



THE MEANING
OF
' EDUCATION '

Problems with the Word and a Possible Solution

Based on Wittgenstein's

Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations

by

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A Thesis

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
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FLY TRAP
Mrs. R.A. Krieg
Lyndoch

FLY TRAP

Frontispiece: Glass Flytraps

(Photographed by courtesy of Barossa Gallery Museum, Tanunda,
South Australia)

The flytrap is a squat glass vessel mounted on three diminutive feet; its base is moulded into the shape of a truncated cone, open top and bottom. In use the flytrap, with its stopper removed, is placed over a saucer containing some sort of aromatic bait - beer, for example. The fly, attracted by the fumes rising from the trap, enters through the narrow neck. Once inside, it buzzes aimlessly round and round, drawn towards the light shining through the walls of its prison but incapable of appreciating that the way to reach it is the way it came in. Finally it falls exhausted and expires in the channel formed between the inner and outer walls of the trap.

Was ist dein Ziel in der Philosophie?

- Der Fliege den Ausweg aus dem Fliegenglas zeigen.

Wittgenstein

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Abbreviations used in references to Wittgenstein's works:

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:

- T My translation of *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung*
 CKO C.K. Ogden's translation
 PMG The translation by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness

Philosophical Investigations:

- PI My translation of *Philosophische Untersuchungen*
 GEMA G.E.M. Anscombe's translation
 STW Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft edition of
Philosophische Untersuchungen

Summary of the Argument

This thesis is an exercise in linguistic philosophy applied to the philosophy of education. After Wittgenstein, I take philosophy to be an activity which aims to clarify thought by clarifying the language which carries it. In his early *Tractatus* of 1921 and his posthumous *Philosophical Investigations* of 1953, Wittgenstein proposes two different ways of doing this, the first based on the analysis of complex statements into elementary sentences verifiable by direct comparison with the circumstances which they depict and the second on the clarification of statements within the language by means of perspicuous samples of usage. I apply these two approaches in turn to problems identified in the first part of the thesis and develop the view that the philosophy of education is the clarification of the word 'education', nothing more. It cannot be more because there is no education other than the word 'education' and apart from the word the philosophy of education has nothing to distinguish it from the philosophy of language in general. 'Education' does not symbolise an entity, education, to which certain properties can be ascribed but other symbols which are in general use in the language and which, if they are not referentially meaningless, can ultimately be validated empirically. The philosophy of education is, therefore, philosophy as method applied to specific problems of language. It cannot be philosophy applied to problems of practice because there is no way of approaching practice other than through the language in which it is symbolised.

Following the *Tractatus* I take the educatee to be the logical *sine qua non* of education as irreducible object. However, as the later Wittgenstein would insist, language-games - socially accepted, rule-governed usages - *are played* with the word 'educatee' and its cognates including 'education'. Claiming nevertheless the centrality of 'educatee' I sketch a concentric hierarchy of 'education' language-games, hoping in the resultant synoptic model of education to synthesise the apparently disparate approaches of the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*; using the former's insistence on a logical nexus between language and reality to inform an account of 'education' language-games which covers both those that are played and those that must be played, or must at some time have been played, as a prerequisite of playing 'education' language-games at all.

Summary of Conclusions

- 1 Education is no more than the word 'education'; educational problems are problems of language, not of circumstance.
- 2 'Education' is meaningless, in principle if meaning implies a referent in reality, and in practice if meaning is not bestowed upon it by a context.
- 3 'Education' may have intra-linguistic meaning (sense) in that it is usable in sentences which have sense by virtue of being sentences (*Tractatus*) and by virtue of being describable by means of other, ostensibly perspicuous, sentences (*Philosophical Investigations*).
- 4 'Education' may acquire extra-linguistic meaning indirectly to the extent that it relates to reality either through the educatee (*Tractatus*) or through the empirical association with a language-independent reality of paraphrases of sentences based upon it (*Philosophical Investigations*).
- 5 Following common usage, 'education' may conveniently be used as the title of a family of words formed by inflecting the educat-stem; it is in no sense, however, the progenitor or head of the family.
- 6 Uses of educat- words are samples of language-games (ritualised, rule-regulated usages) which need have no semantic connection with any original or core meaning of the educat- stem. Language-games played with educat- words form a family in that they display family likenesses but possess no common characteristic.
- 7 The only member of the family which might claim a meaning other than use is 'educatee'. 'Educatee' is the logical member *sine qua non* of the educat- language family. Meaning is not, however, decided by logic; 'education' language-games *are played*. Their being played successfully does not imply the existence of education.

Statement:

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any University.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text.

I consent to the thesis being made available for photocopying and loan if it is accepted for the award of the degree for which it is submitted.

(Dated) 7 January 1988

(Signed)

(Eric F. Thompkins)

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1 'Education' and Education

1.1.1 This thesis records an attempt to clarify what education is. I take my cue from R.S. Peters:

Education has become rather like the Kingdom of Heaven in former times. It is both within us and amongst us, yet it also lies ahead. The elect possess it, and hope to gather in those who are not yet saved. But what on earth it is is seldom made clear.
(Peters [4] 88)

I have no means of making clear what education is other than saying¹ clearly what it is. The method which I adopt is to analyse the relationship between 'education' the word and education the ostensible phenomenon of space and time. Conventionally the relationship between the two is that of name and bearer of the name. Typically, education is taken to be:

... the social process called 'education' with which we are all, to some degree, familiar from our own experience. (O'Connor 8)

And which:

... consists essentially in the initiation of members of a society into a form of life that is thought to be worth while... Such initiation takes place, for the most part, in schools and colleges... (Peters [1] 237)

'For the most part' does not imply 'exclusively'; increasingly in recent times, education has come to be thought of as a lifelong personal activity for which neither teachers nor institutions are indispensable. Education is also taken to be, *pari passu*, the effect of education as cause, manifesting itself ideally, specified normative conditions having been fulfilled, in the phenomenon called 'the educated man'.²

1.1.2 Problems identified as educational tend to be seen as originating in reality, ultimately if not immediately. 'What is

education?' is the central question if the nature of education is under direct investigation; 'What ought education to be?' if the amelioration of practices is under consideration. As Dewey illustrates, either question invites an answer which reveals education as something in the world:

The basic question concerns the nature of education with no qualifying adjectives prefixed. What we want and need is education pure and simple, and we shall make surer and faster progress when we devote ourselves to finding out just what education is and what conditions have to be satisfied in order that education may be a reality and not a name or a slogan. (Dewey [2] 90-91)

I do not go along with Dewey in seeing the problem as basically ontological. Qualifying adjectives cannot be prefixed to education, only to 'education'. If I want to find out what education, unqualified, is, I have to learn what 'education', unqualified, refers to; what, in common parlance, the word means. The problem is, therefore, primarily linguistic.

... the philosopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them. (Ayer [1] 76)¹

1.1.3 Accordingly, I start my argument by rejecting the *assumption*, but not the possibility, that in talking about education I am talking about phenomena of space and time. The existence of education - or even its subsistence, accepting for the sake of argument that there are abstract entities and that education is one - might depend on nothing more substantial than an argument from paradigm cases: Education as a state of affairs in the world figures readily in both popular and specialist discourse. The resultant perceptions serve as a paradigm for the use of the word 'education'. Then, since 'education' is used successfully, the existence of education is not questioned:¹

If a word means something, it is tempting to infer that there is

something which it means. (Ayer [5] 35)

A central theme of my thesis is that the nexus between 'education' and education needs to be argued, not assumed. As to which end of the axis I should start at, it is clear that I have no choice. I cannot start with education; I simply cannot talk about education without 'education':

The idea that we could prise the world off our concepts is incoherent; for with what conception of the world should we then be left? (Ayer [3] 49)²

If 'education' drops out of my vocabulary, I lose the means of talking about education.³ By the same token it is clear that in talking about education I am talking initially about a word. My starting with the word is, therefore, a matter of necessity, not choice.

1.1.4 I assume that 'education' is a word. As to what a word is, I claim to begin with no more than that:

Printers' practice, however accidental, gives the word 'word' a denotation good enough for anything that I shall have to say.
(Quine [1] 14)

However, to say that 'education' is a word merely moves my ignorance along one place. To define word in typographical terms is uninformative and ignores the spoken form without which there would be nothing to write.¹ Talk of either form invokes the assumption that words exist. A more cogent argument for the existence of words is that without words I could not even raise the question whether words exist or not. I take a naively empirical view of existence and say that I know that words exist because I can hear them and see them.² Such are the words I am now typing; they appear as visible marks on the paper. I call these marks 'words' but such words are intrinsically no more than signs perceptible to one or other of the senses. A sign manifests itself as sense data but sense data do not make it a sign. It becomes a sign only

when the sense data acquire symbolic significance and the sign has something to point to.³ There is no difficulty over the existence of sign provided one accepts the evidence of the senses. Difficulties arise when a sign is taken to signify a symbol for something else, particularly something real. If I contend that a certain sign is a symbol carrying referential meaning, I have to prove the contention by showing what it does mean. Direct access to the referent is impossible; I can approach it only through language.⁴ All that I can be sure about, with philosophical trepidation to the extent that I am relying on the notoriously unreliable evidence of the senses, is the sign. I shall take 'education' to be a sign which has potential significance as a symbol; I shall not assume anything about the status of the symbol. The problem then resolves itself into finding a way of linking the putative symbol with what it symbolises.

1.1.5 On the face of it, the concept of education seems to offer a way of linking symbol (concept) and symbolised (education). It is not, however, an approach which I feel it would be profitable to attempt. In trying to analyse the concept of education I anticipate insurmountable difficulties with both conceptual analysis in general and the concept of education in particular.¹ It seems to me that any concept which is definitive and therefore valuable for the purpose of elucidation is by definition unanalysable; and any concept which is analysable is not definitive and therefore not elucidatory. Conceptual analysis leads to an infinite regress unless the regress is blocked by a barrier of nonspeculative concepts. This implies that 'concept' is not definitive. Such is Frege's view:

The word 'concept' is used in various ways; its sense is sometimes

psychological, sometimes logical, and sometimes perhaps a confused mixture of both. Since this licence exists, it is natural to restrict it by requiring that when once a usage is adopted it shall be maintained. (Frege [1] 42)

Frege adopts a purely logical use according to which a concept is logically simple, capable of being neither analysed nor defined.² It is noteworthy that, according to Frege, a concept needs elucidating; it does not elucidate:

What is simple cannot be decomposed, and what is logically simple cannot have a proper definition... there is nothing for it but to lead the reader or hearer, by means of hints, to understand the words as is intended. (Frege [1] 42-43)³

Education is neither a logical simple in Frege's sense nor, by looser criteria, sufficiently determinate to generate an unambiguous, hence elucidatory, concept. The concept of education seems to belong in the first of Frege's categories since different people support different versions of it. Soltis develops this point:

We are, in fact, literally bombarded with a multitude of competing definitions which tempt us to choose among them, to mix an eclectic set of fragments from them, or even, rejecting them all, to find the "real" definition of education for ourselves. (Soltis 2)

Soltis raises the possibility that in attempting to track down this elusive beast we are emulating a centaur hunter rather than an elephant hunter; the quarry might not exist. However one deals with Soltis's problem, it is a matter of logic that one has the concept of education only when one has it. It is equally a matter of logic that one cannot analyse something one does not have. I do not have the concept of education; therefore I cannot analyse it. All that I might succeed in doing is *synthesise* my personal concept of education out of whatever fragments I might think fit to adduce for the purpose.

1.1.6 It seems to me that in subscribing to the notion that the concept of education could reveal what education was, I should be

putting the cart before the horse. The concept cannot identify its object until it has itself been established by some means - an object, perhaps, or the inductive process advocated by Frege. I don't have the concept 'horse' unless I can recognise the object horse; I don't have the concept 'education' until I know what education is. Moreover, for the purpose of identifying education, the concept approach not merely lacks utility but might well be misleading - specifically because talking about education as a concept might encourage me to assume that there is such a thing as education and even that I know what it is, and generally because talk of concepts gives credence to there being concepts. Austin is far from convinced that there are:

... 'concepts', 'abstract ideas', and so on are fictitious entities, which we owe in part to asking questions about 'the meaning of a word'. (Austin [3] 28)

Nevertheless he is prepared to concede that:

To say something about 'concepts' is sometimes a convenient way of saying something complicated about *sensa* (or even about other objects of acquaintance, if there are any), including symbols and images, and about our use of them. (Austin [2] 8)

The most unhelpful aspect of concepts, it seems to me, is that they are totally uninformative. They might appear to be a device, as Austin suggests, for avoiding periphrasis, but they can be shorthand only for existing longhand; a concept never provides new information. Concepts might help me to formulate the problem; they have nothing to contribute towards the solution. They don't even offer an alternative to what I was proposing to do in any case:

It seems clear, then, that to ask 'whether we possess a certain concept?' is the same as to ask whether a certain word - or rather, sentences in which it occurs - has any meaning. (Austin [2] 12)

1.1.7 Reserving the question whether it is anything else, a concept is words. Without clear words I cannot have a clear concept.

I say advisedly 'a concept is words' not 'a concept is expressed in words':

In saying this I am denying that thought expressible in words is first in some peculiar mental medium whose elements are concepts or propositions - as if what was first in concepts is then translated into words for the sake of communication. That seems to me to be a completely unjustifiable claim. (Hirst 71)

If a concept was a thought expressed in words other than the words of the concept, the words of the thought would be in no different case from the original words of the concept in that they would either be self-validating or need to be validated in other words before they could correlate with the words of the concept; the validating words would need to be validated and I should be embarked on an infinite regress. To avoid the regress, according to Ayer, it has to be admitted that some things can be directly identified (Ayer [3] 56). In the present context that implies, if I am not to lose contact with education, that I must be able to identify directly the referent of the words ascribed to the concept of education, and, moreover, know that they are correctly ascribed. I cannot do that unless I first know what education is; I might have words which refer clearly enough in themselves but between which and education no nexus has been substantiated.

1.1.8 Philosophical inquiry, according to Quine, should begin with clear words, not, as the medieval nominalists and British empiricists maintained, with clear ideas.¹ It could not begin with clear ideas because:

... ideas without words would have come to little in any event. We think mostly in words and we report our thoughts wholly in words. (Quine [3] 155)

I should be happy to begin my inquiry into 'education' with clear words but I do not know where I might find clear words about education. I am

inclined to amend Quine's precept to: Philosophical inquiry should begin by clarifying words. If Wittgenstein is right, I might find it necessary to add: ... and will end once the words are clarified. I am not, however, sanguine about the possibility of so positive an outcome. I shall be happy to settle for *clearer* words about education.

1.2.1 Reference to a dictionary is the commonsense way of settling questions about the meanings of words. It is clear, however, that even if the lexicographer takes the view that the meaning of a word is whatever it refers to in the real world, he is in no position to support his view by direct comparison between word and object. The dictionary never reveals what a word means if the nexus between word and referent is intrinsic to meaning. The dictionary deals only in symbols, defining or refining the sense of a symbol in terms of other symbols. The user must still make the link with reality for himself. The lexicographer has no authority to decide that this meaning of a word is right and that ostensible meaning is wrong. All that the dictionary can do is offer guidance on what, in the opinion of the lexicographer, the word is taken to mean by those who use it, taking account of the constant mutability of the forms and the senses of words.¹

1.2.2 With many variables and in the absence of a definitive meaning for a word, dictionary definitions are always to some extent conditional. Conditions include the size and scope of the dictionary; its age; its country of origin (particularly with English dictionaries); the predilections of the compilers (reporting is inevitably selective and therefore subjective to some extent). The entries under 'education' in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) together with its supplement (OEDS) and in Webster's Third International Dictionary (WEB) present two sets of meanings which agree in some respects and differ in others. Both OED and WEB offer definitions which seek to be comprehensive rather

than discriminatory. Neither offers the full range of meanings offered by the other. By collating the two, paraphrasing, breaking down omnibus definitions into discrete elements, and adding where it seemed appropriate a note of explanation or of summary, I have attempted to produce a fairly comprehensive list of dictionary meanings of 'education'. To the resultant list of fifteen I have added another five common enough in my view to merit inclusion:¹

- 1 WEB 1(b): the act or process of providing with knowledge, skill, competence, or usu. desirable qualities of behaviour or character, especially by a formal course of study, instruction or training
(key word - 'teaching')
- 2 WEB 1(b): the act or process of being so provided
(key word - 'learning')
- 3 OED 3: the systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the young (or, by extension, to adults) in preparation for the work of life
(key word - 'curriculum')
- 4 WEB 2(a): a process or course of learning, instruction or training, especially a formal course of instruction or training offered by an institution
(key word - 'syllabus')
- 5 WEB 2(a): *ibid.* often used with a modifier specifying the type or field of instruction or training e.g. physical education; health education; driver education
- 6 WEB 2(b): a system of formal education as a whole
('education' as a synonym for 'education system')
- 7 OED 3: the whole course of scholastic instruction which a person has received
(key word - 'schooling')
- 8 OED 4: culture or development of powers, formation of character, as contrasted with the imparting of mere knowledge or skill
(key words - 'noble aims of education')
- 9 WEB 3: the totality of the knowledge, skill, competence or qualities of character gained by education
(key word - 'educatedness')

- 10 OED 2: the process of 'bringing up' (young persons); the manner in which a person has been 'brought up'; with reference to social station, kind of manners and habits acquired, calling or employment prepared for, etc. (obsolete except with notion of 'schooling')
- 11 WEB 4: the field of study that concerns itself primarily with the principles and methods of teaching or of learning, especially in formal education
- 12 OED 5: attrib. & Comb. ('education' used adjectivally or in combinations e.g. 'education system'; 'Education Department')
- 13 WEB 1(c): a conditioning, strengthening or disciplining especially of the mind or faculties e.g. 'the education of an audience to appreciate modern music'
- 14 OED 3(c): figurative e.g. 'the education of circumstances'; 'the education of the world'
- 15 OED 3(b): the training of animals
- 16 EFT: schools etc. as institutions or as physical entities, with particular reference to whatever can be bought - real estate; hardware; software; staff - e.g. 'more should be spent on education'
- 17 EFT: attendance at a school or other educational institution; often with a modifier e.g. 'students in higher education'
- 18 EFT: what schools etc. *do*, whatever it is that they do
- 19 EFT: non-differentiated sense; any or all of these meanings combined but not specified
- 20 EFT: the 'true' meaning of 'education' whatever it is; expressed always implicitly or explicitly as a question

1.2.3 'Education' is one of a group of cognate words which possess a common stem and obviously belong to the same grammatical family. Combining OED, OEDS and WEB produces the following list of the cognates of 'education':

educability	OED	WEB	
educable	OED	WEB	
educand		WEB	OEDS
educatability		WEB	OEDS
educatable		WEB	OEDS
educate	OED	WEB	
educated	OED	WEB	OEDS
educatee	OED	WEB	
educating	OED	WEB	
education	OED	WEB	
(educationable)	OED		
educational	OED	WEB	OEDS
educationally	OED	WEB	OEDS
educationalist	OED	WEB	
educationalary	OED		
educationist	OED	WEB	
(educationize)	OED		
(educationized)	OED		
educative	OED	WEB	
educator	OED	WEB	
educatory	OED	WEB	
educatress	OED		

1.2.4 To me these words vary widely in familiarity. Some I use or see used frequently; some I do not recall ever seeing used. The words in brackets are considered rare by OED; WEB apparently concurs by omitting them. I should add 'educationary' and 'educatress' to the rare category, claiming support from their omission by WEB; also 'educatory' which WEB notes as 'chiefly Brit.' and equates with 'educative'. Dictionaries do not necessarily agree on the degree of rarity of a word: OED considers 'educatee' a 'nonce word' i.e. a word coined for a particular occasion; WEB treats it as a standard member of the family. I find it indispensable, being able to think of no acceptable substitute in the contexts in which I need it.

1.2.5 With three exceptions the words listed in §1.2.3 are formed by the addition of various endings to the stem *educat-* which is the perfect participle passive stem of the Latin verb 'educare'. The

first three words in the list lack the t- stem, being derived from the infinitive stem educ- of the same verb. It would not be incorrect to regard every member of the list as an inflection on the stem educ-. But that would lose the familiar appearance of the educat- stem and there is another stem educ- from the Latin verb 'educere'. Confusing 'educere' and 'educare' is the cause of a popular fallacy in the theory of education (see §1.2.13). I propose therefore to take note of the three exceptions but to regard the whole set as educat- words.

1.2.6 As morphological phenomena the educat- words differ merely in their inflections. Each inflection denotes, generally speaking, a particular part of speech; what function the word is likely to perform in a sentence (bearing in mind that English converts one part of speech into another with astonishing freedom - the noun 'education' used adjectivally is an apposite example).¹ The question arises whether that is all that it does. If the only difference between one educat- word and another is how it functions in a sentence, then in order to classify the meanings of the entire educat- family it is necessary merely to identify the meanings of the educat- stem. This is in fact what happens both in everyday language and in specialised educational discourse.² It is assumed that the meaning, whatever it is, is carried by the stem and the inflection takes care of the syntax. That is to say, all the educat- signs signify the same symbol, a complex and multi-faceted symbol to be sure, but not a symbol which varies as the sign varies. In other words, it is commonly assumed that it is permissible to inflect educat- (he/she educates; they educate; they are educated people, employed in the education of children; they are educators, concerned with the educa(ta)bility of the educationally disadvantaged)

and affect only the syntax, not the meaning. This assumption is of fundamental importance. It underpins both the concept of education and the philosophy of education; both depend for their *raison d'être* on the integrity of educat-.

1.2.7 The point is important enough to bear a little labouring. Syntax largely determines what inflection a word carries. If an education word is called upon to function as a noun it will have an appropriate noun ending - 'education' or 'educating' or perhaps 'educatedness', a word which figures in neither OED nor WEB but which has acquired a certain currency; as a verb, one of the verb endings - 'educate', 'educates', 'educating', 'educated'. Syntax indicates whether 'educating', for example, is operating as a verb or a noun but is not normally thought to imply any change of meaning in the stem. If a change of meaning did perhaps accompany a change of inflection, far-reaching consequences would follow.

1.2.8 The stem would lose any claim to integrity of meaning; the whole word, stem plus ending, would have to be looked at as a unit. But looking at the word would not reveal its meaning. Since the inflection had a part to play and since the inflection would depend largely on syntax, the meaning of a word would be revealed only by a context. The sentence, not the word, would be the minimum carrier of meaning - as indeed Frege and more recently Austin, among others, insisted that it was. For Austin, one of the consequences of talk about 'concepts' or 'universals' was:

... the error of taking a single *word* or *term*, instead of a sentence, as that which 'has meaning'... (Austin [2] 9)

Nevertheless there would still be things to be said about words,

particularly as they related to other words. Specifically, any claim which 'education' might have had to epitomise the meaning of its cognates would be undermined and the word left as merely the courtesy title of the class. By the same token, the choice of 'education' rather than one, or perhaps more than one, of its cognates as the object of philosophical inquiry is called in question. Why did I select 'education' as the object of my inquiry? The answer might be that I did so on the unquestioning assumption that 'education' is the generic name of a class of which its cognates are merely members. What they have in common, I might have argued, is the stem *educat-* which derives its meaning from the chief of the clan, 'education'. There are, however, semantic and etymological objections to this view.

1.2.9 The notion that 'education' gives meaning to its cognates is based on two false premisses:

(i) 'education' carries the root meaning and the other *educat-* words are derived from it;

(ii) the difference between the words so derived has everything to do with accident and nothing to do with semantics.

These principles generally work well enough in the language. The meaning of a simple transitive verb, for example, survives the change of voice from active to passive. Polonius is at supper, says Hamlet:

Not where he eats, but where he is eaten; a certain
convocation of politic worms are e'en at him.

(Hamlet IV iii 21)

If Polonius had been fortunate enough to be doing the eating himself, it would be inconceivable that what he ate was not eaten. The language-picture of what happens is tautological: The eater eats what he is eating; when he has eaten it, it is eaten. The meaning of 'eat'

survives both accident and syntax. Of particular significance are the two phrases 'he has eaten', 'it is eaten'. 'Eaten', the past participle of the verb 'to eat', functions equally well in its primary role as a part of the verb and in its derived role as an adjective signifying in a compressed form 'in a state such that the eater has eaten it'.

1.2.10 When the same sort of thing is attempted with the verb 'to educate', something odd happens: The educator educates those whom he is educating; when he has educated them, they are educated. It is clear to any proficient user of the English language that the sense is now broken by a non sequitur: 'Educated' in 'he has educated' does not have the same sense as 'educated' in 'they are educated'. The adjective carries a wealth of connotation that the past participle does not. It would be remarkable indeed if an educated person resulted from the efforts of a single educator, but it is sufficient for my argument that the state of being educated need not depend on an educator at all.¹ The state of being eaten depends necessarily on there being an eater; the link between 'eat' and 'eaten' is both grammatical and semantic. There is no such link between 'educate' and 'educated'. It is inconceivable that anything could be eaten without an eater or that an eater could perform without something being eaten; it is perfectly possible (in ordinary usage at least; logically there might be problems) for an educator, specifically so-called or understood so to be, to perform for all he or she is worth without anybody being educated, and for a person to become educated without the assistance of an educator.²

1.2.11 Etymology offers an explanation of the educated/educated dichotomy. Etymologically, the stem *educat-* is essentially passive in

meaning, being derived from the Latin 'educatus' which is the perfect participle *passive* of the active verb 'educare'. When English required a verb with a meaning corresponding to that of 'educare' it created it by back-formation from the stem *educat-*. So we acquired a verb with active force from a stem with residually passive meaning. Being an analytic language, English tends to form tenses by means of auxiliary verbs plus participles. Accordingly the verb 'to educate' formed its participles in the normal manner and added auxiliaries to them in order to form compound tenses such as 'he is educating'; 'he has educated'. The collision between 'he has educated' and 'he is educated' was inevitable. There is no alternative to accepting that they are two different symbols which happen to share a common, but not of course the same, sign:

... it is... simply false that we use the *same* name for different things: 'grey' and 'gray' are *not* the same, they are two similar symbols (tokens)... (Austin [2] 7)

In modern English we have, therefore, two symbols denoted by 'educated', one an adjective which carries the same grammatical weight as the original Latin perfect participle passive 'educatus', which was likewise an adjective, plus a heavy latter-day semantic accretion; the other the past participle active of the verb 'to educate', usable only in compound tenses coupled to the auxiliary verb 'to have' and possessing no sense without it. 'He is educated' goes straight into Latin (begging the question of equivalence of meaning) as 'educatus est'; 'he has educated' rates a standard Latin synthetic tense formation 'educavit'. I conclude that *educat-* is not one multifaceted symbol but at least two quite distinct symbols. What the educator is engaged in is called 'education' and what the educatee gets is also called 'education'. But clearly each is discretely what it is, neither is the other and there is no necessary

connection between them.

1.2.12 The changing meaning of words is a central phenomenon of natural languages. Educat- words mean whatever they currently mean in English. It would be rash to draw inferences from the meaning of the Latin root; it might nevertheless be interesting and possibly illuminating to consider what it was. In Latin 'educare' did not carry the normative connotations of 'educate' in English. It symbolised the process of rearing, bringing up, nurturing, in so neutral a manner as to be applicable to anything in nature. Ovid has a reference to:

quod pontus, quod terra, quod educat aer
whatever the sea, the land or the air brings forth
(Metamorphoses 8, 832)

In Catullus:

imber florem educat
the shower nurtures the flower
(62, 41)

The primary meaning is, however, to raise children. Quintillian refers to:

Romulus educatus a lupa
Romulus fostered by the she-wolf
(Institutiones Oratoriae 3, 7, 5)

Livy notes a sequence of events:

caelum quo natus educatusque essem
the sky beneath which I was born and brought up
(5, 54, 3)

Cicero follows the same sequence in inveighing against a crime committed by one Quintus Apronius:

homine in dedecore nato, ad turpitudinem educato
a man born in shame, brought up to infamy
(de Finibus 3, 17, 57)

Cicero offers an interestingly literal interpretation of 'mother tongue':

filios non tam in gremio educatos quam in sermone matris
sons raised not so much in their mother's lap, more in
her command of speech

(Brutus 211)

1.2.13 The attempt is sometimes made to trace 'education' back to the Latin 'educere' = ex (out) + ducere (lead; draw). Education is, therefore, it is argued, a drawing-out not a putting-in.¹ Certainly 'educere' has left its mark on English, but in the verb 'educere' and the noun 'education', both cognate with other derivations from 'ducere' notably 'deduce; deduction' and 'induce; induction'. In their Latin form - 'ducere'; 'deducere'; 'inducere' - these verbs display the e-stem typical of a verb of the 3rd. conjugation; the 'e' is lost in the perfect participle passive e.g. 'inductus'. Nowhere does the a-stem of 'educare; educatus', which typifies verbs of the first conjugation, put in an appearance. The verbs 'educere' and 'educare' are, in fact, siblings from a common Indo-European parent *deuko; both have 'educō' as the first person singular of the present tense. Neither is derived from the other and it is particularly important to note that 'educare; educatus' was already operative in Latin. To seek support in the Latin for a theory of education based on deriving educat- from ex+ducere is to rely on spurious etymology.² Incidentally, the first recorded use of both 'educere' and 'educare' is in Plautus (?254 - ?184 B.C.). The noun 'educatio' which develops the education- stem in oblique cases appears first around a century later in Varro (116 - 27 B.C.) and then in Cicero (106 - 43 B.C.); the noun 'educator' appears first in Cicero. Both are derived from the educat- stem of the verb, so it makes no significant difference, particularly since both retain the same sense as the verb,

whether the English educat- stem is traced back to 'educare' direct or via the intervening nouns.

1.2.14 None of the above is intended to suggest that the distinction of meaning between 'educere' and 'educare' was clear-cut in Latin. The uses of 'educere' spilled over from the literal 'lead out' into 'raise up' (literally) and 'raise' (figuratively; a child, for example) - another argument against the educate = draw out theory. Neither implied any value judgement however. Educat- acquired its normative overtones at a much later stage of development, creating thereby our present dichotomy of symbolism. As far as the Latin origins are concerned, the last word can comfortably rest with Varro. He has a splendid sentence, quoted by Nonius a 4th. century A.D. lexicographer and grammarian, which sums the whole thing up:

educit obstetrix, educat nutrix, instituit paedagogus,¹
docet magister

the midwife delivers, the nurse rears, the child-minder instructs,
the master teaches

(Nonius 447, 53)

1.2.15 It is clear that neither dictionary nor grammar clarifies adequately for my purpose the meaning of the word 'education'. Both are primarily descriptive of the status quo in language, dictionary purely so, in intention at least. To the extent that grammar analyses language, it is more concerned with the forms of words and the formal relations between words than with the meanings of words. Both are useful, it seems to me, for illuminating the problem of meaning. They do not offer a solution; if they did the problem would not have arisen. Both are concerned primarily with signs; I am concerned to elucidate a symbol. The problem is that symbols as they stand do not necessarily reveal

what they symbolise. It seems that I need some means of processing a symbol into a form which elucidates its referent. The principle, though not the practice, of such a process is a central concern of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.

2 'Education' and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

2.1.1 Wittgenstein's *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung* was first published in 1921. An English translation by C.K. Ogden assisted by F.P. Ramsey appeared the following year under the title by which the work has since generally been known even to German speakers: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* - *Tractatus* for short. According to Flew, Moore suggested the title by analogy with Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* - an inspired suggestion, according to Flew. I am not so sure; the pretentious Latin title adds a gratuitous flavour which a straight translation into English - 'Logical-Philosophical Treatise' - would have lacked and does nothing to reduce the apparent inaccessibility of the work. A translation by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness was published in 1961 and again in 1974 'revised in the light of Wittgenstein's own suggestions and comments in his correspondence with Ogden about the first translation'. Both translations carried the same introduction by Bertrand Russell; I refer to them as CKO and PMG respectively. Both were reprinted in 1981 and these are the editions which I have used.

2.1.2 The *Tractatus* is not well served by its translators. Passmore says of CKO:

The translation, one should add, is extraordinarily bad.
(Passmore [1] 578)

According to de Laguna:

The translation is slavishly literal, which was perhaps prudent. There are many petty errors; and there is also one of the first magnitude, for which, apparently, Mr Russell is responsible.
(de Laguna 26)

PMG has not been generally accepted as markedly superior to CKO. Flew suggests that CKO has in general the merits and demerits of the Authorised Version of the Bible as compared with the later Revised Version represented by PMG (Flew 411). The analogy is presumably intended to do no more than illuminate the relationship between the two versions but by association it succeeds in grossly flattering both CKO and PMG. Flew chooses to quote from CKO 'slightly revised by me'; Kenny follows PMG, 'occasionally preferring my own translation'. In my opinion there are enough inaccuracies and infelicities in both versions to add the risk of misinterpretation to the considerable difficulties of interpretation unavoidably posed by Wittgenstein's gnomic utterances. I have therefore worked from the German text printed on the facing pages to CKO. Direct translations I offer as quotations with Wittgenstein's paragraph numbers in parenthesis. Where these numbers appear in the body of my text, it can be assumed that I have added at least an element of paraphrase or interpretation.

2.1.3 Wittgenstein's complicated system of paragraph numbering facilitates precise reference to his text. Beyond that I do not know what value it has. He claims (footnote to T 1) that his decimal numbers signify the logical importance of his paragraphs (Sätze); the importance which he intends them comparatively to carry. That this claim is not evidently justified is shown by the fact that various commentators have thought fit to offer interpretations of his scheme. These range widely in content and in tone. Finch produces an extraordinarily detailed analysis complete with diagrams which traces in the interrelation of the numbers what amounts to a sub-plot running parallel to the main argument. Favrholt, on the other hand, finds it very misleading to adhere to

Wittgenstein's decimal system as a principle of interpretation.

Stenius, somewhere in between, takes a comparatively sympathetic view of the numbering system but concludes that the closest one can come to what it shows is a kind of rhythm of emphasis. Black finds the device so misleading as to suggest a private joke at the reader's expense. For de Laguna, following the numbers is a constant distraction from the sense; he notes that Wittgenstein himself sometimes gets mixed up. It seems to me that there is no logical relationship between the sequence of the numbers and the sequence of the text; there is no necessity for the paragraphs to be ordered as they are and no consequent necessity for paragraphs so ordered to be numbered as they are.

2.1.4 One or two points concerning the translation of particularly important terms call for special mention. According to the *Tractatus*, objects carry in themselves the possibility of linking so as to form any state of affairs (Sachlage; T 2.014). The simplest level at which they concatenate is in what Wittgenstein calls a 'Sachverhalt'. Dietrich quotes the dictionary of the brothers Grimm as explicating 'Sachverhalt' by the Latin phrase 'status rerum' which signifies, he suggests, not the things themselves but their situation in relation one to the other, what links or separates them, for example (Dietrich 20-21). For an English rendering of 'Sachverhalt', Langenscheidt's *Encyclopaedic Dictionary* suggests 'circumstance(s)' or (especially in legal contexts) 'state of affairs', 'circumstances', 'facts of the case'; Cassell's *German Dictionary* suggests 'circumstances', 'state of the case'. CKO translates, after Russell, as 'atomic fact'; PMG as 'state of affairs'. Ayer is inclined to regard the latter as the more accurate translation (Ayer [4] 111); I agree, but in my view it has an unfortunate

consequence: Wittgenstein uses 'Sachlage' when he wishes to signify 'state of affairs' in general; having used 'state of affairs' for 'Sachverhalt', PMG is reduced to the now regrettably debased 'situation' for 'Sachlage'. 'Elementary state of affairs' would be better, I suggest, for 'Sachverhalt' but is unwieldy. CKO's imputing the connotation of 'fact' to 'Sachverhalt' encourages wide-ranging problems of interpretation (see below). Dietrich, untroubled by problems of translation, expresses himself unequivocally on this point:

Sachverhalte sind keine Tatsachen. (Dietrich 20)

Sachverhalte are not facts.

Taking the hint from Langenscheidt, I propose to translate 'Sachverhalt' as 'circumstance', intending the slightly unorthodox use of the singular noun to underline the technical nature of the term in the context of the *Tractatus*. A circumstance is, in Wittgensteinian terms, the simplest bit of reality that can exist. Circumstances (Sachverhalte) in any degree of complexity then go to make up a state of affairs (Sachlage) and states of affairs (Sachlagen) make up total reality (Wirklichkeit) which equates with the world (Welt). Skipping the intermediate stages, the world is the totality of existent circumstances (T 2.04).

2.1.5 'Satz', which is the standard German for 'sentence' (and a host of other things), poses problems for the translator. Both CKO and PMG render it throughout as 'proposition'. I prefer 'sentence' on the grounds that the existence and ontological status of propositions are matters of controversy for modern logicians. Ayer answers the question whether there are propositions by admitting to using

... the term 'proposition' freely, because it is a convenient way of referring to what is true not only of some particular sentence 'S' but of any sentence to which 'S' is equivalent in meaning. (Ayer [3] 208)

He denies, however, that to say that a sentence expresses a proposition provides any acceptable account of its meaning. He notes that some philosophers consider it objectionable even to talk of propositions as a concise way of talking about equivalent sentences. He doubts, however, whether their preference for ascribing truth to sentences makes much difference since it necessitates considering sentences not merely as audible or visible signs but as signs which are given meanings. Ayer's view would need to be modified if, as Quine asserts, there is no equivalence of meaning and, therefore, no such thing as a proposition. Either view strengthens my argument for preferring 'sentence' as the usual translation of 'Satz'.

2.1.6 It is interesting that in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein anticipates the line followed by Ayer. He distinguishes specifically between 'sign' and 'sign with meaning'. A sentence expresses a thought in a manner perceptible to the senses (T 3.1). The sign perceptible to the senses which is used for this purpose is called by Wittgenstein the 'sentence-sign' (Satzzeichen). A sentence is a sentence-sign projected in relation to reality (T 3.12). The sentence itself and any part of it which characterises its sense Wittgenstein calls an 'expression' or a 'symbol' (T 3.31). It is possible to vary the sentence-sign (the sign is arbitrary - T 3.322) and retain the symbol, producing thereby a class of sentences (T 3.315; equivalent sentences in Ayer's terminology). But Wittgenstein stresses that what varies is only the description of the symbol i.e. the sign, not the symbol itself i.e. the proposition (T 3.317). CKO and PMG produce, therefore, two contradictions in terms by rendering 'Satzzeichen' as 'propositional sign' and 'Satzvariable' as 'propositional variable'.

2.1.7 Completely analysed (T 3.201) the sentence ceases to be variable. This stage is reached with the Elementarsatz, a concatenation of names which reveals from a direct comparison with the concatenation of objects in the circumstance which corresponds to it whether it is true or false. With an Elementarsatz there is no possibility of equivalent sentences since it is logically autonomous and consequently its propositional status is at best doubtful. It would not do to argue that 'elementary proposition' might be justified if different languages were to be used to express the same proposition. Wittgenstein's Elementarsatz is a logical projection beyond the possible equivalences of natural languages to a stage at which there would be in effect only one language. Clearly, the appropriate translation is 'elementary sentence'. Having decided that in three key cases 'Satz' should be translated by 'sentence', I should regard it as misleading to use 'proposition' on any other of the frequent occasions when Wittgenstein uses 'Satz'. To do so would imply that Wittgenstein also uses two distinct terms. In any case, to attempt to discriminate between 'sentence' and 'proposition' on each of many occasions would involve intensive and for my purposes unprofitable philosophical speculation which can quite simply be avoided by avoiding the contentious 'proposition'. There might nevertheless be occasions when 'Satz' would be more appropriately translated by, for example, 'paragraph' or 'statement'. I shall identify any such occasion by including the German in brackets after the English rendering.

2.1.8 T 2.0232 and T 5.5303, in translating which both CKO and PMG seem to me to be in error, are interesting for the psychology of the *Tractatus*:

Beiläufig gesprochen: Die Gegenstände sind farblos. (T 2.0232)

Roughly speaking: objects are colourless. (CKO)

In a manner of speaking, objects are colourless. (PMG)

Beiläufig gesprochen: Von zwei Dingen zu sagen... (T 5.5303)

Roughly speaking: to say of *two* things... (CKO)

Roughly speaking, to say of *two* things... (PMG)

I don't think that either translator has grasped what Wittgenstein is saying. It seems to me that he has simply spoken (gesprochen) in passing (beiläufig) i.e. he is making an incidental observation:

By the way, objects are colourless.

Incidentally, to say of *two* things...

It might be thought odd that Wittgenstein should think it proper in a well-considered logical-philosophical treatise to make any remark in passing and in particular to offer as mere asides observations of philosophical significance. They read more like sudden thoughts jotted down in an early draft pending proper integration at a later stage into the body of the work. They are, however, not untypical of Wittgenstein's approach throughout the *Tractatus*. The whole work reads to me like a series of unedited, semi-connected jottings; a sketch rather than a polished piece of literary craftsmanship. There is no connected line of thought; not even any attempt to edit obvious non-sequiturs into their appropriate location. For example, T 2.021 follows T 2.02 in thought but T 2.0201 intervenes with the first mention of complexes which are then ignored until they are taken up again, spasmodically, in T 3.1432 ff. Deliberate obscurantism would accord ill with Wittgenstein's integrity of purpose and can surely be discounted as a reason for the apparently arbitrary construction of the *Tractatus* - though Quinton suggests that Wittgenstein made the way into his

philosophy deliberately difficult as a method of distancing himself from the 'bourgeois academic philosophy' which he detested (Magee [1] 105). Quinton's suggestion does not strike me as convincing if only because, if that was his objective, Wittgenstein set about it in a peculiarly rough and ready manner. In my view his sins, if any, are sins of omission, not commission.

2.1.9 A more plausible explanation emerges from Flew's comparison of Wittgenstein with Spinoza and his ascription to Wittgenstein of 'the sort of temperament that could be called religious'. Flew sees the *Tractatus* as 'a piece of high and systematic metaphysics' ('systematic' refers presumably to the philosophical rather than the literary method of the work) and quotes Carnap as declaring that Wittgenstein tolerated no critical examination by others once the insight had been gained by an act of inspiration (Flew 411-412). Possibly the others from whom Wittgenstein tolerated no criticism included his own later alter ego. This would explain why he allowed later 'revised' versions of his work to stand. Allowing inspiration to dominate craftsmanship would give grounds for Russell's somewhat acid comment:

Wittgenstein announces aphorisms and leaves the reader to estimate their profundity as best he may. (Russell [2] 126)

The reader might well judge that Wittgenstein's aphorisms are indeed profound. Their philosophical profundity and their aphoristic quality are independent of the literary craftsmanship displayed by the work as a whole; it is only the latter that I am questioning. It might be that the conditions under which the *Tractatus* was written (Wittgenstein was on active service with the Austrian army and later a prisoner of war in Italy) would explain its episodic construction. Another possible explanation emerges from Black's comments on Wittgenstein's numbering

scheme:

In later life, Wittgenstein proposed more in earnest than in jest to arrange the sentences of a philosophical book in alphabetical order: he always thought it harmful to force philosophical thoughts into linear deductive order... Wittgenstein would have dismissed as idle pedantry an effort to impose the strait-jacket of conventional exposition. (Black 2)

Even more revealing is Wittgenstein's own precept, quoted by Black:

Don't worry about what you have already written. Just keep on beginning to think afresh as if nothing at all had happened yet.
(Wittgenstein [1] 30, 6)

I have the impression that in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein has taken his own medicine. I am not convinced by Black's statement that nevertheless

... the organic unity of the whole and its freedom from all but occasional inconsistency are impressive. (Black 2-3)

It must be said, however, that mine is not an orthodox opinion - though it is mild compared with Mundle's, for example. The commoner view, taken by Wittgenstein's courtiers, is that the emperor is fully and resplendently clothed.

2.1.10 A major inconsistency in the work is revealed by what de Laguna calls CKO's 'error of the first magnitude'. This is to treat *Sachverhalt* as a simple fact and *Tatsache* as a compound fact, translating the first by 'atomic fact' and the second by 'fact'.

De Laguna points out that this is not by any means the whole difference between them:

A *Sachverhalt* is a logically possible condition of affairs, which may or may not exist in reality. A *Tatsache*, or fact, is the existence (or non-existence) of *Sachverhalte* (2; cf. 2.06). This distinction is maintained with general, though not perfect, consistency. (de Laguna 26)

De Laguna is a little hard on Russell in blaming him for CKO's 'error' and much too easy on Wittgenstein who signally fails to maintain a coherent view of fact (*Tatsache*) and its relationship to circumstance

(Sachverhalt). Fact, being closely connected with truth, provides a perennial bone of contention for philosophers, a notable recent occasion of relevance to the problems of the *Tractatus* being the long-running altercation between Austin and Strawson in the 1940s and 1950s.¹ For Strawson the only referents of a statement are the things, persons and events to which by convention it refers; their properties, however factual they may appear to be, are not separate things in the world:

What 'makes the statement' that the cat has mange 'true', is not the cat, but the *condition* of the cat, i.e. the fact that the cat has mange. The only plausible candidate for the position of what (in the world) makes the statement true is the fact it states; but the fact it states is not something in the world.

(Strawson [4] 135)

For Austin a true statement is one which corresponds to something in the world which he calls variously 'fact'; 'situation'; 'state of affairs'. The mangy condition of the cat is a fact and is something in the world; therefore a fact is something in the world. Clearly, there are two ways of looking at fact, one as belonging to reality and the other to language. They are obviously incompatible in that the symbol cannot be what it symbolises. Wittgenstein might reasonably have supported one or the other. What he cannot logically do, but what he attempts to do, is hold both points of view at once; this he does apparently without being aware of the dichotomy - certainly with no evidence that he is conscious of it. One view is typified by his equating fact (Tatsache) with what is the case in the world (variously Sachverhalt and Sachlage) and the totality of facts with the totality of reality which is the world; the other by his claiming that a fact is the existence or nonexistence of circumstances (Sachverhalte). That a certain circumstance holds, Wittgenstein calls a positive fact; that it does not hold, a negative fact (T 2.06). Clearly the fact is not the circumstance; moreover 'fact that...' is a metaphysical notion and cannot, therefore, by

Wittgenstein's own rules be depicted. But we do create pictures of facts (T 2.1). We can do this because a picture is a model of reality (T 2.12) and total reality is the world (T 2.063) and the world is the total of facts, not of things (T 1.1). However, the world is also the totality of existent circumstances; therefore, since the 'is' is obviously an equation sign and not the mere copula, the totality of existent circumstances equals the totality of facts and, unless there are to be fractions of circumstances or of facts, a circumstance is a fact and a fact is a circumstance. This is not possible, however, because facts are composed of circumstances (T 4.2211) and any given fact might consist of an infinite number of circumstances. The created picture is a fact (T 2.141); but a fact is also a picture (T 2.16). In order to be a picture, a fact must have something in common with what is pictured; obviously the two cannot have both a mere common element and common identity - in any case, common identity is a nonsensical notion (T 5.5303). The only reason why I can picture facts is that picture and pictured share the same logical form (T 2.18). In a language picture, to be specific, objects are represented by names and the relationship between the objects is revealed (not depicted) by the logical form of the statement (T 2.13 - 2.15; 2.172):

My basic idea is that the 'logical constants' don't represent anything. That the *logic* of the facts cannot be represented.
(T 4.0312)

Whatever Wittgenstein means by 'logical constants' (see Kenny 29), the logic of a fact must be a necessary property of a fact (if it is not I am left with the Wittgensteinian impossibilities of [i] freestanding objects [ii] facts lacking intrinsic logic i.e. facts which could not be expressed in words; cf. T 3.03, 3.031, 3.032); so I cannot express a logical fact in words. But I cannot express an illogical fact either

(T 3.031); it appears, therefore, that I cannot say anything. With T 4.1272 the metaphysical, hence unpicturable, nature of fact becomes evident. 'Fact' signifies a formal concept which is identified by an object which falls under it (cf. Frege [1] 42-44) and by the same token is barred from being such an object.

2.1.11 There is ample evidence here, it might be thought, to support Wittgenstein's claim at the end of the *Tractatus* that what he has been saying is nonsense (T 6.54). I suggest that there is, however, a simple explanation, capable of dissolving the paradoxes, which might have saved many a wordy exegesis and which shows how it is that:

... after all, Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said... (Russell [6] CKO 22; PMG xxi)

Wittgenstein has simply committed the error which he says is common in philosophy, that of using one sign to signify more than one symbol. He uses the one sign 'fact' to signify three disparate symbols:

- (i) the concept 'fact'
- (ii) any individual fact which establishes the concept but which belongs to the language
- (iii) a circumstance or state of affairs which belongs to reality.

Problems arise because he fails to distinguish one from another and, in particular, because he ascribes to one properties inherent only in another. For example, he follows Frege in insisting that fact as concept - or for that matter as language - cannot be described but only shown (cf. §1.1.5). But there is no reason why fact as circumstance should not be described, even to its logical structure. If it could not the language would be full of unintelligible holes:

'Relations are not sensed'. This dogma, held by a very great

number and variety of philosophers, seems to me so odd that... I find it difficult to discover arguments. If I say 'this dot is to the right of that dot', is it not quaint to say that I am sensing the two dots but not sensing the to the right of? ... I sense what in English is described by means of two demonstrative pronouns and an adverbial phrase. To look for an isolable entity corresponding to the latter is a bad habit encouraged by talk about 'concepts'. Austin [2] 18)

2.1.12 On balance, Wittgenstein seems to favour the notion of fact as reality. This is the simplest explanation which will make sense of, for example:

The world is determined by the facts and by their being *all* the facts. (T 1.11)

For the totality of the facts determines what is the case and also whatever is not the case. (T 1.12)

This is cart before horse in commonsense terms. Commonsensically the physical nature of the world determines what the facts of the world are, not vice versa. An alternative interpretation might be that world is, for Wittgenstein, a subordinate construct of thought i.e. of language (cf. Black 35) and moreover a construct of the individual thinker/speaker (T 5.6; 5.61; 5.62):

The world of the fortunate man is another world than that of the unfortunate. (T 6.43)

The evidence suggests that for Wittgenstein there are two classes of world: One with a single member consists of the totality of circumstances or *pari passu* of the totality of facts; the other has as many members as there are specimens of homo sapiens and each consists of the totality of the individual's potentially language-expressed facts of the world. It might be that Wittgenstein intended all along to project by means of his different sorts of facts this dual view of the world - the totality of what is and the totality of what is said to be - but it seems reasonable to suppose that if this had been his intention he would have pointed it out. Inadequate editing and collating of his rich flood

of ideas seems to me the more likely explanation.

2.1.13 In any case, in going for fact as reality there seems little doubt that Wittgenstein chose the less tenable alternative. I have no doubt that Strawson's is the more sustainable point of view and that he got the better of the argument with Austin. Austin never succeeded in giving a convincing account of a fact as something real; as Strawson pointed out, one cannot spill coffee on a fact. A hypothetical solution is needed, therefore, to the problem of fact in the *Tractatus*. Plochmann and Lawson propose 'prime fact' for 'Sachverhalt' and 'derivative fact' for 'Tatsache' and suggest 'Fact₁' and 'Fact₂' as alternatives. They accept that Wittgenstein says that Tatsachen are composed of Sachverhalte but see the relationship as functional rather than that of whole and parts (Plochmann & Lawson 37-39; 131-132). But this will not suffice to solve the problem because Wittgenstein ascribes incompatible properties to Tatsache alone. Fact₁ and fact₂ might more feasibly represent Tatsache as reality and Tatsache as second-order view of reality. But the double confusion inherent in Tatsache on one hand and in its relation to Sachverhalt on the other would remain to plague the interpretation. I feel the need for a more radical solution and see the possibility of deriving one from Quine's view of fact. Quine's view accords with Strawson's, sufficient reason it might be thought, in the light of their fundamental disagreement elsewhere over the nature of philosophy, to treat it with respect.¹ For Quine, objects are concrete, facts are not; the claim that true propositions are those that state facts is spurious in that facts face the same identity problems as propositions; in ordinary usage 'true sentence carries as much weight as 'fact'; facts cannot be supposed to

help us to explain truth; 'the fact' can be useful in supporting the conjunction 'that' and 'that fact' can obviate repetition:

Now so far as these uses go there is no call to posit facts, certainly not over and above propositions, nor any difficulty in absorbing or paraphrasing away the word. Nor have the peculiarly philosophical appeals to fact impressed us.

(Quine [1] 248)

I propose to follow Quine and adopt a two-part solution to the problem of fact in the *Tractatus*:

(i) 'Fact' has no part to play in accounts of reality. If it equates with Sachverhalt (or any other of Wittgenstein's symbols for stages of reality) it is redundant. I shall simply omit any reference to fact (Tatsache) and take as Wittgenstein's view of reality his sequence of stages of increasing complexity:

Gegenstand > Sachverhalt > Sachverhalte > Sachlage > Sachlagen > Wirklichkeit > Welt

Object > circumstance > circumstances > state of affairs > states of affairs > reality > world

(ii) Tatsache as 'fact that... ' serves no useful purpose. it can be excluded by grammatical means; by devising equivalent forms of expression which do not employ it.

2.1.14 If we read 'world' (a sadly corrupted word) as 'heavens and earth', talk of facts, situations and states of affairs as 'included in' or 'parts of' the world is, obviously, metaphorical. The world is the totality of things, not of facts.
(Strawson [4] 139)

All talk, all language, is metaphor. I cannot prise the world off my symbols. I must approach the world through language - but this is precisely what Wittgenstein proposes to do. It is only because he allows fact to intervene between language and reality that problems such as those that I have been reviewing arise. Of course, as Strawson says, to introduce circumstance and the rest is to shift from reality to

symbol. But here the symbol is at only one remove from reality; a proxy for reality. To introduce fact is to shift two stages away from reality; to symbolise a symbol of reality. Wittgenstein's method viewed simply and without gratuitous complication is simple. He proposes to use language to process language into a form in which its relationship to reality is directly revealed, thereby revealing reality itself. He is not interested in any practical outcome from his method, but I am. I am more interested in the possible application of Wittgenstein's philosophy to the philosophy of education than in elucidating the subtleties of the philosophy itself. There is merit, therefore, it seems to me, in trying to read Wittgenstein simply, particularly since no interpretation of his work by another ever seemed to find favour with him:

He always vehemently repudiated expositions of his doctrines by others even when those others were ardent disciples.

(Russell [2] 112)

What precisely Wittgenstein meant on any given occasion is evidently contentious though some at least of the travail of the commentators takes on the character of self-inflicted wounds - when, for example, they follow CKO into the minefield of fact/atomic fact. But what he meant in broad terms is less contentious. Ayer claims that the main theses of the *Tractatus*, taken at their face value, can be very briefly summarised and proceeds to do so in a single page of text (Ayer [4] 111-112). Fortunately from my point of view, the main theses of the *Tractatus* are the more relevant to the philosophy of education as I approach it. It should be possible, therefore, to read Wittgenstein simply, at least in the sense of avoiding the more problematical of his views, and still extract from him a useful contribution towards the elucidation of 'education'. I shall follow Ayer who, looking back to his youthful enthusiasm for the *Tractatus*, records that:

In the intervening years I have come to find much of it obscure and to disagree on many points with what it appears to be saying, but I then took what I wanted from it and did not mind the rest.
(Ayer [4] 111)

I shall take what I want from the *Tractatus* and ignore, or fail to understand, the rest. If I am right in my belief that Wittgenstein's possible contribution to the philosophy of education has been minimally canvassed, compared to the influence he has exerted on mainstream philosophy,¹ it might indeed be wise to base an initial attempt to redress the balance on as straightforward a reading as possible of Wittgenstein's own texts.

2.2.1 In a sentence, Wittgenstein declares in the *Tractatus*, a thought can be so expressed that elements of the sentence which expresses it correspond to the objects being thought about (T 3.2). Wittgenstein calls these elements of the sentence 'simple signs' and the simple signs he calls 'names' (T 3.201; 3.202). A name means the object which it names and the object is the meaning of the name (T 3.203). A name, he insists, cannot be dissected further, cannot be defined. It is a primitive sign (T 3.26). The reason for this is that it names an object which is itself incapable of being analysed further. This must be so if there is to be any possibility of meaning (T 3.23). The possibility of ambiguity would preclude the possibility of determinate meaning. If there is any indeterminateness about any element in a sentence, it can be assumed that the element signifies a complex, not a simple object (T 3.24). By indeterminateness Wittgenstein means that the meaning of the sentence-element is not evident without further elucidation. Any statement about a complex needs, therefore, to be analysed into statements about its constituent parts by means of sentences which fully describe the complex (T 2.0201).

2.2.2 A sentence the elements of which are expressed by simple signs is considered by Wittgenstein to be 'fully analysed' (T 3.201). One name stands for one thing, another name for another thing and they are all linked one with another so that the whole sentence presents a living picture of a slice of reality (T 4.0311). It is to be noted that Wittgenstein adopts a naively realistic view of reality, accepting the

validity of what Moore sees as the commonsense nature of the world (see Ayer [3] 57). What the sentence-picture depicts is its sense (T 2.221). The truth or falsity of the sentence is given by the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality (T 2.222). It is, therefore, possible for a sentence to make perfectly good sense and be untrue. If the sense of a sentence could under no circumstances be either true or untrue - if, for example, it purported to depict something outside the real or any logically imaginable world - it would simply be meaningless. Into the meaningless category Wittgenstein deposits ethics, aesthetics and the whole of traditional philosophy including his own statements in the *Tractatus*; in short, anything metaphysical. All that language can do is depict reality, truly or falsely.

2.2.3 For Wittgenstein, a sentence is a picture or model of reality as we think it is (T 4.01). A thought is a logical picture of reality (T 3). 'Logical' does not mean that the thought is necessarily true but that it could in logic be true even if it appears in a conventional sense to be physically impossible that it could be true; the thought carries the logical possibility that what is thought is true (T 3.02). In order to know whether our thought-picture is true or false, we must compare it with reality (T 2.223). There are no pictures that are true a priori (T 2.225). We use a sign perceptible to the senses, for example the spoken or written word, as a projection of the possible state of affairs pictured by the thought (T 3.11). The sign by means of which we express a thought is called by Wittgenstein a 'sentence-sign' (T 3.12).

2.2.4 Any element of a sentence or the sentence itself which

characterises the sense of the sentence is an 'expression' or 'symbol' (T 3.31). A sign is the perceptible part of a symbol (T 3.32). Language in general symbolises reality and the problem for the language user is to ensure that it symbolises it accurately. In everyday language it happens with extraordinary frequency that the same word signifies in more than one way and therefore represents different symbols (T 3.323). As a consequence the most fundamental confusions easily arise; the whole of philosophy is full of them (T 3.324; cf. §2.1.11). If we are to avoid such confusions we must employ a sign-language which does not use the same sign for different symbols; a sign-language which obeys logical grammar, logical syntax (T 3.325). If we want to be able to recognise a symbol by its sign, the sign must conform to the operational sense of the symbol (T 3.326). A sign assumes a logical form only if it is given a logico-syntactical application; that is to say, whatever is the case in reality has only one logical form and can, therefore, be correctly depicted by only one symbol. There is in consequence only one language as far as Wittgenstein is concerned and he has no interest in the creation of artificial 'logical' languages:

Mr. Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for a logically perfect language... (Russell [6] CKO 8; PMG x)

Thus Russell wishes upon Wittgenstein his own interest in creating such a language.

2.2.5 For Wittgenstein there must be something identical in both picture and what is pictured for the one to be a picture of the other at all (T 2.161):

What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to depict it at all - whether correctly or incorrectly - is logical form, that is to say the form of reality. (T 2.18)

This assumed logical relationship between language and reality is the foundation on which Wittgenstein builds his cosmography. He argues from language to reality on the premiss that it is only by means of language that we have any conscious knowledge of reality:

A sentence constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding so that we can actually see from the sentence if it is true how everything relates logically. (T 4.023)

To understand a sentence is to understand what is the case if it is true (T 4.024). We can therefore understand a sentence without knowing whether it is true or not. An untrue sentence is not useless; conclusions can be drawn from it (T 4.023). The efficacy of the process depends on knowing what is the case. If it is not clear from the sentence itself whether it is a true picture of reality, it must be analysed into simpler sentences and these into still simpler sentences if necessary until the relationship with reality becomes self-evident. Wittgenstein calls the ultimate stage of analysed simplicity an 'elementary sentence' (Elementarsatz). An elementary sentence is a concatenation of names and pictures a circumstance (Sachverhalt) which is a concatenation of objects.

2.2.6 If reality is analysed into its component parts, it is logically necessary, Wittgenstein argues, that eventually there remain bits which cannot be split up any further. Such a bit he calls an 'object' (Gegenstand); he fails, however, to give a clear account of it. The first time it appears (T 2.01), he equates it parenthetically with 'Sache' and 'Ding', two words for 'thing' the difference between which is not readily expressible in English: 'Sache' implies a lifeless object; 'Ding' can imply a living creature and might be used jocularly of a person. Both are, however, corporeal and that is precisely what a

Wittgensteinian object is suppose not to be. Objects acquire material properties only when they are linked to other objects in circumstances and acquire at the same time the possibility of being depicted in elementary sentences (T 2.0231). Circumstances, in common with all states of affairs in the world, are contingent. There has to be something beyond what is the case that can give a stable base to reality. This is the substance, the form of the world, which consists of the non-material objects:

Stability, constancy and object are one and the same thing.
(T 2.027)

Objects are stable and constant; configurations are mutable and transient.
(T 2.0271)

Nevertheless, we are invited in due course to consider spatial objects such as tables, chairs and books (T 3.1431). The nature of a sentence-sign will be made clear, Wittgenstein suggests, if we imagine it as made up of such spatial objects rather than verbal signs. But at the sense data level at which it is reasonable to talk about such as objects, it is surely unreasonable to describe objects as colourless (T 2.0232). Objects seem perhaps not unlike universals (cf. Ayer [4] 115): For example, space, time and colour are forms of object (T 2.0251); two shades of blue are separate objects.

2.2.7 A Wittgensteinian object does not, however, seem to me to be a universal in the traditional sense. A universal has no existence in itself; it is a theoretical extrapolation from the same phenomenon repeated. The property which on the evidence of repeated occurrence goes to identify a universal is not a property of objects but a neurophysiological operation within the brain of the perceiver. In the dark all cats are grey. A rose is red only to the beholder;

rose as Platonic Form or Wittgensteinian object or what Russell calls a 'physical object in physical space' is colourless (Russell [5] 13ff.). Repeated red roses plus red other-objects, though they may vary as to the intensity and the wavelength of the red, stimulate the brain via the optic nerves in a way which, by definition, is the same on each occasion; or has at least enough sameness on each occasion within the degrees of discrimination of which the brain is capable for the so-called 'universal' red to be identified. In any case, the phenomenon is internal to the perceiver; it seems to me necessary, therefore, to speak of a universal in terms of the same phenomenon repeated. It must, I think, be 'same' and not 'identical'. I do not carry a colour chart in my mind with which to identify by comparison each new specimen of red which comes my way. I recognise red directly; that is to say, the *same* neurons, or whatever, are activated on each occasion. Any problem with 'same' arises from interpreting universals as properties of objects (cf. Ayer [3] 56-57; 206-207). A Wittgensteinian object is also a theoretical extrapolation, but as an object in its own right (T 2.0122). But, paradoxically, when it exists as an individual object it has no more than the possibility of existence. In order to exist, it must have external properties and the simple object cannot have external properties because it has no body on which to hang them and no location which it might occupy. Everything has got to be somewhere; space might conceivably be empty but it is inconceivable that a thing (Ding) should be nowhere (T 2.0123). So too with other properties: A speck in the field of vision does not have to be any particular colour but it must have some sort of colour - it is, so to speak, enclosed in colour-space. A sound must have a pitch; an object that is touched must have a degree of hardness and so on (T 2.0131). So everything has got to be both

something and somewhere, but what its properties specifically are does not become manifest until an object concatenates with another object and together they create a circumstance. Then I can perceive and describe the external properties with which each object is now endowed.

2.2.8 However, I now face a major anomaly in Wittgenstein's account of object. In order to know the object its external properties do not have to be known but its internal properties do. A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object does not possess it (T 4.123). For example, the two shades of blue stand in the internal relationship of lighter and darker one to the other; it is unthinkable that they should not. It seems logical enough that the properties which an object necessarily has should distinguish it from another that does not have them. Wittgenstein does not, however, make plain how an object pared down by definition to the logical minimum could retain any non-essential, external, contingent properties. Uncompromisingly, objects are simple (T 2.02). They are, as it were, the simple building blocks out of which the world is made, but a curious sort of non-material block. Wittgenstein insists that the world does not consist of objects. That is because in his view objects have no material properties; they have no material properties because they are the substance of the world and the substance of the world can have only form without material properties. Substance persists irrespective of what happens to be the case in the world (T 1; 1.1; 2.024). Logically, therefore, I cannot know objects pure and simple because they have no physical form that would make them perceptible to the senses. All they have is logical form i.e. they must be there for the world to exist but they are in any realistic sense inconceivable. Yet reality is what Wittgenstein is

ostensibly concerned with. His reality is, however, a logical projection beyond the limits of sense data; it cannot be tested empirically, but at the same time he accepts commonsense reality which can. Wittgenstein's logically conceived objects have no material properties but paradoxically he also talks about objects which are perceptible to the senses. He seems indeed to conflate what Russell calls 'physical objects in physical space' and 'sense data in private space' (Russell [5] 13-18). Objects in physical space are colourless; and also tasteless, smell-less, touch-less and any other sense-data-less. If by 'object' Wittgenstein means such an object or even an object in metaphysical space - as it were, a Kantian Ding-an-sich; a noumenon - then he is correct to announce in passing that objects are colourless. But he also assumes the existence of spatial objects (räumlichen Gegenständen) (T 3.1431) - as it were, Kantian phenomena; Russell's sense data in private space - and these are the antithesis of colourless etc. Sensations are all we know of such objects; such objects are sense data.

2.2.9 Either some means must be found of rationally unifying the two kinds of object or Wittgenstein again stands accused of perpetrating the error of applying one sign to more than one symbol (cf. §2.1.11). This time there is an explanation which would absolve Wittgenstein from the charge of inconsistency though it is not one that I have seen canvassed by any of the commentators. The commonly held view is that examples of Wittgensteinian objects cannot be produced; that ordinary objects are complexes which must be reduced to simples before they can be named (see, for example, Hartnack 13; Black 28). It seems to me that, once embarked upon, this road leads to the

sub-atomic particles; to questions of what the physical world ultimately consists of; to the demise of philosophy and the absorption of the corpse into science.¹ Any stopping place along this road depends on what Wittgenstein expressly precludes, i.e. an arbitrary determination of reality by means of language:

If the world had no substance, whether a sentence had sense would depend on whether another sentence was true. (T 2.0211)

That would, of course, lead to an infinite regress. Sentences which might halt the regress are those which, by common assent, directly link language and reality. They are standard sentences of the language, not Wittgensteinian elementary sentences made up of simple signs. Such are the sentences called by Quine 'observation sentences':

They are expressions that we have learned to associate with publicly observable concurrent circumstances... it is in the observational vocabulary that language makes its principal contact with experience. It is this part of language that we first learn to apply, and to which we retreat when a check point is needed. (Quine [3] 157-158)

Objects specified by observational vocabulary must, it seems to me, be a combination of both internal and external properties - the sort of object which Wittgenstein in fact postulates. Internal properties categorise an object; external properties identify a specimen which falls within the category as that particular specimen and no other. No object can possess solely internal or solely external properties. So it makes sense to talk about spatial objects such as tables, chairs and books, as Wittgenstein does in T 3.1431. A chair is identifiable as a chair by its chairness - its internal characteristics - no matter what it is made of. It is possible to have two chairs which have no constituent material in common - as one moulded in plastic and the other constructed of wood, fabric and glue; I recognise them both as chairs. But to recognise one as a particular chair, it is not enough to know

that it is an object called 'chair'. This aspect of its existence, its 'chairness', lies - in a curiously real sense because the chair would not be a chair without it - beyond the limits of reality. I cannot know a chair as an independent object suspended in logical space; I can know a chair only when it is juxtaposed with other objects in a circumstance and I know that it is a particular chair by its external properties, the features which distinguish that chair from all other chairs.

2.2.10 On this interpretation there is, I suggest, no inconsistency in Wittgenstein's account of object. An object needs different simultaneous levels of existence in order to be a physical object. In seeking to apply Wittgenstein's philosophy to problems of reality, I shall not be concerned with subliminal states of existence. I can note that his reduction of existence to objects and of language to names operates this side of the threshold and try to use it as a tool to clarify my thinking about education. That Wittgenstein's stipulations concerning the nature of an object do operate this side of the threshold of reality can easily be shown. Its internal properties are what make a chair a chair; I can analyse a chair down to its chairness but I cannot analyse it any further and retain the object called 'chair'. 'Chair' appears in fact to be an unanalysable primitive sign. Wittgenstein nowhere stipulates that simples are to be destroyed by analysis - on the contrary the object of analysis is to reveal simples; once the simples have been revealed, further analysis is not so much improper as impossible. Every combination is contingent (T 2.021). If objects were complex, they would be contingent agglomerations of simples and therefore impossible to identify. To say that a chair is not a simple because it is an agglomeration of simpler bits and pieces is to miss the

point. Chair is simple as chair; there are no simpler chairnesses into which it might be divided. A chair can be analysed into its constituent parts - wood, fabric, glue, for example - and each of these can be considered for treatment as an object in its own right and analysed into its simpler constituents; but none of them is a chair and taken all together they need not make a chair. Only its internal properties make a chair a chair and they manifest themselves in the real world.

2.2.11 Of course I do not need to take a chair to bits in order to establish the principle or demonstrate a particular case. I can carry out the process by proxy of language. Any chair has external properties describable in words. The chair on which I am now sitting consists of a plastic moulding and metal tubes held together by metal screws. I could take the description further with details of colour, dimensions, shape; if I had the knowledge, I could go on to stipulate composition of the materials and methods of forming them. But at the very beginning of the descriptive process I lost contact with chair. 'Chair' is my unanalysable primitive sign; chair the symbol and via the symbol the object which it signifies. This example demonstrates the three stages of sign, symbol and reality. I must retain the sign which signifies the symbol; otherwise I am talking about something else. The object anchors the symbol and ensures that it does not drift away somewhere else, but only as long as the object is under consideration - physically or symbolically. The final stage of language before the simple disappears is given by a sentence such as: 'This is a chair' or simply 'Chair' accompanied by an ostensive gesture. It might appear that I am back with Frege and have identified the concept 'chair' and that in so doing I have parted company with Wittgenstein by naming an

object in isolation. But I have, of course, identified the concept only because I have named an object which falls under it and Wittgenstein agrees with Frege over the propriety of doing this. Wittgenstein is by no means averse to *naming* an object in isolation; that is a function which language is quite capable of performing. What he does reject is the possibility of an object's *existing* in isolation. It is, therefore in order for me to identify my chair or any chair by its concept name, by applying the appropriate predicate-term to it, provided that my purpose is solely to distinguish it from an object of any other kind. If the concept 'education' can be given by an object, I now have a means of identifying it. If it cannot be given by an object it is unknowable in terms of the *Tractatus*.

2.3.1 No object that I am aware of is directly named by 'education'. Obviously 'education' names a complex if it names anything. But, according to the *Tractatus*, only simples can be named. The ambiguity of 'education' in both everyday and specialised discourse illustrates the point (cf. §2.2.1). I am faced therefore with the problem of extracting an unambiguous simple from the complex. Wittgenstein offers no guidance on how to do this; he is not interested in empirical methods of testing his theories. He thinks he knows as a matter of logical necessity that even if the world is infinitely complex it must ultimately analyse into circumstances and objects (T 4.2211). My goal is clear enough: 'education' as a primitive sign; the name of an object in the world. It is clear that if there is such a name, it must be an educat- word. If I analyse beyond educat-, 'education' and its cognates disappear; a nonexistent word has no meaning. From my argument in §1.2.6ff. it emerges that 'education' is merely the titular head of the educat- clan. The problem now is to identify which educat- word is the true head; which carries the logical meaning; which is the logical simple identifying the concept 'education' by naming an object which falls under it.

2.3.2 The most striking example of an educat- sign designating incompatibly different symbols is 'educated' in its dual role of adjective and past participle (see §1.2.9ff.). If the other educat- words happened to share the same semantic distinction it might be possible to divide them into two corresponding classes. It might seem

odd to use an adjective and a past participle as the names of classes. In order to avoid this, each can be extrapolated nominally as 'education'. I propose to designate the education that the educatee has by virtue of being educated 'EE' and the education in which the educator has engaged by virtue of his having educated 'ET'. EE and ET can then be used as the titles of two classes into which the educat- words can be sorted:

<u>EE</u>	<u>ET</u>
	educability
	educable
	educand
	educatability
	educatable
	educate
educated	educated
educatee	
	educating
education	education
	educationable
(educational)	educational
(educationally)	educationally
(educationary)	educationary
(educationise)	educationise
(educationised)	educationised
	educative
	educator
	educatory
	educatress

2.3.3 I am aware that in identifying two apparently equivalent classes I might seem to be running the risk of committing a category mistake in that the two classes might not be logically equivalent (cf. Ryle 17ff.). One might, for example, be dependent on the other for its existence. If, however, there is no causal nexus between ET and EE, either can perfectly well exist in its own right without reference to the other (and do in fact frequently so exist).¹ But this is to deny a logically necessary, or possibly any, extra-linguistic referent for a

word and is more *Philosophical Investigations* than *Tractatus*. In §2.3.2 I am feeling my way into an analysis of the complex 'education' into simples or comparative simples. My point at this stage is not so much that EE or ET has any particular characteristic as that neither is the other. I am not sure about the words in brackets. They exist morphologically as cognates of 'education' but what their semantic relation to 'educatee' might be, I can't imagine. If it transpires that 'education' cannot exist without them or that, conversely, they are logically necessary derivatives from 'education' (or, properly speaking, the corresponding symbols are, the sign being arbitrary), it may be that doubt will be cast on the presence of 'education' in the EE column. Perhaps the logical home for 'education' is solely in the ET list. This is an attractive idea which might be worth looking at.² It would dispose of the logical difficulty of regarding 'education' as an object which the educatee possessed; it might with less difficulty be regarded as an activity in which the educator engages. Logically the educatee *has* nothing but, if anything, *is* something, namely educated. The net result is to reduce the EE list to 'educatee' and 'educated'. In any case, the symbols represented by the other signs nominally in the EE column owe their existence to EE and take their meaning, if any, from EE. They are, therefore, of no great discrete significance. What is of fundamental importance is that the only sign unique to EE is 'educatee'. As the only unambiguous sign in the list it must play the central role in a logical analysis of EE; it is merely conventional to cast 'education' for this part. Difficult as it is to break a lifelong habit, I must stop thinking of 'education' as a sign essential to EE. It is no more than a label and a label never says what is in the container.

2.3.4 'Educable' derives directly from the educ- stem of the Latin 'educare' (see §1.2.5); likewise 'educand' which is a pure Latin gerundive minus inflections. This suggests a useful distinction in English: 'educatee' - one who is educated i.e. has the attributes (which need to be identified) appropriate to being considered educated; 'educand' - one who is to be educated i.e. subjected to the process of education (ET). The meaning of 'educare', as I tried to show in §1.2.12ff., was, in a quite neutral sense, to bring up children. There is no logical reason why this should not have continued with 'educate'. But meanings are not determined by logic and 'educate' is no longer neutral. The normative overtones which educat- has acquired in modern English are the reason for the EE/ET dichotomy. If 'educate' was as neutral as 'eat' (cf. §1.2.9), syntax not semantics would decide whether 'educated' was past participle or adjective. Problems arise because the normative outcomes implied by 'educated' are not applicable in anticipation of the event and figure in 'educate' only as the expression of good intentions. Nevertheless they do figure, and figure importantly, and underline the need, in specialised discourse at least, for non-arbitrary, unambiguous terminology. In a natural language both sign and symbol are matters of convention. But the results of convention are not necessarily beneficial; they might be ameliorated in appropriate contexts by an infusion of logic. A 'logical' return to a neutral 'educate' is not, however, one of the options on offer. That is because educated (EE) and educated (ET) would retain different senses even if they were both normatively neutral. They are simply different symbols because they have different, non-conflatable referents. It would have been advantageous if they had been signified distinctively, but they are not. The immediate question is, therefore: Which has the stronger

logical claim to the use of the sign 'educated'? The answer is obvious: EE has a direct link with reality; ET is subordinate to EE; EE could perfectly well exist without ET but ET could not logically exist without EE. In looking for a logical base for educat- symbolism, I feel justified, therefore, in ignoring an approach through ET. ET must logically bring me sooner or later to EE so I might just as well start there in my search for the object which carries the label 'education'.

2.3.5 I have already decided that the only sign unique to EE is 'educatee'. It is unambiguous in its designation of symbol. Its fellow members of the EE list, 'educated' and 'education' participate ambiguously as signs in the ET list also. Even if they were granted for the sake of argument discrete EE symbolism which might have been signified otherwise and unambiguously, that symbolism would nevertheless be subordinate to the symbolism of 'educatee' for the logical reason that properties must be dependent on what possesses them. So the logical *sine qua non* of EE and therefore of educat- is 'educatee'. Educatee is the nearest to a Wittgensteinian object that the educat- symbolism can take me. As far as the *Tractatus* is concerned, the meaning of 'education' is the meaning of 'educatee'. But to say so is to say nothing useful about the world because I still don't know what the meaning of 'educatee' is or what an educatee is other than that each is the other (T 3.203).

2.3.6 According to the *Tractatus*, statements made by the generality of sentences are either true or false depending on their concurrence with reality. There are two special cases, however, that Wittgenstein calls 'tautologies' and 'contradictions' respectively.

A tautology is true for all the truth-possibilities of elementary sentences; it is unconditionally true. A contradiction is false for all the truth-possibilities of elementary sentences; on no condition is it true (T 4.46; 4.461). Tautology and contradiction are not pictures of reality. They represent no possible state of affairs for the former admits every possible state of affairs and the latter none (T 4.462). They are without sense but they are not nonsensical; they belong to the symbolism in the same way as 0 belongs to the symbolism of arithmetic (T 4.4611):

The truth of a tautology is certain, of a sentence possible,
of a contradiction impossible. (T 4.464)

My statement that educatee is the logical meaning of 'education' is a tautology. It gives me no information about either educatee or education beyond what is contained in the statement, namely that each is the other and that they are, therefore, the same thing (cf. T 5.5303).

2.3.7 It is a basic principle for Wittgenstein that any question answerable by logic contains in itself all the elements necessary to the answer. If I find myself in a situation where I have to look to the world for an answer to a logical problem, I am on the wrong track (T 5.551). I do not understand logic by experiencing that something behaves in such and such a manner. Logic precedes experience and says that something *is so* (T 5.552).

It is the distinguishing feature of logical statements (Sätze) that they can be seen to be true from the symbol alone and this fact encompasses the whole of the philosophy of logic.

(T 6.113)

Wittgenstein is, of course, not unique in this; his view of logic is consonant with that of any philosopher who is concerned more with the validity of an argument than with its content. But is a tautology, as

Wittgenstein sees it, complete in itself or does it comply with his generalisation that complex statements are truth functions of elementary sentences? Fogelin takes the view that:

Tautologies and contradictions are truth functions of *significant* propositions... The truths of logic do not, then, simply depend upon the pure interaction of logical terms. That there are truths of logic ultimately depends upon there being truths that are not truths of logic, i.e. elementary propositions. (Fogelin 39-41)

It would facilitate my argument greatly if Fogelin was correct. I could look for an interpretation of 'education equals educatee' in the state of the world. But Fogelin seems to me to be misinterpreting Wittgenstein and confusing tautology and the expression of tautology. Of course the expression of tautology depends upon there being a language capable of expressing it; but its existence does not so depend. There is no ambiguity in Wittgenstein's expression of this point:

To be sure the signs are still linked to each other even in tautology and contradiction i.e. they maintain relations with one another, but these relations are meaningless, inessential to the *symbol*. (T 4.4661)

Fogelin suggests that out of 'it is raining' which does depend for its truth on the state of the world, a tautology 'it is raining or it is not raining' can be constructed which does not depend for its truth on the state of the world. But surely the truth or falsity of 'it is raining' as evidenced by the state of the world is irrelevant to the timeless and stateless tautology constructed out of it which does not even require that 'rain' be given its conventional meaning. 'The mome raths are outgribing' is neither true nor false but - referentially - meaningless, no matter how evocative the language of *Jabberwocky* might be (Carroll 202). Out of it I construct the tautology 'either the mome raths are outgribing or the mome raths are not outgribing' which does, it seems to me, simply depend on the pure interaction of logical terms (Fogelin 41).

2.3.8 Even if 'it is raining' does depend for its truth on the state of the world, it does not so depend for its sense; if it did, fictional and historical accounts would be impossible. Having been given a conventional signification through a link with reality, the sign 'it is raining' can thereafter sever the link and operate solely at the level of symbol. There is no need to agonise as Russell did over 'the present king of France is bald' (Russell [4]) and seek a solution either with Meinong in some curious kind of nonexistent entity or by substituting after Russell a logically proper description of the subject of the sentence. Reality and with it any question of referential meaning need not come under consideration. It is necessary merely to distinguish, as Frege does and after him Wittgenstein, between sense (Sinn) and (referential) meaning (Bedeutung) for the argument to be confinable to the symbolic plane.¹ According to the *Tractatus*, we use the sense-perceptible sentence-sign as a projection of a *possible* state of affairs (T 3.11). A sentence has sense by virtue of being a sentence (T 3.144); in order to find out whether it has meaning we have to compare it with reality (T 4.021ff.). To understand a sentence is to know what is the case if it is true but not necessarily whether it is true or not (T 4.024). In what could be interpreted as a remarkable anticipation of his later philosophy, Wittgenstein announces:

If a sign is not used it is meaningless (bedeutungslos). (T 3.328)

In the current context, however, I take Wittgenstein to be saying that a sign is meaningless if it is not used as a sign is properly used i.e. to name an object or to depict a circumstance; it is not necessarily without significance (sinnlos). T 3.328 is tautological in terms of both the *Tractatus* (equalling 'if a sign does not refer it does not refer') and the *Philosophical Investigations* (equalling 'if a sign is

not used it is not used').

2.3.9 Tautology is of central importance for my thesis on two counts:

(i) If 'educatee' is the logically necessary form of education, according to the *Tractatus*, it will be tautologically so and I cannot look to draw inferences from it about any state of affairs in the world. I am told nothing about education in general and education in particular.

(ii) Statements which purport to be about education might be no more than symbols with no grounding in reality.

In order to establish the concept 'education' I have still got to be able to say on some occasion with knowledge: 'This is an educatee'. But I cannot say this until I know what an educatee is. I can say: 'This is a horse' and expect to meet with general agreement because, although there is no logical reason why the sign 'horse' should signify as it does, there is general agreement on how it is to be taken to signify. I cannot expect similar agreement with 'educatee' and in any case I am trying to find out what it necessarily symbolises, remembering that it is the logical referent of the symbol, not of the sign, that I am seeking. The logical i.e. tautological referent of any sign is its symbol - it is what it is. Wittgenstein insists that the sign is arbitrary in that any other sign might have been chosen instead, but he tends in his use of terms to conflate sign and symbol in common opposition to reality. It seems to me important to maintain the distinction in order to avoid the trap of regarding the educatee and the education which 'educatee' and 'education' respectively signify as any more than language symbols; as a priori bits of reality. It may well be

that the tautological equation of educatee and education is as far as the *Tractatus* can take me in the direction of the elucidation of logical symbolism unless I can break the impasse by invoking the contingent state of the world which is logical in that it is what it is; not what it necessarily is. I am aware of a double peril in proposing this:

(i) To imply that educatee has necessary external properties suggests that it is not after all a simple Wittgensteinian object identifiable by its internal properties.

(ii) Wittgenstein denies the possibility of logical conclusions from contingent premisses; any conclusions which are truly logical will have no connection with the contingent world.

But logical conclusions are tautological and tell me nothing about the world. Clearly the circularity of the argument remains unbroken and must remain *logically* unbreakable according to the *Tractatus*. It might appear that there is a possible escape route through the depiction of circumstances which are admittedly contingent but can nevertheless be seen to hold because the elementary sentences which depict them are true. But this is no less circular than the logical argument.

Circumstances and elementary sentences have no means of support apart from each other. The metaphysics of the *Tractatus* runs into the sand, as Wittgenstein admits that it does, and he leaves me, as in spite of his denials he left the logical positivists, with the empirical as the only possible approach to the world:

The correct method of philosophy would properly speaking be this: To say nothing except what admits of being said, scientific statements (Sätze) therefore - something therefore that has nothing to do with philosophy - and whenever someone else had a mind to say something metaphysical to point out to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his statements (Sätze). (T 6.53)

2.4.1 Educatee is not a conventional notion. It is perhaps of no great significance that the logically essential element of education is not identified and named in common parlance but it is distinctly odd that the same applies to specialist discourse. Not one of the philosophies of education listed in my bibliography indexes 'educatee' or any synonym for it. The reason is clear enough: Since education is commonly equated with schooling, what the language is called upon to do is distinguish teacher and taught; for the latter whatever is the currently fashionable name suffices. None of these equates with 'educatee'. 'Child' begs crucial questions about the age for education; 'pupil' introduces an element of subordination no doubt in order as far as schooling is concerned but logically antithetic to education; 'student' implies a discrete activity, although in Australian English it is the standard term for school pupils as well as post-school participants in educational activities; 'scholar', the obvious cognate of 'school' and what I was called when I first went to school, now tends to be reserved, in its time-honoured sense, for one who is learned rather than for one who has learned or is learning at a comparatively early stage (cf. is educated/has educated); 'learner' has appropriately broader connotations than these other terms but shares their prohibitive disadvantage: There is between any of them and educat- no evident logical nexus; what Quine calls the 'anchor line' of the observation sentence has broken and the topic of discourse has drifted away from education. 'Educated man', a term favoured by philosophers of education, maintains the necessary link with educat- but is not an

equivalent substitute for 'educatee' since it belongs, on logical, grammatical and semantic grounds, in a different category. The perceived necessity nowadays to take account of other than objectively educational criteria, typified by the demand for its replacement by 'educated person', reveals an inherent vulnerability and instability in the term. 'Educated man' (*pari passu* 'educated woman' or 'educated person') is not a synonym for 'educatee' in that it is applicable only selectively, to some but not to others, and only when specified normative criteria have been met. The educated man cannot be a Wittgensteinian object because it is not an unanalysable simple. Clearly, it is a complex of at least two elements, denoted grammatically by a noun and an adjective. If the adjective is interpreted as the past participle of the verb 'to educate', 'educated man' (or at least the 'educated' part of it) belongs with ET, not EE. 'Pupil', 'student', 'child', are, in my interpretation of Wittgenstein's category, primitive signs; analysed, they disappear. 'Educated man' is obviously not a primitive sign; analysed, it splits initially into 'educated' and 'man'. 'What is a man?' is irrelevant to my current concerns; 'what is educated?' cannot be answered, if the *Tractatus* is to be followed, as a set of contingent properties. 'Educated man' implies:

(i) The possession of contingent, possibly debatable, properties, however they are acquired - whether, for example, as a result of social process or personal activity

(ii) The dichotomy educated man/uneducated man. What label is to be attached to those who have been educated but are not educated? I want to avoid the dichotomy by postulating a neutral educatee. By my argument, the dichotomy educatee/non-educatee is impossible because everybody from cradle to grave (and even pre-natally?) is an educatee -

but certainly not an educated man (or educated woman).

Neither popular nor specialist discourse offers a term for the universal, neutral, grammatically passive, subject of 'to educate'. I find the idea impossible to articulate using any of the commonly used cognates of 'education' and if I go to some other stem than educat- I lose contact with any referent 'education' might have. I find 'educatee' indispensable and can think of no alternative to it.

2.4.2 I have suggested that 'educatee' names a Wittgensteinian object. What I must do in order to substantiate my claim is identify the internal properties of educatee, the properties which distinguish educatee from anything else and which it is inconceivable any educatee should be without. In attempting to do this, I do not start with a clean slate. 'Educatee' is not a word to which I can attach any sort of meaning at all. The sign 'educatee' is an item of reality (cf. T 3.14) and needs to be treated as such - although I should claim that its unconventionality allows wider degrees of freedom than could be exercised with some of its cognates. There are empirically observable occasions on which it is comparatively appropriate to utter the relevant sound or inscribe the relevant marks. This is because the symbol designated by 'educatee' has some sense however vague and however one might seek to delimit it - not so much perhaps, in view of its limited range, by way of distinguishing between 'central and peripheral usages of the term' (Peters [1] 24); more, perhaps, by way of fitting it into the category of words in everyday use which have no 'true meaning' but have what might usefully be called a 'core meaning' (Collins English Dictionary xxxiv). Still hankering after a logical meaning, or at least a ratiocinated meaning (logical in the diluted sense of Hirst and Peters, for example,

rather than in Wittgenstein's uncompromisingly rigid sense of tautological), I should like to see it identifying one of the unchanging concepts which belong to the 'massive central core of human thinking which has no history' (Strawson [3] 10). To this end I need a referent, or elements of a referent, identifiable as a posteriori necessary in that it is what it is because:

(i) it is not otherwise

(ii) it is inconceivable that it has been otherwise at any time during the history of homo sapiens

(iii) it is inconceivable that it should ever be otherwise.

2.4.3 These stipulations still leave a wide field of possibilities. Wittgenstein contrasts looking for the method of trisecting the angle, which cannot exist, with looking for a unicorn, which does not exist (see Hallett 490 on PI 463). The educatee might exist, as a unicorn in a sense exists, as an imagined composite of empirically observable parts extrapolated from extant animals.¹ I still need to anchor my postulated educatee in reality by pointing to a known specimen. But I cannot point to one until I know how to identify it; my immediate need is, therefore, for empirically identifiable properties of the educatee. What appears to be the first and most obvious property, that the educatee is a human being, is, however, neither a matter of necessity nor of the observation of educatees but of an arbitrary decision as to the way in which the term 'educatee' is to be applied. Educatee signs are conventionally taken to refer to human beings though a subsidiary usage covers animals.² There are, therefore, no grounds for assuming that the educatee is human; my doing so arbitrarily restricts³ the symbolism and closes the door definitively on the logical approach.

At the same time it determines my way ahead: I must look for properties of human beings which characterise them as educatees. An obvious starting point presents itself: It is a matter of observation that all human beings change; it is a matter of observation that the core meaning of educatee- symbols has to do in some way with change and that the grammatical form of 'educatee', in particular, indicates that the referent is changing in an intransitive not a transitive sense.⁴ Part of the change experienced by every human being is the physical metamorphosis common to all living things. Part is the accompanying mental development. But part takes place because human beings learn to be different.

... learning is logically necessary to education...
(Hirst and Peters 77)

I have argued that educatee and education are logical equivalents. If both these propositions are true, learning is logically necessary to educatee. I have burnt my boats against navigating by Wittgensteinian logic - Wittgenstein himself insists that it is inapplicable to the contingent world - but there is ample buoyancy in the notion that education is unthinkable without learning. That is because the educatee is unthinkable without learning and that in turn is because any specimen of homo sapiens who failed to learn would soon cease to be either sapiens or homo.⁵ Because he is a human being, the educatee is a learner - I do not say 'necessarily a learner' in deference to Wittgenstein's insistence that the only necessity is logical necessity (T 6.37):

That the sun will rise tomorrow is a hypothesis; that is to say, we don't *know* that it will rise. (T 6.36311)

I don't *know* that the educatee is a learner but I am satisfied that I have sufficient reason to hypothesise that the educatee is a learner.

To be a learner is one of the internal properties which identify the object called 'educatee' because it is unthinkable that the educatee should not be a learner (cf. T 4.123). This is far from being an absolute criterion; it rests on my finding it unthinkable that anybody could find a non-learning educatee not unthinkable, but it seems to be the only one I have. I certainly could not say what a non-learning educatee would be like and Wittgenstein finds that a potent argument in the context in which he uses it:

Once upon a time it was said that God could create anything with the single exception of what was contrary to the laws of logic. In fact it is we who could not say what an illogical world would look like. (T 3.031)

If I can now list properties of the learner I should have a hypothesis covering some at least of the properties of the educatee.

2.4.4 Properties which it seems to me unthinkable the learner should not have can be listed without difficulty:

- The learner is an individual by virtue of being a human being; every human being becomes an individual by virtue of being separated from his mother at birth.¹

- Only the individual can learn; 'community education' as the end product of learning is the sum of individual learnings, not a discrete entity; the community mind does not exist.

- Every learner differs from every other learner - this, I think, is tautological. Wittgenstein puts the point the other way round:

... to say of two things that they are identical is a nonsense... (T 5.5303)

- What is learned i.e. what is selected for learning out of the total available for learning is peculiar to the individual learner.

- What has been learned is peculiar to the individual learner -

hence in an education system which rewards performance, the need to assess differing levels of absorption of a common syllabus. This point and the previous point are tautological: The learner learns what he learns; the learner has learned what he has learned.

- What needs to be learned is peculiar to the individual learner since it depends on what has and has not been learned already as well as on the predilections of the individual; I accept that the latter is theory but the former is true for the tautological reason that $x-y+y=x$.

- The learner learns anywhere; special environments such as schools are not necessary.

- The learner necessarily has an age but is of no particular age; cf. Michelangelo's (apocryphal?) last words: Ancora imparo - I am still learning.

- What is learned cannot be predetermined; in schooling, for example, the correlation between syllabus and what is learned is fortuitous - if it was manifest cause and effect there would be no need of assessment.

- Learning is open-ended; what it will lead to and what it will be applied to cannot be foretold.

- It is logically necessary that the learner learns; if he does not he ceases to be a learner.

2.4.5 Since the educatee is a learner, these properties of learner are properties of educatee also. They may be sufficient for learner; they are not sufficient for educatee unless educatee is to equate with learner and lose or fail to acquire separate existence. I need now to add to the list properties specific to educatee. Accepting Wittgenstein's rejection of the synthetic a priori, there is

nevertheless something of the consequential, if not of the necessarily consequential, about the properties of the learner. It might be argued that some are necessary even on Wittgenstein's stringent grounds of logical necessity. I should like to think that the properties which I propose to ascribe to educatee are likewise consequential or necessary but because of the comparative unconventionality of the notion I shall put them forward initially as a hypothesis which needs more substantial proof than the hypothesis that the educatee is a learner. The principal difference, it seems to me, between learner and educatee is that the learner ceases to be when learning ceases; the educatee I see as the learner extrapolated into a continuing state terminable only physically, continuing in some way which needs to be delineated to draw more or less effectively on his accumulating total of learning in his interaction with the world. A learner is for the time being a learner on the strength of a single act of learning irrespective of whether what is learned is later forgotten or remembered. The educatee is changed permanently and as a whole as a result of learning. Not that any item of learning necessarily exerts a direct and discrete effect. It must, however, contribute directly or indirectly to the educatee's permanent capacity to interact with the world. If it does not; if it fades away without trace, it makes no contribution to the educatee's educatedness. A learner might learn what it is predetermined by others he should learn - as in a course of training, for example. What he thereby learns might be applicable in a wider context; what the educatee learns is applicable without predetermined limits as a condition of its contributing to his educatedness. Educatedness includes the capacity of the educatee to respond to his environment and initiate action towards it - not necessarily how he is seen to respond and initiate action; he might

project a deliberately misleading form of behaviour. Educatedness is not assessable either by the educatee or by anybody else. In order to assess the educatee it would be necessary to view his limits from both sides before they could be known to be limits (cf. T 5.61) but neither an objective internal nor an objective external view is available. The educatee is logically what he is but what he is is unknowable - not logically unknowable but as a synthetic a priori consequence of his contingent individuality.

2.4.6 Since the educatee always has the capacity to change, educateeness is not a terminal state. The concept of the educated man makes no sense logically besides being disagreeably reminiscent ethically of Browning's 'finished and finite clods, untroubled by a spark' (Rabbi Ben Ezra III). Unless the educatee puts up the shutters and vegetates once he is educated, in which case he is not educated, he goes on becoming more educated, in which case he was not educated in the first place. If educated can expand into more educated it can also contract into less educated and unless arbitrary cutoff points are determined - what could they conceivably be? - 'educated' is a meaningless term if it purports to name a determinate state. The answer, I suggest, in opposition to the more usual analyses of the concept of the educated man (see, for example, Hirst and Peters 19-25), is to treat educated as value free;¹ every human being has a fluid state of education which is what it is in each case but is neither desirably nor possibly assessable. The educatee is an autonomous individual, always what he is but always becoming something else.

2.4.7 So educatee is both state and flux and the question

arises how this can be so. I have met this problem before in a different form as that traditional philosophical puzzle, the paradox of Zeno's arrow. Zeno of Elea, a 5th. century B.C. philosopher, as reported by Aristotle, argued as one of four paradoxes (of which the athlete and the tortoise is the most famous) that an arrow in flight must be at rest because it occupies a particular place during a given moment of time. Ayer concedes that, in a sense, Zeno was right:

The arrow could be said to be always at rest if what is meant by this is that there is a one to one correlation between the places which it occupies and the times at which it occupies them.

(Ayer [3] 17-19)

He was wrong only in assuming that this was incompatible with its being in flight:

The answer is that its being in flight simply consists in the fact that over a continuous period of time it occupies a continuous series of places. If we are asked how it gets from one place to another our answer must again be that its getting from one place to another simply consists in the fact that it occupies some intermediate place at any given intermediate time. (Ibid.)

This, I think, is the answer to my problem. The state of educatee is what it is during any arbitrarily chosen segment of time and can therefore quite happily be considered to be a state. But over a continuous flow of time it assumes a continuous series of states. I can without paradox treat it as state or flux - whichever is the more relevant.

2.4.8 As a Wittgensteinian object the educatee cannot exist alone in logical space. Clearly he does not; he necessarily stands in relation to other objects and to the world in general. It seems to me that as a human being - though not necessarily expressly as educatee - the educatee relates to the world on two levels, the physiological and the mental. I am not saying that body and mind are separate entities.

I accept that mental phenomena are manifestations of the neurophysiology of the brain and do not have a separate existence or a separate source. But no physiological attribute distinguishes the educatee from the other fauna which pullulate on this planet. Since mental phenomena are manifestations of a physical brain, mental phenomena per se don't distinguish him either since other animals have a physical brain which, in some of them at least, manifests itself in ways comparable to the human. But no other species of animal is capable of doing what the educatee is capable of doing - ratiocinating his relationship to the world by means of the symbolism of language. I am not suggesting that such ratiocination exists in itself; clearly it has no existence apart from the language symbols which carry it. So we rely on them for our thinking relationship to the world:

We cannot think what we cannot think; neither can we say therefore what we cannot think. (T 5.61)

It makes no difference whether we regard ourselves as thinking animals or as talking animals:

A sentence-sign thought out and applied is a thought. (T 3.5)

A thought is a sentence with sense. (T 4)

So thinking/talking is necessary to homo sapiens but not sufficient, in my view, to distinguish him as educatee.

2.4.9 According to Wittgenstein, language pictures reality. Elementary sentences picture circumstances; complex statements picture states of affairs; the totality of language pictures the totality of whatever is the case i.e. the world. It follows that the limits of language are the limits of the world; more precisely:

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
(T 5.6)

Since world and language are co-extensive, I extend the dimensions of my world if I extend the dimensions of my language. There are problems, however, it seems to me, in identifying appropriately extendable dimensions for language. 'Dimensions' is a misleading term if it is taken as analogous to the spatial dimensions of length, breadth, height, area, volume. These have only a metaphorical application to language. Time might seem to be a dimension intrinsic to language but it is a dimension of sign, not of symbol. Sign is perceived sequentially by the appropriate sense, never all at once. Generally speaking, symbol in English correlates with sign, the sense unfolding as the sign proceeds: 'Dog bites man' but 'man bites dog' changes the sense. But this does not happen with a language which, unlike English, retains syntax-revealing accident; in Latin, for example, any of the six possible arrangements of 'canis mordet virum' means the same thing. Only inflections can change the sense: 'canem mordet vir' and so on. But whether word order or accident plays the dominant role in the organisation of sign, symbol is a function of the sentence as a whole. This was Frege's position; Quine has gone further and denied to any single sentence the possibility of determinate meaning. Clearly time in the sense of progression or sequence is not a dimension of symbol; the symbol must logically be grasped as a unit - otherwise it becomes a different symbol.

2.4.10 I am not at present concerned, however, with the possibility that language might have spatial or temporal dimensions. It is not the limits of the language itself which are under consideration but the limits of what I can do with the language. Wittgenstein insists that there is nothing wrong with the language itself as far as its

physical ordering is concerned; there cannot be, otherwise any given sentence-sign would have the potential to be different from what it is, and that is a logical impossibility:¹

Every sentence of our everyday language is in fact ordered (geordnet) entirely logically just as it is. (T 5.5563)

My aim - the aim of philosophy according to Wittgenstein (T 4.112) - should be to improve my thinking, not the language. Language disguises thought as clothing disguises the body (T 4.002). What has to be done is not reconstruct the language but clarify the thought by revealing the logical meaning beneath the surface meaning of the language (T 4.112).

2.4.11 According to the *Tractatus*, at the centre of language lies its capacity to picture reality. So what can be pictured is limited by the total of the possible concatenations of objects which make up reality. Language can picture correctly or incorrectly. On two counts, therefore, it seems to me, the infinite capacity already available and the possibility of error, the primary aim should be to seek to extend, not the picturing capacity of language in general, but the precision of the thought carried by the language of the individual. To extend my language means to clarify my thinking so that my language becomes more effective in operating on the possibilities of reality. Language does not create reality but the result of its application to it will be a version of reality that is essentially mine - more limited, inevitably, than reality but ideally no less accurate. There are, therefore, two sorts of reality as far as the *Tractatus* is concerned:

(i) my world which is co-extensive with my language and consists of those states of affairs which I am capable of depicting in language;

(ii) the total possible world consisting of the totality of

the circumstances which actually hold.

Wittgenstein distinguishes these two by naming them differently, the first as 'Realität' and the second as 'Wirklichkeit'. Realität is empirical (T 5.5561); Wirklichkeit is the objective world (T 2.063). Realität is mentioned only in T 5.5561 and T 5.64 but its implications are far-reaching. The difference between Realität and Wirklichkeit is lost in both CKO and PMG, though the latter does index the difference. Black makes nothing of the difference, noting merely the two occurrences of 'Realität' with the comment that Wittgenstein usually employs 'Wirklichkeit'. Plochmann and Lawson successfully distinguish one sign from the other by means of 'reality' and 'actuality' without making the symbolism any clearer. In order to avoid periphrasis and gratuitous controversy, I think it best to retain the German words.

2.4.12 My Realität is logically whatever it is at a given moment but with the potential for change as my experience develops. It is not the same as anybody else's; even if it had all its properties in common it would not be the same as anybody else's (T 5.5303). It is *my* Realität, *my* world which my thinking/language creates for me:

What solipsism *means* is of course quite correct, only it doesn't allow of being *said* though it becomes apparent. That the world is *my* world becomes apparent through the limits of language (the only language I understand) meaning the limits of *my* world. (T 5.62)

Yet I stand outside and am not a part of the world which I experience. I who do the experiencing am not the experienced - like the field of vision in which there is no inkling that it is seen by an eye (T 5.633; 5.6331). So the I of solipsism has no dimensions; it is the metaphysical, not the physical or the psychological I, the limit not a part of the world (T 5.641):

Now it can be seen that solipsism strictly implemented coincides with pure realism (Realismus). The I of solipsism shrinks into an extensionless point and there remains the Realität coordinated with it. (T 5.64)

So, I speculate, I have the potential to widen my experience of the world, to extend my Realität, without at the same time extending myself. I remain a dimensionless, metaphysical - what? I suggest: A Wittgensteinian object to which I propose to attach the label 'educatee'. The self extending its Realität is probably as close as the *Tractatus* unaided will take me to the logical meaning of educat-, though I can see the possibility of prompting from other sources filling out and more sharply delineating the picture. As a hypothesis based on the *Tractatus* I take the educatee to be homo sapiens in his projective relationship to the world; his Realität in relation to the Wirklichkeit of the world. The limits of his language mean his limits as educatee - in a sense this swings my argument vertiginously back to where the conventional educational debate was forty or fifty years ago: Every teacher is a teacher of English...

2.4.13 Wittgenstein does not offer any clarification of the expression 'empirische Realität' (T 5.5561) and it remains ambiguous. Since it is empirical, Realität is amenable to extension through new experience. To talk of extending my Realität might imply that I either add new elements of Wirklichkeit to the world or extend my grasp of existing Wirklichkeit. I see no reason why these should be mutually exclusive and in a sense to do either is to do the other also since new knowledge on my part is an extension to the state of the world - even if my knowledge is false; reality consists of those circumstances which do not hold as well as of those that do (T 2.06). What prevents the world being swamped in an infinite mass of non-circumstances is the necessity

for any circumstance or non-circumstance to have the backing of an elementary sentence (T 2.0231). Wittgenstein has no use for a world devoid of human consciousness, that is to say, a world not interpreted by, in a sense not created by, the individual thinker/language user (T 6.43); not for him Berkeley's recourse to a divine consciousness (T 6.432). I speculate that Wittgenstein is not averse to the duality within Realität and between it and Wirklichkeit because the monistic result of a merger would not be to his taste. His single reference to idealism in the *Tractatus* disparages the idealist's attempt to unify the multiplicity of spatial relations (T 4.0412). From my point of view, the duality of Realität/Wirklichkeit illuminates helpfully the duality of educatee/potential-but-unachievable-educatedness; omniscience has never had more than Realität as its target - only ignorance of the complexity of Wirklichkeit could ever have suggested otherwise.

2.4.14 There is a more serious problem with Realität: It is empirical; consequently it is consistent with Wittgenstein's view that language cannot express the metaphysical and that the limits of discourse are the limits of whatever is the case in the world. Moreover the limits of the world are given by the limits of the educatee's own language. It appears, therefore, that the educatee is barred from secondhand accounts of the world - from the near totality of a conventional school syllabus, for example; that only what he experiences at first hand can go towards *his* Realität. This view is reminiscent of the theories of schooling which call for relevance and for learning by doing. These are nevertheless required to draw the line in practice; otherwise, for example, the casualty rate among pupils learning about death would be unacceptably high. Wittgenstein perhaps takes too

sanguine a view of the possibility of our knowing, hence saying, how things are. After several millennia of philosophising the link between symbol and reality remains tenuous - inevitably so perhaps, since language can never be what it symbolises even if what it symbolises is known. Nevertheless, to out-Wittgenstein Wittgenstein by dumping Realität into the inexpressible basket along with the metaphysical would clearly be self-defeating. Obviously, the possibility that nothing can be said has to be conceded but equally obviously the effort has to be made to say something. Wittgenstein's notion of empirical Realität, vague and constricting as it is, suggests a way of at least starting to say something about educatee which might lead to fresh insights. I do not think, however, that it is capable of going very far unaided. I shall continue to reserve the question of how it might be supplemented (cf. §2.4.12).

2.4.15 A more pressing problem is that I have still no more than a theory of educatee which needs to be anchored in reality (cf. §2.4.3). A possible approach towards doing so is via what Austin refers to as the

... theory that a word, x, can only have meaning provided that I can know, on at least one occasion, that 'this is an x', where 'this' denotes something sensible... The 'origin of a concept' is commonly admitted to be found when an occasion is found on which I can say, with knowledge, 'this is an x'.

(Austin [2] 15)

Characteristically, Austin is speaking tongue in cheek. Wittgenstein, writing twenty years earlier, taking the view that the meaning of a word is the object which it names and following Frege on concept, says much the same thing but sans arrière pensée:

The formal concept is at once given with an object which falls under it. (T 4.12721)

So I need one object of which I can say with knowledge: This is an

educatee. 'With knowledge' is a stumbling block since it implies that I am doing no more than find an example to match an existing definition, whereas what I am in fact doing is concoct my own definition and then produce to match it an example which I have had in mind all along. Nevertheless this disingenuous procedure does produce an example of educatee - myself. I see myself as educatee in my receptive and projective relationship to the world; my changeable, subjective Realität relating to objective Wirklichkeit. These are the internal properties which I have in common with every educatee; which determine that I am an educatee. I assume that there are other human beings and therefore other educatees besides myself; if there are not, the validity of my argument is the least of my worries. If the properties which I identify as those of educatee are properties of others besides myself, then they will manifest themselves in mental states similar to my own, such mental states being the only available means of ratiocinating the relationship between Realität and Wirklichkeit:

... the theory that other people besides oneself have mental states is one that has no serious rival... Of course none of this puts the sceptic out of court. If he is able to persuade himself that he has been cast into a world in which only he is conscious, there is no way in which he can be refuted... All I can say is that this is not a theory which I myself find it necessary or useful to adopt, and if anyone else adopts it with regard to himself, my possession of my own experiences enables me to know that it is false.

(Ayer [3] 134f.)

I have identified myself as educatee by the internal properties which I have in common with any educatee. I have ignored the empirically observable external properties which, according to my theory, should have distinguished me from any other educatee. My overt excuse is that I am not at the moment interested in distinguishing myself from other educatees but only in establishing the concept 'educatee' through the identification of one object which falls under it. It might reasonably

be objected that if I don't identify my specific properties as educatee, I can't identify my general properties either for the conclusive reason that without specific properties I don't exist, any more than I could identify 'chair' without invoking a particular chair. Wittgenstein comes to the rescue with the rule that I don't have to identify the external properties of an object in order to recognise it (T 2.01231). I think that I know in a vague general way sufficient of my external properties as educatee to distinguish myself from other educatees and this I claim is sufficient for my purpose. If I appear to dismiss somewhat cavalierly the notion of describing in detail my individual educateeness, my motivation is, I believe, more the practical than the logical impossibility of doing any such thing. Logically, I must have acquired and must continue to acquire as long as I live my own mutable Realität but I am sure I shall never be able to say what it is for the Wittgensteinian reason that in order to see myself whole I should have to step outside myself and that nobody who is outside can see the inner me. I see no alternative to its being a logical projection, existentially necessary though contingent in form, since all reality is contingent. So my knowledge that I am an educatee does not rely on my knowing anything sensible; not on any properties empirically verifiable; more on direct introspection of my mental states. I place more reliance on the authenticity of my observation in that I claim to know that certain circumstances are not so: I know that I am not yet finished and finite; I know that I do not know all there is to know and that what I do know has varied down the years and will continue to vary. It is a logical impossibility to prove a positive hypothesis; a single negative instance, against which there can be no assurance, would be sufficient to disprove it, accepting, of course, that the negative instance would itself be subject to proof.¹ Similarly a single positive

instance would disprove any of my negative hypotheses. I should need to show that my intellectual development has come to an end or that I know everything or that my knowledge has always been and will always be finite. Paradoxically, to prove any one of these hypotheses would disprove it and all the others. I conclude that they are incapable of being refuted. I know this of myself; I assume that it is the same for others. I propose to name myself and any other in this context 'educatee'.

2.5.1 To anatomise educatee; equate education with the Realität of the educatee and identify an educatee, establishes education firmly in the world and therefore within the reach of language. The world in which it is established turns out to be, after all of Wittgenstein's 'high and systematic metaphysics' (cf. §2.1.9), a reassuringly commonsense sort of place. The world is whatever happens contingently to be the case (T 1). What in general is the case is that circumstances hold (T 2) and a circumstance is a concatenation of things - commonsense Sachen and Dinge as well as Gegenstände (T 2.01). So the world is composed of things, in spite of Wittgenstein's denial (T 1.1; cf. §2.1.14). Wittgenstein attempts to get round the problem of prising the world off our concepts by insisting that the expression of complex states of affairs needs to be broken down into the expression of their constituent circumstances, at which stage the state of the world becomes self-evident. Common sense seems to me to favour this approach. Not every state of affairs presents an equivalent difficulty of comprehension; some either are or approximate to circumstances and are conspicuously plain. I know a hawk from a handsaw whether the wind is southerly or north-northwesterly and whether the symbolism is twentieth century or Shakespearian. Most people, I dare say, could tell a hawk from a handsaw if both objects were tools; most if one was a bird and the other a tool; fewer, but still a large number, if both were birds. They would do so by direct comparison of word and object and of object and object. A mortar board clearly differs in its internal properties from a tooth-edged tool. Language is not necessary to the comparison of object with

object; vulnerable birds will set up a great clamour at the sight of a hawk overhead and remain indifferent to a heron.

2.5.2 We may well ask, *What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?* but it is in vain to ask, *Whether there be body or not?* That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.
(Hume Part IV Section II)

Wittgenstein does not ask the second of Hume's questions; he takes for granted the existence of the physical world but notes nevertheless that it is not how the world is but that it is which constitutes the mystical (T 6.44). He does not bother to ask the first of Hume's questions (cf. T 6.5) but answers it by: The evidence of the senses. Realität is empirical, but it is also personal, so that solipsism equates with realism (T 5.64). According to Wittgenstein's peculiar brand of solipsism, objects concatenated remain circumstances in the physical world; they are not figments of the imagination. It is not they which occupy no space in the world, but the metaphysical subject observing the world from outside the world (T 5.631ff. Cf. §2.4.12). Nevertheless, I cannot prise the world off my concepts; the circumstances which I experience are symbolised in language. I cannot know what I cannot think and I cannot think what I cannot say. So I cannot know what I cannot say; the limits of my language mean the limits of my world. The limits of language in general set the limits of the knowable world - the Wirklichkeit of which my Realität is the part known to me through experience (Erfahrung); no part of what I experience is a priori:

Everything we see might as well be otherwise.
Everything that we can describe at all might as well be otherwise.
There is no order of things a priori. (T 5.634)

2.5.3 Knowing what I do know as a result of experience gets me

as far as I can go, but that might not be very far. That things are as they are is part of the problem not the solution to the problem (T6.4321). Whatever is known belongs to the world and the world is the problem; not how it is - that is determined by whatever is the case - but that it is. I cannot account for the mystical because the mystical is not expressible in language and is therefore unknowable. So the deepest problems, according to Wittgenstein, lie beyond language and are insoluble:

The solution to the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time. (T 6.4312)

Wittgenstein sees the solution to the problem of life as the disappearance of the problem (T 6.521), a notion which he later develops in the *Philosophical Investigations* into a guiding principle of his philosophical method. The problem disappears because there is no possible answer to it; if a question cannot be answered it cannot be asked (T 6.5). Problems of reality within the framework of space and time are in principle solvable. Accordingly, my problems with 'education' and, for that matter, with education, can in principle be solved if they can be resolved into clarifying what is and what is not the case. But it is pointless for me to look for solutions beyond states of affairs expressible in language. They might well lie there, but if they do they are unknowable along with anything else metaphysical. Nothing need stop me speculating about a metaphysical basis for education but I can't pretend on the authority of the *Tractatus* to be talking about anything I can *know*.

2.5.4 In particular, questions of value in education as in anything else are unanswerable because there is no value in the world:

The meaning (Sinn) of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and everything happens as it does happen. *In* it there is no value - and if there were it would have

no value.

If there is a value which has value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is contingent. (T 6.41)

Education is, therefore, whatever education is - not a transcendental something beyond reality. By my argument it equates with the educatee and is whatever the educatee is. There are countless educatees and there are consequently countless educations, each of which is what it is and none of which is other than what it is. Education is a state of affairs, not an aspiration. In itself this is not a particularly momentous conclusion. It merely says that, for example, if the alumni of Fagin's school for pickpockets have acquired certain skills then they have acquired those skills. I do not say that education is a matter of acquiring skills but merely that skills are acquired to the extent that they are acquired. To prejudge on the basis of perceived values what should or must be learned or how it should or must be learned is a matter solely for the educator, not for the educatee.¹ The educator might think that he knows best but it is no use offering the purest water to a horse which can't or won't drink. Manifestly, what the educatee is not cannot be educatedness; as always the educator proposes but the educatee disposes. Each educatee is developed to the extent that he is developed; that is tautological and necessarily true. The tautology has, however, an implication which is far-reaching.

2.5.5 According to the *Tractatus*, ethics cannot be expressed in language. Ethical considerations have no part to play in education, therefore, for the simple reason that they are not available.

Wittgenstein implies that ethics exists on a higher plane but doing so is beyond the reach of language (T 6.42):

It is clear that ethics allows of no expression

Ethics is transcendental. (T 6.421)

There is, therefore, no ethical block to Fagin's training his students to thieve; nor to the 8th. Commandment's insisting: Thou shalt not steal. Both are equivalent ethically in that neither has ethical backing or ethical proscription. The implementation of either is a different matter entirely. The 8th. Commandment has not eradicated stealing; it has doubtless put the idea into some thief's head. An apprentice pickpocket might well acquire a revulsion for the practice - as Montaigne wished young men to choose the good from knowledge rather than from ignorance of evil. I have never been trained to pick pockets but I have been trained to do what might reasonably be considered far worse 'ethically' - kill people. If I had exercised my skills in certain directions, I could have expected commendation from the community; in others, condemnation. There is in the world no absolute: Thou shalt not kill. Wittgenstein is surely right over this:

One's first thought in response to the decreeing of an ethical law of the form 'thou shalt...' is: Suppose I don't, what then? It is clear, however, that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense... Admittedly there must be some sort of ethical reward and ethical punishment but these must lie in the deed itself. (T 6.422)

Obviously, values are, in Wittgenstein's view, as contingent as anything else in the world. That does not mean there are none; it does mean that they have to be worked out on the human plane:

How the world is is a matter of total indifference to the Almighty. God does not reveal himself *in* the world. (T 6.432)

This seems to me gain not loss since reliance on supernatural sanctions has not mitigated man's inhumanity to man - quite the reverse in fact. Nor has the modern tendency to replace religious with scientific myth:

The whole modern Weltanschauung is based on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are explanations of natural phenomena.
(T 6.371)

So people balk at natural laws as at something taboo, as their ancestors did at God and fate. (T 6.372)

Agreed the omens are not good for an optimistic view of the chances of a human solution and Wittgenstein's essentially pessimistic prognosis might be irrefutable:

Even if everything we wish were to happen it would be only, so to speak, as a favour on the part of fate, for there is no logical connection between will and world that would guarantee it and we could not in any case ourselves will a repeat of the assumed physical connection. (T 6.374)

But Wittgenstein stresses that, just as the only necessity is logical necessity, the only impossibility is logical impossibility (T 6.375). Obviously a contingent world is not devoid of hope; nor is doubt to be regarded with dismay:

For doubt can stand only where a question stands; a question only where an answer stands and the latter only where something can be said. (T 6.51)

If I propose to apply the *Tractatus* to the philosophy of education, I must, therefore, confine my efforts to what can be said - to discourse concerning what is and what is not the case - and keep quiet about what cannot be said - about anything metaphysical. By Wittgenstein's definition this is tautological and accordingly I have no choice. I should be deluding myself if I thought that any of my ostensibly metaphysical utterances were indeed metaphysical. Both temporally and spatially this is the only world in which I can hope to find a philosophy of education. Immortality is not merely not guaranteed, it would not deliver what it was supposed to deliver:

Will a riddle be solved by my living for ever? Is not this eternal life as much of a riddle as the present one?
(T 6.4312)

2.5.6 Limiting the field of debate to a contingent humanism promises, in my view, liberation not confinement for education.

Excluding the metaphysical, particularly in ethics, means that reasons for things have to be justified, not assumed. The debate on whether it is possible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is' seems, as far as I have followed it, to have been based on absolute criteria for 'ought' - with the (inevitable?) Wittgensteinian conclusion that it is not possible.¹ If the field of debate was confined to this world, there might be no reason why an 'is' should not entail an 'ought' if users of the language felt drawn towards that form of symbolism - a contingent 'ought', to be sure, but one more conducive to the general good if it is observable and observed than an absolute 'must' totally rejected. The *Tractatus* seems to me to have a great deal to offer to the educational debate at this level - more, of course, in the adumbration of principle than in the implementation of the details of practice.

2.5.7 Wittgenstein's views on metaphysics in general and ethics in particular are essentially negative in character. If I want positive guidance from the *Tractatus* in elucidating 'education', I must continue to look where my inquiry has been mostly directed - the nexus between language and reality. My inclination, motivated by the usages of everyday English, has been to look for a state describable as 'educated' and applicable to the person so described. I have suggested that an answer might lie in what Wittgenstein calls the empirical Realität coordinated with the metaphysical subject. Ayer pours scorn on this idea of Wittgenstein's:

To suggest that 'my world' is the world of a metaphysical subject makes no sense at all. (Ayer [4] 120)

My sympathies remain sufficiently with Wittgenstein, however, for me to persevere with the idea, if only because what Ayer offers as an alternative strikes me as no less solipsistic and equally metaphysical:

And here the owner of whoever's experiences are in question is the human being. (Ibid.)

If I ask 'which human being?', the answer has to be 'any human being'. 'Any human being' is a metaphysical notion; every human being has his own Realität:

... any knowledge of the world which anyone acquires is bound to be based upon his own experiences. (Ayer [3] 98-99)

This does not imply, according to Ayer, any idealist corollary such as Fichte's 'the world is my idea':

... there are two vital points of difference. The first and most important is that the observer is not permitted to conceive of the data with which he works as private to himself... The second is that the observer is not identified either with myself or with any other person. (Ibid.)

If I take Wittgenstein's 'metaphysical subject' as a metaphor for Ayer's 'observer', there does not seem to be a great deal of difference between them. Both work with public data; neither is identified with a particular person; each acquires a specific view of general states of affairs; both rely on sense-perception but neither is a merely physical being.

2.5.8 There remains the problem of what it is that Wittgenstein's subject operates on and how it does the operating. In a sense, 'empirische Realität' is a contradiction in terms. If it is empirical, it is part of the experience of the observer; if it is real, it is part of the total Wirklichkeit of the world. It cannot straightforwardly be both. Wittgenstein appears to be in two minds about this. Realität, being empirical, is limited by the totality of objects (T 5.5561). Granted the premiss, the conclusion is inevitable. Wittgensteinian objects can exist only as the building blocks of what is the case and empirical methods can operate only on what is the case.

But empirical methods can operate only if there is someone to operate them. According to T 5.64, the solipsistic I which would be doing the operating shrinks into nothingness, leaving only the Realität behind. It looks as though Wittgenstein can't make up his mind whether to regard Realität as reality or as that part of experienced reality which makes up the observer and which exists therefore as concepts. I can't prise the world off my concepts but it would not make sense to claim that my concepts are the only ones there are - not even Berkeley claimed that, though he did think it necessary to invoke supernatural conceptualising. If Realität was concepts, everybody's concepts would have to be the same; even if they were, there would be an insuperable difficulty in its being common knowledge that they were. I identified myself as educatee by introspection. If I look at others, the properties which I identified as internal to the educatee are not apparent. They might manifest themselves as observable behaviour but they need not do so:

If I report moods, feelings, emotions, sentiments, thoughts, images, dreams, etc., that I experience, I am *not referring* to my behavior, be it actually occurring or likely to occur under specified conditions. I am referring to those states or processes of my direct experience which I live through (enjoy or suffer), to the 'raw feels' of my awareness. These 'raw feels' are accessible to other persons only indirectly by inference - but it is *myself* who has them.

(Feigl 34)¹

It might seem sufficient to postulate true concepts and then the conceptualiser can be immaterial in both the standard and the Wittgensteinian sense. But true concepts of true Realität are unusable because they are unobtainable. My symbolised Realität can be no more than my concept of the true Realität to which it seeks to refer. There is no I capable of seeing the true Realität, but that does not cause it not to exist; it must exist as part of Wirklichkeit. Approaching the problem from a different direction, I note that the limits of

Wirklichkeit and the limits of potential Realität are the same - the totality of the circumstances which make up the world. That part of the world of which I have knowledge forms my Realität. If my knowledge is false, the corresponding bits of putative Realität simply do not exist. So my Realität consists of those circumstances of which I have true knowledge. I don't have to know what they are or that they are true. It is sufficient - and Ayer is hoist with his own petard - to know how the truth might, in principle, be verified (see Ayer [1] Chap. I).

2.5.9 It seems to me that Wittgenstein's naive approach to reality founders on this question of Realität, and age-old ontological and epistemological problems catch up with him. He makes no attempt to prove a perfect correlation between what is the case and what empirical inquiry might suggest is the case. I am left with an ambiguous Realität - with two different Realitäten in fact - and, as I anticipated in §§2.4.12 to 2.4.14, I now find it necessary to theorise beyond the *Tractatus* in my search for a firm foundation for educatee. I shall reserve 'Realität' for reality and not apply it to symbol. Then to each educatee corresponds his Realität, that part of the world of which he has empirical experience. I assume that he has no means of experiencing Wirklichkeit other than his senses, and that those parts of Wirklichkeit of which he has sensory experience make up his Realität. It does not matter for my theory how real reality is provided that it is real enough to generate sense data. Sense data I take to be the property of the educatee and the external world starts with whatever generates the sense data; this, without prejudice to its true nature, I shall call 'objects'. Since Realität is external to the educatee it cannot constitute his educatedness. But the objects of Wirklichkeit on which his Realität is

based must play some part in his educatedness. They do this, I suggest, through what Brentano calls their 'intentional inexistence', a notion which he traces back through the mediaeval Scholastics to Aristotle who spoke of the sensed object as being, minus its matter, within the sensing subject:

Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.

This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves. (Brentano 88-89)

Other characteristics of mental phenomena according to Brentano are that they are apprehended solely by inner perception and their perception is directly and immediately evident (cf. Feigl on raw feels, quoted in §2.5.8). He goes further: Externally perceived phenomena cannot be proved true and real, and consequently so-called external perception is not perception; mental phenomena are the only phenomena of which perception in the strict sense is possible:

We could just as well say that they are those phenomena which alone possess real existence as well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire really exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a phenomenal and intentional existence. (Brentano 92)

Recently Searle has taken up the notion of intentionality as the key element in the structure of behaviour. He agrees with Brentano that an intentional mental state has characteristically two components: What it is about and its psychological mode or type which together serve to relate it to the world:

That after all is why we have minds with mental states: to represent the world to ourselves; to represent how it is, how we would like it to be, how we fear it may turn out, what we intend to do about it and so on.

(Searle [1] 60)

2.5.10 Intentionality seems to me to be the key to an understanding of educateeness as I have been trying to develop it, clarifying the relationship between empirical Realität and its intentional (mental) counterpart; adding the necessary element of intervention by the educatee to Wittgenstein's essentially passive account of a neutral third party looking in at the world from outside. Searle outlines half of educatedness. What needs to be added is that the mental states which he postulates are not static. They have developed from past states and will develop into future states. At any given moment his intentionality constitutes the educatedness of the educatee - that is to say, the state of his intentionality is his educatedness; his intentionality in principle is his educateeness. His intentionality inevitably changes, being relative to the compounded effects of his mentality and his experience of the world. The educatee's Realität would change even if his capacity to respond remained the same, so that in a sense his educatedness might regress.¹ Criteria might be postulated for assessing educatedness (or education) as state of intentionality, but they would have to be criteria for human intentionality in general. The intentionality of the individual is never observable, even when it is apparently revealed by behaviour; it can never be formulated or in any realistic sense known. This might seem paradoxical since, according to my interpretation of Wittgenstein, the individual's Realität at least is immanent in Wirklichkeit, and we all have access to Wirklichkeit, in principle at least. There seems to be a necessary antithesis here: When educatee is metaphysical (a pure Wittgensteinian object; Ayer's human being), its Realität is inherent in the world, in Wirklichkeit. It is something, a discrete something, even if what it is cannot be said. When educatee is a corporeal specimen of

homo sapiens (a Wittgensteinian object this side of the threshold in my interpretation [see §2.2.9ff.]; Ayer's human being as Ayer evidently intends him to be seen), his Realität is a logical projection, necessary but metaphysical; distinctive to each educatee and therefore not identifiable in terms of reality because different in each case.

2.5.11 There are interesting possibilities in this theory. It gives me a concept of educatee - the metaphysical, solipsistic (in Wittgenstein's special sense) I, but it also gives me a concept of education perhaps closer to conventional views of education as something acquired - the intentionally inexistent Realität acquired by the educatee as a result of experiencing the world, including, of course, experiencing the educator. I don't think, however, that this definition of education will stand. Certainly, this intentionally inexistent Realität has the properly educational capacity to change but it is inconceivable that it could wax or wane independently of the rest of the educatee's intentionality, particularly those mental phenomena of which alone, according to Brentano, perception is possible because they really exist. Education as intentionally inexistent Realität is an impossible notion, as education conceived as any sort of determinate activity or process inevitably is, because there is no way in which it can be granted immunity from the intentional cross-referencing which goes on during the rest of the educatee's waking and sleeping hours. Intentionality is consciously a non-divisible process - though to be sure the more consciously allusive the mental processes can be made, the better integrated the organism seems likely to become.

2.5.12 The concept of educatee manifests itself in individual

human beings. I sense them but only as physical entities; I do not sense their educateeness, their intentionality, as such - though I might well sense circumstances which contribute to both their and my intentional Realität. Such are the circumstances which I experience in common with any other given educatee and which in common we symbolise in language. But in none of this do I directly sense educatee. I do not even sense myself as educatee; I go direct to my thoughts, my language symbols. But I should delude myself if I thought that there was a separate I who could stand outside my thoughts and assess them:

There is no such thing as the thinking, imagining, subject.
(T 5.631)

So in statements of the type 'A thinks p' it is an illusion that there is an object 'A' to which the sentence 'p' stands in a sort of relation:

It is, however, clear that 'A believes that p', 'A thinks p', 'A says p' are of the form '"p" says p'. (T 5.542)

In other words, there is no 'ghost in the machine', only the workings of the machine - a point developed by Searle: All mental phenomena are occurrences within the neurophysiology of the brain (see Searle [1] 18ff.).

2.5.13 It appears that I do not sense educatee in myself any more than in others because:

- (i) There is no separate I to do the sensing;
- (ii) No objects are involved that I might sense.

I might add also the dilemma with which Hume ends the Appendix to *A Treatise of Human Nature*:

In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. *that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences.*

(Hume 331)

Ayer tries to solve the problem of a connection between distinct perceptions by suggesting that:

What unites them in the main is that either they are experienced together, or if they occur at different times, they are separated by a stream of experience which is felt to be continuous.
(Ayer [3] 115)

Gaps in consciousness can be taken care of by postulating a continuity of physical existence. But now it seems to me that Ayer is mixing two categories which do not share an alternative or end-on relationship. The body does not stop when perception takes over or start to function only when perceptions cease. Ayer's problem might be solved by agreeing with Searle that perceptions are caused by processes in the brain (Searle [1] 18). All the perceptions of any given human organism are therefore physically linked and the philosophical problem of identifying the perceiving individual disappears. However, to suggest that this takes care of Hume's problem seems to me to commit another category mistake. Clearly, the provenance of the perceptions has been clarified but not the perceptions themselves. The source of the perceptions is not the perceptions; a unitary source does not imply a solitary perception and I am still faced with the problem of producing a coordinated Weltanschauung - or a coordinated, introspective view of an educatee. Moreover, the states of affairs which make up the I which exists as a complex in the real world include those which the pseudo I was proposing to identify as specifically educatee states of affairs. My intention was to go direct to my thoughts, my language symbols, and identify educatee as a logical extrapolation from a selection of mental phenomena, though not a phenomenological extrapolation in Husserl's sense, since I had no intention of 'bracketing' the external world; Realität, even if no more than intentionally existent, would play an essential part. But it begins to look as though I can do no such thing

according to Wittgenstein. Agreed, I am a contingent complex of physical circumstances plus their concomitant mental phenomena; certainly that complex can change, but if it does it changes as a whole. If it changes, I become a different I. The change that I am postulating as essential to educatee will result in a different I, not a different educatee. I cannot chop myself in two - educatee states of affairs and non-educatee states of affairs. I have to be, or develop, completely as I am; otherwise I cease to be what I am. It appears that I have no alternative to rejecting 'educatee' as the name for a part of either the corporeal or the metaphysical I (the latter, having no extension, is logically indivisible). It is all or nothing; I might appear to have an element of choice, but I think it will turn out to be illusory.

2.5.14 For example, I might suggest that 'education' names the intentionality of the individual homo sapiens. This will be different and mutable in each case (each educatee) though the generality (homo sapiens) remains unitary. In other words, homo sapiens is the concept and educatee is the individual specimen. But why then do I need 'educatee'? 'Horse' serves perfectly well for the concept and the object; so would 'homo sapiens'. Or I might suggest that educatee is indistinguishable from homo sapiens both universally and individually and that it is necessary to homo sapiens that his intentionality develops in relation to the world. The individual's educatedness then consists of that part of Wirklichkeit which makes up his Realität. But this won't do: Educatedness in this sense is non-definable because to define it would necessitate prising the world off the individual's concepts. This cannot be done because the individual has no means other than language of knowing the world. In any case the world is total

Wirklichkeit (T 2.063) even if it is *my* world (T 5.62). It is not divisible into educatee and non-educatee circumstances. If the world is changed as, being contingent, it can be, then it changes as a whole. The world is independent of my will but if it did happen that willing could change the world, it would change the world as a whole, not a part of it - as it were the educatee part:

In short, the world must then become thereby a totally different world. It must, so to speak, wax or wane as a whole. The fortunate man's world is a different world from the unfortunate's. (T 6.43)

I am left, it seems, with the equation of educatee and homo sapiens; that being so, it might appear that I have argued educatee out of existence. I think, however, that I can see a chink through which I might still escape.

2.5.15 A Wittgensteinian object is a metaphysical projection beyond the limits of reality. An object cannot enter the world alone but only concatenated with other objects. I can't point to the chairness of a chair but only to a particular chair associated with other mundane objects and the chairness of the chair is thereby revealed, not expressed in language. I can't point to myself or to another as educatee but only as a particular specimen of homo sapiens (begging for the sake of argument the question of the efficacy of ostensive definition). Every chair must carry the chairness of chair and be recognised by it. Every man carries educateeness by my argument but is he recognised by it? I should like to argue: Yes; what makes homo *sapiens* is his educateeness, his intentionality. Without intentionality he would be some other species of primate. Intentionality equals educateeness and it is the metaphysical (because variable) educateeness which distinguishes any educatee/homo sapiens from any other. It might

now be objected that I have finally undermined my own argument by providing a synonym to replace 'educatee'. I don't think that this is the case. I am not saying any more than that intentionality is necessary and sufficient for sapiens; it is clearly not sufficient for homo. Physiology and in particular the neurophysiology of the brain seem to me to have no part in educatee - only the mental phenomena which are manifestations of the latter. I might appear to be arguing that such mental phenomena exist in their own right as the manifestations of a mind separate from the body. I do not mean to project a dualistic point of view. I am convinced that no mental phenomenon could exist without a corresponding physical phenomenon in the brain - that the former is a manifestation of the latter. But I am also convinced that the process can proceed without sensory stimulus; that it can live as it were off its store of intentionally inexistent objects and previously processed phenomena and that it is this autonomous ratiocination which preeminently characterises homo as sapiens - to this extent the process is non-physiological in content though necessarily physiological in its machinery.

2.5.16 If educatee equates with sapiens, anything that homo sapiens does or does not do is a manifestation of his education - with the exception of physiological functions over which he has no control. Even anti-social tendencies are a measure of education and are seen to be so when they are implemented - but this is so even on a conventional interpretation of education; lack of education is a measure of education. This conclusion has some interesting implications, not least the assimilation of educator into educatee. My educatee remains in general a logical abstraction, as a Wittgensteinian object necessarily is.

There has to be the ultimately simple educatee, according to the *Tractatus*, if educatee exists at all. With the conclusion that the educatee is homo viewed as sapiens I am inclined to think that I have gone as far as the *Tractatus* can take me towards the elucidation of 'education', perhaps further than I need have gone for practical purposes. I should have settled for educatee as a mundane object. It appears, however, that educatee might be nearer to a Wittgensteinian Gegenstand than I had expected, though the lack of any example of a Gegenstand from Wittgenstein, other than mundane objects and mundane phenomena, undermines the solidity of any argument based upon it.

2.5.17 My argument has also, as I suggested in §2.4.2, a resident mole. It is one thing to identify an object in terms of the *Tractatus*; it is quite another to name that object 'educatee'. According to the *Tractatus*, the sign is arbitrary; it is what it is conventionally decided it should be and it has meaning thereafter as a consequence of naming its object. If I identified an object for which there was no known name, I should have to give it a name, in consultation with others if the object was to figure in public discourse, and from then on continue to link that name with that object. But I have not done this; I have taken an existing word, 'educatee', assumed that it is a name and sought to identify the object which it necessarily/ logically names by attempting to forge a link between a symbol and what it symbolises. The link between symbol and symbolised is logically unbreakable; if it appears not to hold it is because the partners have been incorrectly identified. So success or failure in my attempting to link the symbol which I have called 'educatee' with the object which I have called 'educatee' depends on whether I have identified a true state

of affairs. What I have no justification for is to claim as logical my use of the sign 'educatee' as the name of either or both. According to the *Tractatus*, no sign has a logical signification. I need some initial justification for linking the sign 'educatee' with a particular symbol and a particular object. I don't think that I have any other than the commonsensically powerful but logically feeble accretion of meaning around educat- in the colloquial language. This inhibits my clearing my mind of all previous associations of educat-. I have not started with the conceptual blank demanded by logic:

Logic antedates all experience - that something is so.
(T 5.552)

Logic has not told me what educatee is but only, if anything at all, what something is that I have decided to call 'educatee'. My inquiry has not been truly logical because it started in contingency. I do not have Wittgenstein's authority for claiming as logical a conclusion based on contingent premisses (T 4.465). But I need not, even in terms of the *Tractatus*, reject a solution merely because it is contingent. Whether he was being disingenuous or not, Wittgenstein does say in the penultimate paragraph of the *Tractatus* that anybody who understands him will recognise that what he has been saying is absurd (unsinnig = nonsensical; not sinnlos = sense-less i.e. without sense/meaning). I should use his statements as a ladder up which to climb to a clearer view of the world; when that has been achieved the ladder can be discarded (T 6.54). The sort of nonsense that Wittgenstein has in mind might be that his logical approach reveals a contingent world. The world is whatever it happens contingently to be, not what it necessarily is. So that if a word, a phenomenon of the world, insists on trailing clouds of meaning, I either attempt to peer through the clouds or I engage in the nonsensical pursuit of a cloud-free word.

2.5.18 I can readily concede, as the later Wittgenstein does, that to seek a crystal-clear meaning for a word is to embark on a wildgoose chase. But having followed this trail further than I perhaps need have done, I can at least retreat with comparative ease to a more comfortable position from which 'education' might still be observed in a clearer light and which might still represent progress towards elucidating the word to a useful extent for practical purposes. And Wittgenstein makes the point, which I find illuminating in this context, that in order to recognise the limit as the limit it is necessary to go beyond the limit and see it from both sides. Stepping back, therefore, from a position which has already taken me beyond the limits of the *Tractatus*, I speculate that there might be ways of clarifying the meaning of a word other than anatomising language. The need for unambiguous symbolism might readily be conceded to Wittgenstein without necessarily agreeing with his proposed method of achieving it. Both he and Russell in their various forms of logical atomism too readily assume, it seems to me, that meaning will be clarified by analysing complex expressions into simple signs operating in accordance with logical syntax. It might, but it need not. As the later Wittgenstein comes to realise, a morpheme can be of any length (philosophically if not linguistically) and to analyse it is to destroy it, not clarify it.

2.5.19 But the minimum meaningful elements in a natural language do not come logically into existence in the first place. The same goes for meaning in general, and this undermines the tenability of any theory of meaning, such as that of the *Tractatus*, which takes the meaning of a sentence of the everyday language to be a complex function of the meanings of elementary sentences. Meanings just grow; they are not

logical constructs to be logically analysed. The normative connotations which have grown around educat- in modern English are the reason for the EE/ET dichotomy. If 'educate' was as neutral as 'eat' (cf. §1.2.9), syntax, not semantics, would decide whether 'educated' was past participle or adjective. Problems arise because the normative outcomes implied by 'educated' (EE) are not applicable in anticipation of the event and figure in 'educate' only as the expression of good intentions. Nevertheless, they do figure, importantly, and underline the need, in specialist discourse at least, for unambiguous terminology. In a natural language both sign and symbol are matters of convention, but the results of convention are not necessarily beneficial; they might be ameliorated in appropriate contexts by an infusion of logic - this I take to be the message of the *Tractatus* as far as the philosophy of education is concerned. The solution does not lie in attempting to revert to a neutral 'educate' with a neutral past participle/adjective 'educated'. 'Educated' and 'educated' could both be normatively neutral and still have different senses. They are different symbols because they have different non-conflatable referents. It would have been advantageous if they had been signified differently, but they are not. It is not logical to ignore what is the case. To accept that 'educatee' designates the logical essence of educat- does not remove the rest of the educat- words from the language. The *Tractatus* begins with the uncompromising statement that the world is whatever is the case. It is manifestly the case that educat- words are used in English. Any philosophical method which purports to argue most of them out of existence must be logically flawed. Judged by its own lights, the *Tractatus* has shot its bolt once it has been used to give an account of the objective substance at the heart of educat-. What is now needed is

an account of the rest of the body, if there is one, and an account of the rest of the symbolism in any case.

3 'Education' and Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*

3.1.1 *Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations* was first published, in a bilingual German/English edition, in 1953, two years after Wittgenstein's death. Any reader of Wittgenstein faces the problem of interpreting what he meant. The reader of the *Philosophical Investigations* faces the added problem of knowing what he said.

Wittgenstein did not write the *Philosophical Investigations*; he wrote *Philosophische Untersuchungen*. Whether the former can adequately stand for the latter depends on two factors:

- (i) Whether translation is possible at all;
- (ii) Whether the standard (sole?) English translation,

G.E.M. Anscombe's *Philosophical Investigations* (which I refer to as GEMA) is an adequate translation of *Philosophische Untersuchungen*.

As far as (i) is concerned, the views of, for example, Wittgenstein on language as a way of life and of Quine on 'the indeterminacy of radical translation' might lead to the conclusion that what a given sentence means is never a matter of fact and that consequently translation is impossible. Such views might be agreed with in principle but have to be discounted in practice if a reader limited to one language is not to be denied all access to a writer in another. Accepting the impossibility of perfection still leaves a wide range of possibilities for better or worse and raises the question in the present case whether GEMA is as good a translation as it might be.

3.1.2 I find myself in some difficulty over expressing an opinion on this. Miss Anscombe is a post-Wittgensteinian Cambridge

philosopher in her own right. She carries the authority of long and close association with Wittgenstein and is one of his literary executors. Mehta attributes to Ayer the judgement that Miss Anscombe's

... brilliant translations of his (Wittgenstein's) German works would have been enough in themselves to earn her a place in the English pantheon of philosophy. (Mehta 74)

GEMA is prefaced by a translator's note acknowledging the assistance of seven named distinguished scholars in interpreting the German and improving the English. Nevertheless I find myself disagreeing quite frequently with either the accuracy or the felicity of the translation. I admit that it seems unlikely that I am right and GEMA wrong; the scales must be tipped against me by the sheer weight of authority. An alternative translation - as in the case of the *Tractatus* - would have been useful for reference and comparison but in the absence of such I shall stick to my guns, though I do so with trepidation, and endeavour to interpret *Philosophische Untersuchungen* for myself. I shall use the Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft edition (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1982), referring to it as STW; any quotation from it or reference to it will be my own translation, indicated by PI plus Wittgenstein's paragraph number, unless otherwise noted. My copy of GEMA is the 1983 reprint of the Third Edition (Basil Blackwell, Oxford).

3.1.3 A major consideration in translating *Philosophische Untersuchungen* is that Wittgenstein's style is never formal and ranges generally between homeliness and buttonholing matiness. Much of the text takes the form of dialogue, often one-sided, with an imaginary interlocutor whom Wittgenstein addresses familiarly as 'du' (thou) and who replies in kind when he is allowed to reply. 'Was ist dein Ziel in der Philosophie?' he is made to ask, paving the way for Wittgenstein's

homespun aphorism:

Der Fliege den Ausweg aus dem Fliegenglas zeigen.

To show the fly the way out from the flytrap. (PI 309)¹

Modern standard English does not countenance 'What is thy aim in philosophy?'. Its lack of an acceptable rendering of the second person singular loses this important nuance, which typifies Wittgenstein's expressed intention to use everyday speech for philosophical discourse (PI 116), and the contrast between it and the polite mode of address which, in German as in English, makes use of the grammatical plural. Partly because of this, GEMA tends to sound more formal than the original. The translation does display some ingenuity in anglicising German expressions but is lax, I think, in not adding a note of explanation when the idiom of the translation diverges widely from that of Wittgenstein's text. 'Mr. Scot is not a Scot' is a neat enough rendering of 'Herr Schweizer ist kein Schweizer', though a purist might object that the unorthodox spelling of the proper name detracts from its felicity; it works because the sense of a complete sentence is translated (PI II ii; GEMA 176; STW 281). I am less sure about the propriety or the necessity of converting the sword 'Nothung' into the sword 'Excalibur' (PI 39; 44) in principle because a proper name by definition does not translate and specifically because 'translating' the name alone results in inappropriate cultural associations and the inappropriate attribution of properties. The original Excalibur is a genuine antique; it smacks of cultural vandalism to make him stand in for Nothung, a nineteenth century fake. Admittedly Tennyson's, the best-known account, adds a wealth of Victorian embellishment to Excalibur, but the effect is to consolidate an even more inviolable image in the cultural conscience, an essential element in which is a magic sword

returned intact to the lake from which Arthur had received him:

So flash'd and fell the brand Excalibur:
But ere he dipt the surface, rose an arm
Clothed in white samite, mystic, wonderful,
And caught him by the hilt, and brandish'd him
Three times, and drew him under in the mere.

(Tennyson, *Morte D'Arthur*)

This is language-games with a vengeance; only someone who had never been moved one way or another by Tennyson's coruscating language, and who had in addition failed to take to heart Wittgenstein's teaching that the basic semantic solecism is to transpose a word from its native language-game into an alien environment, could have thought fit to use Excalibur as the exemplar of a sword broken in pieces. Moreover, 'Excalibur' is the name of a class of swords, not of a single sword: Gawain's in the earliest legends emerging mistily from the dark ages; the king's in the Arthurian Legend; subsequent literary versions including Sir Thomas Malory's, Tennyson's principal source. The multiplicity of Excaliburs vitiates the very point that Wittgenstein is trying to make, which depends for its validity on uniqueness of reference. It makes no difference that Nothung doesn't have it either (see §3.2.9) or that the suggestion of Excalibur apparently came originally from Wittgenstein himself (see Baker and Hacker [1] 247). His error of judgement does not excuse GEMA's compounding it.

3.1.4 The substitution of 'Excalibur' for 'Nothung' is perhaps of no great significance in itself but it is disturbing in principle because there is no way of telling from the English text alone whether it represents an isolated example or whether the translator has permitted herself similar licence on other occasions. In PI II xi, for example, the idiom of a paragraph is rebuilt around the idea of 'march' which

does not appear in the original. The German has 'weiche' which, as an adjective means 'soft', 'tender', and as the imperative of a verb means 'move!', 'shift!'. Wittgenstein is concerned with the different flavour of the 'same' word when it is used as different parts of speech.

Polonius makes Wittgenstein's point in his dismissal of Ophelia's plea that Hamlet has made many 'tenders of his affection':

... you have ta'en these tenders for true pay,
Which are not sterling. Tender yourself more dearly;
Or - not to crack the wind of the poor phrase,
Running it thus - you'll tender me a fool.

(Hamlet I iii 100)

On occasions such as this, a note of explanation, perhaps coupled with the quotation of the original would be helpful. Significantly, the First, Second and Third Editions of GEMA were all originally bi-lingual. It was Wittgenstein's wish that his German text should always be made available to the reader of his work.¹ The English-only reprints of GEMA do rather leave the text without visible means of support.²

3.1.5 Disagreement between my interpretation and GEMA's will either be mentioned in context or will be apparent from a comparison of our respective versions. One problem calls for special mention, however, because it concerns a concept of central and recurring significance in Wittgenstein's thought: 'Erklärung' (noun) and 'erklären' (verb). The root of both is -klar- = clear, plain, and the sense of erklär- is, therefore, making clear, explaining, elucidating, in the last two of which the Germanic root -klar- is directly matched by the Romance roots -plan- (level; clear) and -luc- (light). In an appropriate context, erklär- can have the sense of define. But 'define' and 'explain' are not arbitrarily interchangeable. I have examined 134 occurrences of erklär- in *Philosophische Untersuchungen* and can discover

no rationale for GEMA's choice of 78 'explains', 44 'defines' and 12 miscellaneous other renderings. Some of the versions are so odd that one feels there must be some reason for them, however obscure. For example, in PI 31 'Wörterklärung' = 'explanation of a word' (in this case 'king', a chessman) is translated 'definition' without reference to 'word'; in the same paragraph five previous uses of erklär- are rendered by four explan- and one 'tell'. In PI 38 (footnote) 'Wörterklärung' becomes 'explanation of the words'; in this context both the definite article and the plural noun are solecisms. I hesitate to suggest that GEMA has confused the singular 'Wort' and the plural 'Wörter' and read 'Wörter-klärung' instead of 'Wort-erklärung', particularly since the words to which Wittgenstein is referring are connected in sense, in which case the plural 'Worte' would be appropriate; 'Wörter' designates discrete words, as in 'Wörterbuch' = 'dictionary'. In PI 71 'explain' in one sentence becomes 'define' in the next; in PI 208 the shift is the other way round; in PI 444 'explain' becomes 'define' within the same sentence.

3.1.6 In this note I am concerned more with the principle of accurate translation than with the effect on Wittgenstein's intentions of GEMA's choice of vocabulary. Specifically, Wittgenstein has the choice of 'Erklärung; erklären' and 'Definition; definieren' and uses both in *Philosophische Untersuchungen*. The translator should, in my view, respect his choice, select an appropriate English equivalent to 'erklären' - 'explain' and 'elucidate' are obvious candidates - and stick to it throughout. I see no difficulty over this and cannot understand why GEMA makes such heavy weather of it. Possibly the translator thought that Wittgenstein regarded 'erklären' and 'definieren'

as equivalent alternatives, a diagnosis supported by the rendering of a passage in PI 6:

Dies will ich nicht 'hinweisende Erklärung', oder 'Definition', nennen, weil ja das Kind noch nicht nach der Benennung *fragen* kann. Ich will es 'hinweisende Lehren der Wörter' nennen.

I am not going to call this 'ostensive explanation' or 'definition' because of course the child can't yet *ask* about the naming. I am going to call it 'ostensive teaching of words'.

I do not want to call this 'ostensive definition', because the child cannot as yet *ask* what the name is. I will call it 'ostensive teaching of words'. (GEMA 4)

GEMA's unconvincing rendering of the two occurrences of 'ich will', individually and in relation to each other, calls for separate comment. Clearly, they are in apposition, however remote, and need to be treated alike whatever translation is chosen. 'I want to' is a standard version of 'ich will', but, as GEMA obviously senses, to use it for the second 'ich will' results in nonsense. (For that matter, it results in nonsense the first time round. Wittgenstein has no need to express reluctance, being under no pressure to select any particular wording). I take GEMA's 'I will' to be either a solecism for 'I shall' or an expression of resolution after the initial reluctance. But this is to apply an uncalled-for gloss onto Wittgenstein's straightforward usage. The modal auxiliary verb 'wollen' is used in German to form, inter alia, a future tense expressing immediate intention: 'to be going to...'; 'to be about to...', and this seems to me to be the sense here.

3.1.7 There remains the first horn of the dilemma and there is no way of avoiding this. Even when it is perfectly clear what Wittgenstein said, and there is no doubt about the adequacy of the translation, it can still remain far from clear what he meant by what he

said. In such cases I sometimes find it expedient to apply to Wittgenstein the approach recommended to Romeo by Mercutio when Romeo finds one of his friend's conceits too outrageously paradoxical to be accepted:

Take our good meaning, for our judgement sits
Five times in that ere once in our five wits.

(Romeo and Juliet I iv 46)

Not that it is always easy to extract even so much as Wittgenstein's 'good meaning'. It is sometimes particularly difficult - with that phase of his argument, for example, which develops around PI 79 and extends at least as far as PI 120. PI 97 and PI 98, which represent some sort of a climax, exemplify a peculiarity of style which renders the content even more difficult to interpret than it would have been in any case. They are a tangle of flashbacks to the *Tractatus* and contributions to the currently proceeding argument. The reader is left to decide from internal contextual evidence which is which; grammar is no help - the chronological shift is not even indicated by a consistent change of tense. Generally in this passage, Wittgenstein is concerned to revise or repudiate his earlier view: PI 97 sets up at length the Aunt Sally of 'grasping the unique essence of language' in order to knock it down in the last sentence; but PI 98 takes T 5.5563 and develops any residual ambiguity out of it. Wittgenstein's final position seems to be that not merely is every sentence in the language logically in order because it is what it is and not a different sentence, but its use i.e. its meaning is what it is. A sentence is incapable of performing any function other than those it is capable of performing. This is tautological but by no means necessarily uninformative (cf. T 4.4611). It raises a question which the reader of the *Philosophical Investigations* must continually have in mind and which

echoes the doubt which constantly plagued Wittgenstein himself: He consistently equates language and thought (T 4; PI 329, for example); if every sentence is in order, is not every thought in order? If it is, then philosophy, which aims to clarify thought (T 4.112) by exorcising the spell of language (PI 109) must be out of order.¹

3.2.1 From the very beginning of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein seeks to distance himself from his *Tractatus* position according to which the meaning of a word is the object which it names. He quotes a passage from the *Confessions* in which Augustine describes learning how to name things by following the ostensive demonstrations of his elders and how to combine the names to form sentences. This gives us, Wittgenstein suggests, a particular picture of the essence of human language: Words name objects and sentences are combinations of such names. This picture is based on the idea that:

- (i) Every word has a meaning;
- (ii) This meaning is correlated with the word;
- (iii) The meaning is the object for which the word stands.

Augustine says nothing about any difference between kinds of words. To describe language in these terms is to think, Wittgenstein suggests, primarily of the nouns which stand for simple objects and of the names of people; only secondarily of the names of particular activities and properties; not at all of the remaining sorts of words. He considers this a primitive notion of a more primitive language than ours. It is not, however, in spite of Wittgenstein's implying that it is, the view of language which he projects in the *Tractatus*. That is anything but primitive and the language of which he attempts to give an account is not a simple Augustinian kind but our colloquial language (Umgangssprache) which

... is a part of, and no less complicated than, the human organism.
(T 4.002)

Certainly it is fundamental to the *Tractatus* view that a word names an

object. Wittgenstein's notion of object is ambivalent. In theory he intends it to be a logical projection beyond the complex objects of reality; in practice he admits mundane objects and it is with these exclusively that he now concerns himself in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

3.2.2 As an illustration of the simple Augustinian view of language, he imagines a builder building with various shapes and sizes of stone, the name for each of which he calls out as both a means of identification and an instruction to his labourer to bring one of that sort. Wittgenstein invites us to visualise this as a complete primitive language. Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication but this system does not cover everything that we call language (PI 3). That does not preclude its being serviceable, but if it is serviceable it is so only within a narrowly circumscribed field, not over the whole range of the functions of language. It is as if one were to explain what games are by saying that games consist in pushing things about on a surface in accordance with certain rules. Clearly this description does not cover all the sorts of games there are; it could be legitimised only by limiting it expressly to certain kinds of game (PI 3).

3.2.3 The belief that words name things cloaks the functioning of language in a haze which makes it impossible to see clearly how it does function (PI 5). The haze can be dispersed by studying linguistic phenomena as they appear in primitive forms of language; in these it is possible to overview (übersehen) the purpose and the functioning of words. The language of the builder and his labourer might be imagined

to be the language of a whole tribe. Its children will be brought up to perform these activities, use the appropriate words as they do so and react appropriately to the words of another. An important part of the instruction will consist of the teacher pointing to an object, drawing the attention of the child to it and at the same time pronouncing a word. This is ostensive teaching of words, not ostensive explanation or ostensive definition, because the child lacks the linguistic skills necessary to make either viable (PI 6; cf. §3.1.6).

3.2.4 It is already clear that Wittgenstein regards the ostensive method not as a straightforward and definitive linking of word and object, but as an exercise involving both activity and elucidation by means of language. Such elucidation is necessary in order to reduce the risk of misunderstanding. The aim of the exercise is not to produce an association between word and object but to generate a behavioural response, though there are various possibilities, depending on the purpose of the drill, for the way in which the learner is required to perform. The various proceedings are like the games played by children as aids to learning their native language. Wittgenstein proposes to call such games 'language-games' and the complex activity consisting of language and its associated activities 'the language-game' (PI 7):

... the term (Wort) 'language-game' is intended to emphasise that speaking language is a part of an activity or of a way of life.

(PI 23)¹

3.2.5 Wittgenstein proceeds to develop and generalise his idea of language-game. Naming objects is only one form of language-game; there are many others. Games are rule-controlled activities. The rules of one of the simplest language-games direct that words mean things.

But at even a slightly less simple level, these rules don't apply. They don't work with numerals, for example, where the word 'five' does not name an object (PI 1). We can to some extent homogenise our descriptions of the use of words by saying that a word 'signifies' an object or a number. But in so doing we have affected only our description; the kinds of use that the words have remain as unlike as ever (PI 10). The functions of words are as disparate as the functions of tools in a toolbox. We should not be put off by any apparent uniformity in the appearance of words in speech or in print but should look at how they are applied. One such application is to name things; to name something is rather like sticking a label on it. Obviously the labels - the signs - attached to objects whether physically or figuratively, belong to the language. The same applies, though less obviously, to other forms of labelling - the colour samples, for example, used in the ostensive definition of colours:

It is most natural and causes least confusion if we count samples among the tools of language. (PI 16)

3.2.6 Words can be grouped according to their function, but how we group them will depend on our purpose and our inclination (PI 17); there is no predetermined categorisation. We should not worry about the incompleteness of any language-game. Our native language is incomplete; new words, new language-games, are constantly being added to it and old ones dispensed with. The process resembles the organic growth of an ancient into a modern city (PI 18). There is no predetermined form for a sentence either. A single sign can function as a word or as a sentence, depending on how it is used in a context. The speaker with a mastery of the language simply uses the sign for his intended purpose. He is not conscious of his mastery; he does not compare the form of his

utterance with a mental image of what the form of his utterance ought to be. A one-word sentence is not elliptical because it leaves something out that we intend when we say it but because it is shortened in comparison with a particular grammatical model. It might be objected that if the normal and the elliptical sentences have the same sense, this sense should be expressible in words. But Wittgenstein insists that the sense is not a separate entity; the two sentences have the same sense because they have the same use (PI 20). There are countless kinds of sentence and countless possible language-games, each of which is played in accordance with the rules in accordance with which it is played - rules which are not codified but which involve both the language and the social context in which it is used (PI 23; 24).

3.2.7 One reason why learning a language is not just a matter of giving names to objects is that when an object has been named, nothing has been achieved. Attaching a label to a thing is a preparation for the next stage but does not reveal what the next stage is. The name can be used in a wide variety of sentence patterns (PI 27). Nor is naming an object the simple operation it appears to be. Asking the name of an object is a language-game in its own right. It can be played only by someone who already has a certain command of the language. All sorts of things including a proper name, a colour word, the name of a material, a numeral, a point of the compass, can be ostensively defined but in every case the ostensive definition can be interpreted in a variety of ways (PI 28). It does not help to say, for example: This number is called 'two'. 'Number' then needs to be explained; similarly, so do 'colour'; 'length' and so on. Such further explanations take the form of words which also need explaining. Wittgenstein seems to think that

the succession of explanations will end somewhere (PI 29), but I can see no reason why there should be any end of the line in this direction, only the prospect of an infinite regress. Certainly explanations have to come to an end sometime (PI 1) when the language is being used for practical purposes, but the end of the line seems to me likelier to come in the other direction, in ostensive definition supported by verbal explanation.¹ But whether the ostensive definition fulfils its purpose depends on circumstances other than the definition itself:

It might be put like this: Ostensive definition explains the use - the meaning - of a word if it is already clear what part the word is supposed in general to play in the language.
(PI 30)

Only someone who already knows how to do something with the name can make sense of asking for a thing to be named (PI 31).

3.2.8 But no method of elucidating the meaning of a word will eradicate the possibility of misunderstanding; any explanation can be misunderstood. Whether the explanation has succeeded is shown by the way in which the person to whom it has been directed uses the word (PI 29):

The signpost is in order if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose. (PI 87)

Obviously, it might reasonably be thought, the signpost is not the object towards which it points; nevertheless, the attempt has been made to see it as such:

... the only words one does use as names in the logical sense are words like 'this' or 'that'. (Russell, *Logic and Knowledge* 201, quoted at Warnock 76)

The attempt to treat 'this' as the only genuine name is, according to Wittgenstein, an example of a philosophical problem and philosophical

problems arise when language is allowed to idle instead of doing useful work (PI 38). 'This' is used as a substitute for a name, not as a name; it belongs to the explaining, not to the object being explained (PI 45).

3.2.9 The inclination to label an object 'this' arises, Wittgenstein suggests, from the sense that philosophically a word should name a simple object. Someone who takes this view might be expected to argue as follows: The word 'Nothung' is an example of what usually passes for a proper name. The sentence 'Nothung has a sharp edge' makes sense whether the sword is still whole or is already shattered - that is to say when there is nothing to be named and therefore no name. There must consequently be words which name simples into which 'Nothung' can be analysed in order to keep the sense alive and these are the real names. However, the example which he puts into the mouth of the imaginary proponent of logically proper names fails to make Wittgenstein's point because it would not have made the other's either, for two reasons:

(i) Nothung never existed and could not, therefore, cease to exist. Any problem with the name was inherent in the naming and did not arise as a consequence of the destruction of the object named.

(ii) Accepting, for the sake of argument, the existence of a real sword does not rescue the point because there are two Nothungs and 'Nothung' lacks in consequence the necessary uniqueness of reference. 'Nothung' is the name created by Wagner for two swords which figure in *Der Ring des Nibelungen*: Siegmund's which was shattered on Wotan's spear in the encounter which cost Siegmund his life; his son Siegfried's which Siegfried forged from the melted down fragments of his father's sword.

Wittgenstein is being disingenuous if he intends his own theory of logical simples to be included in his strictures; in the *Tractatus* he offers an explanation why 'Nothing has a sharp edge' makes sense, an explanation which his later exposition neither improves nor significantly amends: A sentence is by definition an arrangement of words which makes sense. Even in the *Tractatus*, sense does not depend on reference but only on the logical possibility of reference. 'Nothing has a sharp edge' describes a thinkable state of affairs and therefore makes sense; the question of its referential truth does not arise. In short, sense attaches to symbol; but that is to say no more than that there is symbol. There cannot be two separate things, symbol and the sense of the symbol; the symbol is its own sense which, in Wittgenstein's current terms, equates with its use (PI 20). If sense was separate from symbol, there would be no possibility of referential meaning; as a by-product we should have neither history nor literature. A weakness of Wittgenstein's argument, it seems to me, is that in the *Tractatus* he never identifies or exemplifies the logically simple object which a word is to name, leaving himself with no position from which to retreat. He now claims (PI 40) that the word 'meaning' is used anti-linguistically (*sprachwidrig*) if it is taken to signify the thing which corresponds to the name. This is to confuse the meaning of the name with the bearer of the name and to say that the meaning of a name dies when the bearer of the name dies. This, according to Wittgenstein, is manifest nonsense.

3.2.10 It appears to be nonsense, I suggest, only because Wittgenstein artificially sets up a non sequitur. His surely disingenuous argument depends for its validity on the very contention

that he is seeking to discredit - that a word in everyday speech has, or should have, a single determinate meaning. He does not claim this even in the *Tractatus* where an unanalysed word can designate a complex and where, following Frege, he makes a distinction, which would solve his present problem, between referential meaning and symbolic meaning (sense). If a word has a number of connotations, one of which is to designate when accompanied by an ostensive gesture a particular living being, there is no difficulty over one meaning dying and the rest living on. This, surely, is what happens; Wittgenstein is a case in point. When Wittgenstein was alive, his name meant at least two separate things:

- (i) Ludwig Wittgenstein the physical being;
- (ii) A Ludwig Wittgenstein of the type 'by their fruits ye shall know them'.

When Wittgenstein died, meaning (i) died with him; meaning (ii) continued and took on a life of its own with the potential for waxing and waning as Wittgenstein's works waxed or waned in public esteem. I can resurrect a ghost of (i) in a sentence such as: Ludwig Wittgenstein died of cancer. But it would be nonsense to suggest that 'Ludwig Wittgenstein' in this sentence has the same meaning as in the sentence 'This is Ludwig Wittgenstein' uttered during his lifetime as an accompaniment to an ostensive gesture by someone introducing him to another person. When Wittgenstein died, his name as an accompaniment to an ostensive gesture ceased to have either reference or use and became meaningless, therefore, in terms of both the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. But not, of course, senseless; it could still be used in, for example, a play in which a character called 'Ludwig Wittgenstein' appeared.¹

3.2.11 As he later tacitly admits (PI 43), Wittgenstein has no justification for claiming that the bearer of a name is not the meaning of the name. By his own argument, if that is how the word is used, then that is what it means. This meaning does not prevent the word meaning whatever else it is used to mean. The main difference between his old and new positions is that he now allows a word to name a complex. Even this is no more than a formal acceptance of his informal position in the *Tractatus* where on occasion he speaks of ordinary things as objects. It is worth noting as an illustration of Wittgenstein's views on ostensive definition that the name in the sentence 'This is Ludwig Wittgenstein' would convey the intended meaning only to someone who already knew about Wittgenstein and lacked only the ability to recognise his physical presence. The converse is that to me, who never met Wittgenstein, the name could never be a proper name. I believe that there was such a person as Ludwig Wittgenstein the philosopher and that he wrote certain books (I claim the support of Quine for not believing that he wrote the English translations of his works) but I have no grounds for saying that I know so. 'Wittgenstein' is not a proper name for me because I have nothing to apply it to; it is a sign which signifies a multifaceted symbol. I know him or of him generally as an agglomeration of symbols and specifically as the putative source of whatever propositions I ascribe or another ascribes to him on a given occasion. The word 'Wittgenstein' is a label for a mass of data which might or might not, in whole or in part, bear some sort of relationship to a man who died thirty-odd years ago. But in what symbols precisely must anything be symbolised for there to be general agreement on a concept of it? If your concept of Wittgenstein differs from mine, are we talking about the same thing? How might what is essential to a definition be distinguished

from what is of secondary importance? Wittgenstein asks such questions in PI 79, posing as an example the problem of how one might say who Moses was and concluding:

I am using the name 'N' without *determinate* meaning. (But that does its use as little harm as it does a table to stand on four legs instead of three and consequently wobble under certain circumstances). (PI 79)

3.2.12 The notion of indeterminacy of meaning is of central importance in the *Philosophical Investigations*. It seems to me to make the break with the *Tractatus* far more decisively than the notion that meaning is use, of which between his early and his later work Wittgenstein might be said to do little more than change the grammar. In the *Tractatus* meaning is use in that there is no meaning without use:

If a sign is not used it is meaningless. (T 3.328)

But use is not sufficient for meaning; in a sense it represents a hurdle on the way towards meaning. Analysis of the apparent meaning must be undertaken before the underlying determinate meaning can be revealed through the direct association of language and referent. In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein abandons the determinacy and ostensibly the reference but retains the use:

In a *large* class of cases in which the word 'meaning' is used - even if not in *all* cases - this word can be explained as follows: The meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the *meaning* of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its *bearer*. (PI 43)

On Wittgenstein's insistence, the rider must be added that only the preparatory stage has been covered when the name has been applied to its bearer. Only use in a language-game will reveal what the name means; a thing doesn't even have a name except in a language-game (PI 49).

3.2.13 It is clear that the 'large class' comprises uses of the

word 'meaning'; not words or the uses of words. Wittgenstein is not saying that the meaning of many words is their use and the meaning of the rest is something other than their use. He is saying that the meaning of every word is in many cases its use; he does not, however, explain what exceptions he has in mind. Any exception must, of course, represent a different meaning for 'meaning'. He might be thinking of holders of meaning other than a word; they are possible in German in just the same way as they are in such English expressions as 'the meaning of a dream'; 'the significance of a ceremony'; 'those clouds mean rain'. Another possibility is that Wittgenstein has in mind the secondary meaning to which he refers in Part II of the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI II xi; GEMA 216; STW 347). Use is the primary and general meaning of a word; secondary meaning is in evidence when the word carries an extra charge of significance for the person using it. In Wittgenstein's example: 'the vowel "e" appears yellow to me', the word 'yellow' is not intended in a metaphorical sense because its meaning is expressible only by means of the concept 'yellow'. The secondary meaning is in a sense an extension of the primary meaning because only a speaker for whom the word carries the primary meaning can use it with a personal secondary meaning. Nevertheless he does use it, and difficult questions for Wittgenstein's general thesis arise, it seems to me, over the matter of 'use by whom?'; difficult questions also concerning his rejection of private language and perhaps even his view of metaphor and, consequently, of linguistic symbolism in general. Presumably he speaks of secondary meaning because a single word carries the extra charge. But he might just as well have considered it a secondary use and identified, say, 'general use' and 'personal use' of a word. We do indeed talk about a particular writer's use of a word.

Wittgenstein is notorious in this respect. Passmore notes:

'Grammar' is here a technical expression; there are others in the *Philosophical Investigations*, like 'language-game' and 'criterion'. His readers - and still more his expositors - are disconcerted because Wittgenstein does not pause to explain how he is using these expressions. (Passmore [1] 426)

It appears that the meaning is still the use, but that is no solution to the problem of meaning if the use is, and the meaning therefore remains, problematical. In a footnote Passmore quotes Moore's comment:

I still think he was not using the phrase rules of grammar in any ordinary sense, and I am still unable to form any clear idea as to how he was using it. (Ibid.)

Wittgenstein's failure to quote examples of the exceptions to his theory of meaning illustrates the point and strengthens the case for ascribing definitively to him the slogan 'meaning is use'.

3.2.14 To name a thing remains a possible use for a word. But what is this thing which is to be named? Wittgenstein examines at some length the question of the 'simple constituent parts of which reality is composed' - what he called 'objects' in the *Tractatus* - and comes to the conclusion that it makes no sense to talk absolutely about the simple parts of a chair, for example. The reason for this is that 'simple' means 'not composite' and it is the composite that causes the problem as much as the simple:

We use the word 'composite' (and therefore the word 'simple') in an infinity (Unzahl) of different and differently interrelated ways... To the *philosophical* question: 'Is the visual image of this tree composite and what are its constituent parts?' the correct answer is: 'That depends on what you mean by "composite"'. (And that is of course no answer but a rejection of the question). (PI 47)

Such a conclusion is, in my view, implicit in Wittgenstein's approach to objects in the *Tractatus* (see §2.2.9ff.). It is not possible to talk only about its parts and at the same time talk about a chair. A chair

is a complex state of affairs which needs to be languaged and can be languaged only as a complex. Analysis does not elucidate the complex; it destroys it. It would be nonsensical to claim either that the word 'chair' has no meaning or that the meaning of the word 'chair' exists apart from the word itself. Certainly the meaning of any word might be questioned and precision of meaning be unobtainable, but this might mean no more than that, as Quine has pointed out, no word is precisely replaceable by any other. It does not mean that words are unusable. The important thing, Wittgenstein now argues, is not to seek absolute clarity but to avoid misunderstanding in any particular case (PI 48).

3.2.15 The implications for my search for the meaning of the word 'education' are far-reaching. It now appears that there is no such thing as *the* meaning of a word and it is a pointless exercise to look for one. Nor is it legitimate to look to examples of the use of a word to reveal the reality to which they refer. Examples used in explanations belong to the language not reality. Within its language-game, an example is a means of representation, not what is represented (PI 50). There are all sorts of language-game and the meaning of a word is given by how it is used in a particular game. It is a fallacy to think that the meaning of a word in a given language-game will reveal what it means in any other. But what is the essence of language-game and hence of language? Wittgenstein is adamant that there is none:

Instead of suggesting something common to all that we call language, I am suggesting that there is no one thing common to all the phenomena to which we apply the same word - but they are all related to one another in many different ways.
(PI 65)

Wittgenstein draws an analogy with games. We recognise a game as a game although games overall have no common distinguishing feature. Instead

we see a complicated network of similarities which overlap and intersect both in general and in detail:¹

I can think of no better term to characterise these similarities than 'family likenesses'; for it is the same as the way in which the various likenesses overlap and intersect which persist among the members of a family: build, facial features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament etc. etc. And I shall say: 'Games' constitute a family. (PI 67)

3.3.1 Wittgenstein has been much criticised for his games metaphor, typically on two counts:

(i) Games must have some common distinguishing feature in order to be recognisable as games.

(ii) Language in general and linguistic philosophy in particular are trivialised by associating them with the playing of games.

On the first count, Hirst and Peters, for example, doubt

... whether Wittgenstein was even right about this particular concept. For how should we know which samples to lay out in order to look for the similarities?

(Hirst and Peters 6)

It is not Wittgenstein's fault that Hirst and Peters have put his cart before the horse. He takes pains to make it plain that we recognise a game post hoc, when it happens to come our way. He nowhere advocates formulating a preconception of what a game should be and then looking for examples to fit it. Hirst and Peters go some way towards meeting Wittgenstein by suggesting that the common feature of games need not be a simple observable property; it might be how we conceive the activities which we call games. Their preference is, however, for a clear-cut concept in keeping with their consistent view that essence in the form of concept precedes existence in the form of examples:

A necessary condition of calling something a game is, surely, that it must be an activity which is indulged in non-seriously.

(Ibid.)

Dearden takes up and develops this theme. He rejects as a signpost into an impasse Wittgenstein's injunction not to think but to look and see whether games have anything in common (PI 66). His search for a common factor leads him to a conclusion similar to that of Hirst and Peters:

Play, then, is a non-serious and self-contained activity which we engage in just for the satisfaction involved in it...

(Dearden [2] 84)

3.3.2 This perceived lack of seriousness in games is the basis for the second count on which Wittgenstein has been taken to task for his games metaphor. Magee in conversation with Quinton generalises this point of view:

... this metaphor has been extremely unfortunate. From the fact that Wittgenstein is always talking about language games, and talking about the use of language as a kind of game, a lot of people have concluded that he somehow regarded all utterance as frivolous. It has been used to confirm the prejudice so many people have had about linguistic philosophy, that 'it's all just playing with words'. (Magee [1] 110)

Quinton replies, mildly enough, that that was certainly not Wittgenstein's intention, but he agrees that the games analogy might seem to carry with it the suggestion that the various sorts of language activity are just fun, pastimes. It strikes me as unjust to blame Wittgenstein for the ingrained prejudices of others, particularly when their perceptions are based on nothing more substantial than a simplistic assumption. The weight of evidence from both scholarly studies and everyday experience falls preponderantly on the side of treating play as a serious element in human affairs. Huizinga, as his title *Homo Ludens* implies, sees all that man undertakes by virtue of being 'sapiens' as permeated also by his being 'ludens':

The spirit of playful competition is, as a social impulse, older than culture itself and pervades all life like a veritable ferment. Ritual grew up in sacred play; poetry was born in play and nourished on play; music and dancing were pure play. Wisdom and philosophy found expression in words and forms derived from religious contests. The rules of warfare, the conventions of noble living were built up on play-patterns. We have to conclude, therefore, that civilisation is, in its earliest phases, played. It does not come *from* play like a babe detaching itself from the womb: it arises *in* and *as* play, and never leaves it.

(Huizinga 198)

Huizinga has been criticised (by, for example, George Steiner in his introduction to the book) for taking too restricted a view of play; in particular for underestimating the importance of play in early learning (I am astonished that Dearden as a primary educationist should think play non-serious) and for ignoring contemporary developments in games theory (Neumann and Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour* appeared in 1944, the same year as the German edition of *Homo Ludens* from which the English edition was prepared). Huizinga works at the macrolevel of man as social animal, ignoring nevertheless such universal insights into homo sapiens as psychology and psychoanalysis might provide (as Steiner points out, Freud doesn't even get a mention in the book). There are, therefore, certain affinities between his approach and that of Wittgenstein to language in general. The language-game, the complex of human speech and the activities associated with it, is the medium through which homo sapiens largely plays out and essentially interprets his role as homo ludens.

3.3.3 Berne anatomises games at the microlevel at which the individual speaker/hearer engages in language-games. He sees the games people play as making up the bulk of social activity, which does not imply that the activities are necessarily trivial or that people are not seriously engaged in what they are doing. Conventional athletic games share with gambling and other forms of 'play' the potential for being very serious indeed and possibly even fatal. He points out that some authors include even cannibal feasts under 'play':

Hence calling such tragic behaviour as suicide, alcohol and drug addiction, criminality or schizophrenia 'playing games' is not irresponsible, facetious or barbaric. The essential characteristic of human play is not that the emotions are spurious but that they are regulated. (Berne 17)

It is clear that the games people play according to Berne are language-games in that language is the medium through which they unfold - with accompanying or consequential behaviour, of course. Without conceptualisation the behaviour would mean nothing; would not even exist. Not that the conceptualisation need be conscious; sometimes it is, as in the ploys of a confidence trickster or the manoeuvres of an insurance salesman, but for the most part it is not, that is to say when it plays its part in

... the unconscious games played by innocent people engaged in duplex transactions of which they are not fully aware, and which form the most important part of social life all over the world.
(Berne 45)

3.3.4 It seems hardly necessary, however, to take the sledgehammer of Huizinga or Berne to crack the trivialists' nut. The view that games are not serious is not merely currently untenable in these days of big-business sport, but has been (ignoring the ancient Olympics and the Roman circus which were hardly frivolous) at least since Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton, opposing troops played football in no-man's-land in Flanders (and risked court martial for breaking the rules of the war-game they were supposed to be playing) and relations between England and Australia were strained by the bodyline controversy. The seriousness or triviality of games is in any case irrelevant to Wittgenstein's thesis, according to which 'game' is a word and its meaning is its use. It is a matter of simple observation that it is used to denote activities as trivial as 'the game of ludo', as physically energetic and as financially committed as 'the game of tennis', as intellectually demanding as 'the game of chess', as duplicitous as 'the game of politics', as grim as 'the game of war' and as all-embracing as 'the game of life'.

3.3.5 The trivialists do not argue a case; they merely assume that a game has certain properties of necessity and then make their definition of game correct by restricting it to those properties (cf. PI 3):

No game is of vital importance; it is least of all a 'form of ¹ life', but is rather an unessential activity, lacking a serious purpose... Thus one can hardly imagine a more inappropriate linking of terms than the one incorporated in the phrase 'language-game'. Instead of serving any useful or enlightening purpose, it can only tend to confusion and obscurity.
(Smart 233)

It is understandable that Peters would feel uncomfortable with the notion of 'education' language-games. He is reluctant to call a process 'educational' which does not have the character of a task (Peters [2] 11). His theory does not, however, explain how the striving for perfection of the dedicated player of any game could be free of the element of task - whether self-imposed or dictated by a teacher. To treat even a trivial pursuit seriously is to treat it seriously. No pursuit evaluates its own value; it is evaluated by the way in which it is treated.² This perhaps explains the trivialist's psychology: He assumes that he can prise games as a bit of the world off the concepts of games which the public language supports and which would not exist but for the public language. The trivialist has his private (or at least restricted) concept 'game' which he regards not as a concept but as a state of affairs and which inhibits his seeing that the word 'game' is used in a wide variety of ways. To the extent that these uses coalesce into usages, Wittgenstein would consider them language-games, but there is no need to agree with him over this to see that the word 'game' means whatever it is used to mean. Preconceptions about how a word should be used and reluctance to *look and see* how it is used characterise the approach of the trivialist to games. Preconceptions

even lead Peters to suggest that:

... it would seem highly arbitrary to rule out as 'education' some of the very harsh things practised in institutions as a result of which very cultured and sensitive gentlemen eventually emerged. (Peters [1] 37)

It is surely naive to assume that in this case post hoc necessarily implies propter hoc. It might as plausibly be argued that desirable results were achieved in spite of the harsh practices - possibly because their effects were mitigated by the influence of cultured homes. And, of course, the games for which these institutions were at least as famous as they were for culture would make their non-serious contribution to those most civilised attributes of the sensitive gentleman - the sense of fair play and the determination come what may to play the game.³

3.3.6 For all his talk of language-games, of samples used in the elucidation of philosophical problems belonging to language and not to reality, of concocting 'reality' for philosophical purposes, Wittgenstein is generally thought to take a naively realistic view of reality. As Ayer puts it, linking Wittgenstein with Ryle:

They both accept the validity of what Moore called the common sense view of the world; and seem to assume that there is no point in asking how it can be justified. (Ayer [3] 57)

It may be true that Wittgenstein takes a naively realistic view of objects but his approach to objects is not the usual direct sensory perception of the naive realist. Language still dominates his approach to reality, as indeed it did in the *Tractatus*, but now the nexus is not the logical connection between elementary sentence and circumstance; it is the conceptualising power of language which creates our view of the world. Such ontological knowledge as we have is of an objectivity

constituted by language:

Das Wesen ist in der Grammatik ausgesprochen.

Existence is articulated in grammar.

(PI 371)

Whatever Wittgenstein means by 'grammar' (cf. §3.2.13) - I suggest 'rule-governed language usages' i.e. language-games. Paraphrasing Berkeley, PI 371 might be rendered 'being is saying'. Wittgenstein seems to support this interpretation:

Weche Art von Gegenstand etwas ist, sagt die Grammatik.

(Theologie als Grammatik).

Grammar says what sort of object something is.

(Theology in the guise of grammar).

Man's words do not create things; they say what things are as far as man is concerned. In a sense this is to create things since we cannot prise the world off our concepts and have no other means of making ontology manifest than some form of symbolism. But the reality thus articulated is not finite; it can be expanded or developed or amended through empirical inquiry. But that, Wittgenstein insists, is science. Philosophy looks to the language part of the process, seeking to ensure that the medium on which the ontological message ultimately depends does not confuse the issue.

3.3.7 To the extent that games form part of reality they would, in the normal course of Wittgensteinian events, be subject to empirical inquiry. This is clearly true of, for example, the games played by young animals in which they practise in a modified form and in accordance with instinctively understood rules (e.g. no serious biting) the parts they will play in earnest when they are mature. It is not true, because there is not necessarily any overt behaviour to be observed empirically, of the games played by humans in which instinct is metamorphosed by

consciousness operating, not necessarily consciously, through linguistic symbolism. I surmise that no human game could exist without language because there would be no medium through which rules, whether explicit or implicit, could be carried from person to person. It seems to me that the games played by humans are unequivocally creations of language, since any behaviour is concomitant to symbol, not vice versa. To suggest that the language merely comments on the behaviour is to imply that the behaviour antedated the corresponding mental states; such behaviour would of necessity be anarchic since there would be no mutually understood or accepted control over it. Football was doubtless played before rules were formulated or set down, but not before rules were understood - otherwise there could have been no communal playing of a game. Animal instinct would not do as the controlling factor, even if the purpose of playing football was determined by instinct, because it lacks the potential of human intentionality which is capable of, for example, affecting the outcome of any particular game as an event in space and time and intervening deliberately or spontaneously in the development of a game or of games overall. There is a difference between Macbeth murdering Duncan or the sniper shooting Nelson and a lion killing her prey:

If a lion knew how to speak we should not know what he meant.
(PI II xi)

Language is a way of life, according to Wittgenstein; therefore language-games are a way of life. All human games, which means much of human activity, are language-games in Wittgenstein's sense of language plus concomitant behaviour. The only games which are not language-games are those which are played in a reality which has been prised off our concepts (i.e. off our language) - that is to say, there are none.

3.3.8 The apparent all-pervasiveness of games in human affairs throws a new light on Wittgenstein's notion of language-game. It begins to look as though it might not be a metaphor after all but an account of what is the case. The behaviour could not proceed without the language but the language can readily proceed without the behaviour. I do not mean to imply by this that a glance at the sports pages of a newspaper will demonstrate games, conventionally understood, proceeding in the form of language. The millions of words which have been written about cricket are not the game of cricket; not even the language-game of cricket. They represent other forms of language-game - as it might be the name-dropping game; the character-assassination game; the toadying to the public game; the pot-boiling game; the see-how-clever-I-am game. *The game of cricket, curiously, is never played; it is a symbol minus reality, a concept - just as 'horse' is a concept; one never rides 'horse' but only a horse, though the concept language-game permits one to say: 'The horse is a domesticated animal'. Similarly, one might say: 'The game of cricket is played in Australia', though no game of cricket need be in the process of being played. The game of cricket is being played only when a game of cricket is being played, whether by two or three half-naked figures on a beach or a couple of dozen 'flannelled fools at the wicket'. What constitutes playing is that certain activities are in train which are recognisable by the initiated as the ritualised activity known as 'cricket' - recognisable, it must be stressed, whether the ritual is being comprehensively or merely minimally observed; whether the conceptual framework is manifest or tacit. The game of cricket is a pure language-game in which the behaviour is symbolised; a game of cricket is a language-game in which the behaviour is physically manifest. They both follow rules; they are*

speech habits (Jespersen [2] 29) - if they were not, they would have to be thought out afresh on every occasion. They are, moreover, communal speech habits - if they were not they would be incomprehensible. They are in any case comprehensible only to those who have acquired the habit. The two principal games spawn a host of subsidiary games - subsidiary only in origin, not in status; they become autonomous once they have been established - if a game is played then it is played. There is a language-game the sole rule of which is that the rules of cricket shall be called 'laws'; the 'that's not cricket' game depends for its meaning on its use (of course) depending on which a competent player might play it as a straight-negation game (football is not cricket) or a moral-judgement game (it is not cricket to kick the goalkeeper). A student of English Literature would be confusing two symbols if he deduced that cricket was a game played by the fireside in winter. To play 'cricket' language-games properly calls for initiation into the way of life of a select few nations, particularly as participant in or observer of certain ritualised activities.

3.3.9 There are, however, innumerable degrees of proficiency in the playing of 'cricket' language-games. In spite of having codified laws, cricket is not a precisely delineated concept. Cricket did not, of course, originate as words. Sense-perceptible activities were needed at some stage to establish the concept, but once established the symbolic state became freestanding, even to the point of a formal linguistic codifying of the rules which are to govern the behaviour on occasions when it is intended formally to observe the ritual. Symbol ensures the continuance of the possibility of the recurrence of the ritual from one occasion of its observance to the next. Without symbol

the ritual would die; symbol ensures that the next time a game of cricket is played it does not appear as a game of football. Without the communally understood symbol there could be neither participants nor spectators. It strikes me as highly significant that, for the greater part of the time, even a game such as cricket, which has a readily recognisable behavioural element, is a pure language-game without concomitant behaviour. The behaviour is an optional and transitory extra, necessary on at least one occasion in the past in order to establish the concept - as rugby football is said to have originated on some occasion when a player picked up the ball and ran with it; repeat performances are embroidery, undertaken for ulterior motives.¹ A fortunate chance indeed, if cricket had depended for its continuing existence on being played, that the discovery of Australia circumvented the English winter.

3.3.10 Games such as cricket have the advantage that publicly-sensible manifestations readily underpin their language-games. The possibility has to be faced that for language-games which are played with a word such as 'education', the *Philosophical Investigations* has ultimately no ontological message to deliver; that there is no way through from symbol to reality; that it is all merely, as Hamlet said: Words, words, words. Language-games might leave Wittgenstein with a more intractable solipsism than that of the *Tractatus*, which did at least look to an external Realität and could fall back on a bold attempt to link it to language. But what success my application of this approach might have had in the case of 'educatee' was at the expense of the rest of the educat- family which, unwanted or not, does exist and with which language-games are played. Whether any other than Wittgenstein's two

approaches might be ontologically more successful remains an open question. The problem might lie in language itself, not in Wittgenstein's approach to it; there might be no ontological message to be delivered. Wittgenstein, it might transpire, has simply encountered traditional intractable philosophical questions, and has come full circle to a position indistinguishable from his *Tractatus* position: It is the job of the scientist to answer ontological questions; the philosopher concerns himself with sorting out the symbols which will of necessity be used, inter alia, to carry the ontological message. For the philosopher the medium is the message. Obviously, Wittgenstein is correct to the extent that a muddy medium is unlikely to carry a clear message; the medium has to be clarified before it can be seen whether it carries a message at all.

3.4.1 An important element in clarifying the medium is to determine, in general terms at least, what the limits of clarification are. According to Wittgenstein, the concept 'game' has no boundary. We can if we like draw a boundary for a special purpose - as it were for a particular language-game - but the boundary is not prerequisite to the use of the concept (PI 68; 69). We might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with out of focus edges. It is no use objecting that an out of focus concept is no concept at all. An indistinct picture might be just what is wanted for a particular purpose. And in any case, this is how we do play the language-game with the word 'game' (PI 71). It is pointless, Wittgenstein argues, to seek to delimit a language-game by looking for characteristics common to every sample of it; pointless because we can perfectly well recognise a sample for what it is even though it shares no common characteristic with other samples of the same thing. What is common to all shapes of leaf, for example, or to all shades of green? (PI 73). It is perfectly possible to know what something is and be unable to say it:

Compare: *knowing* and *saying*:

how many metres high Mont Blanc is -
 how the word 'game' is used -
 how a clarinet sounds.

Anyone who is surprised that it is possible to know and not be able to say is thinking perhaps of a case like the first. Certainly not of one like the third. (PI 78)

3.4.2 If someone else wanted to draw a sharp boundary around a concept, there would be no need to prefer his version. His concept would not be the same as mine but might be related to it. It is like

comparing a picture with vague contours and one with sharp contours. The relationship is just as undeniable as the difference (PI 76). In some cases it might be possible to sharpen up a blurred image by replacing vague elements with precise ones. In extreme cases, however, there are no distinguishable elements amenable to finer resolution. Everything merges into everything else (I think of a Turner landscape); anything - and nothing - matches:

Faced with this difficulty, always ask yourself (dich = thyself): How then did we *learn* the meaning of this word (e.g. 'good')? By what sort of examples; in which language games? (Then you [du] will more easily see that the word must have a family of meanings). (PI 77)

3.4.3 Conventionally, 'inexact' is a reprimand and 'exact' is praise on the assumption that our purposes are better served by what is exact. But 'exact' Wittgenstein points out, true to his engineering training, is not an absolute quality. There is no such thing as ideal precision, only precision appropriate to purpose. Inexact does not mean unusable (PI 88). It is the same with language: We feel constrained to analyse language so as to arrive at the ultimate stage of logical precision, grasp the absolute crystal-clear essence of language. This is illusory; language must have a use at the humble everyday level and if it is usable it must be precise enough and if it is precise enough, then it is precise. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein declared:

As a matter of fact, every sentence of our colloquial language is logically perfectly ordered just as it stands. (T 5.5563)

That is because every sentence is a truth function of the elementary sentences of which it is compounded. He still stands by his precept¹ but it is now not so much the logic as the sufficient precision of everyday speech that holds his interest:

On one hand it is clear that every sentence of our language 'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal, as if our ordinary vague sentences lacked as yet any immaculate sense and a perfect language had still to be constructed by us. On the other hand it seems clear: Wherever there is sense there must be perfect order - therefore perfect order must be implanted in the vaguest sentence.

(PI 98)

Wittgenstein does not explain what he means by 'sense'; whether, in particular, it is carried by language before or after the ministrations of the philosopher. One might think that it must be the latter, since otherwise there would be no point in philosophising, but it might well be the former, since Wittgenstein had grave doubts about the value of philosophising and the sense of the passage requires it to be the former. Unequivocally, a sentence is in order by virtue of being a sentence. It must, therefore, be the sense which is variable (though Wittgenstein elsewhere denies autonomy to sense) and we are enjoined to seek adequacy but not perfection. If a thing is worth doing at all, it is worth doing badly because, as Wittgenstein goes on to insist, that is the only way our language allows us to do it.

3.4.4 In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein draws a distinction between sign and symbol. Symbol is the picture which language presents of a possible reality; sign is the sensible medium through which it does so. A given sign might designate more than one symbol and accordingly have a number of senses; it is the job of the philosopher to clarify the resultant confusion. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein has no use for symbol in the *Tractatus* sense because he has no use for referent in the *Tractatus* sense; the meaning of a word is its use in the language, not the object which it names. Sign and symbol are now conflated and the language is its own symbol; the sign not merely tells us what the language means, the sign is what the language means. The

medium has become the message.¹

3.4.5 Wittgenstein insists that the medium is our everyday language. He warns expressly against bestowing on 'sign' any properties more subtle than those it possesses in ordinary speech:

If we think we have to find order and perfection in real language we become discontented with what is called 'sentence', 'word', 'sign' in ordinary life.

The sentence, the word, with which logic deals is supposed to be something pure and clear-cut. And we rack our brains over the nature of the *real* sign - is it perhaps the concept of the sign? or the concept at the present moment?

(PI 105)

Wittgenstein extends his insistence on ordinary usage into even more homely reaches of metaphor. Words are tools and the functions of words are as diverse as the functions of tools. We are confused by the apparent uniformity of words when we see them or hear them. That is because their application is less evident than their appearance. It is as pointless to look for a common use of words as it is to look for a common use of tools. Wittgenstein insists that he is not postulating perfect sense along with his perfect order. The sense of a sentence might leave elements open to interpretation but the sentence must have some sort of sense in order to be a sentence. He still does not explain how we can change the sense without changing the sentence and, consequently, why it should be necessary or possible to change the sentence when it is already in order. Wittgenstein's good meaning (cf. §3.1.7) seems to be that we do not have to go to the other extreme on a wild-goose chase after perfection. We have to see:

... that we must stay with the things that we think about daily so as not to be sidetracked into the ostensible necessity of describing ultimate niceties; which we could not do in any case with the means at our disposal. It is as if we were supposed to repair a damaged spider's web with our fingers.

(PI 106)

3.4.6 The more we examine language as it really is, the more intense becomes the conflict between it and the idealised picture of language demanded by logic. The resolution of the problem lies in removing logic from its position as an assumed prerequisite to the study of language and replacing it with colloquial language usage:

We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language; not about a non-spatial, non-temporal figment of the imagination. (PI 108)

Wittgenstein accepts that there are various ways of being interested in a phenomenon, but we should talk about the phenomenon of language as we should talk about chessmen if we were giving an account of the rules of the game, not describing the physical properties of the pieces. To ask what a word is is analogous to asking what a chessman is (PI 108). If we were giving an account of the rules of chess our aim would be to describe something extant, not to apply empirical methods in the pursuit of new knowledge. Our philosophical approach to language should be of the same order:

And we may not advance any kind of theory. There may not be anything hypothetical in our deliberations. All *explaining* must go and describing alone take its place. And this describing gets its illumination i.e. its purpose from the philosophical problems involved. These are to be sure not of an empirical kind but are solved by looking into the workings of our language, recognising indeed that we do so *in defiance of* an urge to misunderstand them. These problems are solved, not by adducing new evidence, but by collating what has long since been known. Philosophy is a struggle against the way our language bewitches our wits. (PI 109)

3.4.7 To regard language or thought as something unique is an effect of the spell; a manifestation of superstition which is itself evoked by delusions about the way language works.¹ We become emotionally involved with these delusions and their concomitant problems (PI 110). The resultant disquiet is as deeply rooted in us as the very

forms of our language. We have a sense of unease when, for example, a metaphor, supposed dead, stirs with life and casts a misleading light over its context.² A source of disquiet is the contradiction between what we see to be the case and what we think ought to be the case in language. Wittgenstein's earlier view was that the surface of language cloaked the deep, the logical meaning; the essence of the thing might be brought into focus if one concentrated one's gaze with sufficient intensity (PI 113). He quotes against himself his attempt to state the general form of a sentence (T 4.5). It is no use pretending, he now thinks, that such efforts get us towards the nature of things. We do no more than retrace a pattern which we have superimposed upon nature (PI 114):

A picture held us captive. And we could not escape from it for it was incumbent in our language and language seemed merely to reiterate it inexorably to us. (PI 115)

I understand Wittgenstein to be saying that not only did he limit the function of language to producing a picture of reality, he created for himself a picture of language which preoccupied his thinking. He now suggests that the therapy for the philosopher's obsession with grasping the essence of meaning is to ask whether a word is in fact used in that way in its native context:

We reduce words from their metaphysical to their everyday application. (PI 116)

3.4.8 To ascribe meaning to a word is to put the cart before the horse. To say to someone: 'You know the meaning of this word? Well, then, use it with the meaning that you know' implies that meaning is a penumbra around a word which it carries over into any sort of use (PI 117). It implies that meaning is somehow separate from the word. But we can't talk about meaning apart from words and words, in the form

of our everyday language, are what we must use for the purpose (PI 120). The reason why we must use our everyday language is that it is the only one we've got.¹ We cannot look any deeper into language than language itself allows. Wittgenstein denies that any structure of importance will be lost if we reject all but everyday language. We shall destroy nothing but castles in the air, though even that is a useful linguistic ground-clearing exercise² (PI 118):

The results of philosophy are the revelation of this or that piece of sheer nonsense, together with the bruises which the intellect has suffered from ramming its head against the barriers of language. (PI 119)

existing forms of language; its function is to clarify what language does say, not make it say something else. This injunction is based on necessity, not on choice. Philosophy cannot interfere in any way with the actual use of language and can ultimately only describe it. It cannot even give it a foundation; it leaves everything as it is² (PI 124 - 128):

The philosopher's work results in a compilation of reminders for a specified purpose. (PI 127)

3.5.3 The most important aspects of things are hidden from us just because they are so simple and mundane; we don't see them because we are constantly looking at them. So we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful (PI 129). The plain and simple language-games which Wittgenstein recommends us to play are not preparatory studies for a future sophistication of language but criteria for operating the language as it is; their function is to throw light on language relationships through the comparison of one with another. We should avoid the dogmatism into which philosophy so easily slips by not setting up a model of language to which we expect reality to conform (PI 130; 131). As an example, Wittgenstein imagines philosophers inventing a spurious entity which they call 'the possible motion' of a machine and visualise existing before the machine moves; they then rack their brains over its relationship to the actual motion.¹ This is a language problem, according to Wittgenstein; it arises from misinterpreting the mode of expression we use to describe such things:

When we philosophise we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the way civilised people express themselves, misinterpret it and then draw the most peculiar conclusions from their interpretation. (PI 194)

The problem exists only in the symbol, not in the reality which the

symbol purports to symbolise. Language does not need to be matched by reality; an expression appears peculiar only if we think it into a different language-game from the one which is in fact being played with it (PI 195):

The uncomprehended use of a word is thought of as the expression of a peculiar *occurrence*. (As time is imagined to be a peculiar medium, the soul a peculiar being).

(PI 196)

Wittgenstein does not deny that we might have a sense of grasping the meaning of a word isolated from a context. But he does deny any justification for thinking that a causal connection exists between our present grasp and the future use of the word. A word takes its meaning from its past, not its future use. A signpost works only because there is an established use, a custom, for signposts. Rules work only because they are customarily accepted to be rules (PI 197; 198):

To follow a rule, to pass on information, give an order, play a game of chess are customs (usages, institutions).

(PI 199)

3.5.4 If my purpose in attempting to clarify the meaning of 'education' is to improve terminology so as to avoid misunderstandings when the word is used for practical purposes, Wittgenstein might appear to pass by on the other side. He readily admits the feasibility of an undertaking of this nature but denies that such cases are the concern of philosophy. They are malfunctions which occur when the language machine is doing useful work; philosophical problems arise when it is idling and these are the problems which interest him (PI 132). I find myself faced with something of a philosophical problem, therefore, over deciding whether I am engaged in would-be reform of terminology for practical purposes or in the dissolution of a philosophical problem. This is more hopeful, since my dilemma does not look like a practical

question and I might properly look to Wittgenstein for assistance in explaining it away. Wittgenstein's therapy is not at all obscure: Philosophical problems are self-inflicted; they are the result of asking questions there is no need to ask and which steer the enquirer into a trap of his own making. So retracing my steps out of the flytrap and standing once more on comparatively firm ground, I conclude that my tentative interpretation of my problem as a non-*Philosophical Investigations* problem does not necessarily make it a non-philosophical problem. It does not even vitiate the use of Wittgensteinian methods, the efficacy of which owes nothing to predetermining the uses to which their results are to be put. Wittgenstein himself demands that I do not prejudge, but look and see. If an analysis of 'education' according to the precepts of the *Philosophical Investigations* proves efficacious for a practical or for any purpose, then it is efficacious. Wittgenstein might turn in his grave, but that would be in principle no different a reaction from his habitual response in life to interpretations of his philosophy by others.

3.5.5 In any case, if terminology is to be improved so as to avoid misunderstandings in practical contexts, the improvement must be carried out in accordance with certain principles. If, for example, the various meanings of educat- words were to be classified for the purpose of clarification, the procedure would necessarily follow lines closer to the *Philosophical Investigations* than to the *Tractatus*. The *Tractatus* leads into an impasse through its insistence on the unambiguous naming of a logical simple. The *Philosophical Investigations* follows an open-ended and potentially more productive approach to the extent that educat- words are used in English. Whether their meaning is defined as

their use or not is irrelevant to sorting out their use for practical purposes. As usual, Wittgenstein does not explain what he means by 'practical purposes' (praktische Zwecke; PI 132) but it matters less in this case since use is by nature practical and the elucidation of use promises, therefore, a paradigm of practical use and for practical purposes.

3.5.6 Following the *Tractatus*, I thought that I might find a logical meaning for 'education' in the object educatee. Wittgenstein does not now deny the possibility that I might under certain circumstances point to an object and say correctly: 'This is an educatee'. He does, however, remind me that there are other education-words, including 'education', which I was perhaps too ready to discard as lacking logical justification or to treat as complexes in need of analysis into simples. I am now reminded particularly and properly that 'education' is a word which *is used* in English. If my purpose is to use it in accordance with its meaning, I need a compilation of reminders of how the language-game *is played* with the word 'education'. Or if, as I suspect, 'education' is the name of a family of language-games, I need a compilation of compilations of reminders of how language-games *are played* with the word 'education'.

3.5.7 This does not strike me immediately as a potentially fruitful insight since the uses that I sample might be incorrect - or, if 'incorrect' is not a legitimate description, might require further elucidation. But I do not know what criterion of correctness or of elucidation it is proper for me to apply. Even if there is no such thing as incorrect use, there might well be incorrect reminders. I

might be out of order in feeling a conventional need for a criterion of correctness of use (if meaning is use, meaning is use) but I need a criterion of correctness of reminding. The correctness does not lie in the reminding but in the object of the reminding; I cannot assess the reminders without some means of assessing what they are reminding me about or for. I sense the assumption on Wittgenstein's part of some sort of norm. In PI 1 he declares that explanations must come to an end somewhere - though there is a hint that this might be the result of exhaustion as much as success in elucidation. But when the explanations end, what then? In the *Tractatus* explanations ended, hypothetically at least, in a definition of the meaning of a word; in a primitive sign which named an object. In terms of the *Philosophical Investigations*, the search for a definition of education, particularly the search for an a priori concept of education in which education as a phenomenon of the real world reveals itself as mental phenomena expressed in language, is an exercise of the cart before horse variety. Language users create their own concepts of education; there are any number of them, any number of 'education' language-games, none of which has a claim to ascendancy over any other or to be valued in any way differently from any other. Value is simply not in contention; if a particular game is played with 'education' then that game *is played*. That is how the word is used and that is what the word means. If I seek to say what the word ought to mean, my search lies in some realm other than philosophy, for philosophy may in no way interfere with how words are used.

3.5.8 To the extent that education is a concept, it might well be, in terms of the *Philosophical Investigations*, an out of focus concept; a concept with blurred edges, varying with place and time -

certainly not an a priori concept since the a priori by definition precedes experience. Wittgenstein might appear by now to have fully parted company with the *Tractatus*, but I think the appearance will prove to be deceptive. What things are in the *Tractatus* is contingent but part of the real world - but only, tautologically, if they are part of the real world and not merely language symbols expressing possible but not necessarily actual states of affairs. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, the symbol assumes the dominant role; education is a phenomenon of language and its nature has to be elucidated in language. Wittgenstein insists that the samples to be used in the elucidation belong to grammar, not reality (PI 50). But they have to be samples of something and it is clear that Wittgenstein does not regard the something as further symbols; explanations have to come to an end somewhere and Wittgenstein obviously assumes that they end sooner or later in reality, naively interpreted. Nevertheless, the samples appear to be expected to carry unaided the whole burden of the elucidation; explanation is proscribed as a philosophical method (PI 109). Not for the first time, Wittgenstein appears to be contradicting himself; elsewhere he sees describing, which according to PI 109 is to replace explaining, as a method of explaining (PI 69, for example). Once again I take Wittgenstein's good meaning (see §3.1.7), the accumulated instances of which lead me inevitably towards doing as Wittgenstein does, not as he says should be done. I shall find that not even theorising is out of order and sooner or later, it seems to me, a theory is going to be necessary.

3.5.9 What in particular detracts from the utility of Wittgenstein's approach as I have tried to expound it so far, is the

lack of any criterion of legitimacy of use. It seems to me not enough to declare that meaning is use and that the uses of 'education' constitute a family of interrelated uses. Language, according to Wittgenstein, is a way of life; so, I should like to add, are the social customs which determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of members of a family. Wittgenstein seems to think that this principle applies also to fundamental intra-language relationships:

The social status of contradiction or its status in the community:
that is the philosophical problem.

(PI 125)

It is a philosophical problem because language is a social activity and philosophical problems arise when language is idling i.e. when social activity is not directed towards a useful end. Contradiction is in Wittgenstein's view the prime example of language idling; whether it is socially acceptable or not is, therefore, the philosophical problem.¹ The education-family is full of contradictions. Wittgenstein says that if I describe all the 'education' language-games fully, leaving nothing undisclosed, contradictions will vanish. It seems to me that I shall still need some means of overcoming the obstacle of 'this game is played'. And the problem remains, assuming the rejection of any definitive criterion of meaning, what alternative might set some limit to the otherwise limitless genealogy of education.

3.5.10 Wittgenstein's method of identifying a game is simple: Don't theorise; look and see (PI 66). What I shall look for in identifying language-games is any contextual use of language identifiable as a type of use i.e. a usage distinct from other usages. I take it that not every use is a language-game since uses might be examples of the same game repeated, although every use will be known by

the name of the game - as every game of cricket is called 'cricket'. Meaning is use, agreed, but it is usage which identifies the language-game. Any identifiable usage of a word is a language-game. Any phrase, sentence or larger slice of language identifiable as a usage is a language-game. The whole of a language is a language-game. Language itself, plus its concomitant activities, is *the* language-game. The distinguishing feature of a language-game is that it operates in accordance with its own code of rules which need not be in any sense formulated but which will be honoured when that particular game is being played correctly; if they are not honoured, it is just not being played. Philosophical error arises from drawing false analogies between the way a word works in one game and the way it works in another. A common error is to extrapolate from the particular use to the general and strive to grasp the essence of the thing. Those of us who have been initiated into the way of life that is cricket can play the 'cricket' language-game well enough, but only according to our own lights. None of us could say what the essence of cricket is. Perhaps its essence, being a metaphysical notion, lies beyond the limits of language and is inexpressible in words.

3.5.11 One everyday use, one usage, of 'education' is as a label.

It is used to label two things:

(i) A field of interest which covers whatever it is used to cover by those who participate in it;

(ii) The family of language-games played with it and its cognates.

The first stands to the second in the relationship of putative referent to generally unacknowledged symbol. The everyday interpretation of the

relationship is that the second is the name of the first, so that when the second is used the first is meant - directly, without the intervention of language (cf. §1.1.1). The use of 'education' to label the first might now be considered a philosophical problem as an example of a word idling instead of doing useful work and I should have found the answer to my question in §3.5.4. Any arbitrary label, once accepted, would fulfil the same purpose since a label never conveys information; it is either a tautology (what it labels is what it labels) or a contradiction (what it labels is not what it labels). A philosophical error with potentially dire practical consequences arises from interpreting a contradiction game as a tautology game. The label never says which game it is playing, as people have discovered to their cost on using petrol from a container labelled 'kerosene' or drinking paraquat from a bottle labelled 'lemonade'. The rules of the labelling language-game are, as with every language-game, a matter of social custom; of the way people live i.e. what they do. Petrol could be labelled 'kerosene', if that was the custom, just as kerosene is labelled 'pétrole' in France. A label is trustworthy only if it is known from evidence other than the label itself to be trustworthy (cf. Russell's Theory of Types and Wittgenstein's comment on it in T 3.332). Such evidence is readily available in the case of 'petrol' and 'pétrole' in the form of empirical tests of whatever degree of sophistication is thought desirable. How might the coincidental correlation of 'education' and education be verified? this was Dewey's problem to which, by the age of 75 at least, he had found no answer:

... the fundamental issue is not of new versus old education nor of progressive against traditional education but a question of what anything whatever must be to be worthy of the name *education*.
(Dewey [2] 90)

3.5.12 If the question-begging 'worthy' is discounted,¹ the question remains: What must anything whatever be to have the name 'education' applied to it? This was the principle underlying my search for the Wittgensteinian object called 'education'. It now seems clear to me that, no matter how the question is phrased, it cannot be given an explanatory answer. The argument remains inevitably circular: 'Education' is used correctly as a label when it labels education; education is correctly labelled when it bears the label 'education'. The label does not reveal what education is but, paradoxically, it is impossible to identify education without the label. I have tried to show that, if 'education' labels anything logically, it labels the state of the individual educatee's intentionality. I see this as a Wittgensteinian object which needs to be named. But it need not be named by 'education'; any other arbitrarily chosen label would serve equally well. The criterion for the success of its use would be acceptance by its users, not logical correlation between name and object. 'Education', in common with every other label, has no logical meaning; it means whatever it is used to mean. There is nothing more to the name than this. Juliet's rhetorical question is particularly apposite in the case of education which is a difficult topic to approach rationally because of its accretions of sentiment. To question education is commonly considered to be on a par with questioning motherhood, and for cognate reasons. One of the many curious paradoxes which underly the education system is that the foundation of the most basic skill of all - the ability to understand and to use the mother (sic) tongue - is entrusted to amateurs. Children learn, or fail to learn, to listen and to speak effectively from their parents, particularly their mothers, and the education system thereafter devotes much time and energy and

resources to grading the quality of the parental educational input and rewarding those children who had the good sense to be born to supportive parents. Equality of educational opportunity is a myth. Privilege in schooling is an effect, not a cause; the cause is the commitment and competence of parents. This is an aspect of the theory of education which, in my opinion, has had nothing like the attention it deserves. One reason is that professionals tend to disparage the efforts of the uncertificated; another is that education is generally regarded by professional and lay people alike as what happens in school. A third reason might be the impossibility of formulating a coherent view of so incoherent a sphere of activity. Peters, for example, is reluctant to 'call such goings on processes of education' because of the difficulty of conceiving them 'as tasks either on the part of the teacher or of the learner' (Peters[2] 11f.). In all these cases 'education' means what the user is using it to mean, applying a concept restricted for the purpose. It is not that 'education' is not definitive enough as a label; it is no less and no more satisfactory in this respect than any other label; that is to say, it gives no information whatever about what it is labelling. In another respect it is less satisfactory than the usual run of labels, any one of which might coincidentally name contents correctly. 'Education' can never label correctly because there is no criterion of correctness of contents; what it is ostensibly to label has not been conventionally delimited:

We don't know the boundaries because none have been drawn. As I've already said, we can draw a boundary for a particular purpose. Do we make the concept usable only by doing that? Absolutely not! Except for this special purpose. (PI 69)

3.5.13 'Education' labelling education is the common usage; paradoxically, there is nothing for it to label and the word goes proxy

for the putative object with its users secure in the knowledge, if the circumstance occurs to them at all, that they will not be called to account for their use by producing an example of the object ostensibly being named. 'Education' labelling the family of 'education' language-games is not the common usage; paradoxically there is now a lot for it to label because the contents are not a hypothetical object but the manifold and manifest usages of a family of words. 'Education' acts as the head of the family but as a label it cannot be more than the nominal head. It is not a parent of the family and is in no sense to be regarded as the keeper of its brothers and sisters. We have done nothing when we have attached a label; Wittgenstein insists that attaching a label is no more than a preparation for doing something. In this case, doing something entails demonstrating by means of a sufficient number of perspicuous examples the existence of the family of 'education' language-games. 'Sufficient' is an ad hoc magnitude; the totality of the family cannot be demonstrated because, apart from any practical difficulty in doing so, it does not exist. New members of the family are born and old ones die - a metaphor for the constant mutability of a natural language. The metaphor is strengthened by the ease with which the uses of words can be born or die; the birth or death of a priori entities which words merely named would be a much more difficult process either to conceive of or, barring divine intervention, to execute. As Wittgenstein points out, if our concepts were a priori and not contingent we should be studying their sources in nature, not studying the language within which they are formed (PI II xii).

3.5.14 The *Philosophical Investigations* rejects the naming function as the prime use of a word; to act as a label is no more than

one possible use of a word. If 'education' was merely a label, it would be devoid of meaning. But it has uses other than to label which occur, paradoxically, when it is used ostensibly to name something; since there is nothing to name, these uses must be something other than to label. The same applies to its cognates; they too must have their meaning if they have their use. They exist as words in their own right; their integrity cannot be of a lower order than that of 'education'. It is clear that any educat- word must carry in itself the undifferentiated potential to express as many identifiably discrete symbols as there are usages of the word, bearing in mind that the number is not and can never be finite. If meaning is use, meaning comes only with use. Yet it cannot be use alone which distinguishes one educat- word from another; otherwise it would not be distinguished in a list, for example. Technically, each word is distinguished by its inflection, but clearly an inflection must be something more than a mere technicality since it determines use and use determines meaning:

If somebody says to me e.g. the word 'dice', I know what it means.
But can the total use of the word hover before me if I *understand*
it in this way? (PI 139)

Wittgenstein argues the degree of use and understanding but he has already conceded my point: A word in isolation can carry at least some meaning. So that when I see the word 'educator', for example, enough still adheres to it from the occasions when I have seen it in use for me to identify it as a freestanding term with meaning. In particular, I do not confuse it with 'educatee', though the only difference between them is the inflection. Clearly, it is not possible to maintain the semantic purity of educat-. In addition to the threat posed by inflection, 'semantic purity' offers a very unstable base in a Wittgensteinian context. It is not as though use bestowed anything like a real meaning

on a word. It could be misleading to say that a word acquires meaning from use in a context. It might be more accurate to say 'acquires discrete meaning' or 'the particular meaning of a word is identified'. Nevertheless, common sense suggests that the meaning, any possible meaning, of a word is endemic in the word itself and it is no more than the particular meaning which is activated and distinguished from the general by the context. Otherwise 'education' would have no meaning and would merely elicit meaning from the context. The word would be like a catalyst which plays no part in a chemical reaction but enables the reaction to take place. This might appear, at first sight, to be an impossible notion; surely, the only possible source of meaning in a statement lies in the words of which it is composed?

Like Frege and Russell I take a sentence to be a function of the expressions contained in it. (T 3.318)

However, in the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein rejects Frege's calculus theory of meaning. The meaning of a statement is carried by semantic units larger than a word, from its use in which the word acquires meaning; perhaps from the sentence qua sentence (accepting that a one-word sentence is merely syntactically a single word); perhaps from the sentence plus a wider linguistic context; certainly from whatever units of language in fact carry or generate the meaning. I should like to use the term 'morpheme' for the minimum syntactical slice carrying holistic, indivisible meaning rather than, as standard usage has it, the least morphological element carrying meaning. The latter is liable to carry, depending on whether one looks at it through the eyes of the early or the later Wittgenstein, polyvalent meaning or no meaning at all. There is, therefore, I admit, no such thing as a morpheme as my hypothetical definition would have it since language is never free of ambiguity. But a compromise might be reached along the lines of

Wittgenstein's out of focus concept which might allow a closer approximation to the expression of minimum meaning than lexicographical snippets can.

3.5.15 It would have been tempting to take a short cut past these arguments by saying that *educat-* has, of course, no meaning in itself because it has no use. But this would not be true; I have used *educat-* frequently and developed a language-game which I attempt to play consistently in accordance with its unarticulated rules. This game is not, however, an 'education' language-game; it is a grammatical game to be played in the language used to talk about playing, not to play, 'education' language-games. *Educate-* is useless in 'education' language-games because it carries no meaning - or antithetical meanings, which amounts to the same thing. The stem requires an ending before it can be used to generate some sort of 'education' meaning. There is no alternative, therefore, to looking at how cognate derivatives on *educat-* actually function in a context or, more accurately, to looking at the context in which each functions. It might then be possible to decide whether two or more cognates on *educat-* could be treated for any purpose thought desirable as semantically the same i.e. carrying a common meaning for *educat-* and differing merely grammatically. The suggestion might appear non-Wittgensteinian in that the use of a word is its use, not the use of a quasi-parent or a sibling. Whether there would be any merit in such a procedure is another question. A possible object might be to retain some sort of traditional meaning for 'education', perhaps as a kind of titular head of the clan, useful as a label for a topic of discourse - as it is indeed used already, but justifying, rationalising and generally legitimising the use. But there is no need, as far as Wittgenstein is concerned, to attempt to legitimise usage; use is use.

It is sufficient, if one thinks it desirable, merely to continue to use 'education' as a label. It is then so used and that is then the meaningless meaning of that 'education'; the language-game that is played with it, the rules of which do not apply to any other game played with the word. It would be erroneous to infer than any given usage of 'education' necessarily sets a seal on any other. The proper procedure, following the later Wittgenstein, is to describe after the event, not prescribe before it. The philosopher's task is to produce a descriptive compilation of reminders of how 'education' language-games *are played*.

3.5.16 The problem with reminders is that, ostensibly, they can operate only on what has already been known and, presumably, more or less forgotten. On the face of it, this would prohibit the passing on of new information. This does not, however, appear to be Wittgenstein's intention. Certainly, the philosopher is not to adduce new empirical evidence in compiling his reminders; he is to collate what has long been known. But known by whom is not specified; nor is any definition of 'known'. What the philosopher has known might not have been known to others; his reminders might well contain material new to someone else. It could not be otherwise: Knowledge is neither common nor universal and the philosopher is more likely not to know than to know what another needed reminding about. It must be what the philosopher has himself long known that he is to collate as a memorandum for a purpose which he has identified. Anyone else might then use it as a check list for his own thinking on that topic. This interpretation rests on a wider connotation for 'Erinnerung' than a mere 'reminder' and this appears, fortunately, to be:

- (i) allowable by the language-games played in German;

'Erinnerung' can mean 'admonition', 'erinnern' can mean 'point out',
'mention';

(ii) Wittgenstein's intention:

What effect then did my argument have? It made us aware (reminded us) [Es machte darauf aufmerksam (erinnerte uns daran)] that we should be prepared under certain circumstances to call another procedure as well 'using the picture of the dice' and not just the one we had originally in mind. (PI 140)

Making aware is positively interventionist compared with reminding but Wittgenstein is apparently not averse to equating the two. Making aware might, it seems to me, take any of three forms:

(i) Recalling to the conscious memory what has become submerged in the unconscious.

(ii) Making consciously or coherently known what has been subconsciously or disjointedly known.

(iii) Passing on information known to the informant but not to the recipient of the information.

This offers a more positive and potentially profitable basis for an account not merely of the 'education' language-games which are generally played and might readily be seen to be played, but also of those which, like the games analysed by Berne, are played unwittingly.

3.6.1 Ostensibly it is not possible, in terms of the *Philosophical Investigations* to explain the meaning of 'education'. It can only be *shown* - as indeed it could according to the *Tractatus*. The difference, it seems to me, is that Wittgenstein has now ceased to insist on the analysis of complexes into simples as a prerequisite for the revelation of meaning through the direct comparison of statement and circumstance. The samples of language now appear in their everyday clothes, not in their philosophical Sunday best (PI 116). What might be thought a properly Wittgensteinian method of presenting examples is, however, open to various interpretations. There can be little doubt about the foundation of the method: Examples are to be collected - Wittgenstein does not stipulate how many; sufficiency for purpose appears to be the aim (PI 133). The examples as they are collected are the finished form; they are not to be regarded as trial runs or as models for some future sophistication of language (PI 130). Explanation is proscribed and description alone is to be practised (PI 109). Doubt arises, however, because of a certain incoherence in Wittgenstein's account, whether these examples are already the reminders of which the philosopher is to make a compilation or whether they need some form of processing before they become capable of making aware as well as merely reminding how specified language games are to be played. The answer might lie in determining more clearly the purpose for which the reminders are to be compiled. This might be achieved through exploring where the cutoff point comes between the compilation of reminders and the purpose for which it is to be made. It seems to me that two

questions are central to this:

(i) Whose is the purpose? It might be the philosopher's own; he is then reminding himself or making himself aware of what he must bear in mind as he works towards fulfilling his purpose. It might be someone else's, in which case there is a hiatus between the reminders and the purpose; the reminders will need to take a freestanding, a more codified form;

(ii) When is the specified purpose achieved? If the purpose is the philosopher's own, it might never be achieved in spite of Wittgenstein's injunction that explanations must end somewhere; or it might be achieved as one step in a series of steps of indeterminate length. If the purpose is someone else's, the purpose of the philosopher is to produce a compilation of reminders processed to a stage at which the other can make effective use of it.

3.6.2 The key to both these questions lies, I suggest, in what Wittgenstein means by 'übersichtliche Darstellung', the concept of which he claims to be of fundamental importance to his philosophy (PI 122). It characterises his philosophical aims and methods - and characterises presumably, therefore, both the compilation of reminders and the purpose for which it is to be made:

The notion of 'Übersichtlichkeit' is prominent in all Wittgenstein's later philosophy and is of paramount importance... and is a key to his conception of philosophy... Notoriously, there is no happy way of translating 'Übersicht' and its cognates into English... His translators... have been unable to find a successful solution to the problem. Worse still, they have been unable to adopt a consistent one, thus obscuring the centrality of the idea in Wittgenstein's works.

(Baker and Hacker [1] 531)

Baker and Hacker review various renderings suggested by commentators and conclude:

While agreeing that there is no happy solution, we lay some store by consistency (as it were in the interests of Übersichtlichkeit), and will either use the German word itself, or some cognate of 'survey' (including the archaic noun 'surview').

(Ibid.)

'Survview' strikes me as so irretrievably archaic that I am encouraged to advance the claims of another archaic word not mentioned by Baker and Hacker or by any commentator whom I have read but which has undergone something of a resurrection in recent years. The word is 'overview', current in Shakespeare's day and used by him, according to Bartlett's *Complete Concordance*, on one occasion. OED gives the meaning of the verb as: 'to look (a thing) over or all through; to examine; inspect; peruse' and of the noun as: 'survey; inspection; supervision; overlooking', but notes that both noun and verb are obsolete. However, OEDS of 1982, with examples as late as 1975, instructs the reader to 'delete Obs. & add later examples' for the verb, and for the noun: 'Restrict Obs. to sense in Dict. and add: 2. orig. U.S. A survey, summary or comprehensive review of facts or ideas; a concise statement or outline of a subject'. The original and now revived meaning of the verb and the new meaning of the noun seem to me to translate with remarkable accuracy the German verb 'übersehen' and the noun 'Übersicht'. Problems arise with compounds; OED offers no derivative of 'overview' that would serve for 'übersichtlich' or 'Übersichtlichkeit'. 'Overviewable' and 'overvisible' are not English; neither is 'overviewability' or 'overvisibility'. These might serve as what OED calls 'nonce-words' - words coined for a particular need. They perhaps have a use in explaining the German, but I should not feel comfortable about using them in contexts in which their eccentricity might detract from their intended message. To go to a different stem for compounds ('conspectus' is not bad for 'Übersichtlichkeit') loses the centrality

of 'Übersicht' in Wittgenstein's vocabulary. Also, the problem is lurking a short distance ahead of finding a suitable adjective to go with a suitable translation of 'Darstellung'.

3.6.3 Baker and Hacker note that Wittgenstein himself felt the difficulty of translating 'Übersicht' and its cognates. A pre-war translation by R. Rhees goes as far as PI 107 and is extensively corrected in Wittgenstein's hand. 'Übersichtlich' in PI 92 (italicised in STW; GEMA omits the italics and renders 'surveyable') is paraphrased by Wittgenstein as 'becomes transparent. I mean capable of being seen all at a glance'. It would be interesting to know which of the two versions Wittgenstein would finally have settled for, since they are not equivalent alternatives. To see through a thing is not to see it whole or, indeed, necessarily at all. I am aware of a window pane by virtue of its imperfections and surface accretions, not its transparency as glass. Obviously, GEMA can claim some support from Wittgenstein for the choice of 'perspicuous' in PI 122, though the inconsistency with PI 92 might be thought regrettable. I should claim at least equal support for the notion of totality of view, and the feel of the German seems to me to tip the balance decisively in this direction. Wittgenstein's 'capable of being seen all at a glance' suggests that he wants a compressed view. Accordingly I suggest 'synoptic' as the key word, encouraged to do so by Cassell's Dictionary which gives for 'synopsis' 'die Übersicht, Synopsis' and for 'synoptic(al)' 'synoptisch, übersichtlich'.

3.6.4 There remains the choice of a suitable translation of 'Darstellung', another concept of central importance, common to both the

Tractatus and the *Philosophical Investigations*. The *Tractatus* is based on the idea of language being a bildliche Darstellung - a pictorial representation - of the world. But it is essential to note that it is we, the users of the language, who create the pictorial representation:

Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen.
(T 2.1)

The notion of *making* pictures of facts for ourselves sounds odd in English (the reason why PMG suppresses it, perhaps), but not in German, where 'Bild' can name a three-dimensional representation (a statue, for example) as happily as a two. The notion of 'making' is essential to an understanding of 'Darstellung'. A Darstellung is something man-made; it contrasts with a Vorstellung which, if we create, we create only as an idea, a concept (cf. Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*). With a Darstellung there is an end product, which I am reluctant to go on calling a 'representation' since it might well be non-representational in the artistic sense. This is particularly true of a word picture of reality. The 'bildliche Darstellung' of the *Tractatus* becomes the 'übersichtliche Darstellung' of the *Philosophical Investigations* but the medium remains the same - language. I need a word which will cover the abstract form of representation that is language. Wittgenstein suggests 'model', by analogy perhaps with the mathematical models of Hertz by whom, as a young theoretical engineer, he is said to have been much influenced and for whom he retained a lifelong admiration:¹

Das Bild ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit.
(T 2.12)

In the *Philosophical Investigations* language is no longer said to be a model of reality. The end product is now, ostensibly at least, a model of the language itself; an übersichtliche Darstellung - a synoptic model - of the way we use our words. I have doubts about the morphological

flexibility of this phrase, but with its assistance I feel that I might attempt a translation of PI 122:

Es ist eine Hauptquelle unseres Unverständnisses, daß wir den Gebrauch unserer Wörter nicht *übersehen*. – Unserer Grammatik fehlt es an *Übersichtlichkeit*. – Die *übersichtliche Darstellung* vermittelt das *Verständnis*, welches eben darin besteht, daß wir die *>Zusammenhänge sehen<*. Daher die Wichtigkeit des Findens und des Erfindens von *Zwischengliedern*.

Der Begriff der *übersichtlichen Darstellung* ist für uns von grundlegender Bedeutung. Er bezeichnet unsere *Darstellungsform*, die Art, wie wir die Dinge sehen. (Ist dies eine *>Weltanschauung<?*)

A principal source of our lack of understanding is that we do not view the use of our words *synoptically*. Our grammar lacks *synopticality*. The *synoptic model* facilitates that understanding which consists precisely in our 'seeing associations'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing *connecting links*.

The concept of the *synoptic model* is of fundamental significance for us. It characterises the form of our models, the way we see things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?).

(OED does not support my use of 'synopticality'; I claim it as a reasonable nonce-word, to be preferred to semantically restrictive periphrases such as 'synoptic quality'; 'synoptic sense'; 'synoptic dimension'; 'the synoptic view').

3.6.5 I do not claim that this translation gives – or, persuaded by Quine, that any translation could give – a definitive version of what Wittgenstein meant to say in PI 122. As always, there are two main sorts of problem: What the German means as German and what the German means as English. A problem from the former category turns on whether Wittgenstein was using the 'same' substantive in different senses in '*übersichtliche Darstellung*' and '*Darstellungsform*'. The grammar allows that he is, requiring it to be the concept of the *übersichtlichen Darstellung* and not of *Übersicht* or *Übersichtlichkeit* which characterises his *Darstellungsform*. So in essence, a *Darstellung* characterises a *Darstellung*; this is either an unhelpful tautology or

the use of two different symbols sharing a common sign. These are the polite explanations; the real explanation, it seems to me, is that Wittgenstein has been careless in his use of language and his good meaning is to the effect that synopsis (Übersicht) characterises the way he presents things (unsere Darstellungsform).

3.6.6 There remains the major problem of translation that with 'synoptic model' I might be accused of trying to squeeze out of 'übersichtliche Darstellung' more juice than it contains. A Darstellung is any one of many possible forms of representation and calls for a neutral rendering in the absence of explicit guidance from the author. It might be objected that with 'synoptic model' I am postulating the application of some sort of theory for which I do not have Wittgenstein's authority; a theory of the relationship between the representation and what is represented. This objection might be met by diluting 'synopsis' to 'overview' and 'model' to 'representation'. The passage might then read:

A principal source of our lack of understanding is that we do not *overview* the use of our words. The dimension of overview is missing from our grammar. Representation by overview is a means to that understanding which consists precisely in our 'seeing associations'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing *connecting links*.

The notion of representation by overview is of fundamental significance for us. It characterises the form of our representations, the way we see things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?).

This version still implies whatever element of interpretation is inherent in 'overview'. Still further dilution of 'Übersicht' could be envisaged until the stage is reached of tolerating no comment whatsoever. It might be argued that this is what Wittgenstein has had in mind all along with his proscription of explanation and his insistence that it be replaced by description alone. 'Panorama' might

be a sufficiently neutral term to describe the results of a survey undertaken without comment. Agreed, it might seem to imply too extensive a view to be 'capable of being seen all at a glance'. But Wittgenstein can't have it both ways at once; he must choose between intervention and indeterminacy. Either of the other two approaches might produce a deliberately reduced view, if that is what he wants. A view that is not preemptively delimited in any way is implied by the indeterminate series of examples which he proposes in PI 133. A panorama has at least one more dimension than a series, but shares its essential property of indeterminacy. The problem of deciding which of the three versions most closely matches Wittgenstein's intentions I can leave to be settled empirically by looking at the results of following each of them in turn, regarding them as possible stages in a single process rather than mutually exclusive alternative processes.

3.7.1 A panoramic view of 'education' is more easily and convincingly undertaken than a panoramic view of education. Educational signs are common and manifest. It can be assumed that they designate symbols - otherwise they would not be there. Whether anything is symbolised is irrelevant to surveying, by looking at an indeterminate number of examples of educational words being used, 'education' ostensibly as symbol but undeniably as sign. Nevertheless, the production of a panoramic view of 'education' could in no sense be an exact undertaking. A total view would be impossible to achieve for both logistical and logical reasons: It could not practically be done and in any case it simply does not exist. The concept is indeterminate at any given moment and liable to be different at any succeeding moment. Whatever degree of completeness was achievable or achieved, a panoramic view would include, however, both the spoken and the written word. The spoken word is the primary and commoner form of the language.¹ If meaning is use, meaning includes the speaker's nuances of speech which determine radically the message the hearer is intended to receive. Presumably for reasons of inaccessibility, the spoken word rarely figures in discourse concerning 'education'. The lack of a text necessarily inhibits a traditional kind of search for the meaning of a word. Speech has traditionally been considered too volatile for studious contemplation and the possibilities inherent in the tape recorder do not appear to have been much exploited as yet. A prerequisite would be the acceptance of Wittgenstein's aim of reducing words from their philosophical to their everyday use. The general drift in educational discourse is still in the opposite

direction. The analysis of education tends, therefore, to find both its subject matter and its modus operandi in ad hoc written texts couched in more or less technical language.

3.7.2 Indeterminacy and incompleteness are not necessarily inhibiting factors in an approach which looks to the *Philosophical Investigations* for guidance. Wittgenstein insists on both the inevitability and the usability of an indeterminate concept; precision and totality are neither accessible nor necessarily desirable. The attempt to clarify meaning is nevertheless worthwhile and the resultant panorama, even if it is misty, better than no view at all. An out of focus view might, paradoxically, be precisely what is wanted. The reason why words need to be reduced to their everyday use is that they are incapable of meeting the metaphysical demands laid upon them by philosophers, the results of which are nonsense and a mental battering for the user. Better to work from the start with our commonplace vague sentences (PI 98). I need, therefore, a source of examples of the use of educat- words couched in everyday language. I suggest that newspapers provide such a source. Newspaper language has something of the occasional and transitory quality of speech, and by definition reflects at least one aspect of everyday usage. Judging by the frequency with which it appears, education is a topic of constant and abiding interest to the readers of newspapers.

3.7.3 Appendix I is a collection of samples of the use of educat- words, drawn from newspapers published in Australia and the United Kingdom during the period 1982 to 1987. The samples appear in context as photocopies of the original text. I have not attempted to

provide any extraneous ascription of samples to sources. In my view, such an attempt would tend to negate the essential character of use. Either the context reveals the source, which consequently contributes to the meaning, or the use is so clear that a source is irrelevant. A use is not legitimised by a source; a use is a use. Any use which happens to be idiosyncratically incomprehensible remains a use but remains also incomprehensible and therefore, from the point of view of a user who wishes to communicate, self-defeating. Such a use would involve words which needed to be brought back to their ordinary use. It might then be made plain that they did not mean what the user intended them to mean; more appropriate words might then be found and the communication problem not resolved but dissolved - revealed by a therapeutic process to be a non-problem i.e. a philosophical problem of words idling instead of doing a useful job.

3.7.4 I make the naive assumption, since I know of no way to reject it without also rejecting the assumption that language works as a means of communication, that the samples which I quote are accurately reported. The words are, of course, the words of someone other than the original user - the reporter ostensibly or the typesetter pedantically.¹ The problem is endemic in all written communication - and for that matter in oral communication too, since what is said depends upon what is heard and no two hearers hear alike. Wittgenstein covers this point with his insistence that communication through language is necessarily imprecise. In any case, it should be of no significance in a *Philosophical Investigations* context since what is said is of no consequence. How it is said, the language-game being played, is Wittgenstein's sole concern.

3.7.5 Bearing in mind Wittgenstein's insistence that samples belong to grammar, not to reality, there remains the problem of a criterion for assessing the efficacy of the samples chosen. Having collected an indeterminate number of samples, what more might I do with them in order to reveal the meaning of 'education'? An uncompromising reading of Wittgenstein would suggest: Nothing; these samples exemplify the use of the word and exemplify, therefore, its meaning. They are not a complete account of the meaning of the word since a complete account is not possible, but as far as they go they are manifestly examples of how the word is used - more accurately, has been used - in particular contexts and that is all that can be done without looking for a rule for the use of the word or, indeed, a rule for the collection of samples:

'How do I know how to follow a rule?' - if that is not a question about my original motivation it is a question about my justification for doing *what I do* in following it.

But when my grounds are exhausted I strike bedrock and my spade is turned. I am then inclined to say: 'I just do it'.

(PI 217)

Fogelin notes Wittgenstein's insistence that explanation has to come to an end somewhere, that at some point reasons give out, and comments that for him reasons seem to give out very quickly. It seems that the spade is turned after barely scratching the surface (Fogelin 147). Fogelin quotes a passage from the *Zettel* which expresses this attitude very clearly:

Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation: the difficulty - I might say - is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognising as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. 'We have already said everything. - Not anything that follows from this, no *this* itself is the solution!'

This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it and do not try to get beyond it. The difficulty here is: to stop.

(Zettel 314)

In support of Wittgenstein it might be argued that he is merely being consistent, or at most making a virtue of necessity. He is not arguing, it seems to me, that we should decide arbitrarily to turn over the topsoil and then call it a day. The reason why we can't get into the bedrock is that we have only the spade of our everyday language. All that our everyday language can do is quote examples. Normally, examples are taken to be examples of something; one might start with examples and seek to deduce the generality which they represent. For Wittgenstein, however, examples appear to be the be-all and the end-all; they represent nothing but themselves. If one wants to explain what a game is:

One gives examples and wants them to be understood in a certain sense. But by this expression I don't mean that the other should now see in these examples the generality which I - for whatever reason - could not express. But that he should now use these examples in a particular way. Here exemplifying is not an *indirect* means of explanation - for want of a better. For even any general explanation can be misunderstood. It is just that *this* is how we do play the game (I mean the language-game with the word 'game'). (PI 71)

3.7.6 This is an interesting passage as much for what it does not say, but necessarily implies, as for what it does say. A certain ambivalence seems to have clouded the purity of Wittgenstein's precepts. He gives examples: How are they chosen? He wants his examples to be used: In accordance with what principles? Wittgenstein must have a theory of choice and of use in mind, but he does not divulge it. It seems to me that in the absence of a theory, the random collection of however many examples of the use of education- words is a useless exercise for throwing light on the meaning of 'education'. All it does is demonstrate conclusively the absence of light. I am left with a nebulous mass of four hundred-odd examples which illustrate what I

already knew - that the uses of educat- are many and varied but its meaning is far from evident. All I have done is produce a formalised illustration of the state of mind which motivated my inquiry. Clearly, a panorama of uses is not an übersichtliche Darstellung. Meaning might still be use, but examples of use need some sort of processing before they can be seen to be elucidatory.

3.8.1 The time has come to do as Wittgenstein does and take with a pinch of salt what he says to do:

And we may not advance any kind of theory. There may not be anything hypothetical in our deliberations.
(PI 109)

Yet Wittgenstein has already advanced his theories of language-games and word families and is about to develop his theory of the impossibility of a private language. His thinking throughout the *Philosophical Investigations* is conditioned by the theory that language is a way of life; 'meaning is use' is a theory. The whole book is a theory, an incomplete but none the less deliberate Weltanschauung. In §3.4.6, attempting to interpret Wittgenstein sympathetically, I tried to avoid the blatant contradiction of precept and practice by equivocally translating 'Erklärung' by 'explaining' rather than 'explanation' and 'Beschreibung' by 'describing' rather than 'description'. Wittgenstein might be implying, I wanted to suggest, that describing was a legitimate approach to the desired goal of elucidation whereas explaining was not, particularly in view of the overtones of defining which 'erklären' carries. The desired goal must surely be elucidation; explanation? If not, what on earth is the point of philosophical investigation? But this attempt to rescue Wittgenstein will not work; the German is uncompromising:

Alle *Erklärung* muß fort, und nur Beschreibung an ihre Stelle treten.

All *explanation* must go and description alone take its place.
(PI 109)

On numerous other occasions, Wittgenstein flatly contradicts his rejection of Erklärung. He has a great deal to say about hinweisende

Erklärung (ostensive explanation), which he considers to be problematic but necessary. His method of defining meaning is Erklärung durch Beispiele (explanation by means of examples); e.g. PI 69-73; 208-210.

PI 75 is as unequivocal as PI 109:

Is not my knowledge, my concept of game, totally expressed in the explanations (Erklärungen) that I could give? Namely, in my describing examples of games of various kinds; showing how by analogy with these one might construct other games of all possible kinds; saying that I should hardly call such and such a game; and so on.

In this passage description is clearly an approach to explanation, not a substitute for it. I can make sense of the dichotomy only by reading erklär- on each of the many occasions when it occurs as one of two possible concepts: Descriptive elucidation which is not merely acceptable but essential; prescriptive definition which is to be avoided. Wittgenstein then stands accused 'merely' of using words loosely - a charge which might be levelled at him on many occasions throughout the *Philosophical Investigations*, not least for his failure often to make it clear who are the participants in his imaginary conversations and who is saying what (PI 71 is a recent example). Alternatively, he might be using words precisely but in some secret way known only to him which he does not bother to explain or describe.

3.8.2 Remarkably, the paradoxes of PI 109 are not yet exhausted:

And this description gets its illumination, i.e. its purpose, from the philosophical problems involved. These are, to be sure, not empirical but are solved by looking into the workings of our language, recognising indeed that we do so *in defiance of an urge to misunderstand them.* (PI 109)

The problems might not be empirical (how can a *problem* be empirical?), but the proposed solution certainly is:

What is common to all these? - Don't say: 'There *must* be something

common to them, otherwise they would not be called "games" - but
look and see whether there is anything common to them all...
As I've already said: Don't think but look and see!

(PI 66)

To look and see is the epitome of empiricism. How can Wittgenstein, in one paragraph, negate so many of the precepts he insists on elsewhere? The effect is so curious that I have tried to see it as deliberate; perhaps as Wittgenstein playing devil's advocate - like Goethe's Mephistopheles who is der Geist des Widerspruchs, the spirit of contradiction.¹ It is not impossible that Wittgenstein is enjoying an elaborate joke at the reader's expense. He might be setting us up for the disquiet caused by misunderstanding the forms of our language which he talks about in the next couple of paragraphs. He does warn us:

Let us ask ourselves: Why do we feel a grammatical joke to be *deep*? (And that is surely philosophical depth).

(PI 111)

Meaning is use and use can lead, he might be teaching us, to perfectly proper but contradictory meanings. It is up to us to ensure that we are not led astray by the surface of words. We must not assume that because a word has a particular meaning in one language-game, it necessarily has the same meaning in another. I am almost convinced by this argument and fully convinced by its conclusion. It certainly gives added point to:

Philosophy is a struggle against the way our language bewitches our wits.

(PI 109)

3.8.3 Becoming aware that different uses of *erklär-* are not mutually exclusive and can exist happily and simultaneously provided they are kept apart in different language-games has immediately a pronounced therapeutic effect and in the long term profound implications for my approach to *educat-*. Wittgenstein has consistently warned me against attempting to circumscribe or prejudge the use of a word and

cannot be blamed for my interpreting his use of a word in one context as reflecting on its use in another. There is no point in accusing Wittgenstein of opening the gate to the path which leads towards indeterminacy of meaning à la Quine.¹ He set off down this path at the beginning of the *Philosophical Investigations* and has not looked back. The meaning of a word is anchored sufficiently for any of the purposes to which we might put it by the particular language-game that is being played with it. It is of no great significance that I remain unclear what game Wittgenstein is playing in PI 109. I have learned my therapeutic lesson from it and must devise my own way of going forward with the words that are my special concern. The most promising route, it seems to me, is to try to identify the 'education' language-games which are being played in the samples in Appendix I. As to what it is I am to look for, Wittgenstein gives unusually clear guidance. It is family likenesses between one language-game and another:

... a complicated network of likenesses which overlap and intersect. Likenesses on both a large scale and a small.
(PI 66)

It will, I think, be advantageous to apply a category label to a sample, rather than herd the samples into categories. Samples in different categories but in the same context can then be sensibly dealt with; in particular, they are not deprived of mutual support - which might indeed be their chief determinant of meaning. I already have a list of categories which will serve for this purpose - the list of dictionary meanings of 'education' in §1.2.2. These now emerge as language-games that are played with 'education'; each occasion of playing an identifiable game - each use of a usage - should be categorisable under one of the twenty headings on the list. I shall include other education-words in the appropriate 'education' category. I expect that it will be

a matter of opinion sometimes as to which game is being played. It might be that the player is not sure or that I as spectator am not sure. Any other spectator might have his own interpretation of what is going on; he does not have to prefer mine, nor I his. I might find it necessary to indicate in cases of doubt which game seems to me primarily to be being played and which in an ancillary or related mode. The degree of agreement between the interpretations of different spectators might serve as a criterion of the perspicuity of the original.

3.8.4 A properly Wittgensteinian method of justifying the categorisation of the samples and so producing an overview of 'education' language-games is a problem. Any description necessarily involves the use of other words but elucidation of any kind is only second best to a perspicuous original. Clearly, the aim must be to depart as short a distance as possible from the original, bearing in mind that not to depart at all is unproductive and that my purpose is to elucidate the educat- element, not the whole of the speaker's utterance. It seems to me that the least interventionist approach would be a paraphrase which changed the original by the minimum necessary to reveal which 'education' language-game was being played. Obviously, the undertaking is perilous from a Wittgensteinian point of view. It might turn out to be non-Wittgensteinian if it transpires that I am *defining*, perhaps by generalising, what a word means and consequently implying what it must mean. If I do not understand how a word is being used on a given occasion, am I already over the border into non-Wittgensteinian territory? I am not sure how to resolve a case in which intra-linguistic evidence fails to make clear how a word is being used and, therefore, what it means. It might be necessary to invoke extra-

linguistic reference in order to resolve the impasse. It is conventionally assumed that a word or an expression has meaning only if it is seen to refer to something beyond itself. If there is nothing beyond the words I am faced with the prospect of the death of meaning. This was certainly not Wittgenstein's intention; on the contrary, his aim was to clarify meaning. But to describe or explain meaning in other words means inevitably, if explanations are to end somewhere, appealing to a third-party criterion; to an arbiter of the accuracy of the paraphrase. I see no other player for this role than communally sensible reality; another opinion is merely the gateway to an infinite regress. But how might I judge the correlation of my opinion, my paraphrase, with reality? Since I am attempting to follow Wittgenstein, I see no reason why I should not do as he does and rely on naive realism (cf. §3.3.6). I see no alternative to doing so but I am conscious that I am escaping from one flytrap by entering another. If I retrace my steps out of that one, I might leave most of the *Philosophical Investigations* behind. It might, of course, come to that, but for the moment I shall proceed circumspectly with paraphrasing the samples numbered in Appendix I, in each case changing the wording by the minimum necessary to elucidate the use and, therefore, the meaning of the educat- word which figures in it.

3.8.5 The first conclusion that I draw from my attempt, recorded in Appendix II, to paraphrase the samples of 'education' language-games, is that some of the educat- elements will not paraphrase. The educat- word is a member of a group of which the meaning is the meaning of the group as a whole, not the meanings of the separate words added together. Jespersen distinguishes formulas and free expressions.

A formula (e.g. How do you do?) can be analysed and shown to consist of several words but it is felt to be and is handled as a unit which may mean something quite different from the meaning of its component words taken separately. Nothing can be changed in a formula without destroying the character of the formula. 'How did you do?' or 'How do they do?' changes more than just the tense of the verb or the person of the subject pronoun. A free expression is created on the spur of the moment according to a certain pattern which has become imprinted on the speaker's unconscious as a result of recurrent linguistic experiences. The sentence pattern is a speech habit; the speaker inserts into the pattern words which meet his immediate need for expression. In general, the grammatical contexts of the *educat-* samples seem to be free expressions. Clearly, however, many of them have the character of formula. They are unlike a Jespersen formula in that they are not organic growths within the natural language. They have been created for some ad hoc purpose - perhaps as the name of an institution or an office. But once it has been created, the synthetic formula assumes the characteristics of a natural formula. Its composition is immutable; meaning attaches to the formula as a whole and is not a function of the separate words. It is particularly striking that the *educat-* word which figures in it need carry no distinctively *educat-* connotation. The formula as a whole names an identifiable phenomenon of the real world (naively interpreted) but what it names is not the sum of what its constituent words name. The effect is pure Wittgenstein: The formula, as context, bestows meaning on the *educat-* word used in it, but only as part of the total meaning of the formula; the formula acquires meaning from the context in which it is used, not from the *educat-* word used in it. The formula 'the education system' is an instructive example. We

talk about the education system of states as disparate as Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, Scotland, Australia and Ancient Sparta, and the meaning of 'education system' shifts with the context. Talk about education systems takes the form of a family of language-games; error arises from assuming that the use of the word 'education' in one game is analogous to its use in any other. Philosophical agonising over whether it is proper to apply the term 'education' to what a totalitarian state does to its young citizens is a misconception of the cart before horse variety. In 'the education system of...' the word 'education' is a recipient, not a donor, of meaning. There is no philosophical problem - an archetypally Wittgensteinian escape from the flytrap. There is not even a grammatical *problem*, merely a grammatical usage.

3.8.6 Since a formula is an irreducible unit of meaning, it might be thought appropriate to designate it by the linguistic term 'morpheme' (cf. §2.5.18 & §3.5.14). But to Wittgenstein all statements, even free expressions, are in a sense morphemes in that their meaning is not divisible into the meanings of their constituent words. For this reason I prefer to follow Jespersen's usage, bearing in mind the distinction between an organically grown formula and the species generated around an *educat-* word. Formulas belong typically to the category of use identified by OED as 'attrib. and Comb.'. 'Attributive' indicates that the *educat-* word is being used adjectivally; both 'education' and 'educational' are commonly used in this role, although in a formula it amounts to no more than a syntactical formality. A truly adjectival role is revealed when the *educat-* word can be paraphrased by means of some other adjective. I have tried to distinguish the two roles in Appendix II by including all formula-type

adjectival uses of educat-, together with uses in combinations, in category 12, and distributing free expression-type uses among the other categories as seems appropriate. Neither 'attrib.' nor 'Comb.' identifies any referential meaning for the educat- word. In a formula it has no discrete meaning; its role is analogous to that of a letter in a word.

3.8.7 The second conclusion which I draw from Appendix II is that educat- words in general and 'education' in particular are totally expendable in the type of discourse represented by the examples in Appendix I. They disappear in paraphrase and never have discrete meaning in formula. In paraphrase there is evidently no difficulty over finding free expressions with which to replace them, generally with clarification of the sense. In a formula the presence of an educat- word is arbitrary in that it is the result of considerations other than those inherent in the word itself. To take a couple of examples: It makes no difference to the referent directly or necessarily whether it is styled 'college of education' or 'teacher training college'; 'physical education' or 'physical training'; 'religious education' or 'religious instruction'¹. If one differs from another it is because the one differs from the other, not because it is called something different. Of course, perceptions *might* change with change of name and lead to differences in procedure, but equally they might not, any more than changing the label on a box exerts any effect on the contents.² The label might be changed in the hope of encouraging others to change the contents (so 'sex instruction' became 'sex education'); or as a euphemism because the existing label was felt to be derogatory (the formula 'special education' made not a whit of difference to the

treatment accorded to the clients of 'education of the handicapped'). In any case, there is no 'it' that is education; there are only activities in which people might engage or states which people might assume, all of which need identifying labels so that they can be talked about. If the activities cease or the states fail to materialise, education ceases to exist - not that it existed in the first place. The label is not the thing itself, and since there is no thing the label is all we have. There is only the way we use the word 'education' in the English language, and it is a misnomer to call any of these uses a label since there is nothing to label, not even some mysterious pseudo-entity of which we might have or acquire (or lose? cf. Austin [2] 10) a concept. Wittgenstein is surely right: The meaning of 'education' is not what it refers to, because there is nothing for it to refer to, but how it is used in the language. Not even the word is indispensable, except in one case, when the word itself is being addressed: What is the meaning of the word 'education'?

3.8.8 It is interesting that this indispensable use is, of all uses, the least revelatory of the meaning of the word. The question has no logical answer; that is to say, there is no answer intrinsic to the question. It has no a priori answer, or if it has we have no a priori sense with which to perceive it. To answer that its meaning is its use is not an answer but another question: How is it used? In answering that question, the word becomes readily expendable - necessarily expendable, since the one word of least use in explaining/describing how it is used is the word itself. I can, therefore, leave open with sceptical equanimity the question whether any other context might appear in which 'education' was indispensable - any context, that is to say,

which answered rather than posed or implied the question.¹ If one should appear which identified an indisputable referent, then the true meaning of 'education' would stand revealed. Such an outcome would, of course, be Wittgensteinian of the *Tractatus*, not of the *Philosophical Investigations*. As far as the latter is concerned, education appears to be one of the castles in the air (Luftgebäude, PI 118) due for demolition in a linguistic ground-clearing exercise.

3.8.9 My third major conclusion is that 'educatee' has no part to play in the elucidation of the uses of educat- words. 'Educatee' did not figure in Appendix I either, but judgement could reasonably be postponed at that stage since 'educatee' is not a word which is in common use in the language. But when no synonymous expression appears in Appendix II, it is time to raise again the question raised in §2.4.1. The one educat- word on which the existence of all the others depends - semantically, of course, not grammatically - does not appear in the samples in either their original form or in paraphrase. This does not, of course, imply that that it might not appear in a future continuation of the random sampling which led to Appendix I, but I should be disingenuous if I said I thought it likely. The 'education' language-games sampled in Appendix I are, in the main, schooling language-games - a reflection of the standard connotation of the word in common parlance.¹ Any reference which might lead in the direction of 'educatee' will, therefore, use terms appropriate to the recipient of schooling e.g. 'student' (in an Australian context); 'pupil' (if the context is one of the education systems of the United Kingdom); 'child' (if a wider connotation than formal instruction is intended).

3.8.10 It is clear that Appendix II supports Wittgenstein's view that samples of usage are linguistic phenomena. This is plain from the ease with which uses of *educat-* can be paraphrased or read as elements in a formula. These are linguistic activities as far as *educat-* is concerned, though I must maintain, because I cannot see how to dispense with every criterion, that I perform them against the assumption, at however many removes, of some ultimate grounding in reality. Quine, if I understand him correctly, would dispute this, relying on the 'cognitive equivalence' of different forms of words. I don't see how this would work in the absence of a common something to have cognition of, and until I do I shall continue in the belief that an acceptance of reality is necessarily invoked in order to elucidate meaning-in-other-words. I am not, of course, claiming knowledge of education. The knowledge which enables me to think, justifiably or not, that I can paraphrase *educat-* is not knowledge of education but (assumed) knowledge of phenomena of the real world, describable and described in language appropriate to them. It is this language which carries the paraphrase of the 'education' usage. Nowhere in this process does education come under consideration; I am as far off as ever from knowing education. 'Education' is a word; the meaning of the word is its use *in* the language, and this use can be expressed in other words. Either the whole process never moves beyond the symbol or, to the extent that words can have a referential meaning, the words which do so in my paraphrases are the paraphrasing, not the paraphrased. The ostensibly complex unknown is described in terms of the ostensibly simple known. Such simples are not the metaphysical simples of the *Tractatus*, but certain objects (using the word in the widest sense to denote any phenomenon perceptible to the senses) and their language symbols which, for the purposes of a particular language-game,

I assume require no further analysis - an explanation which does not stop somewhere is no explanation. The net result is that 'education' is either paraphrased out of existence or is left with a question mark - the state in which it started.

3.8.11 One conclusion is, evidently, that 'education' is a shorthand substitute for utterances that would otherwise necessitate periphrasis. All 'educational' utterances, I might argue, are expressible in other words. This could not be said of *all* utterances; some must consist of quasi-logical simples, otherwise communication would be impossible. 'Chair' or 'red' cannot be paraphrased without losing the sense which the word was created to carry; 'education' does not carry such a definitive sense - hence it must be explained. In short, 'education' has no meaning. The same conclusion would be reached via the purely Wittgensteinian approach of 'meaning is use'. If a particular sample of use is perspicuous, paraphrase is not necessary, but meaning still resides in the use, not in a referent. It was not to be expected that a method based on the *Philosophical Investigations* would educe a freestanding meaning for 'education'. Philosophy leaves everything as it is, and how things are is how the word is used in the language. It is not for the philosopher to dig deeper than that. Once I have turned over the topsoil I strike bedrock and with a mere spade I *cannot* dig deeper. I might nevertheless, even in Wittgensteinian terms, attempt to do something useful with the soil that I have turned over; plantings suited to the terrain might bear fruit.

4 'Education' beyond Wittgenstein

4.1.1 In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein proposes the principle that, in order to be able to recognise a limit, one must be able to go beyond the limit and see it from both sides. Otherwise one does not know that the limit has been reached (cf. §2.5.18). It seems to me that I now need to apply this principle to my analysis of 'education' based on the *Philosophical Investigations*. The question is whether the view of philosophy projected in the *Philosophical Investigations* has taken me as far as it can; whether I have reached a limit of clarification of 'education' which Wittgenstein would regard as the limit, bearing in mind that Wittgenstein is, in the main, concerned with general principles and that, when it comes to the application of those principles, the limit of possible application seems to be reached remarkably quickly (cf. §3.7.5). There appears to be no problem over identifying a limit for the clarification of meaning according to the *Philosophical Investigations*. 'The meaning of a word is its use in the language' imposes its own limit - the limits of language. The ostensible disadvantage of accepting that this is the limit is that I shall be unable to achieve my aim of clarifying what education *is*. For that purpose, 'meaning is use' is sterile if it can offer no more than a descriptive account of how *words* are used. All that can be achieved by that route is clarification of the use. I shall not get beyond the word and it was with the word that I started. I claim no virtue for Appendix II as it stands, but it does exemplify a method which might clarify how the word 'education' *is used* in English. It tells me nothing about any referent that the word might have beyond the language,

and seems, indeed, to deny that it has one, since the word itself disappears before a referent comes into view. The samples report how the word has been used on occasion. It is clear that the use of the word has taken place in the world. Its use, at least, is a phenomenon of reality, naively interpreted, and its use, taking Wittgenstein's point, belongs to a way of life, to social customs and conventions. But the most that is implied about the world is that under certain circumstances the word is used in certain ways by people, speakers of English, using the language. I am told nothing about what the user is referring to, or thinks he is referring to, when he uses the word. One possible answer, bearing in mind the apparent dispensability of the word, is: Nothing. There could be something only if an irreplaceable word referred to something inexpressible in other words. But the maximum value of the word in my examples appears to be as an element in utterances which have a use and therefore a meaning as a whole; the word itself has no meaning.

4.1.2 This account is, perhaps, plausible as far as it goes but it seems to me that it does not go far enough in either of two directions:

(i) It underplays the importance of existing links between the word and referents other than some putative, definitive referent that has proved impossible to unearth, and does not exhaust the possibility of other links. I am prepared to concede that there is no generic difference between *talk* about unicorns and *talk* about rhinoceroses. That does not mean that unicorns fall into the same category as rhinoceroses. To argue so would be to put everything that can be talked about into the one category - which it is certainly

possible but quite unhelpful to do. This is akin to the *Tractatus* principle that language as a whole pictures the world as a whole and the limits of rational discourse set the limits of the world. There still needs to be some method, for which the *Tractatus* suggests one possibility, of linking the detail of the picture with the detail of what is pictured. The later Wittgenstein thinks that no method is necessary, and consistently and naively links word and referent.

(ii) It offers no explanation why a particular word did, or could, come to have an elemental use within a wider context of use in free expressions. It implies that current use has no history. But the word has not suddenly sprung fully armed from the ground and it would be nonsense to suggest that some other word was being used on an occasion when 'education' was, in fact, being used. 'Education' *is used*; 'education' *language-games are played*.¹ The sign at least is a phenomenon of the physical world and needs to be accounted for as such.

4.1.3 The word 'education' has come from somewhere; its use has developed into what it is now but, indeterminate as it is, it has never been totally incoherent or arbitrary - if it had been it would not have survived. The word carries a core, or at least a sufficient residue, of referential or catalytic meaning, which enables me to make such sense as I do make of utterances in which it figures - both my own and other people's. I might be misled on any given occasion in thinking that this core meaning is operative but however out of focus the concept of education may be, it remains essentially selective and to that extent precise against the indeterminate background of language as a whole (cf. PI 68ff.). 'Education' narrows the field of discourse; it must, therefore, have some significance. However diffuse the uses of

'education' are, they do not have available to them the total spectrum of the possible uses of all words. The word is limited in meaning because the contexts in which it can sensibly be used are limited even though they are not clearly defined. The word does exhale an atmosphere of meaning - which explains why its meaning is both indeterminate and undeniable. Wittgenstein accepts this (PI 139-142) and stresses that meaning is a matter of social convention. An important element in how a word is used is how its use has been learned (PI 77). A language-game is playable only because there is a socially accepted, socially acquired rule for playing that game; that does not mean that there is in general use a rule for playing a language-game with the core meaning of the word or, on the other hand, that one could not be discovered or invented.

4.1.4 One way out of the flytrap might be to take Wittgenstein at his word; to agree that once the topsoil has been turned over and bedrock struck, philosophy can do no more. That does not necessarily imply that nothing more can be done. Philosophy can do no more than exorcise the spell of language over thinking by clarifying the language and, consequently, the thinking. I assume for the sake of argument that my approach via Appendix II has clarified the education- vocabulary to the stage at which it no longer need bewitch my thinking about education. The question then remains: What is this education that these examples purport to be talking about? Can it be identified with - does it ever, for example, label - any element in the physical world, the existence of which Wittgenstein not merely naively accepts but regards as an indispensable basis for language? The answer, I might now infer, has nothing to do with philosophy because philosophy, being confined to language, has nothing further to contribute. I have reached the limit

of philosophy as Wittgenstein sees it and to show that it is a limit I step across and look at it from the other side. I can step across any limit only if there is somewhere to go on the other side; If I don't know whether there is anything on the other side I can only follow Wittgenstein's precept and look and see.

4.1.5 Where the limit lies is plain enough in theory; it must be the demarcation of language and reality. In the *Tractatus*, two such limits are postulated:

(i) The limit of language as a whole which is the limit of rational discourse and the limit of the world beyond which lies what cannot be expressed in language i.e. anything metaphysical such as ethics, aesthetics, value judgements.

(ii) The limit between language reduced to elementary sentences and the circumstances which they picture. Neither is the other although they are logically related to each other. The boundary between them resembles less a line of demarcation than a zone of indeterminate nature lying between parallel tracks - perhaps like a railway track the rails of which are at all times both linked and kept apart by the logical framework of the sleepers but linked to some purpose only whilst a train is using them.

Limit (i) no longer applies under the *Philosophical Investigations*. No topic, metaphysical or not, is barred. If words are used in ethical discourse, for example, then they are so used and their use is their meaning. But, as I have seen, this concession does not amount to much if it merely deposits me in the morass of language. It is clearly limit (ii) that I need to transcend and in order to do so I must leave philosophy behind and look for manifestations identifiable as education

in the world.

4.1.6 The investigation of education becomes in consequence the investigation of states of affairs. I am not suggesting that there are educational states of affairs to be investigated; only that if there are then there are and since I am taking Wittgenstein at his word, I should look and see whether there are. There might be in this the makings of an escape from the trap of use co-extensive with language. Either education is a purely linguistic phenomenon - in which case elucidation along the lines of Appendix II might well be the end of the matter - or 'education' has a referent, or referents, in reality and my proper course of action is to try to say what it is or they are. There is no impediment to this procedure in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Wittgenstein assumes that it is perfectly proper to investigate what there is; he just thinks that such investigation is not philosophy. It is science (*Wissenschaft*), bearing in mind that '*Wissenschaft*' covers knowledge of any kind and that the narrower use of 'science' in everyday English is covered in German by '*Naturwissenschaft*'. The important point is that Wittgenstein accepts the existence of the commonsense world. He even admits to being interested in the correlation between concepts and very general facts of nature - particularly those facts which tend not to strike us because they are so general. But he disclaims interest in the possible causes of concept-formation, giving as his reason:

... we are not pursuing natural science; not even natural history - since we can, of course, even fabricate the natural-historical to suit our purposes. (PI II xii)

There could be no clearer indication that Wittgenstein is interested, not in what is said, but in how it is said; for him the medium is the

message (cf. §3.4.4). At the same time he accepts the relevance for the non-philosopher of investigating what there is. In short, the clarification of what education is said to be is philosophy; the clarification of what it is is science.

4.1.7 Wittgenstein's acceptance of reality might not amount to much if the only tool I possess in order to dissect the reality of education is language. I simply come full circle back to the dispensability and consequent meaninglessness of education. Unless the language-tool can be adapted to cut in a *meta-Philosophical Investigations* manner? One possibility might be to show that the 'education' language family is not a true Wittgensteinian language family. Extrapolating from Wittgenstein's family of games, it might be assumed that the members of the 'education' language family share recurring traits but nothing in common. But supposing they do have something in common, what might it be? Clearly, any such pervasive element could not be the total of each meaning in the family of meanings. Since discrete meanings do exist, it could be only an element. By the same token I am not dealing with a traditional universal or concept. I am still with Wittgenstein to the extent of accepting the individuality of the members of the family; they are themselves, not just family members. What I am looking for is an element which is intrinsic to every member of the education family and therefore to the family as a whole. Accepting that it cannot be the totality of the family, there is no reason why it should not be the totality of one member of the family - as it were one particular use in a family of uses such that, if that use did not exist, none of the others could either. There might be a hierarchy of uses based on necessity of use or perhaps

on the history of use. Looking for the head of this hierarchy might equate with looking for an occasion when it was necessary to use 'education' rather than any other word. This would imply that the rules of language-games are not of equal validity. Within each game they are; it is a fundamental tenet of the *Philosophical Investigations* that the rules of one language-game do not apply in any other. But might the playing of one game be a rule for the playing of another? all the others? To say with Wittgenstein 'game y is played' is, perhaps, not enough. I want to ask: How is it possible to play game y? Does its playing depend on the playing of game x? Does game x have to be played as a precursor to every playing of game y? - as a coin-tossing game is played as a precursor to a number of other games. Or is game x perhaps a criterion for testing whether some other game is being played,¹ as a game of cricket, or even a game of cards, cannot be played in default of the rules of the 'that's not cricket' game. Cheating is not playing the game, or any game, unless cheating is one of the rules of the game - war, say, or politics. But the account, even of a dishonest game, must be honest.

4.1.8 'Necessary game' threatens to be a flytrap which I should do well to avoid. No game is necessary; no language-game is necessary, since language itself is not necessary. I might try a different angle of approach to the necessary element in 'education' language-games. Wittgenstein's acceptance of reality colours all his thinking in the *Philosophical Investigations*; it is not a concession which has to be wrung out of him. It is introduced in PI 1 with the story of the five red apples and is thereafter never very far away. It is obvious that there are no apples in the pages of his book; it is equally obvious that

the words would have no meaning if I did not know what it was to experience five red apples. What gives the words 'five red apples' meaning is the possibility that on a given occasion they could refer to a phenomenon perceptible to the senses. This is the *Tractatus* position and Wittgenstein does not seem to have departed significantly from it. Any difference lies in the level at which the reference takes place, not in the principle of reference. The early Wittgenstein states, the later Wittgenstein implies, that words name objects, though the former doesn't know what an object is and the latter apparently disclaims the responsibility of speculating. Even in the *Tractatus* a word which is not used is described as meaningless¹ (T 3.328) and the concept is, of course, a central theme of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Consequently, when Wittgenstein declares that as far as the meaning of the word 'five' is concerned:

No such thing was under discussion here; only how the word 'five' is used. (PI 1)

it is clear that its use is to symbolise a phenomenon of reality. In Wittgenstein's example, the fiveness belongs to the group of apples, whether they are real or merely intentionally existent (cf. §2.5.9), not to the language. Certainly the word 'five' belongs to the symbol but it would be nonsensical to maintain that the sense of five proceeds no further than the symbol. If it does not, how can I detect the difference between five apples and six apples or between either and no apples at all? Putnam makes the point inelegantly but forcefully:

... 'meanings' just ain't in the *head*!
(Putnam [1] 227)

Of course I can juggle with meanings in my head but I must have learned the meanings first, perhaps by a suitable combination of ostension, description and definition. It seems reasonable to suppose that, if the

meanings are not clear, I might make some attempt to clarify them in my head. But I am not creating new meanings and even my clarified meanings will be no use for communicating with others until they have been discussed in mutually agreed language and accorded some measure of public validity.

4.1.9 The point is developed explicitly by Wittgenstein as one of the major themes of the *Philosophical Investigations*. His aim is to refute the possibility of a private language, of a set of symbols which nobody else *could* learn. To know directly the contents of another's mind is impossible. The only way we can acquire such knowledge is through communication by means of language. To communicate effectively, language must have a criterion in commonly observable phenomena; these can only be phenomena of the physical world. This is not to imply that communication need be or ever could be precise. Ayer argues that the problem involved in endowing any sign with meaning is no less in the cases where the object for which the sign is supposed to stand is public than in the cases where it is private (Ayer [6]). But problematical or not, a relationship must hold between symbol and object symbolised; the symbol cannot stand alone in perpetuity. The referent of the symbol need not be a direct referent in reality; it might be another symbol or it might be putative reality, possible or not. But ultimately there must be, as Ayer says and Wittgenstein agrees, something that is directly recognised - otherwise there will be no halt to explanations and a descent into an infinite regress (PI 1; Ayer [6] 256). The recognition, it seems to me, must be of a state of affairs; from the language point of view, semantic, not syntactic. If only the syntax is honoured, nonsense results.¹

4.1.10 Having established, I hope, that 'education' language-games must have referential meaning at however many removes in order to have any meaning at all and that I am not abandoning Wittgenstein in following this line, I can return to the point which I rather left hanging in §4.1.5. Is there a necessary element in the circumstances covered by 'education' language-games which might serve as a departure point for ordering them in some sort of hierarchy? In one sense of 'necessary' I have been here before: If 'necessary' means 'logically necessary', this is the *Tractatus* approach; the *sine qua non* of education is someone to be educated (EE not ET) - the educatee. In another sense of 'necessary' I can take my stand on the *Philosophical Investigations*: Meaning is not a property of objects but a matter of social convention; but if an 'education' language-game is played then it *is played*.¹ It is a matter of observation that someone to be educated (either EE or ET) is assumed explicitly or implicitly in the 'education' language-games that are commonly played. The educatee does not have the equivalent centrality of meaning in all of them, but that is my point: There is a hierarchy of language-games based on the relative importance of the role of 'educatee' in each. For example, teachers playing a 'learning' language-game and teachers playing an 'industrial relations' language-game are playing two socially recognised 'education' language-games but it is a matter of fact that the former is more directly influenced by the educatee than the latter - although the interests of learners will no doubt be invoked in the latter for the purposes of propaganda. The *Philosophical Investigations* does not recognise hierarchies of language-games. But it does recognise description of language-games - insists upon it in fact. Description alone will reveal the comparative weight of the educatee and other elements within the

reference of any given language-game.² It would then be perverse, in my view, not to describe 'education' language-games overall and a comparison of one with another becomes unavoidable. In short, I don't have to choose between Wittgenstein's early semantic logic and his later grammatical logic. They both tend in the same direction, which happens to be the direction in which I want to go - towards the elucidation of the meaning of a word among words. In any case, if they really were as different as they are commonly assumed to be, they would belong to different categories and would be not merely not mutually exclusive but would require both to be taken into account if a full picture was to emerge.

4.1.11 The drift of my argument is towards using the explicit stance on reality of the *Tractatus* to underpin the implicit stance of the *Philosophical Investigations*. If they were radically different, either might need radical reshaping in order to accommodate the other. In fact I anticipate little difficulty; the relationship between the two, it seems to me, is that of two viewpoints, not two views. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein stands, as it were, outside language and looks in; in the *Philosophical Investigations* he stands inside language and looks around. The result is variant perspectives on the same object. The *Tractatus* claims that language is part of and no less complicated than the human organism; this is the biological version of Wittgenstein's later sociological view that language is a way of life - the micro and the macro view; the individual and society.¹ My *Tractatus* approach seeks to add 'educatee' language-games to the 'educator' language-games that are commonly played; together they might offer a more complete picture of 'education' language-games. In effect I am postulating the

Tractatus procedure of linking language and reality, implemented at the level of the *Philosophical Investigations* - that is to say, in the language as it is, not in some fictitious concoction of elementary sentences; accepting the playing of language-games but seeing them played in and with reality and using them to elucidate the reality implicated in each. A key element in the procedure will be the playing of the 'educatee' language-games which I learned to play through following the *Tractatus*. It seems to me undeniable that I play these games and that others can play them if they wish; they are not played in some private language of my own. What remains debatable is whether others are required to play them, logically or sociologically, if they want to play 'education' language-games at all. The logic is synthetic a priori, not tautological, and must therefore be discounted in a Wittgensteinian context of an ostensibly *Tractatus* type - discounted, that is to say, as far as the language is concerned. Even in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein does not build his cosmography on tautology - the world is whatever it happens contingently to be. So it is in the *Philosophical Investigations* also, and this explains why a synthesis of Wittgenstein's early and later views of how the world is need do no violence to either. What does ostensibly change is his view of how language relates to the world. The later Wittgenstein sees no need to analyse language before its relation to circumstance becomes evident. Language-games are played; logic then demands that if a language-game is played, it *is played*. Language is a way of life; language-games are social habits. Language-games which *are played* have, therefore, their niche in society, their recognised role which bestows upon them their social status. 'Educatee' language-games are parvenus; upstarts whose claim to recognition might not be accepted in polite society. The key philosophical question which

might open the door to a synthesised view of the two Wittgensteins is, therefore, appropriately paraphrased, the question which Wittgenstein asks in PI 125 (cf. §3.5.9): What is the social status of 'educatee' language-games?

4.2.1 According to the *Philosophical Investigations*, language is a social activity. The community has its rules for using language which are not consciously applied but go without saying (selbstverständlich; PI 238). They are habits,¹ usages (Gebräuche), institutions (PI 199). Rules are followed blindly (PI 219); all I can say by way of justifying my obeying a rule is that I simply do it (PI 217). A given language-game *is played* (PI 654); it is not a matter of explaining a language-game empirically but of making it manifest that it is played (PI 655).² Nevertheless, no rule is either absolute or eternal; old language-games die and new ones are born (PI 18).³ The rules of 'education' language-games can change⁴ - which is not to say that they are changed or are changeable by any third party unilaterally. The rules of an 'education' language-game, as of any language-game, are not formulated ad hoc. They emerge as social customs and change as customs change. If it is not manifest, and cannot be made manifest, that 'educatee' language-games are played, then their social status is questionable. If they are not played, if they are not social language habits, they have no status in society. If they are played, even if their playing is not manifest, they are played and their place in the social scheme of things is secure as long as they continue to be played.

4.2.2 According to Wittgenstein, the rules of language-games are never private. The social status of any language-game depends on the availability of public criteria. There is no direct access to minds; public criteria must be based on communally observable phenomena.

This does not imply a determinate form for every specimen of a given phenomenon:

Someone shows me various leaves and says 'That's called "leaf"'. I acquire a concept of leaf-form, a picture of it in my mind. But what, then, does the picture of a leaf look like which shows no determinate form but 'that which is common to all leaf-forms'? what shade is the 'pattern in my mind' of the colour green - of that which is common to all shades of green?

(PI 73)

It seems to me that Wittgenstein has come full circle back to his *Tractatus* view of objects - at least as I interpreted it in §2.2.9ff. 'Leaf' or 'green' names a logical object which manifests itself as mundane objects; each needs the other, though the first is never more than symbol and the second never merely symbol but always symbol plus symbolised. In terms of the *Philosophical Investigations*, this is language-game and occasions when the language-game is played (cf. § 3.3.8ff.). The 'leaf' language-game has the backing, actual or potential, of the object leaf; its rule is the possibility of reference to an empirically observable object, the myriad mundane manifestations of which have in common only their common logical objectivity as specimens of leaf. So with educatee and the 'educatee' language-game; individual educatees can be as different one from the other as leaves, but they must all have educateeness in common and educateeness must be common to all. Clearly, educateeness cannot be what some educatee is not; since 'educatee' is logically necessary to educat-, the same is true of education and educatedness, the criteria for which must be applicable to every educatee. That is why I identified educateeness with intentionality (see §2.5.9ff.) and educatedness with the state of the educatee's intentionality, criteria which are applicable to every educatee.

4.2.3 'Necessary game' (cf. §4.1.8) is now seen not to be a flytrap, at least within the ambit of 'education' language-games. Educatee, I have argued, is necessary to sapiens even if not to homo; homo sapiens is necessary to human society. 'Educatee' language-games are, accordingly, assured of social status by the indispensability of educatees to society. Indispensability is no criterion of social rank, however, or of exclusivity, or even of survival beyond a niche in history. 'Education' language-games are played which take little or no account of the educatee - I suggest examples in due course - but they could not now be played if 'educatee' language-games had not been played originally. In turn, the playing of 'educatee' language-games would not have been possible if circumstances had not appeared in which educatee the object was concatenated with other objects. 'Educatee' language-games must still be the starting point for an account of 'education' language-games, however, because 'educatee' remains the logical *sine qua non* of educat- words; logic is not subject to history.¹ Also, some explanation is called for as to how it is possible to play any nominally education-based language-game which takes no account of the logical core of the concept.

4.2.4 I owe the centrality of 'educatee' to the *Tractatus*; continuing to follow its lead, I should look for tautological expressions based on 'educatee' and true by virtue of the interrelationship of their constituent terms. Such can be found e.g. 'No educatee is the same as any other educatee' or, if 'same as' is thought to be too problematical, 'Every educatee is what it is and not some other thing'. This statement is true and would still be true if educatee was a symbol for custard pie or Rembrandt painting. If it is taken to be a symbol for pupil, a

proposition emerges of far-reaching consequence for both the theory of schooling and the philosophy of education. As far as the theory of schooling is concerned, it implies that one might, if one so desired, seek to achieve compatibility with the individual pupil by individualising the curriculum. As far as the philosophy of education is concerned, it says that one has no choice in the matter. Whatever one does with the curriculum, its effect will be individualised by the individual pupil. A philosophy of education could be built on such a foundation but it would not necessarily take me beyond 'educatee' to the other language-games that *are played* with educat- words. I went some way down this road with my attempt to analyse educatee as Wittgensteinian object but abandoned the tautological approach because of its pretence that the world does not exist. Since I was attempting to follow the *Tractatus*, this entailed also abandoning any pretension to logically necessary meaning. I don't think, however, that the consequences for my argument are severe. Wittgenstein denies that there are synthetic a priori truths, in Kant's terms; that there can be logically necessary consequences of a contingent premiss. This is of a piece with his contention that belief in the causal nexus is superstition (T 5.1361). I am happy to go along with Hume and look for relations into which habitual experience persuades me that the educatee, albeit not necessarily, *does* enter:

The idea of cause and effect is derived from experience, which presenting us with certain objects constantly conjoined with each other, produces such a habit of surveying them in that relation, that we cannot without a sensible violence survey them in any other.
(Hume 175)

4.2.5 The relation between educatee and learner is the one which, preeminently, I could not see rationally being severed. It seems

inconceivable to me that the educatee could fail to be a learner. The educatee is more than a learner in that he maintains an active as well as a passive relationship to the world, and the two are, consequently, not coterminous. But the educatee, whether necessarily or by definition but in either case as a matter of fact, undergoes a continual change of state, physiologically as homo and intellectually as sapiens - though, of course, the two are not separate but are indissoluble aspects of the one organism; there is no ghost in the machine. The 'education' language-game in which educatee is spoken of as learner explicates in the main how change of state comes about in the educatee. It does not explain why the educatee has an urge, which varies from one to another, to seek a change of state through learning. I do not mean motivation to learn in any particular instance but the general urge to develop, through learning, a relationship with the world. An explanation of this might be a theory of what education, holistically, is. The trend of my reasoning has been towards denying the possibility of treating education holistically. Clearly, it is impossible to treat 'education' in any way as the designation of a single symbol. But that need not preclude separating those language-games which treat of a putative object from those which are incapable of other than symbolic reference and reserving 'education' as the name of one or the other. If the former was selected, education could be given a solid base in manifestations of the physical world such as teachers and pupils, bricks and mortar, hardware and software, but the choice would have to fall on the latter if traditional notions of education were not to be lost sight of. A quasi-holistic education might then begin to emerge, though I admit that its existence would be likely to be no more than grammatical. It might nevertheless symbolise characteristics or properties which become manifest through

sense-perceptible phenomena. I might say: What the educatee has by virtue of being educated is X; if I can suggest a value for X, I might have a value for education. It has to be something which every educatee has; any attribute which one has and another has not is excluded by definition. Moreover, unless I intend to stipulate that educatees, unlike learners, begin only at a certain age (what age could that conceivably be?), it has to be possessed by every educatee from cradle to grave and be capable of emerging in as many manifestations as there are educatees.

4.2.6 I attempted to develop something along these lines in §2.4.11ff. as the individual's Realität in its relation to the Wirklichkeit of the world. I think that my development of the idea was flawed by the necessity, ex hypothesi, to follow the *Tractatus* as closely as possible. I had no real answer to the scorn poured by Ayer on Wittgenstein's metaphysical I (§2.5.7). The scorn has nothing to stick to if the ambience is not reality but a language-game. I cease to talk about a real metaphysical I, which is a nonsense, and play a language-game which attempts to explicate the inexplicable by means of symbols. A change of vocabulary and I am playing the essentially similar game of intentionality - the externalising of states of mind in, for example, perception, judgement, approval or disapproval. Learning can cover only the history of the educatee. Intentionality covers his future - not, of course, in descriptive or even in prescriptive terms, but to the extent that his future depends on his interaction with his world. Education which covers only the past is dead. Education which covers both the educatee's potential for reacting with his environment and his potential for acting upon it has a living role to play until it

too passes into history and is replaced by a new education. Education as the intentionality of the individual is both state and flux (cf. §2.4.7). To give an account of intentionality in its past, present and future modes, a language-game is needed which I call EE - education of the educatee. There is, of course, no such thing as EE. I am not sure that there are even educatees. There are human beings who might properly be called 'educatees' in the course of certain language-games. But the game of EE does not exist any more than the game of cricket exists. There is only the playing of a game on a given occasion - of EE as of cricket - and the playing of any one is identifiable by the rules which are being observed. In short, the 'educatee' language-game, for all its apparent grounding in reality, turns out to be no more substantial than any other language-game. The *Tractatus* approach clarifies language, as Wittgenstein intended it should, but only through clarification within the language and not by forging a direct link between language and reality. All that I can sensibly (in Hume's sense) know is the human being. I then play language-games in order to explicate my more or less rational surmises about human beings. Of these language-games, EE played as intentionality seems to me to offer the best possibility of a plausible account of educatee as the central notion of educat-.

4.2.7 The educatedness of the educatee, whether it is viewed as the state of his intentionality or otherwise, is necessarily forward-looking as long as the educatee lives. It determines how the organism will respond to and seek to control its environment; it is a determinant of response to future experience and a contributor to future states of educatedness. The change of state in the educatee which has come about

following the interaction of past states and past experiences is over and done with as far as the process of change is concerned.¹ In order to give an account of it I must play a different 'education' language-game which I shall call EL. This is a necessary game, needed to cover the process, or whatever, which must have taken place for the educatee to have undergone a change of state. The process is commonly recognised in the language by the name 'education' or, with more specific implications, 'learning'. There is a tendency to confuse process and product: learning with learnedness or educatedness.² There is also a tendency to equate learning with change of behaviour in the learner. I wish to avoid these tendencies and see learning as no more than a particular mode of linguistic symbolism; a language-game; what might be called metaphorically a 'logical abstraction' from certain statements. It is never anything more than an abstraction; 'learning' has no objective referent. It is merely a form of words to say that learning must have taken place because the educatee has changed - a convenient form of words which I shall continue to use; a language-game which I shall continue to play, mindful that there is no such thing as learning. One of the consequences of regarding learning as something substantial is the tendency to split it up into separate chunks, any one of which might be thought to exert a discrete, perhaps even an identifiable, effect upon the educatee. This strikes me as an impossible notion; learning never operates in a vacuum but only as an element added to the educatee's current educational (EE) state. The learning that must have taken place is, therefore, not identifiable. It might be thought that, consequently, nothing can be said about it, but this is not so. Learning necessarily implies a learner; there are a number of true statements that can be made about the learner and therefore about

learning. I made such of them as occurred to me in §2.4.4 by way of identifying necessary characteristics of the educatee as learner, noting some of them for the sake of grammatical convenience as characteristics of learning. The link between 'learner' and 'learning' as far as EL is concerned - though not necessarily in the games played in the language at large - is grammatical, and the link between learner and educatee is necessary by definition.

4.2.8 It is clear that whatever language-game one plays, an account of the learning that has taken place will logically exclude any mention of the learning which might have but did not in fact take place. I need an 'education' language-game in which to talk about the total potential learning available to the learner out of which for some reason and by some means the learner selected the learning which was achieved. I shall call this game EA; like EL it is commonly called 'education' and like EL it deals only in logical abstractions. There has to be for any educatee an expanding totality of potential learning experiences, though it could never be feasible to give an account of that totality since it is both unknown and unknowable. By playing EA, some useful things can nevertheless be said about it. It is not to be equated with the overt curriculum of pedagogical institutions - nor yet with the hidden curriculum, either. Both might well find a place in the totality expressed in EA but so might any other conceivable learning experience. What distinguishes an EL from an EA experience is that the former makes (strictly, has made) a contribution to the educatedness of the educatee; to the state of his intentionality. It seems nonsensical to me to claim that the learning resulting from other than structured 'educational' experiences cannot be classed as 'education'.¹ How is the educatee to

judge what experiences are properly educational and what are not? Supposing he can learn to judge, how will he then unlearn what he should not have learned in the first place? (He could not, of course, know that a given experience was non-educational until he had experienced it). It is quite impossible to ensure that learning from some undesirable source does not taint a pure 'educational' source.² The fact of the matter is that learning experiences from any source can make a contribution to educatedness if they are EA and will already have done so if they are EL. The problem is sociological not pedagogical. Society is already educative, however remote the ideals of the Educative Society might appear. Adult education might like to trace its origins back to the Mechanics' Institutes of the nineteenth century, but the education of adults began in the Garden of Eden.

4.2.9 The Book of Genesis offers an interesting paradigm of the way in which EE, EL and EA interrelate. From the total EA environment a clearly episodic EL emerges which changes to an unprecedented and never to be repeated degree the intentionality of the educatee. A new language game is now played for the first time, and it is highly significant that at this primal stage of human education it is a woman who plays it. In real time, ET has become one of the most commonly played games in the whole family: Education of the educator; of deliberate intervention in EA by any third party, particularly parent; teacher; trainer; 'teaching' is the key word. It is to be noted that the intervention is in EA, not EE as is commonly thought. All that ET can do is contribute to the total potential learning available. ET's contribution to EA might convert into EL and so affect EE. But there is no causal nexus between ET and EE. Whatever ET attempts will be more or

less individualised by the time it reaches EE. This effect is seen strikingly in a class of pupils of widely varying ability. ET makes the same contribution to the EA of each of the pupils but the EL which emerges owes as much to feedback from EE as it does to input from ET. The remoteness of ET from EE throws light on the educated/educated dichotomy (see §1.2.11): 'educated' in 'he has educated' designates a different symbol from 'educated' in 'he is educated'. To see the relationship between ET and EE as cause and effect is, quite apart from any philosophical problems with the causal nexus, to commit what Ryle calls a 'category mistake'. ET is preeminently schooling; schooling is commonly regarded as education *par excellence*. Only its distance from EE allows it to maintain this anomalous position. It is easy enough to pour bucketsful into the mainstream of EA and hope that the effect will be noticeable in due course down river. It would be an undertaking of quite a different order to demonstrate the effect beyond a temporary local staining - say beyond sessional or school-leaving examinations.¹ If EE and ET were directly juxtaposed, ET would have to take account of the necessary characteristics of the educatee as learner, if only because it would be obvious whether it was doing so or not. The distance between them buffers the evident failure of ET under the current dispensation to do so - perhaps under any dispensation short of a utopian educative society; and perhaps not even then since sapiens is ultimately an island whether homo is or not. As it is, contributory failure on the part of ET is generally subsumed under whatever is substituted for EL/EE in the 'education' language-games that are commonly played. Well-meaning attempts to mitigate the stigma of failure by tempering the academic winds to the intellectually-shorn lambs, tend in my experience to deny invigorating breezes to the more

robust members of the flock.

4.2.10 Such considerations apply only because ET persistently confuses two codes of rules. The talk is of education, but the practice is training; an inefficient training, moreover, since not enough account is taken of what ET is reasonably capable of achieving or of the most efficacious methods of achieving it. It is rather like attempting to play association football with a rugby ball; simply substituting a round ball would result in improved direction and purpose and increased satisfaction for the team and individual players alike. ET claims to purvey education but education is not something that can be purveyed. Education, as I have tried to show, is neutral; education is whatever the state of the educatee is. This is the only logical state of the educatee; a not-educated educatee would be a nonexistent educatee. Logico-semantic problems arise because under ET language-games are played which conflate 'education' and 'training'. Education as educatedness, the state of the educatee's intentionality, is open-ended; nobody knows, because it is impossible to know, what it will lead to. Much of what is done in schools is training, instruction leading to preconceived assessable goals.¹ This is not to denigrate training; trainers, or those whose agents they are, very properly lay down their desired content and methods of training and stipulate criteria for assessing its success. A trainee might properly succeed or fail either absolutely or on a comparative scale. Success or failure in education is not so much improper as impossible. The necessary characteristics of the educatee are neither optionally nor comparatively to be observed. They are not characteristics which, in pedagogical circles for example, might be weighed in the academic balance and found either to tip the

scale or to be wanting. They cannot be shelved as inconvenient; they will necessarily condition how the educatee responds to any potential learning influence, whatever is thought or sought by others. In spite of appearances and popular perceptions, ET is an extremely complicated and difficult game to play. In my view the principal reason for this is that the game of which it is commonly thought to give an account is at least two games, probably more, the rules of which are incompatible. The solution might lie in deciding which game schooling, as the protagonist in ET, is best suited to play - or is the only feasible candidate for playing - and arranging provision elsewhere and otherwise for the other games. The current trend is towards the worst of all possible worlds - schools attempting to do the job which a properly caring society would do and nobody doing to proper advantage the job which schools alone could be capable of doing.²

4.2.11 It is manifest that I have fallen into the habit of talking about EE, EL, EA and ET as though each was the name of a quasi-object and not merely an 'education' language-game. This is a useful shorthand, commonly used in discourse about games, and likely to become invidious only if a further transference is made and the existence of a real object is assumed. EE, EL and EA are, to some extent at least, of my own creation.¹ I do not think that they are games which are commonly played - at least with the rules according to which I want to play them - even though they are, in my view, necessary games; games which have to be played if educatee is to retain any referential meaning at all. However, as I move further away from EE, I come to 'education' language-games which *are played*, the first of which is ET. My object now is to say how they are played, not how they must be played; to make manifest

the rules according to which they are played (cf. §4.2.1).

4.2.12 The educatee and with the educatee all pretensions to logical meaning for 'education' begin to look pretty remote with ES - education of the education system; of organisations and institutions established for the purposes of, or tolerated by, the state. The purpose of ES is ostensibly to serve ET, but in effect ET is its servant, not its master. The education system of a western democracy - I think of Scotland as the example I know best - synthesises in its origins and development three main streams of influence:

(i) Planning, executed principally through implementing the enactments of the state's central and local legislative processes;

(ii) Evolution, manifested in whatever degree of organic development the political system, whether by design or default, permits;

(iii) Entropy, the tendency for a system to run down; inevitable in an organisation tinkered with from time to time but never fundamentally renewed in response to changing circumstances - particularly the transformation of the social circumstances which motivated its original creation.

The prime mover of the education system is government; government is about politics, not education. It is not reasonable to suppose that any government would seek through legislation to subvert its own purposes. It can safely be assumed, therefore, that the planned intentions of the education system are to contribute to the political objectives of the legislators through the performance of those functions which it is considered most apt to perform. As to what those functions are, the principal assumption is that the purpose of the system is to provide schooling (at any level) which is to the taste of the government of the

day. The polite fiction is maintained (or, perhaps, politicians do believe) that this is achievable by legislative means - by, for example, establishing by law a comprehensive rather than a selective form of organisation for schools.

4.2.13 ES is only nominally an 'education' language-game; no state education system has, to my knowledge, been established on educational principles, though educational objectives are commonly adduced by the legislators - perhaps to lend respectability to measures aimed at social engineering. In England, for example, the education system was devised to meet the needs of an expanding industrial society with an overseas empire. Its purposes were to teach cognitive skills to the limited level considered necessary for industrial machine-minders; to grade young people for their roles in a comparatively static and hierarchical society; to mind the growing numbers of children; to 'gentle the masses'. It still exercises these functions and finds them increasingly in conflict with the changing educational needs of a rapidly changing society. There is as yet no general demand for a new code of rules for ES; the game continues to be played much as it has been played since its inception. Politics seems to follow the line of least resistance; in the case of ES the tendency is to tinker with the internal workings of the machine rather than design a new one which reflects the passing of the age of steam. 'Permanent Education' was proposed by the Council of Europe as long ago as 1970; it has made little headway against the prevailing inoculation theory of education, according to which a dose of schooling early in life affords lifelong protection against the disease of ignorance. A national crisis seems to be needed before interest in reforming ES is aroused. Napoleon's

victory at Jena is credited with motivating the rise of the formidable Prussian schoolmaster. The Industrial Revolution created the need for universal primary schooling in England. Sputnik I led to a would-be radical reappraisal of public education in the U.S.A. EE never seems to initiate a sense of national crisis - except perhaps as one of the noble ideals of the French Revolution. Even then the proposals of the 1791 Constitution, modestly restricted as they were to free, compulsory, primary instruction, had to wait a hundred years to be implemented.

4.2.14 These examples illustrate the ease with which ES becomes a sociopolitical language-game. The connection between EI and education is even more tenuous. Education is an industry; education is the biggest or near-biggest-spending department of government. It goes without saying that the money is spent only on things on which money can be spent; things which can be bought with money such as the services of people, real estate, hardware and software, furniture and equipment of many kinds, even books. EE cannot be bought; neither can EL or EA. ET straddles the dividing line between what can and what cannot be bought. Teaching can be bought in the sense that teachers can be paid for their services but money is not the sole or even a direct determinant of the quality of the teaching, let alone its contribution to EA, and through EA to EL, and through EL to EE. 'More must be spent on education' is a sentence from the EI language-game, not from EE. ET might properly be immune to financial considerations but ES tends to cast a shadow over ET and that shadow is partly financial since ES depends absolutely on finance. Similarly EI casts its shadow over ES; the administrators, and more particularly their popularity-seeking political masters, are not immune to the blandishments of salesmen and

many a school cupboard is stuffed with the expensive white elephants of educational technology. Industrial relations play an important part in EI - even demarcation disputes between different teachers' unions. It is not unknown for teachers to take industrial action - an interestingly euphemistic language-game in any industrial context since inaction is the medium chosen for its implementation. It is of particular interest in the case of teachers since they, unduly self-deprecatingly it might be thought, tend to claim altruistic concern for the wellbeing of their charges as the motivation for the withdrawal of their services. Industrial action by ancillary staff can close schools. There have been schools where what might be done with buildings and equipment was dictated by strong-minded janitors (caretakers) and cleaners. It is ironical that EI, which has little or nothing to do with EE, should be one of the most commonly played 'education' language-games; the reason is, no doubt, the popular appeal of money. All the activities of which EI gives an account are, literally, education within the meaning of the act - certainly in the education systems of the United Kingdom, where Education Acts of various dates charge statutory authorities with making provision for them. Their claim to the title of 'education' is likely to be reinforced by definition. A director of education presumably directs education; whatever he directs is presumably, therefore, entitled to be called 'education'. Since education is an industry like any other, it is not surprising that vested interests of one sort or another provide strong motivation - perhaps in opposition to educational idealism. There is, accordingly, no reason to think that the expenditure of more money will necessarily result in better education or even in better teaching. It might conceivably do so if the highest financial rewards were reserved for the best teachers. Paradoxically,

it is traditional in the education industry for teachers who distinguish themselves to be paid more to teach less and to be paid most not to teach at all.

4.2 15 That there is a close correlation in education between quality and expenditure is a popular perception on the part of those not professionally involved in the system and professionals alike. There are enough other perceptions and misconceptions for EP to be a readily recognisable subfamily of language-games. Naturally, these perceptions, misconceptions, expectations, tend to be held by those not in a position to know better - principally pupils, parents and the public at large - though some are held by professionals as well. They fall into two categories, distinguished by the identification of education with ET and EE respectively; whether education is seen as cause or effect. Without question, the most widely held in the ET category is the perception that education equates with schooling. As a corollary, both are equated with vocational preparation; the purpose of going to school and getting educated is to get a good job. The current dearth of good jobs, or of jobs of any kind for young people, leads either to a disenchantment with schooling/education or to a demand for more education in the hope of picking up one of the jobs of a better qualified type that are thought still to be available. The perception of many employers is that the skills which they would like their young recruits to have are not being adequately developed by the schools. On the other hand, teachers tend to deny that it is the responsibility of the school to develop vocational skills; the concern of the school is with the total development of the child as an integrated human being. This game is, however, played with variant rules: One perception has it that anything

which smacks of preparation for employment is improper in school and must be weeded out of the curriculum; another admits that the state of the individual's total development will largely determine career prospects and that, to this extent at least, schooling is inevitably vocational preparation. Displeasure with the behaviour of schoolchildren on public transport or in the street encourages the current popular perception that the schools lack discipline. The perception that there is a direct causal connection between teaching and desirable modes of behaviour is part of the wider perception that children learn only what they are taught, and sees the schools made the scapegoat for the malfunctioning of other social agencies, particularly the family. A misconception held by many people and used by others as a convenient way of shelving responsibility is that schools can effectively mitigate the trauma inflicted on children by other operators less inhibited by moral scruples. Ingenuously or disingenuously, cognisance is not taken of the fact that the school could directly influence its pupils, other factors being equal, during less than one third of their waking time; the other two thirds are not called 'education' and are, therefore, not education. Time is an absolute determinant of what schools can do; consequently, they need a hierarchy of the tasks which they propose to attempt. Efforts aimed at drafting a hierarchy of tasks commonly come to grief in the implementation because perceived desirability is allowed to dominate possibility tempered by practicability.¹ In my view, the ordinary human limitations of teachers do not figure sufficiently in theories of schooling.

4.2.16 The common perception of education as effect is that it is intrinsically valuable, and therefore intrinsically desirable, to be

educated. However, what it is to be educated is a matter of subjective judgement; of perceptions influenced by which of a wide range of possible factors the judge accepts as relevant. It is a matter of aspirations towards a state, with the possibility, even the probability if the aspirations are lofty, that the state will not be attained. Such value judgements cannot logically belong, therefore, to discourse concerning what the educatee is, to the language-game which I identify as EE. If there is such a thing as educatee, it must be possible to talk generally about all educatees and not just some educatees. By definition EP does not relate to EE or to any aspect of reality. Perceptions are symbols and nothing more; if they correlate to any degree with reality, their doing so depends on factors other than those inherent in the perceptions. The playing of any language-game is a matter of perception in that reality is not involved,¹ only a conceptualisation of reality expressed in language. EP is, however, always one stage further removed from reality than any of the language-games which lie between it and EE. It deals in perceptions of these language-games; in perceptions of perceptions, therefore, not perceptions of reality directly. It is not surprising that education, like Wittgenstein's solipsistic subject (T 5.634), shrinks into nothingness, leaving only a perceived causal connection between events in space and time. For example, the belief in a nexus between education and employment boils down into a belief that doing well at school, however 'well' is defined in theory and determined in practice, will lead to a good job; education has, in the event, nothing to do with it and if the word 'education' is used at all it is used merely as a synonym for 'schooling'.

4.2.17 Typically, perceptions of education are spoken of, not as psychological states of the perceiver, but as properties of the perceived. For example:

'Education'... does have normative implications... It implies that something worth while is being or has been intentionally transmitted in a morally acceptable manner... This is a purely conceptual point. Such a connection between 'education' and what is valuable does not imply any particular commitment to content... All that is implied is a commitment to what is thought valuable. (Peters [1] 25)

Conceptual points are taken by the conceiver, not by what he conceives to be the case. As Peters takes pains to make plain, a purely conceptual point is normatively neutral. It belongs to perceptions of education, not to education itself. What these perceptions are amounts, in Peters's view, to remarkably little - to nothing specific, in fact, as to content and method. The one is to be worth while and the other morally acceptable, but that this is so is a purely conceptual point. It reveals or stipulates, depending on whether the logical nexus is a priori or synthetic a priori - it does not matter which it is as far as the end-product is concerned - that education has normative implications; it does not, however, analyse the normative nature of those implications. What they are in any given case depends on the predilections of the perceiver, not on properties stipulated by the concept of education:

That education must involve something of ethical value is... a matter of logical necessity. There is, however, no logical necessity about the particular values ascribed in particular societies to the variable of 'being worthwhile'. The justification of such values, too, must go beyond the realm of conceptual analysis into that of ethical theory. (Peters [1] 91)

Analysing the concept of education will, therefore, throw no light on any normative postulates that education might be perceived to have. I agree with Peters over this conclusion, though I have come by a

different route. I argue that educatee is the logical *sine qua non* of education and that it is, consequently, a contradiction to postulate any internal property (in the *Tractatus* sense) of educatee which some educatee does not have. Normative precludes by definition the universally existent. Peters gets round this problem by applying normative criteria to both educatee and educator; to what-is-passed-on-to and to what-is-passed-on-by in the name of education, and removing the criteria for normative outside the ambit of education. I attempt to get round it by asserting that neither educatee nor, consequently, education, can be subject to normative criteria - they are what they are - and that normative criteria are matters solely for the perception of the educator (including the educatee as self-educator). They issue as the well-intentioned (pragmatically; there is no absolute good) playing of ET language-games of an EA type - what might more conventionally be called 'curriculum theory'. Whether there is a possibility that the educatee might be affected by curriculum theory depends primarily on whether any attempt is made to turn it into curriculum practice. If the attempt is made, ET language-games are played which might or might not influence the educatee in ways which he or somebody else might or might not consider desirable but which, and on this I agree with Peters, have to be justified or assessed as to their worth-whileness by criteria other than educational. I am thankful that, being concerned with what is and not with what ought to be, I am not called upon to venture into the morass of ethical theory in search of suitable criteria. Such an expedition could not possibly discover any criterion which would make any educatee one iota different from what he is. It might produce in that vein different ways of looking at the educatee and different perceptions of how he ought to be - different EP games to play. But the

playing of EP is irrelevant to the playing of EE. I must be able to talk about the educatee as *every educatee is*; otherwise I have no concept of educatee.¹ Every educatee is what he is and not something different - that is tautologically true. Every educatee has properties which identify him as educatee and properties which identify him as that particular educatee (internal and external properties respectively, in *Tractatus* terms) - these are synthetic a priori truths since they depend on the contingent premiss that there are educatees. I am not competent to judge whether any statements of ethics are logically true, either in the tautological Wittgensteinian sense or in the diluted synthetic a priori sense allowed by Kant and favoured by Peters. The *Tractatus* assures me that ethics is inexpressible and the *Philosophical Investigations*, in a single dismissive reference, characterises ethics as a matter of how we learn to play certain language-games. Such games belong, in my scheme, to EP, not EE, because they are the expressions of the value judgements of educators, not expressions of characteristics common to educatees.

4.2.18 The perceptions that are given an airing in EP have a lot of material to work on in the 'education' language-games which lie between them and EE. There is still a connection, however tenuous, with EE even when all connection with institutions is apparently lost and an 'education' language-game is played which treats education, indeterminate as to both theory and practice, as the cure for some perceived social malaise - smoking, for example, or drinking and driving. Beyond EP lies a miscellaneous scatter of 'education' language-games which I propose to designate EM for ease of reference, though it is not one language-game but any number of discrete language-games each

of which is played with 'education' but none of which has any connection with EE. Into EM goes the use of 'educated' as a synonym for 'trained' when said of animals, and odd specialised uses such as that of 'education' for the rearing of silkworms and as a collective noun for silkworms. But the main membership of EM comprises those uses of 'education' which, after Jespersen, I have characterised as 'formulae' in Appendix II (cf. §3.8.5ff.). These are pure *Philosophical Investigations* language-games, untainted by any *Tractatus* logicity. For example, it is unlikely that the Minister of Education's functions differ significantly from those of his/her French or German counterpart. 'Minister' survives translation but 'education' does not: 'Ministre de l'Instruction Publique' is the French version, and the German concurs with 'Unterrichtsminister'. Not that 'minister' is any more necessary than 'education'; The Minister for Education and Science might still be called the President of the Board of Education, or his duties might be taken over by the chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, without the management-plan of the office being altered in the slightest. In other 'education' language-games of the formula type, 'education' has been known to appear without necessarily amending the rules of the game. There are numerous examples in which 'education' has replaced 'training' or 'instruction'; post hoc practices might also have changed, but not propter hoc. The influence of the new nomenclature might seep across the language-game border into EP and new perceptions motivate new practices. But what those perceptions and practices might be is anybody's guess and it remains a matter of personal perception whether they are in the event worthy to be called 'education' (cf. Dewey [2] 90). The fallacy is to think that words will alter circumstances (cf. PI 124). Technical education, for example, is simply technical

training carried out in an educational institution instead of at the workplace. Training is improved when it is improved, not when it is given a fancy name; that is to prefer the shadow to the substance, specifically to see 'education' as somehow propitious and 'training' as somehow pejorative. Both are merely words and neither can begin to mean anything until it is used in a language-game.

4.2.19 With EM, I should like to think, my identification of a family of 'education' language-games was complete. This account could then be expanded to any length thought appropriate and the result would be a first-order account of education - words about education. Philosophy could then take over and, playing its own language-games, produce the second-order account that, it is generally held, it is the function of philosophy to produce - words about words about education. The fallacy in this notion is that 'education' language-games do not present the facts of the matter about education. They are words about a word, not words about an object, and 'education' is shorthand for a multitude of words which might ultimately be seen to refer to states of affairs - if they have any referential meaning at all. So the philosophy of education is, at its most direct, words about words about words about states of affairs and this remoteness explains the vagueness which surrounds the concept of education. The way to tighten up the vagueness is, I suggest, to cancel the last stage in this progression; to accept that education is no more than a word, the meaning of which is given by the use made of it in the language-games that are played with it. 'Education' language-games are the nearest one can come to education. Let them be accepted, therefore, as the first-order account of education needed for the purposes of philosophy. With them the

philosopher can then play his own language-game which must, by definition, be a 'philosophy' language-game, not an 'education' language-game, and accordingly be played following philosophical not educational rules.¹ The method of the philosophy of education, i.e. the rules of the 'philosophy of education' language-game, must be authentically philosophical if it is to be called 'philosophy'. But since the game is to be played specifically with education-words, it might be appropriate to give it a distinctive appellation. In my scheme I shall call it EW, the game the words of which encompass the words of all the other 'education' language-games and submit them individually and collectively to its scrutiny.

4.3.1 Beginning in §2.5.15 I developed a view in which 'educatee' was equated with 'sapiens', thereby denying in effect the existence of homo sapiens other than as educatee. I still think this is a tenable hypothesis, supported by such evidence as the development of a human being to any stage in the progression from hunter-gatherer to technological genius, not as an evolutionary effect on every specimen of the species, but as an achievement in principle available to any one within the span of a single lifetime. The level reached by any individual, his capacity to perform (including mental performance invisible to an observer) represents, I should like to say, his educatedness. If this could be conceptualised in a perfectly neutral sense, free of any normative implication, I might have something like a Wittgensteinian object of which 'education' is the name. There are then three ways of dealing with other manifestations of the word 'education':

(i) They are meaningless. 'Education' is a sign which designates a number of symbols; its only true designation is educatee. The other symbols which 'education' purports to designate, to the extent that they symbolise objects, can be given or already have other signs as names, the use of which would obviate ambiguity.

(ii) The question of referential meaning does not arise. 'Educatee' is merely a language-game among the other language-games that are played with educat-. All are of equal status, being socially accepted speech habits; conventional aspects of a way of life.

(iii) Neither of these approaches tells the whole story. The logical meaning of educat- is of limited practical value in the common-

because 'education' is no more than the courtesy title of the clan. If the family had a progenitor, it would have to be 'educatee' - an interesting manifestation, if conventional connotations are applied, of Wordsworth's dictum that the child is father of the man.

4.3.3 My solution to the problem of ensuring that my explanations are not merely classificatory or cosmetic but add something to my account of education is to accept that all the uses of educat- are equal in terms of the *Philosophical Investigations* but that, in terms of the *Tractatus*, one is more equal than the others and will shed the light of its inequality over the others in direct proportion to their proximity to it. I can bring educatee into contention with the others by withdrawing it from its extreme position as logical *sine qua non* of educat- and treating it as a use among uses, an 'education' language-game which is played, retaining nevertheless as of right the uniqueness of its ratiocinated position. The result is a family of language-games assembled in hierarchical order. I start necessarily with 'educatee'; the rest follow in a linked progression marked by increasingly tenuous relations with 'educatee' until the concept shades into the linguistic environment and is lost to view. I try to overcome the problem of separating nominally the various members of the family by developing the simple notation which I first used in §2.3.2. There I distinguished EE from ET; my complete list now distinguishes nine 'education' language-games, each characterised by its own basic rule the observance of which determines that that particular game is being played.

4.3.4 The nine 'education' language-games, listed and characterised, create what I should like to think is a synoptic model

(eine übersichtliche Darstellung; see §3.6.2ff.) of education:

EE - education of the educatee; educated/educatedness as the individual educatee *is*, not as it might be considered desirable he should be.

EL - education as learning; the learning that *has* made a contribution to EE from whatever source.

EA - education as the total potential learning out of which EL has been and will continue to be selected.

ET - education of the educator; of deliberate intervention in EA by any third party, for example parent or teacher.

ES - education of the system; provision made by or approved by the state for the purposes of the state.

EI - education of the education industry; of buying and selling whatever can be bought or sold in making provision for ES.


EP - education as it is perceived, whether by those with either a direct or an indirect professional involvement or by those not professionally involved e.g. pupils, parents and the public.

EM - a miscellaneous collection of language-games, principally of the formula type, that are played with education.

EW - language-games played with 'education' language-games; second-order language-games; philosophising about education.

4.3.5 It is obvious that none of these is the name of an object or an entity of any kind. The concept 'language-game' excludes no sort of subject of discourse whatever - even subjects which the *Tractatus* classed as metaphysical and therefore beyond the reach of language - though this concession is granted only at what might be regarded as the excessive cost of removing referential meaning from the ambit of

philosophical concern. Even EE is not real; along with the others it is the name of a language-game and gives no more than a general indication of what the topic is when that game is being played. This is nevertheless a great deal more information than is conveyed when 'education' is used in the conventional unqualified manner. The hierarchical relationship between the various 'education' language-games might be more accurately represented as a series of concentric circles; a target with 'educatee' as the bullseye:



4.3.6 An analogy might be drawn with the image of a point source of light thrown by a lens. Since no lens is perfect, the image takes the form of a circular patch of light. As the lens is moved into and out of focus, the patch decreases or increases in diameter. When the patch is at its minimum diameter, indicating that the lens is as sharply focussed as its construction will allow, it is known as 'the circle of least confusion'. If I imagine the 'true' meaning of 'education' to be a point, I accept that my image of it will always be out of focus to some extent; my object is to achieve the circle of least confusion commensurate with the dimensions of the problem in hand. This I do by discounting irrelevant outer circles. It is not possible to discount the circles which lie between the one under consideration and the centre without severing the connection with the logical core of educat- and thereby changing the topic to something other than education. If in any instance the educatee could not relevantly be brought into consideration, the rules of *the* 'education' language-game are not being followed; some other game is being played even though grammatically an 'education' language-game appears to be being played - as it might be a 'schooling' language-game or a 'politics' language-game. The educatee represents the circle of least confusion attainable in practice in the field of focus of educat-. This is not the absolute focus of educat-; it is not even the image of a mundane object. The mundane object is the human being from which the educatee is a metaphysical projection - a nothing, therefore, in the eyes of the early Wittgenstein but in the eyes of the later a word with which language-games might readily be played. Educatee as a true Gegenstand is represented by the dimensionless point which is the centre of the circle (cf. T 5.64).

4.4.1 I accept that my synoptic model of education is simplistic - though less so, I should claim, than the usual holistic view of an undifferentiated education which somehow manages to be the effect of itself as cause. In particular, each of my 'education' language-games is not a single game. Each represents, rather, a family of games within the larger family of 'education' language-games, as 'football', for example, does within the family of games played with a ball. It might be better to regard the family of 'education' language-games as a tribe within which there are any number of families. It is no disadvantage, in Wittgenstein's view, if a concept is imprecisely formulated, provided that it serves its purpose. Either the concept of tribe or the concept of family could be a signpost to a view of the way in which a part of the language works and a signpost is in order if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose (PI 87). However, such a proliferation within indeterminate boundaries might be thought to compound the difficulties with which I was faced at the beginning of my inquiry and leave me with a correspondingly slenderer chance of escape from the flytrap. My inquiry originated as a reaction to this very diffuseness; the meaningless state of 'education' induced by its superfluity of meanings. Wittgenstein has provided a philosophical explanation of my problem but might easily make it worse by denying that there is a problem - this is simply how things are with the language. I am not prepared to accept that I must learn to live with my problem; I am still looking for a reasoned account of education. The answer is, I think, that the logical heart of the hierarchy is immune to either

innovation or loss. 'Education' language-games as members of the families within the tribe can be born or die or even whole families might disappear - it is not impossible that ES, for example, will be reduced to a historical mode of operation as a result of sociological or technological change. But without EE no other 'education' language-game could be played which would ultimately, after however many stages of symbolism, make the 'educatee' link with reality which, according to my argument, the nature of homo sapiens requires his language to make. Without this link to reality through educatee, the concept of education would lose both its *raison d'être* and its social status, though the sign 'educatee' could of course be used to designate some symbol unconnected with educatee.

4.4.2 Accepting the necessity of the link with reality leaves untouched the problem of how the link is to be made. The later Wittgenstein accepts commonsense empiricism so unquestioningly that he does not raise the issue; according to the *Tractatus*, also, the link between language and circumstance is self-evident, though complex statements need analysing into elementary sentences before it appears so. Paradoxically, it is with the early Wittgenstein that explanations of the nexus come to an end; with the later they do not even start. In both cases the result is the same, and I see no alternative to going along with Wittgenstein's naively realistic approach, though the method might be formalised somewhat and given a semblance of philosophical respectability. Ayer suggests criteria for the assumptions involved in characterising anything as a physical object:

It has to be accessible to more than one sense and to more than one observer and it has to be capable of existing unperceived. In addition, it has to occupy a position or series of positions

in three-dimensional space and to endure throughout a period
of time. (Ayer [3] 80)

There is no difficulty, it seems to me, in educing from many 'education' language-games a physical basis which complies with these criteria. Ayer would point out that my naive perceptions were still susceptible to analysis and carried inferences which might need to be made explicit. Common sense needs to be supported by reasoning and even then nothing is certain. I accept that I must go along with Ayer over this; I claim nevertheless that some things are less doubtful than others. Curiously, these appear to be the phenomena with which the more remote 'education' language-games are played. School buildings and equipment, teachers, pupils, are real enough and the language-games which are played around them have so firm a foundation in reality that their status as rule-governed, intra-language activities might seem to be threatened. *Language-games* might more obviously be seen to be played when direct contact between statement and observable application is lost; when one or more stages of symbolic elucidation are called for before the nexus with reality becomes manifest. Such 'education' language-games might appear to have a stronger claim to the title since they are no more than language. Those played with objects are still language, of course, but language which depends directly on its accepted nexus with reality for its survival. If this is so, I am drawn to the paradoxical conclusion that the truer 'education' language-games are those based on the *Tractatus*, and that it is the *Philosophical Investigations* which forges the direct link between language and reality. A further dimension to the paradox is that the truer the language-game, the better the hope it offers of approaching the physical heart of the matter. Playing 'education' language-games purely in the spirit of the *Philosophical*

Investigations would absolve me from the tiresome necessity of rationalising a link with reality, but only at the expense of losing any practical application my ideas might have. It would be self-defeating to concoct my own facts of education as Wittgenstein suggests natural history might be concocted for philosophical purposes (PI II xii). I have accordingly sought a different way out from the flytrap through playing 'education' language-games with the logical foundation advocated in the *Tractatus*. If it is a matter of logical necessity that certain language-games are played, the facts of the matter can safely be left to logical necessity. To express it like this is to put the cart before the horse: There is no logical necessity for any language-game to be played, or, indeed, for language to exist. But if there are states of affairs in the world, then the content of the language which expresses those states of affairs is logically determined. All that I am called upon to do is to reveal, by describing it, what is the case.

4.4.3 Having described a hierarchical family of 'education' language-games with a foundation in logic (which, admittedly, hovers somewhat uneasily around analytic and synthetic a priori); and having attempted to meet Wittgenstein's expressed need for an *übersichtliche Darstellung* by extracting from my account a sketch of a synoptic model of education, what remains for me to say? In theory Wittgenstein might be expected to declare, with Hamlet: The rest is silence. I long ago reached what should have been the bedrock according to Wittgensteinian principles and have since done a fair amount of landscaping of the topsoil. In practice, however, Wittgenstein manages in the *Tractatus*, as Russell points out, to say a good deal about what cannot be said and, in the *Philosophical Investigations*, to say at some length what his theory of indeterminate concepts might suggest could as well, or as

badly, be said briefly. Following Wittgenstein's practice rather than his theory, and risking his disapproval by apparently making an architectonic demand for an explanation, I still feel the need to interpret my conclusion specifically in terms of the word 'education', the meaning of which is, formally at least, the subject of my inquiry. Accordingly, from my ostensible first-order account of education I extract two second-order hypotheses:

(i) Education is no more than a word; 'education' is a sign which designates a symbol usable in contexts which make sense. Education as symbol is interpretable as other symbols which, if they have sense, are directly or indirectly verifiable by correspondence with a socially accepted reality. 'Education' has no direct correspondence with reality and is, therefore, referentially meaningless.

(ii) Even as a symbol, education treated holistically is self-contradictory and is, therefore, without sense. There is no logically simple education-as-concept which could serve as an intra-linguistic referent for the word 'education'. In order to engage in rational discourse about education it is necessary to identify which of the many possible symbols is intended on each occasion when the word is used. 'Education' does not designate any particular symbol; it is merely the title of an extended family of language-games. For the sake of clarity I have recast these two somewhat prolix hypotheses as seven which I list on page vii as a summary of my conclusions. Coincidentally, my seven hypotheses equal in number the seven principal divisions (Sätze) of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. He claimed that anyone who understood him would come to see his statements (Sätze) as nonsensical (unsinnig) when they had been used as a ladder up which to climb to a higher understanding; once this had been achieved,

the ladder could be discarded. I should be disingenuous if I followed Wittgenstein and claimed the same for my conclusions, though I could with equanimity see them rejected if they had contributed to the appreciation of the need for a clearer understanding of education. 'Education' is an important word and should, accordingly, be a clear word. The vernacular always has been and always will be a law unto itself. My hope is that the ostensibly careful discourse of those who profess a commitment to education will reflect an awareness of the need always to qualify the word explicitly or implicitly; to make plain on each occasion when it is used what language-game is being played with it. Awareness of the need to do this is the first of the two principal contributions which Wittgenstein might make to the philosophy of education. The second concerns the referent of the word. By its apparent unity and homogeneity, 'education' encourages the taking of a holistic view of the very diverse field of which it is commonly assumed to be the name. Attempting a holistic conflation of the incompatible elements within education as it is perceived, generates a host of problems. Wittgenstein shows that the entrance is the way out from the flytrap; there is no need to go into it in the first place. Educational problems are pseudo-problems; they arise from treating education as a problem-generating entity. There are no problems of education because there is no education. That is not to say there are no problems; of course there are, countless problems, but they are political, religious, ethical, perceptual, pedagogical, motivational, vocational, professional, industrial, legal, demotic, historical, financial, logistical... in general social or psychological, not educational. The primary prerequisite for solving any problem is an appreciation of what it is. As far as education is concerned, there is only the word 'education' and

the task of the philosopher is to compile memoranda for the playing of the many language-games that are played with it.

APPENDIX I

A Panoramic View of 'Education'

(See §3.7.3ff.)

The past decade has seen some fundamental changes in the approach to education in Australia. The Schools Commission, in the early 1970s, encouraged experimentation and the comparatively vast sums of Federal money available flowed into many projects aimed at widening education perspectives, stimulating students and making schools more interesting. Some ideas worked, some did not and some turned out to be frivolous and wasteful. When the money began to run out, many withered away.

Today, when ironically many parents are demanding a return to more formal forms of education, the best of those educational experiments are proving their worth, and showing positive benefits for students. The Priority Projects scheme, introduced in 1974 to develop special programs for underprivileged and immigrant children in lower socio-economic areas, has received a most encouraging assessment in SA. In 1974, many children — and their parents — in those areas considered schools irrelevant and even alien institutions. Consequently, attitudes towards schooling, attendance levels and achievements were poor.

Now, in 113 SA schools supported by Priority Project funding, absenteeism has fallen, school work standards and attitudes have improved dramatically, and achieve-

ment levels have risen markedly, measured against standards at the outset of the programs. That proven bench-mark, reading ability, has improved for a majority of students, and so has their self-esteem. The educational ground has been gained through changes in curriculum and methods, and greater involvement of students and their parents in school programs.

The Priority Projects form one arm of a widening educational effort, which has included such other worthwhile experiments as the "choice and diversity" project run jointly by the Schools Commission and the SA Education Department. That project, aimed at matching more closely the interests and aspirations of students and parents with school programs, has resulted in different approaches at different schools, in some cases offering more links from school to jobs, and providing less formal work aimed at personal development, the learning of social skills and the acceptance of responsibility. That, too, has shown positive results.

The programs have cost money, mostly for extra staff. But they do not draw excessively on education funds and in terms of educational gains and equality of opportunity for Australian children, it is money properly and well spent.

10

An odd thing about education is that so few people profess to know with any exactness what it actually does to those who are exposed to it.

This was evident this week when the question of the literacy of students leaving school came up again. It seemed to be assumed by those who care about it, both lay and professional, that an unknown number of these young people cannot express themselves adequately in speech or writing; but no one was prepared to offer any estimate of the extent of the problem, though it is supposed to have existed for some time.

He said that, until relatively recently only a minority of students stayed in school after Year 10. They did courses that were "heavily orientated" towards students preparing for university and college studies.

The rest entered the workforce.

The matriculation exam of the Public Examinations Board (which will be replaced by SSABSA next year) was "a selection mechanism" to pick students for higher education.¹⁴

Now SSABSA would help foster an appropriate education for the greater diversity of students, as well as continue the role of the PEB in preparing students who wanted to enter higher education.

"A lot of the PEB subjects are in fairly restrictive subject disciplines which have tended to reflect the kinds of discipline areas that are related to traditional university courses," he said.

If there was no alternative to these subjects, many students would become hostile to education as a result of doing subjects they could not cope with.¹⁶

SSABSA next year will begin a two-year transition period in which existing Year 12 courses, including PEB courses, will be run by the authority. In that time SSABSA will approve which of these courses, and what new courses, it will run in 1986 and beyond.

11 Education methods must change as the goal that they were directed towards — that is employment, and the independence and identity that goes with that — is no longer certain.

12 Education must be geared to help meet changes in society. But schools cannot do it in isolation, nor can they do it by returning to the education style of a seemingly golden past.

17 The SA College of Advanced Education was "in good shape" to begin the academic year despite earlier fears over staffing levels, the college principal, Dr. G. Ramsey, said yesterday.

In September and October, college academics protested at the initial staffing cuts to meet reduced Federal funding, saying they would affect the quality of education as well as end the jobs of more than 40 contract staff.¹⁸

They say, for example, that 53 p.c. of Federal education money goes to private schools, which is true.

What they do not point out is that 82 p.c. of all money spent on education in this country comes from State governments which get their money from their own resources and from tax reimbursement grants.

The reality is that 24 p.c. of children in private schools get only 12 p.c. of the combined Commonwealth and State education budgets.

The prejudice against private schools by the Teachers Federation is based partly on an anti-religious mentality of their policy-makers, partly on the increased enrolments at private schools which threaten the jobs in the public sector, and partly because the federation thinks that their approach to education is the only reasonable one.

That sort of policy is fine if you think that education is the extension of the State. But if education is the extension of the family, then diversity of school systems is essential to allow parents a reasonable choice as to the kind of school they would like their children to attend.

Both the ALP and the Liberal Party support State aid to private schools and the principle of diversity and choice in primary and secondary education.

TODDLERS are about to be plugged into the computer age for education in the kindergarten.

Everyone said it couldn't be done, but a leading infant educationalist has worked with Atari to produce an educational game for infants from 12 months to three years of age.

Dr Lee Salk has worked in education for 35 years and like so many other educationalists was eager to see the new video game fad turned to more constructive use than mindless exercise.

He approached Atari, and over a two-year period worked with their engineers to design a series of educational programs to run on Atari computers for infants.

The Education Secretary, Mr Mark Carlisle, yesterday gave a broad hint that the Government would soon give the go-ahead for a major change in education.

He told the North of England Education Conference at Carlisle that the Government would shortly publish guidance on the type of curriculum they believe should be taught in English and Welsh schools.

This statement is expected some time next month, writes An Education Correspondent. The Government believe every child aged between five and 16 should be taught a basic "core" of subjects, English, maths, a foreign language, religious education and physical education.

These key subjects would take up well over 50 per cent of the school curriculum, with at least 10 per cent devoted to English and 10 per cent to maths.

However, Mr Carlisle told the conference he accepted that public expenditure cuts would have an impact on education provision and jobs.

PROPOSALS

"But we should not abandon the task. My concern, and I think that of the whole education service, would be to take the long view, to establish our goals, clearly, and despite our current difficulties to move towards them in every way we can," he said.

"We have seen the end of the *Space Invader* wave," says Ferrand. "Programs are now a lot more sophisticated and educational as well as entertaining."

The main thrust of the hundreds of software companies exhibiting in Chicago at the 1984 International Electronic Show was educational.

A large number of the companies have hired educationalists and abandoned the games philosophy. The programs are purely educational and intended to coach children at home in weak areas of school curriculum.

BOLTON education authority in Greater Manchester has set up a special force of 29 school rangers to protect education premises against vandals and thieves who cause thousands of pounds worth of damage every year.

The school day should be lengthened, the president of the Australian Council for Educational Standards, Professor Lauchlan Chipman, says. 46

He wants this to ensure that basic literacy and numeracy skills are taught to children.

He says major disciplines such as science, mathematics and history have suffered because of an emphasis on teaching social studies and current affairs.

Professor Chipman, professor of philosophy at Wollongong University and visiting professor of jurisprudence at the University of Sydney, said the problem would be solved by keeping children about 40 minutes longer each day, not by a higher school-leaving age.

"That would give us the equivalent of five periods each week to teach the traditional education skills," he said. 47

The extra time at school would overcome problems arising from the amount of idle time children often had between leaving school and their parents returning from work.

Professor Chipman also maintained that education standards had fallen and would continue to fall because of a lack of practical training for teachers, and that some teachers did not understand the objectives of education. 48

"When pupils say they don't see the relevance of history or geography some teachers will agree with them. I don't doubt that they have a genuine commitment to the pupils. They believe that something with a more immediate application is in the interests of their children," Professor Chipman said. 49

He raised the issues at Wollongong University at the weekend during a conference on educational research. 50

"The increasing demands made upon the school for socialisation education must be purchased at a price and that price is a reduction in time spent on traditional objectives of schooling," he said. 51

"This has led some to call for a raising of the school-leaving age even to 18, in order that all of these objectives can be accomplished.

"Such a step would be disastrous," Professor Chipman said.

"In particular, it would do nothing for the poorly motivated pupil, but it would add enormously to the problems of school discipline. Instead, I believe we should look at extending the school day, which in most States is shorter than it was two decades ago."

He said he was most concerned about the quality of training for secondary teachers, who would need to be "better educated and better trained and skilled in teaching" to deal with expected higher numbers of students continuing with secondary education. 52

53

But it must be remembered that not all American academics place the blame wholly on television and radio. One who has found other causes is Mr Paul Copperman, who at 32 wrote a controversial book with the title of *The Literacy Hoax: The Decline of Reading, Writing and Learning in Public Schools and What We Can Do About It*. The symptoms of decay, he believes, are manifestations of a deeper malady, the breakdown of authority in education. And he writes: "If it is not clear to a child why he must learn grammar ...

educational authority should communicate its utility and the consequences of not acquiring it, but above all insist it be learned." 54

55

ilea Inner London Education Authority 56

Inspector for Business Education (District Rank) 57

Salary £18,468-£19,908 (inclusive of £1,284 London Weighting Allowance)

58 To inspect and develop business education courses in the Authority's Colleges and Schools. Applicants should possess an appropriate university degree and/or professional qualification and substantial teaching experience. 59

Details and application forms from the Education Officer (EO/Estab 1b), Room 365, County Hall, London SE1 7PB. (Please enclose a stamped addressed envelope).

"Computers can be used in the teaching/learning situation; in management tasks for the student, the teacher, and the school; in the home; and in wider applications.

"The committee wishes to see all children educated in this information technology area, and to have all teachers responsible for promoting awareness of the computer and for using it as a teaching aid wherever practicable." 60

He wished to confine the university's role to a level of generality which he deemed to be consistent with its primary object of research. He saw the expansion of facilities for higher or tertiary education in the 1960s as an opportunity to remove responsibility for vocational education and service to the community from the universities, so they might concentrate wholly on research.

As chairman of the Australian Universities Commission, Sir Leslie set out to remake Australian universities in the image of the Cavendish Laboratory. He sought to turn them into centres of research and, at the same time, to found new institutions to take their place in the provision of vocational education and service to the community.

This was the negative aspect of his support for higher technical education. There was a positive side as well.

ILEA TEACHER FELLOWSHIPS

The Authority is offering secondments to members of its teaching staff to undertake one year Fellowships to do research at the Centre for Multi-Cultural Education (Co-ordinator Dr J S Gundara), the University of London Institute of Education, 20 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AL. The aim of the research is to advance understanding of issues and concepts in the field of education for a multi-cultural society and to develop appropriate approaches, curricula or organisation, closely related to the practice in schools, colleges and the community. Teachers from any subject discipline in Primary, Secondary and Further Education sectors are encouraged to apply. The fellows will work under the joint supervision of the staff at the Institute and the Authority's Senior Inspector for Multi-ethnic Education, Mr P. L. B. Woodroffe.

Application forms and other relevant particulars are obtainable from EO/TS/12 (tel. 633 1312). Completed application forms must be returned to EO/TS/12, Room 92b, County Hall, SE1 7PB, by 21 January, 1983.

The fact is that behind the Elizabeth House vocabulary of change and reconstruction, Sir Keith Joseph's record itself is a sufficient explanation of why teachers "feel insecurity in the classroom": a continued erosion of the B.Ed qualification and a particular attack on public-sector teacher education provision; a lack of commitment to in-service training for qualified teachers; and, above all, a continued refusal to lay a coherent strategy for the education of children before the voting public.

72 The SA Education Department and leading Australian sporting authorities have produced a new primary school physical education program.

73 The developers of the program claim it could be one of the major curriculum shifts since the introduction of the new maths.

74 The program, which has been introduced throughout Australia, lifts the amount of physical education a student does to an hour a day, or just under one-fifth of total class hours.

Most schools previously devoted about an hour a week to PE.

The hour is broken up into 15 minutes of physical work, such as dancing and running, and 45 minutes for skills development in the higher grades.

At the end of primary school all students will have the basic skills of 13 sports.

A small SA Christian fundamentalist school has asked for special leave to appeal to the High Court in its continuing battle with State law.

75 The school, run by Grace Bible Church Inc., of Pooraka, has refused to seek registration as it is required to do under the SA Education Act to ensure satisfactory instruction and the "health, welfare and safety" of children.

76 The church says the school is part of the church and the church is controlled by God, and that registration would give the State power over the education of the school's children.

In mid-July, the school failed in a Supreme Court appeal after two prosecutions in the Adelaide Magistrates Court in the past 2½ years.

77 In a five-point grounds-of-appeal statement included in the special leave application, the church says the Full Supreme Court erred in finding there was no inalienable right to freedom of religious worship and expression; and in finding that the SA Education Act did not infringe on the exercise of religious freedom.

The syllabus says the course is not designed to convince students that religion is true or false.

Some committed Christians have voiced concern about religious studies along the lines proposed by the syllabus.

78 An SA Anglican Church education committee said last year that government school religious education materials, which were used as aids in existing primary and secondary school subjects, and which took a similar, if simpler, approach to the new matriculation subject, led to Christianity's being reduced to the status of "tribal religions or ancient religions."

MELBOURNE — Education standards should be reviewed to stop the decline in the secondary school system, according to leading employers.

And following the issuing of a Liberal report on education, the Business Council of Australia plans to unveil an education policy in Sydney later this month.

The council, which includes such leading employers as

BHP, Westpac, IBM and Telecom, believe too little emphasis is given to the three Rs.

It is believed the report will call on secondary schools to emphasise traditional subjects such as maths and English.

The BCA's assistant director, Mr George Hutton, said employers were dissatisfied with the standard of education.

"Our belief is that students should have a strong ground-

ing in maths, English and all the traditional subjects," he said.

"We are not satisfied with what is being done."

Former teacher Mr David Freeman, now an educational and clinical psychologist, said people needed a "good dose of truth" about education levels. He runs a testing service of potential students for leading independent schools.

"The fact is our service is flourishing because school reports are not worth the paper they are written on," he said.

"It's absolutely essential that we teach the basic skills, namely reading, writing and arithmetic. Parents want their kids literate and numerate."

Mr Freeman said there should be an immediate review of education standards, including teacher training.

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r 382 4442	PEPER BOX. 36 inch... tank with long... Ph. 250 1605.	VOLVO FB charged e. Rockwell suspensor o.n.o. Ph.
1978 model ter diesel, 6 \$8500 SDF. John Knight. rs.	SUSPENSION SEATS. Isrl. to suit most trucks. from \$420 plus	VOLVO FB delivery v driven Eb pumps and mountable

Teenagers should "think again" if they were contemplating not re-enrolling in school next week, the Minister of Education, Mr. Arnold, said yesterday.

He said he urged youths who had the option of leaving school once they reached 15 to consider all education and training alternatives before opting for a full-time job hunt, and risk the damaging frustration of long periods without work.

At a time of record youth unemployment, it was disturbing that schools were not retaining students, especially when those with the least education and skills were experiencing the most difficulty in finding a job.

"Britain's system of titles, honors and awards and education maintains an elite still drawn disproportionately from the alumni of two ancient universities and a handful of famous schools," author Anthony Sampson concluded in 1982.

The debate about the continuing dominance of the old-school-tie, Oxbridge crowd has broadened into a debate about whether the education and experience of the governing class meet the needs of an industrial nation.

A new conception of senior secondary school education is on the horizon, according to the first head administrator of SA's new Year 12 examination authority, Dr Graeme Speedy.

He said "winning" in senior secondary school education would no longer be limited to whether students did well only in traditional academic subjects.

Dr Speedy, who was appointed chief executive officer of the Senior Secondary Assessment Board of SA this week, said the board would help develop new subjects and assessment procedures to meet the needs of the

growing diversity of students in Years 11 and 12.

More new multi-disciplinary subjects, such as consumer education, and how to live in a world dominated by information technology, could be added to traditional subjects.

THE WORKERS' EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION

A major provider of community education

It is hard to understand why Sir Keith Joseph is so intent upon plunging schools into the kind of chaos that will ensue if this proposal is turned into practice. We are now the only western European country where corporal punishment has not been abolished, and all the evidence indicates that its absence does not precipitate the kind of classroom anarchy that the caners claim would follow. Indeed, 14 education authorities in Britain have now banned it with no evidence that teachers have lost control as a result. The consultative document says that the Government is impressed by the strength of parental conviction in favour of retaining the cane. But what about the strength of parental feeling on the decline in education standards, 99 charted recently again by the Schools Inspectorate? There is to be no consultative paper about ways of mitigating the effects of expenditure cuts on education standards. 100 It seems that Sir Keith is more concerned about the rights of pupils to be beaten than their rights to be properly educated. 101

But the old children's classics stand up because they've got something that goes right on appealing to children—and to the child in grown-ups. I'd be appalled if small children were to be given only those books whose clothes and attitudes, habits and food and politics fit exactly the approved educational line of the times if only because they would miss, among other things, Eeyore's views on education. He was gazing, you'll remember, at three sticks placed to form a capital A, and realised that Rabbit had recognised it. 102

'You mean this A thing is something Rabbit knew?'

'Yes, Eeyore. He's clever, Rabbit is.'

'Clever!' said Eeyore scornfully, putting a foot heavily on his three sticks. 'Education!' said Eeyore bitterly jumping on his six sticks. 104
'What is learning?' asked Eeyore as he kicked his 12 sticks into the air.
'A thing Rabbit knows. Ha!'

'I think'—began Piglet nervously.

'Don't' said Eeyore.
Especially not about complicated reasons to avoid that anti-hero, the Bear of Very Small Brain.

The thing about a Jesuit education 105 is that it stays with you for life, whether you remain a Catholic or not. Indeed, some of the world's great atheists and revolutionaries were the beneficiaries of the west's most intellectually rigorous education for gifted boys. 106

Professor Ritchie said there, was also a great lack of understanding about the importance of science and this ignorance was costing billions of dollars.

"Take corrosion. That costs us about 3 or 4 per cent of gross domestic product each year," he said.

"Ill health costs us about twice that. We train about 100 medics and 450 paramedics in Western Australia each year, but we don't train a single corrosion scientist. A few may drift into the field, but that is it. That makes no sort of sense. A lot of problems in corrosion could be solved simply by education." 107

Some teachers believe the US is heading for a new era when children of the new wave of Oriental and Asian immigrants will move into positions of leadership in many fields. They are already doing so. One of the great role models is Connie Chung, a glamorous newscaster and daughter of a nationalist Chinese official, who earns about \$100,000 a year and can afford to smile at jokes about "yellow journalism."

"They are different," Barbara Stewart said. "Extremely self-disciplined. They dress better, are less likely to take drugs or drink, and go for the hard subjects like engineering and physics, which demand discipline and application."

"Some are looked upon as anti-social, but it doesn't seem to bother them. They are future-oriented, with very well-defined goals. Some didn't have much of a childhood. I'm very much reminded of the children of the depression era who prized education highly and saw it as the number one priority." 108

There are other contrasts: rows of bleary eyes did not meet your scrutiny in years past but neither did the students of those days come from homes where both parents worked, often on shifts.

The social disruption of television — it seemed like magic when it began with the Olympic Games in 1956 — had not yet touched us. Whether its distracting effect is the sole cause of a change in students I won't hazard; but distraction is now a great challenge to serious education. There is a monumental lack of concentration in many, a real fear of uselessness on the employment market and a philosophy of "let's try it" which, while not novel, leads to much more damage than smoking an Ardat behind the toilets. 109

There is a serious imbalance in Britain today in the full process which is described by the two words 'education' 110 and 'training'. The idea of the 'educated person' is that 111 of a scholarly individual who has been neither educated 112 nor trained to exercise useful skills; who is able to understand but not to act. Young people in secondary or higher education increasingly specialise, and do so too 113 often in ways which mean that they are taught to practise only the skills of scholarship and science. They acquire knowledge of particular subjects, but are not equipped to use knowledge ways in which are relevant to the world outside the education system. 114

This imbalance is harmful to individuals, to industry and to society. A well-balanced education should, of 115 course, embrace analysis and the acquisition of

knowledge. But it must also include the exercise of creative skills, the competence to undertake and complete tasks and the ability to cope with everyday life; and also doing all these things in co-operation with others.

There exists in its own right a culture which is concerned with doing, making and organising and the creative arts. This culture emphasises the day to day management of affairs, the formulation and solution of problems and the design, manufacture and marketing of goods and services.

116 Educators should spend more time preparing people in this way for a life outside the education system. The country would benefit significantly in economic terms 117 from what is here described as Education for Capability. 118

The central irony of all these schemes, this new emphasis on training, is of course that these initiatives are training youngsters for a labour market that has been eroded. Clare Short saw other ironies. "The educators who 119 constantly moan about the neglect of the most able, the Keith Josephs and David Youngs, are suddenly desperately concerned about the bottom 40 per cent," she said.

"They seem to be saying that this group learns best by work experience and so are feeding that back into the school system which is the ultimate negative conclusion of the paradox — saying let's all start to learn to be plumbers at 14; and then someone else will say, why not 12? or nine? Then you're in a lunatic situation where high unemployment and the desperation that induces young people to get skills that might put them ahead of the field are used to justify a real onslaught on any kind of traditional broad-based education for young 120 people. Logically, we should be saying preparation for

work is less relevant than it ever was."

Underlying all this confusion, however, are fundamental questions that have yet to be asked in any national forum, let alone answered. What is the future of work and employment? What are real jobs; are they only to be found in manufacturing industry, are they only in the market economy? Is unemployment here forever, necessitating a wholesale revision 121 of educational values, or can it be reversed? Or can we only attain full employment again by redefining work to include concepts which are seen at present as on the margins — like community service? Do the traditional 122 intrinsic values in education mean anything any more — or are they going to prop up a two-tier educational system, in which traditional 123 values apply to those pupils who are heading for jobs, while broader ideas are relegated to the second division? Until such questions are resolved, there seems little chance that the education system can properly begin to 124 respond to the challenges it faces.

Why are so many young male drivers killed late at night?

They have been out prowling and, if they have been lucky, they are probably tired, too. And what of their behavior on the road? It is all part of a sexual display. What of their choice of such powerful and noisy vehicles? Same reason. And why drink so much? Showing off again.

The sad thing is that it is all so natural. Can you educate your 125 tomcat not to yowl and roam? Not without a visit to the vet!

What is needed is not so much fluoride in the water as bromide in the beer.

In 1955, as one of three representatives of the University of Melbourne on a committee to advise the government on the establishment of an Institute or University of Technology in Victoria, Sir Leslie gave strong support to the proposal as the means to supply trained workers for industry.

He told the committee: "The existing university was concerned with finding new facts, and people were needed to interpret these findings and apply them in industry."

126 He made no provision for vocational education of this kind within his department. He said in an interview in 127 1975: "Now, the education that I was aware of as a professor of physics was good for turning out men who were going to do research — the best of them — and, of course, there would be the rump who would come out as BScs and become teachers and turn into engineers or what have you."

He considered that it would be better to train these people in institutions set up specifically for these purposes. Not only did he consider that this would be more efficient, but also that it would be in the interests of the students.

But Neill never believed that education was about getting kids through exams. It was, he believed, showing approval, tenderness, tolerance. "I know from experience," he wrote, "that children brought up with self-government and freedom will never hate Jews or Negroes; they will not beat their children nor make them guilty about sex; they will never frighten them with tales of a punishing God." 128

THE potential of hooking up tertiary institutions to satellites will be investigated at the University of Western Australia.

The Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission will fund the research by Dr James Lange, the chairman of the communications department at the University of Guam. 129

Satellites have the capacity to extend distance education within Australia and overseas — for example, to Tonga and the Cook Islands which have no universities. They could also enable networking of specialists through satellite seminars, conferences and informal exchanges of information. 130

The main target, he said, should be examinations. As they stood, they were a tremendous barrier to the majority of pupils. Having removed them, he said, we needed to take a cool look at traditional subjects and their usefulness and introduce concepts such as community service on to the curriculum.

He felt that such experience was valuable in itself — to educate school-children to be better citizens, rather than as a means to a specific vocational end. "We've kept to the academic mode for so long because we see it as the only way; but a 19th, even 18th century curriculum simply doesn't fit into a 20th century economy. In my school two years ago we got everybody in a particular age group outside the walls of the school for two or three weeks on work experience schemes, not because we thought it would get them jobs but because we wanted that particular dimension to their education." 131

The Minister for Education, Senator Ryan, will meet education lobbies and State governments next week to outline the criteria for assessing private schools into a new 12-category system believed to have Cabinet approval. 132

IS anything in education ever decided by research? Take this business of the comprehensive schools. According to Lady Cox, the research carried out by the National Council for Educational Standards proves that pupils in the old grammar and secondary modern system did better in examination results than those in comprehensive schools. 135

Most statisticians do not agree. They find the NCES research flawed and its conclusions invalid.

But what's that to Lady Cox? Before the research was commissioned, she knew that grammar and secondary modern got better results. Having seen the results, they confirm her belief.

Dr Pettman says that having students think for themselves about human rights almost inevitably means they will question the social structure in which they find in school and class.

"It just depends whether you are a democrat or not as to whether you think that is a good thing," he said.

He believes schools can effectively organise their students observing human rights to this extent and not plunge into anarchy.

"The argument is always discipline and efficiency," he said. "That must always be at odds with the kind of education that evokes awareness." 137

"The word 'education' comes from the Latin word to lead out. You can either impose things from above or you can present information and creative opportunities for individuals to take the next step." 138

"I believe it is the second process which creates a whole happy human being."

Twelve local education authorities in England and Wales and two in Scotland have already banned corporal punishment. A further 30 have set dates for abolition or are investigating its merits. 139

The review follows legislation proposed in Victoria which would make principals and teaching staff educationally accountable to State school councils, and give councils more say in who should be appointed principals. 140

The Opposition's education 141
spokesman, Senator Baume,
said the reported decision to
freeze funds for some children
and to extend the "hit list" by
a further 15 would have
"severe repercussions".

The headmaster of Trinity
Grammar School in Sydney,
Mr Roderic West, defended
the right of all parents to gov-
ernment education funding 142
and said the independent
schools were "mortified" by
reductions in funding.

The fundamental question about
State aid was, and still is, about
who has the right to determine
which schools children will attend.

Opponents of State aid are usual-
ly, but not always, opponents of
religion in general and of the Chris-
tian religion in particular.

The inculcation of a secular phil-
osophy of education is acceptable, 143
while a Christian or religious philo-
sophy of education is unacceptable. 144

Clearly, members of the teaching
profession employed in State
schools are, generally speaking,
going to oppose State aid and
private schools because they per-
ceive threats to their own personal
employment.

More ideologically inspired oppo-
nents of State aid see the State as
the fundamental group unit with
the right to determine what
approach shall be taken to educa- 145
tion.

The fact is, however, that parents
are demanding the right to choose
for themselves what sort of school
their children will attend.

And in recent years they have
increasingly opted for independent
schools even though it costs them
more.

Since the family, in a democratic
society, is really the fundamental
group unit of society, then govern-
ments ought to be responsive to the
wishes of the electorate in making
the choice of private education 146
easier rather than more difficult.

E DU CATION historian 147
and author, Alison Mack-
innon, came face-to-face last
week with some of the history of
which she has been writing.

It was a historic moment for the
historian.

Ms Mackinnon met Mrs Beatrice Jolly,
Miss Daisy Harry and Mrs Elsie Thorne, all
old scholars of the Advanced School for
Girls in Adelaide, which is featured in Ms
Mackinnon's new book on girls' secondary
education in SA. 148

The Advanced School opened in 1879 and
was absorbed in 1907 to become part of
Adelaide High School.

"There is still a great tendency if a
child is having learning problems at
school to say 'He'll grow out of it' but
the fact is they will not, they need
help.

149 "Part of SPELD's work is to edu-
cate parents and teachers to recog-
nise the symptoms so their children
can be identified as soon as possible.
They have a good chance of over-
coming these disabilities but the
earlier they are helped the better the
chances of success."

A. S. Neill used to com-
plain that he was a prophet
without honour in his own
country — and indeed his
prolific and revolutionary
writings are far better known
and followed abroad than at
home. His books no longer
feature in the syllabus of
teacher - training courses
here — yet little has hap-
pened to British education 150
since he first wrote to make
the books less relevant now
than then. Eighty per cent
of British schools still cane
children.

CANBERRA — The Australian
Democrats have called for an in-
crease in education spending as part
of the party's education policy. 151

152 Announcing the policy yesterday,
153 the Democrats' education spokes-
man, Senator Macklin, said increased
spending was needed to overcome
unmet student demand, out-of-date
equipment and substandard accom-
modation.

"Necessary funds could be provided
by the Commonwealth if it returned
to 1979-80 funding levels," he said.

154 "This would mean a further \$430m
would have been spent by the Com-
monwealth on tertiary education this
financial year."

155 Senator Macklin said the Demo-
crats opposed any tertiary education
fees.

He said the Government's experi-
ment with the \$250 administration fee
showed fees were neither an equitable
nor efficient way of expanding terti-
ary education. 156

The Democrats advocate a new
Australian Research Foundation to
co-ordinate all Federal Government
funding to higher education. 157

158 They call for the establishment of
an open university to improve the
delivery of higher education to ex-
ternal students.

The Democrats favor a per capita
grant for all students regardless of
which school they attend, as well as
special funding provisions for schools
with special needs.

"The Commonwealth has a respon-
sibility to work with State govern-
ments to enhance the quality of
public schooling," Senator Macklin
said.

"A healthy public school sector is a
fundamental ingredient for a healthy
democracy."

THE term TAFE — Technical and Further Education 159 — may not be familiar in SA, although it has been in use for several years in other States.

Late last year the Government changed the name of the Department of Further Education to the Department of Technical and Further Education, which I believe is more appropriate to our present function. 160 161

The Department of TAFE is the major provider of tertiary education in this State, and is seen by the Industrial and Commercial Training Commission as the major educational training arm of government. 162 163

The Department of TAFE occupies a central position in filling the demands of our community for technically qualified manpower and for providing training and retraining for the new occupations and the changed occupations which are appearing as a result of the increasing rapidity of technological change.

PHI Delta Kappa, the international fraternity for men and women in education, has come to Australia with the establishment of a chapter in Canberra. The organisation was founded by educator George Reavis in 1966 to advance education through friendship and professional growth among people working in the field. 164 165 166

University of Leicester

SCHOOL OF EDUCATION 167

Lectureships in MATHEMATICS AND Computing Education (2) 168

Applications are invited from honours graduates in Mathematics with experience of teaching in schools for two posts of Lecturer in the School of Education, both specialising in mathematics and computing in education. It is hoped that the successful candidate for at least one of these posts will have interest and experience in the teaching of mathematics in primary schools. Both Lecturers will take part in initial teacher-training main method courses in mathematics and computing and will also be expected to contribute to taught masters courses in mathematics in education and in computing in education and to other courses for serving teachers within the School. 169 170 171 172

Both appointments will date from September 1, 1983, on the Lecturer salary scale £6,375-£13,505.

Application forms and further particulars can be obtained from the Registrar, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester LE1 7RH, to whom completed forms should be returned by May 3, 1983.

173 **THE EDUCATION** world is perplexed. It finds itself trapped inside a web of paradoxes that is being spun between the Department of Education, the Manpower Services Commission, and the lengthening dole queues. Teachers and careers advisers, parents and children are having to make sense of contradictory signals. There is a new emphasis on vocational training, through Government initiatives such as the Youth Training Scheme and the technical training scheme for 14 to 18-year-olds — but the job opportunities to which they are supposed to lead are drying up rather than increasing. 174

If youngsters and their parents are desperate, then teachers are confused and demoralised. How relevant are traditional educational ideas about the intrinsic worth of learning in the light of mass youth unemployment? How relevant, come to that, are progressive ideas about work experience when there is little work to be got? What is education? What is a job? Suddenly, values and concepts that were taken for granted are on the line. 175 176

TECHNOLOGY policy must incorporate adequate provisions for training and retraining workers "by hand and brain", as well as management methods which were less authoritarian and remote, according to Sir Bruce Williams.

Delivering the first Geelong Lecture for 1983 at Deakin University, Sir Bruce said that if Australia was to use technological developments to full advantage it must allow for innovations in education and management. 177

"The capacity for industry to develop opportunities depends on investment in research and education, that is, appropriate supplies of skills of hand and brain, and the ability to make adjustments to these to meet new needs," he said. 178

"Management methods appropriate to an educated labor force must be much more open than has been customary." 179

Sir Bruce also criticised the "appalling" level of knowledge of technological change, saying that we have not yet learned to make technical change a smooth process.

The question of the balance of technical change should also be considered especially during periods of boom, when bias was likely to develop.

AUSTRALIAN education is 180
in crisis. If you don't believe
me ask some parents.

To find out what is wrong
with the Australian education 181
system you do not need to look
far beyond the militant left-
wing Australian Teachers
Federation (ATF).

I can think of few organisa-
tions that have so harmed the
cause of their members or
done so much to diminish the
professional standing of what
was once a highly respected
group within the community.

Of course there are some ex-
cellent government schools
staffed by dedicated and well-
qualified teachers. And there
are some poorly performing
non-government schools.

But an increasing number of
Australians are concerned
with falling standards in the
public education system. 182

The ATF is anxious to in-
crease funding for govern-
ment schools and it recently
commissioned a survey by a
market research company.

I guess the ATF expected the
research to show that govern-
ment schools are held in high
regard and, on the basis of
this, to argue for more tax-
payers' money to be spent on
public education. 183

But when the research was
completed it revealed what
virtually everyone (except the
trade union bosses in the edu-
cation system) knew. 184

The survey results are a
devastating indictment of the
public education system. 185

The incidence of teenagers rejecting
schools had prompted a series of
forums in the past year.

The intellectual and social handicap
of semi-literacy was a major reason for
the alienation.

Mr Steidle said he had therefore held
out "very strongly" for money to be
devoted to literacy programs within the
Commonwealth Government's new
participation and equity program.
[This is a major program aimed at
keeping more students in education 186
beyond the post-compulsory years].

SYDNEY University's Pro-
fessor of Australian Literature,
Dame Leonie Kramer, raised
eyebrows in Perth when she
launched an attack on egalita-
rianism in education policy in a
187 lecture honouring one of
Australia's most illustrious Fab-
ian Socialists, Dr Herbert
Cole "Nugget" Coombs.

Delivering the inaugural Her-
bert Cole Coombs Lecture at the
WA College of Advanced Educa-
188 tion, Professor Kramer said:
189 "The educational system must
free itself from its own myth-
ology.

"It has to cease pretending that
190 education policy, which panders
to our sacred cow, egalitarian-
ism, can be fair."

"An education is fair only if it
191 brings out whatever is the best
in students, not if it pretends
that their capacities are equal,"
Professor Kramer said.

"If education is to encourage
192 the spirit of enterprise, it must
encourage faith in the future
and preserve 'divine discontent'."

She drew a distinction between
"divine discontent" and whinge-
ing disgruntlement, adding that
the latter deserved no sympathy.

Professor Kramer said she was
193 not convinced educational
programs either encouraged
faith in the future or preserved
"divine discontent" - or that
they even tried to imbue stu-
dents with any conscious sense
of purpose.

194 THE Mitchell College of Ad-
vanced Education at Bathurst
will take over the administra-
tion of the W.S. and L.B. Rob-
inson College at Broken Hill
when the University of NSW
ends its involvement at the
end of next year.

UNSW decided to phase out
its operations at Broken Hill
because the small enrolment
made it both financially and
195 educationally difficult to sus-
tain a full-time program. The
use of Robinson College as a
study resource centre has
been approved by the State
196 Minister for Education, Mr
Mulock.

"A think-tank is being set up by the Minister of Education, Mr Arnold, to provide an alternative source of advice from outside the Public Service on educating SA children.

The 12-member advisory committee is not part of the departments of Education, or Technical and Further Education, nor is it a body of lobbyists for particular interest groups.

Mr Arnold said yesterday the body would provide him with "a sounding board and ideas group." The membership had been selected to reflect community views.

Members of the committee are educator Mr Dean Ashenden, a special adviser to the Federal Minister for Education and Youth Affairs, Senator Ryan; a reader in history at the University of Adelaide, Mr Hugh Stretton; the Foreign Editor of *The Advertiser*, Mr Bill Guy; the director of the Institute of Aboriginal Development in Alice Springs, Mr Yami Lester; the managing director of John Shearer Ltd, Mr Walter Stamm; the head of the department of sociology and education at the SA College of Advanced Education, Mr Mike Presdee; a lecturer at the SACAE and the Department of Technical and Further Education, Ms Joan Russell; an officer of the SA Institute of Teachers, Ms Sue Owens; a student at the SACAE, Ms Annette Herbert; a director of the Education

Department, Mr Trevor Barr; a former advisory teacher in multicultural education, Ms Voula Giannopoulos; and the building project manager, Woodside Military Area redevelopment, Mr Mario Griguol.

Mr Arnold described the membership as ranging from those experts in the field of education to others who provided a breadth of vision valuable in dealing with problems in education, even though they were not involved in education on a day-to-day basis. They would form a body with which he could share ideas and explore options on key educational issues.

"The committee's purpose is not as a surrogate department or administrative body," he said.

Mr Arnold said the departments of Education and TAFE had been interested in the idea of the committee and now were keen to see the recommendations it would put to him.

The Opposition spokesman on education, Mr Wilson, said he supported the concept. The need for such bodies had arisen throughout Western democracies to ease the growing pressure on Ministers by vocal interest groups.

He hoped the Minister would meet the committee regularly so its advice infiltrated directly into the Education Department through the Minister himself.

Mr Wilson said he was surprised no member of the committee carried a more traditional view of education. Such a person was needed to balance those members of the committee who represented a radical view of education.

All SA school students will have to learn two languages if the SA Government adopts the recommendations of a major report.

The report, "Education for a Cultural Democracy," was issued yesterday by the Minister of Ethnic Affairs, Mr Sumner, who said it would be subject to public comment and reaction before a final decision was made on the recommendations.

The report, prepared by a task force formed in November to examine multiculturalism and education in SA, says all students should learn a language other than English. Teaching these languages should be part of SA Education Department policy and a requirement for the registration of non-government schools.

The report also recommends that:

● Each education body in SA should establish a unit to act as a focus for the development of multicultural policies.

● Education policies at all levels should be approved only after full consideration of implications relating to multiculturalism.

● Members of minority ethnic communities should be appointed to those educational bodies responsible for all major aspects of all levels of the education process.

Keeping the entire teacher population in State schools in recent years would have been economically unsound, the Minister of Education, Mr. Allison, said last night.

He was commenting on an ALP claim that the Liberal Government has let nearly 900 teaching positions disappear since 1979.

Labor says in its education platform it will retain teaching positions liberated from some areas through declining enrolments and channel them to needy areas, such as class sizes that are still too large, special education, Aboriginal education and curriculum development.

Mr. Allison told a public meeting of about 400 at the SA Institute of

Teachers headquarters that enrolments in the State school system had dropped by about 35,000 in the past seven years.

"To suggest that we might have maintained the entire teacher population through the whole of that loss is really flying in the face of economy because these are straitened times," he said.

Earlier, the Opposition spokesman on education, Mr. Arnold, said education had suffered in the past three years through financial mismanagement, and while the Government might say it was devoting more money to the State system, the ALP believed from its data that \$12m. less had reached the classroom door since 1979.

Mr. Allison said the Liberals' education policy would be issued this week.

If it's French or philosophy.

A CURIOUS and archaic attitude to education is showing itself in a piecemeal campaign by HM Customs and Excise to impose VAT on adult education. In the colleges of further education and some adult education centres in Oxfordshire students taking a variety of courses from car maintenance to cookery, keep fit and self-defence are paying VAT at 15 per cent, while others attending similar courses within a couple of miles are not. But, wherever you are, choose French, philosophy, or even pottery and you are still safe from tax.

The picture is uneven nationwide. Early in 1982 local tax officers told Der-

byshire LEA that "all adult education courses except those in languages, typing, local history and GCE subjects are taxable." But Derbyshire, along with Kent, Essex and Walsall, has resisted demands in spite of the threat of back tax. (The £35,000 which the county council set aside to cover VAT if the worst came to the worst must have made that decision easier.) Late in 1983, West Sussex was asked to supply details of all its adult education classes.

While difficult local decisions are being made, national negotiations between HM Customs and Excise and the local authorities' representatives — the Association of County Councils and the

Association of Metropolitan Authorities — are not making progress. Nor are they likely to while HM Customs and Excise hold to the entrenched view that if students don't learn and shower afterwards their classes must be for pleasure rather than education.

Until recently there was no thought of imposing a tax on what has been recognised as a Cinderella service. Education is generally exempted from VAT. But the 1972 Finance Act excludes from the exemption education of a "sporting or recreational nature". To the taxman crafts such as silk-screen printing are recreational, while literature is not. Underlying this discrimination is the age-old prejudice against education.

it's education; if it's cookery

which isn't book-learning, against PE and doing things with your hands.

The 1944 Education Act requires the local authority to provide education "to contribute to the spiritual, moral, mental and physical development of the community," and, in particular, "to secure the provision for their area of . . . part-time education for persons over compulsory school age; and leisure-time occupation in such organised cultural training and recreative activities as are suited to their requirements, for any persons over compulsory school age who are able and willing to profit . . ." not "able and willing to pay high fees." Unfortunately, the 1972 Finance Act contradicts these

educational principles; VAT regulations arising from the Sixth Directive of the EEC and not from an understanding of United Kingdom provision for continuing education.

What factors have caused the taxmen to cast their eyes on the education service belatedly, apart from the fact that we are, at last, learning to present education as enjoyment? One is pressure from the private sector — from those running sports courses and the managers of squash courts. But commercial courses do not share the broader objectives of the education service, nor do they attempt to cater for minorities and the underprivileged. They do not offer fee reductions to those who could not

otherwise benefit, nor do they provide educational counselling. For LEA students the course for which they initially enrol is often the first step into anything from literacy to higher education.

But perhaps the critical factor is, ironically, the effect of the cuts in local government spending. It has always been easier to cut adult education than any other part of the education budget and a stage has been reached at which much adult education has become almost self-financing. This has meant sweeping increases in fees, and these in turn have caught the attention of the VAT inspectors.

Until recently it was possi-

or keep fit, it's not

ble to believe that the necessity to cut spending on continuing education was a matter of regret to the Government, but can this be so if a 15 per cent tax is to be added to ever-increasing fees? What has become of the provisions of the 1944 Education Act if they are to be judged by the Secretary of State at the Treasury, Mr Barney Hayhoe, to be "unfair competition" for commercial organisations? Should public money be circulated from education into the Treasury in this way?

Continuing education, in the words of the chairman of Oxfordshire's Education Committee, Councillor John Clarke, is "the smallest part of the budget and the most

cost-effective." The volunteer input which it attracts multiplies the value of the little that is invested in it. To impose VAT not only means a further increase in fees for students but also adds intolerable hours of administrative work which there is no paid staff to do. An amendment to the VAT Act 1983 specifically exempting all adult education provided by LEA colleges including adult and community education centres is now urgently needed to ensure the survival of this key part of the education service.

Pauline Nashashibi

Pauline Nashashibi is Community Education Organiser for North & West Oxford.

South Australia is moving in the same direction. The Minister for Health, Dr John Cornwall, is gesturing in all directions in an anti-smoking campaign of heroic dimensions.

He has spent taxpayers' money in the newspapers declaring his educational and legislative intentions in relation to tobacco, which, he declares in the face of every known world statistic, is "the single most significant cause of preventable illness".

The latest available figures showed that in June last year there were about 19,000 private overseas students in Australia, plus about 3000 who come here under sponsorship schemes through the ADAB. This compares with about 9500 private overseas students in 1978.

Of the 19,000 there were about 14,500 in formal education — about 10,500 in tertiary courses and 4000 in secondary courses. Another 4500 students were here in other categories of education such as occupational trainees.

While private overseas students have been entering Australia since the 1900s it is only since the mid-1970s they have become a political issue. The abolition of university fees by the Whitlam government meant that overseas students, like local students, could take advantage of a free education. However, the Government set a maximum quota of 10,000 private overseas students studying in Australia at any one time.

PETER Karmel the economist probably will be best remembered as Peter Karmel the education planner and administrator.

Yesterday he returned to the lecture room where he once taught at the University of Adelaide but with a class very different from the budding economists he spoke to 22 years ago.

He was then the university's professor of economics. Now, having steered Flinders University in its first days as Vice-Chancellor, chaired Federal Government, university and tertiary education advisory bodies for a decade, and headed major SA and Federal enquires into education, it is his thoughts on education that are valued.

It was for that reason Professor Karmel, 60, and Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National University, Canberra, returned to speak at a conference of senior administrators associated with SA's secondary and tertiary education.

The three-day conference is looking at what sort of schooling should be provided for 15 to 18-year-olds at a time of massive unemployment.

Professor Karmel says educators in the late 1960s and early 1970s believed that the economy would continue to grow and something like full employment would continue.

As a result, the enquiry into education in SA in 1971, which he chaired, was concerned with giving "more of the same," that is, getting as many people as possible to reap the fruits of education by simply pouring more money into the education machine.

He still supported parents' rights to send their children to whatever type of school they liked, but the school's curriculum would have to be of some educational value. He might even consider taking action

against parents who send their children to schools at which they are effectively taught nothing.

By this time, everyone was confused.

The question arose when the Opposition began asked about a school which had been set up by Mrs Rona Joyner.

Mrs Joyner, who has begun what is called an Accelerated Christian Education system school in the northern Brisbane suburb of Woody Point, has the ear of the Premier, Mr Bjelke-Petersen.

The Opposition began to question whether what Mrs Joyner was providing was in fact education.

Mr Powell said the Government was completely unconcerned if children emerged from such schools without a junior or senior certificate. The choice was the parents', not the Government's.

Then, almost inexplicably, Mr Powell changed his mind. The Government WAS concerned if Queensland students emerged from these non-approved schools without any relevant qualifications for their future life, he said. In fact, the Government might act against parents who did not ensure their children received an education in the "true" sense of the word.

The assumptions about the economy remained in the 1973 report of the interim committee for the Commonwealth Schools Commission for the Whitlam Government which he also chaired. But the strategy for equality of educational opportunity had become more subtle, going beyond equal resources for everybody.

The 1973 report argued that more resources had to go to the disadvantaged if they were to have the same opportunities from education as others, and so the Commonwealth Schools Commission embarked on special programs, which are still in place, for the handicapped, Aborigines, and the socio-economic disadvantaged.

"By 1973 we were talking about compensatory education that is bigger inputs for the disadvantaged," Professor Karmel says.

"We are still talking about that really.

"What has changed is that then we saw the disadvantaged as being people who would leave school and get jobs but they would be poor jobs and they would be handicapped by their educational background for their working lives."

"Now we recognise that there is a large proportion of school-leavers which do not get jobs quickly and some of those will be out of employment for a rather long period.

"It would be better to devise educational programs to hold them in, if they are not going to get jobs, with a view of the programs being worthwhile activities. Earlier we thought of the educational programs as an aid to getting the jobs."

Unless the education system is able to impart literacy and numeracy skills, and an ability to reason in a complicated society, this group will have children who are even more disadvantaged, resulting in a sub-culture like working-class urban blacks in the US.

Professor Karmel is still a believer in education, if less simplistic as to how it can achieve a better society.

"I don't think any of us are quite as starry-eyed," he says. "We are more aware of what the limits and constraints are. Most of us felt education would solve everything if more education was pumped into people."

"We are more aware now of the fact that there are so many different variables which determine the way the world is and we don't expect education to do everything."

But there were more demands on education that a decade ago.

"You have to use it not only to help people to learn to cope with life and work, but also we have to think of it as a worth while activity in itself," he says.

The union is keen on educational reform, but opposed to the ad hoc committee which it believes should have a wider representation and be more "grass-rooted". It is also strongly opposed to the highly centralised education system where the curricula are controlled by Mombusho.

The assistant secretary-general of the JTU, Mr Hachiriyo Ueda, blames the high economic growth of the 1960s for many school problems.

"Education is the train connected to the locomotive of high economic growth policy," he says. "But education should not be subjugated to economic policy — it should be to bring out the personality."

Mr Nakasone also sees room for improvement in the teaching of English. Children can study English for up to six years of high school, but educationists are alarmed that few can converse in even a limited fashion.

The main fault has been teaching method — the use of dictionaries for endless translations, but with little exposure to conversation or native speakers.

But they were being forced to adapt anyway through the advent of the 14-18 scheme and the YTS. Could schools digest these foreign bodies or would they cause an acute attack of educational indigestion? Absorption would obviously be easier if schools knew just what the 14-18 scheme was all about. Is it a new route of learning for all ability ranges, as the MSC has said it is; or is it a solution to "the problem of our least able children," as Sir Keith Joseph has said it is? For if Sir Keith is right, then it will quickly be seen as a second-rate education for the children we care least about. But then again, if children actually want to be, say, plumbers, isn't it better they learn to do that at school than forcing them to follow curricula which they see as irrelevant? And isn't opposition to such vocational schemes at odds with advocacy of experience-based curricula? Tony Watts disagreed.

"If we hold people for longer and longer in pursuit of general educational value, we're in the business of schooling," he said. "If you give them one experience which is attached to an identity, which is their future, that is very different from giving them access to a variety of work experiences from which they can learn all sorts of skills and things which might be of wider value."

As for the Youth Training Scheme, that seems to be perceived within the education service as a con-trick — an attempt to park the young unemployed somewhere for a while and legitimise that process with a philosophy that sounds good.

John Swallow explained: "If it was the kind of training we've been talking about for years, there would have been some kind of unification at the government centre. Instead, it's coming through a department that has nothing to do with the education system. Beyond that, there's a conscious attempt to keep schools and colleges out of it altogether and keep it employer-based." Such a bias has led cynics to conclude that one of its primary functions is to depress youth wages.

Training for work is important — everyone seems agreed on that. But there is considerable scepticism that YTS can actually deliver. "The resources and expertise required to deliver the rhetoric attached to YTS are far wider than are found in places of employment," said Tony Watts. "The constant battle is between many of us saying, look, we want it to be a high quality education and training programme and employers saying, I'm sorry, we can't do this or that because we've got a job to do and we've actually got to meet our targets and we haven't got time to go round helping these youngsters to learn."

The danger was, he said, that there would be a split. It would begin in the upper end of the schools, which would revert to academicism and away from the "new sixth" broader curricula, and which would pull the lower part of the schools along the same path. Then there would be the YTS; but the 14-18 scheme would cut right across the academic school structure and wouldn't fit in. And the YTS would have allowances and access to employers, while the 17-plus which was similar in many respects to the YTS, would not. So there would be new tensions within the schools.

Teachers will have to come to terms with the information revolution just as weavers had to adapt to the production line, according to a university professor of education. 301

Professor C. N. Power, of Flinders University's education department, 302 told a conference on computers in education at the weekend that the new 303 information technologies offered new tools and methods to the teaching profession.

[For example, micro-computers can allow students to develop mathematical skills through programs that instruct them to perform exercises and then indicate whether they are correct; more advanced programs allow such things as simulation of biology experiments.]

Professor Power told the conference, held by the SA Institute of Teachers, that teachers would need a great deal of help if they were to realise the possibilities and strengths of the new tools and be in a position critically to evaluate their products.

"Unfortunately, educators have 304 tended to do little more than wait passively for corporations to produce video games and computer-based instructional packages rather than actively contributing to the realisation of

305 the educational potential of the new technology," he said.

306 "As it is, the vast bulk of the educational software produced thus far is of very poor quality. In addition, corporations find it more profitable to develop and market technotronic babysitters than games and children's programs, which teach as well as entertain or fill time.

307 "Thus far, the new technology has done little to meet the educational needs of children. If it is to do so, 308 educators will need to adapt creatively to the challenge."

Professor Power looked to the Commonwealth Schools Commission, which carries out special Federal Government education programs, to create 309 a context in which this could happen.

Babies born with a sound education ³¹⁰

PSYCHOLOGISTS have occasionally suggested that our lives may be colored by experiences before birth.

But these theories have always been confronted with two objections. What experiences can we have, floating securely in the dark in our amniotic fluid? And supposing such experiences are possible, is the brain of the unborn infant developed enough to store memories and make associations?

Research reported in Science, the journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, shows that the unborn child can indeed remember and make connections.

A team under Dr Anthony Decasper, at the University of North Carolina, studied the possibility that unborn babies could remember sounds and make associations which they could act on after birth.

Before they could tackle these problems, though, the team had to solve another — how to get information from a baby.

They developed a device that connected a baby's bottle to a tape-recorder so the baby could choose one or two recorded sounds by the way it sucked.

The scientists quickly found children preferred their mothers' voice, compared with any other.

The question then was: had they heard the voice in the womb or was it merely the voice they heard first and most frequently since birth?

To test this Dr Decasper got a number of men who had been present when their children were born to talk to their babies as much as possible during the first couple of days of life.

The children showed no evidence of preferring their fathers' voice to that of other men, although their sucking pattern showed they could distinguish between the voices.

To check positively that babies heard and remembered sounds in the womb, Dr Decasper persuaded a group of pregnant women to read to their unborn babies from Dr Seuss's *The Cat in the Hat*.

Once born, the children showed a preference for this compared with the reading of another children's book, thereby demonstrating that children do remember sounds heard through the amniotic fluid before birth.

One of the Government's moves which is likely to get lost in today's release is the decision to appoint Professor Peter Karmel, the man whose 1973 report shaped our present pattern of Commonwealth school funding, to head a committee to review the quality of education.

Professor Karmel, who is Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National University and who in the past decade has had involvement with the tertiary rather than school system, will be a controversial appointment to the post.

That is because he is on record as urging the Federal Government to spend its money increasing participation in education rather than trying to improve existing school standards.

In short, he believes that schools are doing pretty well and that it is unrealistic to try to raise the spending per child when there are more pressing demands to increase the numbers; that schools should be doing better with the funding levels they already have.

None of that goes down well with the major government school groups, in particular, who are likely to be more than a little nervous with what a 1980s "Karmel Committee" would come up with.

Carel Kapek's vision of Rossum's universal robots or Robert Heinlein's concept of the semi-human computer "Mike" are both, thank God, a long, long way in the future.

But computers, despite their limitations, are becoming an essential part of education.

Right now, Australia is experiencing a veritable flood of educational software for a wide variety of computers coming on to the market.

Much of it is rubbish. Much was prepared overseas and is not suitable for Australian use. But some of it is superbly written to fit in precisely with Australian educational requirements.

The problem is that in most schools there just are not enough computers to go around to make use of the good programs. In many schools it is rare for a child to get more than a few minutes a week actually using a computer. Which is a great pity because modern computer programs can teach children to cope with the modern world.

One of the great educational problems is a language called Logo, which is now available for a variety of machines. If you have a child of school age at some point you will be exposed to Logo and its turtle so it is best if you are prepared to answer questions at least half-way intelligently.

Logo is a painless way for children - and grown-ups - to learn computer logic and programming.

It was originally designed in

1968 by Seymour Papert, and a group of researchers at a Cambridge, Massachusetts, consulting firm.

He believed computers were ideal tools for creating a stimulating educational environment and for all I know he may well be right.

Logo encourages the use of a structured approach to writing a program. Each step is broken down into its smallest tasks. From the beginning Logo is teaching how to program in a proper and logical way.

However, because we are scared stiff of words like programming we do not use that word with Logo. A set of tasks is called a procedure. (The fact that I think the word procedure is even more frightening than programming merely shows I have not had the sort of education that I should have had.)

I am willing to argue that there is a need to educate our children in the process of writing programs as well as using them. This way they will truly learn to control the computer and not vice versa. Logo is a major step forward in that direction.

If ever there was a reason for buying a personal computer for home use it is as an educational aid. It is not just that computer literacy is, in itself, a good thing, but that a computer can, with the right programs, teach logical thought and can supplement - not replace - a normal education. Logo is a classic example of such a program.

PROFESSOR Peter Karmel, the man who will head the Federal Government's major review of educational quality, is probably the only educator to become a household name in this country.

That was through the 1973 Karmel Report which determined the pattern for Commonwealth funding for private and government schools which remains today.

The report had a profound effect on education - it identified important deficiencies in schools, set ideal resource levels, (known as the Karmel targets), and put in train increased federal funding through the Commonwealth Schools Commission.

A decade later, Professor Karmel, now Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National University, has been called on again by a Labor government to reassess the school system.

But "Karmel revisited" is being conducted in a far different political and educational climate.

As the Minister for Education and Youth Affairs, Senator Ryan, said yesterday, the Government is concerned that despite the overall increase in resources devoted to education in the last decade, problems of quality remain.

In other words, the Karmel targets set in 1973 were reached six or seven years ago and resource standards have continued to rise, yet many are questioning whether the educational outcomes are as good as they should be.

The unprecedented meeting is designed to pressure the Federal Government to allocate increased funds to engineering departments.

The dean of engineering at Adelaide University, Dr K.E. Moxham, said the current funding-demand situation was regarded as a "crisis situation".

"There has been a big upswing in the number of students wanting to take engineering, and at the same time we have been faced with cuts in funding," he said. "At Adelaide, for example, one branch of engineering is now more difficult to get into than medicine."

The other organiser, Mr J.H. Brodie, of the University of Tasmania, said from Hobart: "The need for Australia to enhance its technological base has been stressed almost continuously for the past year. This cannot take place unless engineering education is properly supported."

AUSTRALIA'S education will only become a viable export if universities, TAFE colleges and colleges of advanced education design courses to meet the specific needs of Asian students.

Dr Peter McCawley, a member of the Jackson Committee on overseas aid, told an Adelaide conference at the weekend that the Federal Government and educational institutions would have to do more than merely lift Asian student quotas if education was to become a viable export.

He said most tertiary courses were designed to suit the needs of Australia, which was a highly developed country in comparison with Asia, so they would have to be modified if they were to attract foreign students.

Dr McCawley, who is a senior research fellow at the Australian National University, was one of two speakers who urged a market-oriented approach when they addressed the national conference of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. The national president of the institute, Sir Russel Madigan, also said the tertiary sector should capitalise on Australia's ability to provide educational services for Asian countries.

AUSTRALIA must look seriously at the rationale behind the present funding system for tertiary institutions, according to Dr Gregor Ramsey, the new chairman of the Advanced Education Council.

Listing a series of possibilities, Dr Ramsey asked whether it would:

STILL be appropriate for the Commonwealth to provide virtually all the funding for higher education institutions.

BE more appropriate for State governments to support all elements of tertiary education in the way it provided for government schools and TAFE.

BE appropriate for students to pay for their own tertiary education.

BE more appropriate for employers to pay for the education of individuals.

"In asking these questions I want to encourage the serious consideration of the rationale for current financial support of our institutions," he said.

"I can see that there could come a time in Australia (not in the next decade perhaps) when employers take on the education of young people from an early age, and schools are not publicly supported.

LOCAL communities should have an input into tertiary education to avoid the "Educating Rita" syndrome, according to Dr Dennis Davis of Macquarie University.

Dr Davis told a seminar at the Nepean College of Advanced Education recently that the "Educating Rita" syndrome occurred when people were taken out of their community context and left in a culture that was strange to them.

This eventually made them feel alienated in their own environment — a position similar to that of Rita in the film Educating Rita.

Dr Davis proposed that "universities without walls" should be set up to help overcome both motivational and transport problems faced by students in the western suburbs of Sydney.

The scheme would be for people who had already passed through the education system, who were unemployed, but who lacked the higher-education credentials to get them back into the education system.

"I propose that facilitators go to the western suburbs and carefully select about 10 people with educational problems, and work out an educational package which would have three main elements," Dr Davis said.

"The first main element is basic skill courses such as literacy and numeracy, which is a basic remedial type work.

"Then there would be a group of subjects taken from existing tertiary education institutions such as universities, CAEs or TAFE. But I would expect six times out of 10 it would be taken from TAFE.

"Finally, there would be the community-type subjects which would draw from the community background from which a person comes."

Dr Humphrey is director of planning, research and information – the first woman to have reached the third tier of TAFE administration. The purpose of the Fulbright Award is to provide opportunities for qualified educators to study the American system, and is not designed for study towards an academic degree.

"I am going to be looking at American college facilities in both rural and urban areas," she said. "I am particularly interested in the specialised, high-technology training education."

Dr Humphrey will also learn about information systems and programs for disadvantaged groups.

She will look at community relations and public awareness of education, as well as internal communications.

DR Blewett's comments concerning the transfer of nurse education to colleges of advanced education lack credibility. This so-called "historic" decision will prove to be highly expensive, lower the junior standard of nursing and certainly not provide any long-term nursing advantages to these graduates as they progress.

It is because State governments, and the NSW Government in particular, cut back funding so drastically to hospitals that the hospitals were forced to advise governments that they could no longer afford to fund nurse education.

To say that the nurses demanded college education is baloney. Dr Blewett and the bureaucrats demanded it! Nurses need to be trained as nurses, not as doctors. Each have a separate and vital function to fulfil.

To be able to function efficiently in the life and death situations of a hospital requires experience at "just coping" on a day-to-day basis and this is the valuable training which will be delayed for three years while nurses achieve a college education.

LUNACY in our education system is now personified. Listed as an entry in the Wattle Park Teachers Centre, Nature Education Centre's Joan catalogue is a living organism called the HUNTSPERSON Spider would you believe? How long before we have to call specimen specimen?

IT WAS the Fraser government which began the habit of blaming the education system for ever-rising levels of youth unemployment, of lambasting schools for not preparing students for the workplace.

It is a theme politicians find hard to resist, and one which the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, returned to, albeit indirectly, yesterday when he told a Canberra conference that with increasing competition for jobs, schools had to provide students with the right skills to move into the market. He doubled the education system was equal to the task.

Mr Hawke is not wrong of course to question the education product – rational analysis of the quality of our schools is essential for a country trying to scramble up the technology ladder and restructure its economy.

But the implication, however veiled, that changes in curricula will somehow provide children with a better chance of getting jobs is too glib an approach to the fact that we no longer have enough jobs to go around.

That aside, the Government's interest in "educational outcomes" is very much in line with the approach it seems to be developing over funding.

This is that after substantial investment by State and federal governments in education it is time to do some sort of cost-benefit analysis of it all and see whether we're getting value for money.

The Government has already appointed education's elder statesman, Professor Peter Karmel, to head a committee reviewing educational quality, and the professor is on record as saying that schools should be doing much better in forming basic skills, considering the money poured in during the past decade.

There should be no quarrel with such a review, but the Government must not use it as a convenience for reducing the education budget – a move already feared by some in the State school system, still angry at the favoritism shown the private, rather than the State system, in the latest funding allocations.

Moreover, in its search for relevant curricula the Government must be careful not to shape the system to meet narrow, utilitarian goals which, though they may suit short-term economic factors, could leave future generations without the questioning education which has characterised the best of the Western system.

The direction of education 370 towards "vocational" subjects presupposes in the directors some philosophy of what edu- 371 cation in itself should entail. If this is to exclude study in disciplines which train the individual into questioning habits of thought, and some acquaintance with the ethical aspects of life, then we are witnessing a process of direction which is very sinister indeed.

MOST Australian children want to be educated about sex, 372 a study on the sexual thinking of 5 to 15-year-olds has found.

The study, of how children in North America, England, Australia and Sweden perceive sexuality, found 85 per cent of 7-year-olds, 97 per cent of 9-year-olds and 100 per cent of those over 13 wanted sex education. 373

SCHOOLS and teachers are not making the best use of computer technology. This is the view of Professor Alfred Bork, of the Educational Technology Centre at the University of California, who was a keynote speaker at the ACEC '84 conference held last week at Macquarie University in Sydney.

Professor Bork regards the use of computers in schools as vital in ensuring that education 375 remains receptive to technological change.

"AUSTRALIA'S domestic satellite could be used to extend teaching resources," the Minister for Education, 376 Senator Susan Ryan, is quoted as saying in the latest edition of the NSW Department of Technical and Further Education newsletter. 377

Unfortunately it is hard to take Susan seriously. The headline on the article reads: "Educational use of satellites." 378

It is unfortunate, to say the least, that a statement about the situation in Ethiopia "the first desperate need is contraceptives . . ." is given respectability by a Professor of Imperial College, London (Letters, November 1). If ever I saw an argument for more development education, advocated in the letter in the adjacent column, that must be it.— 379

A WINTER of discontent in schools which will mean part-time education for 380 thousands of pupils was threatened by teachers 381 meeting in Scarborough yesterday.

GILES Pickford suggests (Letters, 19/9) that the act of worship cannot have the worshipper as its object. I seem to recall that during my English public school education we were often reminded that we were successful, English, and essentially self-made men. On Sundays, of course, we worshipped our Maker.

I CAN'T refute the assertion by sex educators Sol Gordon 382 and Wendy McCarthy that parents should "tell children everything, all the time" (28/8). Maybe so, maybe not.

However, with so many of the confident assertions by progressive educators over the 383 past decade proven wrong in practice, parents could be forgiven for scepticism about "experts."

We are under attack again. It would appear that those whose lives are based on a literal interpretation of the events in the Bible would have us all accept their intellectual feebleness as the educational 384 standard for our youth.

A report shown on Channel 9's program Sunday (16/9) indicated that the Queensland Minister for Education has 385 established by ministerial fiat that "Creationism" must stand on the same footing as "The Theory of Evolution" in Queensland schools.

To pretend that a private interpretation of a glorious poem must stand beside rigorous research in the name of educational honesty is to 386 debase education. 387

WHAT is the point of education? 388

With the unemployment situation in Australia worsening, many people in their last two years of school begin to wonder whether all their years at school have been worth while.

They cannot see the point of continuing with an education 389 which will probably not get them a job. Very often they simply give up and leave school.

Some stay on but make excuses to themselves for not studying. One boy I know does no study at all in a weak subject because he says it is "useless" and won't get him a job.

On the other hand there is a group of students, especially first-generation Australians, who study phenomenally hard because education is their only asset. They 390 know that if they are unemployed their whole families will live in poverty.

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Education cannot expect to escape cuts in the next State Budget, according to the Minister of Education, Mr Crafter.

He said yesterday that the community faced the need for restraint and "sectional interests within education, including teachers, cannot expect to avoid their share".

Mr Crafter was responding to claims by the SA Institute of Teachers that SA's primary, secondary and tertiary education system faced the most serious cuts in more than a decade.

The SAIT president, Mr R. W. Jackson said an expected 4 p.c. cut "across the board" would mean cuts of about \$30m to education and the axing of jobs for 600 teachers.

(The State's 1985-86 education budget, including about \$98m for the Department of Technical And Further Education, is about \$700m).

The Government did not confirm or deny the SAIT's predicted figures but Mr Crafter said there was a clear need for restraint at Federal and State levels "at this time of economic difficulty".

"Education and other human services cannot expect to be excluded from the need for tighter scrutiny to ensure resources are being used as efficiently as possible," he said.

"The State Government has already demonstrated a clear commitment to education by improving resources for the benefit of students and school staff."

Mr Jackson said that following talks with the Premier, Mr Bannon, on Friday the union expected a 4 p.c. cut "across the board" in the next State Budget.

Such cuts would cause a serious decline in the quality of education and would result in overcrowded classrooms, and reductions in facilities and

the number of subject choices that could be offered by schools.

The meeting with Mr Bannon had been to determine the State Government's position in light of union concern there would be Federal Government funding cuts to education — particularly to the professional development of teachers, the Participation and Equity Program (which encourages disadvantaged groups to continue their education), and the English as a Second Language (ESL) Program (for people whose mother tongue is other than English).

Mr Bannon had "indicated significant cuts" to SA's education budget and said the State Government would be unable to pick up the tab for cuts in Federal Government programs as it had done in the past.

Mr Jackson said that although exact figures were not given at the meeting, "informal departmental sources" calculated this would mean about 600 jobs and a cut of \$30m.

While the institute recognised difficulties being faced by all governments because of current economic circumstances an "assault" on education of this magnitude could only make matters worse.

"Experience both here and overseas has time and time again proved a direct relationship between economic growth and adequate funding for education," he said.

"The only way we may be able to get the Premier to reconsider is to have a joint parent-teacher debate with the Government with people writing to him, speaking to him and teachers will want to protest to him."

Mr Jackson said the SAIT Council would consider the implications at its meeting this Saturday.

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IN July 1983 the Hawke Government asked the Commonwealth Schools Commission to begin a major review of Australian education.

The aim was to bring about greater participation in the education system, to improve confidence in government schools, to help ensure that every child had access to a satisfactory standard of education, and, most important, to provide stability and security for the funding arrangements for government and non-government schools.

The commission consulted State governments, government and non-government education authorities, and teacher and parent organisations in all States and territories in developing its recommendations to the Commonwealth.

Arising out of that consultation the Commonwealth Government has decided on a new, common basis for the financial support of all schools, both government and non-government, according to an eight-year plan.

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All primary and secondary schools in Australia will continue to receive Commonwealth funds to help meet their running costs.

No school will receive less money per student in 1985 than it is receiving in 1984.

The common basis for funding from 1985 will be the community standard — a measure developed by the Schools Commission of the basic education resource needs of each student in a typical school.

The new Commonwealth arrangements for the funding of government and non-government schools are based on the following principles:

THE Commonwealth Government accepts that it shares with State governments, non-government education authorities and parents a community responsibility for the education of all Australian children.

GOVERNMENTS have a primary obligation to the public education system. The Hawke Government is wholly committed to the public education system's principle of openness to all, whatever their circumstances and needs. It will cooperate with the State governments to ensure that the government schools operate at the highest possible standards.

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APPENDIX II

An Overview of 'Education' Language-Games

(To be read in conjunction with Appendix I)

Explanation of the Columns:

- [1] Number of the example in Appendix I
- [2] Minimum wording identifiable as a semantic unit
- [3] Suggested dictionary meaning, numbered as in §1.2.2, pp. 11 & 12
- [4] Suggested paraphrase; (other explanatory wording in brackets)

[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
1	education	18	schooling
2	education	3	curricular
3	education	1	teaching methods
		4	courses of instruction
4	educational	1	pedagogical
5	educational	2	learning
6	educational	1	instructional
		4	courses of instruction
7	SA Education Department	12	(formula)
8	education funds	16	public money allocated to schools etc.
9	educational gains	9?	higher levels of achievement
		3?	improvements to the curriculum
10	education	7	schooling
11	education	1	teaching
12	education	6?	the education system
		18?	what is done in schools
13	education	1	teaching
14	higher education	17	attendance at tertiary institutions
15	education	4	courses
16	education	2	studying
17	College of advanced education	12	(formula)
18	education	1	teaching
19	education	16	for schools etc.
20	education	16	schools etc.
21	education	16	for schools etc.
22	education	20	education
23	education	10	bringing up children
24	education	10	bringing up children

25	education	17	attendance at school
26	The Education Secretary	12	(formula)
27	education	3	the curriculum
28	North of England Education Conference	12	(formula)
29	An Education Correspondent	12	(formula)
30	religious education	5	(name of school subject; formula)
31	physical education	5	(name of school subject; formula)
32	education provision	16	resources available to schools
33	the whole education service	6	all who operate within the system
34	education	4	courses of instruction
35	educationalist	11	theorist of teaching
36	educational	1	instructional
37	education	19	schools etc. in a non-differentiated sense
38	educationalists	11	theorists of education
		1	teachers
39	educational	1	instructional
40	educational	1	instructive
41	educational	16	concerned with schools as consumers of software
42	educationalists	11	theorists of education
		1	teachers
43	educational	1	instructional
44	education authority	12	(formula)
45	education	16	school
46	Australian Council for Educational Standards	12	(formula)
47	education	2	learning
48	education standards had fallen	2	pupils were learning (or were expected to learn) less
49	education	3	the curriculum

50	educational	11	into the principles and practice of schooling
51	socialisation education	10	(tautological; 'socialisation education' = 'socialisation')
52	educated	7	academically qualified
53	education	17	attendance at school
54	education	16	schools
55	educational	1	of teachers
56	Education Authority	12	(formula)
57	Business Education	5	(name of subject; formula)
58	business education	5	(name of subject; formula)
59	Education Officer	12	(formula)
60	educated	1	taught
61	education	16	institutions
62	education	7	training
63	education	7	training
64	education	4	courses
65	Centre for Multi-Cultural Education	12	(formula)
66	Institute of Education	12	(formula)
67	education	7	schooling
68	Primary, Secondary and Further Education sectors	16	primary schools, secondary schools and further education colleges
69	Multi-ethnic education	12? 5?	(formula) (courses of a particular type)
70	teacher education provision	5	courses of training for teachers
71	education	7	schooling
72	Education Department	12	(formula)
73	physical education	5	(name of school subject; formula)
74	physical education	5	(name of school subject; formula)
75	SA Education Act	12	(formula)

76	education	10	upbringing
77	SA Education Act	12	(formula)
78	Anglican Church education committee	12	(ad hoc formula)
79	religious education	5	(name of school subject; formula)
80	education	1	teaching
81	education	18	what happens in schools etc.
82	education	3	curricular
83	education	2	learning
		9	achievement
84	educational	11	concerned with the theory and practice of teaching and learning
85	education	9	of achievement
86	education	1	of instruction
87	educator	-	(typographical error/solecism for 'educator'; a sign without educational significance)
88	Minister of Education	12	(formula)
89	education	4?	courses
		17?	attendance at school
90	education	9	academic qualifications
91	education	16	schools etc.
92	education	7?	schooling
		10?	upbringing including schooling
93	senior secondary school education	3	(either 'school' or 'education' is redundant; = s.s. education or s.s. schooling)
94	senior secondary school education	1	(cf. No. 93; differs in implying learning rather than teaching)
95	consumer education	5	(name of school subject; formula)
96	Workers' Educational Association	12	(formula)
97	community education	5	(name of courses of a particular type)
98	education authorities	12	(grammatical plural of a formula)
99	education	18	in the achievements of schools

100	education	18	of what schools do
101	educated	1	taught
102	educational	3	curricular
103	education	9?	educatedness
104	'Education!'	-	(expletive; no educat- meaning)
105	education	7	schooling (received)
106	education	3	schooling (given)
107	education	7	training
108	education	9	educatedness
109	education	2	learning
110	'education'	-	(the sign; no symbolic meaning)
111	'educated person'	-	(sign labelling a concept)
112	educated	1	taught
113	education	17	(in attendance at) schools etc.
114	education system	12	system of schools etc. (formula)
115	education	3	curriculum
116	educators	1	teachers
117	education system	12	(formula)
118	Education for Capability	12	(ad hoc formula)
119	educators	6	administrators of the system
120	education	3	curriculum
121	educational	20	educational
122	education	20	education
123	two-tier educational system	1	system of teaching (not system of schools since it is implied that the two tiers could exist within one school)
124	education system	12	system of schools etc. (formula)
125	educate	15	train
126	education	7	training

127	education	3	curriculum
128	education	1	teaching
129	Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission	12	(formula)
130	education	1	teaching
131	educate	1	teach
132	education	3	curriculum
133	The Minister for Education	12	(formula)
134	education	19	(education in any sense)
135	education	18	what schools do
136	National Council for Educational Standards	12	(formula)
137	education	1	teaching
138	'education'	-	(the word; no referential meaning)
139	local education authorities	12	(grammatical plural of a formula)
140	educationally	3	for the curriculum
141	education	19	(education in any sense)
142	education	16	for schools etc.
143	education	20	education
144	education	20	education
145	education	7	schooling
146	education	17	attendance at school
147	education	6? 16?	the education system schools
148	education	16	schools
149	educate	13	condition; make aware
150	education	6	the education system
151	education	16	on schools etc.
152	education	6	for the education system
153	education	19	(education in any sense)

154	education	16	colleges etc.
155	education	17	for attendance at...
156	education	16	colleges etc.
157	higher education	16	tertiary colleges etc.
158	higher education	5	(courses of a particular type; formula)
159	Technical and Further Education	12	(formula)
160	Department of Further Education	12	(formula)
161	Department of Technical and Further Education	12	(formula)
162	tertiary education	5	(courses of a specified type)
163	educational	16	college-based
164	education	16	schools and other institutions
165	educator	19	teacher? theorist? administrator?
166	education	20	education
167	School of Education	12	(formula)
168	Computing Education	5	(name of subject; formula)
169	School of Education	12	(formula)
170	education	3	the curriculum
171	education	3	the curriculum
172	education	3	the curriculum
173	the education world	19	people with a professional interest in schooling, teaching etc.
174	Department of Education	12	(formula)
175	educational	20	educational
176	education	20	education
177	education	18	what schools etc. do
178	education	16	schools etc.
179	educated	9	thinking
180	education	6	the education system

181	education system	12	(formula)
182	education system	12	(formula)
183	education	16	schools etc.
184	education system	12	(formula)
185	education system	12	(formula)
186	education	17	attendance at school etc.
187	education	18	for what schools do
188	College of Advanced Education	12	(formula)
189	educational system	12	(formula; variant of 'education system')
190	education	18	for what schools do
191	education	3	curriculum
192	education	3	schooling
193	educational	3	curricular
194	College of Advanced Education	12	(formula)
195	educationally	1	from the teaching point of view
196	Minister for Education	12	(formula)
197	Minister of Education	12	(formula)
198	educating	1	teaching
199	Departments of Education, or Technical and Further Education	12	(formulae; 'department' understood common to both)
200	educator	11	educational theorist
201	Minister for Education and Youth Affairs	12	(formula)
202	department of sociology and education	12	(formula)
203	College of Advanced Education	12	(formula)
204	Department of Technical and Further Education	12	(formula)
205	Education Department	12	(formula)
206	multicultural education	11	(branch of the theory of teaching and learning)

207	field of education	11	theory of teaching and learning
208	education	3	schooling
209	education	6	the education system
210	educational	6	having to do with the system
211	Departments of Education and TAFE	12	(formulae; cf. No. 199)
212	education	19	all aspects of schooling
213	Education Department	12	(formula)
214	education	20	education (what education is)
215	education	20	education (what education should be)
216	'Education for a Cultural Democracy'	12	(ad hoc formula used as a label)
217	education	3	the curriculum
218	Education Department	12	(formula)
219	education	18	concerned with what schools do
220	education	3	curricular
221	educational	18	(variant of No. 219)
222	education	3	schooling
223	Minister of Education	12	(formula)
224	education	6	the education system
225	special education	12	(ad hoc formula)
226	Aboriginal education	5	schooling for Aborigines
227	education	19	anything labelled 'education'
228	education had suffered	16	less had been spent on schools etc.
229	education	6	for the education system
230	education	20	education
231	adult education	5	courses for adults
232	colleges of further education	12	(formula)
233	adult education centres	12	(formula)
234	adult education courses	5	courses of an adult education (formula) type

235	adult education classes	16	provision made for adults
236	education	13	mental disciplining
237	education	4	courses of instruction
238	education	4	courses
239	education	2	learning
240	education	20	education
241	1944 Education Act	12	(formula)
242	education	4	courses
243	education	4	courses
244	educational	20	educational
245	continuing education	12	(formula with ad hoc meaning)
246	education service	6	education system
247	education	2	learning
248	education service	6	education system
249	educational	3	curricular
250	higher education	17	attendance at a tertiary institution
251	adult education	16	(resources/finance implied)
252	education	16	schools etc.
253	adult education	5	courses for adults
254	continuing education	16	provision for 'continuing education' (formula)
255	education	16	educational institutions
256	continuing education	12	(formula)
257	adult education	5	courses labelled 'adult education'
258	adult and community education centres	12	(formula)
259	education service	6	education system (formula)
260	Community Education Organiser	12	(formula)
261	educational	13	public-conditioning

262	formal education	17	attendance at schools and colleges
263	education	16	pedagogical institutions
264	education	17	attendance at a school etc.
265	education	6	the education system
266	tertiary education	12	(formula labelling a sector of the
		6	system)
267	education	18	what schools etc. do
268	education	20	education
269	education	6	sectors of the system
270	educators	11	theorists and administrators
271	education	6	the education system
272	education	2	learning
273	education machine	16	schools etc.
274	educational	20	educational
275	Accelerated Christian Education	12	(ad hoc formula)
276	education	20	education
277	education in the "true" sense of the word	20	education ('in the "true" sense of the word' is tautological)
278	educational	17	access to schools, colleges etc.
279	education	17	attendance at school etc.
280	education	1	teaching
281	educational background	7	academic record
282	educational programs	4	courses (offered)
283	educational programs	4	courses (taken)
284	education system	12	(formula)
285	education	20	education
286	education	7	schooling
287	education	9	educatedness
288	education	17?	going to school
		6?	the education system

289	education	16	schools etc.
290	educational	6	of the system
291	education system	12	(formula)
292	education	16	the provision of schools etc.
293	education	3	schooling
294	educationists	11	administrators (?)
295	educational	20	educational
296	education	3	schooling
297	educational	20	educational
298	education service	6	operators of the education system
299	the education system	12	(formula)
300	education	20	education
301	education	11	education as a field of study
302	education department	12	(formula)
303	education	16	schools
304	educators	1	teachers
305	educational	1	pedagogical
306	educational	1	instructional
307	educational	2	learning
308	educators	1	teachers? administrators? researchers?
309	education	3	curricular
310	education	13	conditioning
311	education	18	what schools do
312	education	17	attendance at school etc.
313	education	16	the equipment of schools etc.
314	educational	1	instructional
315	educational	18	what schools do
316	educational	2	learning

317	educational	2	conducive to learning
318	education	7	schooling
319	educate	1	train
320	educational	2	learning
321	education	7	schooling
322	educational	18	what the schools do
323	educator	11	educational theorist
324	education	18	what schools do
325	educational	11	(perceptions of education)
326	Minister for Education and Youth affairs	12	(formula)
327	education	16	schools
328	educational	7	schooling
329	engineering education	5	(courses of a specified type)
330	education	17	attendance at colleges etc.
331	colleges of advanced education	12	(formula)
332	educational institutions	16	schools, colleges etc.
333	education	17	attendance at colleges etc.
334	educational services	4	courses
335	Advanced Education Council	12	(formula)
336	higher education institutions	16	tertiary colleges etc.
337	tertiary education	6	the tertiary sector of the system
338	education	17	attendance at colleges etc.
339	education	17	attendance at colleges etc.
340	education	3	schooling
341	tertiary education	18	what tertiary institutions do
342	"Educating Rita"	-	(sign with ad hoc significance)
343	College of Advanced Education	12	(formula)
344	"Educating Rita"	-	(sign with ad hoc significance)

345	<i>Educating Rita</i>	-	(label; no educat- significance)
346	education system	12	(formula)
347	higher education credentials	7	academic qualifications
348	education system	17	attendance at college etc.
349	educational	2	learning
350	educational	4	of courses
351	tertiary education	16	tertiary ('education' is redundant)
352	educators	6	operators of the system
353	education	4	courses
354	education	18	what schools etc. do
355	education	4	training courses
356	nurse education	5	(courses of a specified type)
357	education	17	attendance (at college)
358	education	7	training
359	education system	12	(formula)
360	Nature Education Centre	12	(formula)
361	education system	12	(formula)
362	education system	12	(formula)
363	education product	9	educatedness of school-leavers
364	"educational outcomes"	9	the productivity of the schools
365	education	16	schools, equipment, staffing etc.
366	education's	6	the education system's
367	educational	18	what is done in schools
368	education	16	for schools etc.
369	education	9	educatedness
370	education	3	curriculum
371	education	20	education
372	educated	1	taught

373	education	2	to learn about
374	Educational Technology	12	(formula)
375	education	18	what is done in schools
376	Minister for Education	12	(formula)
377	Department of Technical and Further Education	12	(formula)
378	Eductional	1	pedagogical (typographical error, presumably, for 'educational')
379	development education	5	(courses of a specified type; formula)
380	education	17	attendance
381	education	7	schooling
382	sex educators	12	(formula; specialists in a specified field)
383	educators	11	theorists of schooling
384	educational	9	of educatedness
385	Minister for Education	12	(formula)
386	educational	20	educational
387	education	20	education
388	education	17	going to school
389	education	3	schooling
390	education	9	educatedness
391	education	16	schools etc.
392	Minister of Education	12	(formula)
393	education	6	the education system
394	education system	12	(formula)
395	education	16	schools etc.
396	education	16	schools etc.
397	Department of Technical and Further Education	12	(formula)
398	education	6	the education system

399	education	6	the education system
400	education	1	teaching
401	education	16	schools etc.
402	education	17	attendance at school etc.
403	education	16	schools etc.
404	education	16	purchasable provision
405	education	16	schools etc.
406	education	18	what is done in schools etc.
407	education system	12	(formula)
408	education	1	teaching
409	education authorities	12	(formula)
410	education	2	learning
411	education authorities	12	(formula)
412	education	3	schooling
413	education system	12	(formula)
414	education system	12	(formula)

NOTES

1.1.1

1 I follow Jespersen's usage of taking speaker/hearer to include writer/reader unless there is a specific reason for distinguishing one from the other. See Jespersen [2] 17.

2 I merely report the use of the term 'educated man'; I do not condone it. As I explain in due course, I have no use for the term on philosophical grounds; it is for others, if they feel so inclined, to argue against it as sexually discriminatory.

1.1.2

1 This is consistently Wittgenstein's view. In the preface to the *Tractatus*, he declares that philosophical problems rest on misunderstanding the logic of language. The way to solve them is to make the logic of language clear. In doing so, philosophy does not create its own doctrine; it merely clarifies the status of statements laid before it (T 4.003; 4.112). In the *Philosophical Investigations*, he takes a similar line. Philosophy is not concerned with explaining the facts of the matter. Philosophical problems arise from misunderstanding the forms of our language and are dissolved (not solved) by looking afresh at what has long been available, not by adducing new evidence (PI 109). It is not that our everyday language is out of order but that we need to distinguish what it is saying from what it might appear to be saying, particularly when we attempt to interpret it philosophically. Illustrations of the point, typically lacking in Wittgenstein, can be found in Jespersen [2] and [3], the former exhaustive, the latter brief but illuminating - it contains, for example, what is surely a definitive dissolution (in the Wittgensteinian sense) of the age-old paradox of the liar. There is, in fact, no paradox:

... when we say that a person is a liar, the linguistic expression does not preclude the possibility of his speaking the truth once in a while.
(Jespersen [3] 5)

Accordingly, Epimenides the Cretan can declare that all Cretans are liars without his utterance causing any logical problems.

1.1.3

1 The great variety of things, even incompatible things, which education is spoken of as being, should be sufficient warning that it is unsafe to take expressions based on 'education' as proof of the existence of education:

The argument fails not only... because the fact that an expression is used successfully leaves room for considerable disagreement as to what it can legitimately be taken to refer to, but also because expressions in common use can be associated with theories that turn out to be unacceptable. (Ayer [3] 42)

Ayer cites the case of witchcraft, concerning which expressions were at one time accorded public acceptance. We all continue to use successfully expressions which have the sun rising and sinking; that does not invalidate the Copernican system. For our commonsense purposes the moon waxes and wanes and the earth is flat.

2 There is no difficulty about prising our concepts off the world.

The whole of fictional literature shows that language does not require a referent in reality in order to be significant. Clearly, the symbol in this case symbolises nothing beyond the language because there is nothing beyond the language for it to symbolise and, in the case of fantasy, it is impossible that there should be. Nevertheless, Hamlet seems real to me - more real than many real people - and I readily accept anthropomorphic animals from Aesop to Orwell via La Fontaine and Carroll. If the symbol is no more than a linguistic phenomenon in these cases, why need it be anything more in any other? How can I tell when what I am saying about education is not mere fiction? Any inclination that I might have to argue that it would not matter if it was is inhibited by my consciousness of Russell's stern disapproval of such levity in a philosophical context:

Morally, a philosopher who uses his professional competence for anything except a disinterested search for truth is guilty of a kind of treachery... the true philosopher is prepared to examine *all* preconceptions. (Russell [1] 788)

The reason why we have no difficulty in prising our concepts off the world is that it is their normal state to be separate. To have a concept of anything - concrete or abstract - is not to have the thing itself; it is not even to have *the* concept of the thing (if I had *the* concept of anything, what would anyone else have?). The problem - a central problem of philosophy - is to link concept and reality; thought

and the putative object thought about. My mental image of a unicorn is no different in kind from my mental image of a rhinoceros. I can conjure up a mental image and apply the word-label 'rhinoceros' to it and relate it to a specimen of the beast located anywhere in space and time. I can do the same with 'unicorn' but I could not now support my thinking with the living presence of a real animal. I want to know whether 'education' is a rhinoceros-type or a unicorn-type label. It is no answer to say that it cannot be either since education is abstract. I don't know that education is, or is not, abstract until I know what it is. A non-corporeal unicorn is no less abstract than a non-corporeal education; a nonexistent either is no different from the nonexistent other. There cannot be different sorts of nothing. (Cf. Ayer's savaging of Heidegger's thesis that the proper object of metaphysics is the exploration of Nothing; Ayer [4] 228-229).

I might imagine education, just as I might imagine unicorn; that doesn't make either of them real. But in the case of unicorn I can imagine the sense data which would prove that its reality was on a par with that of a rhinoceros and that would be sufficient to verify statements about it:

A proposition... is verifiable in the weak sense, if it is possible for experience to render it probable.

(Ayer [1] 50)

What experience would enable me to say that a given proposition concerning education was at least probably true? I can't say, because I don't know what education is. Paradoxically, I know what a unicorn is, because there is general agreement on what a unicorn is to be taken to look like, and should recognise it instantly if I saw one.

3 Cf. Orwell, 1984, Penguin 1955 Reprint, 242:

...political and intellectual freedom no longer existed even as concepts, and were therefore of necessity nameless... no word that could be dispensed with was allowed to survive. Newspeak was designed not to extend but to *diminish* the range of thought, and this purpose was indirectly assisted by cutting the choice of words down to a minimum.

I do not understand why Orwell says 'indirectly'; reducing the choice of words directly diminishes the range of thought.

1.1.4

1 ... the spoken and heard word is the primary form for language and of far greater importance than the secondary form used in writing (printing) and reading. This is evidently true for the countless ages in which mankind had not yet invented the art of writing or

made only a sparing use of it; but even in our modern newspaper-ridden communities the vast majority of us speak infinitely more than we write. (Jespersen [2] 17)

Jespersen was, of course, writing before radio and television added a ceaseless gabble of spoken words to the environment.

2 I hope to be immune to Ayer's criticism of the stance adopted by Moore when he sought to prove the existence of objects by holding up his hands and declaring 'here is one hand' and 'here is another hand':

... the most that can be conceded to Moore is that when he said that his hands existed, he was saying something that he had the right to consider true, and this amounts to very little until we can determine what this something was... it may have been no more than that Moore was having certain sensations, perhaps even no more than that certain sensations were occurring.

(Ayer [3] 42)

Ayer does not question that Moore uttered certain sounds which speakers of English are wont to utter; nor does he hesitate to use the written equivalent of such sounds. When I assume that words exist, I imply no more than the sense-perceptible occurrence of such spoken and written signs.

3 The sign is conventional in that no logical connection holds between its sense data and its significance and it has significance only for the initiated. For example, it was reported in *The Advertiser of Adelaide* for 15 March 1985 that shoes made in China had caused great offence in Egypt because the anti-slip pattern on the soles formed by chance the sign for God in Arabic. The lens of the eye has no transcendental powers; assuming no physical aberrations and a contiguous viewpoint, the retinas of a Chinese and a literate Arab would carry a similar image. Only when nerve impulses generated by the image reached the brain would there be differences in perception and different culture-conditioned reactions. It appears that, as far as sign is concerned, Berkeley's dictum 'esse est percipi' operates and sense data acquire the status of sign only when they are perceived to signify. But how far does the signifying have to proceed? Does any more need to be said than that words are signs and that their signification stops with the sign if the words are unintelligible? It might be argued that if the words are unintelligible, the sense data cannot be a sign. But unintelligible to whom? I cannot claim my own comprehension as the sole arbiter of whether sense data are signs; the only reason why language

works for me is that it works for others - I did not invent the English language. (Whether there could ever be a private language is a different argument). If other people use language incomprehensible to me, it follows that there are many words which I perceive as sense data and assume are signs even though I do not know their signification. This happens with many words even in my native language. If in the course of time any of them comes to have an identified significance, it is clear that the sign has not changed, only my interpretation of it. Sign appears to be a sort of halfway house between the audio/visual/tactile manifestations necessary for language to be a means of communication between sentient beings and the symbolism of the words. I conclude that words-as-signs are discrete entities, freestanding elements in language, the physical existence of a word, or larger unit, carrying no definitive implication of meaning.

4 The problem is to link language symbols and reality. There is no problem in the case of 'unicorn' because unicorn is a creation of symbol and remains nothing but symbol. There is no problem in the case of 'rhinoceros' because the partnership of name and referent is generally understood and socially accepted. Quine's caveat over 'gavagai' is less inhibitive in the case where my interlocutor and I share a common language. By supporting an ostensive explanation with verbal explanation, it could be made comparatively plain if necessary that the complete animal was intended as the referent and not merely a rhinoceros stage or part (cf. Quine [1] 51ff.). There is thought to be no problem in the case of 'education' (judging by the readiness with which people use the word unqualified), but that is because the familiar symbol creates a pseudo-reality. But all that is created is symbols, and the problem remains of linking them with reality. There is nothing in either the symbol or its ostensible referent to link the one definitively with the other. Paradoxically, I need to know what is symbolised in order to verify the symbol, but in the absence of evident reality the only way I have of approaching reality is the symbol.

1.1.5

1 Peters suggests that:

...'education' is a concept which is not very close to the ground. By this I mean that it is not a concept like 'red' which picks out a simple quality, like 'horse' which picks out an object, or like

'running' or 'smiling' which pick out observable occurrences. 'Education'... refers to no particular process; rather it encapsulates criteria to which any one of a family of processes must conform. (Peters [2] 1)

2 Frege distinguishes absolutely between concept and object. A concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate. A proper name i.e. the name of an object, cannot be a grammatical predicate:

In the sentence 'The morning star is Venus', we have two proper names, 'morning star' and 'Venus', for the same object. In the sentence 'The morning star is a planet' we have a proper name, 'the morning star', and a concept-word, 'planet'. So far as language goes, no more has happened than that 'Venus' has been replaced by 'a planet'; but really the relation has become wholly different. An equation is reversible; an object's falling under a concept is an irreversible relation. (Frege [1] 44)

It appears then, applying Frege, that education is not absolutely a concept; it is a concept only when it functions as a grammatical predicate. In any other role in a sentence, it is the name of an object of which anything one fancies might be predicated. This polyvalent symbolism is not, however, anchored by 'education's ever having been used predicatively as a logical simple and is not, therefore, definitive. It is easy enough to use 'an education' predicatively. I have on occasion remarked that to drive through the slums of Calcutta is an education. Do I have the concept of education? I have no doubt that I have a concept of education; one which meets Frege's grammatical criterion, moreover:

... the singular definite article always indicates an object, whereas the indefinite article accompanies a concept-word. (Frege [1] 45)

But my statement awaits my explanation of what I mean by 'education' before it can claim to convey any precise information - or, strictly speaking, any information at all; in the absence of external evidence to the contrary, 'an education' might in this context mean 'an assault on the senses and the sensibilities'. As it stands, 'an education' is doubly vague: Both my concept of education and the concept of education are subject to a range of possible interpretations. Until 'education' is anchored to some determinate referent, the concept of education must remain uninformative.

I take Frege's use of the indefinite and definite article to distinguish concept and object to be a post hoc indication, not a precondition.

Otherwise, concepts could not be expressed in Latin or Russian, for example, which have no article. Perhaps they cannot, and this would support Austin's view that there is no such thing. 'Ecce homo' has to rely on a context to distinguish between 'a man' and 'the man'.

3 Typographical anomalies add gratuitously to the problems of the concept approach. Frege's preferred usage would call for: the concept *education*; others use: the concept 'education'; the concept of 'education'; the concept of education. Passmore comments:

Anyone who wishes to think exactly, and to avoid philosophical howlers, will have to acquire the habit of so using quotation marks, or some other typographical device, as to make it perfectly clear whether he is using a concept (i.e. operating with it predicatively) or *talking about* a concept (i.e. representing it by an object)... few contemporary philosophers use quotation marks without misgiving. (Passmore [1] 154-5)

Passmore refers the reader to Geach, "On Names of Expressions" in *Mind* 1950, for examples of the difficulties that arise. I find Geach's article too technical to be of practical value and prefer to follow Kenny's simple principle, suitably modified:

In philosophy it is important to be careful to employ quotation marks when using a word to refer to itself, instead of using it in the normal way. Obviously enough, Rome is a city, 'Rome' is a four-letter word... Carelessness about quotation - though great philosophers, including Wittgenstein, have been guilty of it - can lead to confusion of symbols with what they symbolise. (Kenny 15)

I think that Kenny himself has confused the symbol with what it symbolises and symbol with sign. In my view, 'Rome' is a sign; Rome is the symbol designated by the sign; what Rome symbolises is a miscellaneous collection of ideas and phenomena of space and time. Accordingly, in my usage 'education' is the word, the sign; education is the symbol, without prejudice to what it symbolises - to clarify what it symbolises is the ostensible object of my exercise. The root cause of problems in the philosophy of education is, in my view, the assumption that in talking about education one is talking about a phenomenon of space and time.

Peters (and Hirst and Peters) favours: the concept of 'education'. This has the unfortunate consequence that when he talks about 'education' he can be misinterpreted as talking about the word:

In *Ethics and Education* Peters asserts that the word 'education' has 'normative implications'. It has 'the criterion built into [it] that something worth while should be achieved'. (Woods and Barrow 10)

Peters does not assert this; on the contrary, he has been at pains in the previous two pages to differentiate between coming to grips with the concept and comprehending usages of the term 'education'; (see Peters [1] 23-24).

1.1.8

1 Quine attributes the innovatory shift of attention from ideas to words to John Horne Tooke who in 1786 suggested that Locke's *Essay* could be much improved by substituting the word 'word' everywhere for the word 'idea'. Quine later identifies Tooke's suggestion as the first of "Five Milestones of Empiricism" (Quine [2] 67ff.).

1.2.1

1 *The Australian* for the week beginning 17 February 1986 produced an instructive example. A correspondent accused the editors of the *Macquarie Dictionary* of 'an apparent lapse of professional decorum and intellectual integrity' in including Queensland among the referents of the term 'banana republic'. A reply pointed out that lexicographers merely report usages; they do not invent them. It seems, however, that the age-old custom of blaming the bearer of bad news is still practised.

1.2.2

1 I decided against including in the list the use of the sign 'education' without symbolic significance because it is not a conventional dictionary meaning. It comes into its own as an example of the later Wittgenstein's notion of meaning as use. For examples see Appendix I Nos. 104, 110, 138.

1.2.6

1 The process is most commonly seen in the use of nouns as verbs or adjectives but the converse is also common and no part of speech seems to be immune. A few examples at random: house; garden; plant; tool; motor; jet; mother; rabbit; ferret; dog; frame; tile; fish; run; swim; brown; green; dark; outback; rubbish. The process became possible when Middle English shed the system of syntactical inflection which Old English had inherited from Indo-European and which still survives in German and French, for example. Shakespeare revelled in this new-found

freedom and helped greatly to develop it:

Grace me no grace, nor uncle me no uncle.

(King Richard II II iii 87)

Wouldst thou be window'd in great Rome?

(Anthony and Cleopatra IV xii 72)

In the dead vast and middle of the night.

(Hamlet I ii 198)

See Potter 56ff. for an account of the process and further examples.

- 2 See, for example, Hirst and Peters 74 which has within the space of two paragraphs 'education', 'educational', 'educating', 'educate', 'educated'.

1.2.10

- 1 Cf. Peters [1] 24-25:

... education is associated with learning, not with a mysterious maturation. But no specific type of activity is required. A man can do it himself in solitary confinement or acquire it by constant activity in a small group. He can be trained on his own by a tutor or be inspired by lectures given to 500... 'education'... picks out no particular activity or process.

- 2 My point is strengthened by the reluctance of English usage to countenance the term 'educator'. The verb 'to educate' is manifestly active; the relation between it and the noun 'education' is grammatically clear. But when it is a matter of denoting the agent implied by the verb or the operator of the process implied by the noun, a proficient speaker of English would shy away from 'educator' and use 'teacher' instead. The philosophical consequences could be far-reaching. The question is not whether 'to educate' could survive the physical loss of the sign 'educator'; there would be no problem over this, just as there would be no problem over 'to eat' surviving the loss of 'eater', provided that the connotation 'eater' could be maintained in other terms. What is threatened in the case of 'to educate' is the connotation of 'educator' and that threatens the verb itself and any of its cognates. In any case, if 'teacher' is adopted as a substitute for 'educator', the nexus between the two needs to be argued against the authoritative view that there is none:

It may be a general empirical fact that most things are learnt more rapidly and more reliably if the situation is explicitly structured by a teacher. But it certainly is not a conceptual truth that either 'learning' or 'education' implies 'teaching'... learning is logically necessary to education, whereas teaching is not.

(Hirst and Peters 77)

1.2.13

1 For an archetypal, ostensibly fictional, account see Spark 36, and for a mundane example Appendix I No. 138.

2 This is of course entirely without prejudice to any theory of teaching founded on eductive or on inductive principles. It would, however, be chronologically, geographically and linguistically anomalous to cite the prime historical example, Socratic Method, in support of the educate < educere argument. The etymology of an English word is irrelevant to Socrates's inducing Pythagoras's theorem into Meno's slave, or educating it out of him. His procedure rests on its own laurels, such as they are, as an example of teaching method:

Tutors who have attempted to follow Socratic method will have been made aware of the importance of the fact that Plato was able to script the answers as well as the questions.

(Flew [2] 330)

1.2.14

1 educit: 3rd. person singular present tense of 'educere'; an example in which the verb has the sense of ex + ducere = bring forth.

paedagogus: a slave who accompanied children to and from school and had charge of them at home. (Cassell's Latin Dictionary)

2.1.10

1 See Austin [4] and [5]; Chisholm 14-20; Furberg 136-155; Graham 185-213.

2.1.13

1 See Strawson [3]; Quine [1] on 'descriptive' versus 'revisionary' metaphysics.

2.1.14

1 In the philosophies of education listed in my bibliography, I have noted a couple of dozen scattered references to Wittgenstein but no evidence that any of the authors has either taken his philosophy to heart or rejected it after due consideration. The references are, almost without exception, to the *Philosophical Investigations*; they are all incidental and tend to be perfunctory in manner; some are dismissive

(cf. §3.3.1); few reveal any appreciative understanding and some display a depth of misunderstanding that transcends the tolerable limits of subjective interpretation:

Just as there are separate rules for the games of cricket and golf, so there are different sets of rules for the language used in everyday life and language used as a means of communicating philosophical ideas. (Schofield 13)

Any attempted definition of a word will include a list of criteria for its use. (Gribble 4)

It is only by virtue of the relationship that is created between the symbols and, in Wittgenstein's phrase, 'the form of life' that the context presents, that there can be that objectivity of judgement that we call truth. (Hirst 160)

Of these three quotations, the first two ascribe views to Wittgenstein which would negate those he does express; the third concludes a bold attempt by Hirst to interpret meaning and truth from a starting point in Wittgenstein's 'the meaning is the use' (Hirst 157). Hirst reaches the *Tractatus*-type conclusion that truth is the correlation between the symbol and the 'form of life' - the state of affairs - given by the context; a true statement pictures what is the case. The later Wittgenstein expressly turns his back on this view. According to the *Philosophical Investigations*, there is no relationship between symbol and Lebensform - they are the same thing. Language is a way of life (Lebensform) - a way of social life, moreover; the rules of language-games are the unwritten rules of social habits:

True and false is what people say it is; and they reach agreement in *language*. This is not agreement in their opinions but in their way of life. (PI 241)

'The form of life' is not Wittgenstein's phrase; Hirst joins the ranks of those who have been led astray by GEMA. (See §3.1.1ff. for general comment on GEMA and Note 3.2.4.1 for a comment specifically on 'form of life').

2.2.9

1 Both Pears and Kenny, for example, seem to me to threaten philosophy with this fate. Pears says that the assertion that his watch is on the table implies many other propositions concerning, for example, the mechanism inside the watch (Pears [1] 58). Kenny speaks of analysing the sentence 'My fork is to the left of my knife' into a

series of simpler statements which will end only with symbols which denote non-complex objects (Kenny 6). Neither takes the point that at an early stage of such an analysis all contact is lost with the ostensible subject of the discourse. It was on such grounds that Stebbing took the physicists to task for their improper use of ordinary language to describe extraordinary states of affairs. Eddington, one of the chief culprits, describes, for example, stepping on a plank as 'like stepping on a swarm of flies' because 'the plank has no solidity of substance'. This denial of solidity is nonsensical because:

... the common usage of language enables us to attribute a meaning to the phrase "a solid plank"; but there is no common usage of language that provides a meaning for the word "solid" that would make sense to say that the plank on which I stand is not *solid*.
(Stebbing 52)

The notion that sentences such as those quoted by Pears and by Kenny, the meaning of which is already plain, need to be analysed into elementary sentences before their meaning becomes plain, is nonsensical because, as Stebbing shows, to do so is to destroy their meaning, not make it plain. Wittgenstein does not advocate such a procedure for our everyday sentences which are already perfectly ordered logically (T 5.5563); he assumes that his own statements are capable of conveying his meaning as they stand; he proposes spatial objects and their relationships as a paradigm of the sentence-sign (T 3.1431). In short, his analysis of complexes into simples is intended as a theoretical account of the way in which language works, not as a practical method of processing it.

2.3.3

1 I face the problem at this stage of my argument of being committed to the *Tractatus* line, although I am aware of flaws in it. The coexistence of EE and ET takes the form of uses of words, not of the existence of objects. The resultant symbols need bear no relation to reality or to other symbols. It is an error to look to a logical connection or disconnection between EE and ET as a determinant of the state of the world or even of the way in which words are used. The way in which words ought to be used is determined subjectively, not logically.

2 I find it attractive in that it neutralises the paradox inherent in

conventional usage according to which education is the effect of itself as cause. Nothing can cause itself, arguments to the effect that God is *causa sui* notwithstanding. If 'education' is kept for naming what the educator engages in, no great loss is suffered by EE. It even benefits from the removal of the temptation to regard education as something which the educatee *has*. Usage does not allow that the educatee has an education, even though he has received one. The *Tractatus* solves the problem by denying the status of object to education; the *Philosophical Investigations* changes the grammar and dissolves the problem by revealing it as a matter of words, not objects.

2.3.8

- 1 Cf. Strawson [2]: The meaning of a sentence is not what it refers to but the rules for its correct use.

2.4.3

- 1 Supposing we asked: 'How can one *imagine* what does not exist?'. The answer seems to be: 'If we do, we imagine non-existent combinations of existing elements'. A centaur doesn't exist, but a man's head and torso and arms and a horse's legs do exist. 'But can't we imagine an object utterly different from any one which exists?'. We should be inclined to answer: 'No; the elements, individuals, must exist. If redness, roundness and sweetness did not exist, we could not imagine them'.
(Wittgenstein [4] 31)
- 2 See, for example, OED Educate 4 (b); Education 1(b); 3(b).
- 3 'Arbitrarily' in the sense that I decide to do so for reasons of expediency, not logic.
- 4 There is no proscription of change in Wittgenstein's view of object. Any one of the mundane objects which he quotes as examples might change its external properties and remain the same object. I see no reason why change should not be an internal characteristic of an object. It is inconceivable that any object, organic by definition, should not change through decay. There are innumerable inorganic objects of which change is an intrinsic property. Change is inherent in a universe characterised by entropy - but that is a scientific, not a philosophical point. Because a given object changes, it does not follow that the concept which it exemplifies changes. 'One cannot step into the same river twice' does not devalue the concept 'river'. On the

contrary, an unchanging river would not be a river; an unchanging educatee would not be an educatee.

5 The learning which characterises educatee has, for me, no normative implication. It is what it is - or, rather, it has been what it has been, since any learning which makes a lasting contribution to educatedness must, as learning, be over and done with. Normative considerations belong to the educator, not to the educatee - except when the educatee is operating as self-educator; even then aspirations do not determine outcomes. Whether normative considerations are operative, and if so what they are, is contingent. But change is not a contingent property of a human being. Every specimen of homo sapiens, even a so-called 'human vegetable', has to change. The educatedness of a human being regresses whose mental development remains static whilst his chronological age advances; that is still a state of educatedness. To see change as ever solely mental or intellectual is, in my view, to subscribe to an untenable dualism.

2.4.4

1 This categorical statement needs, perhaps, to be modified by the case of Siamese twins, whose physical uniqueness is manifestly not absolute. Each needs, however, to be mentally unique as a condition of being considered to be an individual and it is mental uniqueness which characterises homo sapiens - uniqueness as both species and specimen of the species. From the ostensibly physical and certainly mental uniqueness of the individual his spiritual uniqueness follows, if one is drawn towards that form of symbolism - in which case one is likely to claim that the third precedes and outlives the first two. Kierkegaard develops this theme; his spiritualistic conclusions might be challenged but not his premiss:

... each and every one is an individual.
(Kierkegaard 102)

Each human being has infinite reality... The central point about being human is that the unit '1' is the highest; '1000' counts for less.
(Ibid. 103)

This could be the point of departure for an existentialist approach to education which might well end with the existence of the individual educatee taking precedence over the essence of the educated man. Authenticity for the educatee might consist in the development of his

inner 'infinite reality'. Any interaction between one organism and another would necessarily be at the physical level; at the level of homo not of sapiens. Sapiens would nevertheless manifest itself at the physical level in the individual's capacity to perform, particularly in his ability to decide his own course of action and the necessity for him thereby to exercise his freedom of choice (cf. Sartre's remark to the effect that he and his compatriots were never more free than under the German occupation; in the absence of quasi-acceptable authority the individual must choose his own path to freedom). Affinities are readily discernible between such an approach and one based on the *Tractatus*. It is interesting that on one occasion during the 1930s at Cambridge, Wittgenstein declared:

Kierkegaard was by far the most profound thinker of the last century. Kierkegaard was a saint. (Rhees [2] 87)

2.4.6

1 The answer to the question whether any sort of learning will do is that any sort of learning *is*. The educatee learns what the educatee learns; it is futile to wish otherwise. Normative outcomes for education as process, formulated in anticipation of the event, are matters for the subjective judgement of the educator, influenced by whatever factors he sees as relevant - political, sociological, ethical, religious and so on. Even if such normative stipulations for educatedness were fully met, the resultant properties would not be those of a Wittgensteinian object because they would not characterise every educatee; they would not be properties which it would be unthinkable the educatee should not have - unless the concept 'educatee' was to be restricted in its application to those who did possess those properties. A term would then be needed for those who had been subjected unsuccessfully to the process of education. A term would also be needed for the embryonic educated man - that is to say, if education is truly a lifelong activity, for every one of us when we are at the receiving end of the educational process i.e. whilst we are still alive. Such anomalies can easily be avoided by postulating a normatively neutral educatee whose educatedness is simply what it is. I am not saying that it is desirable for the educatee to learn undesirable things, or that undesirable outcomes are to be desired in anticipation of the event; but if undesirable things are learnt then they

are learnt, they make their contribution to the total educatedness of the educatee and we need an education vocabulary capable of taking account of the fact. This is, incidentally, a much less difficult undertaking than defining 'desirable'.

2.4.10

1 Wittgenstein again takes up this point in the *Philosophical Investigations*. See §3.4.3 and Note 3.4.3.1.

2.4.15

1 Cf. the accounts of Popper in Magee [2] 22ff. and Ayer [3] 27-29; 157-158.

2.5.4

1 If the educatee does the prejudging, the educatee becomes the self-educator. I might have lofty aspirations for my learning; that says nothing about what, in the event, I learn. My educatedness is what it is and not something different. I am trying to give an account of educatee-ness as it logically is. The only logical state of educatedness is that it is what it is in each case.

2.5.6

1 A telling argument, based on the *Philosophical Investigations*, against 'ought' statements being a priori expressions of some ethical law is that 'ought' is a language-game played only by speakers of English. It is not universal to human speech, being untranslatable into, for example, French or German. 'Ought' is a speech habit; a formula, moreover, being immune to personal and temporal accidance. A proficient speaker of English does not say 'I have ought... ', 'they had ought... '. The French user of 'devoir' or the German user of 'sollen' has available a range of verb forms and a wealth of idiomatic expressions. Significantly, both modify the auxiliary verb in order to express a change of tense or of person:

he ought to do it	they ought to have done it
il devrait le faire	ils auraient dû le faire
er sollte es tun	sie hätten es tun sollen

Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* is dismissive of ethics. Expressions

purporting to be statements of ethics have no meaning; he ignores the fact that they are used. The later Wittgenstein accounts for their use by categorising them as language-games; socio-temporally accepted usages. The proficient speaker does not, cannot, justify his following the 'ought' rule; he just does it in verbalising certain social mores. The ethical rule describes what is done; it is cart before horse to interpret it as determining what is done - or even ought to be done, whatever that might mean. It used to be socially acceptable to punish the insane in order to drive out the devils possessing them; ergo, the insane ought to be punished. In more recent times and in western societies it has become socially unacceptable to punish the insane; ergo, the insane ought not to be punished. Right and wrong are what people say they are (cf. PI 241) and ethics is what a community decides pragmatically it is. There is no evidence that ethics is supernatural in origin; the conduct of the proponents of divinely ordained codes of behaviour is not uncommonly outrageously unethical by humane standards. Pragmatism issuing as enlightened self-interest is a safer guide: Do not behave as you would wish others not to behave - in case they are given the opportunity. As Macbeth - and Adolf Hitler - discovered, bloody instructions which return to plague the inventor are counter-productive to one's own best interests. The problem is, of course, to know where one's own best interests lie in practice; even altruism is in principle self-interest - the selection of the personally more comfortable course of conduct. Even the martyr would rather die than live with his offended conscience.

2.5.8

1 Feigl took the notion of 'raw feels' from Tolman, but not Tolman's dismissive view of them:

... 'raw feels' are by very definition 'private' and not capable of scientific treatment. And we may leave the question as to whether they exist, and what to do about them, if they do exist, to other disciplines than psychology - e.g. to logic, epistemology and metaphysics. (Tolman 253)

Tolman's interest is in 'behavioral psychology':

... all human knowledge, including physics, purposive behaviorism and our own present remarks, are but a resultant of, and limited by, human behavioral needs and human behavioral capacities. (Tolman 430)

It seems to me that Tolman is confusing the way something is learnt with the way the learning subsequently manifests itself. It could be conceded to him, whether it is true or not, that all human thought processes originate in behaviour and are limited to the possible effects of behaviour, without implying that they necessarily manifest themselves, once acquired, in behaviour. Wittgenstein approaches the problem from a slightly different angle and avoids the dichotomy. He insists that mental events need external criteria (PI 580) but he is equally insistent that he does not mean to deny that we experience mental events (*geistige Vorgänge*) (PI 308). For me to deny that I experience mental events, or raw feels, imposes upon me the 'logical necessity of affecting general anaesthesia' (Ogden and Richards 23). Educatedness can perfectly well manifest itself other than in behaviour. I claim that mine not merely habitually manifests itself in raw feels but does so necessarily because I am incapable of expressing my mental events through behaviour, even if I wanted to do so. My mental events on hearing a certain piece of music are real enough to me but inexpressible through behaviour or any other medium; they are different moreover from those motivated by different music, or by the 'same' music on a different hearing, or played by different musicians, or heard again in my head whether obsessively, as sometimes happens, or as 'emotion recollected in tranquillity' (Wordsworth). Perhaps the criterion of a raw feel is that it is necessarily inexpressible; the effect of music, poetry, the visual arts, any aesthetic experience - including, for example, a proof in mathematics, an elegant scientific experiment, a neat solution to a practical problem - is therefore a raw feel. If that is the case, the encouragement of raw feels should dominate the curriculum of every educational institution. It has, I suspect, always been so with institutions of quality, with the proviso that though the feels may be raw, their genesis is culture.

But to characterise such manifestations as metaphysical, as Tolman seems inclined to do, is to drift towards dualism of mind and body. They are, it seems to me, physical in that some area of the brain must be involved - possibly those areas which identify physical sensations as pleasurable, whether the stimulus takes the same route or a different, possibly more direct, route. I might like to think that what I characterise as intellectual pleasure is of a higher order than physical pleasure, but

I must be deluding myself. I have only one body; not a separate mind, and certainly not a separate soul, to participate in purified non-sensual pleasure.

I have used the term 'raw feels' but I find the notion puzzling in that Feigl's raw feels don't seem in the least raw, but culture-cooked to a high degree of sophistication. I doubt indeed whether there is such a thing as a raw feel. If in a darkened room I walk into the edge of a door, reality impinges upon me directly and produces what might be characterised as a raw feel. If the blow is light enough not to render me unconscious, I symbolise the event in language, attempting to explicate what has happened and adding no doubt an expletory gloss to my would-be factual description. By now the feel is no longer raw; all sorts of personal and sociological and interpretative factors have intervened to produce a sophisticated account of the event. Only if the blow is heavy enough to render me unconscious do I fail to language the event because I am incapable of doing so. I have experienced, but paradoxically do not feel, a raw feel. For once in a way I have prised the world off my concepts but only at the cost of forfeiting both world and concepts.

2.5.10

1 Cf. the case of the adult whose reading age froze at the physical age of, say, nine or ten. He was then appropriately literate but has now regressed and has become functionally illiterate.

3.1.3

1 I would like an illustration of a flybottle, which people describe variously. (The word is not in the O.E.D., and for the German, i.e. *Fliegenglas*, you have to go to the old Grimm.)
(Hall R. Review of *Philosophical Investigations* 3rd Ed. Phil. Qtly. XVII)

I have been able to meet Hall's request, thanks to the German settlers of the Barossa Valley in South Australia. In addition to the examples which I photographed for my frontispiece, I have seen three specimens in the Birdwood Mill Museum.

Thanks to GEMA, 'flybottle' now appears in OEDS, together with Hall's reference and a third reference to the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Suppl. Vol. XLIII 108.

Hall is not correct over the exclusivity of Grimm. The Muret-Sanders

German/English dictionary of 1933 gives 'Fliegenglas' and equates it with 'Fliegenfänger', the meaning of which when it is used to denote a utensil (Gerät) is given as 'fly-trap'. I don't know where GEMA gets 'flybottle' from; I don't like it because 'trap' makes Wittgenstein's point much more decisively besides being the term used by those with experience of the object, 'Glas' does not carry the connotation 'bottle' and a bottle without a bottom is a curious sort of bottle.

The 1862 edition of the dictionary of the brothers Grimm gives for Fliegenglas:

glas mit engem halse, in dem sich fliegen fangen
glass with narrow neck in which flies are caught
(my translation)

The English 'are caught' loses the sense of the German 'sich fangen' = 'catch themselves'. The use of the reflexive verb where English would use the passive voice of the verb is a common German idiom. The self-infliction implication of its sense might well have been stirring in Wittgenstein's mind when he devised his metaphor for the philosopher caught in a trap of his own making. I do not think it would be a case of one of the dead metaphors to which Wittgenstein refers in PI 112 stirring with life. It would be more the playing of the same (i.e. labelled the same) language-game in two different contexts: Die Fliege fängt sich...; der Philosoph fängt sich... No malign third party intervenes to do the catching - I am not, of course, suggesting that Wittgenstein had such considerations consciously in mind (though it is possible that he had) but rather that they are inherent in the German speech habits in which his thoughts would be cast (would cast themselves!).

Wittgenstein's metaphor of the philosopher caught in a flytrap of his own making is evidently not entirely an original flight of fancy on his part. Grimm quotes a couple of examples of the figurative use of 'Fliegenglas' (my translations):

hätt er sich nicht in einem wirtshause in das fliegenglas der werber zu tief verflogen

had he not in an inn flown too deeply into the recruiting sergeants' flytrap

das zimmer, worin du siehst, präsentier ich dir als ein fliegenglas voll hofbediente

the room into which you are looking I present to you as a flytrap full of the court's lackeys

3.1.4

1 White, for example, prints as an appendix at the request of Wittgenstein's publishers the passages from *Philosophische Untersuchungen* which he quotes in translation in his book.

2 Hall notes that in the perennial stream of articles in which the debate on the *Philosophical Investigations* proceeds:

... great weight is often put on the wording of passages of the English translation. The present translation is the only one available, and therefore needs to be entirely reliable, as not everyone can use the facing German original.

(Hall 362) (Phil. Quarterly XVII)

He considers it a pity that the opportunity was missed of making a thorough overhaul of the English version for the third edition and goes on to suggest a considerable number of amendments of a detailed nature, commenting that:

There must be a good many other alterations that need making, even though Miss Anscombe is on the whole a good translator.

(Hall 363)

3.1.7

1 Cf. Note 3.4.3.1

3.2.4

1 Wittgensteinians, whose fondness for the expression 'form of life' appears to be directly proportional to its degree of preposterousness in a given context, say that acquiring the customary use of such a word as 'tiger' is coming to share a form of life. What they miss, or at any rate fail to emphasise, is that while the acquired disposition may be sufficiently complex and sufficiently interlinked with other complex dispositions to warrant special mention (though hardly the overblown phrase 'form of life'), what *triggers* the disposition is often highly discrete - e.g. a simple lexical definition frequently succeeds in conveying a pretty good idea of how a word is used.

(Putnam 149)

To be fair to Wittgenstein, he does say as much (PI 139). If Wittgensteinians are excessively fond of the expression 'form of life' they join Putnam in being misled by GEMA. The primary meaning of 'Lebensform' is 'way of life' or 'life style'. Dictionaries which I have consulted are unanimous on this; see, for example:

(i) Langenscheidt's *Encyclopaedic German-English Dictionary*:
Lebensform 1. Way of life 2. Biol. form of life, life-form

(ii) Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR, *Wörterbuch der deutschen Gegenwartssprache*, 1973:

Lebensform, die Einrichtung, Gestaltung des Lebens: eine traditionelle, soziale, wirtschaftliche, politische L.; eine persönliche L. wählen. pflegen; neue demokratische Lebensformen herausbilden; die bürgerliche L. durch die sozialistische ersetzen.

Lebensform: the organisation, pattern of life: a traditional, social, commercial, political L.; to choose, practise, a personal L.; to construct new democratic LL.; to replace the bourgeois L. with the socialist L. (my translation)

(iii) Brockhaus Wahrig, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, 1982:

Lebensform 1. (allg.) die Form, Art, sich sein Leben einzurichten, gestalten 2. (Biol.) ... Gruppe von Organismen unterschiedlicher systematischer Stellung...

Lebensform 1. (general) the shape, way, in which one organises one's life 2. (biology) ... a group of organisms of distinct systematic disposition... (my translation)

Putnam's 'acquiring the customary use of' words comes close to Wittgenstein's notion that learning how to use words is acquiring a way of life. Wittgenstein is saying what Jespersen said some thirty years earlier (in 1922, the same year as Ogden's *Tractatus*):

... a language thus is seen to be one particular set of human customs of a well-defined social character.

(Jespersen [1] 8)

Cf. PI 199:

To follow a rule, convey information, give an order, play a game of chess are *customs* (usages [Gebraüche], institutions).

3.2.7

1 Cf. Quine on what he calls 'observation sentences':

They are expressions that we have learned to associate with publicly observable concurrent circumstances... Earlier I made Wittgenstein's point: how public language anchors experience, arresting drift. Now we are noting the converse: how public experience anchors language. The observation sentence is the anchor line. (Quine [3] 157)

3.2.10

1 The use of the term would not be confined to a character in a play;

it could be used to designate whatever one fancied, as many 'proper names' have come to designate objects. It need not be an object:

A problem which is solved by an argument which proves that there is no problem might one day be called a 'Ludwig Wittgenstein' or 'Wittgenstein's Ghost'.

3.2.15

1 The 'family-face' notion appears in embryo in the *Tractatus*:

An internal property of a fact can also be called a feature of that fact. (In the sense in which we speak of, say, facial features).
(T 4.1221)

'Facial features' (Gesichtszüge) appears in both T 4.1221 and PI 67.

3.3.5

1 Cf. Note 3.2.4.1.

2 Cf. T 3.332:

No statement can express anything about itself, because the sentence-sign cannot be contained within itself (that is what the 'theory of types' is all about).

3 It is interesting in a Wittgensteinian context to note that German, lacking a native equivalent, has adopted the English expression 'Fair play', perhaps partially domesticating it to 'fares Spiel'. 'Fair' is now accepted usage, explained by the Brockhaus Wahrig dictionary as: 'einem Gegner eine Chance lassend' = 'allowing an opponent a chance' (my translation). 'Chance' is pronounced more or less as in French but its meaning is as in English or American (chance; break) not as in French (luck; fortune).

3.3.9

1 Hamlet's 'what's Hecuba to him or he to Hecuba' might well be said of any game and its player. The answer will be in terms of his aspirations, not the game's which is nothing and has none.

3.4.3

1 It should be noted, however, that Wittgenstein misquotes himself and subtly changes the sense of his earlier utterance according to which every sentence is 'logisch vollkommen geordnet' (not 'in Ordnung') i.e. perfectly ordered (arranged; organised; put together) logically. That is because (i) it is ex hypothesi a sentence (ii) its syntax is what it is and not something different (iii) since it is a sentence its syntax must be in order (iv) in order to be that sentence and not a different

sentence its syntax must be both exactly what it is and logically in order. The later Wittgenstein is concerned with sense, not syntax. He now declares that every sentence is 'in Ordnung. wie er ist' i.e. in order as far as its sense is concerned. He claims that adequate sense is perfect sense and on this I find it impossible to follow him. He leads himself astray, in my opinion, with a monumental non sequitur in implying that any improvement in our existing vague sentences must wait for the construction of a perfect language. I see no reason why, even within the confines of our existing ordinary vague sentences, sense should not be better or worse made. Wittgenstein obviously agrees with this point of view. If he really believed that sense either is or is not made, he would have said his say in a couple of paragraphs of unimprovable vague sentences and not striven officiously to keep his argument alive throughout several hundred pages of prose. Cf. the conclusion of §2.4.10 and §3.1.7.

3.4.4

1 In his account of the written word as one of the media which need to be understood, McLuhan sees the phonetic alphabet as of central importance in creating many of the basic patterns of the Western way of life:

This fact has nothing to do with the *content* of the alphabetised words... (McLuhan 93)

In contrast to pictographic and hieroglyphic writing:

... the phonetic alphabet, by a few letters only, was able to encompass all languages. Such an achievement, however, involved the separation of both signs and sounds from their semantic and dramatic meanings.

(McLuhan 97-98)

The analogy with the later Wittgenstein is clear. For him the content of the language is of no philosophical interest; we can create our own content for the purposes of philosophy (PI II xii). It is not what is said but how it is said that is of philosophical interest; not the message but the medium. Clearly, Wittgenstein has not changed his stance since the *Tractatus* where philosophy was not a matter of doctrine but an activity the purpose of which was to clarify language/thought. To my mind the analogy extends smoothly into the theory of schooling. It is axiomatic that we can create our own syllabus and do so inevitably to the extent that we must be selective. How we present the selected

content determines its potential effectiveness in stimulating learning:

'The medium is the message'... implies that the critical content of any learning experience is the method or process through which the learning occurs. (Postman & Weingartner 30)

According to Postman and Weingartner, McLuhan restates Dewey's belief that we learn what we do; the way a classroom is organised carries the burden of what people will learn from it; a 'discipline' or a 'subject' is a way of knowing something - in other words, a method (op. cit. 27-30).

3.4.7

1 It is a common delusion that words have magical associations. One of the commonest manifestations of the delusion is that certain words, particularly certain words which carry a sexual connotation, are socially taboo whereas other words which have the same reference are not. Since the referent is the same in both cases it can be only the word which exhales a malign aura. See Wilson 32-36.

Perhaps the most important way in which we are tempted by the magical properties which we assign to words is our love for using abstract nouns and pretending that they 'stand for things'. (Wilson 35)

The commonsense reification of education illustrates Wilson's point. See Ogden and Richards Chap. II for an account of the influence of symbols upon human life and thought; Freud [1] on taboos associated with names and Freud [2] footnote for an interesting example: Freud quotes Julius Caesar III iii; the mob set upon Cinna the poet because he has the same name as Cinna the conspirator.

2 Wittgenstein gives no example of the kind of thing he has in mind. Fowler quotes 'the sifting of evidence' as an example in which: ... the metaphor is so familiar that it is about equal chances whether sifting or examination will be used, and that a sieve is not present to the thought - unless indeed someone conjures it up by saying 'All the evidence must first be sifted with acid tests', or 'with the microscope' -; under such a stimulus our m. turns out to have been not dead but dormant. (Modern English Usage 349)

3.4.8

1 Cf. T 5.62. There has been controversy over whether Wittgenstein meant 'the language which I alone understand' or 'the only language which I understand'. The first would now clash seriously with Wittgenstein's views on the impossibility of a private language but

there is no doubt, because of the exigencies of the grammar in the German, that the second was what he meant. See Hintikka 157 and Anscombe 167.

2 Perhaps the notion of clearing the ground by destroying castles in the air (Luftgebäude) might serve as an example of a disquieting metaphor. I certainly find it disquietingly mixed and can plead only that it is Wittgenstein's own as far as the crucial 'air' (Luft) is concerned (Gebäude = buildings). I do not find GEMA's 'houses of cards' any more reassuring. Houses of cards, however flimsy, are (i) a construct (ii) man-made. Castles in the air are (i) airy nothings (ii) not a man-made anything therefore. Castles in the air cannot be destroyed because they have never been built. In Wittgenstein's context one clears the linguistic terrain of illusions, delusions, misconceptions - the effects of the spells which language casts over the mind. The metaphor is mixed but comprehensible; Wittgenstein's sentences are in order as they stand and one takes his 'good meaning' - on his own insistence one simply batters one's head against a wall by seeking to inquire too deeply into language.

3.5.2

1 The idea of solving a philosophical problem by dissolving it is foreshadowed in the *Tractatus*:

The solution to the problem of life is made evident by the disappearance of the problem. (T 6.521)

2 Philosophy changes perceptions; that, according to Wittgenstein, is its purpose. To change one's perceptions of a thing, or even of language, is not to change the thing itself or even the language. Both are left just as they were - unless one takes literally the Berkeleian view that to be is to be perceived and pushes it to the extreme solipsistic position of denying other than intentional existence to anything. I accept that I cannot prise the world off my concepts but I assume that there is a world which might be prised off my concepts. If any of J.S. Mill's 'permanent possibilities of sensation' are realised as sense data, it is not the perceiver who motivates the sense data. In any case, as Wittgenstein points out in his 'private language' argument, talk of sense data doesn't make sense without some public criterion for it. Even if I could change my private world or my private language by

philosophising about them, I could not conceivably change the public world or the public language. The limits of my language may be the limits of my world, so that by clarifying my language through philosophising I can change my world, but clarifying my language does not alter the physical circumstances of which the public world is composed. I am, moreover, committing the *Tractatus* error of applying one sign 'world' to two different symbols and the *Philosophical Investigations* error (which is a metaphorical way of saying the same thing) of conflating two different games which might legitimately be played separately with the word 'world'. In short, it does not seem to me to matter whether Wittgenstein's ambiguous 'it (philosophy) leaves everything as it is' (PI 124) is intended to apply to the world, to language or to both; it cannot alter how things are but only how they are perceived.

3.5.3

1 An engineer would be concerned with the motion of a machine in theory - as Wittgenstein was, for example, at Manchester University (see Granger for a reproduction of part of the machine drawing of an aircraft reaction engine on which he worked there). I take Wittgenstein's point to be that the engineer would not, however, conceptualise such 'motion in theory' as 'theoretical motion' endowable with properties in its own right. The engineer would be concerned with the correlation of theory and practice, but he would not make the error, ostensibly conceptual but in fact linguistic, of regarding theory and practice as discrete entities. Wittgenstein accuses his hypothetical philosopher of making such an error; that is why he is like a savage (Wittgenstein does not say that he *is* a savage) who misinterprets the modes of civilised speech.

3.5.9

1 Alternatively: Since language is a social activity, the degree of acceptability of usages reflects their acceptability in society i.e. their social status. The philosopher's task is, therefore, to compile a descriptive account of language-games which puts them into their position in society. I attempt this exercise with 'education' language-games in §4.2.1ff. An important corollary is that agreement between one person and another is not agreement in the expression of

their opinions but agreement in their way of life (PI 241):

To communication by means of language belongs not merely agreement over definitions but also (however odd this may sound) agreement over judgements. (PI 242)

Normative perceptions of education are matters of value judgement (ethical theory, according to Peters [1] 91); they are therefore variables and accordingly, as Peters points out, not justifiably to be regarded as intrinsic to the concept of education. I develop this point in §4.2.17.

3.5.12

1 Cf. Note 3.4.7.1

3.6.4

1 See Janik and Toulmin 29, 175, 179f., 225.

3.7.1

1 Cf. Note 1.1.4.1

3.7.4

1 If use bestows meaning, what is the status of typographical errors or Freudian slips? Freud, of course, sees great significance in them (see Freud [2] 79-88). The use of the words in the following letter to the editor of a newspaper is clear enough, but what is one to make of the original, reported use?

Sir, - Twenty years ago you told us that Sir Malcolm Sargent was a master at controlling chairs. On June 4, at last, you have put the record straight, by reporting that a choir had been thrown through a window. - Yours etc. (Guardian 6/6/85)

Perhaps the two cases in which 'chair' and 'choir' were transposed might be classed with the cases postulated by Wittgenstein (PI 43) in which meaning is something other than use - intended use possibly. But this notion is fraught with difficulties, particularly the implication that meaning is inherent in the language as it is thought, not as it is uttered, and the corollary that language is always potentially private and never evidently public. Wittgenstein no doubt intends 'meaning is use' to imply necessarily the social context, which Jespersen stresses, of speaker and hearer, but there is no way of ensuring, even when the sign emerges as the speaker intended, that the hearer will interpret it

likewise. Wittgenstein knows this perfectly well, of course, as he shows by his acceptance of the indeterminacy of meaning. He does not, however, attempt to rescue meaning from its consequent fate of meaninglessness by offering some sort of criterion for meaning. Cf. § 4.1.1ff.

3.8.2

1 Mephistopheles says of himself:

Ich bin der Geist, der stets verneint!
(Goethe, *Faust I*, Studierzimmer I
1399)

I am that spirit which constantly negates!
(my translation)

Everything that exists, declares Mephistopheles, is worthy only to be destroyed. A line of thought might be traced from this through Schopenhauer to Wittgenstein's own profound pessimism which led him at times to consider destroying himself. He had precedent enough: Three of his elder brothers committed suicide, a way of death that was almost a way of life in the *fin de siècle* Vienna to which Wittgenstein was born. Janik and Toulmin advance the thesis that Wittgenstein and others sought an antidote to corruption in society through a critique of the accepted means of expression through which the corruption became manifest. Language - in politics, literature, the stage, society generally - was notably corrupt in Habsburg Vienna. Such motivation would adequately explain Wittgenstein's perennial complaints of lack of understanding of his work - starting with Russell's introduction to the *Tractatus*. Language as a part of the human organism or as a way of life must have a profound effect on the way we live; *is*, in a sense, the way we live. The antipathy to academic philosophy of Wittgenstein the would-be social reformer becomes readily comprehensible. The diversion of some of the Wittgenstein-generated philosophical energy into the channel of the philosophy of education might well have met with his approval. His first resort after, as he thought, achieving with the *Tractatus* the final solution to the problems of philosophy and turning his back on it, was to schoolteaching.

3.8.3

1 Perhaps the doctrine of indeterminacy of translation will have little air of paradox for readers familiar with Wittgenstein's latter-day remarks on meaning. (Quine [1] 77 footnote)

3.8.7

1 In my grammar school in the early 1930s the subject was called 'divinity' and was taught by a member of the church militant with a peculiarly literal view of suffering little children.

2 Cf. §3.5.11

3.8.8

1 The philosophy of education might be thought to be a more likely source of a context in which 'education' is indispensable.

Accordingly, I have searched the philosophies of education listed in my bibliography but have been unable to find such a context. There are plenty of examples in which 'education' is indispensable but they are without exception contexts in which the question is asked, explicitly or implicitly: 'What is education?'. I can find none which answers the question and retains 'education'. 'Education' is always explained in other words which consequently render 'education' dispensable. See, for example, the explanation by Hirst and Peters of the concept of 'education' (see Note 1.1.5.3) which I quote in Note 4.2.1.4 (Hirst and Peters 25). Clearly, 'education' has a useful function to perform in acting as shorthand for an explanation of this length (cf. Austin's view of the value of concepts as a means of avoiding periphrasis, quoted in §1.1.6). But that is the only function of the word; it adds no information on its own account. In the description offered by Hirst and Peters - which represents a subjective view replaceable by any number of others - 'education' is elucidated, not elucidatory; it labels a package of indeterminate size but the contents of the package say what the label means, not vice versa. Peters makes the shorthand function of 'education' explicit:

... specific achievements and states of mind which give content to the formal notion of 'the educated man' which is a shorthand for summarising our notion of a form of life which is worth-while enough to deserve being handed on from generation to generation.
(Peters [2] 5f.)

Shorthand does not bestow meaning; it has meaning bestowed upon it by concepts which approximate closely enough to logical simples with socially accepted meanings. If they do not, they need clarifying in simpler terms before they can be used in an elucidatory mode; the possibility of ambiguity precludes the possibility of determinate

meaning (cf. T 3.23; 3.24). (See also Frege on the non-definability of concepts, quoted in §1.1.5 and Ayer on the indispensability of universals as general terms than which there is nothing simpler; Ayer [3] 207). 'Education' is not a logical simple or a universal and needs elucidation in other words, during which process it is paraphrased out of existence. Education is, therefore, a pseudo-concept because (i) it is never explanatory (ii) it is always explained away, never explained.

3.8.9

1 This reflects the commonest connotation of 'education' in everyday usage but is of no significance for my argument. 'Educatee' does not figure in philosophies of education either. I have already argued against 'educated man' as a synonym; see §2.4.1.

4.1.2

1 The word exerts a strong centripetal force, so that the headline on an article in the newsletter of the NSW Department of TAFE which reads: 'Educational Use of Satellites' is likely to be read as it was intended to appear (see Appendix I No. 378 but cf. Note 3.7.4.1). The pull of 'education' is too strong for the process to work in reverse. An advertisement in *The Advertiser* of Adelaide for 31 May 1986 offered for sale a 'Sewerage Educator' (see Appendix I No. 87). It was not until another advertisement from the same firm appeared a couple of weeks later that I realised that what was meant was a 'Sewerage Eductor', a machine for extracting the contents of septic tanks. This episode, incidentally, reinforces my queasiness over 'education as a drawing-out' (see §1.2.13). Only what is already in can be drawn out and manifestly the results could be, under certain circumstances, somewhat unsavoury. Which is not to say that education as a putting-in would necessarily produce more attractive results; as the infelicitous use of computers convincingly demonstrates, putting rubbish in means getting rubbish out.

4.1.7

1 Cf. Peters [1] 25:

(Education)... picks out no particular activity or process. Rather it lays down criteria to which activities or processes must conform.

4.1.8

1 Wird ein Zeichen nicht gebraucht, so ist es bedeutungslos.
(T 3.328)

If a sign is not used then it is meaningless.

CKO and PMG translate differently and, in my opinion, incorrectly - particularly since both agree that the sense of 'Gebrauch' in T 3.326 is 'use'.

4.1.9

1 This is the principal grammatical means by which Carroll achieves his effects:

'I see nobody on the road,' said Alice.

'I only wish *I* had such eyes,' the King remarked in a fretful tone.

'To be able to see Nobody! And at that distance too! Why, it's as much as *I* can do to see real people by this light!'

(Carroll 286)

The sustained use of the same device in *Jabberwocky* creates the skeleton of what has been called 'the greatest nonsense-poem in the English language'. To my mind, such a judgement creates a false categorisation into 'poem' and 'nonsense-poem' with the unjustifiable corollary that, because a poem - or a statement - is intended not to be nonsense, it thereby succeeds in not being nonsense, and vice versa. It is much safer to regard *Jabberwocky* as simply a great poem, in which capacity it can comfortably hold hands with, say, Wordsworth's *Ode on Intimations of Immortality*, instead of being required to compete with it in accordance with the criteria of 'greatest' and 'nonsense'. There are two points in this which underline the continuing importance of Frege's crucial distinction between (symbolic) sense and (referential) meaning:

(i) Honouring syntax results in grammatical sense which, with an appropriate choice of vocabulary, can produce an aesthetic effect true to itself. Carroll's and Wordsworth's nonsense makes excellent sense; the meaning of their words is the use they make of them. There is no reason why philosophy (of education) should not be poetry. The *Tractatus* strikes me as a poem, perhaps a great poem; perhaps even, accepting Wittgenstein's own assessment, a nonsense-poem.

(ii) Truth to reality demands, tautologically, that a statement be true to reality. Factual statements about education, for example, must honour the facts of the matter; they must, therefore, have third party verification since no statement can express anything

about itself (T 3.332; cf. Note 3.3.5.2).

What I want to teach is: how to transfer from covert to overt nonsense. (PI 464)

See Searle [1] 28ff. on what he sees as the inevitable restriction of artificial intelligence to syntax.

4.1.10

1 These two views of necessary meaning are polarised in Putnam [1] 215-271 and Ayer [4] 267-270. Putnam develops the idea of essential meaning. Water, for example, must have the microstructure denoted by the formula H_2O in order to be water. Anything with the commonsense properties of the stuff called 'water' which did not have this structure would not be water. Ayer attacks Putnam's argument with commonsense empiricism. 'Water' names what it would be taken to name by speakers of English generally even if it has a different microstructure. Its commonly understood properties are what make it water. I agree with Ayer (and Stebbing; cf. Note 2.2.9.1) but propose, for the sake of developing my argument, to steer a middle course between these two positions: Acceptance of the socially agreed uses of words tempered by the possibility of a core use which conditions, to a greater or less extent, some or all of the other members of the family of uses.

2 Cf. PI 126:

Philosophy just sets everything out baldly and explains and infers nothing. Since everything lies exposed, there isn't even anything to explain. For what is in any way hidden is of no interest to us. 'Philosophy' might even be the name given to what is possible *before* any new discovery or invention.

Twice in this passage and on numerous other occasions, GEMA fails to pick up the use of 'auch' = 'even', either omitting it and losing the intended emphasis or giving it its other common connotation of 'also' and changing the sense of the context. 'For example', as a translation of 'etwa' (according to context = 'perhaps'; 'indeed'; 'in some way') makes a nonsense of the third sentence in PI 126.

4.1.11

1 Cf. the approach to language-games of Berne and Huizinga respectively; see §3.3.2ff.

4.2.1

1 Cf. Jespersen [2] 29:

... language is not exactly what a one-sided occupation with dictionaries and the usual grammars might lead us to think, but a set of habits, of habitual actions...

2 Nicht um die Erklärung eines Sprachspiels durch unsre Erlebnisse handelt sich's, sondern um die Feststellung eines Sprachspiels.

It is not a matter of explaining a language-game experientially but of making a language-game manifest.

(PI 655)

GEMA seems to me wide of the mark with 'noting' for 'Feststellung'.

3 We are currently seeing the rules of the 'gender' language-game changing. As recently as 1979, the then new Collins *English Dictionary* could note as informal the use of 'gender' to denote 'the state of being male, female or neuter'. Things have moved rapidly since then and 'gender' is now used as a synonym for 'sex' in contexts as formal as the titles of honours courses in university departments of English and in official communications from the vice-chancellor of at least one university. I hope this is not a case of not knowing better on the part of those who, pre-eminently in my old-fashioned view, ought to know better, but I doubt whether this particular usage falls into the first of the categories identified by Fowler:

gender... is a grammatical term only. To talk of *persons or creatures of the masculine or feminine g.*, meaning of the *male or female sex*, is either a jocularity (permissible or not according to context) or a blunder.

(Modern English Usage 211)

A third, and I think likely, possibility is that the 'Fowler' language-game is no longer played by those whose predecessors in office were among its principal exponents. To agree with Wittgenstein that language is ultimately imprecise need not preclude a sense of loss when one small possibility of greater rather than less precision is thrown away.

'Education' is not in the same case; the problem there is to go the other way - towards instilling a measure of precision into a plethora of anomalous meanings.

4 Cf. Hirst and Peters 25:

It looks, therefore, as if the concept of 'education' is a very fluid one. At one end of a continuum is the older and undifferentiated concept which refers just to any process of bringing up or rearing... The more recent and more specific concept links such processes with the development of states of a person that involve

knowledge and understanding in depth and breadth, and also suggests that they are desirable.

4.2.3

1 Cf. T 5.552: Logic antedates all experience.

4.2.7

1 As a corollary, the notion of education as an episode in life terminating in what is called the 'educated man' needs to be revised. There is no terminal state of educatedness other than death which, as Wittgenstein points out, is not an episode in life (T 6.4311). Where and how, in order to establish the concept, might one find an educated man as postulated by Hirst and Peters, for example? And if a certain proportion of the population (1% 5% 10%?) could be endowed with the desired state of educatedness, what would happen to the lesser breeds without the lore? Everybody is somebody; we must have a terminology of education which takes account of everybody other than by the dichotomy educated/uneducated.

2 I know of no way in English of expressing 'educating' in the passive voice, although in a sense I argue that 'educated' is the passive form of 'educating' since I take 'educatee' to be both state and flux - state at any given moment and flux overall.

4.2.8

1 Peters makes this claim. He distinguishes between:

... processes of education proper which can be viewed as a family of tasks leading up to the achievement of being educated.

(Peters [2] 14)

and processes of 'picking up' things which might be as desirable as a passion for poetry, as undesirable as bad manners and as trivial as mannerisms:

My reluctance to call such goings-on processes of education is not just due to the fact that what is passed on may be trivial or undesirable, but to the difficulty of conceiving them as tasks either on the part of the teacher or the learner.

(Peters [2] 11)

Peters is, of course, at liberty to restrict *his* use of the term 'educational process' in whatever way he fancies; as long as he makes it clear how he is using it, I can understand what he is saying without necessarily agreeing with him - I see no correlation whatever between

'task' and 'educational process'. But I do not say that there is anything nonsensical in Peters's concept of educational process or in his holding it. What is nonsensical is to think that there could possibly be any way of distinguishing before the event (or after it, though for different reasons) what is and what is not a process of education. An educational process is one which *has had* an educational effect - educational by any definition including the one favoured by Peters. Peters subscribes to the polite fiction that there is something magical in syllabus:

What is forgotten is that activities like history, literary appreciation, and philosophy, unlike Bingo and billiards, involve forms of thought and awareness that can and should spill over into things that go on outside, and transform them. For they are concerned with the explanation, evaluation and imaginative exploration of forms of life.

(Peters [2] 8)

This is simply not true; none of the 'activities' listed by Peters is an absolute. The educational (by Peters's own criteria) effect of any of them depends on the effect it exerts and that, in a schooling context, depends largely on the way in which it is presented. History, badly taught, can be and frequently is educationally disastrous; billiards, appropriately presented, could provide a wealth of learning experiences in mathematics, physics, philosophy (see Hume 341 - Appendix A to *A Treatise of Human Nature*), aesthetics, sociology... The line taken by Peters reinforces my long-held view that syllabus is not essential to schooling and is relevant only when it is made to be so, e.g. for the convenience of public examinations. In the words of the once-popular song: It ain't what you do it's the way that you do it - that's what gets results. In latter-day terms, the medium is the message; cf. Note 3.4.4.1

2 Attempts throughout history to do so have resulted in many of the more spectacular manifestations of man's inhumanity to man.

4.2.9

1 I am talking only about demonstrating a lasting effect in anticipation of the event, not whether schooling exerts or can exert a lasting effect on educatedness. It would be foolish, and in my case contradictory, to deny the potential contribution of schooling to educatedness. I am conscious as I write, even to discrete instances, of

the ministrations of my teachers of fifty years ago.

4.2.10

1 Peters, it seems to me, takes a similar view of education. The concept of the educated man is analysable in terms of predetermined goals which are to be approached via tasks performed by teacher and taught.

2 Nonetheless, he believes that it has not been established that schools are really capable of doing anything other than teaching academic subjects to bright children, and the more they try to do other things the worse they are at their central task.

(*The Australian* of 31 July 1987, reporting the views of Alastair Mackerras, the retiring Principal of Sydney Grammar School).

4.2.11

1 It is hardly likely that I have invented a new 'education' language-game; a use of education which has not previously been thought of and which establishes an identifiable usage. If I have, then what I am saying is likely not to be comprehended unless I succeed in making manifest the language-game which I am playing (PI 655; cf. §4.2.1 and Note 4.2.1.2). My 'educatee' language-games might be of the type of 'centaur' language-games - constructed out of the bits of other language-games as Wittgenstein suggests we might imagine a nonexistent centaur as a combination of the known elements of existing animals (see Note 2.4.3.1). They would remain nonexistent for all that, mere symbols of symbols - one stage further removed from reality than any 'education' language-game already is. Alternatively, they might be authentic 'education' language-games but overshadowed by their socially more forward and more widely recognised fellows:

We do not become conscious of the inexpressible variety of all the language-games which we play day in, day out (aller der tagtäglichen Sprachspiele), because our language clothes them all uniformly. (PI II xi)

However, there is no proscription of my introducing what I take to be a new language-game. Wittgenstein establishes the principle from the start of his account of language-games that the family is never complete. New language-games are born and old ones die continually. Any new one, it seems to me, must of necessity be introduced by a single speaker; there is no communal consciousness - as it were a Greek Chorus - to

generate a language-game in instantaneous unison. Wittgenstein approaches the question from the other end:

Anything new (spontaneous; 'specific') is always a language-game.
(Ibid.)

What else could it be? We cannot prise the world off our concepts and thought is not separable from the language which carries it:

If I think in language, I don't have 'meanings' hovering around in addition to the linguistic expression; on the contrary, the language itself is the vehicle for the thought.
(PI 329)

Clearly, as far as Wittgenstein is concerned, I need not feel inhibited over introducing new 'education' language-games to society. Whether society is prepared to receive them is, of course, a different matter.

4.2.15

1 Bloom's *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives* is the *reductio ad absurdum* in this genre. Hirst and Peters put their finger on a crucial failing:

... it shows no awareness of the fundamental, necessary relationships between the various kinds of objectives that can be distinguished.
(Hirst and Peters 61)

Any attempt to implement such a programme would inevitably be subverted by the individuality of the educatee and the human fallibility of the educator.

4.2.16

1 Except, of course, in the playing, which is real enough. At one level this could be viewed as the answer to my tortuous search for a link between 'education' and reality. 'Education' language-games are played in the real world; they are a physical phenomenon - audible; visible; tangible - perceptible to the senses and to nothing else. But this is no solution to my problem; on the contrary, it is where I came in: 'Education' is a word; a sign perceptible to the senses. The symbol is not touched by the playing of 'education' language-games; every other sort of language-game that is played is also played - that is to say no more than that there is language. The tautology has its uses however:

(i) It reminds me that I must not argue that 'education' language-games are a paradigm for the existence of education.

(ii) It absorbs whatever imputation of the reality of education might be thought to lie in 'education' language-games and explains it away. I need feel no guilt over discounting the possibility that the manifest existence of 'education' entails the existence of education.

4.2.17

1 I accept that in interpreting educateeness as intentionality I am playing an EP language-game. What is not an EP language-game, in my view, but an EE language-game, is the need to postulate distinguishing properties for educatee. If there are none, there is no such thing as educatee. This, as Peters would say, is a purely conceptual point, but it entails the survival of educat- in anything like a traditional sense.

4.2.19

1 There is a danger in philosophy of education, as in any other applied field, of polarization to one of two extremes. The work could be practically relevant but philosophically feeble; or it could be philosophically sophisticated but remote from practical problems. (Peters in Archambault x & Hirst vii)

In Peters's view, the aim should be to produce work which is both practically relevant and philosophically competent. Passmore wants to replace philosophy with science, ostensibly of education, though it is clear that he subscribes to the conventional equation of education and schooling:

Educational science stands to teaching as horticultural science stands to gardening; it asks what goes on in our schools as horticultural science asks what goes on in our gardens.

(Passmore [2] 56)

I have doubts about the felicity of the metaphor: The relationship between teacher and pupil is not the same as that between gardener and plant; questions would be asked if a teacher applied to a recalcitrant pupil the sanctions available to a gardener with regard to a recalcitrant plant. But the philosophical undertaking (of science or of education) is misconceived. If Passmore's aim was achieved, an empirical account of a collection of idiosyncratic schools would result. If these could be collated objectively, a science of schools might emerge which could then be extrapolated on some proven theory into a science of schooling. But that would not be science of education.

I have every sympathy with Passmore. He obviously feels the need for a first-order account of education; a statement of the facts of the matter. He wants to solve what Russell calls:

... the problem of using sentences so as to convey truth rather than falsehood; this belongs to the special sciences dealing with the subject-matter of the sentences in question.

(Russell [6] in CKO 7-8; PMG ix)

The philosophical problem would remain untouched i.e. what Passmore sees as the relationship between educational science and philosophy of education and Russell characterises as the:

... conditions for *accurate* Symbolism, i.e. for Symbolism in which a sentence 'means' something quite definite.

(Russell [6] in CKO 8; PMG 10)

But Passmore is on a wild-goose chase for at least four reasons:

- (i) Schooling is not education;
- (ii) No two schools are alike except for the highest common factor of some sort of location plus teacher plus taught;
- (iii) The objective observer who might give an objective account of a school does not exist in this subjective, contingent world;
- (iv) Scientific truth is the best available theory.

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