, 1983, p.263) is beyond doubt. The program has been openly discussed in Kuwait’s National Assembly. A parliamentarian has also openly discussed the existence of external interference that prevents the government from stopping the deprivation of the Bedoun's citizenship and corresponding human rights deprivations. MP Saleh Ashour (quoted in Izzak, May 17, 2016) confirmed this problem in a statement that was remarkably similar to the view of community leader Hakeem al Fadhli, expressed in this research (interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015). Clearly, if the National Assembly and the government of Kuwait does not have the capacity to stop the program, the country requires external support from the international community to stop it, to order to prevent further ethnic cleansing and theft of the Bedoun's identity.

Qualitative data in this study and the data from a range of international humanitarian reports listed in the reference section of this study (commencing from 1991), can be analysed by the Rapporteurs, as the data was apparently derived directly from the Bedoun community. This could help to establish grounds for a full fieldwork investigation by the rapporteurs. National policy designed by Hadar intellectuals (subsequently implemented) to reduce the population size, including specific doctrines designed to deprive the Bedoun of education on grounds that their cultural 'consciousness' should be prevented from developing, and efforts to convince others of the worthiness of such aims, should be considered as evidence of the intent to cause physical and cultural destruction of the Bedoun.
Community representatives who have attempted to advocate for their needs should be involved in any investigation, and this should include the Bedoun diaspora as well as the local community in Kuwait. Non-Bedoun humanitarian organisations and representatives in Kuwait should not be involved in these processes, due to the progressive replacement of Bedoun 'activists' with citizens since the Arab Spring which has arguably, marginalised the Bedoun from participating in public discussion and the development of knowledge about the group, as much as human rights deprivations have themselves achieved this effect. Instead, international agencies with long-term contacts in the community who have maintained positive relations with the Bedoun, would be best placed to facilitate, but in no way substitute, the community’s representation. In order to clarify the need for such an investigation, I have included a conceptual map of the local and international influences on the creation and enabling of ethnic targeting and population reduction of the Bedoun (see Figure 3, below). Ethnic targeting occurs at so many levels of the cultural system, that the basic concepts can be difficult to grasp due to the overwhelming nature of the Bedoun problem. Yet the solution to the problem, the grant of Kuwaiti citizenship in accordance with previous government commitments, has always been very simple.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this thesis explored the identity and culture of the Bedoun of Kuwait, who are part of the Bedouin community in Kuwait. The group were permanently settled in a formal program from 1965, in which they were to receive citizenship on the basis of their tribal membership (Stanton Russell, 1989). They settled in Kuwait as part of regional steps taken to settle all Bedouin tribes across the Middle East; in other states, the Bedouin were provided with citizenship and land on which to settle (the International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations (1957) (ILO) discussed in Bocco, 2006, p.306; also Fabietti, 2006; Kark and Frantzman, 2012). The group were regarded as citizens in Kuwait, or as Kuwaitis to whom citizenship would be granted imminently.

There have been two broad approaches to studying the Bedoun, one in the social sciences, and the other in the field of international humanitarian law (individual authors were discussed in Chapter 2). The study of the Bedoun in international law has involved secondary source research of the human rights reports of international humanitarian agencies, who have contributed substantially to the existing state of knowledge about the Bedoun. This thesis attempted to draw together and synthesise this previous literature from a variety of fields including unpublished research by Kuwaiti authors, and to use the sociological method to demystify (Horowtiz, 1975) some of the misconceptions surrounding the Bedoun in existing social science interpretations. The study utilised a sociological framework drawing on mainly humanistic sociology utilising theories of culture (Znaniecki, 1934; 1952a), cultural and ethnic identity (Znaniecki,
and Gross, 1978, 1998), and also theories of nationalism, marginalisation (Bayat, 2013; Znaniecki, 1952b), stigmatisation and ‘passing,’ labelling and criminalisation (Becker, 1983; Goffman, 1963; Sigona, 2005, 2009, 2011). The findings were discussed in the context of cultural patterning, evidence of ethnic cleansing and indicators of genocide in the context that the Bedoun are a stateless group, and an indigenous Bedouin group (Lemkin, 1944; Short, 2010). The research was qualitative, and employed multiple methods, with an emphasis on fieldwork in Kuwait with the Bedoun community, and supplementary research of literature, government data and other materials.

Because this field is still emerging, and appears to have been subject to censorship at some levels, there were quite a few new findings in this study. Overall, the findings were concentrated around the emerging Bedoun ethnic identity, their exclusion from society, and their attempts to remain connected to the cultural order through engagement with citizen society. They did this through social interaction with other groups, conscious management of identity, the emulation of principles of citizenship in the practice of ‘active citizenship’ (Bayat, 2012, 2013). A strong theme of the findings was the emergence of new ideals and values based on the universal principles of human rights. Such principles were aligned with the traditional culture, the sharing of resources and altruism and social solidarity arising from it. This phenomena also manifested in different forms of resistance of oppression and cultural expansion including cross-fertilization with other cultures, ethnic and/or political solidarity (‘sumud’), expressions of ‘true generosity’ (Freire, 1970) toward their oppressors and social movement toward self-education (Znaniecki, 1952b).

I have argued that while the Bedoun have been subject to extraordinary conditions of administrative expulsion (1986) (‘The Study,’ 2003), physical expulsion and killing (Fineman, November 2, 1992; Gasperini, 1991, August 20; Lorch, 1991, May 12), and a program of erasure that commenced in 1983 (al Anezi, 1989, p.263) the group remains subject to that same or a similar program today, referred to in this research as the program of ‘status adjustment.’ The program attempts to remove ethnic and tribal identity of the Bedoun and to ‘replace’ it with an ineffective nationality label (i.e. fraudulently recording a false identity) via force and coercion of individuals. The 'status adjustment' program managed by the Ministry of Interior's Central Apparatus makes the group vulnerable to mass identity erasure and deportation under The Comoros Plan. Erasure is a form of administrative ethnic cleansing (Weissbrodt, 2008).

The psychological pressure experienced by the Bedoun due to this program, along with social marginalization and stigmatization, are quite extraordinary. This is because the whole of their culture is subjected to a system of organised repression, which gives rise to a unique form of imposed, restrictive, cultural re-organisation (M. Secombe, personal communications, January 22, 2016). Although the interview group also showed very
positive signs of creative, cultural re-organisation, including the presence of an intellectual leadership group, the Bedoun also remained especially vulnerable to ethnic, identity-based targeting (Chapter 8, Table 25), reflective of the broader program of government management and control over the whole population.

The Bedoun interviewees demonstrated a remarkably resilient capacity for cultural expansion and intellectual identity. They have articulated their community's situation and the extraordinary extent of their suffering with clarity. But this aspect of their culture, their ability to express themselves and communicate their ideas, remains most at risk. In the long term, as long as the Bedoun cannot speak for themselves, mobilize as a community and expand their culture, their population also remains at risk of diminishment of numbers. This is without even considering the range of concrete policies in place that prevent them from expanding through normal family and social life. The forces of social disorganisation and cultural destruction are almost overwhelming and appear to outweigh the Bedoun’s capacity for creative, cultural organisation. Thus, part of the study explored interview data on the group’s consciousness of the indoctrination of citizens and the ideologies used to oppress them (section 8.3.3).

The study contributed to understanding of ethnic identity and social change, statelessness and citizenship, nationalism, social relations and cultural systems, refugee studies, ethnic cleansing, genocide studies and society in the Middle East. It also contributed to understanding of the role of nationalism in education, the sociology of knowledge (particularly regarding the development of knowledge indigenous tribal people, and the control of modes of knowledge production about them by elites) and the role of education in developing pedagogies of resistance. Urgent intervention is required to stop the erasure of Bedoun identity, ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun via 'status adjustment,' which includes the Comoros Plan, to prevent further physical and cultural destruction of the population and to provide the group with the safeguards they require to sustain themselves into the future.
Figure 3 A Conceptual Map of Local and International Factors Enabling Ethnic Persecution of Kuwait’s Bedoun (1983-)

**Regional (Middle East)**
International agencies and states – regional settlement program - gave rise to ‘tribalism theory’ - Bedouin as inferior; Hadar academics virtually uniform in approach to the Bedouin

**International Agencies**
UN, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR – no formal statistical monitoring of the Bedouin population; no coordination across agencies, no investigation of post- Gulf War ethnic cleansing, particularly killings and disappearance of large proportion of population

**International Governments**
U.K. Foreign office and U.S. Department of State aware of erasure policy since at least 2006; aware of extreme ethnic nationalism at the political level, Ministry of Interior's spawning of fake passport trade in the Middle East. U.K. policy changes block Bedouin refugee claims

**Social**
Anti-Bedouin ideology, transmitted through national education system, *dīwanniyya*, media, interpersonal interactions. Same themes target citizens and Bedoun; Bedouin more vulnerable due to statelessness

**Government Policy**
Targets ethnic group with pattern resembling ethnic structuralist theory; Academic Team introduces policy direct to Supreme Planning Council; Ministry of Interior manages surveillance and erasure of identity

**Political**
Kuwaiti-Arab nationalist policy to deprive Bedouin of citizenship from 1965; key nationalist intellectuals serve on Academic Team (above) introduce ethnic targeting policy including National Census expulsion, end Bedouin naturalisation policy

**Academic**
Local application of ‘tribalism’ theory from regional level, proliferates at social level, transmitted to/from government level as extreme, nationalist ideology
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**Legislation, Decrees and Court Documents**


Instruments of International Law


The Stateless Bedoun in Kuwait Society

A Study of Bedouin Identity, Culture and the Growth of an Intellectual Ideal

Volume II

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Appendix A

Analysis of Interview Data

Appendix A features the following sections:

i. A full list of themes and participant numbers

ii. A visual organiser illustrating the themes arising from the interview data
Appendix A, i
Themes and quotations from the interview transcripts

Appendix A, i, features three tables featuring three meta-themes derived from the analysis, a full list of all the themes derived from the meta-themes, and the participant numbers connected to each theme.

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<td>Tribal origins (Sub-theme)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>・ The removal of family and tribal names by government (P13)</td>
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<td>Religious values (sub-theme)</td>
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<tr>
<td>・ Religion as a source of hope and moral guidance (P8)</td>
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<td>・ Religion as a source of humanitarian values and the principle of equality (P13)</td>
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<td>・ Differences between (and mixing among) the Sunni and Shia sects (P3, P5, P12)</td>
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<td>Personal evaluations of identity (sub-theme)</td>
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<td>・ The emergence of different values in the new generation (P5, P6, P7, P13, P7, P8)</td>
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<td>・ The need to adapt or to retreat (P10, P11, P14)</td>
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<td>・ Adoption of values for personal survival (P9, P10, P11, P15)</td>
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<tr>
<td>・ Value of the stateless collective (P4, P9, P12, P13, P15, P16, P17)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Changing social roles of Bedoun women (sub-theme)
- Bedoun women financially supporting families (P8, P11)
- Covering of identity or expression of ‘national’ identity (P7)
- Women returning to the home after their education (P7)
- Seclusion impacting the formation of the marriage relationship (P4)
- Bedoun women challenging oppression (P4, P7, P8, P16, P17)

Bedoun children and Kuwaiti citizen mothers (sub-theme)
- Children’s destiny overseas (P1)
- Additional rights vulnerable to removal (P4)
- The citizen woman as a link to basic rights (P3)
- Citizen mother’s rights facilitate access to education (P5)

Changing social roles of Bedoun men (sub-theme)
- The traditional life pattern and the seclusion of men (P8, P9, P12, P13, P15, P16, P17)
- The prohibitive cost of traditional marriage practices for stateless males (P8, P13)
- Seclusion due to poverty, unemployment and instability of employment (P10, P11, P14)
- Seclusion men due to lack of civil identification documents (birth and marriage) (P12, P13)
- In relation to suicide of stateless men (P1, P12, P16, P17) Specifically in relation to oneself (P5, P8)
- Pressure on the Bedoun collective (P9, P12)

Collective identity and government interactions (theme)

Family histories and citizen registration (sub-theme)
- Documents citing the Bedoun were Kuwaiti (P8, P9)
- Did not know it was necessary (P4)
- Nomadic culture (P3, P6, P12)
- Illiteracy (P3, P6)
- Unable to travel to the registration office (P8, P12)
- Rejection of second-degree nationality (P9)

Experiences of the current generation – myths and reality (sub-theme)
- The myth of ‘waiting’ for citizenship (sub-sub-theme)
  - The process of parliamentary citizenship grants (P4)
  - The Central Apparatus contribution to the myth of ‘waiting’ (P7)
  - Intergenerational suppression and lack of due process (P13)
- The actual process of citizenship acquisition – a case example (sub-sub-theme)
  - Benefit of the Kuwaiti mother category (P5)
  - Limitations of the Kuwaiti mother category (P5)
  - Denial of urgent medical treatment (P5)
  - The strategy of delaying citizenship (P5)

Official methods used to change Bedoun identity (sub-theme)
- General refusal to provide documentation (P3, P6, P12, P13)
- Refusal of authorities to process marriages (P8)
- Identity re-allocation by government - Saudi Arabian and Syrian (P14, P11)
- Government rejection military personnel of the Six Day War (1967) and October
Note: Bedouin identity – includes analysis of meta-theme, themes, sub-themes and minor sub-themes
Themes Derived from the Meta-theme - Marginalisation of Identity and Culture

Marginalisation of identity and culture (meta-theme)

Ethnic targeting and social exclusion (theme)

Ethnic targeting of the northern tribes (sub-theme)
- Northern tribes (P3, P5, P17)
- Northern tribes’ accent and/or dialect (P3, P5)
- Tribal sectarianism (P3, P14)
- Northern and southern tribes and sectarian issues (P12)
- Distinctions between tribal origins (P13, P17)

Other themes related to the ethnic targeting and Bedouin identity (sub-theme)
- ‘Iraqi’ (P4, P7, P12)
- ‘Foreigner’ (P12, P13)
- Bedoun status (P3, P5, P6, P9)
- Religious sectarian stigma (P3, P14, P17)
- Native people (P3, P9)
- Difference (P5, P12, and P17)

Poverty and homelessness (sub-theme)
- Homelessness and hunger after the Iraq war (P8, P16, P17)
- Poverty generally (P3, P4, P15, P9, P16, P17, participant observation/photographs)

Stigma, stranger status and Bedoun identity (theme)

Stigmatisation and the citizen population (sub-theme)
- The Bedoun at the centre of Hadar-Bedoun tension (P5)
- Stigmatisation by citizens of the Bedoun (P3, P5, P7, P9, P13)
- Citizen’s fear of association with the Bedoun (P8, P16, P17)
- Fear of reprisal on family (P3, P5, P9)
- Citizen’s fear of removal of citizenship (P16, P17)
- Abuse of power (P5, P8)

Experiences treated as a stranger (sub-theme)
- Treated as if they are not ‘real’ Kuwaitis
  - Treated as if they do not exist (P13, P14, P6)
  - No right to say you are Kuwaiti (P5, P9, P10, P11)
  - Treated as disloyal to Kuwait (P4, P7, P13)
- Government policy to exclude the Bedoun (P7, P8, P9, P13) – see also under identity – suicide and eradication
- Criminalisation (P4, P7, P8, P13)
- Concern for the future and lack of opportunity (P5, P8, P9, P11, P12, P16, P17)
- Strangers within the tribe (P14, P15)
- Religious values do not overcome Bedoun stigma (P3, P14)
- Impact of new citizenship on Bedoun identity (P3, P5)
  - Acquisition of Kuwaiti citizenship
  - Acquisition of citizenship from a Western country
Contradictions of the Bedoun-citizen stranger status (sub-theme)
- Treated as outsiders despite cultural sameness (P4, P6, P8, P12, P13)
- Government gave my rights away to strangers (P4, P14)

Social integration (theme)

Prior to administrative expulsion (1986) (sub-theme)
- Integration of stateless and citizen society (P4, P8, P9)

Social integration in the present day (sub-theme)
- Tribal solidarity (P8) – also under identity
- My generation… must change their ideas (P7) – also under identity
- They will learn how to think independently (P3) – also under education
- A new society (P9) – also under education

‘Passing’ as a citizen (sub-theme)
- Children of Kuwaiti mother’s special status (P4)
- Passes due to new nationality status (overseas) (P3)
- Passes due to new nationality status (Kuwaiti) (P5)
- Passes due to identity concealment (P6)

Friendship and the disclosure of identity (sub-theme)
- Non-disclosure of identity in the social circle (P5, P7)
- Disclosure of identity in the social circle
  - Fear of loss of friendship (P6, P14)
  - Fear of identification (P3, P7)
- Danger to friendship group (P9)
- Little in common with friends (P6, P7)

Note: Marginalisation of identity and culture – includes meta-theme, themes, sub-themes and minor sub-themes
Table A3

*Themes Derived from the Meta-theme - Bedoun Education and the Intellectual Ideal*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bedoun Education and the intellectual ideal (meta-theme)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Issues (theme)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Institutional discrimination (sub-theme)</strong></td>
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<td>• Central Apparatus issues (minor sub-theme)</td>
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<td>o Bedoun entrance delayed by Central Apparatus bureaucracy (P17)</td>
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<td>o Undocumented status – Central Apparatus prohibiting work in area of professional training (P10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Issues within educational institutions (minor sub-theme)</td>
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<td>o Course options substantially restricted to the Bedoun (P2, P6, P7, P10, P17)</td>
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<td>o Bedoun cannot access degree education; results are questioned (P6, P7, P10, P15)</td>
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<td>o Bedoun unable to join student clubs at Kuwait University (P5, P9)</td>
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<td>o Schools were businesses, with limited tuition (P3, P14)</td>
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<td>o General discrimination by teachers in the school system (P5, P6, P15)</td>
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<td><strong>Access to education (sub-theme)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The informal system (minor sub-theme)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Wasta is used to access education (P8, P7)</td>
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<td>• ‘Sponsorship’ – support for Bedoun participation in the community (P6, P9)</td>
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<td>• Accessed private citizen support to go to school (P15)</td>
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<td>• The Khatahib School (P9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Direct negotiation with Ministry of Education regarding ‘undocumented’ Bedoun</td>
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<td><strong>The formal system (minor sub-theme)</strong></td>
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<td>• Entrance after mother became a Kuwaiti citizen (P5)</td>
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<td><strong>Positive experiences in education (theme)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Positive social relations (sub-theme)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Positive experience with peers (P3, P4, P9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Good relationships with teachers/Professors (P5, P11)</td>
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<td>• Part time study facilitates a larger and longer term social network (P13)</td>
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<td><strong>Persistence, resilience and high achievement (sub-theme)</strong></td>
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<td>• The impact of education bans (P16)</td>
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<td>• Returning to school to access Kuwait University (P5)</td>
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<td>• High achievement and lifelong learning (P3, P11)</td>
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<td>• Love of learning (P3, P5, P7, P9)</td>
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<td>• Family support (P7, P8)</td>
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<td><strong>Participation in civil society (sub-theme)</strong></td>
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<td>• Giving back to the community (P3)</td>
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<td>• Kuwait University activities (P9)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
• The Khataib School (October 2014) (see also scholarships) (P9)

Intellectual life (sub-theme)
• Changing your ideas (P5)
• Self-realisation of the scale of the Bedoun problem (P3)
• Suppression of Bedoun authors (P9)
• Creating a new society (P9)

Aspirations (sub-theme)
• I have ambition, I want a better situation (P4)
• They are content with what they have. The new generation is not (P5)
• My biggest dreams are the their basics in their life (P6)
• They want to study and finish university like citizens (P9)
• I want to be the good guy – avoiding criminalisation (P13)

The social and cultural purpose of education (theme)

Fulfilment of basic needs (sub-theme)
• Poverty alleviation – family (P6, P9, P15)
• Productivity (P4, P8) (from Work opportunities linked to the vocational sector (P4, P8)
• Financial independence (P16) (from quote ‘I want to know myself, to support myself’)

Cultivation of Self (sub-theme)
• Hope (P8, P10, P11, P17)
• Life purpose (P17)
• Self-worth
  o Dignity (P16)
  o Self-esteem (P3)
  o Self-confidence (P17)
  o Self-respect (P15)
• Self-awareness (P3, P7, P11, P16)

Identification with a higher purpose (sub-theme)
• Intellectual growth (P3, P8)
• Personal excellence (P3, P10)
• Personal empowerment (P8)
• Identification with higher principles (P17)
• Transcend limitations (P3, P4)

Improvement of society (sub-theme)
• Positive input into society (P3, P7, P13)

Recognition and reconciliation with other social groups (sub-theme)
• The Bedoun identity is Kuwaiti (P5)
• They must ask the Bedoun about their heritage (P9)

Marginalisation in education (theme)

Experiences of overt abuse (sub-theme)
• Students abused due to tribal background in citizen schools (P3)
• Students locked in rooms without being taught (P8)
• Amplification and shaming of Bedoun identity (P10)
• Whole classes failed for no reason (P14)

Experiences of stigmatisation (sub-theme)
• Self or others hide their identity at university now (P5, P6, P7)
• Avoidance of identity disclosure, exposure as impoverished (P6, P15)
• Resisting the practice of concealing identity (P5, P7)
• Children of stateless/citizen couples attempt to migrate (P1)
• Anti-Bedouin sentiment at Kuwait University (P2)
• Experience of stigmatisation – involvement of Central Apparatus – (P10) - see Experiences of overt abuse
• See also Institutional issues above, which discusses abuse by teachers.

Social segregation in education (theme)

Expulsion of the Bedoun from schools 1986-1992 (sub-theme)
• I started crying (P16)
• I waited 19 years enter university (P17)
• I am Kuwaiti. The government made the difference between us (9)
• They couldn’t do anything for us, we came to understand that (P4)
• They will say Bedoun. They will know (P8)
• Experiences acquiring education when borders closed to the Bedoun (P2, P3)

The unschooled Bedoun (sub-theme)
• Imposed idleness – P3 (females), P6, P16, P17 (males)
• A wasted life (P10, P11)
• The street life (P7)
• No work, no exit from house (P12)
• Expense of the private system; criminalisation of the community (P13)
• Intergenerational impacts (P13, P16, P17)
• Comparison of experience in a new country (P3)

Note: Bedoun education and the intellectual ideal – meta theme, themes, sub-themes and minor sub-themes
### Appendix A, ii

**A Visual Organiser Illustrating the Themes Arising from the Interview Data**

Table A4

*Themes Arising from the Analysis of Interview Data*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meta-theme</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Sub-theme</th>
<th>Minor sub-theme</th>
<th>Minor sub-sub-theme</th>
<th>Minor sub-sub-sub-theme</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bedouin identity</td>
<td>Tribal identity</td>
<td>Tribal origins</td>
<td>Presence prior to the modern state</td>
<td>Native people</td>
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<td>Differences between (and mixing among) the Sunni and Shia sects</td>
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<td>Religious tensions related to multiple factors</td>
<td>The Bedoun and tribal politics Bedoun/citizen mix in tribes</td>
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<td>Involvement of the British in tribal matters</td>
<td>Tribal voting blocs and oil rights</td>
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<td><strong>Formation of the marriage relationship</strong></td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Central Apparatus contribution to the myth of ‘waiting’</td>
<td>Intergenerational suppression and lack of due process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The actual process of citizenship acquisition – a case example</th>
<th>Benefit of the Kuwaiti mother category</th>
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<tr>
<td>Limitations of the Kuwaiti mother category</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>Denial of urgent medical treatment</th>
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<tr>
<th>The strategy of delaying citizenship</th>
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<tr>
<th>Official methods used to change Bedoun identity</th>
<th>General refusal to provide documentation</th>
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<tr>
<th>Refusal of authorities to process marriages</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation of identity and culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government rejection of military personnel of the Six Day War (1967) and October War (1973) (a case example)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Northern tribes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern tribes’ accent and/or dialect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal sectarianism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern, southern tribes and sectarian issues</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Distinctions between tribal origins</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other themes related to ethnic targeting and Bedouin identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Iraqi’</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Foreigner’</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bedouin status</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious status</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious sectarian stigma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native people</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Poverty and homelessness</td>
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<td>Poverty and hunger after the Iraq war</td>
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<td>Poverty generally</td>
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<td>Stigma, stranger status and Stigmatisation of the citizen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bedouin at the centre of Hadar-Bedoun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedoun identity</td>
<td>population tension</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigmatisation by citizens of the Bedoun</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizen’s fear of association with the Bedoun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of reprisal family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s fear of removal of citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuse of power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiences treated as a stranger</td>
<td>Treated as if they are not ‘real’ Kuwaitis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No right to say they are ‘Kuwaiti’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treated as disloyal to Kuwait</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government policy to exclude the Bedoun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminalisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern for the future and lack of opportunity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strangers within the tribe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious values do not overcome Bedoun stigma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of new citizenship on Bedoun identity</td>
<td>Acquisition of Kuwaiti citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition of citizenship from a Western country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contradictions of the Bedoun-citizen stranger status</td>
<td>Treated as outsiders despite cultural sameness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government gave my rights away to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strangers</td>
<td></td>
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<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social integration Prior to administrative expulsion (1986) Integration of stateless and citizen society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social integration in the present day Tribal solidarity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My generation… must change their ideas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They will learn how to think independently</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A new society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiences 'passing' as a citizen Children of Kuwaiti mother’s special status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passes due to new nationality status Citizen of a Western country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passes due to identity concealment Citizen of Kuwait</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclosure of identity in the social circle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-disclosure of identity in the social circle Fear of loss of friendship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of identification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danger to friendship group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little in common with friends</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedoun education and the intellectual ideal Institutional Issues Institutional discrimination Central Apparatus issues Bedoun entrance delayed by Central Apparatus bureaucracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented status – Central Apparatus prohibiting of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td>The informal system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsorship – support for Bedoun participation in the community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessed private citizen support to go to school</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <em>khataīb</em> school</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct negotiation with Ministry of Education for ‘undocumented’ Bedoun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive experiences in education</td>
<td>Positive social relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive relationships with teachers/Profess</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ors</td>
<td>Part time study facilitates a larger and longer-term social network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistence, resilience and high achievement</td>
<td>The impact of education bans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returning to school to access Kuwait University</td>
<td>High achievement and lifelong learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love of learning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in civil society</td>
<td>Giving back to the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait University activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <em>khatatib school</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual life and visions of a new society</td>
<td>Changing your ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-realisation of the scale of the Bedoun problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppression of Bedoun authors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating anew society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspirations</td>
<td>I have ambitions, I want a better situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are content with what they have. The new generation is not</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My biggest dreams are the basics in their life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
They want to study and finish university

I invest in my life… want to be the good guy

…To be a good person. I feel I should be.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The purpose of education</th>
<th>Fulfilment of basic needs</th>
<th>Poverty alleviation - family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Productive employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Financial independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivation of Self</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hope</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Life purpose</th>
<th>Self-worth</th>
<th>Dignity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-esteem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Self-confidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-respect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification with a higher purpose</th>
<th>Intellectual growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal excellence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal empowerment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with higher principles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcend limitations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A duty to one’s people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improvement of society</th>
<th>Positive input into society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognition and reconciliation with other social groups</td>
<td>The Bedoun identity is Kuwaiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The must ask the Bedoun about</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation in education</td>
<td>Experiences of overt abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students locked in rooms without being taught</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amplification and shaming of Bedoun identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whole classes failed for no reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiences of stigmatisation</td>
<td>Self or others hide their identity at university now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avoidance of identity disclosure, exposure as impoverished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resisting the practice of concealing identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children of stateless/citizen couples attempt to migrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-Bedouin sentiment at Kuwait University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experience of stigmatisation – involvement of the Central Apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social segregation in education</td>
<td>Expulsion of the Bedoun from schools 1986-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I waited 19 years to enter university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I am Kuwaiti. The government made the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
difference between us

They couldn’t do anything for us, we came to understand that

They will say Bedoun. They will know

Trapped behind borders closed to the Bedoun

The unschooled Bedoun

Imposed idleness

The street life

A wasted life

No work, no exit from house

Expense of the private system; criminalisation of the community

Intergenerational impacts

Comparison of experience in a new country
Appendix B

The Bedoun: Bedouin heritage and citizenship

i. The main Bedouin tribes of Kuwait
ii. Collective names of the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) of Kuwait
iii. Government Legislation and Other Commitments to Grant the Bedoun Citizenship (1950-2014)
iv. National Census and other Bedoun identity documents
v. The Constitution of Kuwait (1922/1962), Article 25 (military servicemen)
vi. The Nationality Law (1959) of Kuwait
The Main Bedouin Tribes of Kuwait are set out below. Not all tribes had claims tribal dirah (traditional lands) extending across what is now the territory of Kuwait. However, tribes had access to other tribes’ dirah by agreement due to the principles of resource sharing among tribes (Wilkinson, 1983). The main tribes were incorporated into the state by tribal agreements with the ruler, the al Sabah, and later, through the parliamentary process. The spellings in English commonly differ, for example, between the two authors below.
Table B1

*The Main Tribes of Kuwait and Their Traditional Tribal Territories (Dirah)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Tribal Unit</th>
<th>Tribal Territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Azmi</td>
<td>Awazem</td>
<td>Kuwait and eastern area of Saudi Arabian Gulf coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Ajmi</td>
<td>Ajman</td>
<td>Southern and western Kuwait and eastern Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutairi</td>
<td>Mutair</td>
<td>North eastern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashidi</td>
<td>Rashaydah</td>
<td>Kuwait and North eastern Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Anzi</td>
<td>Anza</td>
<td>Northern Arabian peninsula from Syria/Jordan to Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shmmari</td>
<td>Shammar</td>
<td>North central Saudi Arabia and western Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhafiri</td>
<td>Dhafir</td>
<td>Zubair in Iraq westwards and south into Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalidi</td>
<td>Bani Khalid</td>
<td>Kuwait and eastern Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fadhli</td>
<td>Fadhul</td>
<td>Southwestern Iraq and northern Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dosari</td>
<td>Dawasir</td>
<td>West central Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murri</td>
<td>Murra</td>
<td>The Empty Quarter north through eastern Saudi Arabia and Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajeri</td>
<td>Bani Hajer</td>
<td>Qatar and eastern central Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qahtani</td>
<td>Qahtan</td>
<td>Central Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Utalbai</td>
<td>Utban</td>
<td>Northern central Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* This list was revised and updated by Professor Abdulla Alhajeri (2004, table 3.2, p.79) in *Citizenship and Political Participation in the State of Kuwait: The Case of the National Assembly (1963-1966)*. Some of the original information incorporated was from the work of Abdullah Khalifah al Shayeji (1988, table 5.6, p.206) *Democratization in Kuwait: The National Assembly as a Strategy for Political Survival*. The Bedoun were assumed to be members of the Bedouin tribes of Kuwait until 1983 (al Anezi, 1989, p.263).
Appendix B, ii

Collective Names of the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) of Kuwait

What hindered the outcome Freeth envisioned in 1970, whereby the badu would be assimilated and the term no longer used to designate a distinct social group?
(al Nakib, 2014, p.7)

The names used to refer to the Bedouin of Kuwait - including the Bedoun - are provided in Table B2, below. I have listed eight names. The table may be read with Appendix C, i, which sets out other names used to describe the Bedoun, which evolved during the historical process of their marginalization and expulsion.

**Different spellings for the term Bedoun**

*Bedoun*: Lorch, May 12, 1991; Fineman, November 8, 1992. The spelling was also used by the United Nations Security Council, July 2, 2004 and June 30, 2005, the *Arab Times* in Kuwait. This spelling is use in this research.


*Bidun* is a French term for slum-dweller, formerly used to characterise north African poverty. I have never found any direct no correspondence to the Arabic term ‘Bedoun’ meaning ‘without.’ It is a derogatory term, beyond the scope of the present discussion.
### Table B2

**The Collective Names of the Bedouin (Including the Bedoun) of Kuwait**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Origin of the terms and references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sons of the desert <em>Abna al badiyya</em></td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>A local term used in Kuwait (al Waqayan, 2009; Beaugrand, 2014b, p.737), still used today by the Bedoun to describe themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dwellers of the Kuwait desert/Bedouins of Kuwait <em>Badiat al Kuwayt</em></td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>A local term used in Kuwait, still used. Officially, the term legally exempted these tribal members from the Nationality Law regarding foreign residents Beaugrand (2014b, p.737). It was cancelled by Emiri Decree 41/1987 (Group 29, 2012, p.6). Clearly, the term refers to the Bedouin within the territorial boundary of the modern state of Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Semi-settled Bedouins of Kuwait <em>Arab dar</em></td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>The term comes from the concept of the Islamic abode in Quranic philosophy, <em>dar</em> meaning house, abode or structure (Ramadan, 2008). Thus, the term may simply mean the house or home of the Arabs, as in the <em>dirah</em> (traditional lands) of the Bedouin. The term <em>Arab dar</em> was also used by Dickson (1949, p.108-109); he indicated he applied the term to semi-nomads, including those who pitched their black tents on the outskirts of Kuwait city annually (see Appendix H for photographs). It is likely al Anezi (1989) adopted the term from this author.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Semi-settled Kuwaiti Bedouins <em>Uraib dar</em></td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Al Anezi (1989, p.174-175, n44) claimed the term <em>uraib dar</em> meant Bedouins of Kuwait who were permanently settled outside Kuwait City but within the territory. The distinction between two groups, one which observed the (unmarked) territorial boundary and one which did not, is entirely theoretical, but it also happened to reflect Dickson’s (1949, p.108-109) discussion of the process of transition to permanent settlement, also seen in al Moosa (1976).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nomadic Kuwaiti Bedouins</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Settled in Kuwaiti, but no fixed place of residence (seasonal settlement at multiple sites), no observance of territorial boundaries (national boundaries) due seeking pasture for their flocks. As above, Al Anezi (1989, p.174-175) attempted to compare the Bedouin with anthropological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concepts</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Denotes different designations in Arabic – pastoral or desert dwellers. Alhajeri (2014, p.18) may have been referring to the above terms Arab dar and uraib dar, used by Dickson (1949) and al Aanezi (1989) further refined, reflecting an attempt to illustrate anthropological distinctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Semi-desert or desert people</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>‘All were citizens of the State of Kuwait in the 1950s,’ in Al Anezi (n.d., in Alhajeri, 2014, p.18). This was reflected on the National Census, with the Bedoun listed under ‘Kuwaiti’ until their removal in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994; see Appendix D, iii). It was also reflected on the actual National Census document issued to the Bedoun (see Appendix B, iv).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kuwaiti</td>
<td>Up to the 1960s</td>
<td>Initially authors referred to the Bedoun as the Kuwaiti Bedouin. The term was used by some Kuwaiti academics writing their theses in English at universities in the United Kingdom and the United States. (1) Al Fayez (1984, p.257-8) defined the term Bedoun as reference to Bedouins who had been recruited in the security forces (police, military and national guard), acknowledging no prior nationality. Al Anezi (1989) referred to the term Bedoon being used in place of a nationality on government records, to indicate Kuwaiti Bedouins waiting for citizenship. The name was officially dropped in a Council of Ministers Resolution 1983, see ‘non-Kuwaiti national.’ (2) I have not found the term in local use prior to 1970s, as Alhajeri (2014, p.18; 2013, p.18) stated, but he may have been referring to oral discourse and/or Arabic language authors or newspapers such as al Qabas. For example, in al Moosa (1976) they were referred to as Bedouins who were waiting to receive their promised citizenship grants, and distinguished from non-Bedouin stateless people. But he did not use the term, Bedoun. (3) The term was first used by in the West by Foreign correspondents initially discovered the Bedoun after the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait (Cushman, June 30, 1991, July 16, 1991; Evans, February 28, 1991; Gasperini, August 20, 1991; Lorch, May 12, 1991; Wilkinson, May 20, 1991) prior to Human Rights Watch (1991a) in September, 1991, deriving the term ‘jinisya’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
from Crystal, 1992. It was also later used by Fineman (November 2, 1992, November 8, 1992). In Evans, February 28, 1991, the Bedouin were labelled ‘Iraqi intruders’ by government authorities. Human Rights Watch (1995) claimed the term was regarded as a temporary one, used to refer to individuals who were waiting for their citizenship claims to be verified, while government issued them with documents stating they were *bedoon jinsiyya*.

(4) Other spellings include *Bedoon, Bidoun, Bidoon* and the derogatory term which has a different meaning, *Bidun*. See Chapter 2 regarding development of definitional terms by academics. See below for use of the different spellings.

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**Note:** Source information is given in each section. I have listed the number of terms used to refer to the Bedouin in the column on the left. The numbers continue on in Table C1, *The collective names of the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) of Kuwait*, which concerned the official names given to the Bedouin after their administrative expulsion in 1986 (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003).

Table B2 above, features mainly traditional names from the Arabic which were used by the Bedouin themselves, referring to their desert and/or nomadic practices. Other names were introduced based on anthropological classifications that distinguished Bedouin tribes at various stages of nomadism and settlement, such as fully nomadic, semi-nomadic and settled. These classifications were usually based on the types of animals that the Bedouin grazed, or the type of pasture consumed. The term *Bedouin* was never confined to a fully nomadic existence in the desert for all but refers to tribal social structures and/or relationships (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014), depending upon scholars’ theoretical inclinations (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of this theory). Unfortunately, many terms for the Bedouin and Bedoun are not referenced by scholars.
Appendix B, iii

Government Legislation and Other Commitments to Grant the Bedoun Citizenship
(1950-2014)

Table B3 below, sets out the range of commitments that the government of Kuwait made to the Bedoun in public, that the group would be granted Kuwaiti citizenship. It appears to be the first time the range of assurances has been collated. It included reference to government legislation and claims (official pronouncements not necessarily legislated).
List of Government Legislation and Other Commitments to Grant the Bedoun Citizenship (1950-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Details of the commitment and references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950s and</td>
<td>Government commitment</td>
<td>Citizenship in exchange for permanent settlement and employment. Offer included additional family members being welcome to settle with those employed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>The first open registration period for citizenship claims to be lodged took place from 1961-1963, as part of implementation the Nationality law (Kuwait) 1959.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Government conditions,</td>
<td>Mass naturalization of the Bedouin on the basis of their tribal identity, from 1965. The same programs were run throughout the Middle East at the time, organised via the United Nations, the Arab League, the ILO and other partners with state governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>The Nationality Law (1959) Article 5(3) was amended to allow for the naturalisation of stateless students who were born in Kuwait and had completed high school in Kuwait – a short-lived law marred by corruption and of little benefit to the group (see al Anezi, 1989).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Government claim</td>
<td>In October 1976, pledge by Defence Minister/Minister of the Interior regarding citizenship for defence, police and National Guard personnel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1990-1992 Legislation

December, 1990, recommendation of the Academic Team for Population Policy submitted a report to the Supreme Council to reverse the policy of ‘population balance’ from granting Bedouin citizenship en masse, to strictly prohibiting any further mass citizenship being distributed to the stateless Bedouin of Kuwait (the Bedoun). Citizenship would be given to the stateless Bedoun only if they could prove their eligibility under the Nationality Law of 1959. Policy was legislated for official implementation in Supreme Planning Council Resolution No. 11 of January 8, 1992, adopted by Cabinet, January 30, 1992. A recommendation to provide citizenship to all who had proved they resident prior to 1965 was never implemented. The proposal for the new, national population policy came from the Supreme Planning Council and the Committee for Population Policy and Manpower Development on the same date: January 8, 1992


2000 Legislation


2010 Government claim

On November 5, 2010, the Supreme Planning Council Study published a figure of 34,000 of this category recommended ‘eligible for naturalisation.’ The figure appeared to have been drawn from figures announced under the pledge of 1976, Law 100/1980 and Law 22/2000 (all listed above). This group, who were eligible to receive citizenship under Law 100/1980. They were predominantly members of the military and police services, drawn from the northern tribes (al Moosa 1976; al Fayez, 1984; Alhajeri, 2004).

Sources: The ‘2010 Study’ published in al Qabas, 34 Thousand Candidates for Naturalization from 106 Thousand, see Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.21. See also Stanton
Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, n32 for the first time this group was identified at the policy level.

2012

Government claim

The same group identified above (re: 1990) related to a ‘new’ identity system introduced by the Central Apparatus, announced in The Kuwait Times (‘Color ID Cards for Bedoons Soon,’ 2012, April 21). The population would be identified under four different colours, reflecting Central Apparatus classifications already used within the Apparatus (see 8,000 Bedoons to Become Illegal Residents Soon, June 18, 2012, in The Kuwait Times and Judicial Recourse for Bedoun Colours, December 23, 2012 in The Arab Times). According to the categorisation criteria, those designated the green identity category were ‘eligible’ for citizenship. The meaning of the green identity category under the new system implied that the recipients of would receive citizenship, but it was not guaranteed. From 2012 to 2016, government worked to reduce the number in this group it believes are eligible for citizenship, from over 35,000 to just a few thousand, and it appears the number will soon be reduced to zero (see Appendix D, part iv).


2013

Legislation

In 2013, parliamentarians presented a range of arguments as to why the Bedoun should/would be naturalised upon legislation to approve the annual citizen lists. Amnesty International (2013a), the AFP (Kuwait Passes Bill to Naturalise 4,000 Stateless People, March 20, 2013) and the BBC (Kuwait MPs Pass Law to Naturalise 4,000 Stateless Bidun, March 20, 2013) issued pre-emptive statements stating that the legislation would be used to grant citizenship to the Bedoun, followed by Human Rights Watch in The Kuwait Times (Rights Group Praises Kuwait Bedoon Move, March 27, 2013). No grant was received by any Bedoun out of 4,000 grants to ‘foreigners’ after the legislation was passed. Amnesty International’s (2013a) report on the matter, Kuwait: Small Step Forward for Bidun Rights as 4,000 ‘Foreigners’ Granted Citizenship, was later removed from the Kuwait UNHCR webpage and the Amnesty International webpage. Human Rights Watch (2014, p.2) confirmed that no Bedoun received citizenship out of the 4,000 grants.


2016

Legislation

National Assembly legislated to allow parliament to naturalize up to 4,000 people in 2016, reported by Izzak (May 17, 2016) in The Kuwait Times (Nod to naturalize 4,000 in 2016, May 11, 2016). The law gave government the opportunity to naturalise Bedouns, but similar laws passed in previous years has led to government naturalizing few individuals, overlooking Bedouns, for example in the legislation of 2013.

In 2014, Beaugrand (2014a) implied there was some kind of misunderstanding between the public and the government of Kuwait, such that the public had adopted wishful thinking to governments’ previous statements. This interpretation should be ignored, because as I have demonstrated via the multiple citations above, the tendency for government to ‘promise’ citizenship to the Bedoun is virtually a public institution in Kuwait, and it is used as a mechanism that has been used to quell and delay confrontations between the community and authorities for decades.

Furthermore, Beaugrand (2014a) has never published any systematic analysis of these claims and legislative actions in the National Assembly. Pre-emptive claims in news media that have misled the public could be blamed solely on the news media, if it were not for vigorous National Assembly discussion that includes public statements of intent to grant citizenship, which were characteristic of the legislation passed in 2013. Indeed, it is possible that pre-emptive claims (‘promises’ that citizenship would be forthcoming to tens of thousands), parliamentary debates and legislative actions have occurred simply because there are parliamentary and other government sources who do actually support the grant of citizenship to the Bedoun.

In most cases, citizenship applications have been followed by undisclosed processes of assessment and evaluation of claims characterised by lack of transparency, arbitrary and/or biased decision making and what appeared to be in many cases, a simple failure to actually process applications (see Human Rights Watch, 1995, 2000). The issue of citizenship for the Bedoun was raised recently in relation to legislation being passed in 2016 to prepare for 4,000 new citizenship grants. These are regular parliamentary grants, but they require fresh legislation to enact the grants each time, and this process tends to lead to national discussion about how many Bedoun will receive citizenship as a result (al Anezi, 1989). Although a variety of parliamentarians claim the law will be passed to grant the Bedoun citizenship, this has rarely happened. In an unusually frank revelation during discussion time, MP Yousef Zalzalah and MP Saleh Ashour reflected on the failure of past
promises and legislation enacted by the National Assembly, reported by Izzak (May 17, 2016):

MP Yousef Al-Zalzalah slammed the government’s treatment of bedoons, saying some of them can’t get married, get an education or get the least of their basic rights. ‘This is a form of oppression and there are people who are deliberately oppressing bedoons,’ he said. ‘Bedoons must be allowed to live a dignified life.’ (Izzak, May 17, 2016)

The current law will not resolve the problem of bedoons, adding that those who think that the current government will resolve the issue are “dreaming”. He said that in the past, dozens of similar laws were passed but failed to resolve the problem, “because we need the government to believe in resolving the problem”. (MP Saleh Ashour in Izzak, May 17, 2016)

That these national debates occur at all should be regarded as some indication of the Bedoun’s integration in Kuwaiti society and the importance that their citizenship holds for some parties. But moreover, the information forms an important historical record that illustrates the local perception of the group as ‘Kuwaitis,’ and not as ‘other nationals,’ emphasising the confounding social and political position of the group: while no other ethnic group in Kuwait has been as violently targeted for so long as the Bedoun, nor has any other non-Kuwaiti citizen ethnic group been so integrated in the life of the nation.
Appendix B, Part iv
National Census and Other Bedoun Identity Documents

These documents have not been reproduced due to security concerns, but are available to the examiners on request.
Appendix B, v
The Constitution of Kuwait (1922/1962), Article 25 (military servicemen)
The Constitution of Kuwait 1962

Article 25
The State shall guarantee the solidarity of Society in bearing burdens arising from catastrophes and public calamities and shall guarantee compensation to those sustaining damages by reason of war or in the performance of their military duties.

Source: The Constitute Project
Appendix B, vi

The Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait

The following translation of the Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait is from an unofficial translation at Refworld, the United Nations online reference library. Note that Articles 4 and 5 concern ‘service to the state,’ a concept which is referred to elsewhere in the text of these Appendices in relation to Bedoun public servants and their families having qualified for the conditions required to be granted citizenship.

Article 1

Original Kuwaiti nationals are those persons who were settled in Kuwait prior to 1920 and who maintained their normal residence there until the date of the publication of this Law. Ancestral residence shall be deemed complementary to the period of residence of descendants.

A person is deemed to have maintained his normal residence in Kuwait even if he resides in a foreign country if he has the intention of returning to Kuwait.

Article 2

Any person born in, or outside, Kuwait whose father is a Kuwaiti national shall be a Kuwaiti national himself.

Article 3

Kuwaiti nationality is acquired by any person born in Kuwait whose parents are unknown. A foundling is deemed to have been born in Kuwait unless the contrary is proved.

Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior to any person [upon his attaining his majority who was] born in, or outside, Kuwait to a Kuwaiti mother whose father is unknown or whose kinship to his father has not been legally established. The Minister of the Interior may afford to such children, being minors, the same treatment as that afforded to Kuwaiti nationals until they reach their majority.

Article 4

Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior to any person of full age satisfying the following conditions:

1. That he has lawfully resided in Kuwait for at least 20 consecutive years or for at least 15 consecutive years if he is an Arab belonging to an Arab country. The requirement of consecutive residence shall not be affected if the applicant leaves Kuwait on official business. If he leaves for a reason other than that of official business, but retains the intention of returning, the period spent abroad shall be deducted from the total period of his residence in Kuwait;
2. That he has lawful means of earning his living, is of good character and has not been convicted of an honour-related crime or of an honesty-related crime;
3. That he has knowledge of the Arabic language;
4. That he possesses qualifications or renders services needed in Kuwait;
5. That he be an original Muslim by birth, or that he has converted to Islam according to the prescribed rules and procedures and that a period of at least 5 years has passed since he embraced Islam before the grant of naturalization. Nationality thus acquired is *ipso facto* lost and the Decree of naturalization rendered void *ab initio* if the naturalized person expressly renounces Islam or if he behaves in such a manner as clearly indicates his intention to abandon Islam. In any such case, the nationality of any dependant of the apostate who had acquired it upon the naturalization of the apostate is also rendered void.

A Committee of Kuwaiti nationals, appointed by the Minister of the Interior, shall select from those who apply for naturalization, the applicants whom it recommends for naturalization in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

The number of persons who may be naturalized in any one year in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be decided by an Act.

**Article 5**
Notwithstanding the provisions of the immediately preceding Article, the following may be granted Kuwaiti nationality by Decree, upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior:
1. Any person who has rendered valuable services to Kuwait;
2. Any person [upon his attaining his majority who was] born to a Kuwaiti mother and who has maintained his residence [in Kuwait] until reaching the age of majority and whose foreign father has irrevocably divorced his mother or has died. The Minister of the Interior may afford to such children, being minors, the same treatment as that afforded to Kuwaiti nationals in all respects until they reach the age of majority;
3. An Arab belonging to an Arab country provided that he had resided in Kuwait since before 1945 and has maintained his residence there until the promulgation of the Decree providing for his naturalization;
4. A non-Arab provided that he had resided in Kuwait since before 1930 and has maintained his residence there until the promulgation of the Decree providing for his naturalization. Ancestral residence shall be deemed complementary to the period of residence of descendants for the purposes of the application of the third and fourth paragraphs of this Article, provided that the descendant was born in and is residing in Kuwait. Proof of residence shall be effected according to the procedure prescribed by Article 21 of this Law.
The number of persons who may be naturalized in any one year in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article shall be decided by an Act. The grant of Kuwaiti nationality in virtue of the provisions of this Article shall be further subject to the conditions laid down in paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the Article immediately preceding.

**Article 6**
A person who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of any of Articles 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of this Law shall not have the right to vote in any Parliamentary election within 30 years following the date of his naturalization. The provisions of this Article shall apply to any who have already acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of naturalization prior to the enactment of this amendment. The 30 year period shall be deemed to start to run in the case of such persons from July 6, 1966.

A person to whom this Article applies shall not have the right to stand as a candidate for or to be appointed to membership of any Parliamentary body.

**Article 7**
The [foreign] wife of a foreigner who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality shall not ipso facto be considered to be a Kuwaiti national unless she declares her wish so to be considered within one year following the date of her husband's naturalization. The children, being minors, of a foreigner who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality, shall, ipso facto, themselves be considered to be Kuwaiti nationals. They shall have the right to decide whether to retain their nationality of origin within a year of their attaining the age of majority.

**Article 8**
Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior to a foreign woman who marries a Kuwaiti national provided that she declares her wish to acquire Kuwaiti nationality and that the marriage shall have lasted for at least 15 years from the date of her declaration. All or part of the above requirement as to time may be waived upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. In the event of such woman's marriage being terminated by divorce or the death of her husband, and if a child had been or is born to her by her husband, Kuwaiti nationality may be granted to her by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior, provided that she maintains her lawful and normal residence in Kuwait until the end of such 15 year period.

**Article 9**
A foreign woman who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of either of the two articles immediately preceding shall not lose it upon the termination of the marriage
unless she thereupon re-acquires her nationality of origin or acquires another nationality.

**Article 10**

A Kuwaiti woman who marries a foreigner shall not lose her Kuwaiti nationality unless she acquires the nationality of her husband at her own request.

**Article 11**

A Kuwaiti national shall lose his Kuwaiti nationality if he becomes voluntarily naturalized according to the law of another State. His wife, being a Kuwaiti national, shall not lose her Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of her husband’s naturalization unless she voluntarily acquires the nationality of her husband. His children, being minors, shall also lose their Kuwaiti nationality if they themselves acquire *ipso facto* the nationality of the State according to the law of which their father has become naturalized if that law so provides. Such children shall reacquire Kuwaiti nationality upon their informing the Minister of the Interior within two years following their attaining the age of majority of their wish to do so.

A Kuwaiti national who has lost his Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of this Article may reacquire his Kuwaiti nationality by Resolution of the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior, provided that he has lawfully resided in Kuwait for not less than one year and provided further that he applies for such reacquisition and has renounced his foreign nationality. He shall resume his Kuwaiti nationality upon the acceptance of his application by the Council of Ministers.

**Article 11 part** [note: the part number was not stated in this translation]

A foreigner who may acquire Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of any of Articles 4, 5, 7 or 8 of this Law shall renounce any other nationality he may have within three months following the date of his naturalization according to the law of Kuwait and shall provide evidence of his having done so to the Minister of the Interior. In the event of his failure to do so, his naturalization shall *ipso facto* be revoked and deemed void *ab initio*. Kuwaiti nationality shall be revoked by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. Kuwaiti nationality which may have been acquired by any dependant of any such person shall also be revoked.

**Article 12**

A Kuwaiti woman who has lost her Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of either of the two Articles immediately preceding may reacquire her Kuwaiti nationality by Resolution of the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior, provided that she has renounced her foreign nationality and that she has maintained her normal residence in Kuwait or has returned to reside in Kuwait. She
shall resume her Kuwaiti nationality from the date of the Resolution of the Council of Ministers.

**Article 13**
The nationality of a Kuwaiti national naturalized by virtue of any of Articles 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 may be revoked by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior in the following cases:

1. Where naturalization has been acquired by virtue of fraud or on the basis of a false declaration. Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such person may also be revoked;
2. Where, within 15 years of the grant of naturalization, a person is convicted of any honour related crime or honesty-related crime. In such case, the nationality of the convicted person alone may be revoked;
3. Where, within 10 years of the grant of naturalization, a person is dismissed from public office on disciplinary grounds for reasons relating to honour or honesty;
4. Where the competent authorities have evidence that a naturalized person has disseminated opinions which may tend seriously to undermine the economic or social structure of the State or that he is a member of a political association of a foreign State. Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such person may also be revoked.

**Article 14**
A Kuwaiti national may be deprived of his Kuwaiti nationality by Decree upon the recommendation of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security, in the following cases:

1. Where a person has entered the military service of a foreign State and has remained in such service notwithstanding an instruction from the Government of Kuwait that he leave such service;
2. Where a person has worked for a foreign State which is at war with Kuwait or with which diplomatic relations have been suspended;
3. Where a person is normally resident abroad and lie has become a member of an association whose objects include objects which may tend seriously to undermine the social or economic structure of Kuwait or where he has been convicted of an offence involving breach of his allegiance to Kuwait. In such cases, only the person concerned may be deprived of his nationality.

**Article 15**
Kuwaiti nationality may, by Decree issued on the submission of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security, be restored at any time to a person from
whom it was withdrawn or who was deprived of it in accordance with the provisions of the Articles preceding.

**Article 16**
The acquisition, withdrawal, deprivation or re-acquisition of Kuwaiti nationality shall be of no retrospective effect, unless express provision to the contrary is made [by the relevant Decree or other instrument].

**Article 17**
The age of majority referred to in any provision of this Law shall be in accordance with the general provision at any time in force of Kuwaiti law.

**Article 18**
All declarations, notifications of choice and option, application forms and all other forms and procedures referred to in this Law shall, where effected in Kuwait, be addressed to the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security. Where effected outside Kuwait, they shall be presented to the Consular bodies authorised to attend to them.

**Article 19**
The Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security shall issue to every Kuwaiti national a certificate of Kuwaiti nationality after investigation has been made to establish his right to such nationality in accordance with the provisions of this Law.

**Article 20**
In every case, the burden of proof shall rest upon one who claims Kuwaiti nationality.

**Article 21**
Kuwaiti nationality as provided for by the provisions of this Law may be proved by way of an investigation carried out by Nationality Committees established by Decree upon the recommendation of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security. Such Committees may accept documentary evidence as constituting proof of Kuwaiti nationality. The Committees may also admit evidence submitted by witnesses considered to be trustworthy, and be guided by matters of common repute and any other circumstantial evidence as they may consider to be sufficient to substantiate a claim to nationality.

The Committees shall report to a Supreme Committee to be established by Decree upon the recommendation of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security. No determination of a Committee shall be valid until it shall have been affirmed by the Supreme Committee.

Membership of all such Committees and rules of procedure to be adopted by them shall be regulated by Decree upon the recommendation of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security.
Article 21 part A
A nationality certificate may be withdrawn if it appears to have been obtained by virtue of fraud or on the basis of a false declaration or on the basis of false evidence submitted by a witness. Such withdrawal shall be effected by Resolution of the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such person may also be revoked.

Article 21 part B
Any person who has made, whether orally or in writing, incorrect statements to the administrative authorities responsible for verification of Kuwaiti nationality or to the Committees established for that purpose, with the object of seeking to prove his own Kuwaiti nationality or that of another, or with the object of seeking to facilitate the acquisition of Kuwaiti nationality according to the provisions of this Law and who is not proved to have made reasonable effort to determine the truth of his statements, shall be liable to either or both of a term of imprisonment not exceeding three years and to a fine of not more than 200 Kuwaiti Dinars.

If such person has furnished statements knowing them to be false, he shall be liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years and to an additional fine of up to 500 Kuwaiti Dinars.

Article 22
For a period of 2 years from the date of entry into force of this Law, no Kuwaiti passports will be issued save to those who have established their Kuwaiti nationality in accordance with the provisions of this Law.

Article 23
All passports issued before the date of entry into force of this Law and all passports issued during the period of 2 years thereafter as provided by Article 22, to any who does not carry a certificate of Kuwaiti nationality as provided for by Article 19, shall cease to be valid on the expiration of that two-year period.

Article 24
This Law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall enter into force as from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.

All Orders for its due implementation shall be issued by the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security.

Note The text above is an unofficial translation which incorporates all changes/amendments form Decree Law No. 40/1987, Decree No. 1/1982, Decree Law No. 100/1980 and Statute no. 30/1970. For a discussion on the frequent amendments to the Nationality Law of Kuwait (1959), see al Anezi (1989). This version was accessed
at UNHCRs *Refworld* online reference library
(http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ef1c.html).
Appendix C
Discursive omissions, objectification, dehumanisation

Analysis of government sources
i. Other names used to describe the Bedoun
ii. Al Waqayan’s (2009) stages of criminalisation of the Bedoun
iii. ‘Other nationality’ typing (2010-2014)
iv. Colour typing of the Bedoun population by the Central Apparatus (2012-2014)
v. Identity cards issued to Bedoun by the Ministry of Interior, pre-2012 and post-2012

Analysis of academic sources
vi. Key themes in academic and public discourses concerning the Bedouin and Bedoun
vii. Thematic analysis summaries
viii. A visual organiser illustrating the themes arising from academic and public discourse on the Bedouin and Bedoun
Appendix C, i

Other Names Used to Describe the Bedoun

Table C1 below illustrates other names used to describe the Bedoun, aside from *Bedouin*, Bedoun, *Kuwaiti* and other traditional or anthropological references to the Bedouin of Kuwait.
Table C1

*Other Names Used to Describe the Bedoun*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Origin of the terms and references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 9      | Without nationality
Bidoun
Jinsiyya | 1992 | Beaugrand (2014b) stated this form was derived from the previous use of ‘desert dwellers’ *badiat al Kuwayt*, but the connection is unclear. Bedoun individuals in this study disagreed with this interpretation. The name ‘without’ was connected to the Bedoun not being given their ‘papers’ (i.e., documents proving citizenship), which coincides with historical facts (Chapter 6). Rather, the term appears to have been introduced by Western academics from 1992 (see Chapter 2). The Kuwaiti academics I have studied in this research, did not use the term at that time. For example, al Anezi (1989, p.255) referred to the Bedoun as stateless Bedouins, while al Moosa (1976, p.158) referred to the Bedoun as Bedouins who had not yet received citizenship, actually distinguishing them from stateless people. The term signified the expulsion of the Bedoun listed as ‘Kuwaitis’ in the National Census, and the beginning of criminalising definitions used by scholars. Sources: Beaugrand, 2014b, p.737; Crystal (1992, p.75; 1995, p.182); Human Rights Watch (1991a, p.50; 1995). |
| 10     | Non-Kuwaiti, non-Kuwaiti national
Ghayr Kuwayt | From the 1980s, likely first official usage from August 1984 (Al Anezi, 1989, p.263, in Alhajeri, 2004, p.86). The name was officially adopted in a Council of Ministers Resolution 1983 that prohibited the use of the term ‘Bedoun’ on official documents. Al Anezi (1989) stated the resolution was not published, but the policy was evident in its usage by senior officials in the Kuwaiti newspapers *al Anbaa* and *al Rai* (p.263, n132). The adoption of this term by government marked the beginning of transformation of Bedoun identity to ‘unknown’ illegal migrants and re-organisation of the group with criminal restrictions, ending their regulation by the state as citizens. (2, 3) Used in the 1980s: the term was believed to have been the commencement of the policy change on the stateless Bedoun seen in 1985-1986 (Human Rights Watch, 1995, Beaugrand, 2011b; Beaugrand, 2014, p.737). In this thesis, I argue that the policy change commenced in the 1970s, indicated by al Moosa’s (1976) study. Therefore, I adopt al Anezi’s (1989) viewpoint on the use of this term. See Chapter 6. |
(4) In 1992 the population was moved from ‘Kuwait’ to ‘Non-Kuwaiti, other Arab’ on the national census (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). The population became ‘non-Kuwaiti’ due to the actions of government which allocated to different nationalities through the ‘status adjustment’ program (see population typing and labelling in Appendix C, iii and iv, and Appendix E, parts v and vi).

(5) Decree 409/2011 allowed the use of the term as an alternative to a previous policy of forcing stateless people to claim their ‘original nationality’ is a non-Kuwaiti one and to name it for use on official documentation (Kuwait Government Response, 2011, p.7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Term Description</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Unidentified nationality</td>
<td>Approximately 1990s</td>
<td>Refers only to government use of the term and not any popular use. A term use prior to invasion by Iraq (Alhajeri, 2014, p.18) but note that historically, stateless Bedouin were simply known as ‘Bedouin,’ because no Kuwaiti had Kuwaiti citizenship until the1960s. I could not find any other reference to this term in English language sources. I believe it is a similar translation from the Arabic to the two terms below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Undetermined nationality</td>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Apparently this term was used prior to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. See Human Rights Watch (1991a, p.51, 2000); Beaugrand (2010, p.185).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Unknown identity</td>
<td>After 1991</td>
<td>A post-war Iraq invasion term introduced when the group were intensively criminalised, although the date does not seem to be known. See Beaugrand (2010, p.19) and Alhajeri (p.18, 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Unknown citizenship</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>The government of Kuwait defined the term Bedoun (Arabic for ‘without’) as ‘persons of unknown citizenship’ in communications with the international humanitarian community (Human Rights Watch, Refugees International and Amnesty International) in the Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Illegal residents</td>
<td>1974 (1)</td>
<td>There are a number of sources stated by previous authors, noting that al Moosa (1976) appears to be more accurate than interpretations following his study, which have not accounted for historical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1987 (4) 1993 developments in Bedouin society in Kuwait.

(1) The terminology is similar that used by the Committee for Illegal Dwellings (1986) from 1974, as the Committee oversaw the shanty Bedouin ‘problem’ by al Moosa (1976, p.66). Scope for claiming the ‘illegality’ as well as the statelessness of Kuwait’s Bedouin was explored in the Committee’s study.

(2) Based on the Study of the country’s problem of the category of the ‘stateless’ (December 29, 1986, in ‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003), the Bedouin became ‘illegal residents’ in 1986-1987. The document itself was a description of a policy of administrative expulsion (see Appendix E, ii, for a copy of the newspaper article that released the document, in Arabic). It was a forerunner policy document describing the outcome of the repeal of article the Immigration Law 17, article 25(h), below. This policy showed the method by which the Bedouin population would be switched from stateless Bedouin to the term ‘illegal residents’ in both policy and practice. See BedoonRights.org, ‘Full Translation,’ October 12, 2012

(3) In 1987, the Law 17/1959, the Immigration Law (Aliens Residence Law) was amended. Article 25(h) was repealed in Ministerial Resolution 649, according to Longva (1997, p.72, n7, and Beaugrand, 2010, p.128).

(4) 1993 the Central Committee to Resolve the Status of Illegal Residents was established by Decree 221/1993, October 19 1993. Government admitted to the term being in use from 1993 in Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.3), aligned with the establishment of the committee. Beaugrand (2014b) also seems to have been in agreement with this interpretation (contrarily to the citation above at (3)). She believed that the term came into use after the liberation of Kuwait, ‘when the state started to handle their case through a specific administrative authority’ (p.737). However, the Bedouin were subject to such an authority since the beginning of Kuwait’s independence (see Appendix D, ii.

17 Illegal migrants 1986

Beaugrand (2010, p.19, 80; 2014, p.744) stated this is the term used by the Executive Committee for Illegal Migrant’s Affairs, but Human Rights Watch (2000) translation referred to ‘illegal residents.’ The discrepancy seems to regard the not illegal status but the transition of the terms for migrants – that is, the actions of the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program, recording the Bedouin under other national
identities.


18 Iraqi, Syrian, Saudi Arabian, Jordanian or according to alternative fake passports: Eritrean, Dominican, Comorian and others 1986 onwards

Government policy related to ‘illegal resident status’ claims that the stateless population are actually individuals with ‘original nationality’ officially held in other states. On this basis, the Bedoun were forced to ‘admit,’ ‘reveal,’ and/or ‘accept’ other nationalities being listed as their identity, on official identity documents and government documents, particularly in order to receive documents such as birth, marriage and death certificates. This policy implemented up to 2011 and was supposed to be halted under Decree 409/2011. The labelling of the Bedoun with other nationalities appears to remain the normative practice, based on reports the Decree 409/2011 reforms including use of the term ‘non-Kuwait’ are not being implemented. See Reply of Government of Kuwait to the Human Rights Committee (17 October – 4 November, 2011); Kuwait Government Response to to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.7); WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514 (November 26, 2006).

19 Stateless (3)

Used by al Moosa (1976), who claimed there was a very small group of stateless residents in the Bedouin desert settlements, plus a large number of Bedouin who had not yet been granted citizenship (Al Moosa, 1976 p.158, 188). The Bedoun are also contextualised as a stateless group in Human Rights Watch (1991, p.5) and Alhajeri (2014, p.18).

‘Stateless’ is a legal status in international law, designating lack of nationality: Article 1 of the 1954 Convention on Stateless Persons defines the stateless individual as ‘one who is not considered a national by any state under the operation of the law.’

Note: Source information is provided in each section. I have listed the number of terms used to refer to the Bedoun in the column on the left. The numbers continue from Table B2, The collective names of the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) of Kuwait, which concerned the traditional and self-ascribed names.

In Table C1 above, the numbers in the left hand column continue from Appendix B (Collective names of the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) of Kuwait). I have done this to illustrate the continuity of evolution of names that the Bedoun referred to themselves according to traditional custom, by the state and others. The evolution of names demonstrates a trend to deny the Bedoun identity and their legal status and to portray them as a people ‘unknown’ (unknown identity). I have explained in this thesis (Chapter 2, 6) that
this notion was untrue, but it formed an important part of the mono-ethnic, nationalist ideology that attempted to justify the eradication of the Bedoun.

After the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Bedoun entered a phase of criminalisation and subjection to false claims that the group held citizenship in other states. This phase was elaborated by academics (Crystal, 1995; Ghabra, 1997b; Longva, 1997), promoting the ideology internationally. Al Waqayan (2009) discussed three evolutionary phases of the experience of the Bedoun collective, saw through the ideology and analysed it as predominantly criminalizing. I aligned the different names featured in this Appendix and Appendix B according to his model (see Appendix H, below). The term ‘unidentified bodies’ was used by Kenneth Roth (Director of Human Rights Watch) to refer to murdered Bedouns during the ethnic cleansing of the group (Roth, June 11, 1991), perhaps indicating the expediency of the terms ‘unidentified’ and ‘unknown’ to refer to the Bedoun. Roth’s writing published separately to Human Rights Watch had been censored to delete discussion of the Bedoun.
Appendix C, ii

Al Waqayan’s (2009) Theory of Criminalisation of the Bedoun

Al Waqayan (2009) theorized three evolutionary phases of the experience of the Bedoun collective, including recognition of the Bedoun as Kuwaitis, rejection including denial and indictment, marking the criminalisation of identity, expulsion and statelessness.

Table C2

Terms for the Bedoun Analysed Using Theory of al Waqayan (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of Recognition</th>
<th>Stage of Rejection</th>
<th>Stage of Indictment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognition as Kuwaitis until further notice to</td>
<td>Rejection of the collective and denial of rights and nihilistic terms which</td>
<td>Indictment such as charged with possession of foreign nationalities, stripped of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entitled to all rights except the right to nationality</td>
<td>denied the state was aware of the group's origins and/or legal status</td>
<td>all rights, forced to produce 'original documents'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Native and Kuwaiti</th>
<th>Without nationality</th>
<th>Non-Kuwaiti</th>
<th>Unidentified, unknown</th>
<th>Illegal</th>
<th>Other nationality labels</th>
<th>International Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sons of the desert (1), Dwellers of the desert (2), nomadic Kuwaiti Bedouins (3), settled Kuwaiti Bedouins (4), Semi-desert (5) or desert people of Kuwait (6)</td>
<td>Bedoun (7), Bedouin Jinsiyya (8)</td>
<td>Non-Kuwaiti national s (9), non-Kuwaiti (10)</td>
<td>Unidentified nationality (11), non-specific nationality (12), undetermined nationality, (13) unknown identity (14)</td>
<td>Illegal residents (15), illegal migrants (16)</td>
<td>Iraqi, Syrian, Saudi Arabian, Jordanian (17)</td>
<td>Stateless (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labelling combined with programs for purchase of fake passports with no effective nationality.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table C2 above, aligned the range of different traditional names and names used by government and others for the Bedoun that were listed in Appendices B, ii and C, i with al Waqayan’s (2009) three developmental stages in Stateless in Kuwait: The Crisis and Consequences (Journal of Asseyasah Addawliah, No.175, January, 2009) (translated by
Mohammed al Anezi of London). In the second stage, the stage or rejection, the government of Kuwait began to deny that the Bedoun were stateless and to deny the concept of statelessness in international law, actually existed. This stance remains the official policy today (see Appendices E, iii, and iv).

Beaugrand (2010) interviewed al Waqayan, noting he was an insider at the Majilis al Ummah (Kuwait’s parliament), where he had unique access to government’s strategy toward the Bedoun. He was the second Kuwaiti scholar to discuss the ‘status adjustment’ program after al Anezi (1989), and offered some sense of the scope of the program, applied to thousands of Bedoun public service employees. Al Waqayan (2009) was also the first scholar to examine the Bedoun issue from a cultural perspective. This aspect of his work is discussed in Chapter 8. The scholar is highly respected by community leaders and intellectuals in the Bedoun community.
Appendix C, iii

‘Other Nationality’ Identity Typing (2010-2014)

This section is derived from a thematic analysis of documents concerning the administration of the Bedoun population, and the system imposed to change their identity, from 2010. Two major themes emerged:

1. The use of ‘other nationality’ labelling to change the Bedoun’s identity (1983-), linked to previous committees and ‘studies’ of the Bedoun (1965-)
2. Colour-typing of the Bedoun population into different levels of criminalisation (2012-), linked to the ‘other nationality’ labelling (above), the issue of ‘security restrictions’ (1992-) and preparation for mass deportation (1986-)

Both of these themes comprise key elements of the Ministry of Interior’s ‘status adjustment’ program, managed by the Central Apparatus (a division of the Ministry of Interior).

The first theme was associated with the claim by government that the Bedoun had citizenship in other Arab states, which was known to be a false claim that forms part of an ideology of eradication featured in scholarly work of the early 1990s (see literature review, Chapter 2). This data is set out in this Appendix. The second theme referred to the typing of the Bedoun population according to four colours. The public introduction of the internal colour typing system in 2012 marked the public promotion of the typing system (‘8,000 Bedoons,’ 2012), along with the promotion targets ‘met’ in the ‘status adjustment’ program. The data from this second theme, is set out in Appendix C, iv (below).

The typing of the population was reflected in the Supreme Planning Council (2010) study of the Bedoun (Appendix E, ii). The study was conducted as part of a series of ‘studies’ of the Bedoun than ensued for decades, as part of a culture of surveillance developed within the Municipality of Kuwait, the Central Statistics Office and the Ministry of the Interior since the 1960s. I then compared the data to statistics released in 2014 (Table C4), which showed the implausible nature of the workings of the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program, in particular claims the Bedoun hold citizenship in other countries to justify their ‘status adjustment’ to an ‘original’ nationality. There appears to be a substantial population loss of Bedoun with ‘Iraqi’ between 2010 and discrepancies in statistics on ‘Syrian’ nationalities between 2014 and 2015, in statistics released by the Apparatus in Appendix G, iv, below. This aspect warrants further attention, but I take full responsibility for any errors in the calculations, which are mine.

Bedoun research participants squarely challenge the notion of the ‘Saudi Arabian’ Bedoun, inviting outsiders to apply a ‘common sense’ test. They ask what Saudi Arabian citizen in their right mind, would reside in Kuwait for any time for the purpose of obtaining
Kuwaiti citizenship via the processes of the Central Apparatus, when they already hold Saudi Arabian citizenship and live in relative luxury over the border in their own country, in their own house, with their own family? Furthermore, it is well known in Kuwait that Saudi Arabian citizens have been historically, granted dual citizenship from Kuwait without any need to pretend to be Bedoun, which is a second reason why a Saudi Arabian citizen would not bother to pretend to be Bedoun. The argument seems to be quite a logical one. The development of the so-called Comoros Plan has led to one Kuwaiti MP pointing out that the very suggestion of such a plan virtually proves that the notion asserted by government since the 1980s, that the Bedoun have another nationality, has always been fictitious (I discussed governments’ awareness the Bedoun were stateless when they first arrived in Kuwait, in Chapter 2).
Typing of the Bedoun Population by the Supreme Planning Council (2010)

Table C3

*The Supreme Planning Council Study, November 2010*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number affected</th>
<th>Status/nationality label</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>Registered in 1965 census</td>
<td>Eligible for naturalization [implying: to be naturalized] (See notes below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>Already ‘Iraqi Citizens’</td>
<td>Have 3 years to correct status before legal action may be taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>Other ‘known origins’</td>
<td>Have 3 years to correct status before legal action may be taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>Total number of stateless people registered with various government authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: S*ources include ‘34 Thousand Candidates for Naturalization from 106 Thousand,’ *al-Qabas*, November 5, 2010 (accessed November 14, 2010) in Human Rights Watch (2011, p.21) (I was unable to access the URL provided by Human Rights Watch).

The first group of 34,000 shown in the table above, who were registered in the national census of 1965, were also identified in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994) and 2000 (Human Rights Watch, 2000, 2001) as eligible to be granted citizenship according to the Nationality Law (1959). They were members of the northern tribes in state security services, including the national guard, military (Ministry of Defence) and police services (Ministry of Interior) (Alhajeri, 2004). The group was estimated at approximately the same size in different government announcements through to 2016. It appears unlikely statistics published about the size of Bedoun population sub-groups were ever updated (a span of 24 years), since the data has been repeatedly re-released without reference to past releases. Note that there are no Saudi Arabian ‘other nationals’ in the population. In the data shown in Table C4, a massive jump in figures is shown, where over 58,000 Saudi Arabian ‘nationals’ are claimed by the Central Apparatus.

**Comparison of ‘Other National’ Labelling of the Stateless Bedoun (2010-2014)**

In Table C4 below, I compare figures issued by the Supreme Planning Council (2010 in Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.21) and Colonel Mohammed al Wuhaib of the
Central Apparatus (Nacheva, April 6, 2014). Note that al Wuhaib referred to figures dating back to 1986, but the Supreme Planning Council also studied the ‘illegal’ population, which was deemed illegal in 1986 (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003) and therefore, it is fairly safe to assume the population counts commenced from the same point. Note that the 2014 figures appear to match the current population numbers, even though the ‘other nationality’ of individuals was supposed to have been identified since 1986. That is, there appears to be no historical fluctuation for the total population growth. Rather, it appears that the ‘other nationalities’ are not discovered historically as claimed by the government, but rather, applied to current population figures.
### Table C4

**Bedoun ‘Other Nationality’ Origins According to the Ministry of Interior (2010 and 2014)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status/nationality label</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Kuwaiti’ Bedoun who qualify as citizens</td>
<td>34,000 Registered in 1965 census, eligible for naturalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi nationality</td>
<td>42,000 Already ‘Iraqi Citizens’</td>
<td>11,958 Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabian nationality</td>
<td>58,770 Saudi Arabia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities, usually other Arab states not of the Arabian Gulf</td>
<td>26,000 Other ‘known origins’</td>
<td>7,879 Syria + 1,856 Iran + 520 Jordan + 6,296 ‘others’ = 16, 551 others of known origins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undetermined nationality</td>
<td>4,000 Unknown</td>
<td>Unstated by the source. Approx. 24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(calculated by author: 111,000 total population - 87,279 ‘known’ origins = 23,721 ‘unknown’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>106,000 total population (registered with various government authorities)</td>
<td>111,000 total population (approximately – claimed by same source)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Sources for the data under 2010 include: ‘34 Thousand Candidates for Naturalization from 106 Thousand,’ *al-Qabas*, November 5, 2010 (accessed November 14, 2010) in Human Rights Watch (2011, p.21) (I was unable to access the URL provided by Human Rights Watch) Sources for the data under 2014 include: Nationality origins according to 2014 data announced by Colonel al Wuhaib, Manager of the Nationality Department of the Central Apparatus (Nacheva, April 6, 2014).*
Appendix C, iv

**Colour Typing of the Bedoun by the Central Apparatus (2012-2014)**

This section is derived from a thematic analysis of documents concerning the administration of the Bedoun population, and the system imposed to change their identity, from 2010. The nature of the analysis was introduced and the first theme arising from it, was discussed in Appendix C, iii, above. The second theme referred to the typing of the Bedoun population according to four colours. The public introduction of the internal colour typing system in 2012 marked the public promotion of the typing system (‘8,000 Bedoons,’ 2012), along with the promotion targets ‘met’ in the ‘status adjustment’ program. The data from this second theme, is set out in this Appendix.

The Bedoun were issued with green, plastic identification cards issued prior to 2012. The new system added to the existing stratifications of the population according to four types: green, yellow, blue and red. The colour types had already been used by government bureaucrats to classify individuals security files internally. The issue of the new cards in 2012 marked the public promotion of the typing system (‘8,000 Bedoons,’ 2012), along with the promotion targets ‘met’ in the ‘status adjustment’ program: the number of individuals pressured by the Central Apparatus to relinquish their identity each month or every few months, reported as a cumulative total since 2011 (‘6051 Illegal Residents,’ 2014; ‘6,860 Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘7,828 Illegal Residents,’ 2016). The colour types reflected a more public, goal-oriented approach to the criminalisation of the Bedoun linked to particular country labels (false ‘nationalities’ of the Bedoun).

The approach signified a new phase of implementation of restrictions on the Bedoun, following the Arab Spring. Previously, the obscurity of nations with which the Bedoun were associated, such as the Dominican Republic and Liberia (see Appendix E, part v) made the system somewhat easier to detect. The narrowing of labelling to only Middle East states appeared to be a streamlining ‘improvement’ to the system, which has/had the potential to make mass population shifts on the National Census more difficult to detect. The adoption of public goals by the Apparatus seemed to be motivated by the Apparatus’ need to ‘remedy’ the Bedoun problem through ‘study’ by the end of 2015, and to improve the credibility of its processes. However, the nature of media releases indicated that authorities had used their new, public voice in the media to intimidate the population (Major General Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah has played a key role in this effort).

However, as conditions deteriorated in Kuwait after the Arab Spring, Kuwaiti MPs began to call out the ‘status adjustment’ labelling as a fake apparatus, having nothing to do with the Bedoun’s ‘other nationality,’ while doing nothing to solve the Bedoun’s condition.
of statelessness. Some MPs have come very close to acknowledging the program is a system of erasure/administrative ethnic cleansing, continually used to oppress the Bedoun. For example, MP Faisal al Duwaisan in ‘Government to Offer,’ 2014 and MP Hassan Jawhar in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014 spoke out about the system, which was associated with the banning of Bedoun children from commencing school in September, 2014.

Three colour categories attached to different timelines for deportation (the yellow, blue and red types) except those designated to ‘green,’ who were identified as having met all requirements for citizenship according to the Nationality Law (1959) (‘8000 Bedoon,’ 2012; ‘Judicial Recourse,’ 2012). The recognition of this important sub-group could be traced back to 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994); this particular category was then criminalised en masse (see Appendix D, part iv). The new system involved an intensification of pressures on the Bedoun to ‘adjust status’ by relinquishing their citizenship claims and submitting to being labelled with a false (fraudulent) identity (see Appendix G, iv). This data reveals important internal targets and outcomes of the ‘status adjustment’ program of erasure. I compare Apparatus statistics on its ‘status adjustment’ program below, illustrating gross changes in the number of recorded Bedoun accused of being Iraqi and Saudi Arabian citizens. I discuss the results of my thematic analysis of the Central Apparatus (2012-2014) in Appendix G, iv below.

Table C5

‘New’ Identity Categories Typing the Stateless Bedoun into Four Groups, Central Apparatus (March 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Card Type</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Outstanding case issues</th>
<th>Citizenship: disqualifying condition</th>
<th>Other issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Maybe provided</td>
<td>Pending further study</td>
<td>‘Security offences’ approx. 21,000 issued between 2012-2014</td>
<td>Established residency prior to 1965 &amp; all other conditions required for citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>May become eligible with further documentation</td>
<td>Must provide further documents; documents undefined</td>
<td>May meet all conditions for naturalisation… ‘Verification’ process undefined</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>Not eligible</td>
<td>Fraudulent passport</td>
<td></td>
<td>Government coerced military to buy fraudulent passports and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Red Not eligible Other Arab, criminal, security risk Residency proof only from 1980; proof of residency up to 32 years; maybe longer


In the thematic analysis of documents, I analysed each colour type according to its function stated by government sources at the time of initial announcement (from approximately the beginning of 2012) and thereafter (through to approximately the end of 2014) in order to analyse the system as a whole. The findings indicated that the card system was based on a complex set of meanings that appeared to significantly fluctuate over just two years. I traced changes to the meanings of the cards based on official announcements and published sources from the Central Apparatus, such that a pattern of movement of meanings was detectable, whereby the meanings of the categories were merged and switched. These movements indicated the system was circular, closed, subject to an internal logic. All identity types were fluid to the extent that they fulfilled essentially the same functions: criminalisation, denial of citizenship and functional components of the programmed erasure of identity of the Bedoun. A key area of focus is the double-speak surrounding the requirement of the Bedoun to obtain fraudulent identity documents to ‘adjust status,’ that which the Apparatus claims are both illegal acts of a criminal nature (‘8,000 Bedouns,’ 2012; ‘Judicial Recourse,’ 2012), and legal acts that re required to make one’s status ‘legal’ (‘Hope for non-census,’ 2014).

For example, from 2012-2014, government announcements indicated that the yellow identity type took on characteristics of the red identity type (‘8,000 Bedouns,’ 2012) and the green identity type (‘Hope for non-census,’ 2014). I discuss these changes further in Appendix G, iv.


The major area of government activity appears to have been regarding the green identity category, reducing the number of individuals eligible to receive citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959) and The Constitution of Kuwait (1922/1962) via criminalisation (Appendix D, iv). This action can be linked to the suppression of the Bedoun’s freedom of expression and public gathering since the Arab Spring and the issuance of punitive, ‘secret’ ‘security restrictions,’ which removes the groups right to citizenship claims in Kuwaiti law.
The shifting of numbers of the Bedoun was shown in the gradually disappearance of the category of 34,000 Bedoun registered in the 1965 National Census, from 2010 to 2014 in Table C4 (in the data reported by the Apparatus in Nacheva, April 6, 2014) and the 21,000 ‘security restrictions’ issued in Table C5 above (under the column headed Citizenship: disqualifying condition). The disappearance of the category of those eligible to receive citizenship under Kuwaiti law confirmed that the purpose of the strategy of applying 21,000 ‘security offences’ to this group between 2012 and 2014, rendering them ‘criminals’ was to rationalise why the group of Bedoun who had long qualified for citizenship ‘officially' should never receive it (‘80,000 Bedoons,’ April 5, 2016).

The individuals in the group as I have mentioned, were identified as having qualified for citizenship in 1992 (Stanton Russell and Ramadhan, 1994). They were consistently promised citizenship from at least 1992 (twenty years), but between 2012 and 2014, around 21,000 of the group were issued ‘security offences,’ reducing the overall number of Bedoun who were regarded as ‘eligible’ for citizenship by the Central Apparatus, to just 15,000. By 2016, the group was included in generalised statements about the acceptance of the Government of the Comoros of ‘all’ the Bedoun population (the whole ethnic group) as citizens (Izzak, May 17, 2016). That is, the new plan for wholesale erasure of the Bedoun, as opposed to the previous strategy of splitting the group and attempting to allocate separate, false national identities connected to other (non-Arabian Gulf) Arab countries, appears to be applied to all Bedoun. That is, the group ‘eligible’ for citizenship were to be brought under the same pressures of the Comoros Plan, indicating government’s intention to force that group also, to undergo erasure and identity replacement (the allocation of a false identity). I have discussed the history of this group and their basis of having qualified for citizenship decades ago, in Appendix D, iv, as one of multiple methods of Bedoun population reduction used by the state.

The Purpose of the New Colour Typing Identification System of 2012

The perception of the identification system described by government and key civil society actors is shown below. The data includes statements from representatives of the Central Apparatus, the Kuwait Lawyer’s Society and Mona Kareem at BidoonRights.org, which represented the opinions stateless Bedoun population at the time the data was published.
### Table C6

Comparative Perceptions of the Bedoun Colour Typing Identification System
Introduced by the Central Apparatus (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government of Kuwait</th>
<th>Kuwait Lawyers Society</th>
<th>BidoonRights.org</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To preserve a civilised image of commitment to human rights. ‘Human rights’ were delivered in eleven reforms in Decree 409/2011</td>
<td>Majority will be distanced from attaining citizenship</td>
<td>An additional system of stratification of types (on top of the one already imposed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate delivery of government services</td>
<td>No provision of citizenship for those deemed eligible to receive it</td>
<td>An illusion that some are more deserving than others (based on arbitrary criteria).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Enjoyed’ services, ‘privileges,’ ‘rights,’ ‘benefits,’ ‘facilities,’ ‘package of measures’</td>
<td>No sign commitments already made to grant citizenship would be ever fulfilled.</td>
<td>The system weakens social solidarity (by dividing people into categories and types).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report to Central Apparatus or immigration to submit documents to change identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table C6 above contrasted the perspectives of three different sources about the new Bedoun identity typing scheme introduced in 2012. The perspective helped to unlock key concepts used by the government of Kuwait, regarding the system of erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing) carried out via methods of population typing and organisation into different categories of identity change associated with different levels of prohibitions/access to basic public services. Each colour type was associated with different levels of criminality associated with each type, which represented the stage at which individuals were placed along the process of ‘status adjustment’ – that is, transition to identity change to another nationality label and erasure of Kuwaiti, Bedouin ethnic and Kuwait national identity (shown across the proliferation of labelling types, illustrated in previous tables in Appendix C, Tables C1-C5).
The key concept from the government’s perspective was that the notion that ‘human rights’ was connected to the erasure of the Bedoun’s identity (national and ethnic). According to the Central Apparatus sources, Human ‘rights’ delivered in Decree 409/2011 were rewards for submitting a fraudulent passport to the Central Apparatus. Hence, the linkage between Arab Spring human rights reforms were shown not to be genuine and authentic, but yet another strategy to mislead the Bedoun population and the international community about the true nature of the ethnic cleansing ‘status adjustment’ program. This connection appears to have been misunderstood or omitted by authors to date, including human rights organisations, due to the complicated nature of the system. However, government statements issued in local news articles and KUNA (the government’s news agency) actually make the connection patently clear, while the different perceptions by local actors (government, Kuwaiti lawyers and a Bedoun representative) have helped to deconstruct these concepts and increase our ability to understand the system. Therefore, the inability of human rights organisations (particularly the UNHCR statelessness unit) and scholars who have worked on Kuwaiti society to date, to grasp the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun population under the new system since 2012, must be questioned.

From 2012, the new identity types resulted in ‘different benefits’ being issued based on the ‘type’ their identity type the Bedoun were allocated under (Nacheva, April 6, 2014), although the exact nature of different levels of rights given to the Bedoun was (and still remains) unclear. The ‘status adjustment’ program involved declaring another nationality, but ‘more rights’ are given after the fraudulent passport is submitted, according to a Central Apparatus source in Nacheva (April 6, 2014). This latter statement indicated the importance of face-to-face psychological pressure tactics used by the Central Apparatus (described as ‘transactions’ in WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable, November 26, 2006; ‘Color ID Cards,’ 2012) to forced individuals into signing an initial document declaring they have another identity in return for access to public services, which they are then expected to ‘prove’ by obtaining and submitting fraudulent passport or other types of identification documents stating they are a citizen of another country (Nacheva, April 6, 2014). The identity documents to adjust status could be submitted at either the Central Apparatus office in Ardiya or the immigration department in the governate of Mubarak al Kabeer (Saleh, February 9, 2014).

The assertion by the Kuwait Lawyers’ Society that government commitments to grant the Bedoun citizens would never be fulfilled under the new scheme was later proven to be correct. For the history of government commitments to grant citizenship to the Bedoun, see Appendix D, ii. Evidence of this fact soon came to hand in the so-called annual citizenship list grants issued by parliament. Four thousand ‘foreigners’ - individuals who
already held citizenship in other countries - were granted citizenship in 2013. Not one Bedoun was granted citizenship (‘Kuwait Plans,’ 2013). This occurred after the law was only passed in parliament by MPs on the basis of arguments that the law was specifically for the purpose of granting the Bedoun citizenship (‘Kuwait Plans,’ 2013; ‘Rights group,’ 2013).

The notion of a five-year period of access to various rewards by government (‘services,’ ‘benefits’ and so on) has been a strategy discussed by government since 1983 (al Anezi, 1989). It is an old strategy, and one that has merely set out to provide basic access to public services, in response to pressure from humanitarian activists who have asserted that Kuwait must provide access to basic public services according to international law. But this strategy of holding out only five years’ access to such services has never been matched with actual access for the whole population. The five-year period of access to public services was conditional and arbitrary by the government’s own account: there were no safeguards built into the system to ensure its effective implementation or that access would be provided for the actual five years. The possibly that the five year period would be extended was even more remote, since all that the population could rely on was the ‘promise’ by government, never fulfilled (Amnesty International, 2013b; Human Rights Watch, 2014). Such promises are well known to the community; they tend not to be fulfilled, just as promises to grant citizenship to them are not fulfilled.

The commentary issued by the Kuwait Lawyers’ Society (‘Judicial Recourse,’ 2012) and BedoonRights.org (‘From Discriminating,’ 2012; ‘Kuwait’s Cabinet’ 2012, para. 2) (by Mona Kareem and her research team) demonstrated insider perspectives held by those who see through the ideology of Bedoun identity erasure and eradication. The five-year period of ‘services,’ ‘benefits,’ ‘privileges’ and ‘incentives’ (access to basic public services) has also been extended in the ‘Comoros Plan’ (‘Government to Offer,’ 2014; ‘MPs Conflicted, 2016). The rewards for submitting to identity change under the Comoros government ‘economic citizenship’ offer (‘Government to Offer,’ 2014) are almost guaranteed to be as meaningless as the Decree 409/2011 ‘human rights’ reforms (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011; Reply of Government of Kuwait to the Human Rights Committee, 17 October – 4 November, 2011), because government has refused or been incapable of providing basic public services to all Bedoun (Amnesty International, 2013b; Human Rights Watch, 2014) that the government claimed were human rights ‘enjoyed’ by the Bedoun population (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). Kareem also highlighted the fact that the new identity system further splintered the group bureaucratically and socially, in order to weaken it (‘Kuwait’s Cabinet,’ 2012).

The hierarchical nature of the system of typing identifies micro-target groups, that is, it prioritizes who should be erased/eradicated first. As I have discussed in Chapter 7 and Appendix G, The Arab Spring-Comoros years – 2011-2016) have been characterised by the
targeting of those who were eligible to receive citizenship according to the Nationality Law (1959) and the Constitution of Kuwait (families of military servicemen), via the reduction of numbers ‘eligible’ in the green identity category (see Appendix D, part iv). They have also been targeted for over attempts to exercise freedom of expression, public gathering. Those in the green identity category in particular, have been labelled as ‘activists.’ They are punished in response to virtually any form of public intellectual activity that involves expressions of their collective identity or culture, which is generalised as ‘activism.’ The ‘security restriction’ is essentially an acceleration of the erasure process, which renders them Bedoun Bedoun (see discussion in Chapter 7).

The program according to the government’s own accounts, happens to prepare the group for physical ethnic cleansing by relocation (to the Comoros) or genocide (physical eradication by killing or physical transfer to danger zones, such as Syria or Iraqi theatres of war). The strategies of eradication used during the Iraq war must be born in mind when the ideology of eradication of the Bedoun (vis a vis the stateless Bedoun do not exist: there is no such concept as statelessness), and the administrative strategies used to achieve it (‘status adjustment’ has been in place since 1983, see Appendix E), have remained stable for some twenty-five years. The similarity between the statements of intent to remove the group to a desert camp and the Abdali border camp, and the strategies of deporting the group incrementally by dumping them in war zones (previously Iraq) without water, food or any arrangement with the ‘receiving’ nation, add to the likelihood that already a range of previously practiced (and successful) methods of destroying the Bedoun population are likely to be used again in the future. Any risk assessment of the impact of the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program system of typing and ‘conversion’ to other nationalities must take these factors into account. The historical data and cultural patterns present in Kuwaiti society and the government bureaucracy (including the subjective data of key actors) should be incorporated into any serious study of the Bedoun population, for it is only by incorporating these different sets of data that the full picture of the harm currently being done to the Bedoun population and their future risk can be fully understood.
Appendix C, v

Identity Cards Issued to the Bedoun by the Ministry of Interior, Pre-2012 and Post-2012

The identity cards shown below (Image C1 to C4) have been modified by computer and re-photographed to protect the card recipients.

Image C1

*Photograph of an identification card issued 2012, from the front*

![Identification Card Image](image1)

Image C2

*Photograph of an identification card issued from 2012, from the back*

![Identification Card Image](image2)

*Note:* On the back of the card in Image 9.2 above, the statement at the bottom states that the card cannot be used as an identification card. The card is part of the new identity typing system. The recipient was classified as the yellow type and was required to report to the Central Apparatus every twelve weeks to ‘renew’ his card. The requirement was stated on the card.
Note On the back of the card in Image 9.4 above the statement in red asserts that the card cannot be used as an identification card.

Many of the Bedoun research participants pointed out that the statement is indicative of the ideology of erasure, in that the government of Kuwait is loathe to issue any form of legitimate identification whatsoever to the Bedoun population that would confirm their actual existence. The statement on the back of the identity cards was perceived as an expression of the resentment of the authorities of the state, to their existence. The nihilistic sentiment was aligned with statements issued by government that there is no stateless population in Kuwait, that the Bedoun are not stateless, and that there is no such concept (in international law) as statelessness (see Appendices E, iii, iv).
Appendix C, vi

Key Themes in Academic and Public Discourse Concerning the Bedouin and Bedoun

What led to the resurgence of the hadhar-bada dichotomy in Kuwaiti popular discourse in the 1980s and 1990s? (Longva, 2006, p.182)

1980: Rejection of Bedoun evidence for citizenship
1983: Identity erasure, the ‘status adjustment’ program, begins
1985: Kuwaitization policy introduced
1985: Committee for the Study of Illegal Residents (Bedoun only) takes over from Shanty Clearance Higher Committee (Bedouin citizens and stateless Bedoun)
1986: Administrative expulsion of the Bedoun
1986: Measures preventing Bedoun from founding families
1992: Bedoun prohibited from mass naturalisation on ethnic grounds
1992: Bedoun expelled on the National Census
1990-1995: Ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun

This thematic analysis of discourse about the Bedouin and Bedoun of Kuwait was organised under three meta-themes: Contemporary colonialism and tribalism theory, ‘developmental’ approaches and ‘new’ theory - eradication dialogues. The analysis was conducted on scholarly discourse and a limited number of additional news articles that helped to illustrate the major themes pursued in the academic literature. The purpose was to explore the predominant themes that arise in the literature regarding the Bedouin ethnic group and the Bedoun sub-ethnic group, which was referred to Chapter 6, the discussion. Detailed analysis tables are provided in the following section, Appendix C, vii. A visual organiser illustrating the breadth and depth of the analysis is also included in the final section, in Appendix C, viii. This Appendix illustrates the role of the Bedoun in Bedouin-Hadar ethnic conflict in Kuwait.

This area of literature about the Bedoun has developed almost entirely separate from the large corpus of human rights reports about the group, although dialogues criminalizing the Bedoun published by Western scholars in the 1990s appear to have been a direct response by scholars, to the human rights atrocities committed against the group immediate after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait after their invasion of the country. This analysis helps to illustrate the discursive forms of ethnic hatred directed toward the Bedoun in the light of the previous violence the group has been subjected to by the state. The examples analysed appeared to have been produced largely at the level of the intelligentsia for consumption by non-Bedouin, literate populations as ideology. For example, much of the local material produced by pro-Hadar academics was promoted as potential national policy; other material is put forward as positivistic statements of fact, not only regarding
colonialist misrepresentations of identity, but also the themes suggesting or justifying physical and/or cultural eradication.

Thus, it also forms supplementary information to the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun experienced in ordinary, everyday social interactions discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, as it provides an important link between the prejudices of the populace and the policy of the government Apparatus. According to Znaniecki’s (1952a) theory of cultural and ideological systems, is the likely the main source of ideology used to construct and manage the system of imposed, restrictive cultural re-organization (M. Secombe, personal communications, January 22, 2016), of the Bedoun. Below, I highlight the range and development of ideas that indeed, point to the salience of this theory.

Contemporary Colonialism and Tribalism Theory

The meta-theme of contemporary colonialism and tribalism theory was related to three themes, negative and selective omissions of the Bedoun from scholarly work specifically examining the Bedoun, or Kuwaiti society, myths and ‘othering’ of the Bedoun particularly related to criminalisation and the ideology of the ‘other national,’ blaming the Bedoun and Bedouin for their marginalisation and lack of urban ‘development,’ stigmatisation and political weakness, and the portrayal of the Bedouin as an inferior race and/or culture. Longva’s (1997) claim that the Bedoun were ‘not be confused with the Bedouin’ (p72, n6) was misleading because the Bedoun were and are Bedouin, and Longva (1997) was aware of this. Curiously, this note was seized upon by future writers and it has been repeated by countless commentators on Kuwaiti affairs ever since, demonstrated by Google search. Subsequently, scholars have developed this line approach further, to the extent that the Bedouin origins of the Bedoun discussed by Human Rights Watch (1995) once often quoted, has begun to be omitted altogether (for example, Peterson, 2012, p.23; Alissa, 2013, n61, p.4 and Beaugrand, 2014b, p.744, n4). Thus, while Beaugrand (2010) previously portrayed the Bedouin as invisible, the researcher has now made them ethnically and culturally invisible in her own texts (2014b), concealing her knowledge about their Bedouin ethnicity with the label, ‘stateless Arabs.’

Criminalisation of the Bedoun was very common, if not the uniform approach taken by scholars in the social sciences the 1990s following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Through the denial of the groups’ ethnicity and heritage, along with criminalisation, scholars of Kuwait area studies of the 1990s made it very difficult for future scholars to explore the real identity of the Bedoun. While these efforts reflected the detailed theoretical explorations of the Bedouin that had been conducted by scholars of Hadar (Kuwaiti and other Middle Eastern backgrounds), they did not acknowledge them, perhaps due to the probability new scholars would discover the extent of Hadar ethnic hatred of the Bedouin in some quarters. Thus, the ‘othering’ of the Bedoun, utilizing the notion of the Bedoun as
‘foreign migrant national’ and citizen of other Arab states, has underscored the same themes and values projected onto the Bedouin as are directed toward the Bedouin, with criminality providing the rationale as to why new researchers in the field should not believe the Bedouin’s claims of identity. Kuwaiti scholars imported colonialist ideas about Arabs (such direct attribution of ideas to Patai (1976, p.128 in Alessa, 1981, p.2) couched in developmental dialogues indicating the influence of developmental thinkers such as Learner (1958). For broader influence of such theories on ideas about the Bedouin of the Middle East in other parts of the region, see Chapters 3 and 7 of this thesis which outlines the impact of the ideas on ‘tribalism’ theory, and further elaborates on the themes found in this analysis, respectively. Not all Orientalist or Oriental modes of thought should be reduced to Patai (1976) but rather, I have discussed his work as he and Stoakes were cited by Alessa (1981, p.2, 109). It is likely that other thinkers also provided inspiration.

Hence, ‘othering’ of the Bedouin was constructed by the authors in these dialogues. The symbolic shadow cast over all Arabs by Patai (1976) was selectively pushed back onto ‘the native’ Bedouin (Patai, 1976, is famous for presenting one of the most depraved views of the Bedouin, but his theory was projected onto all Arabs). In this context, the Hadar scholarly elite seemed to view themselves less as Arabs than as a mixed race, no longer Bedouin for the purpose of arguing the Bedouin were uncivilised. ‘Arab’ was used as a derogatory label when referring to ‘the nomad,’ who was sometimes also referred to as indigenous to the Middle East, or to Kuwait specifically. Thus, term ‘Arab’ becoming an ambivalent term, plucked out according, it appeared, to convenience. Then at other times, it was also used to emphasise the diverse origins of the Hadar collective internationally, that is, to refer to other Arab nationals of the Middle East living in Kuwait and outside Kuwait, who were by their collective descent, more special and capable than the Arab nomad (sometimes by the same authors, virtually contradicting themselves; see Alessa, 1981 and al Khalaf and al Hammoud, 1987 for example).

Such thinkers then attempted to use the term to ethnically distance the Kuwaiti Hadar from the Kuwaiti Bedouin, as if lack of specificity or the mixing of terms was enough to create a ‘screen’ of uncertainty of the connection between the two groups. Some academics may find this approach quite implausible due to the degrees of Bedouin ancestry among the Hadar, and difficult to believe such a problem could become so entrenched. I suggest that this occurred due to the lack of Middle East Studies academic willingness to critically interrogate their colleagues ideas, beyond the polarising discourse of the ‘right vs left’ camps. This aspect emphasises the seeking of a separate identity by Hadar intellectuals. There was never any consideration, as far as I am aware, that any Hadar might still retain remnants of ‘tribal consciousness’ (al Naqeeb, 1990). Similarly (according to my own
knowledge), discussions of who is a ‘true’ or ‘real’ Kuwaiti in Kuwait, are uniformly projected by the Hadar onto the Bedouin, and not the other way around.

As I discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the ideology of identity negation and ethnic targeting asserting the Bedouin were criminal imposters pretending to be stateless, commenced in Western literature with Crystal (1992) and continued for many years through multiple authors until Shultziner and Tétrault (2012, p.283, 284). The authors claimed the Bedouin were still ‘pretending’ to be Bedouin, despite decades of dedicated reports on the group (utilizing fieldwork data) by international humanitarian organisations such as Human Rights Watch (1991, 1995, 2000, 2004, 2011). There reports challenged the notion of the Bedouin imposter was simply a fallacy and ideological in nature, but scholars in the social sciences all but ignored the empirical evidence put forward by these organisations. Scholars in international law did not; on the contrary, they have accepted it without question, even though such information is not collected in ways that are supposed to reflect the rigour of academic fieldwork studies. Academic writing I have researched over the four years has featured no concrete evidence whatsoever to support scholars’ claims the Bedouin were not stateless Bedouin whose first nation of permanent settlement was Kuwait, but rather, a maze of clever, interconnected arguments have been used to make the Bedouin appear to be imposters and criminals, and the use of colonialist and developmental ideas seems to have been exploited as much as possible, to make such ideas appear to be ‘scientific’ (these findings are somewhat similar to Bocco, 2006, who found the same tendency among Hadar scholars in other parts of the Middle East. He openly argues the case of prejudice of such scholars toward the Bedouin.).

Through the construction of tribalism theory, the seeds for ethnic hatred of the Bedouin may have been laid by European and American colonialists thinkers (Bocco, 2006), but the sentiments were most definitely compounded into a more extreme form by the Hadar, who used their social dominance to exert influence over the fate of the Bedouin in the region (Bocco, 2006). Virtually the same phenomena occurred in Kuwait. Local scholars inculcated the Bedouin in the same ethnic conflict as Bedouin citizens of Kuwait, along virtually identical lines. Themes of blaming the Bedouin for their apparent lack of assimilation into urban society (Ghabra, 1997a, p.62; Tétrault, 2003, p.223; al Nakib, F., 2014, p.7) have been little more than criticisms by the Hadar that the Bedouin are innately different to the Hadar and especially, do not share their ‘origins’ (Ghabra, 1997b). Al Nakib, F. (2014, p.6) stated that the ‘last remaining Bedouin’ had already commenced their transition into urban life, as if Bedouin cultural identity is finite, and in its end-stage.

More importantly, the overall analysis of these studies tends to concur with the findings of Bocco (2006), that researchers merely set about proving their pre-determined assumptions with little regard for evidence that might conflict with their worldview,
claiming to have conducted original ‘scientific’ research. The general uniformity among scholars across multiple countries who worked together for political ends (Bocco, 2006) demonstrated the power of the ‘tribalism’ not among the Bedouin, but by the academic community. Al Naqeeb (1990) is probably the best example of nationalist fanaticism in Kuwait; he was expelled by the ruler. Further information on the connection of developmental theories to Orientalist thought may be found in Lockman (2004) and Turner (1998).

‘Developmental’ Approaches

The ‘developmental’ approach emerged from tribalism theory in my analysis, as a separate meta-theme that portrayed the Bedouin as well as the Bedoun of Kuwait as inferior and having little capacity for development (incapable). Developmental approaches included three especially insidious themes filtered through the social science paradigm, with author emphasis on the ‘science’ of their ideas. This included the ‘psychological development’ approach, the ‘cultural development’ approach, and the ‘resources’ approach. The latter concentrated on rationales and justifications for the deprivation of basic public resources from the whole Bedouin community, as well as from the Bedoun as the weakened, tribal minority group (to this extent, scholars were most attracted to proposing broad national policy on the back of these ‘scientific’ theories).

Where the traditional society was in the process of transformation via the demands of state modernization, particularly the expansion of the national economy and the defence of the state, and ‘technological’ or ‘scientific’ (academic) solutions were sought to rationalise the exploitation and oppression of the Bedouin generally and the Bedoun in particular. Kuwaiti Hadar and other Arab national academics were particularly strong contributors to this area of tribalism theory. As I have argued, their participation in this field of ideas may have reflected the regional trend, but there seems to have been a time-delay before this influence really took hold in scholarship about Kuwaiti society, with its zenith occurring during the 1980s and 1990s (however, it is possible that this is only reflected in the lack of early English language sources, and it may not apply to Arabic language sources of research).

It is through tribalism theory and ‘developmental’ approaches that the ethnic targeting of the Bedouin was revealed as a component of a generalized approach toward the Bedouin of Kuwait taken by scholars (al Khatib, 1978; al Nafisi, 1978; Khalaf and al Hammoud, 1987; Alawadi, 1980; Khalaf, 1992; al Ramadhan, 1995, al Kandiri and al Hadben, 2010). The approach was not developed in isolation within the government of Kuwait, among politicians and/or the so-called merchant elite, the Hadar. That is, the Bedouin in general and the Bedoun in particular were targeted to prevent the spread of mass
education and the development of its own intellectual class, which would be necessary for the development of political thought and nationalist consciousness (Znaniecki, 1952b).

The developmental approach has led in some cases directly, to national policy outcomes linked to mass population transfer and erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing), and the prohibition on expansion of the Kuwaiti public education system in Kuwait in order to permanently deprive the Bedouin of education to stop the growth of ‘tribal consciousness’ (al Moosa, 1976, al Naqeeb, 1990 and Alessa, 1981). Some of these discourses have represented somewhat purist, extreme, nationalist doctrine in their own right, while others focused on the development of more practical eradication policies that were later adopted by government and manifest in the ‘security state’ model and restrictive measures that sought to control and to re-organise the Bedouin culture, discussed throughout these Appendices.

Arab nationalists (of Marxist-socialist and Muslim Brotherhood origins) and Kuwaiti nationalist (so-called liberal, pro-democracy Hadar with mono-ethnic nationalist positions) shared policy platforms that sought to block the Bedouin from being granted any Kuwaiti citizenship at all, since 1965 (al Mdaires, 2010; Stanton Russell, 1989). These policy positions were articulated by intellectual-politicians such as al Khatib (1978) and al Nafisi (1978) through their political interests, which at times shared across party platforms (due to al Nafisi’s’ many changes of political allegiance: al Mdaires, 2010) leading up to the administrative expulsion of the Bedoun (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003).

The closely connected nature of the themes of tribalism theory demonstrated the coherence of the vast system of ideas elaborated by Hadar scholars (Kuwaiti and other Arab nationals alike) about the Bedouin. Bocco (2006) noted that the ‘nomad problem’ was one way for Hadar scholars to remain indispensable and employed. On the one hand, the ‘psychological development’ approach covered all bases, while the ‘cultural development’ approach covered major areas of social life, as if designed by an anthropologist or sociologist: education, work, recreation and cultural practices related to family and community life (marriage, religion and other communal celebrations). The ‘resources’ approach also discussed cultural life, in particular the role of education in the development of political consciousness and materialism – the desire to ‘get the benefits’ of Kuwaiti citizenship that was undeserved (pertaining to the Bedouin) or high-level thinking and skills that would enhance the economy (pertaining to other Arab nationals) among future generations (Alessa, 1981). Ironically, for one of the wealthiest nations in the world, the resources approach targeted the Bedouin as a burden on public expenditure on education, regardless of the return inputs achieved (such as further integration and contribution to the economy, which the Bedouin were already achieving in the 1970s, as a full reading of al Moosa, 1976, indicates). Thus, the Bedouin-Hadar ethnic conflict may be far more closely connected to the failure of Kuwait to develop institutions nurturing civil society and in
particular, urban public infrastructure, than has been appreciated to date. Certainly, it is more likely to be the cause of bad planning and inequitable resource destruction, than the effect of it (as al Nakib, 2014, maintains), because as I have pointed out, the anti-Bedouin ideology was there first, regionally and then locally.

The ‘cultural development’ approach contained some quite militant strands of argument, portraying the Bedouin as a national security threat. As with the identity ideologies, scholarly discourse was intensely rhetorical and almost entirely devoid of concrete examples. I have called these extreme discourses ‘cultural hygiene,’ as they opened the critical space for the introduction of positive and negative eugenics in new eradication discussions (I address this further below). Two sub-themes were highlighted – the concepts of ‘desertization’ portrayed the Bedouin as dangerous due to their ‘tribal activities’ (Ghabra, 1997a, 1997b and others; Tétreault, 2000, 2003 and others), which built on the misrepresentation of social and cultural activities of Bedouin in desert settlements in the 1970s (al Moosa, 1976). The exclusively ‘tribal’ activities were so generic (narrowly defined issues like ‘prayer, time of prayer, style of dress and so on,’ in Ghabra, 1997a, p.62), and the analyses of them so vague and sentimental (‘The process destroys the hope of a nation-state,’ p.62) that the concept of ‘desertization’ was undermined by scholars’ use of flimsy examples. The style of intellectual debate was disarmingly incompetent, and quite frankly, inviting ethnic conflict. Feminist critiques were continued along very much the same lines by Tétreault with Kuwaiti scholar Haya al Mughni (Tétreault and al Mughni, 1995a, 1995b) and others. The Tétreault (2003) brand of feminism was distinctly white, middle-class and neo-conservative, out of place in the Arabian Gulf but for American and British intervention in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Unsurprisingly, neoconservative, interventionist values were revealed in analogies of the violent rape of Kuwaiti citizen women’s potential affluence and independence by the patriarchal power of the Bedouin state (Tétreault and al Mughni, 1995a, p.67, 75-76) and complaints the Bedouin did not support missile purchases from Western countries, which would be stored on Kuwaiti soil (Tétreault, 2003). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Tétreault (2000, 2003) jumped on board Ghabra’s (1997a, 1997b) ‘desertization,’ and attempted to develop it even further.

‘New’ Theory – Dialogues of Eradication

The third meta-theme, ‘new’ theory and dialogues of eradication, featured narratives of Bedouin and/or Bedoun eradication dialogues and omissions of the 1980s -1990s, which featured erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing), expulsion and killing as well as peacetime eradication talk, and omissions of the Bedoun from texts as if the group were already non-existent. A tendency among some academics to theorise the Bedouin as if their cultural existence as a ‘way of life’ is about to end, giving the impression that the end of the people who comprise the ethnic group itself is also imminent, is well-known (Lancaster and
Lancaster and Lancaster, 1988), but this manifests in a range of different expressions, with some emphasising the inevitability (Cole, 2006) or injustice (Aurencche, 1993; Chatty, 2006) that have been wrought upon the Bedouin during this process, and others, the desirability of assimilation into the ‘modern’ world (al Nakib, 2014; Salzman, 2007).

Thus, some discourses lament Bedouin eradication, some simply report it, while others urge it, somewhat akin to the previous use of modernisation theories (the ‘for their own good’ approach). The urban planning or urban history theme is also linked to portrayals of the Bedouin as an inferior race/ethnicity/culture, particularly the portrayal of Bedouin ‘squatters’ and ‘slum-dwellers’ who were actually members of the public service, while al Moosa’s (1976) photographs taken in 1974 patently challenge these interpretations (see Appendix H).

As I have mentioned in the thesis, al Nakib (2014) has questioned why complete ‘assimilation’ of the Kuwaiti Bedouin citizen group has not taken place yet, and she has suggested the term Bedu, which is probably the most comment self-identifier of Bedouins regionally, could not have already been done away with in Kuwait. Any continuation of themes reflective of the trajectory of al Naqeeb (1990) (different spelling of the surname, but a close relative), who exploited tribalism theory to its fullest extent, is problematic to say the least.

As I have discussed throughout this thesis, definitions of the Bedoun have been the most troubling a problem area, because when all the different definitions are accumulated Appendix B, ii and Appendix C, i), it becomes clear that the group is being systematically written out of Kuwait’s history as if there were an intent to extinguish the group from the national consciousness. In other words, while some academics may believe their approach is objective and benign, it is worth considering if it is part of a broader tendency which is part of a collective thought movement that has historically exhibited genocidal intentions (Davidson, 2012), whether this has been conscious or unconscious. The discourse analysis points to the existence of such a phenomenon.

Biological sampling and testing of the Bedouin is now regarded as necessary to secure the state, according to well-known representatives of the Hadar community. Regular calls for blood and DNA testing of the Bedouin only from approximately 2010, in order to ‘prove’ their nationality and if they were ‘deserving’ of citizenship to all Kuwaiti Hadar (‘Insulted Kuwaiti tribesmen’, January 31, 2012) is indicative of the level of much of the one-way, public dialogue expressing ethnic conflict. The claims led government to impose DNA testing on the whole population, ostensibly for ‘security’ reasons after recent the bombing of a city mosque by ISIS, although such calls have now been retracted (since the Hadar were also required to submit blood) to return to the Bedoun-only DNA collection policy which includes, of course, ‘security threats’ and Bedoun parents whom the state
demands, must prove parentage with blood samples, implying an unspoken state policy that all Bedoun are illegitimate unless otherwise proven.

Government policy has been influenced accordingly (‘24,000 Stateless residents, 2014’) and the United Kingdom (Harper, February 23, 2013, ‘Equality (Language Analysis – Palestinian, Syrian and Kuwaiti Testing) Authorisation (No.2) 2013). While dehumanisation discourses humiliating the Bedouin have been common in the public arena for some time in Kuwait, government ‘requirements’ of the Bedouin for citizenship have been linked to grossly dehumanising claims masquerading as genuine cultural data, use to pad ‘scientific’ results of DNA profiling (in Johns et al., 2015, the Kuwait Genome Project). Significantly, analytical flaws formed the basis for the researchers allocating the appalling description to – rather predictably - the northern tribal group). The study was an example of the development of (or regression back to) eugenic beliefs about the ‘purity’ of the Hadar (Longva, 2007) and southern tribes as literally, close to God (by virtue of their imagined ‘origin’ in Mecca) and disturbingly, the attempt to institutionalise their superiority, based on ‘science.’ The description of animal mating to describe contemporary marriage practices, though totally inappropriate, may be regarded as an attempt to symbolise the ‘impure’ tribe juxtaposed against the ‘pure’ one, in the most dehumanising of terms.

Within this meta-theme, I included narratives of ethnic cleansing which comprised the area in which I drew mostly on news articles and humanitarian reports, due to the dearth of scholarly activity surrounding this topic. Nevertheless, it provided important context to the other themes arising from the meta-theme of new theorization of the Bedouns’ eradication. New dialogues about the Bedoun reflect settler-colonialist values among and/or about Kuwait’s elite Hadar, similar to contemporary dialogues about Palestinians in Israel, produced by Israeli and pro-Zionist scholars, encompassing eugenic arguments behind radical nationalism.

These dialogues have reduced the concepts of ethnic targeting, terror, violence and population eradication into little more than discursive symbols, undercutting scholarly analysis of the social reality (Rosenfeld, 2002). Abrahamian’s (2015) narrative on the Comoros Plan for the Bedoun (and other similar schemes) was aggressively marketed in Europe and the United States by Columbia University. The loose, discursive and largely unreferenced narrative framed the latest requirements for the Bedoun to obtain citizenship outlined by the state: having their identity sold to the Comoros Islands. Abrahamian (2015) interpreted this as a contemporary, commercial form of homogenized, ‘global citizenship’ rather than human trafficking and potential mass deportation (reported by Kholoif, August 25, 2014; Rasheedi, January 5, 2015). While the first is rightly ‘commodification’ it also dehumanisation (a feature of genocide, Stanton, 2004). The latter is well-established as a form of ethnic cleansing (Bell-Fialkoff, 1999; Mann, 2005).
Recent scholarly work on the Bedouin and the Bedoun has failed to produce substantial new knowledge about the group or to rigorously analyse existing knowledge, while such authors have persisted in attacking the Kuwaiti Bedouin and the Bedoun with old stereotypes. For example, the Bedouin are becoming increasingly Islamist in the National Assembly in Peterson, 2012, p.23; Bedouin public leaders and intellectuals are: ‘the most virulent populist protestors, like Mussalam al-Barrak,’ in Dazi-Heni, 2015, para. 52; there is no such thing as a ‘settled’ Bedouin because they live in ‘urban’ areas, in Maktabi, 2015, p. 2, n. 2; Gulf states including Kuwait have stateless populations for purely political reasons, citizenship is a method of demographic distribution to achieve ‘population-balance’ (the government’s 1992 phrasing for ethnic cleansing including killings), cleverly reconfigured as a Darwinian theory of natural ‘citizenship’ selection in Okruhlik (2016, p.26).

Okruhlik (2016) rationalised the creation of the Bedoun’s statelessness and the group’s suffering as a natural and necessary process of statehood via a return to Orientalist tropes. If we compare these dialogic twists and turns with the development of definitions for the Bedoun among government and in academic circles, it is difficult not to interpret them as contributing to new attempts to obscure the Bedouin identity and culture, while adding to government justifications. In this respect, we see what Hakeem al Fadhli (Chapter 8. Section 8.4.4) predicted – a new wave of generalised attack on the Bedouin citizenry, which attempts to use the same strategies of identity-stripping discourse that was used previously on the Bedouin. And as with the academic discourse against the Bedoun of the 1990s, once again, researchers are busy reflecting (and arguably endorsing) government policy, rather than asking the people.

This recycling of old themes by individual researchers is a concern, given the extremity of ideas that have emerged in this field. Since the Arab Spring, scholars have glossed the historical antecedents to the Bedouns situation. Rather than the overt criminalisation of the past, government policy was reinforced through implicit silence and policy promotion (dissemination of the ideas as if such policy were entirely acceptable, in the absence of critique). They have largely ignored Bedouns’ threatened cultural annihilation, and similarly ignored the cultural patterning of the treatment of the Bedouin in Kuwait (Alhajeri, 2004), which can be traced back to the ideology of Hadar elitism (al Anezi, 1989) and themes of supremacy described herein, embraced by intellectuals.
Appendix C, Part vii
Thematic analysis summaries

Appendix C, part vii, features three tables that illustrate the themes arising from the following meta-themes:

- Contemporary colonialism and tribalism theory (Table C7)
- ‘Developmental’ approaches (Table C8)
- ‘New’ theory - dialogues of eradication (Table C9)

Note on sources: The analysis was drawn from more than fifty authors, the majority of which were Kuwaiti, and authors who specialise in the field of Middle East studies, concentrating on the Kuwaiti context. The authors are not listed in this Appendix, but the analysis and author list was available to the thesis examiners, and it will be stored for future research in The Bedoun Archive, at the Australian Data Archive at the Australian National University.
Table C7

All Themes Derived from the Meta-Theme, ‘Contemporary Colonialism and Tribalism Theory’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contemporary colonialism and tribalism theory (meta-theme)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negation and selective omission (theme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Negating tribal/ethnic identity and heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The invisible Bedouin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The active/passive Bedouin stereotype</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myths and ‘Othering’ (theme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Othering to produce ‘foreign migrant national’ ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Bedouin ‘pretend’ to be stateless and have a false identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Criminalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaming (theme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cultural difference is the Bedouin’s problem, leading to lack of assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• New ‘theory’ of the Bedouin as a low status tribe, inferior tribal groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inferiority (theme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bedouin as an inferior race</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bedouin as having inferior tribal/cultural characteristics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table C8

**All Themes Derived from the Meta-Theme, ‘Developmental’ Approaches**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>‘Developmental’ approaches (meta-theme)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The ‘psychological development’ approach (theme)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Intellectual and personality characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Bedouin ‘mind’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Bedouin ‘personality,’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Bedouin ‘attitude’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Capacity for productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The lazy, ‘underproductive’ Bedouin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The ignorant, Bedouin ‘illiterates’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The ‘cultural development’ approach (theme)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Misrepresentations of ‘dangerous’ social activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cultural practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recreational practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Educational practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Work practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cultural hygiene – ‘Desertization’ and feminist critiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ‘Desertization’ - urban pollution and the ‘national security threat’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o More ‘dangerous’ tribal activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Religious practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Personal appearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Scholarly, feminist critique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Bedouins with women’s representation are misguided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Bedouins won’t support purchase of weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Bedouins are religious fanatics and terrorist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The (deprivation of) ‘resources’ approach (theme)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deprivation of resources targeting Bedouin in desert settlements and popular housing areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Delay in state education expenditure on the Bedoun at all levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack expenditure on Bedouin children’s education by design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Arguments for the withdrawal of the state education expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Arguments for the withdrawal of resources from civil society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table C9

All themes derived from the meta-theme, ‘New’ theory – eradication dialogues

### ‘New’ theory - eradication dialogues (meta-theme)

**Bedouin/Bedoun eradication dialogues and omissions of the 1980s -1990s (theme)**
- **Erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing), expulsion and killing (sub-theme)**
  - Minimisation, understatement, lack of elaboration
  - Selective omission and redirecting attention away from relevant and/or substantial issues
- **Ethnic cleansing directives (sub-theme)**
  - Instructions to ethnically cleanse issued by government officials in the media
  - Misrepresentation of the Bedouin and Bedoun identity as ‘Iraqi’ citizens
  - Dual stateless targets – the Bedouin and Palestinians as the fifth column collaborators

**Promotion of Bedouin/Bedoun eradication in peacetime (theme)**
- Urban ‘history’, ‘planning, ‘space’ approaches - – the Bedouin as basically incompatible with, and antithesis to, ‘urban’ culture
- Tribal ‘culture’ as tribal primitivism, squatting and slums and ‘chaos’
- Psychological and spiritual ‘disturbance’/destruction - the ‘need’ for the Bedouin to vacate their homes
- Withdrawal of state resources and impoverishment - blaming the Bedouin for physical degradation, filth and refuse
- Bedouin settlements on desert land requiring ‘evacuation’ and ‘eradication’
- Population transfer/eradication/offshoring or encampment of the whole Bedoun population

**Contemporary ‘citizenship’ - requirements of the Bedouin (theme)**

**The Bedouin are not ‘Kuwaiti’ or ‘citizens’ (sub-theme)**
- The Bedouin are not capable of citizenship and democracy
- The Bedouin are disloyal to the state because they are loyal to the tribe and the Emir
- The Bedouin are not ‘real’ or ‘true’ Kuwaitis
- The Bedouin are not ‘original’ Kuwaitis
- The Bedouin are not ‘pure’ Kuwaitis

**Enforcement of ‘true’ citizenship of the Bedouin (sub-theme)**
- Dehumanisation - attack on marriage, founding families and the Bedouin state
- Genetic makeup, sexuality and marriage practices
- Vermin and animals
- Negative eugenics and biosecurity - protecting the Hadar state
  - Biological procedures required to prove real/true/pure Kuwaitiness and nationality
  - DNA
  - Blood
  - Fingerprint
- Language testing in the United Kingdom
### Themes Arising from the Analysis of Academic and Public Discourse, Concerning the Bedouin and Bedoun

Table C10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meta-theme</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Sub-theme</th>
<th>Minor sub-theme</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary colonialism and tribalism theory</td>
<td>Negation and selective omission</td>
<td>Negating tribal/ethnic identity and heritage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Myths and ‘Othering’</td>
<td>Othering to produce</td>
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<td></td>
<td>‘foreign migrant national’ ideology</td>
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<td>Urban ‘history’, ‘planning, ‘space’ and ‘design’ approaches</td>
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<td>The theoretical triad: ‘tribalism,’ ‘Islamism’ and the welfare state</td>
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</table>

<p>| Negative eugenics and biosecurity – protecting the Hadar state | Biological procedures required to prove real/true/pure Kuwaitis |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>s and nationality</th>
<th>DNA</th>
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<td>Blood</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fingerprint s</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Language testing in the United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This table shows the analysis of meta-themes through to minor sub-sub themes, arising from the analysis.*
Appendix D
Population Control and Physical Segregation

i. Population reduction

ii. Government Ministries, committees and other agencies responsible for the examination, control and management of the Kuwaiti Bedouin in general and the Bedoun in particular


iv. Citizen eradication – the reduction of those ‘eligible’ for citizenship
### Table D1

**Population and Citizen Reduction Measures Used Against the Bedoun Implemented (1980-)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of implementation</th>
<th>Type of strategies used and sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Legal conversion of second-degree to first-degree citizenship stopped and delayed a further ten years to total of thirty years, via Law 130/1986. Source: Al Anezi (1989, p.235, 244-245, 297-298).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>The policy of administrative expulsion of the Bedoun from the public service, which caused widespread impoverishment, diminishment of social roles and life purpose, including preventing individuals from forming families or having more children. Sources: Human Rights Watch (1995); ‘The Study’ (2003); al (2009).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The policy of administrative expulsion of the Bedoun and more broadly, Ministry of Interior policy labelling new-born Bedoun children as having other nationalities via the false (fraudulent) nationality labelling on birth certificates, was engineered via the official policy of stating ‘original nationality’ on birth certificates in such a way as to prevent legitimate birth documentation and recording of the population. See discussion below.


Violent ethnic cleansing also called ‘purification,’ including judicial and extra-judicial killings of adults, particularly male military/police servicemen.


Threats of violence (hanging) issued by government impacted Bedoun mothers – pregnant or with new-borns – at Abdali border camp directly, leading to mass deaths of babies linked to the psychological condition of the mothers (1991-1992), although physical conditions at these sites were most arduous (e.g. direct exposure to summer temperatures in excess of 50 degrees) and should also be considered as potential contributors to the cause of death.

Sources: Cushman (June 30, 1991; July 16, 1991); Gasperini (August 20, 1991).

Prohibition on re-entry of Bedoun civilians into Kuwait after Iraq war.


Deletion of names from prisoner of war lists (Iraq) to prevent Bedoun repatriation linked to international efforts to repatriate Kuwaiti POWs.

Sources: (June 30, 1991; July 16, 1991); Gasperini (August 20, 1991).

Implementation of additional restrictions on Bedouin citizen intermarriage with Bedoun, in particular in the Ministry of Planning’s Long-term Plan of 1990-2015, adding to policy restrictions placed on the Bedoun preventing their marriage, in 1986 – see above).

Sources: ‘The Study,’ (August 30, 2003); Stanton Russell and al


1992  Removal of the Bedouin population from the national census as ‘Kuwaiti.’


1992  Exclusion of the Bedouin from international development measures reported to UNESCO, the UNDP and so on, directing funding to citizens only


The Decree established the Executive Committee for Illegal Residents’ Affairs, which was one of a series of committees charged with managing the Bedouin population. However, al Mdaires (2010) also indicated that the decree also demanded that *no official papers of the Bedouin could be accepted without the authorization of the Committee* (p.59).


Note: The source information is provided in each section of the table.

The Role of Royal Decree 58/1996

Al Mdaires (2010) is the only author I located during my research, who discussed this Decree aside from mention in Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011. He implied that Decree 58/1996 strengthened the ability of the Executive Committee for Illegal Residents’ Affairs to reject citizenship applications at its discretion, due to its ability to vet all documents submitted by the Bedouin. This occurred in addition or instead of to the procedures of the Nationality Committees established in the Nationality Law (1959), Article 21, and Decree 5/1960. In other words, it was an over-riding function of the *Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait*. The law gave the Committee the official capacity to reject valid documents that could be used as evidence of valid citizenship claims by refusing to ‘authorize’ such documents (although it seemed that in practice, this had been occurring for decades, for example, Law 100/1980, above). If al Mdaires (2010, p.59) interpretation is
correct, Decree 58/1996 was a second law designed to deprive citizenship of the Bedoun on ethnic grounds. Certainly his approach is consistent with Supreme Planning Council Resolution No.11/1992. Resolution No.11/1992 prohibited the group from being granted citizenship collectively. Decree 58/1996 enabled the Committee to prevent individuals being granted citizenship on an individual basis, even where valid documents were supplied to meet the requirements of the *Nationality Law (1959)*, Kuwait.

**Restrictions on the Founding of Families**

It is beyond the scope of the current study to explore all of the aspects of the administrative expulsion, but these aspects have also tended to be well documented by international humanitarian organisations. However, within the context of population reduction methods as part of the restrictive cultural re-organisation of the Bedoun, it is pertinent to address the manipulation of the Bedoun population’s ability to marry and found families, which was articulated in the administrative expulsion policy document of 1986 (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003).

As I discussed above, policy of administrative expulsion introduced restrictions on Bedoun marriage (which had been in place for 30 years at the time of writing), leading to immense administrative barriers placed to reduce Bedoun marriage to citizen Bedouins and to other Bedouns, leading to the delay of marriage and non-marriage. Al Waqayan (2009) also documented that some out-migration had taken place for the purpose of obtaining legal marriage contracts from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (p.31), due to issues associated with the legal recognition of children, for which legal marriage contracts are required under Kuwaiti law (this is likely because the problem of illegitimate children under Kuwaiti law extends far beyond the immediate concerns of ‘unwed’ parents). Based on reports from Bedoun individuals in interview data, as well as the government of Kuwait itself citing statistics on the issue of marriage certificates (in Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011 and intermittent, Kuwaiti newspaper and international, humanitarian reports), the vast majority of the population appeared to continue to be forced into continuing to resort to traditional/informal marriage practices due to the failure of the Ministry of Justice to issue formal marriage certificates to members of the group. Logical deduction leads to the conclusion that the population’s marriage and birth rates would have declined according to these difficulties and certainly the participants in this research indicated that this issue remained problematic for them and contributed to a desire among many, not to even entertain the possibly of marriage. The very low rate of marriage of the participants, while unlikely to be representative of the whole Bedoun population, reflected the participants’ experience (see the results, Chapter 5, section 5.1.5 marital and birth data, tables 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10). The intention of the official policy to have this effect was articulated in the expulsion document, in the context of a complaint the Bedouin have families with many
children, as well as specific measures to reduce marriage (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). The document unequivocally sought to impose demographic engineering on the Bedouin, to the extent of grossly interfering with and impeding their right to found families. This aim was aside from other restrictions introduced that also contributed to indirect restrictions on the same rights, such as inducing poverty through expelling public servants from the workforce in order to impoverish families, and simultaneously expelling their children from the public education system, so they would never be able to fully participate to their potential in the workforce, ensuring the same families would remain impoverished into future generations.

Moreover, the impact of these measures on personal and cultural identity may be regarded as dehumanising. The expulsion of the Bedouin and the policy labelling newborn Bedouin children as having other nationalities via the false (fraudulent) nationality labelling on birth certificates issued by the Ministry of Health, was part of the official policy of erasure. Thus, ‘status adjustment,’ specifically the policy of stating ‘original nationality’ on birth certificates (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7), not only impaired the state’s function in issuing legitimate birth documentation and recording the national population accurately, it threatened to destroyed the legal and psychological identity and cohesion of families, by recording children as having different nationalities to their parents. The practice was so removed from concrete reality that various siblings were recorded with different nationalities, as well as their parents. Thus, newborn infants were targeted for erasure, along with their parents (as were the dying and deceased, via the failure of the state to issue death certificates, a matter beyond the scope of the present study). It is worth remembering that children were targeted via their enrolment in schools, such that they were also pressured to change nationality if their parents had not enabled this on the birth certificate. They would be threatened with expulsion from schools or prevented from enrolling, if they did not change their national identity according to the ‘status adjustment’ program.

For these reasons, the ‘status adjustment’ program was not limited to calling the Bedouin ‘illegal residents’ and attempting to remove the ethnic and national identity of male heads of household to other nationalities in order to make them appear to be ‘migrants’ who overstayed their work visas (this was largely the approach taken by Beaugrand, 2010 and arguably, government has become more ‘transparent’ about its erasure program since then). It distorted knowledge about the demographic makeup of the country at a fundamental level. In consideration of the downward pressures on population from 1991-2015 in Table D2 (above), the policy of stating one’s ‘original’ nationality on official identity documents has been a highly effective strategy. It targeted the Bedouin at all stages of their lifespan, including birth certificates), childhood (enrolment in schools), transition to adulthood (the
driver’s license), maturity (marriage certificates) and old age (death certificates). Thus, the impact of the erasure may be seen as impacting the overall population decline, particularly in relation to pressures on forming families, in addition to the 1986 administrative expulsion, the 1990-1995 violent ethnic cleansing and killing of the Bedoun and the population typing introduced in 2012, tied to administrative expulsion goals.

Table D2

**Approximate Bedoun Population Data (Pre-1991 to 2015)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Population total</th>
<th>Loss in numbers (approximate)</th>
<th>Loss in percentage (approximate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 1991</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 1995</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>111,000</td>
<td>Loss: 39,000</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Sources include Human Rights Watch (2005); ‘Over 111,000,’ (December 23, 2013).*
Appendix D, ii
Government Ministries, Committees and Other Agencies Responsible for the Examination, Control and Management of the Bedoun

The previous literature concerning the Bedoun has focused almost single-mindedly on the Bedoun’s statelessness and human rights deprivations owing to an apparent policy change around 1986, which marked the administrative expulsion of the group. Beaugrand (2014b) stated that the term ‘illegal residents’ was used to refer to the Bedoun after the liberation of Kuwait, ‘when the state started to handle their case through a specific administrative authority’ (p.737). Beaugrand’s (2014b) has not accounted for the the history of the Bedouns’ settlement in Kuwait as Bedouin tribespeople in the region and the territory of the state. It is beyond the scope of this study to go into all of the arguments for and against the notion that the Bedoun arrived in Kuwait unexpectedly as unwelcome ‘migrants’ looking to exploit the ‘benefits’ of Kuwaiti citizenship, but I have offered new information about this issue from older studies in Chapter 2, that has not been discussed in the context of the Bedoun’s presence in Kuwait, in English, by previous authors or in humanitarian reports. This section focuses on the issue of the Bedoun’s entrapment in the state from as early as 1965 (twenty years earlier than the 1986 expulsion date), though an organised system that sought to control the Bedoun’s population numbers, but equally, the system of tribal culture.

The first departments of government used to ‘monitor’ the Kuwaiti Bedouin settlement programs from 1965 included the Municipality of Kuwait and the Central Statistics Office. Regular ‘investigation’ or ‘study,’ surveillance and monitoring was conducted by Central Statistics Office staff and on the spot identity-checking process involved hundreds of residents at a time (al Moosa, 1976, p.161). Government agents entered individual homes to check documents to ensure the inhabitants were authorised to reside in the camps. Al Moosa (1976, p.161, 306) described secondary processes of registration and identity checks with government; the population had been closely monitored (monthly reporting to municipal offices was required), delimited and managed since 1965, when citizens first complained of Bedouin settlements arising on what had become private land in Kuwait City (al Moosa, 1976, p.161, 306). The group were also registered with government and a range of other agencies from the time of their recruitment by selection committees as public servants, particularly for military and police personnel. Significantly, the Central Statistics Office had found the identity of the majority of the inhabitants of the desert settlements were citizens of Kuwait. After recommendations by al Moosa (1976), they became known as without citizenship, the Bedoun. This aspect of the definitional problems describing the Bedoun was a crucial aspect at the policy level, leading to the administrative expulsion in 1986.
Table D3

**Government Ministries, Committees and Other Agencies Responsible for the Kuwaiti Bedouin (Including the Bedoun) Since 1965**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Implemented</th>
<th>Name of government departments or formal committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Municipality of Kuwait and the Central Statistics Office with the Ministry of Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/1975</td>
<td><strong>Shanty Clearance Higher Committee and the Committee Concerning Illegal Dwellings</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Committee concerning Illegal Dwellings was established in 1975, headed by members of all government ministries; for administrative purposes it was designated under the Council of Ministers (al Moosa, 1976, p.305).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td><strong>Committee for the Study of Illegal Residents, with the Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The committee was chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the Crown Prince of Kuwait, who is today the Emir of Kuwait. Additional information-sharing measures through PACI commenced for the purpose of cross-matching data on the Bedoun in different government departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sources: <em>The Study of the country’s problem of the category of the ‘stateless’</em> (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003); Beaugrand (2010); Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.2, 3); Salem (March 17, 2012). A full printout of the news report in ‘The Study,’ (August 30, 2003) is in Appendix E, ii).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>‘Reconstitution’ of Committee for the Study of Illegal Residents under al Awadi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unnamed Decree, issued by Cabinet (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdul Rahman al Awadi reports on post-war ethnic cleansing - the ‘enemy’ murder count (Bedoun and Palestinians) - to the Prime Minister, citing thousands more than official reports, carried out by the second resistance wave (Mason, 201, p.130). He is appointed to head of Bedoun Committee in 1991 while in the same position, as Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.3) (see Appendix F, i).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Supreme Planning Council (SPC), the Population and Human Resources Committee of the Supreme Planning Council and the Academic Team for Population Policy manage administrative expulsion of population embedded in national migration policy

After the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and prior to the resumption of the National Assembly, the Academic Team for Population Policy played a pivotal role in advising the Prime Minister and the SPC directly via its special powers.


1993

Central Committee to Resolve the Status of Illegal Residents

Established via Cabinet Decree 221/1993, issued on October 19, 1993 to March 26, 1996

Source: Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.3); Beaugrand (2014b, p.737).

1996

Executive Committee for Illegal Residents’ Affairs

Established via Royal Decree 58/1996, March 26, 1996. The decree established individual case files for every member of the population, ostensibly for the resolution of their cases; but actions of the Apparatus indicated this was more likely for surveillance (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006). It also demanded that no official papers of the Bedouin could be accepted without the authorization of the Committee (al Madaires, 2010, p.59). Al Mdaires (2010) implied that the Decree formalized the ability of the Committee to reject valid citizenship applications at its discretion, thereby interfering with the application of Decree 5/1960.

Source: Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.3); al Mdaires (2010, p.59); WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, (November 26, 2006).

2000

Judicial and Administrative Deportation Committee

July 8, 2000


2009

Supreme Council for Planning and Development

Established via Cabinet Decree 906/2009, October 26, 2009 to November 9, 2010

Source: Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.3).

2010

The Central System to Resolve Illegal Residents’ Status
Established via Royal Decree 467/2010, November 9, 2010 to November 6, 2015. The strategies used to ‘remedy’ the ‘illegal residents’ status (‘status adjustment’) were approved in the Cabinet Decree No 1612 of 2010 (Eman al Nasser in ‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015).


Note: See also Appendix H, which shows a photographic record of the areas designated ‘squatter’ areas and ‘slums’ (Al Khatib 1978, in al Zaher, 1990, p.192; al Awadi, 1980; Zhou, 1990) managed by these committees.
Appendix D, iii


Table D4 below, shows the amendment of National Census data, legislated in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.571). There are discrepancies among sources on this matter, which seems quite odd since a bulk population transfer of over 100,000 people should be one of the more concrete events that researchers could pin down. In the absence of detailed explanations, it appears that some sources may have not been as certain or authoritative as they appeared to be.

Human Rights Watch (1995) stated that the Ministry of Planning’s Central Statistics Office recorded the Bedoun population under the total Kuwaiti Citizen population until the 1989, when the group was transferred on the National Census from ‘Kuwaiti’ to the non-Kuwaiti, migrant expatriate population. Human Rights Watch (2000) stated that the policy to de-nationalise the population from ‘Kuwaiti’ to the generic ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ was implemented in 1988. Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan (1994) implied the transfer took place commenced in 1992, backdated to 1985. They showed the data they had collected (Table D4, below). Stanton Russell (1989) was a highly skilled demographer, and had studied Kuwait for some time. Arguably, she pre-empted the transfer. Al Anezi (1989) noted that the program of population transfer commenced with ‘status adjustment’ from 1983, via an unpublished decree.

Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan (1994) explained that in 1992, the Bedoun were transferred from the ‘Kuwaiti’ section of the National Census data and re-allocated to the ‘other Arab’ expatriate section, but recorded without an unspecified nationality (see Appendix C, I for the context of use of this term). The amendments were backdated to 1985. The authors did not refer to the alternative date 1989, as stated by Human Rights Watch (1995). The latter organisation did not clarify whether or not there was a legislative basis to the National Census amendment of 1989 – a decree or resolution – or not. Nevertheless, there were certainly a number of population policy developments leading up to the invasion by Iraq, which were connected to the 1986 administrative expulsion of the Bedoun, that pressured the Ministry of Planning to ‘solve’ the ‘Bedoun problem’ by restricting the population artificially (demographic engineering) (see Appendix F, iii).

Table D4

_Statistical Abstracts Showing the Expulsion of the Total Bedoun Population, Backdated to 1985 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.571)_
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>% Non-Kuwaiti</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>% Non-Kuwaiti</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>% Non-Kuwaiti</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985a</td>
<td>681,288</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>470,473</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>572,376</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>634,306</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Kuwaiti</td>
<td>1,016,013</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,226,828</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,563,300</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>744,641</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabsb</td>
<td>642,814</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>853,629</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>1,011,586</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>355,947</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>355,947</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>554,103</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>17,252</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>17,252</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,697,301</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,697,301</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,135,676</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,378,947</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

bState of Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office (1992), *Annual Statistical Abstract* 1991–92, Table 9, p. 25 and Table 13, p. 27. Based upon revised 1985 census results (Bidoon reclassified as non-Kuwaiti Arabs).
cPublic Authority for Civil Information (PACI), April 1990, *Abstract of Civil Data (Population by Nationalities)*, Table 2, p. 2. Figures for Asians and others from PACI, April 1990, *Abstract of Civil Data (General Count of Population)*, Table 6, p. 16.
dPACI Population and Labor Force Profile, April 1993, Table 1.
eThe 210,815 Bidoon are classified as Kuwaitis in the 1985 Census results and as (non-Kuwait) Arabs in revised 1985, 1990, and 1993 data sources.
Appendix D, iv
Citizen Reduction - the ‘Secret’ Erasure of Those ‘Eligible’ for Citizenship

This Appendix discusses a special group of Bedoun to whom additional commitments to provide citizenship were given by the government of Kuwait shown in Table D5 below, concerning the reduction of the number of Bedoun that government qualified as ‘eligible’ for citizenship). The basis of their being treated as a ‘special’ group by government was their being listed as ‘Kuwaiti’ on the national census in 1965. The group appeared to be singled out in the literature in 1996, by the ‘Academic Team for Population Planning,’ who recommend citizenship be granted to this group, while it simultaneously ensured that the group would not receive that citizenship through the parliamentary process as a whole group, by introducing a prohibition on the Bedouin receiving citizenship en masse. The prohibition was called the Supreme Council Resolution No.11/1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). It was introduced while the Bedoun were being ethnically cleansed, and it was coupled with the strategy of expelling the Bedoun from the national census in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994) (I illustrate this in Appendix F, iii).

It is uncertain as to whether the size of the group to be prevented from receiving a citizenship grant was stated in Resolution No.11, or if the prohibition simply applied to every individual from the stateless Bedouin (Bedoun) population. However, it was clear that the Kuwaiti Bedouin were the only ethnic group targeted with this prohibition (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994), due to the intervention of the Academic Team for Population Policy. The Academic Team was group of intellectuals who had direct access to the Prime Minister and Supreme Planning Council, introduced by the National Council (see Appendix F, iii). No sooner did this group of experts confirm the Bedouns legal right of the group to receive citizenship, it was taken away in a set of prohibitions designed by the same group. This was part of the Academic Teams’ policy design, and was not a plan directly devised by government. Nevertheless, the royal appointment of special committees to develop national policy and report directly to the ruler or his Prime Minister is a basic feature of the structure of governance in Kuwait.

This group appeared again in the 2010 Supreme Council Study published in al Qabas, reprinted in Human Rights Watch, 2011. The group were then described in 2012, when the Central Apparatus began to published a series of announcements and conduct interviews with local newspapers about a new system of coloured identity categories. The group was allocated to the green identity green identity type. It was acknowledged that their families had proven they were in residence in Kuwait prior to the 1965 National Census, but had also tended to be formerly employed in the government services, especially in the military, policy and national guard. Therefore, in the news media they were described as
those deemed to have already qualified for citizenship under the *Nationality Law (1959)*, according to Ministry of Interior assessments. Those regarded as a group who had potentially qualified for citizenship were those allocated to the yellow identity category. According to the Apparatus, they did not have documents proving residency prior to the 1965 National Census, but had rendered services to the state via their previous employment in the government service. This meant that they too were qualified for citizenship (MP Abdullah al Tamimi in ‘Hope for non-census,’ 2014, clarifying a shift in definitional terms used for each identity category, apparently communicated to him by the Minister for the Interior directly).

During this research it became apparent that since the Arab Spring, the size of the particular population of this green identity group was diminishing, amidst irregularities in the reported total population of the sub-group (based on my analysis of government announcements in local news sources). Additionally, the main, official justification for the size of group being reduced in size since the Arab Spring (2011-2012) was discussed in local newspapers. It had occurred on grounds of secret, undisclosed ‘security restrictions,’ issued in response to human rights ‘activism.’ The Central Apparatus frequently issued threats this population group was being radically diminished in the local media between 2012 and 2016. On February 9, 2014 the Apparatus revealed that it had issued the ‘security restriction’ to more than half of this group, cancelling the citizenship eligibility of 21,000 individuals over the previous two years (see Saleh, February 9, 2014, below).
### Table D5

**Reduction of the Number of Bedoun ‘Eligible’ for Citizenship**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of report</th>
<th>Approximate number</th>
<th>The population regarded as having formally qualified for citizenship according to the <em>Nationality Law (1959)</em> Kuwait</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>The number of applications from Bedoun accepted by government as ‘eligible’ for citizenship, according to the Ministry of the Interior. Source: Human Rights Watch (2001).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>A plan was outlined by the Kuwaiti government in 1999, described by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (despite more than three times that number having qualified for citizenship under the Nationality Law, 1959). The remainder would be given permanent residency. Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees in Doebbler (2002, p.543, para. 2 at n120).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>43,231</td>
<td>The number of Bedoun registered in the 1965 census as at January 29, 2007, quoted by the Assistant Undersecretary for Nationality and Passports, Sheikh Ahmad Nawaf. This condition has always been stated as the defining characteristic of the group. Source: Al Waqayan (2009, p. 49).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>34,000 could qualify for citizenship, but noting only 16,000 Bedoun applications were approved in the last 20 years (but were not followed by citizenship grants), according to ‘local reports,’ in ‘Rights Group,’ 2013. Source: ‘Rights group,’ (2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>The number of Bedoun remaining eligible to receive citizenship (in this group) after the application of approximately 21,000 ‘security restrictions’ between 2012 and 2014, quoting un-named, confidential sources, Saleh, 9 February, 2014, para. 2, <em>The Kuwait Times</em>. Source: Saleh (February 9, 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>Those who had been registered in the 1965 census, quoting Major General Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah, Undersecretary of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>The number of Bedoun out of the group of 34,000 above, who had ‘clean files,’ and remained qualified to receive citizenship, according to Major General Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior for Citizenship and Passport Affairs (in The Kuwait Times, November 30, 2015). ‘Clean files’ referred to those individuals that had not received ‘security restrictions.’ Security restrictions are secret, undisclosed offences deemed equivalent to criminal offences, which government regards as cancelling individuals’ ‘eligibility’ for citizenship, where they would otherwise qualify for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959) (‘Magnetic cards,’ 2012; ‘Kuwait Plans,’ 2013; see also Appendix D, iv).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>On May 16 to 17, 2016, news articles reported that Comorian officials had confirmed their government had accepted the agreement proposed by the government of Kuwait, to convert the Bedoun population to Comorian citizenship in Izzak, May 17, 2016). The articles implied the whole population would be re administratively re-allocated to the government of the Islands. Within a few weeks, the Foreign Minister of Kuwait published a clarification that the Comoros Plan was not yet implemented because the legal process had not been completed (‘Kuwait’s FM denies,’ June 20, 2016 in The Kuwait Times). The news release showed signs of Ministry of Interior vetting, by coupling notification of sentencing and incarceration of Bedoun individuals with Comoros Plan policy announcements, which had also occurred in 2014, during the UN Human Rights Councils’ Universal Periodic Review of Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sources are included in each section of the table.
The application of some 21,000 security restrictions to those who had already proven they had met the criteria of the Nationality Law (1959) to receive citizenship, had made the whole community aware that government had absolved itself of its commitment to provide citizenship to this particular sub-group, as a punitive response to ‘activism’ from the Arab Spring. The first international humanitarian organisation to acknowledge the cancellation of citizenship eligibility of this special group via was Amnesty International (2016), which published their concerns in their annual report on February 24, 2016, at least two years after the government of Kuwait began publicizing the strategy. The organization cited that the new strategy was revealed in a memorandum issued by the Central Apparatus to government in August 2015. I had been in contact with the Bedoun community throughout this period and shared their frustration with the lack of recognition of this problem attracted from international humanitarian organisations who were aware of the problem. Some members of the community had told me in February 2014, that they believed that this outcome of writing off those eligible for citizenship would certainly arise eventually, based on their personal knowledge of how and why the security restrictions were being applied to them. This is one of the reasons I attempted to follow developments in the published data on this group – a number of participants in this study had their identity erased by the state over the duration of my research.

The population reduction strategy forms just one of a range of population reduction methods used by the government of Kuwait to attempt remove its obligation to grant those Bedoun who have met the eligibility criteria for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait. The approach is part of the broader ‘status adjustment’ strategy which attempts to eradicate the group from Kuwait through criminalization and identity erasure. Based on the data issued by government to date, is appears to have been planned that numerical data will continue to be issued reducing the group’s size, until it declares that not one single Bedoun individual remains eligible to citizenship. However, many Bedoun in this category ask ‘why?’ this group should be targeted in this way, when they are supposed to be the ‘most deserving’ (the symbolic phrasing used for someone ‘good enough’ to be ‘Kuwaiti,’ commonly used by Kuwaitis and government, in the media), and their descendants had, in fact, already qualified for Kuwaiti citizenship according to the law (see comment by P13, Chapter 8, 8.3.3).

There appear to be two grounds upon which this special group received special recognition of their having qualified for Kuwaiti citizenship. First, they had established they had qualified for citizenship by presenting documents showing they were included in the 1965 census. As I mentioned above, those in the 1965 National Census were very likely present in Kuwait during the initial citizenship application rounds, as citizenship applications in that first round were not completed until the late 1960s. They were likely rejected due to
the formulaic approach used for citizenship distribution, whereby exactly 100% of the Hadar group received citizenship with voting rights, while exactly only half of the total Kuwaiti Bedouin population at that time received citizenship, in the second degree (Human Rights Watch, 1995) (see Chapter 7, sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2). This secondary type of citizenship, also called ‘naturalization,’ denied these citizens from obtaining voting rights for twenty years, which was then extended to thirty years in Law 160/1986: al Anezi, 1989).

Historically, substantial efforts had been made by the Hadar elite to prevent Bedouin citizens receiving full political rights via the award of voting rights, vis a vis the grant of first degree citizenship extended to thirty years. This special group of Bedoun appears to have been first isolated as eligible for citizenship in 1976, as Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior personnel, also known as the state security forces (members of the military, police and formerly the National Guard; see al Fayez, 191984; Alhajeri, 2004; and Appendix B, iii). It is not a great leap of reasoning to surmise that this particular group of Bedoun, having been already assessed as having qualified for citizenship by the Ministry of Interior (obstensibly under Clause 4 of the Nationality Law, 1959, Kuwait, service to the state – the same grounds on which the Bedoun had been recruited to join the forces and permanently settle in the country), may also have been assessed as citizens (by first or second degree) when the first citizenship applications had been processed by the Nationality Committees to 1966 (al Anezi, 1989) (either via their own application, or applications submitted by their fathers/grandfathers applications lodged with authorities) and thus they had already been recorded as participants I the 1965 National Census (al Moosa, 1976, found that desert camp occupants had been living in the camps decades over multiple generations, which makes this possibility seem quite reasonable). In other words, I am suggesting that it is highly likely that both groups are the same. I will explain why below, after providing data on both groups.

Over time, the groups’ numbers have been diminished via variations in public reporting by the Central Apparatus, and via concurrent claims by the Central Apparatus emanating from the Iraqi invasion and later from the Arab Spring, that the group has been issued ‘security restrictions’ which cancel their right to receive citizenship from the state (I discuss this strategy further below). When the government of Kuwait and/or ordinary Kuwaitis refer to those Bedoun who are most ‘deserving’ of citizenship, they are referring to either, those registered in the 1965 National Census, and/or those military and police servicemen original promised citizenship by government.

Families That Participated in the 1965 National Census

This group was identified by the Academic Team for Population Policy as ‘eligible’ for citizenship in 1992, as they had already proven their eligibility under the Nationality Law (1959) due to the lack of deniability of their National Census (1965) documents. The
Academic Team determined that ‘the rest would be given identification and considered non-Kuwaitis’ (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.581). This was a very casual reference to the administrative expulsion and the mechanisms of identity erasure, which were already underway. The group again acknowledged as a special group in 2000 (Human Rights Watch, 2000) and 2010 (the Supreme Planning Council Study, in Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.21). The figure of 43,231 in the group was provided by the Assistant Undersecretary for Nationality and Passports, Sheikh Ahmad Nawaf, January 29, 2007 (al Waqayan, 2009, p.49). Note that the census date is important because it includes the period during which the *Nationality Law (1959)* Kuwait was first implemented, as the first applications for citizenship for all Kuwaitis (including so-called ‘originals’ of the elite, Hadar commercial establishment) were still being processed at this time.

As I mentioned above, the whole Bedoun sub-ethnic group was removed from the ‘Kuwaiti’ column of the National Census in 1992, and re-allocated to the ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ column, backdated to 1985. Their nationality was not specified on the National Census at that time. But this occurred at the same time the Academic Team had defined them as qualifying for citizenship (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.571). Thus, one of the announced measures was ignored, the other implemented, leading to reinforcement of the expulsion strategy for *all* Bedoun. This strategy indicated that although the group had been distinguished as ‘special’ by the Academic Team, that immediately, the categorisation had no bearing on their prospects for citizenship, because other policies were introduced simultaneously that targeted the whole group on the basis of their ethnicity. The whole-group targeting strategy cancelled out any hopes the group would be given citizenship, since the latter policies also applied to them. This general approach does not seem to have changed since, which explains why sometimes scholars, humanitarian organisations, and the Bedoun themselves, become confused by the policy stance and practical actions, that have historically been implemented to deal with the population.

This matter was discussed by al Anezi (1989) and Human Rights Watch (1995) in relation to the national debate over Law 100/1980, leading to a parliamentary inquiry into the targeting of Bedoun through the citizenship applications process. It was found that the Bedouns’ citizenship applications had been entirely ignored or destroyed by the Ministry of Interior and/or the Nationality Committees. The revelations arose during a parliamentary hearing which led to the collapse of parliament within 48 hours, and the immediate implementation extra-constitutional rule in July, 1986. The extra-constitutional period of rule lasted until after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The administrative expulsion of the Bedoun occurred in on 26 December, 1986, some six months later (Proceedings of the National Assembly, July 1, 1986 in Human Rights Watch, 1995, n13).
Henckaerts (1995, p.89) theorized citizenship ‘registration’ used in relation to Law 100/1980 was a ‘citizenship vacuum’ leading to mass expulsion. The researcher mainly drew on Human Rights Watch (1995), citing that the lack of grants of citizenship to those already identified as eligible to receive it, along with the violent expulsion of the Bedoun after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait (1990-1995), was an indicator of the direct impact that (non-protective) nationality laws can have on mass population expulsions, and the need for the development of international standards to be applied to nationality laws (p.99). Henckarts (1995) indicated that the nationality law itself had facilitated the expulsion, by virtue of the ability of the state to delay or indefinitely ignore, due citizenship grants. He believed that there was something inherent in the law that enabled the state to create a perpetually stateless population. In this thesis I have argued that Decree 5/1960 in particular, enabled the Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait to be interpreted in a manner that enabled the grants to be avoided, according to the rules contained therein (Chapter 7).

**Those Families Who Gave Service to the Nation**

A second group identified in the literature as eligible for citizenship comprised members of the northern Bedouin tribes, recruited to Kuwait especially to perform public service for the country: the military, police and national guard (prior to the Iraq war) (al Fayez, 1984; Alhajeri, 2004). This group was promised citizenship upon their recruitment to the public services, having been selected by government authorities for their suitability (as discussed in Chapter 2). They were then formally assured that their citizenship would be forthcoming at least three times (for a list of historical commitments, see Appendix B, iii). The pledge was made to the group’s males heads of household or their ascendants, having served in the military services for Kuwait, in:

- Government pledges in 1976 that were formulated into Law 100/1980
  - Legislation - Law 100/1980

But additionally, aside from public commitments made by government that citizenship would be granted to them, the group also remains eligible for citizenship until this day due their participation in the states’ security services, according to:

- The Nationality Law (1959), Article 4, paragraph 5

The exception to these rules, it the capacity of the Ministry of Interior *vis a vis* the Central Apparatus, to rule out potential citizens of grounds of ‘security restrictions.’

Those who served in the police or armed forces were specifically set out as being identified as qualified to receive citizenship in Article 4, paragraph 4 of the Nationality Law (1959), according to the explanatory note attached to the legislation (al Anezi, 1989, p.193).
Article 4, paragraph 5 stipulated that such people would ‘possess qualifications’ without stating the type of qualification. Al Anezi (1989) emphasised that the explanatory note to the law stated the qualifications as ‘having higher academic degrees’ or ‘having certain expertise’. Those who had rendered service to Kuwait were specifically identified in the explanatory note as those who had served in the police or the armed forces (p.193, including n139).

Removal of Citizenship ‘Eligibility’ to Prevent Granting Citizenship According to Kuwaiti Law and the Constitution of Kuwait

The groups’ special qualification under the Constitution does not appear to have been mentioned in previous literature. I located the stipulation by reading the Constitution. These provisions could still override any action that has made the group ‘illegal’ either according to the whole-group expulsion policy of 1986 (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003) or according to the ‘security restriction’ dicta of criminalisation (see Saleh, February 9, 2014) if the ruler chose to recognize this aspect of the Nationality Law (1959). The problem appears to be that specific reference to these clauses have been not been made in analysis of the Bedoun’s situation. For example, in Human Rights Watch (1995), Ahmed al Nassar, Rapporteur of the National Assembly’s Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, stated:

In the 1970s, when we looked at the problem, there were already two or three generations of Bedoons—parents, children and grandchildren. They were employed by the armed forces and police, and were promised many solutions that were never carried out. (Human Rights Watch, 1995, ‘The National Assembly,’ para. 14)

The reference in the Nationality Law and the Constitution that provided for their citizenship were simply omitted from consideration by such groups, by diverting conversations to the need to find ‘solutions’ for the group, or to work out who remains ‘deserving’ of citizenship, as if the stipulations under which they legally qualified for citizenship, did not already exist in Kuwaiti Law. The mechanisms for the grant of citizenship already exist, as MP Saleh Ashour has pointed out Izzak, May 17, 2016).

Knowledge of an organised approach to preventing the Bedoun who have actually qualified for citizenship under Kuwaiti law was revealed recently by MP Saleh Ashour, reported in discussion time at the National Assembly on the 11 May, 2016:

There is a group in the country that is more powerful than the National Assembly and which does not want bedoons to be naturalized,” he charged. Can the government naturalize the 32,000 bedoons whom the committee said qualify for citizenship? No, because this influential group is more powerful than the government. (Izzak, May 17, 2016)
This extra-constitutional element (the suspension of parliament and the privileging of special committees advising the ruler and/or the prime minister) intervened for the 1986 administrative expulsion, the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, especially around 1991-1992 (with the Academic Team for Population Policy advising the Prime Minister directly), and it may also have been active during shorter parliamentary suspensions during the Arab Spring and 2016, when government appeared to change strategies on the Bedoun (first, increasing punitive security restrictions in response to protests, and second, altering the dissemination strategy for the Central Apparatus’ five-year ‘study’ reporting period, and the rolling back of the ‘final solution’ that had been touted by the Ministry of Interior, in late 2016).

The Central Apparatus allocated the group to the ‘green’ identity type from 2012 (‘8,000 Bedoons,’ 2012), apparently in recognition of their prioritisation by the state, to receive citizenship before other applicants. Yet Table D5 (above) displayed the gradual diminishment of the number of Bedoun regarded as ‘eligible’ for citizenship by the government of Kuwait since 1992, in a programmed, downward fashion. Countless announcements have been issued over the decades since the 1960s regarding the eligibility of the Bedoun for citizenship. These announcements have misled the public, as for the most part, the only concrete actions taken toward the whole group involve making it more difficult for them to access citizenship legitimately (citizenship for which they have already qualified) while restricting the group’s participation in family and social and cultural life further. Withholding citizenship from those legally eligible to receive it (Sokoloff and Lewis, 2005), remains the strategy.

Methods Used to Reduce the Groups’ Numbers: Labelling as ‘Traitors’ and Secret, Undisclosed ‘Security Restrictions’

The two main methods have been used to (theoretically) reduce the numbers of the group are:

- Cancelling of citizenship entitlement due to the status of national ‘traitor.’
- Cancelling citizenship entitlement due to Arab Spring freedoms of expression and public gathering.

Cancelling of citizenship entitlement due to the status of national ‘traitor.’

The notion that certain individuals were unqualified to receive citizenship due to their status as ‘security threats’ and national ‘traitors’ was initiated after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (see Human Rights Watch, 1995). At the time, the state security apparatus (including the special state security court) played a major role in managing the country, especially prior to the resumption of the National Assembly. The use of the term ‘traitor’ by government authorities warrants clarification by way of example, however. During the occupation of Kuwait (1991), the act of buying bread that had been baked in Iraq because it was not available in Kuwait - due to the occupation of the country by Iraqi forces - was
sufficient to attract the charge (Lesch in Lesch and Lustick, 2005, p.170). On the other hand, after the Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait, the Bedoun were executed with bullets to their head, tortured, beaten and starved to death in jail, disappeared and were deported en masse, to the extent the population was reduced by some 150,000 (Human Rights Watch, 1995) (see Appendix F, iii).

The Bedoun were also symbolically targeted in discourses of ‘purification’ and the need to to ‘cleanse’ Kuwait. All Bedoun were blamed for the Iraqi invasion (Alhajeri, 2004). Since the methods of reporting such individual’s ‘crimes’ against the state was entirely dubious (see the activities of the State Security Investigative Police, state prosecutors and the State Security Court, and the role of Abdul Rahman al Awadi, in Appendix F, i), individuals targeted may simply have been symbolic targets representing the masses. Killings of the Bedoun were never investigated by the authorities (Human Rights Watch, 1991, 1992, 1995, Amnesty International 1992, 1994, 1996), and this seemed to be connected to the presumption that those who were murdered, deserved it because they were ‘traitors.’ Thus, if any such individuals were actually regarded as traitors by the government of Kuwait, it seems to be implausible that the government would not have deported them (if not killed them) at the time according to their own system of retribution, which was the ethnic cleansing and killings.

Despite this, hundreds of individuals were reported as having been listed with ‘security restrictions’ on their security files with the Ministry of Interior after the war. Initially the action seemed to be a method of marking out of individuals most wanted by the security apparatus, but over time government began to claim that those with ‘restrictions’ were no longer eligible for citizenship. The Bedoun were facing such grave circumstances, having been dealing with administrative expulsion five years prior to the invasion, then experiencing entrapment in the state during the war and the occupation, then being being claimed to be ‘traitors’ by citizens and authorities returning to the country after the war. Thus, comparatively speaking, the ‘security restriction’ may seem to have been a relatively minor issue at the time. However, note that the ‘security restriction’ is applied to whole families, and across multiple generations. Age does not matter to the Apparatus – restrictions are placed on babies and young children (this aspect has been discussed in both the local news media in Kuwait and international humanitarian reports).

Initially, hundreds of individuals were identified as having ‘security restrictions’ until the number reached nearly one thousand. After that, the restrictions went unreported. The ‘security restriction’ functioned as what is commonly known in Kuwait as the government blacklist. Government regularly announces the number of immigrants blacklisted and targeted for deportation from Kuwait, along with their nationalities. The same treatment is applied to the Bedoun. It is difficult to know how many Bedoun have
been exited from Kuwait in this way, as this an aspect of the parts of the ‘status adjustment’ program that remains well hidden. No journalists or humanitarian agencies have appear to have reported on this aspect, since mass deportations in 2001 (Human Rights Watch, 2001).

**Cancelling citizenship entitlement due to Arab Spring freedoms of expression and public gathering.**

The notion of the cancelling out of citizenship ‘eligibility’ was recycled during the Arab Spring, when individuals found to be expressing their freedom of speech and gathering in public were subject to undisclosed ‘security restrictions’ due to the ‘national security threat’ of freedom of individual expression. This method was used to reduce the category eligible for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959) by thousands, to the extent that this announcement showed that if the rate of security restrictions continued without change, there would be no Bedoun left ‘eligible’ to receive citizenship by 2017. This self-fulfilling prophecy was born out by the fact that by 2016, ‘all’ Bedoun were regarded as ‘accepted’ by the Comoros government for identity transfer to Comorian citizenship (Izzak, May 17, 2016), implying that not one Bedoun would receive citizenship after the Arab Spring. In fact the whole population has been ‘illegal’ since 1986 by virtue of the 1986 expulsion doctrine (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003), which would disqualify them from receiving citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959).

The security restriction is just one level of criminal labelling to which the Bedoun are subjected to by the government of Kuwait, noting that all Bedoun are referred to as criminal, ‘illegal residents’ as a matter of public policy, anyway. It is also worth remembering that the restriction applies to whole families, and that restrictions can be continually applied, although it is not known what additional, punitive measures may be associated with multiple restrictions, aside from extra intimidation and the application of security restrictions to family members including newborns and children. As I mentioned above, between 2012 and 2014, new security restrictions had been issued to 21,000 Bedoun (in response to the Arab Spring). If we add these numbers together with those criminalised in the identity typing system introduced in 2012, we find that approximately 103,000 Bedouns hold ‘security restrictions’ equivalent to criminal offences, or are typed into one of three (out of a total of four) colour categories by the Central Apparatus which apply a criminal status and timeframe for deportation (see the analysis of the Central Apparatus colour typing, Appendix C, iv). That is, nearly the total number of the Bedoun population of 111,000, save a few thousand (8,000), had either been allocated with security restrictions, or had already been listed as a criminal status of refusing to ‘reveal’ their ‘other nationality’ – i.e. submitting to changing their identity via the ‘status adjustment program.’

The group still remains eligible to receive citizenship under the Constitution of Kuwait 1922/1962, Article 25 (see Appendix B, v) as well as the Nationality Law (1959)
(Appendix B, vi) as technically, they have not received criminal offences that have been processed through the court system. If the Ministry of Interior did not exercise such a hold over the Bedoun matters, government might be able to clear the way for concessions regarding this point. When the Central Apparatus indicated that that security restrictions were equivalent to a (conviction for a) criminal offence (‘Kuwait Plans,’ 2013; Magnetic cards,’ 2012; Nacheva, April 6, 2014; Colonel Mohammed al Wuhaib, in *The Kuwait Times*, February 9, 2014, in Saleh, February 9, 2014), he assumed the Ministry of Interior’s special discretion concerning issues of nationality and citizenship, which bypasses court system and the parliamentary system in Kuwait and indulges in direct reporting to the Emir. In other words, the ‘security restriction’ cancels Bedoun qualification for citizenship because the Central Apparatus says so. It is difficult to perceive how this status of affairs does not diminish the dignity of Emiri authority. The US Embassy confirmed that one of the main functions of the Executive Committee (now the Central Apparatus) was to, track ‘security restrictions’ (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006). Essentially, the US Embassy staff described the management of a government blacklist that was in the process of expanding to include the whole population. This was precisely the strategy adopted by the government after the Arab Spring, via the distribution of the ‘security restriction,’ which began with individual transgressions and have now been issued to tens of thousands, for reasons that are ‘secret.’

As I discussed in Appendix E, v, when considering how the Bedoun were subjected to ‘status adjustment’ and their identity was changed to other nationality labels, in 2006, the Ambassador to the United States reported that one of the main functions of the Executive Committee (now the Central Apparatus) was to track ‘security restrictions’ (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26). This function was performed simultaneous to the erasure. I mentioned that the surveillance function oppressed the population so that the state could suppress opposition while continuing to conduct the program of erasure that had been in place since 1983 (al Anezi, 1989).


Conditions by which a stateless resident becomes unqualified for citizenship, including having a criminal record. (*The Kuwait Times*, February 9, 2014).

Note the emphasis on vague, broad use of the term ‘conditions’ and the definitive, narrow use of the reference, ‘unqualified for citizenship.’ Effectively, security restrictions included having a criminal record – or anything else. The discretionary power of the Apparatus
enabled it to determine, and keep secret, ‘anything else.’ The implication that the security restriction could be applied for any reason, or no substantive reason, or a totally implausible reason, or for any other reason, was quite clear, based on language used by the Apparatus itself.

Why is this group targeted?

The ‘reality’ of the organisational culture inside the Ministry of Interior’s Central Apparatus was given in the US Embassy Cable (issued in 2006): the Apparatus operates as a surveillance network of ‘state security’ verging on the scale of the Stalinist model, for the purpose of conducting surveillance and issuing ever more ‘restrictions’ to prevent the Bedoun participating in social and cultural life, and to justify the rationale that all Bedouns who were ever eligible to receive citizenship, had caused their own loss of citizenship, by attracting security offences (of a criminal nature) or security restrictions (not of a criminal nature, but deemed to be equivalent to a criminal offense, according to apparatus officials). In other words, it appears that one of the official but unspoken policies toward the Bedoun, introduced after the invasion by Iraq, has been to for the Ministry of Interior to use its Central Apparatus to furnish the government with ‘reasons’ and ‘evidence’ for each Bedoun legally qualified for citizenship (those with proof of census participation and those who gave service to the nation) to be refused the grant, by issuing them with a ‘security restriction’ recorded on the security file of each individual/their family.

This policy seems to have been enacted to compensate for the growth of resistance in the community - their refusal of many tens of thousands of Bedoun to cooperate with ‘status adjustment,’ for example, refusing to sign affidavits to claim they had a different nationality, refusing to provide fraudulent passports through Central Apparatus document traffickers, and refusing to accept their children’s birth certificates with false nationalities stated on them.

Between 2012 and 2014, less than 5.5% of the population showed ‘other nationality’ to authorities, indicating there are few individuals of other nationality among the Bedoun population, and that the vast majority resisted ‘status adjustment.’ I calculated these figures based on two articles that cited the number of Bedoun who had changed their status since 2011 (5746 individuals in Saleh, February 9, 2014 and 5982 individuals in Nacheva, April 6, 2014). This indicated that the population is aware that government is attempting to erase their identity and citizenship claims. Certainly the results of this research indicate that this is the case. Another evidence of this resistance was shown in the rejection of birth certificates stating false nationalities, that parents refused to accept from the state, which was an issue that emerged as contentious during the bans on children commencing school in September, 2014. Government had decided to direct special efforts toward forcing parents to accept the inauthentic birth certificates (see Appendix E, vi and G, ii). It had inadvertently already
discussed failing to achieve this goal some years prior in *Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch* (2011, p.7) where it pointed out that between 2006 and 2011, the number of birth certificates with pre-filled ‘original nationalities’ on them collected by parents from the Ministry of Health was 3608, and the number of birth certificates never accepted was a staggering 12,471.

Government explained the policy and procedures that had existed from 1986 until 2011, whereby the Central Apparatus or its equivalent had determined the original nationality through ‘secret’ internal investigations and research. The Central Apparatus then instructs the Ministry of Health of the nationality, which is pre-filled on the application for the certificate (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7). That the majority of the Bedoun population resisted the intense psychological, financial and other pressures demanding they submit to the program of erasure, is revealed in the relatively low numbers of those recorded as having submitted to ‘status adjustment’ issued regularly by the Apparatus in local newspapers (for example, ‘6051 Illegal Residents,’ 2014; ‘6,860 Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘7,828 Illegal Residents,’ 2016).

During this study, I was passed written evidence of the statements Bedouns were asked to sign by the Apparatus, for inclusion in their security files as ‘proof’ of the nationality the Central Apparatus had designated to them. I could not verify the statements with identical second copies, and was only able to collect anecdotal evidence. The statements were equivalent to pledges, whereby the recipient would have to sign to confirm that he or she was aware that they would lose their Central Apparatus privileges (access to basic public services) if they were found to communicate with others, and/or speak in public about, any Central Apparatus procedures. Even if the evidence was not ‘solid,’ it certainly reflected accurately, the rationale of the Central Apparatus, as the sentiment expressed was consistent with the public actions of the Apparatus.

Interviewees explained that they are threatened with not speaking to outsiders about Apparatus procedures, or they will receive security restrictions as sanctions. I have analysed the approach to the restrictions on freedom of expression, which encompass virtually any attempt a Bedoun might make to engage in public intellectual activities, to speak about their own identity, or that of their community (Chapter 8, section 8.2.2, Table 25), so there is little surprise in these statements, or in the existence of the documents I received. As I have mentioned, a number of interviewees had already had these security restriction applied to them directly, and some also had experienced their individual restrictions being applied to other members of their family. Again, we see the program of focusing on the individual, the family, and the whole ethnic group, which is the same blueprint or cultural pattern observed in the approach of removing names (Chapter 2, section 6.2.2, Table 20). And this highly coordinated approach of ‘harm one – harm many,’ is played out in the media constantly,
when Bedouin citizens are stripped of their citizenship, followed by their close relatives, then extended family members (in some Gulf countries, whole tribes are targeted with citizenship stripping (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2014).

At the end of this spectrum of oppressive measures, lies the grim record of torture by the Kuwaiti state security police enforcement, which has an established practice of targeting individuals that has changed little since prior to the Iraqi invasion:

It is equally concerning that serious discriminations are inflicted on torture victims based on their nationality and their political opinions. In effect, complete impunity is bestowed upon those responsible for torture practiced against non-Kuwaitis or political opponents.

[Citation of the Mohamed al Mutairi case, where a Kuwaiti citizen was tortured to death by police but at least the perpetrators were punished].

The procedures for such cases is different, however, when it relates to Biduns and political opponents. The same rigorous standards are not observed by the investigation and certain cases of torture or death in prison of several political opponents or non-Kuwaiti citizens have been allowed.

… Many other cases of torture were reported over the last years. Abdulhakim [Hakeem] Al Fadhli was arrested in February 2014 during a protest and was tortured by agents of the state security services. After having complained to the Prosecutor, Mr Al Fadhli was sent back to prison and no measure was taken to investigate his allegations. (Alkarama Foundation, 2014, p.4)

It is almost needless to say that Hakeem al Fadhli is a member of the group most ‘eligible’ to receive citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959), Kuwait, and that security restrictions have been applied.

If we consider why government would be inclined to focus more intensively on criminalising and placing punitive restrictions on those Bedoun most legally qualified to receive citizenship, rather than those least legally qualified to receive citizenship during the ‘study’ period from 2010 (on which the 2012 system of typing was based) to 2016, the answer lies with the issue of the Bedoun who could not prove their basic identity with any papers. According to al Anezi (1989, p.263), the Bedoun who were not employed in the military, police force or national guard at the time, did not have to submit to enforced nationality re-labelling on their identifications cards like the former group, because they did not carry identification cards. Up until at least 1989, the state had never issued them with what he called the National Identity Card (al Anezi, 1989, p.266, n150). After the Iraqi invasion, just two to three years later, the state refused to issue any further identification to
the Bedoun (Maktabi, 1992). In other words, the state had always with-held identification, knowing the group were stateless and had none, certain interests in the state ensured they would never obtain any, from the government of Kuwait – lest it be used as evidence to satisfy the *Nationality Law (1959)* Kuwait, for citizenship (some scholars such as al Nakib, 2014, have suggested this latter group comprise some of the oldest families in Kuwait, which have been present in the territory for longer than most citizens). According to Human Rights Watch (2000),

Bidun not employed by the government found themselves facing serious obstacles when seeking to register births, marriages, divorces, and deaths, because they lacked the required identification and were typically required to go through lengthy security checks before the Ministry of Interior would issue a letter of no objection. (Human Rights Watch, 2000, iv, ‘background’).

In other words, those not in the two groups stated above, had remained virtually no identification papers at all.

Government was confident that because this second group (non-military/police/national guard personnel) were undocumented, they would never be able to prove their identity, and thus, they were easy targets for ‘status adjustment.’ Certainly in terms of Kuwait’s international reputation, and the states’ responsibility to provide identification for stateless people, the pressure was off in terms of expectations to grant this group citizenship (clearly expressed by by UNHCR Statelessness unit’s Mark Manly regarding his endorsement of the attempt at forced re-allocation to Comorian nationality, contrary to international law, discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis). In the meantime, for those who were more capable - entirely capable - of proving their eligibility for citizenship under the *Nationality Law (1959)* Kuwait, a rationale for them to be stopped had to be found. This would be the new ‘solution’ or rather, the new focus, to ‘Bedoun problem,’ established over the five-year study project (ultimately, a seven-year project) of the Central Apparatus. After all, it was always the documented Bedoun - those who had long established their legal right of Kuwaiti citizenship due to their *sheer luck* of their parents and grandparents having received and preserved their personal documents which had also survived the war – who had been the ‘troublemakers’ (the term used by the Hadar in Kuwait for Bedouns who speak openly about their citizenship rights). (Note that government had always held these records but chose not to produce them prior to the invasion by Iraq, when government archives were pillaged). This had been established in the mishandling of the Law 100/1980 issue, that had led to the administrative expulsion of 1986 (see Chapter 7 and Appendix B, iii). Just as the Iraqi invasion was used as the rationale for post-war killings and ethnic cleansing, the Arab Spring protests were used as the rational for the increase issue
of tens of thousands of ‘security restrictions’ cancelling citizenship ‘eligibility.’ The group has always had better access to education than the remainder of the population, and hence, they have been more inclined to be the leaders of Bedoun society, to have developed an informed political consciousness, to have had more effective responses and articulate voices.

Here, we see the rationale for escalation of punitive actions toward documented Bedoun, rather than undocumented Bedoun (see the F.C.O. Kuwait letter of 2007, in U.K. Home Office, 2009, 2014, 2016, which has given rise to the United Kingdom’s foreign policy of refusing to acknowledge the discrimination and victimisation of documented Bedoun). The rationale for this escalation was borne out in the data analysis, indicating an intense focus on Arab Spring human rights activists by the Central Apparatus, who were sons of military and police personnel and families who had retained their 1965 National Census registration documents, who could thus prove their eligibility for citizenship – ‘the right to have rights’ – as well as the expansion of their targeting via repression of a variety of forms of intellectual activity by means of which they could communicate their message to the world (Chapter 8).

The Ministry of Interior’s ‘security restriction’ bypasses all aspects of Kuwaiti law that might be used to challenge the deprivation of citizenship, removes access from public services in order to prevent the Bedoun from participating in society and overcoming poverty, and flags individuals as ‘marked’ by the apparatus, increasing their surveillance and the punitive manner in which they are treated by the state. In this case, I suggest the group most intensively targeted arose after the Arab Spring, for the same reason as the group which arose after the invasion of Iraq marked with the ‘traitor’ status. They are the most ‘deserving’ and so they will be the most punished, and due to the obsessive focus of the Ministry of the Interior, one of the ways in which this plays out is that the Apparatus is tasked with building up ‘security files’ with layer upon layer of pieces of paper signed by Bedouns admitting ‘other’ identity, signed statements promising not to speak to anyone about Apparatus procedures, and evidence from unnamed informants, and criminal indictments. This is what is Al Waqayan (2009) had referred to this as ‘the stage of indictment.’ As a local person, perhaps he was privy to this strategy.

The theme of open retribution encapsulated in government policy against the Bedoun, was established after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (Sokoloff and Lewis, 2005). The ‘security restriction’ is used as an incentive for ‘status adjustment:’ if one is never going to receive citizenship or access to public services, one might as well submit to erasure – at least one will officially receive five years’ access to public services (give or take a security restriction). During my fieldwork in Kuwait I discussed the Bedoun blacklist with both male and female Hadar professors at Kuwait University. They confirmed the Bedoun blacklist exists, discussed how it works, but asked not to be named in this study.
Appendix E

Erasure (Administrative Ethnic Cleansing) - the ‘Status Adjustment’ Program (1983-)

i. Administrative expulsion (1983-1993) - summary from the thematic analysis


iii. Denial of the stateless population by Kuwait government authorities

iv. Denial of the concept of stateless by Kuwait government authorities

v. Main types of ‘other nationality’ ascribed to the Bedoun

vi. Main methods of ascribing ‘other nationality’ to the Bedoun
Appendix E, i

Administrative Expulsion (1983-1993) - Thematic Analysis Summary

The administrative expulsion of the Bedoun was reported to commence in 1985 (Human Rights Watch, 1995) or 1986, according to the date of a policy document outlining the measures (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). Despite this, al Anezi (1989) documented expulsion and erasure measures changing the national identity of the Bedoun of official documents starting with an unpublished decree in 1983. This policy is now known as ‘status adjustment.’ On 15 December 1988, the Supreme Planning Council issued its Strategy for Development. The Ministry of Planning was given task to make Five Year Plans reflecting a long-term population strategy for Kuwait (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). ‘Kuwaitisation,’ and the policy to de-nationalise the population from ‘Kuwaiti’ to the generic ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ was also implemented in 1988 (Human Rights Watch, 2000), likely as part of or connected to, the same process. The initial measures are described according to the year they appeared to be introduced in Table E1, below.
Table E1


<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>‘Status adjustment’ policy began to be implemented without public announcement. The stateless Bedoun population were prohibited from using the widely accepted term ‘Bedoun’ to describe their pre-citizenship status. They were instructed by government authorities to ‘show their original nationality’ on security card applications; the policy was not published but first imposed upon stateless Bedoun military servicemen, and then all adult males. Later, letters would be sent by the Ministry of Interior and other government departments to their Bedoun staff, demanding that ‘foreign passports’ be produced by them, and submitted to government agents for the purpose of establishing (changing) their identity (see below, 1986). The point is made here to emphasise that ‘original nationality’ was any nationality, as long as the submitted document was ‘foreign’ – that is, not Kuwaiti. Identity cards (military servicemen, others not required to carry identification cards) and drivers’ licences (general population) reissued with ‘non-Kuwaiti national’ (Al Anezi, 1989, p.263, n132; p.266-267, n152) or new nationality labels, which was been interpreted by government as the proper expression of the policy of ‘status adjustment’ (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7). Al Anezi (1989) believed that an unannounced policy was implemented in late 1983 and carried out starting early 1984 (p.263), evidenced in the statements of authorities in Kuwaiti newspapers. These factors would later facilitate deportation according the repeal of the Immigration Law in 1987; see below. Mass processing of identity erasure was reported in 2000, using fake foreign passports and affidavits demanded by the Ministry of Interior to change the identity of thousands of Bedoun men, targeting military servicemen. Affidavits were supplied by the Central Apparatus (Human Rights Watch, 2000).</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>In 1992, the national census was amended back to this date as part of the development of Kuwait’s Selective Migration Policy. The amendment involved removed the whole stateless Bedoun population from ‘Kuwaiti’ without citizenship to ‘non-Kuwaiti,’ ‘other Arab’ nationality (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.571, 581). ‘Kuwaitization’ policy was introduced, ostensibly to nationalise the Kuwaiti economic sector. It was predominantly as a political strategy, rather than a practical one (Stanton Russell, 1989).</td>
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1986  *The Study of the country’s problem of the category of the ‘stateless’ produced* by the ‘Committee for the study of Illegal Residents,’ December 29, 1986 (reprinted August 30, 2003, in ‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). The following measures were introduced:

- Registration of civil identification prohibited
- Access to birth, death and marriage certificates prohibited
- Access to employment prohibited, expulsion from positions without identity correction. Note the concordance with Kuwaitization policy.
- Freedom to travel prohibited with limited exceptions
- The Immigration Law is implemented to apply the notion of the ‘valid passport’ introduced to avoid termination from employment. The Kuwaiti travel document, the A17 is issued to stateless Bedoun – on condition that they relinquish to right to return to Kuwait
- Stateless government employees are issued letters directly from their Ministerial sections requesting they show a foreign national passport (al Anezi, 1989, p.266-267, n152). This point was mentioned above.

Exception to above measures: those working in the security services (military, police, national guard) continued their employment and were issued residency documents, as stipulated in the 1986 *The Study of the country’s problem of the category of the ‘stateless,’* (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). While this exception was being made by government to prevent direct confrontation with the states own armed forces, this segment of the population was the first that was undergoing ‘status adjustment’ involving changes their civil identification cards from 1983.

1987  Article 25(h) of Law 17/1959, the Immigration Law was an exemption to the Immigration regulations for tribesmen, allowing them to enter Kuwait by land routes to carry out their business; it was repealed in 1987 (Longva, 1997, p.72, n7). The repeal meant that those who could not present a passport to prove they were a ‘valid’ non-national resident, they would be deemed illegal immigrants (Article 1 of the Immigration Law by Emiri Decree, December 14, 1959). This was essential to making the population appear to be legally deportable, according to the proviso that an individual may be granted permission to reside in Kuwait for a period of 5 years at discretion of the Minister of the Interior (Articles 9 and 12) (al Anezi, 1989). The preparation period had commenced in 1984 in relation to changing official identification documents.

Access to drivers’ licences, access to school education only provided in limited circumstances, such as for families in the military service and where the mother of a stateless child is a citizen (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Note that these circumstances have varied a great deal since 1987; uniform access to these basic rights to both these groups has never been provided.

1988  Access to university education and participation in civil organisations generally banned, but some access given in limited circumstances (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

The policy to de-nationalise the population from ‘Kuwaiti’ to the generic ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ was implemented in 1988 (Human Rights Watch, 2000). Coinciding the administrative expulsion, the Supreme Planning Council introduced its ‘strategies for Development’ and commenced acquiring United
Nations Development Program funding to aid its programs. The programs involved the strategic population reduction of the Bedoun from society, including illegalising them and implemented specific bans on education and employment (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994; Alessa, 1981).

1992 ‘Population restructuring’ program policy introduced. Ethnic targeting policy introduced to prevent the Bedouin ever receiving citizenship en masse again, singling out the Bedoun. The policy is was introduced via the arrangement of special powers for a group of individual intellectuals, the Academic Team for Population Policy, which superseded all Ministries prior to the resumption of the National Assembly.

The Bedoun were transferred from the National Census as ‘Kuwaiti’ to ‘non-Kuwaiti, other Arab’ with the nationality.

See also ‘developmental’ approaches in Appendix C, vi-viii and population reduction strategies Appendix D, i, and Appendix F, ii.

1993 Stateless Bedoun and citizen Bedouin together expelled from military service by the returning National Assembly (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Alhajeri, 2004). All previous exceptions to expulsion measures for military servicemen are ruled out. Nevertheless, during the war such servicemen were outcast and subject to human rights atrocities along with the general stateless population: they had already been expelled for all practical intents and purposes (see a). See also Appendix B, v, regarding the rights of military servicemen under the Constitution of Kuwait 1922/1962, Article 25.
Appendix E, ii

On August 30, 2003, al Talea reprinted the administrative expulsion policy document in ‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003. The policy was discussed in terms of specific measures that began to be implemented immediately, with 1986 as the start date. The image E1 below was provided by Mona Kareem.

Image E1

لجنة وزارية مصغرة أقرت سياسات التضييق على البدون في العام 86

ترأسها صلاح أحمد و턴ض من أعضائها وزير الداخلية نوف أحمد

التفاصيل

تضييق على فئة البدون في مصدره ومنع توظيفهم ورعاهم ووقود الامتناعات السابقة وعقود الدروج وتعديل الأسعار ومصانعة الدول المصورة لاستقبالها من ينشئ إليها

المحدثة

نيما: موجود موحد من مصادر الوثائق على البنية تحتية البدون ونقاط التوجيه للمعالجة لمتحورات الخدمة العامة

ختم الجهة الإدارية

تم توجيه الجهة الإدارية والجهات العامة حول الشكوفة

الموضوع:

المواد من مصادر الوثائق على القانونية والجهات العامة حتى الشكوفة
Appendix E, iii

Denial of the Stateless Population by Kuwait Government Authorities

The imposed, restrictive cultural re-organisation of the Bedoun by the government of Kuwait has relied on the method of ‘status adjustment,’ which changes the national identity of the Bedoun, as part of an overall program, which removes national and ethnic identity (see Chapters 6 and 7). This gave rise to the imposition of a false identity upon the Bedoun, the ‘illegal resident’ of false (fraudulent) nationality, who is by definition not stateless (a social and legal status created by government through the denial of citizenship). An extension of this logic is the denial of the existence of a stateless population in Kuwait. One of the clearest examples of the ideology of denial can be found in denials that the Bedoun is a stateless population by government authorities. This dialogue of denial is highly repetitive, and tends to be issued with the same, repetitive phrases. Examples are listed below, in Table E2

A further extension of the logic is the denial of statelessness as a concept in international law by government authorities. Al Anezi (1989) first analysed this approach. I then explored these ideas further to illustrate the breadth and depth of the system of ideas that lies behind the cultural re-organisation of the Bedoun by authorities. This is discussed in Appendix E, iii and iv, below. The tables are not an exhaustive list. More examples can be found in Kuwaiti newspapers and in National Assembly discussion time transcripts.
### Table E2

**Examples of Kuwaiti Authorities Who Have Denied of the Bedoun Are a Stateless Population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>‘A source’ at the Central Apparatus in an interview with Colonel Muhammad Al Wuhaib, the Director of the Nationality Authentication Department in the Central Apparatus and Mr Salah Youssef al Fadhalah, Chief Executive of the Central Apparatus</td>
<td>Major steps to solve illegal residents’ limbo to be taken by 2016. <em>Who wants to prolong their problem?</em> (Nacheva, April 7, 2014, p.2) in <em>The Kuwait Times.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E, iv
Denial of the Concept of Statelessness by Kuwait Government Authorities

Table E3, below, shows examples of the denial of the statelessness in international law by Kuwaiti government authorities. The denial of statelessness as a concept in international law appears to stem from the inability of government authorities to articulate the logic of the ideology of the denial of the Bedoun as stateless, discussed in Appendix E, part c), above. The denial of the concept of statelessness generally speaking was first explored by al Anezi (1989), drawing on examples of official statements in local newspapers. The notion forms part of the overall program of ‘status adjustment’ program, as a rationalisation of the validity of the idea that the Bedoun have always held another nationality/citizenship from another country. This latter concept is an important indicator of the attempt of the government of Kuwait to extend the acceptance of the program internationally, and an indicator of the extent to which international audiences have enabled Kuwait to conduct the ‘status adjustment’ program.

Ideologist have taken a provocative stance in promoting this aspect of the ideology in forums whose purpose is to create and maintain international law: the United Nations and its various organs, particularly the Human Rights Committee. The denial of statelessness as a concept is not challenged when expressed by the Kuwaiti government in these contexts. The complicity of the United Nations which tolerates these denials in its own forums, helps to explain why no international actor has ever provided assistance to the Bedoun, to stop the erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing) and population reduction of the group or to help the Bedoun retain their collective identity.
Table E3

*Examples of Kuwaiti Authorities who Have Denied the Concept of Statelessness (from al Anezi, 1989)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>The Manager of the Nationality Department</td>
<td>Sources: Al Anezi (1989, p.269, n.162), <em>al Anbaa</em> Newspaper (Kuwait), 11 August 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Manager of the Nationality Department</td>
<td>Sources: Al Anezi (1989, p.269, n.162) referred to <em>Yaqdha</em> Magazine (Kuwait) vol 757, April 22, 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Mr al Adsani, President of Parliament</td>
<td>Sources: Al Anezi (1989, p.269, n.159) referring to a quotation in <em>The Study,</em> vol 856, p.12, stated August 12, 1984; reported August 29, 1984.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>The Minister of Justice</td>
<td>Sources: Al Anezi (1989, p.269, n.159 and n.163) referred to interviews in <em>al Rai</em> Newspaper, 4 and September 21, 1985 (n159). Also Al Anezi, (1989, p.269, n.163) <em>al Qabas,</em> September 28, 1985 (n163)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E, v
Main Types of ‘Other Nationality’ Ascribed to the Bedoun

The documentary analysis showed the following themes of ascribing ‘other nationality’ to the Bedoun, which indicated the country to which nationality was claimed/changed. The nationalities are listed below, in Table E4. The politically significant nationalities listed reflect the locations of traditional tribal lands (dirah) of the Bedouin in Kuwait, prior to the formation of the modern nation state. However, the dirah tended to be transnational and included many areas, from Syrian to Yemen. For a list of nations across which the dirah of the main tribes of Kuwait extended, see Appendix B, i. The countries were associated with Bedoun, either linked to the fake, foreign passports government demanded the Bedoun obtain and submit to the Ministry of Interior from the early 1980s, or stated on affidavits, or other documents.

Table E4
A List of the Main Nationalities Ascribed to the Bedoun by the Government of Kuwait

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalities ascribed to the Bedoun by government authorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group 1: ‘Any’ nationality but not Kuwaiti group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2: Politically significant associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Iranian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Iraqi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Syrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Saudi Arabian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There have been countless government announcements since that time, stating that the Bedoun population was a group of foreign nationals, foreign citizens, and/or fifth column spies working in covert operations, for these countries. It is notable that my analysis found major discrepancies in numbers of individuals who were listed as having ‘original nationalities’ associated with these states, especially Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In 2014, the Central Apparatus announced that there were an 58,770 additional Bedoun found to be ‘Saudi Arabian’ citizens, a remarkable increase of 58,770 (Nacheva, April 6, 2014) since the
2010 Supreme Planning Council study had declared there were no Saudi Arabian Bedoun (Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.21 quoting the study released in Kuwait’s al Qabas newspaper). The nature of this labelling is discussed in more detail below.

**Group 1: ‘Any’ Nationality But Not Kuwaiti**

From 1984 to 2011, the official policy was for stateless people to have to state their ‘original nationality’ even if they didn’t have one. That is, being stateless, the policy was to force the population to ‘admit’ or ‘reveal’ they had a nationality that did not exist. This was a requirement for the Bedoun to keep the status as legally registered with the Central Apparatus, for the purpose of obtaining an identity card, for the receipt of identity document birth certificate, marriage certificate or drivers’ licences. The introduction of the policy coincided with the policy dropping the official usage of the name ‘Bedoun’ from official documents, and enforcing the use of the term ‘non-Kuwaiti nationality’ (see Appendix C, i). The policy was expressed by international humanitarian agencies very benignly, to the extent that it might be construed as misleading, for example:

> During the year, Kuwaiti authorities escalated pressure on the Bedoons to secure citizenship elsewhere in order for them to remain in Kuwait lawfully. (Human Rights Watch, 1994, n.p.)

How could the Bedoun ‘secure citizenship elsewhere’ when they were prohibited from leaving the Kuwait and returning? The agency was quite aware that this was almost impossible, for authorities refused to allow the Bedoun to return to their homes if they crossed the Kuwaiti border. This information was withheld. It would have pointed to the fact that the group were required to obtain false documentation of ‘other nationality’ from inside the country, which led to the burgeoning fake document trafficking industry operating in Kuwait.

From 2011, as part of Decree 409/2011 reforms, the previous official policy was amended to allow individuals to use the term ‘non-Kuwaiti’ on all government documents instead of Bedouns being required to (untruthfully) list actual states as their nationality (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011; Reply of Government of Kuwait to the Human Rights Committee, 17 October – 4 November, 2011). In 2014, it was reported that government agencies had not implemented this consistently, but instead, had continued to demand that actual nationalities to be listed on documents. However, the allowance of the term ‘non-Kuwaiti’ to be listed (Decree 409/2011) was actually precluded at the outset of Decree 409/2011 by the satisfaction of proof of non-Kuwaiti citizenship, rather than simply allowing an applicant to write ‘non-Kuwaiti’ on official documents. In other words, the government response about its own policy to Human Rights Watch, was

This explained why at the grassroots, there were small improvements for a few, but no improvement for the vast majority of the population, which would enable them to access public services arising from Decree 409/2011 (personal communications with Hakeem al Fadhli, 19 October, 2014, 1 December 2015). Because the Bedoun could not access this policy by showing their ‘real’ nationality (since they did not have one), the previous policy of forced/coerced erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing) and change of identity to false (fraudulent) nationality labels simply continued. In other words, there was no substantive change of policy with Decree 409/2011 but rather, the continuation of the previous policy introduced in 1983. At that time, letters by government forcing the Bedoun to produce foreign passports in order to prevent their expulsion from public service employment and potentially, deportation (Al Anezi, 1989, p.266-267, n152).

Having explained some of the historical and recent events regarding the concept of ‘other nationality’ labelling, I will now examine how that policy works in terms of the government of Kuwait’s involvement in the human trafficking industry, specifically promoting the trade of false identity documents including fraudulent passports. A US Embassy cable in 2006 confirmed that the use administrative erasure and surveillance methods in Bedoun ‘transactions’ with the Central Apparatus (then called the Executive Committee of Illegal Residents), the administrative arm of the Ministry of the Interior that controls the registration of the stateless population, was out of control, remarking, ‘the situation is ridiculous’ (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26). The US Embassy confirmed that one of the main functions of the Executive Committee (now the Central Apparatus) was to track ‘security restrictions’ – that is to conduct surveillance on the Bedoun population, in addition to re-assigning their nationality on official records.

My research indicated that the surveillance function oppressed the population so that the state could continue with the program of erasure, with minimal opposition from the population at the grassroots (see my discussion of security restrictions as a method of eradicating the potential population of Kuwaiti citizens, in Appendix D, iv). The approach was a long-term one, still used in 2014, confirmed by government authorities whom provided key sources for a story, Bedoon Draft Laws Upset State-Body Work Plan (February 9, 2014, The Kuwait Times). The term ‘security restrictions’ was clarified as,

Conditions by which a stateless resident becomes unqualified for citizenship, including having a criminal record. (The Kuwait Times, February 9, 2014)
The US Embassy cable had discussed ‘transactions’ between the Bedoun and government agents at the Central Agency Office. These methods necessarily involved stateless people being compelled to obtain false identity documents but also, the coercion of the Bedoun at government offices, forcing them to do so. The cable pointed to overt pressure and coercion took place to ‘convince’ Bedoun individuals to change their nationality during face to face ‘transactions’ with Central Apparatus staff, where the contact details passport traffickers, whom the Bedoun were told to contact, were posted on the walls:

Instead they reportedly try to convince Bidoon that if they declare a nationality, they will find it much easier to proceed with this transaction as well as future transactions. Once a Bidoon declares a nationality, however, he has for all intents and purposes permanently given up his chance to get Kuwaiti citizenship. (US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006).

The outcome of this policy was that the Bedoun were required to obtain documentation fraudulently labelling their ‘original’ origins with any origin. As a result, many men submitted to purchasing fraudulent passports and/or other documents from human trafficking agents, as they were instructed to do so by the Apparatus. This policy had been in place since 1983, in relation to the official letters issued by government (mentioned above).

Hence, the administrative expulsion of the Bedoun was never simply a matter of listing the Bedoun as ‘illegal residents’ and threatening them with deportation from the country. The program described by al Anezi commencing in 1983, was always a program of erasure. The enforcement not only of the concept of ‘original nationality,’ but of making the stateless Bedoun acquire documentation to show they held any nationality, as long as it was not Kuwaiti, was confirmed again in 1994 by Human Rights Watch (1994); in 2006 by the US Embassy in Kuwait (US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514 at 4, November 26, 2006) and in 2011 by the government of Kuwait (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011). The states involved included the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Liberia and Nigeria (US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514_a, November 26, 2006, at 7), Eritrea and Yemen (al Waqayan, 2009) and Somalia (Beaugrand, 2010, p.155).

The ramifications were broad, as the process changed not just the individual person who signed the affidavit or submitted a fraudulent passport, it changed the identity of all members of their household under Kuwaiti law. Since its inception, the program has been organised through the Central Apparatus offices, the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence, and had initially included the targeting of these Ministry’s own employees in the past, when many of the Bedoun were employed there prior to the 1986 expulsion.
The ‘status adjustment’ program comprised the theft of the Bedoun’s collective national and ethnic identity. The psychological ramifications of dispersing the groups’ identity to a range of disconnected, nonsensical and ineffective nationality labels had left the population in a constant state of psychological and social crisis (al Waqayan, 2009, p.35). These issues were discussed further in Chapter 7 of the thesis.

Beaugrand (2010) on the other hand, claimed she believed the process involved covert and illegitimate, human trafficking transactions between the state of Kuwait and a variety of foreign governments affecting thousands of Bedoun men and their family members. That is, al Waqayan (2009) believed the identities changed involved ineffective nationalities, while alternatively Beaugrand (2010) speculated that financial transactions and and *effective* nationalities were involved (selling the population’s identity *vis a vis* the Comoros Plan and perhaps a whole range of other nations, giving them a nationality they could ‘effect’ if they were actually residents of those countries, which they were not). However, the researcher did not show any evidence that effective nationality had been obtained, and the matter of whether or not a legitimate grant of nationality given by another state in such circumstances would be an effective one (since the individual could not use it effectively anyway under the current conditions of entrapment the Bedoun experience), would more likely be a contestable point of law. Nevertheless, Beaugrand’s (2010) suggestion is worth considering, as complicity may explain the silence of the other states to whom the Kuwaiti authorities continually claim the Bedoun belong.

Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah, the current Undersecretary for Citizenship and Passports Affairs at the Ministry of Interior, believes the program of forced identity erasure is perfectly legitimate. However, he has lamented that some Bedoun could not continuously obtain fraudulent passports for the *same* countries again and again, without gaps in between:

Some bedoons have already legalized their status and got Dominican, Somali and Yemeni citizenships, yet they have to keep their passports valid to be deemed legal residents.’ (Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah in, ‘Bedoons to Get’, 2015).

Interestingly, al Jarrah mentioned one nationality mentioned in each of the group of nationalities discussed in the WikiLeaks cable (US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514_a November 26, 2006, at 7), in al Waqayan (2009) and Beaugrand (2010). Here, the Ministry of Interior openly disclosed its approach that the Bedoun should be forced to acquire fraudulent identity documents, and that there is no regard for the effectiveness of citizenship or nationality attached to the document. Through the statement, the government of Kuwait implicated itself in the organised crime of human trafficking of the whole Bedoun population. Surely this statement gave the game away? The question arises as to why high
authorities can issue such bizarre public statements have never attracted the attention of international human rights agencies, nor academics who study Kuwait or the Middle East.


**Group 2: Politically significant associations**

In this section, I will address each country named in Group 2, Table E4, above.

**Iranian.** The ‘Iranian’ fifth column emerged from the alleged involvement of Iran in the assassination attempt on the Emir, which was linked to the stateless population. One individuals involved in the Emiri guard was a stateless person, who was killed protecting the Emir. The assassination took place in in May 1985. Alhajeri (2004) interviewed Ghanim Alnajjar about the matter in November 2002, about the ideas behind the ‘Iran’ accusation, noting that none of the reasons had ever been justified despite the accusation reaching international circulation as a ‘reason’ for the expulsion of the population in 1986.

The ‘Iranian cell’ factor became so significant that it has consistently overshadowed other political factors as a supposed rationale for the expulsion of the Bedoun in 1986, for example the debate over Law 100/1980 or the Bedouin representation in the National Assembly reaching over 50% in 1981 and 1984 (Alhajeri, 2004).

The notion continued to be developed with such certainty that it was later elevated to the level of political ‘theory’ by the US Embassy in Kuwait, classified under confidential ‘political affairs,’ ‘internal government affairs’:

Another theory points to a Bidoon [stateless] cell cooperating with Iran in the Iran-Iraq war that was discovered in 1986. This raised fears that the Bidoon, who made up as much as 80% of the military enlisted ranks, might constitute a fifth column. In any case, the Government began dismantling Bidoon rights… (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26).


**Iraqi.** The ‘Iraqi’ fifth column was claimed as a rationale for the abuse of the Bedoun after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, including killings and ethnic cleansing. The label, sign or symbol of the ‘Iraqi’ enemy has been used to kill the Bedoun en masse and it is linked to a number of ideological motifs of Kuwaiti nationalism, such as ‘defence against a common enemy’ and ‘sins of the fathers’ (Znaniecki, 1952a). To the extent that it was used to implement state-sanctioned terror (virtually equivalent to that
discussed regarding Palestinians, by Mason, 2010), a comparison with Palestinian persecution and ethnic cleansing during the same period, is warranted.

While Palestinians were cited to be collaborators with Iraqis, the Bedoun were cited as both collaborators with Iraqis, and also cited as being Iraqis, in government announcements. For example, state-sanctioned violence was related to attempts to force the Bedoun population into Iraq; partial transfer was achieved. Additionally, at the Abdali border camps, babies died after their parents were advised they were Iraqi and would be hanged if they attempted to return to Kuwait. See methods of violent ethnic cleansing 1990-1995, also called the ‘population restructuring’ program in Appendix F.

I raise concerns about significant population losses of Bedoun between 2010-2014, allocated ‘Iraqi’ through the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program, in Appendix G, iii, below. The attribution of ‘Iraqi’ nationality to the northern tribes Bedoun remains a significant, ‘live’ issue in Kuwaiti society, which I discuss in Chapter 6 and 7. It may be regarded as the most significant and dangerous label, sign or symbol of ethnic targeting used by authorities and ordinary members of society, to marginalize and stigmatize the Bedoun. The fact that this continues after the state of Kuwait had normalised its diplomatic relations with Iraq, emphasises the problem of the social causes and social maintenance of this sentiment.


Syrian. The royal family of Kuwait, the al Sabah, are apparently derived from the large al Anezi tribal confederation. The tribe are the only main tribe of Kuwait whose dirah (traditional tribal territory) is associated with Syria (see Appendix B, i). The government’s amplification of claims the Bedoun were Syrian coincided with Kuwait’s ‘Pledging Conferences’ to respond to the Syrian war from February 2013 (the first Pledging Conference, Kuwait donated $300 million) and the UNHCRs promotion of stateless Syrian children. In meetings with the European parliamentary group, Kuwaiti authorities emphasised the whole population does not belong in Kuwait and shifted the emphasis of their ‘origins’ to Syrian nationality. I did not observe that this occurred consistently over many years, but rather, the attribution appears to be very recent, taking advantage of the situation in Syria.

I raise concerns about significant population losses of Bedoun in 2014-2015, allocated ‘Syrian’ through the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program, in Appendix G, iii below.
Saudi Arabian. In Appendix G, iii, I discussed the typing and labelling of the Bedoun by the Central Apparatus. I made a quantitative comparison of ‘other national’ labelling of the Bedoun from 2010-2014 derived from the thematic analysis. Colonel al Wuhaib of the Central Apparatus announced that since 1986, a total of over 58,770 Bedoun were found to be ‘Saudi Arabian’ citizens (Nacheva, April 6, 2014). In 2010, the Supreme Planning Council Study had allocated no Bedoun (nil or zero) as Saudi Arabian, also taking their data from the beginning of the Bedoun’s ‘illegal’ status, December 26, 1986. There were no Saudi Arabian ‘nationals’ believed to be in the Bedoun population at that time. The recent claim of the Bedoun’s Saudi Arabian nationality occurred only through ‘status adjustment,’ which involved coercion.

Note that the Bedouin of the southern tribes are generally speaking, assumed to be of Saudi Arabian background. The claim that the Bedoun are of Saudi Arabian citizens, is closely associated with national debate and National Assembly conflict over Law 130/1986 regarding dual citizenship (see al Anezi, 1989) and previous author’s focus on al Haddad’s (1981) study of the Ajman. That study which revealed some of them held dual citizenship (al Haddad, 1981; repeated by Crystal, 1995, p.89 and others). The Ajman were related to both the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian royal families by marriage. Nevertheless, these issues concerned Kuwaiti Bedouin citizens and not the Bedoun.

One exception to this was Al Fayez (1984, p.249), who noted that the Ajman was one of many Kuwait’s northern tribes, and the northern tribes have characteristically been associated with the Bedoun. However, in this case, the reference does not seem to point to Saudi Arabia, so the point may have little relevance, other than to illustrate the different perspectives that can be taken when categorising the northern and southern tribes.

I raise concerns about the significant population influx of Bedoun between 2010-2014, allocated ‘Saudi Arabian’ through ‘status adjustment,’ in Appendix G, iii, below.

Appendix E, vi

Main Methods of Ascribing ‘Other Nationality’ to the Bedoun

The documentary analysis showed the following themes by which government used a range of different methods to ascribe ‘other nationality’ to the Bedoun. These are summarised below in Table E5, then discussed further. The five-year period of ‘benefits’ so often raised by government as an object of exchange in this program, is discussed below.

Table E5

Summary of the Methods of Ascribing ‘Other Nationality’ to the Bedoun Used by the Government of Kuwait

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Target population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Affidavit program – forced ‘confessions’</td>
<td>Thousands of military servicemen were targeted and forced to commit affidavit fraud. Deportation committees were run concurrently to expel those who would not submit</td>
<td>Bedoun military servicemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Government issued ID cards</td>
<td>Government ID cards</td>
<td>Military, policy and national guard servicemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Drivers’ licences</td>
<td>Drivers licences issued with false nationalities or ‘non-Kuwaiti’</td>
<td>All adult, Bedoun males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Letters program – procuring fake foreign passports</td>
<td>Government employees issued letters with notes. The note required they submit any ‘foreign’ passport from their (unnamed) embassy</td>
<td>All Bedoun government service employees, other than those in the military, police or national guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mass, bi-lateral population transfer</td>
<td>Multiple bi-lateral, international agreements enabling identity transfers to other states suggested by Beaugrand (2010). See also the Comoros Plan below</td>
<td>Bedoun military servicemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The passports program – fake foreign passports</td>
<td>Pressure on individuals to submit fake foreign passports. Contact details of traffickers provided by Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>All Bedoun male heads of household and their dependents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Marriage and divorce certificates</td>
<td>‘Other nationality’ required to be declared on marriage certificate documentation, with supply of fraudulent identity documents to</td>
<td>Newly married couples; divorcing couples</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Birth and death certificates

| ‘Other nationality’ required to be declared for the acquisition of a birth certificate and subsequently, school enrolment | Newborn babies and young children; the deceased (rationale to change their children’s nationality) |

9. Contracts and statements of obligation issued by the Central Apparatus

| Letters are sent by the Education Fund setting out their obligation to submit children to the ‘status adjustment’ or they will be issued debts for children’s schooling | Parents of children at school, Possibly older students and/or the whole population attempting to access Decree 409/2011 reforms |

10. The Comoros Plan

| Comorian passports issued by government providing ‘legal residents’ status for 5 years. The ‘nationality’ is contingent on passport renewal every 5 years | The whole population |

11. Those who resist ‘status adjustment’: The encampment option

| Segregation and encampment near Saudi Arabian border. Not yet government policy, but introduced by a member of parliament. | Those who engage in public expression about the Bedoun (intellectuals/social leaders); those who resist ‘status adjustment’ |

1. Affidavit Program – forced ‘confessions’

Military servicemen were required to sign affidavits to enable the Ministry of the Interior to change their nationality in a citizenship application program (Human Rights Watch, 2000). The program went for nine months. It pressured Bedoun men sign affidavits to ‘admit’ they had foreign citizenship, and to renounce their Kuwaiti identity. In return, five years of legal residency and access to public services was promised. Essentially, this provision was the ‘reason’ for official cessation of access to public services for Bedoun after five years, instead of the informal blanket ban on all Bedoun that was already in place. A special deportation committee was established at this time to manage the prosecution of individuals who did not transfer their nationality, due to the expected number of refusals (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

When the applications closed, individuals were threatened with mass deportations although Human Rights Watch (2000) was never able to establish that these deportations actually took place. However, this has certainly been a pattern – mass deportations threatened in 2012 were never documented by the organisation, but nor did they explain their own cutting back of resources to the Kuwait/Bedoun human rights portfolio after the threats were issued. Hence, lack of reporting by international humanitarian organisations should not be interpreted as the events, promised by the Ministry of Interior and other government
officials, failing to occur. Masses of ‘illegal migrants’ who are ‘other nationals’ have taken place since then under migrant deportation schemes. They may well include ‘re-nationalised’ (erased) stateless Bedoun, those recorded as other nationals, as a result of the Program. Humanitarian organisations have never attempted to deeply investigate the nexus of the ‘other nationals’ who are routinely deported from Kuwait in their hundreds and thousands, in order to establish if Bedoun are being deported en masse but listed on government records as expatriate, other national workers. There has never been a historical investigation into mass deportations that government had arranged for, at this time.

Participants in this study discussed the forced ‘resignations’ of their fathers from the military and police services, which included the same or similar pressures on individuals to claim a false nationality (P8, P16, P17). Nearly all of the participants in this study had a father in the military or police services and was forced to sign such resignation papers after they were expelled from their roles after the Iraq war, in order to receive their salaried benefits. They did not receive their entitlements in any case, while authorities added the signed documents of ‘other nationality’ to their security files.

Key sources: Human Rights Watch (2000, 2001); Participants 8, 16 and 17.

2. Government issued ID cards

Al Anezi (1989) helps to delineate the ‘two groups’ of Bedoun (discussed in Chapter 2), and the problem of the Bedouns lack of registration with government and/or lack of ability to prove their identity with appropriate official documentation in the late 1980s. In particular, he addressed policy changes that were applied to the National Identity Card (al Anezi, 1989, p.263) and drivers licences (p.263). Up until late 1983, Kuwaiti public policy regarded the Bedoun as ‘persons without Kuwaiti nationality’ and the term ‘Bedoun’ was used on official documents that stated their identity. That is, the term was used on official documents for those who could register with government and have their identity acknowledged as existing.

At this stage, only those Bedoun employed in the military, police or national guard carried National Identity Cards (al Anezi, p.266, n150, 267, n152). It was later established that other Bedoun could never obtain such documentation (Human Rights Watch, 2000) which the F.C.O. Kuwait (2007) called ‘undocumented Bedoun’ (in U.K. Home Office, 2009, 2014, 2016). As such, they were not initially targeted for ‘status adjustment’ in this program to change their national identity, because they lacked identity cards. They were targeted through the changes to drivers’ licenses and other programs.

From 1984, a policy change occurred, and the Bedoun were no longer allowed to use the term ‘Bedoun.’ According to al Anezi (1989, p.263), the new policy was to call the Bedoun as ‘non-Kuwaiti nationals’ on the identity cards (Manager of the Nationality Department, Ministry of Interior, in al Anbaa, 11 August, 1984; Minister of Justice in al Rai, 4 September, 1985).
However, he did not confirm his sighting of any cards stating this term. It appears that he had to rely on newspaper archives in which government authorities stated the policy (al Anezi, 1989, p.263). The significance of the change was that previously, the Bedoun were not referred to as nationals of any state, because they were stateless. The national policy remained that they would be granted citizenship in due course, based on the assumption that they belonged to the main tribes of Kuwait (al Anezi, 1989, p.263). The new policy referred to the Bedoun as ‘nationals’ of other states.

Two points are salient here, because we do not know if the use of the term was implemented on the cards as the researcher alluded to. By 1986-1987, just two years later, government was pressuring other Bedouns in the public service to supply foreign passports to prove this ‘other nationality,’ as the policy was rolled out to those other Bedouns not in the military services, the police force or the national guard, but employed in other parts of the government service. This action was to enable the Apparatus to label identity documents with a specific nationality label that matched evidence collected in the Bedoun security files.

The second point is that the Ministry of Interior acknowledged that its practice was that the agency itself determined the specific nationality label to be used on the Bedouns official identity documents issued by other Ministries, including birth, death, marriage and divorce certificates based on secret investigations and research (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7). This appears to have been the standard policy from at least 1986 to 2011. Government claimed that the Bedoun could use the term ‘non-Kuwaiti’ national on all of these documents plus drivers’ licenses, from 2011, as part of Decree 409/2011 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p. 3, 4), as it had historically forced specific national labels on documents. The Decree emanated from Bedoun community protest actions and negotiations with government in the Arab Spring.

For both of these reasons, it is reasonable to conclude that perhaps ‘non-Kuwaiti’ was the policy, but not the actual label that was used on the documents, and that the specific (false) nationality had to be stated from 1984 when the policy was rolled out. But either way, we know that the Apparatus was seeking the specific (but false) nationality label to be stated at all costs, due to the policies contained in the administrative expulsion of 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003) which sought to switch the Bedouns’ identity to that of illegal expatriate workers (who needed to appear to have arrived recently from another country), and the existence of the affidavits program and the letters program (see Table E5, above).

It is also worth asking, was the policy implemented across all types identity documentation issued by government to this registered group of Bedoun (those in the military, police or national guard and their immediate families)? Al Anezi (1989) did not indicate that the policy did not apply to those documents, or was only limited to the two
document types he mentioned (identification cards and drivers licences) but rather, that he was simply aware the policy was carried out on the two forms of identification that he mentioned.


3. Drivers licences

Al Anezi (1989) discussed the change of policy for naming the Bedoun ‘non-Kuwaiti nationals’ (of other states) on identity and drivers licenses (p.263). The policy was passed through government in 1983, and implanted in 1984 (see discussion of Identity Cards, above). The author did not clarify which group were affected by the change to drivers licences.

I have pointed out that al Anezi (1989) described two groups of Bedoun, one who were more able to identify themselves due to their registration with government and one who were unable to acquire documents. I am not sure how members of the second group would have obtained the drivers licence in this case, if they did not have other identification for the licence registration process. Therefore, we might tentatively assume that this measure applied only to the first group, those members of the military, the police and national guard.

In any case, the author also noted that by 1989, drivers’ licences were not being replaced (al Anezi, 1989, p.267, n153) and that other discriminatory measures had been implemented, but did not name them (p.267). By the end of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Bedoun could not obtain virtually any kind of documents from government that might state their identity because ethnic cleansing had been implemented in earnest.

Source: Al Anezi, p.263, n132, p.267, n152.

4. Letters program to procure foreign passports

The next program to ‘adjust status’ of the Bedoun, it appears to have commenced some time from 1985 to 1987. Following nationality re-labelling on military servicemen’s identity cards, and Bedoun men’s divers’ licenses, other government service employees were targeted (except employees in the military, police and national guard). According to al Anezi (1989, p.266-267, n152), all Bedoun government service employees, other than those in the military, police or national guard, were sent letters by the under-secretary of the ministries in which they were employed (al Anezi, p.267). The notes stated that if they disclosed their ‘original nationality’ and obtained passports from their respective embassies, the government would facilitate their legal residence in Kuwait. If they did not comply, their employment would cease. Al Anezi (1989) left an important two important clues. First, he
stated an ‘original nationality’ (p.266) was required to be stated by the Bedoun, following the policy. However, when he came to explain the letters (p.267 n151) there was no request to state ‘original nationality’ but rather, the note instructed to servicemen to get a foreign passport. Second, he stated that no embassy was nominated on the letter, indicating that government did not know the nationality of the individuals (because they were stateless).

The notes were accompanied by a letter from the undersecretary of the Ministry concerned, to the undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, on behalf of the Bedoun individual. The letters were sent in a strange, back-handed manner. Therefore, it is worth quoting al Anezi (1989):

A letter was sent by the under-secretary of the Ministry concerned to the under-secretary of the Ministry of the Interior asking him to grant the stateless person concerned a residence permit for five years provided that he produced a valid passport from his embassy. The letter was accompanied by a note to the stateless person asking him to obtain a passport from his embassy (no mention of the name of the embassy) and send it to the Ministry of the Interior in order to obtain the residence permit. (al Anezi, p.267, n151)

The letter requested a grant of legal residence permit for a five-year period in return for the production of a valid passport from the individual’s embassy. No particular embassy was named, indicating government had no knowledge of any nationality held by the individual (al Anezi, 1989, p.266-267, n152).

The letter was sent with ‘a note to the stateless person’ requesting them to obtain a passport from his embassy and to send it to the Ministry of the Interior to obtain a residence permit (Al Anezi, 1989, p.267, n152). That is, the government instructed the stateless individuals to obtain a foreign passport to avoid losing their government employment (and associated benefits such as their pension accrual). Clearly, this practice was associated with the text of the 1986 expulsion decree, which claimed to intend to demand individuals ‘show their passports’ under procedures for organising ‘migrant’ residency. The informality of the ‘note’ is curious. What was expected of the Bedoun (men with little formal education) on receiving it? Would they think that the authorities wanted them to go to any embassy? Or would they think that the authorities wanted them to go to a local document trafficker?

Those who attempted to obtain nationality from other country authorities in an attempt to obtain a passport, who were unsuccessful with the attempt because they were Bedoun, were then found guilty of providing false information to the Kuwait government: for having registered as a Bedoun when they were nationals of the country to which they had applied for that nationality, other suitable documents, or a passport (see Beaugrand 2010, p.161-162, who provided a case example given R. H. al Anezi, 13 December, 2005, in personal interview). Of course, the nationality was not ever established by the court, the
nationality was assumed proven by the judge, and the verdict of guilt cancelled out their ‘edibility’ to gain citizenship. It is worth noting that by this time, the Bedoun men began to be directed to fraudulent passport sellers by employees at the Central Apparatus, who became virtually institutionalised there (al Waqayan, 2009; WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26).


5. Mass, bi-lateral population transfer program

Around 4,000 members of the military services had previously ‘changed’ their identity status under instructions from the government of Kuwait. They seem to have been unaware of their involvement in an illegal scam to change their identity in order to keep their jobs (al Waqayan, 2009; see also al Waqayan in interview with Beaugrand, 2010). If we consider their cultural background, which imbues great loyalty to their superiors, their lack of formal education, and the culture of the military services, this seems feasible, though we cannot be certain. Either way, individuals would have had been given little choice in the matter by their employer. This strategy seemed to apply to the employees of the military forces only. It appears to have been linked to the 1993 National Assembly legislation, which expelled stateless men from the security services (military, police, national guard) (Human Rights Watch, 1995), but not necessarily to the affidavit program which targeted the military servicemen (see above), as both al Waqayan (2009) and Beaugrand (2010) indicated that fraudulent passports were involved.

According to al Waqayan (2009) and Beaugrand (2010), this program appears to have been run some years after the first passport program (based on official letters of demand) that targeted all Bedoun government service employees. It seems to have involved quite some level of in-depth, practical cooperation between the Ministry of Interior and the Department of Defence, and to have been known to the National Assembly, as al Waqayan (2009) obtained was exposed to the program as a government researcher. The actual method of changing nationality was not clear. Therefore, I am not sure if the group were simply listed on government ‘security’ files under different nationalities in a very basic form of administrative cleansing such as the shift of the population on the National Census in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994; see also Appendix D, iii), or if there was organised signing of documents, such as the affidavits program, or organised trafficking in fraudulent passports, initiated by the first program that targeted the whole population with letters of demand for ‘foreign’ passports.

The type of identity documentation used for the process is unclear – it seems likely the documents were affidavits, but they may have been any kind of document. I have
collected anecdotal evidence from Bedouns in Kuwait that they are often told to sign pieces of paper with statements printed on them that claim they have another nationality, when they visit Central Apparatus offices. The form of the statements is characterised by its quasi-formality – it does not appear to be an actual affidavit, but the emphasis is on the Bedoun signing documents, perhaps any kind of document, to ‘admit’ their ‘true identity’ or ‘original nationality.’ It is possible that the transfer of identity took place directly on the government database, as even today, it is commonplace for government to claim it holds ‘secret’ data on the Bedouns ‘real,’ ‘original’ nationality in individuals’ ‘security file,’ though no documentary proof has even been provided by the state in a public forum, that such proofs exist.

Beaugrand’s (2010, p.155) analysis regarding bi-lateral government agreements tends to indicate the latter. According to Beaugrand (2010) the negotiations comprised ‘secret,’ bilateral agreements signed between Kuwait and other states including Eritrea, Liberia, the Dominican Republic and others nations to transfer the identity of the Bedoun (p.155). Beaugrand (2010) did not produce evidence to convince readers of her suggestion, and she was inclined to cast aspersions about secret business through her research work (including in the opening statement of her thesis) without much substantiation. Since then, discussion of the Comoros Plan has led to the realisation that any genuine citizenship offered by other states would be ineffective for the Bedoun, and hence legally useless, since they cannot exercise the citizenship due to travel restrictions, re-entry restrictions, and the fact that the citizenship offered bears no relation to their identity.

Additionally, more knowledge about the fraudulent identity trafficking industry in Kuwait has emerged (Abrahamian, 2015; WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26), which is discussed below under point 4. This gives cause to believe the nationalities are merely labels, since the passports are frauded. Another reason that we can fairly safely assume the nationality labels are ‘just labels’ and not effective nationality - continually overlooked by Beaugrand (2010, 2014b) and other researchers, and perhaps this is the most substantive one, is that nationality labelling is a basic method of erasure programs (administrative ethnic cleansing). The method has been used recently to erase Albanians (Dedic, 2003; Dedic in Weissbrodt, 2008) and Romas (Sigona, 2003), and the method tends to be used precisely for illegitimate identity transfers for whole target populations. The issue wherein al Jarrah outlines the Central Apparatus demand that Bedouns repeatedly engage in the crime of obtaining fake passports or a citizenship that is not theirs over many years – potentially their adult lives - adds to the crime of erasure.

Key Sources: al Waqayan (2009); Beaugrand (2010); Weissbrodt (2008); WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514 (2006, November 26).

6. The passports program for more fake, foreign passports
Another program was run out of the offices of the Central Apparatus offices that dealt directly with the Bedoun population, who are obliged to report regularly to such offices. This seems to be a fairly standard, ongoing program and perhaps the most common approach of all those listed in Table E5, above. Again, the program involved forcing Bedoun men, albeit using a different method, to obtain a foreign passport, and to submit it to the Central Apparatus office for copying and inclusion on the recipients ‘security file.’ The program has led to the proliferation of the fraudulent documentation industry in Kuwait, and it has also promoted the people-trafficking industry. This has led to an expanded relationship with organised crime and the international movement of enslaved labour (Abrahamian, 2015). According to WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26,

The situation has become ridiculous, with many Bidoon holding counterfeit passports from places such as the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Liberia and Nigeria just so they can get the papers necessary to go about their lives. The Human Rights Society accuses the GOK [government of Kuwait] of actually posting ads in ECIR [Executive Committee for Illegal Residents] headquarters for shops that provide fake passports. (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26, Kuwait’s Bidoon (Stateless Residents): Background and Update [italics added])

The reference to necessary papers, means birth certificates, marriage certificates, and the other personal identity documents discussed herein. According to the program procedures, these documents would have been listed with the nationality on the fake passport, as the nationality on the official Kuwaiti-government issued documents. And herein lies the irony, that the fake identity documents that the Bedoun are forced to procure, are then used as an excuse by the Central Apparatus, to create more fake identity documents.

These programs in general, were acknowledged at the United Nations speech to the Human Rights Committee at Kuwait’s most recent universal periodic review, on 30 January 2015, by Ms Eman al Nasser, the Head of the Technical Office at the Central Agency for Remediying of the Illegal Residents’ Status. Note that I have already addressed the fact that government was aware the Bedoun were stateless:

Al-Nasser said that the government labels those people as “illegal residents” in accordance with the Central Agency’s foundation decree No 467 of 2010. “They were labelled so because they violated foreigners’ residency law No 17 of 1959 which necessities the possession of a valid passport to get a residency permission. They have concealed their original passports on a false belief that this would qualify them to get the Kuwaiti citizenship,” she said. (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015)
Here, al Nasser provided the official rationale for the program directed to international audiences. The details of the domestic version are somewhat different, but features the same ideology of the ‘illegal,’ ‘other national.’ The domestic version points to the fact that the Ministry of the Interior is constructing the illegality itself (by requiring the Bedoun to engage in document fraud, via a false nationality declaration), by which it claims the Bedoun can become ‘legal’ residents in Kuwait. It blatantly instructs the Bedoun to commit a crime of identity fraud which implicates other states, in order to legalise their identity for its own administrative purposes. What is always absent, is proof government knows the ‘original nationality’ and the existence of an ‘original passport’ – the exception to this is military servicemen who were issued Kuwaiti passports up until the 1980s, which were their ‘original passports.’

A comparison of the international dialogue and the domestic dialogue regarding the Bedouns’ requirement to obtain and submit fake passports is instructive, as it helps to unpack the ideological motifs and strategies of implementation. In this context, the quote shown above can be contrasted with a statement from Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah, regarding the knowledge of the Ministry of Interior and the function of the Central Apparatus, where he sets out the requirement for Bedouns to repeatedly acquire fake foreign passports, in order to keep them ‘valid:’

Some bedoons have already legalized their status and got Dominican, Somali and Yemeni citizenships, yet they have to keep their passports valid to be deemed legal residents.’ (Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah in, ‘Bedoons to Get’, 2015).

Note al Jarrah’s reference to some of the same states as mentioned in the WikiLeaks Cable and the other programs above, in somuch as the Ministry of Interior demands proofs of identity with a foreign passport, a document that would obviously facilitate his Ministry’s deportation of a Bedoun. His high position as Undersecretary deems his statement most authoritative. Impressive photographs of Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah are frequently printed in Kuwaiti newspapers accompanying his statements, going about his important official duties inside the Apparatus offices with his junior staff, or in military-style portraits, enhancing the official look of the statements. But furthermore, al Jarrah’s statement illustrates the point that the concept of the Bedoun having ‘original nationality’ or ‘original passports’ (al Nasser in ‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015) is inauthentic (bogus), because one of the priorities of the program is to force the Bedoun to adopt identities of countries to which the Bedoun have no plausible connection – Libya, Somalia and so on. Additionally, the possibility that effective nationality (one which the said country recognises) or a ‘real’ citizenship is provided by those other states (as al Jarrah alluded to above) does not cancel out the fact that the
statement proves the government was always aware that the ‘original nationality’ concept is false – any passport will do, as long as it is not a Kuwaiti one. The prospect that other states have been complicit in ‘status adjustment’ as Beaugrand (2010) and al Jarrah (above) imply, simply broadens the crime. I discuss this prospect below.

One more point about al Jarrah’s statement deserves attention. He connects ‘citizenship’ to the acquisition of the passport. His claim that citizenship has been obtained in other countries because they ‘legalised their status’ is misleading – ‘legalised their status’ refers to Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ procedures, not the countries attached to the passports (we know this because Kuwaitis MPs complain in the National Assembly that the Apparatus has never shown proof of Bedoun citizenship in other states: see for example, comments by MP Hassan Jawhar in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014 and MP Hammoud al Hamdan in Izzak, November 14, 2014, below). Yet al Jarrah seems to have implied that citizenship in those countries flowed from acquisition of the passports (most of us will be aware that it works the other way around for genuine passports). Later, he directly contradicts this view, when it applies to Kuwait rather than to other nations:

Passports provided by Kuwaiti officials to stateless people function just as travel documents, and not documents of citizenship. (General Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah, in MENA Report, May 10, 2016)

Al Jarrah refuted his own statement that citizenship was tied to the country stated on the passport (in ‘Bedoons to Get,’ 2015).

Finally, it should be remembered that due to Kuwaiti law, the targeting of heads of households means that all family members are affected by changes to the identity of the male head of household. Legally, the head of household is responsible for all of its members except adult males. This includes all wives and male and female children under the age of twenty-one, plus any adult females who are unmarried or widowed. Thus, when an individual male is made to submit to ‘status adjustment,’ the legal status of whole families is affected. Future generations of children - the unborn Bedoun - are also impacted.


7. Marriage and Divorce Certificates

Government’s open disclosure of its practice of pre-filling marriage and divorce certificates with nationalities it determined as a result of its own ‘investigations,’ emerged in 2011 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Right Watch, 2011, p.7; Reply of
Government of Kuwait to the Human Rights Committee, 17 October – 4 November, 2011. In this section, I will elaborate on marriage certificates, and the issue’s overlap with the problem of birth certificates.

Al Waqayan (2009, p.30-32, 44) documented the problem for the Bedoun who attempted to marry. Bedoun have to file their applications in court to have their contracts of marriage registered. The process can take years to be processed through the court system, if the contract is recognized at all. Al Waqayan (2009) discussed the situation whereby many Bedoun were compelled to respond to government pressure to adopt false nationalities in order to obtain documents that would be recognised (though they were false or illegally acquired) in order for their marriage to be recognized by the Ministry of Justice in Kuwait. Crucially, the issue of marriage certificates was also connected to health care, leading not only to insufficiently registered marriages, but also to obstacles in relation to the admission/exit/procedures related childbirth (interview with female manager of al Jahra hospital in al Waqayan, 2009, p.30-31). In other words, al Waqayan (2009) described the ‘status adjustment’ program as an incentive to enable children’s births to be registered, where government otherwise interfered with birth registration by refusing to issue a correct birth certificate (Weissbrodt, 2009 analysed this as a breach of international law).

Al Waqayan (2009) described a process of the humiliation was inflicted on Bedoun men obstructed from collecting their wife and child from the maternity department of hospitals after birth, because their marriage certificate had not been granted by the courts due to delays, or due to the certificate containing wrong information – a false nationality. Group (2012) described the inter-connection between marriage and birth certificates and the education system in Kuwait. However, due to the very personal nature of the issue, authors have been quite brief in relaying details of how this system works. Some interviewees assisted me in understanding the complex processes, but few would do so in recorded interview, due to the humiliation they felt describing their own experiences. Understandably, no one wanted to talk about how this problem affected them, as it cut into the cultural significance of the importance of legitimate (official) forms of lineage in Bedouin and Muslim culture. Hence, the high rate of unmarried Bedoun; many interviewees stated that they did not want to entertain this life path, having seen the effects on their older brothers or sisters.

The obstacle of lack of marriage certificate or the dreadful compromise of accepting a certificate stating the wrong nationality, subsequently impacted the child in the course of their life, including enrolment in school (discussed below). In this section, I discuss the connection between marriage and birth documentation impacting immediate, practical concerns raised by al Waqayan (2009) – taking the wife and child home from hospital. If the couple were stateless, or the male spouse stateless, they might not have a valid marriage
certificate. As I have mentioned, this was most often due to delays in processing (al Waqayan, 2009) or, because the wrong information was recorded on the certificate by the issuing authority, the Ministry of Justice, leading to the couple having to appeal the decision due to a mistake on the certificate or to reject it. If the couple did not have a valid marriage certificate, he could not take his wife and child home from hospital after the child was born. Although this would be the case for any family in Kuwait according to local law, it affected the Bedoun especially, because they are not issued official documents that state their real identity. The Ministry of the Interior determines the nationality, then coordinates with other state departments to ensure that the nationality section of the paperwork is actually pre-filled with the Bedoun individuals’ nationality (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7). Thus, the Bedoun often have no documents at all, because they do not accept the incorrect documents, or documents stating false nationality. But the case of the marriage certificate is one of the most troubling, as delays in processing it then also affected the ability of the parents to obtain birth certificates.

Al Waqayan (2009) explained that the marriage certificate would not be issued until application to the family court, which set aside time for perusal of the marriage contract. If the contract was not approved by the time the baby was born, a birth certificate could not be issued for the child by the Ministry of Health. The hospital staff would have to make some kind of concession to enable the wife and child to be released by the hospital in lieu of the certificate. Al Waqayan (2009) did not state what the concession was, other than it was humiliating for the male spouse. Thus, the crucial issue that arose was the delay in providing approval of the marriage contract by the Family Court.

P8 provided an example of how this works during her recounting her everyday life, and the hardships of her brothers and sisters. She pointed out that the process of registering a marriage was not guaranteed for the Bedoun. Therefore although she did not explicitly state it, her narrative implied that the traditional ceremony took place and the couple commenced life as a married couple while waiting for the marriage certificate to be processed. The process posed great difficulty if couples subsequently became pregnant. Cultural expectations would have it that the wife should become pregnant as soon as possible after marriage, complicating matters further. P8 recalled her sister having given birth to two children while waiting for the marriage to be recognised. Because the marriage was not recognised, the birth certificates could not be issued (regardless of whether they were correct or incorrectly pre-filled). The first time the court refused the application, and the couple then had to lodge an appeal. The appeal decision was not handed down until the oldest child was six or seven years old.

The failure of the state to provide legitimate marriage certificates in a timely fashion flowed on to difficulties with hospital administration related to at least two areas that I could
discern. First, the ability of the wife to prove her marriage and therefore her right to be released into the care of her husband. Second, the ability of parents to acquire a birth certificate, and therefore the father’s right to have the newborn child released to him (in Kuwaiti law, he is the legal guardian of both wife and child; the guardianship of the child is not shared at this stage).

The reason why interviewees suggested the only possible way to bypass this problem, was to not get married at all, was based on cultural practices. Young adult men and women usually cannot socialise together in private, unless they are close family members and/or married. Study and work places provided alternative outlets for alternative social practices, but these are public and risk observation by onlookers who may report back to family networks. Often children are made quite aware who their parents expect them to marry when they are young, noting that the Bedouin had traditionally preferred early, arranged marriages within the family. For those who attempt to cross these boundaries without parental consent, the consequences can be devastating. They are highly unlikely to secure permission to marry the preferred spouse from their parents afterward, and they may never be approached for marriage by anyone else if anyone outside the family finds out. There may be a call for retribution over lost honour, or reluctant agreement with quarrelling over the bride price. Hence, there is no period of dating or engagement where the couple could develop a socially recognised relationship before marriage.

I wondered about cultural ‘adaptations’ – why were interviewees quite fixed about their viewpoint on this subject but not others, and how could couples get around this problem? Perhaps changing the order of the ceremonies - an engagement period where the marriage contract could be lodged with authorities prior to a traditional marriage ceremony? But interviewees pointed out that sometimes the marriage contract was not approved by the court, and then couples would have to appeal and/or obtain another contract and apply to the Family Court again. Thus the process could go on for an indefinite length of time. The process was not only timely, it was expensive, and most Bedoun could not afford to make multiple applications. Hence, the prospect of marriage and starting a family was most daunting. But only other option, the ‘choice’ not to marry (if the relinquishment of one’s right to found a family can be viewed as a choice) also attracted long term social oppression. Other than killing the Bedoun in the early 1990s, this aspect of population control was probably the most effective in oppressing the community that I have discussed in this research. It was set out in the 1986 expulsion document (‘The Study,’ 2003).

Key sources: al Waqayan (2009); Group 29 (2012)

8. Birth and death certificates

Government’s open disclosure of its practice of pre-filling birth and death certificates with nationalities it determined as a result of its own ‘investigations,’ emerged in
In this section, I will discuss the issue of government’s issue of incorrect birth certificates, and the issues’ overlap with the problem of school enrolment.

Up to 2011, birth certificates issued required a nationality to be provided, but ‘Kuwaiti’ was prohibited from being recorded by stateless people (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7). Government stated the following statistics pertaining to Bedoun birth certificates over the five year period from 2006 to 2011 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7):

- Birth certificates accepted: 3608
- Birth certificates rejected: 12,471

Bedoun claims proper birth certificates were not issued by government were not fully understood in the light of this policy. Birth certificates were issued, but they were intentionally incorrect, as part of the attempt to carry out erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing) on the Bedoun. Parents had to submit to ‘status adjustment’ of their newborn babies in order to have a birth registered. The Ministry of Interior determined the nationality that would be stated on the birth certificate. The Ministry would then advise the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Health would ensure the ‘nationality’ section on the form was pre-filled with the nationality. The birth certificate issued would state that nationality – incorrectly. Parents were then asked to sign for the document, which was interpreted as ‘acceptance’ of the nationality stated on the document. If the parents had not submitted to ‘status adjustment,’ the child’s birth certificate would state a different nationality to their own.

The phenomenon of resistance to ‘status adjustment’ within the Bedoun community has not been studied before, and warrants further research about the Bedouns’ viewpoints and experiences. As with the issue of marriage certificates, it is a very personal area of discussion which attracts shame, and the community is reluctant to talk about the concrete details which affect them, but less reluctant to describe the system hypothetically or using examples about others’ experience. It may be assumed that many more thousands of parents refused the inauthentic birth certificates going back to 1986, when the measures were first introduced in official policy (‘The Study,’ 2003).

The birth certificate was required for enrolment in school. Thus in late 2014 when undocumented Bedoun children were banned from school, MP Hassan Jawhar linked the program of targeting children for ‘status adjustment’ to their inability to acquire an accurate birth certificate and to enrol in schools (‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). Where Bedoun parents did not accept a false nationality label on a birth certificate, the certificate was not issued. Staff at the registry filled in the nationality and left the certificate for parents to
collect. In 2011, the government had explained that parents never collected the certificates, leading to the ‘rejected’ statistic cited above.

But the reforms have been used as a means to exclude rather than to include the Bedoun from primary and secondary school in Kuwait. Kuwaiti MP Humoud al Hamdan openly claimed that the requirement set out in Decree 409/2011 ‘human rights reforms’ that any Bedoun must be registered with the Central Apparatus in order to access school enrolment, was used as a pretext to deprive the Bedoun of education. The pretext enabled the Central Apparatus to pressure private schools to reject all enrolment applications from unregistered Bedoun children, and not as a reform through which education was provided (Izzak, November 15, 2014). Why? Because it was virtually common knowledge that Bedoun children were not issued with correct birth certificates, and therefore they had none.

In Kuwait, the knowledge that the Bedoun were rejecting false birth certificates was implicit, which is why it tends to not be clearly stated, even in MP statements. Nevertheless, the MPs refer to the broader program of ‘status adjustment’ as the cause of the problem. Both the accounts of MP Hassan Jawhar and MP Humoud al Hamdan, published in November 2014 (Tough Requirements,’ 2014 and Izzak, November 15, 2014 respectively), were utterly consistent with my personal communications with the Bedoun community about this issue in October, 2014. The Bedouns resistance to ‘status adjustment’ on birth certificates was used to ban children from commencing or continuing primary school; the ‘solution’ posed by government was for the children to be submitted to ‘adjustment’ – all the parents had to do was sign for the birth certificate, and the false nationality (labelling) would be recorded as accepted.

During the national debate over these bans from September 2014, community advocates explained that the previous policy requiring ‘original nationality’ remains is entrenched and continued after the introduction of Decree 409/2011 reforms ((H. al Fadhli, personal communications, October 19, 2014, January 14, 2015; a parent with children affected by the ban in personal communications, October 21, 2014). The procedure whereby departments of government coordinated under the authority of the Central Apparatus to issue of birth, marriage and death certificates with nationalities pre-filled on the form, was described in Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.7, at 2.). According to the Ministry of Interior, the option of being listed as ‘non-Kuwaiti’ as had been provided for in Decree 409/2011 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights, 2011). But the Bedoun explained that this option had not been made available, because as far as the Central Apparatus was concerned, the false nationality had already been determined and allocated.

The practice of the Bedoun being forced to accept a nationality - but not a Kuwaiti one - had always been the general practice since the 1980s, and it remained so. The Central
Apparatus and other government areas still asserted that ‘secret’ files held information about ‘original nationality’ and that the original nationality was selected for inclusion on the official identity documents, without consulting the applicant. The applicants were then given the option of viewing the documents, or not, but Bedoun advocates deny this. Either way, the false declaration of nationality ‘discovered’ by the Central Apparatus, was entered onto the government database and shared with all departments. The Apparatus supplied the nationality to the Ministry of Health for birth and death certificates, and the Ministry of Justice for marriage certificates.

Key sources: Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.7); MP Hassan Jawhar in ‘Tough Requirements,’ (2014); H. al Fadhli (personal communications, October 19, 2014, January 14, 2015); Bedoun parent with children affected by the bans (personal communications, October 21, 2014); Participants 10 and 11 in this study whose own birth certificates were ‘adjusted’ by the Apparatus to different nationalities from each other.

9. Contracts and statements of obligation issued by the Central Apparatus

‘Other nationality’ was to be provided in return for Education Fund support (Group 29, 2012). The rules were ‘bent’ to enrol Bedoun children without nationality. Although I have criticized some aspects of the organisation, Group 29 (2012) provided some sound case studies in their research. The organisation presented evidence that the Education Fund was involved with the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program by attempting to force Bedoun parents to sign contract-like documents submitting to changing their children’s identity (submitting to ‘status adjustment’) in return for attending school (that should be provided for free by the state according to international law). The parents were then sent letters, reminding them of their obligation to submit children to the ‘status adjustment’ or they would be billed directly for fees by the private schools (who could then sue them) (Group 29, 2012, p.50-51). I have called this the process ‘contracts and statement of obligation.’

Pressure was applied by school administrators, who must collect the document stating false nationality. The funding is a Decree 409/2011 ‘service,’ which is supposed to be a ‘human right’ according to government. Members of the Bedoun community pointed out that this was a common method used by the Apparatus in regards to school enrolment, which entered the equation after parents had negotiated directly with schools to enrol their children. They also emphasised that the Ministry of Interior pressures the schools to pressure the parents, to collect the documents.

It is possible that this method is used for enrolments in other parts of the education sector, or for all types of access to Decree 409/2011, of which there are eleven ‘services,’ ‘benefits, ‘facilities’ or human rights (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights
The example showed what was tantamount to entrapment in debt for education as well as entrapment in the procedures of ‘status adjustment.’ If the child’s family did not subsequently submit to the erasure of their identity, they would be billed directly for the school fees. Again, we see the desperation of government in trying to collect ‘proofs’ of false nationalities, such as the passports and affidavits.

Key source: Group 29 (2012).

10. The Comoros Plan

The Comoros plans proposes that Comorian passports issued by government would provide ‘legal residents’ status for 5 years, including access to a package of benefits, which comprise basic public services. This ‘sells’ Decree 409/2011 human rights reforms to the Bedouin in return for ‘status adjustment’ and a Comorian passport. Recipient are classed as having voluntarily relinquished any rights in law to Kuwaiti citizenship. The passport have to be renewed every 5 years. Government has offered to give out the residents permit for free. Essentially, this is the same system as all the programs which rely on fake passports of any nationality, but it forces the whole population to submit to erasure with one nationality. The key difference is the endorsement by the government of the Comoros Islands. It is the second-generation version of the mass, bi-lateral population transfer that was taken up by the United Arab Emiratis government around 2008, to deport a few hundred stateless Emiratis (above).

On May 19, 2014, an announcement was made that officials in the Central Apparatus and the Citizenship and Passports Department of the Ministry of Interior of Kuwait had met three weeks earlier with representatives of the Comorian government to discuss the Comoros plan for ‘economic citizenship’ in Kuwait (‘Kuwait, Comoros,’ 2014). According to a Central Apparatus official, the plan stipulated that the Comorian government must recognize the Bedouin as their own nationals, and agree to accept all Bedouns deported from Kuwait who had committed crimes. Additionally, the project would commence with a mass transfer of 1,900 individuals on its database, to Comorian nationality. In response to criticism, Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah, the Undersecretary for Citizenship and Passports Affairs, announced that there were no plans to deport all Bedouns (‘Kuwait, Comoros,’ 2014). A ‘high level diplomatic source’ told al Rai in May 18, 2014, that Kuwait ‘will not hesitate to take any route that leads to ending this dilemma for once and for all.’ The stipulation that the government of the Comoros would have ‘receive’ transfer (deportation) of individuals deemed to be ‘criminals’ by Kuwait (Kuwait, Comoros,’ 2014), implied the Comoros Islands Plan was to be transformed into Kuwaiti penal colony.

In considering the concept of deportation of criminals to the island, the mass criminalisation of the Bedouin since the Arab Spring, particularly of those who are eligible for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959) of Kuwait and the Constitution of Kuwait
(the green identity type, discussed in Appendix D, iv), is salient. The whole population was deemed ‘illegal’ and having breached Kuwait’s migration law in 1986, when the administrative expulsion was implemented. The colour-coding criminal labelling inherent to the ‘new’ identity types in the ‘status adjustment’ program as at 2012, left all but approximately 15,000 criminally labelled (Nacheva, April 7, 2014), progressively reduced to 8,000 (according to al Jarrah in ‘Bedoons to get,’ 2015). Additionally, between 2012 and 2016, the vast majority of Bedoun eligible to receive citizenship had been issued ‘security restrictions’ (21,000), regarded as equivalent to criminal offences by the government of Kuwait (Kuwait Plans,’ 2013; ‘Magnetic cards,’ 2012; Colonel Mohammed al Wuhaib, in Saleh, February 9, 2014) ‘Security restrictions’ were applied on multiple occasions to the target’s security file, or to any family member of the target. Thus, the Bedoun are subject to multiple layers of criminalisation (see discussion about the targeting this group with citizenship deprivation, criminalisation and potential deportation, in Appendix G, iii). But if we consider the 1986 expulsion measures (‘The Study, 2003), the whole population of Bedoun are regarded as ‘illegal residents’ as a matter of public policy. Therefore, it appears that government may find it well within their means to interpret the provision for the deportation of criminals as applying to the vast majority, if not the whole of the population, if it desired to do so.

The scheme was again widely publicized just a few weeks after the community had been affected by bans on children without birth certificates commencing school, reported in The Kuwait Times by al Hajji (2014) on October 14, 2014, in 600 Bedoon children denied admission to local schools. Government officials spoke to journalists on and off the record about the scheme on November 9, 2014, in MPs Hit ‘Comoros’ Bid to Paper-Over Bedoun Issue (November 9, 2014 in The Arab Times), Few Takers Seen for Costly Comoros Citizenship Scheme: AI Slams Proposal (November 10, 2014, in The Arab Times), and Kuwait’s Stateless Bidoon Offered Comoros Citizenship (November 10, 2014, in BBC News Middle East). In the local media, questions were raised about the level of commitment to this plan, and its plausibility.

On November 5, 2014, MP Faisal al Duwaisan very openly explained that government had now itself proved the implausibility of their claim that the Bedoun had ever had other ‘original’ nationalities and that it had misled members of parliament for decades (‘Government to Offer,’ 2014 in The Kuwait Times). He reminded the government that it had never been able to prove the group had the alternative nationalities it had claimed since the 1980s, and nor had the government been able to acquire the associated deportation permissions from those countries, to return its nationals. He accused government of misleading National Assembly over the past decades, and challenged it to deport any Bedoun individual to the nations it had claimed they were nationals of. Al Duwaisan also declared
that he would file a motion to question the Prime Minister directly if he attempted to implement the Comoros Plan (in Kuwait, this is known as a ‘grilling’ session, where members of government or parliament are held to account for corruption in public) (‘Government to Offer,’ 2014). The Comoros Plan has been linked to business deals among some of Kuwait’s most senior government officials, including the Prime Minister (Abrahamian, 2015) and it is quite clear that mass deportation of the Bedoun to the country, could inevitably become personally profitable for those officials. The business incentive of mass deportation of the Bedoun warrants was discussed by Sloan (November 11, 2014).

On March 28, 2016, The Kuwait Times reported that two MPs had given conflicting accounts of whether or not the transfer of the Bedouns to Comorian nationality had been discussed during a Kuwaiti parliamentary delegations’ visit to the islands one week earlier (‘MPs Conflicted,’ 2016). The Head of the delegation, Saud al Huraiji, denied the issue was discussed, but prior to the visit, MP Hamdan al Azmi had claimed that the delegation had planned to discuss the mass identity transfer of the Bedoun in ‘workshops,’ and that specifically, ‘the settlement of bedoons in the Comoros’ was planned to be discussed in those meetings. He stated that a previous delegation had discussed the issue and that as a result, the negotiations had been ongoing for over one year. Al Azmi had reported that Comorian officials had ‘agreed in principle’ to the plan (‘MPs Conflicted,’ 2016).

On April 5, 2016, al Jarrah announced that the government had held negotiations with two other countries for the sale of the Bedouns’ collective national identity in return for citizenship documents, similar to the Comoros plan. Egypt was one of the countries (‘80,000 Bedoons,’ 2016). The announcement confirmed an earlier report that the Egyptian government had devised such a plan (Toumi, July 4, 2014). Al Jarrah had claimed that the Comoros plan did not mean that the total population would be deported to the islands. But another report from 2014, published around the time that the Egyptian proposal was first slated, had stated that:

Maj Gen Sheikh Mazen Al-Jarrah Al-Sabah, the General Director of the Department for Citizenship and Passport Affairs, said during a televised interview the previous night that Kuwait was in negotiations with an Arab state he did not name in order to deport the state’s ‘bedoon’ population there after they receive the said country’s citizenship. (No Plans, May 20, 2014).

He reiterated all that those not in the green identity category, who had already proved their ‘eligibility’ for citizenship with 1965 National Census documents, must submit to ‘status adjustment’ or they would be ‘confronted’ and regarded as residency law violators – adding another layer of criminalisation to their status (No Plans, May 20, 2014). On 16 May, 2016 in The Kuwait Times, Comoros government authorities confirmed the plan had already been
agreed to ‘in principle.’ In a carefully worded statement by Comorian minister of external affairs, Abdulkarim Mohamed, stated that the Comoros was ready to ‘receive’ the Bedoun (Izzak, May 17, 2016), implying the whole populations’ identity would be transferred, including those who were eligible for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959) who had been provided additional assurances by government for decades, that citizenship would be granted to them as a group (see Appendix B, iii, and D, iv). On June 20, 2016, the Kuwaiti minister of foreign affairs Sheikh Sabah Khalid al Sabah announced in al Qabas, that he had not yet completed the necessary procedures to enable the Comoros plan to become constitutionally valid (‘Kuwait FM,’ 2016).

The report also indicated that local media discussions in Kuwait had suggested that the Comorian citizenship program had already been activated, with ‘scams involving large sums charged for assistance’ (‘Kuwait FM, 2016), implying that the plan was already linked to corruption because the Bedoun remained desperate to access basic public services in Kuwait after the failure of Decree 409/2011 reforms. Nevertheless, this appeared to be a ruse – implying the population were lining up for identity erasure, in contrast to the known facts (the monthly ‘adjustment’ figures issued by the Central Apparatus) that the vast majority of the population has resisted the erasure for decades and continues to attempt to do so.

Clearly, the Comoros Plan has involved discussion and plans for the deportation of the whole Bedoun population. Those who were not in the green identity category (those ‘eligible’ for citizenship) would be forced to adjust their status for potential deportation to the Comoros Islands. The vast majority of those in the green identity group had been issued ‘security restrictions’ equivalent to criminal offences. Due to their criminal status, were also be qualified for deportation. Analysis of the rapid, progressive nature of the labelling program indicated that by the end of 2017, all members of the green identity group who had not yet been criminalised with the ‘security restriction’ in 2014, would have been issued at least one restriction. This latter group would also be qualified for deportation under the stated criteria set out by Major General Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah. In other words, since the issue of the identification system in 2012, all members of the population had been targeted for deportation via ‘status adjustment’ and the ‘security restriction’ that formed part of that program. Countries identified as potential mass population sites (here I refer to identity erasure and/or deportation) included the Comoros Islands and Egypt. One other country is apparently yet to be named; it is quite possibly Saudi Arabia, or the encampment option (an artificial refugee or concentration camp), which is adjacent the Saudi Arabian border (see below).

Key Sources: Abrahamian (2015); al Hajji (2014); ‘Bedoons to get’ (2015); ‘80,000 Bedoons’ (2016). ‘Few Takers’ (2014); ‘Government to Offer’ (2014); ‘Kuwait, Comoros’
(2014); ‘Kuwait FM’ (2016); Elgayar (November 23, 2014); ‘MPs Conflicted’ (2016); ‘MPs Hit’ (2014); Saleh (February 9, 2014); Izzak (May 17, 2016).

11. Those who resist erasure: The encampment option

This option has not been formally presented by government as yet. However, it has been proposed as a policy by a member of parliament. A proposal to move the stateless population to a desert camp, akin to an artificial refugee camp or a concentration camp, was reported in the following outlets:

- ‘Kuwaiti MP Wants Stateless Sent to Desert Camp,’ April 17 2014 in the Gulf News (‘Kuwaiti MP,’ 2014),
- ‘Two Racist Proposals,’ April 22, 2014 in The Kuwait Times (Abbas, April 22, 2014), and

The association of desert camps near the Saudi Arabian border with the Bedoun refugee camps at Abdali near the Iraqi border was obvious to any Bedoun who had lived through the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath in Kuwait (1990-1995) (see Cushman, June 30, 1991, July 16, 1991; Gasperini, August 20, 1991; a, 1992).

The idea of a simulated refugee camp arises from the Abdali refugee camps and the policy of segregation. These camps were called refugee camps in the media and by government, but they were not refugee camps. They were camps which contained Kuwaiti Bedouns, entrapped on the borders of Kuwait. The camps were predominantly filled with Bedoun, and Bedoun babies died en masse in at least one of the camps. There were three camps at Abdali, which had a total, peak population of around 15,000 Bedouns (Gasperini, August 20, 1991).

The locations were on the borders because the government was attempting to push the Bedoun into Iraq, such that the locations were convenient. Government dumped masses of Bedoun presumably located in Kuwait City (in the Central Prison, al Talea deportation centre and other sites) into Iraq simultaneous to the operation of these camps. The rationale was successful, because at one stage, after government threats the Bedoun would be killed, thousands of them fled the camps and literally ran into the territory of Iraq, and disappeared.

Although the compounds of Taima and Sulabiya were never designed to be concentration camps, it is arguable that they have since become concentration camps, due to the relentless nature of the extreme nationalist ideology they are subjected to, which seeks to eradicate the population. The encampment suggested by anti-Bedoun MPs followed two lines of argument, targeting:
• Those Bedoun who engaged in public expression about the Bedoun issue, and,
• Those Bedoun who refused to submit to ‘status adjustment.’

Therefore, all of the community but their intellectuals and social leaders in particular, were targeted. This focus is similar to the government targeting of the same group with ‘security restrictions’ since 2012. Encampment did not appear to be promoted as a method for the standard enforcement of ‘status adjustment’ for the whole Bedoun population, but it was put forward as an option for those who refused to submit. In other words, it was a punitive option, and it was clearly envisaged as another incentive to enforce ‘status adjustment’ on individuals. This aspect reinforces the notion of the encampment option as a concentration camp.

The policy of Bedoun social segregation is a longstanding and historical one developed from the first permanent settlement of the Bedouin in Kuwait, until the Bedoun were separated and abandoned in Taima and Sulabiya (after most citizens residing there had left the compounds due to the difficult conditions). It was part of the Kuwaiti and Arab nationalist policy to deprive the Bedouin of citizenship in Kuwait, and this was accompanied by a strong desire to physically separate the group from the Hadar in Kuwait City. This ‘developmental’ approach was designed and facilitated by academics, many of whom were unashamedly, politically motivated. I discussed these ideas and policies in Chapter 2, section 2.6 of this thesis, and in the thematic analysis in Appendix C, vi-viii). The dividing line between policy of social segregation and the establishment of concentration camps is historically, a rather thin one. It is rooted in ethnic hatred. Intellectuals have tended to contribute to these ideas.


A note on the five-year period of ‘Benefits’

I mentioned the repetitive nature of offers of ‘benefits’ for five year periods in relation to the Comoros Plan above, called ‘economic citizenship.’ The government offer of five years access to a ‘package’ of ‘privileges’ (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011) and ‘benefits’ (Kuwait Showcases, 2015) appears to have been first mentioned in government propaganda in 1983, when the ‘status adjustment’ program was first introduced. It had involved government using false nationality labels on the Bedouns’ identification cards and drivers’ licences (al Anezi, 1989, p.263, n132), when the Bedoun were first re-labelled as ‘non-Kuwaiti national’ (al Anezi, 1989, p.263) as if the Bedoun were in possession of a nationality rather than stateless. This was the beginning of ascription of a whole range of other nationalities to the Bedoun. The provisions of the five-year
package of benefits and services merely comprised a conditional grace period of five years’ access to basic public services. In the case of primary school education, for example, the state is required to provide such services to all those in its territory under international law, in any case (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

Much poorer states provide such services as a normative aspect of civil society. Language is deployed to make the program appear to be a) voluntary, b) generous and c) efficient. The concept has been repeated and reintroduced for nearly thirty-five years. Note that the ‘package’ is the same length of time that an average passport is valid before expiry. Al Jarrah reminded the Bedoun that they must engage in passport fraud over consecutive time periods to keep the passports continuously ‘valid’ for the purpose of ‘legal residency’ (‘Bedoons to Get,’ 2015), which included in theory, access to the five year ‘package.’ Nevertheless, Bedoun interview respondents denied this off-the-record. Their experience is that some individuals may access the ‘benefits’ while others cannot, because the Apparatus is always endeavouring to invent reasons and ‘restrictions’ to their prevent access.

Sadly, the government of Kuwait also refers to the five-year package of benefits as the Bedouns ‘human rights’ granted in Decree 409/2011. Thus, the Bedouns human rights are an object are to be exchanged as a reward for submission to ‘status adjustment’ erasure. This exchange bargain has been openly flaunted at the United Nations Human Rights Committee (see Appendix G, i).
Appendix F


i. Methods of violence and killing (1990 -1995) - summary from the thematic analysis

ii. Methods of expulsion and other forms of eradication (1990 -1995) - summary from the thematic analysis

iii. Activities of the Academic Team for Population Policy, the National Council and the Supreme Planning Council concurrent to violent ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun

Introduction to Appendix F

This Appendix diverges from others by my inclusion of a joint introduction due to the special nature of the topics discussed herein. In the following three appendices, I discuss the methods of violence and killing used to eradicate the Bedoun population and other methods of ethnic targeting concerning their mass removal from Kuwait (other than by killing), from 1990 through to 1995. Most atrocities occurred between 1991 and 1993. I argued that the first two summaries of evidence constituted the physical ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun from 1990 to 1995, while I attempt to illustrate how the policy for ethnic cleansing developed concurrently to the violent actions in the third appendix.

It is necessary to shed light on this neglected area, because the Bedoun community may be observed grieving from the weight of these atrocities in Kuwait each year on National Day and Liberation Day. Comparatively speaking, the Palestinian population who were ethnically cleansed simultaneously to the Bedoun, though they received inadequate assistance and compensation for their losses, they have received much greater assistance and compensation than the Bedoun. The Bedoun community has received virtually no support whatsoever in compiling information about these atrocities, or bringing those who inflicted such suffering to justice, or to reconciling and recovering from the events.

The purpose of these two appendixes is to provide a preliminary analysis to support the claim of LA Times foreign correspondent Mark Fineman (November 2, 1992), that ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun likely took place after the Iraq war, in the absence of academic claims of the same nature. I previously discussed my initial findings of ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun at the Researchers for Asylum Seekers annual conference at Melbourne University in 2015 (Kennedy, 2015a).

Other authors have indicated that the Bedouns’ indigenous status (and entitlement to Kuwait’s oil resources) is the cause of their statelessness (Castellano, 2008), and they have
discussed the mass population expulsion of the Bedoun contravening international law – whether or not the Bedoun were nationals of other states or stateless (Henckaerts, 1995) (although the author was satisfied the group were genuinely stateless and have never been nationals of other states). Others have discussed the attempt to eradicate the Bedoun as an indigenous population by lowering their birth rate (Weissbrodt, 2008), discrimination leading to statelessness and mass population reduction (Doebbler, 2002), and a multi-faceted policy approach to destroying the group for the purpose of denying them citizenship and to enact retribution for perceived wartime sins (Sokoloff and Lewis, 2005). However, there has been no detailed analysis of these events.

Generally speaking, scholars have not yet attempted to collect information about this period of the Bedoun’s history from a variety of available sources published at the time, to theorise ethnic cleansing or genocide of the Bedoun. I believe that one of the reasons for this is the general lack of studies about the Bedoun but also, the conservatism among scholars who have clung to the flawed concept that Kuwait society comprises only one ethnic group (the ‘Kuwaiti’) made up of two ‘social groups’ (the Bedouin and the Hadar), while the Bedoun were ‘mercenaries’ (Longva, 1997, 2006). This has led other researchers, I believe, to assume the Bedoun were not Kuwaiti, not part of Kuwaiti society, or part of the country. I have discussed the flaws of this approach in Chapters 2 and 7.

In this study, I have attempted to establish the Bedouin and the Bedoun as ethnic groups in Kuwait in their own right which may serve as a starting point for this important aspect of theorisation. I have provided this modest, preliminary analysis of sources regarding ethnic cleansing to support my claims in the discussion, that the group was physically, ethnically cleansed as well as subjected to erasure (which is also called administrative ethnic cleansing, in Weissbrodt, 2008), as well as my tentative conclusion that the group is likely being subject to genocide in the present day. This analysis extends my arguments in Chapters 6 and 7 regarding ethnic targeting of the Bedoun by government and in everyday social interactions, and the nature of the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program. I hope to extend this work with a more rigorous theoretical discussion against theories of ethnic cleansing and/or genocide in the near future. I believe that this area of study requires further research as soon as possible, to mitigate the current risks of physical and cultural destruction to the Bedoun and to help prevent or reverse the decision for their collective identity transfer to the Comoros government (see Appendix E, vi, section 7).

In my discussion of this thesis and through many of the Appendices, I have attempted to show that joint responsibility for the Bedouns suffering should be shared by a number of different parties or groups in society, not only the government of Kuwait, and/or the ruling family. Regarding the ruling family’s involvement in these atrocities, I have pointed out the scripted statements issued to individuals, and my firm belief that such
statements were supplied by propagandists at the Ministry of Information. This is not because I am adopting an apologist stance, but because I am aware that at least one adviser to the Minister of Information at the time was a highly influential intellectual responsible for key aspects of the development of anti-Bedouin and anti-Bedoun ideology and government policy through the 1980s and beyond.

Most of the material I used for the analyses in Appendix Fi and Fii, was drawn from international humanitarian reports and newspapers. I also referred to some of the very limited publications on the Palestinian ethnic cleansing in the discussion for comparative purposes. A small number of scholars of Palestinian studies discussed these matters in the context of analysis of Palestinian killings and ethnic cleansing which occurred simultaneously to the targeting of the Bedouin (El Najjar, 2001; Mason, 2010; Rosen, 2012), but they largely overlooked the Bedoun. Nevertheless, since many atrocities occurred in mixed groups of the Bedoun, Palestinians and sometimes also other expatriates or Kuwaiti citizens, their analyses are of value. Mason (2010) especially, made a very thorough study from the perspective of theorisation of the crime of state terrorism.

Most of the information below has not been previously discussed by scholars who have focused on the Bedoun in any kind of substantive detail. Some of the diverging political narratives from scholars of Kuwait areas studies focused on repeating government policy and discrediting the Bedoun, and omitted the available information on these matters reported from the field. I discussed some of these mainstream authors and their limitations in Chapter 2.
Appendix F, i


The measure of Kuwaiti respect for human rights is not the barbarity of Saddam Hussein but the international standards to which Kuwait has formally subscribed, including the Fourth Geneva Convention and its First Additional Protocol, as well as the requirements of customary international law. By these standards, Kuwait’s human rights conduct since liberation has been nothing short of deplorable…

…The highest levels of the Kuwaiti government are complicit in these killings in that they have yet to arrest or prosecute any of those responsible, in notable contrast to the vigor with which the government has pursued perceived collaborators with the Iraqi occupiers. Nor have exhumations or any other form of investigation been ordered into the mass graves containing unidentified victims of post-liberation violence. To the contrary, the periodic government calls to cleanse Kuwait of a presumed fifth column have, if anything, further inspired this violence. (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p.2)

The following themes listed in Table F1 below, emerged from the thematic analysis of literature regarding methods of violence and killing used to eradicate the Bedoun during ethnic cleansing from 1990-1995. Each theme is discussed further below.

Table F1

Summary of Methods of Violence and Killings of the Bedoun (1990-1995) Sanctioned by the State of Kuwait

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods of violence and killing of the Bedoun collective (1990-1995)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Collective targeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Labelling of the Bedoun as national security threats and traitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Collaboration with enemy agents, the ‘fifth column’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Forced confessions extracted with torture and show trials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Judicial killings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extrajudicial killings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other relevant factors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summaries of evidence in the literature from which the above themes were derived that were are discussed in more detail below. I have not summarised judicial killings, as these were extensively reported by Human Rights Watch (1991a, 1992a, 1993, 1994) and
Amnesty International (1992, 1994) and local media outlets and although they attracted concerns from international humanitarian organisations, these processes were subject to a comparatively higher level of due process than the other themes (they were subject to actual reform and the practice was ceased). These matters are also partially covered under the theme of forced confessions and show trials conducted as part of the State Security Court judicial processes, below.

**Collective Targeting**

The Bedoun population was reduced from approximately 300,000 to 150,000 during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the years afterward up until 1995 (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Ghabra, 1997b). The state security court of Kuwait had a notorious reputation for acts of impunity and had met in secret and issued decisions not open to appeal, even before the invasion by Iraq (Human Rights Watch, 1991b). It prosecuted the Bedoun for crimes related to the invasion from the end of occupation until it was dismantled in 1995 (Amnesty International, 1996). Therefore, I have designated the period of collective targeting and violent ethnic cleansing as occurring between 1990 and 1995. Minor themes from the analysis are elaborated in the points below.

The notion of collective targeting of non-Kuwaiti nationals by the government of Kuwait has been emphasised in relation to Palestinian population (Roth, June 11, 1991; Mason, 2010). Overall, the Palestinian population was far larger than the Bedoun, but as I mentioned above, in incidents where the Bedoun and Palestinians were victimized, some references showed that there were higher numbers of Bedoun victims compared to Palestinians. In others, Bedoun and other nationals were targeted, but not Palestinians. For example, Reuters, August 1991, Iraqi reports of expulsions including Bedouns and Jordanians (in Human Rights Watch, 1992). Additionally, Human Rights Watch (1992b, para 13, *Iraq and Occupied Kuwait*) cited that most prisoners of war captured by Iraqis during the initial invasion and the seven-month occupation, and sent to Iraq by the Iraqis, were Kuwaiti citizens and Bedouns (and ‘other residents’ – Palestinians were not mentioned in particular). Human Rights Watch stated that most of those captured were repatriated after the war, but it also reported that the Kuwaiti government refused to accept thousands more than government initially cited as ‘missing’ back from Iraq, and it also reported that those Bedouns in particular were forbidden by government from returning to Kuwait, and that Bedoun civilians had been crossed off the ICRC missing lists. In other incidents, Palestinians in particular were targeted.

The omission of details about the Bedoun in discussion by scholars of Palestinian studies may have occurred because the ‘Bedoun problem’ was beyond the scope of their inquiry. However, the omission has downplayed the targeting of the Bedoun, when such scholars had read sources that indicated the Bedoun suffered simultaneous targeting, and the
Bedoun had a smaller total population, and could not leave the country as easily as the Palestinians. In terms of these last three points, it is arguable that the Bedoun appeared were more intensively targeted by the government of Kuwait, than the Palestinians.

Generally speaking, the collective targeting and reduction of both populations reflected the goals of the government planning policy, *Strategy for Development* (1988) (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.573). The policy sought to radically reduce the non-Kuwaiti citizen population and expatriate populations. Government’s control of the population ‘balance’ after the Iraqi forces were removed from Kuwait was then celebrated during and after the ethnic cleansing as a sort of policy victory, for example, in al Ramadhan (1995). Similarly, the policy to de-nationalise the population from ‘Kuwaiti’ to the generic category of ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ was reported as implemented in 1988 (Human Rights Watch, 2000), or formalised during the cleansing period in 1992 by the Bedouns’ expulsion from the National Census (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). However, I have not located other references that concur with the date given by Human Rights Watch (2000) and the account offered by Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan (1994) was more rigorous.

The collective targeting of the Bedoun as one of three main ethnic groups (the Bedoun, Palestinians and Iraqi citizens, the latter being present in much smaller numbers) was discussed in reports by international humanitarian agencies and foreign correspondents, such as Human Rights Watch (1991a, 1992a, 1993, 1994) and Amnesty International (1992, 1994, 1996). Scholar Ann Lesch travelled with Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch (then called ‘Middle East Watch’). Lesch was part of the organisation at the time. Some of the foreign journalists who covered the expulsion of the Bedoun included Cushman (June 11, 1991; June 30, 1991; July 16, 1991), Evans (February 28, 1991); Fineman (November 2, 1992); Gasperini (August 20, 1991); Macha (November, 1991) and Wilkinson (May 20, 1991).

There seems to be some irregularities in reporting, where the Bedoun were omitted by journalists due to censorship. Roth (June 11, 1991), Hedges (August 2, 1991) and Arundel (June 12, 1991) all omitted the Bedoun from reports of incidents, as if there were no Bedoun involved. In reports by Arundel (June 1, 1991; June 12, 1991) Sudanese people were featured predominantly in reports with Palestinian and Iraqi abuses. However, these incidents corresponded to very similar if not identical reports in Human Rights Watch (1991a, 1992a), that featured the Bedoun as significant victims.

Collective targeting of the Bedoun (explicitly or implicitly identified) was discussed in the context of a desired strategy in editorials of *Sawt al Kuwait* of May 8, 1991, August 6, 1991 and others (a, p.5). The public media played a significant role in indoctrinating Kuwaiti citizens in an ideology of ethnic targeting and hatred, inciting ethnic cleansing (specific statements are listed below).
The long-term strategy of population restructure violating the Bedoun’s human rights continued beyond immediate post war period (Human Rights Watch, 1993). Atrocities committed via the state security court system, which operated along with the State Security Police, included adopted a fairly standard approach of ordering judicial killings for traitors who had been forced to confess their disloyalty to the state (see Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992a; Amnesty International 1992, 1994; Mason, 2010). The court continued until late 1995 when it was disbanded in September 1995 (Amnesty International, 1996).

Kuwaiti intellectuals worked intensively at this time to legitimise and enshrine the policy of population ‘purification’ (Evans, February 28, 1991) at the official national policy level to justify the violence. While the Bedoun were one of three identified ethnic target populations (the Bedoun, Palestinians, Iraqis) (Human Rights Watch, 1992a), there was also a double-focus on the Bedoun that the other groups were not subject to, which I will now elaborate.

The Bedoun were guilty of ‘being’ Iraqi enemies as well as Bedoun collaborators. Thus, they were perceived not just as ‘with’ the Iraqis, but as actual Iraqi nationals. The ‘collective crime’ of traitor applied to Palestinians, also applied also to the Bedoun, revealed via the similarity of treatment by government authorities and certain groups of citizens. There were some important differences in the official reasoning why the groups were targeted, such as the Palestinians’ connection to Iraq at the political level via the PLO; while this did not apply to the Bedoun, the northern tribal connections were the focus (in Chapter 6 and 7, interviewees openly discussed the sins of the Bedoun identity, as perceived by Kuwaitis, which neatly fit the nationalist ideology). Bedoun were the primary targets of torture, the refusal to accept persons at Abdali refugee camp, the attempt to empty the camps when government threatened the inhabitants with death if they attempted to return to their homes; the highest numbers of death sentences and extrajudicial killings, the most significant proportion of over 600 hundred stateless people left in Talha deportation centre, including those acquitted after 1991 but who were abandoned there indefinitely (Amnesty International, 1994, 1996, 2005). Kuwaiti authorities refused return of babies and their mothers, despite epidemic starvation, growth and development problems attributed to psychological trauma (Cushman, July 16, 1991).

The Bedoun were also targeted collectively to the extent that they were omitted and neglected by international humanitarian organisations such as the UNHCR, much more than the Palestinians and other expatriate nationals. The UNHCR did not attempt to re-settled the Bedoun as a group at this time, regarding them as insufficient for refugee status because they were not displaced, but victims of violent ethnic cleansing and killing which occurred on a similar scale, if not a greater scale (in terms of proportion of the population that went
unaccounted for), than the Palestinian cleansing. A small portion of the population expelled and driven into Iraqi territory was assisted by the UNHCR. The UNCHR re-settled and aided the Palestinian population in a variety of ways (see Mason, 2010). The Bedoun in Kuwait were simply omitted from discourse about non-Kuwaiti national victims, some of whom became refugees if they were not permitted to return home. Those who were at home, were hiding, hungry, homeless, hunted and murdered. No Bedoun inside Kuwait appears to have been assisted – rather, American forces were compelled by their command to stand by and watch (see the United States policy and particularly, the deployment of U.S. forces in Kuwait after liberation, in Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p.58-60). I discuss this problem further in relation to mass expulsion incidents and the manner in which the Bedoun were entrapped, while other populations were assisted to leave, in Appendix F, ii below.

Additionally, the Bedoun suffered in certain, unique ways, such as the burden of their national identity as Kuwaiti being rejected as a mark of being ‘traitors,’ while they had comprised the majority of the military force on the front lines during the invasion, were abandoned without orders by their superior officers, and were taken prisoner by Iraqi forces. The fact that more numbers of Palestinians fled Kuwait during this period was because they could leave, compared to the Bedoun, who could not. Thus, it appears more likely that more Bedoun were killed during the ethnic cleansing compared to Palestinians, who were aided individually and collectively, in their escape from Kuwait. However, the actual ratio of Bedoun deaths compared to expulsions and numbers driven out of the country is impossible to establish, even to approximate, as very few expulsions and ‘voluntary’ exits from the country were ever observed.

Data estimates of Palestinians who fled compared to those who were killed are available (Mason, 2010), because the UNHCR and other agencies were involved in their escape and resettlement. The Bedoun never received this assistance, so there is no estimate available on the number killed or the number who fled Kuwait, and only a general estimate of the appalling, total population loss. Some comparative data showed the Bedoun suffered more than Palestinians in terms of numbers (I elaborate on examples below), but authors who discussed the Palestinian ethnic cleansing did not observe this. The fact that the Bedoun suffered alongside, and sometimes to a greater degree, than the Palestinian population was significantly downplayed or overlooked altogether, by authors such as al Nakib, M. (2014); el Najjar (2001), Mason, (2010); and Rosen, (2012).

In fact, more Bedoun than any other group of non-Kuwaiti nationals (including Palestinians) were detained and killed by Iraqi forces (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p.3). For example, thousands of Bedoun serving in the military and police forces were detained and held prisoner by Iraqi forces (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1995) compared to hundreds of Palestinians and other non- Kuwaiti national expatriates (Human Rights Watch, 1991a).
Additionally, the Palestinian population was able to continue to function to some extent, as an effective, transnational economic unit within Kuwait during its occupation by Iraqi forces (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Lesch in Lesch and Lustick, 2005; Mason, 2010), while the Bedoun were economically crippled and impoverished, due to government withholding the salaries from security forces personnel, and the status of administrative expulsion for Bedoun, non-security forces personnel from 1986.

This included Bedoun military servicemen who were on duty and available to defend the state. They were not given orders by their commanding officers to enable them to respond to the invasion, because their officers, the Chief of Staff of the military services and his deputy, had abandoned them in the field and left the country (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Alhajeri, 2004, p.92). It was clear that substantially more harm was inflicted on the Bedoun, particularly due to their entrapment within the border of Saudi Arabia, the cruel and overt nature of attempts to push them across the Iraq border, their having been barred from leaving Kuwait via the airport. The only border exit open to them for escape was to Iraq, which was being invaded by coalition forces. While scores of Bedoun military personnel were held in Iraqi prisons as prisoners of war, Bedoun civilians were pushed across that border as enemies of the state and thereafter, were prohibited from return (Gasperini, August 20, 1991).


Labelling of the Bedoun as National Security Threats and Traitors

The term ‘fifth column’ is a reference to a clandestine group or faction of subversive agents who attempt to undermine a nation’s solidarity by any means at their disposal (Encyclopaedia Britannica, April 30, 2014). Specific claims that the Bedoun were or Iraqi identity or Iraqi citizens are included under the theme ‘Collaboration with enemy agents,’ below.

After the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi forces, anti-Bedoon policies took a violent turn. The whole group was accused of aiding Iraqi occupying forces, the Bedoons were singled out for retribution, even though many of them had already been killed for resisting the Iraqi occupation (Human Rights Watch 1993, para. 6). Known acts of resistance by non-Kuwaiti citizens were diminished by authorities and the media (Human Rights Watch 1991a, p.5) while the ‘traitor status’ was amplified in order to increase harm done to the Bedoun,
Palestinians and other non-Kuwaiti national populations based on the targeting of the two specific, stateless groups, the Bedoun and Palestinians. The Bedoun, Palestinians and (actual) Iraqis, were the key targets of the ethnic cleansing, while persons of other nationalities were captured during the initial pogrom. Over time, official policy was reformulated to make it appear that all expatriates were welcome to leave Kuwait, so that it might look like no group in particular was more targeted than any other, but this belied the evidence which emerged from the ground, as well as the fine details of the policies (Appendix F, iii). This situation was reflected in a case brought against Kuwait in ‘The government’s repeated accusations that non-citizens constituted an ongoing threat to Kuwait’s security incited its forces to increased abuses’ (Farhat v Kuwait, 1992, III, A).

Despite this form of targeting based on the assumption the Bedoun were of Iraqi identity and/or citizenship, government had already conceded the Bedoun as a whole were not from Iraq at the same time attempting to ‘prove’ the population are non-Kuwaiti imposters, by trying to force Bedoun military employees to take up non-Kuwaiti and non-Iraqi nationalities since at least 2006 (Beaugrand, 2010, p.156; ‘Stateless Arabs,’ 2008; al Waqayan, 2009). The findings of this study show that accusation that the Bedoun population is Iraqi continues until today as a slur of ‘betrayal’ regardless of people’s actual origins used to deny the group citizenship on grounds of their ethnic identity, and it has now been transmitted across generations (see Chapter 7). The very basis of the accusation of ‘fifth columnist’ is not taken seriously by ordinary people in the Middle East, where the concept is de-mystified and recognised for its currency as propaganda. Michael Rubin (14 August 2013), a specialist on terrorism in the region, explained the use of the concept in Kuwait:

Warnings about the so-called Shi’ite crescent reflect traditional Arab Sunni bias that Shi’ites represent a fifth column. (Michael Rubin, Has Kuwait Reached the Sectarian Tipping Point?, August 14, 2013.)

In other words, the ‘fifth column’ accusation is related to age-old sectarian tensions, and was adapted to the ‘Bedoun problem’ to label the group at the convenience of ideologists, dividing the community and inciting ordinary citizens to join in a violent pogrom of eradication, particularly between 1991-1992, and more generally a broad scheme of programmed, violent ethnic cleansing and killing from 1990 to 1995.


Collaboration with Enemy Agents, the ‘Fifth Column’
Instructions to ethnically cleanse and ‘purify’ Kuwait of fifth columnists (to murder them) were issued from a variety of sources, and included official statements from individuals at the highest level of government and newspaper editorials, as listed below:
• Address to the nation by the Emir of Kuwait, in KUNA on April 10, 1991, to ‘cleanse’ Kuwait of a fifth column, quoted in Human Rights Watch (1991a, p.5).

• Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheikh Sa’ad who wished to ‘purify’ elements of society, on July 9, 1991 in Sawt al Kuwait on July 10, 1991 (quoted in a, p.5, n8. In the context of the ‘need to “purify society” of Iraqi intruders, and the need to assess just who deserves to be in Kuwait and who should not’, the Minister for Information, Badr al Yacoub stated that the ‘clean-up’ should commence prior to the resumption of the National Assembly to ‘confront all those who seek to sow doubt in the unity of Kuwaiti ranks’ (Evans, February 28, 1991).

• Minister of the Interior in The New York Times on July 7, 1991, stated ‘The biggest internal security threat is the presence of ‘Iraqi agents’ suspected of hiding in Kuwait.’ Those suspects comprised the three, targeted ethnic groups discussed above, the Bedoun, Palestinians and any Iraqi citizens who happened to be in the country at the time (Human Rights Watch 1992a, n5).

• How can we achieve security when Kuwait is full of hordes of fifth columnists who helped the Iraqi aggression? … Even those who did not directly help the occupation assisted in other ways… they still live inside Kuwait, editorial of Sawt al Kuwait (6 August 1991) in Human Rights Watch (1991a, p.5).

Instructions to cleanse fifth columnists and to purify certain elements in society referred generally to targeted ethnic groups labelled Iraqi ‘collaborators’ in numerous statements by government figures and in news editorials. Thus, Mason (2010) also draws on these statements as evidence of Palestinian ethnic cleansing. However, the fact is that such ‘collaborators’ were known at the grass-roots level as the Bedoun and the Palestinian populations, targeted by the second, organised resistance force, headed by the State Security Police and Kuwaiti citizen youths who were granted special powers to attack the two groups. In a confusing but likely intentional dialogue, this second force also became known as the ‘Kuwaiti resistance,’ which replaced the Kuwaiti resistance efforts of local people trapped in Kuwait during the Iraq invasion. Bedouin military personnel and the CIA were believed to have been part of the first wave of resistance that helped evacuate expatriates during the invasion (Chen and Lamb, 1990). The LA Times (September 4, 1990) featured Chen and Lamb’s (1990) piece lauding the efforts of the Kuwaiti Bedouin at the beginning of Iraq-Kuwait conflict, which was soon forgotten in the mainstream media as the official narrative turned on the Bedoun.

The mention of Iraqi intruders in Evans (February 28, 1991) was virtually identical to the notion of the fifth column, and notions of ‘infiltration’ of the enemy. Some Kuwaiti youths comprised new generations of the Hadar elite and intellectuals, attending universities
in the United States. They were trained by the CIA in the United States to weed out any ‘Iraqi’ intruders they could find. Human Rights Watch (1992a) reported that the young members of this force targeted Bedoun, Palestinians and Iraqis and had such powers bestowed on them by the State Security Police, that they detain their prisoners while reaping retributive justice. These actions formed the informal side of punishment. If prisoners survived this phase, they were then handed onto the State Security Court for mock trial.

The Minister of Information’s reference to the Kuwaiti ‘ranks’ was a reference to the Bedoun-dominated military and police services who were expelled from their posts. The reference to timing the ‘clean-up’ of those ranks, specifically to prior to the resumption of parliament, was a reference to both the practical and theoretical dimensions of the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun and Palestinian populations that took place between 1990 and 1995. On the one hand, the statement referred to the actual program of implementation of mass, human rights atrocities including the judicial and extra-judicial killing and state-sanctioned terrorisation (Mason, 2010) of the Bedoun and Palestinian populations, that for the Bedoun, resulted in the loss of approximately 150,000. On the other hand, it referred to the development of the new national population re-structuring policy through the National Council, facilitated by the Academic Team for Population Policy (headed by geographer Abdullah al Gonaim at Kuwait University), according to the Academic Team document issued at the time, in al Ramadhan, 1995 which was rushed through both the basic policy development and the legislative stages to become law (see Appendix F, iii, Activities of the Academic Team for Population Policy, the National Council and the Supreme Planning Council concurrent to violent ethnic cleansing).

Human Rights Watch (1992) referred explicitly to the program, explaining, ‘The pretext for these [human rights] abuses was… to restructure Kuwaiti society’ (Human Rights Watch, 1992, Developments Since Liberation), including killing or otherwise driving out with impunity, vast swathes of its members. The role of academics in advising the Minister for Information at this time, and their role in the production of ideological principles and statements promoting the ethnic cleansing and killing of the Bedoun, Palestinians and other nationals in Kuwait, issued by the Minister for Information and other government Ministers in press conferences and to foreign journalists, warrants further research.

Externally, very similar efforts of ideological transmission were undertaken by the government-in-exile in Saudi Arabia and supported by the Hadar ‘Free Kuwait Society.’ Members of the ‘Free Kuwait Society’ were notoriously involved with the purchase of public relations war propaganda via the firm Hill and Knowlton and subsequently scores of advertising agencies, first funded by elite, private individuals and later by the government of Kuwait (Doorly and Garcia, 2015; MacArthur, 1992; Secunda and Moran, 2007). Their role in the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun and Palestinian population, so far as many individuals
were highly influential over government at the time and operated as adjuncts to it giving 
‘expert’ advice, warrants further research.

Sources: Chen and Lamb (September 4, 1990); Evans (February 28, 1991); Human 
Rights Watch (1991, p.5); see also KUNA (April 10, 1991) and the editorial of Sawt al 
Kuwait (August 6, 1991) in Human Rights Watch (1991); Human Rights Watch (1992, n5); 
Mason, 2010.

**Forced Confessions Extracted with Torture for Show Trials**

Most (but not all) of the information below was derived from Human Rights Watch 
(1992) due to the organisations special access to the Bedoun in Kuwait, after the invasion of 
Iraq. The justification for judicial killings rested upon the foundation of extracting false 
confessions as evidence of wrongdoing, which was then used to conduct show trials. 
Persons labelled ‘enemy collaborators’ were tortured as part of the process of martial law 
trials in order to extract confessions. Confessions obtained by torture the only form of 
‘proof’ required, but also often the only form of proof obtained by prosecutors. The State 
Security Investigative Police, prosecutors and the court itself conducted the interrogations. 
The court was not disbanded until 1995.

Trails were fundamentally marred by serious limitations of due process. Death 
sentences and commuted death sentences characterised by evidence obtained from torture of 
the accused and others. Legal counsel were intimated and threatened in an attempt to force 
them to withdraw from representing the accused. At times no legal counsel was obtained 
before trial (Human Rights Watch, 1992).

The official position was that acquittals only occurred due to lack of evidence, not 
lack of guilt (Sawt al Kuwait, June 27, 1991 in Human Rights Watch, 1992). Defendants 
acquitted by the State Security Court in 1992 and 1993 were still being held in long-term 
deporation centre was a converted school in Farwaniya, which housed hundreds of the 
Bedoun in overcrowded conditions. By 1996, 600 individuals, the majority Bedoun, were 


**Extrajudicial Killings**

After Bedoun police and military servicemen had been expelled from service by 
government during the liberation of Kuwait, they became the victims of state-sanctioned 
violece. From liberation, until 1993, Bedoun in government custody were subject to 
summary execution, disappearance or torture as a matter of public policy (Human Rights 
Watch, 1993, para. 6). State Security Investigative Police was the main force identified with 
human rights atrocities (Human Rights Watch 1992a). As I have mentioned above, the
Bedoun were collectively targeted and comprised substantially larger numbers of victims compared to other targeted group, including the Palestinians.

The Bedoun were arguably the most targeted group with the highest number of victims of violence compared to other groups, except concerning expulsion from Kuwait (due to the Palestinians being facilitated to leave Kuwait, while the Bedoun were entrapped or driven out into Iraq). Bedoun prisoners in local jails died due to starvation, beatings and torture, inadequate medical care and executions, with shots to the head at point blank range (Human Rights Watch 1992a). Numerous disappearances of prisoners and prisoners kept incommunicado obscure the reasons for disappearance, and the numbers murdered while in the custody of the state, or deported (Human Rights Watch, 1992).

Mass graves were found at Mushrif, Bayan and al Riqqa, Kuwait, but the deaths were not investigated. Because the deaths were not investigated (Human Rights Watch 1992a), it is difficult to tell if these persons were Bedoun or others (Lubbadah in El Najjar, 2001). At al Riqqa, twenty-four mass graves appeared to be dated from the Iraqi occupation, while twenty mass graves were fresh, indicating they had been created during after Kuwait’s liberation. The bodies in those new mass graves showed signs of ‘unspeakable torture’ and many were transferred directly from police stations after liberation (Roth, June 11, 1991). Roth (June 11, 1991) concluded that the mass graves at al Riqqa did not reflect the full extent of killing after liberation, but that their examination would have provided a necessary point for beginning to examine official violence. Roth (June 11, 1991), the deputy director of Human Rights Watch at the time, highlighted the targeting of Palestinians and did not refer to the Bedoun in his article in the New York Times, but his organisation’s reports (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 199b, 1992a and others) established the abuse and killing of the Bedoun occurred on at least a similar scale to that of Palestinians, and that the Bedoun had been special targets of the State Security Court prior to the war. Roth’s information to the New York Times was censored to omit the Bedoun.

Mass graves near Basra in Iraq were also omitted by international agencies investigating mass graves in Iraq (Kirmanj, 2013). Bedoun were dumped in Iraq as part of a regime of deportations, without food and water, in the middle of the night, in mine-infested areas, and in areas frequented by wild dogs. In some cases the deportees had appeared to have been tortured or beaten prior to being abandoned at the border, or over enemy lines (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992a). The possibility of deceased Bedoun buried in mass graves in Iraq, near Basra in particular (due its closeness to the northern border of Kuwait near to where the Bedoun deportees were abandoned, as well as close to the refugee camps inhabited by around 15,000 Bedoun prior to them running into Iraq due to Kuwait government threats to their life) warrants fresh investigation, particularly given the extent of media suppression of war crimes committed during the first Gulf war.
Kuwait authorities explicitly informed Human Rights Watch (1993) that no torture or killings in relation to prisoners held in detention would be investigated. Only a very small number of disappearances and killings of civilians investigated (Human Rights Watch, 1993). Over seventy disappearances of prisoners in Kuwaiti custody not accounted for 10 years later (Amnesty International, 2002). Lack of interest in investigating killings implicated the highest levels of government (Human Rights Watch, 1992). The state security court that prosecuted the Bedoun and ordered prisoners to be held whereupon they disappeared or were killed or deported in human conditions, was not disbanded until September, 1995 (Amnesty International, 1996, p.3).

Finally, government’s appointment of the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs during the war was Abdul Rahman al Awadi. Shortly after, he was appointment as head of Bedoun committee in 1991 in an undisclosed decree (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.3), during the post-invasion wave of ethnic violence. His role as Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs included reporting state-sanctioned, extrajudicial killings of the Bedoun and others carried out by the State Security Investigative Police (SSIP, Mababeth Ann al Dawla in Arabic), to the Prime Minister (Mason, 2010, p.130). Awadi was also the Minister of Planning from 1985 (Rabinovich, 1987, p.401), leading up to the administrative expulsion of the Bedoun in 1986 (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). Therefore, it was likely that he was quite closely involved in the development of 1986 administrative expulsion policy, as well as the ethnic cleansing of the Bedouns from 1990 to 1995. In particular, educated, professionals appeared to be singled out for assassination and torture (Lesch in Lesch and Lustick, 2005, p.180, n66). Mason (2010, p.130) referred to Al Awadi in the position of Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and other sources confirm it. However, she also referenced Human Rights Watch (1992a), which cited Dhari Abdalla al Othaman. (I have carefully checked my sources to the best of my ability, to ensure I have referred to the correct persons and not different people in these roles.)

The resistance was led by the SSIP and mobs of hundreds of Kuwaiti citizen youths to whom the SSIP distributed arms and special powers with which they used to redefine the ‘enemy,’ to hunt down, arrest, physically abuse and hold incommunicado for long periods, the non-Kuwaiti citizen targets that were ethnically cleansed, including the Bedoun (as well as the Palestinians and any Iraqis present) (Human Rights Watch, 1992). This ‘resistance’ performed the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, Palestinians and other non-Kuwaiti citizens (1990-1995) (Mason, 2010). When a resistance member reported the killings of some eighty individuals by the resistance group, Al Awadi responded that the number of killings was more in the vicinity of one thousand (Lesch, May 29-31, 1991, p.49; Graham Brown, 1999; Mason, 2008 in Mason, 2010, p.130). The combination of the two roles appears to have been crucial in targeting the Bedoun for ethnic cleansing and the mass reduction of the
population, but it does not appear to have been discussed to date, with Awadi’s role on the Bedoun committee of 1991 emerging in English, in 2011 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011).


Other Relevant Factors

The Bedoun made up to 95% of non-officer forces, under order of military command, both Kuwait and Iraqi at different times (El Najjar, 2001; Lesch, May 29-31, 1991). Bedoun civilians were forced to continue to report to work under other authorities, which included Iraqi occupiers (El Najjar, 2001; Mason, 2010). This led to their being automatically accused as traitors to the state. Crystal (2005) provided a scathing account of the Bedoun as traitor enemies of the state, working for the Iraqi occupying army. The fact that the Bedoun were under enemy occupation alongside Kuwaitis and were forced to report to the occupying army as a method of monitoring, or that they were then targeted for killing by the second Kuwaiti resistance, was omitted. She also did not take into account Bedoun government employees were not paid their salaries during or after the war, due to their being accused of being traitors and enemies of the state. Earlier in her work revised to include the Iraqi invasion and post-war events in Kuwait, Crystal (1995) bizarrely implied the Bedoun had attempted to gain inroads to acquiring citizenship during the war, by stealing government citizenship records – while the Bedoun were being hunted down, killed, detained, held as prisoners by both Iraq and Kuwait, and deported. The suggestion was totally implausible, based on readings of the other sources cited herein.

Note that Mason (2010, p.130) did not clarify two troubling points concerning the Bedoun, a) the differences and change-over between first and second resistance forces, and b) the period where the Bedoun military servicemen and police were on duty, abandoned in the field and then targeted along with Palestinians by the ‘new’ army and police working with the second resistance after Bedouns had been expelled from those services. These discrepancies were documented by Human Rights Watch, other international humanitarian agencies and foreign correspondents. Mason (2010) would have regarded the Bedoun as out of scope of her study, but the account of the Bedoun’s role can be confusing. She appears to assume that the Bedoun were part of forces who targeted Palestinians and were then victims alongside Palestinians, but does not explain what happened in the interim. I gathered evidence from a variety of sources to reconstruct timelines and events to trace what happened during these events, which appears to be the strategy used by others to study the Palestinian ethnic cleansing including Mason (2010) herself. The role of the Bedoun as well
as Palestinians may not always be so clear-cut due to the desire to portray them an enemies of Kuwait, but also because it is possible that some did prefer to side with Iraq, and were perhaps used as vigilantes to attack other Bedouns, just as Kuwaiti citizens were trained to attack ‘Iraqis’ which the Bedoun had been labelled. But it is worth remembering that Kuwaiti citizens, including the Hadar, had strong links to Iraq prior to the war though this fact is rarely discussed in invasion-related literature.

More than one third of Kuwaitis were not in Kuwait during the war, but were spending their annual summer holiday in other countries (Hedges, 2 August 1991). Hadar elite and nationalist notables spent the period of occupation in luxury hotels in London and other locations devising plans to reform Kuwait once they returned to their country. Even those that remained in Kuwait during the war had to fend off the suspicion of those outside who rallied together in the Free Kuwait Movement to persuade Western countries to become involved in Kuwait’s occupation by Iraq. Inside Kuwait, the resistance movement, Bedoun and Palestinians collaborated with each other and were at odds with each other, due to their extreme and detrimental conditions.

Lesch and Lustick (2005) pointed out that the resistance movement network did not extend to give assistance Bedoun and Palestinian areas, but some limited essential supplies were provided to them. This means it is likely that the Bedoun had to obtain food to survive from Palestinians, who in turn had obtained loaves of bread from Iraq. Some Kuwait citizens and authorities interpreted eating bread made in Iraq as an act of treason, although such actions were taken by such people to prevent them from starving to death (Lesch and Lustick, 2005, p.130). Other acts of service to the community during the occupation, which appear to have been taken to keep occupied population focused on survival, were also labelled as ‘collaboration,’ for example:

The martial law trials, held in the months following the war, failed to prove the government's often repeated claim that Bedoons as a group collaborated. The prosecutors and the martial law courts utilised draconian measures to convict defendants of collaboration, which was so broadly defined as to include minor acts of association with the enemy. For example, school teachers and nurses who worked during the occupation were charged with collaboration. (Human Rights Watch, 1995, ‘The Iraqi Occupation and the Liberation of Kuwait,’ para.2)

This information is vital to contextualising the definition of the ‘traitor’ and ‘enemy of the state’ of Kuwait at this time. Remarkably, the Palestinians were enabled to run an internal economy inside the state during the occupation by virtue of their transnational connections and other, certain sources of support. The Bedoon were faced with more extreme challenges to their economic and physical survival due to their social isolation.
Lesch in Lesch and Lustick, 2005), which the participants of this study attested to with their own personal experiences of fear, homelessness and hunger (P8, P16, P17). Their fathers worked for the state security services and hence, after the Bedoun were expelled from those service, they were officially made the targets of the second wave of resistance.

The initial resistance movement from within Kuwait, comprising mostly civilians of all backgrounds, was limited to approximately six weeks, due to instructions from the Kuwaiti government in exile to cease their activities (Levins, 1995). The Bedoun participated in what appears to be a first wave of resistance (Levins, 1995; El Najjar, 2001, Lesch, May 29-31, 1991 and Abu Haider, Sawt al Kuwait, 8 August 1991, in Human Rights Watch Sept 1991a, p3, n4). There appears to have been a very crucial difference between this group and a second wave of ‘resistance’ described in the sources, though I am not entirely convinced they were two different, separate forces, because sources tend to describe one or the other scenario, but not both. Further research, perhaps including fieldwork with witnesses, is required to clarify this matter. Based on the sources quoted above, the first group comprised individuals trapped inside the country during the occupation. Based on the sources cited below, a second group comprised Kuwaiti authorities, the State Security Investigative Police and young, male Kuwaiti citizen recruits who were granted special powers to act on behalf of government to carry out the violence towards the Bedoun and Palestinian populations in particular, and other non-Kuwaiti nationals (Lesch in Lesch and Lustick, 2005, p.170; Mason, 2010, p.130). This second group was organised by the so-called government in exile and/or the interim National Council, prior to the resumption of the National Assembly. The Minister of Information referred to this stage as the ‘clean-up’ (Evans, February 28, 1991). As I have mentioned above, young, male Kuwaitis at university overseas were trained by the CIA to identify ‘Iraqis’ (Chen and Lamb, 1990); this coincided with the importation of young, male Kuwaiti citizens who had been outside the country at the time of the invasion (Mason, 2010), into the second wave of resistance.

By the end of 1992, authorities informed Middle East Watch that they had no plans to investigate persons implicated in the killing and torture of prisoners while ‘only a handful’ of disappearances and killings of civilians had been investigated (Human Rights Watch, 1993). Amnesty International (1992) reported the Minister of the Interior stating that 40 persons had been under investigation for abusing detainees, but the government did not ever disclose anyone actually held to account. The United Nations Compensation Commission process appears to have drowned out calls for the investigation human rights atrocities and gross population losses of the Bedoun and Palestinians from Kuwait from 1990-1995, in preference for paying out large sums to Kuwaiti citizens, corporations and Palestinians.

Human Rights Watch (1995) claimed to have interviewed around 500 Bedoun for their seminal report, The Bedoons of Kuwait; Citizens Without Citizenship. The data has
never been made available to the group. Many respondents in this research felt that Human Rights Watch in particular and a number of other international humanitarian organisations who had promoted the Bedoun’s ‘democracy’ seeking during the Arab Spring were no longer acting to support the Bedoun. Information released since the Arab Spring indicates that human rights organisations, particularly those based in Washington such as Human Rights Watch, may have played a substantial role in conducting surveillance on local populations who participated in Arab Spring uprisings (Cartalucci, December 31, 2011; Doublas Bowers, 2011) and this should be weighed against the significant decline in reporting on the human rights situation of the Bedoun in Kuwait since the Arab Spring, compared to sustained reporting from other Middle East nations. In particular, Human Rights Watch has substantially reduced their reporting on the Bedoun to just a few sentences in annual world reports, since Belkis Wilie was installed at the Kuwait/Yemen desk, which marked a post-Arab Spring change of policy to reduce reporting on the Bedoun, compared to the detailed reporting provided from 1991 through to 2011.

The organisation collected important, irreplaceable data on crimes against humanity committed against the Bedoun by the state of Kuwait between 1990 and 1995, of which key points have been analysed above. However, while making limited representations to the United Nations about the group to some committees, the organisation has not made a strenuous effort to use the data on behalf of the Bedoun seek prosecution of the state of Kuwait for its crimes against the Bedoun, particularly to the extent that ethnic cleansing and genocide could have been extrapolated from the themes which emerged from their reports from 1991 to 1995. Rather, the organisation has changed strategy since the Arab Spring and it no longer investigates in detail, much new data about the oppression of the Bedoun available in the local media and from its local informants. In these circumstances, I suggest that the interview data collected by the organisation, and for the 1995 report in particular, should be made publically available to the Bedoun community (with appropriate confidentiality measures in place), so that the group may use it to seek prosecution of authorities using the existing framework of international humanitarian law that is available to the them.

Appendix F, ii

Methods of Expulsion and Other Forms of Population Eradication (1990-1995) - Summary from the Thematic Analysis

The following themes listed in Table F2 below, emerged from the thematic analysis of literature regarding methods of expulsion and other forms of population transfer used to eradicate the Bedoun during ethnic cleansing from 1990-1995. Each theme is discussed further below.

Table F2

*Summary of Methods of Expulsion and Other Forms of Mass Eradication Sanctioned by the State of Kuwait*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods of expulsion and other forms of mass eradication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Expulsion strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mass expulsion incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conditions of expulsion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Persons deleted from POW and missing persons lists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expulsion of Bedoun via Abdali border camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Failure of repatriation of individuals (return to Kuwait)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The UNCC ‘late claims’ process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Expulsion Strategies**

Administrative deportation was a common strategy used to control the size of the migrant population in Kuwait prior to the Iraq war, as well as after it (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1991b, 1992). Martial law trials frequently issued deportation orders (Human Rights Watch, 1992). Administrative deportation replaced court-ordered deportation orders after martial law lifted, June 29, 1991 (Human Rights Watch, 1992). While tens of thousands of formal expulsion orders were issued to Bedoun individuals, the state attempted to drive the whole population from Kuwait in through two mechanisms: terrorisation (Mason, 2010) and preventing re-entry after to the country after border crossings. I elaborate on these points below. The policy of population management at this time was largely blamed on government, however it was also strongly influenced by the production of an extreme nationalist ideology that emerged during the 1980s, which claimed to be geared toward
‘migration’ and ‘population balance’ (Stanton Russell, 1989; Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). The policy had begun to be implemented prior to the war. It was then installed immediately after the war, during ethnic cleansing and prior to the resumption of the National Council. The Minister for Information had indicated his desire to see the ‘clean-up’ completed prior to the return of parliament (Evans, February 28, 1991).

The ideology was produced by intellectuals with strong political interests. The policy was more highly influenced by Kuwaiti academics than Ministers and bureaucrats due to the instalment of a committee of academics, the Academic Team for Population Policy, with direct access to the Prime Minister (see Supreme Council Resolution No.11/1992 in Appendix F, iii). This had the effect of diverting knowledge and theorization about mass expulsion incidents into discourses of voluntary immigration, changes to visa rules, ‘population balance,’ ‘migration flows’ and the like. For example, a dedicated Expulsion Centre was established in Kuwait Central Prison to house prisoners of all ethnic backgrounds, but the Talha deportation centre in Farwaniya was converted from a public school because additional space was needed to detain hundreds of Bedoun prisoners who were abandoned there in overcrowded conditions, indefinitely (Amnesty International, 1994, p.26; 2005).

I have collated information exploring the overlap between violent killing and expulsion methods with government population policy development in the following section, Appendix F, iii. See also Appendix D, i and iii, for other methods of population reduction targeting the Bedoun.


Mass Expulsion Incidents

The government of Kuwait attempted to remove around 24,000 Bedoun with deportation orders after the Iraq war. It is not known how many officially expelled Bedoun were accepted by other governments. However, as Mason (2010) pointed out, the targeted groups were violently killed and driven out, such that masses of the population were forced to leave in fear of their lives. Yet by 1995, although Palestinians had left Kuwait with assistance from the United Nations and its organisations, the Bedoun lived in Kuwait under virtual house arrest. The Bedoun were unable to travel for any reason (including religious pilgrimage and for medical emergencies), unless they never returned to Kuwait. Any border crossing was interpreted as a formal expulsion by the state. Conditions inside Kuwait caused such hardship for the Bedoun, that they were openly encouraged as a matter of public policy, to exit the country (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

The ratio of the number of deaths compared to the number of expulsions is unknown, and the topic of mass expulsion remains somewhat taboo. Scholars who have
explored the mass expulsion of Palestinians at this time, barely delve into or omit entirely, the mass expulsion of the Bedoun that took place simultaneously, often even though they describe events that included both Palestinian and Bedoun victims (for example, el Najjar, 2001; Mason, 2010; Rosen, 2012; al Nakib, M., 2014).

The nationality of victims of many mass expulsion incidents was often not known or approximately only through observation, but ‘Iraqi’ deportations were observed to comprise the Bedoun (Arundel, June 12, 1991; Cushman, June 11, 1991). After the Iraq war, the government issued over twenty-four thousand individual expulsion orders for the Bedoun. However, the population declined by approximately one hundred and fifty thousand persons at this time (Human Rights Watch, 1995). On June 23 1991, four hundred Bedoun were accused on being ‘Iraqis’ by government authorities (Sawt al-Kuwait, June 26, 1991; Middle East Watch interview, July 15, 1991 in Human Rights Watch, 1992, n25). In one expulsion of two hundred and forty-seven persons of multiple origins, Iraqi authorities stated that one hundred and nineteen (nearly half) were Bedoun (AFP, Reuters, August 4, 1991 in Human Rights Watch, 1992, n29).

Other mass deportations of ‘Iraqis’ numbered in the hundreds (Human Rights Watch, 1992, n219-225). The Bedoun identity was so intensively targeted by authorities, that an informal national policy articulated by officials was that the Bedoun were Iraqi (see Appendix F, i, above). Four thousand Bedoun were stranded at Safwan, Iraq (Arundel, June 12, 1991). The very small numbers of mass deportation incidents actually observed compared to those formally ordered, and the general decline in the Bedoun population at the time, as well as the fact that the borders were managed by the Kuwaiti and allied forces, indicate that much of the expulsion activity and/or Bedoun border crossings took place in secret or out of view. It is also possible that there was a far more intense concentration on mass killings than expulsion, since government had articulated its policy that it would not investigate mass killings (see Appendix F, i).

Henckaerts (1995, p.97-99) addressed the right of the Bedoun to be protected from mass expulsion from the state of Kuwait during the war, despite some minor errors in defining the Bedoun identity due to lack of investigation of secondary sources. The author explained that lack of citizenship ‘registration’ had led to a ‘citizenship vacuum’ in Kuwait which facilitated mass expulsion. The author provided one of the most straightforward accounts of Kuwait’s expulsion strategy deployed against the Bedoun: ‘Kuwait erroneously insists that all Bedoon are foreigners and can be expelled at will. Even if this were the case, mass expulsion would not be permissible’ (p.98).


**Conditions of Expulsion**

No personal documents were allowed to be carried by individuals during their physical expulsion from the state of Kuwait, that would enable them to be formally identified themselves across the border in Iraq. Deportees including women and children were abandoned one mile from the Iraqi border in the dark, with no flashlights. They had to cross mine-infested land with wild dogs. They were abandoned without food and without water, and no arrangements were made with any party over the border to safeguard them (Arundel, June 12, 1991; Human Rights Watch, 1992, n24; Wilkinson (1991). The identity of the expelled was unclear, due to government’s insistence that Bedoun were citizens of Iraq (Cushman, June 11, 1991).

Expulsions of people driven into Iraq by Kuwaiti authorities were carried out in front of US Soldiers (Branigin and Boustany, March 17, 1991 and Drogin, March 18, 1991 in Human Rights Watch, 1992) and also in front of UN and International Committee of the Red Cross observers (Arundel, June 12, 1991; Human Rights Watch, 1992, n24). Talha deportation centre contained over 600 detainees in 1996. The vast majority of detainees were Bedoun, held over for years from the war period, prolonging the groups’ misery (Amnesty International, 1996). For example, a Bedoun acquitted by the State Security Court on June 30, 1993, was still in detention in 1996 (Amnesty International, 1996). The situation for the Bedoun was one of entrapment, compared to the Palestinians and other Arab, foreign nationals who were facilitated by the UNHCR and other agencies to exit the country and re-settle (Mason, 2010).


**Persons Deleted from POW and Missing Persons Lists**

Initially government demanded the release of all persons listed on International Committee of the Red Cross lists of persons held as prisoners by Iraq or thought missing in Iraq (Human Rights Watch, 1992). Approximately 1000 people, mostly Bedoun, were later deleted from government records requesting return of persons from Iraqi authorities (Human Rights Watch, 1992). Approximately 3,700 stateless persons registered with ICRC stranded in Iraq. Almost all never allowed to return to Kuwait (Human Rights Watch, 1992), but given that the overall Bedoun population was approximately 150,000 (Human Rights Watch, 1995) clearly much larger groups went unaccounted for. For this reason, the investigation of unmarked and/or mass graves was warranted, which the government refused.
The labelling of the Bedoun as ‘Iraqi’ by Kuwaiti authorities had the effect of obscuring the identity of the Bedoun, making it more difficult for international observers to identify them and to keep count of the number killed, tortured and expelled. The use of the target words ‘collaborators’ and ‘fifth column’ for the Bedoun and Palestinian populations further confused the identity of the Bedoun during and after the invasion by Iraq. These terms were also identifying signals for ethnic cleansing. However, as I mentioned in relation to the comments made by government ministers in the previous Appendix, it is arguable that the Bedoun were targeted more intensively in this respect, because although Palestinians were regarded as traitors also, they were not regarded as the foremost enemy, Iraqis.

The ideology was promoted during the 1990s by Kuwaiti citizen intellectual of Palestinian-American heritage, Sharfeeq Ghabra (1997a, 1997b). He expanded on the ideology as an uncritical research narrative, including erroneous referencing of claims that most Bedoun were descended from Iraqis, which he attributed to Human Rights Watch (1995) report (Ghabra, 1997b, p.365, n33). Additionally, information about second and third refugee camps at Abdali was largely unreported. Gasperini (August 20, 1991) indicated that there were three camps and three times more inhabitants at the camp (approximately 15,000) than were reported by other authors. Others tended to report only one camp existed, presumably because they only visited one camp (see Cushman, June 30, 1991, July 16, 1991, for example). Most, if not all of the inhabitants of the camps, were Bedoun (Gasperini, August 20, 1991; Human Rights Watch, 1992). I discuss the Abdali camp below.


**Expulsion of the Bedoun via the Abdali Border Camp**

While most sources reported just one refugee camp existed at Abdali, a border-town in the north of Kuwait, this was disputed by Gasperini (August 20, 1991), a foreign correspondent who worked out of Kuwait at the end of the war. For example, border post at Abdali became a refugee camp housing up to 5,000 people at one time, almost all Bedoun, according to Human Rights Watch (September 1991a p.54). Nevertheless, according to Gasperini (August 20, 1991) there were three refugee camps sited at or near Abdali, housing a peak population of 15,000. This was three times the number of inhabitants quoted by other sources. If just one source could uncover such a large discrepancy in numbers, the question arises as to whether other camps holding the Bedoun existed, which could be linked to the mass population loss of approximately 150,000.

According to Human Rights Watch (1991a), by the time the UNHCR intervened to attempt to assist the Bedoun out of the camp, there were less than 700 people remaining. Six hundred individuals were allowed to return to Kuwait under the UNHCRs carefully timed involvement. Various estimates from 5,000 to 3,700 were reported to have retreated into
war-ravaged Iraq for better shelter; they were never allowed to return (Cushman, June 30, 1991; Human Rights Watch, September 1991a, p.54). However, this number does not seem to have included information on the three camps (Gasperini, August 20, 1991), but referred to just one camp.

One thousand, two hundred Kuwaitis at Abdali were known to have fled the camp over a ten-day period and entered Iraq, for fear of being accused as collaborators by Kuwaiti authorities (Cushman, June 30, 1991). The inhabitants of camps at Abdali had been forced back to Iraq due to the appalling conditions in the camp including mass deaths of babies, and terrorization by government with threats to hang Iraqi ‘collaborators’ who returned to Kuwait (meaning Bedoun and Palestinians), while those inside the camps were also accused directly, of being ‘Iraqi’ (see the Appendix F, i, above). Babies born in the camp suffered an endemic level of failure to thrive syndrome, due to psychological damage done to families. Diarrhoea and dehydration were also common, leading to mass deaths of Bedoun infants (Cushman, July 16, 1991).


**Failure of Repatriation of Individuals (Return to Kuwait)**

The government of Kuwait did not allow Bedoun to return to Kuwait after the war. They were terrorized in an effort to persuade them to exit the country and never come back. Even those who were known to have been prisoners of war in Iraq who were later found at the Abdali border camp, attempting to return homes, were not permitted to return to their ho (Human Rights Watch, September 1992a, Wilkinson, 1991). Kuwaitis ‘in exile’ claimed they were angry at Iraq’s failure to document fully or return the Kuwaitis who are refugees in Iraqi towns, or still in prison, or missing (Lesch, May 29-31, 1991), but this concern did not see to extend to the Bedoun, because most Kuwaitis ‘in exile’ were affluent Hadar who sat out the war in exclusive London apartments (plotting their future political machinations) who had already left Kuwait prior to the invasion (Lesch, May 29-31, 1991; Hedges, August 2, 1991) while Bedouin citizens were trapped in Kuwait when the invasion commenced, and were then driven out of Kuwait during the invasion and its aftermath of ethnic cleansing (Hedges, August 2, 1991). Al Mughni and Tétreault (2000, p.260) later accused the Bedouin citizens of abandoning the country without providing a shred of evidence to support their generalisations. They also played up Hadar support for the country. Their commentary was politically divisive, and they seemed to imply that all Bedouin citizens, along with the Bedoun, were traitors of Kuwait, while the Hadar were true patriots.

The government of Iraq claimed it sought repatriation of all prisoners of war to Kuwait, but the Kuwaiti government rejected the return of all Bedoun, while the remaining
2,900 were stateless Iraqis without legitimate residence in Kuwait who could not re-enter their country either (Iraq) (Human Rights Watch, 1991b; 1992).


The United Nations Compensation Commission ‘Late Claims’ Process

While the government of Kuwait rejected the return of stateless Kuwaitis born on its soil and who had defended Kuwait, it accepted the return of gold bars to the value of $700 million from Iraq under UN supervision (‘Iraq Gives,’ 1991) and war reparations of over $52 billion value out of over 352 billion claimed by Kuwaitis (UNCC at a Glance, United Nations Compensation Commission, n.d.). Why were civilian Bedouns rejected? Likely because government knew they could not prove their claims of Kuwaiti identity, due to lack of documentation. As I discussed in Appendix D, iv, government had long-since isolated one group of Bedoun who had possession of sufficient documentation to prove their citizenship right under the Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait, while the the others did not, and would not, because government was not ever going to issue them with any such genuine documentation. For the majority of Bedoun, the most they have ever been offered by government has been incorrect documentation stating false nationalities. Those that were identified as having correct documentation, have been subjected to the intensified issue of ‘security restrictions’ to remove their claim to citizenship.

Some authors (for example Chung, 2005; Vela, 2015) used the inclusion of the Bedoun and Palestinians in the Kuwait war reparations to challenge criticism that the process was set up to monetarily reward the state of Kuwait for the invasion by Iraq, in the light of the extraordinary payments made to Kuwaiti citizens and especially, corporations. It is arguable that these authors wrongly assessed the role of government in the late claims process, because they used the example of the Bedoun and Palestinian populations to promote the process as having been carried out duly, which is somewhat obscene considering the scope of government-ordered ethnic cleansing and the methods used.

There was sufficient literature on the violent ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun in scholarly work in international law, the grey literature of international humanitarian organisations and media articles published by large daily newspapers in the United States (discussed in Chapter 2, Appendix Fi and other sections of this Appendix), for these authors to be aware that the government of Kuwait used methods of state-sponsored terror (Mason, 2010) to kill and eradicate these populations by other means. I would suggest that the author’s failure to observe this is one of the costs in the social sciences promoting the misrepresentation of the Bedoun in the 1990s, which discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis (it is almost needless to say that, today, some of these scholars hold or have held prominent positions in organisations and/or consultative working groups funded by the oil industry).
One of the worst examples of commentary on the Bedoun case at the UNCC has been Vela (2015), in a study of the United Nations’ Compensation Commission approach to statelessness which assessed the commission’s late claims process of the Palestinians and Bedoun. Vela (2015) glossed over many important details available in the work of international law scholars who studied the whole claims process, omitting crucial but basic facts regarding the treatment of Bedoun claims. Vela (2015) did not discuss any individual issues relevant to the Bedoun claims, such as the majority of the population being barred from applying for compensation by the government, although her study claimed to include the whole Bedoun population. The study, commissioned by the Institute on Statelessness, appeared to be little more an exercise in distraction from important issues, similar to the criminalizing portrayals of the Bedoun in the social sciences, seen in the 1990s (see Chapter 2 of this thesis).

For example, Vela’s (2015) study simplified previous research in this area, which had not addressed the statelessness of the Bedoun in relation to the claims but had provided far more detailed and deeper analysis of the claims process overall. While the wartime suffering of other groups had been taken into account, the wartime suffering of the Bedoun was not. The context of the post-war ethnic cleansing was not regarded as part of the invasion and occupation experienced, even though the violent and pogrom-like response of the government of Kuwait was arguably directly related to the war. If it was not, was the agency and assessors of the damage assuming the pogrom was just a regular government action? Vela (2015) did not observe that the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun had taken place simultaneously to the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in Kuwait.

The population loss of approximately 150,000 Bedoun from 1990 to 1995, and the nature and extent of the violence, has never been investigated by any Kuwaiti or international agency. Although stateless people were reported to have been assisted in southern Iraq near Basra following the war (Mason, 2010), it is difficult to know if this assistance was extended to the Bedoun or only to Palestinians who were registered with the UNHCR. While some mass graves in that area have never been investigated (Kirmanj, 2013), Bedoun killings and disappearances in Kuwait were also never investigated (Amnesty International 1992, 1994, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992a).

A report on the profile of internal displacement in Iraq from the Global Internal Displacement Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council (February 19, 2004), confirmed that from at least 1998, there was no information on the Bedoun of Kuwait who had been driven into Kuwait after the war:
Since the war around half of them have fled from or been expelled from Kuwait, mostly to Iraq. Though they are refugees, their statelessness, their displacement and their Iraqi connections mean that their status has much in common with that of other ‘internally displaced’ people. Detailed information on their situation in Iraq is, however unavailable. (Dammers 1998, p.184)

Some of the major concerns that I observed based on my limited study of the claims process, involved the UNCC allowing the government of Kuwait to vet the Bedoun claims, make decisions about their identity and ability to receive money, and then to distribute the claims money for Bedoun claimants. This ‘supervision’ by the government of Kuwait was strictly prohibited for any other group, due to the need for the payments process to remain independent, and free of corruption (Palmer, 2015). The proportion of the amount awarded to military and police personnel on the front lines during the invasion and to civilians who endured the occupation, also warrants questioning. More Bedoun were at greater risk than citizens during the war, due to their employment as military/police personnel but also due to their inability to leave the country, while most Kuwaiti citizens were not even in the country at the time. But the Bedoun claims were miniscule compared to Kuwaiti citizen, migrant and corporations claims, which escalated into vast, multi-million dollar claims to compensate for oil losses. The Late Claims process capped all payments for the Bedoun at a maximum of $2500, which was the minimum amount of all other claims for all other groups (Palmer, 2015; see also ‘Decision concerning the filing of “late” claims of the Bedoun,’ United Nations Security Council, July 2, 2004).

The method of assessment of claimant eligibility led to the exclusion of virtually all Bedoun civilian households (those not headed by men in the military or police forces who were employed in active duty at the beginning of the invasion) from the claims process, comprising around two thirds of the Bedoun population. The usual circuitous logic was applied, typical of Ministry of Interior decision-making: the exclusion of the Bedoun civilians was automatic, regardless of their case circumstances, due to the role of government in determining identity. As I have mentioned, the UNCC did not allow such vetting for any other group, but did not appear to question the rationale for exclusion of the Bedoun, either. I did not locate any inquiries of this nature in my reading of United Nations Security Council documents, and although as I have mentioned, my research of this area was somewhat limited, I believe I had read all the major Bedoun decision documents issued by Council.

Other important points are that the UNCC only added the Bedoun at the very last moment before the process was closed when all other claims had been completed, after concerns arose internally within the United Nations that the Bedoun had been omitted from the entire process (United Nations Security Council, July 2, 2004). How the exclusion of
the Bedoun actually came to be raised as an issue, is not clear. Finally, the UNCC was also unable to address the fact that many of the potential claimants were killed or driven out of Kuwait by Kuwaiti authorities or their agents after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (since the population was reduced by approximately half its size). There appears to have been no attempt by the UNCC to have ever acknowledged this population loss, let alone account for the missing potential claimants or investigating how their relatives might be compensated. It seems strange that the above authors who specialised in the UNCC legal processes, as well as a researcher from a statelessness ‘think tank,’ uniformly omitted these details as well as the UNCC, given that quite a few scholars of international law have published on this topic, and generally speaking they referenced their work more meticulously than other work on the Bedoun in the social sciences (see Chapter 2), and additional information about the topic was freely available online.

Appendix F, iii

Activities of the Academic Team for Population Policy, the National Council and the Supreme Planning Council concurrent to Violent Ethnic Cleansing

I have combined some of the information presented in Appendices F, i and ii, with notes on the development of population policy after with withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. As I mentioned above, the first two summaries of evidence described the violent ethnic cleansing and killing of the Bedoun from 1990 to 1995, which was achieved by physical methods eradication, primarily killings and driving the population out of Kuwait using state terror (Mason, 2010) and deportation. The purpose of the two appendixes was to offer a limited analysis to support the claim by journalist Mark Fineman (November 2, 1991) that ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun likely took place after the Iraq war, in the absence of academic claims of the same nature. This third appendix in the group attempts to show a time-line of development of the so-called post-war ‘population restructuring’ policy and legislation that was implemented in Kuwait after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces. These developments are shown below, in Table F3. The table is long and detailed, but I ask readers to bear with it due to the gravity of the phenomenon it illustrates, which is the planned and intentional ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, Palestinians and non-Kuwaiti citizens at the policy level, involving academic advisors as well as bureaucrats and Ministers, simultaneous to the violence being carried out on the targeted groups.
Table F3

A Timeline of the Development of Official Population Policy Toward the Bedoun by the Government of Kuwait and the Violent Ethnic Cleansing of the Bedoun

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Party involved</th>
<th>Description of activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985-1990</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning</td>
<td>The Ministry of Planning introduced its Five Year Plan for 1985-1990 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). Kuwaitization policy was introduced, ‘nationalising’ the Kuwaiti economic sector or in fact, merely political sentiment (Stanton Russell, 1989). Coinciding with or stemming from these measures in 1985, administrative expulsion measures were introduced against the Bedoun, to de-nationalise the group (Human Rights Watch, 1995; ‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). The Plan set out to make the population problem the focus of the country’s development strategy which was to alter the population balance to achieve a 50-50 per cent balance of Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis by 2000 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.572-3), of which the central goal pointed out by Abdul Hadi al Awadi (Undersecretary of the Ministry of Planning) was to alter the population balance (p.573, n9).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 December, 1988</td>
<td>Supreme Planning Council</td>
<td>Issues Strategy for Development. Ministry of Planning given task to make Five Year Plans reflecting a long-term population strategy for Kuwait (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). The policy to de-nationalise the population from ‘Kuwaiti’ to the generic ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ was implemented in 1988 (Human Rights Watch, 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 August, 1990</td>
<td>Iraqi forces</td>
<td>Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 1990</td>
<td>Jeddah Conference, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Approximately 1,000 Kuwaitis representing political groups assembled to express solidarity to the Emir.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
October, 1990 | Minister of Planning, Sulayman al Mutawa | The military resistance ceased its activities due to Iraqi retribution and the Minister of Planning urged the resistance to cease military resistance (Levins, 1995).
---|---|---
January 16, 1991 | Coalition forces | Coalition forces entered Kuwait.
February 26, 1991 | Coalition forces | Kuwait was liberated from Iraqi forces.
April 8, 1991 | Emir of Kuwait, in a National Address circulated by KUNA the government news agency | Instructions to ‘cleanse’ the country of internal enemies, called ‘fifth columnists.’ Referred those who required cleansing to be collaborators with Iraq; did not name particular nationality groups (*KUNA*, April 10, 1991, in *Human Rights Watch*, September 1991a, n7).
Late Spring, 1991 | Committee to Organise the Labour Force | Duties: to prevent build-up of non-Kuwaiti population (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, n20).
May, 1991 | Kuwaiti authorities | Government insisted that nationality was not a factor in arrests of people after they resumed control, an official list of 546 detainees as at May 1991 included only 12 citizen detainees, with 534 detainees stateless Bedoun or of other nationalities (*Amnesty International*, 1992).
June 27, 1991 | Ministry of Justice spokesperson, Nahess al Enezy in interview | Government refers to those put on trial without due process: ‘Just because they were acquitted, does not mean they are not still suspect. It only means there was not enough evidence for their guilt,’ (*Sawt al Kuwait*, June 27, 1991 in *Human Rights Watch*, 1992, n218).
July 5, 1991 | Minister of Defence, in interview | Announcement telling Kuwaitis that Iraq had planted a fifth column, which was still in Kuwait (quoted in an interview in *Sawt al Kuwait* (in *Human Rights Watch*, 1991a, n9).
July 6 or 9, 1991 | First session of the interim National Council | (There is a minor difference in dates between Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan 1994, p.577-8 and *Human Rights Watch*, 1992, n8).
July 6 or 9, 1991 | Crown Prince of Kuwait, the Prime | Announcement advising Kuwaitis it is necessary to ‘purify the country of the evil elements that constitute a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event/Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1991</td>
<td>The Ministry of Planning, following instructions from the Prime Minister to switch social concerns for economic goals in the wake of the invasion by Iraq, introduced the ‘Preliminary View’ policy. Population ‘balance’ (size and composition) was prioritized over economic considerations in determining ‘migration’ requirements. This policy led to the establishment of the ‘Ministerial Committee for Population Policy’ (<em>Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.578</em>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6, 1991</td>
<td>An editorial warns, 'Kuwait is full of hordes of fifth columnists… even those who did not directly help in the occupation assisted in other ways… they still live inside Kuwait,' (<em>Sawt al Kuwaiti</em>, in Human Rights Watch, September 1991a, p.5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6, 1991</td>
<td>Calls for strategies to deal with the stateless Bedoun population specifically, due to large numbers in Kuwait – that is, to change the Ministry of Planning’s Long Term Plan. The Ministry was required to re-submit the plan. The plan proposed to ensure the Kuwaiti citizen population was 40% of the country’s total population by 2015 (<em>Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.574</em>). The ‘study,’ management and control of the Bedoun population was thereafter pegged to five year plans. The Central Apparatus mandate from 2010 was expected to cease with a final solution by 2015, which was extended with the development of the Comoros Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 91</td>
<td>Committee established and headed by Minister of Planning, also Ministers for Social Affairs and Labour, the Interior, Finance, Trade and Industry and the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs. The committee oversaw all reports and proposed legislation on population, including those of the Supreme Planning Council (<em>Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.578-9, n24</em>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6, 1991</td>
<td>Several ministers on the National Council express concern over the Bedoun claiming citizenship and calling for immediate plans to control the current situation (<em>Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, p.579, n25</em>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Ministry/Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1991</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1991</td>
<td>First Bedoun population loss estimated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1991</td>
<td>National Council/Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1991</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 21, 1991</td>
<td>Minister of Defence in interview</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| December 12, 1991| Crown Prince of Kuwait, the Prime Minister               | Interview – ‘evil elements’ planted by Iraq were present in Kuwait that needed to be removed. Those who had cooperated or collaborated with the Iraqi occupation must be flushed out (al Majalla (Saudi Arabian weekly) in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Body</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 30, 1991</td>
<td>National Council</td>
<td>Adopts new measures to admit only those with high-level skills, to limit alien residency to 5 years, to limit marriage of Kuwaiti citizens to among themselves and to ‘resolve the Bedoun question’ (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.580).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1991</td>
<td>Academic Team for Population Policy, working for the Supreme Planning Council</td>
<td>Academic Team recommendations: Citizenship for stateless Bedoun only if they prove eligibility under Nationality Law 1959; cease mass naturalisation of the Bedouin (the same group), register those not complying with the Nationality law 1959, to issued a registration card and classified as ‘non-Kuwaiti’ [indicating the reallocation of the Bedouin from ‘Kuwaiti’ on the National Census]. The migration policy contradicts itself, claiming to tighten migrant population controls, it <em>loosens</em> of immigration/employment controls simultaneous to <em>tightening</em> of controls on the Bedoun population who are not migrants (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, n32). Remember that the Bedoun are being ethnically cleansed at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs</td>
<td>Abdul Rahman al Awadi, Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, was appointed as chair to the Bedouin committee in 1991 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011). Al Awadi’s other role at this time was as a personal advisor to the prime minister (Mason, 2010, p.130). He reported on the post-invasion ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, Palestinians and others, specifically the number of state-sanctioned, extrajudicial killings achieved by the government-organised second-wave of Kuwaiti ‘resistance’ (the SSIP, resistance members, civilian vigilantes groups and royal ‘death squads’) (Lesch in Lesch and Lustick, 2005, p.171). When initially a member of the resistance gave a report of eighty killings, al Awadi reported that the number was actually around one thousand (Graham Brown, 1999; Lesch, May 29-31, 1991, p.49; Mason, 2008 in Mason, 2010, p.130).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>National Council and the Academic Team</td>
<td>The National Council adopts a policy of increasing the proportion of Kuwaiti citizens in the total population of the country to 70% (National Council position on the Cabinet working agenda published in <em>Al-Rai Alaam</em>, 1992. No. 9684, p. 4, 5, 13, in al Ramadhan, 1995), while simultaneously adopting the policy to remove the Bedoun from that population, which increases the requirement to eradicate a higher proportion of the non-Kuwaiti population. The Academic Team’s recommendation becomes official government policy. <em>Population Policy for Kuwait: Foundations, Goals and Directions</em> by Abdulla</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1992
- **Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office (1992)**
  - Stateless Bedoun population removed from ‘Kuwaiti’ population group to ‘Non-Kuwaiti’ Arab population (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.571, n.d.).
  - The amendment reflected the policy to de-nationalise the population from ‘Kuwaiti’ to the generic ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab,’ implemented in 1988 (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

- **January 8, 1992; January 30**
  - Cabinet adopts the policy of the Academic Team for Population Policy on January, 8, 1992 and it is legislated on January 30, 1992, prohibiting the Bedouin ethnic group from receiving any future mass grants of citizenship (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, n32).

- **March 1992**
  - ‘Reconstruction period’ reform policy published, adopting the recommendations to the Academic Team made into law January 30, 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994).

- **March 1992**
  - Emir of Kuwait
  - Emiri speech declaring that the population composition is a matter of the highest national importance (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.581, n34).

- **April 1992**
  - The State Security Court, well known for conducting unfair trials devoid of due process prior to the invasion of Iraq (Amnesty international, 1994, p.2), takes over from the Martial Law Court. It tries cases of ‘collaborators’ detained since early 1991. Amnesty International reported that the court denied fair processes at every sage of proceedings (Amnesty International, 1994, p.2); trials were characterised by impunity and at times, humiliation (Amnesty International, 1992, 1994, 1996). Defendants were not aware of the reason they had been detained or charges made against them by the state (Amnesty International, 1994, p.7).

- **April 1992**
  - Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
  - The Ministry begins to issue work permits to the private sector without any submission of labour needs; employers decide who and how many immigrant workers they want.

  Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan (1994) showed that Kuwait’s urgent priority for unskilled, female Asian
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1992</td>
<td>Second time a more moderate and gradual reform package issued by Ministry of Planning is rejected (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994).</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 5, 1992</td>
<td>Upcoming National Assembly elections were held (Human Rights Watch, 1994).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992-1995</td>
<td>‘Scores’ of individuals accused of ‘collaboration’ continued to be sentenced to death by the State Security Court at this time (Amnesty International, 1993). Defendants acquitted by the State Security Court in 1992 and 1993 were still being held in long-term detention in 1994 and many hearings were conducted throughout 1993 and 1994 until the court was closed in late 1995 (Amnesty International, 1994). Some detainees, including those pardoned by the Emir of Kuwait, remained in detention in 2005 (Amnesty International, 2005).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Sources are provided throughout the text.*
Appendix G
The Arab Spring-Comoros years - 2011-2016

i. Decree 409/2011 human rights ‘reform’ law
ii. The limits of knowledge about the Bedoun in education
iii. The Central Apparatus System - Key findings from the thematic analysis
iv. Local and international factors influencing the ethnic targeting and population eradication of the Bedoun (1983-)

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Appendix G, i
Decree 409/2011 Human Rights ‘Reform’ Law

The provision of access to basic public services for the Stateless Bedoun was also referred to as the eleven human rights reforms. They are listed below in Table G1.

Table G1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform number</th>
<th>Description of reform</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Free treatment for illegal residents through the Charitable Fund for the Health Care of Needy Residents of Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Free education for the children of illegal residents through the Charitable Fund for the Education of Needy Children of Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Issue of birth certificates for the children of illegal residents that list nationality as ‘non-Kuwaiti.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Issue of death certificates for illegal residents that list nationality as ‘non-Kuwaiti.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Issue of marriage contracts for illegal residents that list nationality as ‘non-Kuwaiti.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Issue of divorce certificates for illegal residents that list nationality as ‘non-Kuwaiti’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Issue of driver’s licenses for illegal residents that list nationality as ‘non-Kuwaiti’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Access for disabled illegal residents to services provided by the Supreme Council for the Disabled in accordance with existing conditions. At the same time, this group was and continues to benefit from a set of social, administrative, educational and medical facilities before the issuance of Cabinet Decree 409/2011. They benefit from the services offered by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, access to job opportunities in the public and private sectors, and services offered by the Ministry of Health in government hospitals like those offered to nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>The right to obtain any kind of authorization from the Department of Authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>The opportunity for appointment in the government and private sectors was opened to illegal residents according to the need for work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Availability of a provision card (the food ration card used by all Kuwaiti citizens) for ‘eligible’ illegal residents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The eleven human rights reform for the Bedoun were introduced in 2011, as a negotiated settlement to stop the Bedoun community from protesting on the streets of Kuwait City. At the outset of this study in 2013, I assumed the reforms were genuine. But that same year, feedback began to be released indicating the reforms had failed (Amnesty International, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2014). When I conducted my fieldwork in Kuwait, I soon established that the reforms were piecemeal. Some Bedoun were benefitting from the reforms, but those individuals carefully pointed out that they were rare cases, and that most others had not access to the reforms. Over the course of my research, I came to know some members of the community better and to observe their different levels of access to the reforms, which are simply basic public services. I observed how they managed their lives without access to basic public services. I also observed how they managed the disquieting instances when access was switched on or switched off by the Central Apparatus, according to patterns of surveillance, where ‘human rights’ which in Kuwait, are just basic public services, are held out and taken away from the Bedoun like a cat and mouse game.

The reason for the failure of these reforms and the states’ incapacity to provide the Bedoun with basic human rights was indicated by the lack of comprehension of the human rights concept by the government of Kuwait. My thematic analysis of the Central Apparatus system revealed that human rights were perceived by the government of Kuwait similarly to the Bedouns ethnic and national identity: as an object to be used in transactions, an object that could be gotten by the Bedoun in return for ‘adjustment’ of their identity, and as an object for sale as a ‘package of benefits.’ While Beaugrand (2015) suggested that one of the problems for the Bedoun is that the government perceives citizenship as a commodity, I would suggest that the problem is that the government also perceives the Bedoun people and their human rights as separate commodities.

There is a basic lack of intellectual comprehension of concepts by those put by government on the front line to discuss the Bedoun issue in the media, while behind the scenes, intellectuals who have designed the system behind the policy. This was evident in the denials the Bedoun are stateless, and the denials of the concept of statelessness itself (Appendix E, iii and iv). The policy and its presentation, carefully curated for public consumption, looks unintelligent. This enables the system of re-organisation to be carried out without resistance, because it is described in way that makes it appear to be more foolish than harmful. Decree 409/2011 was designed to fail, as it merely reinforced the necessity of ‘status adjustment.’ First, I will illustrate what government thinks the human rights are,
when speaking to the public. Then, I will illustrate how the Bedoun are told they can access the grant of human rights, that have (in theory) already been delivered to them.

What does the government think human rights are? According to government, human rights for the Bedoun were the items listed in Decree 409/2011. They were merely a list of basic public services, or objects attached to a service, such as a government-issued, plastic card. The basic public services named in the reforms were also called ‘services,’ ‘facilities,’ ‘benefits’ and ‘privileges’ in different sources, but sometimes also in the same document (such as the Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011). These terms were all believed to be equivalent to actual human rights. For example, a human right is a rational card (the object). A human right is a divers’ licence. A human right is an authorization from the Department of Authentication (the department that authenticates the fraudulent passports the Bedoun are forced to submit to it, discussed in Chapter 7, section 7.4.2).

When Decree 409/2011 was discussed by by the government of Kuwait in its Response to Human Rights Watch (2011), it listed the eleven public services set out in Table G1, above. The Apparatus deemed benefits, privileges and basic public services, all to be equivalent to ‘human rights,’ and that human rights are given or not given, on the basis of a transaction, in this case, submission to ethnic cleansing. The Apparatus confused the terms for public services, public facilitates, welfare benefits and elite privileges as a matter of routine. Government then described the bestowing of human rights on the Bedoun as an initiative,

… lauded by the Cabinet, which welcomed it as a way to complement and strengthen existing efforts to extend many benefits, services, and humanitarian, social and civil privileges to this class. (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch)

As illustrated above, the terms were sometime bunched together to make the apparent provision of human rights appear to be very generous indeed. Language such as, human rights are ‘enjoyed’ was often used, as if policy makers were either dangerously stupid, or disquietingly cynical.

How do the Bedoun access their human rights? This problem was illustrated in an article in The Kuwait Times, which recounted the viewpoint of the Central Apparatus describing how the Bedoun would be given access to Decree 409/2011 human rights:

Some 5,982 illegal residents have corrected their status. They will be given more rights after bringing in their (original) passports. (Nacheva, April 6, 2014)
The Bedoun are instructed to present false passports to show their status, so that they could ‘enjoy’ their ‘benefits’ (Nacheva, April 6, 2014). In this passage, Colonel Mohammed al Wuhaib of the Central Apparatus reminded the Bedoun that he knew they had fake passports to bring to his department:

‘The illegal residents who need to correct their status are classified in one group. “We know that some of them have passports from other countries and they need to come forward and bring them.”’ (Colonel Mohammed al Wuhaib in Nacheva, April 6, 2014)

These were the passports required to be handed over to the Central Apparatus for photocopying and inclusion in their security file as proof of their nationality. Once that task was complete, the individual would be asked to sign paperwork submitting the nationality on the passport was their ‘real’ nationality. Then, they would be ‘given more rights.’

But there was a problem in that sometimes the passports expired. The Bedoun were required to keep their fake passports up-to-date, and to submit new a passport when the previous one expired. In December, 2014, the Central Apparatus head of public relations, Salaeh al Saeedi, was reported in MidEastEye denying the program still existed. He stated:

We resolved the issue of fake passports over a decade ago. Those who bought forfeited African passports reclaimed their initial status as illegal residents in Kuwait. (al Saeedi in Kholai, December 12, 2014)

Because the author of the article was not aware of the Bedoun’s history, she was not able to counter this claim with other data, beyond quoting a Bedoun individuals’ opposing account. WikiLeaks had published their data in 2006, eight years prior. Furthermore, the higher-ranking Sheikh Mazen a Jarrah contradicted the claim of the public relations manager, confirming in 2015 that the fake passports program was still in place. Note that al Jarrah himself was the highest the authority responsible for the program, after the Minister of the Interior.

Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior for Citizenship and Passport Affairs, reminded the Bedoun to get new, fake passports regularly:

Some bedoons have already legalized their status and got Dominican, Somali and Yemeni citizenships, yet they have to keep their passports valid to be deemed legal residents.’ (Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah in, ‘Bedoons to Get’, 2015).
Al Jarrah, indicated that the Bedoun have to continually re-purchase the fake passports, preferably from the same country, when the old one expired. If they did not renew the passport once expired, the access to basic public services – the Bedouns human rights – would be cut off, until they submitted a valid one. In this way, the eleven reforms perceived by government to be human rights, functioned only as in instrument of the Central Apparatus system. That instrument was used to try to force the Bedoun to submit to the ‘status adjustment’ program. Note that the ‘original’ passport could be from the Dominican Islands or Somalia, it need not bear any relation to any country the individual was otherwise associated with, as long as it was not Kuwaiti.

Another example of the failure of the Decree 409/2011 reforms was in February 2015, at the United Nations Human Rights Commission’s Universal Periodic Review (second cycle) for Kuwait. Government representatives claimed that approximately 56,547 illegal residents benefited by the human rights ‘services’ out of over 111,000 (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). This was approximately half the population. Being called illegal residents, it was difficult to tell if the government was referring to the stateless Bedoun population alone or a mixed cohort with illegal migrants who were legitimate nationals of other countries. If we assume the announcement concerned only the Bedoun population, it appeared that around half of the population who did not have access to public basic services had resisted participating in the ‘status adjustment’ program, and/or had been issued one or more ‘security restrictions.’

Furthermore, the nature of the access was not disclosed – was the access permanent, temporary or tentative? Were all eleven reform points available to the said recipients at all times, or were only some points accessible while others were withheld? Government had described all Bedoun as having access to basic public services as an ‘enjoyment’ of rights and services (Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015), but only half had received them. The claim was self-contradictory. Kuwait was lauded for the achievement at the United Nations, while around half the Bedoun still could not access their package of human rights, also known as ‘services,’ ‘facilities,’ ‘benefits’ and ‘privileges.’ A number of members of parliament spoke out about the ongoing situation where the Bedoun could not access basic human rights in Kuwait, in 2016:

MP Yousef Al-Zalzalah slammed the government’s treatment of bedoons, saying some of them can’t get married, get an education or get the least of their basic rights. ‘This is a form of oppression and there are people who are deliberately oppressing bedoons,’ he said (Izzak, May 17, 2016).

Within the country, the failure of the Decree 409/2011 reforms is now widely acknowledged as part of the intentional policy of oppression of the Bedoun.
Appendix G, ii
The Limits of Knowledge About the Bedoun in Education

‘Nathir al ‘Ash Laikbar Farkah’
‘Destroy the Nest Before the Bird Grows Up’
(a Kuwaiti Nationalist Slogan)

A social problem is likely to arise from the inevitable existence of poor, ignorant and illiterate groups of persons. The very existence of such persons might be regarded as a disgrace in this modern State, which even before its independence, had committed itself to fight illiteracy, not only within its own borders, but in other Arab countries. (al Anezi, 1989, p.266)

One cannot change people’s behaviour and attitudes through building more schools and vocational centres… Illiterates…the primary reasons for this derive from the naturalization of the Arab nomad, the Badu. (Alessa, 1981, p.83).

The spread of education in the Gulf and Arab countries leads to their becoming more firmly and deeply rooted in what we may call the tribal consciousness… All of this pours into the general channel of the structural crisis which reveals a number of pathological symptoms… undoubtedly the result of the decline of the socialist and Arab nationalist current… when society lost its spirit. (al Naqeeb, 1990, p.127-128)

The present state of knowledge about the participation of the Bedoun in education, particularly quantifiable information about the numbers of participants, is quite dismal. The majority of information available has been released by international humanitarian organisations, and some additional knowledge has been generated in the public media. Some comments on education can also be found in Beaugrand (2011). The predominant theme of quantitative data I have gathered over the duration of this study does not regard restrictions on education per se, but rather, restrictions on information about the Bedouns’ participation in education. One of the reasons that this problem exists due to the history that lies behind the exclusion of the Bedoun from education, and I explain this problem in Example 9 of this section.

Another reason this problem exists is due to the status quo among the various organisations of the United Nations which fund the state for development programs which including monitoring requirements. These organisations have been complicit in allowing the Bedoun population not only to go unmonitored as a whole population on the National Census, but also to go unmonitored for education, social and economic developmental measures (Carr-Hill, 2013) in areas funded by the United Nations, UNDP and UNESCO.
This includes sectors where some of the Bedoun population does participate, such as education. In a nutshell, there is no national data on the Bedouns’ participation in society released by the government of Kuwait, and therefore no information is provided to UNESCO. As the United Nations is well aware that the population exists, one might expect UNESCO or the UNDP to initiate discussion about the need to capture some information about the group, if only to affirm its existence. Clearly, this has an impact on the ability of the Bedoun, and outside parties, to meaningfully discuss the participation of the Bedoun in education. But is also an extremely worrisome situation for the group regarding the lack of acknowledgement of its physical and cultural existence, and it should be regarded as a general risk to the population.

In this section, I provide nine examples of the nature of discussions about the Bedouns’ restricted access to education. I have attempted to cover information about all sectors of education aside from early childhood education, and to cover domestic and international reporting. These examples point to some rather serious monitoring and reporting issues within the state, and communications with international partners involved in Kuwait’s education system: UNESCO, the UNDP and the World Bank. The examples are listed below:

- Example 1: Three ‘official’ bans on Bedoun education
- Example 2: Education Fund expenditures as measures of Bedoun education
- Example 3: Primary and secondary school data
- Example 4: Tertiary education sector data
- Example 5: Domestic reporting to the National Assembly
- Example 6: International reporting – the US Department of State Human Rights report 2014
- Example 7: International reporting: UNDP, UNESCO and the UNHCR Statelessness Unit
- Example 8: Education reform Decree 409/2011 as an extension of the ‘status adjustment’ program
- Example 9: ‘Kuwait’s Strategic Education Planning Policy and Processes

**Example 1: The Three ‘Official’ Bans on Bedoun Education**

Bans on the Bedouns’ education was a core component of the administrative expulsion of 1986 (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003; see Appendix E, ii). They were implemented in two phases. The first general ban concerned all Bedoun students who did not have fathers working for the security forces (military or police). They were expelled from schools from 1986 according to the first administrative expulsion ‘The Study,’ (August 30, 2003). The second general ban on education commenced in 1992, expelling all Bedoun
students whose fathers had worked for the security forces (military or police), which coincided with their fathers’ formal expulsion from those services following the invasion by Iraq.

A third ban targeting young children commencing school in the academic year 2014-2015 (al Hajji, October 14, 2014; ‘Bedoun Children,’ 2014; Borqais, November 19, 2014; ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). The children did not have birth certificates, and had not been submitted to ‘status adjustment.’ The children did not have birth certificates for one of two reasons. Usually, the Bedoun negotiated directly with schools to bypass the birth certificate requirement. Because of the sheer number without documents, the private school system was used to managing the issue. But at the commencement of each school year, the Central Apparatus would pressure the Ministry of Education and the Bedoun population directly, to provide birth certificates for enrolment. In late 2014, the Ministry of Education decided to ban all commencing students who did not have a birth certificate, as well as those already enrolled. The action was an intentional breach of Article 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948).

The reason why the Bedoun cannot obtain legitimate birth certificates and marriage certificates is because government attempts to use these documents to effect ‘status adjustment’ leading to the erasure of the Bedouns national and ethnic identity. This issue is discussed further in Appendix E, vi.

Example 2: Education Fund Resources as Measures of Bedoun Education

A major aspect of the initial bans on education was the redirection of the Bedoun education sector as a potentially large, commercial market segment to the private sector. This aspect was discussed in the original administrative expulsion document (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). It is at this time (after 1992), some form of compensation, or the appearance of compensation, for the expulsion of the Bedoun from the public education sector was needed, lest Kuwait’s treatment of the Bedoun draw too much attention from the United Nations for breaches of the provisions of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations, 1948) (by failing to provide free schooling during the compulsory years, primary school and junior high school).

A system whereby the Bedoun would appear to be funded by an outside agency for private education school fees was invented. It goes by a variety of names, but for the purpose of this study I shall call it the ‘Education Fund.’ Ethnic conflict between the Bedoun and Kuwaiti citizen society was at a low point during the years that the Education Fund was introduced, and for this reason, the Bedoun were isolated to study in schools that only comprised Bedoun students. Government has been promoted the Education Fund as a ‘charity’ which ‘reimburses’ parents for school fees, to make the funding appear to be a generous act. But this is not an accurate depiction as the fund is neither a charity and nor
does it reimburse parents, as I will explain below. At the same time, a network of further restrictions related ‘status adjustment’ on the Bedoun was also introduced, to reduce the Bedouns ‘eligibility’ to access the Education Fund, and to increase access by other groups. Hence, the Education Fund developed into a large, bureaucratic system for transferring monies from the Ministry of Awqaf and Ministry of Education, to the private schools sector, and the monetary aspects of this system has been the main focus of government ever since.

In a nutshell, the government of Kuwait has always promoted the existence of the Education Fund as a system of reimbursements, and as a mechanism for ensuring the whole Bedoun population with education according to Article 24 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations, 1948). However, the Education Fund has never provided all Bedoun children with education by funding their places in schools. The funding mechanism has never been available to the Bedoun population as a whole, or to primary school and junior high school aged children as a high-priority group (all children must be given free education by the state, according to Article 24). It has never offered reimbursement of 100% of school fees for any Bedoun student, and therefore it has never offered an appropriate level of support to assist impoverished Bedoun children is provided by the state (all children must be given free education by the state, according to Article 24). In other words, it has never been a safeguard to ensure that Kuwait has met its obligations in Article 24 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations, 1948), concerning the provision of the Bedouns human rights.

Many young children and adolescents have been unable to attend school, ostensibly due to their inability to obtain a correct birth certificate. This ‘reason’ is used to attempt to force implementation of the ‘status adjustment’ program on children. But it is also because the Education Fund system does not provide for the full, free education of students. The funding system has been created as a mechanism to distance the Bedoun from accessing education while distributing government funds into the private sector market, to implement further restrictions on the Bedoun attempting to access that funding for the purpose of education, in order to force their submission to ‘status adjustment,’ and divert discussion over whether or not the Bedoun can exercise their human rights to access basic education for their children.

The government of Kuwait had persisted with a policy of addressing questions on the deprivation of education to the Bedoun, by issuing data about the Education Fund (U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report for 2009, Kuwait; Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.33; ‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). The government’s primary self-reporting mechanisms regarding the provision of education to the Bedoun, is the flow of funds passed between Ministries and the private education sector and not the actual education of children in school. Regardless of the purpose for which the Education Fund was claimed to have been
established, government dialogue about the role of the fund and its provision of education cleverly avoid government accountability for providing basic, free school education for all children in its territory. Dialogues about the fund have been used as a diversionary strategy for years, evading discussion of real measures of education received by the Bedoun. This is no surprise, given the bans of education issued by government, but it should raise flags to researchers and policy makers about the need for caution, if not scepticism, regarding government claims the Bedoun are provided with education as public policy.

Another issue that has contributed to this strategy though it may have been unintentional, is that great deal of reporting by humanitarian agencies has been devoted to describing the lack of education received by the Bedoun, due to issues arising from inequitable distribution of Education Fund monies, and interference in funding allocation by the Central Apparatus. The strategy has enabled the government of Kuwait to avoid any discussion about the specifics of education policy for the Bedoun and what kind of education has been obtained by the Bedoun, and the processes of obtaining instruction. The Bedoun education issue has been stuck on a polarised debate of claims the Bedoun have access to education vs claims they do not. Concerns that the community has not received education at all have been allowed to overwhelm more detailed discussion of the black hole of statistical data on Bedoun education published by government, which has covered up a) basic information about Bedoun enrolment at each level of schooling, attendance, retention, graduation and employment outcomes, causes of achievement and failure, and b) how education is received, including discrimination and other human rights violations experienced in schools, and the how students are pushed out of the system.

As with many topics concerning the Bedoun, observation of these challenges for students leads to the underlying program of cultural restrictions and enforced ‘status adjustment.’ However, the study of the social processes by which the Bedoun attempt to participate in education point to even more human rights deprivations or violations. Issues include those that may be expected for a victimised minority group, but also unexpected indicators of compromise and adaptation on the part of the Bedoun, and bias and corruption on the part of the authorities who are involved in the system. Issues include ethnic discrimination, verbal and physical abuse by teachers, Bedoun who do not receive government funded places but pay full fees for their children’s education which they cannot afford, impoverishing families, a common method of extortion called the ‘Bedoun levy’ on private school fees, the placement of children by government authorities in inappropriate locations and classes, including at inappropriate times of the day. For example, primary school children are sometimes placed in night time, adult remedial classes. This latter strategy comprises the direct abuse of these children via administrative means, to act as a disincentive for education.
A good example of the diversionary approach was a speech delivered to the United Nations in early 2015 by Ms Eman al Nasser. She discussed a range of data about expenditure flows from the Education Fund to other departments of government, and private schools. She indulged in discussion of the ‘enjoyment’ of human rights by the Bedoun, including education. But only three figures of student enrolment across the country, a total for enrolments in primary, junior and senior secondary schools combined, a total for college programs and a total for university programs (‘Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). Furthermore, the figures were woeful; an unacceptably low percentage of Bedoun students were counted in the system. In any case, the enrolment figures were not necessarily figures of the real presence of students in the classroom. Rather, enrolment figures are the means by which the Education Fund monies are accessed by the private schools. This account comprised the whole of the government’s case that it provided education to the Bedoun in respect of their human rights, according to Article 24 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations, 1948).

The rate at which the Bedoun population participates in all levels (each year level) of schooling, their rates of attendance and retention levels across all years of enrolment, their graduation rates and the outcomes of their education such as employment figures, are all unknown. The causes of their success and failure are largely unknown, aside from data collected in this study. It is unsurprising then, that not only are comprehensive measures on Bedoun education not available, population-wide data regarding Bedoun unemployment and poverty is not published, either. It is government’s role to provide this information. It is a concern that this approach has been the main approach since at least 2009, and that UNESCO’s and the World Bank’s active involvement in Kuwait’s education programs has made no positive impact on the culture of Bedoun exclusion and the omission of real education measures about the group. UNESCO has hidden behind the fact that only ‘citizen’ rates of education need be reported to it for its schools programs, leaving reporting of stateless populations to go unmonitored.

International human rights organisations and Kuwaiti politicians have previously tried to address the issue of Bedoun education through dialogue about a ‘Charity Fund’ for education (Human rights Watch, 2011; Group 29, 2012; ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). Other agencies, such as the United Nations Human Rights Council (at their two universal periodic reviews) and the U.S. Department of State (see below) have also been involved. None of these parties have been willing to recognise and challenge the Kuwait government’s approach, by acknowledging that information about the Education Fund does not provide valid information about the education of the Bedoun population that the state is obliged to provide to demonstrate it is complying with international law.
As I have mentioned, the Education Fund does not attempt to provide funding exclusively for the Bedoun, but instead disperses the funds to others. This policy works in concert with Central Apparatus restrictions which reduces Bedoun access to the Fund. This seems to have the advantage for other groups, of minimising the amount of money flowing to pay for Bedoun education, while increasing the amount of money other groups can access. For example, Human Rights Watch (2011, p.35, n102) reported a school administrator had observed a decrease in Education Fund provision for the Bedoun and an increase in Education provisions distributed to foreign national residents, affecting school enrolments. The report also noted that the Education Fund monies were not exclusively directed to Bedoun students. It was somewhat difficult to verify this information, but not impossible. A government document called the National Report on Education 2004-2008 (2008) demonstrated that the Education Fund did not actually provide financial support for the provision of education exclusively for the Bedoun, but was used for the education of any children it deemed ‘needy,’ including students from at least 34 different nationalities. The purpose of the Education Fund, when it is touted as a charity, is not ‘for’ the Bedoun, but for low-income children of any background. This example illustrated that the Education Fund had never been distributed solely to the Bedoun, but had always been distributed to pay for the education of foreign nationals as well; nor did it cover education costs in full (National Report on Education 2004-2008, 2008).

The Kuwaiti public had been told the Education Fund was for the purpose of the Bedoun only, in response to the reinstatement of education for the Bedoun in 2004, after the Bedoun had experienced more than a decade of education bans on all levels of education (Group 29, 2012). This remains a common, though mistaken, belief in the community and it is little wonder, as humanitarian organisations did not seem to have discovered the information that the Fund was not set aside for the Bedoun either, until 2011 (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The U.K. Home Office (2009, p.4 at 3.6.3) also cited the charity fund was set up by the Sheikha, a member of the royal family who felt sorry for the Bedoun. The Bedoun also believed that the member of the ruling family had donated her own money to this cause. This story made the Kuwaiti public believe that the Education Fund was established for the Bedoun. However, in another account, the government of Kuwait stated the Education Fund was established along with a similar fund to subsidize health costs, which appear to be linked to the Ministry of Awqaf in Cabinet Decree 855, meeting number 2003/2/29, of September 7, 2003 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.4). There is no doubt that this is reflective of the need to justify Kuwait’s social segregation policy in education, which the Education Fund is promoted as positively maintaining, even though it does not fully fund Bedoun education.
Most arguments about the education of the Bedoun inevitably return to the basic fact that the state of Kuwait has not satisfied its obligations under Article 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948). Distracting dialogues about the Education Fund have led to a situation where very little is known about the Bedouns level of participation in education. It appears that government has placed many obstacles in the system that reduce their inclusion, and increase their exclusion, in order to prevent them from accessing education at all, and then, push them out of the system as soon as possible, once they access it. This includes using the provision of education to attempt to force Bedoun children to be submitted to ‘status adjustment.’ The confusion around the purpose of the Education Fund, as well as its inadequacy providing a means for education of the Bedoun, is an example of the culture which surrounds the education of the Bedoun in Kuwait. This problem has had flow-on effects such as enabling the government to fail to publish data on Bedoun education in its national data statistics, and enabling UNESCO to fail to monitor the population through such education measures. This has only assisted the state to cover up its breaches of international law concerning the right of the Bedoun to access basic education.

Example 3: Primary and Secondary School Data

As I discussed in the example above, in January 2015, Ms Eman al Nasser reported to the United Nations Human Rights Council during its universal periodic review on Kuwait, that 15,105 Bedoun children benefited from education ‘services’ provided by the state in relation to Decree 409/2011:

She pointed out that the government is keen on providing education services to the children of the illegal residents, noting that 15,105 of students of this category are benefiting from this service. Up to 5,758 people were also enrolled in the University of Kuwait and 3,347 others were enrolled at the Public Authority for Applied Education and Training, she said. (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ February 1, 2015).

The report did not clarify what ‘education services’ the children actually received, leaving it for audiences to assume she meant ‘school.’ This is a strategy that is used by Kuwaits official news agency, KUNA, to distance the government from speaking about what it actually provides to the Bedoun (KUNA, January 30, 2015). Similarly, the Bedoun are referred to ‘illegal residents’ though it also refers to other nationals who have overstayed their visas as ‘illegal residents’ who are also commonly discussed in the same human rights forum. However, as the discussion led to mention of those illegal residents having to ‘rectify their status’ to access to the education services, we can safely conclude that the group of illegal residents referred to the Bedoun (KUNA, January 30, 2015). Here again, we see the
obsessive focus with ‘status adjustment’ openly flaunted, this time at the United Nations Human Rights Council, as the incentive for access to the human right of education as occurred with the education bans. Clearly, government does not see the right of education detached from the program of identity erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing), when it pertains to the Bedoun, nor does it find it distasteful to promote the program at a forum of international law. This is typical of the government strategy: its public face appears incapable of the cognition of the notion of human rights and the statelessness of the Bedoun (the public face is dumbed-down). This belies the intelligent (and cynical) design of the program, in which it gets away promoting ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun at the United Nations, and its segregation policy in education.

The figure of 15,105 out of a total registered population of around 111,000, meant that less than 14% of the population were attending receiving ‘education services.’ Approximately 20% of Kuwait’s total citizen population are school-aged children enrolled in school (Kuwait Education Indicators Report, 2007, p.4-7), while legislation making school compulsory for children aged 6 to 14 years was passed during my fieldwork (I attended the National Assembly for the discussion). This data indicates that around 6% of the total population, nearly 7,000 individuals, a significant portion of the Bedoun populations’ school-aged children, are not schooled. This figure is derived from government’s figures based on enrolment, which as I have argued, is not a true indicator anyway – it is likely the figure is larger, due to the enrolment figures not being offset against the negative retention rate. Certainly the Bedoun community already made great efforts to articulate this problem through international humanitarian agencies and the media (Bourqais, November 19, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2011; Refugees International, 2007).

It is worth considering that the vague mention of education ‘services’ comprised the entire case of the state’s response to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, regarding the lack of provision of basic school education to the Bedoun. In contrast, the state directed has a great deal of attention to achieving the UNESCO Millennium Development Goals (MDG) for its citizens, including the two MDGs regarding education, ‘Universal Primary School Education’ and youth/adult literacy for 15-24 year olds. Kuwait shows such near-perfect scores in these domains that they beg belief. The historical pattern of improvement should be regarded very cautiously if we consider that al Nakib (2014) admitted that the first generations of mass-educated Kuwaiti Bedouin are only beginning to go through university, now, and that this has been due to under-resourcing by the state.

The states’ progress (National Report on Education 2004-2008, 2008, p.9) was been measured across three areas of performance:

- Net enrolment in primary education (the total number of children enrolled).
- Proportion of pupils starting Grade 1 who reach the last grade of primary (the
retention rate).

- Literacy rate of 15-24 years of age (the adult literacy rate, another MDG).

These measures could be used in future, to ascertain the participation rate of Bedoun primary school-aged children in education and the literacy rate of youth and young adults. However, it would also be necessary to plausible population measures for the whole group, and the size of the population at each age level, to establish comparative rates of enrolment compared to non-enrolment. The population was expelled from the National Census in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994) and no official data of this nature for the Bedoun population appears to have been published ever since. This point is certainly not meant to imply the government does not collect such data, but to emphasize that it is never published. The issue of primary school education was taken up in the National Assembly just a few months prior to this report of the United Nations Human Rights Councils’ universal periodic review. The dialogue was replete with and hinged on, incorrect ‘unofficial’ figures issued by government authorities, because of the lack of published measures. This issue is discussed below, in Example 5. Where great efforts are invested in education measures for the citizen population as above, it is quite obvious that the same measures are within the capacity of government to provide for the Bedoun.

A note on the age of the data in the National Report from 2008 is useful to provide context of the overall system in Kuwait. The report I sourced appears to be the last detailed report on Kuwait’s education system in English (National Report on Education 2004-2008, 2008). Hayden et al (2015, p.539) recently used the report as a main source in The Sage Handbook in Research in Education, which tends to substantiate this possibility. A subsequent report appeared to have been sponsored by the World Bank (Kuwait Education Program Achievement Report, 2010-2014). The report appeared to be partly modelled on the previous national report, but it was of a much lower standard and provided much less information to readers. It is possible that the most recent reports are not being translated into English, but certainly the World Bank report shows a ‘slowdown’ in the competency of the Ministry, which already appeared to be struggling, to account for its operations. The standards of national reporting in the national report and the World Bank report publication were both rudimentary at best, and in no way reflect the huge financial resources provided to the state by international agencies to assist with education reform (even though Kuwait is one of the most affluent states in the world, which can very easily fund its own weak areas of national development).

Moreover, these reporting efforts do not reflect the capacity of educators employed by the state at Kuwait University, or the capacity of educators in the private system, or the even the data that is available. Kuwait has a strong system of National Census reporting pertaining to Kuwaiti citizens and expatriates, and the Central Apparatus also has a strong
system of data collection on Bedoun education. It is unfortunate that the Ministry of Education cannot access the expertise of local professionals to obtain better statistical data and produce a higher quality of research. Shah (2013) showed this potential but excluded the Bedoun from the research inquiry, even in a context where Bedoun students would have been present in the classroom researched. The ethnic conflict in Kuwaiti society comes into play as a factor here, so that the omission of the Bedoun from education measures is never challenged.

Regarding previous attempts to research education in Kuwait, Crystal (1995, p.78-79), observed that during the 1950s, ample schools were built in Kuwait to enable all Kuwaitis to attend schools. But she did not consider whether or not Kuwaitis actually did attend schools, or the social, environmental and structural factors that prevented them from doing so. Crystals’ (1995) elaboration of limited statistical indicators about education did not account for the Bedouin in desert settlements who had not been able attended schools up to the mid-1970s (al Moosa, 1976). Among these children were the Bedoun, who were then formally banned from schools in 1986. The group was still impeded from returning to school up to 2000 after the bans were officially lifted, as the Central Apparatus restricted access to identity cards and documentation enabling enrolment in schools (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

By 2015, children’s education was still one of the most, if not the most, significant problem for the community (al Hajj, 2015). One example of the complexity of the Bedouns’ situation demonstrates the lack of reliability of ‘new data’ published about Bedoun education reform in Kuwait. In May 2015, there was a reported transfer of some 5,000 Bedoun children from (fee-paying) private to (free) public schools due to their family’s service in the military (U.S. Department of State, 2015, p.18) (due to a renewed intake of Bedoun into the services). Although the U.S. Department of state reference to this reform was repeated in United Kingdom Home Office (2016), neither government agency referenced the claim. There was no confirmation the new policy idea was implemented, despite the pattern of policy failure relation to Decree 409/2011 education reform (Amnesty International, 2013b; Human Rights Watch, 2014).

Since the Arab Spring, more than thirty thousand Bedoun (allocated the green identity type from 2012) who had performed service in the military, and tens of thousands of other members of the group, had been targeted for removal of all access to public services including attendance at public schools, due to ‘security restrictions’ (see Appendix D, iv and Appendix G, iii). This means that while government has been reporting the inclusion of the Bedoun in education, it has been busy trying to push the Bedoun out of the system. Until the government of Kuwait develops models of transparency regarding the Bedouns presence in the state’s National Census, and includes Bedoun children in its UNESCO programs.
(Education for All/Children Out of School), speculation about the provision of education to the Bedoun will remain almost meaningless. UNESCO already provides the statistical resources within its division. The UNDP has funded the government of Kuwait for Ministry of Education computer systems and training. The World Bank has provided monitoring systems and training since 2003 (‘Kuwait Launches,’ March 27, 2015, *The World Bank*). The state of Kuwait has refused to disclose the population to UNESCO, and international agencies have been complicit in enabling governments to omit them (Carr-Hill, 2013). The state has more than sufficient resources to provide education to the Bedoun, and to monitor it, to equivalent standards of that which is provided to its citizens and expatriates.

**Example 4: Tertiary Education Sector Data**

Continuing from the quote in Example 3 above, in January 2015, Ms Eman al Nasser also reported to the United Nations Human Rights Council that 5,758 Bedoun students (referred to as ‘illegal residents’), attended Kuwait University (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015) and around 3,347 attended college. Prior to that announcement, the policy had been for the institution to enrol just 100 Bedoun per year (Oskay, 2010) and only Bedoun with Kuwaiti citizen mothers were accepted (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.11). Despite this, *The National Report on the Development of Education 2004-2008* (2008, p. 76) sited thirty-one scholarship places for the ‘needy’ to Kuwait University were provided each year between 2004 and 2008. The Ministry of Awqaf awarded seventeen scholarships to the ‘needy,’ while the Ministry of Education awarded fourteen. Multiple scholarships were awarded to thirty-four other nations. Perhaps we may cautiously assume that those described as ‘needy’ rather than nationals of a particular country, were Bedoun.

On the basis of these figures, the Education Fund/Charity Fund had provided financial support to just 31 Bedoun students at Kuwait University each year, almost exactly one third of the Bedoun student quota at Kuwait University. The figures also indicated that generally speaking, around half of the funds monies allocated for student expenses were used for foreign national students, while an unknown but significant other portion was used to fund administrative programs and other types of costs that were not directed toward students. The Education Fund was supposed to exist as a funding pool for student tuition fees, and not for administrative expenditures which should be covered directly by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Awqaf and the Ministry of Education perform the administrative duties.

As I have mentioned, the *The National Report on the Development of Education 2004-2008* (2008) is one of the most thorough government reports published on education in Kuwait that is available in English. Yet this style of reporting attracts criticism for the Ministry of Education's unwillingness to transparently account for the Bedoun population in its system, particularly the children and disabled students under its care. We should not have
to comb through such reports looking to find ‘clues’ for reference to the Bedoun who are represented under other terms or types, because government does not want to identify them as participating in the system because they are a stateless minority group. This points to yet another way in which the Bedoun are being written out of the national history of Kuwait.

I will now turn to efforts to improve the participation rates of the Bedoun in the tertiary education sector by local advocacy groups. Media reports issued during the Arab Spring sited that Kuwait University was working with government to expand the number of Bedoun admissions. This was reflected in changes in the university’s online admissions policy (Kuwait University Admissions Policy, 2011-2012 and 2012-2013). During the Arab Spring, members of Group 29, a predominantly Hadar advocacy group that worked specifically in the area of Bedoun education, became associated with the change in admissions policy at Kuwait University, which they claimed to have achieved by organising sit-ins at the university with the Bedoun community. They also claimed to have organised 100 fully funded scholarships for Bedoun students to attend the university (‘Everybody has the right to education,’ *The Arab Times*, n.d.). Therefore, I made arrangements with the group to visit them in Kuwait and to gain access to the student community through their working scholars.

When I made contact in Kuwait, the group was unable to introduce me to a single Bedoun student who was enrolled at Kuwait University. The organisation had over one years’ notice of my request to work with them on this research, and they had made assurances that they could provide me with genuine opportunities to meet Bedoun university students who were their scholarship recipients (see the discussion of methodology, Chapter 4). In Kuwait, the organisation was unable to show me any written or other type of concrete evidence that any Bedoun student attended Kuwait University. When I asked one of the Group 29 representatives, Ebtihal al Khatib (Professor of Literature at Kuwait University) to help me arrange appointments with education administrators at Kuwait University or the Minister of Education (I had access to their office via an official press pass to the National Assembly), she refused, claiming that the no one would never release accurate statistics on the Bedoun in any case, and therefore, there was no point to attempting to collect such data. Al Khatib had nothing to fear from helping me to meet with officials, as they were quite aware of her public activity as a Bedoun humanitarian advocate, the Ministry and the university had apparently facilitated her efforts in the past to enrol the Bedoun, and she regularly appears on Group 29s own television show as a quasi-celebrity in the humanitarian field. I asked if there was any follow-up to the enrolment of additional Bedouns at Kuwait university, she said no. It was as if the ‘campaign’ had never occurred.

Similarly, Group 29s research officer, Dr Sheikha al Muhareb, a well-known specialist physician in Kuwait, also believed that there was no accurate information available
from any government agency regarding Bedoun education. This made me wonder how Group 29 ever came to have such data. When I investigated Group 29's own claims that their efforts had led to some one hundred students being admitted to Kuwait University (Everybody has a right to quality education, n.d., The Arab Times), I discovered that the campaign was run alongside an almost identical campaign on twitter, run by Bedoun social leaders. The only difference in the campaign was that they had gained admission for Bedoun students into private institutions, not Kuwait University. The organisation was only able to put me in contact with one individual who had been admitted to a private college for a diploma. They were not able to put me in touch with any university student that had benefitted from their scholarship campaign to increase Bedoun student numbers at Kuwait University. Muhareb confirmed the organisation had not performed any follow-up to their campaign by early 2014 to check on student progress, and they were unable to site which students in their scholarship program, were still enrolled or had completed a program of study. I would suggest that during the Arab Spring, the greatest gains for the Bedoun at Kuwait University were made in the admission policy changes. However, my experience is that it is very difficult to know if these students provided for in the policy, have actually ever been enrolled, or completed a course of study.

This ambivalence was reflected in the policy itself, which only provided places once all places for citizens were provided, and if there are any places (called ‘seats’) left over. It seems anomalous that the Bedoun must rely on spare seats in a classroom, to fulfil the admissions policy. This provision appears to be an ad hoc mechanism for exclusion, enabling justification for the policy not being implemented at all, in case such issues are ever raised in public forums. Thus, the inclusionary policy featured a ‘way out’ to prevent policy implementation, enabling exclusion rather than inclusion, similar to Decree 409/2011.

This outcome to fieldwork in Kuwait was woefully disconnected to the enrolment over five thousand Bedoun students at Kuwait University, claimed by government at the United Nations in January, 2015 (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). It also bore virtually no relationship to the claims Group 29 had taken credit for the public media, for helping to achieve over one hundred enrolments at Kuwait University (‘Everybody has the right to education,’ The Arab Times, n.d.). Group 29 staff navigated this contested ground with positivist rhetoric about education deprivation and little else. All but one of the authors of the Group 29 (2012) report on education had left the organisation by the time I arrived in Kuwait, and I met them separately.

Lund-Johanssen (2014) conducted a Masters level research project on the group just weeks before I met with the group. The researcher criticized Bedoun social activists and endlessly promoted the efforts of Group 29. While the group has produced some good-quality reports that have indeed, provided new and important information about Bedoun
issues (Group 29, 2012, 2013) this research has tended to be carried out by other researchers on a commission basis. Lund Johanssen (2014) failed to observe that Group 29 was unable to substantiate its basic claims about its advocacy for Bedoun higher education, or that the group had fallen into serious disrepute during the Arab Spring, not only with the local community, but with many of its own members over its treatment of the Bedoun issues, and Bedoun individuals with whom it came into contact.

The situation of lack of information on education measures for the Bedoun is concerning. The government in general is unable to account for Bedoun participation at the international level in its reports to the United Nations, including reporting on its human rights obligations to the Bedoun, and reporting of national data on education. The Ministry of Education and Kuwait University are unable to account for Bedoun participation at the national level, beyond rhetoric on seat allocations that are unable to be substantiated with further information. Local civil society/humanitarian organisations that claim to have helped the Bedoun directly with entry into local public and private institutions, are unable to account for Bedoun participation at the local level. Highly regarded, local academics are unable obtain data on Bedoun education at the policy level (Alkhandari, 2013, whose work I discuss below), nor are they able to include the Bedoun in comparative studies of participation in education. Instead, they exclude the group for political reasons, as feature of their methodology (Shah, 2013). This situation does not help to protect the marginalised community, but increases its vulnerability of the Bedoun given that the population is omitted from the National Census and all education, social and economic development measures that are reportable at the international level, to the United Nations (Carr-Hill, 2013).

**Example 5: Domestic Reporting to the National Assembly**

The monitoring of the Bedoun’s participation in education has become virtually impossible due to the ‘status adjustment’ program run by the Central Apparatus in the Ministry of Interior. This includes the participation of children in the compulsory years of school – primary and junior high school - which the state of Kuwait is obligated to ensure according to international law, as discussed above. Even if there was an attempt to include the Bedoun in official statistics, the manner in which the ethnic group’s identity is re-allocated under the ‘status adjustment’ program, may make in impossible to establish the segment of the population who are Bedoun but who have been recorded with a false identity by the Central Apparatus, erasing their national and ethnic identity and replacing it with an alternative identity, of the Apparatus’ choosing. The group was transferred from ‘Kuwaiti’ national section – without citizenship – to the ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ section of the census in 1992. The population transfer was backdated, showing there was little apprehension in ascribing the Bedoun incorrect identities or forthright about when it occurred.
The ‘status adjustment’ program has obscured comprehension of the national development, such that it is not known if the Bedoun are recorded as other nationalities as part of an incremental, mass transfer, or if they simply struck off the census altogether, or when this has actually happened. The Central Apparatus has indicated that the immigration department is intimately involved in the reporting of ‘status adjustment’ the Bedoun, but this does not really confirm the extent to interference with the National Census. Obviously this has flow-on effects, such as the inability or unwillingness of government to provide national education data on the Bedoun (I have argued that government has this information, but chooses not to disclose it). In the matter of education, the ability of people to identify themselves as individuals and as cultural collectives is important. Access to education in a culturally appropriate environment is important, and this is a reason touted as a benefit of the development of such a strong private schools sector in the country. This value also explains why international monitoring of education occurs under the UNESCO mandate.

As the Appendices section of this study shows, there is a whole network of strategies used to cover up the Bedouns lack of access to education, and these confound efforts to accurately report on their situation. The following example regarding bans on children commencing primary school in September 2014 because they lacked birth certificates is a case in point. In this example, we see how some issues about education of the Bedoun have advanced in the National Assembly, though they have been marred by incorrect information (particularly for Chairman Dashti, who leads the government’s human rights committee). The process was actually initiated by Bedoun intellectuals, who emerged from the Arab Spring to generate public debate on the bans. This led to the development of public knowledge of the new bans on children’s education by the Central Apparatus (the third bans in example 1), and to improved knowledge about the potential number of Bedoun children who are not educated. This case arose just a few months prior to the government’s unusual release of Bedoun enrolment data to the United Nations Human Rights Council, discussed above in Examples 3 and 4.

The requirement that Bedoun children show birth certificates to schools on enrolment was part of Decree 409/2011 ‘human rights’ reforms in education, and this stipulation existed independently of any consideration of the Education Fund, the Fund’s seven ‘facilities’ (U.S. Department of State, 2015), etc. The requirement of registration of births is normally connected to government programs which include the population, and therefore it is of benefit for people to register. In the case of the Bedoun, government attempted to register them incorrectly, changing their national identity in the process in order to exclude them from citizenship and the state, claiming they would relinquish their legal right to citizenship in the state, even if they qualified for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait. Remember that sometimes, the nationality recorded on the birth
certificate did not even reflect nationality assigned to the parents or to their siblings, by the Apparatus. This is called ‘status adjustment.’

Therefore, the Bedoun have had to avoid registering births of their children, in order to preserve their identity, and in their eyes, their legal right to citizenship. The stipulation the Bedoun had to provide a birth certificate on enrolment in any education program, was connected to resistance in the Bedoun community to the ‘status adjustment’ program. The stipulation was a method of forcing the Bedoun to submit to ‘status adjustment’ which would issue them with a false identity on the document, and on the government database. I discussed this issue in terms of the different ways the program worked to enforce false identity and conduct administrative erasure on the Bedoun, in Appendix E, vi.

As I have mentioned elsewhere, in 2011 the government reported that over 12,500 birth certificates issued to the Bedoun population from 2006 to 2011 that were never collected by parents (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7). They were never collected by parents because the Central Apparatus had determined a false nationality, which was then pre-filled onto the forms under their instruction, by the Ministry of Health. The 12,500 parents in this five-year cohort, did not accept the determination, nor the certificates. It may be assumed that many more thousands of parents refused the inauthentic birth certificates going back to 1986, when the measures were first introduced in official policy (‘The Study,’ 2003). The figure of 12,500 was around four fifths of the Bedoun births reported by government - a very large proportion of the population was resisting ‘adjustment’ of their identity.

Thus, over 12,500 Bedoun children born from 2006-2011 did not have birth certificates, which government was highly aware of – it had emphasized this cohort in 2011, in its responses to Human Right Watch and to the United Nations. It was one of the reasons why government intervened to more strictly follow the new policy set out in Decree 409/2011 in late 2014. By 2014, the children were between 3 and 8 with a median age of 5. This is the age when children commence school. Hence, the timing of the bans. In 2011, government had stated the problem as:

The concerned party’s refusal to complete the procedures for obtaining a birth certificate by stating their original nationality. This indicates the Ministry of Health’s commitment to producing birth certificates in accordance with the law. (Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7)

Here, government emphasised that the law actually required the Bedoun to ‘state their original nationality,’ as long as it was not Kuwaiti. The Bedoun were being forced to state a nationality that was not theirs, according to the law (Beaugrand, 2010, p.154; MP Hassan Jawhar in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). But moreover, the statement was not
accurate. The Bedoun were not required to state *their* original nationality. They were required to state the ‘original nationality’ that the Central Apparatus had determined, as a result of its secret investigations and research (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011). This was clearly explained by government, in exactly the same document as the one above.

MP Hammoud al Hamdan asserted that the requirement for children to be ‘registered’ with the Central Apparatus was a *pretext*, when such children could not receive official registration from that agency (at least not an accurate one), which undercut the state’s obligation to provide education to all Bedoun children in the state according to international human rights charters (Izzak, November 14, 2014). The government’s refusal to register the Bedoun, and government’s inclination to delete Bedoun from the states’ administrative system, has been documented by international humanitarian agencies since 1991 (Lorch, May 12, 1991; Human Rights Watch, 1995). Although initially the number of children affected was reported as around 600 (al Hajji, 2014), the very brief data government issued in early 2015 indicated that the scope of the problem was much larger (community leaders had always pointed this out).

The community had no way of counting such children, so they suggested the number as a modest estimate of cases they were aware of (H. al Fadhli, personal communications, October 19 and January 19, 2015). I looked to the government’s statement of the numbers of children without birth certificates to attempt to find out the likely numbers using that data. For example, based on the figures of the number of children who went without birth certificates between 2006 and 2011 (in Kuwait Government Response, 2011, p.7), over twelve thousand children born during the five-year period did not have birth certificates. I calculated the number of children who would have reached school age, and those in different grade at school, as at 2014. The number out of the cohort without birth certificates, due to start school in 2014, would have been approximately 2,000 children (see below, Table G2).

The issue became contentious in the National Assembly, when Chairman Dashti of the Kuwait government’s Human Rights Committee reported on the bans on education to the National Assembly in late 2014, after the problem was reported internationally (al Hajji, 2014; ‘Bedoun Children,’ 2014; Borqais, November 19, 2014; Elgayar, 24 November, 2014). Dashti claimed the figures of just forty-four children were banned from starting school in the National Assembly (’Khatatib Bedoons,’ 2014). Hakeem al Fadhli explained that Dashti was misinformed; the figure of forty-four children that Dashti reported was merely the number of children assembled in two classrooms at the Kuwait Teacher’s Society, which had allowed a temporary classroom to be established to enable the media to access the teachers and children involved in the bans. The figure was taken form the report in *The Kuwait Times*, which explained the schooling of children at the Kuwait Teachers’
Society in al Jahra, involved just a few children – a room of boys and a room of girls, totalling forty-four altogether. The school was called the *khatatib* school, which means ‘community school’ in Arabic (‘Khatatib Bedoons,’ 2014).

Dashti also provided an estimate of undocumented children already in school, which showed a disproportionately higher number across each grade level than he had estimated in relation to the class of 2014-2015 that was prohibited from starting school. For this reason, I compiled the Table G2 below, indicating the various sources regarding the number of undocumented children who could not start school in 2014. Another issue was that government not only banned these children from starting school. It threatened to expel all other children without birth certificates already in school. If the government had been true to their threat and had expelled all students from their classrooms that did not have birth certificates (al Hajji, 2014), this would have actually revealed the real number of Bedoun children who did not possess a birth certificate. Hence, it never happened.

In any case, Dashti’s numbers did not remotely reflect the limited data available on Bedoun birth certificates issued (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011; Reply of Government of Kuwait to the Human Rights Committee, 17 October – 4 November, 2011), and education enrolments (‘Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). And this raises another issue for the government of Kuwait, as to why Chairman Dashti and the government’s Human Rights Committee have grossly underestimated the number of Bedoun children in school, compared to figures offered by other departments? The incongruence of the figures points back to the problem on inadequate monitoring of the population’s size and development, attempts to avoid reporting, attempts to obscure reporting, and the nation’s avoidance of meeting its obligations to provide the Bedoun with basic education as a human right, as a matter of public policy.
The number of Bedoun children without birth certificates who were expected to be in school or commencing school in the academic year 2014-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source data</th>
<th>Number of Bedoun children without birth certificates</th>
<th>Number of children without birth certificates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure stated by Chairman Dashti, Human Rights Committee, 17/11/2014 (‘Khatatib Bedoons,’ 2014)</td>
<td>44 at entrance level banned from starting school</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure released by Chairman Dashti, Human Rights Committee, 17/11/2014 (‘Khatatib Bedoons,’ 2014)</td>
<td>4,656 in school in 2014</td>
<td>Average of 388 at each year level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure estimated by the stateless community’s khatatib school (al Hajji, 2014)</td>
<td>600 at entrance level banned from starting school</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure released by government 2011 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011)</td>
<td>12,471 from 2006-2011 inclusive – half now school age across the lowest 3 grades</td>
<td>Average of 2078 starting school each year 2014-2016 and at each year level Prep-Grade 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sources are provided in the text

The number of Bedoun children prohibited from commencing school in 2014 represented a new generation of children banned from attending school in Kuwait. Kuwait is obligated in international law to provide free public schooling to all children in its territory (and according to Kuwait’s participation in UNESCO programs such as Education for All), regardless of their background or status (UNESCO, n.d., Education for all goals). While the undocumented group due to commence school in 2014 were the first group explicitly isolated and banned from participation in school since 1986, this number not represent the true scope of the problem.

The ‘status adjustment’ program removes children’s access to education as it reconfigures their families’ identity. Once nationality is recorded under other countries, as ‘illegal migrants,’ the children will not be able to access school or the Education Fund due to conditions related to their so-called migrant status, unless their fathers continue to obtain false identity documentation every five years. This aspect of the system recently explained by Major General Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah (‘Bedoons to Get,’ 2015; see Appendix C, iii, and
In other words, the ability of Bedoun children to stay in school once ‘status adjustment’ has been affected, is dependent upon their fathers taking al Jarrah’s advice, to become repeat passport fraud offenders. This last point underscores that the erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing) that is called ‘status adjustment’ must be factored in to any serious consideration of the provision of education to the Bedoun by the state of Kuwait.


This example highlights the nature of international reporting of the Bedouns education, which reveals serious issues of focus and gaps in knowledge. The U.S. Department of State reported the bans on children commencing school in late 2014 in detail in its Human Rights report on Kuwait (2015). The Department of State (2015) focused on access to the so-called Education Fund, rather than the process of school enrolment, attendance, and retention across year levels and graduation. The report authors stated these issues in the positivist manner, but failed to evaluate the outcome of the issues. The measures introduced to deal with the problem did not address the issue but merely created new obstacles for the children and their families, and therefore, the problem had not been resolved at all.

The issue of Bedoun education bans was addressed via a description of the seven requirements for receipt of Education Fund sponsorship:

> Individuals must hold an identification card by the Central Apparatus for Illegal Residents, hold a civil identification card with a national number, have a birth certificate, receive a salary from the Social Insurance Public Authority, be serving in the armed forces, be a child of a bidoon who fought for Kuwait in previous wars, or be the child of a Kuwaiti woman and a noncitizen father. (Kuwait: U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014, p.18)

The approach seemed to be respond directly to the government response issued by the Kuwaiti government on the matter, rather than to attempt to independently investigate and evaluate the Bedoun claims about the bans. Following the trend of international humanitarian organisations reporting on Bedoun education, the U.S. Department of State report authors focused on Kuwait government policy and the conditions under which government claimed education was provided, rather than establishing whether or not Bedoun were actually participating in education, and to what extent. Reports on the Bedoun issued during the Arab Spring Human Rights Watch (2011) and Refugees International (2011) report have contained the most comprehensive summaries on Bedoun education to date from Washington-based humanitarian organisations, but due to their context, the focus remained
on whether basic access to schools could be achieved. Similarly, this was the focus of the U.S. Department of State (2015) human rights report.

The U.S. Department of State (2015) report described the solution that government claimed had been implemented in response to the ban of children starting school in the 2014/2015 academic year, as the ‘integration’ of children assigned to schools by government there (U.S. Department of State, p.14). This was a policy statement issued by bureaucrats, not a statement of what happened next. The ‘integration’ was more accurately interpreted as a cynical disincentive for young children go to school:

- The schools allocated were not local schools,
- The schools were too far from their homes for parents to be able to reasonably drive them there each day,
- Where the youngsters had brothers or sisters already in school, they were not allowed to go to the same school and,
- Students were also assigned to night-time school classes, which comprise older students
- Students were put in inappropriate classes, such as adult remedial classes and classes for adult expatriates of other cultural backgrounds (including adults).

This last option was totally inappropriate for young children attempting to commence primary school, most of whom were around four to six years old (H. al Fadhli, personal communications, February 9, 2014). The children had prepared to start the year with other kindergarten students. The Bedoun community leaders who attempted to advocate for the children with agencies including the U.S. Department of State were issued security restrictions; some were charged with criminal offences.

Furthermore, the structure of the Education Fund, such that is does not pay for all private education fees, and the informal imposition of additional fees via the ‘Bedoun levy’ was not observed. There was no account of those students left out of the qualifications cited in the report (government’s conditions for funding education) or an estimate of their number.

The implication of ‘status adjustment’ in the provision of education to the Bedoun was confirmed by Kuwaiti MP Hassan Jawhar (in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). But the report also omitted this very important point of the education bans - perhaps the most crucial point - which had been reported in the mainstream Kuwaiti media.

Despite the efforts of international human rights organisations and the U.S. Department of State (2015) with regard to reporting on the deprivation of education, the culture of human rights reporting seems to have followed or worked in tandem with, the state of Kuwait. These parties have all tended to produced texts pre-occupied with the Bedouns access to the Education Fund and the payment of school fees as the measure of education
delivery, rather than actual school attendance and other measures of *education*. Where the Bedoun have demonstrated they suffer from discrimination and persecution on grounds of their ethnic identity (U.K. Home Office 2009, 2014), clearly there is far greater scope for deprivation of human rights in the education arena, than basic access to schools. Moreover, as I have explained in Examples 3 and 4, Education Fund data does not actually indicate if the Bedoun are *in* school, or actually being educated.

**Example 7: International Reporting in Education: the UNDP, UNESCO and the UNHCR Statelessness Unit**

Al Anezi (1989, p.266) pointed out that the existence of illiteracy groups in Kuwait due to the withholding of national funding to these groups, was a disgrace to the nation (see second quote at the beginning of this Appendix). He highlighted that Kuwait had funded other states directly to enhance their development programs in education, or had accepted their students and educated them in full at no cost, absorbing the costs within the Kuwaiti budget. Referring to the Bedoun, he stated, ‘The existence of this group may well be an obstacle to the implementation of development programs.’ Alessa (1981) seemed to respond directly to this statement, in arguing for the removal of education resourcing from all Bedouin in the state, and planning for the removal of the state’s education resources from the Bedoun population altogether. Once the removal of the Bedoun from the population on the National Census (introduced 1992, backdated to 1985) was accomplished and justified as a genuine and sound economic policy known as ‘Kuwaitization’ (introduced in 1985), this would ‘fix’ the problem of developmental program reporting. Kuwait would still accept the money for developmental planning from the UNDP. Kuwait’s developmental statistics would instantly begin to recover to reach remarkable, near-perfect levels after severing the Bedoun from the national population data, and the national(ist) consciousness.

In the examples in the above sections of the Appendix, concerning the lack of accurate information released about the provision of education for the Bedoun across all levels of schooling, I discussed information presented to the UN Human Rights Council by the government of Kuwait in January 2015. The government challenged complaints made in numerous submissions to the Human Rights Council, which had claimed that the state did not provide basic education for the Bedoun population to an adequate level. Two points are worth noting here. The UN Human Rights Council sitting was called for the purpose of Kuwait’s second universal periodic review. During proceedings, the government of Kuwait issued an arrest warrant on January 27, 2015, for Nawaf al Hendal, a young Kuwaiti representing the Bedoun community at Geneva for the Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review. Simultaneously, a range of twelve members of the community including Hakeem al Fadhli were detained, arrested and sentenced in Kuwait (Amnesty International, 2015), after having helped to promote the dissemination of information about the bans on
primary school children due to lack of birth certificates, in October 2014. Al Hendal’s arrest warrant was withdrawn by authorities just four days after it was issued (Amnesty International, 2015), he was re-arrested and beaten by authorities one month later, on March 23, 2015. This incident is an indicator of the kind of climate in which the Bedoun community attempt to assert the right for their young children to attend schools including reporting to the United Nations.

The government of Kuwait carried out these punitive actions in response to the community’s attempt to exercise freedom of expression, and their coordinated attempt to exercise their collective right to acquire education according to Article 24 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. It is well within the resource capacity of the state of Kuwait to provide basic education to all Bedoun in the public education system, where the majority of the Kuwaiti Bedouin citizen community are schooled. I discussed why schooling in the public school system among other Bedouin is desired by the community, in Chapter 7. In addition to the punitive responses, the government failed to present data to the Human Rights committee on the actual education of the Bedoun, due to the preoccupation with dialogue directed toward the budget of the Education Fund. As I have mentioned, the complicit silence around this issue at this the level has been disappointing; other states parties and international organisations who have been in a position to help Kuwait’s authorities to better understand its obligations, have under-reported the issues.

I will now refer to international reporting in research on education only briefly, as the Bedoun are excluded or barely mentioned. In the Sage Handbook of Educational Research, the authors accounted for the Bedoun’s education as, ‘In 2011, the Kuwaiti government granted them access to education and health services’ (Hayden et al, 2015, p.533). The authors very quick reading of a human right report referred to the introduction of a policy that was never adequately implemented, Decree 409/2011, and therefore it was inaccurate. The failure of the reforms had been announced by international humanitarian organisations (Amnesty International, 2013b; Human Rights Watch, 2014). Educational researchers at the international level have no real understanding of the Bedouns’ participation in education because the government of Kuwait excludes the Bedoun from all developmental measures sent to international agencies such as UNESCO (Carr-Hill, 2013). But where they have lacked specific data on educational measures, it seems somewhat odd that researchers would rely on such brief, blanket statements without checking their facts.

While children out of school is a significant issue that must also receive attention, there is a capacity for reporting on the Bedouns’ education in Kuwait right now, because government has the data. The problem is that it chooses not to disclose it. But it is also difficult to tell if the omission of the Bedoun from educational and virtually all other forms of research is due only to government repression, or also to attitudes of the local Hadar
population (Kuwaiti and other Arab nationals) who dominate the higher education and research sector, and determine education policy (see Appendix C, vi-viii).

International agencies such as the United Nations, the UNDP and UNESCO are implicated in the maintenance of the status quo of the state of Kuwait, in failing to ensure the state provides free, basic education to the Bedoun. UNWRA and the UNDP appear to have made a greater contribution to perpetuating myths about the Bedouin as ‘squatters’ and ‘slum-dwellers’ used to obtain funding for the eradication of the Bedouin from urban land space (Alawiadi, 1980; Zhao, 1990), than to the Bedouins’ development in education.

Recently, the UNDP funded the state of Kuwait’s Supreme Planning Council five-year development goals commencing with $16 million USD for ‘efficient and effective administration’ (that is, for just one goal in a multi-goal plan – to support ‘capacity development’ of the Supreme Planning Council) over two years (United Nations Development Program Kuwait, Kuwait Project Document, 2011-2013). These goals have been produced by the Planning Council since the 1980s and they have enabled the government to implement at the bureaucratic level, the planning of this system. The result has included virtually the wholesale exclusion of the Bedoun at the policy level (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994; al Ramadhan, 1995; see Appendix F, part iii). This warrants calls for increased accountability from the United Nations, concerning its funding of Kuwait programs which have arguably facilitated the planning of the Bedouns administrative expulsion, and the ongoing maintenance of the system of restrictive, cultural re-organisation including bans on Bedoun education, the restriction of Bedoun education, the diversionary education funding system claimed to provide the Bedoun with education, and ‘status adjustment.’

No statistics on Bedouin participation in education are published – the offering of Ms Eman al Nasser to the UN Human Rights Committee in 2014 (abovementioned) did not address whether or not the Bedoun actually go to school and of the cohort that does, how many there are in school. The Bedoun are not included in any international development measures by the state of Kuwait (Carr-Hill, 2013) including a range of education development programs funded by UNESCO and the UNDP. The Bedoun are excluded from all reports on education that I have located that are issued by UNESCO including the Millennium Development Goals (reporting on adult literacy), the Education for All and Children Out of School (reporting on children’s education). The UNESCO mandate requires states to report only on citizen participation, carefully avoiding the monitoring and reporting of the developmental status of stateless populations. Examples of reports in which the Bedoun are omitted include, ‘State of Kuwait, The millennium development goals progress report, 2010,’ (State of Kuwait and UNDP Kuwait, 2010), ‘Education for all, 2000-2015: Achievements and challenges: the education for all program monitoring report’ (UNESCO,
2015) and ‘Fixing the broken promise of education for all: findings of the global Initiative on out-of-school children (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2015). Although the Bedoun were omitted even from the second report, the report provided an indication of areas that future researchers and human rights advocates may target in the future, for the purpose of drawing attention to this problem.

There is no requirement for states of Kuwait to report to the UNDP or UNESCO on development of stateless populations within their territories, even if they are indigenous to those territories, due to the mandates of those organisations only requiring reporting of citizen data, according to their reports (refer to the reports I have mentioned above) and according to state practice (Carr-Hill, 2013). This begs the question of what the role of the UNHCR statelessness unit in eliminating statelessness by 2024 is, in ‘the fight against statelessness’ (UNHCR Central Europe, n.d., ‘Statelessness Conventions’). The UNHCR statelessness unit headed by Mark Manly, has no relationship with the Bedoun community.

Additionally, the Statelessness unit does not promote any joint working arrangements or communications with other sections of the United Nations, particularly in the area of arguably the greatest relevance to it, the Human Rights Council. There is no joint liaison between the stateless unit and the stateless Bedoun community, the state of Kuwait, the UNDP and UNESCO, to promote the inclusion of the stateless population in the funded UNDP Kuwait and UNESCO Kuwait education programs. Given that the overall policy tenor of the United Nations, supporting sovereign states cooperatively may mean that the Human Rights Council is not disposed to make real progress on such issues as the exclusion of stateless populations from civil society. Yet there is still scope for the monitoring of such populations, which could be achieved via a broadening of UNESCOs mandate to better reflect international law: requiring member states to submit national development measures on whole-state populations, rather than merely only citizens, with special provisions for the collection of data and reporting on stateless communities who are not included under any states’ monitoring programs, such as occurs for other types of non-native citizens.

**Example 8: Education Reform Decree 409/2011 as an Extension of the ‘Status Adjustment’ Program**

On the surface, governments’ failure to disclose meaningful information about the provision of education to the Bedoun seems to be due to a short sighted preoccupation with budget finances. Despite appearances, a more thorough study of the development of the restrictions on the education of the Bedoun indicates that the program has been thoroughly designed to stop the stateless ethnic group from receiving a quality education, in line with the basic standards of international law (United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations, 1948). Careful planning of the deprivation of education has been carried out to the extent that the both primary and secondary level restrictions built into the system.
example, even if a Bedoun individual is technically able to access education on a policy basis, the secondary level restrictions are designed to prohibit participation in practice, such as unemployment, poverty, homelessness, inability to access required, specialist medical care, confiscation of the identity card, the issue of security offences, blacklisting, erasure from the Central Apparatus system, and so on.

This problem was key to the nature of prohibitions on the Bedouns education, explained by international human rights organisations from the 1990s (Human Rights Watch, 1995, 2011) until the Arab Spring, which documented the various issues of many Bedoun unable to access the Education Fund. A small group of case studies were presented by Group 29 (2012) researcher, which demonstrated the idiosyncrasies of the corrupt system. While some examples may appear to be confusing to outsiders unfamiliar with the nature of the Kuwaiti bureaucracy, these instances were certainly united by the common outcome. The goal of depriving the Bedoun of education was achieved on a case-by-case basis approach. The policy and practice around identity documentation forms part of a network of prohibitions, which restrict the Bedouns’ participation in society in a number of areas, of which education is just one area. These areas were outlined in the 1986 administrative expulsion document (see Appendix E, part ii).

From the beginning of the Arab Spring, the Bedoun community complained that it was deprived of education and other basic human rights. The community claimed that secondary factors had led to the community being prevented from participating fully in education, despite the assumptions they had received the restoration of their right to schooling when education bans were lifted, in 2004 (Refugees International, 2011, p.8). In response to this complaint, the government of Kuwait implemented Decree 409/2011, which was designed to provide basic human rights including education to the Bedoun. The government released information about the Decree in the Government of Kuwait Response to Human Rights Watch (2011) and Reply of Government of Kuwait to the Human Rights Committee (17 October – 4 November, 2011), describing how the decree worked.

The requirement for the Bedoun to have possession of a birth certificate was stated as necessary for school enrolment. Meanwhile, the document claimed that the government policy of forcing the Bedoun to state their ‘original nationality’ on those birth certificates would no longer be enforced. The reforms were later found to be ineffective (Amnesty International, 2013b; Human Rights Watch, 2014). The existing policy had remained in place – ‘status adjustment’ was built into the process of acquiring a birth certificate. Thus, children had to either submit to changing their identity in order to attend school, of families used wasfa to make direct arrangements with schools, and paid for the school fees directly. Decree 409/2011 had never been intended to provide access to education to the Bedoun, without ‘status adjustment,’ which is a form of erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing).
There has continued to be an organised attempt to force the Bedoun population into submitting to ‘status adjustment,’ which was held out by the government of Kuwait as a requirement the Bedoun must satisfy, in order to enable their children access to basic school education. This includes access to the so-called Education Fund (Hassan Jawhar, ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). The erasure is carried out by parents being forced to sign their acceptance of birth certificates pre-filled by the Ministry of Health, under the instruction of the Ministry of the Interior, who determines the country that is placed in the ‘nationality’ or ‘citizenship’ section of the form. Once the child’s identity has been changed permanently, they are supposed to be able to receive five years of access to basic public services under Decree 409/2011, regarded by government as a package of human rights. The child then will never be permitted to receive Kuwaiti citizenship, even if he or she is qualified to do so under the Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait. The child does not have a nationality, and they may never obtain one but remain perpetually stateless. Similarly to the erasure performed on adult males who are heads of households (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006), the strategy involving birth certificates and enrolment in education targets individual Bedoun children with erasure, directly.

This close link was documented in Group 29 (2012), which illustrated a range of different types of cases. One case that I have called the process of ‘contracts and statements of obligation,’ showed a contract-like document issued to families by the Education Fund (Group 29, 2012, p.50-51, including Figure 38). The case illustrated that the Education Fund was directly involved in the enforcement of the ‘status adjustment’ program with the Central Apparatus and the Ministry of Education. The parent was requested to sign the document confirming they would ‘adjust the status’ of their children, by changing their nationality with the Central Apparatus. The consequence for not doing so was also stipulated: that the Education Fund would withdraw support and the family would be charged for the school fees directly. In this case, the failure to ‘adjust status’ would result in the family incurring a debt. This scenario was confirmed by Kuwaiti MP Hassan Jawhar (Tough Requirements, 2014), who referred to the Central Apparatus forcing children to be listed under nationalities that did not belong to them.

The Group 29 (2012) study of education had shown that the Education Fund, established in 2004 simultaneous to the reinstatement of education to the Bedoun, had been used to pressure the Bedoun into participation in the ‘status adjustment’ program of erasure. Education was not the only pressure point where the Central Apparatus pressures the Bedoun to participate in status adjustment, but the targeting of children at this level, forcing them into subjection to erasure or to go without education, deserves special attention as a method of state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing. Ultimately, all roads seem to lead the Bedoun back to ‘status adjustment.’ For further discussion of the program, see Appendix G, iii.
Example 9: ‘Kuwait’s Strategic Education Planning Policy and Processes’

In 2013 Dr Eisa Alkhandari completed his thesis at the University of Leeds London, entitled ‘Perceptions of the Effectiveness of Kuwait’s Strategic Education Planning Policy and Process’ (Alkhandari, 2013). As a Kuwait with ‘insider’ access to the Ministry of Education, Dr Alkhandari accessed personal at the highest levels in the government sector. The title of the thesis indicated that from this topic, we could expect to see a very detailed picture of who the national education policy and program. The researcher conducted a qualitative study, collecting interview and survey data leaders of the Ministry of Education, local government district leaders, and school leaders. Data collection was followed by followed by policy analysis. The study sought interviews to ‘investigate the nature of the current policy that controls the education system in Kuwait.’ This first phase of the study was a concern: why would policy information – that policy content - need to be collected from face-to-face interviews, rather than data obtained from government policy reports?

The second phase was the collection of survey data on interviewees perceptions of the policy ‘issues that result from policies that control [the] strategic education plan’s formulation and implementation.’ The third phase was an investigation of how the Ministry of Education’s policies might underlie such ‘issues,’ that is, if the actual policies were strengths of weaknesses of the strategic education plan. The findings of the thesis indicated that the design and implementation of public education policy was ‘centralized’ within the Ministry of Education offices to the ‘extreme’ level, due to a focus on controlling resource allocation (spending) (Alkhandari, 2013, p.iii-iv). Centralization was over-wrought despite one of the key goals of the Ministry of Education’s vision for the future for 2005-2025, was decentralization. This was because the Supreme Planning Council conducted such heavy oversight of the Ministry of Education directly, the highest levels of management could do little more than simply follow instructions (Alkhandari, 2013).

These points provide a sense of the nature of government organisation in Kuwait, but my concern during my own research was my inability to get past gatekeepers to locate concrete information on Bedoun participation. However, on viewing Al Khandari’s (2013) study, I realised that the researcher, an insider with the right name in Kuwaiti academic circles, had accessed very few documents himself. This was revealed in the reference list. After many years of study and attempting to access appropriate policy and programming literature from the Ministry of Education, the thesis references list included only eight references to Ministry of Education documents. One document was a book published by the ministry’s press. Three documents were annual statistical records. There was one internal study on teacher training (from 2000), one annual report (2005), one policy document for the
‘quantitative development of learning’ (1998), and one policy document, a statement of the
general education strategy (2003). In other words, the researcher could obtain only two
standalone policy documents from the Ministry of Education for the study, at best three, if
we include the annual report.

Nevertheless, the system of organisation surround the Ministry was most revealing. The
Supreme Planning Council held the most influencing in advising the Ministry of
Education, but it was not the only department. The National Centre for Education
Development, also instructed the Ministry. The Ministry was subject to top-down
supervision from authorities who attempt to manage the Ministry from above the Education
Minister. There was always constant lateral oversight from liberal ‘experts’ who work in far
more comfortable conditions, in research institutions ‘studying’ the under-resourced
government departments. This a common pattern in government and privately organised
bureaucracy in Kuwait, and it is a reflection of the Bedouin-Hadar cleavage within public
institutions. Bedouins work in ordinary public service jobs; the Hadar fill the upper echelons
and advise in consultancy roles. Finally, the Ministry was also shadowed by the Ministry of
Interior’s Central Apparatus, which holds oversight over it with regard to the Bedoun. The
Apparatus can (and does) intervene in the Ministry’s affairs at any time to block individuals
and groups from accessing education.

The country is now in the second, five-year phase stage of its development plan, the
School Education Quality Improvement Project, linked to the longer-term Kuwait National
Education Development Plan. The plan is funded by the World Bank and the National
Centre for Education Development, entitled (‘Kuwait Launches,’ 2015). Clearly, the
Ministry of Education faced resourcing issues and obstacles developing autonomy, however,
the World Bank had funded their data reporting systems, which helps to collect data on
Bedoun participation, which is shared with the PACI, which then distributes the information
across Ministries.

These structural, political factors influenced the culture inside the Ministry and help
to explain why information is difficult to obtain. Despite this, the capacity to report on the
Bedoun is already in place, and occurs. Therefore, it should not be difficult for the
government to release the information to the UNESCO/UNDP statistical reporting divisions.
Appendix G, iii

The Central Apparatus System - Key Findings from the Thematic Analysis

Table G3 lists the major themes arising from the analysis of Central Apparatus data from 2012 to 2014, mainly extracted from media reports. The main themes and sub-themes arising from them are listed below. The Central Apparatus tends not to publish regular, detailed updates of official policy. Some brief policy announcements are made in KUNA, the official government newsagency, but more detailed information is often released to local journalists through the National Assembly and personal interviews given to journalists. The style of this official and unofficial communication is common practice among government ministries in Kuwait, due to the presence of the press core at the National Assembly.

Table G3

Summary of Themes Regarding the Central Apparatus System 2012-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Themes – the Central Apparatus system 2012-2014</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Apparatus perspective and processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Status adjustment’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security restrictions and surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminalisation</td>
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<td>Substantial population fluctuation indicative of mass deportations or deaths</td>
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Central Apparatus Perspective and Processes

The Central Apparatus is also known as the Central System to Resolve Illegal Residents’ Status. It is a section of the Ministry of the Interior. The ‘system’ has actually been in place since 1965, when it was used to manage all Bedouin who lived in the traditional manner in the territory of Kuwait (see Appendix D, ii). In the 1960s, the aim of the system was to entrap, exploit, restrict and remove all Bedouin from Kuwait. In the 1970s, when it was realised that that goal was too ambitious, it was modified to the more achievable goal to entrap, exploit, restrict and remove all Bedoun from Kuwait. Various committees and departments have been named to manage the system. In 1985, the Committee for the Study of Illegal Residents adopted more extreme goals and methods, such as resorting to mass population expulsion, first administratively, and then physically. In the 1990s, the anti-Bedouin ideology had become so successful, that it erupted into a
government-sanctioned resistance movement, killing and ethnically cleansing to destroy the Bedoun. After the Bedoun were decimated, the 1990s and 2000s marked a period of growth in legislated prohibitions and restrictions including the development of the more technical side of the ‘status adjustment’ program and the security apparatus within the Ministry of the Interior, which would ensure that the oppression and control of the population was strictly maintained. Status adjustment is the program which functions to change the Bedouns national identity on official records; it removes reference to ethnic and national identity and replaces national identity with a false nationality label (another country’s name).

By 2010, when the Central Apparatus was established, the Bedoun were a physically and psychologically weakened community. They were almost forgotten due to their showing almost no signs of life to the outside world for around eighteen years, aside from a small but steady stream of humanitarian reports. Marking the 25th anniversary of the policy to deny of the identity of the Bedoun and the administrative expulsion which followed shortly thereafter, the ‘system’ was put into the permanent care of the Ministry of Interior, alleviating high ministerial councils of the burden. It was their turn to ‘study’ the Bedoun, the term used to refer to hyper-surveillance of the group. From the outside, it might have appeared that community resistance was so low that ‘status adjustment’ could be enforced by the Ministry of the Interior fairly swiftly and firmly from this stage, and perhaps the group could even be quietly exited from the country. The Bedoun problem would be ‘resolved’ forever.

On the ground however, the Bedoun showed signs of a mass national consciousness that has been present since at least the 1970s, if not earlier. In a nutshell, this manifested in a refusal by the collective to submit to ‘status adjustment,’ for re-allocation with a false nationality. Although many thousands of families had already been affected (based on data of identity transfers of military men, and data of refused identity documents), in the 2000s, this comprised only around 25% (based on data of refused identity documents), with around 75% refusing to comply. If trouble was brewing, it was just as well that the Ministry of Interior had the portfolio as the Central Apparatus, as they could confront the Bedoun with the security state. After all, there were only around one third of the Bedoun left, compared to their population in the early 1990s.

What makes the system unique is its strength and longevity, which lies in its extreme ideology that has been present in Kuwait since the states’ independence, and probably before. The system has outlasted and outgrown the multiple, ministerial committees that have attempted to manage it. This is because the ideology has been quite vigorous and persistent, and it has continued to grow, fed by the intellectuals who have created and maintained it for decades while advising the highest levels of government on how to solve the problem. The ideology has been so successful that the whole of the Central Apparatus
has been indoctrinated into it. The system was born with the state of Kuwait. It is a manifestation of what extreme nationalists believe is democracy – their right to be ‘original’ citizens, and their right to annihilate the Bedoun. That is their end-game. For the ideologists, the reason why the system is still in place is that is hasn’t been able to get rid of all the Bedoun, as yet. At the same time, owing to the resilience of their community and some degree of positive social relations within the Bedoun citizen collective, the Bedoun have managed to survive, although they are in much smaller numbers today.

As I have mentioned, the Central Apparatus as a social institution, appears to have been thoroughly indoctrinated. This is quite clear from an analysis of statements issued by staff at the Apparatus. They explain their tasks from the point of view of the internal logic of the system, with little reference to objective reality or standards. Individuals who carry out the Apparatus functions, including high-level officials, deploy language in ways which illustrate they have absorbed the nationalist ideology that the Bedoun are not Kuwaitis and are enemies of the state that need to be removed. ‘Status adjustment’ is the way to return the Bedoun to their origins, wherever they might be, or to any other country if necessary, so Kuwait does not have to deal with them. This mistaken belief guides their ideas and actions in the Apparatus, as they carry out tasks that they believed were in service of the nation, which imposed re-organisation on the Bedoun population and its culture.

Staff at the Central Apparatus are not aware of the history of their department, or the consequences of their actions. How could we expect them to be, when academics cannot even detect the ethnic cleansing, after being warned by Fineman (November 2, 1992) and other foreign correspondents who encountered it in the field? They are indoctrinated in an ideology that they believe to be true, that the Bedoun are not who they say they are. This ideology has convinced scholars in the past, who have reinforced it. A few have created it, and convinced others. They are exposed to it daily. They are not the first. Bedoun community leader Hakeem al Fadhli pointed out that generations of bureaucrats have been taught the same ideas. If any doubts arise, and perhaps they might even have some Bedoun in their own families, they will be influenced by all those around them who firmly believe in the ideology. They are outnumbered, and complying with the ideas is part their job, and they must carry out their duties. Loyalty is important in Kuwait, and they serve important roles for their country. In the following paragraphs, I present two arguments that I believe are representative of the perspective of the Apparatus on the Bedoun, at both the official and grassroots levels.

The strength of the ideology outweighs the lack of sense-making of many of the policies and procedures. Circuitous logic and nationalist motifs are used to explain away the facts of the matter that might point to violent removal of identity, cruel and inhumane treatment of individuals targeted for ‘security’ reasons, or ethnic cleansing. Human rights
are bargained. Access to basic public services, which government believes comprise the Bedouns human rights (reasoned as ‘that is all they are getting, and nothing more’) in exchange for participation in the ‘status adjustment’ program. However, the Bedoun are losing this bargain over time, which is evident in the population numbers in serious decline, and the ability of government to conceal accurate population statistics on the group from the public and international agencies.

Another way of looking at the Central Apparatus perspective is to explore the nationalist narrative and the ethnic backgrounds of the parties involved. But first, we should acknowledge that the government of Kuwait was always aware that the Bedoun were always stateless, and intentionally brought the stateless Bedouin to Kuwait for permanent settlement, citizenship and engagement in the economic and political sectors (see Chapters 2 and 7). The state’s interpretation of ‘original nationality’ by Hadar elites and intellectuals is a fundamentally tribal interpretation, as it assumes that ‘original nationality’ is in fact, the traditional, transnational, Bedouin tribal dirah (land). It imposes this ideology upon the much smaller modern state, in order to justify the policy of eradicating the population. It is this fact that makes the states’ conception of the Bedoun incompatible with modern statehood.

This may be a reason why we see the state denying the Bedoun exist as a stateless population and denying the concept of statelessness in international law, since international law arises from the context of the modern state and the tribal dirah existed before modern borders were drawn. ‘That other place’ that the Bedouns ancestors may have come from, was simply not a country or a nation in the modern sense of the word, when their ancestors came from there to settle in Kuwait. Therefore, the Bedoun are stateless and have no nationality. Yet the Apparatus claims that the Bedoun must obtain proofs of nationality that match the locations of the tribal lands of their ancestors. This notion is equivalent to asking Queen Elizabeth of England, who belongs to the House of Windsor, to produce a document proving she has German citizenship.

My analysis of the system was based mostly on secondary newspaper sources which included government announcements and interviews with Ministers and senior Apparatus officials. My understanding of this data was enhanced by the interview data and follow-up conversations with some my interviewees about specific issues. Two major themes arose concerning the Apparatus interactions with the Bedoun, which was a surveillance function, and an identity management function.

The surveillance function included items such as: issuing criminalising restrictions, prohibitions and hyper-surveillance regulation of individuals’ identity card, their ‘security file’ and ‘security restrictions,’ and the deprivation of human rights (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514 (November 26, 2006). The identity management function included
items such as: the management of ‘status adjustment,’ a program concerned with the transfer of Bedoun identity to false nationality labels (and presumably to the same nationality entries on the National Census) (‘8,000 Bedouns,’ 2012; ‘80,000 Bedoons,’ 2016; ‘Hope for non-census,’ 2014; ‘6051 Illegal Residents,’ 2014; ‘6,860 Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘7,828 Illegal Residents,’ 2016).

Both of these areas, ‘status adjustment’ and ‘security restrictions’ and other aspects of surveillance linked to identity card validity, involved other Ministries and departments of government, such as the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education. In some cases, it included the Family Courts (within the Ministry of Justice). In all of these areas, except the family court, the Central Apparatus was able to exercise its powers of oversight over other ministries to determine any Bedoun individual’s identity.

The deprivation of human rights was mediated by the Ministry of Interior through its oversight over other departments. In this context, I refer to the government’s definition of the Bedoun’s human rights, which are the eleven ‘facilities’ in Decree 409/2011. These eleven items were just basic public services that government also deemed were the Bedouns human rights, including items such as personal documentation, the identity card, a drivers licence, access to schooling and health clinics (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011).

As for other human rights, such as freedom of thought and speech, freedom to move in public, and so on, these were the subject of intense interest of the Central Apparatus. These areas were managed through its surveillance function, in order to prohibit and restrict their expression, to manage via ‘blacklisting,’ to apply ‘security restrictions’ or the more serious security offence, or criminal offences. Note that the police and and its intelligence unit State Security Investigate Police are also run under the Ministry of the Interior.

There was constant pressure on the Bedoun to submit to ‘status adjustment’ to obtain some measure of access to resources in order to survive. But additionally, the surveillance function of the Apparatus was managed in a fashion to add additional pressure to coerce compliance with ‘status adjustment.’ This was done by the Apparatus’ ability to regulate the identity card, which gave access to public services – the Bedouns very narrowly defined, human rights. The Apparatus controlled individuals’ access by turning the card access on and off across various government departments, to control whether or not the individual could access public services.

If the card was switched off to block access, the individual could not receive access to one or many or all public services. If they approached a government counter at a particular agency where they needed to use the card to access a service, they would be told the card was not working or their access was blocked, according to information on the government database. They would be turned away. In some cases, the card would be
confiscated, cancelled or expired on demand (by the Apparatus) which had the same effect, although this was a more serious, general and long-term problem. When individuals reported the problem to the Central Apparatus, or when they were required to report to the Apparatus, they would be told that they had to submit to ‘status adjustment’ in order to ‘rectify their situation,’ or a similar phrase of this nature (a range of fairly stock-standard phrases were used). Thus, the surveillance function of the Apparatus was used to coerce or force submission to the Apparatus’ identity management functions. Similar scenarios applied for individuals who were blacklisted or those with ‘security restrictions’ or criminal offences, although these were more serious contexts and tended to be accompanied by more personal ‘communications’ such as phone calls, visits, interrogation or detention.

This brief summary described the background to the Central Apparatus, and the perspective and procedures with which it carries out its functions to manage the Bedoun population. I discussed some aspects of the ideology with which the institution and its workers have been indoctrinated. I also discussed their interactions with other government departments, through which the Apparatus communicates its determinations of individual’s identity, their need to submit to ‘status adjustment.’ Finally, I also discussed the approach to human rights, the methods of regulation of the Bedouns access to public services, which are very narrowly defined by government as the Bedouns human rights, and the methods of oppression used to restrict other rights, namely freedoms of expression.

**Status Adjustment**

In this discussion of the status adjustment program, I will outline the foundation ideology on which it has been based, the definition of the Bedoun as having ‘original nationality.’ I will then address rational counter-arguments to the ideology which help to contextualise the program as a system of erasure and administrative ethnic cleansing that prepares the Bedoun for mass deportation. I will discuss how the program of ‘status adjustment’ operates to achieve these goals (how the program works), and conclude the section by mentioning some important forms of resistance that has risen response to it from inside the community, and from Kuwaitis MPs.

**The definition of the Bedouns original nationality.**

The concept of the Bedouns ‘original nationality’ was discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The notion that the Bedoun have an original nationality from another state had been a key feature of scholarly definitions of the group since the 1990s, when the ideology was applied in earnest. The concept is a false concept, but it has been used by government as the central pillar of the ideology justifying the Bedoun are not ‘Kuwaiti’ and therefore, are unfit for, or not deserving of, Kuwaiti citizenship. The ideology has then been exploited further, to deny citizenship to Bedoun who have historically, since the 1960s when citizenship
applications were first processed, actually qualified for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959).

The ideology has also been used to justify the population makeup of the country, the exclusion of the Bedouin of the northern tribal dirah of the main tribes of Kuwait (the Bedoun) and the mono-ethnic Hadar monopoly over ‘original’ citizenship. This latter aspect has guaranteed their group’s 100% acquisition of citizenship, diluted by the absorption of new foreign national members into their group likely to similar proportions, as they chose. Because the concept of the Bedoun having ‘original nationality’ that is not Kuwaiti is not true because the Bedoun are stateless according to the norms of international law, government has had some difficulty in applying the concept. Certainly it has received virtually uniform support from scholars and policymakers over the last three decades. In fact, the concept is a basic one used by scholars to define the Bedoun at present.

However, the approach to maintaining this policy relied upon by government since 1983 has been ‘status adjustment’ or ‘regularizing one’s status.’ This approach is the enforcement of other nationality by fraudulent means, via administrative erasure involving chiefly, false identity labelling on its own official documents, and forcing the Bedoun to supply it with false documentary ‘proofs’ of other nationality. This is called the ‘status adjustment’ program.

Counter-arguments to the notion of the Bedouns foreign, ‘original nationality.’

In order to counter this concept, I analysed previous scholarly definitions of the Bedoun in Chapter 2 and discussed their laws, namely the lack of substantiation of claims by scholars, including a lack of concrete evidence. I also expanded upon more specific lines of arguments, including some more serious, lesser known arguments or evidence, in Chapter 8. Some of these arguments included,

- The implementation of the Nationality Law (1959), carried in a discriminatory fashion to keep the Bedouin out, including targeting of the northern tribes via provisions than enabled subjective qualification to be applied to reach a rationalised ratio of Bedouin 50% citizenship. The implementation of the same measures to ensure all Hadar received citizenship, to a rationalised ratio of 100%.
- The lack of account for those Bedouin who did not inhabit Kuwait City, who occupied the territory of Kuwait either permanently or seasonally, in the application of the Nationality Law (1959). This lack of accounting for the right of people who lived in the country to receive citizenship is so ingrained, scholars continue to apply the reasoning today, and claim Kuwait is a city state, as if it is like Singapore or Hong Kong, which is not an accurate depiction, and discounts a) the homeland of the Bedouin and b) oil resources. The Hadar interpreted ‘residence’ in the country of Kuwait, as residence only within the narrow confines of the city wall.
• Other evidence included a statement by the Minister for the Defence department, a member of the ruling family, who was aware that the Bedoun in the military forces were stateless.

• The founding ideological motif of ‘they Iraqis are stealing our identity’ was used during the invasion of Iraq, and circulated in newspapers. The possibility it was aided by advertising consultants in the West, akin to the Hill and Knowlton scandal. The idea was subsequently, skilfully applied to the Bedoun, to steal their identity.

• Lack of evidence presented by scholars that the Bedoun had nationalities or any other ties to other states resembling nationality or citizenship.

• The common ideological motifs and patterns among scholarly writings applied to the Kuwaiti Bedouin, which could be initially linked to Orientalist and developmental theory stereotypes, then branched out to specifically isolate the Bedoun. The government policy on the Bedoun appeared to be crafted into an ethnographic account by Western scholars, embellished with academic authority to convince others that the ideology used to displace the Bedoun’s identity, was their ‘real’ identity.

The workings of the status adjustment program.

The status adjustment program is the enforcement of other nationality on the Bedoun, by fraudulent means, via administrative erasure involving false identity labelling on Kuwait government official documents and forcing the Bedoun to supply the Apparatus with false documentary ‘proofs’ of other nationality. The evidence of ‘other nationality’ is gathered via secret investigations and research conducted by the Central Apparatus, PACI (the information-sharing agency of government) and other ministries. PACI has assisted with the program since its inception in 1985. However, government also produced its own false personal documentation after an individual submits to erasure. These state the false nationality determined by the Apparatus on Kuwait government birth, death, marriage and divorce certificates, drivers licences and any other form of official document that states the individual’s nationality. Other evidence includes fake passports, false affidavits and paperwork describing contract-like undertakings to submit to status adjustment, that are signed by the Bedoun under Apparatus coercion and/or force. This has included agreements that subject the individual concerned to debts to pay for the provision of ‘services’ that have, by definition of the government itself, been regarded as their ‘human rights.’

The so-called evidence is then attached to each individual security file of each member of the registered Bedoun population, on the Central Apparatus database. Those who are not registered are not regarded as part of the population – in fact, they are regarded as non-existent, despite intensive surveillance and various some attempts (genuine and not) to
absorb them into the program. The evidence gathered in each security file is used to coerce and/or forced the Bedoun to provide further items of evidence. Each security file is attached to the male head of household, and the family group is recorded on the database. Each file is connected via information-sharing, so that evidence collected on one file, is used to impact other files in the family group. Though the evidence would be regarded by objective standards as fake, false or fraudulent, it is not only fake, false or fraudulent, but it is also gathered by coercive, manipulative and/or forced means.

The process is approached individual by individual, until the whole collective has been subjected to status adjustment. This is one of the goals that must be achieved to ensure mass population transfer or total destruction, evidenced in the transfer of the whole group on the National Census in 1992, although partial cleansing is already acceptable, such as the physical ethnic cleansing of around 50% of the population from 1990-1995, and further mass deportations that appear to have occurred in the early 2000s. This is one of the reasons why Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah was intensively involved in a public relations campaign in 2015 and 2016, in an attempt to sell the Comoros Plan, normalising it to the non-Bedoun citizen public, and communicating its inevitability to the Bedoun.

Key to the program are two other, overlapping aspects of population management conducted by the Central Apparatus, identity function, and the surveillance function. I named some of the related points of these functions in the section above. Through the identity function, the Apparatus has been in permitted to ‘manage’ the Bedouns access to basic public services, which government has claimed in a rather narrowly conceived definition, are the Bedouns human rights. Since 2011, these have been called ‘the eleven facilities,’ a package of benefits and/or services, which government claimed, were contained in Decree 409/2011. It then offered use those human rights as an exchange incentive for the Bedoun in return for submission to ‘status adjustment.’

The identity function deems the Bedoun nationals of other countries and then appears to redistribute them to individual country data on the National Census. Hypothetically speaking, once adjustment has occurred, the Bedoun are then directed to the immigration department, to report as nationals of other countries (even though they are not). Bedoun report that when this occurs, they are cut off government databases and are not acknowledged at by this department, but that they remaining under the hyper-surveillance of the Apparatus. However, government has claimed the Bedoun must report to immigration. There is some element of double-speak here, as the same officials have also said that the Bedoun continue to submit fake passports every five years, to the Apparatus and not to the immigration department. This indicates that some procedures are not entirely clear. What is clear is that this aspect of the program has been promoted relentlessly in the local media since the Arab spring. Monthly totals of Bedoun identity ‘conversion’ (submission to status
adjustment) have been published by KUNA (the Kuwait government official newsagency) and daily newspapers in Kuwait since the Arab Spring, around the same time that Decree 409/2011 was introduced.

Prior to 2011, the labelling of the Bedoun with other nationalities occurred through the many different methods of ascribing nationality to the Bedoun, linked to the different nations (nationality labels, not actual/effective nationality) to whom nationality is attached. This included certain mass-intake programs, where thousands of Bedouns public service employees were submitted to having their identities erased as Bedouns, and reallocated as ‘other nationals.’ Despite the massive size of the programs, they all involved the same obsession with the collection of ‘proofs’ that are a hallmark of the program, mainly fake affidavits and fraudulent passports. I have identified at least ten different methods used to create ‘evidence’ the Bedoun have other nationalities, which are described in Appendices E, v and E, vi. The number of methods to ascribe false nationality and the number of different nationalities involved, are testament to the scope and history of the program, as well as the success of its ideological foundations.

Through the surveillance function, the Apparatus has used psychological and physical pressures to enforce the program. This area of function is connected to the means by which evidences of other nationality that fake, false, and/or fraudulent are procured by the Apparatus. This includes various restrictions on public activity and criminalisation, for example the issue of tens of thousands of security restrictions targeting those whose families have already proven their eligibility for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959), the new identity colour typing system that introduced a timeline of deportations, the notion that human rights in Decree 409/2011 are only available in five-year batches, linked to the validity of fake passports, blacklisting, detention, imprisonment for public expression, specifically for discussion about the Apparatus policy and practices and other aspect of hyper-surveillance. The program has been theorised in this research as pertaining to the management segregation and oppression of the Bedoun population since 1965 as a form of controlled, restrictive cultural re-organisation.

Forms of resistance to status adjustment.

Another way of describing the program is through resistance to the program. The study of resistance to the program has enabled me to understand the insidiousness of the program, and the finer details of the ideology, rationale and procedures behind its implementation. I have analysed information on two broad types of resistance, including resistance from within the Bedoun community, and resistance from among members of parliament in Kuwait, who also know about the program. Understanding the serious nature and overwhelming scope of the program, some members of parliament have been unable to maintain their complicit silence with it, and have occasionally spoken out and released
important details about the purpose of the program, and/or how it works. This latter form of resistance, along with WikiLeaks cables, has been extremely helpful in assisting me to verify the reality of the program, and its interconnection with other government departments.

Resistance from within the population has been is indicated by three forms of data published by government:

a) The rejection of birth certificates

b) The very modest tallies in status adjustment (identity conversions to a range of different nationality labels), and

c) Failure of Bedouin men to renew fraudulent passports

The rejection of birth certificates pre-filled with ‘original nationalities’ was revealed in Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.7). In that report, the basic procedure whereby the Apparatus secretly determines each Bedouin individuals’ identity and ensures this is pre-filled on any identity documentation requested by the Bedouin (basically, any government form that requires a nationality to be named on it). Between 2006-2011, Bedouin parents rejected four fifths of the birth certificates issued for their children due to their disagreement with the nationality pre-filled on the form (12, 471) while only one fifth were accepted (12, 471) (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7). The birth certificate is among other things, necessary for enrolment in school. For those parents who accepted the birth certificates, their child’s would be recorded as having had their status adjusted.

The second form of resistance was slightly more general, in that the governments overall tally of ‘adjustment’ figures were relatively low compared to the whole population. Accumulative totals of adjustments achieved for different countries by the Central Apparatus were published on a rolling basis (I did not observe these prior to 2012). For example, ‘6051 Illegal Residents,’ 2014; ‘6,860 Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘7,828 Illegal Residents,’ 2016. These headlines provide a feel for the kind of dialogue that is used.

Most of analysis concerned the years 2012 to 2014 leading up to the announcement of the Comoros Plan. I calculated figures based on two articles that cited the number of Bedouin who had changed their status since 2011 (5746 individuals in Saleh, February 9, 2014 and 5982 individuals in Nacheva, April 6, 2014). Between 2012 and 2014, less than 5.5% of the Bedouin population submitted to the program by signing for acceptance of the nationality allocated to them by the Apparatus. This rather tawdry progress indicated that although conditions for the Bedouin involved great hardship and suffering, they resisted the organised program to change their identity. The data, combined with the birth certificate data, quite soundly indicated that the population is aware that government is attempting to erase their identity and citizenship claims.
The third form of resistance was discussed by Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah in ‘Bedoons to Get’, 2015. Bedoun men who had previously obtained fraudulent passports from countries that bore no relation to their identity whatsoever, were instructed by al Jarrah to renew them to maintain their access to basic public services. In other words, the Bedoun were instructed to repeat the offences. The instructions were issued by al Jarrah in the Kuwaiti newspaper, indicating that access to the services, also deemed the Bedouns human rights (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011), remained subject to Bedoun repeating offence.

A fourth form of resistance has included statements issued by members of parliament which have also shown there is a certain level of insider knowledge in Kuwait, about the true nature of the program. Any doubt about the true nature of the program has been dispelled by these brave individuals, who have openly spoken up not only about the abuse of the Bedoun by the state, but also about the ‘status adjustment’ program itself. They have included MP Faisal al Duwaisan (‘Government to Offer,’ 2014; Toumi, 2014, November 10), MP Hassan Jawhar (‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014), MP Hammoud al Hamdan (Izzak, November 14, 2014), MP Saleh Ashour (Izzak, May 17, 2016), and MP Yousef Zalzalah (Izzak, May 17, 2016). Although commentators such as Tetreault (2003) have observed that MP support for the Bedoun has piecemeal, temporary and self-serving, this is definitely not the case when we consider the personal danger that these individuals have attracted by speaking out against a system which ably conducts hyper-surveillance and detention, and has been associated with torture through the Ministry of Interior, and has the power to criminalise all who it targets with ‘secret,’ undisclosed offences. Additionally, the danger of speaking out about the system is also indicated by the extremely low numbers of those who have spoken out, and usually from high-ranking positions (members of parliament and/or professors).

Although I have discussed their quotes elsewhere I this research, these criticisms by Kuwaiti MPs warrants repeating together here. This is because their commentary helps to explain various abstract concepts of the program linked to real events that have occurred in the community, leading them to make comment. Thus, they have helped to create a historical account of the program, along with Apparatus officials themselves who have regularly discussed the program in the public media. The MP commentary provides a sense of the reality of the program faced daily by the Bedoun since 1983, and reveal a great deal about the extent to which the enforcement of false nationalities on the Bedoun it is known and discussed in the National Assembly. These MPs have also served the invaluable duty of dispelling the notion of false nationality of the Bedoun, which to the detriment of the academic field of Kuwait areas studies, has not yet been sufficient to motivate other scholars.
to stand up and take notice of the purpose and functions of the status adjustment program, which is a form of ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun.

MP Faisal al Duwaisan (‘Government to Offer,’ 2014) openly challenged the status adjustment program and its flawed basis, founded on the notion that the ‘original nationality’ of the Bedoun is not Kuwaiti. The awareness of this myth of the Bedouns identity was reiterated in relation to the announcement of the Comoros Plan in late 2014, which set out the new strategy replacing the Bedouns national identity en masse to the Comoros. Al Duwaisan accused government of providing false information to the National Assembly by claiming the Bedoun had nationalities of other countries. (‘Government to Offer,’ 2014). He told the assembly,

The announcement means the government has been providing false information to lawmakers suggesting that stateless people hold nationalities of other countries. (‘Government of Offer,’ 2014)

He also criticized the Comoros Plan to reallocate the whole group’s nationality to the Comoros Islands, emphasising the gravity of the plan was,

… A very dangerous development that has not been studied carefully and could lead to the fall of government. (‘Government of Offer,’ 2014)

Finally, he pointed out the connection of the Comoros Plan to the false notion that the Bedoun had ‘original nationality’ from other states:

There is not the slightest doubt that there are fallacies about the claim that most Bidoons had another nationality. (MP Faisal al Duwaisan in Toumi, November 10, 2014)

MP Hassan Jawhar (‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014) also openly objected to the status adjustment program as the cause of the bans on children commencing school. He challenged the Ministry of Interior’s attempt to force young children to accept the issue of incorrect birth certificates for the purpose of acquiring enrolment in school, as it forced them to submit to a false identity. He viewed this as an abuse of their human rights,

On his part, head of the Bedoun Committee, MP Hassan Jawhar was reported to have said, ‘We hope that MOI [Ministry of the Interior] stops its pressure on the Bedouns to acquire nationality other than theirs; these pressures have victimized the students who have every right to an education.’ (‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014)

MP Hammoud al Hamdan in Izzak (November 14, 2014) also contributed to the debate on children prohibited by the Apparatus from commencing schools in September 2014.
He drew connections between the ‘status adjustment’ program with the new bans on education against the kindergarten-aged children and the Apparatus’ refusal to register them at all with the agency, in the absence of the birth certificate (forcing them to remain what the FCO Kuwait (2007 in U.K. Home Office, 2009) describes as ‘undocumented’ Bedoun. He explained the rejection of registration of the children by the Agency was simply a pretext:

Hamdan said he has learnt that private schools have rejected to admit a number of Bedoon students under the pretext of not being registered with the Central Agency for Illegal Residents, the government name for bedoons. He said those pretexts are in violation… (MP Hammoud al Hamdan in Izzak, November 14, 2014)

The purpose of the pretext was to force the them to submit to a false nationality, which Hassan Jawhar had pointed out in the same debate (in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014; see above). Hamdan’s statement illustrated that not only were the children not able to obtain correct birth certificates, that their parents refusal to accept the ‘status adjustment’ of their child meant that the Central Apparatus refused to register those children at all. Hence, they remained no only without personal documentation (regarded in some quarters as ‘undocumented’ Bedoun), government did not count them in their population statistics. Such unregistered Bedoun could not access any of the Decree 409/2011 public services unless they submitted to status adjustment, allowing the Apparatus to assign a false nationality.

More recently, in relation to the yearly citizenship grants which would give Kuwaiti citizenship to 4,000 individuals, (but none of whom are Bedoun), MP Saleh Ashour emphasised the ineffectiveness of the National Assembly to carry out any Central Apparatus recommendations to grant citizenship to those tens of thousands of Bedoun who had already proven to be qualified to receive it under the Nationality Law (1959). He believed that this was due to the interference of group more powerful than government,

There is a group in the country that is more powerful than the National Assembly and which does not want bedoons to be naturalized… Can the government naturalize the 32,000 bedoons whom the committee said qualify for citizenship? No, because this influential group is more powerful than the government. (MP Saleh Ashour in Izzak, May 17, 2016)

Previously, al Anezi (1989) had identified that group as the Hadar elite, who had influenced the implementation of the Nationality Law (1959) without requiring representation in the National Assembly. Note that there is does not seem to be any referenced to the law that was proposed by the Academic Team for Population Policy, which prevented Bedouin grants
of citizenship to large numbers that was passed in 1992 (Supreme Planning Council Resolution No. 11 of January 8, 1992).

The debate had been conducted against the backdrop of the Apparatus’ promotion of the Comoros Plan, which would allocate their national identity to ‘Comorian’ instead of to an Arab country as was the standard practice since 2012. During the same national debate, MP Yousef Zalzalah (in Izzak, May 17, 2016) confirmed that the Bedoun were still unable to access the Decree 409/2011 reforms in 2016, that were supposed to give them access to the appropriate identity documentation. At that time, government claimed it would allow Bedouns to register as ‘non-Kuwaiti.’

MP Yousef Al-Zalzalah slammed the government’s treatment of bedoons, saying some of them can’t get married, get an education or get the least of their basic rights. ‘This is a form of oppression and there are people who are deliberately oppressing bedoons,’ he said. ‘Bedoons must be allowed to live a dignified life.’ (Izzak, May 11, 2016)

Al Zalzalah’s statement emphasised that neither of these reforms had taken place, at least not to a reasonable extent across the whole population, such that generally speaking, the Bedouns situation appeared to have changed little since the administrative expulsion measures of 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003) were first introduced.

In this section, I have presented part of my analysis of the status adjustment program run by the Central Apparatus, a department of Kuwait’s Ministry of the Interior. Initially, I collected data on the new colour typing system introduced in 2012, and gained a clear picture of the program via its internal procedures. However, this information was complex and maze-like, and therefore it required a large amount of detail to be described and theorised (my first write-up of the analysis was over seventy pages long). In order to make the program easy for others to understand, I have adopted a broader view than my first analyses. I have instead outlined the definition of ‘status adjustment,’ the ideology on which it is founded, counter-arguments to that ideology that reveal the nature of the program as one that enforces false identity and erases genuine ethnic and national identity. I also provided a fairly general overview of how the program works, and important examples of resistance to the program from within the Bedoun community and from Kuwaiti members of parliament who have provided confirmatory information about the rationale behind the program and the details of its implementation, enhancing understanding of what the program looks like to outsiders, and how it is experienced by the Bedoun themselves. I reiterate that the offerings by members of parliament have been made not without personal cost and deserve the attention of scholars of Kuwait area studies.

**Security Restrictions and surveillance**
The security restriction is a type of punitive measure issued against the Bedoun which is recorded on their security file by the Central Apparatus. The security restriction was part of the Apparatus surveillance function which included general surveillance, blacklisting, investigating and sanctioning security restrictions, security offences and criminal offences. Similar to its function of determining the Bedouns ‘original nationality,’ which was established with secret research and investigations (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011) the security restriction was also established through secret investigations. The restrictions were regarded as a lesser sanction of the security offence, as the offence was more commonly assumed to reflect genuine national security threats, such as terrorism and organised crime. However, based on discussions by authorities in local newspapers, the security restriction appeared to be designed primarily for sanctioning the Bedoun on grounds of their ethnicity, and to remove their capacity to be granted citizenship after they had qualified for it under the Nationality Law (1959) decades earlier.

Some data on the security restriction had already been discussed in reports on the Bedoun by the U.K. Home Office (2009, 2012, 2014). The Bedoun are the only ethnic group actually listed as the sole ethnic group of concern in the title of any of the U.K. Home Office country information and guidance reports; the reports are solely devoted to their claims. It is not clear from the Kuwait country information and guidance notes, why this is the case. This data was of quite some assistance in researching the Central Apparatus, because using a comparative approach within my thematic analysis, I recognised commonalities between Bedoun asylum/refugee applicant data, the interview data from members of the community still living in Kuwait, and the newspaper data drawing on policy and other information from Central Apparatus staff. Therefore, it is worth diverting for a moment to observe the kind of data compiled in these reports which tell us much about the surveillance function of the Apparatus which issues the security restrictions, before returning to the important nexus between security restrictions, the deprivation of human rights and the ‘status adjustment’ program.

From 2009 to 2014, the U.K. Home Office published data that showed a pattern of gross surveillance, personal interference and restrictions imposed on the Bedoun population in Kuwait, by the Central Apparatus. Britain was receiving a steady asylum flow of Bedoun refugees from Kuwait citing tribal persecution on the basis of this data. The following is an account of an analysis of case testimony from the U.K. Home Office (2014). Refugee applicants had reported to have lost access to ‘basic amenities’ including education, healthcare and employment in return for collaboration with Iraqi forces and/or social activism during the Arab Spring:
These are red flags on the files of some members of the Bidoon community – the number of Bidoon flagged in this way is unknown. Once flagged, their access to basic amenities – employment in particular - is severely curtailed and often removed completely.

The Bidoon Committee have said that these flags are attached to the files of those who have been convicted of a crime, or who collaborated with Iraqi forces during the invasion.

Human rights groups and members of the Bidoon community claim that they [security ‘blocks,’ ‘flags’ and so on] are used arbitrarily by the Kuwaiti government, and that they are often used to disincentives members of the community from political activism. The allegation is that those involved in protests, activism or advocacy for Bidoon [stateless people’s] rights have such flags attached to them within the system; and that these extend to their families as well, meaning that if an activist is ‘flagged’ in such a way, their entire family will be denied the right to work, and will find access to healthcare and education much harder.

Removal of such flags is at the discretion of the Bidoon committee and the security services, does not appear to be time-limited, and is not open to judicial oversight. (UK Home Office, 2014, p.27)

This data coincided with Central Apparatus announcements regarding the status adjustment program and the issue of security restrictions. The announcements were part of a dialogue that began in earnest after the new identity typing system (based on colours) was introduced in 2012, and became more intense in early 2014, while I was conducting fieldwork in Kuwait. The account above described not only similar phenomena to newspaper articles published from 2012 to 2014 in which Central Apparatus authorities described their system of punitive actions to force the Bedoun to reveal their ‘original nationality,’ it also coincided with far more detailed information I received on and off the record from interviewees and other contacts in Kuwait, including Hadar intellectuals who explained the system from their perspective. The following correspondences emerged:

- The ‘blocks’ and ‘flags’ (above) were delivered in informal ways, mirroring blacklisting, and formal ways, mirroring the security restriction. Central Apparatus authorities had discussed a hierarchy of restrictions and offences that were issued against the Bedoun, such as the security restriction, the security offence and the criminal offence (Nacheva, April 7, 2014; Saleh, February 9, 2014). Another term used by the Central Apparatus is ‘security holds’ (‘Kuwait’s Cabinet,’ 2012).
- The blocked access to education and health services, was equivalent to blocked access to Decree 409/2011, the eleven so-called facilities (Kuwait Government
Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011) that had ostensibly provided the Bedoun with human rights via access to basic public services.

- The application of ‘blocks’ and ‘flags’ to whole families, resembled accounts from interviewees about the ‘security restriction;’ it also conformed to the methods of citizenship stripping used by the government of Kuwait (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2014).

- The mechanisms of the ‘flag’ or ‘block’ on access to basic public services coincided with the information-sharing policy conducted between different Ministries, overseen by the Central Apparatus, through PACI (see Table D3). This capacity was in place from 1985. The new identity cards issued in 2012 had enhanced this process with new security and surveillance technologies.

- The interference with work practices also reflected mirrored blacklisting, not based on specific information I discussed with some interviewees (noting that five of the interviewee respondents in this study were issued with security restrictions). This also coincided with my collection of data concerning interference with work practices particularly related to the performance of professional roles including public speaking, publishing writing, journalism, research and even reporting to the United Nations directly (Chapter 8, section 8.2.2), but also other types of employment.

- Targeting for protests, activism or advocacy coincided with targeting of the Bedoun in other areas of intellectual expression and social leadership abovementioned. Methods other than security restrictions and blacklisting were used, such as suppression of the spread of ideas in novels and poetry by blocking publication and stealing the work for prior publication, and suppression of communications online via the legislation of new media laws (Chapter 8, Table 25).

- These aspects also coincided with a range of additional discriminatory practices targeting intellectual activity in the education sector (Chapter 8, section 8.2.2), hence the study of themes of suppression of education, intellectual activity and social solidarity in this thesis.

What were the key patterns arising from this data? My analysis of the news announcements by Apparatus officials on both status adjustment and the issue of security restrictions, indicated that since 2006, government had become aware that resistance to status adjustment had spread within the Bedoun community. When status adjustment was first introduced, thousands of Bedoun men had been taken in by the program, with the assistance of organised programs involving government letters, affidavits, fake passports and passport traffickers. After the community gained knowledge of the consequences of the
program first-hand, the information was disseminated throughout the community, and less identity transfers took place. This was evident in the data that the Central Apparatus had published, which pointed to such resistance (see the discussion on status adjustment above, regarding resistance to incorrectly labelled birth certificates, the uptake of fake passports and accumulative totals published in the newspapers of number of ‘adjustments’ achieved).

From 2012, the security restrictions had become main method used to reduce the number that had already been recognised by government as ‘eligible’ for citizenship. This appeared to be used to counteract the lack of uptake of false nationality.

Additionally, government had repeatedly offered a ‘package of benefits’ to the Bedoun in return for status adjustment. The deal was to trade in their identity via ‘status adjustment’ in return for these benefits (basic public services), even though they were supposed to be equivalent to the Bedouns ‘human rights’ (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights, 2011) which should have been available at least in principle, unconditionally according to the international law of human rights. While there was virtually no proof that these human rights services were being accessed in increasing numbers by the Bedoun, reports from the Bedoun continued to emerge about access to the services being withdrawn.

On the ground, the Bedoun reported that the blocks on services was due to the ‘security restriction,’ just as the Bedoun refugee applicants had reported to British immigration authorities in their case data, in the U.K. Home Office (2014). Government had warned the security restriction would block access to Kuwaiti citizenship, but not basic human rights. It still claimed it was providing these to the Bedoun and somewhat obscenely, that the Bedoun were ‘enjoying’ these rights (‘Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). In other words, the Decree 409/2011 ‘human rights’ had been promoted as an incentive for ‘status adjustment’ (and loss of a legal citizenship claim) while also being withdrawn (along with the legal right to citizenship) as a consequence for the security restriction. It is a very short leap of reasoning to suppose that the security restriction was being used as punishment for resisting ‘status adjustment.’ ‘Human rights,’ access to basic public services was the carrot for ‘status adjustment,’ the ‘security restriction’ was the stick. All roads led back to ‘status adjustment,’ administrative ethnic cleansing. The application of security restrictions and criminalisation appeared to be an increasingly frequently applied method to remove citizenship eligibility compared to changing individuals’ nationality via ‘status adjustment’ program, due to the ongoing resistance within the stateless community to change identity. The development of the Comoros Plan (Sloan, 2014; Izzak, May 17, 2016) confirmed this, to the extent that government had acquired a new plan for mass identity transfer to replace the former, relatively unsuccessful attempts to transfer whole-group identity to a range of different Arab states.
The security restriction has been used as an excuse not to grant those most eligible under the Nationality Law (1959), Kuwaiti citizenship. Ultimately, it was also used to deprive the Bedoun of human rights that were purported to be delivered in Decree 409/2011. Previously it was associated with ‘traitor’ accusations following the invasion of Iraq. After the Arab Spring it was aimed at ‘protestors’ and ‘activists’ as a punitive measure issued against who spoke about their identity, culture and persecution including claims of deprivation of citizenship and human rights. Both generations of targeted groups happened to be largely allocated to the green identity group according to the new identity typing system announced by the Apparatus in 2012. Some were also in the yellow group, which also contained some members of the military services according to government (‘New Hope for Non-Census,’ 2014). It is quite possible it is also used as a sanction against all other Bedouns - those in other identity colour categories. But since those groups have already been issued with criminal offences for presentation false identity (ironically due to their participation in ‘status adjustment’), and their citizenship claims have not been regarded as strong, dialogue about the security offences issued from the Apparatus has mostly concerned those who would be eligible for citizenship, in the green and sometimes the yellow identity categories. For further discussion on how the citizenship claims of this group in particular have been reduced to virtually zero via the application of tens of thousands of ‘secret’ security restrictions for between 2012 and 2014, see Appendix D, iv.

**Criminalisation**

Criminalisation of the Bedoun did not start within the Ministry of the Interior. It commenced at the level of urban planning. The security apparatus was necessary to impose criminalisation for the purpose of erasure. The ‘need’ was created by scholars in the 1970s, who circulated the ideology of the Bedoun as foreigners and imposters. They had become targeted by Kuwait and Arab nationalists as members of the northern tribal dirah, to be omitted from citizen grants in the 1960s. This means Bedoun were not managed by the Central Apparatus or its equivalent body commencing in 1985, as Beaugrand (2010, 2014a) also suggested. The Bedoun were initially managed as part of the Kuwaiti Bedouin population, with whom they were integrated.

In order to emphasise this continuity, I have included earlier government agencies responsible for the management of the Bedoun, below. This point also serves to underscore the point that the Ministry of Interior committees for Bedoun management inherited their duties from the Municipality of Kuwait with the Central Statistics Office and the Ministry of Planning from 1965, which led to the criminalisation of the Bedoun in the 1970s, when they were still regarded as indigenous tribespeople. A summary table of the strategies imposing administrative erasure via criminalisation is provided below in Table G4.
Indigenous Bedouin settlement recast as ‘illegal dwellings’ housing ‘migrant,’ ‘squatters’

Initially, the Bedouin were managed by the Municipality of Kuwait and the Ministry of Planning, with assistance from the national statistics office. In reference to the Bedouin desert settlements, academic labelling as ‘squatters’ and ‘slum’ dwellers and demands to ‘eradicate’ the settlements, was applied first to Bedouin homes, then to Bedouin people, and then to the Bedouin in particular, selected for segregation. Academics portray the Bedouin as ‘migrants.’ Successful uptake at national policy level, leading to the creation of the security apparatus to manage the ‘illegal’ population. This was evidenced in the transition from the Committee and the Committee Concerning Illegal Dwellings to the Committee for the Study of Illegal Residents in 1985. Recent authors have continued in this way, but have not cited the previous sources.


‘Illegal residents’ and ‘status adjustment’- demand Bedoun produce foreign passports, committing fraud

The intention to shift all Bedouin into an illegal residents category via retrospective application of the Immigration Law, was discussed in the expulsion policy document of 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003). But from 1983, the Bedouin had been pressured to ‘produce foreign passports’ (al Anezi, 1989) for status adjustment.


Enemies of the state, fifth column, ‘Iraqi’ etc.

The Bedouin were deemed to be enemies of the state along with Palestinian population in a series of scripted announcements by Kuwait’s ruler and government Ministers. Bedouin identity is no longer symbolically interpreted as ‘foreign’ but literally interpreted as ‘Iraqi.’ Mass deaths, deportations and exits. Those never charged, acquitted of charges, or who had finished their sentences, are retained in prisons or deportation centres indefinitely. Non-renewal of ‘registration’ of Bedouin by the Ministry of interior indicating administrative erasure alongside National Census shift indicating expulsion.

Sources: Human Rights Watch (1991a, 1992); see also Appendix Fi and ii.
2000

Thousand forced to commit affidavit fraud.
Mass deportations of Bedoun mixed with deportations of migrant nationals

Affidavit program adds to production of fraudulent documents. Thousands of Bedoun are forced to sign false documents to ‘admit’ they have another nationality. Affidavits supplied. Committees of mass deportation set up adjacent renewed to calls for the group to ‘register’ their citizenship claims and crackdowns on illegal residents migrants (nationals of other states who had violated visa laws). This merged the two groups. Along with ‘status adjustment’ already in progress since 1983, the numbers affected were impossible to tell. Status adjustment continues.


2006

Status adjustment targets directed to passport traffickers.

U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait reports ‘the situation is ridiculous,’ indicating ‘status adjustment’ is out of control. Those identified as having to submit to status adjustment are directed to passport traffickers by Central Apparatus staff. This is causing the purchase of fraudulent passports bearing no relationship to the recipient’s identity, threatening exposure of the erasure and involvement of Apparatus in organised crime.

Sources: WikiLeaks (US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26).

2010

Status adjustment goals published.

Population numbers allocated to different nationalities are published. Major discrepancy in numbers indicating continued National Census manipulation, e.g. over 50,000 Bedoun are suddenly listed as Saudi Arabian nationals. Integrity of the National Census data is implicated in the Ministry of Interior’s ‘status adjustment.’


2011

Status adjustment procedures published.

Central Apparatus takes responsibility for identity documents by Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice citing enforced nationality labels. Ministry of Interior takes full responsibility for determining the identity of the Bedoun, based on secret, undisclosed investigations and research. It determines all Bedoun nationalities stated on documents issued by government, including birth, death, marriage and divorce certificates and drivers’ licences. Continues to deny concepts of statelessness and possibility Bedoun may be statelessness as a pretext for claiming ‘other nationality’ and assumption of criminal identity.

2012

Status adjustment procedures streamlined to intensify submission to erasure.

Security restrictions applied. Targets identified and oppressed.

Dual focus emerges:

a) Those possessing some form of genuine identity documentation are subjected to security restrictions and intense surveillance. Applied en masse to tens of thousands to prevent citizenship acquisition under the Nationality Law and oppress and punish the Bedouns intellectual and leadership classes. New media laws shut down Bedoum publishing.

b) Those with no access to genuine identity documents are pressured more intensively with ‘status adjustment.’ Four categories of identity are given different criminal statuses and different capacities to qualify for citizenship.

Contradictory statements issued by Central Apparatus. Confusion over concept of citizenship and concept of passport by Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah. Ministry of Interior begins to firm up its view that citizenship will never be forthcoming to the Bedoun, even for those who prove their qualification to receive it, under the Nationality Law (1959). Access to public services in Decree 409/2011(equivalent to ‘human rights’) are offered in five-year parcels as an exchange incentive for submission to status adjustment (identity erasure).

Sources: Color ID Cards for Bedoons Soon’ (2012, April 21), ‘8,000 Bedoons’ (2012); ‘From Discriminating’ (2012); ‘Judicial Recourse’ (2012); Nacheva (April 7, 2014); Saleh, (May 12, 2012).

2014

Bedoun children targeted to submit to false nationality declarations for ‘status adjustment’ in return for access to primary school.

Bedoun children targeted to submit to ‘status adjustment’ by declaring a false nationality on birth certificates. Kuwait members of parliament speak out in protest. Comoros Plan emerges with caveats for prioritisation of criminal deportation and whole population deportation.

2014

The Comoros Plan is introduced - 5 years’ access to human rights to be exchanged for whole-group erasure.

Access to public services in Decree 409/2011(equivalent to ‘human rights’) are offered in five-year parcels as an exchange incentive for submission to status adjustment (identity erasure) specifically attached to Comorian nationality.

‘Only’ criminalised Bedouns are identified as targeted for deportation to the Comoros (all are criminalised). Policy for Comoros to ‘receive onto the territory, all those deemed ‘criminals’ by Kuwait. 1,900 Bedoun are identified as targeted for mass deportation. Kuwaiti MPs attend workshops to discuss settlement of the whole population on the Comoros Islands. Other MPs introduce ‘policy’ to send Bedouns to desert camps for those who are charged with criminal offences, or speak out about their community’s situation

Sources: ‘Bedoons to Get’ (2015); 8,000 Bedoons’ (June 18, 2012); 8,000 Bedoons’ (June 19, 2012); Hope for non-census,’ 2014; Kuwait, Comoros’ (2014); Kuwait Priorities Protection’ (2014); ‘Kuwait Showcases’ (2015); ‘Judicial recourse’ (2012); ‘Kuwait MPs,’ 2016; ‘Kuwait Plans,’ (2013); MENA Report (May 10, 2016); Nacheva (April 7, 2014); ‘MPs Conflicted’ (2016); ‘Magnetic cards’ (2012); Saleh (9 February, 2014); 6051 Illegal Residents’ (2014); ‘6,860 Illegal Residents’ (2015); ‘7,828 Illegal Residents’ (2016; Toumi (August 11, 2014).

2015

Bedoun instructed by Ministry of Interior to repeat fraudulent passports offences to maintain access to public services/'human rights.'

Expired fraudulent passports clogging up the system as Bedoun fail to renew them. Renewal of fraudulent passports called for by al Jarrah. Bedoun show resistance to committing identity fraud as awareness of the program increases. Access to public services in Decree 409/2011(equivalent to ‘human rights’) are offered in five-year parcels as an exchange incentive for submission to status adjustment - Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah confirms this is contingent on committing repeat offences of passport fraud to make their identity and residency ‘legal’ under Ministry of Interior procedure.

Sources: ‘Bedoons to Get,’ (2015); Kholaf (December 12, 2014); ‘Kuwait, Comoros’ (2014);’ MENA Report (May 10, 2016); ‘MPs Conflicted’ (2016); ‘No Plans,’ (20 May 2014).

Note: Additional data on criminalisation via the construction of names for the Bedoun, and the deletion of names, can be found in Appendix B, ii, Table B2 and Appendix C, i, Tables C1, C2, and Chapter 6, Table 20 respectively.
Appendix G, iv

Local and international factors influencing the ethnic targeting and population eradication of the Bedoun (1983-)

This Appendix lists the confluence and convergence of broad, local, regional and international factors, around the development of the Bedoun problem, the suppression of information and failure to prevent the escalation of the crisis in Kuwait. The factors are summarised in Chapter 9, Figure 3 in the conclusions and recommendations of this study. The factors attempt to illustrate the complex nature of the problem and to argue for an investigation by the United Nations Special Rapporteurs on Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, in order to stop and/or prevent all measures of ethnic persecution, including ethnic cleansing, population reduction, and other factors which may comprise indicators of the genocide of the Bedoun.

Regional Level - International Agencies and Academic Research

- Development of knowledge about Bedouin society was generated from the Middle East Bedouin settlement programs research programs during the 1950s and 1960s.
- The process involved discrimination by Hadar academics producing and disseminating anti-Bedouin ideologies that enhanced their domination over the group as they were required to facilitate the permanent settlement of the Bedouin through their development plans and their implementation in the region (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006; see Chapter 2).
- Racist theories observed by Bocco (2006) and Aurenche (1993) involved major themes that essentially, form today’s ‘tribalism’ theory in Middle East studies.
- This site of knowledge production and political control over the Bedouin, appears to be linked to the development of anti-Bedouin nationalist policy platforms in Kuwait from 1965 (al Mdaires, 2010) as well as the origin of anti-Bedouin academic discourses later expanded by scholars in Kuwait studies (see Academic, below).

National Level

Known government policies enabling ethnic targeting

- Nationality Law and its implementation via Decree 5/1960) (see Table 22, Chapter 7)
- Royal Decree 58/1996, March 26, 1996 (see analysis, Appendix D, i)
- Supreme Planning Council Resolution No. 11/1992 (see analysis, Appendix D, i) and Appendix F, iii)
• Administrative expulsion (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003) (see analysis, Appendix E, ii)
• Ethnic cleansing (1990-1995) (Fineman, November 2, 1991; see analysis, Appendix F)
• Erasure via ‘Status Adjustment’ (administrative ethnic cleansing: Weissbrodt, 2008; prepares for physical eradication via population re-allocation on the National Census) (see analysis, Appendix E)

**Hidden government policies**

• Removal of Bedouin ethnic identity from the Bedoun (every level of the ethnic structure, 1983-2012) (see Chapter 6, Table 20).
• Ethnic targeting of Bedoun intellectual activity – speaking, literary products, online communications, punishment of intellectual leaders in particular (see Chapter 8, Table 26).

**Political**

• Kuwaiti Hadar and Arab Nationalism (‘the Nationalist bloc’) articulated a policy position to deprive the Bedouin of citizenship from 1965, on the basis of their ethnicity.
• The northern tribes became the easiest targets, mediated through their employment in the public service (which was used by the Municipal Council and Ministry of Planning to control their physical segregation) and domination of Arab nationalists in the Municipal Council (Bedouin desert settlements/‘urban planning’) and Education Council (al Mdaires, 2010).
• The influence of the nationalist domination over the Municipality of Kuwait was seen in the chain of committees, which have monitored and conducted close surveillance of the Bedoun, and organised the physical segregation of the population, since 1965. This was a new finding. For a list of the committees, see Appendix D, ii). For brief discussion of the nationalist policies, see Chapter 7.

**Academic**

• In the academic arena, nationalist ideology was embedded in ‘tribalism’ theory, extending the regional academic themes discussed in the first item, above.
• A range of anti-Bedouin ideological themes, called ‘tribalism’ theory, offered ‘scientific’ explanation for the biological, social and cultural inferiority of the Bedouin. The same key, anti-Bedouin themes were copied into literature about the Bedouin with little variation, a practice, which Western academics have perpetuated as much as Kuwaiti ones, while variations on the key themes continue to expand.
• These themes were very much present at the social level, and experienced by the Bedoun on a daily basis when they interacted in citizen society (see below). Hadar identity themes increasingly feature supremacy motifs, which can be linked to eugenic theory (see discussion, Chapter 7, see also analysis, Appendix C, vi to viii).

Social
• Anti-Bedouin ideology disseminated to the public from the academic-political arena, through political discourses in the local media scene, social institutions such as the national education system, and likely cultural institutions, such as the diwanniya.
• This research described the experience of the Bedoun with these ideologies encountered during interpersonal transactions in public spaces, and set out the cultural patterning of these encounters related to established anti-Bedouin ideologies, in Chapter 7.

International Governments
• Both the governments of the United Kingdom (United Kingdom Home Office, 2014, p.18, n62, 63, 64) and the United States (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26) are cogently aware of the ‘Status Adjustment’ program.
• The United States embassy in Kuwait has described some of the practical aspects of the program of erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing), while the government of the United Kingdom has collected data from Bedoun refugees, who have described an accurate picture of how the program works. The United Kingdom has cooperated with the Central Apparatus directly to return Bedoun asylum seekers. The developments were publicized by the Central Apparatus.

International Agencies
• Regional settlement program for the Bedouin in the Middle East (1950s-1960s) enforced the permanent settlement of a variety of tribal groups, distributed across all states (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006).
• Kuwait’s national settlement program from 1965 (purported to provide citizenship and land as a national policy) (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994) was part of regional development programs sponsored by the U.N. Today, the U.N. has ‘forgotten’ these historical antecedents, and only responds to inquiries through its various treaty review processes, that are put directly to the state of Kuwait. If these questions are not raised, the Bedoun do not exist at this level, due to lack of formal monitoring mechanisms (Car-Hill, 2013).
The Bedoun appear to have been unreported in UNDP and UNESCO statistics since their expulsion from Kuwait’s National Census in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994).

UNESCO excludes the Bedoun from education data, particularly children in school (in the ‘Education for All’ data), and children out of school (in the Children Out of School data) and youth-adult literary statistics aged 15-24 (in the ‘Education for All’ data). This is because UNESCO commits states to report only on citizen participation, leaving it ‘optional’ to report on stateless groups, in particular, the Bedoun of Kuwait (Carr-Hill, 2103).

The UNCHR Statelessness Unit has no relationship whatsoever with the Bedoun community in Kuwait, and has actively attempted to repress information on the group being disseminated.
Appendix H
A Photographic Record of the Bedouin Desert Settlements, Tent Accommodations and Popular Housing Compounds Kuwait (1974-2014)

Appendix H includes the following sections:
Images H1-H8 The Desert Settlements (1974)
Images H9-H14 The Popular Housing Complexes (1974)
Images H15-H22 The Popular Housing Complexes (1990)
Images H23-H36 The popular Housing Complexes (2014)
Images H37-H48 Bedoun Living and Recreational Spaces (2014-2016)

Explanatory Note

The popular housing settlements at Mina Abdullah in al Moosa (1976) and Um Elhiman in al Zaher (1990) were both located southwest of Ahmadi and appear to be placed at the same location according to maps in al Moosa (1976, p.298, Map 7.1) and al Zaher (1990, p.235. Figure 6.1). Additionally, al Moosa (1976) took photos of Saihed al Awazim, which al Zaher (1990) referred to as the approved area of Shedadiya, while al Moosa (1976) showed they were located adjacent each other in the same compound.

Al Moosa (1976) two items named ‘Mina Abdullah,’ the shanty settlement and a seaside location. Based on the above, it appears that this settlement which was the same as Um Alhiman in al Zaher (1990). In many respects, the two studies (al Moosa, 1976 and Al Zaher, 1990) can be regarded as two parts of a longitudinal study).

A summary of captions for each image, follows.
Appendix H, i
Images H1-H8 The Desert Settlements (1974)

The following photographs of Bedouin desert settlements at Saihed al Awazim and al Jahra, Kuwait, 1974, were taken by Professor Abdulrasoul al Moosa (1976) in *Bedouin Shanty Settlements in Kuwait: A Study in Social Geography*.

Image H1 Aerial view of the Saihed al Awazim desert settlement

Image H2 Close-up aerial view of a desert dwelling at the Saihed al Awazim settlement
Image H3 Aerial view of the comparative spacing between dwellings

Image H4 The desert settlement at Magwaa with stock grazing nearby
Image H5 Traditional and contemporary (temporary) housing at the al Jahra desert settlement

Image H6 A brand new ‘shanty,’ prefabricated timber hut
Image H7 Mixed materials used for housing construction in a desert settlement

Image H8 Bedouin children playing football at the Magwaa desert settlement
Appendix H, ii

The following photographs of the ‘popular housing’ compounds at Mina Abdullah and al Jahra, Kuwait, were taken by Professor Abdulrasoul al Moosa (1976) in *Bedouin Shanty Settlements in Kuwait: A Study in Social Geography*.

Image H9 Popular housing complex showing space at front centre for prayer area.

Image H10 (above) A tin partition used to screen the front door of a dwelling from open desert
Image H11 Children walking by a house, with goats grazing

Image H12 The main shopping strip in Saihed al Awazim, with goats
Image H13 Modest house ‘extensions’ at Mina Abdullah

Image H14 A ‘Popular housing’ street, showing the virtually uninhabitable conditions at Mina Abdullah
Appendix H, iii
Images H15-H23 The Popular Housing Compounds (1990)

The following photographs of the ‘popular housing’ compounds at Taima, al Jahra, Sulabiya and Um Elhiman, Kuwait, were taken by Ajeel al Zaher (1990) in *Housing Conditions and Aspirations of Popular Housing Tenants in Kuwait*.

**Image H15** A street in a ‘popular housing’ compound

**Image H16** Rapid deterioration of homes in popular housing settlements due to environmental conditions
Image H17 Streetscape at the popular housing settlements

Image H18 Housing ‘extensions’ required for shade and to accommodate families
Image H19 Tent housing at a popular housing settlement

Image H20 ‘Illegal’ house extensions at a popular housing settlement
Image H21 Lack of public facilities at a popular housing settlement

Image H22 The relative size of a car compared to popular housing dwellings
I took the following photographs of the ‘popular housing’ compounds at Taima, al Jahra, and Sulabiya, Kuwait, between February and April 2014. My cultural guides and translators assisted me to visit the area several times, including for interviews.
Image H25 An unmodified home in the popular housing compound, Taima

Image H26 A sequence of homes cemented together due to lack of inside space, in Taima
Image H27 Lack of maintenance to public roads in Taima

Image H28 A housing area with a concentration of adult, citizen females (Sulabiya)
Image H29 A renovated home with a second storey, in Sulabiya

Image H30 An impoverished area where Shia residents live
Image H31 An unmodified home in a Shia Area

Image H32 The front gate of a smaller home in Taima
Image H33 An unmodified home in Sulabiya

Image H34 A home with an uncovered courtyard
Image H35 The Public Authority for Civil Information property labels Taima

Image H36 Improvements made to homes
Appendix H, v
Images H37-H48 Bedoun Living and Recreational Spaces (2014-2016)

These images were taken inside an interviewee's home in Taima, al Jahra, with the permission of the interviewee and his family members who lived there.

Interior of a ‘popular housing’ dwelling in Taima

Image H37 The kitchen of a home in Taima (1)

Image H38 The kitchen of a home in Taima (2)
Image H39 The kitchen sink and laundry area

Image H40 The front entrance of a home in Taima.
Image H41 The inner courtyard of a home in Taima
A homeless Bedoun man

Image H42 An impoverished Bedoun man selling goods on the roadside
Image H43 An automobile used as a home in al Jahra

Image H44 Fresh fruits are sold to make ends meet
Photographs of recreational tents in Kuwait, exterior and interior

Image H45 Tents on the fringe of built-up areas

Image H46 A large, ceremonial tent in a public space, al Jahra
Image H47 The interior of a small, family tent

Image 48 The interior of a larger, communal tent
Images H47 and H48 were taken by my cultural guide and translator, T3.
Summary of image captions

**Image H1 Aerial view of the Saihed al Awazim desert settlement.**
This was one of the sentiments officially designated by government, along with sites at al Jahra and al Shedadia (adjacent Saihad al Awazim). These homes have large settlement with five or six wood huts. Some scholars such as al Nakib (2014) still call these huts ‘shanties,’ although one hut was equivalent to a ‘shanty’ in what was normally known as a shanty settlement. (Plate No. 2.1, in al Moosa, 1976, p.62).

**Image H2 Close-up aerial view of a desert dwelling at the Saihed al Awazim settlement.**
Dwellings of different sizes with roaming livestock, which are closed in at night. Tin was a sand-proof material, but hot, while the timber was not sand-proof, but provided a breathable shell. Sand storms are frequent in Kuwait, while temperatures reach over fifty degrees in summer. (Plate No. 4.1, in al Moosa 1976, p.112)

**Image H3 Aerial view of the comparative spacing between dwellings.**
Compare to Plate 1 at Saihed al Awazim, showing that the Bedouin’s homes were brought closer together and in a more organised fashion at the large, formal settlements. Large, metal boxes contained water. Small, separate buildings serve as *divanniya*, the kitchen, and rooms for sleeping. (Plate No. 4.2, in al Moosa, 1976, p.112).

**Image H4 The desert settlement at Magwaa with stock grazing nearby.**
The combination of timber and wood is clear. Initially huts were constructed with sheets of corrugated tin and other, found materials. Later, they featured poured concrete slabs and pre-fabricated timber rooms were sold, making the dwellings fit for longer term use. (Plate 6.2, in al Moosa, p.172).

**Image H5 Traditional and contemporary (temporary) housing at the al Jahra desert settlement.**
Two traditional, tent homes with prefabricated housing, behind. The grey, striped materials are thick, woollen blankets that were the basic material used for traditional housing. Jahra settlement. (Plate 6.5 in Al Moosa, 1976, p.177).

**Image H6 A brand new ‘shanty,’ prefabricated timber hut.**
The concrete slab floor can be seen under building to the left. Note behind is a wood hut with tin roof and a second-storey building constructed with corrugated tin. Kuwait Oil Company first began providing the concrete, perhaps after it was realised that the temporary homes would have to withstand decades of harsh desert conditions, due to state housing shortages. (Plate 6.6 in al Moosa, 1976, p.181).

**Image H7 Mixed materials used for housing construction in a desert settlement.**
The author claimed this was a home with poorer inhabitants, but it appears to be an older prefabricated wooden dwelling like many others, with a gate (and with a sign on it) to the right, a tin roof and behind to the left, other buildings with tin roof and sides. This was likely required to protect from sand storms, given the dwellings were permanent. (Plate 6.7 in al Moosa, 1976, p.181).

**Image H8 Bedouin children playing football at the Magwaa desert settlement.**

Al Moosa (1976) explained that the settlements were too far from schools for the children to attend, but criticized their parents for not attending city sports clubs as an example of anti-social ‘tribalism. (Plate No. 6.3, in al Moosa, 1976, p.173)

**Images H9-H13 The Popular Housing Compounds (1974).**

The following photographs of the ‘popular housing’ compounds at Mina Abdullah and al Jahra, Kuwait, were taken by Professor Abdulrasoul al Moosa (1976) in Bedouin Shanty Settlements in Kuwait: A Study in Social Geography.

**Image H9 Popular housing complex showing space at front centre for prayer area.**

Mosques were not built by government in the popular housing areas, although provision for them along with other facilities (also never built) was made by planners (al Zaher, 1990, p.194). Similar to the misnomer ‘shanty,’ the concrete, windowless, brick boxes behind this area were called ‘popular housing’ or ‘low income’ housing. The white boxes on top of the homes are water tanks. (Plate 4.6, in al Moosa, 1976, p.126).

**Image H10 A tin partition used to screen the front door of a dwelling from open desert.**

The automobile offers a sense of scale – the house is a long as the car is. Each compound contained a ‘monitoring’ office dedicated to destroying additions to the homes (al Zaher, 1990, p.191), such as the makeshift corrugated iron fence, required to keep the sand out of the house during wind storms. (Plate 4.8, in al Moosa, 1976, p.128).

**Image H11 Children walking by a house, with goats grazing.**

Al Moosa noted the animal pen was ‘attached’ to the house. The size of the children can be compared to the usually small rooms of the homes. (Plate 6.11, in al Moosa, 1976, p.234).

**Image H12 The main shopping strip in Saihed al Awazim, with goats.**

This picture shows a resident taking his goats for exercise. Al Moosa (1976) pointed out that most desert settlement areas were not close to any shops of community facilities. This shopping strip is for the mainstream community. Planners included these kinds of facilities in the popular housing compounds, but they were not
constructed until decades later. Once schools and health clinics were built, they operated only briefly before being shut down in the 1986 administrative expulsion. Today, citizen children have been placed in the public schools in the popular housing areas, to replace the local Bedoun children, who are prohibited from attending those schools. (Plate 4.3 in al Moosa, 1976, p.117).

**Image H13 Modest house ‘extensions’ at Mina Abdullah.**
This picture shows a small, white cement wall constructed to give privacy and to protect from the environment, which may have become an additional room, later. (Plate 4.7 in al Moosa, 1976, p.127).

**Image H14 A ‘Popular housing’ street, showing the virtually uninhabitable conditions at Mina Abdullah.**

**Image H15 A street in a ‘popular housing’ compound.**
Note that nothing has changed with the drainage issues, even after the roads were paved. Compare with Image 26. (Appears to be Plate 7.1 in al Zaher, 1990, p.274 (plate number omitted).

**Image H16 Rapid deterioration of homes in popular housing settlements due to environmental conditions.**
Al Zaher (1990) showed that gross deterioration of the homes had occurred due to weather conditions, while some homes had been abandoned after holes had been knocked out in the brick walls, as if the occupants had attempted to construct windows. (Plate 7.2, in al Zaher, 1990, p.274).

**Image H17 Streetscape at the popular housing settlements.**
The author complained about the water on the road and the state of ill-repair. Not only was no maintenance performed on the homes by the government owner, the residents were prohibited from making their own adaptations to the home by authorities located in offices on the housing sites, while no maintenance to the public areas of the housing sites was ever carried out. This fact remains evident today (see Images 26, 27). (Plate 7.6, in al Zaher, 1990, p.284).

**Image H18 Housing ‘extensions’ required for shade and to accommodate families.**
By 1990, there was still enough space outside the homes to erect tents for family visits, outdoor diwanniya and celebrations. Al Zaher noted this was necessary due to the small size of the homes. (Plate 7.7 in al Zaher, 1990, p.287).

**Image H19 Tent housing at a popular housing settlement.**
I cropped some of the photographs, such as this one. Some of Al Zaher’s (1990) photographs indicated he did not leave his car, in order to take them. (Plate 8.1, in al Zaher, p.301).
Image H20 ‘Illegal’ house extensions at a popular housing settlement.
Image 18 and 19 were used by al Zaher (1990) to demonstrate illegal house extensions, such as areas for shade (on the left), and tents used as additional rooms. (Plate 7.7, in al Zaher, 1990, p.287).

Image H21 Lack of public facilities at a popular housing settlement.
The only large spaces like this that remain in Taima and Sulabiya today are located near the local shop, shown in Plate 22. However initially, such planned facilities were not built for the Bedouin occupants. (Plate 7.7, in Zaher, 1990, p.287).

Image H22 The relative size of a car compared to popular housing dwellings.
Al Zaher (1990) recorded this picture as an example of ‘luxury cars’ at the popular housing sites. This car was parked between two houses, showing the relative size of the tiny rooms. Today, these spaces are covered with tin due to the space issue, giving each home an additional half room. (Plate 7.1 in Zaher, 1990, p.258).

Images H23 The local convenience store, Sulabiya.
I took the following photographs of the ‘popular housing’ compounds at Taima, al Jahra, and Sulabiya, Kuwait, between February and April 2014. The only shop in a housing block in Sulabiya from the original architectural plan. A car is needed to travel to the main shopping areas beyond the compound. Each block has only one local shop, according to the first urban designs. There are no other facilities for the public in both Taima and Sulabiya.

Image H24 Car shelter at the front of a home in Taima.
This image illustrates the front of the original ‘popular housing’ dwellings. ‘Illegal’ extensions built with tin are still constructed due to there being no garages and no public transport in these areas. The carport appears to be very similar to the one in Image 19.

Image H25 An unmodified home in the popular housing compound, Taima.
Many homes have satellite dishes, as there is no provision of cable television, unlike in other areas of Kuwait.

Image H26 A sequence of homes cemented together due to lack of inside space, in Taima.
The back of the homes is joined by the next home, behind it. That is, there is no access behind the homes and no backyard.

Image H27 Lack of maintenance to public roads in Taima.
Asphalt was laid between the homes but there appears to have been no maintenance performed since it was first laid, leading to flooding during seasonal rains. Compare the condition of the road to Image 16.
Image H28 A housing area with a concentration of adult, citizen females (Sulabiya).

A rare, yellow brick home at the end of the street is next to the house with an additional storey in Image 29. Some Kuwaiti citizens still live in Taima and Sulabiya, as originally some citizen men and their families from the same tribes as the Bedoun were settled in Taima. Bedoun families with female citizens spouses who were encouraged to move to Sulabiya under a welfare scheme prior to 1986.

Image H29 A renovated home with a second storey, in Sulabiya.

New rooms are built on when sons marry, as traditionally they bring their wife and remain in their fathers’ house as their family grows. Although there is a well-established history of government authorities destroying any new rooms built as additions to these homes, there is now an increasing number of second story dwellings at Sulabiya, although most homes remain single-storey and constructed with additions made of tin, as the previous photographs show. This home with new, yellow brick and a new front wall and gate is a somewhat unusual example of an affluent home in this area, indicating that it may belong to a citizen (which would also explain why it has not yet been destroyed by authorities). This kind of example is not seen at Taima. The little flags on the home have pictures of the Emir, likely to show housing. Authorities they do not want the top storey of the house removed by them.

Image H30 An impoverished area where Shia residents live.

Some areas of Taima are in worse condition than others, due to the impoverishment of residents. In particular, there are pockets of Shia residents who have difficulty accessing work and House of Zakat support. The Shia mosques in al Jahra and Sulabiya exist in a particularly impoverished, vandalised condition, unlike Shia mosques in central Kuwaiti City, which are among the most luxurious and affluent, appointed buildings in Kuwait.

Image H31 An unmodified home in a Shia Area.

There are Shia areas in Taima, which are a poorer than the Sunni areas, which go without modifications or decoration. Sulabiya is characteristically slightly more affluent looking, as there are more trees and house decorations. I have tried to show the typical characteristics of each area.

Image H32 The front gate of a smaller home in Taima.

Unmodified homes are smaller than ones that have been modified, due to the covering of the middle courtyard area of the house, and the sequestering of the small space between the outside of some homes, which were frequently converted to an additional room.

Image H33 An unmodified home in Sulabiya.
Some side streets still open up to open land, which can be seen on the left. These free areas are prohibited from further construction or the parking of cars. Sometimes temporary carports are built because there is insufficient space for cars at the front of homes, which other photographs show. However, they are periodically destroyed by housing authorities.

**Image H34 A home with an uncovered courtyard.**
Sulabiya. This home shows the small courtyard, where the front of the space between the homes was walled in, but a roof could not be added. It appears to be the side of the home from the original structure. Compare with Image 15 and Image 23, which show front extensions made into front rooms that are usually transformed into an enclosed *diwanniya*.

**Image H35 The Public Authority for Civil Information property labels Taima.**
The Public Authority for Civil Information registers all houses, as government owns and collects rent on the dwellings. The authority’s plate can be seen on the upper right side of the door.

**Image H36 Improvements made to homes.**
Sulabiya features many homes painted the patriotic colours of the Kuwaiti flag with decorations. Many homes have Kuwaiti flags and pictures of the Emir strewn across them, to discourage authorities from raiding and destroying parts of the dwellings. Other homes appear to be more neglected, because the occupants cannot afford to improve them, while any modification deemed unsuitable by authorities is destroyed, including additional rooms.

**Images H36-H48 Bedoun Living and Recreational Spaces (2014-2016).**
The following photographs show the interior of Bedoun living and recreational spaces were taken by the researcher in 201. They include the interior of a ‘popular housing’ dwelling in Taima (Images 36-40), images of a Bedoun man with his car, which is his home (Images 41-43), and images of recreational tents in Kuwait (Images 44-47). The images were taken by the researcher and her research assistant, from 2014 to 2016.

**Image H37 The kitchen of a home in Taima (1).**
There is a recently purchased stove for the family, which is used to feed not only the main householders but the extended family (the sons’ families), who rent small dwellings outside the home, due to lack of space. Separate gas bottles are still required (on the right), due to lack of public infrastructure. In terms of the permanent, basic facilities provided to tenants, compare this image to Image 40, showing the kitchen sink. Note the blankets left over from the night before – members of the family have to sleep in the kitchen to obtain privacy, because there is not enough space for married
couples with small children, to stay together, or for older single siblings to sleep in males-only and females-only bedrooms.

**Image H38 The kitchen of a home in Taima (2).**
Part of the kitchen, showing the same room as Image 35, above. The kitchen is too small for a table.

**Image H39 The kitchen sink and laundry area.**
The third wall of the kitchen and twin-tub laundry near the sink. The plumbing is fragile, similar to the kind of set-up found in Asia. But the water supply is plentiful there. Spare water is in the blue tub.

**Image H40 The front entrance of a home in Taima.**
This photograph shows the front entrance, from the inside. The *diwanniya* is to the right.

**Image H41 The inner courtyard of a home in Taima.**
The inner courtyard, which is partially covered, facing the front of the house. One bedroom window is on the right. The second bedroom was adjacent to me on the right and the kitchen was to the left. The bathroom was is in the picture, on the left.

**Image H42 An Impoverished Bedoun man selling goods on the roadside.**
Police often target roadside sellers to remove them from the public eye. Begging is illegal in Kuwait and can lead to deportation, but nevertheless it is quite common. Impoverished Bedoun men sell goods by the roadside, attempting to engage in a dignified business activity rather than seeking charity. This man kindly provided his permission to be photographed for this research.

**Image 43 An automobile used as a home in al Jahra.**
The inside of the car has deteriorated over time, due to the heat and sand. It gets up to 50 degrees in summer in Kuwait and there are seasonal sandstorms. Kuwait’s ruling family comes from this suburb, and members of the Emir’s family still live in al Jahra. This man spends much of his time avoiding the authorities, as homelessness is illegal in Kuwait, and another layer of ‘illegality’ faced by the Bedoun.

**Image 44 Fresh fruits are sold to make ends meet.**
The man has obtained fresh fruits to sell in al Jahra. Some individuals are so poor that they sell tiny packets of seeds on the roadside, inside tiny, home-made paper bags, with dimensions of around 7cm x 7cm. Street-selling persists in Kuwait because most Kuwaitis are sympathetic to the activity, because accepting charity is regarded as undignified by comparison. Twitter accounts show many pictures of homeless and working men and children selling goods by the side of the road.

**Image 45 Tents on the fringe of built-up areas.**
Many tents can be seen on empty lands on the fringes of housing developments. Kuwait City has many pockets of undeveloped land, and the common academic image of the nation as a city-state is quite far from the reality. During winter, hundreds of these tents can be seen, and hundreds of larger tents can also be seen on the fringe of Kuwait City going south and especially to the north of the state. Further beyond that, in rural areas, much larger tent compounds with full-service facilities (security fences, stadium lighting, additional mobile sheds for storage, water tanks, stock yards and semi-trailers for transporting the dwellings, and so on) can be seen. These are used as second, seasonal homes for affluent Bedouin citizens, who still keep animals (goats, sheep and camels), that graze on the steppe under the care of shepherds.

**Image 46 A large, ceremonial tent in al Jahra.**
The tent in Image 44 is a tribal tent, located on a small, empty block on the side of a road in Al Jahra. These tents are used for large, public celebrations such as elections or marriage parties for affluent, local people who are expected to provide a venue for well-wishers to attend them.

**Image H47 The interior of a small, family tent.**
This tent features the requisite Kuwaiti coffee, tea, shisha and internet facilities.

**Image 48 The interior of a larger, communal tent.**
The interior of a larger tent, with a large television, used for communal gathering. As the original form of *diwanniya*, these spaces are used often, but not always, as social spaces for men. Bedouin families share these facilities communally and therefore, many (but not all) of the Bedouin have access to them just as citizens do, as they comprise the same families.
Appendix I
Documents Supplementary to the Methodology and Analysis

Appendix I includes the following parts:

i. Development of the research questions
ii. Main and supplementary interview questions
iii. Interview data sheet
iv. Ethical review letters
v. Techniques used to enhance validity and reliability
vi. Audit trail document
vii. Transcription and data management protocol
viii. Codebook
ix. Codebook analysis chart
x. Excerpt from a transcript
xi. Data extraction summary sample
xii. Excerpt from participant observation notes
### Development of the Research Questions

#### Table I

**Minor Changes Made to the Research Questions in this Study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal stage August 2013</th>
<th>Changes in the field February-April 2014</th>
<th>Changes during data analysis August 2014</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the extent of personal participation of the Bedoun <em>Jinsiya</em> in higher education?</td>
<td>1. What is the extent of personal participation of the stateless Kuwaitis in higher education and in society in general?</td>
<td>1. What are key aspects of the personal and cultural identity of the Bedoun?</td>
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<td>2. What factors – positive and negative - impact on personal participation of the Bedoun <em>Jinsiya</em> in higher education?</td>
<td>2. What factors – positive and negative - impact on personal participation of stateless Kuwaitis in higher education and in society in general?</td>
<td>2. What are some of the key experiences that have helped to form the development of identity of the Bedoun?</td>
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<td>3. How has participation in higher education influenced student’s formation of personal identity and culture as part of the Bedoun <em>Jinsiya</em>?</td>
<td>3. How has participation in higher education influenced student’s formation of personal identity and culture as part of stateless Kuwaitis? What other factors influence the formation of their identity e.g. family, employment, relationships with citizens?</td>
<td>3. What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society? What are the challenges for those who are excluded?</td>
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<td>4. What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of the Bedoun <em>Jinsiya</em> in higher education?</td>
<td>4. What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of stateless Kuwaitis in higher education, in primary and secondary school?</td>
<td>4. What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of the stateless in post-secondary education? What are the challenges for those who are excluded?</td>
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<td>5. What are the thoughts and feelings of Bedoun <em>Jinsiya</em> students in higher education in relation to achievements, difficulties, their rights, obligations and duties as members of their families, the stateless community and as members of the student community alongside Kuwaiti citizens and other non-nationals?</td>
<td>5. What are the thoughts and feelings of stateless Kuwaitis students in higher education in relation to achievements, difficulties, their rights, obligations and duties as members of their families, the stateless community and as members of the student community alongside Kuwaiti citizens and other non-nationals?</td>
<td>5. What are the thoughts and feelings of the Bedoun in relation to achievements, difficulties, their rights, obligations and duties as members of their families, the stateless community and as members of the student community alongside Kuwaiti citizens and other non-nationals?</td>
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Appendix I, ii

**Main and Supplementary Interview Questions**

The main interview questions in this study are listed in bold. Supplementary questions are listed underneath them, which provided guidance to topic areas as required. Not all of the questions were posed in the course of interviews as the interviews were loosely structured.

1. **What is the extent of personal participation of the Bedoun in higher education?**
   (Such as full/part time, subject load, attendance at lectures/non-compulsory activities)
   1.1 What is the nature of the participation of students in the higher institution they attend?
   E.g. full time, part time, pay fees, scholarship
   1.2 What courses and qualifications are they studying?
   1.3 How much of the course have they completed?
   1.4 What subjects have been passed or failed?

2. **What other factors – positive and negative - impact on personal participation of the Bedoun in higher education?**
   2.1 How did students gain admission to the institution where they are studying?
   2.2 What challenges were faced gaining entry to the institution?
   2.3 What challenges have been faced since commencing studies?
   2.4 What factors helped them gain entry to university?
   2.5 What factors have helped them since commencing studies?

3. **How has participation in higher education influenced student’s formation of personal identity and culture as part of the Bedoun?**
   3.1 Do Bedoun students see themselves as having an identity and culture that is specific to the Bedoun group and separate to Kuwaiti citizens?
   3.2 How are Bedoun students regarded by other students, such as Kuwaitis and other non-nationals, in the institution?
   3.3 How to Bedoun students regard other students, such as Kuwaitis and other non-nationals, in the institution?
   3.4 Have Bedoun students’ sense of identity and culture been strengthened or weakened as a result of higher education studies?
   3.5 Do Bedoun students find their patterns of thinking, feeling and living changed in any way since they began their higher education studies?

4. **What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of the Bedoun in higher education?**
   4.1 Do students believe their higher education will lead them to better job prospects, better salary?
4.2 Do students believe their higher education has led them to having a different outlook, a different role in the Bedoun or Kuwaiti community, becoming a role model/leader for others?

4.3 Do students find their family or friends have treated them differently since commencing studies? How/why?

4.4 Do students find they think of feel differently about their personal status and their community status since commencing studies? Or, do they believe the completion of studies will change their personal status in the community? How?

4.5 What challenges do students believe they have been subject to because they are Bedoun? I.e. challenges that citizen/non-national students would not experience.

4.6 Is participating in higher education worth the effort personally, and in terms of the increasing the education of the community? Why/why not?

5. What are the thoughts and feelings of Bedoun students in relation to achievements, difficulties, their rights, obligations and duties as members of their families, the Bedoun community and as members of the student community alongside Kuwaiti citizens and other non-nationals?

5.1 What has been the greatest achievement of academic studies? How did it make them feel?

5.2 What has been the biggest challenge of academic studies? How was it overcome?

5.3 To what extent are Bedoun students conscious that only a minority in their generation is achieving access to higher education that others missed out on since the 1980s? What advice would they give to members of the Bedoun community who are not students, based on their experience in higher education?

5.4 How important is the right to higher education to them? Compared to other rights?

5.5 Have Bedoun student’s obligations and duties as members of their family, the Bedoun community and the larger community in Kuwait changed since they commenced studies?
### Table I2

**Table of Interview Data: the Date, Location, Interview Number and Language/s Used in Interviews**

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<td>1 of 2</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.04.14</td>
<td>P08</td>
<td>Ahmadi</td>
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<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>P16, P17</td>
<td>Al Rai</td>
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<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>21.07.15</td>
<td>P09</td>
<td>Skype (Taima)</td>
<td>3 of 3</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
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<td>21.07.15</td>
<td>P14</td>
<td>Skype (Taima)</td>
<td>2 of 2</td>
<td>Arabic/English Translator: T3</td>
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<td>03.08.15</td>
<td>P18</td>
<td>Skype (Ahmadi)</td>
<td>1 of 2</td>
<td>English</td>
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<td>05.08.15</td>
<td>P18</td>
<td>Skype (Ahmadi)</td>
<td>2 of 2</td>
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<td>26.12.15</td>
<td>P19</td>
<td>Skype (London)</td>
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<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>29.02.16</td>
<td>P20</td>
<td>Skype (Ahmadi)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I, iv
Ethnical Review Letters

Ethical Review Letter, December 10, 2013

10 December 2013

Dr M Secombe
School of Education

Dear Dr Secombe

PROJECT NO: H-2013-087
Participation of the Stateless (Bidoon Jinsiya) in Higher Education in Kuwait

I write to advise you that the Human Research Ethics Committee has approved the above project. Please refer to the enclosed endorsement sheet for further details and conditions that may be applicable to this approval. Ethics approval is granted for a period of three years subject to satisfactory annual progress reporting. Ethics approval may be extended subject to submission of a satisfactory ethics renewal report prior to expiry.

The ethics expiry date for this project is: 31 December 2016

Where possible, participants taking part in the study should be given a copy of the Information Sheet and the signed Consent Form to retain.

Please note that any changes to the project which might affect its continued ethical acceptability will invalidate the project’s approval. In such cases an amended protocol must be submitted to the Committee for further approval. It is a condition of approval that you immediately report anything which might warrant review of ethical approval including (a) serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants; (b) proposed changes in the protocol; and (c) unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project. It is also a condition of approval that you inform the Committee, giving reasons, if the project is discontinued before the expected date of completion.

A reporting form for the annual progress report, project completion and ethics renewal report is available from the website at http://www.adelaide.edu.au/ethics/human/guidelines/reporting/

Yours sincerely

Dr John Semmler
Convener
Human Research Ethics Committee
10 February 2014

Dr M Seacombe
Education

Dear Dr Seacombe

PROJECT NO: H-2013-087
Participation of the Stateless (Bidoun Jinsiya) in Higher Education in Kuwait

Thank you for the revised ethics application dated 20.1.14 and 29.1.14 requesting amendment to the above project. I write to advise you that on behalf of the Human Research Ethics Committee I have approved the request to expand the participants and study methods as described in the submitted documents. Thank you for the response dated 10.2.14 to the matters raised regarding the revised protocol.

The ethical endorsement for the project applies for the period until: 31 December 2016

Where possible, participants taking part in the study should be given a copy of the Information Sheet and the signed Consent Form to retain.

Please note that any changes to the project which might affect its continued ethical acceptability will invalidate the project’s approval. In such cases an amended protocol must be submitted to the Committee for further approval. It is a condition of approval that you immediately report anything which might warrant review of ethical approval including (a) serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants (b) proposed changes in the protocol; and (c) unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project. It is also a condition of approval that you inform the Committee, giving reasons, if the project is discontinued before the expected date of completion.

A reporting form is available from the Committee's website. This may be used to renew ethical approval or report on project status including completion.

Yours sincerely

Dr John Semmler
Convenor
Human Research Ethics Committee
5 March 2015

Dr M Seacombe
Education

Dear Dr Seacombe

PROJECT NO:  H-2013-087
Participation of the Stateless (Bidoun Jinsiya) in Higher Education in Kuwait

Thank you for the revised ethics application dated 3.3.15 requesting amendment to the above project. I write to advise you that on behalf of the Human Research Ethics Committee I have approved the request to include five additional participants for interview as described in the submitted documents.

The ethical endorsement for the project applies for the period until: 31 December 2016

Where possible, participants taking part in the study should be given a copy of the Information Sheet and the signed Consent Form to retain.

Please note that any changes to the project which might affect its continued ethical acceptability will invalidate the project’s approval. In such cases an amended protocol must be submitted to the Committee for further approval. It is a condition of approval that you immediately report anything which might warrant review of ethical approval including (a) serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants; (b) proposed changes in the protocol; and (c) unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project. It is also a condition of approval that you inform the Committee, giving reasons, if the project is discontinued before the expected date of completion.

A reporting form is available from the Committee’s website. This may be used to renew ethical approval or report on project status including completion.

Yours sincerely

P.D. Professor P Delfabbro
Acting Convenor
Human Research Ethics Committee
Table I3 lists techniques used in this study to enhance validity, reliability and the interpretation of data were suggested by Guest et al (2001, p.99-101). The examples describe the ways I incorporated the techniques into this study.

Table I3

**Techniques Used to Enhance Validity and Reliability of the Data Analysis and Interpretive Processes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technique</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of multiple methods and/or data sources</td>
<td>Methods included interviews, participant observation (see analysis of this data in Appendix A), research of documents and secondary literature sources (Appendix B-G), photography (Appendix H).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusting the structure of instruments to fit the goals and structure of the study</td>
<td>Loosely structured interviews, participant observation and a range of possible questions were used to explore a range of topics and to adjust the focus of interviews; see the excerpt from a transcript, Appendix I, part xi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring data for theme development as they emerged</td>
<td>This was reflected in the development of the research questions and the code book in Appendix I, i and part h).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliciting feedback from the participants after summarizing the interview</td>
<td>The researcher stayed in touch with participants to ensure that they were able to feedback any issues or concerns. Development of the research was member-checked a number of times (see Chapter 4, Methodology) for discussion of the research collaborative approach used with some participants).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcribing data using a transcription protocol</td>
<td>See Transcription protocol and data management protocol based on Guest et al (2012); see Appendix I, vii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish translation expectations established at the beginning</td>
<td>I discussed expectations prior to interview. Three translators were used. I discussed translation in Chapter 4 (Methodology) and the transcription and data management protocol (Appendix I, vii).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and use a precise code book</td>
<td>See the audit trail and code book analysis chart (Appendix I, vi and part i).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External or peer review of coding and summaries</td>
<td>My Principal Supervisor checked my code book and data analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Create an audit trail

See the audit trail in Appendix I, vi.

Triangulate data sources

Methodological triangulation was not a main priority in the methodology, but it emerged naturally over the course of the study. This was because a lack of previous consolidation, analysis and evaluation of data about the Bedoun across every thinly spread sources led me to use multiple sources of information checks. For example, literature sources were spread across a variety of disciplines and fields (for example, anthropology, political science, sociology, international law, medical research, newspaper articles, activist and academic blogs (e.g. the MER and Jadaliyya blogs in Middle East Studies), grey literature reports (of international humanitarian agencies) which I cross-checked with some participants, seeking explanations for information gaps, inconsistencies, or to extend knowledge further. The analysis of documentary and secondary sources is in Appendices B-G. This provided a systematic base of information that had not yet been consolidated in any publication, which helped me to illustrate convergence of data with interview themes and quotations, and participant observation notes included in the thematic analysis.

Negative case analysis

Negative cases helped to inform the change in focus of the research questions, and enhanced specific areas of data such as the processes by which the Bedoun interviewees’ families were left perpetually stateless, the manipulation of the Bedouin population via the implementation/failure to implement government policy, identification typing, and those who experienced bans on education. * See example below.

Support themes and interpretation with interview quotes (for interview-based research)

Quotations were integrated throughout the Discussion. There was a generous use of quotes, which is characteristic of studies that have employed the humanistic coefficient in sociology (Chapter 4, Methodology). I attempted to show explicit links between themes and their interpretation, in the thematic analysis in Appendix A:

- Thematic analysis summaries (Appendix A, i).
- A full list of themes and participant numbers (Appendix, ii).
- Quotations and/or participant observation notes linked to each theme (transcript evidence) (Appendix A, iii).
- A visual organiser showing the met-themes and all other themes arising from them (Appendix A, iv).

and by providing the following supporting documents, as recommended by Guest et al., (2012), in various parts
of Appendix I:

- Code book (Appendix I, ix)
- Code book analysis chart (Appendix I, x)
- Sample transcript excerpt (Appendix I, xi)
- Sample data extraction summary (Appendix I, xii)
- Excerpt from participant observation notes (Appendix I, xiii)
The following Audit Trail topics are based on Guest et al (2012, p 93-94).

**Individuals Involved with Specific Data Points and Analytic Activities**

The Researcher completed all steps of the analysis independently except for translation. The steps included interviewing, making participant observations, transcribing, coding and analysing the data. For translation, see Methodology (Chapter 3) and the Transcription Protocol (Appendix I, part vii).

**Data Included/Not Included in Analysis**

The interview data was considered the primary data for the project. The interview data was subject to the systematic thematic analysis. Information on what was included and not included from the interview transcripts is in the Transcription Protocol.

**Rationale Behind the Decision of What/What Not to Include**

Regarding the interview transcripts, see Transcription Protocol (Appendix I, part vi). Participant observation data and photographic data systematically because the methods to collect that data were considered supplementary. The data from these methods were incorporated during the write-up of the Discussion and referenced accordingly.

**Units of Analysis**

**Methods used to find themes and apply codes.**

Themes were discovered and codes applied through the interview data. Themes emerged from the first interview. The researcher commenced listing themes accordingly. Codes were not assigned to the data immediately, but made a separate code list was made. This was due to the nature of the fieldwork process, where there was not enough time to transcribe after each interview. Codes were added to the list up until the last interview and during the analysis phase.

The data was more abundant that what had been expected, even up until half way during the fieldwork. Some themes were not only noteworthy but also novel or reflective of negative cases (Guest et al, 2012, 68). There was also a possibility that some codes might be dropped as issues were clarified and misconceptions corrected, or new information was discovered through the transcription process.

Researcher notes were made during transcription process in the interview texts to explain the application of codes and to reference important points with similar or different data from other participants. This helped in the identification of negative cases and significant quotes. See examples in the Transcription Protocol.
Transcription was performed manually to ensure that the meaning of the text was preserved as much as possible by the researcher. The decision not to apply software analysis tools was made tentatively before the fieldwork, and confirmed after data was collected.

The basic typology and emergent codes were applied again to all text, to extract all relevant data systematically. The sources of the typology are discussed in the Methodology under Research Design (Figure 1) and the code book (Appendix I, ix).

During the transcription phase, I decided not to analyse the data according to the research questions, but to analyse all the data according to the code book developed. This would ensure all relevant data recorded in the loosely structured interviews would be captured and not only direct responses to particular questions. This decision stemmed from the decision to try to establish a basic sociological typology if the data was sufficient, to fill existing gaps in the field.

A ‘3 x pass’ method was used for transcript coding (see Guest et al., 2012 and the Transcription Protocol). It was decided that it was better to leave intact some larger interview quotes assigned to multiple codes rather than trying to reduce them by splitting up the chunks of data, so that the context of all data assigned to particular major codes could be read and interpreted together (i.e. so as not to reduce the meaning of passages).

**Changes made to the code book.**

The code book emerged during the fieldwork. When I returned from the fieldwork, I had noted nineteen basic codes. One major code, *Code 19 Educational Experience*, and additional sub-codes emerged during the transcription process. A total of 20 major codes emerged. Different numbers of sub-codes were generated during the analysis according to the nature and richness of the data around each major code. These are shown in the Code book analysis chart (Appendix I, x).

**Reasons for the changes to the code book.**

The only change worthy of note that occurred was during the transcription and coding phase, was the separation of a separate, major code for educational experience. In the field, I had tentatively assigned certain issues under existing codes until I established if they would warrant another key code as below. This related to the development of educational experience as a code (Code 18).

Complex issues related to primary and secondary school experience emerged unexpectedly. Initially I allocated this as a sub-code of higher education experience. Over time, I found that as data expanded the whole area of educational experience needed to be separated from all levels of education (primary, secondary and tertiary) and treated as a major code. Because the experiences were so important to the research, it was better to group this body of experience separate to other educational matters rather than to split and group it according to educational level. I recoded the completed transcripts accordingly.
Data Reduction and Organisation Techniques

The data were reduced and/or organised in the following ways:

- A brief summary of participants’ demographic data was extracted and used to create a ‘basic profiles’ sheet. This helped me keep a snapshot of the basic characteristics of each participant and to help collate summary data tables for the basic sociological types, such as gender, age, marital status, parents, siblings, children and so on.

- Key quotes from each transcript were highlighted in red to make their identification easier on sorting the data according to codes. According to Guest et al (2012) ‘Quotes lay bare the emergent themes for all to see. They are the foundation upon which good qualitative data analysis is based’ (p.95).

- Data was copied onto separate documents, collated under each major code. This data was *not* reduced, as I did not want to remove any contextual relevance including the researcher notes added during the transcription phase, but the quotes remained highlighted.

- Different organisational levels of the data emerged in the codes. Some concepts split off from both the basic types and types specific to the local population. First, I noted the issues specific to the interviewer related to the interview questions. This involved locally specific concepts such as identity type, concealment of identity, separation, discrimination, monitoring, travel restrictions, desire for escape by migration, bans on education, difficulty paying for education. Second, I created the basic typology, leaving out irrelevant sub-types and including the locally relevant ones I had collated and began to apply it.

- Over time, I added new codes as the data expanded and I gained new insights. The basic sociological types allowed me to focus on and extract other relevant but not necessarily novel information from the data. This information increased in importance over time as participant numbers grew because no basic typology had ever been published on stateless Kuwaitis, and it helped to contain the exploration process (see Chapter 4, the Methodology).

- This led to the realisation that the research questions would need to be refocused for the thesis. Some questions had become more important, rendering others less important. This was documented in Development of the Research Questions (Appendix I, i). Because the interviews were loosely structured and the approach exploratory, it was to be expected that the data would not conform strictly to the research questions. There was plenty of data from the field because the data had been collated from ‘street-level’, which gave scope for different levels of abstraction to be applied (Guest et al, 2012). I commenced analysing and writing up the data.
systematically according to the code book, starting with descriptions of the basic demographic data shown in Chapter 5, the Results, followed by more abstract themes about identity, culture and marginalisation).

- Although I have described a top-down arrangement of themes above in the presentation of my analysis (Appendices A-G), the inductive nature of the analysis was maintained throughout the study. This means that each portion of data from respondents was analysed from the ground-up at the level of sub-themes, by grouping the quotes derived from the minor codes across interviews 1-17, together. Themes were constructed from the data sequentially via the coding process and then in a back and forth motion across the data as commonalities and differences were analysed. Where noticeable gaps in the data appeared (usually because I did not ask questions that would elicit such information in the interviews) and I observed different characteristics during the fieldwork or relevant literature filled such gaps, I explained this in the analysis and/or discussion sections.

- Some topics seemed to work better together than apart. For example, I joined Code 1 Geographical data and Code 7 Housing Data together during the write-up phase to form a chapter on Geographical and Housing Data, which due to word count limitations, was not included in the discussion section. Code 4 Family and Code 5 Parental data overlapped and formed another chapter that extended beyond the scope of the present study, but some of the parental data concerning fathers’ employment and data on gender roles, was included in the Results (Chapter 5) and Discussion (Chapters 6 and 7). After analysing the data on identity, I noticed that the participant’s viewpoints were highly informed and were supported by some historians of the Arabian Gulf. This prompted me to begin systematically gathering secondary data that I consolidated for thematic analysis, comprising Appendixes B-G.
Appendix I, vii

Transcription and Data Management Protocol

Note that the protocol provided by Guest, et al., (2012) was written in the future tense. I have written the text in the past tense, to reflect what I have done.

General Instructions

I transcribed all interview audio files according to the following format:

1. Times 11 point font
2. Standard page margins
3. All text was fully blocked with no indentation, beginning on the left hand margin, justified to the left.

Source Labelling

The source ID for the interviewees was indicated by a P and two digits. Single digits were preceded by a zero, for example: 01. For example, the first participant interviewed was P01. The source IDs were allocated chronologically according to date of interview. Some interviewees were interviewed on more than one occasion, due to the in-depth nature of discussion. Interview numbers were indicated by a slash and a single digit number, for example: P01/1 referred to the first interview of participant one.

The source ID for the interviewer was SK. The source ID represented the conversational style of the interviews, comprising interviewer and participant talk. Not all of the interviewer talk comprised questions, while not all of the interviewee talk comprised answers, strictly speaking.

The source ID for the translators was a T and two digits. Single digits were preceded by a zero, for example: 01. For example, the first translator was recorded as T01.

Labelling for Individual Interview Transcripts

1. Participant number, see source labelling above
2. Date
3. Interview number
4. Site/Location
5. Number of audio files

I inserted three blank lines between the labelling information and the interview text. The source labelling preceded my questions and the interviewee’s responses (see above). The interview conversation was typed in standard text. The interviewer’s notes were italicised and preceded by the term ‘Interviewer Note.’

I kept a separate data-recording sheet with the participant’s basic demographics, called the Interview Data, to identify the participants and the dates of interviews. This was required to prevent data errors. The data sheet can be found in Appendix I, iii), with identifying information removed to protect the confidentiality of the research participants.
File changes

I indicated changes in audio files in uppercase letters.

Time Labelling

I indicated periods of time rounded to ten minutes or to indicate significant quotes, for example 5:00.

End of Interview

I indicated the end of the interview in uppercase letters, as: END OF INTERVIEW.

Interpreters and Interview Data Translation

Arabic interview data was translated into English during the interview. The process of translation was one where trusting was required. I did not have access to resources at the University of Adelaide to have interviews in translated into English. However, I also preferred to trust the translation of Kuwaiti Arabic (and Bedouin, tribal dialects) to the local translators, which I would transcribe directly in English, rather than to ‘objective,’ third-party translators from other cultural backgrounds who had no familiarity with the Bedouin’s context. There was the possibility that cultural biases toward the Bedouin might influence the interpretation of the oral texts (as I have mentioned in the discussion of this thesis, this seems to be a cultural issue among some metropolitan Arabs).

I was required to trust that the interpreters and interviewee were translating with integrity. I did not question this process, as the whole interview was based on the presumption of trust between the parties concerned. I observed it is common for social science researchers who are fluent in English and Arabic, to translate their own Arabic interview data into English, as if such translation enhances the authority of their claims. This does not make the integrity of the data translated into English greater, because the process is no more transparent. I have never seen an example excerpt of transcript data or translation of transcripts for research in the social sciences related to any literature I have cited in this research. I have read countless research publications and theses in English, relying on the researcher translating from Arabic personally, and no translation or interview transcription data has been disclosed, and this appears to be the gold standard in the field. Certainly the ability of researchers to use both Arabic and English languages has done little to contribute to the growth of knowledge about the Bedouin, and almost all the literature sources I have drawn upon to consolidate basic facts about the Bedoun in Appendices B-G were from English language sources.

Protection of Sensitive Data

Square parentheses were used with three full stops to indicate data not transcribed due to sensitivity. This was used for longer parts of text such as a sentence or more. For example: [...].
The text was blacked out to indicate sensitive data transcribed because the research might need to access it later, after the audio recordings were destroyed. This was used for shorter parts of text, such as a word or a few words omitted due to sensitivity. For example:

Deletion of Irrelevant Data

Square parentheses were used with three full stops to indicate data not transcribed due to irrelevance. This method was chosen to coincide with the method for protecting sensitive data, so that it would be more difficult for sensitive data to be identified prior to the audio files being destroyed.

Content

Audio files were transcribed verbatim (word for word), exactly as said, without additional nonverbal or background sounds. If words were mispronounced, the words were transcribed as the individual said them. If any incorrect or unexpected pronunciation results in difficulties in comprehension of the text, the correct word will be typed in square brackets. If explanations of the text are required, such as implicit meanings that may be difficult for readers to interpret, an explicit meaning was provided within the quote in square parenthesis. Filter words were transcribed if they are contained within relevant text and were meaningful. Word or phrase repetitions were transcribed.

Inaudible Information

Pauses were marked by three full stops. I identified portions of the tape that are inaudible or difficult to decipher, by noting the occurrence in square brackets. Where there was a long period of silence, the researcher identified the pause and noted the time on the audiotape in square brackets.

Queried Text

I noted text to be queried text for reasons of questionability/authenticity/veracity. A question mark in bold was inserted before the statement. Interviewer notes were made in italics, as discussed above.

Reviewing for Accuracy

I proofread all the transcripts against the audio tape and revised as necessary. The researcher adopted a ‘three pass per tape’ policy to ensure the full audio file was been listened to three times before submission, but some parts of the text were listened to more often.

File Labelling

The Files are kept under files named ‘audio files’ and ‘transcripts’ and numbered according to the source identifier with the date the recording took place, for example: P01_04Mar2014. Participant observations were entitled with a descriptive title and date.
Photographs were labelled by number. A photograph index listed each set of pictures with a descriptive title and date. They key file types and their extensions include:

- Audio files: m4a extension.
- Transcripts: .docx extension.
- Participant observation notes: a.docx extension.
- Photographs: .jpeg extension

**Backup Files**

All files containing field data accept the audio files were backed up on a duplicate file in the digital repository.

**Storage of Data**

A digital repository at the University of South Australia was arranged for final deposit of data after thesis examination. The University of Adelaide School of Education only provides hard-copy storage of data. The university of Adelaide library does not provide any facility to hold student data on their digital research database.

**Audio Files**

The audio files needed to be destroyed due to the risk they could be used to identify the research participants. A specific timeframe for this aspect of data management was not discussed in *Management of Research Data, University of Adelaide Student Research Handbook*, leaving the matter up to the researcher and supervisors. Audiotapes were be destroyed after review for accuracy and the transcription files are saved and backed up, according to the protocol in McClellan et al., (2003), also recommended by Guest et al. (2012).

**Ethical Considerations**

*Regarding sensitivity of information and confidentiality of research participants*

First, issues discussed in the application for ethical clearance highlighted the vulnerability of the research participants:

- Confidentiality of research participants was absolutely essential, aside from the community leader who is a public figure
- Participants had no or limited legal rights as stateless persons
- Participants may be subject to targeting and blacklisting by government
- Participants providing sensitive information that may include human rights violations

The University requirement to keep sufficient data for thesis examination and defence and to consider the lasting value of the data to the field:

The central aim is that sufficient materials and data are retained to justify the outcomes of the research and to defend them if they are challenged. The potential
value of the material for further research should also be considered, particularly where the research would be difficult or impossible to repeat. (Management of Research Data, Research Student Handbook, The University of Adelaide, para. 3)

The ethics committee provided permission to record consent for interview on the audio files, but urged written consent to be kept - where possible. This was not possible, as it was a security issue to do so, which I discussed in the application. The extensive transcript data was supplied in Appendix A, iii) in order to provide benefit to the field. All full transcripts were deposited in the electronic storage repository.
Appendix I, ix

Codebook

Figures I4 to I8 below, display the major and minor codes developed in the code book during the fieldwork interviews and analysis. These codes were applied to the interview transcripts during the thematic analysis. Themes abstracted from the analysis and quotations and/or a limited number of observational notes, were collated. All of the themes and quotes can be found in the Appendices, Part 1.

Major Codes in the Code Book

Table 14 (below) lists the major codes were included under the topics of demographic data, identity and socialization, education and others.

Table I4

Major Codes of the Code Book

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Demographic data</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Geographical data</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Personal Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Family and Household</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Parental background</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Health</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Housing</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Economic data</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Access to public services</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Social Stratification</td>
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<table>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Access to (and bans on) education</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Experiences and values in education</td>
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**Major and Minor Codes in the Code Book**

Table I5 (below) lists the codes organised under the sub-head of demographic data, including geographic data, personal status, employment, Family and household relationships and factors, parental data, health, housing, economic factors, access to public services, social stratification and segregation.

Table I5

*Minor Codes Linked to Demographic Data*

<table>
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<th>1 Geographic data</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0 Place of birth (native/foreign)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1 Parents place of birth</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2 Type and size of community of upbringing (rural, small town, city, metropolis)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3 Type and size of community in which the respondent lives</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.4 Geographical region of the community in Kuwait city</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.4.1 Al Jahra – Taima, Sulabiya and the Shia area, or Farwaniya, closer in</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>2 Personal status</th>
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<tr>
<td>2.1 Sex</td>
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<td>2.2 Date of Birth, age</td>
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<td>2.3 Ethnic background</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.4 Tribal Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Bedoun status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Citizen status - Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Citizen/migration status – post migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.8 Religious sect</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.9 Security Offence or black listed respondent</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 Employment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 Occupational rank (upper, middle, lower, professional, technical, labouring status)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2 Work situation (salaried, self-employed)</td>
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<td>3.3 Institutional realm</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.4 Previous employment – type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1 Impact of Bedoun status (education ban, poverty, being Bedoun) on employment (including others in family) i.e. unemployed or unable to maintain work</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.4.2 Discrimination in the work place for being Bedoun</td>
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<td>3.4.3 Loss of employment/employment opportunity due to same</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.5 Salary and wage disparity with citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.6 Number of people working in the household</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.7 Spousal or sibling, other family employment (current)/unemployment</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.8 Previous employment – experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.9 Employment prospects, positioning and future</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.10 Job title</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.11 Job role and/or function/conditions</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.12 Voluntary, adjunct and/or community service</td>
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</table>
4 Family and household relationships and factors

4.1 Respondent marital status
4.1.2 Married
4.1.2 Widowed
4.1.3 Divorced
4.1.4 Single
4.2 Issues in marriage, sustaining a family (re: statelessness, consanguineous, genetic disease, divorce)
4.2.1 The decision of a partner, marriage proposal, dhoury, negotiations (including parents pressuring for an arranged marriage)
4.3 Mixed Bedoun/Citizen household and/or extended family
4.4 Relationship patterns - contemporary, traditional (Bedounin)
4.5 Gender issues in relationships
4.6 Children
4.7 Live at home with parents
4.8 Live in new home apart from parents
4.9 Relationship issues parents – good/bad/support/discord
4.10 Siblings/their children - relationships, experiences (note, respondent’s siblings under 5, below)

5 Parental data

5.1 Marital status
5.1.1 Married
5.1.2 Widowed
5.1.3 Divorced
5.1.4 Number of wives in household – father’s
5.1.5 Number of children (respondent’s brothers and sisters)
5.1 Parent’s education
5.2 Parent’s occupation
5.3 Military service and termination of service
5.4 Parent’s status Bedoun/citizen
5.5 Grandparents
5.6 Male relatives and martyrdom
(Note that is an error in numbering above; at 5.1 above, there is a repeated code. I discovered this in the last interview, and made manual amendments)

6 Health

6.1 Health characteristics of the Kuwaiti population
6.1.1 Lifestyle disease affecting Bedoun
6.1.2 Genetic disorders susceptibility
6.2 Physical health of respondents
6.2.1 Physical health of respondents family or others
6.3 Mental health of respondents (including negative e.g. depression, immobility, but also positive factors of resilience and determination)
6.3.1 Mental health of respondents family or others
6.4 The restriction of health services to the Bedoun and its impacts
6.5 Discrimination regarding delivery of health services to the Bedoun
7 Housing

7.1 Ownership/rental/Rent (Bedoun are prohibited from ownership)
7.2 Type of housing
7.3 Number of family clusters/generations living in the household
7.4 The primary family group,
7.5 The extended family - wives and offspring
7.6 Size of housing - factors influencing crowding
7.7 Interrupted housing – factors influencing frequent movement, instability

8 General economic factors

8.1 Residence (owns, rents, boards)
8.2 Consumer goods (auto, TV, car)
8.2.1 Own business
8.3 Pre-Post war economic situation
8.4 Economic positioning within the Bedoun society
8.5 Economic positioning within Kuwaiti society
8.6 Roles of economic provider of self, immediate and extended family (e.g. including citizen partner)
8.7 Salary
8.8 Card-related factors – frequent registration, bank accounts, time off work etc. reducing ability to sustain
(For economic factors related to acquiring a spouse, see 4.2.1)

9 Access to public services

9.1 Citizen wife social benefits and payments
9.2 Citizen wife education benefits and payments
9.3 Military social benefits and payments
9.4 Others – e.g. lack of? No security card, Bedoun-Bedoun husband/wife
9.5 The ‘education allowance’ (partial government subsidy for private fees)
9.6 Green card reimbursement of fees
9.7 The Education Fund
(See employment and wage disparity for rental subsidy, education)

10 Social stratification – segregation

10.1 Stratification within Kuwaiti society
10.2 Stratification within Bedoun society
10.3 Stratification based on eligibility for citizenship - identity cards
10.4 Stratification based on religious background Sunni and Shia
10.5 Stratification based on having a citizen mother
10.6 The potential for mothers to transfer citizenship
10.7 Citizen men/women partners of Bedoun or vice versa
(Stratification within Bedouin society – intermarriage in families/tribes – see families and household)

Table 16 (below) lists the codes linked to identity and socialization including freedom of movement, social deviance, identity and social action.
Table I6

Minor Codes Linked to Identity and Socialisation

11 Freedom of Movement

11.1 Freedom of travel for leisure, education and health related issues
11.2 Domestic travel and the policed state
11.3 Access to the Article 17 travel document
11.4 Factors influencing access/non-access/acceptance of to the a17 travel document

12 Social deviance

12.1 Labelling factors preventing citizenship and social mobility
12.2 Criminality and the situational definition – e.g. criminality due to poverty
12.3 Protest as an offence against public order
12.4 Disenfranchisement and the threat to national security
12.5 Blacklisting/security offence listing to prevent citizenship
12.6 Punitive arbitrary removal of citizenship, and/or threat of
12.7 Other threats/danger to self/family/friends/Bedoun community
12.8 Iraqi collaboration during the war

13 Identity

13.1 Pre-war identity and issues
13.1.1 Citizen registration process, historical within a family
13.1.2 Parent/grandparent identity
13.2 Post-war identity and issues
13.2.1 Bedoun registration process, contemporary – self and others – e.g. administration, documents, birth certificates, marriage, including business registration
13.2.2 Citizen registration
13.2.3 ‘Illegal’ typing through false passports
13.3 Identity cards
13.3.1 The card or Bedoun status as a marker of deviant ‘illegal’ types
13.3.2 The card as a marker of eligibility for citizenship/public services
13.4 Ascribed, achieved, master status. (Ideas, experiences and values on identity not directly linked to the educational context)
13.5 Concealed identity – hiding, not passing (passing, see 13.10)
13.5.1 Factors in concealment – tradition, religion, national security, hatred and blacklisting, prohibition of freedom of thought, speech
13.6 Kuwaiti identity and Bedoun identity
13.6.1 Kuwaiti (citizen & Bedoun) identity and migrant identity
13.7 Tribal identity and tribalism
13.7.1 Northern/southern tribes
13.7.2 Language/dialects spoken
13.8 Ascription of other nationalities by authorities or citizens, Iraqi/Saudi/other
13.9 Arabism, pan-Arabism, Islam and the global Ummah (as inclusive ethnicity and religious values, a home for Arabs in the Gulf states)
13.10 ‘Passing’ citizen
13.11 Religious values and identity - Shia/Sunni sects, atheism, faith, destiny, lack of information etc.
14 Social Action

14.1 Informal and formal activism
14.2 Physical and online activism
14.3 Voluntary associations and political organisation
14.4 Determinants and impacts of activism (e.g. security offence)
14.1.1 Family discord/disapproval/fear due to activism/freedom of expression outside the family i.e. related to social identity
14.5 Activism and everyday social interaction
14.6 Tribal social capital, and ‘tribalism’
14.7 Bedoun identity, Kuwaiti citizen society and the mutual threat/danger to society
14.8 Failure to capitulate on the Arab Spring
14.9 Social mobility - inertia for the Bedoun/citizen partners
14.10 Wasta
14.11 Withdrawal of wasta
14.12 Self-education
14.13 Migrant experience, identity (including potential migration)
14.14 Political issues in activism – e.g. competing groups, false activism

Table 17 (below) lists the codes linked to education, arising from primary and secondary school, higher education, access to higher education, and values and experiences in education.
### 15 Primary & Secondary School

15 Primary and Secondary Education  
15.1 Primary  
15.2 Secondary schooling  
15.3 Years of schooling  
15.4 School types  
15.4.1 Kuwaiti schools for Kuwaitis – citizen and stateless, later citizens and stateless children of Kuwaiti mothers only  
15.4.2 Attendance at both Kuwaiti and private schools  
15.4.3 Private school only  
15.5 Interrupted/stopped schooling  
15.6 Bans on education – re primary/secondary education  
15.7 Parent’s/grandparent’s education  
15.7.1 Illiteracy of parents/previous generations  
15.8 Results, outcomes  
15.9 Enrolment type – hours at school – e.g. morning/afternoon/evening  
15.10 Ownership, management, teaching staff, facilities in the private schools  
15.11 Presence of ‘other Arab’ and Asian population in private schools  
15.12 Affordability of private schools before/after reimbursements came in

### 16 Higher Education

16 Respondents enrolled in higher education (current) – or their siblings, children (R2)  
16.1 Respondent enrolled at university  
16.2 Respondent enrolled at college/vocational and technical education sector  
16.3 Current University enrolment  
16.4 Type of qualification enrolled in (currently)  
16.4.1 College diploma  
16.4.2 Bachelor degree  
16.4.3 Master degree  
16.4.4 PhD  
16.5 Institution enrolled in  
16.6 Past qualifications enrolled in  
16.6.1 Respondent was enrolled at university  
16.6.2 Respondent was enrolled at college/vocational and technical education sector  
16.7 Areas of study  
16.8 Online and distance education  
16.9 Participation in student activities – including allowed/limited  
16.9.1 Student support services  
16.10 Past enrolment - Level achieved  
16.10.1 College diploma  
16.10.2 Bachelor degree  
16.10.3 Master degree  
16.10.4 PhD  
16.11 Enrolment type – hours at school e.g. morning/afternoon/evening  
16.12 Fee-paying, private institution  
16.13 Scholarship
16.14 Mature age entry – anyone
16.15 Enrolment numbers – Bedoun

17 Access to Higher Education

17.1 Bans on education – re higher education (including transition between schools – years lost - except for experiences – see 18 below)
17.1.1 Overseas allowances/restriction on stateless in education (e.g. Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Syria)
17.1.2 Kuwaiti mothers’ children special access [not economic, moved to 9]
17.1.3 Green identity card access through public institutions (this needed to be reflected in social benefits section for fee reimbursement)
17.2 The admissions policy gaps
17.3 Kuwait university system/PUC/PAAET/general higher ed policy, admissions, places, etc.
17.4 Activism in education in Kuwait during the Arab Spring protest period
17.5 The monitoring and suppression of activism in education in Kuwait
17.6 Other barriers accessing Higher Education
17.6.1 Family
17.6.2 Does not wish to leave home country for study
17.6.3 Did not achieve good enough marks
17.6.4 Did not receive an offer
17.6.5 Rejected an offer or discontinued a course
17.6.6 Not able to take up course preference/alternative offer
17.6.7 Private education system & government subsidy access – false economy
17.6.8 Materials, resources, quality and access

18 Experiences and values in education (all levels)

18.1 Human rights in education
18.1.1 Bans on education & school public/private school transition
18.1.2 Experiences of direct physical/emotional abuse in schools or university
18.1.3 Abuse ascribed to forced poverty
18.1.4 Abuse ascribed to religious and tribal background/racism
18.1.5 Abuse ascribed to poor quality/neglect
18.1.6 Other emotional factors/other difficulty due to bans/transition (e.g. emotional impact of themselves or siblings interrupted schooling, positive impact of peer support, motivation) – this may need to be divided into sub-categories later)
18.1.7 Mark fixing – high school, university
18.2 Barriers to participation (while enrolled). Participation barrier due to bans – see bans.
18.3 Other challenges/negative factors in education e.g. illness, isolation
18.3.1 Work/education balance e.g. working and studying, multiple commitments
18.3.2 Negative influences on education – overcrowding at home, lack of support
Table I8 (below) lists the codes related to culture and the research process including the culture of Bedoun and Kuwaiti citizens, Bedouin (including Bedoun) and Hadar, and discrimination arising from cultural differences and three minor Issues related to the research process.
### 19 Bedouin culture, Kuwaiti culture

19.1 Similarities between Kuwaitis – citizens and stateless (social stratification)
19.2 Differences between Kuwaitis – citizens and stateless (e.g. as below for Nomadism, Bedouin, Hadar) (social stratification)
19.3 General discrimination, marginality, repression, poverty and abuse of the stateless (education experience)
19.3.1 Freedom of expression, individual thinking, empowerment as part of the collective (education experience)
19.3.2 Materialism, greed, lack of altruism, other negative characteristics (education, negative experiences)
19.4 The divided Bedouin culture, political tribalism and the Bedoun (social stratification)
19.5 Claims to equality as a human right, human rights abuse *per se* (identity, education experiences)
19.6 Nomadism, segregation, Bedouin culture (social stratification)
19.7 Claims to citizenship: indigeneity and homeland (genealogy, traditional culture)
19.8 Migration, seeking asylum as Bedoun (family, social action, educational experience)
19.9 Generational differences among Bedoun, contemporary (family, identity)
19.10 War Narrative (see also 12.8)

### 20 The research process

20.1 Research process/method/participation
20.2 Potential over-research of community
20.3 Unwilling to participate in the research process due to fear, marginality, blacklisting
Appendix I, x

Codebook Analysis Tables

The following tables show the major and minor codes from the code book (Appendix I, above) generated from the interview transcript data for participants 1-17. Table displays the codes for Participants 1 to 8. Table 110 shows the codes for Participants 9 to 17. This analysis did not include Participants 18 to 20 (see Chapter 4, Methodology).

Analysis of Data from Participants 1-8

Table I9

*Code Types Derived from Analysis of the Interview Data, Participants 1-8*

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<th>Theme</th>
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<th>P02</th>
<th>P03</th>
<th>P04</th>
<th>P05</th>
<th>P06</th>
<th>P07</th>
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| 20. The research process | 20.1 | 20.1 | | 20.1 | 20 |
## Analysis of Data from Participants 9-17

### Table 110

**Code Types Derived from Analysis of the Interview Data, Participants 9-17**

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Appendix I, xi
Sample of interview transcript

[Please note that I have shortened the whole interview by omitting talk from 0:00 to 2:00 and 20:00 to 45:00 minutes for this Appendix. I started the text at 2:00 to begin the transcript with the first questions, after the introductions were completed.]

March 7, 2014
Participant: P03
Interview: 1 of 1
Location: American University of Kuwait, Salmiya, Kuwait

[2:00 minutes]
SK: What was the extent of your education and the subjects you studied?
P03: I finished my high school in Kuwait. Then I did my Bachelors in Bahrain in computer science, and then I immigrated to Canada, and completed my Masters and PhD at

SK: Can I ask your age?
P03: Yeah I was born April 1977. [37 years]
SK: …Did you do all of your primary and secondary schooling in Kuwait?
P03: Yes.
SK: And where abouts did you do that?
P03: Jahra, in Jahra.
SK: Was that in the public or private school system?
P03: No. It was in public only, primary school... High school was in private, because all the stateless people were not allowed to continue in the public [school system] after 1991. So nobody from stateless people from 1992 was allowed to study in public schools, so they did it in private schools.
SK: Ok, so what year were you in at the time of the change-over?
P03: I was in Grade 8.
SK: Grade 8? Ok, so your parents were able to send you to the private school?
P03: No. It was very difficult at the time. Luckily because my father works in the Ministry of Defence, those people in the Ministry would pay for the kids in private schools.

It’s named a private school but actually it was only a kind of business that was created because so many kids were banned from public schools. So many businesses came at the time to take these customers as private schools, but it was not close to any standard to the private schools.
SK: […] Who owned and ran those schools?
P03: I forgot the name of the company, it was a private company.
SK: Of Kuwaitis?
P03: Yes, Kuwaitis.
SK: Did they rank the results of students?
P03: Normally those schools are the lowest ranking schools.
SK: Oh, so they do measure the ranks of those students?
[5:00]
P03: Yeah, compared to, in Jahra I’m talking about, because you imagine, the results are based in Grade12, how many graduate with more than 90% for example. Their quality of teaching - there was a complete absence of science labs or any kind of field trips, for example, it was completely absent, just teaching from there.
SK: So very bare basics?
P03: Yeah.
SK: Not very engaging?
P03: Not at all.

I went to Bahrain in 1996, because Bahrain was the only country at the time, which allowed stateless people to enter without visa.
SK: In the whole Gulf?
P03: Even in the whole world at that time. So it was extremely, terribly difficult, to get a visa to any country at the time, or even to get a passport was very difficult. So it was the only open country. And there, we were not allowed to study medicine or engineering. It was just possible to study literature or science. And that’s why I studied computer science.
SK: So you didn’t have an Article 17 to travel in those days? [the Article 17 is a specific travel document issued to the Bedoun; it is no longer issued].
P03: It was, it was, it was an Article 17, but nobody [not many countries] at that time accepted it. Many countries [now] they give it a visa, but at that time, it was just Bahrain and Egypt. Syria too... Bahrain, Egypt and Syria. In Egypt they have a different style [of education]. I’m talking about the 90s, when I finished my high school.
SK: How did you manage to get into university then, if you were just at a very basic school? Was it just due to your studying?
P03: Yes I was personal effort. It I scored 94.7% in my high school and at the time it was a good grade that would allow a university to be convinced to accept me.
SK: You got very high marks. You must have worked very hard…
P03: Oh, yeah, it was all my life you know, until now… I’m an Assistant Professor. So I have been studying all my life.
[…]
SK: Did you ever have any problems with your studies? […]
P03: No, I never got less than a B, I think once I got a B minus, only one.
SK: [...] How has the education on the Bedoun affected you in Kuwait? We touched on where-about you were able to study, is there anything more you would like to tell me about that.
P03: If you are talking about us as a family, one of the things that touched me the most was in 1992 when we were forced out of public schools. We were ten brothers... 9 brothers at the time who were at the age of going to school, so 6 brothers and 3 sisters, but because we did not have the means of study, only the boys went to school. The girls were forced to skip their school.
SK: The three of them? For the entire period?
P03: So, 2 years after that, when we were eligible to get the scholarship from the Ministry of [blank], two were able to [go to school]...
[10:00]
but my sister that was ah, just younger than me, she was not able to. She was eleven I think. And that was one of the things that touched me the most, that she was never allowed to continue her studies.
SK: And your other two sisters...?
P03: They were 7 and 8. They caught up and they were able to continue to finish their high school... on the scholarship [2 years later]. My sister was elder at the time. It was she who was held up. [that is, she could not catch up to recover her schooling like the younger sisters]

They were able to continue, to go on and continue.
SK: So the scholarship covered how many children? Eight? children at the time?
P03: I forgot the details of that. But it was my sister because she was the elder at that time.
SK: What do you think was the impact of that at the time?
P03: It was terrible, because you see all your brothers go every day to school and she stayed home.
SK: Do you think that led to feeling pressure to marry early?
P03: Possibly.
SK: How is she doing now?
P03: She’s good. Yeah, she is good. At the time it was difficult, but now she went [got] over it.
SK: Can you tell me what positive and negative factors have impacted on your participation in education – the good things and the bad things?
P03: The good thing is that I always felt that I was studying on behalf of thousands of kids who were not allowed to enter into school, so this was one of my main motivations.
That’s why… in my Bachelors I got the Award of Excellence. So at the university, the University of Bahrain, I got the highest GPA at the university of Bahrain. Then I graduated. I was awarded…there was in the Graduation Ceremony but unfortunately, I wasn’t able to go there. Because by the time, the law changed, and the stateless people were not allowed to enter into Bahrain.

Only those who were there, they stayed there until they finished their school, because they cannot go out and come in. And us, who finished just before that and exited, were not allowed to enter inside. So that was one of the things that touched me also because I was the top student, but I was not allowed to attend the ceremony and to get my prize.

Then I continued my masters and my PhD. So at the time, the only exit to Bahrain was closed to, stateless people so no one was able to continue their higher education, so, I felt the responsibility more and more to continue my education and to dedicate it to all of those who were not allowed to… [study] So I continued to excel and in my PhD I got the award of excellence too. My GPA was 4.1 when I graduated in PhD.

SK: Congratulations.
P03: Thank you.

So that was, if we can say, the positive, encouraging part, that continued my high esteem to pursue my education.

SK: And the negative?
P03: Never, I never had… I wasn’t one of those who would be depressed due to life’s circumstances. I would also take it as a force that would push my life forward. So, I don’t recall any negative impact on my education. I always took it as a force that would make me detach from everybody and everything, distractions, and just focus on my studies.

[15:00]

SK: So you were very determined and resilient. You weren’t going to let any negative thing get in the way?
P03: No. I really love and I still love education, that’s why nothing was able to distract me from it.

SK: That’s wonderful to have that motivation.
P03: I was lucky.

SK: Have you found the challenges have become less over time as you continued to do well with your studies and then to become successful in your career? Or do you find that as a Bedouin you still have life challenges relating to the discrimination or limited opportunities to the Bedoun.
P03: I immigrated and I got citizenship in 2007, which means I was 30 years old. So I adapted to the life of and I’ve been living there every since. I just come only once per year to visit my family. So it’s just a lucky time that I was here.
SK: Yeah, I appreciate that.
P03: I was invited to a conference in Jeddah, so I went to the conference and I am just passing by. I’m leaving on Sunday morning.

SK: So can you describe for me that change that you felt of experienced when you gained citizenship?
P03: It’s difficult to express because all your life you have been discriminated [against], without any support at all. Now [that he has citizenship] you feel that you have a country that can stand for you, that can give you some essential services. And also there is a feeling of belonging for the first time ever, that you belong to a country… so that has a remarkable effect, and appreciation to the country itself and trying to contribute toward it.

I volunteer my time there, so I work for free in the university. I graduated one PhD and seven masters, for free. I work as a consultant in a company and there I’m paid, but I continue to do services in education for people because I value what the opportunities that were given to me to continue my education.

[...] SK: A lot of people would just move on… their life journey without looking back…
P03: I feel… it’s hard for me to leave university especially after graduating. And I find the teaching positions a little bit boring. But I want to contribute, so I have my research lab.

SK: How has the participation in higher education helped for your identity, your sense of identity as a person? This is a bit of an abstract question, but please let me know any thoughts and feelings that come to mind.
P03: Especially engaging into research when I started my Master’s degree, it’s like you said - I found that this is me, this is my identity. I’m somebody who loves education and learning, and identifies himself as a life-long learner. I still take Coursera and MOOQ courses all the time [online university course delivery]. I spend most of my midnights and driving time listening to lectures and stuff. So, I feel that this is my… I identify myself with research and learning.

And that was build mostly during my PhD research. Because in my Masters [degree], I did it very quickly – I did seven courses and one master’s thesis in one year. So it went very fast. I couldn’t even get much of it.

[20:00 to 45:00 omitted in this sample for brevity]

[45:00]

They would tell their kids, ‘be like you can make it.’ And that touched me a lot you know, because whatever I succeed in, there are many people who are looking into hope you know, for their kids. Yes, the situation is very difficult, but you can succeed, you can be
who you want, and you can make it. And it had positive effect on many families, many of my friends and of my cousins.

SK: Because there is an example, you are the example?
P03: There is an example, yes, yes… So nobody can constrain you, unless you accept to be constrained. And life can give you chances so work hard now and don’t think about when you finish school that there is no opportunities. Because if you succeed, doors will open to you.

So this is one of the things that also motivated to me to always excel and give these kids an example that they should never surrender to this situation.

[…]

SK: So then I’m interested… I know that you have moved on to Canada to move on professionally. How do you feel about yourself becoming a role model or a leader for others in relation to what you’ve just mentioned?
P03: I continued even in the immigrant community or the Muslim community over there. I continued to take that role, that position because you are aware of people looking up to you. So ah, even my, among the Muslim community I gave chances to many people to, because I work in the industry… take people from the university to give them chances in the industry to try to help them.

And to maintain good character and ethics and moral behaviour, because I am aware of the fact that when I succeed, it’s a responsibility, and many people are looking up to that. Even if they are not stateless any more, because I am dealing with citizens, but because of the accumulation of experiences, so my participation in student activities… I was for whatever lucky reasons I was able to give contributions to the student movement and in my specific University of Concordia, one of the special things about it is that it encourages student movements and activities and associations. So I participated in that and I was successful, perhaps because of my long experiences. And so I was elected as one of the main Board of directors of the student movement… so it continued. And I like it.

It’s not that it’s pressuring me to be a good person, I feel I should be. Because I lived through difficult times,

[50:00]

and I value life. I don’t take it lightly.

SK: And what about in Kuwait? Do you feel like you have the capacity to take on a role like that in Kuwait? Or is it still difficult because of the restrictions for example on public assembly and people’s ability to express themselves in a public fashion.
P03: It is difficult, because when I felt freedom being a Canadian, I can’t go back and be constrained by families or certain discriminatory laws. Or people not acting on whatever
they talk about in the General Assembly (government), all these things. So I cannot accept it any more and I cannot tolerate it any more.

And if I come here, I will be a burden on my family because my family is stateless. And if I take any decision or make any voice because of my lack of tolerance, this will affect their life, you know? Maybe even seriously. So if I come here to be silent, I just have to hide somewhere and not to be, voice my opinion, I cannot do that. Because I felt freedom. So the best way for my family is for me to be away. And that was difficult too for me. I cannot live with them before because I cannot accept the way they are treated. I don’t know how I… I was tolerating it before, but now I can’t. And it’s not fair for them that I can express myself openly and affect them, not me. Because I am a [redacted] citizen, the embassy can defend me. But them, nobody.

[...]
P03: You also mentioned your personal status in the community. Do you find that when you come back to Kuwait… are you able to visit in a low-key way, or feel like there are any demands from other people in the stateless community… are people relying on you for information on how to do similar things for how to do similar things to what you have done in your life?

SK: Yes, if I come here for one or two weeks. And every night The youth come and ask me to talk to them, to motivate them… some of the elders bring their kids… And I make myself available… I give all of my time. I give people appointments… So I try to make myself available myself… That’s why I lose my voice when I come here, because I talk so much.

SK: Did you find participating in higher education worth it personally, in terms of increasing the prospects of your community?

P03: Yeah, yes.

[SK: But this is challenged by the problem of not being able to tolerate living in Kuwait any more.]

[...]

SK: What has been the greatest achievement of your academic studies? Is there one thing that you can pinpoint, or is it a series?

P03: The greatest thing is graduating Masters and PhD students. When I graduate [supervise] them, I take it very seriously. And I teach them that the least important thing is your dissertation or the way it goes.

[55:00]

Higher education is about understanding life. Having a broad view of life. And being able to explore things deeply. And then come up with your own thoughts of how they should be. Ah and hopefully they will be genuine in you.
So understanding that has been my highest achievement I think. And being able to communicate it with people. The accumulation of all my experience has led me to that. It’s not winning all the scholarships of the keynotes I get invited to… it’s the understanding of life and the role of research and how to do research and how to be like a self-trainer to Masters and PhD students, not just like a professor who gives reading materials and discusses results.

SK: What advice would you give to members of your community who are not in higher education… to stateless people and even Kuwaitis… regarding higher education in an increasingly competitive world?

P03: I feel in this day and age we are living in and this specific region we are living in, higher education is essential. People one of the problems in this region is that people are unable to form independent opinions.

That’s why I even support some research centres in Saudia, and try to support ones in Kuwait. Because doing higher education will help people learn how to do their own independent study, literature survey, understand the subject matter deeply and form their independent opinion about it. And people lack this… people just follow still the tribal way or follow just the government…. There is always an authority who will think on behalf of them, and they think they are obliged to or will just subconsciously just follow it. I feel higher education and research is essential for their region, because it will help people become independent. [When] they become independent, I think they will be able to face the challenges and they will understand what they have done to us. Because I just don’t think they pause and ponder about it. We are from the same country and from neighbouring tribes and everything, but we are discriminated [against] because our parents came at different times to the city.

But they can’t think about it, it’s not easy at all, because… of the collective, community-thinking mind.

SK: You mentioned … many people were out of town looking after their livestock [at time of citizenship registration] as you mentioned? Do you think… many people weren’t too far away in fact when those first registrations were being done?

P03: Because they were illiterate, you know. For example my grandfather, when they told him that so and so, he went and registered and got a paper. And they told him, paper? Where should I put this paper in my tent… I don’t have a closet in my tent, you know? To this extent he was illiterate about the effect of having that registration paper… that he don’t have a drawer or thing in his tent… that was the only problem he had at the time.

So not being educated, being illiterate and not enough education or whatever they would call it [when] the government would [should] do it to let the people know the
importance of what they should do, or how [it would] impact on their life, not only on their life but on the generation that would come later… made them take it lightly.

SK: How would they know?
P03: Yeah, how would they know?
[1:00:30]

[End of interview]
Appendix I, xii

Excerpt from Participant Observation Notes

Participant Observation notes, 04.03.14
I have been in the field 6.5 weeks. There are 3 main approaches to developing the study:

- Collecting audio interviews and beginning to make written transcripts from the audio. I have not had time to type transcripts lately as I have enough interviews to keep me going.
- Contacts, and schedule sheet that is a working word doc, off which I run paper copies of calendars. The paper copies are frequently amended and replaced due to the rate of rejection after initial discussion.
- Another working document is variables and theorising – the code book. After each interview I revisit this document and based on my key impressions from the interview, make notes on new/expanding areas of data/amendments to the key social variables I have listed in my code book.

The main unexpected variables include the secret society elements: passing, denial of identity, hiding, self-monitoring, peer-monitoring, institutional-monitoring and potentially, government-monitoring. Obviously, these include my involvement, somehow.

No one declines from participating at the outset. Quite often people make a time to see me then leave me waiting to see them and don’t answer the phone again, or text me to make another time, and so on. This is after the ‘gate-keeping’ process. I am given the number from a special group of contacts to phone and mention the gatekeeper, or the gatekeeper arranges it and brings them to me directly, or sometimes the gatekeeper gets the person to phone me. This is the general pattern. This seems to reflect the above elements in the data – the secretive or subversive aspects.

There is a tension between activists who wish to be open about themselves and those who wish to conceal their identity. It is not so much that some don’t wish to participate in my research. It is that they have strong online/public identities but weak private/offline identities. They are online activists but not physical, embodied activists. There seems to be 2 groups: some older ones from Taima, like [redacted] who have had presence since 2011 and have been in prison and received and security violations. There are others, younger ones, who have online presence but don’t seem to be willing to meet outsiders [redacted] is somewhere in the middle, I am still not sure if he is a helper or minder. The whole notion of what an ‘activist’ is contestable but it’s a very popular concept. Is it merely a bunch of students running some twitter accounts and having conversations with other students in Arabic? Or is it someone who is doing something physically and being active in the
community as a real person – i.e. outreach work? I have the impression the word is used to attract credibility of some sort, but it does not really apply to many.

[Hadar contact, academic] explains that this is due to the desire for ‘passing,’ there is the constant tension between authentic identification and the performance of ‘activism’ – even if it is simply being who you are, or stating who you are, with assimilation, wasata and rewards for being compliant and well-behaved ‘citizen’ even though the Bedoun are not citizens. Thus, compliance and assimilation seem to be the same as ‘passing’ due to external pressure from the Hadar or other citizens – to shut up, behave and not to be identified as a Bedoun. That is, I am not sure who is in control of this practice – the Bedoun, or their oppressors. For example, [Hadar contact, academic] claims the Bedoun choose to ‘pass’ but clearly he expects them to, because he disdains ‘activism’ as a form of social disharmony.

But he also mentions casually in relation to another matter, that he has anyone’s background checked into, because he has plenty of money to do make it happen, to make sure he is not being fooled about anyone’s identity. That is, he will do security checks including accessing the Central Apparatus system, to make sure someone is not an ‘undesirable’ – e.g. a Bedoun. Not because he has to, because he can. He sees it as a form of personal security, keeping his family safe. He seems to like this idea, there is an ego attachment, he enjoys the idea. This comes from a Bedoun ‘activist’ in the Hadar community. Is this a ‘security’ attitude or a liberal attitude? Why are these kinds of values present among groups who publically perform roles of supporting the Bedoun, when clearly, they don’t? Are they the best of the Bedoun haters, meaning the social experiences for the Bedoun may be much worse than I could imagine, or are they infiltrators indicative of Apparatus values? I find it difficult to tell.

But certainly it explains why Bedoun would not want to disclose their identity. The notion of the Bedoun as a ‘threat’ is not genuine, but related to an ego attachment to the abuse of power over others, as a form of entertainment. There value is in finding out this side of the transaction – it shows me a lot about the process of trying to establish trust. In the meantime, my observations are teaching me that the pearls of this process are located in the spaces in between the solid information I am searching for, it is a much more intuitive process. The social dynamics between Bedoun and citizen, particularly the Hadar citizen, is where the inequality, oppression and exploitation can be observed in subtle communications cues, words, tones of voice, ‘looks’ and physical behaviours. The process can be detected in the uncensored description of the Bedoun and in the social interaction.

[End of Sample]
Appendix I
Part xiii
Sample data extraction summary

Education – thematic analysis – data extraction summary 31/10/2015

Institutional Issues

Quality of education.
I later changed the theme header to ‘institutional discrimination.’ I then split into issues with Central Apparatus and issues within educational institutions

- Schools – Teachers did not care – no teaching - cultural issues (Egyptian national teachers) – P05, P06, P15
- Many young men’s school education was ruined by cultural discrimination at school, abuse, neglect and stigmatisation by the staff and institution itself – e.g. P03, P05, P08, P11, P14 – some of themes directed to experiences of overt abuse
- Could not work in area trained as Bedoun, due to deletion of identity file on Central Apparatus system – P10
- Has very good relationships with teachers/Professors at Kuwait University – P05 (now a citizen)
- But cannot join student clubs (P05) – collated under Bedoun unable to join student clubs at Kuwait University
- Bedoun cannot join student clubs at Kuwait University – but wasata led to inclusion a once-off event - – collated under Bedoun unable to join student clubs at Kuwait University
- First Bedoun schools were a business, no education – P03, P14
- Students abused due to fee issues - school P08
- Brothers/friends could not go to school/receive tuition due to fee issues - 0P8, P16, P17 – I regarded this as an issue related to segregation – the unschooled Bedoun, omitting P8 as not sibling but a friend

Other – administrative, resources, course options.

- University - Bedouns tend to be allocated to courses they didn’t apply for/want - not only the last choice, the opposite choice – they think its intentional – P02, P6, P7, P10
- Central Apparatus interferes via the Card and can delay education indefinitely – P17
- Books and materials poor P08, P13, – difficult to get a Western-standard textbook due to restrictions on publications P13 (i.e. Islamic element in the Ministry of
Interior). Building facilities also poor – [redacted] gave me photographs of the schools, but they were abandoned, so they are not so useful.

Access to Education

Informal system.
- Use of teaching profession to give access to relatives P08 – later collated under washta access
- Wasta is used to get in to public education P07 – later collated under washta access
- Direct negotiation w/ schools for education for those without documentation [redacted] – later added to individuals’ range of intellectual activities for the improvement of civil society
- Sponsored by public/private scholarship – P06 – later collated under sponsorship
- There is an active community including private citizens who help fund education, at the informal level – P09 – later collated under sponsorship
- A great deal of struggle to save up for fees to stay in private education system – P4, P14, P16, P17 – dropped as economic issue
- P14 cannot afford to attend private education; no access to allowance - dropped as economic issue
- Accessed private citizen support to go to school P15

Formal system.
- Marks required are exceptionally high for the Bedoun to enter Kuwait University
- Got in due to re-sitting exams and getting required marks – P05
  But his father works for [redacted] and had become a citizen first – to legitimately ‘qualify’ for participation
  I split some of the below themes into cultivation of self and identification with a higher purpose, improvement

Poverty alleviation and financial independence grouped into fulfilment of basic needs
I grouped the following interview extracts into the theme of ‘positive experiences in education’

Positive social experience – peers and staff.
- Positive experience w/ friends – P03, P04, P09
- Positive experience, until realisation she could not attend university P04
  (learned she was Bedoun at this time
- Positive experience, until realisation he could not attend university P09
- Private college – as student and teacher – best experience in life, and key motivation P03, P08
• Part time study enables more social contacts over time P13
• University is a permissible location for gender mixing with minimal religious policing, despite ‘liberal’ the Ministry of Education is dominated by Islamists. I.e. the latter element is overblown (but it affects textbooks). Even at Kuwait University where classes and cafeteria are gender segregated, there is plenty of social mixing in the grounds.

**Persistence, resilience pursuing education.**

• Education bans mean for some ten years wait prior to attending university, and enrolment/Central Apparatus barriers P16, P17 – allocated to *impact of education bans*
• Became a citizen – re-sat Year 12 and entered Kuwait University P05
• ‘A force that would push my life forward’ P03

**High achievement and lifelong learning.**

• One respondent completed his PhD – still learns online – inspires others P3 (a great deal of information here)
• Doing PhD and teaching - P11
• Patterns of repeat qualifications and lifelong learning – split into themes of aspirations/love of learning

**Creativity and intellectual life.**

• Published poet (and journalist) P09
• Experience invited to KU by ‘clubs’ who are not allowed to accept Bedoun members, where he joined his friends – desire for civil society participation
• Experience of helping youngsters find scholarships to university at the informal level, has been a creative outlet P09
• It is the duty of young people to participate in society and to do well P9 – *moved to identification with higher purpose*
• Discussing philosophy and changing your ideas to accept your life and status P05
• What they have done to us – now intolerable P03

**Aspirations.**

• Ambitions – want better life - related to multiple course completion P04
• New generation not content with what parents had P05
• My biggest dreams are the their basics in their life P06
• Just to enter university P14
• I want to be the good guy P13 – to be a good person P03

**Perception of purpose of education**
Themes arising around self-improvement, purpose of self-improvement – goals related to self-concept e.g. hope, self-worth, confidence, awareness, God, higher purposes.

- Poverty alleviation for self and family – P06, P15 – regarding younger generation P09
- Self-esteem, intellectual growth, participation in civil organisations and career – P03 – later allocated under self-worth – self-esteem, intellectual growth
- No one can constrain you. Higher education is about understanding life. Having a broad view of life. If you succeed, doors will open to you – P03 – later allocated under self-awareness, personal awareness, transcending limitations
- Continuing education to maintain hope for the future – P11
- Achievements – academic prizes and life-long hard work – P03 – personal excellence
- Always doing your best – P10, P11 – later grouped with 0P3 under personal excellence
- It is worth waiting for the intellectual engagement, even after bans – P16, P17 – later allocated to dignity, self-awareness (P16), life purpose and self-confidence, identification with higher principles (P17) by unpacking the concepts within quotations
- Socialisation – a key permissible site for gender mixing – see above – but Bedouins don’t talk much about that – there are too many other social problems around it, but it may influence ideas about early marriage practices – i.e. avoidance of partnering in the hope of discovery of a romantic match
- Some room for freedom of thought beyond the Kuwaiti situation – access to other thoughts and values, experience of not being stigmatised through direct identification w/ intellectual work

I later analysed these themes at deeper level (abstract concepts) and grouped under a theme header, ‘Cultivation of Self.’

[End of Section]