



BRØNDAL'S SYSTEM OF GRAMMAR: A TRANSLATION OF,
AND COMMENTARY ON, MORFOLOGI OG SYNTAX (1932)

BY

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Dedicated to the memory of

Associate-Professor W.G. (Bill) Hoddinott

who taught linguistics at the

University of New England.

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I certify that the substance of this thesis has not already been submitted for any degree and is not being currently submitted for any other degree.

I also certify that any help received in the preparation of this thesis, and all sources used, have been acknowledged in this thesis.

Should the thesis be accepted for the award of the degree, I consent to its being made available for photocopying and library loan.

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27.3.89

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of the largely neglected grammatical theories of the Danish structuralist and co-founder of the Linguistic Circle of Copenhagen, Viggo Brøndal (1887-1942). The introduction discusses the general linguistic background and the main trends in linguistics during Brøndal's student and teaching years. Two special sections deal at some length with the Germanic system of grammatical terminology and the theory of **partes** (word classes) and **membra** (sentence members or constituents). Both topics are crucial to an understanding of Brøndal's work.

The central part of the thesis consists of an English translation of **Morfologi og syntax** (1932). The work was the second of three major works elaborating his scheme of logico-linguistic analysis. It continued the use of Aristotelian generic logical concepts first set out in **Ordklasserne** (**Word classes**) (1928), and the theory developed in the present work was in turn to be refined in **Præpositionernes teori** (**Theory of prepositions**) (1940). The first work in this series has been translated into French (**Les parties du discours**, 1948), as has the third (**Théorie des prépositions**, 1950), which has also been translated into Italian (1967). **Morfologi og syntax**, however, has never been translated into any other language.

The translation is followed by a detailed commentary which seeks to provide the English-speaking reader with a guide not only to unfamiliar aspects of Brøndal's own system of grammar, but also to the copious references and quotations from other languages (also translated where necessary) from classical, mediaeval, renaissance and modern sources, philosophical, philological and linguistic. Throughout the commentary cross-references are supplied to Brøndal's other works to chart the development of the system. Consideration is also given to counter-arguments by scholars opposed to his views. The arguments presented in **Morfologi og syntax** are evaluated, and in some instances demonstrated to be clearly erroneous, though the overall significance of the work as a valuable and highly original contribution to modern linguistic thought is stressed. Finally, the catholicity of Brøndal's approach, as against the doctrinaire positions of Hjelmslev and the Genevans, is seen as vindicated in the light of recent developments (e.g. functional grammar, cognitive grammar) which reject the narrowness of 'autonomous' linguistics.

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Note: I have rearranged the position of Brøndal's Bibliography and his Contents page in accordance with English convention; in the original the annotated Bibliography precedes the text, the Contents page follows it.

PREFACE

The translation of Brøndal's *Morfologi og syntax* (1932), hereinafter M & S, presented here is intended to make the work accessible to a larger public than that of the Danish-speaking world. The introduction sets out to provide an outline of Brøndal's career sufficient to situate M & S in relation to Brøndal's other major works and to the intellectual background of European linguistics in the 1920s and 30s. There follows a discussion of two topics which have proved particularly resistant to inclusion in the commentary proper despite many attempts at different placements. They are: 1, the dual native and Latin systems of grammatical terminology in the Germanic tradition, a distinction appealed to by linguists like John Ries and by Brøndal himself when pointing out the absurdity (evident in the transparent native compounds in German and German-influenced Danish terminology), say, of claims that syntax is the study of word-classes (parts of speech).

This is followed in turn by 2. the rise of the careful distinction in the Germanic tradition of *partes* and *membra*, a distinction generally ignored in the English-speaking world (apart from studies written in English by followers of the Germanic tradition like Jespersen or Deutschbein) and also ignored in the French, although it appears that this distinction was first elaborated in detail by the Frenchman (Abbé) Gabriel Girard in 1747 (and independently in the same year,

according to Diderichsen, by the Dane Høysgaard: details are given at the appropriate point of the commentary).

The commentary seeks to account for any matter which might be unfamiliar to an English-speaking student of linguistics who has read for the subject in recent years at an English-speaking university. (I enlarge upon this topic in the Introduction). This has proved a delicate task. Since the translation is meant to make the original Danish accessible to readers outside the Scandinavian world, it seemed reasonable not to make the tacit assumption of Brøndal's time that all readers would cope effortlessly with the major modern European languages and the classical languages too, or at least, with Latin and Greek. I have tried to give a gloss of most of the non-English examples in the commentary, unless they are obvious from the context. Danish or Swedish examples are glossed directly in the translation itself. Comments of substance are denoted in the translation by an asterisk thus: *. In this way, readers conversant with Latin, say, or Italian, may read on without the distraction of such a signal (merely to find, perhaps, a simple gloss or paraphrase to bring out the point being made). I have, however, of necessity presumed a knowledge of French and German for the commentary, simply because Brøndal gave but one address in English (at the 1936 International Congress of Phonetic Sciences, out of deference to his hosts at University College London) and because the secondary literature is, other than Danish, overwhelmingly in French and German, when not in Italian, Spanish, Serbo-Croatian, Russian or Czech (as in Dokulil's obituary, until

recently one of the most revealing on Brøndal the man - Dokulil had attended Brøndal's seminars in Copenhagen in the late 30s and was thus writing with first-hand knowledge). Though my own grasp of Czech is practically nil, at the time this was one of the longest accounts of Brøndal's life and works available, so I was more or less obliged to construe the gist of it with a Czech dictionary and on the basis of a knowledge of Russian, with subsequent verification and correction by a native speaker. A footnote in Dokulil referring to M & S took my attention: 'Vyjde v nejbližší době v italiském překladu.' ('To appear in the near future in Italian translation'). (Dokulil 1943: 19) I wondered about this for some time. I tried to imagine an Italian scholar wrestling with Brøndal's dense prose amidst the general uproar, supposing this to be taking place in, say, Rome 1942-43. I scanned the printed catalogues of The British Museum, Library of Congress, Bibliothèque Nationale, the *Bibliografia nazionale italiana*, and in 1982, the card catalogues of the University Libraries of Copenhagen and Aarhus - in vain. Much later I noticed in the 'Bibliographie complémentaire' to Brøndal's *Essais* a note against the brief abstract of M & S: 'Édition italienne en préparation': it was Brøndal himself, it appears, who intended to make the translation, though why in Italian remains a mystery, unless it was Rosally Brøndal's own project (she, too, was a Romance scholar and joint editor, with Togeby, of the posthumously published *Essais*.)

I have also tried to suggest why anyone unfamiliar with the older European tradition in linguistics should bother to read Brøndal,

other than as some kind of test of logico-linguistic versatility: indeed, a number of his contemporaries, even when reviewing his work with guarded admiration, spoke of experiencing 'vertige' and 'Schwindelsucht' when reading Brøndal. I know the feeling only too well. My task here of stating the relevance of Brøndal today has been made immeasurably easier by the recent upsurge in Brøndal studies centred on Sven Erik Larsen's work at the University of Odense (Larsen 1986 *et seq.* - there are more details on this in the introduction below).

My hope is that the reader will find much, if not all, in M & S as intellectually stimulating as I have found it to be. It may be that even on points where current informed opinion (say on the possibility of 'primitive' languages or the view of Chinese as a language without word classes) is entirely against Brøndal, some sounder evidence may be produced to sustain his general argument, and perhaps from a standpoint other than the purely grammatical - the French and Danish semi-oticians evidently believe this to be so, but to judge on such matters is well outside my competence. I am content to leave the reader with Brøndal's system of grammar, the core of which is encapsulated in this study of morphology and syntax.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, thanks to my mentor in linguistics, the late Bill Hoddinott, who introduced me to the work of Jespersen in his post-graduate course for language graduates (Litt. B. in Linguistics) at the University of New England. These courses were given with the verve, wit and scholarship one might expect from a Welsh Oxonian. His own specialization was in the Aboriginal languages of the Daly River region of Northern Australia. After I completed the Litt. B. externally by examination (on a course in classics in linguistics from Jespersen to Chomsky, Fillmore and Halliday) and a minor thesis, which I elected to write on Jespersen's 1921 work on junction and nexus (*De to hovedarter af grammatiske forbindelser*), I continued to work in this field with an MA Honours thesis on Jespersen 1913, *Sprogets logik*, in which the notion of rank, among other topics, was first set forth.

The successful conclusion of this work left me with an appetite for more. Bill suggested field work in his area, and I was strongly drawn by the idea; many Aboriginal languages are dying out virtually unrecorded and such field work is vitally necessary though not universally appreciated. In the end, purely practical considerations ruled this undertaking out. It then seemed best to build on the foundations of my earlier research by turning to the work of one of Jespersen's most outstanding pupils.

I enrolled for the present dissertation in 1981 and had made substantial progress by the summer of 1984. On my return from U.N.E. to South Australia I was shocked to hear, from Associate-Professor D.G. Londey, my other supervisor, of Bill's death. David Londey, a philosopher and logician, has taught at Danish and Norwegian Universities and has meticulously checked my translation from the Danish for both of the earlier Jespersen dissertations as well as for Brøndal. He generously offered to continue as an outside supervisor should I be forced to transfer my candidature, as proved to be the case. I cannot express my thanks to David sufficiently for all his help from 1976 to the present.

I had some difficulty locating a suitable supervisor in linguistics, and here I must express my thanks to Professor Brian Coghlan of the Department of German at the University of Adelaide for his sound advice. Through his good offices I was taken on as a candidate by George Turner, then Reader in Linguistics at Adelaide. George returned from Oxford during the first term of 1985 and I immediately gained the benefit of his advice as a linguist and his proofreading skills as a lexicographer. Though new to Danish, G.T. is a highly competent Germanist and was soon able to suggest improvements to the translation from a linguistic standpoint. Scattered throughout my commentary will be found the note: 'I owe this suggestion to G.T.' He has generously continued to supervise the work even in his busy retirement (other Australian Oxford dictionaries are appearing under

his editorship after he edited *The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary* in his last year at the University).

Once again I thank Fr. Anne Bohr, now retired, formerly Reference Librarian at the University of Copenhagen for help with Brøndal's entries in the Library catalogue. Thanks also to an unknown colleague in the Inter-Library Loan Dept. of Copenhagen University who sent me a copy of Diderichsen's *Helhed og struktur* by return mail. I thank Herr Juul-Larsen of the Library at Odense University who managed to find me a precious copy of Sven Erik Larsen's dissertation when the University Bookshop had no copies left for sale. Herr Michael Rasmussen, one of the scholars of the Brøndal revival, formerly of Odense and now at Aalborg, cheerfully answered my enquiries about the background of this renewal of interest in Brøndal in Denmark and kindly sent me a reprint of his long Danish abstract of Dr Larsen's dissertation.

Thanks, too, to my colleagues in the Library at Roseworthy Agricultural College: to Margaret Emery, Chief Librarian, for all sorts of advice and encouragement; to Marie Kozulic and to our Computer Manager, Brian Glaetzer, for helping me to transfer files from lap-top to main-frame to micro to floppy disk; to Jean Thompson of the Faculty of Agriculture for keying in much of the translation.

Murphy's Law has struck in the eleventh hour: in these latter weeks a faulty disk drive has been corrupting my files - and I have had to

reenter the bibliography several times. I am extremely grateful to Ms. Elizabeth Herman, Secretary of External Studies at the College, for coming to my rescue at this time by producing the work quickly on a laser printer and by keying in some of the text where main, backup and second backup disks had become unusable.

Lastly I thank my wife Hannelore, not only for her patience and understanding during these extended studies, but also for proofreading, keying in text, collating copies, pushing me on when I started to rest on the oars, and, in this last-minute computer-produced crisis, for staying calm and getting me sufficiently organized to produce the final copy.

Dozens of errors have been removed from every page thanks to the vigilance of my supervisors and others; for those which undoubtedly remain despite all this kind help, I alone am responsible.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations of titles of books and articles by Brøndal have been used below:

The present work, *Morfologi og syntax*, 1932: M & S

Ordklasserne. Partes orationis. Studier over de sproglige kategorier, 1928: OKL

Præpositionernes teori: indledning til en rationel betydningslære, 1940: PT

Essais de linguistique générale, 1943: Essais or ELG

Les parties du discours, [1928] 1948: PD

Théorie des prépositions [1940] 1950: TdP

Articles reprinted in the *Essais*, their most accessible form, are cited with page references to the collection thus:

'Le système de la grammaire', 1930: SG/ELG: 1-7 [etc.]

'L'autonomie de la syntaxe', 1931: AS/ELG

'Structure et variabilité des systèmes morphologiques', 1935: SVSM/ELG

'*Omnis et totus*', 1937: O&T

'Définition de la morphologie', 1937: DM/ELG

'Les oppositions linguistiques', 1937: OL/ELG

'Langage et logique', 1937: LL/ELG

'Le problème de l'hypotaxe', 1937: PH/ELG

- 'L'originalité des prépositions du français moderne', 1939: OPFM/ELG
'Linguistique structurale', 1939: LS/ELG
'Le concept de 'personne' en grammaire', 1939: CPG/ELG
'Compensation et variation, deux principes de linguistique générale,
1940: CV/ELG
'La constitution du mot', 1942: CM/ELG
'Théorie de la dérivation', 1942: TD/ELG
'Les formes fondamentales du verbe', 1942: FFV/ELG
'Délimitation et subdivision de la grammaire', 1942: DSG/ELG

(Articles dated 1942 unpublished, but sketched out for editors by Brøndal.)

Also: Transformational-generative grammar: TGG

INTRODUCTION

Like Jespersen before him, Brøndal devoted his life to linguistics; his career was constituted by his teaching, research and publication, his travels, so far as I know, were all related to his chosen discipline in one way or another (student and teaching years in Paris, Conferences in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, England, papers given in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and so on). The sketch that follows is based on Professor Eli Fischer-Jørgensen's entry on her former teacher in the *Dansk biografisk leksikon* (1979), with occasional additions from obituaries. Most of the scholars mentioned here have entries in my commentary, p.199-383 below.

Rasmus Viggo (Hansen) Brøndal, 13th October 1887, Copenhagen - 14th December 1942, Copenhagen.

Brøndal (=B.) was born into a working-class family. [Dokulil says he had an aristocratic temperament.] He attended the Frederiksberg Grammar School in Copenhagen, matriculating in 1905. His first studies were in law, as Jespersen's had been, but after a year he changed to philosophical, linguistic and historical studies. In 1912 he took the equivalent of a master's degree in Romance philology (linguistics), which he had studied under the outstanding scholars Kristian Sandfeld (whose immediate colleague he became in 1928 on succeeding to Nyrop's chair) and Kristoffer Nyrop. He was also influenced by Holger Pedersen, the Celtic scholar (according to Sommerfelt: 1948: 261) His particular intellectual debt, however, was to the philosopher Harald

Høffding and to the linguists Vilhelm Thomsen and Otto Jespersen (Thomsen's pupil). In 1912-13 B. studied in Paris under the great comparativist, Antoine Meillet - an ex-colleague of Saussure's - and M. Roques and J. Bedier. (Influenced also by M. Grammont - Sommerfelt *ibid.* loc. cit.) In 1917 he took his doctorate with the dissertation *Substrat og lån i romansk og germansk* (*Substrat et emprunt en roman et en germanique* 1948). From 1917-25 he worked for the Danish Place Name Commission. From 1925-28 he was lecturer in Danish at the Sorbonne and from 1928 to 1942 he was Professor of Romance Language & Literature at the University of Copenhagen.

In his dissertation, B. attempts to establish the underlying causes of linguistic change; language is seen primarily as a social phenomenon (probably under Meillet's influence). He distinguishes **norm** (the linguistic ideal aimed at by all members of a given language community) and **idiom** (the sum of all deep-seated unconscious dispositions and tendencies of the race). Idiom thus operates in the direction of language change and can become a so-called **substrate** in various languages. The common Celtic substrate in French and various neighbouring languages is taken as an example. ('Le français est du latin parlé avec l'idiome gaulois' - from B's own abstract in ELG 141).

At this time B. was already contemplating a system of linguistics with a universally valid logical basis, though his publications over the next few years did not betray this intent: *Stedenavnstudier før og nu*. 1919, 24 p. (*Toponymics ancient and modern*); 'Den bestemte artikels oprindelse og brug', *Danske studier* 1923: 75-85 ('Origin and use of the definite article'); 'L'œuvre de Vilhelm Thomsen', *Acta philo-*

logica scandinavica, II, 1927-28: 289-318; and 'Mots "scythes" en nordique primitif', *Acta philol. scand.*, III, 1928-29: 1-31.

Now he began to publish his works on the logico-grammatical structure of language. OKL, 1928; M & S, 1932; PT, 1940; and the collection of major articles on these themes in ELG, 1943. OKL establishes a universal system of classes based on the four generic concepts **descriptum** (D), **descriptor** (d), **relatum** (R) and **relator** (r): these are a refined and redefined version of Aristotle's categories: quantity, quality, substance and relation. [This is discussed at considerable length in the commentary relating the point in M & S (Sec. 21) where these concepts are introduced and the reader is referred by B. back to OKL for details. I have supplied the necessary quotations from OKL for this purpose.] By combinations of the four concepts we obtain 15 word classes, four unidimensional: numerals (D), adverbs (d), proper names (R) and prepositions (r) [i.e. relators or relations in a wider sense], six two-dimensional: nouns (Rd) - which subdivide for B. into (n.) substantive (Rd) and (n.) adjective (Rd) (bolding shows emphasis) - like Jespersen, B. insisted on this terminology on the grounds that it united the nominal class of Latin and Greek, where the similarities are evident (**bonus dominus, bona domina** etc.); in view of this insistence, I have been obliged to translate **substantiv** as (the otherwise old-fashioned) **substantive** throughout - , verbs (rd), pronouns (RD), conjunctions (rD), possessives (rR) and reflexives (dD); four three-dimensional classes: derived verbs (Drd), derived nouns (DRd), derived pronouns (rDR) and deverbal nouns (rdR); and one undifferentiated class, the interjections (rRdD).

There are thus four levels of complexity. The classes are universal, but individual languages are characterized by the actual number of degree of complexity of classes used. The classes established by this logical analysis in OKL are then used in the present work, M & S, as a basis for morphology, while syntagmatic combinations of the same concepts are used to establish the corresponding sentence elements or **members**, as they are known in the Germanic tradition. (See discussion of **partes** (word-classes, so-called 'parts of speech') and **membra** in separate section below.) While morphological classes and syntagmatic members are indepently defined, they bear a certain affinity or homology to one another by virtue of the shared generic concepts.

In PT 1940 B. assumes all of the foregoing analysis, with some slight amendments, and reaches the stage in his system of the semantic description of words within a class: he chooses first the prepositions, as they are the class embodying relations above all else. He draws from modern logic (Høffding, Russell) to establish relational concepts, e.g. six abstract concepts - **symmetry, connexity, transitivity** (in Russell's sense, not in the normal grammatical sense - see commentary on Sec. 21), **variability, plurality and generality**; two concrete - **continuity, totality**; two complex - **extension, integrality**; one total relational concept: **universality**. (See my comment on Høffding's doctrine of categories, Sec. 84, for the similarities between this scheme of B's, at first glance so utterly unlike anything one might expect in the linguistic work of the English-speaking world.)

According to Fischer-Jørgensen 'the cast of [B's] mind is so original that it is hard for others to adopt it and his books are written in a

condensed, almost lapidary style which make them difficult to read' (cp. my remark in the Preface above about B's contemporaries complaining of 'vertigo' or dizziness after reading him - and Fischer-Jørgensen was a fellow Dane and former pupil, after all.)

B. was a very enthusiastic international linguist; he attended practically every meeting of the Linguistic Circle (**Lingvistenkreds**) of Copenhagen, founded by himself and Louis Hjelmslev in 1931: cp. the 'structural and theoretical stance which characterized the newer group of Danish linguists who formed the **Lingvistenkreds** in **conscious opposition to Jespersen's** (and Aage Hansen's) **pragmatic and empirical views.**' (Haugen and Markey: 1972: 1468 - my emphasis). (One might note Jespersen's preface to v. 1 of **A modern English grammar** (1909-49), where he notes that though this volume treats of phonology and orthography 'In a language everything is linked together with everything else, and it is impossible to treat sounds separately without regard to [their] significations ... thus ... even syntactical phenomena are here and there touched in this volume' (Jespersen 1909-49, I: v). If somebody else had written that, one would have heard cries of 'Structuralism!' - presumably for the young Turks of 1931, these words denote mere pragmatism.)

Though gravely ill in his latter years (cancer) he continued to build his system to the very end; the sketches of articles he provided for his wife Rosally and her co-editor, Knud Togeby, were dictated from his sick-bed. Of chief interest here is his final redrafting of his great scheme of linguistics in relation to the universe of knowledge in DSG, especially where the sharp division of morphology and syntax

in the present work is modified in his concept of morpho-syntax. I have cited this article in my commentary on B's system of grammar in his Introduction. Cp. also F-J's comment in her article 'Danish linguistic activity 1940-48':

The subject of this last chapter [DSG] is of central importance in B's production. He has treated it more fully in his book [M & S] and mentioned it in several articles and discussions. To establish a system of grammar B. makes two basic distinctions 1) between the inner and the outer, and 2) between system and rhythm. The first distinction (Saussure's **signifié** - **signifiant**) is not difficult to accept. The second is identified by B. himself with de Saussure's distinction between **langue** and **parole**, but is hardly quite the same ...

(Fischer-Jørgensen 1949: 97)

One brief example of the reaction Brøndal's work could provoke is the celebrated Frei-Togebj-Frei controversy. In 1944 the Geneva School linguist and sinologist Henri Frei wrote a scathing review of the **Essais**. Among other points, Frei refers to system and rhythm and says it is not Saussurean at all, indeed such a distortion is not limited to B., 'elle semble assez commune chez ceux qui n'ont pas pénétré la pensée de Saussure. Du reste, il [B.] était moins linguiste que 'logicien du langage', pour employer une expression sortie de sa plume' (Frei 1944: 149). B. gets a caning over his views on Chinese - I cannot help but agree with Frei here: his own article on ergativity in Chinese is considered worthy of inclusion in the descriptive masterpiece **Modern spoken Chinese** 1968 by the doyen of Chinese linguists writing in English, Y. R. Chao (the native palm goes to Wang Li, who died in 1986) - Chao, incidentally, greatly admired and frequently quoted Jespersen - as, too, did Wang Li. Frei ends his review by saying B's work is an example of what general linguistics should not

be, that B. will get a place among the minor linguists - as against Bally (!) and Trubetzkoy [granted] - who fluttered about in the reflections of Saussure's dazzling rays without understanding him or carrying him further:

Je recommande le recueil du regretté Brøndal à la méditation des linguistes. Ils y trouveront un exemple de ce que la linguistique générale, à mon très-humble avis, ne doit pas être, et je conclus par le jugement sommaire que lui-même, naguère, portait sur les *Nachgelassene Schriften* d'Anton Marty: 'Jetzt wohl wesentlich von historischem Interesse' ... L'historien futur de la science des systèmes de langues réservera à Brøndal une place honorable parmi les *scriptores minores* qui, à l'encontre d'un Bally ou d'un Troubetzkoy, auront voltigé dans les reflets de la grande lumière de Saussure sans le comprendre ni le continuer.
(*ibid.* 153)

Togebly's reply was held over until well after the war and Frei's counterblast was published immediately below it. Togebly wrote:

Le jugement d'ensemble est que Brøndal n'était pas saussurien orthodoxe et qu'il a mal compris F. de S. Nous tenons à dire tout de suite que M. Frei a raison dans les deux cas. Non, VB n'était pas saussurien. Il s'est créé une théorie linguistique originale et qui ne doit absolument rien à celle de S. Un des points capitaux de cette théorie est la distinction entre la morphologie et syntaxe, distinction expressément rejetée par S. Un autre point capital est l'établissement de deux séries de concepts logiques capables de définir et les unités morphologiques (les mots et les formes flexionnelles) et les unités syntaxiques (les membres de phrase). S. évité justement une telle collaboration avec la logique. B. n'a pas désiré continuer le grand maître genevois, il n'a pas 'voltigé dans les reflets de la grande lumière de S.', et il ne peut donc pas être jugé à ce point de vue.

(Togebly [1944] 1950: 351)

Frei repeated his claims, finishing with another insult:

Pour un esprit qui reste à la surface des faits, toute tentative de séparer ce que l'apparence confond doit nécessairement présenter quelque chose de comique et d'artificiel. Brøndal se réclamait d'Aristote; M. Togebly ferait bien de lire Platon, ennemi des sophistes.

(Frei [1944] 1950: 356)

Enough has perhaps now been said to give something of the flavour of bitter controversy that always surrounded Brøndal's work. Togeby himself was a Glossematician and wrote the first full-scale grammar of any language (French in this case) couched in Hjelmslevian terms (just when most linguists were saying; 'Yes, very nice, immanent structures, figuræ and so on, but will it ever emerge in some concrete shape such as a grammar?' - but he was evidently piqued by the attack on his fellow Dane. The Genevans were very jealous of their reputations as guardians of the thoughts of Saussure and were quick to repulse outsiders taking the great name in vain. Frei is right about Chinese - but his is a case in point of F-J's remark that others could not adopt B's cast of mind. Frei was very much a descriptivist, and in any case, 'what Saussure really meant' is an industry on the Joycean scale - the best recent comments to my mind are Tullio de Mauro 1972 and Roy Harris 1987 (*Reading Saussure*). There seems to be general agreement that Saussure's views of syntax would hardly get anyone very far in theory or practice, and I think Togeby is correct to point out the achievement of Brøndal here in presenting a symmetric and stable system of morphology and syntax. In the commentary on the section on morphology, I give detailed references to a recent revival in the 1980s of the study of morphology as a topic of grammar independent of syntax, where in the TGG era syntax tended to swallow up more and more of morphology, phonology and semantics. Suffice to say that here again (I refer to the Odense group) we have an instance of Brøndal's 'actualité', his relevance to modern (end of the 80s) linguistics despite the fact that much of his argumentation seems quite implausible in detail.

In some way he reminds one of the physicist - (Rutherford ?) - who was said to have made atrocious errors of simple arithmetic in his calculations, but had good luck: somehow the errors always balanced out.

In concluding this part of my Introduction, I would like to expand briefly on my prefatory remark about linguistic courses in English-speaking countries. One of the reasons why Brøndal's *œuvre* will doubtless seem rebarbative to the empirical cast of Anglo-Saxon thought is not only its resemblance to Husserl and similar Continental thinkers, but also in the parochial nature of American-dominated linguistics of the TGG era, which would make M & S seem very foreign indeed. We are fortunately turning away from the period characterized recently by Igor Mel'cuk who finds four factors militating against dependency syntax, which he believes has come into its time, though it was originally eclipsed by Immediate Constituency (IC) models in the 1930s, especially under Bloomfield's influence (who, Percival claims - according to Hudson 1984 - got the idea of ICs from Wundt):

1. **English as mother tongue of the founding fathers of modern syntax.** Even though this sounds a bit too Whorfian, I am fairly sure that PS-syntax could not have been invented and developed by a native speaker of Latin or Russian ... To promote PS-representation in syntax, one has to be under the overall influence of English, with its rigid word-order and almost total lack of syntactically driven morphology ...

2. **Exaggerated formalistic drive.** The *Sturm und Drang* years of modern syntax began with a crusade against 'mentalism'; for more than two decades, only surface, directly observable data were admitted as legitimate. The Chomskyan revolution ... changed the course of events, but to my taste, not radically enough ... syntactic dependencies ... are much less directly observable than constituency and therefore require more intuition-based steps to relate them to ... surface forms ... although ... discovery procedures do not enjoy the prestige they used to ... this fact is still perceived as a flaw.

3. **Available mathematical apparatus.** Modern linguistics is ... strongly biased toward mathematization ... The trend is clearly visible from Bloomfield [1926, 'Postulates ...'] ... to Harris to Chomsky ... I find this ... highly productive ... [but] until now, mathematics has been using the PS-formalism almost exclusively ...

4. **Isolationist attitude toward semantics.** Even today, the basic working hypothesis in modern syntax is that of the centrality of syntax, ... the fact that modern linguistic theories fail to put enough emphasis on dependencies seems to follow from the autonomist treatment of syntax ('generate structures first, and ask the questions about meaning later').

(Mel'cuk 1988: 4-6)

I have quoted this excellent work at some length because it gives a view from outside: Mel'cuk was pushed out of the USSR precisely because of his linguistic catholicity and contacts with western linguists. He found a home in the Université de Montréal and finds the Gallic atmosphere conducive to his own cast of mind. Much work on Tesnière has been done there. Mel'cuk goes on to concede that the picture he paints has changed over the last ten to fifteen years (though Chomsky was being taught 'als ob der Heilig' Geist diktiert' in a number of Australian institutions up to a few years ago.) Mel'cuk notes with satisfaction the development of Relational Grammar - 'a decisive shift from PS- to D-representation in syntax' (he cites Perlmutter 1983, while I have quoted Johnson 1976 below, who starts his dissertation with a Jespersen quotation - again, Jespersen and Brøndal are only interested in syntax in terms of functional members, not parts of speech as in TGG - a contradiction in terms for the Germanic tradition: see section immediately following) and especially approves of Hudson's **Word grammar** 1984, which is explicitly a dependency grammar. So in the light of all that Mel'cuk has said here, I believe it indicates the return of a climate favourable to Brøndal's

grammatical views, at least on the symmetry of morphology and syntax and the distinction of word classes and sentence members.

It may also be of interest to note that the ever sceptical and independent Householder chose Brøndal's 1937 article on Hypotaxis as the first of his collection of classic articles in **Syntactic theory**, v.1, **Structuralist**, translating it himself from the French. The selection is all the more significant since Householder relied 'on the opinions of many colleagues ... among those who contributed especially long lists were John Lyons, Peter Matthews, M.A.K. Halliday ... Frank Palmer... I.A. Mel'cuk' (Householder 1972: 16) - names that are frequently quoted in my commentary. The **Familienähnlichkeit** between these linguists and Brøndal for me is - their lack of tunnel vision and the absence of the **odium theologicum** in their work.

LATIN v NATIVE GERMANIC LINGUISTIC TERMS

Danish technical and cultural vocabulary, like that of German, which has influenced it (Haugen 1977), reflects a conflict between traditional and classical systems of nomenclature. Brøndal exploits this difference in much the same way as John Ries had in *Was ist Syntax?*, especially in the introductory historical sections of M & S. Thus where the English-speaking world has retained the Latin grammatical terminology - terms such as *noun*, *verb*, *participle*, derived from Priscian's *nomen*, *verbum*, *participium*, which are in turn derived from Thrax' *onoma*, *rhema*, *metoche*, etc. (for full discussion see Robins (1967: 30-36; 56-62) - with occasional 16th and 17th century attempts to introduce native English terms like 'for-noun' or 'joining-word' going unheeded (Michael: 1970: 512-514), the other Germanic languages have a dual system whereby the native coinings coexist with the Latin terms. We may note that the survival of such doublets differs from the case of unnecessary cultural and technical French borrowings in German like *Passagierbillet*, which was officially replaced by *Fahrschein* by the Imperial German Post Office after the Franco-Prussian War - the Post Office alone listed some 700 mandatory substitutions of this kind: the native terms in such fields are natural and unambiguous and their Gallic predecessors are unlikely to be reinstated. In the field of grammar, however, a peculiar situation obtains. For German, Stopp has listed some 120 odd English grammatical terms with their (Germanized) Latin and (often multiple) native equivalents. (Stopp, 1960: 599

ff.) The list is called 'Termini Technici der Grammatik. Fachausdrücke der Sprachlehre'. He observes that the Latin forms may be preserved (with minor orthographic change) : **Futurum, Partizipum**, or cited in shorter forms: **Futur, Partizip**. Alternatively, there are

... one or more German compounds, usually of standard words, devised as substitutes for the [Latin] terms ... of which one is commonly widely accepted. Thus from **-wort** comes **Hauptwort, Zeitwort**; from **-form** comes **Nennform, Tat- und Leideform** ...; from **-lehre** comes **Sprachlehre**, etc.

There are reasons for this duplication of terminology; the rationale of the system rests in part on pedagogical grounds, the native terms being viewed as more suitable for younger pupils:

As might be expected, the German forms are preferred in primary schools, while the Latin terms are used predominantly in grammar school and university. Those in favour of the German forms consider that they are more helpful in teaching grammar to younger pupils, and that their use should enable German grammar to liberate itself from ways of grammatical thought derived from, but only suitable to, the classical language. On the other hand, the arguments against such forms are that (i) they make international exchange more difficult; and (ii) they are subject to arbitrary change and extensions as the result of personal theories and predilections; thus **Dingwort** (beside **Hauptwort**), **Tätigkeitswort** und **Tuwort** (beside **Zeitwort**), **Grundform** and **Nominalform** (beside **Nennform** [infinitive]); and the terms for the tenses are legion. (p.599)

Stopp concludes rather drily:

The student is advised to use the short, Latin forms. But some familiarity with the various German forms is essential, since the grammatical 'double-speak' described above (and illustrated in the title to this Appendix) is widely spread. (p.600)

The Danish situation is broadly comparable to that outlined by Stopp. Steller & Sørensen's **Engelsk grammatik** (1966), intended for university students, uses full Latin forms (**præsens participium**), shorter Latin forms adapted to Danish orthography (**konjunktiv**) as well

as modern terms, e.g. Jespersen's *nexus* (as in *infinitivsnexus* p.114) and *junction* (*junktionen* p. 93). A popular primer, such as Kirchheiner's *Engelsk kursus på 100 timer* (22nd ed, 1949) uses native terms, e.g. *stedord* (pronoun, lit. 'place-word'), *nutid*, *datid* (present, past; lit. 'now-time, then-time'), sometimes with the Latin equivalent in parentheses: *Ejestedordene* ('de possessive pronominer'). Now if this were all there were to the matter, namely that native terms are used at the lower school or popular primer level, while the Latin terms are used at higher levels, a brief footnote would suffice here. However, Stopps's expression 'widely spread doublespeak' hints at a more complex situation as will be seen in the discussion of *Membra & Partes* below. In any case, we are not directly concerned with pedagogical usage at any level, though this inevitably arises as part of the linguistic debate on terminology, rather we are concerned with the way the dual system is exploited in the scholarly works discussed by Brøndal and with the way he uses the system himself. Stopp's point about the native forms' being subject to personal predilections is brought out clearly by Jespersen with regard to Danish:

One frequently comes across the term *hovedord* [lit. *head-word*]; but the uncertainty of its precise value is shown by the fact that it is used in different senses. In general it is used for 'substantive', thus too the quite common *Hauptwort* in German. But Højsgaard [sic: Høysgaard in VB], who was certainly the first to use the term in Denmark, understood it to mean a verb, as for him this was the most important word class.

(Jespersen 1913, 28; tr. Hallon, 1981, 30)

(Not that Højsgaard's view is necessarily wrong, either; in modern times Tesnière's dependency grammar uses tree diagrams ('*stemma*') with the verb as the highest node instead of S[entence] as in Transforma-

tional Generative Grammar. Cp. also discussions of dependency grammar in Hays 1964 and Johnson 1976 where the 'governor' of all elements in a sentence is the main verb. Quite recently, Igor Mel'cuk has written an excellent work on the topic (Mel'cuk 1988).) In any case, **hovedord** is no longer in use, **navneord** being the accepted native equivalent of **substantiv** (the term used in Steller & Sørensen), perhaps for the reason Jespersen suggests. We may now look briefly at Ries' usage for an example of what I have called 'exploitation' of the dual terminology.

In **Was ist Syntax?** Ries is concerned to establish the proper object of the study and to remove topics of grammar frequently assigned to syntax in many traditional works such as the meaning and use of case-forms or even elements of stylistics and rhetoric. The fact that **Satzlehre** [lit. 'the theory (study, doctrine) of the sentence'], **Satzfügungslehre**, **Wortfügung** or **Satzbau** are used as synonyms of syntax has an obvious bearing on the matter, but is not decisive. He distinguishes three groups of theoreticians of syntax. The first two are classed according to their fundamental acceptance of the equation '**Syntax = Satzlehre**':

Während die einen Syntax im wesentlichen mit **Satzlehre** gleichsetzen, also den Satz, das wichtigste **syntaktische Gebilde selber**, zum eigentlichen Gegenstand der Forschung und Darstellung machen, wenden die andern ihre Betrachtung den **einzelnen** aus ihrem Zusammenhang gelösten **Bestandteilen** zu, aus denen syntaktische Gebilde sich zusammensetzen können, und indem sie die **Bedeutung** und den **Gebrauch** der verschiedenen Arten und Formen der **Wörter** [= 'words in isolation', cp. **Worte** 'words in context'] untersuchen, weisen sie der Syntax als ihren Gegenstand zugleich alles dasjenige aus der Wortlehre zu, was in der gewöhnlichen Wortbiegungs- und Wortbildungslehre nicht enthalten

ist.

(Ries, [1894] 1927, 10)

The one group, then, focuses on the sentence, the most important syntactic construction itself, as the principal object of their study, while the second focuses on individual component parts which can unite to form syntactic structures and by studying the meaning and use of the various types and forms of isolated words they thereby assign to syntax every aspect of lexicology (*Wortlehre*) not already contained in the usual study of word inflexion and word formation. Ries evidently sympathizes with the former, though he does not accept the equation completely; yet there is another group for whom he reserves his sharpest words: this group has hardly any systematic principle at all, for they are the proponents of *Mischsyntax* who mix up and confuse all the objects of their study:

Wir bezeichnen diese Gruppe mit dem Namen

MISCHSYNTAX

wegen der prinziplosen Nebeneinanderstellung
oder Durcheinanderwürflung ihres verschieden
gearteten Stoffes.

(Ries [1894] 1927. 11; original layout as shown)

In this group we find discussion of the nature and use of word classes (*Wortarten*) or the 'so-called parts of speech' ('die sogenannten Redeteile'), the study of uses and meaning of inflexional forms together with a 'more or less systematic study of sentences/syntax' (*Satzlehre*) or at any rate, 'fragments of such a study' ('Bruchstücke einer solchen') with frequent excursions into the domains of stylistics and rhetoric. Several pages of extremely harsh, not to say downright abusive, criticism are levelled at this group in general, followed by 25 pages specifically criticizing the German Slavonic scholar Miklosisch,

who had stated that syntax had two parts, the meaning of word classes and the meaning of word forms ('Die Syntax zerfällt ... in zwei Teile, von denen der erstere ...die Bedeutung der Wortklassen, der andere die Bedeutung der Wortformen zum Gegenstand hat'). To this Ries retorted: 'Einfach, klar und - sicherlich unrichtig.' ('Simple - clear and - certainly wrong.' (p, 19). By p.46 Ries is ready to give his own view. It would be nice ['**hübsch**' - as ironic in German as in English] if we could dispense with the word and concept 'syntax' and write in plain German [or English respectively] '(...gut deutsch) **Satzlehre**' [**Study of the sentence/ sentence-theory**]. Then the study of grammar would consist in **Lautlehre** ['sound-theory']; **Wortlehre** ['word-theory'] and **Satzlehre** ['sentence-theory'], which would result in simplicity and clarity and would, moreover, be attractive on account of the convenience of the (native) German designations:

Die völlige Gleichsetzung von Syntax und Satzlehre hat freilich viel Verlockendes. Es wäre in der Tat hübsch, wenn man Wort und Begriff Syntax überhaupt entbehren und dafür gut deutsch Satzlehre setzen könnte. So würde dann der Laut- und der Wortlehre einfach als dritter Hauptteil eine Satzlehre zur Seite treten: eine Einteilung der Gesamtgrammatik, die zumal durch ihre Einfachheit und Klarheit, dann auch durch die Bequemlichkeit der deutschen Bezeichnungen besticht. (loc. cit.)

Apart from theoretical considerations, what emerges from this passage is that Ries is fully aware of the contrast between native and Latin terms, that the contrast is, moreover, anything but a question of 'mere' stylistic variation.

The answer, according to Ries, lies in the fact that the correct listing of linguistic elements is not **sound - word - sentence**, but **sound - word - word combinations** [**Wortgefüge** - better: 'syntactic con-

struction(s)', here perhaps a somewhat circular rendering, though later the term *Wortgefüge* is expressly equated by Ries with *syntaktische Gebilde* (p. 47). 'Combinations of words' is Jespersen's English version of the term (following a quotation from Ries in the original German (Jespersen 1937: 110).] Moreover, the concept and term *sentence* (*Satz*), being a term of logic in origin, became the natural counterpart of *word* just as *judgement* and *concept* are related in logic. But now that the erroneous definition 'the sentence is the linguistic expression of a judgement' has been rejected, the definition 'Syntax ist Satzlehre' ('syntax is sentence-theory') should have been abandoned too, even when used as a purely grammatical term (p.47). Both definitions are based on the dangerous method of proceeding from the content, of which the form of expression is then sought or postulated. If the attempt to proceed from the given linguistic form had been made seriously, the error in the series *sound - word - sentence* would have been immediately obvious ('so wäre der Fehler in der Reihe *Laut - Wort - Satz* sofort in die Augen gefallen') (p. 47-48). Ries then says of sentences, in a passage quoted extensively by Hjelmslev (1928, 36-37): 'A formal analysis, [though it will yield *sound - word - word group*] will not reveal *sentences* at all' ('Sätze aber findet eine formale Analyse zuvörderst nicht') (p.48). It is interesting here to recall Brøndal's observation in the present work: 'If the designation *word* is seriously used as a name for the elements or members of a sentence, then it is thereby asserted that the sentence can be morphologically defined [cp. Ries' 'formal analysis'] ... a highly debatable point of view' (M&S 44.22 ff.).

We shall return to Ries again when looking at Brøndal's gradual development of his own theory of what morphology is, what syntax is, and how they relate to each other in the grammatical system. (Ries' notion of syntax as the study of 'Wortgefüge = syntaktische Gebilde' has also been taken up in more recent times by Ullmann (1959).) For the present, however, I believe that enough has been said to emphasize the significance of native Germanic terms in linguistic discussion in the relevant languages. As a final remark on the influence of German on Danish vocabulary, we may note the important case of the extension of meaning of an established Danish form, **sætning** (placing, setting; then - proposition; clause or sentence), precisely through German influence: the **Dansk etymologisk ordbog** shows that the word existed in Old Danish (**gammeldansk**, 1100-1500) in the same form, notes the cognates **setning**, Nor., **sattning**, Swe. etc; describes it as a derivation from the verb **sætte**: then adds: 'i grammatisk, logisk betydn. eft. ty. **Satz**' ['in the grammatical & logical senses, after German **Satz**']. (Nielsen, 1976: 497). Now it is evident that any discussion of syntax in Danish will make use of the term **sætning**: what we shall see, however, is the way the native terms **sætning**, **sætningslære**, **sætningsbygning** and so on are played off against the idea of 'syntax' in M & S.

PARTES & MEMBRA

The importance of the contrast of the **partes** and **membra** is crucial to Brøndal's concept of morphology and syntax, their mutual relations and their position in the system of grammar. Towards the end of the Introduction to M & S he writes:

The general disciplines [**partes** ... general morphology; **membra** ... general syntax] can now be defined as purely logical: the study of **membra** ... is in fact analogous to the study of **partes** ... in the sense that only here can the most general framework be established for speech and 'language' respectively.

(Sec. 9.19)

I believe that much more needs to be said on this matter than can reasonably be slotted in as a comment at the first mention of the contrast, given that this idea has been unfamiliar outside the Scandinavian and German tradition until relatively recently. The following section sketches the historical background to this.

The concept of 'parts of speech' (**partes orationis**) is over two thousand years old and, protests of Sapir, among others, ('Our conventional classification of words into parts of speech is only a vague, wavering approximation to a consistently worked out inventory of experience'... and again: '... no logical scheme of the parts of speech ... is of the slightest interest to the linguist' - Sapir 1921: 117; 119) notwithstanding, does not seem to be under serious threat of extinction today. On the other hand the designations for 'parts of the sentence' (elements, terms, members), while of similarly classical venerability (Gk **kolon**, -a: L. **membrum**, -a), appear in Aristotle & Cicero

only in relation to logic and prosody, not grammar. *Kola*/*membra* are terms or members of propositions; while *hypokeimenon* [*hypo*, under; *keimai*, to lie, suppletive passive of *tithemi*, to put, place], meaning both **substance** and **subject** in Aristotle, becomes Latin **suppositum** [**sub** + **ponere**, to place] and **subjectum** [**sub** + **jacere**, to lie]. **Subjectum** contrasts with **praedicatum**, **suppositum** with **appositum**.

Michael (1970) & Robins (1967) disagree as to whether Priscian (c. 500 AD) distinguished the logical and grammatical senses of the subject: 'Priscian does in one passage suggest a distinction between the logical subject (**suppositum**) and the grammatical subject ... 'subjects in the nominative case' (**subjectiones nominativae**)' (Michael 1970: 134); '...the terms subject and object were not in use in Priscian's time as grammatical terms, though the use of **subjectum** to designate the logical subject of a proposition was common' (Robins 1967: 60). They also disagree on the interpretation of Thomas of Erfurt's use of **suppositum** in his *De modis significandi sive grammatica speculativa* (c.1350), formerly attributed to Duns Scotus (and thus cited by Brøndal in OKL and still in PT (in the bibliographies). According to Robins,

The construction of noun and verb was taken as fundamental ... and the terms **suppositum** and **appositum** (subject and predicate) were used to denote the syntactic functions of the two parts of the basic sentence ... [these] terms ... were, of course, related to the **subjectum** and **praedicatum** of the logicicans, but they were, very properly, kept distinct.

(Robins 1967 : 82)

Whereas Michael discounts the significance of the contrast **suppositum**/**subjectum**:

The distinction between logical and grammatical subject is, at

it were, waiting in the wings during the whole of the medieval period. It cannot be said to have been unformulated, but it was not so clearly made that separate terms were generally felt to be necessary ... *Suppositum* and *subjectum* seem to have been used as equivalent terms by Roger Bacon [c.1250] ... Predicate was more exclusively a category of logic. Thomas of Erfurt provides a rare instance of its use in a specifically grammatical context. He is describing one of the conditions necessary for an utterance to be considered complete, and he refers to 'constructio ... habens suppositum et appositum'. But though the context is grammatical the reference of the words is still logical. Thomas is not thinking primarily of words.

(Michael 1970: 135)

Whatever Thomas' intentions were, one thing is clear: the grammatical tradition of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance restricted the scope of syntax to concord and regimen (government). Ramus, for example, divides his Latin grammar (*Rudimenta grammaticae latinae* 1595) into 'etymologia' (sounds, syllables; word-formation, inflexions) and 'syntaxis' (concord, case-constructions) (Funke 1955: 92). During the seventeenth century the Port Royal Grammar, *Grammaire générale et raisonnée* 1660, by Claude Lancelot & Antoine Arnauld and the Port Royal Logic, *La logique, ou l'art de penser*, 1662 by Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, emphasized the connexion of logic and grammar. Logic consisted in the operations of 'concevoir, juger, raisonner & ordonner' while grammar was concerned with the first two processes; judging involves making propositions consisting of two necessary terms, the subject & the predicate, as well as the copula:

Le jugement que nous faisons des choses, comme quand je dis: la terre est ronde, s'appelle PROPOSITION: & ainsi toute proposition enferme nécessairement deux termes: l'un appelé *sujet*, qui est ce dont on affirme, comme *terre*; & l'autre appelé *attribut*, qui est ce qu'on affirme, comme *ronde*: & de plus la liaison entre ces deux termes, est.

(Lancelot & Arnauld 1660 [facsim 1967]: 28-29)

As Brøndal remarks in OKL, the Port Royal Grammar 'dominates and animates [linguistic] research throughout the 18th century and not in France alone' (OKL 10). Now while John Wilkins had been working on the idea of 'universal characters' since 1641 (Slaughter 1982: 107) and especially in the 1650s at Oxford with other so-called 'projectors' such as Wallis, Ward and Dalgarno, it appears that the Port Royal Grammar had some influence on his famous **Essay towards a real character and a philosophical language**, 1668, at least in the area of syntax. (The wider intent of these projects, which 'popped up like weeds during the 17th century, starting with the works of [Francis] Bacon and the letters of Descartes' (Slaughter 1982: 1), was to encapsulate the whole of knowledge in a gigantic taxonomy of ideographic signs somewhat like algebraic symbols or Chinese characters: indeed it was Bacon who declared that these latter were **characteres reales, non nominales** [real, not nominal characters] in **De Augmentis scientiarum** 1623, (Ellis & Spedding ed., v.I, p. 299; = expanded Latin edition of **Advancement of learning** 1605 (Ellis & Spedding ed., v.III, chap. 6, p. 605.) It is interesting to note that Wilkins began as a mathematician and that (Seth) Ward and John Wallis, author of an important English grammar in 1657, were also mathematicians. Wilkins makes clear in his work that he is carrying forward Bacon's idea, though such 'projects' were first taken up in France by philosopher-mathematicians, particularly Mersenne (**Harmonie universelle** 1636-37) and Descartes before the English began to investigate the matter. We shall see elsewhere that mathematicians and logicians formed the nucleus of the phenomenological movement, especially Husserl. There are close links between

mathematics, logic and linguistics in the works of Frege, Peano and Couturat from the 1880s with links in turn to a revival of interest in international 'auxiliary' languages, e.g. Jespersen's own invention, 'Novial'.)

At a crucial point in Wilkins' discussion of the verb, he repeats the Port Royal idea that the verb can be taken as being equivalent to an adjective plus copula:

the verb ... ought to have no distinct place among integrals [full or lexical words] in a philosophical grammar; because it is really no other than an adjective, and the copula **sum** fixed to it or contained in it; so **caleo, calefacio, calefio** ... is the same as **sum calidus, calafaciens, calefactus**.

(Wilkins 1668: 303; quoted Michael 1971: 250;
also quoted Funke 1959: 84)

Michael's source note adds: 'from the Port Royal Grammar.' The Port Royal Grammar has (Chapter 17 [misprint for 18], 'Des verbes qu'on peut appeller **adjectifs** ...'):

... c'est une erreur commune de croire que tous ces verbes signifient des actions ou des passions. Car il n'y a rien qu'un verbe ne puisse avoir pour son attribut, s'il plaît aux hommes de joindre l'affirmation avec cet attribut. Nous voyons même que le verbe substantif **sum, je suis**, est souvent adjectif, parce qu'au lieu de prendre comme signifiant simplement l'affirmation, on y joint le plus général de tous les attributs, qui est l'être comme lorsque je dis: **je pense, donc je suis, je suis** signifie là **sum ens**, je suis un être, une chose; **existo** signifie aussi **sum existens**, je suis, j'existe.

(Arnauld & Lancelot 1660 [facsim. 1967]: 115-116)

Shortly after Wilkins' discussion of the copula in this fashion occurs what Michael claims to be the first use of the word **subject** in an English grammatical text:

The word subject I use, as the logicians do, for all that which goes before the copula; which if it consist of only one word, then it is the same which the grammarians call the nominative case.

(Wilkins 1668: 304, quoted Michael 1971: 484).

Although Funke gives the precedence in this matter to Wilkins' 'closest follower among grammarians of the English language' (Robins 1967: 121), Christopher Cooper (*Grammatica linguae anglicanae* 1685), the question is one of interpretation rather than a clear-cut issue: Funke had written a number of studies on Wilkins between 1929 and 1959 and had also quoted the passage 'caleo = sum calidus' (though with the intention of showing Dalgarno's influence here), so he could hardly have been unaware of the occurrence of **subject** in Wilkins. At all events, the close link between the **Essay** and the **Grammatica** is evident:

The first English grammarian who pays attention to sentence-structure as such is Cooper in his **Grammatica linguae anglicanae**... Cooper was rather fortunate in having good authorities among his immediate predecessors, and besides Wallis it was especially J. Wilkins (**Essay** 1668, esp. 354-56 'On discourse') on whom he could rely in questions of semantics and sentence-problems. In this way Cooper introduces for the first time the terms 'Subject', 'Predicate', 'Copula' into his syntax; he speaks of the position of the S and O ...

(Funke 1955: 93)

Our result so far is that while the **Partes** as such have remained a staple of grammatical description from classical times, even though their number and nomenclature has been a matter of vehement dispute (Michael's survey reveals 56 different systems up to 1800), the notion of a countervailing syntactic system has been a relatively late development. If we accept Wilkins-cum-Cooper as the emergence of the Subject-Predicate-Object concepts in theoretical English grammar, say later 17th century, there is still the question of the general recognition of this approach in pedagogical grammar. According to Michael, there was none:

The terms subject and object had long histories in logic and

philosophy before they were applied to grammar. Although subject came into English grammars at the end of the seventeenth century it remained primarily a logical term until well into the eighteenth century.

(Michael 1970: 481)

The real test in fact is the contrast of subject and predicate in grammar:

The sentence 'Man is mortal' can be regarded in two ways. A logical analysis is to divide it into three parts: subject, copula and predicate. A grammatical analysis is to divide it into two: subject and predicate (... is mortal). This latter division, whereby the grammatical predicate is a syntactical and not a logical category, does not appear in the English grammars before 1800.

(Michael 1970: 485)

Moreover, the opposition of parsing and analysis which became a routine of school grammar in the later 19th century was previously unknown:

Because the distinction between parts of speech and parts of an utterance had not yet been clarified the early English grammarians continued the traditional conception of syntax as primarily the relations (agreement and governing) between parts of speech. Parsing corresponded to the division of grammar usually called etymology: it consisted in saying to what part of speech each word belonged, and was a familiar practice taken over from Latin teaching. But there could as yet be no distinct analytical procedure related to syntax. Before 1800 there are no exercises requiring the schoolboy to divide a sentence even into subject and predicate, and the routines of clause analysis are unknown.

(Michael 1970: 468-69)

Yet by the 1900s theoretical syntax as exemplified by Onions' *Advanced English syntax* 1904 treats only of analysis in the modern sense, parsing not being mentioned: sentence construction is analysed into: subject, predicate, attributes and adjuncts. Matriculation level primers such as Low & Briggs *Matriculation English course* (3rd ed. 1909; 1st ed. 189-?; Low's *English language* (1st ed. 1887) put the chapter on 'Analysis of sentences' before that on 'Parsing': analysis means

breaking up into component parts, viz. subject, predicate, object (direct, indirect), adverbial adjunct etc., while Meiklejohn's popular **English language** (1886, 25th ed. 1903) treats of analysis only. Nesfield's **Manual of English grammar & composition** (1898, 4th ed 1964) mentions both aspects in the title to Part One ('Parsing & Analysis') - this may be a survival from the first edition because parsing does not appear again at all until p. 101 (4th ed), Chap. 12 'Syntax and parsing', with a parsing chart. All in all, there is a clear shift from concern with parts of speech to parts of the sentence at some time in the 19th century. It is uncertain when the shift of emphasis occurred in the English-speaking world. It is significant that as late as the 1870s John Earle (**The philology of the English tongue**, 1871) can declare: 'The chief result of grammar, the exponent of grammatical analysis, is the doctrine of the Parts of Speech' (p. 176). Now Earle was not immune to the influence of the Continental grammarians, nor was he resolutely opposed to any changes in the traditional terminology. For example, prepositions and conjunctions are discussed under the same heading, 'The link-word group' (cp. **Beziehungswörter**). Discussing the 'Verbal group' he notes the concept of tense or time is reflected in Aristotle's definition of the verb as also in the German **Zeitwort**; others again take action to be the main idea - thus Ewald's **Tatwort** is mentioned:

But in these expressions the essential is obscured by that which is more conspicuous. Madvig, in his Latin Grammar, seems to me to put it in the right light. He designates the verb as **UDSAGNSORD**, that is, 'Outsayings-word'; because it 'udsiger om en person eller ting en tilstand eller en virksomhed, 'outsays (=pronounces, asserts, delivers) about a person or thing a condition or action. - It is the instrument by which the mind

expresses its judgements, or (in modern parlance) makes its deliverances.

(Earle 1871: 225)

Earle might have noted also that 'udsige' apart from 'state' or 'utter' can mean 'to predicate'. (Thus **udsagnsord**, verb, word of predication; **udsagnsled**, - glossed 'sentence verb' in V & B, unhelpfully perhaps for the reader not conversant with the **Glieder/ Led** terminology, - i.e. member of predication, predicate (restricted sense), predicator.) Yet while going so far as to quote Madvig in Danish to bring out the element of affirmation in the word, it is surprising that we find no hint of analysis in Earle's syntax. He starts promisingly by observing that though the study of syntax may be approached from the parts of speech with syntax being built up on that basis, the better approach is to start with the sentence and work downward:

Syntax will accordingly mean the resolution of the sentence into its component parts, with a view of tracing by what contrivances it is made to produce a continuous and consistent signification.

(Earle 1871: 460)

For Earle there are three kinds of syntax: flat, flexional and phrasal. 'Flat' refers to 'collocation, or the relative position of words', while flexional is described as that 'where the **functions** of the ~~mem-~~**bers** of the sentence are shewn by modifications in the forms of words' (my emphasis), and the third 'where the same relations are expressed by symbolic words' (i.e. particles as against Earle's 'presentive' or full/lexical words; p. 461). Despite the use of 'function' and 'members of the sentence', analysis is still into **partes**, not **membra**:

The analytical action of syntax resolves the sentence not merely into words, but into parts of speech. The knowledge of words

as parts of speech is the sum total of the doctrine of syntax. And it happens quite naturally that many of the details which are ordinarily comprised under the head of syntax have already been disposed of in the foregoing chapters on the parts of speech.

(Earle 1871: 461)

Small wonder, then, that the chapter on syntax in this tradition was often the shortest in the book, as indeed it was at the high watermark of American descriptive linguistics (Bloch & Trager 1942; Z. Harris, 1952 etc.). Now while I believe that the Germanic nomenclature and the continental tradition of emphatically contrasting **partes & membra** (at least as early as K.F. Becker, *Deutsche Grammatik* 1827, 4th ed 1844) constitutes the essential background for Jespersen's emphatic contrast of ranks (members - primary, secondary and tertiary) with word-classes, and of Brøndal's basic distinction of **membra vs partes** as an essential element in the distinction between syntax and morphology, I do not claim that this tradition was dominant. Neo-grammarians generally until Delbrück devoted space to **Lautlehre - Formenlehre - Satzlehre** in something like 5:3:1 proportions, if as much. Evidently, if syntax = 'analysis into parts of speech' it is hardly worth its place in the 'Division of Grammar' - and Brøndal's book would not have been worth writing. Hence the vehemence of Ries ('Mischsyntax') and also Brøndal's supportive remarks in M & S.

At this point we may recall the concept of **membrum** (glossed in Georges' *Lateinisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch* 184-, 5th ed 1862, 'Ein Glied des tierischen Körpers' etc. 'insbesondere, in der Rede, ein Glied, Satzglied') in Classical usage. We have seen that, isolated and debatable instances apart, the concept of syntactic members is a relatively late one. The rhetorical use of **membrum** (from Greek *kolon*)

derives especially from Cicero:

It will be evident that the conditions of public speaking impose *inter alia* certain limitations on the length of the constituent parts of a sentence: there is a maximum breath-unit. It was doubtless such practical considerations which had led in Greece to the emergence of a style in which the sentence was broken up into 'limbs' (*kola*) and 'pieces' (*kommata*), terms which Cicero rendered as *membra* and *incisa* (*Orator* 1.211). Ideally the full period consisted of four such *membra*, each approximately the length of an hexameter verse (*Orator* 1.222) ... In actual court practice the greater part of the speech will consist of sentences organized in *membra* and *incisa*.

(Palmer 1954: 131)

In terms of current frequency of meaning, *period*, *colon* and *comma* have become the designations of the marks punctuating rhetorical periods (sentences of several clauses constructed according to classical rules) or sentences, their clauses and phrases. ('Period' and 'colon', 'cola' are still current as terms of rhetoric, but 'comma' as 'a short member of a period' is marked 'obsolete' in S.O.D.) *Membrum* was taken over in the vernaculars with its logical, rhetorical and grammatical senses (among many others), thus (S.O.D.): 'A division or clause of a sentence; a head of a discourse; a branch of a disjunctive proposition 1534'. Spalding (*Historical dictionary of German figurative usage*) notes that *Glied* is used as a grammatical term in the 16th century, adding 'still in use cp. *Satzglied*', an indication, I think, of the relative unfamiliarity of the concept in the English-speaking world, given that Spalding's work is intended for English-speaking Germanists in the first place. (Spalding, 1952-: 1074-5). Now while most larger English dictionaries from Johnson on include the senses 'Part of a discourse or period; head; clause' (though not Bailey 1733) in the entry for *member* (Webster's 3rd. has 'a syntactic or rhythmic unit of

a sentence; clause'), its use in English grammatical discussion seems rare or casual. It may occur as a translation (as in the English adaptation of Paul's *Prinzipien*, for example), but the preferred terms are **parts** ('...subject or object or any other part of the sentence' Onions [1904] 1971: 17) or **elements** ('..two essential elements in every sentence ... subject and predicate' Curme [1925] 1953: 98); and especially in British usage, thus Halliday (1961: 256 ff.), Quirk et al. 1972: 34), Strang (2nd ed. 1968: 76)). In French linguistic discussion the position appears to be similar, though this is only a personal impression based on far less evidence. The term **membre (de phrase)** is recorded in general dictionaries (e.g. Petit Robert: 'fragment (d'énoncé): **membre de phrase**) and in Marouzeau (**Membre/ Glied/ Clause/ Membro**: Fragment d'énoncé susceptible de constituer une unité intermédiaire entre le mot et la phrase' (3rd ed. 1951: 142). But Dubois' 3 volume *Grammaire structurale du français* (1965-69), for example, treats throughout of word-classes (**nom, verbe**) or constituents (**syntagme nominale, verbale**). Nor have I noticed **membre** in say, Vendryes or Saussure (who speaks of **syntagmes**). **Membre** occurs precisely when Danes, especially, are writing in French. Brøndal uses **membre** (ELG: 7 and *passim*), Sandfeld's *Syntaxe du français contemporain* (1928-36) speaks of the subordinate clause as 'un membre de phrase qui a la forme d'une proposition' and immediately draws attention to the Germanic nomenclature: 'La dénomination allemande 'Teilsatz' définit à peu près exactement la nature de ces propositions..' (II: ix), while Hjelmslev uses **membre** and **terme**: in his obituary of Jespersen he observed that **Sprogets logik** had introduced the concept of rank and that 'Le grand

avantage de cette théorie ... est celui d'insister ... sur la différence entre *mots* et *termes*, ce qui est un progrès décisif vis-à-vis de la grammaire traditionnelle' (1966:166). (German scholars had little need to write in other languages, at least in the 19th and early 20th centuries; Swedes traditionally used German when choosing an international medium though there is a general Scandinavian tendency toward English for this purpose nowadays.)

Why, lastly, this concern about 'mere' terminology? I have tried to show in the discussion of Germanic linguistic terminology that the native system is by no means simply a stylistic alternative to the Latin and that terms originally felt to be simply equivalent when introduced have been subsequently seized upon as arguments in themselves for this or that view (especially by Ries). An additional advantage of the Germanic system is that the original stem under discussion (German *Glied*, Danish *led* etc.) permits a regular lexical development not possible in English: thus *Glied*; *Satzglied*; *Gliedsatz* (*Teilsatz*); *gliedern* (to articulate, to structure); *gegliedert* (articulated ...); *Gliederung* (articulation (of sentences, not sounds), loosely: arrangement); *Zergliederung* (analysis). We noted above that the English translators/adapters of Paul's *Prinzipien* rendered *Satzglieder* as *sentence members*; yet Chapter 16 of this outstanding work, 'Verschiebung der syntaktischen Gliederung', became 'Displacement of the syntactical distribution' (the topic is rank-shifting in Jespersen's sense, but from the psychological standpoint, and constitutes a remarkable anticipation of the notion of hierarchical subordination of sentence members). English knows *member* as a noun, but not as a verb in current use.

Membered has not been exploited in linguistics so far as I know. **Dis-memberment** covers part of the semantic range of **Zergliederung** ('mutilation'; but hardly 'dissection'; and certainly not 'analysis'). Furthermore, 'articulation' has in linguistics, though not in technology (articulated locomotive etc., but cp. Dan. **Ledbus** for 'articulated bus') resisted figurative application beyond phonetics; this sense is ancient (**vox articulata**; cp. Diomedes' 'Dictio est vox articulata cum aliqua significatione ...' (Michael 1970: 45)) and **Artikulation** is a conspicuous survivor of the sea-change to native terminology: Viëtor's little classic **Kleine Phonetik** 1884, 3rd ed. 1903, uses the native terms where possible (e.g. index: 'Spiranten = [see] **Reibelaute**'), but apart from **Artikulation**, **-sbasis**, **-sdauer**, etc. we find **Mundartikulation**, **Zungenartikulation**, hybrid native-Latin forms. This has left the **Wortfeld** open to **Glied** and derivatives for deployment in syntax, where English has for historical reasons been unable to exploit the difference, while the Romance languages have by definition no difference to exploit. Hence, too, **artikulationslære** in M & S as against **ordlære**, **sætningslære** and so on.

WORD CLASSES & SENTENCE MEMBERS (CLAUSE ELEMENTS) TODAY

Until the appearance of the second volume of Jespersen's *Modern English Grammar* (1914), written in parallel with *Sprogets logik* (late 1913, the word-class concept was fairly dominant in linguistic discussion outside the Germanic tradition. Where analysis proceeded in terms of 'parts of the sentence', as in Onions (1904), there is no emphasis on the status of such units as against parts of speech. Jespersen was influenced in his development of the theory of rank, junction and nexus by Sweet's concept of head-word ('The most general relation between words in sentences from a logical point of view is that of adjunct-word and head-word or ... of modifier and modified.' Sweet 1891:16 - for a discussion of the notion, see Hallon 1981:149-51). A second influence was Theodor Keyser's *Afhandling om svenska språket* (1875) which put forward the idea that utterances can be analysed into substantives (object of thought) and definitives (characteristic features of the substantives) and that the latter can be of different order: 'he walks unusually slowly' has **walking** as a definitive of the first order, **slowness** (the concept rather than the word used) of the second, **unusualness** of the third). Jespersen discussed Keyser's work in a 'final note' to *Sprogets logik* (92) (cp. Hallon 1981: 126), but never referred to it again (so far as I know) in his English works. The step from Keyser's 'ordered definitives' excluding substantives to an ordering of all sentence members without regard to word-class is an important one: the inbuilt Germanic contract of **ord-klasse, Wortart** versus **sætningsled, Satzglied** was ready at hand as we

have seen in our discussion of the grammatical tradition in Northern Europe. The importance of this development is well put by Apresjan at the end of the introductory chapter 'The emergence of structural linguistics' in his **Principles & methods of contemporary structural linguistics** (1973):

The empiricism of traditional grammar also shows in its concentration on the study of PARTICULAR rather than general properties. The general properties of entities such as, say, words, phrases or sentences are usually not considered by traditional grammarians. From this point of view, some of Jespersen's notions are quite significant, and especially his theory of syntactic ranks and types of syntactic combination ... Units in sentences were classified by Jespersen as belonging to one of three ranks, distinguished on a functional (syntactic) basis. In conventional terms, his primary units were subjects and objects, his secondary units were predicates and attributive modifiers, and his tertiary units were adverbials of various kinds ...

(Apresjan 1973: 32)

Thus the ranks are **members** not **word-classes**. While he conceded that primaries frequently correspond to (noun) substantives, secondaries to adjectives or verbs (cp. the parallelism of the celebrated example:

The dog barks furiously	A furiously barking dog
I II III	III II I),

and tertiaries to adverbs, Jespersen was insistent that ranks and word-classes were not identical. He returns to this again and again: in **Analytic syntax** (1937) he refers to the fact that the two series 'to some extent, but only to some extent, run parallel', and sets out two columns - A. Word classes (Substantives etc.), B. Ranks (Primaries, etc.):

The chief, and extremely important, distinction between the two series is this, that in A we deal with isolated words in their dictionary or lexical value, while in B we deal not only with

words, but also with combinations of words (**Wortgefüge**) and we take both of these as they appear in connected speech ... In Saussurean phrase we may say that A belongs to *la langue*, and B to *la parole*.

(Jespersen 1937: 119)

This is the view of Brøndal (system and rhythm) and Gardiner (language and speech) quoted above. Sørensen remarked of Brøndal's view (essentially the same as Jespersen's in this respect) 'Saussure would hardly have agreed' (Sørensen 1958: 86) - but then Saussure, although the first to state the associative/syntagmatic dichotomy ('paradigmatic' was Hjelmslev's 1936 suggestion for 'associative'), had very little to say about syntactic structures, assigning the sentence to *parole*, and while for Saussure there is a '*linguistique de la parole*', it does not figure prominently in his system. Brøndal allows the contrast of 'system' (*langue*) and 'rhythm' (*parole*), but makes both aspects objects of linguistic study. It is worth noting here that Jespersen refers explicitly to Ries' expression **Wortgefüge**: in his **Philosophy of grammar** he had described Ries' **Was ist Syntax?** as one of 'the two best thought-out attempts at establishing a consistent system of arrangement of grammatical fact' (p. 89) - the other being Noreen's **Vårt språk**. We have seen above Ries' insistence on the series **Laut - Wort - Wortgefüge**. In turn, the three systems of syntax presented by Brøndal in the preliminary version of the introductory section of *M & S*, viz. the 1930 paper *SLG*, were those of Ries, Noreen and Jespersen. The continuity of terminology and ideas here is significant. Throughout the 19th century linguistics was virtually a Germanic, indeed German, preserve (**Sprachwissenschaft**), and a characteristic, and largely successful, German approach to scientific problems was to attack

from all sides until individual solutions might be encompassed, as it were, into some vast conceptual *Realenzyklopädie*, with the interrelations of all scholarly disciplines spelled out. Doubtless this *Drang nach Systematisierung* could be taken to unprofitable excess - one thinks of the philosophical 'systems' of Schelling and Lotze, for example - but the very real achievements of the German world in the period up to the First World War in linguistics as elsewhere would be hard to overestimate. While Ries is the only German among the group of linguists just mentioned, it is interesting to recall how scathing Sweet was on the condition of linguistic studies in Britain in his time; he had to go to Leipzig to learn the state of the art. In turn, Jespersen studied with Sweet at Oxford - this apparently from a personal preference as well as in tribute to Sweet's eminence in phonetic studies, as a certain animus against the German language and German academic life appears now and again in Jespersen's works. Nevertheless, Jespersen and his fellow Scandinavian, Noreen, were dependent on the achievements of German linguistics, even when rebutting, say, the more extreme and dogmatic views of the Neogrammarians. Indeed, Sweet, Ries, Noreen and Jespersen are important figures in the transition from the 'atomism' of the Neogrammarian era to the emergence of a European structural linguistics no longer dominated by German thinkers. Apresjan brings out this transitional aspect of Jespersen's syntactic theory when he notes that, in addition to the notion of rank:

The same concern for generality and simplicity also characterizes Jespersen's theory of the two kinds of syntactic combination: *JUNCTION* - a close attributive link ... and *NEXUS* - a

free predicative or semipredicative link ... (thus) 1. Language possesses means to convert a nexus combination into a junction with no change in the rank structure of the sentence cf. "the dog (I) barks (II) furiously (III): 'a furiously (III) ... (II) ... (I)' Phrases and sentences are thus viewed as equivalent (in a certain sense). 2. The two kinds of combination occur not only between the elements of phrases ... but also between the elements of compound words. The morphemes of **cleverness** and **arrival** ... are combined by nexus, and these nouns therefore function as substitutes for whole sentences... Thus, on the basis of his theory of syntactic ranks and kinds of syntactic combination ... Jespersen tried to capture the fundamental similarity in the structure of words, phrases and sentences which was later to become one of the cornerstones of the transformational theory of language.

(Apresjan 1973: 32-33)

Some proponents of TGG (viz. Katz 1972, Chomsky 1977) have indeed made claims on Jespersen as a precursor of their theories; I have argued elsewhere (Hallon 1981) against this precisely on the grounds that Jespersen's analysis, especially in **Analytic syntax**, is functional, member-based throughout, whereas TGG develops immediate constituent analysis and phrase structure grammar in a way (so it is claimed) that accounts for the problems of the Distributionalist model (discontinuous constituents, structural ambiguities, and so on), all the while staying with word-class based terminology (NP & VP etc.): cp. Glinz's criticism:

Sowie er (Chomsky) nun nämlich daran geht, seine Regeln aufzustellen, **bedient** er sich schon einer nicht geringen Zahl grammatischer Begriffe, die er nicht als solche nach eigenen Verfahren gewonnen hat, sondern die er teils aus der angegriffenen deskriptiven Linguistik, teils auch einfach aus der herkömmlichen Grammatik entnimmt. So arbeitet er mit 'noun, noun phrase...' usw.

(Glinz 1967: 96-97).

It is not my intention here to discuss TGG, in its (infinitely extensible) Standard Theory form or any other - in any case, I agree with Bugarski (1975) and others that TGG is just another version of Struc-

tural linguistics, valuable and insightful in many respects (when shorn of the metaphysics), but not quite so revolutionary as has often been claimed.

In the 1970s the dissatisfaction with TGG as the dominant model grew; to the cogent protests of linguists like Hockett, Householder and Bollinger, to name just some Americans of the older structuralism (and passing by for the moment the sustained criticism during the period of many European linguists like Haas and Matthews) were added those of lapsed converts like Derwing who had formerly recited the litany of Observational, Descriptive & Explanatory adequacy etc. with due reverence. Johnson's *Toward a theory of relationally-based grammar* (1976) opens with specific reference to Jespersen's *Philosophy of grammar* and

Analytic syntax:

The basic aim of this work is to investigate the role that grammatical relations should play in linguistic theory. In traditional grammar, grammatical relations played a central role (see. e.g., Jespersen 1965 [1924 PG], 1969 [=1937 AS]). During the reign of the structuralists, on the other hand, grammatical relations were ignored, being tainted with their association with meaning. The transformationalists have, in general, considered grammatical relations to be rather peripheral (at least to syntax) ... the 'standard' view concerning the relationship of grammatical relations to the FORMULATION of grammatical rules is that they are irrelevant.

(Johnson 1976: 1)

Johnson goes on to point out that there had been a growing awareness in the linguistic community that such relations are important and cites a number of unpublished references ('underground' lectures, seminars and so on) from linguists like Postal, Perlmutter, Keenan, and Comrie. Later he says his work

attempts to justify incorporating grammatical relations as primitives into linguistic theory and to motivate the develop-

ment of a relationally-based theory, that is, a theory of grammar in which a significant number of rules and constraints are based directly on the notion of grammatical relations such as 'subject-of' and 'direct-object-of'.

(Johnson 1976: 4)

Similar views were expressed by Dik (**Functional grammar** 1978). Thus the view that members of sentences are a different kind of unit from word-classes, a kind essential to any description of syntax, a view propagated in English by Jespersen, developed within the Germanic tradition, and supported vigorously by Brøndal throughout *M & S*, has come to the fore again in current syntactic theory. There have been recent suggestions that any and all attempts to capture the facts of language by any kind of quasi-algebraic method are doomed to failure on the grounds of '**The vastness of natural language**' (Langendoen and Postal 1984), or because language is an 'epiphenomenon' which cannot be an object of study in the sense that the natural and other sciences have objects of study (Moore & Carling 1982); such considerations, however, take us past our present concern, *membra* and *partes*. Before leaving the American linguistic scene, however, I should like to make a few remarks on 'immediate constituent analysis'.

The technique of analysing sentences into immediate constituents and words into ultimate constituents was described by Bloomfield:

Any English-speaking person who concerns himself with this matter, is sure to tell us that the **immediate constituents** of **Poor John ran away** are the two forms **Poor John** and **ran away**; that each of these is, in turn, a complex form; that the immediate constituents of **ran away** are **ran**, a morpheme, and **away**, a complex form, whose constituents are the morphemes **a-** and **way**; and that the constituents of **poor John** are the morphemes **poor** and **John**. Only in this way will a proper analysis (that is, one which takes account of the meanings) lead to the ultimately constituent morphemes.

(Bloomfield 1933: 161)

The first cut here is made between subject and predicate, and in the example the elements of the predicate are closely linked in the form of a phrasal verb. The subject/predicate division in logic goes back, of course, to Aristotle, and on the face of it would seem a natural enough procedure in sentence analysis. Yet as developed by Bloomfield, I.C. analysis may be a relatively modern phenomenon:

Many linguists have the impression, I think, that constituent structure (by which I shall mean here 'constituent structure above the word' ...) is part of our long grammatical tradition, but this is not so. For example, it was not recognized by Panini ..., nor by Thomas of Erfurt and the other fourteenth-century modistae ... In fact, according to [W.K.] Percival 1976 ['On the historical source of immediate constituent analysis' in J.D. McCawley (ed.) *Notes from the linguistic underground*. London: Academic Pr.] it is possible to date its birth quite precisely: it was invented by the psychologist Wundt in the last decades of the nineteenth century, and borrowed from him by Leonard Bloomfield, who introduced it into American linguistics. So the grammatical tradition actually provides more support for dependency theory than it does for constituent structure.

(Hudson 1984: 94)

We have already noted that Høysgaard's 18th century view of the verb as *hovedord*, headword, finds new life in dependency grammar where the analysis is not binary. Indeed, Matthews has pointed out that once the morpheme is taken to be the ultimate constituent as against the word, both Item-and-Arrangement models like Bloomfieldian Descriptive linguistics and Item-and-Process models (e.g. TGG, Systemic linguistics) have no need to insist on the autonomy of morphology.

Moreover, in the tagmemic tradition the notion of 'string constituents' (a term apparently coined by Longacre 1960, related to Pike's 'serial expansion' dating from 1954) is developed as an alternative to

continued binary analysis: Elson and Pickett discuss the sentence 'The old man walked to town' and show the usual IC diagram with horizontal lines and vertical cuts of varying depth:

As the first cut, the subject **the old man** and the traditional predicate **walked alone to town** are the two ICs of the sentence ... [then the usual further binary analysis]. Such IC analysis and the tagmemic approach have in common the recognition of hierarchical structuring, and the resultant description of a given language will be similar at some points. However, in beginning tagmemic analysis we do not look for dichotomous cuts (frequently the choice between two possible cuts is arbitrary ...), but for meaningful groupings at any given level... To distinguish these strings from the predominately binary cuts of IC analysis, we will use the term **string constituents** ... For the sentence above ... the following string of tagmemes would be recognized: subject, predicate (the verb only), manner and location.

(Elson and Pickett 1964: 61-62)

(Presumably, Pike's tagmeme derives from 'syntagma'). Thus the grammatical function of the tagmeme (its 'slot') is in fact realized by sentence members, S-P-O etc. (Elson and Pickett 1964: 57). Thus at least one major American structuralist school paid attention to syntactic function during the period when it was, as Johnson suggests, generally ignored: of course, Pike has always had the strength of mind to argue against 'classical' American Structuralist dogmas such as 'no mixing of levels' (cp. Pike [1947] 1973 on 'Grammatical prerequisites to phonemic analysis').

To end this brief review of current positions on the question of **membra** and **partes**, I should like to consider the neo-Firthian tradition, based on Firth's own views and elaborated in the analysis of a number of non Indo-European languages by his colleagues at The School of Oriental and African Studies (S.O.A.S.), London University, where Firth held the first British chair in Linguistics from 1944. Halliday

(who, together with Harry Simon, was a service instructor in Chinese at S.O.A.S. in the 1940s) in an important paper 'Categories of the theory of grammar' (1961), observed the following:

In description, structures are stated as linear arrangements of symbols, each symbol (occurrence) standing for one place and each different symbol (item) standing for one element ... In a few cases traditional names exist which can usefully serve as names for elements of structure, with the initial letter as the descriptive symbol. In the statement of English clause structure, for example, four elements are needed, for which the widely accepted terms 'subject', 'predicator', 'complement', and 'adjunct' are appropriate. These yield four distinct symbols, so that S, P, C, A would be the inventory of elements of English clause structure.

(Halliday 1961: 256-57)

Halliday notes at this point that these terms are used by Hill in his **Introduction to linguistic structures** (1958), adding 'the "definitions" of these terms ... are of course different, since the theory differs from Hill's '(loc.cit.) (The reference to Hill's work is not a random example: Halliday later catalogues the 'seven sins' on the Bloomfieldian method (roughly, the 'item and arrangement' model) - and notes that **Linguistic structures** is (a) 'probably the best comprehensive account of English grammar yet published' and (b) 'an example of the [Bloomfieldian] method here referred to' (Halliday 1961: 280). The only term in any way unusual in Halliday's list is **predicator**. This term is absent from most standard dictionaries; where it is listed (S.O.D., Webster's 3rd) it bears the sense 'preaching friar'; I cannot find it in, for example, the standard textbooks of Bloomfield, Hockett or Gleason. It remains a term in Systemic linguistics (Sinclair 1972; Berry 1975-77) and has been used by British linguists not (or no longer) directly associated with the Systemic school

(Strang 1968; Matthews, 1981; Leech et al. 1982; Huddleston 1984 (in a work describing itself as 'broadly structural, but belonging to no school such as Generative, Systemic, Functional etc.)), and is of prime interest in the *membra/partes* contrast.

One of Funke's main objections to Jespersen's S V O symbolization in **Analytic syntax** was that V (Verb) was a word or form class and as such was out of place in functional description:

[A.S.] stellt den Versuch dar, eine Art syntaktischer Algebra zu geben, welche durch Zeichensymbole ... S V O ... die syntaktische Funktion kennzeichnen soll. Wir fragen uns: was soll also algebraisch ausgedrückt werden? die Funktion der Sprach-elemente oder ihre Form? Wenn ein Satz wie I see him mit S V O symbolisiert wird, so ist meines Erachtens sogleich die Mischung von Bedeutung und Form ersichtlich; S and O sind Funktionszeichen, V ein Formzeichen, da das 'Verbum' an sich eine Wortklasse, aber keine eindeutige Bedeutungskategorie repräsentiert. Konsequenter funktionell müsste man den Satz mit S P (Prädikat) O symbolisieren.

(Funke 1965: 131)

It is difficult to imagine that this had never occurred to Jespersen; in EEG 10.1 - 'Predicate', he says that in 'the dog barks' 'the dog' is subject and 'barks' predicate', and '... barked furiously at the butcher' is likewise the predicate (Jespersen 1933: 97), goes on to discuss **object** (boldface in original) but then symbolizes S-V-O. Obviously 'predicate' refers only to the verb if we have a structure as simple as 'the dog barks', but there can also be ambiguity: 'The term "predicate" is sometimes restricted to the VERBAL part(s) of the statement' (Zandvoort 1975: 196). Perhaps Jespersen felt he had coined enough new terms without trying to disambiguate 'P'. At all events, the unambiguous **predicator** has become an accepted term which also allows **predicate** to be used where necessary in its broader sense.

Strang notes of predicator (P) that

Like S and C [complement], it can take more complex forms, though its range of possibilities is more limited, and the tie between P and the form-class verb as its realization is uniquely close.

(Strang 1968: 76)

This 'uniquely close tie' would explain why Quirk et al. 1972, a traditional yet thoroughly linguistically aware work, retains V in the S-V-O-C-A analysis. This suggests the (purely hypothetical) possibility of contrasting at least the major word-classes on the paradigmatic axis with the elements of the syntagmatic axis thus

	N				
	Pro				
S	V	O	C	A	
	Adj				
	Adv				

with V simply being defined as a unit of uniquely dual nature, formal and functional. (Cp. Dinneen's figure showing a similar meshing of two axes with the words 'system' (horizontal axis) and 'structure' (vertical) as an illustration of Firth's concepts - Dinneen 1967:305). Such, however, would be a very pragmatic approach and quite unacceptable to proponents of the Germanic tradition which opposes any confusion of *membra* and *partes*. In this particular instance Brøndal prefers *verb* to 'vort navn *udsagnsord*' because although the latter is better than the older *hovedord* or *livord*, it does not cover the infinitive or the gerund (OKL 17), whereas in M & S he offers the native alternative, 'prædikant eller *udsagnsled* (M & S 52.1). However, *udsagnsord* (predication word', i.e. verb; cp. Earle above) and *usagnsled* (predication member' i.e. predicate in the restricted sense, predicator) are both standard Danish grammatical terms and illustrate how the Ger-

manic system of grammatical nomenclature can be used to bring out certain points (such as the 'uniquely close tie' of V and P) in a manner scarcely possible in English other than by resort to paraphrase.

Such then, is the background to Brøndal on morphology and syntax. The foregoing consideration of the Germanic tradition of a dual system of grammatical terminology in general, and the insistence on the distinction of *partes* and *membra* in particular should now enable the reader to appreciate the main thrust of the translation of *Morfologi og syntax* which follows.

MORPHOLOGY AND SYNTAX

New contributions
towards a theory
of language

by Viggo Brøndal

Comme nul événement et nulle forme
ressemble entièrement à une autre,
aussi ne diffère nul de l'autre
entièrement. Ingénieux mélange de
nature: si nos faces n'étaient
semblables, on ne saurait discerner
l'homme de la bête; si elles n'étaient
dissemblables, on ne saurait discerner
l'homme de l'homme.

MONTAIGNE

To

OTTO JESPERSEN

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INTRODUCTION: THE SYSTEM OF GRAMMAR

1. In every field of knowledge we find two closely interrelated tendencies; the one leads to ever more basic aspects, the other to a system* of ever greater completeness and harmony. The same holds for linguistics. In the long run we are not satisfied with a mere description of the immediately obvious characteristics of the phenomena (the practical aspect), nor again with merely establishing their distribution in space, time and society (the historical aspect), rather we seek at the same time and to an increasing degree to subordinate everything to abstract laws (the theoretical aspect). On the other hand we pose with ever renewed interest the question of the relation of the various aspects of language and thence to the system of grammar. It is this last question which is to be put once again in the present work and for which a new solution will be proposed in what follows.

2. The topics which in practice - whether a practical, historical or theoretical point of view is taken as the basis or not - have always been treated in every kind of linguistics and which every grammar laying any claim to completeness must treat, are the following:*

- #1 Sounds and their systems:* earlier orthographia, later ortho-
phonia; modern 'phonology'.*
- #2 Syllable* and accent: earlier prosodia;* now phonetics or study
of articulation.*
- #3 Words and their systems: lexicography (practical); synonymics*

or synonymy (theoretical, since the work of Abbé GIRARD).*

- #4 Use of words: the 'rhetoric' of antiquity; modern 'study of meaning' (semasiology or semantics) and stylistics.
- #5 Word classes or parts of speech: partes orationis; general morphology.
- #6 Inflexion (including case) and derivation (including compounds): etymologia, analogia or accidentia,* special morphology.
- #7 The sentence and its members: analysis; general syntax.
- #8 Government (also: regimen, rection) and concord (also: agreement, congruence): special syntax.

3. Following Priscian, the most original of the Roman grammarians, the following system was established in the Middle Ages (see THUROT, JELLINEK):

- I Orthographia (about the littera, letter, hence the study of sound systems: #1).
- II Prosodia (about the syllaba, syllable, hence the study of articulation or phonation: #2).
- III Etymologia (about the dictio, word, hence the study of words: #3 - #6).
- IV Syntaxis (about the oratio, speech, hence the study of sentences, syntax: #7 - #8).

From this the system was eventually developed which - with variations - is now in general use:

- 3.15 I **Phonetics** (the study of speech sounds, that is, of both their systems and their articulation: #1 - #2).
- II **Morphology** (the study of linguistic forms, by which is most frequently meant the **outer** forms only; basically, it amounts to the study of inflexions, thus only a part of #6, and that from a purely practical or phonetic standpoint).
- 20 III **Syntax** (the study of the meaning and function of linguistic forms, thus both essential parts of #5 - #6 and the entire groups #7 - #8).
- To these are added in the more thoroughgoing expositions (in the work of NYROP, for example):
- 25 IV **The study of word-formation** (partly about spontaneous formations, partly derivation and composition, hence **inter alia** parts of #6) and
- V **The study of meaning** (semasiology or semantics, usually only of semantic shifts and variation, hence essentially = #4).

4. A number of modern linguists have been dissatisfied with this and have therefore established their own systems. For example:

BEHAGEL* (1887) cf. DAUZAT (1906), ELISE RICHTER (1909):

- I **Lautlehre** (= #1 - #2).
- 4.5 II **Bedeutungslehre** (= #3 - #8).
1. **Semasiologie** (= #4).
 2. **Synonymik** (= #3).

3. **Wortbildung** (a part of #6).

4. **Syntax** (#5, a part of #6, #7 - #8).

4.10 NOREEN*(1907-23):

I **Phonology** (about the 'matter' or 'substance' of language: #1 - #2).

II **Semology** (concerns the 'content' of language: #3 - #4).*

15 III **Morphology*** (concerns the 'form' of language, including inflexion, word formation and syntax: #5 - #8).

JESPERSEN*(1924, cf. 1908):

I **Morphology** (concerns **form**, i.e. outer form seen in relation to meaning, thus not #1 - #2, but #5 - #8 from a particular standpoint).

20 II **Syntax** (concerns **function**, i.e. meaning insofar as it is expressed in form, thus not #3 - #4, but #5 - #8 seen from a different standpoint).

III **Symbolology** (concerns **notion**, i.e. pure concepts seen in relation to reality, thus neither #4 - #4 nor #5 - #8).

5. These new and original systems, like the older, traditional ones, can be criticized on a number of points.

5.5 An initial objection relates to the incompleteness of a number of attempts at systematization. The authors of such attempts seek to remove from grammar now **sounds*** (#1 - #2, frequently, for example, in practical grammars or primers), now **words** (#3 - #4, because it is believed that the meanings of words can be dealt with by an autonomous lexicography which is irrelevant to grammar), or now,

lastly, **sentences** (#7 - #8, which are then assigned to the province of logic). However, all these elements are indissolubly interlinked and their treatment constitutes necessary chapters in any grammar claiming to be a theory or study of language.

There is next a weakness in most systems in that unlike things are joined and like things are separated. Thus, for example, the study of sound systems (#1) is most frequently united with the study of sound formation (articulation) (#2): this in BEHAGEL under the heading **Lautlehre**, in NOREEN under **phonology**. In many works the concept **syntax** unites the study of word classes (#5) and the study of the meaning of inflexional forms (#6) with the study of intrasentential relations (syntactic relations) (#7 - #8); JOHN RIES' protest (1894) against such '**Mischsyntax**' has still not had enough effect.

Conversely, we find everywhere things separated which should be joined. Case (and diathesis or voice) thus belongs close to the study of word classes (#3: e.g. genitive and adjective), not to special inflexional morphology (#6, the categories of which - tense, mood, etc. - are of an entirely different kind). And compounds belong - as is recognized by many (JACOBI, cf. LEUMANN) - to syntactic formations (#7), not to derivation (#6 which is related to inflexion).

Of even greater significance is the fact that the concepts which have been made the basis for classification have generally been inadequate. There has been an attempt, for example, to make a basic distinction between inner and outer* or between psychical and physical. Thus BEHAGEL (and DAUZAT) establish the studies of sound

and meaning as the sole main divisions [of linguistics]; and NOREEN likewise distinguishes substance (the subject matter of phonology) from meaning (- semology) and form (- morphology). However, as PAUL VALERY correctly observed (in his essay on Edgar Allen Poe), we cannot in actual fact make a distinction between the spiritual and the material. JESPERSEN had indeed assumed a close synthesis of inner and outer in language and proposes simply - by a shift of viewpoint - to proceed now from outer to inner ('morphology'), now from inner to outer ('syntax'). With curious inconsistency the author of **The Philosophy of Grammar** then assumes after all the possibility of taking into consideration the purely inner aspect ('symbolology') - to which there ought really correspond the possibility of taking the purely outer aspect into consideration (phonetics? - but here indeed, and according to JESPERSEN himself, meaning, the inner aspect, does play a role).

In language we must consistently maintain the assumption of an inviolable synthesis of inner and outer; a linguistic study of an inner aspect without an outer one would then be equally as unjustified as a study of an outer without an inner aspect, and these two aspects, one of which makes manifest the relation of the outer to the inner, the other, that of the inner to the outer, must necessarily coincide and yield identical results.

6. This criticism - which has already been outlined in the Jespersen Festschrift (1930) - cannot however obstruct, but rather serves to emphasize, certain natural affinities between the grammatical disciplines:

6.5 a. The study of sound systems or phonology (#1) is closely related to (though definitely distinct from) the study of sound formation (articulation) or phonetics (#2). They can be joined to form the **study of sounds** or 'phonics' (#1 - #2).

10 b. The study of word systems or synonymics (#4) is likewise different from yet clearly analogous to the study of usage or semantics (#3). These studies constitute the **study of words** or **Lexicology** (#3-#4).

15 c. The study of word classes, which can be designated as general morphology (#5), stands furthermore in close relation to the study of inflexion and derivation (excluding compounding), which can be called special morphology (#6). Taken together, they can be said to constitute the **study of form** or morphology in the broadest sense (#5 - #6).

20 d. The study of sentences and their members, or general syntax (#7) and the study of government and concord (#8), are, finally, clearly related: thus the **study of sentences** or syntax in a broad sense (#7 - #8).

7. In the arrangement of these groups it has been usual to proceed from the fact that the underlying concepts form a series: sound - syllable - word - sentence, because it was assumed that the sentence consisted of words, the word of syllables and the syllable
7.5 of sounds. This is already the case in ARISTOTLE and his commentator Ammonius, later in JAMES HARRIS* (1750) and even now in modern times in J. RIES.* The members in this series, however, are by no means homogeneous, and the transitions from member to member are therefore of a quite different nature. Sounds (#1) and words (#3, #5 - #6) in

fact form systems which are peculiar to a given language, while syllable (#2) and sentence (#7) on the other hand are of another, more universal and non-systematic kind.

It would seem in consequence that phonology (: sound systems) would have to be placed alongside morphology (: word systems and form systems), while phonetics (: syllable) on the other hand would be placed with syntax (: sentence), thus:

Phonology (#1): Morphology (#3, #5 - #6)

Phonetics (#2): Syntax (#7 - #8).

Some imbalance is occasioned here by the study of meaning (#3 - #4), which, practical difficulties notwithstanding, should not be excluded from grammar (cp. SCHUCHARDT:* 'Es gibt nur eine Grammatik, und die heisst Bedeutungslehre ...'). The imbalance can be removed, however, if we distinguish synonymics (#3), which is systematic (like phonology and morphology), from semantics (#4), which is of a more general character (like phonetics and syntax). Semantics, which investigates the variant meanings of a word according to context and situation, can in fact be easily seen to stand in close relation to sentence analysis (#7) and especially to government and concord (#8). The complete system of affinities may then be expressed in schematic form as follows:

Phonology (#1): Morphology (#5 - #6)

with Synonymics (#3)

Phonetics (#2): Syntax (#7 - #8)

with Semantics (#4).

8. In order to define the reciprocal relationship of these subjects (the analogies holding between the two series as well as those within the individual series), two pairs of basic concepts are evidently needed: a single pair (such as sound - meaning, outer -
 5 inner, substance - form) will not be sufficient.

As has already been emphasized, phonology and morphology are systematic disciplines, phonetics and syntax non-systematic. This contrast would appear then to stem from the dual mode of linguistic realization: now as norm, now as speech, or - to put it another way -
 10 now as system, now as rhythm. While the norm or linguistic system is social and of a purely ideal or formal nature, speech or linguistic rhythm is individual and of a real or functional nature. This distinction, which we owe to FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE (*langue - parole*) and which recently (1932) has rightly been strongly emphasized by the
 15 English Egyptologist GARDINER* (*language - speech [Eng]*), is of such fundamental significance that it must also be crucial for the classification of the branches of linguistics.

There is furthermore an important contrast between **sounds** (or more generally: symbols) on the one hand - whether they occur
 20 systematically and normatively and are studied in phonology (#1) or rhythmically and functionally and are studied in phonetics (#2) - and 'words' (in the broadest sense, cf. *λόγος*) on the other - whether they are dealt with, as system, in morphology (#3, #5-#6) or, as rhythm, in syntax (#4, #7-#8). This contrast - which is radically
 25 different from the distinction between system and rhythm - derives from the fact that language is constructed from two kinds of elements: expressions or *σύμβολα*, and thoughts or *λόγοι*. The

symbolic concepts, which are expressions of simple relations, appear most clearly (i.e. relatively most isolated) in the meaning of the most abstract words; they are best studied in the synonymics of prepositions and other particles or of auxiliary verbs. The **logical** concepts, conversely, are the elements forming the basis for the general categories of thought; they make possible both the logical systems which are constructed from the word classes and also the operations in which every kind of intellectual activity consists.

9. Now if we thus tentatively distinguish in part between two forms of linguistic realization, viz. system and rhythm, in part between two kinds of elements, viz. symbolic and logical, we can derive in consequence some system like the following:

9.5

	symbolic	logical
systematic	Phonology (#1)	Morphology (#5-#6) + Synonymics (#3)
rhythmic	Phonetics (#2)	Syntax (#7-#8) + Semantics (#4)

10 While the symbolic disciplines are here defined unambiguously - phonology as systematic symbolics, phonetics as rhythmic symbolics - the logical disciplines evidently demand a more precise differentiation.

We distinguished above (§1) between general morphology or the

study of word classes (#5) and special morphology or the study of inflexion and derivation (#6) and likewise between general syntax or sentence analysis (#7) and special syntax or the study of government and concord (#8).

The general disciplines (#5 and #7) can now be defined as purely logical: the study of **membra** (#7) is in fact analogous to the study of **partes** (#5) in the sense that only here can the most general framework be established for speech and 'language' respectively.

Conversely, the other subjects within morphology and syntax are of a more special and more miscellaneous or derived character. Synonymics (#3) actually presupposes the logical framework of the study of word classes and adds to it its own more special (symbolic) definitions. Semantics (#4) in similar fashion builds upon sentence analysis (subject, object, etc.) and with this as a basis studies the semantic variations of syntactic constructions.

The study of meaning (in systematic form, synonymics; in rhythmic form, semantics) can thus be designated as being both symbolic and logical at the same time; synonymics forms a connecting link between phonology and the study of word classes, and semantics has in the same way a connexion partly with phonetics (NB the study of stress or accentuation), partly with sentence analysis.

We must now group around synonymics the subjects inflexion and derivation (#6); for these subjects, just like synonymics, study systems (more general in the case of derivation, more special in that of inflexion) of inner form. We can likewise group around semantics the study of government and concord (#8); for these syntactic phenomena consist - just like the semantic phenomena - of dependency

relations (now more general ones like concord, now more special ones like government) within the framework of the functions of the sentence.

10. We arrive then at the following - apparently complete - system:*

	symbolic	symbolico-logical	logical
10.5 systematic	PHONOLOGIA	synonymica flexio, derivatio	partes casus
		morphologia	
rhythmic	PHONETICA	semantica rectio, congruens	membra composita
		syntaxis	

11. The proposal here put forward, which is basically aimed at drawing a sharp distinction between 'language' and speech both in the phonic as well as in the non-phonic sphere, can be summarized in the following propositions:

11.5 #1 **Phonology**, defined as the systematics of [linguistic] symbols, studies sounds only as ideal forms, the systems they form or can

form, and the symbolic value which is permanently attributed to the individual sound as a result of its place in the system (- but it does not study syllable formation, however, as SOMMERFELT has supposed -).

#2 **Phonetics**, defined as the rhythmic of [linguistic] symbols, conversely studies sounds only in relation to their combination in groups and syllables and the reciprocal relations of these articulations and combinations; i.e. metrics and the study of stress, assimilation and dissimilation.

#3 **Morphology**, in a broad sense defined as Logical Systematics, considers exclusively the inner form, categories and systems of words - but not their combinations.

#4 **Syntax**, in a broad sense defined as Logical Rhythmics, conversely studies precisely every possible combination of the autonomous, non-phonetic elements of language, i.e. compounds, [syntactic] members, sentences or clauses, periods (or complex and compound sentences) and all the reciprocal relationships holding between them.

The first two propositions - concerning phonics or the study of sounds - have been taken up for discussion in an interesting way in recent years by the PRAGUE SCHOOL, from whose works we may expect a significant change of direction [in linguistics].

The latter two propositions - concerning the mutual independence of the two non-phonetic disciplines - have already been foreshadowed by the founder of synonymics, Abbé GIRARD* (1747) and shortly thereafter by that most eminent Danish grammarian HØYSGAARD (1752); they have in fact been put forward - in spite of unfortunate terminology - by

OTTO JESPERSEN, and now too by GARDINER. It is the task of the
11.35 present work to clarify and justify what these writers have said in
this regard on a number of points.



I. MORPHOLOGY

Die Form ist ein Geheimnis
den meisten. GOETHE

12.5 12. If the proposition concerning the autonomy of morphology (§11, #3) is correct, it follows thence that no morphological concept may be defined syntactically, that is, on the basis of its **position** in the sentence. The basic concepts of the morphological or inner form are the following :

#1 **word**; #2 **word class**; #3 **case** (and diathesis); #4 **inflexion**; #5 **word meaning**.

13.5 13. It is so far from being the case that the autonomy of morphology thus defined has found recognition that, on the contrary, diametrically opposite views are to a great extent assumed in general practice or even explicitly stated by prominent authorities among theoretical linguists.*

10 #1 **Word**.* The very concept 'word', which indeed formerly was a basic concept for the whole of grammar (even the sentence was defined as being constructed of words, as mentioned in §9), has gradually been assigned a secondary role in the works of linguists and psychologists as being logically derived and not, from the historical point of view, an original element in relation to the sentence. Thus A. MEILLET* maintains that a word is simply defined by the totality of the sentences in which it occurs or can occur; H. DELACROIX denies the immediate autonomy of words from a psychological point of view;

13.15 and quite similar statements can be found in the works of foremost linguists like SAYCE* and JESPERSEN or in recent years in those of philosophers like E. CASSIRER* and JØRGEN JØRGENSEN.

#2 **Word Classes.** On the basis of this view of the sentence as the essential and original linguistic unit, the attempt has frequently been made to define the general categories of words, the so-called word classes, according to their syntactic functions. This view in fact underlies the classical term: **partes orationis** or parts of speech; a position which has still been maintained in modern times by a number of linguists. Thus F. KERN (1888) proposed to
 20
 25 classify words according to their role in the sentence in the following manner:

1. **satzbildende Wörter:** verbum finitum;
2. **satzbestimmende:** nomen, adverbium;
3. **satz- und wortverbindende:** conjunctio;
- 30 4. **ausserhalb des Satzes:** interjectio.

Following the same principle, E. HERMANN recently (1928) arrived at a quite different system from this, one which is *per se* rather peculiar:

1. **Teilwort:** wird (gelobt);
- 35 2. **Einzelwort:** Haus;
3. **Gruppenwort:** im;
4. **Satzwort:** nein.

#3 **Case and diathesis.** It is generally supposed, moreover, that case (nominal forms like nominative and accusative) and similarly the
 40 related diatheses (verbal forms like active, passive and middle

voice) have a close, indeed a necessary relationship to certain functions in the sentence. Thus, as is well known, the nominative case is placed in close relationship with the sentential concept of subject (whence the French term **cas-sujet** or subject case), the
 13.45 accusative is correspondingly grouped with the object (whence also **cas-régime**), and the vocative with exclamatory sentences. And an especially internal relationship is assumed to hold between active and object, and analogously, between passive and subject - so that, for example, the passive is assumed to exclude the object.

50 #4 **Inflexion.** While most inflexional forms (person and number; aspect and tense; comparison; gender) have absolutely resisted inclusion in any kind of syntactic relationship, the attempt has been made - not without a certain plausibility - to do so in the case of the moods of the finite verb. Thus the German psychologist HEINRICH
 55 MAIER - who is here following suggestions of linguists like Brugmann and Delbrück - has placed the four Greek (and older Indo-European) moods in close relation with four types of sentence:

1. **Indicative:** **Aussagesatz** (as opposed to **Begehrungssatz** of which all the rest are subordinate forms);*
- 60 2. **Optative:** **Wunschsatz;**
3. **Subjunctive:** **Willensatz;**
4. **Imperative:** **Gebotsatz.**

#5 **Meanings.** Finally, certain word meanings have been designated as syntactical **per se**, or to put it another way, it was believed that
 65 certain words could be defined solely by their function in the sentence. Thus for example in the work of JAMES HARRIS* - who here, as

frequently elsewhere, adopts a classical notion - it is stated that certain words, namely particles like **and**, **with**, **the**, only have meaning in the context in which they occur. Where we, as is
 ,80 customary in our grammatical tradition, draw the distinction between transitive verbs (with an object) and intransitive (without), and between interrogative and relative pronouns, the evident presumption in both cases is that categories of form can be syntactically defined.

The views here outlined - for the most part quite widespread and
 85 undisputed - are closely related; they are all based on a certain disposition, not least prevalent in our own time, to consider situation and context, in other words the **concrete** aspect, as the essential reality and therefore not the abstract elements which underlie and alone make possible the given situation. As this empiricist
 90 attitude, as we might call it, absolutely excludes the autonomy of morphology presupposed in the present work, it may warrant a fresh examination.

14. **The definition of a word.**^{*} If modern linguists have had such difficulty, as we have seen above (§13, #1), in recognising the word as an independent linguistic element and in consequence in defining the very concept 'word', this would seem then to rest on two circum-
 5 stances (both of which, moreover, can be traced back to the dominance of Empiricism).

#1. An outer, phonetic constant form has been required of a word; suppletive stems like the Latin **fero - tuli - latum** or the French **vais - aller - irai** have thus - in spite of the immediate evidence -
 10 failed to be acknowledged as constituting a single word.

#2. Not only single free forms (forms complete in themselves like Danish **for** ['for'; 'fore-'] and **mand** ['man'], but also common combinations like **for-mand** ['fore-man'], i.e. the so-called compounds, which are thus placed automatically on the same footing as
 15 derivations and inflexional forms have been classed as words.

It might, however, be possible - even necessary - to leave any kind of phonetic or syntactic aspect out of consideration in the definition of the concept 'word'. The word then becomes - as GARDINER has recently so aptly expressed it - the unit in 'language',
 20 but not in speech. To put it differently, the word is then viewed as an element in a system, not as a member in a 'rhythm'. It can be defined as a **general morphological totality** or universal form, and from this conceptual definition it follows:

#1 that phonetically different 'stems' can constitute a single
 25 word whose consistency is of a purely inner (logical and symbolic) kind: French **va-**, **all-**, **ir-**; and conversely, that phonetically identical 'stems' can constitute a number of words, the so-called homonyms, which play a significant role in Chinese, for example, and also in European languages; French **en** I. from [Latin] **in**, II. from
 30 [Latin] **inde**.

#2 that the members of compounds (but not of the combinations themselves or of their resultant forms) are to be considered words - but only, of course, if they are viable elements which can occur in independent syntactic usage at the relevant linguistic level. A pre-
 35 position like [Danish] **for** and a substantive like **mand** are thus words in the morphological sense, but the combination **for-mand** ['foreman'] is not - in spite of the usual view;* what we have here is complete

entity of a syntactic kind, the investigation of whose internal construction and overall role is the task of syntax.

15. **Word classes.*** If word classes were defined syntactically - as was explicitly assumed by KERN and HERMANN (§13, #2 above) - then each class (i.e. noun, verb, etc.) and each subclass (i.e. substantive and adjective, finite verb and participle etc.) would of necessity have one and only one syntactic function. However, neither these nor any other linguists have ever succeeded in proving this. Those systems - as incomplete as they are unharmonious - based on this idea are quite unsatisfactory altogether. KERN places the noun (i.e. the substantive and the adjective) together with the adverb as constituting clause-determining words. It is quite true that they all contain a determining or descriptive element (as opposed to e.g. proper names and pronouns). But why then should not participles be included in this class, since they are the descriptive form of the verb? And how might these descriptive classes be distinguished from each other? We learn nothing on this score and indeed can learn nothing on the basis of the principle. KERN moreover designates conjunctions as clause-and word-connecting words, and quite rightly. But then prepositions should be included here, which are after all connectives in an especially exclusive manner; yet on the other hand they must be distinguished from their near relatives, the conjunctions. - As far as EDUARD HERMANN'S system is concerned, it merits - if it can seriously be described as a classification of **words** - no very detailed discussion; for by the distinction between part words and separate words, between group words and clause words (see

examples §13, #2) he can evidently only mean a division of members, i.e. of syntactic elements, without any real reference to the elements' intrinsic value.

16. Before the question of the syntactic function of the individual word classes is taken up for detailed discussion, we must first examine whether the individual word is really - as has here been assumed - characterized by morphological constancy, that is: whether a given word is firmly anchored in a single word class once and for all.

As is well known, it is the directly opposite view that is taught in the grammars and dictionaries of most languages. These works proceed as it were on the general tacit assumption that a word can belong to two, three, four or even more classes at the same time, or - a less consistent version of the same view - that a word, though primarily belonging to **one** class, can also **function** as (if) belonging to - or at least, as analogous to - one or more others. Some examples will illustrate this familiar theory:

A single form is considered to represent a number of words not only when there is a real dichotomy of meaning, i.e. when there is a clear case of homonymy (such as, for example, English **light** - substantive, Danish **lys**; and **light** - adjective, Danish **let**); not only when the stem is constant while inflexion indicates two different classes (English **light** - substantive, Danish **lys**; **light** - adjective [in the sense 'bright'], Danish **lys**); several independent words are listed separately in numerous instances where neither semantic nor formational differences can be shown to exist (English **light** - adj.: '**light** as a feather'; adv.: '**to sit light**').

Thus, for example, we find considered as two words (the following examples are taken from the recently published English dictionary by H.C. WYLD; * they can be supplemented by others from practically any dictionary, even the most recent):

about I adv.: 'look **about**'; II prep.: 'look **about** you'

30 (prepositions occurring outside prepositional constructions, i.e. without a governed object, are considered adverbs in several languages, as we know: Danish 'sidde **over**' ['stay **behind** (in school)]; 'sit **out**' (dance)).

hot I adj.: 'a **hot** day'; II adv.: 'the sun shone **hot**'.

35 (adjectives modifying the verb in a clause are similarly counted as adverbs generally: 'walk **straight**', 'work **hard**', 'live **rough**'; cp. French: 'parler **bas**', 'sentir **bon**', vendre **cher**', or Danish 'gå **lige**' ['walk **straight**'], 'arbejde **hårdt**' ['work **hard**'], 'sælge **dyrt**' ['sell **dear**']).

40 The following are considered as three [separate] words:

now I adv.: 'do it **now**'; II conj.: '**now** while ...';

III - according to WYLD, 'almost a noun': 'up to **now**'.

home I subst.: 'my **home**'; II adj.: 'The **Home** Office';

III adv.: 'go **home**'.

45 **one** I adj.: 'worth **one** pound'; II subst.: 'the number **one**':

III indef. pron.: '**one** came', 'any **one**'.

round I adj.: 'a **round** table'; II adv.: 'go **round**';

III prep.: '**round** the corner'.

The following are considered as four words:

50 **dear** I adj.: 'my **dear** friend'; II subst.: 'isn't he a **dear**?';

III adv.: 'sell **dear**'; IV interj.: '**Dear** me!'.

past*I participle: 'the **past** week'; II subst.: 'undo the **past**';

III prep.: 'walk **past** the gate'; IV adv.: 'walk **past**'.

none I pron.: '**none** so blind ...'; II subst.: '**none** of it';

55 III adj.: 'of **none** effect' [archaic]; IV adv.: '**none** the better'.

17. If any kind of consistent theory underlay this quite widespread lexicographic practice, it would be based on the idea that an adjective (like **hot** or **dear**) or a participle (like **past**) should be, or in some cases would have to be, construable and definable as an
5 adverb without any formal change; a substantive (like **home**) or a pronoun (like **none**) should similarly be convertible to an adjective; and adverbs (like **about**, **now**) should be convertible now to prepositions (**about**), now to conjunctions. And if the theory were elaborated with complete consistency, none of the word class definitions to
10 which a given form is attributed would be primary in relation to the others.

Now as a rule this is evidently not at all what is meant; on the contrary, a single definition is usually chosen as the initial one quite instinctively - by which is meant now the one which is primary
15 from the logical point of view, now the one which is the historically original definition - and on the basis of the latter the other derived or elaborated definitions are assumed: **home** is thus a 'noun' [Eng], i.e. a substantive, **hot** and **dear** are adjectives, **none** a pronoun and **past** a participle, and other definitions of these forms
20 are considered to be secondary ones. Whence the familiar theory according to which a word can function as a substantive or an adjective, as an adverb or as a preposition; one also speaks of a

word's being used substantivally, adjectivally, etc. (one might with equal justice say 'is adverbialized' or 'is prepositionalized').

25 Thus the following are allowed to function as a 'substantive':

#1 adjectives: 'a **dear**'; 'the number **one**' (?) [V.B.'s "?"];

#2 pronouns: '**none** of it';

#3 verbs, especially participles (and infinitives): 'the **past**';

#4 adverbs (?) [V.B.'s "?"]: 'up to **now**';

30 The following are listed as an 'adjective':

#1 substantives: 'The **Home** Office';

#2 verbs, especially participles: 'the **past** week';

#3 pronouns: 'of **none** effect'.

As an 'adverb':

35 #1 substantives: 'go **home**';

#2 adjectives: 'shine **hot**', 'sell **dear**';

#3 participles: 'walk **past**';

#4 pronouns: '**none** the better'.

And as a 'preposition':

40 #1 adverbs: 'look **about** you';

#2 participles: '**past** the gate';

#3 adjectives: '**round** the corner'.

Similarly a so-called adverb (like **now**) is said to function as a conjunction ('**now** while ...') or an adjective (**dear**) as an inter-
45 jection (in the combination '**dear** me!').

18. It is hard, however, to resist the impression of being on shaky ground here. In fact only pure arbitrariness seems to decide to how many and to which word classes a given form can belong - other

than to its primary class; and the suspicion necessarily arises that
 ; designations like substantive and adjective, adverb and preposition
 are by no means being taken in the familiar traditional sense when
 used for the 'secondary' functions. To put it another way: that a
 word **functions as** a substantive, adjective etc., or that it **stands**
 substantivally, adjectivally etc., does not seem to be the same as
 10 **being** a substantive, adjective, etc. From the purely morphological
 point of view **home** is a substantive, **hot**, **dear** and **round** are
 adjectives, **past** is a participle and **none** a pronoun - and these
 definitions seem to be both consistent and sufficient within the
 given norm. To allow a word that **is not** a substantive to function as
 15 one or to stand substantivally or to be substantivized, presupposes
 partly that a word - **qua** word or by virtue of its class (membership)
 - has a single function, either a natural one or one conforming to
 the definition, in the sentence (congruent function* or true meaning,
 as GARDINER puts it), and partly that the word can nevertheless -
 20 against its own nature, as it were - function in a different way. It
 is this theory then which now has to be examined.

19. In order to be able to examine whether a word - taking the
 concept in the purely morphological sense - has just one or rather
 several syntactic functions (for example, one function proper and
 several figurative ones) we are obliged to establish firstly the
 5 possible systems of words and eliminate all irrelevant, i.e.
 non-morphological, constructions. Now if in fact certain supposed
 'words' were in themselves of a syntactic nature, it is clear that the
 investigation would be botched in its very foundation.

Now it has been precisely the general practice, as it were, to
 19.10 include in all word classes - and in all languages - constructions
 which do not possess that simplicity [non-analyticity,
 non-compositeness] required by the morphological definition of the
 concept 'word'; constructions which, however, - because they are
combinations of independent elements - require an analysis which must
 15 be first and foremost of a syntactic nature. As examples here we can
 cite:

'substantives': **chef d'oeuvre**, cf. **master-piece**;

'proper nouns': **Neuveville**, cf. **Newtown**;

'adjectives': **mort-né**, cf. **still-born**;

20 'verbs': **sur-passer**, cf. [**sur-pass**] **out-do**, **over-take**;

'conjunctions': **afin que**, cf. **so that** (in order to);

'adverbs': **aujourd'hui**, cf. **this day** (today);

'prepositions': **au-dessous**, cf. Dan. **neden-under**

[**underneath**: cf. also English constructions like

25 **inside of** or American English **in back of** etc.]

'interjections': **ma foi!**, cf. **my word!**

In every one of these cases - the number of which can be
 multiplied indefinitely - we have not one, but a number of words: that
 is to say, not inflexion or derivation, but combination (including
 30 compounding). These so-called 'substantives' or 'proper nouns' contain
 two nominals (**chef** and **oeuvre** in **chef d'oeuvre**, **master** and **piece** in
masterpiece, etc.); these pseudo-'verbs' contain, in addition to a
 genuine verb (Fr. **-passer**, Eng. **-do**), a preposition of high frequency
 in the (given) language (**sur-**, **out-**), and so on. It is quite true (as
 35 will be objected at this point) that these supposed 'nominals' and

'verbs', 'conjunctions' and 'prepositions' occur in the sentence or function in it similarly to the simple words [i.e. plain stems] of the corresponding class. But this, their usual **global** function, i.e. the role these constructions as complete entities play or can play in the sentence, does not prevent its being a fact that each individual entity can and indeed must be analysed both syntactically, i.e. with reference to the interrelationships of the [constituent] members, and morphologically, i.e. in regard to the specific value of the smallest independent elements.

20. Every word is - as a word - defined by two sets of concepts; the general or logical, and the special or symbolic. To put it differently, in order to define the morphological character of a given word, it is a necessary and sufficient condition to specify in part its class or logical category, in part its synonymic status or symbolic value.* French words like **de** and **que** are thus defined as preposition and conjunction respectively; and similarly in the case of Latin words like **dē** and **quam**. Both Latin **dē** and French **de** are prepositions because - like prepositions wherever they occur - they express a relationship or situation and no other logical concept.

Both French **que** and Latin **quam** are conjunctions because like all conjunctions they designate in part a relationship or situation (whence their close relationship to prepositions), and in part a basis or point of origin. Now as far as synonymics* is concerned, on the other hand, a characteristic difference manifests itself between the French and Latin words mentioned. For while the French words assume a central and dominant position within their classes - **de** as a

general preposition, **que** as a general conjunction - this is not the case with Latin words (or with the corresponding words in most languages, for example the other Romance languages): the Latin **dē** 'from' is far more special than French **de**, and Latin **quam**, 'than', than French **que**. Latin **dē** is a preposition analogous to **ab** and **ex** (cf. French **dès**, Italian **da**) and must be defined in terms of its similarity to and difference from the latter (and vis-à-vis other words which are analogous in some other respect); Latin **quam** is a conjunction related to **atque** and **ut** and must find its synonymic position in relation to the latter. The Latin **dē** is thus defined by the logical concept 'relation' + one-or-more more special symbolic concepts (the expression of the 'from'-relationship, cf. German **von**, **aus**); while French **de** is defined thus: relation + zero. The Latin **quam** is similarly defined by the logical concepts relation and basis + one-or-more more special symbolic concepts (the expression for comparison, cf. German **als**, **wie**); French **que** is simply defined as relation + basis, because any addition is rejected as superfluous. While the symbolic value of a word in systems of a high level of abstraction (such as that characteristically developed in modern French) can be reduced to zero, conversely the logical value of a word cannot apparently be reduced below a certain minimum of categories necessary in order to constitute a word - this is so even in the case of a very high level of abstraction (as in Chinese).*

21. The indispensable fundamental categories for any language are here assumed to be four in all:*

#1 **relation** (cf. preposition);

- #2 **substance** (cf. proper name);
 21.5 #3 **quality** (cf. adverb; n.b.: only qualitatively);
 #4 **quantity** (cf. numerals).

These basic concepts were placed in reciprocal relationship and defined as follows in an earlier work [of the author's] on word classes [Ordklasserne, 1928]:*

- 10 #1 **relation** or situation = **relator** (r);
 #2 **substance** or object, thing = **relatum** (R);
 #3 **quality** or characteristic = **descriptor** (d);
 #4 **quantity** or basis (framework for content) = **descriptum** (D).

The logical concepts should therefore form two pairs just as much
 15 from the one point of view as from the other. They are divided when
 seen from the one side into relative (r,R) and descriptive (d,D); seen
 from the other side into active (r,d) and passive (R,D). By means of
 the relation (r:R) a thing or object in the proper sense (R) is placed
 in reciprocal relationship (r); by means of a description (d:D) a
 20 given content (d) is placed in a framework (D).

It would seem that by means of these concepts the word classes
 which exist in practice - and presumably all other conceivable ones -
 can be defined.

If any single category is applied at a time, it is evident that
 25 the most abstract classes possible will be defined; if, conversely,
 all four are applied simultaneously, they will define an
 undifferentiated class of absolute complexity. According to our
 theory, all classes lie between these two extremes. They are defined

and classified as follows:

21.30

A. Abstract classes:

prepositions (r): **de**;
 proper names (R): **Plato**;
 adverbs (d): **bien**;
 numerals (D): **cinq.**

35

B. Concrete classes:

nouns (Rd): **parisien**;
 verbs (rd): **être**;
 pronouns (RD): **ce**;
 conjunctions (rD): **que**;
 40 possessives (rR): **mon**;
 reflexives (dD): **se, soi.**

C. Complex classes:

45

derived verbs (Drd): **rougir, rougissant**;
 derived nouns (DRd): **parleur, aimable**;
 derived pronouns (numerals) (rDR): **premier, moi**;
 verbal nouns (rdR): **pensée, sagesse.**

D. Undifferentiated class:

interjections (rRdD): **Oh! Oui!**

50

While the abstract classes (A), which are defined only by a single element, can have only one form, all the other classes (B-D) can

occur, other than in their proper form, in a number of subordinate forms or subclasses according to whether the one or the other element is stressed. Most important here in our [western] languages are the

21.55 main and secondary forms of the concrete classes:

	nouns (Rd)	—	[substantives (Rd): homme ;
]	
			[adjectives (Rd): vieux .
]	
60	verbs (rd)	—	[finite verbal forms (rd): va ;
]	
			[participles (rd): allé .
]	
	pronouns (RD)	—	[definite (RD): celui ;
]	
			[indefinite (RD): qui .
]	
65	conjunctions (rD)	—	[copulative (rD): et ;
]	
			[situative (rD): ou .
]	
	possessives (rR)	—	[conjunct (rR): mon ;
]	
70			[absolute (rR): mien .
]	
	reflexives (dD)	—	[conjunct (dD): se ;
]	
			[absolute (dD): soi .
]	

These, then, are the morphological types whose permanence or
75 [susceptibility to] variation with respect to syntax must now be
examined.

22. **Concrete classes** (treated here for practical reasons). - The question here is: have nouns and verbs, pronouns and conjunctions, possessives and reflexives (and their secondary forms) a single privileged syntactic function? Or must we allow them several such
 5 functions all of equal standing? It is obvious here that the investigation must not be arbitrarily restricted to sentences or members of a single type or very peculiar types or to one particular style (e.g. to the 'logical' style of intellectual prose). For this would greatly narrow the number of given possibilities and steer the
 10 solution of the problem in a particular direction in advance.

23. **Nouns (Rd)**. - By this we mean words designating an object (R) accompanied by a description (d). These two elements can - as in the case of pure nouns of the type Fr. **parisien**, Danish **københavnner** [**Copenhagener**], Finnish **suomalainen**, 'Finnish' - hold each other in
 5 balance; these words then are not just substantives or just adjectives, but have both components simultaneously and uniformly. Alternatively one of these defining elements can be stressed: we then have on the one hand nouns emphasizing the object, or substantives; **man (Rd)**; on the other, nouns emphasizing qualities, or adjectives:
 10 **old (Rd)**.

Nouns in the morphological sense here indicated must not, of course, be compounded: words like [Dan] **for-mand** [**fore-man**] and **mester-værk** [**master-piece**], as we have said, are not substantives, words like **død-født** [**still-born**] or **grå-blå** [**grey-blue**,
 15 i.e. **blue-grey**] are not adjectives in this sense. - And words which belong to other classes cannot occasionally function as nouns

(substantives or adjectives).

An adjective, participle or gerund, an adverb, preposition or interjection do not become substantives merely by being furnished with
 23.20 an article; **le beau, le passé, l'allant, le bien, le pour et le contre, un oui**. Nor does a pronoun become a substantive merely by standing alone [i.e. independently from the verb]: '**none** of it'; nor again does a conjunction ('adverb') when governed by a preposition: '**up** to now'. - Nor in turn can just any word become an adjective
 25 merely by standing in combination where it describes an adjoining substantive: a proper noun like **London**: '**London** Bridge'; a substantive like **home**: 'The **Home** Office'; an indefinite pronoun like **none**: 'of **none** effect'; a possessive like **my**: '**my** hat'.

From this it already emerges in part that nouns, whether pure or
 30 undivided ones, or the specialized ones [i.e.] substantives and adjectives, are not limited to a single syntactic function.

#1 **Substantives** do indeed occur in the 'normal' sentence with quite different, even opposite functions; now as subject, now as object or as attribute (also called predicate): '**War** breeds **want**';
 35 '**War** is **war**'; 'Il [Rembrandt] est **people**'. A substantive can next be an emphatic subject - and stand last: '**Vivat rex!**'; or it can be an emphatic object or attribute respectively - and stand first: '**Oculos** habent et non videbunt' (Vulgate); [Dan] '**Nat** var det og ganske tyst' [lit. '**Night** it was and completely still']. A substantive finally can
 40 stand alone, constituting the entire clause, as in direct speech: '**Medice, cura te ipsum**', or in exclamation: **Fire!**; or in titles: **Poems**. - On the other hand substantives are used as part of (or more correctly: members within) a member, or as sub-members, so to speak,

and then [can be] either describing [descriptive] or described,
 23.45 governing or governed. In the combination **Home Office** there are thus
 two substantives involved, the first descriptive, the second
 described; in the sentence [Dan] 'Han blev anset for **mand** for at gøre
 det' ['He was seen as the **man** to do it', i.e. the man for the job;
 lit. 'He was seen **for** the man **for** (to do) it'], **mand** is governed
 50 relative to the first **for**, and governing relative to the rest of the
 sentence. And we must certainly construe the individual members of a
 compound as sub-members because the individual elements here are
 simply brought closer together than in the case of looser combinations
 or juxtapositions. Substantives can, as is well-known, enter compounds
 55 now as the first member: [Dan] **mand-stærk** [lit. 'man-strong', i.e.
 numerous] when, as in this case, for example, it will be descriptive,
 and now as the second member: **for-mand** ['foreman'], when, as here,
 it will be described.

#2 **Adjectives** do indeed take their name from a single syntactic
 60 function inasmuch as the **adjectivum** of Latin grammar is a translation
 of ἐπίθετον, 'addition, appendix', of Greek rhetoric. And in the case
 of the concept 'adjective', and to an even greater extent in that of
 the derivative 'adjectival', we are ever more inclined to think of
 this situation, that a characteristic or quality is ascribed or
 65 attributed to an object, especially (in the case) where quality and
 object constitute parts of the same member [or group]: **good man**. But
 even if the adjective, in accordance with its definition (Rd), is in
 this sense a quality word inasmuch as it always emphasizes the noun's
 descriptive aspect, this does not mean that it is always bound to play
 70 the same role whenever it occurs in the sentence. In fact it can

- hardly occur in fewer different ways than the substantive. To be sure, it occurs quite frequently as an attribute when it is an independent member in the sentence, and then it usually takes the final position: 'God is **good**'; 'Wash a nigger **white**'. Yet it also stands first as an
- ^{23.75} emphatic attribute: 'Klein ist die Welt'. The adjective can indeed be the subject, too ('substantivized'): 'Fair is foul, and foul is fair' (Shakespeare). And it occurs very frequently, as is well-known, as a descriptive ('adverbial') modifier of the verb in a sentence: [Dan] 'Han taler **godt**' ['He speaks **well**'] - (examples were given §16 above).
- ⁸⁰ The adjective also occurs as a complete sentence: [Dan] **Godt!** [**Good!**]; Fr. **bon!**; Ital. **bravo!** - And on the other hand it occurs in a number of different ways as a member of a member. We only need to recall the difference between the prepositive and postpositive attribute (**brave homme** versus **homme brave**, **une certaine nouvelle** versus **une nouvelle**
- ⁸⁵ **certaine**) - a difference which evidently cannot depend upon the words in themselves, but rather in the manner of their combination, and thus must be of a syntactic nature. Finally, adjectives occur in compounds like **grey-green**, **green-blue**, i.e. now initially (descriptive), now finally (described).
- ⁹⁰ #3 What has been observed here with regard to substantives and adjectives holds good so to speak in every particular for the **pure nouns** of the type **français**, 'French' or 'Frenchman', **grec**, 'Greek' [adj.] or '(a) Greek' [subst.], etc. (often they are derivatives of proper nouns: Latin **Latinus**, 'from Latium'; Finnish **suomalainen**, 'from
- ⁹⁵ Suomi, Finland' etc.): Fr. 'il est **grec**', 'c'est un **grec**', les philosophes **grecs**, etc.

It may thus be maintained that nouns of all types are extremely

variable in their syntax: they are now immediate members of the sentence, now merely sub-members; they belong now to one part, now to its counterpart, in a given syntactic construction.

24. **Verbs (rd)**. - By this we understand words which combine relation (r) and description (d). The two elements can be of equal weight here; we then have the general or infinitive form of the verb - a form which precisely because of its general nature will now occur as a combining form, now as a descriptive form. On the other hand, one of the elements can be dominant, either the relative or the descriptive. In the former case we have the so-called finite verbal forms (rd), in the latter, participles (rd). A finite verb is thus (to an especial degree) a combiner, a participle is especially a descriptor - while the infinitive is neutral in this respect.

Combinations in which verbal forms, *inter alia*, occur, should not - in the light of this purely morphological description- be considered as verbs: compound verbs like **out-do** ([Dan] **over-gå**) (cf. **sur - passer**) or [Dan] **hånd-hæve** [**maintain**] (cf. **main-tenir**) should not be considered as independent verbs (so long as) their (constituent) elements are used as free forms in the same language. (And derivatives like [Dan.] **rød-me** ['red-den', 'blush'], [Fr] **roug-ir**, though morphological in nature, are nevertheless more complex constructions than genuine simple verbs.)

#1 Firstly, as far as **participles (rd)** are concerned, it is evident that in syntactic use they are close to their kindred forms, the adjectives (Rd). In normal sentences they usually occupy the position of the attribute: 'He is **wounded**'. They can, however - just

like adjectives - stand as subject: [Dan] '**Gemt** er glemt' [lit. 24.25 '**Hidden** is forgotten', cf. 'Out of sight, out of mind']; that is, almost in the opposite function. They can qualify the main verb, or stand adverbially, as it is put: [Dan] 'Han taler **dannet**' [lit. 'He talks **educated(ly)**, **cultured(ly)**' i.e. 'He speaks in an educated manner, like a man of culture' etc.]. They can also occur as the 30 second member of the compound verb: 'I have **spoken**, 'He has **won** a victory', a property obviously characteristic of their verbal nature. They can stand emphatically, as subject for example in so-called nominal sentences: '**Amantes** amentes'; or as a prepositive attribute: [Dan] '**Elsket** er han ikke' [lit. '**Loved** he is not']. Finally, they 40 can occur without difficulty as whole members: '**Arrivé**' (telegram style). - On the other hand, participles enter in a number of ways, as elements in totality which are themselves sentence members: descriptively they stand now before, now after a second member (often a substantive or other 'substantival' word): 'a **gifted** man', 'un 45 homme **doué**'. And in compounds they occur in either position: [Dan] 'vel-begavet' ['well-endowed'], '**givet-vis**' ['certainly'; lit. '**given-wise**', cf. '**assured-ly**'].

#2 **Infinitives** (rd), which according to our definition stand neutrally midway between participles and finite verb forms, also 50 exhibit a certain double nature from the syntactic point of view: now inclining to the descriptive side and thus functioning analogically to participles (but not for this reason 'nominally', as is often said), now inclining to the relative side and thus functioning analogically to finite verbal forms. In a sentence an infinitive can just as well 55 be a subject as an object and attribute: '**Vivere** militare est'

(Seneca). 'Fallen ist der Sterblichen Los' (Goethe). 'Felix terra ubi vivere est bibere.' 'J'aime voyager.' It can also be the central member of the sentence or, as it is usually put, main verb. This is normal for example in the type of subordinate clause called

^{24.60} accusative with infinitive : 'Suspicio eum esse cum illa muliere' (Plautus). And thus, too, in the so-called historical infinitive: 'Ainsi dit le renard, et flatteurs d'applaudir (La Fontaine) - a construction in which of course there is no implied governing verb, as has been said (see KRETSCHMER). Finally, infinitives can constitute a

⁶⁵ complete sentence, for example a command: **Stehen!** Cf. 'Getrennt marschieren, vereinigt schlagen'. - On the other hand, the infinitive occurs frequently as a submember. It is combined for example with a prepositive definite article or other determinative; thus in Greek: τὸ καθανεῖν (and in scholastic Latin, following the model of Greek

⁷⁰ philosophy: τὸ esse,), and thus in French: 'chaque artiste ... a son faire' (Taine); and in German: 'Uns aber treibt das verworrene Streben ...' (Schiller). One speaks here of a 'substantival' use or of a 'substantivized' infinitive. Wrongly. For the infinitive preserves its verbal character here as elsewhere; it simply functions - when

⁷⁵ governed by determinative elements (light pronouns) - with a certain character of an object, or as it was put in the Middle Ages: **materialiter**; but this is a syntactic function which has nothing to do with the word class 'substantive'. (It is a quite different matter that this construction easily becomes the point of departure for a

⁸⁰ genuine historical transition from infinitive to substantive: words like **le plaisir**, whence English **pleasure**, and **le manoir**, whence English **manor**, which are now pure substantives, were once infinitives

in Old French). Finally, infinitives enter into compounds and then not merely in final position as in [Dan] over-⁰ga [sur-pass, out-do],
 24.85 hãnd-⁰hæve [main-tain], but also in the initial position: søge-lys
 [search-light], flyve-plads [airport; lit. fly-place]; savoir-vivre.

#3 The **finite verb forms** (rd) have, as is well-known, the function of forming the sentence's central member in 'normal' or verbal sentences: 'Finis **coronat** opus'. 'Platon **var** filosof'. ['Plato **was** a
 90 philosopher']. And in current grammatical usage word and function in this case are so far taken as identical one merely speaks of 'the verb', that is, both where a word of a given class is meant (thus as against noun, etc.), and where it is thought of in its function as the predicative central member in the sentence (thus as against
 95 subject etc. to one side, object etc. to the other). It is presupposed here - without being expressly stated - partly that a sentence deserving its name must of necessity contain a finite verb (a claim of syntactic nature which will be examined later), partly that a finite verb always occupies the position of main verb, that is, the central
 100 element. This latter thesis, which touches directly on our discussion at this point, is quite obviously false. For quite certainly the finite verb forms (i.e. insofar as all the moods are used [in a given language]: partly the indicative, partly the imperative and subjunctive, together with the optative) stand most frequently in
 105 modern prose in the central position in the sentence, joining the first half (i.e. the subject and so on) to the last one (i.e. object and attribute): 'Socrates is dead. He **drank** hemlock.' And this naturally deserves to be taken into consideration in the definition of this member - the predicative central member - which hitherto for the

^{24.110} most part has only been characterized morphologically: as 'the verb' or 'the sentence verb'. But on the other hand we must not forget the following important facts:

1. that in many cases the verb - partly outside declarative sentences (i.e. in questions, exclamations, orders), partly in ¹¹⁵ emphatic or archaic style - by no means occupies the central position, but on the contrary, now the first, now the last in the sentence: [Dan] '**Kommer** han?' ['is he coming?', lit. (also archaic) '**Comes** he?'] '**Komme** her og påstå ...!' ['To **come** here and say that...!'] ; '**Kom** dog!' ['**Do** come (on)!'] - '**Carpent** tua poma nepotes.' '**Fortes fortuna** ¹²⁰ **adjuvat**'.

2. that in numerous sentences, especially short ones, there is no central position, or more correctly, it is not filled, so that the verb cannot take a central position at all. This is thus the case partly in sentences which seem to lack a last part (i.e. without an ¹²⁵ explicit object or attribute): '**Deus est.**' '**Le roi règne et ne gouverne pas.**' '**I write**'; partly in sentences where on the contrary it is the first part that seems to be missing (i.e. without an explicit subject and so on): '**Festina lente.**' '**Carpe diem.**' '**Amat patriam.**'

¹³⁰ These facts already suggest that the verb can play several other roles in the sentence apart from taking the central position. The fact that the verb can even constitute the entire sentence points in the same direction; for example frequently in imperative and hortatory sentences: **Come!** **Allons!**; in classical languages also in the ¹³⁵ declarative: Lat. **Amo** (and thus still in Italian and Spanish).

To this we can add that the finite verb is not restricted to

functioning as a member in a sentence. It can also enter as the first, governing element in compounds of the type: **fac**-simile, **marche**-pied, **break**-fast. It is certainly a matter of dispute whether, as A. DARMESTERER supposed, imperatives are always involved here. But since the form can evidently be neither infinitive or participle, we cannot ignore the fact that here we have a finite form functioning as a submember.

We might maintain, then, that verbs, finite forms as well as participles and infinitives, are no more bound to a single syntactic function than nouns.

25. **Pronouns (RD)**. - This class embraces words which at the same time designate a thing as mere object (R) and as an object of description (D). The two elements can be in balance here as in the case of some very abstract pronouns (French **ce**; **tout**, **même**); more often either the relative or the descriptive concept of object is stressed. In the first case we then have definite pronouns (RD), in the second indefinite ones (RD). Examples of definite pronouns are demonstratives like Latin **ille**, **is**, and **iste** and the so-called definite article (Greek $\acute{\omicron}$, French **le**, English **the**, etc). Indefinite pronouns are exemplified by Latin **quis** or English **some** and **any**, and by the so-called indefinite article in modern languages (Fr **un**, Eng **a**).*

The following should not be counted as pronouns, if pronouns are defined in this way and hence purely morphologically:

1. words containing only one of the elements which characterize true pronouns: adjectives like [Fr] **certain** or **divers**, abstract nouns (or proper nouns) like **on** and **chose**; conjunctions like **dont** and **que**

(cf. Dan **hvis** [**whose**], **som** [**which**]); finally possessives like [Dan] **min** [**my**] and reflexives like **sig** [**oneself, himself...**]. For relative and interrogative pronouns, see §39,#3).

,20 2. combinations which, because they include pronouns for example, function analogously to the latter: [Fr] **chac-un** (cf [Dan] **en-hver** [**everyone**]), **quelqu'un** (cf.[Eng] **some-one, any-one**), **lequel, celui-ci, qui/quoi...que**.

#1. **Definite** or demonstrative pronouns (RD), which - by virtue of
 25 their emphasis on the relatum or thing-concept (R) - are akin to substantives (Rd), quite naturally have functions reminiscent of the latter. They generally occur as subject, as object and as attribute: 'Tum **ille**, Non sum, inquit, nescius ..' (Cicero); 'Commendo vobis **illum** et illum' (Suetonius); 'Id est **idem**'. They function in addition
 30 as heavier members: emphatically, and hence outside the usual word order: '**Hoc** dico' (object brought forward); 'Dixit **iste**' (subject put back). They function on the other hand, in French and Italian for example, as lighter members: now proclitic, now enclitic (especially with the imperative) : '**Lo** prometto'; 'Je **le** promets' : - '**Lo** pare';
 35 'Il **le** paraît': - 'Dite glielo'; 'Dites **le** lui'. Finally, they can constitute an entire sentence, an exclamation or a question, for example: '**Her!**?'. - As submembers, demonstratives usually play a determinative or what one might call expository role: they indicate or suggest by way of anticipation an object which - later within the
 40 member - is to be named and possibly described: '**this** man'. (To designate this usage as adjectival or to speak even here of an adjectival pronoun or to say that a pronoun becomes an adjective must be said to be entirely misleading; the pronoun remains a pronoun just

as much as it does when it stands on its own, and its function here is
 25.45 not at all descriptive - which is what is otherwise meant by the term
 'adjectival'). In this category, too, so it would seem, belongs the
 so-called definite article. By this in fact we never mean some
 independent word (to set up the article as a particular class is
 therefore - as pointed out by WIWEL - unnecessary and superfluous); it
 50 is simply a question of a special use of a (suitable) abstract
 demonstrative pronoun. This is placed either - as in Greek or in
 Western European languages - in front of the substantive, or more
 correctly, the material member, or - as in most Scandinavian dialects
 (except West Jutlandish) and some Balkan languages - after it. In the
 55 first case we have a proclitic function bound to the foremost part of
 the submembers ('les quatre grands rois', cf. 'tous les grands rois');
 in the second we have on the other hand an enclitic function very
 closely bound to the material member, a kind of final determinant of
 it ([Dan] 'Mand-en, Romanian 'om-ul'). At the same time, the
 60 phenomenon may well be analogous in all cases: a more or less abstract
 demonstrative is used as an unstressed submember. It remains the task
 of syntax to state what difference is achieved by the use of
 proclisis or enclisis.

#2. The **indefinite** pronouns (DR) function quite analogously to the
 65 definite. They (can) stand as subject, object, or attribute: **something**
 is more than nothing (cf. Spanish 'algo es algo'); 'Do you want
something?' . They can be emphatic: [Dan] 'Noget må han have gjort'
 'He must have done **something**', lit. 'Something he must have
 done'] And they can constitute an entire sentence, for example as a
 70 reply: 'Nothing!' - Alternatively they can stand as submembers: [Dan]

'**Nogle/Ingen** mennesker' [**Some/No** people'], [Eng] '**some/any** people'. In order to indicate the difference between this determinative use and that of the free-standing pronoun ([Eng] 'of **none** effect', cf. '**none** of it') designations like adjectival and substantival, or even (§16) substantive and adjective are usually used. We already know with how little justification this is done. - We must now also count as a determinative or expository use of an (abstract) indefinite pronoun what is usually called the indefinite article: [Eng] 'a man', [Fr] '**un** homme' [Dan] '**en** mand'. It is not a question here, as is usually claimed, of a numeral (Lat. **unus** and its cognates in older Indo-European scarcely rose to the level of this very abstract class), much less of a word **sui generis** which - together with the so-called definite article and possibly with the combination called the partitive article in French - should constitute a class by itself! Here we simply have a special proclitic function of a word which by virtue of its degree of abstraction and indefinite character (emphasis on **D**) seems to be particularly suitable for this purpose.

#3. Now it holds good to an even greater extent of the **pure pronouns** (RD), which in themselves are thus neither definite nor indefinite, and for that very reason can be now more the one, now more the other, that their functions are manifold and mutually quite different. As examples we can examine the French words **tout** and **même**.

Tout is shown in the dictionaries as being:

- I adj.: **tout** homme;
- 95 II pron. indef.: est-ce là **tout**?
- III subst.: le **tout**; rien du **tout**;
- IV adv.: **toute** autre chose; **tout-à-fait**; **tout** en riant.

And **même** is said to be:

I adj.: la **même** chose; moi-**même**;

25.100 II subst.: le **même**; être à **même** de ...;

III adv.: aujourd'hui **même**; (tout) de **même**.

What we have here might in reality be quite simply a series of syntactic uses of words which remain identical with themselves beneath their sundry guises, and by virtue of their character of pure pronouns
 105 (RD) are now more definite or concrete (cf. demonstrative, substantive, proper noun), and now more indefinite or frame-like (cf. indefinite pronouns, situatives, numerals). But what is meant by their so-called character of 'substantives' is simply that they - analogously to substantives - are used with articles (le **même**, le
 110 **tout**), that is, 'materialiter' or as objects within a member, or also that they are governed by prepositions (à **même**; then why not de **même** as well?), that they thus stand as regimen (object governed) or as syntactic relatum. Designating them as 'adjectives' is simply an unfortunate expression for their determinative function (**tout** homme,
 115 la **même** chose). And to turn them into 'adverbs' is here, as so often (elsewhere), only a makeshift, an attempt to summarize a series of entirely disparate syntactic functions (**toute autre chose** for example is a radically different construction for **aujourd'hui même**).

All kinds of pronouns - and not least the most general, the 'pure'
 120 pronouns - have thus a considerable number of different syntactic functions, and here, too, there is no justification for binding the word class as such to a single function.

26. **Conjunctions** (rD). - As belonging to this class we shall here consider words which simultaneously express a connexion or relation (r) and a basis or framework for description (D). Like the other concrete classes, or classes defined by two elements, this class, too, can occur in an undivided and in two subdivided forms: undivided or pure conjunctions stress neither relation nor basis (but preserve the right, according to context, of stressing the one or the other of these concepts). **Copulative** conjunctions (rD) stress the linking element, **situative** ones (rD) the basis or framework. Copulatives are words of the types: [Dan] **som** [as; colloq. **like**], **end** [**than**]; **og** [**and**], **eller** [**or**]; **men** [**but**], **thi** [**for**]. Situatives are for example: **hvis** [**if**], **at** [**that**]; **hvor** [**where**], **når** [**when**]; **da** [as, **since**], **her** [**here**], **nu** [**now**]. As an example of a pure or neutral conjunction we can cite French **que**.

15 In connexion with the demarcation of this class it is to be noted that:

1. Combinations, e.g. French ones with **que** or Danish ones with **at** [**that**] should not - according to the principle which has been asserted again and again in the present work - be considered conjunctions: **pour que** and **for at** [**so that**] are compounded introductory members in subordinate clauses, but each of these consists of two words, not of one.

2. Among the conjunctions, and especially among the situative or framework-emphasizing ones, we must on the other hand accept various words which are counted as 'adverbs' in the grammar of all languages, namely words of the type **here** and **now**, which do indeed denote place and time (though not always in the actual or physical sense), that is,

'**situs**'; however, they do not denote quality at all, as is required of genuine adverbs (d).

26.30 3. Those words which are really and truly accepted as conjunctions, must - unless it is a question of a clear division into a number of words, that is, a recent development of homonyms - be accepted as conjunctions in all their functions; our [Danish] particles **som** [1. **as**; 2. **that, which**] and **hvis** [1. **if**; 2. **whose, of**
3 5 **which**] and French **que** cannot therefore - if they really are conjunctions - be relative pronouns at the same time, unless a definite cleft between two groups of (morphological) characteristics can be demonstrated.

Now when it is a matter, as far as the conjunctions are concerned,
4 0 of examining our ever freshly posed question of their syntactic variation or constancy, it must be remembered that in sentence analysis hitherto it is usually the particles alone that have been dismissed with word class denominations: adverb, preposition, conjunction. This is tantamount to avoiding the syntactic problem in
4 5 advance. But conjunctions (and other particles) must to just as high a degree as the larger word classes (i.e. those classes containing an increasing number of concrete words) be able to lay claim to a characteristic of their role in the sentence - a role which cannot be assumed to be constant without (further) investigation, and which
5 0 cannot at any rate - to judge from experience elsewhere - be assumed to be involved in the word class definitions themselves.

#1. Firstly, as far as **the copulatives** are concerned, it appears - as one might expect if the definition was accurate - that they often occur linking two members: 'A is greater **than** B'; 'A [is] **as** great

is B'; 'A **and/or** B'; 'Not A, **but** B'. Here a certain relation (comparison, addition, choice, contrast) is indicated between two members which are both expressed in the sentence and are introduced in a given series or order. But this is by no means the sole function of these words, however; they can all occur as well in a way which may be called **introductory** (and therefore not merely or essentially linking, since in fact the first of the linked members here has entirely receded into the background of our consciousness): 'Og hvad så?' ['**And** what of it?']; 'Eller mener du ikke?' [lit. '**Or** don't you think so?']; 'Men Peter dog!' ['**But** Peter...!']. In relative clauses **som** [**that, who(m)**] occurs introducing a subordinate clause and also as an object (more rarely as subject): 'Manden **som** jeg mødte' ['The man **that/who(m)** I met']. (It should be noted that this function as object (or as subject) by no means gives the word the right to the title of pronoun. That in Latin, for example, a pronoun would occur here is of course beside the point. And that it is precisely conjunctions which are not unfitted for this function as an objective introductory member in a descriptive subordinate clause is shown by the corresponding use in colloquial Danish of **som at** or **og**: 'Manden **som at** jeg mødte' [lit. 'The man **who that** I met']; 'Der var een **og** spurgte efter dig' [lit. 'There was someone **and** asked after/ for you'.]) **Og** can occur in an exactly analogous way introducing a governed member consisting of a verbal form, especially an infinitive; thus for example in the curious construction which we shall call, with JESPERSEN, 'og = at' ['and = that']: 'Vil du ikke være så god **og** flytte dig' [lit. 'Won't you be so kind **and** move?' cf. 'Go **and** do it']; 'Bliv kun ved **og** syng' [lit. 'Keep on **and** sing', i.e. 'Keep on singing']. - We can finally draw

attention to the so-called adverbial use of **end** and **og**: '**End** (cf. **end-nu**) see vi på Rosenborg klædet ...' (Blicher) ['**Still** may we see the flag on R. (Castle)'] '**End** ikke det svageste forsøg blev gjort' ['Not **even** the slightest attempt was made']; 'Det mener jeg **og**' (cf. **og-så**) ['That's what I think **too** (lit. **and**)']. What we have here are not independent 'adverbs', different from the conjunctions **end** and **og**, but quite simply different syntactic functions (which require a closer analysis) than the copulative function which - evidently wrongly - has been the sole one ascribed to conjunctions, especially the copulative conjunctions.

#2. The **situatives** (rD) frequently have the function of introducing a so-called subordinate clause: '**Hvis, at, når, hvor, da** det sker, ...' ['**If, that, when, where, (or how), since** it happens ...']. However, they are not limited to this: **når** and **hvor** can, of course, introduce independent questions and **hvor** [**where** or **how**] exclamations as well: '**Når** rejser han?' ['**When** is he going (travelling)?']; '**Hvor** rejser han hen?' ['**Where** is he going (to)?']; '**Hvor** herligt!' ['**How** delightful!']. **At** [**that**] can stand determinatively or as a kind of 'article' in front of the infinitive (and then - in spite of all etymological considerations - should not be considered, from the modern point of view, as a different word from the conjunction **at**). And similarly for **hvis** as a descriptive sub-member ('genitively') introducing interrogative and relative clauses: '**Hvis** hus er dette?' ['**Whose** house is this?']; 'En søn **hvis** navn var Saul' ['A son whose name was Saul']. (This function does not warrant the establishment of a special pronoun **hvis**: for the possibility of interrogative use is the same here as in the case of **når** and **hvor**, and

for relative use as in the case of **som**. Every conjunction in fact
 26.110 contains exactly such a 'relative' or copulative element.)

(#3) The French **que** can serve as an example of a **neutral
 conjunction** (rD). It is usually construed thus :

I pronom relatif: ce **que**; fou **que** tu es!

II pron. interrogatif: **que** fait-il?

115 III conjonction: je voudrais **que** ...; **qu'**on écoute!; tel **que** je
 suis; si j'étais **que** de vous.

IV adverbe: **que** de fois!; **que** n'ai-je vingt ans!

27. As can easily be seen from the comparison of the examples
 cited, distinguishing these four formally independent 'words' from
 each other in a consistent way causes considerable difficulties: what
 are here called relative and interrogative words (in the case of
 5 'pronouns') are, as we saw in the case of **når** and **hvor**, only two sides
 of the same phenomenon, and the exclamatory function is quite closely
 connected to this (a function which in a particularly unfortunate way
 has given rise to the establishment of an 'adverb' **que**). What is
 meant by 'relative pronoun' is here (as in the case of **som** and **hvis**)
 10 merely a realization of possibilities inherent in the nature of the
 conjunction.

What is present here in reality is then doubtless a conjunction of
 the highest degree of abstraction: neutral with respect to the
 copulative-situative opposition (and therefore now more the one, now
 15 more the other) and undifferentiated in relation to more special
 conjunctions (and therefore - like **de** among the prepositions - suited
 to substitute for them all). **Que** is, as F. BRUNOT put it, the

universal conjunction.

Rich syntactic possibilities arise naturally from this moreover,
 27.20 since **que** can play the following roles:

- I as the prepositive object or attribute in relative clauses
 (then called 'relative pronoun');
- II as the same in questions ('interrogative pronouns');
- III as the introductory element of a sentence member or of
 25 subordinate clauses (so-called 'conjunction');
- IV as the introductory element of exclamations (so-called
 'adverb').

28. **Possessives** (rR). - This class is supposed to contain those words which simultaneously denote a relation (and thus not merely a possessive relation) and an object for this relation: a relation (r) and a relatum (R). Here either the relation or the relatum can be
 5 emphasized: in the first case we have a **conjunct** possessive (rR:) Fr. **mon**), in the second an **absolute** one (rR: Fr. **mien**). If neither element is emphasized, one may speak of a **neutral** possessive (rR: Dan. **min** [my/mine]).

As is well-known, the conjunct possessives are usually called
 10 adjectival possessives or even (possessive) adjectives, and the absolute possessives are called substantival possessives or even (possessive) substantives. Against this, however, it may be objected that:

#1 The possessives have only a single feature, namely the object
 15 concept (R), in common with nouns (Rd); they lack on the other hand the other feature characteristic of nouns and especially of

adjectives, the descriptor concept (d). Now when certain possessives, namely the absolute ones (Fr. **mien**), emphasize the object concept, then there results, to be sure, a certain likeness to those nouns
 28.20 which emphasize the same concept, namely substantives (and moreover, for the same reason, to the definite pronouns). But it does not follow from this that the other class of possessives, the conjuncts, is analogous in the slightest to adjectives; for the feature emphasized by the adjectives, the descriptive feature, is lacking in
 25 the case of all possessives; and the feature emphasized by the conjunct possessives, the relative feature, is lacking in the case of all nouns, and therefore in the case of all adjectives.

#2 The actual difference between **mon** and **mien**, then, is not at all the syntactic one, as one might think when the unfortunate
 30 expressions 'adjectival' and 'substantival' are used: conjunct and disjunct. Both types are or were used in fact conjunctly. One can say not just **mon ami**, **ma maison**, but also **un mien ami**; in earlier times one could say **une mienne maison**.

In general here the individual form is by no means bound to a
 35 single function: **mien** is now conjunct (**un mien ami**), now disjunct (**le mien**). And even the 'conjunct' forms, which are usually 'con-joined' forms [or added ones, as our Danish equivalent, **ved-føjet**, suggests], do not always play one and the same role. We distinguish, as is well-known, in the case of the possessives as in the case of the genitive
 40 **inter alia** between an objective, a subjective and a predicative function: '**ma vue** lui est désagréable' contains a possessive in objective function for example, '**ma vue** est bonne' contains the same words in subjective function; and in a combination like 'Dit b \ddot{a} st!'

28.45 ['You fool', lit. 'Your fool'] the possessive clearly functions predicatively. As will surely be conceded, the possessive here remains identical to itself in all respects; in every case it expresses primarily a relation, and secondarily an object. But the character of the relation is changed according to the context, and it would seem that the variation in this context can only be of a syntactic nature.

50 How differently a possessive can in fact function is quite naturally best seen in considering neutral forms like Danish **min** or Italian **mio**. The neutral form can not only stand as a submember now in front of (and then, as we have seen, in a number of ways), now after its object member (**mit** hus [my house], casa **mia**). It can also
 55 stand as a independent member in a sentence and then - in resemblance to substantives and pronouns - can now be subject, now object or attribute: '**Min** er den bedste' ['**Mine** is the best']; 'Jeg elsker **min**' ['I love my own ones']; 'Hun er **min**' ['She is **mine**'] (cp. also: **Mit** og **dit** ['**Mine** and **thine**'], so-called substantivization, in fact
 60 simply isolated usage). And in interrogative and exclamatory sentences possessives stand entirely isolated: **Mit!** [**Mine!**].

29. **Reflexives** (dD). - This class, which can also be called personalia, contains such words as denote a framework as well as its proper content, or to express it another way: basis or situs (D) and quality or description (d). Here either the indefinite framework or
 5 the descriptive content may be emphasized; we then have now absolute or passive reflexives (like French **soi**), now conjunct or active ones (like French **se**). If neither of the defining elements is stressed, we have on the other hand a neutral reflexive (like Latin **se/sibi** or our

Danish sig [**oneself/one**].

29.10 As belonging to this class we may consider not only the so-called reflexive 'pronouns' (third person) - which are thus not pronouns in the true sense, since they only have a single element (D) in common with the latter. We may also include the more recent and lighter type of so-called personal pronouns: **me** and **te** cannot in fact be distinguished from **se**, and to this may be added the nominatives **je** and **tu** and the plural forms **nous** and **vous**; **moi** and **toi** cannot be distinguished from **soi**, to which may be added the third person (singular and plural) **lui/elle**, **eux/elles**. The 'personal' and the reflexive forms cannot be distinguished at all by means of these labels: 'Il travaille pour **lui**'; '**Moi**, je travaille'; 'Je travaille, **moi**'. In this context 'person' simply means reflexivity.

Now it is clear that these types - even within the same case - are not limited to a single use. **Se** - and similarly **me** and **te** - which is indeed mostly used proclitically, is now direct, now indirect object: 'Il **me le (te le, se le)** donne'. **Soi** - and similarly **moi** and **toi**, **lui/elle** and **eux/elles** - is now used emphatically pre- or postpositively in the sentence (i.e. as a member), now governed by a preposition or after a determinative (i.e. as a submember): '**Soi**, on ne peut pas mourir, **soi**' (Dorgelès). 'En **soi**.' 'Le **moi**.'

30 As it now thus appears that words of all the **concrete** classes (and all their subclasses) can function in a number of ways, often enough in many intrinsically quite different ones, the task now remains to examine the constancy or variation of the **abstract** word classes.

30. **Prepositions (r)**. - This class, which in a certain sense can be considered the most fundamental of the abstract classes and hence of all classes whatever, comprises only the relatively rare words denoting a mere relation (r), that is, the pure **forholdsord** 5 [**prepositions**, lit. 'relation words']. Consequently we should not consider as belonging to this class:

#1 Words belonging to other, usually non-abstract classes, which however - analogously to a certain function of prepositions - are used merely as governing elements, e.g. with a substantive, pronoun or 10 reflexive as object: adjectives like **sauf** (cf. Eng. **round** §16-17), participles like **excepté** (cf. Eng. **past**), gerunds like **durant** (cf. Eng. **during**).

#2 Combinations containing a preposition and generally acting in a governing function, the other members of which, however, can be 15 completely analysed both morphologically (as words) and syntactically (as members). And similarly for in part looser combinations like **à cause de**, **par rapport à**, in part compounds like **hor-mis**, **par-mi**, **de-puis**, Old French **a-tout**, **en-droit**.

(On the other hand, etymological considerations do not of course 20 prevent former compounds like **dans**, earlier **denz** (Latin **de-intus**) or **avant** (Latin **ab-ante**) from now being true prepositions. **Chez**, earlier **chies**, is also a genuine preposition which at some given moment made the rare leap from substantive to preposition, i.e. from a concrete class to an abstract one and was exposed to an irregular phonetic 25 reduction which must be related to the logical reduction.

The usual point of departure, as already indicated, is that prepositions can only admit of a single construction: that which

governs a following object member (government; Fr. **régime**). This is stated explicitly by NYROP: 'Une préposition introduit toujours un régime'. It is an indisputable fact, however, that numerous prepositions can in part stand after their governed object: 'Landet **over**' ['**Throughout** the land']; and in part can stand without a governed object: 'courir **après**', 'venir **contre**', 'partir **avec**'. (This latter use is often called adverbial, or the prepositions in question are even divided for that reason into a preposition and an adverb - whereby evidently neither the morphological nor the syntactic analysis is advanced.)

To this may be added other functions. Prepositions can introduce a subordinate clause: '**fra** jeg kom **til** jeg gik' ['**from** (the time) I came **until** I went'] - a function reminiscent of that of the conjunctions (rD), which are indeed the near relatives of the prepositions (our prepositions, however, do not therefore become conjunctions in this kind of combination.) Prepositions can even be an object in a sentence: 'Jeg må **af**' ['I must (be) **off**']; 'Hun vilde **med**' ['She wanted to go/come, too', lit. 'She wanted **with, along with** (us...)] - a function reminiscent of that of the infinitive (rd), with which the prepositions have indeed an affinity from another side (cp. 'jeg må **gå**' ['I must **go**']).

Finally it must be mentioned that prepositions as submembers do not only govern a following member: '**à** cause'; 'forcer **à** l'amour'; '**à** aimer'; but also stand frequently as the first member of a compound not governing, but describing the following member: '**sur**-passer', '[**sur**-pass] **out**-do' [as above, §19.20].

This first of the abstract classes is thus much freer and richer

in its sentential functions than one is usually inclined to suppose.

31. **Proper nouns (R).** - If proper names (nouns) are to be understood as pure relata (R), then we can consider as belonging to this class only those words which exclusively denote or indicate mere objects without describing or characterizing them in any way.

5 From this it follows that the category of proper noun must be defined in ways essentially different from the usual practice or psychological view.

#1 We must not consider as proper nouns words belonging to other word classes, nouns for example (the temptation to do so is particularly great in the case of substantives, which are indeed object-emphasizing words) and many types of complex words related to nouns (**Bager** [**Baker**]; **Rydning** [**Clearing**]). Personal names like German **Schneider** or English **Taylor**, names of towns like Norwegian **Odde** [**Headland?**], Finnish **Turku** ('market', = Swedish **Åbo**) are not then proper nouns in
10 the strict sense so long as the relevant words in the same language are still construed according to their descriptive content.
15

#2 We cannot at all consider as morphological proper nouns combinations, including compounds - regardless of whether one or more of the constituent members are genuine proper nouns or not. Place names like **Skovs-hoved** [**Wood('s)-head**] and **Skag-en** [**The Skaw; also scaw**] (and numerous such formations in the toponomastics of most countries, especially of the younger ones) have thus nothing to do with pure proper nouns. Names like **Tysk-land** [**Germany, lit. German(s')-land**] and **Eng-land** [i.e. **Angles' land**] are just as much
20 combinations of common and proper nouns as **Mont-de-Marsan**, for example.
25

(That these combinations - just like pure common nouns of the types mentioned - are used in a given environment as fixed denominations of definite persons and places is of course interesting and important from the semantic point of view, but essentially
 31.30 irrelevant from the morphological one.)

#3 On the other hand - as against the now common practice - we ought to accept as real proper nouns all uncompounded and underived technical terms insofar as their semantic content or synonymic quality are not common knowledge in the relevant language community. We may
 35 take as an example the South American word **mate** (cp. **tea**, **coffee**, **chocolate**); while this is a common noun in its homeland Paraguay, a denomination for a toast and the drink prepared for it from a kind of illex leaf, in every other country and language it must remain an exotic loanword, i.e. a mere name for an object the (defining)
 40 qualities of which are known only to the initiated. Now if it were to come about that the product, and with it the name became widespread and familiar to an entire race, there would then take place (as in Spanish in Argentina and in Portuguese in Brazil) a mental association between the name and the qualities of the object. And from the proper
 45 noun a common noun comes into being, from the **proprium** which is a purely denominating word (R) there arises a substantive which is also descriptive (Rd).

One does not normally find a special syntax of proper nouns in the literature on grammar - apart from the problem of the use of the
 50 article in the case of some languages. It is clear, however, that this class deserves such an examination as much as any other, as much for example as the related nouns and pronouns. Here it appears, as one

might expect, that proper nouns are encountered in essentially the same functions as these very same classes. Proper nouns stand in the sentence as subject, object, attribute: 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon'; 'This is to be Troy'. They can be emphatic, and then prepositive even though object; postpositive, even though subject: 'Charmides Lysiteles salutat' (Plautus); 'Salutem dicit Taxilo Timarchides' (id.). They can stand as the single member of a clause, particularly so in direct address (and then in the vocative where such a case exists): 'Medice, te ipsum.' - On the other hand proper nouns occur as submembers: they can then stand descriptively before or after an object member: 'London Bridge', 'Avenue Thiers', and frequently thus in the genitive: 'Caesar's daughter', 'filia Caesaris'. Alternatively, they can themselves form an object and are then described by pre or postpositive modifiers: 'Great Britain', 'a Solomon'; 'Alexander Magnus', 'Orlando Furioso'; or are governed by a preposition for example: 'Pro Milone'. And they can, as mentioned, occur in compounds in both initial and final position, as in pseudo-proper nouns like Eng-land, [Dan.] Syd-Amerika.

32. **Adverbs** (d). - When this class is construed as consisting of words denoting quality alone, which are thus pure descriptors, the current category of adverbs - the motliest in the whole of grammar - must be opened to a radical revision.* Thus we cannot consider as genuine adverbs:

#1 Words which are simply not descriptive. For example situatives like **her** [here] and **nu** [now], **når** [when] and **her** [sic; hvor/where?], which constitute a subclass of conjunctions: §26, #2),

pronouns like **tout** and **même** (§25, #3).

32.10 #2 Words which are certainly descriptive, but more as well. For example adjectives in combinations like *sælge dyrt* ['sell dear'], *vendre cher* (§16; §23, #2). Thus too the complex words arising from adjectives by derivation: *sage-ment* (originally compounds).

15 #3 Finally combinations which are in part looser combinations like *sans doute*, *tout-à-fait* etc., in part compounds of several different types like *par-fois*, *pour-quoi*, *plu-tôt*, *dés-or-mais*.

There remain as actual or genuine adverbs words like **bien** and **mal**, **plus** and **moins**, **peu** and **trop**, **très** and **assez**, **si** (NB. a homonym with the conjunction **si** and the affirmative response **si**) and **ne** (but not 20 **ni**, which is a conjunction, nor **non** which is a reply, i.e. interjection).

The question is now whether these words always have a single function, which would thus be the adverbial function.

Now it is easy to see straight away that they are used in two 25 completely different ways: on one hand as a member in a sentence, on the other as a member within a member: '*Il parle bien*', cf. '*Il parle assez/si bien*', '*Il ne parle pas*'; cf. '*pour ne rien dire*'.

As different as these functions are (with their quite divergent relationship to the sentence: direct in the first instance, indirect 30 in the second), they nevertheless present certain analogies which could be thought to be - and in fact have been - a pretext for calling them all adverbial. Of a quite different type on the other hand is the unquestionable function as object: '*Faites plus/moins*', cf. '*Ne faites rien*'; as attribute: '*qui plus est*'; or as a governed member 35 after a preposition: '*Un rat, sans plus* (La Fontaine); or as an

introductory element: '**Plus** l'oeuvre est belle, **plus** les caractères qu'elle manifeste sont intimes' (Taine).

Nobody can doubt - and I daresay nobody ever has doubted - that in all these instances we have a single word **plus**, a descriptive adverb, which despite all its syntactic vicissitudes preserves its morphological identity unscathed. - Nor are adverbs, then, bound to a single sentential function consistent with their nature either.

33. **Numerals (D).*** - If this class is defined as words whose sole defining characteristic is the denoting of empty frames or objects for description (D) - we can also use expressions like *basis* or *situs* -, then we are obliged here, as in the case of the other three abstract classes, to weed out a good deal. We cannot then consider as genuine numerals:

#1 Designations of number which are pure substantives, for example popular units of reckoning like **snes** [score], **skok** [sixty], **ol** [eighty] and arithmetic inventions like **million**, **milliard**, etc.

#2 Words which certainly contain the number defining element (D), but more besides. Thus all derived numerals: ordinals, numeral adverbs, distributives etc. **primus**, **bis**, **bini**. - The smallest numbers should no doubt often be considered as not being entirely abstract, particularly when they - like pronouns - are inflected in gender and number. Thus the denominations of 1, 2, 3 and (partly) 4 in the older Indo-European languages: **unus**, -a, -um; **duo**, -ae; **tres**, **tria**; τέτταρες, -α.

#3 Finally all combinations of the simple numbers insofar as these are still clearly recognizable: thus combinations like

33.20 **duo-de-viginti** and compounds like **duo-decim** - in other words the great majority of all denominations of a number.

There remain only relatively very few basic numbers; their total number (within the customary decimal system of counting) would barely exceed ten. This can be e.g. [Dan.] **fem - tolv** [from **five** to **twelve**],
25 **tyve** [**twenty**], **hundrede** [**hundred**].

The syntax of numerals, which - like that of the rest of the abstract classes - has been paid little attention, consists then in the very study of the combinations of these few basic elements.

The role of the numerals in the sentence seems to be most closely
30 analogous to that of the indefinite pronouns (cf. **een** [**one**], **nogen** [**some**], **ingen** [**none**]). They stand, like these latter, as subject, object or attribute: '**Tyve** er en snes' ['**Twenty** is a score']; Han lod **fem** være lige' ['He let **five** be equal', i.e. let two and two be five]; [Eng] 'we are **seven**'. They also stand emphatically: '**Syv** er vi' [lit.
35 '**seven** are we', with the first word in stress position]; or quite alone: '**Fyrre!**' [**forty!**] (e.g. as a statement of a score at cards or tennis).

What is particularly important is their changing role in combinations. The simple numbers can here - again like pronouns -
40 stand 'adjectivally', as it is called, i.e. appended: '**Ti** mand' ['**ten** men']. ('Substantivally', which is the contrasting term, merely means free-standing: 'De var **ti**' ['they were **ten**']). The combinations can also be of many other types; in **vingt-quatre** '20 + 4' = 24 the relation the two members is thus one thing, in **quatre-vingts** '4 x 20'
45 = 80 quite another; while the first relation is additive, the second is multiplicative, but this difference must be of a syntactic kind.

Addition is expressed by a relation between an object member and a descriptor member; multiplication by a relation between a governing member and its regimen (governed object).

34. **Complex classes.** - These classes, which it would take us too far from our present discussion to treat in detail, - their classification has not even been sufficiently elaborated - do not seem to assume any special position from the syntactic point of view: derived 'verbs' like **rodne** [**redden**; cp. §24.17 above] are treated syntactically like genuine verbs, derived 'substantives' like **gerning** [**action**] or **godhed** [**goodness**] are treated like substantives, derived 'adjectives' like **lykkelig** [**happy**] are treated like genuine adjectives, and so on. It is the morphological structure of these words which is more complex. Their syntactic possibilities are exactly those of the concrete classes - only that in certain cases, because they combine the possibilities of opposing classes, they can seem more suited to occupy a complete clause. Thus in the so-called 'nominal' style - which is frequent in e.g. Tacitus and the French naturalists (the Goncourt brothers, A. Daudet and E. Zola) - we find a large number of verbal-nouns: 'Nulla cultus **jactatio**'; 'Funerum nulla **ambitio**' (Tac.) 'Et quel **serrement** de coeur ... Et quelle étrange **souffrance** ... (Zola).

35. **Interjections** (rRdD). - There remains only one class, the undifferentiated class. This is assumed to be defined by a synthesis of all the logical concepts and therefore contains all abstract, concrete and complex classes at once. By this is meant interjections, the characteristic of which it is to be both copulative (r) and bound

(R), both descriptor (d) and described (D), consequently, a simultaneous expression of relation and thing, frame and content. Each word in this primordial class, from which all other classes may be thought to be hived off by (virtue of) differentiation, is thus a totality where none of the class-defining concepts must be wanting; there is on the other hand only one such totality. From this it follows that we cannot consider as genuine interjections:

#1 Words from other, therefore more special word classes: substantives like **Salut!**, adjectives like **Bon!**, verbal forms like **Tiens!**, adverbs like **Bien!** (These words have not lost, as is said, their actual or original meaning at all; they are simply used as sentences.)

#2 Combinations of a number of words of which one from time to time is a genuine interjection: '**fi donc!**'; '**ma foi!**'; '**par-di!** (Such combinations are said to stand as interjections or interjectionally; but what is meant by this is simply that they - analogously to a frequent use of the primary interjections - stand as whole members.)

There remain words of the type '**Oh!**', '**Ah!**', '**Fi!**' (primitive expressions of emotion (and also of the types like '**Bums!**' ['**Bang!**'], '**Tøf!**' ['**Puff!**'], **Hallo!**, **Pst!** (which each in their own way exploit the possibilities inherent in the definition of the class by virtue of inner accentuation). Words of reply like **ja** [yes] and **nej** [no] may also be considered as belonging to the interjections: they constitute the most abstract and most grammatical words of the class.

The question - our constant question, put here for the last time - is now whether genuine interjections necessarily always function in a single manner. It is clear that by virtue of their heavy nature, they

are in themselves to a higher degree suited to constitute the entire sentence than any other words. And it is undeniably in this function
 35.35 that they are most frequently encountered - which has given rise to the designation 'interjectional use' and to the establishment of the secondary interjections. It must not be forgotten, however, that they by no means exclude collaboration with other members in the same sentence: 'Fi donc!'; 'Av for pokker!' ['Oh damn it!'], that they may
 40 quite well stand as subject and object: 'Han sagde av' ['He said "oh!"]'; 'Av var alt, hvad han sagde' ["Oh" was all he said']; and that as submembers they are used both 'materialiter': 'et bums' ['a bang'] and occur in compounds: 'et fy-råb' ['a cry of "shame!", ugh!'], 'et afskeds-hurra' ['a farewell hurrah']. As far as words of
 45 reply in particular are concerned, they can be used, for example, in Danish as bridging particles, i.e. as introductory elements of a sentence or member: 'Ja vist!' ['certainly', lit. 'yes certainly']; 'Stort, ja vældigt' ['Large, indeed enormous'; lit. 'large, yes enormous'].

50 Even this, the apparently most 'syntactic' class - word and sentence seem here to coincide - appears thus, like all the other classes, to have a single form, i.e. inner logical structure, but a number of uses in the sentence.

36. **Inflexion.** - If it were correct, as is now frequently claimed or at least presupposed, that morphology seen from the inside is syntax, then not only word classes, but also inflexional forms would have to be defined according to their function in the sentence.

5 As has already been observed (§12, #4), it will rapidly appear in

the case of most inflexional forms quite impossible to give any syntactic definition to them; it has never even occurred to anyone to connect the feminine or the plural, the future or the superlative, for example, with any special relation in the period or the sentence, member or submember. It is only case (and diathesis) on the one hand, and the moods on the other, of which any such thing might be asserted with any degree of likelihood.

36.10 37. **Case and diathesis.** - It seems clear that 'nominal forms' such as nominative and accusative, and verbal forms such as active and passive belong together and form a class of their own in contrast to all the other inflexional forms. They seem to express general logical relations: by analogy with those relations which are represented by word classes and sentence members, but different from the more special nuances from which synonymy is built up and which sometimes become established systematically in a fixed series of forms (mood, aspect and tense; degree of comparison; gender).

10 Now here by case and diathesis we must naturally understand real formal categories, that is, not merely expressions which in a certain context seem equivalent or more or less analogous to these categories.

#1 A single form cannot thus now be accepted as one case or diathesis respectively, now as another. Forms like **mig** or **ham** (cf. English **me**, **him**) cannot - as MIKKELSEN and SONNENSCHNEIN for example have thought - be considered accusative in sentences like 'Hun hader **mig/ham**' ['She hates **me/him**'], but dative on the other hand in: 'Han gave **mig/ham** prisen' ['He gave **me/him** the prize'].* It is likewise inadmissible to consider the participle **givet** (Eng. **given**, Fr. **donné**),

37.20 as active in the combination **have givet** [(to) **have given**], but as passive in the combination **være/blive givet** [(to) **be given**]. The fact is that forms like **givet** in Danish and the corresponding participles in a number of modern European languages are neutral in relation to the active-passive contrast and that non-nominative [oblique] forms
 25 like **mig** (Eng. **me**, Fr. **me**) are neutral with respect to the accusative-dative contrast. (The unquestionable difference which manifests itself in the different combinations here is of a syntactic nature, then, not of a morphological one.)

#2 A combination here called periphrasis or circumlocution should
 30 not be considered a genuine form at all. Combinations with prepositions are thus not case forms, and combinations with auxiliary verbs are not diatheses. It is not theoretically justifiable and scarcely practical either, i.e. pedagogically useful, to decline French substantives in case paradigms thus:

35 Nom., Acc. **l'homme**
 Dat. **à l'homme**
 Gen. **de l'homme**

for instance only recently in DAMOURETTE & PICHON although with different, newly coined names.

40 And it is just as unfortunate to construe as passive the Latin periphrastic form **amatum esse** and the corresponding turns turns of phrase in modern languages (Fr. **être aimé**, Eng. **be loved**, Ger. **geliebt werden**, Dan. **blive elsket**).

When we already find periphrastic forms cited alongside simple
 45 ones in Latin grammar and then in the grammars of modern languages on the model of the former - thus too for example tense forms in great

number - this is owing to a slavish filling in of a certain traditional schema with approximate equivalents and to a misunderstanding of the grammarian's duty not to halt his analysis until the smallest
 37.50 indissoluble elements are reached.

The question is now whether genuine case forms (such as Latin **dominus, -um, -i**) and genuine examples of diathesis (such as Greek τιθέναι, τίθεσθαι) are bound to a single syntactic construction and consequently admit of or even demand a conceptual definition derived
 55 therefrom.

As far as case is concerned, this is very far from the actual state of affairs. A nominative can in fact be now subject, now attribute: **Homo homini lupus** - not to mention the anacoluthic or absolute usage, i.e. usage outside a particular sentential context.
 60 The accusative can be an object, or, for example, an indication of direction: 'Carpe **diem**'; 'Romam/**domum** ire'; cf. οἶκον ἐλεύσεται (Homer). The genitive stands now as member, now as submember: 'Oblitus sum **mei**' (Terence); '**Ciceronis** domus'. A partitive can stand now as subject, now as object and in even more ways: thus for example
 65 in Finnish and Estonian (cf. SETÄLÄ, SAARESTE). From which it evidently follows that the case system in a given language must be defined without (direct, at least) reference to sentential functions.

And as far as diatheses or **genera verbi** are concerned, i.e. the opposition of active, passive and middle voice (as in Greek) or of
 70 active and medio-passive (as in Latin and the Scandinavian languages), it is quite impossible to derive the definition of these forms from their role in the sentence. The fact is that contrasting forms within this category are used with the same construction, with the object for

example: τιθέναι (active) and τίθεσθαι νόμους (middle): 'to give
 37.75 laws (for others and for oneself, respectively)'; Lat. **auguro** and
auguror aliquid, 'to predict (augur) something'; Danish **minde een om**
noget [to remind someone of something] and **mindes noget** [to remember
 something].

It certainly cannot be denied that there is a certain affinity
 80 between active and object and also between accusative and object, that
 active and accusative thus stand in a certain inner relationship; but
 this relationship between the morphological and syntactic concepts is
 necessarily and unequivocally not evident.

Case and diathesis are thus formal concepts which - contrary to
 85 the plural of inflexional forms - are of such a nature, or more
 accurately: of such a logical (as against symbolic) nature that they
 can be placed in relationship with syntactic operations. However,
 this relation seems definitely not to be of such a direct kind that it
 permits firm inferences from member to form, and so from syntax to
 90 morphology.

38. **Moods.** - The attempt has been made, as we have mentioned, to
 establish a close relation between the verbal forms called **modi** or
 moods and the most important sentence types.

(We cannot here consider as moods infinitive or participle, which
 5 - like the finite verb - are categories directly subordinate to the
 verb, while the moods in the proper sense are only modifications -
 analogous to aspect and tense - (especially) of the finite verb; nor,
 of course, any possible periphrastic forms with so-called auxiliary
 verbs + infinitive: with **skulle** [approx. **shall/will/should**] for the

38.10 imperative, and **skulle**, **kunne** [can] or **mätte** [must] for subjunctive and optative.)

According to [MAIER'S] theory (§13, #4), the indicative should stand in permanent relation to declarative sentences, and the other moods to various 'desiderative sentences': optative to sentences
15 expressing wishes, subjunctive to volitional sentences, and imperative to commands.

Quite apart from the criticisms which could be levelled at this more psychological than logical sentence classification, it must be noted here that: the optative (in Greek) does not only express wishes
20 but also (with ἄν) possibility. Its name is therefore not exhaustively definitive and should not form the basis of conclusions. The subjunctive denotes doubt just as much as volition; and only when we have succeeded in incorporating both these latter will we have found the real concept of this form. And even the imperative is not neces-
25 sarily bound to direct command proper: thus in Greek we frequently find in subordinate clauses the form: οἶσθ' ὅ ποιήσοις 'You (sg.) know what to do, what you are to do' (cp. also the imperative in the first part of compounds: **fac-simile**, etc. §24, #3). To this we can add what is perhaps the most decisive point that the indicative is by no means
30 restricted to declarative sentences (if, as is held by H. MAIER, this concept is to stand in opposition to all the others). The indicative can, on the contrary, by reason of its neutral character (= the bare finite verb) be found in all kinds of sentences, whether they express volition, wish, doubt or orders; this is also so in Modern Danish, for
35 example (where the subjunctive has greatly receded - or perhaps more exactly: has become quite lost).*

All of this might meanwhile point to the fact that types of sentences (of necessity moreover including questions in this regard) no more stand in permanent and necessary relation to mood than for
 38.40 example to tense and aspect.

There has been no successful attempt at all to define any inflexional form in direct dependency relations to syntactic relationships.

39. **Word meanings.** - A final consequence of the doctrine of the syntactic character of morphology would be that the meaning of a word could be syntactic in nature, or that the word as such should be predetermined to a single, special sentential use. In part the
 5 various particles (the so-called 'synsemantica'), in part transitive and intransitive verbs, and in part relative and interrogative pronouns have been construed as being words of this kind.

#1 **'Synsemantica'**.^{*} - Regarding these JAMES HARRIS wrote that while certain words like [Eng] **man, music, sweet** preserve a definite
 10 meaning when subject to sentence analysis, there are others, like **and, the, with,** which - when isolated - upon immediate consideration ([Eng] 'immediately') lose their meaning. Yet HARRIS adds prudently: 'Not that these latter have no meaning at all, but in practice they never have any except combinatorially ([Eng] 'when in **company,** or
 15 **associated'**). This theory, taken up in our own times by the philosopher of language ANTON MARTY^{*} and his pupil OTTO FUNKE, is at the same time - as recognized by SVANBERG (1930) - quite open to criticism. It is true that the meaning, or rather more correctly: shade of meaning of a word, is determined by the context in which it

39.20 occurs in the individual instance, and that this holds true to an even
 greater degree, the more abstract the word is (we may bear in mind
 what was said above about Fr. **de** and **que**). It also holds true in
 especially high degree of prepositions, auxiliary verbs and other
 particles (the so-called **mots accessoires** or **mots-utis** - designations
 25 which, incidentally, are frequently misused, since there is an
 involuntary tendency here to imagine that such words are adequately
 characterized thereby). But from this it by no means follows that such
 words should not have their own independent and constant definition.
 Now it is in fact possible to define every single one of them since
 30 they are in part assigned to a definite class ([Eng] **with** is a
 preposition, **and** a copulative conjunction, **the** a definite pronoun), in
 part allotted a position within the class on a synonymic basis by
 means of more special definitions. There are only a very few, highly
 abstract words that are not suitable for the last-mentioned kind of
 35 conceptual definition: Fr. **de** is a preposition and nothing else, Fr.
que is the universal conjunction, etc. But even these latter have
 therefore their own morphological value: they are 'autosemantica'.
 There are thus no 'synsemantica' or syntactically defined words at all.

#2 **Transitive and intransitive verbs (words)**. - Since the Middle
 40 Ages it has been traditional to divide verbs into two classes (the
 Jewish grammarian ABRAHAM IBN ESRA seems to have been the pioneer
 here): the intransitives, which simply denote an action concerning the
 subject, and the transitives which require an object. **Løbe** [to run]
 is intransitive, for example, and **slå** [to hit, strike] transitive, as
 45 the latter is regularly construed with an object, the former is not.
 But observation shows that the converse is by no means excluded, but

on the contrary is quite frequent: 'Han løber en fare' [He runs a risk]; 'Han slår' [He strikes, hits]; and that on the whole the same verb is now transitive, now intransitive: 'Han taler' [He speaks, is speaking], 'Han taler flere sprog' [He speaks several languages]; 'Monter lentement' (intr.), cf. 'monter une malle' (trans.). - The same observation can be made moreover for adjectives and prepositions; these, too, are now followed by a regimen, now not: 'Han er rig (på gods)' [He is rich (in goods)]; 'Han er for/mod (planen)' [He is for/against (the plan)].

From this it appears clearly enough that it is not verbs (adjectives, prepositions) as such which are necessarily either transitive or intransitive in consequence of their inherent meaning. It is situation and context, the impulse towards a more or less explicit form of expression that results in an alternating construction: with or without an object. The difference thus does not concern the verb qua verb at all (or adjective qua adjective, preposition qua preposition), but only the so-called sentence verb, i.e. the central or predicative member in the sentence. In other words, the phenomenon can safely be transferred from morphology to syntax.

#3 **Interrogative and relative pronouns (words).** - As is well-known, there can be found in the grammar of numerous languages - at all events, in all languages of Indo-European and analogous types - one category of interrogative pronouns, and a second of relative pronouns. Now interrogative and relative (as here understood) are evidently sentential concepts. It will be assumed, then, that here we have words that are defined syntactically. Now this assumption

presents a difficulty of a quite remarkable kind: the so-called
 39.75 relative pronouns coincide regularly in form with the interrogative -
 and also, moreover, coincide regularly with certain indefinite
 pronouns. This is true of e.g. Danish **hvem/hvad** [**who/what, which**] and
hvilken [**what, which, who**], French **qui** and **quoi** and the corresponding
 80 words in other Germanic and Romance and Indo-European languages in
 general; as concerns the so-called relative **qui/quod** and the so-called
 interrogative **quis/quid** in Latin, they are in part strongly conta-
 minated in their declension, and in part both indefinite as well:
qui-cumque, quis-quis etc. Now on the basis of this close
 relationship between the three pronominal categories the question has
 85 been put as an historical problem (a problem in so-called historical
 syntax) whether the first, the second or the third function was the
 original one from which the remaining two would thus have developed.
 Now it has usually been agreed that the relative function must have
 been secondary because of its connexion with the subordinate clause
 90 (assumed to be lately developed). There remained the choice between
 the interrogative and indefinite function, and some then, with BREAL
 and the Semitic scholar BROCKELMANN, took the interrogative as the
 primary function, others, with MEILLET and the Egyptologists SETHE and
 GARDINER, the indefinite.

95 The problem seems, however, in this form to rest on an untenable
 assumption. We can only speak of an historical development from one
 type to another (interrogative to indefinite or vice-versa) if they
 are, each in itself, constant at a given time - and are thus not to be
 construed as mere variants of a higher type of kind. Now the concepts
 100 relative and interrogative are, as mentioned, purely syntactic

concepts and as such inadequate for defining characteristics of a
 morphological type. In fact there occur no pronouns (or even words)
 at all whose function it is to be exclusively relative or exclusively
 interrogative. Words like *nār* [when] and *hvor* [where] (Latin *quando*,
 39.105 *ubi* and their Romance derivatives) are partly interrogative, partly
 conjunctive, i.e. relative; this is true also of an interrogative
 particle like Latin *an* which is interrogative and disjunctive, thus
 relative (= conjunction). And as far as the pronouns mentioned are
 concerned, they are really all indefinite and there is no reason to
 110 assume that there was any time when they did not belong to this
 morphological category, a subclass (defined RD) of pronouns. Now it is
 just this undefined or indefinite character that permits them to
 function not only as what are usually called indefinites (*quis*,
ali-quis, *quis-quis*; *qui-cumque*), but also as introductory clauses
 115 where the indefiniteness appears either as a point of departure for,
 or as a reference to, external description, that is, precisely what
 are called relative and interrogative clauses respectively. It is
 thus only the context or the construction which makes the relevant
 pronouns now interrogative, now relative; in themselves they are only
 120 indefinite,

40. We have examined the question of whether morphological
 concepts - as has been assumed to a large extent - can be defined by
 way of syntax. And we have found that neither the word as such nor
 the individual word classes, neither case nor diathesis, neither
 5 inflexion nor word meaning can be unequivocally linked to or derived
 from given roles in the sentence.

It has turned out, on the contrary, that all these concepts are of a characteristic, non-syntactic nature, and that they can be defined in part by general logical concepts - through the application of which there emerge word classes and, it would seem, case and diathesis, related to the former - , in part by more special symbolic concepts - which are the basis of the synonymics of inflexions and word meanings.

In spite of definite differences within these morphological concepts - particularly between word classes and cases on the one hand, inflexion and meaning on the other - there has nevertheless appeared a certain monotone quality in the morphological sphere, certain common traits recurring everywhere: these concepts always form a **system**, and these morphological systems can be characterized in turn by certain - often overlooked - peculiarities:

#1 A morphological system constitutes a norm. This means in the first place that it is **constant**, in other words: that it stands fast, with a hallmark of invariability for all users, that is, both for producers (speakers and writers) and reproducers (listeners and readers). No change or tendency to change can have its point of departure in the norm as such.

#2 Next, a morphological system is - likewise by virtue of its character of norm - **superindividual**. This appears with an authority demanding absolute obedience from the individual, from all individuals. Everything spoken and written in a given language must - in order to be understood - keep within certain quite precise limits. These limits to be sure always permit a degree of free play (cf. the concept of range of correctness in phonetics), and this margin of play can be very wide in the case of abstract words and forms. The

language community, however, depends upon all individuals' aiming at
40.35 the same ideal.

#3 Now the system is precisely of a purely ideal or **potential**
nature only. It does not at all require that all individuals realize
a given form (word or meaning) in an identical manner or in one which
is analogous in detail; a dialect may avoid certain parts of a system
40 which another dialect or style particularly favours. And it does not
even require, as we have seen in our discussion of suppletive stems,
that forms of the same word have any external element in common. The
normative constancy of words and forms that all members of the
language community must respect - if they are not to be outcasts in
45 that language community - are then only an inner form, a number of
systems where each individual element is a synthesis of logical and
symbolic concepts.

#4 Finally, a morphological system is distinguished by the fact
that its elements are **convertible**. This means that the relation
50 between a given member A and any other member whatever, B, is always
just the same as the relation between B and A. Thought moves with
equal facility in every direction within the system (which does not
exclude differences in logical level, as we have seen). The indi-
vidual elements, i.e. words or forms or classes, do not consequently
55 appear in one fixed and necessary order; the nominative, for example,
might with equal right be placed first or last in the citation order*
of the cases (RASK, as is well-known, has just assumed the contrary),
and prepositions or interjections can be made the first or the last
word class with just as much or as little justification.

60 One will be able to find these traits, which are characteristic of

morphology, recurring in phonology (as it is nowadays being constituted); here, too, the systems in each given language are constant and superindividual, potential and convertible. Phonemes - like words and forms - are fixed, abstract types, raised above and neutral in relation to all individual and combinatorial realizations, and are ordered in harmonious systems. It is this which justifies our summing up morphology and phonology as the systematic disciplines of grammar.

41. In the examination of the relation of the morphological concepts to the sentence members there has emerged meanwhile not only difference, but also similarity. It cannot indeed be denied that words and forms of a given definition, if not necessarily and constantly, nevertheless frequently and naturally seek certain positions and play definite roles on the linguistic scene. It is the extent and cause of this phenomenon that we shall examine in the following part.

II SYNTAX

Il linguaggio è perpetua creazione *

CROCE

42. If the thesis here advanced (§11, #4) of the autonomy of syntax^{*} is correct, it will follow that no syntactic concept can be defined morphologically, i.e. on the basis of the meaning of words or forms. The syntactic concepts, or, as we have called them above, the
5 concepts of the logical rhythm, whose relation to morphology must thus be examined, are the following: #1 period #2 sentence #3 member #4 compound.

43. The independence of syntax has meanwhile been just as far from being generally acknowledged as that of morphology. This is even a consequence of the mixing of morphology and syntax that we observed in the last chapter. This mixing - which it is now our task
5 to consider from the syntactic aspect - can be formulated thus:

#1 **Words.**^{*} - The very concept of word is frequently put at the basis by definition of both sentences and members, and also (particularly) of submembers. Thus a sentence is said to consist of words, and many members and submembers and all compounds as well are con-
10 strued simply as words (of one class or the other, possibly in one case form or another), but they are not construed syntactically at all.

#2 **Word classes.** - A word class such as verb has been assumed to be necessary to constitute a sentence or at all events to constitute a definite type of sentence (the so-called verbal sentence, i.e. as against the nominal sentence or clause). Sentence types would thus be characterized by the words of a given class which they contain. - Next, certain members are denoted merely by the name of the word class: the verb, the adverb, or the verbal or adverbial member. And on this analogy certain sentences, particularly the so-called subordinate clauses, are generally denoted as substantival, adjectival or adverbial, obviously on the presupposition that these sentences - like certain members - appear in the role which is characteristic for the relevant word classes. GARDINER employs the word class concepts in an even bolder and even more indefinite way when he calls thought substantival (directed toward things?) and word meaning adjectival (predicating?).

#3 **Forms.** - While the great majority of inflexional forms are too remote from sentential relations for anyone to have been able to conceive the establishment of some reciprocal dependency relationship here, something of the kind has been attempted in part with the moods, in part with case and diathesis. There has been talk of indicative, subjunctive and imperative sentences, of active and passive sentences, and many sentence members - particularly submembers - have been defined, or named at least, simply as case: in scholastic grammar **nominativus verbi** was the name for subject, and 'dative' is still frequently used for indirect object, and by using the term 'genitive' it is often imagined that an adjunct submember has thereby been sufficiently analysed.

#4 **Word meaning.** - It is to OTTO JESPERSEN that we owe an
 43 40 interesting attempt to place word meaning, especially that of nouns,
 at the basis of a definition of sentence members. According to this,
 when we have two nouns (in which category are included proper nouns,
 substantives and adjectives) or pronouns, the more special of them
 (that is, in consequence of the definition, proper nouns and sub-
 45 stantives in particular) will - necessarily and independently of the
 word order - be the subject, while the more general (i.e. adjectives
 in particular) will be predicative (= our attribute).

The views here summarized - with the exception of JESPERSEN'S
 notion of the relation between member and range of meaning - do not
 50 rest on conscious or properly reasoned theories. They are, as is
 easily seen, diametrically opposed to the prevailing exactly contrary
 tendency to define morphological concepts by way of syntax. These
 views may really be merely consequences of a vague traditional ter-
 minology and are testimony to the fact that a number of syntactic
 55 concepts have still not been brought to clear consciousness and
 therefore have not in any way been the object of consistent attempts
 at definition.

44. **The concept of sentence.** - The attempts which have been made
 since antiquity to give a definition of the sentence, and which have
 recently (1931) been conveniently compiled by JOHN RIES*, are many and
 varied. At this point the definitions based on words and word classes
 5 are of primary importance to us.

#1 As early as the classical grammarians (PRISCIAN* and possibly
 DIONYSIOS THRAX* before him) we find the notion that a sentence is a

combination of words; and thus, too, even in our own time in the work
of a logician like BENNO ERDMANN ('Verknüpfung von Worten'), of a
44.10 psychologist like HEINRICH MAIER ('Wort oder Wortkomplex'), or of
grammarians like H. SWEET ([Eng] 'a word or combination of words') or
E. BRATE [Swed] 'ordgrupp' ['group of words'], H. GÜNTERT ('Wort-
fügung') or A.H. GARDINER* ([Eng] 'word or set of words'). - If by this
is meant simply that in a given language a sentence cannot be formed
15 without using the words of that language (just as a syllable cannot be
formed without using the specific sounds chosen by that language),
then all that has been said is a mere banality (which even then, upon
closer inspection, is perhaps not entirely incontrovertible). If on
the other hand, as is evidently the case for many of the authors named
20 (ERDMANN, BRATE, GÜNTERT), emphasis is placed on a **number** of words,
then an important sentence type is thereby arbitrarily excluded, name-
ly the single member sentence (of which, more later). And if the desig-
nation **word** is seriously used as a name for the elements or members of
the sentence, then it is thereby asserted that the sentence can be mor-
25 phologically defined. This, however, is probably a highly debatable
point of view.

Words (in the sense indicated above) cannot in fact, in
consequence of their **potential** character (§40, #3; cf. §39) as such
(that is, in their capacity as words) be elements in the sentence
30 **proper**.

To be sure, words ostensibly enter into a combination or synthe-
sis; but it is this latter and not the words which creates the sen-
tence, and the sentence is not equal to the sum of (individual) words.*

When words enter a context, by so doing they do not remain mere

44.35 words or lexical elements. They are altered by the synthesis; and the
intention of the sentence changes them from dead parts* to living
 members.

#2 Another and more extensive form of morphological definition of
 the sentence consists in the requirement of the occurrence therein of
 40 words of a given type. A psychologist of language like WUNDT* goes fur-
 thest in this direction, who requires both noun and verb as the funda-
 mental sentence members and expressly declares that these word classes
 essentially coincide with the two main sentence members, subject and
 predicate. (Of our Danish writers, KR. MIKKELSEN took an analogous
 45 standpoint but with less consistency by requiring a verb and, 'as a
 rule', a substantive in the sentence.) - In a more moderate - and more
 frequent - form, the theory requires only the verb, especially in
 finite form: thus for example in the work of the German syntax scholar
 FRANZ KERN (1884), who was followed in this by many, in Scandinavia by
 50 E. BRATE (1898). - A related view may be said to be present in the sen-
 tence definition of traditional logic whereby the sentence necessarily
 consists of three members: subject, copula and predicate - where by
 copula, of course, is meant in fact the verbal form [Lat] **est**, 'is'
 (cf. ZIEHEN).

45. These three types of sentence definition all suffer, then,
 from the same weaknesses:

#1 They put a definite sentence type in place of the sentence, a
 supposedly normal or 'logical' type, characterized by the fact that
 5 the thought moves from a nominal subject through a verbal central or
 copulative member to a nominal predicate (or attribute): 'Gud er

evig' ['God is eternal']; or at least moves from a nominal subject to a verbal predicate: 'Gud er' ['God is (exists)']. - Now it is forgotten here that the sentence can be reduced without any discontinuity
 45.10 to a single member, that this does not need to be a verb (or for that matter, a noun either): 'Gud!' ['God!'] 'Væk!' ['Off!, Away!']; 'Ja!' ['Yes!']; 'Av!' ['Ouch!, Ow!'].

#2 These definitions presuppose on the other hand that there are no languages without verbs (or without nouns). Now it is quite true
 15 that these two word classes (which, moreover, are closely linked both reciprocally and vis-à-vis two other concrete classes: pronouns and conjunctions) play an important role in languages of our family and of analogous type, that is, in Indo-European, Semitic and Finno-Ugric, and that in our languages there can seem to be a certain connexion be-
 20 tween subject and noun (ὄνομα) on the one hand, and to an even greater extent between predicate and verb (ῥῆμα) on the other; when in 'The Sophist' PLATO for example already denotes ὄνομα and ῥῆμα as necessary for λόγος, 'the sentence', it was doubtless not entirely clear whether by this was meant the morphological concepts we call word
 25 classes, or the syntactic concepts we call sentence members (the very names in the classical languages for word classes, **partes orationis** and τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου show indeed that the distinction was not drawn). - Now it is, however, a fact, which in this context it is important to emphasize, that there are languages lacking both noun and verb (and in
 30 consequence of this, pronoun and conjunction, too, in our sense). This is true partly of primitive languages,* which - besides interjections - have only the complex classes, consequently, words like verbal-nouns and pronominal-conjunctions, partly of a superior medium

of civilization like Chinese^{*} which - apart from interjections - has
 45 only the abstract classes, and can thus be said for example to split
 the verb into a purely descriptive form, which is defined like our
 genuine adverbs (and therefore has the function of these, of verbs,
 particularly participles, and also of nouns), and a purely relative
 form, which is defined like our prepositions (and therefore has the
 40 function of these, of verbs, particularly finite forms, and of con-
 junctions). - But in such languages - which in spite of their radical
 difference from ours are by no means formless, but quite certainly
a-verbal - there are sentences of one or more members and members of
 all kinds rather as in our own languages. The sentence (and its
 45 members) must therefore be defined independently of any word class
 system (cf. C. ALPHONSO SMITH).

46. **Interjection = Sentence?**. - There is one word class that by
 virtue of its peculiar special position seems to stand in an especial-
 ly close and necessary relation to the sentence: that is the interjec-
 tions. The interjections have been construed, surely rightly, as the
 5 primitive words (both historically and in fact), as the 'ur-class' or
 primaeval class, or the undifferentiated chaos from which all more
 special classes can be thought to be split off, and from which all
 classes can continuously receive new impulses (by the so-called
 'Urschöpfung' or spontaneous regeneration). From this one quite natu-
 10 rally concludes partly that all spontaneously developed languages will
 always contain interjections as a basic or fundamental class, partly
 that sentences whose logical articulation limits itself to a minimum
 (for example through feeble intellectual development or in highly

emotively charged situations) would be able to consist of interjec-
 46.15 tions alone. - It does not follow from this, however, that the inter-
 jections as such are identical with sentences. We have already (§35)
 drawn attention to the fact that interjections are not of a syntactic
 nature in spite of their undifferentiated character and borderline
 position resulting therefrom. Conversely, it ought to be maintained
 20 that the sentence as such (even in its simplest single-member form) is
 not interjectional. It is precisely here in fact, on this borderline,
 where word and sentence (word sentence and sentence word) meet, that a
 dividing line is to be drawn between two points of view: between the
 interjection as **word** (analogous to the noun and verb and as a synthe-
 25 sis of these and other words); and on the other hand the interjection
 as completing a sentence, that is as **member** (and then analogous to sub-
 ject and predicate and synthesising these and all other members). From
 the first or morphological point of view the interjection is consider-
 ed as an element - the heaviest - in a static system; from the second
 30 or syntactic point of view, though, as a total entity in a dynamic
 rhythm. But a rhythmic or dynamic whole of this kind, that is the sin-
 gle member sentence, can only coincide with the interjection from an
 entirely external point of view (purely materially and factually). The
 sentence must - as nearly as it may seem to resemble the interjection,
 35 being a synthesis of all members - nevertheless be defined differently
 in one aspect: the static or systematic view must be replaced by a
 dynamic or rhythmic one. To emphasize one essential feature: a total
 member or a sentence (these two concepts obviously coincide) cannot
 like the 'total word' called the interjection be simply defined as a
 40 sum of **convertible** elements (rRdD = rdDR etc.). For it is inherent in

the nature of the sentence and of all syntactic formations whatever that they form **ordered series**: concepts like succession, order, direction, in other words, play such a role here that the definition for this very reason must take on a different character.

47. **Sentence members** - In order to be able to examine how the individual members in a sentence are related to morphological concepts like words, forms and meanings, we must of necessity firstly lay down the series of members which are at all possible and define them without regard to any morphological aspects. For if certain putative 'members' were in themselves identical to or simply contained or pre-supposed words of definite classes or certain cases or meanings of a special kind, it is clear that the investigation would be doomed in advance to be wrecked on the shoals of obscurity.

10 If we now wish to attempt to define member and sentence (= total member) by as simple means as possible, we must bear in mind two observations which have been alluded to here in several places, but whose full consequences are now worth drawing:

#1 Members have a certain affinity with words - insofar as only words can be members (or members of members). A member is never comprised of less than one word and cannot be made up of a mere inflexional ending, a prefix, suffix or infix. (It is thus quite unjustified when the attempt has on occasion been made to analyse a Latin verbal form like **amo** by making the **-o** ending the subject, on the grounds that it can be said in a certain sense to take the place of the first person pronoun in modern or analytical languages, and the stem **am-** the predicate(!).) - This close relation between members and words, which

places them in clear opposition to sounds (whether the latter are seen from the phonetic or from the phonological point of view), would seem to be only interpretable thus: that both these concepts are **logical** in nature, i.e. defined by the categories or basic concepts which have proved to be the basis of the word class system.

#2 Certain members seem to have a special affinity with words of certain classes (likewise, too, with certain cases and diatheses). Thus there is no ignoring the fact that the predicative central member or predicate must stand in a certain inner relation with the verb or predication-word (where this is present at all), and similarly for example the total member in the case of the interjection.

It would seem then to be quite obvious that we should try to define the series of possible members by means of the very four logical concepts whose total combinations constitute the system of possible word classes. It is only that the point of view must here be altered: from static to dynamic, from systematic to rhythmic. While the word is defined in and of itself, only **potentially** dependent upon the other parts of the system, the member must be defined precisely as a member in a series, on the other members of which it is **in fact** dependent.

48. - The concepts which we must attempt to apply in the general part of syntax, or '**sætningslære**' [syntax; lit. 'theory/doctrine of the sentence'] are the same then which have been made the basis in the present work for the general part of morphology or word class theory, namely r and R, d and D (§21). But while these symbols are convertible in the morphological definitions (Rd = dR = noun), those in the syntactic definitions must be assumed to be non-convertible. They

must in other words, in order to be able to form units which are to enter, each in its own way, into a rhythmic series or whole, enter
 48.10 these units in a definite order. This syntactic series of the four basic concepts would now seem to be the following:

#1 D = **descriptum**: basis or framework for description;

#2 r = **relator**: combination or relation, i.e. attitude to something new or different;

15 #3 d = **descriptor**: descriptive content;

#4 R = **relatum**: object or result.

A sentence or any thought-articulation whatever takes its course, in other words, in its simplest form in one given way. Attention is focused firstly on a topic (D:), which by virtue of its undescribed
 20 character calls for description. We posit - in order to fulfil this requirement - a relation (r:), which in turn points towards an object. A description (:d) is found which matches the topic. And finally an object (:R) is posited for the relation. - Here therefore D: and d: are descriptive or subjective members, r: and R: relative or objective
 25 members. D: and r: can be called initial members (whose forward progression can be denoted by a postpositive colon); :d and :R can be called final members (and their retrogressive orientation may be denoted by a prepositive colon).

If we now combine - exactly as in the case of the word classes -
 30 these four concepts in every possible way, we have the following fifteen precisely defined members which - in analogy to the word classes - are divided into four rank classes according to their degree of abstraction or complexity. The simplest members defined by a single element can be called elementary members; the two dimensional ones can

48.35 be called analytic, the three dimensional ones synthetic, and lastly the sole four dimensional or undifferentiated member can be called the total member.

I. Elementary members :

40 D: = descriptive or subjective }
 r: = relative or objective } initial member;

:d = descriptive or subjective }
 :R = relative or objective } final member.

45 II. Analytic members :

Dr: = subjective-objective }
 D:d = purely subjective } initial member;

r:d = objective-subjective (purely active) central member;

50 D:R = subjective-objective (purely passive) peripheral member;

r:R = purely objective }
 :dR = subjective-objective } final member.

III. Synthetic members:

- 48.55 Dr:d = subjective (obj.) initial-central member;
 Dr:R = objective (subj.) initial-peripheral member;
 D:dR = subjective (obj.) peripheral-final member;
 r:dR = objective (subj.) central-final member.

IV. Total member (= sentence):

- 60 Dr:dR= subjective-objective, initial and final, central and
 peripheral member.

Now when it is a case of identifying in real sentences the members thus established in a purely theoretical way it will be practical to start with the analytic members. For they must, in consequence of
 65 their neither high nor low degree of abstraction and their position, which follows from this, between the elementary and the synthetic members, be thought of as being the most frequent members in clearly articulated speech and thought. They are to correspond in logical rank to noun and verb and other classes defined by two elements.

49. **Analytic members.** - Of these six members, three immediately attract special attention, one in each section of the sentence: the purely descriptive or subjective within the first section of the sentence, the purely relative or objective within its last section and
 5 the purely active member, which dominates the central part and links the first and last parts of the sentence. We easily recognize here

subject, object and predicate (= central member), which can thus be defined:

subjectum or subject = D:d
objectum or object* = r:R
praedicatum or predicate = r:d

49.10

The remaining three members now group themselves around these three, which can be considered typical each within its own section. To the subject is attached a member which in consequence of its definition (Dr:) must precede the subject and is then obviously the
 15 **introductory member** for which we have frequently had use (especially in the treatment of the conjunctions, §26). In an analogous, indeed precisely symmetrical manner, there is attached to the object a member which in consequence of its definition (:dR) must follow the object
 20 and thus form the final member of the sentence. It is the descriptive-resultative member which we have called **attribute** or 'complement'.* Finally, the peripheral member (D:R) is attached to both poles of the sentence and also as far as the centre. It must be a member that indicates the fact that a result (:R) enters a frame (D:), that is, to
 25 what extent something takes place. We here propose to call it the member of extent or **extensivum**.

As each of these members is defined by two elements, they - like the corresponding word classes, the concrete word classes - will be able to appear partly in a neutral or undivided form, partly in two
 30 subdivided or special-stress members. The overall summary of analytic or two dimensional members comes then to look like the following:

	#1	Dr: = introductor	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Dr:} = \text{intr. I (descriptive)} \\ \text{Dr:} = \text{intr. II (relative)} \end{array} \right.$
4 9 . 3 5	#2	D:d = subjectum	
	#3	r:d = prædicatum	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{r:d} = \text{præd. I (relative)} \\ \text{r:d} = \text{præd. II (descriptive)} \end{array} \right.$
4 0	#4	D:R = extensivum	
	#5	r:R = objectum	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{r:R} = \text{obj. I (active)} \\ \text{r:R} = \text{obj. II (passive)} \end{array} \right.$
4 5	#6	:dR = attributum	

5 0 The question is now whether these six members of the clearly articulated ('normal' or 'logical') sentence (with all their twelve secondary forms) have a constant and necessary relation to certain words and forms, and therefore, whether each of these syntactical units has its morphological correlate.

50. **Introductor or introductory member (Dr:)** . - This member, which is defined as relative (r:) **terminus a quo** (D:), and so, in the

active mood, a basis from which attention is directed forward towards the following member, must in each sentence in which it occurs necessarily stand immediately at the beginning of the sentence - therefore in front of the subject and hence in front of all other members (at least where the latter are of the same rank or weight). Thus both in independent sentences: '**Men** han løj' ['**But** he lied']; and in sentences standing as members: 'Jeg kommer **hvis/når** jeg kan' ['I ('ll) come **if/when** I can'].

Members of this kind can occur not only in global form, but also in accentuated form: in the latter case the introductory member consists of a first part which stresses the basis or situation and a second part which emphasizes transition or continuation. Thus for example in combinations like **ja så** ... [**Oh, I see; indeed?** = set expression] introducing so-called **eftersætninger** [lit. 'after sentences'; here = main clause following subsidiary clause], or in the kind of 'double conjunctions' which often introduce so-called 'subordinate clauses'; **for at** [in order to], **uden at** [without -ing].

Since a member of this sort has never been recognized in syntax hitherto, there has been no opportunity whatever to discuss its relation to morphological concepts like word classes, for example. In general - whether the member consisted of one or of more words - grammarians have quite simply spoken of conjunctions. Now according to our theory conjunctions are defined precisely by the same two elements as introductory members, namely **descriptum** (D) and **relator** (r); we can call units which are identically defined in this way - without belonging to the same domain - **homologous units** (this in contradistinction to analogous units which belong to the same domain

50.30 and are partially identically defined).

Now as a matter of fact the introductory member is frequently represented in the sentence by conjunctions: copulative conjunctions of the type **som** [as], French **comme**, situative conjunctions of the type **hvis** [if], French **si** or neutral conjunctions like French **que**: 'Som jeg mener ...' ['As I believe ...']; 'Hvis det sker ...' ['If it happens ...']; 'Qu'il écoute!'. However, words of a different kind can play the role of introducer without any difficulty: prepositions like Danish **fra** [from; since], **til** [to; until], **om** [about; if], pronouns like Latin **quod** or German **das** (written **dass**, but identical in fact with **das**), an adjective in the neuter form like Danish **skønt** [although], an adverb like French **plus**, an interjection like our Danish **ja** [indeed ... cp. §35, #2]: 'fra jeg kom til jeg gik' ['from (the time) I came until I went']; 'om det sker eller ej' ['whether it happens or not']; 'Accusatus est quod corrumperet juventutem'; 'Plus ça va, plus il s'amuse'. - Added to this is the fact that the member by no means needs to consist of a single word in the morphological sense: what are construed as conjunctions are in many cases more or less strongly bound combinations: **quam-quam**, **ob-gleich**, **om-end-skønt** [al-though]. Each of these expressions can be analysed into more than one member and word; but from the syntactic point of view they constitute introductory members overall.

If we now consider the more special forms of the introductory member, it appears to be true of both of them that they too employ conjunctions frequently, though not exclusively or obligatorily. The provisional or situational introductory member is often a conjunction, either situative: 'nu da' ['now that'], 'her hvor' ['here where'], or

copulative: '**som om**' ['as if'], '**als ob**', '**comme si**'. But prepositions are also found in this function; '**for/efter/uden at**' ['in order to/after having ... **without** ... -ing'], '**pour/après/sans que**'; or
 50.60 pronouns: '**selv om**' ['even if']; or participles: '**forudsat at**' ['provided that'], '**supposé/pourvu que**'; or adverbs: '**bien que**'. To this may be added the fact that the first part of an introductory member, or (conjunctional idiom phrase) as it is called, can be an entire combination: '**afin/sitôt que**'. - In analogous fashion the
 65 resumptive part of the introductory member is certainly often a conjunction like French **que** or Danish **at** [to], but can on the other hand also be now a preposition: '**som om**', now a pronoun: '**quand même**', and now an adverb: '**ou bien**'.

The introductory member is thus not bound to a single word class
 70 (it would seem that there cannot be any talk here of special forms or meanings of words). And it is just this that accounts for the fact that the false, i.e. compound conjunctions or conjunctional phrases, are of such variable character.

51. **Subject** (D:d). - This, the purely subjective member, is defined as a descriptive (:d) **terminus a quo** (D:), therefore as a member which as a frame is intended to accept a content. In consequence of this definition the member takes a central position within
 5 the first part of the sentence - between the introductory member and the predicative central member. Because of its dual nature (D: + :d) it can occur as partly undivided, partly divided into two special forms: a subject (I) (D:d) emphasizing the frame, and a subject (II) (D:d) emphasizing the content: '**Moi (I) je (II) travaille**'.

51.10 The subject has often been placed in a special relationship with the substantive. The basis of this view is that the substantive is as a matter of fact really privileged to occupy the subject position: from which it follows then: when words of other classes, or combinations (which do not of course belong to any single class) occur as
 15 subject in practice, they only do so as 'representatives' of substantives; this holds true for adjectives and participles, infinitives, pronouns, numerals, adverbs (examples are given above under each class), even whole sentences: 'at han ~~kommer~~, er sikkert' ['It is certain **that he will come**' ('He's bound to come')].

20 This view, which is expressly articulated by the Semitic scholar SCHLESINGER, is an old and ingrained one. It rests upon a fatal error and confusion of two concepts of the object which it ought to be vitally important to keep distinct: the concept of the actual or relative object (R) and the concept of the descriptive object (or object of
 25 description) (D). In the case of the concept of ὑποκείμενον, established by ARISTOTLE, translated as **subjectum**, one thinks first and foremost of the latter, but by no means exclusively; because it is usually placed in close connexion with οὐσία = **essentia** and with the latter's quasi-synonym **substantia**, which most closely corresponds to
 30 the first or proper concept of object. In a consistent theory of word classes these concepts should serve to distinguish proper names, which represent individual or historical objects (R), from numerals, which denote situative or mathematical objects (D) - two abstract classes which naturally have been less easily recognized than the concrete
 35 classes, the pronouns, which are a union of both (RD). Now the distinction is no less important in syntax: the proper concept of

object here represents the sentence's conclusion or **terminus ad quem** (:R); by means of this the two closing members of a sentence are formed: object (r:R) and attribute (:dR). The descriptive concept of
 51.40 object on the other hand constitutes the beginning of the sentence or **terminus a quo** (D:), and by means of this the two initial members of the sentence are defined: introductory member (Dr:) and subject (D:d). - It appears from this that there is a homologous relation between subject (D:d) and substantive (Rd) only with regard to the
 45 concept of content (d); with regard to the concept of object (D, cf. R) they are radically different).

A real homology exists on the other hand between the sentence member subject (D:d) and the word class reflexive (Dd), to which the French personal pronouns, for example, belong. It is precisely the
 50 characteristic feature of the reflexives to point or refer to a base which is given in advance - a base which, if it occurs in the same sentence or clause must quite naturally be its subject: 'Han vasker **sig**' ['He washes **himself**']; 'Il se lave'. Of course, it does not follow from this that the subject should for preference be a reflexive (or a
 55 personal pronoun related to it) - we have just seen that words of many other types occur in this function -; nor by any means, conversely, that reflexives should necessarily stand as subject - we have already seen them standing as objects, governed member, etc.

According to the theory, at the same time, a certain special
 60 affinity should hold between the two special forms of the subject (subj. I = D:d and subj. II = D:d) and the two subordinate forms of the reflexives realized in French (the absolute **moi** = Dd and the conjunct **je/me** = Dd). This would seem to find its confirmation. In

the sentence: 'Moi je travaille' moi is precisely an introductory
 51.65 subject denoting the topic to be discussed, and je a resumptive sub-
 ject which leads on to the predication. - A second confirmation can be
 seen in the fact that French se - which is, of course, not definite in
 case, and regularly enters sentences in the position between subject
 and predicate - in certain cases must not be construed as object, but
 70 as subject, and then obviously as subj. II or postpositive descriptor
 subject: 'Madame se meurt', 'Il s'en va', 'Cela se fait, se dit, se
 peut'. This so-called intransitive or passive use of se (there are
 modern French examples in Kr. SANDFELD)* finds a natural explanation if
 we assume that se does not function here as object (which is wrongly
 75 taken as a point of departure as the word's actual or normal func-
 tion), but as subject II (= D:d). In a combination like se tuer the
 language obviously admits two interpretations: if se here is a (pro-
 tonic) object - a member which is to be defined later - then the
 phrase means (he) 'killed himself', 'committed suicide'. If on the
 80 other hand se is a kind of subject or a postpositive descriptive
 adjunct to the subject, then the expression means 'be killed', 'die'.
 If we - as is usually the case now - always construe se as object,
 then the so-called intransitive or passive use becomes as incompre-
 hensible as it is obvious on the assumption that se is a variant of
 85 the subject; it is in fact the subject, and not the object, that is
 related to concepts like intransitive and passive.

It does not follow from this, however, that the two secondary
 forms of the subject should be bound to use reflexives (in the broader
 sense) exclusively. Double subjects of the type mentioned thus occur
 90 generally, in colloquial Danish for example, when a name denoting

object (proper nouns, substantive etc.) is placed at the beginning of the sentence to be immediately followed by a pronoun: '**Petersen han** mente ...' [(as for) '**Petersen he** thought, was of the opinion ...']. And in interrogative, relative and indefinite relative clauses there

5 1 . 9 5 is found in a number of modern languages a divided subject, since a pronoun as first subject is continued by a second pronoun or a conjunction as second subject: 'Han spurgte **hvad der** var sket' ['He asked **what** (lit. **what that**) had happened']; '**Hvad der** var sket var følgende' ['**What** happened was the following'] '**Hvad der** end var sket'

1 0 0 ['**Whatever** happened']; cf. French **ce qui, quoi que**.

52. **Predicate (r:d)**. - This, the purely active and therefore central member in the sentence, is defined as being simultaneously connector (r:) and descriptor (:d). It forms the heart or nucleus of the sentence by standing as intermediary between the sentence's sub-

5 jective introduction and its objective conclusion. In addition, this member will be able to occur in secondary forms apart from the primary one. If the relative element is stressed, a forward-positioned form of a more copulative kind (pred. I = r:d) is produced; if on the other hand the descriptive element is stressed, a rearward-positioned form

1 0 of a more descriptive kind (pred. II = r:d) is produced.

The concept of predicate thus defined is represented in our languages, at least in clearly articulated prose, by a verb - a fact which has occasioned the confusion criticized above (§24, #3) of the morphological concept of verb or 'udsagnsord' [predicate-word] - with

1 5 the syntactical concept predicate or 'udsagnsled' [predicate-member].



Verb (rd) and predicate (r:d) most certainly have - when we except the grammatical domains to which they belong - the same definition; they are homologues. But they are not therefore identical. Just as verbal forms (including participles and infinitives) can occur in many ways without being a predicate (§24), so too, conversely, can there be predicates which are not verbal. This holds true first and foremost for the many language types which have no category of verb at all in our sense (see §45, #2). Such languages, partly primitive, partly non-primitive ones - or more correctly: the people who speak them - all have sentences, of necessity, and in these sentences they have central members. But this member must, as the verb (and with it also our concrete classes altogether) is lacking, consist of the material provided by the relevant norm: this material will, in primitive languages like the Amerindian languages, be words of a complex nature like the verbal noun; in non-primitive languages like Chinese on the other hand it will be words of the highest possible degree of abstraction, either simple copulatives ('living words')* or simple descriptors ('full words')*. - Now instances of non-verbal predicates occur in our Western languages too; here - in analogy with Chinese which is so instructive generally for linguistic analysis - we must think of merely copulative words like prepositions or of merely descriptive words like adverbs. Precisely these two abstract classes - which can indeed be regarded as components of the verb ($r + d = rd$) - occur in a predicative function. Thus for example in the strongly concentrated sentences which are frequently used in newspaper headlines or telegrams: 'N.N. **med** i slutløbet' ['X **in** final race'], 'N.N. **ikke** verdensmester' ['X. **not** world champion']. French here uses its two

universal copulative particles, the preposition **de** and the conjunction **que**: 'Quelle faute **que** cette démarche!', 'Pauvre **de** moi!'. Cf.

52.45 Spanish: '¡Pobrecitos **de** nosotros!'

As far as the two subordinate forms of the predicate are concerned, the relative or first predicate and the descriptive or second predicate, it is clear that they are homologous to the finite verb (rd) and the participle (rd) respectively. Now it is well-known
50 that we find to a large extent central members consisting of two parts, the first of which consists of a finite verbal form and the second of a participle: 'Jeg **har skrevet** bogen' ['I **have written** the book'], 'Han **er gået** sin vej' ['He **has gone** his way']. These so-called periphrastic forms, as earlier indicated (§24, #1, §37, #2),
55 are not verbal forms in the morphological sense (as they contain both a finite form and a participle, the whole expression cannot belong to any of these categories, and the neutral form, namely the infinitive, is clearly separate from it); they are combinations of two verbal forms, each of which has a right not only to a morphological, but also
60 to a syntactic definition. Morphologically the matter is clear: **har** [has] and **er** [here: has (with verb of motion)] are finite forms (rd), **skrevet** [written] and **gået** [gone] participles (rd). Analogously, or more correctly: homologously to this, a purely syntactic analysis must see in **har** and **er** a predicate I or copulative predicate (r:d),
65 and in **skrevet** and **gået** a predicate II or descriptive predicate (r:d). This, however, should not be taken to mean that the first predicate should necessarily be a finite verbal form, and the second predicate a participle. In both functions the verb form can quite naturally be used which is neutral in relation to the finite verb/participle

52.70 opposition, therefore the infinitive. This form occurs as predicate
 II in the so-called future or modal periphrastic forms: 'Jeg vil
 (eller) skal, må (eller) kan komme' ['I shall (or) will, am to ...,
 must (or) can, may come']. Conversely it occurs as predicate I in
 constructions like: 'Han sagdes at have skrevet, at være kommet' ['He
 75 is said to have written, to have (lit. be) come'].

53. **Extensivum** or **member of extent** (D:R). - This member, which
 can be considered as 'passive' (because it contains the two inactive
 or object-concepts) and as peripheral (because it has links with the
 two outer elements in the sentence), is defined as a dynamic synthesis
 5 of situs (D:) and result (:R). What is expressed by means of this
 member, which is thus in all respects different from the central and
 'active' predicate, is that, or whether, or to what extent, a thing
 (:R) takes place (D:). It is thus a member which, bound to the
 sentence as a whole (and not specially to the predicate), indicates
 10 realization (place, time, frequency) and validity (assertion, doubt,
 denial): 'Han taler her/nu/ofte; nok/neppe [næppe]/ikke' ['He talks
 (is talking) here/now/often; still/hardly/not' (with rearrangement for
 the negative in English: "He is not talking ..., does not ... etc.)].

It is clear that the member thus defined coincides to a large
 15 extent with what are usually called adverbs (although this, the
 vaguest of all word class concepts, covers a good deal more) or
 adverbial members or words in adverbial function. In this regard,
 however, it is to be observed that:

#1 We must here except members which - although they are also
 20 called adverbial members - either stand in the sentence in a

completely different way, e.g. as interrogative or relative introductory members: '**Hvor/når/hvorledes** skete det?' ['**Where/when/how** did it happen?']; '**Hvor, når, og hvorledes** det end var sket ...' ['**Wherever/whenever/however** it happened ...']; or stand as more special determiners of another member: 'Han arbejdede **strengt**' ['He works **hard**']; 'Han blev **meget** vred' ['He got **very** angry']'

#2 On the other hand we must not only include genuine adverbs as functioning in this role, but also words of several other types.

If we allow ourselves to be guided by the homology, pronouns (RD) should have certain affinity with the member of extent (D:R). Even if pronouns - at least in our Western languages - do not occur in this way particularly frequently, it is nevertheless clear that many of the 'adverbs' used (i.e. situative conjunctions) are close to pronouns, especially the indefinite ones: words like **her** [**here**] and **der** [**there**], **hvor** [**where**] and **når** [**when**] have - as WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT has observed - a close relation in many languages to pronouns. Negations too, which play an important role in the extensive function, often have a close relation to indefinite pronouns; we only need to recall French **aucun** or English **any** or Latin **non** (from **ne-oinom**, 'not one'), English **not** (<**naught** 'nothing') or our Danish **ikke** (originally neuter form of **ingen** [**no one**]). And from this it follows once more that the negative has a certain affinity to the member of extent.

The words used as members of extent are generally of a number of mutually quite different classes:

A. Genuine adverbs (d): **ikke**, Lat. **non**, Fr. **ne**: 'Je **ne** peux'; **vel** [**well**; other senses like Ger. **wohl**], **nok** [**enough**], Fr. **bien**:

'C'est **bien** moi'.

B. Situatives (rD): **her, der**, Lat. **hic, ibi**, Fr. **ici, là**: 'venez **ici**'.

53.60 C. Derived adverbs (rdR): Lat. **feliciter**; Fr. **vraiment, heureusement**: 'c'est **vraiment** dommage', 'Il travaille **heureusement**' ('happily').

D. Combinations (without word class definition): Fr. **longtemps, bientôt, sans doute, peut-être**.

65 If the member of extent - like the other analytic members - is to be subdivided, the first half of the member or *extensivum* (I) (= D:R) must emphasize the frame or environment and belong to the first or subjective part of the sentence, while the second half of the member or *extensivum* (II) (= D:R) must stress thing or result and belong to the
70 last or objective part of the sentence. This splitting of the peripheral member seems to be realized in sentences like: 'Før var han på landet, nu bor han i byen' ['Previously (before) he was in the country, now he lives in town']. Here the forward-positioned member (which here forms the first sentence member - without thereby being
75 the introductory member or subject) indicates the circumstances, the sphere [of action], the **situation** - in this case a period - in which the whole takes place. The rearward-positioned member on the other hand (which here forms the final sentence member - without thereby being either attribute or object) indicates the form - in this case,
80 local - in which something is **realized**. It is certainly not accidental here that situatives like **før** and **nu** enter the first or situative member and that substantives enter the second or resultative member.

- It is easy to show, however, that these members are not in and of themselves bound to these classes. Sentences like 'I **morgen** kan jeg **udmærket**, **senere** kan jeg **neppe** [næppe]' ['**Tomorrow** I can (do it) **perfectly well**, **later** I can **hardly** (do it)'] show quite different words employed in the two functions of extent.

54. **Object** (r:R). - This, the purely relative or objective member, is defined as a relative (:r) **terminus ad quem** (:R) or as the object of a relation. It thus - as a close counterpart of the subject - forms the dominating part of the latter half of the sentence and in consequence finds its place between the predicate on the one hand and the attribute (if one is present) on the other. The object, by virtue of its bipartite definition, should be able to occur in three forms: an actual or neutral object, an object (I) (r:R) emphasizing relation or aspect, and an object (II) (r:R) emphasizing object or result.

If any word class were to have some specially close kinship to the object member, it would have to be the possessives, which are homologously defined (rR). Now a kinship relation of this kind seems - as MISTELI has observed - to be perceptible in several languages; the so-called objective conjugation, in which the object is absorbed, as it were, in the verbal inflexion by means of suffixation, seems in Hungarian for example to stand in close connexion to possessive suffixes.

However, words of many types can play the role of sentence object, as is well-known; first and foremost, quite naturally, words which in themselves denote an object, - so, proper nouns and nouns, particularly substantives, and pronouns, particularly definite pronouns. But we

do find adjectives and indefinite pronouns as well: 'Han har **åbent**'
 ['He is **open**' lit. 'has **open(ed)**']; 'Jeg kender **ingen**' ['I know **no**
one']. We can indeed find verbs, especially infinitives, and even
 54.25 prepositions and interjections as object: 'J'aime **voyager**'; 'Hun
 vilde **med**' ['She wanted to come' (with us etc), lit. 'she wanted **with**'];
 'Han sagde **ja**' ['He said **yes**']. To this can be added, finally, com-
 binations of numerous kinds, for example members which themselves
 contain several members, **inter alia** by virtue of being clauses: 'Han
 30 erfarede **kongens død/ at kongen var død**' ['He learned (of) **the king's**
death/ that the king was dead'].

The two accentuated forms of the object, of which the first or
 forward-positioned form is to be a **relator** object, the second or
 rearward-positioned object a **relatum** object, obviously correspond to
 35 what are usually called indirect and direct objects or [in our native
 terms] **hensynsled** [lit. 'consideration-, respect-, regard-member'] and
 (proper) **genstandsled** [lit. 'object-, thing-member'] : 'Han gav **ham**
prisen' ['He gave **him the prize**']; 'Jeg betalte **opvarteren regningen**'
 ['I paid **the waiter the bill**']; [Eng.] 'He struck **him a blow**'. In
 40 these sentences the latter object is the real one in the sense that,
 of the two members of the definition, it emphasizes the second, namely
 the object concept; it denotes, then, the object directly touched,
 affected or effected by the relation of the predicate. The first
 object, on the other hand, is of a more indirect nature since it
 45 denotes an object which the predication takes into consideration or
 pays regard to only in passing, as it were. - It is worth noting here
 that where there is only one object present, it is necessarily
 neutral, that is neither object (I) nor object (II) (because they are

complementary objects): 'Jeg betalte **regningen**' ['I paid **the bill**'];
 54.50 'Jeg betalte **tjeneren**' ['I paid **the waiter**']. Here we must not
 transfer the analysis from the more complex sentence to the less
 complex (this is a golden rule in general). - And naturally we should
 speak of neither dative nor accusative - as is often done - when
 analysing the Danish and English sentences quoted; we can only speak
 55 of syntactic differences here, not of different cases.

A special discussion of the relation of the subdivided objects to
 word classes is doubtless unnecessary. The same free relation is
 obviously predominant here as in the case of the neutral object member.

55. **Attribute**^{*} (:dR). - This member, which is defined as a
 descriptive (:d) **terminus ad quem** (:R), that is as a description or a
 content advanced as object or result, must of necessity be the final
 member in every sentence in which it occurs, that is, must come after
 5 the object and all other members (of the same analytic kind): 'Han
 blev **glad**' ['He became **happy**']; 'Hun gjorde ham **glad**' ['She made him
happy']; 'Jeg slog min hånd **til blods**' ['I struck, bumped my hand
until it bled']; 'Il fut **de mon avis**'.

This member - like the other five analytic members - will not only
 10 occur in the proper or neutral form, but also in two divided subordi-
 nate forms. The first member or attribute (I) (:dR) would then
 emphasize the descriptor or content aspect, the second or attribute
 (II) (:dR) would emphasize realization or result: 'Han blev **glad** (I)
ved gaven (II)' ['He was **pleased** (I) **by the gift** (II)']; 'Hun gjorde
 15 ham **ked** (I) **af livet** (II)' ['She made him **sick** (I) **of life** (living)
 (II)']; 'Han blev **rød** (I) **i hovedet** (II)' ['He grew, got **red** (I) **in**

the face (II)']; 'Han var gammel (I) i gårde (II)' ['He was an old resident (of the district), lit. 'He was **old (I) on the farm (II)**]. - It is clear that the last or resultative attribute in a certain sense approaches what we have called extensivum (II) or the final position member of extension. They are distinguished, however, by the fact that attribute (II) is a correlate of attribute (I) and is thus closely linked (as a symmetrical correlate) to the final member of the sentence, whereas extensivum (II) corresponds to an extensivum (I) in the first part of the sentence, and the pure member of extent stands in a looser relation to the whole sentence: 'Nu (I) bor han på landet (II)' ['**Now (I) he lives in the country (II)**']; 'Han bor på landet' ['He lives **in the country**']; 'Han faldt i krigen' ['He fell **in the war**']].

As far as the attribute's relation to word classes is concerned, it is clear that the homologous class of nouns (dR) particularly must come into consideration. In fact we usually find partly the neutral nouns, partly substantives and adjectives as attribute: 'Han er Pariser' ['He is a **Parisian**']; 'Gud er ånd' ['God is (a) **spirit**']; 'Verden er stor' ['The world is **large**']. As attribute (I) we find adjectives especially, and substantives, as mentioned, often occur in attribute (II) (usually introduced by a particle: 'Han er rød (I) i hovedet (II)' ['He is **red (I) in the face (II)**']; 'Han er stor (I) som filosof (II)' ['He is **great (I) as a philosopher (II)**']). But otherwise it already appears from the examples given here and earlier under the individual word classes that a number of other possibilities are not excluded. Thus we quite naturally find descriptive words, even if they do not in themselves contain an object concept, thus

adverbs, participles and reflexives: 'Elle est **bien**'; 'Il est **doué**';
 55.45 'C'est **moi**'. On the other hand we do find precisely object words,
 even if they do not contain a descriptor element, e.g. proper nouns,
 pronouns and possessives: 'C'est **Pierre**'; 'C'est **tout**'; 'Je le
 croyais **mien**'. In this function we finally find words which, like
 numerals and prepositions, do not present even some partial homology:
 50 [Eng.] 'We are **seven**'; 'Er du **med?**' ['Are you **with me?**' (Do you
 understand?)]. That the member cannot be defined in terms of words
 appears even more clearly from the fact that it can consist of the
 most disparate combinations: 'La famille est **à table**; Soyez **sur vos**
gardes'; 'La statue est **de Rodin**' (examples incorrectly construed by
 55 BRUNOT as 'complements' - an extremely vague concept in French
 grammar! - of non-attributive character).

56. **Non-analytic members.** - Now the six classes standing at the
 same logical level defined here above, together with their twelve sub-
 classes, which being defined by the same elements are closely related
 (even if a shade more complex because of the extra factor of empha-
 5 sis), obviously do not exhaust the total possibilities of sentence mem-
 bers. Observation shows both subjects and objects, for example, of an
 essentially different kind. Of these, some are of a lighter, others
 of a heavier nature.

#1 We find lighter or unstressed objects for example on a large
 10 scale in French (here usually proclitic): 'Il faut **les lui** render';
 and also in Italian (here enclitic as well): 'Bisogna render**glieli**'.
 In analogous fashion light subjects are found now proclitically: 'Il
 est un doux pays'; now enclitically: 'Que s'est-**il** passé?'

#2 We find heavier or stressed subjects now initially, now
 56.15 finally: '**Moi, jaloux!**'; '**Jolis, ses livres!**' Heavier objects (or
 attributes) likewise: '**Oleum perdidisti!**'; '**Jolis, ses livres!**'; '**Moi,
 jaloux!**'

It would now seem that two of the sets of definitions that we
 established deductively above (§48) correspond precisely to these two
 20 'non-normal' types of members. The light members would then be
 defined as elementary or one-dimensional, the heavy ones as synthetic
 or three-dimensional.

57. **Elementary members.** - Each of these is defined by a single
 element and is thus homologous with one of the abstract word classes:

D: = **proclitic subject**; cf. numerals (D);

r: = **proclitic object**; cf. preposition (r);

5 :d = **enclitic subject**; cf. adverb (d);

:R = **enclitic object**; cf. proper noun (R).

What is common to these members is their light or atonic character
 - which is owing to their abstract definition or as it were: slight
 logical mass. They can be construed as split forms of the normal or
 10 analytic members. The subject proper (D:d) can thus be split into a
 proclitic subject (D:) and an enclitic one (:d); the object proper
 (r:R) can be similarly split into a proclitic object (r:) and an en-
 clitic one (:R). This splitting process can be considered as an ex-
 treme application or limiting case of the subdivision of the analytic
 15 members previously examined (§49 et seq.). If thus in subject (I)
 (D:d) the frame concept is thought of as gaining a steadily increasing
 preponderance over the descriptor concept, then the proclitic subject

(D:) emerges as a limiting case; the reverse process would result in the enclitic subject (:d). And an object (I) (which is already forward-positioned would in analogous fashion become a proclitic object (r:), while an object (II) already rearward-positioned would become an enclitic object (:R). The next task is to investigate the relation of these elementary members to word classes.

58. **Proclitic subject (D:).** - This member, defined as a simple frame or topic member, can be construed as a provisional subject or as the first ('passive') part of the real subject. By virtue of this it also becomes closely related to the introductory member and the member of extent, especially to their first or forward-positioned forms (introducer (I) = (Dr:); extensivum (I) = (D:R). In consequence of this definition the member must stand immediately at the beginning of the sentence, but in consequence of its proclitic nature must prop itself up against a following member (predicate, for example). As it is homologous with numerals (D), it will have a certain affinity with pronouns, especially the indefinite ones (RD), and with conjunctions, especially situative ones (rD).

Now in this function it is precisely situatives that we find, for instance, the unstressed Danish **der** [**there**]: '**Der** var engang en konge og en dronning' ['**There** was once a king and a queen ...']; '**Der** kom en soldat marcherende ...' ['(lit.) **There** came a soldier marching ...']. (It should be noted here that in this case we merely have an unstressed use of the same word **der** which grammarians and authors of dictionaries in other contexts call now 'relative pronoun', now 'adverb', which, however, from the overall morphological perspective is a

situative conjunction.) We find moreover, as might also have been expected, abstract pronouns of an indefinite or neutral character: Danish **det**, German **es**, English **it**, French **ce**: '**Det** er en mani hos mig at ...' ['**It**'s a regular mania of mine to ...']. And we find the even
 58.25 more indefinite and neutral French **il**, which is more abstract, and therefore more colloquial as well, than **ce**, and which must doubtless be defined as exclusively denoting the indefinite frame or **situs** (D), which is emphasized by the indefinite pronouns and which [i.e. D] is the sole characteristic feature of the numerals. - To this category
 30 obviously belong the so-called impersonal verbs for example: '**Il** pleut', '**It** rains', '**Es** regnet', '**Det** regner'. They are thus not without a subject (cf. Latin **pluit**), but the subject is of a provisional and indefinite character (and the words used are indefinite and abstract in a manner closely corresponding to this.)

35 A peculiar construction belonging to this category, a construction which likewise - and possibly to an even greater degree - bears witness of high abstraction is the French phrase **il y a** - to which none of the other European languages (not even the Romance ones) have any close correlates. The characteristic feature - to which we will
 40 find parallels only in French - is that the unstressed member, here proclitic, is once again a divided one.

We have thus established that the proclitic subject function can be executed by the exactly homologous word (French **il**), but that this function is by no means bound to it.

59. **Proclitic object** (r:) - This member, which is defined as a simple copulative or relational member, can be construed as a

provisional object or as a first (active) half of a real object member. By this means it also comes to be considered as an anticipatory form of the introductory member (in its second form = (Dr:)) and of the predicate (in its first form = (r:d)). It must in consequence of this definition stand at the end of the first half of the sentence, between the introductory member (or subject) on the one hand, and the predicate on the other, and it must prop itself up against the latter. - As it is homologous with prepositions (r) the member has an affinity with verbs, especially finite verbs (rd), to possessives, especially the conjunct possessives (rR), and finally to conjunctions, especially the copulative conjunctions (rD).

It will be important to examine if several so-called prefixes in polysynthetic languages ought not to be construed as verbal or possessive words in the proclitic object function here defined. In French we find actually conjunctions like this: 'J'en connais'; 'J'y pense'; 'Il y en a' - words which do not of course by functioning in this way earn the right to the name of pronoun, which most grammars bestow upon them (even worse is the name 'pronominal adverbs', since there is nothing at all common to adverbs and pronouns). Besides this partially homologous class we do find non-homologous ones as well - thus for example pronouns and reflexives: 'Tu l'a voulu'; 'Il te connaît'.

Apart from this we find - once again as something which with its logical lightness is characteristic of French - the proclitic object divided into a number of members; the question here is of the well-known but never thoroughly analysed combinations: **me le, te le, se le; le lui, and le leur.**

59.30 Also this, the second of the elementary members, is thus quite variable with regard to the use of morphological material.

60. **Enclitic subject (:d)**. - This member, which is defined as a simple descriptor or content member, can be construed as an appended subject or as the second (active) part of a subject. It then becomes simultaneously related to the predicate (in its second form (r:d)) and
 5 with the attribute (in its first form = (:dR)). The member must in consequence of this definition stand at the beginning of the second half of the sentence between predicate and object (possibly attribute) and propping itself up against the first of these. - As it is homologous to genuine adverbs (d) it has an affinity with adjectives (dR)
 10 and participles (rd) and with the conjunct forms of the reflexives (dD).

It will be of interest here to examine if various so-called suffixes in polysynthetic languages could not be susceptible of explanation as nominal or verbal words in this enclitic and descriptive function.
 15 The conjunct reflexives, which are indeed to be found in French, in any case play a major role as appended subjects: 'Puis-je entrer?'; 'Veux-tu sortir?'. And the Scandinavian **sik**, **sig** which - like French **se** - are usually construed as an object ('Han slår **sig**' ['He hurts **himself**'] apparently must have functioned in older Nordic as an un-
 20 stressed subject closely connected to a preceding predicate. For without this hypothesis the development of the Nordic medio-passive* is scarcely comprehensible. The transition from **elda-s(i)k** [lit. 'age oneself'] to [Dan.] **ældes** [grow old], from **minna-s(i)k** [lit. 'remind oneself'] to [Dan.] **mindes** [remember] (see examples in FALK and TORP)

60.25 presupposes a weakening or overshadowing of the reflexive concept which must have been absorbed into the verb and must have given it its special diathesis. But this means syntactically, it would seem, that it initially developed from an object (real or enclitic) into an enclitic subject; for it is only thus that the diathesis related to
 30 the subject, the medio-passive, can be explained (cf. discussion of French **se tuer**, §51).

Now the reflexives are not privileged in this function. We just as frequently find object words of a different kind, in French, for example, **ce**, **on**, **il**: 'Est-**ce** que...?'; 'Comment peut-**on** être Per-
 35 san?'; 'Faut-**il** céder?' (It is just the great number of such combinations, both in interrogative and other sentences, that makes an essential contribution to the character of modern French.) Of these words, which are more or less pronominal (**ce** = RD; **on** = Rd; **il** = D), there is nothing that - like the conjunct reflexives - emphasizes the
 40 active descriptor factor. This can be seen from the fact that even if the reflexives may seem to be particularly suited to this function, such preferential placement nevertheless confers no exclusivity.

61. **Enclitic object (:R)**. - This member, defined as an object member reduced to its simplest form, can be construed as an appended object or second (passive) half of a complete object member. It will then be able to occur also as an anticipator of the **extensivum** or
 5 member of extent and of the attribute (in their final or resultative forms, = D:R and :dR). The member must in consequence of its definition stand last in the sentence, but in consequence of its elementary and therefore unstressed character must also be leant against a

preceding active member, thus, the predicate. - As it is homologous
 61.10 with proper nouns (R) it has an affinity with, **inter alia**,
 substantives (Rd) and definite pronouns (RD).

Now it is precisely definite pronouns that we find in the function
 of enclitic object: Ital. amo-**la**, vedo-**lo** (cf. **lo** vedo), Span. lleva-
 ron-**la**, Port. chamo-**o**. However, the personal or reflexive words are
 15 used quite analogously: Ital. amo-**ti**, dice-**si**, Span. 'habia mezcla-
 do-**se**' (Cervantes); Port. disse-**me** (cf. **me** disse). And conjunctions
 often play this role: Ital. lasci-**ci**. (The Italian situatives **ci**
 'here' and **vi** 'there' function atonically for the first and second
 pronouns plural, with which they have a special synonymic affinity
 20 (cf. D'OVIDIO); they correspond in origin to French **ici** and **y** and no
 more become pronouns - even in this enclitic object function - than
 French **en** and **y** in analogous functions).

It is thus clear that all the light or elementary members -
 whether they are proclitic (like D: and r:) or enclitic (like :d and
 25 :R), and regardless of whether they are of a subjective character (D:,
 :d) or an objective one (r:, :R), - function relatively independently
 of word classes, even the homologous ones.

62. **Synthetic members.** - We have assumed by a process of inter-
 polation that apart from the elementary or one-dimensional and the
 analytic or two-dimensional members, together with the single four-
 dimensional total member, there must also occur three-dimensional ones,
 5 which could be called synthetic members.

These last members would have to be of a more complex and therefore
 heavier, more massive nature than those previously examined, since

according to definition they ought to be construable as combinations of the latter [viz. one and two-dimensional members]. This third syntactic rank class contains (in accordance with §48) four members:

#1 Dr:d = an (initial subject (D:d), which is also introducer (Dr:) and predicate (r:d);

#2 Dr:R = an (initial) object (r:R), which is also introducer (Dr:) and **extensivum** or member of extent (D:R);

15 #3 D:dR = a (final) subject (D:d), which is also **extensivum** or member of extent (D:R) and attribute (:dR);

#4 r:dR = a (final) object (r:R), which is also predicate (r:d) and attribute (:dR).

There should also occur stressed subordinate forms of these members, exactly as in the case of the homologous complex word-classes: descriptive and relative, active and passive. They would all deserve study, though such a study has been hitherto neglected. They should all be examined with regard to the particular word classes (complex or otherwise) they make use of. Here we shall direct our attention for the time being toward only two types of sentence, both of which seem to contain members of this sort: a subject and an object.

A. Dr:d : r:dR. Example: **Moi, votre fils!** - Here an initial subject stands opposite a final object. But the subject has absorbed a copulative element (r:) and the object a descriptor element (:d). By this means both members have managed to become predicative (r:d). They can then be said to have jointly absorbed a predicate and to have thereby rendered a separate predicate member superfluous.

B. Dr:R : D:dR. Example: **Jolis, ses vers!** - Here - in sharp contrast to sentence type A - an initial object stands opposite a final

2.35 subject. But the object has absorbed a frame element (D:) which has brought it forward, and the subject an object element (:R) which has taken it back. By this means both members have become extensive (D:R) and a separate **extensivum** or member of extent - which is supposed to indicate the reality or validity of the combination of the two explicit
40 members - is rendered superfluous.

63. What is here described are two types of what are usually called **nominal sentences**, i.e. verbless sentences where not only the subject but also the predicate or attribute is represented by a nominal form (there are two inaccuracies ignored here: that the subject need
5 not, of course, be a noun, and that the names predicate and attribute - which are incidentally often quite questionably and arbitrarily defined - are not quite adequate here; a synthetic member is required). Sentences of this kind were common in older Indo-European (examples in A. MEILLET), and are still of frequent occurrence, not least in modern
10 French (cf. KEYL, LOREY, A. LOMBARD).

Now if the customary term 'nominal sentence' were accurate the characteristic feature of this type (or rather: these types) of sentence would be that nouns, not verbs, were used in them to form predicates. And a type of sentence - that is, a type of syntactic formation - would
15 then be defined by morphological means.

This clearly goes against the thesis of the autonomy of syntax and against the purely syntactical definition of these sentences given here. If this definition is in fact correct these syntactical combinations are characterized by the lack of an explicit predicate
20 which **might** possibly have had a verb, the so-called 'main verb'. But

according to the theory - and in the light of what has been hitherto established on other points - there should be nothing that in and of itself can prevent the two explicit members from being non-nominal and - for example - purely verbal.

63.25 A. Dr:d : r:dR = subject (+ r): object (+ d). - This sentence type will often be nominal: **Hospes, hostis; Träume, Schäume**. It must however be immediately observed that the concept nominal here is often amplified in a manner which is unjustified from a morphological point of view; namely, the concept is made to embrace partly words which, 30 like pronouns and participles, are analogous only with nouns ('**Tous condamnés!**'), partly all so-called substantival or substantivized words and phrases whatsoever - a concept which has already (§23) been sufficiently criticized. A sentence like '**alt vel!**' ['**All well!**'], which is exactly the type defined here, contains no nominal element; it is built 35 up from a pronoun as predicative subject and an adverb as predicative attribute. - To exclude verbs from this construction seems then to be quite unnecessary. In sentences like '**Herren gav, Herren tog**' ['**The Lord gave (and) the Lord has taken (away)**' - lit. **took**'] or '**Gud er**' ['**God is**', i.e. exists] there really seems to be no reason for looking 40 at the latter in any other way than we did in the so-called nominal sentences mentioned above, namely as predicate-attribute (that is, with absorbed object or attribute). Conversely the first member, the predicative subject, can also without difficulty be a verb - thus for example quite generally in the case of an imperative: '**Carpe diem!**', 45 and in the classical languages in the indicative as well: '**Ano patriam**'. What we have here is obviously an introductory predicative member (with absorbed subject).

B. Dr:R : D:dR = object (+ D): subject (+ R). - This type too will often be verbless and to that extent 'nominal': **Jolis, ses livres; Salva res** (Plautus). And here too, however, the necessity has been felt to amplify the concept noun in an improper way, *inter alia* so as to comprise proper nouns and participles: 'Amicus **Plato**'; 'Beati **possidentes**'; 'Charmant le prince'. By the term 'nominal' one is here, as above, obviously led to think merely of a formation (whether this is morphological or syntactic is hardly made clear) in which the object concept plays a role. Now from the syntactic point of view this is just the case to a great extent for this type of sentence where both members contain both the relative as well as the descriptive object concept (D+ R). But this is no justification for excluding verbs from such a construction. Sentences like '**Oleum perdidisti**' or '**Punctum tetigisti**' which begin with an emphatic forward-positioned object, obviously end with a member which has absorbed a free subject - just as with our type B. And the question arises whether sentences like '**Fiat lux**', '**Viennent les rhumatismes**' should not be considered as belonging here too. The second member here is a resultative subject (D:d + :R), and the first member, which is emphatically forward-positioned (D:), seems - in its capacity of intransitive - to have absorbed an object (r:R).

The assumption that verbs should be able to appear - and in a number of different functions at that - in 'nominal' sentences must naturally appear paradoxical. But if we already concede the right of participles to appear in them ('**Beati possidentes**' etc.), it is really impossible, if we wish to be consistent, to exclude infinitives and finite forms.

3.75 If this is correct, then the synthetic members are to an even greater extent than the analytic (and the elementary) ones independent of morphological categories. This is what one must really expect as well, since after all each synthetic member contains according to the definition three analytic or three elementary members (Dr:d) = Dr: +
 80 D:d + r:d = D: + r: + :d) and thereby presumably the possibilities of these latter for morphological correspondence.

64. **Total member** (Dr:dR). - This member, which is defined as a dynamic synthesis of all logical elements, contains both frame and content, both relation and object; it is in other words as much active as passive in both relative and descriptive aspects. It can then be
 5 construed as simultaneously introducer and attribute, subject and object, predicate and **extensivum** or member of extent. It has absorbed the beginning and the end of the sentence, its middle and its periphery. It is identical with **the sentence itself** - which thus in this way has obtained its definition.

10 Now if a given sentence consists of such a total member it will also only contain one word (as word here must be taken in the strongest morphological sense). Genuine single **member** sentences are single **word** sentences; for if there are a number of words, each of them - however closely they were connected - would have to constitute a member, and
 15 the sentence would most certainly - as always - be a totality, but not a unity in the proper sense. (The question of the member's division into submembers is taken up later: §67.)

The total member is homologous with the interjection, and frequently the total member or single word sentence is precisely an

14.20 interjection: **Fy!** [**ugh!**]; **Av!** [**ouch!**]; **Ja!** [**yes!**]; **Nej!** [**no!**]. But
 just as the interjection, in spite of its total definition, is by no
 means bound to the role of total member (§35), so neither is the total
 member necessarily composed of an interjection. We can even show that
 25 words of every class - consequently, even the abstract ones, which in
 rank are furthest removed from interjections - can appear in this func-
 tion. Words of the complex classes are often found isolated as com-
 mands or exclamations: **Afgang!** [**Departure!** i.e. stand back]; **Elendig!**
 [**wretched!**]. Concrete words are no less frequent: we find nouns like
Brand! [**Fire!**] or **Godt!** [**Good!**, **All right!**]; verbs (particularly im-
 30 peratives in modern languages) like **Gå!** [**Go!**], **Amo. Pluit!**; pronouns
 like **Han!** [**He!** (colloq. **him**)]; conjunctions like **Her!** [**Here !**]; pos-
 sessives like **Min!** [**Mine!**] or reflexives like **Moi!** And as we have
 said, even such abstract words as proper names can appear (especially
 in the vocative, where the case exists): **Peter!**; or numerals: **Fyrre!**
 35 [**Forty!**]; adverbs: **Bien!**; [Eng.] **Well!**; or prepositions: **Auf!**

It is thus clear that words of all kinds - regardless of logical
 rank or quality - can appear here and (as far as various classes are
 concerned) are in fact frequent as total members. Even if interjec-
 tions can be said to have a special inherent predilection for this
 40 role, no word class - with, of course, the proviso: 'if certain con-
 ditions are realized' - can be said to be unsuited or unnatural in this
 position.

65. **Ellipsis.** - Grammarians have often found difficulty in
 recognizing sentences with only one or two members as real sentences.
 Starting with the assumption of the more differentiated sentence as the

sole logical or normal one, they have then either turned the short form
 65.5 into a periphrastic one by means of a copula (**cantat = est cantans**) or
 have attempted to complete it by supplying members that are supposedly
 lacking. They then speak of understanding or omitting all possible
 words or members (examples of the method in KR. MIKKELSEN, for ex-
 ample), or of incomplete sentences or sentence fragments. Thus in
 10 nominal sentences it is supposed that a copula is understood (a nul-
 copula, as CH. BALLY has called it), and in inscriptions a subject is
 supplied as well ('This is ...'). HØFFDING says of this: 'Headings on
 dissertations, chapters or pieces of music, names of books on the title
 page, and captions under pictures are logical predicates: they indi-
 15 cate what the text of the dissertation, the [musical] notes, the book
 or the pictures contain'.

Against this ellipsis hypothesis, widespread in the grammars of
 most countries, a sharp reaction has however asserted itself. The
 syntactician ADOLF TOBLER rightly maintains that this kind of supple-
 20 mentation only succeeds by sleight of hand, that it is always arbi-
 trary, and that it makes no contribution to the elucidation of the
 motive and form of the supposed abridgement. And FERDINAND BRUNOT has
 recently condemned grammatical tradition on this point in strong words:
 'L'éducation grammaticale a vécu jusqu'ici des sous-entendus imagi-
 25 naires'. Yet a clear recognition of the danger contained in the el-
 lipsis concept and of the care needed in its application has still not
 been generally accepted. On this point it may be observed that:

#1 Every sentence ought to be analysed in itself, i.e. in the form
 in which it actually appears - without any reference to whether it
 30 fulfils such a requirement for completeness, a requirement based upon

comparison with certain supposedly logical types (subject : predicate, or subject : copula : attribute - types whose privileged status is based exclusively on the exclusively descriptive character of ancient and mediaeval logic; cf. SCHOLZ).

15.35 #2 The fact that a sentence contains only two members (as for example the so-called nominal sentences) or even only one (like the so-called subjectless sentences or the isolated headings or advertisement signs) is by no means sufficient reason to understand or supply anything whatever, be it words or members. The fact is simply that the
40 members entering this kind of sentence are more complex and therefore more massive or heavier than the 'normal' (i.e. analytic) members; they therefore quite naturally govern a larger part of the sentence and in extreme cases all of it.

#3 According to JOHN RIES we should assume an omission when it
45 really is probable that a more complete form has existed or still exists as a parallel form **or can be imagined as an addition.** - Yet even this apparently more careful point of view only deserves to be maintained with quite considerable reservations. What has previously been said or what could now be also said in a given combination is of
50 no significance in reality. Syntactic analysis has only to do with what is said and meant **here** and **now**, that is, in the single, actual and individual case. From this it follows that the only cases where it is really justifiable to talk of ellipsis (understanding, omission or supplementation of elements) is where it is demonstrably a question of
55 **suspended** sentences, thus such sentences where there is evidence, in the intonation for example, that the speaker for one reason or another (forgetfulness, discretion) either cannot or will not complete the

whole thought. 'I have to go to ...' (incident or place forgotten).
 'So it was ...' (something so dreadful that we avoid using the correct
 55.60 but harsh word). '**Quos ego** ...' (Neptune's incompleting threat to the
 winds, **Aeneid** I, 135). It should be observed, however, that what can
 be **shown** here to be understood is never a particular word or word of a
 particular kind. Nor is it even a single particular member, but quite
 certainly one member or another which by its (e.g. resultative) nature
 65 will be suited to complete the sentence or the member.

66. **Submembers.** - The constructions hitherto treated have all had
 the common feature that they immediately entered into sentences as
 members. These constructions are however not the only ones possible.
 As is well-known, we have besides sentences like '**The rose is red**' (A)
 5 combinations like '**The red rose**' (B), besides '**The dog barks**'* (A), '**a**
barking dog' (B).

Various grammarians have been aware of this important difference
 and have sought to define it. HERMANN PAUL^{*} thus speaks in the latter
 case (B) of a degraded predicate (= attribute) and SHEFFIELD says that
 10 a latent copula is implied here. WUNDT and SÜTTERLIN call A-combi-
 nations (and so sentences) closed and B-combinations open. And JES-
 PERSEN, who dealt with the question at length and in an interesting
 way, distinguishes 'nexus' (A) from 'junction' (B); 'nexus' is charac-
 15 terized as a combination of two thoughts, through which something new
 is communicated (thus a predication) - a combination which is flexible,
 articulated and living, and which can be compared to a process or a
 drama (obviously an analogy of the progression of the thought).
 'Junction' or the combination of primary and secondary members on the

other hand constitutes a more closely bound unity, a joint denomination
 16.20 for a single object (expression for a single concept?); it is stiffer
 and more lifeless, and can be compared to a picture or painting.

The observations of these linguistic researchers would seem to be
 of no small value - apart from the fact that they have succeeded in
 giving the quite satisfactory characteristics of this distinction which
 25 is so very important for the whole of syntax.

When it is said that **the red rose** form contains a predication
 (latently or in weakened form), or in other words: that the compound
 concept presupposes a judgement, an unquestionable likeness between A
 and B combinations is thereby pointed out; but on the other hand this
 30 does not do justice to the equally unquestionable difference between
 the two combinations.

When the 'predicative' combination (A) is called closed or finish-
 ed, and the 'attributive' (B) open or unfinished, a difference is
 thereby suggested which is doubtless often valid, namely between A-
 35 combinations as independent syntactic constructions (total entities of
 an absolute character) and B-combinations as dependent ones. But it is
 forgotten that a B-combination, without any change in its words or in
 their reciprocal relations as members, can become independent; thus we
 can use the following as a complete sentence: **A splendid night! Le**
 40 **rare oiseau** (La Fontaine). Accordingly the difference would seem not
 to lie in the combinations as such (i.e. in their inner structure), but
 in their overall use.

When JESPERSEN says that a nexus expresses two thoughts, a junction
 only one, we have to reply that both kinds of combination presuppose
 45 two members (**rose - red**) which are combined and a unity or totality

which is created by the combination. We then have articulation (synthesis and analysis) in both cases, even if evidently not entirely of the same sort.

The comparison of nexus with a drama or a process, and junction
 36.50 with a picture or painting seems to be based on an intuitive recognition of a reality, but images in and of themselves prove nothing, of course; and even if we are by no means obliged to admit that GARDINER is right in saying that JESPERSEN had to give up here ([Eng.] 'is at a loss')*, a closer analysis would nevertheless seem to be required.

55 Such an analysis can be constructed upon the two following trains of thought:

#1 **Members and submembers.** - We must distinguish between actual members and subordinated or submembers. Members form part of a sentence directly, submembers do so only indirectly since they are defined
 60 as members within members. **Rosen er rød** ['The rose is red'] is a sentence with three members: subject, predicate and attribute. **Den røde rose er visnen** ['The red rose is withered'] is also a sentence with the same three members, but here the subject is divided again, namely into three members whose reciprocal relations must be the object of a new
 65 analysis. - It is the distinction between A and B- combinations thus defined (infelicitously called 'predicative' and 'attributive') that is with greater or less approximation expressed in metaphors like flexible - stiff, living - lifeless, or in images like drama - painting.

#2 **Primary and secondary analysis.** - If the logical concepts
 70 (hitherto) used are sufficiently fundamental - and they have already proved applicable in the definition of word classes and primary sentence members -, they must necessarily find their application here too

(where there is after all no question of any area that is new in principle). It would now seem to be really feasible to undertake an analysis of members (whereby they are thus analysed into secondary members or submembers) by applying the same concepts and methods that were used in the analysis of sentences (into primary members).

It is just a fact that a sentence can occur in another sentence, and that such a member-sentence stands entirely analogous to other members: 'Han erfarede **at kongen var død / kongens død**' ['He learned **that the king was dead / (of) the king's death**']. The two objects which can alternate here are completely homogeneous, and not merely as objects in the sentence but in this case also to some degree in respect of their internal structure. The duality of initial subject - final attribute recurs in each, in broad outline at least. - It is on this that the frequently noted and unquestionable likeness between A and B-combinations is based, and so between the logical articulation of the judgement and of the concept. We have here an indication of a principle that must be sought consistently in the analysis of submembers.

67. **Rank of sentence members.** - A theory of three ranks of words or members has been established by JESPERSEN (originally in **Sprogets Logik**): they are divided into primaries, secondaries and tertiaries, or words of first, second and third rank. In a combination like **Meget varmt vejr** [**Very warm weather**], **vejr** [**weather**] is thus primary (first rank), **varmt** [**warm**] co-ordinate member or secondary (second rank), **meget** [**very**] subordinate member or tertiary (third rank).

Of this theory, which has been discussed by, among others, OTTO FUNKE and LOUIS HJELMSLEV,* it must be observed from the point of view

17.10 represented here:

#1 What we are speaking of here are of course exclusively members (as indicated as well by their Danish names: **over-**, **ad-** and **underled** [approximately **super-**, **co-** and **subordinate** members], not words, as it is less fortunately expressed in **The Philosophy of Grammar**.

15 #2 The members in question are all submembers according to our terminology since they can only indirectly enter into the sentence: they are all, the so-called primary or superordinate member included, members within a totality (namely the whole combination: **meget varmt vejr** [**very warm weather**] which is secondary in character since it
20 enters as a member into the primary totality called the sentence.

#3 The series is by no means exhausted by the three named members; on the contrary, a number can be added of a quite divergent character. We can expand the combination with, for example, a prepositive and a postpositive member: '**det** meget varme vejr i **går**' [**The** very warm
25 weather **this year**'] - without any of the latter having the same character as the so-called tertiaries. And it is also quite dubious to say that [Eng.] **much** in the expression **much good white wine** is designated as the same member, namely co-ordinate member (= secondary), as **good** and **white**.

30 #4 Submembers in the sense defined here, that is, members which together form a member, are not necessarily of different rank: they can all enter the combination on an equal footing, just as a member enters a sentence: **megen god vin** [**much good wine**], **mine tre kære brødre** [**my three dear brothers**].

35 #5 Conversely, submembers can, like members, be of different rank because of their greater or smaller degree of abstraction or, if we

wish to express it from the opposite point of view: their complexity. They can be so massive that they fill the entire member or on the other hand can be so subtle that they stand as pro- or enclitic particle-

57.40 -members.

68. **Classification of submembers.** - Submembers can - like members, and because they are in principle of the same nature - be of variable weight since they can be defined by four, three, two or one of the logical elements.

5 #1 A submember can be **undifferentiated** or four-dimensional (Dr:dR); it is then a total submember which coincides with the member itself - a limiting case of considerable theoretical (and as a matter of fact not exclusively theoretical) interest.

10 #2 Next, it can be synthetic or three-dimensional. It will then be able to appear in four different forms (defined like the synthetic members, §62). Of these it only needs two to form a member, and they will be closely joined by virtue of their compound and closely related nature of mutual dependence.

15 #3 A submember can further be analytic or two-dimensional. It can then occur in six different forms which are defined like the normal members (§49) and fall into a number of mutually related groups. Of these, which are clearly separate from each other, it will take two or three, or possibly more, to form a member.

20 #4 Finally, a submember can be of an elementary or one-dimensional nature. The four possible forms in which it can then appear will in consequence of this definition be unrelated and will be attached to the heavier members because of their [i.e. the submembers'] abstract

character as unstressed pre- or postpositive items.

Of these submembers the first occupies a special position: because
 18.25 of its total or absolute character it coincides, though a submember,
 with the member itself (= the secondary totality). This corresponds
 closely to the fact that the total member, though a member, coincides
 with the sentence (= the primary totality). We can here ignore a
 special investigation which would lead to posing the complex question
 30 of the subdivision (according to stress) of a four-dimensionally
 defined formation.

69. **Compounds.**^{*} - The synthetic submembers would seem, according
 to the description already given (§68, #2), to be what are usually
 called members in compounds. Compounds are indeed, as has been more
 than once observed (§10 **et seq.**), syntactic formations. They should
 5 then especially be items to construe as combinations of submembers each
 in itself of a complex nature, and thus logically intersecting each
 other, and precisely for that reason closely interlinked.

The members able to enter compounds, if we take the latter in the
 way just given, will be the following four:

- 10 A. Dr:d = subjective member, but governing (+ r);
 B. Dr:R = objective member, but introductory (+ D);
 C. D:dR = subjective member, but resultative (+ R);
 D. r:dR = objective member, but predicative (+ d).

Of these members the first (A), which lacks the necessary
 15 concluding element (:R), cannot stand last, and the last (D), which

conversely lacks the necessary introductory element (D:), cannot stand first.

The following combinations are accordingly possible:

9.20	(AB) Dr:d : Dr:R = (Dr:) introductory	}	combination.
	(AC) Dr:d : D:dR = (D:d) subjective		
	(AD) Dr:d : r:dR = (r:d) predicative		
	(BC) Dr:R : D:dR = (D:R) extensive		
	(BD) D:rR : r:dR = (r:R) objective		
	(CD) D:dR : r:dR = (:dR) attributive		

25 Now in fact six types of compounds would seem to correspond to this scheme (the forms of which, not least in polysynthetic languages, naturally deserve a far closer study from this point of view than we have opportunity for here):

(AB): **brise-glace, porte-plume, savoir-vivre;**

30 (AC): **chie-en-lit, marche-pied, trotte-menu, réveil-matin;**

(AD): **bon-homme, avant-coureur, bient-tôt, hor-mis;**

(BC): **non-sens, demi-frère, quasi-délit;**

(BD): **quelqu'un, chac-un; Lat. quis-quis;**

(CD): **cerf-volant, bout-rimé, homme-bête (Michelet), sépulcre-enfer**

35 (Hugo).

If the analysis thus indicated is correct, it follows from this with respect to the relation between compounds and morphology that:

#1 A compound is, as a combination of independent words, of a purely syntactic nature. It is a combination which constitutes a member in the sentence, - a member whose function cannot be derived from the morphological or syntactic nature of its components. **Cerf-volant** most certainly strongly suggests **cerf** and **bon-homme** suggests **homme**, and we are therefore inclined to call these compounds substantives after the ostensibly predominant member; that this view is untenable, however, is demonstrated by formations like **hor-mis**, **réveil-matin**, or **savoir-vivre**, where there can be no question of any 'head-member' [i.e. predominant member] and where the result of the compounds is radically different from the components.

#2 A compound as such cannot be defined morphologically. Its individual parts are words, and only words can constitute these parts (**brise-glace**; **hor-mis**). But the parts are also members, and the result is defined only by the character of these members and by the kind and degree of density of the combination following from that character, and so is defined purely syntactically. The result arising from the combination can stand overall in different ways in the sentence: as subject, object, etc. or within a member: governing or governed, describing or described. This relation too must be defined syntactically. And there is thus never any necessity to consider a compound as a word.

#3 A given member in a compound (A, B, C, D) is not bound to a particular word class. The same kind of word can occur now initially (as A or B), now finally (as C or D) and in general in quite disparate functions. As far as the substantive is concerned we can compare, for example, **glace** in **brise-glace** (obviously in the objective function)

69.65 with **matin** in **réveil-matin** (extensive use) and on the other hand **homme** in **bon-homme** or in **homme-bête** (described) with **bête** in **homme-bête** (descriptive). Conversely, a given member in a particular type of sentence is composed of quite different words; thus for example the first, descriptive member in the type AD is now an adjective (**bon-**70 **-homme**), now an adverb (**bien-tôt**) and now a preposition (**avant-coureur, hor-mis**). - This latter was what our investigation set out to demonstrate.

70. **Analytic submembers.** - Since analytic and synthetic members can occur as members (in a sentence), they can also occur as submembers (within a member). While synthetic formations are complex and therefore intersect one another's logical domain and form interlocking constructions, analytic formations on the other hand are relatively individual and distinct; they therefore form the basis for a clearer and more transparent construction of sentences and members. Submembers of the analytic type are defined analogously to analytic sentence members, and are thus of the following six types (where parentheses around the 10 [symbolic] definition denote submembers):

- I. (Dr:), cf. **intr.:** initial, introductory or **presentative**;
- II. (D:d), cf. **subj.:** initial, demonstrative or **determinative**;
- III. (r:d), cf. **pred.:** central, predicating or **qualificative**;
- IV. (D:R), cf. **ext.:** peripheral, extension determining or **restrictive**;
- 15 V. (r:R), cf. **obj.:** final, object-establishing or **material**;
- VI. (:dR), cf. **attr.:** final, attributing or **distinctive**.

Firstly we shall cite some examples in which these submembers appear to occur: **Sa** (I) **plus large** (IV) **acception** (V). **Mon** (I) **cher** (III) **ami** (V). **Ces** (I) **diverses** (II) **histoires** (V). **Certaines** (II) **branches** (V) **de l'histoire** (V). **Une** (I) **date** (V) **certaine** (VI). **Toutes nos** (II) **connaissances** (V) **historiques** (VI). **Tous les** (II) **phénomènes** (V) **de la nature** (VI). **Des** (II) **écrits** (V) **littéraires** (VI).

Next we can test a characteristic of the individual submembers:

I. **Presentative** = (Dr:). - This, like the introductory element of the sentence, is of a provisionally introductory nature. Like a herald, it simply arouses our attention; it forms the member's prelude. It is a function naturally performed by abstract pronouns, which precisely for this reason become what are called prepositive articles: **Une** (I) **histoire** (V). **Le** (I) **conflit** (V). The French so-called partitive article, which is simply **de**, if necessary combined with the demonstrative, shows moreover that not only pronouns but also prepositions can occur in this position: **Du** (de=I, le=II) **pain**; **De** (II) **grands** (IV) **amis** (V).

II. **Determinative** = (D:d). - This member, like the subject of the sentence, specifies who and what are involved here. It indicates the frame or environment for the following determination and determines in an especially situative or quantitative manner. The member can be compared to the numerator in arithmetic: **Mes** (I) **trois** (II) **enfants** (V); **Ces** (I) **derniers** (II) **temps** (V); **Certaine** (II) **petite** (III) **aventure** (V); **Ces** (I) **diverses** (II) **histoires** (V). The examples show not only numerals occurring in this position, but also adjectives, which are morphologically quite divergent from the former (though this naturally does not turn them into indefinite pronouns).

III. **Qualificative** = (r:d). - This member, like the predicate of

0.45 the sentence, describes while simultaneously forming the transition between the initial and final parts of the syntactic totality. It calls attention to the qualities which can be added **in advance** so to speak (**a priori** or 'analytically') to the true object of the combination: **Mon** (I) **cher** (III) **ami** (V); **Den** (I) **hvide** (III) **sne** (V) [The
50 (I) **white** (III) **snow** (V)]; **Det** (I) **bølgende** (III) **hav** [(V)] [The (I) **billowing** (III) **sea** [(V)].

IV. **Restrictive** = (D:R). - This submember, like the extension

member in the sentence, restricts the domain of reality or validity of the whole member. It delimits by indirectly negating, so that we may
55 quite appropriately quote Spinoza here: 'Omnis determinatio est negatio': **Une** (I) **vraie** (IV) **épopée** (V); **Un** (I) **grand** (IV) **homme** (V); **En** (I) **begavet** (IV) **mand** (V) [A (I) **talented** (IV) **man** (V)]; **En** (I) **ganske anden** (IV) **historie** (V) [A (I) **quite different** (IV) **story** (V), i.e. 'quite another story']. - The examples show pronouns besides
60 adjectives in this function.

V. **Material** = (r:R). - Like the object in the sentence, this

object submember is the relative **terminus ad quem** of the combination, the target of the predication or the point to which both pre- and post-positive adjuncts or epithets seem to be attached. It was this material
65 member that writers of the scholastic period had in mind in the expression '**materialiter**', and that JESPERSEN still considers as the head or super-member in a junction: **Mon** (I) **ami** (V); **Le** (I) **beau** (V); **Son** (I) **oui** (V); **Le** (I) **pour** (V). - The examples show the most disparate words in this so-called substantival function (cf. §23).

0.70 VI. **Distinctive** = (:dR). - This submember, postpositive in relation to the 'head-member', is - just like the attribute at the level of the sentence - a descriptive **terminus ad quem** or expression for the result of the predication. It then denotes a more external and independent description than the prepositive epithet; it adds a last
 75 finishing touch to the picture ('eine nachträgliche Korrektur'): **Un** (I) **homme** (V) **brave** (VI); **Une** (I) **épopée** (V) **vraie**; (VI) **Une** (I) **langue** (V) **une** (VI); **Un** (I) **savant** (V) **de premier ordre** (VI). - As we see, not only adjectives (which are homologous with the function, after all) are used here, but words of a quite different type like **un** and also
 80 compound combinations.

71. **The position of the 'attributive' adjective.** - The definitions here advanced of the analytic submembers can serve toward a more exact specification of, **inter alia**, the characteristic differences which manifest themselves in the function of the adjectives (and of the
 5 so-called adjectival members, for example of the genitives). These, as is well known, can be now postpositive, now prepositive epithets; and as prepositive epithets, they can be now determinative (II), now qualificative (III), and now restrictive (IV).

#1 In a combination like **en viss efterretning** [a certain piece of
 10 **news**] the epithetical adjective can be construed now as synonymous with 'one or other', now with 'sure', 'reliable'. The same word occurs in both cases, and so is not an indefinite pronoun in the first case and an adjective in the second. The meaning of the word must be broad enough for it to be able to contain the two nuances; and the successive
 15 realization of these nuances must depend upon an alternating function

according to context. Now this alternation seems to be precisely of a syntactic nature and depends upon a difference between two kinds of prepositive epithets: the determinative (II) and the restrictive (IV). In the one case the adjective stands determinatively, and **viss** [certain] then signifies simply that we have stopped at a given point in the number of items of news which are at all possible. In the second case, conversely, it occurs restrictively; it then demarcates one class of news items set in contrast with another: the uncertain ones.

#2 In a combination like **den hvide sne** [(the) white snow] what is normally meant is 'sneen der **jo** er hvid' ['(the) snow, which is of course white']; likewise when the poets speak of '**den hvide alabast** [(the) white alabaster], or **den hvide svane** [the white swan] and either do not know or do not remember that there are coloured sorts of alabaster and black swans. But if on the other hand I say **den hvide hest** [the white horse] I mean precisely that horse which (as opposed to others) is white. In the latter case the adjective obviously functions restrictively (IV) just as in **en viss** ('sikker') **efterretning** [a certain ('sure') piece of news]. Conversely, it stands qualificatively (III) in the former case, i.e. so that the relevant quality is viewed as self-evident or susceptible of derivation from analysis from the concept of the object following.

#3 In many cases - in the Romance languages for example - the adjective is used now as a prepositive, now as a postpositive attribute or better: epithet. Thus one says in French **un brave homme** or **un homme brave**, **une vraie épopée** or **une épopée vraie** or in Spanish **el verde prado** besides **el prado verde**; cf. '**Mi nueva casa es una casa vieja, mi antigua casa era una casa nueva**'. GRÖBER has characterized

the prepositive attribute as affective, the postpositive as logical; the Hispanic scholar HANSEN calls the first subjective, the second
 1.45 objective, and BRUNOT says similarly that the one evaluates while the other depicts and describes. R. LENZ provides a more thorough syntactic analysis according to which the prepositive attribute modifies the concept of the substantive (i.e. the object) before the latter has been expressed, while the postpositive is a kind of correction or limitation
 50 of the object's initially more indefinitely represented concept. The latter definition by LENZ agrees closely with our definition of the distinctive submember (:dR): it stands as a relatively independent adjunct which at the last moment before the member is closed off alters the characterization of the set concept in a special direction (- to
 55 call such a member logical, as GRÖBER does, or to designate it as objective, as HANSEN does, does not seem to be any nearer the mark). As far as the prepositive epithet is concerned, on the other hand, a distinction is absolutely necessary; for it can be now determinative (II), now qualificative (III), now restrictive (IV), and these func-
 60 tions, even if two by two they have points of contact, are as a whole so disparate that a common definition is not possible. (Expressions like GRÖBER'S affective, HANSEN'S subjective and BRUNOT'S evaluating obviously applies to the qualificative function and not the other two). Now if we leave the determinative ('pronominal' or 'numerative') func-
 65 tion out of account, the qualificative epithets must be established as one subspecies within the prepositive epithets, i.e. those [the qualificative] which really are self-evident or superfluous because they anticipate a part of the envisaged object's concept, but which for this very reason - by this deliberate pleonasm - can have their stylistic

1.70 justification: 'Le **sage** (III) Socrate'; 'Le **grand** (III) Corneille'
 (Corneille is not being compared here to his less famous brother); 'El
verde (III) prado' (we are not thinking here of the meadow in a green,
 as against some other, state). As a second subspecies of prepositive
 epithets we then have the restrictive, which designate a definite char-
 75 acterized individual as distinct from others: 'Un **brave** (IV) homme' 'Mi
nueva (IV) casa'. - While there is a certain kinship between the deter-
 minative (II) and the qualificative (III) function - they are related
 to each other like subject and predicate in a sentence - and likewise a
 certain analogy between the restrictive (IV) and the distinctive func-
 80 tion (VI) - they both denote a characteristic which is so to speak,
 added from the outside -, the qualificative (III) and the restrictive
 (IV) functions on the other hand are, in spite of their often identical
 position within the member, of a completely disparate nature. And a
 characteristic obtained by analysis of qualificatives ('affective',
 85 'subjective') should not be transferred in this way to restrictives.

72. It is now a matter of examining the relation of the analytic
 submembers here defined to word classes. It already appears from
 sundry observations in the section on morphology, and even more clearly
 in the examples just adduced (§§70-71), that a given word class, adjec-
 5 tives for example (and this holds true for the so-called adjectival
 words, e.g. pronouns and possessives) can occur in a number of mutually
 distinct 'attributive' functions. Conversely, each individual submember
 appears to be constituted not by words of a particular class, but now
 of one kind of word, now of another - and very often of combinations.
 10 Certainly, pronouns are often presentative (I), which in this case are

called articles ('le/un grand homme'); but the exactly corresponding introducer-submember with the infinitive, which in Greek precisely employs the demonstrative, the so-called article (τὸ εἶναι), is in modern languages now a preposition ([Eng] **to** be, **zu** sein, cf. **d'être**), now a conjunction ([Dan] **at** være, cf. '**at** han er' ['**that** he is'], where **at** [**that, to**] is an introductory member). - Numerals and pronouns (**cinq** / **quelques** hommes) are usually found as determinatives (II), though possessives (un **mien** ami, il **mio** fratello) and adjectives (un **certain** homme) are also found in this role. - The qualificative member (III) is quite often constituted by adjectives (the **white** snow), but can be participles for example (the **glittering** diamond) or compound forms (a **slant-eyed** Chinaman). - Restrictives similarly are frequently adjectives (my **new**, my **old** house) but can, as to a great extent in English, be substantives and proper nouns, sometimes in the genitive ([Eng] the **boy** king, **People's** Palace, **London** Bridge, **St. Paul's** Cathedral), where these members, of course, neither are nor become adjectives or adjectival members (cf. §23). - The same holds for the distinctive submember following the postpositive epithet (VI); it is often an adjective (un homme **brave**), but may just as often be a substantive in the genitive, for example (amor **patriae**) or a proper noun (L'Affaire **Dreyfus**) or a whole combination (un savant **de premier ordre**). - As far, finally, as the material or object-submember is concerned, words of any class can in fact be used here, not just substantives and adjectives or related nominals (le **feu**, la **beauté**, l'**embellissement**), not just words which like proper nouns, pronouns or numerals in one sense or another are object-words (un **Napoléon**, le **moi**, un **cinq**), but also verbs (le **savoir**, le **revenant**, cf. un **tolle**), or even particles like conjunctions and

adverbs, prepositions and interjections (le **bien**, des **mais** et des **si**,
 le **pour** et le **contre**, son **oui**). In these kinds of cases one speaks, as
 2.40 is well-known, of substantivization (cf. §23); but what happens is
 simply that all these different words are **quoted** or highlighted by
 being placed in the object position within the member; they function
 'materialiter', that is, as material or objective submembers.

For all these submembers (I - VI) it holds true, as various exam-
 45 ples have shown, that they can be multi-membered without changing their
 character in the slightest, so they can be divided again into sub-
 members and because of this consist of a number of words. (This is,
 indeed, the manner in which a number of modern languages replace geni-
 tives with a combination of preposition and substantive or proper noun:
 50 **patris** and **Romae** by **du père**, **de Rome**). This fact suggests that the
 analysis must not stop at submembers or secondary members, but must be
 continued with tertiary members, etc. - according to the same
 principles, of course. This same fact, viz. that several members and
 consequently several words, usually of different kinds, enter into the
 55 same member is also testimony to the extent that submembers are also
 independent of word classes.

73. **Elementary submembers.** - We have assumed above (§68, #4) that
 submembers just as well as members in their simplest form must be
 defined with the very same logical concepts applied one at a time. They
 should then be purely governing (r:) or governed (:R), purely described
 5 (D:) or descriptive (:d).

Such light or accessory - necessarily proclitic or enclitic -
 submembers may be conceived as occurring in sentences within which

members of this type occur are themselves raised to member status. This kind of transformation can take place, for example, if a sentence with
 '3.10 a verb in the indicative as predicate becomes a governed infinitive. French "Il s'en va" and Italian "Se ne va", for example, contain two proclitic members, the first a subject (D:), the second an object (r:). French "va t'en" and Italian "va-tte-ne" contain analogously two enclitic members, the first subject (:d), the second object (:R). By trans-
 15 position from the finite verb to the infinitive we get in French "Il faut s'en aller", in Italian "Bisogna andar-se-ne". Here there then occur submembers of an elementary type, the French proclitic, the Italian enclitic.

As it is the same types of words that are used proclitically and
 20 enclitically, and so within the member's first and second halves and even in directly opposite functions (D:, cf. :d; r:, cf. :R), it is already clear from this that a given member does not here demand one specific word.

74. **Sentences as members.** - We have seen that a sentence or syntactic totality can be analysed into members according to certain principles, and that these members or secondary totalities can be analysed according to the same principles into submembers, and that
 5 this process can be continued. Sentences and members (and submembers and their members in turn) are thus syntactic constructions of principally the same character; they can be primary, secondary, etc., but all are those totalities which are defined in an identical way (Dr:dR). From this it immediately follows that a sentence can stand not
 10 only independently (that is, as a primary totality), but also as

members (that is, as secondary, tertiary, etc. totalities), and that sentence types must be analysed analogously to members.

An independent sentence or period ('a punctum') will thus be susceptible of construction in the following ways:

- 4.15 I. It can consist of a sentence as total member which therefore fills the entire period: **Pluit. Det regner** [It is raining].
- II. It can be formed from synthetic member-sentences [or clauses], of which two together will generally constitute a period. Such a period can then be constructed into opposite ways:
- 20 A. It can be introduced by a subjective clause stating the basis (Dr:d) and concludes with an objective clause stating the consequence (r:dR): **Kommer du, sa går jeg** [If you come, (then) I'll go].
- B. Or it can conversely begin with an objective clause giving a result (Dr:R) and finishes with a subjective clause stating its condition (D:dR): **Jeg går, hvis du kommer** [I shall go if you come].
- 25

There is here a close analogy with the two types of nominal sentences or clauses (§62) of which one (A) consists of an initial subjective and a final objective member: **Moi, son fils!** and the other (B) of an initial objective and final subjective member: **Jolis, ses livres!**

30

III. Next, a period can be formed by (or, besides other constructions, contain) analytic member-clauses, of which two or more are

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necessary to constitute the whole of the first rank. The individual clause, like the individual member, can then be:

#1 **Introductory** = Dr;: - **Det er derfor, jeg går** [That is why I'm going].

4.40 #2 **Subject** = D:d - **At det ikke går, er klart** [That it won't work is clear].

#3 **Predicate** = r:d - **Når jeg går, så er det, fordi jeg må** [If I'm going, then it is because I have to].

45 #4 **Member of extent** = D:R - **Ikke at jeg skulde være imod** [Not that I'd be against (it)].

#5 **Object** = r:R - **Han fortalte, at det var sket** [He said that it had happened].

#6 **Attribute** = :dR - **Sagen er, at jeg er for træt** [The fact is (that) I'm too tired].

50 IV. Finally, a period can contain lightly stressed clauses which - parenthetically, as it were, or on a postponed level - are inserted in front of or behind the weightier members. They can be of the following kinds:

55 #1 proclitic, introductory = D: - **(Se) derfor var det** [(Look), that was why].

#2 proclitic, governing = r: - **Derfor (sagde han) kom jeg ikke** [Therefore (he said) I'm not coming].

60 #3 enclitic, descriptive = :d - **Det var (s'gu') kedeligt** [It was (a) (lit. damn it, i.e. damned) pity].

#4 enclitic, resultative = :R - Det var derfor (**mente han**) [That was why, (**he thought**)].

75. **Sentences or clauses as submembers.** - That sentences or clauses can be not just members but also submembers probably needs by now no special demonstration. We need merely make a sentence, the members of which are sentences/clauses, a member of a second sentence. This latter
 5 will then become a primary totality, the first sentence will be a member in it and as well a secondary totality, and its members (which are sentences/clauses) will therefore be secondary members or submembers: 'Han sagde at **hvis du kom, rejste han**' ['He said that **if you came he'd go**']. In this period both **hvis du kom** and **rejste han** are
 10 synthetic submembers (within the object) formed as clauses. An important example of descriptive sentence-submembers are the so-called relative clauses. In combinations like **Den der taber** [**He who loses**], **L'homme qui assassina**, [Eng] **The light that failed** the relative clauses stand obviously as a submember of an attributive, or more exactly,
 15 distinctive nature (cf. §70, VI).

76. What are here called sentences or clauses as members (or submembers as the case may be) correspond in great part to what we usually call subordinate clauses. These are classified (e.g. by KR. SANDFELD) thus:

- 5 I. **Substantival**: that which taken as a whole can have the same function in sentences as, and is co-ordinate with, substantives;
 II. **Adjectival**: that which functions like adjectives and is often

co-ordinated with adjectives or adjectival combinations;

III. **Adverbial**: that which corresponds to adverbs or adverbial combinations and can be co-ordinated with them.

6.10

This classification - the shortcomings of which for historical research are, incidentally, emphasized by SANDFELD - presupposes that members can be defined like word classes. Such a definition, however, as we have seen in our investigation of all kinds of members, is not possible. If the clauses concerned are, as it seems, quite simply members (subject, object, predicate, etc.) or submembers (e.g. distinctive epithets), such a purely morphological classification of sentence or clause types is not justified. This introduces an alien element into syntax without necessity.

77. **The concept of subordinate clause.** - The usual contrast established between main and subordinate sentences or clauses seems to be altogether of quite dubious value - at all events, in its customary and inconsistent form (for the history of the concept, see JELLINEK and WUNDT). By subordinate clause one might understand a clause which entered as a member into another, thus what has been called here member-sentence [or member-clause]. Conversely, only the absolutely independent sentence, our primary totality, could then become a main clause. However, as is well known, it is not merely sentences of this kind that are construed as main clauses, but also initial or final clauses of a resultative character to which are attached (either pre- or post-positively) a clause, - therefore a so-called subordinate clause, - which states the assumptions of one or the other kind (place,

time, condition, purpose): Kommer du, **går jeg** [If you come, I'll go].

7.15 **Jeg går** hvis/når du kommer [I'll go if/when you come].

In this kind of combination there is in fact no reason to speak of one part as more important and another as less important, of main and subordinate matters, or therefore in the case of main and subordinate clauses. The two halves of the whole are here quite obviously equally
20 important and necessary. They are complementary members, the first introductory (either subjective or emphatically objective), the second conclusive (either objective or emphatically subjective). Only by their co-operation is formed the first class totality which any independent, or if you will: **main**, sentence [or clause] must be.

78. We have now examined from a number of points of view the question of whether syntactic concepts - as is often held - can be defined by way of morphology. And we believe we can assert that neither the sentence as such nor its types, its members or submembers have been
5 susceptible to definition in unambiguous fashion by means of word classes. Verbs or nouns or words of any other class whatever cannot be said to be characteristic of sentences or members of the one kind or the other. And concepts like substantival, adjectival or adverbial do not merit employment as conceptual definitions of any syntactic
10 constructions.

Nor can **inflectional forms** - case comes quite especially into consideration here - be used at all in syntactic definitions. There is no such member as that called nominative (**nominativus verbi** as used to be said in scholastic grammar for the subject); for the subject does
15 not necessarily stand in the nominative (§37). Nor is the dative any

kind of sentence member - in spite of a still quite widespread terminology; for the indirect object or **hensynsleddet** [**member of regard**, etc.] (r:R) which is in question here cannot stand in the dative in the numerous languages - such as Danish, English or Chinese
 8.20 in their modern forms - which have no dative at all.

It should in consequence appear most surprising if it were possible - as attempted by JESPERSEN (cf. §42, #4) - to put word meaning at the basis for certain parts of syntax. According to this scholar's theory, in sentences with subject and attribute (which would by no means need
 25 to be joined by a copula?) the subject is supposed to be a word of more special meaning, the attribute of more general meaning: **Tom er en skurk** [**Tom is a rogue**]. **Tyven var en kryster** [**The thief was a coward**]. In case of doubt - that is especially sentences with a copula, analogously with comparisons - it should nevertheless be possible to find the
 30 subject according to this rule: **Frøken B. var den smukkeste** [**Miss B. was the prettiest**], cf. **Den smukkeste var Frøken B.** [**The prettiest was Miss B.**] - where the proper noun in both instances, (which have, **qua** proper nouns in consequence of an analogous theory of word classes, a very special meaning) is construed as the subject.

35 This theory merits examination. If it were valid in fact then certain members, and consequently syntactic constructions, would be defined by word meaning, and consequently by morphological concepts, - a situation which conflicts with the principle of the autonomy of syntax which has proved capable of verification in all other respects.

40 Now in the first place it is easy to find counter-examples, i.e. sentences where the subject word is more general than the attribute word: **Dette skal være Paris ved nat i middelalderen** [**This is supposed**

to be **Paris by night in the Middle Ages**]. **Intet** er **tåbeligere** [**Nothing is more foolish**]. **Alt** er **forføngelighed og forgængelighed** [**All is vanity and transience**]. The more or less abstract pronouns which stand here at the head of the sentence and are usually and rightly construed as subjects, are without doubt in themselves, as words therefore, far more general than the final members of the sentences quoted, which can hardly be construed otherwise than as attributes.

50 The matter now, however, seems to be that JESPERSEN with this, the syntactic part of his theory, is not at all aiming at word meaning as such, and so not at the more or less full-bodied complex of logical and symbolic concepts of which according to our analysis every word is constructed. He is, obviously, thinking rather of the immediate nuance the
 55 word assumes in the given situation and context; very general words like **dette** [**this**], **alt** [**everything**], **intet** [**no (adj.)**], **none**] can indeed in the individual instance be tokens for more precise objects. But if word meaning is understood in this way, what we have here is a semantic, not a synonymic phenomenon. And then semantics or the study of the
 60 immediate nuances of meaning does not - like synonymics or the study of the potential or fixed concepts of words - belong to the morphological or systematic disciplines, so that there is no contradiction in putting semantic nuances in connexion with syntactic relations. Conversely, it seems precisely that many variations of meaning (as we have seen **inter**
 65 **alia** in the case of adjectives) can and must be explicable from the standpoint of the varying role in the sentence of the relevant words.

79. While a word always remains identical with itself and therefore has an absolute character, this does not hold true for a member. A

member - which in the simplest instance uses or realises a single word
- is variable in more than one respect:

9.5 #1 **in quality**, i.e. according to its role within a given whole (the member is then defined as a descriptive or relative, as active or passive - and it is upon this that its position within the whole depends).

10 #2 **in level of abstraction**, i.e. according to the number of the defining elements (the member is then heavier or lighter and in consequence plays a more or less independent role within its immediately superordinate whole).

15 #3 **in rank**, i.e. according to hierarchical distance from the absolutely independent sentence or whole of the first rank (the member is then a total member, true member, submember or member of a submember, tc.).

80. The difference thus established between words and members can now be more explicitly formulated and generalized. In spite of all points of difference within the syntactic constructions - differences with regard to the quality, level of abstraction and rank of the sentences and members - there have in fact proved to be certain characteristics which place this entire domain in sharp and clear contrast with morphology. We can summarize these characteristics by saying that the syntactic wholes and the units which enter into them always form a **rhythm** and this rhythm can in turn be characterized by the following
10 fundamental features:

#1 The syntactic rhythm is not of a normative or obligatory character. That is, it is in principle **variable** in relation to a given

norm. It varies from time to time, from place to place. A language can
in other words - even if it preserves its form in all respects - be
80.15 spoken and written with changing syntax. Periods and sentences, mem-
bers and submembers can change in structure and kind. There is here
the possibility for tendencies of a lasting kind to assert themselves
(e.g. in the direction of higher abstraction, whereby analytic con-
structions are therefore preferred to synthetic ones). And here the
20 point of origin can be sought for changes which may possibly finally
come to shake the very norms themselves.

#2 A syntactic rhythm is in other words in the final analysis
individual. It depends on the individual (speaker) whether he wishes
to choose sentences or members of the one or other quality, weight or
25 rank. Everything that is spoken or written in a given language can in
fact only become reality, consequently be realized physically and
intellectually, through single individuals and in individual situa-
tions. And the limits on the syntactic freedom of the individual (of
which, naturally, not all individuals will be aware, though poets, for
30 example, will) lie not in the nature of the relevant language as such,
but exclusively in what is permitted by the combination of general
logical concepts.

#3 Rhythm is moreover of a real or **actual** character. It is in and
through it that the language (which would otherwise remain an ab-
35 stract, dead system) comes to operate and thus becomes reality. Only
in the sentence does the word come alive, only as a member can it
denote real or imaginary objects which are experienced in an actual
situation, and only by entering into the syntactic rhythm can mor-
phological elements like words and meanings become intellectual

80.40 realities.

#4 Last but not least - this is perhaps the most deep-seated feature - the syntactic wholes and units are distinguished by being **non-convertible**. This means that a given member A can never be exchanged with another member B without some vital difference being introduced. For if the relation A-B looks forwards, then the relation B-A looks back. Time as we know cannot be turned back and it is impossible to telegraph to the past. In a sentence and in any syntactic structure whatever of higher or lower rank, beginning, middle and end are radically different stages. In other words, a member's place can always be inferred from its nature (of course, not absolutely, but among other given members); it is in this way noteworthy to the highest degree to what extent Chinese word order in the intellectual, distinctly articulated sentence is exactly the same as our own. And a member's place is consequently never a matter of indifference in the determination of its nature; a subject (taken in the broadest sense) can stand in many ways in a sentence, but in each new way it is a new type of subject.

81. These characteristic features of syntax will be encountered not only in the theory of syntax proper (to which belong the theories of congruence and rection) and in semantics (which must therefore be understood as the theory of local and individual realization and shading of meaning of words). We shall also - but naturally to a great extent: **mutatis mutandis** - encounter these features in phonetics, since by phonetics is understood the theory of the articulation of sounds and syllables as it was constituted in the second half of the

19th Century under the influence of the splendid advance of natural
81.10 science. Here too, in fact, we may find rhythm as a fundamental
feature, i.e. a successive realization (here not merely intellectual
but also physical: of symbols which of necessity have an outer side) -
a realization of variable and individual, actual and non-convertible
character. Realized sounds and syllables then appear - just like
15 members and sentences - to be articulations by means of which the
possibilities of the normative system are carried over into the
rhythmic reality of speech. It is this precise analogy that justifies
our summarizing syntax and phonetics as two forms - the logical and
the symbolic - of grammatical rhythm.

CONCLUSION

82. The verification which - after the necessary clarification of the problem - is here attempted of the thesis of the mutual autonomy of morphology and syntax, does not venture to be complete or definitive. Space - and the author's linguistic horizon - have only permitted us to quote a relatively small proportion of the facts, mainly from a few familiar languages. The treatment of details concerning complex words and the corresponding members (especially their more exact classification) has had to be left to later studies. And we have only been able to sketch the most important relation between synonymics and semantics - two disciplines still lacking a rational foundation. However, should the method here indicated prove fruitful, it will find rich application in these uncharted regions in all languages.

83. As far as the parts of the problem already treated here are concerned, namely the relation between general morphology and general syntax - or to use the classical terms: **partes** and **membra** - the result of our discussion can be summarized thus:

#1 There is a sharp difference on a number of decisive points between morphology (characterized in §40) and syntax (§80), and thus between the units of these grammatical disciplines: on the one hand words and forms, on the other sentences and members. While the

morphological constructions or forms are constant, the syntactic
 83.10 formations or constructions are variable. While form units are col-
 lective or social, sentence constructions are of an individual and
 personal nature. While the classes and forms and derivations of words
 are abstract, potential ideals, sentences and their members are con-
 crete, actual realities. And while a series of forms (e.g. of word
 15 classes or cases) can be considered in any order whatsoever without
 difference, the members in a sentence (and in a similar way, the
 sentences in a period) always form a chronological order, where every
 change, even the slightest, will alter the character of the members. -
 We have summarized this relationship of opposition, which has now been
 20 defined from several different aspects, by saying (§8-10) that the
 morphological units always form a **system**, while the syntactical ones
 form a **rhythm**.

#2 On the other hand a fundamental analogy between morphology (as
 described §21) and syntax (§48) has become manifest - an analogy of a
 25 peculiar kind which we (§50) have called **homology**, and which - if our
 theory is confirmed - in the final analysis proves to be a complete
 identity. This - at first sight surprising - identity depends upon the
 fact that the same four categories: relator (r) and relatum (R),
 descriptor (d) and descriptum (D) seem necessarily and sufficiently to
 30 define both all members (and sentences) as well as all word classes. -
 We can summarize these basic concepts of the logical disciplines under
 the name **the logical constant**.

84. These four concepts correspond quite closely to the first -
 and most important four - of the categories established by ARISTOTLE:

- #1 οὐσία = **essentia, substantia**, cf. **relatum**;
 #2 ποσόν = **quantum**, cf. **descriptum**;
 84.5 #3 ποιόν = **quale**, cf. **descriptor**;
 #4 πρός τι = **relatio**, cf. **relator**.

Of these, the last three, but not substance, however, are retained as essential ones by KANT*, who has revived the doctrine of categories in modern times: **Quantität, Qualität, Relation**; and so too
 10 in most later expositions (which usually - as in HØFFDING for example - have characteristically sought to avoid the concept of substance or essence).

While these concepts are for ARISTOTLE the 'predicates of existence' (κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος), they are for KANT merely the basic
 15 functions of discursive thought ('Stammegriffe des Verstandes'). The classical philosopher is here thinking statically, the modern one dynamically. The former - and with him scholasticism - fixed his attention on the system of thought, the latter - and following him many thinkers until modern times - on its rhythm.

85. If this set of categories is, as seems to be the case, the most deep-seated in language and consequently the most fundamental - and mutually equally fundamental - for all linguistic constructions, dynamic as well as static, then it follows:

5 #1 that the relative aspect (in our symbolism: r, R) and the descriptive (D, d) are of equal importance. The concept of relation should not then, as in ARISTOTLE, be seen as secondary; conversely, it should not be made the absolutely primary category, as it is by SEXTUS EMPIRICUS and by modern logicians. The descriptive aspect - which was

85.10 long posited as the basis for all European logic, following ARISTOTLE'S very example - is in actuality just as essential as the relative for the characteristic features of language and thereby for those of thought.

15 #2 that the passive or object-concepts (in our symbols: R, D) and the active or functional concepts are likewise of just the same importance. Quantity (D) is not - as has been believed under the inspiration of modern science - more fundamental than quality (d); here we should always recur to HENRI BERGSON'S^{*} decisive critique of all exclusively quantitative methods - a critique embracing experi-
20 mental phonetics as well as experimental psychology and the misuse of statistics in stylistic studies, for example. On the other hand, the concept of essence or substance (R) - positivism notwithstanding - is just as indispensable for thought as its correlate, the concept of relation; here we have by way of pure linguistic analysis reached a
25 result which appears to coincide with that which for EMILE MEYERSON^{*} - the most outstanding scholar of epistemology in our time - stands as the fruit of a lifetime's critical study of the history of science.

86. If we acknowledge the profound distinction which - in spite of the identity of the constitutive elements - has been established here between morphology (with synonymics) and syntax (with semantics), a number of consequences of a fundamental and methodological kind
5 follow.

#1 Morphology, or the study of the inner form, and syntax, or the study of the sentence or clause, should not be treated together, as is still done in most grammars, both practical and historical. As

86.10 syntax we should retain only the study of the period and the sentence,
 of members and submembers (including compounds), rection and concord;
 and to this we should add semantics, construed as the study of the use
 of words as they change according to context and situation. As mor-
 phology, conversely, should be distinguished - by the now prevalent
 'Mischsyntax' - as the study of word classes, of case and diathesis,
 15 of inflexion and derivation; and to this must also be joined syno-
 nymics or the study of the similarities and differences of the fixed
 meanings of words.

It may possibly be objected from a practical, that is, pedago-
 gical point of view that the two named series of linguistic phenomena
 20 always occur in an indissolubly bound form only (case, for example,
 only in sentences or members, words in every single instance with a
 particular shade of meaning, etc.), and that they therefore can and
 should be treated together. And one can argue from an aesthetic or
 poetic point of view that language - like nature - is always a unity
 25 or whole in which it is artificial, and harmful to the understanding,
 to distinguish between the immediately occurring phenomenon (in lan-
 guage then: speech) and a more deep-seated structure or form (in lan-
 guage: norms). GOETHE, who indeed contended with science in the field
 of colour theory on the basis of such considerations as these, sharply
 30 condemned the distinction of a dissecting analysis between seed and
 rind in a poem ('Der Physiker', 1820):

Alles gibt sie reichlich und gern:

Natur hat weder Kern

Noch Schale.

35 Alles ist sie mit ~~einem~~ Male.

This 'totalitarian' concept - which recurs in romantic philosophy (as a reaction against KANT) and in modern so-called 'idealistic' linguistics (as a reaction against positivism) - leads, however, from the viewpoint of scholarship only to confusion. Just as it is natural
 36.40 for the poet - at least of GOETHE'S kind - to see everything together, so too is it necessary for the scholar - at least in his methodical work - to subject one and the same phenomenon successively to a number of separate analyses. Just as the scientist can and must analyse a given piece of iron from the mechanical and chemical aspects as well
 45 as from the magnetic and electrical ones, so too must the linguist analyse a given utterance now from the morphological (and on the whole, systematic) point of view, now from the syntactic (and on the whole, rhythmic) one. Only by means of a synthesis which seeks to gather the results of the successive analyses can the scholar hope to
 50 approach that totality which it is the poet's (and genius') privilege to apprehend directly.

#2 The morphological and the syntactic viewpoints, albeit in contrast, should be considered complementary, that is, that they are equally necessary and equally legitimate. (It is therefore an un-
 55 fortunate partiality to regard one of the points of view as subordinate or superfluous.) In both practical and historical grammar - both must naturally emphasize the norm - it has been the general practice to neglect syntax for morphology; in part the morphological system was far more important than syntax for both language teaching
 60 and comparative philology, in part syntactic concepts, as we have seen, were most imperfectly defined. Yet only rarely do we find - as in the work of MIKLOSISCH - a preference based purely on principle for

the morphological point of view over the syntactic. - The contrary bias, which - not least in modern times - is so frequent, can be found in epigrammatic expression in a famous remark by WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT according to which language is activity or actuality (ἐνέργεια), not work or completed result (ἔργον). It is the same view which lies at the basis of BENEDETTO CROCE'S aesthetic (= linguistic theory), which has indeed had such a great influence on KARL VOSSLER and through him in turn on an entire trend in modern German linguistics. According to this theory - often advanced with great enthusiasm and great talent - language is always and everywhere a spiritual creation and an expression of the individual - an indivisible whole (cp. GOETHE, §86), in which the sentence is the only reality (cp. several authors §13 #1), and of which logical analysis can only extract lifeless and uninteresting abstractions. - Against these old and new extremes any unbiased theory must hold to the golden mean; word and sentence, form and expression are equally important aspects of language. It is not merely system or merely rhythm, but always rhythm and system at once.

#3 The grammarian then should not be a morphologist only, or a syntactician only - and we can add: nor again, a synonymist only or a semanticist only. The professional morphologist (and synonymist) will easily come to regard his special object of study as the system - the condition for the comprehensibility of language - as the only linguistic reality from which then all the modes of language are thought to be inevitably derived. Concepts like subject and predicate which cannot find any place in the system (and really the concept of the system itself also then comes to stand as a hindrance to an absolute rationalization of the grammatical (understood here as = the

6.90 morphological) categories. These concepts must then - as suggested by
 L. HJELMSLEV - be systematically excluded from grammar. - Conversely,
 the professional syntactician (and semanticist) or, if you will,
 stylist in CROCE'S sense, will easily be led to consider the infin-
 itely manifold individual variations, including the combination of
 95 sentences and the shades of meaning of the word, as the sole true
 reality. This point of view, which is at present very much in fashion,
 has without doubt animated in a beneficial manner the study of artis-
 tic style, so greatly neglected by earlier linguists; it has on the
 other hand led to a most unfortunate misunderstanding of the norm and
 100 of the meaning of clear concepts (as when LEO SPITZER talks of 'Stil-
 sprachen' as against 'Sprachstile!'). - Only an equal consideration of
 morphology and syntax, of the community's needs for form and of the
 free development of the individual, can promote both detailed study as
 well as linguistic theory.

87. There follows from these considerations of principle the rule
 that syntactic methods should not be applied in morphology, nor mor-
 phological ones in syntax. If therefore a method depends on certain
 concepts rooted in one domain, it must be excluded from the other.

5 If a word or a form drops quite out of fashion in certain kinds
 of style (the **passé défini** in modern spoken French, **hos** in modern
 Jutlandish), it is often assumed, without closer investigation of the
 morphological system to which the relevant elements belong, that a
 change of the norm has taken place. This is probably an unjustified
 10 application of stylistic method in a morphological domain; what is
 decisive for the existence of a form is in fact not its current use or

non-use, but its comprehensibility or incomprehensibility in the relevant community as a whole.

The converse offence against our methodological rule, the application of morphological method, therefore, to a syntactic topic, may well arise in so-called historical and comparative syntax (of course: insofar as it treats of genuinely syntactic phenomena). As is well-known, scholars began by building genealogical and historical linguistics on sound and form; and only much later did B. DELBRÜCK seek to constitute for Indo-European a comparative, that is, genealogical, syntax - a discipline which quite naturally followed the already existing and, in the first volume of BRUGMANN'S *Grundriss*, codified methodology of comparative linguistics. It was no accident, however, that this methodology was built up on sound and form; in reality there was no other possibility. For sound and form - and they alone - create at each given linguistic level firm systems which can be used as fixed points for the constructions of historical study, including the reconstructions of genealogical study. Only the norm - or as A. MEILLET has said: the continuity of tradition - has made possible the **interpolations** in which all language history and language comparison consist. A normative constancy of this kind, so great a fidelity of tradition, cannot, however, by any means be found in the syntactic domain, where on the contrary individual variation and personal innovation - therefore fashion, too, to a far greater degree than usual - are prevalent. But it follows that the reconstructive or inferential method - which has celebrated so many and such great triumphs where it built on sound and form relations - cannot at all be applied to syntactic phenomena in the true sense. To take a single

37.40 example: if a number of related languages (like the Indo-European
 ones) each at its oldest stage still accessible to us exhibits the
 same syntactic phenomena (for example, use of the infinitive as
 predicate, and thus a so-called historical infinitive; or little use
 of sentences as members, the tendency then to so-called parataxis)
 45 nothing whatever follows from this concerning the state of syntax at
 the common language stage (Indo-European) to which these languages are
 known on other grounds to go back. Whether Indo-European employed the
 historical infinitive, and whether it preferred parataxis, are matters
 upon which language comparisons can in principle shed no light. For a
 specific use in the sentence is not firmly bound to this form's very
 50 existence (Indo-European can have had an infinitive without using it
 historically; and the historical infinitives handed down in a number
 of languages of our family can have arisen spontaneously and independ-
 ently in each separate place); a more or less complex sentence struc-
 ture depends on the intellectual culture of the individual speaker or
 55 writer, possibly on the custom or fashion in certain circles, but not
 on the inherited morphological norm of language.

88. It has been suggested in the introduction (§8-10 and else-
 where) that the opposition of morphology and syntax is only one ex-
 ample of a more general opposition: of system and rhythm or, to use
 SAUSSURE'S expression, of 'language' and speech. Like general morphol-
 5 ogy or the theory of word classes, synonymics too is ruled by firm
 systems; like general syntax (or the theory of sentences), semantics
 too is ruled by a changing rhythm. And according to the latest -
 PRAGUE SCHOOL - studies on phonics this selfsame distinction seems to

be of just as great significance for the 'outer', or more correctly -
 38.10 symbolic, side of language as for its 'inner' or logical one. Phonics
 should, we are now beginning to recognize, be divided into a sys-
 tematic (NB not 'psychological') discipline: phonology, and into a
 rhythmic one, phonetics. Phonological systems (that is, systems of
phonemes or potential, abstract sound types) then become analogous to
 15 morphological ones; and the phonetic rhythm (that is, the formation or
 articulation of actual, concrete sounds) is then analogous to the syn-
 tactic one.

89. If this profound opposition between language (**langue**) and
 speech (**parole**), of system and rhythm - an opposition which we have
 here sought consistently to carry through, following SAUSSURE'S
 example - really (as has been assumed by GARDINER too) divides all
 5 language creation (**langage**) into two opposed modes or forms of mani-
 festation, or rather into an actual and a potential form, it will be
 natural to examine what relationship they have to the speaking human
 being and to mankind in general.

#1 The system as it appears for the grammarian's analysis in
 10 phonology and morphology, therefore in symmetric groupings of sound,
 word and form types, constitutes a normative ideal for the individual,
 an in principle invariable tradition for the community. This tradition
 is generally bound to the **nation** and it constitutes the precisely for-
 med convention ($\theta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$) without which all comprehension and all com-
 15 munication between members of the relevant community (often dispersed
 in place and time) is impossible. A social crystallization of concepts
 of this kind can be compared with the basic principles of one of the

arts or sciences. The norm is for language what the axioms are for a geometry: the basis upon which we build confidently and dogmatically -
 39.20 until the moment it is discovered that a new basis is possible and more suitable in new circumstances.

#2 The rhythm as it presents itself in phonetics and syntax, in the articulation of the syllable and the sentence therefore - always accompanied by a stronger or weaker degree of consciousness - appears
 25 to depend, on the contrary, to a large extent on spontaneous and momentary activity in the speaker and the hearer, the writer and the reader. It is the **individual** whose thought and will, whose feeling and imagination (φύσις) are decisive here - though with two quite definite limitations. The individual always belongs to a given community, whose
 30 norm - in spite of all margins of free-play - must not be exceeded. The individual is on the other hand - by being human - a ζῶον λογικόν: a being characterized by the logical faculty appearing in all thought and speech (λόγος), **the logical constant** that makes the person a human being.

35 The system is thus historical or national, the rhythm supra-national or common to mankind.

90. If the analysis of language has reached the most fundamental concepts and the correct understanding of its mutual relations (possibly relations of solidarity) and its possible modes of operation, a means must thereby be provided of characterizing not only language
 5 (language in general and the individual language), but also thought (thought in general and the systems or tendencies of the individual thinker). It will be conversely a confirmation of the correctness of

our analysis of language if it appears suitable as a characterization of the most deep-seated philosophical tendencies and systems.

0.10 We have already seen (§85) in several instances how different philosophical biases (and the language-theoretical biases inspired by them) can be construed as depending on an arbitrary predilection now for one, now for the other side of the logical constant. The question then becomes whether the basic opposition in the mode of operation of
 15 concepts - the distinction therefore between system and rhythm, which separates *inter alia* morphology and syntax - should not also recur in philosophy.

Now this does indeed seem to be the case. We find in fact constantly in both ancient and modern philosophy two opposed trends, an
 20 idealistic and a realistic. For the first, reality is of an essential nature: one, unchangeable, complete, and only accessible to an inner or higher sense. For the second, conversely, reality is of an existential nature: manifold, changeable, imperfect, sensible.

There can hardly be any doubt as to where the difference between
 25 these schools rests: idealism has paid attention to the form ($\theta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$) which has crystallized in a given community, and in language to norm and system. Realism has conversely paid attention to discursive thought, to the natural human faculty for combination ($\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$), and in language to speech and rhythm.

30 Theories of language have followed now one, now the other of these tendencies. A theory wishing to be impartial should however agree with both and disagree with both: agree with what they assert and disagree with what they deny. For language (upon which in turn the understanding of all things depends) is both norm and speech, system

30.35 and rhythm, both therefore idea and experience, both essence and existence. Language is for a community at a given stage - in spite of all variations - always the ~~same~~ same: but it is at the same time for the individual - in spite of all convention - continually something **new**.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR MORPHOLOGY AND SYNTAX

(Note: brackets [] indicate Brøndal's own interpolations and section and sub-section references to the present work, e.g. §1, #1. My own occasional interpolations in Brøndal's Bibliography are marked by braces: { }.)

ABRAHAM IBN ESRA, see BACHER.

ARISTOTLE *Aristotelis Opera omnia*, ed. Fr. EHRLE. I - IV. Parisiis 1885-86. *Categoriae, De Interpretatione, Poetica*. - Foundation of the doctrine of categories [cf. §85, see also H. MAIER]. - The concept ὑποκείμενον, subject and substance [cf. §51]. - sound - syllable - word - sentence [cf. §7, see also HARRIS].

BACHER (WILHELM): *Abraham Ibn Esra als Grammatiker. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der hebräischen Sprachwissenschaft*. Strasbourg 1882. - XXIII: Das intransitive und transitive Zeitwort [cf. critique of these concepts §39, #2].

BALLY (CH.): *Le langage et la vie*. Paris 1913. 2nd ed. 1926. - Like CROCE and BERGSON, but most directly inspired by BERGSON, emphasizes 'life', the stream of consciousness and the individual.

-- -- 'Copule zéro et faits connexes' (in *Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris*. XXIII, 1922, p. 1 ff). - [cf. §65].

-- -- 'La pensée et la langue' (ibid. p. 117-37). - Review of BRUNOT

1922.

- BEHAGEL (OTTO): Article in *Literaturblatt für germanische und romanische Philologie* 1887. - Col. 201: Word class system [Report §4, critique §5]. - Col. 202: "auch die Flexionslehre ist Syntax" [here, syntax = the doctrine of the use of forms, cf. §3].
- -- *Deutsche Syntax*, I-II. Die Wortklassen und Wortformen. III. Die Satzgebilde. IV. Wortstellung, Periodenbau. Heidelberg 1923-32. - §804: "Die Interjektionen sind nicht Wörter, sondern Sätze" [treated differently in the present work §35].
- BERGSON (HENRI): *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*. Paris 1889. - Critique of quantitative methods [cf. §84, #2].
- -- *L'évolution créatrice*. Paris, 1907. - P. 357-58: The dependence of philosophical ideas upon language [cf. §90].
- BERTELSEN (HENRIK): *Jens Pedersen Hoysgaard og hans forfatterskab* Copenhagen 1926. - P. 169: H's conception of syntax; inconsistencies.
- BRATE (ERIK): *Svensk Språklära*. Stockholm 1892. - P. 162: "Sats är en ordgrupp med finit verb [!, cf. §44, #1-#2] som predikat".
- BREAL (MICHEL): *Essai de sémantique (Science des significations)*. Paris 1897. - XXII: Le pronom relatif. P. 312: "On demandera quelle est la raison pour laquelle la proposition relative est ainsi lancée en avant la première: je crois qu'il y a là un fait de sémantique... Par la pensée, il faut rétablir une interrogation, en sorte que les deux propositions forment la demande et la réponse. C'est probablement la raison pour laquelle une bonne

partie des langues indo-européennes font cumuler au même pronom le rôle interrogatif et relatif" [critique of this view §39, #3; see also BROCKELMANN].

BROCKELMANN (CARL): *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der semitischen Sprachen*. 1-2. Berlin 1908-13. - I, p. 328: Interrogative pronouns primary in relation to the indefinite ones [critique §39, #3, see also BREAL and on the other hand MEILLET, SETHE, GARDINER].

BRØNDAL (VIGGO): *Ordklasserne. Partes orationis. Studier over de sproglige kategorier*. Copenhagen 1928. - Basis of exposition here in §§ 21 ff.

-- -- 'Le système de la grammaire' (in *A grammatical miscellany offered to Otto Jespersen on his seventieth birthday*. Copenhagen 1930, p. 291-97). - Provisional form of present Introduction §§ 1 ff.

BRUNOT (FERDINAND): *La pensée et la langue. Méthode, principes et plan d'une théorie nouvelle du langage appliquée au français*. Paris 1922. - Vigorous polemic against grammatical tradition, *inter alia* against the concept of ellipsis [rightly so, see §65]. Proclaims the bankruptcy of the word class system, but is unable - by means of better analysis - to put anything new in its place. - On p. 702 denotes *que* as 'conjonction universelle' [cf. §26, #3], but also includes several other types of *que* in the traditional manner. - P. 640: *Une vilaine figure, cf. une figure vilaine*. "Le second seul peint ou décrit. Le premier apprécie" [cf. discussion §71,

#3]. - P. 11: Denies that the prepositional member after être is an attribute [wrongly, in consequence of §55].

CASSIRER (ERNST): *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. I, Die Sprache.* Berlin 1923. - P. 274 ff.: "Primat des Satzes vor dem Worte". [cf. §13, #1, see also DITTRICH].

-- -- *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen des Erkenntniskritik.* Berlin 1910. - [cf. §84 on the correlation of the active and passive concepts].

-- -- *Leibniz und Jungius (Beiträge zur Jungius-Forschung. Prolegomena zu der von der Hamburgischen Universität beschlossenen Ausgabe der Werke von Joachim Jungius).* Hamburg 1929. - Cf. LEIBNIZ, SCHOLZ.

CROCE (BENEDETTO): *Estetica come scienza dell'espressione e linguistica generale.* Bari 1901. 5th ed., 1922 (French translation 1904, German 1905 and again 1932, English 1909, etc.). - Constitutes first part of a "Filosofia dello Spirito", inspired by Hegel. - The subtitle is elaborated in chapter 18 of the theoretical part: *Identità de linguistica con l'estetica.* - P. 159: The theory of word classes is criticized (as a counterpart of artistic and literary genres). Logical analysis is harmful, the sentence being the sole linguistic reality: "L'espressione è un tutto indivisibile; il nome e il verbo non esistono in essa, ma sono astrazioni foggiate da noi, distruggendo [?] la sola realtà linguistica, ch'è la proposizione". [cf. §87, see also SVANBERG, and VOSSLER]. - The theory is applied to language by CROCE himself in a series of articles in the journal *La Critica*, I, III-V.

-- -- **Brevario di estetica. Quattro lezioni.** Bari 1913. Lectures given at the Rice Institute, Houston, Texas (English translation published the same year, German 1913 etc.). [For the spread of these ideas, see: GIOVANNI CASTELLANO: **Introduzione allo studio delle opere di B.C. Note bibliografiche e critiche.** Bari 1920].

DAMOURETTE (JACQUES) & PICHON (EDOUARD): **Des mots à la pensée. Essai de grammaire de la langue française. I.** Paris 1930. Attempt at a 'sociological' grammar. Rich in examples and new [necessary?] terminology. - §65: French case system according to traditional method [criticism §37, #2].

DARMESTETER (ARSENE): **Traité de la formation des mots composés dans la langue française.** Paris 1875 (= *Bibl. de l'Ec. des H. Etudes*, fasc. 19). - Imperative in the type *marche-pied* [cf. §24, #3].

DAUZAT (ALBERT): **Essai de méthodologie linguistique dans le domaine des langues et des patois romans.** Paris 1906. - P. 19: "Tout langage suppose deux facteurs essentiels ... le son et l'idée. D'où la division de la linguistique en deux branches: la phonétique ou l'étude des sons, et le sémantique ou l'étude des idées dans leurs rapports avec les sons - l'étude des idées, indépendamment de toute manifestation phonique, relevant exclusivement de la psychologie" [HJELMSLEV p.94 associates himself with this view; for a different view here §§4 ff.].

DELACROIX (HENRI): **Le langage et la pensée.** Paris 1924. P. 201-2: "Les mots n'ont point d'autonomie; ils ne sont qu'un élément de combinaison [? cf. §13, #1] plus ou moins constante". P. 201: "Il

n'y a pas à faire de différence entre la morphologie et la syntaxe" [? cf. §§11, 83; see also HJELMSLEV].

DELBRÜCK (BERTHOLD): *Vergleichende Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen* (= *Grundriss*, ed. BRUGMANN, III-V). Strassburg 1893. - Essential for comparative syntax [fundamental critique of methods §87; cf. §39, #3].

DIONYSIUS THRAX: *Dionysii Thracis ars grammatica*, ed. G. UHLIG. Lipsiae {Leipzig} 1883. - The basis of Roman grammar and of most grammar thereafter. Defined the sentence as combination of words [critique §44, #1].

DITTRICH (OTTMAR): *Grundzüge der Sprachpsychologie*. I Halle 1903-4.

-- -- *Die Probleme der Sprachpsychologie* .. 1913. - Emphasizes [rightly so from a psychological point of view] the precedence of the sentence over the word.

D'OVIDIO (F.) & MEYER-LÜBKE (W.): *Grammatica storica della lingua italiana e dei dialetti italiani*, trad. EUG. POLCARI. 2nd ed. Milan 1919. - P. 167: "L'avv. di luogo ci serve nel napol., sicil. anche per 3a sing. plur., così pure vi nel lomb., venez. ..." [Addition to the text of §61 {at point where 'situated' ci & vi are discussed}].

EHRLING (S.): *Grammatik og logik* (in *Språk och Stil*. 1914, p. 168-217). - Review of JESPERSEN 1913.

ERDMANN (BENNO): *Logik. I: Logische Elementarlehre*. Halle 1892. P. 241: Satz = "prädikative Verknüpfung von Worten" [cf. §44, #1].

FALK (HJALMAR) & TORP (ALF): *Dansk-Norskens syntax i historisk*

fremstilling. Christiana {i.e. Oslo} 1900. - P. 176 ff.: The reflexive form §60].

FUNKE (OTTO): 'Jespersens Lehre von den 'three ranks' (in *Englische Studien* LX, 1925, p. 140-57). - Cp. JESPERSEN'S reply *ibid.* p. 300-09.

-- -- 'Ein letztes Wort zur Rangstufenlehre Jespersens' (*ibid.* XI, 1927, p. 309-15. - [Cp. from a different point of view present work §67, see also HJELMSLEV].

-- -- 'Von den semasiologischen Einheiten und ihren Untergruppen' (*ibid.* LXII, 1928, p. 35-63). - Continuation of MARTY'S doctrine of 'autosemantika' and 'synsemantika' [critique §39, #1; see also HARRIS and SVANBERG].

GARDINER (ALAN H.): 'The definition of the word and the sentence' (in *British Journal of Psychology* XII, 1922, p.354-55). - Word: denoting something. Sentence: volitional attitude of the speaker.

-- -- *The theory of speech and language*. Oxford 1932. Dedicated to the memory of PHILIPP WEGENER, whose psychological views have {from standpoint 1932} inspired the author. On the other hand, the distinction made by SAUSSURE between language {*langue*} and speech {*parole*} is consistently sought. P. 88: The sentence is the unit of speech, and the word is the unit of language [cf. present work §14, #2]. - P. 106: I shall be at pains to show that noun, adjective and so on, are parts of language, and that the real parts of speech are subject and predicate [Development of this view §§11, 89]. - P. 55: A word-meaning may crystallize in our

minds a thought which has long eluded expression; but that thought is substantival in nature, and the word-meaning adjectival [doubt on meaning of this: §43, #2]. - §42 (p.141 ff.): Word-form and word-function as correlated linguistic facts. P. 145: Unless there are strong reasons for the contrary view, it is always assumed that words are functioning in accordance with their form [This view of a word's real or natural function is disputed in the present work §18]. - P. 98: A sentence is a word or set of words ... [critique §44, #1]. - P. 308: Decisive evidence that the interrogative meaning {viz. of the pronoun} is secondary and derived from the indefinite is, however, forthcoming from Egyptian [Development §39, #3, see also SETHE and MEILLET]. - P. 262: JESPERSEN 'at a loss' [Doubt on this point §66].

GINNEKEN (J. VAN): **Principes de linguistique générale. Essai synthétique.** Thesis, Leyden University. Paris 1907. - Builds on unusual theories both in the psychological and linguistic literature. But entirely fails to appreciate the logical aspect of the nature of language. The difference between word classes is said to depend upon feeling. §103: "la cause psychologique du verbe et du nom sont les adhésions absolue et relative".

GIRARD (Abbé GABRIEL): **Synonymes français, leurs différentes significations, et le choix qu'il en faut faire pour parler avec justesse.** Paris 1718. 3rd ed. 1740. - Basis for synonymics [on this topic: §§2, 6-10, 84].

-- -- **Les vrais principes de la langue française, ou la parole réduite**

en méthode. Vol. 1-2. Amsterdam & Paris 1747. - Establishes independently of word classes [cf. §11] '7 membres: subjectif, attributif, objectif, terminatif, circonstanciel, conjonctif, adjonctif.'

GOETHE: *Werke*, ed. H. DÜNTZER. *Gedichte* III, 1 (= Deutsche National-Litteratur, 84. Band). Berlin & Stuttgart n.d. - P. 38: Allerdings. Dem Physiker. [cf §85, see also J. COHN: 'Goethes Denkweise', in *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. 41, p. 1-58].

GRÖBER (GUSTAV): 'Methodik und Aufgaben der sprachwissenschaftlichen Forschung' (in *Grundriss der romanischen Philologie* 2nd ed. I, Strasbourg 1904-06). - P. 273: "Es handelt sich bei diesen vorangestellten Wörtern immer um Vorstellungen auf die die Aufmerksamkeit des Hörenden gelenkt oder durch die er affektisch erregt werden soll" [cf. §71, #3].

GÜNTERT (HERMANN): *Grundfragen der Sprachwissenschaft*. Leipzig 1925. - P. 96: Satz = "ein Wortgefüge" [cf. §44, #1].

HANSEN (FRIEDRICH): *Spanische Grammatik auf historischer Grundlage*. Halle a. S. 1910. - §43, 4: "Das nachgestellte Adjektiv gibt eine objektive, das vorgestellte eine subjektive beigelegte Eigenschaft" [cf. §71, #3].

HARRIS (JAMES): *Hermes, or a philosophical enquiry concerning universal grammar, in which the most decided dissent is expressed from the fundamental axioms of Locke*. London 1750, 3rd ed. 1771. - An Aristotelian despite the sensory empiricism then dominant in

England : intelligible form, patterns, ideas primary in relation to sense perception. - P. 21 assumes (with ARISTOTLE) sound - syllable - word - sentence to form a continuous series [critique §7]. - P. 26 establishes theory of synsemantika: "and, the, with loses {sic} their meaning, not that these last have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it, but when in company, or associated" [quoted §13, #5; critique §39, #1].

HERMANN (EDUARD): *Gab es im Indogermanischen Nebensätze? Ein Beitrag zur vergleichenden Syntax.* Diss. University of Jena 1894 [= *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung* vol. 33, p. 481-535]. - The question is answered in the negative [but in consequence of the principle stated in §87 cannot be answered at all].

-- -- *Die Wortarten.* Berlin 1928. (= *Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philosophische-Historische Klasse* 1928, 1). Word class system built on syntax [reported §13, #2; critique §15, see also E. OTTO].

HJELMSLEV (LOUIS): *Principes de grammaire générale.* Copenhagen 1928. [= *Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Historisk-Filologiske Meddelelser* XVI, 1). - IV. Division de la grammaire: Morphologie, syntaxe, phonologie. P. 94: "tout fait syntaxique est morphologique". P. 154: "C'est que toute distinction entre morphologie et syntaxe est impossible". [If syntax here - as it is in the present work - were = *sætningslære* {theory or study of the clause/sentence}, this assertion would be highly paradoxical. But

Hjelmslev tends to exclude entirely concepts like subject and predicate from grammar; thus p. 34: "La notion même de sujet ou prédicat **grammatical** est des plus douteuses"; cf. present work §86, #3 and J. RIES 1931]. - P. 129 ff. Discussion of JESPERSEN'S rank theory [cf. §67].

HØFFDING (HARALD): **Det psykologiske grundlag for logiske domme.**

Copenhagen 1899 (= Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Skrifter, Ser. 6., historisk og filosofisk Afdeling IV, 6). - §22 in fine: about titles as logical predicates [quoted with reservation here §65].

-- -- **Den menneskelige tanke, dens former og dens opgaver.** Copenhagen 1910 (German and French translations 1911). - §92: "The dominance of the concept of substance was connected with the old presupposition that the immutable and lasting was the highest {principle}...Substance is an example of a moribund, if not already defunct category" [referred to here §84, see also MEYERSON and RENOUVIER].

-- -- 'Det logiske prædikat. Nogle bemærkninger om forholdet mellem sprog og tanke.' (in **Oversigt over Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Forhandlinger** 1914, p. 231-42). - The logical predicate is put = the psychological, the member emphasized by the stress of the sentence. [This distinction, already partly rendered void by this very equation between logical and psychological analysis should be made superfluous by that {distinction} proposed here §§56, 62 between analytic and synthetic members].

[HØYSGAARD (J.P.):] *Methodisk forsøg til en fuldstændig dansk syntax.*

Hvoraf kan tages anledning, ey al-ene til en ræt og tydelig construction i vort sprog, men og til des nøyere indsigt i alle andre. Copenhagen 1752. - Introduces in an independent way the philosophical grammar of the time to Denmark; see §538: "A philosopher is needed to give its correct form; which I neither am nor claim to be; a philosopher, I say, who would also be a greater linguist than I". - Distinguishes, like GIRARD (1747), "morphology" and syntax; see in particular index and explanatory notes (p. 343 ff.) such as ABSOLUTE, MEANING and especially ETYMOLOGY, where we find: "ETYMOLOGY (the examination or study of words) is that part of grammar in which words are taken absolutely. Just as syntax on the other hand is that part in which words are considered relatively. [cf. § 11, see also H. BERTELSEN].

HUMBOLDT (WILHELM VON): *Gesammelte Schriften. I-IX: Werke*, ed. A. LEITZMANN. Berlin 1903-04. [See also now R. LEROUX: *Guillaume de Humboldt. La formation de sa pensée jusqu'en 1794* = Publications de la Faculté des Lettres, Université de Strasbourg. fascic. 59. 1932].

-- -- *Über die Verwandtschaft der Ortsadverbien mit dem Pronomen in einigen Sprachen.* 1827-29 (in *Werke* VI, 1). - [cf. § 53].

-- -- *Die sprachphilosophischen Werke*, ed. H. STEINTHAL. Berlin 1884.
- P. 262: Language is ἐνέργεια, not ἔργον [NB. more correctly: both - and: § 86, #2].

JACOBI (H.): *Compositum und Nebensatz.* Bonn 1897. - [Cf. §§ 5, 69 on

the syntactic character of compounds; see also LEUMANN].

JELLINEK (MAX HERMANN): 'Zur Geschichte einiger grammatischen Theorien und Begriffe' (in *Indogermanische Forschungen* XIX, 1906, p. 272-316]. - On the history of the concept of subordinate clause [cf. § 73; see also WUNDT].

-- -- *Geschichte der neuhochdeutschen Grammatik von den Anfängen bis auf Adelung* 1-2. Heidelberg 1914-14. - II, p. 1-9: Gliederung der Grammatik [cf. §§ 3 ff.].

JESPERSEN (OTTO): 'Sproglære i anledning af Noreen: Vårt språk' (in *Danske studier* 1908, p. 208-18). - I Sound, II Meaning, III Relation between form and meaning: grammar and lexicon [cf. §§ 4 ff.].

-- -- *Sprogets logik*. Copenhagen 1913 (Universitetsprogram) - 1. Substantive and adjective. P. 17: "The substantive denotes something more special than the adjective" [cf. § 78]. 2. Linguistic rank. P. 31: I superjunct, II adjunct, III subjunct [cf. § 67, see also FUNKE and HJELMSLEV]. P. 31: "The word or concept which is to be made more special by help of another is always more special in itself than the specializing word" [cf. §§ 43, #4; 78, see also EHRLING].

-- -- *De to hovedarter af grammatiske forbindelser*. Copenhagen 1921 (= *Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Historisk-Filologiske Meddelelser* IV, 3). - Junction and nexus [cf. § 66].

-- -- *The philosophy of grammar*. London 1924. - II Systematic grammar. New system [cf. § 4 ff., see also JØRGENSEN]. V. Substantives and

adjectives [§ 78]. VII. The three ranks [cf. § 67]. VIII. Junction and nexus [cf. § 66].

-- -- Tanker og studier. Copenhagen 1932. - Reprint of, inter alia, 'Sammenfaldet: og = at' (Dania 1895). - [cf. § 26, #1].

JØRGENSEN (JØRGEN): A treatise of formal logic. Its evolution and main branches with its relations to mathematics and philosophy. 1-3 Copenhagen 1931. - Chap. XIII, 3: "The material of formal logic": report of theories of language. P. 223: "Grammar should, according to JESPERSEN, be divided into three main divisions: morphology, syntax, and a division which may perhaps be called symbolology, dealing respectively with the functions of the forms of language, their different expressions, and their relation to the real or ideal objects to which they refer" [cf. §§ 4 ff.]. - P. 237: "Psychologically and linguistically [NB. see § 13, #1] the sentences are primary in relation to the words".

JUNGIUS (JOACHIMUS): Logica Hamburgensis. Hamburg 1638. 2nd ed. 1681. - LEIBNIZ ranks him with Galileo and Descartes, especially as a precursor of the logic of relations; see also CASSIRER and SCHOLZ.

KANT (IMMANUEL): Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Riga 1781. - P. 89, 96: Categories derived from judgements [cf. § 84; see also ARISTOTLE, HØFFDING, RENOUVIER].

KERN (FRANZ): Grundriss der deutschen Satzlehre. Berlin 1884. - P. 5 Satz = "Ausdruck eines Gedankens mit Hilfe eines finiten (ausgedrückten oder zu ergänzenden [!] Verbums" [cf. § 44, #2].

-- -- Die deutsche Satzlehre. Berlin 1888. - Word class system

[Reference § 13, #2; critique § 15].

KEYL (HANS): **Zweigliedrige prädikative Nominalsätze im Französischen** (Ma soeur esclave!). Ein Beitrag zur französischen Syntax und Stilistik. Dissertation University of Marburg 1909. - P. 8-17: introduction to Indo-European languages [cf. § 63].

KRETSCHMER (PAUL): 'Zur Erklärung des sogenannten Infinitivus historicus' (in *Glotta* II, p. 270-87). - "Ein Nominalsatz [?] bestehend in einem substantivierten [?] Infinitiv". [Cf. discussion of 'nominal sentence' § 63, of 'substantivization' §§ 23, 70, of historical infinitive § 24, #2].

LEIBNIZ: **Opuscles et Fragments**, ed. COUTURAT. Paris 1903. - Point of departure for modern logic, which - as against ARISTOTLE - emphasizes the concept of relation [§85, #1, cf. JUNGIUS and even as early as SEXTUS EMPIRICUS; see also COUTURAT: **La Logique de Leibniz**. Paris 1901, as well as CASSIRER and SCHOLZ].

LENZ (RODOLFO): **La Oración y sus Partes**. Madrid 1920. (= Publicaciones de la Revista de Filología Española, V). - Principles taken from WUNDT, examples especially from Spanish and American languages. P. 173-76 on position of 'attributive adjective', P. 174: "En la combinación de substantivo y adjetivo, cualquiera que sea el orden, el secundo es el enfático, el distintivo" [cf. §71, #3; see also BRUNOT, HANSEN, GRÖBER].

LEUMANN (E.): 'Einiges über Komposita' (in *Indogermanische Forschungen* VIII), 1888, p.297-301). - Relationship to subordinate clause [cf. §5; see also JACOBI].

LOMBARD (ALF): 'Les membres de la proposition française. Essai d'un classement nouveau.' (in *Moderne språk* XXIII, 1929). - Has not avoided the usual confusion of morphology (= study of words and forms) and syntax.

-- -- *Les constructions nominales dans le français moderne. Etude syntaxique et stylistique.* Uppsala & Stockholm 1930. - Demonstrates in an interesting way the invasion of so-called nominal sentences in French (naturalistic) literature from c. 1865 [cf. §63, see also KEYL and LOREY].

LOREY (F.): *Der eingliedrige Nominalsatz im Französischen. Ein Beitrag zur französischen Syntax und Stilistik.* Dissertation - University of Marburg 1909 [cf. §63].

MAIER (HEINRICH): *Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles.* 1-2. Tübingen 1896-1900. - Demonstrates the significance of the analysis of language for Aristotle's logic [cf. §90].

-- -- *Psychologie des emotionalen Denkens.* Leipzig 1908. - P. 360: Satz = 'Wort oder Wortkomplex' [Critique §44, #1]. - P.380 Moods {of the verb} related to sentence types [Report §13, #4; critique §38].

MARTY (ANTON): 'Über die Scheidung von grammatischem, logischem und psychologischem Subjekt, resp. Prädikat' (in *Archiv für systematische Philosophie.* 1897, p. 174 ff., 294 ff.).

-- -- *Gesammelte Schriften* ed. J. EISENMEIER, A. KASTIL, O. KRAUS. 1-2. Halle 1916-20.

-- -- 'Von den logisch nicht begründeten synsematischen Zeichen', ed

O. FUNKE (in **Englische Studien** 63, p. 12-40). [cf. §39, #1; see also HARRIS, SVANBERG].

MEILLET (ANTOINE): 'Le problème de la parenté des langues' (in **Scientia** XV, 1914, p.403-25). - Recognizes - in opposition to H. SCHUCHARDT - only genealogical relationships, based on the continuity of tradition [cf. §87].

-- -- 'La phrase nominale en indo-européen (in **Mémoires de la Société Linguistique de Paris** XIV, 1906, p.7 ff. [cf. §63].

-- -- 'Linguistique' (in **De la méthode dans les sciences**, 2nd series, 3rd ed. Paris 1911). - P.274: "un mot de la langue courante n'est défini que par l'ensemble des phrases où on l'entend et où il est licite de l'employer" [? cf. §13, #1].

MEYERSON (EMILE): **Identité et réalité**. Paris 1908.

-- -- **De l'explication dans les sciences**. 1-2. Paris 1921. - I,1: La Science exige le concept de chose [cf. §85].

-- -- 'La pensée et son expression (in **Journal de psychologie**. XXVII, 1930, p.497 ff.).

-- -- 'Le sujet et le prédicat' (in **Revue de métaphysique et de morale**, April-June 1930).

-- -- **Le cheminement de la pensée** 1-3. Paris 1931. - Sums up earlier works to form a coherent synthesis, §§ 328-62 related to language. - The necessity of the concept of substance p.142, 529, 767, 978 [cf. our conclusion §85, see also ANDRE METZ: **Une nouvelle philosophie des sciences**. Paris 1928 and HENRI SEE: **Science et philosophie d'après la doctrine de M. Emile Meyerson**. Paris 1932].

- MIKKELSEN (KRISTIAN): **Det nye system i dansk sproglære.** Copenhagen 1902. - Does not understand WIWEL'S justified criticism {viz. of traditional pedagogical grammar}.
- -- **Dansk ordføjningslære.** Copenhagen 1911. - Thoroughly traditional. Thus assumes a dative to exist in Danish [Critique §37, #1]. - Inconsistent definition of sentence p.2: "A sentence can thus be defined according to its form as a combination of words [!, cf. §44, #1] containing a predicate in one of the three main types [?, cf. §44, #2] and as a rule [!!] a noun to which the predicate is related. - Misuses the concept of ellipsis p. 691 - 740 [Critique §65, see also BRUNOT].
- MIKLOSISCH (FRANZ): **Vergleichende Grammatik der slavischen Sprachen.** Vienna 1883. - IV, p.1: "Jener Teil der Grammatik welcher die Bedeutung der Wortklassen und Wortformen darzulegen hat, heisst Syntax" [thus = our morphology, cf. §86, #2 and discussions in J. RIES {Was ist Syntax?}, pt. I, p.19].
- MISTELI (FRANZ): **Charakteristik der hauptsächlichsten Typen des Sprachbaus (= Abriss der Sprachwissenschaft, ed. H. STEINTHAL and FR. MISTELI, II).** Berlin 1893. - P.77 on the relation between possessives and objective conjugation [cf. §54].
- NOREEN (ADOLF): **Vårt språk,** vol. V. Stockholm 1904-05. - Large scale system of theoretical linguistics based essentially on semantics. New, frequently unfortunate and superfluous terminology [see JESPERSEN'S critique 1908; also, HOLGER PEDERSEN in *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen* 1907, p.880-900].

- -- Einführung in die wissenschaftliche Betrachtung der Sprache. Beiträge zur Methode und Terminologie der Grammatik. Vom Verfasser genehmigte und durchgelesene Übersetzung ausgewählter Teile seines schwedischen Werkes "Vårt Språk" von HANS W. POLLAK. Halle (Saale) 1923. - P. 40: Haupteinteilung der Grammatik [Report §4, critique §5].
- NYROP, (KRISTOFFER) : Grammaire historique de la langue française. 1-6. Copenhagen 1899-1930. - I. Phonétique. II. Morphologie. III. Formation des mots. IV. Sémantique. V-VI. Syntaxe [the classification cited in §3] - VI, §6 Definition of prepositions [critique §30].
- OTTO (ERNST): 'Die Wortarten.' (in Germanisch-romanische Monatschrift 16, 1928, p. 417-24). - Reply to E. HERMANN 1928. Establishes the following: Dingwort, Vorgangswort, Zuordnungswort, Eigenschaftswort, Umstandswort 'nach ihrer Beziehungsbedeutung auf Grund einer kategorialen Auffassung der Wirklichkeit'.
- PLATO: Sophistes. - P. 262B: Not until ῥήματα and ὀνόματα are combined does λόγος come into existence [for the meaning of these terms see §45, #2; cf. ZIEHEN p.29].
- ['PRAGUE SCHOOL'] Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague. 1-4. Prague 1929-1931. - 4: Réunion phonologique internationale tenue à Prague 18-21 December 1930.
- -- Charisteria. Guilelmo Mathesio quinquagenario a discipulis et Circuli Linguistici Pragensis sodalibus oblata. Prague 1932. - Important discussions of the principles of general linguistics,

especially phonology, by Prince N. S. TRUBETZKOY, ROMAN JAKOBSON, SERGE KARCEVSKI, A. SOMMERFELT and others.

PRISCIAN: *Prisciani Institutiones grammaticae in Grammatici latini* ed. KEIL II-III. Leipzig 1855-59. - III, p.108, 23: '(est oratio) comprehensio dictionum aptissime ordinarum' [thus: combinations of words, cf. §44, #1].

RASK (RASMUS KRISTIAN): *Samlede tildels forhen utrykte afhandlinger* ed. H. K. Rask. 1-3. Copenhagen 1834-38. - III, p.202-204 (1826) RASK maintains, in a polemic against J. GRIMM - 'the {citation} order of the cases adopted from the Indian {Sanskrit}': nominative, accusative, dative, genitive etc. as the only justified one, that is, grounded in the nature of language; thus already in the prize-winning *Essay Om det islandske sprogs oprindelse* (1814, printed 1818) and in *Angelsaksisk sproglære* 1817. [For a discussion of the arbitrary nature of any ordering in a single series, see §40, #4].

RENOUVIER (CHARLES): *Essais de critique générale. Premier essai: Traité de logique générale et de logique formelle*. I-II. Paris 1912. - XXVI: Catégories. Critique of KANT, whom the author otherwise follows, but the concept of substance (substratum, support) is called I, p. 129 'cette plaie de la philosophie' [cf. §86, see also HOFFDING 1910 and especially MEYERSON].

RIES (JOHN): *Was ist Syntax? Ein kritischer Versuch*. Marburg 1894. - Critique of MIKLOSISCH [whom see] and especially of 'Mischsyntax' [Support of this view here §§5,7]: 'Die Syntax hat es grund-

sätzlich nur mit Form und Bedeutung der Wortgefüge zu tun'.

-- -- 'Zur Gliederung der Syntax und der Gesamtgrammatik' (in *Indogermanischer Anzeiger* 34, 1914, p.11 ff.). - Against R.M. MEYER in *Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift* 5, p.640 ff.

-- -- Was ist ein Satz? (= Beiträge zur Grundlegung der Syntax III). Prague 1931. - List and discussion of definitions of the sentence [cf. §44]. P.127 seeks compromise in the dispute on ellipses: 'Für die Beschreibung eines bestimmten Sprachzustandes bleibt immer fraglich, ob eine Fügung, deren Herkunft aus einer vollständigern historisch erweislich ist, vom Sprachgefühl der Zeit noch als elliptisch empfunden wird' [Criticism §65, #3].

RICHTER (ELISE): 'Die Rolle der Semantik in der historischen Grammatik (in *Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift* 2, 1912, p.231-43). - Address given in 1909 at the 50th German Philological Meeting. Divides - like DAUZAT and HJELMSLEV - all linguistic phenomena - into phonetic and semantic aspects [cf. §4].

SAARESTE (ALBERT): *Die estnische Sprache*. Tartu 1932. - P.41: 'Einer der auffallendsten Züge der estnischen Syntax ist, dass das Subjekt ausser im Nominativ ...auch im Partitiv, als Partial-subjekt auftreten kann'. 'Auch das Prädikativ erscheint ausser im Nominativ auch im Partitiv ..., seltener im Illativ, Genitiv, Abessiv und Komitativ' [cf. here §37 on the relative independence of case {forms} from {functional} members].

SANDFELD (KRISTIAN): *Bisætningerne i moderne fransk. En håndbog for studerende og lærere*. Copenhagen 1909. - P.1-3: Prefatory remarks:

definition of the subordinate clause and its types [cf. §76].

-- -- **Syntaxe du français contemporain. I. Les pronoms.** Paris 1928. -
§§76 ff.: se in intransitive and passive use [cf. §51].

SAPIR (EDWARD): **Language. An introduction to the study of speech.**
Oxford 1921. - Preface: 'Among contemporary writers of influence
on liberal thought Croce is one of the very few who have gained an
understanding of the fundamental significance of language'. The
author of this valuable work seems - following CROCE, cf. VOSSLER
and SVANBERG - inclined to identify language and speech; for this
reason also - like all of this school - has a sceptical attitude
towards the word class concept.

SAUSSURE (FERDINAND DE): **Cours de linguistique générale**, ed. CHARLES
BALLY & ALBERT SECHEHAYE, Lausanne & Paris 1916. 2nd ed. 1922. - A
masterpiece of theoretical linguistics which establishes two
fundamental distinctions: between synchrony and diachrony and
between *langue* and *parole* [Development §§8, 89]. - Cf. *Revue
critique* 83, p.49-51 A. MEILLET; *Literaturblatt* 1917, col. 1-9 H.
SCHUCHARDT; *Museum* 24, p.153-156; 31, p.57-59 A. KLUYVER; *Revue
philosophique* 42, 7 A. SECHEHAYE; *Nordisk tidsskrift for filologi*
4. Series VI, p.37-41 O. JESPERSEN; *Modern language review* 19,
p.253-55 W.E. COLLINSON; see also GARDINER.

SAYCE (A. H.): **Principles of comparative philology.** London 1874. 2nd
ed. 1875. - Ch. IV, §§ 3-5: Language based on the sentence, not on
the isolated word [cf. §13, #1].

SCHLESINGER (MICHEL): **Satzlehre der aramäischen Sprache des**

babylonischen Talmuds. Leipzig 1928. - Construes subject as substantival [critique §51].

SCHOLZ (HEINRICH): *Geschichte der Logik*. Berlin 1931. (= *Geschichte der Philosophie in Längsschnitten*, ed. W. MOOG. 4). - P.31: Aristotelian logic essentially predicate or conceptual logic. - P.41, 46: Consideration of the object of a sentence begins only with JUNGIUS and LEIBNIZ, and therefore of relation [cf. discussion of the relative aspect as being just as important as the descriptive one: §§65, #1 and 85, #1].

SCHUCHARDT (HUGO): 'Geschichtlich verwandt oder elementar verwandt' (in *Magyar Nyelvőr*, 1912). - Combinations like *urbs Romae* in many languages (reprinted in part: *Brevier* p.194-99). Cf. *Archiv* ed. Herrig 130 (1917), p.183-84 R.M. MEYER; *Literaturblatt* 33 (1912), p.294-98 W. MEYER-LÜBKE; *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 1912, col. 1121-23 H. URTEL; *Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung* 13, p.339-40 F. KLUGE.

-- -- Hugo Schuchardt *Brevier. Ein Vademekum der allgemeinen Sprachwissenschaft, als Festgabe zum 80. Geburtstag des Meisters zusammengestellt und eingeleitet von LEO SPITZER*. Halle (Saale) 1922. - P.194: 'der Elementargedanke offenbart sich immer und überall in den Sprachen: der geschichtlichen Verwandtschaft ... steht die ungeschichtliche, die elementare gegenüber'. [Cf *ibid* p. 181, 254-5; development in relation to syntax: here §87, #2]. - P.127: 'Man verzichte doch endlich auf das grammatische Triptychon [Lautlehre, Grammatik, Wörterbuch]; es gibt nur eine Grammatik,

und die heisst Bedeutungslehre oder wohl richtiger Bezeichnungslehre. - Das Wörterbuch stellt keinen andern Stoff dar als die Grammatik; es liefert die alphabetische Inhaltsangabe zu ihr' [JESPERSEN - *The philosophy of grammar*, p.32 - takes an unsympathetic view of this thesis; it is accepted here §7].

SETÄLÄ (E. N.): *Finska språkets satslära*. 3rd ed. Helsingfors {i.e. Helsinki} 1908. - §55 B: partitive in a number of syntactical functions: as subject, object, 'adverbialis', 'absolute' etc. [Cf. §37, see also SAARESTE].

SETHE (K.): in *Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache* XLVII, 1910, p. 4-5: Egyptian interrogative pronouns derived from the indefinite ones [cf. §39, #3, see also GARDINER].

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. - About this sceptic, who summarized his or sceptical propositions under, i.e. the viewpoint of relativity [cf. §85, #1], see ZIEHEN p.46 (with bibliography).

SHEFFIELD (ALFRED DWIGHT): *Grammar and thinking: a study of the working conceptions in syntax*. New York 1912. - Assumes a latent copula in the submember [cf. §66]. - On p.27 interestingly defines the sentence = 'meaning' [cf. {our} system] + 'projection into the field of vital concerns' [cf. {our} rhythm].

SMITH (C. ALPHONSO): *Studies in English syntax*. Boston 1906. - P.20: 'one comes almost to believe that the norms of syntax are indestructible, so persistently do they reappear in unexpected places'. [This agrees - if syntax is taken as being = *sättningslära* {theory or study of the clause/sentence} - closely with our

§§45, 80, 86]. - P.10: 'Polynesian words, for example, are not our words, but the Polynesians have their subjunctive mood, their passive voice, their array of tenses and cases, because the principles of syntax are psychical and therefore universal [Here on the other hand we are talking about something quite different: the monotone nature of the morphological categories. Certain forms recur constantly - though by no means necessarily -, because a few fundamental concepts are their basis].

SOMMERFELT (ALF): 'Sur l'importance générale de la syllabe' (in *Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague IV*, p.156-159). - SOMMERFELT rightly emphasizes the significance of the syllable concept for general linguistics; but overlooks [cf. §11] the fact that it is a phonetic unit (cf. the sentence), not a phonological one (cf. the word).

-- -- 'Sur la théorie de la syllabe' (in *Festschrift til A. Kjør. Christiania* {i.e. Oslo} 1924, p.48-52).

SONNENSCHNEIDER (E.A): *The soul of grammar. A bird's eye view of the organic unity of the ancient and the modern languages studied in British and American schools.* Cambridge 1927. - Argues for a common terminology in the major languages. Allows, for example, a dative in English [incorrectly in consequence of our §13, #1].

SPITZER (LEO): *Stilstudien. I. Sprachstile. II. Stilsprachen.* Munich 1928. - [Critique of the title: §86, #3].

SÜTTERLIN (LUDWIG): *Das Wesen der sprachlichen Gebilde. Kritische*

Bemerkungen zu Wilhelm Wundts Sprachpsychologie. Heidelberg 1901.

- Distinguishes - like WUNDT - between closed and open combinations, i.e. sentences and members [cf. §66].

SVANBERG (NILS): Studier i språkets teori. Kritiska och historiska bidrag. Dissertation Uppsala University 1930. (Source: **Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift**). - Emphasizes, in continuation of CROCE, the individual and the stylistic. P.130 incisive critique of the theory of 'meaningless' particles: 'Synsemantica'' [cf. §39, #1; see also HARRIS, together with MARTY and FUNKE].

SWEET (HENRY): New English grammar. London 1892. - I, p.19: sentence 'a word or combination of words capable of expressing a thought ..'[cf. §44, #1].

THUROT (CHARLES): 'Histoire des doctrines grammaticales au moyen âge' (in: **Notices et extraits des ms. de la Bibliothèque Impériale** XXII, 2). Paris 1868. - On the system of scholastic grammar [cf. §3].

TOBLER (ADOLF): Vermischte Beiträge zur französischen Grammatik. 3rd Series. 2nd ed. Leipzig 1908. - P.150: 'Gelingt es den Liebhabern der "Ellipse" in manchen Fällen etwas ausfindig zu machen, womit der vermeintliche Überrest aus einem greulichen Wortgemetzeln sich zu einem aller erforderlichen Gliedmassen frohen Salzkörper wieder vollständigen liesse - das Motiv der Vertümmelung bleibt freilich gleich unerfindlich, wie der Grund, aus welchem durchaus so und ja nicht anders ergänzt werden soll -, so wird gerade hier es besonders schwer eine Ergänzung vorzuschlagen, die man die wünschbare

Unentbehrlichkeit im Anbeginn und Entbehrlichkeit im Laufe der Zeit nachrühmen könnte'. [Development: §65].

VALERY (PAUL): **Variété**. Paris 1924. - P.113 ff. Au sujet d'Eureka.

P.122: 'Le temps n'est plus où l'on distinguait aisément entre le matériel et le spirituel'. [Development: §6 {sic i.e 5}].

-- -- 'Les sciences de l'esprit sont-elles essentiellement différentes des sciences de la nature?' (in **Revue de synthèse II**, 1931, p.9-11): partout travail interne; système, découverte. [Cf. E. WINKLER: 'Sprachtheorie und Valéry-Deutung', in **Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Literatur LVI**, 1932, p.129-60].

VOSSLER (KARL): **Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sprachphilosophie**. Munich 1923. - Characteristic chapters: Das Leben und die Sprache p.97, Der Einzelne und die Sprache p.152.

-- -- **Geist und Kultur in der Sprache**. Heidelberg 1925. - VI. Sprache und Leben. IX. Sprache und Dichtung. - Inspired by CROCE the author, himself a masterful stylist, fights for the cause of art and the individual against the prevailing positivism. Given this bias, the normative side of language is necessarily neglected [cf. §86, #2].

WEGENER (PHILIPP): **Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens**. Halle 1885. - Psychological theory of, inter alia, psychological subject and predicate; cf. HOFFDING, GARDINER.

WIWEL (H.G.): **Synspunkter for dansk sproglære**. Copenhagen 1901. - Further: 'Om begreb og form i grammatiken' (in **Nordisk tidsskrift for filologi**, 3rd series XI, 1902-03, p.161-68). 'Mere om dansk

sproglære' (in *Dania X*, 1903, p.1-19). - Sharp and often justified criticism of traditional grammar (as in the work of, for example, KR. MIKKELSEN, whom see) but from a positivist standpoint which prevents the author from recognizing the inner form {of language} and from formulating concepts which could replace the discarded ones. - An attempt at a pedagogical revision of the still prevalent traditional parts of speech has been made - following WIWEL'S own example - by ERIK REHLING: *Dansk grammatik med ovelser*. Copenhagen 1924; *Det danske sprog. Fremstilling for lærere og seminarier*. Copenhagen 1932.

WUNDT (WILHELM): *Völkerpsychologie. Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgeschichte von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte*. V.1: *Die Sprache*. 1-2. Leipzig 1900. - Grand attempt at a verification of positivistic psychology (and logic) in the sphere of language. The linguistic horizon, however, - despite the many citations from exotic languages - is essentially Indo-European. Thus for example when both noun and verb (II, p.283) are assumed to be necessary in the sentence [critique §44, #2]. - About open and closed combinations [cf. §66] and the concept of subordinate clause [cf. §77], see index. See also VAN GINNEKEN and LENZ.

WYLD (HENRY CECIL): *The universal English dictionary*. London 1932. - Follows customary lexicographic practice [examples §16].

ZIEHEN (TH.): *Lehrbuch der Logik auf positivistischer Grundlage mit Berücksichtigung der Geschichte der Logik*. Bonn 1920. - P.618 ff.: copula [cf. §44, #2].

TABLE OF PARTES AND MEMBRA FROM MORFOLOGI OG SYNTAX

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NB sign — is equivalent to English "—" (minus)

*misprint for 'obj. encl.'

COMMENTARY

References to the translation of *Morfologi og syntax* are given in the form: Section. Line number, e.g. 80.12 = Section 80, line 12.

Title page: Motto -

As no event, no shape, entirely resembles another, so do they not entirely differ: an ingenious mixture of nature. If our faces were not alike, we could not distinguish man from beast; if they were not unlike, we could not distinguish one man from another.

The essays of Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, tr. C. Cotton. (Book III, Essay 13, 'Of experience'). University of Chicago, 1952, p.519.

The motto sets the theme of Brøndal's work, the contrast between analysis (distinguishing, subdividing) and generalization: on the one hand, the search for distinctive features, on the other, for classes and categories.

Dedication The relevance of the Dedication to Brøndal's former teacher is that the whole of the **Introduction** ('The system of grammar') is based, as Brøndal notes in his **Bibliography** above ('... provisional form of the Introduction Sec. 1 ff.') on his paper 'Le système de la grammaire' (= SG), a contribution to Jespersen's 70th birthday **Festschrift** in 1930. In the earlier paper, after some fairly searching criticism of Jespersen's system (a criticism much toned down in the present work), followed by some suggestions of his own on the points at issue, Brøndal concluded:

Je voudrais offrir ces considérations, nées surtout d'une discussion des idées claires et suggestives de M. Jespersen, à la réflexion du Maître et de tous ceux qui, comme lui, croient encore à la valeur d'une pensée systématique. (ELG/SG: 7)

For his part, the 'Master' - never one to shirk a good polemic - added

the following note to the section of **Analytic syntax** dealing with his pupil's system of grammar:

Brøndal on more than one occasion freely criticizes my own views, but that has not hindered him from dedicating his **Morfologi og syntax** to me. In the same way my own opposition to some of his opinions does not detract from my admiration for his learning and brilliancy. (Jespersen [1937] 1969: 90)

The dedications of Brøndal's other works are: PT, to Axel Højberg Christensen, the Danish Germanist; ELG, to the memory of Nikolai Sergeevitch Trubetzkoy. OKL is without formal dedication, but the last paragraph of the preface names the philosopher Harald Høffding and Jespersen as the most prominent of Brøndal's Danish mentors. (Jespersen's **Language** 1922 is dedicated to his own former teacher, the Orientalist Vilhelm Thomsen. Thomsen - Jespersen - Brøndal alone constitute an impressive teacher/pupil succession in the Danish contribution to linguistics - and the series could easily be extended in both directions.)

Title of introduction

'Grammatikens system' repeats the title of Brøndal's Jespersen **Festschrift** paper just mentioned (SG). As the term **system** appears so frequently in linguistic discussion, particularly with respect to structural linguistics, and in some schools refers specifically to the paradigmatic as opposed to the syntagmatic (Firth: systems - structures; Hjelmslev: systems - processes), it may be worth noting that the expression 'system of grammar' is of long-standing, as is indeed **system** when used as part of a title. One of the earlier senses of **system** was that of 'a complete treatise or body of any art or science' (Bailey 1733); 'a systematic treatise: obsolete except in titles of books - 1658' (S.O.D. 3rd ed. 1944: 2116), thus such titles as: W. Clare, **A compleat**

system of grammar, 1690; J. Bell, *A concise & comprehensive system of English grammar*, 1769; E. Owen, *A short system of English grammar*, 1777 (all quoted Michael 1970: 589, 591-92). Similarly for the subdivisions of grammar, as in: J. Brown, *The first part of the American system of English syntax ...*, 1841 (in Kennedy 1927: 217, item 6061). The phrase seems to have dropped out of British usage in the 19th century, William Angus' *A new system of English grammar* (Kennedy 1927: 216, item 6019) being the last occurrence, so far as I can see; and Brown's 'system of syntax' appears to be the last 19th century American use in this context, which is slightly surprising given the fact that about midcentury the American universities were consciously remodelled after the German example as the prestige of German *Wissenschaft* was beginning to outstrip its competitors in all areas. The expression has survived - this is the point here - in the Germanic tradition throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, both in titles and as a general expression. Ries, for example, in *Was ist Syntax?* speaks throughout of 'das System der Syntax', and refers, for example, to 'das System der Gesamtgrammatik' (Ries [1894] 1927: 3). Hermann Paul uses this expression in the sense of the ideal or possible arrangement of grammar according to its subdivisions when he says: 'Die Stellung der Wortbildungslehre im System der Grammatik ist umstritten' (Paul 1962: 433). Cp. too Deutschbein's *System der neuenglischen Syntax* (1917), listed by Brøndal in the bibliography of OKL. Jespersen used the phrase as the title of a work outlining his theories (*The system of grammar* 1933), while Funke used this title in the 1950s for an article reviewing the possible arrangements of the subdivisions of grammar from Priscian to modern times (Funke 1955).

1.1 ff. The opening section of the Introduction echoes the contrast of the general and the particular in the quotation from Montaigne. The corresponding section of SG refers more specifically to the various approaches to grammar, descriptive (synchronic), comparative and historical (diachronic), prescriptive, rational - universal, and positivist:

On a travaillé de manière bien différente en grammaire (= théorie de la langue). Tantôt on a décrit un état de langue considéré à un moment donné, tantôt on a étudié les rapports entre plusieurs états (grammaire comparé et historique). D'autre part les traditionalistes ont établi les règles d'une norme donnée; les rationalistes ont recherché les possibilités et conditions générales du langage humain; les positivistes enfin ont insisté surtout sur les variations dialectales.

(SG/ELG: 1)

1.2 **aspects: synspunkter** - also **viewpoints, standpoints**. The term chosen fits better, perhaps, with its frequent occurrence in titles **Aspects of ...**; cp. Wiwel's **Synspunkter for dansk sproglære**

1.3 **system**: we have just seen that 'the system of grammar' is a set expression, especially in the Germanic tradition, which predates the use of **system** as a key term of structural linguistics ('La langue est un système des signes...' Saussure [1916] 1972: 33), **system** as a network of reciprocal relations or the like. Nevertheless, the broad sense of **system** (Linnean system, **systema natura** 1735, Paley's 'The universe itself is a system' (S.O.D.)) goes back to the 17th century at least. Here Brøndal is anticipating the outcome of his investigation insofar as the results of his grammatico-logical analyses of **partes** and **membra** will be synthesized into a coherent whole, the system of grammar in the deliberate sense. (Cp Brøndal's remarks on Hjelmslev's morphology-based

suggestion that 'subject' and 'predicate' should be excluded from grammar: 'and really the concept of the system itself then too comes to stand as a hindrance to an absolute rationalization of the grammatical ... categories' (86:87-89.) To complicate matters, apart from sundry other senses of this term, **system** emerges a little later as a key term in opposition to **rhythm** (roughly, the Saussurean *langue/parole*) (9.2 ff).

2.1 ff. The eight possible subdivisions of grammar given here are a reworking of fourteen points in SG. The development involves more than condensation. The SG topics are:

1. Sons et systèmes de sons
2. Valeur symbolique des éléments phonétiques
3. Syllabe, accentuation
4. 'Sprachkörper und Sprachfunktion'; assimilation et dissimilation, métathèse
5. Syntaxe phonétique, **sandhi**, liaisons
6. Forme extérieure des mots
7. Parties du discours
8. Formation des mots, dérivation, composition
9. Flexion, fonction des formes
10. Synonymes, sémantique
11. Phrase et membre des phrases, période
12. Ordre des mots et des phrases
13. 'Rection', accord
14. Figures de rhétorique, stylistique

(SG/ELG: 1-2)

On the basis of topics ('chapitres') of major significance, 1. sounds, 9. forms, 11. sentences, Brøndal says that the generally adopted system is:

- I. Phonétique (1, 3, 5; rarement 2, 4)
- II. Morphologie (6; souvent 8)
- III. Syntaxe (11, 12, 13; 7, 9; une partie de 10 et de 14).

On y ajoute quelquefois comme parties indépendantes:

- IV. Formation des mots (8)
- V. Sémantique (10, souvent purement historique).

(SG/ELG: 2)

As an example of IV and V as separate divisions, Brøndal cites Nyrop's *Grammaire historique de la langue française*. We have already seen that Paul's division was: *Lautlehre - Formenlehre - Satzlehre - Wortbildungslehre*, with derivation and composition dealt with in the latter division, though as an appendix to syntax. (Cp. comment on 5.27 below.) What is interesting here is that SG points 1 - 4 become #1 'Sounds and their systems' and #2 'Syllable and accent'. It appears that SG 2, 'Symbolic value of phonetic elements' and SG 4, 'Sprachkörper...', have been dropped from the list. Yet when Brøndal presents the phonic part of the tripartite system of grammar in SG, called 'Phonetics' - 'Phonétique, théorie du son (ou de l'image acoustique signifiante)', an obvious echo of Saussure's dictum 'Le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique' [1916] (1972): 98) and 'Nous proposons de conserver *signe* pour désigner le total, et de remplacer ... *image acoustique* ... par ... *signifiant*' [1916] (1972): 99), even though Saussure is not mentioned in SG - it is precisely these points which are given pride of place in the elaboration of 'phonétique':

I. Phonétique. - Ici on placera la théorie de la valeur symbolique des sons (2), et le chapitre 'Sprachkörper und Sprachfunktion' (4). On n'admettra la théorie des phénomènes phonétiques qu'à titre de faits bruts et dans la mesure où elle sert utilement à la symbolique.

(SG/ELG: 6)

By 'symbolique' Brøndal means the outer side of language as against the inner, roughly Saussure's dichotomy *signifiant/ signifié* or Hjelmslev's *Expression/ Content*. (Cp. 'sounds (or more generally: symbols)' - 8.18-19.) We shall return to the question of phonics in the discussion of 7 ff. when Brøndal presents his (latest) arrangement of phonics in the system. For the moment we may note the emphasis in the SG (1930) version

on the outmoded notions of symbolic value and **Sprachkörper/-funktion**. By symbolic value of sounds Brøndal is referring to 'the idea that there is a natural correspondence between sound and sense, and that words acquire their contents and value through a certain sound symbolism'. (Jespersen 1922: 396) (In SG Brøndal refers to Jespersen's chapter on 'Sound symbolism' in the work just quoted.) As Jespersen observes, this idea 'has at all times been a favourite one with linguistic dilettanti' and goes back to the Classical dispute over whether language is by nature (**physis**) or, as Aristotle said, by convention (**thesis**). (For **physis** and **thesis** cp. M & S: 89.) It is the theme of Plato's *Cratylus*: 'the naturalist argument leaned as it must on the weight of onomatopoeia in a vocabulary and on a more general sound symbolism in the phonological structure of some words...' (Robins 1967: 18), and the wildly speculative character of naturalist arguments has made the notion suspect ever since. (Jespersen gives the example of Nigidius Figulus who explained that in uttering *vos* the lips are protruded in the direction of the persons addressed, unlike *nos*. (1922 *loc.cit.*) He adds, however, that such absurdities do not thereby rule out serious discussion of sound symbolism.) Suffice to say that sound symbolism could hardly be retained as a major constituent division of phonetics, and it is dropped in the delineation of phonetics here (M & S Section 11). **Sprachkörper und Sprachfunktion** is the title of a work by Wilhelm Horn (1921) which advances the theory that there is a relation between a word's function and its phonic form so that loss or weakening of function is accompanied by a reduction of the phonic form (short discussion without examples in Funke 1950: 44-45). Brøndal makes a brief reference to Horn's work in PT: 105, but the notion is dropped in M & S. Assimilation and dissimilation

are retained, however (11.15).

The morphology model of SG includes 'la synonymie ou sémantique (10), c'est-à-dire l'étude comparée et systématique de la signification des mots' (SG/ELG: 6), whereas here synonymics and semantics are divided between morphology and syntax (M & S Section 7.)

The syntactic model of SG has 11 (the sentence and its members) and 12 (order of words and sentences) as its constituent parts; the study of the function of inflected forms (9) - such a study makes up the entire section on syntax in a work as recent as Palmer's **The Latin language** 1954, for example - and that of the parts of speech are emphatically excluded. Government and concord (13) are assigned to heterogeneous groups outside the system proper, because 'l'étude de la rection et de l'accord est à la fois morphologique et syntaxique...' (SG/ELG: 7); here they have been grouped with the semantic side of syntax (M & S 9.39-40).

Thus we can see that Brøndal's doctrine of the system of grammar has undergone significant changes in the two years since the appearance of SG; how parts of the system in M & S are subsequently developed will be discussed in the conclusion below: for the moment, however, perhaps enough has been said to draw the reader's attention to the fact that behind the somewhat dogmatic presentation of the system in the Introduction to M&S, much in fact remains tentative.

2.5 **Sounds and their systems:** By beginning with sounds (interchangeable in the classical era with 'letters' cp. 3.4-5) Brøndal is arranging the possible topics of grammar firstly in terms of elements or material from smallest to largest unit and then listing the terminology of topics (subjects) in historical order. Subsequent outlines of particular systems are given in the reverse order, viz. name of subject or topic (e.g. **orthographia**) - elements or objects of study (e.g. **littera**). While in the case of Priscian (at least as presented here 3.1 ff.) the one-to-one correspondence means that the same overall ordering according to size results from either method, this becomes increasingly less the case as we approach Brøndal's solution and it is clear that given the confusion in the traditional subject names and the overlapping of their application the order chosen is the appropriate one here. However, in the grammatical tradition from the Middle Ages onward the choice of initial description in terms of elements or subjects has interesting implications:

There had developed within the tradition two ways of displaying the constituent parts of grammar. The older, first explicit in the work of Peter Helias in the middle of the twelfth century, was in terms of material: the constituents are letters, syllables, words and sentences. The alternative way was in terms of processes: orthography, etymology, syntax and prosody. Both medieval and renaissance grammarians tended to favour the former if their inclinations were logical rather than literary, the latter if they were literary rather than logical. Consequently prosody has a firmer place in the second.

(Michael 1970: 184)

orthographia: the Greek term **he orthographia** is simply glossed 'orthography' in L&S (citing Apollonius Dyscolus, **De adverbiiis:** 165.15; Sextus Empiricus, **Adversus mathematicos:** 1.92; it is also the name of works by Herodian, Orus and other grammarians - L&S 1940: 1248b). Similarly as a loanword in Latin but apparently rare (Georges 5th ed.

1862: 'Rechtschreibung', with single reference to Suetonius; not recorded in Lewis 1889). But to interpret this in the current sense, especially 'writing systems' or 'the study of spelling' (Collins 1979) would be misleading since the traditional use was wider and indeed overlapped with prosody by considering the pronunciation of syllables:

Orthography meant the study of the letters of the alphabet, which were enumerated, and classified as consonants, vowels, diphthongs, and often into more refined categories still. The sounds which each letter could represent were usually described. Letters compose syllables, syllables compose words; the structure of a word was therefore shown by the syllables into which it could be divided. Spelling was conceived as the division of a word into syllables, according to rules, and not simply as the enumeration of its letters ... Strictly, the pronunciation of letters and syllables belonged to orthography, and the pronunciation of words to prosody, but the distinction was quite unreal, and constantly ignored.

(*ibid.* 184-85)

(The link between letters and what ultimately came to be recognized as phonemes was probably so close in Latin, as also in some daughter languages like Spanish or Italian, that the dual sense of 'letter' as writing symbol and sound symbol seemed natural. The early 'comparative philologists' like Bopp still spoke of 'letters' in this sense. Conversely, in Modern English, with its orthographic system deriving from an earlier stage, the discrepancy is notorious. Though tachygraphy was a Greek invention, it can scarcely be an accident that England was 'the birthplace of modern shorthand' (EB 9th 1871, v. 21: 836), cp. Bright's *Characterie* of 1588; the investigation of such systems and the construction of military ciphers in the English Civil War underlay the advances of phonetic studies in the 17th century - Cooper 1685 is of special interest here again.)

orthophonia: A neologism. (Not recorded in L&S, Georges, Lewis.) Not current in English in any form (not in S.O.D., Webster's 3rd, Wyld); in 19th century = 'the art of correct speaking/articulation' (Century 1899; Webster's 1900; Ogilvie/Annandale 1903). Current in French, with additional meaning 'speech therapy' (Robert 1978, which gives 1828 as first occurrence). On the other hand, **orthoepy** is a genuine classical word - **orthoepia** 'correctness of diction' in Plato, Democritus and others (L&S) - which was used in English for the division of grammar specifically treating of pronunciation (1668 a/c S.O.D. - Wilkins? -) and 'correct pronunciation' (1801 in S.O.D. which provides the revealing example 'Formerly they regulated their orthography by their orthoepy', 1830 - the reverse of modern trends towards 'spellingpronunciations'.)

2.6 **modern 'phonology':** An advance on the description of 'sons et systèmes de sons' as 'phonétique' (cp. comment on 2.1 ff. above). Brøndal had attended the First International Congress of Linguists held at The Hague in April 1928 (1st ICL [1930]: 186, list of members) and there for the first time he encountered the ideas of Trubetzkoy and the members of the Prague Circle, ideas he found related to and confirmatory of his own ('beslagtede (og bestrykende) ideer' PT: v). Though the proceedings of the Congress were not published until 1930, the year SG was presented on the occasion of Jespersen's 70th birthday, it is hardly imaginable that Brøndal was unaware of the famous Prague Circle contribution to Proposition 22 (relating to the general question 'Quelles sont les méthodes les mieux appropriées à un exposé complet et pratique de la grammaire d'une langue quelconque?'), beginning:

Toute description scientifique de la phonologie d'une langue doit avant tout comprendre la caractéristique de son système phonologique, c.-à-d. la caractéristique du répertoire, propre à cette langue, des différences significatives entre les images acoustico-motrices.

(Jakobson, Karcevsky & Trubetzkoy [1928] 1930: 33)

As we saw above, SG recognizes the Saussurean notion in the definition of 'phonétique' as 'théorie du son (ou de l'image acoustique signifiante)'; now M & S uses the correct structural term for the study of sound systems (of a specific language), **phonology**, as opposed to **phonetics**. The term **phonology** in the broad sense of 'science of vocal sounds' is an 18th century neologism (1799 in S.O.D.), often glossed in the later 19th century as equivalent to the slightly later neologism 'phonetics' (cp. comment on 2.7 below); thus 'The science or doctrine of the elementary sounds uttered by the human voice, which shows how they are respectively formed, the distinctions between them etc.' (entry **phonetics** (Ogilvie/Annandale 1903 [1882-83 = this definition]), similarly Webster's 1900; **The Century Dictionary** 1903 (1st ed. 1889) shows Whitney's influence as editor and scholar responsible for the linguistic definitions:

1. The science or doctrine of the sounds uttered by the human voice, or used in a particular language; **phonetics** - 2. That part of grammar which treats of pronunciation. Compare **orthoëpy**. - 3. The system of sounds and of their combinations in a language.

(v. 6, p. 4451c)

There follows a quotation from Isaac Taylor's **Alphabet** (1883) which appears to illustrate the third meaning: 'the common characteristic of the Semitic alphabets ... the unique phonology ...'. English-German dictionaries of the period render **phonology** as (in addition to **Phonologie**): 'Schall- oder Tonlehre' (Lucas 1854), 'Lautlehre' (Flügel 1894), 'Lautlehre, Phonetik' (Muret-Sanders c. 1910). In practice this

Phonologie or **Lautlehre** meant especially the description of sound changes in the history of a given language, thus Wright **Historical German grammar** 1907, v.1: 'Phonology, word-formation & accident'; similarly Leskien's work on Old Church Slavonic, **Handbuch der altbulgarischen Sprache** [1871] (1922), where **Lautlehre** relates OCS to starred (reconstructed) proto-Indo-European forms.

Abercrombie believes that the current sense of phonology (cp Whitney's third definition above) is in fact of much longer standing than one might suppose, given Brøndal's gloss 'modern' ('i nyeste tid'; lit. 'most recently'):

The word phonology has been used in many different senses; the sense in which it is used [here] is one of its earliest. Peter S. Duponceau, for example read a paper to the American Philosophical Society in 1817 'English phonology; or an essay towards an analysis and description of the component sounds of the English language'...[also] H.D. Darbishire 1895 'The study of the spoken sounds of any language (as distinct from other languages) is called phonology, which also embraces the study of the changes in those sounds during the history of the language. The system of spoken sounds possessed by any language is called its phonological system or more briefly its phonology' (Abercrombie 1967: 169-70)

He adds that the exclusive sense of the study of historical sound changes 'was common in Britain during the early part of this century, but is now almost obsolete' (p.179) This could be expanded to 'common in European linguistics in the 19th century'. The development towards the Prague doctrine is well sketched by Trubetzkoy in the Introduction to the **Grundzüge**:

Linguists arrived only gradually at the separation of phonetics and phonology. J. Winteler ...1876 ... seems to have been the first to recognize correctly that there are phonic oppositions ... used to differentiate the meaning of words in a given language ... But he did not as yet conclude from this fact ... two separate sciences ...

Sweet expressed the same idea on several occasions ... This insight was stressed in particular by Otto Jespersen, the most outstanding of Sweet's students ... [but] Saussure, who recognized and clearly formulated ... the difference between langue and parole ... did not expressly insist on the necessity of distinguishing [phonology and phonetics]. In his *Cours* ... this thought is merely hinted at ... It was only J. Baudouin de Courtenay ... who arrived at the idea that there should be two distinct types of descriptive sound study ... [but] outside [his] limited circle of disciples ... [his] views ... were little known. It thus happened that the distinction did not gain any followers prior to the First World War. This idea began to become popular only in the postwar period. At the First I.C.L. in The Hague in 1928 three Russian scholars, none of whom happened to be from the school of J.B. de C., formulated a short program in which the distinction between the study of sound pertaining to the act of speech and [that] ... to the system of language was clearly and distinctly set forth.

(Trubetzkoy [1939] 1969:4-5 [Baltaxe's tr.])

While phonic studies in themselves are not of direct importance to a discussion of morphology and syntax, the recognition of the phonology/phonetics distinction is of obvious importance for 'The system of grammar'; this question was to remain of the greatest significance for Brøndal to the end, and I have pointed out elsewhere that he made original contributions to phonemic theory in the mid 1930s with a quasi-algebraic analysis of phonemic structure.

2.7 **Syllable:** The choice of the syllable as the unit of what ultimately becomes phonetics may strike the reader more familiar with the American Structuralist tradition as somewhat odd. While it is true that 2.1 speaks of sounds (& systems of sounds) as the units which ultimately become the object of the study of phonology without mentioning the phoneme anywhere in the Introduction, Brøndal was aware of the term; Trubetzkoy's notes to the Introduction of the *Grundzüge* include as the first two recommended references: 'On the relationship between phonology and phonetics, cf. Karl Bühler, 'Phonetik und Phonologie' T.C.L.P. iv [1931] 22 ff.;

Brøndal, 'Sound and phoneme' *Proc 2nd I C Phon Sc 1935* (Trubetzkoy [1939] 1969: 25). The unit in phonetics is generally 'speech sound' or 'segment'; 'phone' can be used in phonetics 'to refer to the smallest perceptible discrete segment of sound in a stream of speech ('phonic continuum' or phonic substance)' (Crystal 1980: 265), but it is also used with a different sense in phonology. At all events, the syllable does not bulk large in the American tradition, though Bloomfield himself devotes a dozen pages or so to the concept (Bloomfield 1933: 120-26, 287-90, 349-51). The syllable (apart from its articulatory significance as the pulse 'produced by the motion of the intercostal muscles' (Gleason 1961: 256)) is mentioned only casually in, say: - Harris (1960 [1951]) - and then only as 'syllabification'; - Gleason (1961) (of three references to syllable in the whole work, one is the articulatory pulse just quoted, one is to syllabic writing (e.g. Japanese *hiragana* and *katakana*), the third tells us 'A morpheme is not identical with a syllable' (p.53)); or Hockett (1958), and does not occur at all in Sledd (1959), though the grammar has the customary first chapter on 'the sounds of English'. In fine, the concept of the syllable is anything but a key term in the American tradition.

The position in the European tradition, including traditional scholarly grammar, e.g. Jespersen, is somewhat different. Jespersen's *English phonetics* [1912] 8th ed. 1966 has a 20 page chapter on 'The syllable', Paul Passy's *Petite phonétique* ... (1906) devotes half-a-dozen pages to the concept with a capitalized section heading, SYLLABES (42-47), the syllable constituting a subdivision of the main divisions of phonetics, viz. 'groupes de souffle' and 'groupes d'intensité', the latter with four

subdivisions, 'groupes de force', 'syllabes', 'durée', and 'intonation'. In the European Structuralist tradition, Trubetzkoy devotes a dozen pages of the *Grundzüge* under the heading 'Prosodic properties' to 'Syllabic nuclei' and 'Syllable and Mora', thus viewing the syllable as being of phonological significance (Trubetzkoy [1939] 1969: 170-81). In particular, the London school around J.R. Firth, followed by Halliday and proponents of what is now called Systemic linguistics, accept the syllable as a basic unit. (We shall return to Firth immediately in connexion with prosody.) Abercrombie devotes some dozen pages to the syllable in his *Elements of general phonetics*: the first section of the chapter 'The analysis of speech' is 'The syllable', where he remarks:

In order to be able to describe and compare the pronunciation of different languages, we have to analyse speech: to split up into units the unbroken stream of movements, and of resulting sound, that constitute an utterance ... One unit seems an obvious starting point for this purpose, and that is the syllable.

(Abercrombie 1967:23)

In view of this emphasis placed by the Prague school on the difference between phonology (phonemics) and phonetics (a reaction by structuralists who were stressing systems of relationships as against the 19th century preoccupation with things and facts), it may be worth noting that Abercrombie emphasizes the complementary nature of the two disciplines. Halliday had pointed out that:

The study of phonic substance belongs to a distinct but related body of theory, that of General Phonetics. Since phonology relates form and phonic substance, it is the place where linguistics and phonetics interpenetrate. Linguistics and phonetics together make up 'the linguistic sciences'.

(Halliday 1961: 244)

However, Abercrombie takes a somewhat different view of the position of phonology vis-à-vis phonetics by making phonology a part of the latter:

The study of the phonology of languages is, of course, of great importance in general linguistics also, in fact it provides the common ground between the two 'linguistic sciences'... it is nevertheless an integral part of the subject of phonetics, and is not a separate subject, although the word 'phonology' is at times used as though it was a name for one.

(Abercrombie 1967:71)

By today's standards, then, the question of whether the syllable is basically phonetic or phonological in nature is not an issue of great importance. What is of importance for Brøndal is that the syllable is the unit of 'rhythm', parole, speech, the syntagmatic axis, and here Firth would agree:

Let us regard the syllable as a pulse or beat, and a word or piece as a sort of bar length or grouping of pulses which bear to each other definite interrelations of length, stress, tone, quality ... The principle to be emphasized is the interrelation of the syllables, ... the syntagmatic relations, as opposed to the paradigmatic or differential relations of sounds in vowel and consonant systems, and to the paradigmatic aspect of the theory of phonemes ...

(Firth [1948] 1957: 128)

Accent: Cp. Michael above: pronunciation of letters & syllables = orthography, that of words = prosody, 'but the distinction was quite unreal'. See also the following note on **prosodia** with reference to accentuation in prosody.

Prosodia: We have seen Michael's comment (under 2.5 above) that prosody as process tended to fall within the province of the literary rather than the linguistic. For this reason, then, the continuous popularity of the **partes** since classical times in grammatical discussion, and the relatively late appearance of **membra**, a prosodic term, in regard to

syntax. And just as the subject/object distinction in grammar is an offshoot of logic, the notion of the parts of the sentence, especially in the Germanic tradition as *Glieder*, *led* ... is an offshoot of literary prosody, metric analysis of verse, though indeed grammar in the traditional sense included just this kind of prosody: the earliest senses of *he grammatike tekhnē*, the art of grammar were: knowledge of *ta grammata*, letters, i.e. the skill of reading and writing (Robins 1967:13); and also, knowledge of the phonetic values of the letters:

This consideration included also accentuation, and was closely related to the study of metre and music. Pronunciation and verification being naturally associated with each other, and both being part of *grammatike*, it is not surprising that, as prosody, they remained part of grammar, in England, until well into the 19th century.

(Michael 1970:24)

It is this sense of prosody that Brøndal has in mind ('earlier *prosodia*') and he realizes that some other term for the subject will be more appropriate. We may note briefly, however, that prosody has been revived as a grammatical technique and that still in the 'forties. In a famous paper 'Sounds and prosodies' Firth challenged the 'apotheosis of the sound-letter in the phoneme' and suggested an alternative strategy:

We are accustomed to positional criteria in classifying phonematic variants or allophones as initial, medial ...[etc] Such procedure makes abstraction of certain postulated units, phonemes ... Looking at language material from a syntagmatic point of view, any phonetic features characteristic of and peculiar to such positions or junctions can just as profitably ... be stated as prosodies of the sentence or word. Penultimate stress or junctional geminations are also obvious prosodic feature in syntagmatic junction. Thus the phonetic and phonological analysis of the word can be grouped under the two headings [of the title], sounds and prosodies. ... The study of prosodies in modern linguistics is in a primitive state compared with the techniques for the systematic study of sounds. The study of sounds and the theoretical justification of roman notation have led

first to the apotheosis of the sound-letter in the phoneme and later to the extended use of such doubtful derivatives as 'phonemics' and 'phonemicist', especially in America ... There is a tendency to use one magic phoneme principle within a monosystemic hypothesis. I am suggesting alternatives to such a 'monophysite' doctrine.

(Firth [1948] 1957: 123)

An outstanding application of prosodic analysis is shown in Lyons' paper 'Phonemic and non-phonemic phonology', where phonemic, morphophonemic and prosodic analyses of Turkish are given (for major and minor vowel harmony); Lyons concludes 'that [the prosodic formula] gives a 'truer' picture of the language seems impossible to deny' (Lyons [1962] 1973: 196). It is not the intention of the proponents of prosodic analysis, however, to replace the phoneme *tout court*, despite Professor Firth's strictures. They suggest that prosodic analysis fits some languages (especially Japanese - Firth's original example - 'we never met any unit or part which had to be called a phoneme' (Firth [1948] 1957: 125), Arabic, and some Indian and African languages) better than does a phonemic analysis. Current versions of Systemic linguistics hedge their bets and thus the units of English phonology are said to be: 'tone group, foot, syllable and phoneme' (Sinclair 1972: 15; Berry 1977: 77).

2.7-8 **phonetics or study of articulation:** *phonetikos* (adj.) meant 'vocal' and Zeno of Citium (the Stoic) used to *phonetikon* for 'the faculty of speech' (L&S 1940: 1968a). The modern term based on this form is a neologism later than **phonology**. For *phonetic* S.O.D. indicates 1826 as the earliest occurrence, and for **phonetics**, 1841; adjective and noun are identical in French, *phonétique*, but Robert 1978 gives 1827 for the adjective and 1869 for the noun ('Branche de la linguistique qui étudie les phonèmes' [sic]: p. 1424b). (Since the word *phonème* (to *phonema*

sound, utterance, speech, language - L&S 1940: 1968a) was first used by A. Dufriche-Desgenettes in 1873 (Godel 1957: 160), the first occurrence of **phonétique** as a noun can scarcely have matched the suggested definition.)

Brøndal's original reads: 'fonetik eller artikulationslære'; the latter is the only Latin-Danish hybrid (with the possible exception of **lydsystemlære**, 'study of sound systems' - M&S 3.4-5 - which occurs as a paraphrase rather than a key term) in this section. Cp. also comments in the introductory section on Germanic Grammatical Terminology on the survival of 'articulation' in the Germanic system and in English terminology in a phonic sense which excludes its application in syntax as an equivalent of **Gliederung**. Phonetics, of course, is not restricted to articulatory phonetics; acoustic and auditory phonetics are the other generally accepted main divisions of the subject. We have already observed that Brøndal continued to elaborate his doctrine of the sound side of language after M & S; it is sufficient to note here that in DSG 1942 Brøndal retains the syllable as the syntagmatic unit of 'rhythm' (**parole**) but finally rejects phonetics as a linguistic discipline, relegating it to the status of an auxiliary science bordering on physiology and physics; it is replaced by prosody (cp. remarks on Firthian prosodic analysis above).

2.9 **synonymics**: synonymic as a noun ('The study of synonyms, as a department of grammar') is presumably later than the adjectival use (1816 in S.O.D.); 'also **synonymics** 1857' (S.O.D.). **Synonymy** in this sense is older (1683 in S.O.D.) and is current, but I have hesitantly opted for

less usual form generally to emphasize Brøndal's view of synonymics as a systematic study which is the counterpart of semantics.

his view of synonymics as being of equal status to semantics seems peculiar to Brøndal and to Behagel (from whom he may have taken the idea). The phenomenon of synonymy is evidently a part of semantics, but generally receives less attention than Brøndal's classification suggests (cp. diagram in M&S 9): Ullmann devotes half-a-dozen pages to synonymy (1959: 108-114), while Lyons treats it as a part of hyponymy, itself only a five page section of the chapter on 'Structural semantics II: sense relations' (Lyons 1977: 291-95). Cp. also note on 'study of meaning' 2.11-12 below.

2.10 Girard: The Abbé Gabriel Girard 1677-1748. According to the *Grand dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle* 1866 'Il vécut très retiré, et l'on ne sait presque rien des circonstances de sa vie' (v.8: 1267). *Grand Larousse* 1964 describes him as a French grammarian; sometime chaplain to the Duchesse de Berry, then Royal Secretary-Interpreter for Russian and the Slavonic languages. He was elected to the *Académie* in 1744. Brøndal's lasting interest in Girard (who is listed in the bibliographies of OKL, M & S and PT) does not appear to be shared by many. Girard is not mentioned in, say, *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* 9th (or any subsequent) edition. He is not mentioned in Saussure's *Cours* or in Vendryes' *Langage*, or even in Ullmann's *Principles of semantics* (2nd ed. 1957), a work whose scope of reference rivals that of Brøndal. While Dinneen 1967 lists *Les vrais principes* ... (1747) in his bibliography, he does not discuss Girard in the text. I have not been able to locate a copy of Girard 1718 in

Australia; however, the preface to Sardou's *Nouveau dictionnaire de synonymes français* 1932 contains a lengthy quotation from the work which is worth reproducing. Sardou says that it has become common for linguists to claim that there are no (true) synonyms in any given language ('il n'y a point de synonymes dans les langues'), adding: 'Voici ce que disait l'Abbé Girard il y a plus de cent ans':

Il ne faut point s'imaginer que les mots qu'on nomme **synonymes** le soient dans toute la rigueur d'une ressemblance parfaite, en sorte que la sens soit aussi uniforme entre eux que l'est la saveur entre deux gouttes d'eau de la même source. Car en les considérant de près, on verra que cette ressemblance n'embrasse pas toute l'étendue et la force de la signification; qu'elle ne consiste que dans une idée principale que tous énoncent, mais que chacun diversifie à sa manière par une idée accessoire, qui lui constitue un caractère propre et singulier. La ressemblance que produit l'idée générale fait donc les mots synonymes; et la différence qui vient de l'idée particulière qui accompagne la générale, fait qu'ils ne le sont pas parfaitement, et qu'on les distingue comme les nuances de la même couleur.

(Girard 1718, in Sardou 1932: iii-iv)

Girard attempted to make a systematically linked inventory of the vocabulary of French as did Roget for English a century later. That such schemes had universal ambitions is borne out by the quotation from Wilkins' *Real character* in Roget's preface to the first edition of the *Thesaurus* (q.v.). The casual user of a dictionary of synonyms would, one imagines, be likely to consider it as a practical tool only, rather than a Baconian scheme of classification. Technical thesauri are clearly hierarchical as well within the given province of specialization (thus the denomination of all chosen terms as 'broader than, equal to, narrower than'); to claim that similar attempts for the whole vocabulary can have theoretical status is another thing. Nevertheless, something of this sort underlies Brøndal's view of synonymics as theoretical and thus part of

system (*langue*) as opposed to lexicography, which he takes to be practical and thus part of **rhythm** (*parole*).

2.11 **use of words**: while 'use of words' sounds slightly awkward in comparison with 'usage', in the original the approach by element or material evidently forms a series: 1. Sounds and their systems 2. Syllable and accent. 3. Words and their systems. 4. Use of words. 5. Word classes etc.

rhetoric: It has been pointed out in the section on **Membra & Partes** that Cicero, following the example of Aristotle, considered the tactics of the deployment of sentence members within the period as an important part of oratory. (cp. Jebb's classic article 'rhetoric', **Encyclopaedia Britannica** 9th ed. 1886 v. 20: 508-16 with a detailed analysis of Aristotle's **Rhetoric**.) Rhetoric thus was wider in scope than 'usage'; it also involved considerations of metre and style.

2.11-12 **study of meaning**: **betydningslære** is the Danish native equivalent of (usually) **semantics** (thus, for example, in V&B); cp. German **Bedeutungslehre**. In other contexts one might merely omit the native term (since 'semantics or semantics' would be clearly pointless), but Brøndal immediately offers two Latin equivalents - **semasiology** or **semantics**, intended clearly as synonymous alternatives (thus in Wahrig 1968 for example under **Semasiologie**, **Semantik**) the former being current in German linguistics from about the 1870s (cp. titles quoted by Paul (1920:74): Heerdegen, **Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Semasiologie** 1875; Hey, **Semasio-**

logische Studien, 1888?; Schneider, *Semasiologische Beiträge* 1, 1892-), the latter term being preferred in French (Bréal, *Essai de sémantique*, 1897: see bibliography to M & S). Ullmann notes that of the various rivals ('sematology', 'semology' etc.) only semasiology and semantics are current (1950s), and although the two are synonymous in philology, semantics has a wider general application, especially in philosophy (Ullmann 1957: 4-5). (According to Dubois et al. 1973, (346, 432) *sémasiologie* is in contrast with *onomasiologie*, both being parts of *sémantique*: this notion appears to derive from Hjelmslev.) A further difficulty arises in the case of Behagel's system (4.5 below). Finally, the subtitle of Brøndal's last major work, *Præpositionernes teori* 1940, is: 'Indledning til en rationel betydningsslære'. In ELG, an abstract is given of this and the subtitle reads: 'Introduction à une *synonymie* rationnelle' (my emphasis), while Naert's 1950 translation has 'Introduction à une *sémantique* rationnelle' (do.). Rosally Brøndal and Knud Togeby edited the ELG and presumably wrote the abstract; however, Brøndal normally provided a French abrégé of his Danish works (with the exception of M&S and PT) - OKL has an appended French summary of over 50 pages - and it is a reasonable guess that the French summary subtitle ('synonomie ...') is his suggestion. They (RB & KT) also wrote the foreword to Naert's translation with notes on textual emendations. From which I conclude that *betydningslære* is best rendered 'study of meaning' here. (GT has pointed out to me that the 2nd Supplement to OED quotes German use of *Semasiologie* as early as 1829.)

2.13 **word classes:** I have added 'parts of speech' here to provide a link

with the Latin term; in fact Brøndal, in keeping with modern English linguistic terminology, is opposed to the older expression, cp. OKL: 'den gamle sammenblanding af de to områder ...i betegnelsen **talens dele**' ('the old confusion of the two domains [language and speech].. in the designation **The parts of speech**') (OKL 52). Even so, OKL was translated as **Les parties du discours**, although the expression 'classe/classement des mots' exists in French.

partes orationis: See the separate discussion in the section on **Partes and membra** above.

2.16 **etymologia, analogia or accidentia:** Etymology now has roughly its classical meaning: thus **etymologeo** 'analyse a word and find its origin', in, for example, Athenaeus (Grammaticus), Strabo: L&S 1940: 704a; Georges, **etymologia:** '... die Wortableitung, Etymologie; von Cicero durch **veriloquium, notatio**, von andern durch **originatio** übersetzt' (Georges 1862; 1, 1534). Now derivation (**Ableitung, afledning**) in morphology refers to the study of the process of word-formation as opposed to inflexion or compounding. In some historical linguistic studies, however, derivation is used as a synonym of etymology in the current sense (as in Georges' definition), The sense of **etymology** was formerly larger and even embraced the study of the **partes**, Brøndal's #5; the S.O.D. traces the development:

- 1a. The process of expounding the elements of a word with their modifications of form and sense..1588. b. The facts relating to the formation and derivation (of a word) c. (obs.) Etymological sense 1714.
2. The branch of linguistic science which treats of the origins of words 1646.
3. **Grammar.** The part of grammar which treats

of the parts of speech, their formation and inflexions 1592.
(S.O.D. 3 1944: 638)

The connexion with **analogy** is brought out well by Michael with regard to the English tradition to 1800:

Etymology and **syntax** were the basic divisions of grammar. Etymology carried two principal senses: 'word-variation' (including 'word-formation') and 'word provenance'. The former was by far the more common, and **etymology** was the usual name for that division of grammar which described the parts of speech. When the provenance of words became a more frequent topic in the grammars some writers used **analogy** for word-variation and **etymology**, or more often **derivation**, for word-provenance.

(Michael 1970: 185)

Moreover, the fluctuation and overlapping of the meanings of these terms in the given period was such that they can best be appreciated when set out in tabular form:

Provenance of words	etymology: commonly till 1700, seldom thereafter. derivation: commonly after 1700.
Variation of words (principally inflection)	etymology: throughout. analogy: sometimes before 1750; often thereafter.
Formation of words (principally suffixes and compounds)	etymology: throughout. derivation: sometimes, between 1700 and 1750. analogy: sometimes, throughout.

(Michael 1970: 185)

accidentia: The Greek **parepomai** 'accompany', 'attend', whence the participial form to **parepomenon**, 'attribute', in logic 'consequence' (Aristotle); **ta parapomena**, 'attendant circumstances' (Longinus) - L&S 1940: 1337a. Whence in Dionysius Thrax, the categories or consequential attributes of a given word class (Robins 1967: 34); in Priscian the Latin equivalent is **accidentia** or 'accompaniments' or formal categories of a

word class (Michael 1970: 107).

2.18 **The sentence and its members:** See separate discussion of **partes** and **membra** above. The study of the **partes** constitutes general morphology, and that of their counterparts, the **membra**, general syntax. This suggests, at least as set out so far, that the problem of morphology and syntax in their general form might be addressed by studying the appropriate units, word-classes and sentence members. This is in fact the line taken by Brøndal (M & S 9.19 ff.), though many linguists would disagree.

2.19 **Government and concord:** The original has **rektion og congruens**. **Rektion** in English is described as 'rare' in S.O.D., first use 1637, defined as 'syntactical government, regimen' (p.1678). **Congruence** is specifically labelled as a grammatical term in few English dictionaries; the **Century** 1903 has 'gr. concord, agreement' and Webster's 3rd has '= agreement 4', which proves to be the grammatical sense. It is unlabelled in, e.g., S.O.D. 1944, Wyld 1936, Ogilvie/Annandale 1903, Collins 1979, Webster's International 1900. It appears that while the phenomena were familiar to the classical grammarians, there were not set terms in Greek or Latin, such relations being described actively, e.g., certain verbs 'demand' the genitive. This is doubtless the reason for the number of alternatives suggested in the renaissance period. The Port Royal Grammar used **convenance** (following Ramus' **convenientia**) and **régime** (Arnauld & Lancelot 1660: 140). For current English usage, Crystal says 'The term concord is more widely used [than agreement] in linguistic studies' (Crystal 1980: 19).

3.1 **Priscian, the most original ...**: Priscian is generally considered the greatest representative of the Roman grammatical tradition, but his achievement is usually seen as being one of synthesis rather than invention. 'Though he drew much from his Latin predecessors, his aim, like theirs, was to transfer as far as possible the grammatical system of Thrax's *Technē* [morphology] and of Apollonius' writings [on syntax] to Latin'. (Robins 1967: 56)

3.4-5, 3.6 **littera - sound systems:**

All this had already been set out for Greek ... and the phonetic descriptions of the letters as pronounced segments and of the syllable structures carry little of linguistic interest except for their partial evidence of the pronunciation of the Latin language.
(Robins 1967: 56)

'sound systems' = original *lydsystemlære*, identified with phonology in M & S 6.5.

3.6-7 **study of articulation or phonation**: original, *lyddannelseslære*, identified with phonetics in M&S 6.7. *Lyddannelse* is rendered 'articulation', 'phonation' in V&B. Strictly, **phonation** refers to 'any vocal activity in the larynx whose role is one neither of initiation nor of articulation' (Crystal 1980: 265), but as *lyddannelse* means literally 'sound creation', V&B's alternative in a less technical sense seems acceptable.

3.9 **dictio**: the sense **word** is from Priscian's definition: 'dictio est pars minima orationis constructæ', 'dictio is the minimum part or unit of

sentence structure' (Keil I.16); in this he was following Dionysius Thrax: *lexis esti meros tou kata syntaxin logou elakhiston* (original only quoted Robins 1967: 43 without reference; according to L&S: 1038, = ed. Bekker DT 633.31) 'lexis is the smallest unit of discourse' (Michael 1970: 44); (lit. 'lexis is the smallest part of the grammatically arranged *logos*, sentence') , a definition scarcely improved until Bloomfield's ('..the word, as the minimum of free form...': Bloomfield 1933: 178). *Dictio*, like *lexis*, had the main senses **speech, diction, style** (cp. L&S: 1038; Lewis: 300) but *lexis* had been used for a single word by Aristotle, Epicurus and by Diogenes Babylonius the Stoic of the famous meaningless *blityri*, whereas *dictio* as 'word' seems to be confined to later grammarians like Diomedes (4th century AD: '*Dictio est vox articulata cum aliqua significatione...*', 'the word is an articulate sound with some meaning', Michael 1970: 45) and Priscian after him (5th century AD).

The study of words: ordlære, identified with lexicology M & S 6.11-12.

3.10 **oratio**: corresponds to Thrax' *logos*; more generally in classical usage, 'speech', 'discourse', 'language', etc., hence Brøndal's gloss **tale, speech**.

the study of sentences: sætningslære, translated literally to maintain parallelism of Latin elements and Germanic process terms in this section, in M & S 6 (a), (b), (c) and (d) and throughout the work.

4 NYROP: Kristoffer Nyrop was one of Brøndal's three teachers in language at the University of Copenhagen, the other two being Vilhelm Thomsen and Otto Jespersen. According to Fischer-Jørgensen and others, it was to Nyrop's Chair of Romance Languages that Brøndal succeeded in 1928.

4.3 BEHAGEL: Otto Behagel (1854-1936), Germanist, Professor at Heidelberg, Basel and Giessen: '... einer der führenden Junggrammatiker, dessen Arbeiten zur Sprachgeschichte und Syntax noch heute unentbehrlich sind' (Brockhaus 1967, v.2: 463). In SG Behagel was not mentioned, the three systems outlined there being those of Ries, Noreen and Jespersen. Behagel's four volume *Deutsche Syntax* 1923-32 (vol. 4 appeared in time to be included in Brøndal's bibliography here) remains a standard work and Behagel ranks with Hermann Paul as one of the great authorities on German syntax in the first half of the twentieth century. Apart from the fact that *Deutsche Syntax* had been completed since SG (1930), Behagel's work has doubtless been chosen as an exemplar of syntactic theory because it can more truly be described as a systematic study of syntax (though traditional in spite of attempts at strict objectivity vis-à-vis the 'subjectivism' of 19th century grammarians like Grimm), whereas Ries' short though incisive work of 1894 devotes the first 60 pages (of a total text of 145) to a sustained polemic against other theories of syntax and is largely concerned with the the issue of the place of syntax in the system of grammar. At the same time, this new positivism in syntax overlooked the emerging phenomenological and structural philosophies of grammar. Glinz observes that the failure of Paul and Behagel to take cognizance of the work of Saussure and Husserl is remarkable from the

standpoint of the history of linguistics:

Wissenschaftsgeschichtlich ist bemerkenswert, dass Werke wie die PAULsche und die BEHAGELsche Syntax 1919/21 und 1923/32 erscheinen konnten, ohne Notiz zu nehmen von SAUSSURE (*Cours*, 1916) und HUSSERL (*Logische Untersuchungen*, 1900/1901).

(Glinz 1967: 55)

(A criticism which cannot be levelled at Brøndal, of course.)

4.5 **Bedeutungslehre**: = **betydningslære** 3.28, the study of meaning, equated by Brøndal with 'semasiology or semantics' (cp. comment on 2.11-12 above), is divided by Behagel into semasiology and synonymics. Thus in Behagel's case, semasiology cannot simply be the preferred term for semantics, but is subordinate.

DAUZAT, RICHTER: grouped with Behagel because the 'first cut' of the division of grammar is phonetics (in the older broad sense, but cp. Abercrombie 2.7 above for defence of that sense) and semantics, Behagel's I. **Lautlehre** II. **Bedeutungslehre**. Brøndal quotes Dauzat: 'Tout langage suppose deux facteurs essentiels ... le son et l'idée. D'où la division de la linguistique en ... la phonétique ... et la sémantique ...' (M & S Bibliography above). Similarly, he notes of Richter: 'Divides - like DAUZAT and HJELMSLEV - all linguistic phenomena into phonetic and semantic [ones]' (M & S Bibliography). The position of Hjelmslev here is by no means simple and will be discussed later, as he denied the practical significance of the separation of morphology and syntax (-**Principes** ... 1928); later he denied that the division could be made at all.

4.10 NOREEN: Adolf Gotthard Noreen (1858-1925), Professor of Scandinavian languages at Uppsala from 1887 to 1915. Brøndal lists only vol. 5 (1904-05) of Noreen's *Vort språk* ('one of the greatest undertakings in the history of grammar': Lotz 1954) from the standpoint of the system of grammar. (In SG Brøndal refers to vols 1 and 5.) Begun in 1903, the work was projected to be in nine volumes; by 1918 five had been completed; v.7 and parts of volume 9 appeared by 1924. 'The very massiveness of the work (...3,348 pages) obscured its great theoretical importance, which was not remedied by the German extract tardily published in 1923 (Noreen-Pollak)' (Haugen & Markey 1972: 1485). Jespersen thought that it was one of 'the two best thought-out attempts at establishing a consistent system of arrangement of grammatical facts' (Jespersen 1924: 39), the other being Ries' *Was ist Syntax?* (But cp. my remark above on Ries under Behagel.) (Paul noted Noreen's exploitation of Germanic terminology to cover 'sentence' vis-à-vis 'clause', otherwise stated in terms of *Satz/ Nebensatz* etc.:

Noreen sucht die Schwierigkeit [viz. the difference of dependent and independent clauses] aus dem Wege zu gehen, indem er für den abgeschlossenen Satz die Bezeichnung 'mening' einführt, um dann die Bezeichnung 'sats' noch für den Nebensatz verwenden zu können.

(Paul 5th ed. 1920: 123)

From the Bibliography of M & S and a note in SG, it is evident that Brøndal's reference '1907-23' includes the German abridgment.

4.11 phonology (about the 'matter' or 'substance' of language ...): in the original, 'fonologi (om sprogets 'stof')'. Reduced form of SG: 'phonologie (dont la phonétique, purement physique, n'est qu'une simple science auxiliaire)' (SG 4). In spite of Brøndal's solution of the

problem of the distribution of 'the study of sound' here in M & S with respect to *langue* and *parole* (Sec. 7), it is precisely Noreen's view of phonetics as a purely auxiliary (non-linguistic) science that Brøndal ultimately adopts in DSG (1942: 136). Noreen chose three aspects for the study of language: material, content and form. But simply to say that phonology is the study of the phonic substance, Hjelmslev's 'expression', hardly does justice to Noreen's clear expression of the phonemic principle; cp. Tullio de Mauro's appendix 'Noreen et Saussure' in his edition of the *Cours* (Saussure [1916] 1972: 390-94), which quotes the original Swedish extensively. Not only must phonology be distinguished from its closest *hjälpvetenskap* phonetics, but this in turn must be distinguished from its own auxiliary science, acoustics. Noreen's pupil Collinder claimed him as a precursor both of Saussure and of Prague phonology; given Brøndal's enthusiasm for both developments, it is slightly surprising that his attitude to Noreen seems on the tepid side compared with that of his own 'master', Jespersen (cp. Brøndal's note on *Vårt språk* in his Bibliography here: 'new, frequently unfortunate and superfluous terminology').

Brøndal's numeric reference, #1 - #2, needs clarification: Sec. 2#1 identifies the study of sounds and their systems with modern phonology, Sec. 2#2 identifies the study of the syllable and the accent, formerly prosody, with modern phonetics or the study of articulation. But Noreen, as has just been pointed out, assigned to phonetics the status of an auxiliary science. Brøndal's Sec. 2#2 is in fact realised as prosody in *Vårt språk*:

The articulated speech phenomena are treated under two headings:

qualitative phonology and prosodic phonology. In the qualitative aspects of phonology, differential meaning occurs as a mark of a phoneme (Vårt språk I: 407) ... The prosodic features are defined - probably for the first time - as contrasts in the sequence. They include ... sonority, intensity, duration and tone. The chapter on sonority deals with the syllabics and with distribution ... The study of prosodics is original, but it seems clear that sonority is a different type of phenomenon from the other prosodic features; it is a structuring pulsation in the speech current, whereas the others are modifications just like the qualitative features.

(Lotz [1954] 1966, II:61)

Though the matter is less vital to Brøndal's overall concern in M & S, the ultimate relegation of phonetics from the system of grammar in DSG follows Noreen by establishing prosody as the study of sound from the aspect of 'rhythm', 'parole'. (DSG loc.cit.)

4.13 **semology** the content of language: Danish and Swedish, **semologi**. The term appears to have been coined by Noreen: Malmberg remarked that 'Noreen est un précurseur de la sémiologie (qu'il appelait 'sémiologie')' (Malmberg 1983: 33). The second aspect of linguistic study for Noreen, content (Danish: *indhold*, Swedish *innehåll*) is defined thus:

Betydelsesläran eller semologien, som redogör för språkets psykiska innehåll: de idéer som genom språkljuden meddelas och på så sätt utgöra dessas 'betydelse'. Semologien är noga att skilja icke blott från sin närmaste hjälpvetenskap 'språkfilosofien', utan äfven [även] från den del af psykologien, som handlar om föreställningarna och de ännu högre förnimmelserna, samt - och detta kan icke nog kraftigt inskärpas - från 'logiken', läran om begreppen såsom sådana (och icke blott så vidt de [har?] fått språkligt uttryck) och om dessas (men icke de språkliga uttryckens) förbindelser.

(Noreen 1903-24 I: 51, quoted Tullio de Mauro 1972: 393)

(The study of meaning or semology, which deals with the psychological content of language: the ideas which are communicated by means of speech sound and in this way constitute their 'meaning'. Semology must be strictly (noga) distinguished not only from its closest auxiliary science 'the philosophy of language', but also from that part of psychology which deals with ideas or representations [cp. *Vorstellungen*] and with even higher perceptions, but also - and this cannot be sufficiently emphasized - from 'logic', the

science or study of concepts as such (and not only insofar as they have found linguistic expression) and of their relations (but not the relations of linguistic expressions).)

I have quoted this passage of 1903 as it is of considerable interest in comparison with the attempt to apply logic in grammar not merely by Brøndal in M&S, but by many Danes from Jespersen (*Sprogets logik* 1913) to the Glossematicians (Hjelmslev, Ulldal, Togeby), Hammerich and more recently Diderichsen and H.S. Sørensen. (Nor is the issue settled today: in the wake of the failed 'revolution' of TGG, the cause of logic in linguistics has been taken up by proponents of modal logic, especially 'Montague' logic, though all such calculi seem to be losing their appeal in the face of more recent sophisticated computer 'network' models of cognitional structures ('connectionism', 'parallel distributed processing') which have been 'sweeping the academic world during the past two years, and which jettisons the concept of rule-governed behaviour (in language, or any other domain) as a crude myth' (Sampson 1987).) Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that Jespersen took his cue from Sweet (cp. Hallon 1981: 149), both from Sweet's famous paper 'Words, logic and grammar' 1875-76 and from his **New English grammar: logical and historical** 1891-98. And it is all the more interesting to find that in spite of Noreen's rejection of the general relevance of logic to grammar - of course, all the Danish grammarians preface their work by warning against the misapplication of logic, 'pseudologic', to grammar, but each goes on to argue for some special application, Aristotelian, Set Theoretical or whatever - that he adopted Sweet's concept of the grammatical relations subordination and coordination. While the notion evidently bears on syntax (which Noreen includes in his 'morphology'),

the relations are discussed in vol. 5 of *Vårt språk* (published in separate sections between 1904 and 1912) which is devoted to semology. Diderichsen, in his paper 'De tre hovedarter af grammatisk forbindelse' (a deliberate reference to Jespersen's *De to hovedarter ... 1921*), discusses the gradual emergence of the notion of relational concepts like predication and attribution, crediting Girard 1747 with the first outlines of the theory of sentence members, and points out that for the development of clear-cut relational concepts grammarians firstly had to recognize that the relations of coordination and subordination can exist between clauses/ sentences and sentence members, and that such relations can exist whether expressed by a conjunction or not. Diderichsen says that apart from Girard, the earliest recognition of this is to be found in Sweet (*New English Grammar*, v.I, Sec. 45 = p.18) from whom it was adopted in a modified form and with new terminology by Noreen (reference to *Vårt språk* V: 169ff):

For at der ... skulle kunne udvikles et system af klare relationsbegreber, måtte man først indse at ikke blot sideordning, men også underordning kunde finde sted så vel mellem sætninger som mellem sætningsled, og at en sådan relation kunne foreligge, uanset om den utryktes ved en konjunktion eller ej. Denne opfattelse har jeg (bortset fra Girard) tidligst fundet hos Sweet, fra hvem den i modificeret form og med ny terminologi overtages af Adolf Noreen ...
(Diderichsen [1952] 1966: 195)

Brøndal's criticism of Noreen's concept of semology is sharp and explicit in SG:

Tandis que la phonologie du savant suédois ne fait guère de difficulté (1 - 4, 5?) [VB's"?: but cp. preceding comment on Noreen's prosodic phonology], sa 'sémologie' (10?) [do.] ne peut pas être considérée comme un progrès. Une théorie des significations qui ne part pas des formes linguistiques risque fort en effet ... d'échouer dans des constructions de philosophie populaire (ou de 'sens commun') qui n'ont rien à faire avec la nature profonde du langage.
(SG/ELG: 4)

The essence of his objection would seem to be that Noreen's semology is, as it is glossed in SG '[une] théorie psychologique du langage'. Lotz, however, finds this

...the most original part of Noreen's work. He defines [semology] as the study of linguistically formed psychological content and distinguishes it sharply from semantics, the study of 'ideas' in general, just as phonology is distinguished from phonetics. Semology includes two sub-disciplines: the study of categories, and the study of functions - nothing was published on the latter...the study of categories is the classification of meaning into various sub-categories. In the latter he treats problems like: utterance and 'glosa', which corresponds to autosemantica and synsemantica in traditional terminology. He distinguishes the deictic and symbolic spheres (which later became famous part of Bühler's *Sprachtheorie*).

(Lotz [1954] 1966, II: 6-)

Brøndal retained his objections to psychologically based linguistics ever since his critical review of Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* in one of Høffding's seminars about 1905 or 1906 ('dengang nye og aktuelle' PT (v) - vol. 1 of Wundt's work *Die Sprache* was published in 1900, but the second edition came out in 1904). I have already mentioned (comment on Sec. 2.7 above) that Bühler and Brøndal were the first two references given by Trubetzkoy in the *Grundzüge* 'on the relation between phonology and phonetics'; *Sprachtheorie* was published in 1934, but there is little reference in Brøndal's work after that time to Bühler, save for a 1939 review of Karl von Ettmayer's *Das Ganze der Sprache und seine logische Begründung*, 1938, which is based on the theories of Wundt, Bühler and Trubetzkoy. What is perhaps surprising here - given Brøndal's sympathy with the Prague School (cp. M & S 11.25 ff.) - is that Bühler was closely associated with the Prague Circle, published in its *Travaux*, and enjoyed the respect of its leading figures - indeed, one might say he was himself one of these, although not considered primarily a linguist (cp. 'the

German philosopher and psychologist Karl Bühler ...': Lepschy 1970: 53 = Chap. III 'The Prague School'). (Bühler was himself sharply critical of Brøndal's OKL - though his criticism was based only on the French summary of the work - in *Sprachtheorie* (p. 303).

Diderichsen has drawn attention to the similarity of Noreen's ideas on 'utterance' and 'glosa' (cp. Lotz above) with Husserl's development of Marty's auto- and synsemantika at about the same time:

Husserls undersøgelser er omtrent samtidige med Noreens ... og kunne opfattes som den almene teoretiske underbygning under den svenske forskers sprogteori, så nær beslægtede er de i deres tankegang, skønt de næppe har kendt hinandens arbejder.

(Diderichsen [1952] 1966: 207) (my emphasis)

4.14 **morphology**: the gloss in SG, 'théorie des formes linguistiques, partie centrale de la grammaire' is strikingly similar to the definition given by Noreen:

Formläran eller morfologien, som redogör för det särskilda sätt, hvarpå ljudmaterialet i betydelseinnehållets tjänst formas till 'språkformer'. Formläran utgör grammatikens centrala och viktigaste del, hvadan den och är skarpt skild från andra vetenskaper.

(Noreen 1903-24 I: 51, quoted Tullio de Mauro 1972: 393)

(The study of forms or morphology, which deals with the specific means whereby the phonic substance is made into linguistic forms in the service of the meaning content. The study of form (morphology) occupies the most central and important part of grammar and, thanks to morphology, grammar is clearly distinct from the other sciences.)

(The French version of the first part here is: La science de la forme ou morphologie, qui se préoccupe de décrire la façon dont le matériel phonique est modélé au service du contenu significatif en 'formes linguistiques'.)

Lotz points out that this section of **Vårt språk**

... [describes] the meaningful signalling units. It is divided into

two subsections: the formation of the signal along the lines of the sequence, and classes of such sequences (corresponding to the 'syntagmatic' and 'paradigmatic' [originally 'associative'] axes in Saussure's theory). The part on sign formation treats word formation and syntax, that on inflexion treats mainly the grammatical paradigms.

(Lotz [1954] 1966, II: 62)

Brøndal's critical comment in SG reads:

Pour ce qui est de sa morphologie (7-9, 11-13), elle est évidemment encore plus hétérogène que la morphologie traditionnelle (6, 8), la syntaxe (11-13) y étant noyée d'une manière très peu satisfaisante.

(SG: 4)

For Brøndal the placing of syntax inside morphology is naturally highly unsatisfactory, since the autonomy of both morphology and syntax is one of Brøndal's key concepts. Noreen's idea is none the less of great interest as many more recent models have tended to take the reverse view (cp. comment on Sec. 13. 1 ff. below).

4.16 JESPERSEN: Jespersen's system was presented differently in the Jespersen *Festschrift*. Brøndal there stated that for Jespersen 'le langage présente une seule distinction fondamentale: son et sens, extérieur et intérieur' (SG: 4). Jespersen's classic formulation of this principle was given in *The philosophy of grammar* thus:

Now any linguistic phenomenon may be regarded either from without or from within, either from the outward form or from the inner meaning. In the first case we take the sound ... and then inquire into the meaning attached to it; in the second case we start from the signification and ask ourselves what formal expression it has found in the particular language we are dealing with. If we denote the outward form by the letter O, and the inner meaning by ... I, we may represent the two ways as O - I and I - O respectively.

(Jespersen 1924: 33)

(Hjelmslev may well have had Jespersen in mind when he described Saussure's view that the real units of language are the mutual relations of linguistic phenomena, not the phenomena themselves, as meaning

thing short of a revolution to conventional philology, [such] having
 on concerned with sounds and meanings only' (Hjelmslev [1947] 1972:
). We have seen in the introduction that Brøndal and Hjelmslev were the
 leading figures in the foundation of the Copenhagen Circle in 1931 'in
 conscious opposition to Jespersen's ... pragmatic and empirical views'
 (Haugen & Markey 1972: 1468); though Hjelmslev had written appreciatively
 of the theory of rank in *Principes* ... (1928) and again in his obituary
 of Jespersen (1943), he never showed anything like Brøndal's (albeit
 critical) admiration for their former teacher. The reason is not far to
 seek. Brøndal always retained a respect for the older concerns of
 philology (cp. his work in word histories, toponomastics and the like)
 and was essentially conservative; Hjelmslev was consciously the leader of
 a new wave which was to have no truck with the phenomenon-oriented
 traditions of the past.)

This system can be considered from each aspect in turn, yielding a study
 of sound and a study of meaning, or from both at once, but in opposite
 directions in turn, in which case we have the arrangement shown in SG:

- | | | |
|-----|----------------|---|
| I | Son | Phonétique |
| II | Sens | Sémantique |
| III | A (Son > Sens) | Morphologie, ou Théorie des Formes |
| | B (Sens > Son) | Syntaxe, ou Théorie des Fonctions |
| | | (ou des Notions, 1929) |
| | | (SG/ELG: 4-5) |

Now in SG as in M & S, the main reference for Jespersen's system is **The philosophy of grammar**, that to 1929 (the article 'Grammar' in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* 14th ed.) being dropped here (cp. also Brøndal's bibliography). The system shown in SG is, however, based on Jespersen's

1908 review of *Vårt språk*, 'Sproglære in anledning af Noreen: V.s.', where the divisions of grammar are as shown. (The bibliography for M & S gives the division as: I Lyd [sound] II Betydning [Meaning] III Forhold mellem Form og Betydning [Relations between form and meaning]). This position is not that of the 1924 classic: there, in Chapter II, 'Systematic grammar', Jespersen comments on the problem of terminology (rejecting 'semasiology', the preferred German term, the 'sematology' of Sayce and Murray, and Noreen's 'semology' - 'a rather barbarous formation', and 'an equally objectionable name 'significs', while accepting Bréal's 'sémantique', semantics) and adds:

In spite of the fact that the subject-matter of semantics is the way in which meanings and changes of meanings may be classified and brought into a general system, and that this branch of linguistic science thus deals with 'general' and not with 'special' facts, it is not customary to include semantics in grammar ... and I may therefore be excused if I leave semantics out of consideration in this volume.

(Jespersen 1924: 35)

In the following section 'Sounds', Jespersen, having thus excluded semantics from the system of grammar, goes on to consider the status of the study of sounds (or 'theory' of sounds, evidently calqued on *lydlære/Lautlehre*):

If next we proceed to grammar, the first part of nearly all scientific treatises consists of a theory of sounds without regard to the meaning that may be attached to them.

(loc.cit.)

He then briefly discusses the difference of terminology, noting that 'phonology' might be better used for the 'phenomena' (he does not use 'system' here) pertaining to a given language, and 'phonetics' for the universal study - 'but this question of terminology is not very important'. Indeed, neither discipline need be included in 'the central part

grammar' - 'It lies outside the scope of this work to say much about netics or phonology' (p. 35-36); moreover,

The definition of phonetics given above, 'the theory of sound without regard to meaning' is not strictly correct, for in dealing with the sounds of any language it is impossible to disregard meaning altogether. It is important to observe what sounds are used in a language to distinguish words, i.e. meanings ... Much of what is usually treated in phonology might just as well, or even better, find its place in some other part of the grammar. (p.36)

But this 'definition' is not Jespersen's, but that of the previously dominant Neo-grammarian tradition ('nearly all scientific treatises' above means until 1924; in the previous year Behagel, realizing an ambition originally conceived in the Winter Semester 1873-74 when he heard Karl Bartsch declare that Grimm had not completed the syntax of his *Deutsche Grammatik*, brought out the first volume of *Deutsche Syntax* which is anchored in this tradition: syntax is to be described 'möglichst objectiv', from Outer to Inner - 'Ich bin deshalb so weit irgend möglich überall von der Beschreibung des äusseren Tatbestandes, nicht vom Inhalt ausgegangen' - Behagel 1923-32, I: ix). Brøndal's citation of Jespersen's system in SG is somewhat disingenuous; he says that the system seems to have changed over the years since Jespersen 'reconnait en effet (1924) que la définition de la phonétique comme une théorie des sons ne prenant pas en considération le sens, n'est pas strictement correcte: 'for in dealing with the sounds...[etc. as above]' (SG: 5). Given the prominence of the references to *The philosophy of grammar* in SG (as in M & S) the reader might reasonably assume that the system shown represents Jespersen's latest thinking, slightly modified by the admission quoted. Brøndal also quotes Jespersen's remark on the indissoluble link between sound and meaning (differing with Sweet's proposal that it is desirable

to treat the two aspects separately):

It should be the grammarian's task always to keep the two things in his mind, for sound and signification, form and function, are inseparable in the life of language, and it has been the detriment of linguistic science that it has ignored one side while speaking of the other, and so lost sight of the constant interplay of sound and sense.

(Jespersen 1924: 40, quoted SG: 5)

To which Brøndal adds, emphasizing the significance of this principle:

La conséquence de ce principe - le plus profond peut-être qu'ait énoncé ce Maître de la linguistique - c'est qu'il ne faut admettre ni phonétique absolument asémantique (I) ni sémantique absolument aphonétique (II).

(SG: 5)

Indeed, this was Jespersen's basic position on sound and meaning from *Language* (1921) on. So to portray his system of grammar as including the study of sound (*lydlære/Lautlehre*) and meaning (*betydningslære/ Bedeutungslehre*) as formal disciplines in themselves rather than as aspects of 'what is by common consent reckoned as the central part of grammar, by some even as the whole of the province of grammar', viz. morphology, word-formation, and syntax (Jespersen 1924: 37), is hardly just. As Jespersen's own 'master', Sweet, put it (with echoes of his student years in Neo-grammarian Leipzig in the opposition 'phonetics/ psychology):

The study of the formal side of language is based on **phonetics** - the science of speech-sounds; the study of the logical side of language is based on **psychology** - the science of mind. But phonetics and psychology do not constitute the science of language, being only preparations for it: language and grammar are concerned not with form and meaning separately, but with the connections between them, these being the real phenomena of language.

(Sweet, 1891-98, I: 6-7)

When one recalls that Sweet and Jespersen were international authorities on phonetics, this willingness to assign an extra-linguistic role to the study of sound vis-à-vis the central parts of grammar, morphology and

syntax, seems all the more remarkable.

The new presentation of Jespersen's system in M & S omits phonetics and semantics; the three divisions of grammar are those of **The philosophy of grammar**, the well-known

...threefold division, three stages of grammatical treatment of the same phenomena, or three points of view from which grammatical facts may be considered, which may briefly be described as (A) form, (B) function, (C) notion. Let us take one functional (syntactic) class and see its relation on the one hand to form, on the other to notion. The English preterit is formed in various ways, and though it is one definite syntactic category, it has not always the same logical purport ... Syntactic categories thus, Janus-like, face both ways, towards form, and towards notion. They stand midway and form the connecting link between the world of sounds and the world of ideas.

(Jespersen 1924:56-57)

The debt to Sweet here is striking. Sweet discusses each 'part of speech' in **NEG** under form, meaning and function in turn: thus the noun is considered under the form of inflections of number and case (p. 49 ff.), the meaning of nouns as 'class-words' (p. 54 ff.), and the function of nouns (that of 'head-words') (p. 62 ff.). We have just seen that Sweet saw grammar as being concerned with the connections between form and meaning, so Jespersen's identification of syntactical function as the connecting link is an obvious move. This division met with sharp disagreement, particularly from Anton Marty's pupil, Otto Funke: 'Jespersens Gruppe 'Funktion' (B) ist ... aus der Welt zu schaffen ..' (Funke 1926: 312; cp. discussion in Hallon 1981, 159 ff.)

4.23 **symbolology**: Dan. **symbolologi**; (notion, like form and function, are given in English in M & S.). I cannot find this term in Jespersen 1924; it is not an indexed term, nor does it occur as a chapter subheading (cp.

'morphology' (pp.40-44), 'syntax' (pp.45-57, = Chap. III) - the subheading used for the section treating the form/function/notion division is 'notional categories' (p.55). Cp. also 'I shall use Bréal's word **semantics** for this study [the theory of the significations of words]' (p.35) referred to above in the general comment on 4.16. In Jespersen 1929 the main divisions are said to be two: 'I. The theory of forms, II. the theory of notions' (p.611). In **Analytic syntax**, the word is used only in the sense of 'scheme of symbolization' - 'After thus discarding various things in grammar which find no place in our symbolology [viz. 'general syntactic symbols'] ...' (Jespersen 1937: 85). The divisions of **MEG** are those of the volumes: I, **Sounds and spellings** - written in 1909, this predates the views of 'the central parts of grammar' of PG 1924, though the preface contains the familiar idea:

In a language everything is linked together with everything else, and it is impossible to treat sounds separately without regard to the significations those sounds are intended to express; thus it happens that even syntactical phenomena are here and there touched in this volume.

(Jespersen 1909-49, I: v)

II - V and VII, **Syntax**, and VI, **Morphology**. Yet 'symbolology' is repeated by Brøndal (5.46) with express reference to **The philosophy of grammar**. SG in this respect was more accurate: 'La syntaxe, appelée ici également Théorie des Fonctions ou des Notions ...' (SG: 5). The term as used in this sense appears to be the invention of Jørgen Jørgensen, whose **Treatise of formal logic** had been published recently (1931): cp. the quotation from this work in the Bibliography to M & S: 'Grammar should, according to Jespersen, be divided into three main divisions: morphology, syntax, and a division which **may perhaps** be called symbolology ...' (my

emphasis).

5.5 ... to remove from grammar ... sounds: The literature on this topic is vast, as is indeed that on what one might call its inverse form, viz. 'can grammar be excluded from phonology?' (cp. Pike 1947 in rebuttal of the American Structuralist insistence on 'separation of levels'). From Aristotle to the end of the 18th century, grammar in any of its numerous senses normally included some consideration of linguistic sounds; the Port Royal grammar, for instance, is in two parts, the first dealing with 'letters as sounds and as characters' (Chap. I, des 'Voyelles', II des 'Consones' [sic but 'consonnes' in the index], III des 'Syllabes', etc.), the second, though far larger, with morphology and syntax – and this was a grammar emphasizing its status as 'general and rational'. In our own time, attempts to provide systematic accounts of language, such as Transformational or Stratificational Grammar, necessarily contain a phonological element. In the 19th century, however, the term **grammar** was narrowed to contrast with the study of sounds, cp. S.O.D., sense 4: 'The system of inflexions and syntactical usages characteristic of a language', citation date 1846. Sayce's article 'Grammar' in the 9th ed. of the **Encyclopaedia Britannica** states that 'where accent and pronunciation do not serve to express the relations of words in a sentence, they fall into the domain of phonology, not of grammar' (v.XI,37b). The grammarians Brøndal has in mind here (apart from Jespersen – the disparity between the presentation of Jespersen's system(s) in SG and M & S shows the difficulty of accepting the statements in **The philosophy of grammar** which restrict the 'central part' of grammar to morphology and

syntax in the face of e.g. the first volume of **MEG**, which deals entirely with phonology) would include, say, Poutsma 1904-17, Kruisinga 1909-10, Sonnenschein 1916, Curme 1925, to take just some of the major names in traditional scholarly English grammar of the relevant period. But equally reputable grammarians took a different view: Paul - or any other neo-grammarians - would not have accepted **Grammatik** without **Lautlehre**; the first volume of Sweet's **NEG** is subtitled 'Introduction, Phonology and Accidence'; Harold Palmer's influential **Grammar of spoken English** (1924) characterized the usual divisions of grammar as 'Accidence, etymology, parsing, the grammar of 'words' and 'syntax', analysis, the grammar of sentences', while his own classification was '1. Pronunciation 2. Parts of speech. 3. Parts of the sentence' (Palmer [1924] 1969: xix-xx). Again, in our own time, descriptive grammars in the traditional mould (e.g. Quirk et al. 1972) exclude the study of sound, and linguists especially of the British tradition prefer this narrower sense (cp. Robins 1964: 'In a wide and imprecise sense, grammar often covers what would more strictly be divided into grammar and phonology ...' (p.185)); in a recent introductory text on linguistics, Lyons mentions the broader sense of the term which subsumes phonology 'and even semantics' [my emphasis] under grammar, adding: 'This can lead to confusion' (Lyons 1981: 100).

5.6 **words**: Brøndal probably has Saussure and Hjelmslev in mind here as grammarians who remove the word from the scope of grammar. Cp. comment on 13.6 below.

5.9 **sentences**: Cp. Hjelmslev: '...la phrase ne semble pas être une notion

d'ordre linguistique' (Hjelmslev 1928: 36; cp. above on Ries quoted extensively here by Hjelmslev). In this Hjelmslev is following the orthodox Genevan view as set out by Saussure:

Une théorie assez répandue prétend que les seules unités concrètes sont les phrases: nous ne parlons que par les phrases, et après coup nous en extrayons les mots. Mais d'abord jusqu'à quel point la phrase appartient-elle à la langue? Si elle relève de la parole, elle ne saurait passer pour l'unité linguistique.

(Saussure [1916] 1972: 148)

5.10-12 On these points, then, and especially on the status of the word and the sentence, Brøndal shows himself to be an unorthodox structuralist (where orthodox = Geneva or what would later be the Glossematics of Copenhagen) by retaining the traditional point of view.

5.21 **mischsyntax:** See discussion of Ries above in section on Germanic grammatical terminology.

5.27 **compounds:** Brøndal emphatically assigns compounds (**composita**) to syntax, not to morphology. Cp. also diagram in M & S Sec. 10; the rationale for this view is set out in M & S Sec. 69. Cp. commentary on that section.

5.34 **inner and outer:** One would have expected a reference here to Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose use of the concept of 'die innere Sprachform' in linguistics provided inspiration for the German idealist school of linguistics (Vossler, Weisgerber in the 1920s, Glinz in recent times), for the Marburg neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer (particularly Cassirer 1923, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. I. Die Sprache*; and also for Anton

Marty (cp. the work by his pupil, the Swiss Anglist Otto Funke: *Innere Sprachform, eine Einführung in A. Martys Sprachphilosophie*, 1924. The concept is criticized by Wundt in his classic *Völkerpsychologie* where he takes a positivist or realist view of *innere Sprachform*:

Wenn dieser Begriff fruchtbar werden soll, so wird man ihn vor allem von jenem ihm seit Humboldt anhaftenden Nebenbegriff irgendeiner, sei es in der Wirklichkeit existierenden, sei es zu ihr hinzuge-dachten idealen Sprachform befreien müssen, an der jede einzelne Sprache zu messen sei ...

(Wundt 1912, v.II: 400; quoted Arens 1955: 363)

Brøndal refers towards the end of the work to the closely related Humboldtian concept of language as dynamic process, activity (*energeia*), not static product (*ergon*): cp. Sec. 82 #2. According to the *Reallexikon der deutschen Literaturgeschichte* the notion ultimately comes from Plotinus and had a profound effect on the concept of form in German literature: the previously dominant notion in aesthetics had been that of 'Der Poet ist der Macher', that the task of the poet was to describe nature as it really is:

Erst Shaftesbury hat, anknüpfend an Plotin, diese Auffassung in ihr Gegenteil verkehrt: 'Das Schönmachende, nicht das Schöngemachte ist das wirklich Schöne' (*Characteristics* ...). Damit verliert der Dichter als 'Macher' seine herrschende Stellung gegenüber der Natur und der Formbegriff seine bisherige Bedeutung. Der Dichter setzt nicht mehr die Regeln, sondern ist nur Durchgang für die 'erste Schönheit'. Shaftesbury hat den Plotinischen Begriff des *endon eidos* (*the inward form*) der neueren Ästhetik fruchtbar gemacht. Damit tritt er der Kunstregel der Franzosen gegenüber und hat auf Sturm und Drang, Herder und die Dichter der Klassik und Romantik bestimmend eingewirkt. Form wird jetzt von der Natur her als schöpferisch wirkende Urkraft aufgefasst, das Kunstwerk als Organismus verstanden. Jeder Stoff hat sein Eigenform, die in der Seele des Dichters als gestalterisches Prinzip wirksam werden muss.

(Kohlschmidt and Mohr 1958: 468-69)

The notion was not restricted to literature, of course; through writers like Herder and Goethe such ideas passed into general intellectual

circulation. The historian Meinecke, for example, cites Shaftesbury's influence in this regard in his memorial address on Ranke:

One would not detract too much from Ranke's achievement if one were to say that the very principles that made his historical writing so vital and so fruitful - feeling for the individual, for the inner forces that shape things, for their peculiar individual development, and for the common basis of life which brings all these together - were won through the efforts of the German mind during the 18th century. All Europe helped ... Shaftesbury gave valuable intellectual aid to the German movement with his theory of inner form ...
(quoted Cassirer 1950: 224-25)

Cp. also Goethe's development of the notion of a science of form as **Morphologie** and its spread to linguistics in comment on Sec. 12 below.

5.46 **symbolology**: cp. comment on 4.23 above.

5.52 **inviolable synthesis of inner and outer ...**: cp. the Saussurean concept of the complementarity of linguistic phenomena: '... le phénomène linguistique présente perpétuellement deux faces qui se correspondent et dont l'une ne vaut que par l'autre'. (Saussure [1916] 1972: 23).

Jespersen Festschrift: cp. commentary on Sec. 2.1 ff. above.

6.8 **the study of sounds or 'phonics'**: original = **lydlære** eller 'fonik'.

6.11-12 **the study of words or lexicology**: original = **ordlære** eller **lexikologi**.

6.15 **excluding compounding**: original has '($\frac{-}{-}$ sammensætning)'. This is to be read 'minus', cp. KN (**Eng-Dansk Ordbog**): 'minus sign **minustegn** (Brit.

& U.S. written -, Dan. $\frac{6}{v}$ or -'. DGL has kindly sent me an extract from *Gyldendals ordbog for skole og hjem* 2nd ed. 1977, where the entry for *minus* uses only $\frac{6}{v}$ in the examples.

6.17 the study of form or morphology: original= *formlære* eller morfologi.

6.20 the study of sentences or syntax: original = *sætningslære* eller syntax.

7.3 series: cp. comment on 2.5 above.

7.5 ARISTOTLE: The term syllable is used by Aristotle in his *De interpretatione* (*Peri hermeneias*, *On interpretation*). However, as GT has reminded me, since Aristotle divides *mys* into the 'syllables' *m-* and *-ys* (*mouse* into *m-* and *-ouse*), the concept hardly tallies with the generally accepted sense of the word. The passage in question occurs in Chapter 4 of the

'Anthropos' (man) ... signifies something, but not that it exists or does not exist; it will become an affirmation or a negation when something is added. But no single syllable of 'anthropos' (has meaning): in 'mice' 'ice' is not significant, but is now only a vocal sound.

(Arens' translation: Arens 1984: 23)

7.6 HARRIS: James Harris (1709-1780). (The date cited by Brøndal (for the publication of *Hermes*) should be 1751.) Arens' *Aristotle's theory of language and its tradition* concludes with the chapter 'James Harris, an Aristotelian of the 18th century' and emphasizes the dominance of *Hermes* over Harris' other works:

James Harris ... M.P., Lord of the Treasury, a man of leisure, philologist and philosopher, author of Works in 5 volumes, won fame with one of them: **Hermes or a philosophical inquiry concerning language and universal grammar**, which ... at once enjoyed greater success than the books of his fellows in the linguistic field, Lord Monboddo and John Horne Tooke.

(Arens 1984: 514)

In the annotation to the entry for Harris in the Bibliography here, Brøndal repeats his claim that Harris assumes with Aristotle that sound - syllable - word - sentence form a continuous series, giving **Hermes** p. 21 as his reference. Now it is true that the word 'syllables' occurs on that page - and nowhere else, so far as I can see - it is not listed as a term in the extensive index - the context hardly supports Brøndal's view. Harris is discussing meaning below sentence level:

Now a sentence may be sketched in the following description - a **compound quantity of sound significant, of which certain parts are themselves also significant**. Thus when I say the sun shineth not only the **whole quantity** of sound has a meaning, but **certain parts** also, such as sun and shineth. - But what shall we say? Have these parts agen [sic] other parts, which are in like manner significant ...? Can we suppose all meaning ... to be divisible, and to include within itself other meanings without end? If this be absurd, then must we necessarily admit, that there is such a thing as a **sound significant, of which no part is of itself significant**. And this is what we call the proper character of a WORD. For thus, though the words // sun and shineth have each a meaning, yet is there certainly no meaning in any of their parts, neither in the syllables of the one, nor in the letters of the other... it follows that **WORDS will be the smallest parts of speech**, in as much as nothing less has any meaning at all.

(Harris 1751: 19-21. Page 21 begins at //)

I have quoted this passage at some length since it is also of significance for the next reference to **Hermes**. (Cp. comment on Sec. 13 #5 below.)

7.7 RIES: We have already pointed out that Ries' series was not 'Laut, Wort, Satz' but 'Laut, Wort, Wortgefüge'. I have not been able to find

any reference to the syllable in *Was ist Syntax?*, though Ries may have used the term elsewhere. (Not that one would expect a full treatment of *Lautlehre* in a work on syntax, but Ries does in fact mention phonological phenomena in the section 'Syntax und Lautlehre' (p. 119-21), e.g. Satz-sandhi, liaison in French, Satzaccent, Pausen, Tempo, der einzelne Laut.) While the issue of the status of the syllable is marginal for Brøndal's overall purpose (morphology and syntax), he needs the syllable as a 'phonetic' unit for speech to contrast with the logical unit derived from phonology, the 'systematic' study of sound. Cp. Sec. 11.

7.19 **The study of meaning:** original, *Betydningslære*. To render this here as *semantics* would obscure the distinction drawn here between *synonymics* and *semantics*. Thus Brøndal is able to use the Danish term to advantage. Cp. however the limitation in Danish vis-à-vis German remarked on in the following comment.

7.21 **SCHUCHARDT:** Hugo Schuchardt (1842-1927), German comparativist and Romanist. Professor at Halle a. S. 1873-75, at Graz 1876-1900. He was known for his vigorous opposition to positivism in linguistics in general and to the Neo-grammarians in particular, cp. his *Über die Lautgesetze: gegen die Junggrammatiker*, 1885. The quotation here is given more fully in the Bibliography (under the entry for the anthology *Hugo Schuchardt-Brevier*): Schuchardt says that the grammatical 'trierarchy' of phonology (broad sense), grammar and lexicon should be abandoned; there is only one grammar and that is (called) semantics (*Bedeutungslehre*) or more properly, onomasiology ('... oder wohl richtiger, Bezeichnungslehre'). (The

equivalence is given in Marouzeau (1951): '(Fr.) Onomasiologie - Bezeichnungslehre - Onomasiology: Terme employé parfois pour désigner proprement la science des appellations ...') While native German terminology provides the distinction noted by Schuchardt, Danish apparently does not. **Betydningslære** (used in 7.19) is calqued on **Bedeutungslehre**, but I can find no Danish form corresponding to **Bezeichnungslehre**, which would presumably be a compound of **betegnelse**. (**Bedeutung** is generally rendered **meaning, sense, signification**, with a number of alternatives in more specific contexts - thus for example in the 4 vol. Langenscheidt (1974). In philosophy, the well-known Fregean opposition **Sinn / Bedeutung** is translated **sense / reference**. **Bezeichnung**, Dan. **betegnelse**, is roughly **denotation, signification, marking, designation, description**. When used as a native term for **Onomasiologie**, **Bezeichnungslehre** stands for something like 'Study of designations or descriptions' (Gk. **onoma** here in its basic sense of **name**). Whence, I take it, the resort in the original to the Greek forms here following, viz. **synonymik** (17.23) ... **semantik** (17.24).

7.23 **Synonymics ... systematic**: As for Hjelmslev and Firth, **system, systems, systematic** here refers to the paradigmatic axis. Synonymic systems of prepositions for over a score of languages were to be elaborated by Brøndal towards the end of the thirties in PT; some indication of this approach is given in Sec. 20 of M & S. Cp. comment thereon below.

7.24 **Semantics ... more general**: For Brøndal, anything non-systematic is

to be placed on the syntagmatic ('rhythmic') axis: thus if by his definition semantics is the study of variant word meanings 'according to context and situation' ('efter sammenhæng og situation'), it can be joined to phonetics and syntax as a study of 'speech' phenomena. The notion of 'context and situation' is probably derived from the more precise 'context of situation', as used by Gardiner. Cp. comment on 8.15 below.

8.13 SAUSSURE: The Bibliography annotation under the entry for the *Cours* says that Saussure establishes two fundamental distinctions: synchrony and diachrony; *langue* and *parole*. Then some references to reviews of the *Cours* are given. It looks as if Brøndal has chosen only those aspects of the great work which fit his arguments. Contrast the lengthy annotation under Gardiner's work.

8.15 GARDINER: Sir Alan Henderson Gardiner (1879 - 1963). Though principally an Egyptologist, as the text states, Gardiner was also held in high regard as a linguist by Firth, for example. He studied the Classics, Hebrew and Arabic at Oxford. He was financially independent and the only post he ever held was a readership in Egyptology at the University of Manchester from 1912 to 1914. He worked in Berlin from 1902 to 1912 on an Egyptian dictionary sponsored by the Academies of Berlin, Munich, Leipzig and Göttingen under the direction of Professor Erman. In 1927 he produced his *Egyptian grammar*, which went into a 3rd edition in 1957:

The writing of the *Egyptian grammar* led Gardiner to linguistics. He was keenly interested in the subject and gave much thought to its problems. It was, however, only in 1932 that *The theory of speech*

and language appeared, to the great relief of his Egyptological friends who regretted that linguistic theories kept Gardiner away from Egyptology. The reviewers were far from enthusiastic about the book to Gardiner's discontent, for he sometimes thought that it was the best of all he had written.

(Černý 1981: 418)

Firth noted Gardiner's interest in 'context of situation' and the origin of **Situationstheorie** in Wegener:

A key concept in the technique of the London group is the concept of the **context of situation**. The phrase 'context of situation' was first used widely in English by Malinowski. In the early thirties, when he was especially interested in discussing problems of languages, I was privileged to work with him. He had also discussed similar problems with Alan Gardiner ... the author of that difficult book, **The theory of speech and language**. ...Gardiner, by the way, dedicated his book to one of the earliest users of the notion of a situational context for language, Dr. Philipp Wegener, who thought there might be a future for the 'Situationstheorie'.

(Firth 1950: 181-82)

In the Bibliography for M & S, Brøndal notes under the entry for Wegener 1885 'Psychological theory, inter alia on psychological subject and predicate cp. also GARDINER, HØFFDING'.

The entry under Gardiner's **Theory** ... quotes briefly from Chap. III, 'The mutual relations of language and speech', Sec. 33: 'The antithesis of 'language' and 'speech'. A more extensive quotation of the passage is needed to bring out the 'context of situation' approach which leads to the 'antithesis':

The attentive reader will by this time have accustomed himself to think of speech as a form of drama needing a minimum of two actors, a scene or situation of its own, a plot or 'thing-meant', and as a last element the extemporized words. Such miniature dramas are going on everywhere speech is practised, and it is little short of a miracle that the authors who deal with linguistic theory seem never to have thought of describing one of them ... there has been a sort of conspiracy not to isolate or analyse in its entirety a single act of speech ... Nor is it even easy to find in the indexes of the voluminous works on the philosophy or psychology of language any reference to 'speech' as the common name of the activity which unfolds itself in these linguistic dramas. If one is lucky enough to find any mention of speech at all, it is usually in the form,

'Speech, see Language', as if the two were identical. But no, I must correct myself. The commonest entry is 'Speech, parts of', whereas I shall be at pains to show that noun, adjective, and so on, are parts of language, and that the real parts of speech are subject and predicate. It is as though the critics were everlastingly discussing dramatic art without ever going to the theatre. One is tempted to conclude that philological science abhors the concrete no less than nature abhors a vacuum.

(Gardiner, 1932: 106-107)

The opposition may be Saussurean, but the spirit of the argument and the conclusions drawn make London seem very far indeed from Geneva. And all that Brøndal wants to stress here is the identification of word classes as units of language and members as units of speech as confirmation of a view he had reached four years earlier in OKL. Cp comment on 2.13 above.

8.22 'words' in the broadest sense ... logos: Cp. the motto of PT: 'Logos: oratio, proportio, ratio' (Cicero). L&S devote nearly six columns to logos; among many meanings they give 'verbal expression or utterance' and note 'rarely a single word'. The usual term for 'word' was *lexis* or *epos*, cp. the Homeric figure *epea ptereonta*, 'winged words', the main title of Horne Tooke's fanciful *Diversions of Purley*.

8.27 expressions ... thoughts: cp. Hjelmslev's concept of 'Expression and Content'.

8.30-31 synonymics of prepositions: Cp. again comment on sec. 20.

9.1-2 two forms of linguistic realization: Original: 'to fremtrædelses-former af sproget'.

9.5 ff. The numbers (#1 - #8) in the diagram refer to the numbered topics set out in Sec. 2.

9.20-21 the most general framework ...: Cp. separate discussion of **partes** and **membra**.

9.25-26 **Synonymics ... logical framework ...**: The association of synonymics and the presupposition of the logical framework of the study of word classes with the addition of 'its more special (symbolic) definitions' sounds somewhat paradoxical, since the symbolic has been opposed to the logical above. The apparent contradiction is resolved 9.30 ff.

9.32 **symbolic and logical at the same time**: In the final system as it appears in DGS, **symbolic** becomes **outer**, and **logical**, **inner**.


10.1 ff. It may be of interest here to compare the schematic representation of the system of grammar with that of Ries:

Objekt		Einzelwort	Wortgefüge
Betrachtet in bezug auf die		Wortlehre	Syntax
Form	Formenlehre	I. Lehre von den Formen der Worte (Wortarten nach formalen Gesichtspunkten &	III. Lehre von den Formen der syntaktischen Gebilde

		Flexionslehre)	
Bedeutung	Bedeutungslehre	II. Lehre von der Bedeutung der Worte, ihrer Arten & Formen	IV. Lehre von der Bedeutung der syntaktischen Gebilde

(Ries [1897] 1927: 79)


Thus for Ries morphology (**Formenlehre**) is placed with semantics (**Bedeutungslehre** - as there is no contrast with **Bezeichnungslehre** in this system there is no need to render this 'study of meaning' here), and the counterpart of syntax is lexicology (**Wortlehre**). According to Ullmann, Ries' system was developed by the Hungarian linguist Gombocz, and Ullmann's own scheme is described as being 'in broad agreement with Gombocz's ideas' (Ullmann 1959: 26). The family resemblance to Ries' scheme is clear in Ullmann's well-known diagram 'the three dimensions of linguistics':



I have entered Ries' divisions on Ullmann's diagram to show the central agreement in the arrangement. This diagram has been reproduced in a number of texts; one popular work on comparative linguistics says 'The diagram is taken from ... Hjelmslev. [diagram as above but without numerals] This Hjelmslev claims to be no more than 'a working hypothesis

... a division, not the division of the domain of linguistics.' (Lord 1966: 22) This confusion (the words quoted are in fact Ullmann's and relate to his own scheme) can only arise from a footnote to this passage in Ullmann: 'Not dissimilar to this arrangement is Hjelmslev's scheme in *Principes* p.48'. This in turn is worth considering since, as we have seen, Brøndal disagreed strongly with Hjelmslev's views on the system of grammar as set out in the *Principes* (1928).

Hjelmslev's diagram is set out thus:



Légende:

x = synchronique
y = diachronique

a = sons	matériel
b = formes	} association
c = mots	
d = syntagmes	

What is 'not dissimilar' to Ullmann's scheme here seems to be the emphasis on the contrast of synchrony and diachrony - otherwise Ullmann is far closer to Ries. Hjelmslev says of his scheme:

Ce que fait voir cette représentation graphique, c'est que, la théorie des sons étant encore en équilibre entre les deux axes, en se prêtant à peu près dans la même mesure à l'étude diachronique et synchronique, les parties suivantes de la théorie linguistique, passant par les formes et les mots pour se terminer enfin dans les syntagmes, **tendant de plus en plus à s'éloigner de la diachronie et d'approcher, dans la même mesure, de la synchronie.**

(Hjelmslev 1928: 48-49, my emphasis)

Thus sounds are represented as being in equilibrium (equidistant from the x and y axes), while other units - forms, words, syntagms - move progressively nearer the x axis, the synchronic aspect. Apart from anything

else, this diagram is avowedly **asymmetric**, where those of Ries, Ullmann and Brøndal are symmetric. One might say that Brøndal was obsessed with symmetry to the point where - as in the global scheme in DSG - every possible discipline is grouped around linguistics in a symmetrical way and everything is defined in two dimensions, as in the relatively simple scheme given here in M & S.

11.5 **Phonology ... systematics:** original: 'Fonologi, defineret som symbolernes systematik ...'

11.9 **SOMMERFELT:** The Norwegian linguist Alf Axelssøn Sommerfelt, 1892 - 1965. Professor at the University of Oslo 1931 - 1962 (except for the war years spent in London with the Norwegian government in exile). His specializations were phonology, language and society, and Celtic studies (Irish, Breton and Welsh). He contributed a seven-page review of OKL to the *Norsk tidsskrift for sprogvidenskap* in 1930; this was one of the few reviews of the original Danish to appear at the time, though it consists mainly of a French summary of the work with little or no evaluation - Brøndal's system was clearly as puzzling to most of his fellow Scandinavians then as it was to be to other linguists when the French version appeared in 1948. Sommerfelt's general sympathies lay with the Prague functionalists (he is included in the entry **PRAGUE SCHOOL** in the Bibliography of M & S), a position which brings him closer perhaps to Brøndal than some the latter's fellow-countrymen like Jespersen or Hjelmslev. He contributed a belated obituary of Brøndal to the first volume of *Lingua* in 1948.

The question of Sommerfelt's view of the syllable recurs in a paper given by Brøndal to the International Congress of Phonetic Sciences at University College London in 1936:

To speak of the phonological importance of the syllable or to consider syllabication as part and parcel of a given phonological system (Prof. SOMMERFELT) would seem to be a trespassing of Phonology upon the consecrated grounds of Phonetics. Articulation and division of syllables is of course of the utmost importance in describing a language as pronounced by certain speakers - just as speech or melody would be. But the syllable being necessarily defined as a time-totality, as a successive combination of phonic elements, its form or rhythm can never be derived from, or even have anything to do with, the timeless system of phonemes, which may be employed in combinations entirely different from those temporarily chosen by the actual speakers. ('Sound and phoneme', ICPS 1936: 44)

This appears to be the only paper given in English by Brøndal, whose normal 'international' language was French. The paper following was given by his friend and mentor (since the 1928 ICL at The Hague), Trubetzkoy: 'Die phonologischen Grenzsignale'.

11.11 Phonetics ...: 'Fonetik ... symbolernes rhythmik ...'

11.14 metrics: original metrik, i.e. prosody in the traditional, not Firthian, sense.

11.16 Morphology: 'Morfologi ... logisk systematik'

11.19 Syntax: 'Syntax ... logisk rhythmik ...'

11.27 PRAGUE SCHOOL: Cp. entry under this name in Bibliography, where Trubetzkoy, Jakobson, Karcevski and Sommerfelt are listed as the leading

members of the school.

11.31 GIRARD: The interpolation 'the founder of synonymics' refers to Girard 1718 (Cp. 2.10 above). Girard 1747, *Les vrais principes de la langue française*, is important as the earliest extension of the idea of grammatical subject and predicate put forward by Wilkins and Cooper in the 17th century. Brøndal's annotation under this item lists the seven syntactic members proposed by Girard without quotation or comment. Given the significance of these ideas for the crucial *membra / partes* opposition on which the morphology - syntax division is based in Brøndal's system, a closer look at *Les vrais principes* is warranted.

The theory is set out in vol. 1, chapter III, 'Sur la construction, la phrase, le régime, & tout ce qui concerne les règles générales de la syntaxe'. After half-a-dozen pages of general discussion of 'les [lois] de la construction', 'construction' being the preferred term for the Greek 'syntaxe' ('... qui dit précisément la même chose que le terme français dont je me sers.' p. 83), Girard turns to the vital notion of 'régime', government:

Le régime n'est autre chose que le concours des mots pour l'expression d'un sens ou d'une pensée. Dans ce concours de mots, il y en a qui tiennent le haut bout; ils en régissent d'autres, c'est à dire qu'ils les assujettissent à certaines lois: il y en a qui se présentent d'un air soumis; ils sont régis ou tenus de se conformer à l'état & aux lois des autres; & il y en a qui, sans être assujettis ni en assujettir d'autres, n'ont de loi à observer que celle de la place dans l'arrangement général. Ce qui fait que quoique tous les mots de la phrase soient en régime, concourant tous à l'expression du sens, ils ne le sont pas néanmoins de la même manière; les uns étant en régime dominant, les autres en régime assujetti, & des troisièmes en régime libre, selon la fonction qu'ils y font.

(Girard 1747, I: 87-88.)

(I have regularized the orthography: thus français, lois, règle for

françois, loix, regle etc.)

This discussion in terms of dependency relations seems strikingly modern. Equally so when Girard goes on to appeal to the concept of function in this context. We must discover how many syntactic functions there are and of what kind. His result is:

Je trouve qu'il faut d'abord un sujet & une attribution à ce sujet; sans cela on ne dit rien. Je vois ensuite que l'attribution peut avoir, outre son sujet, un objet, un terme, une circonstance, une circonstance modificative, une liaison avec un autre, & de plus un accompagnement étranger ajouté comme un hors-d'oeuvre, simplement pour servir d'appui à quelqu'une de ces choses ou pour exprimer un mouvement de sensibilité occasionné dans l'âme de celui qui parle. Voilà donc sept parties constructives ou sept defférentes fonctions que les mots doivent remplir dans l'harmonie de la phrase.

(Girard 1747, I: 88-89)

These, then, are the 'parties constructives' or syntactic elements, but the existing terminology is inadequate. Names should be found which clearly indicate their sentential functions. Thus the subject element is termed the 'subjectif': 'Il y tient le principal rang, toujours en régime dominant, jamais en assujetti' (p.90). The predicator function becomes 'l'attributif'; in modern usage 'attribut' refers to the complement, but the analysis of examples shows that Girard has the verbal element in mind. The direct object function is 'l'objectif'. 'Terminatif' is the 'goal of the attribution', a prepositional or indirect object. An adverbial phrase of manner, time, place and various circumstances is a 'circonstancier', a term still in use. The clause linking function is carried out by a 'conjunctif'. (Some grammarians today consider that 'particles' like conjunctions fall outside functional analysis; cp. Leech, Deuchar & Hoogenraad 1982: 53-54.) 'Adjonctif' is an interjection, and is so called because it is a separate addition to the sentence. The following example

illustrates the analysis:

Monsieur, quoique le mérite ait ordinairement un avantage solide sur la fortune; cependant, chose étrange! nous donnons toujours la préférence à celle-ci.

'Subjectif': 'le mérite'; 'nous'. 'Attributif': 'ait'; 'donnons'.
 'Objectif': 'un avantage solide'; 'la préférence'. 'Terminatif': 'sur la fortune'; 'à celle-ci'. 'Circonstanciel': 'ordinairement'; 'toujours'.
 'Conjonctif': 'quoique'; 'cependant'. 'Adjonctif': 'Monsieur'; 'chose étrange'. (Summarised from pp. 93-95) Girard is perfectly aware that his terminology flies in the face of the conventions of the time, but is confident that enlightened judgement will concede the force of his argument:

Aurais-je à craindre ici qu'on ne me fit un crime d'avoir substitué d'autres noms à ceux de **nominatif, verbe, cas, adverbe**, dont on s'est servi jusqu'à présent dans les écoles pour nommer les parties de la phrase? Non, on est aujourd'hui trop dégagé des préjugés & trop amateur de notre langue pour prendre parti contre une méthode uniquement parce qu'il y en a une autre, sans examiner laquelle des deux a l'avantage, soit par rapport à l'art, soit par rapport à son sujet.

(Girard 1747, I: 96)

This optimism was unjustified so far as his fellow countrymen were concerned. But if Girard remained a prophet without honour in his own land, his contribution receives its due from Brøndal. The idea of functional analysis had to wait some eighty years before being revived by Karl Ferdinand Becker in Germany.

11.32 HØYSGAARD 1752: According to Diderichsen (1964: 367) the basis of the theory of sentence members was advanced by Høysgaard in the same year that Girard published *Les vrais principes*. The reference is to Høysgaard's *Accentuated grammatica* 1747, Sec. 390, where twelve types of

member are given as the maximum. Then as now, evidently, to write in a Scandinavian language (only) gave a linguist little chance for the diffusion of his ideas.

MORPHOLOGY

Motto: 'Form is a mystery to the many' (or: to most, to the majority)

That a quotation from Goethe should be chosen as the motto for the chapter on morphology (*formlære, Formenlehre*) is fitting, since Goethe was seriously concerned with the problem of form in natural science: 'Goethe's theory of metamorphosis has profoundly affected the development of biology. In no other field of natural science have his ideas exerted so deep and fruitful an effect. (Cassirer 1950: 137. The chapter heading is: 'The idea of metamorphosis and idealistic morphology: Goethe'.) It appears that Goethe himself coined the term *Morphologie*. Between 1817 and 1824 he wrote a series of articles entitled *Zur Naturwissenschaft überhaupt, besonders zur Morphologie*. The earliest recorded English usage (as a biological term) is 1830, as a linguistic term 1869 (by Farrar) (OED). In Goethe's poem *Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen* there appears the line: 'Alle Gestalten sind ähnlich, und keine gleicht den andern', which echoes the Montaigne quotation (the master motto for the work).

13.1 ff. **The autonomy of morphology:** One linguist close to home who had recently (1928) denied the value of the morphology - syntax distinction was Brøndal's fellow founding-member of the Copenhagen Linguists' Circle, Hjelmslev:

Etant donné que, en réalité, tout fait syntaxique est morphologique en ce sens qu'il concerne uniquement la forme grammaticale, et étant donné également que tout fait morphologique peut être considéré comme syntaxique puisqu'il repose toujours sur une connexion syntagmatique entre les éléments grammaticaux en question, nous sommes

persuadé que la division possible de la grammaire en morphologie et syntaxe est dénuée de toute importance du point de vue pratique.
(Hjelmslev 1928: 94)

In the entry for the *Principes* in his Bibliography Brøndal quotes from this passage ('tout fait syntaxique est morphologique') together with a later quotation from the same work, 'C'est que toute distinction entre morphologie et syntaxe est impossible', adding: 'If syntax here - as it is in the present work - were = *sætningslære*, this assertion would be highly paradoxical. But Hjelmslev tends to exclude entirely concepts like subject and predicate from grammar ...' Hjelmslev was consciously following the Saussurean view here: a footnote to this passage gives a reference to the *Cours* (without quotation): the section in question is the well-known description of this division of grammar as illusory: 'Mais cette distinction est illusoire ... Linguistiquement, la morphologie n'a pas d'objet réel et autonome; elle ne peut constituer une discipline distincte de la syntaxe' (de Saussure [1916] 1972: 186). Of course, it is one thing to deny the distinction and to posit 'morphosyntax', say, as an integral study; it is another to subordinate one or the other division of grammar. The tendency of more recent morpheme-based grammatical models is to downgrade the word from the linguistic unit to just one unit between morpheme and sentence, discourse or whatever. There is then, it might be argued, little point in distinguishing constructions below, at or above word level:

The description of a word in terms of morphemes ... is ... of precisely the same formal type as that of a phrase in terms of words ... or that of a clause in terms of words and phrases. This insight (whether good or bad) is fundamental to many of the theories of grammar developed in the 1960s. In particular, it is common ground between the 'tagmemic' and 'scale and category' theories of Pike and Halliday ... it is also fundamental to most transformationalist concepts of 'surface structure' ... Naturally, all these theories have

been modified in subsequent development. But this is one point which many theorists of grammar would regard as incontrovertible: namely, that the formal make-up of words is essentially the same as that of phrases, sentences, or any other larger unit.

(Matthews, 1974: 78-79)

To return to the earlier period, however: some other linguists pointed out by Brøndal in his annotations as questioning the autonomy of morphology include (apart from those specifically mentioned in Sec. 13): Behagel 1887, 'Auch die Flexionslehre ist Syntax'; Croce 1901, who denied the reality of word classes, because the sentence (*la proposizione*) was the sole linguistic reality; Miklosisch 1883, Ries' *bête noire*, the perpetrator of 'Mischsyntax'; and Sapir 1921, who was sceptical of (the universal validity of) the word class concept (i.e. when extended beyond the noun and the verb, though Brøndal does not mention this). One might add Sweet to the list. The first volume of *A new English grammar* (1891), the only work by Sweet listed in M & S, gives qualified approval to the distinction of *accidence* and *syntax* on practical grounds (Sec. 581); in a later work he expressed the qualification strongly:

The separation of meaning from form is a pure matter of convenience, and is not founded on any logical necessity, but only on a defect of language as it is, for in an ideally perfect language form and meaning would be one - there would be no irregularities, no isolated phenomena, no dictionary, and what is now dictionary and grammar would be all syntax. Even in languages as they exist form and meaning are inseparable, so that the separation of *accidence* and *syntax* must always be a more or less arbitrary one, which may vary in different languages, quite apart from any questions of convenience.

(Sweet 1899: 125)

In more recent times the study of morphology has been downgraded during the Chomskyan period. Indeed, according to Coates, it nearly disappeared for a time, only to undergo a revival in the late seventies and eighties:

A thumbnail sketch ... of the history of morphology during the 'generative' era might be as follows. For the first twelve years or so, morphology as such did not exist; its territory was divided between an abstract syntax and an abstract phonology, seeing that within transformational grammar no particular special status was accorded to the GWF [grammatical word form]. In the succeeding dozen years, as both syntax and phonology became less and less abstract, morphology gradually came to be seen again as the depository for those things which were subject to neither syntactic nor phonological principles. The first part to recrystallize was lexical morphology ... then inflectional morphology with the 'Extended Word and Paradigm Model' of Anderson (1982) (which builds directly on the work of Matthews, 1972, completed a decade later)...

(Coates 1987: 107)

13.6 word. To take only the position since the publication of the *Cours* in 1916: Saussure had drawn attention to the practical difficulties of delimiting the unit of *langue*, a sound segment which is the signal of a certain concept ('une tranche de sonorité qui est ... le signifiant d'un certain concept' p. 146):

... qu'est-ce qu'une phrase sinon une combinaison de mots, et qu'y-a-t-il de plus immédiatement saisissable? ... Cependant nous sommes mis immédiatement en défiance en constatant qu'on s'est beaucoup disputé sur la nature du mot, et en y réfléchissant un peu, on voit que ce qu'on entend par là est incompatible avec notre notion d'unité concrète... Il faut chercher l'unité concrète ailleurs que dans le mot.

(Saussure [1916] 1972: 147-48)

Saussure's objection is based on the inherent ambiguity of 'word' (word as lexeme, grammatical or morphosyntactic word, phonological word: cp. Matthews 1970, 1974) and on the more specifically French phenomenon of liaison ('Dans *mwa* ("le mois de décembre") et *mwaz* ("un mois après"), on a ...le même mot sous deux aspects distincts, et il ne saurait question d'une unité concrète'). Later, however, he talks in terms of words being near enough to the linguistic unit to give a rough idea of what is involved: 'Ceux-ci [les mots] sans recouvrir exactement la définition de l'unité linguistique, en donnant du moins une idée approximative qui a

l'avantage d'être concrète' (p. 158). He is clearly uneasy about the word, nevertheless, and his disciple Bally stated that 'il faut donc s'affranchir de la notion incertaine de mot', proposing 'semantème' and 'molécule syntaxique' for lexical or syntactic elements. (quoted Ullmann 1957: 46).

Hjelmslev, too, had challenged the linguistic status of the word: a not entirely unexpected position. We have seen elsewhere in our discussion of John Ries that Hjelmslev in denying that the word could be defined non-arbitrarily thereby rejected the usefulness of the morphology-syntax distinction:

Nous pourrions plutôt voir l'importance et l'utilité de maintenir la division en morphologie et en syntaxe en suivant le système de M. RIES et de FORTUNATOV, en comprenant par morphologie la science du mot et par syntaxe des combinaisons de mots. Il semble d'avance que la définition du mot est chose arbitraire, qui n'a rien affaire avec les réalités, et s'il en est ainsi, il va de soi que la division faite par M. RIES ne devra pas être maintenue dans un exposé qui ne prend son point de départ que dans les réalités linguistiques mêmes.
(Hjelmslev 1928: 93-94)

It cannot be denied that the concept of the word bulks larger in the native linguistic consciousness of speakers of a language like English than it does in that of speakers of French. As Bloomfield pointed out,

People who have not learned to read and write have some difficulty when, by any chance, they are called upon to make worddivisions. This difficulty is less in English than in some other languages, such as French. The fact that the spacing of words has become part of our tradition of writing goes to show, however, that recognition of the word as a unit of speech is not unnatural to speakers; indeed, except for certain doubtful cases, people can easily learn to make this analysis.

(Bloomfield 1933: 178)

Sapir made a similar point with regard to objections to the word-as-unit adduced from the Amerindian languages (- 'sometimes ... made to straggle along as an uncomfortable "polysynthetic" rear-guard to the agglutinative

languages' (Sapir 1921: 123):

But is not the word ...as much of an abstraction as the radical element [morpheme]? Is it not as arbitrarily lifted out of the living sentence as is the minimum conceptual element out of the word? Some students of language have, indeed, looked upon the word as such an abstraction, though with very doubtful warrant, it seems to me. It is true that in particular cases, especially in the highly synthetic languages of aboriginal America, it is not always easy to say whether a particular element of language is to be interpreted as an independent word or as part of a larger word. These transitional cases, puzzling as they may be on occasion, do not, however, materially weaken the case for the psychological validity of the word.

(Sapir 1921: 33)

In Sapir's experience native speakers of these languages had no difficulty in determining word boundaries spontaneously and accurately: 'Such experiences ... do more to convince one of the definite plastic unity of the word than any amount of purely theoretical argument'

(Sapir 1921: 34).

While the word was to be discounted again much later in the transformational era along with morphology, as we have just seen, it has found new support in, for example, Hudson's *Word grammar* of 1984, as well as in the Word and Paradigm model for morphology. What is of some interest here is that this view, basically a fairly traditional one developed in the context of the classical languages by Robins and Matthews in England has been taken up in America as well in the present decade. (Cp. also comment on 14.1 below, Definitions of the word.)

13.12 MEILLET: Antoine Meillet (1866-1936), the great French comparative linguist. Professor at the Collège de France from 1906. Himself a pupil

of de Saussure in Paris and in general sympathetic to the Swiss linguist's approach, he is regarded not so much a 'Saussurean' but rather as one of the leading figures of what Leroy calls 'the French Sociological school'. Writing in 1955 in the preface to Marcel Cohen's review of linguistic research in France since the turn of the century, Joseph Vendryes noted that

Though there is no French school of linguistics, claiming any exclusive privilege, there does exist among Meillet's pupil's a mutual feeling of comprehension and friendly collaboration in applying to linguistics the rules of enlightened reason.

(quoted Leroy 1967: 93)

Brøndal's Bibliography quotes Meillet's words: 'un mot de la langue courante n'est défini que par l'ensemble des phrases où on l'entend et où il est licite de l'employer' and marks his disagreement ("?"). This is understandable here given that Brøndal is defending the status of the word; yet Meillet's view is readily relatable to the structuralist view of language as a system of relations as opposed to a collection of linguistic 'facts', a view Brøndal readily endorses. Indeed it was Meillet who coined the famous phrase 'un ensemble où tout se tient', quoted by Brøndal in his article 'Linguistique structurale' (the first item published in *Acta linguistica (Hafniensis)* and in effect an editorial statement) and misattributed to de Saussure. He refers to the use of the term **structure** in psychology:

Structure s'emploie ici, selon LALANDE 'en un sense spécial et nouveau ... pour désigner, par opposition à une simple combinaison d'éléments, un tout formé de phénomènes solidaires, tels que chacun dépend des autres et ne peut être ce qu'il est que dans et par sa relation avec eux'. - C'est exactement de cette façon que DE SAUSSURE avait parlé des systèmes où tout se tient et ... SAPIR du **pattern** ou modèle des ensembles linguistiques.

(LS/ELG: 94)

Cp. Malmberg: 'Le système linguistique est pour Meillet 'un ensemble où tout se tient', formule très saussurienne, souvent attribuée à tort au maître' (Malmberg 1983: 20); also Firth (1950: 180).

13.13 DELACROIX: The study of psychological linguistics in the first decade of the 20th century is associated particularly, according to Leroy, with Jespersen and van Ginneken (chided in the Bibliography here for misunderstanding the logical side of language) under the influence of Wundt. In the following decade

a number of studies were to be devoted to the relationship between thought and language, two of the most important being H. Delacroix's *Le langage et la pensée*, 1924, on the psychological plane and F. Brunot's *La pensée et la langue*, 1922, on the linguistic plane with particular reference to French.

(Leroy 1967: 92)

Delacroix is quoted in the Bibliography: 'Les mots n'ont point d'autonomie; ils ne sont qu'un élément de combinaison [?] plus ou moins constante' (Brøndal's "?").

13.16 SAYCE: Archibald Henry Sayce (1845-1943). Like Gardiner later, Sayce was an Oriental scholar with a keen interest in general linguistics. He taught Comparative Linguistics ('Comparative Philology') at Oxford in the 1870s. (The only work listed in the M & S Bibliography is his *Principles of comparative philology* 1874, 2nd ed. 1875.) He also contributed the article 'Grammar' to the 9th edition of the *Britannica* (1880) (quoted above in the comment to Sec 5.5) and in the same year produced his major work *Introduction to the science of language* (2 vol. - note that 'philology', a term used also for the general study of lan-

guage, becomes **Sprachwissenschaft** under German influence, which easily preponderates in the references and discussion in his work). Sayce was Professor of Assyriology at Oxford from 1891 to 1919.

The M & S Bibliography does not quote Sayce directly, but merely states that 'Language is based on the sentence not on the isolated word'. In the **Introduction to the science of language** there is a motto to chapter 5 'Morphology of speech' from Humboldt: 'In der Wirklichkeit wird die Rede nicht aus ihr vorangegangenen Wörtern zusammengesetzt, sondern die Wörter gehen umgekehrt aus dem ganzen der Rede hervor'. (Also quoted by Cassirer; cp. comment on 13.16.) Discussing the Humboldtian concept of a morphological division of languages, 'polysynthetic', 'isolating', 'agglutinative' and 'inflexional', and comparing it with other versions, Sayce declares emphatically:

Every morphological classification of language must be founded on grammar - that is, on the relations of the several parts of the sentence to one another ... We shall never have a satisfactory starting-point for our classification unless we put word and root out of sight, and confine ourselves to the sentence or proposition ...

(Sayce 1880, I: 369)

However, the context here is Sayce's rejection of the idea that the 'isolating' languages, assuming they lack inflexional morphology (as was assumed for Chinese at this time and later by Jespersen and Brøndal at a time when there was plenty of evidence to the contrary) have no grammar. 'To speak of Chinese being "without grammar", as Bopp does ... is simply self-contradictory.' He also notes that 'Steinthal was the first to make the sentence rather than the word the basis of morphological arrangement [of language families]'. One might note here in passing that the later 19th century treatments of grammar moved away from the collection of

individual word-forms (under the influence of the botanical sciences) to concentrate more on theory. It could be said of many of the early comparativists that they were obsessed with morphology for its own sake; pages and pages of tables of individual forms overshadow discussion. Here in Sayce we see a trend away from this kind of taxonomic linguistics to a more discursive style of presentation as later in Jespersen (1924), de Saussure, Sapir and so on. The same thing appears to be happening today insofar as grammatical discussion no longer needs the elaborate apparatus of tree-diagrams and quasi-algebraic rewrite rules and so forth to be respectable.

13.6 JESPERSEN: Cp. the section on 'The word' in **The philosophy of grammar**, pp. 92-95, especially:

We should never forget that words are nearly always used in connected speech ... isolated words, as we find them in dictionaries and philological treatises, are abstractions, which in that form have little to do with real living speech.

(Jespersen 1924: 95)

Nevertheless there is a difference between Jespersen's attitude here and Sayce's. Jespersen emphasized combinations like nexus and junction, and contrasted word classes with the three ranks, a major point of agreement with Brøndal, who does not speak of rank as such, but uses the same led, underled terminology in syntax. Jespersen's ideas on verbal nexus ('the doctor's arrival') and predicative nexus words ('cleverness') demonstrate that he was not against talking in terms of words where relevant.

13.17 CASSIRER: Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), German neo-Kantian idealist philosopher. Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hamburg

1919-1933. Taught at Oxford 1933-35, Gothenburg 1935-41, Yale 1941-45. He died in New York only a few days after delivering a paper on structural linguistics. The Bibliography here quotes from *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*. 1, *Die Sprache* (1923) just the expression 'Primat des Satzes vor dem Wort', with a cross-reference to this section (13 #1). The expression occurs in quotation marks in the original, as the Bibliography here shows; nevertheless, a longer quotation will tie the appropriate connections. The context is Chapter 5 'Language and the expression of the forms of pure relation. The sphere of judgment and the concepts of relation', and includes the Humboldt quotation used more briefly by Sayce:

... the true and original element of all language formation is not the simple word but the sentence. This is another of the fundamental insights which Humboldt contributed to the philosophy of language. 'We cannot possibly conceive of language ... as beginning with the designation of objects by words and thence proceeding to their organization. In reality, discourse is not composed from words which proceeded it, on the contrary, words issued from the whole of discourse.' This conclusion, which Humboldt drew from the speculative concept underlying his whole philosophy of language - from the concept of 'synthesis' as the source of all thought and speech - has been fully confirmed by empirical, psychological analysis, which also regards the 'primacy of the sentence over the word' as one of its first and most secure findings.

(Cassirer [1923] 1953: 303-04. Manheim's tr.)

In a footnote, Cassirer adds: 'This primacy is asserted by Wundt and particularly by Ottmar Dittrich *Grundzüge der Sprachpsychologie* v.1 (1903) and *Die Probleme der Sprachpsychologie* (1913).' Dittrich's works are included in the Bibliography here: Brøndal's annotation to Dittrich 1913: 'Emphasizes (correctly from a psychological point of view, cp. M & S Sec. 89) the primacy of the sentence over the word.' Thus Brøndal's implied rejection of the prevailing view is only from the standpoint of morphology.

13.17 JØRGENSEN: The Bibliography quotes **A treatise of formal logic:** 'Psychologically and linguistically the sentences are primary in relation to the words'.

13.27 **satzbildende Wörter:** clause- or sentence-forming words.

13.28-29 **satzbestimmende ... satz- und wortverbindende:** these two terms are taken up in their (native) Danish equivalents in Sec. 15, where they have been rendered: 'clause-determining words'; 'clause- and word-connecting words'.

13.30 **ausserhalb des Satzes:** 'outside the clause or sentence'.

13.34 **Teilwort:** lit. 'part word', *del-ord* in Sec. 15, where the hyphen shows it to be a coining. (Not 'particle' - *småord* or *partikel*.)

13.35 **Einzelwort:** separate or individual word.

13.36 **Gruppenwort:** group word.

13.37 **Satzwort:** clause or sentence word. A common term for this notion is 'sentence substitute'. ('Word sentence' is generally used to refer to those complex structures of, say, Eskimo, which are nevertheless apprehended as a single word.)

13.45-47 **cas-sujet, cas-régime**: 'appelés quelquefois aussi **cas actif et cas passif**' (Marouzeau 1951: 43)

13.58 **Aussagesatz**: equated with (Latin form) **indicativ** in original. **Aussagen** 'declare, state, indicate'. cp. also Danish **udsagn** and Earle's reference, quoted above, to Madvig's term for the verb, **udsagnsord**, in the sense 'word of predication, predicator'. **Begehrungssatz**: perhaps 'conative sentence'. **Begehren** (Wahrig: 'sehnlich wünschen' corresponds to the Biblical use of 'crave'; the intention is that it should be superordinate to **Wunschsatz** (lit. 'wish sentence') and **Willensatz** (lit. 'will sentence'). While 'conation', 'wish' and 'will' do not seem to form an obvious semantic hierarchy, it is clear that this is Maier's, originally Delbrück's, intention:

Delbrück's elaborate treatise on the Greek subjunctive and optative (in his **Syntaktischen Forschungen** vol. 1) with a comparison of Greek and Sanskrit usages, is familiar to all scholars. Whatever may be thought of Delbrück's main thesis, the distinction of the subjunctive as the mood of will from the optative as the mood of wish, none can fail to be impressed and instructed by his attractive and original treatment of the subject, which has made an epoch in grammatical science.

(Goodwin 1889: vi)

As Goodwin's work on the subjunctive and optative in Greek remains a standard (first edition: 1860), his evident lack of enthusiasm for the 'will and wish' thesis lends support to Brøndal's criticism in Sec. 38.

13.66ff. **HARRIS**: The relevant passage is cited briefly and not quite correctly in the Bibliography to M & S. In Chapter III of **Hermes**, 'Concerning the species of words, the smallest parts of speech', Harris takes some lines from Shakespeare for analysis ('The man that hath no music in

himself ...' etc. *Merchant of Venice* v. i. 83ff.) and first analyses them conventionally: *The*, article; *man*, no, *music* ... nouns, ... substantive ... and adjective; *that* and *himself* are pronouns ... and so on. Thus in one sentence he says he has found all the parts of speech recognized by the Greek grammarians, and notes that the Latin grammarians did not recognize an article and assigned the interjection to a separate class. He then asks why there are not more 'species of words', why these and not less. He reconsiders the example analysed in the usual manner:

One difference soon occurs, that some words are **variable**, and others **invariable**. Thus the word *man* may be varies into *man's* and *men* ... On the contrary the words *the*, *in*, and ... remain as they are, and cannot be altered.

(Harris 1751: 24-25)

However, this distinction is not the essential one, since some languages - and Harris is concerned after all with universal, not just English, grammar - have variations which are only particular, such as the Greek dual, adjectival concord for gender, case and number in Greek and Latin, or Latin inflexion in '*Brutum amavit Cassius*', where English word order ('Cassius loved Brutus') indicates the subject - object relationship. Therefore:

Suppose then we should dissolve the sentence above cited, and view its several parts as they stand **separate** and detached. Some 'tis plain still preserve a meaning (such as *man*, *music* ...) others on the contrary **immediately** lose it (such as *and*, *the*, *with* etc.) Not that these last have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it, but when in **company**, or **associated**.

(*ibid.* 26)

The Bibliography annotation says that this passage establishes the notion of **synsemantica**. We shall return to this idea (and its status as a 'classical notion') (13.67) again in the comment to Sec. 39 #1 below.

13.85 ff. **situation and context ... empiricist attitude:** cp. comment on Gardiner above (Sec. 12). Brøndal approved the confirmation of his idea of word classes as systems of language (*langue*) and functional relations as 'the real parts of speech', but found much of the Malinowski-Gardiner approach unpalatable.

14.1 **The definition of a word:** The literature on this topic is large; a good survey is provided by Ullmann (1957: 45-56). He points out that

The fact remains that we are faced by a multiplicity of definitions, far less overwhelming, it is true, than the 200 definition routes to the sentence, but bewildering enough as they are. (p. 46)

The approaches to word definition are grouped under six headings: 1, the phonological approach; 2, the approach from lexical morphology; 3, the semantic approach 'still the most frequent'; 4, the approach from syntactic morphology ('consideration of verbal devices such as modification and inflexion'); 5, syntactic semantics, under which heading is quoted Brøndal's posthumously published paper 'La constitution du mot'; 6, the structuralist approach, which considers

the part played by the word within the language system. This attitude is responsible for frequent attempts to define the word and the sentence in contradistinction to one another ... the result being Gardiner's 'The sentence is the real part of speech'. (p.52)

So far as the basic contrast of word systems and syntactic structures is concerned, Brøndal's theory here is structuralist; but the kind of arguments used to arrive at this position suggest that his position on the definition of the word is something like 'morphosyntactic semantics'. (The concept of morphosyntax appears in fact in DSG, the final version of 'the system of grammar'.)

14.11 ff. **for**: Danish **for** is glossed 'for' and 'fore-' in anticipation of a kind of play upon words in Sec. 23.

14.13 **for-mand**: though the semantic range of the Danish word is wider than **foreman**, as it can also mean **president**, **chairman**, and so on, the gloss will serve the point being made about compounds.

14.19 **the unit in 'language'**: Taken with Gardiner's definition of the sentence as the unit of speech, this equilibrium evidently appeals to Brøndal as opposed to the 'primacy of the sentence' tradition.

14.29 **en**: 1. preposition in ('en hiver', 'en France') from Latin **in**; 2. unstressed adv. and pronoun - adv. 'thence, from there': 'j'en arrive'; pron. 'of it': 'nous en parlions' etc., from Latin **inde**, 'whence' (10th c. form **ent**). (Petit Robert)

14.37 **the usual view**: Brøndal emphatically assigns compounds to syntax (Sec. 69) and I have therefore made my comment on this question at that point. By way of brief anticipation of the arguments discussed there the following extract from Sweet may serve to indicate 'the usual view':

A compound is a combination of two words equivalent formally and logically to a simple word ... The formal distinction between a compound and a word-group evidently is that in a compound the elements are associated more closely together ... the elements of **blackbird** are inseparable from one another and follow one another in an absolutely fixed order ... such compounds as **blackbird**, **hatbox**, form their plurals **blackbirds**, **hatboxes** ... But such a word-group as a **box for a hat** can be freely altered ... a **box for hats**, **boxes for hats**, and the elements of .. a **black bird** may be modified and sep-

arated in various ways, as in **so black a bird, the blackest bird, birds black and white.**

(Sweet 1891: 24-25)

The criterion of the greater cohesion of compounds as against wordgroups is often referred to as 'uninterruptability'.

15.1 ff. **Word classes:** At the end of the discussion of morphology, by way of introducing the following treatment of syntax, Brøndal concedes that 'words and forms of a given definition, if not necessarily and constantly, nevertheless frequently and naturally seek certain positions and play definite roles on the linguistic scene.' (Sec. 41.3-6) This being so, it is somewhat difficult to accept that the case for a syntactic treatment of word classes stands or falls on the issue of a one-to-one correspondence between a given word class and a sole syntactic function. This is, nevertheless, the line taken by Brøndal and much of his discussion under each word class established by his logical analysis is devoted to demonstrating that the given class can have a number of syntactic functions and can take a number of positions (e.g. initial, central, final) as syntactic elements. Of course, as Brøndal is at pains to point out again and again, units established by morphological analysis recur, so to speak, in syntactic constructions, but not *qua* words at all, but as members established independently by logico-syntactic analysis.

15.18 **prepositions:** usually grouped with conjunctions in the Germanic tradition as link-words (*Bindewörter*), an idea taken up in English by Earle (1875), for example.

15.21 **Hermann's system:** The Bibliography makes a reference from the entry for Hermann's *Die Wortarten* (1928) to Ernst Otto's reply in the same year. Otto established the classes of: **Dingwort, Vorgangswort, Zuordnungswort, Eigenschaftswort** and **Umstandswort** - 'nach ihrer Beziehungsbedeutung auf Grund einer kategorialen Auffassung der Wirklichkeit' ('according to their relational meaning on the basis of a categorial conception of reality'). The classes established are evidently of less interest to Brøndal here than the kind of analysis employed which seems to be nearer in spirit to the approach in M & S than most other systems referred to.

16.7 **the directly opposite view:** namely, the concept of conversion:

In English, as in many other languages, we can often **convert** a word, that is, make it into another part of speech without any modification or addition, except of course, the necessary change of inflection, etc. Thus we can make the verb **walk** in **he walks** into a noun, as in **he took a walk, three different walks of life**. We call **walk** in these two collocations a converted noun, meaning a verb which has been made into a noun by conversion.

(Sweet 1891: 38)

Also known as a **deverbal** noun. Indeed, the wide use of terms like **denominal, deverbal** and **deadjectival (de-adjectival)** in current morphological discussion suggests that Brøndal's view remains a minority one on this point.

16.18 Danish **let:** light i.e. not heavy. cp. adjective **lys, light, i.e. not dark.**

16.19-20 **inflexion:** the contrast of **light/ lights** and **light/ lighter/ lightest**. Similarly in Danish: though the noun **lys** has no plural inflex-

ion, the adjective inflects for comparison *lys, lysere, lyst* and for concord: *en lys idé* (a bright idea), *et lyst hoved* (a bright fellow, lit. 'head').

16.27 WYLD: Henry Cecil Wyld (1870–1945), pupil of Sweet's, Merton Professor of English Language & Literature at the University of Oxford. **The universal English dictionary** (1932) – reissued with appendix of new words 1936 (Buss) and 1952 (Partridge) and still in print (source: **British books in print**, 1987, which gives 1977 as the latest edition) was a large single volume work (c. 200,000 entries) and an avowedly independent effort. Wyld drafted all the definitions himself before consulting other works, since previous definitions tended to have a 'hypnotic effect' on the lexicographer, as he points out in the preface. I have verified the citations, which are accurate enough: the examples 'a round table' and 'my dear friend' are not Wyld's, but this is of small importance – a more serious discrepancy, however, is the following.

16.52 **past**: M & S has: **past** I participle: the **past** week (etc.). The exact layout of the entry in Wyld (p. 835, col. 3) is:

past (I.) adj. [1. pahst; 2. past]. P.P. of **pass** (I) ...

As Wyld states in 'Note on method of arrangement',

Each entry appears in black type, followed immediately by the part of speech, noun, verb ... Next comes the pronunciation in two forms of phonetic notation ... Following the pronunciation, and preceding the definition of the word, its origin is indicated.

(p.xix)

Thus 'P.P. of **pass**', clearly separated from the part of speech classification 'adj.' by the pronunciation guide, is a note on the origin of the

form, not itself a classification. Moreover, under the entry for **pass** the past participle is given in standard orthography 'the pain has now **pass-ed**' etc. To say that Wyld classes **past** as being a participle seems clearly mistaken. Yet this classification is cited repeatedly in the following section:

17.3, 17.19, 17.28, 17.32, 17.37 and 17.41: '**past**' [=] **participle(s)**, while in the subsequent section ...

18.12 '**past**' is a **participle**: ... Brøndal even agrees with the classification: doubtless he saw what he was looking for instead of Wyld's actual entry, because this idea is repeated several times in later sections on morphology, though not in the section on participles itself (24 #1).

18.18 **congruent function**: The M & S Bibliography quotes Gardiner 1932 (Sec. 42 'Word-form & word-function as correlated linguistic facts'): 'Unless there are strong reasons for the contrary view, it is always assumed that words are functioning in accordance with their form', and notes that this view is disputed here. Gardiner's approach is empirical, 'context of situation' based, appealing, among other things, to the speaker's intention:

.. when educated persons talk consciously their word-consciousness frequently consists in applying certain grammatical rules without awareness of the deeper-lying factual relations which these grammatical rules imply. If the right words have been chosen, those factual relations can be revealed to consciousness by a careful analysis of 'what was really meant', the surrounding words and the situation forming the basis of the deduction. Accordingly, the function of words is, after all, something objective and scientifically ascertainable.

(Gardiner 1932: 148)

More recent developments of this approach have led to the establishment of separate linguistic disciplines, paradigmatics, discourse analysis, where notions like conversational implicature (Grice - cp. Gardiner's 'what was really meant', 'intention' etc.) and speech acts (Austin, Searle) are invoked. The empirical attitude was no more palatable to Brøndal than it was to proponents of TGG later, since the 'context of situation' escapes the net of mathematical or symbolico-logical analysis.

(G.T. has pointed out to me that another way 'context of situation' escapes the net of logical or grammatical analysis is when the speaker's intention determines function over apparent form. As he put it in Chapter seven of *Stylistics*, 'Specific functions of language':

Perhaps you would unthinkingly agree that anyone who asks a question wants to know something, but would you continue to agree after reading these questions?

Why is a raven like a writing desk?

Would some nice little boy like to set the table?

Where are the snows of yesteryear? ...

Wilt thou have this woman to thy wedded wife

Grammatically these are all questions indistinguishable in form from 'Where did you leave the keys?', but they differ in their *intention*. Grammatically 'I wonder if you could tell me where to find the keys' is not a question though it is spoken by someone who wants to know something and in its intention resembles 'Where are the keys?' Intentions are not observable and are easily misunderstood, but language functions efficiently only if, from a complex of grammatical hints and surrounding circumstances along with general cultural assumptions, hearers deduce the intentions of speakers with reasonable accuracy. An account of linguistic variation would be incomplete without some attempt to deal with the shadowy problem of intention.

(Turner 1973: 203)

19.22 **this day**: suggested simply to reflect the more strikingly compound form of the Danish: *i dag* (two orthographic words).

19.29 **combination:** form used in the original: 'combination (hvorunder sammensætning)'.

19.38 **global function:** original '... denne deres sædvanlige globale funktion ...'

19.41-43: **both syntactically ... and morphologically:** in spite of the admission that the global function of compounds is that of words, and that their constituent parts are separately susceptible of morphological analysis, nevertheless the interrelationship of the parts is held to be of a syntactic nature and compounds are assigned to syntax (Sec. 69).

20.5-6 **synonymic status or symbolic value:** original, 'synonymiske stilling eller symbolværdi'. Status can be interpreted in a literal sense of relative position or standing. Brøndal intended to work out relational diagrams for word classes on a universal scale; his main achievement in this regard was PT (1940), his theory of prepositional relations in which, in addition to the logical concepts relevant to the definition of word classes, the 'generic' concepts first set out in OKL and applied here in M & S, a set of relational concepts derived from modern theories of logic, such as symmetry, transitivity, connexity, variability, plurality and generality were applied in an examination of the preposition systems in 23 languages. Cp. comment on 20.14.

20.14 **point of origin:** original **udgangspunkt** (also 'point of departure'). **Origin** fits the almost mathematical spirit of the discussion here. I owe

this suggestion to GT.

20.14 **synonymics**: we may note once more Brøndal's own French rendering of the subtitle to PT, *Indledning til en rationel betydningslære*, in a French abstract as: (Théorie des prépositions): **Introduction à une synonymie rationnelle** (ELG: 150) as against Naert's choice for the published translation (1953) (T. de p.): **Introduction à une sémantique rationnelle**. To get some idea of the style of this representation of preposition systems and to see how literally terms like 'central' are used here, it is instructive to compare the relational diagrams in PT for French and Latin. I have simplified the diagrams by omitting superscript numerals referring to further distinctions discussed in the text of PT where the schemata are exhaustively analysed and logically justified. The row and column headings asymmetric - symmetric and transitive - intransitive are analytic foci analogous to those given in M & S to provide the system of grammar, viz. system - rhythm and symbolical - logical. It is important to note at the same time that these concepts are not Brøndal's invention, but are the terms used by Russell for the logical analysis of relations as set out in *The principles of mathematics* (1903) and elsewhere. The doctrine is explained informally in *Our knowledge of the external world* (1914) (included in the Bibliography of OKL). Russell states that there are two classifications of relations, the first of which is symmetry:

Some relations, when they hold between A and B, also hold between B and A. Such, for example, is the relation 'brother or sister'. If A is a brother or sister of B then B is a brother or sister of A. Such again is any kind of similarity, say similarity of colour. Any dissimilarity is also of this kind ... Relations of this sort are call-

ed **symmetrical** ... All relations that are not **symmetrical** are called **non-symmetrical**. Thus 'brother' is **non-symmetrical**, because, if A is the brother of B, it may happen that B is a **sister** of A. A relation is called **asymmetrical** when, if it holds between A and B, it **never** holds between B and A. Thus husband, father ... etc. are **asymmetrical** relations. So are **before, after, greater, above, to the right of** etc.

(Russell 1914: 56-57)

Russell is evidently talking of concepts rather than words here. Brøndal now takes the notion of **symmetry** and applies it to members of a word class, prepositions. Thus **sur, sous** and **super, sub** are analysed as **asymmetric** in the relational diagrams.

The other relational classification drawn from Russell is that of **transitivity** (in the logical, rather than the conventional grammatical sense, though these senses are clearly allied: in principle, a number of classes other than the verb may be so described from the relational point of view):

A relation is said to be **transitive**, if, whenever it holds between A and B and also between B and C, it holds between A and C. Thus **before, after, greater, above** are transitive. All relations giving rise to series are transitive, but so are many others ... A relation is said to be **non-transitive** whenever it is not transitive. Thus 'brother' is **non-transitive**, because a brother of one's brother may be oneself. All kinds of dissimilarity are **non-transitive** ... A relation is said to be **intransitive** when, if A has the relation to B, and B to C, A never has it to A. Thus 'father' is **intransitive**. So is such a relation as 'one inch taller' or 'one year later'.

(Russell 1914: 57-58)

Thus **sur** and **super**, like **above**, are logically transitive, just as they are logically **asymmetric**. In this way Brøndal notes in the Bibliography to PT that the philosopher Wohlstetter, in a paper on 'The structure of the proposition and the fact' (*Philosophy of science*, III, 2, 1936), defines English **on** as transitive and **asymmetric**, an analysis accepted in PT.

I have omitted **connexity** from the diagrams here as this dimension only

occurs within specific fields, not as an axial definition or focus. Brøndal drew this concept from Professor Stebbing's discussion in *A modern introduction to logic* (1930; PT cites 2nd ed. 1933), where the historical background is discussed at length. Stebbing herself clearly distinguishes between the still valid Aristotelian basis of logic (shorn of its scholastic accretions - a point Brøndal refuses to take), the dubious contributions (from a realist standpoint) of the Idealist logic of Hegel and Bradley (- Brøndal would differ again, at least in regard to the English Idealist), and the Pragmatist logic of Sidgwick and others, as against modern symbolic logic (Frege, Russell and Whitehead, Carnap, Tarski and their successors.) The synonymics of PT thus unites Classical Aristotelian logic (the generic concepts of M & S continue to serve for the analysis of word classes) with 20th century theories of logical relations. Thus:

(Modern French: PT 127)

	intr.		intr. - trans.		trans.	
asy.	pour	par	devant		sur	sous
			après			
asy- sym.	contre À vers		DE		entre EN dans	
sym.	sans	dès	avant		chez	avec
			selon			

(Latin: PT 130)

	intr.			trans.	
asy.	ante	post	---	praeter	trans
	ad	tenus		super	sub
asy-sym.	contra/ ob	prae/ pro	---	inter/ per	propter/ in
sym.	sine	ex	---	penes	coram
	ab	de		apud	cum

(The central column for Latin is deliberately blank in the original to show that a complex 'intransitive - transitive' class cannot be established for that language system.) What is important here is that these constellations of prepositions have been established by exact and carefully considered analysis; that many might disagree with individual results and placings or quite likely with the entire undertaking is not the point. The schematic status of each pronoun is thus defined (with a battery of logical foci omitted here) for each given system. Slightly analogous perhaps are the phoneme charts for individual languages in, for example, Trubetzkoy's *Grundzüge*, or for different stages of a given language as a basis for arguments about 'gaps in the system' and the like. Thus 'central and dominant' (20.17) applies to the French preposition *de* - and according to Brøndal here, to the conjunction *que*, so one can readily imagine the kind of diagrams which could be drawn up for conjunction systems, as was Brøndal's intention - while Latin *de* is 'analogous to *ab* and *ex* (cf. French *dès* ...)' (20.22), illustrated by the fact that *de*, *ab*

and **ex** are placed in the symmetric - intransitive field (defined by row and column) in the Latin diagram just as **dès** (and **sans**) are in the French.

20.35-36 **abstraction** ... **Chinese**: To make this observation intelligible, it will be necessary to anticipate the listing of the abstract word classes (Sec. 21.30 ff.). These are given as: prepositions, proper names, adverbs and numerals. While an improvement on the common European notion that Chinese has no definable word classes, the view is scarcely tenable that, as is specifically stated in OKL, Chinese lacks nouns, verbs, pronouns or conjunctions 'in our sense' ('Her [Kinesisk] findes hverken nominer eller verber, hverken pronominer eller conjunctioner i vor forstand.' OKL 212) What are translated into European languages as such word classes 'are always more abstract expressions from the Chinese point of view'. On the other hand, if we were to say (with Steinthal) that Chinese had no word classes at all, that would deprive the language of a morphology or indeed any grammatical system whatever (OKL 213). This degree of abstraction in word classes is then held to be representative of an analytical style of thought, and to a greater extent than French, the most abstract European language. The essence of this analytic spirit is seen in the Chinese script, a logical sign system ('et logisk tegn-system') in which each symbol is created by a combination of its formally simplest elements, a system rightly arousing Leibniz' admiration (OKL 215). (This common view of Chinese characters holds true only for a few percent of the vocabulary: thus the primitive ideograms **rì** (**sun**) and **yuè** (**moon**) are combined to form **míng** (**bright**). The majority of characters are compounds of a radical, a kind of broad semantic indicator, and a phonetic ele-

ment.) However, reasonable or not, Brøndal repeated these views in *Le français, langue abstraite* (1936). At the same time he points out that Chinese has all the syntactic resources for the expression of any thought: for him, this is a universal of language. He repeats his idea that 'more abstract' means 'more analytical thought' and notes again the attraction of Chinese for Leibniz' concept of a universal symbolic language:

C'est pourquoi LEIBNIZ, dans ses efforts prolongés et passionnés pour construire une langue universelle ou caractéristique générale, ne pouvait ne pas s'intéresser au chinois, précurseur historique de son œuvre géniale.

(FLA 12)

We have seen elsewhere that Bacon's description of Chinese characters (ideograms, ideographs) as 'real, not nominal, characters' provided the impetus for the English 'projectors' like Dalgarno and Wilkins in their attempts to establish a linguistic calculus. Thus the claimed 'abstraction' of Chinese is invoked here as a prelude to the establishment of the fundamental categories of language which in isolation will provide the 'abstract' word classes.

21.1 ff. **four categories:** specifically stated in Sec. 84 to be the first and most important of the Aristotelian categories, where they are given in the original order: substance, quantity, quality, relation. In the *Kategoriai* (*Categories*) ten categories are established: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, state, condition, action and passion ('undergoing'). However, these are not considered to be equal divisions: the fundamental distinction in the *Categories* is substance versus the nine 'accidents' (in the *Prior analytics* reduced to seven),

the substantial and the accidental. Moreover, it seems that Aristotle had a more relaxed view on the question of how many categories or genera of entities can be established than his scholastic followers:

Although Aristotle implied that his ten categories constitute the ten highest genera of entities and hence the only true genera – the only genera that cannot be taken as species of higher genera – he also implied that it is not essential to his theory that the categories be exactly ten in number or even that they be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Categories are listed in various of Aristotle's writings, but the list usually stops short of ten without indication that categories have been omitted. He explicitly stated that no absurdity would result if the same items were included in both the category of quality and that of relation... Despite these indications that his theory of categories is not entirely complete, medieval philosophers generally wrote as though Aristotle's list of ten provided a final, exhaustive enumeration of the highest genera of being.

(Thompson 1967: II, 47)

We shall see how Brøndal arrived at four categories in the discussion of the theory developed in *Ordklasserne* immediately below. It is of interest to note, however, that the Stoics, whose views on the signifier and the signified sound so startlingly modern, argued that there were only four most generic concepts: 'substratum, or subject; quality, or essential attribute; state, or accidental condition; and relation' (Thompson 1967: II, 52). (*Subjectum* is the Latin version of *hypokeimenon*, 'the underlying', substrate, substance.) Thus three of the four categories coincide with Brøndal's: substance, quality, relation. We shall also see that the precise number of categories for his purpose is by no means arbitrary, since it determines (mathematically) the number of combinations of categories realizing word classes (by the 'rule of Leibniz' quoted in OKL). Moreover, while he was able to work here (M & S) with only four 'generic' categories for morphology (and for syntax), he needed an extended set of concepts for the analysis within a given system, namely the relational

concepts of PT (symmetry, transitivity etc. - cp. comment on 20.5-6 above).

21.8-9 an earlier work on word classes: *Ordklasserne*, with over 200 pages of closely reasoned argument, about twice the length of M & S, the result of a decade's elaboration of the basic theory, is a work which is difficult to condense in a few paragraphs without doing its author an injustice. The intention here is to provide some background on the genesis of these ideas.

In the foreword to OKL Brøndal tells us that his studies with Høffding introduced him to the philosophical literature on categories, while with Jespersen he was led to a critical revision of traditional grammar. 'A synthesis (*sammenarbejden*) and elaboration (*videreførelse*) of these ideas led to a search for the general organon of linguistic classification; almost ten years ago I believed I had found a basis for a theory' (viii). He sought confirmation of his hypotheses by studying a number of individual languages as well as the history of grammar. (The discussions of the historical aspects of word class theory in OKL are in fact most valuable in themselves apart from Brøndal's own results.) He realized that his approach ran counter to the spirit of the time - the positivist fear of analysis, as he calls it ('*positivistiske angst for analyse*') and that the work would be considered too philosophical by linguists and too linguistic by philosophers (ix). Part I discusses the history of the terminology (pp. 1-9); of the definitions (9-55); of proposed groupings of word classes (55-62); the basic concepts of the new theory are given (63-73). Part II (74-180) discusses the classes in depth. Part III

(181-216) concerns the consequences of the theory for style, individual languages and linguistic typology. Part IV, the conclusion (217-19), restates the main results: (i) the theoretical maximum number of classes is fifteen (based on combinations of four elements), the minimum four (Chinese, the 'abstract' classes); (ii) a given language is always divided into classes and these classes always form systems ('Et sprog er altid delt i klasser, og disse danner altid systemer'), though the systems vary from language to language; (iii) in spite of linguistic variation, the logical basis is everywhere the same, all word classes are susceptible of analysis using the four generic categories.

The historical discussion examines and rejects morphological and syntactic definitions of word classes and reviews attempts at logical analysis. One idea from the Port-Royal grammar is highlighted in the discussion of adverbs: there the adverb is defined as equivalent to a preposition plus government (*styrelse*). The grammar is not quoted directly, but the analysis is referred to a number of times, so the original is worth consideration:

Le désir que les hommes ont d'abrèger le discours, est ce qui a donné lieu aux adverbess. Car la plupart de ces particules ne sont que pour signifier en un seul mot, ce qu'on ne pourrait marquer que par une préposition & un nom: comme *sapienter*, sagement, pour *cum sapientia*, avec sagesse: *hodie* pour *in hoc die*, aujourd'hui.

(Lancelot & Arnauld 1660: 88. Orthography normalized.)

The chapter on syntax in the Port-Royal grammar divides the topic into two parts, agreement (*convenance*) and government (*régime*). The syntax of the latter is said to be arbitrary, unlike that of the former. After some discussion, the reader is referred back to the passage quoted: 'On peut voir sur ce sujet [régime] ce que nous avons dit ci-dessus, des préposi-

tions & des cas.' (p.142) The Port-Royal conceptual division of word classes into two, 'les objets de pensée' and 'la forme et manière de nos pensées' is rejected (OKL 59), as is Harris' division into 'principals' and 'accessories' (OKL 60), but a logical three part division of word classes by the Belgian grammarian Burggraff (**Principes de grammaire générale** 1863) is described as meriting close attention:

For him the noun expresses an object, the verb expresses the existence of a relation, and the particle expresses the nature of a relation . (Among the particles, prepositions express a relation between thoughts, conjunctions a relation between clauses, while adverbs, in agreement with PORT-ROYAL, are defined as the expression of a relation and a relatum ['udtryk for relation plus relat'].)
(OKL 58)

The formula is repeated as: 'adverbs ... according to PORT-ROYAL'S own definition (preposition plus government, i.e. relation plus relatum)' ['præposition plus styrelse, d.v.s. relation plus relat'] (OKL59). The idea that a preposition signifies relation is found in Scaliger 1540 and a number of others, such as Girard 1747 and Becker 1827 (OKL 32-33). The Danish name for preposition *forholdsord* ('relation word') is advanced in support, as is Sütterlin's *Verhältniswort* (OKL 33). (In the English tradition the idea had been suggested by the anonymous writer 'Mica' in **Observations on grammar** 1793. His system of eleven classes used in part traditional denominations - article, conjunction - and categories - quality, existence, relation - examples of the latter are *of*, *to*, *with*. (Michael 1970: 272)) Although the Port-Royal classification of the adverb is rejected, the concept of a preposition as an expression of relation is maintained as *relator* in opposition to *relatum*: Brøndal's insistence on the structuralist principle of systems and oppositions leads him to seek out part and counterpart wherever possible. The concept of substance as a

relatum can be found in Fichte's 'das Bezogene', that which is related:

Thing or substance can be conceived simply as an object of relation. To think is in fact, as FICHTE said, to establish relations ['at sætte forhold']; the thing which is thought is then necessarily a **relatum**... If the thing is conceived purely and simply as a **relatum** ('das Bezogene') it takes on a purely objective character in the sense that it applies only to objects of thought.

(OKL 70)

Substance, then, is **relatum**, the counterpart of the preposition, the **relator**. The word class corresponding to substance is not the substantive, but the **proprium**, the proper name, one of the abstract classes (having a single logical focus). But a system of classes cannot be established with two categories alone. The idea of attribution as description is a classical one, but Brøndal rejects the traditional idea of the adjective as playing a purely descriptive role. In any event, he is determined, like Jespersen, to preserve the classical unity of the noun as a bipartite class of substantive and adjective. Thus he draws attention to the systems of the German grammarians J.C. Adelung (**Umständliches Lehrgebäude der deutschen Sprache** 1782) and K.W.L. Heyse (1838 revision of J.C.A. Heyse's **Ausführliches Lehrbuch der deutschen Sprache**). Adelung's system classes verbs as 'attributing' ('attribuerende') words, adjectives as 'attributed' ('attribueret'). In Heyse's work, adjectives, verbs and adverbs are classed as 'attributive' ('attributiviske'). Brøndal praises Heyse's system for considering verbs ('more clearly than Adelung does') together with adjectives and adverbs as attributive, i.e. describing (descriptive) words ('som attributiviske, d.v.s. beskrivende ord'). (OKL62) Holding to the idea that the verb has an attributive or descriptive facet, Brøndal goes on to point out that 'verbs have usually been considered as words of predication: but already ARISTOTLE and later

PORT-ROYAL analysed them as copula, or relation, and attribute, or quality.' (OKL 63) Hence the classification of verbs in the concrete (two facet) class as both relating and describing. We now consider what can be classed as 'described' as against 'describing'. The scholastics had a number of expressions for what is called the subjective concept of thing or object. 1. **suppositum**, like **subjectum** a version of **hypokeimenon**. 'This denotes the basis of predication, frame of contents.' 2. **materia prima** - 'Used by Duns Scotus for prime (primordial) matter ('allerførste råstof'), the still indeterminate theme'. 3. **materia quantitate signata** - 'Matter defined quantitatively and no longer qualitatively'. 4. **capacitas formarum** - 'Duns Scotus' expression for a certain neutral capacity for any definition or determination whatsoever' ('en vis neutral tilgængelighed for en hvilken som helst forbestemmelse eller determination') - an idea said to be of the greatest importance for the definition of numerals, pronouns and conjunctions, all of which contain, in Brøndal's analysis, at least a 'described' facet. The definitions point away in fact from substance, the objective 'object', towards the 'objects' of mathematics:

These definitions are all in striking contrast to the objective or proper concept of object ['det objektive eller egentlige genstandsbegreb']; they can be classed as indeterminacy ('non-determinedness') or capacity for determining (**indeterminatum** or **determinandum**) ['ubestemthed eller evne til at modtage bestemmelse']. Now this is just what, according to the latest theoreticians, characterizes the objects of mathematics. These are, as is well-known, unnamed or indeterminate ['ubenævnte eller ubestemte'], so that mathematics can properly be called the science in which one never knows what one is talking about. Whether this science deals with number or space or 'structure', whether it treats these objects as chaotic or ordered elements, static or dynamic, the objects are always without quality ... They are only forms or frames which are created (or found) and are held ready to take a descriptive content. They are objects of description (or **descripta**), not describers (or **descriptores**)

(OKL 71-72)

(This is perhaps the weakest part of the system and few, if any, linguists or logicians would accept this view of numerals as pure **descripta**. Cp. comment on Sec. 33.1 below.) Thus the system has four facets of logical analysis, relation and the related, description and the described, or the domains of relativity and 'descriptivity' ['to områder, det relative eller relativitetens og det descriptive eller descriptivitetens'] and these domains must be considered as constituting the entire world of language:

In both domains we find a single substance concept and a correlated function concept; an object proper is defined simply as being a **relatum**; a subjective object or object of description is defined simply as a **descriptum**. In the objective or relative domain are thus found only oppositions between bound and binding members ... in the subjective or descriptive domain only (oppositions) between described members and describing members.

(OKL 72)

There follows in italics the statement of Brøndal's hypothesis of the four fundamental categories for linguistic analysis:

It is thus proposed to consider these four concepts and only these as fundamental. It is assumed - on the basis of the preceding arguments - that they are the constant categories of language, the only necessary and sufficient ones for the definition of the word class system of any language whatever.

It is furthermore proposed to designate the term of combination or **relator** in the relative domain by *r*, the object or **relatum** by *R*, - and in parallel fashion to designate, in the descriptive domain, the describing element, quality or **descriptor** by *d*. and the 'capacity for form', quantity or **descriptum** by *D*.

(OKL 72)

The four concepts have already been linked with the four generic Aristotelian categories substance (cp. proper name); quantity (cp. numeral); quality (cp. adverbs); relation (cp. prepositions). These are the only necessary categories, for as Grote pointed out, the last six of Aristotle's ten are all special forms of relation. (OKL 67) The maximum

number of word classes in any given system will be formed by taking the concepts one, two, three and four at a time. It is immediately obvious that there are four ways of taking four items one at a time, namely d,D,r,R: these form the abstract classes. It is equally obvious that there is only one way to take four items four at a time without regard to their order: dDrR, the undifferentiated class. The number for four items combined two at a time is six (the concrete class), while the number for four items taken three at a time is four. These latter can readily be calculated either by listing or by calculation (the formula nCr for combinations of n items taken r at a time is: $n!/r!(n-r)!$, where $n! = n$ factorial ($1 \times 2 \times 3 \dots \times n$). Brøndal does not use this formula, but refers to Leibniz' rule for establishing the maximum number of combinations taken one, two, three etc. at a time as $2^n - 1$, though he confuses its use by calculating the number of combinations of combinations, giving the preposterous result of 32,767 - of which, as he remarks, only a relatively small number will be realisable. (OKL 77). In fact, the rule shows that three concepts combined in this way will yield seven classes (2^3-1), while five would yield 31. It seems intuitively evident that less than three facets or more than four will produce too few or too many classes, although it is true that Brøndal nowhere claims that any given language realizes all possible classes. Such, then, are the considerations leading to the statement of the four category hypothesis in its barest form in M & S.

21.35-49 The examples have been carefully chosen as neutral ones, that is, emphasizing no particular element.

21:55ff. In the subclasses of the concrete or two-dimensional classes, the emphasized element is shown in bold type.

22.1 **practical reasons:** In OKL the classes are discussed in order of size as in the list in 21.30ff. It is conceivable that the discussion of the abstract classes is postponed here not because of difficulties with the morphological aspect, but of the difficulty of establishing their syntactic counterparts, as can be seen in Sections 57 - 61.

23.1 **Nouns:** Like Jespersen, Brøndal wishes to preserve the classical unity of noun substantive and noun adjective.

23.11-12 **must not be compounded:** the elements of compounds are assigned to a word class, but compounding is considered to be syntactic in nature, as pointed out above. The topic is discussed in Sec. 69.

23.15 ff. Here as elsewhere, the argument against conversion. The insistence on the idea 'once an adjective, participle etc. always an adjective ...' will lead to some fairly counterintuitive classifications from the traditional point of view, more so perhaps in the classes other than noun or verb, but the analysis is consistently and rigorously applied, however unlikely.

23.27 **Home Office:** In his paper 'Words, logic and grammar' Sweet relates the anecdote of a school inspector finding fault with some children

... for saying that **cannon** in **cannon-ball** was a noun instead of an adjective. The fact is that he had observed that 'cannon' in 'cannon-ball' was not a thing-word, but an attribute-word, and imagining that thing-word and noun were convertible terms, hastened to make the children feel the weight of his brilliant discovery.

(Sweet 1870: 487)

Some twenty years later, Sweet reverted to this example in the preface to

A new English grammar:

Practical teachers, who generally confine themselves to one book and one method, are often hardly able to realize how unsettled grammar still is. I remember once reading a paper on grammar before the Philological Society, in which I modestly advanced the view that **cannon** in **cannon-ball** was not an adjective. When I had finished my paper, an English philologist, who was also a teacher, got up, and told me that my criticisms were superfluous, as no practical teacher possessed of common-sense would think of calling **cannon** in **cannon-ball** an adjective. Thereupon another eminent philologist, who was not only a schoolmaster, but had written an English grammar, got up, and, to the intense amusement of the meeting, maintained that **cannon** in **cannon-ball** was an adjective and nothing else; and although he refused to commit himself to a comparison **cannoner**, **cannonest**, he found another speaker to support him.

(Sweet 1891: v-vi)

Sayce, for example, had stated that 'cannon in **cannon-ball** is as much an adjective as **black** (Sayce 1880b, II: 332), doubtless with Sweet's 1870 paper in mind. The problem is generally solved nowadays by avoiding the word adjective and speaking in dependency terms instead, namely, of a noun standing as modifier to its head.

23.29 ff. The denial of a one-to-one correspondence between word class and given syntactic function; an essential part of the argument through the part on morphology.

23.37 **Oculos** ...: Psalm 115, verse 5. The Latin order is preserved in the Revised Version: "'Eyes have they, but they see not'.

23.41 **Medice** ...: 'Physician, heal thyself' Luke 24, verse 23. **Medice**, 'O physician', is considered as a vocative to stand outside the sentence to which it is in apposition.

23.47 **for mand for** ...: Play on example in 14.11-12.

23.61 **epitheton**: According to L&S this occurs as both 'epithet' and 'adjective' in Apollonius Dyscolus, **de Syntaxi** 41.15 and 81.24 respectively (L&S: 634).

23.83 **prepositive, postpositive**: Postposition of adjectives is normal in French (and the other Romance languages) save for a small number of high-frequency adjectives like **bon, nouveau** etc. The examples quoted here are from an equally small group of French adjectives which can be postpositive, when they have the literal sense, or prepositive, when they have a metaphorical sense. Thus 'un homme brave' - 'a brave man'; 'un brave homme' - 'a decent sort' (Mansion - Harrap's). Similarly, 'une nouvelle certaine' - 'a definite, sure piece of news'; 'une certaine nouvelle' - 'a certain news item'.

23.96 **les philosophes grecs**: Jespersen used this example to demonstrate the closeness of the French adjective and substantive:

... there is no invariable rule for the position of adjectives, which are in some cases placed before, and in others after their substantives. As a consequence of this, one may here and there be in doubt which of two collocated words is the substantive and which the adjective, thus in **un savant aveugle, un philosophe grec**.

(Jespersen 1924: 73)

There is further discussion of the second example ('Interchange of the two classes', p. 78) which derives from the French logician Couturat. Mansion observes that if the collocation involves a possible liaison then it is always in the combination adjective + noun, not in the reverse order. 'Thus, **un savant aveugle** is either [œ savã avø:gl], a blind scientist, or [œ savant avø:gl], a learned blind man.' (Mansion 1919: 194).

24.1-2 **words which combine relation and description:** original: 'ord der forener forhold (r) med beskrivelse (d)'.

24.22 **kindred forms:** since they share the emphatic descriptor element.

24.33 **amantes amentes:** 'Lovers (are) madmen'.

24.55 **vivere ...:** 'To live is to fight'. Given the relative freedom of Latin word order, such constructions have a potential for ambiguity. Cp. the ecclesiastical 'laborare est orare', where the position of the copula makes such ambiguity much less likely.

24.56 **Felix ...:** 'Happy the land where to live is to drink', or more likely, 'where to drink is to live', loosely 'where living means drinking'. On either interpretation, one infinitive stands as subject, the other as 'attribute' (the traditional 'complement', a term rejected by Brøndal).

24.57-58 **central member or ... main verb:** original: 'sætningens centrale

led eller ... sætningsverbum.' In Sec. 24 #3 this is repeated in an alternative form, viz. that the view that the finite verb is always the central member is mistaken.

24.60 **suspicio ...**: 'I suspect him to be with that woman'. The Latin construction 'infinitive with subject accusative' occurs in indirect statements, here with the infinitive as an object following (finite) verbs of saying, feeling or believing.

24.61 **historical infinitive**: 'The infinitive is linked to the subject by *de* in the construction known as the historical infinitive (always affective). The subject is always stressed: 'On emmena le soldat et le paysan. Et eux de s'indigner!'" (Mansion 1919: 81)

24.62 **Ainsi dit le renard ...**: The line is from the fable 'Les animaux malades de la peste' (Book VII, no. 1, line 43): 'Thus spake the fox and the sycophants applauded'. Dupré calls this **infinitif de narration** and 'flatteurs d'applaudir' is described as the classic example, but overdone by contemporary journalists:

Dans l'usage actuel, l'infinitif de narration ne se trouve guère que dans une proposition introduite par *et*, **mais** ou **alors**. Il évoque toujours plus ou moins La Fontaine et donne donc l'impression d'une sorte de badinage distingué ...

(Dupré 1972 II: 1322)

24.69 **to katthanein**: dying (L&S quote Aeschylus, **Agamemnon** l. 1290)

24.70 **to esse**: Graeco-Latin hybrid, 'the' being, existing. In most Latin verbs a gerund exists, e.g. (amo) **amandum**, 'the loving', but gerund and

supine are wanting for **esse**.

24.71 **faire**: technique, style. Normally classed as a noun (**le faire**), a classification which Brøndal now rejects in the case of the infinitive as he has earlier done for other classes cp. 23.18-20.

24.81 **le plaisir**: '**Plaire** (1050) a remplacé **plaisir** d'après **faire** ou d'après le futur **je plairai**.' The first nominal use is dated 1080. (Petit Robert)

24.81 **le manoir**: 12th century. Old French **maneir**, **manoir** (ex Latin **manere**) 'to live in, to dwell' (Petit Robert)

24.89 **Finis** ...: 'The end crowns the work.'

24.119 **Carpent** ...: 'Your grandsons are robbing your fruit-trees.'

24.120 **Fortes** ...: 'Fortune favours the brave.' (also: '... juvat')

24.125 **Deus est**: 'God is, exists'. (Jakobson says somewhere that the scholastic argument '**Deus est bonus; ergo, Deus est**' fell flat with Orthodox theologians as Russian lacks a copula in the equivalent, although of course there is a Russian verb 'to exist'.)

24.128 **Festina lente**: 'Hurry slowly'; **carpe diem**: 'seize the day' (Horace); **amat patriam**: 'He/she loves his/her country'.

24.138 **fac-simile**: **fac** is the imperative of **facio**.

25.8-11 **so-called definite ... and indefinite article**: The articles have an interesting history and have been assigned to a number of classes including a separate one. Brøndal's classification of the articles as definite and indefinite pronouns echoes the earliest ideas. In the Stoics and Thrax **arthron** covers article and relative pronoun, which have markedly similar declensions in Greek. Thus Thrax: 'Article - a declinable part of speech placed before or after the inflexion of nouns; before it as **ho** ['the'], or after it as **hos** [who, which]' (quoted Michael 1970: 67). Classical Latin, however, had no word corresponding to **ho**, **he**, **to**, though the Romance vernaculars developed a definite article from **ille**. Varro used the term **articulus** for case-inflected words not themselves nouns (in the older inclusive sense). According to Michael, Varro made the pronoun an article and Servius made the article a pronoun, while Priscian denied that Latin had any such class as 'article'. In the Middle Ages, Roger Bacon coined the term 'pronomina articularia' for **hic**. (Michael 1970: 67-68). The disagreements of the Classical era on this head were still unresolved in the early modern period when the first English grammars were composed:

As the grammarians found no clear precedent in Latin, and as few of them took notice of Greek, their treatment of the words **a**, **an**, **the** is at first uncertain and varied. Four types of classification are used: (i) the articles may be linked firmly with words like **of**, **by**, **with**, **to** as 'signs of cases'; (ii) they may be treated in various ways as attachments to the substantive, but distinct from the signs of cases; (iii) they may be included with another part of speech; (iv) they may themselves be treated as primary parts of speech.

(Michael 1970: 350)

Harris, whose universal grammar we have looked at above, anticipated current terminology by calling the articles 'definitives' (Harris 1751: 36), i.e. one of the two classes of 'accessories' (synsemantica), and further noted 'their near alliance with pronouns' (p. 71). By the beginning of the 20th century the situation was still a matter of debate. Onions speaks of the 'demonstrative adjective **the**, commonly called the definite article' and similarly of the 'indefinite adjective **a, an**' (Onions [1904] 1971: 142, 144). Nesfield likewise classes the articles with the adjectives (Nesfield [1898] 1964: 36). The difficulty is particularly well-illustrated in Sweet's discussion. The articles are called **form-words** (Sweet 1891: 54), listed under pronouns and then called adjectives: 'The most important of the indefinite pronouns is the indefinite article **a, an**, which, like the definite article, is used only as an adjective' (p.84). (The apparent confusion stems from a deliberate cross-classification thus: declinable words - 1. noun words. Noun, noun-pronoun, noun-numeral ... 2. adjective words: adjective, adjective-pronoun, adjective-numeral ... (p.38).) Thus for example:

Every pronoun is either a noun - **noun-pronoun** or simply **pronoun**, or an adjective - **adjective-pronoun** ... Many pronouns are used both as nouns and as adjectives, in which case the adjective use is generally the primary and the more important; thus **that** is a **noun-pronoun** in 'I know that', an **adjective-pronoun** in 'that man', 'that fact'.
(p.69)

Jespersen, too, considered the articles to be pronouns, and refers to them in quotation marks much as Brøndal speaks of the 'so-called' articles:

... if ... the 'definite article' is justly reckoned among pronouns, the same should be the case with **a, an, Fr. un** etc. To establish a separate 'part of speech' for the two articles, as is done in some grammars, is irrational.

(Jespersen 1924: 85)

The separate classification can still be found in current traditional scholarly work (e.g. Quirk & Greenbaum 1973: 18). A more common approach is to place them in the class of **determiners** (Bloomfield 1933: 203; more recently in, for example, Leech, Deuchar & Hoogenraad 1982: 42).

25.15 **certain**: Classed in e.g. Mansion (1967) as: 1. adjective; 2. indefinite adjective & pronoun 'Certains affirment que ...' ('Some mention that ...').

25.16 **conjunctions like dont**: 'whose', normally considered a relative pronoun (thus Mansion 1967). No example with **dont** is given in the discussion of conjunctions (Sec. 26). One might have imagined **dont** to be a misprint for **donc** (which is listed as a conclusive conjunction in OKL (p. 114)), but the Danish equivalent **hvis** (given in 25.17) confirms the example.

25.27 **attribute**: 'Complement' would be the usual English term, but Brøndal specifically rejects (original:) 'Complementer' here in M & S and elsewhere. Cp. comment on Sec. 55 below.

25.28 **Tum ille ...**: 'Then he said "I am not unaware ..."'; **ille** is normally classed as a demonstrative pronoun 'that (yonder) or he, she, it' (Kennedy 1962: 49).

25.28-29 **Commendo vobis ...**: 'I (re)commend this one and this one (him

and him) to you.'

25.29 **id est idem**: 'That is the same' (neuter definite pronoun, idem, eadem, idem)

25.31 **hoc dico**: This I say ...; **dixit iste**: '... said he'.

25.103 **remain identical with themselves**: original: 'Ord der ... forbliver identisk med sig selv'

26.13 **pure or neutral conjunction ...**: cp. 27.17-18, where **que** is described as the universal conjunction.

26.46 **larger word classes ...**: i.e. open classes, also major classes.

26.62-63 **Og hvad så**: cp. German usage, where **und** can stand alone in the same sense ('So what').

26.63 **Eller ...**: Likewise, German **oder?** can stand alone.

26.100 **a kind of 'article'**: Danish **at** with the infinitive corresponds to English **to**.

28.5-6 **conjunct ... absolute possessives**: Quirk & Greenbaum (1973: 105) call these attributive (**my**) and predicative (**mine**) possessive pronouns.

28.32 **un mien ami**: thus in Mansion (1967) where **mien** is described as an 'occasional possessive adjective'. Here again, the argument is based on unusual as well as standard forms.

28.43 **Dit bæst**: A peculiarly Scandinavian usage of the possessive pronoun before terms of abuse (V & B: 'foran skældsord' = you (fx 'you idiot')). Thus **Din idiot! Dit fjols!** (Jones & Gade 1981: 85). Cp. also Swedish **Din toker!**

30.4 **mere relation**: cp. again 'Mica's' scheme of 1797 quoted above, where 'relation' is the term for prepositions. However, as the previous owner of my copy of OKL (flyleaf dated 1931) noted in the margin against the original exposition of this idea, 'rel. er altid mellem to ting': a relation always holds between (at least) A and B. A 'mere' relation without a goal seems about as plausible as a grin without a cat.

30.10 **sauf**: considered both adjective (**sauf, sauve**) as in 'S'en tirer la vie sauve' ('to get off whole') and preposition 'save, but, except: **sauf accidents, barring accidents**' (Mansion 1967). With **que**, **sauf** can be (in conventional terms) a conjunction, **sauf que** (except that).

30.11 **participles like excepté**: GT has reminded me that in French the difference between **excepté** as preposition and participle can be seen in agreement, e.g. prep. 'tout le monde était arrivé, **excepté la mariée**' ('... except the bride'), adj. 'tous les habitants, les femmes **exceptées**' ('... except the women, the women apart') (Mansion 1972: E 69), and that

in English the difference is seen in 'except these things' and 'these things excepted'.

30.11 **past**: cp. comment on 16.52 above.

30.11 **gerunds like durant**: conventionally a preposition (or postposition): 'Il travailla durant toute sa vie, sa vie durant' (He worked all his life).

30.18 **a-tout**: '... vint li roys de France atout son ost' (The King of France came with all his army) Joinville, **Histoire de Saint Louis** (c.1300), quoted Ewart 1933: 374.

30.18 **endroit**: opposite: '... si se herberjera sor l'autre rive, d'autre part, endroit als ...' (stayed on the bank opposite them) Villehardouin, **Conquête de Constantinople** c.1210, quoted Ewart (1933: 377). Cp. also Diez 1887: 272 (under entry *ritto*).

30.22 **chies**: variant forms **ch(i)es(e)** (Ewart 1933: 121); 'house', from Latin *casa*, 'hut, cabin'.

30.28 **government**: This was the notion derived by Brøndal from the Port-Royal grammar: to the equation 'adverbe = préposition + régime' is added 'i.e. preposition plus relation'. Cp. comment on Sec. 21 above.

30.39 **fra - til**: conventionally, in this usage classed as conjunctions:

'fra jeg var barn' (since I was a child); (V & B); similarly for **til**.

30.41: **near relatives of the prepositions**: as in the concept of linkwords embracing prepositions and conjunctions, perhaps, but not close enough in Brøndal's analysis to have the same number of logical constituents. cp. again the objection to the concept of the preposition as a pure relation raised above.

30.43 ff. **object ... infinitive**: cp. Onions' analysis of the infinitive as object ('I want to go'), quoted in comment on Sec. 24 #2 above.

31.8 ff. **proper nouns ... not nouns**: This sounds less paradoxical in the original: 'Proprier må ikke regnes ord af andre ordklasser f. ex. nominer.' But **propria** is the reduced form of **nomina propria** and thus '**nomina propria** are not **nomina**' is equally paradoxical.

31.20 **The Skaw; scaw**: (archaic) headland, promontory. Of Scand. origin, akin to O.N. **skagi** (Webster's 3rd); 'Old Norse via Shetland' (OED).

31.57-58 **Charmidem ...**: Lysiteles greets Charmides (-**em** is accusative form).

31.58 **Salutem ...**: Timarchides gives greeting to Taxilus (-**o** is dative form).

31.60 **Medice ...**: cp. 23.41 above.

31.68 **Pro Milone:** i.e. **Pro Milone oratio** (Cicero's speech on behalf of Milo).

31.70 **Eng-land:** not a true proper noun for Brøndal because compound (31.24 above).

32.4 **radical revision:** in fact, a radical reduction. cp. OKL 'The genuine adverbs are altogether of a quite abstract and subtle character. In our [Western] languages there are few of them and they are rarely very old.' (OKL 92-93) Thus subsections 1-3 (32.6 - 32.16) specify what is to be removed from the class of adverbs.

32.18 **homonym:** the conjunction **si**, 'if', is derived from Latin **si**; the affirmative response to a negative question **si** (cp. German **doch!**) is derived from **sic** (cp. reference to French **en** as a 'so-called homonym' on the grounds of different etymologies, viz. Latin **in** and **inde**, Sec. 14.28-30.) In OKL the affirmative **si** is said to be historically identical to the qualitative adverb **si**, but no longer so in current usage. (OKL 177).

33.1 **numerals:** cp. summary of the argument in OKL (in comment on 21.8-9 above) for regarding numerals as words 'whose sole defining characteristic is the denoting of empty frames or objects for description', as **descripta** not **descriptores**. cp. also Sec 70 # II, where the syntactic submember, the determinative analytic submember, can be realized 'not just by numerals, but also by adjectives which are morphologically quite different from them'. The contradiction is hardly resolved by Brøndal's

insistence that sentence members are not words, for while the idea that there is no one-to-one correspondence between **membra** and **partes** (similar to Jespersen's rejection of a direct link between word classes and ranks, a notion approved by Hjelmslev), it seems quite unlikely that numerals can be passive objects of description morphologically but can fill a determinative role in syntax.

34.16 **Nulla cultus jactatio**: [Among the German tribes there was no] 'ostentation in dress' (Tacitus, *Germania* 6; Lewis 1889 renders the phrase as 'vain display in armour'). **Jactatio** from **jacto** (I throw; metaphorically, I boast).

34.16 **Funerum nulla ambitio**: [There was no] 'pomp at burials': *Germania* 27. **Ambitio** from **ambio**, I go about. (The semantic development is from going about, especially: canvassing; seeking to flatter; hence, ambition etc.)

35.52 **single form ...**: original: 'een form dvs. indre logisk struktur'. Thus all the classes have now been defined by their inner logical structure, not by their syntactic functions, for each class, including interjections, has more than a single function.

36.2-3 **morphology seen from the inside ...**: cp. comment on the autonomy of morphology, Sec. 12 above.

37.15 **MIKKELSEN**: Danish grammarian whose works were authoritative in

Danish schools in the 1900s. He has been described as 'Denmark's Nesfield'.

37.15 SONNENSCHN: Characterized by Fillmore ('The case for case') as 'Jespersen's favourite bad-guy'; Sonnenschein's claim to find the accusative and dative alive and well in Modern English was probably the main reason for Jespersen's negative criticisms of him in **The philosophy of grammar** and elsewhere.

37.16-17 **accusative ... dative**: Thus too Nesfield, who lists five cases, although he recognizes that 'the [non-genitive] cases have lost their case-endings, and are indicated only by grammatical relations' (Nesfield [1898] 1964: 30); to which his reviser F.T. Wood adds the footnote: 'Since, even in those pronouns which are still inflected the same form is used for [indirect and direct object], there is perhaps not much point in continuing to make the distinction.' Sweet, while discussing examples of what might be even an instrumental case ('struck by lightning') or locative ('to stop at home') in other European languages, had already pointed out (1891) that English in fact had (apart from the genitive) 'the uninflected base constituting the ~~common~~ case ... and for personal pronouns we have **nominative** (he) and an **objective** case (him).' (Sweet 1891: 52) Onions noted that

to speak of a noun as being in the nominative, accusative or dative case, is equivalent to saying that the same word would have been in that case in the corresponding Old English construction, or that the meaning expressed is such as we associate with that case in highly inflected languages.

(Onions [1904] 1971: 83)

After which it is surprising to find the concession that though the dative 'can no longer be recognized by its form as a distinct case', it is nevertheless 'convenient ... to keep the term for preserving syntactical distinctions - as, for example [I.O. and D.O.] - and for comparison with other languages in which it has a distinct case-form' (p. 92).

37.53 **tithenai, tithesthai**: to place, to be placed.

37.58 **Homo homini lupus**: Man (subject) [is] a wolf to [his fellow-] man.
Homo, lupus nominative case, **homini** dative.

37.61 **Roman/domum ire**: to go to Rome, to go home.

37.61 **oikon eleusetai**: (he) will come home. Homer, **Odyssey** Bk 19, l. 313.
(In context, Penelope is saying 'I do not see Odysseus coming home'.) The usual Attic future form of **erkhomai** is **eimi**.

37.62-63 [Ita prorsum] **oblitus sum mei**: I have utterly forgotten myself.
Terence, **Eunuchus** 306. **oblitus sum**, perfect of deponent **obliviscor**.

37.63 **Ciceronis domus**: Cicero's (genitive) house.

37.63 **partitive**: One of the case forms of Finnish and Estonian, which have a large number of relational suffixes:

It denotes part of a larger entity, an indefinite amount or indefinite number in contrast to the basic form which denotes a total entity ... (in English often **the**), e.g. 'Saanko jäätelö-ä?' (partitive

ending -ä), 'May I have some icecream?' [as against] 'Jäätelö (basic form) maksaa X. markkaa', 'The icecream costs X (Finnish) marks'.
(Aaltio 1964: 37)

38.20 possibility:

The optative with **an** forms the apodosis of the less vivid future condition (like the English form **would** or **should**), or has a potential sense, e.g. Ei touto poieseien, athlos an eie, 'If he should (were to) do this, he would be wretched'.
(Goodwin 1889: 67)

38.35 **subjunctive**: 'The subjunctive has disappeared almost entirely from Danish. It has only survived in a few stock phrases, such as ... 'Leve kongen!' ('Long live the King!')' (Bredsdorff 1958: 104). Similarly, Koefoed 1958: 185. Jones and Gade call this mood 'the optative (subjunctive)':

There is no real subjunctive in Danish, but some relics of old subjunctive forms are still used as set phrases: Gud bevare kongen, God save the King ... Optation is nowadays found in expressions indicating indifference or lack of concern, and as such it is also found in a number of set phrases: Fred være med ham! [peace be to him]; Skidt være med det! [Never mind!, or: To Hell with it! lit. 'shit on that/it']; Blæse være med det! [Be blowed to it! or, Never mind!]
(Jones and Gade 1981: 185)

39.8 **Synsemantica**: Harris did not use this expression in his own work - for one thing, the correct combining form for **syn** + **s-** is (by assimilation) **syss-**, and Harris provides a lengthy quotation in the original from Apollonius Dyscolus ('one of the acutest authors that ever wrote on the subject of grammar') where the form **syssemainei** occurs (rendered 'are consignant': the verb is singular in Greek with a neuter subject, viz. the parts of speech). Harris' translation of the passage reads:

In the same manner, as of the elements or letters some are vowels, which of themselves complete a sound; others are consonants, which without the help of vowels have no express vocality, so likewise may we conceive as to the nature of words. Some of them, like vowels, are of themselves expressive, as is the case of verbs, nouns, pronouns and adverbs; others, like consonants, wait for their vowels, being unable to become expressive by their own proper strength, as

is the case of prepositions, articles, and conjunctions; for those parts of speech are always consignant, that is, are only significant, when associated to something else. (*de Syntaxi* I, 3)

(Harris 1751: 28, fn. to previous page)

Harris takes up Apollonius' concept by distinguishing between words which have independent meaning and words which have meaning, as quoted here by Brøndal 39. 14-15, 'when in company, or associated'. The distinction, says Harris, would seem to be essential:

For if all words are significant, or else they would not be words; and if every thing not **absolute**, is of course **relative**; then will all words be significant either **absolutely** or **relatively**. With respect therefore to this distinction, the first sort of words may be called significant by themselves; the latter may be called significant by relation; or if we like it better, the first sort may be called **principals**, the latter **accessories**.

(Harris 1751: 27)

The term **synsemantica** appears to have been coined by the German philosopher Franz Brentano: cp. comment immediately below on Marty.

39.16 **MARTY**: Anton Marty (1847-1914) was Professor of philosophy at the German University of Prague. He was a student of Franz Brentano (1838 - 1917), Professor of philosophy and psychology at Würzburg and later at Vienna, and remained a close associate of Brentano for forty years. Brentano developed the notion of synsemantic expressions in his psychologically based logic, in particular his nonpropositional theory of judgement, the consequences of which, says Chisholm,

are far-reaching. One consequence is an interpretation of Kant's dictum that 'existence' is not a predicate. According to Brentano, when we say that A exists, 'it is not the conjunction of an attribute of "existence" with "A", but "A" itself which we affirm.' The word 'exists' is a synsemantic term that is used to express the act of judgement.

(Chisholm, 1967a: I, 366)

The extension of the term **synsemantic** to the formal opposition of **syn-**

semantic and **autosemantic** in Marty's work may have been suggested on the analogy of phonetic terminology: the classical terms **littera vocalis** (vowel, German **Vokal**) and **consonans** (**Konsonant**) were given native forms which make the implicit opposition explicit, namely **Selbstlaut** and **Mitlaut**. Thus Funke's editorial note to Marty's **Satz und Wort** (posthumously published in 1925, 2nd ed. 1950):

Autosemantika (selbstbedeutende Ausdrucksmittel) nennt Marty solche Sprachmittel, die schon für sich allein den Ausdruck eines für sich mitteilbaren psychischen Phänomens bilden, **Synsemantika** (mitbedeutende Ausdrucksmittel) solche, von denen dies nicht gilt. Entfernte Analogie liegt vor zu den lautlichen Selbst- und Mitlautern.

(Funke, in Marty [1925] 1950: 17)

In philosophical terminology a similar distinction is invoked by **cat-egorematic** and **syncategorematic**. Thus Chisholm:

Marty's most important work is the **Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Sprachtheorie** (Halle, 1908), a treatise on the philosophy of language. His theory of meaning, or 'semasiology', is based upon Brentano's descriptive psychology. From a contemporary point of view, the most interesting aspects of this theory are the distinction between **cat-egorematic** and **syncategorematic** uses of words and the theory of emotive utterances. Like Brentano, Marty appeals to the correctness of affirmation and rejection, and of love and hate (in a broad sense) to explicate the **syncategorematic** character of certain basic philosophical concepts. In the assertion 'There is a horse', the words 'a horse' refer to an object, but the words 'there is' serve only to **express** the fact that the speaker is accepting or acknowledging the object. An object is said to have being if it may be correctly accepted; it has nonbeing if it may be correctly rejected; it is good if it may be correctly loved; it is bad if it may be correctly hated; the necessary is that which may be correctly accepted **a priori**; the impossible is that which may be correctly rejected **a priori**.

(Chisholm 1967b: V, 170-71)

39.16 **FUNKE**: Otto Funke, Professor of English at Prague in the 20s and 30s and later Bern in the 40s and 50s. Apart from his support of Marty's theories from a linguistic standpoint (cp. his **Innere Sprachform: eine Einführung in Anton Martys Sprachphilosophie**, 1924) he was a keen student

of the history of English grammatical works (cp. quotations from Funke on Cooper 1685 above). Also a vigorous opponent of Jespersen's rank theory, cp. comment on Sec. 67 below.

40.18 **morphological systems:** Here again the general structuralist identification of the paradigmatic axis with systems (as against the structures of the syntagmatic axis).

40.56 **citation order:** In the M & S Bibliography Rask is quoted as supporting, in a polemic against Grimm, the citation order deriving from the Indian (i.e. Sanskrit) grammarians: nominative, accusative, dative, genitive etc., as the only justified order, an order grounded in the nature of language itself. The 'Continental' order, nominative, genitive, dative, accusative was established by Thrax and followed by Varro (Michael 1970: 112-113). The order shown in the English tradition of grammars of the classical languages - nominative, accusative, genitive, dative - evidently seeks to simplify declensional paradigms where nominative and accusative are identical in the neuter gender, for example. All schemes begin with the nominative, and it is precisely in the classical languages that the problem arises. In many instances, the oblique forms reflect the nature of the stem better than does the nominative, e.g. Latin *cor* (ex **cords*), *cordis*. Though Brøndal insists that the matter is completely arbitrary, the problem is still topical if one attempts to establish paradigms on a marked versus unmarked basis.

40.61 **phonology:** cp. comments above on the Prague School and Trubetzkoy,

who viewed the phoneme as a bundle of features or oppositions, that is, phonology as systems of relations, not aggregates of atomic items.

SYNTAX

Motto: 'Language is perpetual creation'. *Estetica come scienza dell'espressione e linguistica generale*, 1901: chap. XVIII, the conclusion to part I, Theory of aesthetic(s). To get some idea of Croce's philosophy of language, and to see how far it is removed from the inductive positivism of the still influential Neo-grammarians, here is the context of the motto:

Language is perpetual creation. What has been linguistically expressed is not repeated, save by reproduction of what has already been produced. The ever-new impressions give rise to continuous changes of sound and meaning, that is, to ever-new expressions. To seek the model language, then, is to seek the immobility of motion. Everyone speaks and should speak according to the echoes which things arouse in his soul, that is, according to his impressions. ... The question of the unity of the language is always reappearing, because, stated as it is, it is insoluble, being based upon a false conception of what language is. Language is not an arsenal of arms already made, and it is not a **vocabulary**, a collection of abstractions, or a cemetery of corpses more or less well embalmed.

(Croce [1901] Ainslie's tr. 1922: 150-151)

Croce even refused to countenance the existence of parts of speech, on the grounds that 'Expression is an indivisible whole. Noun and verb do not exist in it, but are abstractions made by us, destroying the sole linguistic reality, which is the **sentence**.' (ibid. 146). He concludes by stating his doctrine that linguistic(s) and aesthetic(s) are ultimately one:

These scattered observations must suffice to show that all the scientific problems of Linguistic are the same as those of Aesthetic, and that the truths and errors of the one are the truths and errors of the other. If Linguistic and Aesthetic appear to be two different sciences, this arises from the fact that people think of the former as grammar, or as a mixture between philosophy and grammar, that is, an arbitrary mnemonic schematism or a pedagogic medley

and not of a rational science or pure philosophy of speaking. Grammar, or something not unconnected with grammar, also introduces into the mind the prejudice that the reality of language lies in isolated and combinable words, not in living discourse, in the expressive organisms, rationally indivisible.

(ibid. 151)

Of this one can only say that if the Junggrammatiker can be accused of atomistic fact-grubbing, at least they provided the basis for a new interpretation of the data. Croce takes a stand, but provides no analysis. As Arens remarks of the *Estetica*, 'Croce's Schrift ist weniger ein wissenschaftliches Werk als das temperamentvolle Manifest eines theoretischen Künstlers ...' (Arens 1955: 375) Fortunately, the other outstanding member of the Idealist Movement in linguistics, Schuchardt (also referred to in M & S.), produced work which was recognizably linguistic, e.g. his famous *Über die Lautgesetze. Gegen die Junggrammatiker* of 1885. Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that Brøndal concedes Croce's position to be extreme (see Sec. 86: 67-79), the appositeness of the motto for syntax follows from Brøndal's view of syntax as the 'rhythmic' or dynamic aspect of grammar. Hence too his annotation of Humboldt's famous observation that language is *energeia*, not *ergon*: 'More correctly: both - and' (Bibliography for M & S). (Croce's idea of creativity is an aesthetic one. I forget who observed - rightly, I believe - that the Transformationalist notion of 'creativity' confuses genuine creativity with mere novelty.)

42.1-2 **autonomy of syntax**: We have seen above that the autonomy of morphology as a linguistic level was questioned in the 30s and subsequently, especially in the Transformational era; only in the 80s has there been a renewal of interest in the topic as an independent domain of research. In

turn, where for TGG syntactic problems accounted for the bulk of linguistic literature, current views are challenging the autonomy of grammar itself: Langacker, for example, in the Preface to volume 1 of **Foundations of cognitive grammar**, says

Lakoff has long insisted on the need for a cognitively grounded approach to grammatical structure, the importance of naturalness in linguistic theory, the centrality of metaphor to language and our mental life, the critical nature of categorization, and the non-autonomy of grammar... I greatly appreciate Moore and Carling's views on the nonautonomy of linguistic structure (1982), ... [and] Hudson's efforts in developing 'word grammar' (1984) ...

(Langacker 1987: 4)

Similarly, Givón, who rejects the Transformational assumption of a linguistic structure independent of function:

Language - and syntax - were conceived of [by proponents of TGG] as structure, existing and understandable independently of meaning or function. 'Autonomous syntax' then constituted its own explanation even within linguistics, thus essentially following Saussure and Bloomfield while vigorously protesting to the contrary. (Cf. Chomsky 1957, 1965)

(Givón 1984: 7)

Brøndal had presented a paper 'L'Autonomie de la syntaxe' in August 1931 at the International Linguistics Conference in Geneva in which he sketched his ideas for this part of M & S. While he changed his views on a number of points, his insistence on the separate status of morphology (forms and meanings derived analytically from the generic concepts) and syntax (the study of sentences/clauses and sentence members derived from the syntagmatic combination of the same generic concepts) remained unshaken. At the same time, his readiness to use concepts derived from non-linguistic disciplines and his ultimate view of the status of linguistics vis-à-vis the universe of knowledge (cp. the chart in 'Délimitation et subdivision de la grammaire' 1942, ELG: 136) means that Brøndal

could not subscribe to Hjelmslev's notion of Glossematics as a linguistic calculus or to a Copenhagen School attitude that rejected 'hyphenated' linguistics out of hand. Thus, when Brøndal supports the autonomy of syntax to maintain clarity of perspective and a clearcut division of the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic, this is not at all in the spirit of Hjelmslev or Chomsky claiming autonomy for syntax and linguistics itself so that linguistics, in their view a mathematical science, should not be 'tainted' by the social sciences.

42.5 **concepts of the logical rhythm:** original: *den logiske rythmes begreber*. Like morphology, syntactic analysis still comes under the column of logic (and symbolico-logic) but lies in the row of rhythm, the dynamic aspect of language in use, *parole*, speech. (M & S, Sec. 10) Here again, Brøndal's structuralism was considered 'unorthodox' by the Genevans and by Hjelmslev, who considered himself to be the true heir of Saussure. Brøndal here is nearer to Gardiner and the Prague School.

43.6 **words:** Like Gardiner, Brøndal is at pains to deny that sentences consist of words - for him, sentences consist of sentence members derived from syntactic, not morphological, analysis. In DSG 1942 there is, however, an indication of a concession in the direction of traditional syntax: Brøndal there posits a subdivision of Morphology and Syntax (which remain two of the four major divisions), a morpho-syntax which would, for example, study the order of words in a sentence, where syntax proper studies the order of **members:**

La morpho-syntaxe est l'étude de l'emploi des mots dans la phrase,

de l'harmonie entre les éléments morphologiques et les éléments syntaxiques, de la variation sémantique des mots dans la phrase, de la rection et de l'accord. Tandis que la syntaxe étudie l'ordre des membres de phrase, la morpho-syntaxe étudie l'ordre des mots. Cette discipline correspond donc à peu près à la syntaxe de la grammaire traditionnelle. (cf. JOHN RIES *Was ist Syntax?* 1894)

(DSG in ELG: 139)

43.12 **word classes:** cp. Croce's denial of 'noun and verb' as 'abstractions ... destroying the sole linguistic reality ... the sentence' quoted immediately above.

43.25 **substantival ...:** original: 'substantivisk (sigtende mod ting?) ... adjektiviske (prædicerende?)'

44.3 **RIES:** In *Was ist ein Satz?* (1931) Ries compiled over 150 definitions of the sentence. Some of these are quoted by Arens, beginning with the great Neo-grammarians Delbrück:

B. Delbrück: 'eine in artikulierter Rede erfolgende Äusserung, welche dem Sprechenden und Hörenden als ein zusammenhängendes und abgeschlossenes Ganzes erscheint'; 'von seiten seiner Form betrachtet: dasjenige, was von zwei Pausen eingeschlossen ist, oder positiv gesprochen: eine aus artikulierter Rede bestehende Expirationseinheit. innerhalb deren, sobald sie eine gewisse Ausdehnung erreicht, ein Wechsel zwischen höherer (stärkerer) und tieferer (schwächerer) Betonung stattfindet.'

B. Erdmann: 'die prädikative Verknüpfung von Worten.' [cp. 44.9]

O. Jespersen: 'eine (relativ) vollständige und unabhängige menschliche Äusserung, deren Vollständigkeit und Unabhängigkeit sich in ihrem Alleinstehen zeigt, d.h. darin, dass sie für sich allein geäußert wird.'

A. Meillet: 'eine Gesamtheit von Artikulationen, die untereinander durch gewisse grammatische Beziehungen verbunden sind, grammatisch von keiner anderen Gesamtheit abhängen und sich selbst genügen.'

(Arens 1955: 350-351)

Ries' own definition ran thus: 'Ein Satz ist eine grammatisch geformte kleinste Redeeinheit, die ihren Inhalt im Hinblick auf sein Verhältnis

zur Wirklichkeit zum Ausdruck bringt' (quoted Gardiner 1932: 239); Gardiner's rendering: 'A sentence is a grammatically formed smallest unit of speech, which brings its content to expression with an eye to this content's relation to reality'.

44.6 PRISCIAN: Priscian's definition was: 'Oratio est ordinatio dictionum congrua, sententiam perfectam demonstrans' (*Institutiones grammaticae* II. 4. 15, quoted Robins 1967:63, glossed simply as 'expression of a complete thought' (ibid. 56). Michael's version is more exact: 'A proper arrangement of words, expressing fully what the speaker wants to say' (Michael 1970: 40). Michael shows that *oratio* in Priscian could mean anything from a sentence to a paragraph.

All we can say is that *oratio*, like *logos*, is used either for discourse in general or for a quantity of discourse which has some measure of wholeness. It is not clear how far *congrua* means 'harmonious' and how far it means 'agreeing grammatically'. The latter sense Priscian usually expresses by *oratio perfecta*.

(ibid. 41)

Sententia, on the other hand, means 'statement' or 'expression of opinion'. The uncertainty of the terms is reflected in the modern vernaculars: in English, the sense 'maxim' for *sentence* is generally marked 'archaic', though it is current usage in French 'une sentence'; it shares the sense 'legal judgement' with French, but not the grammatical ('une phrase'). cp. German: *Sentenz* = maxim; *Satz* = sentence; (*Urteil* = legal judgement).

44.7 THRAX: It is generally agreed that Priscian followed Thrax for his definition of word and sentence: word, *dictio*, is Thrax's *lexis*, while

oratio (discourse, sentence) corresponds to Thrax's **logos**, which had a range of meanings:

Dionysius Thrax gives a formal definition of **logos**, but here also it is not clear that he means by it only what we mean by the sentence. **logos** certainly includes the sentence, but it seems also to include more. It is not yet possible to say that the category of sentence is unambiguously formed: we have rather something which corresponds to 'small unit of discourse'. Dionysius' definition runs: 'A combination of words, in prose [or metre] expressing a complete thought' (**pezes lexeos synthesis dianoian autotele delousa**). Sir Alan Gardiner questions the translation of **autotele** as 'complete'. He prefers 'self-sufficient', and blames Priscian's translation **perfectum** [sic] for introducing into linguistic theory a misleading conception of the sentence.

(Michael 1970: 39)

44.9 ERDMANN: Brøndal has omitted the qualification 'prädikative (Verknüpfung ...)' cp. Ries' collection of sentence definitions quoted immediately above.

44.11 SWEET: M&S bibliography adds to the quotation '...capable of expressing a thought'. In the light of what Brøndal is attacking, the theory that sentences are composed of words, it might be fairer to Sweet to enlarge the quotation :

Sentences are made up of words, but we speak in **sentences, not words**, although it may happen that a sentence is made up of a single word. A sentence is a word or combination of words capable of expressing a thought, that is, a combination of logical predicate with a logical subject.

(Sweet 1891:19; my emphasis.)

44.12 BRATE: In the bibliography, Brøndal applies his critical exclamation mark to the fuller quotation "Sats är en ordgrupp med finit verb [!] som predikat'.

Wortfügung: The entry for GÜNTERT in the bibliography has: Satz = 'ein Wortgefüge'; this is also Ries' term.

44.13 GARDINER: We have already seen that Gardiner's view was 'noun, adjective... are parts of language, and the real parts of speech are subject and predicate' (1932: 106) (comment on Sec. 11) and again Brøndal has quoted Gardiner's view that 'the word is the unit of language' but not of speech (M&S 14/2). It seems odd then that Gardiner should be ranked with the 'sentence = words' party. In fact, Sec 30, p. 93-99 of Gardiner 1932, 'the nature of the sentence', where the phrase 'word or set of words' occurs, is merely an anticipation of part II of the work, (chap IV: The sentence and its form, pp 181-239; chap V, The sentence and its locutional content, pp 240-327). Gardiner's examination faces the possibility that we may have to dispense with either word or sentence (or both), and notes 'Of recent times there has been a tendency to emphasize the reality of the sentence at the expense of the word' (p.94). But he concludes that both concepts are necessary. His discussion of the sentence invokes 'the four factors of speech'. He gives these at the beginning of his work in Bühler's terms (apparently from a lecture given by Bühler in London 1931): 1, the speaker; 2, the listener; 3, the things referred to; 4, the linguistic material - 'the interrelation of which I had declared, nearly 10 years ago, to constitute the whole mechanism of speech' (p.7) (cp. Gardiner 1922 quoted in the M&S bibliography: 'word; denoting some thing. Sentence; volitional attitude of the speaker.' In these terms, appeal is made to:

... adequate relevance both to some definite thing-meant and to some definite audience or listener which alone can entitle an utterance to the rank of 'sentence' ... An attentive and intelligent attitude on the part of the listener is the correlate to the speaker's purpose, and is the minimum requirement of speech. ... I come back,

therefore, to my dictum that the sentence is the unit of speech. For a sentence to be uttered, the four factors of speech must be functioning harmoniously and adequately...

(Gardiner 1932: 97-98)

Gardiner then offers the definition: 'A sentence is a word or set of words followed by a pause and revealing an intelligible purpose'. (p.98) However, while Gardiner uses 'word or set of words' here, the following chapter qualifies this clearly in the passage referred to immediately above ('noun, adjective ... are parts of language [etc.]' So it might reasonably be said that 'word or set of words' should be interpreted in the light of the later qualification. In any case for Brøndal (morphological) word classes are realized by **words** (or **word forms**), syntactic classes are realized by **sentence members**. In sentential context they need no longer be considered as words. At the same time, Gardiner does not envisage a thoroughgoing analysis in terms of sentence members (constituents): 'Apart from 'subject', 'predicate' and 'sentence-qualifiers' [e.g. **doubtless, perhaps**] there are so far as I can see no further parts of speech.' (p.269).

44.33 ... **not equal to the sum ...**: a characteristically structuralist view that a structure has organizational meaning above and beyond the inventory of its constituents. Bertalanffy, who does not use structure as a key term but speaks of systems instead, says:

In dealing with complexes of 'elements ', three different kinds of distinction may be made - i.e. (1) according to their number; (2) according to their species; (3) according to the relations of elements... In case (3), not only elements should be known, but also the relations between them. Characteristics of the first kind may be called **summative**, of the second kind **constitutive**. We can also say that **summative** characteristics of an element are those which are the same within and outside the complex; they may therefore be obtained by means of summation of characteristics and behaviour of elements

as known in isolation. Constitutive characteristics are those which are dependent on the specific relations with the complex; for understanding such characteristics we therefore must know not only the parts, but also the relations.

(Bertalanffy 1973: 53-54)

44.35 ... **altered by the synthesis:** just as the reverse procedure, i.e. reduction, involves change. cp. Bradley's famous observation 'It is a common and ruinous supposition that analysis constitutes no alteration'

44.36 **dead parts:** OKL quotes Humboldt 'Das Zerschlagen in Wörter und Regeln ist nur ein totes Machwerk wissenschaftlicher Zergliederung', and comments:

Her er på romantisk vis en væsentlig distinktion miskendt; man vil på een gang omfatte åndslivets hele indhold, men man risikerer derved at overse de faste typer og disses gøren-sig-gældende selv i åndens tilsyneladende frieste og mest individuelle ytringer. Som F. DE SAUSSURE med klarhed og konsekvens har hævdet, må man skelne selve sproget ('la langue') fra talen ('la parole') (OKL:52)

('Here an essential distinction has been in characteristically romantic fashion misunderstood. He [Humboldt] is trying to grasp the entire contents of intellectual/spiritual life in a single formula. But by so doing he runs the risk of overlooking the fixed types and their realization in the apparently most free and most individual expressions of the mind. As Saussure clearly and consistently demonstrated, it is necessary to distinguish between language itself ('la langue') and speech ('la parole)').

44.40 WUNDT: Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), generally acknowledged to be the 'father' of experimental psychology. A recent textbook of psychology suggests that Wundt's position can be called structuralist:

According to Wundt, the subject matter of psychology was immediate conscious experience, one's experience or awareness of the content of one's own conscious mind. Accordingly, Wundt's theory is sometimes called structuralism. Influenced by the rise of modern physics and chemistry, Wundt argued that the fundamental approach of science, namely, analysis, should be applied to the human mind. To understand any problem, we need to break it down into its smallest parts, or elements, and then examine the parts themselves as fundamental building blocks. Structuralism, therefore, was an attempt to compartmentalize the mind into its basic parts, the so-called mental elements.

(Bourne, Ekstrand and Dunn 1988: 7)

Viewed askance by many linguists (Hermann Paul was particularly opposed to Wundt's (alleged) 'psychologism') for his unlicensed trespassing on their domain, Wundt was an intellectual giant who cannot simply be written off as a 'positivist psychologist of language' (see entry in Bibliography for M & S). After initial studies in medicine at Tübingen, Heidelberg and Berlin, Wundt became a *Privatdozent* at Helmholtz's Physiological Institute from 1857 to 1864. At the age of 24 he fell critically ill and was near death for many weeks; during this crisis he developed 'his most essential religious and philosophical views, and also his ideas concerning the mental [mental phenomena]'. (Wellek 1967: 349) (This episode is graphically related in Wundt's absorbing memoir, *Erlebtes und Erkanntes* 1920, which not only charts his own intellectual progress but also gives a first-hand account of German (and Swiss German) university and intellectual life from the middle of the 19th century to the aftermath of the First World War, an account by no means limited to his main field of experimental psychology but embracing many disciplines.) From physiological studies he moved to psychology in the course of producing a series of studies on sense perception (1852-62). In 1864 he delivered a series of lectures on physiological psychology primarily for students of philosophy; these lectures were published in 1874 under the title *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*. The largest part of the 5th ed. was translated by his sometime doctoral student and enthusiastic supporter, the American psychologist E.B. Titchener (*Principles of physiological psychology*, 1904). This work is considered by psychologists to be his major work (e.g. Wellek 1967 loc. cit., Zangwill 1987; 816).

During the Franco-Prussian war he served as an army doctor. In 1874 he was offered the Chair of Inductive Philosophy at Zurich and in the following year he accepted the Chair of Psychology at Leipzig, a position he held for the next 42 years, retiring in 1917. Here he founded the world's first experimental psychology laboratory in 1879. Apart from psychology, he wrote on logic (*Logik* 2v. 1880-83, 4th/5th eds 3v. 1919 - 24), ethics (*Ethik* 1886; 5th ed. 3v. 1923-24), systematic philosophy (*System der Philosophie* 1889; 4th ed. 2v. 1919), cultural history (*Die Nationen und ihre Philosophie* 1915) and philosophical biography (*Leibniz* 1916). Although he drew ideas from contemporary positivism, he was in fact strongly opposed to (philosophical) sensationalism, materialism and ethical relativity, which frequently went hand in hand with positivism from Comte to Mach and beyond (Wiener Kreis, early A.J. Ayer and so on). He was influenced by Leibniz (whose dualism he maintained, though certainly not in the terms of 'monadology'), Hegel and Schopenhauer. In the light of the generally negative tone adopted by linguists on Wundt - Brøndal, for instance, while a student at Høffding's philosophy seminar, gave a critical review of *Die Sprache* 1900 (V.1 Pt 2 of *Völkerpsychologie*) - it is of interest to note Wellek's observation on Wundt's 'psychologism':

Wundt resisted 'psychologism' as later formulated and criticized by Edmund Husserl - that is, the reduction of cultural organization and normative evaluation to mere mental processes and the relativization of the timelessly valid to the mere here and now of consciousness.
(Wellek 1967: 349)

Wundt's specifically linguistic contribution was the work Brøndal is referring to here (*Die Sprache*), as noted, part of the massive 10 volume *Völkerpsychologie* 1900-1920. (That I had to order this work from the Adelaide/Flinders University Joint Store, a warehouse of items no longer

in frequent use, may be some indication of the current opinion of Wundt. However, as recently as 1980 there appeared **Wilhelm Wundt and the making of modern psychology**, ed. R.W. Rieber. For a good current estimate, see Sir Oliver Zangwill's article on Wundt in the **Oxford companion to the mind**, 1987.) Despite Brøndal's assertion that Wundt required noun and verb as the basic elements of the sentence (naming Mikkelsen shortly later as being of the same opinion - thus linking by mere adjacency the German polymath with the Danish pedagogical grammarian - 'Denmark's Nesfield'), he fails to point out that elsewhere Wundt specifically denies this. Moreover, Wundt's whole purpose is far removed from pedagogical grammar: he is concerned with the way language is shaped by thought. Consider the following passage from *Die Sprache* where Wundt is discussing 'Richtungen des sprachlichen Denkens (gegenständliches und zuständliches, objektives und subjektives Denken':

Die wichtigen Unterschiede des gegenständlichen und des zuständlichen Denkens können 'Richtungen' genannt werden, weil sie weder die Art der Verbindung der sprachlichen Denkinhalte betreffen ... noch auch die Inhalte des Denkens selbst ... sondern vielmehr die eigentümliche Auffassungsweise, der ein gegebener Inhalt, sei es eine aus der unmittelbaren Wahrnehmung gewonnene oder aus früheren Anschauungen zusammengesetzte Gesamtvorstellung unterworfen wird. Wenn im Jakutischen [Jakut, a Turkic language spoken in Siberia] und im Sanskrit irgend eine Tatsache berichtet wird, so kann der Inhalt des Geschauten und in der Sprache ausgedrückten ein vollkommen übereinstimmender, und bei der Neigung des Sanskrit zu verwickelten Wortbildungen kann auch der Grad der Zusammensetzung des Gedankens, das synthetische oder analytische Moment der inneren Sprachform, im ganzen wenig verschieden sein. Dennoch trennt beide Sprachen eine ungeheure Kluft durch die ganz abweichende Richtung des Denkens, die in ihnen herrscht: der Jakute fasst denselben Gedankeinheit gegenständlich auf, der dem Sanskrit-Indier zuständlich erscheint. Diese Gegensätze beruhen also auf den verschiedenen Standpunkten, die der Denkende und Sprechende den Dingen gegenüber einnimmt, und die sich in den abweichenden Begriffen reflektieren, welche die Sprache aus der Gesamtvorstellung herausgreift, um diese und die Beziehungen ihrer Teile auszudrücken. ... Wenn der einfache Satz 'er weint' im Sinne unserer Sprache eine vollkommen eindeutige Aussage

von einer durch das 'er' bezeichneten dritten Person macht, so ist der Vorstellungsinhalt kein anderer, als wenn etwas dasselbe Faktum in einer andern durch 'seine Träne' ausgedrückt wird. **Auch die Vollständigkeit des Satzes ist die gleiche.** Dennoch ist die Richtung des Denkens eine völlig abweichende, und die verschiedenen Wortformen, hier das Nomen mit dem Possessivpronomen, dort das Verbum mit dem Personalpronomen, sind dafür schlagende äussere Zeugnisse.

(Wundt 1900 I, Pt 2: 412-413. My emphasis)

44.54 ZIEHEN: (cp Bibl. M&S) Author of a work on logic using a positivist approach. (**Lehrbuch der Logik auf positivistischer Grundlage mit Berücksichtigung der Geschichte der Logik**, 1929) cp. comment on Wundt above.

45.29/30 ... there are languages lacking both noun and verb (... and pronoun and conjunction in our sense...': If this is the authorial plural (i.e. 'in my sense') then doubtless Brøndal could provide arguments in terms of logical systems and constellations, but there seem to be no examples of analysis to justify this view, other than Brøndal's general comments about Chinese (in OKL and elsewhere for example).

45.31 'primitive languages': the concept of 'primitive' languages has long since been rejected by all schools of linguistic thought. There may be primitive cultures but there are no primitive languages. cp. Wurm's general remarks on the vocabulary of Australian Aboriginal Languages; 'In the vocabulary of a given [Aboriginal] language, various classes of words, such as nouns, verbs, and others, are clearly distinguishable and definable... (Wurm, 1974, EB v.2, 431, article 'Australian Aboriginal Languages', (pp. 430/31); in the current rearranged form of EB = 1985, v.22: 765.) One of the most recent rebuttals of the concept is given in Ruhlen 1987 (**A guide to the World's languages, V1, Classification**) where the author states bluntly 'there are no "primitive" languages' (p.xxiii).

Cp. also Sapir's view quoted above doubting the universal validity of any word class except noun and verb: ('No language wholly fails to distinguish noun and verb ...' Sapir [1921] 1963: 119) (G.T. has reminded me of the problematic case of the transitional stage from pidgin to creole, as discussed by Trudgill 1984, p. 206 ff. (On dialect); however, it seems reasonably clear that Brøndal has nothing as marginal as this in mind.)

45.33/34 ... **superior medium of civilization like Chinese**: here again Brøndal seems to have classical Chinese in mind with Georg von der Gabelentz' **Anfangsgründe der chinesischen Grammatik**, 1883, a likely source of inspiration (possibly via Jespersen; cp. comment on 52. 32 and 33 below). In the 'Allgemeiner Teil' (I) we find:

Die meisten (einsilbigen) Stammwörter gehören nicht ein für allemale einem bestimmten, sondern bald diesem, bald jenem Redeteile an; die Redeteile werden nicht durch lautliche, sondern durch syntaktische Mittel bestimmt,... zu denen auch die Zusammensetzungen zu rechnen sind. Die Chinesen reden nicht von Stammwörtern, sondern von Schriftzeichen...

(Gabelentz, 1883: 19)

Had Brøndal got as far as Section III, ('Neuere Sprache und Niederer Stil') (i.e. late 19th century colloquial Chinese) he would have found the following description:

Der Unterschied zwischen der neueren Sprache und der älteren ist zum grössten Teile lexikalischer und phraseologischer Art. Die Composita haben sich gemehrt, und zu den alten Arten derselben sind neue hinzugekommen; ein Teil der alten Hilfsörter ist durch neue ersetzt worden, andere haben neue Funktionen angenommen. Die Satzfügung bietet wenig Neues; die Arbeit der Analyse ist durch die umständlichere Ausdrucksweise sehr vereinfacht, und die Redeteile pflegen ohne Weiteres kenntlich zu sein.

(Gabelentz, 1883: 76)

By the 1930s the language had further developed in this direction, and indeed has continued to do so ever since: cp. subtitle of and general

discussion in Kratochvíl 1968: **The Chinese language today: features of an emerging standard.**

46.1 **Sentence?:** Brøndal's '?'.

46.22 **word sentence and sentence word:** original, 'ordsætning og sætningsord.'

46.40 **sum of convertible elements:** cp. Sec. 25 pronouns (RD) can also be (Sec 25 #2 (2) indefinite (DR) and in final tables of *Partes and Membra*. The interjection in Sec 21 is rRdD but DrdR in the table to show parallel form to Dr:dR as members.

47.31-32 **verb or predication-word:** original, 'verbet eller udsagnsordet.' While 'predication-word' is awkward, not to say dubious English, the choice as elsewhere in M & S is to ignore the native term (which is normally rendered 'verb') or choose a term which reflects Brøndal's emphasis on drawing a clear distinction between words (word classes) and sentence members.

48.1-2 **In the general part of syntax ...:** original, 'i syntaxens almene del eller sætningslæren'; cp. my introductory section on Germanic Linguistic terminology, *Partes & Membra*, comments on Ries' 'Satzlehre' etc.

48.12 **basis ...:** original, 'basis eller ramme for beskrivelse'

48.13 **combination**: 'forbindelse eller forhold, dvs. stillingtagen til noget nyt eller andet'

48.15 **descriptive content**: 'beskrivende indhold'

48.16 **object**: 'genstand eller resultat'

48.24 **subjective**: cp. argument in OKL (70-72) discussed above based on scholastic terms (*capacitas formarum* etc.) which distinguishes the 'objective object concept' ('objektive genstandsbegreb') = R (Relatum) and 'subjective object concept' ('subjektive genstandsbegreb') = D (Descriptum).

48.30 **in every possible way**: cp. 'rule of Leibniz'

48.34 **elementary members**: parallel to abstract (unidimensional) word classes. (Sec 48)

48.35 **analytic members**: parallel to concrete (two-dimensional) word classes.

48.35 **synthetic**: parallel to complex (three-dimensional) word classes.

48.36 **undifferentiated**: parallel to the sole undifferentiated word class.

48.63 **practical ...**: just as the discussion of word classes begins on practical grounds with the morphological counterpart of the analytic members, viz. the complex classes (Sec. 22 ff.). Again, possibly because the unidimensional classes and members, though logically prior, are hardest to justify: cp. comment on Brøndal's argument for his analysis of numerals.

48.68-69 **logical rank**: cp. Jespersen's quite different system where subject and object are primaries, adjectives and verbs (as members) are secondaries, adverbials tertiaries, though Jespersen, like Brøndal, insists there is no direct connection between word class and sentence member.

49.9 **subjectum**: original, 'subjectum eller grundled' - lit. 'basic member'; the parallelism in the original is between the classical and the native term, which provides a gloss or (re-)interpretation of the classical term in a way difficult to translate in English.

49.10 **objectum**: 'objektum eller genstand.' **Genstand** was borrowed c. 1760 from German **Gegenstand** (Nielsen 1976:128); Nielsen adds that it was one of the words ridiculed by Charlotte Dorothea Biehl in her comedy **Hårkløveren** (**The Hair-splitter**) (1765) (cp. the similar satire by Saint-Evremond, **La comédie des Académistes** (1638, never performed). The Danish Academy's Dictionary rejected **genstand** in the 1777 edition; it was finally accepted in 1802. Paul (3rd ed 1921: 190) says **Gegenstand** was originally 'Gegenwurf' and was used in philosophy to render 'Objekt'. Wahrig's **Deutsches Wörterbuch** (1968) glosses **Gegenstand** as '[eigl. "das Gegenüber

stehende"]', viz. lit. 'the thing standing opposite or facing (one)'. To complicate matters, the native German term for **Subjekt** is **Satzgegenstand**, for **Objekt, Gegenstand**. Danish **grundled** (which would correspond formally to (non-existent) ***Grundglied**) is much clearer; unfortunately Nielsen has no entry for its etymology. (A coining of Høysgaard's?)

49.11 **praedicatum**: **prædicatum** eller **udsagn**. Calqued on **Aussage** (statement) lit. 'out-saying' (cp. Earle on Madvig again ('udsagn')).

49.21 **attribute** or **complement**: 'Det er det ... led som vi har kaldet attribut eller omsagn' [i.e. **omsagnsled**]. Brøndal does not use the term complement cp. Sec 55.55 'complements - an extremely vague concept in French'; again, in the 1937 article on hypotaxis (Householder's version) 'In French grammar the term 'complement' (a very vague notion) is often applied to the object. This is an attempt (doomed to fail) to build the entire edifice of syntax on the notion of determination.' (Householder 1972: 26 ; 'Hypotaxe' in ELG: 75 note 2: 'On sait qu'en grammaire française complément - notion très peu claire ...' etc.) Despite Brøndal's suspicion of the term, I can think of no other; cp. the entry in V&B: '**omsagn**. predicate, verb; **omsagnsled**: - til grundledet, subjective complement.' (V&B 1973 II: 56). Kjørulff Nielsen has: complement: **prædik**, **omsagnsled**; subjective c., **omsagnsled til grundled**; objective c., **omsagnsled til genstandsled**; **objektsprædik**' (KN 1964: 228). (Although Brøndal's view here is not the general one - it is accepted as a clause element in Systemic Linguistics and in the various versions of Quirk et al. 1971, for example - the term has also been challenged by Mitchell;

cp. comment on 55.1 below.)

49.26 **member of extent ...**: omfangsleddet eller extensivum. cp. comment above on extension.

49.33 ff. **introducor** etc.: Latin forms as in original.

50.1 **Introducor or introductory member**: 'introducor eller indleder'. Cp. the suggestion in Leech et al. (1982) quoted above: 'prepositions and conjunctions are "little parts" [cp. empty words, Chinese xiùcí] of sentences in that they do not enter into the structure of phrases: they are rather like arithmetical signs +, -, x, etc. - which is not to say of course, that they are devoid of meaning.' (1982: 54)

50.29 **homologous units**: word classes and sentence members are homologous, not analogous

50.39 **das ... dass ... identical**: dass, with ss realized in current German orthography as a single graph (β), common in English to the end of the 18th century (cp. facsimiles of Dr. Johnson's letters), transcribed **dasz** as a reflex of the written Gothic form ('Fraktur') in the 1920s - 30s, is accepted as a variant of the neuter article/relative pronoun, e.g. in Wahrig (**dass**: ... [= **das**]'; Kluge - '**dass**: etymologisch identisch mit **das** als N[eutrum] des Artikels' (1889: 50)

50.44: **Accusatus est quod ...**: 'He is accused of corrupting youth', lit.

'that he corrupted ... [imperfect subjunctive of *corrumpo*]. Georges identifies the quotation as Quintilian without precise reference; cp. also Lewis (1889: 862-63), 'quod as introducing a fact, as an explanation.'

50.44-45 **Plus ça va ...**: cp. earlier reference to **plus** as an introductory member in Sec. 32 on adverbs: 'No-one can doubt ... that **plus** maintains its morphological identity ... in spite of syntactic variations.'

50.48 **Ob-gleich**: **obgleich** was considered separable in 18th century usage; cp. 'Ob er gleich arm ist' (quoted Flügel 1894 but already archaic).

50.69: ... **not bound to a single word class**: In this way the discussion of sentence members will seek to disprove the theory that there is a one-to-one correlation of *partes* and *membra*; now this will be undertaken from the perspective of syntax in much the same fashion as Brøndal disproved the correlation from the perspective of morphology.

51.74 **SANDFELD**: Kristian Sandfeld-Jensen, 1873-1942. Professor of Romance Languages at Copenhagen. The reference here is to Sandfeld's celebrated *Syntaxe du français contemporain, I. Les pronoms* (1928) secs. 76-78 (pp. 129-133). Sandfeld deserves special attention, because he and Brøndal both held chairs in Romance Languages (and both chairs fell vacant in 1942 when Sandfeld died at the age of 69, Brøndal at the age of 55 (Posner 1967: 426). Brøndal had studied under Sandfeld and Nyrop in the Romance field; Brøndal frequently referred to Sandfeld's work (criti-

cally), and while Sandfeld referred to Jespersen (rank theory) in his *Syntaxe* (v. II, 1936; v.III,1943), he did not mention Brøndal. Temperamentally they were poles apart; Sandfeld, a great descriptivist, shunned abstraction and purely theoretical discussion, while Brøndal's interest, not to say obsession, with abstract analysis led Henri Frei, as already mentioned, to describe Brøndal as an example of everything a linguist should not be. Suffice it to say for the present that linguistics needs many approaches, practical and theoretical, so Copenhagen University had the unique benefit of two chairs in Romance filled by men of international stature working, as it were, in opposite directions. Sandfeld began his studies at Copenhagen, later in France and Germany (under Brugmann, Leskien and Weigand). From 1893 on he published works on cultural topics (on Molière, for example) as well as in linguistics (*Roumain et albanais*). He took his doctorate in 1900, *Etudes roumaines I: L'infinitif et ses périphrases en roumain et dans les langues balkaniques. Un examen comparatif*. He became Reader in Romance Studies at Copenhagen in 1905 (when Brøndal was matriculating from the Frederiksberg Grammar School) and Professor in 1914. In 1909 he wrote a Danish monograph on French subordinate clauses (criticized in M&S 76.4, cp. relevant comment below) which was the first version of v. II of the *Syntaxe; Les propositions subordonnées* ('Le présent volume, qui a pour fond un petit livre intitulé *Les propositions ... que j'ai publié en langue danoise en 1909 ...*' - Avant-propos, [vii]). In 1913 he wrote *La linguistique*, which appeared in German translation 1915, rev. ed. 1923. (At this time Brøndal was studying at the Sorbonne under M. Roques, J. Bédier and Antoine Meillet, the great Indo-European comparatist.) In 1926 he produced a study of the

languages of the so-called 'Balkan Union' (languages of different Indo-European families having unusual features in common such as the periphrastic infinitive in Modern Greek and Romanian, for example): **Balkan-filologien**, French version **La linguistique balkanique**, 1930. The following appreciation is given in Dupré:

Sandfeld est un syntacticien positiviste, qui fuit l'abstraction et les théories, c'est ce que fait la grandeur en même temps que les limites de son apport à la linguistique. Ses ouvrages sont faits avec beaucoup de scrupule et de soin et tiennent encore une place très estimable dans l'esprit de tous les grammairiens d'aujourd'hui.
(Dupré 1972, I: 1 [i.e. lower-case L].)

52.1 **predicate**: cp. again current use of predicator as sentence member.

51.1 **subject**: 'subject eller grundled', lit. 'basic member'. I can find no reasonable English expression to convey the native term.

52.1 **predicate**: 'prædikæt eller udsagnsled', lit. 'predicate member' Brøndal will have to demonstrate the existence of 'verbless' predicates to show that there is no one-to-one correspondence between verb and predicate (predicator), Strang's 'uniquely close' tie; we may expect that this will be harder to find than non-substantival subjects.

52.1 **purely active**: i.e. relator (here a connector (**forbinder**)) and descriptor (**beskriver**) to denote sentence element.

52.21 **This holds true ...**: So he is driven to the concept of 'primitive' languages again -

52.30 **Chinese:** – as well as a contrived view of Chinese.

52.32 **living words:** 'Verba oder "lebende Wörter", **huot-tsi** [sic i.e. **huózi**] Gabelentz (1883: 19). Cp. Jespersen: '...there is certainly much truth in the name given to a verb by Chinese grammarians, "the living word" as opposed to a noun which is lifeless.' (1924: 115); this may have been Brøndal's immediate source. No longer current in native Chinese grammatical terminology. The word now means '(piece of) type', 'letter'.

52.33 **full words:** 'Volle oder Stoffwörter, **sit-tsi** [i.e. **shízi**] (*ibid.* loc. cit.) Unlike **huózi**, still commonly used, though in the form **shíci** lit. 'real words'. **Cí** formerly meant 'word or phrase', cp. Matthews, char. 6984, (old) radical 160, three variants, main form 12 strokes: 'words, speech. A sentence, an expression or phrase. A message, instructions, statements... Inter[changeable] with No. 6971 [old radical 149 + 5 strokes]'. **tz'u² tian³**, a cyclopaedia; book of phrases.' (Matthews [1931] 1943: 1033b). Similarly in Walter Simon's dictionary 'tsyrdean, dictionary of phrases (160 (or 149)/12)' (W. Simon [1947] 1964: 754). The status of word in Chinese has been a classical topic of debate in Chinese grammar, and the distinction between word and character was not drawn by the man in the street. Grammatical usage now distinguishes **zì** (character, sometimes corresponding to a single word, but in Modern Standard Chinese, a polysyllabic language, it more often corresponds to to a bound form. Thus **cídiǎn** translates simply as 'dictionary' with the simplified character **cí** corresponding to old radical 149 (No. 10 in the new radical index, which has extended the old list of 214 to 227) e.g. **Hàn Yǐng cídiǎn**

/ A Chinese English dictionary (Beijing 1978), which itself glosses *shíci* as 'notional word'.

52.40-41 newspaper headlines or telegrams: a somewhat forced argument.

52.44 *Quelle faute que ...*: 'What a mistake that step/move (was)'. This is the exclamative *que* (Mansion 1919: 115, 200) 'Pauvre de moi!' 'Poor me!' Petit Robert, under *pauvre*, describes this use as a set phrase, quoting Daudet: 'Pauvre de moi!' disait-il. 'Maintenant, je n'ai plus qu'à mourir' (1978: 1381). Dupré lists 26 kinds of usage for *de*, but type 11, 'exclamatif' is somewhat different: 'C'est d'un chic!' (I, 594) (Similar examples in Petit Robert). 'Pauvre de moi!' is likewise discussed under *pauvre* as an idiom: 'La locution interjective 'Pauvre de moi!' où *pauvre* est en apposition à *moi* et *de* explétif est une transposition plaisante, d'origine provençal, du latin 'Me miserum!', 'Malheureux que je suis!'' (III: 1906b)

52.45 *Pobrecitos ...*: 'Poor us!' cp. Portuguese use of *de* in 'Ai de mim!' ('Poor me!').

53.1 *Extensivum ...*: 'extensivum eller omfangsled'. As Brøndal points out (53.14 ff.), such sentence elements are largely adverbial, though he is obliged by his general strategy to seek out non-adverbial examples.

53. 29/30 (RD) ... (D:R): the citation order is immaterial for the word class symbols (though pronouns, for example, are consistently listed

(RD)' the order of the analysis in the relevant discussion, ('an object (R) of description (D)'), they are shown in the final table as (DR) to bring out the homology (not identity) with the corresponding member, which must be cited in the order shown.

53.35 HUMBOLDT: the reference is to Humboldt's *Über die Verwandtschaft der Ortsadverbien mit dem Pronomen in einigen Sprachen* 1827-29.

53.40-41 ikke: 'glda. ækki, no[rweg.] ikke, sv. icke, oldnord. ekki; egl. neutr. af pron. ingen med betydn. "intet", dvs. en s[ammensætning] af pron. en i neutr: da. et, oldnord. eitt og part[ikel] *gi' (V & A 1976: 175).

53.45 Je ne peux: I cannot (cp. je ne saurais). Omission of pas in literary style 'with pouvoir, cesser, oser ... governing a positive infinitive (expressed or understood)' (Ferrar 1967: 271)

53.73 the forward-positioned member: 'det fremskudte led'. 'Fronted', though less awkward than the term chosen, evokes (apart from phonetic senses) generative syntax.

53.77 rear-positioned member: 'det tilbageskudte led'.

53.81 situatives like før and nu: while the 'situatives' cited in Sec. 53.58-59 are in fact adverbs of place, Brøndal uses the term to cover any kind of situation or circumstance, as here (adverbs of time). Cp. also

examples of 'situatives' in Sec. 32 #1: *her* and *nu* etc.

53.84 I *morgen*: the conventional orthography leads to the classification of this expression as an adverbial phrase, whereas *idag* [today] is glossed 'adverb'

54.1 **Object**: original, 'object eller genstand'. 'purely relative': because composed of relator and relatum.

54.13 **MISTELI**: The outstanding comparatist Franz Misteli. The reference is to his *Charakteristik der haupsächlichsten Typen des Sprachbaus*, 1893.

54.14 **objective conjugation**: also known as the (Hungarian) definite (as against the indefinite) conjugation: 'The indefinite conjugation is used when there is no object or [only] an indefinite one, the definite conjugation with a definite object.' (Whitney 1944: 15).

54.16-17 **possessive suffixes**: Hungarian 'my': -m, -im; his, hers, its: -a, -ja, -e, -je. cp. definite present: 1st sg. -om, -em, *m (depending on rule for vowel harmony); 2nd and 3rd sg. -ja, -i, as against indefinite present: 1st sg. -ok, 2nd and 3rd sg., zero.

54.25-26 *hun vilde med*: Current orthography has *ville* as the preterite form (identical with the bare infinitive); '...especially [the modals] at *skulle* and at *ville* are often found combined with *med* without the support of other verbs: 'Drengen ville ikke med sin mor' ['The boy didn't want

(to go) with his mother'], 'Vil du med?' ['Do you want to come with (me, us etc.')] (Jones and Gade 1981: 135). cp. German, 'Sie wollte mit' (= mitkommen). 'mit-', a flexible and pregnant prefix, denotes one of two things (a) with some specific person(s), determined by the context: Gehst du mit? Are you going with me/us/them etc.? Er brachte das Buch mit. Ich hab' ihr das Buch mitgegeben [to take with her]; (b) more vaguely, 'with the rest', conveying joining in ... Du musst mitsingen.' (Hammer 1971: 393-94)

54.30 kongens død: cp. Jespersen's verbal nexus (The doctor's arrival = The doctor arrived) (1924: 115, 120, 129, 131)

54.32 ff. first ... second object etc.: with pronouns, however, the order can fluctuate in English (though not in the example quoted 54.39):

(Objektets stilling) Hvis begge objekter er personlige pronominer, og det direkte objekt er it eller them, kommer det direkte objekt imidlertid normalt før det indirekte i soigneret [careful] britisk engelsk: 'John told it her.' 'She gave them me.' På amerikanisk foretrækkes: 'John told it to her.' 'She gave them to me.' (hvad der ingenlunde er sjældent på britisk engelsk heller). På begge sider af Atlanten er imidlertid en tredje mulighed i fremtrængen [catching on, spreading] 'John told her it.' 'She gave me them.'
(Steller and Sørensen 1966: 102)

In German the normal order is: two nouns, dative - accusative (Er gab dem Jungen einen Fussball); two pronouns, accusative - dative (Er gab ihn ihm: though colloquially 'Gib mir's' as well as formal 'Gib es mir'); mixed, pronoun first (cp. Er gab seinem Vater den Brief, Er gab ihn ihm) Er gab ihm den Brief, Er gab ihn seinem Vater (quoted Hammer 1971: 371) It is not clear to me that Brøndal's approach here could account for such phenomena.

54.53 neither dative nor accusative: cp. comments above on Jespersen contra Sonnenschein.

55.1 **Attribute:** 'attribute eller omsagnsled', with the -led compound showing clearly that we are dealing with a sentence member. We have already noted Brøndal's objection to the term 'complement' (comment on 49.21 above). Cp. also Gardiner's view that while the 'real parts of speech' are subject, verb and object, there is no need to extend the analysis of sentences beyond these terms. More recently, Professor Mitchell has challenged the traditional distinction adjunct/complement:

On the table in you left your hat on the table has been commonly termed an 'adjunct', the main criterion for whose recognition has traditionally been that it may be deleted without the meaning of the remainder being affected. ... But such a category, as well as the opposite 'non-deletable' complement (e.g. the 'object complement' your hat in the example, a shame in that's a shame, ten stone twelve in he weighs ten stone twelve, both him and unhappy in it made him unhappy [cp. 55.14-15, 'ked af livet'] etc.), is too often incapable of application to the same linguistic element when it is considered within sets of contrasting and related structures beyond the simple oppositions implicit in the single sentence \pm complement/ adjunct. Certain verbs like shamble, put, set etc. have already been noticed as necessitating extensions of some kind in order to be meaningfully employed within a verb phrase; thus, if we take the sentence they put peas in cans, not only is peas not deletable but so, too, is in cans. Are therefore both peas and cans to be termed complements? If they are, the use of the term is probably only justifiable as far as very early, rather superficial, contrasts are concerned and will in all likelihood have to be abandoned as soon as other types of relationship are discerned with their implications for the modifications of grammatical rules. Thus, it seems reasonable to regard they put peas in cans and they can peas as similar and to identify put in cans and can. If this is so, clearly peas in they put peas in cans differs categorically from in cans and it seems preferable to call it 'object' in preference to 'object complement' and perhaps even in general to look with some suspicion at 'complement'. Similarly ... on the table might be seen as 'adjunct' in you left your hat on the table.

(Mitchell 1975: 178).

Mitchell then suggests that we look at the last sentence from a TGG standpoint, 'as an amalgam of ... you left your hat and your hat was on the table, the latter being incorporated or embedded in the single sentence you left your hat on the table by the application of (transformational) rules to delete your hat and was from the second (underlying) sentence.' (178-79). We would then arrive at a quite paradoxical result:

If such an interpretation of the original sentence is accepted, then at a deeper level **on the table** in the underlying **your hat was on the table** was a complement, not an adjunct. This would hardly be a satisfactory state of affairs. In fact, **on the table** was recognizable as adjunct because of the verb **leave**; if we substitute **put** for **leave**, i.e. **you put your hat on the table**, the same problem arises ... In the same way, **remarkably** is adjunctive in **he does it remarkably well** but complementary in **he not only does it well but remarkably well**. It seems therefore to many modern grammarians that adjunct and complement - at least in the manner of their traditional and sometimes quite recent linguistic employment - are indistinct categories and perhaps even likely to block progress towards a deeper awareness of such relationships as between **John lent the book to Tom** and **Tom borrowed the book from John** and conceivably towards sentence analysis generally.

(ibid. 179)

55.12 ff. The examples suggest that Brøndal's 'attribute II' is the traditional 'adjunct'.

55.20 **extensivum**: **extensivum** I seems to be a traditional adverb, II an adverbial (prepositional) phrase.

55.42 **descriptive words**: because adverbs (d), participles (rd) and reflexives (dD) all contain the descriptor facet.

55.55 **complements** ...: cp. similar remarks in Brøndal's article on hypotaxis referred to above.

56.1 **non-analytic**: the very complexity of the syntax of pronominal objects in the Romance languages means that almost any general statement about the order of direct and indirect object members can be met with counter-examples. Brøndal also has to discover the syntactic elements corresponding to the abstract classes and to the synthetic (three-dimensional) classes; by considering lighter (unstressed) and heavier (stressed) pronouns as being different from the analytic (two-dimensional) subject and object members, he solves the problem adeptly, if not entirely convincingly.

56.10 **Il faut les lui rendre**: 'It is necessary (or: We have to) give them to him (her).'

56.11 **Bisogna renderglieli**: *idem*.

56.16: **oleum perdidisti**: 'You [sg.] wasted your time', lit. 'oil'. The Latin proverb is often cited as 'oleum et operam perdere', 'to waste time and labour'.

57.9 **split forms**: original 'spæltninger'. Thus the syntactic counterparts of the abstract classes can be established by taking the elements of the subject and object proper.

58.2 **frame or topic member**: 'ramme eller emneled'. 'provisional subject': cp. expression 'anticipatory subject'; Jespersen, however, distinguished

'unspecified it' ('It is cold today' ... 'It rains', from 'anticipative or preparatory it as a "dummy subject"' ('It is dreadful to suffer.')

(Jespersen [1937] 1969: 73)

58.10 **certain affinity:** i.e. by virtue of the shared descriptum dimension.

58.14 **der:** Jespersen devoted a major section of **Sprogets logik** 1913 to an analysis of sentences with **der** and **det** and their analogues in other languages: cp. Hallon 1981, 86-105, 181-185.

58.30 **so-called impersonal verbs:** also known as monopersonal verbs.

58.31 **it rains:** Strang calls this the 'spot-filling' use of 'it' (Strang 1968: 120). A good analysis in terms of 'zero-valency' is given by Matthews 1981: 103-5. Also Jespersen 1924: 'Verbs like rain, snow had originally no subject, and as it would be hard even now to define logically what the subject it stands for and what it means, many scholars ([footnote] Brugmann among others [reference to Brugmann 1914, **Ursprung des Scheinsubjekts 'es']]) look upon it as simply a grammatical device to make the sentence conform to the type most generally found' (p.25), with further discussion under the heading 'Conceptual neuter' (241-3). This was already a disputed topic in the 19th century, cp. Paul's 'eine vielfach erörterte Streitfrage' [viz. die sogenannte verba impersonalia'], with references to Miklosisch 1883 (2nd ed) 'Subjektlose Sätze' and others. (Paul 1920: 130). According to Paul, Miklosisch and later Marty**

were appealing to Brentano's psychological doctrine of the possibility of a single-membered logical judgement:

Miklosisch und Marty verkennen die Existenz eines psychologischen Subjekts für die unpersönlichen Sätze. Sie halten dieselben wirklich für eingliedrig mit Berufung auf Brentanos Psychologie und sehen in ihnen einen Beweis für die Theorie, dass das logische Urteil nicht notwendig zweigliedrig zu sein braucht ...

(*ibid.* 132)

Paul goes on to reject this theory with some vehemence:

Von eingliedrigen Urteilen kann ich mir überhaupt gar keine Vorstellung machen, und die Logiker sollten die Sprache nicht zum Beweise für die Existenz derselben heranziehen; sonst zeigen sie, dass auch ihr Denken noch sehr von dem sprachlichen Ausdruck abhängig ist, von dem sich zu emanzipieren doch ihre Aufgabe sein sollte.'

(*ibid. loc. cit.*)

59.4-5 **anticipatory form:** by virtue of the relator.

59.17 **conjunctions:** 'conjunctioner' - en and y are traditionally considered pronouns. Cp. Sec. 25 where Brøndal says that words containing only one of the elements (RD) which characterize true pronouns should not be so classed.

59.24 **reflexives:** cp. Sec. 25, 'reflexives like sig are not pronouns'. French *te* has been analysed in Sec. 29 as morphologically parallel to *se*, and thus remains so for Brøndal even where traditional analysis would describe *te* here as an object pronoun. (In the original, 'connait' is misprinted 'connais'.)

59.28-29 **me le etc.:** refers to the prescribed order of French 'pronouns'-indirect-direct for 1st and 2nd person sg. and pl. and *se*; direct-

indirect for 3rd person sg. and pl.

60.21 Nordic medio-passive: Cp. Jespersen:

In Scandinavian the reflexive pronoun **sik** has in a reduced form fused with many verbal forms, which then generally have acquired a purely passive meaning: **han kaldes**, originally 'he calls himself', now 'he is called.' Sometimes the meaning is reciprocal: **de slås** (with a short vowel) 'they fight (strike one another)'; in this verb there is another form with a long vowel (and glottal catch [stød] for the passive **slå(e)s** 'is struck.

(Jespersen, 1924:225)

In the original version of this point in **Sprogets logik**, the first ('reciprocal') use is transcribed **slåss**, the passive **slåes** (1913: 94).

Koefoed points out that

With some verbs, the passive s form may indicate a medial voice with reciprocal (both active and passive) or intensive-neutral (neither active nor passive) meaning: active: **Jeg følger dig til toget** - I will see you to the train. **Dette hus minder mig om min bedste ven** - This house reminds me of my best friend. passive: **Torden følges [føl's] ofte af regn** - Thunder is often followed by rain. **Her mindes vi om Danmark** - Here we are reminded of Denmark. medial: **Lad os følges [føl's] (ad) til stationen** (reciprocal) - Let us go together to the station. **Jeg mindes ikke at have set Dem før** (intensive) - I do not remember having seen you before.

(Koefoed 1958: 184)

The term middle voice is still retained for Icelandic; for example, in E.V. Gordon's **Introduction to Old Norse** for verbs like **kallask**. German grammars favour **medio-passiv** (A. Noreen, **Altisländische Grammatik** 1923; Gutenbrunner 1951; Ranke 1949.) Kamenski 1955 uses **vozvrantnaia forma**, 'reflexive form'. (I owe all this information on Icelandic to G.T.) However, for the other Scandinavian languages the simpler term 'passive' seems to be preferred in modern descriptions: thus Bredsdorff 1958: 105-7; Jones & Gade 1981:125-30; Hildeman & Beite's elementary Swedish grammar distinguishes passive **s**, deponent **s** and reciprocal **s**:

Passiv: Biljetterna måste hämtas före klockan 18.30 ... Deponens:
 Einige Verben haben eine passive Form aber aktive Bedeutung. Diese
 werden Deponentia genannt ... Jag hoppas, att det snart går över ...
 S-Form mit reziproker Bedeutung ... Vi ses igen om en halvtimme ...
 (Hildeman & Beite 1960: 106-7)

60.34 **on**: morphologically, for Brøndal, not a pronoun but an abstract
 noun (Sec. 25 #1); similarly, *ce* is an abstract pronoun. 'Comment peut-on
 être Persan?': the well-known rhetorical question ('How (on earth) can
 anyone be Persian?') from Montesquieu's satire 'Lettres persanes' (1721).

60.35 **Faut-il céder?**: impersonal *il*, 'Is it necessary?', 'Must one
 (yield)?' - analysed as a single-dimension member D (descriptum) in

60.38. Morphologically this corresponds to numerals (Sec. 21, A), pos-
 sibly the most contentious of Brøndal's classifications. (In the complex
 word classes derived pronouns or numerals have the same symbolization
 (rDR): **premier, moi** (Sec. 21).

60.38 **more or less pronominal**: 'mer eller mindre pronomielle [ord]' -
 i.e. partly homologous to word class pronoun RD (relatum / descriptum).

60.39 **conjunct reflexives**: dD, emphasis on descriptor d.

60.39-40: **nothing that emphasizes etc.**: the symbolization of *ce, on, il*
 have no emphasized descriptor d.

61.13 **amo-la**: original **amo-lla**. Normally in Italian the initial consonant
 of the enclitic object (except *gli*) is doubled after an imperative ending
 in a stressed vowel, thus **da + mi = dammi, fa + mi = fammi, da + lo =**

dallo (these being indirect objects in any case). vedo-lo: I see it (lo vedo = unstressed form).

llevaron-la: they carried her.

chamo-o: I call him.

61.15-16 habia mezclado-se: he got mixed up

61.17 conjunctions: once a given word class, always a given word class, so ci, which is generally analysed in this context as a direct object pronoun ('Leave us!'), cp. 'C'incontrano davanti alla biblioteca', 'They meet us in front of the library' as opposed to the adverb of place ci ('Sono andati alla stazione; andiamo-ci anche noi', 'They went to the station; let us go there too.'). Hence ci and vi are for Brøndal 'situa-tives' which merely 'function' ('fungerer') as pronouns.

62. 4-5 three-dimensional ... synthetic: corresponding to the three-dimensional complex word classes in Sec. 21.

62.11 Dr:d ... by a kind of Brøndalian arithmetic:

$$\begin{aligned} & D :d \\ & + Dr: \\ & \underline{+ Dr:d} \\ & = Dr:d. \end{aligned}$$

Similarly for #2, #3 and #4.

63.26 **hospes, hostis**: 'A guest/stranger [is] an enemy'. **Träume, Schäume**: Dreams [are but] shadows ('froth'). cp. Paul: 'Wir dürfen doch nicht ausser acht lassen, dass Sätze wie Träume sind Schäume ... gleichwertig sind mit Sätzen ohne Kopula: Träume, Schäume ... (Paul 1920: 294).

63.47 **absorbed subject**: in the inflection -o.

63.50 **salva res**: all [or: the matter] is well.

63.53-54 **beati possidentes**: blessed (are) they who have ...(Luke)

63.60 **punctum tetigisti**: you have touched the point (hit the nail on the head).

63.67 **intransitive**: **fiat**, let there be (**lux**, light) 3rd sg. subjunctive of **fio**, 'I become', used as a passive of **facio**.

64.30 **amo**: cp. 63.47, 'absorbed subject'.

64.40 ff. **no word class ... unsuited ...**: Thus the final examination of sentence members demonstrates that there is no one-to-one correspondence between word class and sentence member.

65.1 **Ellipsis**: Jespersen was generally suspicious of explanations which appealed to ellipsis or suppression: numerous references in Jespersen 1924 and elsewhere.

65.5 *cantat* = *est cantans*: cp. Wilkins' analysis of *calificio* in his *Essay ...* (1668)

65.19 TOBLER: quoted at some length in the bibliography to M & S. Professor of Romance studies at Berlin and classed by Iordan/Orr as a neo-grammarian 'whose work on French syntax ... is still invaluable and universally appreciated' (Iordan/Orr [1937] 1970: 24).

65.51 *here and now*: the synchronic as against the diachronic and *parole* as against *langue*.

65.60 *quos ego ...*: 'You, whom I - !' Neptune summons the East wind, Eurus, and the West, Zephyrus, to rebuke them for creating a storm at Juno's behest to destroy the Trojan fleet. The fuller context: '*iam caelum terramque meo sine numine, venti, / miscere et tantas audietis tollere moles? / quos ego ...! sed motos praestat componere fluctus.*' 'Do you really dare, you Winds, without my divine assent / To confound earth and sky, and raise this riot of water? / You, whom I ...! Well, you have made the storm, I must lay it.' (Day Lewis' translation) (G.T. points out that the fact that everybody knows that the sentence is incomplete (an instance of aposiopesis) may be part of its pragmatic meaning.)

66.1 ~~submembers~~: original "underled".

66.5 *the dog barks*: Jespersen's famous example in *Sprogets logik* 1913

which shows the parallel rank of adjective and verb thus:

meget bidske HUNDE gøer sjældent

meget gøende HUNDE bider sjældent

(three type sizes in the original) - in terms of rank, each sentence is: tertiary, secondary, PRIMARY, secondary, tertiary. In this form, the Danish is difficult to translate with the same economy to yield the same parallel, since there is no English form of 'bite' corresponding to **bidske** (snappish, fierce), nor can **very** collocate with a present participle in this context (one can have 'A very biting remark' but hardly *'a very biting dog'). Thus the example is reworked in **The philosophy of grammar** as 'a furiously barking dog' and 'the dog barks furiously' to illustrate the difference between junction and nexus (terms only arrived at in 1921 in **De to hovedarter ...**). As Sandved remarked, '... that well-known dog, which has barked its way into so many descriptions of English syntax ...' (Sandved 1969: 71)

66.8 PAUL: There is, somewhat surprisingly, no entry in the bibliography to M & S for the great neo-grammarians. This may have been an oversight, yet the only bibliographical entry for Paul in any of Brøndal's major works is in PT and that is not the **Prinzipien**, but Paul's **Deutsches Wörterbuch**. Contrast this with Jespersen's attitude, already cited above ('... Paul's golden words ...' 1924: 186, requoted [1937] 1969: 102). My surmise is that the greatest of the neo-grammarians could by no means be tarred with the general brush of 'atomistic fact-grubbing' - he was, indeed, an important transitional figure to later schools, in part by bringing the question of linguistics as an avowedly historical science to

the forefront.

66.9 degraded predicate: 'ein degradiertes Prädikat' (Paul 1920: 140, 'Sätze mit doppeltem Subjekt oder Prädikat').

66.11ff. JESPERSEN: i.e. Jespersen 1921.

66.52 is at a loss: Gardiner's views here warrant more attention than the four words quoted:

Jespersen has given to this subject-predicate relation ... the name of 'nexus', and he rightly insists on the fundamental duality of the relation. ...But while stressing the duality which distinguishes **The dog / barks furiously** from a **furiously barking dog**, he is at a loss to explain it. I think we may well retain the term 'nexus', though it will be clearer to extend it into 'predicational nexus' ... He seems reluctant [PG 145] to give the names 'subject' and 'predicate' to the correlated parts of a nexus like **-(I know) Ralph / to be brave**, but to this there is little objection so long as it is realized that in one and the same sentence subordinate subjects and predicates can coexist with the main subject and predicate. Take, for example, the sentence **Joan having asked her mother, the latter advised her to persevere in the course she had adopted**. Here the main subject is **the latter** and the main predicate **advised her ... adopted**. But side by side with these are no less than three subordinate predicational nexuses, namely (1) **Joan (S) having asked her mother (P)**, (2) **her (S) to persevere ... adopted (P)**, and (3) **she (S) had adopted (P)**. In all four nexuses the predicate is felt as being presently said of its subject, and the warm-blooded vitality evidenced by all grammatical predicates contrasts markedly with the lifelessness which distinguishes their subjects. Each predicational nexus, whether main or subordinate, seems to reflect a separate act of speech assuming its characteristic aspect of saying something about something. And this aspect persists, notwithstanding the fact that all four nexuses are linked together both formally and functionally as each playing its respective part in the achievement of a common purpose.

(Gardiner 1932: 261-62)

66.78 ff. cp. again Jespersen's verbal nexus (1924: 136)

67.9 FUNKE: Funke subjected the theory of Rank to searching criticism in his 1925 article 'Jespersen's [sic] Lehre von den 'three ranks', to which Jespersen replied in the same year ('Die grammatischen Rangstufen'). Funke repeated his criticisms in 1927 ('Ein letztes Wort zur Rangstufenlehre Jespersen's'), noting at the same time the personal animus apparent in the Dane's reply. For a fuller account, see Hallon 1981: 159-164.

HJELMSLEV: Hjelmslev accepted the terms primary, secondary and tertiary, but denied that they were categories. For Hjelmslev 1928, the chief grammatical categories were government and subordination (dependency). It was in the course of his discussion of Jespersen's theory of rank (*Principes* ... p.128 ff.) that Hjelmslev denied the validity of the distinction drawn by Jespersen between the two series, word classes and primaries, secondaries, tertiaries (or adjuncts and subjuncts) and arrived at the celebrated dictum discussed above: 'C'est que toute distinction entre morphologie et syntaxe est impossible. (etc.) (1928: 154)

67.11-13 **members ... not words:** the fundamental distinction of morphology and syntax.

69.1 **Compounds:** Brøndal is emphatic in assigning compounds (*sammensætninger*, *composita*) to syntax - as he says here, from Sec. 10 (cp. diagram) onwards. As the rationale for this view is expounded in this section, this appears to be the most appropriate place to consider the conflicting views on this controversial matter. Now while Brøndal classes

derivation and inflexion together as morphological processes, the 19th century Germanic tradition grouped compounding and derivation together as lexicology (Wortbildungslehre): as Paul observed:

Die Stellung der Wortbildungslehre im System der Grammatik ist umstritten. Ihr Schöpfer J. Grimm, Dietz, Bopp und andere brachten sie zwischen Flexionslehre und Syntax, Schleicher, Miklosisch, Brugmann und Wilmanns vor der Flexionslehre. Da aber die Wortbildungslehre gleichzeitig Morphologie und Bedeutungsfunktion erforscht wie die Syntax, da ferner häufig auch neue Wörter aus syntaktischen Gruppen entstehen, wird sie hier im Anschluss an die Syntax behandelt.

(Paul/Stolte 1962: 328, abridgement of Paul 1916-20).

Similarly in the *Prinzipien*: 'Der Übergang von syntaktischem Gefüge zum Kompositum ist ein so allmählicher, dass es gar keine scharfe Grenzlinie zwischen beiden gibt.' (Paul 1920: 328).

Jespersen, as we noted earlier, removed sound and meaning from his system of grammar, and was left with 'what is by common consent reckoned as the central part of grammar, by some even as the whole ... of grammar', namely, 1. morphology, 2. word-formation, 3. syntax. (1924: 37) Word-formation is explicitly identified with 'Wortbildung', 'dérivation' (ibid. 38). Compounds are discussed in the section 'word' (92- 95): now Jespersen, *qua* phonetician of world rank evidently familiar with the stress phenomena referred to in discussions of compounds and phrases ('distinction ... between ... a 'strongbox and a 'strong 'box' MEG I: 155; also in his *Engelsk fonetik* (1912), section 13.3 on stress in compounds), here chooses to draw attention rather to the difficulty of deciding what a word is:

Words are linguistic units, but they are not phonetic units: no merely phonetic analysis of a string of spoken sounds can reveal to us the number of words it is made up of, or the division between word and word. This has long been recognized by phoneticians and is

indisputable: a *maze* sounds exactly like *amaze* ... Fr. a *semblé* like *assemblé* ... Nor can the spelling be decisive, because spelling is often perfectly arbitrary and dependent on fashion or, in some countries, on ministerial decrees not always well advised. There is hardly sufficient reason for German official spellings like *miteinander*, *infolgedessen*, *zurzeit* etc...

(Jespersen 1924: 92-93)

(The Germans are Jespersen's favourite whipping-boys in such matters; the English are given good marks for linguistic 'progress', e.g. shedding the Germanic case system, and for common-sense - no linguistic Academy, and so on.) If phonetic considerations are to be rejected, so must semantic ones, and we are left with syntactic criteria as being decisive:

On the other hand, words are not notional units, for, as Noreen remarks, the word triangle and the combination three-sided rectilinear figure have exactly the same meaning ... As, consequently, neither sound nor meaning in itself shows us what is one word and what is more than one word, we must look out for grammatical (syntactic) criteria to decide the question.

(*ibid.* 93)

Nevertheless, Jespersen has not dogmatically rejected the relevance of phonetic and semantic criteria, he has simply stated that syntactic considerations are paramount. This pragmatic approach is still valid today:

In a language such as English, how can we expect a single criterion to mark the boundary between lexicalisation and mere institution-alisation? This is not to say the distinction is spurious; it is often the mark of a genuine unit that one has trouble with it! But as with the word in general ... criteria at all levels may be relevant.

(Matthews 1974: 193-94)

There had been a fair amount of discussion in the English-speaking tradition apart from that of Continental scholars who wrote in English (Jespersen, Poutsma): we have already quoted Sweet in the Morphology section where Brøndal states flatly that compounds are a syntactic phenomenon. Bloomfield's *Language* appeared a year after M & S - 'for compounds v. phrases the best discussion is still that of BLOOMFIELD

[1933]' (Matthews 1974: 195) - but Bloomfield 1914: 140, 159-66 provides a good treatment of compounds. In 'Morphology', sec. 12, 'Word-composition: semantic value') he observes:

The problem of in any way classifying compounds is an exceedingly difficult one, because the material and logical relations between the 'members' of compounds are, even within one and the same language, often well-nigh endless in variety. Perhaps the most justifiable basis of classification is that which distinguishes compounds which in form resemble a syntactic word-group and those which do not. By this classification **long-nose**, **shorthand**, **crows-foot**, **man-of-war**, for instance, would belong to the former class, for, though diverging in meaning, these compounds externally resemble such collocations as **long nose**, **short hand**, **crow's foot**, **man of war** ... To the second class would belong **bulldog**, **apple-tree**, **sofa-cushion**, and the like, which do not resemble syntactic groups. The compounds of the latter class can further be divided according to whether they describe an actually present feature of the experience, like **apple-tree**, or, like **bulldog**, express merely an associative element visible on the tree, but the dog merely reminds one of the bull.

(Bloomfield 1914: 159-60)

(Compare the Wundtian echo of 'associative' here with the celebrated, even notorious, stimulus-response account of Jack, Jill and the apple in **Language**.) Bloomfield 1914 also discusses types of composition not found in English: he quotes Nahuatl verbal compounds, copulative compounds in Sanskrit, Chinese compounds of the oppositive type like (modern transcription) **xiongdì**, lit. 'older brother' (**xiong**) - 'younger brother' (**dì**) to yield the meaning 'brother(s)' (in general). (p. 161) In sec. 13, 'Word-composition not a phonetic process' there is a detailed treatment of the relevant stress phenomena, though noting 'Not even the stress-accent of a language like English or German necessarily distinguishes a compound from a succession of words' (p. 162) and that

the concept of a compound, like that of a word is not absolutely definable. Is **stand off** in **Stand off, there!** a compound? It differs from the ordinary use of **stand**, which excludes the idea of movement; on the other hand, in view of **stand up** and **stand aside** we might say that **stand** means not only 'to be in an upright position' but also

'to assume an upright position'. That is to say, then, the difference between compounds and sets of simple words is, like that between derivationally formed words and compounds, a matter of the speaker's associative disposition which may vary from person to person and from hour to hour.

(*ibid.* p. 163)

Then cases are considered where stress does distinguish compounds and phrases, though not in the detail of *Language* (1933: Chap. 14, 'Morphologic types, p. 227-46). Sec. 14 'Simple word: compound: phrase' points out that

compounds may approach the value of syntactic collocations, until, in cases like **bulldog** and **stand off**, we may hesitate before the alternative of speaking of composition or of setting up the apparent first members as independent words. - Thus we see, in our survey of morphology, the most varied types of expression; first, the unit word ... then the inflected word ... then again, the derived word, bordering on a compound, such as **unkind**, **fourteen**; and finally, the compound, bordering, in its turn, on a syntactic collocation of words.

(*ibid.* p. 166)

In the 60s support for the view of compounds as syntactic units came from the Transformationalist perspective in Lees' *Grammar of English nominalizations*, 1963 (first published in 1960 as a supplement to the *International Journal of American Linguistics*), one of the earliest, and, with Chomsky's *Syntactic structures*, still one of the best works of the tradition. The preface is stimulating and provocative in its review of previous treatments of composition and is worth quoting at some length. The (then new) approach challenges

The long-standing traditional view that sentences are constructed from left to right, word for word, by the simple adjunction of successive constituents one to another has obscured for a great many linguists the clarifying conception of nominal expressions, and especially nominal compounds, as transformed versions of sentences.

(Lees 1963: xix)

The Preface looks at the 'three distinguishable traditions' in the literature on compounding: 1, the Panini, or Taxonomic approach; 2, the

Brugmann, or Historical approach, 3) the Typographer's Hyphenation Problem. 'The latter two traditions may be disposed of quickly as being largely irrelevant to our problem, though the literature involved is by no means trivial' (ibid. loc. cit.) The Junggrammatiker historical approach is exemplified by Brugmann's 1900 paper 'Über das Wesen der sogenannten Wortzusammensetzungen. Eine sprachpsychologische Studie', while the 'typographer's problem' is said to be more scientific than historical: can general rules be constructed to predict the orthography of compounds as separate, hyphenated, or simple words; if not, can the rules of orthography be revised to overcome the difficulties? 'Since solutions to these problems obviously involve many non-linguistic criteria ... most of the literature ... is of little interest here.' (ibid. xx). The linguistic traditions can be: semantic; or, rigidly anti-notional and physicalist; or finally, the sophisticated classical approach: in the first

The idea of using physical properties in a taxonomy is quite ancient, but the idea of basing a taxonomy strictly and exclusively upon phonemic form is a modern notion derived from the mistaken conviction that scientific analysis can proceed only by the registration and listing of directly observable physical features ... The physicalist view attempts to classify compounds according to whether they exhibit a certain stress, or consist of a certain sequence of affix morphemes, or contain certain parts of speech in a certain order ... on all such physical counts the [following] five compound types are identical: **talking machine** (machine which talks), **eating apple** (apple for eating), **washing machine** (machine for washing things), **boiling point** (point of boiling), **laughing gas** (gas which causes laughing). Such examples as these, in no wise rare, should be quite sufficient to dampen one's hopes of finding universally and automatically applicable analytic procedures for assigning grammatical structure to arbitrarily chosen expressions ... (ibid. xxi)

The third example is that of 'the more moderate and sophisticated classical approach ... exemplified by Panini's classification of Sanskrit com-

pounds, or Whitney's elaboration of it, and appears at its best in Bloomfield's detailed and perceptive treatment of compounding [in *Language*].' (*ibid.* xxi-xxii) Lees points out that Bloomfield 'understood quite well, and even discussed explicitly, the duplication within compounds of syntactic relations found externally in other expressions of the language.' (*ibid.* xxii) (Examples are given from *Language*, but we have just seen that Bloomfield had made the point in 1914.) After over a page of discussion of what Bloomfield in the 1933 work called 'asyntactic' compounds (e.g. door-knob), Lees concludes: '...barring the improbable case of Bloomfield's simply overlooking the existence of the prepositional phrase knob of a door, the abstract syntactic relation between it and door-knob was just physically too indirect to be admissible for him ...' (*ibid.* xxiii). A couple of pages are devoted to Jespersen, with special reference to MEG part VI - Morphology, 1942), beginning

If we search among the myriad grammatical, semantic, and historical details on English which Otto Jespersen so patiently catalogued, we find that he too perceived the quite clearly those same abstract syntactic relations. We might cite ... his description of the ambiguity in expressions of the form early riser, enormous eater, or again in ... utter darkness, complete ignorance, and, just as in the case of our nominalizations, his derivation of these forms from the underlying expressions riser early, eats enormously, or utterly dark and completely ignorant.'

(*ibid.* xxiii, my emphasis)

(This is an early example of the 'Jespersen as precursor of TGG' claim of Katz and Chomsky: I have discussed this at length in Hallon 1981. Suffice to say here 'Yes, but ...') However, Jespersen's treatment of compounds 'is much more traditional and taxonomic' (*ibid.* loc. cit.). What is worse,

He was never able to draw the correct conclusions from his sometimes very penetrating studies, namely, that there simply is no neat physical or semantic criterion for compounds, that there need not be any such, and that the point of linguistic research is to find grammatical descriptions, not to classify physical or semantic "objects".
(*ibid.* xxiv)

This was written, of course, in the heady early period of TGG, characterized by an exuberant confidence in the new methodology. Subsequently, however, the problems were seen to be as resistant to instant solutions as ever. Matthews, having rejected the transformationalist view of derivation ('...the transformationalist proposal has now been given more than enough rope to hang itself' (1974: 187)), examines compounding and, citing Lees' examples, reviews the position thus:

In the development of the 'transformationalist' view, it was in fact the compounds that were first subjected to full analysis: **madman**, for example, was related syntactically to a **man who is mad**, **girlfriend** to a **friend who is a girl**, **arrowhead** to the **head of an arrow** ... The case for such analyses was similar to the one ... for derivational formations: although **girlfriend** and **arrowhead** are on the 'surface' merely Noun + Noun, their types may be distinguished semantically in the same way that sentences with a Nominal Complement (**The friend is a girl**) may be distinguished from whole-part Possessives (**The arrow has a head**). The arguments against are also of the same sort. One talks of a **girlfriend** and a **boyfriend**, but not usually of a **manfriend** and still less of a **childfriend** or an **adultfriend**. Why so? This cannot be explained by syntax, but only by the particular properties of [the lexemes] **GIRLFRIEND** and **BOYFRIEND** as semantic units.

(*ibid.* 188)

Matthews' discussion of the results provided by analysis from morphological, syntactic, phonological and semantic standpoints demonstrates convincingly that the classification of compounds is a complex matter where all levels of linguistic analysis may be relevant (as already quoted early in this comment):

The criteria we have discussed tend to give different results. **Red admiral** is a compound by the test of meaning, but by the phonological test it would be taken merely as a fossilised or non-transparent metaphor. **Heir apparent** is morphologically two words, but

syntactically the arrangement of Noun + Adjective is unproductive. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that one of them must be THE criterion par excellence. In the history of a language, collocations and figures of speech may often be INSTITUTIONALISED (as clichés or idioms) without also being LEXICALISED as single units... (ibid. 193)

A decade later Hudson's *Word grammar* adopted a network approach where the question of levels can be bypassed; in this approach, it is no longer necessary to decide whether compounds belong to morphology or syntax:

Compounds and clitics are similar in that in both kinds of construction a word contains another word (or words) among its constituents. In both cases, it is hard to decide where the boundary between syntax and morphology lies, because we could be on either level, according to how we interpret our definitions of the levels. Widely accepted definitions would be: 'Syntax is the level which deals with relations between words' and 'Morphology is the level which deals with the internal structures of words.' Clitics and compounds satisfy both of these definitions, so we could locate the structures concerned on either or both of the levels. It seems best, in view of this uncertainty, not to make too much depend on getting the morphology/ syntax boundary right, and one of the characteristics of word grammar is that very little depends on it ...

(Hudson 1984: 52)

69.29 **brise-glace**: ice-breaker (ship); **porte-plume**: penholder; **savoir-vivre**: good manners (lit. 'to know (how) to live (behave)').

69.30 **chie-en-lit**: havoc, uproar. Now normally written **chienlit** [ʃjanli]. Lit. 'shit in bed', **chier** (ex Lat. *cacare*). (Petit Robert quotes De Gaulle's well-known slogan of the March 1968 student troubles, 'La réforme, oui; la chienlit, non.' Passing through Paris in May of that year, I noticed a graffito near the Pont des Beaux Arts: 'La chienlit, c'est lui!', with a caricature of the General, 'Charlot'.) **marche-pied**: running-board (on cars of the 30s); **trotte-menu**: pitter-patter (of mice), from **trotter**; **réveil-matin**: alarm-clock. Normally **réveille-matin**, from **réveiller**.

69.31 **bon-homme**: fellow, chap; also 'good-natured man'. **avant-coureur**: forerunner, precursor; **bien-tôt**: soon, lit. quite soon. **hor-mis**: except, written **hormis**, from **hors**, outside and **mis**, p.p. **mettre** 'put outside'.

69.32 **non-sens**: nonsense, meaningless (phrase, translation, action etc.) 'c'est un nonsens'; **demi-frère**: half-brother; **quasi-délit**: technical offence (legal).

69.33 **quelq'un**: somebody, someone; **chac-un**: everyone; **quis-quis**: whoever, whosoever.

69.34 **cerf-volant**: kite, lit. 'flying-stag'; **bout-rimé**: set rhyme; **homme-bête**: lit. 'man-beast' (not in Petit Robert, though **homme-sandwich** is.); **sépulcre-enfer**: lit. 'tomb-hell'.

70.18 **Sa - plus large - acception**: (in) its - widest - sense.

70.18-19 **Mon - cher - ami**: my - dear - friend.

70.19 **ces - diverses - histoires**: these - various - stories;

70.19-20 **Certaines - branches - de l'histoire**: certain (given) - branches - of history.

70.20 **une - date - certaine**: a - definite - date.

70.20-21 **Toutes nos - connaissances - historiques:** all our - historical - knowledge.

70.21-22 **tous les - phénomènes - de la nature:** all the - phenomena - of nature (all natural phenomena).

70.22 **Des - écrits - littéraires:** ('some') [normally omitted in English] - literary - writings.

70.55 **Omnis determinatio est negatio:** Every determination is (a) negation.

70.56 **une - vraie - épopée:** a - veritable - epoch. **Un - grand - homme:** a - great - man

70.65-66 **head or super-member:** 'hoved- eller overled'.

70.76 **un - homme - brave:** a - brave - man (brave homme, decent fellow)
Une - épopée vraie: a - genuine - epoch

70.76-77 **Une - langue - une:** a - homogeneous - language. Dupré 1972, III: 2615 - 'un, adjectif qualicatif' - quotes the Académie: 'Un est aussi adjectif qualicatif et signifie "qui est seul, unique, qui n'admet point de pluralité." 'La vérité est une', 'Truth is one (and indivisible)'

70.77 **un - savant - de premier ordre:** a - scholar - of (the) first rank.

72.30 *amor patriæ*: love of one's country, *patriæ* genitive sg. of *patria*.

74.59 *s'gu'* as embedded clause - cp. etymology given above (= *sågu* = *så gud* (hjælpe mig)).

76.4 SANDFELD: we have seen above that Sandfeld gave a completely different treatment to subordinate clauses in vol. II of his French syntax, 1936. This classification comes from Sandfeld's short Danish work of 1909, *Bisætningerne i moderne fransk*.

79.1 a word always remains identical with itself ...: Brøndal's Cartesian principle.

80.9 *rhythm*: to characterize the dynamic aspect of the syntagmatic axis; cp. again Brøndal's gloss on Humboldt's famous 'die Sprache ist *energeia*, nicht *ergon*': 'more correctly: both/and' (in the Bibliography to M&S). *Rhythm* is *energeia*, permanent morphological classes are *ergon*. But grammatical *rhythm* at the same time constitutes more than syntax, its logical form: the symbolic form of grammatical *rhythm* is phonetics (Sec. 81).

CONCLUSION

82.9-10 **synonymics and semantics**: this was to be developed in PT 1938.

83.8 ... **words and forms ... sentences and members**: upholding the Germanic view of **formlære, Formenlehre** as against **sætningslære, Satzlehre**.

83.32 **the logical constant**: original, 'den logiske konstant'

84.9 **KANT**: the categories were set out in the **Kritik der reinen Vernunft** (1781: table of categories p. 106). The literature on Kantian categories alone is voluminous. What Kant meant by category (roughly: the very principles by which perception of the external world is possible, the conditions whereby any judgement can be made) was not what Aristotle meant. Walsh's paper on categories discusses the Aristotelian notion of category mistake (and its then topical Rylean version) and concludes:

No doubt people who make category-mistakes can, and frequently do, also make logical mistakes in the narrow sense, but the two do not necessarily go together, nor is the absurdity of one reducible to the other. If this is granted we find a formal point of contact between investigations of the Kantian and Rylean types, or, if that is preferred, between Kant and Aristotle. Both parties are concerned in what they write about categories to examine a species of good sense and absurdity which is neither material nor formal ... But here the resemblance ends. Categorical principles of the Kantian types approximate to material truths, in that they seem to be about the world, and are hence readily confused with empirical hypotheses. By contrast, the categorical injunctions which might be expected from Aristotle or Ryle (for instance "Do not confuse substance-expressions

with quality-expressions") look far more like 'rules of logic or grammar.

(Walsh [1954] 1968: 69-70)

84.10-11 HØFFDING ... substance: The Bibliography for M & S quotes *Den menneskelige tanke* 1910 briefly on substance as a moribund concept. I have been unable to locate a copy of the original but the French version of 1911 at least provides a larger context here:

Depuis Leibniz, on ne peut appeler substance que ce qui agit; toute substance est en action. Par là est éliminé le concept de substance et la loi de l'activité en a pris la place. L'individualité particulière trouve son expression dans la loi des changements qui se passent dans elle, avec elle et par elle. L'ancienne souveraineté du concept de substance était accompagnée de la supposition que l'immuable et l'immobile étaient ce qu'il y avait de supérieur ... surtout pour la pensée qui a besoin de se reposer dans une idée qui ne remette pas la réflexion en mouvement. La substance offre l'exemple d'une catégorie mourante, sinon déjà morte. 'La chose en soi' de Kant est une des dernières formes qu'elle a prise. Hume d'une part, Fichte de l'autre, ont prouvé la non-valeur du concept de substance pour ce qui regarde la vie de l'âme. L'observation immédiate ne nous montre pas la substance de l'âme, déclarait Hume. Plus nous apprenons à nous connaître au moyen de la réflexion, plus nous apercevrons, assurait Fichte, que notre âme n'est qu'action.

(Høffding [1910] 1911: 220)

(These unlikely allies, the Scots empiricist and the German romantic, can hardly be said to have had the last word on this head.)

Høffding's own categories were set out in a table in Høffding 1924:

TABLE DE CATÉGORIES

I. Catégories fondamentales

1. Synthèse. - Relation.
2. Continuité. - Discontinuité.
3. Ressemblance. - Différence.

- | | |
|--|-----------------------|
| a) Série de différence chaotique | |
| b) Série de différence à variations indéterminées. | |
| c) Série de différence à variations régulières. | |
| d) Série de différence à variations identiques. | |
| e) Série de différence progressive. | = Séries rationnelles |
| f) Série d'identité partielle. | |
| g) Série de réciprocité. | |
| h) Série d'identité absolue. | |

II. Catégories formelles

1. Identité.
2. Analogie (réduction du rapport de qualité).
 - a) temps b) nombre c) degré d) lieu
3. Négation.
4. rationalité.

III. Catégories réelles

1. Causalité.
2. Totalité.
3. Evolution.

IV. Catégories idéales (Concepts de valeur).

1. Rappports de valeur formels.
1. Rappports de valeur réels.

(Høffding 1924: 164, summarizing Høffding 1910)

The strong family resemblance this table bears to the categorial analyses in OKL, M & S and PT make the influence on Brøndal pretty evident, and, perhaps, makes the charts and arguments in the latter works not quite so startling as they undoubtedly do on first sight.

84.17-20 the former ... system, the latter ... rhythm: which would seem to claim Aristotle for morphology and Kant for syntax - a novel view.

85.18 BERGSON: The reference is to Bergson's *Essai sue les données immédiates de la conscience*, 1889, a doctoral thesis (English translation 1910, *Time and free will: on the immediate data of consciousness*):

This work was primarily an attempt to establish the notion of duration, or lived time, as opposed to what [Bergson] viewed as the spatialized conception of time, measured by a clock, that is employed by science. He proceeded by analysing the awareness man has of his inner self to show that psychological facts are qualitatively different from any other, charging psychologists in particular with falsifying the facts by trying to quantify and number them. Fechner's Law, claiming to establish a calculable relation between the intensity of the stimulus and that of the corresponding sensation,

was especially criticized. Once the confusions were cleared away that confounded duration and extension, succession with simultaneity, and quality with quantity, he maintained that the objections to human liberty made in the name of scientific determinism could be seen to be baseless.

(Thibaudet & Bird 1975: II, 843)

Similar conclusions are expressed in the final chapter of Bergson's *Matière et mémoire* (1896). Interestingly enough, while Bergson's idealist philosophy is generally derided by the 'ordinary language' Anglo-Saxon school, Thibaudet and Bird state that his work influenced, among others, the pragmatist, William James, the realist, George Santayana and the mathematician and philosopher, A.N. Whitehead (co-author with Russell of the *Principia mathematica*, which can hardly be dismissed as 'idealist verbiage').

85.25 MEYERSON: Émile Meyerson, 1859-1933. An astonishing polymath, Meyerson, like Bergson, was a French philosopher of Polish-Jewish extraction. Born in Lublin, Poland (then part of the Russian Empire), he was educated in Germany (first classics, then chemistry under the celebrated chemist, Bunsen) but moved to Paris in 1882. At one time he was a director of the Jewish Colonization Association for Europe and Asia-Minor. After World War I he became a naturalized French citizen. He applied his knowledge of science and the history of science to epistemology (*Identité et réalité* 1908), to the philosophy of science (*De l'explication dans les sciences* 1921) and to epistemology on the grand scale (*Du cheminement de la pensée* 1931): 'In the last two works it is shown that the mind works always and everywhere in the same fashion, and this catholicity of reason proves that it does indeed include a portion that is a priori.' (Blanché 1967: 307) Here again is Brøndal's Cartesian identity principle. Though

published only a year before M & S, *Le cheminement de la pensée* evidently chimed nicely with Brøndal's long-held views, as did Gardiner 1932: rather than influences on Brøndal, they are adduced as confirmation of the keystones of the system towards which he had been working since 1917 viz. the *a priori* nature of mental structure, reflected in the system of grammar, and on the fundamental opposition of *partes* and *membra*.

The main thrust of Meyerson's (and Bergson's) thought is anti-positivist and thus attractive to Brøndal, not only here in M & S, but in the final sketch of the place of language in the universe of knowledge (DSG/ELG [1942] 1943). In the Preface to PT Brøndal states that he has been influenced by, among many others, the thinking of Niels Bohr; his admiration for Meyerson may have been slightly jolted by Meyerson's rejection of Copenhagen quantum physics 'because it sets bounds to continuity and objectivity' (Blanché 1967: 308), an attitude which seems to fit Bergson's views on quantification. Blanché finally notes that Meyerson's philosophy

enjoyed great prestige about 1930. Since then, it has been somewhat overshadowed by the philosophy of the scientific theorists of the Copenhagen School [Bohr], although Louis de Broglie retains the high estimate of it stated in his preface to Meyerson's [posthumous] *Essais* [1936]. Meyerson's philosophy has also been neglected because of the general shift away among contemporary philosophers from epistemological to existential problems.

(*ibid. loc. cit.*)

Fortunately, the inanities of the 'Existential' movement are no longer taken seriously; in their time the existentialists were (deservedly) a target for logical positivists and ordinary language philosophers, and serious idealist philosophy no longer has to suffer by association with *L'Être et le néant* or its like. That Meyerson is not entirely forgotten

by serious thinkers is shown, I believe, in Kuhn's preface to **The structure of scientific revolutions**; here Kuhn states that the work was first conceived in the mid 40s when he was approaching the end of his doctoral dissertation in physics:

A fortunate involvement with an experimental college course treating physical science for the non-scientist provided my first exposure to the history of science. To my complete surprise, that exposure to out-of-date scientific theory and practice radically undermined some of my basic conceptions about the nature of science and the reasons for its special success ... My first opportunity to pursue in depth some of the ideas set forth below was provided by three years as a Junior Fellow of the Society of Fellows of Harvard University ... Part of my time in those years was devoted to history of science proper. In practice I continued to study the writings of Alexandre Koyré and first encountered those of Émile Meyerson, Hélène Metzger and Anneliese Meyer. More clearly than any other recent scholars, this group has shown what it was like to think scientifically in a period when the canons of scientific thought were very different from those current today.

(Kuhn [1962] 1970: v-vi)

Kuhn adds in a footnote that Meyerson's **Identity and reality** (translated K. Loewenberg) was among the works he found particularly influential. Kuhn's own work, of course, has been frequently quoted by the proponents of TGG to their own purpose, though the whole notion of 'paradigms' of thought has come under a number of attacks, especially by students of linguistic historiography like W. Koerner.

Another researcher who has not forgotten Meyerson is Malmberg; in his study **Structural linguistics and human communication** he noted that

A tendency similar to that of structuralism and of glossematics may be found not only in philosophy (ÉMILE MEYERSON) but also in aesthetic and literary criticism (e.g. in WOLFGANG KAYSER ...) and within natural sciences, e.g. E. SCHRÖDINGER ...

(Malmberg 1963: 193)

86.14 **Mischsyntax**: cp. Sec. 5 (RIES) and comment thereon.

86.29 **colour theory:** the *Farbenlehre*, an ingenious attempt, although in this field the views of the more prosaic Newton have prevailed. (Goethe is famous for his protean talent, but I have read somewhere that his practical activities as a statesman of Weimar were often unsuccessful, rather like those of the protagonists in *Die Wahlverwandtschaften*.)

86.54 **equally necessary and equally legitimate:** a view vindicated in recent times (the 80s) with the resurgence of interest in morphology discussed above (cp. Coates 1987).

86.77 **golden mean:** for all the apparent strangeness of Brøndal's theories, at least as they must seem, say, to students exposed only to the typical courses in linguistics offered in the English-speaking world over the last few decades, there is beneath the unfamiliar terminology and symbolization a core of common-sense. Cp. here Givón's recent plea for negotiating

a middle ground between equally untenable extremes: on the one hand is the Chomskyan extreme, insisting on the Cartesian uniqueness of the human faculty of language ... On the other ... Skinner's propensity for trivializing both language and cognition by viewing them through the reductionist glasses of stimulus-response ... The middle grounds that must be struck again should retain both common-sense and empirical accountability ...

(Givón 1984: 3)

(While the example here is from psycholinguistics, Givón lists similar extremes in all areas pertinent to linguistics, thus biology, anthropology, sociology as well as the specific linguistic disciplines themselves: his topic in fact is syntax - the work is called *Syntax: a functional-typological introduction*.) One thinks again of Brøndal's gloss on

Humboldt's romantic notion of language as 'nicht **ergon**, sondern **energeia**' -
- 'better: "both - and".'

87.35 ff. the reconstructive method ... cannot at all be applied to syntactic phenomena: For a more recent view, see J. M. Anderson's stimulating *Structural aspects of language change* (1973), especially chap. 6, 'structural change (syntagmatic)'.

88.8 PRAGUE SCHOOL: As pointed out earlier, Praguian functionalism was far more compatible with Brøndal's temperament than it was to the Copenhagen School proper (Glossematics). The success of Praguian theories of systems of oppositions in phonology (Trubetzkoy and Jakobson in particular) or of fruitful notions like Mathesius' early topic and comment approach in syntax did not exclude an interest in the linguistic analysis of emotive and literary language (exported to America in the person of René Wellek this became the 'New Criticism' of the post-war era). Cp. also comments above on Karl Bühler's contributions from the psychological perspective to the Praguian movement, though in this case Brøndal had as little sympathy for Bühler's views as Bühler had for Brøndal's.

90.4-5 characterizing not only language ... but also thought: The recent work on Brøndal in Denmark and France has vindicated Brøndal's analysis of language in terms of generic concepts (OKL and M & S) and relational categories (PT) from a semiotic standpoint. Who would have thought even a decade ago that a collection of essays would appear to mark the Brøndal centenary in 1987 and that the inevitable comparison between the co-

-founders of the Linguistic Circle of Copenhagen would be explicitly drawn and examined in length - and would conclude in Brøndal's favour? (Rasmussen 1987: *passim*).

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- 1930 'Le système de la grammaire' = SG/ELG 1-7
- 1931 'L'autonomie de la syntaxe' = AS/ELG 8-14
- 1932 **Morfologi og syntax.** Copenhagen: Gad. = M & S
- 1935 'Structure et variabilité des systèmes morphologiques' = SVSM/ELG 15-24
- 1936a 'Sound and phoneme'; in **Proc. International Congress of Phonetic Sciences**, held University College, London 22-26 July 1935; ed. Daniel Jones and D.B. Fry. Cambridge: C.U.P.
- 1936b **Le français langue abstraite.** Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
- 1937a 'Omnis et totus' = OT/ELG 25-32
- 1937b 'Définition de la morphologie' = DM/ELG 33-40
- 1937c 'Les oppositions linguistiques' = OL/EGL 41-48
- 1937d 'Langage et logique' = LL/ELG 49-71
- 1937e 'Le problème de l'hypotaxe: réflexions sur la théorie des propositions' = PH/ELG 72-80 [Translated by Householder specially

for Householder 1972 **Syntactic theory: I, Structuralist.**

- 1939a 'L'originalité des prépositions du français moderne' =
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2-10. Leading article and declaration of principles and policies
for the new journal devoted to structural linguistics. = LS/ELG
- 1939c 'Le concept de "personne" en grammaire et la nature du pronom'
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- 1942a 'La constitution du mot' = CM/ELG 117-123
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- 1942d 'Délimitation et subdivision de la grammaire' = DSG/ELG 134-137
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CONCLUDING NOTE

The reader who has survived thus far will probably feel like Seneca when he wrote:

Quattuor milia librorum Didymus grammaticus scripsit. Misererer, si tam multa supervacua legisset. In his libris de patria Homeri quaeritur, in his de Aeneae matre vera, in his libidinosior Anacreon an ebriosior vixerit, in his an Sappho publica fuerit, et alia, quae erant dediscenda, si scires. I nunc et longam esse vitam nega.

[Didymus the grammarian wrote 4,000 books. I should feel pity for him if he had only read the same number of superfluous volumes. In these books he investigates Homer's birthplace, who was really the mother of Aeneas, whether Anacreon was more of a lecher than a drunkard, whether Sappho was a tart and other problems the answers to which, if found, should be immediately forgotten. Come now, do not tell me that life is long! (In effect: And then some complain that life is short!)]

(Seneca: *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales*. #88.
London: Heinemann, 1962. V. 2: 372)

To be sure, the context makes it obvious that **grammaticus** is only conventionally translated as 'grammarian'; 'pedant' or 'scholiast' might be nearer the mark. We have had to look into a great many matters which the reader may well feel would be better forgotten. Nevertheless, we point out for the last time that Brøndal's grammatical system on a number of points anticipates current trends in linguistics. He clearly distinguishes morphology from syntax, maintaining for morphology the significance it was later to lose in the Transformationalist era. His system sharply distinguishes word-classes, the **partes** of the classical tradition, from sentence members, the **membra** of the classical tradition, the **sætningsled/Satzglieder** of the Germanic tradition. And lastly, perhaps, we can see in Brøndal a great representative of the logico-philosophical tradition in linguistics, a man of the widest learning and the

broadest culture who sought to apply many disciplines in the service of linguistic analysis. Brøndal's system of grammar could never have been conceived by a positivistically-minded descriptive linguist however such a scholar might pride himself in being a cobbler sticking to his last and avoiding any matters beyond his ken. If Brøndal be called a dilettante, as so many of his contemporaries seemed to think, then we allow this only in Jacob Burckhardt's sense:

Das Wort [Dilettantismus] ist von den Künsten her im Verruf, wo man freilich entweder nichts oder ein Meister sein und das Leben an die Sache wenden muss, weil die Künste wesentlich die Vollkommenheit voraussetzen.

In den Wissenschaften dagegen kann man nur noch in einem begrenzten Bereiche Meister sein, nämlich als Spezialist, und irgendwo soll man dies sein. Soll man aber nicht die Fähigkeit der allgemeinen Übersicht, ja die Würdigung derselben einbüßen, so sei man noch an möglichst vielen anderen Stellen Dilettant, wenigstens auf eigene Rechnung, zur Mehrung der eigenen Kenntnis und Bereicherung an Gesichtspunkten; sonst bleibt man in allem, was über die Spezialität hinausliegt, ein Ignorant und unter Umständen im ganzen ein roher Geselle.

Dem Dilettanten aber, weil er die Dinge liebt, wird es vielleicht im Lauf seines Lebens möglich werden, sich auch noch an verschiedenen Stellen wahrhaft zu vertiefen.

(Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen [1905] 1973,
Berlin: Ullstein: 39)