THE DEVELOPMENT OF IGAD AS A DISTINCTIVELY AFRICAN REGIONAL SECURITY COMMUNITY FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA WITH CASE STUDIES OF SOUTH SUDAN AND SOMALIA.

by

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACOTA: African Contingency Training Program

ACRI: African Crisis Response Initiative

ARCSS: Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan

AFRICOM/USAFRICOM: United States Africa Command

AMISOM: African Union Mission to Somalia

APRCT: Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (Somalia)

APSA: African Peace and Security Architecture

ARS: Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia

ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Nations.

ATT: Arms Trade Treaty

AU: African Union

AUCEWS: African Union Continental Early Warning System

AUPSC: African Union Peace and Security Council

CAN: Civil Authority for New Sudan

CEWARN: Conflict Early Warning Mechanism

COMESA: Common Market for East and Southern Africa

CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CGPS: Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

CJTF-HOA: US Led Combined Task Force of Africa.

CTFISO: US Combined Task Force

CTRH: Commission for Truth and Healing (South Sudan)

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

DOP: Declaration of Principles

ECCAS: Economic Community for Central African States

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

EPPF: Ethiopian Peoples Patriotic Front

EU: European Union

EUNAVOR: EU Naval Force-Somalia-Operation Atalanta

EUTM: European Training Mission

FD: Former Detainees

FOCAC: China African Cooperative Partnership on Peace and Security

GONU: Government of National Unity

GOS: Government of Sudan

GOSS: Government of South Sudan

ICC: International Criminal Court

ICG: International Crisis Group

ICG Somali: International Contact Group Somalia

ICPATP: IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGADD: Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IPF: International Partners Forum

IPPS: IGAD Peace and Security Strategy

IPU: IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union

IR: International Relations.

JAM: Joint Assessment Mission

JMEC: Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission

MDTF: Multi-Donor Trust Fund

MSCHOA: Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa

MVV : Monitoring and Verification Team

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NCP: National Congress Party

NCDDRC: National Council for DDR Co-ordination: Sudan

NEC: National Executive Council (SPLM/A)

NIF: National Islamic Front

NLC: National Liberation Council (SPLM/A)

NSDDRC: North Sudan DDR Commission

NUP/DUP: National Unionist Party/Democratic Unionist Party

OAS: Organisation of American States

OAU: Organisation of African Unity.

OLF: Oromo Liberation Front

ONLF: Ogden National Liberation Front

OPP: Other Political Parties

OSCE: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

R2P: Responsibility to Protect

R-ARCSS: Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan

REC: Regional Economic Communities

RJMEC: Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission

RSC: Regional Security Community

SADC: Southern African Development Community

SANU: Sudan African National Union

SALW : Small Arms and Light Weapons

SSDM/A: South Sudan Democratic Movement

SSIM: South Sudan Independence Movement

SPLM/A: South Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army

SPLM – IO: South Sudanese Liberation Movement in Opposition

SSDDRC: South Sudan DDR Commission

SSM: South Sudan Movement

SSNF: Somalia Security Forces

SSOA: South Sudanese Alliance

SSR: Security Sector Reform

TBC: Technical Boundaries Commission

TFG: Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)

TNG: Transitional National Government (Somalia)

UIC: Union of Islamic Courts

UK: United Kingdom

UMA: Arab Magreb Union (Union de Magreb Arabe)

UN: United Nations

UNIMISS: United Nations Mission to South Sudan

UNISOM: United Nations Mission to Somalia

UNITAF: United Nations Taskforce to Somalia (led by US)

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

US/USA: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the development of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as a distinctively African regional security community for the Horn of Africa. It does so by offering a qualitative study of the successes and challenges of IGAD's involvement in the peace process in South Sudan and Somalia.

Drawing on insights from Karl Deutsch's theory of security communities, the thesis argues that IGAD's members have developed their own common norms, values and identities including the shared experiences of colonialism, post-colonialism, the Cold War, post-Cold War and pan-Africanism. IGAD has also developed a distinctive hybrid of both traditional western negotiation techniques combined with African conflict resolution techniques, such as Ubuntu in its peace negotiations. While IGAD has had to contend with mutual interference prevalent in this region both during and post-Cold War, it has also received considerable support from international partners in its search to bring peace and security to the Horn of Africa.

While traditional security community studies have concentrated on Europe, Asia and even Central America, it is evident there has been a general neglect of scholarly research on regional security communities in Africa. Constructivist scholars who further developed Deutsch's theory and explored regional security communities beyond Europe have argued that Africa, with its instability and weak states, does not conform to security community theory and therefore does not warrant close analysis using this theory. This thesis aims to address this neglect of Africa, in particular the Horn of Africa, through its close examination of IGAD as the region's designated RSC in case studies of South Sudan and Somalia.

This thesis will also argue that there has also been a considerable and successful development of the entire African peace and security architecture under the AU and its designated regional security community in the Horn of Africa, IGAD. IGAD, in particular, now acts as the region's designated RSC as recognised by both the United Nations and the African Union under their respective charters. IGAD, as the case studies show, is now playing the major role as the Horn of Africa's regional security community in regional conflicts and peace, and security negotiations in this conflict prone and volatile region of Africa.

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THESIS DECLARATION

I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in my name, in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no materials previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work, will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name, for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree.

I give permission for the digital version of my thesis to be made available on the web, via the University's digital research repository, the Library search and also through web search engines, unless permission has been granted by the University to restrict access for a period of time.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis argues that IGAD has indeed developed into a successful and distinctively African regional security community for the Horn of Africa. While IGAD does not conform to the classic Deutschian theory of security communities of shared liberal democratic values,[1] its members do share other binding norms, values and identities including the shared experiences of colonialism, post-colonialism, the Cold War, post-Cold War and pan-Africanism.[2]

Constructivist scholars such as Barry Buzan and Ole Waever have argued that Africa with its instability and weak states, does not confirm to security community theory. They note, 'the level of security interaction in Africa has been too low and too local to sustain well-developed regionals RSCs of the type commonly found elsewhere in the international system'.[3]This thesis through its examination of IGAD, as the regional security community for the Horn of Africa, will show this general neglect of the development of RSCs in Africa is a Eurocentric view that fails to acknowledge both the considerable development of a comprehensive African peace and security architecture with the founding of the AU in 2002, and the continued development of IGAD as the designated UN and AU RSC for the Horn of Africa. [4]

The two qualitative case studies examined in this thesis have been selected due to IGAD's key role in efforts to bring peace to both the countries of South Sudan and Somalia. This includes successfully concluding the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) in 2005 that brought an end to the fifty-year civil war between North and South Sudan and its present efforts in negotiations to conclude the civil war that erupted in post-independent South Sudan in 2013. IGAD has also played a key role in the continuing search for peace and stability in Somalia with the help of international partners including the EU and the UN.

In the two qualitative case studies of South Sudan and Somalia, IGAD does indeed emerge as a distinctive and successful African regional security community. This development has occurred through its skilful use of both western norms and negotiation techniques and traditional African methods of conflict resolution to help achieve peace and security in the

[1] Deutsch, Karl W, 'Security Communities', in Rosenau, James, N (ed) *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1961, p.98.
[2] Franke, Benedikt, 'Precis of security co-operation in Africa: A reappraisal', *African Security Review*, 19:2, 2010, p.87.
[3] Buzan, Barry & Waever, Ole, *Regions and Power*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p.323.
[4] Franke, Benedikt, 'Africa's evolving security architecture and the concept of multi-layered security communities', *Cooperation and Conflict,* 43:3, 2008, p.318.

troubled region of the Horn of Africa.[5]IGAD is now recognised by both the AU and UN as the designated regional security community for the region, and in both select case studies, IGAD has successfully negotiated both peace agreements and peacebuilding projects with the support of its international partners.

IGAD has also succeeded as a regional security community despite having to contend with the patterns of mutual interference that have been prevalent in the Horn of Africa, both during and post the Cold War, which at times has worked to undermine its peacemaking efforts.[6] This is seen clearly in both South Sudan and Somalia case studies where Sudan and Uganda and Ethiopia and Eritrea respectively fight proxy wars undermining IGAD's efforts to bring lasting peace to both these IGAD members. Nevertheless, as scholars of regionalism and constructivism such as Barry Buzan and Ole Waever have noted, neighbouring states have much more invested in solving regional conflicts that may affect their own security.[7]Hence, IGAD has also benefitted from this support[8] in its efforts to bring peace and stability to the troubled Horn of Africa.

Additionally, IGAD has also skilfully developed the distinctive use of international partners (IPF) to assist both financially and administratively to support its role as the regional security community for the Horn of Africa. In IGAD's peace negotiations in both South Sudan and Somalia, for example, its international partners have been able to support and put pressure on respective sides of the conflict in both South Sudan and Somalia. This development includes the US use of sanctions to bring Sudan back to the CPA negotiations in 2000 and the use of the EU institutional building measures in support of the ongoing Somalia IGAD peace process.[9]

This thesis comprises six chapters. The first two chapters explore and outline the theory of security communities, as first developed by Karl Deutsch in relation to NATO and Europe and North America, and the later evolution of this theory by constructivist scholars such as Barry Buzan and Ole Waever and Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. While constructivists included other regions in their research and their use of different shared norms and values

[5] Murithi, Timothy, 'Practical peacemaking, wisdom from Africa: Reflections on Ubuntu', *Journal of Pan African Studies*, 1:3, 2006, p.32.
[6] Cliffe, Lionel, 'Regional dimension of conflict in the Horn of Africa', *Third World Quarterly*, 20:1, 1999, p.89.
[7] Buzan & Waever, p.3.
[8] Waihenya, Waithaka, *The Mediator: Gen.Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process*, Kenway Publications, Nairobi, Kenya, 2006, p.38.
[9] Erhart, Hans-Georg & Petretto, Kerstin, 'Stabilising Somalia: Can the EU's comprehensive approach work?' *European Security*, 23:2, 2014, p.180.

beyond the liberal democratic focus of Deutsch, Africa has been largely neglected in these studies. These chapters also explore the contribution of regionalism to RSC theory and an outline of the development of Africa's overall peace and security architecture with the founding of the African Union in 2002 and through a close examination of IGAD's development.

After being founded in 1985 as the Drought and Development Agency (IGADD) IGAD then developed into a regional security community in 1995 as designated both under the AU Constitutive Act and the UN Charter, Chapter VIII : Regional Organisations. These chapters also examine the issues that have specifically affected African regional security community's development and IGAD in particular. This includes IGAD members shared experiences, norms, values and identities formed by the experiences of colonialism, post-colonialism, the Cold War and the post-Cold War.

Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the case study of South Sudan by providing a detailed background to these conflicts and the analysis of IGAD's negotiations to end both the fifty-year civil war between the North and South and its mediation in the present conflict in South Sudan that erupted in 2013, just two years post independence in 2011. These chapters explore IGAD's successful use of both western and indigenous forms of negotiation to develop a distinctive and successful African approach to conflict resolution including its use of international partners to support its peace efforts, both financially and logistically.

Chapter 5 in two parts focuses on IGAD's role in the ongoing and complex Somalian peace process which includes an examination of the colonial and post-colonial history of the country and its ongoing search for peace post independence. This chapter also explores IGAD's use of international partners which at times has both helped and hindered the peace process in Somalia. Chapter 6 offers future directions for IGAD to further improve its effectiveness as the Horn of Africa's regional security community and to help its development into a mature RSC. These issues include the need to address arms control in the region and to increasingly combine both western and African indigenous peacebuilding approaches in IGAD's role as the designated RSC for the Horn of Africa.

In conclusion, this thesis aims to establish that IGAD has indeed emerged as a successful and distinctively African regional security community as recognised by both the AU and UN and its international partners and importantly, by members of IGAD and the region of the Horn of

Africa. While IGAD's challenges are many, its successes are considerable in a region that has been historically prone to conflict and mutual interference during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.

CHAPTER 1

SECURITY COMMUNITY THEORY, REGIONALISM AND AFRICA

Introduction

This chapter outlines the theory of regional security communities as first presented by Karl Deutsch and later developed by constructivist theorists such as Buzan and Waever and Adler and Barnett. It outlines that with the traditional focus of regional security communities on liberal democratic states and nations there has been a general neglect of both the developing world and in particular Africa, which this thesis with its focus on IGAD as the regional security community for the Horn of Africa and the two case studies aims to address. This chapter also outlines the important contribution regionalism and scholars such as Amitav Acharya, have played in developing a less Eurocentric view of both international relations in general and regional security communities in particular.[10]

The chapter will further examine the continuing development of the African state system and its relationship to the traditional regional security community theory of a liberal democratic state, whilst also examining the different norms and values of the African state system including the impact of colonialism, post-colonialism, the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. These aspects have affected the development of a distinctively different African regional security community with different norms and values to the classic Deutschian theory of RSCs, as exemplified in the role of IGAD with case studies of South Sudan and Somalia.

Security community theory: Deutsch and the constructivists

The international relations concept of 'security communities' was first established by Karl Deutsch in the Cold War era to explain the peaceful relations and absence of war between certain states, 'expectations of peace among the participating nations [of a security community] whether or not there has been an integration of their political institutions'.[11] Deutsch based the theory of security communities on the concept of shared norms and identity by the nations of a security community, particularly the concept that they shared liberal and democratic ideas and practices, as he based his work on European and American security communities (e.g. NATO and OSCE) that shared these characteristics.[12]

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[10] Acharya, Amitav, *Constructing a Security Community in South East Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order,* Routledge, London, 2009.

[11] Deutsch, Karl, W, 'Security Communities', in Rosenau, James (ed) *International Policy,* Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1961, p.98.

[12] Ibid.

Deutsch further stipulated that there were both amalgamated (e.g. USA) and pluralistic security communities (e.g. NATO) both characterised by emerging peaceful relations based on shared norms and ideas of liberal democracy.[13]Whilst Deutsch's ideas were largely neglected in the Cold War era that was dominated by realism and neo-realism, they were resurrected in the post-Cold War era by constructivist scholars such as Adler and Barnett, Buzan and Waever. They deepened and widened the definition of security communities and adopted a more empirical and sociological approach, including case studies from world regions (e.g. Asia, South America) which gave further emphasis to the roles of shared norms and identity in the socialisation and development of security communities worldwide.[14]

Specifically Adler and Barnett further developed the theory of RSC by 'sketching a social constructivist approach to the origins and evolution of such communities'.[15]They discerned that RSCs develop through a number of phases: nascent, ascendant and mature where there are increasing levels of integration of member states based on geography and include 'common culture, economic circumstances and security concerns'.[16]Other subsequent constructivist theorists such as Buzan and Waever, see security communities as regional identities and identify the various phases of their development as pre or proto, part and fully developed or mature. Regional security communities ranging from developed and mature include EU/NATO, and pre or proto complexes are represented by the weak states of Africa RSCs including IGAD.[17]This thesis seeks to challenge this analysis, as it clearly neglects the considerable development of a comprehensive peace and security architecture in Africa by the AU with the African RSCs, including IGAD, acting now as chief mediators in regional conflicts and security.

Constructivism : theory and development of its regional security community approach

Constructivism which forms the basis of the post-Cold War development of RSC theory, arose out of the debate in international relations between rationalist and reflectivist theorists that dominated the 1980s.[18]Previously international relations was dominated by the two contending perspectives of realism/neo-realism and liberalism/neo-liberalism, which both

[13] Griffiths, Martin, (ed) *The Encyclopaedia of International Relations and Global Politics*, Routledge, London, 2007, p.751.
[14] Buzan, Barry & Waever, Ole, *Regions and Powers*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003; Adler, Emanuel & Barnett, Michael, *Security Communities*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.
[15] Evans, Graham, (ed) *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, Penguin, Ringwood, Vic, 1998, p.752.
[16] Adler & Barnett, p.33.
[17] Buzan & Waever, p.64.
[18] Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja & Smith, Steve, *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford Uni Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 5.

believe in the anarchy of the international system of states with realism conceiving of 'international relations as a struggle for power and security between discrete political communities of at present, primarily nation states'.[19]Liberalism (and neo-liberalism) whilst also believing in the existence of anarchy in the international system, focused on how 'international cooperation through institutions (e.g. UN) could overcome the negative effects of anarchy'.[20]Additionally, the English school led by Hedley Bull, while acknowledging the anarchical nature of international relations also developed the idea of an international society bound by a 'normative system whose rules and norms provide common standards of action by assigning rights and responsibilities to societal members'[21](states) prefiguring the constructivist approach to IR.

Into this debate came reflective approaches such as critical theory, feminism and constructivism that explained international relations theory and the system of states in new and challenging ways, all with a distinctively post-structuralist approach.[22]Constructivism has been defined as 'an approach to the study of international relations that emphasises the primacy of non-material variables specifically norms, culture, identities and ideas in accounting for agents [states] behaviour'.[23]Constructivism, like the English School, particularly represented a middle ground between realism and liberalism with its belief in power politics, but its explanation too of cooperation between states due to shared norms, identity and cultures, including the further development of the theory of security communities, first established by Deutsch.[24]

A major constructivist theorist, Alexander Wendt noted that states are not in a perpetual state of anarchy but do cooperate to achieve peace and security outcomes as seen in the development of security communities such as IGAD.[25]Deutsch's security community theory hence greatly appealed to social constructivists. As Wendt has noted, ' a security community is a different social structure, one composed of shared social structure, one composed of

[19] Baylis, John & Rengger, N.J (eds) *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 9.
[20] Baylis, John & Smith, Steve (eds) *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p.170.
[21] Lechner, Silviya, 'Why anarchy still matters for international relations: On theories and things', *Journal of International Political Theory*, 13:3, 2017, p.348.
[22] Baylis & Smith, p. 172.
[23] Griffiths, p.115.
[24] Adler, Emanuel, 'Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics', *European Journal of International Relations,* 3:3, 1997, p.321.
[25] Wendt, Alexander, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics', *International Organisation*, 46:2, 1992, p.394.

shared knowledge in which states trust one another to resolve disputes without war'.[26]In the post-Cold War era constructionism has become an important school in international relations, demonstrating the 'value of incorporating ideational factors into the study of global politics [in] addressing empirical puzzles in the areas of security, and international political economy'.[27]

Africa's neglect in the theory of regional security communities

In security communities theory and the work of its leading contemporary theorists, such as Adler and Barnett, Buzan and Waever, there has been a general neglect of the concept's application to the non-western world. Amitav Acharya has noted that the absence of reference to such communities in modern day studies of regional security communities theoretical work may be due to the prevalence of intrastate versus interstate conflict in the developing world and the absence of significant economic interdependence, and common political institutions including democratic liberalism which was the foundation of both the Deutsch theory and later, security community theorists.[28]Acharya's in-depth analysis of ASEAN as a regional security community in South East Asia is a notable exception to RSC theory's Eurocentric bias.[29]

Buzan and Waever in *Regions and Power* actually dismiss African attempts to develop regional security communities, characterising Africa as a 'Hobbesian' anarchical region 'where regional security is so weakly structured [that] all states are in some sense insulators and their region is unstructured'.[30]They even refer specifically to IGAD, noting 'it is far from clear whether the regional organisation IGAD lines up with an emergent RSC or not'.[31] Buzan and Waever do however acknowledge that SADC and ECOWAS qualify as security regimes in Africa, rather than security communities dominated as they both are by regional hegemons. In the case of SADC South Africa acts as the regional hegemon, and in ECOWAS Nigeria acts as the regional hegemon, both economically and in peace and security for the region of West Africa.[32]Generally though, Buzan and Waever and other African regional scholars, such

[26] Jackson, Robert & Sorenson, George, *Introduction to International Relations,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p.239.
[27] Griffiths, p.116.
[28] Acharya, Amitav, *Rethinking Power, Institution and Ideas in World Politics: Whose International Relations?'*, Routledge, London, 2014, p.2.
[29] Acharya, Amitav, *Constructing a Security Community in South East Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order,* Routledge, London, 2009.
[30] Buzan & Waever, p.232.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Buzan & Waever, p.239.

as Jeffrey Herbst, Robert H. Jackson and Carl G Rothberg, believe that security is achieved more at a domestic and local level than a regional level in Africa. [33]

Regionalism and regional security theory

Regionalism as an aspect of international relations theory has been another important contributor to the growth of the theory of regional security communities such as IGAD. Constructivist scholars have been important contributors to this theory including Amitav Acharya, Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell. Specifically RSC theory was interpreted by these scholars as being a way of explaining the new world order of increasing regional co-operation that followed the collapse of the USSR. Regionalism and the growth of regional security communities post Cold War was seen as a means to promote co-operation amongst regional states to enhance their national wellbeing and collective security. [34]

Although the original UN Charter (Chapter VIII: Regional Organisations) outlined a role for regional organisations in world peace and security; this vision was severely restricted in its realisation by the Cold War divisions of the United Nations Security Council.[35]As noted though by regionalism scholar Andrew Hurrell, solutions for conflicts are most likely to be found from the members of the region concerned. 'Commonality of culture, history, homogeneity of social systems and values, convergences of political and security interests' [36]means that neighbouring states provide more effective and lasting enforcement and implementation of negotiated settlement of conflicts, as they have vested interests in maintaining the peace.[37]Therefore regional security communities, such as IGAD, have been a growing feature of the post Cold War era study of international relations and, in particular, regionalism.

Regionalism and the UN

With the founding of the UN in 1945 following the devastating Second World War there was a debate between proponents of the concepts of universalism versus regionalism regarding the maintenance of world peace and security. 'Advocates of regionalism argued that geographic

[33] Herbst, Jeffrey, 'Responding to state failure in Africa', *International Security,* 21:3, 1996, pp.120-145 ; Jackson, Robert H & Rosberg, Carl G, 'Why Africa's weak states persist: The empirical and the juridical in Statehood', *World Politics*, 35:1, 1982, pp. 1-24

[34] Alagappa, Mutiah, 'Regionalism and conflict management: A framework for analysis in regionalism in world politics', *Review of International Studies*, 21:4, 1995, p.359.

[35] Barnett, Michael, 'Partners in peace: The UN, Regional organisations and peacekeeping', *Review of International Studies*, 21:4, 1995, p.411.

[36] Hurrell, Andrew, 'Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics', *Review of International Studies*, 21:3, 1995, p.346.

[37] Ibid.

neighbours would have a better understanding of local disputes, and would be better able to provide assistance to victims of aggression than the universal organisation'[38]of the United Nations Security Council. While the original regional organisations existing at the time of the founding of the UN (e.g. the OAS, the Organisation of the American States and the Arab League) successfully argued for their recognition under the UN Charter (Chapter VIII: Regional Organisations), ultimately the UN decided to vest power for the maintenance of world peace and security with the UN Security Council.[39]The UNSC was to remain the supreme organ of peace and security and regional organisations were made subsidiary to its decision-making powers.

This proved to be a major impediment to world peace and security, especially during the Cold War era with the veto right of the five permanent members of the Security Council (Russia, China, UK, France, US) undermining regional approaches to peace and security, and suppressing the development of regional peace and security architecture. This was especially evident in the Cold War era, with the veto rights of the USA versus the USSR dominating decision making in the Security Council during this time. There have been constant requests to change the composition of the Security Council, including expanding its membership beyond the permanent five (P5) and eliminating the veto vote but all of this has been opposed by the P5.[40] This of course highlights the importance of the growing regional peace and security structures of the world, including IGAD, which seems much more able to act where the great powers refuse, thus allowing regional interests and concerns to become more central to conflict resolution than the UNSC has ever been able to achieve.

Regionalism scholars have noted a general increase in regional approaches to a range of issues, including peace and security in the post-Cold War environment, which especially represents both opportunities and challenges for the developing world in areas of peace and security. As Fawcett notes, clearly 'for developing countries, regionalism has the added appeal of an independence movement'.[41]In particular, for Africa, it has allowed African solutions for African problems and as Franke notes, 'the promotion of a collective African identity and the resultant desire to minimise non-African (international) interference in the

[38] Acharya & Johnson (eds), *Crafting Regional Co-operation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p.2.
[39] Souare, Issaka A, 'Africa and the UN Security Council 1945-2010: A critical appraisal', *African Security Review,* 20:1, 2011, p.84.
[40] Souare, p.90.
[41] Fawcett, Louise, 'Exploring regionalism domains: A comparative history of regionalism', *International Affairs,* 80:3, 2004, p.437.

Continent' [42]has characterised the development of the continental architecture of peace and security in the AU and its RECs such as IGAD.

Still, as Fawcett has also noted with the limited financial resources available to developing countries, this presents challenges for the developing world too.[43]In the case of IGAD it has successfully addressed this issue through the establishment of the IPF (International Partners Forum) which uses international partners, such as the EU, UK and USA, to assist with peacebuilding capacity, training and logistics in its peace and security role. This has included the establishment of a reconstruction fund for Sudan funded by IPF members after the devastating fifty-year civil war between the North and South (1955-2005)[44]and IPF members also contributing to the ongoing peacebuilding processes of IGAD in Somalia.[45]

Regionalism: regional security communities and the idea of burden sharing (US/UN)

An additional reason for the rise of regional security communities such as IGAD to solve regional peace and security issues, was the need for both the UN and USA to share the burden of peacekeeping roles in the post-Cold War era. With the remaining superpower the USA, and the UN increasingly becoming responsible for maintaining world peace and stability, regionalism and regional security communities were seen as a way to burden share due to budgetary and logistic constraints regarding an increasing range of conflicts in the post-Cold War era, especially in Africa.[46]

While the UN had bypassed the regional organisations during the Cold War era, leaving them 'stunted and then ignored, regional organisations were frequently little more than bystanders to unfolding international events'.[47]In the post- Cold War era regional organisations and the UN seem to be working towards similar goals and it was even noted that the 'officials of both the UN and regional organisations speak of the need to create security communities'.[48]

Additionally, as the need for international peacekeeping and peace enforcement forces grows, and the USA increasingly focuses on national interests the role of regional organisations, such

[42] Franke, 'Africa's Evolving Security Architecture and the Concept of Multi-layered Security Communities', *Co-operation and Conflic*t, 43:3, 2008, p. 318.
[43] Fawcett, p.443.
[44] Francis, *Uniting Africa, : Building Regional Peace and Security Systems,* Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006, p..217.
[45] Ehrhart, Hans Gower & Petretto, Kerstin, 'Stabilising Somalia: Can the EU's comprehensive approach work?', *European Security*, 23:2, 2014, p.181.
[46] O'Brien, David, 'The search for subsidiarity: The UN, African regional organisations and humanitarian action', *International Peacekeeping*, 7:3, 2007, p.60.
[47] Barnett, p.412.
[48] Ibid.

as IGAD, will continue to grow.[49]Importantly, other UN Security Council members such as China and Russia, also support the need to allow regional security communities to take the lead in regional peacemaking, peacekeeping and enforcement.[50]

Africa and the state system: the impact of colonialism

In contrast to Buzan and Waever's view, African states and their security communities have indeed developed their own distinctive norms, values and identities formed by a shared history of colonisation and decolonisation. In retrospect, while colonialism was a relatively brief period in Africa's history, it has had lasting consequences for the continent, and its peace and stability in the post-colonial era was deeply affected by the coercive and divisive period of colonial rule. The Berlin Conference of 1884 to 1885 according to historians marked the direct intervention of Europe into Africa. While there had been a period of commercial access and trade via coastal systems before the scramble for colonies in Africa by European powers, the Berlin Conference helped define the rules of annexation of the African continent.[51] The subsequent European 'partition of the continent unleashed unprecedented changes in African societies: political, social, cultural and psychological,'[52]that still affect the continent of Africa today. Africa counts some fifty- four countries, some small and landlocked and economically unviable. At least one third of Africa has experienced large scale political violence or wars which undoubtedly the colonial era and its inappropriate boundaries have contributed to.[53]As Abebajo notes, 'the post Berlin partition in Africa …. destroyed ancient boundaries of identity and old methods of conflict resolution without creating effective substitutes in their place'.[54]

The case studies of South Sudan and Somalia examined in this thesis are both examples of post-colonial states that bare the scars of both colonial and post-colonial failures, but show the success of IGAD's lead to incorporate both western and traditional forms of conflict resolution to build a more peaceful and stable post-Cold War Africa. With the idea of an African Renaissance (raised by Thabo Mbeki when the AU was established in 2002), in the post-Cold War era there is a need under the new AU peace and security architecture to find

[49] O'Brien, p.63.
[50] Berman, Eric G, 'The Security Council's increasing reliance on burden-sharing: Collaboration or abrogation', *International Peacekeeping*, 4:1, 1998, p.3.
[51] Parker, John & Rathbone, Richard, *African History: A Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p.77.
[52] Abebajo, Adekeye, *The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War*, Columbia Press, New York, 2010, p.xii.
[53] Herbst, Jeffrey, *Responding to State Failure in Africa*, p.1.
[54] Abedajo, p.xiii.

African solutions for African problems, which the development of IGAD as an effective RSC for the Horn of Africa clearly represents.[55]

It is also important to appreciate in any analysis of IGAD and African RSCs in general, that African states unlike Western Europe and the Westphalia tradition that Deutsch's theory of security communities was based on, are still in their infancy regarding development. While statehood came relatively late to Africa and most of the developing world, Western European states, which Deutsch based his theory of security communities on, are the outcome of a long process of development beginning with the 'Treaty of Westphalia' in 1648. 'State formation involved the gradual accumulation and centralization of power that enabled a government to exercise effective control within a territory and implement complex policies'.[56]This history of state formation is clearly missing in Africa. The post-colonial independent state was a structure inherited from the Europeans and hastily handed over to independence leaders and colonially favoured elites.

Additionally, in the colonial era 'communities were economically marginalised and politically excluded, often as a result of division along ethnic, religious and race or clan lines'.[57]In contrast to the Deutschian model of the western liberal democratic state ; African states therefore lack the key features that facilitated the creation of modern western states including 'cultural homogeneity, especially a common language, and common political values and traditions'.[58]Interestingly, the post-colonial states in Africa that have been the most stable and economically successful reflect pre-colonial kingdoms or regions, such as Ghana and Botswana, while most African states arbitrary boundaries decided at the Berlin Conference by contrast cut across ethnic and cultural groups.[59]For instance, in the case study of Somalia examined in this thesis, Somalians reside in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. The Somalian military dictator, Said Barre actually invaded the Ogden region of Ethiopia to reclaim it as part of greater Somalia before his fall in 1991. This development led to a war with Ethiopia which contributed to his overthrow.[60]

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[55] Moolakkattu, John, S, 'The role of the African Union in continental peace and security governance, *India Quarterly: a Journal of International Affairs*, 66:2, 2010, p.152.
[56] Sandbrook, Richard, 'Hobbled Leviathans: Constraints on *state* formation in Africa', *International Journal,* 41:4, 1986, p.708.
[57] Healy, Sally, 'Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa: The contribution of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development', *International Affairs*, 87:1, 2011, p.107.
[58] Sandbrook, p.709.
[59] Platteau, Jean-Phillipe, 'Institutional obstacles to African economic development: State, ethnicity and custom', *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization* 71:3, 2009, p.671.
[60] Keller, Edmond J & Rothchild, Donald, *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security,* Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1996, p.78.

Africa state system: post-colonial impacts (including the Cold War)

Post-colonial states in Africa therefore inherited a myriad of problems including arbitrary colonial boundaries, a coercive state structure and economic development that favoured accumulation by the centre at the expense of the periphery, in the manner of colonial rule before it. As Richard Sklar notes, this coercive and exploitative colonial relationship between the state and its people unfortunately also did not change once African nations achieved independence from European colonial rule, but 'was reinforced by neo-colonial leaders more interested in maintaining ties with foreign powers than contributing to the development of their own countries'.[61]

Since African independence from colonial rule, these same elites have failed to consolidate state structures, monopolized states resources and denied Africans representation in the structures of government which in turn has caused many post-colonial internal conflicts. While, a resurgence of democracy across the continent in the 1990's definitely helped in both the birth of the AU and the resurgence of regional security communities, such as IGAD;[62] the overall governance systems of many African countries in the post-colonial era, including South Sudan and Somalia, remains coercive and patrimonial in contrast to the Deutschian concept of security communities of shared liberal democratic values and norms.

Nevertheless, there are many critics of the appropriateness of western style liberal democracy in Africa, as it seems that the African 1990s 'transition to multiparty competitive elections was [mainly] instigated at the behest of the donor community which insisted further aid would be forthcoming only if the new democratic political conditionalities were met'.[63]African intellectuals and African leaders, such as Nyerere (Ghana) and Museveni (Uganda), have argued that Africa requires a developmental democracy, with the one party state being a more appropriate form of governance for Africa, as it reduces ethnic and tribal division in politics and allows state directed economic development in contrast to the neo-liberal agenda of laissez faire markets and liberal democracy.[64]Political ethnicity continues to remain a problem in the democratisation of Africa as 'the group that controls political power also determines

[61] Sklar, Richard, 'Study of Africa in the critical tradition', in Schraeder, Peter, *African Politics and Society: Mosaic in Transformation* (2nd edn), Thomson, Belmont, 2004, p.324.
[62] Engel, Ulf & Olsen, Gorm Rye, *Africa and the North between Globalization and Marginalization*, Routledge, London, 2005, p.7.
[63] Chabal, Patrick, 'The Quest for good government and development in Africa: Is NEPAD the answer?', *International Affairs*, 78, 3 , 2002, p.449.
[64] Udogu, E, Ike & A.B Zack Williams (eds) *African Mosaic: Political, Social, Economic and Technological Development in the New Millennium,* Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle-on-Tyne, 2009, p.2.

how the national resources are to be distributed'[65]supporting the clientalism and patronage party systems that still dominate African politics. In addition, African leaders continue to exploit ethnicity through 'what's commonly know as the politics of ethnic and regional balance'[66]which can erupt into election and post-election violence as happened in Kenya in 2016.

Therefore, African scholars, such as Claude Ake and Richard Sklar, have advocated a type of developmental democracy as more appropriate to African society, where group political interests as opposed to individual self-interest are paramount.[67]Ake, in particular, notes that African democracy will look very different to western liberal democracy, de-emphasising abstract legal and political rights whilst promoting concrete social and economic rights. Nevertheless, he also supports public accountability by elections of those in power to counter the corruption and poor governance of the post-colonial era.[68]Additionally, Africa has its own traditions of democracy, and whilst some African pre-colonial structures were indeed autocratic (e.g. kingship), traditional African political systems reflected broad democratic principles and included 'fully-fledged republics governed by assemblies of the peoples representatives'.[69]Traditional African democracy and accountability depended on 'a system in which elders (or chiefs) of a community met and debated societal problems until a consensus was reached and an oath taken to abide by the decision,'[70]all of which importantly can be built on in the post colonial era with political systems and structures that are actually indigenous in character.

The Cold War and post-Cold War era further complicated the issue of governance in Africa and state stability. As regionalism scholars have noted, while the West enjoyed relative peace and détente in the Cold War, the developing world, including Africa, became the site of proxy wars between the USA and USSR. Wars were fuelled by superpower rivalries of the Cold War as well as internal governance deficiencies on the part of autocratic African leaders. Additionally, since 1960, over forty wars have killed over ten million Africans and created over ten million refugees. As Adekeye Abebajo argues, the curse of Berlin has continued in

[65] Udogu, E Ike, 'The issue of ethnicity and democratization in Africa: Toward the Millennium', *Journal of Black Studies*, 29:6, 1999, pp.797-798.
[66] Olinga, Michel, 'African post-electoral discontents: A consequence of ethnically motivated politics but of poverty riots too, *Cultures of the Commonwealth*, 15:16, 2019, p.16.
[67] Richard Sklar cited in Chabal, Patrick(ed), *Political Domination in Africa*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p.27.
[68] Ake, Claude, 'The unique case of African democracy', *International Affairs*, 69, 2 , 1993, p.241.
[69] Ezeani, Emefiena, 'Cooperative Collegial Democracy for Africa and Multi-Ethnic Societies: Democracy without Tears', *Africa in Development* volume 13, Peter Lang AG, 2012, p. 41.
[70] Udogu,E, Ike, p.802.

the post-Cold War era for Africans.[71]Whilst the Berlin Conference of the nineteenth century demarcated Africa into arbitrary colonial states, the fall of the Berlin Wall in the post-Cold War era in the 1980s ushered in a period of marginalisation for Africa from international affairs and western concerns. While Africa had feared intervention during the Cold War, marginalisation now became a greater concern in the post-Cold War era. Western attention, aid, and investment shifted to the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and resources were then diverted to Afghanistan and Iran after the September 11 attacks against the US.[72] 'Berlin has become a powerful metaphor of Africa's colonial and post-colonial experiences as well as its continuing challenges of breaking the bonds of the political, economic, and cultural institutions inherited from the colonial state'. [73]

Hence, the crucial importance of both African peace and security architecture represented by the AU and the regional security communities of Africa, specifically IGAD, is that it offers the hope of regional peacemaking capacity, in the absence of a strong liberal democratic state structure in post-colonial Africa which Deutsch based his initial analysis of RSC upon and which pervades most literature on security communities. The development of the AU and IGAD also importantly represents the norm of pan-Africanism and 'African solutions to African problems' in the post-Cold War era of regional neglect of Africa by the West.

AU and IGAD: African and other developing world regional security community's characteristics

Whilst the African state remains weak and insecure unlike the European state system, IGAD still appears to share some characteristics inherited from the Westphalia system of states exhibited by other non-European security communities including ASEAN, OAS, and the Arab League. This includes belief in the norms of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs, but IGAD like other developing world RSCs also exhibits some unique adaptations to the western structure of RSCs.[74]In contrast to most western security communities, decision making in non-European RSCs, including IGAD, is not a process of majority vote, but involves consensus decision making and adoption of peacemaking and peace-building approaches that are based on their own indigenous models.

[71] Abebajo, p.32
[72] Keller & Rothchild, p.17.
[73] Abebajo, p.3.
[74] Acharya, Amitav, 'Dialogue and discovery : In search of International Relations theory beyond the West', *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 39:3, 2011,. p.629.

Acharya has explored the use of the principles of the ASEAN way to resolve conflict and achieve consensus among ASEAN member states by use of their common cultural heritage including the traditional Malay concept of 'Kampung' (village: spirit of togetherness) to resolve disputes without confrontation. The ASEAN way 'stresses informality, organisation minimalism, inclusiveness, intensive consultation leading to consensus and peaceful resolution of disputes'.[75]While Acharya's studies of ASEAN represent the most detailed analysis of an alternative regional security community, similar approaches to consensus decision making and informality of organisational structures seem to infuse most non-European RSCs, including IGAD, in clear contrast to the formality of decision making and organisational structures in their western equivalents such as NATO, OSCE and EU.[76]This informal approach to consensus decision making seems much more suited to these RSCs where states and structures remain weak, especially in Africa where IGAD is the principal Horn of Africa REC. As Acharya notes, 'managing conflicts towards their eventual resolution requires not only dialogue or negotiations, but also institutions of confidence building measures and peacekeeping opportunities,'[77]which IGAD reflects in its peacemaking role as the designated RSC for the Horn of Africa.

Therefore, while developing countries may not fit the Duetschian model of integrated liberal democracies, they skilfully combine both western and traditional/indigenous models of peace and security and peacemaking and peacekeeping. Finnemore notes that actors [states] absorb both domestic and international norms,[78]and in the case of the developing world their security communities have managed to reflect indigenous norms, their colonial heritage and those norms from the Westphalian system of international states that spread across the world with the European expansion and colonisation of the seventeenth century and onwards.

Conclusion

This examination of IGAD's role as the RSC in the Horn of Africa, and particularly its role in the case studies of South Sudan and Somalia and its use of both traditional western norms of peacemaking and peace and security combined with indigenous approaches, will show both similarities and differences with the Deutschian concept of security communities. While the theory of security communities still remains a worthwhile structure to examine RSCs it definitely needs updating to include the non-European RSCs, especially in Africa and

[75] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in South East Asia*, p.78.
[76] Adler & Barnett, p.18.
[77] Acharya, Amitav, *Regional Security complexes in the Third World: Stability and collaboration*, www/amitavavacharya.com,p.17.
[78] Finnemore Martha, *National Interests in International Society*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1996, p.6.

including IGAD, which mainstream international relations theory has failed to do with the exception of Acharya's ASEAN studies. As Acharya perceptively notes: 'the sources of international theory conspicuously fail to correspond to the global distribution of its subjects,' [79]especially RSC contemporary theorists such as Buzan and Waever.

The dismissal of the considerable achievements of the development of the peace and security architecture of the AU, and the development of IGAD as the principle peace and security instrument in the turbulent region of the Horn of Africa will be examined closely in the following case studies of South Sudan and Somalia, to directly challenge this clearly inadequate and Eurocentric assessment. This assessment takes into account the very different development of the African state system and the continuing impact of both colonial, post-colonial, Cold War and post-Cold War norms and values that IGAD members share, combined with the indigenous norms and values that have helped produce a distinctively African RSC in the Horn of Africa in the form of IGAD.

[79] Buzan, Barry & Acharya, Amitav (ed), *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia,* Routledge, London, 2010, p.1.

CHAPTER 2
AFRICA'S REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE - AU AND IGAD AND THE SUDANESE CONFLICT

Introduction

This chapter builds on the theoretical basis of the previous chapter's exploration of RSC theory, and challenges the constructivist view of Africa's lack of a functioning regional security community. It does this by outlining the considerable achievement and distinctive development of the African peace and security architecture including the transformation of the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) into the AU (African Union) in 2002. In particular it outlines the development of the regional security community that this thesis examines, IGAD, and its transition from a Drought and Development Agency (IGADD) in 1986 to the designated RSC responsible for peace and security in the troubled and conflict prone area of the Horn of Africa.[80]The chapter also gives a short history of colonial and post-colonial factors that caused the civil war between the North and South in Sudan, including a discussion of the political history of both the North and South and their respective representatives in the peace process, the NCP and the SPLM/A. This chapter also offers an introduction to the key role that IGAD played in negotiating an end to this fifty-year conflict - Africa's longest running civil war.

AU : a continent wide RSC development

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a considerable development of both a regional and continent wide African peace and security architecture reflected by African regional security communities such as IGAD and the African Union overall. One author that acknowledges the development of African security communities is Benedict Franke. He details how, with the replacement of the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) with the African Union in 2002, Africa has developed a considerable institutional peace and security architecture modelled on the EU.[81]This includes an elaborate, collective security system co-ordinated by a Peace and Security Council (PSC), supported by a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Peace Fund.[82] Importantly, unlike its predecessor the OAU, which had staunchly protected state sovereignty

[80] Healy, Sally, 'Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa', p.107.
[81] Franke, Benedikt, 'Africa's evolving security architecture and the concept of multi-layered security communities,'p.318.
[82] Francis, David, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems,* p.5.

and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, the AU Constitutive Act has provisions for intervention in states for protection of human rights.

'The AU Act (Article 4h) provides for the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the AU Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'.[83]Whilst sections of the AU Peace and Security Architecture are still being developed, such as the Standby Force, clearly with the new interventionist AU Act its members have shown a renewed ability and intent to act as the principle instrument for peace and security in Africa.[84]

Importantly, the African Union within the AU Constitutive Act has designated RECs (Regional Economic Communities) including SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD, UMA, ECCAS and COMESA with SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD being the only REC active in the peace and security sector.[85]ECOWAS intervention in the civil wars of Liberia and Sierre Leone with AU and UN approval was vital to restoring peace and stability in the region, and SADC under South African leadership intervened in Lesotho to reinstate a legitimate government there. [86] IGAD has emerged as the principle regional security community in the Horn of Africa with its role in both South Sudan and Somalia's peace processes, and this will be examined in more detail in the case studies in this thesis.

OAU–AU: State sovereignty to responsibility to protect (R2P)

To understand the significance of the development of the peace and security architecture of the African Union and IGAD's role in this structure, it is important to explain the failures and limitations of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which failed to bring peace and security to Africa. The OAU was even called the 'Dictators Club' as it supported and protected many despotic and authoritarian regimes in Africa throughout the post-colonial period.[87]The OAU was established in 1963 with a focus on the colonial struggle and independence from colonial rule. Additionally, the survival of the post-colonial state was a major focus, as while many African states possessed the international legitimacy of

[83]Packer, Corinne A.A, & Rukare, Donald, 'The new African Union and its Constitutive Act' *The American Journal of International Law,* 96:2, 2002, p.372.
[84] Franke, 'Africa's evolving security architecture and the concept of multi-layered security communities', p.322.
[85] Francis, David, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems,* p.5.
[86] Tavares, Rodrigo, 'The participation of SADC & ECOWAS in military operations: The weight of national interests in decision making', *African Studies Review*, 54:2, 2011, p.167.
[87] Murithi, Timothy, *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2005, p.27.

recognition by the UN upon decolonisation, they were territoriality weak with many facing insurgency threats from independence onwards.[88]

The OAU was dedicated to state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference including the maintenance of colonial borders inherited at independence in order to defend their very existence and avoid a feared balkanization of Africa post independence.[89]Hence, the OAU became a body incapable of protecting the peace and security of Africa and Africans due to these constraints developed in the post-colonial era. Julius Nyerere's (Ghana's post-independence leader) commented 'we must avoid judging each other's internal policies, recognising that each country has special problems'.[90]This statement summed up perfectly the OAU's guiding principles of state sovereignty and non-interference. This led to a continual failure by the OAU to maintain peace and security in Africa in the post-colonial period from the time of its establishment in 1963 to when it was replaced by the AU in 2002 with a unanimous vote by member states.[91]

In contrast to the OAU, the African Union seems to have embraced the international norm outlined in the UN document 'The Responsibility to Protect', and the doctrine of 'non-indifference' with the emphasis on humanitarian intervention in the role of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as seen in the African Union peacekeeping missions in Darfur and Somalia.[92] This seems to be a perfect example of Finnemore's constructivist belief that actors (states) engage in development of both domestic and international norms.[93]Acharya refers to this as 'norm localisation' where local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norm fits with the agent's cognitive views and identities.[94]As many authors have noted, the history of African institutionalism is filled with failed attempts to develop peace and security mechanisms and often practice doesn't always live up to the rhetoric,[95]but the African Union peace and security architecture and the AU Constitutive Act offers a truly African centred and carefully developed mechanism for resolution of conflict, which offers the hope of a renewed ability to promote peace and security on the African continent.

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[88] Jackson & Rosberg, p.11.
[89] Herbst, Jeffrey, 'The creation and maintenance of national boundaries in Africa', *International Organization,* 43:4, 1989, p.685.
[90] Williams, Paul, 'From non-intervention to non-indifference: The origins and development of the African Union's security culture', *African Affairs*, 106:423, 2007, p.265.
[91] Moolakkattu, p.153.
[92] Williams, p.271.
[93] Finnemore, p.5.
[94] Acharya, *Rethinking power, institution and ideas in world politics: Whose International Relations?*, p.12.
[95] Acharya, Amitav & Johnson, Alastair John, *Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective*, p.219.

The OAU's charter and its - strict adherence 'to the principle of sovereignty of member states and non-interference in their internal affairs'[96]- weakened that organisation's ability to intervene to prevent and manage conflicts, especially those of an internal nature. In contrast, the AU and its new Constitutive Act combined with the 'Peace and Security Protocol', and the 'Memorandum of Understanding' between the AU and the RECs allows for key co-ordination and action between the AU and the designated RECs that have taken on a peace and security role in their respective regions of Africa.[97]

AU and REC's - respective roles

The AU designated RECs form the practical basis of the peace and security architecture of the African Union. Importantly, and in clear contrast to the UN Charter that doesn't really define the relationship between the Security Council (Chapter VII) and Regional Organisations (Chapter VIII) in the maintenance of world peace and security, the AU Constitutive Act clearly outlines their relationship. Article 3 (1) of the Act states that the AU shall co-ordinate and harmonise polices between existing and future RECs (Regional Economic Communities) for the attainment of Union objectives. Additionally, Article 16 'Relationship with Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention' states that both bodies must keep each other informed and have shared responsibility for the peace and security of Africa. The AU Peace and Security Council is required to consult with regional mechanisms (RECs) to promote 'initiatives aimed at anticipating and preventing conflicts and in circumstances where conflicts have occurred, peacemaking and peace-building functions'.[98]In return the AU Peace and Security Council is also required to keep 'regional mechanisms fully and continuously informed of its activities'. [99]

The AU Constitutive Act's embedded act of reciprocity of responsibility is something completely lacking in the UN charter which acknowledges the regional organisation's role in resolution of peace and security issues, but lacks mechanisms of consultation and co-ordination with them.[100]Also, despite the role of regional organisations in peace and security in the UN Charter unlike the AU Act, the UN Security Council retains supremacy in matters of peace and security and is also authorised to act in regional conflicts by virtue of a

[96] Moolakkatta, p.152.
[97] Abass, Ademola (ed), *Protecting Human Security in Africa*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp.252-253.
[98] Abass, p.254.
[99]Ibid.
[100] Boulden, Jane(ed), *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, p.81.

resolution of the Security Council.[101]This is just one example of how the reconstituted African Union is moving beyond the Western liberal tradition reflected in the UN Security Council where a few states (i.e. the permanent members) have made decisions on peace and security, or vetoed decisions that have left regional organisations powerless to affect peace and security in their region.

The AU Constitutive Act aims to avoid this clash between the overall African peace and security architecture and the vital role of regions in the resolution of conflict and the maintenance of peace and security. Neighbouring states have more invested in solving regional conflicts that may come to affect their own security. The AU Constitutive Act acknowledges their leading role in regional peace and security within the overarching structure of the AU peace and security architecture.[102]Hence, despite some constructivist's dismissal of African attempts to develop regional security communities, the AU Constitutive Act actually allows much greater independence, support and co-ordination in their development in Africa than presently exists in the UN Charter: the world-wide collective security community.

IGAD's development into the regional security community for the Horn of Africa (IGADD to IGAD)

The focus of this thesis is IGAD, the regional security community, and analysing whether it does and does not fit the classic Deutschian concept, and how it has developed its own distinctively African characteristics including its members shared norms and identities. IGAD is one of the designated RECs in the new African Union peace and security architecture, and like the other RECs its development predates the AU. IGADD (Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development) was founded in 1986 as a drought and development agency in response to recurring severe droughts and natural disasters in the Horn of Africa between 1974 and 1984. In 1996 IGADD extended its mandate to include peace and security and humanitarian affairs, along with food security, environmental protection, economic cooperation and integration.

The institution was renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996 to reflect its new status and expanded mandate with its headquarters in Djibouti.[103]The AU Constitutive Act recognises the RECs (Regional Economic Communities) and designates

[101] Francis, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*, p.5.
[102] Abbas, p.255.
[103] www.igad.int

them with regional peace and security responsibilities, but in fact IGAD had already assumed this role since 1994 in the politically volatile and unstable region of the Horn of Africa. 'The characteristics of conflict in the Horn of Africa made the development of peace and security mechanisms both more urgent and more difficult than in other regions of Africa'.[104]IGAD's member states were and remain today Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Eritrea became a member upon gaining independence in 1993 but withdrew in protest at Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in response to the rise to power of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006. South Sudan was admitted in 2011 upon gaining independence.[105]

Whilst IGAD doesn't fit the Deutschian concept of a security community with its members not sharing liberal democratic beliefs, it does as constructivism theory notes share its own set of distinctively African shared norms, beliefs and ideas including member states' experiences of colonialism, post-colonialism and, the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. All these events have impacted on all of the developing world and particularly Africa, but this is even more so in the Horn of Africa where IGAD works to maintain peace and stability. Due to its strategic location external powers have frequently intervened in the politics of the Horn of Africa and exacerbated local conflicts.[106]

During the Cold War, the USA and USSR superpowers fought various proxy wars there and supported at various times Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia, often in wars against each other. Additionally, member states themselves have a history of mutual interference in each other's affairs 'which has been prevalent for most of the last 30 years'.[107]This pattern of mutual interference in each others internal politics and conflicts is reflected in both South Sudan and Somalia case studies. In South Sudan's struggle for independence, for example, in the fifty-year civil war and in the present crisis, IGAD members have been directly involved in the conflicts. For instance, while Ethiopia supported the SPLA/M in its quest for an independent state in South Sudan, Sudan/Khartoum responded with support for Eritrean insurgents in Ethiopia by harbouring and providing logistics for them.[108]The ongoing Somalian conflict has also been exacerbated by Ethiopia's invasion in 2006 to oust the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) with its regional foe Eritrea then being accused of supporting the Islamists in their

[104] Healy, Sally, 'Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa', p.107.
[105] Healy, Sally, 'Peacemaking in the midst of war: An assessment of IGAD's contribution to regional security', *Working Paper No.89, series 2, Royal Institute of International Affairs*, London, 2009, p.3.
[106] Selassie, Bereket Hable, *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa*, Monthly Review P*ress*, New York, 1980, p.1.
[107] Cliffe, p.89.
[108] Cliffe, p.91.

struggle against the Ethiopian invasion and the present AU peacekeeping force (AMISOM).[109]

IGAD's RSC architecture development

However, with the development of the new IGAD mandate and agreement in 1996 including among its principles 'the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security and protection of human and people's rights',[110]IGAD has aimed to both promote peace and stability in the region and also create mechanisms for preventing, managing and resolving conflict in the Horn of Africa through dialogue. With its new mandate in 1996 that included peace and security for the region, it established a dedicated IGAD Secretariat with a division for peace and security.

Additionally, IGAD has since developed extensive institutional operational organs that assist in achieving peace and stability in the Horn of Africa, including four policy forums: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, The Council of Ministers, The Committee of Ambassadors, and an expanded Secretariat headed by an Executive Secretary assisted by the Directors of Divisions of Economic Cooperation and Social Development, Agriculture and Environment, Peace and Security and Administration and Finance. There is also an IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU-IGAD) of speakers of parliaments of IGAD states (2007) and an Executive Council was established in 2008 as its supreme decision-making body.

In 2003 a Civil Society Forum was also established and much earlier in 1998 IGAD established the IPF (International Partners Forum) to establish formal relations with 'Friends of IGAD' (e.g. US, UK, EU) to assist both logistically and financially with IGAD operations. These partners have proved crucial in South Sudan and Somalia peace negotiations led by IGAD. IGAD also launched its own 'Peace and Security Strategy' in 2005 to develop, implement and sustain mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts in the IGAD region.[111]Indeed, in contradiction to Buzan and Waever's dismissal of IGAD in *Regions and Power*, IGAD has clearly developed into an effective regional security community for the Horn of Africa. 'The existence of IGAD has brought a new diplomatic dimension to conflict management in the Horn of Africa. … buttressed by the decision making powers through the AU PSC up to the level of the UN, giving the organisation a crucial agenda setting role in directing African and wider international responses to conflict in

[109] Moolakkattu, p.160.
[110] www.igad.int
[111] www.igad.int

the region',[112]which is a classic definition and role of a regional security community, and a definition this thesis aims to prove in detail.

While the members of IGAD have a history of mutual interference in each other's affairs, as Buzan and Waever note, neighbouring states are also the best placed to deal with regional issues of peace and security as IGAD now effectively does for the Horn of Africa. 'IGADD was founded just as a series of interrelated conflicts in the Horn were reaching a crescendo' [113]in Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia. Since its mandate was expanded in 1996 to respond to these regional conflicts it now offers a forum to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts both inter and intrastate through dialogue. The Horn of Africa, while still a place of conflict, with IGAD's development has managed to develop both an advanced peace and security organisational structure to deal with its conflicts through dialogue and mediation. It seems that IGAD has successfully combined both western norms of peace and security (e.g. parliaments, secretariats, bureaucracy) with African indigenous norms of consensus decision making and peacemaking through dialogue.

Another crucial aspect of security communities that Deutsch noted was the development of economic integration among members; and although the East African Economic Community was founded in 1960 to intensify trade and economy integration in East Africa due to infrastructure issues it had been largely neglected as an issue until IGAD's establishment and expanded mandate of 1996.[114]IGAD in its current Mission Statement states its aim is to both achieve regional peace and security, harmonise trade and macro-economic policies, and develop and improve co-ordinated and complementary infrastructure in the region.[115]IGAD, since its revitalised mandate in 1996 and with the development of the AU peace and security architecture in 2002, has clearly become the designated RSC for the Horn of Africa with increasing effectiveness.[116]

IGAD and the Horn of Africa- regional issues

As Buzan and Waever note, neighbouring countries can aid peace and security as they have much more invested in the outcome, but they can also act as spoilers which at various times in both the CPA and the present conflict in South Sudan IGAD members have done. As Sally

[112] Healy, Sally, 'Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa', p.107.
[113] Healy, p.106.
[114] Mazzeo, Domenico (ed), *African Regional Organisations,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pp.152-153.
[115] www.igad.int
[116] www.igad.int

Healy notes in the Horn of Africa 'the advancement of (regional and) foreign policies through proxy forces in neighbouring countries was part of the normal pattern of relations, entrenching a system of mutual interventions……..with hostile neighbours generally acting as enablers and multipliers of one another conflicts'.[117]This pattern was seen throughout fifty years of civil war before South Sudan's independence in 2011 with neighbouring countries backing either the North or the South in the civil war.

The history of regional interference was a contributing factor to the continuing conflict with opposing sides receiving support and arms from neighbouring countries with Sudan receiving support from the Gulf States while the SPLM at various times received support from Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya. Nevertheless, this pattern of regional interference of IGAD members also worked to advance the peace process of IGAD, as especially with the SPLM 'between them the IGAD members could exert decisive influence on the SPLM which depended on them heavily for diplomatic as well as military support whilst the US exerted considerable pressure on the government of Sudan'.[118]

IGAD and the Horn of Africa- international relations issues

Additionally, due to the strategic location of the Horn of Africa, IGAD has had to contend with both regional and international interference in its attempts to act as the regional security community for the Horn of Africa. Importantly, this has been a region of world strategic importance in the colonial, post-colonial, Cold War and post-Cold War eras with its location near the Red Sea and the Arabian Peninsula and important trade routes. The region's geography alone has defined it as a major geo-political area for the world...…this has long determined its relationship with the world'.[119]This strategic importance only increased with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and later when oil was discovered in the Middle East. 'The geostrategic location of the Horn and its proximity to the Middle East and the Islamic World meant that the region attracted a variety of regional and international conflicts'.[120]

During the Cold War especially, superpower rivalries played out in civil wars in the region with the USA and USSR backing various regimes against each other (e.g. Ethiopia, Sudan).[121] IGAD members hence (as in constructivism) do share values, norms and identities including a

[117] Healy, Sally, 'Peacemaking in the midst of war', p.4.
[118] Healy, p.8.
[119] Medani, Khalid, Mustafa, 'The Horn of Africa in the shadow of the Cold War: Understanding the partition of Sudan from a regional perspective', *The Journal of North African Studies*, 17:2, 2012, p.276.
[120] Francis, D, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*, p.219.
[121] Francis, D, p.220.

shared colonial past, arbitrary colonial boundaries that divided tribal groups, neglect of the periphery by the centre in both colonial and post-colonial eras, plus superpower interference in the Cold War era and more recently the 'War on Terror' in the post-Cold War era. 'The Horn is a reflection of the complex interconnectedness between intra-state conflicts and regional and international politics too'.[122]Therefore, IGAD's negotiation of the CPA, in particular, was a considerable achievement in such a turbulent region characterised by both regional and international interference due to the Horn of Africa's geopolitical strategic significance.

IGAD: environmental security in the Horn of Africa

An additional issue of importance to IGAD's role as the RSC for the Horn of Africa is its ability to address environmental security issues and land conflict issues, and in particular in relation to this thesis, conflicts in South Sudan and Somalia. 'Recurrent drought, resulting in famine and other troubles, among them environmental degradation and economic hardship are expressed in the impoverishment of broad sections of the populations, internal displacement and flows of refugees'[123]with the Horn of Africa having some 33% of the worlds internally displaced persons (IDP).

Additionally, there is no other region of conflict that has produced more death and destruction than the Horn of Africa since the Second World War.[124]As the region is home to both pastoralists and agriculturalists whose very existence is being 'jeopardised by drought, famine and violent conflict'[125]there is always the potential for conflict. This is now successfully being addressed through IGAD's development of CEWARN (Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism) but as it is restricted to border areas between IGAD members, it was excluded from responding to such key, environmentally driven, recent regional conflicts like Darfur which occurred within the borders of Sudan.[126]CEWARN was established in 2002 by IGAD and is based in Addis Ababa where the AU is now based to enable a continent wide co-ordinated monitoring and response to environmental conflicts.

[122] Francis, D, p.218.
[123] Bereketeab, Redie, (ed) *The Horn of Africa: Intrastate and Inter-state Conflicts and Security*, Pluto Press, London, 2013, p.72.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Markasis, John & Fukui, Katsuyoshi, *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, James Curry, London, 1994, p.1.
[126] Bereketeab, p.146.

IGAD and the CPA - peace and security in the Horn of Africa

IGAD's greatest achievement and contribution to peace and security in the Horn of Africa is clearly the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Nairobi, Kenya in 2005 that effectively ended fifty years of civil war between North and South Sudan, which preceeded independence from Britain and Egypt in 1956.[127]The first civil war lasted from 1956 to 1972 when the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement was brokered which gave the South regional autonomy. When the Sudanese President Numeri ended that agreement in 1982 he divided the South into three regions, to gain access to recently discovered oil and also began a policy of Islamisation of the South, including the introduction of Sharia law. The second civil war then erupted in 1983 and lasted until the CPA was signed in 2005.[128]

However, the CPA brokered by IGAD despite being a considerable achievement, as many commentators have noted, also failed to address important issues of remaining conflict between the North and the South, and thus significantly it failed to democratise either region, basically dividing the spoils between the two signatories of the NCP and SPLM/A and excluding other political parties from the peace process.[129]Additionally the IGAD brokered CPA had poor implementation mechanisms, including its failure to assist in establishing a functioning democratic and inclusive government in South Sudan, which seems to have directly contributed to the present conflict in South Sudan.[130]

Sudan - colonial and post-colonial history (including the emergence of the NCP and the SPLM/A)

Colonial rule

Both colonial and post colonial history of South Sudan is important in understanding the reasons for the fifty-year civil war between the North and South, which only ended with IGAD's successful negotiation of the CPA. This development ended the war and ultimately led to the separation of the South in an internationally monitored referendum in 2011. The Sudan has been under a continual process of Arabization and Islamisation since its invasion by Arab tribes from Upper Egypt and the Middle East across the Red Sea. This has occurred since the Middle Ages for both trade and slave raiding for armies by successive central and

[127] Brosche, Johan, *Sharing Power-Enabling Peace? Evaluating Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005,* Dept of Peace and Confict, Uppsala University, Sweden, 2009. p.17.
[128] Duffy Toft, Monica, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010, p.117.
[129] Curless, Gareth & Peen Rodt, Annemarie, 'Sudan and the not so comprehensive peace', *Civil Wars*, 15:2, 2013. p.106.
[130] International Crisis Group, 'South Sudan: A civil war by any other name', Africa Report No 217, Brussels, Belgium, 2014, p.3.

coercive states.[131]In fact, Sudan has actually been subject to three periods of colonial conquest from the Turko-Egyptian conquest of 1820, to a Mahdist state in the ninteenth century (1885-1898) to the Egyptian British Condominium rule from 1890 to 1956 to independence.[132]

The causes of the fifty-year Sudanese civil war had a direct connection with the history of colonial neglect of the South and other closed district areas under the British-Egyptian Condominium rule and continuation of this legacy by the post-colonial elites of Khartoum.[133] The colonial period of rule provided the historical basis for a divided Sudan and its lack of post-colonial unity. The Arabic Islamic North was developed under colonial rule with the Khartoum elites trained as colonial administrators while the British administered the African, Christian/Animist South as a closed undeveloped district with Christian missionaries allowed to administer the education system and English being taught. Mixing between Africans and Arabs, especially marriage, was discouraged and the spread of Islam was prevented by the British while it also kept the South a closed district to protect against northern slave raiders.[134]

Post-colonial rule - Northern/Khartoum elites

As in other colonial administrations in Africa, in Sudan the colonial period first created the 'client and patron state and a large corrupt bureaucracy with little entrepreneurial skills'.[135] This bureaucratic elite who relied on the state and used coercive methods to maintain political control and economic domination continued to hold power post independence. In Sudan the Khartoum elites of riverine Arabs mainly based around the Nile River Valley and Khartoum took on this post-colonial patrimonial role.

Most Indigenous African groups in Sudan have been marginalised by the post independence Sudanese elite who are drawn from just three riverine Arab tribes (The Jaaliyin, the Shaigiya and Danagla tribes) who continue to dominate Sudanese politics, government and state resources and this has fuelled the many regional conflicts, including in the South.[136]The regional wars that continue today have also absorbed much of the country's budget and deepened the marginalisation of the regions. As Khalid Mansour wrote, 'Failure to recognise

[131] Johnson, Douglas, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, James Curry, Oxford, 2003, p.1.
[132] Ryle, John, Willis, Justin, Baldo, Suliman, & Jok, Jok, Madut, *The Sudan Handbook,* James Curry, Suffolk, 2011, pp. 55-59.
[133] Deng, Francis, M, *War of Visions: Conflicts of Identities in the Sudan,* The Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 1995, p.10.
[134] Morrison, Godfrey, *The Southern Sudan and Eritrea: Aspects of Wider African Problems*, The Minority Rights Groups, London, 1960, p.9.
[135] Allen, T & Thomas, A, *Poverty and Development in the 1990's*, Oxford Univeristy Press, Oxford, 1992, pp.10-11.
[136] Ryle et al, p. 35.

the rights and needs of ethnic groups within mulit-ethnic states or heedlessness of the rights of deprived groups inside national entities, only leads to endless and bitter struggles,'[137]as it has throughout Sudan's history post independence and which directly led to the fifty-year civil war with the South.

Additionally, like many African states, Sudan since independence in 1956 has been ruled by a succession of military governments interrupted by only brief periods of parliamentary democracy.[138]The major political parties in Sudan are all northern based and again dominated by the three riverine Arab tribes. These sectarian political parties that formed pre independence are the Umma Party, the National Unionist Party (later the Democratic Unionist Party) and the Muslim Brotherhood, which first emerged in the 1940's and later became the National Islamic Front. This party backed the military coup that installed Omar Bashir as Sudan's President in 1989 and then developed into the ruling party of the National Congress Party, which negotiated the end of the second civil war with the SPLM/A in the IGAD sponsored CPA. After the Islamist coup of 1989 an Islamist state developed in Sudan inspired by religious leader and northern politician Husan al Turabi, which effectively replaced traditionally tolerant Sudanese Sufi Islam with a fundamental brand of Islam (e.g. Sharia Law). Turabi was eventually ousted from the NIF by Bashir in 2000 but he remained influential in Sudanese politics until his recent death, including influencing General Nimeiri to repeal the South's autonomy and impose Sharia law in 1982, which sparked the second civil war. [139]

Southern rebellion (Anyanya and SPLM/A)

In contrast to the North, the South had developed less political structures due to its isolation and lack of development and unity with the North under the closed district policy of the Egyptian-British Condominium rule. There was a pre-independence conference in 1946 in Juba at which the Southern leadership were promised Southern autonomy within a Federal system, but that was only to secure Southern support for independence from Egyptian-British rule and was soon reneged on, once independence was achieved. While the South did participate in nation-wide elections in 1953 held before independence, with the Liberal Party representing the South, the Northern based National Unionist Party won the majority of seats

[137] Khalid, Mansour, *The Government they Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan's Political Evolution*, Kegan Paul, London, 1999, p.424.
[138] Woodward, Peter, *Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State,* Lynne Reinner, Boulder, 1990, p.237.
[139] Ryle et al, pp. 94-95.

and began the Sudanisation of the state, appointing Northerners to key government and political positions.[140]

The Torrit rebellion of 1955 of Southern troops was the beginning of the first liberation war which was fought by the guerrilla army of the Anyanya (1955-1972) with the aim of Southern independence. Anyanya also had a political wing of the SANU (Sudan African National Union) but both the military and political wings were plagued by continual splits with the Southern Liberation Front emerging from a collection of Anyanya commanders, becoming the eventual negotiator of the Addis Ababa peace agreement with the Nimeiri government that ended the first civil war in 1972.[141]

The SPLM/A which was the Southern liberation movement that fought the second civil war against the North was formed in 1983 in response to the breaking of the Addis Ababa peace agreement that had brought peace and autonomy to the South from 1972 to 1983. The SPLM/A again began its existence with a mutiny of Southern troops at Bor in 1983 in response to the breaking of the Addis Ababa peace agreement, including the imposition of Sharia law and the dissolving of the Southern Legislative Assembly. The SPLM/A were rebels who 'fled into the bush and neighbouring countries where they re-grouped and emerged as various rebel groups, the dominant one being the SPLA/M' led by Dr John Garang, one of the rebel commanders who had mutinied at Bor.[142]

The SPLA/M under Garang was a highly disciplined and effective liberation army and movement but again there was a major split in 1991 with the Nasir faction forming the SSIM (South Sudan Independence Movement), a Nuer based liberation movement in contrast to the Dinka dominated SPLA/M and in response to Garang's authoritarian style of leadership.[143] The Nasir faction's aim was to achieve an independent South Sudan in contrast to Garang's vision of a New Sudan where all ethnic groups, regions and communities would have equal citizenship rights in the state of Sudan.[144]Eventually the SSIM re-joined the SPLA/M before the CPA was negotiated, but its Khartoum agreement of 1996/7 with the North to allow a

[140] Khalid, Mansour, *War and Peace in Sudan : A Tale of Two Countries*, Routledge, London, 2010, pp.74-75.
[141] Johnson, Douglas, pp.26-37.
[142] Scott, Phillipa, 'The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Liberation Army' (SPLA), *Review of African Political Economy*, 12:33 , 1985, p.70.
[143] Meletis, Claire, 'Reformed rebels? Democratisation, global norms and the Sudan People's Liberation Army', *Africa Today*, 51:1, 2004, p.71.
[144] Garang, John, *The Call for Democracy in Sudan*, Kegan Paul, London, 1987, p.258.

plebiscite on South Sudanese independence was importantly incorporated into the CPA negotiated by IGAD in 2005.[145]

Conclusion

In conclusion, while constructivist scholars have largely dismissed Africa's new peace and security architecture under the AU and the security communities of the designated RECs, including IGAD, it is clear that they are now playing a central role in the negotiation of peace and security on the African continent. IGAD's role was crucial to the resolution of the fifty-year civil war between North and South Sudan. The very different colonial and post-colonial history of the North and South and the post-colonial Khartoum elites monopoly of power directly contributed to the fifty years civil war between the two regions, before the IGAD negotiated CPA in 2005, which finally bought an end to the conflict, the establishment of an interim government of national unity and the eventual independence of South Sudan in 2011.

The following chapter will investigate in more detail IGAD's actual negotiations that led to this considerable achievement, examining both IGAD's successes and failures in the negotiations and its development of some distinctively African RSC characteristics, mixed with Western approaches, norms and values. Its successful negotiation of the CPA remains its major achievement as the regional security community for the troubled and conflict region of the Horn of Africa, as designated by the AU under its new continent wide peace and security architecture as outlined in the AU Constitutive Act of 2002 and also recognised and now supported by the UN under Chapter VIII (Regional Organisations).

[145] Ryle et al, p.197.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY- IGAD AND THE SUDANESE CONFLICT:CPA NEGOTIATIONS

Introduction

This chapter examines the key role of IGAD in negotiating an end to Africa's longest running civil war in Sudan between the North and South, which had commenced even before independence in 1956 from Egyptian-British Condominium rule.[146]It examines the success and challenges that IGAD encountered in its negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Nairobi in January 2005. The CPA (which ended the fifty-year civil war between the North and South Sudan) was both a successful conclusion to an intractable conflict but also proved to be a significantly flawed document.[147]The CPA's failures have contributed to both continued clashes between the North and South after the South seceded in 2011 and also the present conflict in South Sudan (which resulted from a split in the South's ruling party the SPLM/A), to be examined in the next chapter.

This chapter also examines the distinctive aspects of IGAD as an African regional security community in the CPA negotiations including its use of traditional African conflict resolution techniques combined with its use of international partners to bring resolution to the conflict in Sudan. This clearly illustrates the development of the distinctive characteristics of non-European RSCs as first outlined by regionalism scholars such as Amitav Acharya in his study of ASEAN.[148]

IGAD and the Sudanese conflict: DOP negotiations and the start of the CPA

The CPA has undoubtedly been IGAD's greatest achievement as a regional security community for the Horn of Africa which effectively ended fifty years of civil war between the North and South. The CPA was negotiated over an eleven year period beginning with a 'Declaration of Principles' drafted by IGAD, which included self-determination for the South and a separation of state and religion for the South, first drafted in 1994. 'The document affirmed the need for a secular and democratic state, freedom of worship and religion',[149]but the DOP was ultimately rejected by Khartoum after it had first invited IGAD to help negotiate an end to the conflict in 1994, due to military stalemate and mounting external pressure after the US had declared Sudan a supporter of international terrorism and applied trade and

[146] Johnson, Douglas, pp.26-27.
[147]Mahmoud, Dimah I, 'Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement, amidst the clash of agendas : Attempts, failures and lessons learned', *Civil Wars*, 15:2, 2013, p.158.
[148] Acharya, 'Constructing a Security Community in South East Asia'.
[149] Mahmoud, Dimah I, p.158.

business sanctions.[150]With 'mounting external pressure, compounded with an economy reeling under the strain of war, decreased agricultural production, soaring inflation and high employment,[151]Sudan's international isolation and domestic pressures led it to request IGAD peace negotiations with regional support from neighbours also increasingly affected by the conflict.

Still, once IGAD had developed the DOP and they were then endorsed by the SPLM, the NCP government of Sudan rejected the DOP, stating that 'the issues of self-determination and secularism were not negotiable'.[152]Ultimately, there was no political will or support on the part of the Government of Sudan to implement the agreement or go further with the negotiations, maintaining that IGAD had overreached its mandate, especially regarding the option of self-determination for the South.[153]Despite attempts to revive the peace process by IGAD, the DOP remained unimplemented until Kenya took over the IGAD Presidency in 2001. This development revitalised the peace talks under Kenyan President Moi's leadership with both regional and international support which culminated in the signing of the CPA in January 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya.

Before the negotiations began, a permanent 'IGAD Secretariat for the Sudan Peace Process' was established and when Kenyan President Moi appointed General Sumbeiywo as Special Envoy to Sudan to restart the peace process with IGAD members and international support, progress was finally made towards ending the fifty-year civil war.[154]Interestingly, the same 'Declaration of Principles' (DOP) that the Government of Sudan (GOS) had rejected in 1994 formed the basis of new negotiations which Kenya led, as the President of IGAD in that period. 'Kenya brought the Khartoum government and the rebel factions into closer dialogue and consolidated the peace process'.[155]

The CPA actually comprised a series of agreements that were negotiated over a four year period, including the 'Machakos Protocol' (2002), which built on the earlier IGAD brokered DOP which allowed for regional autonomy for the South, participation in the national government and rewriting the Constitution to ensure Sharia law didn't apply to the South or any non-Muslim throughout Sudan. Importantly, the 'Machakos Protocol' outlined a six-year

[150] Iyob, Ruth & Khadiagala, Gilbert, M, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, Lynne Rienner, London, 2006, p.105.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Iyob & Khadiagala, p.103.
[153] Iyob & Khadiagala, p.106.
[154] Waihenya, 'The Mediator', p.38.
[155] Francis, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*, p. 228.

interim period after which the South would have the right to vote for independence in an internationally monitored referendum, either to vote to confirm Sudan's unity or vote for secession which the South did on January 2011 with a resounding 98% vote for independence.[156]

Other aspects of the IGAD brokered CPA included protocols on 'Power Sharing '(2004), 'Wealth Sharing'(2004), 'The Resolution of the Abyei Conflict' (2004), 'The Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States' (2004) and 'Security Arrangements' (2003 & 2004).[157]The final signing of the CPA was attended by all IGAD Heads of State, the IPF (International Partners Forum) and AU, EU and UN representatives in Nairobi on January 2005, signalling IGAD's greatest achievement in the area of peace and security as the regional security community for the Horn of Africa.[158]

IGAD and its use of both western and African traditional methods of conflict resolution and negotiation (including Ubuntu: an African and universal norm?)

Importantly, IGAD in its role in both the CPA and the present conflict in South Sudan has also shown its ability to mix distinctively African characteristics with more traditional western norms in both its operations and negotiation of peace in both South Sudan and Somalia. This includes the western norm of respecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the use of both western and traditional African methods of negotiation, including the African concept of 'Ubuntu,' that uses traditional African methods of peace and reconciliation as seen in other African post-conflict societies such as Rwanda and South Africa.[159]

Ubuntu is defined as an indigenous social perspective and philosophy that emphasises social harmony. In traditional African societies the belief in Ubuntu is that one is only a person realised through others. It is only in the spirit of Ubuntu with its emphasis on working together that problems can be solved. 'Ubuntu societies developed mechanisms for resolving disputes and promoting reconciliation with a view to healing past wrongs and maintaining social cohesion and harmony'.[160]Ubuntu hence operates as a traditional conflict resolution process in Africa that engages the whole community in peacemaking, as seen in the

[156] Curless & Peen Rodt, p.101.
[157] Accord, 'A summary of the Comprehensive Peace agreement: Peace by piece, addressing Sudan's conflict', *Accord* Issue 18, 2006. www.c-r.org/accord/Sudan.
[158] Waihenya, p.142.
[159] Murithi, Tim, 'Peace making and African traditions of Justice and Reconciliation', in *Peace-making from Practice to Theory, vol 1*, (eds) Nan, Mampilly & Bartoli, ABC-CLIO, LLC, California, 2012, p.276.
[160] Murihti, p. 284.

establishment of the 'South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission' and the traditional Gacaca courts set up in Rwanda after the genocide there, to promote truth, justice and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda in which victims and perpetrators together 'achieve restorative rather than retributive justice'. [161]

Other post-conflict societies that have utilised Ubuntu concepts include Northern Ireland in the achievement of the Good Friday agreement of 1998. In fact in May 1996, delegates from the various factions of the peace process in Northern Ireland travelled to South Africa to attend the 'Aniston Indaba Conference' where they met with members of the South African government who had participated in their own peace settlement just a few years earlier.[162] They had been guided in their negotiations to end the violent era of apartheid, by Ubuntu principles of peace, reconciliation, harmony and forgiveness as exemplified in leaders, such as Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who drew upon 'these aspects of their cultural values and attitudes to enable the country to move beyond its violent past'.[163]This conference was importantly seen as producing the atmosphere of cross-community engagement that contributed to the atmosphere that helped achieve the final breakthrough in the Northern Ireland peace process in 1998.[164]As noted by Michael Roe, 'forgiveness overcomes cycles of societal violence and removes revenge as a motivator…..and can be an intentional tool of intervention into ethnic conflicts'[165]in many countries and the African traditional conflict resolution concept of Ubuntu could offer this tool for post-conflict societies everywhere.

Tim Murithi believes that Ubuntu could actually become a universal norm in the same way western concepts such as human rights have become, with Ubuntu's cultural world view of 'the essential unity of humanity, the principles of empathy, sharing and cooperation in our efforts to solve common problems offering important lessons towards world peace'.[166] Ubuntu is also linked with African customary law where sanctions included repatriation and fines or social isolation and banishment versus death, as the social bonds of the society must be preserved. Therefore, in Ubuntu there is an emphasis on reconciliation and compromise,

[161] Adebayo, Akanum, Benjamin, Jesse J & Lundy, Brandon D, *Indigenous Conflict Management Strategies: Global Perspectives*, Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland, 2014, p. 125.
[162] Bishop, Alec Timberlake, 'Models of reconciliation: From conflict towards peace in Northern Ireland and South Africa during the 1990's', *Digital Commons*, Seattle Pacific University Library, 2016, p.44.
[163] Murithi, Tim & Murphy, Paula, 'Under the Acacia: Mediation and the dilemma of inclusion', *Africa Mediator's Retreat* no.6, 2011, p.80.
[164] Bishop, p.47.
[165] Roe, Micheal, D, 'Intergroup forgiveness in settings of political violence: Complexities, ambiguities and potentialities', *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology,* 13:1, 2007, p.4.
[166] Murithi, Timothy, 'Practical peacemaking, wisdom from Africa: Reflections on Ubuntu', p.32.

group responsibility and informal enforcement procedures including that compensation and restitution is favoured over punishment and retribution, as practised in Western culture.[167] Ubuntu and its approach of reconciliation and harmony were clearly featured in the IGAD negotiation techniques in the CPA process.

This distinctively African concept and norm of peace and security was especially crucial in the one-on-one negotiations between Dr John Garang (SPLM Chairman) and Ali Osman Taha (NCP/GOS Vice President). General Sumbeiywo notes that when the two leaders of the respective sides (NCP & SPLM) were first brought together to break an impasse in the negotiations they were placed in a room on their own with only one bottle of water and two glasses placed before them. Both men related that a long silence passed between them and then Garang poured a glass of water for Osman Ali first and then himself. Both men recognised this as a traditional healing gesture that would lead to reconciliation. The personal bond that formed from then on was crucial in keeping the negotiations going successfully, despite much opposition from hardliners on both sides (SPLM and NCP).[168]

General Sumbeiywo, as IGAD's chief negotiator, also noted that his father's experience as a tribal chief influenced his own peacemaking role in the CPA process and he 'had to throw in everything he learned from his father, who was a chief and a mediator and everything he learned from watching elders arbitrate in disputes'.[169]He notes that the African conflict resolution Ubuntu model he observed as a child is that when he watched elders arbitrate in disputes, 'they sit under a tree whenever there is a dispute, listen to all sides of the conflict, ask the necessary questions and rarely did they fail to get a solution'.[170]Sumbeiywo applied this Ubuntu approach in the IGAD negotiations in conjunction with western styles of mediation assisted by the IPF and Troika, allowing 'the parties to vent their feelings, and thrash out the issues they had to negotiate before settling down collectively to debating them.'[171]

In contrast to the western norm of majority vote in regional security communities such as NATO, the developing world seems to be clearly developing its own norms in negotiations based on traditional consensus decision-making models of pre-colonial times. This is also

[167] Fenrich, Jeanmarie, Galizzi, Paolo, Higgins, Tracy E, *The future of African Customary Law,* Cambridge University Press, , New York, 2011, p.60.
[168] Waihenya, p.124.
[169] Waihenya, p.39.
[170] Ibid.
[171] Ibid.

clearly seen in Acharya's study of ASEAN and the use of the Malay Kampung village processes of peaceful conflict resolution,[172] and IGAD's use of traditional African Ubuntu processes in the CPA negotiations exemplifies this too.

Colonialism's disruption of indigenous conflict resolution models

As Tim Murithi notes, 'colonialism disrupted the traditional African forms of peacemaking by not taking culture into account, by externally imposing a specific framework of knowledge… [resulting] in the colonisation of a people's mental power and knowledge and a denial of their worldview'.[173]Colonialism undermined African cultural heritage and was based on the assumption of the superiority of European culture and modernity in relation to African and indeed all indigenous cultures throughout the world.[174]For instance, Australian Aboriginals also had sophisticated methods of conflict resolution that were severely disrupted by colonialism. This included groups of leaders, or elders who would 'determine the appropriate action or ceremony in the case of conflict situations or infractions against the lore,'[175]and despite the existence of conflict and violence in traditional Aboriginal society, peace and relatedness prevailed until European colonialism severely disrupted these indigenous modes of conflict resolution.[176]

Societies throughout the world beyond the West have all developed their own cultural mechanisms and institutions for managing disputes and conflicts 'that preserves the integrity and fabric of the society'.[177]Colonalism severely disrupted this process throughout the developing world, which is only now being reclaimed by regional security communities such as ASEAN and IGAD. These regional security communities are successfully employing traditional peacemaking and reconciliation models in peace negotiations, such as the CPA, with the assistance of International support from partners such as the Troika (US, UK, Norway).

Murithi in his exploration of traditional African peacemaking processes noted though that these traditional African processes have unfortunately also often been patriarchal in approach and excluded both women's views and civil society.[178]Importantly, IGAD has addressed these

[172] Acharya, 'Constructing a Security Community in South East Asia', p.78.
[173] Murithi, 'Peacemaking and African traditions of Justice and Reconciliation', p.281.
[174] Adebayo & Lundy, p.9.
[175] Bishop, Helen & Coburn, Clare, 'An overview of traditional forms of Indigenous conflict resolution and peace in Australia', in *Peace Psychology in Australia*, Springer Science and Business Media, 2012, p.20.
[176] Bishop & Coburn, p.29.
[177] Murithi, p.281.
[178] Ibid.

issues in its establishment of civil society and women's groups to support IGAD peace and security issues through its forums. In IGAD's -2000 'Khartoum Declaration of Heads of State'- it 'recommended the establishment of a subregional mechanism for conflict prevention, association of professional unions, parliamentary unions and associations among civil society institutions at the subregional and national levels, with the aim of enhancing their contribution to promoting democracy across the subregion'.[179]In 1999 IGAD also established a women's desk within the IGAD Secretariat to 'ensure mainstreaming of gender into IGAD priority projects and programs'[180]and increase women's participation in IGAD priority areas of social, political and economic areas including peace and security issues.

IGAD : African solutions to African problems (African or western norm?)

Finally, as Kenyan President Moi wrote in his introduction to *The Mediator*, a book about General Sumbeiywo and IGAD's negotiation of the CPA to end the fifty-year civil war in Sudan,'it is a matter of great pride that it took an African to do what foreigners could not and thereby reiterate the fact that African solutions to African problems will come from African's themselves, from the resources of the continent and not from outside its borders.'[181]This idea fits perfectly with Acharya's analysis of the distinctive developing word subsidiary of western norms such as non-interference, which manifests as 'The African normative order [that] would continue to reject superpower intervention, espouse regional autonomy and develop regional institutions geared to achieving African cooperation if not outright political unity,' [182]which also demonstrates the IGAD and African norm of pan-Africanism.

Interestingly, Sudanese President Omar Bashir in his original invitation for IGAD to mediate the civil war between the North and South in 1994 stated similar ideas of the African norm of non-interference in the African continent when he noted 'that IGAD would be neutral and transparent, but without loopholes through which colonialism could penetrate in the pretext of humanitarianism….Africans have become mature enough to resolve their own problems… and are no longer in need of a foreign guardian'.[183]While importantly, Bashir also wanted to prevent foreign intervention in the conflict, his endorsement of African solutions for African problems clearly fits with Acharya's analysis of the norm of prevention of foreign interference in Africa that has taken on a distinctive norm for all African regional security

[179] Weldesellassie, Issac K, 'IGAD as an international organisation, its Institutional development and shortcomings', *Journal of African Law*, 55:1, 2011, p.11.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Waihenya, p. vi.
[182] Acharya, Amitav, 'Norm subsidiarity and regional orders: Sovereignty, regionalism and rule making in the Third World', *International Studies Quarterly*, 55:1, 2011, p.115.
[183] Iyob & Khadiagala, p.103.

communities including IGAD. This clearly reflects the constructivist view of norm localisation and subsidiarity, outlined by both Acharya and Finnemore, that non-European security communities like IGAD localise and adapt both western and traditional norms in the development of their own distinctive regional security community's characteristics.[184]

IGAD and its international partners: IPF and the Troika

IGAD's unique development of international partners in the CPA peace process has emerged as another distinctively African norm and mechanism for achieving peace and security by a non-European RSC. The IGAD International Partners forum (IPF) which provided both technical, logistic and financial resources to the IGAD peace process in Sudan 'grew out of the Friends of Sudan Group founded by Norway and the Netherlands in the mid 1990s [and] one of its most important contributions was strong and continuous support of IGAD and the peace process'.[185]A key international group that later developed from the IPF and that was especially instrumental in the IGAD led peace negotiations was the Troika (US, UK and Norway). General Sumbeiywo notes 'that the talks would have gone nowhere without the US and British support and their international pressure on both parties (NCP and SPLM) at key points in the negotiations'.[186]US sanctions in response to Khartoum's aggressive Islamisation and sponsorship of terror in the 1990s applied pressure to the NCP, and later the American Congress and Christian lobby groups also supported the peace process by applying pressure to both the NCP and the SPLM. Critically, 'In early 2002, the USA together with Norway and the UK (The Troika) began to provide technical assistance as well as applying political pressure on both the NCP and SPLM/A in the peace process'.'[187]

The Troika continually supported IGAD mediation, including funding the establishment of an IGAD Sudan Secretariat and provided General Sumbeiywo with crucial technical support in mediation methods and funding to continue the talks, which allowed for more intensive and ultimately successful negotiations. This technical assistance during the CPA negotiations included negotiation training and workshops for all CPA participants. The Troika was especially supportive of General Sumbeiywo in his role as chief negotiator in the IGAD peace process in Sudan that led to the achievement of the CPA in 2005. These international partners were also instrumental in the actual funding of the ongoing peace process that utilised both traditional and western norms of peacemaking and ranged over four years from the restarting

[184] Acharya, Amitav, 'Norm subsidiarity and regional orders', p.97.
[185] Johnson, Hilde, F, *Waging Peace in Sudan: The Inside Story of the Negotiations that Ended Africa's Longest Civil War*, Academic Press, Sussex, 2011, p.25.
[186] Waihenya, p.146.
[187] Johnson, Hilde F, p.50.

of the process in 2001 by Kenya and IGAD to the final signing of the CPA in Nairobi in January 2005.[188]

IGAD and the CPA - flaws in the process: implementation

While the CPA was indeed a significant achievement for IGAD in its role as the regional security community in the Horn of Africa, under the AU peace and security architecture, it has also proved to be a document with considerable flaws, especially in the post implementation and monitoring phases. It has been noted in studies of other negotiated settlements of civil wars that while 'negotiated settlements promise many benefits, …without a threat of direct injury as a consequence of defection, they tend to break down and fail'.[189] This happened with the earlier 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement reached to end the first Sudanese civil war where there were no mechanisms to stop Nimeiri ending its key pillars (e.g. regional autonomy and religious freedom).

Interestingly, General Sumbeiywo describes in detail his largely unsuccessful attempts to include implementation mechanisms in the CPA including protocols on the border areas. He believed that other Sudanese peace agreements, such as the Addis Ababa agreement, had failed due to their dishonouring, by Khartoum. General Sumbeiywo in the final phases of the IGAD led CPA negotiations, introduced the concepts of implementation and monitoring in workshops on 'Proposal on Methods of Work for conducting the Negotiation Session of Implementation of Modalities'. He was assisted by international negotiation partners, such as Nicolas Finke, who had assisted Nelson Mandela in the South African peace process negotiations and Hilde Johnson (Norway's Foreign Minister) as part of the IPF with Norway having proved an especially crucial partner in the IGAD CPA process, both diplomatically and financially.[190]No real implementation and monitoring methods however were incorporated into the CPA, which ultimately has contributed to its limitations in bringing lasting peace between the North and South and also within the two countries.

Significantly, even when the government of National Unity was formed after the CPA was signed and during the six-year interim period before the vote on independence, there were disagreements over the allocation of ministries, oil revenues and Abyei. This disputed border area was already becoming an area of bitter disagreement,despite a ruling by the CPA sponsored Abyei Boundary Commission, disputed and ignored by Khartoum that gains 60%

[188] Johnson, Hilde, F, p.25.
[189] Duffy Toft, p.160.
[190] Waihenya, p.134.

of its oil revenue from this area.[191]These issues were included in the additional CPA protocols but due to poor implementation processes they continued to be areas of dispute between the two signatories of the CPA (the NCP and SPLM) both during the interim period of the CPA under the government of National Unity and post South Sudan's independence.

Failure of IR support for IGAD and CPA: implementation phase

In Hilde Johnson's personal account of the IGAD brokered CPA process in *Waging Peace in Sudan*, the Norwegian Foreign Minister also notes that while the IPF, and in particular, the Troika (UK, US, Norway) had played a crucial supporting role in IGAD's CPA negotiations, both diplomatically and logistically including financially sponsoring ongoing talks, this international support failed to continue after the CPA was completed. Johnson notes that in the CPA implementation phase that IGAD had brokered, it failed to retain the crucial international support that had proved so decisive in the CPA's achievement. Johnson notes that 'peace building is as critical as peacemaking… and importantly more than half of peace agreements fall apart and the parties relapse into war'.[192]Essential peace building processes include the political process, the provision of security, ensuring that processes of protection and demobilisation happen, and reconstruction and development of war affected areas, but none of these peace dividends eventuated after the IGAD brokered CPA was signed. The lack of international support that IGAD retained after the signing of the CPA contributed to the failure to achieve this.

For instance, the IGAD Joint Donor Office, set up to provide funds for reconstruction and rebuilding in both the North and South never functioned as intended and the Multi-Donor Trust administered by the World Bank 'supposedly the speediest MDTF in World Bank history proved to be the world's slowest'.[193]Importantly, a donor conference was held in Oslo and arranged after the signing of the CPA and a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) was established to assist with reconstruction in both the North and South supported by the International Donor's Fund formed by the IPF. 'Working relationships built up during the (CPA) talks, smoothed the formation of the Core Co-ordinating Group (CCG) for the JAM which was headed by Norway and comprised representatives from the GO5, the SPLM and UN and World Bank.'[194]

[191] Curless & Peen Rodt, p.109.
[192] Johnson, Hilde F, p.176.
[193] Johnson, Hilde F, p.210.
[194] Accord, 'A Summary of the Comprehensive Peace agreement: peace by piece: addressing Sudan's conflict', *Accord,* Issue 18, 2006, www-c-r.org/accord/Sudan, p.43.

In practice, JAM like the implementation modalities proposal failed to have a real impact on the CPA outcomes and 'there has been less progress than hoped for or envisaged'[195]and as mentioned 'most critically the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) designed to dispense funds according to the JAM' s recommendations [has] not functioned as planned …whether the international community is to blame for reneging on its commitment or whether the MDTF has been poorly managed and directed, the Sudanese people have yet to see the dividends of peace'.[196]The lack of continued international support for IGAD and the CPA in the implementation phase has all contributed to this lack of a peace dividend for the people of Sudan, both in the North and South and this is seen as a contributing factor to the continued conflict both within and between the North and South in the post CPA era.

IGAD and the CPA- flaws in the process: NCP v SPLM/A only (other actors excluded)

As many commentators have noted the IGAD achievement of the CPA was also ultimately compromised by the exclusion of other voices from the agreement and the failure to democratise either the North or South, which continues to fuel many conflicts in the North and has contributed to the present conflict in the South. With the CPA's emphasis on reaching a North–South Agreement, principles of agreement on power and wealth sharing were developed but democracy was neglected. The CPA failed to incorporate the opposition parties (in both the North and South) in the peace process and as a result, there was little incentive for either the NCP or SPLM to adopt democratisation either in the interim period or beyond.

With a lack of democracy in the region as a whole and amongst IGAD members themselves, combined with international pressure to reach an agreement, there was also no real incentive for IGAD to deal with important peace building issues of post conflict resolution either in the North or South. These failures have directly contributed to both post-independence conflict within and between the North and South.[197]'The CPA with its divisions of spoils and entrenchment of the NCP and SPLM, coupled with the exclusion of the political opposition (in both the North and South) meant that the CPA was in effect a two-way deal between the two biggest military-political groups in Sudan'[198]excluding all other political parties and voices, including civil society too. The civil war in South Sudan and the current civil unrest in Sudan that has led to the removal of President Bashir and replacement with a Military Council

[195] Accord, p.44.
[196] Ibid.
[197] Mahmoud, p.165.
[198] Curless & Peen Rodt, p.106.

that has promised a return to civilian rule after elections scheduled in three years, is a clear result of the exculsion of other parties and voices to the CPA agreement.[199]

Whilst the international sponsors of the CPA did acknowledge the exclusive nature of the deal, they had hoped that with the CPA mechanism for state-wide elections planned for 2008, this would enable the opposition parties to bring about internal change. Still, when the nation-wide elections were finally held in 2010, just eight months before the referendum for South Sudan's independence, they were neither free nor fair with widespread vote rigging by the NCP in the North. The SPLM didn't even contest the elections in the North, preferring to maintain its CPA assured level of representation in the GONU (Government of National Unity) and only contesting the election in the South 'where it was certain of a strong electoral performance'.[200]

Additionally, the option of unity for Sudan that was included in the CPA was never really made attractive to southerners. In effect, 'while the CPA was designed to achieve a more equitable division of political and economic power in the hope that the Southern Sudanese would vote for unity and not separation of the country,'[201]with the untimely death of Dr. John Garang, some twenty-one days after the GONU (Government of National Unity) was formed, the CPA envisaged support of a New United Sudan which Garang also supported and the recognition of the many ethnic groups of Sudan was a doomed vision.[202]In contrast to the CPA's aims of unity and a New Sudan, in a referendum for southern independence held in 2011, 98% of the South (including diaspora) voted overwhelmingly for independence and South Sudan became Africa's newest nation.[203]

IGAD and CPA - flaws in the process: other areas of dispute and unenforced protocols

Finally, but importantly, whilst the CPA protocols covering Abyei and South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States addressed these border areas issues of marginalisation and neglect and allowed for power sharing and regional autonomy, these protocols were never implemented. This has resulted in continual conflict in these areas both pre and post South Sudanese independence and has affected both the North and South, contributing to instability

[199] Kirby, Jenny, 'Sudan's longtime leader was ousted in a military coup: Protestors still want democracy', *Vox*, 11 April, 2019, www.vox.com/world
[200] Curless & Peen Rodt, p.106.
[201] Curless & Peen Rodt, p.102.
[202] Deng, Luka Biong, 'The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement : Will it be sustained?', *Civil Wars,* 7:3, 2005, p.255.
[203] Johnson, Hilde F, *South Sudan: The Untold Story: From Independence to Civil War*, I.B.Tauris, London, 2016, p.1.

in both states (e.g. arms flows, refugees). These border areas where the SPLM North had fought with the SPLM have continued their rebellion against the Khartoum government, whilst it uses both armed militias and aerial bombardments against these civilian populations rather than addressing their grievances or implementing protocol agreements.[204]

With IGAD and the CPA's sole focus on achieving a peace agreement between the North (NCP) and South (SPLM) these areas while included in protocols in the CPA that have never been implemented, still remain in conflict. Additionally, in retaliation for the South's continued support of the SPLM-North in these border areas; Khartoum has also worked to undermine Southern stability both in the interim period of the CPA and post independence by supporting Southern rebel militias left out of the CPA peace process.[205]

CPA Flaws: Abyei and oil revenues

IGAD has also had to negotiate in subsequent disputes between the North and South post independence of the South including disputes over oil revenue sharing and the contested border area of Abyei.[206]Once South Sudan achieved independence in July 2011 with a resounding 98%of the vote for independence, the failures of the IGAD brokered CPA peace deal proved to be decisive in both the contested conflict zones between the North and South of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. There were even direct border clashes between the North and South over Abyei which threatened to restart the North versus South war.[207]This was a conflict that required intensive IGAD negotiation to end, with Ethiopian peacekeepers stationed in Abyei while a final resolution of the disputed border area remains unresolved.

Abyei's boundaries were decided by the CPA sponsored Abyei Boundaries Commission but its findings were then disputed by the North, and while it was agreed by both the North and South during the CPA interim period that there would be a referendum to decide Abyei's future, the referendum was postponed owing to disagreement over voter eligibility and has never been held. Abyei is inhabited by both African agriculturalists and Arab pastoralists which increases the potential for future conflict and with the North gaining 60% of its oil wealth from this region it will remain an area of contested ownership. Provocatively, the South included Abyei in its Transitional Constitution which angered the North, and an

[204] Young, John, *The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process,* Zed Books, London, 2012, p.xix.
[205] Salman, M. A, 'South Sudan's road to independence: Broken promises and lost opportunities', *Global Business and Development Law Journal,* 26:2, 2013, p.409.
[206] Curless & Peen Rodt, p.110.
[207] Curless & Peen Rodt, p.109.

unofficial referendum to join the South, held by largely African tribes in the disputed region, was held in 2013 which remains unrecognised both by IGAD and the UN.[208]A way forward over Abyei could be for IGAD to incorporate traditional conflict mechanisms used by the African Dinka and Arab Misseriya that had effectively kept peace in the border region before Khartoum's interference locally in support of the Misseriya; but with the oil issue now dominating Khartoum's interests in the area this could prove to be difficult to implement without crucial international support.[209]

Other subsequent disputes between the North and South that IGAD has had to adjudicate since southern independence that also have their origins in the CPA agreement include oil revenue sharing. The SPLM had withdrawn from the GONU (Government of National Unity) in the CPA interim period over oil revenue sharing included in the CPA Wealth Sharing Protocol (2004), which stipulated that 2% of national oil revenue was to go to the 'oil producing states in South Sudan in proportion to their output,'[210]with the remaining net revenue being evenly divided with 50% allocated to the GOSS (Government of South Sudan) and 50% allocated to the national government. The CPA also stipulated that GOSS would have no power to negotiate any oil leases granted by the central government prior to the CPA's signing off, which severely restricted the new nation's economic autonomy from the North.[211]A dispute after independence about oil revenue sharing led to the SPLM shutting down the pipeline to Port Sudan in the North as production is mainly based in the South and then transported, refined and exported through Sudan. In this dispute the AU brokered a solution with Thabo Mbeki, acting as chief negotiator, after IGAD had failed to break the impasse due to intransigency of both North and South.[212]

Conclusion

In conclusion, while the CPA is definitely IGAD's greatest achievement as the regional security community for the Horn of Africa, it also contained significant flaws that have led to continuing conflict both within and between the North and South. These flaws included the exclusive nature of the CPA that essentially shared the spoils between the NCP and the SPLM, and excluded other political parties and voices from the peace process. The CPA also

[208] BBC News, 'Abyei opts to join South Sudan in unofficial referendum 2013', 31 October 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world/africa.
[209] Zartman, I, William, (ed) *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict Medicine*, Lynne Reinner, Boulder, 2000, p.100.
[210] Accord, p.32.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Xinhua News Agency, 'UN Chief welcomes oil deal between Sudan and South Sudan', 6 August, 2012, http://search.proquest.com

lacked important implementation and monitoring mechanisms which has led to the non-implementation of protocols on the border areas and the continued rebellion of other marginalised regions and groups (e.g. Abyei, Blue Nile/Kordofan and Darfur) against Khartoum which continues to destabilise both countries (e.g. arms flows, refugees). [213]

Importantly, the international community's failure to assist IGAD both logistically and financially with the post-implementation and monitoring phase of the CPA has shown the continued need for African regional security communities, such as IGAD, to receive ongoing assistance from the international community to achieve lasting peace and security in their region. Still, this is not to underestimate the considerable achievement by IGAD in negotiating an end to Africa's longest running civil war with the signing of the CPA in Nairobi, Kenya on January 1, 2005. In addition, IGAD's unique use of both traditional African and western norms of conflict resolution, examined in this chapter, shows the distinctive and successful development of IGAD as the RSC for the Horn of Africa, which the next chapter further examines in regard to IGAD's role in attempting to resolve the current conflict in South Sudan.

[213] International Crisis Group, 'Sudan and South Sudan's merging conflicts', *Africa Report* No.223, Brussels, Belgium, 2015, p.i.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY – SOUTH SUDAN (IGAD AND THE PRESENT CONFLICT)

Introduction

This chapter examines IGAD's role in the present conflict in South Sudan that erupted in 2013, two years post independence. IGAD has acted as the chief negotiator for peace talks to end the conflict under Ethiopian leadership, as the current President of IGAD. IGAD has negotiated a comprehensive peace agreement 'Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in The Republic of South Sudan' (ARCSS) signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in August 2015 by the warring parties (the opposing SPLM and SPLM-In Opposition). This agreement was then revitalised by IGAD in 2018 as the R-ARCSS (Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan) with the assistance of regional foes and IGAD members, Sudan and Uganda. 'The accord [was] brokered by Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir and Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni'[214]with the final agreement being signed in Addis Ababa on September 12, 2018 under IGAD leadership with support from the AU, the UN and IGAD donor countries including the US, EU and China.[215]The agreement outlines a comprehensive roadmap to peace for South Sudan, including a government of national unity and 'provides for an eight month pre-transitional period, followed by a 36-month transitional period'[216]followed by internationally monitored elections in 2022.

This case study of South Sudan again reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of IGAD as the Horn of Africa RSC and the challenges it faces in negotiating an end to this crisis. These challenges include the CPA flaws examined in the previous chapter, the continued mutual interference of IGAD members, the failure to democratise the SPLM and the exclusion of other Southern voices from the CPA - all issues that have contributed to the present crisis in South Sudan. IGAD's distinctive use of international partners is again shown in their assistance with negotiations to end the conflict.

CPA flaws: other southern groups' exclusion

The conflict in South Sudan clearly also has its origins in both the CPA failures and the history of Sudan as a whole in both the colonial and post-colonial eras. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the CPA essentially divided the spoils of victory between the NCP and the

[214] International Crisis Group, 'Salvaging South Sudan's fragile peace deal', *Africa Report* No.270, Brussels, Belgium, 2019, Executive Summary.
[215] Ibid.
[216] Human Rights Watch, 'South Sudan: Events of 2018', *World Report 2019*, 8 December, 2018, www.hrw.org/word-report/2019/country-chapters/south-sudan

SPLM and largely failed to democratise Sudan as a whole, either in the North or South. 'The CPA excluded other key aggrieved parties both in the North and South and ignored inter-regional differences and assumed that the NCP led government and the SPLM/A represented an homogenous bloc in the regional divide'.[217]

In reality, there were many other political groups in both the North and South. In particular, South upon South violence had been a continual part of the civil war between the North and South, especially in the second phase of the civil war, which resulted in a split in the Dinka dominated SPLM with the Nasir Nuer dominated faction being led by Riek Machar, the present leader of the SPLM-In Opposition engaged in fighting against the Juba based SPLM regime led by Salva Kiir. 'Throughout the 1990's there was a violent deadly conflict between the Nuers and the Dinkas ……fuelled by a rift in the SPLM that ended up pitting the Dinka dominated SPLM against the Nuer dominated Sudan Independence Movement/Army which received support from the Government in Sudan'.[218]

Echoing the current conflict, the SPLM/A split in 1991 after the Ethiopian government fell to rebels and withdrew its support for the SPLM, including its use of Ethiopian bases, and this led to the split by dissenting SPLM commanders with their complaints of Garang's (SPLM/A Leader) authoritarian style of leadership. The Nasir faction accused Garang and others within the SPLM/A of 'creating a dictatorship, suppressing democracy and essentially ignoring the political platform established in 1983'.[219]Eventually the New Sudan Council of Churches and traditional Dinka and Nuer chiefs negotiated an end to this damaging and violent period of the SPLM/A split in Bahr-el-Ghazi Unit, Kenya in 1991.[220]Subsequently, the Nasir Faction (SSIM) re-joined the SPLM before the negotiation of the CPA by IGAD in 2005 which ended the second civil war.

Continued southern rebellions and the big tent policy

Significantly, South on South violence in South Sudan continued even after the signing of the CPA in 2005, with many southern militias still being funded by Khartoum to destabilise the South and in retaliation for South Sudan's ongoing support of SPLM North rebels in their

[217] Antwi-Boeteng, Osman & O'Mahony, Geraldine Maria, 'A framework for the analysis of Peace Agreements and lessons learned: The case of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement', *Politics & Policy*, 36:1, 2008, p.136.
[218] Redekop, Vern Neufield, 'Reconciling Nuers with Dinkas: A Girardian approach to conflict resolution', *Religion: an International Journal,* 37:1, 2007, p.65.
[219] Meletis, p.71.
[220] Redekop, p.76.

regional struggles against Khartoum.[221]Additionally, disaffected SPLM commanders had formed rebel militias in both the civil war period and the CPA interim period including the South Sudan United Army led by a Nuer ex SPLM/A commander Pauline Matipo that had remained outside the peace process, providing a further source of instability in the South. Following the 2010 national elections, other disaffected SPLM/A commanders who had failed to gain SPLM party endorsement also took up arms against the southern government in Juba, including George Abor of the South Sudan Democratic Movement (SSDM/A) and Peter Gadet, a Nuer ex SPLA/M commander who formed the South Sudanese Movement to fight against Juba and also joined the rebellion by the SPLM-IO against the government in Juba. [222]

These regional southern rebellions in the CPA interim period, 'real motivation can be found in a search for economic and political advantages and divisions created during the North South war'[223]among southerners. The SPLM did importantly convene a South-South Dialogue Conference in the interim period after the CPA to allow dissenting voices a forum to help solve inter-ethnic violence, and appeal for unity and reconciliation amongst southerners with some success, introducing a 'Big Tent' policy to integrate all rebel militias back into the SPLM/A. Nevertheless, the IGAD brokered CPA's inability to address post-conflict issues in South Sudan, including Khartoum's continued funding of southern militias to destabilise the South and its exclusion of other groups from the peace process, represents a clear failure by IGAD that has directly contributed to the present conflict in South Sudan.[224]

Additionally, the SPLM policy of granting amnesties to different factions that fought against Khartoum and then integrating them into the SPLM/A has actually encouraged regional rebellions, 'since it meant that military leaders could defect, fight for a while, be granted amnesty and then be reintegrated into the governmental structures often with a higher grade and salary'.[225]This policy of co-option of militias and factions was both costly economically for the South Sudan government and has also led to a deeply divided army with the SPLM becoming 'a collation of ethnic militias rather than a national army,'[226]with these deep divisions in the SPLM explaining the rapidness with which the civil war erupted in 2013.[227]

[221] Salman, p.409.
[222] Brosche, Johan & Hoglund, Kristine, 'Crisis of governance in South Sudan: Electoral politics and violence in the world's newest nation', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 54:1, 2016, p. 75.
[223] Brosche & Hoglund, p. 75.
[224] International Crisis Group, 'Sudan and South Sudan's merging conflicts', p.i.
[225] Brosche & Hoglund, p. 81.
[226] Brosche & Hoglund, p.82.
[227] Rolandsen, Oystein, H, 'Another civil war in South Sudan: The failure of guerrilla government', *Journal of Eastern African Studies,* 9:1, 2015, p. 165.

Additionally, local grievances and ethnic identities have been manipulated by both local and central elites for political power, 'thereby linking tribal politics to politics at the national level.[228]

Present conflict: the SPLM splits again

The present conflict in South Sudan started as a split in the SPLM, which spilled into armed confrontation in Juba on 15th December 2013, but quickly spread to other areas along ethnic lines, with the rebels (SPLM in opposition) being mainly from the Nuer tribe and the government forces (SPLM) being dominated by the Dinka tribe. As the International Crisis Group notes 'neither the CPA/Peace agreement that ended Sudan's second civil war (1983-2005) nor South Sudan's 2011 independence brought stability to either the North or South'.[229] Professor Mahmood Mamdami describes a similar opinion in the AU Report on the current conflict 'Tensions within the political class exploded at the meeting of the National Liberation Council in Juba on Tuesday 14th to -15th December 2013'[230]with a split in the SPLM leadership after several members announced their intention to run for the post of the SPLM Chairman. This occurred after the President Salva Kiir had sacked Riek Machar as Vice President in July 2013 and dissolved the government.

A skirmish broke out in the presidential guard between forces loyal to Kiir and Machar and the tension escalated to attacks in Juba on Nuer civilians with the ensuring violence in Juba being described as 'ethnically cleansing the city of Juba of its Nuer population: the motive of this violence was political: the violence which originated as a schism in the governing elite of South Sudan, targeted one particular ethnicity, the Nuer. Its intent and effect was to divide the civilian population along ethnic lines, to destroy the middle ground, thereby to polarize the society into us and them'.[231]This violence quickly spread to other areas of the county with atrocities committed by both sides in the subsequent fighting beyond Juba, particularly concentrated in the Nuer states of Upper Nile, Unity State and Jonglei. Both government forces supported by the Ugandan army and the SPLM-IO that formed after the attacks in Juba have been accused of war crimes by an AU report into the conflict.[232]

[228] Ibid.
[229] ICG, 'Sudan and South Sudan's merging conflicts, p.i.
[230] Mamdani, Mahmood, *A Separate Opinion: AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan*, AU Commission, Addis Ababa, 2014, p.6.
[231] Ibid.
[232]Human Rights Watch, 'South Sudan's new war: Abuses by government and opposition forces', 7 August 2014, www.sudantribune.org

Present conflict: regional interference issues for IGAD

Importantly, in the ongoing peace efforts by IGAD in the conflict in South Sudan ; the Horn of Africa's pattern of regional interference has again compromised IGAD's role as the area's regional security community and the initial ARCSS peace agreement. Uganda's early military intervention in the conflict to support the Kiir government increased regional tensions and clearly hindered IGAD's early diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. It seems that Uganda and Sudan are engaged in a proxy war in South Sudan with Uganda supporting the SPLM government of Kiir and Khartoum, providing support to the opposition with Riek Machar (SPLM-IO Leader) living in exile there. Khartoum's support for the SPLM-IO was driven primarily by Ugandan involvement in the conflict, but also by the fact that Sudanese rebels (from the North) were fighting alongside the southern government. 'Khartoum also maintains that Juba continues to support the SRF (Sudanese Revolutionary Front: a northern based rebel group) and allows Uganda to arm it via the Yadao airstrip'.[233]Ongoing support from Uganda and the SRF to the government and more limited support from Sudan to the opposition 'embolden[ed] hardliners in both camps and the regional impasse shapes the national level peace talks'. [234]

IGAD mediation and negotiation

Since January 2014 after the present conflict erupted, IGAD negotiated a 'Cessation of Hostilities Agreement,' in January 2014 and in December 2017 and negotiated the withdrawal of the Ugandan army that had intervened at the request of South Sudanese President Kiir to ensure the government's survival.[235]The ARCSS Peace Agreement signed by both parties (SPLM & SPLM–IO) on August 25th, 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia under both regional and international pressure and now the revitalised agreement (R-ARCSS) of September 2018, still serves as the most comprehensive path to peace in South Sudan. The Agreement outlines a federal structure of government, regional autonomy, and a transitional government of national unity with a revised Constitution, with less power concentrated in the Presidency and elections to be held in 2022.[236]

The original ARCSS peace agreement was however severely undermined even before implementation with President Kiir's division of the existing ten states of the South into

[233] ICG, 'Sudan and South Sudan's merging conflicts', p.21.
[234] ICG, 'Sudan and South Sudan's merging conflicts', p.22.
[235] Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip, 'Explaining the (il)legality of Uganda's intervention in the current South Sudan conflict', *African Security Review*, 23:4, 2014, p.356.
[236] Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip, 'IGAD's mediation in the current South Sudan conflict: Prospects and challenges', *African Security*, 8:2, 2015, p.131.

twenty states by Presidential decree, to retain control over the oil producing states of Unity State, Upper Nile and Jonglei which only served to fuel further ethnic conflict.[237]This has importantly been addressed in the revitalised agreement (R-ARCSS) with the formation of a Technical Boundaries Commission (TBC) which will comprise experts from IGAD and Troika Member countries (US, UK and Norway) that 'will work to define and demarcate the tribal areas of South Sudan as they stood on 1 January 1956'.[238]The TBC will decide the number of states and boundaries with a referendum being held before the end of the pre-transitional period if the TBC fails to complete its work.[239]

In contrast to the CPA, IGAD did ensure in both the ARCSS and the R-ARCSS that there is an implementation mechanism to monitor the progress of the peace agreement with the JMEC (Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission) and now the R-JMEC (Reconstitued Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission) located in Juba. The Chairperson of JMEC was Festus Morae the ex-President of Botswana who noted that 'some commendable progress in Institution Building and some reforms'[240]had been achieved under the ARCSS but has also urged IGAD's to support the revitalisation of the peace agreement to deal with the country's ongoing conflict. Still, as the UK envoy to the UN Mathew Rycroft noted that what the government of South Sudan 'says has no relations to what it does'[241] which IGAD needs to address immediately to ensure faith remains in the ARCSS and now the R-ARCSS agreement from all sides of the conflict. The interim chair of the revitalised JEM (R-JMEC) is Kenyan General Augostino Njoroge who is currently overseeing transitional period implementation tasks including the integration of opposition forces into a united armed forces.[242]

SPLM/A deficiencies and contribution to current conflict - corruption & authoritarianism

Importantly, in regards to the present conflict which the IGAD brokered ARCSS and R-ARCSS peace agreement hopes to address, the SPLA/M like many former liberation movements has failed to democratise itself once in government and had shown increasing

[237] Sudan Tribune, 'South Sudan President expands states to 28 as Opposition accuses him of deal violation', 2 October, 2015, http:.//sudantribune.com

[238]Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), *Summary of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the confict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)*, 12 September 2018, Addis Ababa 2018, p.7.

[239] Ibid .

[240] JMEC, 'Statement delivered to IGAD Council of Ministers', 12 June, 2017, www.jmecsouthsudan.org.

[241] Tekle, Tesfa-Alem, 'South Sudan says Western powers resumed regime change agenda', 24 July, 2017, www.sudantribune.com.

[242] Sudan Tribune, 'South Sudan monitoring body urges activation of troops' cantonment', 29 May, 2019, www.sudantribune.com

signs of both corruption and human rights abuses both during the CPA interim period and post independence. As Alex de Waal noted, 'SPLM's secessionist project created a system even less regulated and no less brutal than its northern counterpart'.[243]There was a continuation of the operation of the policies of both Sudanese colonial and post-colonial states with 'South Sudan becoming primarily this way because of how Sudan governed its peripheries with a system of monetised and militarized tribalism'[244]which continues in both the North and South today. The new nation of South Sudan and its ruling party, the SPLM, have exhibited similar neo-patrimonial characteristics to the North during the interim period of the CPA and power sharing government and post independence.

Additionally, failures to democratise the party or adhere to the rule of law and significant human rights abuses have also contributed to the present conflict which echoes Khartoum's post-colonial rule of Sudan. The AU Report recommendations included 'modalities for nation building, especially focused on building of a functional political order, democratic institutions and post conflict reconstruction too'.[245]Importantly, IGAD in its ongoing peace negotiations since the conflict erupted in 2013 in both the ARCSS and now the R-ARCSS peace agreement, has focused on the need to build and consolidate governance structures that were never addressed or implemented after the CPA negotiations, or when South Sudan gained independence in 2011. This includes the development of a Government of National Unity (GONU) and a Federal governance system with regional autonomy for the states to ensure regional interests are represented and also a reduction in the powers of the Presidency under a newly negotiated Constitution.[246]

The AU Commission into the conflict crucially found that 'consideration should be given to repealing provisions that enable the President to remove elected governors, to dismiss or suspend legislatures and to summon or prorogue the National Assembly'.[247]The Commission found that the Transitional Constitution had established a powerful Presidency and 'while the text of the Constitution affirms the doctrine of the separation of powers, several factors (including weak legislature, lack of commitment to separation of powers, and independence of the judiciary and structural links between the legislature and executive) result in a overly

[243] De Waal, Alex, 'When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: Brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan', *African Affairs,* 113:52, 2014, p.349.
[244] Ibid.
[245] AU Commission, p.3.
[246] Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip, 'IGAD's mediation in the current South Sudan conflict: Prospects and challenges', p.131.
[247] AU Commission, p.9.

powerful executive,'[248]which has directly contributed to the conflict in the ruling party and between the SPLM leadership. During the transitional period of the R-ACRSS, a Permanent Constitution making process will ensure a more democratic constitution with assistance of international constitution making bodies (e.g. UN, EU) and regional and international partners.[249]

The powers concentrated in the Presidency under the 2011 Transitional Constitution are currently much greater than those normally vested under most Presidential systems and this has been a significant contributing factor to the conflict.[250]Importantly, IGAD in the ARCSS and R-ARCSS peace agreement on South Sudan has addressed all these factors and involved all parties to the conflict, including the SPLM, SPLM –IO, opposition political parties and civil society in negotiations. The actual parties to the final R-ARCSS agreement were the Government of South Sudan, the Sudan Peoples Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLMA-IO), the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), Former Detainees (FDs) and Other Political Parties (OPP). [251]

IGAD current conflict negotiations: international partners support needed again

IGAD has successfully negotiated with assistance from the AU, the initial Cessation of Hostilities in January 2014 ,and July 2017, the important Agreement on the Status of Detainees (political detainees after the leadership split) and another Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access in December 2017 to allow humanitarian access to civilians caught in the conflict. The IGAD devised ARCSS peace agreement was signed in Addis Ababa in 2015 and then the revitalised (R-ARCSS) was signed in September 2018. IGAD in its distinctive African characteristic of international partnership has again enlisted the help of both the IPF (International Partners Forum) and the Troika partners that were so instrumental in assisting the CPA negotiations. This was done with the approval of the AU after the AU summit in South Africa in June 2015 when IGAD indicated it would need international support in the negotiations, and also to help support the implementation of the monitoring and verification team (MVV) to ensure the 'Cessation of Hostilities' was implemented.[252]

[248] Ibid.
[249] RJMEC, p.23.
[250] Ibid.
[251] RJMEC, p.3.
[252] International Crisis Group, 'South Sudan: Keeping faith with the IGAD peace process', *Africa Report* No.228, Brussels, Belgium, 2015. p.4

Both the ARCSS and now the R-ARCSS peace agreement brokered by IGAD with the AU and international support importantly, unlike the CPA, established an implementation aspect with a Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) and now the Reconstituted Commisison (RJMEC) composed of AU/IGAD and international partners, but the absence of an enforcement mechanism has clearly been a contributing factor to the continuing conflict in South Sudan. Therefore, after Machar and his troops returned to Juba in 2016 to form a Government of National Unity (under the original ARCSS peace agreement guidelines), they came under fire from government forces, forcing both Machar and his troops to flee Juba and hostilities resumed between the SPLM & SPLM-IO. Without a mechanism for full enforcement of the revitalised peace agreement (R-ARCSS), IGAD will be powerless to prevent a return to hostilities in South Sudan. As many commentators note, there is a real need for a third party protection force to prevent a remilitarisation of Juba by the competing armed forces and 'Each of the main warring parties has reasons to back deployment of a third-party force if it provides the narrow path to forming a government together'.[253]This has already contributed to a six month extension to the forming of a government of national unity due to security fears and also the failure to complete many of the pre-transitioanl tasks. The extension has been agreed to by all parties to the agreement with IGAD endorsement. 'The [ACRSS] agreement brokered by the regional body IGAD (the Intergovermental Authority on Development, long chaired by Ethiopia), gave the parties eight months to complete two main tasks: unifying a national army and resolving internal boundaries'.[254]

Hence, the revitalisation and enforcement of the IGAD negotiated peace agreement (R-ARCSS) will require ongoing active engagement from the international community, including the UN Security Council, and especially China and the USA with their respective regional influence.[255]Notably, IGAD's distinctively African use of international partners that had proved so crucial to the successful brokering of the CPA, now needs to be fully utilised in the quest to re-establish peace in South Sudan and further establish IGAD as an effective regional security community for the Horn of Africa. This is already the case with both the AU and UN and international partners supporting IGAD's continuing efforts to bring peace to South Sudan. The US noted that the regional revitalisation of ARCSS to support a permanent settlement to end the war, was the only viable solution to the conflict.[256]UN authorisation of a regional protection force in 2017 to protect civilians and infrastructure was another positive

[253] International Crisis Group, 'Salvaging South Sudan's fragile peace deal', p.32.
[254] International Crisis Group, 'A critical six months for South Sudan', *Statement: Africa,* 8 May, 2019, www.crisis.group.org
[255] ICG, 'Sudan & South Sudan's merging conflicts', p.25.
[256] AFP, 'US warns South Sudan regional plan is last chance for peace', 21 July 2017, www.daily.co.uk

step by international partners to help enforce the IGAD brokered peace agreement. IGAD, with AU endorsement, has also made a request to the UNSC for an additional 1,700 troops from IGAD member states to be part of the UNMISS Regional Protection Force, which is still being considered by the UN, but should be supported by the international community to ensure the enforcement of the revitalised ARCSS agreement.[257]

War crimes - the end of impunity including IGAD's western and traditional approaches in the peace agreement

Additionally, and crucially the ACRSS and revitalised R-ACRSS peace agreement have included accountability mechanisms regarding prosecution of war crimes by both sides of the current conflict in South Sudan, unlike the impunity afforded to all parties that occurred in the CPA. This will be achieved through the establishment of a hybrid South Sudan/AU Court with western modes of justice along with the use of traditional African modes of reconciliation and justice for addressing communal violence. This initiative has been used successfully in other African post conflict nations such as South Africa and Rwanda and will include the establishment of a South Sudan 'Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing'.[258]The CTRH will 'lead efforts to address the legacy of conflicts, and promote peace, and national reconciliation and healing,'[259]including investigating human rights violations and abuses.

The AU report on the current conflict also importantly supported the IGAD peace process and agreement which in turn supported the 'central role played by customary justice in facilitating access to justice in South Sudan,'[260]emphasising the need for formal accountability processes as well as peace and national healing and reconciliation.[261]All these aspects are a central part of the IGAD 'Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in The Republic of South Sudan' (ARCSS) and now the R-ARCSS.[262]This is a distinctively African norm of the regional security community of IGAD, which builds on traditional African modes of peace and reconciliation while continuing to use the western tribunal system for serious offences committed in the conflict.

[257] International Crisis Group, 'Salvaging South Sudan's fragile peace deal', *Africa Report* No.270, 13 March 2019, p.31.
[258] AU Commission, *AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, final report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan: Executive Summay*, Addis Ababa, 2015, p.24.
[259] RJMEC, p.20.
[260] Ibid.
[261] AU Commission, p.2.
[262] AU Commission, p.3.

As both the IGAD Peace Agreement (ARCSS and R-ARCSS) and the AU report notes, during the civil war between the North and South post independence of the South there has been an environment of impunity for human rights abuses. It is therefore important that any current IGAD led peace process in South Sudan addresses this need for 'accountability mechanisms for gross violations of human rights and other egregious abuses to ensure that those responsible for such violations are held to account'.[263]During CPA negotiations, these issues were never addressed with an exclusive focus on bringing the fifty-year civil war to an end and therefore neglecting the important issues of a post conflict society, including DDR (Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration) reconciliation and accountability for those responsible for war crimes. IGAD has ensured that accountability is central to its revitalisation of the ARCSS peace agreement to end South Sudan's culture of immunity regarding human rights abuses against civilians. This was a feature of both the civil war between the North and South and the conflict in South Sudan. As Human Rights Watch notes 'fear of repetition and anger over those crimes created conditions for the present conflict and the abuses perpetrated in it'.[264]

SPLM : lack of democratic structures and accountability

The SPLM's transition to a more broadly representative political and military institution clearly remains 'unfinished business,' due to the lack of substantive SPLM reform reflected in the present conflict and its quick escalation to nation wide ethnic violence. The SPLM has only held two national conventions in its thirty-one years of existence (1994 and 2008). These conventions are supposed to be held every five years with the preparation process being slow and open to delays and manipulation. The National Liberation Council organises these events but the convention due in May 2013 was postponed due to political competition for the leadership and the NLC, which erupted into violence on December 15, 2013 following the internal power struggle in the party. The power struggle emerged in the spring of 2013 when Kiir sacked his entire cabinet including his deputy, Riek Machar and then threatened to dismantle the whole SPLM party structure, and replace the cabinet with appointees. This triggered the crisis, with a broad coalition of internal opponents holding a Press Conference on December 6th 2013, in which they accused 'Kiir of incompetence and of being undemocratic'.[265]After the opposition boycotted the NLC meeting and postponed a public

[263] Ibid.
[264] Human Rights Watch, 'South Sudan's new war: Abuses by government and opposition forces'.
[265] Rolandsen, p.170.

rally, tensions quickly escalated on December 15th 2013 with 'a spiral of unchecked violence'[266]that caused the civil war in the South.[267]

The SPLM completely lacks a democratic process for leadership change and South Sudan as a whole lacks established opposition political parties with only individuals (e.g. disaffected military leaders) running against the SPLM in the 2010 elections, resulting in conflict generating factors and ethnic divisions.[268]It is important that reform of the SPLM occurs before any future elections, which under the R-ARCSS are planned for 2022 and both IGAD and its international partners need to closely monitor SPLM reform of its internal processes before this time.

As the South Sudanese state is completely dominated by one party (SPLM/A), the real competition will occur before any elections with the elections legitimacy depending on the reform of the party's internal processes before this occurs. As Ronaldson notes, 'it is likely that consensus politics with a power-sharing mechanism will have to continue for an extended period'[269]in South Sudan to ensure lasting peace and security for the world's newest nation. IGAD has acknowledged this situation in its revitalisation of the ARCSS peace agreement with the transitional period of the R-ARCSS including all parties to the agreement involved in a power sharing agreement. Nevertheless, the timing of any future elections once peace is fully restored will have to be closely monitored by IGAD.

IGAD and South Sudan: the road ahead to peace and security

As noted, IGAD's revitalised peace agreement (R-ARCSS) lays the groundwork for the long overdue transformation of the SPLM and indeed South Sudan itself, and will require a long-term commitment from the South, regional and international partners and IGAD to achieve such transformation. As constructionists have outlined, all regional security communities have a 'comparative advantage when they deal with conflicts in their sphere'[270]due to their greater knowledge of conflict structures, cultural background and proximity. Additionally, because they are directly affected by the conflict they are more likely to engage in seeking lasting solutions over the long term. IGAD, in particular, seems to have successfully embraced its role as mediator in the regional conflicts of the Horn of Africa and in this role also acts as a means of self defence for all IGAD members as 'civil wars can spread to regional states, and

[266] Rolandsen, p.171.
[267] Rolandsen, pp.169-171.
[268] Brosche & Hoglund, p.83.
[269] Rolandsen, p. 172.
[270] Apuuli, 'IGAD's mediation in the current South Sudan conflict: Prospects and challenges', p.123.

the regional consequences of violent internal conflicts has encouraged sub regional organisations (such as IGAD) to take active intervention measures'.[271]

This development has already occurred in the conflict in South Sudan where refugees have streamed into the neighbouring IGAD countries. According to Human Rights Watch there are now more than 4 million people who have fled their homes in South Sudan with over 2.47 million South Sudanese refugees now living in neighbouring states including Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. There are another two million people internally displaced, including over 200,00 now people living in six UNIMISS protection sites within South Sudan, all needing humanitarian assistance including food shortages. [272]

Refugees from the conflict are a strain on both Sudan and Uganda's economy as these countries have taken in the most refugees from the crisis in South Sudan. Deutsch's theory of economic independence, providing common interests that promote peace between neighbouring countries has particular relevance here. These shared economic interests seem to have finally pushed these long-time regional foes to help broker the revitalised IGAD peace process in South Sudan and end their regional proxy war there which has only extended the crisis,[273]and had previously undermined the IGAD led peace process.

Additionally as IGAD members are increasingly linked economically, with Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia involved in trade with the North and South, regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa impact on these neighbours economically, as noted in constructivists' accounts of the development of regional security communities such as IGAD.[274]The South Sudanese conflict is increasingly impacting South Sudan's regional neigbours, both economically and politically, with oil revenues affected by continued conflict in the Nuer oil rich states directly affecting both Sudan and South Sudan's economy, and its neighbours' economies too.[275]

Also, the regional dimension of the prospect of an ongoing proxy war being played out in South Sudan by both Uganda and Sudan has added both complexity and urgency to the IGAD need to implement the R-ACRSS peace agreement to end this present conflict which threatens to continue to involve its neighbours unless comprehensively resolved. All these factors

[271] Ibid.
[272] Human Rights Watch, 'South Sudan: events of 2018: Word Report 2019, 8 December, 2018, p.2.
[273] Ibid.
[274] Apuuli, 'IGAD's mediation in the current South Sudan conflict: Prospects and challenges', p.135.
[275] Soliman, Ahmed, 'Uganda and Sudan begin mediation talks in South Sudan's conflict, *AllAfrica*, 25 June 2018, www.allfrica.com

increase the urgency to implement the revitalised IGAD brokered peace agreement signed between the SPLM and SPLM in Opposition and other parties (e.g. Political Detainees) on September 12th 2018 in Addis's Ababa, Ethiopia.[276]

Conclusion

As the International Crisis Group (ICG) notes in its report on the present crisis in South Sudan 'the conflict that broke out on 15 December 2013 was decades in the making'[277]due to the autocratic nature of the post-colonial Sudanese state, which the SPLM repeated in its autocratic rule of an independent South Sudan. This included the exclusion of other voices from the CPA process and the lack of any implementation, monitoring or enforcement mechanisms inside the CPA, especially the failure to assist the South to establish a functioning, inclusive and democratic state. IGAD's current negotiated revitalised peace agreement (R-ACRSS) signed in Addis Ababa in 2018 shows significant promise in resolving all the issues of the present conflict in contrast to unfinished business aspects of the CPA. While the CPA was a significant achievement, importantly, it lacked essential aspects to ensure ongoing peace is achieved in post-conflict societies such as South Sudan. IGAD's role in helping South Sudan emerge from this present crisis by ensuring the R-ACRSS is fully implemented and helps build a democratic, inclusive state is vital to its growing credibility as the regional security community in the Horn of Africa.

In the current revitalised South Sudan peace agreement (R-ARCSS), IGAD has already shown the ability (unlike in the CPA) to deal with both immediate conflict issues (e.g. power sharing and governance) and long-term issues, such as DDR, and a proposed new Federal system of government and accountability for combatants in the present conflict. With the recent extension of time of the pre-transitional phase which was agreed to by all parties the agreement, it is important that international partners remain engaged in the peace process to assist IGAD in its role as the regional security community in the Horn of Africa.[278] The full implementation of the R-ARCSS peace agreement, negotiated by IGAD, still provides the best hope of ending the present conflict in South Sudan and to assist with the important issues

[276] International Crisis Group, 'South Sudan: Rearranging the Chessboard', 2016, *Africa Report* No.243, Brussels, Belgium, 2015, p.1.
[277] ICG, 'South Sudan: A civil war by any other name', p.35.
[278] AlJazeera, 'South Sudan president: delay unity government formation by a year', 9 May 2019, www.aljazeera.com/news

of nation buiding that the CPA failed to address. ‘The R-ARCSS has the potential to facilitate a return to peace, stablility, reconciliation, unity and prosperity in South Sudan’.[279]

[279] Hazvinei Vhumbunu, Clayton, ‘Reviving peace in South Sudan through the revitalised peace agreement: Understanding the enablers and possible obstacles’, *Accord*, 2018, p. 16, www.accord.org.za

CHAPTER 5
IGAD AND THE SOMALIA PEACE PROCESS

PART 1: IGAD and the Somalian peace process

Introduction:

The aim of this chapter is to outline IGAD's ongoing and crucial role in the Somalian peace process including conducting successful and peaceful UN sponsored Somali elections held in 2016. The chapter outlines IGAD's key role in both the Arta and Eldoret Peace Conferences that helped establish the first functioning governments in Somalia since the collapse of the military government of Said Barre in 1991. The chapter also provides an outline of both Somalia's colonial and post-colonial history which has contributed to its continuing instability.

The chapter acknowledges that in contrast to IGAD's successful negotiation of the CPA to end the fifty-year civil war in Sudan, IGAD's involvement in the Somalia peace process has been a difficult and less successful process, with the Somalia conflict proving to be intractable and ongoing with Islamic insurgents (Al Shabaab) still active in parts of both central and South Somalia.[280]Similar to the Sudan peace process, IGAD has also had to contend with a history of mutual inference prevalent in the Horn of Africa between neighbouring countries (e.g. Ethiopia and Eritrea) and from international interference, including the US 'War on Terror', in its ongoing efforts to bring about peace and stability in Somalia.[281]

The chapter is divided into two parts with IGAD's role in the Somalia peace process central to part one including its ongoing role as the Horn of Africa's designated regional security community. The second part of the chapter deals with the positive and negative influence of IGAD's international partners, including the EU and USA, and ex-colonial powers (the UK and Italy) to assist IGAD in bringing peace and stability to Somalia. This part concludes with the need for IGAD to search for a solution to the Somali crisis, independent of the agenda of its international partners and their narrow focus on the 'War on Terror'.

[280] Hills, Alice, 'Security sector in security arena: The evidence from Somalia', *International Peacekeeping*, 21:2, 2014, p.168.
[281] Apuuli Kasaija Phillip, 'The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008 -2009 : Results and problems', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 28:3, 2010, p.276.

Somalia's colonial and post-colonial history

Somalia's history of colonialisation is one shared by all IGAD members with ongoing effects in the post-colonial era, and representing constructivist shared values that characterises IGAD as a regional security community.[282]During the colonial period commencing in the nineteenth century (1887-1960) the Somali people were divided between five areas including French ruled Djibouti, Ethiopia, British Somaliland, Italian Somalia and the British Kenya Western Frontier District. 'These five divisions of the nation are represented in the five- pointed Somalia star, the national emblem adopted by the Somalia Republic at the time of independence in 1960'.[283]Somalia, unlike other countries in the Horn of Africa, actually enjoys ethnic homogeneity (people, language, religion, culture) but still remains a divided country both geographically and politically due to its colonial division and post-colonial experiences.[284]

The colonial period's division of the Somali people between Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somaliland and Somalia and the period of colonial rule - undermining the dominant clan identity of Somalis and their system of indigenous governance by clan elders - has contributed to the country's continuing instability.[285]In the British Somaliland Protectorate system of indirect rule, clan elders were co-opted into the 'state system by bestowing upon them the title of chief, providing them with a government stipend, and giving them limited judicial and revenue collecting powers'.[286]In the Italian colony 'Somalia Italiana' which experienced more direct rule and where the traditional lineage and clan influence was undermined to establish plantation agriculture,[287]there was a subsequent undermining of traditional institutions including clan structures. Additionally, under Italian rule in the South the indigenous socio-economic system was also largely destroyed where plantation farms and forced labour were introduced and a highly hierarchical society emerged, which was intensified in the repressive period of Italian Fascist rule in the 1920s under the 'Africa Orientale Italania' (AOI).[288]In the South, 'colonialism fostered ethnicity because when faced with the assertion of foreign culture, dominance and expropriation, clan affiliation and lineage became the most suitable

[282] Buzan & Waever, p.3.
[283] Lewis, Ioan M, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliand: Culture, History, Society,* Hurst and Company, London, 2009, p.29.
[284] Hoehne, Markus & Luling, Veronica, *Peace, Milk, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics*, Hurst and Company, London, 2010, p.368.
[285] Loubser, Helge-Mari & Solomon, Hussein, 'Responding to State failure in Somalia', *African Review*, 6:1, 2014, p.2.
[286] Bradbury, Mark, *Becoming Somaliland,* James Currey, Oxford, 2008, p.28.
[287] Bradbury, p.29.
[288] Novati, Giampaolo Calchi, 'Italy and Africa: How to forget colonialism', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 13:1, 2008, p.43.

way of surviving,'[289]which had ongoing consequences for the stability of the Somalia nation, particularly in the South. The undermining of traditional indigenous political structures in the South explains 'the protracted nature of the conflict …since the 1990s and the difficulty of restoring political order there.'[290]

Upon independence from colonial rule in 1960, the northern area of Somalia (Somaliland), a British protectorate joined with the southern section of Somalia previously under Italian rule until Italy's defeat in the Second World War and subsequently under UN trusteeship, to form the Republic of Somalia.[291]Upon independence, Somalia then enjoyed a short period of multi-party democratic rule from 1960 to 1969 that was filled with 'corruption, nepotism and cronyism [that] characterised state institutions'.[292]This period of unstable parliamentary government was followed by a military coup and repressive central rule by General Said Barre from 1969 until his overthrow in 1991 by a coalition of armed opposition groups, which later formed the basis of the clan militias that plunged Somalia into civil war from 1989 to 1991, prompting international intervention by the US and UN in 1991.[293]

General Barre's rule from 1969 to 1991 was characterised by centralised state repression under a Marxist ideology called 'Scientific Socialism which both suppressed and manipulated indigenous power structures including clan structures'.[294]Scientific Socialism was 'based on the principles of communism and comradeship, co-operation and the equal status of all Somalis'.[295]In reality it was a repressive one party rule of Barre's 'Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party' with all other political parties being banned, as Barre stated they had acted as 'products and tools of the clans'[296]in the unstable period of parliamentary rule from 1960 to 1969. Under Barre's Scientific Socialism, industry was nationalised, people were settled on agricultural communes and orientation centres were established where unemployed youth, orphans and street children were re-educated in socialist principles.[297]

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[289]Ibid.
[290] Bradbury, p.29.
[291] Laitine, David & Samator, Said. S, *Somalia: A Nation in Search of a State*, Westview Press, Boulder Colarado, 1987, p.73.
[292] Elmi, Afyare Abdi & Barise, Abdullahl, 'The Somali conflict: Root causes, obstacles and peace building strategies', *African Security Review*, 15:1, 2006, p.33.
[293] Ssereo, Florence, 'Clanpolitics, clan-democracy and conflict regulation in Africa: The experience of Somalia', *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 2:3/4, 2003, p.28.
[294] Elmii & Barise, p.35.
[295] Ssereo, p.36.
[296] Hesse, Brian J, 'Introduction: The myth of Somalia' *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 28:3, 2010, p.251.
[297] Ssereo, p.36.

Traditional Somali conflict resolution methods, such as the use of 'shir' councils of elders, were replaced with state appointed peace councils and 'diya', the traditional grievance and conflict resolution system that was a part of Somalia customary law 'xeer' was outlawed.[298]A repressive National Security Service was established and 'given unlimited powers to arrest and detain opponents without trial'[299]along with a military police and paramilitary 'Guulwade' that provided community based surveillance and 'instilled a culture of fear and silence'[300]in the Somali people.

While Barre stated that Scientific Socialism was designed to 'achieve a non-tribal conflict-free society'[301]to reduce clan divisions in Somalia, in reality he actually manipulated and increased clan divisions and gave state patronage to the clans associated with his immediate family, those of the Darrod family. This process especially increased after the defeat by Ethiopia in the Ogaden war of 1977 to reclaim the Somali inhabited area, which Ethiopia had seized in 1887 during the scramble for Africa. Faced 'with the prospect of losing power [Barre] ratcheted up clan differences….his goal was to divide, weaken and conquer his opponents while drawing attention away from his regimes failures',[302] both politically and economically. After Barre's overthrow and when the country descended into civil war, northern Somalia declared its independence in 1991 as Somaliland and has since established a stable and democratic government, despite still being unrecognised by the international community including the AU and UN.[303]

Somalia: IGAD Somalia peace conferences

There have been over twenty-one peace conferences on Somalia sponsored by both regional bodies and the international community to bring peace to Somalia, which despite both IGAD and the international community's best efforts has remained a failed state since the collapse of the military regime of Said Barre in 1991. The first two international reconciliation meetings aimed at establishing a Somalia government after Barre's fall, were held in June and July 1991 in Djibouti. A second reconciliation conference organised by the UN was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1993 and then in Nairobi, Kenya in 1994. A third major conference was held in Sodere, Ethiopia from November 1996 to January 1997 plus an Egyptian led initiative

[298] Hesse, p.251.
[299] Bradbury, p.38.
[300] Ibid.
[301] Ssereo, p.36.
[302] Hesse, p.251.
[303] Hansen, Stig Jarle & Bradbury, Mark, 'Somaliland: A new democracy in the Horn of Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 34:113, 2007, p.461.

held in Cairo in 1997. The two main conferences IGAD led were held in Arta, Djibouti in 2000 and in Eldoret, Kenya from 2002 to 2004.[304]

Subsequent Somalia peace conferences that IGAD has played a prominent role in have included the London Peace Conference of 2013, which was co-hosted by the UK Government and the current Somalia Federal Government, and was attended by friends and partners of Somalia including IGAD.[305]Other peace conferences that have aimed to return peace and stability to Somalia have included the UN led Djibouti process of 2008-9 and the Istanbul Conferences on Somalia in 2010 and 2012, with the Brussels Conference of 2013 being the most recent peace conference. IGAD also sponsored the important Addis Abba negotiations in 2011 which led to a road map for Somalia governance, including a provisional Constitution, a Federal Charter and plans to hold elections in 2016 as endorsed in the document 'Vision for 2016'[306] which occurred in November 2016. All the peace conferences though have collectively failed to deliver lasting peace and stability to Somalia, but importantly IGAD's Arta and Eldoret peace conferences were responsible for producing the main structures of governance that still exist in Somalia today.

Arta peace conference

The Arta conference was the first peace conference held under IGAD leadership and took place in Arta, Djibouti over five months, culminating in August 2000 with the Arta Declaration and the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG). Importantly, this first IGAD led conference included both civilian leaders and armed clan militias and warlords that had dominated Somalia since the collapse of the Barre military regime. In contrast to previous reconciliation meetings, the Arta conference included 'traditional leaders, civil society organisations, intellectuals and businessmen [who] came together to forgive each other and to establish a national government'.[307]The TNG, whilst gaining international recognition which included regaining its seat at the UN and in regional bodies, failed to provide a stable and lasting peace for Somalia. The international community also importantly failed to provide assistance to the TNG. Opposing clan leaders with Ethiopia's support

[304] Interpeace Centre for Research and Dialogue, *The Search for peace : a history of mediation in Somalia since 1988*, May 4, 2009, www, interpeace.org.au, pp.15-16.
[305] Healy, Sally, *Somalia: after the London Conference*, Conciliation Resources, 2012, www.c-r.org
[306] Sahan Statebuilding Team, *Somalia's troubled transition: Vision 2016 revisited*, May 2015, um.dk/partners, p.5.
[307] Apuuli, 'The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008-2009', p.264.

undermined the peace process and instead founded the Somalian Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in Ethiopia in opposition to the TNG.[308]

Eldoret peace conference:

IGAD's second attempt at negotiating peace in Somalia before the TNG mandate ended was the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference in 2002 held in Eldoret, Kenya from 2002 to 2004. The final agreement was signed by twenty four factional leaders and aimed to create a Federal structure in Somalia, as opposed to the Arta conference that proposed a unitary structure which many Somalis still fear, as during both the colonial and Barre period the unitary state was a repressive organ of control. The Eldoret Conference involved over 300 delegates and took over two years to produce an agreement of a Transitional Federal Charter with 275 members of parliament, who then selected Abdullahi Yusuf as President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in October 2004.[309]

An important and lasting outcome of the Eldoret Peace Conference was the establishment of the 4.5 power sharing formula to allow for fair clan representation in the TFG. The formula divides Somalia into four major clans of Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Rahanweyn and condenses the other minority clans into .5. The clan system is the basis of all Somalia society.[310] 'In traditional Somali society, the clan was the social and political unit of organisation and governance with each clan having its own leader and council of elders'.[311]While both the period of colonisation and Barre's military regime manipulated and undermined the clan system, the clan remains the social, political and economic basis of Somali society.[312]

The IGAD led Eldoret Peace Conference by establishing the 4.5 power sharing model acknowledged the continuing force of clans in modern Somali life, and reinforced the need to use indigenous approaches to conflict resolution in African peace processes as IGAD had done in the Sudan peace process. IGAD skilfully combined this with western styles of negotiation as seen in the Eldoret Conference's use of Technical Committees to achieve specific outcomes such as a 'Cessation of Hostilities' agreement.[313]IGAD like other non-European security communities has managed to skilfully combine both western and

[308] Interpeace Centre for Research and Dialogue, p.16.
[309] Apuuli, 'The UN-led Djibouti peace process fro Somalia 2008-2009', p.265.
[310] Ibid.
[311] Samatar, Ahmed I, (ed) *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1994, p.212.
[312] Elmi, Afyare Abdi, *Understanding the Somali Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding*, Pluto Press, London, 2010, pp.32-33.
[313] Interpeace Centre for Research and Dialogue, p.64.

indigenous norms and values in its peace negotiations in Somalia. Still, the 4:5 formula which is essentially a power-sharing arrangement between the four major clans has been criticised and 'has not been accepted by all groups, and is seen as offensive by some who believe their clans have not been adequately represented'[314] including Islamists, who believe providing for the smaller clans by calling them .5 clans 'adds insult to injury…and is simply not acceptable in Islam'.[315]

Nevertheless, the peaceful and successful Somalia 2016 elections were held according to the formula with 135 clan elders from all Somali regions selecting 14,025 delegates who voted for 347 parliamentary representatives based on their clan's allocated number of seats.[316] While critics have argued that the 4.5 formula just entrenches the country's complex clan system, in the absence of political parties, 'clans remain at the heart of the (political) process'.[317]Additionally, in a country seen as too unstable and insecure to hold a popular vote, by acknowledging the embedded clan system and to avoid inter-clan rivalry, the 4.5 formula devised by IGAD best accommodates the indigenous power structures of Somalia.

The problems with the Eldoret Conference though was that it was widely seen as being controlled by regional hegemons, Kenya and Ethiopia. Both countries have significant Somali populations as a result of the colonial partition of Somalia with Somali peoples now living in five different countries including the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the North West area of Kenya. The Ogaden region was ceded to Ethiopia in the scramble for Africa by the colonial powers and the British North Western District, which had been part of British Somaliland, was transferred to Kenya respectively upon the British departure from Somalia at independence in 1960.[318]It has been the hope of Somalia nationalists, including the Islamist insurgents (Al Shabaab) since independence, to reunite these areas.

In 1977 General Barre attempted to reclaim the Ogaden region militarily, but he was defeated by Ethiopian troops backed by Cuban and Soviet forces which in turn contributed to his regime's collapse, due to both the economic and social impact of the war with Ogaden with Somali refugees flowing into Somalia, especially in the North.[319]This historical claim to a

[314] Harper, Mary, *Getting Somalia Wrong?: Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State*, Zed Books, London, 2012, p.39.
[315] Elmi, p.43.
[316] AFP, 'Somalia: voting under way but democracy delayed', *Daily Nation*, 24 November, 2016, www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/somalia.
[317] Ibid.
[318] Elmi, p.19.
[319] Ibid.

greater Somalia, which even Al Shabaab endorses, has led to Kenya and Ethiopia's fear of a central, unitary and strong Somalia state which could lay claim to these Somalia regions now incorporated into Kenya and Ethiopia and explains both countries determination to control the outcomes of the peace process in Somalia. 'In the 1960's and 1970's, Kenya and Ethiopia [even] maintained a joint security alliance out of a common perception of the danger of Somali irredentism'.[320]

Clearly another problem with the Eldoret Conference was the exclusion of civil society. One of the few civil society representatives on the Leaders Committee stated 'we are struggling to maintain a profile at this meeting. The political leaders want us sidelined'.[321]The Islamists were also excluded. Thus it was evident, the 'omission of significant sectors of Somalia society such as traditional and religious leaders'[322]severely undermined conference outcomes. While the Eldoret conference established a functioning government for the first time since 1991, the TFG ultimately like the TNF before it failed to establish its authority throughout Somalia and initially could only operate out of Nairobi due to security concerns in Somalia.

The TFG was not able to relocate to Somalia until 2004 and never exercised effective control of Somalia, with the warlords continuing to control much of the country.[323]The TFG was also split internally into factions and when the UIC (Union of Islamic Courts) emerged in 2006 and defeated a US sponsored coalition of warlords (The Alliance of the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism : APRCT) and also threatened the TFG; Ethiopia invaded Somalia to support the TFG with US backing, with both countries fearing the rise of an Islamic state in Somalia.[324]The Ethiopian invasion to oust the UIC and support the TFG also confirmed Somali fears of Ethiopia's manipulation of the Somalia peace process to achieve its own geo-political and territorial aims.

IGAD and the present Somalia peace process

IGAD has importantly assisted the Federal Government of Somalia to produce its current '2016 and now 2020 Vision for Somalia' which outlines plans for a Federal system of government in Somalia, the defeat of Al Shabaab (the main Islamic insurgent group) and the holding of elections in 2016 which has since successfully occurred.[325]IGAD has also

[320] Ibid.
[321] Interpeace Centre for Research and Dialogue, p.3.
[322] Ibid.
[323] Interpeace Center for Research and Dialogue, p.52.
[324] Menkaus, Ken, 'The crisis of Somalia: Tragedy in five acts', *African Affairs,* 106:204, July 2007, p. 378.
[325] Sahan Statebuilding Team, p.5.

produced a 'Regional Grand Stabilisation Plan for Somalia' and assisted with producing the 'New Deal' document developed at the Brussels Conference in 2013, which addresses Somali governance, security, social and economic needs and its relationship with its international donors. IGAD is also currently involved in the training of the Somali military and police and assisting the regional Somali administrations of Puntland and Juba in their preparations as Federal Member states to join a reconstituted Federal Somali state. IGAD has also established an 'Office for the Facilitation for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation' and has continued to gain both regional and international credibility through its non-partisan involvement in Somalia state building and governance institutions.[326]The former UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon 'commended IGAD for the key role it plays in regional peace and democratic governance – in particular, hailing IGAD's role in the peace process and state building in both South Sudan and Somalia'.[327]

As noted by the IGAD Somalia Special Representative, IGAD has acted as a constant partner in the Somalia Peace Process with the Somalian Prime Minister publically thanking IGAD in 2015 for its continual effort in support of Somalian statehood and governance initiatives.[328] Additionally, in a conference on Somalia in 2012 held at the Rift Valley Institute in Nairobi, Kenya, the Executive Secretary of IGAD stated that IGAD's constant focus on restoring peace and stability to Somalia had importantly 'kept it on the international agenda for 22 years'.[329]Finally, the Sahen State Building Team in its paper 'Somalia's troubled transition: Vision 2016 revisited' notes that while Somalia is 'in far better shape than when the current President Hassan Sheik took office in 2012',[330] there were still fears that much of that progress would unravel with the country heading towards an 'uncertain and ill-prepared political transition'[331]including multiparty democratic elections in 2016.

While the UN sponsored 2016 elections were widely seen as not entirely free or fair with extensive vote-buying and limited franchise due to instability and continued clan rivalry, the elections were peaceful and seen as successfully 'maintaining the momentum toward

[326] Rift Valley Institute, 'Nairobi Forum Meeting Report: IGAD and Somalia', 25 October, 2013, www.riftvalley.net/publication, p.2.
[327] IGAD, 'IGAD commended by UNSG for role in regional peace and democratic governance', 26 September, 2016, www.igad.int.
[328] IGAD, 'Prime Minister welcomes new IGAD special Envoy's support of Somalia', 6 January, 2014, www.igad.int
[329] Rift Valley Institute, p.1.
[330] Sahan Statebuilding Team, p.5.
[331] Ibid.

democratic governance in the African nation'.[332]IGAD's continual support of the Somalian peace process has been a key contributing factor in its gradual emergence from decades of instability and insecurity, as reflected in the successful 2016 elections.

IGAD and international partners: AMISOM

Additionally, IGAD in all its peace endeavours in Somalia has continued its distinctive use of international partners in its negotiation of peace and security in the Horn of Africa. This has included support from the Arab League, the EU, the World Bank and the UN. The EU importantly funded the IGAD led Eldoret Conference and also provides ongoing funding for the current AMISOM force in Somalia.[333]

AMISOM is an African Union led and UN sponsored mission to keep peace and stability in Somalia and provide support to the current Federal Somalian Government. IGAD had initially intended to deploy an IGAD led force to replace Ethiopian troops that invaded Somalia in 2006 to support the TFG ; but due to financial and logistic constraints it was unable to do so and the UN Security Council instead under Resolution 1744 authorised an AU force (AMISOM) in 2007 to support the TFG.[334]Nevertheless, IGAD members actually make up the majority of AMISOM troops, with forces being comprised of Kenyan, Ethiopian and Ugandan troops with smaller contingents from Burundi and Sierre Leone.[335]This has led to problems for both IGAD and AMISOM, as the presence of foreign troops of IGAD members, including Ethiopia and Kenya, continues to fuel the insurgency, as Somalis have a long history of opposing foreign forces, especially in relation to their historical foe, Ethiopia.[336]

IGAD - Somalia and the pattern of mutual interference of the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia and Eritrea's proxy war

IGAD has still had to contend with the mutual interference characteristic of the Horn of Africa in its efforts to bring peace to Somalia, with Ethiopia and Eritrea being engaged in a proxy war in Somalia. Both support insurgent groups in their respective countries with Eritrea supporting the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF) while Ethiopia supports Eritrean opposition

[332] UN News Centre, 'Somalia: UN Security Council urges sustained momentum towards democratic governance', 10 February, 2017, www.un.org
[333] AMISOM, 'The AU secures EU funds for the AU Mission in Somalia', 22 Septmber 2016, www.amisom.com
[334] Omorogbe, Eki Yemisi, 'Can the African Union deliver peace and security?', *Journal of Conflict and Security* Law, 16:1, 2011, p.56.
[335] Anderson, Noel, 'Peacekeepers fighting a counterinsurgency campaign: A net assessment of the African Union mission in Somalia', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 37:11, 2014, p.939.
[336] Elmi, p.373.

movements. Additionally, while Ethiopia intervened to remove the UIC (Union of Islamic Courts), remnants of the UIC leadership fled to Eritrea and reconstituted itself into the 'Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia'.[337]

While UIC moderates later became part of the Djibouti peace process which led to the present Federal Government of Somalia, UIC hardliners have remained in Eritrea and continue to undermine the peace process.[338]While the Ethiopian decision to invade was mainly fuelled by its fear of the rise of an Islamic state in Somalia, the UIC's agenda of a greater Somalia and its offering of a safe haven to Ethiopian insurgent groups, it was also influenced by alleged Eritrean involvement with the UIC. Regional tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea[339]were directly responsible for both the rise of the UIC and the Ethiopian invasion that followed. The proxy war created by Ethiopia and Eritrea over Somalia has continued to complicate the IGAD led peace process, especially with Ethiopia being the current chair of IGAD and Eritrea having resigned its membership over the Ethiopian invasion in 2006.

Continued tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea being played out in Somalia, first arose over a border war in Badme that was ended by the UN sponsored Algiers Agreement in 2000. Tensions have remained high since then, between the two countries, with Ethiopia refusing to withdraw from the disputed area despite a 2002 decision by the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague) that the area belonged to Eritrea.[340]In addition to its support of the UIC, Eritrea has also been accused by both Ethiopia and the UN, of supporting Islamic insurgents Al Shabaab, which was the UIC's military wing and now has links to Al Qaeda. The UNSC has also passed sanctions on Eritrea to stop its support of Islamic insurgents after the UN Monitoring Group reported to the UN Security Council on clear evidence of links between Eritrea and Al Shabaab.[341]

It seems both the border stalemate between Eritrea and Ethiopia, fragile and authoritarian governments in both countries and their 'capacity and willingness to use proxy forces to

[337] Barnes, Cedric & Hassan, Harun, 'The rise and fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts', *Journal of Eastern African Studies,* 1:2, 2007, p.156.
[338] Ibid.
[339] Demeke, Memar Ayalew & Gebru, Solomon, Gebreyohanu, 'The role of regional economic communities in fighting terrorism in Africa: The case of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)', *European Scientific Journal*, 2SE, September 2014, p.226.
[340] Harper, pp.185-187.
[341] AllAfrica, 'Somalia: Eritrea continues support to Somalia's Al Shabab, says Ethiopia', 29 July, 2013, www.allfrica.com.

undermine the other'[342]are clearly linked to the conflict in Somalia. This further complicates IGAD's ability to resolve the Somali crisis. One recent, positive development for IGAD's continual efforts to bring peace to Somalia has been the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which were terminated after the border war in 2000. They have now re-opened their respective embassies and landlocked Ethiopia will have access to Eritrea's port.[343]

This move may finally lead to enhanced stability in Somalia which has continued to be de-stabilised by the proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea fought in Somalia. It may even allow the AU AMISOM force to be eventually withdrawn under the 'IGAD Somalia Transition Plan and 2020 Road Map', which allows for 'a conditions-based, gradual handover of security from AMISOM to the Somalia Security Forces, and looks forward to its swift finalisation and implementation'.[344]This would also hopefully reduce the activity of Al Shabaab, which continues to see AMISOM as an occupying force and is still undermining the security and stability of Somalia which IGAD, as the regional security community for the Horn of Africa has worked so hard to achieve.

[342] Lyons, Terrence, 'The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict and the search for peace in Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 36:10, 2009, p.173.
[343] BBC News, 'Eritrea and Ethiopia to re-establish diplomatic ties', 9 July 2018, www.bbc.com.news/world/africa.
[344] IGAD, 'Statement issued by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on the ongoing political tension in Somalia', 26 March, 2018.www.igad.int

PART 2: International actors - IGAD and the Somalia peace process

USA and Somalia: history of involvement in Somalia and the War on Terror

IGAD has also had to contend with international interference in its attempt to negotiate peace in Somalia with the US led 'War on Terror' in Africa being focused on the Horn of Africa, and Somalia in particular. The US supported the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia to remove the UIC, despite it bringing peace and stability to Mogadishu for the first time since the state collapse of 1991. 'While not enjoying any form of democratic legitimacy, the UIC nevertheless provided a higher level of security and a modest economic upsurge … and managed to get rid of clan-based warlord rule'.[345]The reasons for US support of the Ethiopian invasion was, like Ethiopia, it feared the development of an Islamic state in Somalia, and also it was convinced that the UIC was sheltering non-Somalia terrorists connected to Al Qaeda including the suspects in the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.[346]As Terrence Lyons notes the Ethiopian invasion was clearly in response to 'incentives created at the global level [US War on Terror] to pursue regionally focused interests in terms that elicit international support'[347]namely the ongoing proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia.

Direct US involvement in Somalia actually dates back to 1991 when the US first intervened in Somalia after the collapse of Barre's military dictatorship when US troops in partnership with the UN launched 'Operation Restore Hope' (UNITAF) to 'restore security and provide humanitarian activities to help relieve the suffering of the civilian population'.[348]UNITAF consisted of twenty-four countries under US leadership and operated under a UN Security Council mandate. Part of the mandate was to disarm the Somali militias, restore peace and security and allow for reconciliation between the parties to the conflict; but after the failed US raid to capture the warlord, Farah Aideed and the subsequent death of eighteen US Ranger Troops, the US troops withdrew and the UN subsequent mission (UNISOM) was terminated in 1994.[349]

Commentators have noted that this failure of the first US led humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War has since influenced US policy toward Africa in general and Somalia

[345] Apuuli, 'The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008-2009', p.265.
[346] Menkaus, 'The crisis of Somalia: Tragedy in five acts', p.368.
[347] Lyons, p.178.
[348] Bah, A Sanjoh & Aning, Kwesi, 'US Peace operations policy in Africa: From ACRI to AFRICOM', *International Peacekeeping*, 15:1, 2008, p.119.
[349] Ibid.

in particular. Subsequently, US Africa policy has focused on 'developing the capacities of African countries to undertake peace operations',[350]including the members of IGAD involved in the AMISOM mission to Somalia. The US has developed various command structures to address African peace and security issues since the failure of UNITAF, ranging from the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to the African Contingency Training Program (ACOTA) to the Global Peace Initiative to train 75,000 personnel globally (with a strong focus on Africa), to enhance countries and regional and subregional organisations such as IGAD to conduct peace operations.

The present US Africa Command Structure (AFRICOM) was established in 2006 to co-ordinate all US military and security interests in Africa with a Combined Joint Task Force dedicated to the Horn of Africa and a US base at Camp Lemanier in Djibouti.[351]The US has carried out drone strikes from Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti against Al Shabaab bases in Somalia, which has further enhanced Somali distrust of the US role in Somalia after the US backed the Ethiopian invasion to remove the UIC in 2006. It was actually the US backed Ethiopian invasion which first prompted the rise of Al Shabaab, the UIC's military wing, which emerged as the main source of armed resistance to Ethiopian occupation and which continues to fuel the insurgency against the AMISOM troops.[352]

US security officials only play an advice and assist role with the African Union (AMISOM) forces in Somalia, but clandestinely US troops have also been involved in raids against militants in South West Somalia.[353]In addition, since the 9/11 attacks on the USA and the US led global 'War on Terror', the Horn of Africa has again become of particular strategic interest to the USA with the US seeing this region 'as seething with Islamic fundamentalists and crawling with Al Qaeda agents'.[354]Al Shabaab has added to this US concern regarding Somalia's terrorist links, having 'already declared itself an Al Qaeda affiliate with the objective of establishing an Islamic state in Somalia'.[355]Additionally, the proximity of Somalia to American interests in the Arabian Peninsula also affords it priority status to US foreign policy objectives.[356]The Horn of Africa has always had geo-political strategic

[350] Bah & Aning, p. 120.
[351] Bah & Aning, p. 126.
[352] Ibrahim, Mohamed, 'Somali and global terrorism: A growing connection?', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies,* 28:3, 2010, p.289.
[353] VOA News, 'US fires on Al-Shabab militants in Somalia raid', 12 May, 2016, www.voanews.com
[354] Markakis, John, 'The Horn of conflict', *Review of African Political Economy*, 30:97, 2003, p.361.
[355] Demeke & Gebru, p.221.
[356] Burgess, Stephen, 'Comparative challenges in securing the Horn of Africa and Sahara', *Comparative Strategy*, 34:2, 2015, p.206.

significance due to its position 'in regards to the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden [and] has always been of interest to both regional and international powers too'[357]including the US. Overall, though, US presence in the Horn of Africa region actually acts to undermine IGAD's role in the peace process in Somalia.

EU and Somalia peace process

In contrast with the USA's clearly interventionist role in the Somalia conflict, the EU has provided IGAD with non-partisan and continual support, both logistically and financially, in its attempts to advance the Somalia peace process. The EU's approach to the Somalia conflict has been described as a comprehensive one that addresses 'political root causes by combining humanitarian, developmental, civilian and military policies'.[358]It has encouraged IGAD's intervention and mediation in the Somalia peace process including providing IGAD with funding through the EU African Peace Fund.[359]The EU in its 'Strategy for Special Aid to Somalia' has shown 'flexibility, strict neutrality, contacts at a local level and the multi-sectoral strategy from humanitarian aid to relief through rehabilitation to development'[360]in contrast to the US narrow focus on the 'War on Terror' and protection of its strategic interests on the Arabian Peninsula. The EU has also encouraged regional capacity in Africa for peacekeeping including being the major donor financing the AMISOM operation in Somalia.[361]

Like the US though, the EU and its member states are 'increasingly reluctant to send troops or intervene directly in conflicts in Africa'.[362]Therefore, EU policy is to support regional organisations, such as IGAD to solve African economic and political problems and crisis such as that evident in Somalia. The EU and its member states are also part of the IGAD Partner's Forum (IPF) and the IGAD Standing Committee on Somalia. The EU is also a member of the UN led 'International Contact Group (ICG) for Somalia' which provides an informal forum for the international community to deal with peace and security and the future of Somalia. The EU has also developed an 'EU Regional Strategy for the Security of the Horn' focusing on governance, security and regional cooperation and integration with a focus on partnership with IGAD. The EU Regional Strategy acknowledges that the Horn of Africa is a regional

[357] Woodward, Peter, *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2003, p.14.
[358] Erhart, & Petretto, p.180.
[359] Gilbert, Marie, 'The European Union in the IGAD sub-region: Insights from Sudan and Somalia', *Review of Political Economy,* 33:107, 2006, p.145.
[360] Gilbert, p.144.
[361] Erhart & Petretto p.182.
[362] Ibid.

system with insecurities which feed on one another including refugees, terrorism, poverty and underdevelopment and conflict.[363]

The EU has also produced a 'Joint Somalia Strategy Paper' to encourage democracy, reconciliation and the rule of law in Somalia and has appointed a Special Representative for the Horn of Africa to support IGAD in the Somalia peace process. The EU also established the EUTM (European Union Training Mission) in Uganda in 2010 in close cooperation with the UN, AMSIOM, Uganda, the US and IGAD with the aim to build the capacity of both the Somalia security forces (SSNF) and the Somalia Army. The EUTM has trained some 3,000 Somalian soldiers to improve the Somalian government's effectiveness in providing security.[364]

EU, IGAD, Somalia and piracy

The Horn of Africa and Somalia have become a focus of EU security policies in support of IGAD's attempts to establish peace and security in the region and specifically Somalia. Importantly, since 2007 the EU has also provided IGAD with support in anti-piracy measures after escalating attacks on international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, which have originated from Somalia and Puntland in particular. The EU has established an off shore presence, the EU Naval Force Somalia–Operation Atalanta (EUNAVOR) which works in co-operation with the US led Joint Task Force of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and NATO to protect international maritime operations in the Gulf of Aden. 'In addition to these multilateral maritime missions, other states have deployed military vessels to counter piracy in the region under their own national commands',[365]and this includes India and China.

The EU has also set up a 480-mile-long 'Recommended Transit Corridor' and established the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) with shipping industry assistance. The EU has also participated in the 'Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia' (CGPS) established in 2001, which co-ordinates civil, political and military policies re shipping awareness, public information and dismantling of the pirate group's financial networks.[366] The EU's CGPS aim is to 'improve maritime security in the region to deter piracy and strengthen the security of the main maritime routes.' [367]

[363] Raffaelli, Mario, 'The EU in Somalia: Furthering peacemaking and reconciliation', *The International Spectator,* 42:1, 2007, p.125.
[364] Erhart & Petretto, pp.183-186.
[365] Erhart & Petretto, p. 183.
[366] Erhart & Petretto, p. 184.
[367] Erhart & Petretto, p. 185.

Importantly, for both IGAD and its partners such as the EU, the causes of piracy in Somalia also need to be addressed. There has been illegal fishing by international trawlers in Somalia waters since the state's collapse and toxic waste dumping that have affected fishermen's livelihoods and helped produce the piracy problem in Somalia. As Ken Menkaus notes 'Somali piracy is unquestionably an onshore problem …. demanding an onshore solution'.[368] Still, piracy is also largely controlled by militias and seems to be another symptom of state collapse in Somalia with 'the warlords [finding] new ways to parlay their firepower into profit'[369]with sophisticated criminal gangs operating primarily from Puntland, with connections in both business and government, working with local fishermen and villagers in carrying out the operations.[370]It is this combination of socio-economic factors that both the EU and IGAD needs to also address in addition to the assistance of the EU to IGAD in keeping maritime routes safe, in order to fully counter piracy in the region, and Somalia in particular.

IGAD, Somalia and ex-colonial powers: UK and Italy

Additionally, the ex-colonial powers of Italy and the UK have both played a continuous and positive role in supporting IGAD's peace process in Somalia. Italy co-chairs the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) with Norway and both the UK and Italy are participants in the UN led International Somalia Contact Group. Italy has importantly always supported IGAD's regional approach to the peace process in Somalia and has 'backed the sustainability of the process itself, rather than specific groups or individuals, thereby gaining credibility amongst most Somali political actors'.[371]

The UK also assisted the Somalia peace process with its London Conference held in conjunction with the present Federal Government of Somalia at Lancaster House in 2013. This conference included the autonomous regions of Puntland and Juba and, importantly included the self-professed independent state of Somaliland for the first time at any international peace conference. It seems that 'having spurred participation in previous internally sponsored Conferences, it seems to have opened a new diplomatic avenue for Somaliland… including over $100 million US dollars in new development

[368] Menkaus, Ken, 'Dangerous waters', *Survival,* 51:1, 2009, p.22.
[369] Ibid.
[370] Pham, J Peter, 'Putting Somali piracy in context', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 28:3, 2010, p.344.
[371] Rafaelli, p.126.

assistance',[372]although Somaliland still insists it will not join a reconstituted Federal Somalia state, despite IGAD and the international community's pressure on it to do so.[373]

The UK sponsored 'London Conference' of 2013 also importantly emphasised the IGAD approach, since Eldoret, of the 'bottom-up approach' to peace building in Somalia, which previous internationally sponsored peace conferences on Somalia have largely ignored, instead focusing on reinstating a strong central unitary state, which most Somali's fear after the repression of the central state in both colonial and post- colonial eras.[374]The London Conference focused on 'supporting local areas of stability [which] Somalia peace activists have long advocated'.[375]For instance, the locally produced peace in Somaliland was a result of a series of local reconciliation conferences which started with the 'Grand Conference in Borama' in 1993 'where elders embarked on a peace building endeavour aimed at resolving all major outstanding issues between communities across the country.'[376]

Traditional conflict mediation has been used successfully in Somaliland to produce a peaceful and stable multi-party democracy, with an executive, legislature, judiciary, and constitution, despite it failing to gain recognition from the international community. Somaliland has also incorporated indigenous 'bottom-up' approaches in its legislative design, with an upper house consisting of nominated clan elders and a lower house and president directly elected by voters in general elections.[377]Still, as other authors have noted, Somaliland's example may not be generally applicable to the rest of Somalia, as the North and South had very different experiences of colonisation that still continues to affect their respective different development even today, and IGAD will have to incorporate this consideration in its efforts to bring peace to Somalia.[378]

IGAD, Somalia, and the 'War on Terror'

IGAD has increasingly adopted the stance of its western allies in the 'War on Terror' and Islamists in relation to Somalia, including recently producing a paper on Al Shabaab as a transregional threat to peace and stability in the region. IGAD adopted a Draft

[372] Healy, 'Peace-making in the midst of war', p.2.
[373] Hulliars, Asteris, 'The viability of Somaliland: Internal constraints and regional geopolitics' *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 20:2, 2002, p.168.
[374] Ahmed, Ismail I & Green, Reginald Herbold, 'The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local level effects, external intervention and reconstruction', *Third World Quarterly*, 20:1, 1999, p.115.
[375] Healy, 'Peace-making in the midst of war', p.8.
[376] Ahmed & Green, p.123.
[377] Hesse, Brian J, 'Where Somalia works', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 28:3, 2010, p.352.
[378] Hoehne & Luling, p. 46.

'Implementation Plan to Counter Terrorism' in 2003 in Kampala, Uganda. IGAD has also subsequently worked with the USA led combined Joint Task Force of Africa (CJTF-HOA) to combat terrorism in the Horn of Africa and has developed an IGAD capacity building program against terrorism (ICPATP) and also established the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy (IPPS) in 2010. Finally, IGAD along with the US, EU and several European states has provided training of the Somalian army and security forces to combat terrorism.[379]

Some commentators have been critical of IGAD's reliance on external assistance for both financial and logistic assistance in the fight against terrorism in the Horn of Africa and specifically Al Shabaab in Somalia. They believe IGAD should focus on the underlying issues driving terrorism including 'political marginalisation and polarization, social and economic inequality, endemic poverty, pervasive corruption, bad governance, lack of tolerance and external ideologies which threaten the Horn's political stability and provide fertile grounds for the recruitment of terrorist and Al-Shabaab fighters'.[380]

As mentioned in regards to Somalia, it also has a long history of fierce resistance to foreign troops and a historical animosity with its neighbour, Ethiopia which continues to fuel the Islamic insurgency led by Al-Shabaab. Militant Islam in Somalia has its origins in the colonial era when Mullah Mohammad (the Mad Mullah) used Islam to unite Somalis against the British colonisers, just as Al-Shabaab has done in the recruitment of Somalis against the AMISOM troops and other foreign incursions by Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.[381]

IGAD and Somalia: future challenges

For IGAD to successfully maintain its role as the regional security community for the Horn of Africa, it will also have to be careful of not just closely following the US and the focus of western international communities on terrorism and state failure in its search for peace in Somalia. As Benedict Franke perceptively notes, with US and EU support and funds being provided for the IGAD led Somalia peace process, IGAD is increasingly being seen as bound to a post-colonial situation where Africa provides the troops (AMISOM) and the West provides funds while still driving the agenda of the Somalia peace process in particular.[382] There has been a 'creeping Westernisation of African Security Affairs'[383]especially in

[379] Demeke & Gebru, pp.222-223.
[380] Demeke & Gebur, p.227.
[381] Elmi, p.51.
[382] Franke, Benedict & Esmenjaud, Romain, 'Who owns African ownership? : The Africanisation of security and its limits', *Southern African Journal of International Affairs*, 15:2, 2008, p.147.
[383] Franke & Esmenjaud, p.148.

IGAD's current focus on terrorism and state failure in co-operation with the US, EU and the United Nations. The West it seems in a post-colonial world is 'increasingly shaping the discussion about the meaning of African security in their own image.'[384]

Additionally, many Somalis are still suspicious of AMISOM's motives and believe it mainly represents Ethiopia and Kenya's interests and that 'AMISOM was not more than the sum of its national (and self-interested) parts'.[385]Clearly, AMISOM needs a clear exit strategy from Somalia, but with IGAD's and the AU's request for UN troops to eventually replace AMISOM not being supported by the UNSC due to the failures of its earlier missions (UNITAF and UNISOM) in Somalia, it looks like AMISOM will remain the principal support of the Somalia Government for some time yet.[386]

IGAD's successes and failures regarding its ongoing role in the Somalian peace process have reflected both its strengths and weaknesses as a regional security community for the Horn of Africa. As Buzan and Waever have noted, neighbouring countries are indeed best placed to solve the peace and security issues in their regions due to sharing common values, history and ideas as in the constructivist world view.[387]As previously discussed, IGAD has also had to contend with the continued history of mutual interference in the Horn of Africa with Ethiopia and Eritrea playing out a proxy war in Somalia. Also, members of IGAD with strategic interests are also members of the AMISOM peacekeeping force (Ethiopia & Kenya), which is widely seen as an invading force by many Somalis, including Al Shabaab.

All of these elements combine to severely compromise IGAD's ability to act as a independent mediator in the Somalia conflict and peace process. Additionally, with IGAD's key western allies in the International Partners Forum (IPF), such as the US and the EU's focus on the 'War on Terror' and state failure issues regarding Africa generally and Somalia in particular; this has led to an inability on the part of IGAD to consider any other solutions to the ongoing crisis in Somalia, other than the reconfiguration of a central state, which to most Somalis has always represented a site of coercion and repression.

For a peaceful and stable Somalia future in contrast to its war torn past, IGAD and its western allies in the International Partners Forum (IPF) may need to rethink their commitment to the

[384] Franke & Esmenjaud, p.149.
[385] Williams, Paul D., 'Stabilising Somalia', *RUSI Journal*, 159:2, 2004, p.58.
[386] Omorogbe, p.59.
[387] Buzan & Waever, p.3.

reconstitution of a central Somalia state when clearly 'the concept of the state within Somalia remains bitterly contested, yet [still] the international community can brook no prospect of the Somali state being allowed to disappear permanently'.[388]Whilst Federalism seems to be IGAD's accommodation of the Somali need for local autonomy and the international community's favoured approach to reconstitution of the Somalia state, as Sally Healy notes the 'future of the Somali state remains as problematic as ever [and] the current warring in much of the territory of the former Republic of Somalia shows, the vision of a Somalia state remains both desired and deeply contested'[389] by Somalis themselves.

Healy has actually identified three competing visions of the Somalia state- the independent state of Somaliland, the vision of a unitary federal state which IGAD and its western allies support, and even the vision of an Islamic state as espoused by the militant Islamic group Al Shabaab that are all still competing for Somali support.[390]It will be IGAD's challenge as the regional security community for the Horn of Africa to navigate these three visions, including IGAD and its allies vision of a unitary Federal State, which still respects and includes Islamists, respects Somaliland independence, and hopefully will also finally provide the Somali people and their nation with the peace and stability that has eluded them since independence from colonial rule in 1960.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the collapse of Somalia was due to a combination of factors including 'the legacies of European colonialism, the contradictions between the centralisation of state power and the traditionally uncentralised political culture of Somalis, Cold War politics, militarisation, autocratic government, oppression and economic and social injustice'.[391]IGAD and its international partners will have to consider all these elements and importantly learn to engage closely with local informal structures of peace building and governance including 'clan elders and moderate religious leaders along side elected politicians and not only during reconciliation conferences but on an ongoing basis'[392]to achieve lasting peace and stability in Somalia.

[388] Healy, Sally, 'Reflections on the Somalia state: What went wrong and why it might not matter', in Hoehne & Luling (ed), *Peace, Milk, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics*, Hurst and Company, London, 2010, p.381.
[389] Healy, 'Reflections on the Somalia state', pp.367-368.
[390] Healy, pp.167-168.
[391] Bradbury, p. 15.
[392] Oksamytna, Kseniya, 'The European Union training mission in Somalia and the limits of liberal peacebuilding: Can EUTM contribute to sustainable and inclusive peace? *International Spectator*, 46:4, 2011, p.109.

The 2016 UN sponsored successful and peaceful elections held in Somalia though do indicate that Somalia may be on the road to recovery with the lower House of the People being elected by clan elder appointed delegates and the Upper House seats being allocated to regions including Somalia's most established Federal states of Jubbaland and Puntland.[393]This election and its newly constituted parliament including the new president, Mohamed Abdullah Mohamed 'Farmajo'[394]could finally provide a starting point for a future stable Federal Somali state that includes Somalis from all regions and clans, including the moderate Islamists, with IGAD continuing to act as a central advocate and mediator in that process.

[393] UNISOM, United Nations Assistance Commission in Somalia, 'Fact sheet on Somalia's 2016 Electoral Process', 23 October, 2016, http://unsom.unmissions.org

[394] Gettleman, Jeffrey, 'In Somalia, next leader brings cheers in the streets', *The New York Times*, 9 February, 2017, www.nytimes.com

CHAPTER 6
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CHALLENGES FOR IGAD

Introduction

While it is important to recognise IGAD's achievements in its development as the AU & UN designated regional security community for the Horn of Africa, it is also important to recognise its limitations. In this thesis, the case studies of South Sudan and Somalia have provided key assistance in identifying future directions to improve IGAD effectiveness in its ability to bring peace and stability to the conflict prone region of the Horn of Africa. This final chapter outlines various areas and issues that IGAD needs to focus on to continue its improvement and, importantly, complete its development from a nascent to a mature regional security community for the Horn of Africa as recognised by the AU and UN. This includes improving its co-ordination with other actors (e.g. UN, AU, EU), increasing the incorporation of indigenous peace building approaches, addressing the issues of arms control, pastoral conflict and the responsibility to protect (R2P). This helps to continue IGAD's development into the successful and distinctively African RSC for the Horn of Africa that it has clearly become, as reflected in the two qualitative case studies of South Sudan and Somalia examined in this thesis.

IGAD: International donors co-ordination issues

One focus area for IGAD is the need for better co-ordination with key important regional and international actors and partners. This includes the AU, UN, EU, USA, China and the IPF (International Partners Forum) formed during the CPA negotiations and which continues to provide important financial, technical and logistic support to IGAD. Many commentators have noted this need for better co-ordination. It seems that overall, international support for the APSA including IGAD, remains fragmented with a multiplicity of actors involved in peace and security in both Africa generally and the Horn of Africa in particular.[395]

A recent proposal to avoid duplication of efforts and resources and ensure more effective co-ordination of donor efforts to bring peace and security to the region, is a 'single entry point [that] would facilitate coherence of policy, convergence of interests and more effective co-ordination of donor support,'[396] rather than the multiplicity of actors and programs operating in Africa and the Horn of Africa at present. The IPF group formed for the CPA was an

[395] Giorgis, Andebrhan, W, 'Co-ordinating international support for African peace and security efforts from the G8 to the EU', *The International Spectator*, 45:2, 2010, p.79.
[396] Ibid.

effective example of international and African multi-actor collaboration that helped achieve the CPA. The IPF could be further developed and consolidated as a 'one stop forum' and entry point for cooperation between IGAD and its international partners in the Horn of Africa in the ongoing peace process and post conflict stage of reconstruction in South Sudan and Somalia.[397]

African peace and security efforts are increasingly delegated to the AU and regional organisations such as IGAD, in the new era of regionalism and burden sharing favoured by the UN and all international partners. Still, there will increasingly be a need for international support for AU peace operations and the APSA to help build Africa's own peace and security resource capability.[398]The UN Peacebuilding Fund and the EU Peace Fund and other multilateral donors such as the US and ex-colonial powers of the region of the Horn of Africa (e.g.Italy and U.K.) will still need to provide vital and necessary financial and technical assistance. Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop better co-ordination and avoid duplication of efforts in order to help both the AU and IGAD achieve the desired aim of 'African solutions for African problems'.[399]

IGAD and AU co-ordination

Additionally, key African partners in peace and security of the AU and the regional security communities such as IGAD, will also need to improve their own co-ordination regarding peace and security issues. While the AU charter clearly recognises the RECs important role in regional peace and security and established co-ordination mechanisms, the reality has been less than successful. For instance, the AU has failed to provide peacekeepers to enforce the present peace agreement in South Sudan, despite IGAD's inability to do so as it has no standing force. This instead resulted in the Ugandan army's intervention in the crisis in support of the Kiir government against the SPLM-IO, which has only further complicated IGAD's attempt to negotiate an end to the hostilities.[400]'IGAD possesses the mandate to deploy peacekeeping/enforcement missions, but what it [presently] lacks is the capacity to actually do so.'[401]

[397] Murithi, Tim, 'Inter-governmental Authority on development on the ground: Comparing interventions in Sudan and Somalia', *African Security*, 2:3, 2009, p.142.
[398] Giorgis, p.82.
[399] Miall, Hugh, 'The EU and the Peacebuilding Commission', *Review of International Affairs,* 20:1, 2007, p.42.
[400] Apuuli, 'Explaining the (il)legality of Uganda's intervention in the current South Sudan conflict', p.353.
[401] Apuuli, p.361.

Also, while the AU produced an important report on human rights abuses in South Sudan committed during the current conflict, the recommendations have not been acted upon by IGAD, as this was seen as not supportive to the South Sudanese peace process negotiations. Positively, though the AU and IGAD collaboration in the peace process in Somalia with international support has been more successful, resulting in the AU (UN sponsored) peacekeeping force of AMISOM with IGAD being left to work with international partners on local and state wide peace building initiatives.[402]Still, it is imperative that both IGAD and the AU become more committed partners rather than acting as separate mediators which only serves to undermine the peace process as in the current case of South Sudan.

IGAD and the East African Standby Force

Another important future direction for IGAD that needs urgent attention is the setting up of the East African Standby Force, as outlined under the AU peace and security architecture with each region required to have a standby force for conflict and peacekeeping. At the AU Summit in 2003, it was decided to establish an African Standby Force 'consisting of five brigades, each comprising contributions from states in a particular region with IGAD to establish the East African Standby Force'.[403]It was envisaged that each regional economic community, including IGAD, would be responsible for its co-ordination and management. The AU Regional Standby Forces remain at the planning stage only,[404]and IGAD's inability to provide a peacekeeping force to allow Ethiopia's withdrawal from Somalia, left the AU and UN to take on the mission, resulting in AMISOM, an AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia funded by the UN and EU. [405]

The lack of a co-ordinated regional peacekeeping force also continues to limit IGAD's ability to enforce peace agreements successfully achieved including the CPA and the current peace agreement in South Sudan (R-ACRSS). For instance, in the present conflict in South Sudan, after the original peace agreement(ACRSS) was achieved and had been implemented, hostilities broke out again despite the presence of IGAD's Joint Monitoring Group (JEM) and IGAD was powerless to prevent the return to hostilities.[406]A major flaw of the CPA was

[402] Rein, Conrad, 'The EU and peacekeeping in Africa: The case of AMISOM', *Global Affairs*, 1:2, 2015, p.194.
[403] Laakso, Lisa, 'Beyond the notion of Security Community: What role for the African Regional Organisations in peace and security?', *The Round Table*, 94:381, 2005, p.498.
[404] Laakso, p.497.
[405] Rein, p.195.
[406] Ylonen, Aleksi, 'Dwindling but surviving : South Sudan and external involvement in the current crisis', *Review of African Political Economy*, 41:141,2014, p.470.

the lack of implementation and enforcement processes, which meant pressure could only be applied to both the SPLM and NCP through informal channels to keep the CPA on track.[407]

The present IGAD peace agreement (R-ARCSS) in South Sudan has exhibited the same flaws regarding the lack of enforcement mechanisms to ensure full implementation of the agreement. This is directly due to IGAD's lack of a Standby Regional Force to enforce its peace-agreements, which should be an immediate focus for development by IGAD with the AU's support.[408]The UN also has a role to play here, as it only provided a Regional Protection Force (largely with IGAD member troops) under an enlarged UNIMISS mission mandate, in 2018, some 18 months after the resumption of hostilities, despite IGAD's request for the authorisation of this force after the conflict had resumed in July 2016.[409]

R2P (Responsibility to protect) issues for IGAD and AU

Additionally, despite the AU Constitutive Act Article 4 (h)[410]allowing for intervention regarding crimes against humanity and genocide : both the AU and IGAD have failed to intervene to protect civilians, especially in the current conflict in South Sudan, which included the massacre of Nuer civilians in Juba on December 2013 after the split in the SPLM party took on an ethnic conflict dimension. There have also been many subsequent attacks on civilians in South Sudan by both sides of the conflict, by the government and the SPLM-IO.[411]Despite the provision for intervention in the AU Act under Article 4 (h) 'the AU has proven controversial when it comes to turning these ambitions into reality'.[412]IGAD seems to have followed this approach too, an example being of the AU and its RECs (including IGAD) decision to 'suspend co-operation with the ICC (International Criminal Court) on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity to some African leaders'[413]including the then Sudanese President, Omar Bashir in regards to atrocities in Darfur.

This works to undermine both the UN and AU agreed R2P (Responsibility to Protect) principles as outlined in the UN policy document 'Agenda to Peace', supported by and

[407] Ylonen, Aleksi, 'Building a state without the nation? : Peace-though statebuilding in Southern Sudan 2005-2011', *UNISCI Discussion Paper*, No.33, 2013, p.22.
[408] Ibid.
[409] Musisi, Fredic, 'East Africa: End South Sudan crisis now, UN tells IGAD', 24 June, 2017, www.monitor.co.ug.
[410] Ifedinoar, Obinna Franklin, 'The responsibility to protect and the African governance architecture: Exploring the nexus', *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review*, 6:2, 2016, p. 95.
[411] Brosche & Hoglund, p.68.
[412] Murithi, Tim (ed), *Handbook of Africa's International Relations*, Routledge, London, 2014, p.198.
[413] Aning, Kwesia Lartey, Ernest , 'Establishing the future state of the Peace-Building Commission,perspectives on Africa working paper : The future of the Peacebuilding Architecture Project', University of Ottawa, 2010, p.23.

developed with African members input at the UN. The UN Peace Building Commission has stated that this lack of commitment to the international norm of R2P by African security communities including IGAD, reinforces the culture of impunity in African politics which in turn undermines efforts to build sustainable peace in African post-conflict societies. [414]

The AU Report into the current situation in South Sudan importantly outlined the need for a post conflict 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission' and criminal prosecutions for more serious human rights abuses regarding the current conflict, but IGAD has yet to respond or act on the report.[415]Positively though, both the ARCSS and now the R-ARCSS peace agreement brokered by IGAD include such provisions, but after the resumption of hostilities in July 2016, they are still to be implemented.[416]

IGAD and indigenous and hybrid peacebuilding approaches

It is important in relation to future directions for IGAD that it pays more attention to 'African ways of building and restoring peace'[417]in its peace building efforts in the Horn of Africa conflicts as examined in the case studies. Traditional peace building in Somaliland and in South Sudan during the civil war with the North have revealed the rich tradition of conflict resolution in Africa. For instance, Somaliland's use of elders in conflict resolution at the Grand Conference in 1993 brought peace to Somaliland that has eluded Somalia.[418] The mediation of Dinka and Nuer chiefs along with an alliance of Sudanese churches that was held in Wunit Kenya in 1991 helped end the bitter split in the SPLM during the civil war with the North.[419]

These are clear examples of successful indigenous solutions in peace building that IGAD needs to model in its own peacemaking and peace building attempts. As the dominant discourse of peace building and post-conflict reconstruction has been led by the United Nations and western actors it is important that indigenous traditions of peace building are utilised too. Many writers have also noted the neo-imperial elements of the Liberal peace agenda which sees peace building as state-building and 'is born more or less directly out of its Eurocentrism, which takes Western agency and ideas as the only serious side of

[414] Ibid.
[415] AU Commission, pp.2-3.
[416] Ibid.
[417] Molomo, Mpho, G, 'Building a culture of peace in Africa: Toward a trajectory of using traditional knowledge systems', *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, 4:3, 2009, p.58.
[418] Ahmed & Green, p.115.
[419] Redekop, p.65.

politics',[420]which IGAD needs to challenge in its continued peace building efforts in the Horn of Africa.

Authors such as Roger McGinty have noted that many non-western states have their own strong indigenous traditions of conflict resolution that deserve recognition and incorporation into peace building, which the UN and its dominant western discourse continue to exclude.[421] These critics of Liberal peace have called instead for a hybrid approach to peace building that incorporates both modern and traditional modes of conflict resolution.[422]This approach also importantly recognises that while traditional systems include positive aspects, such as consensus decision making and restorative justice, it is also important to acknowledge that traditional societies had oppressive practices including the exclusion of women voices and the emphasis on warfare instead of the pursuit of peace.[423]

Somaliland which has remained an island of political stability in the unstable Horn of Africa region[424]with its Bicarmel parliament (i.e. an upper house of elders and a lower house of elected representatives) could again represent a model of this type of hybrid peace building that IGAD could adopt in is efforts to bring peace and stability to the region. Additionally, the AU has also incorporated hybrid peacemaking approachs with its organisational structure based on the EU, but its development of the AU Panel of the Wise (of elders) reflecting indigenous approaches to peace building. There are five panel members who represent Africa's five regions and who are appointed by the AU General Assembly, and are selected due to their past outstanding contributions to peace, security and development in Africa. 'The panel is expected to use their expert knowledge and moral influence to advise the African Peace and Security Council (APSA) and facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflicts via diplomacy and mediation'.[425]The Panel actually reflects African indigenous conflict resolution where 'chiefs, priests, healers and elders play a key role in mediation and

[420] Sabaratram, Meera, 'Avatars of Eurocentrism in the critique of the Liberal peace', *Security Dialogue*, 44:3, 2013, p.270.
[421] MacGinty, Roger, 'Indigenous peacemaking versus the Liberal peace', *Co-operation and Conflict*, 43:2, 2008, p.151.
[422] Jabri, Vivienne, 'Peacebuilding, the local and the International: A colonial or a post-colonial rationality?', *Peacebuilding,* 1:1, 2013, p.5.
[423] MacGinty, p.150.
[424] De Waal, Alex, *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power,* Polity Press, Cambridge, 2015, p.96.
[425] Ani, Ndubuisi Christian, 'Re-empowering Indigenous principles for conflict resolution in Africa: Implications for the African Union', *Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies*, 10:9, 2017, p.29.

diplomacy,'[426]and this is a structure that IGAD could utilise in its mediation efforts in both South Sudan and Somalia.

Peacebuilding : DDR and SSR

Despite some of the major limitations of the Liberal peace building agenda in regards to Africa, there are also some important aspects of the Liberal peace that could contribute to the enhanced effectiveness of IGAD as the RSC for the Horn of Africa. This involves the development of effective DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) and SSR (Security Sector Reform) processes successfully employed in other post conflict countries in Africa, such as Ethiopia and Mozambique, and which have resulted in lasting peace and and an end to hostilities.[427]While the CPA did have a DDR clause and made provision for the establishment of three institutions responsible for the process including 1) the National Council for DDR Co-ordination (NCDDRC) and 2)North Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC) and South Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC), 'the DDR process largely remained at the planning process'. [428]

Additionally, it seems the NCP's vast and repressive security section was merely replicated in the South upon independence and the GOSS's approach to disarmament was simply the absorption of all the rival militias formerly funded by Khartoum.[429]As a result, by 2012 the SPLA payroll was over 230,000 with one billion US dollars in spending on paramilitaries, national security and arms purchases.[430]The SPLM had developed into a collection of rival militias rather than a national army, which in turn contributed to the speed of the SPLM split's eruption into civil war. As Edward Lino, a senior SPLM commander notes, the SPLA was 'divided and shredded into tribal formations, based on localised tribal understanding'[431]and local commanders and not a national army. An effective DDR and SSR process by IGAD in the CPA could have integrated the army and reformed the security sector avoiding the outbreak of hostilities in Juba in December 2013. Fortunately, in IGAD's negoation of the current South Sudan Peace Agreement (ACRSS and R-ACRSS) these issues are now finally being addressed.[432]

[426] Ibid.
[427] Babiker, Mohammed, Hassan & Ozerdam, Alpuslan, 'A future disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process in Sudan: Lessons learned from Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda', *Conflict*, *Security and Development*, 3:2, 2003, p.218.
[428] Knight, Andy, W, '*Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa: An overview', African Security*, 1:1, 2008, p.43.
[429] De Waal, p.96.
[430] De Waal, p.97.
[431] De Waal, p.98.
[432] RJMEC, p. 11.

IGAD and CEWARN

An important present initiative of IGAD that could provide the basis for future directions to further build peace and security in the Horn of Africa is the further development of the IGAD CEWARN mechanism, first established in 1998. CEWARN is a Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism that was actually founded even before the AU and its peace and security architecture was established and actually became the model for the AU's continent wide Conflict Early Warning System. CEWARN was founded by IGADD 'to target pastoral cross-border and trans-border conflicts in three clusters. These clusters included: 'Dikihil between Djibouti and Ethiopia, Somalia between Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia and Karamoja between Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia'.[433]CEWARN has proved a highly successful conflict prevention mechanism in the Horn of Africa but its mandate only involves border conflicts rather than intrastate conflicts which is a severe limitation due to the intrastate nature of most conflicts in the region.

CEWARN's focus remains limited to 'livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, smuggling and illegal trade, nomadic movements, refugees, landmines and banditry'.[434]While CEWARN has gained further importance and strength through its co-ordination with the AU CEWS (Continental Early Warning System) criticism continues to revolve around the restriction of its main focus on pastoral conflict in a region with a history of a range of violent conflicts beyond these issues.[435]IGAD nevertheless can build on the success of CEWARN and future direction could include expanding its mandate to focus on a 'wider range of conflicts and conflict identifiers'[436]including intrastate conflicts (e.g. Darfur).

IGAD and arms control

Another key area that IGAD must focus on to promote peace and stability in the Horn of Africa is to reduce the proliferation of small arms in the region. In many parts of the Horn, due to chronic insecurity and the states inability to provide security for pastoralist societies, 'the issue of human security is closely linked to small arms'.[437]A Somali elder is quoted as saying 'For us an AK 47 or so is like a decoration, it's part of us'.[438]For centuries in the Horn

[433] De Sousa, Ricardo, Real P, *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), subsidarity and the Horn of Africa: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD*), Center of African Studies, Lisbon, 2013, p.68.
[434] Wagner, Carie Marie, 'Reconsidering peace in the Horn of Africa: The impact of increased co-operation and the African Peace and Security Architecture', *African Security Review*, 22:2, 2013, p.42.
[435] Wagner, p.43.
[436] Wagner, p.44.
[437] Gebrewold, Kiflemariam, 'The relationship between human security, demand for arms and disarmament in the Horn of Africa', *Medicine, Conflict and Survival*, 18:4, 2002, p.402.
[438] Ibid.

of Africa, pastoralists have been taking care of their own security due to the state's inability to do so.[439]These pastoralists arm themselves for protection from attacks and incursions from other ethnic groups, and also from cattle raiding.

Since the 1970s there has been an increased proliferation of small arms in the Horn of Africa due to the Cold War and other regional conflicts. Additionally, due to failing state structures and endemic conflict in the region, people have increasingly turned to small arms for protection which undoubtedly fuels continuing conflicts in the region as seen in Somalia and more recently in South Sudan.[440]It is important for IGAD and its members to address much needed security sector reforms (SSR) in all member states. This will ensure better equipped and more professional law enforcement agencies to provide security for the region's citizens, and to reduce the need and demand for small arms in the region.[441]Additionally, the lack of comprehensive disararment, demobilisation and rehabilition programmes (DDR) in the Horn of Africa, as seen in the case studies of South Sudan and Somalia, have also contributed to continued conflict. The lack of these DDR programs and the resulting profusion of illicit firearms continues to undermine security and stability in the Horn of Africa.[442]This is an important and urgent issue that IGAD needs to address.

Encouragingly, some important regional initiatives aimed at small arms controls that IGAD could build on, include the '2004 Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa' which represents an important 'collaborative effort among the regional governments to maximise security'.[443]In 2011 the African Union also adopted 'The African Strategy on the control of illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons',[444]in order to curb illicit activities of SALW on the African Continent and strengthen cooperation at the national, regional and international levels on SALW.

Additionally, the African Union and African states have been key contributors to the development of a global Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) passed at the United National General

[439] Ibid.
[440] Hassan, Rania, 'CEWARN's new strategy framework: Implications for Sudan and South Sudan's existing and emerging conflicts', *African Security Review,* 22:2, 2013, p.33.
[441] Gebrewold, p.406.
[442] Omondi, Paul, 'Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa: The conflict economy and arms control', *Arms Control*, 2:5, 2010, p.8.
[443] Ibid.
[444] Murithi (ed), 'Handbook of Africa's International Relations', p.236.

Assembly in 2014.[445]The ATT came into force in December 2014 but as major arms suppliers to Africa, such as Russia and China, have not signed the treaty and the USA has not yet ratified the treaty, the ATT's effectiveness is severely limited. This is despite the ATT being supported by the majority of UN member states, particularly Africa, which 'has experienced the most destructive consequences of the largely unregulated global arms market'[446]as seen in case studies of South Sudan and Somalia.

It is another concern to regional security that IGAD member countries continue to spend enormous amounts on arms. In both Sudan and South Sudan oil revenue has been used for military expenditure instead of important and much needed infrastructure and services, and this practice continues to fuel conflicts in and between both states. Research has shown that 'the majority of weapons imported by the Third World governments are used… to repress domestic opposition groups'[447]which is also the case across other IGAD countries in the Horn of Africa.

It is imperative that policy makers in western democracies who continue to be the world's largest suppliers of weaponry show more concern for the impact of arms transfers on politics and violence in recipient countries, especially in Africa and the potential blowback effects of these arms sales. These effects include the development of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and its terrorist attacks on IGAD member states and western interests including the US embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya.[448]In fact, Somalia is today regarded as the major transit point for weapons into East Africa.[449]While some members of the UNSC (US, UK, France) have proposed arms embargos in Somalia and South Sudan; Russia and China, both major suppliers of arms to Africa, while agreeing to an arms embargo against Eritrea due to its links to Al-Shabaab, have failed to support a proposed arms embargo against warring factions in South Sudan. This clearly undermines IGAD's ability to negotiate an end to the conflict there.

China, in particular, has become an increasingly important arms supplier to both Africa in general (e.g. Zimbabwe) and the Horn of Africa in particular (e.g. Sudan and South Sudan). Its norm of non-interference and respect of state sovereignty in regards to oppressive regimes has led to characterisation of Chinese involvement in Africa and its supply of arms in return

[445] Stavrianakis, Anna, 'Legitimising liberal militarism: Politics, law and war in the Arms Trade Treaty', *Third World Quarterly*, 37:5, 2016, p.840.
[446] Lamb, Guy, 'African states and the ATT negotiations', *Arms Control Today*,2012, p.15.
[447] Plaut, Martin, 'How unstable is the Horn of Africa?', *Political Economy*, 40:136, 2013,p.321.
[448] Plaut, p.328.
[449] Thusi, Thokozani, 'Assessing small arms control initiatives in East Africa', *African Security Review*, 12:2, 2003, p.20.

for access to natural resources 'as narrowly mercantile at best and devoid of moral content at worst'.[450]China has historically supplied arms to Sudan since 1995 with transfers of over $50 million US dollars. China has also engaged in high level political and military interaction with both Sudan and South Sudan in order to gain access to Africa's natural resources, particularly oil.[451]China's non-adherence to UN arms embargos or sanctions against African states[452]means that it is an increasingly important player in arms sales on the Continent.

While China has also contributed to both peacekeeping and infrastructure projects in Africa and the Horn of Africa in particular, its policy of non-interference and arms sales for oil seems to be fuelling wars in Africa and this region. Positively though, China is also assisting IGAD with its peace and security structure development with both a memorandum of understanding and a contribution of $100,000 US dollars to operational costs and a donation of $98 million US dollars in 2012. It has also established a China-Africa Co-operative partnership (FOCAC) for peace and security to assist with post conflict reconstruction in Africa.[453]'Chinese policy makers though will have to more seriously tackle issues of proliferation because Chinese interests are ultimately best served by a stable and conflict free Africa too'.[454]

IGAD : A nascent regional security community

Finally, the major challenge that IGAD needs to focus on is to develop from a nascent into a mature regional security community, which Barnett and Adler characterise as when 'regional actors share an identity and therefore entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change and security now comes into existence',[455]and which includes increasing mutual trust and decreasing levels of fear of threats from neighbouring states.[456]The main reason IGAD has not yet fully developed into a mature RSC is due to its members history of mutual interference that has characterised interstate relations in the region, both during the Cold War and today.

This is clearly evident where various liberation movements and insurgents have gained support and refuge in neighbouring states and the continual pattern of proxy wars in the Horn

[450] Alden, Chris & Lange, David, 'On becoming a norms maker: Chinese foreign policy, norms, evolution and the challenges of security in Africa', *The China Quarterly*, 221, 2015, p.130.
[451] Taylor, Ian & Wu, Zhengyu, 'China arms transfers to Africa and political violence', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 25:3, 2013, p.465.
[452] Morgan, Earl Conteh & Weeks, Patti, 'Is China playing a contradictory role in Africa?: Security implications of its arms sales and peacekeeping', *Global Security and Intelligence Studies*, 2:1, 2016, p.99.
[453] Alden & Lange, p.131.
[454] Taylor & Wu, p.472.
[455] Adler & Barnett, p.55.
[456] Alder & Barnett, p. 56.

of Africa. As David Francis notes 'the countries in the region have developed the habit of supporting insurgency and guerrilla groups and rebel movements against their neighbours'.[457] This shared norm and history of mutual interference continues to undermine IGAD's ability to bring peace and stability to the Horn of Africa as seen in the case studies of South Sudan and Somalia, along with IGAD's lack of peacekeeping and enforcement capabilities, which like all of the AU APSA is also severely hampered by a lack of financial and logistic support from member states.[458]Still, as many authors have noted, it took Europe many years of warfare and negotiation to achieve integration and peace[459]and the states of Africa, which were artificial colonial creations and exhibit 'juridical rather than the empirical attributes of statehood',[460]will take many years to develop the level of integration and peace achieved in the developed world.

IGAD does though meet the overall definitions of both Deutsch and the constructivists, such as Buzan and Waever, that security communities exist where 'the members are so inter-related in terms of their security that actions by any member and significant security related developments, inside any member, have a major impact on the other'.[461]This is clearly the case with IGAD and its member states in the Horn of Africa and this is reflected in its Charter and Peace and Security Strategy established in 2010.

While, IGAD's ability to provide peace and security in the Horn of Africa region is still hampered by lack of trust among its member states due to the legacy of interstate and intrastate conflict and their pattern of mutual interference; as Buzan and Waever have noted, neighbouring states are also the best placed actors to help solve regional security problems due to the impact on each other of peace and security threats and challenges. [462]
This is especially the case in the Horn of Africa where refugees, arms and cross border pastoralist conflict constitute security challenges shared by all countries in the region. IGAD as the regional security community for the Horn of Africa offers a clear framework to resolve conflict with its diplomatic and organisational links with the AU and the UN, that was clearly

[457] Francis, David, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security systems*, p.218.
[458] Williams, Paul, 'Reflections on the evolving African peace and security architecture', *African Security*, 7:3, 2014, p.157.
[459] Goldgeier, James M & McFaul, Michael, 'A tale of two worlds: Core and periphery in the post-Cold War era', *International Organisation,* 48:2, 1992, p.475.
[460] Jackson, & Rosberg, p.3.
[461] Frazier, Derrick & Stewart, Ingersoll, Robert, 'Regional powers and security: A framework for understanding order within regional security complexes', *European Journal of International Relations*, 16:4, 2010, p.733.
[462] Buzan & Waever, p.3.

lacking for the region before its mandate was updated to include peace and security in 1996.[463]

Conclusion

IGAD has indeed established itself as a successful and distinctively African regional security community for the Horn of Africa and is now best placed to provide peace and security in this region, as designated under both the AU Peace and Security Architecture and the UN Charter Chapter VIII: The Role of Regional Organisations.[464]While the original vision of the UN at its inception for regional organisation's involvement in peace and security remained severely restricted during the Cold War, and the resulting UN Security Council's impasse between the two super-powers (USA v USSR); there is a renewed vision of the importance of the role of regional organisations such as IGAD in the global search for peace and security.[465]This new emphasis on regionalism by the UN under its 'Agenda for Peace' and other international actors (e.g. US, EU) has allowed Africa to develop 'African solutions for African problems.' This has included the development of both the continent wide security community of the AU and specifically IGAD as the designated RSC for the Horn of Africa.

While Africa still remains the most conflict prone Continent and the Horn of Africa, in particular, is the most conflict prone area in the world, the number of armed conflicts in Sub Saharan Africa declined significantly between 1996 and 2006.[466]The African Union declared 2010 to be the African year of peace and security and African leaders including IGAD members, have committed themselves to dealing with the conflict and violence that has affected the Continent since independence, stating that 'we as leaders cannot bequeath the burden of conflict to the next generation of Africans'.[467]It seems the advance in the African continental and regional peace and security architecture, as seen generally in the AU and specifically in IGAD, has indeed worked to effectively reduce conflict in Africa and IGAD has played a key role in this advance, as noted in the case studies examined in this thesis.

Finally, by incorporating future directions for IGAD outlined in this chapter, IGAD can further strengthen its already key role in peace and security in the troubled region of the Horn

[463] Healy, 'Peacemaking in the midst of war', p.3.
[464] Boulden, p.15.
[465] Besada, Hany, *Crafting an African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century, Ashgate, Surrey, 2010,* p.xix.
[466] Devon, Curtis & Dzinesa, Gwinyay,A, *Peacebuilding, Power and Politics in Africa*, Ohio University Press, Ohio, 2012, p.2
[467] Devon & Dzinesa, p.1.

of Africa, and proceed to develop from a nascent to a mature RSC as outlined by constructivist scholars Adler and Barnett in *Security Communities.*[468]

[468] Adler & Barnett, p.55.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the theory of 'Security Communities' which originated with Karl Deutsch to explain the security co-operation between liberal democratic states in Western Europe and North America[469]and later developed by constructivism, is still a valuable theory to explain increasing regional co-operation and the increased role of RSCs in peace and security post the Cold War.[470]It is a theory that helps explain IGAD's development from a Drought and Development Agency in 1986 to a RSC in 1996 with an extended peace and security mandate required when a 'series of interrelated conflicts in the Horn was reaching a crescendo',[471]and Horn of Africa countries were forced to find a solution to these peace and security threats in their region.

IGAD has since developed into a successful and distinctively African regional security community for the Horn of Africa as shown in this thesis and, in particular, through the qualitative case studies of South Sudan and Somalia. As Amitav Acharya noted 'while common values are necessary for community building these need not be liberal democratic values'.[472]IGAD members instead share norms in relations to the experience of colonialism, post-colonialism, the Cold War, the post-Cold War and pan-Africanism that continue to influence the continental structure of both the AU and IGAD and the shared values of IGAD members.[473]

IGAD may still be at the nascent stage of development in comparison to other mature regional securities, such as NATO and ASEAN,[474] but its negotiation of the CPA to end Africa's longest running civil war, and its ongoing support for the Somalian peace process are both considerable achievements. As Sally Healy noted 'IGAD has brought a new diplomatic dimension to conflict management in the Horn… and performs a crucial agenda setting role in directing African and wider international responses to conflicts in the region'.[475]This is clearly seen in the conflict in South Sudan and IGAD's revitalisation of the ARCSS peace agreement with its international partners' support including both the AU and UN.

IGAD's limitations have also been explored in this thesis in South Sudan and Somalia case studies with the last chapter suggesting future directions and improvement for IGAD, to help

[469] Deutsch, Karl W, 'Security Communities', in Rosenau, James, N (ed) *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1961, p.98.
[470] Alagappa, p.346.
[471] Healy, Sally, 'Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa, p.107.
[472] Acharya, Amitav, *Constructing a Security Community in South-East Asia* p.36.
[473] Franke, Benedikt, 'Precis of security co-operation in Africa: A reappraisal', p.87
[474] Adler, & Barnett, pp.55-56.
[475] Healy, Sally, p.107.

it move from a nascent to a mature RSC for the Horn of Africa. An important recommendation is the development of an enforcement mechanism for IGAD (e.g. the proposed East African Standby Force) to ensure its peace agreements are implemented successfully. IGAD's lack of such a capacity directly contributed to the return to conflict in South Sudan after IGAD had successfully negotiated the ARCSS (Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan). The revitalisation of the ARCSS will require this implementation capacity to ensure success in ending the conflict and bringing lasting peace to South Sudan.

IGAD also needs to address and combat the history of mutual interference in the Horn that has characterised relations between neighbouring states and also acts to constrain IGAD's ability to comprehensively resolve conflicts in the region.[476]Other future directions for IGAD include the need for better co-ordination with the AU and its international partners and the need to address arms control in the region, especially regarding ongoing pastoralist conflicts that continue to contribute to overall regional insecurity.

IGAD's many strengths have also been explored in the thesis including its successful engagement of International partners (e.g. IPF) that provide both financial and political support to IGAD in its role as RSC for the Horn of Africa.[477]For instance, during IGAD's CPA negotiations, the US was instrumental in ensuring all parties (SPLM and the NCP) remained engaged in the negotiations while the EU continues to provide IGAD with both logistic and financial assistance in the ongoing Somalian peace process. Additionally, IGAD's ability to combine the use of both western styles of negotiation and traditional African forms of conflict resolution (e.g. Ubuntu) shows its clear development as a distinctively African regional security community.[478]

As Amitav Acharya noted there are 'multiple and global heritage of norms and [IR needs to] respect the diversity of normative cultures in world politics and different forms and sites of agency involved in the spread of ideas and the construction of political and security communities'.[479]RSCs from all regions of the world, including Africa, deserve to be fully researched to explore both their distinctive aspects and commonalities with other security communities and their unique strengths and areas for improvement. This thesis and its

[476] Cliffe, p.89.
[477] Francis, *Uniting Africa: Building a Regional Peace and Security System*, p.217.
[478] Murithi, 'Practical peacemaking, wisdom from Africa: Reflections on Ubuntu', p.32.
[479] Acharya, Amitav, *Rethinking Power, Institutions and Ideas in World Politics: Whose IR?,* p.13.

detailed study of IGAD as the regional security community for the Horn of Africa plus the two qualitative case studies will hopefully contribute to a future research agenda for detailed studies of other non-European security communities. This will help to address the 'Eurocentric' focus that has dominated both the discipline of international relations generally and the study of security communities in particular.

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