# Estimating the effects of non-discriminatory trade policies within structural gravity models

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*Abstract.* We propose a simple method to identify the effects of unilateral and non-discriminatory trade policies on bilateral trade within a theoretically consistent empirical gravity model. Specifically, we argue that structural gravity estimations should be performed with data that include not only international trade flows but also *intra-national* trade flows. The use of intra-national sales allows identification of the effects of non-discriminatory trade policies such as most favoured nation tariffs, even in the presence of exporter and importer fixed effects. A byproduct of our approach is that it can be used to recover estimates of the trade elasticity, a key parameter for quantitative trade models. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques in the case of most favoured nation tariffs and "time to export" as representative non-discriminatory determinants of trade on the importer and on the exporter side, respectively. Our methods can be extended to quantify the impact on trade of any country-specific characteristics as well as any non-trade policies.

*Résumé. Évaluation de l'incidence des politiques commerciales non discriminatoires au sein de modèles de gravité structurels*. Dans un modèle de gravité empirique théoriquement cohérent, nous proposons une méthode simple pour identifier les effets des politiques commerciales unilatérales et non discriminatoires sur le commerce bilatéral. Plus précisément, nous affirmons que les estimations basées sur des modèles de gravité structurels doivent être réalisées en tenant compte non seulement des données relatives

aux flux commerciaux internationaux, mais aussi nationaux. L'utilisation de données relatives aux ventes domestiques permet d'identifier les effets des politiques commerciales non discriminatoires, par exemple les tarifs douaniers de la nation la plus favorisée (NPF), même en présence d'effets fixes importateur et exportateur. Notre approche peut être utilisée pour redresser les estimations relatives à l'élasticité des échanges, un paramètre clé des modèles commerciaux quantitatifs. Nous démontrons l'efficacité de nos techniques dans le cadre des tarifs douaniers NPF et des délais d'exportation, facteurs déterminants, représentatifs et non discriminatoires sur le commerce, à la fois pour l'importateur et l'exportateur. Il possible d'étendre nos méthodes pour quantifier les effets de n'importe quelle caractéristique spécifique à un pays sur le commerce, ainsi que de n'importe quelle politique non commerciale.

JEL classification: F10, F13, F14, F47

## 1. Introduction

**O**WING TO ITS THEORETICAL microeconomic foundations and remarkable predictive power, the structural gravity model has become the workhorse in the empirical trade literature that studies the effects of various determinants of bilateral trade flows and the impact of trade policies in particular.[1] However, despite its popularity and empirical success, the structural gravity equation cannot be used to identify the impact of any unilateral and non-discriminatory trade policies on both the importer side (for example, most favoured nation tariffs) and the exporter side (for example, export subsidies).[2]

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1 The structural gravity equation has been derived from a series of alternative theoretical foundations including, but not limited to, Armington–CES, Ricardian, Heckscher–Ohlin, monopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms, intermediate goods and dynamic settings. The corresponding empirical gravity equation consistently delivers strong fit (of 60% to 90%) with aggregate data but also with sectoral data for both goods and services. We refer the reader to Anderson (2011), Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014), Head and Mayer (2014) and Yotov et al. (2016) for recent gravity surveys.

2 As pointed out by Head and Mayer (2014), the effects of such policies cannot be identified within the structural gravity model because they are perfectly collinear with and absorbed by the importer and/or by the exporter fixed effects, which have to be included in gravity estimations to control for the multilateral resistance terms of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Specifically, on pages 157 and 158, Head and Mayer (2014) write, "In the presence of importer and exporter fixed effects a variety of potentially interesting trade determinants can no longer be identified in a gravity equation. Notably, (1) anything that affects exporters' propensity to export to all destinations (such has [sic] having hosted the Olympics or being an island), (2) variables that affect imports without regard to origin, such as country-level average applied tariff, and (3) sums, averages, and differences of country-specific variables. If any variables of these three forms is added to a trade equation estimated with importer and exporter fixed effects, programs such as Stata will report estimates with standard errors. However the estimates are meaningless."

This deficiency of the gravity model poses important challenges to comprehensive quantitative trade policy analysis because much of today's trade policy landscape is in fact shaped by various unilateral and non-discriminatory measures. Most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs and export subsidies are but two classic examples. More importantly, as emphasized in a series of public speeches by former director general of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Pascal Lamy[3] the world trade system has evolved from a state of protection (with the producer in mind) to a state of precaution (with the consumer in mind), where unilateral trade policies such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade (TBTs) are more prominent and more relevant than ever. The non-discriminatory nature of SPS measures and TBTs does not allow identification of their potential effect on international trade relative to their effect on domestic trade within a properly specified (with exporter and importer fixed effects) structural gravity equation.

Motivated by these challenges, the contribution of this paper is to propose a simple method to identify the impact of unilateral and non-discriminatory trade policies on bilateral trade flows within the structural gravity model. Our solution consists of a simple and theoretically consistent adjustment to gravity estimations. Specifically, we argue that gravity regressions should be estimated with data that include not only international trade flows but also *intra-national* sales. As we demonstrate in the methodological section, 3.3, the use of intra-national trade allows identification of unilateral and non-discriminatory trade policies even in the presence of importer and exporter fixed effects, since by definition the trade policies apply only to international trade flows, while the fixed effects are defined for both international and intra-national observations. In other words, our identification strategy relies on the fact that, while trade policies may be unilateral and non-discriminatory, they apply only to international trade and not to domestic sales.[4]

We demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in section 4.2, where we obtain estimates of the effects of MFN tariffs and "time to export" (TTE) as representative unilateral and non-discriminatory policies on the importer

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3 See, for example, Lamy's WTO speech "The universe of non-tariff measures has changed," at www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl243_e.htm, and reactions to Lamy's speeches, at www.invisiblegreenhand.wordpress.com/2015/03/18/the-new-world-trade-order-is-about-precaution-not-protection-pascal-lamy/ and www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3589010/asset-management-macro/free-trade-has-more-support-than-many-think-says-pascal-lamy.html.

4 In econometric terms, our paper focuses on an identification issue, i.e., we demonstrate that we can identify the effect of non-discriminatory trade policies. However, in terms of inference, we have nothing to add to Fernández-Val and Weidner (2016, 2018) and Weidner and Zylkin (2019), who focus on and demonstrate consistency, biases and inference of the PPML estimator with alternative sets of fixed effects.

and on the exporter side, respectively.[5] To perform the empirical analysis, we build a data set of consistently constructed international and intra-national manufacturing trade flows. Intra-national trade flows are calculated as apparent consumption, equal to the difference between the values of gross manufacturing production (which come from UNIDO's INDSTAT2 Industrial Statistics Database) and total exports (which come from the United Nation's COMTRADE database).[6]

Our most important result is that we can indeed identify the estimates of the effects of both non-discriminatory trade policy variables (MFN tariffs and TTE), in the presence of importer and exporter fixed effects, without any collinearity issues. In addition, we note that, in accordance with our intuition and despite the fact that our covariates were selected for methodological and demonstrative purposes, the estimates of the effects of MFN tariffs and "time to export" have the expected negative signs, are statistically significant and have plausible economic magnitudes. In particular, our preferred econometric specifications deliver estimates of the impact of MFN tariffs that are used to obtain structural values for the trade elasticity parameter of around 3.6 to 6.9, which are readily comparable to corresponding estimates from the existing literature.[7] Furthermore, our preferred estimates of the coefficient on "time to export" reveal that an additional day of time to export reduces trade flows by around 3.5%.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature in order to highlight our contribution in relation to existing studies. Section 3 discusses the identification issues of non-discriminatory trade policies within structural gravity models and demonstrates that our proposed econometric specification resolves these issues. Section 4 describes our data and presents the empirical estimation results for MFN tariffs and time to export. Section 5 concludes.

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5 Data on MFN tariffs, as the most widely used tariff policy, come from UNCTAD's Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS). On the exporter side, we focus on "time to export," defined as the number of days it takes to export a standardized cargo of merchandise. We use this variable because it is a non-discriminatory and country-specific determinant of exports for which data are available for many countries and over a long period of time. The TTE data come from the Doing Business Report within the World Development Indicators (WDI) Database of the World Bank.

6 We offer a detailed description of our data in section 4.1, where we also note that databases that offer consistently constructed international and intra-national trade flows are more widely available and accessible nowadays. Two examples include the GTAP database and the WIOD database. We use the WIOD database to test the robustness of our methods.

7 For example, Head and Mayer (2014) offer a summary meta-analysis estimate of the elasticity of substitution of $\sigma = 6.13$.

## 2. Relation to literature

Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. From a methodological perspective, our approach improves on three existing methods to identify the impact of unilateral policies and country-specific characteristics within the gravity literature. (i) Numerous papers have used country-specific variables directly in a-theoretic empirical gravity models, i.e., those that do not properly account for the structural multilateral resistances (MRs) and, therefore, deliver estimates that are potentially biased and subject to the critique of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). In relation to these papers, our methods allow identification of the effects of country-specific variables even in the presence of exporter and importer fixed effects that control for the MRs. (ii) Some authors have constructed new *dyadic variables* as combinations of the country-specific variables of interest.[8] The coefficients of the new bilateral variables can be estimated in the presence of exporter and importer fixed effects. However, this approach does not allow for interpretation of the impact of the country-specific variables. Our contribution in relation to this literature is that our methods allow for direct identification and clear interpretation of the effects of country-specific variables without the need of bilateral transformations. (iii) Finally, a third group of papers have implemented a two-stage estimation approach where, in the first step, the appropriate set of exporter and importer fixed effects are included in the gravity regression, and then, in the second step, the fitted values of the fixed effects are regressed on the policy variables of interest that could not be included in the first step.[9] Even if the first-stage fixed effects are estimated consistently,[10] the two-step approach has been criticized because its asymptotic properties have not yet been established formally. Furthermore, if the first-stage gravity estimates are obtained with the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator, which has become the standard for gravity regressions (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006), then the fixed effects can be predicted perfectly in the second stage by the structural gravity terms, i.e., by size and the multilateral resistance terms; see Fally (2015). As any country-specific variable, such as income or expenditure, is perfectly collinear with the multilateral resistance term, we cannot disentangle

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8  For example, Rauch and Trindade (2002) identify the effects of ethnic networks on bilateral trade by the product of the ethnicity share in the two counties. Similarly, Rauch and Trindade (2002) construct a dyadic ratio variable for the strength of institutions for defending trade. Djankov et al. (2010) estimate the impact of the ratio of time to export of two countries exporting to a third country by using the ratio of the two countries' exports.

9  Examples include Eaton and Kortum (2002), Head and Ries (2008), Anderson and Yotov (2012) and Head and Mayer (2014).

10  Only recently has the consistency of the model parameter estimates in nonlinear panel models with two types of fixed effects been shown, by Fernández-Val and Weidner (2016).

the effect of these variables from the effect of the multilateral resistance term or from non-discriminatory trade policies using only trade data in a two-step regression approach.

From a practical perspective and as emphasized above, our methods allow for identification of the impact of non-discriminatory and unilateral trade policies on the exporter side and on the importer side. Thus, our work contributes to the literature on the trade effects of MFN tariffs (see, for example, Augier et al. 2005) as well as to the literature concerning trade facilitation (for examples, see Wilson et al. 2005, Martinez-Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos 2008, Djankov et al. 2010) by allowing for estimation of the effects of such policies directly within the structural gravity model. While the focus of the analysis in this paper is on *trade policies*, our methods can be extended and applied more broadly to obtain estimates of the effects on trade of any country-specific characteristics (for example, size and institutions; see Beverelli et al. 2018) as well as any non-trade policies (for example, value added taxes and exchange rates), thus having much broader implications and contributing to a much wider literature.

A byproduct of our approach is that it can be used to obtain estimates of the elasticity of substitution, which is the single most important parameter in the international trade literature; see Arkolakis et al. (2012). This has implications for trade policy analysis because it enables researchers to estimate the elasticity and perform counterfactual general equilibrium simulation experiments with the elasticity that has been obtained within the same theory-consistent structural estimation framework. Since MFN tariffs are a direct price shifter, gravity theory can be used to recover the elasticity of substitution directly from the estimate of the coefficient on MFN tariffs.[11] Thus, we contribute to the literature that aims at estimating trade elasticities.[12] While bilateral measures of effectively applied tariffs have previously been used to identify the trade elasticity in structural gravity frameworks (for example, de Sousa et al. 2012, Egger and Larch 2012, Aichele et al. 2014 and Heid and Larch 2016), to date MFN tariffs have not been used as the literature so far has focused on estimating gravity models using *inter*national trade data only, and, as noted above, the effects of MFN tariffs in such settings are absorbed by the importer or importer–time fixed effects in structural gravity models. The ability to use MFN tariffs has several practical advantages. Specifically, MFN tariffs are the predominant form of non-discriminatory trade policy.

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11  We refer the reader to Heid and Larch (2016) for a formal derivation of the structural gravity system with tariffs.

12  See, for example, Eaton and Kortum (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Broda et al. (2006), Kee et al. (2008) and Simonovska and Waugh (2014). Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) and Head and Mayer (2014) provide discussions of the available estimates of the elasticity of substitution and trade elasticity parameter.

In addition, MFN tariff data are widely accessible and available over a long period of time and for a wide range of countries.

With appropriate data on ad valorem export subsidies and including them as an additional regressor, in principle, our method could also be used to recover estimates of a single export supply elasticity that is common across countries, similar to the estimate of the elasticity of substitution, which is also assumed to be identical across countries when using tariff data. By applying our method to product-level trade (and subsidy) data, we could estimate product-level export supply elasticities.[13] Once again, our method would allow identification because, while export subsidies are unilateral and non-discriminatory by definition, they apply only to international trade and not to domestic sales. In general, data on export subsidies are not available because such subsidies are prohibited under WTO law. Hence, for aggregate trade data as we use in our paper, export subsidy data would not be available.[14] Still, the principal possibility to recover export supply elasticities using product-level trade and export subsidy data for agricultural goods while controlling for the impact of bilateral non-tariff trade barriers may complement the popular approach from Broda et al. (2006, 2017) and Broda et al. (2008), which requires detailed unit price data and whose theoretical framework relies on a costlessly traded outside good.

Our work is also related to a literature that has already capitalized on some of the benefits of using intra-national trade flows within the structural gravity model.[15] For example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), de Sousa et al.

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13  Export supply elasticities at the product level have been estimated previously by Kee et al. (2004), Broda et al. (2006), Broda et al. (2008), Tokarick (2014), Imbs and Mejean (2015), Imbs and Mejean (2017) and Nicita et al. (2018).

14  See article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and chapter 5.3 in Van den Bossche and Prévost (2016) for a short overview of the legal status of subsidies. Export subsidies are permitted for agricultural goods, and data on these subsidies are collected by the WTO (http://agims.wto.org). Still, these data are not available in ad valorem terms, so bringing them into this form such that they can be used with our method is far from trivial.

15  While the current literature review focuses on the most closely related papers from a methodological perspective, we also note that our work is related to a recent and more broad literature that recognizes the importance of intra-national trade frictions. For example, Ramondo et al. (2016) demonstrate that the standard findings that: (i) larger countries should be richer than smaller countries and (ii) real income per capita increases too steeply with country size disappear when intra-national trade costs are taken into account. Donaldson (2018) studies the implications of intra-national trade costs in the form of the railroad network in India for productivity and welfare. Coşar and Demir (2016) and Coşar and Fajgelbaum (2016) consider the impact of improvements in transportation infrastructure and internal geography when trade must pass through gateway locations.

(2012) and Anderson et al. (2018) use intra-national trade data to estimate border effects, Anderson and Yotov (2010) use intra-provincial and inter-provincial sales to study the impact of trade liberalization within Canada, Yotov (2012) uses intra-national trade flows to resolve "the distance puzzle" in international trade, Dai et al. (2014) employ domestic sales in order to identify the impact of free trade agreements and, finally, Bergstrand et al. (2015) rely on intra-national trade flows in order to identify the impact of globalization and the evolution of international borders over time. A common feature of all of these studies is that they use intra-national trade flows data in order to identify the impact of *bilateral* variables within the structural gravity model. Thus, the analysis in none of the above-mentioned studies is subject to the challenges from non-discriminatory trade policies. Instead, the contribution of our work is exactly to address these challenges by recognizing and highlighting the ability of the structural gravity model to identify the impact of *unilateral and non-discriminatory* trade policies.

Similar in spirit to our paper, Waugh (2010) shows that one can identify asymmetric border effects in gravity models when using domestic trade data. Using this insight, Waugh (2010) illustrates that asymmetric trade costs are one way to rationalize differences in trade flows between rich and poor countries (another way is to recur to non-homotheticity; see Fieler 2011). To make his point in the most forceful way possible, Waugh uses a reduced form or summary measure of the asymmetry of trade costs, which he constructs by using either importer or exporter fixed effects. However, Waugh's paper does not focus on identifying the impact of observable, individual, non-discriminatory trade policies, which is the main focus of our paper. Hence, we see our paper as complementary to Waugh (2010), who documents that trade costs are asymmetric, while we demonstrate how researchers can simultaneously estimate the trade elasticity of individual exporter- and importer-specific observable variables.

Finally, our methods have already been validated independently using Monte Carlo studies, c.f., Sellner (2019), and they have been used to motivate further contributions related to the identification of the impact of important determinants of trade, c.f., Beverelli et al. (2018). Specifically, Beverelli et al. (2018) extend our methods to demonstrate that it is possible to identify the effects of *any country-specific characteristic* (institutions, hosting the Olympics, etc.) on international trade within the structural gravity model. The main source for identification in Beverelli et al. (2018) is also the introduction of intra-national trade flows; however, they discuss important differences related to inference and interpretation of the effects of country-specific variables as compared to trade policies, which are the focus here. In addition, Beverelli et al. (2018) implement a novel econometric approach to address potential endogeneity concerns in the case of country-specific institutions but with broader implications for gravity estimations in general.

Sellner (2019) compares our method citing the working paper version of this paper, Heid et al. (2017), to methods that do not rely on intra-

national trade flows. He concludes, "First and foremost, assuming that [non-discriminatory trade policies] impact only border-crossing trade flows, we recommend to use the approach outlined [by] Heid et al. (2017) for econometric estimation of a theory-consistent [structural gravity model]. The [Monte Carlo] results on bias and consistency showed, that this estimator has favorable asymptotic properties under very general assumptions. In contrast, the BV and FE-2S methods that have been frequently employed in past empirical research, often because domestic trade flows were unavailable, yield biased and inconsistent point estimates."

## 3. Theoretical foundation and identification strategy

We start with a brief review of the theoretical foundations of the structural gravity model in section 3.1. We describe our proposed econometric specification in section 3.2. In section 3.3, we discuss the issues with the identification of the effects of non-discriminatory trade policies within the structural gravity model and demonstrate that our proposed econometric specification provides a simple solution to overcome these challenges.

### 3.1. Theoretical foundation

As demonstrated in the seminal paper of Arkolakis et al. (2012), and as summarized in the survey articles of Head and Mayer (2014) and Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014), a large class of trade models lead to the following structural gravity equation for bilateral trade flows $X_{ij}$ from country $i$ to $j$:

$$X_{ij} = \frac{Y_i}{\Omega_i} \frac{E_j}{\Phi_j} \mathcal{T}_{ij}, \tag{1}$$

where $\mathcal{T}_{ij}$ is a function of bilateral trade costs between $i$ and $j$, including both tariffs and non-tariff trade costs. Structural gravity models impose the condition that the value of production in country $i$ equals its total sales to all countries, including domestic sales, $Y_i = \sum_j X_{ij}$, and that expenditure in country $j$ equals the sum over all imports, $E_j = \sum_i X_{ij}$. $\Omega_i$ and $\Phi_j$ are outward and inward multilateral resistance terms that are defined by the following system of equations:

$$\Omega_i = \sum_m \Phi_m^{-1} \mathcal{T}_{im} E_m, \quad \Phi_j = \sum_m \Omega_m^{-1} \mathcal{T}_{mj} Y_m. \tag{2}$$

The same equations apply at the aggregate and sector level when according measures of sectoral production and expenditure are used.

The final step in defining an operational structural gravity model is to define bilateral trade costs $\mathcal{T}_{ij}$. In general, $\mathcal{T}_{ij}$ can be decomposed into two parts:

$$\mathcal{T}_{ij} = \tau_{ij}^{\epsilon_1} T_{ij}^{\epsilon_2}, \tag{3}$$

where $\tau_{ij}$ is a tariff, for example the MFN tariff, in which case $\tau_{ij}$ is equal to 1 + the ad valorem MFN tariff rate. $\epsilon_1$ is a direct measure of the demand

elasticity with respect to price. $T_{ij}$ is a measure of non-tariff barriers. Many researchers specify non-tariff barriers as a function of, inter alia, bilateral (log) distance between countries or whether countries share a common border, language, colonial history or trade agreement membership, etc. In general,

$$T_{ij} = \prod_f t_{ij,f}^{\delta_f}, \tag{4}$$

where $t_{ij,f}$ denotes individual measures of non-tariff barriers as mentioned above and $\delta_f$ is the corresponding tariff equivalent trade cost elasticity of barrier $f$. In the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) framework, $\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_2$ equals $(1 - \sigma)$ if trade flows are measured including tariffs and $-\sigma$ if trade flows are measured excluding tariffs. In the data, reported trade flows do not include tariffs, but many quantitative trade models write trade flows including tariff values to ease notation.[16] As is well known by now (see, for example, Arkolakis et al. 2012 and Head and Mayer 2014), using the Eaton and Kortum (2002) framework replaces $(1 - \sigma)$ with $-\theta$. $\theta$ is inversely related to the variability of productivity across countries.[17] For expositional convenience, we will stick to the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) framework from now on. However, we note that our methods to identify the impact of non-discriminatory trade policies are independent of the specific theoretical micro-foundations of the structural gravity model. Thus, the elasticity of substitution between varieties that we will obtain in the empirical analysis below can also be interpreted as an estimate of the technology parameter $\theta$.

## 3.2. Econometric specification

$$X_{ijt} = \exp\left[\beta_1 \ln \tau_{jt}^{MFN} \times I_{ij} + \beta_2 \tau_{it}^{TTE} \\ \times I_{ij} + \mathbf{GRAV}_{ijt}\gamma + \eta_{it} + \mu_{jt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}\right], \quad \forall i, j. \tag{5}$$

Here, $X_{ijt}$ denotes nominal trade flows from exporter $i$ to importer $j$ at time $t$. In order to be as general as possible, we set up the estimating equation under the assumption that it will be implemented with panel data. However, in order to demonstrate the validity and robustness of our methods, we also implement equation (5) in a cross-section setting. A very important difference between equation (5) and the typical gravity equations from the related empirical literature is that equation (5) includes not only international trade observations $(X_{ijt}, j \neq i)$ but also internal trade flows observations $(X_{iit})$. As we will demonstrate, the addition of intra-national trade flows is the key

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16 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see footnote 16 in Felbermayr et al. (2015).

17 In Eaton and Kortum (2002), productivity across countries is distributed according to the Fréchet distribution with shape parameter $\theta$. Helpman et al. (2008) derive an aggregate gravity equation from a heterogeneous firms model where $\theta$ is the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution of firm productivities. For details, see Head and Mayer (2014).

adjustment that will enable us to identify the impact of non-discriminatory trade policies on bilateral trade within equation (5).

The regressors enter equation (5) exponentially because we follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to estimate the gravity model with the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator.[18] The use of any specific estimator does not play a role for the implementation of our methods and does not affect their effectiveness. However, in order to demonstrate the robustness of our approach, in the sensitivity analysis, we also obtain estimates using the OLS estimator.

Turning to the covariates in equation (5): $\tau_{jt}^{MFN}$ is defined as one plus the uniform MFN tariff rate that country $j$ levies on all imports that enter the country.[19] In order to emphasize that MFN tariffs do not apply to intra-national trade flows but only to imports from abroad, we interact $\ln \tau_{jt}^{MFN}$ with an indicator variable $I_{ij}$, which is equal to one for international trade and set to zero for intra-national trade. MFN tariffs fit our purpose perfectly because: (i) MFN tariffs represent a non-discriminatory trade policy, (ii) MFN tariffs are the prevailing form of trade protection via tariffs due to WTO rules, (iii) MFN tariffs are a direct price shifter, which implies that we can recover an estimate of the elasticity of substitution from the estimate on MFN tariffs within the structural gravity model, and finally (iv) data on MFN tariffs are more reliable (compared with data on other, non-tariff protection measures) because they are easier to measure and more widely available.

$\tau_{it}^{TTE}$ is defined as the number of days it takes to export a standardized cargo of merchandise, including the time it takes to go through all official

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18  Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) demonstrate that, since trade flows exhibit a large degree of heteroscedasticity, estimating a log-linearized version of equation (5) leads to inconsistent parameter estimates due to Jensen's inequality. Therefore, they propose the use of PPML as an alternative that overcomes this deficiency of the standard OLS estimator. An additional advantage of the PPML estimator is that, since the gravity model is estimated in multiplicative form, PPML enables us to take advantage of the information that is contained in the zero trade flows.

19  In our data set, we apply the MFN tariff to all countries to ensure that it really is non-discriminatory across countries. However, we recognize that countries may apply different tariffs, for example, various preferential rates. Furthermore, in principle, WTO–MFN tariffs apply only to WTO member states. However, many countries apply their MFN tariff also to non-WTO members, and non-WTO member countries report MFN, i.e., non-preferential, tariff rates in TRAINS. As of October 2017, the following countries are not members of the WTO: Algeria, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Holy See, Iran, Iraq, Kiribati, Lebanese Republic, Libya, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, North Korea, Palau, Palestine, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria and Uzbekistan. In our data set, of these, only Belarus, Eritrea and Ethiopia are included. We make sure that the MFN tariff rates are non-discriminatory in our data set.

procedures that have to be fulfilled to export the good. Similar to the case of MFN tariffs, we interact $\tau_{it}^{TTE}$ with the international border dummy $I_{ij}$. Thus, by construction, $\tau_{it}^{TTE} \times I_{ij}$ represents a non-discriminatory trade policy variable that applies only to exports.

$\mathbf{GRAV}_{ijt}$ is a vector of control variables that includes all standard time-invariant gravity covariates (the log of bilateral distance, common language, etc.) as well as time-varying determinants of trade (for example, regional trade agreements, RTAs). We will experiment by replacing the time-invariant bilateral gravity variables with a full set of pair fixed effects. In some specifications, we also include an applied preferential tariff variable $\ln \tau_{ijt}^{applied}$, which we interact with $I_{ij}$ as we do with the MFN tariff.

Finally, $\eta_{it}$ denotes the set of exporter $\times$ year fixed effects, which will control for the time-varying unobservable outward multilateral resistances and also will absorb any other country-specific trade determinants on the exporter side. Similarly, $\mu_{jt}$ denotes the set of importer $\times$ year fixed effects, which will control for the time-varying unobservable inward multilateral resistances and also will absorb any other country-specific trade determinants on the importer side. $\varepsilon_{ijt}$ is a remainder error term. Errors in trade gravity models are likely clustered within exporters and importers; see Egger and Tarlea (2015). We therefore use the variance covariance estimator proposed by Cameron et al. (2011), which is robust to two-way clustering at the importer and exporter level.[20]

### 3.3. Identification strategy

To show that we can identify all variables included in our estimating equation (5) in the simplest possible way, we first consider a cross-sectional bilateral trade data set that consists of trade flows between $N$ countries labelled $\{A, B, \ldots, N\}$. $N^2 - N$ of these trade flows are international flows and $N$ are domestic trade flows. Take logs of both sides of equation (5), ignore the error term and summarize all explanatory variables and importer as well as exporter fixed effects in a matrix $\mathbf{Z}$. We can then write international bilateral trade flows as $\ln \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{Z}\boldsymbol{\theta}$, where $\ln \mathbf{x}$ is a $(N^2 - N) \times 1$ vector of log bilateral international trade flows and $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ denotes the corresponding parameter vector.[21]

We start with a brief demonstration of why standard gravity analyses are unable to identify the impact of non-discriminatory trade policies. Typically, researchers use only international trade flows. Focusing on MFN tariffs, the corresponding vector of dependent variables and the relevant part of the data matrix $\mathbf{Z}$ can be represented as follows:

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20 All PPML estimations are executed using the `ppml_panel_sg` Stata package by Larch et al. (2019) and all OLS estimations using the `reghdfe` Stata package by Correia (2017).

21 We denote vectors with lowercase bold letters and matrices with uppercase bold letters.

$$\ln \mathbf{x} = \begin{pmatrix} \ln X_{AB} \\ \ln X_{AC} \\ \vdots \\ \ln X_{BA} \\ \ln X_{BC} \\ \vdots \\ \ln X_{CA} \\ \ln X_{CB} \\ \vdots \end{pmatrix}, \tag{6}$$

$$\mathbf{Z} = \begin{pmatrix} \cdots & \boldsymbol{\mu}_A & \boldsymbol{\mu}_B & \boldsymbol{\mu}_C & \ln \boldsymbol{\tau}^{MFN} & \cdots \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \cdots & 0 & 1 & 0 & \ln \tau_B^{MFN} & \cdots \\ \cdots & 0 & 0 & 1 & \ln \tau_C^{MFN} & \cdots \\ & & & \vdots & & \\ \cdots & 1 & 0 & 0 & \ln \tau_A^{MFN} & \cdots \\ \cdots & 0 & 0 & 1 & \ln \tau_C^{MFN} & \cdots \\ & & & \vdots & & \\ \cdots & 1 & 0 & 0 & \ln \tau_A^{MFN} & \cdots \\ \cdots & 0 & 1 & 0 & \ln \tau_B^{MFN} & \cdots \\ & & & \vdots & & \end{pmatrix}, \tag{7}$$

where $\boldsymbol{\mu}_A, \boldsymbol{\mu}_B, \ldots$, are the vectors for the importer dummies/importer fixed effects. $\ln \boldsymbol{\tau}^{MFN}$ is the vector of our regressor of interest, i.e., the non-discriminatory unilateral MFN tariff vector. If $\mathbf{Z}$ is of full rank, then $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ is identified and given by the OLS estimator $\boldsymbol{\theta} = (\mathbf{Z}'\mathbf{Z})^{-1}\mathbf{Z}'\ln \mathbf{x}$. As $N^2 - N$ is larger than the number of regressors (including the dummies for the fixed effects), $\mathbf{Z}$ is of full column rank if its columns are linearly independent. However, we can express the non-discriminatory MFN tariff vector $\ln \boldsymbol{\tau}^{MFN}$ as the sum of the importer fixed effects, i.e., $\sum_{i=A}^{N} \ln \tau_i^{MFN} \boldsymbol{\mu}_i = \ln \boldsymbol{\tau}^{MFN}$, where $i = \{A, B, \ldots, N\}$, which implies that $\mathbf{Z}$ is not of full column rank. Thus, due to perfect collinearity, it is impossible to identify the impact of MFN tariffs in a typical gravity specification that uses only international trade data and employs a proper set of importer fixed effects to control for the unobservable multilateral resistance terms. This is exactly what Head and Mayer (2014) discuss on pages 157 and 158. Note that this argument applies to all country-specific variables, on both the exporter and importer sides.

We have just demonstrated that creating the right set of exporter and importer dummies creates a perfect collinearity between the dummies and our regressor of interest. Equivalently, using a suitable transformation of the dependent variable that cancels the importer and exporter effects will automatically also wipe out the regressor of interest.[22] For example, one such

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22  Similarly, in a one-way fixed effect panel model, any time-invariant variable is wiped out by the within-transformation or first differencing; see, for example, Baltagi (2013), chapter 2.2.

transformation is $\widetilde{\ln X}_{ij} = \ln X_{ij} + \ln X_{ji} - \ln X_{ii} - \ln X_{jj}$. Intuitively $\widetilde{\ln X}_{ij} = \widetilde{\ln X}_{ji}$ is two times the deviation of the average of trade between country $i$ and $j$ from the domestic trade average for $i$ and $j$.[23] Under this transformation, our model from equation (5) becomes

$$
\ln X_{ij} + \ln X_{ji} - \ln X_{ii} - \ln X_{jj} = \beta_1 \left( \ln \tau_j^{MFN} + \ln \tau_i^{MFN} \right)
$$
$$
+ \beta_2 \left( \tau_i^{TTE} + \tau_j^{TTE} \right) + (\mathbf{GRAV}_{ij} + \mathbf{GRAV}_{ji} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{ii} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{jj})' \boldsymbol{\gamma}.
\tag{8}
$$

The transformed model contains the parameters of interest, $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$. Hence, to show that we can identify/estimate them when using the information contained in the domestic trade flows, we simply have to show that the regressor matrix of the transformed model in equation (8) is of full column rank. We define the vector of the dependent variable over the $(N^2 - N)/2$ observations of $\widetilde{\ln X}_{ij}$ by $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}$.[24] Similarly, we collect the right-hand side variables in matrix $\tilde{\mathbf{Z}}$ as follows:

$$
\tilde{\mathbf{Z}} =
\begin{pmatrix}
\ln \tau_B^{MFN} + \ln \tau_A^{MFN} & \tau_A^{TTE} + \tau_B^{TTE} & (\mathbf{GRAV}_{AB} + \mathbf{GRAV}_{BA} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{AA} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{BB})' \\
\ln \tau_C^{MFN} + \ln \tau_A^{MFN} & \tau_A^{TTE} + \tau_C^{TTE} & (\mathbf{GRAV}_{AC} + \mathbf{GRAV}_{CA} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{AA} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{CC})' \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
\ln \tau_A^{MFN} + \ln \tau_B^{MFN} & \tau_B^{TTE} + \tau_A^{TTE} & (\mathbf{GRAV}_{BA} + \mathbf{GRAV}_{AB} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{BB} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{AA})' \\
\ln \tau_C^{MFN} + \ln \tau_B^{MFN} & \tau_B^{TTE} + \tau_C^{TTE} & (\mathbf{GRAV}_{BC} + \mathbf{GRAV}_{CB} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{BB} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{CC})' \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
\ln \tau_A^{MFN} + \ln \tau_C^{MFN} & \tau_C^{TTE} + \tau_A^{TTE} & (\mathbf{GRAV}_{CA} + \mathbf{GRAV}_{AC} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{CC} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{AA})' \\
\ln \tau_B^{MFN} + \ln \tau_C^{MFN} & \tau_C^{TTE} + \tau_B^{TTE} & (\mathbf{GRAV}_{CB} + \mathbf{GRAV}_{BC} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{CC} - \mathbf{GRAV}_{BB})' \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots
\end{pmatrix}.
\tag{9}
$$

Inspection of matrix $\tilde{\mathbf{Z}}$ shows that the coefficients $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$ in equation (8) are identified as long as there are at least two different values in the vectors of interest $\ln \boldsymbol{\tau}^{MFN}$ and $\boldsymbol{\tau}^{TTE}$.[25] This is the same identification condition for any exogenous variables: to be of full column rank, we need at least two different values in each column of $\tilde{\mathbf{Z}}$.

The intuition for this result is as follows. If removing the importer and exporter fixed effects by using the transformed dependent variable and the

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23 Note that $\widetilde{\ln X}_{ii} = \ln X_{ii} + \ln X_{ii} - \ln X_{ii} - \ln X_{ii} = 0$. For the model estimated in levels using PPML, the corresponding transformation is $\tilde{X}_{ij} = X_{ij} X_{ji} / (X_{ii} X_{jj})$.

24 As $\widetilde{\ln X}_{ij} = \widetilde{\ln X}_{ji}$, we can focus on a data set that contains the $(N^2 - N)/2$ unique values of the transformed variable created from the original $N^2$ bilateral gravity data set that also contains the domestic trade flows. Adding the other half of identical observations will not change the estimated coefficients and hence will not affect our proof of identification.

25 In the unlikely case when the policies on the importer and on the exporter side are perfectly collinear with each other, one cannot identify their separate effects. In this case, one can identify only the relative effect of the common trade policy on international relative to internal trade. Stimulated by our paper, Beverelli et al. (2018) demonstrate this formally by studying the impact of country-specific characteristics (i.e., institutional quality).

transformed regressors does not remove our regressors of interest, we can identify their associated coefficients. We can then estimate this coefficient by either using OLS on the transformed model or, as we do in the next section, estimating equation (5) directly, using the full $N^2$ observations, including domestic trade flows and the full set of exporter and importer dummy variables. Both approaches are equivalent.

Note that the above derivations work for including multiple measures of non-discriminatory trade policies simultaneously, i.e., our method allows the identification of $L$ non-discriminatory trade policies on the exporter side, $\tau_{jl}^{EX}$, and $M$ non-discriminatory trade policies on the importer side, $\tau_{im}^{IM}$. In this more general case, we replace $\beta_1(\ln \tau_j^{MFN} + \ln \tau_i^{MFN}) + \beta_2(\tau_i^{TTE} + \tau_j^{TTE})$ with $\sum_l^L \beta_l(\tau_{jl}^{EX} + \tau_{il}^{EX}) + \sum_m^M \beta_m(\tau_{im}^{IM} + \tau_{jm}^{IM})$, and the first two columns in $\tilde{\mathbf{Z}}$ are replaced with the corresponding $L + M$ columns.

The arguments for identification of the effects of non-discriminatory MFN tariffs and TTEs in a cross-section setting translate to the panel case, where the main difference is that controlling for the unobservable multilateral resistance terms requires the use of exporter–time and importer–time fixed effects. Intuitively, the panel setting can be decomposed into a sequence of cross-section matrices. Furthermore, our methods apply even in the presence of bilateral fixed effects. To demonstrate the validity of our approach, we consider a panel with only two time periods; however, it is straightforward to extend the analysis to more years. With the two-period panel data, we can apply a first-difference strategy. This will wipe out all of the bilateral fixed effects and also requires us to express all remaining variables in changes (denoted by $\Delta$). The system in changes that corresponds to equation (8) is

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Delta \ln X_{ij} + \Delta \ln X_{ji} - \Delta \ln X_{ii} - \Delta \ln X_{jj} = {} & \beta_1 \left( \Delta \ln \tau_j^{MFN} + \Delta \ln \tau_i^{MFN} \right) \\
& + \beta_2 \left( \Delta \tau_i^{TTE} + \Delta \tau_j^{TTE} \right) \\
& + (\Delta \mathbf{GRAV}_{ij} + \Delta \mathbf{GRAV}_{ji} - \Delta \mathbf{GRAV}_{ii} - \Delta \mathbf{GRAV}_{jj})' \gamma.
\end{aligned}
\tag{10}
$$

From equation (10), it is clear that also in the panel setting we can identify country-specific variables as long as there are at least two different values in the vector of changes for the country-specific variables $\Delta \ln \boldsymbol{\tau}^{MFN}$ and $\Delta \boldsymbol{\tau}^{TTE}$. This is the same identification condition we have for all exogenous variables in a panel setting (see the last term in equation (10)).[26]

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26 In the working paper version of this paper (Heid et al. 2017), we show the identification strategy differently using a three-country example and line-by-line excerpts of the respective data matrices. Further, we show it separately for MFN tariffs and a non-discriminatory export policy, such as time to export.

## 4. Empirical analysis

### 4.1. Data

In order to perform the empirical analyses, we construct an unbalanced panel data set for 68 countries for the years 2005 to 2012.[27] We start in 2005 because data on one of our main regressors of interest (time to export, TTE) are available only since 2005. We end in 2012 because the production data we need to construct intra-national trade flows end in 2012. Our data cover four key components: (i) international trade flows, (ii) intra-national trade flows, (iii) non-discriminatory trade policies and (iv) standard gravity variables.

*International trade flows.* Data on international trade flows come from the United Nations' COMTRADE database, which is the standard and most comprehensive source for international trade flows data.[28] To create our data set, we keep every country-pair observation that we observe at least twice such that the bilateral fixed effects do not perfectly predict bilateral trade flows by construction. We focus on manufacturing trade. The reason is the need to construct proper intra-national trade flows, which we discuss next.

*Intra-national trade flows.* Availability of intra-national trade flows data is crucial for the implementation of our method. We construct domestic trade flows as apparent consumption, i.e., as the difference between the value of domestic production minus the value of total exports. While it is tempting to obtain aggregate domestic sales as the difference between GDP and total exports, we do not recommend this approach due to the inconsistency between the measure of GDP as value added and the measure of total exports as gross value. In other words, in order to construct consistent intra-national trade flows, we need gross production value data. Therefore, we rely on the UNIDO's Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT2) for our main results, which offers cross-country gross production manufacturing data for a large sample of countries.[29] However, the implementation of our method is not limited to the data set that we use for the current analysis. Recently, more and more data sets include consistently constructed international and intra-national trade flows. The GTAP database and the WIOD database by Timmer et al. (2015) are two prominent examples. Depending on their purpose and preference, researchers may apply our methods to any data set that includes intra-national trade flows. To show the robustness of our method, we also present results using domestic and international manufacturing trade data from the WIOD 2016 Release, which is available only for a smaller subset of countries.

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27 A list of the countries in our data set appears in appendix A4.

28 We access UNCOMTRADE via the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) website, `http://wits.worldbank.org/default.aspx`.

29 UNIDO's INDSTAT2 database can be accessed at `www.unido.org/researchers/statistical-databases`.

*Tariff data.* As noted earlier, while we do recognize that, in some cases, countries apply different tariffs (for example various preferential rates) instead of MFN tariffs and that, in principle, while MFN tariffs apply to only WTO member states, in our data set, we apply the MFN tariff to all countries to ensure that this variable really is non-discriminatory across countries. Data on MFN tariffs come from UNCTAD's Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS), which we accessed via World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS).[30] As a robustness check, we control for the applied preferential tariff in some specifications, which we also source from TRAINS.[31]

*Non-discriminatory exporter policy variable.* We use time to export (TTE), a part of the World Bank's Doing Business project, which collects information about measures of business regulation including policies that impact imports and exports, for a wide range of countries over time.[32] TTE measures the number of days it takes to actually export goods. This includes three distinct parts: (i) the time it takes to gather all domestic documents needed for exports, (ii) the time to proceed through customs and comply with border regulations and (iii) the time of domestic transport to the final port of embarkment. The data are collected via questionnaires sent out to exporting firms, port and customs authorities as well as domestic freight companies. Time measurement of the raw data is done in hours and is then transformed to days.[33] The TTE variable is available beginning in 2005 only, which is therefore the start year of our panel data set. The crucial aspect of TTE is that it is by definition a non-discriminatory (export) trade policy as it applies to all export destinations in the same way, as there is only one value of TTE that is identical across all export destinations.

*Other data.* We also use a set of control variables. In order to perform the main analysis with panel data, we employ directional bilateral fixed effects that absorb all time-invariant bilateral determinants of trade. However, we

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30 See `wits.worldbank.org`.

31 As we use aggregate trade data, tariffs provided by TRAINS are simple or weighted averages. We use the world average of the MFN tariff for each reporting country and year to ensure that the MFN tariff really is non-discriminatory and does not vary across import source countries just due to a difference in the set of products that are imported from different countries. In some cases, the bilateral applied tariff rate is therefore larger than the MFN world average for a given importing country. By definition, applied tariffs have to be lower or equal to a country's MFN tariff, not larger. In these cases, we replace applied tariffs with the value of the MFN tariff. This aggregation measurement error can easily be remedied by using more detailed trade and tariff data. To keep the exposition of our method simple, we use aggregate data.

32 Data can be downloaded from `http://databank.worldbank.org/source/doing-business`.

33 For a description of the data, see Djankov et al. (2010) and `www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/Trading-Across-Borders`.

cannot use directional bilateral fixed effects in our cross-section regressions. Therefore, in this case, we rely on the set of standard gravity variables from the literature. Specifically, we use data on bilateral distance, common spoken language, contiguity and colonial ties, which are taken from CEPII's distances database (see Mayer and Zignago 2011). An important advantage of CEPII's distances database for our analysis is that it provides population-weighted distances, which can be used to consistently calculate both bilateral distances and internal distances. Finally, our measure of regional trade agreements comes from Mario Larch's Regional Trade Agreements Database from Egger and Larch (2008).[34]

### 4.2. Estimation results and analysis

We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method in several steps. We start with a standard cross-section specification, where the only non-discriminatory trade policy variable of interest is MFN tariffs. Then, we extend the specification to a panel setting, which is estimated with standard gravity variables and with bilateral fixed effects. In the next step, we simultaneously obtain estimates of MFN tariffs, as a representative non-discriminatory trade policy on the importer side, and of TTE, as a representative non-discriminatory trade policy on the exporter side. The empirical analysis concludes with a series of sensitivity experiments, where we test the robustness of our findings with respect to the definition of our tariff variable as well as by employing different samples and different estimators.

A first set of estimation results are reported in table 1. All estimates that are reported in table 1 are obtained with the PPML estimator and with a complete set of exporter and importer fixed effects. In order to construct the key covariate of interest, we use simple averages of MFN tariffs across products. Column (1) of table 1 reports cross-section results for 2012. The estimates on the standard gravity covariates are in accordance with our prior expectations and they are readily comparable to corresponding indexes from the literature.[35] This establishes the representativeness of our sample.

More important for our main purposes, the results from column (1) demonstrate that we can obtain estimates of the impact of MFN tariffs, as a representative unilateral and non-discriminatory trade policy, even when we have included the complete set of exporter and importer fixed effects. From an economic and policy perspective, our results show a highly statistically significant negative estimate for MFN tariffs ($-12.036$, std.err. 3.103), which implies that MFN tariffs are indeed a significant impediment to international trade. As discussed in section 3.1, depending on the microeconomic foundations used to derive structural gravity, the estimate of $-12.036$ implies an elasticity of

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34 Database is available at `www.ewf.uni-bayreuth.de/en/research/RTA-data/`
`index.html`.

35 We refer the reader to Head and Mayer (2014), who offer a meta analysis study of more than 2,500 gravity estimates from 159 papers.

**TABLE 1**
On the impact of most favoured nation tariffs on international trade

| | (1) 2012 Cross-section | (2) 2005–2012 Panel | (3) 2005–2012 Pair FEs | (4) 2005, 2008, 2011 Intervals | (5) 2005–2012 Applied tariff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $I_{ij}$ | −1.823*** | −1.758*** | | | |
| | (0.273) | (0.249) | | | |
| $\ln(DIST)_{ij}$ | −0.745*** | −0.808*** | | | |
| | (0.073) | (0.063) | | | |
| $CONTIG_{ij}$ | 0.398*** | 0.355*** | | | |
| | (0.104) | (0.106) | | | |
| $COMLANG_{ij}$ | 0.357*** | 0.428*** | | | |
| | (0.103) | (0.081) | | | |
| $COLONY_{ij}$ | 0.158 | 0.017 | | | |
| | (0.113) | (0.137) | | | |
| $\ln \bar{\tau}_{jt}^{MFN,simple}$ | −12.036*** | −9.700*** | −6.851*** | −9.675*** | −6.957*** |
| | (3.103) | (2.746) | (1.741) | (1.573) | (1.829) |
| $RTA_{ijt}$ | 0.387*** | 0.263*** | 0.092* | 0.106** | 0.093* |
| | (0.077) | (0.098) | (0.053) | (0.048) | (0.052) |
| $\ln \bar{\tau}_{ijt}^{applied,simple}$ | | | | | 0.160 |
| | | | | | (0.553) |
| Bilateral FEs | | | X | X | X |
| N | 4,059 | 33,400 | 33,400 | 12,492 | 33,400 |

**NOTES:** This table reports gravity estimates using a PPML estimator for 68 countries in 2012 in column (1) and an unbalanced panel from 2005 to 2012 in columns (2), (3) and (5). Column (4) uses every third year. Dependent variable are bilateral trade flows, $X_{ijt}$, including domestic trade. Trade flows are calculated as the average of reported trade flows from country $i$ to $j$ if COMTRADE reports both imports and exports; if only imports or exports are observed, these are used. Constructed domestic trade flows are set to missing if negative (5 observations in the cross-section for 2012, 15 observations for the panel regressions; for details, see table A2). All regressions include exporter or exporter–year and importer or importer–year fixed effects. In addition, columns (3) to (5) also include directional country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to two-way clustering at the importer and exporter level. * for $p < 0.1$, ** for $p < 0.05$ and *** for $p < 0.01$. See main text for further details.

substitution of 12.036 or an import-demand elasticity with respect to MFN tariffs of −12.036.[36]

Column (2) of table 1 reports estimation results from an unbalanced yearly panel of 68 countries from 2005 to 2012 using PPML and simple averages of MFN tariffs. In combination with gravity theory, the use of panel data requires proper control for the multilateral resistances with exporter–time and

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36  In addition, we note that the structural value of the trade elasticity parameter that is recovered from the estimate on the coefficient on tariffs in the gravity model depends on the interpretation of tariffs in the definition of trade costs. Studies that treat tariffs as iceberg trade costs would deliver structural values of 11.036 and −11.036 of the elasticity of substitution and of the import-demand elasticity, respectively. We refer the reader to Yotov et al. (2016) for a detailed discussion of the structural interpretation of the estimates on tariffs in gravity equations.

importer–time effects, which we employ in column (2). The most important result from column (2) is that, as was the case with cross-section data, we are able to identify the impact of MFN tariffs even in the presence of the exporter–time and importer–time effects in a panel setting. The estimate of the coefficient on MFN tariffs is again highly statistically significant. In terms of economic magnitude, with a value of $-9.700$, our MFN tariff estimate is a bit smaller in absolute magnitude than the corresponding estimate from column (1); however, it is still in the upper tail of comparable estimates from the existing literature.[37]

A possible explanation for the large MFN tariff estimate may be that trade policies, such as tariffs or whether two countries sign a regional trade agreement, are not randomly assigned across countries.[38] Therefore, both the *RTA* regressor and our measure for the non-discriminatory trade policy, $\tau_{it}^{MFN}$, are potentially endogenous. Matching techniques to correct for the selection bias are hampered by violations of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) as trade policy has by definition general equilibrium and third country effects via its impact on trade creation and diversion (see, for example, Viner 1950 and Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). Instrumental variables that fulfill the necessary exclusion restriction are hard to come by at the country or industry level. We therefore follow Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and include bilateral (directed) country-pair effects to control for the endogeneity of trade policy in column (3). Note that directed bilateral fixed effects also control for all time-invariant country characteristics that may affect trade flows, such as a country being landlocked or being an island country.[39] Allowing for asymmetric bilateral trade costs in this way also controls for the

---

37 Existing elasticity estimates from the related literature usually vary between 2 and 12. Head and Mayer (2014) offer a summary meta-analysis estimate of $\sigma = 6.13$. We refer the reader to Eaton and Kortum (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Broda et al. (2006), Simonovska and Waugh (2014), Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) and Head and Mayer (2014) for discussions of the available estimates of the elasticity of substitution and trade elasticity parameter.

38 See, for example, the arguments in Trefler (1993) and Magee (2003). For example, countries that are closer have a significantly higher probability of signing an RTA; see, for example, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Egger et al. (2011).

39 In appendix table A1, we present cross-section regressions that control for these variables. Note that, different from non-discriminatory import tariffs or time to export, country-specific variables such as a country being an island are the same for both a country's exports and imports. For these variables, our method can identify only an average effect on total trade but not a separate effect on a country's exports and imports. Beverelli et al. (2018) discuss this implication of our method in detail. Importantly, results on the non-discriminatory trade policy variables remain similar.

potential scale effects in trade costs due to differences in trade volumes as modelled in Anderson et al. (2016).

As discussed in the analytical identification section 3.3, the inclusion of pair fixed effects does not prevent identification of the impact of unilateral and non-discriminatory trade policies in structural gravity equations. Accordingly, once again, in column (3) of table 1, we are able to identify the estimate of the coefficient of MFN tariffs. The estimate on MFN tariffs is still highly statistically significant. Furthermore, consistent with the endogeneity analysis from Baier and Bergstrand (2007), when we control for the unobserved directional bilateral effects, the estimate drops to $-6.851$, which is readily comparable to the corresponding estimates of the elasticities of substitution and the import demand elasticities, which we summarized in footnote 37.

The last two columns of table 1 offer results from two robustness experiments. Specifically, in column (4), we use three-year intervals instead of each year. The motivation for this experiment is that trade flows may need time to adjust in response to trade policy changes; see Cheng and Wall (2005). As can be seen from table 1, the specification with three-year intervals is still able to identify an estimate of the coefficient on MFN tariffs, but delivers an estimate that is larger than the corresponding estimate from column (3). The last column of table 1 reports estimation results when controlling for the applied preferential tariffs. With a point estimate of $-6.957$, the coefficient on MFN tariffs is virtually identical to the $-6.851$ value from column (3). The effect of the applied tariff is not statistically significantly different from 0.

The results that we present in table 2 replicate the specifications from table 1, but after adding as an additional regressor time to export (TTE), which is our representative non-discriminatory unilateral trade policy on the exporter side. Two main findings stand out from table 2. First, and most important from an econometric perspective, we are able to identify an estimate of the impact of TTE in each column of table 2, while, at the same time, we are still able to identify estimates of the impact of MFN tariffs. Second, from an economic and policy perspective, we obtain negative and highly statistically significant estimates of the impact of TTE across all specifications in table 2. As with MFN tariffs, the estimates from the panel specification with bilateral fixed effects lead to smaller TTE estimates in absolute value. In terms of economic magnitude, column (5) of table 2 ($-0.036$, std.err. 0.006), suggests that an additional day of time to export reduces trade flows by 3.6%.

We finish the analysis with several robustness experiments. Panels A and B of table 3 reproduce the results from the specifications from tables 1 and 2, respectively, but using the OLS estimator and logarithmized trade flows as dependent variable instead of the PPML estimator and trade flows in levels. Most importantly, the estimates from table 3 confirm that we can identify the effects of unilateral and non-discriminatory trade policies on the importer and on the exporter side. In addition, we find that, overall, both non-discriminatory policies are significant and have negative effects on trade flows. Generally, the estimates for the MFN tariffs become larger in absolute values,

**TABLE 2**
On the impact of most favoured nation tariffs and time to export on international trade

| | (1) 2012 Cross-section | (2) 2005–2012 Panel | (3) 2005–2012 Pair FEs | (4) 2005, 2008, 2011 Intervals | (5) 2005–2012 Applied tariff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $I_{ij}$ | −1.031*** | −1.172*** | | | |
| | (0.318) | (0.210) | | | |
| $\ln(DIST)_{ij}$ | −0.773*** | −0.795*** | | | |
| | (0.081) | (0.063) | | | |
| $CONTIG_{ij}$ | 0.423*** | 0.378*** | | | |
| | (0.113) | (0.111) | | | |
| $COMLANG_{ij}$ | 0.297*** | 0.306*** | | | |
| | (0.094) | (0.068) | | | |
| $COLONY_{ij}$ | 0.131 | 0.017 | | | |
| | (0.113) | (0.131) | | | |
| $\ln \bar{\tau}_{jt}^{MFN,simple}$ | −11.363*** | −8.121*** | −4.265** | −7.483*** | −4.447*** |
| | (2.837) | (2.779) | (1.668) | (1.929) | (1.721) |
| $\tau_{it}^{TTE}$ | −0.068*** | −0.066*** | −0.035*** | −0.029*** | −0.036*** |
| | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.006) | (0.010) | (0.006) |
| $RTA_{ijt}$ | 0.352*** | 0.315*** | 0.071 | 0.090** | 0.073 |
| | (0.075) | (0.088) | (0.050) | (0.045) | (0.049) |
| $\ln \bar{\tau}_{ijt}^{applied,simple}$ | | | | | 0.293 |
| | | | | | (0.501) |
| Bilateral FEs | | | X | X | X |
| $N$ | 4,059 | 33,400 | 33,400 | 12,492 | 33,400 |

**NOTES:** This table reports gravity estimates using a PPML estimator for 68 countries in 2012 in column (1) and an unbalanced panel from 2005 to 2012 in columns (2), (3) and (5). Column (4) uses every third year. Dependent variable are bilateral trade flows, $X_{ijt}$, including domestic trade. Trade flows are calculated as the average of reported trade flows from country $i$ to $j$ if COMTRADE reports both imports and exports; if only imports or exports are observed, these are used. Constructed domestic trade flows are set to missing if negative (five observations in the cross-section for 2012, 15 observations for the panel regressions; for details, see table A2). All regressions include exporter(exporter–year) and importer(importer–year) fixed effects. In addition, columns (3) to (5) also include directional country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to two-way clustering at the importer and exporter level. * for $p < 0.1$, ** for $p < 0.05$ and *** for $p < 0.01$. See main text for further details.

as do the time-to-export coefficients, at least when not controlling for bilateral fixed effects. The latter are no longer statistically significant when controlling for bilateral fixed effects.

Panels A and B of table 4 reproduce the regression results from the specifications given in tables 1 and 2, respectively, after replacing the average MFN tariff with weighted MFN tariffs, where the weights are the observed levels of trade, and similarly for the applied preferential tariff. It is well known that using tariffs weighted by the value of trade flows may lead to an endogeneity problem if policy-makers set tariffs as a reaction to the level of trade. Still, weighted tariffs are often used as an alternative measure of tariffs. As can be seen from the estimates in table 4, using weighted instead of simple average tariffs does not change any of our results qualitatively and hardly matters quantitatively. Mainly, time to export as well as the applied

**TABLE 3**
On the impact of most favoured nation tariffs and time to export on international trade, OLS estimates

| | Panel A: Replication of the estimates from table 1 | | | | | Panel B: Replication of the estimates from table 2 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| | 2012 Cross-section | 2005–2012 Panel | 2005–2012 Pair FEs | 2005, 2008, 2011 Intervals | 2005–2012 Applied tariff | 2012 Applied tariff Cross-section | 2005–2012 Panel | 2005–2012 Pair FEs | 2005, 2008, 2011 Intervals | 2005–2012 Applied tariff |
| $I_{ij}$ | −1.005* | −1.398*** | | | | 0.758 | −0.052 | | | |
| | (0.572) | (0.415) | | | | (0.683) | (0.355) | | | |
| $\ln(DIST)_{ij}$ | −1.318*** | −1.346*** | | | | −1.324*** | −1.345*** | | | |
| | (0.112) | (0.105) | | | | (0.112) | (0.105) | | | |
| $CONTIG_{ij}$ | 0.336 | 0.282 | | | | 0.338 | 0.291 | | | |
| | (0.229) | (0.204) | | | | (0.230) | (0.202) | | | |
| $COMLANG_{ij}$ | 0.822*** | 0.752*** | | | | 0.814*** | 0.746*** | | | |
| | (0.164) | (0.142) | | | | (0.164) | (0.143) | | | |
| $COLONY_{ij}$ | 0.744*** | 0.721*** | | | | 0.739*** | 0.715*** | | | |
| | (0.172) | (0.189) | | | | (0.175) | (0.190) | | | |
| $\ln \tau_{jt}^{MFN,simple}$ | −21.363** | −14.973*** | −6.607*** | −9.632*** | −6.096*** | −19.215*** | −9.054*** | −4.954** | −8.491*** | −4.440* |
| | (8.090) | (3.298) | (2.080) | (2.588) | (2.137) | (6.300) | (2.369) | (2.262) | (2.762) | (2.393) |
| $\tau_{it}^{TTE}$ | | | | | | −0.138*** | −0.106*** | −0.020 | −0.013 | −0.020 |
| | | | | | | (0.040) | (0.012) | (0.016) | (0.012) | (0.016) |
| $RTA_{ijt}$ | 0.487*** | 0.376*** | −0.018 | 0.018 | −0.023 | 0.478*** | 0.367*** | −0.018 | 0.018 | −0.023 |
| | (0.152) | (0.127) | (0.093) | (0.085) | (0.092) | (0.152) | (0.125) | (0.093) | (0.085) | (0.092) |
| $\ln \tau_{ijt}^{applied,simple}$ | | | | | −0.582 | | | | | −0.583 |
| | | | | | (0.734) | | | | | (0.734) |
| Bilateral FEs | | | X | X | X | | | X | X | X |
| $N$ | 4,056 | 33,349 | 33,262 | 12,365 | 33,262 | 4,056 | 33,349 | 33,262 | 12,365 | 33,262 |

**NOTES:** This table reports gravity estimates using OLS for 68 countries in 2012 in columns (1) and (6) and an unbalanced panel from 2005 to 2012 in columns (2), (3), (5), (7), (8) and (10). Columns (4) and (9) use every third year. Dependent variable are logged values of bilateral trade flows, $\ln X_{ijt}$, including domestic trade. Trade flows are calculated as the average of reported trade flows from country $i$ to $j$ if COMTRADE reports both imports and exports; if only imports or exports are observed, these are used. Constructed domestic trade flows are set to missing if negative (5 observations in the cross-section for 2012, 15 observations for the panel regressions; for details, see table A2). All regressions include exporter(exporter–year) and importer(importer–year) fixed effects. In addition, columns (3) to (5) and (8) to (10) also include directional country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to two-way clustering at the importer and exporter level. * for $p < 0.1$, ** for $p < 0.05$ and *** for $p < 0.01$. See main text for further details.

**TABLE 4**
Most favoured nation tariffs and time to export – Robustness checks: Weighted most favoured nation tariffs

| | Panel A: Replication of the estimates from table 1 | | | | | Panel B: Replication of the estimates from table 2 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1)<br>2012<br>Cross-section | (2)<br>2005–2012<br>Panel | (3)<br>2005–2012<br>Pair FEs | (4)<br>2005, 2008, 2011<br>Intervals | (5)<br>2005–2012<br>Applied tariff | (6)<br>2012<br>Cross-section | (7)<br>2005–2012<br>Panel | (8)<br>2005–2012<br>Pair FEs | (9)<br>2005, 2008, 2011<br>Intervals | (10)<br>2005–2012<br>Applied tariff |
| $I_{ij}$ | -1.936*** | -1.858*** | | | | -1.187*** | -1.271*** | | | |
| | (0.246) | (0.222) | | | | (0.306) | (0.189) | | | |
| $\ln(DIST)_{ij}$ | -0.750*** | -0.798*** | | | | -0.775*** | -0.786*** | | | |
| | (0.073) | (0.063) | | | | (0.080) | (0.065) | | | |
| $CONTIG_{ij}$ | 0.403*** | 0.372*** | | | | 0.430*** | 0.392*** | | | |
| | (0.102) | (0.105) | | | | (0.113) | (0.110) | | | |
| $COMLANG_{ij}$ | 0.387*** | 0.474*** | | | | 0.327*** | 0.346*** | | | |
| | (0.092) | (0.073) | | | | (0.084) | (0.063) | | | |
| $COLONY_{ij}$ | 0.128 | 0.022 | | | | 0.102 | 0.023 | | | |
| | (0.114) | (0.138) | | | | (0.114) | (0.130) | | | |
| $\ln \bar{\tau}^{MFN,weighted}_{jt}$ | -14.596*** | -13.725*** | -5.966*** | -10.302*** | -5.054** | -13.444*** | -11.271*** | -4.159** | -8.702*** | -3.473* |
| | (3.527) | (4.066) | (2.186) | (1.589) | (1.981) | (3.563) | (4.150) | (2.026) | (1.673) | (1.847) |
| $\tau^{TTE}_{it}$ | | | | | | -0.065*** | -0.065*** | -0.036*** | -0.025** | -0.035*** |
| | | | | | | (0.014) | (0.012) | (0.005) | (0.010) | (0.005) |
| $RTA_{ijt}$ | 0.360*** | 0.264*** | 0.100* | 0.094** | 0.092* | 0.329*** | 0.315*** | 0.074 | 0.082* | 0.068 |
| | (0.078) | (0.088) | (0.053) | (0.046) | (0.052) | (0.076) | (0.084) | (0.049) | (0.044) | (0.049) |
| $\ln \bar{\tau}^{applied,weighted}_{ijt}$ | | | | | -1.517** | | | | | -1.211** |
| | | | | | (0.621) | | | | | (0.562) |
| Bilateral FEs | | | X | X | X | | | X | X | X |
| N | 4,059 | 33,400 | 33,400 | 12,492 | 33,400 | 4,059 | 33,400 | 33,400 | 12,492 | 33,400 |

**NOTES:** This table reports gravity estimates using a PPML estimator for 68 countries in 2012 in columns (1) and (6) and an unbalanced panel from 2005 to 2012 in columns (2), (3), (5), (7), (8) and (10). Columns (4) and (9) use every third year. Dependent variable are bilateral trade flows, $X_{ijt}$, including domestic trade. Trade flows are calculated as the average of reported trade flows from country $i$ to $j$ if COMTRADE reports both imports and exports; if only imports or exports are observed, these are used. Constructed domestic trade flows are set to missing if negative (five observations in the cross-section for 2012, 15 observations for the panel regressions; for details, see table A2). All regressions include exporter(exporter-year) and importer(importer-year) fixed effects. In addition, columns (3) to (5) and (8) to (10) also include directional country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to two-way clustering at the importer and exporter level. * for $p < 0.1$, ** for $p < 0.05$ and *** for $p < 0.01$. See main text for further details.

tariff turn significant even when controlling for bilateral fixed effects. This is different from table 2, where the simple average of the applied tariff was not significant.

Until now, all our regressions used trade data from COMTRADE augmented with production data from UNIDO's INDSTAT2 database. The main reason for this is that it allowed us to include the largest number of countries possible in our analysis. A potential disadvantage of this approach is that, because the data from COMTRADE and INDSTAT2 are collected independently, measurement discrepancies between the two databases can, in a few cases, lead to negative constructed domestic trade flows. In our sample, this happens for 15 observations from eight smaller countries (for details, see table A2). In these cases, we have set the domestic trade flow to missing. 68 countries for eight years as in our (unbalanced) sample implies that we need to construct $68 \times 8 = 544$ domestic trade flows. Hence the 15 negative domestic trade flows represent less than 3% of all potential domestic trade flows. As can be seen from table A2, there is no apparent pattern of a particular country's constructed domestic trade flows being always negative. This suggests a classical measurement error problem, not a systematic bias. Finally, we also note that this measurement error in the dependent variable does not lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. If the bias were systematic for a country, the importer($\times$year) and exporter($\times$year) fixed effects would control for this bias. Still, some researchers may prefer using data, such as the WIOD database, that are constructed in a consistent way such that negative domestic trade flows do not occur.

We therefore reestimate table 2 using international and domestic merchandise trade data from WIOD (Release 2016). WIOD contains information on 43 countries. After merging with the tariff data and the time-to-export variable, we are left with 31 countries, considerably less than the 68 countries in our baseline data set. Of the countries with constructed negative domestic trade flows in our baseline data set, only Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania are included in WIOD. The correlation between all trade data from COMTRADE and the WIOD trade data is 0.99, and the correlation between only domestic trade data from COMTRADE and WIOD is 0.95.[40] We present results in table 5. As can be seen, the sample size is considerably smaller than in table 2. Accordingly, standard errors are larger than in table 2. The effect of the MFN tariff is of a similar size as in our larger sample. Also the effect of time to export is similar when not including pair fixed effects across both data sets. When including pair fixed effects, the dampening trade effect of time to export is reduced. In sum, using WIOD prevents negative constructed trade flows but does not change our broad conclusions concerning the efficacy of our proposed method.

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40 See appendix A3 for a scatter plot and further discussion of the comparison of domestic trade data from COMTRADE and WIOD.

**TABLE 5**
Using WIOD data

| | (1) 2012 Cross-section | (2) 2005–2012 Panel | (3) 2005–2012 Pair FEs | (4) 2005, 2008, 2011 Intervals | (5) 2005–2012 Applied tariff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $I_{ij}$ | −1.438*** | −1.208*** | | | |
| | (0.302) | (0.279) | | | |
| $\ln(DIST)_{ij}$ | −0.846*** | −0.925*** | | | |
| | (0.094) | (0.077) | | | |
| $CONTIG_{ij}$ | 0.320*** | 0.248*** | | | |
| | (0.108) | (0.088) | | | |
| $COMLANG_{ij}$ | 0.112 | 0.131 | | | |
| | (0.097) | (0.088) | | | |
| $COLONY_{ij}$ | 0.168 | 0.052 | | | |
| | (0.109) | (0.134) | | | |
| $\ln\bar{\tau}_{jt}^{MFN,simple}$ | −12.876*** | −10.044*** | −3.597* | −3.577 | −3.481* |
| | (4.432) | (3.504) | (2.084) | (2.484) | (2.063) |
| $\tau_{it}^{TTE}$ | −0.067*** | −0.075*** | −0.011 | −0.014 | −0.012 |
| | (0.013) | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.010) | (0.012) |
| $RTA_{ijt}$ | 0.374*** | 0.253** | 0.047 | 0.021 | 0.053 |
| | (0.100) | (0.100) | (0.056) | (0.069) | (0.055) |
| $\ln\bar{\tau}_{ijt}^{applied,simple}$ | | | | | 0.584 |
| | | | | | (0.771) |
| Bilateral FEs | | | X | X | X |
| $N$ | 901 | 7,598 | 7,598 | 2,883 | 7,598 |

**NOTES:** This table reports gravity estimates using a PPML estimator for 31 countries in 2012 in column (1) and an unbalanced panel from 2005 to 2012 in columns (2), (3) and (5). Column (4) uses every third year. Dependent variable are bilateral trade flows, $X_{ijt}$, including domestic trade. Trade flows, including domestic trade, are from WIOD. All regressions include exporter(exporter–year) and importer(importer–year) fixed effects. In addition, columns (3) to (5) also include directional country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to two-way clustering at the importer and exporter level. * for $p < 0.1$, ** for $p < 0.05$ and *** for $p < 0.01$. See main text for further details.

To summarize, the empirical analysis in this section demonstrates that our proposed method works well, produces sensible estimates and can be fruitfully applied in realistic gravity data sets.

## 5. Conclusion

The effects of unilateral or non-discriminatory trade policies are interesting and important for both for academics and policy-makers. In this paper, we propose a simple method to identify the trade effects of such policies within structural gravity models that employ complete sets of theoretically motivated fixed effects on the importer and on the exporter side. We demonstrate the validity of our method and illustrate the effectiveness of our approach by evaluating the trade effects of most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs and time to export as representative determinants of bilateral trade on the importer side and on the exporter side, respectively. A series of sensitivity experiments

(panel vs. cross-section, OLS vs. PPML, alternative measure of the regressors, etc.) demonstrate the robustness of our method and findings. In addition to quantifying the impact of non-discriminatory trade policies, our method can be extended to identify the effects of a wide range of interesting and policy-relevant, *country-specific* determinants to trade within the structural gravity model.

## Supporting information

Supplementary material accompanies the online version of this article.

## Appendix A1: Additional control variables in the cross-section

Table A1 presents a robustness check for our cross-section regressions. In addition to the regressors used in the main text, we use *ISLAND*, a dummy variable that is 1 when an exporting country is an island country, and 0 otherwise, and *LANDLOCKED*, a dummy variable that is 1 when an exporting country is a landlocked country. The information to construct these dummies comes from the Dynamic Gravity Dataset from the United States International Trade Commission; see Gurevich and Herman (2018) for documentation of the data. In line with our other regressors of interest, we interact these variables with $I_{ij}$ to identify their differential effect on international trade flows relative to domestic trade.

Note that we do not include variables that indicate whether an importing country is an island or landlocked. Beverelli et al. (2018) explain in detail that, when there is no variation in a non-discriminatory policy variable on the importer and exporter side, such as country-specific variables like being an island country or being landlocked, our method allows the identification of only an average effect on trade flows. We would obtain a numerically identical estimate when including *ISLAND*, defined as a dummy variable that is 1 when an importing country is an island country, and similarly for *LANDLOCKED*. Accordingly, we drop the subscript from the variables.[41]

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41 This phenomenon is somewhat reminiscent of Lerner symmetry. Lerner symmetry (see Lerner (1936) for the original reference and Blanchard (2009) for a good modern treatment) refers to the fact that, in a theoretical model of international trade, the same equilibrium (i.e., the same consumption and production choices, prices and welfare) can be reached by either an import tariff or an equivalently chosen export tax. Lerner symmetry is foremost a theoretical equivalence result. More importantly, it is silent on *bilateral* trade flows, as pointed out by, for example, Subramanian and Wei (2007). For Lerner symmetry to hold, the value of *aggregate* imports has to equal the value of aggregate exports; otherwise, the tariff revenue generated by the import tariff will not be identical to the revenue from the export tax. In the data, trade amongst countries is not balanced, and our gravity estimates take this into account by allowing for separate importer and exporter fixed effects. Also,

**TABLE A1**
Additional control variables in the cross-section

| | (1) PPML | (2) PPML | (3) OLS | (4) OLS | (5) PPML | (6) PPML |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $I_{ij}$ | −1.994*** | −1.068* | −1.007* | −1.017*** | −2.089*** | −1.245** |
| | (0.384) | (0.556) | (0.504) | (0.375) | (0.347) | (0.508) |
| $\ln(DIST)_{ij}$ | −0.755*** | −0.776*** | −1.320*** | −1.318*** | −0.758*** | −0.778*** |
| | (0.081) | (0.084) | (0.113) | (0.113) | (0.080) | (0.083) |
| $CONTIG_{ij}$ | 0.432*** | 0.423*** | 0.337 | 0.340 | 0.438*** | 0.431*** |
| | (0.123) | (0.133) | (0.230) | (0.229) | (0.121) | (0.132) |
| $COMLANG_{ij}$ | 0.332*** | 0.290*** | 0.818*** | 0.823*** | 0.357*** | 0.317*** |
| | (0.118) | (0.110) | (0.162) | (0.163) | (0.114) | (0.103) |
| $COLONY_{ij}$ | 0.142 | 0.133 | 0.741*** | 0.738*** | 0.116 | 0.104 |
| | (0.104) | (0.110) | (0.173) | (0.174) | (0.103) | (0.109) |
| $ISLAND$ | 0.350 | 0.035 | 0.522 | 0.472 | 0.353 | 0.068 |
| | (0.274) | (0.320) | (0.460) | (0.409) | (0.269) | (0.303) |
| $LANDLOCKED$ | 0.176 | 0.124 | −0.494 | −0.600 | 0.181 | 0.146 |
| | (0.372) | (0.337) | (0.942) | (0.939) | (0.406) | (0.368) |
| $\ln \bar{\tau}_{jt}^{MFN,simple}$ | −10.138** | −11.028*** | −21.512*** | | | |
| | (4.025) | (3.969) | (8.050) | | | |
| $\tau_{it}^{TTE}$ | | −0.067*** | | | | −0.063*** |
| | | (0.022) | | | | (0.023) |
| $RTA_{ijt}$ | 0.402*** | 0.353*** | 0.485*** | 0.484*** | 0.380*** | 0.334*** |
| | (0.080) | (0.085) | (0.152) | (0.152) | (0.084) | (0.088) |
| $\ln \bar{\tau}_{jt}^{MFN,weighted}$ | | | | −29.443*** | −12.496*** | −12.877*** |
| | | | | (6.176) | (4.633) | (4.721) |
| $N$ | 4,059 | 4,059 | 4,056 | 4,056 | 4,059 | 4,059 |

**NOTES:** This table reports gravity estimates using a PPML estimator for 68 countries in 2012 except in columns (3) and (4), which are estimated by OLS. Dependent variable are bilateral trade flows, $X_{ijt}$, including domestic trade except in columns (3) and (4), where logged values of bilateral trade flows ($\ln X_{ijt}$) are used. Trade flows are calculated as the average of reported trade flows from country $i$ to $j$ if COMTRADE reports both imports and exports; if only imports or exports are observed, these are used. Constructed domestic trade flows are set to missing if negative. All regressions include exporter and importer fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to two-way clustering at the importer and exporter level. * for $p < 0.05$, ** for $p < 0.01$ and *** for $p < 0.001$. See text for further details.

In any case, we control for these and all other time invariant country-specific variables when including directional bilateral fixed effects in our panel regressions.

The table consists of the main cross-section regressions presented in the manuscript (i.e., column (1) in table 1, column (1) in table 2, columns (1) and (6) in table 3 and columns (1) and (6) in table 4) but also controls for whether a country is an island country or is landlocked. Neither *ISLAND* nor

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Lerner symmetry breaks down if there is international investment between countries; see Blanchard (2009). The large flows of FDI observed in the data again stress that Lerner symmetry is a theoretical result, not an empirical regularity. Hence the fact that we can identify only an average effect of country-specific variables may be reminiscent of, but ultimately unrelated to, Lerner symmetry.

*LANDLOCKED* is significant in any of the regressions, whereas results on our regressor of interest remain similar to what we find in the main text.

## Appendix A2: Descriptive statistics on constructed negative domestic trade flows

**TABLE A2**
Number of observations with constructed negative domestic trade flows

| | Year | | | | | | |
| Country | 2005 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Eritrea | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Ireland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Kuwait | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Lithuania | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Latvia | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| Nepal | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Tajikistan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 15 |

**NOTES:** This table reports the number of observations where our method to construct domestic trade flows delivers negative domestic trade flows. We set these observations to missing, i.e., we exclude them from our regressions.

## Appendix A3: Difference in the constructed domestic trade flows between the UNIDO and WIOD data

In this appendix, we provide further details on the difference in the constructed domestic trade flows between the UNIDO and WIOD data. Figure A1 shows a scatter plot of the constructed log domestic trade flows using UNIDO and WIOD data for the 31 countries that are included in both UNIDO and WIOD for all available years. As can be seen, the correlation between constructed domestic trade flows is high. The $R^2$ of the linear fit through the scatter plot is 90.21%, implying a correlation of 0.95, only slightly lower than the correlation of 0.99 between all (log) trade flows. The scatter plot also marks country–year combinations for which the difference between the log constructed trade flows is larger than 5%, but lower than 10% (marked with "+"; 9 observations). The country–year combinations are India between 2006 and 2011, Latvia in 2005 and Mexico in 2009 and 2010. We also mark differences equal or larger than 10% (market with "x"; 9 observations). The country–year combinations are India in 2005, Ireland in 2009, Lithuania in 2010 and 2011 and Mexico from 2005 to 2008 as well as in 2011. This highlights that, particularly for India and Mexico, researchers should investigate thoroughly which data source to use when constructing domestic trade data.

**FIGURE A1** Correlation of internal trade flows: UNIDO vs. WIOD

## Appendix A4: List of countries

The following countries are included in our panel data set: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Vietnam.

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