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Emerging water and carbon market opportunities for environmental water and climate regulation ecosystem service provision

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1 **Emerging water and carbon market opportunities for environmental water**
2 **and climate regulation ecosystem service provision**

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11

12 **Abstract**

13 Markets are increasingly part of government, non-government, and private business provision of
14 public environmental interests. Key examples include carbon credit markets and environmental
15 water markets. Market demand for carbon credits from sequestration are expected to expand in
16 size and geographic scope as a result of climate action obligations and increased carbon credit
17 tradability provisions in the Paris Agreement on climate change. Market based reallocations of
18 water are also increasingly common. The increased use of markets for multiple and related
19 environmental good provision will inevitably introduce synergies and risks in joint ecosystem
20 service provision. This study assesses water and carbon ecosystem service supply potential for a
21 joint carbon and water market participation strategy using a case study of the lower
22 Murrumbidgee, in the Murray-Darling Basin. The methodology is a dynamic hydro-economic
23 simulation of river flows, floodplain inundation, forest carbon dynamics, carbon credit value, and
24 water opportunity cost. The study results indicate possible synergies in joint provision of carbon
25 sequestration and environmental flow benefits through a carbon-water trading strategy. This
26 involves funds for environmental water purchases generated through sale of carbon credits from
27 improved floodplain conditions. Results identify limited trading opportunities at the current
28 carbon price (AU\$13/tCO₂), resulting in an economically viable re-allocation of 2.31GL/year
29 (0.1% of water currently diverted for irrigation) to the environment with frequent years of zero
30 re-allocation. At prices above AU\$20/tCO₂, there may be additional trading opportunities and as
31 much as 5% of current irrigation diversion was predicted to be reallocated at AU\$100/tCO₂.
32 While the results are particular to the case study, the conclusions discussing policy design
33 challenges related to realizing effective environmental improvements in interacting carbon and
34 water markets are relevant to many water catchments globally.

35 **Key Words:** ecosystem services; environmental water; carbon markets; water markets; Murray-
36 Darling Basin; hydro-economic modelling.

37 **Highlights**

- 38 • Potential to finance water purchases through generation and sale of carbon credits is
39 demonstrated
- 40 • Achieved by allocating water to environmental use to stimulate floodplain carbon uptake
- 41 • Results are sensitive to carbon and water prices, foresight, and future climate
- 42 • Challenges to implementation include additionality, leakages and sequestration
43 impermanence

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47

48 **1 Introduction**

49 In many river basins around the world water is fully allocated for consumptive purposes and
50 flow-dependent ecosystems are subsequently degraded (Grafton et al., 2018). Wetlands have
51 disproportionately high carbon sequestration capacity which translates into high economic value
52 for carbon storing and crediting (Patton et al., 2015). However, wetlands are particularly
53 vulnerable to degradation (Davidson, 2014; Settre and Wheeler, 2017) and their declining health
54 can erode sequestration capacity and ecosystem services (Banerjee et al., 2013). Conversely,
55 when wetlands are preserved and restored, they can generate extensive ecosystem services (Bark
56 et al., 2016) including global benefits from carbon storage and climate change mitigation (Patton
57 et al., 2015). Water markets are increasingly used to reallocate water from consumptive to
58 environmental uses to restore wetlands and floodplains or prevent continued degradation.
59 Examples include water reallocation programs in the Columbia River Basin (Garrick et al.,
60 2011), California (Howitt, 1994) and the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) in Australia (Wheeler et
61 al., 2014).

62 Carbon and water policy in the MDB is relatively unique as it is a place that has formal, low
63 transaction cost markets for both water and carbon. The MDB water market is currently being
64 used by government actors and environmental non-government organizations (NGOs) to
65 reallocate consumptive water to the environment (Lane-Miller et al., 2013; Grafton and Wheeler
66 2018; Haensch et al. 2019). Additionally, Australian climate policy includes options to generate
67 potentially tradable carbon credits through active forest and bush management through the
68 Australian Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF). The ERF incentivizes emissions reduction
69 activities across the Australian economy through competitive tenders for payments for actions to
70 reduce or offset emissions. One ERF method pays landholders for the generation of carbon

71 credits by planting new forests or actively managing existing forests to promote carbon uptake
72 and prevent carbon loss (DoEE, 2016).

73 This study explores possibilities to improve ecosystem service outcomes through governments or
74 NGOs trading in both the carbon credit and water markets. Overbank floods to water-stressed
75 floodplains can improve vegetation condition and stimulate carbon uptake or prevent carbon
76 decay. The existence of water and carbon markets potentially allows for the delivery of strategic
77 floodplain inundation in a pattern which can generate biomass growth and carbon credits of
78 sufficient dollar value to offset the cost of environmental water purchases on water markets
79 required to cause the inundation.

80 This study adds to the literature examining the potential trade-offs and synergies between
81 provisioning (e.g. agricultural water use) and regulating (e.g. carbons storage) ecosystem
82 services through integration of hydro-ecological and economic principles (Harou et al., 2009;
83 Momblanch et.al, 2016; Settre et al., 2017). Key integrated models representing carbon tradeoffs
84 include Kim et al. (2018) who develop a process-based hydrological model to assess the
85 economic trade-offs for global carbon benefits relative to loss of landscape level provisioning
86 services. Triviño et al. (2015) use multi-objective optimization to find the optimal forest
87 management for carbon and timber services. Patton et al. (2015) integrate spatial estimates of
88 carbon storage in US wetlands and the social cost of carbon to determine an average global
89 carbon value of US\$2,800/ha of wetland. Taken as a whole this past research highlights the
90 importance of carbon storage valuation in modelling decisions of land and water allocation and
91 the necessity for more holistic ecosystem service modelling (Monblanch et al., 2016).

92 While there has been extensive hydro-economic modelling in Australia's MDB (see Settre et al.,
93 2017 for a review), it has primarily focused on agricultural production and economic impact of
94 reallocating water from agriculture to the environment (e.g. Grafton and Jiang 2011). There has
95 also been considerable work studying the economics of MDB water trade (e.g. Qureshi et al.,
96 2013), climate change (Adamson et al., 2009) and the integration of hydrological, biophysical
97 and economic value using stated preference survey results (Akter et al., 2014). In addition, there
98 is a growing body of literature assessing the benefits of public and private environmental water
99 holders (EWHs) using and trading water entitlements (permanent water rights) and/or water
100 allocations (temporary water rights) for environmental outcomes (Wheeler et al., 2013). For
101 example, key studies by Kirby et al. (2006), Ancev (2013) and Connor et al. (2013) evaluated
102 EWH potential to trade temporary water for the environment. All three studies find that
103 flexibility introduced by temporary water trade provides opportunities to raise funds from leasing
104 water to irrigators in times of scarcity and using proceeds to finance water purchases at other
105 environmentally critical periods. Set within this context, the key novelty of this research is a
106 hydro-economic assessment of opportunities to realize more multiple public good ecosystem
107 service provision by strategically trading in carbon credits and water markets.

108 **2 Materials and methods**

109 **2.1 Case study: the Lower Murrumbidgee**

110 Globally between 64–71% of wetlands have been lost since 1900 with continued high rates of
111 loss across Asia and Africa (Davidson, 2014). In Australia, wetland loss and damage is extensive
112 (Kingsford, 2003; Settre and Wheeler 2017) and restoration efforts are ongoing (Bark et al.,
113 2016). Our study focuses upon a remaining, but degraded, floodplain wetland area in the

114 southern MDB called the Lower Murrumbidgee (the Lowbidgee, Figure 1). The Lowbidgee
115 floodplain is in the Murrumbidgee catchment, covering 8% of the MDB but accounting for 22%
116 of MDB consumptive water diversions (CSIRO, 2008). Irrigated agricultural development occurs
117 along either side of the Murrumbidgee River (Wen, 2009), where the primary crops are annual
118 cereals for grain, including rice, wheat and millet. The Murrumbidgee River is 1,600km in length
119 and flows westwards to a confluence with the River Murray. The Lowbidgee floodplain is in the
120 downstream reaches and covers 51,535 hectares (MDBA, 2012). It is a particularly good
121 example of a floodplain River Red Gum (*Eucalyptus camaldulensis*) forest (Kingsford, 2003).
122 Large-scale catchment modifications have depleted the volume and variability of instream flows
123 to the Lowbidgee and have resulted in considerable floodplain damage and an opportunity for
124 ecological restoration (Fraizer and Page, 2006).


125 There is an active water market in the Murrumbidgee catchment for water entitlements
126 (permanent water rights sale) and water allocations (annual/temporary water rights). Most of the
127 water transactions in the MDB are water allocation trades and this is the water market considered
128 in this study. Water allocations prices vary considerably and are driven predominately by water
129 scarcity factors (Wheeler et al., 2014).

130 There is also potential to sell carbon credits that result from land use and management changes
131 through the national emissions reduction payment scheme (ERF). Projects can be proposed to
132 reduce emissions or offset emissions with increased carbon sequestration. Projects that can
133 produce abatement eligible for credits include energy efficiency, low carbon electricity
134 generation, electrification and fuel switching options. Most relevant to this study is the assisted
135 natural vegetation regeneration where a land management change can generate carbon credits. In
136 each auction round bids are solicited where proponents propose abatement activities consistent

137 with ERF rules and the credit price at which they are willing to undertake the activity (Clean
138 Energy Regulator, 2018). Across seven ERF auctions a total of AUD\$ 2.45 billion has been
139 committed to achieve 192 Mt CO₂-e abatement at an average price of AUD\$11.97 tCO₂-e⁻¹
140 (Evans, 2018). Of this, land use and management change activities were by far the most funded
141 source of ERF credits with 65% (125.5 Mt CO₂-e) of the total abatement secured through forest-
142 based methods (Clean Energy Regulator, 2018).

143 This study models the potential for an entity with environmental objectives, for example an
144 environmental water trust, to act in water and carbon markets in the Lowbidgee floodplain area.
145 We model the possibilities to supplement environmental flows with water markets purchases and
146 finance the costs with carbon credits resulting from improvements in floodplain tree carbon
147 sequestrations. The boundaries for the study are defined as the extent of the River Red Gum
148 floodplain population from the upstream water management point at Maude Weir to the
149 confluence of the Murrumbidgee and Murray Rivers.

Figure 1 The Lower Murrumbidgee Floodplain, Australia



151


152 2.2 Methodology framework

153 A dynamic hydro-economic simulation model developed for the Lowbidgee wetland consists of
 154 four sub-models, namely: a) catchment hydrology model; b) floodplain forest and carbon growth
 155 and decay model driven by floodplain inundation; c) economic valuations of environmental and
 156 irrigation opportunity costs; and d) a water reallocation decision algorithm. A model schematic is
 157 shown in **Error! Reference source not found.** The model development was guided by the
 158 ecosystem services framework which seeks to link biophysical sciences with economic value and
 159 human institutions (Braat and de Groot, 2012; TEEB, 2010). The model was programmed in the
 160 General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS). Dynamic simulation was chosen as an

161 appropriate solution choice given the many integrated elements, time-steps and spatial units
162 which pose optimization difficulties.

163

Figure 2 Hydro-economic model



164

165 The aim of the model was to simulate incremental reallocation of water from irrigated agriculture
166 to environmental use (i.e. floodplain inundation) and identify a discrete annual reallocation

167 volume for which the marginal benefit of reallocation equals or exceeds the marginal cost of
168 reallocation.

169 The simulation model began with a catchment hydrology network node model calibrated for the
170 Lower Murrumbidgee. The hydrology model computed irrigation and environmental water
171 availability assuming current water-sharing rules and irrigation development levels. Annual
172 environmental water availability drives the inundation modelling which computed the frequency
173 and extent of inundation for discrete floodplain zonal areas. The inundation modelling results
174 were input to a floodplain carbon dynamics model built using locally calibrated floodplain River
175 Red Gum carbon (C) stock growth and decay functions which respond to water deficits and
176 overbank floods. Because the dominant agricultural activities in the Murrumbidgee are annual
177 cereals and rice, which do not have high long-term potential for vegetation carbon sequestration
178 (with the exception of soil carbon, see Rajkishore et al., 2015), declines in agricultural carbon
179 stocks when water is reallocated from agriculture to the environment is not accounted for. This is
180 further discussed later on.

181 Modeled additional floodplain carbon was converted to CO₂e and valued as carbon credits using
182 exogenous carbon price levels chosen to represent the Australian market equilibrium price and
183 the global social-cost of carbon (SC-CO₂) for a range of emissions and discount scenarios. A
184 regression-based water cost model was used to relate historic water availability to changes in
185 temporary water prices, which is influenced by annual water reallocation decisions. The
186 regression model was used to estimate the opportunity cost of irrigation water use.

187 The water reallocation decision algorithm compared the marginal benefit of reallocation (i.e. the
188 value of additional carbon credits generated by inundation) to the marginal cost of reallocation

189 (i.e. the purchase cost of the water required to cause the inundation). The decision algorithm
190 selected a discrete temporary water allocation volume that maximizes the expected additional
191 carbon achievable such that the marginal carbon benefits of reallocation are equal to or greater
192 than the marginal water costs of reallocation. The modelled water reallocations occur for a
193 period of one year and are then returned to the consumptive pool, comparable to a temporary
194 water sale. The final step tested outcome sensitivity to key outcome drivers. As described in
195 section 2.12, this includes varying carbon price, water availability changes consistent with
196 climate change, and foresight horizon (ability to consider possible future states of water
197 availability).

198 **2.3 Catchment hydrology model**

199 The hydrology sub-model is an annual water balance for the Lower Murrumbidgee catchment
200 and is a component of a whole-of-basin hydrological model developed in Kirby et al. (2013).
201 The water balance represents inflows, two dam nodes, consumptive water demands, losses, dam
202 storage and spill, baseline environmental and irrigation water supply, and annual water
203 reallocation volumes. Reservoir inflows, storage and outflows within the hydrological simulation
204 ran over 113 years using the historic climate sequence (1896-2008). Water available to inundate
205 the floodplain is the annual river outflow, which is the sum of dam outflows and catchment
206 runoff less irrigation abstraction, and dam and channel losses.

207 Water available to inundate the floodplain is altered by the yearly reallocation decisions of the
208 modelled EWH. Reallocations were simulated each year by reducing irrigation water extraction
209 by 5% increments and increasing flow to the floodplain accordingly, bounded by zero and 50%
210 reallocation volumes. The desired flood volumes and return intervals required to meet the

211 environmental requirements of the floodplain River Red Gum forest are shown in Table 1. As
 212 shown, higher total catchment inflows relate to higher return intervals and a larger area of
 213 floodplain inundation.

214 **Table 1 Desired instream flow volumes in the Lower Murrumbidgee**

Flowband (<i>i</i>)	Total inflow to the Lower Murrumbidgee floodplain (GL/year) ($ER_{(i)}$)	Floodplain inundation return interval (years) ($EF_{(i)}$)	Area of River Red Gum inundated (ha) [% of total area inundated] ($A_{(i)}$)
1	50	0.95	1,073.6 [2%]
2	100	1.10	2,684.1 [5%]
3	170	1.33	5,905.1 [11%]
4	270	1.43	9,662.9 [18%]
5	400	1.67	13,420.7 [25%]
6	800	2.00	25,231.0 [47%]
7	1700	4.00	45,093.7 [84%]
8	2700	6.67	51,535.6 [96%]

215 Source: adapted from MDBA (2012; p.13).

216 The model simulates an EWH who can alter the frequency and magnitude of overbank flooding
 217 by annually reallocating water when it is economically justifiable to do so. Annual reallocation
 218 volumes are described by the variable $et_{(t,c)}$ (Equation 1):

$$219 \quad et_{(t,c)} = \left(\frac{c}{20} - 0.05 \right) iw_{(t,c)} \quad (1)$$

220 Where c represents a discrete reallocation portion chosen each year by the modelled EWH and
 221 takes values one to eleven in 5% increments representing reallocation between zero and 50% of
 222 water initially supplied to irrigation. $Iw_{(t,c)}$ is the irrigation water supply prior to any reallocation
 223 exogenously determined from the catchment water balance with current allocation rules.

224 **2.4 Floodplain carbon dynamics model**

225 A stock-and-flow model of annual potential vegetation carbon storage was developed based on
 226 the biophysical condition of the floodplain River Red Gum forest in response to overbank

227 flooding and water scarcity events, the driving force of forest productivity (Junk et al., 1989) and
228 carbon assimilation (van der Molen et al., 2011). The model also represents how in the absence
229 of the required water availability, forest productivity (Doody et al., 2015) and carbon
230 sequestration rates degrade (Chaves, 1991).

231 To simulate this, the floodplain is divided into eight zonal areas, $A_{(i)}$, each of which should be
232 inundated by a flow $ER_{(i)}$ at a desired return period of $EF_{(i)}$ years if it is not to pass into a state of
233 poor condition and carbon decay. For example (referencing Table 1), $ER_7=1,700\text{GL}$ is the flow
234 level required to create an inundation of floodplain zone seven which has an area of 45,093ha. It
235 is required at return interval $EF_{(7)}=4$ years to maintain forest productivity and carbon
236 accumulation (as opposed to a decay in carbon stock due to water deficit).

237 The carbon dynamics model is described using four ecosystem states representing floodplain
238 productivity and carbon storage potential: i) growth; ii) decay; iii) maximum carbon stock
239 equilibrium; and iv) minimum tree-death equilibrium. Transition between states are modelled as
240 functions of the severity of hydrological disturbances represented with time-dependent iteratively
241 updated flood and drought counter variables (i.e. a high value for the drought counter describes a
242 more severe drought). The counter iteratively sums the number of consecutive years that a flood
243 volume for each floodplain zonal area exceeds the desired return interval for each flowband. The
244 counter reverts to zero when a flood of desired magnitude and frequency is delivered. Carbon
245 growth dynamics are maintained for periods when the drought counter is less than or equal to the
246 desired return period for each flowband, and dynamics switch from growth to decay when the
247 desired return period is exceeded, subject to boundary conditions on maximum/minimum carbon
248 volumes in equilibrium states.

249 **2.5 Modelling maximum and minimum carbon storage capacities**

250 The maximum potential carbon storage volume per hectare ($MaxCarbonStorage_{(i,t,c)}$) is the total
251 possible volume of carbon stored per hectare of mature, non-water stressed River Red Gum
252 forest derived from in-field sampling conducted in a comparable MDB floodplain forest (Smith
253 and Reid, 2013). This was the volume of carbon stock assumed at the start of the simulation
254 ($t=0$) (Equation 2).

$$255 \quad MaxCarbonStorage_{(i,t=0,c)} = 104.4 tCha^{-1} \quad (2)$$

256 The minimum volume of carbon stored ($MinCarbonStorage_{(i,t,c)}$) occurs when an area of forest
257 has decayed to a dead-tree equilibrium at which point carbon uptake is zero. It is greater than
258 zero because carbon remains trapped in woody biomass and coarse litter of dead trees. The
259 minimum carbon volume for River Red Gum is sourced from Smith & Reid (2013) (Equation 3).

$$260 \quad MinCarbonStorage_{(i,t,c)} = 4.7 tCha^{-1} \quad (3)$$

261 **2.6 Modelling carbon stock decay in response to water deficit**

262 The annual increment of carbon decay for each reallocation proportion, c , relative to the baseline
263 scenario (i.e. no reallocation, $c=1$) is governed by Equation 4. Equation 4 represents *avoided*
264 carbon decay from reallocation as a carbon benefit expressed as difference in smaller carbon
265 decay rate expected with reallocation compared to baseline condition (more rapid decay).

$$266 \quad AvoidedCarbonDecayIncrement_{(i,t,c)} = e^{vEC_{(i,t,c=1)}} - e^{vEC_{(i,t-1,c)}} \quad (4)$$

267 Where $AvoidedCarbonDecayIncrement_{(i,t,c)}$ is the annual incremental volume of carbon decay per
268 hectare of River Red Gum forest, v is the decay constant, $EC_{(i,t,c)}$ is the number of sequential

269 years past the desired return interval for floods in flowband, i , for each reallocation proportion, c .
 270 As $EC_{(i,t,c)}$ increases, the incremental decay in carbon storage increases at an exponential rate,
 271 such that decay in the first year of drought is less than decay in the tenth year of drought, as is
 272 consistent with observed ecological tipping points during water stress (Banerjee & Bark, 2013).
 273 Absent a monitoring history of sufficient length required to specify the period of time until tree
 274 death occurs, we calibrate the decay model to the rule of thumb that ten years past the desired
 275 flood return interval and below average rainfall will likely cause River Red Gum mortality of
 276 any aged tree. This is implemented by choosing decay constant of $\nu=0.31$ to reflect that after ten
 277 years past the desired return interval (i.e. $EC_{(i,t,c)} > 10$), per hectare carbon stock approaches the
 278 minimum capacity (Equation 3).

279 **2.7 Modelling carbon stock growth in response to overbank flooding**

280 Carbon stock growth and (re-)growth is modeled using the von Bertalanffy-Chapman-Richards
 281 (vBCR) forestry function to capture non-linear growth and sequestration rates (Zhao-gang and
 282 Feng-ri, 2003). This approach follows a precedent in modelling of carbon sequestration in native
 283 Australian Eucalypt species (e.g. Paterson and Bryan, 2012). The annual increment of carbon
 284 growth relative to the baseline scenario (i.e. no reallocation, $c=1$) is governed by Equation 5.
 285 Equation 5 calculates the annual growth increment that would occur with reallocation (e.g.
 286 higher growth rate) relative to the baseline scenario (e.g. slower growth), and therefore
 287 demonstrates the additional carbon benefit relative to the baseline.

$$288 \quad CarbonGrowthIncrement_{(i,t,c)} = Aexp(-Be^{-kEB_{(i,t,c)}}) - Aexp(-Be^{-kEB_{(i,t-1,c=1)}})$$

289 (5)

290 Where $CarbonGrowthIncrement_{(i,t,c)}$ is the annual increment of tree growth, used as a proxy for
291 annual carbon uptake, A is the asymptote (i.e. maximum carbon storage capacity per ha), B is a
292 calibration parameter and k is the tree growth rate. In the absence of detailed tree growth data for
293 River Red Gums, the growth parameter for a slow-growing Mallee species (*Eucalyptus kochii*)
294 was used as a starting value ($k=0.06674$) and the equation was iterated to find $k=0.1052$ for a
295 calibration parameter $B= 3.1006$. These parameters were iteratively calibrated to match existing
296 findings indicating approximately 80% of biomass is accumulated within the first 25 years of
297 tree growth, after which point incremental change diminishes as the growth asymptote is
298 approached. Equation 5 scales carbon storage growth to be proportional to tree growth up to
299 asymptotic maximum storage per hectare, such that carbon uptake is assumed proportional to
300 tree growth. $EB_{(i,t,c)}$ is the flood counter that iteratively sums the number of years the desired
301 flooding volume and frequencies have been met. When $EB_{(i,t,c)}>0$, tree condition remains in the
302 growth state and the critical threshold into decay has not been passed.

303 **2.8 Net additional carbon**

304 The net difference in carbon stocks per hectare relative to the baseline scenario is the sum of the
305 additional increments of carbon sequestered or carbon decay avoided, as caused by incremental
306 improvements in floodplain inundation as a result of reallocation, c , relative to that which would
307 occur in the case of no reallocation. The net additional carbon stocks across the floodplain in
308 each year was obtained by summing the carbon stocks per hectare by the total area of the
309 floodplain zones, $A_{(i)}$, as shown in Equation 6. Equation 6 represents the increase in floodplain
310 carbon stocks or prevented decay generated by incremental tree growth promoted by incremental
311 increases in reallocation volumes, governed by parameter, c .

$$\begin{aligned}
312 \quad & Net_Additional_Carbon_{(t,c)} = \sum_{i=1}^8 (AvoidedCarbonDecayIncrement_{(i,t,c)} + \\
313 \quad & CarbonGrowthIncrement_{(i,t,c)}) \qquad \qquad \qquad (6)
\end{aligned}$$

314 In addition, an annual time-series of carbon dynamics is generated by expressing carbon stocks
315 in each year as a function of carbon storage in the previous period, plus or minus incremental
316 carbon growth and decay in the current period. The total volume of carbon across the whole
317 floodplain in each year was obtained by summing the carbon stocks per hectare by the total area
318 of the floodplain.

319 **2.9 Economic modelling**

320 **2.9.1 Carbon valuation**

321 Floodplain carbon stock and additional carbon generated through reallocation was converted to
322 carbon dioxide (CO₂) using a conversion factor of 3.667 to be consistent with national carbon
323 pricing systems (ERF, 2014). Assuming all net additional carbon is creditable, the dollar value of
324 additional carbon stocks on the floodplain is given in Equation 7.

$$325 \quad Additional_Carbon_Value_{(t,c)} = CarbonPrice(3.667 * Net_Additional_Carbon_{(t,c)}) \quad (7)$$

326 A range of carbon prices were modelled representing the social cost of carbon (SC-CO₂) and the
327 recent Australian carbon market equilibrium price. SC-CO₂ is the global economic cost caused
328 by an additional ton of CO₂ emissions being emitted and the amount that would be paid in a
329 mature intergenerational market for carbon (Nordhaus, 2017). The estimated SC-CO₂ for 2020
330 (in 2007 US dollars) and for discount rates of 5%, 3% and 2.5% are US\$12, US\$42 and US\$62
331 per tCO₂, respectively. Using a long-term conversion rate to AUD (1991-2018) (MacroTrends,
332 2018), this corresponds to approximately AU\$15, AU\$55 and AU\$80 per tCO₂, respectively.

333 Recent carbon prices set through competitive ERF auctions in Australia run between 2015 and
334 2017 have established the current Australian market price of carbon to be between AUD\$10.2
335 and \$13.9 per tCO₂. The average price per ton of abatement in a recent ERF auction (December
336 2017) was AUD\$ 13.08/tCO₂.

337 **Temporary water price model**

338 The water price model is based on Connor et al. (2013) and is obtained by regressing past
339 average temporary water market prices on allocation levels in the Murrumbidgee catchment from
340 1996-97 to 2008-09. Modeled water price is shown in Equation 8. Water price varies with the
341 volume of water available for irrigation $iw_{(t,c)}$ driven by system inflows and climate, as well as
342 the volume of water removed from the consumptive pool and allocated to floodplain inundation,
343 $et_{(t,c)}$.

$$344 \text{WaterPrice}_{(t,c)} = 1.754 \left(2716 - 798 \log(iw_{(t,c)} - et_{(t,c)}) \right) \quad (8)$$

345 Where $\text{WaterPrice}_{(t,c)}$ is the temporary water market price (AUD\$/ML), $iw_{(t,c)}$ is the volume of
346 water available for irrigation, and $et_{(t,c)}$ is the volume of water allocated to floodplain inundation
347 each year, as previously described. In simulation and assuming all else constant, $\text{WaterPrice}_{(t,c)}$
348 and the irrigation opportunity cost increases incrementally as more water is reallocated to the
349 environment, thus providing an indication of the cost of irrigation water forgone and the
350 increasing scarcity value of water.

351 **2.10 Water reallocation model and treatment of foresight**

352 The water reallocation model simulates the decisions of an EWH faced with the known water
353 costs each year for each reallocation level and expected carbon benefits of water reallocation

354 over the iteratively updated decision horizon. Accounting for inter-annual dependencies of
355 environmental health is an important consideration in water resource decision-making due to
356 ecosystem path-dependencies and tipping-points. Reallocation decisions should therefore be
357 made with the understanding of how reallocating water in the present year will influence
358 expected future carbon dynamics and carbon-water trade-offs. However, the future is not certain
359 and may therefore be treated probabilistically.

360 Conceptually, the challenge of optimal allocation of available water in each year over a long
361 planning horizon to irrigation and carbon generation could be thought of as an optimal control
362 problem. However, it is unrealistic to assume the EWH operates with all the information and
363 computational capacity required to compute a stochastic dynamic forward-looking optimization
364 each period. It also becomes computationally intractable with the 113 year time horizon and
365 multiple states of nature involved. Instead, a rolling horizon heuristic is used to model a forward-
366 looking EWH concerned with the impact of reallocation decisions in the current period, t , on
367 future simulation periods ($t+n$). In each period, the modelled EWH is assumed to understand the
368 probabilities of all future state of nature across the decision horizon of t to $t+n$ years. Decisions
369 to reallocate water are made based on the known water availability, water price and ecosystem
370 conditions in the present year, t , and the expected value of additional carbon due to reallocation
371 over a decision horizon from t to $t+n$. For each future year in the planning horizon in period,
372 $t=t+1, \dots, t=t+n$, all possible values of environmental water availability, consumptive water
373 availability, carbon values and irrigation costs are enumerated for all reallocation proportions, c .

374 The additional carbon value considered over the decision horizon, $t+n$, is given by the sum of the
375 discounted flow of net additional carbon caused by reallocation for each year of the decision
376 horizon. A discount rate on the future flows of benefits is $\delta = 3\%$. The simulation continues to

377 run in iteratively updated decision horizons until the end of the simulation, which occurs at
 378 $T=113$. The present value of the flow of possible carbon benefits generated by annual
 379 reallocation is given by:

$$380 \quad CarbonValuePr_{(t,c)} = \sum_{t=0}^n \left(Additional_Carbon_Value_{(t,c)} \frac{1}{(1+\delta)^n} \right) \quad (9)$$

381 Where t is each simulation period, n is the number of years in decision horizon, δ is the discount
 382 rate, and $Additional_Carbon_Value_{(t,c)}$ is the dollar value of additional carbon generated in each
 383 simulation period. Equation 9 is iteratively updated over the length of the simulation, T .

384 The purchase cost of water required to cause the inundation is given by the volume of water
 385 reallocated, $et_{(t,c)}$, multiplied by the annual price of water reallocations, as shown in Equation 10.

$$386 \quad IrrigOC_{(t,c)} = et_{(t,c)} WaterPrice_{(t,c)} \quad (10)$$

387 For each period, and accounting for the future flow of carbon benefits, the algorithm compares
 388 the cost of water and the floodplain carbon benefit corresponding to all reallocation proportions,
 389 c . The decision algorithm selects a discrete lease volume that maximizes expected additional
 390 carbon achievable such that the marginal carbon benefits of reallocation are equal to or greater
 391 than the marginal water costs of reallocation.

392 In simulation, there is a trade-off between precision and computational cost in expanding the
 393 decision horizon. Through experimentation we chose a horizon of three years (i.e. $t+n=3$), such
 394 that the modelled EWH considers the present year and two years ahead in the future when
 395 considering carbon benefits. A 3-year horizon was deemed to provide a good comprise between
 396 increasing computational burden and accurate convergence toward infinite horizon results.

397 **2.11 Modelling scenarios and sensitivity**

398 Due to the dynamic and integrated nature of the hydro-economic model, changes to one
399 parameter invariably influence others and impacts the results. To assess the varying parameter
400 conditions that could arise and their effect on the outputs, scenarios were run for three key
401 variables: (i) carbon prices ranging between AU\$10-100/tCO_{2e} in increments of AU\$10/tCO_{2e};
402 (ii) the number of foresight years (N=1,2,3); and (iii) future water availability (wet and dry future
403 climate projections). A scenario for varying water prices was not run exogenously because water
404 prices are iteratively updated through a regression-based calculation within the model which
405 changes water price in response to varying annual water availability and environmental water re-
406 allocation. The process for the scenario modelling involved running the model for one carbon
407 price and holding all else constant, outputting the results, incrementally increasing the carbon
408 price and re-running the model. This process was repeated for the number of foresight years and
409 future water availability scenarios. This resulted in a total of 90 separate scenarios (i.e. 10 carbon
410 price scenarios, three foresight scenarios, the current climate scenario and two future climate
411 scenarios). The suite of output results for each scenario was then statistically and graphically
412 analyzed. The scenario analysis also served to test the sensitivity of the model. Complex and
413 comprehensive sensitivity analysis was beyond the scope of and unnecessary for the conceptual
414 and demonstrative purposes of this research, although is identified for future research.

415 **3 Results**


416 **3.1 Carbon financed water allocation**

417 Results show opportunity to improve carbon stocks by reallocating water through the water
418 market in a pattern which serves to prevent drought conditions in isolated low flow years and

419 extend some moderate flood peaks. For the current market price of carbon (AUD\$13.08/tCO₂)
420 opportunity exists to economically finance water purchases of an average volume of
421 2.31GL/year with purchases at unit water price up to AUD\$45/ML. However, these
422 opportunities for reallocation occur in few isolated years over the historic climate sequence
423 where water price is low (e.g. <AUD\$45/ML). As carbon price increases and begins to exceed
424 AUD\$20/tCO₂, reallocation becomes increasingly more viable and the frequency and volume for
425 reallocation increases (Figure 3 and Figure 4). For the social cost of carbon (AUD\$55/tCO₂ in
426 2020), the average economically justifiable reallocation volume is 72GL/year (8,228 GL over the
427 simulation), with a maximum of 1,029GL/year and a frequent minimum of 0GL/year. This
428 opportunity exists for water prices between AUD\$20–274/ML, where the average unit purchase
429 cost of water is AU\$62/ML. For context, the 2.31GL and 72GL re-allocations represents around
430 0.1% and 3% of historic average annual water in the Murrumbidgee diverted for consumptive
431 use (2,257GL/year) (CSIRO, 2008). Re-allocation volume for a carbon price of AUD\$100/tCO₂
432 is approximately 5% of the consumptive supply per year on average.

433
434

Figure 3 Volume reallocated to inundate the floodplain for varying carbon prices and foresight years




435
436

437 Varying carbon prices also influences the number of years water is reallocated to the floodplain,
438 as shown in Figure 4. Opportunities for economically justified reallocation occur more
439 frequently as the modelled carbon price increases. As stated, there are very marginal
440 opportunities to reallocate water at the current market price of carbon and opportunities existed
441 in only 2% of the modelled simulation years. However, considering the social cost of carbon
442 (AUD\$55/tCO₂) reallocation is economically viable in between 9-16% of years, depending on
443 the level of foresight considered in the algorithm (see sensitivity analysis). The frequency of
444 reallocation reaches approximately one in four years for a carbon price of AUD\$100/tCO₂ with a
445 foresight algorithm of three years.

446

Figure 4 Number of reallocation years for varying carbon prices and foresight years




447

448 **3.2 Impact of carbon financed water reallocation on floodplain carbon** 449 **stocks**

450 **Error! Reference source not found.** shows the modelled average additional volumes of carbon
451 stored on the floodplain caused by reallocation volumes over the 113-year simulation. The
452 observed difference in carbon stocks relative to baseline scenarios indicates carbon that has either
453 been sequestered or prevented from decay that would not occur over the historic climate sequence
454 and historic water extractions for irrigation without re-allocation.

455
456

Figure 5 Average additional carbon resulting from reallocation for varying carbon prices and foresight years



457

458 For the current carbon price (AUD\$13.08/tCO₂) and a foresight level of three years, the
459 reallocation volume of 260GL over the modelling time horizon to the environment results in an
460 average annual additional volume of 3,177 tons of carbon, an improvement of approximately 6%
461 of the baseline mean carbon floodplain storage. The social cost of carbon scenario in contrast drove
462 8,228GL of reallocation over the simulation and an additional annual average 28,742 tons of
463 carbon. To place these results in context consider that carbon offset estimated for carbon prices of
464 AUD\$13.8, 55 and 100/tCO₂, equal 0.002%, 0.022% and 0.029% of annual NSW emissions, or
465 130.2 million tons of CO₂ in 2013-2014 (DoEH, 2014).

466 The increased volume of carbon storage relative to baseline is predominately derived by
467 improved floodplain conditions on the lower elevation floodplain areas (flows of 50-
468 800GL/year) which can generate additional carbon valuable enough to offset required water

469 purchase even for low to moderate carbon prices. Marginal improvements in watering conditions
470 are evident in higher elevation floodplain areas (flows of 1,700–2,700GL/year) only for high
471 carbon prices (>AUD\$70/tCO₂). However, these opportunities are not often viable given the
472 prohibitive cost of acquiring the required volume of water to create these flows. In addition, the
473 relationship between increasing carbon prices and additional carbon is non-proportional due to
474 the non-linearity of the floodplain geomorphology, floodplain inundation response, and carbon
475 growth curves. This is evident in Figure 4 which shows only incremental additional carbon for
476 carbon prices between AUD\$40-70/tCO₂, followed by an increase in additional carbon supply
477 caused by higher carbon prices driving reallocation to larger floodplain zonal areas.


478 **3.3 Sensitivity analysis**

479 The results are sensitive to a range of uncertain parameters, most notably carbon prices, foresight
480 years and climate driven surface water availability. The modelled ability to probabilistically
481 account for future conditions affected both the volume and frequency of reallocation (Figure 3
482 and Figure 4) and hence benefits in additional carbon volume (**Error! Reference source not
483 found.**). On average, the reallocation algorithm using three foresight years allocates 1.7 times
484 more water than the algorithm considering only one foresight year and 1.2 times more water than
485 the algorithm using two foresight years.

486 Changes in surface water availability (e.g. rainfall) drive the temporary water price and have
487 subsequent impacts for both the volume of reallocation and additional carbon value. Figure 6
488 shows the reallocation results for varying projected climate change scenarios (extreme dry: -28%
489 water reduction, dry: -9% reduction, wet: +13% increase, extreme wet: +20% increase) and a
490 foresight level of three years. For extreme reductions in water availability it is not economically

491 viable to offset water costs for carbon prices lower than approximately AUD\$30/tCO₂ due to
 492 increases in water prices driven by water scarcity. Under moderate water reductions there
 493 remains some marginal opportunities, albeit at lower volumes, typically 40% less than volumes
 494 viable under the historic climate scenario. Under the wet climate scenarios, the price of water is
 495 driven down, resulting in a greater number of low-cost opportunities for reallocation, with
 496 reallocations typically one and a half times greater than volumes reallocated under the historic
 497 climate scenario.

498 **Figure 6 Volume reallocated to inundate the floodplain for varying climate scenarios and a**
 499 **foresight level of three years**



500

501 **4 Discussion**

502 Some key findings from this study are similar to findings from the most related previous studies.

503 Like Kirby et al. (2006), Ancev (2013) and Connor et al. (2013) who evaluated water trade to

504 improve environmental outcomes, we also found that flexibility introduced by market re-
505 allocation mechanisms provided opportunities to achieve environmental goals more cost
506 effectively. The novelty of this research is in understanding of opportunities for environmental
507 benefit provision from operating strategically in two markets (water and carbon) simultaneously.
508 Kirby et al. (2006), Ancev (2013) and Connor et al. (2013) all identified similar arbitrage
509 opportunity for an EWH to sell when water was scarce and high value to irrigators but not so
510 valuable environmentally, and to buy when irrigation opportunity cost was low and
511 environmental value high. The mechanism identified here is different as it has no water selling,
512 but rather only buying additional water when it is less valued for irrigation and has high carbon
513 sequestration incremental value.

514 **4.1 Policy opportunity and challenges**

515 Markets are increasingly a feature of how environmental goods are provided, especially for
516 carbon emissions since the Paris Agreement on climate change (United Nations, 2015). Market
517 are also increasingly used to provide for public good environmental water outcomes, such as in
518 the Australian MDB setting. Currently, settings with institutions supporting both carbon markets
519 and water markets in the way described in this study are rare. However, the findings are broadly
520 relevant internationally because the development of such institutions and governance is growing
521 globally both in carbon and water realms.

522 Future application of this approach may be particularly relevant in comparable semi-arid regions
523 with floodplains which benefit from periodic inundation and could be aided by the proposed
524 carbon-water trading strategy. One such location in the semi-arid south west United States,
525 where flood flows are the driving factor of riparian biomass and biodiversity (Stromberg et al.,

526 2017) and water market institutions currently support the purchase of in-stream flows (Garrick et
527 al., 2011).

528 Where supporting institutions may exist, there are both opportunities for additional joint benefit
529 and risks of non-additionality when multiple markets interact. This study is an example of
530 supporting institutions for markets for two highly relevant ecosystem services: carbon
531 sequestration and hydrological floodplain benefits. Results show potential for co-benefits from a
532 wide array of public good benefits (e.g. habitat maintenance, soil productivity, water and nutrient
533 cycling), potentially with value much greater than the value of carbon abatement benefit
534 considered in this study.

535 While this study identified improved environmental outcome and cost saving opportunities, there
536 are a number of policy design challenges to actually realizing the opportunities identified. One
537 policy challenge relates to potential for non-additionality or “anyway” projects that proponents
538 might take on even without carbon credit payments (Burke, 2016; Lui and Swallow, 2018). The
539 risk of non-additionality is particularly pronounced in the context to reducing livestock grazing
540 to increase growth of woody revegetation that sequesters carbon (Evans, 2018). This is because
541 changes in global commodity prices and terms of trade can significantly motivate marginal land
542 change from grazing to forest cover even in the absence of carbon payment policy (Marcos-
543 Martinez et al., 2019). The type of carbon credit suggested in this study could also incentivize
544 “anyway” projects. This could occur in the sense that an environmental entity like a water trust
545 that already intended to buy water for the environment could finance this from carbon credits.
546 This type of non-additionality may not necessarily create an undesirable outcome if the intent of
547 policy is to tip incentive balance toward primarily unpriced public good values generated by
548 water and climate regulation ecosystem services. In such context, non-additionality could even

549 be seen as positive outcome, if adequate governance is in place to ensure that the entity that takes
550 the actions uses credit income to expand their budget for environmental investments.

551 Implementing effective carbon credits of the type described in this study would also require
552 policy design to address interrelated challenges of impermanence, risk, and monitoring costs
553 (Meijaard et al., 2014). The challenges arise from uncertainty about future forest and soil carbon
554 stocks changes. For example, from forest fires, reduced establishment success, and reduced tree
555 carbon storage in drought (Evans, 2018). A monitoring challenge arises because the value of
556 carbon abatement with and without actions to generate carbon credits is uncertain in this context.

557 Non-additionality and impermanence risks are both policy challenges requiring further research
558 and policy innovation. However, pragmatic approaches built into credit payment policy like the
559 Australian ERF, such as discounting the level of credit relative to what is estimated without
560 accounting for risks, can be further developed to deal with these risks (Evans, 2018).

561 A final observation is that similar strategies involving the trade of other and bundled marketable
562 ecosystem services such as biodiversity, water quality or land degradation credits or payments,
563 may also be a viable means of offsetting environmental water purchase costs.

564 **4.2 Limitations and implications**

565 The model has several limitations which have implications for the interpretation and application
566 of the results. A key difficulty was the limited data available on carbon stored in some local tree
567 species (e.g. Black Box and Lignum), approximating carbon growth rates, and absence of data on
568 carbon stored in grassland, soil and woody debris. This does not, however, limit confidence in
569 results, given the sensitivity testing undertaken. A more fundamental challenge is interpretation

570 of results given the accounting solely for carbon market value in this study. We do not provide
571 estimates for additional values likely to be enhanced through environmental flows such as water
572 quality, fisheries provisioning, supporting ecological function like habitat value, and less tangible
573 existence, sense of place and cultural values.

574 In principle, the choice of a rolling horizon algorithm with up to three years in foresight imposes
575 the limitation that the three years may not be sufficient to fully represent the long-term effects of
576 annual floodplain carbon stocks. However, scenario analysis of one, two and three foresight
577 years (e.g. N=1,2,3) and testing for longer N=5 year rolling horizon showed that very little value
578 of additional carbon was achieved for longer than three year decision time horizons even though
579 conceptually there can be cumulative incremental tree growth which can persist long beyond
580 inundation. Applying similar methods to another basin would lead to results that differ as a
581 function of factors such as geomorphology and eco-hydrology and endemic tree species of the
582 river basin in question. In particular, the current model is set in a context where competition for
583 irrigation water is largely between annual agricultural crops and perennial natural forests, where
584 the opportunity cost of storing carbon in agricultural biomass is low due to the annual harvest
585 regime. However, in cases where there is competition between perennial tree crops (e.g.
586 almonds, oranges) and native forest carbon sequestration, the potential loss of carbon stocks due
587 to tree crop decay (in addition to other costs), would need to be taken into account when
588 considering the economically efficient reallocation volume. This would likely result in lower
589 volumes being reallocated. However, this limitation does not diminish the wider explanatory and
590 conceptual value to other river catchments facing similar environmental issues, especially in a
591 global context with growing use of markets in public good climate and water.

592 **5 Conclusions**

593 This study presented a dynamic hydro-economic simulation of temporally varying flow,
594 floodplain inundation, floodplain tree carbon storage, and irrigation and environmental water use
595 values, with a case study of the Lowbidgee in the Murray-Darling Basin. Application of the
596 model demonstrated potential cost-neutral opportunities to finance temporary water purchases
597 through the generation and sale of carbon credits in co-existing carbon and water markets. The
598 results suggest that when two formalized markets for public good services exist, there is potential
599 opportunity for the generation of multiple public good ecosystem service values which are joint
600 in production and potential for tangible value to be realized.

601 Institutional development will be required to facilitate this latent potential. In the case of
602 Australia’s MDB, fundamental underpinning water markets are in place, hence the key challenge
603 would be developing accounting methods of generating tradable carbon credits (e.g. through
604 floodplain inundation) and to deal with risks. The results of this case study suggest that there
605 may be value in the further exploration of this idea to assess the generalizability of the suggested
606 approach and applicability to other cases.

607

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