A STATEMENT

OF THE

PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTS

OF A PROPOSED

NATIONAL SOCIETY,

FOR THE

CURE AND PREVENTION OF PAUPERISM,

BY MEANS OF

SYSTEMATIC COLONIZATION.

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STATEMENT,

COLONIZATION, strictly speaking, signifies the creation of every thing but land where nothing but land exists; and it is in this sense only that we propose to use the word. The progress of colonization, in this its strictest sense, must greatly depend on the mode in which the land shall become the property of individuals,—the mode adopted by the government in the disposal of that on which all other things are to be created. That there has been a total disregard of principle in the modes of granting land in new colonies seems to be proved by this remarkable fact,—that the same mode never was pursued in any two colonies, and that in every colony there have been many changes in the manner of supplying fresh territory. In all America, from Buenos Ayres to Nova Scotia, not less than a hundred different modes have been adopted; and at this time, several modes, totally differing from each
other, are pursued in the three great British colonies, Canada, South Africa, and Australasia. Yet it is certain that there must be some one mode better than all the others;—it is certain that, in this, as in every other great operation of public economy, there must be some first principles, by adhering to which the best possible course would be pursued. It would, we admit, have been impossible to prescribe, on the discovery of America, a general law for the guidance of proceedings in colonization; because there has existed a great variety in the objects with which waste countries have been settled. The main object, for instance, of the first settlers in Canada, was to carry on a trade in furs;—that of the first settlers in South America was to obtain gold; that of the settlers at Sierra Leone was to humanize the Africans. But, at this time, the sole objects of the British government in promoting colonization, in the sense which is here attached to the word, ought to be everywhere the same. If we state those objects correctly, we have only to ascertain the best mode of effecting them, in order to lay down the principles which ought to guide the British government in the conduct of colonization.

The main, indeed the sole, objects of this state in promoting colonization, appear to be two. Firstly—to afford the greatest possible relief to the most miserable class in Britain, by enabling
the greatest number of them to emigrate. Secondly—to create the largest possible market, or as many markets as possible, for the products of British industry.

If this statement be correct, the best mode of colonization is that which, being unobjectionable in other respects, would enable the greatest number of English paupers to enjoy the necessaries and comforts of life, and to multiply in waste countries.

The population of Britain being about twenty millions, and possessing a natural power of increase at the rate of four per cent. per annum, we may presume that if the territory of Britain could be suddenly increased fourfold, the twenty millions would become forty millions in about twenty years. As we know that the British state has at its disposal a waste but naturally fertile territory, at least ten times as large as Britain, it seems plain that the only obstacle to the emigration of more than half a million of English people every year, and a proportionate spread of colonization, is the distance of the colonies from the mother country. If the colonies could be brought to Britain, her population might exert its utmost capacity of increase without a check; and the colonies would soon be covered with people, because the increase of people would begin with a procreative power of twenty millions, and would
proceed continually whilst any good land remained uncultivated. The North Americans are the most extensive colonizers (in the strict and proper sense of the word) that ever existed. They have plenty of waste land close to their increasing population. If Britain had plenty of waste land close to her population, she might colonize twice as fast as America; because she would start with a nursery of twenty millions,—whereas the American nursery is only ten millions. The vicinity of waste land is the greatest facility, the distance of waste land the greatest obstacle, to colonization. We are labouring to establish a truism; but on this truism the whole theory in question is founded: it is at least a safe foundation.

Let us now inquire in what manner the distance of the colonies operates as a check to emigration,—in what manner, distance, and distance only, prevents the increase of twenty millions of people from spreading over the waste countries which they call theirs.

First. Attachment to the country of one's birth is perhaps the strongest, and certainly the most prevailing affection, of the human mind; for it involves many other affections, such as love of parents and friends; and it becomes a second nature, through the force of numerous habits which strengthen with every day of a man's
growth. And this affection influences men even above the degree in which they themselves feel it, by the more powerful degree in which it is felt by women. If America had been close to England, millions of Englishmen would have emigrated, who have been kept at home by this affection; and, as it is, thousands would have emigrated, notwithstanding this affection, who have been kept at home by their sisters, mothers, daughters, and wives. The sole motive to emigration is the desire to better one's condition. No one will emigrate until that desire become stronger than attachment to country. Hence it follows that there is but little disposition to emigrate, except amongst the classes who are very miserable. Some few, indeed, do emigrate, whose condition is not perfectly wretched; but they are very few as compared with the number of their class who would emigrate if the colonies were close at hand. We may say, therefore, that the distance of the colonies, by operating on that strong affection, attachment to country, checks the emigration of all but the very miserable.

But is this to be regretted? Is it at all desirable that a strong temptation should be held out to the emigration of the middle classes, who, if they should emigrate in large numbers, would constantly abstract large masses of capital from the country? The eastern states of North America are constantly suffering by the emigration,
to the West, of citizens not paupers. The paucity of capital in those eastern states (after fifty years of self-government) is a matter of wonder to Europeans, and of regret to the most sensible Americans.* Perhaps it might be shown that no inconsiderable number of the labouring poor of Britain have been thrown out of employment, during the last year, by the emigration of farmers and others, having capital, to the new settlement in Western Australia. But it is quite needless to prove that the constant and permanent abstraction of capital from any state must be injurious rather than beneficial. The distance of the colonies, therefore, operates beneficially to the parent state, when, by acting on the love of country, it checks the emigration of those who are not miserable. Our own governments, however, appear to have thought quite otherwise; for, as far as any deliberate purpose can be discovered in the various modes of colonization which they have adopted, from the plantation of Virginia to the new settlement in Western Australia,—that purpose seems to have been to tempt persons, not paupers, to abstract capital from the country. †

* Some of the Eastern States have lately borrowed, or are still endeavouring to borrow, English capital for the execution of great public works, of which the utility and the profit to the undertakers have been long since demonstrated, but which could not be undertaken for want of capital.

† “The capital for peopling Virginia was raised by a lottery,
Secondly. How does distance operate to prevent the emigration of by far the most numerous class,—the very miserable—who have no reason to love their country, and who, instead of being useful to their country, are its greatest burthen? This class is so very wretched, that the desire of bettering their condition takes place of all other passions. An affection for warmth and food is the strongest desire of shivering starving paupers. Why, then, do they not emigrate in immense numbers to countries where their labour would be amply rewarded? For the very reason which inclines them to emigrate,—their extreme poverty, which absolutely prevents them from moving. If men of that class do not work hard all this week, they starve all next week. They have not leisure to think of emigration,—much less to take any measures for removal; or, if maintained in idleness by parish charity, they are still chained to the spot. But, above all, even supposing them well informed of the advantages of emigration, and able to move to a sea-port, they are totally unable to defray the cost of a passage to

and was spoken of as the real food by which Virginia was nourished."—*Marshall's Life of Washington*, Vol. 1. p. 54.

Extract from the regulations for granting land at Swan River. "Such persons as may arrive in that settlement before the end of the year 1830, will receive, in the order of their arrival, allotments of land, free of quit-rent, *proportioned to the capital* which they may be prepared to invest in the improvement of the land."
the colonies! As every labourer emigrating to a waste country might produce more than he would consume, and thereby provide employment for other labourers, it may be stated that the only obstacle to the emigration of paupers is the cost of passage; and this is the way in which distance operates to prevent the increase of twenty millions of people from spreading over the waste countries which they call theirs.

We have thus endeavoured to establish another truism. This, however, is a safe mode of proceeding.

Having determined that cost of passage, alone, prevents the emigration of immense numbers of paupers, it is time to enter on the main question—May passage, cost free, be provided for such a number of paupers as would, during many years at least, relieve this country of its excess of people?

Bonaparte used to instruct his generals to "make the war support the war." He did not invent that method of making war; but he used it more extensively than any other conqueror. It is the first principle of conquest, and, like all truths, has existed from the beginning, and will exist to the end of the world, if war should last so long. In like manner the payment of colonization by itself is the first principle of colonization. The emigrant having capital, recovers in the colony the cost of his settlement; the pauper
emigrant whose passage is found by a capitalist, repays the outlay by his labour in the colony; and the labourer who provides his own passage, repays himself by the higher wages that he obtains in the colony. Were not this the case, there never would have been any emigration to distant countries, for the purpose of colonization, in the sense which in which, alone, we use the word. If, as appears manifest, this be the main principle of colonization, it follows that the best method of colonization is that, which will bring that main principle into the largest operation.

Two methods of giving considerable operation to that principle have been tried:—

1st. That of providing a free passage to "indentured labourers," obtaining from their labour in the colony a return for the outlay. 2d. That of advances by Government for the passage and location of paupers, looking for repayment of the advance to an increase in the value of the land so located, and to the produce of the settler's labour on that land.

The former method has been practised for two centuries, but is now nearly abandoned. It has never afforded any considerable relief to the miserable classes in Britain, and it never can,—for, either the indented emigrant is not held to his bond, in which case the capitalist who has paid for his passage is a loser; or, if he be held to his bond, his condition is not bettered. In the
one case, the capitalist is dissatisfied—in the other, the labourer; and both cases operate as "an example to deter." Up to the time of the American Revolution, capitalists in America did manage, by an excessive tyranny, to hold indented emigrants to their bonds; but the consequence was, that there were very few voluntary emigrants of that description, and that the extreme want of labourers led to a species of slave-trade in whites, called "kidnapping." Since the American Revolution it has been found quite impossible in the United States,* and very difficult in the British colonies, to hold an indented emigrant to his bond. "There is no instance on record in the history of the colony," says a principal landowner of New South Wales† "where settlers have been able to prevent their indented servants, hired in England, from becoming dissatisfied, and then

* The great number of poor Germans conveyed to the Northern States of America during the late war, and sold under the name of "redemptioners," would appear to form an important exception to this general rule; but these foreign bondsmen were, in point of fact, not indented labourers, but temporary slaves. Their total ignorance of the laws, and even of the language, of America, placed them at the mercy of their masters; and very often but little mercy was shewn to them. On their arrival at the American ports they were actually sold to the highest bidder; and, in too many cases, the master contrived to prolong the term of service agreed upon, by bringing his bondsmen in debt, and requiring to be repaid in labour.

† Mr. M'Arthur.
leaving them after their arrival." It is clear, therefore, that colonization, to any great extent, by means of providing a free passage for indented labourers, is become impracticable. This method of colonization was never of any use to the mother country, nor of any permanent use to any colony; because, as to the mother country, the emigrants were too few to afford any relief to those who remained behind; and because, as to the colonies, they were all males, who caused no permanent increase of the colonial population.* So much for the former method.

The latter method—that of advances by Government for the passage and location of pauper settlers,—was recommended by the Parliamentary Committee on Emigration. All that can possibly be said in justification of such advances will be found in a letter from Mr. Took to Mr. Wilmot Horton, published by the latter in his "Causes and Remedies of Pauperism." Mr. Took, however, supposes that the state would merely advance certain funds, and would be sure of re-payment: whereas there seems no hope that advances for the passage and location of paupers would

* In the course of twenty years after the first plantation of Virginia, nine thousand emigrants reached the colony. At the end of the twenty years the population of the settlement was only 1800. It is believed that the population of New South Wales was in the fortieth year of the settlement, less than the number of emigrants during the forty years.
ever be repaid by those paupers, suddenly converted into landowners. This, at least, is certain,—that nearly all paupers so located would be ignorant and improvident; and that either ignorance, or improvidence, or idleness, or drunkenness, or fever, or a serious bodily accident, or a wandering disposition, not to mention death, would prevent the pauper settled and located by Government from repaying by his labour the cost of his passage and location. And as for the repayment of the advances of Government through the improved value of the land held by the settler, it is very sure that in a thinly-peopled country, where the soil is naturally rich, new land is worth more than land which has been exhausted. There is hardly a work on America that does not complain of the practice of exhausting land; but the New England settler (who understands settling better than any body) knows that the best course, with a view to profit only, is to exhaust an allotment of land, to obtain a second allotment, and exhaust that also, and so on continually. In Canada and the United States there are hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of acres of land, once fertile and cultivated, but which are now deserted, and will not for a century to come resume their ancient fertility! In a country where the disproportion between people and territory is so great, that new land may always be obtained, either for nothing, or for a very low price, the settler who
looks to nothing but profit, has only to calculate the difference between the cost of maintaining the fertility of cleared land by skilful cultivation, and the cost of obtaining new land and preparing it for seed. As, in such countries, the wages of labour are generally extravagantly high, skilful cultivation, or rather what is considered skilful cultivation, in old countries, is very expensive; and the cost of maintaining the fertility of old land is greater than the cost of obtaining new land and preparing it to yield a succession of rich crops without skilful cultivation. Hence the New Englander often finds "squatting" (the exhaustion and abandonment of new land) more profitable than "settling." Some American and several English writers seem to imagine that the "squatter" is actuated solely by a wish to evade the payment of any first price for his land: but when the moderation of the highest price any where required for new land, and the disadvantages of settling without a title, are considered, it will appear, that he who cultivates new land without a title, and abandons it as soon as it is exhausted, acts, principally, on a conviction that it is more profitable to exhaust new land than to cultivate old land. This, at least, seems a just conclusion as to every case where the settler exercises a choice; but it must be borne in mind that, in most cases, there is an absolute want of labourers, even at the highest rate of wages, and,
that, consequently, the settler does not exercise a choice. The exhaustion of land is not by any means confined to those who make use of land without a title. Except in the neighbourhood of towns the practice is almost universal. It is in fact the result, not of a wise calculation, but of absolute necessity. One man unable to obtain the assistance of other labourers, and compelled, therefore, to do almost every thing for himself, can bestow but a small portion of his time on the mere production of food. With his own hands he must build and repair his house, make and mend his furniture, and follow an infinite number of occupations unconnected with tillage. His labours in the field, therefore, and the tools with which he works, are of the rudest kind. "An English farmer," said Washington, in a letter to Arthur Young, "ought to have a horrid idea of the state of our agriculture, or the nature of our soil, when he is informed that one acre with us only produces eight or ten bushels. But it must be kept in mind, that where land is cheap and labour dear, men are fonder of cultivating much than cultivating well. Much ground has been scratched, and none cultivated as it ought to be." Where land is extremely cheap, or may be obtained for nothing, and where, consequently, labour for hire is not only dear, but very scarce, and often even quite wanting, "scratching," instead of good cultivation, is unavoidable; and
where so barbarous a mode of cultivation is unavoidable, plenty of food could not be obtained otherwise than by the continued exhaustion of new land, of which the great temporary fertility compensates for the less productive nature of the labour bestowed upon it. One of the most celebrated English writers on political economy has attributed the constant exhaustion and abandonment of land, in the slave states, to a want of animal manure, in consequence of the labour of cattle being performed by men; but every English farmer knows that his land would soon be exhausted, if he had no manure but what is furnished by his working cattle; and there are many districts of Europe, such as the mountainous coasts of Spain and Italy, not to mention nearly the whole Chinese empire, where agricultural labour is entirely performed by men, and where, nevertheless, land is maintained in the highest state of fertility by means of animal manure. At all events, it is established in America, that land which has been long cultivated is of less value than new land, unless, indeed, it be situated near a town, so that all, or a part of it, acquire the character of accommodation-land. In this latter case, no doubt, the land will improve in value with the increase of inhabitants, even though it should remain unsettled; but this forms the exception to the general rule, and a very rare exception it must be in such completely
waste districts as could be located by emigrants from Britain. It appears, therefore, that the hope of obtaining repayment of the advances made to pauper settlers, either through the produce of their labour, or through the improved value of their land, is entirely delusive. If so, however, it is a delusion into which any inhabitant of an old country, who had never seen a new country, might easily fall; and as the reasoning faculties of the inhabitants of "new countries" are not, generally speaking, much better cultivated than their land, we have no right to quarrel with the colonial evidence by which this delusion was propagated in England.

It is needless to dwell longer on either of these, at the best, very inadequate methods of making colonization pay for itself. Let us now inquire whether there be any other method which should combine the principle of self-payment with an operation in practice sufficiently extensive to prevent, in the mother-country, whatever misery arises from an excess of people. If it be possible to point out such a method of colonization, then the natural increase of twenty millions of people might spread over the waste countries which they call theirs.

Taking the population of Britain to be twenty millions, and supposing that their utmost power of increase, if exercised without any check from misery, would move at the rate of four per cent.
per annum, the twenty millions might become forty millions in about twenty years, and the first year's increase would be eight hundred thousand. The constant yearly removal, therefore, of eight hundred thousand persons, would prevent any domestic increase, even though the condition of the people were perfectly happy. Supposing the cost of removing one person to be 10/.,* the cost of absolutely preventing any domestic increase would be 8,000,000/ per annum. But the procreative power of a people is not equally shared amongst them all; it resides in those only who are capable of procreation. The procreative power, every year brought into action, resides in those couples who every year attain the age of puberty. The proportion to the whole population of those who every year attain the age of puberty, varies, of course, with the rate at which the population may be increasing. In this case we are supposing a happy people to multiply continually at the greatest possible rate, which, as above stated, is taken to be four per cent. per annum. Let us farther suppose that when a population is increasing at the rate of four per cent. per annum, the number of couples who every year

* "In the year 1824-5, some three hundred settlers from the north of Scotland found means to evade the regulations intended for their benefit, and their passage to Cape Breton did not cost them more than 50s. or 3l. each."—Quarterly Review, No. 83, page 84.
attain the age of puberty is as one to one hundred in proportion to the whole population. The pro-
creative power every year brought into action, would in that case be two hundred thousand young couples. The yearly removal of the whole procreative power every year brought into action, or, in other words, the constant removal of all the young couples, would of course soon depopulate the country. This might be effected at a cost (the passage of each person costing 10l.) of 4,000,000l. per annum. Thus, by a selection of emigrants, the country might be depopulated, for one half of what it would cost to prevent any domestic increase by removing the increase without selection.

| The constant yearly removal of the increase, say eight hundred thousand persons, would cost per annum | 8,000,000l. |
| All the young couples | 4,000,000l. |
| Balance in favour of depopulation | 4,000,000l. |

But though the expenditure of 4,000,000l. a-year in one way would soon depopulate the country, while the expenditure of 8,000,000l. a-year in another way would be necessary only to prevent any increase, our object is to do, in the cheapest possible way, no more than that for which, on the above suppositions, the larger sum would be required. What is the smallest amount of emigration which, with selection, would prevent any increase? What is the proportion of the
procreative power every year brought into action, the yearly removal of which would prevent any increase at home? Whatever that proportion, the removal of a little more, or a little less, must occasion a decrease, or permit an increase, as might be desirable.

We pretend not to determine that proportion. The constant yearly removal of half the young couples would, it is evident, ultimately depopulate the country. Let us suppose that the constant yearly removal of one quarter would prevent any increase. If so, and supposing all the young couples to be two hundred thousand, all domestic increase might be prevented by a yearly outlay of 1,000,000l. Thus the same end might be obtained in one way, at a cost of one-eighth of what it would demand if pursued in another way. In most cases there is one way of proceeding far better than all the others.

Now, taking for granted that the expenditure of 1,000,000l. per annum would prevent any increase of the domestic population, and that a slight addition to that outlay would cause a decrease of people, it becomes plain that the greater part of the poor-rate,—all that part of it which supports in idleness persons capable of labour,—might be saved at a cost amounting to less than one-seventh of the whole tax. This is an important consideration. But it is trifling
when compared with the next that presents itself.

Supposing 1,000,000l. per annum to be expended in the removal of a number of young couples, sufficient to enable the population remaining behind to exert their utmost capacity of increase; and supposing, further, that the persons removed were happily placed in the colonies,—the whole population, colonial and domestic, might double themselves in twenty years. Being twenty millions in 1830, they might become forty millions in 1850. In only twenty years, therefore, Britain might create a colonial population double the amount of that which it has taken two hundred years to create in the States of North America! And the cost of so mighty a work would be about one-seventh of the tax levied in Britain during the same period for the maintenance of paupers.

This is, no doubt, a startling conclusion; but it may be true, nevertheless. We all expect that the actual ten millions of Americans will be twenty millions in little more than twenty years; and if they were twenty millions now, we should expect them to become forty millions. We expect them to increase as they have increased heretofore, because we know that there is no check to the greatest natural power of increase amongst a skilful and industrious people, who
are able to increase their territory with the increase of their numbers. If the check of misery did not operate upon any part of the British population, either domestic or colonial, we believe that they would increase quite as fast as the Americans. If we could bring home our colonies to our people, we believe that the people would double themselves in twenty years. Why, then, should we doubt that, if the operation of distance as a check to colonization be prevented, at a cost of £1,000,000 per annum, the expenditure of £1,000,000 per annum would enable our people to multiply as rapidly as the Americans?

Whence, however, are we to derive that potent sum of £1,000,000 per annum,—having regard to the first principle of colonization, viz., that it should pay for itself?

According to the above suppositions, 20,000,000l. of money, and twenty years of time, would suffice for creating twenty millions of colonial people. If twenty millions of people were scattered over a territory as large as Europe, they must be a very poor people. Under such circumstances they could not possibly be rich; and the reasons for their poverty are obvious. But if they were concentrated on a territory twice, or, at most, three times, as large as Britain, and if they were also skilful and industrious, they would be a wealthy people. If created within so short a period as twenty years by emigration from this
civilized country, we may presume that they would be skilful, industrious, and wealthy. Let us suppose that their income were equal only to a tenth part of that of Britain, which is now estimated at 300,000,000l. per annum. Their income for one year would still amount to more than the whole cost of their creation, viz. 20,000,000l. Here, then, is an obvious means of making colonization pay for itself! It seems probable that a tax of ten per cent. upon the landed rental only of such a people would pay five per cent. interest on the sum employed in their creation, and, if redeemed at twenty years' purchase, would finally repay the principal.

These calculations have not any pretension to accuracy; nor, as they are offered merely in illustration of a principle, is it necessary that they should be strictly accurate. If we are supposed to have underrated the cost of creating twenty millions of skilful, industrious, and wealthy people, we are ready to admit that it might amount to 50,000,000l. (about one-sixth of the yearly income of Britain); and it will still be evident that a small deduction from the wealth of the created people would repay the cost of calling them into existence.

In further illustration of this principle, let us suppose that a portion of colonial territory, equal to twice the extent of the United Empire, could be transported to the coast of Britain, and that
the cost of that miraculous operation were 20,000,000l. In twenty years the new territory would be cultivated by twenty millions of people, called into existence by its arrival; a deduction of twenty shillings from the income of each of those people, would produce a sum equal to the cost of their creation: or one year’s rent of the new land would probably exceed the cost of the operation by which that land had been converted from wilderness into farms and gardens. Again, let us imagine that Britain were a wilderness, and that a skilful, industrious, and wealthy British people could be created in twenty years at a cost of 20,000,000l. Who can doubt that the new people, even if they were only half as rich as the people which has in one year spent as much as 120,000,000l. in the public service, could readily pay 20,000,000l. only, for their own creation?

Still, is it possible that the people of Britain should be able to exert their utmost procreative power by an outlay of 1,000,000l. per annum? For that sum exactly, we answer, provided the points which we have assumed for illustration be correct, namely, first—that the utmost procreative power of twenty millions of people be as two hundred thousand young couples per annum; secondly—that the constant abstraction of one quarter of the procreative power would cause all the increase to take place in the colonies; and,
thirdly, that the cost of removing each person would be 10l. These figures may be altered to meet the estimate either of the wildest or of the most prudent calculator; and it will still appear that the cost of creating a new Britain might be less than one year's revenue of the new people.

But in the above hypothesis two things are assumed, which require explanation—first, that the new people of twenty millions would not be scattered over a territory as large as Europe, but would be concentrated on a territory not more than three times as large as Britain;—secondly, that the colony or colonies to be peopled, would furnish employment and plenty to a constant yearly immigration of fifty thousand young couples.

As to the first point, if the one hundred thousand emigrants yearly landed in the colony were allowed, or encouraged, or forced, as has more or less been the case in all new colonies, to spread themselves thinly over an immense territory, they would be, at the best, a poor people, like the United States Americans, or, at the worst, a sort of half Tartars, like some of the Spanish Americans at this day, or the Dutch colonists of South Africa in the last century. Wealth never did, and never can, exist without concentration. "The arts," says Sir STAMFORD RAFFLES, "never fix their roots but in a crowded population: Egypt, from the fertility of its soil and conse-
quent density of its population, led the way in science and refinement amongst ancient nations, while the sterile tracts contiguous to that favoured land have been inhabited from primeval times by dispersed tribes of unimproved barbarians." "The British nation," says a writer on Canada,* "is the greatest landowner in the world; but up to the present time we have fooled away our foreign possessions, we have marred our settlements, we have made them sinks for wealth, instead of sources from which it might be drawn. Nay, what is worse than waste of treasure, we have rusticated, and enfeebled, and vitiated our transplanted stock, all from inattention to certain simple truths in regard to the state of property." When this opinion of the Canadians was written, they were, as they are still, a very poor people, though they owned one square mile of territory to every seven souls of their population. They were poor, because they possessed a territory greatly excessive in proportion to their numbers,—because they were scattered over immense regions, separated from each other, prevented from dividing their labour, or, in one word, barbarized. At that time (1817) there were, in Britain, two hundred souls to every square mile of territory; and the people of Britain were a wealthy people, because they were not scattered, not prevented from acquiring wealth by the

* Robert Gourlay.
division of labour; because, in short, they were
a concentrated and civilized people. Examples
without end might be cited to show that, as
concentration is indispensable to wealth, poverty-
is the necessary consequence of dispersion. In
fact, a review of the entire history of the world
must convince the least reflecting inquirer, that
dispersion and wealth have never been united;
and there is no such science as political economy,
if they ever can be.

It is important, it is essential, therefore, that
the twenty millions of people to be created should
not be allowed to spread themselves over a terri-
tory immense in proportion to their numbers.
For reasons which will be presently manifest, it
would be necessary to give them a territory more
extensive than that of Britain, but it would be
equally necessary to confine them, throughout the
whole progress of their increase, within the narrow-
est limits which would permit the greatest possible
increase of people. Though we should determine
the proper amount of territory for twenty mil-
lions of colonists to be an area three times that of
Britain, and though we had a waste island of that
extent precisely, still our way would not be clear;
because the first, second, and third hundred thou-
sand emigrants would spread themselves over
that island, and degenerate into half savages.
But we have no such island: the waste territories
at the disposal of Britain are Canada, South Africa,
and Australasia, each of which being but nominally peopled, is large enough to maintain perhaps ten times twenty millions. If, as supposed above, we could bring colonial territory to the shores of Britain, and if, moreover, we could bring it piece-meal, so as to supply every year an addition of territory sufficient, but not more than sufficient, to maintain in plenty the yearly increase of people, then, indeed, there would be no difficulty in the case. The operation of converting twenty millions into forty millions of people would take place without any dispersion of any portion of the people, except only that desirable dispersion, which would give to every man land enough for his subsistence, and would thereby forbid the existence of pauperism. The newly-created people, the occupiers of the new land, would preserve the utmost division of labour compatible with the happiness of all; any number of them would be as wealthy as a similar number of the occupiers of any other portion of Britain, and they would have ample means wherewith to defray the cost of their own creation. But the days of miracles are past: by what means, then, might the people to be created by the yearly emigration of fifty thousand young couples be prevented from spreading themselves over the colonial wastes, and degenerating into half savages?

The means of effecting this all-important object
appear to be very simple, and not less certain. The waste land of the British colonies is the property of the State. The government, therefore, might determine, at pleasure, the extent of land to be appropriated by each hundred thousand emigrants, or by each emigrant. It would, of course, be the object of the government so to regulate the amount of grants as that, whilst the gradual increase of land should permit the people to exert their utmost capacity of increase, it should also maintain such a degree of concentration as might insure the greatest division of labour and accumulation of wealth, compatible with the happiness of all. Such a course of proceeding, however clearly advantageous, both to the government and to the people, would be directly opposed to that which has been adopted by all governments in the disposal of waste territory. The governments of Spain, of France, of Holland, of Britain, and of the United States, have invariably either compelled, or encouraged, or permitted, their colonial subjects to appropriate more waste land than they could possibly cultivate, and to scatter themselves over a territory immense in proportion to their numbers; but then the nations, or the germs of nations, created by the colonial policy of those governments, are, without exception, poor, ignorant, and uncivilized, when compared with the civilized nations of Europe; and it would not be difficult to show,
that every "new people," as it is called, is less poor, ignorant, and uncivilized, in proportion to the degree in which circumstances independent of government, such as very dense forests and hostile tribes of natives, interfered with the dispersing, barbarizing policy of its government. For instance, the Cape of Good Hope and the State of New York were settled by emigrants from the same country, who were, in the first instance, we may presume, equally skilful, industrious, and prudent. Yet the progress of the two colonies in wealth and civilization will not bear comparison. To what cause must the very striking difference be attributed, if not to a remarkable difference between the degrees of concentration which occurred in the two colonies? The Hollanders in North America were kept together by dense forests and hostile savages, and they preserved the civilized habits of their mother country. The Hollanders in South Africa, meeting neither dense forests nor hostile savages, dispersed themselves over the colony; they were far separated from each other; every one of them did every thing for himself; and, by degrees, they became half savages. If they had not obtained slaves, whereby some little division of labour was preserved, we may believe that they would have degenerated into perfect savages, like some of the descendants of Spaniards near the River Plate, who have forgotten the arts of civilized
life, and whose pampas are almost fit to be colonized over again! Upon the whole, it is plain, that to adopt a different policy now is both very easy and very desirable; and, at all events, the principle of colonization, which we are endeavouring to elucidate, involves a total change of policy, or rather, the adoption of what might be justly termed policy, in the disposal of waste land. We must now offer some remarks on the second point, which has hitherto been assumed without proof, viz.—that the colony or colonies to be peopled, would furnish employment to the proposed rapid increase of people. If the poor emigrants were landed in a perfectly waste country, they must be all starved. Whatever the number of pauper emigrants landed in any Colony, such of them as could not obtain employment must be starved; and unless all of them should obtain profitable employment, that is, an ample provision by their labour, the main purpose of their emigration would not be effected. If not starved, they would be miserable; and if in the least degree miserable, they would not exert their greatest natural power of increase. Their misery, whether taken by itself, or viewed as a check to their increase, would be equally fatal to the purpose for which the state had promoted their emigration. Indeed, it would effectually prevent extensive emigration. A desire to better one's condition is, we must repeat, the
sole motive to emigration; and the most wretched pauper would prefer misery in his own parish house-of-idleness, to misery in Canada, South Africa, or Australasia. He would even prefer misery at home to only comparative plenty in a distant land. Nothing would induce him to emigrate but the certainty of obtaining absolute plenty,—an ample provision of food, clothes and fuel, for himself, his wife, and any number of children. It is the more necessary to insist on this point, because we are supposing, always, that the condition of the whole domestic population would be improved. Supposing the condition of the people of Britain to be such that want did not operate as a check to the procreation and rearing of children, an indispensable condition of the new mode of colonization would be, that the emigrant labourer should obtain in the colony an existence even superior to an ample provision of mere necessaries. He must be enabled, besides maintaining his family in ease, to lay by some property every year, and to become, in time, an employer of other labourers—an occupier, if not a proprietor, of land. Such a prospect would be a motive to emigration, with those in the mother-country who should not be satisfied to remain labourers for hire during the whole course of their lives,—to those amongst the labouring classes who might feel ambitious to acquire some leisure for the improvement of
their minds, and the means of raising their children in the scale of society. If pauperism were extinguished in Britain, a less favourable prospect would not provide the amount of emigration requisite to prevent the return of pauperism. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that a prospect not less favourable should be held out, not only to every male emigrant, but to fifty thousand male emigrants, every year.

In order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion with respect to this essential feature of the scheme under review, we must have recourse to an elementary proposition in political economy. Employment for agricultural labour is furnished by land and capital united. Land by itself, however rich and plentiful, will not furnish employment to labourers having no capital; because, if without capital, they would starve whilst endeavouring to render the land productive. Without capital, they would be without cattle for breeding, without implements, without seed, and, above all, without food to keep them alive until food should be produced. So, again, agricultural capital without land will not furnish employment to labour. A large or small number of people, isolated on a barren rock, must be starved in thirteen months, though they possessed cattle, implements, seed, and a twelve-months' provision of food. These are truisms; but we beg the reader to keep them in mind.
There are many countries whose inhabitants possess twice, three times, ten times, as much land as they cultivate, and where, nevertheless, emigrant labourers would not find employment, because they would not meet a demand for labour, or, in other words, a superabundance of capital. Britain is an example of a country in which there is abundance, if not superabundance, of capital, in proportion to profitable employment for it, but where thousands of the people are starving, because there is a deficiency of fertile land whereon to employ more capital in the production of food. No country can furnish, from its own soil, ample employment to a very rapidly increasing population, unless there exist in it an abundance both of land and of capital. The United States are an example of such a country; for though there be, in the United States, a paucity of capital with reference to the objects in which capital might be profitably employed, the high rate of wages proves that there is abundance of capital in proportion to labour. The principal British colonies are in a similar condition. Their inhabitants, having emanated from a highly civilized country, are industrious, skilful, and prudent; and even wealthy, when compared with the inhabitants of some other countries where land is in equal superabundance. They produce more than they consume; they accumulate; they possess capital; they are con-
stantly struggling for civilization against the barbarizing tendency of dispersion. In all those countries there exists an urgent demand for labour,—an abundance of land, and an abundance of capital, in proportion to labourers. The question is, whether the three great British colonies would, amongst them, afford ample wages to a population constantly increasing by the annual immigration of fifty thousand young couples.

Without better information than we at present possess, we are not so rash as to answer that question in positive terms; but it leads to some reflections which must always be of weight in any inquiry on the subject. The increase of slaves in the United States is about fifty thousand per annum. One of the most profitable trades in America is the breeding of slaves, or, in other words, the production of labour. The average value of a slave being about 60l., the people of the American slave-states lay out 3,000,000l. per annum for the increase, only, of negro labour! Considering the prime cost of slaves, the necessity of maintaining them in sickness, the average loss occasioned by their premature death, the cost of superintending their labours, the cost of recovering, or attempting to recover runaways, the loss through the permanent escape of some of them, their stupidity, their necessary hatred of labour, and their indifference to the interests of the master,—it may be fairly presumed that the
employment of slaves is less profitable than that of freemen, even though the wages of the latter be extravagantly high. In America, however, from the encouragement given to all, except slaves, to become proprietors of land and would-be employers of labour, no capitalist can depend on a permanent supply of free labour. In America, therefore, no capitalist unprovided with slaves will undertake any mode of cultivation which requires the employment of many hands in one field.

This part of the subject may be properly illustrated by reference to the operation of scarcity of labour for hire, in preventing the accumulation of capital. The back-settler of an American state in which slavery is forbidden, clears his land, and soon obtains abundance of food; but the accumulation of food is useless, and his neighbours, having plenty of food, will not give him something else for his superfluous food. He would gladly give his superabundance of food to labourers who might produce other things for his enjoyment, but there are none to take what he does not want. He has no motive, therefore, for producing more than will supply his own wants. This done,—and, by constantly exhausting new land, it is done with very little labour,—he passes much of his time in drinking, smoking, and hunting; he becomes a half-savage; and, after leading that sort of life for a
few years, prefers it to any other, and loses all desire to improve his condition by increasing his wealth. The back-settler of a slave State, on the contrary, exchanges his surplus food for slaves, because he wants slaves, and the slave breeder wants food for his human cattle, who are employed in growing sugar, tobacco, and cotton. Obtaining slaves, he readily accumulates; he brings into operation the soul of production, the division of labour. He, too, becomes a grower of exchangeable produce, by employing many hands in one field; he has every motive for making his produce as great as possible, for buying more slaves, for accumulating, for improving his condition. Remaining civilized, he wishes for knowledge, or is, at least, desirous to bestow knowledge on his children. Most of the great men of America have sprung from the slave States; and the commerce of the other States, to which the people owe much of their concentration in towns, was founded on the labour of slaves in producing exchangeable commodities. The people of Boston, New York, and Baltimore, have been carriers and factors for the people of the south. A great part of the trade of New Orleans, even, is conducted by permanent residents of the northern States, who visit the southern extremity of the Union only during the healthy season, in order to share, as merchants, in the profits arising from the divided
labour of slaves. If there were no slaves in America, if slaves were allowed to appropriate and exhaust new land, every one of them doing almost everything for himself, who would produce those exchangeable commodities which furnish the commerce of America, and support the great sea-port towns? What might Washington and Jefferson have been, if their fathers had not been slave owners?—a sort of wild men of the woods! Not to dwell on the advantages, nor to mention the terrible evils, which America has derived from slavery, it seems evident that great cheapness of land produces, amongst a skilful and industrious people, great scarcity of labourers; that great scarcity of labourers is injurious or almost fatal to accumulation; and that the want of power to accumulate soon removes the desire—whereby civilized men are converted into semi-barbarians. It is by this process that the French in Lower Canada, and the colonists of Buenos Ayres, degenerated from the civilization which they carried to America—it is by the reverse of this process that the greatest amount of employment for labour may be created and maintained, wherever a gradual increase of territory, in due proportion to the increase of people, shall at all times prevent any excess of people.

If this view of the subject be correct, and if it be true that the employment of slave labour is
less profitable than that of free labour, it becomes clear that the whole American people, a portion of whom every year expend 3,000,000/. in the purchase of fifty thousand slaves, might give ample wages to fifty thousand labourers every year emigrating to America. Again, the yearly increase of able-bodied freemen in the United States exceeds, probably, fifty thousand; yet such is the facility for becoming a would-be employer of labour, that no capitalist can depend on a permanent supply of free labour; and the institution of slavery is preserved through the constantly-operating cause of its revival in America—the struggle of a people, anxious to be civilized, against the barbarizing tendency of dispersion.

But why do we conclude that the Americans could readily employ a constant yearly increase of fifty thousand labourers, whilst we are less confident that the colonists of Britain would, amongst them, employ a similar yearly increase of labourers? Because the Americans are ten millions of people, most of whom are in urgent want of labourers, and every one of whom might readily become an employer of labour, supposing that an ample supply were obtained; whilst the British colonists are a much smaller number of capitalists wanting labourers. The demand for labour is nearly as intense in Canada, South Africa, and Australasia, as in the United States—it is much less only in amount. This difference,
however, proves that an increase of the number of colonists would occasion a corresponding increase of the demand for labour. It proves that in any waste country, colonized by skilful and industrious people, the amount of demand for labour, that is, of capital, may increase progressively with the increase of people, so long as any naturally fertile land remains uncultivated. In every such case the increase of people and of capital may proceed in a geometrical ratio, constantly doubling themselves, and, with themselves, the amount of the demand for labour. It follows that, even though the colonists of Britain should not at this moment be able to afford employment to a sudden accession of fifty thousand labourers, the increase of the colonial population will shortly give them that power; and that they would acquire that power almost immediately, if the power, which they do possess, were at once used in the manner proposed. We are inclined to believe that the colonists of Britain do, at this time, possess an amount of capital sufficient to give employment to a sudden accession of fifty thousand labourers; but the question is of little importance, provided it be admitted that, whenever an industrious and skilful people can increase their territory with the increase of their numbers, every increase of their numbers must be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the amount of their means far giving employment to labour.
Another important consideration belongs to this part of the subject. Because labour is very scarce in many places where land is very plentiful, superficial observers are apt to suppose that superabundance of land is the only cause of high wages. We have already noticed this gross error by referring to countries where land and labour are equally superabundant, in proportion to the demand for them. Based on this error, however, an opinion prevails that a constant excess of territory is necessary to maintain so high a rate of wages as to enable all classes to exert their utmost power of increase. The fact appears to be that a constant increase of territory, without excess at any time, will accomplish that end, whilst the greatest excess will surely prevent it. Dispersion, by itself, is unfavourable to a high rate of wages. In some parts of South America, where the Spanish colonists were not at all kept together by dense forests or hostile natives, wages are unknown; the people are become savages; everyone does every thing for himself; there is no accumulation of capital; and the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence is as severe as in England. In Canada, again, the amount of demand for labour, or of capital, is relatively less than in the state of New York, because in that state some degree of concentration is preserved by the price which, in the United States, is required for new land; whilst in
Canada infinite pains have been taken to scatter the people, and to reduce them to a condition similar to that of some of the inhabitants of the Pampas. The greater the concentration, the greater must be the division of labour, the quantity of production, and the accumulation of wealth—the greater consequently must be the demand for labour; provided always that, if the people are increasing, they may be gradually concentrated on an increasing territory. One man, isolated on a square mile of land, and obliged, of course, to do every thing for himself, might not produce more than enough food for his own subsistence; ten men in the same situation might produce a great deal more food than they could consume, and would thereby provide employment for other labourers, who, united with them, would produce still more food in proportion to their consumption: and the number of labourers might constantly increase, with benefit to all, until the whole square mile were well cultivated. That degree of concentration, therefore, which is required to enable a new people easily to repay the cost of their creation, would not operate as a check to high wages and the greatest possible increase of people, but would, on the contrary, insure them, by giving the greatest possible produce to the greatest possible number.

Having thus slightly noticed the principles of
the proposed system of colonization, we must now say a few words as to the means of execution.

First. For the sake of more ready illustration, we have assumed that the state would have to advance 1,000,000£ per annum for twenty years; but, in fact, the sum might be more or less, according to the number of emigrants and the cost of freight; and the period assumed is wholly arbitrary, inasmuch as if twenty millions of colonists could pay 20,000,000£ for their own creation, any smaller number would be equally able to repay a proportionally smaller sum. If the principles which we have here discussed be sound, the repayment of colonization by itself might proceed continually, pari passu, with the increase of the colonial population. If the income of twenty millions of people might be taxed to the amount of 20,000,000£, the income of one million might be taxed to the amount of 1,000,000£. The state, therefore, would not be in advance, except until an increase of labourers in the colonies had created a colonial income, wherefrom to obtain repayment of that first advance. Afterwards, the colonists might, as it were, themselves pay beforehand for the immense advantage of constant emigration, and the advances of the parent government might entirely cease. That is to say, the greater the amount of emigration in one year, the greater would be the colonial wealth
wherewith to defray the cost of emigration in subsequent years.

Secondly.—But a deduction from colonial income, in the shape of a tax wherewith to pay for emigration, has been assumed, like the sum of 20,000,000l. and the period of twenty years, merely to illustrate a principle. A much more simple, and therefore effectual method, of giving effect to that principle, is suggested. It is proposed that the Government shall require a considerable price for all future grants of land without exception, and that the proceeds of sales shall be wholly devoted to the purposes of emigration. Supposing the colonists concentrated and wealthy, they would have plenty of capital to employ in the production of food for their constantly-increasing population. For this purpose, they must purchase waste land. Their purchases of waste land must be constant, from the moment, at least, when a sufficient amount of immigration had enabled and compelled them to cultivate all the fertile lands now appropriated without purchase. The purchase-money of waste land would be constantly expended in still further increasing the colonial population. This would occasion a further accumulation of capital and a further demand for land; the purchase-money would be employed as before; and colonization would proceed with most rapid strides, and without any cost to the mother country, until no more land
remained to be colonized. As in the assumed case of a tax upon income, the cost of creating a concentrated and wealthy people would be wholly defrayed by themselves; their ability to pay for their own creation would be caused by the mode of creating them; their contribution to the emigration fund would be a deduction from their income; and the disposal of the deduction would produce more income, to be virtually taxed, in like manner, and for the same purpose.

The Americans pay 8,000,000l. a year for their increase of black labour. That sum would provide for the yearly emigration, from the over-peopled states of Europe, of three hundred thousand young couples! Can it be doubtful that, if the Americans should expend that sum in that manner, and repay themselves by requiring a considerable price for waste land, they might abstain from breeding slaves, and become, within the time of living men, all that is foretold of them?

Thirdly.—The extreme simplicity of the proposed method of making emigration pay for itself, is not its only recommendation. We have shown that if emigrants were scattered over a territory immense in proportion to their numbers, they might have no surplus income for taxation. Concentration, we repeat once more, is essential to the success of the scheme. In a waste country, the concentration of the people is to be obtained
only by some restriction on the appropriation of waste land. How might the Government determine the due measure of restriction? By no means so sure and simple as by refusing to sell waste land for less than the highest price, that would not cause any, the slightest, pressure of population upon the means of subsistence. We know very well that if fertile land could be constantly brought to the shores of Britain, and sold for 5l. per acre, in any quantity for which that price might be offered, pauperism, arising from want of employment, would wholly cease. Experience, alone, perhaps, may determine the highest price which, in the colonies, would permit an increase of people without any decrease of wages; but this is already beyond a doubt,—that the price would be too low, if it did not prevent the exhaustion and abandonment of fertile land! In the assumed case of a tax on income there might be no income to tax, without concentration; in this case, which supposes a virtual deduction from the income of the people, the means of paying for land are to arise through the concentration, the division of labour, the great production, the wealth, which the necessity of paying for all new land would occasion. This, therefore, is not only the most simple method of obtaining payment from the colonists of the cost of their creation, but it is also the best possible mode of enabling them to pay. Referring to the preceding remarks on the advan-
tages of concentration, it appears that, even though the cost of removing fifty thousand young couples per annum were defrayed by a tax on the people of Britain, it would still be necessary to require a considerable price for new land, in order merely to create employment for so rapid an increase of colonial population. Admitting this proposition to be true, it would be right to demand a considerable price for new land, even though the money obtained by sales should be thrown away;—it follows that an emigration-fund must necessarily create itself by means of emigration.

In order more fully to show that, even if the fifty thousand young couples, supposed annually to emigrate, could be transported to the colonies without any expense, it would still be desirable to impose restrictions on the occupation of new land, merely for the purpose of creating employment for this great annual increase of the number of hands, let us state clearly what would be the condition of one of the British colonies in America or Australasia, with respect to production and the employment of labour, if any person could obtain a grant of land by merely asking for it.

We shall suppose the most favourable circumstances under which this liberty of dispersion could possibly be conceded; that is, we shall suppose that the condition of cultivating the land is strictly enforced, and that no one, conse-
quently, receives a larger grant than he is able to cultivate.

We conceive that the state of this colony, as respects the mode of cultivation and the degree in which the resources of the soil were made available, would, in some respects, bear a very close resemblance to the present situation of Ireland. The people, indeed, would be well fed, and would not have rent or tithe to pay. They would therefore be free from wretchedness, and from dependence; but the productive powers of the soil would be turned to no better account in Australasia or Canada than they are in Ireland at present.

Everybody allows that the soil of Ireland yields only a trifle in comparison with what it might be made to produce, even with the same number of hands which it now employs. And what is the reason of this? It is, first, that no good mode of cultivation, can exist where there are not the means of providing good implements, and incurring considerable outlay in other ways for which a return cannot be immediately expected; and a single family cultivating a rood of land, has not these means; and, secondly, that great production is never accomplished, either in agriculture or in manufactures, except by combination—by setting several persons to help one another in the same work. Now, when each man is set to work by himself, on his own
patch of ground, the productive powers of labour are broken up into the smallest possible fractional parts; and every farmer who has the employment of twenty men, knows that he should lose the greater part of the value of their labour, were he to set them to work in such a way.

Further, the amount of employment for labour is determined not only by the amount of the gross produce, but also by the proportion of that produce which is accumulated and converted into capital. When the land is cultivated in little parcels, such as one man and his family can cultivate (which is the case in Ireland), not only is the produce much less, but a much smaller proportion even of that smaller produce is accumulated to compose a fund for the employment of more labour.

Suppose, for a moment, that the landlords and the tithe-owners should forego the whole of their claims, leaving the entire produce of the soil of Ireland to the full and undivided enjoyment of the cottier—it is probable that he would, in the first place, produce much less, and take out a great part of his reward in the form of leisure or indolence; and, secondly, that what he did produce beyond the food of his family, he would employ not in hiring labourers, but in buying additional comforts and enjoyments for his family, by which he would afford no new encouragement to production, since he would only expend what
the landlords and tithe-owners expended before. No new employment at all, therefore, would be afforded to labour; except that the natural increase of population might go on longer, without being restrained by want of food.

If, however, the Government should step into the place of the landlord and tithe-owner, should take the rent and tithe to itself, and form them into a fund for the employment of labour, the fund, so raised and applied, would at once create a new demand for labour to that amount; to say nothing of any subsequent accumulation from the profits of the labour so employed.

It may therefore be concluded, that if settlers, on landing in the colony, were to claim pieces of ground as large as each settler could cultivate, the amount of production in the colony would be much less, and that of that less quantity a less proportion would become available for the employment of additional emigrants, than if, by any means that would effect the object, the same persons could be compelled to work as labourers for the proprietors or occupiers of considerable farms.

That emigrants would, almost universally, claim land if it were allowed to them, no one who knows any thing of the habits of emigrants, or of the state of the facts in the particular colonies in question, can doubt.

According to the ideas which every person
carries out with him from an old country, there is a peculiar and undefinable importance attached to being the proprietor of land. The extreme difficulty which the colonial governments experience in levying quit-rents, arises chiefly from this cause. The great object of a settler's desire and ambition is a freehold property in land; and if he can have this, with abundance of food and moderate labour, the absence of all other comforts is abundantly compensated in his opinion by the excitement of a wild, unrestrained, independent, half-savage life; an excitement which, even in the case of the hunter, who is continually in danger of being without food, is known to have a peculiar charm. Notwithstanding the greater produce which would be obtained by a different mode of cultivation, and notwithstanding the greater share of that produce which would be obtained by the labourer, under circumstances so much more favourable to the accumulation of capital, he prefers the name of a proprietor, and the independence of a back-woodsman, to the comforts of civilized society.

It may be said that if the emigrants prefer this kind of life, they should be allowed to enjoy it. We answer, no: because when England is about to confer a boon on certain of her pauper subjects, who are now in a state of misery, she has a right to annex to that boon any conditions which will not render the gift nugatory; and, in
the exercise of this right it is her duty to consider, not in what manner she may so conduct emigration as to give to a small number of emigrants what they like best, but how she may manage to remove the greatest number from a state of abject misery, dependence, and temptation to vice, into a condition of comfort, independence, and comparative virtue. Nor is this all; the opposite course would not be advantageous to the emigrants themselves, if moralists and politicians be right in supposing that, although the strong excitement of savage life renders it more apparently eligible to a person who has hitherto known only the evils of society, yet a state of civilization, when accompanied by plenty, is more conducive to the real happiness both of the individual and of the race.

_Fourthly._—As the territory already appropriated by the colonists is disproportionately large, that degree of concentration which would produce wealth, either for taxation or for the purchase of new land, could not now be obtained, otherwise than by such an increase of people, _without any increase of land_, as would occasion a due proportion between territory and inhabitants. Either, therefore, the proposed sales of land, and the employment of the proceeds, must be delayed until the colonial population shall, without the interference of the State, reach the desired proportion to territory; or the State must advance
the cost of emigration for a short period, in order to hasten the time when the colonists would defray beforehand the whole cost of emigration. True it is, that the federal government of the United States obtains nearly 400,000l.* a-year by the sale of waste land at a very low price; but then, even the little more than nominal payment which they require for waste land, has prevented the excess of appropriated land from being so great in those States as in the British colonies; and the population of those States is, besides, positively much greater than that of the colonies. If it be an object, and this appears to us to be the first object, to bring the system into early and complete operation with reference to the pauper population of Britain, some advance from the Government appears unavoidable. But it must be borne in mind, that repayment would be certain, more certain, at least, than in, perhaps, any former case of public expenditure, and that the moment of repayment would be early, in proportion to the greatness of the advance. If but 50,000l. a-year were advanced for the emigration of two thousand five hundred young couples, many years might elapse before the colonists would be able and willing to purchase waste land; but if 1,000,000l. a-year were advanced for the

* This sum does not include the sales of land by the separate States, which are very considerable.
emigration of fifty thousand young couples, the proper degree of concentration would be speedily obtained, and the advances of Government would be as speedily recovered. It seems hardly doubt-ful that a constant yearly addition of fifty thou-
sand young couples to the colonial population of Britain, would occasion, almost immediately, an amount of sales more than sufficient to pay five per cent. interest on whatever sum the emigration might cost. If so, the Government would have no difficulty in raising the necessary funds on the security of future sales. And it has been further suggested, with a view to the immediate payment of interest on any advance, and in order that the colonists who have appropriated land without purchase, may contribute something towards the cost of the immense benefits to be conferred on them, that a tax upon the rent of land shall be levied, and carried to the emigration fund. As rent, properly speaking, does not exist in the colonies, and as the proposed change in the pro-
portion of people to land, would call it into exist-
ence, such a tax would, of course, take from the landowner only a portion of what the whole sys-

tem must first bestow on him; and such a tax, applied as proposed, would be manifestly advan-
tageous to the landowner, if nothing else would prevent any delay in the complete operation of the whole system. There is, however, one serious objection, perhaps, to such a tax—namely, that it
might introduce some complication into a system, the great simplicity of which is its chief recommendation.

For, after all, the whole measure amounts but to this—that the Crown, which has entire control over waste land, shall prevent its misappropriation in future. The Crown, even without the intervention of Parliament, may declare that no more land shall be misappropriated—that is, appropriated without a due provision for its cultivation. For the due cultivation of waste land, a certain amount of labour is required, which none of the colonies furnish. "Pay, then," says the Crown to the grantee, "so much per acre for the land, and you shall receive in return a certain amount of labour from the mother country, where labour is superabundant. You will pay, not for the land, but for the means of cultivating it. You will thus be enabled to recover very quickly what you have paid. Moreover, as the imported labourers will be all young couples, they will very rapidly increase the colonial population, whereby your land will speedily acquire a value far above the amount of the purchase-money." The land, viewed by itself, would still be given away; but it would be given away for a new purpose. It would not be given away, as heretofore, to encourage some scattered settlers to waste their capital in a fruitless struggle for civilization. It would still be given away; but the mode of
giving it would make the present immensely valuable, not only to the receivers, but to all who should live upon the land, who would thereby be called into existence, and forbidden to degenerate from their parent stock. The aggregate of gifts, too, must be of infinite value to the people of Britain, inasmuch as every one of them would operate like a gradual increase of territory, according to the increase of people. As to Britain, the day, of course, must come, when the pressure of people upon territory could no longer be thus prevented; but, in the meanwhile, several new Britains might be created, which is no despicable end; and, above all, perhaps, this mode of relieving the miserable classes in Britain would instruct them, by a great practical lesson, that "the pressure of population on the means of subsistence" may be prevented, either by a constant increase of territory, or by "moral restraint."

We have now described the main features of the scheme under review. Some essential points of detail remain unnoticed; and we have abstained from following this principle of colonization to many of its conclusions. We are tempted, however, just to point at the following important considerations:—

1st. In order to prevent any temporary excess of people in the colonies, arising from too great an amount of immigration, caused by any unusual and but temporary demand for labour, it is sug-
gested, that every person in the colonies, being unemployed and destitute, should have a legal claim for mere subsistence, either on the colonial government, or on the township in which such pauper might reside. A provision to that effect would render those, who should determine the yearly amount of immigration, very careful not to sin on the side of excess; and would be satisfactory to the emigrants, by absolutely insuring them against the risk, however slight, of perishing for want.

2nd. However impolitic the various modes of granting new land pursued in the several British colonies, the colonial governments have, one and all, adopted those territorial systems with the very best intentions toward the colonists. No government has dispersed its subjects for the purpose of rendering them poor and uncivilized. In almost every case, on the contrary, it will be found that conditions have been expressly attached to grants of land, having for object to render the people wealthy and civilized. But these conditions have never been insisted on by the grantors, for the best of all reasons,—because it was impossible for the grantees to observe them. A common condition, for example, is, that the grantee shall cultivate his land within a specified time; but the immense extent of the grant, and the extreme scarcity or absolute want of labourers, render the cultivation of the grant impossible.
The condition, therefore, is a mere dead letter. In like manner, those conditions which require the formation and maintenance of roads are evidence of the good intentions of the government; but, generally speaking, it is quite impossible to observe them. The animus of all such conditions is manifestly excellent: but to render them beneficial, their execution should be at least possible. The fact is, that wherever proper conditions are attached to grants of land, the grants have an effect directly and inevitably contrary to the purpose of the conditions. Now we venture to state, without fear of contradiction, that the proposed mode of granting land would not only provide for the observance of such beneficial conditions, but would render them quite unnecessary, by securing, as a matter of course, all the good which the best conditions could require.

3d. In South Africa, slavery must die a natural death, by the substitution of free labour. What the colonists now pay for slaves they would pay for land, and the state would supply them with labour. And as most slave-owners are land-owners, the increased value of land, arising from concentration, would more than repay them for the diminished value of slaves.

4th. The increase of demand for the produce of British industry would be immense. The concentrated colonists would divide their labour in the production of agricultural commodities
suited to the British market, and the price of such commodities would be lower than at present, though the landlord, the capitalist, and the labourer, should all receive a larger amount of production. The price, of course, must be governed by the price of labour; if the production were much greater in consequence of division of labour, the labourer's share might be less, though the amount of his wages were greater; and it is the labourer's share that constitutes the price of labour. This part of the subject seems to deserve the fullest inquiry; but here it is only needful to point at the many advantages which would be conferred on all classes in Britain, and more especially on the lowest class, by a sudden, rapid, and constant increase of demand for the products of British industry and skill.

5th. Though the proposed measure might, if well administered, prevent, throughout the British dominions, any pressure of population on the means of subsistence, yet there must always remain in Britain a pressure of people on the inclination to emigrate; though there should be neither starvation nor absolute pauperism for want of employment, though the workhouses of England should be nearly empty, and the ravages of hunger and typhus should cease in Ireland, still the lowest classes would not become independent, but must necessarily labour for their daily bread. Though the Esther Hibners might
want children to work even unto death,* love of
country, operating on a population not utterly
wretched, would prevent any scarcity of labour
in proportion to employment.

6th. The mother country might save all the
cost of governing her colonies, inasmuch as the
expense of governing a concentrated colony
would little exceed that of a dispersed one, sup-
posing the extent of territory equal; whilst, if
the amount of taxation on each person were the
same in both cases, the amount of public revenue
might be ten or twenty times as much in the
case of concentration as in the case of dispersion. In
this view of the subject, a main objection to all
colonization would be entirely removed.

7th. If the colonists were only so much con-

* Extract from the Quarterly Review for January 1830, Article
IV. page 104:—* Notwithstanding all that might be, and ought to
be, done at home, there can be no doubt that, sooner or later,
emigration must come to be regarded as a momentous national
concern; but, without reference to any more or less remote con-
tingencies, it is, we think, clear to demonstration, that multitudes
of the destitute children who are thrown upon their respective
parishes for support, might be most economically disposed of by
the public, and most advantageously for themselves, by sending
them to those colonies where hands are wanted, and where (as in
Nova Scotia) by a few years of faithful service, they might earn the
means of establishing themselves in independence and comfort.
Arrangements might easily be made for thus relieving our work-
houses, to the infinite benefit of the poor children themselves,
many of whom would thus be saved from a worse than Egyptian
bondage.*
centrated as to insure the due cultivation of all their land, they would not be manufacturers. Though they would produce many things besides food, such as hemp and flax in Canada, and tobacco, cotton, silk, and wine, in South Africa and Australasia, they would be, principally, an agricultural population. But as such, they would be wealthy. As they would be created with great rapidity, they would require to be furnished from Britain with many classes of persons whose emigration would not abstract capital from the country, such as medical men, lawyers, teachers, &c.; and they would be able amply to reward such persons for emigrating. The schools and colleges of England would supply the colonies with instruction. In short, the proposed system of colonization would, to a great extent, afford to the redundant educated classes at home the same demand for their services as a miraculous increase of the British territory.

8th. The measure is not equally applicable to all the three great British colonies, Canada, South Africa, and Australasia. To Canada it could be but partially applied; but a slight notice of the causes and consequences of this difference will place the merits of the scheme in a forcible point of view. In Canada the British Government cannot regulate at pleasure the degree of concentration which its subjects shall enjoy, because it does not possess an absolute power over waste
land. In the immediate neighbourhood of the British settlements there are immense tracts of new land, over which the Government of Canada has no control whatsoever; and to these the colonists would emigrate if the Colonial Government should require a higher price for waste land than that which is required by the Governments of the neighbouring United States. Be it remarked here, that as there are no paupers in the colonies, all classes possess the means of emigration. Hence it appears, that the Government of Canada must necessarily regulate the price of its waste land by that which should obtain in the United States. That price is now, we have already shown, by far too low for the most desirable degree of concentration, for causing the greatest possible demand for emigrant labour, and the largest means of obtaining it. But, such as it is, it would be productive of very great advantages to Canada. It would produce there, the same concentration of people and accumulation of capital that take place in the States of Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania; it would provide a considerable fund for the conveyance of British paupers to the colony, and, by furnishing them with employment, would prevent them from emigrating once more to the United States, as is now the practice with a large proportion of the labourers conveyed from Britain to Canada. In every one of the accounts of
Canada, published during the last twenty years, there occur expressions of wonder and regret at the disposition of poor British emigrants to abandon "a British colony" for "a Foreign state;" and the last file of Canadian newspapers contains abundant proof that the "disloyal tendency," as it is called, still prevails. There is no disloyalty in the case. The labourer is a practical political economist. Conveyed, either by Government or an individual capitalist, from his English workhouse or Irish cabin, to a place where he can save a part of his earnings, he has the means of removing to another place where labour is in yet greater demand; and his eagerness to aid in supplying that demand is no more disloyal than the anxiety of the Liverpool merchant to sell Manchester goods at New York. The amount of demand for labour is relatively greater in the United States than in Canada, in proportion exactly as concentration and capital are relatively greater; and this important difference seems to be occasioned by the different modes of disposing of waste land pursued by the two Governments. In Canada new land is given by favour; hundreds of thousands of acres are owned by persons residing in, England, who never intended to cultivate them; hundreds of thousands of acres, again, have been "reserved," for the crown and the church,—that is, they were but nominally appropriated, as if for the sole
purpose of compelling bond fide settlers to live far apart from each other and to become half savages;—whilst, at the same time, every man can obtain new land by paying certain fees which amount to only a nominal price. In the State of New York, on the contrary, no one can appropriate new land until he have paid for it near two dollars per acre. This price is, as before observed, too low,—as any price must be too low that should encourage the exhaustion and abandonment of new land; but, low as it is, it renders the condition of the inhabitants of the State of New York very much preferable to that of the Canadian colonists. Though it permit the Americans to advance too rapidly into the wilderness, it compels them to advance in a body, not sufficiently concentrated we admit, but still, not, as happens in Canada, so dispersed as absolutely to forbid the division of labour, the accumulation of capital, and the preservation of civilized habits. Yet, however desirable it may be to concentrate the Canadians, to provide employment for labour, and a supply of labour, by selling waste land, and devoting the purchase-money to the emigration of young couples from Britain, it is clear that no higher price will be obtained than that which is, or may be, required in the adjoining States not subject to our control; and it follows, that if that price be too low to insure the greatest concentration compati-
ble with the greatest possible increase of people, the Canadians would not derive from the proposed measure all the advantages that it might bestow on them, if their government possessed an absolute control over all the waste land in their neighbourhood. They might be made as rich as the inhabitants of the State of New York, but not richer; they might, perhaps, soon become as numerous as the citizens of the United States, but they could not become more civilized; they might be able to purchase as many of the products of British industry as the Americans would purchase if their tariff and our corn-laws were repealed, but not more; they might become, in one word, a more than half-civilized, instead of remaining, for generations to come, a more than half-savage, people. Can there be a better illustration of the admirable effects of the measure in question in those colonies, where it might be adopted without any check from the impolicy of neighbouring states?

For in South Africa, and Australasia, the British government has an undivided control over all waste land. As, there, the colonists would be unable to emigrate to an adjoining state to buy land at a lower price than that required by the government, they must remain in the colony, and give the government price, whatever that price might be; and the government, infixing a price, would have to consult nothing but the
greatest happiness of all—to determine on the highest price which would not forbid the greatest possible increase of people. Upon that point the whole system turns! If too low a price were required, slaves would be valuable in South Africa, and desired, if not desirable, in Australasia; whilst, in both colonies, it would be more profitable to exhaust new land than to cultivate old land; and yet the amount of demand for labour would be unequal to the demand of British labourers for employment. If, on the other hand, too high a price were required, the colonial people would press on the means of subsistence; wages would be not high, but very low; and British paupers would no longer accept as a boon the offer of a free passage to the colonies. Upon this point, we must repeat, the whole system turns; but though it were not easy at once to name the price which would be neither too low nor too high, it is very easy to name a price which would be too low; and by fixing that price as the minimum, with a promise of future increase, no harm could possibly arise,—whilst the prospect of an increase of price would tempt speculators to purchase waste land,—that is, to subscribe to the Emigration Fund,—without loss of time. Perhaps it will turn out that the price by which the largest fund for emigration might be obtained is also the best price, with a view to
9th. From the moment when, in consequence of the zealous exertions of Mr. Wilmot Horton, emigration was seriously contemplated with a view to the cure and prevention of pauperism in Britain, philosophers and statesmen have acknowledged the importance of the question; but those, almost without exception, who have carefully examined the whole subject, insist on two conditions as indispensable to any good practical measure. The two conditions are,—1st. That the vacuum created by emigration, should not be filled up by an increase of people, arising from that tendency of population to increase beyond the means of subsistence, which, alone, calls for emigration. 2ndly. That the cost of emigration should inevitably be less than that of maintaining the excess of people. Not one, we believe, of the eminent persons who insist on those conditions, acknowledges that the conditions are satisfied by any measure yet proposed. Those conditions, until satisfied, remain, under the courteous name of conditions, absolute and fatal objections to the interference of the state in promoting emigration. Now the measure, which is here submitted to the public, professes to meet those two conditions, or, in other words, to remove those two objections; for it professes,—first, to encourage the greatest possible increase of people, without any excess
for generations to come; — and, secondly, to render emigration absolutely costless to the state. To conclude—We have purposely abstained from dwelling on the improvement which this system of colonization might effect in the moral condition of the poorer classes in Britain, or on the wonderful rapidity with which, by calling millions and hundreds of millions into existence, it might people the desert regions of the globe. Such speculations, however grateful, are unsuited to the present occasion. We have confined ourselves to statements and arguments which may be submitted to the test of rational inquiry. Any man, inquiring with a single desire to find the truth, may readily convince himself whether or not the proposed selection of emigrants would prevent all undesirable increase of people in the mother country, and, at the same time, cause the greatest possible increase of people in the colonies;—whether or not the proposed concentration of the colonists would tend to their wealth and civilization, would furnish the greatest amount of employment for labour, and the largest fund for conveying labour to the market. These are questions in the science of public economy, which must be speedily decided. If they should be decided in the affirmative, it must inevitably follow, that the measure in question, being well administered, would save the greater part of the poor-rate of Eng-
land, and prevent, in Ireland, the still greater evil of pauperism without poor laws; that it would occasion a great and constant increase of the demand for British manufactures; that it would extinguish slavery in South Africa, by the substitution of free labour; and that it would enable the most extensive British colonies to defray the entire cost of their own government and protection. Moreover, if the principles of the suggested measure be sound, the measure may be adopted—not only upon any scale, that is, by degrees, so as to render its adoption perfectly easy,—but also without harm to any, and with benefit to all; without the least injury to a single person, and with definable and manifest advantage—to the poor, both those who should remove, and those who should remain; to the landlords, farmers, manufacturers, merchants, and shipowners, of Britain; to the colonists of every class, but more especially to the landowners and merchants; and, finally, to both the domestic and the colonial governments. We beg the reader to observe, that these conclusions are stated hypothetically. The accuracy of the conclusions depends on the truth of the principles which it is our wish rather to submit for examination, than to assert with confidence; but if those conclusions should turn out to be founded on reason and truth, it will be acknowledged, that objects more important were never sought by more simple means.
PROPOSED SOCIETY.

In order to establish a general system of Colonization, founded on the main principles of Selection, Concentration, and the Sale of Waste Land, for the purposes of Emigration,

It is proposed—

First, That a Society be formed, to be called

"THE NATIONAL COLONIZATION SOCIETY."

Second. That his Majesty's Government be requested to aid the objects of the Society, by requiring a payment in money for all future grants of land in the three great colonies, Canada, South Africa, and Australasia; and by paying to the Society, out of the proceeds of sales, a fixed sum for every young couple which the Society shall convey to a colony free of cost.

Third. That as soon as an Emigration Fund shall be obtained, the especial business of the Society be, to provide a free passage to the several colonies for the greatest number of young pauper couples who may be anxious to emigrate, and for whose labour, at the same time, the colonies may furnish an ample demand.
Fourth. That until the increase of colonial people, and the sale of waste land, shall have created an Emigration Fund, the Society undertake to provide a free passage to those *orphans and destitute children*, of both sexes, for whose emigration, parishes in England, and societies or individuals in Scotland and Ireland, may be willing to pay at the rate of for each person; and that such orphan and destitute children be apprenticed to settlers in the colonies.*

Fifth. That the Society endeavour to obtain subscriptions and donations, to be applied to the emigration of orphan and destitute children, and to the general purposes of the Society.

Sixth. That, as more than one society, acting independently of each other, would raise the price of freights by means of competition, would further enhance the cost of emigration by requiring separate agents in each colony, and would conduct emigration with less safety and effect by reason of their less accurate information as to the demand for labour in the colonies,—the inhabitants

* It has been fully ascertained, that there are now in London and its neighbourhood some thousands of destitute children, for whose emigration the parishes would rejoice to pay at the rate of 10l. each; and that great numbers of settlers in all the colonies (but more especially in those where the inhabitants are least dispersed) will rejoice to obtain the services of such children by maintaining them, and paying one shilling per week, during the whole term of apprenticeship, which it is supposed might average four years.
of the several Counties of Great Britain and Ireland be invited to form *Branch Societies*, for the purpose of acting in concert with the National Society in London.

*S Seventh.* That each *County Society* be empowered to name one Director of the National Society.

23d *March, 1830.*

At an adjourned meeting, held this day at the British Coffee House, Cockspur Street, to consider of the formation of a Society for affording relief to the pauper labouring classes, by means of systematic colonization,

It was Resolved,

That a *Provisional Committee*, with power to add to their number, be appointed, for the purpose of making known the objects of the Society, by means of the Press and otherwise, as they may deem most advisable, and of communicating with persons desirous to promote the great national objects of the Society.
April 2nd, 1830.

At a Meeting of the Provisional Committee, held this day at the British Coffee House, Cockspur Street,

It was resolved,

First. That the statement of the principles and objects of the proposed Society, now submitted to this Committee, be published, and that the profits (if any) arising from the sale of the pamphlet, be paid to the fund for the promotion of the objects of the Society.

Second. That a General Meeting of persons desirous of promoting the objects of the Society be called, when and as may be thought expedient by this Committee.

Third. That a Subscription be opened at the banking houses of Messrs. Bosanquet and Co., Lombard Street; Messrs. Smith, Payne, and Smiths, Lombard Street; Messrs. Grote, Prescott, and Co., Threadneedle Street; Messrs. Drummond, Charing Cross; Messrs. Hammersley and Co., Pall Mall; and Messrs. Cockburns and Co., Whitehall; for the purpose of defraying the contingent expenses of this Committee in forwarding the objects of the Society.
Farther information respecting the Society may be obtained from

ROBERT GOGER,
Secretary of the Committee.

Committee Room,
British Coffee House, Cockspur Street,
April 2nd, 1830.

LONDON:
SHACKELL AND BAYLIS, JOHNSON'S-COURT, FLEET-STREET.