Out of South Africa and Into Australia: The Afrikaners’ Quest for Belonging in a Post-apartheid World

Johanna Elisabeth (Hanna) Jagtenberg

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Anthropology
School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts
University of Adelaide
September 2019
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Figures vi

Abstract vii

Declaration viii

Acknowledgements ix

Dedication x

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Introduction 11

A personal start: encounters in Polokwane 13
The question: how to cope with loss and change? 16
The aim: reaching a deep understanding 20

Human needs: an alternative model 28

Belonging: the key to our existence 33
Enacting belonging through attachment 33
Who is in and who is out: sameness and difference 36

What if belonging is lost? 38
How do we deal with loss? 38
Meaning-making: maintaining the tie and recreating the bond 40

Thesis outline 41

CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY AND TERMINOLOGY

Introduction 44

In the field: research process 45
Collecting stories: interviews 45
Who were the story tellers? A general profile 47
The context: on ‘being there’ in modern anthropology 51
Beyond the stories: interpretation and analysis 55
Questions of belonging: being the insider/outside 57

Terminology: clarification of concepts & terms 60
An Afrikaner diaspora in Australia 62
Afrikaner vs. Afrikaans: breaking relationships of belonging? 64
In conclusion

CHAPTER 3. ‘NO COUNTRY FOR WHITE MEN’: IN SEARCH OF ECONOMIC BELONGING 67

Introduction

South Africa: ‘No future for white sons’
  Affirmative action: ‘Paying for the sins of the fathers’ 72
  The ‘Deep Story’ and its performative power 74

Australia: ‘No land of milk and honey’
  ‘Nobody gives it the time of day’: grief over unemployment 78
  ‘Lured under false pretences’: the felt policy/practice discrepancy 80
  ‘No “fair go” for immigrants’: perceived discrimination 83
  On the reality of suffering 86
  ‘Starting over from scratch’: loss of career, wealth, and self-esteem 88
  ‘But the kids are all right’: meaning-making through sacrifice 90

Conclusion 93

CHAPTER 4. ‘WAITING TO BE NEXT’: SEEKING PHYSICAL SAFETY 96

Introduction

South Africa: ‘You’re just not safe’
  When living in fear becomes the norm 100
  ‘Luckily, it wasn’t us’: secondary traumatisation 104
  Closing down and tightening up: the effects of fear 107

Australia: ‘You just feel safe, it is the strangest feeling’
  ‘How can you live like that?!’ Traumatised by living in safety 112
  ‘It is just so in you’: the socialisation of our habits 115
  Opening up and letting go: the results of trust 117

Conclusion 121

CHAPTER 5. ‘WE DON’T BELONG THERE’: YEARNING TO FEEL INCLUDED 123

Introduction

‘Rather dull than dangerous’: in search of a familiar place
  ‘Just another African country’: how home became foreign 128
  ‘Everybody drives sixty’: regaining law and order 131
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘How do you explain that? Africa…’: loss of geographical belonging</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Our children will become Aussies’: recreating inclusion</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘They don’t want us there’: the pain of feeling rejected</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘I matter here’: the meaning of political inclusion</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Tolerated, not embraced’: feeling socially excluded</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 6. ‘WE WILL NEVER ADJUST TO THIS’: CULTURAL BEREAVEMENT</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of difference: ‘They are British’</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘That British nastiness, you get that amongst them’: the pain of history</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘They never invite you back’: a ‘distant’ culture</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘They don’t speak their minds’: ‘British politeness’ vs. ‘Dutch directness’</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The big mirror: ‘They are atheists’</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Playing different games’: cultural bereavement at work</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Children rule’: the perceived lack of Christian values</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘In our culture, you do your best’: projecting the Calvinist doctrine</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 7. ‘IT NEVER GETS EASIER’: LOSS OF INTERPERSONAL BELONGING</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The meaning of losing family: conflict and vulnerability</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘My oldest brother still won’t talk to me’</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Ultimately, you choose between your children and your parents’</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘I took them away from love, but I gave them a future’</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The loss of community: lack of support and of familiarity</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coping Strategies: Maintaining the ties &amp; Recreating the bonds</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘The distance is just too great…and you try to root here’</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘A lot of people say: “Oh yeah, it’s easy.” I don’t think it’s easy’</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoring the bonds: family reunification</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacing the ties: ‘Your Afrikaner friends become your family’</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘You don’t have to explain yourself all the time’</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 207

Introduction 207

The felt loss of belonging in South Africa 207

The Reality of the ‘Deep Story’ 209

Restoration and Loss in Australia 210

(Not) Finding meaning in loss 213

Conclusion: Belonging, our essential need 217

REFERENCES 219
FIGURES

Figure 1. Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs  

Figure 2. An alternative model of human needs
ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I analyse the experiences of white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, who self-identify as Afrikaners, and who immigrated to Australia in the post-apartheid era. Based on 16 months of ethnographic fieldwork amongst this group, I centrally argue that they had lost their sense of belonging in their homeland and moved to Australia in an attempt to recreate this. Hence, I use the experience of loss of belonging as my main analytical framework. Loss is defined as the severance of attachment and belonging as togetherness. Since we attach ourselves in first instance to other people, I argue that interpersonal belonging is our most essential need. Belonging is further similar to identity, since we feel that we belong to someone or some group because we identify with them. As such, it is concerned with who we are (and not) or to whom we belong (or not), and thus with inclusion and exclusion. In South Africa after 1994, the study participants had felt excluded in nearly every sense. Since secondary research demonstrates that Afrikaners, as a group, are not excluded in their homeland, I further argue that most of these losses were felt losses. However, whether our version of reality is congruent with facts is irrelevant in our lived experience: we act upon what we believe to be true and thereby create our own reality. Therefore, the Afrikaners’ overall story that, to them, feels as if it is true, became real in its consequences. That is, due to their felt loss of belonging, they immigrated to Australia. When we are faced with loss, we generally react with grief, and grief works itself out through the competing tendencies of trying to preserve or restore the past while simultaneously attempting to recreate or replace what was lost. The Afrikaners focused on the latter by trying to replace South Africa with Australia. However, since our attachments are specific, loss is irreplaceable. Ultimately, grief can only be resolved or made bearable through meaning-making. Since the study participants failed to this with regards to their pre-immigration losses, they were still grieving over their felt loss of belonging to their homeland. Next to this, in Australia, they felt excluded too, due to their migrant status. In fact, the migration was associated with loss and grief as well, since many participants lost, to a considerable extent, their careers, wealth and, with that, their self-esteem. Most of all, they felt bereft of their culture and their relatives. However, since they viewed all of these losses as sacrifices they had made for their children, whom they felt were fully accepted in Australian society, they coped well with their post-immigration losses. Thus, the Afrikaners’ loss of belonging was made bearable through enacting belonging: the participants restored meaning to their own lives through their children.
THESIS DECLARATION

I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in my name, in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name, for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree.

I give permission for the digital version of my thesis to be made available on the web, via the University’s digital research repository, the Library Search and also through web search engines, unless permission has been granted by the University to restrict access for a period of time.

I acknowledge the support I have received for my research through the provision of an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.

Signature of candidate:

Date:
January 2020
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Since ‘we exist in a bundle of belonging’, in the words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, I have created this thesis with the help, support and cooperation of many others—all of whom, in their own way, have thus been a part of this project. In the first place, evidently, I could not have conducted this research without the cooperation of my research participants. Their willingness and openness to share their stories has laid the foundation of this work. I have enjoyed the hospitable and generous nature of many of the Afrikaners whom I met and hold fond memories of long talks at kitchen tables and on large and cosy living room sofas, always over coffee and cake. It has been a privilege to listen to their stories and discuss their feelings with regards to their home and host country.

Yet, in chronological order I should start by thanking the Afrikaners whom I met in Polokwane in 2011, whose stories prompted me to do this research, most notably Mada Vorster. I would also like to acknowledge the support of my previous supervisor, Professor Emeritus Robert Ross at Leiden University, for his support in the early stages of the research proposal. The journey from Leiden to Adelaide was made possible by an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship, for which I am grateful to the University of Adelaide and the Commonwealth of Australia. In Adelaide, I have been very lucky with my supervisory team. I am grateful to Professor Andrew Skuse for his light, efficient and down-to-earth supervisory style, great mentorship and, above all, for always being there and for always believing in me. To Dr Valerie Liddle I am thankful for thoughtful comments, careful editing, practical support regarding research software, for which I also owe thanks to Val’s husband John Liddle, and, most of all, for long, personal conversations over lunch. Both my supervisors have been incredibly flexible towards the end and have given me all the moral support and encouragement to finish within candidature. Thank you, Andrew and Val.

I would also like to thank the other staff members of the Department of Anthropology and Development Studies, most notably Dr Dianne Rodger, for her kind and stable presence and willingness to help with anything at any time. I further owe thanks to our Postgraduate Coordinators Dr Susan Hemer and Dr Anna Szorenyi for efficient support regarding practical issues relating to candidature. My gratitude also goes out to Professor Amanda Kearney,
currently at Flinders University, for her support, mentorship and, above all, for being such an inspiring example. Thank you, Amanda. To Professor John Coetzee from the Department of Creative Writing and to Dr Carli Coetzee from SOAS in London I am grateful for helpful critical comments on the first, raw draft of my data analysis. Furthermore, I thank Associate Professor Harry Wels from Leiden University and Associate Professor Chris van der Borgh from Utrecht University for supportive conversations in the Netherlands.

Within the School of Social Sciences there are three fantastic professional staff members who have provided much practical and moral support, namely Shamira Barr, Sarah Hoggard and Cheryl Fisher. Thank you so much. My gratitude also goes to our research librarian, Helen Attar, for her kindness and efficient support, as well as to the professional staff at the Graduate Centre, in particular to Janelle Palmer, for her inventiveness, generosity and encouragement. My fellow PhD cohort, both in our department and within the wider school and faculty, have also been an indispensable source of guidance and support. I am especially grateful to Jaye Litherland-de Lara, Bronwyn Hall and Barry Lincoln. Together, along this journey, we have figured out why it is called the philosopher’s degree.

I would further like to thank our amazing neighbours, Nicole Brammy and Nick Lagos, who have made our ‘landing’ in Australia very soft. They have also provided me with a space for writing retreats by opening up their home while they were away. For doing the same, I thank Jan and Alan Brammy, Jaye Litherland-de Lara and Gil Lagrou and Jyoti Sing. In the quiet refuge of your respective homes I have written a great deal of this thesis. From the Netherlands, Aruba and Portugal, I have also received the loyal support of my lifelong friends Rieke Righolt, Eline Scheele, Margootje Geurts and Judith Witteveen. Thank you.

Finally, I would like to thank my sister, Willemarij Jagtenberg, for her incredible support, encouragement and soulmate-ship. To my parents, Harmien Alkema and Karel Jagtenberg, I am grateful beyond words for their continuing and generous support. I could not have done this without them. Last and thus not least, I thank my wonderful partner and CEO of our family, Jens. Because he committed himself to nurturing our growing family, I could undertake this project. I may have written this thesis, but it is the outcome of teamwork in the truest sense of the word. Thank you, Jens. I am grateful.
I dedicate this thesis to my parents,
Harmien Alkema and Karel Jagtenberg,
who have supported me throughout my education;
from Utrecht to Madrid, from Cape Town to Gainesville, from Uppsala to The Hague,
and now, ultimately, from Leiden to Adelaide.
Chapter 1  Introduction

Introduction

This thesis deals with the experiences of white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, who self-identify as Afrikaners, and who immigrated to Australia in the post-apartheid era. Conducted as an ethnographic case study, its primary objective is to provide a deeper understanding of the effects of the end of apartheid on this group, as well as of their subsequent resettlement in Australia. Research on contemporary Afrikaners is scarce (Boersema 2013; Davies, R 2009; van der Merwe 2009), and on their post-apartheid migration experiences especially. Furthermore, studies that do exist tend to be conducted either through a racial lens (see, for example, McKenzie & Gressier 2017; Schönfeldt-Aultman 2009) or through a classical migration prism (see, for example, Forrest, Johnston & Poulsen 2013; Lucas, Amoateng & Kalule-Sabiti 2006; Visser, B 2004; Wasserman 2016). Next to that, they usually focus on white South Africans in general, thereby overlooking the fact that within this group, those who identify as Afrikaners view themselves as completely different from Anglo-Saxons. Other than this, these analytical approaches – race and migration – are valuable, however, this thesis contributes to our understanding of the experiences of contemporary Afrikaner émigrés by using the ethnographic method, that is, by letting the people under study tell their story themselves. Through this method, anthropological research often leaves existing theories behind (Ragin 1994).

Indeed, the theoretical framework that I have used in this thesis, that of loss of belonging, is partly based on previous empirical research among Afrikaners in South Africa 2011. There, I observed that the Afrikaners I met appeared to be mourning. However, what they were

---

1 I explain my usage of this term in Chapter 2.
mourning only became clear to me during my research in Australia. Principally, I found, they had lost their sense of belonging in their homeland after 1994. Following this, I soon discovered that, although belonging is seen as one of the most pressing issues of our time (see, amongst others, Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005; Leve 2011; Linger 2007; Lovell 1998), the concept is hardly theorised (cf. Gammeltoft 2018). Furthermore, I found that, apart from studies on bereavement through the death of a loved one, research on other types of loss is scarce (cf. Parkes 1986; Stillion & Attig 2014).\(^2\) This is so despite the wide recognition that any type of loss causes a grief reaction and sets in motion a similar mourning process (Archer 1999; Bhugra & Becker 2005; Burton 1651; Doka 2002; Fagin & Little 1984; Freud 1917; Houghton & Boersma 1988; Kübler-Ross 1972; Loizos 1981; Marris 2015 [1986]; Parkes 1986; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976; Stillion & Attig 2014). Given these findings, my thesis further aims to contribute to our theoretical understanding of the concept of belonging as well as to the still small body of literature that deals with the question of how we cope with loss other than death, in this case caused by major socio-political transition and migration.

Finally, since my research is concerned with the experiences of Western,\(^3\) privileged and relatively wealthy people, this thesis also aims to contribute to so-called ‘modern’ anthropology. That is, in contrast to most anthropological research, which continues to be conducted by researchers from ‘the West’ (the former colonisers) on ‘the rest’ (the formerly colonised), this study focuses on ‘ourselves’, in order to uplift the scientific adequacy and democratic relevance of our discipline (see Nader 1974; cf. Gusterson 1997; Hart 2004; MacClancy 2002; Starn 2015). I further discuss these aims and contributions in the first part

---

\(^2\) Among the few works that are referred to in the literature are those conducted by Fried on slum clearance (1963), Marris on urbanisation, modernisation and revolution (2015 [1986]), and Fagin & Little on unemployment (1984). The anthropologist Colson (1971), however, made an invaluable contribution on the effects of modernisation and forced migration through her study of the Gwembe Tonga in Zambia.

\(^3\) In this thesis, with the term ‘Western’ I refer to a general, overarching culture that has its roots in a common descendancy from northwestern Europe. Geographically, it indicates the northwestern European countries and their settler colonies, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada and the United States of America. This culture is based on common economic, political, social and, ultimately, religious values. Principally, these are neoliberal capitalism, parliamentary democracy, individualism and equality, and Christianity respectively. These values are not inclusive and represent prevailing ideas about ‘Westernness’ that are, following white privilege, dictated by ‘the West’ and as such generally regarded as positive in ‘the West’. However, to the list could equally be added: rationality, order, obsessive self-control, the repression of emotions and rigidity (Dyer 1988, 1997); cultural chauvinism and, above all, hypocrisy (Paynter 2001).
of this introductory chapter, within a broader description of the context in which I came to study this topic. Subsequently, I contemplate the idea of belonging and argue for an alternative theory of human needs based on this concept. Furthermore, I explain what happens when belonging is lost, that is, I discuss the bereavement paradigm. The chapter concludes with an outline of the rest of the thesis.

A personal start: encounters in Polokwane

As with most social science research, my project originated from a personal experience. In 2011, I spent five months living with an Afrikaner family in Polokwane, formerly known as Pietersburg, in the most northern part of South Africa. I met this family by coincidence, as I was looking for a place from where to conduct my fieldwork (on an unrelated topic) and they were running a guesthouse where I booked a room. As we got along very well, I stayed with them for my entire fieldwork period. Somehow this surprised me, because before, I had felt biased against Afrikaners due to South Africa’s racial past. After all, as a group, they had been responsible for reinforcing and upholding a political system of institutionalised racism known as apartheid—the Afrikaans word for segregation. This system was designed to entrench white superiority and privilege through oppressing and exploiting those who were classified as non-white, especially the so-labelled black majority of South Africa’s population (see, amongst others, Christopher 1994; Griffiths & Prozesky 2010; Ross 2008; Thompson 2001).

4 It is important to note that there have also been groups of Afrikaners who publicly opposed the apartheid system. The most well-known are Die Sestigers (The Sixtyers), a group of prominent Afrikaner literary figures in the 1960s including internationally renowned authors such as Ingrid Jonker, Elsa Joubert, André Brink and Breyten Breytenbach, who used Afrikaans literature and poetry to move away from the traditional conservatism of the Afrikaners (see, amongst others, Brink 1979; Senekal 2015; Viljoen 2012); the Voëlvry (outlaw) movement of the late 1980s including well-known singers Karla Krimpelien, Ralph Rabie (alias Johannes Kerkorrel) and André du Toit (alias Koos Kombuis), who used Afrikaans rock and roll music as a form of protest against the regime and traditional Afrikaner beliefs (see, for example, Grundlingh 2004; Hopkins 2008); and a group of journalists, who, under the leadership of Max du Preez and Jacques Pauw, through the Vrye Weekblad (The Free Weekly), shaped and influenced the thinking of more liberal or ‘enlightened’ (verligte) Afrikaners (see, amongst others, Bettersby 1988; Faure 1997; with thanks to Professor Maria Marchetti-Mercer 2020, personal communication January 2020). However, none of my research participants had been adherents of these movements, or, if they had been, they did not tell me. Therefore, one tentative conclusion of this research is that those Afrikaners who decided to leave South Africa after 1994 appear to belong to the more conservative group, who, in apartheid South Africa, were known as the verkrampte (narrow, conservative). Yet, since my group of participants does not necessarily constitute a representative sample of all immigrants in Australia who identify as Afrikaners, this remains a tentative conclusion only. I do not further discuss this issue in the thesis, since it is beyond the focus of my current work.
At that time, I was not yet fully aware of the fact that apartheid was the generic form of the colonial state in Africa (Mamdani 1996) – if not of all colonial states including the settler colonies –, nor had I fully grasped the reality that I myself, as a child of Dutch parents, benefitted from white privilege in very similar ways as Afrikaners do. I was conscious of the fact that I had white skin and that this had a political and socio-economic meaning in our world order, however, I did not yet have the insight that this feature comes with ‘an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, tools and blank checks’, as McIntosh so famously defined it (2015 [1989]: 241). That is, I was more or less oblivious to my own ‘racial’ advantage, which is, perhaps, white privilege’s key characteristic: it is so normal to those who enjoy it, that they are unaware of it (Garner 2007; Wadham 2004). For a long time, it has left people with white skin ‘racially unmarked’, as Schönfeldt-Aultman (2009: 121) explains, since they represent the norm against which all others are defined (cf. Fanon 1963 [1961]; 1986 [1952]; Said 1994, 1995 [1978]). It is only in the recent era of postcolonialism and critical race studies that white people are indeed recognised to ‘have’ a race (see Steyn 2001). After all, the fact that they were, as said, ‘racially unmarked’, was a consequence of European imperialism and colonial conquest (Hage 2000). Since South Africa under Afrikaner rule held on to and brutally enforced white privilege, while the rest of the African continent and larger world was engaged in decolonising processes, white South Africans, and Afrikaners in particular, have come to be seen as its epitome.

Perhaps it is precisely this close similarity to how the Dutch, or Europeans and their descendants in general, conducted themselves in colonies and settler colonies, that made me, on a subconscious level, feel repulsed by Afrikaners at first. As one of my research participants said on this topic: ‘No one hates and criticises the smoker more than the recent ex-smoker’ (Joost, casual conversation, 2015). Nevertheless, during my time with the Afrikaners in 2011, I engaged in a process what Devereux (1967) called confrontation rather than defence against my own anxieties and conflicts as ethnographer, in order to develop genuine empathic understanding. It was through this effort that I came to realise in full my own position as a

---

5 All citations in this thesis are my translations from Afrikaans to English, unless otherwise indicated (that is, when the original was in English). Also, I have used pseudonyms in order to protect the identity of my research participants. I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 2.
Western, white, and thus privileged person. Because of this, I was able to develop a sincere compassion for the Afrikaners whom I was learning to know. Steadily I deconstructed my ‘empathy wall’, that is, my ‘obstacle to deep understanding of another person’, or group in my case, ‘one that can make us feel indifferent or even hostile to those who hold different beliefs or whose childhood is rooted in different circumstances’ (Hochschild 2016: 5). This allowed me to see the Afrikaners’ reality through their eyes.

Before I continue, it is important to return to the concept of race once more, so as to clearly state my position at the outset of this thesis. We know that races are nothing more than social constructs, since genetics has disproven their existence (Eriksen 2017). However, as the above discussion on white privilege has made clear, as a social construct, race is highly significant in most if not all social analyses. As we have seen, having white skin has historically become associated with wealth, status, ‘Western civilization’ and, most importantly, with privilege (Hage 2000; Garner 2007; Wadham 2004). From this, it seems that people have become their skin, since our skin colour defines, to a large extent, our position in the global racial hierarchy. However, using skin colour as an adjective as I have done, that is, to speak of ‘white South Africans’, is ontologically incorrect. Skin colour is a physical attribute, not a state of being. That is, it is something you have, not something you are. We all have a certain amount of melanin in our bodies which determines our degree of pigmentation. All the rest is invented, perpetuated and, fortunately, in the process of being reinvented, albeit slowly, with the acknowledgement of ‘white’ people as one of the socially constructed races as a crucial first step.

Yet, throughout this thesis I necessarily refer to ‘white’ South Africans, ‘black’ South Africans, ‘coloured’ South Africans and ‘Indian’ South Africans. This is not because I agree with the use of these socially constructed terms, but only because I lack a better alternative. Classifying population groups by the colour of their skin is problematic and arguably racist; however, in any work on South Africa it is still largely unavoidable. In its data collection, the South African government continues to use the old apartheid race distinctions of ‘African’ (‘black’), ‘coloured’ (persons of mixed-race descent), ‘Indian’, currently combined with Asians in general (‘Indian/Asian’), and ‘white’. Moreover, it uses these classifications for the very
purpose of redress for the previously disadvantaged population groups (Archibong 2013; Erasmus 2015). In order to indicate disagreement with their use, many scholars working on South Africa use quotation marks when referring to these terms (that is, ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘coloured’), with the aim of ‘de-racifying and de-naturalising’ these ‘arbitrary and fictive social categories’ (Scheper-Hughes 1994: 817). Although I agree with this practice, given the length of the work presented here I have chosen to omit the quotation marks for readability concerns.

Having said all this, I also want to clarify at the start of this thesis that in this work I am not concerned with race and racial issues as such. This is because this thesis is the result of an ethnographic study, which means that it presents empirical data from primary sources, that is, from Afrikaner immigrants in Australia themselves. Had my research participants talked extensively about race, then it would have been an important part of the data results and thus of the thesis. As it is, they did not. Rather, they narrated many losses, and as I came further into my analysis, I realised that essentially, they narrated a profound loss of belonging in the broadest sense of the term. Therefore, the main concept of this thesis, thus grounded in empirical data (see Charmaz 2014), is belonging. Before I discuss this in more detail, it is important to briefly return to where it all began.

The question: how to cope with loss and change?

During my time with the Afrikaners in Polokwane I noticed that most, if not all, of them, especially those belonging to the older generations, expressed a profound sense of sadness. To me, they appeared to be a people in deep mourning. Their stories demonstrated that they were grieving the changes that their country had undergone since 1994. They experienced most, if not all, of these changes as losses. When I started reading the literature on post-apartheid Afrikaners I was surprised to find that, although most studies did mention the concept of loss, most notably Boersema’s 2013 PhD thesis *Afrikaner, Nevertheless: Stigma, Shame, and the Sociology of Cultural Trauma*, it was hardly theorised. Moreover, until recently, the concept of grief, the natural reaction to loss (Brison & Leavitt 1995; Durkheim 1995 [1912]; Robben 2009; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976) was barely discussed.
Chapter 1  Introduction

Vanderhaeghen’s 2018 book *Afrikaner Identity: Dysfunction and Grief* is the work that, in my view, most appropriately approaches the state of mind of many Afrikaners in South Africa today, although I do not agree with his entire argument, as I will explain further on. Previous studies contended that post-apartheid Afrikaners feel disillusioned, alienated, detached, excluded, powerless, marginalised and dejected (see, amongst others, Davies, R 2009; Giliomee 2010, 2011; Goodwin & Schiff 1995; Louw & Mersham 2001) and that they behave passively and apathetically (Bornman 2005; van Rooyen 2000; Visser, W 2007). What these studies largely fail to notice, however, is that these feelings and behaviours are all signs of grief (see, most notably, Aldrich 1963; Freud 1917; Kübler-Ross 1972; Marris 2015 [1986]). Therefore, a question loomed in my mind that begged answering: how were the Afrikaners coping, truly coping, on a psychological level, with their country’s changes?

Next to this, what struck me was the large number of Afrikaners who were leaving South Africa. It seemed that everyone I met in Polokwane had at least one family member who had emigrated or was in the process of emigrating, mostly to Australia. My later fieldwork in Australia confirmed this observation, as many of my research participants had siblings, children, parents or parents-in-law and other relatives living in either Australia, New Zealand, the USA, Canada, Germany or the Netherlands. Secondary data also confirmed my observation. According to the available statistics, between 1994 and 2011, 10 to 15 per cent of the Afrikaner population had left their birth country (Giliomee 2011: 709), which translates into 300,000 and 450,000 people (Statistics South Africa [SSA] 2011), the total Afrikaner population being three million at that time (2011). However, various sources state that the real figure could be much higher. Van Rooyen (2000: 27), for example, argues that the statistics of the destination countries are double and sometimes triple the numbers provided

---

6 Although great variation exists in the ways in which grief is culturally (allowed to be) expressed (see Brison & Leavitt 1995; Durkheim 1995 [1912]; Hochschild 1979; Hollan 1995; Kaufman & Morgan 2005; Radcliffe-Brown 1964; Scheper-Hughes 1992; Woodrick 1995).

7 Vanderhaeghen (2018: 39) states that in 2018, the total white Afrikaans-speaking population of South Africa is 2.7 million, which confirms that about 10 per cent has left. According to Statistics South Africa, Afrikaners constituted six per cent (3,035,205 people) of the country’s total population in 2011. Taken together with English-speaking white South Africans, nine per cent of the country’s population is classified as white. An equal nine per cent is labelled as coloured, two per cent as Indian/Asian, and eighty per cent as African (black) (SSA 2011).
by Statistics South Africa (SSA). It appears that South Africa’s official statistics can be misleading, since many Afrikaners (and other South Africans) do not indicate on their departure forms that they are leaving with the intention not to return (Bhorat, Meyer & Mlatsheni 2002; Bornman 2005; Dodson 2002; cf. Lucas, Amoateng & Kalule-Sabiti 2006; Oberholzer 2011). Indeed, a number of research participants initially moved to Australia on temporary work visas. Therefore, it is plausible that they did not tick the box ‘emigration’ on their initial departure forms. Furthermore, Marchetti-Mercer and Roos (2013) state that many white South Africans have double nationality, which some of my research participants indeed had. This complicates matters for those who are trying to keep track of migration statistics.

Due to a lack of accurate statistical data, it is impossible to tell how many Afrikaners immigrate to Australia. According to the 2011 Census (Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] 2011) there were 31,484 Afrikaans-speaking South African immigrants in Australia, out of a total of 145,683 South Africans. These figures could be higher, as not everyone indicates what language they speak at home and not everyone speaks Afrikaans at home, although the great majority of my research participants did. However, some of those counted in the 31,484 number could belong to South Africa’s so-called Cape coloureds, a population group originating from the early relationships between African peoples, European settlers and imported slaves in the Cape (Ross 2008), whose vernacular is also Afrikaans. The latest Census (ABS 2016) counted 162,448 South African born individuals residing in Australia, of whom 43,439 spoke another language next to English. The category ‘Language Spoken at Home’ was no longer a part of the 2016 Census. Thus, it is impossible to state the exact number of Afrikaners currently residing in Australia, but South Africans as a whole make up nearly one per cent of Australia’s population (ABS 2014) and, as the latest Census results show, their number continues to grow.

It should be noted that other South Africans are emigrating too, most notably English-speaking white South Africans, and that many others would like to but cannot, due to a lack

---

8 Although the credibility of his work has been convincingly doubted by Schönfeldt-Aultman (2009).
of skills or finances (Crush 2000; Lucas, Amoateng & Kalule-Sabiti 2006; Schönfeldt-Aultman 2009). It is clear that most white South Africans continue to enjoy an economic advantage over most so-called non-white South Africans, both in terms of skills and wealth, and that this puts them, as a group, in a better position to emigrate (cf. Wasserman 2016). Furthermore, the current Afrikaner emigration flow should also be placed within the global contemporary context of mass migration. Yet, the great majority of the Afrikaners who have participated in this research did not leave South Africa because they wished to, but because they felt that they were forced to. Although they do not fit the United Nations’ definition of refugees, as the latter have a ‘well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group’ (UN 2019, my emphasis), most of my research participants did feel that they were refugees. This paradox creates what Vanderhaeghen calls ‘an irony of well-off citizens adopting a political identity of being dispossessed or marginalised’ (2018: 50). Thus, it appears that there exists an important incongruence between the way in which Afrikaners experience their reality and how commentators, including scholars, journalists, politicians and general observers, view the Afrikaners’ situation.

My aim with this thesis is to tell the Afrikaners’ story through the Afrikaners’ eyes. This is not because I lack the ability to think critically or because I want to argue their case, if there is any (cf. Crapanzano 2011). Rather, it is because of the question that arose in my mind in Polokwane in 2011: how were they coping with South Africa’s massive post-1994 changes? I had preliminary concluded that my two key observations, the Afrikaners’ mourning and their leaving, were somehow related. Indeed, I could imagine that, for those who feel that they ‘have lost everything’, as one of my research participants would later put it (Freek, interview, 2016), leaving could be a preferred coping strategy. All this time I had been wondering how the Afrikaners were making sense of their lives after such an enormous socio-political transition as South Africa’s democratic turn, especially since they had previously been in

---

9 Neither can they be classified as ‘forced migrants’. This broader term is similar to ‘displaced persons’ and includes not only refugees but also people who are ‘forced to move due to external factors such as environmental catastrophes’ (UN 2019).

10 My use of italics in verbatim quotes means that the interviewee in question stressed these words.
power and had lost their privilege.\(^{11}\) It seemed that many coped by leaving. This made me wonder how the Afrikaners who had left were coping in their new country, because, in addition to their post-apartheid South African experiences, emigration generally brings about its own set of losses (see, amongst others, Arredondo-Dowd 1981; Boss 1999; Casado, Hong & Harrington 2010; Disman 1983; Lee 2010; Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013; Prudent 1988; Volkan 1993). Consequently, as many anthropologists do (MacClancy 2002), I followed my research participants to their new destination, Australia.

**The aim: reaching a deep understanding**

In Australia, as well as in the Netherlands when I was preparing my research proposal, my research topic was frequently met with surprise, scepticism or antagonism. How could I be interested in studying these ‘racists’? Indeed, I quickly came to the conclusion that South Africa’s Afrikaners are among those peoples in our world who are ‘least likely to receive understanding or sympathy from anyone’, as Livingston (2010: 210) wrote about adult children of Nazi perpetrators. Leaving the discussion on the resemblance between Afrikaners, myself and other descendants of European colonisers, including white Australians, aside for now –I have mentioned the rage of the ex-smoker—, it struck me that academics, too, are usually either overly critical of Afrikaners or defend their interest in this group. To the latter group belong, for example, Harrison (1982) and de Reuck (1996), who stress that their engagement with Afrikaners comes from a desire to understand the past rather than to justify or apologise for it, or Boersema (2013) who underlines that his project is ultimately about major collective identity renegotiation, South Africa’s Afrikaners being a prime example. I must say that I, too, have argued along these lines or used these defences, because, as a social scientist, my aim is to understand contemporary Afrikaners in order to shed light on our broader societies and the general human condition.

\(^{11}\) That is, much of their privilege or the normalcy of it, since apartheid’s legacy continues to work through in South African society (see, amongst others, Allanson & Atkins 2005; Erasmus 2015; Morrell 2002; SSA 2016; van Wyk 2014; cf. Chapter 3).
However, by far and away most authors belong to the other group, who appear to echo the dominant though superficial discourses about post-apartheid Afrikaners. Most prominently among them is the narrative that Afrikaners, and white South Africans in general, are leaving South Africa because they cannot live under a black government, that is, they cannot adapt to their loss of privilege and continue to be ‘racists’ (McKenzie & Gressier 2017; cf. Verwey & Quayle 2012). Authors following this line of arguing generally critically investigate white South Africans’ reactions to the end of apartheid, but without extending their analysis to a deeper psychological level and without compassion or self-reflection. The exception here are Griffiths and Prozesky (2010), who, using Heidegger’s (2001 [1971]) and Taylor’s (2002) respective philosophies, argue that white South Africans have lost their ‘dwelling place’ (a place where they felt physically and mentally safe) and ‘social imaginary’ (the world as they understood it). In the light of my research results, their analysis makes complete sense.

Perhaps Vanderhaeghen’s recent book (2018) presents an apt culmination of the dominant view on post-apartheid Afrikaners. Vanderhaeghen argues that present-day Afrikaners have adopted a narrative of victimhood because this negates their stigma as former oppressors (cf. Baines 2013; Krog 1998, 2003, 2009). That is, by presenting themselves as victims in the present, their role as perpetrators in the past is somehow neutralised (cf. Davidson 2005 and Hage 2000 on white Australians and Garner 2007 on white people in general). The Afrikaners who participated in my research certainly saw themselves as victims in a number of respects, for example, from affirmative action policies, increased crime levels and socio-cultural marginalisation. However, I seriously question whether they would agree with Vanderhaeghen’s assertion that they view themselves in this way in order to get rid of their stigma.12

First of all, if they indeed have adopted a collective narrative of victimhood, then this represents a historical continuum. That is, if Afrikaners are involved in a struggle for survival since 1994 (van der Merwe 2009, 2010), this is not new. In fact, their history is drenched in,

---

12 It is also important to place the Afrikaner’s tendency towards narratives of victimhood within the wider, global trend of ‘commodifying victimhood’ (Kleinman, Das & Lock 1997: xi). That is, since the late twentieth century, victimhood has come to be seen as an attribute rather than a liability for various real and perceived marginalised groups around the world (Ahmed 2014; Baines 2013; Fassin & Rechtman 2007; Kleinman, Das & Lock 1997; MacMillan 2009; Novick 1999; cf. Frosh 2019).
if not characterised by, at least the perception of this kind of struggle (see, amongst others, Crapanzano 1985; de Villiers 1988; de Vries 2013; O’Meara 2009 [1983]; Patterson 1957).

Arriving in the Cape in 1652 with the Dutch East India Company, the first Dutch and German Company subjects who were later to become the Afrikaner volk or people (mixed with other Europeans, most notably French Huguenot refugees, as well as with Africans),\(^\text{13}\) were, from the onset, struggling against the Company’s authority (Giliomee 2011). After having been freed, they started farming in the Cape but were colonised by the British in 1795 (Giliomee 2011; Ross 2008; Thompson 2001). In order to retain their autonomy, many moved away – trekked, migrated– from the Cape into South Africa’s hinterland, founding two independent states, Natal in 1852 and the Orange Free State in 1854, while fighting various indigenous African groups (Patterson 1957). After numerous wars with the British, they ultimately lost their states to the United Kingdom in 1902 following the latter’s victory in the ‘Anglo-Boer War’ – Boer is the Afrikaans word for farmer. In this war, roughly 28,000 Afrikaner or Boer women and children died in British concentration camps (Pakenham 1993 [1979]; cf. Field 1979). This was arguably the crucial event causing the fanatical character of Afrikaner nationalism and subsequent notorious apartheid regime (de Villiers 1988; Dubow 1992; Shingler 1977; van Jaarsveld 1961; cf. Horowitz 1985; Louw & Mersham 2001).

Thus, with the exception of their 1948–1994 rule, throughout all of their history, Afrikaners saw themselves as victims of British imperialism, expulsion, antagonistic African peoples and a harsh geographical environment in which they struggled to survive (Crapanzano 1985; Giliomee 2011; Harrison 1982; Patterson 1957). Crucially, they have always identified as indigenous to Africa, since, according to their own foundational myth, they migrated to the area at the same time as tribes from other parts of Africa did (see, for example, de Villiers 1988; Patterson 1957; Steyn 2001).\(^\text{14}\) Despite historical evidence to the contrary (see Harrison 1982), my research participants still believed this.\(^\text{15}\) At the same time, my research participants...

\(^{13}\) The contribution of African and Asian (slave) women was almost unacknowledged (Ross 2011, personal communication). Mixed ‘racial’ marriages were common in the Cape for the first seventy-five years of Company rule and according to Heese (1971), seven per cent of Afrikaner families have a non-European ‘stammoeder’ or progenitress.

\(^{14}\) With the exception of the Khoi and the San, who were already living in the region but who were all but exterminated during the early years of colonisation (Ross 2008; Thompson 2001).

\(^{15}\) In an admirable effort at compromise, De Reuck (1996) refers to the Afrikaners as ‘a colonising indigene’.
demonstrates that the post-apartheid era has given new impetus to the Afrikaners’ felt links with Europe. However, much more than the African peoples, if at all, my interviewees resented ‘the British’, that is, Anglo- or English-speaking white South Africans. Especially the transgenerational trauma caused by the Anglo-Boer War was still very much alive (see Chapter 7). In this regard, Laura’s sentiments were illustrative and indeed echo a sense of victimhood:

... at the end of the day, South Africa was a three hundred-years experiment that didn’t work. We white people should never have come to South Africa, we should have stayed in Europe. Because, us Afrikaners, we never stood a chance, with the English in any case not, who exterminated us in the Anglo-Boer War ...

(Interview, 2015)

Given these general sentiments, I was surprised to find that most studies on post-apartheid South African emigration do not significantly distinguish between Afrikaans- and English-speaking South Africans. With some exceptions, such as Hatoss, Starks and Janse van Rensburg’s work in Australia (2011) and that of Barkhuizen and associates in New Zealand (Barkhuizen 2006, 2013; Barkhuizen & de Klerk 2006; Barkhuizen & Knoch 2006a, 2006b), which focused on Afrikaans language maintenance, Afrikaner and English-speaking white South Africans are generally studied and referred to as one group, namely as ‘white South Africans’ (see, for example, Arnold 2011; deGelder 2004; Forrest, Johnston & Poulsen 2013; Khawaja & Mason 2008; Louw & Mersham 2001; Lucas, Amoateng & Kalule-Sabiti 2006; McKenzie & Gressier 2017; Schönfeldt-Aultman 2009; Visser, B 2004; Wasserman 2016; Wood 2005).\(^\text{16}\) My fieldwork observations, however – both in South Africa and in Australia – reveal that Afrikaners generally do not feel as if they belong to Anglo-South Africans. Clearly, they are renegotiating their identity in a post-apartheid world (Blaser 2004; Boersema 2013; Davies, R 2009; Giliomee 2010, 2011; Goodwin & Schiff 1995; Steyn 2001; Wines 2007), however, whatever they are becoming, in their own view, it is not British. As Richard’s feelings

---

\(^{16}\) Sonn, Ivey, Baker and Meyer (2015) have conducted an important study on notions of displacement and belonging among post-apartheid South African migrants in Australia. However, Afrikaners were not part of the authors’ interview sample. Also, Davidson’s study (2000) focused on English-speaking white South Africans in Australia only.
illuminated when he concluded that he and his family were now ‘living our life in an English-speaking country, ehm [sic], as best as we can’ (Interview, 2015).

Perhaps it is their perpetrator stigma that makes Afrikaners in their own right a seemingly unworthy object of study that, as I have stated, some find needs defending. Others have even argued that studying white South Africans is an ‘intellectual folly’ and sign of ‘self-obsession’, if not racism (Haffajee 2013; cf. 2015). If this was the case, then we would not be able to study any so-called white group, or descendants of former colonisers, which would defeat the purpose of anthropologists’ efforts in recent decades to democratise our discipline – that is, to study ourselves, ‘the West’, as much as the rest (Gusterson 1997; Hart 2004; MacClancy 2002; Nader 1974; Robben & Sluka 2007). On the contrary, to me it is evident that not studying white people would be another sign of white privilege, which has been the key historical critique on anthropology (see, amongst others, Hymes 1974; Ruby 1982; Starn 2015; cf. Davies 2008). If Afrikaners represent the epitome of white privilege, then they are, in fact, an excellent group to study. How are we otherwise to reach an understanding of how post-colonial reconciliation works or does not work? Certainly Australia could benefit from lessons from South Africa in this respect, the country having yet to start a genuine post-colonial healing process of its own (Balvin & Kashima 2012; Grant 2016, 2017; Pilger 1991, 2013). Europe may have it somewhat easier in this respect, being geographically removed from its former colonies. However, in the former ‘mother’ countries similar reconciliatory work should be performed, if we want to address and redress the global apartheid that European imperialism has created.

South Africa’s Afrikaners thus provide an intriguing case study of how people, in this case, white, privileged, relatively wealthy people, deal with loss and change caused by major socio-political transitions such as decolonisation.17 If we want to reach a deep understanding of

---

17 In many African countries, white settlers experienced black empowerment as a traumatic event (Lucas et al. 2006: 46), however scant research exists on this topic. Lucas et al. suggest that this is because these elites were numerically small. I would add to this two possible reasons. First, it could be related to the general tendency in the social sciences, and in anthropology especially, to focus on the so-called sub-altern, that is, on the formerly colonised. Next to that, it could be associated with the same stigma that Afrikaners suffer from. That is, these white elites may be seen as former oppressors and racists, and therefore unworthy of study. Although beyond the scope of this research, future comparative studies between the experiences of loss of the
their experiences, we should above all talk to them, rather than about them, as most studies do. This means that we should first and foremost undertake ethnographic research, next to textual analyses and surveys. If we omit doing this, we might be satisfied with relatively superficial answers, for example that ‘post-apartheid Afrikaners flee black rule and crime’, or with explanations that offer a slightly deeper level of analysis, such as ‘they view themselves as victims to negate their perpetrator stigma’. The narrative of victimhood and self-exclusion, as most recently set forth by Vanderhaeghen (2018), is plausible. However, it lacks, in my view, an ultimate layer of analysis, one that can only be reached by ethnographic research. That is, by talking to the people, the Afrikaners, themselves; by listening to their story and, above all, by imagining ourselves in their shoes. That is what anthropology is all about: taking people seriously (MacClancy 2002). This is what I did during sixteen months of fieldwork amongst Afrikaner émigrés in Australia, the results of which form the basis of the arguments presented in this thesis. Centrally, I argue that, although the Afrikaners whom I worked with were living a narrative of victimhood, to them, it was real. The losses they felt they had sustained in their post-apartheid country, as well as those they experienced due to their immigration to Australia, were real to them. The central loss of belonging, which expresses itself in many different forms, as the empirical chapters will show, is their ‘Deep Story’, as Hochschild calls it, ‘a narrative as felt’ (2016: xi, original emphasis), or, a story that feels as if it were true (ibid: 16, original emphasis).

Let us presume for a moment that Vanderhaeghen’s analysis is correct and that the Afrikaners are engaged in a deep, largely subconscious psychological process of viewing their lives as ‘grievable’, to use Butler’s term (2010, following Vanderhaeghen) in order to shed their stigma. Then, in order for them to do this, they need to believe it. My research shows that they do. My interviewees viewed South Africa’s post-1994 changes as losses. Thus, for them, it is not a justifying story; it is their complete and utter reality, with all the fear and pain that this belief brings forth, as the chapters in this thesis discuss. If anthropology has taught us

---

post-1994 Afrikaner immigrants in Australia and other former colonial settler groups, for example the Indisch Dutch who migrated to Australia after World War II, would be interesting (see, most notably, Coté 2010; Coté & Westerbeek 2005; Meijer 2004; with thanks to Dr Nonja Peters, personal communication January 2020).
anything, it is that people’s lived experience is real to them and that we act upon what we believe to be true, thereby creating our own reality (cf. Bruner 1996; Hervik 1994). Evidently, the Afrikaners’ reality is not congruent with many other views on the same events. One of the dangers of doing ethnography is, of course, that the researcher, as the instrument of research, overly empathises with her research participants and starts to believe their perception of reality as well. Indeed, when hearing so many similar stories from so many Afrikaner émigrés in Australia for such a long period of time, I sometimes had the tendency to agree with their interpretation of things. These were the moments where I took a break, returned to secondary research and took time to reflect. That is, I made a conscious effort to retain a critical stance towards the data I was presented with and to employ a ‘critical empathy’ with regards to my study participants (Stein 2010), thereby committing myself to what Scheper-Hughes calls ‘a highly disciplined subjectivity’ (2000: 132).

This having been said, if we wish to genuinely understand how the Afrikaners in the post-apartheid world are making sense of their lives, in this case in the diaspora18 in Australia, we need, in first instance, to empathise. Yet, most of us, as Hochschild (2016: xi) argues:

... wrongly imagine that empathy with the ‘other’ ... brings an end to clearheaded analysis when, in truth, it’s on the other side of that bridge that the most important analysis can begin.

Perhaps this is the reason why more profound studies into Afrikaners’ psychological reactions to the end of apartheid as well as their psychological motivations for emigration are lacking (see Kynoch 2013; Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013). Apparently, for most, climbing the ‘empathy wall’ between us and those who so closely resemble ourselves is one wall too high. Trying to understand the phenomenon of the post-apartheid Afrikaner ‘exodus’, as some have called it (van Rooyen 2000; Visser, W 2007) through a race or migration prism, however, is not going to give us the answers we are looking for. These approaches are also valuable and we need to explain our social issues from various theoretical standpoints, since, evidently, ‘... a human phenomenon which is explained in one way only is not explained at all’ (Devereux 1978: 1). However, it is my contention that, through its method of cultural relativism (Eriksen

18 See Chapter 2 for an explanation of how I view this term.
that is, of viewing the world through the eyes of those we study, anthropology offers the best approach to reach a deep understanding because, indeed, we can only begin philosophical analysis once we have successfully put ourselves in their shoes. For only when we have understood the lives of others, are we able to say something theoretically meaningful about their behaviour. Hage (2000: 21) calls this desire to understand rather than to deplore, ridicule or detest a ‘Spinozan-Bourdieuian’ stance of intellectual inquiry. It reminds us of Devereux’s (1967) self-reflective efforts that I have referred to earlier, though I would go beyond this in that my aim is not to judge.

Hence, it is not my aim with this thesis to evaluate the validity of the Afrikaner’s stories and beliefs, but rather to point to their practical implications and contribute to a more sound understanding of their collective being in the present world. By presenting their ‘Deep Story’, their narrative as they felt it (Hochschild 2016), I aim, indeed, to shed light onto their psychological experiences and motivations. If we want our research to have meaning, that is, if we want it to contribute to society by informing society about itself with the aim of improving intergroup understanding and thus relations, we need to allow our analysis to go beyond primary and secondary levels, as I have argued, and access and lay bare what lies at the very bottom of any given issue. In the case of the Afrikaner émigrés in Australia who have participated in my research, what lay beneath everything else was a loss of belonging in virtually all respects. Before I continue to explain this theoretically, I will first address my primary layer of analysis, because the latter led to the former. Since, based on my 2011 fieldwork observations, I approached the topic from the perspective of loss, during the time I was in the field, and after, I was continuously groping with the question of what it was that had been lost (cf. Loizos 1981), or, what was felt to be lost. My preliminary analysis revealed that these were all basic human needs.

---

19 Since Bourdieu was influenced by Spinoza in appropriating this ethical stance (see, most notably, Spinoza 1868 [1670]).
Human needs: an alternative model

After roughly four months in the field I started coding ‘losses’ as narrated by my interviewees and other research participants (see Chapter 2 for a description of the fieldwork process). Over the course of the following twelve months I came to see that, in post-apartheid South Africa, the Afrikaners I was working with had lost their sense of security (in terms of livelihood, see Chapter 3), their sense of safety (both physically and mentally, see Chapter 4), and their sense of socio-political and spatial belonging (see Chapter 5). As a coping strategy, they moved to Australia. However, in Australia, the only losses that were fully restored were physical safety, for all (see Chapter 4), and political belonging, for most (see Chapter 5). For the great majority of interviewees, economically, the immigration experience was associated with initial insecurity and a loss of wealth. These losses further led to a loss of self-esteem and of self-realisation (see Chapters 3 and 6). Most additionally suffered from a loss of geographical belonging and social belonging (see Chapter 5), which also led to a loss of self-esteem (see Chapter 5). Above all else, in Australia, participants struggled with a deep sense of cultural bereavement (see Chapter 6) and a high degree of suffering due to the loss of family members who had stayed behind in South Africa (see Chapter 7). In the process of asking myself what all of this meant, I came to realise that all of these losses were directly related to basic human needs. Thus, I returned to the works of Maslow (1943-1970), the father of human needs theory.

Starting in 1943 and continuing until his death in 1970, Maslow set forth his theory of human motivation based on universal human needs. He argued that these needs are universal because human beings are biologically similar: apart from personality or character, we only differ from one another in terms of what we believe, that is, in terms of culture (Maslow 1943: 389, cf. Lofland 1985). In sum, Maslow’s theory entails that all human behaviour is motivated by the satisfaction of six hierarchical needs, the first five of which he saw as ‘basic’ or fundamental needs, and the sixth and highest as ‘meta-motivation’ or ‘self-transcendence’. According to his conceptual framework, which is mostly depicted in the literature as a pyramid (see Figure 1), for humans to survive, we first need to satisfy our physiological needs (food and water, and later reproduction). Next to this, we also need to be safe from physical
and mental harm. The safety needs are closely followed by what Maslow called the love and belongingness needs. These entail that we need to give love and receive love, to and from other human beings, to whom we thus feel connected. Once we have fulfilled these three needs, Maslow argued, we will be motivated by our need for esteem, that is, respect from both ourselves and others. The lucky people who have attained all of this will then have the ability to become who they were born to be, that is, they can actualise themselves in the creative sense. This refers to the ability to fully express ourselves through the work that we do, meaning that we carry out work that is fulfilling, enjoyable and rewarding to us. Maslow saw the anthropologist Ruth Benedict, who was his mentor and inspiration, as an example of someone who had reached this level of needs satisfaction (Hoffman 2011). Those like her would be able to reach the sixth level, he contended. In contrast to the other five, this level was a ‘meta-need’ that ‘transcended’ the more ego-centric, ‘lower’ needs. This meant that individuals functioning at that level would transcend their ego and attain a level of altruism equalling supreme spiritual awareness (Maslow 1967, 1971).
This last level is mostly forgotten in the literature, which Guest (2014) attributes to the fact that Maslow added it only shortly before he died. I will not discuss it here further, as it is not relevant to this research. However, as I have stated above, many of the Afrikaners who participated in my study had lost, in their own experience and to various degrees, most or all of the other five needs: their sense of economic security (the need for food and water, or, to provide for oneself); their sense of safety (freedom from physical and mental harm); their sense of belonging in many respects (politically, socially, culturally, interpersonally); their feelings of self-worth and respect by others; and, for many, their need for self-realisation (doing work that allows full self-expression). Thus, I found Maslow’s theory to be highly suitable as an analytic framework for my research data. Of course, I acknowledge that models, including Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs, tend to simplify the world to a great extent. There will undoubtedly be cultural relativists who argue that Maslow’s hierarchy is too general. However, many social scientists continue to use his model, precisely because their data supports it (see, amongst others, Thielke et al. 2012; Yawson, Armah & Pappoe 2009; Zalenski & Raspa 2006).

Some scholars have also attempted to build on Maslow’s theory, most notably Galtung and Wirak (1977) and Doyal & Gough (1984, 1991). However, what these and other authors primarily have done is reshuffle and/or rephrase Maslow’s terms while adding things to the levels, often making it more complex than necessary – the power of his work lies precisely in his ability to simplify complexity. For example, Doyal and Gough (1984) call Maslow’s first three levels, taken together, ‘Health needs’, and the fourth and fifth ‘Creative consciousness’ or ‘Individual identity or autonomy’. Similarly, Galtung and Wirak (1977) refer to Maslow’s physiological needs as ‘welfare’ or the absence of poverty; to his safety needs as ‘security’ or the absence of violence; to his love and belonging needs as ‘identity’ or the absence of alienation;\footnote{Interestingly, Galtung later changed this into ‘meaning needs’ (1990).} and to his esteem and self-actualisation needs as ‘freedom’ or the absence of repression. Of course, their analyses are valuable in their own right, but they do not depart significantly from Maslow’s original theory. In general, research on human needs after Maslow has supported and confirmed his ideas. As I said, some critique will undoubtedly exist.
on his universalising tendency, yet, for my research data his theory also proved to be very useful. However, my second layer of analysis revealed that actually, \textit{belonging} is the key to human motivation, as I will explain in the next part of this chapter. Therefore, I propose that the concept of belonging lies at the heart of human needs theory, as opposed to representing the third level in the hierarchy. Next to this, I suggest that the model should be visualised as a set of ever-widening circles, similar to a ripple effect expanding across water, where belonging is the object symbolically dropped into it and from which all else follows (see Figure 2).

Before I theorise the concept of belonging, I will first explain my thought process behind this alternative framework. It starts from the realisation that, in order to have access to nutrition, that is, in order to satisfy our physiological needs, we need to belong. Clearly, babies cannot feed themselves and will thus die without caregivers. Furthermore, access to physical nutrition is equally important to emotional or psychological nutrition. Without love and affection, babies and young children either die or develop severe psychological disorders, as, above all, the notorious Harlow experiments on Rhesus monkeys have demonstrated (see,
Harlow 1958, 1971). Indeed, the most commonly found cause for ‘maladjustment and more severe psychopathology’ is ‘the obstruction’ of what Maslow called ‘the love needs’ (1943: 381). If the Harlow experiments have brought us anything, it is the knowledge that psychological damage sustained in early childhood is irreparable. As adults, affected individuals will continue to suffer from disturbances in thought and behaviour, ranging from less serious to severe pathologies.

This brings us to the safety needs, which are equally important to nutrition and for which belonging is, too, a direct prerequisite. Clearly, in order to be and feel safe, we need to belong to other people. At the physical level this is self-evident: babies need care givers to keep them safe from harm. On a psychological level, children as well as adults need to be free from chaos and disorder in order to feel safe (Bowlby 1980; Davies, J 2012; Davis 1992; Maslow 1943, cf. Boss 1999). That is, we need a predictable world filled with regularities that make our lives comprehensible (Dewey 2007 [1922]; Marris 2015 [1986]). Such a situation is usually, and ideally, initially provided by our primary carers. The deeper our sense of belonging in early childhood, that is, the more positively attached we are to our primary caregivers, the better we are usually able to cope with major disruptions in later life (cf. Bonanno 2004; Bonanno, Westphal & Mancini 2011; Mancini & Bonanno 2006). In other words, the better we are loved and cared for, the more resilient we become in the sense of trusting our abilities to deal with the irregularities that life presents us with (cf. Bowlby 1980; Marris 2015 [1986]). Furthermore, when we feel loved, connected and included, that is, when we positively belong to primary carers, we will feel valued by those to whom we belong. This, in turn, gives us a sense of self-worth. And when we take ourselves seriously, most others will do so too. This is then a self-reinforcing phenomenon. Ultimately, when we enjoy respect we will have trust in our abilities, which will lead us to realise our full potential. That is, we will create. Thus, we have seen that the satisfaction of our basic needs start from belonging. But what is belonging

---

21 In these highly unethical experiments, that have been allowed to continue until as recent as 2017, infant rhesus monkeys were separated from their mothers and raised in various laboratory settings in order to study different effects of maternal deprivation on primates to formulate theories relevant to humans (see, for example, Aalai 2016; cf. Blum 1994).
exactly? In the following section I conceptualise this key term and argue that it relates to our very existence.

**Belonging: the key to our existence**

Since the experience of the loss of belonging and, in response to that, the search for some kind of restoration of this feeling emerged as the central theme from my research data, I started reading and thinking about this concept. As previously mentioned, I found that many authors use the term, especially in socio-cultural anthropology (see, amongst others, Leve 2011; Linger 2007; Lovell 1998), but few conceptualise it (cf. Gammeltoft 2018). This struck me as rather odd, since anthropology essentially takes belonging as its starting point for analysis. As Eriksen illustrates:

... anthropology distinguishes itself from other lines of enquiry by insisting that social reality is first and foremost created through relationships between people and the groups to which they belong.


Indeed, I found that belonging is centrally about relationships. Furthermore, I contend that it is concerned with three interrelated elements, namely attachment, inclusion/exclusion and identity. Ultimately, it pertains to our very existence, as the following sections demonstrate.

**Enacting belonging through attachment**

Let me first note that I am concerned with the term in the sense of ‘belonging to’, that is, in its meaning of ‘being a member of,’ ‘being a part of,’ or ‘being included in’ (see the *Oxford English Dictionary*, henceforth referred to as OED). The word originates from the Old English prefix ‘be’ in combination with ‘longen’, meaning ‘to go along with’ or ‘to go together with’. Thus, the meaning of belonging lies in togetherness. Indeed, humans are social or group

---

22 As opposed to other meanings of the term, such as ownership (possession) or natural belonging in the sense of belonging to a specific blood type.

23 From Old English ‘langian’, cognate with Middle Dutch ‘belanghen’ and German ‘belangen’ (*Online Etymology Dictionary*).
animals: we need each other in order to survive, both physically and emotionally (see, amongst others, Davies, J 2012; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maslow 1943, 1970). Thus, we instinctively form relationships by attaching ourselves to others (Bowlby 1980; cf. Archer 1999; Yuval-Davis 2006), in the first place to our primary care givers and later in life to other individuals with whom we create bonds of friendship and partnership (Bowlby 1980; cf. Girard 2016).

It is not only our (initially complete) dependence on others that makes our relationships with other people, what Gammeltoft calls ‘intersubjective belonging’ (2018: 85), the most important form of belonging: these others also principally inform our lives with meaning. That is, they provide us with reasons to act (cf. Marris 2015 [1986]). Indeed, as I will demonstrate throughout this thesis, for the great majority of Afrikaners who participated in this research, their children principally informed their lives with meaning and, as such, they made the choice to leave South Africa primarily for them. Most study participants had emigrated as a nuclear family unit (see Chapter 2); however they suffered immensely from the loss of their families of origin and extended families, as we will see in Chapter 7.

Indeed, with regards to interpersonal belonging, next to individual bonds we also form relationships of belonging to larger groups of people, with the same essential sub-conscious aim of increasing our chances of survival (Bowlby 1980; Davies 2012; Marris, 2015 [1986]). In the first place this concerns the extended family group or clan. After that comes the tribe, which, in general, is currently symbolised by the nation-state. Being a member of a particular nation-state provides us with ‘political belonging’ (Gammeltoft 2018; cf. Anderson 2006; Yuval-Davis 2006). However, many citizens of ‘nations’ identify much more with their sub-tribe or sub-cultural group24 than with the overarching ‘national’ group, whether this sub-group is living within the borders of the nation-state or elsewhere. Indeed, most of my

24 I deliberately avoid using the term ‘ethnic group’, because this term is too often being used to inspire intergroup competition and war. It carries the connotation that ethnicity would be something inherent in us, something primordial, instead of something which is taught or learned. The Greek ethnos, from which the term derives, simply means ‘people’. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘ethnicity’ as ‘the fact or state of belonging to a social group that has a common national or cultural tradition’ (cf. McLean & McMillan 2003: 177). Thus we see that the term ‘cultural group’ is much more suitable (cf. Hobsbawm 1990).
interviewees identified in the first place as Afrikaner and in the second place as South African. Furthermore, in many cases members of cultural groups or tribes are living across regions that cover multiple ‘nation-states’. Indeed, this incongruence of national borders and cultural groups is one of the main causes of violent conflict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2016). Simultaneously, the efforts of political elites to construct a sense of ‘national’ group identity also creates a high degree of suffering. The forced construction of an ‘Afrikaner identity’ between 1901 and 1948 (see de Villiers 1988; Harrison 1982; Patterson 1957), which culminated in the apartheid regime, is a case in point. After 1994, when apartheid came to an end, the Afrikaners felt that they had lost their political belonging in South Africa and they sought to find membership of another political entity, Australia (see Chapter 5).

Political belonging usually overlaps with spatial or ‘territorial belonging’ (Gammeltoft 2018), which can be defined as ‘having an affinity for a specified place’ (OED). Here, we feel connected to a physical, geographical area to the extent that we feel ‘at home’ in this place. Most often we are attached to this area because we were born there and it thus represents the place that is most familiar and, therefore, safe to us (see Bowlby 1980; Davies, J 2012; Davis 1992; Dewey 2007 [1922]; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maslow 1943). For many people, including most Afrikaners who took part in my research, the place where they grew up remains the place they regard as ‘home’. For the majority of interviewees, however, South Africa after 1994 had changed too much to be felt as home, as we will see in Chapter 5. Thus, the place that they called ‘home’, the South Africa of their childhood, only still existed in their minds.

Next to a geographical place, the nation-state usually also has, or attempts to have, an overarching national group identity in which political, economic and social values overlap, values originating from an ideology or worldview, usually a spiritual belief system/religion. This can then be referred to as ‘cultural belonging’, although many sub-cultures exist within most societies and, of course, members of overarching cultures and sub-cultures often also believe different things (cf. Eriksen 2017). Yet, all cultural groups and sub-groups have a common underlying ideology that determines the thoughts, behaviour, customs and habits of its members, although most of them are not consciously aware of this (Davies, J 2012;
Although culture is dynamic, this research demonstrates that the overarching Afrikaner culture remains based on Christianity (Calvinism), as chapter 6 will demonstrate. There, we will see how deeply culture is ingrained in us, and, consequently, how painful cultural bereavement often is. Chapter 6 also demonstrates that the research participants did not want to belong to their host culture. This brings us to the second and third element of the concept of belonging: inclusion and exclusion, based on real or perceived sameness (identity) or difference.

Who is in and who is out: sameness and difference

Paradoxically, relationships of belonging, that is, inclusive bonds, are intrinsically exclusive, because, as Girard (2016: 4) notes, ‘[in order] to exist, they have to exclude some people.’ Arguably the only relationship that is inclusive to all of us is belonging to the human race. Yet, even this was contested until recently, as, for example, Aboriginal Australians were denied their humanness by colonists and settlers. In most if not all other relationships of belonging, being included in one group automatically means not being part of another group. It would be, for example, hard to identify as a Christian and as a Muslim simultaneously. In this example, this may not be perceived as a problem, since one presumably would not want to identify as both. However, there are many forms of belonging that are contested, relationships to which individuals want to belong but they cannot; to which they find themselves excluded. As I have previously stated, most of my study participants felt excluded in South Africa as well as in Australia, albeit in different ways. In South Africa, they felt economically, politically, socially and culturally excluded, whereas they wanted to be included. They also felt alienated in a spatial or territorial sense. In Australia, the great majority felt politically included, but socially and economically excluded – albeit to a lesser

---

25 Calvinism refers to the theological doctrine of John Calvin (1509–1564), who was a leading figure in the Protestant Reformation.

26 Until the 1970s, they were counted as ‘flora and fauna’ (Dudgeon et al. 2010; Hollinsworth 2006; cf. Sonn & Quayle 2012). Of course, in most other European colonies, the original inhabitants of the area were also denied most of their human rights, South Africa, especially under apartheid, being a case in point. However, to my knowledge, only in Australia were Aboriginal peoples legally classified as non-humans.

27 Of course, before 1994, successive apartheid governments had been excluding all so-called non-white South Africans in all of these respects, most notably in a political sense, as these groups were denied citizenship.
extent than in South Africa. Most of all, they felt themselves to be alien to what they viewed as Australian mainstream culture (see Chapter 6).

From this we see that belonging is concerned with (perceived) sameness and difference. It is about who is in and who is out and who decides on these matters. Individually more than socially, we make this decision ourselves – to the extent in which our culture allows us to – based on perceptions of who and what is similar (to me) and who and what is different (from me). Thus, we feel that we belong because we identify – identity meaning ‘sameness’ or ‘oneness’ (from the Latin *identitas*). As discussed, we principally identify with people (family, friends), with places (locales, countries) and with belief systems (cultures). The concept of identity thus refers to our idea of *who we are* and is constructed on *relationships of belonging*. In the first place, it is built up of our bonds with other humans (cf. Gammeltoft 2018; Girard 2016). That is, if someone asks us who we are, most aspects of our answer will include other people, since we are all someone’s child and often someone’s sibling, parent, partner, friend, colleague, etcetera. Thus, identities can be defined as stories about *who we are* (and who we are not) (Martin 1995; Yuval-Davis 2006), or, rather, as stories about *to whom we belong* and to whom we do not. Essentially, then, *to belong is to be and vice versa*. Or, in the words of de Saint-Exupéry: ‘Man is nothing but a web of relations; with regard to man, only relationships count’ (1942: 183; cf. Corr 2002; Gammeltoft 2018; Jackson 2002; Neimeyer 2002). We see this confirmed in the sentiments of one of my research participants, who had lost his career, a lot of his wealth and, with that, to a considerable extent his self-esteem due to his immigration decision (see Chapter 3), but yet concluded that ‘happiness does not lie in material goods, happiness lies in relationships’ (Paul, interview, 2016). This suggests that, as long as we do not lose our most inner circle of loved ones, or our most intimate form of ‘interpersonal belonging’, we will be able to cope with other losses. But how do we cope with loss? And is *all* loss, then, essentially a loss of belonging? These questions are further explored in the next section.

---

28 Paul was very happy with his wife and daughters, and the fact that they were doing well in Australia was most important to him.
What if belonging is lost?

The interviewee cited above, Paul, was still relatively wealthy, as he belonged to the socio-economic middle class in Australia. This means that, despite his losses, he and his family had their most fundamental needs satisfied. Yet, from my data analysis it was clear that the answer to my question in Polokwane in 2011, that is, how the Afrikaners were making sense of their world after apartheid, lies in the loss of belonging. My study participants’ immigration stories revealed that they were, above all else, in search of belonging. They wanted to find a place where they would be included again. More than anything else, they wanted to find a place where they could feel that their children would be included again. In South Africa after 1994, they had lost all hope for their children’s future. What I witnessed in my interviewees was a deep grief over this loss. Therefore, as I have stated before, I do not believe that Afrikaners as a group appropriate a victim narrative in order to negate their perpetrator stigma. Rather, I argue that their tendency to see themselves as victims recalls the posture of chronic grief (Marris 2015 [1986]: 64) or depression (Freud 1917). They felt that they had lost everything in post-apartheid South Africa, and, as I have demonstrated, this is their reality. This ‘everything’ entailed, in my final analysis, a perceived loss of economic belonging (their previously mentioned sense of economic security), of physical belonging (fearing for their safety), of spatial belonging and of socio-political belonging. In Australia, they subsequently lost their sense of geographical, social, cultural, and interpersonal belonging. How they dealt with these losses is discussed in the empirical chapters of this thesis. By means of introduction, however, it is important to first discuss the bereavement paradigm.

How do we deal with loss?

Scholars generally agree that humans react in similar ways to different types of loss. That is, regardless of whom or what we lose, our reactions, namely grief and mourning, are similar (Archer 1999; Bhugra & Becker 2005; Burton 1651; Doka 2002; Freud 1917; Houghton & Boersma 1988; Parkes 1986; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976; Stillion & Attig 2014). Many have observed, for example, the parallel mourning processes of those who have lost a loved one through death and those who have immigrated (Grinberg & Grinberg 1984; 1989; Volkan 1993; cf. Ainslie 2005). The similarities spring from the fact that grieving reactions are evoked
when our adaptive abilities, that is, our ability to cope with change, are threatened (Marris 2015 [1986]; cf. Taylor 2002). ‘Coping’ refers to strategies for dealing with threat (Lazarus 1996), specifically the threat of disintegration. Thus, the question of how we cope with loss becomes the question of how we deal with the threat that the severance or destruction of an attachment poses.\footnote{The word ‘loss’ originates from the old English *los*, meaning ‘destruction’.
} For attachment is the prerequisite for loss: if we are not attached to the object, we will not experience its loss as loss (Freud 1917; cf. Bowlby 1980). In other words, if we do not feel that the lost object *belonged* to us, in the sense that it formed part of our life story, or our identity, we cannot lose it. Hence, we also see that any loss is essentially a loss of *belonging* and a loss of *self*, since that what we lost was a part of *us* (cf. Aldrich 1963; Freud 1917; Marris 2015 [1986]).

Since belonging, or attachment, is an instinctive universal human need, so is the reaction to loss (Brison & Leavitt 1995; Durkheim 1995 [1912]; Robben 2009; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976). The grief emotion has to be worked through in a process we call mourning (Bowlby 1961; Marris 2015 [1986]; Robben 2009). In contrast to their universal character, the ways in which grief and mourning are *expressed* are culturally determined (Bhugra & Becker 2005; Brison & Leavitt 1995; Durkheim 1995 [1912]; Hollan 1995; Kaufman & Morgan 2005; Woodrick 1995), as anthropologists have amply demonstrated (see, most notably, Hertz 1960 [1907]; Malinowski 2009 [1954]; Radcliffe-Brown 1964; Turner 1969; van Gennep 1960 [1909]).\footnote{In fact, a number of scholars have demonstrated that culture produces the very feelings that are determined as grief (Hochschild 1979; Radcliffe-Brown 1964; Scheper-Hughes 1992; cf. Rosaldo, M 2009 [1984]).} However, regarding the question of how mourning is resolved, anthropologists have contributed little to the debate (Fabian 2009 [1973]; Hunter 2007-2008; Leavitt 1995; Palgi & Abramovitch 1984; Wellenkamp 1988), arguably because they ‘recoil from making the sweeping generalisations common in sociology and psychology’ due to their focus on cultural diversity (Robben 2009: 12). I have less problems with proposing universal theories regarding the human condition, because, next to cultural variation, the question of *what we have in common* has always been equally fundamental to anthropological inquiry (see Eriksen
In fact, Clifford (2007: 480) defines the anthropologist as ‘the builder of general theories about humanity’. Rather, since the conflict of bereavement represents, in principal, a psychological conflict, and since psychology and anthropology have experienced an unfortunate rift (Bruner 1996; Ewing 1992; Shore 1996), it is plausible that many anthropologists have shied away from studying this phenomenon. Yet, it was Malinowski who described grief as ‘[the] desire to maintain the tie and the parallel tendency to break the bond’ (2009 [1954]: 20). Other anthropologists have described this conflict as the incompatibility between the urge, on the one hand, to preserve or restore the past, and, on the other, to replace or recreate what was lost (Colson 1971; Davis 1992; de Waal 1989). How we generally resolve this conflict is discussed in the next section.

Meaning-making: maintaining the tie and recreating the bond
For a long time, scholars thought that the conflict of grief is worked out through ‘stages’, starting from denial and anger, progressing to negotiation and depression and culminating in acceptance of the loss (see, most notably, Kübler-Ross 1970; cf. Aldrich 1963; Bowlby 1961, 1980; Lindemann 1944). Currently, however, the academic debate has shifted toward meaning reconstruction as the key (Castelli Dransart 2013; Hunter 2007-2008; Marris 2015 [1986]; Neimeyer 2000, 2001, 2002; Neimeyer et al. 2008; Neimeyer, Prigerson & Davies 2002; Stroebe & Schut 2001; cf. Davis 1992; Houghton & Boersema 1988). That is, today, we acknowledge that we cope with loss by giving it meaning. When we lose a part of ourselves, which, as we have seen, is the essence of loss, we lose something that gave our life meaning, something that helped us to make sense of the world. Thus, what needs to be restored in order for us to continue with life after loss, is meaning. I define meaning as the significance or value that we attach to our relationship with someone or something. When people cannot

---

31 Indeed, Robben argues that the focus on cultural specificity has come at the expense of investigating commonalities and has left anthropologists on the margins of the bereavement debate (2009: 12-14; cf. Brabant 2002; Houghton & Boersma 1988).

32 Arguably, this happened under Geertz’s (1973) influence (Gammeltoft & Buch Segal 2016: 404). The subfield of psychological anthropology aims to deconstruct this barrier, as, evidently, the psyche develops within a cultural context and the two are thus inextricably linked (Barley 1977; Bruner 1996; Casey & Edgerton 2007; Cohler 1992; Devereux 1978; Elias 1987; Ewing 1992; Holland et al. 2003 [1998]; Kakar 1982; Klass 1999; Obeyesekere 1990; Paul 1989; Shore 1996).

33 As he observed it being expressed in the funeral rite.
find meaning in a loss, that is, if they are unable to find an explanation as to why they were bereaved, they generally succumb to chronic grief, that is, depression (Davies, J 2012; Doka 2002; Freud 1917; Livingston 2010; Marris 2015 [1986]; Shand 1920). This does not mean that meaning making necessarily stops suffering, but it does make it bearable (see Frankl 2008 [1946]). Indeed, although we can adjust to a new reality – that is, to life with the loss –, low levels of grief may remain present throughout our lifetime (Brison & Leavitt 1995; Disman 1983; Hollan 1994, 1995; LaCapra 1999; Leavitt 1995; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976; Woodrick 1995). Yet, it is clear that meaning-finding is maintaining the tie and breaking the bond: the loss lives on once we see what the lost person or object meant to us (because that meaning still exists), and we can continue with our life once we understood why it happened (what the experience has brought us).

As we will see throughout this thesis, the Afrikaners who took part in my research had not found meaning in the losses they felt they had sustained in post-apartheid South Africa. I argue that this is the reason why they left their homeland. This also means that they were still grieving these losses. The emigration decision had not brought a resolution to their pain, a conclusion predicted by Griffiths & Prozesky (2010). The losses associated with their immigration to Australia, however, were given supreme meaning. As we will see throughout the empirical chapters, the great majority of research participants viewed their own losses as sacrifices they had made for their children. Therefore, they were coping well with these losses. Their primary bond of belonging, thus, was the relationship with their children. Ultimately, the fact that they themselves could not find a place where they felt they fully belonged, in a post-apartheid world, was made bearable because they did feel to have found this place for their children. Thus, ultimately, they had sacrificed their own sense of belonging for that of their children. Before we now turn to read about their story, I will first briefly outline how each of the empirical chapters relates to this central argument and to each other.

**Thesis outline**

As previously discussed, in this thesis I take the conflict of bereavement as central focus of analysis. As such, each of the empirical chapters answers the question of how the Afrikaners
who participated in this research were attempting to resolve the competing tendencies to preserve or restore the past and to recreate or replace what they had lost. Each individual chapter does this for one of the principal five losses that the research participants narrated. As explained, all losses were losses of belonging, though all represented a different type. The first three chapters address losses that interviewees felt they had sustained in South Africa, namely the loss of economic belonging, the loss of physical belonging, and the loss of socio-political belonging. Since the study participants dealt with these losses by immigrating to Australia, Chapters 3-5 subsequently address to what extent this coping mechanism was successful and why. Here, we will see that the Afrikaners were faced with additional losses, that is, with those associated with emigration, as mentioned before. The last two chapters focus solely on how the conflict of bereavement played itself out with regards to the two main post-immigration losses, namely the loss of cultural belonging (Chapter 6) and the loss of interpersonal belonging (Chapter 7).

Chapter 3 focuses on the felt loss of economic belonging, which is conceptualised as the loss of having the opportunity and ability to provide for oneself and for one’s family. The analysis in this chapter demonstrates that, although the Afrikaners did not lose this fundamental human need, they yet felt that they had. Their ‘Deep Story’ in this regard, that is, the story that, to them, felt as if it was true (Hochschild 2016), was that they had no choice but to leave South Africa because they, and their children in particular, were discriminated against due to affirmative action policies. Thus, the perceived reality became real in its consequences: the research participants left their homeland. However, since grief can only be resolved through meaning-making, the move to Australia did not resolve this. Furthermore, in Australia, the interviewees also suffered a loss of economic belonging, since they felt to a large extent excluded due to their immigrant status. Yet, this loss, and the additional losses in which it resulted, were given supreme meaning because the interviewees saw them as sacrifices they had made for their children.

Chapter 4 tells the story of how the Afrikaners had lost their sense of physical safety or physical belonging in South Africa and how they successfully recreated this by moving to Australia. It deals with the interviewees’ extreme fear of violent crime, which they felt had
increased in post-apartheid South Africa and was specifically targeted them, because they were seen as the former oppressors. Similar to Chapter 3, the analysis here also shows that, with regards to its practical, performative power, it is irrelevant that this narrative, too, is contested by secondary data. It was not just their story; it was their life. As such, it resulted in fear as a way of life. The chapter demonstrates how the emotion of fear affected the research participants, by changing their thoughts, bodies, and behaviour. Subsequently, it also shows how the opposite emotion, trust, altered all these aspects after the interviewees had moved to Australia. The chapter further discusses how difficult it was for the interviewees to adjust to the change, even though it was beneficial, and concludes that ultimately, the meaning of the change lay in freedom.

Chapter 5 is concerned with the Afrikaners’ felt losses of spatial and socio-political belonging and how they tried to recreate this by moving to Australia. Firstly, the concept of spatial belonging refers to our identification with the place we live in, since we see it as an extension of ourselves. The chapter shows that South Africa had become an unfamiliar place to the interviewees. In their view, it had become a ‘third world’ country. Moving to Australia restored their sense of belonging in this sense, however, they lost their geographical belonging, as they missed that part of them that belonged to ‘Africa’. Secondly, the chapter focuses on the Afrikaners’ lost sense of socio-political belonging, which is conceptualised as the merging of our social and political identity: that part of our identity which derives from our sense of belonging to the social group that is also our ‘national’ group, that is, the group with whom we share citizenship. In South Africa, the study participants felt rejected by both their state and society due to their apartheid stigma. Despite the fact that most interviewees obtained citizenship in Australia and felt ‘wanted’ by their new government, they felt excluded by the Australian society at large. Thus, in this respect, recreating a sense of belonging proved elusive. Yet, they did restore a sense of inclusion for their children, which, similar to the conclusion in Chapter 3, made their own pain bearable. Chapter 5 concludes by arguing that the pre-immigration losses combined meant that the Afrikaners had lost their ‘ontological security’, that is, their basic trust in their world (Giddens 1990).
Chapters 6 focuses on the interviewees’ loss of cultural belonging in Australia. Here, the analysis shows that the Afrikaners felt extremely culturally bereaved and that they coped badly with this. This demonstrates that their believed reality of being refugees is real in its consequences: amongst all migrants, refugees cope worst with culture loss because they did not seek the change. The fact that the research participants felt socio-economically excluded in Australia exacerbated their angry and criticising attitude towards the host community. This expressed itself in a discourse of opposites: Australians were seen as what the Afrikaners were not. The process of stereotyping produced two main narratives about Australians. First, they were seen as ‘British’, and second, as ‘atheists’. Here, we see that the study participants were mirroring how they viewed their own culture, namely as ‘European’ and ‘Christian’. Thus, their perceptions about Australians tell us more about themselves and less about Australians. Furthermore, underneath this negative ‘othering’ of the host community lay a deep sense of insecurity about the Afrikaners’ place in their new homeland, related to their feelings of exclusion as discussed in Chapters 3 and 5.

Finally, Chapter 7 answers the question of how the research participants dealt with the loss of family members that had stayed behind in South Africa. This loss is conceptualised as the loss of ‘intersubjective belonging’, or, in concrete terms, the loss of our sense of attachment to significant others (see Gammeltoft 2018). The first part of the chapter focuses on the meaning of losing family for interviewees. Here, the analysis demonstrates that this principally lay in a loss of harmony and a loss of community. The second part of the chapter shows that participants fully engaged in the conflict of bereavement: they were simultaneously trying to preserve and restore as well as attempting to recreate and replace their lost family ties. The analysis here reveals that, although most interviewees focused more on recreating a substitute family out of their fellow Afrikaner émigrés, ultimately, the loss of their biological family could not be restored. Yet, the chapter concludes that most participants coped with this loss because they had given it meaning. Once more, they viewed their suffering as sacrifices for their children’s wellbeing.

Now, we first turn to Chapter 2, which explains my research methodology and clarifies important concepts and terms that I use throughout this thesis.
Chapter 2  Methodology and terminology

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have discussed the topic and rationale of the research underlying this thesis, as well as the theoretical field in which it was undertaken. In short, it has considered what I researched, why it was important to do so and where I conducted it, conceptually. What remains is the how question. That is, before I can begin to discuss the findings in detail, it is important to address the methodology and methods that I used for both data collection and analysis. As stated previously, I conducted an ethnographic case study, which remains the key anthropological method. That is, I studied my research participants in their natural environment and in their daily lives over an extended period of time, and participated in their activities while speaking their native language. Within this method, casual conversations as well as in-depth, open-ended interviews were the main method of data collection. The discipline of anthropology has long evolved from the early days of Malinowskian-style participant observation, in which simply ‘being there’—hanging out with informants—was enough to claim ethnographic authority, to an era in which we recognise that much more is needed in order to attain this (see, amongst others, Clifford 2007). Today we acknowledge that participant observation in the form of taking part in our informants’ daily lives and activities merely provides the context for other data collection techniques, most notably for interviewing (Dewalt & Dewalt 2002). Next to that, we usually employ a third method, in my case textual analysis, in order to enhance the overall validity of our research, the so-called ‘data triangulation’ (Beuving & de Vries 2015; Ragin 1994; Riemer 2012).

Furthermore, at present we overcome the earlier critique of a lack of openness about our own position in the field, as well as about how we collected and analysed our data, by being completely transparent about the research process. In doing so, we enhance the validity and
reliability of our work. We also do this through theoretical candour and by using as much as possible fieldnote evidence, most notably interview excerpts (Riemer 2012). Thus, in the empirical chapters of this thesis I have used as much as possible verbatim quotes from my research participants. The aim of the current chapter is to describe in detail how I acquired these fieldnotes. It describes the research process as well as practical data results, such as the number of participants, demographic data and other relevant statistics. Next to that, I use the second part of this chapter to explain in more detail what I mean with a number of key terms and concepts that I use throughout the thesis.

In the field: research process

Collecting stories: interviews

I collected the main part of the data through in-depth, open ended interviews that mostly took the form of guided conversations. Over a period of 16 months, starting in September 2015 and ending in December in 2016, I assembled the personal immigration stories of 74 self-identified Afrikaner émigrés in Australia over the course of 60 interviews. This means that 14 interviews were conducted with two people simultaneously, in 13 cases with couples and in one case with siblings. All interviewees belonged to the first-generation of immigrants, that is, they had relocated to Australia as adults. Next to that, they had all done so in or after 1994. On average, these interviews took about three hours, although some were shorter and, in most cases, I spent half a day to a day with interviewees, as our conversations were usually held in combination with coffee, lunch and/or dinner. The great majority of interviews were held in Afrikaans (49), 2 were conducted in English, where both participants had an Australian, English-speaking partner, and 9 in a mix of Afrikaans and English. I always let the interviewee decide in which language we conversed and usually this evolved naturally. Sometimes I had to make the participant in question aware of the fact that I could speak Afrikaans well enough to converse before they comfortably switched to their mother tongue (although Afrikaans is closely related to Dutch in terms of vocabulary, the pronunciation is different and I have a
Since Adelaide was the main fieldwork location, most interviews were held there – 38 interviews with 42 people. Next to that, 14 people were interviewed in Whyalla, 4 in Sydney, 3 in Mount Gambier, 8 in Melbourne and 3 in Perth. Thus, in total, interviews were held in six different cities covering four different states.

About two-thirds of the interviews were audio recorded (43), whereas nearly one-third was not (17). Within this last category, occasionally people explicitly chose not to be audio recorded, though oftentimes I decided not to ask, as I felt the setting or the atmosphere was not conducive to audio recording. This was either when the interview took place in a crowded setting, at a dinner party or in a public space like a café or restaurant, or when I felt that the participant in question was feeling slightly nervous and would become increasingly uncomfortable and less inclined to speak openly if I would bring up the issue of audio recording. Out of the total of sixty interviews, more than half were held in people’s private homes or in my home (32 and 2 respectively). Twenty-one interviews took place in cafés and restaurants, and five at people’s work places. Naturally, I always let the research participants choose where they would like to meet, at whatever place would be most convenient and comfortable for them.

Although interviewees were made aware of the fact that there was no specific benefit for them in participating in the research, such as a monetary reward that is sometimes given for filling out surveys, or a promise of some form of action related to policy change in certain social scientific research, I did receive the feedback from a number of participants that they had experienced the interview as helpful or even as healing. Indeed, the telling of stories is essential to the facilitation of mourning and healing (Munn 2006; Rosenthal 2003; Rothschild 2000), as is the feeling that one has been heard (Kaslow 2008). As I previously argued, Afrikaners are not likely to receive sympathy from most people, and they therefore do not often get a chance to tell their side of South Africa’s story or share their post-immigration difficulties. Yet, as this study shows, they do have many grievances, and research has

---

1 I have learned to speak Afrikaans during fieldwork in 2011 and after that through a course at the South Africa House in Amsterdam in 2012.
demonstrated that in sharing our stories with people who want to listen we receive the validation, or self-esteem, needed to move forward (Boss 1999; Livingston 2010). In fact, Fassin and Rechtman (2007) contend that listeners are equally or more important to psychiatrists, and that bearing witness to someone else’s pain is a humanitarian thing. Thus, it is my hope that, by having been interested in hearing my research participants’ stories and in having actively listened to their experiences, I have supported them in some way in their process of adjusting to loss and change.

Regarding the interview process, the method was similar. I would ask participants to share with me their immigration story. From there, the conversation usually flowed and I guided it only slightly, mostly by asking questions to check whether new interviewees had similar sentiments to those whom I had spoken to before, the so-called method of ‘member-checking’ (Riemer 2012). Usually I had given interviewees a participant information sheet and consent form beforehand, either personally or digitally, by email or sometimes through Facebook. However, I also brought hard copies of the forms with me to be signed before the interview started. Thus, all interviews were held with informed and written consent. Only one of my final interviews had a different set-up as this was with my main gate-keeper, a woman who had provided access to a great number of other research participants and was a leadership figure within her community. She and I agreed that I would, by contrast, share with her my interpretation of all the previous research participants’ stories, and she would then comment on this. This turning of roles proved an invaluable final ‘member-check’ and she, above all, confirmed the Afrikaners’ narrative of loss of belonging. Before I describe the context in which the story-telling took place, that is, the process of how I recruited my research participants, the next section first provides an overview of the most relevant characteristics of those Afrikaners that participated in my research through official interviews. These are: region of origin; age or generation; gender; family status; occupation and religion.

**Who were the story tellers? A general profile**

Out of the total of 74 interviewees, 48 emigrated from Gauteng, 14 from the Western Cape, 8 from North West Province, 2 from the Free State, one from the Northern Cape and one from
Mpumalanga. Gauteng’s overrepresentation can be explained by the fact that it is South Africa’s most violent province (SSA 2018; cf. Chapter 4). Concerning age, the great majority of interviewees was between 40 and 60 years of age, that is, those born between 1955 and 1975 (59 in total). Within this group, the largest part consisted of those between 40 and 50 (38) and the rest of those between 50 and 60 (21). A small group was in their thirties (9), the generation of the late 1970s and early 1980s, a smaller group in their sixties (3), born between 1945 and 1955, two people were between 60 and 70, born between 1935 and 1945, and one interviewee was 85, born in 1931. The youngest person interviewed was thirty-three and the oldest participant was eighty-five. Most of the sample group immigrated when they were in their thirties (37) or in their forties (19). A smaller number came in their twenties (10), two in their fifties, five in their sixties, and one at seventy years of age. Although the group presented a random sample in the sense that I met them through the snowball method, which I will clarify in the next section, other research on South African migration to Australia, most notably that of Wasserman (2016; cf. ABS Census 2011 and 2016), suggests that my sample group is roughly congruent with the age demographics demonstrated by official statistics. Evidently, most South Africans migrate to Australia in their thirties and forties.

About two-thirds of the total group of interviewees migrated during the 2000s (47), most of which were between 2005 and 2010 (33). This indicates that they belonged to the ‘Second Wave’ of Afrikaner emigration, as one research participant called it (Marieke, interview, 2015). That is, they saw themselves as those who were hopeful in the years shortly after 1994 and thought that South Africa had a bright future now that apartheid had been finally abolished. However, after some ten years into the ‘new’ dispensation, they found that this was not the case. Most of all, there was no end to affirmative action and so they believed that their children did not have a future in their home country, as will be further discussed in the next chapter. Out of the rest of the group, 6 people had immigrated in the period 1994–2000, 18 between 2010 and 2015, and 3 in the year that the research started, that is, in 2015.

In terms of gender, the great majority of interviewees was female (47), with the rest male (27). This imbalance can be explained in a number of ways. First of all, the fact that I am a woman plays a role. The way in which we are socialised into our gender roles may make it
easier for women to connect to each other than to men. This socialisation could also explain why women are generally more open about sharing their stories than men. Another, more practical explanation is that I met a number of interviewees at special, women-only events in Adelaide, as I will explain further on. Next to this, from my experience Afrikaner culture is fairly traditional and for adult, married men to meet individually with a woman that they are unfamiliar with is not common. At events, especially at braais (barbecue parties), I was always ‘automatically relegated to the female world’, to use Grima’s words (2004: vii), as women and men usually group separately at these gatherings. This gender issue is also reflected in the fact that out of the 27 male interviewees, 14 were interviewed together with their wives. Having said this, my research topic lends itself well to couple interviews, as the great majority of Afrikaners migrates as a nuclear family unit (ABS Census 2011; 2016). Indeed, 53 interviewees migrated to Australia with children under 18 years of age. Five came over before they had a family, and their children had subsequently been born in Australia. Another five participants moved at an older age leaving adult children behind, two came over to join their adult children and grandchildren in Australia and a final six did not have children, though this was not by choice.

Furthermore, with regards to occupation, most interviewees were professionals and highly skilled. The great majority had tertiary degrees and some held PhDs. This is a general characteristic of South African migrants to Australia, as demonstrated by statistics (ABS Census 2011; 2016; Crush 2000; Dodson 2002; Louw & Mersham 2001; Lucas, Amoateng & Kalule-Sabiti 2006; Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013) and reflects Australia’s skills based immigration policy (Hugo 2014; Louis et al. 2010; Visser 2004; Wasserman 2016). Given this policy, which focuses on attracting and admitting highly skilled migrants, it is unsurprising that there were only three interviewees who were ‘unskilled’, that is, they did not have tertiary or secondary diplomas. These three participants all narrated stories of entering Australia through exceptional circumstances and told me that it had only been possible because of God’s will. What probably contributed to the fact was that they were willing to move to the most rural places, that is, to the outback, and, for two of them, to work for less than the

---

2 Although all of them were aiming to sponsor visas for their children in order to reunite the family in Australia.
Australian minimum wage. This leads us to the final characteristic to be discussed here, which is the fact that all research participants were religious, with one describing herself as ‘more spiritual [than religious], now’ (Noor, interview, 2016).

Historically, the Afrikaner people were Calvinists, and they belonged to either one of three protestant ‘sister churches’, based on or related to the Dutch Reformed Church (Giliomee 2011). Today, however, in South Africa as well as in Australia, Afrikaners are choosing from many different Christian denominations. Most of my research participants were members of the Christian Reformed Church, others had chosen the closely related Presbyterian Church, and again others went to Uniting, Lutheran, or Pentecostal churches. One interviewee was a member of the Anglican church. There was also one participant who had stopped going to church altogether, though she still said to have ‘a relationship with God’ (Eva, interview, 2015). Finally, only one interviewee was not raised within a church community, though she described her family as religious and she believed that God had guided her through many things in her life, including her immigration to Australia. As she stated: ‘How could I have obtained a visa for Australia if it hadn’t been for God?’ (Tessa, interview, 2016). Thus, this research suggests that the historical, stereotypical image of Afrikaners as being deeply religious (Dubow 1992; Giliomee 1979, 2011; O’Meara 2009 [1983]; Patterson 1957; Shingler 1977; Thompson 1985; van Jaarsveld 1961) holds some truth. As one participant explained:

... religion is something inherent in Afrikaner culture, and a Calvinist way of life ... you don’t have to go to church, but religion is part and parcel of what we are, or of what Afrikaner culture is.

(Margo, casual conversation, 2015)

I will explain more about my use of the term ‘Afrikaner’ in the second part of this chapter. Before doing so, however, in the next section I explain in detail the context in which the interviews took place, that is, how I engaged with the participant observation method.

---

3 Calvinism refers to the reformed protestant Christian tradition based on the ideas of John Calvin (1509-1564).
The context: on ‘being there’ in modern anthropology

Indeed, how did I find all these story tellers? Clearly, I could not ‘do ethnography’ following a ‘traditional’ or ‘Malinowskian’ model (Fischer 2009: viii), where my mere presence in a remote village with a largely homogenous population was enough to claim that ‘I was there’ and could thus tell ‘their’ story. By contrast, my main fieldwork location was Adelaide, the capital city of South Australia, consisting of close to 1.5 million people and rich in sub-cultures, of which Afrikaner migrants constitute one of many immigrant minority groups (ABS 2018). This meant that I was not naturally ‘there’ but in fact had to actively search for my research population, as many ‘modern’ anthropologists do, that is, those of us who study contemporary phenomena in mainly Western locations (see Amit 2000; Faubion & Marcus 2009; Gupta & Ferguson 1997; Marcus 1999; Rabinow 2005; and Strathern 2004 amongst others on the changing nature of fieldwork in modern times). I started this search by posting a message to the Facebook group Afrikaanse Klub (Club) Adelaide of which I had become a member. I introduced myself personally and as a researcher, informed the group of my idea of researching the Afrikaner diaspora in Australia and asked whether somebody was interested in helping me refresh and further develop my Afrikaans language skills. This initial action led to two results from which further developments ensued.

The first result was that someone replied to my call for Afrikaans conversation ‘lessons’. This person became a research participant and we met regularly throughout the fieldwork period. Over time, our language-skills-focused conversations transformed into casual conversations between friends. Our families became acquainted as well as regularly visiting at each other’s homes. Through this participant, I also met another couple whom I befriended and who participated in the research as interviewees later on in the process. They, in their turn, introduced me to other relevant people. The second result was that I was invited to the bi-monthly Afrikaanse ‘Ladies Tea’, a get-together for primarily Afrikaans-speaking South African women held approximately every six weeks at venues around Adelaide. At this first ‘Ladies

---

4 The Greater Adelaide region counted 1,345,777 inhabitants in 2018, of which approximately one quarter (26.3 %) was born overseas (ABS 2018).
Tea’ in June 2015, I introduced myself and my research plan to approximately 30 Afrikaner women and established long-term contact with a number of them. One of the women that I met at this first ‘Ladies Tea’ invited me to come to church with her. This church in Adelaide had its origins in the Dutch Reformed Church, and had many members of the Afrikaner Diaspora. I got to know some of the people whom I met there quite well over the next one-and-a-half years and they introduced me to others who were willing to be interviewed.

The above-mentioned church became a crucial field site, as I started to regularly attend the services, which, at that time, included a monthly service in Afrikaans, after I had obtained ethics clearance. The group of Afrikaners that I met there became one of three important networks, and it was during the coffees after the services that the most significant casual conversations took place. At this church, I also attended a Bible Study group for a period of six months, both as a field site and out of my personal interest. The other two networks consisted of the group of women from the aforementioned ‘Ladies Tea’ and a group of Afrikaners who had set up their own church in another part of Adelaide. At the ‘Ladies Tea’s’, although not all the same ladies attended these functions, there was a core group that usually attended, but also new women at every tea. I thus saw the core group every six weeks. Next to that I had regular bilateral coffee dates with a number of these ladies and I was in contact with many of them via Facebook as well. With regards to the other church group, I did not visit their services regularly since my main focus was on the earlier church. In light of the project’s limited timeframe, and since I had already begun developing deeper relationships with people from the first group, it made more sense to remain focused on them. As Starn writes:

> How do we pull [multi-sited research] off without becoming spread so thin as to lose the intimacy of sustained ethnographic engagement that remains fieldwork’s highest promise in the first place?

(2015: 7)

Yet, I met a few amazing research participants at the other church, and through the network I established there I also found more interviewees.

---

5 These teas were also and increasingly attended by women from other South African subcultures.
At the Ladies Teas, the church services, and other events that I was invited to, I always introduced myself and my research, though usually I was introduced by someone whom I already knew. Other events included Afrikaans dances, movies, concerts, and most of all barbeque parties (braais) at people’s homes. Thus, these were the places where most of my participant observation occurred, and they including numerous casual conversations about the Afrikaner migration experience. Whenever I spoke to someone and felt that they were interested, I asked them if they would be willing to participate in my research through an interview. If they replied positively, I would then ask them for their contact details and call them within the next few days to make an appointment. Usually I would ask them for an email address as well, so that I could send them the Participant Information Sheet with attached Consent Form beforehand, and, as previously stated, I always brought those papers to the actual interview as well. At the end of each interview, especially in the beginning, I asked my interviewee whether they knew of someone that would possibly be interested in participating in the research as well. In this way, I was contacted by a considerable number of willing interviewees who had heard about my research through their personal network, that is, through the so-called ‘snowball effect’ (Beuving & de Vries 2015; Ragin 1994).

Next to the 74 official interviews, at all events that I participated in I spoke to at least two to five people about their emigration from South Africa to Australia – always after having introduced myself as a researcher. These were both Afrikaners that I already knew and new acquaintances, as well as visiting relatives from South Africa. Informal conversations were not confined to these types of events though, as I also met with a number of research participants on a regular basis for coffee or lunch and a chat. Participant observation obviously stretched into the realm of interviewing as well, especially since most interviews were held at people’s homes. Vice versa, a core group of participants were regular guests at our home as well. Indeed, it is important to note that my family, consisting of my husband and toddler daughter at that time, were very much part of the fieldwork experience, as they were usually invited to everything that I was invited to and started joining me to the church services early on. Finally, the networks were also regularly overlapping, with research participants mentioning friends or acquaintances that I already knew or had interviewed. On the other hand, at some events
I appeared to be the common denominator and found myself introducing Afrikaner émigrés to each other. This demonstrates the relative incoherence of the Afrikaner diaspora in Adelaide, as I will discuss further on and in Chapter 7.

Next to this, the networks also extended far beyond Adelaide, and one of my early research results was that participants urged me to interview their fellow émigrés in other locales in Australia, as they maintained that their experiences would be different from their own, especially of those who had moved to metropolises such as Melbourne and Sydney. They also connected me to their relatives and/or friends in these cities. For these reasons, I decided to extend my research locations, which would allow more people at different places across Australia to share their stories. However, Adelaide remained the main focus, given ethnography’s focus on relationship building. Apart from Adelaide, I undertook three short fieldwork trips to those cities in Australia that have the biggest concentration of Afrikaner immigrants: Perth, Sydney and Melbourne (ABS Census 2011). Furthermore, I also conducted fieldwork in Whyalla and Mount Gambier, the second- and third-largest cities in South Australia. This allowed me to gain the perspective from people who had moved to smaller towns as opposed to cities, although some of my study participants in Adelaide and other cities had lived in towns and villages throughout Australia before. Especially in the mining town of Whyalla I interviewed a considerable number of participants (14), as many Afrikaners work in the mining sector and I was referred to them by my main gatekeeper. My family joined me on all fieldwork trips except for Perth, and in all additional locations, apart from Mount Gambier, we attended events with research participants, mainly church services and barbeque parties. In conclusion, fieldwork was conducted for 16 months, with the first migration story recorded in Adelaide in September 2015 and the last in Perth in December 2016. I will now discuss how I interpreted and analysed these stories.

6 In contrast, I found that many aspects of the relocation were experienced in similar ways, regardless of the different locales. However, I have not interviewed large enough samples in the other places to be able to draw significant conclusions on this topic.
Beyond the stories: interpretation and analysis

For any ethnographer, the fieldwork diary is where data analysis begins (Beuving & de Vries 2015; Robson 2002). I wrote my diary at the end of each day or, sometimes, the next morning, when I had returned home late from an event. During interviews, casual conversations and events, I usually took fieldnotes in a small notebook and often also afterwards in the car. Mostly, though, I wrote full reports on my computer upon returning home. After my research had started reaching saturation, that is, when I stopped receiving new information –after about roughly a year in the field–, I started to only write reports when I had heard something new or remarkable, yet I kept recording my new understandings, insights, thoughts and feelings every evening in my fieldwork diary. From this diary I developed a ‘meta-analysis’ file, in which I continued to record all my relevant thought processes until December 2018, when the first full draft of the thesis was completed. Thus, data analysis began immediately, that is, after the first event that I attended, and continued simultaneously with data collection throughout the fieldwork period. Hence, I engaged with the iterative process, posing new questions based on data collected so far, while using the constant comparison method, that is, comparing each piece of evidence to already collected data (Beuving & de Vries 2015; Riemer 2012). All this time, the main question that I asked myself was what was the meaning behind what my participants were saying and doing or not saying and doing.

Data analysis occurred in overlapping stages in which I progressively narrowed down larger, overarching themes to specific sub-codes. Initially, coding was all-over-the-place, as I did not yet know what would become important themes and what not. Although my preliminary concepts regarding loss and grief were inductive, as they were based on previous fieldwork, I did not take them for granted and I never asked research participants specifically about loss or grief. In fact, after the first three months in the field I thought that I was mistaken in working from this angle. It was only after six to eight months in the field that I realised that, in fact, all my interviewees were talking about was bereavement. Yet, answering the question of what was lost and how they were coping with that, happened, evidently, completely inductively. That is, the theory on human needs and belonging as I have used it and developed further in this thesis, is grounded in the data that emerged from this research (see Charmaz
Indeed, ethnographic work is particularly useful for advancing theory due to the effort to see the world through the eyes of our informants, as mentioned previously.

Apart from insights gained through participant observation and interviews, I also analysed texts as part of the research. These came from four different sources. In the first place, I sometimes received texts from research participants, including poems, song lyrics, and, in one case, a self-published book about the emigration experience. Song texts from the concerts I attended were also important in helping me to understand more about the lives and situation of my research participants. Secondly, I read content on diaspora websites. The key sites I visited regularly were the Afrikaanse Klub Australia, Aus Brokkies and South African Events. The Afrikaanse Club Australia is an Australia-wide organisation by Afrikaners for Afrikaners and other South Africans in Australia (the website is available in Afrikaans and in English). Unfortunately, I could not attend any of their activities since they were all held in other states, mainly in Queensland and New South Wales. The second website, Aus Brokkies, is from a solo entrepreneur who mainly sends out news ‘snippets’ (brokkies) by email on a monthly basis, following his success in doing so in New Zealand. Finally, South African Events is an organisation that brings South African artists to Australia and other diaspora countries.

The third data source for textual analysis came from (mostly digital) newspapers, as I kept myself up to date with the news regarding South Africa and South African immigration to Australia, as the latest news would usually come up in my conversations with research participants. Lastly, and most importantly, I studied Facebook group discussions of three different South African diaspora groups: ‘Afrikaanse Klub Adelaide’, ‘South Africans in Adelaide’ and ‘Aussiekaners’, which is an Australia-wide group. However, as fieldwork progressed and it became clear that I had a large amount of willing interviewees, I let the Facebook analysis subside to the background. This was because I found it much more important to talk to people face to face than analyse content on a website. Next to that, I faced two problems with using Facebook. On a practical level, I could not always be sure that

---

the posts were from Afrikaners, as the Facebook groups are open to all South Africans and it is not always possible to tell by the name whether someone is Afrikaans, English, or another language speaker. On ethical grounds, I experienced major unease researching Facebook. Even though I was a member of the groups and had announced myself as a researcher, I felt highly uncomfortable using them as a source of data collection. For these reasons, though mostly because of the overwhelming amount of ‘live’ research participants, I only used the Facebook analysis for contextualisation and as a way of checking data that I had gathered through other methods, that is, for data triangulation.

Indeed, if I faced a challenge during this research, apart from the inherent difficulties in anthropological investigation faced by all ethnographers –limits to our absorption capacity, compassion fatigue and general exhaustion– it was the enormous amount of willing interviewees. It was hard for me to decline willing participants yet I had to due to time constraints. I found it extremely difficult to disappoint them, as I wanted to give as many people as possible the opportunity to share their story. I partly resolved this by talking to these people in an informal style as much and as long as possible at events. The reason why I had so many willing research participants lies, I believe, mostly in the various ways in which I ‘belonged’ to their group, although evidently I ultimately remained an outsider. I discuss this in more detail below.

Questions of belonging: being the insider/outside

Davies states that ‘all researchers are to some degree connected to, a part of, the object of their research’ (2008: 3, my emphasis). It is important to investigate this connection, or, how we are related to our research participants and their world, otherwise, as Bourdieu argues (1990), we will not be able to understand it. Indeed, as I have explained in the previous chapter, I somehow became a part of the Afrikaners during my 2011 fieldwork through the realisation of just how much we had in common. It is not just the fact that I, too, am a descendant of a previously colonising nation and that I, too, belong to the white, privileged classes of our current world. I originate from the same country or region as the first Afrikaners, namely the Netherlands, although I was born in Southern Africa, in Zambia, to
Dutch missionary doctors. Thus, my research participants and I shared a Dutch as well as an African history, a bond to which they frequently referred in our conversations. For instance, they would use sayings such as ‘We are stubborn Dutchmen’, stubbornness being a stereotype of the Dutch culture. Or, when talking about their deep love and longing for Africa, they would ask ‘How do you explain this to someone who has not lived there?’ since they assumed that I, having been born and partly raised there, felt the same—which I do.

Next to these commonalities, I also noticed the extent to which Afrikaner and Dutch cultures are similar. Notwithstanding the fact that the Netherlands is arguably the most liberal and progressive country in the world, the overarching Dutch culture remains squarely based on Calvinism. Furthermore, I was raised in the heart of the country’s so-called ‘Bible Belt’, a geographical area holding the highest concentration of conservative Calvinists. Although I left the (reformed) church when I turned 18—because I agree with Gandhi that God has no religion—being raised in this tradition has certainly helped me to understand the Afrikaners. Furthermore, although I did not agree with many aspects of the church services that I attended as part of my fieldwork, I have enjoyed them, not in the least because they reminded me of my childhood. Next to this similar cultural background, of course the languages, Dutch and Afrikaans, are very much alike as well. Language is deeply intertwined with culture (Kulick 2018), and for people to be able to express themselves in their own language is extremely valuable for any social research, let alone for anthropology. If we want to reach a deep understanding of people’s experiences, we need to speak their language, in order to grasp the meaning behind what is being said and how it is being said. In this respect it is regrettable that I had to translate my participants’ stories to English, though I have tried my best to retain the subtleness of the meaning in the translations.

What also enhanced a sense of belonging between me and my study participants was the fact that I had lived in South Africa. Usually, this was the first question participants would ask me. They also regularly referred to it in our conversations, saying things like ‘but you would know this, having lived in Pietersburg’. Additionally, our shared migration experience formed a bond. Interviewees often asked me, after sharing a certain post-migration experience, whether I had noticed or experienced the same. Since most Afrikaners felt that they had gone
through so many negative experiences in Australia, I am sure that they would not have shared these sentiments with me had I been Australian. I also seriously question whether they would have been interested in talking to me had I conducted my research in English, because many of them have a historical resentment towards the language and most participants preferred to speak Afrikaans in their leisure time.

Ultimately, of course, my migration experience is incomparable to that of the Afrikaners I worked with because I did not leave the Netherlands out of a sense of persecution. I have never experienced the feeling of not being welcome in my home country and I do not know what it feels like to believe that I cannot return. In this respect, Rosaldo (2014 [1984]) states that what the ethnographer can understand depends on their position, that is, our position is based on life experiences that can either enable or inhibit specific insights. Following this, I believe that what most specifically enabled me to understand my research participants’ fears, anxieties, sorrows and decisions was the shared experience of being a parent. As one interviewee stated: ‘From the moment you have children, the other half of your heart is with them’ (Jacqueline, interview, 2016, cf. Chapter 3). As previously explained, the Afrikaners’ main decision-making motive was their offspring, whom most profoundly provided their lives with meaning.

In conclusion, although ultimately my position with regards to the Afrikaners was that of an outsider, I believe that the above described factors helped me to gain an emic perspective to a considerable extent, what Starn calls that of a ‘halfie’ (2015: 7). Frankl (2008 [1946]: 20) maintained that the true insider is not detached enough to make scientific analyses of their own situation, although his ground-breaking work was based on his personal experiences as a prisoner in Nazi concentration camps. Simultaneously, however, he contended that the outsider ‘is too far removed to make any statements of real value’ (ibid). The solution for himself, the insider, Frankl argued, was to try and avoid any personal bias. This is what we ethnographers, as outsiders, also attempt, but then from the other side. Yet, trying to be completely neutral is impossible, since we all have our own frame of reference based on unique life experiences, unique relationships of belonging (Girard 2016) and, above all, an independent mind. This framework determines how we view the world. Thus, the only thing
that can bridge the somewhat disheartening fact that ultimately ‘only the man inside knows’ (Frankl 2008 [1946]: 20) and the ethnographer’s task to construct theories based on people’s subjective experiences, is empathy – as elaborated in the previous chapter. That is, if the researcher, in this case me, cannot understand a certain feeling due to a lack of experience – for example, being a South African who feels persecuted – the only thing she can do is try to put herself in their shoes, that is, try to feel the world as her research participants feel it. I have taken this effort seriously, as I hope my empirical chapters will demonstrate. Before we can turn to those, I must now, finally, explain a number of crucial concepts.

**Terminology: clarification of concepts & terms**

In the previous chapter I have discussed the key theoretical concepts that I work with in this thesis. However, six more frequently used terms need explanation. The first three of these are practical, namely how I refer to the Afrikaners who participated in this research, my choice for pseudonyms, and why I use the terms ‘immigration’ and ‘emigration’. The latter three are more related to theory, as they concern my use of the terms ‘diaspora’, ‘Australians’ and ‘Afrikaners’. To start with the former set, firstly, throughout this thesis I refer to the Afrikaners who I worked with as my ‘research participants’, ‘study participants’, ‘participants’ or ‘interviewees’. Although I am aware of the tendency among contemporary social scientists to speak of ‘interlocutors’ when referring to research participants, I choose to maintain the term ‘interviewees’ because I agree with Beuving and de Vries (2015) that the relationship between researcher and interviewee/informant is not an equal, that is, a reciprocal one. As these authors explain, ‘[the term interlocutor] disregards that we as researchers want to find out about society, and not the other way around’ (2015: 45). Indeed, although I have laughed and cried with my participants and shared a lot of myself in the research process, they were doing the story telling and I who was doing the listening. Next to this, I also sometimes refer to my research participants as ‘the Afrikaners’. In doing so, I only refer to those Afrikaners who have participated in my research and not to all Afrikaners in Australia, South Africa or in the world at large.
Secondly, I have chosen to give my research participants pseudonyms, also against the tendency of doing so since, in Scheper-Hughes’ words, it ‘fools few and protects no one … – save, perhaps, the anthropologist’s own skin’ (2000: 128). I have changed my participants’ names for the simple reason that I have promised them anonymity. As previously discussed, most of them live in Adelaide and the information in this thesis is of a personal and sometimes sensitive nature. Since there are relatively few Afrikaner names, I have chosen Dutch names as pseudonyms to prevent Afrikaner people in Australia from being identified by mistake. Dutch and Afrikaans names are relatively similar. In an attempt to fool many and protect all, I have also omitted specific dates and places when quoting my research participants. In the third place, I am also going against the grain with the use of the terms ‘emigration’ and ‘immigration’ rather than ‘migration’. Although I am conscious of the fact that most academics currently prefer the latter (see, most notably, Glick-Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton 1995), I deliberately work with the former because my study participants did. ‘Emigration’ and ‘immigration’ also indicate that the Afrikaners have left their country with the intention to permanently settle in a foreign nation (OED, my emphasis). Thus, these concepts are more suitable than ‘migration’ or ‘migrant’ because the latter merely indicate a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence (Lee 1966).

Related to this, I also use the term ‘émigrés’ in referring to the Afrikaners I worked with. This is because this term, which has its roots in the French Revolution, denotes exactly what my research participants felt they were, namely persons ‘who [have] left their own country in order to settle in another, typically for political reasons’ (OED). Indeed, this is what also makes the Afrikaners a ‘diaspora’ in the classical sense of the term. Although it is currently attributed to many migrant groups (see Berg & Eckstein 2009; Daswani 2013; Pries 2013; Tölölyan 1991) and often conflated with the fashionable label ‘transnational community’ (Ong 2003), in its classical meaning the diaspora concept refers only to those migrant groups that disperse due to a perceived or actual threat to its survival (Du Toit 2003; Tölölyan 1996). The departure is

---

8 The term originates from the Greek diaspeirein, meaning ‘a fruitful scattering away of seeds’ (Du Toit 2003: 16) and originally only referred to the Jewish, Greek and Armenian dispersal (Tölölyan 1991).
therefore associated with catastrophe and the dispersed people are traumatised, which causes the work of memory and a nostalgic longing for the past, commemoration, and mourning to become central in the diasporic community (Daswani 2013; Tölöyan 2007). Associated with this is an acknowledgement of personal and collective sacrifice, in the present or from previous generations, that is, ‘feeling coerced to give something up or to be away from the place one yearns to be’ (Daswani 2013: 46). Furthermore, the threat to and/or quest for survival and subsequent dispersal represents a common thread in the history of the people concerned (Clifford 1994; Tölöyan) and is accompanied by the so-called ‘myth of return’, that is, the idea of eventually returning home, even though at a deeper level it is known that in reality, this will not happen (Clifford 1994; Daswani 2013; Tölöyan 1996; 2007). Next to that, diasporas are said to have a collective identity that is built up of myths and memories of and defined by the ongoing relationship with the homeland (Clifford 1994; Tölöyan 1996; 2007). Also, they occupy a marginal position in both the home, and host country (Du Toit 2003), and tend to retain a myth of their uniqueness (Gonzalez 1992; cf. Kearny 1995). Last but not least, they have ‘collective homes away from home’ (Clifford 1994: 302), in the sense that they build strong diasporic communities.

**An Afrikaner diaspora in Australia**

Although I have not used the diaspora concept as my main theoretical framework, I would classify the Afrikaners who I engaged with as a diaspora group since it is evident that ‘diaspora’, in its classical sense, is concerned with a deep loss of belonging. An analysis of my study participants’ stories following the above characteristics demonstrates clearly that they constitute a diaspora and not a ‘transnational migrant’ group – ‘transnational’ referring to having a sense of belonging to two or more nations (Faist, Fauser & Reisenauer 2013; Glick-Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton 1992; Vertovec 2009; Wulfforst, Rocha & Morgan 2014). The great majority of interviewees, regardless of their length of stay in Australia, only had a sense of belonging to South Africa, albeit to a South Africa that does not exist anymore (pre-1994). As stated in Chapter 1, and as I will demonstrate in the empirical chapters, they left their home country due to a perceived threat to their survival indeed. I would also argue that they are traumatised, if we define trauma as an overwhelming experience that resists integration.
and expression (Caruth 1996), and thereby causes chronic grief. Next to this, they have a history of migration or treks as well, as we have seen in the previous chapter. Because of this, Giliomee (1979: 60) refers to the Afrikaners’ pain as a continuous ‘struggle for the preservation of [their] identity’. Additionally, there is a sense of sacrifice, since most interviewees were in Australia for their children. However, I do not believe that they themselves were aware that this is a collective meaning-making experience, as I will explain throughout the thesis.

Furthermore, most if not all interviewees held on to a so-called myth of return, as they generally stated that they would go back to live in South Africa ‘if things will change’, with which they meant: if a new government would come to power, one that would not be dominated by the African National Congress (ANC), the country’s ruling party since 1994. However, most participants felt in their hearts that this was a myth indeed and foresaw that ‘things in South Africa will first get much worse before they will get better’. Also, part of their identity is certainly a collective part, that is, they had a shared sense of loss of belonging both relating to South Africa and to Australia, and they also described their culture in very similar ways, a culture which they, indeed, found to be unique. Next to this, numerically, they do hold a marginal position in both their home and host country, even though socio-economically, they certainly do not. Yet, as I argue in this thesis, the felt reality is the lived reality, and the Afrikaners I worked with absolutely felt economically marginalised in both South Africa and Australia. Finally, my research demonstrates that the only aspect of diaspora communities that does not apply to the Afrikaners in Australia, is the existence of a cohesive diasporic community. In fact, as referred to before, I have observed a relative incoherent group. Rather, the study participants formed small sub-groups, which I will discuss in Chapter 7. Although the Afrikaanse Club Australia on their website claims to be ‘Your family, away from your family’,9 I have not met any Afrikaners that were members of this Club or felt that the Afrikaner community in Australia was a strong, close-knit group. Thus, I would argue that they found each other on a clan-level, but not as a tribe. In general, my study participants were anything but tribal, in the sense that they did not care too much about the future of the

---

9 ‘Jou familie, weg van jou familie’ in Afrikaans, see http://afrikaans.org.au/.
Afrikaner volk. They cared, to a certain extent, and some more than others, but overall they cared much more about their direct family members, most notably their children. Also, they never referred to themselves as a diaspora, though this could be because the term is more used in academia than in public life. In the following section I discuss how they did refer to themselves.

Afrikaner vs. Afrikaans: breaking relationships of belonging?

In South Africa, the use of the term ‘Afrikaners’ as well as what it means and who it includes is continuously debated (Blaser 2004; Boersema 2013; Giliomee 2010, 2011; Goodwin & Schiff 1995; van der Merwe 2009, 2010). It appears that there is a group of Afrikaners who no longer want to be associated with the apartheid regime and, therefore, refer to themselves as being ‘Afrikaans’ instead (see Vanderhaeghen 2018). Initially, I thought that my research participants generally subscribed to this new term. However, after having been longer in the field and having asked more participants about their feelings regarding this issue, it became clear that the great majority principally still referred to themselves as ‘Afrikaner’ and to their volk as ‘Afrikaners’. There were three notable exceptions in this regard, interviewees who explained that it made them uncomfortable to be referred to as ‘Afrikaner’ because of that word’s association with the past. “‘Afrikaner’ is Eugène Terre’Blance,’ Joost, for example, told me, “‘Afrikaans’ is an Afrikaans-speaking South African, a person of Dutch descent who has lived in South Africa for three hundred years’ (Interview, 2015). With this, Joost meant that he did not want to be associated with those ‘Afrikaners’ such as Eugène Terre’Blance, a former white supremacist and leader of the ultra-right Afrikaner Resistance Movement. On the other hand, most participants felt that their fellow émigrés should not make an issue of this and agreed with Katrien that ‘You’re an Afrikaner, man, just get over it!’ (Casual conversation, 2016).

Indeed, most interviewees had no problem with the term ‘Afrikaner’ and many of them were surprised that I even asked the question. Yet, they nearly always referred to themselves as Suid Afrikaners (South Africans), and not as ‘Afrikaners’. However, in speaking about Suid Afrikaners, they only referred to their own cultural group and not to the at least eleven other
I believe this happened largely subconsciously. Similarly, when they spoke about ‘Australians’, they referred only to Australian-born citizens with white skin of Anglo-Saxon descent. In Australia’s case, this may be unsurprising, since, despite considerable immigration, at the turn of the twentieth century Anglo-Saxon Australians still comprised seventy percent of the country’s total population (Price 2000). As such, they represent the dominant or ‘mainstream’ Australian culture, as other authors on Australian culture and migration have also noted (see Hage 2000; Stratton 2011; Zevallos 2005). Thus, it could be that the Afrikaners did this subconsciously, or it could be a sign of white privilege, in the sense that they focused, in both cases, only on their own, that is, white group –because for them, this represented the norm. Yet, our conversations were always about their group specifically, so they may also have simply taken this for granted. I shall now conclude this chapter with a final note concerning the story that I tell in this thesis.

**In conclusion**

As the discussion regarding ‘Afrikaner’ vs. ‘Afrikaans’ demonstrates, the Afrikaner émigrés whom I worked with were not a homogeneous group. I found diversity in many respects, as I would have done in any group, since ‘few individuals are “typical” representatives of their group’ (Eriksen 2017: 162). There was, for example, Dirk, who had never really felt he was an Afrikaner, and Simone, who only came to understand that she belonged to the Afrikaner group when other people had perceived her as such. Also, Bernardien, for instance, told me that she was not an ‘Afrikaner-Afrikaner’, with which she meant a conservative apartheid supporter, since her parents had been ‘very liberal and had always opposed apartheid’ (Interview, 2016). On the other hand, there was also Rianne, who completely identified with Afrikaner stereotypes in explaining to me that ‘This is how we are, us Afrikaners. We are farmers, we are trekkers (migrants), we are rebels (dwarstrekkers), we are proud and independent’ (Interview, 2016). Apart from these differences, there was also variation in other respects, those associated with upbringing, age, gender and class for example. However, the story of loss of belonging was a common thread in nearly all of my research

---

10 Which include the Zulu, Xhosa, Venda, Sotho, Ndebele, Tswana, Pedi, Tsonga, Swazi, Khoisan and Anglo-South African groups.
participants’ narratives. This was despite the fact that most of them stated, at the beginning of interviews, that I would probably hear ‘so many different stories’ and that their fellow Afrikaner émigrés would have had ‘so many different reasons for leaving South Africa’ and such ‘different experiences in Australia’. As a matter of fact, I did not. Their narratives were, in essence, surprisingly similar.

Ultimately, of course, the story presented in this thesis is, necessarily, my interpretation of their story. As Eriksen explains:

... no matter how outstanding an anthropologist is, as a fieldworker, as a writer and as an analyst, the text always represents a selection, and it will always to a greater or lesser extent be marked by the subjectivity of the translator.

(2017: 32)11

Indeed, ethnography, in its literal sense, means ‘writing about people’. Thus, we do not theorise based on our own experience –except in autoethnography– but rather on our participation in and observation of our informants’ experience, as previously discussed (see Frankl 2008 [1946]). Yet, I have attempted to engage in a process that Clifford (2007: 486) describes as a ‘constructive negotiation involving at least two, and usually more, conscious, politically significant subjects.’ That is, I have attempted to construct this thesis in cooperation with my research participants, in the sense that I have continuously checked with them whether I understood their stories correctly with the aim of this analysis becoming more than an interpretation. Thus, I hope that those interviewees who may read it will feel that, indeed, it reflects the ‘Deep Story’ of the Afrikaner diaspora in Australia, to reiterate Hochschild’s term (2016), although they may not feel that all aspects of my analysis apply to them personally. Let us now, then, turn to that story. It begins with the felt loss of economic belonging, which is the topic of the next chapter.

---

Chapter 3  ‘No country for white men’:  
In search of economic belonging

Introduction

This chapter addresses the Afrikaners’ attempt to recreate their lost sense of economic belonging in South Africa by moving to Australia. It is divided into two parts. The first part demonstrates that the research participants felt that they, and, most of all, their children, did not have a future in their home country because of affirmative action policies that, in their perception, excluded them from having full access to economic opportunities. This is their ‘Deep Story’, that is, as we have seen, a story that feels as if it is true (Hochschild 2016), because my analysis further demonstrates that, in reality, they were not seriously affected by South African redress policies and that, as a group, Afrikaners are not economically excluded in South Africa. Nevertheless, as previously explained, we generally believe that our own perception of reality is its only true version and, as such, believe the stories we create about whom and what we belong to and to whom and what we do not. In this case, the Afrikaners’ belief in the threat of affirmative action, most of all in the threat that it posed to their children’s future livelihood, led them to leave their country.

In the second part of the chapter, I demonstrate that through their resettlement in Australia they were able to free themselves from this threat and restore a sense of economic belonging for their children. However, my analysis subsequently shows that the research participants were unable to do the latter for themselves. In Australia, they felt economically excluded as well. This time, they felt that they were being discriminated against for being immigrants. Although the reasons are difficult to investigate, the facts, as they were narrated to me by my interviewees, were that many of them only found employment after an average of two years, and often at a lower skills level or in an entirely different sector. Overall, this meant that they
lost their career and, for a large part, their wealth. This, in turn, signified a major loss of self-esteem. Ultimately, however, in conclusion of this chapter I argue that the Afrikaners coped well with these losses because they had given them meaning. By viewing their own losses as sacrifices they had made for their children, they were able to accept them.

Before I discuss the ethnographic data on which these arguments are based, let me first discuss the concept of economic belonging in more detail. As we have seen in Chapter 1, in this thesis, I use ‘belonging’ in the sense of ‘belonging to’, that is, referring to ‘being a member of’ or ‘being included in’ (OED). Economic belonging, then, refers to being a member of an economic community, and, in this case, to membership through formal education or formal employment. That is, we are all part of economic communities, also when we work at home (raising families), in the informal economy, or when we are supported by the government through welfare programs. However, the felt loss of economic belonging that the Afrikaners narrated referred to formal membership, and at the national level. That is, they felt excluded from the economic community that South Africa represents, and, to a lesser extent and in a different respect, from Australia’s economic community, too. Belonging to an economic community is crucial for our survival, because, in its simplest form, it ensures our access to food and water (Maslow 1943; 1970), which means that we are economically secure (Doyal & Gough 1991; cf. Guillen-Royo, Velazco & Camfield 2013; Hoffman 2011; Tay & Diener 2011; Thielke et al. 2012; Yawson, Armah & Pappoe 2009; Zalenski & Raspa 2006) and do not suffer from poverty (Galtung & Wirak 1977). More specifically, then, I define economic belonging as the possibility and ability to create a decent living for oneself and for one’s family through formal education and employment.

Since economic belonging is so crucial for our survival, it is evident that exclusion from an economic community is one of the most threatening phenomena in this world.¹ Because what

---

¹ On a global level, it is, of course, the people within the symbolic ‘global south’ or so-called developing countries who are excluded from the global economy and, as such, suffer from this very real threat on a daily basis; that is, they are actually living in poverty and struggling to survive (Appadurai 1996; Ferguson 2005; Inda & Rosaldo 2008; cf. Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005; Jackson 2002; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2016; Sachs 2005).
it means to be economically excluded, ultimately, is to lack food and water, which results in death. Thus, underlying the fear of the loss of economic belonging lies a fear of death. Indeed, Becker (1973), most notably, argued that all human behaviour is, at the deepest psychological level, motivated by a fear of death. Although I would rather argue that we are driven by an intrinsic will to live (conation), I certainly contend that, essentially and subconsciously, the Afrikaners were in search of survival. However, as previously stated, this chapter makes clear that they were driven by a fear of the loss of economic belonging and not by its actual loss. Yet, their fear was real, and people generally react similarly to a threat to basic needs satisfaction as to their actual loss. That is, both provoke the ‘emergency response’ (Maslow 1943), precisely because these needs are so fundamental. Seen in this light, the story of the Afrikaners’ loss of economic belonging in South Africa, as well as that of their economic post-settlement experiences, becomes understandable. Let me now discuss that story.

South Africa: ‘No future for white sons’

Apart from two interviewees, all research participants had a strong perception that, as white South Africans and as Afrikaners in particular, they did not have a future in their home country due to affirmative action policies. Affirmative action in the South African context refers to an amalgam of policies in different sectors of society aimed at redressing the inequalities resulting from apartheid by giving preference to those population groups that the system oppressed. That is, it aims to ‘affirm’ those people that were collectively labelled as ‘black’ during the apartheid years. The main legal frameworks for the implementation of affirmative action are the 1998 Employment Equity Act (EEA) and the 2003 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BB-BEE, henceforth referred to here as BEE), with their subsequent amendments (Archibong 2013; Mbeki 2009). Both frameworks enacted laws aimed at achieving demographic representation in the workplace, with BEE specifically designed for the private sector. Given the nature and aim of affirmative action, the Afrikaners, as white South Africans, felt disadvantaged by them. The fear of the threat that these policies pose was felt more strongly, indeed in first instance, with regard to their children’s livelihoods. In this sense, it was an anticipated threat that their children would not be able to provide for themselves as adults. This reminds us of Heidegger’s (1962) assertion that fear is always
essentially concerned with the future, as it involves an anticipation of hurt or injury. However, it affected the research participants in the present, as it produced high levels of stress and anxiety.

In the vision of most Afrikaners I engaged with, affirmative action ensured that their children lacked equal chances to access education and employment in South Africa because they had white skin. It was further felt that, if the children would be able to attain suitable employment, they would always be in an insecure position due to the ongoing threat of retrenchment as part of economic redress policies. Most interviewees specifically referred to their sons, because, as apartheid’s prime beneficiaries, white males were considered to be affirmative action’s prime victims. Bert, for example, stated: ‘My sons don’t have a future in South Africa. Even if they would obtain a doctoral degree, they won’t get a job. Because they are white and they are men’ (Interview, 2016). Another participant, Marieke, explained in more detail:

... I have two sons. They are white sons. With the affirmative actions in South Africa it’s going to be absolutely difficult for a white young man to study and to get a profession. [With the] affirmative action, I think now, at universities, it’s 70 per cent is being given to black students, and the other 30 per cent is being divided between your other previously disadvantaged, so your Indians, your coloureds, your Chinese, your Asians, [all] are being advantaged even before a white South African, then your white woman, and then the white boy. So this is, he will be the very last. And even if his points [performance] are the best, first all the other students will get a place at university.

(Interview, 2015)

Like Marieke, most interviewees believed that South African universities were applying racial quotas to ensure demographically representative student intakes. They viewed this and other forms of affirmative action as ‘reverse discrimination’, often calling them ‘racist policies’, which other authors have also noted (see, most recently, Vanderhaeghen 2018).² Yet, initially they had not opposed the policies, since they thought that some forms of redress were indeed

² Afrikaners, or perhaps all white South Africans who feel this way, are herein not alone. The same resentment against affirmative action can be witnessed in Australia (Augoustinos, Tuffin & Every 2005; Mellor 2012), in the USA (Hochschild 2016; Pincus 2000, 2003) and in the world at large (Garner 2007).
necessary after apartheid. However, what angered and frightened the Afrikaners was the fact that the policies were continuing without any prospect of closure and that they were affecting their children, who were mostly born after 1994. In their view, this was incredibly unfair, as Stein’s statement demonstrates:

At some point I realised there’s never going to be a sunset clause [to affirmative action], and if that is the case, and our children want to follow professional careers or become medical doctors or whatever the case may be, why should there be a limitation on them, who have had no influence whatsoever on the political arrangements of the past, to be penalised for those injustices of the previous generations? The concept of BEE and affirmative action, I don't have a personal problem with it … The problem I have is, when do you take that driver away, to say that people now need to normalise on a social basis or on a non-cultural basis, purely for the sake of merit. You know, when is that balance achieved? … Purely for me, I still crossed over from being a beneficiary to someone that was at the pointy end of restitution. So I could say: ‘Yes, personally, I can accept that, because I benefited from opportunities etcetera.’ But now, my children didn’t have anything to do with this! It becomes more difficult to convince yourself that your children should pay for the sins of their fathers.

(Interview, 2016)

Many participants used this Biblical reference, that children should not pay for their father’s sins (see, for example, Jeremiah 31: 29-34 or Ezekiel 18: 19), when discussing their frustration and anger about their children perceivably being discriminated against in post-apartheid South Africa. The fundamental importance of their offspring formed a major theme throughout all their stories, as referred to previously. Jacqueline’s feelings are exemplary in this respect:

And when you have a child, it’s not just about you anymore, your whole perspective changes. … You look to the future, you don’t just look at the present. If you cannot see a future for your child, no parent shall ever choose for his child to suffer, so this is not a question. For you, this is an easy decision: I cannot be here [in South Africa], because I cannot bring my child up here. I will die in twenty, thirty years, but my child still has sixty years to go. How will their lives be?

(Interview, 2016)

Jacqueline was one of many interviewees who felt that her son had no future in South Africa because, in her view, he would be economically excluded. Although the threat of exclusion

---

was felt most strongly for their children, many male participants saw job loss as a very real personal threat too. For some it had become a reality, as the next section shows.

Affirmative action: ‘Paying for the sins of the fathers’

Out of the 74 Afrikaners who participated in this research through interviews, six people had been directly affected by affirmative action. These were all male, although in two cases it concerned the husband of the interviewee. The husbands had both been in their mid-career when they were retrenched due to economic redress policies. They did find other jobs, but these were far away from home and came with a lower salary and as a result, the whole family suffered. One of the wives stated that as a consequence:

... we [became] impoverished, to... where we were poorer middle-class. Whereas I was used to, we had been going on holiday twice a year, we would go away for the long weekends, and then [after he lost his job] we would go on holiday maybe once a year, because you couldn’t, financially, the costs of living was just ... it was extremely expensive just to be able to continue to live.

(Marieke, interview, 2015)

The third ‘victim’ of affirmative action was also above 40 years of age when he was retrenched to make room for previously disadvantaged South Africans. In two other cases it concerned young men at the start of their career. Jaap could not get a training place upon graduation (in the medical sciences). He was literally told that he would not get a place because of his skin colour, and recounted that no white student from his university had ever attained a placement since 1998. ‘It’s just the way it is’, he said. ‘The affirmative action policies do not have an end-date, in fact, they only seem to be putting more into place; it’s becoming firmer’ (Interview, 2016). Mark, the second young man who had to ‘pay for his father’s sins’, was born in 1981 and thus 13 years old when apartheid ended. ‘But then people like me,’ he said, ‘that don’t have anything to do with that [apartheid], ... now I am being punished for this’ (Interview, 2016). Mark was confronted with affirmative action when he was unable to advance his career at one of the large mining companies operating in South Africa. He had had a scholarship from this company during his studies and afterwards he was supposed to be recruited as a mining captain. However:
... they struggled to appoint me in that position ... because I was white. I had black managers and they told me to my face that they were struggling to appoint me because I am white. And, at the end of the day, the only way in which they managed to appoint me was, they appointed a black person as well [for the same position], but he didn’t do anything, he sat in the office, he didn’t have any responsibility, he earned a good salary, but, this was the only way to appoint me: they had to appoint a black person too. Purely because of the fact that I was white, no other reason. ... This is part of the Black Economic Empowerment. Part of this was that a certain percentage of your senior management had to be black ...  

(Interview, 2016)

This experience was very disheartening for Mark. He continued to say that he had felt dispirited for a long time before he and his wife finally made the choice to move away from South Africa. As he explained:

I enjoyed my work. I worked very hard, long hours, and we had a good life, but I just saw that, how old was I at that stage, twenty-seven, and I just saw that for me, it was going to be very hard to advance my career as a consequence of apartheid. ... I’m going to compete with ten, twenty blacks, and they are simply going to exclude me.

Lastly, one interviewee, Daan, had had his own recruitment company. He was affected by redress policies in the sense that he felt he could not comply with BEE legislation. According to BEE policies, he had to recruit a representative percentage of employees from all the main cultural groups in South Africa. However, Daan stated that he was unable to find enough qualified people from each of these groups. As a consequence, he could not attract enough assignments.

Despite the fact that only a small percentage of research participants had had a real life experience with affirmative action, the fear of its threat was enormous, as referred to in the introduction. Indeed, nearly all interviewees were convinced that if you lose your job as a white man above 40 years of age, your chances of getting new work are zero. And, in their perception, this causes a life-threatening situation, since, as many interviewees explained to me, at that stage of their lives (mid-career) they will have children in high school and/or at university, and will no longer be able to support them. This means that the entire family will get into financial difficulties and, in the worst-case scenario, ‘end up in a white squatter camp.’ This last remark refers to the post-1994 phenomenon of slums for poor white South
Africans, mostly Afrikaners—ina contrast to those that have always existed for poor black South Africans—as an indicator of their impoverishment, amongst others as a consequence of affirmative action (see, for example, Boersema 2013; de Vries 2013; Yates 2014). In sum, what the *fear* of the threat of affirmative action caused among the Afrikaners was a deep sense of insecurity about their current and future livelihoods. They were confronted with this perceived precariousness of existence on a daily basis, which caused great levels of stress and anxiety, thereby having a deleterious effect on the quality of their lives. As the next section will demonstrate, affirmative action policies thus made them *feel* excluded from South African society in an economic sense.

**The ‘Deep Story’ and its performative power**

Next to the fact that only six research participants had actually been affected by post-apartheid economic redress policies, their children had had no experience with them at all. This was because most of them had been too young of age when they left South Africa, or they had not been born yet. However, when I asked interviewees about their relatives in South Africa, including nieces and nephews, all but two stated that these were able to study what they wanted and secure jobs, although some were self-employed in response to affirmative action policies. Furthermore, only two interviewees had older family members, namely a brother and a brother-in-law, who had been negatively affected by affirmative action. From this, it can be concluded that the fear of these policies was much greater than the actual reality. Secondary data supports these findings. In general, white South Africans have largely maintained their economic power since 1994 (Baines 2013; Kynoch 2013; Scheper-Hughes 2014). Due to a lack of statistics, it is impossible to say whether Afrikaners are performing better or worse than Anglo-South Africans in this respect, but together, white South Africans remain privileged in South Africa, although less privileged than before 1994 (Allanson & Atkins 2005; Erasmus 2015; Morrell 2002; Statistics South Africa 2016; van Wyk 2014). As a group, they continue to have the lowest unemployment figure and this has actually *decreased* in the middle and upper middle classes in recent years (SSA 2016). Of all

---

4 It is important to note that there were also two interviewees who explicitly stated that they did not believe that white South Africans, including Afrikaners, were discriminated against in South Africa.
population groups, white men have the lowest unemployment figure, 1.1 per cent at the time of research (in comparison, for black men this figure is 35.3 %) (ibid), and white women have actually been included as beneficiaries of affirmative action since 2008, because the policies are also aimed at redressing existing gender imbalances (Archibong 2013).

The overall effect of affirmative action policies for white South Africans has been that it has slowed down the growth of its middle class. It is not growing as fast as the black middle class, but it is still growing (Erasmus 2015). Next to that, although since 1994 gaining access to jobs has become more difficult for young white men, especially for Afrikaans-speaking men from the lower classes, it is still easier for them than for young black men (Morrell 2002). Lastly, contrary to the Afrikaners’ perception, universities in South Africa do not make use of rigid quota systems (BusinessTech 2016; De Vos 2013; Jones, M 2011). Many universities choose to use stricter admission policies to redress their unequal racial make-up and to better reflect South African society (Jones, M 2011); however, all applicants have to meet minimum criteria for admission (BusinessTech 2016). Furthermore, next to those that do, there are also universities that do not use race as a proxy for disadvantage and thus as a criterion for admission (Jones, M 2011). This implies that research participants had the option to choose a university where their children would have an equal opportunity of being accepted. Thus, it appears that they either did not believe this to be true or they only wanted their children to attend certain universities.

From this we can conclude that, rather than their economic belonging, the interviewees had lost their sense of economic belonging. That is, neither they nor their children were economically excluded in their home country. In reality, what happened after 1994 was that Afrikaners were no longer competing on the labour market with 4 million white South Africans, but with 54 million South Africans. Before that time, privilege, and above all economic privilege, had been normal, that is, familiar for Afrikaners. It was the primary object through which they understood their world and that made their lives predictable (Griffiths &

---

5 The latest exact estimate of South Africa’s total population is 57,725,600, of which 4,520,100 (7.8 %) is classified as white (SSA 2018) –no distinction is made between Afrikaans- and English-speaking white South Africans.
Prozesky 2010), consciously or subconsciously. The democratic transition radically changed that. What the Afrikaners experienced instead, economic equality, was unfamiliar to them. Furthermore, on top of equal access, they experienced economic redress policies as measures that actively excluded their group from economic opportunities (cf. Wasserman 2016).

Factually, as we have seen, the effects of affirmative action in South Africa have been rather limited (Archibong 2013; Roberts 2010; cf. Sowell 2004). However, facts are only relevant to people in as far as they are part of people’s personal experience (Frankl 2008 [1946]). We incorporate facts into our lives in such a way that they make sense to us, thus interpreting them in a manner that reflects how we believe they relate to us. Hence, in Nietzsche’s famous words, ‘facts do not exist, only interpretations’ (Kaufmann & Nietzsche 1954: 458, original emphasis). The great majority of study participants interpreted affirmative action as the prime fact that negatively changed their lives in South Africa. It became the main object of threat, most notably the threat that their children would not be able to belong, economically, to their country. They also felt this to be incredibly unfair, as the story that feelings tell removes judgement (Hochschild 2016). Thus, the story that, to the Afrikaners, felt as if it was true, was that their children did not have a future in South Africa because they were being discriminated against.

Unfairness and injustice make us feel anxious and unsafe, not because of the injustice per se but rather because ‘this treatment threatens to make the world look unreliable, or unsafe, or unpredictable’ (Maslow 1943: 377). Indeed, this research shows that affirmative action seriously threatened the predictability of the Afrikaners’ lives. Regardless of what statistics suggest about the effectiveness of South Africa’s economic redress policies, for the research participants, the idea of not knowing whether they would lose their job or whether their children would be able to secure a future for themselves, and the constant threat of these fears becoming a reality, was highly distressing for them. As I have explained in Chapter 1, for people not to suffer they need predictability (Bowlby 1980; Davies 2012; Davis 1992; Dewey

---

6 They did not consider the serious impact of South Africa’s post-apartheid embracement of neoliberal capitalism in terms of creating major divisions between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ (Boersema 2013; cf. Jackson 2002).
2007 [1922]; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maslow 1943). Thus, underneath the felt loss of economic belonging lay a profound loss of feeling safe. The interviewees no longer felt psychologically safe in South Africa, as also argued by Griffiths and Prozesky (2010).

Finally, as discussed in the introduction, the fear of losing a fundamental need provokes a similar reaction to its actual loss (Maslow 1943). Arguably, a threat to our basic needs causes us to become obsessed with our efforts to preserve or restore this imminent loss. The Afrikaners who participated in this research saw no hope of preserving or restoring this in their homeland, and thus they decided to try and recreate it by moving to another country. However, as previously outlined, this was not entirely successful. In fact, most participants sustained considerable losses in an economic respect in Australia. Yet, they did manage to restore their sense of security with regards to their children’s economic future. This made their own losses supremely meaningful, as I will now further discuss in the second part of this chapter.

**Australia: ‘No land of milk and honey’**

In Australia too, most research participants felt economically excluded, although to a lesser extent than in South Africa. By moving to Australia they had freed themselves from the fear of the threat of affirmative action, especially with regards to their children. However, in their new country they felt that they were subjected to a phenomenon which Hage calls ‘anti-immigrant racism’ (2014: 233). For the great majority of interviewees this meant that they were unable to attain employment straight away, that they had to accept jobs at a lower-skilled level, or that they had to change careers altogether. This echoes conclusions reached by Wasserman (2016) based on her study of South African migrants in Australia. Some study participants were unemployed for years. Once employed, they further experienced that they could not advance their careers easily. Overall, for most interviewees the emigration meant a significant loss of career, wealth, and, as a consequence, of self-esteem. In the following section, I first look at those interviewees who had not found work at the time of research.
‘Nobody gives it the time of day’: grief over unemployment

Those Afrikaner émigrés who had not gained employment still had a livelihood through the employment of their partners. Yet, the fact that they, themselves, did not have work made them feel depressed to varying degrees. Janus, for example, found that for both his career and for his family’s financial situation, the emigration had been a bad decision (Interview, 2015). He immigrated with his wife and two young children in 2008 and had moved four times within Australia following his wife’s work. In order to carry out his profession in the public sector, Janus had to have Australian citizenship and repeat three years of his professional qualifications. Since his wife could make a career in Australia with her profession in the medical field, they decided to focus on her work. Janus’ job was to take care of their children, and in the meantime he took up new studies. However, he became very lonely. As he recalled his feelings in the first years after immigration, he said that it was ‘extremely hard to sit at home with two young children in a country where you don’t know anyone… I became very depressed’ (Casual conversation, 2015). At the time of my research, Janus was still not feeling well. He did not have many social contacts and I had a strong impression that I was the only person with whom he met on a regular basis. More than once he mentioned that, while he had an outgoing personality and had always been the life of the party in South Africa, after the emigration he had become increasingly withdrawn and subdued.

What Janus’ example shows is that grief can change someone’s personality (cf. Jones, S & Beck 2006-2007). Next to that, it demonstrates that unresolved grief leads to depression (Bradbury 2001; Davies 2012; cf. Freud 1917; Shand 1920) or, as Marris called it, chronic grief (2015 [1986]: my emphasis). In Janus’ case, it was not only the loss of his job that made him feel dejected. It was a combination or accumulation of many losses, such as the loss of his family and friends. Since the work environment usually enables us to meet new people, unemployment makes it harder to build new relationships of interpersonal belonging. This is one of the losses associated with job loss, also theorised as ‘secondary losses’ (see Doka 2002; Fagin & Little 1984). These secondary losses can thus, as demonstrated here, contribute to depression. This was also the case for Diana, who moved to Australia in 2010 and had, at the time of our interview, still not found employment. She told me that she had applied for
‘hundreds of jobs’, not only in her own professional field but for many other different types of employment as well. Eventually, she applied for unskilled work, precisely because she yearned for social contacts. In her own words:

   But you know, Hanna, I’ve applied in desperation, not even because of the money but because of getting out and meeting people, at the little shopping centre up here [close to her home], for a cleaner’s job!

(I Interview, 2016, English original)

Diana was unsuccessful in her application for the cleaner’s job because, according to the employer in question, she was ‘overqualified’. However, the jobs that she applied for at her own skills-level also failed. Overall, the job-seeking process was ‘so, so destroying,’ Diana stated, ‘because I’ve got the qualifications, I’ve got the experience, you know, and nobody gives it the time of day.’

Long-term unemployment and multiple rejections in response to job applications had a devastating effect on other study participants as well. One interviewee had come to feel particularly depressed, angry and bitter. Adriaan had immigrated with his wife in 2009 and had not been able to find work since. ‘I was prepared to go back in career five or even ten years,’ he stated, ‘but I hadn’t expected it to come to a complete halt’ (Interview, 2016). His wife, whom I interviewed separately and saw regularly in a casual setting, also felt extremely miserable due to the situation. Although she had a job herself, she said that Adriaan’s unemployment put a lot of pressure on everything for her. ‘Where we hardly ever fought, now we’re fighting every day, about simple things’ (Laura, interview, 2015). This made Laura doubt their emigration decision. ‘I wonder whether we should have come at all or whether we should return to South Africa,’ she said, ‘because to me, it seems better to feel happy for a short while there, than to sit here in absolute misery all the time.’ With the remark that they could be ‘happy for a short while’ in South Africa, Laura meant that she thought that South Africa’s future looked grim and that a revolution was imminent.\(^7\) However, she still preferred to be *there*, in her troubled and dangerous homeland, than in Australia, where she and her husband felt utterly miserable. Laura, as well as most other interviewees, knew of many

\(^7\) A number of interviewees thought that a violent revolution was a real possibility as a consequence of South Africa’s political climate at the time of research, which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 5.
fellow Afrikaner émigrés who had returned to South Africa due to financial troubles related to long-term unemployment. However, evidently, most of the Afrikaners who participated in this research did find employment, ultimately. But because it took relatively long, they felt that the Australian government had ‘lied’ to them in providing them with visas. The next section discusses this experience in more detail.

‘Lured under false pretences’: the felt policy/practice discrepancy

Of the total number of interviewees, 69 were in the workforce. Out of this group, 40 individuals had immigrated without having secured employment beforehand. Those who did find employment from this group, all struggled for a certain period to do so. On average, it took them about two years. Next to that, none of them found work at their previous level, and many found jobs in different fields, requiring them to make a career change. Only 7 out of the total of 69 participants in the workforce acquired employment at their previous level and in their own field, and these seven had secured employment before immigrating. From this group, two were working as ministers of religion, two as senior managers in the financial and mining sector respectively, one as a mid-level manager in the mining sector, one changed job locations within the consultancy company she worked for (as an expatriate), and one was recruited upon graduation by a multinational financial enterprise. The other interviewees who had secured employment before immigrating entered the Australian job market at a lower professional level. Paul, for example, had been working as a managing director of an engineering company in South Africa, but came to Australia to work for a mining company as operations manager, which was three steps down from his previous level. ‘For sure, it was a huge sacrifice,’ he said, ‘but we were just so happy to be out of South Africa’ (Interview, 2016). Another participant, Marieke, had advanced her career in nursing in South Africa from the work floor to the management level. However, in order to meet Australian immigration requirements, she ‘had to go back to being a nurse’ (Interview, 2015). ‘I had to quit my better paid job and return to the work floor as a nurse for two years so that I could qualify for a

---

8 The remaining five came over as retirees to join their adult children and grandchildren (cf. Chapter 2).
permanently reside in the country. She was happy to do so, however, because, like Paul, she desperately wanted to get her family out of South Africa.

A permanent residency visa (subclass 190) for Australia is a state-specific visa granted by the Australian government based on a person’s qualifications and skills. The state governments decide at any given time what types of skills are needed to balance their state’s job market and thus who qualifies to immigrate to Australia. About half of the interviewees in the workforce entered the country on this visa based on either their own or their partner’s skills. The other half received a Temporary Skilled (Worker) visa (subclass 457), which was, at the time, an employer-sponsored visa for up to four years. Here, either the research participants themselves or their partners had obtained temporary employment in Australia. Both types of visa allow family members to join the visa holder. Without exception, the interviewees’ goal was to apply for citizenship as soon as they were eligible, which comes with its own set of conditions. For temporary visa holders this was a two-step process, since they first had to apply for permanent residency as a prerequisite for citizenship. All in all, obtaining citizenship took between two to eight years, depending on Australia’s laws and regulations at the time at which different participants were immersed in the process.

Those interviewees who immigrated on a permanent residency visa felt very confused and disappointed about the fact that they struggled to find employment. Because their skills or their partner’s skills were sought after by an Australian state government, they had expected to find employment quickly and easily. However, as Sofie stated:

My husband could not find a job, whereas they [the Victorian government] had said he would. It took him about a year, just when he had planned to move back to South Africa.

(Interview, 2016)

---


10 This visa has been discontinued. Please note that visa types and conditions are continuously subject to change, hence this information may be outdated by the time this thesis is published.

Likewise, Esther said that she and her family were ‘lured here [to Australia] under false pretences, because when we arrived, my husband could not get a job’ (Interview, 2015). Esther’s family entered on a PR visa for South Australia based on her husband’s skills in 2010. However, after having been unemployed for nearly a year, he found lower paid work in a different sector. He and his wife were still feeling disillusioned about this experience, and Esther said they would not have made the move had they known this beforehand. Another interviewee had been unemployed for 10 months when she decided to take a job at one of the big fast food chains, just so that she would have ‘something’:

*I applied for thousands of jobs, but they [the South Australian government] lied to me: I did not get a job. When I entered Australia, I thought that the hard parts of my life were over. Was I wrong.*

(Lieke, interview, 2016)

What these experiences make clear is that, for the research participants, acquiring a visa held a promise of employment. For them, it was as if a visa said: ‘Come on over, we need you here’. What contributed to this perception was that many interviewees had visited so-called ‘Expo’s’ in South Africa, events organised by Australian state governments, enterprises or immigration agencies, to recruit skilled South Africans. At these events, participants said, Australia was presented as ‘the land of milk and honey’, that is, as a place where everything is wonderful and perfect, because they, as skilled, – and white – South Africans, ‘will get a job in no time’. Indeed, other research supports the creation of these wrongful expectations (Mersham 2000). However, in their experienced reality, this was not true. In Carolien’s words:

*I think, with the immigration, there’s a lot of deceit. Many lies are being told to the people, because they [Australia] send the immigration agents out, and they offer a night, they say: ‘Do you want to emigrate? Come and listen to so and so …’, and they guarantee it will be successful. And then they have all these things that they tell you, amongst others the one thing that South Africans are doing really well here, that South Africans are very much sought-after here, that they get jobs very easily, … all those things they say. And the people believe this. … After coming back from such a visit, you almost have the idea that when you land here [in Australia] and you get off the plane, that the people will get you and put you in a car and, with a driver, drive you to an employment. And this is absolutely not how it is.*

(Interview, 2016)
In a similar vein, Adriaan stated:

> Whether it’s the immigration agents or the big companies ... they need people to work in inhabitable ... places, and therefore come to recruit in South Africa. They offer less wages than they would offer Australians, but for a South African it’s much more since he’s used to getting paid in rand. What they don’t realise, is that life in Australia is also much more expensive than in South Africa, so that their salary isn’t so much as it seems in relative terms. So either way, with the migration agents or with the big companies, South Africans are being cheated. It’s not a land of milk and honey, Australia.

(Casual conversation, 2016)

Thus, many participants came to Australia with false expectations concerning the employment process. Similar to those interviewees cited above, after a certain period of struggling to find (suitable) employment, they came to the conclusion that a discrepancy exists between what the Australian government policies set forth when recruiting skilled migrants and what Australian employers want. In Richard’s words:

> And now you have to struggle to find a suitable job, right at the bottom of the food chain. There’s a disconnect between what the government tells you, and what the place of employment actually expects of you.

(Interview, 2015)

In the perception of the Afrikaners, the reason for this discrepancy was discrimination against immigrants. Although the Australian government seeks to attract immigrants with certain skills, they found that ordinary Australians reject immigrants because they are seen as foreigners. In the next section, I discuss how the interviewees experienced this ‘anti-immigrant racism’ (Hage 2014: 233).

‘No “fair go” for immigrants’: perceived discrimination

Based on their experiences regarding the employment process, the great majority of research participants, especially in Adelaide, found that ‘Australians choose their “own” people first’ (Margo, casual conversation, 2015). Employers frequently rejected them due to ‘a lack of local experience’, they stated. However, when they managed to attain the required local experience –usually by doing voluntary work for a number of months– they continued to be rejected. This time it was often for ‘being overqualified’. Most interviewees did not believe that these were the real grounds for their rejections. Laura, for example, stated: ‘This is not
honest, they lie to you, this is just an easy way out’ (Interview, 2015). Rather, many Afrikaners thought that the reason behind being rejected was, indeed, discrimination against immigrants, as Henk’s sentiments illustrated when he said ‘It’s all about my last name that I don’t have a job yet’ (Casual conversation, 2015). Related to this, participants also found that their chances of succeeding in the employment process were blocked due to a lack of network, both professionally and personally. In their perception, Australians, and Adelaideans in particular, were ‘extremely cliquey’. Adriaan stated in this respect:

Here, I will always remain a foreigner, no matter what I do or how I try. It might be different in Sydney or Melbourne, but in Adelaide, which is just a village, everybody knows everybody, and you will not get a job unless you know somebody. Here, people still have their best friends from primary school ...

(Interview, 2016)

Whereas Adriaan thought that the situation could be different in the bigger cities, Carlijn, who immigrated to Sydney, said:

... Australia pretends to be the country of the ‘fair go’, but it’s absolutely not the case. If you’re not well-connected, born into the right family or go to the right private school, you’re definitely faced with a glass ceiling.

(Interview, 2016)

Paul, who had lived in a smaller town in South Australia, stated along similar lines:

They say there’s a ‘fair go’, ‘Everybody gets a “fair go”’, but there isn’t really a ‘fair go’. In South Africa, there’s no such thing as a ‘fair go’, and everybody knows this. Here, there’s a lot of pretence. Friends are being privileged, and there’s definitely no ‘fair go’ for immigrants.

(Interview, 2016)

Furthermore, study participants generally thought that Australians disliked white South African immigrants because of their relatively high qualifications. In their experience, this made Australians feel threatened and insecure, scared that ‘these foreigners’ will bypass them or take their jobs. As a consequence of Australia’s skills-based immigration policy, most contemporary immigrants, including the South African sub-group, are in fact more highly qualified than Australians (Cai & Liu 2015; Forrest, Johnston & Poulsen 2013; Wasserman 2016). However, the majority of interviewees believed that Anglo-South African immigrants were more readily accepted in Australia, because ‘they are seen as an extension of the UK’
Afrikaners, however, have an accent when they speak English, and this is one of the things that puts possible employers off, according to the interviewees. Many participants at some point decided to delete their South African experience from their resume, when they were not being invited for interviews. One of them, Simone, stated that after she had done so, she suddenly was invited for interviews. However ‘when we were on the phone [with the possible employer], they would hear my accent and I would still not get the job’ (Interview, 2015).

Once they did find employment, most interviewees found that they were unable to advance their career. This had, in their perception, the same cause, namely anti-immigrant discrimination. Agnes, who was in a leadership position for a while at the private school where she worked, explained that she had decided to step back from that role as she found that:

... they [Australians] don’t tolerate other cultures as in charge of them. You can be the best worker, you can be the most appropriate person or equipped person, but because [of] your accent, I found that they don’t accept us. But we make very good donkeys, meaning we lift other people. And as long as you do that, you’re welcome, but do not, there’s a certain unsubscribed rule... and that’s why so many of our friends really struggle, because they want to go into second line of management or so, and that’s just unacceptable.

(Interview, 2015)

Likewise, Bea stated, ‘If you are willing to do the dirty jobs for the Australians, then you can get a job easily. But if you want a leadership position you can forget it’ (Interview, 2016). And Arjan, who had been working as a high-ranking bank manager in South Africa and now occupied a mid-level position at an Australian bank, did not think he would get a promotion, because, in his own words, ‘it is very hard to get into the top layer, who are all Australians, and who are recruiting Australians’ (Interview, 2016). Thus, in sum, most research participants felt excluded from Australia’s job market to a considerable extent because it was difficult for them to find suitable employment and advance their careers. Before I turn to discuss the consequences of this, in the next section I briefly look at the broader context in which they had this experience.
On the reality of suffering

It would be difficult if not impossible, to investigate the extent to which the interviewees’ perception regarding their employment situation and perceived discrimination in Australia is congruent with reality. Existing research on the topic shows that Australia has a long history of discrimination against immigrants (see Hage 2000, 2002, 2014; Jupp 2007; Pilger 1991; Stratton 2011) and is increasingly restrictive towards non-skilled migrants and asylum seekers/refugees (Haslam & Holland 2012), the latter of which are routinely dehumanised (see Boochani 2018; Hage 2014; United Nations 2016; cf. Wills 2013). Like many people in most nations, Australians have a long-standing fear of and hostility towards immigrants (see, for example, Longley Arthur 2018; Louis et al. 2010), but according to the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, Australia scores particularly high with regards to anti-immigrant discrimination (Susskind 2010). Thus, secondary data does provide a context in which the experiences of the Afrikaners can be understood.

However, their experiences of discrimination are relative compared to those of so-called non-white immigrants in Australia (see, for example, Claudio 2014; Ip, Wu & Inglis 1998; Lange & Nisbet 2000; Ryan, J 2000; Stratton 2011). Indeed, in their host countries, immigrants are assigned to a specific racial group based on their home country’s position within the global racial ranking order (Glick-Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton 1992). Despite being a settler colony or a ‘traditional immigration country’ (Hugo 2014: 868; cf. Castles, De Haas & Miller 2014), Australia has historically largely limited immigration possibilities to individuals with white skin, preferably from the UK, as epitomised by its ‘White Australia Policy’ (1901-1973) (see Chesterman 2005; Hage 2000, 2002; Hugo 2014; Jupp 2007; Pilger 1991; Stratton 2011, 2016). The definition of ‘whiteness’ was only extended on rational terms, at times when the government saw its need to populate the country as greater than its aspiration of remaining a ‘white’ nation (see, amongst others, D’Cruz 2000; Hage 2000; Jupp 2007; Pilger 1991; Stratton 2011). This happened, for instance, with regards to the Irish, the Greeks and the Italians in the second half of the twentieth century. What appears to have happened now is

---

12 This is the common name for the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act, which ensured, in Australia’s first Prime Minister Edmund Barton’s words, that ‘No n*gger, no Chinaman, no laska, no Kanaka, no purveyor of cheap coloured labour’ could be ‘an Australian’ (cited in Graham 2019).
that, since Australia started focusing on attracting highly skilled migrants in the 1990s (Cai & Liu 2015; Forrest, Johnston & Poulsen 2013), the definition of ‘whiteness’ has been extended to include white South Africans.\footnote{With the relatively large influx of Asian immigrants in recent times being given a status of ‘honorary whiteness’ (see Stratton 2011: 215).} Thus, compared to other immigrant groups, including black South Africans, whom white Australians sometimes mistake for Aboriginal Australians (see Sonn et al. 2015), the Afrikaners still enjoy the privilege of ‘being’ white in Australia. However, the subconscious expectation that a shared white privilege would ensure an easy economic transition into Australia caused most research participants to feel extremely disappointed. As Laura stated during our interview (2015): ‘Even though we are white, they misuse us’.

Yet, to the research participants this is all irrelevant. As I have previously argued, since our lived experience is real to us, our suffering is also real. Furthermore, since we cannot compare our subjective experience of any given situation to that of someone else, we should also not compare human suffering (Merleau-Ponty 2012 [1945]). It is impossible to know what someone else’s pain feels like, since pain is a private, personal experience (Melzack & Wall 1996; cf. Scarry 1985). Yet, when we suffer, this usually absorbs us completely (Frankl 2008 [1946]; cf. Maslow 1943; 1970), and the fact that others are also suffering, or are suffering more, does not diminish our own pain. Thus, regardless of the experiences of other immigrant groups in Australia, the Afrikaners believed that they were being discriminated against, and this was painful for them because they felt excluded. More important than the reason, however, was the \textit{real} economic consequence of moving to Australia and what that meant to interviewees. Namely, most participants suffered a substantial loss regarding their careers. Most of them had had good jobs in South Africa (cf. Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013) and moving to Australia signalled a considerable setback in this respect (cf. Wasserman 2016). Overall, their emigration decision meant that they had to start over in terms of career, which caused a loss of wealth and, most importantly, a loss of self-esteem, as we will see in the next section.
Chapter 3  ‘No country for white men’

‘Starting over from scratch’: loss of career, wealth, and self-esteem

Corien was one of many research participants who had to redo her professional qualifications in Australia, which meant that she ‘went three steps down the career ladder’ which had put her ‘back ten years, career-wise and money-wise’ (Casual conversation, 2015). She had found it very difficult to immigrate, because ultimately, it entailed that she and her husband ‘had to start over from scratch’. Similarly, Dirk stated that for him, ‘the most important sacrifice was building up my career from scratch at age 37 while I was well established in South Africa’ (Interview, 2016). Another participant doubted her emigration decision with hindsight:

... if I look back now, I’ve been here fifteen years, and I have a friend in South Africa who studied with me, and we did the same type of job in South Africa, [and] I made a promotion before she did, and she is now in a higher position than me, so you can’t do different than look back and think: ‘But if I had stayed there, I would have been in that position.

(Carolien, interview, 2016)

Carolien still worked in her own field, that of law, but in a much lower position. She had acquired this position after four long years of undertaking bridging courses, all the while doing unskilled labour to earn an income. Still, she will never attain the level she was at in South Africa, she said. At her current career level, she added, ‘there’s few people from my age. They are either not working or retired already or they are in higher positions. ... Because I had to start over from scratch.’

Apart from a loss of position, job loss caused, for many participants, severe financial distress, which aggravated the intensity of their experience (cf. Fagin & Little 1984; Leana & Feldman 1992). For those interviewees who immigrated without having secured a job beforehand, the loss of employment was, of course, initially a self-chosen loss. However, they had expected it to be a short-term loss. Yet, for most people in this group the first few years in Australia turned out to be a seriously challenging period, especially for those interviewees whose partners had not yet secured employment beforehand either. They relied heavily on their savings, which had already been diminished considerably since the South African rand is worth approximately one-tenth of the Australian dollar. Next to that, most participants had lost their pension funds in South Africa. In order to start rebuilding these, they wished to find
employment as soon as possible. This added significantly to the stress they experienced in the initial years following their emigration.

More important than a loss of wealth, however, was the loss of self-confidence associated with this experience. Some interviewees openly discussed this. For most, however, I came to this conclusion by carefully listening to what they said and did not say while observing their body language and behaviour. Many of the women stated it about their husbands, who, I noticed, often looked despondent. Esther, for instance, said that her partner’s unemployment had been ‘very difficult for [them], and especially for him’ (Interview, 2016). ‘He lost all his self-esteem,’ she continued, ‘and he didn’t have any hope for the future anymore.’ Similarly, when talking about her husband, Laura said that it was very painful for her ‘to see a person who was always a go-getter being broken down to absolutely nothing’ (Interview, 2015). Once again, this echoes the findings of Wasserman’s (2016) research. Another participant, talking about her own situation, explained it as follows:

Then you go and search for a job. Then they hear your accent and think you are stupid, [they think] ‘Maybe I should talk s-l-o-w-l-y, because maybe you don’t understand me, and I talk a bit LOUDER,’ and this... this erodes your self-image... All our degrees don’t mean anything. This is very bad for your self-confidence ... so I became extremely depressed.

(Anja, interview, 2016)

The first part of this chapter has demonstrated that the fear of job loss alone makes us feel anxious because our livelihoods depend on employment. As such, it threatens one of our fundamental needs. Here we see that the loss of employment or career opportunities also threatens another important need, namely that of esteem. This refers to the universal need for self-confidence and for respect, both from oneself and from others (Doyal & Gough 1984, 1991; Maslow 1943, 1970; Ryan, RM & Deci 2000; Ryff & Keyes 1995; Tay & Diener 2011; Thielke et al. 2012), as discussed in Chapter 1. Being able to provide for oneself and one’s family forms an important part of fulfilling these needs. Hence, the inability to do so usually causes people to feel insecure and makes them question their self-worth and personal identity (Staub 2001; cf. Doka 2002; Fagin & Little 1984; Zalenski 2006). Thus, we see that unemployment or decreased career opportunities shake our sense of belonging. In addition
to this, the fact that many interviewees had to start their career ‘over from scratch’, which meant that they occupied professional positions on a lower level than what they were skilled for (‘downward mobility’, see Wasserman 2016), also signified a loss of self-actualisation needs. Self-actualisation refers to the need to express our creativity through our work (Doyal & Gough 1984, 1991; Galtung & Wirak 1977; Maslow 1943, 1970; Tay & Diener 2011), and losing the opportunity to do so, for the Afrikaners in this case because they saw themselves forced to underperform in order to at least have an income, ‘restricts ones agency’ (Thielke et al. 2012: 478). That is, it inhibits our full self-expression and sense of autonomy. This is a serious loss, which in turn undermines our sense of esteem as well (ibid; cf. Ryan 2000).

Thus we see that, for most Afrikaners, the emigration caused a loss of career, which meant a loss of wealth and, above all, a loss of self-esteem and self-realisation. Hence, the answer to the question to which extent they had been able to recreate their lost sense of economic belonging in South Africa is ambiguous. In Australia, they felt economically excluded, too, albeit in different ways. Yet, most research participants did manage to find employment, albeit at a lower level or in a different sector, and all were able to secure a livelihood for themselves. Next to this, they had liberated themselves from their fear of affirmative action. Crucially, however, they felt that their children were and would be –as adults– economically included in Australia. Without exception, all interviewees with children had fully recreated their sense of security in terms of their children’s future livelihood. This made their own losses worthy sacrifices, as the last section of this chapter, to which I now turn, demonstrates.

‘But the kids are all right’: meaning-making through sacrifice

Fifty-three out of the 74 Afrikaners who took part in this study through interviews immigrated as a nuclear family unit with small children or with children in high school (cf. Chapter 2). At the time of research, some of these children had already completed tertiary education and secured employment. Others were in university, many were in high school, and some were still in primary school—the latter were often born in Australia. Without exception, the parents felt elated about the fact that their children were in the school of their choice, or rather, of the parents’ choice—usually private, Christian schools— or studying for the degree that they
wanted at their preferred university or other institute of higher education, thereby creating the future of their dreams. The relief of not having to deal with affirmative action was immense, as Rianne’s sentiments illustrate:

Our children have opportunities here: if [my son] is not good enough to be in the team for gymnastics, or hockey, then he isn’t in the team. But if he’s the best, then he gets his place in the team, whether he is white, pink, yellow, green, purple, *it doesn’t matter*, and this is fair.

(Interview, 2016)

Indeed, the perception that their children would not be discriminated against in Australia was unanimous amongst interviewees. Therefore, those who had gone through a difficult time in terms of finding employment in Australia all felt that it had been worth their sacrifice. Marieke, for example, told me that her husband had been unemployed for quite some time, but that he had not become depressed about it because:

he knew that the other option was [that] we would go back to South Africa, and he would have done *anything* to keep his children here, because we could see [that] here is a future for our children and there isn’t one there.

(Interview, 2015)

Similarly, Sander stated that, although the emigration had been difficult for him and his wife, ‘you know that here, your children have a future, and there [in South Africa] they haven’t. So you will do everything you can to ensure that you are successful here’ (Interview, 2016).

Those participants with children in tertiary education, mostly university students, were absolutely thrilled and felt that they had accomplished their main goal regarding the emigration endeavour. Anneke, for example, told me excitedly about her eldest daughter who had just started university in a different state. ‘She has started, she could study what she wanted to study!’ Anneke exclaimed, ‘so it’s not that, as a consequence of her skin colour or her language that she was not allowed to’ (Interview, 2016). In a similar vein, after talking

---

14 This perception could be questioned (see, for example, Peters 2000), but to discuss that here would go beyond the scope of the current research. Further study amongst second-generation Afrikaner émigré would be able to shed light on this issue.
about the sacrifices he had made due to his emigration, Stein repeated my question: ‘Has it been worth it?’ and answered:

Well, have my children got access to academic qualifications? Yes, they do. Can they go and study anything they want to? … Are there any blockers for [my daughter] to go and do that [become a medical doctor]? No. Only herself and her own motivations. Tick box.

(Interview, 2016)

Finally, Rob put it succinctly when he stated: ‘The sacrifice to move at mid-career, you do this for your children’ (Interview, 2015).

These examples demonstrate that interviewees had successfully restored their faith in their children’s future by moving to a place where the latter were economically included. In this sense, Australia had replaced the country that South Africa had been to them before 1994. We can thus conclude that the object of loss had been recreated in another country. For themselves, this was not the case, since for most participants the move to Australia had actually resulted in more losses in an economic and personal sense. However, they coped well with these losses because they saw them as sacrifices they had made for their children. Since they believed that they had successfully secured their children’s future livelihood, these sacrifices had not been in vain. Hence, their own losses were given supreme meaning: the meaning of sacrifice.15 The interviewees felt that they had given up their own career in order for their children to have one. Thus we see that, indeed, sacrifice can be defined as ‘feeling coerced to give something up’ (Daswani 2013: 46, cf. Chapter 2). That this loss of career additionally caused a loss of self-esteem was accepted, because it was seen as ‘giving up something valued for the sake of something else regarded as more important or worthy’ (OED). Here, we are reminded of Paul’s remark cited earlier, who had lost his career and wealth but was happy to see his daughters thriving and concluded that, in the end, happiness lies in relationships, not in material goods.

---

15 The six childless interviewees saw, above all, living in freedom from fear of violent crime as a meaningful trade-off for their losses, as the next chapter will show.
This demonstrates that suffering is made bearable by giving it meaning. Sacrifice is a supreme form of meaning-making (see Frankl 2008 [1946]). As such, it is a common theme among diasporas, as we have seen in the previous chapter, as well as among other migrant groups (see, for example, Fortier 2000). For the Afrikaners, I would argue that, on a deeper level, their sense of sacrifice is related to their strong religion. The term ‘sacrifice’ has its origin in the Latin *sacer*, meaning ‘holy’. Thus, when the Afrikaners saw their losses and suffering as worthy sacrifices, they referred to doing something holy for their children. Many research participants stated things along the lines of Agnes, who explained to me that her children ‘[they] are my responsibility. God has given them to me to take care of them, and [thus] I have decided to do what is best for them’ (Interview, 2015). Indeed, most if not all interviewees mentioned God’s guidance in their immigration decision and process. As Davies (2012: 54-64) points out, Christianity sees suffering as integral to moral or spiritual advancement, or, to the movement from an unholy to a holy life (cf. Dante 1985; Gorer 1955; Marris 2015 [1986]). As such, at a deeper level, sacrifice is about ‘constituting a relationship between those involved and a transcendent or sacred world’ (Miller 1998: 75; cf. Hubert & Mauss 1964). Thus, although most of the research participants were motivated by the wellbeing of their children, sacrificing their own wellbeing to achieve this was, at a subconscious level, a spiritual experience that concerned themselves. Furthermore, viewing their suffering as a sacrifice for their children gave new meaning to their lives. Thus, ultimately, they acted out of a wish to restore meaning to their own lives, which demonstrates that all loss is essentially a loss of self (Aldrich 1963; Freud 1917; Marris 2015 [1986]; cf. Castelli Dransart 2013; Hunter 2007-2008; Neimeyer 2001; cf. Chapter 1). Simultaneously, it shows that the research participants were motivated by belonging: they gave new meaning to their lives by acting in the interest of those others that were, most intimately, a part of them.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has told the story of the Afrikaners’ search for economic belonging. To belong, in an economic sense, means that we need to be part of some sort of productive, usually monetary, community, which ensures our opportunity and ability to create a decent living for ourselves and for our families. As such, economic belonging is one of the most fundamental
forms of belonging. The fear of its loss represents, on a deep, psychological level, the fear of
death. Yet, this chapter has demonstrated that we do not only need to be part of an economic
community, we also need to feel part of such a group. My analysis showed that the Afrikaners
were part of South Africa’s economy, however they did not feel included. Thus, they felt that
they had lost one of their basic needs, namely their economic security (Doyal & Gough 1991;
Galtung & Wirak 1977). Above all, they felt this loss for their children.

Indeed, in their experience, affirmative action policies primarily threatened their children’s
future livelihoods. Furthermore, they perceived these policies to be unfair, which made their
world look unpredictable and dangerous (Maslow 1943; 1970). Hence, with their felt loss of
economic belonging they also lost a sense of safety, in a psychological respect. The need to
feel mentally (and physically) safe is equally important to being or feeling economically
secure, as I argued previously (Bowlby 1980; Davies 2012; Davis 1992; Marris 2015 [1986];
Maslow 1943, cf. Boss 1999). Furthermore, based on my analysis in this chapter, I have also
argued that the stories that feelings tell are equally important to the stories that facts tell, if
facts tell a story at all. Indeed, this research demonstrates that facts are only meaningful after
interpretation (Kaufmann & Nietzsche 1954). We see this evidenced in the fact that the
Afrikaners left South Africa because of their felt loss of economic belonging. That is, we see
that people act upon what they believe to be true and thereby create their own reality (cf.
Bruner 1996).

In the second part of this chapter we have seen that, for themselves, the interviewees were
unable to fully recreate a sense of economic belonging in Australia. When we look at the
conflict of bereavement as explained in Chapter 1, that is, the urge, on the one hand, to
preserve or restore the past, and, on the other, to recreate or replace it (Colson 1971; Davis
1992; de Waal 1989), it is clear that the Afrikaners were completely focused on the effort to
recreate or replace what they had lost. However, in Australia, most of them actually lost their
careers to a considerable extent. With that, they also lost a lot of their wealth, their feelings
of self-worth and the opportunity for full self-expression. Since self-esteem and self-
expression constitute basic needs as well (see Doyal & Gough 1991; Maslow 1943, 1970; Tay
these were serious losses. Yet, because the research participants were able to find meaning in them through their children, overall, they coped well with them. Viewing their post-immigration losses as sacrifices for their children restored meaning to their lives. That they did this through enacting belonging supports my argument that interpersonal belonging is our most essential need. Indeed, with regards to the felt loss of physical belonging or physical safety, which is the topic of the following chapter, the interviewees, too, primarily acted in their children’s interest.
Chapter 4  ‘Waiting to be next’: Seeking physical safety

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the Afrikaners’ lost sense of physical belonging or physical safety in South Africa, and how they recreated this by immigrating to Australia. The chapter consists of two main parts. The first part discusses the research participants’ narrative with regards to the loss concerned. They felt that they could no longer live in their home country because of the deadly threat posed by violent crime, which they believed was particularly directed at them out of revenge for apartheid. My analysis demonstrates that this felt loss, too, represented mostly a fear of loss. That is, in contrast to their perception, secondary research indicates that violent crime in South Africa does not affect Afrikaners more than any other cultural group, and my ethnographic data also suggests this, since only 4 out of 74 interviewees had had an actual experience of violent crime. Yet, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, in this respect, too, the analysis reveals that the narrative as felt creates the same reality as if it were true. That is, participants suffered immensely due to the emotion of fear, which was so omnipresent that it became part of them. Since the emotion was real, it became a fact, through the results it generated. One of these results, or, the ultimate result, was that they decided to leave their homeland and move to Australia.

The second part of this chapter discusses how this coping mechanism worked out for the study participants. Here, my analysis shows that the Afrikaners were able to fully recreate their sense of safety or physical belonging. However, it also reveals that they were having great difficulty adapting to living in a relatively safe country. Initially, this absolutely shocked them, which shows that we adapt to our environment, also when it is harmful, to such an extent that we identify with it. Following this, I argue that, although the loss of belonging to
South Africa in this respect had a positive meaning—it entailed the liberation of the fear of becoming a crime victim—initially the interviewees still suffered from a loss of familiarity. The chapter concludes, however, that, ultimately, they were able to adjust to the otherwise beneficial change. Before I continue to explain the difficulty of change for people in general, I first discuss the concepts of physical belonging and the emotion of fear.

By the term physical belonging I refer to the ultimate material form of belonging on this earth, that is, being present in the world in a physical body. Thus, put simply, it refers to the act of living. As discussed in previous chapters, evidently one of the most crucial requirements for doing so is to be safe from physical harm. Although all adults are aware of the fact that they will, one day, cease to exist in this life, we usually do not think about this on a daily basis. My research participants, however, did. Most of them said that, in South Africa, they ‘never knew if this day was going to be [their] last’. They feared for their physical safety due to the prevalence of violent crime, which, as stated above, they felt was specifically targeted at them. Vanderhaeghen (2018: 46) refers to this as a ‘discourse of extinction’, ‘of genocide’, even, and argues that Afrikaners feel threatened by physical extermination due to the phenomenon of ‘farm murders’ (plaasmoorde), attacks on farms in which farmers, usually white, and their families are assaulted and/or killed, often brutally (see, amongst others, SAHRC 2014; Wilkinson 2017; Wines 2003). As the first part of this chapter demonstrates, my analysis supports his argument.

Yet, as the previous chapter has shown, a discourse is not just a story for the people who believe it. For them, it is a reality (cf. Bruner 1996; Hervik 1994). Crucially, the emotions associated with the belief in this reality are real, too. In the case of the Afrikaners in this research, whom believed that they, sooner or later, would become victims of violent crime, the emotion of fear was very real, as the ethnographic data demonstrates. It created a high degree of suffering, since most interviewees had felt extremely scared in South Africa, all the time. Hence, they left. Indeed, as my analysis shows, like most emotions, fear results in altered behaviour. Next to conduct, emotions also affect our bodies and minds. More specifically, as the neurological processes designed to keep us alive (Damasio & Carvalho 2013; Elias 1987; cf. Lutz & White 1986), emotions lead to an emotional state which result in
an altered physical as well as mental state (Damasio 2001: 103, my emphases). This mental state is referred to as feelings, which can thus be defined as ‘cognitive representations of emotional states’ (Damasio 2001: 104) or ‘mental experiences that accompany a change in body state’ (Damasio & Carvalho 2013: 143, 145; cf. Damasio 1999). Here, we see that, contrary to common thought, feelings are merely one end result of emotions and should not be equated with the neurological process as such (cf. Elias 1987; Heelas 1984; Rosaldo 2009 [1984]). For example, when we are faced with danger, our brain sends a collection of responses to our body and to other parts of our brain (Damasio 2001: 103), which results in an emotional state that we call fear. Consequently, our bodies change in the sense that our muscles tighten and our heart rate increases, and our minds change in the sense that we are feeling scared. As we have seen, feeling scared often leads to a behavioural change as well. In this case it resulted in the fact that the Afrikaners decided to leave their homeland. Yet, through this decision they were confronted with a different type of fear, namely the fear of change.

Change can be defined as the loss of familiarity. Familiarity is part of our safety needs, since we need to understand, predict and be able to interpret other people’s behaviour (Marris 2015 [1986]), as well as understand that behaviour in the societal context, in order to feel psychologically safe (Boss 1999; Bowlby 1980; Davies 2012; Davis, J 1992; Dewey 2007 [1922]). Importantly, the familiar reality does not have to be positive, as long as it is known. Davies (2012: 39-40) illustrates this with the example of abuse victims who miss their former violator, not because of the latter’s behaviour but due to the familiarity and constancy that the relationship afforded. Similarly, Rosenblatt, Walsh and Jackson argue that a strongly felt loss can be ‘more a sign of broken patterns than of lost love’ (1976: 116). Thus, since we attach to whatever it is that becomes familiar to us, it is understandable that it was difficult for the Afrikaners to suddenly be freed from the fear of crime. Although the situation in South Africa was bad, they had become accustomed to fear as a way of life (see Green 1994; 1999; cf. Scheper-Hughes 1992), in the sense that they had adjusted their habits to the circumstances.
Chapter 4  ‘Waiting to be next’

Habits can be defined as:

... acts which are regularly performed without our full conscious awareness or deliberation ... those ingrained patterns of thought, action and feeling which direct our lives in predictable ways; ways that help us live in relatively harmonious accord with the social group into which we have been socialised.

(Davies 2012: 12)

The habits that interviewees had developed in adjusting to the crime situation in South Africa had helped them, in their own experience, to survive. Furthermore, although we are adaptable beings, our capacity for adaptability depends on predictability and continuity. That is, we assimilate new experiences by placing them in the context of a familiar construction of reality (Marris 2015 [1986]: 2-12; cf. Colson 1971). This explains why, despite the change being beneficial, most research participants still experienced difficulty in adapting to their new situation in Australia. I discuss this in more detail in the second part of the chapter. Now, I first focus on the Afrikaners’ sense of loss of physical safety in South Africa.

South Africa: ‘You’re just not safe’

It is unsurprising that the study participants felt unsafe in South Africa, given the fact that the country is one of the most violent in the world (UNODC 2010; 2014). If we look at murder statistics, which are a yardstick for crime measurement in general (because few murders go unreported, see Merten 2018b), we see that in the year 2017/2018, 1 20,306 South Africans were murdered (SSA 2018), which translates into an average of 57 people per day (Merten 2018b) or 35.2 individuals per 100,000 inhabitants. This is more than five times the global average, which currently stands at 6.2 per 100,000 (UN 2014). For comparison, this number is also higher than the conflict-related deaths in today’s most fatal war, namely Syria (in 2017, the Syrian conflict cost just over 20,000 lives, see Pettersson & Eck 2018). Thus, although South Africa is not officially at war, in terms of violent deaths it would qualify as such. The reasons for this have to be sought in a number of factors.

---

1 The period from 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2018 (South Africa’s financial year).
In the first place, evidently, the legacy of colonialism and apartheid plays a major role. That is, South Africa has always been a violent country, due to the very nature of the state. Secondly, South Africa is one of the world’s most unequal countries (World Bank 2019)\(^2\) with more than half of its population living in poverty (Pretorius 2019) – and poverty relates directly to crime (Sachs 2005). Next to that, countries undergoing major transitions are usually characterised by a temporary increase in violence (see, for example, Habib 2013). Finally, answers also need to be sought in various, regionally specific, indigenous social and cultural practices (see Glaser 2008). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss these explanations further. What is important here is that, due to the prevalence of violent crime, the fear of becoming a crime victim impact on everyday life in South Africa to such an extent that fear has, indeed, become a way of life (see Kynoch 2013; Møller 2005; Scheper-Hughes 2014; cf. Green 1994, 1999). The following section demonstrates how interviewees experienced the normalisation of crime.

**When living in fear becomes the norm**

In the view of the Afrikaners, crime in South Africa had proliferated since 1994. Contrary to their belief, this perception is mostly based on the fact that the apartheid state had largely shielded them, and other white South Africans, from crime before 1994 (Kynoch 2013; Møller 2005; Scheper-Hughes 2014; Super 2010). This means that, in contrast to most other South Africans, the Afrikaners had not been used to high crime levels and living in fear before South Africa’s democratic turn. Indeed, as Super states (2010: 175), with the country’s democratic transition, ‘crime in South Africa has democratised as well’. The issue of whether violent crime has increased in the post-apartheid period is highly debated in South Africa in general (see, for example, Kriegler & Shaw 2016; Kynoch 2013; Møller 2005), and ultimately this question is impossible to answer due to a lack of reliable statistics on crime reporting, both during and after the apartheid period (Durington 2009).

\(^2\) South Africa’s GINI coefficient, the World Bank’s measure of income inequality, is 0.63 on a scale where 0 represents perfect equality and 1 represents perfect inequality (World Bank 2019).
Yet, statistics do demonstrate that white South Africans are, indeed, much more affected by crime since 1994 (Møller 2005; Scheper-Hughes 2014; Super 2010). My research supports this, since the great majority of the Afrikaners I spoke with had experienced crime post-1994. Most commonly, interviewees had become victims of one or multiple home burglaries. These ranged in seriousness from the theft of a few small items to the stripping of their entire house. This finding supports other research demonstrating that burglary is a category in which white South Africans are more affected by crime than other South Africans (Møller 2005; Silber & Geffen 2009). This is not because they are white, but because they are overall wealthier, since household crime occurs more among the wealthier classes of society (Møller 2005). Yet, this is also the only category in which white South Africans are more affected by crime than other South Africans: overall, they are not targeted more frequently than others.

Next to burglary, many interviewees had also become victims of other types of crime, most notably car theft and attempted car hijackings. Although these crime experiences did affect their wellbeing, the Afrikaners did not consider them to be violent and they spoke about them in an astonishingly laconic manner. This was, as I came to learn, because for them, these sorts of crimes had become perfectly normal. What I witnessed what was Taussig (2012 [1992]: 11) calls a ‘numbing and apparent acceptance’ in response to the ‘mundane experience of chronic fear’ (Green 1994: 230). Indeed, even though some of my research participants had been held at gunpoint, they maintained that ‘at least nothing bad has happened to us.’ What they meant with this was that they had not become victims of what they did see as violent crime: torture, rape and murder. Yet, the fact that these things could happen to them, and, most of all, to their children, instilled in them such a fear that it made their lives unbearable. To a certain extent, their fear can be put into context because violent crime in South Africa often is that violent (CSVR 2007), as the following story of Bert and Chantal, who experienced an armed house robbery, illustrates.

---

3 No separate statistics exist for Afrikaners and Anglo-South Africans.
Bert and Chantal had been living in Pretoria and had had many security measures installed in and around their homes, as I will discuss further on. Yet, this had not prevented armed robbers entering their property one fateful night. As Chantal came home by car, Bert had opened the gate for her electronically, through remote-control, from inside the house. As he turned away from the window to go and meet his wife, however, he saw a number of armed men crouching behind Chantal’s car, entering their front yard through the opened gate. His fear at that point had been enormous, he said, because:

... normally, what they [the criminals] basically do is, they come in, then they surprise the husband, the man, in the home, they usually tie him up with telephone [wires] or whatever, and then usually they gang-rape the woman, rape the woman, and the children have to watch and see what’s happening, and then they torture you [the man] by putting boiling water in your throat or they burn you with an iron... so they are cruel, very cruel.

(Interview, 2016)

Yet, Bert remained calm enough to go and fetch his gun and hide behind a large piece of furniture. Chantal, in the meantime, had opened her car in the garage and was immediately grabbed and held at gunpoint by the attackers. They forced her to open the house and enter, but as they walked along the corridor, Bert started shooting at them. The attackers opened fire as well. Through the heat of the event Bert did not remember exactly what happened next. However, he was shot through his knee and, ultimately, he shot one of the attackers dead. Upon this, the others fled. Bert and Chantal, as well as their children who had been asleep, survived. ‘It was not me who was there and doing all those things,’ Bert said, ‘God took over.’

Another participant’s friend, however, had not been so lucky. Natalie recounted how her friend’s wife was gang-raped in front of him and their three sons during an armed robbery at their home. ‘Why?!’ Natalie cried. ‘This is very cruel and makes you feel very sick, this rips your heart out’ (Interview, 2016). Another interviewee, Daphne, was at home with her two daughters one weekend when her husband was away on a trip. She woke up at 2 am to find two armed robbers in her bedroom. ‘I don’t want to go into detail about what happened there,’ she said, ‘because they are things that I want to block out. But that night, I promised my children I would take them out of the country’ (Interview, 2015). These personal
experiences, as well as those of relatives and friends, made the Afrikaners believe that violent crime had a racial element. Although most of them related petty crime or non-violent crime to poverty and unemployment, which they saw as results of the successive ANC governments’ mismanagement, they felt that violent crime was racially motivated. Many echoed a comment by Bas, who stated that ‘Crime is not racially motivated, but the way in which the murders take place is’ (Interview, 2016). His explanation was similar to Joke’s, who felt that, ‘because of the unnecessary violence and the severity [of the physical harm done], it must be more than just sociopathic, it is racially motivated’ (Interview, 2016).

In discussing this issue, many interviewees referred to the phenomenon of ‘farm murders’, as explained previously. In relation to this, most also referred to the song ‘Kill the Farmer’ or ‘Kill the Boer’ (‘Aw dubul’ibhunu’ in Zulu). This is an old anti-apartheid struggle song that Julius Malema, the current leader of one of South Africa’s political parties, frequently sang when he was functioning as the ANC Youth League president from 2008 to 2012 (Forde 2012). For this, he was convicted of hate speech and expelled from the ANC in 2012 (Mail & Guardian 2011). Although the song is now banned in South Africa, its former usage has made many Afrikaners, including my research participants, feel extremely threatened (cf. Vanderhaeghen 2018). They interpreted the song, and the associated farm murders, as a deliberate ANC strategy to continue the fight against white South Africans, and Afrikaners in particular. Yet, none of my study participants, nor any of their friends or family members, had become victims of such farm attacks post-1994. Next to this, secondary research shows that, overall, farm attacks are not racially motivated (SAHRC 2014; Wilkinson 2017; Wines 2003). Indeed, most farmers are white, and therefore these attacks can appear racialised. However, black farmers and black farm workers are also killed in these attacks (SAHRC 2014) – out of the 52 farm owners murdered in 2017/2018, 48 were white and 4 were black (Davis, R 2018; cf. Vermeulen 2018). Furthermore, farm murders constitute a very small percentage of the total murder rate in South Africa. In 2017/2018, this figure was 0.3 percent.\(^4\)

\(^4\) In total, there were 62 people killed in violent attacks on farms (Davis, R 2018). Out of a total of 20,306 murders (SSA 2018), this is 0.3 per cent.
The reason why farms are often attacked is because they are so-called ‘soft targets’, meaning that they are easier to attack than properties in suburban areas due to their remote locations. Because of their geographical isolation, farms are ‘further removed from the possible deterrent presence of close neighbours, the police and other security institutions’ (Solidarity 2012: 59; cf. SAHRC 2014). One research participant, who had worked in the criminal justice system in South Africa, confirmed this when she said:

... many of the farmers are white, as a consequence of the apartheid system it is the white people that own the farms. But the white people [that] are being killed, they are victims because they are remote. If you want to go and kill and steal from people, it is obviously much more easy to do it on a far remote farm than in a city.

(Carolien, interview, 2016)

Carolien and her husband were two out of a handful of interviewees who held this view. The rest of the Afrikaners perceived the farm attacks as racially motivated. This demonstrates the pervasiveness of their own narrative. Yet, research conducted among black perpetrators of violent crime in general does demonstrate that some of this crime is indeed racially driven and has the intention of inflicting a painful death on its victims as its prime motive (Segal, Pelo & Rampa 2001). Hence, the fear that violent crime strikes in the Afrikaners can be placed in this context. Nevertheless, as we have seen, only a few interviewees had personally experienced violent crime. Other researchers, working with Afrikaans-speaking South Africans pre-migration, have also found that, contrary to their expectations, very few of their participants had experienced violent crime (Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013). This supports my analysis that it was predominantly the fear of crime that gave the Afrikaners a sense of loss of belonging, as I demonstrate in the following section.

‘Luckily, it wasn’t us’: secondary traumatisation

Nearly all Afrikaners whom I spoke with told me that they had been ‘much more lucky’ than their fellow émigrés because ‘this [violent crime] did not happen to us’. They also believed that I would hear ‘so many awful and painful stories’ from those fellow Afrikaners who, they
thought, *had been* affected by violent crime in South Africa. As this analysis shows, I did not. This demonstrates once more the power of the participants’ ‘Deep Story’, to reiterate Hochschild’s term (2016), and, most of all, the performative power of fear. Indeed, as Edmund Burke noted, ‘No power so effectively robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear’ (cited in Green 1994: 227). This is not meant to downplay the Afrikaners’ fear. By contrast, although it may not be based on a balanced perspective on reality, *the fear itself* was real, as I have previously argued. Next to that, South Africa *is* a very violent country, where, as a consequence, fear is not an acute reaction to a threat but rather ‘a chronic condition’ (Green 1994: 227). Furthermore, ‘*threats* of violence are also violence’ (Galtung 1990: 292, my emphasis), and, as we have seen in the previous chapter, we react to *threats* of the loss of basic needs as if they were already lost (Maslow 1943; 1970; cf. Bowlby 1980). When our physical safety is at stake, or when we *believe* it is, this completely dominates our lives (Zalenski & Raspa 2006: 1122; cf. Frankl 2008 [1946]), which the ethnography in this chapter illustrates.

What this section further demonstrates is that, as intrinsically social beings, we are not only affected by what happens to ourselves, but also, and perhaps equally so, by experiences of people around us. In this respect, research shows that the quality of people’s lives deteriorates by the impact of crime on others (Powdthavee 2005). The fear that this generates negatively affects levels of well-being to an equal extent as actual victimisation (Cohen 2008; Powdthavee 2005), and, in South Africa, to a *greater* extent (Møller 2005, my emphasis). My research supports these findings. It appeared that the constant anticipation of becoming a violent crime victim terrorised participant’s lives. As Agnes said, ‘It’s about terror, about fright, that you live in fear … because you never knew, it was random, you never knew when it was your turn’ (Interview, 2015). Also, most interviewees stated that, as violence ‘came closer’, they had become more afraid. First, they had read stories in the newspapers about anonymous victims of violent crime. Then, the victims were friends of friends. Finally, the victims became friends or family members. Indeed, all interviewees were affected by violent crime in South Africa through the experiences of relatives, friends and colleagues. A number of participants’ elderly parents had been attacked and assaulted in their homes; some had siblings that experienced armed house robberies; one participant’s sister was
raped; one interviewee’s neighbours were attacked in their homes, in which the husband was killed and the wife raped; to escape rape and possibly murder, one couple’s friend was shot fourteen times while fleeing her house with her toddler child, who was shot too; one interviewee, in his professional role as a minister of religion, had buried three farmers who were killed in farm attacks; and several participants had close colleagues who were killed.

The experiences of people around them created the belief amongst participants that they could and would be next in becoming a victim of violent crime. Diana, a woman in her sixties, for example, stated: ‘Do I want to become one of the statistics: “An old lady being raped and murdered in her flat?!”’ (Interview, 2016, English original). Most strongly, however, interviewees feared for their loved ones’ safety. Men mostly feared for their wives and daughters with regards to the possibility of them becoming rape victims. Karel’s sentiments were typical in this respect as he exclaimed: ‘Was I going to wait until they kill my wife and rape my daughter?!’ (Interview, 2016). Women, too, felt that they could not protect their children from violent crime. Tessa, a single mother, recounted how she realised this when, on a Sunday afternoon in a wealthy neighbourhood in Pretoria, someone smashed her car’s window and grabbed her bag from the seat next to her son. ‘If my car would be hijacked,’ she thought, ‘I would not have time to fetch [her son] from the backseat, and they [the hijackers] would have him. I would not survive something like that’ (Interview, 2015). Here, we are reminded that ‘violent threats against those one loves … can be more damaging than any assault against oneself’ (Jackson 2002: 39). In a similar vein, Anja stated:

I looked at my daughters and thought: this is a matter of time, before we are going to be attacked. It’s going to be your turn. It’s not a question of: ‘Ag, this happens to other people,’ no, this is a question of: this is going to happen to you. This is how I started to think. This is going to happen to me and my daughters, one or other time …

(Interview, 2016)

As these examples show, most study participants feared that they or their family members would become violent crime victims due to the many stories of people around them who
were victimised. In this sense, it can be said that they suffered from ‘secondary traumatisation’, meaning that they had psychological problems similar to actual victims (Zerach, Greene & Solomon 2015; cf. Figley 1986), such as feeling tense, stressed, anxious and depressed (Powdthavee 2005). This, in Zalenski and Raspa’s words, ‘reveals the brutality of a life directed by a regimen of fear’ (2006: 1122). The effects of this on the interviewees can be witnessed in all three end results of the emotional state that fear generated. That is, as discussed in the introduction, the fear resulted in a changed mental state, a changed bodily state, and in altered behaviour. The analysis in the next section demonstrates this in more detail.

**Closing down and tightening up: the effects of fear**

Although we have seen that the occurrence of violent crime in South Africa is normalised, my analysis makes clear that none of the Afrikaners I engaged with had genuinely become accustomed to living in constant fear. Indeed, this would be impossible, as Green (1994) argues. About the ‘regimen of fear’ in 1980s Guatemala in which she conducted her fieldwork, Green writes: ‘Although this “state of emergency” in which Guatemalans have been living for over a decade may be the norm, it is an abnormal state of affairs indeed’ (1994: 228). She explains this further:

> How does one become socialized to terror? Does it imply conformity or acquiescence to the status quo? While it is true that, with repetitiveness and familiarity, people learn to accommodate themselves to terror and fear, low-intensity panic remains in the shadow of waking consciousness. One cannot live in a constant state of alertness, and so the chaos one feels becomes infused throughout the body.  

(ibid: 231)

Indeed, the ‘invisible violence of fear and terror’ (ibid: 247) became visible in most of the Afrikaners’ bodies through *physical changes*, namely illnesses. Most commonly, they had

---

5 It is also important to note the role of the media in the amplification of fear of crime (see, for example, Furedi 2007; Weatherburn & Indermaur 2004). Next to that, neither the increase in fear of crime nor the discordance between perception and reality regarding its threat is a uniquely South African phenomenon (see, amongst others, Ambrey, Fleming & Manning 2014; Davis, B & Dossetor 2010; Duffy et al. 2008; Durington 2009; Ferguson & Mindel 2007; Furedi 2007; Low 2007). Indeed, globally, the fear of crime has increased to such an extent that it is currently recognised as a more widespread problem than crime itself (Bannister & Fye 2001; Moore 2006).
Chapter 4  ‘Waiting to be next’

suffered from back pains and headaches. Many interviewees had been using heavy medications, primarily anti-depressants, in an attempt to find relief from their pain. Margo’s story is typical:

... we had many headaches when we were there [in South Africa], and spasms in our necks and so forth. And we took many pills, painkillers, and, I just recently said to [my husband], we never took paracetamol, we always took codeine. Here [in Australia], I heard, you have to, they want you to have a prescription for codeine, and we took only this, all of us [Afrikaners], we only took codeine. Because this, the other stuff is not strong enough ...

(Interview, 2015)

Yet, the use of anti-depressants as a way of trying to ‘numb’ the fear (see Taussig 2012 [1992]) did not work because still, the fear was felt constantly. This was because the participants perceived the danger to be ‘everywhere and anywhere’. Margo, for example, who, together with her husband, witnessed an armed robbery of a jewellery store, recalled that afterwards, ‘we were even more alert than before [but] you were always on your guard, people are always, there’ (Interview, 2015). Similarly, Carolien stated ‘You had fences, your doors were locked, you had a gun, and still you were scared... [Because] you always had in the back of your mind, you know, [that] something can happen’ (Interview, 2016). Another participant compared living in South Africa to ‘living in a warzone: you have to be afraid all the time’ (Joke, interview, 2016). This reminds us that more people are killed through crime in South Africa than through war in Syria. Though perhaps Natalie put it most succinctly when she said ‘in South Africa, you always sleep with one eye open’ (Interview, 2016).

Interviewees could not find analgesics for the resulting behavioural changes either. The fear changed their conduct in three principal ways. First, participants recounted how they, and everyone around them, became very aggressive and egocentric, since their primary concern became their own safety. This played itself out in traffic situations where, for example, everybody would speed and break other rules in order to get home quickly. It could also be seen in other public situations, for example, when somebody’s grocery bags had fallen over in a parking area and nobody would offer to help because they were too eager to get home safely themselves. One woman had been seven months pregnant when she wanted to get into her car to fetch her older child from school, when a large tree trunk had fallen over and
Chapter 4 ‘Waiting to be next’

blocked her driveway. She asked her neighbour for help but he replied: ‘I’m busy now’. Because of experiences like this, she said, ‘I almost didn’t like South Africans anymore’ (Joke, interview, 2016). Here we see that fear, indeed, destabilises social relations (Green 1994: 227). In general, participants recounted, people stopped being open and welcoming and started being closed, selfish and suspicious. Therefore, they spoke of a deep moral decline.

Secondly, the fear resulted in a phenomenon sometimes referred to as ‘inward migration’ (see, for example, Bornman 2005). That is, study participants started to withdraw from society. Primarily, this occurred because they remained inside their homes for most of the time, especially at night. Many mothers narrated how they would stay indoors with their children until their husbands came home, out of fear that something would happen to them otherwise. Children were no longer allowed to play outside, not even in the garden. Some interviewees also started home schooling their children because they regarded school as a dangerous place. This demonstrates that fear can ‘shrink bodies in a state of afraidness,’ where ‘safety becomes a question of not inhabiting public space’ (Ahmed 2014: 70).

Ultimately, the great majority of the Afrikaners, and especially those from Gauteng province, moved to so-called gated communities: walled suburbs with armed, boom-gated entrances and security personnel patrolling the area. Even within these ‘secured villages’, participants transformed their homes into self-made prisons due to the multiple forms of security they installed in and around their houses in order to regain some sense of safety. Many interviewees recounted what their gardens had looked like, with high walls, electronic gates, fences, beams and sensors, and their homes, with alarm systems, slam-lock doors, burglar bars covering all windows, gated security doors dividing living and sleeping areas, and sometimes with panic rooms (fortified rooms within the house to provide safe shelter in the event of a break-in) and private security. This last term refers to armed response units similar to police teams who operate privately and come to your aid in case of an emergency. This

---

6 As discussed in Chapter 2, Gauteng, with its capital Johannesburg, is South Africa’s most violent region (SSA 2018). It is also worth noting that, associated with the previously mentioned general increase in fear of crime, the phenomenon of the ‘gated community’ is a global issue and the Afrikaners’ behaviour in this respect should thus also be seen within this context (see Dupuis & Thorns 2008).
type of home security is, for those who can afford it, increasingly used in South Africa because of the failing police services (see, most notably, Diphoorn 2015). Here we see another result of the invisible violence of fear, in the sense that the participants were repressing themselves by ‘locking [themselves] in’ (see Galtung 1990: 293).

Despite all their efforts, however, they were not safe, as ample stories of burglaries demonstrate. Security measures can protect people from crime only so far, and, ultimately, they cannot. Daphne’s story is illustrative here. She and her daughters experienced an armed house robbery while her husband was away for the weekend, as referred to earlier. This happened despite the fact that the family had moved into Pretoria’s most heavily secured village, which they had done as a consequence of multiple break-ins including a previous armed robbery. ‘This [last village] was like Fort Knox,’ Daphne said, ‘you know, six feet walls, double electric fencing, guards walking around with firearms, barriers, you can only enter with your finger print...’ (Interview, 2015). Indeed, instead of a safe haven from the outside world, such as the image of ‘the home’ is usually—and ideally—constructed (see, for example, Ahmed 2014; Chapman & Hockey 1999), home became ‘the most dangerous place to be’, in the experience of most participants. This was because, as Anja stated, ‘This is [the place] where they are coming to get you: in your home, in the middle of the night’ (Interview, 2016). This shows that the experience(s) of house burglaries ‘leads to a fundamental reconsideration of the safety of the boundaries of home’ (Chapman 1999: 141).

In this respect, the Afrikaner émigrés that I worked with had a fundamentally different experience from those whom Boersema (2013) interviewed in South Africa. By contrast, he writes that his participants whom had moved to ‘gated communities’ experienced home as haven indeed, and that ‘inside the gate, they feel at home because the place ... allows them to feel care free’ (2013: 237). This difference in the felt experience could be one indication of which Afrikaners decide to stay (Boersema’s research participants), and which decide to leave (my interviewees). This brings us to the third way in which the fear of violent crime changed

---

7 This is an ideal image of the home, since there are, evidently, many people who are not safe in their own homes, due to domestic violence, abuse or neglect.
participants’ behaviour, namely, they left South Africa. Since their attempt to preserve or restore their sense of safety through ‘inward migration’ failed, they subsequently tried to recreate or replace their loss through emigration. Thus we see that fear, as the reality in which the Afrikaners lived, was ‘the hidden state of (individual and social) emergency factored into the choices [they made]’ (Green 1994: 228). In the next part of this chapter, we will see that this reality had become a part of who they were, that is, it belonged to them, to such an extent that they experienced difficulty in adjusting to a fear-free situation.

**Australia: ‘You just feel safe, it is the strangest feeling’**

In contrast to South Africa, Australia is a relatively safe country with respect to the prevalence of crime. Globally, it ranks highest in terms of social progress, together with the northwestern European countries, Canada and New Zealand (Social Progress Index 2018). For comparison, in 2018, Australia’s Social Progress Score was 88 on a scale from 1 to 100 hundred, whereas South Africa’s score was 66. Also, Australia’s GDP per capita was three times higher than South Africa’s in 2018 (ibid). As we can see from these figures, social progress is directly related to income (wealth) and development (opportunities) and, as such, to the prevalence of crime (see, for example, Weatherburn, Halstead & Ramsey 2016; cf. Pash 2018; Global Wealth Migration Review 2018). Accordingly, a high level of social progress indicates a low level of crime. Therefore, Australia is regarded as a peaceful country. In 2018, it ranked 15th highest in the Global Peace Index (Global Peace Index 2018). Although crime levels have slightly increased since 2016 (ABS 2016), Australia is still considered as one of the safest countries in the world, and particularly for raising children (Global Wealth Migration Review 2018).

Hence, by moving to Australia, the research participants were able to regain their sense of safety. In a way, they were even able to restore the past, by replacing pre-1994 South Africa with Australia.\(^8\) This is illustrated by the fact that many interviewees referred to Australia as

---

\(^8\) That is, by replacing their experience of pre-1994 South Africa by Australia. As previously stated, for most other South Africans, that is, for those who were classified as non-white during apartheid, South Africa has always been a violent and dangerous country.
‘South Africa 30 or 40 years ago’ regarding the relatively low levels of violent crime and the way of life that this allows. In this respect, the emigration drastically changed their lives. Their circumstances altered from being in a situation in which they feared for their lives and for the lives of their loved ones on a daily basis, to one in which they were able to trust that they and their loved ones were reasonably safe from physical harm in terms of the probability of becoming a victim of violent crime. Although the result of this change was positive for the participants, they were initially absolutely shocked by the abnormality of living in safety, as the following section illustrates.

‘How can you live like that?!’ Traumatised by living in safety

The extent to which the safety situation in Australia had initially been bizarre, almost ridiculous, to the Afrikaners, is exemplified by the following excerpt from an interview with Diana (2015), who recalled her first visit to an Australian friend in 2010:

... as we drove up [to the house] I said: ‘There’s no fence!’ He says: ‘No, there’s no fence.’ So I said: ‘How safe is that?!’ And he said: ‘Quite safe.’ For me, that was just so... you know... in [South Africa before 1994] there was no fences, it was just like it is here [in Australia] now. That’s what it was. You could walk up to a front door and ring the bell, you know. You can’t do that anymore today: it’s high fences, it’s razor wire, it’s electric fences, it’s flood lights, it’s, you know... And then, the other thing, the first night I stayed here [in Australia], I looked around and I said: ‘It’s so dark.’ And he said: ‘Well, that’s normal here, at night it’s dark.’ And I said, ‘But in South Africa, I’m so used, there’s always light from one of the other houses that sort of shines into your yard,’ you know, and it was just, it was just so different and ... I, I was... I was shocked!

Other participants also spoke of shock and disbelief about the way people were living in Australia. Judith for example, who emigrated with her family in 2010, told me how she had been ‘awestruck by the fact that I could have all this freedom and walk anywhere, anytime, without having to have fear or be afraid or look over my shoulder or anything’ (Interview, 2015). Jolanda and Mark, a couple that immigrated in 2008, recalled that upon arrival they went to a festival with Mark’s new Australian colleagues. At the event, Mark and Jolanda would not let their children run out of sight to play with other children. The Australian parents, however, assured them that that was all right, that they could do that and that their children would still be safe. ‘We were just so shocked about that’, Jolanda said (Interview, 2016).
What these examples show is that, although the change was beneficial, the new reality was unfamiliar to research participants, and, therefore, it shocked them. What they had known in South Africa, that is, what had been familiar to them, was to live in fear. Now, the new situation abruptly released them from this fear. This reminds us that our reality does not have to be loved in order to be experienced as a loss (see Boss 1999; Davies 2012; Doka 2002; Freud 1917; Marris 2015 [1986]; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976). It has to have been familiar and predictable however unhealthy the situation may have been. Hence, it took quite some time for interviewees to get used to the new situation in Australia, even though the altered circumstances meant a significant improvement in their quality of life. Participants mentioned that they had needed a period of adjustment ranging from somewhere between three months up to three years. For instance, Judith, who moved with her husband and their teenage daughters, commented on the abnormality of being free from fear:

It’s something to get used to, I battled with that, because, especially with the girls in the beginning, they would want to go here and they would want to go there and I was so nervous because ‘You can’t! What if something happens!’ You can’t get on the bus, because you don’t get on the bus in South Africa, you don’t get on the train, so in the beginning it was a thing. I wouldn’t let them go anywhere, I would go and Google-search it first and drive there and I wanted to go and see everything before I let them go anywhere and they had to report every five minutes. And now it’s like, now it’s: ‘[Mom], we’re going there,’ and I’m like: ‘OK, when will I see you again.’

(Interview, 2015)

We could say that Judith was ‘traumatised’ at first, in the sense that she was overwhelmed by the experience of living in safety in Australia and could not immediately integrate this into her life world (see Caruth 1996; cf. Chapter 2). Indeed, many participants used the word ‘trauma’ in describing how they had felt upon arrival in Australia. Lena, for example, told me that the first six months in Australia had been ‘very traumatic’ for her:

… because the house that we lived in at first only had the smallest, most simple locks, that I told my husband: ‘I can break into this house and I’m not even a crook! So how easy must it be for someone who wants to break in, to break into this house?’ What they call security fencing [in Australia] is not for me security fencing! This is, anyone that kicks it hard will open it!

(Interview, 2015)
For Lena, who had carried a gun with her every day of her life, who had had shooting lessons as part of her leisure activities in order to be able to defend herself in the case of an attack, who was used to security bars in front of her windows and who had become comfortable with alarm systems, security gates and electric fences, living in Australia was actually scary at first. She could not understand how people could live without all these things and yet feel safe, and it took her about six months to realise that, in fact, it had been the South African lifestyle that had been abnormal.

Like Lena, most interviewees stated that they only realised how traumatising fear as a way of life had been for them after they had been living in Australia for some time. Also, certain events triggered long-suppressed fears and anxieties. For instance, Reinder recalled how he was confronted with his own mental wounds when, in his new home in Australia, the fire alarm went off in the middle of the night. In recounting the story, he sat up straight once more, looking shocked, panicked: ‘We were both [his wife and himself] out of our bed: “What is happening?!” … “Are our children OK?!” But then we thought: “We don’t have an alarm.”’ (Interview, 2016). Thus, half a sleep, Reinder put new batteries into the fire alarm and all became quiet again. However, when he got back to bed, he could not sleep anymore:

> Because that alarm that went off in the middle of the night, that aroused so many old emotions and old stuff, I couldn’t sleep. Because you were always so alert when an alarm went off in the middle of the night [in South Africa], the first thing you do is, you jump up and check if everybody’s OK, close the door, keep safe. Where is the alarm ringing, in which zone in the house, then you know what to do, where to go. All that stuff …  
> (Interview, 2016)

Reinder’s experience echoes Suárez-Orozco’s (1990) finding that when people have lived with terror, they carry their psychological wounds with them, regardless of the new, safe situation. Suárez-Orozco found that his research participants, who had survived Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’, were stalked by nightmares long after. Indeed, some of my interviewees also suffered from terrible dreams after they had arrived in Australia. For instance, Anja recounted how, after having lived in Australia for two months, she started having awful nightmares about people attacking her: ‘Every night I dream [that] I’m lying in my bed, then they come and hit me on my head, then I wake up with pain in my head, because it was so real! This feels to me it’s
genuine!’ (Interview, 2016). ‘Or,’ Anja continued, ‘I dream that someone is on top of me and starts to rape me, tears my clothes from me…’ On other nights, she dreamt that her children were being attacked and she could not protect them, or that she was driving in her car and being hijacked. But then she thought:

But why? Why am I dreaming this? I am safe now. Then I realised that I had all those fears in South Africa but I never acknowledged it. I’ve always supressed it, it was in my subconscious. And now that I am safe, it comes up, now it surfaces. And when I realised this, the nightmares stopped. When I started making sense of what was happening to me.

Anja’s example demonstrates once more that our beliefs construct our reality. That is, whether people are actually in a life-threatening situation, such as in Videla’s Argentina (see Suárez-Orozco 1990) or whether they believe they are, such as contemporary Afrikaners in South Africa, their experience of the fear emotion and its consequences are similar. Anja’s story also shows that we need to understand the source of our problems in order to resolve them, or, alternatively, that we cope with grief by sense-making (see Castelli Dransart 2013). As Anja stated, her nightmares stopped when she understood her hidden trauma. By contrast, however, she could not change her habits that easily. The next section reveals that this was the case for most interviews.

‘It is just so in you’: the socialisation of our habits

As pointed out in the introduction, most participants had great difficulty letting go of old, ‘South African’ habits, even though they no longer needed them in Australia. This is because habits are so ingrained in us that we identify with them (Davies 2012). For example, Lena said that all the security measures she had taken in South Africa, including the shooting lessons and carrying a gun, were ‘so much a part of [her]’ that she could not ‘get out of this mentality’ easily or quickly (Interview, 2016, my emphasis). In general, discarding or changing habits is painful for people, as Davies (2012: 41) explains:

A central reason for this common response to significant change (even if this change was by all accounts for the best) becomes clearer when we understand we are rarely prepared psychologically to fit into a new situation. Being still orientated to the life we have left behind, our habits must alter ‘on the job’ so to speak.
That our habits belong to us, as Lena’s example illustrates, helps to explain why we are so unfit, mentally, to adapt to a new environment. Other research participants used similar phrases when talking about how they retained their South African habits with regards to safety, such as ‘... it is just so in you, you know, that whole thinking’ (Diana, interview, 2016). This demonstrates that the Afrikaners had fully integrated into their way of life in South Africa. The habits and customs associated with living in fear of crime had become a part of their identity. Margo’s anecdote is illustrative as well:

And [my husband], he never opened the curtains, because he was afraid that they would, would break in or something like that. And then I would say to him: ‘But they...here it’s not, people are not going to break in here!’ But this was just, this was still from South Africa. When we just came here, we were continuously in that thing [in that South African mindset].

(Interview, 2015)

Similar to keeping curtains closed, many female interviewees said that they still locked the doors when they were home alone, and some of them had been living in Australia for more than 10 years. I also observed many women locking the doors behind me when I entered their house for an interview or casual visit. Other habits also died hard, such as leaving lights on at night and checking on children every so often. For instance, Tessa told me that during the first three years that she had been living in Australia, she kept checking her son’s bedroom, every hour, to see if he was still there and still safe (Interview, 2016). Another participant stated:

For the whole first year, I checked, every night, whether the windows were closed and if there was no one lurking around in the garden. And even now, after nine years, I still sometimes look around to see if someone is following me, or when I’m driving my car, I think that I should drive a few more rounds before going home. And then I realise, I don’t have to.

(Sasha, interview, 2016)

Like Sasha, the great majority of interviewees at some point realised that it was unnecessary for them to cling to South African habits with regards to trying to keep safe from violent crime. These habits, that were ‘configured to succeed in the old situation,’ were now ‘out of step with the new’ (Davies 2012: 41). Gradually, the emotion of fear was replaced by the emotion of trust, for each participant at their own pace. They experienced that they could now trust that they were reasonably safe from physical harm, and this new emotional state resulted in
Chapter 4  ‘Waiting to be next’

a change of behaviour, in an altered bodily change and in different feelings. These changes are the focus of the next and final section of this chapter.

**Opening up and letting go: the results of trust**

In terms of behaviour, the most significant change was that in Australia, the Afrikaners started to re-inhabit public space (Ahmed 2014) and to re-open the boundaries of the home (Chapman & Hockey 1999). Children played outside and out of sight of parents again, teenagers went out to the city unsupervised on public transport, and curtains and windows were opened. Whereas fear ‘restricts the body’s mobility’ (Ahmed 2014: 69), trust works to open the body up to the world. Indeed, the great majority of study participants narrated how wonderful it was for them to be able to go out again without experiencing fear. They mostly spoke about seemingly simple outings, such as taking the dog for a walk or going jogging. Margo, for example, said:

… it’s better for me [in Australia] because I have more personal freedom. I’m happy that I have this, because I can go out more, I can go running outside, I can do anything outside, this is, I do much more things outdoors, outdoor activities, and I never did this in South Africa.

(Interview, 2015)

Similarly, Eva told me that she did not want to return to South Africa ever, because ‘they [South Africans]’, in contrast to Eva in Australia, ‘have no freedom, [because] it is not safe’ (Interview, 2015). And another interviewee used the example of me and her being able to go the movies at night, or go anywhere at night-time for that matter, because ‘it is safe’ (Corien, interview, 2015). What these examples reveal is that the meaning of safety for the study participants lay in freedom. Freedom, here, in the sense of ‘being unrestricted and able to move easily’ as well as ‘not being imprisoned’ (OED). Thus, we see that ‘emotions align bodily space with social space’ (Ahmed 2014: 69) in the sense that the Afrikaners were leaving their homes, which no longer looked like prisons, and joined public life because trust had replaced fear.

The trust emotion did not only affect where the interviewees took their bodies, it also altered their bodies as such. In contrast to the analysis in the first section of this chapter, where we
saw that many of the Afrikaners suffered from physical and mental illnesses due to their constant fear, here my analysis shows that their bodies became relaxed. For instance, Margo, who remembered having severe ‘stress headaches, every day’ in South Africa, experienced the following:

... when we came here [to Australia], the first three months, this remained. And after these first three months, I can’t remember anymore when I last had a headache. I stopped having it altogether. ... It was just strange when we came here and we stopped having these headaches.

(Interview, 2015)

Similarly, Carolien stated:

I’m much healthier here. There, I was on many medications and this was all as a consequence of the stress. And from the moment I came here, I almost never went to a doctor. You didn’t have that tension.

(Interview, 2016)

The release of tension was narrated by nearly all study participants. Whereas in South Africa, their bodies had been in a constant state of vigilance, now they began to be transformed into a state of relaxation. This was experienced as a literal loosening up of the body. For instance, many female interviewees narrated how they had always been ‘clenching their handbags tight’ to their bodies in South Africa. Most others also talked of ‘always looking over your shoulder,’ indicating a tightness in the body, especially in the back and shoulders. After coming to Australia, their bodies could let go of this tension and thus, literally, loosen up. In Lieke’s words, being in Australia was ‘... just like... being... [inhales and exhales deeply] ... like breathing’ (Interview, 2016). Here, too, it took time before participants adjusted to their new situation, as Aafke’s story illustrates:

In the beginning [in Australia] I held on to my handbag so tight, I was so afraid that something would happen to my handbag, [that] they would steal my handbag. But I haven’t had any problem ever.

(Interview, 2015)

Aafke told me that it took her a month or two to leave her handbag alone, and even put it on the backseat of her car without closing the car doors. This was an entirely new habit for her.
Another participant, Tessa, recalled how being in Australia changed her in the sense that she no longer had to be in a constant state of watchfulness:

I worked in the city ... so I would walk from work on a Friday after work, to the car park across, well, two, three streets away, and I wouldn't think, or be thinking: ‘Who’s walking behind me,’ you know, ‘Who’s in my [car],’ ‘you know. You don’t have to be alert all the time.

(Interview, 2016)

Similarly, Anja initially did not dare to drive with her car windows open, but after a few months she noticed that, in Australia, ‘nobody has tried to hijack me. In fact, they don’t even see me!’ (Interview, 2016). This is the state of inobservance or inattentiveness that trust allows, and to which most research participants adjusted after having been in Australia for a certain amount of time. As stated, this timeframe varied for different interviewees. It took Sasha for example nine years before she could experience the following:

Just the other day, I was texting in my [parked] car with the door open, in front of my house, and someone walked past and I didn’t even notice really, I didn’t look up. And just as the person passed, I thought: ‘Wow, in South Africa I would’ve never sat like this, openly texting in my car.’

(Interview, 2016)

Finally, this bodily state of relaxedness is, of course, closely related to a peaceful mental state that derives from the trust emotion. Indeed, the above described behavioural and bodily changes were accompanied by feelings of relief, liberation and freedom. These ‘mental experiences’ or ‘cognitive representations of the emotional state’ (see Damasio 2001) were also unfamiliar to the study participants. For example, Miranda, after having lived in Australia for only three months, said with surprise: ‘You just feel safe, it is the strangest feeling, it really is’ (Interview, 2015). Likewise, Emiel told me how strange he had felt coming to Australia and suddenly not having to worry about safety anymore. His story, like most, demonstrated immense relief:

Since I’m in Australia, I realise how it feels to walk to restaurants without being worried about safety, to be out in the evenings and never being worried that your wife is alone somewhere or things like that. This makes a huge difference in one’s peace of mind.

(Interview, 2015)
Other participants also contrasted this carefree feeling with how they had felt in South Africa. For instance, Evelina found that, in Australia, ‘peace and tranquillity was waiting for us’ (Interview, 2016) and Sander said that, although he had initially wanted to return to South Africa, his wife told him a definitive ‘no’, because ‘she feels safe, she didn’t feel stressed anymore’ (Interview, 2016). Perhaps Carolien put it most succinctly when she said that, in contrast to South Africa, in Australia ‘you can sleep at night and you can actually sleep’ (Interview, 2016). What we see here is that the mental state accompanying the loosened bodily state and the freer behaviour also signified relaxation. Noor, for example, said that in contrast to Australia, in South Africa, ‘I did not feel quite relaxed, ever’ (Interview, 2015).

Judith explained the different feelings well when she shared the following anecdote:

I was telling my sister [in South Africa] the other day, I said to her: ‘If I have to explain to you what it’s like when we’re here [in Australia], I can only use an example,’ and that’s when we went on holiday, me and her, to the Cape. And I said to her: ‘Remember when we got there, the minute we unpacked the car you got this sit-back-and-relax feeling,’ it’s just that ‘I’m not worried,’ that feeling. I said to her: ‘That is how I live [in Australia] every day.’

(Interview, 2015)

Ultimately, the *meaning* of this relaxed mental state lies in freedom as well. Not in the sense of ‘freedom to’, that is, freedom to move through public space as previously discussed, but here in the sense of ‘freedom from’, that is, ‘the state of not being subject to or affected by something undesirable’ (OED), in this case the fear of violent crime. In trying to explain to me how she felt about this freedom, Sabine’s summary was illustrative:

When you have lived in fear… you will never feel how it is not to live in fear until you come and live in a country in which you do not have to be afraid. And… *that freedom*, which you get, I don’t know how to explain this… this is something within you that just… this just changes who you are.

(Interview, 2016)

Indeed, many interviewees witnessed an identity change in themselves due to the freedom from fear. After their move to Australia they experienced that they had become calmer, friendlier, and, as one participant put it, ‘a much nicer person’ (Tirza, interview, 2016). Thus we see that, with regards to physical belonging, the Afrikaners were able to fully recreate their loss. Moving to Australia had restored their safety needs in both a physical as well as a
mental respect (see Bowlby 1980; Davies 2012; Davis, J 1992; Dewey 2007 [1922]; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maslow 1943; 1970). That is, they had regained their freedom by liberating themselves from the repression (Galtung & Wirak 1977) and invisible violence (Green 1994) of the fear of violent crime.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the story of how the Afrikaners dealt with the loss of their sense of physical safety in South Africa stood central. I have conceptualised the need to be physically safe as the need for physical belonging. As discussed in the introduction, Vanderhaeghen (2018) refers to the Afrikaners’ loss of physical belonging as a ‘discourse of extinction’, which makes sense, since physical belonging refers to the act of living. In post-apartheid South Africa, the research participants felt that their lives were threatened on a daily basis due to high crime levels. According to their own narrative, these crime levels had increased significantly since 1994 and, crucially, violent crime was directed at them, as a group, because they were being held responsible for apartheid. Although secondary data contests both these beliefs, my analysis in this chapter demonstrates that, similar to that in the previous chapter, for the lived reality this is irrelevant. That is, although it may be a ‘discourse’ of extinction, or a discourse of threat of extinction, for the people who live this discourse it is not a story. It is their life.

Consequently, this chapter has demonstrated the devastating power of the emotion of fear. We have seen how the fear of harm and death became the interviewees’ way of life in South Africa, similarly to how Green (1994, 1999) witnessed it in her research participants in Guatemala and how Scheper-Hughes (1992) saw it destroying her informants’ lives in Brazil. My ethnographic data particularly echoed Greens’ works, as we have seen throughout this chapter. Furthermore, the analysis has demonstrated how this fear, like all emotions, resulted in changes in the research participants’ bodies and minds, and, subsequently, in their behaviour (see Damasio 1999; 2001; Damasio & Carvalho 2013; Elias 1987; Heelas 1984; Lutz & White 1986; Rosaldo 2009 [1984]). Their bodies became tense and tight and ill and they felt constantly scared. This resulted in two opposite types of behaviour. The first, conceptualised as ‘inward migration’ (Bornman 2005), can be seen as the attempt to preserve or restore what
was lost. Here, the Afrikaners moved to so-called ‘gated communities’ or ‘secured villages’ (see, amongst others, Dupuis & Thorns 2008; Durington 2009; Low 2007) in an attempt to feel safe from violent crime again. However, we have seen that this attempt failed: they were still affected by violent crime and it did not restore their sense of safety.

The second way in which they acted upon their fear was by ‘outward migration’, that is, by emigration. This strategy represents the opposite side of the conflict of grief, namely, the urge to recreate or replace what has been lost. As the second part of the chapter demonstrated, this was successful. Australia is a prosperous and therefore relative safe country with respect to the occurrence of violent crime, as we have seen (Global Peace Index 2018; Global Wealth Migration Review 2018; Social Progress Index 2018; Weatherburn, Halstead & Ramsey 2016). Yet, the analysis also revealed that it was quite traumatic for the research participants, at first, to suddenly live in freedom from fear. As discussed, this is because we thrive on familiarity and feel thus threatened by change. As the bereavement of familiarity, change robs us of our need to feel psychologically safe. That is, in order to feel mentally safe, we need to understand our world, and in order to do so, it needs to be constant and predictable (Boss 1999; Bowlby 1980; Davies 2012; Davis, J 1992; Dewey 2007 [1922]; Marris 2015 [1986]). This means that, even though the Afrikaners liberated themselves from their fear of violent crime by moving to Australia, that is, even though the change was nothing but beneficial in this respect, they still had a difficult time adjusting to their new situation. Yet, ultimately, they were able to adjust to their new, free, lifestyle. Indeed, this chapter has concluded that the meaning of the change lay in freedom. By moving to Australia, the study participants had regained their freedom to move through public space because they had recreated trust in their physical safety. In the next chapter, we will see to what extent the immigration additionally restored their sense of spatial and socio-political belonging.
Chapter 4  ‘Waiting to be next’:
Seeking physical safety

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the Afrikaners’ lost sense of physical belonging or physical safety in South Africa, and how they recreated this by immigrating to Australia. The chapter consists of two main parts. The first part discusses the research participants’ narrative with regards to the loss concerned. They felt that they could no longer live in their home country because of the deadly threat posed by violent crime, which they believed was particularly directed at them out of revenge for apartheid. My analysis demonstrates that this felt loss, too, represented mostly a fear of loss. That is, in contrast to their perception, secondary research indicates that violent crime in South Africa does not affect Afrikaners more than any other cultural group, and my ethnographic data also suggests this, since only 4 out of 74 interviewees had had an actual experience of violent crime. Yet, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, in this respect, too, the analysis reveals that the narrative as felt creates the same reality as if it were true. That is, participants suffered immensely due to the emotion of fear, which was so omnipresent that it became part of them. Since the emotion was real, it became a fact, through the results it generated. One of these results, or, the ultimate result, was that they decided to leave their homeland and move to Australia.

The second part of this chapter discusses how this coping mechanism worked out for the study participants. Here, my analysis shows that the Afrikaners were able to fully recreate their sense of safety or physical belonging. However, it also reveals that they were having great difficulty adapting to living in a relatively safe country. Initially, this absolutely shocked them, which shows that we adapt to our environment, also when it is harmful, to such an extent that we identify with it. Following this, I argue that, although the loss of belonging to
South Africa in this respect had a positive meaning—it entailed the liberation of the fear of becoming a crime victim—initially the interviewees still suffered from a loss of familiarity. The chapter concludes, however, that, ultimately, they were able to adjust to the otherwise beneficial change. Before I continue to explain the difficulty of change for people in general, I first discuss the concepts of physical belonging and the emotion of fear.

By the term physical belonging I refer to the ultimate material form of belonging on this earth, that is, being present in the world in a physical body. Thus, put simply, it refers to the act of living. As discussed in previous chapters, evidently one of the most crucial requirements for doing so is to be safe from physical harm. Although all adults are aware of the fact that they will, one day, cease to exist in this life, we usually do not think about this on a daily basis. My research participants, however, did. Most of them said that, in South Africa, they ‘never knew if this day was going to be [their] last’. They feared for their physical safety due to the prevalence of violent crime, which, as stated above, they felt was specifically targeted at them. Vanderhaeghen (2018: 46) refers to this as a ‘discourse of extinction’, ‘of genocide’, even, and argues that Afrikaners feel threatened by physical extermination due to the phenomenon of ‘farm murders’ (plaasmoorde), attacks on farms in which farmers, usually white, and their families are assaulted and/or killed, often brutally (see, amongst others, SAHRC 2014; Wilkinson 2017; Wines 2003). As the first part of this chapter demonstrates, my analysis supports his argument.

Yet, as the previous chapter has shown, a discourse is not just a story for the people who believe it. For them, it is a reality (cf. Bruner 1996; Hervik 1994). Crucially, the emotions associated with the belief in this reality are real, too. In the case of the Afrikaners in this research, whom believed that they, sooner or later, would become victims of violent crime, the emotion of fear was very real, as the ethnographic data demonstrates. It created a high degree of suffering, since most interviewees had felt extremely scared in South Africa, all the time. Hence, they left. Indeed, as my analysis shows, like most emotions, fear results in altered behaviour. Next to conduct, emotions also affect our bodies and minds. More specifically, as the neurological processes designed to keep us alive (Damasio & Carvalho 2013; Elias 1987; cf. Lutz & White 1986), emotions lead to an emotional state which result in
an altered physical as well as mental state (Damasio 2001: 103, my emphases). This mental state is referred to as *feelings*, which can thus be defined as ‘cognitive representations of emotional states’ (Damasio 2001: 104) or ‘mental experiences that accompany a change in body state’ (Damasio & Carvalho 2013: 143, 145; cf. Damasio 1999). Here, we see that, contrary to common thought, *feelings* are merely one end result of emotions and should not be equated with the neurological process as such (cf. Elias 1987; Heelas 1984; Rosaldo 2009 [1984]). For example, when we are faced with danger, our brain sends a collection of responses to our body and to other parts of our brain (Damasio 2001: 103), which results in an emotional state that we call *fear*. Consequently, our *bodies* change in the sense that our muscles tighten and our heart rate increases, and our *minds* change in the sense that we are feeling scared. As we have seen, feeling scared often leads to a behavioural change as well. In this case it resulted in the fact that the Afrikaners decided to leave their homeland. Yet, through this decision they were confronted with a different type of fear, namely the fear of change.

Change can be defined as the loss of familiarity. Familiarity is part of our safety needs, since we need to understand, predict and be able to interpret other people’s behaviour (Marris 2015 [1986]), as well as understand that behaviour in the societal context, in order to feel psychologically safe (Boss 1999; Bowlby 1980; Davies 2012; Davis, J 1992; Dewey 2007 [1922]). Importantly, the familiar reality does not have to be positive, as long as it is known. Davies (2012: 39-40) illustrates this with the example of abuse victims who miss their former violator, not because of the latter’s behaviour but due to the familiarity and constancy that the relationship afforded. Similarly, Rosenblatt, Walsh and Jackson argue that a strongly felt loss can be ‘more a sign of broken patterns than of lost love’ (1976: 116). Thus, since we attach to whatever it is that becomes familiar to us, it is understandable that it was difficult for the Afrikaners to suddenly be freed from the fear of crime. Although the situation in South Africa was bad, they had become accustomed to fear as a way of life (see Green 1994; 1999; cf. Schepers-Hughes 1992), in the sense that they had adjusted their habits to the circumstances.
Habits can be defined as:

... acts which are regularly performed without our full conscious awareness or deliberation ... those ingrained patterns of thought, action and feeling which direct our lives in predictable ways; ways that help us live in relatively harmonious accord with the social group into which we have been socialised.

(Davies 2012: 12)

The habits that interviewees had developed in adjusting to the crime situation in South Africa had helped them, in their own experience, to survive. Furthermore, although we are adaptable beings, our capacity for adaptability depends on predictability and continuity. That is, we assimilate new experiences by placing them in the context of a familiar construction of reality (Marris 2015 [1986]: 2-12; cf. Colson 1971). This explains why, despite the change being beneficial, most research participants still experienced difficulty in adapting to their new situation in Australia. I discuss this in more detail in the second part of the chapter. Now, I first focus on the Afrikaners’ sense of loss of physical safety in South Africa.

**South Africa: ‘You’re just not safe’**

It is unsurprising that the study participants felt unsafe in South Africa, given the fact that the country is one of the most violent in the world (UNODC 2010; 2014). If we look at murder statistics, which are a yardstick for crime measurement in general (because few murders go unreported, see Merten 2018b), we see that in the year 2017/2018,\(^1\) 20,306 South Africans were murdered (SSA 2018), which translates into an average of 57 people per day (Merten 2018b) or 35.2 individuals per 100,000 inhabitants. This is more than five times the global average, which currently stands at 6.2 per 100,000 (UN 2014). For comparison, this number is also higher than the conflict-related deaths in today’s most fatal war, namely Syria (in 2017, the Syrian conflict cost just over 20,000 lives, see Pettersson & Eck 2018). Thus, although South Africa is not officially at war, in terms of violent deaths it would qualify as such. The reasons for this have to be sought in a number of factors.

---

\(^1\) The period from 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2018 (South Africa’s financial year).
In the first place, evidently, the legacy of colonialism and apartheid plays a major role. That is, South Africa has always been a violent country, due to the very nature of the state. Secondly, South Africa is one of the world’s most unequal countries (World Bank 2019)\(^2\) with more than half of its population living in poverty (Pretorius 2019)—and poverty relates directly to crime (Sachs 2005). Next to that, countries undergoing major transitions are usually characterised by a temporary increase in violence (see, for example, Habib 2013). Finally, answers also need to be sought in various, regionally specific, indigenous social and cultural practices (see Glaser 2008). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss these explanations further. What is important here is that, due to the prevalence of violent crime, the fear of becoming a crime victim impact on everyday life in South Africa to such an extent that fear has, indeed, become a way of life (see Kynoch 2013; Møller 2005; Scheper-Hughes 2014; cf. Green 1994, 1999). The following section demonstrates how interviewees experienced the normalisation of crime.

**When living in fear becomes the norm**

In the view of the Afrikaners, crime in South Africa had proliferated since 1994. Contrary to their belief, this perception is mostly based on the fact that the apartheid state had largely shielded them, and other white South Africans, from crime before 1994 (Kynoch 2013; Møller 2005; Scheper-Hughes 2014; Super 2010). This means that, in contrast to most other South Africans, the Afrikaners had not been used to high crime levels and living in fear before South Africa’s democratic turn. Indeed, as Super states (2010: 175), with the country’s democratic transition, ‘crime in South Africa has democratised as well’. The issue of whether violent crime has increased in the post-apartheid period is highly debated in South Africa in general (see, for example, Kriegler & Shaw 2016; Kynoch 2013; Møller 2005), and ultimately this question is impossible to answer due to a lack of reliable statistics on crime reporting, both during and after the apartheid period (Durington 2009).

\(^2\) South Africa’s GINI coefficient, the World Bank’s measure of income inequality, is 0.63 on a scale where 0 represents perfect equality and 1 represents perfect inequality (World Bank 2019).
Yet, statistics do demonstrate that white South Africans are, indeed, much more affected by crime since 1994 (Møller 2005; Scheper-Hughes 2014; Super 2010). My research supports this, since the great majority of the Afrikaners I spoke with had experienced crime post-1994. Most commonly, interviewees had become victims of one or multiple home burglaries. These ranged in seriousness from the theft of a few small items to the stripping of their entire house. This finding supports other research demonstrating that burglary is a category in which white South Africans are more affected by crime than other South Africans (Møller 2005; Silber & Geffen 2009). This is not because they are white, but because they are overall wealthier, since household crime occurs more among the wealthier classes of society (Møller 2005). Yet, this is also the only category in which white South Africans are more affected by crime than other South Africans: overall, they are not targeted more frequently than others.

Next to burglary, many interviewees had also become victims of other types of crime, most notably car theft and attempted car hijackings. Although these crime experiences did affect their wellbeing, the Afrikaners did not consider them to be violent and they spoke about them in an astonishingly laconic manner. This was, as I came to learn, because for them, these sorts of crimes had become perfectly normal. What I witnessed what was Taussig (2012 [1992]: 11) calls a ‘numbing and apparent acceptance’ in response to the ‘mundane experience of chronic fear’ (Green 1994: 230). Indeed, even though some of my research participants had been held at gunpoint, they maintained that ‘at least nothing bad has happened to us.’ What they meant with this was that they had not become victims of what they did see as violent crime: torture, rape and murder. Yet, the fact that these things could happen to them, and, most of all, to their children, instilled in them such a fear that it made their lives unbearable. To a certain extent, their fear can be put into context because violent crime in South Africa often is that violent (CSVR 2007), as the following story of Bert and Chantal, who experienced an armed house robbery, illustrates.

---

3 No separate statistics exist for Afrikaners and Anglo-South Africans.
Chapter 4 ‘Waiting to be next’

Bert and Chantal had been living in Pretoria and had had many security measures installed in and around their homes, as I will discuss further on. Yet, this had not prevented armed robbers entering their property one fateful night. As Chantal came home by car, Bert had opened the gate for her electronically, through remote-control, from inside the house. As he turned away from the window to go and meet his wife, however, he saw a number of armed men crouching behind Chantal’s car, entering their front yard through the opened gate. His fear at that point had been enormous, he said, because:

... normally, what they [the criminals] basically do is, they come in, then they surprise the husband, the man, in the home, they usually tie him up with telephone [wires] or whatever, and then usually they gang-rape the woman, rape the woman, and the children have to watch and see what’s happening, and then they torture you [the man] by putting boiling water in your throat or they burn you with an iron... so they are cruel, very cruel.

(Interview, 2016)

Yet, Bert remained calm enough to go and fetch his gun and hide behind a large piece of furniture. Chantal, in the meantime, had opened her car in the garage and was immediately grabbed and held at gunpoint by the attackers. They forced her to open the house and enter, but as they walked along the corridor, Bert started shooting at them. The attackers opened fire as well. Through the heat of the event Bert did not remember exactly what happened next. However, he was shot through his knee and, ultimately, he shot one of the attackers dead. Upon this, the others fled. Bert and Chantal, as well as their children who had been asleep, survived. ‘It was not me who was there and doing all those things,’ Bert said, ‘God took over.’

Another participant’s friend, however, had not been so lucky. Natalie recounted how her friend’s wife was gang-raped in front of him and their three sons during an armed robbery at their home. ‘Why?!’ Natalie cried. ‘This is very cruel and makes you feel very sick, this rips your heart out’ (Interview, 2016). Another interviewee, Daphne, was at home with her two daughters one weekend when her husband was away on a trip. She woke up at 2 am to find two armed robbers in her bedroom. ‘I don’t want to go into detail about what happened there,’ she said, ‘because they are things that I want to block out. But that night, I promised my children I would take them out of the country’ (Interview, 2015). These personal
experiences, as well as those of relatives and friends, made the Afrikaners believe that violent crime had a racial element. Although most of them related petty crime or non-violent crime to poverty and unemployment, which they saw as results of the successive ANC governments’ mismanagement, they felt that violent crime was racially motivated. Many echoed a comment by Bas, who stated that ‘Crime is not racially motivated, but the way in which the murders take place is’ (Interview, 2016). His explanation was similar to Joke’s, who felt that, ‘because of the unnecessary violence and the severity [of the physical harm done], it must be more than just sociopathic, it is racially motivated’ (Interview, 2016).

In discussing this issue, many interviewees referred to the phenomenon of ‘farm murders’, as explained previously. In relation to this, most also referred to the song ‘Kill the Farmer’ or ‘Kill the Boer’ (‘Aw dubul’ibhunu’ in Zulu). This is an old anti-apartheid struggle song that Julius Malema, the current leader of one of South Africa’s political parties, frequently sang when he was functioning as the ANC Youth League president from 2008 to 2012 (Forde 2012). For this, he was convicted of hate speech and expelled from the ANC in 2012 (Mail & Guardian 2011). Although the song is now banned in South Africa, its former usage has made many Afrikaners, including my research participants, feel extremely threatened (cf. Vanderhaeghen 2018). They interpreted the song, and the associated farm murders, as a deliberate ANC strategy to continue the fight against white South Africans, and Afrikaners in particular. Yet, none of my study participants, nor any of their friends or family members, had become victims of such farm attacks post-1994. Next to this, secondary research shows that, overall, farm attacks are not racially motivated (SAHRC 2014; Wilkinson 2017; Wines 2003). Indeed, most farmers are white, and therefore these attacks can appear racialised. However, black farmers and black farm workers are also killed in these attacks (SAHRC 2014) – out of the 52 farm owners murdered in 2017/2018, 48 were white and 4 were black (Davis, R 2018; cf. Vermeulen 2018). Furthermore, farm murders constitute a very small percentage of the total murder rate in South Africa. In 2017/2018, this figure was 0.3 percent.\(^4\)

\(^4\) In total, there were 62 people killed in violent attacks on farms (Davis, R 2018). Out of a total of 20,306 murders (SSA 2018), this is 0.3 per cent.
The reason why farms are often attacked is because they are so-called ‘soft targets’, meaning that they are easier to attack than properties in suburban areas due to their remote locations. Because of their geographical isolation, farms are ‘further removed from the possible deterrent presence of close neighbours, the police and other security institutions’ (Solidarity 2012: 59; cf. SAHRC 2014). One research participant, who had worked in the criminal justice system in South Africa, confirmed this when she said:

... many of the farmers are white, as a consequence of the apartheid system it is the white people that own the farms. But the white people [that] are being killed, they are victims because they are remote. If you want to go and kill and steal from people, it is obviously much more easy to do it on a far remote farm than in a city.

(Carolien, interview, 2016)

Carolien and her husband were two out of a handful of interviewees who held this view. The rest of the Afrikaners perceived the farm attacks as racially motivated. This demonstrates the pervasiveness of their own narrative. Yet, research conducted among black perpetrators of violent crime in general does demonstrate that some of this crime is indeed racially driven and has the intention of inflicting a painful death on its victims as its prime motive (Segal, Pelo & Rampa 2001). Hence, the fear that violent crime strikes in the Afrikaners can be placed in this context. Nevertheless, as we have seen, only a few interviewees had personally experienced violent crime. Other researchers, working with Afrikaans-speaking South Africans pre-migration, have also found that, contrary to their expectations, very few of their participants had experienced violent crime (Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013). This supports my analysis that it was predominantly the fear of crime that gave the Afrikaners a sense of loss of belonging, as I demonstrate in the following section.

‘Luckily, it wasn’t us’: secondary traumatisation

Nearly all Afrikaners whom I spoke with told me that they had been ‘much more lucky’ than their fellow émigrés because ‘this [violent crime] did not happen to us’. They also believed that I would hear ‘so many awful and painful stories’ from those fellow Afrikaners who, they
thought, *had been* affected by violent crime in South Africa. As this analysis shows, I did not. This demonstrates once more the power of the participants’ ‘Deep Story’, to reiterate Hochschild’s term (2016), and, most of all, the performative power of fear. Indeed, as Edmund Burke noted, ‘No power so effectively robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear’ (cited in Green 1994: 227). This is not meant to downplay the Afrikaners’ fear. By contrast, although it may not be based on a balanced perspective on reality, *the fear itself* was real, as I have previously argued. Next to that, South Africa *is* a very violent country, where, as a consequence, fear is not an acute reaction to a threat but rather ‘a chronic condition’ (Green 1994: 227). Furthermore, ‘threats of violence are also violence’ (Galtung 1990: 292, my emphasis), and, as we have seen in the previous chapter, we react to *threats* of the loss of basic needs as if they were already lost (Maslow 1943; 1970; cf. Bowlby 1980). When our physical safety is at stake, or when we *believe* it is, this completely dominates our lives (Zalenski & Raspa 2006: 1122; cf. Frankl 2008 [1946]), which the ethnography in this chapter illustrates.

What this section further demonstrates is that, as intrinsically social beings, we are not only affected by what happens to ourselves, but also, and perhaps equally so, by experiences of people around us. In this respect, research shows that the quality of people’s lives deteriorates by the impact of crime on others (Powdthavee 2005). The fear that this generates negatively affects levels of well-being to an equal extent as actual victimisation (Cohen 2008; Powdthavee 2005), and, in South Africa, to a *greater* extent (Møller 2005, my emphasis). My research supports these findings. It appeared that the constant anticipation of becoming a violent crime victim terrorised participant’s lives. As Agnes said, ‘It’s about terror, about fright, that you live in fear … because you never knew, it was random, you never knew when it was your turn’ (Interview, 2015). Also, most interviewees stated that, as violence ‘came closer’, they had become more afraid. First, they had read stories in the newspapers about anonymous victims of violent crime. Then, the victims were friends of friends. Finally, the victims became friends or family members. Indeed, all interviewees were affected by violent crime in South Africa through the experiences of relatives, friends and colleagues. A number of participants’ elderly parents had been attacked and assaulted in their homes; some had siblings that experienced armed house robberies; one participant’s sister was
raped; one interviewee’s neighbours were attacked in their homes, in which the husband was killed and the wife raped; to escape rape and possibly murder, one couple’s friend was shot fourteen times while fleeing her house with her toddler child, who was shot too; one interviewee, in his professional role as a minister of religion, had buried three farmers who were killed in farm attacks; and several participants had close colleagues who were killed.

The experiences of people around them created the belief amongst participants that they could and would be next in becoming a victim of violent crime. Diana, a woman in her sixties, for example, stated: ‘Do I want to become one of the statistics: “An old lady being raped and murdered in her flat?!”’ (Interview, 2016, English original). Most strongly, however, interviewees feared for their loved ones’ safety. Men mostly feared for their wives and daughters with regards to the possibility of them becoming rape victims. Karel’s sentiments were typical in this respect as he exclaimed: ‘Was I going to wait until they kill my wife and rape my daughter?!’ (Interview, 2016). Women, too, felt that they could not protect their children from violent crime. Tessa, a single mother, recounted how she realised this when, on a Sunday afternoon in a wealthy neighbourhood in Pretoria, someone smashed her car’s window and grabbed her bag from the seat next to her son. ‘If my car would be hijacked,’ she thought, ‘I would not have time to fetch [her son] from the backseat, and they [the hijackers] would have him. I would not survive something like that’ (Interview, 2015). Here, we are reminded that ‘violent threats against those one loves … can be more damaging than any assault against oneself’ (Jackson 2002: 39). In a similar vein, Anja stated:

I looked at my daughters and thought: this is a matter of time, before we are going to be attacked. It’s going to be your turn. It’s not a question of: ‘Ag, this happens to other people,’ no, this is a question of: this is going to happen to you. This is how I started to think. This is going to happen to me and my daughters, one or other time ...

(Interview, 2016)

As these examples show, most study participants feared that they or their family members would become violent crime victims due to the many stories of people around them who
were victimised. In this sense, it can be said that they suffered from ‘secondary traumatisation’, meaning that they had psychological problems similar to actual victims (Zerach, Greene & Solomon 2015; cf. Figley 1986), such as feeling tense, stressed, anxious and depressed (Powdthavee 2005). This, in Zalenski and Raspa’s words, ‘reveals the brutality of a life directed by a regimen of fear’ (2006: 1122). The effects of this on the interviewees can be witnessed in all three end results of the emotional state that fear generated. That is, as discussed in the introduction, the fear resulted in a changed mental state, a changed bodily state, and in altered behaviour. The analysis in the next section demonstrates this in more detail.

Closing down and tightening up: the effects of fear

Although we have seen that the occurrence of violent crime in South Africa is normalised, my analysis makes clear that none of the Afrikaners I engaged with had genuinely become accustomed to living in constant fear. Indeed, this would be impossible, as Green (1994) argues. About the ‘regimen of fear’ in 1980s Guatemala in which she conducted her fieldwork, Green writes: ‘Although this “state of emergency” in which Guatemalans have been living for over a decade may be the norm, it is an abnormal state of affairs indeed’ (1994: 228). She explains this further:

How does one become socialized to terror? Does it imply conformity or acquiescence to the status quo? While it is true that, with repetitiveness and familiarity, people learn to accommodate themselves to terror and fear, low-intensity panic remains in the shadow of waking consciousness. One cannot live in a constant state of alertness, and so the chaos one feels becomes infused throughout the body.

(ibid: 231)

Indeed, the ‘invisible violence of fear and terror’ (ibid: 247) became visible in most of the Afrikaners’ bodies through physical changes, namely illnesses. Most commonly, they had

---

5 It is also important to note the role of the media in the amplification of fear of crime (see, for example, Furedi 2007; Weatherburn & Indermaur 2004). Next to that, neither the increase in fear of crime nor the discordance between perception and reality regarding its threat is a uniquely South African phenomenon (see, amongst others, Ambrey, Fleming & Manning 2014; Davis, B & Dossetor 2010; Duffy et al. 2008; Durington 2009; Ferguson & Mindel 2007; Furedi 2007; Low 2007). Indeed, globally, the fear of crime has increased to such an extent that it is currently recognised as a more widespread problem than crime itself (Bannister & Fyfe 2001; Moore 2006).
Chapter 4  ‘Waiting to be next’

suffered from back pains and headaches. Many interviewees had been using heavy medications, primarily anti-depressants, in an attempt to find relief from their pain. Margo’s story is typical:

... we had many headaches when we were there [in South Africa], and spasms in our necks and so forth. And we took many pills, painkillers, and, I just recently said to [my husband], we never took paracetamol, we always took codeine. Here [in Australia], I heard, you have to, they want you to have a prescription for codeine, and we took only this, all of us [Afrikaners], we only took codeine. Because this, the other stuff is not strong enough ...

(Interview, 2015)

Yet, the use of anti-depressants as a way of trying to ‘numb’ the fear (see Taussig 2012 [1992]) did not work because still, the fear was felt constantly. This was because the participants perceived the danger to be ‘everywhere and anywhere’. Margo, for example, who, together with her husband, witnessed an armed robbery of a jewellery store, recalled that afterwards, ‘we were even more alert than before [but] you were always on your guard, people are always, there’ (Interview, 2015). Similarly, Carolien stated ‘You had fences, your doors were locked, you had a gun, and still you were scared... [Because] you always had in the back of your mind, you know, [that] something can happen’ (Interview, 2016). Another participant compared living in South Africa to ‘living in a warzone: you have to be afraid all the time’ (Joke, interview, 2016). This reminds us that more people are killed through crime in South Africa than through war in Syria. Though perhaps Natalie put it most succinctly when she said ‘in South Africa, you always sleep with one eye open’ (Interview, 2016).

Interviewees could not find analgesics for the resulting behavioural changes either. The fear changed their conduct in three principal ways. First, participants recounted how they, and everyone around them, became very aggressive and egocentric, since their primary concern became their own safety. This played itself out in traffic situations where, for example, everybody would speed and break other rules in order to get home quickly. It could also be seen in other public situations, for example, when somebody’s grocery bags had fallen over in a parking area and nobody would offer to help because they were too eager to get home safely themselves. One woman had been seven months pregnant when she wanted to get into her car to fetch her older child from school, when a large tree trunk had fallen over and
blocked her driveway. She asked her neighbour for help but he replied: ‘I’m busy now’. Because of experiences like this, she said, ‘I almost didn’t like South Africans anymore’ (Joke, interview, 2016). Here we see that fear, indeed, destabilises social relations (Green 1994: 227). In general, participants recounted, people stopped being open and welcoming and started being closed, selfish and suspicious. Therefore, they spoke of a deep moral decline.

Secondly, the fear resulted in a phenomenon sometimes referred to as ‘inward migration’ (see, for example, Bornman 2005). That is, study participants started to withdraw from society. Primarily, this occurred because they remained inside their homes for most of the time, especially at night. Many mothers narrated how they would stay indoors with their children until their husbands came home, out of fear that something would happen to them otherwise. Children were no longer allowed to play outside, not even in the garden. Some interviewees also started home schooling their children because they regarded school as a dangerous place. This demonstrates that fear can ‘shrink bodies in a state of afraidness,’ where ‘safety becomes a question of not inhabiting public space’ (Ahmed 2014: 70).

Ultimately, the great majority of the Afrikaners, and especially those from Gauteng province, moved to so-called gated communities: walled suburbs with armed, boom-gated entrances and security personnel patrolling the area. Even within these ‘secured villages’, participants transformed their homes into self-made prisons due to the multiple forms of security they installed in and around their houses in order to regain some sense of safety. Many interviewees recounted what their gardens had looked like, with high walls, electronic gates, fences, beams and sensors, and their homes, with alarm systems, slam-lock doors, burglar bars covering all windows, gated security doors dividing living and sleeping areas, and sometimes with panic rooms (fortified rooms within the house to provide safe shelter in the event of a break-in) and private security. This last term refers to armed response units similar to police teams who operate privately and come to your aid in case of an emergency. This

As discussed in Chapter 2, Gauteng, with its capital Johannesburg, is South Africa’s most violent region (SSA 2018). It is also worth noting that, associated with the previously mentioned general increase in fear of crime, the phenomenon of the ‘gated community’ is a global issue and the Afrikaners’ behaviour in this respect should thus also be seen within this context (see Dupuis & Thorns 2008).
type of home security is, for those who can afford it, increasingly used in South Africa because of the failing police services (see, most notably, Diphoorn 2015). Here we see another result of the invisible violence of fear, in the sense that the participants were repressing themselves by ‘locking [themselves] in’ (see Galtung 1990: 293).

Despite all their efforts, however, they were not safe, as ample stories of burglaries demonstrate. Security measures can protect people from crime only so far, and, ultimately, they cannot. Daphne’s story is illustrative here. She and her daughters experienced an armed house robbery while her husband was away for the weekend, as referred to earlier. This happened despite the fact that the family had moved into Pretoria’s most heavily secured village, which they had done as a consequence of multiple break-ins including a previous armed robbery. ‘This [last village] was like Fort Knox,’ Daphne said, ‘you know, six feet walls, double electric fencing, guards walking around with firearms, barriers, you can only enter with your finger print…’ (Interview, 2015). Indeed, instead of a safe haven from the outside world, such as the image of ‘the home’ is usually—and ideally—constructed (see, for example, Ahmed 2014; Chapman & Hockey 1999), home became ‘the most dangerous place to be’, in the experience of most participants. This was because, as Anja stated, ‘This is [the place] where they are coming to get you: in your home, in the middle of the night’ (Interview, 2016). This shows that the experience(s) of house burglaries ‘leads to a fundamental reconsideration of the safety of the boundaries of home’ (Chapman 1999: 141).

In this respect, the Afrikaner émigrés that I worked with had a fundamentally different experience from those whom Boersema (2013) interviewed in South Africa. By contrast, he writes that his participants whom had moved to ‘gated communities’ experienced home as haven indeed, and that ‘inside the gate, they feel at home because the place … allows them to feel care free’ (2013: 237). This difference in the felt experience could be one indication of which Afrikaners decide to stay (Boersema’s research participants), and which decide to leave (my interviewees). This brings us to the third way in which the fear of violent crime changed

---

7 This is an ideal image of the home, since there are, evidently, many people who are not safe in their own homes, due to domestic violence, abuse or neglect.
participants’ behaviour, namely, they left South Africa. Since their attempt to preserve or restore their sense of safety through ‘inward migration’ failed, they subsequently tried to recreate or replace their loss through emigration. Thus we see that fear, as the reality in which the Afrikaners lived, was ‘the hidden state of (individual and social) emergency factored into the choices [they made]’ (Green 1994: 228). In the next part of this chapter, we will see that this reality had become a part of who they were, that is, it belonged to them, to such an extent that they experienced difficulty in adjusting to a fear-free situation.

**Australia: ‘You just feel safe, it is the strangest feeling’**

In contrast to South Africa, Australia is a relatively safe country with respect to the prevalence of crime. Globally, it ranks highest in terms of social progress, together with the northwestern European countries, Canada and New Zealand (Social Progress Index 2018). For comparison, in 2018, Australia’s Social Progress Score was 88 on a scale from 1 to 100 hundred, whereas South Africa’s score was 66. Also, Australia’s GDP per capita was three times higher than South Africa’s in 2018 (ibid). As we can see from these figures, social progress is directly related to income (wealth) and development (opportunities) and, as such, to the prevalence of crime (see, for example, Weatherburn, Halstead & Ramsey 2016; cf. Pash 2018; Global Wealth Migration Review 2018). Accordingly, a high level of social progress indicates a low level of crime. Therefore, Australia is regarded as a peaceful country. In 2018, it ranked 15th highest in the Global Peace Index (Global Peace Index 2018). Although crime levels have slightly increased since 2016 (ABS 2016), Australia is still considered as one of the safest countries in the world, and particularly for raising children (Global Wealth Migration Review 2018).

Hence, by moving to Australia, the research participants were able to regain their sense of safety. In a way, they were even able to restore the past, by replacing pre-1994 South Africa with Australia.\(^8\) This is illustrated by the fact that many interviewees referred to Australia as

\(^8\) That is, by replacing their experience of pre-1994 South Africa by Australia. As previously stated, for most other South Africans, that is, for those who were classified as non-white during apartheid, South Africa has always been a violent and dangerous country.
‘South Africa 30 or 40 years ago’ regarding the relatively low levels of violent crime and the way of life that this allows. In this respect, the emigration drastically changed their lives. Their circumstances altered from being in a situation in which they feared for their lives and for the lives of their loved ones on a daily basis, to one in which they were able to trust that they and their loved ones were reasonably safe from physical harm in terms of the probability of becoming a victim of violent crime. Although the result of this change was positive for the participants, they were initially absolutely shocked by the abnormality of living in safety, as the following section illustrates.

‘How can you live like that?!’ Traumatised by living in safety

The extent to which the safety situation in Australia had initially been bizarre, almost ridiculous, to the Afrikaners, is exemplified by the following excerpt from an interview with Diana (2015), who recalled her first visit to an Australian friend in 2010:

... as we drove up [to the house] I said: ‘There’s no fence!’ He says: ‘No, there’s no fence.’ So I said: ‘How safe is that?!’ And he said: ‘Quite safe.’ For me, that was just so... you know... in [South Africa before 1994] there was no fences, it was just like it is here [in Australia] now. That’s what it was. You could walk up to a front door and ring the bell, you know. You can’t do that anymore today: it’s high fences, it’s razor wire, it’s electric fences, it’s flood lights, it’s, you know... And then, the other thing, the first night I stayed here [in Australia], I looked around and I said: ‘It’s so dark.’ And he said: ‘Well, that’s normal here, at night it’s dark.’ And I said, ‘But in South Africa, I’m so used, there’s always light from one of the other houses that sort of shines into your yard,’ you know, and it was just, it was just so different and ... I, I was... I was shocked!

Other participants also spoke of shock and disbelief about the way people were living in Australia. Judith for example, who emigrated with her family in 2010, told me how she had been ‘awestruck by the fact that I could have all this freedom and walk anywhere, anytime, without having to have fear or be afraid or look over my shoulder or anything’ (Interview, 2015). Jolanda and Mark, a couple that immigrated in 2008, recalled that upon arrival they went to a festival with Mark’s new Australian colleagues. At the event, Mark and Jolanda would not let their children run out of sight to play with other children. The Australian parents, however, assured them that that was all right, that they could do that and that their children would still be safe. ‘We were just so shocked about that’, Jolanda said (Interview, 2016).
What these examples show is that, although the change was beneficial, the new reality was unfamiliar to research participants, and, therefore, it shocked them. What they had known in South Africa, that is, what had been familiar to them, was to live in fear. Now, the new situation abruptly released them from this fear. This reminds us that our reality does not have to be loved in order to be experienced as a loss (see Boss 1999; Davies 2012; Doka 2002; Freud 1917; Marris 2015 [1986]; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976). It has to have been familiar and predictable however unhealthy the situation may have been. Hence, it took quite some time for interviewees to get used to the new situation in Australia, even though the altered circumstances meant a significant improvement in their quality of life. Participants mentioned that they had needed a period of adjustment ranging from somewhere between three months up to three years. For instance, Judith, who moved with her husband and their teenage daughters, commented on the abnormality of being free from fear:

It’s something to get used to, I battled with that, because, especially with the girls in the beginning, they would want to go here and they would want to go there and I was so nervous because ‘You can’t! What if something happens!’ You can’t get on the bus, because you don’t get on the bus in South Africa, you don’t get on the train, so in the beginning it was a thing. I wouldn’t let them go anywhere, I would go and Google-search it first and drive there and I wanted to go and see everything before I let them go anywhere and they had to report every five minutes. And now it’s like, now it’s: ‘[Mom], we’re going there,’ and I’m like: ‘OK, when will I see you again.’

(Interview, 2015)

We could say that Judith was ‘traumatised’ at first, in the sense that she was overwhelmed by the experience of living in safety in Australia and could not immediately integrate this into her life world (see Caruth 1996; cf. Chapter 2). Indeed, many participants used the word ‘trauma’ in describing how they had felt upon arrival in Australia. Lena, for example, told me that the first six months in Australia had been ‘very traumatic’ for her:

... because the house that we lived in at first only had the smallest, most simple locks, that I told my husband: ‘I can break into this house and I’m not even a crook! So how easy must it be for someone who wants to break in, to break into this house?’ What they call security fencing [in Australia] is not for me security fencing! This is, anyone that kicks it hard will open it!

(Interview, 2015)
For Lena, who had carried a gun with her every day of her life, who had had shooting lessons as part of her leisure activities in order to be able to defend herself in the case of an attack, who was used to security bars in front of her windows and who had become comfortable with alarm systems, security gates and electric fences, living in Australia was actually scary at first. She could not understand how people could live without all these things and yet feel safe, and it took her about six months to realise that, in fact, it had been the South African lifestyle that had been abnormal.

Like Lena, most interviewees stated that they only realised how traumatising fear as a way of life had been for them after they had been living in Australia for some time. Also, certain events triggered long-suppressed fears and anxieties. For instance, Reinder recalled how he was confronted with his own mental wounds when, in his new home in Australia, the fire alarm went off in the middle of the night. In recounting the story, he sat up straight once more, looking shocked, panicked: ‘We were both [his wife and himself] out of our bed: “What is happening?!” ... “Are our children OK?!” But then we thought: “We don’t have an alarm.”’ (Interview, 2016). Thus, half a sleep, Reinder put new batteries into the fire alarm and all became quiet again. However, when he got back to bed, he could not sleep anymore:

> Because that alarm that went off in the middle of the night, that aroused so many old emotions and old stuff, I couldn’t sleep. Because you were always so alert when an alarm went off in the middle of the night [in South Africa], the first thing you do is, you jump up and check if everybody’s OK, close the door, keep safe. Where is the alarm ringing, in which zone in the house, then you know what to do, where to go. All that stuff ...

(Interview, 2016)

Reinder’s experience echoes Suárez-Orozco’s (1990) finding that when people have lived with terror, they carry their psychological wounds with them, regardless of the new, safe situation. Suárez-Orozco found that his research participants, who had survived Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’, were stalked by nightmares long after. Indeed, some of my interviewees also suffered from terrible dreams after they had arrived in Australia. For instance, Anja recounted how, after having lived in Australia for two months, she started having awful nightmares about people attacking her: ‘Every night I dream [that] I’m lying in my bed, then they come and hit me on my head, then I wake up with pain in my head, because it was so real! This feels to me it’s
genuine!’ (Interview, 2016). ‘Or,’ Anja continued, ‘I dream that someone is on top of me and starts to rape me, tears my clothes from me...’ On other nights, she dreamt that her children were being attacked and she could not protect them, or that she was driving in her car and being hijacked. But then she thought:

But why? Why am I dreaming this? I am safe now. Then I realised that I had all those fears in South Africa but I never acknowledged it. I’ve always supressed it, it was in my subconscious. And now that I am safe, it comes up, now it surfaces. And when I realised this, the nightmares stopped. When I started making sense of what was happening to me.

Anja’s example demonstrates once more that our beliefs construct our reality. That is, whether people are actually in a life-threatening situation, such as in Videla’s Argentina (see Suárez-Orozco 1990) or whether they believe they are, such as contemporary Afrikaners in South Africa, their experience of the fear emotion and its consequences are similar. Anja’s story also shows that we need to understand the source of our problems in order to resolve them, or, alternatively, that we cope with grief by sense-making (see Castelli Dransart 2013). As Anja stated, her nightmares stopped when she understood her hidden trauma. By contrast, however, she could not change her habits that easily. The next section reveals that this was the case for most interviews.

‘It is just so in you’: the socialisation of our habits

As pointed out in the introduction, most participants had great difficulty letting go of old, ‘South African’ habits, even though they no longer needed them in Australia. This is because habits are so ingrained in us that we identify with them (Davies 2012). For example, Lena said that all the security measures she had taken in South Africa, including the shooting lessons and carrying a gun, were ‘so much a part of [her]’ that she could not ‘get out of this mentality’ easily or quickly (Interview, 2016, my emphasis). In general, discarding or changing habits is painful for people, as Davies (2012: 41) explains:

A central reason for this common response to significant change (even if this change was by all accounts for the best) becomes clearer when we understand we are rarely prepared psychologically to fit into a new situation. Being still orientated to the life we have left behind, our habits must alter ‘on the job’ so to speak.
That our habits **belong** to us, as Lena’s example illustrates, helps to explain why we are so unfit, mentally, to adapt to a new environment. Other research participants used similar phrases when talking about how they retained their South African habits with regards to safety, such as ‘... it is just so in you, you know, that whole thinking’ (Diana, interview, 2016). This demonstrates that the Afrikaners had fully integrated into their way of life in South Africa. The habits and customs associated with living in fear of crime had become a part of their identity. Margo’s anecdote is illustrative as well:

> And [my husband], he never opened the curtains, because he was afraid that they would, would break in or something like that. And then I would say to him: ‘But they...here it’s not, people are not going to break in here!’ But this was just, **this was still from South Africa**. When we just came here, we were continuously in that thing [in that South African mindset].
> (Interview, 2015)

Similar to keeping curtains closed, many female interviewees said that they still locked the doors when they were home alone, and some of them had been living in Australia for more than 10 years. I also observed many women locking the doors behind me when I entered their house for an interview or casual visit. Other habits also died hard, such as leaving lights on at night and checking on children every so often. For instance, Tessa told me that during the first three years that she had been living in Australia, she kept checking her son’s bedroom, every hour, to see if he was still there and still safe (Interview, 2016). Another participant stated:

> For the whole first year, I checked, every night, whether the windows were closed and if there was no one lurking around in the garden. And even now, after nine years, I still sometimes look around to see if someone is following me, or when I’m driving my car, I think that I should drive a few more rounds before going home. And then I realise, I don’t have to.
> (Sasha, interview, 2016)

Like Sasha, the great majority of interviewees at some point realised that it was unnecessary for them to cling to South African habits with regards to trying to keep safe from violent crime. These habits, that were ‘configured to succeed in the old situation,’ were now ‘out of step with the new’ (Davies 2012: 41). Gradually, the emotion of fear was replaced by the emotion of trust, for each participant at their own pace. They experienced that they could now trust that they were reasonably safe from physical harm, and this new emotional state resulted in
a change of behaviour, in an altered bodily change and in different feelings. These changes are the focus of the next and final section of this chapter.

**Opening up and letting go: the results of trust**

In terms of behaviour, the most significant change was that in Australia, the Afrikaners started to re-inhabit public space (Ahmed 2014) and to re-open the boundaries of the home (Chapman & Hockey 1999). Children played outside and out of sight of parents again, teenagers went out to the city unsupervised on public transport, and curtains and windows were opened. Whereas fear ‘restricts the body’s mobility’ (Ahmed 2014: 69), trust works to open the body up to the world. Indeed, the great majority of study participants narrated how wonderful it was for them to be able to go out again without experiencing fear. They mostly spoke about seemingly simple outings, such as taking the dog for a walk or going jogging. Margo, for example, said:

> ... it’s better for me [in Australia] because I have more personal freedom. I’m happy that I have this, because I can go out more, I can go running outside, I can do anything outside, this is, I do much more things outdoors, outdoor activities, and I never did this in South Africa.

*(Interview, 2015)*

Similarly, Eva told me that she did not want to return to South Africa ever, because ‘they [South Africans]’, in contrast to Eva in Australia, ‘have no freedom, [because] it is not safe’ (Interview, 2015). And another interviewee used the example of me and her being able to go the movies at night, or go anywhere at night-time for that matter, because ‘it is safe’ (Corien, interview, 2015). What these examples reveal is that the meaning of safety for the study participants lay in freedom. Freedom, here, in the sense of ‘being unrestricted and able to move easily’ as well as ‘not being imprisoned’ (OED). Thus, we see that ‘emotions align bodily space with social space’ (Ahmed 2014: 69) in the sense that the Afrikaners were leaving their homes, which no longer looked like prisons, and joined public life because trust had replaced fear.

The trust emotion did not only affect where the interviewees took their bodies, it also altered their bodies as such. In contrast to the analysis in the first section of this chapter, where we
saw that many of the Afrikaners suffered from physical and mental illnesses due to their constant fear, here my analysis shows that their bodies became relaxed. For instance, Margo, who remembered having severe ‘stress headaches, every day’ in South Africa, experienced the following:

... when we came here [to Australia], the first three months, this remained. And after these first three months, I can’t remember anymore when I last had a headache. I stopped having it altogether. ... It was just strange when we came here and we stopped having these headaches.

(Interview, 2015)

Similarly, Carolien stated:

I’m much healthier here. There, I was on many medications and this was all as a consequence of the stress. And from the moment I came here, I almost never went to a doctor. You didn’t have that tension.

(Interview, 2016)

The release of tension was narrated by nearly all study participants. Whereas in South Africa, their bodies had been in a constant state of vigilance, now they began to be transformed into a state of relaxation. This was experienced as a literal loosening up of the body. For instance, many female interviewees narrated how they had always been ‘clenching their handbags tight’ to their bodies in South Africa. Most others also talked of ‘always looking over your shoulder,’ indicating a tightness in the body, especially in the back and shoulders. After coming to Australia, their bodies could let go of this tension and thus, literally, loosen up. In Lieke’s words, being in Australia was ‘... just like... being... [inhales and exhales deeply] ... like breathing’ (Interview, 2016). Here, too, it took time before participants adjusted to their new situation, as Aafke’s story illustrates:

In the beginning [in Australia] I held on to my handbag so tight, I was so afraid that something would happen to my handbag, [that] they would steal my handbag. But I haven’t had any problem ever.

(Interview, 2015)

Aafke told me that it took her a month or two to leave her handbag alone, and even put it on the backseat of her car without closing the car doors. This was an entirely new habit for her.
Another participant, Tessa, recalled how being in Australia changed her in the sense that she no longer had to be in a constant state of watchfulness:

> I worked in the city ... so I would walk from work on a Friday after work, to the car park across, well, two, three streets away, and I wouldn’t think, or be thinking: ‘Who’s walking behind me,’ you know, ‘Who’s in my [car],’ ‘you know. You don’t have to be alert all the time.

(Interview, 2016)

Similarly, Anja initially did not dare to drive with her car windows open, but after a few months she noticed that, in Australia, ‘nobody has tried to hijack me. In fact, they don’t even see me!’ (Interview, 2016). This is the state of inobservance or inattentiveness that trust allows, and to which most research participants adjusted after having been in Australia for a certain amount of time. As stated, this timeframe varied for different interviewees. It took Sasha for example nine years before she could experience the following:

> Just the other day, I was texting in my [parked] car with the door open, in front of my house, and someone walked past and I didn’t even notice really, I didn’t look up. And just as the person passed, I thought: ‘Wow, in South Africa I would’ve never sat like this, openly texting in my car.’

(Interview, 2016)

Finally, this bodily state of relaxedness is, of course, closely related to a peaceful mental state that derives from the trust emotion. Indeed, the above described behavioural and bodily changes were accompanied by *feelings* of relief, liberation and freedom. These ‘mental experiences’ or ‘cognitive representations of the emotional state’ (see Damasio 2001) were also unfamiliar to the study participants. For example, Miranda, after having lived in Australia for only three months, said with surprise: ‘You just feel safe, it is the strangest feeling, it really is’ (Interview, 2015). Likewise, Emiel told me how strange he had felt coming to Australia and suddenly not having to worry about safety anymore. His story, like most, demonstrated immense relief:

> Since I’m in Australia, I realise *how it feels* to walk to restaurants without being worried about safety, to be out in the evenings and never being worried that your wife is alone somewhere or things like that. This makes a huge difference in one’s peace of mind.

(Interview, 2015)
Other participants also contrasted this carefree feeling with how they had felt in South Africa. For instance, Evelina found that, in Australia, ‘peace and tranquillity was waiting for us’ (Interview, 2016) and Sander said that, although he had initially wanted to return to South Africa, his wife told him a definitive ‘no’, because ‘she feels safe, she didn’t feel stressed anymore’ (Interview, 2016). Perhaps Carolien put it most succinctly when she said that, in contrast to South Africa, in Australia ‘you can sleep at night and you can actually sleep’ (Interview, 2016). What we see here is that the mental state accompanying the loosened bodily state and the freer behaviour also signified relaxation. Noor, for example, said that in contrast to Australia, in South Africa, ‘I did not feel quite relaxed, ever’ (Interview, 2015). Judith explained the different feelings well when she shared the following anecdote:

I was telling my sister [in South Africa] the other day, I said to her: ‘If I have to explain to you what it’s like when we’re here [in Australia], I can only use an example,’ and that’s when we went on holiday, me and her, to the Cape. And I said to her: ‘Remember when we got there, the minute we unpacked the car you got this sit-back-and-relax feeling,’ it’s just that ‘I’m not worried,’ that feeling. I said to her: ‘That is how I live [in Australia] every day.’

(Interview, 2015)

Ultimately, the meaning of this relaxed mental state lies in freedom as well. Not in the sense of ‘freedom to’, that is, freedom to move through public space as previously discussed, but here in the sense of ‘freedom from’, that is, ‘the state of not being subject to or affected by something undesirable’ (OED), in this case the fear of violent crime. In trying to explain to me how she felt about this freedom, Sabine’s summary was illustrative:

When you have lived in fear… you will never feel how it is not to live in fear until you come and live in a country in which you do not have to be afraid. And… that freedom, which you get, I don’t know how to explain this… this is something within you that just… this just changes who you are.

(Interview, 2016)

Indeed, many interviewees witnessed an identity change in themselves due to the freedom from fear. After their move to Australia they experienced that they had become calmer, friendlier, and, as one participant put it, ‘a much nicer person’ (Tirza, interview, 2016). Thus we see that, with regards to physical belonging, the Afrikaners were able to fully recreate their loss. Moving to Australia had restored their safety needs in both a physical as well as a
mental respect (see Bowlby 1980; Davies 2012; Davis, J 1992; Dewey 2007 [1922]; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maslow 1943; 1970). That is, they had regained their freedom by liberating themselves from the repression (Galtung & Wirak 1977) and invisible violence (Green 1994) of the fear of violent crime.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, the story of how the Afrikaners dealt with the loss of their sense of physical safety in South Africa stood central. I have conceptualised the need to be physically safe as the need for *physical belonging*. As discussed in the introduction, Vanderhaeghen (2018) refers to the Afrikaners’ loss of physical belonging as a ‘discourse of extinction’, which makes sense, since physical belonging refers to the act of living. In post-apartheid South Africa, the research participants felt that their lives were threatened on a daily basis due to high crime levels. According to their own narrative, these crime levels had increased significantly since 1994 and, crucially, *violent* crime was directed at them, as a group, because they were being held responsible for apartheid. Although secondary data contests both these beliefs, my analysis in this chapter demonstrates that, similar to that in the previous chapter, for the lived reality this is irrelevant. That is, although it may be a ‘discourse’ of extinction, or a discourse of *threat* of extinction, for the people who *live* this discourse it is *not* a story. It is their life.

Consequently, this chapter has demonstrated the devastating power of the emotion of fear. We have seen how the fear of harm and death became the interviewees’ way of life in South Africa, similarly to how Green (1994, 1999) witnessed it in her research participants in Guatemala and how Scheper-Hughes (1992) saw it destroying her informants’ lives in Brazil. My ethnographic data particularly echoed Greens’ works, as we have seen throughout this chapter. Furthermore, the analysis has demonstrated how this fear, like all emotions, resulted in changes in the research participants’ bodies and minds, and, subsequently, in their behaviour (see Damasio 1999; 2001; Damasio & Carvalho 2013; Elias 1987; Heelas 1984; Lutz & White 1986; Rosaldo 2009 [1984]). Their bodies became tense and tight and ill and they felt constantly scared. This resulted in two opposite types of behaviour. The first, conceptualised as ‘inward migration’ (Bornman 2005), can be seen as the attempt to preserve or restore what
was lost. Here, the Afrikaners moved to so-called ‘gated communities’ or ‘secured villages’ (see, amongst others, Dupuis & Thorns 2008; Durington 2009; Low 2007) in an attempt to feel safe from violent crime again. However, we have seen that this attempt failed: they were still affected by violent crime and it did not restore their sense of safety.

The second way in which they acted upon their fear was by ‘outward migration’, that is, by emigration. This strategy represents the opposite side of the conflict of grief, namely, the urge to recreate or replace what has been lost. As the second part of the chapter demonstrated, this was successful. Australia is a prosperous and therefore relative safe country with respect to the occurrence of violent crime, as we have seen (Global Peace Index 2018; Global Wealth Migration Review 2018; Social Progress Index 2018; Weatherburn, Halstead & Ramsey 2016). Yet, the analysis also revealed that it was quite traumatic for the research participants, at first, to suddenly live in freedom from fear. As discussed, this is because we thrive on familiarity and feel thus threatened by change. As the bereavement of familiarity, change robs us of our need to feel psychologically safe. That is, in order to feel mentally safe, we need to understand our world, and in order to do so, it needs to be constant and predictable (Boss 1999; Bowlby 1980; Davies 2012; Davis, J 1992; Dewey 2007 [1922]; Marris 2015 [1986]). This means that, even though the Afrikaners liberated themselves from their fear of violent crime by moving to Australia, that is, even though the change was nothing but beneficial in this respect, they still had a difficult time adjusting to their new situation. Yet, ultimately, they were able to adjust to their new, free, lifestyle. Indeed, this chapter has concluded that the meaning of the change lay in freedom. By moving to Australia, the study participants had regained their freedom to move through public space because they had recreated trust in their physical safety. In the next chapter, we will see to what extent the immigration additionally restored their sense of spatial and socio-political belonging.
Introduction

In addition to economic and physical belonging, the Afrikaners who participated in this study had lost their sense of spatial and socio-political belonging as well in post-apartheid South Africa. This chapter is concerned with these losses and with how the study participants sought to address them by moving to Australia. It is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on spatial belonging or ‘territorial belonging’ (Gammeltoft 2018), which refers to having an affinity to a certain physical area to the extent that we feel ‘at home’ in that place. From his landmark study on the effects of slum clearance in Boston, Fried (1963) found that we regard the space or area in which we live as an extension of our dwelling unit, our home. Our home, in turn, is felt as an extension of ourselves (Chapman & Hockey 1999). Thus, the locality in which we live forms a part of who we are and, as such, is ‘invested with … meaning’, giving us a ‘basic sense of identity’ (Fried 1963: 362; cf. Fried & Gleicher 1961).

For the Afrikaners, the place that they had called home became increasingly unfamiliar after 1994. Indeed, my analysis in the first part of this chapter demonstrates that most interviewees felt alienated from their homeland because they could no longer recognise it from the country they had known and loved. In their perception, South Africa had changed from a ‘first world’ country to a ‘third world’ country since 1994, due to high levels of corruption in the ANC-led governments. This is the story that, to them, feels as if it is true (Hochschild 2016), because for most other South Africans, the country had never been a so-called first world country. Most notably the black majority had been forced to live in underdeveloped areas under apartheid, constructed artificially as ‘homelands’ but in reality
reserves.\textsuperscript{1} Yet, since the interviewees had lived in the country’s modern, well-developed areas where ‘everything worked’, for them, South Africa appeared to be degenerating after the democratic transition. Thus, they experienced this as a loss. Moving to Australia was a successful coping mechanism in this respect, because Australia is, in the experience of the Afrikaners, a ‘first world’ country where ‘everything works’.\textsuperscript{2} Yet, in another regard the move also caused a loss of spatial belonging, because most participants missed ‘Africa’ immensely. That is, since they identified with South Africa’s geographical characteristics such as its land mass, its climate and its flora and fauna, in moving they lost a part of themselves. I have conceptualised this as a loss of geographical belonging.

The second part of the chapter focuses on the loss of socio-political belonging. I have merged the concepts of social and political belonging because the social group that I am concerned with here constitutes the ‘national’ group as well. That is, if our ‘social belonging’ refers to the groups we identify with (Eriksen 2017; cf. Tajfel 1982), then this chapter focuses on the political group we belong to –the nation at large (see Anderson 2006). Whereas political belonging on its own may simply refer to citizenship (Galtung & Wirak 1977; Gammeltoft 2018; Schuetz 1944; Sonn et al. 2015; Yuval-Davis 2006), the analysis here demonstrates that official political membership by no means ensures social inclusion in the sense of feeling valued by one’s society (cf. Hage 2000, 2002a, 2003; Heater 1990). Indeed, I will show that both in South Africa and Australia, most research participants felt they were ‘second-class citizens’.

In their home country, the Afrikaners had felt socio-politically excluded due to their apartheid stigma. In their experience, the successive post-1994 governments as well as the broader South African society, rejected them as part of the group. In contrast to their lost sense of economic and physical belonging, regarding this issue, secondary data suggests that it is not

\textsuperscript{1} These areas were also referred to as ‘Bantustans’ and constituted the cornerstone of ‘grand’ apartheid’s policy (separate development), as they entailed the forced resettlement and restriction of black South Africans to reserves, where they were to live separately from the white minority (see, amongst others, Christopher 1994; Khunou 2009; Ross 2008; Thompson, L 2001).

\textsuperscript{2} There are still many Aboriginal communities living in dire poverty in underdeveloped rural areas in Australia, as a consequence of structural racism (see, most notably, Pilger 2013). Yet, most other Australians, permanent residents and migrants –myself included– benefit from a so-called first-world, Western and wealthy life-style.
a narrative as felt but rather one that is based on reality. As Vanderhaeghen’s (2018: 5) states, ‘the non-racial discourse of post-1994 democracy (as embodied in the Constitution) has been overtaken by one of exclusion, in the name of an “authentic” citizenship’. In this discourse, Afrikaners as a group are portrayed as violent racists who have forfeited their right to live in South Africa. The result is, Vanderhaeghen argues, ‘a construction of a people who dare not speak their name’ (ibid: 41) and it raises the question ‘whether self-denial on the part of the Afrikaners is a prerequisite for their moral admission as citizens of South Africa’ (ibid). Indeed, this might just be the reason why they left – because they did not want to deny themselves.

In Australia, all interviewees who had obtained citizenship had successfully recreated a sense of political inclusion. The most important factor in this respect was that their relationship with the Australian government had replaced their previous bond with the apartheid state. That is, since the Afrikaners felt that the Australian government would take care of them when needed, they had re-established a relationship of trust with their administration. This was not the case with regards to society at large, however. By contrast, in the interviewees’ experience, an Australian passport holds no social value at all. In this, they are not alone. Research on other migrant groups in Australia has reached similar conclusions (see, amongst others, Ip, Wu & Inglis 1998; Lange & Nisbet 2000; Longley Arthur 2018b; Ryan 2000). As previously mentioned, Australia has a long history of racism, first and foremost against Aboriginal Australians and secondly against most, if not all, migrant groups except for Anglo-Saxons (Balvin & Kashima 2012; Boochani 2018; Claudio 2014; Haslam & Holland 2012; Mellor 2012; Pilger 1991, 2013; Stratton 2011; Udah, Singh & Chamberlain 2019). In line with existing research, the analysis in the last part of this chapter shows that the Afrikaners, too, felt socially excluded by Australians.\(^3\) However, since their children were growing up in Australia, they felt that they were accepted as ‘full Aussies’ and would thus not be discriminated against. Therefore, they saw their own pain in reaction to feeling excluded as meaningful sacrifices they made for their offspring. Hence, similar to the conclusion reached in Chapter 3, they coped relatively well with this.

\(^3\) Whom they defined as white Anglo-Saxons (see Chapter 2).
Since this chapter is the final one that discusses pre-immigration losses, in the conclusion I will also focus on the meaning of these losses combined. There, I argue that for the Afrikaners, the loss of a sense of economic, physical, spatial and socio-political belonging in post-apartheid South Africa culminated in the feeling that they lost ‘everything’, to quote Freek once more (Interview, 2016). Since, in essence, most of these losses were derived from a loss of privilege, I further argue that the Afrikaners’ pre-1994 sense of belonging to South Africa was based on their privilege. Without it, they were, thus, lost. Losing ‘everything’ resulted in the loss of what Giddens conceptualises as ‘ontological security’ (1976, 1984, 1990; cf. Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013). That is, combined, the Afrikaners’ felt post-apartheid losses meant that they no longer felt psychologically safe in their home country (see, most notably, Davies 2012; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maslow 1943, 1970). Thus, they had become ‘strangers in their own land’, to borrow Hochschild’s (2016) phrase. This also resembles Griffiths and Prozesky’s contention (2010) that white South Africans have lost their ‘dwelling place’ in post-apartheid South Africa. Indeed, if ‘dwelling’ means living in peace, that is, protected and guarded (Heidegger 2001 [1971]; cf. Young 2002), which, in Heidegger’s conception, is the true meaning of a ‘homeland’ (Young 2002: 64), then the Afrikaners suffered from an ‘existential homelessness’ (Griffiths & Prozesky 2010: 37). My analysis also supports Griffiths and Prozesky’s argument that this loss cannot be resolved by emigration, as I will explain in the conclusion. Now, I first discuss the loss and, to a certain extent, the recreation of spatial belonging.

‘Rather dull than dangerous’: in search of a familiar place

For most of the Afrikaners whom I worked with, South Africa after 1994 changed from an orderly, lawful society into a place where anarchy and chaos prevail. They perceived their homeland as a dangerous place to live in, and suffered accordingly. Interviewees generally did not consider the fact that, for most other South Africans –who were oppressed during apartheid– South Africa had always been a dangerous place to live in. Whereas, before 1994, the latter group never had a social contract, for the Afrikaners, between 1948 and 1994, this contract had defined who they were. The social contract refers to the ideal ordering of society, where citizens give up some of their freedoms in return for the protection of the
state, which has the monopoly on violence through its army (Rousseau 2004 [1762]). This contract is based precisely on people’s fear of anarchy and chaos, which motivates them to sacrifice their individual autonomy to some extent in order to be ‘governed’ (ibid; cf. Hobbes 1996 [1651]). To be ‘governed’ means that the state provides basic needs such as safety, security, the rule of law, health care, education, and physical infrastructure. In the previous chapter we have seen that the study participants did not feel that the South African state provided them with safety. Here, I will demonstrate that they neither felt that the government guaranteed any of the other abovementioned needs. When governments cannot guarantee and enforce the social contract, they are often referred to as ‘failed’ states (see Srbljinovic & Bozic 2017; cf. Rotberg 2003). Exploring this concept further is beyond the scope of this thesis. What is relevant here is the emotional consequence for citizens when they feel that their state is ‘failing’, namely, they lose trust in their government (ibid).

Indeed, the Afrikaners had lost faith in their government completely. In their perception, the post-apartheid state had become increasingly corrupt. Interviewees saw political corruption, that is, the abuse of power for personal gain by government officials (see Nye 2002 [1967]), as the principal reason for what they experienced as the general decay of society. They did not consider the fact that successive post-apartheid governments have been responsible for taking care of more than 50 million citizens as opposed to roughly 5 million white citizens (for exact population figures, see Chapter 3). Evidently, this is a much harder task. Next to that, the research participants conflated all levels of government, but to discuss this here is outside this thesis’ framework. This having said, secondary data supports their perception about corruption. Although, contrary to the Afrikaners’ beliefs, the ANC-led governments inherited a high level of state corruption from the apartheid regime (see Hyslop 2005; Lodge 2000), South Africa’s formidable democratisation and modernisation process has crucially enlarged the scope and opportunities for corruption (Habtemichael & Cloete 2010; cf. Haller & Shore 2005; Huntington 2002 [1968]; Mbeki 2009). Yet, in this thesis I am not concerned with the reasons for South Africa’s high corruption levels (Daniel et al. 2011; Essop 2011; Feinstein 2009; Johnson 2010), but rather with its felt consequences as experienced by the Afrikaners. In their view, it meant having a government incapable of governing, which expressed itself
Chapter 5 ‘We don’t belong there’

principally through a serious decline in public service delivery. The result of this was that, for them, their country changed so much that they no longer felt at home, as the following section illustrates.

‘Just another African country’: how home became foreign

Invariably, interviewees stated that they had witnessed a steady decline in public services in post-apartheid South Africa. In their experience, the quality of health care and education, as well as of basic service provisions such as infrastructure, water and electricity, postal services and general administration, deteriorated. Most of all, they had lost trust in their police force. This perceived downward trend in government performance significantly affected their quality of life. The effects were felt in daily nuisances as well as in more serious instances. Concerning the former, many interviewees recounted, for example, how the water in their houses had been brownish, dark-coloured, water that you could not take a bath in, let alone drink. Also, after load shedding (the interruption of an electricity supply to save energy) had become official policy in 2008, there had been sudden power cuts that caused great annoyances. As Sabine said:

You know, you are in the shower in the morning and you are getting ready for work, and the next moment, in the winter or in the summer, there is a power cut and you can’t see anything, you cannot blow dry your hair, you know. And then you go to work and none of the traffic lights are working ...

(Interview, 2016)

Many interviewees also stated that it had become dangerous to drive in the country because the roads were full of pot holes due to a lack of road maintenance. They further stopped making use of postal services because letters and packages would not arrive. Simple activities such as renewing a passport or driver’s licence also became sources of great frustration, since it would take an entire day to arrange such a duty. And often it could not be finalised then at all, as the experience of Sabine’s husband exemplifies:

... my husband went to register his car, and he had to take the day off from work because it takes so long to do this, and he already went in the morning, before 7 am,

---

4 Again, they did not take into consideration that they now had a government that was not primarily looking after the concerns of the white population.
Chapter 5  ‘We don’t belong there’

so that he didn’t have to stand in the queue the whole day, and when eventually it was his turn, the person who was supposed to do the job was sick that day ...

(Interview, 2016)

Of a more serious nature were the general deterioration in the health care and police services that participants experienced. Many interviewees stated that they had been afraid of going to state hospitals for treatment, since, in their perception, they had declined so badly. They also related countless stories of fire trucks arriving at a fire without water in their tanks, of police officers not showing up because there were not enough duty vehicles, and of ambulances not being able to arrive at an accident due a lack of fuel. Regarding this last issue, Diana’s story is typical. She had woken up one night because somebody had had a car accident in front of her house, hitting her wall. The man in question was still alive but not moving, and he needed an ambulance. So she called the police:

No answer. [I] Phoned again: ‘Helloooo?’ [in a bored tone] ‘Well, there’s somebody injured, there was a car accident, it’s there and there, and the person is injured in the car, could you please send an ambulance and the police?’ ‘Okaaayyy’ [in a very bored tone]. Half an hour later, still nothing. I phone up again: ‘Okaaayyy.’ They didn’t come. The people [strangers who had stopped] actually in the end, they took the guy out of the car and took him to the hospital. It’s... you know what I mean, it’s...

(Interview, 2016)

Apart from being seen as useless, interviewees, especially women, had been very scared of the police force. For instance, Simone said:

... they [the police] are so corrupt and they have the power to just stop you and they often rape women, and since there is total lawlessness in South Africa, they are not being punished, you cannot bring them to court. All they get is perhaps a slap on the wrist from their superiors or something like that.

(Interview, 2015)

This perceived impunity greatly frightened interviewees. They felt that breaking laws and criminal behaviour reigned, creating an atmosphere and a society where anything could happen to them at anytime and anywhere, as Emiel said, ‘just because it can’ (Interview, 2015). Here, we are reminded of the fact that we generally thrive in orderly, predictable societies due to our safety needs (Davies 2012; Davis 1992; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maslow 1943;
1970). We also see that, regardless of the reasons, the ANC’s increasing ineffectiveness under former president Jacob Zuma’s reign resulted in a loss of trust on the Afrikaners’ part.

Next to this, in the Afrikaners’ experience, South Africa’s overall decline meant major disappointment. They had been living a privileged lifestyle in apartheid South Africa, one that was similar to that of citizens in Western countries. Now, they felt that their homeland had become ‘just another African country’, with which they meant a so-called developing country. Vanderhaeghen (2018: 193) refers to this loss of ‘historical notions of order’ as a settler loss, which is convincing, because for the Afrikaners, a Western society meant order. That is, for people who are born and raised in African countries, an African country may be perceived as perfectly orderly (see Marris 2015 [1986]). Yet, as I have previously argued, the Afrikaners’ loss in this respect was real. Witnessing what was, for them, South Africa’s demise, was very painful. In Alexander’s words:

> It feels to me like, as if I have built a house from scratch, with my own hands, and now people are coming to break it down, they are coming with hammers and...to break it down. And at first, you try to mend it, you try to repair the holes, but the people with the hammers are just far too many…

(Interview, 2016)

Here we see that people indeed view the place where they live as ‘an integral part of home’ (Fried 1963: 362).

In conclusion, this section has shown that for the study participants, South Africa had changed to such an extent that they could no longer identify with their homeland. Joke’s feelings were illustrative in this respect. ‘I love my country,’ she said, ‘I really, really do. But what is there at the moment is not my country. It has changed too much for it to be my country (Interview, 2016). This demonstrates that we feel that we belong to a place because we identify with it (see, amongst others, Cohen 1982; Gammeltoft 2018; Hochschild 2016; Lovell 1998). Subsequently, since our living area –whether it is our neighbourhood, city, region or country– represents a part of who we are, we regard a condemnation of our locale as a condemnation of ourselves (see Marris 2015 [1986]). The Afrikaners condemned the kind of place that South Africa, in their view, had become. They no longer felt part of the country and they no longer
wanted to feel part of the country, in this respect, since they could not recognise it from the place they had known and loved. As the next section will demonstrate, they loved Australia for being that familiar, orderly place that South Africa, for them, once was.

‘Everybody drives sixty’: regaining law and order

As one of the settler colonies, in terms of physical infrastructure, Australia is set up similarly to South Africa. Next to that, the country is part of the so-called developed world, as discussed previously. Therefore, the Afrikaners were able to restore their feeling of belonging in the sense that they found themselves ‘back in the first world again’, which brought about intense relief. In talking about Australia in this respect, interviewees usually juxtaposed it to South Africa by stating that ‘In Australia, everything works.’ Many participants remembered their first impressions and specifically how pleasantly surprised they had been to see ‘just how orderly and clean’ Australia, in their experience, is. After settling in, they quickly learned that public service delivery in Australia is of a high standard. Although initially this was strange for them, it was a welcome and desperately anticipated change. Many interviewees echoed the following comment by Tirza, always with a tone of surprise:

When you want to get something sorted out, you can. You get on the phone and you arrange things, like opening a bank account and all kinds of practical things you need to arrange for your house, garden, and so forth.

(Tirza, interview 2016)

Yet, at the same time, participants unanimously felt that, in Australia, the social contract is being maintained and enforced too tightly, in the sense that they saw the country as extremely legalistic and its citizens as too obedient to the law. They usually contradicted this experience with South Africa, where they spoke with a certain appreciation of the freedom that impunity provides. That is, they saw life in South Africa as more exciting, tougher, wilder and urgent. Ultimately, however, all of the interviewees preferred living in ‘overly-organised’ Australia to ‘anarchic’ South Africa. Although most of them had a difficult time adjusting to living in a society that was so much more regulated than the one they were used to –Noor’s husband, for example, received three speeding fines a day in the immediate period after their arrival (Interview, 2015)– they invariably stated that they were happy to live in a country ‘where there are rules’. More importantly, the fact that these rules were enforced and, thus,
lived up to, provided the Afrikaners with a sense of safety. The crucial importance of psychological safety associated with trust in the social contract became clear, for example, in Marieke’s story, who said that for her, this provides

... freedom. This sounds strange but it is... I have to drive sixty [km/hour], because this is the speed limit. In South Africa, the sixty sign is there but nobody drives sixty, for example. When I drive sixty, I know that my child can walk safely on the sidewalk, I don’t have to worry about my child, because everybody follows the rules.

(Interview, 2015)

In most of Australia’s towns and cities the speed limit is sixty kilometres per hour. Like Marieke, many research participants referred to Australians’ general obedience to this limit as a symbol for the country’s general state of law and order. Whereas most expressed a certain disdain about what they saw as Australians’ ‘blind obedience’ to the government, they still enjoyed ‘that people here are obedient to the law’, as Aafke stated (Interview, 2015). Likewise, Ronald and Marjolein agreed that, ‘Yes, everybody drives sixty, but we love it. It gives us peace and calm. For the first time, we enjoy driving, we enjoy watching the surroundings and the scenery’ (Casual conversation, 2016). And, after sharing a similar story, Arjan stated that ‘here, there is law and order, and although it may seem dull, it works. Everybody is safe, and it just works’ (Interview, 2016).

In conclusion, we see that the existence of, and, more importantly, the adherence to rules provide people with freedom from fear and anxiety. To be at peace or to have a calm mental state is related to the emotion of trust, as we have seen in the previous chapter. Indeed, by moving to Australia, the study participants regained trust in their government. They trusted that the Australian state upholds its social contract with its citizens. As Magda expressed this in an interview (2016): ‘This is a land of law and order, and Australia will take care of us, we know this, Australia will take care of us.’ This shows that the paradox upon which states are built –sacrificing personal liberties for a higher degree of safety and security– is essential for people to have a sense of peace. The organisation of society is a prerequisite for freedom because it ensures that ‘the activities of others may be permanently counted upon’ (Dewey 2007 [1922]: 306-307). That is, it ensures predictability (see Davies 2012; Davis 1992; Giddens 1990; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maslow 1943, 1970) and, thereby, provides a sense of safety. For
the Afrikaners, having regained this also meant that they could identify with their state again. In this sense, Australia had replaced South Africa. Evidently, however, Australia is not South Africa, and, as such, the loss was irreplaceable, as the next section will demonstrate.

‘How do you explain that? Africa…’: loss of geographical belonging

Since our relationships of belonging are specific, we cannot replace them. As Marris explained, ‘… we love particular people, places, kinds of work, and cannot readily substitute for them by any abstract calculus of generalised well-being’ (2015 [1986]: 161, my emphasis; cf. Girard 2016; Hollan 1995; Loizos 1981; Maxwell 1995; Wellenkamp 1988). What we can replace is the role that a specific person or place played in our lives. Archer, for example, wrote the following with respect to the loss of a spouse:

Although remarriage cannot replace the person who has died, it can replace many of the features of the married state which might be particularly missed – the status it confers, sexual relations, companionship, and in traditional societies a domestic or a provider role. Such cases highlight the distinction between loss of a role, which can be replaced, and loss of an individual, which cannot.

(1999: 126)

By analogy with the lost spouse, we have seen in the previous section that the role the South African state had played in the lives of the Afrikaners, in the sense of creating and maintaining law and order, could be replaced by the Australian state. However, like an individual, the country, as a unique physical object, could not.

Indeed, the great majority of the Afrikaners experienced considerable grief due to their longing for what they referred to as ‘Africa’. With this, they meant the geographical characteristics of the Southern African region. This area has a predominantly semiarid climate and is dominated by a vast plateau with a series of mountains and cliffs around its edges, surrounded by highvelds, lowvelds and bushvelds. Importantly for the Afrikaners, it is home to many large animals that are still residing in their natural habitat, although their living space is constricted. Most famous are the lion, elephant, rhinoceros, buffalo and leopard, referred to in colloquial as ‘the Big Five’. However, it also includes other big animals such as crocodiles, hippos, giraffes and a great variety of antelopes. Many interviewees mentioned how much
they missed these wild animals when they talked about the loss of their homeland. Most struggled to express their overall longing for the land, such as Joost for example, who stated:

... I miss Africa... Africa’s material wealth is something one cannot forget... I cannot explain it. There is just something there, which is... the fullness of the colours, the variation, the nature, the amazing wild animals... How do you describe this to someone who hasn’t been there?

(Interview, 2015)

Likewise, Diana said:

I don’t know how to explain it, how do you explain that to somebody? Africa... for me, is... the dust... the sun, the heat on your face, the smell... that wild, that untamed smell, you know? And then on the same hand, for instance in Johannesburg, you get the Highveld storms in summer, I’ve never experienced anything like that anywhere in the world. That crackle, and that thunder, and then the rain ... it’s just something... or then, the smell of a veldfire... You know what I mean? I mean, we had bushfires here [in Australia], it’s not the same! It is not the same, you know. And my husband knows I love the Kruger park, so he took me to the Monarto Zoo. I said: ‘Never ever do that again. It is like a slap in the face!’ I said: ‘No! That’s not even coming close, you know, that is a big zoo, nothing else.’

(Interview, 2016)

Monarto Zoological Park is the largest open range zoo in the world and is located in Monarto, South Australia, close to Adelaide. Kruger National Park lies in northeast South Africa, covering the provinces Limpopo and Mpumalanga and bordering Mozambique. Although Monarto Zoo is open range, its animals live in captivity. In the Kruger park, which is 1300 times larger than Monarto Zoo, animals roam freely. Also, in Kruger visitors can drive around with their own vehicle, whereas in Monarto they are constricted to busses with other tourists and guides. These differences provide the context in which interviewees experienced disillusionment with Monarto Zoo when they went there in an attempt to reconnect with Africa. For instance, because he missed South Africa so much, Rob and his family visited Monarto in celebration of his fortieth birthday. However, it was ‘a huge disappointment,’ Rob said, because ‘it just wasn’t the same’ (Interview, 2015). He could not explain this any further, and added that talking about the things he had lost ‘brought a lump to [his] throat’.

---

5 The parks cover areas of 19,485 and 15 square kilometers respectively (see www.monartozoo.com.au and www.sanparks.org/parks/kruger).
Indeed, I observed his difficulty to speak, and he turned silent. Rob was not the only interviewee who struggled to voice his pain about the longing for his homeland. This reminds us of the inexpressibility of pain (see Ahmed 2014; Gorer 1955; Melzack & Wall 1996; Scarry 1985). Lieke captured the feeling, for her, in one sentence when she said: ‘I’m a farm child, I’m an African child’ (Interview, 2016). She could not describe what that meant, though. Jacqueline made a more elaborate attempt:

So you exist here [in Australia], I feel as if I exist here, but there’s just not that connection... and if you ask me what it is that I wish to connect to, I don’t know... I have good friends, I have South African friends, I shop at the South African shop, I eat South African food, I read Afrikaans books, I protect my culture, I speak Afrikaans with my child, there’s nothing from there that I don’t have here, except... the country.

(Interview, 2016)

For many interviewees, like Jacqueline, living in Australia, or any other country that was not South Africa, meant that they ‘existed’, as opposed to being alive. In other words, they survived but did not thrive. In their research on white South Africans who were planning to emigrate, Marchetti-Mercer and Louw also observed that ‘Afrikaans-speakers feel part of Africa, and leaving Africa is painful to them’ (2013: 573, my emphasis). Indeed, one participant found it harder being unable to show her children Africa than to miss her family (Rianne, interview, 2016). My analysis thus shows that Afrikaners have a strong sense of geographical belonging to South Africa indeed, and that its loss cannot be substituted. Thus, emigration restored their sense of spatial belonging in one respect, but destroyed it in another. As we will see in the second part of this chapter, to which we now move, the immigration also successfully restored a sense of political belonging, but failed to do so in a social sense.

‘Our children will become Aussies’: recreating inclusion

South Africa’s first democratically elected president, Nelson Mandela, was compassionate and forgiving and did everything in his power ‘to reassure white South Africans of their value to the nation-building project’ (Kynoch 2013: 434). His successor, Thabo Mbeki, however, embarked on an ‘African Renaissance’ policy with the aim of Africanising the country by focusing on a black South African identity (Beinart 2001; Blaser 2004; Vanderhaeghen 2018).
For the Afrikaners who participated in this research, this resulted in a feeling of being marginalised as a group. Indeed, Vanderhaeghen (2018: 7), himself a white South African, wonders ‘whether [Mbeki’s] “I” marginalises my “I”, whether “African” is inclusive of my whiteness.’ My interviewees would firmly answer ‘yes’ to his first and ‘no’ to his second question. Here, we are reminded of the apparent paradox of belonging: the gift of inclusion, per definition, goes hand in hand with the violence of exclusion (Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005; Girard 2016; Philo 2010; Sen 2006). Within current global ‘autochthony vs. allochthony’ debates, that is, the general contestations over the question who is indigenous and who is not (see Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005), Mbeki’s South Africa took a strong direction into asserting the rights of black South Africans as the only indigenous group, thereby assuming a historical and legitimatised claim to the geographical and national (Vanderhaeghen 2018). The effect of this on my research participants was that they, as white South Africans, felt portrayed as intruders or strangers (cf. Wasserman 2016). Under Mbeki’s successor, Jacob Zuma, this feeling intensified, as the following section shows.

‘They don’t want us there’: the pain of feeling rejected

Within our ‘national’ identity, we establish and maintain socially efficient boundaries between groups, of which we subsequently speak in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (see Eriksen 2017). In their country after 1994, the Afrikaners felt constructed as ‘them’ by the larger South African society. More so than because they were seen as non-indigenous to the land, they felt this way because they believed they were blamed for apartheid. As Noor’s feelings demonstrate: ‘As a white person I felt like an outsider, because everything you’re going to do in the future will be a struggle, because of, obviously of apartheid. And that will never change’ (Interview, 2015). Similarly, Jacqueline stated that ‘[You] will never be rid of it, there is always that [apartheid] stigma, all throughout history, you’ll always be branded’ (Interview, 2016; cf. Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013). Indeed, as Vanderhaeghen states, ‘In public discourse the taint of apartheid attaches tenaciously to South African whites in general and to Afrikaners in particular’ (2018: 2; cf. Boersema 2013). In his book, he provides examples of ‘a public discourse of denigration, disparagement and diminution in which Afrikaners are held by definition to be violent, racist, unscrupulous, deceiving and corrupt’ (2018: 40-41).
This discourse was very strong under the presidency of Jacob Zuma (2009–2018). For example, many interviewees referred to Zuma’s 2015 statement that ‘All of South Africa’s trouble [had] started when Jan van Riebeeck arrived in the Cape in 1652.’ Corien captured the effect of this statement on the Afrikaners well when she concluded: ‘They don’t want us there … that’s what Zuma said’ (Interview, 2015). Other participants mentioned Zuma’s performance of the old apartheid struggle song ‘Kill the farmer, kill the Boer’ at the ANC centenary celebrations in 2012. As discussed in the foregoing chapter, this song is considered hate speech. Zuma’s public performances, combined with the government’s lack of response to address the problem of ‘farm murders’ made some interviewees believe that the government was secretly supporting a genocide of white South Africans, or, in any case, was ‘trying to get rid of all the whites’ (Janus, casual conversation, 2015; cf. Wasserman 2016).

What the above demonstrates is that for the Afrikaners, apartheid’s legacy meant, above all, a strong feeling of exclusion and thus of estrangement from the rest of South African society. The term ‘estrangement’ captures their sentiments well, as it originates from the Latin extraneus, meaning ‘not belonging to the family’. Indeed, if we can view the nation as the overarching, ‘national’ tribe, as discussed above and in Chapter 1, what this section demonstrates is that the Afrikaners felt ostracised. Their beliefs were supported by three interrelated societal trends, namely the marginalisation of their language, culture and history. With regards to the first, Afrikaans has all but disappeared as a public language since 1994 (cf. Baines 2013; Vanderhaeghen 2018), which was very painful for the research participants. As Rianne explained:

Afrikaans is being attacked in South Africa so severely at the moment, that many people say: ‘Yes, no, you know what, it’s old stories, it’s time for new change now.’ But so many people are sad about this and I am one of them. Afrikaans is a very beautiful language …

(Interview, 2016)

---

6 During an ANC fundraising dinner in Cape Town in February that year (The Guardian, 20 February 2015). Jan van Riebeeck was the Dutch colonial administrator who arrived in the Cape in 1652 with the Dutch East India Company and started a trade post. He is seen as the father of the Afrikaner people.

7 As such, Zuma’s performance has been removed from YouTube, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6fzRSE_p1Ys, last viewed on 23 September 2019.
Lena also felt very sad about the side-lining of Afrikaans, and specifically about the fact that children were no longer learning about Afrikaans literature and poetry in schools. Together with the language, she believed that the Afrikaans or Afrikaner culture was being marginalised and had, in fact, ‘already disappeared’ (Interview, 2015). ‘The perspective on history has changed,’ Lena said, ‘Nowadays, it’s frowned upon if you as Afrikaners come together and visit the Voortrekker monument.’ Then you are seen as a racist.’ Similarly, Noor questioned, during our interview, what Afrikaner culture actually was, because:

…the things I remember as a child, you know, the songs we sang and how proud we were, and flags and all of that! But now it’s all wrong! It’s all wrong! You shouldn’t do it! Woooooh, it’s taken away, off the table! OK… so there’s a big chunk, I feel, of my childhood, that was not valid. … The new government is making it out as: ‘That was all bad, you can’t celebrate all the bad things …

(Interview, 2016, English original)

Noor’s feelings were shared by most research participants, despite the fact that Afrikaner private cultural industries are actually growing (Baines 2013), which can be seen in the multiple Afrikaans cultural festivals organised in South Africa each year as well as the number of Afrikaans artists touring the diaspora countries such as Australia. This demonstrates the crucial role of the government in ensuring and facilitating minority rights (see, Turton 2000). That is, despite the growth of the private industry, interviewees felt marginalised in the public sphere.

Yet, next to the government, the Afrikaners also felt rejected and attacked by the wider South Africa society. In this respect, most participants referred to current developments in South Africa. At the time of research (2015-2016), South Africa experienced a wave of sometimes violent student uprisings, collectively known as the #FeesMustFall or #RhodesMustFall movement. This movement, sparked by increased tuition fees for students, principally

---

8 A monument in Pretoria which commemorates the ‘Great Trek’, an Afrikaner migration movement in the 1830s and 1840s, out of the Cape and into the South African hinterland (see Chapter 1).

9 For a list of Afrikaans cultural events, see the website of the Federation of Afrikaanse Cultural Associations (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge), http://www.fak.org.za/. For diaspora tours of musicians and/or festivals, see https://www.southafricanevents.com/. In addition to this, South Africa’s online subscription video on demand, Showmax, has an Afrikaans sub-stream, KykNET, which is available in the main diaspora countries including Australia. Many of my research participants were subscribed to KykNET.
demanded free, decolonised education for black people (see Griffiths 2019). During the protests, some students wore T-shirts and carried banners stating ‘Fuck whites’ (see, amongst others, Haden 2016; Lamb 2016). They also destroyed statues of former colonists and statesmen, most notably that of Cecil Rhodes in Cape Town, and burned famous historical paintings in university halls. Although the protests seemed more concerned with the economic aspect (raised fees) than with the anti-white aspect (decolonised curriculum) (see Griffiths 2019), the Afrikaners saw the destruction of their cultural heritage as a confirmation that their society did not want them. Therefore, they felt seriously aggrieved, which expressed itself predominantly in anger (see Kübler-Ross 1970, 1972). Natalie for example exclaimed: ‘... why do they have to burn the paintings, this is heritage, these are pieces of heritage! They are from very famous artists in South Africa, why do they have to tear those pieces down and set them on fire?!’ (Interview, 2016).

Likewise, Sabine felt very upset:

Why would you want to erase the whole history?! Why do you want to remove all the statues? Why do all the street names have to be changed? You know, just like it! Because it is not just one culture that lives in that land, you know, there are many cultures and you cannot just erase history, even if you remove all the statues. And I understand that you want to remove all the [statues of] political figures that are connected to apartheid, you know, of that era, but some of these people have won Nobel prizes, you know!

(Interview, 2016)

These examples reveal a pain amongst the Afrikaners associated with feeling excluded and rejected by their society at large. Arguably, in processes of decolonisation, someone loses out—in any case the former colonisers. As one type of redress, street names are indeed being changed, in many former colonies. The problem in South Africa, however, is that the Afrikaners do not see themselves as colonisers and are still living in the country (many of them). Next to that, the research participants experienced the attack on their language, culture and history as an attack on them, which is unsurprising given that these are salient

aspects of our identity. Indeed, the interviewees lost a part of themselves, as Corien’s feelings illustrate:

When you have a government that does not represent you and is not interested in you, you lose a part of your identity ... [Our identity] it’s not allowed ... You are [a foreigner] because you are treated like that ...

(Interview, 2015)

Ultimately, what this experience meant for the research participants was that they did not feel valued in post-apartheid South Africa. This, in turn, meant that they lost their self-esteem to a considerable extent. As I have discussed in previous chapters, our ‘esteem needs’ are a crucial part of our sense of social belonging (see Doyal & Gough 1984; 1991; Maslow 1943, 1970; Thielke et al. 2012; Yawson, Armah & Pappoe 2009; Zaleński & Raspa 2006). We need to feel valued by other people, in this case by our broader society, in order to feel included. If our lives have no meaning in the eyes of others, especially in the view of those in power (see Marris 2015 [1986]; cf. Turton 2000; Tutu 2000), we lose our sense of belonging (cf. Galtung 1990). Indeed, most interviewees seemed to have come to agree with former president Zuma, as Bea’s feelings demonstrate:

I don’t know why Jan van Riebeeck ever set foot on that piece of earth. He should have never gone there. Never! Because we don’t belong there. And they are driving...they have driven us out now! The last three million is only a matter of time.

(Interview, 2016)

Thus, we see that the Afrikaners felt ‘forced out’ of South Africa. The next section will demonstrate that, in terms of their government, they were able to recreate a sense of belonging precisely because they felt valued by the Australian state.

‘I matter here’: the meaning of political inclusion

Invariably, interviewees were extremely grateful for having been granted visas by the Australian state. They saw this as a sign that the Australian government, in contrast to the South African, appreciated their skills. Moreover, after having employed these skills for a certain period of time in the country, the state awarded them with citizenship. Obtaining citizenship, or, ‘formal status of belonging’ (Sonn et al. 2015: 9) to Australia, was the
fundamental goal for nearly all research participants. In the previous section we have seen that citizens expect the state to take care of them. This demonstrates that interpersonal belonging extends to political belonging in the sense that ‘to belong together means to care about and provide for one another’ (Gammeltoft 2018: 85; cf. Stasch 2009). Thus, in the modern welfare state, the state can be seen as a parent or as parents, especially in the absence of real parents, when these have passed away or are no longer able or willing to support their children. This relationship was revealed previously, for example, in Magda’s trust that ‘Australia will take care of us’ (Interview, 2016). Indeed, for people, the parent, most notably the mother, ideally is the ultimate symbol of safety, of ‘home’, of care and protection from a hostile, dangerous world (cf. Heidegger 2001 [1971]; Young 2002; cf. Chapter 4). By extension, the state becomes the embodiment of this safe haven.

As the previous section has demonstrated, for the Afrikaners, the post-apartheid South African state instead became an object of fear, because they felt it rejected them. By contrast, the Australian government became an object of love, because they felt it wanted them. Here, we see that emotions work along the dimensions of withdrawal and approach (see Damasio 2001). That is, ‘the turning away from the object of fear also involves turning towards the object of love’ (Ahmed 2014: 68, original emphasis). For instance, Tessa told me that Australia was home to her now, because ‘This is the country that takes care of me, that supports me… I matter here’ (Casual conversation, 2015). Similarly, Marieke stated: ‘Here [Australia], here is home. … this is the country that is giving me the opportunity, this is the country that is going to give my children the opportunity’ (Interview, 2015). And Sabine recalled that when she received her Australian passport, she felt that ‘I am an Aussie now and I belong here. They want me here’ (Interview, 2016). Here we see that what we view as ‘home’ is, in Jackson’s words, ‘the domain in which we are recognised and our actions matter’ (2002: 34-35).

These examples further demonstrate that political belonging is just as much concerned with feeling valued and wanted as interpersonal belonging. The meaning of having an Australian passport, for the Afrikaners, lay in belonging to a place—a territory, a people, a government—that they could count on for support, a place that would take care of them if needs be, that is, a place where they felt safe. This also became clear in discussions concerning dual
citizenship. Most interviewees opted against this and renounced their South African passport, because, as Tirza exclaimed:

What does a South African passport help?! Really, when something was to happen to me, Jacob Zuma is not going to help me. Jacob Zuma doesn’t even know that I exist! He misses my tax returns, that’s for sure, but he won’t help me.

(Casual conversation, 2016)

Statements such as this reveal a deep pain of not feeling seen, of not feeling regarded as important, by their previous ‘parent’, the South African state. In sharp contrast, by being welcomed into the Australian state, the research participants felt that, to the new ‘parent’, their lives were important. The fact that the Australian government saw their lives as meaningful, made their lives meaningful. Here, we see once more that others’ appreciation enhances our self-esteem and gives our lives meaning (Marris 2015 [1986]; Maslow 1943, 1970), even when these ‘others’ are, in this case, imagined and/or symbolised by the state (cf. Anderson 2006). Contrary to the state, however, most interviewees did not feel valued by Australian society at large. Linking back to their experiences regarding economic exclusion as discussed in Chapter 3, the final section of this chapter focuses on feelings of social marginalisation.

‘Tolerated, not embraced’: feeling socially excluded

As previously discussed, Australia has a long and troubled history regarding racism, both against the country’s original inhabitants and against immigrants. As we have seen, discrimination has always been strongest against Aboriginal Australians, and, in the second place, against other people whose skin colour is classified as non-white. According to Graham (2019), Australia has always been conducting its affairs in a climate of ‘fear and loathing of “the other” –of anyone who is not white’. The definition of ‘whiteness’, as we have seen, has been flexible throughout history reflecting economic need, and, currently, white South Africans are accepted into the Australian economy based on their skills. Yet, the ethnographic data in this section supports Nicolacopoulos and Vassilacopoulos’ argument that all immigrant groups apart from the British remain constructed as ‘perpetual foreigners within the Australian state, quite apart from their legal status or self-understandings’ (2004: 32; cf.
Sonn et al. 2015). Indeed, the Afrikaners who participated in this research found that, despite their legal status—that is, possessing an Australian passport—Australians regarded them as foreigners. For most, this was also contrary to their self-understandings. For instance, Marieke told me, ‘Even though I feel in my mind that I am [Australian], and even though I am the best fan and the biggest [Wallabies] supporter,’ the community is not going to forget that I am not an Australian (Interview, 2015).

The foremost reason why the research participants felt this way was concerned with their accent. As we saw in Chapter 3, this ‘gave them away’ as being, what Ceuppens and Geschiere call “fake” autochthones’ (2005: 402-403). As Margo explained:

In general, Australians are very nice to you until you open your mouth. Because at first glance, they think you are Australian, because you look like them, but then they hear your accent and then they stop talking to you or retreat.

(Casual conversation, 2015)

While sharing this, Margo physically drew her body away from me to denote the distance Australians kept, in her experience, when they ‘heard’ that she was not ‘one of them’. Corien did the same when she told me:

They pick up you’re not Australian the moment you open your mouth. But before that, they treat you exactly the same because we look exactly like them. We look exactly like them; they would not know you’re not Australian. ... I think it catches them off guard, that you’re not Australian, and they go like: no, no, no, no, no.

(Interview, 2015)

Here, it is interesting to note that Wasserman, in her thesis on migration from South Africa to Australia, notes that white South Africans ‘may not experience isolation and marginalisation such as “visible” migrants do’ (2016: 187-188). As this research shows, the Afrikaners who participated in my research did feel marginalised in Australia. This is not to say, however, that their experience of discrimination is equal to that of so-called non-white immigrants. As I have argued in Chapter 3, this is certainly not the case (see, amongst others, Claudio 2014; Ip, Wu

---

11 The Wallabies is the name of the Australian national rugby team.
& Inglis 1998; Lange & Nisbet 2000; Pilger 1991; Ryan 2000; Stratton 2011; Udah, Singh & Chamberlain 2019). Next to that, it is nowhere near the level of racism that refugees and asylum seekers experience (Boochani 2018; Haslam & Holland 2012), let alone Aboriginal Australians (Balvin & Kashima 2012; Mellor 2012; Pilger 1991, 2013). Yet, as I have also argued before, in the lived experience of the Afrikaners, these comparisons are irrelevant. They felt excluded and this caused pain. Subconsciously, they assumed that their white skin, an aspect of their identity which they shared with Australians, would protect them against anti-immigrant discrimination (cf. Steyn 2001; Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013). Yet, they found that, regardless of skin colour, ‘Australians operate on a never ending pattern of exclusion’ (Farah 2015).

Indeed, most interviewees felt that Australians expected them to assimilate and forget about their South African past. They found Australians to be ‘aggressively monolinguisitc’ (Joost, casual conversation, 2015) who ‘don’t like it if you speak your other language’ (Lena, interview, 2015), and who would gladly see monolingualism (English only) ‘turned into law’ (Rosalien, casual conversation, 2016). Next to that, they felt that they were not allowed to speak about the lives they had lived in South Africa. As Anja’s story illustrates:

I realised quickly [that] I don’t have a past. The life that I had does not count. Nobody is interested in it. When you talk about your childhood days, then they [Australians] will say to you: ‘Why are you always talking about your life in South Africa?’ But it’s OK for you, as an Aussie, to talk about your childhood days. So you feel, then, you are not allowed to talk about it anymore, it doesn’t count anymore. So I no longer have an identity. I am nothing. I am nobody.

(Interview, 2016)

Anja’s experience painfully demonstrates her loss of belonging in Australia. It echoes Loizos’ work on Cypriot Greek refugees (1981) who were criticised by their hosts for talking about their home region. It also reminds us of Schuetz’ description of the immigrant as ‘a man without a history’ in his seminal article *The Stranger* (1944). Furthermore, it shows the ‘demoralising and destructive impact of mainstream Australia’s indifference to or negation of the past experience of immigrants’ (Longley Arthur 2018a: 11; cf. Persian 2018). In this respect, Farah (2015) refers to research demonstrating that 44 per cent of Australians still supports the “we grew here, you flew here” mantra’ of which the ‘coded message’ is that...
‘you are not allowed to be proud of non-Western, non-Anglo cultures.’ What all of this reveals is that, although Australia has officially switched from an immigration policy of assimilation to multiculturalism over four decades ago (Hugo 2014; Jupp 2007; Jupp & Clyne 2011; cf. Baldassar 2001; Peters 2000), in practice, Australians still expect immigrants to assimilate.

Indeed, in their everyday experience, most participants felt forced to ‘de-socialise’ away from their own culture and ‘re-socialise’ into the Australian culture (see Galtung 1990: 293). The result of this was that they did not feel genuinely welcome. Although most had not experienced outward hostility from Australians, they generally felt that the latter gave a superficial welcome with antagonistic undertones. Simone, for instance, said that ‘Australians seem to tolerate you, but then they don’t really... They are friendly, but then again not really friendly... They seem welcoming, but they are not genuinely welcoming’ (Interview, 2015). As Simone’s struggle demonstrates, this phenomenon was felt to be intangible and, as such, reminds us of Hage’s contention that Australia’s racism is characteristically covert, indirect and hard to identify (2014: 233-234). As Agnes expressed as follows, after having lived in Australia for eleven years:

I’ve never felt that this country really... ehm, they’re happy for you to work and pay your taxes and so on, but you are not embraced. The word is embraced, [we are] never embraced, it’s, I’ve never, you are tolerated, but you never become part of the family.

(Interview, 2015)

Consequently, most interviewees did not feel 100 per cent loyal to Australia. As previously discussed, inclusion and respect from a group can lead to higher self-esteem (see Zalenski & Raspa 2006). Regardless of the nature of the group, group membership makes us feel ‘that we matter’, since ‘they offer recognition’ (Eriksen 2017: 161). Hence, when immigrants feel unaccepted by the majority culture, a ‘sense of rejection, alienation and poor self-esteem may occur’ (Bhugra & Becker 2005: 19). The fact that Agnes did not feel ‘embraced’ by Australians made her feel rejected indeed, which became clear when she said: ‘I’ll stay here for my kids’ sake, but I’ll never stay here for Australia’ (Interview, 2015). Like Agnes, many participants stated that they would return to South Africa if their children would not be living in Australia by the time of their retirement. This was because they had ‘nothing in Australia.’
This shows that ‘a sense of responsibility ... in the form of moral obligation ... only emerges when the society you belong to honours you’ (Hage 2002b: 4). Indeed, in Kunz’ words (1988: 216), ‘lasting loyalties [between a state and its citizens] flow from a deep feeling of accepting and being accepted’. Most of the Afrikaners I engaged with lacked this feeling. Laura’s sentiments are illustrative:

... I contribute to society here, I am not a criminal, I pay taxes, I buy a house, I buy a car, I support the local enterprises, I look like them, I try to assimilate, but they won’t let me assimilate! They will always treat you as if you are an outsider. A second-rated citizen ...

(Interview, 2015)

This reminds us, with regards to the relationship between social and political belonging, that while

[c]itizens are omnipresent; Citizenship is rare... although billions are classified as citizens, only a small proportion of that number can be truly said to enjoy citizenship as a status of social dignity and a source of effective rights.

(Heater 1990: 1)

From the above it is clear that, ultimately, most study participants had not been able to recreate a sense of social belonging. For them, emigration was no solution to their loss. However, for their children they felt it was. This was because, contrary to themselves, their children ‘grew here’ (see Farah 2015, cited above). Therefore, interviewees felt that they were regarded as full members of Australian society, most notably since they would have ‘that Aussie accent’. This was essential to the Afrikaners, despite the fact that some found it personally difficult that their children had that accent. For instance, Simone, who herself was struggling with a sense of exclusion, was still happy to be in Australia, because, as she

---

12 As referred to in Chapter 3, it remains to be seen whether or not participants’ perceptions about their children in this respect are congruent with reality. Peters (2000: 65), herself a second-generation Dutch immigrant of the 1950s, argues that the first generation had ‘... internalised the myth that growing up in Australia was all that was required to make their children feel Australian.’ In time, further research among second-generation Afrikaner immigrants will be able to provide answers to this question. Given the strong emphasis most interviewees placed on their children’s future wellbeing with regards to their emigration decision, it is crucial that such a research will take place, not in the least to find out whether the second generation, that is, ‘the children’ in this research, experience their parents’ feelings of sacrifice as a psychological burden.
explained, ‘My sons have a future here. They will not be discriminated against in this country because they are very Australian. Especially the eldest, he speaks Aussie English without any accent’ (Interview, 2015). In a similar vein, Bea stated:

... this is a big thing to sacrifice [your language and culture], but it’s still worth doing for your child. And we [Afrikaners] are all like that: the better my child speaks English and the better they can align with the Australian psyche, the happier I am as a parent.

(Interview, 2016)

Indeed, Bea’s feelings were representative for most study participants. Mark, in speaking about his own losses associated with the move to Australia, summed it up succinctly when he concluded that: ‘... at the end of the day, it’s about them. I will make that sacrifice for my children ... and I feel in my heart that that is the right decision. Because we create a better life for them’ (Interview, 2016). Ultimately, we see that, similar to the conclusion reached in Chapter 3, the interviewees coped with their loss of social belonging, and of geographical belonging too, because they saw them as sacrifices they had made for their children.

Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the Afrikaners’ sense of loss of belonging in post-apartheid South Africa in a spatial as well as a socio-political respect, and how they sought to restore or recreate this by moving to Australia. The first part demonstrated that, overall, the research participants could no longer identify with the place that their country, in their view, had become. This was a serious loss, since having a sense of spatial identity is ‘fundamental for human functioning’ (Fried 1963: 365). Yet, we have seen that the interviewees successfully recreated a sense of territorial belonging to Australia, because they recognised it as similar to the South Africa that they had lost. However, the analysis further demonstrated that we cannot replace our particular attachments because, ultimately, all places are unique (Marris 2015 [1986]; Girard 2016; Hollan 1995; Loizos 1981; Maxwell 1995; Wellenkamp 1988). That is, although Australia could replace the role that pre-1994 South Africa had played in the Afrikaners’ lives, it could not replace the country as such (cf. Archer 1999). In a geographical sense, therefore, the move to Australia signalled a loss of belonging.
With regards to their felt loss of socio-political belonging, defined as our identification with the social group at the national level, the answer to the question to which extent the immigration to Australia was a successful coping mechanism also remains ambiguous, as the second part of this chapter has demonstrated. Here, we first saw that the Afrikaners felt rejected by their fellow South Africans and actively ‘forced out’ by their government due to their role in the country’s past. We have seen how this is not entirely a ‘Deep Story’, to reiterate Hochschild’s (2016) term once more, but is substantiated by secondary research (most notably Vanderhaeghen 2018) and by media outlets from South Africa. These sources reveal that the successive ANC-dominated governments, at least until the time of research (2015-2016), expressed an increasingly anti-white attitude and were, at times, openly hostile towards Afrikaners as a group. The Afrikaners thus felt that they were ‘second-rated citizens’ who could not count on their government for support.

Thus, they moved to Australia in an attempt to feel included again, this time in another society. However, the analysis revealed that in Australia, too, the participants felt to be ‘second-class’ citizens. Although most of them achieved formal belonging to Australia through citizenship, and while they felt valued by the Australian state for their economic worth, they felt rejected, once more, by the society at large. That is, although the state, or, the ‘parent’, in the analogy that I have used, wanted them, they experienced ordinary Australians, the ‘siblings’, so to speak, to be less enthusiastic in welcoming them. This experience fits into the larger body of literature on immigrant experiences in Australia (Claudio 2014; Ip, Wu & Inglis 1998; Lange & Nisbet 2000; Longley Arthur 2018b; Peters 2000; Pilger 1991; Ryan 2000; Stratton 2011; Udah, Singh & Chamberlain 2019). The analysis made clear that the promise of social belonging enclosed in citizenship is elusive (cf. Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005; Hage 2000, 2002a; Heater 1990). Crucially, however, interviewees unanimously felt that their children were included in Australian society. This belief made their suffering bearable and reflects my conclusion in Chapter 3 on the supreme meaning of sacrifice (see Frankl 2008 [1946]; Hubert & Mauss 1964; Miller 1998).

What we can further conclude at the end of Chapters 3–5 is that the Afrikaners’ sense of loss of belonging in South Africa was, for the most part, a consequence of their lost privilege. Thus,
I have argued that it was this privilege that ensured their sense of belonging in South Africa. Their previous advantaged position, based on the apartheid doctrine and system, was the principal framework through which they understood their world and which gave it meaning (Griffiths & Prozesky 2010). Losing this meant that they no longer felt psychologically safe in their home country (Davies 2012; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maslow 1943, 1970). This can also be referred to as the loss of ‘ontological security’ (Giddens 1976, 1984, 1990) or the loss of their ‘dwelling place’ (Griffiths & Prozesky 2010 following Heidegger 2001 [1971]). Thus, the Afrikaners had become ‘stay-at-home-migrants’ (Hochschild 2016: 49). They had stayed; their way of life had left. With this way of life went their sense of belonging. As a result, they embarked on a quest for inclusion elsewhere. As we have seen, this was not entirely successful.

More importantly, the research participants had not found meaning in their pre-immigration losses. And those losses that fail to make sense, in which no good can be found, but which shatter the meaning of our assumptive worlds and feelings of self-worth, will cause chronic grief (see Folkman 2001; Janoff-Bulman 1989, 1992; Thompson, SC & Janigian 1988; cf. Davies 2012; Doka 2002; Freud 1917; Livingston 2010; Marris 2015 [1986]; Shand 1920). The Afrikaners who participated in this research had not found any benefits in the ‘death’ of apartheid. From their perspective, all of their country’s post-1994 changes were negative. Hence, they were still grieving. This expressed itself most clearly in the fact that they saw themselves as refugees—with a few notable exceptions. This self-perception had crucial consequences for their resettlement experience in Australia, as the next chapter will demonstrate.
Chapter 6 ‘We will never adjust to this’:
Cultural Bereavement

Introduction
This chapter discusses the Afrikaners’ resettlement experience in Australia in terms of the loss of cultural belonging. My analysis shows that, overall, the research participants did not cope very well with this, due to two reasons. First, although culture loss is experienced by most, if not all, migrants, it is generally stronger amongst refugees and forced migrants (Bhugra & Becker 2005; Eisenbruch 1990, 1991; Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013; Sluzki 1979). Since the Afrikaners perceived of themselves as refugees, they had psychological experiences similar to those of refugees and classical diaspora groups – who left their homeland due to a real or perceived threat to their survival (Bornman 2005; Clifford 1994; Daswani 2013; Du Toit 2003; Giliomee 2011; Gonzalez 1992; Kearny 1995; Tölölyan 1991, 1996, 2007; van Rooyen 2000; cf. Chapter 2). This demonstrates, once more, the reality of the narrative that is felt to be true (Hochschild 2016). The grief over this loss expressed itself predominantly in anger and a criticising attitude towards the host community (Bowlby 1980; Kübler-Ross 1970; 1972; cf. Leavitt 1995; Lewis 1961; Rosaldo 2014; Rosenblatt, Walsh and Jackson 1976).

Secondly, the analysis here shows that this reaction was exacerbated by the fact that the Afrikaners felt excluded by Australians, as discussed in foregoing chapters. The result of this was that the great majority of interviewees spoke about Australians and Australian culture in completely opposite terms as to themselves and their own culture.¹ That is, they engaged in a strong process of othering and stereotyping. This suggests that, in reaction to feeling excluded, they were excluding the ‘others’, the host community, themselves. The felt

¹ As a reminder, with ‘Australians’ they meant white, Australian born citizens of Anglo-Saxon descent, and thus referred to the dominant or ‘mainstream’ culture only (cf. Chapter 2 and 5).
Chapter 6  ‘We will never adjust to this’

contrasts were narrated in two key dichotomies, which the two main parts of this chapter will discuss. First, interviewees saw Australians as ‘British’, whereas they described themselves as ‘European’. Next to that, in their experience, Australians were ‘atheists’ whereas they saw themselves as ‘Christians’. These stereotypes reveal underlying historical discourses of anti-Britishness and religious superiority respectively. Before I discuss this further, it is important to consider more in-depth the concepts of cultural belonging and the process of stereotyping as a form of ‘othering’.

Cultural identity, or cultural belonging, refers to our membership of a group that shares general customs, habits, and modes of thinking and behaviour which originate from an underlying ideology or worldview, as explained in Chapter 1. It can overlap with national or political belonging if we are members of the dominant cultural group in our society. For instance, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, in the Afrikaners’ view, only white, Anglo-Saxon Australians’ cultural and political identities overlap, and all other Australians are members of minority groups. In relation to this, the analysis here shows that cultural belonging can be felt strongest in relationship to a sub-culture: the Afrikaners with whom I engaged identified more as Afrikaner than as South African. Next to this, within any type of culture, variation exists as well in terms of what individuals believe and how they act. However, the group at large ‘share[s] a world-view and speak[s] the same language in both a literal and a metaphoric sense’ (Eriksen 2017: 26-27). That is, members of the same cultural group can usually understand and interpret each other’s words and behaviour without questioning. They understand what the other means because both were, literally, cultivated in a similar environment. The shared language is ‘the unquestioned mother tongue’ and the behaviour is ‘a matter of course’, which is based on a shared ‘thinking as usual’ (see Schutz 1944), hence the lingering popularity of Geertz’ definition of culture as ‘shared meanings expressed through public communication’ (1973; cf. Eriksen 2017). Although the concept remains elusive, essentially, culture refers to ‘everything that is learned’ (Eriksen 2017: 27). Thus, it signifies what we believe to be true about the world and how we behave accordingly. Of course, this changes, usually when some members of the younger generations critically question what they were taught and come to the conclusion that some of it, or most, is false. Thus, culture is also dynamic (cf. Eriksen 2017), although the pace of change is usually slow.
Precisely because culture is taught, and from birth, it becomes a cornerstone of our identity. As previously discussed, we attach ourselves to other people, as well as to places and things, in early childhood specifically (Bowlby 1961, 1980; Davies 2012; Marris 2015 [1986]). This includes culture. That is, cultural belonging can also be referred to as cultural attachment. We attach so strongly because our brain, literally, grows within our social context. Humans are born with 25 per cent of their total brain, which means that an astonishing 75 percent of our brain develops outside the womb during childhood and adolescence, thus ‘in direct relationship with an external environment’ (Shore 1996: 3, my emphasis). Thus, our brain, which creates our mind (Damasio 2002), is inextricably linked to the culture we grew up in. This means that what we think and how we think is formed by our culture. From this, it follows that cultural loss is a serious loss. Indeed, Davis argues that it is ‘most like the loss through death of a parent, spouse, child …’ (1992: 157). Vice versa, Caine (1979: 120), writing about the loss of her husband, asserts that ‘being a widow is like living in a country where nobody speaks your language.’

Indeed, cultural loss stands out from other losses associated with migration (Bhugra & Becker 2005), such as the loss of homeland, family and friends, personal and professional networks and a familiar way of life. These can make the migration experience, in general, one of loss and grief (see, amongst others, Aichberger et al. 2010; Arredondo-Dowd 1981; Berg 2009; Berg & Eckstein 2009; Casado, Hong & Harrington 2010; Disman 1983; Lee 2010; Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013; Prudent 1988; Volkan 1993). However, since, apart from our loved ones our culture most significantly provides our lives with meaning (as it gives us a framework through which we can understand the world), cultural loss is arguably one of the greatest losses that migrants face. As Ainslie states:

The link between culture and the deepest features of subjective experience is as ingrained as it is pervasive; this is why cultural dislocation has such profound psychological consequences for the individual.

(2005: 208)

Hence, Ainslie argues that all migrants are ‘perpetual mourners’ (2005: 214; following Volkan 1993).
Yet, there is a principal difference between those migrants that choose to migrate and those that are or feel forced to leave their homeland. The former may be prepared to deal with the associated losses, including that of culture, because they actively sought the change (see Davies 2012). The latter, however, who left their homeland involuntarily, may not be prepared or less capable of doing so (Bhugra & Becker 2005; Eisenbruch 1990, 1991; Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013). As such, they usually find it more difficult to adjust to the host culture (see, for example, Sluzki 1979). This explains why the Afrikaners who participated in this research had such a strong sense of cultural bereavement. Most of them said similar things to Joke, who felt that ‘no Afrikaner truly wants to be in Australia; it’s all by default’ (Interview, 2016) or echoed the following comment by Evelina:

In reality, we are all refugees. My parents, my grandparents, born and bred in South Africa. Really, now I am here in Australia! Do you think we would have come here if things would have gone right [in South Africa]?!’

(Interview, 2016)

Evelina’s sentiments illustrate an anger that was typical for most interviewees. Anger is the primary response to separation or loss (Bowlby 1980; cf. Leavitt 1995). As such, it is a common sign of grief (Kübler-Ross 1970, 1972; Rosaldo 2014 [1984]; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976) which often finds expression through a criticising attitude (see Bhugra & Becker 2005; Hogg 2006; Leavitt 1995; Stets 2006; cf. McCall & Simmons 1978). The Afrikaners felt angry about ‘being forced’ to leave their homeland and also about their perceived marginalisation in Australia. In this respect, it is telling that those interviewees who felt most excluded, undervalued and rejected by Australians were also the ones who were most critical of their hosts and who voiced the strongest stereotypes.

Stereotyping is a dangerous and violent form of othering (cf. Balvin & Kashima 2012; Bernasconi 2012). The process of ‘othering’ refers to the tendency to construct an image of someone else in that of our own (Hegel circa 1795, reprinted in Wootton 1996). It is inherent

---

2 It is important to note that there were also two interviewees who specifically stated that they did not see Afrikaners as refugees. They criticised their fellow émigrés for portraying themselves as such.
in human nature and we start doing this from early childhood to confirm the boundaries of the self in our social world (Sibley 2001). Crucially, the self requires the other to realise itself, since without that which we are not, we cannot distinguish what we are (Hegel circa 1795, reprinted in Wootton 1996; cf. Clifford 1986; Foucault 1980; Kapuscinski 2008 [2006]; Levinas 1987; 1999; Said 1995), similar to how we cannot understand what light is without knowing the darkness. Thus we see that, in analogy to relationships of belonging as discussed in Chapter 1, in order to exist, that is, to realise our unique self, we have to exclude others, those who are not ourselves (see Girard 2016). Yet, paradoxically, it also means that without the other, we cannot exist. Indeed, ‘othering’ or ‘alterity’ originates from the Latin alter or alteritas, meaning ‘the one/the other’ or ‘the other of two’. This demonstrates that belonging or togetherness is the key to our existence.

By extension of our individual identity construction, we also construct images of collections of individuals through contrast. As discussed previously, our social identity consists of the group(s) we belong to (Eriksen 2017; cf. Tajfel 1982). Thus, it follows that we also construct an image of our ‘in-group’ through constructing difference with ‘out-groups’. Indeed, Schwalbe et al (2000: 422) refer to ‘othering’ as ‘a form of collective identity work’ where we reaffirm in-group membership by demarcating an out-group. As I have argued at the onset of this thesis, all humans are biologically similar and share the same basic needs. The only respect in which we differ from each other lies in how we were cultivated. Thus, othering or constructing a social identity is normal and does not pose problems as long as groups of people refrain from judging other groups for being ‘different’ from themselves. However, as the world demonstrates, the self or the ‘in-group’ is often seen as ‘the dominant and hegemonic “in-power” entity, while the Other is the alternate minority’ (Staszak 2009: 2). Thus, most of us operate along patterns of exclusion, not only Australians (see Farah 2015 cited in Chapter 5; cf. Philo 2010).

Answers to the question as to why we usually have a positive image of our ‘in-group’ and a more negative image of ‘out-groups’ have to be sought in our fears and anxieties regarding the unknown (Davies 2012; Dunant & Porter 1996; Marris 2015 [1986]) and, ultimately, in insecurity (cf. Bernasconi 2012). That is, since confrontation with ‘other’ groups breaks our
‘thinking and behaviour as usual’ (Schuetz 1944) – ‘their’ thinking and behaviour is different since ‘they’ were cultivated differently – we do not know how the others will behave. This can be frightening. Ultimately, we may be afraid that the other group will harm us, or, as the Afrikaners felt about Australians, reject us. This demonstrates that underlying the process of stereotyping ‘other’ groups lies insecurity about the self, or, about the worthiness of the own group (cf. Bernasconi 2012). The Afrikaners’ perception of Australians is a case in point, which I will now discuss.

Perceptions of difference: ‘They are British’

In their 2013 article on recent immigration to Australia from South Africa and Zimbabwe, Forrest, Johnston and Poulsen state that white, middle-class South Africans resettle in Australia with ‘minimal problems’ due to the ‘scarcely different’ subcultures. By contrast, my research demonstrates that the Afrikaners encountered many psychological problems in adjusting to Australian culture, precisely because they perceived it to be so fundamentally different from their own. However, they did think that ‘Anglo-South Africans’ would settle in easily in Australia, as referred to earlier. For instance, Adriaan stated: ‘Australians view British immigrants as their own, and English-speaking white South Africans fit in; they are like fish in the water because they’re all from the UK’ (Casual conversation, 2016). On the other hand, interviewees invariably described themselves as ‘European’, which, in their view, was different from ‘British’. Most agreed with Rianne in asserting that ‘We are from German, French, and Dutch origin, the Afrikaners, this is what we are made of’ (Interview, 2016). Many participants narrated how shocked they had been to discover that, in their experience, Australia is ‘actually a British country’. As Bea’s sentiments illustrate:

This was the last thing I ever thought about: that they [Australians] are actually British! Otherwise I would have reconsidered [moving to Australia], I don’t like the English way, not at all! I like the Dutch and the German way, because I can identify with that.

(Interview, 2016)

Perhaps Forrest, Johnston and Poulsen (2013) shared this perception and referred to English-speaking white South Africans only.
Similarly, Janus told me that, with hindsight, he and his family should have immigrated to Europe. ‘Because we would have been surrounded more by our people,’ he said. ‘As a European [in Australia], you are far removed from the other European countries’ (Casual conversation, 2015). Before I explain what the Afrikaners meant by these statements, it is first important to discuss the Australian context.

Although Australia, as a former British colony, has British roots and remains partly British in character (Chesterman 2005; Goosen 1997; McLeod 1963), the two countries have been growing apart during the latter half of the twentieth century—with Australia focusing much more on its relationship with the USA—to the extent that, as Davidson argues, ‘the monarchical link between Australia and Britain is the only substantial one remaining’ (2005: 111). Next to that, although the origins of Australian culture lie in nineteenth century English middle-class values (Stratton 2016), Australian society is deeply influenced by migrant cultures, increasingly so since the abolishment of the ‘White Australia Policy’ in the 1970s and the adoption of ‘multiculturalism’ as official policy (see previous chapters). Today, nearly half of the country’s population lives in migrant households (Longley Arthur 2018a: 3) and a language other than English is spoken in 22.2 per cent of Australian homes (ABS Census 2016).

Thus, although Australian citizenship as a legal category was only established in 1948 and existed alongside ‘British subjecthood’ until 1984 (Chesterman 2005: 34), since then, Australian society has drastically changed and the idea that Australians are essentially Brits is ‘a myth’ (Goosen 1997: 92).

Yet, as we have seen throughout this thesis, in the perception of the Afrikaners, the only genuine Australians, or ‘authentic’ as opposed to ‘fake’ autochthones (see Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005), were white Australians of Anglo-Saxon descent. Secondary research supports the perception that this group represents Australia’s ‘dominant’ or ‘mainstream’ culture (see, most notably, Hage’s works, 2000-2014). This explains in part why the study participants compared themselves so starkly with this group. A deeper explanation, however, lies in their historically antagonistic relationship with white South Africans of British descent. Clearly, the experience of being colonised by the British and being treated as inferior within the imperial racial-ranking system left an enduring mark on the collective psyche of the
Afrikaner people (Crapanzano 1985; de Villiers 1988; cf. Giliomee 2011; Harrison 1982; Horowitz 1985; Louw & Mersham 2001; Patterson 1957). As my analysis in this chapter demonstrates, most interviewees projected a historical dislike of anything British onto Australians, whom they principally perceived as ‘distant’, ‘evasive’ and ‘unreliable’. These negative stereotypes were juxtaposed to the Afrikaner culture, which was described in positive stereotypes as being much more hospitable, direct and trustworthy.

Regardless of whether the projected characteristics are negative or positive, stereotyping, including self-stereotyping, is always a negative process because of the expectations it creates (Bernasconi 2012). Stereotypes can be defined as concepts in our minds that contain our prejudiced knowledge and expectations about distinct social groups (Kunda 1999). Balvin and Kashima (2012) state that stereotypes are powerful and dangerous because they often represent cultural knowledge. Yet, by definition, they constitute gross generalisations and caricatures of some or more cultural norms or traits of the stereotyped group. This is clearly demonstrated in the way the majority of the Afrikaners portrayed Australians. Although some stereotypes originate from a culture’s underlying ideology, evidently not all members of a certain group think or act in the stereotypical way. For example, the perceived British ‘evasiveness’ may originate from a culture in which it was crucial to behave politely (see Langford 1992). However, individual variation within any group ensures that we will always find members of the British cultural group who behave in a direct manner. Margo, for instance, told me that one of her colleagues was ‘very straightforward and outspoken, and this is something you don’t usually see in Australian people’ (Interview, 2015). Before I discuss this stereotype further, in the following section I first focus on the participants’ historically-informed anti-British attitude.

‘That British nastiness, you get that amongst them’: the pain of history

Many interviewees explained to me that they ‘did not like the British’ due to South Africa’s history, and mostly due to the experience of the Anglo-Boer war (see Chapter 1). Margo explained it to me by referring to her Dutch friend, who ‘holds a terrible grudge against the
Germans because of the Second World War, because they killed her father and her brother.’

‘So with us,’ she continued:

... we also have this, this is something that comes through many generations of Afrikaners. They don’t like the English, they hate... because we were brought up like that: ‘We hate the English because of the Anglo-Boer war’.

(Casual conversation, 2016)

Here, we are reminded of our ‘cultivation’ or socialisation, that is, of how we are brought up to believe certain things about the world and about others in it (see Davies 2012; Shore 1996). It also demonstrates the workings of transgenerational trauma, that is, the transmission of trauma to next generations (Livingston 2010). In this respect, a number of interviewees spoke of the stories of their grandparents, who had survived the Anglo-Boer war. For instance, Joost told me that both his grandfathers had been put into British concentration camps as small boys. ‘The Afrikaners were terribly suppressed during that war,’ he said, ‘it was very cruel what the English did’ (Casual conversation, 2015). Joost continued to explain how the British had applied the scorched earth policy and burnt all the Afrikaner farms. After the war, their goal was to keep the Afrikaners poor: ‘All jobs, all contracts, everything went to English-speaking people’. As a consequence, Joost’ grandparents went through extreme poverty (cf. de Villiers 1988).

Richard’s grandparents went through a similar experience. ‘My grandma,’ he said, ‘she would never eat a closed sandwich, because they [the British] used to put pieces of glass, broken glass, in the sandwiches in the concentration camps’ (Interview, 2015). Richard felt very strongly about the Anglo-Boer war. ‘Because all the [Afrikaner] women and children were put in concentration camps,’ he stated:

... these guys showed Hitler what to do in the Second World War. Because they gave him a great example of how to actually get rid of the population. So more than thirty thousand white women and children died in concentration camps.

In reality, about 28,000 Boer women and children died in the concentration camps, which constituted 10 per cent of the Afrikaner population (see Pakenham 1993 [1979]; cf. Field 1979). Next to this, 7000 Afrikaner men lost their lives in battle (Crapanzano 1985; Patterson
1957). On the British side, 22,000 soldiers died (Pakenham 1993 [1979]; cf. Crapanzano 1985; Gray 1982), 518 of whom were Australians (Field 1979; cf. Chamberlain 1999). In addition, the war claimed 34,000 black South African lives, 12,000 in battle (Crapanzano 1985; Pakenham 1993 [1979]) and another 20,000 in concentration camps (Harris 2001).

The Afrikaners, however, were either unaware of this or found these facts irrelevant. This reminds us that ‘facts are only significant as far as they are part of a man’s experiences’ (Frankl 2008 [1946]: 19-20; cf. Kaufmann & Nietzsche 1954). Most Afrikaners whom I interviewed were still preoccupied with the injustice done to them during the Anglo-Boer War (cf. Crapanzano 1985; de Vries 2013). Because of the British atrocities during that war and the marginalisation of the Afrikaners in its aftermath (cf. Patterson 1957), many research participants perceived contemporary British people to be mean. They subsequently projected this onto Australians, about whom Evelina, for example, said:

That [British] nastiness, you get that amongst them [the Aussies]. If he can, he will hurt you [the Aussie]. Listen to me, they will be nice to you, but they will turn their backs and they will say things about you or do things against you ... They are not a good nation. This still comes out in them here, those ugly things.

(Interview, 2016)

Indeed, historically, Afrikaners have held a perception that the British, or, by extension, ‘outsiders ... will always try to do you harm’ (de Villiers 1988: 237). Paradoxically, many have intermarried with English-speaking white South Africans. Some interviewees referred to this phenomenon within their own family, but always stated that the ‘English’ person had been integrated and had become ‘Afrikaans’. For instance, Bea told me that her father-in-law ‘was English until he married [her mother-in-law]’ (Interview, 2016). Similarly, Laura explained that her father ‘was English’, but that her mother had ‘taught him structure, rules, responsibility, with a farm, a family, [and] the church’ (Casual conversation, 2015). Here, we see a number of ideas that Laura expressed about perceived dichotomies between ‘English’ and ‘Afrikaner’ values. Most research participants talked about these dichotomies, which can be summarised as ‘distant’ vs. ‘hospitable’, ‘evasive’ vs. ‘direct’ and ‘unreliable’ vs. ‘dependable’. Since
interviewees saw ‘Aussies’ essentially as ‘British’, they subsequently projected these ideas onto Australians, as the following section demonstrates.

‘They never invite you back’: a ‘distant’ culture

Australians were generally perceived as ‘distant’ in two related respects. First, in a literal sense, since most interviewees found that ‘they only meet each other outside’, that is, in public spaces. Many study participants had invited their new Australian colleagues or acquaintances to their homes, usually for a dinner party. In the Afrikaners’ culture, this is the normal thing to do in the process of establishing new relationships. The expectation, from their cultural background, is that, after a certain period of time, the other(s) will invite you back (and so it continues). However, the Afrikaners experienced that Australians do not do this. It took them a while to figure out that, in Australian culture, it is, by contrast, normal to meet each other ‘at a pub’, which, as Eva, amongst others, explained, ‘comes from the British culture’ (Interview, 2015). Although this cultural trait has been generalised (see, for example, Sharp 2012), evidently, there are Australians who do invite others into their homes. Yet, the Afrikaners explained this experience in terms of distance and of superficial friendships, because in their culture, friends visit each other at home. Afrikaner culture was further seen as very hospitable where ‘we are used to pop in’, where ‘there is always food on the table’ and ‘you can always stay for dinner’. By contrast, research participants found that with Australians, ‘you always have to make an appointment’. Eva, for instance, recounted a ‘mistake’ she had made when she had just arrived, by ‘popping in’ at a colleague’s home who lived nearby (interview, 2015). The result was very awkward as it made her colleague incredibly uncomfortable, thus Eva quickly realised that this was ‘not done’ in Australia.

The Afrikaners also found Australians to be distant in a metaphorical way. That is, in their experience it was difficult to have a meaningful conversation with them because ‘they don’t really show themselves’ and remain ‘superficial’. Sophie, for example, explained that ‘Aussies are very, very friendly when you get lost, to help you, yes they are friendly, but there’s also a very big distance’ (Interview, 2016). Therefore, she found that, in trying to develop relationships with Australians:
Chapter 6 ‘We will never adjust to this’

The giving that I give, is not being given back; there’s no reciprocation in the same amount ... I don’t understand this, they have a different way, a different dimension of friendship.

Sophie further stated that her son also struggled to befriend Australians, as he had told her: ‘They’re your mate, they’re not your friend’ (Interview, 2016). Joost explained this perceived difference between ‘mates’ and ‘friends’: ‘A friend, for us, is someone you would go through fire for; not an acquaintance’ (Casual conversation, 2015). Most research participants further agreed with Joost that friendships are built on sharing, not only experiences, but, and more importantly, thoughts and feelings. Australians do not do this, they found, since ‘they never say what they think’. This, they thought to be ‘very British’, as the next section shows.

‘They don’t speak their minds’: ‘British politeness’ vs. ‘Dutch directness’

Indeed, most Afrikaners I spoke to found it extremely difficult that, in their experience, Australians do not say what is actually on their mind. They attributed this to Australia’s British heritage, referring to the stereotype of ‘British politeness’, which, as they explained, originates from a desire ‘to avoid conflict at all cost’. This perceived cultural feature violently clashed with Afrikaner culture, because Afrikaners have, in their own experience, ‘that Dutch directness’. By this, they meant that, according to their customs, ‘... if you want to know something, you just ask. You don’t mean anything with that’ (Eva, interview, 2015). By contrast, in Australia, ‘you can’t do that. You have to get the answer with a large detour’ (ibid).

Since the Afrikaners were mostly confronted with interaction with Australians in the work space—in their leisure time they could share each other’s company, as the next chapter will discuss— it was here that they experienced most problems due to this felt difference. For instance, Laura recounted how she had ‘burnt her fingers’ when she first started working in Australia. ‘After half an hour into a meeting I still did not understand what was expected of me,’ she said. ‘So at some point, I started making summaries and asking questions:

‘So, if I understand it correctly, you are asking me to do this and this and this?’ People [Australian colleagues] got very red in the face when I did that, but I didn’t mind because I wanted to know what was being asked of me, to get things clear. With my own team, I was very clear. That is how we do things in South Africa.’

(Casual conversation, 2015)
The perceived Afrikaners’ clarity, of which Laura talked here, was attributed to their Dutch heritage. As Laura explained, ‘In South Africa, like in Holland, yes is yes, and no is no. With us, there’s no maybes’ (Casual conversation, 2015). However, this straightforwardness absolutely shocked Australians, they believed. ‘They find us very aggressive and pushy,’ Sander, amongst others, explained (Interview, 2016). However, as Margo clarified, ‘we don’t have to fight with someone, but you can have a good argument and tomorrow you will talk again normally with that person’ (Interview, 2015). All study participants saw conflict as a productive force and agreed with Noor that:

… sometimes things need to be said. And sorted out. But they [Australians] hate confrontation, they hate taking people on or being seen as assertive … I mean, a lot of people here are initially from the UK.

(Interview, 2015, English original)

The tendency to avoid confrontation was, in the Afrikaners’ view, the very opposite of polite. In their culture, it is rude not to say what you think, they explained. It is regarded as dishonest. Therefore, they saw Australians essentially as untrustworthy. Again, this was attributed to their British heritage, where Joost’s sentiments were typical in declaring that, ‘With the Australian, as with the Englishman, you never know where you stand’ (Casual conversation, 2016). As discussed previously, this perception has strong historical roots (see Crapanzano 1985; de Villiers 1988; de Vries 2013; Harrison 1982; Patterson 1957).

The view of Australians as being unreliable was aggravated by the belief that, although Australians ‘won’t say things to your face’, they ‘will say it behind your back’ (Hilde, interview, 2016). In this respect, Corien, in relation to the work environment, stated that ‘you won’t hear until six months later that you didn’t do something the way they wanted you to do it. And you’ll hear it from someone else’ (Casual conversation, 2016). She found this incredibly difficult, because ‘now six months are lost in which you could have corrected it and done it different.’ By contrast, the Afrikaners viewed themselves as ‘never wasting time’ by ‘always being honest’ because ‘[we] talk about our problems’ (Anja, interview, 2016). From their perspective, their honesty made them trustworthy. As Ronald explained: ‘This is in your blood. It is in the Afrikaner’s nature to work hard, to be honest, to be dependable. This is in
our blood’ (Interview, 2015). Here, Ronald also indirectly refers to the second main dichotomy that the interviewees felt existed between Australians and themselves. Namely, the Afrikaners’ attitude towards work is based on Protestantism, and specifically on the Calvinist doctrine. I discuss this further in the second part of the chapter, to which we now turn.

The big mirror: ‘They are atheists’

Almost unanimously, the study participants felt that they had entered an atheist country, which they found absolutely shocking. They generally described Australian society as one where ‘anything goes’ and Australians as lacking moral values, with which they meant Christian values. As a consequence, Australians were often described as people who do not dress appropriately, drink too much alcohol, use drugs and marry and divorce as they please. Interviewees attributed these gross stereotypes to Australians’ perceived lack of faith. Next to this, and more importantly, they also found Australians to be apathetic in the sense that, according to most research participants, they ‘possess no drive or passion’ to achieve anything. In the following sections I will demonstrate that this perception, too, was constructed in contrast to the Afrikaners’ own values and derives from the Protestant ethic (see Weber 1987 [1930]) and Calvinism in particular. Indeed, as previously discussed, the process of ‘othering’ is one of mirroring: the ‘other’ is constructed as what the ‘self’ is not (Hegel circa 1795, reprinted in Wootton 1996; cf. Clifford 1986; Foucault 1980; Kapuscinski 2008 [2006]; Levinas 1987; 1999; Said 1995). Crucially, however, most people are not aware that they are engaged in this process –of constructing images of others in that of their own– in the same way as that they are unconscious of the fact that they, themselves, are profoundly shaped by the particular culture in which they grew up (see Eriksen 2017; cf. Davies 2012; Shore 1996).

Due to this ‘homeblindness’, as Eriksen calls it, most people lack the ability to critically self-reflect and realise that:

... their own habits and notions are created in a particular social environment, under special circumstances; and that they would in crucial ways have been different individuals if they had been raised elsewhere.

[4] For a discussion of some of these stereotypes, see Sharp 2012 and, most (in)famously, Horne 1978 [1964].
Indeed, my analysis here reveals, by analogy with Said’s ground-breaking and discipline-shaking demonstration of Orientalism as a mirror on the West instead of the East (1995 [1978]), the way in which research participants portrayed Australians says a lot about Afrikaners and little about Australians. This is not to say, however, that cultural differences are not real. By contrast, since we grow up in different environments we see the world differently (Damasio 2002; Eriksen 2017; Shore 1996). Therefore, entering another culture is often experienced as a shock. What the Afrikaners experienced post-immigration could be referred to not only as cultural loss but as ‘spiritual deprivation’ (see Kauffman 2002). The latter represents the underlying loss—the perceived loss of being surrounded by people who share their ideology, in this case Christianity, which informed their values, norms, and thinking and behaviour patterns. The next section illustrates this.

‘Playing different games’: cultural bereavement at work

With regards to the immigrant experience, Schuetz wrote that the stranger’s—that is, the immigrant’s—learned cultural pattern continues to be his ‘unquestioned scheme of reference’ and that, therefore, he ‘starts to interpret his new social environment in terms of his thinking as usual’ (1944: 502). Indeed, this research shows that the Afrikaners measured their new, Australian, social world against the one they had physically left behind in South Africa but which in their minds still existed. Consequently, the main cultural bereavement, for them, lay in the fact that they had left a society—and here they referred to South African society at large—in which being religious was the norm and entered one where this was, in their experience, not the case. As Margo explained, ‘In South Africa, … religion is the one issue, … the only issue, where people do not have a problem with each other. It is part of our identity and culture’ (Interview, 2015). In a similar vein, Jacqueline told me that, in Australia, she had to make sure her son entered a Christian school, ‘whereas in South Africa you didn’t even have Christian and non-Christian schools!’ (Interview, 2016). Bea illustrated the deeply disorienting effect of cultural bereavement by comparing the two cultures, Australian and South African, to two different sports being played in the same field:
... you cannot rely [on the fact that] that they [Australians] think like you think, like a Christian thinks. And because they don't think like that, they are playing a different game. ... and because we are playing two different games, you are surprised *all the time*. I mean, put a rugby player and a soccer player on the same field, you see this rugby player groping the ball and he runs away with it, but you have learned that you cannot touch the ball with your hands! You have to kick it! Here comes this guy and he runs away with it!

(Interview, 2016)

Bea’s analogy demonstrates that the rules which we were taught about society and our place in it determine how we ‘play the game’ of life. It also shows the surprise and shock that we can experience when entering a different society where other rules apply. Ultimately, the feeling of not knowing the rules by which to play the new society’s game, increased participants’ levels of insecurity. As Carolien’s story illustrates:

... in South Africa, this was easy, anyone that you would meet, you could assume that they would have the Biblical values. So you would know immediately where you stand with that person. Here, you are extremely careful with what you say ... because you don’t know what this persons’ values are. You don’t know if you’re going to offend this person with something you say. So, you are extremely careful to give your opinion. So ... this comes [down] to self-confidence.

(Interview, 2016)

These examples demonstrate that growing up in a particular cultural pattern provides us with security and assurance because it makes our lives predictable (Davies 2012; Dewey 2007 [1922]; Marris 2015 [1986]; Schuetz 1944). As a consequence, losing this deeply threatens our safety needs (Bowlby 1980; Davies 2012; Davis 1992; Maslow 1943). We no longer understand, or, in Taylor’s words, ‘imagine’, how we ‘fit together with others’, how things go on between us and our fellows, and, crucially, ‘the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations’ (2002: 106). In reaction to this loss, we can feel angry. As Marris (2015 [1986]: 76) wrote:

Wherever people are expected to treat each other as equal members of the same society, yet do not share the same symbolic code, the anxieties of misinterpretation create a pervasive defensiveness.

Most Afrikaners who participated in this research projected this defensiveness –and thus, insecurity– outwards, onto Australians, by stating, for instance, that Australians are ‘not
honest because they are not religious’ and that the difference between South Africa and Australia was that ‘to South Africa came mostly Christians from Holland and France, and to Australia came only prisoners, criminals’ (Laura, interview, 2015). Here, we see the violence of stereotyping at work, by imposing a false identity on a collection of individuals (see Bernasconi 2012), in this case Australians.

What added to the interviewees’ insecurity was that they felt excluded by Australians, as previously discussed. Thus, their trading in negative stereotypes can be seen as an inferiority complex which manifested itself as a superiority complex – as it often does. In coping with their sense of lack of belonging to their new society, they constructed stories, based on the meanings of the past, so as to regain a sense of continuity in the present (cf. Marris 2015 [1986]). In this regard, Jackson writes:

… in telling a story with others one recovers some sense of purpose, and comes to feel that the events that overwhelmed one from without may be brought within one’s grasp.

(2002: 36)

Thus, we see here that the Afrikaners constructed stories about Australians in order to retain and build anew a coherent narrative about their own cultural identity after this had been deeply disrupted by the immigration.

Laura’s above statement also shows a deep ignorance of Australia’s history and displays a strong belief in Christian superiority. Most interviewees shared her views. Regarding the first, obviously, not only convicts came to Australia; there were also colonial officials, settlers and migrants (see, amongst others, Macintyre 2015; Murray 2014; Peel & Twomey 2017). Next to that, many ‘convicts’ had done little more than steal a bread or rebelled against the British Crown (see, for example, Pilger 1991), so they can hardly be collectively labelled as ‘criminals’. Concerning the latter, the ‘belief’ in Christian superiority was used by all European imperial powers to justify slavery and colonialism (Fanon 1963 [1961], 1986 [1952]; Giliomee 2011; Mamdani 1996). However, the Afrikaners were ‘the last lonely champions of White Christian Civilisation’ (Patterson 1957: 295). Their cultural history originates from ‘an equating of Christianity, civilization and whiteness’, similar to most protestant societies (ibid: 202; cf.
Dubow 1992; Kinghorn 1994; van der Merwe 2009; van Jaarsveld 1961; O’Meara 2009 [1983]). This research suggests that many Afrikaners still believe that Christianity, and, as I will demonstrate, their version of Christianity (Calvinism), is superior to other value systems. Before I continue to discuss this, it is important to briefly sketch the Australian context and discuss Calvinism.

Contrary to the interviewees’ perception, Australia’s cultural foundation, originating from nineteenth century England, is Christian (Goosen 1997; Melleuish 2014; Stratton 2016), specifically Anglican (see Stratton 2016) and thus Protestant. This having said, since the 1960s, Australia has been involved in a secularisation process (Barnes 2009: 119; Bouma 2006; Carey 1996), similar to much of the Western world. Yet, although ‘Christendom, the era of ecclesiastical dominance of government, society and culture, has passed’ (Bouma 2006: 142), Australia’s religious and spiritual life is alive and well. As Bouma writes:

> ... many religious groups and spirituality movements are rising to the challenge of responding to the demand for connection with the transcendent in ways that continue to engage a world they may find hard to understand but are prepared to live in and try to shape.

(2006: 142)

The 2016 Census data indeed shows that Australia cannot be described as a secular or ‘atheist’ country. The Census reveals that the majority of Australians, 57.7 per cent of the population, continue to identify as ‘Christian’. However, ‘Christian’, or even ‘Reformed’, is not identical to Calvinism (see Weber 1987 [1930]). This is crucial to understand the Afrikaners’ response to their resettlement experience in Australia and their strong sense of bereavement.

Like most religions, Calvinism is a way of life. It refers to ‘a world and life view in which everything is for the glory of God’ (Ward 2009: 212; cf. Barnes 2009; Weber 1987 [1930]). Within the larger Protestant ethic of having a sense of vocation, concern with worldly success,

---

5 The most common responses for religion were: No Religion, so described: 29.6 %, Catholic: 22.6 %, Anglican: 13.3 %, Not stated 9.6 % and Uniting Church 3.7 %. Other major religions identified were Islam: 2.6 % and Buddhism: 2.4 % (Census 2016).
Chapter 6  ‘We will never adjust to this’

contempt for luxury and ostentation, responsiveness to challenges of reasonable risk and hard work (Weber 1987 [1930]; cf. McClelland 1961), Calvinism puts particular emphasis on what Calvin saw as virtues, namely: moral seriousness, piety, frugality, perseverance, hard work, learning, talent and responsibility (Calvin & Dillenberger 1975; Prentis 2008; Weber 1987 [1930]; cf. Vanderhaeghen 2018). The latter four are especially important in understanding the Afrikaners’ reaction to Australian culture, as I will discuss in the next section. Since interviewees had most difficulty adjusting to the professional ‘way of doing things’, the main focus here is on their sense of bereavement in terms of work culture. The first section, however, deals with their shock regarding Australian culture in general.

‘Children rule’: the perceived lack of Christian values

As argued, the Afrikaners’ view of Australians most of all reflected their self-image. Thus, when research participants stated that Australians lack moral values, they actually said that they perceived of themselves as having high ethical standards. Indeed, as Bernasconi explains:

To group individuals according to identifiable features such as skin colour, size, gender, length of hair, choice of clothing and so on, usually means that they do not conform to some norm that we have established for ourselves.

(2012: 152)

Indeed, when interviewees described Australians as people who ‘dress ferally’, ‘drink too much’, ‘switch [romantic] partners easily’ and ‘pamper their children’, they mirrored the norms that their culture had prescribed for them. Still, these descriptions clearly represent gross negative stereotypes and demonstrate a generic construction of all Australians as being the same, since participants usually referred to all Australians with a generic ‘they’ (cf. Burke 2018).

Further reflecting their own culture, all of these stereotypes were attributed to a lack of Christian faith. With regards to the perceived inappropriate dress, for example, Simone said:

I cannot believe how people dress and behave, and sometimes I just have to close my eyes when I’m in the city centre, because the people are so feral. I think it has to do with Christian values, or thus with the absence of Christian values.

(Interview, 2016)
Simone also expressed her surprise about how her colleagues at work were ‘always talking about how drunk they were on the weekend,’ and what she found most shocking was that ‘they speak about it as if it’s something to be proud of!’ Many interviewees shared Simone’s shock about what they saw as ‘Australians drinking behaviour’ and stated that, for them, it was incomprehensible. As Joke exclaimed, ‘Why do you have be drunk in the weekend? Why can you only have fun when you’re drunk? What is this weird behaviour?’ (Interview, 2016). And Lena demonstrated the workings of the cultural mirror by stating that ‘In my culture, this [drinking behaviour] is absolutely unacceptable’ (Interview, 2015).

What is also unacceptable in traditional Afrikaner culture, is divorce. This, too, reflects general conservative religious values. Aafke’s sentiments were illustrative in this respect, when she referred to cohabiting as ‘living in sin’ (Interview, 2016). ‘They [Australians] don’t marry,’ she said, ‘They get kids, they separate, continue with the next one, and so on.’ The children then have to live ‘with all the new parents,’ which Aafke found to be ‘completely messed up’. Yet, overall, the research participants found that Australian children are raised in a messy way. This was the one issue that they found most difficult about, what they perceived as, Australian culture. They generally referred to Australian children as ‘disrespectful’, ‘unmannered’, ‘rude’, ‘wild’ and ‘pampered’. The overall view was that, in Australia, ‘children rule’. As Arjan, for example, stated: ‘They [Australian children] lack any kind of respect for their parents; they don’t listen to their parents and scream at them’ (Interview, 2016). ‘In South Africa,’ Arjan explained, children would never, ever, do that, and it’s normal to give them a hiding when they behave badly.’ Arjan subsequently wondered how Australian children ‘ever become normal adults.’ Indeed, many study participants referred to the fact that in Australia, they were not allowed to punish their children ‘in the traditional way’ (by giving them a hiding) because ‘here, children have rights’.

---

6 Next to the perception that ‘drinking’ is an important and normal part of Australian culture, interviewees also believed that many Australians use drugs, mostly ICE (crystal methamphetamine). This was not a topic that they further expanded on, though.
In the perception of the Afrikaners, Australian children have too many rights. ‘In this Godless country,’ as Rianne called Australia, ‘the children break down the house’ (Interview, 2016). Indeed, ‘They go and play everywhere in the house, even in our bedroom,’ Lena said, ‘and they walk in without even greeting [my husband] and me!’ (Interview, 2015). Similarly, Anneke found that ‘... they don’t greet you when they enter your house, they don’t thank you, they don’t say goodbye when they leave, they call you by your first name ...’ (Interview, 2016). In this respect, Judith shared an anecdote about her first encounter with one of her daughter’s Australian friends:

... so one day we’re at home and there are a lot of South African people and we are busy doing something, and me and [my cousin] are standing in my kitchen, and in walks this boy, and we look at him and we’re like: ‘OK’, and then he goes: ‘Oh, hello’. And I look at her and she looks at me, and I’m like: ‘Wow! So I’m a visitor in my own home now!’

(Interview, 2015)

Although Judith had initially been shocked about Australian children’s behaviour, she was one of a few participants who also saw Australian childrearing as positive. She enjoyed the ‘openness’ of Australian children, she said. ‘I enjoy the fact that you can sit and have a conversation with them, they’re not shy to give their opinions ...’ (Interview, 2015). Judith contrasted this with Afrikaner children, saying that they are ‘more reserved’:

I would say, most of them [are] not that comfortable to sit with and have a conversation with an adult, and [they are] conservative. ... Because in South Africa they’re brought up with a much stronger Christian belief and a Christian basis for everything they do, they come here and they want to portray that, they want to stay in that realm of that Christianity and being a good person ...

Thus, in Judith’s view, Christianity sees ‘good children’ as quiet children who do not contradict their parents and behave timidly. One participant who shared her view was Carolien, who thought it was a good thing for Afrikaner children to become ‘more Australian’, because, as she explained, traditional Afrikaner childrearing was ‘patriarchal’. This meant that:

... if your father said you shouldn’t do something, then you didn’t do it. So this was more of an external-control-theory. Whereas here in Australia, it’s more of [a] choice theory. It is amazing to me the way they give children choices. They say: ‘Here is the information, you can now choose’. Or they ask whether the child wants to pursue the
Thus we see that, in the social realm, there were a few interviewees who found some virtue in Australian child-rearing practices, as opposed to the majority who perceived them as utterly negative. By contrast, in the professional sphere, the research participants were all but unanimous in their negative view of, what they saw as, Australian work ethic, which I will now discuss.

‘In our culture, you do your best’: projecting the Calvinist doctrine

Virtually all interviewees belonging to the work force found it difficult to work in Australia because they experienced Australian work culture to be opposite to their own. They generally characterised Australians’ attitude towards work as ‘indifferent’, ‘passive’ and ‘apathetic’. In sharp contrast, they found their own work ethic one of commitment, ambition and passion. They ‘had been taught’, as we will see, ‘to strive towards excellence’. Australia, however, in their perception, ‘consciously stimulates mediocrity’. The reason for this, the Afrikaners thought, was that Australia suffers from ‘the Tall Poppy Syndrome’, a phenomenon where ‘successful individuals are “cut down to size” by those who are less successful in order to “normalize them”’ (O’Neill, Calder & Allen 2014: 211; cf. Mouly & Sankaran 2000; Peeters 2004). The ‘Tall Poppy Syndrome’, in turn, was believed to be a result of ‘the wish that everybody should be equal’, or, the Australian stereotype of ‘egalitarianism’.

Indeed, Australia has long prided itself in being ‘an egalitarian’ nation (Peeters 2004; cf. Macintyre 2015; Murray 2014; Peel & Twomey 2017). From the onset of the colony, the desire to create an egalitarian society came about as a reaction against the hierarchical British class system (Birrell 2001; O’Neill, Calder & Allen 2014; Peeters 2004). Out of the social mix of Australia’s settlement by Westerners, which consisted of English freemen and convicts, grew

---

7 The egalitarian ideal only applied to white Anglo-Saxons at the time. As we have seen in previous chapters, Aboriginal Australians were never included.
a distinctive hierarchy that led to a strong underdog culture (see Feather 1989). From this, the concepts of ‘egalitarianism’, ‘a fair go for all’, and ‘mateship’ developed into typical Australian virtues (see, amongst others, Ernst 1990; Horne 1978 [1964]; Longley Arthur 2018b; Peeters 2004). However, the extent to which these virtues still apply is increasingly being questioned, as referred to previously (see, for example, Farah 2015; Longley Arthur 2018b).

Nevertheless, Peeters (2004: 19) argues that the ‘Tall Poppy Syndrome’ is ‘alive and well’ in Australia (cf. O’Neill, Calder & Allen 2014). Although we will evidently find a measure of this syndrome in all countries and cultures—since many people experience envy—it appears to be so pervasive in Australia that Kortlang claims that the country ‘invented’ the syndrome (cited in Peeters 2004: 14). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to further discuss this phenomenon and its relation to Australia. Furthermore, based on my analysis I argue that, although the Afrikaners attributed Australians’ general work attitude to, what they viewed as, oppressive egalitarianism, in reality their strong critical reaction to the Australian work and learning culture demonstrates a grief over the loss of their own culture. This culture was based on Calvinism, as I have previously explained. As such, most participants’ narratives revealed a strong belief in and admiration of the virtues of hard work, talent, and responsibility.

Regarding the first, interviewees were shocked to learn that, in their view, Australians do not work hard. They also felt that they were being punished when they did. For instance, Arjan, soon after having started his job at one of Australia’s major banks, found that he could not come in at 7 am and leave at 5 pm as he had been used to doing in South Africa. ‘People really didn’t like it,’ Arjan said, ‘You shouldn’t work harder than the rest and you shouldn’t show off’ (Interview, 2016). So now Arjan works from 8 am to 4 pm. ‘In this way,’ he told me, ‘I don’t make myself unpopular.’ Regarding this perceived difference, Anneke said:

In South Africa people are proud of their work, but here they work for money. They just work for the money and they don’t want to work any extra. In the weekends they drink and play sports. But we work.

(Interview, 2016)
Hard work was associated with the responsibility of using your talents. According to the Calvinist doctrine, God gives individual people specific talents and they have to make use of them accordingly (based on Matthew 24: 14-30 and Luke 19: 11-27, amongst others). Sytske, for example, told me:

How we were brought up, in our culture, you do your best and you make the best of it with what you have been given. And you have a responsibility when you have received a lot [of talents], to contribute well.

(Interview, 2015)

She referred to this by means of contrast, when talking about how, in her experience as a teacher, in school in Australia ‘you just have to do the easiest subjects. You don’t do what your potential is, you just do what is easy, what’s going to give you easy points.’ Because of her perception, Sytske worried about her son, who ‘had lost a lot of his drive ... because people around him don't have any drive' (Interview, 2015). ‘The culture is getting to him,’ she said, and she thought that in this respect, it would have been better for her son had the family stayed in South Africa.

Other interviewees also felt that their children were being affected by ‘the culture of mediocrity’, as they saw it. For instance, Joke’s daughter initially started at a public school in Australia. However, her grades dropped significantly. ‘When I asked her about the reason,’ Joke said, ‘[my daughter] answered: “Nobody really tries, nobody really wants to get anywhere”’ (Interview, 2016). ‘And when we spoke to the teacher,’ Joke continued, ‘he didn’t even know [my daughter’s] name! And he said [that] “she’s been doing OK so I’m directing my attention to other kids.”’ After this experience, Joke and her husband sent their daughter to private school, ‘where her grades went up again in no time,’ Joke said, ‘[because] there people want to do their best.’ Indeed, most participants sent their children to private schools, if they could afford it. This was both because they believed that the standard of education was higher at these schools and also because by doing this they could choose Christian schools. What Joke’s example further shows is that the responsibility to use one’s talents is associated with a drive to excel. Indeed, as Corien stated, ‘... we grew up with that, to be driven, to achieve and to improve yourself’ (Interview, 2015).
Corien, amongst other interviewees, experienced that her Australian colleagues did not understand her ‘drive’. Next to having a full time job and running a household with three children, Corien was doing her Master’s degree at the time of our interview. For this, she had to endure many questions from colleagues, such as: “Why do you study? What benefits does it have? Why do you stress yourself out so much by doing all these extra things?” (Interview, 2015). Because, Corien explained, ‘... it doesn’t make sense to them. Most of them think you’re crazy, to take on this extra load when you’ve already got this full job and household ....’ But ‘what it is,’ Corien explained, ‘we are far more driven.’ She thought that Australians sometimes perceive this as negative. So did Anja, who stated that ‘... we are assertive, we are aggressive, we are driven. The Aussies find this often offensive. We don’t care because we cannot help it’ (Interview, 2016). Indeed, the discussed characteristics were felt to be in the Afrikaners’ nature, as culture is. Therefore, it was very difficult for the study participants to change, or, to adapt to Australian work culture. They essentially refused to do it, since they felt that their ‘way of doing things’ was far superior. Jacqueline, for example, found that, although Australians might ‘live longer than us, [because] maybe they are less stressed than we are,’ she would rather not employ Australians in her business ‘due to their lack of drive’ (Interview, 2016).

However, in order to belong, interviewees had to conform to some extent to the Australian professional culture (cf. Davies 2012). For instance, Sander said that, because Australians ‘find us aggressive’, you ‘have to become calmer’ (Interview, 2016). One participant, Lieke, wanted to find ‘a happy medium’ between the Afrikaner and the Australian work mentality. She stated that she wanted to become ‘a bit more calm, more chilled, more relaxed’ (Interview, 2016). However, she continued by saying: ‘But I will never adopt the laziness of the Australians and I will never give up my drive, my passion and enthusiasm.’ Lieke’s attitude was typical for the great majority of participants. Indeed, most asserted that they ‘would never adjust to this’, meaning Australian work culture. Although they demonstrated to be talking about their own culture mostly, by using expressions such as ‘I was taught that’, or ‘we were brought up to’, all but one interviewee was conscious of their mirroring and projecting. This shows that culture is so much a part of us that we consider it to be ‘natural’, which means that we do not question it but take it for granted (Schuetz 1944; Shore 1996). It also reveals that the
underlying ideology or ‘the original ideas’ on which, in this case the Afrikaners’ culture, is founded, are largely forgotten (Davies 2012). That is, the interviewees did not realise that they were projecting Calvinist values onto Australian society and Australians. Furthermore, their overly critical attitude shows that they were mostly attempting to rebuild a sense of self in the face of an ongoing sense of loss (see Jackson 2012).

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the loss of cultural belonging that the Afrikaners experienced after their immigration to Australia. My analysis has demonstrated that, overall, they were managing the loss of their culture relatively badly. This was most clear with regards to the professional environment, because here, interviewees were forced to interact with Australians – in their leisure time, they could choose the company of fellow Afrikaner émigrés, as the next chapter discusses. Since they formed a minority, they had to adjust to the dominant culture to some extent and could thus not preserve, restore or recreate their own. However, they also refused to replace it, since they saw their own culture as far superior to that of Australians. This meant that the conflict of bereavement could not work itself out (see Colson 1971; Davis 1992; de Waal 1989; Malinowski 2009 [1954]). Hence, they were grieving. As we have seen, cultural loss represents a key loss for most migrants, since our sense of cultural belonging is usually very strong (Ainslie 2005; Bhugra 2004a, 2004b; Bhugra & Becker 2005; Volkan 1993). That is, we identify to a great extent with the habits and customs of the ‘social tribe’ that cultivated us, and, often unknowingly, with their underlying values (Davies 2012; cf. Damasio 2002; Davis 1992; Shore 1996). For refugees and forced migrants, who do not choose to relocate, the sense of cultural loss is generally much stronger (Bhugra & Becker 2005; Eisenbruch 1990, 1991; Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013; Sluzki 1979). Hence, they have a more difficult time adjusting to the host country’s ‘way of life’ (cf. Davies 2012). Although Afrikaners chose to migrate, they felt forced. In their ‘Deep Story’ (Hochschild 2016), they were refugees. This explains their strong sense of bereavement and demonstrates that what we believe to be real is real in our subjective experience (cf. Bruner 1996; Hervik 1994; Shore 1996).
The analysis has further demonstrated that the grief experience expressed itself predominantly in an angry and criticising attitude (Bowlby 1980; Kübler-Ross 1970; 1972; cf. Leavitt 1995; Lewis 1961; Rosaldo 2014; Rosenblatt, Walsh and Jackson 1976). I have argued that this was exacerbated by the fact that most research participants felt excluded by the host community. As previous chapters have shown, most interviewees felt economically and socially marginalised by Australians. When migrants feel rejected, excluded, or otherwise not valued by their host society, they may react with anger and start blaming and criticising members of the host community (Bhugra & Becker 2005).\(^8\) As this chapter has revealed, most of the Afrikaners who participated in this research did this and engaged in a strong process of ‘othering’ where they mostly spoke of Australians in terms of gross and negative stereotypes. The way in which they did this further revealed underlying beliefs that were carried over from South Africa. In the first place, they projected a deep historical resentment of ‘British’ people onto Australians. Next to that, they held on to a strong belief in Christian superiority as a legacy of colonialism and apartheid, which they also projected onto Australians. Mirroring what they believed to be true about themselves, they subsequently viewed Australians as ‘British’ and ‘atheist’ –everything that they were not (see Hegel circa 1795, reprinted in Wootton 1996; cf. Clifford 1986; Foucault 1980; Kapuscinski 2008 [2006]; Levinas 1987, 1999; Said 1995).

Ultimately, we have seen that underneath this process of projecting and ‘othering’ lay a deep sense of insecurity. The research participants lacked confidence in Australia because, with the immigration, they had lost ‘[their] status, [their] rules of guidance’ and the guarantee of ‘their normal way of life’ (Schuetz 1944: 507). This ‘bitter experience’ (ibid) caused most of them to ‘put on a front of aggressive, confident behaviour’, which demonstrates that they were actually a people ‘who lack love and seek it’ (Maslow 1943: 386; cf. Freud 1917; Stets 2006). That is, they wanted to be accepted and included by their new society but they felt that they were not. Their deep sense of insecurity and exclusion, which can be seen as ‘victimhood’ (see Vanderhaeghen 2018), also suggests a continuum from how they felt in South Africa –

\(^8\) Alternatively, they may withdraw from the interaction completely (Bhugra & Becker 2005) or they may do the opposite by trying to adjust completely, in an attempt to become accepted by the host community (see Stets 2006).
where they felt threatened in every respect. Furthermore, research demonstrates that historically, Afrikaners have *always* felt this way, not only after 1994 (see Crapanzano 1985; de Villiers 1988; de Vries 2013; O’Meara 2009 [1983]; Patterson 1957; van der Merwe 2009; 2010 amongst others, cf. Chapter 1). This was partly reflected in their ‘Australians are British’ stereotype. Thus, it could be that the strong belief in their cultural superiority is actually an expression of an inferiority complex, as I have argued. Yet, the loss of their cultural belonging was also very real. Culture loss is arguably equally strong as the loss of family (see Ainslie 2005), which migrants also face. The next and last chapter of this thesis focuses on how the interviewees experienced and dealt with this loss.
Chapter 7

‘It never gets easier’:
Loss of interpersonal belonging

Introduction

In this last chapter, we return to the beginning. That is, it deals with the loss of that type of belonging from which all other forms originate, namely ‘our sense of attachment to other individuals’ or ‘intersubjective belonging’ (Gammeltoft 2018; cf. Davies 2012; Girard 2016; Jackson 2002; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maslow 1943; 1970; Yuval-Davis 2006). As previously argued, belonging to other people is our most essential need. Others provide us with physical and emotional nutrition and, equally crucial, provide meaning to our lives. As such, a large part of our identity consists of our relationships of belonging to other people (cf. de Saint-Exupéry 1942; Eriksen 2017; Gammeltoft 2018; Girard 2016; Mackay 2014; Yuval-Davis 2006). In first instance, we belong to our nuclear family or family of origin, which consist of biological or adoptive parents and often siblings, and usually includes an extended family as well.

By immigrating to Australia, most of the Afrikaners that participated in this research lost their family of origin as well as their extended families. Of course, they did not lose them through death, but the migration experience is often compared with this type of bereavement, as discussed previously (Grinberg & Grinberg 1984; 1989; Volkan 1993; cf. Ainslie 2005). Indeed, my research shows that many study participants were grieving the loss of their relatives, although they were still physically present in the world. The first part of this chapter discusses what this loss meant to them. Here, my analysis shows that the research participants experienced a loss of harmony and a loss of community due to the loss of their families. The first was caused due to conflicts over their emigration decision. Many participants experienced both interpersonal and intrapersonal conflict, as I will discuss. Secondly, the loss of community was felt as a loss of ‘we’, of ‘togetherness’ (see Ahmed 2014: 39), which was
narrated primarily in terms of loss of support and of familiarity. Both losses—harmony and community—indicated, at a deeper level, a loss of feeling safe, since harmony and community provide us with a sense of safety (see Bowlby 1980; Davies 2012; Davis 1992; Maslow 1943; 1970; cf. Boss 1999).

The second part of the chapter discusses how the interviewees were managing these losses. Here, my analysis shows that the conflict of bereavement, as the contrasting tendencies to preserve or restore the past and to replace or recreate what was lost (see Colson 1971; Davis 1992; de Waal 1989; Malinowski 2009 [1954]; Marris 2015 [1986]; Stroebe 2002; Stroebe & Schut 1999; 2001; cf. Chapter 1), was in full progress. That is, the research participants were trying to maintain kinship ties while simultaneously they were reconstructing and replacing kinship bonds. Concerning the first, most made an effort to maintain contact with their relatives in South Africa both through digital and physical means. That is, they called, emailed and used other types of modern communication, and they visited South Africa. In attempts to restore close family ties, many interviewees tried to convince and/or support family members to relocate to Australia as well. However, since this was often not possible, for reasons that I will discuss, the great majority reconstructed a ‘surrogate’ family by closely befriending a small group of fellow Afrikaner émigrés.

Yet, as discussed previously, since our attachments are particular, the ‘new’ family could only replace the role of the ‘old’ one (see Archer 1999; Girard 2016; Hollan 1995; Loizos 1981; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maxwell 1995; Wellenkamp 1988). Thus, as the chapter title suggests, the ‘missing of family never got easier’. Indeed, my analysis shows that low levels of grief continued to exist (cf. Brison & Leavitt 1995; Desjarlais 1992; Disman 1983; Hollan 1994, 1995; LaCapra 1999; Leavitt 1995; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976; Woodrick 1995), although most of the Afrikaners I interviewed could adjust to the new reality. Indeed, they were generally coping well with the loss of their families as they had given it supreme meaning. As previously argued, in this respect, too, they saw their own losses as sacrifices they had made for their children. I will now first discuss in more detail the meaning of the loss of interpersonal belonging.
The meaning of losing family: conflict and vulnerability

As we have seen in previous chapters, most of the Afrikaners I worked with saw their emigration decision as ‘forced’. They all felt that they had to move away from South Africa, for reasons that have been discussed. Yet, none of them wanted to be apart from their family. This itself represented a conflict, as Sasha’s feelings illustrate: ‘You want to be there [in South Africa] but you also want to be here [in Australia]. You want your family with you’ (Interview, 2016). Similarly, Jolien wrote to me following our interview that, despite her incredibly difficult post-immigration path, she was fine now except ‘one wish would be to have my family close –I miss them dearly’ (Email communication, 2016). Some participants spoke of the loss of friends as well, though to a much lesser extent. In fact, most friendships seemed to have been actually lost, in the sense that they did not exist anymore. In contrast, most relationships with relatives still existed, albeit in an altered form. Generally, participants agreed that ‘friends you can make but family you can’t’ (Chantal, Interview, 2016), and, therefore, the focus of their narratives was on the loss of family.

Since, as I will discuss in the second part of this chapter, most interviewees could not be reunited with their families, they remained torn between their conflicting desires. For instance, Chantal remarked, after having lived in Australia for nine years: ‘Your mind says you are in the right place, but your heart says you are not in the right place ... You know you have left half of your heart in South Africa’ (Interview, 2016). These examples support Ainslie’s view of immigrants as ‘perpetual mourners’ (2005: 214; cf. Volkan 1993), as discussed in the previous chapter. Ainslie refers to the loss of culture and of loved ones as one loss, since he views them as inseparable (2005: 208). Apart from this basic inner conflict, many interviewees experienced interpersonal conflict due to their emigration decision. This was because some of their relatives, mainly siblings, felt angry with them for leaving. Oberholzer (2011) found the same in his research on Afrikaner immigrants in Brisbane. What it meant is that the research participants did not lose the relationships as such, although some did, but rather the type of relationships they had had with certain family members (cf. Livingston 2010). These changed from being harmonious to becoming conflicted. Next to this, nearly all interviewees experienced major inner battles that were concerned with two specific incompatible goals:
the wish to provide for their children and simultaneously care for their parents; and the desire to secure a future for their children while at the same time providing them with an extended family structure. In the next section, I first discuss the interpersonal conflicts.

‘My oldest brother still won’t talk to me’

The loss of harmonious relationships with ‘stayers’, that is, with family members who were left behind in South Africa, caused many research participants a lot of pain. Generally, the angriest reactions to participants’ emigration plans had come from siblings. In some cases, the conflicts were resolved with time, but in other cases relatives, mostly siblings, broke off contact with interviewees completely. Such, for example, was the case for Nienke, who told me that, 11 years after emigration, her oldest brother still refused to talk to her because she had left (Interview, 2016). Some interviewees’ parents had also been cross, and most parents had been heartbroken. However, in general, parents were able to set aside their own pain and look at their children’s interest. In the end, as Emiel explained, ‘They want what’s best for us’ (Interview, 2015). Even those parents who had initially been unable to do so, usually eventually overcame from their resistance and reconciled themselves to a certain extent with their children’s decision. One of those parents was Aafke. She and her husband decided to join their two adult children who had both left for Australia. About her initial reaction to their daughters’ emigration decision, Aafke said:

I was very angry with the children ... and I told them: ‘You can’t go!’ ... I have fought and said: ‘South Africa, do not write the country off, the country is going to be good for you,’ even though deep inside I knew that this wasn’t true ...

(Interview, 2015)

Not long after her children had left, Aafke revised her opinion and even immigrated to Australia herself. Many participants whom the parents had visited said that they had subsequently changed their opinions, as I will discuss later on.

With regards to siblings, however, this often remained another story. Most interviewees thought their brothers and sisters were angry with them for one of two reasons or both. First, they felt that their siblings saw them as ‘traitors’ for leaving their homeland, which is a
common accusation of Afrikaners leaving South Africa (see, amongst others, Barkhuizen & de Klerk 2006; Blaser 2004; Oberholzer 2011). Here, Marieke’s story is typical. She recounted how one of her brothers had told her that she was ‘a traitor, because “How can I leave the country, how can I just leave everything behind and run away to here [Australia]’ (Interview, 2015), meaning how could she not stay and help the country to improve itself. The other reason, participants thought, had to do with envy. For instance, Derrick and Rianne recalled how Derrick’s brothers had resented their emigration plans. However, Derrick said, ‘They had also wanted to come [to Australia] but it didn’t work out for them. So that was very painful for them’ (Interview, 2016). Finally, it was often believed that the two reasons went together. As Tirza, for example, stated: ‘You will always get a few people who will call you a traitor [including her brother-in-law], but often there are amongst those people those who would also like to emigrate but who can’t for some reason’ (Interview, 2016). What participants did not say, though what could very well lie beneath the angry reactions from siblings and other relatives, is, of course, grief. As we have seen in the previous chapter, anger is ‘the primary response to any separation’ (Bowlby 1980: 87; cf. Aldrich 1963; Kübler-Ross 1970, 1972; Leavitt 1995; Rosaldo 2014 [1984]; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976). In the next two sections, I focus on anger within the interviewees themselves following their emigration decision.

‘Ultimately, you choose between your children and your parents’

As stated previously, the first inner conflict that many of the Afrikaners experienced was concerned with the perceived choice between parents and children. The great majority of interviewees felt that they had lost their parents by choice, and, therefore, they struggled with feelings of intense guilt. For example, at the time of our interview, Joke was supporting her sister and her sister’s family to move to Australia as well. Although she obviously thought that this was in her sister’s best interest, Joke said that the guilt she felt towards her parents, whom now ‘had to lose both children,’ was ‘consuming’ (Interview, 2016). Because the research participants did not see a future for their offspring in their home country, they felt forced to choose between their children, that is, between giving them a future by immigrating to Australia, and their parents, that is, leaving them behind in South Africa. In other words,
they chose between the future, symbolised by their children, and the past, symbolised by their parents. This choice was relatively easy, especially for those participants whose parents were supportive of their emigration decision. After emigration, however, the majority of interviewees entered into a perpetual inner conflict about having, in their view, abandoned their elderly parents (cf. Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013; Oberholzer 2011).

What increased the burden of guilt was the fact that the study participants worried about their parents’ safety and medical care, due to South Africa’s high crime levels and worsening public services as discussed in previous chapters. Janus, for example, when talking about his parents, asked out loud: ‘Is this really how they should live the final years of their lives?’ (Casual conversation, 2016), with which he meant under the conditions of loneliness, fear, and poor medical care. What added to interviewees’ grief was the fact that their parents were not likely to come and visit them in Australia, either because of old age or a lack of finances. Those participants who could not afford to buy their parents flight tickets, as well as those of whom the parents were too old or unwilling to fly, were acutely aware that they would only see their parents ‘a few more times’ before they would die. Although this loss was, to a certain degree, anticipated (cf. Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013), only after emigration could the Afrikaners genuinely appreciate what it meant that they would only see their parents a handful of times, and the high degree of suffering this entails.

Some participants had said their final goodbyes to their parents when they left South Africa for Australia. That is, their parents had died before the interviewees had had the chance to visit them. This was another issue that haunted interviewees. Whether they had seen their parents again after emigration or not, they all feared ‘that phone call that you will get one of these days, that says your mom or your dad is dead …’ (Laura, interview, 2015). Many participants struggled with this issue to the extent that it made them question their emigration decision. As Chantal’s feelings illustrate:

… you only live on this earth for a short time, you know. Is this really, is this fair? Tomorrow your mother dies and then you haven’t seen her for the last ten years. Is it worth it? That’s the question that you always ask yourself, you know.

(Interview, 2016)
Those interviewees who had *had* the feared phone call answered this question. Simone, for example, who had emigrated with her family in 2009, had lost both her parents in South Africa since then. Due to a lack of finances, she had not been able to attend her mother’s funeral, only her father’s, and her husband and children had not been able to join her. This was incredibly painful for Simone. On top of this, she wondered whether she should have ‘been there’ for her father during the last years of his life, for he had been sick. But then, she said, ‘What would we have done now, now that they are dead?’ Because, when they had been living in South Africa, Simone’s family had spent every weekend with her parents. ‘So what would we have done now in those weekends?’ she asked herself again during our interview (2015). ‘In the end, it’s a decision between your children and your parents,’ she added. ‘And your children are the future, and your parents are going to die sometime.’ Here we see that ultimately, the choice between the children and the parents was not difficult. It was *living with that choice* that was painful for most interviewees. Providing their children with a future came at another big cost, as the next section will show.

‘I took them away from love, but I gave them a future’

Indeed, as previously stated, most Afrikaners I talked to were struggling with the fact that they had ‘taken their children away’ from their extended family. Although all of them felt that, ultimately, offering their children a future outweighed growing up within a broader family structure, most suffered from an ongoing inner conflict regarding this issue because they felt guilty towards their children for depriving them, in their own view, of their second most important group of belonging – the clan. Sometimes this feeling was instigated by things the children expressed themselves. They would, for example, continue to ask ‘Why have we left grandma and grandpa?’ and cry heartbreakingly at the departure for Australia after every return visit. Aafke, who had been a ‘staying behind grandmother’ before moving to Australia to join her children and grandchildren, said about the partings of her granddaughters:

> I will never forget, the evening that the children came to say goodbye, ... I will never forget the granddaughters, *ag*, they were small still, about six and eight, those eyes that looked at me and that were fixed on grandma, and grandma cries because I can’t let them go …

*(Interview, 2015)*
Mostly, however, the guilt feelings originated in the parents themselves, since they thought that ‘the children don’t know any better’ (than growing up without that extended family structure). Participants who had good memories of growing up within such a structure themselves, especially felt that they deprived their children of the experience of being part of a larger group of people that loves you, knows you and cares for you. As Joke’s sentiments illustrate:

Because you take them out of a family who unconditionally loves and understands them, who has seen them grow up, who knows everything about you because you grew up amongst them. And all of a sudden, we take that child away, and we deprive them of that ‘going to grandma for a weekend’ love or that ‘grandma’s coming to town and she’s coming to visit and she’s gonna take you for a milkshake,’ that sort of thing.

(Interview, 2016, English original)

Earlier in our conversation, Joke said that when she and her husband had left South Africa, they had taken away her mother’s only grandchild, and that this still haunted her. In response to my question whether it had been worth it—the move to Australia for her children’s future—she said:

... it depends on my state of mind or my mood, I would say, how I answer this question. But it is this thing of, when we decided that we were going to settle in Australia, we made that decision that we want this for our children, we want the safety and the opportunities that this country offers for our kids. But in the back of our minds there’s always this question of: does that make up for a loss of love?

In a similar vein, Anneke, although she was happy that her children were ‘safe’ and that they ‘could study what they wanted to study’, was mourning the loss of them growing up with an extended family and concluded ‘... some days you are fine, and other days you are not fine’ (Interview, 2016). Yet, like most research participants, Anneke agreed with Stein when he said that, although his children were ‘growing up without knowing their grandparents,’ they would not have to go through ‘that emotional sacrifice of cutting ties with parents’ and that ‘they will have grandparents for their children here [in Australia],’ meaning himself and his wife (Interview, 2016). Thus, most Afrikaners felt that they sacrificed their children’s experience of growing up within an extended family structure for their children’s own sake. Yet, similar
to the conflict about the parents versus the children, they seriously struggled living with this choice. Many continued to ask themselves that, if the extended family was still in South Africa, ‘Why are we here then?’ (Joke, interview, 2016) (cf. Klingenberg 2016). This question was not only related to their children being able to enjoy the company of grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins. The loss of family also signified a broader loss, as the next section will demonstrate.

The loss of community: lack of support and of familiarity

Due to the physical distance between South Africa and Australia, the method and frequency of contact between research participants and their family members changed drastically. Many research participants went from seeing their parents and siblings once a week or at least once a month to once a year or once every two, three, four or five years. Some interviewees had never seen their parents and siblings since their emigration. Next to the decrease in physical contact, many participants went from speaking to their family members every day or every week, during which conversations they shared trivial things about their lives, to talking to each other once a month via Skype or FaceTime, during which much more general information was transferred. This was mostly due to the time difference between South Africa and Australia, which is approximately nine hours, depending on the specific Australian location. As a consequence, interviewees and their relatives had different life routines.

Next to this, the spatial distance made it hard to stay in close contact as well. The loss of the ability to frequently or regularly be in each other’s physical presence, combined with the decrease in contact through telecommunication and the Internet, meant that the Afrikaners generally felt that they were no longer a part of their loved one’s lives and vice versa. The loss was thus the loss of ‘togetherness’, or, ‘the loss of a “we”, the loss of a community based on everyday conversations, on the coming and going of bodies, in time and space …’ (Ahmed 2014: 39). The pain that this caused was mostly expressed through sentiments about the loss of watching nephews and nieces grow up. For instance, Emiel, who had two brothers in South Africa with five children amongst them, said that he had lost ‘that connection’ with his
nephews and nieces because ‘you only see them on Skype, once a month, ... and you see them [live] once every two years’ (Interview, 2015). Chantal’s feelings were also typical in this regard. During our interview (2016) she recounted how she had felt when she had visited her family in South Africa:

... and I saw my sister’s child, he’s now six years old, [and] I don’t know anything about him! I wasn’t there when she was pregnant with him, I didn’t see him when he was born, I don’t know him at all, I don’t! In my framework he actually doesn’t exist at all, and this is the same with my other sister ... They have continued with their lives, and you are no longer a part of that, and you have continued with your life and they are no longer a part of that.

Here, we are reminded of the definition of ‘belonging to’ in the sense of ‘being a part of’ (OED). Indeed, what interviewees often conveyed is that they no longer felt to be genuinely part of their relatives’ lives. This was extremely painful for them. One participant, who was feeling utterly depressed at the time of our interview, told me that because of this, for her:

... emigration is like standing outside of your house in the snow. And you look inside, and you see your family, and they are happy, because they are together, and life goes on. But you are standing outside and you are totally kept from that. And you cannot go into the house and be a part of it ...

(Laura, interview, 2015)

What we see here is that, at least for this participant, happiness is directly related to togetherness (cf. de Saint-Exupéry 1942; Eriksen 2017; Gammeltoft 2018; Girard 2016; Mackay 2014; Yuval-Davis 2006). Next to that, togetherness, or belonging, is principally associated with the family of origin (see Bowlby 1980), since Laura was talking here of her parents, her siblings and her siblings’ children. Furthermore, Laura’s words demonstrate how she could not feel happy because she was excluded from this group, due to her emigration. That is, she no longer belonged. Her pain was extraordinary, I believe, yet many research participants shared her feelings to various degrees. Stein summarised it most typically when he said that, although he did try to maintain contact with his family in South Africa, ‘That sense of community...is lost’ (Interview, 2016). Although most interviewees made an effort to replace this, as I will discuss in the second part of this chapter, the loss was never resolved. As Boss (1999: 2) argues for a different migrant group (her own parents of Swiss origin in the USA), the Afrikaners, too, in this respect expressed ‘a melancholy that never went away’ (cf.
Chapter 7  ‘It never gets easier’


Included in the loss of togetherness was a strong element of loss of support. Many interviewees referred to the loss of receiving as well as giving support when they spoke about their relatives in South Africa, and it was felt in both a practical and a moral sense. Practically, they often referred to the loss of having a support network, for example with regards to childrearing. Financially, the loss of family was also experienced as threatening. Agnes, for example, stated that, should something go wrong financially, she and her husband had ‘that risk that we don’t have a family to fall back on’ (Interview, 2015). Similarly, Carolien said that she did not mind working extra because she and her husband did not have that ‘safety net, … that family,’ which made her feel ‘more vulnerable’ (Interview, 2016). With the South African rand being weak in relation to the Australian dollar (10 ZAR for 1 AUD at the time of research), many study participants realised that indeed, should something happen, their families in South Africa would not be able to help them.

Interviewees also struggled with the fact that they could not easily turn to their family for moral support in times of need. In this sense, some felt that their relatives in South Africa ‘had it easier’ than themselves with regards to the family break-up. For instance, Jolanda stated that her siblings had each other for comfort, whereas ‘we are alone on this side [in Australia]’ (Interview, 2016). Other participants referred to the pain of not being able to support relatives who faced hardship in South Africa. In this regard, Emiel recounted how difficult it was for him when he could not ‘do anything’ for his brother who was going through a divorce. ‘I can only talk to him,’ Emiel said, and then ‘only through Skype’ (Interview, 2015). It is telling that the word ‘family’ originates from the Latin *famulus*, which means ‘servant’. From *famulus* is derived *familia*, referring to ‘household servants’. Thus, a family consists of that group of people that, indeed, serve one another. Here, we are reminded of Stasch (2009) who conceived of kinship as caring and providing for each other (cf. Gammeltoft 2018).
Thus, we see that, ultimately, what was grieved for over the loss of family was a sense of safety that togetherness, or belonging, provides. The loss of harmonious relationships and of community, of being surrounded by people that love you and that you love, fundamentally means a loss of feeling safe, which makes us feel vulnerable. For the research participants, the loss of family was thus felt as a lack, in LaCapra’s words ‘as something that ought to be there but is missing’ (1999: 703). This lack can also be described as a lack of being surrounded by people that know you and that you know. As one interviewee told me, ‘We have many friends here, or rather, acquaintances…but … you just want that person who knows you’ (Anneke, interview, 2016). This echoes the works of Colson (1971), Maslow (1943, 1970), Marris (2015 [1986]), Davis (1992) and Davies (2012), amongst others, on the need for familiarity as part of our safety needs. Ultimately, it shows that belonging is a prerequisite for safety, and is, therefore, the primary human need. Since this is the case, the Afrikaners also attempted to reconstruct relationships of belonging in Australia. Evidently, in their new country, they also needed a community of people to know and be known. In the next part of this chapter, I discuss how they recreated this community. The first section, however, focuses on how the research participants tried to maintain the ties with relatives in South Africa.

**Coping Strategies: Maintaining the ties & Recreating the bonds**

Many bereavement scholars have found that people usually react to loss by engaging in so-called ‘loss-oriented activities’ on the one hand and ‘restoration-oriented’ activities on the other (Stroebe 2002: 134; cf. Stroebe & Schut 1999; 2001; Colson 1971; Davis 1992; Davies 2012; de Waal 1989; Marris 2015 [1986]). These are analogous to what Malinowski referred to as the parallel tendencies to maintain the ties and break the bond (2009 [1954]). Here, I first discuss what the participants in this research did in order to attempt to preserve the lost family ties in South Africa. After that, I will show how they engaged in strategies aimed at restoring and recreating the bonds.

**‘The distance is just too great…and you try to root here’**

As stated in the introduction, most interviewees tried to maintain in contact with loved ones in their home country in two principal ways: through digital means and through return visits.
With regards to the first, they mostly used contemporary modes of communication, such as FaceTime, What’s App video calls, What’s App chat, and Facebook. Although many scholars have argued that transnational connections, that is, connections between people across countries, have intensified due to major continuing developments and advancements in the communications sector (Ainslie 2005; Chin & Smith 2015; Daswani 2013; Faist, Fauser & Reisenauer 2013; Glick-Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton 1992, 1995; Kearny 1995; Rocha & Coronado 2014; Tölöyan 2007; Vertovec 2009; Wulfhorst, Rocha & Morgan 2014), this study demonstrates that the participants found it difficult to maintain contact despite those advancements. Therefore, I would argue that the technological revolution may have made transnational communication quicker and less expensive, but not necessarily more intense.

For the Afrikaners, in the first place this was due to the difference in time and space between Australia and South Africa, as discussed. In fact, this research reveals that physical distance is not at all as easily overcome as some have argued (see Gupta & Ferguson 1992). Next to the practical difficulties regarding time and space, participants also faced psychological struggles in trying to maintain contact. In the first place, they generally felt that they made much more effort to keep in contact with loved ones in South Africa than the other way around, making it ‘a one-directional way of contact’ (Joke, interview, 2016). Most interviewees were not willing to continue with this form of contact in the long term. I discuss this in more detail in the next section. More importantly, however, many participants experienced maintaining contact through regular phone calls or chats to be counterproductive to their efforts of settling in in Australia. Here, we are reminded of authors who, in relation to loss, argued that we cannot continue with life if we keep focusing on the past (Freud 1917; Marris 2015 [1986]). As Davies has noted, when we ‘remain wedded emotionally to the lost object’, we ‘get stuck …’ (2012: 38).

In this respect, Sander, for example, told me that the first few years after his emigration, he had put in a lot of effort to stay in touch with relatives in South Africa. However, apart from the fact that ‘the distance was just too great’, he was also ‘trying to root here [in Australia]’ (Interview, 2016). It was hard enough to make new friends, Sander found, and staying in close contact with loved ones in South Africa only made it more difficult. Sander’s example reveals
why the conflict of bereavement is experienced as a conflict, as he could not focus on preserving, that is, on loss-oriented activities, and on rebuilding, that is, on restoration-oriented activities, simultaneously, because these are incompatible goals. For another research participant, Chantal, this conflict was too intense to deal with. She, therefore, decided to focus, almost completely, on recreating bonds, which meant she cut off nearly all contact with her family in South Africa. As Chantal explained:

... I think it makes it hard for me, when I keep in contact with them the whole time, to break the ties ... I don’t have to break the ties, but the less I know about them, that’s a way of coping for me. When I’m too attached to them, it affects me more.

(Interview, 2016)

Thus, we see that Chantal consciously chose to ‘break the bond’ as opposed to ‘maintaining the tie’ (see Malinowski 2009 [1954]) because this was less painful for her. This does not mean that the conflict was resolved. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, when there is no attachment, there can be no loss (Bowlby 1980; Davies 2012; Freud 1917). Hence, Chantal decided to make herself less attached to the lost relationships by investing, instead, in new relationships in her home town in Australia. Freud (1917) referred to this process as decathexis/cathexis, that is, detaching the ego from the lost object and attaching it to a new one. Although none of the other interviewees made a similar choice so deliberately, most agreed with Chantal when she said that ‘You cannot continue with your life here [in Australia] when half of your life is still in South Africa’ (Interview, 2016). Despite this, and contradictory perhaps, Chantal made regular visits to South Africa to see her relatives. Like many other research participants, she, her husband and their children visited their extended families every two years. The next section focuses on return visits as attempts to preserve to lost family ties.

‘A lot of people say: “Oh yeah, it’s easy.” I don’t think it’s easy’

From the total of 74 interviewees, 26 stated that they visited South Africa ‘every few years’. Out of this group, 12 participants specified that they went every two years. Seven participants visited their home country every four years, two every three years, and five did not specify the ‘every few years’. Next to this, there were 11 interviewees who returned to South Africa...
every year. The analysis shows that this frequency was unrelated to age or wealth, but was rather associated with the intensity of the longing for family and country. Two participants visited South Africa twice a year, and one of them said that this was ‘the only way that [she] could cope’ with living in Australia (Bernardien, interview, 2016). Furthermore, 18 interviewees had visited their home land once since their emigration, and, finally, there were 13 participants who had never visited South Africa after they had left.¹ For seven interviewees of this last group, this was because they had no desire to return, for reasons previously discussed. For two, the reason was a lack of finances, for two others it was because they felt they were too old to make the journey, and for one couple it was because they had just arrived in Australia –our interview took place approximately three months after their immigration. They indicated that they intended to make return visits to South Africa in the future.

Thus we see that this research supports the argument that contemporary diaspora groups have the possibility of multiple returns due to ease of travel, as opposed to their historical counterparts (Guarnizo & Smith 1998; Ong 2003). It also support’s Tölölyan’s (2007: 649) idea that modern-day diasporas ‘... re-turn without actual repatriation, that is, they turn again and again to the homeland through travel ...’. Yet, I would argue against the argument that these groups are, therefore, ‘not experiencing diaspora in its original sense of a lack of hope of return to one’s homeland’ (Ong 2003: 87), because this study also demonstrates that there is a considerable difference between feeling that you can return to your homeland for holidays and that you could return to live there because there might be a future for you there after all. None of the interviewees believed the latter. Next to this, visiting relatives in South Africa was not without problems. Nearly all research participants narrated struggles of various natures related to their return visits, and for six of them these were reasons why they decided never to visit their homeland again. The main difficulties concerned painful feelings while being in South Africa and interaction with ‘stayers’, that is, with the family members that were left behind.

¹ From four interviewees, I am not sure how often they travelled back to South Africa, because it was not specified in our conversations.
Painful sentiments associated with return visits were usually expressed as ‘opening up the wound’. For instance, Carolien told me that she and her husband had friends who visited South Africa every year, but that they themselves had consciously decided against that, because:

... we have experienced that, every time you go back, when you are back here [in Australia], it takes a while...You have to adjust again, you are depressed again, that there’s another little piece of you that remained there.  

(Interview, 2016)

Similarly, Corien explained that for her, return visits were ‘still very emotional ... and it’s very emotional when you come back’ (Interview, 2016). ‘It’s like a, I always say, it’s like a wound,’ she continued. ‘You just open it up every time you go, and then you have to heal it again’. Because of this, Corien found return visits very difficult. ‘A lot of people say: “Oh yeah, it’s easy”. I don’t think it’s easy,’ she concluded. Sabine’s feelings were also typical when she explained that every time she saw her family ‘it brings back the pain of you’re not [being] together’ (Interview, 2016). Furthermore, Sabine, like most interviewees, experienced that while on the one hand saying goodbye became a bit easier because ‘you know now what to expect,’ the second time she had to say goodbye to her family ‘was almost worse than the first time because you know now how it is [to live without them].’ Because of this, Sabine said that she ‘would rather want to recommend people not to emigrate!’

Despite this longing for family members, being around them on return visits often posed a real challenge for interviewees. This was mostly because of two reasons. In the first place, study participants felt that their family members had no interest in them. In this regard, Marieke, for instance, told me that the first time she went back to South Africa, nobody except for her closest sister had taken time off to see her in the three weeks that she had been there, which made her feel extremely disappointed (Interview, 2015). Most interviewees experienced similar treatments and felt that their relatives in South Africa were not at all interested in hearing about their Australian lives. ‘They actually don’t want to talk about you emigrating,’ Corien, for example, said (Casual conversation, 2015). ‘I don’t know,’ she continued, ‘I think it’s difficult for them, a lot of people wish they could do it [emigrating],
but they can’t, so they don’t want to talk about it.’ In this respect, many participants felt guilty and thus refrained from talking about ‘their good lives’ in Australia, where, in their perception, their loved ones were ‘struggling to survive’ in South Africa. For instance, Bea narrated how she, her husband and their daughters ‘never talk about how good it is in Australia,’ during visits home (Interview, 2016). ‘We never say anything like “Oh, at our place this is so wonderful or...”, Bea said. ‘We remain dead silent ....’ Although participants did have compassion for their relatives, the felt lack of interest and the inability to share things about their ‘new’ lives made many feel ‘disconnected’ from their families in South Africa.

Secondly, return visits were often not experienced as a relaxed vacation but as hard work, visiting relatives around the country. This in itself was problematic for many interviewees, but for some it was particularly upsetting in combination with the perceived lack of love ones’ interest in their lives. What added to this frustration was the previously discussed experience that the communication, whilst in Australia, had been largely unidirectional. That is, the interviewees themselves had initiated most of the contact. Here, Judith’s story is illustrative. She told me that going back to South Africa was very hard work for her, because:

… everybody wants a piece of you, and I just feel that, it’s fair enough if you expect me to come and spend time with you and I get that, but then, the minute I get on the plane and I get here [to Australia], you forget about me! I don’t get texts or emails or nothing from you, so why must I pay a fortune to go there and then still divide my time to spend time with everybody!

(Interview, 2015)

For this reason, Judith had decided not to visit South Africa again. Instead, she would invite family members to come and stay with her in Australia.

Many interviewees found encouraging relatives to spend holidays with them in their new country to be a welcome alternative to traveling to South Africa. Often, the offer included return tickets, because, as Anita said, ‘It’s easier to save dollars than rands!’ (Interview, 2016) ‘Five thousand dollars is still a lot of money,’ she continued, ‘but it’s easier for me to save five thousand dollars than it is for my family to save up fifty thousand rands.’ However, not many family members replied positively to the offer. Next to that, some participants became so
angry with their relatives in South Africa for the, from their perspective, one-way contact, that they stopped inviting them altogether. Jolanda, for example, stated in this regard:

I’m over it now. I don’t invite them to come and visit anymore, I don’t call them on their birthday anymore, because nobody calls me! I mean, this costs me money as well to call to South Africa! So you can call me too! And in today’s day and age, you have email, you have Skype, you have messenger, you have What’s App, you have Snapchat … you have everything! But for them…they have continued with their lives.

(Interview, 2016)

Overall, those relatives that did come to visit were parents and parents-in-law. In line with the discussion in the first part of this chapter, it was usually believed that siblings did not come because they were angry. Coming to visit was a way of ‘acknowledging that we left,’ Bea explained, ‘so they won’t come’ (Interview, 2016). Here we see once more that parents appeared more willing and able to set aside their grief and to come and acknowledge their children in their new life in Australia. For the interviewees, their parents’ visits were absolutely crucial. Only by visiting, they felt, could their parents see that they ‘had made the right choice’. Most participants whose parents had visited narrated that it was through those visits that their parents had been able to reassure themselves of their children’s wellbeing in Australia and understand their children’s choice. In some cases, parents changed their views completely after visiting. Mark, for example, told me how his parents-in-law had been devastated and outraged by his and his wife’s decision to leave South Africa. After having endlessly tried to discourage them from emigrating, his father-in-law did come to visit. Mark went to pick him up from the airport, and ‘after driving for just 200 kilometres through the Blue Mountains [in New South Wales], he told me: “If you would ever consider going back to South Africa, I will shoot you!”’ (Interview, 2016). Because, Mark explained, his father-in-law had seen that in Australia ‘everything just works and everything is just as it should be.’

Despite this positive outcome for Mark’s family, a result shared by many interviewees, the research participants generally felt that their attempts to preserve their lost family relationships were inadequate. Most agreed with Stein when he said that, even though he was not ‘severing’ the ties:
maintaining those [family] relationships over an eight thousand kilometre divide is much, much more challenging than it is if you live next door to them. We have visited from time to time and we get family visiting us from time to time, but ... that sense of community and that sense of family is lost

(Interview, 2016)

Likewise, Joke’s statement was typical when she said that Skype and FaceTime ‘just don’t make up for it’ (Interview, 2016). ‘My sister and mother and I talk quite regularly,’ she continued, ‘when I’m cooking, or, when we’re eating, they sit and watch us eat.’ Joke’s family also visited their relatives in South Africa every two years, and in the other year her parents came to visit them in Australia. Furthermore, ‘we try everything we can to make up [for the loss],’ Joke said, ‘we send packages and we just do as much as we can, but it doesn’t make up for it.’ Thus, we see that easier modes of and access to communication have not made physical contact obsolete (see Guarnizo & Smith 1998; Gupta & Ferguson 1992; Ong 2003), as I have concluded earlier. In fact, most study participants desperately wanted to restore the state of being together, and, therefore, tried to convince and support their relatives to relocate to Australia as well, as we will see in the next section.

Restoring the bonds: family reunification

Family reunification is a well-known coping strategy for real or perceived forced migrants, since they seek to restore continuity in their self-concept and in their social identity (see Fried 1963). That is, forced migrants often seek to restore their sense of interpersonal belonging. The fact that many of the Afrikaners that participated in this research actively tried to ‘get family members here’, demonstrates once more that they are, in their own perception, refugees. Out of the total of 74 interviewees, there were 5 participants who lived in Australia with their complete family of origin. That is, their parents and their siblings with their families had also relocated to Australia. These participants appeared to be coping best with their immigration experience, and they attributed this to the fact that their families were with them in their new country. Anja, for example, whose aged mother was also living in Australia (her father had died in South Africa) as well as her three siblings with their families, stated that she was very happy about her move but that ‘the others [other Afrikaner émigrés] miss their family’ (Interview, 2016).
Apart from these five interviewees, there were two participants whose families were near-complete, missing only one sibling and one son, both of whom had remained in South Africa. A number of other participants were in the process of sponsoring parents and/or siblings to come to Australia at the time of research. The great majority, however, were alone in Australia. That is, they had migrated with their nuclear family unit but had no extended family in their new home country. Most probably this would remain so, for three principal reasons. First, not all relatives wanted to leave South Africa. Second, even if they wanted to, many could not emigrate, for previously mentioned reasons of lack of finances or skills. Finally, some relatives had already migrated to other parts of the world, namely to the USA, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands (cf. Chapter 1). This meant that most of the Afrikaners that I worked with had rebuilt or were in the process of rebuilding lost family structures through forming new interpersonal relationships. The overwhelming majority did this by establishing around them a small but close-knit group of fellow Afrikaner émigrés, as the next section will show.

Replacing the ties: ‘Your Afrikaner friends become your family’

In dealing with the loss of family, many migrants turn to members of their wider cultural group or tribe who are already living in the host country (Abe, Zane & Chun 1994; Bhugra 2004a, 2004b; Bhugra & Becker 2005; Parkes 1986; Ward & Styles 2003; cf. Disman 1983; Fried 1963; Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013). This is a logical consequence of the importance of cultural belonging in our overall identity, as discussed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, when faced with loss, we generally react by enacting belonging (Gammeltoft 2018). That is, we turn to each other for support. Usually, we turn to those who are closest to us, to family members and close friends. However, in the Afrikaners’ case presented here, as with most migrants, it was the closest circle that was lost –apart from partners and children, who generally moved with them. Since, in most cases, the extended family or clan was also lost, they turned instead to the tribe, which represented the next-closest group of belonging. That is, these were the people that they had most in common with –a language, a culture, a history– and thus felt most comfortable to be around.
Only a few interviewees critiqued the tendency of Afrikaner immigrants in Australia, in their view, ‘to clique together’, saying that this ‘annoyed’ them (Noor, interview, 2015) and that ‘if you are not going to blend in a bit [and] have some Aussie mates, you might as well not have left’ (Emiel, interview, 2015). Although most research participants did have some ‘Aussie’ friends, they made a clear distinction between these ‘friends’ and their Afrikaner friends. Australian ‘friends’ were, in the participants’ view, people that Australians would refer to as ‘mates’, as explained in the previous chapter. These would be colleagues, for example, with whom participants would drink a cup of coffee in a public place after work. In contrast, their Afrikaner friends were people with whom they had developed deep relationships, in which they shared essential things and whom they would visit at their homes and vice versa. They referred to these friends as ‘home friends’ (*huisvriende*). I only met one interviewee who said she had many ‘Aussie’ friends, a few of whom I met during the course of fieldwork. Next to this, even those participants who found that ‘your circle of friends should reflect Australia’s diversity’ (Daphne, interview, 2015), relied for the most part on their fellow Afrikaners to replace the lost family. For one participant, this included other white South Africans as well. As Emiel explained:

... the [white South African] people here are the people with whom you celebrate your Easter holidays and with whom you *braai* [barbeque] every weekend, and all those things that you would do with your family, you have to do that now with your friends here.

(Interview, 2015)

Emiel continued by saying that his white South African friends in Australia had become very close friends *because* there was no family around, meaning that those friends had replaced the role of family members by default. As an example, he mentioned ‘looking after kids’, or babysitting, an activity that, in his experience, parents or siblings would normally do. Most interviewees spoke along these lines. Here we are reminded of the previous discussion concerning the replacement of the *role* that individuals perform in our lives –whereas it is impossible to replace the unique person (see Archer 1999; cf. Girard 2016; Hollan 1995; Loizos 1981; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maxwell 1995; Wellenkamp 1988). We also see that the research participants were actively recreating or replacing the support network that their family had
been to them. As Agnes explained, ‘... we [Afrikaner immigrants in Australia] have become each other’s families ... because, who else do you rely on? Who do you phone [at] three o’clock at night?!’ (Interview, 2015). Here we see the symbolic but also the very real and practical meaning and purpose of having a primary support group: these are the people that we rely on when it really matters. This echoes Stasch’s conception of kinship as a network of individuals that take care and provide for one another (2009; cf. Gammeltoft 2018) and reminds us of the original meaning of the term ‘family’ (household servants), as discussed in the first part of this chapter.

Thus, the great majority of study participants rebuilt their family out of the larger group of fellow Afrikaner émigrés who were living in their respective locales. Even the one interviewee who, before immigration, had had a perspective of herself that she and her family ‘were going to have Aussie friends and [we] were going to become totally English’, found that:

... the complete opposite has happened: most of our friends are Afrikaners. I have a few Australian friends, but this is not, not so intense and personal as with the Afrikaners. And you replace your family with these people. So they become, basically, your adopted family, your brothers and sisters for you.

(Marieke, interview, 2015)

This process also worked the other way around: when new Afrikaner immigrants arrived, many study participants felt the need to take care of them, which other research confirms (Hatoss, Starks & Janse van Rensburg 2011; Oberholzer 2011). For instance, Hans, who had been living in a smaller town with a close-knit Afrikaner community, said that he would ‘tell newly arrived [Afrikaner immigrants]: “I will be, and we [the already existing community] will be your father, your mother, your sister, your brother, your aunt, your uncle. Whatever you need, come to us, we’ll help you”’ (Interview, 2016). Chantal, who shared Hans’ feelings, stated that reaching out to newly arriving families had also helped her to cope with her own loss. ‘You left your family behind in South Africa,’ she said, ‘but now your South Africans become your family here’ (Interview, 2016).
Having said this, most interviewees also told me that they had deliberately chosen to have ‘only a few good friends’ instead of trying to create a large support group around them. More importantly, they universally agreed that they were not friends with fellow Afrikaners because they were Afrikaners, but because they ‘shared something together’, that is, because they could identify with them (see, amongst others, Eriksen 2017; Gammeltoft 2018; Girard 2016; Mackay 2014; Yuval-Davis 2006; cf. Chapter 1). Many had experienced a similar process after arrival in Australia, of which Judith’s story is exemplary:

> When we came here, ... the identity-loss effect that I experienced, made that you just wanted to mix and hang out with all the other Afrikaans people because they are Afrikaans. That’s what it [was] all about: they are Afrikaans. Then, after only a short while, we found that we are mixing with people that we would not have mixed with [in South Africa], because this isn’t really our kind of people, but because they are Afrikaans.

(Interview, 2015)

Indeed, from the relatively large pool of Afrikaner émigrés in their respective places of residence in Australia, the research participants drew their own small group of close friends, those ‘that are your type of people’ (Anita, interview, 2016). My experiences as a participant observer confirmed this. As I have previously remarked, at most events that I attended, I knew people from different groups but they did not know each other. Overall, the Afrikaner community in Australia does not appear to be a coherent group, although this could be different in Queensland, where there is an ‘Afrikaans Club of Australia’ (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, overall, they drew their new family from their own cultural group.

This demonstrates that the term ‘family’ can refer to the people that raised us and with whom we grew up, that is, ‘the family of origin’, or it can indicate individuals whom we select in adulthood, that is, ‘the family of choice’ (Boss 1999: 4). Origin or choice is irrelevant as long as those referred to with the term ‘family’ belong to ‘that intimate group of people whom we can count on over time for comfort, care, nurturance, support, sustenance, and emotional closeness’ (ibid). Illustrative of this, one interviewee, Marieke, recounted how awkward she had felt when her biological sister came to visit her in Australia. Because, now, she had to

---

2 I unsuccessfully tried to establish an interview with the chairperson of this organisation during my fieldwork period.
introduce that sister of origin to her chosen sister, who had basically replaced the former in her role. Marieke exclaimed: ‘Yes, this is your blood sister [referring to her biological sister], but this is my sister now! [referring to her chosen sister]’ (Interview, 2015). Still, Marieke had chosen her new sister from the larger group of Afrikaner immigrants residing in her city. In the following and last section of this chapter, I discuss how the need for familiarity contributed to this process.

‘You don’t have to explain yourself all the time’

The finding that the Afrikaners recreated or replaced their family structures in Australia through their broader network of fellow Afrikaner émigrés is not unique. Indeed, it is common for immigrants to attempt ‘to recreate around them the culture they have lost’ (Parkes 1986: 210; cf. Bhugra 2004a; 2004b; Bhugra & Becker 2005). This reminds us again of Ainslie’s argument that, in immigration, ‘It is not only people who are mourned, but culture itself, which is inseparable from the loved ones whom it holds’ (2005: 208). Placing themselves ‘within concrete communities of others’ (Gammeltoft 2018: 84-85), generally helps immigrants to counter the possible negative mental health impacts of migration (see, amongst others, Abe, Zane & Chun 1994; Ainslie 2005; Ward & Styles 2003; cf. Disman 1983; Fried 1963; and Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013). Thus, recreating same-culture support groups in an alien environment can be seen as a form of medicine. As Colson, in her work on the forced removal of the Gwembe Tonga in Zambia, stated:

It is a truism that kinship comes into its own in times of trouble, when people turn to those with whom they feel a bond based on something stronger than congeniality or economic interest.

(1971: 70)

Similarly, Loizos (1981: 203) argued that Argaki refugees (Cypriot Greeks) re-established themselves within their own cultural community because this group ‘had the great advantage over total strangers of themselves being familiar with and of knowing something about Argaki, its customs, prosperity, and personnel’. Indeed, Loizos continued that ‘the refugees did not want mere contacts ... but relationships with people who really understood what their pre-war life was all about, who shared the same pattern of meanings’ (ibid, original
emphasis). The same can be said about the Afrikaners who participated in this study with regards to their pre-immigration life. Nearly all interviewees found it much easier to establish relationships with fellow Afrikaners than with Australians because of the ‘common ground’, as Richard and Agnes called it (Interview, 2015). That is, due to the presence of a shared background or history including ancestry, life experiences, and, crucially, a culture or value system including a shared language. This demonstrates that we feel that we belong to others because we identify with them.

Thus, we see that the overly criticising attitude towards Australians, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, was accompanied by a strong inclination to search for comfort in the familiar group. Note that the term ‘familiar’ shares its origin with ‘family’: the cultural group is the larger family. Research participants did not only perceive Australians to be fundamentally different from themselves regarding serious issues such as values. The felt absence of a common ground with the dominant host culture also played itself out in seemingly superficial cultural traits. Kees, for instance, talked about hunting. ‘To an Australian,’ he said, ‘you cannot brag about which big antelope you have shot, because that’s not in their culture.’ He continued:

> Men around the braai, drinking beer and talking nonsense about what animal they shot where, is something you can only do with South Africans, since they share that experience with you.

(Casual conversation, 2016)

Likewise, many interviewees mentioned humour. They generally felt that their self-mockery, which they saw as part of their culture, was unappreciated by Australians. ‘The Aussies hate this,’ Sophie explained. ‘They don’t understand it and [thus] feel offended when you do this [mocking yourself]’ (Interview, 2016). Anneke, in this regard, stated that she preferred to surround herself with Afrikaners because she wanted ‘... to laugh! In my humour, with someone that understands it’ (Interview, 2016) (cf. Hatoss, Starks & Janse van Rensburg 2011). Most importantly, though, was the issue of language. Nearly all interviewees wanted to speak Afrikaans in their leisure time. They had reconciled themselves to the fact that they had to speak English at work and in public spaces, but ‘when we relax, we want to speak
Afrikaans’ (Marieke, interview, 2015). One participant said that she and her husband were trying to befriend ‘Aussies’, but that is was ‘hard, because we still find it strange to speak English [in our leisure time]’ (Sabine, interview, 2016). This resembles the work of Barkhuizen and associates on Afrikaans-speaking immigrants in New Zealand (Barkhuizen 2006, 2013; Barkhuizen & de Klerk 2006; Barkhuizen & Knoch 2006). It also confirms the inextricable link between language and identity (see, amongst others, Grinberg & Grinberg 1984; Grinberg & Grinberg 1989; Kulick 2018), although this has been questioned in the Afrikaners’ case in other research (Hatoss, Starks & Janse van Rensburg 2011).\(^3\)

Finally, this last section demonstrates that ‘the availability and presence of familiar people whose patterns of behaviour and response are relatively predictable’ (Fried 1963: 368) is crucial for us when faced with loss. As the first part of this chapter showed, the loss of family meant a loss of familiarity – the people that know and understand you and vice versa. Thus, it is unsurprising that the Afrikaners responded to this loss by placing themselves amongst people who most resembled their families: those from the wider tribe. Because, as Corien explained, this ensured that ‘you don’t have to explain yourself all the time’ (Casual conversation, 2015). This echoes Schuetz’ argument that, for the people from the in-group, that is, ‘For those who have grown up within the cultural pattern’, the habits, customs and attitudes as well the thinking patterns underlying them, ‘are an unquestioned “matter of course” which gives them both security and assurance’ (1944: 504). Thus, we see that belonging – to a familiar group – is not only a prerequisite for our sense of physical safety, but equally so for our feelings of mental safety.

Yet, despite having placed themselves within this ‘concrete community’ (Gammeltoft 2018: 84-85) of familiar others, this chapter must conclude that the Afrikaners’ grief over the loss of their families remained unresolved, as its title suggests. This is because our attachments

\(^3\) Most of the Afrikaners I worked with had not much trouble with the fact that their children’s first language was or became English. This was because they wanted their children to identify with Australia, as referred to previously. This also demonstrates that the research participants sought each other out principally for comfort, and not as a way of preserving their culture. Indeed, as I have argued before, they did not demonstrate a strong sense of group cohesion in the broader (tribal or nationalistic) sense.
are specific, as discussed above and in previous chapters (see Archer 1999; Girard 2016; Hollan 1995; Loizos 1981; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maxwell 1995; Wellenkamp 1988). Having a substitute family certainly helped the Afrikaners cope with their loss, yet, as many interviewees commented, missing their biological family ‘never got easier’. This demonstrates the paradox in Chantal’s previously cited comment that ‘friends you can make but family you can’t’ (Interview, 2016). It also reminds us of Ainslie’s contention that loss ‘is an experience that creates an emptiness that remains an emptiness despite efforts to fill it in’ (2005: 207). Or, in Rob’s words, no matter how much he tried to recreate a life in his ‘new’ country, ‘there is always a hole in your heart’ (Interview, 2015).

Furthermore, as we have seen, the key to resolving grief is meaning-making (see, amongst others, Castelli Dransart 2013; Marris 2015 [1986]; Neimeyer et al. 2008; Stroebe & Schut 2001), if it can be resolved at all (Archer 1999; Desjarlais 1992; LaCapra 1999; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976). As we have seen, meaning-making makes suffering bearable (Frankl 2008 [1946]). Regarding the loss of family, too, the study participants’ children were the ones through whom the loss was given meaning. Again, sacrifice was the supreme mechanism (ibid), since the interviewees saw living in close presence to their families as something they had been forced to give up (see Daswani 2013) for the wellbeing of their children. In this respect, we have seen that interviewees believed that their children ‘did not even know’ what they had lost with their extended families. Indeed, as Joke stated concerning the guilt that she felt about depriving her children from growing up within a larger family structure: ‘It is my loss, not necessarily the kids’ loss’ (Interview, 2016). And Joke, like most other interviewees, coped with it because she felt that she suffered for their children.

Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with the loss of interpersonal belonging that the Afrikaners experienced due to their immigration to Australia. Conceptualised as ‘our sense of

---

4 As stated in Chapter 3, what made the post-immigration losses worth it for those interviewees without children, was primarily the feeling of having liberated themselves from living in fear of becoming a violent crime victim.
attachment to other individuals’ (Gammeltoft 2018; cf. Davies 2012; Girard 2016; Jackson 2002; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maslow 1943; 1970; Yuval-Davis 2006), interpersonal belonging is the most important form of belonging, because we need each other to survive, physically as well as psychologically. Other people determine, to a large extent, our individual and social identity, since our relationships of interpersonal belonging principally inform our lives with meaning (see, amongst others, de Saint-Exupéry 1942; Eriksen 2017; Gammeltoft 2018; Girard 2016; Mackay 2014; Yuval-Davis 2006). For the Afrikaners, we have seen, the most important relationships that were lost, or altered, were those with their relatives—they hardly mentioned friends.

The first part of this chapter has further demonstrated that the meaning of the loss of family lay in a loss of harmony and a loss of community. The former meant that interviewees experienced conflict, both with family members and with themselves, over their emigration decision. Frequently, relationships with relatives, mostly siblings, changed from being harmonious to conflicted, because these siblings or other relatives were angry with the study participants for leaving. There was also a loss of inner peace, in the form of continuous doubt over the emigration decision due to the feeling of having abandoned elderly parents and having deprived children from growing up within an extended family structure. In the second place, the loss of community was experienced as a loss of support and familiarity. We have seen that the meaning of family, in essence, lay in having a support network and in knowing and being known. That is, the idea of community entailed being surrounded by familiar others. This, in turn, provided interviewees with a sense of safety, which familiarity does (Boss 1999; Bowlby 1980; Davies 2012; Davis 1992; Dewey 2007 [1922]; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maslow 1943).

My analysis in the second part of this chapter showed that the Afrikaners were engaged in the conflicting tendency to preserve or restore the ties and to recreate or replace the bonds (see Colson 1971; Davis 1992; de Waal 1989; Malinowski 2009 [1954]; Marris 2015 [1986]; Stroebe & Schut 1999, 2001). In terms of preservation, we saw that most participants tried to maintain family relationships through digital as well as through physical contact. Although modern modes of communication and the relative wealth of most research participants
enabled these respective forms of contacts, the analysis revealed that most interviewees found these methods to be insufficient to preserve the lost bonds. Based on these findings, I argued against the current trend in migration studies to view the concept of transnationalism as an easy identity fix for migrants that makes physical contact obsolete (see Guarnizo & Smith 1998; Gupta & Ferguson 1992; Ong 2003). In fact, this research shows that for the great majority of Afrikaners, family reunification in Australia was the preferred coping strategy as a way of restoring the loss.

However, since this was not possible for most interviewees, they principally engaged in processes aimed at recreating or replacing the original family structures, by choosing a ‘new’ family from the wider pool of fellow Afrikaner émigrés. As explained, this is a common strategy for real or perceived forced migrants (Abe, Zane & Chun 1994; Ainslie 2005; Bhugra 2004a, 2004b; Bhugra & Becker 2005; Disman 1983; Fried 1963; Parkes 1986; Ward & Styles 2003). Surrounding themselves with those people that were (most) familiar to themselves helped the Afrikaners to provide a sense of continuity in the face of the major, disruptive change that immigration entails. Ultimately, however, this chapter concluded that the Afrikaners’ grief over the loss of their families remained unresolved because our attachments are specific (Archer 1999; Girard 2016; Hollan 1995; Loizos 1981; Marris 2015 [1986]; Maxwell 1995; Wellenkamp 1988). Yet, most research participants coped well with their grief because they had given it supreme meaning. They did this by viewing it as a sacrifice they had made for their children, as they did with their other post-immigration losses. Thus, we see that one of the main conclusions of this thesis is that the Afrikaners’ children were the means through which ‘painful motives and affects’ were ‘transformed into publicly accepted sets of meanings and symbols’ (Obeyesekere 1985: 425). I shall now turn to discuss the other conclusions, too, that can be drawn from my analysis of the Afrikaners’ stories.
Chapter 8 Conclusion

Introduction

This thesis has discussed the experiences of contemporary Afrikaner immigrants in Australia. The principal aim of the study was to gain a deep understanding of how members of this particular cultural group have experienced South Africa’s democratic transition, how this has influenced their decision to relocate to Australia and how they experienced their resettlement. Through this aim, the research contributes to anthropological research on contemporary Afrikaners, and thus also to the current trend within anthropology of studying ‘ourselves’, that is, white, privileged, Western people. Furthermore, through the exploration of the key concepts that emerged from the data, the study further contributes to our understanding of the concept of belonging as well as of our experiences of loss other than through death. In order to reach a deep understanding, the research was conducted as an ethnographic case study, in which long-term fieldwork based on participant observation and in-depth interviewing were the primary methods of data collection. In total, 74 self-identified, first-generation post-1994 Afrikaner émigrés in Australia took part in the research through interviews. Next to that, at least another 50 to 75 white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans participated through casual conversations at events and other gatherings.

The felt loss of belonging in South Africa

The key finding of the study was that the great majority of the research participants had completely lost their sense of belonging in their homeland. Therefore, the main theoretical framework through which I analysed the data was the loss of belonging. Belonging refers to ‘going together with’, ‘being a part of’ (OED) or, simply, ‘togetherness’ (Ahmed 2014; cf. Gammeltoft 2018; Girard 2016; Yuval-Davis 2006) and takes many forms. We usually have a sense of belonging to other individuals, groups of individuals, places, political units (nation-states) and belief systems (cultures), to name the most important types. Belonging thus
relates to our identity, which can be defined as stories about who we are, or, who we belong to (cf. Yuval-Davis 2006). Paradoxically, belonging to certain individuals, groups, places or cultures usually means that we do not ‘go together’ with other individuals, groups, places and cultures. Thus, although belonging refers to a ‘we’ (Ahmed 2014), that is, to inclusion, it is almost always, and necessarily so, also concerned with exclusion (Girard 2016; cf. Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005; Sen 2006).

Indeed, as the empirical chapters have demonstrated, in post-apartheid South Africa, the Afrikaners who participated in this study felt excluded in nearly every sense. First, we have seen that affirmative action policies made the interviewees feel discriminated against and excluded from the larger South African economic community. This loss, which I conceptualised as the loss of ‘economic belonging’, was felt mostly with regards to their children. Secondly, the research participants felt that their physical integrity was being threatened, since they believed that violent crime in South Africa was specifically directed against their cultural group as a punishment for their role in the previous regime. This loss was conceptualised as the loss of ‘physical belonging’, since the fear of death – here, through violent crime – is concerned with the will to live, that is, to be physically present in the world (see Becker 1973, 2009 [1977]).

Furthermore, the Afrikaners also lost their sense of spatial and socio-political belonging to their homeland. In terms of spatial or ‘territorial belonging’ (Gammeltoft 2018), that is, our affinity to the area that we call ‘home’ (Chapman & Hockey 1999; Fried 1963: 362), the research participants could not recognise the place that South Africa, in their view, had become since 1994. As we have seen, for them, their country had changed from a developed one with a functioning state to a developing country with a corrupt government. With regards to ‘socio-political belonging’, which I conceptualised as the overlapping social and political groups with which we identify at a national level (Anderson 2006; Eriksen 2017; Gammeltoft 2018; Sonn et al. 2015; Tajfel 1982; Yuval-Davis 2006), the analysis revealed that the Afrikaners felt completely rejected by both of these groups. They felt that their larger society as well as their government excluded them due to their previous role in apartheid.
The Reality of the ‘Deep Story’

The second key finding of this research was that the Afrikaners’ felt exclusion was, in most respects, based on their perception of reality and not on reality per se. That is, my analysis of secondary data sources demonstrated that Afrikaners, as a group, are not economically excluded in South Africa (see, amongst others, Allanson & Atkins 2005; Archibong 2013; Baines 2013; De Vos 2013; Erasmus 2015; Jones 2011; Kynoch 2013; Morrell 2002; Scheper-Hughes 2014; Statistics South Africa 2016) and not targeted more than any other cultural group with regards to violent crime (Møller 2005; Scheper-Hughes 2014; Super 2010). Also, we have seen that for most other South Africans, the country had always been corrupt. What happened after 1994 was that the forms as well as the extent of political corruption changed (Habtemichael & Cloete 2010; Huntington 2002 [1968]; Hyslop 2005; Lodge 2000; Mbeki 2009). Yet, for the Afrikaners, the deterioration in overall public services meant a significant loss. Furthermore, with regards to the felt loss of socio-political belonging, I have argued that it is largely based on reality, since the post-Mandela governments have demonstrated an increasingly anti-white, and specifically anti-Afrikaner, attitude (Vanderhaeghen 2018).

That the other losses were felt losses is, as I have subsequently argued, irrelevant with regards to their personal and social implications. As my analysis has demonstrated, the study participants lived and thus acted upon their ‘narrative as felt’ (Hochschild 2016). According to their own ‘Deep Story’, their country did not want them. In fact, it wanted them gone. It was saying to the Afrikaners: ‘You don’t belong here’. The main personal implication of the participants’ belief in this story was that they were experiencing, overall, high levels of pain. As Richard’s sentiments demonstrate:

... the Afrikaner volk has been completely trampled, it’s totally marginalised. There’s hardly anything left of it. Because you take away its jobs, you rape its women, you slit its daughter’s throats, you shoot its old people, you burn them to death with irons, you ban its culture, you destroy its monuments...

(Interview, 2015)
Similarly, Bea maintained:

> If you take an Afrikaner on strength of character, this will take a lot to break him. But [with what] is happening now, there [in South Africa], I think it has already happened: he is broken, he is no longer what he used to be. It has already gone too far.

(Interview, 2016)

And, sad and bitter, Laura concluded:

> This [Afrikaners] is a dying breed. We shall very soon cease to exist ... And we will atrophy together. We will cease to exist together. Because South Africa was our country and it isn’t anymore. And it won’t be given back to us.

(Interview, 2015)

The main social consequence of the participants’ ‘Deep Story’ was that they left their homeland. They did not want to maintain their relationship with South Africa, since South Africa did not want to be in a relationship with them. Thus, because they felt excluded, they excluded themselves, literally. The move to Australia can thus be seen as the reaction to the study participants’ overall loss of belonging. This, in turn, can be seen as a strong focus on only one side of the conflict of bereavement, which entails that grief, the universal reaction to loss (Archer 1999; Bhugra & Becker 2005; Burton 1651; Doka 2002; Freud 1917; Houghton & Boersma 1988; Parkes 1986; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976; Stillion & Attig 2014) essentially represents a conflict between the urge to preserve or restore and the attempt to recreate or replace what was lost (Colson 1971; Davis 1992; de Waal 1989; Malinowski 2009 [1954]). By moving to Australia, the Afrikaners thus concentrated on their efforts to recreate or replace their overall loss of belonging.

**Restoration and Loss in Australia**

In Australia, however, most losses could not be fully recreated. Indeed, only the loss of physical belonging could be ‘restored’, since Australia is a much safer country with regards to the prevalence of violent crime and, in their new country, the Afrikaners did not fear that they were a special crime target. Since the interviewees felt familiar with Australian society in the sense that, in their experience, Australia is a ‘first world’ country, they also recreated their sense of spatial belonging. Yet, as the analysis has demonstrated, most interviewees
simultaneously suffered from a loss of geographical belonging since they missed South Africa in a physical sense: the landmass and its natural features. With regards to socio-political belonging, the great majority of study participants felt valued by the Australian government but not by the society at large. The fact that they were granted visas, based on their skills, and later citizenship, based on their labour input in Australia, made most of the Afrikaners feel wanted and thus included. However, most interviewees felt that political belonging, in the form of citizenship (Galtung & Wirak 1977; Gammeltoft 2018; Schuetz 1944; Sonn et al. 2015; Yuval-Davis 2006) did not have any social meaning. In general, they felt excluded by Australians, whom they defined as white, Australian-born citizens of Anglo-Saxon descent, for being ‘foreigners’. This feeling was closely related to the sense of economic exclusion they experienced. Indeed, most participants felt rejected by Australians on the labour market. Where in South Africa they had felt marginalised by affirmative action policies, in Australia they felt discriminated against for being immigrants.

I have further explained that it is impossible to investigate to which extent the Afrikaners’ perception of discrimination in Australia is congruent with reality. Yet, my analysis of secondary sources demonstrated that, in comparison to so-called non-white migrant groups, the level of discrimination against Afrikaners is relative (see, amongst others, Claudio 2014; Ip, Wu & Inglis 1998; Lange & Nisbet 2000; Ryan 2000; Stratton 2011). However, I have further argued that in the lived experience of the Afrikaners, this is, once again, irrelevant. Since people believe what they feel (Bruner 1996; Hervik 1994; Hochschild 2016; Shore 1996), for the Afrikaners, their socio-economic marginalisation in Australia was real. Hence, they suffered accordingly. Yet, more important were the practical and moral consequences of being unemployed for a prolonged period of time, as well as ‘downward mobility’ (Wasserman 2016), that is, accepting work at lower levels. Indeed, another main finding of this research is that many interviewees lost, to various extents and degrees, their careers and, as a consequence, much of their wealth and self-esteem. Thus, rather than restoring a sense of economic belonging, the move to Australia actually entailed losses in this regard, for most participants.
The emigration also signified a strong sense of cultural bereavement for most research participants. With regards to this, my analysis demonstrated once more that our conception of the real becomes real because we act upon it (Bruner 1996; Hervik 1994; Hochschild 2016; Shore 1996). First, we saw that the perception of being refugees caused many interviewees to experience a strong sense of cultural loss in Australia. Refugees and forced migrants generally suffer from cultural bereavement more strongly because they did not seek the change (Bhugra & Becker 2005; Eisenbruch 1990, 1991; Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013; Sluzki 1979; cf. Davies 2012). Next to that, since many study participants felt socio-economically marginalised in Australia, they felt aggrieved. This expressed itself in anger and a criticising attitude towards their host community. The analysis here showed that many Afrikaners engaged in a strong process of ‘othering’ with regards to Australians, where they spoke about Australians in gross stereotypes.

Thus, here we saw again that feelings of exclusion lead to grief, of which anger and a criticising attitude are symptoms (Bhugra & Becker 2005; Hogg 2006; Kübler-Ross 1970, 1972; Leavitt 1995; Rosaldo 2014 [1984]; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976; Stets 2006), and that, in reaction to this, the research participants were, themselves, excluding Australians. They saw Australians as inherently different from themselves, as they were seen to be ‘British’ and ‘atheist’, both of which traits the interviewees saw as negative. Furthermore, these stereotypes were based on historical discourses of anti-Britishness and Christian superiority. As such, they revealed much more about Afrikaners than about Australians (Hegel circa 1795, reprinted in Wootton 1996; cf. Clifford 1986; Foucault 1980; Kapuscinski 2008 [2006]; Levinas 1987; 1999; Said 1995). Above all, their overly critical attitude demonstrated their ongoing sense of bereavement, as they were mostly telling these stories about Australians in order to rebuild a sense of self (see Jackson 2002).

The power of the ‘Deep Story’ also became clear in the last chapter, where we saw that, for most participants, feeling ‘forced out’ of their homeland led to an intense experience with regards to the loss of interpersonal belonging. Many interviewees recounted how the missing of their family remained difficult despite conscious efforts to recreate and replace the lost family structures. The analysis here most clearly demonstrated that we cannot replace what
we have lost, because of the particularity of our relationships of belonging (Marris 2015 [1986]). That is, we attach ourselves to specific people and places. Other people and places, such as substitute siblings or countries, can only replace the role that the lost people or country played in our lives (Archer 1999; Girard 2016; Hollan 1995; Loizos 1981; Maxwell 1995; Wellenkamp 1988). Indeed, since loss is irreplaceable, we do not cope with it by breaking the bond or maintaining the tie (Malinowski 2009 [1954]), but by doing both. As I have argued, we do this by finding meaning in the loss. Through meaning-making, the lost object lives on – in the meaning, which still exists. Simultaneously, this meaning symbolically breaks the tie, since we can usually continue with our lives once we have understood why something has happened, that is, when we have found benefits in the loss, which are often non-materialistic, such as personal growth (Constans 1998; Davies 2012; Parkes & Markus 1998; Saunders 1998).

(Not) Finding meaning in loss

In this light, another key conclusion of this research is that the Afrikaners had not found meaning in the losses they felt they had sustained in South Africa. If they had, they might not have left. Instead, at the time of our interviews, they were still grieving these losses, as illustrated by the above quotes. For the research participants, all of South Africa’s post-apartheid changes were negative, and, as discussed, those losses in which no good can be found, that fail to make sense, but that shatter our worldview, will cause chronic grief (see Folkman 2001; Janoff-Bulman 1989, 1992; Thompson & Janigian 1988; cf. Davies 2012; Doka 2002; Freud 1917; Livingston 2010; Marris 2015 [1986]; Shand 1920). Overall, the loss of belonging that post-apartheid South Africa signalled for the Afrikaners resulted in a fundamental loss of ontological security (Giddens 1976, 1984, 1990; Marchetti-Mercer & Roos 2013). In their home country, they had lost their basic trust in life and, with that, all hope for a future. As discussed, Griffiths and Prozesky (2010) refer to this, following Heidegger’s philosophy (2001 [1971]), as the loss of their ‘dwelling place’, a place where they trusted to be safe and thus felt at peace. What these authors have also rightly predicted is that this loss cannot be resolved by emigration.
Griffiths and Prozesky (2010: 29) further argue that Afrikaners, as part of South Africa’s white population, would have to come to terms with ‘the historical forces that shaped their identity’ should they want to ‘resolve’ this loss. I would add to this that coming to terms may not resolve their grief, but could make it bearable (see Frankl 2008 [1946]; cf. Brison & Leavitt 1995; Desjarlais 1992; Disman 1983; Hollan 1994, 1995; LaCapra 1999; Leavitt 1995; Rosenblatt, Walsh & Jackson 1976; Woodrick 1995). Instead, however, the Afrikaners’ strong sense of exclusion in post-apartheid South Africa led them to go in search of a sense of belonging elsewhere. Yet, as this research has demonstrated, this ‘solution’ brought about other significant losses. As a result, most research participants stated that they were ‘not happier’ in Australia than they had been in South Africa. Indeed, as Klingenberg, herself a white, Afrikaans-speaking South African migrant in Australia, writes:

South Africans generally seem to fit in. Many look the same, speak the language and like their sport and barbeque. But on the sidelines, some struggle quietly with a loss of belonging, a sense of loneliness, a deep grief of many unforeseen realities, a constant evaluation and re-evaluation of their decision, or the effects of memories from a past country all too often plagued by violence and trauma. For these individuals, such struggles are a regular reminder that all is not well.

(2016: 13)

Similarly, one interviewee, who was working in the mental health field, stated:

I think that a lot more people [fellow Afrikaner émigrés] need to come and see me! Really. I think there’s a lot of trauma in this whole...and a lot of loss and grief that goes unaddressed.

(Joke, interview, 2016)

I have conceptualised the losses associated with the relocation to Australia as losses of belonging as well. The crucial difference, however, between the pre- and post-immigration losses, was that most study participants had found meaning in the latter. Indeed, as concluded in Chapters 3, 5 and 7, all those interviewees with children saw their losses as sacrifices they had made for their offspring. In fact, most of them stated that they would not have left South Africa had they not had children. In this sense, this research clearly demonstrates that the Afrikaners constitute a diaspora in the classical sense of the term. As discussed, for classical diasporas, the real or perceived forced relocation is associated with
‘feeling coerced to give something up or to be away from the place one yearns to be’ (Daswani 2013: 46), that is, with sacrifice. In this respect, it is telling that those interviewees who immigrated while leaving adult children behind in South Africa, saw this as their biggest sacrifice. As Karel and Hilde, for example, stated: ‘The sacrifice is immense. But it’s worth it, because we are now able to support our children. And we live on the hope that they will come and stay in Australia one day’ (Interview, 2016). Here, Hilde and Karel referred to the fact that they were earning Australian dollars as opposed to South African rands, which allowed them to financially support their children in South Africa.

Furthermore, the essence of children in providing meaning to the participants’ lives also became painfully clear in the stories of two couples who had ‘waited too long with settling in’, in Australia, career-wise, and who were now ‘too old’ to have children. For those couples, this was the principal sacrifice regarding their immigration. When I asked one of these interviewees whether she was happy with her emigration decision, she answered:

This is a very difficult question to answer; there’s no yes or no to this question. We came here and we thought we’ll make sure we’re on the right track again in terms of work, and then we will start a family. But it took us a bit longer to settle in into our jobs again, we’ve worked terribly hard and I was too old then. This did not work, we went through IVF and all those sad things. So this is what I had to give up, and this is a huge thing to sacrifice. But if it wasn’t for this, then yes, it was worth it ...

(Interview, 2016)

Thus, we see that, in different ways, sacrifice and meaning-making were linked to offspring.

The great majority of research participants, who did have children, narrated how seeing their children ‘happy’ and ‘flourishing’ made all of their own pain worth it. Sophie, for instance, who felt quite depressed at the time of our interview, stated that, after 16 years of living in Australia, ‘I, for myself, still cannot make sense of our lives here, but the kids are better off than I am’ (Interview, 2016). Similarly, Jacqueline, who had been living in Australia for 14 years, said that she still felt ‘like a visitor’ and that Australia was ‘still strange’ to her. Nevertheless, she could live with the pain of not being in South Africa because:

I think the moment you see that your children are flourishing, it changes everything in you. When you see that your children are happy, you know, they have friends here,
they have opportunities here … then you can be all right with this, you can live with this.

(Interview, 2016)

Another interviewee, Simone, felt that she would always be ‘an outsider’ in Australia, though she recounted an experience that made her sacrifice worth her while. She and her family had recently travelled back to South Africa for holidays, and when their airplane was landing in Australia again, her son had said: ‘Look how beautiful Adelaide looks’. This, Simone said, ‘made me happy because I realised that, for him, this is home’ (Interview, 2016). Finally, Stein’s sentiments succinctly illustrate the feelings of most study participants when he answered his own question concerning whether his children would appreciate the sacrifices he and his wife had made for them:

I bloody hope so. I don’t know. They won’t appreciate the sacrifices that we put ourselves through. ... They won’t have that framework to test and measure it. Which is fine, that was the whole point! That they wouldn’t have to.

(Interview, 2016)

Thus, we see that the sacrifice ‘was the whole point’. That is, offspring was the principal meaning-making mechanism of the Afrikaners’ emigration endeavour. As discussed in the empirical chapters, sacrifice, or doing something holy (from Latin sacer), is a supreme form of meaning-making (see Frankl 2008 [1946]). On a deeper, sub-conscious level, it is related to religious beliefs as it concerns ‘constituting a relationship between those involved and a transcendent or sacred world’ (Miller 1998: 75; cf. Hubert & Mauss 1964). Indeed, Christianity sees suffering as integral to moral or spiritual advancement (Davies 2012; cf. Dante 1985; Gorer 1955; Marris 1986 [2015]). Thus, on a subconscious level, giving up important things – such as career, wealth, culture and family– for the sake of something that they regarded as higher –their children’s wellbeing and future– was something the participants also did for themselves.

Furthermore, as this research has concluded, by viewing their own losses as sacrifices, the research participants restored meaning to their own lives. Since we have seen that all loss essentially constitutes a loss of self (Aldrich 1963; Freud 1917; Marris 2015 [1986]; cf. Castelli Dransart 2013; Hunter 2007-2008; Neimeyer 2001), meaning-making also, essentially,
concerns the self. Ultimately, however, my analysis concluded that the way in which the Afrikaners restored meaning to their lives was through enacting belonging. They were primarily motivated by their children, whom they most intimately belonged to. This demonstrates that interpersonal belonging is the most fundamental form of belonging. That is, the question of ‘How do I exist in this world?’ ultimately refers to: ‘To whom do I belong in this world?’

**Conclusion: Belonging, our essential need**

The essential, general conclusion of this thesis, then, is that belonging is the primary motivator of our behaviour. From my case study of the Afrikaner diaspora in Australia I have theorised that, in terms of basic needs, belonging to other people, or togetherness, is the prerequisite for all our other needs, first and foremost, as set forth by Maslow (1943–1970). Access to food and water, being safe from harm, enjoying a healthy self-esteem and realising our full potential all depend on others. This is why I have proposed an alternative model of human needs. Furthermore, throughout this thesis I have demonstrated that, after interpersonal belonging, which includes our ‘emotional nutrition’—that is, love and affection—and from which all else originates, our need for food and water can also be conceptualised as ‘economic belonging’. Next to that, our need to be safe from harm can be theorised as ‘physical belonging’. Since our need for self-esteem depends on our level of inclusion by others, this can also be framed as ‘social belonging’. If we see our second-most important identity group as the group in which we were cultivated, we can refer to this as ‘cultural belonging’. As discussed, social belonging can overlap with ‘political belonging’ when we are referring to our membership of an overarching society which is congruent with a nation-state. Furthermore, our need to express ourselves through our creativity can be conceptualised as ‘professional belonging’.

Thus, based on this research, it is my contention that, at a deeper level, people are motivated by belonging. Alternatively, this means that we are driven by our fear of exclusion. This is because on a subconscious level, exclusion means death (see Becker 2009 [1977]). Since we have an intrinsic will to live, we want to survive. Ultimately, the Afrikaners who participated
in this research felt that they, and, most importantly, their children, could not survive in post-apartheid South Africa. This is the meaning of their loss of belonging at the deepest level: not having a future (hence, the association with the subconscious fear of dying). Thus, they went in search of belonging elsewhere, in Australia. Ultimately, however, my analysis concluded that most research participants were ‘stuck’ in a place of non-belonging, since they could not fully recreate, let alone replace, their South African losses in Australia. Furthermore, the move brought about additional losses. Yet, they felt that they had succeeded in finding a place where their children could belong. Thus, they did restore a sense of continuity in the aftermath of deeply disruptive loss and change (see Marris 2015 [1986]). However, this came at a high price. Namely, they were ‘existing’ so that their children could thrive. This was the ultimate sacrifice— which restored meaning to their lives.
References


References


Arnold, P 2011, *A Unique Migration: South African Doctors Fleeing to Australia*, CreateSpace, USA.


References


References


References


Davis, B & Dossetor, K 2010, '(Mis)perceptions of crime in Australia ', *Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice*.


De Vos, P 2013, 'In black and white: the truth about ‘unconstitutional’ race quotas in universities', *The Daily Maverick*.


References


Durington, M 2009, 'Suburban fear, media and gated communities in Durban, South Africa', *Home Cultures*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 71-88.


Dyer, R 1988, 'White', *Screen*, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 44-64.


Essop, P 2011, 'ANC is erger as NP! Briesende Tutu maan Zuma hy sal bid vir sy val [ANC is worse than NP! Furious Tutu warns Zuma he will pray for his downfall]’, *Beeld*.


Farah, S 2015, 'So 90% of us are 'proud Australians'. Proud of what, exactly?', *The Guardian*.


References


Frankl, VE 2008 [1946], Man’s Search For Meaning, trans. I Lasch, Rider, St Yves, UK.


Furedi, F 2007, 'The only thing we have to fear is the ‘culture of fear’ itself', Spiked, http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/3053#.WXFjhtOGNE4, last viewed 23 September 2019.


Giliomee, H 2010, 'The Afrikaners: Twenty Traumatic Years',


*Global Wealth Migration Review*, 2018, AfrAsia Bank,

References


Graham, C 2019, 'Tears for Christchurch: Australia First Imported Hate In 1788. Now We’re In The Export Business', *New Matilda*.

Grant, S 2016, 'The Australian Dream: Blood, History and Becoming', *Quarterly Essay*, vol. 64.


Green, L 1994, 'Fear as a Way of Life', *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 227-256.


References


Haden, A 2016, 'UCT student says there is an “extreme hatred of whites”', *The South African*.


Haffajee, F 2015, *What if there were no whites in South Africa*, Picador Africa/Pan Macmillan, Johannesburg.


Harris, P 2001, 'Spin' on Boer atrocities: Letters reveal British effort to cover up true horrors of the first death camps', *The Guardian*.


Jones, M 2011, 'Bar still raised for white pupils', *Cape Times*.


Kortlang, I 1995, Background Briefing, ABC Radio National.

Kriegler, A & Shaw, M 2016, 'Facts show South Africa has not become more violent since democracy', The Conversation.


Lamb, G 2016, 'Why have university protests been so violent?', UCT News.


Leve, L 2011, 'Identity', *Current Anthropology*, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 513-535.


Livingston, K 2010, 'Opportunities for mourning when grief is disenfranchised: descendants of Nazi perpetrators in dialogue with Holocaust survivors', *Omega: Journal of Death & Dying*, vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 205-222.


References


Mamdani, M 1996, *Citizens and subjects: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism*, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.


McIntosh, P 2015 [1989], 'Extending the Knapsack: Using the White Privilege Analysis to Examine Conferred Advantage and Disadvantage', *Women & Therapy*, vol. 38, no. 3-4, pp. 232-245.


Merten, M 2018b, 'Crime Stats: The war zone in a no-war zone as minister Cele admits police have dropped the ball', *Daily Maverick*, [https://www.dailymaverick.co.za](https://www.dailymaverick.co.za).


Neimeyer, R 2001a, Meaning Reconstruction & the Experience of Loss, American Psychological Association, Washington DC.


References


References


Peeters, B 2004, 'Tall poppies and egalitarianism in Australian discourse: From key word to cultural value', *English World-Wide*, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 1–25.


Philo, C 2010, 'Michel Foucault', in P Hubbard & R Kitchin (eds), *Key Thinkers on Time and Place*, Sage, London, pp. 121-128.


Pretorius, L 2019, 'Frequently asked questions about poverty in South Africa', *AfricaCheck*.

Price, CA 2000, *Australians All: Who on Earth Are We?*, Canberra.


Spinoza, B 1868 [1670], Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [A Theological and Political Treatise], N. Trübner & Co, London.


van der Merwe, J 2010, 'Die Afrikaner se belewing van transformasie en nasiebou in ‘n postapartheid Suid-Afrika [The Afrikaner’s experience of transformation and nationbuilding
in a postapartheid South Africa], Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 313-327.

van Gennep, A 1960 [1909], The Rites of Passage, Chicago University Press, Chicago.


Vanderhaeghen, Y 2018, Afrikaner Identity: Dysfunction and Grief, University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, Durban.


References


Wills, S 2013, 'Negotiating migration, sentiment, and insecurity: Encounters with sadness and shame in Australia', in N Steiner, R Mason & A Hayes (eds), Migration and Insecurity: Citizenship and social inclusion in a transnational era, Routledge, Oxon and New York.


References


Zevallos, Z 2005, 'It’s Like We’re Their Culture': Second-generation Migrant Women Discuss Australian Culture', People and Place, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 41-49.