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Rational Religion and the Idea of the University:

a study of the Noetics, 1800 to 1836.

by

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Summary

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Oxford University was both a religious and an educational institution. The question of university reform, therefore, inevitably involved both religious and educational issues. Foremost among the supporters of reform in the early decades of the nineteenth century were the Noetics of Oriel College. The following study looks at the religious and educational views of the Noetics, at their version of rational religion and their idea of the university.

The first chapter is devoted to Edward Copleston, Provost of Oriel from 1814 to 1828, who has been called "the father of the Noetics". A brief section outlining Copleston's career is followed by a detailed consideration of Copleston's philosophical views, in particular, his theory of knowledge, and his views on religion and education.

The second chapter is concerned with the third decade of the nineteenth century, a period when the younger Noetics came into prominence and Noetic attitudes were widely accepted. Three Noetics are discussed in detail, Richard Whately, Renn Dickson Hampden, and Edward Hawkins. The chapter concludes with a brief look at other fellows of Oriel, including not only Noetics such as Baden Powell and Thomas Arnold, but also future Tractarians such as Newman, Pusey and Keble. It would appear that during this period there was no clear-cut division discernible between Noetics and future Tractarians.

It was at the end of the 'twenties and beginning of the 'thirties that this division occurred, and the third chapter traces the factors which contributed to the alienation of Noetics and Tractarians, as well as examining closely Hampden's Bampton Lectures and the resulting controversy. Connected with this controversy was the issue of the admission of Dissenters to the university, and the Noetics' attitude to this issue is explained.

The conclusion argues that the Noetics were more than just a university clique and that their importance was greater than that of provoking the Tractarian "reaction". Although neither the Noetic version of rational religion nor the Noetic idea of the university were entirely acceptable to succeeding generations, nevertheless elements of both did find acceptance in some circles and constituted an important legacy to posterity.

Declaration

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university, and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by any other person, except that which has been duly acknowledged in the text or notes of the thesis.

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INTRODUCTION

In 1886 John Henry Newman described the intellectual climate at Oxford in the early years of the nineteenth century as follows:

> When in the beginning of the present century, not very long before my own time, after many years of moral and intellectual declension, the University of Oxford woke up to a sense of its duties, and began to reform itself, the first instruments of this change, to whose zeal and courage we all owe so much, were naturally thrown together for mutual support, against the numerous obstacles which lay in their path, and soon stood out in relief from the body of residents, who, though many of them men of talent themselves, cared little for the object which the others had at heart. These Reformers, as they may be called, were for some years members of scarcely more than three or four Colleges; and their own College, as being under their direct influence, of course had the benefit of those stricter views of discipline and teaching, which they themselves were urging on the University. They had, in no long time, enough of real progress in their several spheres of exertion, and enough of reputation out of doors, to warrant them in considering themselves the élite of the place....Thus was formed an intellectual circle or class in the University, - men, who felt they had a career before them, as soon as the pupils, whom they were forming, came into public life; men, whom non-residents, whether country parsons or preachers of the Low Church, on coming up from time to time to the old place, would look at, partly with admiration, partly with suspicion, as being an honour indeed to Oxford, but withal exposed to the temptations of ambitious views, and to the spiritual evils signified in what is called the 'pride of reason'.[1]

In this select class of men Newman discerned "the rudiments of the Liberal party".[2] Of the three or four colleges referred to in the above passage, the one which was most prominent was Oriel College, and the fellows of Oriel formed the nucleus of this élite. Thomas Mozley, himself a fellow of Oriel College and brother-in-law of Newman, stated that "the new Oriel sect was declared to be Noetic, whatever that may mean, and when a Fellow of the College presented himself in the social gatherings of another society he was sure to be reminded of his

pretence to intellectual superiority".[3] When Newman, in the eighteen thirties, set himself to oppose liberalism at Oxford, it was the Noetics whom he saw as its main exponents, and consequently it was their teachings which he was determined to combat.[4]

This view of the Noetics as leaders of a Liberal party was repeated by other Tractarian writers. R.W. Church, for example, who was both a participant in and historian of the Oxford Movement, claimed that the Noetics laid the foundation at Oxford "of what was then called the Liberal School of Theology".[5] J.B. Mozley, brother of Thomas, similarly wrote: "a speculative liberalism had been the growing element for some time, even in Oxford and in Oriel, under the fostering patronage of Dr. Copleston and Dr. Whately's vigorous and argumentative training".[6] The main characteristic of this Noetic liberalism was considered by these men to be the intrepid but incautious questioning of received opinions. Thomas Mozley recalled that the Noetics "seemed to be always undermining, if not actually demolishing, received traditions and institutions; and whether they were preaching from the University pulpit, or arguing in common room, or issuing pamphlets on passing occasions, even faithful and self-reliant men felt the ground shaking under them".[7] According to the Tractarian view, the Noetics came perilously close to, if indeed they were not guilty of, "the pride of reason". Moreover, for all their questioning of received opinions, they had very little of positive value to offer in their place. In comparison with the Noetics, Newman, according to T. Mozley, exhibited "a certain yearning to build as fast as men cast down", and was critical of "men who lash

the waters to frighten the fish when they have made no preparation to catch them".[8]

Noetic liberalism, then, in Tractarian eyes, was essentially negative and barren. "Liberalism", wrote Newman, "was the badge of a theological school, of a dry and repulsive character, not very dangerous in itself, though dangerous as opening the door to evils which it did not itself either anticipate or comprehend".[9] Similarly, Church declared:

> Liberalism had hitherto [that is, prior to the 1840s] been represented in Oxford in forms which though respectable from intellectual vigour were unattractive, sometimes even repulsive. They were dry, cold, supercilious, critical; they wanted enthusiasm; they were out of sympathy with religion and the religious temper and aims. They played, without knowing it, on the edge of the most dangerous questions.[10]

Tractarianism, on the other hand, Church believed, while a theological movement, was also a spiritual movement, a religious revival, recalling men to greater spirituality and morality:

> The movement, whatever else it was, or whatever else it became, was in its first stages a movement for deeper religion, for a more real and earnest self-discipline, for a loftier morality, for more genuine self-devotion to a serious life, than had ever been seen in Oxford".[11]

The Oxford Movement, he thought, supplied that warmth which Noetic liberalism lacked, and indeed was a direct reaction to the cold, logical nature of that liberalism.[12]

Such is the picture of the Noetics which we inherit from Tractarian sources, and which has largely become the accepted, traditional view of them and their theology. Most writers on church

history since their time have placed them in the liberal wing of the church, citing without fail their questioning spirit. Many, in fact, have seen this attitude as the main intellectual bond between them, rather than shared ideas and principles, and thus have denied that the Noetics represented a school of thought. A.C. Fraser, for example, said in a lecture of 1864 that the Noetics "were united by the subjective bond of a common intellectual activity and moral earnestness, rather than by the objective bond of a common system of notions and opinions....The remarkable men of Oriel....were thinkers or scholars, rather than a school or sect".[13] This is a view which has been repeated by a number of historians. J.H. Overton claimed that one speaks of the Noetics "as a 'school' for want of a better name; but they never became what is properly termed 'a school of thought'".[14] More recently, A. Dwight Culler has stated that in their theological opinions the Noetics were of no definite school, either High or Low, while D.H. Akenson has described them as representing "not a school of thought but a set of attitudes; not a scholastic or ecclesiastical sect, but certainly an academical clique".[15]

Assessment over the years of the Noetics' worth and achievement has been varied. Some writers have echoed the Tractarian opinion. F.W. Cornish, for example, agreed with the Tractarians that the Noetics were essentially negative: "they were good for attack, not for defence; for pulling down, not for building up...."[16] J. Stoughton, like Newman and Church, thought that the Noetics were incautious and did not realise the consequences of their free thinking.[17] Others, however, have applauded the liberalism of the Noetics, regretting only that it did not go far enough. Mark

Pattison, at the end of his life, was one who thought that the intellectual ferment maintained in the Oriel common room was "wholesome", disturbing as it did the "scurfy pond" of an Oxford "stagnant with sameness and custom".[18] John Tulloch, too, approved of the Noetics, and spoke of "the richer mental tone and broader spirit of love" infused into Christianity by the religious philosophy of Coleridge and the liberalism of the Noetics.[19]

But whether historians have approved or disapproved of the Noetics, the picture they have presented has been consistent. They have depicted the Noetics as inheritors of eighteenth century rationalism or as forerunners of a later liberalism, in contrast to Tractarianism, which (influenced rather by the spirit of the Evangelical movement) has been seen as a spiritual revival in reaction to the rationalism and liberalism of the Noetics. Mark Pattison described Tractarianism as a reaction to the Noetics:

> This little germ of premature "free enquiry", though ultimately destined to grow into a flourishing tree, was at its first appearance too violently in contrast with the established ways of thinking of the whole University not to provoke a reaction. The reaction came, as was to have been expected, within the same college within which the provocation had been given. But it came with a violence and *éclat* which were so out of all proportion to the scale on which the challenge had been given, that it has well-nigh obliterated the historical relations between the movement and the counter-movement.[20]

The last sentence indicates one of the problems with the traditional view of the Noetics. "Tractarianism", Pattison went on, "has attracted to itself the attention of the public, as though it were an independent phenomenon which could be known and apprehended without its genealogy being traced; whereas it was only one phase - the

indispensable, reactionary, and complementary phase - in the movement of thought which belongs to the nineteenth century". To a large extent this situation has been remedied by modern studies of the Tractarian debt to the Evangelical movement or the High Church tradition.[21] But still the link between them and the Noetics has largely been ignored. And it is still true, as it was when Pattison wrote the above words, that the Oxford Movement has eclipsed the Noetics, and that little interest has been taken in them until very recently. Thus, the traditional picture has on the whole been uncritically accepted. But this traditional picture is an over-simplification of a complex situation and leaves unanswered many important questions.

One of these questions is, in what sense were the Noetics liberals? What, indeed, is meant by "liberalism" in this context? The term, as used by Newman and the Tractarians, referred primarily to liberalism in religion, although Church did suggest a political aspect. The Liberals, he said, "patronised Dissenters; they gave Whig votes; they made free, in a mild way, with the pet conventions and prejudices of Tories and High Churchmen".[22] Newman defined liberalism as follows:

> Now by Liberalism I mean false liberty of thought, or the exercise of thought upon matters, in which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to any successful issue, and therefore is out of place. Among such matters are first principles of whatever kind; and of these the most sacred and momentous are especially to be reckoned the truths of Revelation. Liberalism then is the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word.[23]

For Newman, "liberalism" and "rationalism" meant the same thing, or at least "rationalism" was a form of "liberalism", for rationalism was just this mistake of subjecting to human judgement those revealed doctrines whose truth ought to be accepted on the authority of the Bible. The question remains of whether the Noetics were indeed rationalists and how far their liberalism extended. There is here a difficulty of definition. Newman accused the Noetics of a tendency towards rationalism, an accusation which the Noetics fervently denied. Who, then, was right? Or did Newman and the Noetics in fact understand different things by "rationalism"? As for "liberalism", Pietro Corsi has rightly pointed out the danger of using this word in connection with the Noetics. "The term 'liberal' in this context", he states, "has been grossly misused. A mistaken analogy with the meaning of the term in later decades of the nineteenth century has biased the assessment of intellectual and religious movements in the early decades of the century."[24] Corsi disputes the traditional view of the opposition of High Church theology and the Oxford Movement to the daring "liberalism" of the Noetics.[25] And indeed, Newman himself, although he saw himself as opposing the "liberalism" of the Noetics, acknowledged in the Apologia that the "liberalism" of the Noetics was vastly different from that of a later generation.[26]

There are numerous other questions which also need to be asked. For example, to what extent, if any, was the Oxford Movement a reaction to Noetic theology? If so, what aspects of Noetic theology were the Tractarians reacting against? And was it only theological differences which were at issue? Were there other factors, such as political or educational, which were involved? Moreover, is the

Tractarian picture of Noetic theology in fact correct? Did they, as Newman suggested, place reason before faith, knowledge before devotion?[27] And is it true that they had nothing positive to offer, that they were merely questioners? Or did they have principles and ideas, either philosophical, religious, political, or educational, in common, such that, contrary to the accepted view, we are justified in regarding them as a school of thought, despite their different positions on various practical or political issues?[28] Moreover, did they in fact have a strategy for opposing what they saw as the main evils of the day, a strategy which the Tractarians did not recognise as such, due to their differing assessment of the evils to be combatted and the methods to be used. If the Noetics had nothing positive to offer, it is difficult to see why they should be considered important in the history of the Anglican church and of Oxford University. And yet their importance has been acknowledged by men such as Pattison and Tulloch, and even Newman allowed to them considerable significance by saying that they "unconsciously encouraged and successfully introduced into Oxford a licence of opinion which went far beyond them."[29]

Indeed, the importance of the Noetics in the history of Oxford University cannot be denied. And if important in the history of that university, then they were of wider significance as well, because of the key influence of Oxford in national life. As educators of the rising generation of clergy, the Noetics had a direct impact on theological thinking and trends in the Anglican church, as Newman recognised and feared. In the 'twenties their prestige was at its height. In the following decades Tractarianism threw the Noetics into

the shade, but in the second half of the century, liberalism, if of a different kind, once more became prominent and, in Pattison's words, grew "into a flourishing tree". For example, the Broad Church movement, as is often granted, owed a debt to the Noetics. Respecting this later liberalism, the importance of Thomas Arnold is generally cited, but other Noetics also exerted influence. It was not only to his father that Matthew Arnold was indebted, but also to his father's friends, Whately and Hampden.[30] Moreover, Tractarians themselves did not escape this influence. The leaders of the Tractarian movement were members of Oriel College and during the 'twenties lived in harmony and friendship with the Noetics. Newman, in the Apologia, acknowledged an intellectual debt to Whately and Hawkins, although the extent of that debt was greater than Newman there intimated. In fact, the idea of Tractarianism as a reaction to Noetic theology is too simplistic and disguises the many points in common between Tractarians and Noetics.

A study of the Noetics, then, is essential for an understanding of the religious and intellectual developments of the first half of the nineteenth century. But the Noetics are also important for an understanding of educational developments. In fact, when it comes to Oxford it is impossible to separate religious and educational issues, as the two were intimately tied. Oxford was both an educational and a religious institution. The connection between religion and education was one which dated back to the origins of the university and the colleges, and it was a connection which was still in the early nineteenth century very visible. Moreover, Oxford University was not only a religious institution, but more specifically an Anglican

institution. The statutes of the university required students at matriculation to subscribe to the thirty-nine articles of the Anglican church, thus excluding Dissenters and Roman Catholics. The Visitors of many colleges were Anglican bishops. The statutes of the colleges stipulated that most fellows were to take orders within a specified period, which meant that the tutors and Heads of Houses (that is, the majority of resident masters) were generally Anglican clergymen. And the profession into which a large proportion of graduates went, was the Anglican ministry.[31] In effect, Oxford University was a theological training college, (as was proudly acknowledged[32]) and was viewed by Anglicans as the bulwark of the established church. Any reform of the university, then, had not only educational but also religious implications.

Educational reform at Oxford during the first half of the nineteenth century centred on two main issues, firstly, curriculum and examinations, and secondly, the Anglican status of the university. In the decades up to 1830 the dominant issue was the reform of university studies. The century began with the new examination statute of 1800, which was intended to eliminate the abuses prevalent in eighteenth century Oxford and to reinvigorate academic life, and which indeed had far-reaching results. For, despite the conservative nature of the curriculum it established[33], by the innovation of an honours school and the enforcement of public, competitive examinations, it revitalized Oxford studies and paved the way for the mid-century reforms. This statute, in fact, was only the beginning of examination reform. A number of alterations to the original statute were passed in the first ten years of the century and again in the 'twenties, and

in the debates regarding these measures the Noetics were active and influential participants.

In the 'thirties the second main issue, that is, the religious exclusiveness of Oxford University, was raised. The Anglican monopoly of university education was being challenged during this period, and Dissenters were demanding admission into the ancient universities.[34] This was part of a wider challenge to the connection of church and state, which had recently resulted in the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts and in the removal of Roman Catholic disabilities.[35] At Oxford the Noetics were at the centre of discussions regarding the removal of the matriculation test, and, in fact, a pamphlet by one of the Noetics, R.D. Hampden, which advocated the admission of Dissenters, resulted in a storm, known simply as "the Hampden controversy", the repercussions of which were felt throughout the Anglican church. The part played by the Noetics, then, in the educational debates of the first half of the nineteenth century was of the foremost importance, and many of the issues which they discussed were later tackled by the University Commission appointed in 1850, which set the direction which Oxford, and English higher education in general, was to take in the second half of the century.

The following study looks closely at four of the Noetics who played active roles in the life of the university during the period 1800 to 1836. Edward Copleston, as "father of the Noetics", is given particular attention. It was Copleston who, first as tutor and then as Provost, established Oriel's reputation. Throughout his Oxford career he was involved in and supported university reform, and even

after leaving Oxford, he continued to give advice from afar and occasionally interceded for Oxford in the House of Lords. But more importantly, it was Copleston who established the principles and mapped out the path followed by the later Noetics. Richard Whately was Copleston's student and close friend, and the most prolific and vigorous expounder of Noetic theology. As Archbishop of Dublin he was a prominent figure, whose views were listened to. He was not afraid to interfere directly in Oxford affairs and he was a vocal opponent of Tractarianism. Edward Hawkins inherited from Copleston not only the position of Provost of Oriel but also his idea of the university, an idea which he attempted to uphold through turbulent times. As a member of the Hebdomadal Board he was directly involved in university administration in the 'thirties, and came into close conflict with the Tractarians. Renn Dickson Hampden was perhaps the most notorious of the Noetics. Around him the storm of the mid-'thirties raged, for, to Tractarian eyes, the liberal and rationalist tendencies of Noetic teaching became obvious in Hampden's writings. In the Hampden controversy we see the close connection between educational and religious issues in the early nineteenth century, for it was a controversy which concerned both Noetic theology and the Noetic idea of the university.

CHAPTER 1. EDWARD COPLESTON, THE FATHER OF THE NOETICS

Section 1. Copleston's Career

Edward Copleston was born on February 2nd, 1776, in the village of Offwell, Devon, where his father was rector of the parish church.[1] He was educated by his father to the age of fifteen, when he was elected scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and embarked on what was to be a distinguished university career. He graduated as Bachelor of Arts in 1795, having already won the Latin Verse Prize for his poem "Marius Amid the Ruins of Carthage", and in the same year he was elected fellow of Oriel College, despite the fact that he had not offered himself as a candidate.[2] In the following year he won the English Essay Prize for his essay on agriculture, an early indication of his wide-ranging interests. In 1800 he volunteered to be one of the first examiners under the new examination statute, a reform which he whole-heartedly supported. Other university posts which he held included those of professor of Poetry (1802-1812), and junior proctor (1807). Copleston's connection with Oriel College began with his election to a fellowship in 1795, and in the following years he served his college in a number of capacities. He was a tutor for thirteen years, from 1797 to 1810, senior treasurer for six years and dean from 1810 to 1814.[3] From 1800 to 1814 he was also vicar of St. Mary's, the vicar always being chosen from the resident fellows of Oriel College. On the death of Provost Eveleigh in 1814, Copleston was elected by the fellows of Oriel to the Provostship, a position which he held until his elevation to the episcopal bench in 1827.[4]

The above list of Copleston's official posts gives only a mere outline of his participation in university life. The picture needs to be filled in with details of his involvement in issues which concerned the university during his years of residence, and even after he left Oxford to take up his duties as Bishop of Llandaff he continued to take an interest in the university and its welfare, as many of his letters show. From the first Copleston threw himself into university life. As an under-graduate he was a member of the "Lunatics Club", an unofficial "Society for Scientific and Literary Disquisition", which met in college rooms, and which, according to one of its original members, had fostered the liberalised spirit which brought about the examination reform.[5] Certainly, Copleston was in favour of this reform, although he, and some other tutors, opposed two sections of the statute of 1800, on the grounds, however, that they did not go far enough.[6] Copleston also took an active interest in university politics. In 1805 and 1806 he was busy drumming up support for Richard Heber, who unsuccessfully stood for the Oxford seat in Parliament in 1806.[7] He again involved himself in politics in 1814 when there was a rumour that the Oxford seat might fall vacant and Heber was thinking of standing,[8] and in 1826 when he favoured T.G. Bucknall-Escourte for the seat vacated by Heber.[9]

More important in its repercussions as far as Copleston was concerned, was his energetic support in 1809 of Lord Grenville for Chancellor of the University of Oxford. This support earned him the gratitude and friendship of Lord Grenville,[10] but also had less pleasing consequences. In a pamphlet by John Coker, Copleston was accused of inconsistency for promoting while proctor in 1807 the

address to the King, which congratulated the King on defending the establishment against Roman Catholic claims, and then voting for Lord Grenville, a known advocate of Roman Catholic emancipation.[11] The question of Catholic emancipation was an issue right through the early decades of the nineteenth century, and one on which Oxford University invariably took a negative stance. As the bulwark of the Anglican church, Oxford saw it as its duty to oppose a measure which threatened the established order in church and state. During the first three decades of the century the university sent numerous petitions to Parliament opposing emancipation, and indeed from 1817 they were almost annual events. In answer to Coker's accusation Copleston wrote that he had in fact opposed the address to the King, although he had not felt empowered to veto it as proctor, a claim which appears to be borne out by the evidence.[12] Indeed, in 1812 Copleston twice spoke in Convocation against presenting petitions to Parliament opposing the relief of Roman Catholic disabilities.[13] However, his advocacy of Roman Catholic emancipation was carefully qualified, as he himself explained in his Letter to John Coker:

> ....I am not one of those who subscribe to the reasoning by which the Catholic claims are usually supported. The argument of abstract right and justice has always appeared to me untenable and inconsistent with the principle, that the Church establishment is an essential part of the Constitution. That principle I maintain in its fullest extent; and any provision which may be thought necessary to secure it, however hard it may bear upon a part of the community, will always meet with my decided support. To reason against those provisions absolutely, on the ground of abstract right, has always appeared to me dangerous and unconstitutional.[14]

His support of emancipation was based on the grounds of expediency, as Richard Whately pointed out in the Remains of the Late Edward Copleston, and he held that the imposition or relaxation of Roman

Catholic disabilities was not a fundamental rule of policy but must always be "relative to the circumstances of the times".[15]

This position again laid him open to the charge of inconsistency at the time of Catholic emancipation. In November, 1826, Copleston had delivered a sermon at Chester, which, while once more stressing that Catholic emancipation was a question of expediency rather than one of principle, implied that it was at present inexpedient, and contained harsh words on the "pernicious and anti-social doctrines" of Rome.[16] However, when he became a member of the House of Lords, he voted and spoke in favour of emancipation, and in consequence "was abused in the papers as a turn-coat".[17] This caused Copleston some disquiet, as he was ever tender about his reputation and, in particular, did not wish to appear indifferent to religious error. The calumny he wished to refute, he wrote to his friends, was "the charge or insinuation that because I vote for civil benefits to [Roman Catholics], I think less decidedly than others of their religious errors".[18]

The charge of inconsistency was, in fact, unfounded, as the position that he held in 1809 was essentially the same as that expounded in his sermon of 1826 and his speech in Parliament in 1829.[19] By 1829 he had indeed reversed his opinion of 1826 on the expediency of granting Roman Catholic claims, but he still maintained, as he had always done, that it was a question of expediency. The point at issue, according to Copleston, was not whether all religious tests in secular affairs were unjust, but whether they were required for the safety of the established church. To decide on these grounds

in favour of emancipation did not mean acting in violation of right and duty, or imply any sacrifice or compromise of doctrine.[20] Of course, if the argument from abstract right and justice were valid, which Copleston did not accept it to be, then all question of expediency became superfluous. Copleston's attitude to Roman Catholic emancipation is clearly stated in a letter to his dean at Llandaff, W. Bruce Knight:

> There is so little security pretended in the Bill for altering the Oath which now keeps Roman Catholics out of Parliament - that if I apprehended serious danger from the measure, I should perhaps oppose it - notwithstanding the internal condition of Ireland, which is said to call for such a remedy without delay.
>
> But in truth the more I reflect upon the whole subject, the more I am inclined to think that all danger to our Church Establishment is imaginary - and that the anxiety and apprehension which prevails arises from early impressions and traditional opinion belonging to a period when real danger was to be apprehended from a Popish claimant of the throne....
>
> Those days and those dangers have passed away - and as I have always held that religious tests and exclusion from civil office on account of error in Christian belief, are unjustifiable except on the principle of defence, I cannot wish to retain those which appear to me to exceed the just measure of defensive policy.[21]

Copleston's Letter to John Coker, written in defence of his own reputation, also contains elements of attack, and reveals his talent for the use of irony, which he had already used to good effect in his Advice to a Young Reviewer (1807) and in The Examiner Examined.[22] In fact, W.R. Ward remarks that "In these halcyon days Copleston had the makings of a literary terror".[23] Copleston was, indeed, very busy with his pen at the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century. Before he had even completed writing The Examiner Examined he was contemplating an answer to the criticisms of Oxford which had recently appeared in the Edinburgh Review.[24] This was his

well-known Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford, which he followed up with a second and third reply in 1810 and 1811. Coker's pamphlet appeared while Copleston was in middle of writing his first Reply, and prompted him "to fire a sheet or two of foolscap at him".[25] As well as engaging in these controversies, Copleston had his university duties to attend to. As Professor of Poetry he had lectures to prepare, as vicar of St. Mary's sermons to write, and his tutorial duties he did not resign until mid-1810.[26] Moreover, he was being pressed by Richard Heber and the editor of the Quarterly Review, William Gifford, to assist the newly-formed Quarterly by contributing reviews himself and by persuading his friends at Oxford to contribute.[27] Despite early reservations about the quality of this journal and indignation at its treatment of two Oxford men, and notwithstanding his other literary projects and university commitments,[28] Copleston contributed two articles in 1811 and another in 1813, and also appears to have succeeded in encouraging some of his friends to support the Quarterly.[29]

All these activities helped to establish Copleston's reputation as a man of vigorous and sharp intellect. Indeed, his potential had been recognised early, as is shown by the circumstances surrounding his election to an Oriel fellowship. He was seen to possess an "original and creative mind" and great things were expected of him.[30] This was especially so after the publication of his "Replies", which consolidated his reputation in Oxford, where they were considered an outright victory over the Edinburgh Review, and earned him the gratitude of the university, expressed in 1814 by the award of the degree of Doctor of Divinity by diploma. Friends and

acquaintances sent him letters of congratulations regarding these "Replies". But Copleston's reputation reached further than the precincts of Oxford. In 1814 he was invited to contribute to a supplement to the fifth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica and in 1818 he was asked to lend his name to an edition of early English chronicles and historians.[31] Copleston declined on both occasions due to, among other things, pressure of other work.

Copleston's reputation was further enhanced by the publication in 1819 of his two letters to Peel on the currency, and in 1821 of his discourses on necessity and predestination.[32] These discourses were on the whole favourably received, and indeed were described in the Edinburgh Review as "one of the best models of philosophical style", with Copleston being referred to in the same review as "the only writer of our time who has equally distinguished himself in paths so distant from each other as classical literature, political economy, and metaphysical philosophy".[33]

In the 'twenties Copleston's achievements and reputation were such that his friends considered him to be an obvious choice for a bishopric. One friend wrote to him in 1822, "I hope ere long, (and I hope confidently) to hear of your own elevation to an English see: the restoration of Lord Grenville's influence will enable him to do that which he must have long waited to do".[34] Copleston was in fact a strong candidate for the bishopric of Oxford, which fell vacant in 1827, but due to his ambiguous views on Catholic emancipation he was passed over in favour of Charles Lloyd, who has the advantage of

having Robert Peel for a patron.[35] But although Copleston had to wait for promotion while younger men were elevated ahead of him, he was eventually raised to the episcopal bench in 1827 as the Bishop of Llandaff. This bishopric was admittedly the bottom-most rung of the episcopal ladder, having the lowest stipend of all the bishoprics, yet, combined as it was with the deanery of St. Paul's Cathedral, it provided a comfortable living. Lloyd himself would have been happy to accept it in 1826, for he wrote to Peel on the elevation of C.R. Sumner to the see of Llandaff, "When the King thinks fit to send him to something greater, you may place me where he is. I would as soon have his preferment as any in England. A small Bishopric and a rich Deanery form a union not to be despised".[36]

Copleston's belated elevation was welcomed by his friends, and R.W. Jelf, fellow of Oriel College, wrote to Copleston's successor in the Provostship, Edward Hawkins, that he rejoiced "at the event which places so eminent a man in a station where he may have an opportunity of being a still more shining light".[37] However, in the end Copleston failed to live up to such expectations. Only a few months after his appointment as bishop, his former dean of Oriel, James Endell Tyler, wrote to Hawkins concerning Copleston, who at that time was suffering from depression, "how much has he disappointed the hopes which his early promise had excited".[38] This does not mean, of course, that as a bishop and a member of the House of Lords Copleston was a dismal failure. On the contrary, he appears to have carried out his episcopal duties conscientiously and to have taken a close interest in the affairs of Parliament. His success as a bishop has

been variously judged. Brock states that he "made a bishop of admirable vigour". B.M. Lodwick, on the other hand, is more critical and claims that Copleston "failed completely to understand his diocese and its problems".[39] It is outside the purpose of this thesis to give a decision on this point, but it seems fair to say that Copleston made a respectable, if unremarkable, bishop. As a member of the House of Lords his contribution to parliamentary debate was not great. He noticed in himself a deficiency in this area: "There is a want of self-possession, when I arise which practice might perhaps overcome - but which I shall never have practice enough to enable me to overcome".[40] In fact, he spoke in Parliament only occasionally, for the most part on issues concerning the church or the universities.

Nevertheless, Copleston did have reason to feel satisfaction with his career at the end of his life. His early ambitions had been largely fulfilled. Around 1810 Copleston was definitely contemplating a university career rather than that of a parish priest. By 1813 he was obviously hoping for the Provostship, as is shown by the fact that he refused the Headship of Magdalen Hall, because it would have necessitated relinquishing his fellowship, thus precluding him "from all chance of obtaining [a favour] to which I might hereafter aspire and might be allowed to give the preference".[41] Copleston was successful in realising this ambition and in later life could look back on a distinguished university career. He also achieved the distinction of being made a bishop of the Anglican church, a remarkable recognition of his merit considering the disadvantages which he faced. For as Lord Dudley wrote, "The bishops that are not

chosen from the great families must be considered as very fortunate men".[42]

In another respect, however, Copleston had less reason to feel satisfied with his achievements. Throughout his university career he had aspired to produce some scholarly work "permanently useful to mankind".[43] His ambitions extended beyond being a writer of critical reviews and controversial pamphlets even while he was engaged in these activities. In 1809 he confided to Heber that he aspired "to higher distinction than that of being a writer in a review", and again, in 1811, he declared, "I cannot look upon myself as a writer in the Quarterly Review", for review writing interfered with "other pursuits more pleasing, and more important to myself".[44] In 1814, in his letter declining to contribute to the supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, he indicated that all his leisure time was occupied in literary pursuits and that he had intentions of communicating his speculations to the world "at some future time in a form that may invite a serious and calm attention".[45] What kind of speculations these were, Copleston revealed in another letter to Heber in 1818: "My serious studies are directed to Theology and what is called metaphysics - in both of which....I fancy I see much that remains to be done. I have a vast field before me - and I never expect to beat one third part of the ground".[46]

In the event Copleston beat very little of the ground. Despite the anticipations of his friends[47] and his own intentions to publish a philosophical work, the closest he came to such a work was his

Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination. In 1837, at the age of sixty-one, he acknowledged to Whately that it was now highly improbable that he would ever carry out his earlier plans, although he did not completely renounce them.[48] As late as 1841, just eight years before his death, he still thought it possible that he might re-edit his theological works "with some additions", but this new edition never eventuated.[49]

The reasons for Copleston's small output were various.[50] Firstly, it would seem that Copleston needed to be prompted by some controversy, political issue, or professional responsibility to undertake the task of writing. He himself noted that nearly all his publications had been occasioned "by some temporary circumstances" and that most of them had "a controversial character".[51] Secondly, throughout his life he was subject to fits of depression, which he and his friends attributed to some physical indisposition,[52] and this may have hindered his studies. And thirdly, and this was perhaps the most telling factor, Copleston was burdened by "increasing cares of a practical kind".[53] Up till mid-1810 he was senior tutor at Oriel College, a post which involved giving two to three catechetical lectures a day to small classes of about six to twelve students, six days a week.[54] Although he resigned these duties in 1810 and also gave up his private pupils[55] in order to devote himself to his own studies, this period of leisure did not last long, for in 1814 he assumed the duties of Provost, as well as those of a member of the Hebdomadal Board. From 1828 he had episcopal functions to fulfil, as well as those of the Dean of St. Paul's, and he sometimes found,

because of the travelling involved, that he lacked not only the leisure but also the books necessary for scholarly pursuits. Moreover, despite his early ambitions, Copleston's letters give the impression of an essentially practical man rather than a scholar, an impression which is verified by his pupil J. Hughes, who wrote of "his manly and practical habits of mind" and said that "it was not his nature to make the most trifling thing a sinecure which came under his notice",[56] and also by his competent conduct of college affairs as treasurer, dean, and provost.[57] In other words, when practical duties and scholarly pursuits both laid claim to his time, it was the scholarly pursuits which had to give way. In fact, after becoming a bishop Copleston does not appear to have devoted much more time to the study of philosophy.[58] His later sermons do not show any development of thought in this area, but merely express views previously arrived at during his university years. Consequently Whately was of the opinion that the middle part of Copleston's life, that is, his Oxford years, was his "meridian", when "his intellectual energies were in their chief strength".[59]

It could be asked why, if Copleston failed to produce scholarly works of lasting value, he is worthy of study. In fact, it would seem that a reviewer of William Copleston's Memoir of Edward Copleston doubted Copleston's importance, for, according to Whately, he characterised Copleston "as a sensible, indeed, and respectable writer, but not such a one as to have exercised any influence on the age".[60] Whately defended Copleston against this disparagement by pointing out Copleston's contribution to his own book, Elements of

Logic. The Elements of Logic was certainly a useful book in its day, but it is not to this book, or any other, that we are to look for proof of Copleston's importance. In his early career, Copleston was primarily a teacher, and over the years many pupils passed under his care. He was also a very impressive character and highly respected in the university.[61] It is likely that in Oxford at least his personal influence was of greater significance than his published works.[62] This is especially the case within Oriel itself. Copleston has generally been accounted the "father" of the Noetics, and it is difficult to doubt that the critical talents of the younger generation at Oriel were fostered by his example and encouragement, or that in their thinking they often followed the lead set by him. Indeed, Whately readily acknowledged his debt to Copleston, and others among the Noetics sought and listened to his advice; for example, Hawkins, at the time of the Oriel tutorial dispute, Hampden, during the controversy of 1836, and Baden Powell, on being elected Savilian Professor of Geometry. Of course, many of the Noetics went further on some issues than Copleston himself was prepared to go. For instance, Copleston thought some of Arnold's reasonings on the question of Catholic emancipation "rash and dangerous", and he was not "so liberal or so bold" as Hawkins concerning the admission of Dissenters to the university.[63] Nor was the exchange of ideas completely one-sided. Nevertheless, it is true to say that Copleston set the tone at Oriel in the early nineteenth century, a tone which came to be known as "Noetic".

Section 2. Copleston's Philosophical Views

Whately considered Copleston's Oxford years as his "meridian", and certainly this seems to have been the case as far as his thinking on philosophical issues was concerned. Copleston worked out his philosophical position fairly early in life, and then did not depart significantly from it, a fact which accounts for the element of repetition and predictability in Copleston's later works. That his Oxford years were the formative years is substantiated by Copleston's Commonplace book, where he often made notes from the philosophers he was reading or inserted his own views. Although it is impossible to give exact dates to these entries, as Copleston himself rarely added a date, it seems likely that the vast majority, especially those on philosophical topics, were made while Copleston was fellow and then Provost of Oriel.[1]

The major influence on Copleston's thinking during this period was Aristotle. Aristotle, in fact, was a major influence on the thinking of many an Oxford man in the nineteenth century. From mediaeval times Aristotle had held a prominent position in the Oxford curriculum, and this position was re-affirmed by the new examination statute of 1800. Later in the century Matthew Arnold recalled "the reverent devotion formerly, at any rate, paid at Oxford to text-books in philosophy, such as the Sermons of Bishop Butler, or the Ethics of Aristotle".[2] But it was not just Aristotle's Ethics, and the Rhetoric, which were studied at Oxford, but also Aristotelian logic, although students came to this through the medium of digests and compendiums, especially that of Henry Aldrich, rather than a direct acquaintance with Aristotle's Organon. After a period of neglect in

the eighteenth century, the study of Aristotelian logic was given a new lease of life by the examination statutes of the first decade of the nineteenth century by being made a compulsory element in the curriculum for the Bachelor of Arts degree. This emphasis on logic gave rise to complaints within Oxford, such as those of the outspoken Rector of Lincoln College, Edward Tatham. Tatham had a great contempt for Aristotle, whom he called "that uncircumcized and unbaptised Philistine of the Schools".[3] The Edinburgh Review, too, took up the cry, and published derogatory comments about Oxford in three reviews in 1808 and 1809.[4] J. Playfair's review accused Oxford of neglecting mathematics and science, and devoting too much time to Aristotle. At Oxford, he wrote, "the dictates of Aristotle are still listened to as infallible decrees, and....the infancy of science is mistaken for its maturity".[5]

Copleston, however, was not one of those who dismissed Aristotelian logic as a useless, antiquated discipline. When appointed tutor of Oriel College in 1797 he found himself required to lecture on logic. According to Whately, Copleston up to this time had never made any study of the subject, as it had not been taught in his former college, Corpus Christi, and indeed, Whately affirms that in most colleges at that time logic was regarded "as a system of useless and obsolete subtleties, to be laid on the same shelf with Astrology and Alchemy".[6] Nevertheless, Copleston set to work, made himself proficient in the subject, and lectured on it in his college for the next thirteen years. Oriel men, in fact, became notorious in Oxford for their dialectical ability, and it was said of the Oriel common

room that it "stank of Logic".[7] Whately maintained that Copleston was instrumental in bringing about a revival of interest in the study of logic,[8] and certainly Copleston championed the cause of that discipline both in his "Replies" to the Edinburgh Review and in his attack on Henry Kett's book Logic Made Easy.

Copleston's study of Aristotle and Aristotelian logic had a noticeable effect on his thinking. He accepted Aristotle's definition of man as a rational animal and believed that the most appropriate intellectual occupation of man, as man, was reasoning. Consequently, he stressed the importance of correct reasoning and saw great value in the study of logic: "To understand the theory of that which is the appropriate intellectual occupation of Man in general, and to learn to do that well, which everyone will and must do, whether well or ill, may surely be considered as an essential part of a liberal education".[9] This emphasis on correct reasoning and his training in logic account for the scholastic tone which is discernible in some of his arguments; for example, in his Enquiry, where he maintains the compatibility of God's foreknowledge and man's free-will, his argument hinging on the meaning of the word "certain". Indeed, despite his dislike of logomachies and his contempt for "the wire-drawn sophistries of schoolmen",[10] Copleston's concern for precision of language often give his own writings a scholastic feel, which Newman made fun of in his novel Loss and Gain.[11]

Another Aristotelian idea which found favour with Copleston was that of the "golden mean". Aristotle's dictate to avoid both excess and deficiency and to seek the mean encouraged Copleston to strive for moderation in all things and on opposing issues to follow a middle

path. Despite his early skirmishes with Henry Kett and John Coker, in which he was not afraid to make use of the weapon of sarcasm, Copleston gained during his university career a reputation for moderation and temperance.[12] This search for moderation and tendency to avoid extremes was obviously a natural characteristic in Copleston, but it was a characteristic which was reinforced by his reading of Aristotle. If it is true that there are but two classes of men, Aristotelians and Platonists, then Copleston was without doubt an Aristotelian.[13]

In the early part of the nineteenth century, however, it was not Aristotle and Plato who were being placed in opposition to one another, but Aristotle and Bacon. Tatham, for example, suggested that the study of Aristotelian logic at Oxford should be replaced with the study of Bacon's Novum Organum. Tatham and others portrayed Aristotelian logic as an out-dated system, which had been rendered obsolete by Baconian induction.[14] Copleston first challenged this view in The Examiner Examined, where he disputed "the confused notion, that Induction has superseded the use of Syllogism, or that they at all enter into competition with each other".[15] He returned to the subject again in his "Replies", in answer to Playfair's charge that Oxford mistook the infancy of science for its maturity. Copleston was of the opinion that "that contemptuous reproach....with which it has been fashion to assail the organum of Aristotle"[16] was due to a mistaken view of logic. This mistaken view was not confined to men such as Tatham, for whom Copleston had scant respect,[17] but was shared by the Scottish philosophers, Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart, with whom on other topics Copleston had a large measure of agreement.

Thomas Reid was the founder of what is known as the Scottish Common Sense school of philosophers.[18] Stewart was a follower of Reid, and a great deal of interest was taken in his writings in the early nineteenth century. Later, when the works of Kant and then Hegel became known in England, the Scottish philosophers lost their appeal. John Stuart Mill, as early as 1828, considered that the authority of the Scottish philosophers was on the decline, and Pattison in his Memoirs spoke of Stewart as "an author now obsolete".[19] But in the second decade of the century Stewart's works were widely read and went through a number of editions.[20]

Reid and Stewart were no great admirers of Aristotle. In the first volume of his Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind Stewart had made some derogatory remarks about Aristotelian logic and its inclusion in the university curriculum, and had wished to see it replaced with a "rational logic, a science of far more extensive utility....than the trifling art which is commonly dignified with that name".[21] Copleston objected to Stewart's use of the word "logic". Stewart's "rational logic" he described as "a strange phrase - something like Hume's Sceptical doubts".[22] Stewart seemed to Copleston to include within the sphere of logic "not only Dialectic, but the laws of investigation, the division and classification of the objects of human knowledge; in short, almost the whole province of the philosophy of the mind".[23] Copleston, then, attempted to eliminate such unrealistic expectations of logic and to confine it once more to its true purpose. "An Art", he argued, "must not be blamed for not teaching more than it professes to teach. The proper business of Logic is to make the agreement or the disagreement of two

given terms more evident than it was before".[24] Confined thus to its proper purpose, syllogism was in no way opposed to induction.

According to Copleston, induction and syllogistic logic occupied totally different spheres, induction being concerned with investigation, syllogism with reasoning. Copleston held that all reasoning was deductive and capable of being put into syllogistic form. In his Commonplace book he was critical of Stewart for making a distinction between mathematical reasoning and all other reasoning. While admitting that mathematics is "a science of pure reasoning", he said that "wherever reasoning enters into the other sciences it is of this kind", and that the difference between mathematics and other sciences is that, unlike mathematics, they consist also of investigation.[25] Induction, then, was the process of investigation, of examining experience, of bringing in particular instances, in order to derive the general principles from which reasoning proceeded.[26] Aristotle's Organon was concerned with the reasoning process alone, not with investigation, and therefore to criticise it for failing to add to our knowledge of nature was to misconceive its purpose:

> That treatise does not propose to investigate the nature of things and to assign the causes of phenomena. It merely enquires what the rules are which render a conclusion from certain propositions necessary and probable. It is in no way conversant about the physical truth of its principles but upon the logical or rational connections of those premisses with the conclusion.[27]

In the course of his "Replies" to the Edinburgh Review Copleston had occasion to mention Thomas Reid's analysis of Aristotle's Organon, which he considered defective and unfair to Aristotle. This, in turn, prompted Stewart to include a section on Aristotelian logic in the

second volume of his Elements, which was published in 1814. Stewart stated that his motive for this attack on Aristotle

> was a wish to counteract the effect of those triumphant panegyrics upon Aristotle's Organon, which of late have been pronounced by some writers, whose talents and learning justly add much weight to their literary opinions, and an anxiety to guard the rising generation against a waste of time and attention, upon a study so little fitted, in my judgement, to reward their labour.[28]

That Copleston was one of these writers is confirmed by a reference to Copleston's criticism of Reid and a quotation from Copleston's Second Reply.[29] Stewart maintained that Copleston's concession "'that discoveries in Natural Philosophy are not likely to be promoted by the engine of syllogism'....reduces the question about the utility of the Aristotelian logic within a very narrow compass". This chapter of Stewart's book J.W. Ward[30] described as "a direct attack upon the whole system", and he had hopes that Copleston would answer it by writing a paper on it for the Quarterly Review. Not that he himself had much time for logic. In fact, he admitted to Copleston that he inclined to the view of Stewart.[31] But Ward remained disappointed, and the defence of Aristotelian logic had to wait until the publication of Whately's Elements of Logic.

Apart from Aristotle, most of the writers who influenced Copleston's philosophical thinking were British. Judging from his Commonplace book his reading in the area of philosophy and theology (excluding the ancient philosophers) consisted mainly of British authors.[32] Copleston, in fact, was a typical example of English provincialism and he shared in the current English suspicion of French philosophy, which was considered to have contributed to the French

Revolution.[33] That second author, whom along with Aristotle Matthew Arnold named as Oxford's favourite philosophers, Bishop Butler, was highly regarded by Copleston. Copleston's debt to Butler is most obvious in his Enquiry, where he openly expresses his admiration[34] and where the very structure of the work is reminiscent of Butler's Analogy of Religion. Copleston's views on certainty and probability, too, show the influence of Butler. But Copleston was not blind to Butler's shortcomings. For example, he thought that Paley's arguments, rather than Butler's, were more effective against the atheist, but he considered Butler's "admirable" for combatting the objections of the Deist or for quietening "those uneasy surmises which spring up in active and inquiring minds".[35] Moreover, he agreed with Daniel Wilson, the future Bishop of Calcutta, that Butler had "fallen short of that view of Christianity which is most effectual in subduing the heart of man and training him for heaven". But, he went on,

> allowance may surely be made for the nature of his argument, which was principally to refute the infidel, and to bring men as willing disciples to the Gospel. The full development and powerful enforcement of Gospel truths is the constant business of our profession. He has not entered so largely into this office as might have been done - and yet, as it seems to me, he has gone as far as his undertaking required him to go.[36]

Pre-eminent among British philosophers was, of course, John Locke, and Copleston was clearly very familiar with his writings. Although Copleston had great respect for Locke and agreed with many of his arguments and conclusions, he certainly should not be counted an uncritical disciple of Locke. Perhaps Locke's dubious religious views (he was suspected of denying the Trinity) made Copleston wary of accepting his philosophical theories. In any case, Locke's theory of ideas had led to the idealism of Berkeley and the scepticism of Hume,

and this was enough to make a man such as Copleston cautious. Copleston, then, found fault with Locke and held that his doctrine of determinate ideas "whose agreement or disagreement we perceive, and without which, according to him, there is no knowledge" was "a gratuitous assumption which leads to a world of errors".[37] Copleston was impressed by the arguments of Locke's contemporary critic, John Sergeant, but he also agreed on the whole with the arguments of the Scottish Common Sense philosophers. This school of thought seemed to provide an alternative to the Lockean theory of knowledge and held out the hope of avoiding Hume's scepticism. Copleston, in fact, considered that Locke's doctrine of "ideas existing in the mind, distinct from the mind, and from things in themselves" was "a doctrine now generally exploded".[38]

Despite his disagreement with Stewart regarding Aristotelian logic, with regard to Locke and the theory of knowledge Copleston held many views in common with Stewart. Indeed, Copleston had a high opinion of Stewart, whose works he read eagerly as they appeared and with whom he exchanged books and greetings through their mutual friend, J.W. Ward. No doubt Copleston's high opinion of Stewart was a contributing factor to the popularity of the latter's writings at Oriel in the following years. One point on which Copleston and Stewart were unanimous in attacking Locke was the issue of innate ideas. In opposition to Locke's view Copleston wrote,

> Might not a principle be innate - such as 'that it is imposs. for the same thing to be and not to be', and yet the mind never have reflected upon it or have been conscious of

> it, until an occasion arises for using it? And then surely everyone presumes upon it, altho' he has never reduced it into words nor perhaps is capable of so doing.[38]

Copleston appears here to use the word "innate" in the sense in which it was accepted by Stewart in his Philosophical Essays. In his first Essay Stewart argued that the ideas of personal identity, causation, time, number, truth, certainty, probability are arrived at by intuitive judgments, and that all of them, "while they are manifestly peculiar to a rational mind, necessarily arise in human understanding when employed in the exercise of its different faculties".[40] Whether these ideas are to be called "innate" or not is, in Stewart's view, essentially an unimportant verbal question, although he did recognise the dangers of this terminology; for example, he did not countenance the supposition of "the existence of latent ideas in the mind, previous to the exercise of the senses (a supposition bordering nearly on the old Platonic scheme of the soul's reminiscence)".[41] Stewart argued that although the senses may furnish the first occasions on which the above ideas occur to the understanding, neither sensation nor reflection are the source of these ideas. In his consideration of topics such as time, probability, and causation, Copleston was generally more interested in pointing out the ambiguities of language and the nominalistic distinction between "words and things" than in hypothesizing on the source of these ideas, but the coincidences between the language he used and Stewart's suggest that he accepted Stewart's explanation. That he agreed with Stewart's theory of "fundamental laws of belief" is implied by the following entry in the Commonplace book:

> The principles of reasoning are certain intuitive axioms, which perhaps are never expressed in words or even reflected upon, but which we tacitly assume in every process of reasoning. "That the same thing cannot be and not be" is a principle universally implied in reasoning. It may therefore be called an "Innate Idea" - Again "That the laws of nature are fixed", is a principle universally assumed in all physical investigations. If either of these principles be denied or doubted, there can be no deduction.[42]

Despite Copleston's objections to Locke's theory of ideas, he did follow Locke (as, indeed, did the Scottish philosophers[43]) in considering that sense experience is the main source of knowledge. In other words, he accepted Locke, with the qualification that sensation and reflection are not the only sources of knowledge, but that certain intuitive principles must be acknowledged. Concerning sense experience, he found Berkeley's contention "that we have no knowledge by our senses but of our sensations only" "absurd and dogmatical",[44] and in his Commonplace book he listed among "demonstrable truths", "things of which we have the evidence of our senses".[45] This reference to "demonstrable truths" raises the question of the certainty rather than the source of knowledge, a question of particular importance in regard to religious knowledge or faith.

Copleston gave the following definition of knowledge:

> ....to know properly signifies only to judge a thing to be or not to be on sufficient grounds.
> Belief may be equally firm as an act of mind, but resting on inferior grounds.[46]

Knowledge, then, consists of truth, belief, and evidence, and the only thing which distinguishes knowledge from true belief is evidence. In the case of things of which we have the direct evidence of our senses, Copleston believed that the evidence is present and undeniable, and

therefore the knowledge certain.[47] The only other "demonstrable truths" are "mathematical theorems (which according to the definitions or hypotheses) are strictly so or those logical inferences which must be true if the terms are admitted".[48] These mathematical and logical truths, however, do not give us factual knowledge. In effect, they are true by definition. For all matters of fact, apart from those of which we have the direct evidence of our senses, the evidence includes not only sense experience but also inferences from that experience. In other words, it involves reasoning, reasoning which can be probable only, and thus in philosophical terms these facts are not certainties, but probabilities.[49] Copleston argued that,

> all reasoning is hypothetical - that is, it proceeds upon the assumption of certain principles. That reasoning is demonstrative which assumes only undeniable principles - all other reasoning is probable only - i.e. conclusive only in so far as the principles it assumes are just.[50]

The intuitive principles of reasoning constitute such "undeniable principles". But this is not much help in reasoning on matters of fact, for, as Stewart pointed out, these principles do not help us to enlarge our sphere of knowledge, being merely the links of the chain whereby our reasoning is conducted. Stewart, in fact, preferred to call them "fundamental laws of human belief", and said that they are not principles from which reasoning sets out - nothing is deduced from them - but rather "the necessary conditions on which each step of the deduction tacitly proceeds".[51]

From this it can be seen that Copleston considered the sphere of "demonstrable truths" to be very small. But this does not mean that he denied the name "knowledge" to all but "demonstrable" truths. To

"know" something meant to believe it "on sufficient grounds".[52] The probability of any given proposition could range anywhere on a continuum from the slightest possibility to "moral certainty". "Moral certainty" was the term commonly used in philosophical discussions to refer to things of which we can be certain but which cannot be proved demonstratively. "Moral certainty", then, was opposed to demonstrable truth. As Copleston explained it, "when the probability is of the highest degree we call it moral certainty - implying by that that there is no ground for doubt".[53] Although, in terms of philosophy, "moral certainty" is really only the highest degree of probability, for practical purposes it is equivalent to knowledge. Copleston believed that it was futile to be always looking for demonstrative proof of our knowledge, including religious knowledge, and he realised that we must often be satisfied with even less than "moral certainty". He agreed with Bishop Butler that probability is the guide to life.

Although Copleston was of the opinion that most of our reasoning must be probable, not demonstrative, this did not lead him to undervalue reason. On the contrary, one of the distinguishing characteristics of Copleston, and indeed of the Noetics in general, is the stress placed on correct reasoning. For if probability is the guide to life, then obviously reason is of fundamental importance in weighing the evidence and determining that probability. And if the estimation of probability is to be correct, then the reasoning must be correct. It was on this account that Copleston saw great value in

Aristotelian logic, for logic was an aid to right reasoning and helped guard against "sophistry and imposture".[54]

While Copleston and Dugald Stewart differed on the value of Aristotelian logic, concerning the importance of language for philosophy they were in complete agreement. The following quotation from Stewart Copleston copied twice into his Commonplace book:

> Perhaps the most valuable fruit of metaphysical researches is that scrupulous precision in the use of language, upon which, more than upon any one circumstance whatever, the [logical] accuracy of our reasonings, and the justness of our conclusions essentially depend.[55]

Copleston's interest in language is obvious both in his printed works and especially in his Commonplace book. If his volume on metaphysics had ever eventuated, no doubt it would have been largely concerned with the use of language and the mistakes caused by imprecision. Indeed, he expressed just such an intention in the Preface of his Enquiry. His Commonplace book contains numerous references to the ambiguous use of words leading to errors and logomachies. Even Locke, who realised the dangers of ambiguity and who observed "that the greatest part of disputes are logomachies", was in Copleston's opinion guilty of the equivocal use of words, and the errors of Berkeley and Hume could perhaps be traced to the same source. Many religious disputes, too, Copleston believed resulted from the loose use of language.[56]

In order to avoid such mistakes Copleston held that whenever close reasoning is attempted, we cannot be too scrupulous in the exact use of words. But this is no easy matter, as Copleston realised, for

words inevitably have more than one meaning and an equivocal use of words can easily escape detection. Nor did the answer to this problem lie in adopting for philosophy a language in which the terms were strictly defined and correct, or in defining the principal terms at the beginning of each philosophical treatise. Both procedures, besides being practically impossible, offended against Copleston's principle of moderation. Copleston's view concerning a strictly philosophical language (that is, one which would exclude common phrases such as "the sun rises" as being incorrect) was that, "As it would be inconvenient and even injurious to have two kinds of languages, one purely philosophical, and the other merely practical, language ought to be framed on the basis of a liberal compromise between contemplation and action".[57] Concerning definition, Copleston slightly modified an observation of Aristotle, and proposed as a golden rule of reasoning, "not to demand a greater precision in the use of a word than the particular argument in which it is used requires. As far as it is necessary to guard against equivocation, no care is too great, no distinction too refined". However, to demand precision where there was no danger of ambiguity or to take delight in exposing an insignificant looseness of phrase, was to subject oneself and others to the thraldom of arbitrary sounds. "Words", as Hobbes had wisely remarked, "are the counters of wise men, and the money of fools".[58]

Where equivocation was most likely to occur, Copleston thought, was in the use of familiar words commonly used in reasoning, whose ambiguity is easily overlooked due to their familiarity.

> It is then of great importance that we should be aware of the ambiguities to which the principal words employed in reasoning are liable - such as, reason, cause, truth, certainty, contingency, chance, argument, axiom, conclusion. Those words in short ought to be most attended to - in which the ambiguity is the most important - most likely to occur - and most apt to elude detection when it does occur.[59]

For this reason, Copleston paid great attention to words such as "reason" and "cause", "truth" and "reality", "certain" and "necessary", "probable" and "contingent". He believed that confusion arose in the use of these words because of the common tendency to employ one in place of the other: for example, to say "reason" when we mean "cause", or "truth" when we mean "reality". The Calvinistic interpretation of the doctrine of predestination, Copleston held, was the result of just such a confused use of language in regard to the terms "certain" and "necessary". Copleston maintained that the first word of each of the above pairs strictly speaking referred to words or propositions, the second to things or matters of fact. Thus "certain" and "probable" are applicable to propositions, but tell us nothing about reality; they are words "relative to the mind" and only improperly applied to the objects of our thoughts. We may be certain, but "our knowledge or conviction can have no influence on the nature of the thing".[60] This is an example of what Copleston considered a very prevalent error, that of mistaking words and things. It was partly for this reason that Copleston was wary of placing too much trust in definition:

> Definition should always be subservient to the argument, not pretend to controul it. It may correct our use of words, it cannot alter or influence the nature of the thing. The thing we are reasoning about is independent of our speech;

> it is, and ever will be, just the same, whether we argue about it or not.[61]

This distinction between words and things is one which Copleston made again and again. It was not, of course, a new distinction. Locke had pointed out that a "great abuse of Words is, the taking them for Things",[62] and, in fact, the opposition of "words" and "things" went back to the mediaeval controversy between the Nominalists and Realists. The distinction also appears to have been a familiar one in the early nineteenth century,[63] but nevertheless Copleston considered it an important point, the neglect of which had been and continued to be the cause of many unnecessary disputes, both philosophical and theological. Locke himself, despite his caution against it, was guilty of this very error in Copleston's view. He accused Locke of perpetually confounding "words with things, or definitions expressed in words with the truth denoted by them", and asserted that "Much of the reasoning in the 1st B. is disputable, because the Author does not distinguish enough betw. Words and things. He speaks of the understanding as a thing and not as an expedient which we employ in order to converse about mind...".[64]

Copleston, then, assumed a Nominalist position, as is shown by various entries in the Commonplace book. For example, under the heading of "Realism" he wrote, "All the questions concerning abstract truth, abstract justice, right, fitness, etc., are absurdly handled as if these abstract notions were realities". Concerning Belsham's[65] rejection of definitions of virtue which do not comprehend the virtue of God, Copleston exclaimed,

> How absurd and unphilosophical all this is! Right and wrong are no separate existences - they relate to man and human conduct. It is absurd to distinguish the acts of God in this manner. All that he does is right. But great authors are continually falling into a similar error. Thus Butler in a note to Chap.6 of the Analogy, p.161, talks of God perceiving "an abstract proposition to be true" as if words were anything but conventional symbols between men. Words in their own nature are merely impulses of air, or marks upon paper.[66]

Copleston's opinion of this is summed up succinctly in his observation that "This practice of measuring divine attributes and acts by a human standard is like regulating a dial by the town clock".

The distinction between words and things is useful for elucidating Copleston's attitude to Baconian and Aristotelian logic, and the contrast which he draws between investigating and reasoning. Baconian induction was a method of investigation and was concerned with things. Aristotelian deductive logic was a method of reasoning and was concerned with words. This is stated quite explicitly in the Papers belonging to the Commonplace book.

> In syllogistic reasoning the sole enquiry is concerning the truth and falsehood of a given proposition - and truth and falsehood are ideas which belong properly to language. The nature of things is quite a distinct object. A Syllogism does not import that the premises are the cause of the conclusion - but the reason why we may affirm the conclusion to be so.

Logic, indeed, was in Copleston's opinion an art of language, and in his Commonplace book we find the statement that "Logic is properly an art of language. It has nothing to do with reasoning except as expressed in words".[67] This may appear paradoxical, after what has been said about logic being an aid to correct reasoning, but Copleston is here merely emphasizing the importance of words.

Stewart, too, had emphasized the importance of words, but this had led him to despise syllogistic logic, for it assumed that the same word was always employed in the same sense, thus ignoring the most difficult part of the reasoning process, that is, determining the exact import of words. In support of this view Stewart quoted from Bacon:

> Syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, and words are the signs of notions; therefore, if our notions, the basis of all, are confined, and over-hastily taken from things, nothing that is built on them can be firm; whence our only hope rests upon genuine induction.[68]

Copleston quoted a similar passage from Bacon, but came to the conclusion that "this only shews the importance of words, not the inutility of syllogism".[69] In fact, Copleston thought that the syllogism was useful for preventing ambiguities caused by the loose use of words:

> Syllogism is the crucible in which we decompose words, and detect their ambiguity; which, when they are employed in composition with all the admitted looseness and irregularity of expression escapes the notice. Whenever such ambiguity is suspected in a principal term, the simple expedient is to construct a syllogism containing the term, and it will appear instantly whether any foreign admixture adheres to its true import.[70]

Thus, without denying Bacon's great contribution to scientific method, Copleston sought to uphold Aristotle's contribution to human reasoning. Aristotelian logic, he admitted, had been misused in the past. The scholastic philosophers had attempted to use it as a means of investigation, to gain new knowledge, a use for which it was not

fitted.[71] But confined once more to its proper role as "the grammar of reasoning by means of words",[72] it was useful for putting an end to philosophical and theological controversies.

Copleston, then, rather than placing Aristotle and Bacon in opposition as so many of his contemporaries were doing, tried to give due deference to both. The influence of Aristotle and Bacon can be discerned in the works of Copleston and the Noetics. That of Aristotle is perhaps the more obvious, due to Noetic emphasis on correct reasoning and the value of logic. But the Noetics were not impervious to the influence of Bacon. Although Copleston did not consider Bacon's Novum Organum a suitable text book for undergraduate studies[73] and championed the cause of Aristotle, he was careful to point out the limitations of logic and to affirm that new knowledge was to be sought by means of investigation, by the method of induction. Nor did Copleston limit the method of induction to the physical sciences. In some areas of human knowledge, in law, morality, and philosophy, for example, investigation was chiefly concerned with the meaning of words.[74] That this was also the case for theology was a conclusion hinted at by Copleston and explicitly drawn by later Noetics, particularly Hampden. The source of religious knowledge was the Bible, and therefore knowledge of God was to be gained by a close but cautious investigation of the meaning of the words of that book. This was the basis of that inductive theology made notorious by Hampden in the 'thirties.

Section 3. Religious Knowledge and the Role of Reason

Copleston's thinking on philosophical issues was related to his religious views in a number of ways. The most obvious connection between the two was his attitude to language. Just as many philosophical errors were to be attributed to an imprecise use of words, so too, Copleston thought, many theological debates were mere logomachies, or at least could be shown to be unnecessary by a closer attention to the meaning of words. In his Enquiry he applied this method to the current and long-standing theological controversy concerning free-will and predestination.

Predestination was the doctrine subscribed to by Calvinists. In the early nineteenth century it was a topic much debated, and in fact there existed within the Anglican church a Calvinistic controversy. Sermons, such as Daniel Wilson's sermon before the university in 1810, were analysed to see if they were Calvinistic or not, and praised or blamed accordingly. As Bishop Wilson's biographer stated: "Calvinism was then the battle-ground of the Church".[1] Even some Evangelicals were careful to disavow the name of Calvinist, for although in the minds of many non-Evangelical clergy and laymen, the names Calvinist and Evangelical (or Methodist) went together, they were by no means interchangeable terms.[2] The prominent Cambridge Evangelical, Charles Simeon, realised that the Calvinism of some Evangelicals brought all under suspicion. In 1822, when a number of Irish clergymen, including the Archbishop, withdrew from the British and Foreign Bible Society, he wrote; "The bugbear on their mind is Calvinism, by which term they designate all vital religion". For himself, he declared, "though strongly Calvinistic in some respects, I

am as strongly Arminian in others. I am free from all trammels of human systems". Though friendly towards Calvinism, he felt it necessary to deliver a blow at Calvinism "as an exclusive system", in a note to the sermon he preached in Ireland and at Cambridge in that year.[3]

Calvinists, for their part, claimed that they alone were "true Churchmen", because they accepted the thirty-nine articles of the Anglican church in the true, Calvinistic sense. At the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, this was an embarrassing charge which was taken seriously, for it was a time of increased attention to doctrines and articles in reaction to the free-thinking of previous decades.[4] The apparently Calvinistic nature of the articles, especially of the seventeenth on predestination and election, caused problems for non-Calvinists. Thus, we find the Bampton lecturer for 1804 attempting to refute the claim that the articles were Calvinistic.[5] Besides denying that the articles were Calvinistic, the orthodox clergy brought counter-charges against the Calvinists. The doctrine of predestination, it was said, and the concentration on faith rather than works, led to antinomianism, a charge which can be found voiced in the spate of sermons on faith and works delivered in the early nineteenth century. But Calvinism was also said to constitute a threat to political peace and the establishment. The Calvinists were denominated Puritans, and people were reminded that the Puritans of the seventeenth century had brought about civil war.[6]

Copleston was not so extravagant in his criticisms of the Calvinists, and in fact he admitted that many of them were "lively

patterns not only of piety but of moral virtue".[7] In the Enquiry, although he did make reference to the supposed antinomian tendency of Calvinism, he concentrated rather on refuting their tenets by means of philosophical argument, looking in particular at the meanings of terms commonly employed in connection with the doctrine of predestination. He discussed words such as "certain", "contingent", "probable", "possible" and "impossible", and argued that although God is "certain" of future events, that is, he knows what is to come, this fact does not make those events "certain", in the sense of fore-ordained or necessary. The latter sense, in Copleston's opinion, was a misuse of the word "certain", which is a term relative to the mind and incorrectly applied to events.[8] Thus, although man's free-will and God's foreknowledge appear incompatible, they are not in fact contradictory, and Copleston declared that the difficulty lies "not in the things, but in the notions we form, or in the words by which we express them" and that "most of the speculative difficulties which perplex people's minds, about divine prescience, providence, free-will, and the origin of evil, turn out to be disputes concerning the signification of words".[9]

This ingenious solution to the Calvinistic controversy must have convinced some readers, for Copleston's Enquiry received a number of favourable reviews, and was even credited, by a former critic of Copleston, with helping to overcome personal doubts on the subject of free-will.[10] It would certainly have been acceptable to those who wished to hold on to orthodox beliefs, but who were plagued by doubts

that they were irrational, for Copleston's argument seemed to relieve them of that suspicion. However, it did not pretend to resolve all difficulties concerning the doctrines of free-will and God's providence, to make the two completely compatible, and, indeed, it relied for such force as it had on the assumption that some religious truths were incomprehensible to human reason. Those who were not inclined to accept this assumption were unlikely to be convinced by Copleston's solution of the problem. Even some of those who did accept this assumption were not impressed by this sort of argument,[11] and one cannot help agreeing that Copleston resorted too often to the charge of misuse of language and was too optimistic in hoping that precision of language would eliminate many religious differences. Newman satirized this view in his novel Loss and Gain, in his description of a sermon by Dr. Brownside:

> He said that the most celebrated questions in religion were but verbal ones; that the disputants did not know their own meaning, or that of their opponents, and that a spice of good logic would have put an end to discussions, which had troubled the world of centuries, - would have prevented many a bloody war, many a fierce anathema, many a savage execution, and many a ponderous folio.[12]

Apart from the subject of language, there were other areas where Copleston's philosophical views were relevant to his religious views. As we have seen, Copleston accepted that much of our knowledge is derived from sense experience. When we turn to religious knowledge, however, it would appear that a sense experience is not sufficient. While not denying the importance of nature as a source of religious knowledge, Copleston did not consider that the knowledge it provided was adequate by itself. This had been the thesis of the Deists and Copleston was no Deist. Copleston fervently believed that the most

important source of religious knowledge was the Bible. In the Bible were revealed many things which human reason, starting from sense experience, could not hope to discover, for example, mysteries such as the Atonement and the doctrine of the Trinity. There still remained, of course, the question of how we know that the Bible is a revelation from God. For an answer to this question, Copleston thought, we have to rely on human reason to weigh up the evidence for and against, and as with all questions of fact, we cannot expect demonstrative proof. But the evidence for its probability could be such as to amount to moral certainty, and it was on this account that the Noetics, especially Whately, stressed the importance of the evidences of Christianity, for if the authenticity of the Bible were suspect, then the very basis of their theology would be shaken. It was not enough to rely on emotion, for this could not provide knowledge. Knowledge comprised truth, belief, and evidence. If we based our belief on emotion rather than evidence, then at best we could arrive at true belief, at worst superstition.

Although reason was thus important for arriving at religious knowledge, it also had its limitations. There were bounds beyond which it could not go. If the Bible were divinely inspired, then what was revealed in it constituted sure knowledge. Human reason should not question what was clearly revealed in the Bible, for reasoning depended on language, and language, formed as it was with reference to human experience, was an imperfect instrument for scanning the ways of God.[13] In fact, Copleston maintained that the language of the Bible itself did not reveal God "as he is absolutely in himself, but relatively to ourselves - and that the terms employed are such as

clearly to indicate not his nature and essence, but the duties which belong to us arising out of that relation".[14] Biblical language, then, when discussing the nature and attributes of God, was analogical, and consequently we should be wary of attempting to draw logical conclusions from it. Not that Copleston objected to reasoning by analogy. His high opinion of Butler's Analogy of Religion would be sufficient to disprove that charge, if it were not already disproved by his own use of analogical reasoning in the Enquiry. What he did object to, however, was the confusion of analogy and identity, and the attempt to draw demonstrative conclusions instead of analogical ones. "It is of the essence of an argument from analogy to be probable only, and not demonstrative".[15] Copleston held that it was a great mistake to try to erect systems of theology based on a literal interpretation of Scripture. Scripture language, he argued, was sometimes literal, sometimes figurative, but always concerned more with our edification than with philosophical truth, and his advice to all was

> to shun all atempts at being wise above what is written, and in the interpretation of what is written, to be humble and cautious; never boldly affirming what is not plainly revealed, and always bearing in mind, that the words which speak of heavenly things, borrowed as they are from things on earth, must, by their very nature, be imperfect expressions, quite sufficient indeed, for our instruction and edification, to raise our hopes, to purify our hearts, to increase our faith in Christ, and our zeal for his service, but not capable of making us see invisible things more clearly than before, and certainly not designed that we should build systems of reasoning upon them.[16]

Copleston's view of the limitations of reason in matters of religion has some parallels with his thoughts on the limitations of logic. He had a high opinion of the usefulness of both, provided that

they did not stray outside their rightful spheres. Logic was an aid to reasoning, but did not help in investigation and the discovery of new knowledge. Similarly, reason certainly should not be ignored in religion, but it should not be looked to as the way to religious knowledge. The Bible was the source of religious knowledge, and just as the scientist studied nature by the method of induction in order to gain scientific knowledge, so too should the Bible be studied in order to gain religious knowledge. Copleston did not actually use the term "inductive theology", although he did note in the Papers belonging to the Commonplace book that "Warburton declares that the study of Religious truth is like that of Natural - to be pursued by Induction, and likely to lead to new discoveries". Although Copleston denied in his first Reply that any new discoveries could be made in religion, he was there referring to the discovery of things not contained in Revelation and was not commenting on the method of studying Revelation itself.[17] That Copleston did consider that Revelation should be studied as a scientist studies nature is shown by his numerous criticisms of attempts to deduce systems of theology from single texts and his admonitions to study the whole of the Bible, comparing texts, considering context, and confining attention to "Does God command this?" rather than "why".

Concerning the role of reason in religion Copleston in effect adopted the traditional distinction of above, according to, and contrary to reason, a distinction which Locke accepted and outlined in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke summarized this theory as follows:

> 1. *According to Reason* are such Propositions, whose Truth we can discover, by examining and tracing those *Ideas* we have from *Sensation* and *Reflexion*, and by natural deductions, find to be true, or probable. 2. *Above Reason* are such Propositions, whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles. 3. *Contrary to Reason* are such Propositions, as are inconsistent with, or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct *Ideas*.[18]

As to the third point, Locke and Copleston both thought that a true religion could not be contrary to reason, for reason itself was a God-given attribute. This view led Locke to the conclusion that "*no Proposition can be received for Divine Revelation*, or obtain the Assent due to all such, *if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive Knowledge*".[19] An example of such clear intuitive knowledge given by Locke is that the same body cannot be in two places at once. This could be interpreted, and indeed was interpreted by some, as calling into doubt the doctrine of the Trinity.[20] This intuitive knowledge, which was simply the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, Locke argued was more certain than our knowledge that any revelation actually came from God, or that we understood it correctly. Thus Locke concluded that

> *Faith* can never convince us of any Thing, that contradicts our Knowledge. Because though *Faith* be founded on the Testimony of GOD (who cannot lye) revealing any Proposition to us: yet we cannot have an assurance of the Truth of its being a divine Revelation, greater than our own Knowledge.[21]

If this entailed the rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity, then Copleston obviously did not accept Locke's conclusion, but how was he able to avoid the force of the argument? In the absence of a philosophical treatise setting out his theory of knowledge, it is difficult to be sure. Perhaps he felt entitled to reject the

conclusion because he rejected the premisses on which it was built. As we have seen, Copleston was critical of Locke's theory of ideas and did not accept that knowledge consisted of perceiving the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Moreover, he held that Locke's use of words such as "idea", "probable" and "certain" was vague and equivocal, and he asked, "Can we expect consistent reasoning when all these significations are admitted in the use of the principal terms?"[22] But perhaps Copleston did not reject Locke's conclusion, but rather denied that the doctrine of the Trinity was contradictory to our intuitive knowledge.

Copleston's argument, as gathered from various statements in his writings, would seem to be that the probability that the Bible is a revelation from God is high, as is the probability that the doctrine of the Trinity is contained in the Bible. However, the probability that this doctrine is contrary to reason is not high, because, due to the imperfection of human reason, it is very likely that we do not understand it correctly. In other words, the probability that the doctrine is revealed by God, and thus true, is greater than the probability that it contradicts reason, and therefore we should accept it on the authority of the Bible.[23] Speaking more generally, Copleston held that anything in the Christian religion which appeared contrary to reason, was not really so, but only appeared contrary to reason because of our imperfect knowledge. In the day of judgment all would become clear. The Enquiry was in part an attempt to show this in relation to the doctrines of God's providence and man's free-will. Copleston argued that both were found in the Bible, and he admitted that they appeared incompatible. On the other hand, these doctrines

were also to be found in natural religion, where they were each separately established. The doctrines were not in fact contradictory (this view being due to a misuse of language), and thus belief in them was not contrary to reason. How both doctrines could be true was beyond the reach of human understanding. They were not contrary to reason, although their combination was above reason.

It could well be argued that this is mere sophistry, an attempt to rationalize the irrational. If a true religion could not be contrary to reason, then a religion which contained doctrines which were contrary to reason ought to be rejected, or at least those doctrines should be rejected. Indeed, Bishop Butler had allowed that clear contradictions in a supposed revelation would prove it false.[24] The Unitarians held that the doctrine of the Trinity was self-contradictory, and on that ground, although not rejecting the whole revelation, refused to accept that doctrine. But Copleston's position would seem to allow one to justify any belief, however unreasonable, for it could always be said that our understanding is incomplete, that human reason is imperfect, and that therefore we must accept what <u>seems</u> unreasonable, on the authority of the Bible. In effect, then, it becomes impossible to prove the falsity of a supposed revelation by exposing contradictions in its doctrines, and the proof comes down solely to the strength of the evidences, which thus become all-important, as Bishop Butler believed.[25] As far as Copleston himself was concerned, this position was mitigated by his insistence on toleration and a certain latitude of interpretation, and also by the emphasis which he elsewhere placed on the importance of reason, but nevertheless it left the way open for others to ignore reason and

to accept any doctrine, however unreasonable, so long as they were convinced that it was Bible teaching, by the simple expedient of placing such matters in the realm of "above reason" rather than "contrary to reason", and declaring that in the day of judgment all would become clear.

Copleston, then, placed the mysteries of religion, such as the doctrines of the Trinity and the Atonement, in the category of "above reason". In this he appears to go further than Locke, who had limited his examples of this category to such things as the existence of angels and the resurrection of the dead (a limitation which aroused suspicious as to his orthodoxy). Similarly, Copleston included problems such as the existence of evil in the world, and the questions of eschatology, for, as Locke said, they are "beyond the discovery of our natural faculties".[26] Copleston's attitude to all beliefs which he considered above reason was that, as reason cannot explain them, our only resource is to turn to the Bible. Where Revelation is clear on these points, we must accept without questioning. Where Revelation is incomplete, we must be content with what <u>is</u> revealed and not try to systematize Revelation. We must accept with simplicity and submission, and not be "wise above what is written". Copleston was continually emphasizing that the purpose of the Bible is spiritual, not intellectual - it aims at our edification, not at increase of knowledge. This point of view he expressed in his sermon, "The Lord's Long-Suffering":

> ...that the improvement of the heart, not of the understanding; that spiritual instruction, not the increase of natural knowledge, nor the improvement of civil society, is the peculiar object of the Bible; and that even the knowledge of heavenly things is no further revealed to us than as it may serve to our edification; to the making us fit for the enjoyment of that inheritance to which we are called by our Redeemer.
>
> It is then, the part of true wisdom, not to endeavour to penetrate into the mysteries of the invisible world (for our present faculties are not designed for such objects, and are probably incapable of comprehending them), but to draw from every part of Revelation, as well as from every dispensation of Providence, some lesson of profit to ourselves; something that shall direct and regulate our own lives, correct our errors, elevate our desires, increase our faith, enliven our devotion, mend our hearts and affections, and guard us against temptations.[27]

This conception of the purpose of the Gospel, combined with his conviction of the imperfection of language, was the reason for Copleston's criticism of those religious denominations or parties, such as the Roman Catholics and Calvinists, which seemed to him to depart from the Gospel simplicity and to attempt to be "wise above what is written". Copleston urged the folly of trying to force Scripture language into the confines of a systematic theology and insisting with excessive rigour on certain dogmatic interpretations, for he was convinced that it was "unbecoming in any man to prescribe more exact limitations to the revealed truth than the clear and uniform unequivocal language of Scripture warrants".[28] Copleston's stand is nowhere better summarized than in the following passage from his Enquiry:

> Let us keep to Scripture: and Scripture so understood will never lead us beyond our depth. It is only by going out of Scripture, by building theories of our own upon subjects of which we must have an imperfect knowledge, that such apparent contradictions are produced. If we set up these

> notions of our own as the standard of faith, and require a peremptory assent to all the inferences which appear to flow from them, we quit the true, the revealed God, and betake ourselves to the idols of our own brain....to attempt to know God otherwise than as revealed in Scripture, is a vain, a fruitless, a dangerous undertaking. The words of that blessed martyr [Ridley] before quoted, cannot be too firmly engraven in the bosom of every Christian. "In these matters I am so fearful, that I dare not speak farther, yea almost none otherwise, than the text doth, as it were, lead me by the hand".[29]

This attitude to the Bible was one that found favour in Evangelical circles. J.B. Sumner, for example, the future archbishop of Canterbury, preached the same lesson in his book Apostolical Preaching (published in 1815), a book which understandably was highly regarded by the Noetics. Copleston referred approvingly to it in his Enquiry, and it was recommended to Newman by Edward Hawkins.[30] Like Copleston's Enquiry, it was aimed against Calvinism. "My attention", Sumner wrote in the preface to the ninth edition, "had then been accidentally directed towards a high tone of strictly Calvinistic preaching, which soon afterwards led to a partial secession from our Church, with whose tenets it was justly felt to be incompatible".[31] Similarly, Charles Simeon objected to systematic theology. He was impressed by Copleston's Enquiry and agreed with him that "The learned have thought only of theories and systems of their own, instead of considering scripture as written for the practical use of man". He praised Copleston for the "simplicity" with which he embraced divine truth and for his willingness to be led by the word of the Bible.[32]

However, Copleston's position is not without problems. It is not so much that the text of the Bible has led different people in different directions. Copleston was fully aware of this, and he argued that where an interpretation of a text is doubtful, or where it

is rendered doubtful by some other text, then that interpretation must not be asserted dogmatically, but the possibility of alternative interpretations must be allowed. Thus Copleston guarded against unwarranted dogmatism. The problem is, rather, to determine when dogmatism is warranted. Does Copleston's position in fact allow any doctrines to be established beyond doubt? Is he reduced, like Locke, to insisting merely on the fundamental belief that Christ is the Messiah? This was the basis of E.W. Grinfield's criticism of Copleston, as it was later to be the Tractarians' criticism of Hampden. Grinfield's pamphlet, Vindiciae Analogicae, appeared after the publication of Copleston's Enquiry, and it accused Copleston of throwing open "the flood-gates of doubt and scepticism" by undervaluing the role of reason and the importance of natural religion. Grinfield felt that religion had more to fear from scepticism than dogmatism, and he maintained that a sceptical spirit, "under the garb of humility" pervaded the Enquiry.[33] What Grinfield particularly objected to were Copleston's observations on analogical reasoning. Grinfield pointed out that "in philosophical language probability is not opposed to certainty but to mathematical proof", and he accused Copleston of confusing probability and doubt: "You are always arguing as if doubt and uncertainty were essential to all matters of analogical reasoning".[34] That Copleston was quite aware of the distinction between probability and doubt has already been shown. He held that probability could amount to moral certainty. That he did not object to analogical reasoning, but merely the abuse of it, has likewise been pointed out above. But is it true that an aura of doubt pervades Copleston's writings?

Although he warned against dogmatism and held that certain mysteries could not be comprehended by human understanding, he was personally convinced that many religious beliefs could be proved beyond reasonable doubt, that is, that they amounted to moral certainties or knowledge; for example, the existence of God, the truth of the Christian Revelation, the Resurrection, the miracles, the inspiration of the Bible, and also, because based on the authority of the Bible, the Christian mysteries such as the Atonement and the Trinity.[35] The most problematical area, as far as Copleston was concerned, was that of those Christian doctrines which were above reason and whose sole proof was derived from the Bible, the doctrine of the Trinity being the prime example. Copleston believed that we are only justified in insisting on these if they are verified by the "clear and uniform unequivocal language of Scripture". However, he himself pointed out the ambiguities which language was likely to lead to, and stated that "it is in Holy Scripture, as in all other compositions, that language is found to be a variable and imperfect medium".[36] It is for this reason that he emphasized that the language of Scripture on these points must be uniform. To ascertain this fact involves the comparison of texts and consideration of context - in other words, the use of reason. Reason, then, must be employed in order to prove the existence of doctrines which are above reason. Although this seems paradoxical, it is not actually illogical, as reason is not used to prove the truth of doctrines which are above reason, but merely to prove that such doctrines are actually stated in the Bible. This is paralleled by the view that evidence is necessary to prove the authenticity of the Bible, but once proved, the revelation contained in it must be accepted implicitly. That is,

reason establishes the authenticity of the Bible but must not question its contents.[37] This line of argument allowed Copleston to rest assured in his own mind that his faith was reasonable, but it was a rather unconvincing attempt to draw a line beyond which reason ought not to go. Reason could go just so far, but no further. For Copleston, reason was properly employed when engaged in historical or textual criticism in relation to the Bible, but over-reached itself if it attempted to sit in judgment over the doctrines of Revelation.

Whether or not Copleston's argument was convincing, and many did find it convincing, his position had a major difficulty. Were there, in fact, any doctrines which were established by clear, unequivocal, uniform language? Copleston felt entitled to assert the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, and yet the Unitarians did not consider that the divinity of Christ was proved by the Scriptures. On the other hand, the Roman Catholics considered the doctrine of transubstantiation to be scriptural, a claim which Copleston rejected. Obviously, unanimity could not be relied on as the test of which doctrines were scriptural, and if this were so, how could it be maintained that Scripture language was unequivocal? Were there, indeed, any doctrines which could with safety be insisted upon? Thus there appears to be some justification for Grinfield's accusation that Copleston's views led to doubt and uncertainty. Not that Copleston himself experienced doubts concerning doctrines such as the Trinity and Atonement, but his position could lead to doubt. Copleston himself could not see this. Despite his emphasis on the limitations of language, he did believe that there were clear and unequivocal passages in Scripture which established the Christian doctrines, and

when others differed from himself in their interpretation of such passages, he was inclined to attribute this to some fault in the individuals concerned. Either they were guilty of false reasoning, or blinded by an allegiance to a dictatorial church (that is, the Roman Catholic church), or, as in the case of the rationalist, their denial of what Copleston considered the obvious sense of Scripture was due to "the pride of human reason", which was humbled by being asked to accept doctrines it could not comprehend. This was the error of rationalists such as the Unitarians. Copleston warned against the folly and danger of

> submitting the revealed will of God to our own judgments of what is rational or probable; rejecting some parts and explaining away others (such as the doctrine of the Trinity, of the Atonement, of the agency of evil spirits), because we cannot reconcile them to our own notions and prepossessions, and to those previous opinions men have commonly formed of the nature of God's government, and the perfection of his attributes.[38]

That revealed truths which are "above reason" must be accepted unquestioningly and not added to or systematized if only partially revealed, is a recurrent theme in Copleston's writings. Copleston did not see this as a denial of the importance of reason but rather as an attempt to prevent reason from over-reaching itself.[39] Although there was an anti-rationalist element in Copleston's thinking, seen in his desire to confine reason within definite limits, this was balanced by a rationalist element. Copleston was convinced of the importance of reason, and consequently for Copleston the sphere of "according to reason" was a large one. The intellectual powers, Copleston held, "were given to us by the Almighty as a talent to be improved in his

service".[40] One of his accusations against "enthusiasts" such as the Methodists was that they undervalued reason. It was a sign of the "enthusiast", he thought, to "reject with scorn or with suspicion all the auxiliaries of human reason and human learning, as something hostile and incongruous with true religion". Copleston, on the contrary, approved of efforts to show the reasonableness of Christianity, to remove difficulties, to offer explanations of things "hard to be understood", and to point out the evidences of Christianity".[41] It was quite proper, too, to apply reason to the interpretation of Scripture, as long as the cautions against questioning unambiguous revelations and systematizing Scripture language were kept in mind. The Scriptures often admit of various interpretations, and clearly some were better, or more probable than others. He objected, for example, to the scriptural interpretations of the Hutchinsonians. They were led, he thought, by that common human failing, a liking for the mystical and marvellous,[42] to an over-use of type or allegory. Although Copleston did not completely dismiss all allegorical interpretations, he was of the opinion that "what is called spiritualizing Scripture is in general an erroneous and fanciful interpretation of the plain narrative", and he deprecated "the mystical folly and delusion" of those who tried to give a spiritual significance to every object mentioned in Scripture.[43] This practice tended "to corrupt the simplicity of gospel truth, to convert religion into a species of romance, and in place of sober and sincere devotion to substantiate the reveries of enthusiasm".[44]

Gospel simplicity was also corrupted by the Roman Catholics and the Calvinists, in the opinion of Copleston, and he believed that

these corruptions were often based on a misinterpretation of Scripture. For example, Copleston argued that the Roman Catholic interpretation of the text "upon this rock I will build my Church", from which they deduced the supremacy of the Pope, was unreasonable and improbable.[45] The mistake of the Calvinist was not so much misinterpretation of single texts, as deducing more from them than was warranted, and failing to take account of other texts which qualified their view. Thus the Calvinists exhibited what Copleston believed to be another distinguishing characteristic of the "enthusiast"; that is, they failed to teach the whole Gospel message, but concentrated on a few points or emphasized one doctrine (God's providence) at the expense of another (man's free-will). Similarly, the Methodists tended to stress the need for conversion and for feeling oneself to be in a state of grace. All such narrow and one-sided teaching Copleston judged to be "quackery", and dangerous, because it put a stumbling-block in a brother's way and caused divisions in the church.[46] The way to avoid such "quackery" and "enthusiasm" was by the application of reason to the text of the Bible. Reason must decide the most probable meaning of Scripture passages by studying the whole of the Bible, comparing texts, considering context, and taking into account the changing nature and imperfections of language.[47] Some of Copleston's sermons provide examples of this method,[48] although in general he was more concerned with laying down the principles to be followed in the study of the Bible and with pointing out the practical lessons to be learnt from various texts, than with expounding interpretations and furthering Biblical criticism.

It is interesting here to notice in passing Copleston's attitude to Biblical criticism and scientific research. As can be inferred from the above, history was important in Copleston's view both for the interpretation of Scripture and for the proof of Revelation. Interpretation was facilitated by a knowledge of historical context and of the ancient languages and the changing meanings of words. The proof of Revelation relied on the historical evidence of the miracles.[49] Logically, then, Copleston could not object to any historical research which impinged on religion, whether that research were strictly historical, such as on the date of the Gospels, or scientific, on the age of the world. Nor did he. Geological studies were at that time attracting much attention, and many religious people viewed them with suspicion because the conclusions reached often conflicted with the Biblical account of the age of the world or the universal flood. Copleston, however, being convinced of the authenticity of the Bible, did not consider that it had anything to fear from science, and he approved of the work of the Oxford geologist William Buckland.[50] This confidence was due to the fact that Copleston held less strict views on the inspiration of the Bible than many of his contemporaries. He did not hold the position of the plenary inspiration of the Bible. He believed in the universal flood, but did not insist on the seven "days" of creation. If geology disproved the latter, Copleston did not think that this would disprove the Christian religion, even though his own opinion of the thoery of an infinite series of centuries was that "Nothing but scepticism could venture to make so large a demand upon human credulity". Conversely, concerning the former, he believed that it was unphilosophical, when trying to explain the history of the world, to ignore the evidence of

written records which profess to describe that history. He did, indeed, qualify this by saying "that to assume these records to be infallible, and above all criticism, is to prejudge the question, and to supersede all inquiry".[51] In keeping with this view, Copleston nowhere proscribed research into the authenticity or date of the Gospels, or other Biblical studies. In fact, he stated explicitly that

> There cannot be a fitter subject even of literary study to a Christian, than the sacred history, in its most minute particulars. Whatever is connected with it, whatever can tend to make us better acquainted with the times, the persons, the places, which are the groundwork of that wonderful dispensation, must impart a livelier conception, as well as a more distinct and habitual remembrance, of the divine economy.[52]

Copleston's assertion that the Bible must not be considered above all criticism is somewhat surprising when put alongside his admonitions against subjecting the Gospel message to the judgments of human reason. In his acceptance of a doctrine such as the Trinity on the sole authority of the Bible does he not assume the Bible to be infallible and above criticism? This discrepancy Copleston was able to explain away by means of his views on the purpose of the Bible and the nature of language. The purpose of the Bible, he argued, is moral and spiritual edification, not the teaching of scientific facts or philosophical theories. The language of the Bible is relative to us, meant to teach us our duty to God and man, and accordingly not necessarily philosophically correct. "Even the inspired language is adapted to our ordinary conceptions, not to the reality of things".[53] Therefore Scripture language concerning the creation of the world could well be figurative, and so the discoveries of geology in no way contradict the Bible.

However, does not this apply equally well to the doctrine of the Trinity? Is this not a philosophical theory? Copleston disapproved of attempts to deduce philosophical systems from Bible language. But could it not be argued that the doctrine of the Trinity is part of just such a philosophical system? Could it not be that Biblical references to the three persons of God are merely figurative, and therefore, on Copleston's own principles, should not be interpreted too strictly; that, in fact, they should be rejected if found contrary to reason, just as the seven days of creation could be discounted of contrary to the findings of geology? In the 'thirties Newman argued that this was indeed the tendency of Noetic teaching. Copleston's only means of avoiding this conclusion was the distinction of above, according to, and contrary to reason. The age of the world was a physical fact, concerning which the evidence of geology was relevant, and thus it came within the province of reason. Concerning the doctrine of the Trinity, however, there was no physical evidence by which it could be proved or disproved, and therefore it was above reason. Being above reason, we could not hope to comprehend it fully, but we were not on this account justified in rejecting it, for this would mean rejecting the only evidence that we have for religious truths which are above reason, that is, the Bible. There is an appearance of circularity in this argument, inasmuch as the Bible is used to establish the truth of something revealed in the Bible. But it is an appearance only, for Copleston, following Locke, held that the authenticity of the Bible revelation was proved on independent grounds, and if a true revelation, then, on the assumption that God does not lie, its contents must be true. Nevertheless, the argument is not really convincing, because it is too easy an answer to place

doctrines such as the Trinity into the category of "above reason" and thereby end the discussion. Nor does the argument, even if accepted, solve the problem, for it still does not help us to determine when the Bible language is to be taken in a figurative or a literal sense.

Despite his approval of Biblical studies and despite the reputation which Oriel, under Copleston, gained for free thought, Copleston was no different from the majority of his contemporaries in his suspicion of German Biblical research, which he thought was undertaken in a spirit of rationalism. There is no evidence that Copleston had any first-hand knowledge of German studies, apart from reading Thirlwall's introduction to Schleiermacher's St. Luke.[54] Judging from the books mentioned in the Commonplace book, it would seem highly unlikely that Copleston could read German, and thus his opinion of German theology was probably formed on the basis of English criticisms, such as Hugh J. Rose's famous lectures at Cambridge.[55] He had apparently read a criticism of Strauss's Life of Jesus and was impressed by its arguments against Strauss.[56] Copleston, then, shared in the prevalent English suspicions of German Rationalism, which, he said, was another name for infidelity.

This suspicion of German Rationalism is an example of one of the two opposing tendencies which can be discerned in Copleston's thinking. On the one hand, Copleston's writings exhibit a distrust of reason, a fear that reason, if left completely unrestrained, would lead to one of two opposite extremes; either to the rejection of religious beliefs and doctrines, or else to dogmatism and systematic or scholastic theology. Therefore, Copleston stressed the limits

beyond which reason should not go. On the other hand, Copleston, brought up as he was in the Aristotelian tradition, had a great respect for reason and had an eighteenth century contempt for the "enthusiast" and the fanatic. He did not deny that feelings had a place in religion, but they were to be kept under control. Religious faith must be rational, not "enthusiastic". In Copleston's works there is an uneasy balance between these two tendencies. He was able to justify this balance in his own mind by maintaining that he did not deny the importance of reason, but only warned against its abuse, and that although there were mysteries which were "above reason", yet the sphere of "according to reason" was a large one, which offered men ample opportunities to exercise their God-given gift. Nevertheless, in his attitude to reason there remains a tension which is felt in his writings.

Section 4. Moderation and the "Via Media"

It is not only in Copleston's attitude to reason that a tension between opposites is discernible. In his Aristotelian avoidance of extremes, Copleston found himself taking up a middle position on many issues. The middle position appealed to Copleston, because it enabled him to avoid the errors of extreme views, to acknowledge their good points, and generally to see himself as a man of moderation. Even moderation itself was a mean between dogmatism and indifference.

Copleston's denunciation of dogmatism and plea for moderation, however, were not simply owing to temperamental characteristics, but were based also on philosophical and religious grounds. Philosophically, dogmatism was only justified concerning those doctrines which were clearly revealed in the Bible. These amounted to moral certainties. (Logically, even these truths could not be proved demonstratively, because they depended on the assumption of the authenticity of the Bible, an assumption which must be proved by considering the evidence in favour of its probability, and a probable premiss cannot give a demonstrative conclusion). Where the Bible was less clear, however, the probability of our interpretations being correct was consequently lowered, and thus they should not be insisted on too rigorously. The Bible too, Copleston maintained, taught the same lesson. Romans, chapter 14, verse 13, states: "Let us not therefore judge one another any more: but judge this rather, that no man put a stumbling-block or an occasion to fall in his brother's way". Unnecessary dogmatism, Copleston thought, constituted a stumbling-block. He used this verse as the text for a sermon in which he expounded his views on moderation. In this sermon he wrote,

> When, therefore, a latitude and variety of meaning is unquestionable, and when according to one sense the conscience of a brother is offended, and according to another his mind is comforted and his faith strengthened, it is not least presumptuous in us to decide with peremptory rigour, and to deny to him the benefits of the Gospel, or to disturb his peace because he accepts a signification varying in degree or in some slight circumstance, from our own.[1]

The main motivation behind this emphasis on moderation, other than Copleston's own natural inclination, was the abatement of party-spirit. The temper of the times seemed to Copleston to require that the Bible exhortation to unity should be firmly restated, and Copleston considered that one of the main threats to church unity was party-spirit. It created divisions within the church, such as High Church and Evangelical, and was one of the causes of Dissent and Dissenters' hostility to the established church.[2] The division between Evangelical and other Anglicans was of particular concern in the early nineteenth century. Dismissed by non-Evangelicals as incurably "enthusiastic", Evangelicals countered with the implied claim that they alone had a monopoly of "true" Christianity. They were often not slow to accuse conservative clergymen of being "nominal" rather than "real" Christians, of lacking "vital" religion, of preaching mere moral sermons rather than preaching "Christ crucified". Copleston himself was the target of such criticism, being accused by a writer in the Christian Observer and Advocate of failing to preach "Jesus Christ, and him crucified", and of being ashamed of Christ and his Gospel.[3] Obviously, charges such as these did not endear the Evangelical clergy to their non-Evangelical brethren, and their use of stock words and phrases acted as a party-badge to further emphasize the division in the church. Copleston deplored such manifestations of party-spirit, and hoped that if men could be persuaded to adopt a moderate approach to religious questions, then

the evils of party-spirit would be lessened, and the church strengthened to withstand the dangers which currently threatened it.

One of the main threats to the established church in the early decades of the century was perceived to be Dissent. Fear of Dissent, in fact, largely replaced the fear of infidelity which the French Revolution had aroused in the breasts of conservative Englishmen. The Methodist movement had greatly increased the number of Dissenters, and the existence of the Evangelical party within the Anglican church seemed to pose the threat of further secessions, thus weakening the church and strengthening Dissent. A sermon of 1830 on The Danger of a Divided House stated that

> A division notoriously prevails in the Church.... The existence of a party of Clergy and Laity, denominated Evangelical, places the Church in the very situation described in the text [Luke XI.17], and that in a time of no ordinary peril. We are "a house divided against a house".

The preacher was convinced "that the ultimate consequence of the formation of an evangelical congregation is the serious increase of dissenters, and consequently of danger to the Church".[4] The danger posed by Dissent was the disruption of the established order in church and state. Churchmen were afraid that Dissenters, once strong enough, would agitate for the disestablishment of the Anglican church.

In the early nineteenth century, consequently, there was a hardening of the Anglican attitude to Dissent in general, which revealed itself in a reluctance on the part of the establishment to grant political concessions to Dissenters. Anglican suspicion of Dissent was a motive behind the founding of the National Society for the Promotion of the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the

Established Church, which was set up in 1811. This was a reply to the Royal Lancasterian Society, which was supported by Dissenters and radicals. Unwillingness to co-operate with or encourage Dissent also dissuaded many High Churchmen from joining the British and Foreign Bible Society (founded in 1804), which included Dissenters among its members.[5] They believed that the circulation of the Bible without the prayer book might promote the growth of Dissent.

The claims of Dissent, the ranks of which were steadily growing, could not be ignored indefinitely, however, and by the 'twenties Dissenters were actively campaigning for the relief of their disabilities. The repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts finally came in 1828, and the prospect of further reforms, following the passing of the Reform Bill in 1832, threatened to weaken the connection between church and state. By the early 'thirties, then, a crisis situation existed for the Anglican church and fears of disestablishment were widespread among churchmen. Copleston was one who shared these fears. Although he supported the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts and was confident that repeal would not harm the Anglican church but on the contrary render it "more secure, more respected, and more beloved"[6], by 1833 he was less optimistic, believing that the temporal prosperity of the establishment was "on the wane".[7] In the following year he wrote, "How long the union of Church and State will subsist I can hardly venture to guess - but I should think not many years".[8]

Copleston's answer to this challenge to the Anglican church centred around moderate reform and compromise. Compromise, he felt,

was necessary in order to avert disestablishment. "Let us make the best of things while we can", he advised, "and not be obstinate in resisting improvements".[9] But it was not the case that Copleston supported reform simply as a last minute effort to avoid disestablishment. Reform, he thought, was not only necessary but desirable. In 1830 he complained, "we must have some reform. In my opinion we ought to have begun long ago. Now it is forced upon us."[10] The church reform which Copleston most desired was effectual church discipline[11], but he also favoured reform in the matters of pluralities, non-residence, patronage, sinecures, and tithes.[12] He also admitted that many improvements could be made in the distribution of church property[13], and was inclined to support the Irish Church Bill once the spoliation clause had been withdrawn:

> ...the better distribution of Church Revenues with a view to serve the Protestant Cause, is surely no invasion of the rights of the Church - When the rights of living persons are secured, it has rather a tendency to support and confirm them.[14]

Copleston, in fact, had been an advocate of church reform for many years. As early as 1813 he was rather severe on the bishops who had blocked a parliamentary bill for the better support of stipendiary curates:

> It is not the clamorous stickler for some antiquated privilege whom we regard as its truest friend in a season of general defection - but he who seeks to rectify what is amiss, to remove all ground of reproach and scandal, to correct the growing abuses to which all human institutions are liable, to frame expedients according to the change of times and manners, by which the same good may be affected in all ages, and to baffle that greatest of all innovators, time, by corresponding alterations in the detail and administration of its important duties. Let us only possess

> a few powerful friends, with hearts so disposed, and our rights and endowments are safe enough against all our enemies.[15]

Copleston's solution, then, to the problems which faced the Anglican church was moderate reform in the organisation of the church, and moderation in the attitude of church-members to one another and their religious differences. Moderation was the key word. But Copleston realised that there was the possibility that moderation could degenerate into indifference, and indifference he in no way condoned. Here too he could quote the Bible in support of his view. The Bible admonishes us to "prove all things, hold fast that which is good" (I. Thess. 5.21). Consequently, Copleston believed that a man has a duty to examine his beliefs, and to hold fast to those which stand up under this examination: "it is doubtless, the duty of a Christian to adhere as closely as possible to that doctrine which to himself seems to possess the greatest probability, and to be supported by the best authority".[16] Copleston himself, while disclaiming any pretensions to infallibility, could be decidedly dogmatic on topics on which he held strong views. Thus, at various times during his life he voiced forceful criticisms of the tenets of Calvinists, Roman Catholics, and Tractarians. In fact, although regarding inessential points Copleston held that we should not force our own opinions on others or insist on faith in them as necessary for salvation, yet concerning vital points of Christian doctrine it was an abuse of the term moderation, Copleston thought, to remain indifferent.[17] Thus, the errors of Romanism were to be opposed with all possible firmness, although even here Copleston advocated moderation in the language used, to speak the truth in charity and not to "wantonly hurt the feelings, or angrily and fiercely attack the character of those with

whom our dispute may lie".[18] Indifference concerning such important matters of faith Copleston stigmatized as "false liberality":

> it is a perversion of the term liberality to apply it to those whose opinions and principles sit loose upon them, or, as is not infrequently done, to those who have no religious principles at all. True liberality consists, if I know anything of the force or meaning of words, in bearing with those who differ from us, in using them kindly, gently, and respectfully; not in sinking the difference that subsists between us upon matters of high importance; not in explaining it away, and pretending to treat it lightly; not in surrendering sacred truths, in order to catch temporary applause or popularity. For if these things are held to be matters of indifference, what merit is there is tolerating them? How can that be called liberality, which concedes nothing? Or if they be matters of indifference, how can that be called candour or charity, or even honesty, which tends to confirm men in error, to separate them from the true Church and thus to hazard their future salvation.[19]

At a time of much religious animosity, Copleston's call for tolerance and charity was praiseworthy and much needed. However, it did not really help individuals confused over the rights and wrongs of the various competing views. Unlike the Calvinists, and later the Tractrians, who put forward definite doctrines for believers to embrace, Copleston gave by his principle of moderation no guidance as to what beliefs or doctrines should be regarded as fundamental to the Christian faith. In effect, it was left to the individual to decide. Moreover, moderation was not an easy creed to live by. Copleston himself occasionally fell short of his own ideal, and the bitterness and furore aroused by the Oxford Movement in the 'thirties and 'forties indicates that it was an ideal which, for a time at least, was forgotten.

The difficulty of maintaining a mean between two extremes is well illustrated by the problem of private judgment versus church authority. On this matter, too, a tension can be discerned in

Copleston's attitude. Copleston did not dismiss authority, but said that the Christian should adhere to the doctrine which seems to possess the greatest probability, and "to be supported by the best authority". But is it up to the individual to weigh up evidence and decide on probability? And what is the "best authority"? Is it, as the Roman Catholics believed, the church? Should the individual rely on the church to decide these matters and receive those doctrines which were supported by church authority? Copleston, following the Anglican church, tried to do justice to both private judgment and church authority. He accepted the distinction made in the thirty-nine articles between matters of discipline and matters of faith.

Concerning matters of discipline Copleston argued that the officers of the church have the authority to enact and enforce laws for the peace of the church. The Bible commands us to "follow such things as make for peace and edification", but does not go into particulars. But some rules are necessary for the maintenance of peace and good order, and as these are not specified by the Bible, the church is entitled to decide on them, although they need not necessarily be the same for every branch of the universal church. In matters of faith, on the other hand, Copleston stated that the officers of the church do not have authority "to change any of the divine laws, or to impose any article of faith, or rule of moral duty, or to prescribe any terms of salvation which are neither expressly contained in Scripture, nor can with certainty be inferred from them".[20] In other words, the authority of the Bible is superior to

the authority of the church, and it was precisely concerning this point, Copleston thought, that the Roman Catholics erred by placing a human tradition above the Gospel. A similar view was expressed by Pusey in his Letter to the Bishop of Oxford (1839), quoted by Copleston in his Pastoral Address on Roman Catholic Errors:

> Rome differs from us as to the authority which she ascribes to tradition: she regards it as co-ordinate, our divines as sub-ordinate; as to the way in which it is to be employed, she, as independent of Holy Scripture; our's, as subservient to, and blended with it; as to its limits, she supposes that the Church of Rome has the power of imposing new articles necessary to be believed for salvation; our's that all such articles were comprised at first in the Creed, and that the Church has only the power of clearing, defining, and expounding those fixed articles.[21]

Interpretation of the Bible, however, as Copleston admitted, was not easy and different interpretations were possible. Was the individual in these cases entitled to decide between these different interpretations for himself, or should he accept the interpretation of the church of which he was a member? Copleston attempted to steer a middle course between these two extremes. He condemned self-appointed teachers as detrimental to the peace and unity of the church, and maintained that "our religion was not set adrift in the world to be preached or explained according to the will and fancy of individuals".[22] This would seem to support church authority, but Copleston also insisted that the church is not infallible, and separation from it is justified, is indeed a duty, if one is convinced that the church is in fundamental error. Thus, the right of private judgment is protected, or rather, as Hawkins pointed out and Copleston agreed, the duty of private judgment.[23] But it is a duty which must be undertaken with circumspection: the duty "of exercising private

judgment in disputed questions of religion [is] a duty which all men should practice according to their measure of learning or ability, but with a due sense of the risk they run, in trusting to their own judgment, when it differs from the general and uninterrupted doctrine of the Christian Church".[24] And even the church itself should be careful in interpreting Scripture doctrine. Copleston praised the seventeenth article of the Church of England for keeping to Scripture language and not trying to give a theoretical explanation of the doctrine of predestination, such as was attempted by the Calvinists.[25] To insist on greater rigour of interpretation than either Scripture warrants or the nature of language allows, was to be both unchristian and unphilosophical. Copleston's opinion on the extent of church authority was summarized in his sermon "Judge not one another", where he maintained that it was only in matters left doubtful by Scripture that the authority of the church was claimed, and even then only as "the safest guide for individuals amidst endless diversities of opinion".[26]

This balance between private judgment and church authority was one which proved difficult to sustain, although Copleston and the Noetics never renounced it. Hawkins, in particular, paid much attention to this question and strove to uphold the Coplestonian balance. But it was too easy to slide towards one view or the other, as became clear during the Oxford Movement when Noetics and Tractarians inclined towards the opposite extremes. Copleston, himself, although he attempted to give due weight to both private judgment and church authority, actually believed that it was private judgment which had to be the final arbiter in any important difference

between the two. This is the conclusion which must be drawn from Copleston's statement that "all separation must be either a duty or a sin". Copleston emphasized the sin of schism, and cautioned against jeopardizing one's salvation by falling into this sin through personal whim or inclination. Nevertheless, the statement implies that there are situations when separation is justified, and Copleston stated that "Doctrines, indeed, and practices contrary to the word of God we are bound to resist, by whatever Church they may be enjoined".[27] It was on such grounds that the Anglican church as a body had separated from the Church of Rome, and thus that separation was not to be classed as schism.[28] Similarly, in the case of individuals, separation was a duty where the church's teachings were judged at variance with the Bible. The authority of the Bible was paramount. But interpretation of the Bible in such cases was necessarily a matter of private judgment, and therefore private judgment took precedence over church authority.

Copleston's desire to steer a middle course between private judgment and church authority was largely due to his conception of the errors of Dissenters and Roman Catholics. Roman Catholics he held to be guilty of elevating church authority even above the Bible. The Dissenters, on the other hand, placed too much emphasis on the right of private judgment, to the detriment of church unity. This tendency, described by Copleston as the "indulgence of private humour in religious matters", he considered to be "the prevailing error of the present time",[29] and it was a tendency which he was determined to combat, although he could not condone the Roman church's method of

ensuring unity. Copleston believed that the Church of England did in fact pursue a "via media" between Dissent and Roman Catholicism, thereby avoiding the errors of both. He argued that at the Reformation the English church had cast off the corruptions with which the Roman church had distorted the Gospel message, but had avoided the excesses of the reformed churches on the continent, which, in reaction to the Roman church, rejected everything they considered Popish. Copleston praised the moderation of the English Reformers, whose aim was

> to preserve all that was agreeable to Scripture - all that tended to edification - all that was sanctioned by the practice of the pure and uncorrupt ages of Christianity. Thus, while they cast off the dross, they were careful to retain the precious substance, whenever they could ascertain it - to prove all things - to hold fast that which was good.[30]

His main criticism of the Continental churches was that they failed to take account of the practice of the early church, and consequently rejected, among other things, the episcopal form of church government.

In this appeal to the practice of the early church Copleston anticipated the Tractarians. However, he did not entirely approve of the Tractarians' use of this appeal, as is shown by the fact that in his Pastoral Address he pointedly limited his appeals to the first three hundred years of the church. Moreover, he expressly stated that the Christian Fathers were not to be regarded as inspired men, gifted with supernatural powers or favoured with a special revelation, as the Apostles had been, although their works were valuable for determining

what was or was not part of the teaching of the early church.[31] Nor did he approve of the extremes to which this practice was taken by the Ritualists, who seemed to him to waste their time in frivolous and minute inquiries into the ritual practices of early times. On this subject Copleston pronounced, "whoever has imbibed the spirit of apostolical discipline, can seldom be at a loss how to conduct himself in these matters of detail, and will carefully abstain from appearing to attach greater importance to a ceremony of human institution than to the spirit of that law which tells us that all things should be done in the Church unto edification".[32]

The Roman Catholics, then, had a false view of church authority. But the Dissenters, in turning from the errors of Rome, had, like the reformed churches on the continent by which they were influenced, rejected more than was necessary. The established church, on the other hand, had remained true to the principles followed by the English Reformers. Thus, the established church provided a "via media" between Dissent, which allowed the word of God "to be preached or explained according to the will and fancy of individuals",[33] and Roman Catholicism, which demanded implicit obedience to a supposedly infallible church.

The Church of England, by a correct notion of the role of reason in matters of religion, was also enabled to avoid other errors to which the various denominations were liable. The characteristic fault of the Roman church Copleston affirmed, in typical eighteenth century terms, to be superstition and fanaticism. The Roman Catholic church

corrupted the Gospel with a "spurious mixture of fraud, of fable, of priestcraft and superstition". The people were held in "the thraldom of superstition and senile ignorance", imposed on them by the cunning and ambition of the priests, and from which he hoped that they would be emancipated by "the progress of knowledge and freedom among mankind" - a hope which faltered during the crisis of the Oxford Movement.[34] Rationalists, however, were encouraged by this progress of knowledge to place too much confidence in human reason. Rationalism was seen by most churchmen as being the prevailing error of the Unitarians, although it was not confined to Unitarians, but even affected some members of the Church of England. Copleston did not say much specifically about the Unitarians, although he did consider the controversy between the Unitarian minister, Lant Carpenter, and the Oriel fellow, Daniel Veysie, to be a very important one, and worthy of being given space in the Quarterly Review.[35] He clearly felt that the Unitarian rejection of doctrines such as the Atonement and the Trinity was due to trusting to human reason in matters which were above reason. Through this reliance on human reason the Unitarians were led to deny parts of the revealed message, to subtract from the Bible.

That Copleston did not often mention the Unitarians does not indicate that he did not consider their error to be a serious one, but in fact most of his writings are more concerned with the opposite error, that of adding to the Bible, of erecting systems of theology on doubtful texts.[36] Thus Copleston attacked the Roman Catholics and the Calvinists, both of whom he thought guilty of departing from Gospel

simplicity and adding to the Bible, the Roman Catholics engrafting on it "many vain and foolish notions", the Calvinists overlaying it with a "garb of human metaphysics". These additions, Copleston felt, must be challenged. But it was important, not only to challenge erroneous doctrine, but also unwarranted dogmatism and intolerance. Copleston was of the opinion that

> The fault....to which mankind are most prone is, not a stubborn inflexible adherence to what they erroneously deem essential truth, but an intolerant spirit towards those who disagree in what is not essential, and a busy inquisitorial disposition to sift and canvass their opinions, and to bring something to light which they construe as incompatible with sound doctrine.[37]

Copleston was concerned to preserve, and as far as possible, restore, church unity, and he was convinced that unwarranted dogmatism and intolerance led to party-spirit, which endangered this unity. In the early part of the century it was the Calvinistic controversy which divided members of the church. Later it was to be the Oxford Movement which was the main cause of parties within the church. To Copleston, then, rationalism seemed less of a threat to church unity than dogmatism, and hence his relative silence on Unitarianism.

Copleston was by no means silent on the error at the opposite extreme of rationalism, that is, "enthusiasm". "Enthusiasm" was suspect in the eyes of the ruling elite at Oxford, and Copleston was no different from his peers in this respect. He was critical of the mysticism and "enthusiasm" of the Hutchinsonians, and of the Irvingites, who claimed supernatural gifts of healing and preaching in tongues. In 1823 he had heard Irving himself preach, and although

allowing him to be "ingenious and eloquent", judged him "fanciful and unsound. In manner studied and theatrical to excess".[38] Concerning the controversy at Oxford in 1831 aroused by the sermon of the Evangelical H.B. Bulteel, who soon after left the Anglican church and for a short time became an adherent of Irving, Copleston wrote: "Bulteel's Sermon is a sad affair - not that it is silly, but incurably enthusiastic".[39] With those "wild enthusiasts, who plead special revelations made to their own minds - an inward light, of which no one but themselves is sensible", Copleston considered it useless to argue "for we have no common ground of reason on which to meet".[40]

It was not that Copleston wished to suppress all display of religious emotion, although, certainly his own faith was undemonstrative. In 1834 he wrote to his dean on the subject of preaching:

> I think we must be careful not to repress that fervour or rather animation which is so attractive - and which if exercised in behalf of the Church, will strengthen her more than anything else. It was the want of this animation which lost us so many of our people - who can be recalled by no other means.[41]

But moderation in this, as in everything else, would have been Copleston's advice. Nor did Copleston deny the possibility of an "inward light", if by this is understood an inward conviction of the truth of the Gospel. What he objected to were "enthusiastic" claims to "special revelations" and "sudden and complete illuminations", which tended to result in a disregard for elementary and gradual instruction in the truths of the Bible, and to support the pretensions

of self-appointed preachers. Such preachers justified their actions by a "pretence" of an "immediate personal call from the Holy Spirit itself; a pretence which certainly ought in all reason to be supported by the display of miraculous powers, such as were possessed by the Apostles, and by which they fairly established their claim to an immediate commission from God". Nevertheless, Copleston did agree with the Evangelicals that "vital religion" consisted of more than "mere moral obedience, or....a correct understanding merely of the several parts of Scripture", and that for faith we must look to the grace of the Holy Spirit.[42]

It is almost as though grace constitutes another means to religious knowledge. Just as intuition, as well as sense perception, is an element in the acquisition of ordinary knowledge, so grace appears to supply an intuitive element in religious knowledge. The man who comes to the Bible with a right heart is enabled by the grace of God to feel its force and truth. Copleston preached that "to an evil heart of unbelief there is no hope proposed....[for] the Scripture tells him, that with the heart man believeth unto salvation; and that while that heart retains its attachment to earthly things, and has no desire to be with God, it cannot believe". But the man who comes to the Gospel with a right heart, with not only a love of truth but with a desire for what is good and agreeable to God's will, he will perceive "a native probability, and intrinsic beauty, in the doctrines of the Gospel...'If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God'".[43]

However, it must be pointed out that knowledge and faith are not the same thing, and that a right heart and the grace of God are held up by Copleston as the way to faith rather than to knowledge. For knowledge of God and his ways, Copleston insisted that we must turn to the Bible. The Bible is the source of religious knowledge. But even the Bible does not answer all our questions, and it is a trial of our faith that knowledge is not complete.[44] We must rely on the grace of God to help us to faith, despite our imperfect knowledge. But Copleston was careful to point out the error of relying exclusively on divine grace, and neglecting to assume our responsibility of studying the Bible. A faith which was not grounded on the evidence of the Bible was "enthusiastic", but neither could one attain a "vital" faith unless one approached the Bible in the right spirit, with a sense of the spiritual character of the truth expressed therein.

> Neither....can they expect to be favoured with a right understanding of spiritual matters, who, while they presume upon assistance from above, are backward in their own endeavours, and slight the opportunities afforded them of knowing the way of the Lord as it is discoverable from the faithful record of his word. Without that divine help, indeed, their own efforts will be unavailing; and the humblest disciple who lends a willing ear to this instructor, will acquire a better knowledge of divine things - will discern more readily what is suitable to his wants, and what is agreeable to his Lord's will, than either the educated man who engages in those studies without devotion, or the enthusiast who thinks himself above the need of them.[45]

The errors of the "enthusiast", then, were various. Firstly, they neglected a close study of the Bible, relying instead on the grace of the Holy Spirit, or else they concentrated on a few points only, emphasizing one doctrine at the expense of another. In short, they did not preach the whole Gospel. Secondly, they tended to

undervalue reason and to resolve "the whole of religion into a spiritual abstraction of the soul from all human objects of pursuit".[46] And thirdly, they were guilty of spiritual pride and party-spirit.[47] As we have seen, Copleston particularly deprecated party-spirit, as it went against the Biblical injunction of peace and unity, and weakened the church and fed Dissent. Up to the publication of Tract 90 and William Ward's Ideal of a Christian Church, it was largely on this ground that Copleston disapproved of the Oxford Movement.

In his evaluation of Copleston as Bishop of Llandaff, Lodwick says that Copleston's "rantings against Protestant Dissent and Roman Catholicism were immoderate and intolerant".[48] To present day ears they may well sound so, but to understand the reason for these "rantings" we must consider the political and religious background and Copleston's philosophical and theological convictions. Copleston did, in fact, believe in religious toleration, at least as far as Christians were concerned. According to Whately, he thought "that we are bound not to impose or to maintain any penalties or any restrictions - even on those who, perhaps, may not be disposed to show kindness or justice to us - when these can be dispensed with as not requisite for the public welfare. To return evil for evil, on the ground of the alleged ill-desert of the parties, is manifestly to act on an unchristian principle".[49] This summary of Copleston's position is supported by Copleston's speeches and writings on the subject of Catholic emancipation. However, although in favour of religious toleration, he believed that religious toleration in England had had

the unfortunate result of inducing some to form fallacious opinions about the nature of heresy and schism.

> Because no legal compulsion is employed either to control men's religious opinions, or to bring them within the pale of the Church; some persons are hence led to consider both religious opinions and religious conformity as matters of no great consequence in a moral point of view. They ought, indeed, to be left to the decision of every man's own conscience; but he is accountable for his decision in the sight of God, and he will be most fearfully accountable indeed if he regards them as matters of indifference.[50]

Both heresy and schism Copleston held, on the authority of the Bible, to be sins. But the sin of schism, in particular, seemed to be taken too lightly, as was shown by the prevalence of Dissent, and especially by the growth of the Methodist movement. The Methodist movement was regarded by many as a particularly insidious threat to the church. Originally a movement within the church, its recent defection gave it the aspect of a traitor, and even cast suspicion on the loyalty of those Evangelicals who remained within the fold of the church. Moreover, the rapid growth of the movement and its great success with the poor alarmed churchmen, causing them in reaction to attempt to win back their lost sheep by providing more church accommodation for the poor.[51] The success of the Methodist movement was nowhere more evident than in Wales, and therefore Copleston, as Bishop of Llandaff, was constantly aware of the evil of schism. Early in his episcopate he acknowledged the good work done by the Methodists in poor, populous regions whose needs the Church of England was unable to meet, but even so he deprecated their party-spirit and disregard for the sin of schism, and towards the end of his life, after twenty years experience as a bishop in Wales, he was less inclined to think

kindly of the Methodists and accused them of counteracting and subverting "the ministrations of the Church in places where it is most ably and faithfully performed, and most effective".[52]

For the sake of the unity of the church, then, Copleston thought that it was necessary to emphasize the sin of schism. Not that he thought lightly of the sin of heresy (indeed, he realised that the two often went together[53]), and he always considered it important to guard against religious error, especially the errors of Roman Catholicism. However, up to the time of the Oxford Movement the main threat to the church appeared to be, not Roman Catholicism, which was generally unpopular, especially at Oxford, but Dissent and party-spirit within the church. Consequently, early in his career Copleston concentrated on the sin of schism and its causes. But with the rise of the Oxford Movement heresy seemed a much more real threat, hence his "rantings" on Roman Catholic errors.

This change in Copleston's estimation of the danger of heresy is evident in his reaction to the Oxford Movement. Whately stated that for a time Copleston under-rated the danger of the Tractarian party,[54] and Copleston's writings do show that his attitude to the movement hardened over the years. Although he disapproved of it from the very beginning, having reservations about Keble's Assize Sermon and also about the address to the Archbishop instigated by "some hot-headed narrow-minded men at Oxford", this disapproval was based on his dislike of "enthusiasm" and party-spirit, and not disagreement with their aim to fight the threatened separation of church and state.

What Copleston objected to were "these secret tribunals - these unseen and unknown authorities, directing the proceedings of the whole Clergy of England and Wales".[55] His relationship with Newman in these early years of the movement was cordial, although even in 1835 he suspected that "our opinions on matters of academical and ecclesiastical concern do not exactly coincide".[56]

The Hampden controversy, however, widened the breach between Copleston and Newman. On the whole, Copleston approved of Hampden's works, both his Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity and his Bampton Lectures. He was indeed critical of a certain amount of obscurity in the Essay and he thought that the first part "might have been rendered more perspicuous and less abstract", but he assured Hampden that as he read further he was impressed by the Essay, and in the part entitled "Practical Force of the Evidence of Analogy" he was "charmed with the eloquence and beauty both of the thoughts and of the language".[57] Concerning Hampden's Bampton Lectures too Copleston had reservations. He objected to Hampden's use of the phrase "matter of fact" as opposed to "doctrine", and said that some passages were "startling and paradoxical", but these were faults which could be remedied, and the general purpose of the book, as he interpreted it, he considered unexceptionable:

> If I understand it rightly, you meant to shew that the theological phraseology of the Church grew out of the scholastic disputations - that it was natural and even proper that such language should be used, as was most intelligible to educated and thinking people of the time - that false doctrine was condemned, and true doctrine asserted in this phraseology - but if the Church were now to assert the same truths, or to reprobate the same errors, they might not use exactly the same words - (some of them

> having become obsolete or their meaning changed) - but would adapt its language to the habits of thinking and modes of speaking prevalent in the age.[58]

Copleston expressed his approval of Hampden's book in a letter to his dean at Llandaff: "What ticklish ground that of Nominalism is? His object was to trace the history of our theological vocabulary - which he has done with great learning and ability".[59] This reference to Nominalism reveals Copleston's view of the controversy. He considered it to be an example of the common error of confusing words and things, a dispute about words, a logomachy. This view is also evident in the advice which he gave Hampden concerning the defence of his Bampton Lectures. He told Hampden "to be very careful not to give a handle for misrepresentation" and "however you may feel that a source of ardent controversy is merely a logomachy - not to say so in explicit terms", the reason for this being "that people are always angry at being told in direct terms they are disputed [sic] about a word, or are guilty of equivocation".[60] Copleston, then, thought that Newman was quibbling about words and was guilty of misrepresentation, and that Hampden's loose use of language "would have been perfectly innocuous, if this party rage had not been kindled".[61] When, in May 1836, the university deprived Hampden of the Professor of Divinity's power to appoint select preachers, Copleston wrote that "the University have acted rashly for themselves, as well as cruelly and unjustly towards an individual", a view which he re-iterated when the Hampden controversy was revived on the appointment of Hampden to the bishopric of Hereford".[62]

The publication of Tract 90 made Copleston realise that the Oxford Movement involved more than just logomachies and party-spirit,

but posed a real threat of heresy. Copleston's printed criticisms of the Tracts and the leaders of the movement were at first still relatively moderate. For example, in his Pastoral Address of 1841 he maintained that Newman had been unjustly accused of leaning towards Popery and that he was intent "only upon restoring some practices, which he believes to have had the sanction of the primitive church long before the papal corruptions began". This Address also contains a defence of Pusey, "whose name has been most unfairly and coarsely used as a kind of bye-word for what is called a new heresy".[63] Nevertheless, there is an implied criticism of the movement in his reference to those who, "though not-professed members [of the Church of Rome], are her ambiguous apologists and abettors", and no doubt the fear of the growth of Popery expressed in this Address was largely prompted by the Oxford Movement.[64] Even in his Charge of 1842, where the criticism of the Oxford Movement is more open, he still acknowledged the good which the Tracts had done, admitting that they had made men think more deeply about divine matters, and especially about the nature of "the CATHOLIC CHURCH OF CHRIST".[65]

His private correspondence, however, reveals his increasing suspicion of the movement. In December 1841 he expressed concern at the rumours he was hearing about the "religious aberration at Oxford" and strange "doings at Littlemoor", and he made reference to the "Jesuitical Tracts" and "the new Heresy".[66] By the following year he thought that Newman's writings were "indefensible" and that the Bishop of Oxford had been too lenient on him in his charge.[67] In 1843 he looked forward to the secession of Newman, "his influence being now

much more pernicious than it will be when he is an avowed instead of a disguised Romanist", and enquired of Hawkins what support he could hope for among the Oriel fellows for "the suppression of this heresy within [his] own society".[68] Copleston considered that the time had come for "open war [to] be proclaimed against this conspiracy",[69] and he was confirmed in this opinion in 1844 by the publication of W.G. Ward's Ideal of a Christian Church.

From this point on Copleston's letters express the hope that the university will stir itself and take strong action against both Ward and Tract 90,[70] and his Charge of 1845 is very outspoken in its denunciation of the movement and particularly of Ward. He expressed his opinion that the university had been too lenient with some of the leaders of the Tractarians, who had shown "flagrant dishonesty" in subscribing to the thirty-nine articles despite holding Roman doctrines. The Tractarians he depicted as "those false brethren who poison the very fountain of religious education", whose writings were "marked with all the characteristics of Jesuitical subtlety" and reminded one of "the day-dreams of monks" and the "wire-drawn sophistries of schoolmen". Ward, in Copleston's opinion, was guilty of "unblushing heresy". The form of that heresy was, predictably, the same as Rome's: "under the miserable pretence of development, [the Tractarians] impiously add to the book of life doctrines and traditions utterly at variance with Divine revelation".[71] Here we recognise the by now familiar theme of "Gospel simplicity". The Tractarians, like the Roman Catholics and the Calvinists, offended against this Gospel simplicity by adding to the Bible, thus

endangering the purity of the faith and disturbing the peace of the church.[72]

Copleston hoped to escape the errors which he discerned in other churches and factions by avoiding extremes and following a "via media". The Church of England, he thought, provided this "via media", but the unity of the church was in danger of being destroyed by parties within the church asserting their own views with dogmatism and intolerance. Copleston, therefore, preached moderation, although he did not countenance indifference. Throughout his life Copleston continued to preach this message of "moderation, but not indifference", but while in the early part of his career he tended to stress "moderation", later he stressed "not indifference". The cause of this change of emphasis was the Oxford Movement.

This is demonstrated by Copleston's attitude to the articles of the Anglican church. In the Enquiry Copleston praised the "cautious language" of the church regarding the doctrine of predestination, and maintained that this caution was "not the result of an equivocal and compromising policy", but necessarily arose out of the nature of the subject.[73] This cautious language allowed a certain latitude of interpretation of the doctrinal terms used in the articles, and Copleston felt that the church could accommodate these various interpretations. To insist that these doctrinal terms should be understood in only one sense was unphilosophical:

> The limits of what is essential or non-essential, of what is literal or figurative, of what is technical or substantial, cannot be exactly prescribed, even in the various

> transactions of life, still less are they capable of being ascertained in the abstruse questions of religion.[74]

Ironically, the dangers of this maxim, which in the 'twenties and 'thirties had appeared to hold out the hope of peace and unity in the church, were made apparent in the 'forties when Newman in Tract 90 showed that the thirty-nine articles could be understood in a Catholic sense, and Ward claimed that in subscribing to them he renounced no Roman doctrine. Copleston, accordingly, was compelled to qualify his stand with the following rider:

> Nevertheless, though we hesitate to define precisely and peremptorily the sense in which certain doctrinal terms must always be received, yet when the difference of opinion amounts to an absolute denial of the doctrine of the Church, under any legitimate sense, we scruple not to declare that the assent professed is a prevarication which no casuistry can justify.[75]

Copleston's solution, then, was to look for a "via media" between a too strict and a too loose interpretation of the articles of the church. However, this solution was no more than an uneasy compromise, forced on Copleston by the turn of events, and the tension inherent in his position was no longer just felt, but must have been obvious to all, even Copleston.

Section 5. Copleston's theology

The theology expounded by Copleston was not new. In fact, often the very terminology which he used was typical of eighteenth or early nineteenth century sermons. This was certainly the case with his denunciations of the "fanaticism" and "superstition" of the Roman Catholics and the "enthusiasm" of the Methodists.[1] Copleston's view of the Church of England, most clearly set out in the two lectures included in the Remains, was acceptable High Church doctrine. In brief, he held that the church was a visible, spiritual and universal society, instituted by Christ; that the Anglican church was a true branch of this universal or catholic church, as indeed was the Roman church, despite its corruptions; and that the Anglican church had reformed the corruptions of Rome without falling into the errors of Dissent, and thus provided a "via media" between Roman Catholicism and Dissent. He accepted wholeheartedly the Reformation principle that "Scripture, and Scripture only, is the rule of faith", thus affirming his acceptance of the Protestant Reformation, although he refused to abandon the title "Catholic" to the Roman Catholic church. His adherence to Reformation principles was proved by his financial support of that test of allegiance, the Martyrs' Memorial in Oxford, and also by his opposition to the increased grant to Maynooth College, on the grounds that it was "a measure inconsistent with the doctrine of the Reformation".[2] In his insistence on the catholicity of the Anglican church, and indeed in the importance he placed on episcopacy and the apostolical succession, he approached the High Church position as held by the Hackney Phalanx[3], although he did not go so far as the Tractarians did and assert that churches which lacked episcopacy and

the apostolical succession thereby forfeited their claim to be part of the universal church. This view he considered to be unwarrantable, uncharitable, and impious, and he maintained that it was not the doctrine of the Anglican church. Nor did he agree with the Tractarian interpretation of apostical succession, but rejected as a false notion the idea of it as "the transmission of a mysterious virtue from one individual to another".[4]

Neither was Copleston alone in his insistence on the sin of schism. The High Churchman, Archdeacon Charles Daubeny, in his Guide to the Church (1798), had stated that, "So long as the Church continues to be what it originally was, a society of Christ's forming, a wilful separation from it must be at all times equally sinful; it being not less an opposition to a divine institution in one age of the Church than in another".[5] It was a topic which also found favour with the Bampton Lecturers.[6] N.U. Murray points out that at the end of the eighteenth century Latitudinarian clergymen began to join High Churchmen in their denunciations of schism, a term which they had previously avoided, but on the grounds that unity was a blessing not lightly to be destroyed rather than that the Church of England was right in all her doctrines and practices. Copleston's position seems to be a combination of both High Church and Latitudinarian views, and in fact, Copleston provides a good example of that rapprochement of High Church and Latitudinarian noticed by Murray.[7]

Copleston based his denunciation of schism on the Biblical injunctions against disunity, and in this appeal to the Bible Copleston was in the Latitudinarian tradition. J.K.B. Boulton-Jones

lists the recurring themes of Latitudinarianism as "the sufficiency of Scriptures, the moral right of free enquiry, the place of reason, the need for toleration among those who differ only in opinions about secondary questions...".[8] The similarity of many of Copleston's view is unmistakable. Dislike of religious controversy and insistence on the practical purpose of the Bible had been the mark of the Latitudinarian divine right back to the time of the Cambridge Platonists.[9] However, even in that aspect in which he seems closest to the Latitudinarians, that is, his advocacy of moderation and toleration, his agreement is qualified by the conservatism typical of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Thus, he disapproved of the desire to appear liberal and deprecated that "false liberality" which was no better than indifference, and affirmed that Catholic emancipation was to be granted not as a right but as a favour, views which were typically conservative.[10] Copleston's religious position, then, appears to derive from both the High Church and the Latitudinarian traditions of the Anglican church.

This being so, we should not be surprised to find that the philosophical basis to this theology was not original to Copleston. Indeed, the idea that human reason was limited when it came to dealing with the ways of God was a commonplace one, and the view that ambiguities of language were the cause of many religious and philosophical disputes had been expressed by many writers prior to Copleston. Bacon, for example, had declared equivocation or ambiguity of words and phrases "the great sophism of all sophisms".[11] Copleston's thoughts on analogical reasoning owed much to Archbishop King, as Copleston himself acknowledged, and many of the points made

in the Enquiry were anticipated by Veysie in his book A Defence of the Preservative against Unitarianism. Copleston's predecessor, Provost Eveleigh, also preached many of the same themes as Copleston. For instance, in the second sermon in his Sermons on Various Subjects, he argued that human reason is imperfect and that the language of Scripture is relative to us. He advised his listeners to confess their ignorance and rest the doctrine of free-will on the authority of Scripture.[12] Copleston's contemporaries at Oriel, in fact, often expressed views similar to Copleston's.[13]

Copleston's theology, then, was not new and was in many ways conservative. He cannot be portrayed as a daring "liberal" and questioner of received views. Nevertheless, his theology was not simply an amalgamation of well-worn clichés. It was the result, rather, of much critical thought, whereby these widely accepted ideas were put to the test and were judged to be well-founded. Thus, in a sense he can be regarded as a questioner, for he did not uncritically accept prevailing views but satisfied himself that such views were justifiable.

There is also some truth in the contention that the theology espoused by Copleston was essentially negative. His picture of the Anglican church, for example, consisted mainly of what the church was not, rather than what it was. The "via media" meant following a path which avoided the errors of other churches, rather than one which led to positive goals. Newman recognised this defect. The "via media", he wrote, was "at first sight negative... A Via Media was but a receding from extremes". In Newman's opinion it needed to be drawn

out "into a shape, and a character"; it had to be shown "to be one, intelligible, and consistent".[14] And this is what Newman tried to do, until he finally gave up the attempt, abandoning the "via media" as an "impossible idea", an example of "standing on one leg".[15] Copleston's denunciations of dogmatism, too, merely told men what to avoid and did not say, "this is what you should believe". In other words, for those seeking positive direction and firm beliefs, Copleston's sermons would have been of little assistance.

However, it is not the case that Copleston's theology was completely negative. One clear message comes through all Copleston's teaching, and that is the Protestant message of "back to the Bible". Although Copleston warned against the tendency towards individualism, a tendency which was inherent in Protestantism and which revealed itself in an emphasis on private judgment to the detriment of church authority, yet in his attitude to the Bible he was firmly in the Protestant tradition. The Bible, he believed, was the touch-stone of the Christian faith, and he called on those who disputed about Christian doctrine to take an honest and unbiassed look at what the Bible had to say. Where the Bible admitted of various interpretations, then men should use moderation in advancing their own views.

There was also a positive purpose behind Copleston's plea for moderation. As has been argued Copleston hoped by this means to preserve the unity of the Anglican church and strengthen it against attacks from without. This plea for moderation Copleston rested on philosophical grounds. In his philosophical position Copleston owed a

debt to Locke. However, there is a difference of emphasis in the writings of Locke and Copleston, which is due to a difference in purpose. Locke was concerned to prove the reasonableness of Christianity, and was thus led to emphasize what he considered the fundamental belief of Christianity, that Christ is the Messiah, and to minimize lesser points of faith. Very likely Copleston had reservations about this procedure. Locke's philosophy, he saw, had led to the idealism of Berkeley and the scepticism of Hume. Moreover, Locke's stress on the one fundamental belief to the exclusion of other matters of faith may have seemed to Copleston a case of subtracting from the Bible, and of not teaching the whole of the Gospel message. Copleston, of course, did not disapprove of efforts to demonstrate the reasonableness of Christianity. Nor did he disagree with Locke's warnings against insistence on things which were not fundamental. But Copleston was more interested than Locke had been in the lesser matters of faith, despite, or rather, because of, the fact that these were the main subjects of religious debates. Copleston was a minister of a church which was under attack. He was concerned not only to show the reasonableness of Christianity but also the reasonableness of the Church of England. The various denominations of Christianity were agreed for the most part (the Unitarians constituted a doubtful case) on the essential articles of faith, but were divided on the inessentials. It was inevitable, then, that any comparison between the different denominations would have to deal with these lesser matters of faith. Moreover, it was these lesser matters which caused divisions within the Church of England. Like Locke, Copleston thought that a reasonable attitude (in the sense of philosophical, not prudential) to these issues was a moderate one, not overly dogmatic. Thus he attempted to promote this view among the members of the Church of England.

The controversy surrounding the Oxford Movement would seem to indicate that Copleston's strategy of promoting peace and unity in the church by means of moderation was unsuccessful. Moderation was not the key-note of the 'thirties and 'forties. Even Copleston himself was less moderate in his language during this time, and his theories, when developed by Hampden, provoked a storm. However, with the Broad Church movement moderation came once more to the fore, and certain similarities between the arguments of Broad Churchmen and the Noetics suggest that Copleston's philosophical reasonings were not completely without issue.[16]

But although Copleston's theology contained seeds for further development, as presented by Copleston himself, it is unconvincing. This is largely because of Copleston's penchant for the "via media". When considered individually the various middle positions which Copleston advocated often seem sensible. For example, a mean between intolerance and indifference may well be considered a reasonable and, indeed, praiseworthy aim. But taken as a whole, Copleston's position appears much less convincing. His attitude to every problem becomes predictable; his solution being to find the "via media". However, it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the "via media" cannot provide the correct answer on <u>every</u> occasion.

The most interesting example of "via media", and the most important because it underlies many of the others, is Copleston's attitude to reason. Copleston advocated a mean between the abuse of reason and the neglect of reason, but this mean is unsatisfactory. Even with Copleston himself it is not successfully sustained, and at

times his arguments seem to tend towards the subordination of reason, and at times to the recognition of reason as the final arbiter. This makes it hard to decide whether Copleston's theology should be regarded as rationalistic or not; whether he was guilty of "the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it".[17] Copleston was critical of those who submitted the revealed will of God to their own judgments of what was rational and probable. However, he argued that the will of God is revealed in the Bible and the Bible must be interpreted with the help of human reason, by weighing up what is a rational and probable interpretation. Does not Copleston, then, in this way subject the will of God to his own judgment of what is rational and probable? Does he not agree with Locke, that "Reason must be our last Judge and Guide in every Thing"?[18] Copleston did have a defence against this accusation, as we see if we study his words closely. He condemned rejecting or explaining away those parts of the Gospel revelation which did not accord with the notions men formed, independently of the Bible, of the nature of God's government or his attributes. Thus, the doctrine of the Atonement was sometimes rejected or explained away because the idea of vicarious punishment was thought to be incompatible with God's justice. Similarly, Copleston did not condone the rejection of doctrines, such as the Trinity, which were above the reach of human reason. To tamper with the Gospel in these ways, he held, was to be guilty of rationalism. But it was not rationalism to use reason to determine the meaning of Biblical language, or to prove the authenticity of Revelation.[19] Newman, in fact, gave a very similar definition of rationalism in the Tracts for the Times:

> As regards Revealed Truth, it is not Rationalism to set about to ascertain, by the exercise of reason, what things are attainable by reason, and what are not....nor to determine what proofs are necessary for the acceptance of a Revelation, if it be given....nor, after recognizing it as divine, to investigate the meaning of its declarations, and to interpret its language.... This is not Rationalism; but it is Rationalism to accept the Revelation, and then to explain it away; to speak of it as the Word of God, and to treat it as the word of man; to refuse to let it speak for itself; to claim to be told the why and the how of God's dealings with us, as therein described, and to assign to Him a motive and a scope of our own; to stumble at the partial knowledge which He may give us of them; to put aside what is obscure, as if it had not been said at all; to accept one half of what has been told us, and not the other half; to assume that the contents of Revelation are also its proof; to frame some gratuitous hypothesis about them, and then to garble, gloss, and colour them, to trim, clip, pare away, and twist them in order to bring them into conformity with the idea to which we have subjected them.[20]

For Copleston and Newman, then, rationalism was an abuse of reason. It consisted of submitting the Gospel message to the judgment of human reason, and it resulted in the diminution of the Gospel message. In effect, it was tampering with Revelation. According to this definition, Copleston was not guilty of rationalism. But is it possible in practice to draw a clear-cut distinction, such as Copleston and Newman, following Locke, attempted to make, between judging the content of Revelation and judging of the meaning of Revelation? Given the limitations of language, even Biblical language, is it possible to determine the meaning of the Gospel message without being influenced by our own notions and prepossessions? One way out of this problem was to accept the church's interpretation, where set out in the articles of religion, as infallible. Although in practice Copleston did tend to accept the church's interpretations, in theory he could not receive it as infallible, and therefore, despite his cautions against the unrestrained use of private judgment, there remained no other final arbiter when it came to disputed interpretations. Copleston virtually

acknowledged this when he said that separation from the church could in some circumstances be a duty: separation was either a duty or a sin.

The only other way of avoiding a thorough-going rationalism was to admit the limitations of human reason, to argue that some parts of Revelation were above reason and therefore must be accepted without questioning. This was the position which Copleston took. The distinction of above, according to, and contrary to reason was one that even Pusey was inclined to allow early in his career. In his discussion of German Rationalism he made the interesting comment:

> That milder form, which, according to the scholastic distinction, admits things above, but not those contrary to human reason, rather incidentally and occasionally, than in its own nature, agrees with the pure Rationalism, and stands within or without Scriptural Christianity, according as the Christian doctrines appear to each individual who adopts it, contrary or not to that of reason.[21]

Copleston remained within Scriptural Christianity by ascribing Christian doctrines to the realm of "above reason". But although he thus resolved the problem of the place of reason to his own satisfaction, the tension of his position is obvious.

The two abuses to which reason was most liable in matters of religion, and between which Copleston sought a middle way, were the opposite errors of "adding to" and "subtracting from" the Gospel message. The first Copleston generally referred to as the fault of systematizing Revelation, which meant the attempt to force Revelation into a coherent philosophical or "metaphysical" system by adding to it doctrines not contained in the original record or not clearly revealed, and insistence on these human additions with dogmatism and

intolerance. Calvinism and Roman Catholicism he held to be examples of this. The second abuse, that of sitting in judgment over Revelation and rejecting Gospel doctrines, was usually referred to simply as rationalism, although both faults, being the misuse of reason in matters of religion, could perhaps be included under this term. Unitarianism was commonly held up, by Copleston and others, as an example of rationalism. Copleston's works show that of these two abuses he concerned himself primarily with the first. He consistently deprecated this error, and even checked the tendency towards it when he detected it in his own friends. For example, he criticised one of Whately's works, saying,

> There is, I think, a hardness in the whole of this argument, inconsistent with the genuine spirit of the whole gospel - a disposition to treat the case of the sinner logically and metaphysically. For myself, I am always checked in the career of such reasoning by the reflection that the whole economy of redemption from evil is mysterious, and beyond my reason; and that our Saviour's example, as well as His doctrine, encourages us to obey the moral and religious impulses of our nature, not systematically, but like affectionate children in all simplicity.[22]

It was this abuse of systematizing and adding to the Bible, which, in the end, he considered the Tractarians were guilty of. Newman, on the other hand, thought that emphasis on this particular error led to the opposite abuse, that of rationalism and subtracting from the Gospel. Of Jacob Abbott's Corner Stone he wrote that it was "a poorly concealed Socinianism - So this, it appears, is what really comes of declaiming against 'metaphysical' notions of the Revelation, and enlarging on its moral character!"[23] In attacking Abbott, Newman was also attacking the Noetics, for he felt that Abbott's writings were based on the same religious philosophy as those of the Noetics.[24] It is significant that Noetics and Tractarians should thus end in

accusing each other of the opposite errors to which they considered reason was liable in matters of religion. It would suggest that in a system of theology in which reason is accorded a prominent role, one or other of these abuses is almost inevitable. In fact, Copleston's theology, as a whole, despite its air of reasonableness and moderation, was not an easy creed to live by, because of its balance of contradictory elements. It was very easy for moderation to slip into indifference, or caution in the exercise of private judgment into the full acceptance of church authority.

Section 6. Liberal Education and the Idea of the University

Just as there is a tension of conflicting elements in Copleston's religious views, so too is there a similar tension in his educational thinking. Copleston, as has been seen, put great store on reason, that "noblest faculty of man",[1] and consequently, as might be expected, saw education as a means of developing and refining that faculty. To develop the reasoning powers, education must make students use their minds rather than just absorb facts: "The more I think on it", he wrote, "the more I am convinced that to exercise the mind of the student is the business of education, rather than to pour in knowledge".[2] For this reason he stressed the value of thoroughness and the benefits of a deep rather than a wide reading ("multum non multa").

It was partly on this account that Copleston recommended the study of Aristotle, for the effort involved in following Aristotle's closely argued theses was good intellectual exercise. Aristotle's treatises tried the student's diligence and discrimination, the accuracy of his thoughts, and the force and vigour of his mind.[3] Copleston had a hatred of "things made easy", which appeared to him to defeat the ends of education, hence his dislike of Kett's book on logic, even apart from its errors.[4] In Copleston's opinion, the great value of the study of syllogistic logic, and to a lesser degree mathematics, was that it developed the reasoning powers of the mind. Besides giving us a command over our own knowledge and enabling us to convey our reasoning in the clearest and most correct manner, "it

exercises and improves the mental faculties so employed, gives them a facility of action, and guards them against sophistry and imposture".[5]

It would appear, then, as an educator Copleston wished to extend his pupils and thereby to foster intellectual excellence and to promote talent. This is also suggested by his support of educational reforms such as the new examination statute and the honours system. These, he hoped, would greatly improve the standard of university education. Within the confines of Oriel, too, he followed the example of his predecessor, Eveleigh, and encouraged the recognition of intellectual promise in the awarding of fellowships, a significant departure from the practice of the majority of colleges at that time.[6] "'Detur digniori' was his unvarying rule" was said of him at his funeral.[7]

On the other hand, however, there is a suggestion of an anti-intellectual element in Copleston's stance on various educational issues. For example, although he realised that the standard for a pass degree was very low, he maintained that so long as "the system be so conducted as to encourage exertion, it would be absurd to reject those of the most moderate pretensions, who have passed through their period of residence with good conduct, and a tolerably regular attention to the prescribed studies".[8] This statement can perhaps be explained as a concession to the circumstances of the time. Copleston realised the impossibility of setting too high a standard for the pass degree when, in the absence of an entrance examination, students came to the university with widely differing levels of attainment and

ability. This was one area in which Copleston agreed with Tatham, with whom on other matters he had little in common.[9] Both probably kept in mind the words of the examination statute, which said, "we intend nothing severe or harsh. We study mildness in every particular, provided it be not of a kind to give the appearance of encouragement to the idleness of young men".[10] Tatham, for his part, denied the charge of being too rigid and severe:

> Let the Candidates for Degrees spend their Academical years, not in idleness and dissipation, but in a generous application to these liberal studies: let them be led on by an honest Emulation, vying with each other in the spirit of men and behaviour of gentlemen.... And, though I would animate the foremost in the generous race with my best applause, I would discourage none, but cheer the hindmost with expressions of the most friendly kindness; and I would disappoint no one, whose moral conduct and honest industry were approved, of his Degree, for which he has laid out both his money and his time....[11]

Like Tatham, Copleston looked to "emulation" as the solution to the problem. Emulation, he felt, was encouraged by the honours system, which thus fostered intellectual excellence while not denying a pass degree to the less able majority. Copleston wished to improve the honours system by having the names of all who passed printed in order "to heighten the honour of the classes".[12] In 1830 he wrote to Hawkins, congratulating Oriel on appearing in the first class, but he added,

> When will the time arrive, for which I have been so long anxious, that the second and third classes will be objects of earnest desire, and strong encouragements to universal industry? Nothing but exposing idleness and imbecility and sloth to the public eye, by printing the fourth class, will ever effect this.[13]

The above comment reveals, however, that by means of the honours system Copleston hoped just as much to promote industry among the less able as excellence among the talented. In fact, Copleston was of the opinion that university education should be concerned mainly with the majority of students of average ability rather than the clever, with the many rather than the few. It was partly for this reason that Copleston preferred college to professorial lectures: the professorial lecture, he declared, "is not, it cannot be, the most effectual means by which instruction is to be conveyed to the minds of the great majority of students".[14] In the small college classes the lecturer could "address himself to individuals, satisfy their scruples, correct their errors" and could perceive as he went along how his instruction was received.[15] "Elementary information", he insisted, "was so much better communicated in small private classes".[16]

This emphasis on elementary instruction suggests another anti-intellectual aspect of Copleston's educational thinking. He did not, it seems, regard the advancement of knowledge as a major function of a university. In the middle of the century, when the Royal Commission was considering the direction the universities should take in the latter half of the century, this particular topic became the subject of much debate. The question was whether research or teaching was the main function of a university. Copleston did not have much to say concerning research, although there are indications that he saw this as at least part of a university's purpose. Professors, he implied, rather than lecturing to undergraduates should spend their

time in study. Thus in 1827 he advised Baden Powell, the newly appointed Savilian Professor of Geometry, against giving an inaugural lecture. Although he thought it laudable for Baden Powell to try to compensate for the deficiencies of college instruction in mathematics ("In some colleges I fear even elementary instruction is not regularly given, and it certainly would be well for the professor to supply this want"), yet he did not consider that lecturing was the most important duty of the professor. Rather, "the credit of the university will be chiefly consulted by such philosophical essays and scientific researches as form your principal employment".[17] Fellows too, Copleston seems to suggest in his Reply, should ideally be engaged in research. There it is stated that most resident fellows of the college were engaged in tuition and that very few "possessed of leisure to carry on learned works", and while Copleston claimed that the increased importance placed on tuition had made the university "a more effective engine of education", he regretted that the university had in the process lost much of the characteristic feature it once had "as a residence of learned leisure, and an emporium of literature".[18] Copleston himself, at the time he wrote this, was contemplating giving up his tutorship and devoting himself to "learned leisure". However, once he became Provost and had to oversee the educational responsibilities of the college, he gave these priority and discouraged the residence of non-teaching fellows in order to make more rooms available for undergraduates. Copleston, in fact, regarded teaching rather than research as the university's main concern.

Copleston's attitude to these educational issues is explained by his views on the purpose of university education and his idea of the

university. In Copleston's view the university should attempt to impart a liberal education. At the beginning of the century Copleston defended this ideal of liberal education against the alternative ideal of professional education, which was being enthusiastically supported by proponents of "useful knowledge".[19] Richard Lovell Edgeworth[20] had recently published his Essays on Professional Education, which were reviewed by Sydney Smith in the Edinburgh Review. In the course of this review Smith was critical of the dominance of classical literature at Oxford and of the narrowness of the way it was taught. He claimed that "an infinite quantity of talent is annually destroyed in the Universities of England", and sneered "When an University has been doing useless things for a long time, it appears at first degrading to them to be useful...". "Usefulness", to Smith, was an important criterion in education: "...what ought the term University to mean, but a place where every science is taught which is liberal, and at the same time useful to mankind".[21]

In his "Replies" to the Edinburgh Review Copleston defended the Oxford ideal of liberal education against detractors such as Sydney Smith and other proponents of "useful knowledge". "There must be surely a cultivation of mind", he declared, "which is itself a good: a good of the highest order; without any immediate reference to bodily appetites, or wants of any kind".[22] Nevertheless, he refused to admit the uselessness of the type of education offered by Oxford, and argued that a liberal education was useful in a higher sense of the term than that used by writers such as Edgeworth and the Edinburgh

reviewers. He maintained that "intellectual pleasure and improvement are objects not only of equal, but of greater utility" than those which "minister to the bodily wants of man", as long as those are provided for.[23] Admittedly, a liberal education does not train a man for any specific employment, but the knowledge thus acquired

> expands and enlarges the mind, excites the faculties, and calls those limbs and muscles into freer exercise, which, by too constant use in one direction, not only acquire an illiberal air, but are apt also to lose somewhat of their native play and energy. And thus, without directly qualifying a man for any of the employments of life, it enriches and ennobles all. Without teaching him the peculiar business of any one office or calling, it enables him to act his part in each of them with better grace and more elevated carriage; and, if happily planned and conducted, is a main ingredient in that complete and generous education, which fits a man 'to perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously, all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war'.[24]

While the proponents of professional education and "useful knowledge" favoured the teaching of scientific subjects, Copleston claimed that this generally amounted to no more than "the hasty acquisition of miscellaneous knowledge".[25] Copleston was not against the inclusion of scientific studies in the university's curriculum. In fact, in subsequent years Copleston made attempts to promote such studies at Oxford where, he was well aware, they failed to flourish.[26] For example, in 1817 he tried to get attendance at courses of scientific lectures made a prerequisite for the M.A. degree. Not succeeding in this, he advised Lord Grenville, who had asked for suggestions from Copleston concerning some proposed new scholarships, that the scholarships might be used to encourage the study of mathematics and the physical sciences, or that at least

attendance on the Natural Philosophy course might be required as a qualification for the scholarships.[27] Nevertheless, he was convinced that literature, and in particular, ancient literature, formed the basis for a liberal education.

The classics, Copleston argued, "contain some of the choicest fruits of human genius".[28] The ancient authors provide the best models for the cultivation of literature. The poetic faculty is developed by the study of the poets, while the historians provide instructive lessons, "both of the dangers of turbulent faction, and of corrupt oligarchy". "To think that any student can peruse and understand these works", Copleston declared, "without catching some portion of the generous spirit that breathes in them, is to argue an ignorance of the frame and constitution of man's nature.[29] In fact, Copleston maintained that the moral character "is in a great measure formed by the study of good authors", and where these studies do not take possession of the mind, "there is not only a moral blank, but an intellectual barrenness - a poverty of fancy and invention, a dearth of historical and poetical illustration, a want of all those ideas which decorate and enliven truth". In short, he who lacks the benefits of such an education may make a useful inspector of roads, mines, and canals, but "all that distinguishing grace, which a liberal education imparts, he foregoes for ever".[30]

This panegyric of liberal education and classical studies merely expressed the widely held view of the value of the classics as the basis of education. This view was particularly strong in Oxford,

where, as Sydney Smith complained, the classics were dominant, and where even rhetoric and moral philosophy were studied "in so far as they are derivable from the ancient authors".[31] John Davison reiterated some of Copleston's arguments in his own review of Edgeworth's Essays on Professional Education. Like Copleston he criticised Edgeworth's neglect of a more liberal and enlarged cultivation. "Professional talent is like strength in the arm; but health is the greater blessing, and of more general and certain use".[32] Even for professional and practical ability the two things needed were knowledge and cultivated faculties, the latter being the more important. And of the intellectual powers, Davison went on, judgment took the foremost lead in life. It was not science and mathematics that were useful for developing judgment, but "religion; (in its evidences, and interpretation;) ethics, history, eloquence, poetry, theories of general speculation; the fine arts, and works of wit", and the best means of studying most of these topics was provided by the ancient languages.[33]

Copleston, as has been seen, did not wish to dismiss mathematics and science from the university. Mathematics in particular he held to be useful for developing the reasoning faculty of the mind. However, it was not this faculty alone which needed to be developed, but all of man's faculties, and hence the value of the classics as the basis of education. "Mathematics", he wrote to Grenville in 1817, "will always hold a subordinate rank in Oxford to literature, as I, for one, should certainly wish them to do".[34] In contrast with the specialisation of professional education, a liberal education, Copleston believed,

developed all the faculties. Thus, despite its concentration on ancient literature, Oxford education was not a specialist education, for its end result was not the well-trained specialist, but rather the well-rounded individual. Copleston was critical of educational schemes which attempted to mould students according to some fore-ordained plan:

> We want not men who are clipped and espaliered into any form, which the whim of the gardener may dictate, or the narrow limits of his parterre require. Let our saplings take their full spread, and send forth their vigorous shoots in all the boldness and variety of nature.

Admittedly, Copleston saw the need for some "pruning" and "fertilising", but nature (that is, the innate characteristics of individuals) must be allowed to take its course. Similarly, John Davison challenged Edgeworth's assumption that talent can be turned in any direction by education, and maintained that "individuals are sometimes born with a cast and qualification better adapted to one purpose than another". With different imagery but with the same thought, Davison declared that the educationalist "should beware of spoiling the natural mintage by attempting to set a new face upon it, which may only obscure the inscription, and falsify the value of the coin".[35] Thus, both Copleston and Davison disputed the epistemological basis of Edgeworth's theory.

In the early years of the century advocates of "useful knowledge" tended to derive their theories from Lockean "tabula rasa" epistemology and Hartleian association psychology. Copleston, however explicitly rejected this epistemology and the systems of education based on it: "The mind, they tell us, may be moulded like wax, and

wax-work truly is all these plans will make of it".[36] Instead, as can be seen from the above quotations from Copleston's works, he spoke in the terminology of faculty psychology[37] and advocated the fostering and nurturing of the various talents of the mind. Thus Copleston was not only critical of Locke's theory of ideas, but also of the systems of education which resulted from it. Just as he believed in a certain intuitive element in the acquisition of knowledge, so too did he believe in the existence of certain innate talents and predispositions.

Sheldon Rothblatt, in his book Tradition and Change in English Liberal Education, describes how in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries educational debates were conducted in the terms of two competing epistemological theories. On the one side were Lockeans, Hartleians, and sensationalists of various kinds, whose educational theories were based on association psychology, and on the other those who believed in the existence of "innate powers, inborn sentiments or common sense", and who embraced the theorems of faculty psychology.[38] By mid-century, Rothblatt claims, faculty psychology had become the dominant theory and the cultivation of the mental faculties, or mind training, was widely accepted as the basic goal of education. In fact, Rothblatt discerns during this period a shift in what was understood by a "liberal" education. The eighteenth century concept was concerned with sociability, civility, and character formation. In Victorian times, by contrast, the emphasis was more on intellectual training, and the purpose of an university education was largely to exercise the mind.

> A liberal education, then, was a matter of mind-training. The value of a particular subject or discipline lay in the number of faculties it could cultivate, so that classical languages could be said to stimulate the logical faculties, and especially the faculty of memory, classical poetry the imaginative ones, classical rhetoric the moral faculties, and so on. The old virtues - glory, nobility of mind, dignity, generosity, liberality - for which one needed an exemplar slipped away, and cerebral qualities took their place. A change in education was made from social or socio-moral ends to intellectual means not directly related to those ends, and 'the minuter decencies and inferior duties' were sent packing.39

Copleston, as has been shown, stressed the importance of training the reasoning powers, of exercising the mind and developing its various faculties, and thus would seem to provide an illustration of Rothblatt's point regarding the shift in the concept of a liberal education. But as Rothblatt acknowledges, eighteenth century theories of character formation lingered on into the next century, and for Copleston, who was in many respects an eighteenth century man, character formation was definitely a part of his idea of liberal education. In fact, Copleston's idea of liberal education embraced not only mental characteristics, but also social, moral, and religious aspects.

It is clear from Copleston's writings that he believed that an university education should not only train the mind, but also the gentleman, as Newman still did forty years later. Copleston's adherence to the eighteenth century idea of a non-specialist, gentlemanly education is especially noticeable in his admiration of Locke's summary of the work of a "governor" or tutor. Here Copleston was for once in complete agreement with Locke, and he quoted this passage nearly in full in his Reply and referred to it in his

Commonplace book as "admirably written" and "a just compendium of the business of liberal education".[40]

> The great work of a governor is to fashion the carriage, and form the mind; to settle in his pupil good habits and the principles of virtue and wisdom; to give him, by little and little, a view of mankind; and work him into a love and imitation of what is excellent and praiseworthy; and in the prosecution of it, to give him vigour, activity, and industry. The studies which he sets him upon, are but, as it were, the exercises of his faculties, the employment of his time, to keep him from sauntering and idleness, to teach him application, and accustom him to take pains, and to give him some little taste of what his own industry must perfect. For who expects, that under a tutor a young gentleman should be an accomplished critic, orator, or logician, go to the bottom of metaphysics, natural philosophy, or mathematics; or be a master in history or chronology? Though something of each of these is to be taught him; but it is only to open the door, that he may look in, and, as it were, begin an acquaintance, but not to dwell there; and a governor would be much blamed, that should keep his pupil too long, and lead him too far in most of them. But of good breeding, knowledge of the world, virtue, industry, and a love of reputation, he cannot have too much: and if he have these, he will not want what he needs or desires of the other.[41]

In particular, Copleston agreed with Locke that the pupil, by which Copleston understood the university undergraduate, should not be expected to become an expert, but that his studies are "only to open the door, that he may look in, and, as it were, begin an acquaintance, but not to dwell there". As Copleston himself said,

> It is folly to think that everything which a man is to know must be taught him while young; as if he were to spring at once from College, and be intrusted with the immediate management of the world: as if life had no intervals for extending knowledge: as if intellectual exercise and the act of learning were unbecoming the state of manhood.[42]

This had important consequences for Copleston's views on university education. It led him to conclude, for example, that undergraduate

education should be concerned with received knowledge (an eighteenth century idea, as Rothblatt points out[43]), for it was ridiculous to expect the student to debate disputed points of theology, for instance, as this would be to ask him to run before he could walk. His answer to Sydney Smith, who had advocated that young men should dispute upon moral and political truth, form and pull down theories, and indulge in all the boldness of youthful discussion, was that some think "it best for us to learn something, before we dispute about everything".[44]

This was another reason for Copleston's preference for college rather than professorial instruction for undergraduates. The professorial lectures, he held, were not the best vehicle for conveying received knowledge. They were the means, rather, of communicating the results of private research, of "correcting errors of former systems, throwing light upon obscure points, enlarging, or improving, or enriching some department of science or philology", and were thus "designed for a class of auditors beyond the age of elementary instruction".[45] In those universities which were "still kept together by the fame of public lectures", Copleston claimed, the professors were continually aiming at some striking novelty in order to keep the attention of their class, and "hence a perpetual vacillation of doctrine [was] observable, whether in morals, in metaphysics, or in religion, according to the frequency of change in the professorial chair". This was proved, he held, by the situation in Germany, where each newly appointed professor immediately set about refuting the fundamental positions of his predecessor. It was a "notorious fact", Copleston said,

> that the German schools of theology teem with speculations of the boldest and most licentious kind, offered to the reception of hearers who cannot possibly judge of the soundness of those opinions which are propounded for the first time, and which, on that account, are sure to attract the greatest notice.[46]

The result of all this for the undergraduate, was that, even if they were not actually mislead with wrong information, yet a wrong bias was given to their studies and their minds were led away from "that orderly and proportionate arrangement which is the only solid foundation of useful knowledge". Surely, Copleston asked, there was "enough of what is undoubtedly true, and yet unknown to the learner, to occupy his mind" while the experts conduct their research and experiments in their own private studies and laboratories".[47]

But college instruction was also preferable because it helped develop the moral habits and social graces of the gentleman. Under the collegiate system of Oxford and Cambridge a young man's character was gradually and imperceptibly formed by the daily intercourse with fellow students and the supervision of college authorities.

> ...it is by the cultivation of literature and science under such circumstances that a man may truly be said to have had the advantages of liberal education; advantages by no means confined to the degree of proficiency he may have reached in those studies, but which are exemplified in a thousand ways, incapable of exact measurement, in the opinions, the habits, the tastes and feelings of the individual so trained.[48]

It was partly because of the lack of this collegiate system that Copleston objected to the proposed London University. The idea for a new university in London was first mooted in 1820 by the poet Thomas Campbell (1777-1844), and it received the support of Benthamites, Whigs, and Dissenters. Campbell was impressed by the Scottish and German universities, and the new university was to be organised along

German lines. It was to be a non-residential university in order to be more accessible to the middle classes, being intended for "the youth of our middling rich people",[49] who could not afford the expenses involved in an Oxford or Cambridge education.[50] Instruction was to be by means of professorial lectures rather than tutorials. The curriculum was to be wider and more professional than at Oxford, including medical, legal, economic, and engineering studies as well as classical. And it was to be non-denominational, with no tests or examinations in religion, and hence it gained the name of the "godless" university. It was the lack of religious tests which in particular attracted the support of Dissenters, barred as they were from the ancient universities.

The London University, then, challenged not only Oxford and Cambridge's monopoly over university education in England, but also the ideal of liberal education upheld in those universities.[51] Once again Copleston came to the defence of this ideal. In his article in the Quarterly Review Copleston pointed out some of the practical difficulties involved in setting up the London University, but more importantly he stressed the ways in which the proposed university would fall short of what a university should be. In particular, the article pointed out the error "of resolving EDUCATION into the mere acquisition of knowledge, or of applying that term at all to the single branch of it which is unconnected with religious instruction, and with the formation of manners and character".[52] The lack of a collegiate system would hamper the new university's ability to shape young men's manners and character, but an even more important

deficiency was its lack of religious instruction. Copleston disavowed any desire to exclude from the benefits of intellectual improvement all those who failed to accept the Anglican articles of faith, but he insisted that religious instruction was a necessary part of a liberal education. He maintained that religious knowledge was "not merely a code of agenda and credenda, a summary of articles, or a manual of devotion". Religious knowledge was in fact a fundamental part of knowledge: it was intimately connected "with the whole course of ancient history, with philology and criticism, with the study of the learned languages, with moral and metaphysical philosophy". It ran "parallel with the progress of the human mind in every liberal pursuit". To ignore religious knowledge was to give a one-sided education:

> If, indeed, the mind be carefully instructed in every other branch of liberal knowledge, without a corresponding acquaintance with that which is the most momentous of all, an undue bias must be given to the judgment: the topic which is not expanded in proportion to the rest, will virtually shrink into insignificance and be despised; its track will be forsaken, its treasures undiscovered, its domain uncultivated. We cannot, therefore, too earnestly insist upon the incompleteness of any system of education in which this main ingredient is wanting.[53]

On the grounds that religious instruction was a necessary element of a liberal education, Copleston was opposed to the admission of Dissenters to Oxford, for he did not think that such instruction could be carried out effectively if persons of all denominations were admitted. It is a moot point whether the religious instruction given at Oxford at this time was indeed very regular or thorough. The examination statute of 1800 did require all candidates for the B.A. degree to pass an examination in the elements of religion and the

thirty-nine articles, the two Professors of Divinity delivered courses of lectures, and, of course, there were regular university sermons. However, a former pupil at Christ Church, resident during the years 1810-1812, later complained,

> I was never once called upon to attend any lectures either upon theology or divinity; I never received any religious instruction whatever, apart from that which I derived from enforced attendance at chapel, and I am ashamed to say that I never during the whole period of my residence heard a single sermon.[54]

The Tractarian Frederick Oakeley was similarly critical of the lack of religious guidance at Christ Church when he was an undergraduate, although he does suggest that the situation was better at Oriel.[55]

Copleston, indeed, believed that the colleges had a responsibility to provide for the religious education of their students. The Provost's office, he thought, included spiritual as well as temporal duties, but more particularly, the office of tutor had both academic and pastoral aspects. Besides supervising his student's studies, a tutor should observe his conduct" and see more especially that his religious instruction went on".[56] By 1832 he was of the opinion that the situation throughout the university had improved:

> There is not however at present, I am happy to say, that carelessness and levity and inattention to the sacred character of the profession for which most academics are intended, which was formerly perceptible in our universities. There are, I believe, in most colleges lectures in the Greek Testament, in the articles of religion, and in the matters most connected with clerical duties - and according to the character of the tutor (which of course varies in different societies) these lectures are

> more or less efficient. Their general effect is, I am persuaded, highly beneficial.[57]

Although this passage refers primarily to the education of those intending to take orders, their education was the same as that of other students, and thus it indicates a general improvement as far as religious education is concerned, an improvement noted by others as well.[58]

The above quotation indicates that Copleston accepted the widely held view that part of the purpose of the universities was to train clergy for the Anglican church,[59] and that the universities were in fact the bulwarks of the church. Copleston maintained that there was an "essential and indissoluble" union between the ancient universities and the established church. Not only did the universities supply the church with its ministers, but, just as historically they had been formed partly for the purpose of "raising the character of religion in England", so even now it was their duty to guard against religious error, fraud, and fanaticism.[60]

Traditionally, however, the universities had served another purpose as well. Copleston pointed out in his "London University" article that the universities, whose object had originally been to provide for the "three great professions of theology, law and physic", had come to provide education also for the sons of the nobility and gentry, and he believed that it was part of the universities' purpose to cater for the "class destined to fill the higher ranks and the more liberal employments of life".[61] He considered that the universities

provided a "system of national education"[62] and consequently owed a duty to society.

University education, then, should not only be of benefit to the individual and the church, but should also serve the needs of the nation as a whole. The claims of all three needed to be balanced. Regarding the opposition of individual and society Copleston argued that any system of education which aimed solely at the material advantage and prosperity of the individual was "narrow, selfish, and mercenary".[63] On the other hand, the individual should not be sacrificed to the needs of society. Specialisation, for example, could be useful to the community and could contribute to the accumulation of national wealth, but it was detrimental to the individual: his mental powers and habits became contracted and he became merely a cog in a machine, "useful in its place, but insignificant and worthless out of it". "The advantage of the community", Copleston concluded, "is nearly in an inverse ratio with his own". However, Copleston was convinced that in practice these extremes could be avoided, for "reason and common sense require that neither an individual's advantage nor advantage of the community should be exclusively regarded".[64]

The liberal education which Copleston advocated did, he believed, benefit both the individual and society in general. The benefits to the individual have already been discussed. But a liberal education was also "useful" to society, "useful" in a deeper sense than that contemplated by the proponents of professional education. For society requires more from the individual than just the particular duties of

his profession. A narrow professional education encourages man's tendency to become engrossed in his own interests and occupations, and to under-rate the importance of those of which he knows nothing. "In the cultivation of literature", however, "is found that common link, which among the higher and middling departments of life, unites the jarring sects and subdivisions in one interest, which supplies common topics, and kindles common feelings, unmixed with those narrow prejudices with which all professions are more or less infected".[65]

Copleston's conviction that the university had a duty not only to the individual and to the church, but to the nation as a whole explains his attitude to various educational issues. For example, his emphasis on undergraduate education was due to his belief that conveying instruction "to the minds of the great majority of students...is the prime object in any system of national education".[66] Hence his stress on teaching rather than research, and his preference for college tuition rather than public lectures. Teaching, he thought, was more "useful" than the "shewy business of authorship and public lectures", and a thirst for distinction, he argued, should not be allowed to interfere "with homely duties more really important to mankind".[67] Oxford, as a seat of national education, could best fulfil her duty to society by providing all her students with a liberal education:

> If we send out into the world an annual supply of men, whose minds are imbued with literature according to their several measures of capacity, impressed with what we hold to be the soundest principles of policy and religion, grounded in the elements of science, and taught how they may direct their efforts to further attainments in that line; if, with this common stock, of which they all partake, they be encouraged afterwards to strike off into the several professions and employments of life, to engage in the public service of the state, or to watch over and manage the lesser circle of affairs, which the independent gentlemen of this country,

> and of this country only, conduct in their respective neighbourhoods; I think we do a greater and more solid good to the nation, than if we fought to extend over Europe the fame of a few exalted individuals, or to acquire renown by exploring untrodden regions, and by holding up to the world, ever ready to admire what is new, the fruits of our discovery.[68]

Copleston was well aware that the supply of young men which the universities sent out into the world was too small to meet the needs of the nation or to satisfy the growing demand for higher education. Copleston urged the universities to do more to respond to this demand. His article on the London University ended with a plea to the established universities to be more conscious of their duty to society and to remove defects which stood in the way of their public usefulness. One of these defects, in Copleston's opinion, was the waste of college rooms. In his own college he did his best to accept as many students as possible. He was most particular about the use of college rooms, discouraging fellows who were not involved in tutoring from occupying rooms, and during his Provostship additional sets of rooms were built, with a resultant jump in the intake of students.[69] Copleston appears to have striven for a number of years to get the university to accept its duty to cater for more students, but in the end he recognised that

> It is not the <u>interest</u> of any College, as a body, to increase the number of their undergraduate members, and it is but too evident that public spirit alone, without the concurrence of interest, or without some impulse given from a powerful quarter, is insufficient to induce men to make this sacrifice, and to burden themselves with the trouble and anxiety attending upon increased numbers of young men.[70]

Consequently, he favoured the scheme of university extension by means of the building of new halls. This concern for public usefulness is attested to by his nephew, who wrote that Copleston "would sometimes

express freely and strongly his regrets, that some of our collegiate societies had not done more towards meeting the educational demands of the age".[71]

Copleston did not rule out the possibility or the legality of government interference in the affairs of the university. Although in his Reply he advised caution when it came to altering founders' wills, and later hoped that the universities would reform themselves, he no-where denied the right of Parliament "to do their best to render the University establishments more subservient to the good of the nation".[72] In fact, in 1837 Copleston wrote to Hawkins that he intended to oppose Lord Radnor's bill for a university commission, but not "on the ground of such institutions being exempt from the controul of Govt. or of Parlt. If they have privileges from the State, they are amenable to the State..."[73]

However, the threat of government intervention in order to force the universities to open their gates to Dissenters put Copleston in an awkward position, for the admission of Dissenters would disrupt that union between the established church and the universities which Copleston so valued, and interfere with the role of the universities as bulwarks of the church. Copleston's conception of the dual role of the university, as serving both church and state, was perhaps feasible in the early years of the century when the alliance of church and state remained intact,[74] but this alliance was weakened by the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828 and by Catholic emancipation in 1829. This legislation would logically seem to entail that the

university, if an institution of national education, should be open to Dissenters and Roman Catholics, who now had full rights of citizenship. For how could the university be said to serve the state if it continued to turn away all who were not members of the Church of England? This Copleston was reluctant to accept. However, he finally came to the conclusion that some compromise was necessary, and thus he was prepared to accept at Oxford the arrangement which already prevailed at Cambridge, that is, that Dissenters be admitted to colleges on the understanding that they would conform to the religious discipline of the college. "Degrees, will I trust", he declared, "not be conferred in either University except on condition of conformity".[75] In this way, education would be offered to all, but control of the university would be kept in Anglican hands, and Anglican religious instruction could be continued.

Copleston's ideal of liberal education and his idea of the university, like his theology, consisted essentially of a balance of competing elements, a balance which similarly proved difficult to maintain. Copleston's defence of Oxford education and his outline of liberal education in his Reply to the Edinburgh Review won him the gratitude and admiration of Oxford men. It was an ideal embraced by Newman in his Idea of a University, where he quotes from Copleston's Reply and acknowledges his debt to him.[76] But despite its appeal, it was an ideal which was easily distorted by an undue emphasis on one or other of its constituent parts. Copleston himself considered that the Tractarians were guilty of this, for in 1844 he wrote to a friend concerning Oxford and the Tractarian movement,

> When mystical divinity has had its run, perhaps the other purposes of life, for which our faculties were given us, will begin to receive due attention at Oxford. For the last two years, I understand, Oxford has exhibited a practical specimen of the Caliph Omar's maxim - "Burn the books: if they are in accordance with our faith, they are useless; if against it, they ought to be destroyed". Science and literature will now, I trust, raise their heads again.[77]

Copleston's idea of the dual purpose of the university as serving both church and state was just as difficult to maintain, although the Noetics, on the whole, tried to be true to it. The Tractarians, on the other hand abandoned the attempt to keep a balance. They were in no doubt where their allegiance lay: for them the university was first and foremost a religious institution.

There is, then, in Copleston's educational thought a certain conflict, an attempt to balance competing principles or theories. Copleston was not successful in resolving this conflict, but nevertheless his views are important,for his writings raised early in the century a number of issues which were to be hotly debated by mid-century. In fact, in some respects Copleston was in the vanguard of educational developments of the nineteenth century. This was so, for example, with regard to his interest in and his emphasis on teaching. Rothblatt states that initially "the most conspicuous influence of the revival of learning was on teaching". The primary purpose of the Royal Commission of 1850, Rothblatt declares, was to improve teaching at Oxford and Cambridge.[78] The Royal Commission also considered other points which Copleston had touched on, for instance, the respective merits of professorial and tutorial instruction. Indeed, many of the issues tackled by Copleston continued, and continue, to be debated. The problem of what constitutes a "liberal

education" is not easily solved. And is a "liberal education" to be preferred to a professional education? Tied up with this is the question of the "usefulness" of an university education and the purpose of the university. In what sense should an university education be "useful", and what is the role of the university? Is it to advance knowledge, or to serve the needs of society, the state, or the government? Is teaching more "useful" than research, and, moreover, is some type of research more "useful" (and therefore worthy of more funds) than another? The problems which Copleston considered have their modern equivalents, and like Copleston, modern educationalists are still trying to achieve a balance between competing ideas. Thus perhaps we should not be too critical of Copleston if he failed to resolve these issues as they applied to the circumstances of his own day.

Section 7. Copleston. A Liberal Conservative

At first sight Copleston appears a confusing figure, a practical man who was interested in metaphysics, and whose writings present conflicting ideas without on the surface giving the impression of inconsistency. He has, indeed, caused problems for historians who have wished to use neat categories such as liberal or conservative, Whig or Tory, Low Church or High Church. Overton was one who found Copleston difficult to classify. He noted Copleston's comment that he was more of a High Churchman than most of the so-called High Churchmen at Oxford, but pointed out also that Copleston had the respect, which he reciprocated, of the Evangelical Charles Simeon. It is obvious that Copleston cannot be classed as an Evangelical, but Overton was also of the opinion that he was never really a High Churchman. Although Overton included Copleston in his chapter on "The Liberals", he concluded that he belonged to that party "only in a very limited sense", and said that "it is impossible to label Copleston as belonging to any party, and it is only his friendship with the Noetics which his position at Oriel brought about that renders it necessary to mention him in this connection at all".[1] This statement would seem to indicate that Overton's understanding of the Noetics was inadequate, for the relationship between Copleston and the other Noetics was more than just friendship. The Noetics in general shared many of Copleston's views, and if Copleston is not to be classed as a "Liberal", then the liberalism of the Noetics must also be suspect. "Liberalism" is a word with a number of meanings, and it is necessary to make clear in what sense, if any, Copleston is to be regarded as "liberal".

Politically, Whately stated, Copleston was "a most decided Tory". However, as Whately pointed out, he disagreed with the Tory Administration over the removal of Roman Catholic disabilities and on the currency question. In Whately's opinion, Copleston was not "one of those bigots to political party who cannot see, or, at least, will not acknowledge, any good on one side, or any error on the other".[2] On the subject of the Reform Bill, although he wished for moderate reform and initially voted against the Bill only because he thought the proposed reform too radical, he was critical of "the Moderate Reformers" (that is, Peel and his supporters) for not proposing a reform of their own, and he finally came to the conclusion that reform was absolutely necessary to avoid civil unrest, and that only the Whigs could carry it through.[3]

Although a Tory, then, Copleston sometimes found himself supporting what would seem to be liberal reforms, favoured by the Whigs. For this reason he is classed among the Liberal Tories by such historians as W.R. Ward and R. Brent. Copleston's politics in general appear a mixture of liberal and conservative. Indeed, Copleston objected to the concession of the term "liberal" to the opposite political party, although he was satisfied with the term "conservative":

> I hate, as you do, the word liberal and I wonder at the concession made by the constitutional party of this title to their opponents. Conservative is not so objectionable for it expresses the very notion of constitutional, implying that there is a party in the country of a revolutionary character - whose object is to destroy that which we seek to preserve.[4]

He supported reforms such as the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts and the removal of Catholic disabilities, and yet, on the other hand, opposed the grant to Maynooth College and the Jews Bill. His support of Catholic emancipation was admittedly largely on grounds of expediency, as he himself stressed, but behind it was what would seem to be a liberal principle, "that religious tests and exclusion from civil office on account of error in Christian belief, are unjustifiable except on the principle of defence".[5] Just what threat the Jews posed it is difficult to imagine. Obviously Copleston must have seen a difference between error in Christian belief, and error in religious belief. Copleston's opposition to the Maynooth grant is perhaps more easily justified, for toleration need not entail support. Thus even in 1829, when Copleston was considering voting for Catholic emancipation, he wrote that nothing would induce him "to join in voting for the support of popery - or in allowing the R.C. anything like a legal establishment in Ireland".[6] Copleston, then, tended to support limited reform despite a basic conservatism.[7]

It was not in the political sphere, however, that Copleston played his main role in life. Although a member of the House of Lords, he did not contribute much to parliamentary debates,[8] speaking only rarely and mostly on religious or educational issues. It is in these areas that we must look for the significance of Copleston.

In the field of education Copleston supported and was actively involved in university reform. Reform did not always come as quickly as Copleston desired and at times Copleston felt frustrated. In a letter written soon after he had left Oxford to take up his episcopal

duties, he likened a meeting of Trustees at Caerleon to "one of our meetings of Heads of Houses about a proposition for reform - prejudice, and timidity, and indolence, opposed to all reasoning and all attempts at improvement".[9] Copleston, then, was a reformer. But the reforms which he advocated were not revolutionary. This fact is noted by R.G. McPherson, who points out that Copleston proposed no major innovations in the curricula or teaching methods of the universities and argues that his educational ideas were essentially traditional. But at the same time McPherson acknowledges that Copleston strove to improve the university and was instrumental in raising educational standards, in particular by making Oriel "an ideal for the emulation of the rest of the University". He concludes that

> Copleston's ideology was not unique, on the contrary, it was a coherent statement of what had become traditional. But it embodied ideas that had not currently been voiced with such force and publicity. It articulated a high ideal at a time when university men seriously needed such a thing around which to rally, in the face of the criticism of men who could not see beneath superficialities.[10]

Copleston, in fact, had no wish to change the traditional character of the university, but rather believed that the spirit could best be preserved by changing the letter of the statutes. Moreover, the reforms which were necessary, whether in church, state, or university, were best achieved, he held, by a gradual process of adaptation to the circumstances of the time. He disliked "the restlessness and love of change inherent in man" and dreaded "all sudden and theoretical measures".[11] Thus he advised Newman, on the latter's appointment to the position of treasurer at Oriel, not to be content with following precedent blindly, but to accommodate his method "to the changes which Time is forever bringing on, and study continued improvement, which is the way in all things to prevent both

degeneracy and revolution".[12] These views indicate that in education, as in politics, Copleston can be regarded as a liberal conservative.

Even though Copleston's ideas were not new or revolutionary, his importance should not be underestimated. The university reforms of the first decade of the nineteenth century were not revolutionary in the curriculum which they established, but were on the contrary traditional and conservative. And yet these reforms revitalized university studies and transformed the attitudes of both dons and undergraduates. Oriel was in the forefront of this revival of learning, and in Oriel the influence of Copleston is undeniable. Oriel men wholeheartedly embraced the idea of the university which Copleston had eloquently expressed. Thus Copleston continued to exert an influence on Oxford even after he had departed in 1828, for the younger Noetics took an active part in the educational debates of the 'thirties and 'forties. Moreover, developments at Oxford had repercussions beyond the walls of Oxford, and inevitably had an effect on the public schools which supplied the university with its undergraduates. One of the Noetics, in fact, had a direct and important impact on the public school system - Thomas Arnold at Rugby.

Nor was it just on educational matters that the younger Noetics followed Copleston's lead. Copleston's religious views were likewise embraced by the Noetics[13], and in the 'twenties their brand of theology was widely accepted both within Oxford and without. As in his educational, so too in his theological position, Copleston was traditional and orthodox, without being opposed to reform and improvement. Consequently, he was placed by Storr in the more liberal

wing of the old High Church or Orthodox party.[14] But even more important than Copleston's various theological opinions is his method of supporting those opinions. Copleston's philosophical deliberations encouraged those whom he influenced to look closely at their beliefs, to consider evidence, probability, and the grounds of faith, to seek a reasonable faith and to aim at moderation. Nor did his influence stop with the Noetics, but through them reached a wider audience. It could well be argued that it touched Newman himself, that Newman's interest in the certainty of faith was a result of his early Oriel training. Moreover, in the Broad Church movement we meet once again that search for moderation and a reasonable faith that was characteristic of the Noetics.

CHAPTER 2. ORIEL IN THE 'TWENTIES

At the beginning of the third decade of the nineteenth century Copleston was the most widely known and respected member of Oriel College. During the 'twenties, however, other members of the Noetic group gradually emerged from his shadow, and began to assume university duties and office, and to venture into print. Through Copleston's influence with Lord Grenville Richard Whately was appointed Principal of St. Alban Hall in 1825,[1] and thus joined Copleston as a member of the Hebdomadal Board. In 1827 Baden Powell became Savilian Professor of Geometry, and began his long fight to improve the status of scientific studies at Oxford. Whately, too, became a professor two years later, when he succeeded his former pupil Nassau Senior in the newly established Drummond chair of Political Economy. On the elevation of Copleston to the bench of bishops Oriel was in need of a new Provost, and early in 1828 Edward Hawkins was elected by the fellows to fill this position.

With Whately and Hawkins now part of the ruling hierarchy of the university they took over from Copleston the task of attempting to improve Oxford education. From 1825 the examination statute had once again been under review, and in 1829 a committee was appointed by the Hebdomadal Board to discuss a new statute. Whately and Hawkins were members of this committee, and the report which it submitted to the Board, according to W.R. Ward, "bore the mark of the powerful mind of Richard Whately, and of his old Oriel friends such as R.D. Hampden".[2] Certainly, among the recommendations were at least two proposals

advocated by Whately, firstly, that logic should not be compulsory for the ordinary degree but that mathematics should be allowed as an alternative,[3] and secondly that a matriculation examination should be instituted to raise the standard of university entrance. The latter suggestion was not acted upon, but the former was ratified by Convocation in November 1830.

In the following year Whately was appointed Archbishop of Dublin, to the surprise of friend and foe alike, for Whately's rather eccentric behaviour and unconventional views made him seem unlikely material for an archbishopric. Tales of Whately's eccentric behaviour abound. For example, Caroline Fox noted in her journal that Whately "once pronounced the benediction with one leg hanging over the reading-desk in church".[4] Copleston, in fact, thought that Whately had certain "defects of manner", in particular the want of a conciliatory manner and too great an indifference to public opinion, which would be a disadvantage in an archbishop.[5]

With Whately's elevation Hawkins was left as the sole Noetic on the Hebdomadal Board, until joined by Hampden in 1833, when the latter was appointed Principal of St. Mary Hall. In this capacity as a member of the board Hawkins was to play a significant role in the controversies of the next two decades. In the 'thirties, when it was proposed to substitute a declaration for the matriculation subscription, it was Hawkins who was entrusted with the job of drafting the declaration. Pusey's biographer, H.P. Liddon, maintained that it was Hawkins, too, who drew up the Board's condemnation of

Tract 90 in 1841, and who was the "principal author" of the measures taken against Ward in 1844/5.[6] Hawkins was indeed very hostile to Ward, suggesting to the Vice-Chancellor that Ward be asked to subscribe again to the thirty-nine articles, and was involved in the preparation of the statutes aimed at Ward and the Tractarians.[7] Moreover, some eighteen months previously he had been one of the "six doctors" who condemned Pusey's sermon on the Holy Eucharist and had, after an initial hesitation, agreed in that tribunal's suspension of Pusey from preaching within the university for a period of two years.[8] The Tractarians, then, were justified in viewing Hawkins as one of their main opponents on the Hebdomadal Board. Church, in fact, places Hawkins among the three most influential men on the Board, all three of whom he says were hostile to Tractarianism.[9]

In the 'forties this hostility was also expressed in print and the Noetics were outspoken in their criticisms of Tractarianism, but in the 'twenties they were still in the process of establishing their reputations in the publishing world. As early as 1819 both Whately and Hawkins had had works published - Whately, his Historic Doubts (this, however, being an anonymous publication, did not bring his name before the public), and Hawkins, his sermon on The Use and Importance of Unauthoritative Tradition, a sermon which may have passed almost unnoticed at the time, apart from a review by Whately in the Quarterly,[10] but which in retrospect assumed some significance. Hawkins published another sermon in 1825, and during this same year and the following year Baden Powell was writing articles for the British Critic and the Christian Remembrancer, as well as his attack

on Unitarianism, Rational Religion Examined. The editor of the Christian Remembrancer at this time was Renn Dickson Hampden, and he too published his first works during the 'twenties: his Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity in 1827, and a volume of Parochial Sermons in 1828. At the end of the decade, during the controversy over Roman Catholic emancipation, Thomas Arnold, who in 1828 had been engaged as headmaster of Rugby school, aired his pamphlet on The Christian Duty of Conceding the Claims of the Roman Catholics. But it was Whately who was the busiest with his pen, publishing during the decade well over a dozen books, sermons, pamphlets or reviews. In fact, it was Whately who succeeded Copleston as the best-known of the Noetics, and by the 'thirties was seen as the leader of the group.[11] The prominence of Whately is illustrated by Newman in the Apologia, where he relates how, when presenting some of the first Tracts to a country clergyman in 1833, he was challenged suspiciously, "Whether Whately was at the bottom of them?"[12]

Section 1. Richard Whately

(i) Richard Whately and the theory of knowledge

Richard Whately was born on 1st February, 1787. He matriculated at Oriel College in 1805, and took his B.A. degree, with a mediocre double second class, in 1808. In 1811 he was elected fellow of Oriel. As an undergraduate at Oriel he attended Copleston's lectures, as well as those of the other tutor, William Bishop. Whately's opinion of the respective merits of the two tutors was vastly different. Although he respected the personal character of Bishop, he felt that Bishop must have over-rated his own abilities, or else he would not have undertaken the duties of a college tutor, "for which he was as utterly incompetent as I am to command a fleet in the Baltic".[1] Copleston, on the other hand, was in Whately's opinion everything that a student could hope for in a tutor, and their early tutor-pupil relationship developed into a life-long friendship. Whately himself, while fellow of Oriel, undertook the duties of college tutor, besides coaching private pupils.[2] His teaching methods, however, were not those of a coach cramming students for their degree. Like Copleston, he did not see it as the teacher's job to pour in knowledge. He preferred instead to arouse his pupils' curiosity, which he believed to be "the first business of the teacher (first not only in point of time, but of importance)", and to make them think. "No half notions, no ill-digested facts, no confusion of thought or vagueness of language, were suffered to pass muster".[3]

During his years as fellow of Oriel Whately took an energetic part in the common-room debates. Up to Whately's election as fellow,

John Davison had dominated these debates, but Whately, on his arrival in the common-room, challenged this supremacy. It was said that he and Davison "crammed habitually for post-prandial talk", and visitors to the common-room often found the enjoyment of their evening spoilt by these "animated dialectics". Whately obviously relished a good argument. He liked, he said, to have an anvil on which to beat out his thoughts. But those who served as the anvil did not always appreciate the experience:

> ...in the debates of Common rooms, Whately, as he went with head up and heavy tread, trampling down opposition as an elephant treads down brushwood, left behind him many sorely mauled, who did not forget the treatment they received.[4]

In 1821 Whately resigned his fellowship in order to marry, and left Oxford to take up the benefice of Halesworth in Suffolk. He returned again in 1825 as Principal of St. Alban Hall, the duties of which position he carried out with his habitual energy. His university career came to an end in 1831 with his appointment to the archbishopric of Dublin, but although he left Oxford this did not signal an end to his interest in Oxford affairs. During the Oxford Movement, in particular, he watched with alarm the developments there, and in 1844 even intervened directly, writing to the Vice Chancellor urging the Hebdomadal Board to take action against W.G. Ward.

Copleston, like everyone else, was greatly surprised by Whately's appointment as archbishop, but he was confident in his ability to rise to the task.[5] Copleston, in fact, had a very high opinion of Whately's character and talents,[6] a respect which was more than reciprocated by Whately. Whately's works contain numerous references to the intellectual debt which he owed to Copleston, and as late as

1848 he wrote to him, "Even when I apply the principles I have derived from you, differently from yourself, and we are thus placed on opposite sides as to some practical question, still, you may fairly say 'that is my thunder'!"[7]

Whately's debt to Copleston is nowhere more obvious than in his Elements of Logic. In the Dedication and Preface to the Logic Whately acknowledged this debt, saying that when commissioned to write an article on logic for the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana (an article which he subsequently republished with additions as the Elements of Logic), he had obtained permission from Copleston "to make use of manuscripts compiled in great measure from what I had heard from him in conversations on the subject, or which he had read to me from his Commonplace book, interspersed with observations of my own".[8] When Whately edited Copleston's Remains he complained that this acknowledgement of Copleston's help in the formulation of the Logic had been overlooked and that Copleston had not received due credit.[9]

This is a trend that has continued, despite the fact that Copleston's influence on Whately is generally admitted. Indeed, after Whately's death, his friend W.J. Fitzpatrick suggested in his Memoirs of Richard Whately that Whately had been over-generous to Copleston in the Preface to his Logic.[10] More recently, Gillian Evans has discussed the part Newman played in the composition of the Logic, for Whately also acknowledged the help of Newman, saying, "I cannot avoid particularizing the Rev. J. Newman, Fellow of Oriel College, who actually composed a considerable portion of the work as it now stands,

from manuscripts not designed for publication, and who is the original author of several pages".[11] Evans holds that a good deal more than these few pages "retained the stamp of Newman's thought", although she admits that Newman himself considered the Logic as entirely Whately's book and his own role as that of a mere amanuensis and sorter of notes. According to Evans, Newman claimed as his own work only a small section on the history of logic near the beginning of the Introduction, and some contribution to the "Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning", which Evans says "certainly has an air of Newman about it".[12] It is interesting to note that it was just this section of the book where, according to Whately himself, Copleston's influence was greatest, and that Whately, after acknowledging the assistance of Newman and Nassau Senior, went on to say that Copleston "contributed far more, and that, in the most important parts, than all others together".[13] Evans, however, makes no mention of Copleston.

While the Logic must be considered as Whately's work, rather than Newman's or Copleston's,[14] there are enough similarities between the Logic and Copleston's Commonplace book to suggest that Whately was right to confess his debt to Copleston. In fact, the Logic formalizes, illustrates, and follows out the implications of many of the points found scattered in Copleston's Commonplace book, and the main line of thinking is the same. It seems likely that as far as his philosophical ideas are concerned, Whately followed along in the direction in which he was first pointed by Copleston. As a student he was no doubt introduced by Copleston to the writings of the Scottish Common Sense philosophers, for the Logic reveals an acquaintance with

their works, especially those of Stewart. But Whately does not appear to have been as interested as Copleston was in highly speculative philosophical questions, and sometimes mentions such theories only to pass over them as having no practical relevance to the point under discussion.[15] This accords with A.C. Fraser's summary of Whately's intellectual strengths and weaknesses. Fraser described Whately as practical rather than theoretical. He said that Whately "instinctively turned aside from the depths of properly philosophical investigation", and that his contribution to philosophy consisted, not in original thought, but in the clarity of his restatements of the conclusions of other philosophers, and in the ability to provide appropriate examples and connect the theories "with the common experience of life".[16]

Whately began his Logic with a defence of Aristotelian logic and an exposition of its true purpose, an exposition which was a restatement of the position which Copleston had maintained over fifteen years before in The Examiner Examined and the "Replies" to the Edinburgh Review. Like Copleston, he argued that Aristotelian logic and Baconian induction are not opposed.[17] Induction, according to Whately, is concerned with investigation, deductive logic with reasoning. The inductive process is "that by which we gain what are properly new truths; and which is not connected with Logic; being not what is strictly called Reasoning, but Investigation".[18] Deduction, on the other hand, is not a means to new truth, but is simply the process of reasoning. Also like Copleston, Whately insisted that induction and deduction are not two distinct types of

reasoning, but that all inductive arguments contain a suppressed premise and are capable of being put in syllogistic form, a view still occasionally maintained today. In other words, strictly speaking all argumentation is deductive, induction being merely the investigation and collection of facts from which an inference is made: "Induction means properly, not the inference of the conclusion, but the bringing in, one by one, of instances bearing on the point in question, till a sufficient number has been collected".[19] Whately, then, made the same distinction as Copleston between investigation and reasoning, induction and deduction, and argued that logic is not concerned with the discovery of new truths.

In the section entitled "On the Discovery of Truth" Whately appears to add to Copleston's argument. He says that there are two kinds of "new truth" or "discovery" - "physical discoveries" and "logical discoveries". "Physical discoveries" include all matters of fact which could not be discovered by means of reasoning alone. "Logical discoveries" are those which may be elicited by reasoning, although they may be initially as unknown as "physical discoveries". They do not in fact rely on observation or testimony, but are implied in what we already know, and thus may be "discovered" by reasoning from that knowledge. Evans notes that when Newman inspected the early drafts of Whately's Logic, he found that this section was one of the parts drafted in Newman's handwriting,[20] and so perhaps this departure from Copleston's terminology marks the contribution which Newman is supposed to have made to the dissertation on the Province of Reasoning.

However, the different terminology does not mark a difference of opinion with Copleston. Whately, in fact, dismisses the terminology as unimportant:

> It is a question comparatively unimportant, whether the term "Discovery" shall or shall not be extended to the eliciting of those Truths, which, being implied in our previous knowledge, may be established by mere strict Reasoning.[21]

What was important, though, both to Whately and Copleston, was not to confuse these two types of discoveries. Mathematics, and a great part of law and ethics, are concerned solely with logical discoveries, they "involve no assertion as to real matters of fact".[22] Matters of fact cannot be discovered by reasoning alone, but also require observation or testimony. Thus the certainty of these discoveries rely not only on the accuracy of the reasoning process, but also on the accuracy of the initial observation or testimony, and so cannot amount to mathematical certainty. "No matter of fact can be mathematically demonstrated; though it may be proved in such a manner as to leave no doubt on the mind".[23] To revert to Copleston's terminology, matters of fact involve investigation as well as reasoning, and can amount only to moral certainty, not demonstrative proof. In regard to law and ethics, Whately made another point which is found in Copleston's Commonplace book. He stated that although ethical and legal reasonings resemble mathematics in some ways, they have this difference:

> that not only men are not so completely agreed respecting the maxims and principles of Ethics and Law, but the meaning also of each Term cannot be absolutely, and for ever, fixed by an arbitrary definition; on the contrary, a great part

> of our labour consists in distinguishing accurately the various senses in which men employ each Term, - ascertaining which is the most proper, - and taking care to avoid confounding them together.[24]

In law and ethics, then, investigation involves the meaning of words.

Whately followed Copleston in emphasizing the importance of words and language. As for Copleston, so for Whately logic was the "art of employing language properly for the purpose of reasoning".

> ...Logic is entirely conversant about language. If any process of reasoning can take place, in the mind, without any employment of language, orally or mentally, (a metaphysical question which I shall not here discuss) such a process does not come within the province of the science here treated of...[25]

In opposition to the Scottish Common Sense philosophers, who were trying to widen the study of logic into the philosophy of mind, Copleston and Whately restricted logic to the study of reasoning and, in fact, to the study of language.[26] In this they are in close sympathy with more modern schools of philosophy, such as the linguistic philosophy of Wittgenstein. Whately also disagreed with the Scottish philosophers (or at least with Sir William Hamilton) on the metaphysical question which he here passes over. Hamilton, in his review of Whately's Logic, besides challenging Whately's view that "logic is entirely conversant about language", declared confidently that Whately could not surely sanction the "psychological hypothesis...once and again refuted", regarding "the absolute dependence of the mental faculties on language".[27] However, that Whately did indeed consider that language is necessary for thought (at least abstract thought and reasoning), is suggested by other passages in the Logic and elsewhere.[28]

Logic, then, for Whately was the science of reasoning, and reasoning, as Whately pointed out, was liable to three defects; that is, terms were liable to be indistinct, propositions to be false, and arguments inconclusive. Logic was strictly only applicable to the last defect, although it was useful indirectly and to a certain extent in preventing the first two. However, as Copleston said, this did not indicate the uselessness of logic, but merely the importance of words, and the dangers of amgibuity. In the first appendix, on ambiguous terms, Whately explained a number of common words which were likely to be used ambiguously, including some of Copleston's favourites, such as "certain", "possible", "necessary", "truth", for, as Whately observed,

> words whose ambiguity is most frequently overlooked, and is productive of the greatest amount of confusion of thought and fallacy, are among the commonest, and are those of whose meaning the generality consider there is the least room to doubt. It is indeed from those very circumstances that the danger arises; words in very common use are both the most liable, from the looseness of ordinary discourse, to slide from one sense into another, and also the least likely to have the ambiguity suspected. Familiar acquaintance is perpetually mistaken for accurate knowledge.[29]

Ambiguity was dangerous, Whately thought, because it frequently led to mistaking verbal questions for real. He maintained that all disputes were either verbal or real; that is, either people agreed in their opinion of the matter of fact and disagreed only on the meanings of the terms employed, or else they agreed in their use of terms, but disagreed as to the matter of fact. In short, in verbal questions the disagreement was about words, in real questions it was about things. When verbal questions were mistaken for real, when words were taken for things, the result was generally logomachy.[30]

Whately, then, like Copleston, frequently warned against mistaking words for things.[31] This error Whately considered to be fostered by the Realist notion of the real existence of "Universals". The Nominalist and Realist disputes of the middle ages Whately seems to have looked upon with disdain as an example of party-spirit and persecution. Nevertheless, he agreed with the Nominalist position. The Realist theory he considered absurd.[32] The Conceptualist viewpoint, as represented by Locke, is usually regarded as a variation of Nominalism. Whately, however, appears to have regarded it as simply a variation of Realism, in that, although the conceptualists did not maintain that abstract ideas or universals have an existence independent of the human mind, as did Plato, yet they held that these abstract ideas could exist in the mind independently of language and that language merely supplied them with a name. Whately, however, believed that even if such abstract ideas did actually exist in the mind, a point which he doubted, language was necessary when it came to reasoning. Language, in fact, was "an indispensable instrument of all Reasoning". It was a characteristic of man, he thought, to employ general terms "formed by Abstraction, as instruments of thought; by which alone a train of Reasoning may be carried on".[33]

From this it can be seen that Whately concurred with Copleston in the rejection of Lockean "ideas", and, in fact, on questions of philosophy, and in particular on the theory of knowledge, Whately was in general agreement with Copleston. Knowledge Whately defined as consisting of three things: truth, proof, and conviction (that is, in modern terms, knowledge is justified, true belief). All three must be

present if one is to attain knowledge. One cannot know something that is not true. Nor can one claim to know something "unless there is sufficient proof to justify such confidence". And finally, although the conditions of truth and proof may be fulfilled, one cannot be said to know a thing unless one is convinced by that proof.[34] The significance of this for religious knowledge, as far as Whately was concerned, was that it underlined the importance of evidence. A person cannot be said to know that Christianity is true, unless he is aware of the evidence in favour of it, and unless that evidence is sufficient to produce conviction. In brief, truth and belief are insufficient without evidence. Consequently, we find that Whately, throughout his life, put great emphasis on the evidences of Christianity and believed that they should be widely taught.[35] Whately's Remains contains an interesting comparison of the Agapemonist claim that "Brother Prince" was an incarnation of the Holy Ghost with Jesus' claim to be the Son of God, Whately wrote:

> what difference is there except what is derived from an appeal to the Reason? i.e. that the one gave proof by His miracles of the truth of the claim, and the other, none at all... No difference, then, can be made out, except the difference of evidence and no evidence. The case is altogether one of an appeal to the understanding in judging of evidence.[36]

This emphasis on the evidences of Christianity, in particular the external evidences of miracle and prophecy, was a typical characteristic of late eighteenth century apologetics, the foremost exponent being William Paley. This evidential school of theology continued well into the nineteenth century, and Paley's book, The Evidences of Christianity, was its manual. At Cambridge, Paley's

influence was particularly strong, and his Evidences had been part of the curriculum since 1787. At Oxford Paley was less popular, though still highly respected in many quarters.[37] Whately, for one, appreciated Paley's Evidences and brought out his own annotated edition in 1859.[38] But although there was no lack of exponents of Paleyan evidential apologetics, there was a growing trend in the nineteenth century to turn away from the external evidences and to concentrate on the internal, or indeed to reject the need for evidences at all.

This was a trend which Whately detected and deplored. Romanticism and the Evangelical movement both contributed to this development, for both fostered the tendency to appeal to the feelings or emotion. This was a tendency from which even Oxford was not immune. For example, the Bampton lecturer for 1817 asserted the superiority of the internal evidences over the external. The external evidences, he argued, required learning and were therefore not for the multitude, but the inward attestation of the heart provided practical proof.[39] The Evangelical Daniel Wilson, considering that evidences included internal as well as external evidences, attempted to combine the two in his The Evidences of Christianity Stated in a Popular and Practical Manner.[40] But Coleridge provides the best-known example of this trend away from the evidences. He expressed his impatience with Paleyan type reasoning in the oft-quoted exclamation: "Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust to its own evidence...". With some justification, Whately objected to this that Coleridge proposed

> not as a confirmation of other evidence, (which he might have done with much truth,) but as a complete substitute for them, a man's feeling of the suitableness of the religion for his wants; a suitableness which doubtless many of the Mahometans perceive in their own religion, and of the Hindoo in theirs.[41]

For faith to be rational, Whately insisted, religious belief must be based on more than just feelings. Thus, while not rejecting the internal evidences of Christianity, he emphasized, more than any of the other Noetics, the external evidence of the Christian miracles.

(ii) Whately's Religious Views

Considering Whately's agreement with Copleston concerning the theory of knowledge, it is not surprising to find that Whately also agreed with the theology allied to that theory. In fact, Whately's religious works in the 'twenties expound the same principles found in Copleston's works, and indeed Whately stated that his publications of this period

> may be regarded as so far Bishop Copleston's, that though he is not responsible for any part of them - since I always ultimately decided according to my own conviction - they were submitted, wholly, or in great part, to him, before publication, and are indebted to him for many important suggestions and corrections.[42]

The basic principles, then, are the same, but whereas Copleston rarely wrote on them at any great length, the much more prolific Whately, on the contrary, delighted in stating the principles he had learned from Copleston and in drawing out their implications. Thus, for a fuller exposition of Noetic theology it is useful to turn to the works of Whately.

On the role of reason in religion Whately adhered to the same view as Copleston. He considered that in religious matters some things could be determined by means of reason, but that others were above reason. Of those mysteries which were beyond the province of reason, some were unexplained by Revelation, while others were partially explained. Concerning the former no knowledge was possible, and therefore it was useless and wrong to make them grounds of dispute and dissension. They were to be accounted among the "secret things which belong unto the Lord our God". Enquiry as to these mysteries was presumptuous, and constituted a desire for "forbidden knowledge", the sin of Adam and Eve.[43] Among this class were questions such as the origin of evil and the state of the soul between death and the general resurrection.[44] As to the latter, that is, mysteries which were partially explained, such as the doctrines of the Atonement and Trinity, the Bible constituted the only source of certain, if incomplete, knowledge. Incomplete, because these mysteries were not fully explained, but certain because the evidence for them was the word of God himself, which could not be doubted. That the Bible was in fact a genuine revelation from God was, of course, a belief which itself needed to be confirmed by independent evidence before being accepted as knowledge, a point which Whately acknowledged by his stress on the evidences of Christianity.

Whately emphasized the opinion that concerning the mysteries which are above human reason, we should be satisfied with the partial revelation afforded us, and not try to systematize the Bible. We

should not attempt to be wise above what is written.[45] With Copleston, he believed that the purpose of the Bible was not speculative, but practical; that it was not intended to satisfy our curiosity, but to influence our feelings and conduct. Its aim was edification. If this fact were sufficiently kept in mind, Whately thought, our propensity for unprofitable speculations might be curbed. This theme of practical Christianity was not new, as has already been pointed out in reference to Copleston. Nor was it confined to the precincts of Oriel or Oxford. Newman, for example, detected the same theme in the works of Erskine and Abbott.[46] But it was a theme which was taken up and reiterated by Copleston and Whately and the Noetics in general, and which through their works and teaching gained in popularity at Oxford. To such an extent, in fact, that by the mid-'thirties Newman felt that it was a view which needed to be challenged.

Whately treated this topic at greatest length in the sixth lecture of Use and Abuse, and the fourth essay of Essays on Some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion. Both these essays were written in the early 'twenties, and the influence of Copleston is marked, especially in Use and Abuse. The general purpose of Use and Abuse was to combat schism by pointing out ways to avoid party spirit. The text of the sixth lecture was, "foolish and unlearned questions avoid", and in part it was directed against Calvinism, as Copleston's Enquiry had been, although Whately also had in mind other controversies which were disturbing the peace of the church, for

example, the current debates on the millennium.[47] The Essays on Peculiarities, as Whately stated in his Preface, were designed to oppose those who regarded Christianity with indifference, and in particular, those who looked to natural religion rather than the Bible.[48] In this work Whately proposed to elaborate on some characteristics which were not found in natural religion but which were peculiar to Christianity. The fourth essay is on the "Practical Character of Revelation", and Whately used this characteristic both as a further evidence of the truth of Christianity, and as a guide to the study of the Bible.

In this essay Whately argued that it was a mark of a true revelation to abstain from points of mere speculation. The Bible, as was to be expected of a true revelation, "teaches us what is needful for us to know, but little or nothing besides,... the information it imparts is such as concerns the regulation of our character and practice, but leaves our curiosity unsatisfied".[49] An example of this was the doctrine of the Trinity. Although revealed in the Bible, it was not revealed in such a way as to be completely comprehensible to human reason, and attempts to render it so, had often resulted in heresies.[50] Nevertheless, Whately held that the doctrine of the Trinity was of great practical significance. The Bible revealed, as the Catechism stated, that God, "as the Father, hath made us and all the world, - as the Son, hath redeemed us and all mankind, - as the Holy Ghost, sanctifieth us, and all the elect people of God".[51] The practical consequence of this was

> that as we believe God to stand in three relations to us, we also must practically keep in view the three corresponding relations in which, as is plainly implied by that doctrine we stand towards Him; as first, the creatures and "children of God"; secondly, as the "redeemed and purchased people" of Jesus Christ; and thirdly, as "the temples of the Holy Ghost" our Sanctifier.[52]

Whately believed that in emphasizing edification rather than speculative knowledge he was following the example of St. Paul, who had preached, "Let all things be done unto edifying", and "Let us therefore follow after the things which make for peace, and things wherewith one may edify another".[53] But besides being Biblical, this teaching had certain advantages particularly relevant to the nineteenth century. In an age when the authority of the Bible seemed to be challenged by modern scientific research, this theory allowed Whately to give due respect to both the Bible and science by showing that they occupied different spheres and therefore did not really conflict. Science was seen by many as the enemy of religion, for geological discoveries regarding fossils, for example, appeared to disprove the Biblical version of the age of the world or to throw into doubt the Mosaic account of the deluge. Whately, however, argued that, the aim of the Bible being edification, we should expect from Revelation only "what is in a religious point of view practically important for us to know".[54] In other words, we should not expect from the Bible exact scientific knowledge on geology, astronomy, or any other branch of physical science. In fact, the Bible was unlikely to be scientifically accurate, as its language was necessarily adapted to the conceptions of those to whom it was addressed:

> But he who can seriously object to the want of philosophical correctness in such passages, for example, as those which speak of the rising and setting of the sun, should recollect, that when occasion called for an allusion to such

> matters, unless language conformable to the popular ideas had been employed, one of two alternatives must have been adopted; either men must have been fully instructed by revelation in the Newtonian system, or they must have been addressed in a style which though in itself correct, would have been to them utterly unintelligible.[55]

While the rising and setting of the sun may seem a rather trivial example, this view of the language of the Bible had important implications. It indicated a moving away from implicit acceptance of everything stated in the Bible to a less literal attitude to Biblical inspiration. Thus, Copleston was able to contemplate the possibility that the "days" of creation might not necessarily mean "days" of twenty four hours. If the language of the Bible could be interpreted in this less strict fashion, then it could be maintained that the supposed conflict between science and religion was only apparent, not real. It is doubtful whether in the 'twenties the Noetics, ignorant as they were of the trends of thought in Germany, foresaw where this view would lead. For example, if the story of creation was not to be considered true in every detail and Biblical language was to be treated with a certain freedom, then an easy next step was to argue that the account of Adam and Eve was not literally true, but an edifying story written for people of uneducated times - in other words, a myth. Next, as Strauss was to suggest, it might be held that Jesus too was a myth. Neither Whately nor the rest of the Noetics ever countenanced such freedom. For them, the Bible was not myth but an historical record.[56] The freedom which they did countenance, rather than being destructive of the Bible, seemed to hold out the hope of removing any conflict between science and religion and to allow each to hold sway in its own proper sphere. The purpose of the Bible, Whately argued, was edification, not scientific knowledge. But scientific research was not proscribed by the Bible. Scientific

knowledge was a legitimate area of human endeavour. It was to be obtained "by the light of reason, aided by observation and experiment",[57] and Whately was convinced that an honest search after truth could never ultimately lead to any conclusion really irreconcilable with a true revelation.

Religious knowledge, however, was the concern of the Bible, and here too the principle of edification afforded valuable guidelines and yielded important results. St. Paul advised his followers, "foolish and unlearned questions avoid", and warned against "strifes of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings".[58] Following these precepts, Whately advised men to turn away from foolish and presumptuous speculation. Speculation on mysteries which were only partially revealed in the Bible led very often to heresy and always to strife and party-spirit, which disturbed the peace and unity of the church.[59] The way to avoid this, Whately preached, was to concentrate on the practical application of such doctrines and not attempt to explain things beyond the reach of the human faculties to comprehend. Thus, Whately's theory of the purpose of the Bible allowed him to accept the mysteries of the Christian religion without becoming involved in what he termed "metaphysical" discussions on the interpretation of those doctrines, and thus to avoid the "strifes of words" evident in current debates such as those on faith and works, baptismal regeneration, and predestination.

As has been said, Newman in the 'thirties was concerned at the growing popularity of this attitude towards the Bible, and devoted one of the Tracts to combatting it. The ground of his criticism was that

this theory, although paying lip-service to the mysteries of religion, in effect disparaged them. He held that on this view those doctrines (such as the Trinity) whose practical character was not immediately obvious tended to be pushed into the background, ignored, and perhaps even finally denied. Thus, according to Newman, doctrine was cut out by its roots.[60] Although the Noetics did not go to this extreme and in fact always insisted that the mysteries of religion had to be accepted because revealed in the Bible, yet it cannot be denied that their sermons on the whole concentrated not on the mysterious, but on the practical, and that the tendency of their teaching was to reduce emphasis on doctrine. Religion, it could be argued, became on their view largely a matter of conduct rather than faith. Yet, in favour of the Noetics it must be admitted firstly that they were correct in their assessment that disagreement over doctrine was a major source of controversy and ill-feeling within the Anglican church (and indeed, between the different denominations), and secondly, that their refusal to attempt explanations of the mysteries of religion at least had logic on its side, for doctrines which are capable of explanation cease to be mysteries. When looked at in this way, it could be argued that the Noetics, rather than removing the mysterious element in Christianity, were attempting to preserve it. Regarding their theory of the practical purpose of the Bible, Newman did make the telling point, "we have no right to pronounce that [the truths of Revelation] are revealed merely with a view to their importance to us", a criticism which was also levelled against Hampden by Pusey.[61]

Whately's attitude to the Bible, in short, was that man should be content to accept humbly the imperfect knowledge imparted by

Revelation, and not look for full scientific knowledge or be tempted to systematise the Bible. Our first enquiry, he insisted, should be what is revealed? In studying the Scriptures we should seek for truth, not system, and "not only for truth, but for practical truth, with a view to the improvement of our life and heart".[62]

This attitude is reflected in the method of studying the Bible which Whately advocated. According to Whately, religion was not like mathematics. It was not a man-made form of knowledge, whose conclusions could be demonstratively proved from its theorems. Consequently, we should not start with a single text of the Bible, and proceed to deduce from this, as if conducting a mathematical proof, conclusions which are then accepted as dogmas and placed on a par with the Bible.[63] We should not, as was often done, search the Scriptures for isolated texts which could be quoted in confirmation of some system of theology. This practice was well criticised by Whately in a later edition of the Logic, where he described it as making an anagram of Scripture:

> The materials indeed are the stones of the Temple; but the building constructed with them is a fabric of human contrivance. If instead of this, too common, procedure, students would fairly search the Scriptures with a view not merely to defend their opinions, but to form them - not merely for arguments, but for truth, - keeping human expositions to their own proper purposes, and not allowing these to become, practically, a standard, - if, in short, they were as honestly desirous to be on the side of Scripture, as they naturally are to have Scripture on their side, how much sounder as well as more charitable, would their conclusions often be![64]

Rather than the mathematician, it is the natural philosopher or physicist who should be used as an example. In other words, the Bible

should be studied inductively. The whole of the Bible should be studied, text compared with text, and attempts should not be made to alter or bend Revelation in order to fit human theories.[65] This similarity of method between theology and natural philosophy Whately made explicit in his later work Essays on some of the Dangers to Christian Faith. There he argued that man "can no more make or alter a revelation, than he can set aside the physical laws of the Universe", and that

> It is the office of a Church - of all its members in some degree, and of its ministers more especially - to be students (and helpers of other students) of God's revealed will, as recorded in the inspired writings; - in that second volume, as it were, of the divine laws and instructions: - always appealing to those Scriptures, even as a sound natural philosopher does to observations of the existing course of nature; not, like many of Bacon's precedessors, to the arbitrary assumptions the ipse dixit of any human master.[66]

In one respect, however, Whately realized, there was an important difference between science and religion. Natural philosophy is essentially the search for new truth. "In religion, on the contrary, a full and final revelation having been made, no discovery, properly so called, (of any high importance) is to be expected".[67] Consequently, although we may look for elucidation of minor points or bring forward fresh arguments in support of essential doctrines, any radically new interpretations of Scripture are bound to be incorrect: "unless our faith be the same in the main, with that of early Christians, we may be well assured that it is unsound".[68]

Despite this statement's apparent sympathy with the Tractarian preoccupation with the early church, with Whately it does not indicate

an interest in primitive tradition or a desire to study the Fathers. It is rather a variation on the theme of "Gospel simplicity". Whately argued that it was unlikely that the true meaning of the Bible had remained hidden until modern times, because the Bible message, being intended by God to convey instruction to all, must have been capable of being understood in all ages. And not only was the Gospel message intelligible to all ages of men, but also to all classes of men. Even the humblest believer was able to understand it. Now the danger of this position was that it could be taken to imply the uselessness of human learning. This was a conclusion which many Evangelicals drew and one which Whately certainly did not wish to support. Whately agreed that "every thing is placed within the reach of each man's capacity that is requisite for his own salvation", but objected that "if it be meant, that all Christians are on a level in point of intellectual advantages, or that the most acute and most learned can understand no more of the Gospel-scheme, than the dullest and most illiterate, such a notion is contradicted by Scripture, no less than by common sense and experience".[69] Concerning mysteries which were beyond the reach of human understanding, he did, of course, concede that the learned and the unlearned, the wise and the simple, were on a par.[70] However, in general Whately's writings insist on the usefulness of human learning in matters of religion, and inculcate the duty of ministers to make use of their learning to explain the Scriptures and to teach the evidences of Christianity to their congregations. In Whately's Remains we find the following entry:

> each individual minister is bound to put before his people, to the best of his power, the true sense of Scripture, i.e. of the real original Scripture, as the sacred writers left

> it. Let no one presume to say, "It is of small consequence whether the people understand this or that particular passage". It is our plain duty to explain to the people whatever may help them to the right understanding of the Scriptures; not presuming to say, "It matters not much if so and so be not understood, or if they are mistaken as to such and such a trifling matter". To be pure from the blood of all men, we must not shun to set before them all the counsel of God.[71]
>
> And we must not be deterred from this duty by the fear (so often put forward) of what is called "unsettling men's minds"... But a truly honest and conscientious minister will not dare to leave anyone in darkness whom he is able to enlighten; or to practise or to connive at anything of the character of a pious fraud, on the ground of a supposed expediency.[72]

Whately was certainly not suggesting that in their sermons ministers should engage in abstruse metaphysical disquisitions on the meaning of terms such as "consubstantiality", "personality", and "hypostatic union". This was not the type of learning which he was recommending. Indeed, such terms were not to be found in the "real original Scripture" - they would have been unintelligible to the plain unlearned persons who comprised the majority of the Apostles' converts. The type of learning which Whately considered most useful was historical and linguistic. Some things in the Scriptures which would have been clear and obvious to a Jew, may be less so to people of a different age and country, and a knowledge of history or a knowledge of the ancient languages could help a minister to clear up such difficulties for his flock.[73] Whately, then, saw the sermon as a means of teaching, and in fact seems to have considered teaching, that is, conveying the word of God to the people, as the main duty of the minister. He did not, as the Tractarians did, emphasize the sacramental side of the minister's role. Akenson points to this aspect of Whately's outlook. He maintains that Whately's years at Oriel made him a perpetual don: "From his election in 1811 on ... he

is best understood as a teacher; a teacher who happened to write books and became an archbishop, but first and always, a teacher".[74]

In the above extract Whately was once again insisting on the teaching of the whole Gospel. Yet, in an interesting passage in one of his earliest works, Whately at first sight appears to present a contradictory view. After admitting that the word of God is sufficient to lighten our path despite our partial understanding of the divine dispensation, and that even the ablest philosopher's understanding of God's dealings is very imperfect, Whately continued:

> And as the strongest intellect may be bewildered by prying too deeply into the counsels of the most High, and seeking to explain what is, to man, in his present state, inexplicable; so, persons of inferior powers and attainments may be led, not to knowledge, but to error, by hastily proposing to them such statements and explanations as surpass their capacity, though they may be intelligible and instructive to the abler and more advanced. No vain clamours therefore about deceiving the people, - no groundless charges of keeping the vulgar in ignorance, and preaching a different gospel to different persons, should deter us from following, at once the dictates of sound sense, and the example of the Apostle Paul; or induce us so to perplex and confuse "those who are weak in the faith", as really to incur the blame of deceiving them, for the sake of avoiding the appearance of it.
>
> For it should be remembered that, practically speaking, all truth is relative. That which may be to one man a true statement of any doctrine, may be, in effect, false, to another, if it be such as cannot but lead him to form false notions; and that which gives him, if not a perfectly correct notion of things as they are, yet the nearest to this that he is capable of, may be regarded as, to him, true. Such is the account given in the book of Joshua, of the sun's being made to stand still: had a more correct statement of the fact, according to the Copernican system, been given, it would have been (to those whom it was addressed to) unintelligible.[75]

It could be thought that Whately is here coming close to the Roman Catholic doctrine of "Reserve", that is, keeping back part of God's

message from the people, a charge which Whately himself levelled against the Tractarians after the publication of Isaac William's tract On Reserve in Communicating Religious Knowledge. Whately, as this passage shows, considered this a "groundless charge" as applied to his view, and in later works he vehemently opposed the idea that Christianity consisted of two systems, one for the learned or for the priesthood, and one for the masses.[76] Moreover, Whately could easily have defended his position by arguing, as he later did in The Kingdom of Christ,[77] that he did not advocate concealment but merely deprecated ill-considered haste, that all teaching was a gradual process, religious teaching included. Here too, then, Whately revealed his experience as a teacher.

In fact, this passage is a natural extension of Copleston's views about the imperfection of language in general and the relative nature of Scripture language. Just as Copleston advised against dogmatic insistence on one interpretation of Scripture when other meanings were also possible, as such dogmatism put a stumbling block in another's way,[78] so here Whately is advising against putting a stumbling block in another's way and leading him to false conclusions by proposing explanations of Scripture which he is unable to understand. As to Whately's statement "all truth is relative", Whately and Copleston held that "truth" was an attribute of propositions, "reality" being the correct word to apply to "things", and, considering the imperfection of language when dealing with the ways of God, relative truth was the best we could hope for. Even the Gospel language itself often provided only relative truth, for it revealed God as He is relatively to us, not absolutely, and was adapted to our common

beliefs rather than strict philosophical truth.[79] Therefore, it was not unreasonable to expect that the language used to explain Christian doctrines to the uneducated might need to be less strictly correct than that used towards the educated. It was not that any doctrine or truth was hidden, but that it might need to be expressed differently.

Seen against this background, this passage does not seem so startling, although it is likely that Whately would have expressed himself more fully, if he had written this work in later life, after his experience of the Oxford Movement. That the above two passages appear contradictory and need to be reconciled is indicative of the fact that Whately was attempting to pursue a course which avoided two extreme views, views typically associated with the Evangelicals and the Roman Catholics: firstly, that concerning the Gospel message, everyone was equal and that human learning was useless; secondly, that everyone was not equal, and that therefore the <u>whole</u> Gospel should not be preached to all. Whately believed that human learning was valuable, and indeed necessary for a more complete understanding of the Gospel, but he abhorred the idea of a learned clergy constituting a priesthood in possession of truths not revealed to or meant to be understood by the laity. He believed that, as a religion intended for the "mass of mankind", Christianity must be such as to be able to be understood by people in general. Moreover, he held that, as Christ appealed to evidence to support his claim to be the Messiah, the masses must be capable of understanding the evidence, and that, if they could not, it would count against the truth of Christianity. The "via media" which Whately took, was to insist that every man was capable of understanding what was necessary for his own salvation, but

that human learning could enhance one's understanding of the Gospel scheme; that Christianity was a religion for the great mass of mankind, and as such was not two systems, but one religion, which could be understood and be received on evidence, "though not necessarily the same evidence to all", by men of all ranks.[80]

Thus Whately, while he preached, as did Copleston, the folly of being "wise above what is written" and the duty of childlike submission concerning revelations which were beyond the reach of human reason, was far from inculcating childish credulity and ignorance. Whately asked whether it was not possible "to encourage profitable, and to repress impertinent, curiosity?" The Christian, he argued, was taught in the Bible to make it his study "to distinguish what subjects are, and what are not, within the reach of his faculties; that while he avoids presumptuous enquiries, he may at the same time be diligently pursuing such knowledge as is attainable and profitable".[81] Because we are aware that our faculties are limited, does not mean that we should not employ them as far as they extend. Whately held that faith did not consist "in assenting to a proposition without sufficient evidence, but in a disposition candidly and fairly to weigh the evidence - in a due distrust of the human faculties - and in a readiness to admit whatever shall appear to be clearly taught by our divine Instructor, even though it be such as we should never have expected, nor can clearly comprehend".[82]

Moreover, even concerning those mysteries which were above human reason, he believed that we should not be too quick to renounce all use of reason and thus be led into superstitious error. In a passage

of the Logic which is both reminiscent of Copleston and foreshadows Hampden, Whately points to the difference between attempting to explain the nature of God and explaining our use of words. Concerning the doctrine of the Trinity, he claims, many

> content themselves with saying, that the whole subject is mysterious, and must not be too carefully pried into; not noticing the difference between divine revelations and human expositions of them; between inquiries into the mysteries of the Divine nature, and into the mysteries arising from the ambiguity of language; and that too, language framed, as in the present case, by uninspired men. What Scripture declares, the Christian is bound implicitly to receive, however unable even to understand what is declared: but to claim an uninquiring assent to expressions of man's framing, without even an attempt to ascertain their meaning, is surely (however excellent the expressions may in fact be) to fall into one of the worst errors of the Romanists.[83]

Whately is here making a distinction, which was later to be the theme of Hampden's Bampton Lectures, between God's word and man's interpretations and explanations of that word. And this difference between the word of God and man could only be recognised through the exercise of human reason. Whately was far from countenancing presumptuous enquiries into things beyond the reach of human faculties, but he realised that "we cannot even exercise the requisite humility in acquiescing in revealed doctrines, unless we employ our reason to ascertain what they are".[84]

It was here that human learning was helpful, for an historical knowledge of the first centuries of the Christian era, for example, or an acquaintance with the developments of language, were obviously relevant for determining the meaning of Scripture.[85] In fact, Whately asserted that the proper object of theological learning was "to establish the authority, and to ascertain and explain the meaning, of

the sacred writings".[86] Whately also believed that while some things were in principle beyond the reach of human understanding, other things only appeared so, because of a deficiency in learning. Any endeavour, then, to supply this deficiency was commendable, as long as reason did not overreach itself. In effect, this position brought even those doctrines which were "above reason" within the dominion of reason, since their authority was confirmed and their meaning ascertained by reason. Moreover, it meant that even those doctrines whose certainty seemed assured because vouched for by the word of God, were not infallibly certain, for human reason was fallible. Whately, however, was not worried by this, and freely acknowledged the consequences of his position in a letter to Baden Powell in 1839:

> Our belief in any point for which we refer to Scripture, must rest on the conviction of our own judgment, not only, 1st, as to the evidence for the safe and unaltered transmission (tradition, if any one chooses to call it so) of the books, but also, 2ndly, as to the evidence for the authors of these books having been really divinely commissioned; and again, 3rdly, as to the evidence for the sense of the passage referred to, being such as we understand it in. Hence, I observed, our certainty is only a hypothetical certainty, dependant on the correctness of our judgment on every one of these three points. The weakness, as far as fallibility is to be called weakness, is in three of the links, and not merely in one. And the result also I fully admit - viz., that I am fallible, which I should not be if I were infallibly certain of infallibly following an infallible guide.[87]

Grinfield had complained in 1822 that Copleston's views opened "the floodgates of doubt and scepticism".[88] The same charge could just as easily have been brought against Whately's works. Whately defended himself against this criticism by arguing against the idea that there was no medium between a claim to infallibility and

universal hesitation or absolute scepticism.[89] "In all matters which do not admit of absolute demonstration", he pointed out, the majority of men regard themselves as fallible, and yet on many occasions act, after a careful consideration of the situation, with complete confidence and decision. In matters of religion, which likewise do not admit of absolute demonstration, we do indeed have the promise of divine assistance, but since that spiritual aid is imperceptible (in comparison with the aid afforded the Apostles, which was accompanied by miracles), we can never be sure that our actions are thus guided in individual instances. Nor can we be sure that, even if free from error, we will ever remain so. We are not bound, Whately argued, to suspect our doctrines to be erroneous, but we must not be so confident in their truth as to preclude examination. We must not claim infallibility. Scripture teaches us that divine guidance will be given to the pious and diligent student, who seeks the truth with humility, patience, sincerity, and watchfulness. But, in this world a man can never be certain how far he has exercised these virtues or how far he has been deceiving himself. "In the meantime, he must <u>act</u> on his convictions, as if he were certain of their being correct; he must <u>examine</u> and re-examine the grounds of them as if he suspected them of being erroneous".[90]

Whately, then, was not one to look for an infallible authority on which to base his faith. He scorned the Roman church's attempt to provide such an authority, and he discerned a similar search in the Oxford Movement, which he also deplored. Newman, however, was unable to accept Whately's view on this matter. For him it indicated doubt.

The man who "professes to keep his mind open to change on a point if evidence comes ... implies that the thing in question may perhaps [turn out] in the event to be not true". For Newman Whately's view seemed to promise only "practical certainty" and "if this were all, there was no faith".[91] Newman, consequently, turned to the church to provide the certainty he required.

For Whately, on the other hand, if the Bible was unable to provide him with infallible certainty, seeing that his conviction of the truth of the Gospel message depended on the accuracy of his judgments concerning its authenticity and meaning, which conceivably might be mistaken, still less could the church provide it. On the debate between private judgment and church authority, Whately decided in favour of private judgment, maintaining that private judgment was unavoidable, since the very decision to accept the decrees of the church as infallible was in itself an act of private judgment.[92] This did not mean that one was entitled to disregard the teachings of the church and to decide every matter according to one's own whim, for Whately, like Hawkins, considered that man had the <u>duty</u>, not just the <u>right</u>, of private judgment, a duty which entailed examining all the evidence in favour of an interpretation, evidence which included not only historical and linguistic factors, but also what the church had to say on the subject. As the Bible enjoined, a man must "prove all things, and hold fast that which is good". To separate from the church was a momentous decision to take. It involved the risk of the sin of schism. But such separation could be justified by a plea of conscience, if one were convinced that the church was in error on an

important point. As Copleston taught, all separation was either a duty or a sin.[93]

Reciprocally, the church had the right to eject members who refused to accept its decisions on such important points. Although both Copleston and Whately advocated moderation and deplored party-spirit, and believed that the Church of England could accommodate a certain variety of interpretation concerning religious beliefs and doctrines, they did not hold that the church should be all-inclusive. Copleston, for example, was dubious about Thomas Arnold's views on the church.[94] Whately contended that in order to be a society, a church must have certain rules and terms of communion. Thus, he drew a distinction between "authority" and "power". The church, as stated in the thirty-nine articles, had power to ordain rites and ceremonies, and authority in controversies of faith, authority which was secondary to the Bible.[95] It did not have power to alter the Gospel message or to impose new doctrines necessary to be believed for salvation, but it did have authority to interpret the Scriptures and to propose certain doctrines as necessary to be believed in order to be a member of the Church of England. In other words, like any society, it was entitled to propose terms of communion, and these terms were set out in the articles. The articles, then, were the test of membership, and if anyone rejected these articles then the church was justified in excommunicating him. In Whately's view, this constituted part of the "power of the keys" which Christ had given to Peter and the other Apostles.[96] The articles were admittedly human compositions, and should not be appealed to in place of the Bible in order to decide what doctrines

were to be received as part of the Christian faith, but they were rightfully appealed to in order to decide who ought, or ought not, to remain a member of the Church of England. These articles were designed by the English Reformers to allow "a certain latitude on points which they regarded as not of fundamental importance", but this latitude did not mean that "all varieties of doctrine are to be regarded with indifference, as long as those who maintain them profess their adherence to the Church".[97]

As events were to prove, however, the articles were not adequate for the task which Whately allotted to them. Like the Bible itself, the articles could be interpreted in different ways, and the latitude which the Reformers had allowed on questions not of fundamental importance, was capable of being extended further than Whately approved. Moreover, Whately's statements begged the question of what were to be considered fundamental doctrines. How far could this latitude of interpretation be taken before all questions of doctrine became matters of indifference? Whately's difficulties were due to the fact that, although insisting on private judgment, he wished also to give due deference to the authority of the church. He wished to find a "via media" between extreme statements of the two views, and as always with a "via media", was confronted with the problem of reconciling opposing ideas.

(iii) Moderation and the "via media"

As with Copleston, so with Whately the theme of "moderation, but not indifference" formed a leitmotiv in his works. In the second lecture of Use and Abuse he stated specifically that he was seeking

out a "middle course between ... narrow-minded bigotry and intemperate party-spirit, on the one hand, and careless indifference on the other".[98] The fact that Whately abhorred "narrow-minded bigotry" and preached moderation, did not mean that he thought lightly of the sins of heresy and schism. Nor did he believe that schism could be avoided by overlooking heresy.[99] As we have seen, Whately held that a society must have terms of communion; that unity achieved by overlooking all differences of opinion would be a union in name only and would destroy the existence of the society. Moderation achieved by means of indifference Whately, with Copleston, stigmatized as false liberality:

> for charity must consist in making allowances for what is wrong - in feeling kindly towards those who are in fault; but if there is nothing wrong in differing from us, there can be no charity in allowing that difference; nor is there any room for liberality when there is nothing to concede.[100]

The theme of "moderation, but not indifference" is just one of the many middle courses which Whately sought to follow. Indeed, "moderation" was more than just a theme, it was a guiding principle, inherited from his reading of Aristotle and reinforced by the influence of Copleston. Despite his strong opinions and energetic expression of them, Whately agreed with Copleston in advocating the "golden mean" and in deprecating all extremes. Although he realised that this was likely to lead to the accusation of being luke-warm, moderation being frequently mistaken for indifference, yet he maintained that such a course was not only the best, but did not necessarily entail indifference, and he cited in vindication St. Paul, for "he is as striking an example of the discretion which steers a middle course between contrary excesses, as he is of sincere, and earnest, and uncompromising zeal".[101]

This principle of the "golden mean" led Whately to strive for a "via media" on a number of issues, some of which have already been noted,[102] and it is particularly noticeable in his attitude to the use of reason in matters of religion. Firstly, he sought a "via media" between the mis-use of reason and the under-use of reason. It was a mis-use of reason to attempt to employ it on subjects which were "above reason", to attempt "to be wise above what is written". This he held to be the error of the German Rationalists. This use of the term "Rationalist" Whately thought to be rather unfortunate, for it gave the impression that the Rationalists' approach to religion was the only rational one.[103] Whately, however, believed that religious faith could be rational, without falling into the errors of the so-called Rationalists, or into the opposite error, that of relying exclusively on tradition or feelings. In the late 'thirties Whately was very much concerned to answer those theologians who turned away from what Whately considered rational religion, who disparaged or neglected the evidences, and relied instead on tradition or the dictates of the heart.[104] In the early 'twenties it was the Evangelicals whom Whately considered to neglect the proper use of reason by refusing to take advantage of the fruits of human learning. The fourth sermon of his Five Sermons preached before the University of Oxford, entitled "Use of Human Learning in Matters of Religion", which was preached in 1821, addressed this subject. Whately seems to have had in mind, while composing this sermon, the criticisms which had been levelled at Copleston in the Christian Observer and Advocate in 1818 for not determining "to know nothing but Jesus Christ, and him crucified". Whately's view, however, was that,

> Instead of determining to "know nothing but Christ", we must explore the treasures of ancient and modern philosophy, and range through all the regions of nature and of art, in search of whatever knowledge may conduce to the proving, explaining, and enforcing of the great truths of Christianity.[105]

In Whately's eyes another fault of the Evangelicals, which was allied to this neglect of human learning, was their tendency to rely on God's grace, to boast of a consciousness of God's influence and to pretend to a direct, personal and infallible inspiration. Any such inspiration, Whately thought, should be attested by miracles.[106] But in avoiding this fault, we should be wary of falling into the opposite error of trusting too much to ourselves. Thus, another "via media" which Whately proposed was to take full advantage of human learning, but also to remember to ask for and to acknowledge the assistance of God's grace, for,

> The error of trusting in our own unaided strength, and neglecting to implore the guidance and support of the Holy Spirit, to stimulate, and sustain, and prosper our exertions, is at least as great and as dangerous as the opposite error, of looking for miraculous assistance, and pretending to infallible inspiration....[107]

Yet another "via media" advocated by Whately was one which avoided two opposite abuses of the use of reason. The correct use of reason in matters of religion was not only a mean between the mis-use of reason and the under-use of reason, but also between two opposite, and both mistaken, applications of reason to the Bible. This "via media" has already been alluded to in relation to the works of both Copleston and Whately. The two abuses of reason were systematising and adding to the Bible doctrines derived from human deductions, and explaining away and subtracting from the Bible doctrines which did not accord with human preconceptions. The middle course between these two

abuses consisted in accepting the Bible as it was, without attempting to systematise or pare away.[108]

One of the dangers of adding to the Bible was, as Copleston also insisted, that these additions might become a stumbling block in the way of believers. Even if these human speculations were true, they might mislead some or unnecessarily alienate others. As Paley had said, Christianity might be loaded with a weight that sinks it. If these deductions were not revealed in the Bible, there was no justification for insisting on them, for "the same authority which forbids us to 'diminish aught' from the word of God, forbids us also to 'add thereto'".[109] This abuse of reason Whately dealt with in the third essay of Essays on some of the Difficulties in the writings of St. Paul. The opposite error of subtracting from the Bible, he discussed in the second essay, which appears to have been prompted by the publication of Bentham's book, Not Paul but Jesus, but which was also aimed at the Unitarians, who, according to Whately, tended to "torture" or ignore St. Paul's writings and thus did not teach the whole Gospel.[110] Part of the Noetic mission, in fact, was to rescue St. Paul from the misrepresentation and misinterpretation of both Calvinists and Unitarians.

A less obvious way of subtracting from the Bible was to undermine its importance by an over-emphasis on natural religion. This topic Whately treated in Essays on Some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion. The proper place of natural religion and the danger of its usurping the place of Revelation, he described in the Preface of that work:

> ....the study of natural religion ought properly to follow, or at least to accompany, not to precede, that of revelation. Our own speculations ought to be controlled and regulated by a divine revelation, when it is once ascertained that a revelation exists: they should not be left to range unlimited and unassisted, on a subject which God has Himself decided that man is not competent of himself to judge rightly. And if Reason be for some time enthroned as sole judge and law giver, she will not afterwards readily resign her seat, and submit her decisions, to Revelation, but will often exercise an undue interference.[111]

To the objection that this practice of continually referring to the Bible biassed the mind, Whately answered that the complaint was just, if the Bible were not the word of God. If it were, then we should guard against the opposite error, that of allowing the mind to be biassed in the study of the revealed will of God "by the deductions of unaided reason".[112]

In the next decade Whately reiterated his view that the study of natural religion must follow, not precede, the study of Revelation in a letter to Baden Powell, who had seemed to dispute it in his work Tradition Unveiled when he censured those who entered on the study of natural theology "with the Bible in their hand". Whately argued that it was not necessary (or indeed possible) to have a complete demonstration of the being and attributes of God, before enquiring whether a revelation existed. All that was necessary was to establish a strong probability that there might be a God, and then it was quite legitimate to enquire what evidence there was of such a being having communicated with man. (Here, once again, is an example of the importance which Whately placed on the evidences of Christianity). If it appeared that there had been a revelation, then it was to this revelation that we should look in order to learn of God's actions and attributes, turning to the natural world only for confirmation of what

was learnt from the revelation.[113] Whately, then, was emphasizing the Protestant theme, look to the Bible. It was this same theme that had brought on Copleston the criticisms of Grinfield, who considered that Copleston's argument amounted to "giving up all the doctrines and proofs of natural religion".[114] For Whately, as for Copleston, the Bible was to come before everything; before natural religion, before the church, before creeds and articles. It was the Bible, Whately held, which revealed to us the Christian religion, and we should beware of undermining its importance by exalting natural religion too high, or of confounding Christ's religion with systems of philosophical speculation or popular superstition. Rather, we should "keep our eyes steadfastly fixed, as it were, on the star which stands over the holy Infant at Bethlehem, and which has no fellow in the firmament".[115]

Whately, then, attempted to keep his eyes on the Bible and to inculcate by his preaching the virtues extolled therein. The Bible, he argued, taught humility, charity, and public spirit, and he believed that if men followed the Bible and avoided pride, animosity, and selfishness, then political dissensions would be lessened and "we should much oftener attain truth, and we should never fail of attaining moderation".[116] Moderation itself Whately considered to be a Biblical virtue, at least in the sense of forebearance, if not in the Aristotelian sense of the golden mean. St. Paul had preached, "Let your moderation be known unto all men", and in numerous texts had advocated forebearance and the avoidance of strife.[117] But moderation was not only intrinsically good, but also prudent, for an intemperate

and violent espousal of any object often produced the opposite result aimed at. Surely, Whately asked, even if men "cannot be taught that the middle way is the best, they may perceive from experience that it is the safest".[118] Similarly, peace and unity within the church were not only the exhortations of Christ and the Apostles, but they were expedient.

> Nothing will more weaken our efforts in behalf of the Church against her opponents, than intestine divisions: which, besides that they draw off the attention of the members of any society from the common cause, will also dispose those most violent in party, to welcome the aid of foreign auxiliaries against a rival faction; while they furnish to the adversary a theme of triumphant reproach.[119]

In other words, Whately, like Copleston, besides preaching the lessons inculcated in the Bible, was also advocating a programme for the defence of the church, a programme which attempted to promote unity through the mitigation of party spirit. Thus, the aim of Use and Abuse was to inhibit the progress of heresy and schism by suggesting principles of conduct to church members, in particular principles which assisted in the avoidance of party spirit. Its message was, "Blessed are the peace-makers".

One of Whately's main criticisms of the Tractarians was that they fostered party spirit and endangered the unity of the church. In Copleston's Remains Whately included a letter of his to Copleston, written at the time of the Hampden controversy, in which he expressed fears for the condition of the church, endangered as he considered it to be, not only by enemies from without, but even more by its own members.[120] By their denunciation of Hampden the Tractarians were, in Whately's opinion, striking a the root of all discipline and church-

unity, and thus threatening the very existence of the church as a Christian society. The question of whether Hampden's doctrine was unsound or not should be decided, Whately argued not unreasonably, by the church; that is, by the Bishop, Archbishop, or some regular ecclesiastical authority; not by individuals or groups of individuals. The Tractarians, however, who professed "to pay more reverence than most Protestants would allow, to church-authority, and church tradition",[121] were setting themselves up as a self-constituted authority and taking upon themselves the roles of accuser, witness, judge, jury, and executioner. As far as Whately was concerned, their actions were similar to those of other self-constituted authorities, such as the Luddites, who took the law into their own hands.

Moreover, the Tractarians, he implied, were going against the teachings of St. Paul, who had censured the Corinthians for banding together in parties to excommunicate their brethren. They were also betraying their ordination vow, in which they had promised to submit to church authorities and to preserve "peace and quietness", and transgressing the church canon against "public opposition between preachers". In short, they were introducing discord and schism into the church, in the place of "quietness, peace, and unity". Whately judged the action of the person who left the church to become a Dissenter, even if his grounds appeared frivolous, less objectionable than that of "one who remains in the Church to throw contempt on its Authorities, and to sow dissension among its members". Whately's verdict on the Tractarian opposition to Hampden was that the whole proceeding was "in the highest degree schismatical, and subversive of

Church-authority; if, at least, there be any such thing as schism, and any such thing as a Church".[122]

(iv) Rational Religion

The general agreement between Copleston and Whately on religious and philosophical topics is plain to see. Whately indeed owed much to Copleston, as he himself admitted, and they shared the same basic principles. On practical issues, however, there was not always total agreement between the two. In the area of education, for example, Copleston did not subscribe to all of Whately's opinions concerning the religious education of children.[123] Whately disapproved of rote learning, even the rote learning of prayers, and thought that all, even children, were capable of attaining a rational faith,[124] by which he meant, capable of understanding at least some, if not all, of the evidence in favour of Christianity. This conviction inspired his Introductory Lessons on Christian Evidences. Whately also believed in the feasibility of the combined religious instruction of children and youths of different denominations, which Copleston did not. Whately, as Archbishop, made trial of this in Ireland, and approved of the same attempt being made at London University.[125] Copleston, on the other hand, opposed the establishment of London University, and as regards Oxford University, was less sympathetic than Whately to the admission of Dissenters. Whately, in fact, favoured the abolition of religious tests and the restoration of the rights of independent M.A.s to open halls, which would have allowed Dissenters to open halls of their own.[126]

As far as politics were concerned, Copleston and Whately were not always found on the same side. Whately stated that Copleston was a decided Tory. Whately, although he prided himself on belonging to no party,[127] inclined more to the Whigs. On the question of Jewish emancipation, Copleston and Whately voted on opposite sides, with Whately supporting and Copleston opposing the measure. Concerning the alliance of church and state, Copleston and Whately both held that Christ's kingdom was not of this world and their view of the church was essentially the same.[128] However, Whately's Letters on the Church. By an Episcopalian advocated the separation of church and state, whereas Copleston, while admitting that the alliance had its drawbacks, considered that on the whole it was beneficial. Apparently Copleston did not think that this alliance of church and state set at naught Christ's statement that his kingdom was not of this world, but Whately did. Whately argued that the church and state were not communities which might "allowedly form such an alliance", that the rights which the church resigned by the alliance were "indefeasible", and that the character of Christ's kingdom was "doubly violated" by the intrusion of the civil magistrate in spiritual affairs and the spiritual society in temporal.[129]

Whately, then, although starting from the same principles as Copleston, sometimes arrived at different conclusions, and usually these conclusions were less conservative than Copleston's. This may explain why many of the future Tractarians do not appear to have realised the dangerous "liberal" tendency of these principles when expounded by Copleston as Provost, and were even inclined to accept them, until the "liberal" conclusions which Whately reached on various

practical issues alerted them to the danger. S. Rashid argues that Whately's "liberal" views were in fact the natural unfolding of principles which he had learned from Copleston. He notes that Copleston was the strongest single influence on Whately, and that "the latter worked out the logical consequences of Copleston's liberal position and brought them before the public". Copleston he describes as majestic and urbane, "but somewhat reticent", whereas Whately, "being a hardier and more resolute man than his tutor, flinched at nothing, with the result that he felt himself to be a lone voice crying out to Oxford".[130] There is a good deal of truth in this picture. Certainly, Whately's principles were the same as Copleston's. Moreover, there was definitely a difference in temperament between the two men, which accounts for Copleston's more conservative stance on some issues. Conservatism was, in fact, more of an inbred characteristic in Copleston, whereas Whately, besides being hardier and more resolute, seems actually to have thrived on controversy, despite his preaching against it. Copleston was much more concerned than Whately with reputation, and more inclined, after his youthful skirmishes with the Edinburgh Review, to avoid controversy. It could be said, perhaps, that Copleston was by nature more of a peace-maker than Whately. Whately gives an interesting example of this characteristic of Copleston in the introduction to Copleston's Remains. In order to draw a comparison with the Tractarians' behaviour towards Hampden, he relates an incident which occurred during his residence at Oxford. A university sermon had been preached, which Whately considered to contain an objectionable passage that should not be allowed to pass unnoticed. Whately drew Copleston's attention to the matter.

> Dr. Copleston fully concurred in my view of the subject, but being unwilling to cause an agitation, if it could be well avoided, in the public mind, by at once bringing a charge of heterodoxy before the regular tribunal, he wrote a private note to the preacher, stating how much offence had been given (and as he thought, reasonably) by that passage of his sermon. He received a reply, thanking him for the admonition, and promising that the passage should be (as it accordingly was) entirely expunged.[131]

Despite the broad similarity between the works of Copleston and Whately, there can be discerned, besides practical differences, a certain difference of emphasis, indicative of the changing currents of religious thought. Copleston, in response to the Calvinistic controversy, was concerned mainly with what he saw as the abuse of reason, and in particular that abuse which revealed itself in dogmatism and adding to the Bible. Whately, too, warned against the abuse of reason, although, being aware of the resurgence of Unitarian views, he paid more attention than Copleston to the abuse of subtracting from the Bible. But Whately gradually came to concentrate not so much on the abuse of reason as on the disparagement of reason and human learning. Thus, in the early 'twenties he argued that as regards our knowledge of God we are like children; our knowledge is relative, imperfect, but sufficient for the conduct of life. He warned against presumptuous attempts to explain the unexplainable, and advised a childlike simplicity.[132] In 1839, however, we find him quoting St. Paul's precept, "in malice be ye children; but in understanding be ye men".[133] It is not that Whately changed his ideas, for even in the early 'twenties he had advised against childish credulity, insisting that faith must not be irrational, and had preached a sermon against the neglect of human learning in matters of religion. Nor did he ever cease to warn against trusting too much to human reason. But he came to feel the need for stressing rational

religion, for emphasizing the head, in reaction to those who emphasized the heart.

In Difficulties ... of St. Paul he had referred to this antithesis of heart and head and the mistake of trusting solely to the former and neglecting the latter. However, he there stated his belief that this was not a common error.[134] Likewise, in Errors in Romanism he had insisted that religion must be rational, that it was not sufficient to believe without knowing why one believed "'Be always ready', said the apostle Paul, 'to give a reason for the hope that is in you'".[135] In the 'thirties he began to feel that this rational religion was under threat, that the error of trusting to the heart to the exclusion of the head was more prevalent than he had thought. Thus, in Dangers to Christian Faith we find a warning against this tendency to rely on the heart in order to avoid "the pride of human reason".[136] And in later editions of his Logic he added to the section on "Fallacies", the fallacy of regarding the reasoning powers as useless, because they were insufficient for attaining truth in religious questions. He likened the view that, because of the limits of reason, we should appeal to the heart rather than the head, to saying that "since just weights alone, without a just balance, will avail nothing, therefore we have only to take care of the scales, and let the weights take care of themselves".[137] To neglect the rational basis of Christianity, to despise its evidence, was, in Whately's opinion, to give the advantage to the enemies of Christianity, whom he believed to be more numerous than was generally supposed and likely to become more open in their opposition.[138]

This was another part of Whately's quarrel with the Tractarians, for he considered that by their emphasis on tradition and church authority they disparaged reason and evidence, and thus encouraged infidelity. In 1840 he wrote to Hawkins that "there is a third party [the Tractarians] aiding the Mystics and the Socialists, who, like partners at cards, are sitting opposite, but playing into each others hands: both contending that no man can have any better reason for being a Christian than the Parson tells him".[139] In Dangers to Christian Faith Whately even went so far as to raise the suspicion that the Tractarians were in fact "concealed infidels indulging in an ironical sneer". This was, of course, unfair to the Tractarians and Whately could not have seriously suspected them of infidelity. Nevertheless, an infidel, he thought, could desire nothing better than to see professed Christians deprecating appeals to the evidences of Christianity and relying instead on the authority and antiquity of the church, thus "resting their faith on the same ground with that of the Hindoos".[140] Indeed, Whately maintained that the Tractarians, by this appeal to tradition, were imitating the pagans and reversing the practice of Christ and his Apostles, who had appealed to the evidence of prophecy and miracles to prove that Christ came from God.[141] Moreover, the appeal to faith rather than reason to justify one's religion was, as Hume had argued, resting faith on itself.[142]

Besides the danger of infidelity, there was also the danger of general ignorance and superstition, the one leading to the other. For if the people were taught to renounce private judgment and to rely on the judgment of those in authority in the church, who were more learned in religious matters, it might soon come about that these

authorities, instead of searching the Scriptures, might deem it sufficient to rely on the judgment of the Fathers, ascertained from commentaries and compilations of the Fathers, or from abridgments of these compilations, or brief compendiums based on these abridgments:

> so that, in the end, - and that, no remote end, - the wise and the learned, on whom the mass of the People are implicitly to rely, become unwise and unlearned, there being no one to detect their deficiencies; ignorant of Scripture, of which they were left to be the authoritative interpreters, - ignorant of it, in fact, from that very cause; - and in short, "blind leaders of the blind".[143]

Consequently, Whately exhorted ministers to study the Bible closely and to preach "not, whatever others are convinced, but, what you are yourselves convinced, is declared or implied in Scripture", and to call on their hearers to receive as divine truth, "that only which they are convinced of as scriptural".[144] Whately was not discouraging ministers from taking advantage of the fruits of human learning as regards the Bible, or indeed from passing on the results of that learning to their congregations, but he insisted that both minister and parishioner must satisfy themselves that anything claimed to be a doctrine of the Bible was in fact contained in the Bible. The Bible was not to be superseded by learned treatises or sermons. Whately, as has been said, was first and foremost a teacher, and he saw the minister's role as essentially that of a teacher. The minister, starting from a position of superior knowledge, should not use that knowledge to impose dictatorially on his flock his own interpretation of Scripture, but rather, by sharing the fruits of his learning, attempt to bring them as close as possible to his own vantage point and thus help people to exercise their own judgment in a more enlightened manner. Whately was perhaps overly optimistic regarding the capabilities of ordinary people, but he was by nature

optimistic and anyway, could not accept the other alternatives, that is, that faith should be based on authority rather than reason, or that there were two systems of Christianity, one for the learned and one for ordinary people. The theory of "reserve", which Whately called "the double doctrine", and the idea that the ministers of the church constituted a separate sacerdotal caste possessing supernatural powers were repugnant to Whately.[145] Teachings such as these alienated Whately from the Tractarians, as did what he saw as their hypocrisy and disingenuousness, evidenced by their protestations of high regard for ecclesiastical authority even while they subverted it by their actions. Concerning Newman in particular, Whately held that his "Elucidation" of Hampden's Bampton Lectures was "such a deliberate misrepresentation" that Whately thenceforth ceased to trust Newman's honesty.[146]

Whately's belief in the possibility of rational religion and his apprehension of the dangers inherent in relying on the heart, did not change over the years. In fact, he became even more convinced of the necessity of upholding the Noetic idea of rational religion once German rationalism had made an impact on English thought. In his Commonplace book we find the following entry under the heading "Weights without Scales", dated December 1860:

> It is curious to observe coincidence in principle between the "Review and Essay" school and some of those most opposed to them, but who unconsciously favour them. They both represent what has always been called <u>evidence</u> ... as quite useless; because, forsooth, a <u>mere</u> address to the understanding is not sufficient (and no one ever said it is) to make anyone a good Christian, any more than a correct chart will bring a ship into port without wind or steam. And they allow of no ground of right conviction except on <u>feeling</u> a certain doctrine to be suitable to our <u>wants</u> and <u>wishes</u> and <u>conjectures</u>. And the perception of this they

> regard as a special revelation from Heaven. Now all this being admitted, a suspicion will arise that all that evidence which is, it seems useless, has no real existence, and that all the miraculous narratives of Scripture may be explained as parables, myths, exaggerations, mistakes, or pious frauds.
>
> And when each person brings his own candle to the sundial, to throw the shadow which ever way he will, there will be endless differences as to the conclusions embraced and rejected, precisely because the principle is the same, of each following his own fancy and taste.[147]

Whately's emphasis on rational religion and on the importance of evidence no doubt accounts for some historians' judgment of his theology as excessively rationalistic. S. Rashid, for example, speaks of Whately's "overly rational view of Christianity" and his "suffocating rationality", and says that Whately lacked "soul". D.H. Akenson, who is by no means unsympathetic to Whately, is reluctant to pass judgment on Whately's religious views, but says, "Simply put, on matters of religion he was not keen". A convinced Christian, he believed, "albeit in his own way".[148]

However, some modern estimates of Whately's religion have been influenced by a hostile Tractarian interpretation. Church, in his history of the Oxford Movement, asserted that the leaders of the movement recoiled from "Whately's hard and barren dialectics", and reacted against the prevailing "specious but shallow view that everything in the search for truth was to be done by mere producible and explicit argumentation".[149] Whately, in the opinion of the Tractarians, was attempting to convert by syllogisms. Unfortunately, this assessment has sometimes been uncritically accepted. W.R. Fey, for example, in his study of Newman, gives a mistaken picture of the Noetics, due to his reliance on Tractarian sources. Fey states that

> The Noetics argued that no one has a right to believe until he has applied to his claims the same canons used by mathematicians and physicists. For logical argument is "the most appropriate intellectual occupation of MAN, as man"; and when it is obtained it compels assent to the articles of Christian belief. But by establishing a proportion between the reasonableness of one's belief and the rigour of objective proof, this school tended to reserve a well-founded faith for the scholarly few who could master technical proofs.[150]

In support of his view Fey quotes Whately's statement that "all Reasoning, on whatever subject, is one and the same process, which may be clearly exhibited in the form of Syllogisms". "The Noetics", he continues, "seemed to have endorsed Descartes' dogma that the clarity and distinctness of an idea is the criterion of its truth; and then concluded that truths of faith like those of mathematics should be immediately compelling to an honest mind".[151] In comparison to the Noetics, Newman, Fey argues, realised that apologetic arguments in demonstrative form were powerless to bring about the assent of faith: "First shoot round corners, and you may not despair of converting by a syllogism".[152] Fey states that Newman "found in Joseph Butler a refreshing alternative to the rationalism of the Liberal school", (a reference to the Noetics[153]). Newman "agreed with Butler about the broad role of probability in that human mode of inquiry which is not governed by the rationalist alternative of having either mathematically demonstrated propositions or nothing worthy of being called knowledge".[154]

Now Butler could hardly have provided a refreshing alternative to the Noetics, considering the similarity between their points of view, but even apart from that, this whole passage indicates a lack of understanding of the Noetics and their religious and philosophical

beliefs. The Noetics did not in fact limit knowledge to "mathematically demonstrated propositions". They did indeed emphasize the need for evidence if faith was to be reasonable, but they did not insist that this evidence had to be put in syllogistic form and demonstratively proved. On the contrary, religious faith was a question of probabilities and was incapable of being demonstratively proved. Whately's statement regarding syllogisms was an expression of the Noetic belief that all reasoning is capable of being put in syllogistic form, that is, that all reasoning is deductive.[155] The Noetics saw great value in syllogistic logic as an aid to correct reasoning, but they were far from suggesting that all Christians should study logic in order to render their faith reasonable. It was not the form in which the evidence for faith was expressed, which made faith reasonable, but the fact that there was evidence for it, that it was based on evidence.

Nor did the Noetics endorse Descartes' dogma "that the clarity and distinctness of an idea is the criterion of its truth". On the contrary, regarding religious truths which were above reason, the Noetics sought to discourage men from searching after too great a clarity and distinctness. This desire for excessive definition led to dogmatic religion and the fault of being "wise about what is written". The Noetics taught that people must be content with an imperfect knowledge, with seeing through a glass darkly. Far from viewing the clarity and distinctness of an idea as the criterion of its truth, they considered that some religious doctrines were indistinct and yet certain. As far as religious knowledge was concerned, they did not equate certainty with completeness and

clarity. The doctrine of the Trinity provides a good example. Of this, Whately wrote,

> Nothing, indeed, can be more decidedly established by Scripture, - nothing more indistinctly explained (except as far as relates to us) than the doctrine of the Trinity; nor are we perhaps capable, with our present faculties, of comprehending it more fully.[156]

One was justified, then, in being certain of the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, even though it was imperfectly understood.[157]

Whately, then, despite his emphasis on reason and evidence, did not teach that religion was simply a matter of argument and demonstrative proof. Religious faith, he well knew, was not a purely intellectual affair.[158] Although it cannot be denied that, as his friend W. Fitzpatrick pointed out,[159] his sermons were directed to the head rather than to the heart, yet he realised the limitations of the head and was not unaware of the importance of the heart. Alongside his emphasis on reason and need for evidence, Whately also maintained that one of the most striking peculiarities of the Christian religion was that it appealed to our affections, for Christ and his Apostles knew that "it is in vain the reason is convinced, if the heart be not warmed".[160] Thus, the principal motive for obedience to God's commands was not an intellectual conviction of a future life, or any other argument drawn from natural religion, but rather the love of Christ. Nor was it just right conduct that was required, but the conduct must proceed from the right motive. Whately maintained that the prudential motives supplied by natural religion were in fact insufficient even if they resulted in right conduct, for Christ required his followers

> to give up their hearts to Him, and to obey Him, not merely as servants, but as affectionate children. None of their duties, though ever so well performed, are pleasing in His sight, unless they proceed from a love, reverence, and gratitude towards Him, similar to that which we feel for a most excellent parent.[161]

Nor, in his concern for evidences and rational religion, did Whately completely lose sight of that favourite doctrine of the Evangelicals, the grace of the Holy Spirit. In the quest for religious faith, Whately taught, man should not rely solely on his own devices and forget to seek through prayer the assistance of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, he acknowledged that, although a Christian could not claim religious knowledge if his belief rested on no firm evidence, yet the Christian was required "to grow in grace" as well as "in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ".[162]

Whately, then, did not ignore the claims of the heart, even though his own sermons were directed to the head. Undoubtedly, the intellectual rather than emotional nature of his sermons was due to his character and education. An Oxford education, and especially an Oriel education, with its emphasis on Aristotle and logic, it could be argued, was not the best training for the writing of inspirational sermons. Of course, Newman and Keble could be pointed to in order to disprove this argument. But in the case of Whately, the highly intellectual and logical nature of his university studies and common-room debates reinforced what appears to have been his own natural bent.[163] Whately would have been more at home in the eighteenth century, the age of reason, than in the romantic nineteenth century. His sympathy with the previous century is particularly evident in his dislike of "enthusiasm" in religion. True Christian feeling, he

thought, was not "enthusiastic" but "steady". "Sudden and short bursts of devout fervour will not produce a uniform, careful, and active course of virtue; but a rational and deep-fixed love of God undoubtedly will".[164]

The third essay in the series on Peculiarities of the Christian Religion, which unlike most of his other works commends the heart as against the head, was among the earliest of Whately's works. Whately's purpose in this essay was to warn against an over-reliance on natural religion, which was addressed to the head and whose moral precepts were accordingly "needlessly dry, unattractive, and uninteresting to the feelings",[165] and to advocate reliance on the Christian Revelation, one of the peculiarities of which was its appeal to the feelings. In the early 'twenties, Whately joined Copleston in fighting what seemed a pressing danger, that is, an over-reliance on reason and consequent neglect of the Bible. Later, however, as has been argued, Whately felt that the main danger came not so much from the abuse of reason as from the opposite extreme, the over-reliance on the heart, and so Whately turned his efforts to combatting this error. This early essay, then, is not inconsistent with Whately's later views, but merely indicates a change of emphasis. In any attempt to steer a middle course it is necessary to give varying emphasis to the dangers of the opposite extremes, depending on the circumstances of the time. Copleston, for instance, preached "moderation but not indifference" throughout his life, but early in his career stressed "moderation", whereas during the Oxford Movement stressed "not indifference".

Akenson, however, maintains that Whately's religious views do contain inconsistencies. He argues that Whately's writings on religious matters

> should not be construed as constituting a systematic theology. Whately had opinions on a large number of subjects, and he expressed them with clarity and force, but he never took his religious thought far enough to involve system building. Hence, the implications of some of his opinions clashed with other of his own views.[166]

There is certainly a lot of truth in this. Whately himself would have agreed that his religion was not systematic. Both he and Copleston deplored system-building. Religion could not be systematic, they believed, because the Bible was not systematic, and religion should be based on the Bible. However, we should not take this lack of system as implying that Whately's religious statements were isolated opinions, unrelated to any underlying principles. Whately's pronouncements on various issues can, in fact, be traced back to a number of basic principles, both philosophic and religious, which he shared with Copleston. All their religious writings, for example, were inspired by the theme of "back to the Bible". Moderation, or the golden mean, was another principle of paramount importance, inherited from Aristotle but also, in the view of Copleston and Whately, in accord with Biblical teachings. And if the implications of some of Whately's opinions clash with each other, this is largely due, as it is with Copleston, to the difficulty of maintaining the golden mean. In attempting to steer a middle course between opposite extremes, one is ever likely to tend towards one or other of the extremes, and possibly towards different extremes at different times. Concerning the "via media" between the over- and under-use of reason in matters

of religion, Whately's tendency was obviously towards the over-use of reason, although he tried to keep this in check and was warned against it by Copleston.[167] Consequently, his theology had that rationalistic air, criticised by Newman and the Tractarians.

Section 2. Hampden's Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity

Two years after the publication of Whately's Peculiarities there appeared a work which could be seen as an answer to it, An essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity, written by the former Oriel fellow, Renn Dickson Hampden. Hampden was six years junior to Whately, having been born on 29th March, 1793, in Barbadoes, where his father was a colonel of militia. Hampden was sent to England in 1798 and was educated by the Reverend M. Rowlandson, vicar of Warminster in Wiltshire, until 1810, when Hampden entered Oriel as a commoner. His official tutor at Oriel was John Davison, who had taken over the duties of college tutor on Copleston's retirement from that position. Hampden passed his B.A. examination with distinction in 1813, gaining a double first-class. He was also successful in gaining the Latin Essay prize. In 1814 he was elected fellow of Oriel College. Two years later he was ordained and married, and he left Oxford to become the curate of Newton, near Bath. After a number of years of pastoral and literary work,[1] he finally returned to live in Oxford in 1829, and served as examiner for the B.A. degree in 1829, 1831, and 1832, and as Bampton lecturer for 1832. He rose quickly up the academical ladder, becoming Principal of St. Mary Hall in 1833 and Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1834, and two years later became the centre of controversy in Oxford, due to his appointment as Regius Professor of Divinity. In 1847 this controversy was rekindled, both within Oxford and further afield, by his elevation to the bishopric of Hereford.[2]

It is ironic that of all the Noetics it was Hampden around whom this controversy raged. He had not, like Copleston in his youth, engaged in pamphlet warfare with individuals or journals. Nor was he the sort of person to throw himself enthusiastically into such battles, as Whately would have done. Indeed, the two men were vastly different in character, and the style of their writings reflect this difference. An Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity was Hampden's first published work, and like Whately's first publication, Historic Doubts, the Essay was concerned with the Christian evidences. But there the similarity ended. Hampden's style, in this essay and in his Bampton lectures, was much more academic, less popular than Whately's. In fact, Hampden did not win many admirers as a writer. Thomas Mozely implied that his Bampton lectures were unreadable.[3] He certainly lacked Whately's talent for clear expression and apposite illustration, but, on the other hand, the Bampton lectures reveal more thoroughness of research and greater depth of thought than is found in Whately's works.[4]

Hampden's Essay and Whately's Peculiarities provide good examples of the respective styles of Hampden and Whately, but besides stylistic differences, the two works develop different, and on the surface, conflicting lines of thought. Hampden's work can be seen as an answer to Whately's, in so far as it offers an opposite view of the value of natural theology. In the Preface to the Peculiarities Whately had criticised those who began with natural theology, thinking to honour and support the Gospel "by laying a foundation which, in fact, tends to weaken and degrade the superstructure".[5] Hampden, however, believed that both foundation and superstructure were important, and

that natural theology provided valuable evidence of the truth of Christianity. Whereas Whately concentrated mainly on the external evidences of Christianity, Hampden showed more interest in the internal evidences, particularly within the sphere of natural religion.[6]

According to Hampden, there were two methods of treating the internal evidences. Firstly, we might judge of a revelation directly by comparing what it reveals of God with the principles of our moral nature; or secondly, we might judge of it indirectly by comparing it with what we learn of God from nature.

> The first mode of inquiry suggests an answer to the question: is it such a revelation as the Divine Being recognized in the dictates of conscience should give? The second mode of inquiry suggests and answer to the question: is it such a revelation as God has already given? ....The first seeks to establish the morality of the revelation; the second to establish its philosophy.[7]

The first, with its appeal to conscience, had some affinity with contemporary attitudes to the internal evidences, although, as described here by Hampden, it suggests more of an eighteenth century rather than a nineteenth century approach, being a much more intellectual, less emotional, application of the test of conscience than was common in some, especially Evangelical, circles. The second was definitely more in harmony with the spirit of the previous century, particularly as evinced in the works of Bishop Butler. Hampden was a great admirer of Bishop Butler, and in fact Hampden's Essay was basically a defence of Butler and Butler's method, that is, the method of analogy.[8] The second mode of inquiry, then, was the one adopted by Hampden in this early work.

In Peculiarities Whately had maintained that the study of natural theology should follow (or at least accompany, but not precede) the study of Revelation, and that we should look to natural theology only for confirmation of things revealed in the Gospel. Hampden, although agreeing at the outset of his Essay that miracles were the ultimate confirmation of a revelation (his admiration for Bishop Butler could hardly have allowed him to do otherwise, as this was also Butler's position), nevertheless seems to imply that a study of the internal evidences should precede the consideration of miracles.[9] He is not altogether clear on this point (Copleston remarked on a certain obscurity in the first part of the book), and elsewhere he implies the opposite by saying that the question of how far the analogy between nature and supernatural revelation indicates divine origin of that revelation, can only be asked of revelations resting on the evidence of miracles.[10] But regardless of whether the study of the internal or external evidences should come first, it is obvious that Hampden was trying to make the point that natural religion should not be neglected, and that miracles, although the ultimate proof of Christianity, are insufficient by themselves to bring about conviction, which, besides truth and proof, is necessary for knowledge.[11]

The miracles, Hampden argued, could not by themselves provide conclusive proof of the truth of Christianity.

> The separation, indeed, of the miracles, from the internal evidence of the religion, in favour of which they are alleged, is to impute to them, per se, a demonstrative force which they cannot really possess. They are, at most, only highly probable evidence of the reality of a divine commission, even to the witness of them.[12]

This is so, firstly, because they prove nothing but power, the divinity of that power being deduced from further assumptions, such as that only God can interfere with the order of his creation; and secondly, because they do not guarantee that the words of the miracle-worker are the words of God, this deduction likewise depending on further assumptions. Thus Hampden concluded that the miracles could not prove the authenticity of the Christian Revelation, but only render it highly probable. In this conclusion Hampden did not really differ from Whately, for Whately did not contend that the miracles provided demonstrative proof of the truth of Christianity (no matter of fact could be proved demonstratively). However, whereas Whately seemed to rest satisfied with the level of probability provided by the miracles, Hampden went on to argue that "an evidence of such a nature, admitting of degrees, requires to be substantiated by accompanying evidence, derived from the internal character of the religion, as well as by every collateral proof".[13]

Natural religion, then, bolstered the proof provided by the miracles. Its value as a proof of Christianity depended on the discovery of points of similarity between natural religion and Revelation, although in itself a lack of similarity would not disprove Revelation, as the realms of nature and Revelation might be compatible but distinct. Disagreement between the two, however, would disprove the authenticity of Revelation.[14] On the other hand, if the facts of nature and the facts of Revelation did "exhibit a general identity of truth", then this identity would be evidence that they proceeded from

the same author, and as God was the author of nature, he must also be the author of the Christian Revelation.[15]

But besides adding an extra proof of the authenticity of the Christian Revelation, natural religion, in Hampden's opinion, also helped overcome a problem associated with the external evidence. In the previous century miracles had been a great subject of debate. The Deists had argued against miracles on the grounds of the fixed order of nature. They believed that God had created the world and thereafter did not interfere in his creation. The Deistical writer, John Toland,[16] had attempted to supply natural explanations of the Scripture miracles. But the most telling argument came from David Hume.[17] In his Essay on Miracles he made use of the argument from experience. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature, but experience shows these to be fixed. For any supposed miracle, then, the possibility of it actually being miraculous is counterbalanced by the possibility of it being a deception on the part of the witnesses or reporters of it. For while it is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true, it is not contrary to experience for testimony to be false. Thus, Hume concluded that "no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion".[18]

It was this argument that Whately had tried to combat in his Historic Doubts. This jeu d'esprit, in which he disputed the existence of Napoleon, was intended to be a "reductio ad absurdum" of Hume's argument in order to laugh it out of court. Hampden, however, saw the force of Hume's objection to miracles. Miracles, he admitted,

using the terminology of the Scottish Common Sense school of philosophy, went against a fundamental principle of human belief, that is, belief in the immutability of nature. But this disadvantage of the evidence of miracles, Hampden thought, could be lessened by attending to the analogy of scriptural and natural truth. Natural religion enables us to

> rise from the credibility of the facts abstractly considered, to a conviction of their truth as miraculously established; without feeling ourselves committed to a belief in miracles unaccompanied by the probability of other circumstances essentially connected with them. Our objection to miracles in general may still remain in its full force, while it is removed as to the matter of the revelation in question which the miracles are intended to prove. The scripture truth being acknowledged as internally credible, it then appears irrelevant, to question them on account of the mode of their conveyance because it is miraculous.[19]

There is a suspicion of special pleading about this. Hampden appears to concur with Hume regarding miracles in general, while making an exception in the case of the Christian miracles. And, in fact, a certain ambivalence can be felt in Hampden's attitude to miracles. He was not willing to give up miracles as a proof of Christianity, for, like Whately, he considered them to provide a basis for a rational faith. With Whately, he was concerned to counter Hume's objection to miracles, and the above argument was intended to protect their credibility.[20] Nevertheless, his views tended towards that decreasing emphasis on miracles noticeable in the nineteenth century, which became more marked as the century advanced. Like Hampden, Baden Powell also came to see the problems associated with miracles, and in 1860, in Essays and Reviews, he wrote, "if miracles were in the estimation of a former age among the chief supports of Christianity, they are at present among the main difficulties and

hindrances to its acceptance".[21] Matthew Arnold summed up this feeling in his catchcry, "Miracles do not happen". Hampden never went this far, but in his works there is not the same reliance on the proof of miracles as we find in Whately's. Hampden was concerned with conviction as well as proof, and in his eyes the advantage of natural theology was that it not only supplied evidence of the truth of Christianity and counteracted the speculative objections brought against it by its enemies (which had been Bishop Butler's main purpose), but it was also an aid to conviction and predisposed one to believe in Revelation.[22]

In his defence of natural theology Hampden by no means intended to disparage revealed religion or to imply that natural theology was more important than Revelation or sufficient by itself. Hampden held that the ends of natural theology and Revelation were quite distinct. Thus the immediate end of the instruction we gain from studying the course of nature, is "that we may obtain our natural good as inhabitants of this world". The study of nature only gives us information on things necessary for life on earth and tells us nothing about spiritual matters. The Scriptures, on the other hand, "are a direct appeal to God himself and the things of the invisible world". They give us information on things on which nature is silent. "The spiritual good of man, accordingly, is their primary object", and it is to the Scriptures that we must turn for guidance in our spiritual lives.[23]

Like Copleston and Whately, then, Hampden stressed the all-importance of the Bible. Like them, too, he warned against

making a wrong use of the Bible and seeking from it a type of knowledge it was not meant to impart. The Bible, Hampden argued, was intended to influence conduct and feelings, not to give information on human arts and sciences or even on heavenly matters not relevant to human duty.[24] Consequently human knowledge of divine things was necessarily very imperfect. Not only did the Scriptures reveal only part of God's providence, that part which was necessary for us to know, but also the knowledge that we did gain from the Scriptures was merely relative. This was due both to the limitations of the human faculties and to the limitations of human language. Revelation was addressed to the human faculties, which were constituted so as to receive knowledge from experience. In order to be intelligible to the human faculties, any message from God must conform to this constitution. "It cannot impart to them a knowledge of a different nature from that which they are adapted to receive, and this we find to be of a relative nature; such therefore must be also the truth scripturally revealed".[25] Moreover, human ideas and the language in which they are expressed, are the instruments employed in a scriptural revelation, and therefore that revelation is limited to imparting a relative and analogical knowledge.[26] Hampden's debt to Copleston and Whately on these points is obvious, and indeed Hampden was impressed by Copleston's remarks on analogy in the Enquiry.[27]

If the knowledge of God imparted by the Scriptures, which are a direct communication from God, is relative, then we can hardly expect other than relative knowledge from the study of nature. For the knowledge of God communicated by nature is, as it were, second-hand.

By means of self-reflection we make deductions from the facts of nature to the behaviour of God. That is, we use our knowledge of our own nature and behaviour in order to deduce facts about God. The argument from design is an example of this. Because man, an intelligent being, uses his intelligence to create objects whose intricacy and workings indicate design (for example, a watch), it is assumed that the creator of the universe, which, like a watch, seems to show signs of intricacy and design, must also be an intelligent being. A similar line of reasoning is followed when we make deductions about other people's actions and character. For example, if someone weeps, we assume him to be sad, because this is our own reaction to sorrow. However, Hampden warned, whereas concerning other people we can apply our own experience with confidence since we are of like nature, concerning God we cannot regard our experience as of absolute authority, seeing that the infinity of his nature "constitutes an unparalleled case".[28] As our knowledge of God, then, whether derived from nature or Revelation, is necessarily relative and imperfect, we should be careful in our pronouncements on that subject, making allowance for our ignorance and incompetence and not presuming to encroach on matters beyond our understanding. In particular, we should not attempt "to be wise above what is written" ("The Christian Philosopher ... does not attempt to philosophize <u>independently</u> of the Bible") and indulge in presumptuous speculations, thus making theology the pastime, instead of the discipline of the intellect.[29]

Despite the divergence from Whately over the importance of natural theology, it can be seen from the above summary discussion that Hampden's position was not a serious departure (if indeed a

departure at all) from the Noetic theology as set forth by Copleston and Whately. In fact, this essay was an attempt to show that the study of natural theology was quite compatible with Noetic principles. Hampden wished to defend natural theology against the accusation that it tended towards the pride of human reason and speculative theology.

Concerning the pride of reason, Hampden held that it was inaccurate to distinguish between Revelation and natural theology as respectively representing the areas of faith and reason, if that distinction led one to assume that reason had no part to play in the acceptance of the truths of Revelation. This fallacy was caused by a loose use of the word "reason", to refer to both the knowledge naturally acquired by the mind, and the faculties of the mind by which it is acquired. Strictly speaking, Hampden argued, "what we learn by supernatural revelation, and what we know naturally, are in the same sense truths of reason - truths, which reason accepts on the perception of their evidence".[30] Thus Hampden corrected Locke's distinction between reason and revelation, contending that Locke should have stated

> that nature and the scripture-revelation were equally the appointed means of instruction from God, and that reason was the receiver and interpreter of both; the facts of both with their proper evidence being submitted to its assent, - and the assent consequently to a scriptural truth, however remote that truth may be from probability, being as reasonable, where the proper evidence of it is discerned, as an assent to the most common fact of experience.[31]

In essence, Hampden was saying that faith and reason were not opposed (although he did not object to the common use of the terms "faith" and "reason" to represent the truths of Revelation and nature, so long as

the fallacy inherent in that use was guarded against), but that faith in the Gospel Revelation was reasonable in that it rested on evidence. If, then, reason had a part to play in Revelation as well as in natural theology, it was clear that the danger of pride of human reason was not limited to the sphere of natural religion.

But despite the danger, it was one which could be avoided, in Hampden's opinion. The abuse of human reason in matters of religion resulted, according to the Noetics, either in speculative religion or rationalism, in systematising the Bible, adding to or manipulating its words, or in mutilating it, ignoring and explaining away those doctrines which human reason found difficult to accept. Hampden, who equally with Copleston and Whately deplored these abuses of reason, believed, however, that the type of natural theology which he recommended, and which Bishop Butler had practised, avoided "encroachment upon the authority of scripture"[32] and was thus not liable to these errors. As mentioned above, he maintained that there were two methods of treating the internal evidences. Firstly, we might study the revelations of the Bible directly, and judge of their reasonableness or moral fitness. For example, the doctrine of a future life, where our actions in this life are rewarded or punished, could be argued to be probable on the principle of justice. Secondly, we might follow the more indirect method of comparing the doctrines of the Bible with the truths of natural religion. In this way Bishop Butler had examined the evidence which nature provided for the probability of a future life. Both arguments, Hampden felt, could "be brought into the service of Christianity", but the second method, the analogical method of Bishop Butler, was safer. It was safer because,

although neither argument could give more than a probable proof, the argument from analogy appealed to observable facts of nature and was thus difficult to reject, whereas the other argument was based on abstract principles such as liberty, justice, or moral fitness, which might be denied.[33]

Moreover, the argument from analogy was more cautious and less likely to fall into the above-mentioned abuses of reason. In arguing for the reasonableness of any doctrine it was necessary to keep a check on speculative curiosity and to bear in mind the limitations of human knowledge. There was the ever-present danger of "reducing the scripture-revelation to the fallible standard of human reason, and, whilst we impotently endeavour to make everything in it appear reasonable, of enervating that authority on which our faith should implicitly repose".[34] This was not the case with the argument from analogy. Although the form of the argument was speculative, it was not speculative in its spirit and tendency.

> By its very nature it represses curiosity, and silences the dogmatism of arrogant speculation. Instead of ministering to the pride of the human understanding, by proposing the doctrines of religion to the approbation or disapprobation of reason - it humbles reason to an acknowledgment of them in their own mysterious character, by simply presenting their real, indubitable, counterparts in the book of nature. It sanctions no opinion relative to the invisible things of God, which is not warranted by real experience of the course of His visible administration. And if our opinions are only so warranted, it forbids us to question further. Whilst indeed we view opinions so formed, in juxta-position with corresponding declarations of scripture, we are effectually guarded against the imputation of a speculative theology. The correspondence itself in which the whole effect of our conclusions lies, is an answer to those who would accuse us as mere theorists in religion.[35]

Although Hampden was mainly concerned with vindicating the analogical method of considering the internal evidences, he also at times indicated a more acceptable way of employing the more direct method. He advised, instead of a speculative or argumentative approach, an experimental approach. Here Hampden stepped out of the eighteenth century and came close to the nineteenth century attitude to the evidences. Christianity, he said,

> expressly refers us to experimental proof of its divine origin; it directs us by the mouth of its great Agent and Interpreter, to "do the will" of God, if we would "know of the doctrine, whether it be of God"; by which precept, we may understand the necessity of examining the truth of that scheme of knowledge which it unfolds, by the test of its accordance with our nature and condition.[36]

Copleston preached the same lesson, and the section of Hampden's work which he most admired was the section on the "Practical Force of the Evidence of Analogy".[37] Here Hampden argued that, as life consists not in contemplation but in action, the practical usefulness of a religion is evidence of its truth. "A religion.... upon which it is expedient to act, <u>is true</u> to every practical purpose;.... A religion, on the contrary, upon which it is inexpedient to act, <u>is false</u> to every practical purpose".[38] For if a religion appears inexpedient, either that religion is false, or else the constitution of things to which it is applied, is absurd, the former being the more likely conclusion. And Hampden maintained that it was on this test of experience that the belief of the generality of mankind was founded, and to which even the conviction of the learned ultimately appealed. The Christian religion appeals to the wants, feelings, desires, hopes, and fears of man. Those who accept its teachings, accept truths "to which their hearts respond yea and amen". Without this experimental

proof the other evidences of religion only bring about a "cold and inoperative belief".

> For, splendid as the apparatus of miracles and prophecy may be, by which its divine origin is established; numberless as the arguments may be, from considerations of the nature of human testimony, and from collateral proofs, there is nothing in all such evidences which wins the individual attention of the inquirer.[39]

At the end of the book, after having set out at length the evidence afforded by natural religion, he admitted that it was an evidence "whose force cannot be fully argued out and placed before the view. It must be felt, in order to be rightly understood". The Analogy of Bishop Butler was of inestimable value to those who would study this evidence, but even so, each person "must explore it in the observation of his own experience, and listen to its dictates in the 'still small voice' of conscience".[40] Here, then, is an appeal to the heart reminiscent of Coleridge.

It must not be supposed from this that Hampden approved of the growing tendency, criticised by Whately, to dispense with the other evidences of Christianity. The researches of the learned into all the various proofs were necessary for the general defence of Christianity. It was necessary "that they should thoroughly know the strength of the position which it occupies in the historical world, - that they should have gone round the towers, and have marked well the bulwarks of their Sion".[41] Moreover, Hampden was careful to make a distinction between this appeal to conscience, which he believed to be an authentic principle of human nature, implanted in us by God, and appeals to "so capricious and fluctuating a thing as mere inward

sensation, which may, or may not, be real and natural".[42] Of how to distinguish between the two, however, Hampden was silent. Like Copleston and Whately, Hampden considered that reliance on "mere inward sensation" was the mark of the "enthusiast", and thought that the opposite errors of the rationalist and the "enthusiast" were equally to be avoided.

> Where the mind is embued with a false philosophy, and impressed with a fond conceit of the abilities of human reason, - there it produces a rejection of vital religion, under the various shades of the liberal, the rationalist, the sceptic, and the infidel. Where the mind is uncultivated, or naturally ardent and susceptible, or unaccustomed to a severity of control in its imaginative powers, - there we observe its effect in the enthusiast - the mystic - the fanatic - and the superstitious.[43]

Hampden believed that it was possible to keep to the "via media" between these two extremes in the study of natural theology. Butler's Analogy was proof of this. No-one, of course, accused the Analogy of being "enthusiastic", but nor should it be regarded, thought Hampden, as rationalistic.

> His is the true spirit of the philosophy of Bacon applied to theology. For he calls upon us to abandon our theories, - to curb our imaginations, - to lay aside our prejudices - and to come, as athletes, bared for the conflict of severe inquiry into the truth, to the consideration of what the constitution of nature in fact is, - and accordingly to accept the conclusions to which such an inquiry may lead us, however repugnant to our antecedent views, - however unacceptable to speculative reason.[44]

Natural theology, then, rather than exalting reason, humbles it, by compelling it "to be a learner in the school of nature" and to accept the facts as they are, without endeavouring to mould or alter them to fit preconceived theories.[45] In other words, its method is inductive, and it prepares us for a similarly inductive approach to the

Scriptures. Like Whately, Hampden explicitly compared theology with science. The true Christian philosopher, he contended, "will take the facts of the scriptures, as they are written". Just as the scientist or Natural philosopher cannot shape the facts of the visible world to fit his theories, but must reason from them as they are, so too the Christian philosopher must accept the truths of Scripture "as facts no less rigid than the phenomena of the natural world", not attempting to modify them in any way so as to be more agreeable to human prejudices and theories.[46] And just as science gives us knowledge of particular physical facts without pretending to explain their essential nature (for example, it tells us of the existence of a universal law of gravitation, without explaining the nature of that force), so too theology gives us knowledge of divine facts, such as the triune nature of God, without enabling us to completely understand such mysteries.[47]

In one respect, however, Hampden saw Christian philosophy as being different from all other sciences. Science, while not pretending to explain the essence of things, does seek for ultimate principles. It attempts to detect connecting principles among the events of nature, and to simplify such connections and reduce them to ultimate principles. In religion, on the other hand, we must repress this desire for simplicity. We must be content, said Hampden, to hold all the truths of religion as ultimate principles, for we have no way of judging which principle or doctrine is more fundamental than the rest. Attempts to make any one doctrine, such as predestination, the basis of a theological system, have generally led to the denial of some other doctrine, such as the free-will of man, which is equally revealed in Scripture, and have, in fact, ended in a disparagement of

the whole Christian Revelation, "by subordinating it to an abstruse metaphysical tenet".[48] Whereas superior beings may be able to see that all the doctrines of the Bible are connected, with one ultimate principle pervading all, "we can only know them as individual facts connected with each other in one scheme; or as instances, for the most part, of different principles of Divine Providence, which it belongs not to us to reconcile with each other, whilst they must be held by us in perfect concord".[49] In short, we should not attempt to systematise the Scriptures.

Although Hampden's essay can be seen as an attempted correction of Whately's neglect of natural theology, and thus in this respect at least in disagreement with Whately, on a deeper level it is an example of typical Noetic theology. Most of the Noetic themes are to be found in it, and in particular, the attitude to the role of reason in matters of religion in the same as that expressed in the works of Copleston and Whately. The limitations of reason are recognised, and the theory that some of the mysteries of religion are above reason accepted.[50] Yet there is the same insistence on rational religion and on the importance of evidence, whether internal or external or preferably both, and the same attempt to find a "via media" between the abuse of reason and the neglect of reason. Here, too, is to be found the emphasis on the importance of the Bible, and the exhortation for an inductive rather than a speculative study of it - a theme which Hampden would treat in greater depth in his notorious Bampton lectures in the next decade. In this essay the theme of the supremacy of the Bible is present in a negative rather than positive sense. That is to say, rather than arguing for the all-importance of the Bible, Hampden

argued that the study of natural theology need not derogate from the authority of the Bible, but in fact enhanced and supported that authority.

Section 3. Edward Hawkins: private judgment and church authority, a middle way

The all-importance of the Bible was one of the main messages preached by the Noetics. Hampden accepted it, although, being a great admirer of Bishop Butler, he insisted that the Bible should not be studied to the exclusion of natural theology. Another Noetic, Copleston's successor in the Provostship, Edward Hawkins, also accepted that principle, but like Hampden added a caveat. The supremacy of the Bible, he warned, did not imply the unimportance of the church.

Edward Hawkins was born at Bath on February 27, 1789. In 1807 he was elected to an Andrew exhibition at St. John's College, Oxford, and graduated with a double first-class in 1811. In 1813 he was elected fellow of Oriel, where he served as tutor from 1819 to 1828, dean in 1826, and Provost from 1828 to his death in 1882 at the age of ninety three. According to J.W. Burgon, Hawkins early in his life had wished to study law, but he chose an academic and clerical career because of the need to assist his mother, who was a widow with ten children.[1] Burgon describes Hawkins' mind as legal in its texture, and certainly all accounts of his character emphasize his concern for form, rules, fairness, and impartiality. It was perhaps this aspect of his character which led him to balance the Noetic stress on the Bible with a reminder of the role of the church and tradition. Hawkins was not the kind of man to sympathise with the ultra-Protestants, who following Chillingworth,[2] declared that "the Bible only is the

religion of Protestants", and who claimed the right of private judgment, that is, the right to study the Bible directly and to decide for themselves its meaning, in disregard of the traditional interpretations of the church.

Hawkins first stated his views on this subject in 1818 in a sermon before the university on the Use and Importance of Unauthoritative Tradition.[3] Ironically, considering their later hostility, this sermon made quite an impression on Newman, who said in the Apologia that it was from this sermon that he learnt the doctrine of Tradition.[4] According to Tuckwell, this sermon brought Hawkins "into direct conflict with the Noetic teaching, in which he had hitherto concurred, as held by Whately, Baden Powell, Hampden, Arnold".[5] This, however, is not true. No doubt the sermon would have been discussed in the Oriel common room, and there is no evidence that the sermon provoked any controversy among the Noetics at that time. Later Thomas Arnold did describe this sermon as "unhappy",[6] but that was in the light of subsequent events. During the 'twenties there is no indication that the Noetics disagreed with Hawkins' view. Whately, in fact, wrote a favourable review of Hawkins' sermon for the Quarterly, and recommended it to his readers in a number of his published works.[7] That Hawkins was not departing from the Noetic position is substantiated by Newman's comment in the Apologia that Hawkins' exposition of the doctrine of Tradition did not exceed, or even reach, the High Anglican position, and that Whately agreed with it.[8]

In this sermon of 1818 Hawkins discussed the difficulty of "the very indirect method observed in the New Testament for teaching the Christian doctrines".[9] The Christian doctrines were not taught systematically in the Bible, but had to be gathered from indirect and scattered allusions to them throughout the Bible. Attempts had been made to account for this difficulty using arguments based on utility and analogy. The indirectness of the Bible was useful, it was averred, because it placed the proofs of the doctrines above suspicion of corruption; it was a trial of humility and faith; it promoted research and roused the curiosity of learned men; and the disputes and errors to which this obscurity had given rise, had helped to spread Christianity and keep alive its spirit. The argument from analogy pointed out that this difficulty applied not only to the doctrines of Christianity but also to the moral precepts of the Gospel, which similarly were not taught in a systematic way in the Bible. These arguments, Hawkins thought, only partially answered the difficulty. In particular, concerning the argument from analogy Hampden objected that the analogy was incomplete, for in discovering moral precepts we had the aid of our moral sense and of reason, whereas in the case of the revealed doctrines, this ancillary aid was lacking, and necessarily so, as the essence of these was, "although never contrary to our reason, yet to be undiscoverable by human capacity, and often to be above our reason".[10] Hawkins suggested that perhaps tradition was intended by God to supply this lack.

> In a word, why may it not have been the general design of Heaven that by early oral, or traditional, instruction the way should be prepared for the reception of the mysteries of faith; that the Church should carry down the <u>system</u>, but the Scriptures should furnish all the <u>proofs</u> of the

> Christian doctrines; that tradition should supply the Christian with the arrangement, but the Bible with all the substance of divine truth?[11]

There were two main conclusions to be drawn from this, conclusions which were later taken up and developed by the Tractarians. The first concerned the importance of primitive tradition. If the writings of the Bible were not originally addressed to infidels but rather to converts and believers and were thus not intended as an introduction to Christian doctrines, which were handed on by oral instruction, then this oral instruction or tradition became an important witness to the truth of Christian doctrines. If any doctrine could be shown to have been handed down uninterrupted from apostolic times, in other words, be shown to be a primitive tradition, then there was a presumption in favour of its truth. This much Hawkins allowed.[12] What he did not allow, was that such traditions were authoritative.

Here the significance of the word "unauthoritative" in the title becomes clear. Hawkins wished to draw a distinction between his theory of tradition and that of the Roman Catholic church. He considered that with the Roman Catholics tradition was exalted to an authority equal or even paramount to the Bible. Hawkins, however, maintained that it was not the fact that a doctrine had been handed down by uninterrupted tradition which guaranteed its truth, but rather the fact that it was revealed in the Bible. Conversely, if any tradition could not be shown to be contained in the Bible, then it was not binding on Christians. This fine line between authoritative and unauthoritative tradition easily became blurred, and it was not always easy to determine what the term "tradition" meant when used by

different people. The Tractarians, for example, insisted that their interpretation of tradition was distinguishable from that of the Roman Catholics, but not everyone could see the difference.[13]

The second conclusion, which was the one that Hawkins was more concerned to draw, was the importance of the church for the teaching of Christian doctrines. Just as the church had been the instrument of Christian instruction in the earliest ages, so too even now it was to the church that we should look for instruction in Christian doctrines. The church was to supply that systematic teaching which was not to be found in the Bible. But Hawkins was far from advocating neglect of the Bible. On the contrary, in true Noetic fashion, he urged: "Let not only the theological student therefore, but every Christian be ready to give a reason for his faith from the only authority for it, the inspired Scriptures; nothing less than this is either a Protestant, or a Christian, procedure".[14] What he was criticising was the opposite practice; that of referring exclusively to the Bible for instruction and neglecting the help afforded by the church, in her creeds, catechisms, and liturgies.

In particular, Hawkins was criticising the practice of the British and Foreign Bible Society. The evangelically inspired Bible Society, which was an interdenominational society, was looked on with suspicion by many High Church Anglicans, because to join meant both co-operating with Dissenters and sanctioning the dissemination of the Bible unaccompanied by the English Prayer Book. At Oxford the work of the Society was supported by the evangelical Principal of Magdalen

Hall, John Macbride, and in 1824 Newman, who was still in his evangelical phase, had subscribed. By 1830, however, he had come around to the High Church view and so he wrote to Macbride withdrawing his name from the Society.[15] Hawkins, from the first, took the High Church attitude. The propagation of Christianity, he believed, required more than just the distribution of the Bible. There was a need for catechetical instruction, which it was the province of the church to provide. The respective roles or uses of the church and the Bible, Hawkins summed up in the sentence, "the Church should teach, and the Scriptures prove, the doctrines of Christianity".[16]

The emphasis which Hawkins put at this time on the role of the church to teach doctrines would give the impression that he thought that one of the main functions, if not the main function, of the clergy was to teach, that, like Whately, he saw the clergy's role as mainly pedagogical rather than priestly. And indeed, the view of the clergy which is gathered from Hawkins' sermons does reveal similarities with Whately. In a sermon of 1830 he described the especial duty of the clergy as "to 'preach the word; to be instant in season and out of season' - to teach, and explain, and recommend, and imprint the sacred truths which they collect by diligent study from the holy Scriptures".[17]

It was this attitude to the sacred ministry which was one of the main differences between Noetics and Tractarians. The Tractarians tended to emphasize those aspects of the ministry which set the clergy apart and, as the Noetics objected, exalted them into a priesthood. They laid great stress on the sacramental duties of the clergy. Pusey

heard confessions. Isaac Williams recommended "Reserve in communicating Religious Knowledge". And their interpretation of the Apostolical Succession showed that they viewed the clergy as superior to the laity not only in religious knowledge, but also in the possession of special powers passed on by bishops at ordination and exercised in the sacraments. To the Noetics this view was anathema. For them the clergy was not a class apart (except in the sense that the clergy should possess greater learning in religious matters). Hawkins insisted that the "Christian Church" included not only the ministers of the Gospel but also the laity. Nor did the Christian religion have any esoteric doctrines, mysteries meant only for the priest and not the layman. On the contrary, ministers should take care to preach all the doctrines of Christianity, not presuming "to be wiser than our heavenly Master" by keeping some doctrines out of sight for fear of their being misunderstood or perverted. The way to avoid such misunderstanding, he held, was to teach them more fully and more correctly.[18] And if the clergy were to be teachers, then it was necessary for them to be learned. Moreover, that teaching must be systematic in order to be effective. Hawkins and the other Noetics were well aware that not all people were of equal capabilities and attainments, and that thus the Gospel had to be taught with discretion, taking account of such factors and progressing from the simple to the more complex, so that it might be received more profitably.[19] Notwithstanding this, all doctrines must be taught, and as to "their practical efficacy, the very end for which they should be known, a very low and imperfect comprehension of them, when that alone is within the disciple's power, is sufficient". Indeed, concerning the mysteries of religion even great learning was incapable of giving

complete understanding, and as regards "practical efficacy", Hawkins acknowledged that a person of feeble intellect could have a better knowledge than the most learned divine.[20]

The danger of this emphasis on the "practical efficacy" of doctrines, as has already been pointed out, was that religion might come to be regarded as a matter of practice only, and sermons might become merely moral discourses with little or no reference to the doctrines of Christianity. This was a criticism that was actually levelled against some of the Noetics. Copleston's sermon of 1818, for example, was damned as "an ingenious and able moral essay", more suited to the lecture hall of the moral philosopher than the pulpit of the Christian minister.[21] Thomas Arnold too, ten years later, noted that it had been said at Oxford that in his sermons he "did not preach the Gospel, nor even touch upon the great doctrines of Christianity".[22] And in the 'thirties the Tractarians brought the same charge against Hampden. While it is unfair to the Noetics to claim that their sermons were mere moral essays, for Christian doctrine is certainly to be found in them,[23] yet it cannot be denied that the tendency of their teaching was to reduce the importance of doctrine, a tendency which was taken further in the Broad Church movement.

In his sermon Christianity not the Religion either of the Bible Only, or of the Church (1830) Hawkins returned to the topic of unauthoritative tradition, once again pointing out that although the Bible alone had absolute authority, yet the church was intended to introduce us to the knowledge of the Gospel and should not be

overlooked in favour of an independent study of the Bible. "The spirit of independence", Hawkins warned, "is the spirit of pride".[24] The practice of consulting the declared decisions of the church did not infringe on the authority of the Bible. The church "claims no authority above the Scriptures, but only above individuals. That is to say, the judgment of the whole society is of course preferred to that of individuals".[25] On the question of private judgment and church authority, unlike Whately, Hawkins, with his love of order and self-discipline, inclined towards church authority. However, he attempted to show that his interpretation of church authority did not abrogate the right of private judgment. For although the church, as a society, must fix its terms of communion and thus decide who are heretics and who are schismatics, she does not claim to be infallible. The right of private judgment could not be denied: "For what in fact does this vaunted right imply but simply this - that every human being is responsible for his own conduct? As we must act, so also must we believe, upon our own individual responsibility".[26] But, he warned, we are also responsible for the use we make of the advantages afforded us, both for acting and for thinking rightly, and one of these advantages is the church.

> And herein is the sum of the whole matter; that Christianity is not the religion either of the Bible, or of the Church, but of both - because both the Bible and the Church are among our inestimable privileges, by whose aid, under the blessings of God, we may attain to a pure and lively faith, and to conduct and affections such as may in some slight measure prepare us for the happiness of heaven.[27]

In this sermon, as in his earlier one, Hawkins was trying to expose the error of those who, in reaction to what Protestants saw as the

Roman church's unwarranted exaltation of church authority, fell back on "the religion of the Bible" and neglected to take advantage of the rightful and designed assistance which the church afforded. He was, in fact, seeking a middle way between the errors of the Romanists and the ultra-Protestants, and was thus led to advance this rather unconvincing compromise between private judgment and church authority.

The events of the 'thirties showed that Hawkins' sermons had not been successful in promoting this compromise, and indeed it appeared that they had even contributed to a counter-reaction against private judgment and to an excessive veneration for church authority. Thomas Arnold thought that Hawkins' "unhappy sermon on Tradition" had contributed to the Tractarian "mischief",[28] and, in fact, it was not easy to see the difference between Hawkins' position and that of some of the leaders of the Oxford Movement. Roundell Palmer, in his Memorials, stated, "I am not sure that the leaders of the Oxford Movement dogmatically propounded a view of the Fathers which went further than [Hawkins']".[29] But what was obvious was that in practice some Tractarians went much further than Hawkins was willing to go, and that, as Palmer said, the difference between authoritative and unauthoritative tradition was lost sight of. In 1836 Hawkins was urged by Whately to write a counterbalance to his sermon on Tradition,[30] and this Hawkins did in his Bampton Lectures of 1840, An Inquiry into the Connected Uses of the Principal Means of Attaining Christian Truth. In the Preface to this work he mentioned his earlier sermon on Unauthoritative Tradition and said that in recent years his words and arguments had been employed "to forward conclusions, to

which I think they do not properly lead, and which appear to me exaggerated or incorrect".[31] The Bampton Lectures, then, were an attempt to correct these mistakes and to explain more fully his own stand on the subject of tradition and church authority.

Concerning the authority of the Bible, Hawkins' Bampton Lectures propounded the same view as his earlier works, that is, that the church teaches and the Scriptures prove, but they stressed more emphatically the unauthoritative nature of tradition. In his first lecture he generously assumed that those who declared that "Scripture and Tradition taken together are the joint Rule of Faith", did not intend to deny the supreme authority of Scripture, but he suggested that "the too great similarity between their language and that of the Church of Rome" arose "from an indiscreet endeavour to bring into one and the same definition both the Test of sound doctrine, which is Holy Scripture, and one of the Means of ascertaining the true sense of Scripture".[32] Thus it was legitimate to refer to the universal practice of the church in order to interpret doubtful passages of Scripture, to make "well-known facts and admitted history the natural commentary upon Holy Scripture".[33] Here he was in agreement with Keble.[34] But Hawkins advised caution in the application of this principle, and made a distinction between the tradition of facts and the tradition of doctrines.

> For the tradition of <u>facts</u> must not be confounded with tradition of <u>doctrine</u>. It may very well be that outward Ordinances, the constitution of the Church itself, the baptism of infants, the Lord's day, may have been committed to the safe-keeping of the Church, and with some scriptural sanction, although without any specific command, superadded to universal practice, they may carry the conviction to our minds of their Apostolic origin. Yet will it by no means follow that Doctrines also are likely to have been thus

> committed to Tradition with a similar imperfection in the Scriptural proof of their Divine authority. The Ordinance might have been binding, although not so binding, had Scripture never noticed it; but the alleged Christian Doctrine, if it cannot be proved to be revealed, is, as a Doctrine, nothing.[35]

That doctrines could be proved solely by primitive tradition he thus flatly denied, rejecting the Roman Catholic view of tradition as "the unwritten word of God". Hawkins declared that he was not aware of any tradition that was entitled to supreme authority (that is, that had been proved to have come from the Apostles), although the presumptive authority of several, in particular the more prominent doctrines, was very high. Still, these doctrines should not be accepted solely on the basis of that authority, but needed to be verified by Scripture in order to be received as the word of God. Thus the authority of tradition was subordinate to that of the Bible, and should be considered not "as superseding inquiry, but inviting it; ...not as the mistress of Scripture, but her handmaid".[36]

As this would imply, Hawkins accepted the Protestant principle of "the Sufficiency of the Scriptures", stipulating, however, sufficiency for salvation, not for every conceivable purpose. The church too had a part to play, and among its functions was that of "stating, suggesting, introducing Christian truths".[37] But the church was not infallible. Hawkins rejected the Roman Catholic claim of infallibility as incapable of proof, and based on "insufficient presumptions, and texts of disputed meaning".[38] Similarly, he denied the infallibility of the primitive church, although admitting the high probability that the primitive church knew and preserved the genuine doctrine of the Apostles.[39] The church, then, whether primitive or

present-day, provided an unauthoritative statement of doctrine, whereas the Bible provided authoritative proof. Hawkins' view of church authority was, in fact, similar to Whately's and Copleston's. He made the same distinction between matters of discipline and ceremony and matters of faith. Each branch of the church had the right to settle matters of discipline, and each had the right, in matters of faith, to determine terms of communion, as was necessary in any society. But in matters of faith the church did not claim immunity from error or absolute authority, but only the authority of influence, that is, it claimed respect and deference. He agreed with Copleston and Whately that "every separation is either a duty or a sin", that the authority of the church, in other words, was void if it clashed with the authority of the Bible.[40] Far from attempting to undermine the authority of the Bible, Hawkins, in these lectures as in his earlier works, was merely contending against the exclusive, independent study of the Scriptures and pointing out that the correct path to Christian truth lay in "the combined use of the Scriptures and the Church".[41]

Hawkins' emphasis on the role of the church, then, did not imply a denial of private judgment or an exaltation of authority at the expense of reason. In fact, the whole tone of his work, with its logical, reasoned approach, indicates that, like the other Noetics, Hawkins placed great store on rationality and correct reasoning. With Copleston, he held that reason was a God-given faculty which, like all our other faculties, should be developed and used.[42] Nor should it be abandoned in the sphere of religion, for it was a remarkable feature

of the Bible that it called for the diligent exercise of our understanding, that it bade us to be men, rather than children.[43] Hawkins' attitude to reason and religion was the familiar one, that while nothing in the Christian religion is contradictory to reason, some things are above reason, and consequently the exercise of reason on religious subjects is limited, that is, it must not exceed its proper bounds, but not excluded.[44] Like Hampden, Hawkins held that faith and reason were not opposed, but that faith included reason, in that an act of faith required the exercise of reason:

> Faith is a more comprehensive term than mere belief, or than mere reason; referring always to moral qualities and affections, which the term Reason does not. Still Faith includes in its meaning the exercise of our Reason and Judgment. By Reason we examine the evidences of Revelation; by Reason we scrutinize and interpret the language in which its truths are conveyed; by Reason we apprehend the meaning of the propositions in which revealed truths, as well as all others, are expressed; by Reason, lastly, comprehended in Faith, and blessed and consecrated by the Spirit of truth, we embrace and believe them.[45]

Faith was more comprehensive than reason because it included conscience. The truths of Revelation, Hawkins believed, were embraced by means of reason and the moral sense combined: by reason we comprehend what is true, by conscience we feel what is right. "Conscience is to morals what Reason is to truth".[46] Hawkins, like Hampden, realised the importance of the internal evidences for religious belief, and so we find that Hawkins included conscience together with reason in his discussion of "the principal means of attaining Christian truth".[47]

In thus linking together reason and conscience Hawkins was attempting a reconciliation of Noetic and Tractarian views on the

subject of faith and reason. Although the Noetics did acknowledge the role of conscience in the assent of faith, on the whole they paid more attention to the role of reason. In the 'thirties the Tractarians warned against an over-reliance on reason. Keble, in particular, emphasized conscience, and Newman, too, preached on the "Usurpations of Reason" and stressed the importance of the moral sense.[48] Hawkins, while remaining true to Noetic beliefs, appears to have wished to do justice to Tractarian views. Here we can see aspects of Hawkins legalistic temperament showing themselves. Like a good judge he was concerned to weigh up all the evidence, give each side its dues, and decide with impartiality. Thus, despite close conflict with the Tractarians in the 'thirties and 'forties (in comparison with Copleston, Whately, and Arnold, who shot their arrows from afar), Hawkins on the whole appears more tolerant of the Tractarians than do the other Noetics. Judging from what has been written about Hawkins, it would appear that he desired to remain on friendly terms with Tractarians no less than with the Noetics,[49] and that his writings and actions were dictated by a conscientious effort after truthfulness and fairness.[50] Mozley states that Hawkins, "who had long striven to keep an even course between all sides, had really won the love and esteem of all. In whatever he wrote or said, he laboured to concede to anyone what he asked, without sacrificing what was due to the truth, as he conceived it".[51] To be sure, he was more prepared to see the Tractarian point of view than, for example, Whately. Consequently, he allowed a certain value and utility to the principle that true doctrines are those which have been received always, everywhere, by all ("quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus"), whereas Whately

merely brushed it aside in a footnote.[52] And where he came closest to the Tractarians was in the stress which he placed on the role of the church.

But while he came close to the Tractarians in his views on the church, he did not depart from typical Noetic attitudes to the Bible and the role of reason in religion. Regarding reason, Hawkins insisted, as did his fellow Noetics, that although it was rightly and necessarily employed in the sphere of religion, its limitations should be kept in mind and the abuse of reason guarded against. In the seventh sermon of Principal Means he discussed three main abuses. The first was that of the rationalist, who attempted to judge by reason, not the evidence for Revelation, but the mysteries of Revelation, which were above reason, and who, in rejecting all that was incomprehensible to human reason, was led to reject Revelation itself. Hawkins, like most other churchmen, considered Unitarianism the prime example of rationalism, as is shown by his references to Unitarians such as Dr. Channing. With such advocates of the right of private judgment, Hawkins held, the exercise of that right amounted to "the pride of reason undisguised", and would "generate or countenance disunion without limit, and errors the most fearful, not only without suspicion of fault, but with complacency and pride".[53] Hawkins agreed with Whately that it was rationalism rather than superstition or fanaticism, which would be the prevailing error of the future. This "perversion of Reason" Hawkins held to be, in fact, unreasonable, "for right reason would have taught us even to expect in a Divine

Revelation things surpassing our previous conceptions, not to be wholly understood, running up into mysteries inscrutable".[54]

The second abuse was "akin to Rationalism", and consisted of making the internal evidences, instead of a confirmation of the divine origin of Revelation, the necessary evidence of divine truth. Thus, men who fell into this error tended to reject doctrines for which they did not see the reason or which did not seem to have a moral purpose, or at least to make them subservient to other doctrines more easily embraced. For example, the doctrine of the Trinity was by some depicted as subservient to the doctrine of the Atonement, as the Atonement was more in accord with what was seen as the purpose of the Gospel, that is, "restoring men to the lost image of their Creator".[55]

In writing this section Hawkins acknowledged his debt to Newman's Tract On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Revealed Religion, which, by means of a critique of the works of Thomas Erskine and Jacob Abbott, had criticised Noetic theology, especially their view of the practical purpose of the Bible and their lack of emphasis on doctrine. Hawkins agreed with many of Newman's points. He agreed with him on the importance of doctrine. He insisted that all the doctrines of the Gospel must be taught, and despite his belief in moderation and charity, did not dismiss errors of doctrine as unimportant. Hawkins set great store upon the value of truth, and he disapproved of the indifference of those who pursued charity at the expense of truth, and who believed that sincerity excused all

errors.[56] He thought that it was only the sincerity of those who made use of all their advantages, not the sincerity of the careless, indolent, and uninquiring, which at the final day would be accepted by God as a plea in mitigation of religious error, and he pointed out that "the sacred Scriptures make but little and occasional mention of Sincerity in error, whilst they speak largely and constantly of Truth and Faith".[57] Of the importance of doctrines, Hawkins stated:

> There are some Christian doctrines, then, or doctrines alleged to be Christian truths, the very reverse of curious, frivolous, unimportant, or of secondary importance; even doctrines of deep and vital importance to us all. Not without reason have Divines spoken of Fundamental truths, and of Fundamental errors; truths directly essential to the doctrine of the Gospel-covenant, errors directly subversive of it. Some Christian truths there certainly are of which it is written, "he that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be condemned".[58]

Hawkins was also in agreement with Newman that revealed doctrines were to be taught and accepted simply by virtue of the fact that they were revealed. In reference to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, he declared that "whether this great Christian mystery could or could not be shewn to have any immediate bearing upon Christian practice, we must receive and we must teach it simply because it has been revealed".[59]

Nevertheless, on the whole Hawkins concurred with the Noetic belief in the practical purpose of the Bible, and with Whately held that the doctrine of the Trinity was "fitted to exert the most overwhelming influence upon our whole souls, our hearts and our understandings, our feelings and our conduct".[60] Moreover, he displayed a very Noetic dislike of speculative theology:

> Therefore, let us avoid, so far as we may, not merely the fanciful or incautious argument ... but the dry disquisition, the subtle distinction, the vain attempt at theory and explanation, nay even, in ordinary cases and so far as we safely can, the exact and precise Theological statement. Doubtless it is the very office of the Church to state the truth directly, and clearly, and adapt her statements to every variety of human capacity. Yet even in this she ought to keep Scripture constantly in her view, and imitate Scripture, so far as she may, in the enunciation of Scriptural truth. Let us never forget the proneness of men, of the believer as well as the unbeliever, to seek to be wise above that which is written, and to tamper with the simplicity of Revelation.[61]

Hawkins warned against the danger of passing from exact definitions into dogmatism, and of mistaking "presumptuous and irreverent reasonings, for progress in the truth of Christ".[62] He contended that the Christian doctrines, although indeed addressed to our reason, were not intended for an exercise of our intellectual faculties, but rather their purpose was "to purify our hearts, exalt our pious affections, and sanctify our lives; not to be explained, but believed; to be gratefully accepted, not curiously scanned".[63] Creeds and articles Hawkins thought to be necessary in order to guard against heresy, but none the less they were the compositions of fallible men, and he felt that even the church, in drawing up these creeds and articles, had to be careful not to exceed its duty and fall into the error of adding to the Bible.[64]

The third abuse of reason which Hawkins discussed in the seventh sermon of Principal Means was just this error of speculative religion, the error of attempting to systematise the Bible. Although elsewhere Hawkins advocated "systematic" preaching or teaching, he did not mean by this, "systematic divinity", as he was careful to point out.[65] This "systematic divinity", such as had been practised by some of the

Fathers, by most of the Schoolmen, and by Calvinists, generally resulted in "a human addition to a revealed doctrine", which was likely "to prove a stumbling-block in the way of its acceptance".[66]

These three abuses of reason which Hawkins discussed in his lectures can easily be reduced to two, as the second abuse is really just a variation of the first, as Hawkins admitted. The two abuses are those treated of in the writings of the other Noetics, that is, rationalism (which results in subtracting from the Bible) and dogmatism (resulting in additions to the Bible). The first Hawkins dubbed "impiety", the second "mistaken piety".[67]

The fact that reason was liable to be misused in religion should not, according to Hawkins, deter us from striving for a right use of this God-given faculty. In this sermon he once again insisted that reason was to be employed in studying the evidences of Christianity and in the interpretation of the Bible, and he added that it was likewise to be employed in the study of the Fathers and Christian antiquity, for ancient liturgies had been interpolated and corrupted, General Councils were not infallible, and even the early Fathers were not immune from error. Thus, Hawkins concluded, "the treasures of Christian Antiquity invite and demand, instead of superseding, the most discriminating exercise of our Reason".[68] He then proceeded to list the chief aids to the right use of reason and safeguards against its abuse, that is, divine assistance, the guidance of the church, intellectual cultivation, and moral and religious training.

Here were clear guidelines for Oxford educators, engaged as they were in training young men for the ministry. Whereas it was up to the individual to pray for divine assistance, in the other three areas an Oxford education should have been of assistance. Being in part a seminary for the Anglican clergy, Oxford University could have been expected to teach the doctrines of the church and to encourage familiarity with the great theologians. Although Oxford only fulfilled this expectation to a very limited extent, at least the articles of religion of the Anglican church were studied and examined. The Tractarians aimed at improving Oxford's performance in this area, but their efforts also demonstrated, to the eyes of their opponents, the danger of taking to excess an interest in Christian antiquity. Nevertheless, the Tractarians did contribute to a deepening of religious feeling at Oxford during the first half of the nineteenth century, a development noticed by Copleston. Regarding intellectual cultivation and moral and religious training, Copleston had argued in his Replies and in his article on the London University that the collegiate education of Oxford was ideally suited to these purposes, and indeed, under him as Provost, Oriel led the way for the rest of the university. In his years as Provost, Hawkins too attempted, though less successfully, to maintain the intellectual standards which had gained Oriel its reputation, as well as have a regard for the moral and religious training of its undergraduates.[69] Oriel, Hawkins was determined, was to remain a place of religion, learning, and education.

In an earlier sermon Hawkins also gave advice to the individual to help guard against the abuse of reason. This short-hand rule,

which was much admired by the other Noetics, was to emphasize the duty rather than the right of private judgment. Over-emphasis on the right of private judgment, Hawkins believed, fostered a spirit of pride and independence, which often resulted in the above-mentioned abuses of reason, causing divisions in the church and threatening its unity. But the way to lessen this evil was not to try to prevent the use of private judgment, which was both impossible and undesirable. In other words, the way to restore the unity of the church was not through the exaggeration of church authority. This had been tried before (Hawkins was referring to the Roman Catholics) and had failed, and had in fact produced by way of reaction this over-emphasis on the right of private judgment. A better way was to inculcate the duty of private judgment, which, rather than fostering independence and hostility towards others, focussed attention on one's responsibility to seek for truth and to use every available aid in that search.[70] This good advice, however, although accepted by Noetics and Tractarians alike, did little to mitigate the hostility and divisions arising from the Oxford Movement.

Hawkins thought, then, that those who considered private judgment a duty, were less likely to reject, in a spirit of independence, that assistance which the church offered. But that duty also included the exercise of judgment and reason, for the Scriptures bade us to "prove all things, hold fast that which is good", and to "be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you with meekness and fear".[71] The Noetics generally understood these texts in an intellectual sense, that is, as calls to study the

evidence for the truth of Christianity and to be ready to cite that proof if challenged by unbelievers,[72] although, as has been seen, they did also allow an experimental proof: "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God". But Hawkins did not accept the view that such Biblical injunctions were not to be taken as vindicating the right of private judgment because their appeal was to the conscience rather than to reason.[73] Whether these passages, and many others similar to them, appealed to conscience or reason, they appealed to the judgment of individuals, and so countenanced the right of private judgment. But they also inculcated the duty of private judgment "by implying the personal responsibility of every individual in the investigation of religious truth". And this responsibility applied to the conscience just as much as reason: everyone was responsible "for the right cultivation and proper exercise both of his Moral Sense and of his Reason".[74]

This duty of private judgment did not fall on all to an equal extent, but was dependent on each person's capacity and opportunity. Not everyone, for example, could be expected to be able to set out all the evidences of Christianity, and some were justified in relying on authority. The instruction of children in the truths of Christianity must begin in this way.[75] Hawkins conceded that

> No doubt the answer of a holy life is the best and most convincing evidence which very many can offer of the sincerity of their faith; and by a simple reference to the authority of their teachers some will fully satisfy the spirit of the injunction. For a sufficient authority is a sufficient reason for our hope, and to judge of moral evidence is not the province of all persons of every age.

However, he continued:

> But the answer which is suitable to the child, the peasant, or the layman, may very ill become the parent, the man of education, or the Christian Minister.[76]

This passage is both a concession and an answer to Keble. Hawkins acknowledged the truth of Keble's contention that simple people cannot be expected to engage in learned disputes upon religion. However, this did not mean that human learning was to be despised or neglected. Thus Hawkins reaffirmed the Noetic belief in the necessity of a learned clergy. And Hawkins, first as tutor and then as Provost of Oriel, was directly responsible for the education of that clergy.[77]

Religious truth should be sought, Hawkins believed, by means of the aid afforded us by the Bible, by the church, and by reason. But there was also a fourth factor necessary for the attainment of Christian truth, which was the grace of the Holy Spirit. Hawkins taught, as indeed did the other Noetics, that it was essential to look to and pray for this assistance. At the same time, he also thought that it was possible for the doctrine of Grace to be misapplied, and that it was so misapplied by the enthusiast. The pretensions of those who claimed to deliver a new revelation from God should be closely examined, and the same proofs of authenticity sought, which all previous revelations had exhibited; that is, "the same consistency with former Revelations, the same evidence from Miracles, or Types, or Prophecies, separate at least if not combined".[78] Hawkins pointed out that Christ had warned against "false prophets". Therefore, men should scrutinize all claims carefully and not have "itching ears", lest they cause divisions in the church and commit the sin of schism. The favourite example of schism resulting from enthusiasm was that of the Methodists, and Hawkins cited Wesley, along with the Quaker George Fox and those who permitted the utterance of unknown tongues (a

reference to the Irvingites), as enthusiasts.[79] In his mention of Wesley there was a warning to the Tractarians. He asserted that cautions against the abuse of the doctrine of Grace might be requisite even at Oxford, for the Wesleyan schism had been occasioned "by the Enthusiasm of educated men, members of our own University, admitted to degrees, elected to Fellowships, occupied in this place with the instruction of youth, called to the sacred Orders of Deacon and Priest in our own Apostolical Church".[80] But just as the fact that reason was often abused should not deter men from attempting a right exercise of reason, so too the fact that this doctrine had been abused should not lead them to ignore it:

> ...let no extravagance, or excess, or abuse of the doctrine of Grace, cast that all-important doctrine into the shade. Neither Enthusiasm itself, nor any schism which it has occasioned, can compare with Unbelief. And without the Grace of the Holy Spirit we cannot believe.[81]

The purpose of Hawkins' Bampton Lectures was contained in its title. Hawkins was advocating the connected use of what he considered the four principal means of attaining Christian truth, which were, the Bible, the church, reason (together with conscience), and grace. If one of these means was emphasized to the detriment of the others, then, Hawkins contended, errors inevitably followed.

> It is not only the Enthusiast who employs one of the means of truth and casts away the rest, seeking the aid of the Spirit, but neglecting Reason, and the Church, and the Scriptures: the Romanist exaggerates the use of the Church till he lays the Holy Scriptures practically in abeyance; large classes of Protestants, and individuals in all classes, pushing the principles of Protestantism to extravagance, exalt the Scriptures till they virtually forget the Church; the Rationalist begins with setting the Church aside, and ends with degrading Holy Scripture to the level of mere human compositions.[82]

Such unbalanced approaches were among the causes of heresy, Dissent, schism, and party-strife, and Hawkins entertained the hope that these evils could be alleviated "by a more considerate use of all our privileges in their due connexion, under the gracious aid of the Spirit of God".[83] Thinking more specifically of Oxford and the current theological disputes, Hawkins gave the following warning:

> You can readily perceive, that the Rationalist can go wrong by his Reason, and the Enthusiast by his party-spirit, and the Ultra-protestant by the Scriptures; and so may we also, and this is the more likely danger in the seats of learning and in a well-ordered and Apostolical Church, by too exclusive or excessive a regard for learning, and theology, and the Fathers, and the Church itself".[84]

Hawkins, then, was advocating a balance of these four principal means of attaining Christian truth, a balance which would enable one to walk a "via media" between the various excesses caused by too great a concentration on any one of these means. Before the advent of the Oxford Movement Hawkins had thought that the assistance provided by the church was being overlooked, and therefore he delivered his sermons on tradition and church authority. But just as Whately (regarding the opposition of heart and head) had to shift his emphasis with changing circumstances, so too Hawkins had to adjust his preaching on the subject of church authority and to warn Oxford in particular against an excessive reliance on the church. However, the balance proposed by Hawkins was neither practical nor convincing. It was, in fact, an impossible balancing act. In practice it was impossible to give equal weight to all four of Hawkins' "principal means". Inevitably people inclined to one or two at the expense of the others. This was certainly true of the Noetics themselves, for they placed much more emphasis on reason and the Bible, than they did

on the church and God's grace. Moreover, Hawkins' solution suffers from the problem associated with any "via media" - it has the appearance of a compromise and in attempting to accommodate opposite views pleases no-one. Just as Copleston's over-all position is unconvincing due to his predictable advocacy of the middle way on almost every issue, so too Hawkins' solution to the religious disputes fails to convince, and, indeed, failed to resolve those disputes.

Hawkins, in fact, had a number of things in common with Copleston. Although by all accounts he had not Copleston's majestic manner, yet he was certainly like Copleston in his search for moderation. Unlike Whately, who was noted for his eccentricity and disregard for public opinion, Hawkins also shared with Copleston a deference to convention and a concern for reputation, and like Copleston, he tended to be more conservative than Whately. This was remarked on by Rannie, who said that Hawkins had "Whately's robust orthodoxy without his liberalism" and that he "represented the Coplestonian tradition without the Whatelyan Liberalism".[85]

From the above discussion it can be seen that Hawkins, both in the 'twenties and later, was preaching in the Noetic tradition and that the typical Noetic themes are present in his works. Despite his emphasis on the authority of the church, he took the same view as Copleston, Whately, and Hampden on the place of reason in religion and on the pre-eminence of the Bible. He did agree with the Tractarians on the importance of doctrine, but denounced speculative religion and stressed instead the practical nature of Christianity. But his

criticisms of speculative religion did not mean that he countenanced indifference. In fact, towards the end of the last sermon in his Bampton Lectures, he prayed, "Only let thoughts like these incline our hearts to Charity, but never tempt us to Indifference".[86] Hawkins, then, was advocating charity, or moderation, but not indifference, and he advised his hearers to imitate the charity and moderation of the Anglican church.[87] In short, he was attempting to follow the "via media" outlined by Copleston and the other Noetics.

Section 4. Oriel College

Whately, Hampden, and Hawkins were not the only Oriel men to take up the themes which are found in Copleston's works. Baden Powell, who matriculated at Oriel in 1814 and graduated in 1817, joined the circle of the Noetics and was allied to them by more than just ties of friendship or marriage.[1] Baden Powell's debt to the older Noetics has been pointed out by Corsi, who states that on the question of the Sabbath Baden Powell was probably influenced by Copleston and that, as far as his epistemology was concerned, he followed Stewart and Whately.[2] Corsi comments that "in characteristic Noetic and Stewartian fashion" Baden Powell held that many theological disputes arose from the neglect of the rules of reasoning and lack of clear definitions. Concerning definition Baden Powell recommended "the very necessary step of setting out with a definition of the terms employed, and the equally essential rule of keeping to that definition throughout".[3] Copleston, although agreeing on the necessity of a strict use of words, was more circumspect in his views on definition and was critical of such attempts to rule discussion by means of definition.[4] Nevertheless, on the whole Baden Powell was in accord with the other Noetics, particularly in the position he took on the role of reason in religion.

Like them, he believed that reason could establish the authenticity of Revelation, even though much of what was revealed was above reason. In later years differences were to develop between the apologetics of Baden Powell and Whately, as Corsi has shown, in particular in Powell's stress on natural religion rather than on the

evidence of miracles.[5] In this respect he was subsequently closer to Hampden than to the other Noetics. In the 'twenties, however, these differences were yet to appear. One of his earliest productions was a favourable review of an essay on the "Just Limits of Reason", which was in close agreement with Noetic views on this topic.[6] Although Baden Powell thought that the essay did not show "any great originality of observation or any remarkable depth of argument", he praised it as "characterized by the more essential requisites of sound views and clear language", thus affirming his own acceptance of Noetic views and values.[7]

Thomas Arnold was elected fellow of Oriel in 1815 and during the next four years of his residence at Oxford formed close friendships with Hawkins and, in particular, Whately. But as with Powell, so too with Arnold it was not simply friendship which bound him to the other Noetics. Although Arnold was much more bold in his ideas than the more cautious and conservative Copleston and Hawkins, and even with Whately was not always in total agreement,[8] yet his writings show that he is correctly classed among the Noetics. The Noetic theme of moderation but not indifference is to be found in his works. In fact, in Principles of Church Reform (1833) he took moderation further than even most of the other Noetics were prepared to go, in recommending that the church establishment should be extended so as to include Dissenters. His suggestions for church reform did not, he assured his reader, indicate indifference or latitudinarianism, for in recommending a wide extension of the terms of communion so that Anglicans and Dissenters might join together in one national religious

establishment, he was not asking Anglicans to surrender or compromise any part of their faith, but merely to forbear imposing it on others.[9]

> The conclusion to be drawn from the known fallibility of human judgments, is, not that we should be sceptical ourselves, or compromise our own practice, but that we should bear with our neighbour's thinking as he judges right, as long as he will bear with our acting as we judge right.[10]

Another aspect of Arnold's theology which was typically Noetic was his emphasis on practical and dislike of speculative religion. Bonamy Price, who had been a student of Arnold's and later a master at Rugby, commented on this as a characteristic of Arnold's exegesis:

> ...doctrine in the strict sense, doctrine as pure religious theory, such as it is exhibited in scientific articles and creeds, never was his object. Doctrine, in its practical and religious side, as bearing on religious feeling and character, not doctrine, in the sense of a direct disclosure of spiritual or material essences, as they are in themselves, was all that he endeavoured to find, and all that he believed could be found, in the teaching of Scripture.[11]

Thus in his Principles of Church Reform we find Arnold insisting that the seriousness of error is not determined by the excellence of the object to which it relates (by which criterion errors concerning God's nature and attributes would be deemed fundamental), but rather by the practical effect of that error. According to Arnold, fundamental error was that error "which directly interferes with our own edification". Consequently, opinions concerning God's moral attributes were of utmost importance,

> because such as we suppose him to be morally, such we strive to become ourselves; but opinions as to his nature metaphysically may be wholly unimportant, because they are

> often of such a kind as to be wholly inoperative upon our spiritual state: they neither advance us in goodness, nor obstruct our progress in it.[12]

Other Oriel men who gave expression to the favourite themes of the Noetics include Edward Berens, Garrard Marsh, William Brudenell Barter, and James Endell Tyler.[13] Berens, who was a contemporary and friend and admirer of Copleston, agreed with him in praising the moderation and "prudent forbearance" of the English church in "'pronouncing almost none otherwise than as the Scriptures do as it were lead her by the hand'".[14] Marsh, who later addressed to Copleston his letters on the education of the clergy,[15] inculcated the duty of examining the evidences in order to be able to give a "reason of the hope".[16] Barter agreed with the Noetic emphasis on moderation. Like them he thought that moderation was a characteristic of the Church of England ("it arose between popery and puritanism, it exists between infidelity and enthusiasm"), and he followed Whately in deprecating that enemy of moderation, party-spirit.[17] Party-spirit, Barter thought, led one "to speak the truth, but not the whole truth, to preach some Scriptural doctrines, and to be silent on others equally necessary to salvation".[18] Although it was our duty, on controverted points of doctrine, to oppose what we considered erroneous teaching, it was also our duty to combat the spirit of strife and "to extend the hand of fellowship to every member in our household of faith".[19] Tyler served his college in the capacity of tutor (1818 to 1826) and as Dean (1820 to 1826), and as Dean became, according to T. Mozley, Copleston's right-hand man.[20] It was Tyler who preached the sermon at Copleston's consecration as Bishop of Llandaff, and this sermon was an expression of approval both of Copleston himself and his brand of theology.[21]

The Noetic brand of theology, in fact, was during the 'twenties almost the official theology of Oriel College. Nor was it confined to Oriel and Oxford. The religious ideas of the Noetics were not new but were in many cases widely accepted views. This was so, for example, with their attitude to the role of reason in religion, as is shown by the fact that Davies' essay on the "Just Limits of Reason", which expressed thoughts similar to those of the Noetics, was the prize essay on the topic suggested by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge and Church Unity in the Diocese of St. David's. The religious writings of the Noetics in the 'twenties in general met with approval.[22] In the 'thirties the growing popularity of certain of the ideas which the Noetics expounded gave Newman cause for alarm, and prompted him to oppose Noetic influence within Oxford. Newman and the Tractarians attempted to turn Oxford, and thereby the Anglican church, away from the undogmatic, unsystematic, practical religion of the Noetics, towards a dogmatic, doctrinal, catholic theology. However, this was a development of the 'thirties. In the 'twenties there were no sharp distinctions of parties among Oriel men. Noetics and future Tractarians lived together in harmony and friendship. Nor were the future Tractarians distinguishable from the Noetics by peculiar tenets or by a rejection of Noetic principles.

Pusey provides a good example. His two volumes on German Theology do not constitute a repudiation of Noetic views.[23] Indeed, the tone of the work, which Tulloch describes as reasonable and "liberal, in the best sense of the word",[24] was congenial to the Noetics. The attitude to the thirty-nine articles expressed in Part

II was not incompatible with Whately's (and Copleston's) theory of the church. He argued that articles were "absolute necessary... to the well-being of a Church", that the church has a right to require its ministers to teach the doctrines set out in the articles, and that uniformity of doctrine in essentials, despite the possibility of error on some minor points, was preferable to "an arbitrary and licentious exposition of Scripture truth". But, like Whately, he thought that articles should be limited as far as possible to essentials and should not exceed "in their definitions the just bounds".[25] Concerning the inspiration of the Bible, he rejected plenary inspiration if by that it was meant that every minute fact, regardless of its religious significance, was to be deemed divinely inspired. He held that inspiration only applied to those facts which were connected with religious truth, although he did not presume to determine what was or was not the result of inspiration. To Keble, who had criticised Pusey's language on this point, Pusey wrote:

> it has no effect in diminishing in the least the practical value of Scripture, but seems to me to be the truth and to get rid of theoretical difficulties. In any matter of practice or of doctrine the authority of Scripture is to me as great as to those who hold the most plenary inspiration.[26]

Keble was not the only one to raise objections to some of Pusey's statements. The publication of the second part of the book was delayed while Pusey made corrections in order to satisfy Bishop Blomfield, to whom he had sent proof-sheets for his criticism. This second part was itself an answer to the strictures of the High Churchman, H.J. Rose, who subsequently was instrumental in initiating the Oxford Movement, and of whose lectures on German Rationalism

Pusey's first volume was a direct criticism. Indeed, the work was later an embarrassment to Pusey, and he was forced to defend himself from charges that he was "tinged" by German Rationalism and rejected Biblical inspiration. He withdrew from circulation all unsold copies, retracted certain statements, and in his will desired that "the two books on the theology of Germany should not be republished".[27] Against this disapproval should be placed the approval of the Noetic, Blanco White, who described the first volume as "admirable".[28] At the end of the decade, then, there was no reason to suspect that in a few years Pusey would be one of the leaders of a group of High Churchmen, intent on opposing what they saw as the dangerous aspects of Noetic theology.

Nor did Newman seem a likely candidate for such a role in the 'twenties. During this period he was in a stage of transition from his early Evangelical creed to his later Tractarian position. In the early 'twenties any differences in doctrine between Newman and the Noetics were due to Newman espousing Evangelical rather than High Church views. In fact, the Noetics were more High Church than Newman at this time, and, indeed, were instrumental in effecting the change in Newman's creed. When Newman became a fellow of Oriel, and especially after 1824, he came into close contact with the Noetics and was directly influenced by them, in particular, by Whately, Hawkins, and Blanco White.[29] This was a period of his life which he later considered to be a time when he was drifting towards liberalism.[30] However, his intellectual debt to these men Newman freely acknowledged.[31] Blanco White taught him to have freer views on the

subject of inspiration than were then common. Hawkins, by introducing him to Sumner's Apostolical Preaching[32] and to the doctrine of Tradition, aided his transition from Evangelical to High Church. Whately, too, assisted this development by teaching Newman "the existence of the Church, as a substantive body or corporation" and fixing in him "anti-Erastian views of Church polity".

Newman claimed in the Apologia that this was the only religious opinion which he owed to Whately, and it is possibly true that the opinions listed were the only ones, learned from the Noetics, which he continued to hold in later life. In the 'twenties, however, Noetic influence on his thought was greater than this. The Apologia does indeed imply that this influence was short-lived, but it would appear that Newman's emancipation was not complete until the end of the 'twenties, if even then. Concerning Whately, Newman stated that "his mind was too different from mine for us to remain long on one line", and that he himself had no sympathy with Whately's "special theological tenets".[33] In support of this he cited Whately's dissatisfaction with Newman's article for the London Review[34] and criticisms of his Easter sermon in 1827. The latter incident is interesting as he later described it as one of his "first declared departures from Whately's teaching".[35] In his journal of 1828 Newman gave the following account of it:

> At Easter I had to preach the usual sermon in the College chapel, and got into some little controversy about it. The Provost Copleston liking it, recommended it to Whately (part of it was on the divinity of Christ) who accused it of Arianism. Hawkins thought it dangerous, and Blanco White thought it systematized more than Scripture does. So it must have been faulty more or less*. *(It took, without

> knowing it, Bull's doctrine of the 'Subordinatio Filii'. Whately, Hawkins, and Blanco White, were all verging towards Sabellianism themselves).[36]

An earlier account of the same dispute, written about a month after the delivery of the sermon, indicates that this was a rather tentative departure from Whately's teaching, and that, in fact, Newman at this time did accept a number of Noetic principles. This memorandum of May 13, 1827 begins with the statement, "I am sure I must be more or less wrong, for B. White, Whately, and Hawkins all think me so".[37] Similarly, early in the following year he was still inclined to defer to their opinion, as is shown by the above quotation, whereas later he implicitly dismissed Whately's view by saying that he inclined to Sabellianism.[38] In the memorandum of 1827 Newman, in deference to his friends, attempts to lessen the differences between himself and the Noetics by suggesting that the language of his sermon had been in places incorrect and obscure, thus leading to misunderstanding. Newman acknowledges as the main fault of the sermon that it gave only "a partial view" of the doctrine of the Trinity, true as far as it went, but not the whole truth. He admits that he should have added "some strong sentences" indicating that this was the case, one of the suggested additions being "that we should not presume to speculate on the Divine Nature etc." On this subject the memorandum contains the further comment,

> I need hardly add for my own future recollection that I as cordially dislike all discussions concerning the <u>nature</u> of God, and speculations about the <u>mode</u> of His existence as Three and One, as the most strong opposer of Bishops Pearson and Beveridge. - I do not even like the words Trinity, Person, Procession etc. etc. - indeed any systematic exposition of the doctrine but what is <u>relative to us and practical</u>.[39]

Thus we find here Newman accepting a typically Noetic teaching, and one which he himself subsequently considered highly dangerous.[40] Even in 1829 Newman appears to have felt no qualms about delivering the Bosworth lectures, which expounded Noetic views, in the College chapel.[41] Thomas Mozley, in comparison, found in 1836, when it was his turn to read the lectures, that the doctrine of the Trinity which they contained was so objectionable that he was unable to carry the task to completion.[42]

Keble, apart from his self-effacing temperament, might seem a more likely leader of a High Church, anti-Noetic movement. He was from the first a High Churchman, and reputedly never completely at ease with the old Oriel school. He was initially shy of Newman because of his Evangelicalism and Liberalism.[43] Against this, however, should be put his friendship with Thomas Arnold, and perhaps John Davison.[44] Thomas Mozley, in fact, was puzzled by the question of how Keble managed to get on with the old Oriel school.[45] But despite differences, Keble had many points of contact with the Noetics. He could certainly sympathise with Copleston's dislike of Calvinism and with his loyalty to the Church of England. Like the Noetics Keble too was an admirer of Bishop Butler and accepted his maxim that probability is the guide to life. Demonstrative proof was not to be expected in matters of religion, but this did not mean that faith could not be reasonable, or that implicit faith and rational inquiry were irreconcilable.[46] Keble also believed in a "via media" between enthusiasm, or the rejection of reason, and speculative religion,[47] and advocated the necessity of practical religion. In a sermon delivered in 1823, he stated that "Nothing in religion itself

is important, except as far as it may be brought to bear upon practice. This is the uniform tenor of the Bible, and of the Church's dogmatical decisions..."[48]

The point of the above parallels between the teachings of the Noetics and the future Tractarians is not that there were no differences between them. Indeed, the Noetics themselves were not in complete agreement on all issues. The point is rather that in the 'twenties any differences which did exist were offset by sufficient areas of agreement to prevent any strict classification into distinct parties. The complexity of theological alignments in the 1820s is noted by Corsi,[49] and his study of Baden Powell leads him to the conclusion that "the clear-cut division customarily made between the Hackney Phalanx and the Oxford Movement on the one hand, and the Noetic circle on the other is without factual basis".[50]

John Davison provides a good example of the impossibility of making neat distinctions for this period.[51] Although generally regarded as a Noetic, he does not fit easily into that classification, and in some respects seems closer to the Tractarians. Certainly, he appears on the whole to have been on friendlier terms with some of the Tractarians than with the Noetics. Copleston respected his intellectual ability, as is shown by a comment in one of Lord Dudley's letters,[52] but it would seem that their personal relationship was not free from conflict.[53] That their friendship was not a particularly close one is suggested by the fact that, in his publication of Lord Dudley's letters, Copleston failed to exclude some passages which

painted a very unfavourable picture of Davison. He did indeed suppress Davison's name, but it would not have been difficult to guess who was meant. J.T. Coleridge, in his Memoir of Keble, admitted that there was in Davison's manner "something not exactly finical, yet over precise, and constrained, something of a want of ease and naturalness", which perhaps hindered the formation of a close friendship.[54] Whately too, despite (or perhaps because of) their battles in the common-room, was not on close terms with Davison. He was offended by a remark in Davison's Discourses on Prophecy, which gave a mistaken interpretation of his views, and even more annoyed by Davison's explanation that he had not read Whately's work and by his delay in correcting the offending passage.[55] Of the Noetics, it was probably his former student, Hampden, who thought most highly of Davison.[56]

Davison's closest friend at Oriel would appear to have been Keble. It was Keble who helped Mrs. Davison in the publication of her husband's Remains.[57] During his life-time Davison's advice was valued by Keble. Keble sought his opinion of his poems before venturing to publish The Christian Year, and in 1833 he wrote to Davison, as well as a few other "intimate friends", asking for his thoughts on the formation of an association for "the circulation of primitive notions regarding the Apostolical Succession ... and ... the protection of the Prayer-book against profane innovation".[58] Davison's reply is not recorded, although J.B. Mozley wrote to his sister that "Keble has heard from Davison, the writer on the Prophecies - a great name, by far the most talented, I should think, of the old school of Oriel lights. He approves of the thing, though how far he is ready to go I

have not heard".[59] Just how far he would have gone with the Tractarians is impossible to tell, as Davison died in the following year.

Some time after his death there arose a controversy over whether Davison had read and approved of Hampden's Bampton Lectures. Hampden stated that he had, but this was doubted by those who considered that approval was "inconsistent with Davison's known character and views".[60] T. Mozley inclined to the opinion that Davison had probably only dipped into the lectures, but nevertheless Mozley acknowledged that the Tractarians had perhaps over-estimated the extent of Davison's agreement with them. He pointed out that Davison had "passed all his days in the old Oriel school" and that "in the main principles he agreed with Coplestone [sic] and others".[61] Newman, too, while admiring Davison's intellect and piety, seemed to place Davison more in the old Oriel school than in the new:

> It was Mr. Davison's unhappiness to live at a time when Christian doctrine was under a partial eclipse, and hence his principles are far more Catholic, or, we will rather say, positive and defined, than his dogmatic statements. His principles and their definiteness are his own; his doctrines, or rather their indistinctness, is the peculiarity of his age.[62]

However, Newman did note that Davison treated the Fathers with more respect than was usual in his day, and Davison was said to have been drawn to the works of the Fathers in his later years and to have been intending to edit a selection from the writings of the early Church.[63] But, on the other hand, his published works emphasize that the Bible is the final authority and proof of any doctrine,[64] and explicitly reject Tradition.[65]

Confronted with this confusing evidence, Tuckwell declined to place Davison definitely in either school, and said that "he stood aloof from both the earlier and later Oriel movements".[66] This is probably the correct assessment. Judging from his expressed views, it seems unlikely that he would have approved of the direction which the Oxford Movement took. But, on the other hand, the label "Noetic" sits uneasily upon him. The typical Noetic themes, while not entirely absent, are not prominent in his works. The ties of friendship which bound the other Noetics together, do not appear to have been strong when it comes to Davison. Rather than close friendship or agreement with the other Noetics, the main reasons behind his classification as a Noetic would seem to be his position and reputation as a fellow of Oriel, his keen participation in the common-room debates, and perhaps the fact that, like Copleston, he wrote on a wide number of topics, including religion, education, and political and social issues. In other words, in his early life he was associated with the Noetics and contributed to the stimulating intellectual environment of Oriel.[67]

Although it is possible to identify typically Noetic themes from a study of the writings of the Noetics in the 'twenties, this does not mean that these themes were exclusive to the Noetics or absent from the works of future Tractarians, as has been shown. These themes, then, do not provide a means of dividing Oriel into opposing factions. Nor is it possible to separate Oriel men into Noetic or Tractarian camps by seeing what religious doctrines they supported or opposed, for on the whole they held the same doctrines, with differences of interpretation only emerging at a later date. Even when the Oxford Movement was well advanced, it could still be

difficult to decide whether the various interpretations were incompatible or not. For example, Pusey's interpretation of Tradition seemed to Copleston in 1841 acceptable Anglican teaching, whereas Whately, quoting exactly the same passage from Pusey as Copleston, found it highly objectionable and contrary to the tenets of the Anglican Church.[68] If any distinction can be made in the 'twenties between the works of Noetics and Tractarians, the difference is one of emphasis and tone, rather than doctrine.

This difference of tone is illustrated by a comparison of Whately and Keble, a comparison made by Rannie, who said that from 1818, when Keble took up a college tutorship, there were two contrasting centres of influence at Oriel, that is, Whately and Keble.[69] Although this statement should not be interpreted too strictly as indicating the existence of separate cliques within the walls of Oriel,[70] there is a certain amount of truth in it. In the Apologia Newman describes how in his early years at Oriel he had been friendly with Whately, but had gradually, through his friendship with Hurrell Froude, come under the influence of Keble.[71] Whately Rannie aptly described as "a Noetic of the Noetics".[72] Keble, however, was different. V.H.R. Green maintains that Keble, in his distrust of dialectic, was not a typical product of the Oriel common-room.[73] In fact, Keble's was a poetic soul. Whereas Whately, with his emphasis on intellect and correct reasoning, gives the impression of being in closer affinity with the eighteenth century age of reason than the Romantic nineteenth century, Keble was more in touch with the Romantic movement. There was a temperamental difference between the two.

The Romantic Keble, then, tended to value human learning and intellectual ability less than most of the Noetics. R.W. Church cites as one of Keble's characteristic habits of mind, "a strong depreciation of mere intellect compared with the less showy excellences of faithfulness to conscience and duty".[74] His early sermons contain warnings against intellectual pride and stress that intellectual advantages "cannot advance us in genuine wisdom, so far as the keeping of God's commandments will advance the weakest and humblest of our brethren".[75] Of course, we have to be wary of making sweeping statements and too sharp distinctions, as the Noetics, as well as the Tractarians, warned against intellectual pride, and the Tractarians certainly did not despise human learning, as is shown by the scholarly Pusey. But it is true that Keble stressed conscience rather than reason, whereas most of the Noetics (and especially Whately) put more emphasis on reason.[76] Thus, Keble's interpretation of the Bible text which was a favourite with the Noetics, was somewhat different to the usual Noetic interpretation:

> It is true, Christians are enjoined to be "always ready for an answer to every man that asketh them a reason of the hope that is in them". But it is, manifestly, "the answer of a good conscience", sober and holy living, which is meant. We are directed to lead such a life, as may be appealed to, if necessary, in vindication of our Creed. If we do so, it matters little, comparatively, whether we can dispute for our religion or no.[77]

And with the depreciation of reason comes a readiness to rely more heavily on church authority:

> Nor can we ever be thankful enough, that in respect of all the chief dogmatical truths of Christianity ... we are strictly guided and limited. It is our privilege and

> safeguard, part of our joy and crown, as members of the Holy Catholic Church.[78]

However, once again it must be pointed out that the Noetics, too, allowed the importance of conscience and church authority. The difference is not one of teaching, but of tone.

Keble and the Noetics agreed in pursuing a "via media" between the abuse and the neglect of reason, between private judgment and church authority (the Anglican "via media", in fact, between Dissent and Romanism). But on a number of aspects of this "via media", perhaps most notably on the question of private judgment and church authority, their natural tendency was to the opposite extremes. The main point of one became the qualifying point of the other, and vice versa. In the 'twenties these differences between Noetics and future Tractarians were not sufficient to interrupt friendships or disturb the calm of Oxford life, but in the next decade the gap was to widen and friendships were to be abruptly severed and Oxford thrown into turmoil.

CHAPTER 3. THE HAMPDEN CONTROVERSY

Section 1. Oriel divided

The private letters of both Noetics and future Tractarians reveal the widening of the gap between the two groups and their growing suspicion of each other in the late 'twenties and early 'thirties, but it was not until the Hampden controversy of 1836 that Oriel definitely and publicly broke into two opposing camps. This is not to say that all Oriel fellows sided with one party or the other. Some, no doubt, sympathised with neither side, while others would have agreed with some aspects of both views. This may well have been the case with Davison, if he had lived. Nor, of course, were the adherents of the opposing sides confined to members and former members of Oriel College. The Oxford Movement spread much wider in the university than Oriel and included, for example, men such as Isaac Williams and William Copeland of Trinity College. The Noetic circle, too, had its adherents; for example, Whately's chaplains Samuel Hinds, a graduate of Queen's College, Oxford, and Charles Dickinson, a graduate of Trinity College, Dublin.[1] Nevertheless, the prominent position taken by Oriel men on both sides justifies the division of Oriel into "the old Oriel school" and "the new Oriel school".

Although the Hampden controversy marked the beginning of open war-fare between the two groups, a number of earlier issues had paved the way for this confrontation. In 1829 the parliamentary election for the university seat, which was contested between Robert Peel and Sir Robert Inglis, found Oriel men on opposite sides, with Hawkins and

Whately supporting Peel, Keble and Newman Inglis. Stated briefly, the circumstances behind this election were as follows. Oxford University had for many years been sending petitions to parliament against concessions to Roman Catholics, and Robert Peel, as sitting member for the university, had consistently opposed emancipation. In 1828, however, due to the threat of civil war in Ireland, he changed his position and decided to support the Duke of Wellington in his attempt to carry Catholic emancipation. Consequently, in February 1829 he sent his resignation to the university[2], but subsequently allowed himself to be re-nominated, with Whately and Hawkins actively canvassing for him. The Noetics had a long history of support for Catholic emancipation. Disapproving of religious persecution, they held that civil penalties were only justified as a means of self-defence. That is, when the Roman Catholics had constituted a danger to the state, their exclusion from parliament had been warranted. Thus, Catholic emancipation became, not a religious question, but a question of political expediency. If the danger to the state from Roman Catholics appeared less, as indeed it was, than the danger of civil war in Ireland were emancipation not granted, then it was expedient to remove Catholic disabilities.[3] Keble and other supporters of Inglis, however, thought that the re-election of Peel would compromise the university. Keble argued that they were in danger of "lowering the standard of political integrity to suit the times, instead of trying to raise the times to our standard".[4] Newman, while agreeing with the Noetics that emancipation was not a religious question (he had, in fact, previously been in favour of emancipation), felt that Peel had betrayed the university, and so he supported Inglis in order to save "the University's consistency":

> I considered that Mr. Peel had taken the University by surprise, that he had no right to call upon us to turn round a sudden, and to expose ourselves to the imputation of time-serving, and that a great university ought not to be bullied even by a great Duke of Wellington.[5]

He does add, however, "Also by this time I was under the influence of Keble and Froude; who, in addition to the reasons I have given, disliked the duke's change of policy as dictated by liberalism".

In the Apologia Newman says that this election was the occasion of the formal break between himself and Whately, and he describes the "humorous revenge" which Whately took on him by inviting him to a dinner party comprised of "the least intellectual men in Oxford", thereby implying that these were the sort of men with whom he had co-operated in opposing Peel. Although Newman cites this election as the formal break, it should be noticed that his letters show that in 1831, on Whately's appointment as Archbishop of Dublin, Newman expected Whately to invite him to accompany him to Ireland.[6] This would indicate that, despite Newman's shift of allegiance from Whately to Keble and Froude, he did not consider that his friendship with Whately was entirely at an end, at least as far as Whately was concerned.

The Peel election also affected Newman's relationship with Hawkins. In 1824 and 1825 Newman had become very friendly with Hawkins, when they had spent much time together during the long vacations, and on the retirement of Copleston from the Provostship in 1827, Newman favoured Hawkins rather than Keble to be his successor. His reasons he set out in a letter to Keble:

> I have lived more with Hawkins than with any other Fellow, and have thus had opportunities for understanding him more than others. His general views so agree with my own, his practical notions, religious opinions and habits of thinking, that I feel vividly and powerfully the advantages the College would gain when governed by one who, pursuing ends which I cordially approve, would bring to the work powers of mind to which I have long looked up with great admiration. Whereas I have had put few opportunities of the pleasure and advantage of your society...[7]

However, in February 1829, scarcely twelve months later, Newman referred to Hawkins in a letter to his mother as "our meddling Provost". This "meddling", as he explained to his mother in a later letter, consisted of drumming up support for Peel after Christ Church had decided to give him up and to choose another candidate, and acting without consulting the Oriel common-room. According to Newman's memorandum of July 1830, Hawkins' conduct during the Peel election "put an end to all frank and easy intercourse" between the Provost and the Oriel tutors.[8]

It was not just the Peel election, however, which upset the friendship of Newman and Hawkins. Their relationship was further strained by the Oriel tutorial dispute of 1829/30. This was a dispute between the Provost, Hawkins, and three of the tutors, Newman, R.H. Froude, and R. Wilberforce, concerning the system of tuition used in Oriel. Briefly, the old system had been to allocate each student at matriculation to one of the official tutors, who thus had the reponsibility of general supervision of his pupils' studies and behaviour; but as far as academic instruction was concerned, the tutors' lectures were public, that is, they were not confined to their own students. Each term the tutors decided which books were to be read, the students were placed into classes depending on which lectures it was thought best for each of them to attend, and then the

tutors chose which lectures they would give. The new system proposed by the three tutors, and actually put into practice without the Provost's knowledge, was that each tutor should give approximately two public lectures and three private lectures (that is, lectures confined to their own students). Although this might appear only a minor change, it involved significant repercussions, as shall appear. After a series of meetings and exchange of letters, which failed to achieve a compromise, the issue was decided perforce in favour of the Provost by the expedient of assigning no more students to the three obstinate tutors.

Mark Pattison, who entered Oriel College as an undergraduate in 1832, dated the decline of Oriel from this incident. In his Memoirs the election of Hawkins to the Provostship is depicted as one of the main causes of Oriel's decline from the position of eminence to which it had been raised by Eveleigh and Copleston. Pattison compared "the thinness and superficiality of the new Provost's character by contrast with the sterling force and richness of that of his predecessors" and asserted that the commencement of Oriel's decline was "co-incident with the accession of Hawkins to the headship".[9] In his view, the turning point came in 1831, after "the Provost had got rid of the three energetic and successful tutors, and had supplied their places with three inefficients".[10] This seems rather hard on Hawkins, especially seeing that in his conduct of college affairs he consciously attempted to follow the policy laid down by Eveleigh and Copleston. Indeed, Pattison himself realised that the change of Provost was not the sole cause, but that the rise of the Tractarian movement had an effect on the fortunes of the College. "The old

character of the Oriel fellowship was obliterated", he wrote, by the struggles between Hawkins and Newman over fellowship elections.[11] Intellectual promise was no longer the most important quality considered, but rather the shade of the candidates' theological opinions became a major criterion. According to Pattison a number of inferior elections were made. But it was not only in the election of fellows that the Oxford Movement created problems for Hawkins. The appointment of tutors remained a source of trouble even after the end of the tutorial dispute of 1829/30, due to Hawkins' understandable reluctance to appoint fellows tainted by Tractarianism.[12] Moreover, in the selection of undergraduates Hawkins could not afford to be as discriminating as Copleston in the 1820s, when there had been a waiting list to get into Oriel. In 1838 Samuel Wilberforce wrote to his brother Robert, that due to the party divisions at Oxford, many parents were preferring to send their sons to Cambridge. "This presses most heavily on Oriel, and McBride told me the Provost felt from it that he could not at once choose the best to admit but must take such as he can get".[13] A further point which needs to be taken into consideration is that the pre-eminence of Oriel was relative to the other colleges, and as they improved their performance, it was not only a case of Oriel declining but of the other colleges catching up. As T. Mozley put it, "other colleges were joining the race".[14]

In his "Autobiographical Memoir", written over forty years after the event, Newman invests the tutorial dispute with great importance by saying that the Oxford Movement proper may be dated from Newman's and Hurrell Froude's "premature separation from the office of college tutor" and that, "humanly speaking, that movement never would have

been, had [Newman] not been deprived of his tutorship; or had Keble, not Hawkins, been Provost".[15] Just what Newman meant by this is not clear. Did he mean that, if he had remained a tutor, his energies would have been put into his tutorial duties rather than the activities which he undertook during the Movement?[16] Or did he mean that, had his view of the tutorial office been allowed, then he would have been able to use that office, rather than the Tracts, to propagate his theological beliefs and to educate the next generation of clergy in catholic theology?[17] Was the tutorial dispute in fact a theological rather than an academical dispute? Storr argues that Hawkins' dismissal of the three tutors "marks his disapproval of the system of which they were the leading representatives" and that beneath his opposition lay "a real dislike of Tractarianism".[18] This is an obvious anachronism in that in 1830 the Tracts had not yet been started and Newman and Froude could hardly, at that time, be considered the leading representatives of any system. But Newman himself gives support for the view that theological differences were at the bottom of the dispute. In his "Autobiographical Memoir" he states that the quarrel was "mixed up with both academical and ecclesiastical differences between the two parties", stressing, however, that the important difference was one of religious principle. In fact, Newman allows that in practice a compromise would have been possible, if it had not been for the personalities of the two parties and the "ever-widening theological antagonism" between them.[19]

That Newman's former admiration of and friendship for Hawkins had diminished somewhat since Hawkins' election as Provost is suggested by

the fact that Newman chose to introduce this reform without first informing his Provost. This was a calculated step on Newman's part, as is shown by his letters, for he asked Keble's advice on the propriety of altering the lecture list plan without consulting the Provost.[20] But was it the consciousness of theological differences which caused Newman to take this course? In his memorandum of July 9, 1830, Newman wrote,

> ...it would have been natural in the course of conversation to have mentioned it to the Provost, had we been in the habit of familiar intercourse with him. As it was, we never concealed it from [him], and in fact (as will presently be seen) informed him of our views shortly after we commenced acting upon them. We considered too that the Lecture list, which we sent to him every Term, was a document intended among its uses to inform him of the proceedings of the College Tutors - and that thus our correction of the routine system would be formally brought under his cognizance.[21]

The statement that the tutors did not conceal the plan was not completely honest, as is shown by Newman's letter to Samuel Richards, on February 6, 1829. This letter reveals that Newman was well aware that the lecture lists would not inform Hawkins of the new system.

> The most important and far reaching improvement has been commenced this term: - a radical alteration (not <u>apparent</u> on the published list) of the lecture system. The bad men are thrown into large classes - and thus time saved for the better sort who are put into very small lectures, and principally with their own Tutors quite familiarly and chattingly. And besides a regular lecture system <u>for the year</u> has been devised. But we do not wish this to be talked about.[22]

This description of the reform as "a radical alteration" is in glaring contrast to his later statement in the memorandum of 1830: "Not that

I considered I was introducing a new system of lecturing..."[23] The question remains, then, of why Newman felt it necessary to conceal this reform. Why was he no longer in the habit of "familiar intercourse" with Hawkins?

In the "Autobiographical Memoir" which he wrote in 1874, Newman gave three reasons for failing to communicate the plan to Hawkins. Firstly, he argued that the tutorship was a university, not merely a college office, and thus the tutors were responsible for the performance of their duties to the Vice-Chancellor, not to the Provost. Secondly, the tutors considered that the arrangement of the lecture lists was a matter for their own discretion and was no concern of the Provost's. It was sufficient if the Provost saw the lists and examined the pupils at the end of each term.

> "And thirdly, they knew him well enough to be sure that, if, instead of acting on their right, concealing indeed, but volunteering nothing, they proceeded to consult him, he would put his veto upon it, however unnecessarily, and there would be a deadlock in the College administration.[24]

The first two points are justifications of his action rather than reasons for it, and even if the justifications are well-founded, the secrecy hardly displays the courtesy and deference one would expect fellows to show towards their Provost.[25] The third is perhaps the real reason. That is, Newman feared that Hawkins would not have agreed to his reform. In the 1830 memorandum Newman gave a similar reason for the concealment. This states that Newman did not communicate his plan to Hawkins beforehand

> because I knew it was the habit of his mind to raise difficulties in every subject proposed to him - because I had long considered him an eminently unpractical man - because moreover, he is not only slow in entering into the views of others and dilatory in forming a judgment on them, but far from gracious in the expression of his opinion - (and this checks confidence).[26]

This estimation of Hawkins as "an eminently unpractical man" is a reversal of Newman's earlier view of Hawkins, when he supported him to succeed Copleston as Provost of Oriel. The "Autobiographical Memoir" suggests that, as Provost, Hawkins failed to live up to Newman's expectations and that by 1829 Newman was somewhat disillusioned. Hawkins' reforming zeal, it would appear from Newman's account, had dimmed and he had become more conservative and status-conscious. This would explain the less intimate relationship. However, the rift at this time was not perhaps as great as the later Memoir portrays it. Certainly, Newman's letter to Richards in February 1829 expresses satisfaction with the situation at Oriel. He tells Richards that Robert Wilberforce "annoys me by his way of railing against the Provost", and he warns Richards not to believe such railings, as "we have gone through the year famously". He admits that, in the improvements in the College which he lists, Hawkins had not taken the initiative (adding "nor should a Head"), but says that Hawkins "has always approved, sometimes kept abreast with us - and at Collections has slain the bad men manfully".[27] This letter, then, although perhaps hinting at a slight disappointment in Hawkins as Provost, certainly does not indicate any deep-felt dissatisfaction. Nor is there any evidence in the letters to suggest that Newman was discouraged from approaching Hawkins by a consciousness of differing theological opinions.[28] It is more likely that Newman suspected that Hawkins' conservatism might cause him to disapprove of the plan,

especially since the tutors had recently been pressing a number of reforms on Hawkins. Newman may have feared that they were moving too quickly for Hawkins.[29]

Once the conflict was out in the open, Newman saw himself as contending for an important principle, that is, the pastoral aspect of the tutorial office. For Newman this principle was the crux of the argument. For him pastoral care was the most important aspect of the tutor's office, and he concluded that this duty could only be effectively carried out if each tutor spent most of his time with his own students, rather than lecturing to mixed classes made up from the students of all the tutors. Hence the reorganisation of the lecture lists. Hawkins opposed this reorganisation, and consequently Newman assumed that he also opposed the principle which had prompted it. He considered that Hawkins' earlier advice to him not to hurry into taking orders showed that Hawkins had doubts whether the tutorship constituted a fulfilment of the vow made at ordination. According to Newman, Hawkins had asked, "'Why bind yourself with a vow, when there is no necessity, and which <u>may</u> mean something incompatible with staying at College and taking pupils?'" He admitted that Hawkins "did not go so far as to pronounce College employments directly and formally unclerical", but maintained that Hawkins left it an open question.[30] However, it is highly unlikely that this was the ground of Hawkins' opposition in 1829. In fact, Hawkins accepted that the tutor's office had a pastoral side, for in one of his letters to Newman he outlined a tutor's responsibilities to his own pupils and said that "it was his province not only to observe their conduct and character but to see that their religious instruction went on

properly".[31] It would be strange if one who was to stress the pastoral aspect of the Provost's office,[32] should allow nothing of the kind to the tutors. Indeed, Hawkins' later opposition to an increase in the number of lay fellows in Oriel was partly due to his desire to have a supply of clergymen from whom to appoint tutors. Fellowships, Hawkins considered, were intended for "a learned clergy qualified to teach the people by their life and doctrine".[33]

Hawkins' objections to the system proposed by the tutors are nowhere given a fair hearing. Most later writers imply that his objections were unreasonable and inspired by personal feelings of threatened authority. Pusey's disciple, H.P. Liddon, for example, described Hawkins' removal of the three tutors as "an act of arbitrary indiscretion", and even Tuckwell, who was more sympathetic to Hawkins, said that "his action seems to have been dictated by personal apprehension".[34] Unfortunately, Hawkins never wrote a vindication of his motives. Newman, on the other hand, explained at length in his memorandum and Memoir the reasons for his actions, as well as giving his own interpretation of Hawkins' motives, an interpretation which is distorted and less than just to Hawkins. In fact, the whole affair of the tutorial dispute does not reflect well on Newman, although it has generally been Hawkins who has received the bulk of the blame. In his "Autobiographical Memoir" Newman implied that Hawkins' objection to the new system was that it upset the old, and that, apart from this, he could offer no objections to it.[35] That Hawkins did in fact have other reasons for opposing the new system is revealed by a close examination of the correspondence which passed between him and the tutors, and also between him and Copleston, to whom he turned for advice.

In part the dispute involved a controversy over what Mozley termed the "academic position of a college tutor, to which the Provost would not allow a substantive character".[36] Hawkins was concerned to maintain the Provost's control over the curriculum. In his letter of advice to Hawkins, Copleston described earlier disputes between the tutors and Provost Eveleigh, and then added,

> At that time [that is, before the examination statute of 1800] however a College was in no way accountable to the University for the education of its members. Since the reformation of the Schools the case is altered - and for the general credit of the body which he governs, the Head may reasonably require to have a controul in the system of education. Nothing indeed can be plainer than that this is the spirit of the Oriel Statutes - and by their Spirit not by their Letter the College have, in my time, almost unanimously agreed to be governed.[37]

Hawkins enlarged on this argument in his letters to Newman (May 15 and June 9, 1830), at times echoing not only the arguments of Copleston's letter, but even using its wording. It is also possible, as Mozley and Tuckwell suggest, that Hawkins was concerned about the practical difficulty of conducting the Collections examination under Newman's system.[38] But his main objection was that the new system almost reversed the old, in that "the instruction of the Students in common having become rather the exception than the rule". The great advantage of the old system was that the academic needs of all the pupils were considered impartially, before the tutors selected their classes:

> The important points are that the classes were not formed in the first instance either by any particular Tutor or for him; and that the Pupils were not arranged in the classes with any regard to their being the Pupils of one Tutor or another. It was not unimportant also that all the students were placed in the proper number of classes before the Lectures were chosen by the Tutors.

The defect of Newman's reorganization was that it "might by and by make the distribution of the Pupils not a little unfair and unjust" due to differences in the character and abilities of the tutors.[39] Newman himself appears to acknowledge this objection of Hawkins when he says that Hawkins "maintained that Newman was sacrificing the many to the few, and governing, not by intelligible rules and their impartial application, but by a system, if it was so to be called, of mere personal influence and favouritism".[40] That there was indeed some justification for Hawkins' concern is suggested by Newman's comment to Richards, that the "bad" men were to be thrown into large classes.

Hawkins' rejection of the tutorial reform, then, does not appear to have been based on theological considerations. In part his objections resulted from practical difficulties which the scheme involved. But his opposition was also based on a principle, although not the same one that Newman contended for, a principle which he had inherited from Copleston. As mentioned above, Hawkins turned to Copleston in this crisis, and indeed, in the early years of his Provostship Hawkins seems to have been following the path already laid down by Copleston. In his dispute with Newman Hawkins was defending a concept of university education such as Copleston had espoused. In his Reply to the Edinburgh Review Copleston had maintained that "the charge of education is a weighty one, and many interests are involved in it: it must be conducted with a view to the general benefit; and rules not always liked, not always profitable to individuals must be inforced".[41] Similarly, Hawkins in 1829/30 was contending for the

good of the majority of students, for as Copleston believed, and, no doubt, Hawkins as well, the majority of students, the many not the few, must be the prime concern of any system of national education.

The third event which tended to alienate future Tractarians from Noetics, and in particular affected Newman's relationship with Whately, was the suppression of the Irish bishoprics. This was the result of the Irish Church Act of 1833, which attempted to rectify some of the anomalies of the Irish church. At this time the church in Ireland had twenty-two bishoprics in charge of a total of one thousand two hundred livings (that is, less than the Diocese of Lincoln), a few of which livings had no Protestant parishioners.[42] By the Act the boundaries of the sees were rearranged, ten were abolished, and the revenues of these applied to the benefit of the poorer livings. The original bill had in fact stated that the revenues of the suppressed sees were to be applied to a purpose chosen by Parliament (that is, possibly a secular purpose), but after meeting with opposition in the House of Lords, this clause was given up. Whately, as the newly appointed Archbishop of Dublin, was involved in this reorganisation of the Irish church, and consequently earned the disapproval of Keble and his friends. For his part, Whately felt that the situation in Ireland was so serious that it was too late "to think of unexceptionable expedients to meet the emergency". He wrote to Copleston in September, 1831: "It is a great loss to cut away masts and throw the cargo overboard, but the ship is on the eve of foundering. Some decisive steps must be taken, and that very speedily, if the Irish church, or indeed Ireland, is to be saved".[43] Copleston too thought

timely concession the wisest course, although he lamented the prevalence of "revolutionary notions" and feared that the precedent of the Irish church would soon be used against the English church. He refused to countenance the alienation of church property, but once this clause was removed, was inclined to support the bill.[44] Keble, on the other hand, saw the acceptance of state interference in church affairs as an indication of "national apostasy", and in July 1833 he delivered his famous sermon of that name which Newman considered marked the start of the Oxford Movement. Newman deplored "the extinction (without ecclesiastical sanction) of half [the Irish church's] candlesticks". In his view, Whately, as Archbishop of Dublin, should have defended the church and resisted the incursions of the state, but instead had acquiesced in "perilous measures" and led the Irish church in a "secular and unbelieving policy".[45] In a letter to a friend at the time, Newman commented:

> As to poor Whately, it is melancholy. Of course, to know him now is quite impossible, yet he has so many good qualities that it is impossible also not to feel for him. I fear his love of applause, popularity, etc., has been his snare; for a man more void of, what are commonly called, selfish ends does not exist.[46]

The suppression of the Irish bishoprics seemed to be only the beginning of parliamentary interference in church affairs. With the Whigs in power and with calls for church reform coming from all sides, it appeared that the separation of church and state was only a matter of time, as Copleston and others feared, and that, in the meantime, the church would be subjected to parliamentary action, both as to its temporalities and its liturgy.[47] Noetics and future Tractarians were united in their belief that the church needed to be defended from

these attacks, but they disagreed over the method of defence. The Noetics, as has been seen, were of the opinion that the best method of defence was by timely concession and reform, and that the church would be strengthened by the removal of any existing abuses and grounds for criticism. Newman, while not averse to reform, preferred dis-establishment to concession, which he saw as siding with the Liberals and as introducing liberalism into the church.[48]

It was this that Newman fought against. As he said in the Apologia, his battle was with liberalism, and by liberalism he meant "the anti-dogmatic principle and its developments".[49] Newman equated liberalism with indifferentism. The passing of the bill on Roman Catholic emancipation he described as "one of the signs of the times, of the encroachment of Philosophism and Indifferentism in the Church".[50] The Noetics, on the other hand, differentiated between moderation and indifference, and while deprecating indifference, believed that moderation, besides being a Biblical virtue, strengthened the church by abating party-spirit. The danger of scepticism, which Whately, no less than Newman, feared, Whately considered could best be warded off by teaching "rational Christianity". Newman's strategy against these threats to the church and the Christian religion, however, was to fight indifferentism in the church by arousing the clergy to a realisation of the importance of church doctrine and promoting the study of theology. The Tracts for the Times were an attempt to arouse and to educate the clergy. Newman expected a flood of scepticism to pour over the land, and he considered that the clergy were unprepared to cope with it. "The most religiously-minded men are ready to give up important doctrinal truths

because they do not understand their value".[51] Questions of doctrine and ecclesiastical law, Newman felt, were questions of "things, not words".[52] In his view the Nominalism of the Noetics was wrong. Their moderation was no better than indifference and led to Unitarianism. He pointed to Blanco White in proof of this assertion.[53] Thus, what Newman objected to in the Noetics was not so much erroneous teaching on any particular doctrine, but rather their neglect of doctrine, their vagueness and anti-dogmatism, which, Newman held, led to indifference and thereby to infidelity. This explains Newman's accusations against Whately and Hampden. To Whately he wrote that his views on religious questions were "based on the pride of reason, and tending towards infidelity", and to Hampden, that the principles professed in his pamphlet, Observations on Religious Dissent, "legitimately [tended] to formal Socinianism".[54] It was this pamphlet of Hampden's which, in Newman's opinion, commenced the liberal attack on the university.[55]

Although Newman stated in a note appended to his letter to Hampden that, "This letter was the beginning of hostilities in the University", the main battle did not come until early in 1836 when Hampden was appointed Regius Professor of Divinity. The Tractarians were aghast. Newman had previously urged Keble to accept the appointment if offered to him (both Keble and Newman were among those considered for the post), if only to keep Hampden out.[56] The Tractarians immediately set about organising opposition, and Newman sat up all night penning his Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements, which picked through Hampden's Bampton Lectures in order to show that Hampden held heterodox views which, if not overtly

Unitarian, tended to Unitarianism. The Noetics felt, not without reason, that the Elucidations were unfair to Hampden.[57] Copleston, for example, thought that Newman's drawing of parallels between Hampden's work and the writings of Blanco White and other Socinians was disingenuous, and he complained of Newman's "misrepresentation" and "unfair constructions". He suggested to Hampden a couple of points on which the Elucidations could be challenged, and gave some general advice on a method of defence of the Lectures.[58] The Noetics were not alone in their opinion of the injustice of the opposition to Hampden. A "Tory Country Clergyman", to whom the Elucidations had been lent, wrote that "the Doctor is not fairly treated. These very men were quiet at the appointment of Whately".[59]

This comment indicates one of the major complaints against Newman and his friends over the Hampden affair. Not only had they not protested against the appointment of Whately to the Archbishopric of Dublin, but they had not even protested against Hampden's Bampton Lectures, which they were now labelling as heterodox, at the time of their delivery, nor indeed had they protested against Hampden's appointment as Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1834. Thomas Arnold emphasized this delay in his indignant review, "The Oxford Malignants".[60] Whately, too, made much of this point in the introduction to Copleston's Remains.[61] He was of the opinion that it was Hampden's advocacy of the admission of Dissenters to the university which was the real reason for the opposition to Hampden, and indeed, the position of importance which Newman assigns in the Apologia to Hampden's Observations on Religious Dissent as the beginning of hostilities in the university lends support to this view.

The question needs to be asked; why did not Newman or his friends protest against the Bampton Lectures when they were first published? Newman himself was aware that the question needed an answer, as is shown by the very first sentence of the Elucidations where he explained

> that he had hoped to have been spared the necessity of an invidious task which pertained more to others than to himself; to those who were less connected by College ties with the Author in question. He felt that he had no call of office or station that way, and that he could not put himself forward without an apology for so doing.[62]

That Newman was inhibited by his "College ties" with Hampden is substantiated by T. Mozley, who says that shortly after the publication of the Lectures, someone, possibly H.J. Rose, wrote to Newman advising him to "notice" Hampden's Lectures and, if possible, to get the university to denounce them. According to Mozley, Newman replied "that he would do nothing in the matter, for there was necessarily a personal question between him and Hampden, the latter having been employed by the Provost to oust him and the other tutors. Under the circumstances he wished to keep at peace with Hampden, whom he was coming across daily".[63] The same motive may have prevented Newman from criticising Hampden's Moral Philosophy lectures, which Rose regarded as worse than the Bamptons, especially seeing that Newman's own hopes of gaining the Moral Philosophy chair had been dashed by the success of Hampden's last-minute application.[64]

On Hampden's appointment to the chair of Divinity, however, there were further considerations which overcame Newman's scruples. Firstly, in Newman's eyes the Divinity chair was much more important

than that of Moral Philosophy, in that men intending to take holy orders were required to attend the lectures of the Professor of Divinity. Thus Hampden, as Professor of Divinity, would be in a position to influence the next generation of clergymen, not only to expound but also to propagate his theological views, and to foster among the clergy that indifferentism which Newman so much feared. Secondly, due to the formation of the Tract party, Newman in 1836 was in a much better position to organise effective opposition to Hampden than he had been in 1832. And thirdly, although this was not so much a reason for agitation as rather one of the advantages incidentally to be gained from agitation, Newman saw that by opposing Hampden the Tractarians were likely to gain adherents to their views. Newman wrote to his friend J.W. Bowden of the advantages of Hampden being made Divinity Professor:

> the Ministry will be at open war with the Church; the Archbishop will be roused; and a large number of waverers in this place will be thrown into our hands. Our Theological Society will increase in consequence at once. What a lucky thing it is just set up![65]

That the Hampden controversy did actually result in the strengthening of the Tractarian party, was the decided opinion of Whately. He also believed that this early encouragement afforded the party to a large extent caused the subsequent conflicts in the university, as, but for this encouragement, "their audacity could hardly have reached such a pitch". "The Convocation", he maintained, "which censured Dr. Hampden 'sowed the wind', and their successors 'reaped the whirlwind'".[66] Thus Newman and Whately, although viewing the affair from opposite sides, were agreed on the importance of the Hampden controversy.

Section 2. Hampden's Bampton Lectures

According to the report of the committee set up to object to the appointment of Hampden as Regius Professor of Divinity, the controversy was concerned not so much with an individual or a book as with a principle.

> This principle is the philosophy of Rationalism, or the assumption that uncontrolled human reason in its present degraded form is the primary interpreter of God's Word, without any regard to those rules and principles of interpretation which have guided the judgements of Christ's Holy Catholic Church in all ages of its history and under every variety of its warfare. It is the Theory of Rationalism (as set forth systematically in the Bampton Lectures of 1832, and still more recently in lectures addressed to students) which is to be considered the root of all the errors of Dr. Hampden's system.[1]

Condemnation of the abstract principle of rationalism was not likely to be a controversial matter in Oxford (the Noetics would have joined Tractarians in condemning this). But condemnation of rationalism, as the Tractarians interpreted it, inevitably involved a condemnation of the individual and his book, despite protestations that no doubt was being cast against Hampden's personal faith.[2]

What the main objection to Hampden's book was, apart from the general charge of rationalism, is revealed in the introduction to the second edition:

> The work has been held up as an attempt to explain away Christian Truth - to leave nothing of Christian Doctrine - to reduce the Creed of the Christian to a few historical events, or else to certain abstract general points in which the various opinions of discordant sects may be found to agree - and generally to unsettle the minds of believers as to what is Christian Truth, and what is not.[3]

The charge was not that Hampden taught false doctrines, although Newman and Pusey were doubtful of the orthodoxy of his interpretation of doctrines such as the Trinity and Atonement, but that he minimized doctrine. Newman complained in the Elucidations that Hampden's doctrinal statements were vague, and were such that even a Unitarian might subscribe to them. J.B. Mozley wrote that Hampden "uses the words 'heterodox' and 'orthodox' throughout the lectures obviously with the most perfect impartiality between the two, thinking both equally wrong as being dogmatisers".[4] Mozley had to admit, however, that it was largely a matter of tone, and that it would have been difficult to get a court to convict Hampden of heterodoxy. Some who joined in the condemnation of Hampden, considering the lectures heterodox, later had second thoughts on the subject. The most notorious case was that of Samuel Wilberforce, who, during the uproar at the appointment of Hampden to the bishopric of Hereford in 1847, wrote to him that after examining the Bampton Lectures he felt bound to declare "that they do not justly warrant those suspicions of unsoundness to which they have given rise".[5] At the same time the Hebdomadal Board, which had in 1836 indicated its censure of Hampden by proposing to Convocation that he be deprived of his vote in the choice of Select Preachers, sent an address to Hampden which stated that, having had the opportunity of hearing Hampden's lectures and sermons since the 1836 controversy, "we are not only satisfied that your religious belief is sound, but we look forward with confidence in your endeavours to preach the Gospel of Christ in its integrity".[6] Even Charles Marriott, while he still disliked and disapproved of the Bampton Lectures, admitted in 1847 that they were open to an orthodox

construction, pointing out that "in the passage on the Unity of God, Hampden calls this Unity a fact, thus admitting such a sense of the term". He added, "I have had a painful sense all these years, whenever I thought of Hampden, of his having been really misapprehended and misrepresented, though I still think, as I did from the first, that there was ground for stronger acts than have been taken against him".[7] Roundell Palmer also came to the conclusion that "most readers gave Hampden credit for meaning more than he said", and his more mature judgment was that the censure against Hampden was not warranted.[8]

Nevertheless, it is easy to see why people were upset by the lectures, for they certainly contained provocative statements. For example, in his third lecture where he discusses the Trinitarian controversies, Hampden states:

> To me it matters little, what opinion on the subject has been prior, has been advocated by the shrewdest wit or deepest learning, has been most popular, most extensive in its reception. All differences of this kind belong to the history of the human mind, as much as to theology, and affect not the broad basement of fact on which the manifold forms of speculation have taken their rise. The only ancient, only catholic, truth is the Scriptural fact. Let us hold that fast in its depth and breadth - in nothing extenuating, in nothing abridging it - in simplicity and sincerity; and we can neither be Sabellians, or Tritheists, or Socinians.[9]

This, besides being objectionable to the Tractarians for seeming to disparage antiquity and tradition, appeared to imply that the differences between Unitarians and Trinitarians were unimportant. In his eighth lecture he writes: "Strictly to speak, in the Scripture itself there are no doctrines. What we read there is matter of

fact". Similarly, "Dogmas of Theology then, as such, are human authorities" - they are not to be afforded the status of "the simple Divine Word".[10] And Hampden makes it clear that he is referring not only to the thirty-nine articles but also to the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, whose expressions are based on notions which are unphilosophical and unscriptural.[11]

Statements such as these were bound to provoke criticism, and they made easy prey for Newman when he came to draw up his Elucidations. Their full meaning (which was more orthodox than appeared at first sight) could only be understood by means of a close reading of the whole text of the lectures (and even then his meaning was not always completely clear), and this Hampden's rather dry, and sometimes convoluted style, did not encourage. Thus, to a certain extent Hampden had himself to blame for the misinterpretation of his views, and in subsequent writings he had to explain more fully and closely the offending passages in his lectures.

Copleston was one who thought that the lectures contained "startling and paradoxical" passages, and he advised Hampden against using paradoxical modes of speaking for the purpose of surprising the reader. In particular, he found fault with Hampden's use of the phrase "matter of fact" as opposed to doctrine.[12] Newman took this phrase to mean that "Scripture itself is a mere record of historical facts; that it contains no dogmatic statements, such as those about the Trinity, Incarnation, Atonement, Justification, etc."[13] Pusey, too, objected to this phraseology and wondered what was left of divine

truth by Hampden's distinction between doctrines and Scripture facts. Finding the Bampton Lectures not very explicit on this point, Pusey turned for enlightenment to the first edition of Hampden's Observations on Religious Dissent, where he found the explanation,

> When I say, therefore, that the Christian revelation is matter of fact, I intend by it, to express my conviction that the substance of the revelation is the doings and the actions of God; I have always before my view, some event in the history of God's providences to which I refer it.[14]

Elsewhere Hampden also stressed the historical nature of the Christian revelation. In the second of his Parochial Sermons, for example, he compared it with the unhistorical character of other religions, which he described as "the imaginations of an unauthorized and inventive curiosity". Christianity, in comparison, "directs our contemplation to the steps of the Deity, impressed on the world in which we live; and instructs us what God is, by what it tells us he has certainly done in regard to us".[15] In his Inaugural Lecture as Professor of Divinity and in the introduction to the second edition of the Bampton Lectures, Hampden made the same point. In both places, however, he hastened to explain that he did not limit the Christian revelation to historical facts. The word "fact", he pointed out, could be understood in two senses; the primary sense being the historical one of "something done", the secondary one being the philosophical sense of "whatever is".[16] In his letter of advice to Hampden, Copleston had acknowledged that the word could be used in these two ways, although he was not completely happy with it: "Matter of fact in philosophical language may perhaps include whatever cannot be questioned - as for instance an authoritative decree or assertion as well as a real

occurrence. But there is I think an impropriety in this use of the phrase - and much, I fear, of the accusation against you rests on this basis".[17]

No doubt, as Copleston suggested, the confusion caused by Hampden's two uses of the word "fact" contributed to the misunderstanding of his views and was a factor in the outcry raised against him. The confusion was all the greater in that the two senses were not completely distinct, but closely associated. Hampden appears to have held that facts (in the sense of doctrines) are revealed in the Bible by facts (in the sense of events). Thus, in the Parochial Sermons, he states

> The doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, is the ineffably sublime result of all that God is related to have done in our behalf, in that narrative of his providences which we call the Bible. It is not a mere dogma, or formal declaration of some opinion concerning God, simply deduced from certain texts of Scripture ... but is a general fact, clearly resulting from all those manifold occasions on which the Deity is manifested to us as we read the pages of the Bible.[18]

Again he says, "there is no disturbing the faith or the sense of that Christian, who points to the Bible as a whole, containing this doctrine in it as matter of fact - as a truth identified with, and inseparable from, the events which it records".[19] The confusion, too, was not just caused by Hampden's use of the phrase "matter of fact", but also by his use of the word "doctrine". In the Bampton Lectures he opposed "doctrine" to "matter of fact", but as has been shown, he also used "matter of fact" to include doctrines. Copleston objected to this as well. Doctrines were indeed to be found in Scripture, he held, "unless you confine the word (for which I believe there is not

sufficient authority) to interpretation and reasoning. And even then I believe you would find many such doctrines in the text of Scripture".[20]

In his Inaugural Lecture and in the second edition of his Bampton Lectures, Hampden attempted to clear up this confusion and thus answer the charges brought against him. But the text of the Bampton Lectures itself substantiates his claim that he did not reject all doctrine, but only speculative expositions of doctrine. The Lectures refer to the doctrines of Grace, Original Sin, Atonement, Justification by Faith as "facts",[21] and the concluding paragraph affirms that "objections against the theoretic parts of doctrines (and objections are principally of this kind) are no objections against the fundamental doctrines themselves - the revealed facts - which are really and in themselves, independent of those theories".[22] Concerning the doctrine of the Trinity, Hampden held that the Unity of God was a revealed fact, as was the manifestation of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. These facts, Hampden argued, "we comprehensively denote by the doctrine of a Trinity in Unity", but we should not attempt to build theories on them and "pretend to that exactness of thought on the subject, on which our technical language is based".[23]

Newman and Pusey, however, required more from Hampden than just a declaration of assent to the Christian doctrines, an assent which kept as close as possible to the language of the Bible. They considered that Hampden's views were rationalistic and tending towards

Unitarianism, and they wanted Hampden to explain his interpretation of the doctrines in question. In the Elucidations Newman quoted from Hampden's Observations a passage referring to the doctrine of the Atonement, and followed it with the comment:

> Vague all of it, and in Scripture language. It is the kindest thing to say of such a passage, that it is very loosely and inaccurately worded. An unfair person, or a stranger, would not doubt of its accuracy, but impute a worse defect.

Newman demanded proof "that Dr. Hampden says something more than a Socinian; proof that he attaches some definite sense to Scripture, and that that is the Church's sense".[24]

In the introduction to the second edition of the Bampton Lectures, besides explaining his use of the phrase "matter of fact" and stating in what sense the Scriptures were not dogmatic,[25] Hampden also defended himself against the charge of rationalism. In fact, he professed astonishment at that charge:

> If there is anything to which my writings have been uniformly opposed, it is Rationalism .... When indeed I expressly condemn speculative deductions from Scripture language, I condemn Rationalism, whatever form it may assume, - whether it seeks to explain away Divine Truth, or to support that Truth by ingenious and subtile argumentation. I have not, I confess, tried to escape from Rationalism by running into Mysticism. But let not any fancy that they do avoid Rationalism by such a resource; for Mysticism itself is but an insane Rationalism.[26]

Hampden is here turning the charge of rationalism against the Tractarians themselves, for the Noetics considered that the Tractarians were running into mysticism. It is interesting to note, too, that Hampden has widened the definition of rationalism so as to

apply not only to those who attempt to explain away Gospel truths, such as the Unitarians, but also to those who add human deductions to the Bible, and indeed even to those who support divine truth "by ingenious and subtile argumentation". For Hampden, rationalism was equivalent to the wrong use of reason, regardless of whether the conclusions of that reasoning were true or false. His lectures, then, can be seen as opposed to rationalism, in that they attempt to determine the correct use of reason in matters of religion. Hampden himself saw his lectures as being concerned with the following question:

> Reasoning on the text of Scripture being allowed, what is the right application of reasoning; or, all Rationalizing of the word of God being forbidden, when is reasoning duly employed in relation to that word? I argue only against what I consider a wrong application of reasoning. Some seem to think that there is wrong reasoning only on the side of unbelief and heterodoxy. But all logicians are aware, that right conclusions may be connected with false premises.[27]

Hampden's Bampton Lectures are a consideration of a particular case of wrong reasoning applied in the defence of Christian truth, that is, the systematic theology of the Schoolmen. Although convinced of the piety of the Schoolmen, Hampden attempted to show that their deductive, logical method of approaching the Scriptures was ill-conceived, and that the theological language which had been inherited from them, could lead to logomachies and religious disputes, if adopted uncritically and without any knowledge of its history.

However, Hampden was definitely not protesting against all use of reason in religion. In the introduction he expressly stated that he did not object to "the just application of reasoning to the Sacred

Text".[28] As in the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity, so here he maintained that faith and reason were not opposed, this being in his view a "speculative distinction".[29] He denied that assent to divine truth could be an act of faith, as distinct from an act of reason, and consequently he objected to the idea that reason was concerned with the evidence of Christianity, faith with the things revealed.[30] At first sight, Hampden appears in this to be going further than the other Noetics, for they held that reason was to judge of the evidence and prove the authenticity of revelation, but once this was established, the contents of revelation should be accepted, even if above reason. However, Hampden was not really in disagreement with this position, as is shown by a number of passages in the lectures. For example, in the eighth lecture he states, "Any fact, therefore, that is found expressly written in the Bible, must be regarded, by virtue of its sole and primary existence there, to be ascertained with an evidence to which no further proof can add reality".[31] In other words, the truth of facts contained in the Bible is vouched for by their being part of a revelation from God, presuming that revelation has been shown to be authentic. Nor does he deny that parts of this revelation may be mysterious and above reason.[32] But he objects to the above distinction between faith and reason because it "leaves the real matter of dispute altogether untouched; since it is about the various things themselves proposed to our belief, that we want a criterion".[33]

Here Hampden put his finger on an important point, one which the other Noetics did not consider at any length, but which was later

taken up and developed by theologians of the Broad Church movement. Hampden was concerned with the crucial problem of interpretation of the Bible. He believed that not all the doctrines which had been claimed to be revealed in the Bible were in fact revealed. Many were human deductions, some more probable than others, but nevertheless human, and consequently, not to be accorded the same certainty as divine truths. Thus, in the introduction Hampden acknowledged the Protestant theorem that whatever is divine truth is proved by Scripture (if it cannot be so proved, then it is not divine truth), but maintained that the reverse did not hold, that is that whatever is proved by Scripture is divine truth. Hampden commented that it was a brave man who was willing to admit the principle that whatever claims to be so proved is true, for what may constitute sufficient proof to one man, may fail to convince another.[34] Concerning things proposed to man's belief, then, the problem remained of deciding which were human deductions and which were divine truths, or in Hampden's terminology, which were dogmas and which facts of religion. To help in this decision was the real object of his lectures. He sought "an arbitration of the point, where Divine Truth ends, and Human Truth commences; or, where the certainty of Divine Fact ceases, and the probability of Opinion takes its rise, in matters of Religious belief and conduct".[35]

This purpose of the lectures is allied to the other purpose which Hampden professed, that is, to determine the correct use of reason in matters of religion, for he believed that the correct use of reason led to divine truth, whereas a wrong use of reason led to mistaking

human opinion for divine truth. Hampden considered that the Scholastic theology was an example of the latter, and by describing this theology in his lectures he was able to illustrate what he saw as the wrong use and to throw out hints as to the correct use of reason. The Schoolmen, Hampden argued, made the same mistake in theology as they made in science. Before the time of Bacon, philosophers reasoned deductively from a priori ideas and logical definitions. Logic, in fact, was the method of philosophy and was regarded as an instrument for investigating truth.[36] They neglected to test their reasoning by the facts of nature.

> A Philosophy of this kind resulted, as is clear, in a Philosophy of Language only, or, in other words, a Logical Philosophy. It sufficed to develop and explain the notions contained in terms and propositions; but it did not penetrate within the veil of nature. It was of admirable use for forming classifications and systems, and cementing together the parts of a Science; but it left the basis of Science purely notional and hypothetical.

Once Bacon had exposed their error and revealed the value of the inductive method, science was revolutionized, and the discoveries of Newton were made possible. Then was established "a philosophy of Fact in contradistinction to a philosophy of Theory, or an Inductive system instead of a Deductive one, and one that, instead of commencing with Definitions, results in them".[37] The Schoolmen made the same mistake in theology, but a similar revolution to that in science had not yet occurred in theology. Admittedly, Hampden conceded, the Reformation had effected a vast improvement, removing many of the mischievous results of Scholastic theology, but even the Reformers had not been able to escape the influence of that theology.[38] The Scholastic theologians had begun from abstract theological definitions or assumed theories about God, and from these deduced consequences which they

invested with the same demonstrative certainty as the deductions of mathematics. In other words, they treated theology as an exact science and constructed a logical or speculative theology.[39]

This speculative tendency was reinforced by the philosophy of Realism, which was in the ascendancy in the Scholastic period. Realism,

> by assigning, what metaphysicians call an objective reality to the general notions of the mind, made the whole of our knowledge deducible from abstract ideas. A dictatorial or a speculative Theology readily combined with such a theory. Men were thus taught, to distrust the senses, to distrust conclusions from mere experience; and to rely only on the clear consequences of unquestioned speculative principles .... Nominalism, on the contrary, by denying any objective reality to general notions, led the way directly to the testimony of the senses and the conclusions of experience.[40]

The Scholastic theologians were Realists in that they assigned an objective reality to their own definitions and sought demonstrative conclusions from those definitions in disregard of the actual facts to which those definitions were mere approximations. They mistook "words" for "things" and thought to discover truth by examining the logical connection of terms. They were "practically Realists in this respect; that they applied the analytic power of language to the interpretation of nature".[41] Hampden, like Copleston, held that language was an imperfect means of conveying knowledge of God, and that even the Bible, using as it did the medium of language, only brought that knowledge "before us darkly, under the signs appropriate to the thoughts of the human mind". Such language was "altogether inadequate in point of Science".[42] To treat it as scientific, to

deduce consequences from definitions without reference to reality, like a mathematician, was merely to re-arrange language, not to arrive at truth.[43] This was the mistake of the Schoolmen - "whilst theologians of the schools have thought they were establishing religious truth by elaborate argumentation, they have been only multiplying and arranging a theological language".[44] Moreover, to treat theological language, even the technical language of the Schools, as scientific, was to ignore its essential vagueness, for the technical terms of theology were not, like those of mathematics or physics, restricted to one particular sense, but their meanings were subject to various interpretations, depending on the associations of the hearer. To ignore this vagueness, to be under the misapprehension that one's own interpretation of a particular term, such as Justification, was not an interpretation of a theological truth, but rather was the theological truth, was to open the door to "that fruitful mother of Controversy - Logomachy".[45]

Hampden's Nominalistic viewpoint aroused the suspicion that he altogether denied the truth of Christian doctrines; that, because he considered many doctrinal disputes to be about "words" and not "things", he denied the real existence of the "things" themselves. In the introduction to the second edition of the Bampton Lectures he felt it necessary to defend himself on this point.

> Nor does it follow that in objecting to Realism, as a philosophical system, I should attribute no reality to the objects about which Revelation is conversant. These may be realities, (as they are,) and yet some of the Terms by which they are expressed may be merely notional. For instance, the doctrine that there is Life Everlasting, describes a reality. It is not merely a nominal or metaphysical Truth,

> but a Truth which implies a real existence. And yet the Terms themselves are abstract, representing ideas which have no existence apart from living beings.[46]

He stressed that his lectures left the matter of doctrine untouched, and were only concerned with the mode of statement. A truth, he argued, was independent of any particular mode of statement. Indeed, "a Fact would be no less a Truth, or rather no less a Reality" (Hampden had obviously taken note of Copleston's distinction between "truth" and "reality"), "though there existed no language in which it could be expressed....",[47] and the fact that an idea can be expressed in different ways in no way affects the truth of the idea. Thus in theology, to show that the mode of stating theological truths is variable, is not to shake the foundation of doctrine. The problem, according to Hampden, was that the technical terms used to express religious truths had become so identified with the truths themselves, that an inquiry into the origin and nature of doctrinal statements could easily be represented by "an ignorant or unfair antagonist" (is the latter epithet a reference to Newman?), as an attack on the doctrines themselves. This Hampden denied. He emphasized that his lectures had to do "not with any explanations of the Christian verities or Doctrines, as such - as they exist, - as they are revealed, - but with the Language and Forms of expression in which they are conveyed in Theological systems".[48] But while not denying the reality or truth of doctrines, he was warning against identifying the theological statements, the mode of expression, with the religious truths. He warned against taking "the sign for the thing, the counter for the money".[49] Newman, however, took a different view. In 1835 he wrote to Froude: "At present you hear Nestorianism preached in every

other pulpit, etc., and the more I think of these questions the more I feel that they are questions of things, not words".[50]

Against Hampden it could be argued that it is not possible, in the case of difficult abstract concepts such as the Trinity in Unity, to separate the truths themselves from the mode of stating them, and that different modes of stating these concepts do indicate significant differences of interpretation. The Arian view of the Trinity, for example, denied the full divinity of Christ, while the Sabellian denied his independent subsistence. The only way to avoid these differences was to refuse, as Hampden did, to state exactly what one understood by the expression "Trinity in Unity". But does that expression, then, have any meaning at all? On the other hand, if the doctrine of the Trinity was "above reason", as was generally accepted, then obviously it was not possible to explain it satisfactorily and attempts to do so were misconceived. This is what Hampden and the Noetics argued. Such a position naturally gives rise to the suspicion that the doctrine itself, being incapable of expression, might have no basis in reality,[51] hence the accusation that Hampden's Bampton Lectures attempted to explain away Christian truth.

In criticising the logical theology of the Scholastic age, Hampden did not consider that he was merely treating of a long-exploded error. The Schoolmen, and their favourite subject, logic, were indeed no longer highly regarded, but Hampden thought that their influence was still felt through the technical language which they had initiated and which was still in use in the church,

particularly in the Articles, but also in ordinary theological discussions. In fact, the technical terms had become popular terms.[52] Thus, the dangers posed by a logical theology were not confined to the Scholastic age. "We are now tracing to its origin", wrote Hampden, "that speculative logical Christianity, which survives among us at this day; and which has been in all ages the principal obstacle, as I conceive, to the union and peace of the Church of Christ".[53] The unity and peace of the church were endangered by the disputes and logomachies which this logical theology fostered. Hampden believed, moreover, that it was one of the chief causes of infidelity among speculative men,[54] that it violated Gospel simplicity, and that it led to religious error. The Scholastic practice of making logical deductions from divine truths inevitably meant that people looked more to consequences than to the original truth, and were tempted to adjust that truth if it seemed to involve unwanted consequences. They tended to systematize order to avoid objections. The simple facts of Revelation, on the other hand, "must, by their nature, be open to objections, and, it may be said, to unanswerable objections; because these facts belong to an order of things, of which we do not directly know the general laws".[55] Because of the imperfection of our knowledge, these objections may be suffered to stand, without detracting from our faith. A metaphysical theology, however, demands their solution. Hampden asked,

> Is it then for a moment to be supposed, that the simplicity of the Faith can be held, where such a principle of Theology is recognized? Is it not evident rather, that the Faith, as it is in Christ, must be corrupted? The conclusions of human reason will naturally be intruded on the sacred truth. The fact will be accommodated to the theory: and exactness of theological definition will usurp the place of the plain dictates of the Holy Spirit.[56]

A further danger of a logical theology was that it interfered with practical religion. Just as the Scholastic theologians paid insufficient attention to the rhetorical and ethical nature of the Scriptures and sought conclusions, rather than precepts or rules of conduct, so men were still inclined to treat a question such as the Divine Agency "as a matter pregnant with consequences, or inferences, rather than as one of simple, moral acquiescence and obedience".[57] Doctrines such as Predestination and Grace, Hampden held, "concern more the heart than the intellect",[58] and the Epistles of St. Paul, from which these doctrines were generally derived, were not speculative, but rhetorical and ethical, proclaiming the goodness and love of God and offering comfort and encouragement to men.[59] Similarly, the Unity of God was not proclaimed in the Bible as a speculative belief. Rather was it a "bare fact, a limit of speculation".[60] The declaration to Moses, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord", was not meant to convey any theoretical notion of the oneness of the Deity, but to free their minds from superstition and to instil the practical precept, "Thou shalt have no other Gods but me".[61] In fact, Scripture language as a whole had a practical purpose. Although inadequate, as Hampden argued, in point of science, it was "abundantly instructive to us in point of sentiment and action; teaches us, that is, both how to feel, and how to act, towards God".[62] "Practical Christianity", then, did not call on men to decide speculative questions such as whether Baptism was always equivalent to Regeneration, whether Predestination was certain, or whether all were predestined.[63]

This stress on practical religion was criticised by Pusey in Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements and the Thirty-nine Articles Compared. There he turned the type of arguments favoured by the Noetics against the Noetics themselves. He argued that this insistence on the practical character of Christianity tended to encourage that rationalism and systematizing which Hampden deplored. It fostered disbelief of those parts of the Bible which were not obviously practical, and encouraged the straining or degrading of some truths in order to make them fit into this system of practicality. Pusey maintained that the whole idea was presumptuous and unphilosophical. It was presumptuous to declare that the sole purpose of God's revelation was to guide human conduct, for such a declaration exceeded our admittedly imperfect knowledge of God's ways and purposes. It was unphilosophical, because it committed the error of "forming notions beforehand what a revelation must be, and then criticising the revelation by those a priori notions".[64] To one such as Hampden, who prided himself on preaching the acceptance of the "facts" of the Bible without addition or subtraction, such a charge must have seemed unfounded. The plausibility of the charge was due to the unguarded nature of some of Hampden's statements. Copleston, indeed, warned Hampden against incautious language ("You will of course observe the prudent precaution of not speaking universally when it is sufficient to affirm 'ὡς ἐπι το πολυ'").[65] On the topic of practical religion Copleston had generally contented himself with advising people to avoid profitless speculation and to seek from the Bible information on their duty towards God. Spiritual instruction, rather than intellectual gratification, he held, was "the peculiar

object of the Bible".[66] From Hampden, however, Pusey was able to quote a statement such as, "The only conceivable end of instruction from God is the good of mankind".[67] But Copleston and Hampden were unanimous in holding that human language could only give us relative knowledge of God.[68] This did not satisfy Pusey, who complained of Hampden, as Grinfield had previously complained of Copleston, that his theory made God remote: "God is to us, as to the Athenians, 'an unknown God'".[69]

The Scholastic theology constituted for Hampden a prime example of the wrong use of reason in matters of religion, and he hoped for a change of method in theology similar to that effected in science by Bacon, that is, a change from deductive to inductive theology. This he made clear in the introduction to his lectures: "making allowance for the different circumstances, the same rule of proceeding applies both to Theology and Science .... we must study the Sacred Records as we study Nature. The method of Induction is to be used here, as there".[70] What this involved Hampden's subsequent statements show. Observations were to be classed, irrelevant matter excluded, texts compared, context considered, and the spirit of the Bible as a whole taken into consideration. By studying the Bible in this way, Hampden held, we would be led to divine truth. This view of the correct use of reason in religion explains Hampden's insistence on "facts". It was suggested by the analogy with science. Hampden defined the "great principle of the modern Inductive Philosophy" as "the principle of resting on ascertained Fact as the only proper ground of knowledge".[71] Inductive theology, then, must follow the principle of resting on the

"facts" of the Bible as the proper ground of knowledge. The philosophy of Realism which the Schoolmen had embraced, had caused them to turn away from the facts of experience and to attempt to deduce their knowledge from abstract ideas, whereas the Nominalism which Hampden advocated, directed attention back to the facts themselves.

Newman eventually came to an entirely different opinion of the value of applying the Baconian method to theology. For him Hampden's inductive theology reduced faith to too limited a compass and went against his personal need for dogma. In his Idea of a University, written as a Roman Catholic in 1855, Newman attacked the Noetic concept. In his lecture on "Christianity and Physical Science" he stated that it was "a huge mistake to introduce the method of research and of induction into the study of Theology at all".[72] This, he now realised, was the mistake of Protestants, whether they used as their store of facts the Bible, antiquity, or nature.[73] The result of applying the empirical method to theology was scepticism. The true method, as Roman Catholics were aware, was deductive:

> Knowledge .... of these revealed truths, is gained, not by any research into facts, but simply by appealing to the authoritative keepers of them, as every Catholic knows, by learning what is a matter of teaching, and by dwelling upon, and drawing out into detail, the doctrines which are delivered; according to the text, 'Faith cometh by hearing' ... Such, I say, is the theological method, deductive; however, the history of the last three centuries is only one long course of attempts, on the part of the partisans of the Baconian Philosophy, to get rid of the method proper to Theology and to make it an experimental science.[74]

Although advocating an inductive theology, Hampden did not rule out all deductive reasoning. Indeed, he could hardly have done so if

he followed Copleston's and Whately's view that, technically speaking, all reasoning was deductive. But even apart from this technical point, Hampden allowed a place for deduction. He declared that he held "the use both of deductive and inductive reasoning in making out and expounding the meaning - the religious meaning, of course, not the mere grammatical one - of the bible, as legitimate and necessary".[75] Deduction was permissible when based solely on the facts of Scripture, that is, when the premisses were taken completely from Scripture. These facts being certain, consequences correctly deduced from these premisses were also certain, for, as any student of logic knew, the conclusion was already implied in the premisses.[76] Hampden gave as an example of this the conclusion that Christ united two natures in one person. This conclusion was derived from the premisses, both of which were clearly revealed in the Bible, that Christ was truly God and truly man. The conclusion is contained in the premisses, which are certain because revealed by God. However, Hampden maintained that there was a difference between "thus establishing the revealed truths of Scripture, and deducing speculative doctrines beyond Scripture".[77] When we turn away from the facts and instead base our arguments on speculative theories about God (for example, arguing that God's foreknowledge precludes man's free-will), then the conclusions are no longer certain. When an argument turns on the meaning of words such as "Nature", "Substance", "Person", "Foreknowledge", "Priority", "Identity", the result is logomachy. "We have not the premises of our argument in the Scripture, and we are not warranted, therefore, in our conclusions".[78] It was this type of speculative or theoretical deduction to which Hampden objected. Both the method and the result

he considered to be vastly different from that of inductive theology. The speculative method was to start with a proposition, dissect it, and argue that

> such or such must be a revealed truth, because it is logically deducible from that proposition. Conclusions, so obtained, depend on our definitions of terms, or the sense which we choose to give them; and are therefore only hypothetically true, in the same manner as mathematical theorems. But if we follow the method of Induction, and confine ourselves to Facts, excluding all hypotheses, we shall arrive at absolute Truth, - and Truth not dependent on Phraseology.[79]

Just as scientific conclusions were based on observation of the facts of nature, so too should theological conclusions be based on the facts of Scripture. As Hampden summed it up, "I would have Christian Doctrine rested on Scripture Evidence".[80]

Here, however, the analogy between physical science and theology, stopped. As Hampden pointed out, the inductive method in science, rather than starting with definitions, ended with them,[81] but whether definitions were allowable in theology seems to have been a doubtful point with Hampden. To a certain extent, it would appear that he permitted them, if doctrines such as the two-fold nature of Christ or the Trinity in Unity, which are deduced from Scripture, are to be classed as definitions. But he was cautious about attempts to explain or define such Scripture truths more exactly. For example, discussing Predestination and Grace, he wrote,

> If these truths are to be defined, the only legitimate mode is, the laborious, historical, experimental one, formed on a comprehensive and accurate study, under the guidance of that selfsame Spirit, whose ways we are exploring, of every fact of Nature and Scripture, and the collection of these into a general law of the Divine Procedure. But this is the work

> of a Christian life; it is a process of induction which can only be carried on, where there is a disposition and an activity, in doing the Divine Will, and obeying the Divine Motions.[82]

Once again Hampden is discountenancing the speculative method of starting with them as definitions, and in fact goes on to state that the assertion of these doctrines "in the theoretic form, as primary truths concerning the Divine Being, can never be free from objection". But even the attempt to arrive at definitions by the "inductive" method, even if possible, Hampden seems to have considered misguided.

> These are truths, it cannot be too often repeated, which concern more the heart than the intellect; and, in defining which accordingly, every attempt, however exactly and piously worded, must fail; much more, any theory of them drawn from antecedent speculations on the Nature and Will of God.[83]

This, then, was where the comparison with science broke down. Hampden enlarged on this point in his pamphlet, Observations on Religious Dissent. In answer to the argument that theological conclusions may be drawn from Scripture, as the philosopher draws conclusions from the facts of nature, Hampden stated:

> if there must be a science of theology, we must at least take care that it be framed according to the proper rules of a science. But after all, the method itself may be radically wrong. If we cannot properly have any science of divine things, then is the principle itself wrong, on which we proceed in framing our system of theology.[84]

The implication throughout the Bampton Lectures is that it is better to stick to Scripture "facts", not to attempt to deduce too much or to seek too strict definitions. If men avoided this temptation to over-exactness, they would be less likely to fall into error and would

"neither be Sabellians, or Tritheists, or Socinians".[85] In the eyes of the Noetics, and indeed of most other Protestants, it was the Roman Catholic church which was especially guilty of systematising and deducing too much from the Bible. Hampden, however, recognised that it was a fault not confined to Roman Catholics, but found also among Protestants, especially among Calvinists and Unitarians. The former often stated their views on Justification with "the point and precision of theory"; the latters' insistence on the natural efficacy of repentance was "but a dogmatism founded on theory". We should learn from these extremes, Hampden maintained,

> that, the more indistinct our language is on this sacred subject, - the less of theoretic principle it embodies in it, - the more closely do we imbibe the true spirit of Protestantism; - the more faithfully do we walk in the path of that Holy Spirit, whose 'ways are in the deep', and whose 'footsteps are not known'.[86]

Another difference between science and theology, briefly hinted at in the introduction to the lectures but explained more fully in Observations on Religious Dissent,[87] was that the facts of nature must be discovered by investigation, whereas the facts of the divine world, so far as it has pleased God that we should know them, have been laid before us in the Bible - no amount of human investigation would be able to discover them. Moreover, the Bible states these facts in such a way as "to impress them on our hearts, and enforce them on our belief and conduct".[88] Here comes in the theme of Gospel simplicity. The Bible

> appeals to no philosophical powers for the estimate of its simple facts; nothing is required but that these be clearly and correctly stated: and there is no other difficulty in the way of rightly understanding them, but the obstruction of the proud and licentious heart.[89]

In this respect, then, studying the Bible is easier than studying nature. Its facts are expressly stated and do not have to be discovered, and they are also simple and can be readily understood by all classes of people.

Related to this is a third difference between science and theology. As the understanding of nature involves investigation, it is to be expected that new truths about nature will from time to time emerge as the result of this investigation. As far as theology is concerned, however, Hampden agreed with Copleston and Whately that no new discoveries were to be expected. The great truths of the Gospel had been proclaimed once and for all by Christ and his Apostles, and therefore men were not to look for new truths as they did in the physical sciences. Improvements there might be, but these would take the form of a restoration of neglected truths or a removal of corruptions - that is, a return to original truths rather than an addition of new truths. A closer attention to the Bible could bring about improvements by clearing up what had been obscured, emphasizing what had been little noticed, stating more fully what had been imperfectly taught, or confirming by fresh evidence what was already believed. "Thus, though there can be no improvement in Doctrine, as Doctrine stands for Truths Taught, there may be improvement in the Exposition of Doctrine".[90] Exposition of doctrine naturally varied from age to age, as each age must teach the truths of the Gospel in the way most suited to the capacities and condition of those who were to be taught.

> At one time a Scholastic method, and Scholastic phraseology, would be properly employed, as most intelligible and satisfactory to educated and thinking people of the time. By these means, False Doctrine would then be most effectively denied, and True Doctrine asserted. But if the Church were now called upon anew to assert the same truths, or reprobate the same errors, it might not use exactly the same words, or the same method, - some of the words having become obsolete, or their meaning being changed, and the method itself being superseded; - but would adapt its language to the habits of thinking and modes of speaking prevalent in the age.[91]

But to say that the mode of expounding Christian doctrine may be improved, was not, asserted Hampden, to say that doctrine itself could be improved. Once again, the distinction between words and things was applicable. In criticising the words, he was not criticising the things. The words may be improved, he argued, but the things remain unaltered. His Bampton Lectures criticised the Schoolmen's exposition of doctrines and suggested a way of improving on it, but did not criticise the doctrines themselves. Nor, in fact, did he deny that the Schoolmen's exposition served a purpose in its own day. All that Hampden asserted was that it could be improved upon, and the way to do this, was to reject the false philosophy on which it was based and turn instead to the inductive method of studying the Bible. Other than this suggestion on method, however, Hampden did not give any examples of proposed improvements,[92] and indeed, in view of Hampden's statements on the dangers of too exact definitions it is doubtful whether any doctrinal statement which departed from or attempted to explain Scripture language would have completely satisfied him.

Despite his insistence on inductive theology, Hampden did not, as has been said, rule out all deductions. In fact, in the Observations he admitted that it was practically impossible to check the tendency

of the human mind to speculate on the truths of the Bible.[93] Besides those deductions, mentioned above, which were based solely on Scripture facts, Hampden allowed for "pious opinions", such as Paley's inference from the words of St. Paul that the saints in a future life meet and know one another.[94] But inferences such as this were only probable. The premisses were not taken solely from the Bible but included also human assumptions or interpretations. To take the example from Paley, St. Paul's words "that we may present every man perfect in Christ Jesus" were interpreted by Paley as an expression of St. Paul's hope and prayer "that at the general judgment of the world he might present to Christ the fruits of his ministry, the converts he had made to his faith and religion, and might present them perfect in every good work", and Paley asked, "how without knowing again his converts in their new and glorified state, could St. Paul desire or expect to present them at the last day?" Now, although Hampden allowed that the conclusion which Paley drew might be highly probable, he denied that it was a necessary conclusion, because the premisses were not distinctly revealed in the Bible, and as the premisses were therefore only probable, then the conclusion too could only be probable. Deductions of this kind, Hampden admitted, "may be an edifying exercise of the pious mind", but they should not be confused with divine truth: "...such conclusions must be held by the believer only as probable truths, or true opinions, as long as they remain only probable, and are not positively revealed inferences".[95] Such opinions might be held by Christians as part of their theology, and the church was within its rights, if these opinions became a matter of debate and controversy, in giving a decision on the disputed points

for the sake of peace and in requiring moderation from its ministers and teachers in regard to them. "Doctrines of this kind may justly be denominated Theological Truths; to distinguish them from those higher Verities, the essentials of a Saving Faith, which are in the most proper sense Articles of Faith".[96] The thirty-nine articles of the Anglican church, Hampden maintained (with the authority of Archbishop Bramhall and Stillingfleet to support him) included both sorts of truths - both the fundamentals of religion and these lesser or theological truths.[97]

Hampden, then, divided religion into "simple facts divinely revealed, and theories of divine truth founded on those facts". The simple facts of Scripture must be accepted implicitly, just as the physical scientist has to accept the facts of nature. Their truth is guaranteed by their being revealed by God, and it is not up to man to accept some and reject others, or to decide that some are more important than others. "All must be equally received and followed as true".[98] The theories raised on those facts, the dogmas of religion, however, are open to the strict examination of reason as to their probability:

> ...so far as doctrines are deductive statements - conclusions drawn from the facts, or words, of Divine Revelation, - they may be examined by that reason which deduces them. It being granted that they follow from the data of Scripture, it is to be seen, whether they are such as ought to have been deduced; whether they have the support of evidence, from their general accordance with Scripture, - from the concurrent opinion of the wise and the unprejudiced, - and from other considerations of this kind. And the degree of evidence, resulting from such considerations must decide the theological truth and relative importance of such conclusions.[99]

Hampden was not indeed denying the truth of such deductions, but rather insisting that in the two cases the truth was of a different order. The simple Gospel facts partake of the "truth of Fact"; the dogmas or theories, "the truth of Opinion". The difference is essentially one of certainty and variability. The "truth of Fact" is certain and invariable. No further discussion can add anything to its certainty. The "truth of Opinion", on the other hand, is probable and variable - it is "of a nature to be modified, and improved, and established, by the course of time, - by the progress of civilization, and arts, and knowledge, - by accessions of experience, - by the conflict of judgments".[100] Here, too, is room for authority, for in matters of opinion it is unreasonable to disregard the views of the wise and experienced. It was indeed possible, Hampden thought, to have a sound theory of Tradition, as long as it was remembered that such reasoning amounted only to probabilities.[101] The important thing was to keep in mind the distinction between "truth of Fact" and "truth of Opinion", and not to ascribe to one the certainty and invariability which was the characteristic of the other.

Hampden made the same distinction in the Observations, although the terminology is slightly different.[102] There he distinguishes between "Religion", which consists of the truths contained in the Bible, as well as the feelings and actions suggested by them, and "Theological Opinion", which is the result of the action of the mind on those truths, in other words, doctrines or dogmas. In Hampden's mind, "Theological Opinion" did not always rise to "truth of opinion". For example, he did not consider Unitarian opinion

concerning the doctrine of the Trinity to be correct.[103] The probability of the opinion depended to a large extent on the method of the deduction, that is, on whether it was deduced from the facts of Scripture or from abstract theories and "the mere conclusions of [human] reason".[104] The Unitarians were guilty of the latter, and consequently their conclusions Hampden did not accept as "Theological Truths", although they were "Theological Opinions".

Although dogmas of theology were "human authorities",[105] being theories erected on the facts of Scripture (for in Scripture itself there were, in Hampden's terminology, no doctrines or dogmas), and therefore had not the same certainty as the facts of Scripture, yet Hampden claimed that he did not mean to dismiss dogmas as unimportant, or wrong, or inconsistent with true religion. Rather he wished "to establish their importance and proper truth, as distinct from the honour and verity of the simple Divine Word".[106] One cannot help suspecting that this is a case of lack of courage on Hampden's part, that he would indeed have liked to limit religion to the Scripture facts and to do away with dogmas altogether, but was afraid of so radical a step. But in fact, Hampden did not even completely reject the language in which the dogmas were expressed, although he disliked it as being derived from Scholastic theology. Hampden conceded that the technical dogmatic theology of the Scholastic age had been useful in its time, and perhaps still had its uses. It had arisen in defence of orthodoxy, to combat the errors of the heretic, and it was natural that the language used should have been that which had been made familiar by the logical philosophy of the time. Moreover, the heretic

used theoretical language to espouse his views, and it was necessary for theory to be retorted by theory. "Orthodoxy was forced to speak the divine truth in the terms of heretical speculation; if it were only to guard against the novelties which the heretic had introduced". This being the origin of dogmatic theology, then, it follows "that its proper truth consists in its being a collection of negations; of negations, I mean, of all ideas imported into religion, beyond the express sanction of Revelation".[107] This Hampden saw as being the original purpose of the thirty-nine articles, and indeed of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds.

As to the question of whether these articles and creeds could now be discarded, on the grounds that the danger which they had been intended to avert no longer threatened true religion, here again Hampden's courage seems to have failed him, and he answered in the negative. It would be better, he admitted, if we did not need articles, if we could rely solely on the word of God as protection against heretical doctrine, but so ingrained was the Realism of the human mind that metaphysical and logical theology was an ever-present danger, and thus there would always be a need for articles. Consequently, "it were well to retain, admidst all its confessed imperfections, a system of technical theology, by which we are guarded, in some measure, from the exorbitance of theoretic enthusiasm".[108] But an attempt could be made to remove the imperfections of the articles. Hampden insisted that the articles were capable of improvement; they were not immutable. Rather, being records of opinion they were essentially variable. To suggest that

they were capable of improvement, of being better adapted to the circumstances of the present-day church, was no impeachment of their truth. Concerning the difficulty of or need for alteration Hampden had nothing to say here, although in the Observations he did express the view that the church should consider the question of improvement.[109] He merely pointed out that to deny the essential variableness of articles is to make a human authority equal with the divine, and to imply that the church is infallible. The use and importance, then, of dogmatic theology was that it made possible the "Social Profession of Christianity". If religion was to be purely a private matter there was no need of articles of religion. But Christ had instituted the church as a "visible society", and as Whately had observed, the church, being a society, needed rules and terms of communion just as any other society. Hampden summed up the situation as follows:

> The case appears to be this. The agreement of a community in certain views of Scripture-fact is presupposed. The problem before the Dogmatic Theologian is, to preserve that agreement entire; to guard it from a latitudinarianism which would virtually annul it; and to prevent its dissolution by innovators, either within or without the religious society. The anathemas of Creeds and Councils can only be justified on this ground. They are the penalties of social Religion.[110]

Section 3. Tractarian criticism of the Bampton Lectures

To the Tractarians it appeared that Hampden's lectures, far from preserving the agreement of the Anglican Church, were introducing "a latitudinarianism which would virtually annul it". To Newman Hampden represented indifferentism. J.B. Mozley implied the same when he complained that Hampden used the words "orthodox" and "heterodox" "with the most perfect impartiality between the two, thinking both equally wrong as being dogmatisers".[1] The lectures certainly advocated moderation. In fact, the concluding sentence expressed the hope that the knowledge imparted by the lectures would foster "candour, forbearance, charitable construction of the views of others, an humble and teachable disposition towards God".[2] Copleston had advocated moderation as the mean between dogmatism and indifference. Had Hampden, however, in his zeal to combat dogmatism, drifted towards its opposite? Had Noetic moderation degenerated into indifference?

Mozley was partly right in his accusation against Hampden. Hampden did consider orthodox and heterodox equally wrong "as being dogmatisers". That is to say, he considered that the orthodox, if maintaining their views in a dogmatic manner, were equally to blame as the heterodox in that they used a wrong method. This is implied by his statement that wrong reasoning is not always employed only on the side of unbelief and heterodoxy.[3] The Bampton Lectures are essentially about method, not content. However, Hampden did in fact believe that orthodox views were on the whole correct, and heterodox ones wrong. He was himself orthodox, as is shown by his statements and subsequent career.[4] Take, for example, the doctrine of the

Trinity in Unity. Hampden held that Trinitarians, as well as Unitarians, had been guilty of clouding the practical force of that doctrine with the "mists of human speculation", and he advised men to return to the bare facts of Scripture rather than to attempt to solve that divine mystery, which in any case was above reason, by abstract notions of number, time, and being.[5] However, he did not mean to imply by this that the Trinitarian and Unitarian positions were equally as valid as one another. Although his criticisms of Unitarianism were milder than was usual at that time (for example, he did not deny them the name of Christians and said that, as far as theological dogmatism was concerned, they were no more at fault than other Christians)[6], he did not himself sanction their views. He believed that Unitarian attempts to explain away the mystery of the Trinity failed, for they ignored the facts of Scripture, that God had manifested himself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.[7] His own adherence to the Trinitarian position he declared both in the text of the lectures and in the introduction, where he counts it among the "vital substantial Truths to be drawn from Scripture, which a man should hold as he values salvation".[8] Hampden, then, while criticising a method employed by heterodox and orthodox alike, was not implying that the beliefs which that method was intended to support, were equally valid. He was not indifferent in the sense of holding that one belief was just as good as another.[9]

But could it perhaps be argued that his reluctance to criticise and argue against heterodox views indicates indifference of another kind; indifference to the maintenance of truth or the suppression of

error? Hampden's moderate attitude towards those of opposite views was a logical consequence of his conviction that most religious disputes were disputes over theological opinion rather than disagreement over the basic facts of Scripture.[10] As theological opinion, as opposed to divine truth or fact, could only be probable, then it was reasonable to use moderation in upholding one's own opinions and criticising those of others. This, however, Hampden argued in true Noetic fashion, did not indicate a lukewarm attitude towards truth or an indifference to error.

> We cannot, indeed, believe ourselves to be right in our religious convictions, without believing all dissentients from our views to be wrong. But this does not require that we should condemn and censure all who differ from us, or that we should hold ourselves free from all censure because we are correct in our belief. It is the very spirit of the Church of England to admit that we are not infallible, though we may not allow that we are in actual error. Whilst, therefore, we detest all False Doctrine in itself, we are bound to concede to dissentients that they are not necessarily in error, though we believe them to be in error.[11]

Moreover, in support of moderation, Hampden could point to the example of Christ, whose caution against censoriousness in a case of immorality (that is, the woman taken in adultery), Hampden felt, could be equally well applied to questions of faith.[12] In later years Hampden expressly denied that this moderation towards those of opposite views indicated an indifference to truth. In a lecture of 1842 on the thirty-nine articles he averred that he had not "presumed to give away God's truth". He admitted that he had "indulged charitable sentiments towards those who differ from us, however widely", and had not interpreted the Bible so as to justify him in hating others of a different creed. But, he declared,

> I have not been liberal out of that which is not mine to give away. I have not confounded the notion of sincerity in the individual with the attainment of truth. And in conceding, accordingly, the merit of integrity of motive to those who profess to have conscientiously sought the truth and yet missed it, I have not conceded the truth itself. I have held fast, and have encouraged others to hold fast, the one faith delivered to the saints, and the one truth consigned to the Scriptures. I have in no sense been the advocate of indifferentism or lost sight of the oneness of truth.[13]

Indeed, Hampden considered that the theory which he was endeavouring to establish was "the very reverse of that system which would emasculate religion, by reducing it to mere generalities". Rather, he was attempting something of positive value:

> I would bring men to think more of the real substance of their religion, and less of abstractions. I would have them regard it as it is embodied in the life and blood of the gospel itself - not as it appears in the phantasmagoria of controversial statement. It is to the real, personal, living character of our religion, that I would recall their thoughts.[14]

Moderation towards opponents, then, need not be a sign of indifference. But did moderation require that the arguments for heterodoxy should not be met by arguments in favour of orthodoxy? Did not the lack of such arguments in Hampden's lectures indicate indifference? Firstly, in Hampden's defence, it should be reiterated that the lectures were about method rather than content. They were a discussion of a particular method of expounding doctrine, rather than a discussion of doctrine itself, and an attempt to suggest a better method. Refutation of particular expositions of doctrine, then, was essentially outside the purpose of the lectures. This was a point which was overlooked during the Hampden controversy, as Newman and Pusey focussed public attention on Hampden's treatment of doctrines.

And many people did not take the trouble to read Hampden's lengthy lectures, but judged them from the excerpts quoted by Newman and Pusey. Secondly, we can hardly expect from Hampden the type of argument that it was the very purpose of his lectures to discredit. Certainly, Hampden did not rule out all argument in favour of theological opinion, but to indulge in speculative arguments on the exact nature of the Trinity, for example, in order to refute Arian, Sabellian or Socinian interpretations, would be to fight the enemy on their own ground and to rely on human argumentation rather than divine fact. The correct method of establishing the doctrine of the Trinity was to refer back to the Bible, to seek there the evidence for the doctrine, and not to attempt a more exact definition than the Bible facts warrant. By directing people back to the Bible Hampden was in fact opposing wrong belief, on what he considered the right ground. He did not indeed argue against individual beliefs which he considered mistaken, but instead sought to provide the means of preventing all wrong belief. Hampden was convinced that wrong belief was frequently the result of wrong method. If men would confine themselves to the right method, that is, the inductive method of studying Scripture facts, rather than deductive reasoning from human premisses, then they would be less likely to draw wrong conclusions.

Moreover, if the distinction between divine fact and human opinion were kept in view, then the danger posed by wrong belief would be lessened. Dissension and schism resulted when human opinion was mistaken for divine truth. Hampden believed that Christians on the whole were in agreement on the divine truths and disagreed only in

human opinions. If men realised that these human opinions were only probable and were not to be invested with the certainty of divine facts, then moderation would prevail and theological disputes would lose their bitterness. Concerning the charge of indifference, then, it could be said that as far as concerned theological questions which he considered speculative, Hampden was indifferent. For example, he denoted the disputes concerning predestination "idle questions"[15] and he considered the practical significance of the doctrine of the Trinity more important than metaphysical debates on the three Persons and one God. However, it could not be said that he was indifferent to the maintenance of truth and the suppression of error, for the lectures did uphold divine truth by attempting to provide the method by which the truth might be recognized and error prevented.

Even if Hampden himself could not justifiably be accused of indifference, could it be argued that his views tended to foster indifference in others? Hampden certainly disclaimed any wish to encourage others to indifference:

> I would not have any one indifferent as to what opinion he professes. I do not see how those who have really examined questions of theology, and have formed deliberate convictions of the error of certain conclusions, can forbear to maintain their convictions, so long as they apprehend danger to the truth from those conclusions. They cannot, ought not to, teach otherwise than according to such convictions. Neither the cause of truth, nor that of religion, can require that any one should abandon convictions of truth, which he not only holds on grounds of serious deliberation and argument, but considers of high importance.[16]

Nevertheless, this was in substance Newman's charge against both Whately and Hampden. Hampden's views, Newman thought, tended to

Socinianism, and this opinion appeared confirmed by the conversion of Blanco White to Unitarianism. Logically, however, Hampden's position was the same as that of the Church of England, and if the church's position were considered tenable, then so too should Hampden's.[17] Hampden pointed out that, unlike the Roman Catholic church, the Anglican did not claim infallibility, and thus was led to tolerate opinions despite believing them to be erroneous. In support of this view he quoted Bishop Marsh's exposition of the Anglican viewpoint: "'though we <u>believe</u> that we are right, we admit that we are <u>possibly</u> wrong; though we believe that others are <u>wrong</u>, we admit that they are <u>possibly</u> right; and hence we are disposed to <u>tolerate</u> their opinions'".[18]

As to the factual question of whether Hampden's teachings, and those of the other Noetics, actually inclined others to indifference or Unitarianism, an answer to this would require a detailed study of those who came under their influence. A consideration of the relationship of the Noetics to the later Broad Church movement would be relevant to this question,[19] although, of course, while Tractarians might consider Broad Churchmen the epitome of indifference, such an assessment would not be accepted by all. This indicates that any judgment on the charge of indifference is necessarily based on an opinion of what constitutes indifference. The charge that their teachings led to Unitarianism or infidelity would seem to be easier to judge, as one could look to the subsequent religious views of men whom they influenced (presuming that this relationship could be established and that Noetic influence could be distinguished from other

influences).[20] However, an apologist for the Noetics could just as well argue that it was the teachings of the Tractarians, rather than the Noetics, which caused young men like Mark Pattison and A.H. Clough[21] to lose their faith. The Noetics themselves were convinced that Tractarianism led to infidelity. Hampden, for example, saw J.A. Froude's Nemesis of Faith as "valuable evidence of the workings of Tractarianism". It showed, he thought,

> how infidelity is the natural result of that disparagement of Scripture, in order to raise the standard of tradition and Church authority, which ... the 'Tracts' have been inculcating; and how, also, a corruption of feeling is the fruit of that morbid imaginative sentimentality and poetical religion, which their teaching would propagate throughout the Church.[22]

Blanco White's conversion to Unitarianism, as has been said, was pointed to by the Tractarians to justify their fears of Noetic theology. During the Hampden controversy, which began a few months after Blanco White joined the Unitarian communion, the suggestion was made that Hampden's Bampton Lectures owed much to the influence of Blanco White. This was denied by Henrietta Hampden in her biography of her father. Modern historians are divided on the question of Blanco White's influence. Wigmore-Beddoes accepts the view that he played an important part in the production of Hampden's lectures, and he implies that the subsequent denial of Blanco White's influence was due to the embarrassment of his conversion to Unitarianism.[23] But Wigmore-Beddoes fails to consider that the allegation may have been prompted by the very desire to embarrass Hampden - a point not overlooked by Corsi, who says that "the political motives behind this allegation are too evident to deserve detailed comment".[24] Some

comment is warranted, however, as it is often averred that Blanco White played an influential role in the religious debates of the day, and particularly in the formation of Noetic theology. The general influence of Blanco White is a subject which requires further study, but it would appear from this examination of Noetic theology that the main outlines and themes of that theology were well-established before Blanco White became an intimate member of the group. It is true that Blanco White had spent a year in Oxford in 1814/15 (T. Mozley, in fact, dates Hampden's friendship with Blanco White from this time)[25], but there is no indication in the writings or letters of the Noetics that they were on familiar terms at this early date. The first recognition of Blanco White in Whately's works (and Whately was ever ready to acknowledge the help of his friends) was in the Dedication of his essay on The Errors of Romanism, which was published in 1830. Even T. Mozley does not seem to date Blanco White's influence from 1814, for he states that "there was nothing in Hampden's publications before 1831 to prepare for his Bampton Lectures, nothing in his after publications in keeping with them".[26] He implies that they were written under the stimulus of personal intercourse with Blanco White in the period between 1829 and 1832.

When considering the supposed debt of Hampden to Blanco White, the important question is not whether Blanco White provided Hampden with information concerning the Scholastic philosophy; whether, in other words, he supplied Hampden to some extent with the subject matter of the lectures. Indeed, the evidence does support this conclusion. Blanco White was well versed in the Scholastic philosophy

(T. Mozley says, in fact, that at the time Blanco White was the only man in Oxford who knew anything about it), and J.B. Mozley quotes a probationer of Oriel in 1829 as listing "the errors of scholastic divinity" as one of Blanco White's favourite topics. T. Mozley also states that Hampden and Blanco White saw a great deal of each other in the latter part of 1831 and the early part of 1832, a fact corroborated by the testimony of Blanco White's pupil, Canon Hinds Howell.[27] It would be surprising if Hampden did not take the opportunity to learn from Blanco White. The more important question, however, concerns Hampden's treatment of the material. Wigmore-Beddoes claims that Blanco White not only guided Hampden in the subject matter but also provided him with the critical bias with which he approached it. The Bampton Lectures, he asserts, "exhibit essentially the same critical attitude as Blanco White towards the subject". He is of the opinion that Blanco White "contributed a rationalistic attitude which did much to establish the liberal outlook which characterized the Noetics at Oriel", and he quotes with implied, though qualified, approval Liddon's statement, "Of Blanco White's positive influence, it is not too much to say that he is the real founder of the modern Latitudinarian school in the English Church".[28]

Wigmore-Beddoes, in fact, relies too heavily on Liddon, as well as on T. Mozley, both sources hostile to the Noetics,[29] and does not consider the opposite arguments put forward by more friendly sources. In her biography of Hampden, for example, Henrietta Hampden quotes a letter of Archdeacon Hare, in which it is maintained that Hampden's earlier Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity contained

the germs of the chief speculations of the Bampton Lectures, and that these Lectures were a genuine birth of the Oriel school.[30] This claim was dismissed by T. Mozley,[31] but then Mozley was only considering the subject matter (that is, the Scholastic philosophy), and not the themes drawn out during the discussion of the subject matter. As the Scholastic philosophy was not discussed in the Essay, he assumed that the claim that it contained the germs of the Bampton Lectures to be false. Other writers, however, have accepted Hare's view. Tuckwell echoed it.[32] Tulloch "failed to trace any definite impulse communicated by [Blanco White] to the Oriel School".[33] More recently, Corsi has correctly pointed out that Hampden's parochial sermons, published in 1828 (that is, before his return to Oxford and close association with Blanco White), insist on the Noetic standpoint on creeds and articles of faith. Corsi even goes so far as to suggest that Blanco White was, at this time, learning from the Noetics, a claim which Corsi says is substantiated by the marginalia added by Whately to a sermon of Blanco White, which the latter had submitted to Whately for comment.[34]

It is interesting to note that in some respects Blanco White was closer to Newman than to the Noetics. Newsome comments on the similarity of their views in 1828.[35] And in the 'thirties Blanco White, like Newman, came to stress the importance of conscience, although without Newman's compensating stress on the church. Admittedly, the other Noetics, as has been argued, did not ignore the claims of conscience, and were well aware that faith involved the heart as well as the head. But Blanco White seems to have experienced

in his own faith the potential antagonism between reason and emotion. Despite being considered a rationalist because of his conversion to Unitarianism, the call of the heart was always very strong with Blanco White, and throughout his life he sought to reconcile the two and to solve the age-old problem of faith versus reason. His solution bears some similarity to Newman's. He realised that reason by itself was insufficient for faith, that man cannot be argued into belief in God and he postulated the existence of some instinct or innate faculty, by means of which knowledge of God and faith are gained. This inner sense, which he equated with conscience, had more to do with the heart than the understanding, and yet, unlike imagination, which resulted in enthusiasm, was not irrational. Conscience, in fact, was practical as opposed to speculative reason.[36]

Whether or not Blanco White was influenced by the Noetics in the late 'twenties, it cannot be denied that he had many ideas in common with the Noetics even before he became a member of the Oriel common room in 1826. In support of his view that Hampden was indebted to Blanco White, Wigmore-Beddoes points out parallels between Hampden's Bampton Lectures and Blanco White's works. From Blanco White's Observations on Heresy and Orthodoxy (which, though published in 1835, Wigmore-Beddoes says was fundamentally the same as his earlier work, Facts and Inferences) he quotes passages which are strikingly similar to the ideas put forward in the Bampton Lectures.[37] Blanco White's diaries also show that he held Noetic views before coming to Oriel. For example, on 26th January, 1813, he wrote:

> In the various professions of Christianity which distinguish its different sects, there is certainly a great deal which is evidently the work of man. Those who form professions of Faith which they set up as the standard of Christianity, do the greatest possible harm to the interests of the Christian Religion. Christ never established any Creed to be the test of his true disciples: and it is a very remarkable thing that our divine Saviour, who left us a peculiar form of prayer, never spoke a word about professions of faith. Why should the disciples of Christ make it the very essence of Christianity to believe a certain number of metaphysical propositions, which contain nothing but the feeble attempts of men to explain the original system of the Christian religion by the doctrines of the philosophical schools to which the early Christian writers belonged? They clothe the Christian religion in a ridiculous garb: they set up a phantom of their own making, and expose it to the malicious eye of their enemies, who easily find out the vanity of what is given to the world under the name of revealed religion. They deify a cloud which their enemies insultingly debauch and pollute.[38]

And on 21st December, 1818, he declared: "I do not make my own reason paramount to the revealed word of God; but...I use it, as my Mind's eye, to distinguish that Word from the inventions of Men".[39]

But such similarities do not make Blanco White the founder of Noetic theology. It is more likely that his quick acceptance into the Oriel circle was facilitated by the compatibility of his views with those of the other Noetics. He was, in fact, a kindred spirit. Nor do they prove that the themes of the Bampton Lectures were derived solely, or even mainly, from Blanco White. The discussion of Hampden's Philosophical Evidence in the previous chapter confirms Hare's statement that the germs of the Bampton Lectures were contained in this earlier work. For example, he argued there that we must examine any proposed revelation, "lest we mistake the counterfeit of an impious ingenuity for the pure light of divine wisdom, and dishonour God by paying that reverence to the wisdom of man which is

transcendently due to his word alone".[40] He concluded that "there is but little comparatively of theological matter simply didactic in the volume of scripture. The body of divine truth, strictly related to the Deity, is historical. The mode in which that divine truth is conveyed is for the most part indirect...".[41] And he praised Bishop Butler for recommending the learning which is "learned at the feet of the Prophets, and Apostles, and Evangelists", and for enforcing the wisdom "which has the fear of the Lord for its beginning...and not that which unprofitably attempts to scale the heavens by steps of argumentation".[42]

Hare was also correct in saying that the Bampton Lectures were a genuine birth of the Oriel school.[43] On the whole, the other Noetics approved of the lectures, despite reservations about incautious language.[44] Copleston's views have been discussed. Whately recognized the affinity between his own teachings and those of Hampden.[45] Arnold wrote to Hampden that he fully agreed with what Hampden had said of "the evils of a technical and theoretical theology", and he considered that the attack on Hampden was an attack on "the cause of Truth and Honesty".[46] In fact, both the Philosophical Evidence and the Bampton Lectures exhibit typical Noetic themes. Both warn against speculative theology, and direct the reader instead to the Bible, which teaches, it is maintained, practical rather than speculative religion. Although discountenancing speculation, Hampden did not wish to be seen an encouraging indifference. Like the other Noetics, he taught moderation, not indifference, although he did tend to lay even more emphasis on

moderation than they did, and exposed himself to the charge of indifference by his more indulgent attitude to Dissenters. He did not, for example, have anything to say about the sin of schism, and we do not find in Hampden's writings, as we do in Copleston's, Whately's, and Hawkins', the theme of "separation either a duty or a sin".

Indeed, it was on this subject of church unity that Hampden differed most widely from the views of Copleston, Whately, and Hawkins, although, like them he deplored party-spirit as detrimental to the peace of the church. Copleston, Whately, and Hawkins held that the church was a visible society. They objected to the Evangelical notion of the church as an invisible society of those, and only those, who were "working out their salvation in deed and in truth, living and walking in the true spirit of the Gospel, and filled with the Holy Spirit of God".[47] The unity which Christ had prayed for was something more than a unity of this so-called invisible church, or a "unity of heart and spirit".

> We must needs look for some unity which all may see and understand, for the gracious effects of the Holy Spirit, as well as for His presence, and since the fruit of the Spirit is not only love but truth ... we look for some agreement also in faith, and worship, external order, as well as unity of spirit and sentiment. There is not only "one Lord", but "one faith", not only "one faith", but "one baptism".[48]

But although unity of faith, worship, and external order were to be striven for, this did not mean that there must be complete uniformity among the different branches of the universal church. Hawkins realised that uniformity was an impossible ideal: "the more completely the Church becomes universal, the more will some diversity in outward things become unavoidable and necessary", but, "unity in

faith", he insisted, "there may be amidst diversity in external forms".[49] Even the "unity of faith", however, did not require complete unanimity of opinion: "there may be differences in some external forms, and differences also in many opinions, which need not affect Christian unity".[50]

Just what differences would affect Christian unity was, of course, the problem, and it was this problem which Hampden's Bampton Lectures attempted to address. Hampden, and indeed Arnold, went further than Copleston, Whately, and Hawkins in allowing diversity in forms and opinions. Arnold's Principles of Church Reform sought to promote unity by suggesting the union of Anglicans and Dissenters (barring only Unitarians) in one national, undogmatic church, but this had not been accepted whole-heartedly by the other Noetics. Hampden shared in other respects a large measure of agreement with Arnold, but he was not so optimistic as Arnold on the possibility of different denominations combining together. In fact, his conviction of the impossibility of a visible union of the various sects made Hampden assert in opposition to the other Noetics and in almost Evangelical fashion, that "the real unity of the Church is, after all, an invisible one. It is the communion of saints; the union of Christians with the Holy Spirit himself".[51] Like Arnold, Hampden looked for points of similarity rather than difference between Anglicans and Dissenters, and for him the greatest heresy was not unorthodox belief but the disturbance of church unity:

> It is no culpable Latitudinarianism which includes within the limits of the Church, a dissent that the heart practically disowns. The "heretic" whom Titus was required by St. Paul to reject, was not the mere dissenter, as we now understand that term, but one apt to produce heresy or party

> in the Church, αἱρετικὸν ἄνθρωπον , a practical disturber of the Church, whose perverseness and mischief were evident in his acts. In truth, the most orthodox person in doctrine would be the most heretical according to St. Paul, if his actions tended to excite and foment party-spirit in the Church.[52]

Here we see the Noetic hatred of party-spirit. Hampden also took up the Noetic message of "back to the Bible". In directing his reader back to the Bible, Hampden expounded his views on the necessity of an inductive theology, a theme which, although less developed, was certainly not absent from the works of the earlier Noetics. Hampden's criticisms of deductive theology followed logically from Copleston's and Whately's observations on induction and deduction. In fact, the philosophy behind the Bampton Lectures was the philosophy which he had imbibed first as an undergraduate and then as fellow of Oriel College. Copleston and Whately had pointed out that demonstrative conclusions drawn from definitions (as in mathematics) tell us nothing about reality. Copleston said that definition must be subservient to the argument, not pretend to control it; that definition cannot alter "the nature of the thing".[53] Whately, following Copleston, argued that in matters of fact probability is all that we can hope for ("No matter of fact can be mathematically demonstrated"), but that probability can amount to moral certainty.[54] Hampden, then, held that speculative or deductive theology, which began with abstract definitions from which it attempted to draw demonstrative conclusions, told us nothing about reality, that is, about God, heaven, the angels, or the next life. All deductions which moved beyond the facts of Scripture, Hampden taught, were probable only, theological opinions rather than divine truth. Only those deductions which were based firmly on Scripture facts were certain, because the certainty of these facts was vouched for by being divinely revealed. Indeed, these

deductions were more certain than the deductions of physical science, because the facts on which they were based were clearly revealed in the Bible, whereas the facts of nature required investigation before any deduction could proceed.[55] Strictly speaking, of course, even these deductions from the Bible facts, although considered by Hampden to be certain, were only morally, not demonstratively certain (that is, they attained the highest degree of probability), for they proceeded on the assumption that the Bible was a revelation from God, and this, as a question of fact, could not be demonstratively proved.

On the problem of language and the Nominalist-Realist distinction, Hampden followed Copleston in holding that to dispute about conclusions drawn from definitions was to argue about words, not things, and resulted in logomachy and party strife. Human language, they both believed, was inadequate for representing the divine reality. It is perhaps concerning this subject that we can discern the distinctive contribution of Blanco White. Copleston had argued the inadequacy of human language on philosophical grounds. Language, he said, was a human instrument. That is, it was invented by beings who had no direct knowledge of the divine world. When these beings, therefore, attempted to describe the divine world, they used words and concepts which strictly speaking related only to the natural world, and they applied them analogically to the divine. Thus, when people spoke of God's love or anger, they used words which described human feelings and behaviour and applied them, by analogy, to the actions of God. Human language, then, could give only a relative knowledge of God, not absolute knowledge. Blanco White, on the other hand, while

agreeing with Copleston on the inadequacy of human language for treating divine matters, added historical evidence to support the conclusion. He showed how theological language had evolved from the metaphysical speculations of the scholastic era. Samuel Hinds, the disciple of Whately, brought both these views together in his History of the Rise and Early Progress of Christianity (1828), urging his reader not to forget the historical and epistemological nature of all theological statements.[56] In Philosophical Evidence Hampden was closer to Copleston's philosophical method.[57] In the Bampton Lectures, however, the approach was more historical, but far from being contradictory to the philosophical argument, it in fact confirmed it by giving an historical example of the human origin of technical theological language. Whately appears to have recognized the difference between and yet compatibility of these two methods, for he wrote to Hawkins in 1833, "[Hampden] and I have gone over much of the same ground, in opposite directions; I, conjecturally, upwards, and he, historically, downwards".[58] This historical approach, then, may indicate the influence of Blanco White. Certainly, as Mozley pointed out, he had the historical knowledge of Scholastic philosophy which the early Noetics lacked. They agreed on the dangers of speculative theology and on the inadequacy of human language when it came to religion, and Blanco White's historical knowledge added an extra argument. Thus, it could not only be asserted in abstract terms that dogmatism was wrong because of the imperfection of human language, but that assertion could be supported by historical evidence showing the human origin of dogmatic language and the human errors which it enshrined.

Considering the furore raised in 1836 regarding the orthodoxy of Hampden's religious views, it is reasonable to ask, not only why the Bampton Lectures were not denounced when first delivered in 1832, but also why, if they were a natural development of the theology taught by the Noetics in the previous decades, this theology was not criticised even earlier? Noetic theology, in fact, seems to have been considered orthodox in the 'twenties and to have been widely accepted. Corsi argues that the Hackney Phalanx found much to approve in it.[59] Even the future Tractarians appear to have accepted it in many respects. As late as December 1831, we find Newman expressing views which appear to foreshadow Hampden's Bampton Lectures:

> What an extreme exercise of intellect is shown in the theological teaching of the Church! Yet how was it necessary? Chiefly, from the previous errors of heretical reasonings, on subjects addressed to the moral perceptions. For while Faith was engaged in that exact and well-instructed devotion to Christ which no words can suitably describe, the forward Reason stepped in upon the yet unenclosed ground of doctrine and attempted to describe there, from its own resources, an image of the Invisible. Henceforth the Church was obliged, in self-defence, to employ the gifts of the intellect in the cause of God, to trace out (as near as might be) the faithful shadow of those truths, which unlearned piety admits and acts upon, without the medium of clear intellectual representation.[60]

Newman and Hampden, then, agreed that it was the misuse of reason which had originally brought about technical theological language and had made articles of religion necessary. Of course, they drew from this different conclusions. Hampden urged men to turn to the Bible, whereas Newman emphasized the importance of the church.

By 1836 this earlier agreement between Noetics and Tractarians was lost sight of and Noetic theology appeared to the Tractarians as

heterodox and dangerous. What, then, had changed? The major change was that in the 'thirties the church seemed in imminent danger. At the time of the Reform Bill of 1832 and for a time after, it appeared that the church was soon to suffer government interference in temporalities and liturgy. The threat of disestablishment was in the air. The universities, the bastions of the church, were also under attack. Dissenters were clamouring at their gates. In 1834 and 1835 bills were actually introduced into Parliament for the abolition of university tests, and although these were rejected by the Lords, the attack seemed sure to be renewed.

The Noetics and Tractarians reacted differently to these threats to church and university, and their differences over practical issues alienated them from each other and caused them to view each other's theology with suspicion, especially when (as in the case of Hampden and the admission of Dissenters) it was alleged that their stand on practical matters was based on religious principle. Thus, whereas in the 'twenties forebearance of religious differences was possible, in the more turbulent 'thirties this became more difficult. Newman in 1828 could write to Blanco White:

> Nay I might even be tempted to say that on no single point do any two individuals agree - no single object do their minds view from the same spot and in the same light. And this will of course hold good in religious matters. - Necessary as it is, that we should all hold the same truths (as we would be saved) still each of us holds them in his own way; and differs from his nearest and most loved friends either in the relative importance he gives to them, or in the connected view he takes of them, or in his perception of the particular consequences resulting from them. - Accordingly I trust I shall always be very slow to quarrel with persons differing from me in matters of opinion. For words are not feelings - nor is intellect ἦθος.[61]

When he returned from the continent in 1833, as he himself relates in the Apologia, he was much more fierce and preached that "it would be a gain to the country were it vastly more superstitious, more bigoted, more gloomy, more fierce in its religion than at present it shows itself to be".[62] In the 'thirties, despite his acknowledgment of the religious feelings of both Whately and Hampden, he felt obliged to protest against their intellectual views because of the practical consequences to which they led.

Section 4. The Admission of Dissenters

At the end of the 'twenties and the beginning of the 'thirties a number of practical issues tended to separate Noetics and future Tractarians and to accentuate religious differences, making them important and divisive. The Peel election, the Oriel tuition dispute, and the Irish church question found Noetics and Tractarians on opposite sides. It was the last issue, that of government inference in the Irish church, which was the immediate cause of Keble's Assize sermon of 1833 and the start of the Oxford Movement. However, it was a fourth issue, that of the admission of Dissenters into the university, which brought about the final break and marked the beginning of public antagonism between Noetics and Tractarians.

Hampden broached the subject of the admission of Dissenters in his pamphlet Observations on Religious Dissent in 1834. In the following year he complained to the Earl of Radnor that he had been the object of attacks, "and chiefly it seems because I have put forward the religious grounds (for I have abstained entirely from political considerations) on which I conceive a change ought to be made in regard to the Tests".[1] In 1836, on Hampden's appointment to the chair of Divinity, the storm broke out in its full force. That it was in fact Hampden's attitude to the admission of Dissenters which was the real reason behind the opposition to his appointment and complaints about his orthodoxy was asserted by Whately. Whately maintained that the supposed heresy of Hampden's Bampton Lectures was only discovered "on his becoming obnoxious to a particular academical and political party, on an academical question".[2] This is an

exaggeration, for Newman and his friends were suspicious of Hampden's religious views prior to the publication of his Observations, as is shown by their private correspondence. Nevertheless, the importance of the question of the admission of Dissenters and the significance of Hampden's pamphlet were acknowledged by Newman himself, for in his view it was Hampden's Observations which marked the beginning of the attack of liberalism on the university.[3]

Newman opposed the admission of Dissenters as a measure dictated by liberalism and indicative of indifference. But what were the views of the Noetics on this subject? All supported it, although some with more alacrity than others (Arnold and Baden Powell were enthusiastic; Copleston much less so)[4]. What were their reasons? As far as Whately and Hawkins were concerned, Corsi considers their motive was "political opportunism". In support of this he quotes Whately's statement,

> I think the same of it [the admission of Dissenters] in one respect as I did of the R[oman] C[atholic] Relief; viz: that it will be carried; and that therefore it is better to make terms early, lest you have to buy one Sybill's book at the price of three.[5]

Copleston gave qualified support because he too was convinced that reform was inevitable and that concession was necessary. It was a Noetic trait to prefer timely concession to useless obstinacy. But this is not the whole truth. It is not true of all the Noetics, as Corsi himself shows, nor indeed is it the whole truth concerning Copleston, Whately, and Hawkins. In the case of Whately, the above quotation no more proves political opportunism to have been his sole motive for supporting the admission of Dissenters than it proves it to

have been his sole motive for supporting Roman Catholic Relief, a measure which he favoured on the principle of religious toleration.

Corsi's study of Baden Powell demonstrates that his support for the admission of Dissenters, although tied up with his fight to extend the scientific curriculum of Oxford university, was also due to his view that universities should serve the nation. Corsi argues that on questions of church and state, Baden Powell was influenced by Thomas Arnold, and that he agreed with Arnold's insistence on the national character of the church and the universities.[6] However, it was not just Arnold and Baden Powell who believed that the universities were national institutions, and as such should benefit the nation. All the Noetics agreed with this. Copleston, in his Reply to the Edinburgh Review had insisted that the universities provided a "system of national education", and in his article on the London university, had appealed to the universities to be more conscious of their duty to society.[7] But Copleston had also pointed to the connection between the universities and the church. The universities, he emphasized, also owed a duty to the church. Similarly, Hawkins recognized these dual duties and consequently argued in his pamphlet on university oaths and tests,

> Unquestionably it would be our duty to extend our advantages to [Dissenters], provided at least, we could receive them without excluding those for whose use those advantages were immediately designed, and provided also we could admit them without seriously impairing the very uses for which the University was created and endowed. It is a National Institution, I admit, but having a direct reference, never hitherto forgotten, to the National Church".[8]

Hampden, too, kept both functions in mind:

> I am for my part desirous of as great an extension as possible of the benefits of the University. My only reserve is, that, I should wish to see the ascendancy of Church-of-England principles maintained, as those which I believe to be the best guardians of pure Christianity. Any provision that tended to this point would be satisfactory to me.[9]

The provision which Hampden thought satisfactory was the deferring of subscription to the period of regency, that is, the period between taking the B.A. and M.A. degrees, thus allowing Dissenters the benefit of university education and the right to take the B.A. degree. In this, Hampden was more generous than Copleston, who was reluctant to give Dissenters the right to take degrees,[10] but Hampden's scheme would still keep power in the university in Church of England hands, for the M.A. degree admitted men to the right of voting in Convocation and of undertaking university teaching.[11]

The national character of the university, then, was a motive over and above "political opportunism" for supporting the admission of Dissenters. Hampden, however, claimed also to have put forward the religious grounds for making a change in the tests. This is slightly misleading. Although the religious principles set forth in the Bampton Lectures and in Observations on Religious Dissent led logically to the plea for toleration, toleration did not in turn necessarily require the admission of Dissenters into the university, as Hampden himself pointed out. The Church of England, he argued, was justified in educating those entrusted to her care in the doctrines she professed. This must in fact be the right of all distinct communions, otherwise their very foundations would be undermined. The university was not bound to require all who entered to adopt its

theology, but it was bound to teach it. In order "faithfully to do our part", he maintained, "it is our duty to deliver our opinions with sincerity and distinctness, whether it be to a member of our own communion, or to a dissenter".[12]

What the principles advocated in the Bampton Lectures and the Observations did do, however, was help remove objections to the combined religious education of Anglicans and Dissenters, which was considered one of the main obstacles to the admission of Dissenters. The main thesis of the Bampton Lectures was that the Christian faith was founded on the firm basis of revealed "facts". All denominations (except perhaps the Unitarians) accepted these "facts". From these further conclusions had been deduced, but these conclusions (involving as they did certain assumptions about God and his ways) did not have the certainty of the Biblical "facts" - they were theological opinions. Not all denominations agreed in their theological opinions. In fact, these opinions had in the past (and still were) the cause of many religious disputes. It was these differences in theological opinion which stood in the way of combined religious instruction. But Hampden argued that this need not be so. The revealed "facts", he believed, were the important beliefs, the fundamentals of the faith. As most denominations were in agreement on these, why should not combined religious instruction be possible? The agreement between the different denominations was more significant than their disagreement. Differences of theological opinion should be tolerated, for such tolerance did not involve a denial of the fundamentals of the faith, or even, for that matter, indifference to

theological opinion. Thomas Arnold, who approved of Hampden's Observations,[13] stated the argument succinctly in a Declaration which he circulated:

> while [the undersigned] feel most strongly that the foundation of all education must be laid in the great truths of Christianity, and would on no account consent to omit these, or to teach them imperfectly, yet they cannot but acknowledge that these truths are believed and valued by the great majority of Dissenters no less than by the Church of England; and that every essential point of Christian instruction may be communicated without touching on those particular questions on which the Church and the mass of Dissenters are at issue ... they are of opinion, that all other Dissenters [viz. all except Unitarians] may be admitted into the Universities, and allowed to take degrees there with great benefit to the country, and to the probable advancement of Christian truth and Christian charity amongst members of all persuasions.[14]

In the Observations Hampden was in fact arguing for two distinct, although connected, things. Firstly, for the removal of the test at matriculation, and secondly, for the admission of Dissenters. The second followed as a corollary of the first. Hampden's opposition to the matriculation test was partly due to a dislike, shared by the other Noetics, of unnecessary oaths. An oath was not something to be taken lightly. Hawkins cited this as a reason for objecting to subscription to the thirty-nine articles, as well as to the oath, also taken at matriculation, to observe all university statutes and customs.[15] Copleston was of the opinion that oaths were sometimes not only unnecessary or ineffectual (as he considered to be the case with the matriculation oath) but also positively harmful. Making his usual distinction between the spirit and the letter, he argued that penalties could not prevent the spirit of the oath being broken, and that sometimes people pleaded conscience for not doing what they would otherwise approve, because that action appeared to violate the letter

of the oath, even though the spirit of the oath might thereby be upheld. Copleston therefore approved the substitution of a declaration for an oath at matriculation. The oath seemed to him, "with people of education and character, to be efficient only for a bad purpose. It binds in trifles and forms, or even for things that are not expedient - and as to all other things a solemn declaration is equally binding".[16] Copleston in general disliked over-regulation and favoured laissez-faire. Whately wrote of him that "he was always most decidedly opposed to that over-governing system which would enjoin by law everything that men ought to do, and enact legal prohibitions of everything that is inadvisable".[17] Similarly, Hampden favoured a laissez-faire policy. In a letter of thanks to Whately's former student, Nassau Senior, who had sent him a pamphlet on political economy, Hampden wrote:

> I trust we are daily advancing towards a more practical recognition of the great principle which you enforce, of leaving the course of nature as much as possible to its own free action, instead of encumbering and impeding it by officious regulations. For my part, I have always been opposed to the system of exclusion. Neither the cause of truth, nor the well-being of a country, I am convinced, has ever been effectually promoted by such a method of legislation....
>
> I look indeed with earnest hope to what may yet be accomplished by following out your principle, even in this stronghold of prejudice. I have exerted my humble means to bring about a reformation of our practice here in regard to tests.[18]

Hampden also disliked the university tests as being "merely boundaries of exclusion".[19] In his opinion tests were not a part of religious education. Men were against altering subscription through "the fear of admitting Dissenters to the University - the necessity of resisting the 'movement' - the innovating spirit of the times - the

horror of Arianism, Socinianism, and all sorts of heresy".[20] But Hampden maintained that the present religious character of the university was not owing to subscription at matriculation, but generally to the religious revival throughout the country, and more specifically to the examination in divinity for the B.A. degree. In other words, the way to prevent heresy was not to make young men subscribe to the thirty-nine articles at matriculation, but to educate them in the doctrines of the church during their undergraduate years. Moreover, at matriculation, Hampden held, students were much too young to subscribe to the articles. From his experience as a university examiner Hampden could declare

> that even four years of discipline and instruction in the University, still leave many very imperfectly acquainted with the doctrines of the Church. How much more must this be the case at matriculation! Indeed, the general student ought not to be expected at entering to be prepared in that controversial knowledge, which an assent to the Articles implies. It is beginning at the wrong end. His study of his Religion ought to have been more elementary and simple.[21]

For these reasons Hampden favoured the removal of the matriculation test. The admission of Dissenters he was prepared to accept as a consequence of this. But it was not merely a reluctant acceptance. Hampden considered that there were also positive points besides that of meeting the needs of the nation, in favour of the admission of Dissenters. Like Arnold, he thought that it would advance Christian truth and charity. Hampden declared that he would be glad to see Dissenters "appearing among us, as on a neutral ground, on which we may forget war, and learn together the arts of peace and charity". As long as the university was able to continue teaching Anglican theology, the admission of Dissenters, he argued, involved no

compromise of principle or indifference to important differences of doctrine, and any danger of proselytism to heterodoxy was "more than counterbalanced by the probability of conformity to ourselves from the ranks of dissent".[22]

It is clear from this that Hampden was far from advocating the secularization of the university. Although he despised the fanaticism which he thought was tending to degrade Oxford "to the rank of a low theological school",[23] he did not wish to remove religious instruction from the university syllabus. On the contrary, he wished for improvement in this area. "I do not feel satisfied (as who can?) with the present state of theological instruction in the University", he wrote to Whately. "My idea is, that there should be a board of lecturers established by the Regius Professor and acting in concert with him, in the University".[24] Hampden agreed with Copleston's view that a liberal education must include religious instruction, as is shown by his comment concerning the education of the poor that, while he approved of the secular instruction of the people, "without religious instruction and training combined, it is not education".[25] In fact, all the Noetics agreed on this point. It was because of his failure to get an examination in Scripture included as a necessary part of the B.A. degree, that Thomas Arnold resigned from the Senate of the London university, and Whately agreed with Arnold that a B.A. degree which did not guarantee a knowledge of the Christian religion was no certificate of liberal education.[26] Despite differences of opinion on details,[27] all the Noetics accepted the general concept of liberal education as expressed by Copleston, that is, that such an

education should be based on the classics, with the addition of logic, mathematics, and science to develop the reasoning powers, and with religion as an indispensable element.

As well as agreeing with Copleston's concept of liberal education, the Noetics, as has been seen, also accepted Copleston's view of the function of the university as servant of both church and state. Indeed, many of the themes present in Copleston's educational writings are to be found in the works of the other Noetics. In particular, the Coplestonian moderation and balance of competing principles is evident in their works. For example, the Noetics all desired to foster intellectual excellence. They were concerned with academic standards and promoted university reform. Whately and Hawkins wished to introduce an entrance examination because they felt that the low academic level of those entering the university was a bar to raising the standard of the B.A. degree.[28] As to intellectual excellence, Whately admired Arnold's comment that it was important for a school to have masters of superior ability for the sake of that one boy in twenty, "the boy of superior talents, who is a more important person than the others".[29] On the other hand, however, Whately followed Copleston in maintaining that educators must be concerned with "the many, not the few". Thus, referring to masters of public schools, Whately lamented that their reputation depended too much on the small number of first classes and prizes gained by their students at university, rather than on what he considered the real merit of a good teacher, that is, "the diligent elementary instruction of <u>the great mass</u>".[30] Hawkins, too, in the Oriel tutorial dispute,

maintained this principle, paraphrasing the words and arguments of Copleston.

Hawkins, in fact, of all the Noetics came the closest to Copleston as far as their educational views were concerned. Tuckwell states that, as Provost, Hawkins modelled himself on Copleston,[31] and Hawkins' writings do indeed reveal similarities with Copleston. In his Letter to the Earl of Radnor, for example, he insisted, as Copleston continually did, that it was more important to keep the spirit rather than the letter of statutes. He also argued that the college system of instruction was preferable to professorial lectures, although, like Copleston, he acknowledged that the best system would be a combination of the two. For Hawkins, as for Copleston, the B.A. degree did not signify the end of education. It signified merely that a foundation had been laid, on which it was necessary to build further.[32] Hawkins also maintained that undergraduates should confine themselves to the task of laying this foundation, which meant especially the study of the ancient classics, and should not attempt "to form opinions on the difficult and delicate questions which divide Christians into parties". He warned undergraduates against rushing to premature decisions, and advised them "that you should beware of becoming judges when you should be learners; partisans, when you should be listeners".[33]

In 1875, when the removal of the last remaining religious restrictions at Oxford and Cambridge was being canvassed, Hawkins defended the ecclesiastical character of Oriel and of the Provostship,

and pointed out that in the College Ordinance of 1857 Oriel was repeatedly described as "a place of Religion, Learning, and Education".[34] Throughout his career Hawkins attempted to uphold this concept of Oriel. In 1875 he was particularly concerned with preserving the religious character of Oriel, when this was under attack, but he had in fact always believed that, not only Oriel, but the university as a whole, was a religious institution. During the tutorial dispute of 1829/30, as has been seen, he was not denying that college tuition entailed religious duties. And in 1835, in his letter to Lord Radnor, he pointed to the university's traditional connection with the established church. Hawkins also viewed the university as "a seat of learning and quiet study".[35] In a letter to Gladstone in 1850 Hawkins appears to place more stress on this aspect of the university than Copleston did, for he says that the object of the collegiate foundations was study rather than the education of undergraduates. However, in the same letter he acknowledges that education is also an important function of the colleges, for he admits that it was highly useful that the colleges gave time to "the mere business of education".[36] The tone of these comments is reminiscent of Copleston's statement in the Reply, where he speaks of the usefulness of the homely duties of college tutoring.[37] Hawkins' position is illustrated by his attitude to fellowships. Fellowships, he thought, were not intended by the founder for monastic clergy, nor for "merely learned academic" clergy, but for "a learned clergy qualified to teach the people by their life and doctrine".[38] As Provost of Oriel it was one of Hawkins' duties to see that there were tutors to carry on the "mere business of education", and one of the reasons for Hawkins'

opposition to altering the college statutes so as to allow fellowship elections to be conducted with reference to the sole criterion of merit (by which was meant the number of marks gained at a competitive examination) and to the disregard of indigence, was that "persons who do not need a Tutor's salary will not undertake a Tutor's work".[39]

This view of Oriel, and of the university as a whole, was essentially the same as that espoused by Copleston in the second and third decades of the century. For Copleston, and for the rest of the Noetics, the university was "a place of Religion, Learning, and Education". Although the stress placed on these three aspects may have varied among the Noetics, they all agreed that each was an essential element and that a balance between them had to be maintained.

In the 'thirties, then, the Noetics continued to uphold the Coplestonian idea of the university. Their willingness to admit Dissenters into the university in no way indicated a surrender of the principle that a liberal education must include religious instruction, nor did it mean conscious support for the secularization of the university. For the Tractarians the admission of Dissenters was indeed a religious issue and they viewed it as a first step towards secularization. But for the Noetics, as Whately stated, it was primarily an academic issue, concerning the idea of the university, although certainly in this controversy religious and educational factors converged and were difficult, if not impossible, to separate. The Noetic solution to the problem of maintaining the university as

both an institution of national education and as an arm of the Anglican church involved retaining control of the university in Anglican hands, while at the same time allowing Dissenters access to university education. When the university was reformed in 1854 it was the Noetic solution which was adopted. The Oxford University Act abolished religious tests both at matriculation and on taking the B.A. degree. However, subscription to the thirty-nine articles was still required for the M.A. degree, and the provision that most fellows and Heads of House were to be in Anglican orders remained unchanged. The church thus kept control of teaching and the government of the university. This situation prevailed largely unchanged until 1871, when all religious tests were abolished.[40]

The eventual abolition of religious tests and the removal of the great majority of clerical restrictions indicates that in fact the Noetic solution, as the Tractarians had feared, was not tenable as a final solution. It was merely a resting place on the way to secularization. Once the outer gates of the university had been opened to the Dissenters, it was not possible to exclude them indefinitely from the inner sanctum, and once the university admitted all denominations to its degrees and offices, it became more truly a national institution, but also inevitably a lay institution. The Noetic balance between the two functions of the university could not be maintained. By helping to make good Oxford's claim to be an institution of national education the Noetics unwillingly aided the process of secularization, and hastened the day when Oxford would no longer be viewed primarily as the bulwark of the established church and as a seminary for the Anglican clergy.

CONCLUSION

The Noetics, it has often been asserted, represented no school of thought; they were linked by their membership of Oriel common-room, by ties of friendship, by the bond of a common intellectual activity, by their questioning spirit. The emphasis placed on the Noetics' questioning spirit has often carried the implication that the Noetics had nothing positive to offer, but were essentially negative. In fact, the main importance of the Noetics has sometimes been taken to be that they provoked the Tractarian reaction.

The purpose of the above study has been to show that this picture underestimates the significance of the Noetics. The Noetics were more than just an Oxford clique and their importance greater than that of providing a foil for the Tractarians. In some respects it is true that the Noetics did not constitute a school of thought in the usual sense. They were a group of individuals who followed no party line. Disagreement, even on such an important issue as that of the relationship of church and state, was possible.[1] Nor did they have a leader and a group of disciples. Whately was indeed sometimes portrayed as the leader, and he did have his own small following.[2] But Whately was merely the most colourful and most outspoken of the Noetics, not their acknowledged head. Certainly, his position in the circle of the Noetics cannot be compared to Newman's among the Tractarians. Nor were the Noetics easily identifiable as a school through being associated with a set of specific doctrines or dogmas, as the Tractarians were associated with the doctrine of the

Apostolical Succession. Nevertheless, there was a large measure of agreement among the Noetics, especially on the subject of religion, so much so, in fact, that we are justified in speaking of "Noetic theology".

The Noetic theology consisted not so much of an exposition of doctrine as of a laying down of guidelines. There are a number of themes common to the religious writings of the Noetics. The Noetics were hostile to the spirit of dogmatism, and warned their readers against the folly of attempting "to be wise above what is written". Rather than dogmatic religion they preached practical religion. They urged people to avoid "system" and to turn instead to the Bible and to an inductive study of the "facts" contained therein. "Moderation, not indifference" was their motto. By the means of moderation, they thought, the evils of party-spirit, which led to the sin of schism, might be avoided. For the sin of schism, or the duty of unity, was a major concern of the Noetics.

Just what this unity consisted in or how it was to be achieved, the Noetics were not entirely agreed.[3] However, they were agreed in rejecting the idea that unity meant uniformity. Unity, they believed, was not inconsistent with some differences of religious opinion, and moderation and toleration of differing views was necessary in order to preserve the peace of the church. This moderation they justified by the citation of religious texts but also by a theory of knowledge. This theory of knowledge is a major factor binding the Noetics together as a group. The Noetics applied to religion the

philosophical theorem that no matter of fact can be demonstratively proven. They argued that in religion, as in other areas of knowledge which concern matters of fact, demonstrative proof was not possible, and consequently should not be sought. Religion, like the rest of life, was (philosophically speaking) a matter of probability, although that need not preclude certainty (moral, not demonstrative). As has been shown, the Noetics also accepted the view that many of the truths of religion were above reason, and that therefore a full understanding of such truths was unattainable. Moreover, language itself, the instrument of thought, was inadequate for expressing divine truths. For all these reasons, the Noetics believed that our knowledge of God was necessarily imperfect, it was an analogical knowledge.

The conclusion which the Noetics drew from these philosophical deliberations was that a dogmatic, systematic theology, such as prevailed among the Calvinists, for example, ignored the imperfection of human knowledge of the divine dispensation, and attempted to formulate precise definitions on a subject where such definitions were not possible. The result, the Noetics declared, was logomachy, a dispute about words, not things. The way to religious knowledge, they argued, was not by arguing about words but by studying facts, the facts of the Bible. These gave us certain knowledge, because revealed by God. When one went outside these facts, however, uncertainty crept in and moderation was necessary. The Noetics, then advised caution and moderation in the assertion of dogmas which were not clearly revealed in the Bible. What was clearly revealed in the Bible, they declared, was our duty to God and our neighbours. Here was

information which was easily comprehended by everyone. It concerned not difficult truths which were above reason, but ourselves and our actions. It required no great learning to be understood, but merely a desire to do the will of God. It was this practical knowledge, the Noetics affirmed, that we should seek, and not metaphysical definitions of truths but darkly revealed.

This, in brief, was the theology which the Noetics espoused. And while it is to a certain extent true that the Tractarians reacted against this theology, this is not the whole truth. The situation was much more complicated than that of a simple reaction. As has been argued, in the 'twenties the Noetics and future Tractarians shared a large measure of agreement and their subsequent alienation was due not just to religious differences, but was caused also by political, educational, and philosophical issues. Even in the 'thirties, despite their antagonism, Tractarians and Noetics still had much in common in their religious and philosophical beliefs. The difference in their interpretation of church authority, for example, was subtle and far from obvious to outsiders.[4] Indeed, one cannot help feeling the aptness of the comment made in Parliament in 1834 in reply to a speech of Copleston's, that

> The law which regulated religious controversy was very like the law which regulated gravitation - namely, it operated in the inverse ratio of the distance; and the nearer the theological disputants approached in their doctrines - the less they were divided from each other - the stronger was the power of repulsion.[5]

The complexity of the relationship between Noetics and Tractarians is well illustrated by reference to Newman. Newman

consciously rejected the liberalism and anti-dogmatism of the Noetics, but, on the other hand, he shared many of the philosophical ideas by which the Noetics justified their theology. Newman's theory of knowledge was drawn from the same sources as that of the Noetics and he came to many of the same conclusions. Like the Noetics he agreed with Locke on the importance of experience as the source of knowledge, but he also insisted, following Stewart, on the active power of the mind.[6] Again like the Noetics, he concluded that questions of fact could be probable only (he wrote in his Essay on Development that there was but probability for the existence of God), but that probability could amount to moral certainty.

However, counterbalancing these areas of agreement between Newman and the Noetics, was an important difference in their philosophical views. In the Apologia Newman admits to a tendency to Idealism, a philosophical theory to which he inclined even as a boy.[7] Idealism, however, was not a doctrine which appealed to the Noetics. Their references to Plato's theory of Ideas were dismissive, and Copleston did not have a high opinion of Berkeley. The philosophical theory to which the Noetics inclined was that of Nominalism. Copleston's philosophical speculations were largely concerned with the importance and ambiguities of language. It was Copleston who outlined the Nominalistic position that was accepted by the Noetics and elaborated by Hampden in his Bampton Lectures. Newman found this Nominalism repugnant. He abhorred Hampden's "vague" religion and in his novel Loss and Gain ridiculed the Nominalism of the Noetics. His description of the sermon of Dr. Brownside, who was "one of the

acutest, if not the soundest academical thinkers of the day" and who "was so clear or so shallow, that he saw to the bottom of all his thoughts",[8] was a parody of Hampden's Bampton Lectures, but it was also a parody of Copleston and the Noetics, and of Noetic theology as a whole.

There was also a difference in temperament between the Noetics and the leaders of the Oxford Movement, and this was in fact the main division between the two groups. The Noetics were in many respects men of a previous age. With their emphasis on reason and logic, their hatred of "enthusiasm", their undemonstrative faith and practical religion, they looked back to the eighteenth century. The Tractarians, on the other hand, were nineteenth-century Romantics. Although Keble and the other Tractarian leaders shared the Noetic distaste for Evangelical "enthusiasm", yet they themselves aroused enthusiasm, if of a different kind, as they sought to awaken people to the importance of religion and of the church. Whately, the logician, and Keble, the poet, can and have been viewed as exemplifying the difference between Noetics and Tractarians.[9] But, as has been argued above, the distinction, although a real one, should not be so exaggerated as to distort a proper picture of the Noetics, and to give instead a caricature. For the depiction of the Noetics as cold, negative, and attempting to convert by syllogisms, is just such a caricature.[10]

The relationship between the Noetics and the Tractarians, then, is no simple matter. It is a fascinating subject which has generally

been over-simplified or neglected. However, it should not be assumed that this relationship is the sole, or indeed main, factor which renders the Noetics worthy of study. The Noetics have an importance of their own; they were not just pre-Tractarians. But if their importance does not lie in providing a contrast to the Tractarians, neither is it to be judged by the success of the main ideas which they sought to promote. For in some respects both Noetic theology and the Noetic idea of the university were failures.

Noetic theology was an attempt to provide a firm, rational basis for Christian faith. The Noetics sought to establish rational religion, while at the same time avoiding rationalism. Whether they did in fact avoid rationalism is a question whose answer depends on one's definition of the term. For the Noetics (and indeed Newman[11]) rationalism meant tampering with Revelation, and they knew themselves to be innocent of this charge, although the Tractarians were less sure of Hampden's innocence. If rationalism is seen as the tendency to make reason the final arbiter in matters of religion, then one might be inclined to share the Tractarians' suspicion that the Noetics were tainted with rationalism, but even here the verdict is not certain as both rationalistic and anti-rationalistic tendencies can be discerned in the Noetics. The question of whether or not they successfully avoided rationalism, although the main interest of their contemporaries, becomes superfluous when one concludes, as one must, that the Noetics failed in their aim of establishing rational religion.

The Noetic version of rational religion depended on the Bible being regarded as history. The authenticity of the Christian Revelation was proved, if not solely, then most convincingly, by the fulfilment of prophecy and the performance of miracles. J.B. Sumner expressed the Noetic point of view succinctly when he said that "the real faith of an inquiring mind must be raised upon the rational conviction of the understanding, and that conviction must rest upon historical evidence as its basis".[12] In the first half of the nineteenth century, in England at least, this assumption of the historical truth of the New Testament was not seriously challenged.[13] But in the second half of the century this was no longer the case. Growing interest in the discoveries of science (which had as its basic premiss the principle of the uniformity of nature), steadily undermined belief in the possibility of miracles. German speculations, too, began to impinge on English thought, and German Biblical criticism suggested the possibility that what had been regarded as historical fact was in reality myth. The Noetic argument, consequently, lost much of its force. Baden Powell, himself a Noetic, in fact abandoned the historical approach. Although still accepting the need for evidence if religion is to be rational, he came to prefer the evidence provided by nature, and in his final essay "On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity", which was published in Essays and Reviews in 1860, he concluded that miracles did not provide a proof of Christianity.[14]

However, it was not only German influence which weakened the Noetic argument. The Noetics themselves undermined their own

position. The work of Davison and T. Arnold on prophecy helped to bring about more sober estimates of the role of prophecy as an evidence of Christianity. But of even greater consequence were the Noetic views on language. They argued that language was a man-made, imperfect instrument, and that this applied even to Biblical language, which was adapted to human preconceptions. Thus, we should not expect scientific knowledge from the Bible, for the Evangelists necessarily spoke in terms comprehensible to the people of their day. The Noetics, then, rejected verbal inspiration. But they went further than this, and argued that even regarding religious knowledge, the Bible was not always to be interpreted literally. Here too Bible language was adapted to human preconceptions, and concerning the divine nature imparted an analogical knowledge. It was but a small step to apply this theory to the historical portions of the Bible as well, and thus their views on language paved the way for a mythical or poetical interpretation of the Bible.

The Noetic version of rational religion, then, was a failure. It failed to prove that the Christian faith was reasonable, and it failed to protect that faith from doubt and infidelity. But despite this, Noetic theology should not be regarded as a complete failure, for the Noetics did succeed in passing on a number of ideas and attitudes to the next generation. The Noetics' refusal to accept religious beliefs without scrutiny, to base faith on "human" authority (the authority of the Bible was another matter), did not go unnoticed or uncopied. The "questioning spirit" for which the Noetics are so well known, certainly did not die out with them, but in fact flourished in the second half of the century and became more radical.

The influence of the Noetics on writers and thinkers of the second half of the century is not a topic which has received much attention. More interest has generally been taken in tracing the influence of German philosophy and theology on English thought. Coleridge is often cited as being one of the first to introduce German speculations to England, although the role of Thomas Arnold is occasionally mentioned as well. M.A. Christensen, for example, attempts to show German influence on Matthew Arnold by maintaining Thomas Arnold's debt to German theology. The point of Matthew Arnold's Literature and Dogma (1873), he writes, "is the dichotomy between the spirit of religion and the historically conditioned expression of it, which the 'mediating' critics drew from Spinoza and which Thomas Arnold drew from them".[15] W. Blackburn, however, traces another influence. He argues that neither Spinoza nor Coleridge dealt with the Bible and dogma in Matthew Arnold's fashion. "So far as I can discover", Blackburn writes, "he learned that fashion from Whately and Hampden. Arnold's debt to his father is one of the commonplaces of Arnoldian criticism. It has not been noted, however, that he is indebted to his father's friends for the point of view which motivates his chief religious works".[16] Certainly, Matthew Arnold's arguments in St. Paul and Protestantism (1870) and in Literature and Dogma have many similarities with the Noetic position.

Nor was it just Matthew Arnold who would seem to have been influenced by the Noetics. Benjamin Jowett, for example, as a Biblical critic was in many respects closer to the Noetics than to German critics. J. Barr gives the following estimate of Jowett:

> Jowett was a critic, firstly, in that he thought that the real meaning of biblical texts was something that had to be discovered: it was not already there in the form of traditional interpretations. For the discovery of it, however, he laid little stress on any complicated scheme of research or interpretation, historical or other. The meaning was already there and fairly plain in the texts themselves, especially if one could rid oneself of the veil of misunderstanding woven by traditional interpretations. It was directly accessible to the informed interpreter ('informed' here means primarily 'with an adequate knowledge of Greek') and no complicated hermeneutic scheme was necessary. In this Jowett differed characteristically from his German allies, for whom something like a complete and systematic (and necessarily complicated) account of the hermeneutical process was more natural.[17]

Like Hampden, then, Jowett recognised a difference between traditional interpretations of the Bible and the text itself, or, in Hampden's terms, between "dogma" and "fact". Unlike the Germans, who pursued historical research into the origins of Christianity to ascertain whether it was myth or historical fact, Jowett was more concerned with the history of interpretations of the Bible.[18] In this he carried on the Noetic interest in language. Barr maintains that the rise of Biblical criticism in the nineteenth century cannot simply be portrayed as the rise of the historical concern with origins. "Biblical criticism grew up also from a quite different side, which was preoccupied not with discovering the history or the origins but with evaluating the character of the truth expressed in the Bible".[19] In the early part of the nineteenth century the Noetics were prominent exponents of this aspect of Biblical criticism.

Jowett was a Broad Churchman, and to a large extent the Broad Church movement seems a natural progression from the Noetic position.[20] Moderation and the toleration of differing theological opinions, for example, was the mark of the Noetic and the Broad

Churchman. Although it might appear that the Noetic message of moderation was forgotten by both sides during the controversies and bitter disputes surrounding the Oxford Movement, yet it was a message which was taken up by Broad Churchmen. For the German historical research, which undermined the foundation of the Noetics rational religion by throwing doubt on the historical basis of Christianity, had the effect of making the Noetic message of moderation even more relevant to the age. Moderation was necessary, when knowledge was uncertain. Moreover, while their lesson of "back to the Bible" would seem at first sight to be nullified by the attacks on the historicity of the Bible, this was compensated for by their theory of the practical purpose of the Bible and their emphasis on the "spirit" rather than the "letter". If the historical accuracy of the Bible were doubtful, it could be argued that we should look to the lessons to be learnt from the Bible, and not worry about disputes over historical details. Just as we were not to expect scientific knowledge from the Bible, so too, perhaps we should not expect historical knowledge. This was the direction in which the Germans were heading. As we have seen, the Noetics on the whole resisted this line of reasoning and upheld the historicity of the Bible (or at least the New Testament). Nevertheless, the Broad Church concentration on the "spirit" of the Bible was in the Noetic tradition as well as the German.

As in theology, so too in the field of education the Noetics had both their successes and their failures. Judged from the standpoint of their own aims and ideals, the Noetic idea of the university was in

one respect eventually a failure. The Noetics had fought to preserve the university as the bulwark of the Anglican church while at the same time attempting to make it more truly an institution of national education. The compromise which they proposed, that is, opening the doors of the university to Dissenters but keeping power in Anglican hands, was indeed accepted by the Royal Commission on the Universities and ratified by Parliament in 1854. But it was a compromise which did not last intact for very long. Dissenters gradually won greater concessions and by the mid-'seventies not only higher degrees and fellowships, but in fact most university offices were open to Dissenters as well as Anglicans. Thus the Noetic aim of making the university more truly a national institution, was achieved, but only at the expense of weakening the university's connection with the Anglican church. For the compromise which they proposed proved to be, as the Tractarians feared it would, a first step towards the secularisation of the university. Thus the Noetics unintentionally aided the dissolution of the connection between church and university which had been so evident at the beginning of the century.

But if this is to be accounted a failure (in itself, a debatable point), it is overshadowed by their successes. In the early years of the nineteenth century Oxford studies were revised and the university's intellectual life revitalized. The Noetics contributed to this process both by active participation in university reform and by providing an example for others to follow. The intellectual vigour of the members of the Oriel common-room was conspicuous in the early part of the century. They set high ideals both for academic standards

and for the purpose of university education, and by their example and their efforts they aided the university's advance towards those ideals. To the stimulus provided by the Noetics Oxford University owed a great debt. Indeed, not just Oxford University, but English higher education in general. For Copleston and the Noetics were effective champions of the ideal of liberal education, an ideal which was not new but one which was in danger of being forgotten or replaced by the ideal of "useful knowledge". This ideal of liberal education inspired Newman, and through his Idea of a University later generations of educationalists, and despite changes in the conception of that ideal,[21] it is still relevant to the counterbalancing of the arguments of the modern equivalent of the "useful knowledge" school.

The Noetics, then, do not represent just a passing phase, interesting but of minor importance, in the history of Oxford University. Their significance for Oxford's history, both religious and educational, can hardly be doubted. The Noetic legacy, however, was not any particular university reform or theological doctrine, but something more intangible. Within the university they provided a stimulus. They roused men's minds, encouraged intellectual effort and questioning, challenged dogma, and preached moderation. Nor was their influence, although strongest at Oxford, confined to Oxford, but spread like ripples in a pond. Their published works set forth their views to the reading public, and Whately, in particular, had some success in popularising Noetic ideas. But Noetic attitudes and ideas spread also, and perhaps more effectively, through personal contact and influence (for they were teachers as well as theologians), and

through the writings and teaching of others, such as Newman, Matthew Arnold, and Jowett, who, however much they might depart from the Noetic religious position, yet owed a debt to the Noetics and helped propagate key elements of Noetic theology and the Noetic idea of the university.

NOTES

Introduction

1. John Henry Newman. Apologia Pro Vita Sua. Being a History of His Religious Opinions. London: Oxford University Press, 1964, p.298f.

2. ibid., p.300.

3. Thomas Mozley. Reminiscences. Chiefly of Oriel College and the Oxford Movement. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1882, vol.1, p.19, "Noetic" was derived from the Greek word νοητικός, meaning "intelligent".

4. Newman stated that it was the publications of the Noetics on religious topics which prompted him to write his essay "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Revealed Religion". Essays Critical and Historical. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1890, vol.1, p.101.

5. R.W. Church. The Oxford Movement; Twelve Years 1833-1845. London: MacMillan and Co., 1892, p.17.

6. J.B. Mozley. Essays Historical and Theological. London: Rivingtons, 1878, vol.2, p.27.

7. T. Mozley. op.cit., vol.1, p.19. See also Church, op.cit., p.17: "Under the leading of Whately, questions were asked about what was supposed to be beyond dispute with both Churchmen and Evangelicals. Current phrases, the keynotes of many a sermon, were fearlessly taken to pieces. Men were challenged to examine the meaning of their words".

8. T. Mozley. op.cit., p.20.

9. J.H. Newman. Apologia. London: J.M. Dent and sons. Everyman's Library edition, p.233. Unless otherwise stated, future references to the Apologia are to this edition.

10. Church. op.cit., p.390.

11. ibid., p.302.

12. See Church. ibid., pp.255f. and 258.

13. A.C. Fraser. Archbishop Whately and the Restoration of the Study of Logic. A lecture, delivered at the commencement of the academical session, November 3, 1863. London and Cambridge: MacMillan and Co., 1864, pp.20f. Mark Pattison also remarked on the Noetics' questioning spirit, saying that they disallowed authority in intellectual matters, and went back instead to first principles. However, Pattison, while allowing the Noetics to be thinkers, disallowed the title of scholars: "Intellect, not scholarship was the mark of a Fellow of Oriel". For Pattison, the limited compass of the Noetics' learning prevented them from

being considered scholars: "The Noetics knew nothing of the philosophical movement which was taking place on the continent; they were imbued neither with Kant nor with Rousseau..." M. Pattison. "Philosophy at Oxford". Mind. vol.1, 1876, pp.83f; Memoirs. Sussex: Centaur Press Ltd., 1969, p.79.

14. J.H. Overton. The English Church in the Nineteenth Century (1800-1833). London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1894, p.124.

15. A.D. Culler. The Imperial Intellect. A study of Newman's educational ideal. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955, p.36. D.H. Akenson. A Protestant in Purgatory: Richard Whately, Archbishop of Dublin. Archon Books, 1981, p.22. W. Tuckwell also claimed that the Noetics "created no school; for that method was necessary and they were essentially unmethodical". But Tuckwell did recognise that they were "linked by virtual uniformity of opinion" and thus, for him, it was lack of organisation rather than lack of agreement which prevents them being seen as a school. (W. Tuckwell. Pre-Tractarian Oxford: A Reminiscence of the Oriel 'Noetics'. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1909, p.258). This would seem closer to the truth, and indeed more in line with Newman's reference to the Oriel common room in his Autobiographical Memoir: "its members, together with its distinguished Head, being as remarkable for the complexion of their theology and their union among themselves in it, as for their literary eminence". H. Tristram (ed.) John Henry Newman: Autobiographical Writings. London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956, p.73.

16. F.W. Cornish. The English Church in the Nineteenth Century. Part I. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1910, p.247.

17. J. Stoughton. Religion in England from 1800 to 1850. A history, with a postscript on subsequent events. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1884, vol.1, p.165: "It is quite clear that influences were at work tending to unsettle existing opinion, without sufficient care being taken to guard against the abuse of free inquiry.... Whately....had habits of talking which, whilst they stimulated inquisitiveness, did not adequately supply caution and guidance".

18. Pattison. Memoirs, p.79.

19. J. Tulloch. Movements of Religious Thought in Britain during the nineteenth century. Leicester University Press, 1971, p.168.

20. Pattison. Memoirs, pp.80f.

21. For example: Y. Brilioth. The Anglican Revival: Studies in the Oxford Movement. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1925; P.B. Nockles. Continuity and Change in Anglican High Churchmanship in Britain, 1792-1850. Oxford University D.Phil. thesis, 1982.

22. J.H. Newman. Apologia. 1964 edition, p.391.

23. ibid., p.300.

24. P. Corsi. Natural Theology, the Methodology of Science and the Question of Species in the works of the Reverend Baden Powell. Oxford University D.Phil. thesis, 1980, p.100.

25. Corsi points to the fact that the Noetics, as much as the Tractarians, were attempting to defend orthodox beliefs. Similarly, Richard Brent states that the Noetics and other Anglican liberals "began writing not as the opponents but as the defenders of religious orthodoxy, not as the supporters but as antagonists of a secularising liberalism". R. Brent. The Emergence of Liberal Anglican Politics: The Whigs and the Church 1830-41. Oxford University D.Phil. thesis, 1984, p.166.

26. J.H. Newman. Apologia, p.233.

27. J.H. Newman. Apologia. 1964 edition, p.301.

28. Copleston and Whately, for example, held different views on the emancipation of Jews, the merits of a university matriculation examination, and the feasibility of combined religious instruction.

29. J.H. Newman. Apologia. 1964 edition, p.301.

30. See W. Blackburn. "Matthew Arnold and the Oriel Noetics". Philological Quarterly. vol.25, no.1, 1946, pp.70-78.

31. M. Sanderson gives the figure of 64.2%. M. Sanderson. The Universities in the Nineteenth Century. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975, p.9.

32. See, for example, F. Jeune. The Studies of Oxford Vindicated. In a sermon preached before the University, on Act Sunday, June 29, 1845. Oxford: J. Vincent, 1845, p.9. Also G. D'Oyly. "Considerations respecting Cambridge". Quarterly Review. vol.19, no.38, 1818, pp.412 and 445. D'Oyly was referring here to both Oxford and Cambridge.

33. The curriculum it decreed was essentially the traditional Oxford one, dating back to mediaeval times, of grammar, rhetoric, logic, moral philosophy, and the elements of mathematics and physics. The main innovation in regard to curriculum was that the elements of religion and the doctrinal articles of the Anglican church were to form a compulsory part of every examination.

34. Both Oxford and Cambridge. The situation at Cambridge differed from that at Oxford in that students were required to subscribe to the thirty-nine articles of the Anglican church on taking their degree rather than at matriculation. Thus Dissenters were able to study at Cambridge, but not proceed to a degree.

35. The Test and Corporation Acts required all holders of public office to receive communion according to the rites of the Church of England. Roman Catholics were prevented by law from sitting in Parliament and from holding certain civil and military offices. The Test and Corporation Acts were repealed in 1828, and Roman Catholic emancipation followed in 1829.

Chapter 1

Section 1. Copleston's Career

1. Offwell still contains memorials of the Copleston family, both in the church itself, and also in the small school, built by Edward Copleston.

2. The story is related in R. Whately. Remains of the Late Edward Copleston D.D., Bishop of Llandaff. London: John W. Parker and Son, 1854, pp.3ff.

3. Possibly from 1806 to 1812. See W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.19. The latter part of the diary entry appears to be of a later date.

4. The sources for the above biographical details are The Dictionary of National Biography; W.J. Copleston. Memoir; and G.C. Richards and C.L. Shadwell. The Provosts and Fellows of Oriel College, Oxford. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1922.

5. L.M. Quiller Couch (ed.). Reminiscences of Oxford by Oxford Men. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1892, pp.220-222.

6. W.R. Ward. Victorian Oxford. London: Frank Cass and Co., 1965, p.13. A letter of congratulation on Copleston's election to the Provostship speaks of Copleston's "meritorious efforts in giving birth to a highly reformed or new system of scholastic exercises". The writer adds, "You not only had the honour to convince us what ought and was necessary to be done, but by your own interference and example proved by what means it was possible to be effected and perpetuated". Bodleian Library. MS. Eng. lett. d. 309 (Copleston Correpondence) fols. 1 and 2.

7. Bodl. MSS. Eng. Misc. b. 78, fols.49-58; Eng. lett. d. 207, fol.64; Eng. lett. d. 210 (Heber letters), fols. 99 and 100. W.R. Ward. Victorian Oxford, pp.24-28. Richard Heber was the half-brother of Reginald Heber, the future Bishop of Calcutta. He was elected to represent Oxford in 1821.

8. Bodl. Lib. MSS. Eng. lett. d. 207, fol.98; Eng. lett. d. 214, fol.99; Heber letters, fols.132-137.

9. Oriel College Archives. Old Letters of Provosts. MS. papers on election of 1826; W.R. Ward. Victorian Oxford, pp.67f.

10. National Library of Wales. MS. 21977c. fols. 1, 2 and 7. See also Copleston's correspondence with Lord Grenville in the British Museum. Add. MS. 59416.

11. John Coker. Some Reflections on the Late Election of a Chancellor of the University of Oxford. Maidstone: J. Blake, n.d. Coker is described by Ward (Victorian Oxford, p.22) as "an irascible barrister with a thirst for controversy".

12. See a letter of Cyril Jackson, quoted in Ward, Victorian Oxford, p.30. Also Heber letters, fols. 113 and 114.

13. Ward. Victorian Oxford, pp.37f.

14. Edward Copleston. A Letter to John Coker, of New College, Esq. on his Second Edition of Reflections on the Late Election of a Chancellor of the University of Oxford. Oxford: Parker and Rivington, 1810, p.13.

15. Whately. Remains, pp.32f; E. Copleston. Letter to Coker, p.15.

16. E. Copleston. A Sermon Preached in the Cathedral Church of Chester, on Sunday Nov. 5, 1826. London: J. Murray and C.J. Rivington, 1826, p.35.

17. Llandaff Cathedral MS. vol.2, fol.15. See also fols. 16 and 17, and vol.1, fol.3.

18. ibid., vol.2, fol.16.

19. M.G. Brock takes the same view of Copleston's consistency. See "The Case of Dr. Copleston". The Pelican Record. vol.30, no.9. June 1957, p.201. In any case, Copleston's support of Lord Grenville did not necessarily imply approval of his views on Catholic emancipation. Copleston in fact claimed that he did not see the election as a political question. Lord Grenville, he believed, was "among our public men, most firmly attached to the church from a sense of religion, and his 'Catholic' measures, I am convinced, will not be renewed". Copleston supported Grenville because he was "the ablest and the most learned nobleman in the kingdom - a firm friend of the Established Church - a sincere Christian - a man of the most correct private life, and a determined anti- Gallican and anti-philosophist". (W.J. Copleston. Memoir, pp.26f). The final comments indicate an anti-French feeling typical of the times in England, due not only to the Napoleonic Wars but also to the suspicion that French philosophy had led to the French Revolution and fears that it could have a similar effect in England if such thinking were allowed to spread among the lower classes.

20. E. Copleston. Speech of the Bishop of Llandaff, in the House of Lords, on Tuesday, the 7th of April, 1829, in the debate on the Roman Catholic Relief Bill. London: printed for the Proprietors of The Mirror of Parliament, 1829, pp.6ff.

21. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.2, fol.13.

22. E. Copleston. Advice to a Young Reviewer, with a specimen of the art. Included in J.C. Collins (ed.). Critical Essays and Literary Fragments. Westminster: Archibald Constable and Co. Ltd., 1903. Copleston wrote this after a volume of poems by the former Oriel fellow, Richard Mant, had been harshly criticised in the Critical Review. (E. Berens. A Memoir of the Life of Bishop Mant. London: F. and J. Rivington, 1849, pp.47f). E. Copleston. The Examiner Examined, or Logic Vindicated. Oxford: 1809. This was a scathing attack of Henry Kett's book, Logic Made Easy; or a short view of the Aristotelic system of reasoning. Oxford: 1809.

23. Ward. Victorian Oxford, p.17.

24. Bodl. Heber letters, fols. 109 and 110.

25. ibid., fols. 113 and 114.

26. In fact, he completed his last private tutorial engagement in 1811: NLW MS.19978c. Edward Hall Collection. (Hughes letters). Letter to T. Hughes, Nov. 8, 1811.

27. Bodl. Heber letters, fols.107-114.

28. Copleston thought that the Quarterly had many of the same faults as the Edinburgh Review: "a hasty and imperfect view of the book reviewed - political prejudices of a narrow kind continually interfering", and a pandering "to the false taste of the public in order that it may be a selling article". (Heber letters, fols. 109 and 110). The two men who, in Copleston's opinion were harshly treated were J. Kidd and J. Penrose. Kidd's Outlines of Mineralogy (Oxford: 1809) had been severely criticised in the Quarterly, despite the fact that he had been one of its earliest contributors (see H. and H.C. Shine. The Quarterly Review under Gifford. Uni. of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1949, p.8). Penrose had submitted an article to the Quarterly, but it had not been printed.

    Copleston's letters to Heber in 1809 and 1810 complain of his lack of leisure (fols. 111 and 112, 113 and 114, 119 and 120). He claimed that his university duties were more numerous than those of any other man in the place. A letter of T.S. Smythe to Richard Heber (May 1811) states: "Poor Copleston is troubled about many things, two Lectures, a Sermon and his Commemoration speech" (Bodl. MS. Eng. lett. d. 207, fol.92).

29. Copleston's articles were reviews of T.D. Whitaker's De Motu per Britanniam Civico (Q.R. vol.5, no.11, 1811, pp.84-100), G. Ensor's On National Education (Q.R. vol.6, no.12, 1811, pp.419-433), and the Earl of Harrowby's speech on the Curacy Bill (Q.R. vol.10, no.19, 1811, pp.41-57). It is possible that Copleston wrote articles in 1810 and 1811 (see Bodl. Heber letters, fols. 121 and 122, and Shine and Shine, op.cit., pp.13 and 25), and collaborated with Lord Dudley on one or two others (see Shine and Shine, op.cit., pp.31 and 39). Later contributions to the Quarterly by Copleston were articles on the "State of the Currency" (vol.27, no.53, 1822, pp.239-267), Buckland's Reliquiae Diluvianae (vol.29, no.57, 1823, pp.138-165), and "The London University" (vol.33, no.65, 1825, pp.257-275). Friends of Copleston who contributed include Penrose (Bodl. Heber letters, fols. 111 and 112), John Davison (ibid., fols. 119-122), Lord Dudley (ibid., fols. 121 and 122, and Shine and Shine, op.cit., under "Dudley"), Henry Philpotts (ibid., under "Philpotts"), and Richard Whately (ibid., under "Whately"). Copleston's influence with the editor of the Quarterly in the early 'twenties was attested to by J.H. Newman: "Whately tells me, if I have any desire ever to write in the 'Quarterly', I have nothing to do but mention it to the Provost, and the editor will quite jump at anyone recommended from so high

a quarter". A. Mozley (ed.). Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his Life in the English Church. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911, vol.1, p.66.

30. Bodl. MS. Eng. lett. d. 207., fol.110. See also fol.121.

31. The invitation to contribute to the Encyclopaedia Britannica may well have been the result of his friendship with John W. Ward, later Earl of Dudley. The suggestion of Copleston's name came from the Scottish philosopher Dugald Stewart, and Ward was the former pupil and friend of both Stewart and Copleston (B.M. Add. MS. 34611, fols. 51 and 117). For the edition of the English chronicles Copleston's name was suggested by Richard Heber. According to Heber what was wanted was Copleston's sanction of the project, control of the plan, occasional advice and decision, and perhaps a preface. (Heber letters, fols. 138 and 139).

32. E. Copleston. A Letter to the Right Hon. Robert Peel, M.P. for the University of Oxford, on the Pernicious Effects of a Variable Standard of Value, especially as it regards the Condition of the Lower Orders and the Poor Laws. Oxford: John Murray, 1819; A Second Letter to the Right Hon. Robert Peel, M.P. for the University of Oxford, on the Causes of the Increase of Pauperism and on the Poor Laws. Oxford: John Murray, 1819; An Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination in Four Discourses preached before the University of Oxford. With Notes, and an Appendix on the Seventeenth Article of the Church of England. London: John Murray, 1821. In 1821 Copleston had meetings with Peel, Baring, and Huskisson to discuss financial policy (see W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.86).

33. Sir James Mackintosh in the Edinburgh Review. vol.36, no.72, Oct. 1821, p.254. The Enquiry was criticised by E.W. Grinfield in Vindiciae Analogicae. A letter to the Rev. Edward Copleston, D.D. Provost of Oriel College, Oxford etc. etc. etc., on his 'Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination'. London: T. Cadell, 1822. For Grinfield's criticisms, see below, p.59.

34. Bodl. Copleston Correspondence, fols.7-9.

35. Goderich, the Prime Minister, sounded out Copleston's views on Catholic emancipation and reported them to the King before Copleston was appointed bishop. Copleston's claims to a bishopric are discussed at length by Brock (Pelican Record, vol.30, no.9, June 1957, pp.193-201, vol.32, no.2, March 1958, pp.33-38, vol.32, no.3, June 1958, pp.65-68, vol.32, no.4, Dec. 1958, pp.85-90). He concludes that the delay was due not only to Copleston's stance on Catholic emancipation, but also to his lack of influential patrons. Pietro Corsi suggests that Copleston's views on the Sabbath were the cause of his failure to gain the bishopric of Oxford. See Corsi op.cit., p.44. However, in 1827 the views of a prospective bishop concerning Catholic emancipation would have been of more immediate importance in the eyes of the Prime Minister and the King.

Fitzpatrick, William John. Memoirs of Richard Whately, Archbishop of Dublin. With a Glance at his contemporaries and times. 2 vols. London: 1864.

Fraser, Alexander Campbell. Archbishop Whately and the Restoration of the Study of Logic. London: 1864.

Froude, James Anthony. Short Studies on Great Subjects. London: Everyman's Library, 1964.

Gladstone, W.E. Gleanings of Past Years, 1844-78. London: 1879.

Grant, James. Memoirs of Sir George Sinclair, Bart., of Ulbster. London: 1870.

Grinfield, E.W. Vindiciae Analogicae. London: 1822.

----------. Vindiciae Analogicae. Part the Second. London: 1822.

Hamilton, William. Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform. Edinburgh: 1866.

Hampden, Henrietta. Some Memorials of Renn Dickson Hampden, Bishop of Hereford. London: 1871.

Hampden, Renn Dickson. An Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity. London: 1827.

----------. Inaugural Lecture. London: 1836.

----------. Observations on Religious Dissent. 2nd edit. Oxford: 1834.

A Postscript. London: 1835.

----------. Parochial Sermons. London: 1828.

----------. The Scholastic Philosophy Considered in its relation to Christian Theology. 3rd edit. Hereford: 1848.

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 2nd and 3rd series. London and New York: Kraus reprint Co., 1971.

[Hare, Augustus]. A Letter to Daniel K. Sandford, Esq. Professor of Greek in the University of Glasgow, in answer to the strictures of the Edinburgh Review on the open colleges of Oxford. Oxford: 1822.

Hawkins, Edward. The Apostolical Succession. A Sermon. London: 1842.

----------. Christian Unity. A Sermon. Oxford: 1855.

----------. Christianity not the Religion of the Bible Only, or of the Church. Oxford: 1830.

no.990). Again in the 'twenties, we hear of the Quarterly Review article on the London University being written "under extreme depression of spirits", and in 1828 James Endell Tyler described Copleston's looks as "those of a broken down old unhappy man" (W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.106. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.777. See also letter 786, for a reference to ill-health in the previous year). Copleston's letters as bishop contain frequent references to his ill-health.

53. Copleston wrote to Whately in 1837, "My natural indolence and variations of health, and increasing cares of a practical kind, will, I fear, effectually stifle many an embryo plan, which I once hoped to develop and communicate to the world". W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.104.

54. In W.J. Copleston's Memoir, J. Hughes, the former pupil of Copleston, writes that "the college studies embraced only one lecture a day" (p.30). However, this refers to the students, not to the lecturers, as is shown by the lecture lists of Michaelmas term, 1809 (Oriel Coll. Lib. Ellacombe Papers. MS. papers relating to Oriel College). These lists show that for this term Copleston lectured on Aristotle and Thucydides on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday mornings, and on Xenophon, Euclid, and also Logic on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday mornings. In the first decade of the century Oriel had only two tutorial positions. Among Copleston's associates in the tutorship were Richard Mant and William Bishop. Copleston was succeeded by John Davison. In 1809 Copleston and Bishop were lecturing to a total of thirty-eight undergraduates.

55. After the examination reform of 1800 it became increasingly common for students to seek private tuition from tutors or coaches in addition to the college tuition given in the college lectures. Copleston's private pupils included Richard Whately, J.W. Ward (Lord Dudley), and J. Hughes.

56. W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.29.

57. Copleston was treasurer of Oriel for six years, contrary to the usual custom of one year, and during this time greatly improved the financial situation of the college (ibid., p.19). Mark Pattison wrote that Copleston "administered the affairs of the college with the skill and decision of a practical man of business". M. Pattison. Memoirs, p.71.

58. See next section.

59. R. Whately. Remains, p.93.

60. ibid., p.90.

61. T. Mozley states that Copleston was "the most substantial and majestic, and, if I may say so, richly-coloured character within my knowledge of Oxford". Reminiscences, vol.1, p.80. Pattison says that Copleston was "a very considerable figure in the literary history of the day" and that "within the University he

enjoyed an assured ascendancy". His personal influence "as the man of most power and tact in the place was undisputed by any rival". Memoirs, pp.70ff.

62. This is true of a number of Oxford personalities. J.H. Newman is an obvious example, as is Benjamin Jowett later in the century.

63. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.1, fol.3. (also in W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.130). Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.1338.

Section 2. Copleston's Philosophical Views

1. The earliest dated entries (under the headings of "Manuscripts" and "Marches") were made in 1805, the latest in 1843 (see Commonplace book, pp.20, 43, and 151). Many of them appear to have been written around 1810, as is shown by their correspondence with Copleston's "Replies" to the Edinburgh Review (the Morning Chronicle, Oct. 4, 1810, is cited in the Papers Belonging to the Commonplace book), and many others were probably made in preparation for writing the Enquiry. There are numerous references to the Scottish philosopher, Dugald Stewart, whose books, apart from the first volume of Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (published 1792) and Outlines of Moral Philosophy (published 1793), Copleston most probably read soon after publication, judging from J.W. Ward's comment that Copleston "devours eagerly all that proceeds from the pen of Mr. Stewart". (S.H. Romilly (ed.) Letters to Ivy, from the First Earl of Dudley. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1905, p.177). Apart from the two books mentioned, all the rest of Stewart's books referred to in the Commonplace book were published in the period 1810 to 1821. In fact, nearly all the books and journals quoted or referred to in the Commonplace book were published prior to 1827. Stewart's third volume of the Elements (published in 1827) is not mentioned, and, in general, books of a later date which are cited in the Commonplace book tend not to be on philosophical subjects. The only entries clearly marked by Copleston as written after 1827 are a reference to the translation of Niebuhr (translated in 1828), which is signed "E.Ll.", a quotation from the Times, December 29, 1836, on the equivocal use of words, and an extract from the Morning Herald, August 18, 1843 on the subject of locomotion (see pp.116, 135, 151).

2. Matthew Arnold. "Bishop Butler and the Zeit-Geist", in Essays Religious and Mixed, edited by R.H. Super. Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press, 1972, p.11.

3. E. Tatham. An Address to the Members of Convocation at large, on the proposed statute on Examination. Oxford: Nathaniel Bliss, 1807, p.6. Complaints against the importance placed on logic in examinations were again voiced at Oxford in 1819 (anon. The Oxford Spy, in Four Discourses; with an Introduction. Oxford: 1819, p.xiv) and again in 1829 (Philodicaeus. A Brief Appeal to the Good Sense of the University of Oxford on Classification of Merit: with some hints to the Rev. H.A. Woodgate on Logic. Oxford: 1829).

4. The authors of these reviews were John Playfair (vol.9, no.22, Jan. 1808. La Place's Traité de Méchanique Celéste), R. Payne Knight (vol.14, no.28, July 1809. Falconer's Strabo), and Sydney Smith (vol.15, no.29, Oct. 1809. Edgeworth's Professional Education).

5. Quoted in E. Copleston. A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford, containing an account of studies pursued in that University. Oxford: 1810, pp.16f.

6. R. Whately. Remains, p.94.

7. J.H. Newman. Apologia, p.164.

8. R. Whately. Logic, p.ix.

9. ibid., pp.xf. This was Whately's opinion, but the idea was originally suggested to him by Copleston.

10. E. Copleston. A Charge, delivered to the clergy of the diocese of Llandaff at the Triennial Visitation, in October 1845, by Edward, Lord Bishop of Llandaff. London: F. and J. Rivington, 1845, p.20.

11. J.H. Newman. Loss and Gain. Oxford University Press, 1986, pp.50f. Newman is here satirizing not only Copleston but also Hampden, and no doubt the Noetics in general. To modern readers, however, familiar with the linguistic philosophy of the twentieth century, many of Copleston's ideas have a modern ring. Copleston's theories on language are treated in greater detail below.

12. Pusey commented on Copleston's temperance during the period leading up to Roman Catholic emancipation, a time of "passion and prejudice". MS. Pusey House. Copy of a letter of Pusey to Newman, Jan. 9, 1827. J. Mackintosh, in a review of Stewart, also spoke of Copleston's "condour and temperance" (Edinburgh Review. vol.36, no.72, Oct. 1821, p.254).

13. Copleston did not approve of Plato's views on education (see Reply, p.157). The Noetics as a whole were Aristotelians rather than Platonists, although Thomas Arnold appreciated Plato.

14. Henry Home Drummond, although sympathetic towards Copleston, agreed with Tatham on this point. H.H. Drummond. Observations, suggested by the Strictures of the Edinburgh Review upon Oxford; and by the two Replies, containing one account of the late changes in that University. Edinburgh: John Ballantyne and Co., 1810, p.35.

15. E. Copleston. Examiner Examined, p.39.

16. MS. Oriel Coll. Lib. Papers belonging to the Commonplace book of E. Copleston.

17. In 1810 Copleston described Tatham as "an eyesore, a disgrace to us.... At best he is a madman. I will not say what he is at worst. But the most moderate opinion I can form of him is that of an impudent unprincipled libeller of his own corps". Bodl. Heber letters, fols. 113 and 114. He also had a very low opinion of Tatham's book, The Chart and Scale of Truth. See Copleston's Commonplace book, p.117, MS. Oriel Coll. Lib.

18. The Scottish Common Sense philosophers include Thomas Reid (1710-1796), James Oswald (1715-1769), George Campbell (1719-1796), James Beattie (1753-1803), and Dugald Stewart (1753-1828).

19. J.S. Mill. "Whately's Elements of Logic". Westminster Review. vol.9, Jan. 1828, p.138; Pattison. Memoirs, p.129.

20. Stewart's writings were also noticed by the Edinburgh Review and the Quarterly Review. See Edinburgh Review, vol.17, Nov. 1810; vol.27, Sept. 1816; vol.36, Oct. 1821; and Quarterly Review, vol.6, no.11, 1811; vol.12, no.24, 1815; vol.17, no.33, 1817; vol.26, no.52, 1822.

21. D. Stewart. Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, in The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, Esq. F.R.S.S. edited by Sir William Hamilton. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable and Co., 1854, vol.2, p.205.

22. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.111. Copleston was also critical of Bacon's loose use of the word logic: "Yet Bacon uses the term Logica for his treatise not philosophia. p.LIII. Is not this an abuse of words? and does it not lead to confusion? If the true meaning of Logica be 'The science of discovering natural causes both in matter and mind' it certainly does not belong to the Organon of Aristotle". Papers belonging to the Commonplace book.

23. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.100.

24. E. Copleston. Examiner Examined, p.2.

25. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.111. Two other entries in the Commonplace book suggest that Copleston was of the opinion that all reasoning could be expressed in syllogistic form. See page 79 (a quotation from John Sergeant's Solid Philosophy) and page 100 (a reference to Stewart).

26. J.S. Mill gives a similar account of syllogism and induction in his review of Whately's Elements of Logic (Westminster Review. vol.9, Jan. 1828, pp.147f).

27. E. Copleston. Papers belonging to the Commonplace book. In these papers Copleston has noted a quotation from Bacon himself in support of this view: "Province of Logic. 'It tendeth rather to judgment than invention, and rather to discover truth in controversy, than new matter'. Bacon. Filum Labyrinthi. p.396".

28. Stewart. Elements, vol.3, p.184. Copleston's references to Reid are to be found in the first Reply, p.25, and in A Second Reply to the Edinburgh Review. By the author of a Reply to the Calumnies of that Review against Oxford. Oxford: 1810, p.24.

29. Stewart. Elements, vol.3, p.218, and footnote, p.203.

30. J.W. Ward, the Earl of Dudley, was the former student of both Copleston and Stewart.

31. J.W. Ward. Letters to the Bishop of Llandaff, pp.16f and 21. Letters dated Feb. 11 and March 3, 1814.

32. The Commonplace book does contain references to Montaigne, Descartes, Leibnitz, Helvetius, Michaelis, and Stael, but these are far out-weighed by references to British writers. These include theologians of various shades of opinion (for example, the High Church Hooker, the Cambridge Platonist Cudworth, the Calvinist John Edwards), and philosophers such as Bacon and Locke and the Scottish Common Sense philosophers.

33. See his approval of Lord Grenville as an "anti-Gallican and anti-philosophist" (see note 19, p.376).

34. E. Copleston. Enquiry, pp.95 and 169.

35. E. Phipps. Memoirs of the Political and Literary Life of Robert Plumer Ward, Esq. Author of 'The Law of Nations', 'Tremaine', 'De vere', etc. etc. With selections from his Correspondence, Diaries, and Unpublished Literary Remains. London: John Murray, 1850, vol.2, pp.122f.

36. J. Bateman. The Life of the Right Rev. Daniel Wilson, D.D. late Lord Bishop of Calcutta and Metropolitan of India. With extracts from his Journal and Correspondence. London: John Murray, 1860, vol.1, p.161.

37. E. Copleston. Enquiry, p.138.

38. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.117. Locke's theories, however, have proved longer-lived and more fertile than those of the Scottish school.

39. E. Copleston. Papers belonging to the Commonplace book.

40. D. Stewart. Philosophical Essays. Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1818, p.98.

41. ibid., p.102.

42. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.131. J.H. Newman held a view similar to Copleston's. In the late eighteen fifties he wrote,

> There are various dogmas which all the world holds - I don't go as to the question of their origin, whether intuitive, or instinctive or from experience - but in fact, from a child, from the first use of reason, all men all over the world hold or act as if they held that "the course of nature is uniform", "there is a right and a wrong".

(Quoted in W.R. Fey. John Henry Newman, Empiricist Philosophy, and the Certainty of Faith. D.Phil.thesis, Oxford University, 1973, p.72).

43. See Stewart. Philosophical Essays, third essay, p.176.

44. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.122.

45. ibid., p.120.

46. ibid., p.122.

47. This is not a view readily accepted by modern philosophers. The reliability of sense experience is an issue which is hotly debated.

48. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.120.

49. This applies also to religious knowledge, for this is concerned with matters of fact and not mathematical or logical truths.

50. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.131.

51. D. Stewart. Elements, vol.3, p.47.

52. Compare a modern definition of knowledge as "justified, true belief".

53. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.110. For other examples of the use of this term see Stewart. Elements, vol.3, p.181; Joseph Butler. The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Oxford at the University Press, 1833, p.1. Newman also used this distinction between demonstrative and probable reasoning. For example, in 1846 he wrote that in his University Sermons he had used the term "probable" as "opposed to demonstrative, not to certainty" (I. Ker and T. Gornall, ed. The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, vol.11, p.293). And in 1864 he acquiesced in the following explanation of a passage in the Apologia:

> Newman is not talking of probability in the popular sense in which it has always some uncertainty or misgiving about it, but in the philosophical sense in which it rises to the highest certainty in given cases equal to but differing from demonstration.
>
> Reasoning is rightly divided into demonstrative and probable corresponding to mathematical and moral - each applicable to its special material and inapplicable to the other - the one attaining its certainty with one stroke, the other with many attaining to its own not a jot inferior to the other - as is plain in thousand of cases. (ibid., vol.21, p.146).

54. E. Copleston. A Third Reply to the Edinburgh Review, by the author of a Reply to the Calumnies of that Review against Oxford. Oxford: 1811, Appendix, p.10.

55. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.118.

56. ibid., p.102 for the quotation from Locke, pp.79, 88 and 112 for criticisms of Locke, and pp.88 and 112, where Copleston quotes Beattie's assertions against Locke, Berkeley and Hume. For examples of ambiguities see especially the entries under

Equivocation, Ambiguity, and Logomachy (pp.88, 102, 112, 132) and Papers belonging to the Commonplace book.

57. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.75.

58. E. Copleston. Who are the Persons Authorized to Preach the Gospel? A Sermon, preached at Usk, October 23, 1838, at the anniversary of the Monmouthshire District Committees of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. By Edward, Lord Bishop of Llandaff. With an appendix on logomachy, and on the duty of building churches. London: J.G. and F. Rivington, 1839, Appendix A, p.28.

59. E. Copleston. Papers belonging to the Commonplace book. See a similar thought expressed by Bacon and quoted by Copleston, Commonplace book, p.112. Similar observations are recorded in the Commonplace book, pp.3 and 135, and in the Enquiry, p.xiii.

60. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.120. See also p.110, where Copleston says that probability may amount to moral certainty, "and yet after all, this may be false - for the evidence which operates on our minds has no controul over the nature of things. They are or are not, whatever opinion we may form concerning them - or whatever evidence we may have or not have of their existence".

61. E. Copleston. Who are the Persons...., p.29. Compare Stewart's observations on definition, especially the difference between mathematical definitions and definitions in other subjects (Elements, vol.3, pp.118f).

62. J. Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by P.H. Nidditch. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1975, p.497 (Book 3, ch.10, sect.14).

63. The Papers belonging to the Commonplace book contain a quotation from the Antijacobin Review which makes this distinction. See also J.H. Newman. Loss and Gain, p.49.

64. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.132, and Papers.

65. Thomas Belsham (1750-1829). Unitarian divine.

66. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.84.

67. ibid., p.79. See also p.100, Third Reply, Appendix, p.8, and Examiner Examined, p.51.

68. Quoted in Stewart. Elements, vol.3, footnote p.206. See also pp.107f and pp.359f.

69. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.111.

70. ibid., p.124. It was not only useful for detecting fallacies and ambiguities, but it also "enables us to exhibit the truth in the

most intelligible and clearest manner - to extricate it from confusion - to expose not only fallacy, but emptiness and nonsense". ibid., p.100.

71. Copleston did believe, however, that logic, in conjunction with induction, did lead to new knowledge. In his Commonplace book, for example, he states that "Principles are acquired by induction, but if used syllogistically generate new truths" (p.124). The fault of the scholastic philosophers was that they paid scant attention to the initial induction and relied too heavily on reasoning. The principles from which they reasoned were hastily and prematurely assumed (see Second Reply, p.20).

72. E. Copleston. Third Reply. Appendix, p.9.

73. ibid., and Second Reply, pp.22f.

74. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, pp.111 and 132.

Section 3. Religious Knowledge and the Role of Reason

1. Bateman. op.cit., vol.1, p.136. Daniel Wilson graduated B.A. from St. Edmund Hall, Oxford, in 1802. His sermon was on the text, "If any man will do his will he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God". Bateman's verdict was that the sermon was scriptural, and unconcerned as to what system it supported or opposed.

2. Matthew Arnold, much later, argued that there was indeed an affinity between Arminian Methodism and Calvinism, despite the fact that the former repudiated the doctrine of predestination. See M. Arnold St. Paul and Protestantism. London: John Murray, 1912, p.15. The term "Methodist" is rather problematical, because it is not always clear in writers of the early nineteenth century, whether they are referring to Dissenters or to Evangelical members of the established church. For example, Richard Mant, a former fellow of Oriel, wrote in 1808,

> With some of the Methodists, their hostility to the national church is open and avowed: whilst others hypocritically PRETEND AN ATTACHMENT to her, although they have in many instances separated from her communion, and are really and practically her enemies. Others again attend her services, and affect to join with her members in praying to be delivered from schism; and their next step is to the conventicle, where they unite with her adversaries in a schismatical worship.

R. Mant. Puritanism Revived, or Methodism as Old as the great Rebellion. In a series of letters from a curate to his Rector. London: F.C. and J. Rivington, 1808, p.18.

3. W. Carus. Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. Charles Simeon, M.A. Late Senior Fellow of King's College, and Minister of Trinity Church Cambridge. With a selection from his writings and correspondence. London: Hatchard and Son, 1847, pp.563 and 566. The Evangelical Charles Sumner was also concerned to repudiate Calvinistic doctrine (see below). "Vital religion" was a stock phrase used to designate Evangelical religion.

4. This was one aspect of the conservative reaction (discernible both in religion and politics) brought about by the French Revolution. On this, see N.V. Murray. The Influence of the French Revolution on the Church of England and its Rivals, 1789-1802. Oxford Univ. D.Phil. thesis, May 1975.

5. R. Lawrence. An attempt to illustrate those Articles of the Church of England which the Calvinists improperly consider as Calvinistical. Oxford: 1820.

6. Richard Mant declared that "to those Puritans we were indebted in former times for the murder of our King, the overthrow of our monarchy, the dissolution of our civil constitution, and the abolition of our ecclesiastical establishment". R. Mant. op.cit., p.95.

7. E. Copleston. Enquiry, pp.25f.

8. See page 41 above.

9. E. Copleston. Enquiry, p.83.

10. This was D.K. Sandford, who had been an unsuccessful candidate for a fellowship at Oriel. In an article in the Edinburgh Review (vol.35, 1821, pp.302-314) he had implied that the Enquiry was "learned drivelling and marrowless inflation" (see Grinfield. Vindiciae Analogicae. Part I, footnote pp.1 and 2). In a letter to Copleston (Dec. 22, 1823) he apologised and admitted that when he wrote the article, he had not read the Enquiry (W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.92). Favourable reviews of the Enquiry appeared in the Quarterly Review ([C.J. Blomfield]. Q.R. vol.26, no.51, Oct. 1821, pp.81-102) and in the British Critic ([W. Roberts?]. vol.15, June 1821, pp.561-591 and vol.18, July 1822, pp.1-32). After the appearance of Grinfield's criticisms, the Enquiry was defended by W. Dalby. A Defence of Some Passages in Dr. Copleston's "Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination", in reply to a letter addressed to that author, by the Rev. E.W. Grinfield.... Oxford: W. Baxter, 1822.

11. For example, Grinfield. He accepted that certain doctrines were mysterious (op.cit., p.50), but did not think much of Copleston's brand of philosophy:

> "It is the boast and glory of that 'New School of Speculative Philosophy', over which you preside, to have discovered, that all the disputes of our ancestors respecting Foreknowledge and Freewill may be reduced to questions of bare philology, and that all the mysteries of 'the Five Points' may be settled by adjusting the meaning of the five words - 'Contingent', 'Impossible', 'Accidental', 'Necessary', 'Uncertain'. And thus may the Millennium be brought about by the study of our dictionaries, and the passions of Polemics be soothed by the accents of Lexicography...."

E.W. Grinfield. Vindiciae Analogicae. Part the Second. Being a reply to the third section of the Rev. Dr. Copleston's "Remarks on the objections made to certain passages in the Enquiry concerning Necessity and Predestination". London: T. Cadell, 1822, pp.72f. Although Grinfield, and Newman (see below), made fun of Copleston, and were justified in doing so in as far as Copleston's linguistic analysis was very superficial, yet it is along this path, on which Copleston took a few tentative steps, which much twentieth century philosophy has gone.

12. Newman. op.cit., p.51.

13. E. Copleston. Enquiry, pp.41-43, 94-97.

14. ibid., p.102.

15. E. Copleston. Remarks upon the objections made to certain passages in The Enquiry concerning Necessity and Predestination. London: J. Murray, 1822, p.53.

16. E. Copleston. "The Penitent Thief" in Original Family Sermons. vol.5. London: John W. Parker, 1835, p.171. See also Enquiry, pp.96f, 102f, 140f.

17. E. Copleston. Reply, p.151. Whately, too, stated that "a full and final revelation having been made, no discovery so called (of any high importance) is to be expected". The Bible, he argued, was intended by God to be clearly intelligible to all from the first and that therefore "unless our faith be the same in the main, with that of the early Christians, we may be well assured that it is unsound". (R. Whately. The Use and Abuse of Party Feeling in Matters of Religion, considered in Eight Sermons preached before the University of Oxford, in the year MDCCCXXII at the Bampton Lecture. 3rd edit. London: John W. Parker, 1833, p.93). But Whately, too, advocated an inductive study of the Bible (see next chapter). Indeed, this was necessary to correct errors and abuses. Neither Copleston nor Whately sanctioned Newman's idea of development.

18. Locke. Human Understanding. Bk.4, ch.17, sec.23, p.687.

19. ibid., p.692. "Intuitive Knowledge" he defines as "the perception of the certain Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas immediately compared together" (ibid., p.685).

20. Locke has often been suspected of being a Socinian, or, to use the later phrase, a Unitarian. For example, the Calvinistic divine, John Edwards (1637-1716) wrote several books against Locke, including Some Thoughts concerning the several causes and occasions of Atheism, especially in the Present Age, with some brief Reflections on Socinianism and on the late book entitled "The Reasonableness of Christianity". Keble thought that Locke was "at least an Arian" (J. Keble. Sermons, Academical and Occasional. Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1847, p.380), and Hawkins, too, had reservations about Locke's religious views (E. Hawkins. An Inquiry into the Connected Uses of the Principal Means of Attaining Christian Truth. Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1840, p.7). More recently, H. McLachlan (The Religious Opinions of Milton, Locke and Newton. Manchester University Press, 1941) has argued that Locke was a Unitarian.

21. Locke. Human Understanding, p.692.

22. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.110.

23. Locke himself opened the door for this interpretation (Bk.4, ch.18, sect.9, p.695):

> "in those [propositions], concerning which [the mind] has but uncertain Evidence, and so is persuaded of their Truth, only upon probable Grounds, which still admit a Possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain Evidence of its own Knowledge, and over-turning the Principles of all Reason, in such probable Propositions, I say, an evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent even against Probability. For where the Principles of

> Reason have not evidenced a Proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear Revelation as another Principle of Truth, and Ground of Assent, may determine; and so it may be Matter of Faith, and be also above Reason. Because Reason, in the particular Matter being able to reach no higher than Probability, Faith gave the Determination where Reason came short; and Revelation discovered on which side of Truth lay".

24. Butler. Analogy, Part II. ch.3, p.205.

25. ibid., p.204: "And therefore, though objections against the evidence of Christianity are most seriously to be considered; yet objections against Christianity itself are, in a great measure, frivolous...."

26. Locke. Human Understanding, p.694. For Copleston's views on eschatology and the problem of evil, see E. Copleston. A Sermon, preached at Usk, at the Anniversary meeting of the Monmouthshire District Committee of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, and of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. London: C.J.G. and F. Rivington, 1828, pp.5f; "The Penitent Thief", p.170; R. Whately. Remains, pp.158 and 170.

27. R. Whately. Remains, pp.247f. See also pp.274ff, and E. Copleston. A Sermon, preached for the Devon and Exeter Hospital, in the parish church of St. Thomas the Apostle, on Sunday, August 11, 1805, and published for the benefit of that institution. Exeter: n.d., pp.6f; Enquiry, pp.96f; "Penitent Thief", p.170.

28. R. Whately. Remains, pp. 235f. See also pp.241f.

29. E. Copleston. Enquiry, p.141.

30. Newman. Apologia, p.35.

31. J.B. Sumner. Apostolical Preaching Considered, in an Examination of St. Paul's Epistles. Ninth edit. London: Hatchard and son, 1850, p.iii.

32. NLW. MS. 21977c. fol.115.

33. Grinfield. op.cit., Part I, p.58 and Part II, p.43.

34. Grinfield. op.cit., Part II, pp.18f. Grinfield also doubted the sincerity of Copleston's admiration for Bishop Butler (see pp.48f). However, the very format of the Enquiry indicates Copleston's debt to Butler. Like the Analogy, the Enquiry begins with the realm of nature before moving on to Revelation, and shows that the difficulties found in revealed religion (in the case of the Enquiry, the apparent incongruity of the doctrines of God's providence and man's free-will) are also to be found in natural religion.

35. For example, see "Penitent Thief", p.176. "To us, to all who have been educated in a Christian land, the Redemption purchased by the death of Christ is a matter of fact and of knowledge. All doubt is removed".

36. Whately. Remains, pp.235f.

37. This, in general, was the position accepted by the Noetics, although Blanco White finally rejected it. In 1830 he wrote in his diary, "If God had intended to dwell miraculously among men in a Book, as in an Oracle, he would not have left that first foundation of the intended certainty, to probability and conjecture. It is absurd and contradictory to say, you must believe these propositions as Articles of Faith necessary to your salvation; you must hold them with unhesitating certainty, because it is probable that they are contained in a book, which book, it is probable, was in some degree (we cannot tell precisely in what degree) inspired by God". J.H. Thom (ed.) The Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White Written by himself; with portions of his correspondence. London: John Chapman, 1845, vol.1, pp.280f.

38. Whately. Remains, p.284.

39. ibid., p.236.

40. E. Copleston. A Sermon, preached at the anniversary of the Devon and Exeter Hospital, August 25, 1818. 2nd edit. Oxford: Parker, Murray, Rivington and Hatchard, 1819, p.16.

41. R. Whately. Remains, pp.203 and 285.

42. ibid., p.194.

43. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.129, and R. Whately. Remains, pp.212f. For criticisms of the Hutchinsonians see Remains, pp.258f and Commonplace book, pp.75 and 129.

44. R. Whately. Remains, p.259.

45. E. Copleston. False Liberality, and the Power of the Keys. Two Sermons, preached 15th Nov., 1840 at St. Paul's Church, Newport, on the opening of an enlarged Popish chapel in that town: with a Pastoral Address, on Roman Catholic Errors. London: J.G. and F. Rivington, 1841; Pastoral Address, pp.82f.

46. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.123. R. Whately. Remains, pp.235f and 242. Copleston was of the opinion that this "quackery" was "generally the result of an ardent temperament joined to scanty knowledge - in a mind that has received little culture" (Commonplace book, p.123). Similarly, an uncultivated mind could lead to a "narrow notion of God's providence", bordering on superstition (Enquiry, p.64). For the suggestion that the preaching of Dissenting ministers was narrow and concentrated on a few points of Christian doctrine, see E. Copleston. Separation Either Duty or a Sin. A Sermon, preached

at the Consecration of Trinity Church, Abergavenny, Nov.6, 1840, by Edward, Lord Bishop of Llandaff. London: J.G. and F. Rivington, 1840, p.13.

47. R. Whately. Remains, pp.235f.

48. As in The Power of the Keys, where he discusses the use of the word "sacrifice" (see pp.25ff), and in the Pastoral Address, where he refers to the practice of the early church in order to dispute the Roman tenet of the Pope as supreme head of the church (see pp.82f).

49. Richard Whately's Historic Doubts Relative to Napoleon Buonaparte. 12th edit. London: John W. Parker and Son, 1859, was a "reductio ad absurdum" of Hume's doubts about the miracles as historical events. Whately states (Remains, p.84) that this pamphlet was a result of a conversation with Copleston and had his seal of approval.

50. William Buckland (1784-1856), fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Buckland published his Vindiciae Geologiae, which created a sensation in 1819, his Reliquiae Diluvianae (reviewed by Copleston in the Quarterly Review) in 1823, and his Bridgewater Treatise in 1836.

51. E. Copleston. Q.R. vol.29, no.57, 1823, p.142.

52. R. Whately. Remains, pp.170f.

53. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.11.

54. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.1, fol.89.

55. Hugh. J. Rose. The State of the Protestant Religion in Germany; in a series of discourses; preached before the University of Cambridge. Cambridge, 1825.

56. W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.196.

Section 4. Moderation and the "Via Media"

1. R. Whately. Remains, p.236. See also p.318; Q.R. no.57, 1823, pp.164ff; Separation either a Duty or a Sin, pp.7f; False Liberality, p.22.

2. E. Copleston. A Charge, delivered to the Clergy of the Diocese of Llandaff, at his Primary Visitation, in September, 1830, by Edward, Lord Bishop of Llandaff. London: C.J.G. and F. Rivington, 1830, p.16; Charge. 1833, p.9. Copleston's Oriel Commemoration Sermon enlarges on the dangers of party-feeling in matters of religion, although he also maintains that man's natural instinct to form parties does have its benefits, so long as it is kept within bounds. A Sermon, Preached before the Members of Oriel College, upon the Commemoration Festival, held June 15, 1826, to celebrate the completion of five hundred years from the foundation of the College. Oxford: 1826, see especially pp.6-10.

3. Christian Observer and Advocate. No.203, Nov. 1818, pp.738-744.

4. J.E.N. Molesworth. The Danger of a Divided House. A Sermon preached May XXVIII, MDCCCXXX at the visitation of the Worshipful Herbert Jenner, KNT.LLD. London: C.J.G. and F. Rivington, 1830, pp.9f.

5. Copleston was not in favour of a proposal to set up an auxiliary Bible Society in his diocese in 1828. "I do not approve", he wrote, "of the Bible Society as a mode of disseminating the Scriptures - especially when other means are before us of doing the same thing without any compromise of principle" (i.e. through the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge). Lland. Cath. MS. vol.2, fol.5.

6. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.2, fol.8.

7. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.2, fol.118.

8. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.3, fol.191. See also vol.1, fol.175; NLW MS19978C, letter to Mrs. Hughes, n.d.; letter quoted in J. Grant. Memoirs of Sir George Sinclair, Bart., of Ulbster. London: Tinsley Brothers, 1870, p.179.

9. NLW. Hughes letters. Letter dated 21 Oct., 1832.

10. ibid., letter dated 10 Nov., 1830.

11. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.2, fol.105. Copleston advocated that bishops should have summary power of suspension, and that deacons should serve a period of probation (ibid., fol.20). See also E. Copleston. A Charge delivered to the Clergy of the Diocese of Llandaff, in September 1833, by Edward, Lord Bishop of Llandaff. London: J.G. and F. Rivington, 1833, pp.22ff; and A Charge delivered to the Clergy of the Diocese of Llandaff, in September 1836, by Edward, Lord Bishop of Llandaff. London: J.G. and F. Rivington, 1836, p.8.

12. His attitude to some of these problems is not always clear-cut, mainly because Copleston always took into consideration practicalities as well as principle. Non-residence and pluralities, for example, he thought were sometimes necessary, although not desirable, because of the inequality in church livings. E. Copleston. Q.R. vol.10, 1813, p.51; Charge. 1833, pp.16ff; Charge. 1836, pp.9ff; Lland. Cath. MS. vol.1, fol.17; vol.2, fol.105.

13. NLW. Hughes letters. Letter dated 21 Oct., 1832.

14. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.2, fol.128. On the Irish Church Bill, see chapter 3.

15. E. Copleston. Q.R. vol.10, 1813, p.49.

16. R. Whately. Remains, p.239. The word "prove" in the Biblical text was not always interpreted in this way, even by the Noetics themselves. Hampden, for example, acknowledged an "experimental" proof (see next chapter, p.216). But the Noetics did tend to emphasize an intellectual "proving".

17. The problem remains, of course, of deciding which points are essential and which inessential.

18. R. Whately. Remains, p.234. Occasionally, however, his moderation failed when it came to his opinion of his opponent's character. See, for example, his pronouncements against the Tractarians, especially W.G. Ward, in the latter stages of the movement.

19. E. Copleston. A Sermon, preached at the re-opening of Abergavenny Church, on Sunday, Sept. 20, 1829. London: C.J.G. and F. Rivington, 1830, p.7. See also False Liberality, pp.9f; R. Whately. Remains, pp.316f; Hansard. n.s. vol.19, p.183.

20. R. Whately. Remains, p.239.

21. E. Copleston. Pastoral Address, footnote pp.87f. Whately, however, objected to Pusey's statement (for this, see next chapter). For Copleston's views on the error of Roman Catholics, see E. Copleston. False Liberality, pp.16f. and R. Whately. Remains, p.209.

22. R. Whately. Remains, p.294.

23. See next chapter, p.243.

24. E. Copleston. Who are the Persons..., p.32. See also R. Whately. Remains, pp.235f.

25. E. Copleston. Enquiry, p.215.

26. R. Whately. Remains, p.240.

27. ibid., p.305. See also Copleston's sermon, Separation either a Duty or a Sin.

28. Copleston did not rely solely on the argument of the corruption of the Church of Rome in his vindication of the English Reformation, but argued as well, that the Church of Rome had usurped its authority over the English church, for the supremacy of the see of Rome, asserted by the Roman Catholics, was not justified, in Copleston's opinion, either by Scripture or by the practice of the primitive church. Therefore, the English church was within its rights in withdrawing from communion with the Roman. See Copleston's second lecture in R. Whately. Remains, pp.306-318. These two lectures were written by Copleston for Whately to deliver as the concluding lectures in the series of Bosworth Lectures at Oriel College. Being designed for undergraduates, they were of an elementary character, as Whately points out, but nevertheless they are valuable because they sum up in a small space Copleston's view of the Church of England, a view which he maintained throughout life. They also represent the official position of Oriel College, for, as Mozley states (Reminiscences, p.20), the Bosworth Lectures were not written afresh each year, but the manuscripts were handed down from fellow to fellow.

29. R. Whately. Remains, p.317.

30. E. Copleston. Sermon of Abergavenny. 1829, p.13. See also The Power of the Keys, p.43; Church Discipline and National Education. A Charge delivered to the Clergy of the Diocese of Llandaff, in September, 1839, by Edward, Lord Bishop of Llandaff. London: J.G.F. and J. Rivington, 1839, p.38; Charge. 1845, pp.17f; Whately. Remains, pp.309-315.

31. E. Copleston. Pastoral Address, pp.72f, 76, 83 and 91.

32. E. Copleston. A Charge, delivered to the Clergy of the Diocese of Llandaff, at the Triennial Visitation, in Aug. 1848. By Edward, Lord Bishop of Llandaff. London: F. and J. Rivington, 1848, pp.6f.

33. R. Whately. Remains, p.294.

34. E. Copleston. Sermon at Chester, 1826, pp.23f and 35; Lland. Cath. MS. vol.1, fol.159. For accusations of priestcraft and superstition, see Charge. 1839, p.36; False Liberality, pp.8f; Power of the Keys, pp.24-30, and 42f; R. Whately. Remains, pp.226f. For Copleston's doubt about the power of reason to overcome superstition, see Pastoral Address, p.89.

35. The article submitted by Penrose but rejected by the Quarterly was on this controversy. See above, note 28 on page 377. In the early years of the century Unitarianism did not seem to pose as much of a threat to the church as did the "enthusiasm" of the Methodists. It was not thought likely to have a wide appeal due to its cold, rationalistic spirit, a charge commonly brought against Unitarianism both at this time and later. See, for example, the comments of Veysie and J. Davies: D. Veysie. A Preservative Against Unitarianism: in a letter to Lant Carpenter, LL.D. Occasioned by his discourse, delivered at Bristol, before the Society of Unitarian Christians, established

in the West of England, entitled, "Errors Respecting Unitarianism Considered; and Motives and Means for the Dissemination of it Stated". Exeter: Trewman and Son, 1809, pp.40ff; J. Davies. An Estimate of the Human Mind. Being a Philosophical Inquiry into the legitimate application and extend of its leading faculties, as connected with the principles and obligations of the Christian Religion. London: John Hatchard and Son, 1828, vol.1, p.162. Even the well-known American Unitarian, William Ellery Channing, acknowledged in 1839 that Unitarianism in the early part of the century had been too intellectual and lacked vitality (see a letter of Channing to Blanco White, in J.H. Thom (ed.) Life of Blanco White, vol.3, pp.96f). By the 'twenties, however, Unitarianism was undergoing a religious revival as well as becoming more active politically, and consequently was a force to be reckoned with.

36. The importance of this particular "via media", between extracting too much or too little from the Bible, was pointed out to me in a letter by Professor A.M.C. Waterman.

37. R. Whately. Remains, p.234.

38. W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.98.

39. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.389. On the circumstances surrounding this sermon, see W.R. Ward. Victorian Oxford, pp.75f.

40. E. Copleston. Charge. 1848, p.8.

41. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.3, fol.197.

42. R. Whately. Remains, pp.201, 203, 303.

43. E. Copleston. "Obstacles to the Reception of the Gospel". in Original Family Sermons. vol.3, pp.1-13. London: John W. Parker, 1834. Compare Newman's idea of antecedent probability.

44. R. Whately. Remains, pp.291f.

45. ibid., p.208.

46. ibid., p.202.

47. See Charge. 1830, p.15; Charge. 1833, p.9; Pastoral Address, pp.92f; Who are the Persons..., pp.14f.

48. Lodwick. op.cit., p.74.

49. R. Whately. Remains, pp.32f.

50. ibid., p.305.

51. A reaction which hardly went to the root of the problem. Copleston was one of those who looked to church building as a solution to the problem of Dissent, but he realised that it was not the whole solution. The Methodist movement, he acknowledged,

had been made necessary by the "spiritual slumber" of the church in the previous century, and he was pleased to note a more diligent and conscientious attitude in the clergy of the nineteenth century. He looked for continued improvement, and charged his clergy to put on "the whole armour of God - and to stand firmly prepared each in his appointed station, that no enemy may take us unawares, and that our Lord when he cometh may find us watching". E. Copleston. Charge. 1833, p.36.

52. E. Copleston. Charge. 1845, p.31. See also Charge. 1830, p.16; Sermon at Abergavenny, p.8.

53. R. Whately. Remains, p.304.

54. ibid., p.66.

55. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.3, fols. 148 and 150.

56. Bodl. MS. Eng. lett. d. 309. Copleston Correspondence. fols. 84 and 85. Copleston here agrees to read Newman's pamphlet on suffragan bishops and says that he has "a great personal regard" for Newman. His suspicion that he might disagree with Newman on this topic proved true (Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.400).

57. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.H-3a.

58. ibid., no.H-4a. See also Lland. Cath. MS. vol.4, fol.253, where he says that in some places Hampden's language is "incautious and blameable".

59. ibid., vol.4, fol.254.

60. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.H-5.

61. ibid., Lland. Cath. MS. vol.4, fol.253 and 258.

62. ibid., vol.1. Letter to J.M. Traherne, 10 May, 1836; Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.407; Bod. Lib. MS. John Johnson Collection fol.30.

63. E. Copleston. Pastoral Address, pp.87f. Three years later, however, in a private letter to Hawkins, he was more critical of Pusey (Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.405).

64. E. Copleston. Pastoral Address, pp.71 and 88. The immediate cause of these two sermons (False Liberality and Power of the Keys) and the Pastoral Address was the opening of a Roman Catholic chapel in Newport. But while the Roman Catholic church posed a threat from without, the Oxford Movement posed an insidious threat from within, which was creating parties within the church and was perhaps more likely to produce converts to Rome than were the open efforts of the Roman Catholic church. (See below, for Copleston's views on the dangers of a hidden enemy). The fact that the movement was centred at Oxford was also cause for alarm, for Oxford was a place of education not only for young men in general, but more specifically for the clergy of the Church of England.

65. E. Copleston. A Charge, delivered to the Clergy of the Diocese of Llandaff, at the Triennial Visitation, in October 1842. London: J.G.F. and J. Rivington, 1842, pp.11f and 19. However, Copleston denied that the Tracts had been the cause of a religious revival, but claimed that this revival had begun long before their appearance (ibid., p.12). In a letter of 1842 he wrote, "Whatever good may have arisen out of this evil, and certainly much good has arisen, those writers have not the credit of it..." Lambeth Palace MS. 1805. Correspondence of Charles Pourtales Golightly, fol.70. Newman considered Copleston's Charge of 1842 a "violent" attack on the movement. (A. Mozley. Letters of J.H. Newman. vol.2, p.361).

66. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.864.

67. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.1, fol.106. See also his letter to Golightly, loc.cit., where he says that the Oxford Tract writers "have been treated with too great tenderness".

68. Lambeth Palace. Golightly Correspondence, fol.72; Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.404.

69. ibid.

70. ibid., letters nos.57-59; Lland. Cath. MS. vol.1, fol.125; Charge 1845, pp.21f. He approved of the suggestion that Ward be asked to subscribe to the thirty-nine articles, supported the proposed statute requiring graduates to subscribe to the articles in the sense in which they were first published, and regretted the proctors' veto of the censure of Tract 90.

71. E. Copleston. Charge. 1845, pp.16f, 19f, 21.

72. R. Whately. Remains, pp.228 and 281f.

73. E. Copleston. Enquiry, p.219.

74. E. Copleston. Charge. 1848, p.17.

75. ibid., p.18.

Section 5.

1. On the "via media" between the errors of the other denominations a similar view to Copleston's was expressed by Whately's predecessor as Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Magee: "We are neither with the Socinians, to enslave Revelation to reason...nor yet with the enthusiast, to reject reason in judging Revelation; and least of all, are we with the followers of the Church of Rome, to close our eyes against the light, both of one and the other". Quoted in W.J. Fitzpatrick. Memoirs of Richard Whately, Archbishop of Dublin. With a Glance at his Contemporaries and Times. 2 vols. London: Richard Bentley, 1864, vol.1, p.120.

2. Lambeth Palace. Golightly Correspondence, fol.70; Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd series, vol.81, p.553. The Martyrs' Memorial was first proposed in 1838 and built in 1841. The grant to Maynooth College was debated in Parliament in 1845.

3. A group of High Churchmen, living in the vicinity of Hackney, among whom were included Joshua Watson and H.H. Norris.

4. E. Copleston. Charge. 1848, pp.12f; False Liberality, pp.19f; Who are the Persons..., pp.30f; W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.196; R. Whately. Remains, p.69.

5. Quoted in U. Henriques. Religious Toleration in England, 1787-1833. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, p.68. Charles Daubeny (1745-1827) was a fellow of New College, Oxford. He is often cited as a forerunner of the Oxford Movement.

6. For example, Nott (1802), Le Mesurier (1807), Spry (1816).

7. Murray. op.cit., pp.111 and 121ff.

8. J.K.B. Boulton-Jones. Anglican Theological Thought (1750-1833) with especial reference to the Pre-Tractarians. Leeds University Ph.D. thesis, 1968, p.6.

9. A group of theologians, who flourished in the period 1633-1688, and who advocated tolerance and comprehension within the church.

10. Compare Bishop Horsley's criticism of those clergymen who were "ambitious of liberality of sentiment (for under that specious name a profane indifference is made to pass for an accomplishment". (Murray. op.cit., p.93). Also Southey's attitude to toleration: "...to tolerate is to allow that which is not approved - to suffer that which is not and ought not to be encouraged... And no more dissenters ought to expect or ask, more being inconsistent with the fundamental principles of any constitution whereof religion is part" (quoted in Henriques. op.cit., p.69). Henriques states that those who inclined to High Toryism tended to look upon toleration as an indulgence rather than a right. From this is would appear that conservatism in politics and religion went hand in hand.

11. E. Copleston. Commonplace book, p.112.

12. John Eveleigh. Sermons on Various Subjects, doctrinal and practical, preached before the University of Oxford. Oxford at the University Press, 1810.

13. For example, R. Mant (fellow 1798-1804) in Puritanism Revived; E. Berens (fellow 1799-1804) in Church Reform. London: John Murray, 1828; J. Davison (fellow 1800-1817) in Discourses on Prophecy, in which are considered its structure, use, and inspiration; being the substance of Twelve Sermons preached in the chapel of Lincoln's Inn, in the lecture founded by the Right Reverend William Warburton, Bishop of Gloucester. 4th edit. Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1839; A.D. Hendy (fellow 1803-1805). in An Essay on the Utility of Classical Learning in subservience to Theological Studies, in Three Sermons on Practical Subjects. Oxford, 1808. There is here, of course, the question of possible influence.

14. J.H. Newman. Apologia, p.82.

15. ibid., p.148.

16. On this, see Conclusion.

17. See above, Introduction p.6.

18. Locke. Human Understanding. Book 4. ch.19, sect.14, p.704. Bishop Butler makes a similar statement: "I express myself with caution lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason, which is indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning anything, even revelation itself". Analogy, p.204.

19. Compare Locke. op.cit., Book 4. ch.18, sect.8, p.694: "But yet, it still belongs to Reason, to judge of the Truth of its being a Revelation, and of the signification of the Words, wherein it is delivered".

20. J.H. Newman. "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Revealed Religion", p.32.

21. E.B. Pusey. An Historical Enquiry into the Probable Causes of the Rationalist Character Lately Predominant in the Theology of Germany, to which is prefixed A Letter from Professor Sack, upon the Rev. H.J. Rose's Discourses on German Protestantism; translated from the German. London: C. and J. Rivington, 1828, p.173.

22. E.W. Whately. Personal and Family Glimpses of Remarkable People. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1889, p.30.

23. J.H. Newman. "Rationalistic Principles", p.76.

24. ibid., p.101. Note on Essay II. Jacob Abbott (1803-1879) was a prolific American author, whose writings included many stories for children. The work Newman was criticising was entitled, The Corner-Stone; or, a familiar illustration of the principles of Christian truth.

Section 6. Liberal Education and the Idea of the University

1. E. Copleston. Reply, p.23.

2. W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.38.

3. E. Copleston. Third Reply, Appendix, pp.18f. W.J. Copleston. Memoir, pp.27, 40, and 212f. E. Copleston. Reply, pp.140f and 175f.

4. Kett's book was entitled Logic Made Easy (see note 22 to section 1).

5. E. Copleston. Third Reply, Appendix, p.10.

6. Unlike Oriel, where all but a few fellowships were "open" (these last restrictions were removed in 1821), most colleges were restricted by their statutes to choosing new fellows from among founders' kin or people from specified localities. Compatibility with existing fellows was also a characteristic generally of more importance than intellectual talent.

7. W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.221.

8. E. Copleston. Reply, pp.143f.

9. See note 17 to section 2.

10. Ward and Heywood. op.cit., vol.2, p.33.

11. E. Tatham. A Second Address to the Members of Convocation at Large, on the proposed new statute respecting Public Examination, in the University of Oxford. Oxford: R. Bliss, 1807, p.8.

12. W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.210.

13. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.746.

14. E. Copleston. Reply, p.149.

15. ibid., p.146.

16. E. Copleston. "London University". Quarterly Review. vol.33, no.65, 1825, p.265. On this topic Copleston's search for moderation again reveals itself, for in the Reply he did concede that the best method would be one which combined both methods of instruction (see Reply, pp.145f and 153).

17. W.J. Copleston. Memoir, pp.114f. Corsi rather unfairly interprets this letter as advising Powell "not to spend much time in promoting academic science" and says that Copleston cared more for the public image of the university, than for the actual state of health of scientific disciplines" (Corsi. op.cit., pp.109 and 152). Admittedly, Copleston was concerned with the public image of the university and, as Ward says (Victorian Oxford, p.19), painted a rosy picture of Oxford's scientific studies in his Reply, but he does appear to have been genuinely concerned about

the languishing state of scientific and mathematical studies (see below for Copleston's attempts to improve the situation). His advice to Baden Powell was based not only on his views on university tuition, but also on a realistic appraisal of the situation - "I do not think [the lecture] would be well attended, and you might take a great deal of pains to no purpose".

18. E. Copleston. Reply, footnote pp.185f.

19. Newman took up the same cause later in the century in his Idea of a University. The debate is in fact an eternal one, and it is of particular interest at the present time.

20. Richard Lovell Edgeworth, 1744-1817. Father of the novelist, Maria Edgeworth.

21. S. Smith. "Essays on Professional Education. By R.L. Edgeworth". Edinburgh Review. vol.15, no.29, Oct. 1809, pp.50f.

22. E. Copleston. Reply, p.168.

23. E. Copleston. Second Reply, p.108.

24. E. Copleston. Reply, pp.111f.

25. ibid., p.176.

26. The low level of scientific studies at Oxford does not mean that Oxford dons took no interest in scientific subjects. Geology was of particular interest in the early decades of the nineteenth century because of its clash with the Biblical account of creation and the age of the world. W.H. Hale, an undergraduate of Oriel College, described in 1815 a "Geologizing Party", consisting of "all our Resident Fellows with many from other Colleges", which walked to Shotover Hill to study strata (MS. Oriel College. Extract from diaries and some letters written at Oriel College, Oxford 1814-1816 by W.H. Hale). In 1824 Hawkins humorously denied the charge that all in Oxford were "geologically mad", declaring that Oxford had "numerous sons absolutely untainted with all scientific mania" (MS. Oriel Coll. letter no.1225).

27. B.M. Add. MS. 59416 fol.80. Copleston also wished to encourage the study of mathematics. In 1824, when the examination statute was under review, he proposed an alteration to provide for the case "of extraordinary merit in a candidate of the second school, who will now have a chance of obtaining honours". He also agreed, despite his belief in the importance of logic, to making logic optional by allowing mathematics as an alternative, because the Hebdomodal Board could think of no other way of encouraging the study of mathematics (B.M. Add. MS. 59416 fol.94). This concern with encouraging mathematics suggests that Copleston may be the author of the anonymous paper in the Bodleian Library, which certainly looks to be in his hand-writing, and which apparently refers to the 1809 examination statute. This paper suggests an alteration to the statue to allow at least some weight to mathematics for the gaining of a testimonial (MS. Top. Oxon. c. 236, fol.20).

28. E. Copleston. Reply, p.113.

29. ibid., pp.160f.

30. ibid., pp.175f.

31. Ward and Heywood. op.cit., p.62. The Oriel fellows, A.D. Hendy (fellow 1803-1805) and H. Jenkyns (fellow 1818-1834) both wrote essays on the advantages of classical education. Other expressions of this view can be found in Drummond. op.cit., pp.80f; Jeune. op.cit., pp.13f; H.J. Rose. The Tendency of Prevalent Opinions about Knowledge Considered. A Sermon, preached before the University of Cambridge on Commencement Sunday, July 2, 1826. Cambridge: J. Deighton and Sons, p.11.

32. J. Davison. "Edgeworth's Professional Education". Quarterly Review. vol.6, no.11, 1811, p.177.

33. ibid., p.180.

34. B.M. Add. MS. 59416, fol.80.

35. J. Davison. Q.R. vol.6, p.169.

36. E. Copleston. Reply, p.157. Locke, like his later followers, had also asserted the uselessness of a classical education. Locke was taken to task by Newman in The Idea of a University. New York, London, Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947, pp.140ff.

37. It should be noted, however, that although Copleston used this terminology, he did not regard the faculties as realities, as some later writers did, but rather as terms of convenience. They were words, not things. This is shown by the fact that in his Commonplace book under the heading of "Nominalism", he included quotations from the Spectator which point out that the faculties are not separate entities but merely "different ways or modes in which the soul can exert herself" (Commonplace book, p.84).

38. T. Rothblatt. Tradition and Change in Liberal Education. An Essay in History and Culture. London: Faber and Faber, 1976, pp.127f.

39. ibid., pp.131f. Rothblatt argues that the examination statute of 1800 aided this change by its new emphasis on competition and the acquisition of testable knowledge (ibid., pp.124ff).

40. E. Copleston. Reply, p.106; Commonplace book, p.54.

41. J.W. Adamson (ed.). The Educational Writings of John Locke. C.U.P., 1922, pp.75f.

42. E. Copleston. Reply, p.173.

43. Rothblatt. Tradition and Change, p.158.

44. E. Copleston. Second Reply, pp.112f. See also Third Reply. Appendix, p.19. This view of Copleston's conflicts with his conviction that the business of education is to exercise the mind (v. above, p.109). Once students are taught to think, the questioning of received knowledge becomes inevitable.

45. E. Copleston. "London University", p.265.

46. ibid., p.266.

47. ibid., pp.267f.

48. ibid., pp.264f.

49. The Times, 9th Feb. 1825, quoted in M. Sanderson. op.cit., p.31.

50. Copleston believed that much nonsense was being talked at that time about the expense of university education. College charges, he claimed, were actually less than when he was an undergraduate, and the expenses complained of were not those of a university. "They are just what must arise from the fortunes of young men living together, not as boys, but as men; and if people of no fortune have the ambition to associate with the class above them, what right have they to object to the expenditure it involves? The same thing must occur in every other department of society". (A letter to his brother in 1825, quoted in W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.9). Copleston obviously had no qualms about the elitist nature of Oxford education. In his view an Oxford education was for the upper class, for gentlemen. As for opening the doors to women, the thought would not have crossed his mind.

51. Oxford did all that it could to oppose the new university, and in fact succeeded in preventing the university gaining a charter to confer degrees until 1836. Oxford objected that ecclesiastical privileges and endowments were annexed to arts degrees, which up to now had guaranteed membership of the Anglican church.

52. E. Copleston. "London University", p.260.

53. ibid., p.271. Compare Newman's argument in The Idea of a University. Richard Brent observes that the liberal Anglicans recommended the inclusion of religion in the curriculum "less on the ground of its intrinsic truth than as an important element in civilised society". R. Brent. The Emergence of Liberal Anglican Politics: The Whigs and the Church 1830-41. Oxford D. Phil. thesis, 1984, p.231. However, this is not entirely true in the case of Copleston. Whately took that position (see E.J. Whately. Life and Correspondence of Richard Whately, D.D., late Archbishop of Dublin. 2nd edition. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1868, p.109). Copleston's argument appears to be, not that religion was merely an important element in civilised society, but that it was an important part, indeed the most important part, of knowledge.

54. Sir James Graham, quoted in W.R. Ward. Victorian Oxford, p.350, note 87.

55. Quiller Couch. op.cit., p.330.

56. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.1308.

57. Bodl. MS. Eng. lett. c. 134, fol.67. Letter to Thomas Burgess, Mar. 1, 1832.

58. See E. Denison. A Review of the State of the Question respecting the Admission of Dissenters to the Universities. London: John Cochran, 1835, p.10.

59. There was no specifically theological training at Oxford, although most bishops did require from ordinands a certificate of attendance at the lectures of the Divinity Professors. The reservations which one can sense in Copleston's statement are due to Copleston's conviction that the education of the clergy still left much to be desired. In particular, he was of the opinion that a clergyman needed practical experience before undertaking sole care of a parish. This view was set out, in terms agreeing with Copleston's ideal of Liberal education, by the Oriel fellow E.G. Marsh, in two pamphlets: On Clerical Education: a letter addressed to the Right Reverend Father in God, Edward, Lord Bishop of Llandaff. London: J.G. and F. Rivington, 1832. On the Office of Deacon: a Second Letter, addressed to the Right Reverend Father in God, Edward, Lord Bishop of Llandaff. London: J.G. and F. Rivington, 1832.

60. Hansard. 3rd series. vol.37, p.1010. E. Copleston. Reply, pp.151f.

61. E. Copleston. "London University", p.270.

62. E. Copleston. Reply, p.149. A position also maintained in the 'thirties by Sir William Hamilton. The university, he argued, was a national establishment, as opposed to the colleges, which were private institutions.

63. E. Copleston. Reply, p.106.

64. ibid., pp.107-110.

65. ibid., pp.111f.

66. ibid., p.149.

67. ibid., pp.149 and 185. See also Bodl. MS. Eng. lett. c. 134, fol.65, where Copleston writes, concerning the establishment of a college for the education of the clergy in the diocese of St. David's, that small classes are best, for "the object of course will not be display to the world at large, but efficient instruction to the several individuals educated there".

68. E. Copleston. Reply, p.150.

69. For Copleston's thoughts on the use of college rooms, see Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.1335; "London University", pp.272-5; Hansard, 3rd series. vol.37, p.1010; B.M. Add. MS. 59416, fols. 100 and 106; T. Mozley. Reminiscences, vol.1, p.238.

Copleston was critical of Dr. Blackstone, the non-resident Principal of New Inn Hall, where there were no students. In 1817 fifteen additional sets of rooms were built on the south side of Bishop Robinson's wing at Oriel (J. Ingram. Memorials of Oxford. Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1837, vol.1, p.14). The admission of students rose to thirty in 1818, which was almost twice the average annual intake since 1800 (C.L. Shadwell. Registrum Orielense. London: H. Frowde, 1902). It was probably at this time that the number of tutors was raised from two to four. Extensions to Oriel appear to have been contemplated in 1818 (see J.W. Ward. Letters to the Bishop of Llandaff, pp.187f and 191), but Copleston was frustrated in this (see the note in Pattison's diary regarding this: "[Copleston] asked the Dean to give him up St. Mary Hall, and complained of his unreasonableness in refusing, 'though he offered him the best lodgings in High St.'" Pattison. Memoirs, p.203).

70. B.M. Add. MS. 59416, fol.100. See also J.W. Ward. Letters to the Bishop of Llandaff, p.239, where the indolence of some of the colleges is criticised.

71. W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.8.

72. Hansard. 3rd series. vol.29, p.520. E. Copleston. Reply, p.183. For a summary of Copleston's attitude, see R. Whately. Remains of Edward Copleston, pp.7-11.

73. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.1336.

74. Although, even so, it could hardly be said to serve the needs of the nation as a whole, for Dissenters and Roman Catholics were still members of the nation, even if they did not have full rights of citizenship.

75. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.3, fol.191. See also vol.1, fol.25; Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.1338; Hansard. 3rd series. vol.29, p.522. Copleston was convinced that the colleges had the right to insist on conformity, but appears to have had reservations about the university, for in a letter to Hawkins, he wrote, "I think that the Colleges", and then he inserted above this, "and perhaps the University", "have a fair right to require all their members to be conformists to the Church of England". Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.403.

76. Newman. Idea, pp.148-150.

77. W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.186.

78. Rothblatt. op.cit., pp.176f.

Section 7.

1. Overton. op.cit., pp.48 and 117f. For Copleston's criticisms of Oxford High Churchmen in 1814, see W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.47. Copleston claimed that these clergymen were only concerned with "converting the property of the church to their private advantage, leaving the duties of it to be performed how they can", whereas he was more of a High Churchman in that he "would have much greater exertions made to preserve the unity of the church: and to make in effect, as well as in name, a national church".

2. R. Whately. Remains, pp.28ff.

3. For Copleston's views on the Reform Bill, see Lland. Cath. MS. vol.2, fols. 26, 43, 56, 107; NLW Hughes letters, letter to T. Hughes, Nov. 5, 1831; W.J. Copleston. Memoir, pp.139ff.

4. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.1, fol.54. Letter to J.M. Traherne, Sept. 14, 1837.

5. ibid. vol.2, fol.13. Letter to W. Bruce Knight, March 18, 1829.

6. ibid. vol.2, fol.11. Letter to W. Bruce Knight, Feb. 21, 1829.

7. This conservatism is discernible in his opinion of movements such as Chartism: "Let them call it Chartism, or Socialism, or Jacobinism, or Owenism - it is all the same thing, under various denominations - the restlessness and love of change inherent in man - and which is easily worked up by artful demagogues and writers to a pitch of excitement, agreeable to themselves, and full of terror and dangers to the rest of society". ibid. vol.1, fol.76. Letter to J.M. Traherne, Nov. 17, 1839.

8. See above p.21.

9. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.1, fol.4. Letter to J.M. Traherne, Oct. 17, 1829. A letter of Lord Dudley (Jan. 28, 1814) similarly refers to Copleston's sense of frustration, and other letters indicate Copleston's desire for reform (J.W. Ward. Letters to the Bishop of Llandaff, pp.5, 91, and 235-9).

10. R.G. McPherson. Theory of Higher Education in Nineteenth-Century England. University of Georgia Monographs, no.4. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1959, p.27.

11. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.1, fol.76. W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.158.

12. I. Ker and T. Gornall. Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1979, vol.2, p.103. See also E. Copleston. Charge. 1839, where he praises Bacon's "Essay on Innovation".

13. This will become clear in the next chapter.

14. V.F. Storr. The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 1800-1860. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913, p.95.

Chapter 2

1. B.M. Add. MS. 59416. fol.90. Letter of Copleston to Lord Grenville, Dec. 10, 1821.

2. W.R. Ward. op.cit., p.58.

3. Whately hoped that this measure would raise the standard of logical studies at Oxford: "That which must be done by every one, will, of course, often be done but indifferently". Logic. 9th edit. p.xiii.

4. W. Monk (ed.) The Journals of Caroline Fox, 1835-71. London: Elek, 1972, p.167. See also T. Mozley. Reminiscences. vol.1, pp.24f. For the general surprise at Whately's appointment see ibid., pp.266ff., and anon. "Recollections of Archbishop Whately. By an old Oxonian". Christian Observer and Advocate. Nov. 1863. vol.63, p.873.

5. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.386. See also W. Copleston. Memoir, p.101.

6. H.P. Liddon. Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey. 4 vols. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1893, vol.2, p.425 and 434. Liddon's account is biassed in favour of the Tractarians. Liddon does, however, reveal that Hawkins, in compliance with a request from Pusey and Newman, had proposed that the Board delay their judgment of Tract 90 until Newman had had a chance to publish his explanation (see vol.2, p.174).

7. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letters nos.57-59; W.R. Ward. op.cit., pp.120f.

8. Liddon. op.cit., vol.2, p.319.

9. Church. op.cit., pp.326. The other two were Dr. Symons, Warden of Wadham, and Dr. Cardwell, Principal of St. Alban Hall.

10. [R. Whately]. "Dissertation on the Use and Importance of Unauthoritative Tradition". Quarterly Review. vol.21, no.42. April 1819, pp.352-9.

11. Church, for example, speaks of "Whately's school". (Church. op.cit., p.326), a view accepted by later historians. Tulloch states that Whately "may be said to have founded, or at least inspired with its most vigorous life the 'old' or 'early Oriel School'". (Tulloch. op.cit., p.42). Overton describes Whately as "beyond a doubt the leading spirit of that rising party which never rose..." (Overton. op.cit., p.119).

12. Newman. Apologia, p.61.

Section 1. Richard Whately

1. E.J. Whately. Miscellaneous Remains from the Commonplace Book of Richard Whately, D.D. late Archbishop of Dublin. Being a collection of notes and essays made during the preparation of his various works. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1865, p.230.

2. The exact date of when Whately was college tutor is uncertain. He was tutor in 1818, judging from a comment in his Remains (E. Whately. Misc. Remains, pp.103f), but he had pupils, possibly private, as early as 1814 (ibid., p.69). His private pupils included Nassau Senior and Samuel Hinds.

3. ibid., anon. "Recollections of Archbishop Whately", p.872.

4. (anon. "Recollections", p.871); Tuckwell. op.cit., p.59.

5. NLW. Hughes letters. Sept. 20, 1831.

6. See B.M. Add. MS. 59416. fol.90 Letter of Copleston to Lord Grenville, Dec. 10, 1821; Lland. Cath. MS. vol.3, fol.239. Letter to W. Bruce Knight, Jan. 20, 1836; Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.386; W. Copleston. Memoir, pp.101 and 206.

7. Bodl. MS. John Johnson Collection. Letter from R. Whately, Jan. 14, 1848. See also E.J. Whately. Life, p.205, letter to Copleston, July 7, 1845.

8. R. Whately. Logic, p.vii.

9. R. Whately. Remains of Edward Copleston, p.90.

10. Fitzpatrick. op.cit., p.10.

11. R. Whately. Logic, p.viii.

12. G.R. Evans. "'An Organon More Delicate, Versatile and Elastic': John Henry Newman and Whately's Logic". The Downside Review. vol.n.s.97, 1979, pp.179 and 181.

13. R. Whately. Logic, pp.vi and viii.

14. Copleston, like Newman, seems to have regarded the Logic as Whately's work (see Logic, p.vi). Whately claimed most originality in the Analytical Outline and the Treatise on Fallacies.

15. See p.151.

16. A.C. Fraser. Archbishop Whately and the Restoration of the Study of Logic. A lecture, delivered at the commencement of the academical session, Nov. 3, 1863. London and Cambridge: MacMillan and Co., 1864, pp.29f and 35. R.E. McKerrow, too, comments on the practical orientation of Whately's Introductory Lessons on Mind. R.E. McKerrow. "Richard Whately on the Nature

of Human Knowledge in Relation to Ideas of his Contemporaries". Journal of the History of Ideas. vol.42, no.3. July-Sept. 1981, p.439.

17. R. Whately. Logic, pp.151 and 175f. Compare chapter 1, pp.29-31 and 43ff.

18. ibid., p.155.

19. ibid., pp.15, 151f, 154.

20. Evans. op.cit., p.183.

21. R. Whately. Logic, p.162.

22. ibid., p.161. See also pp.165 and 169.

23. ibid., p.163. See also pp.170f.

24. ibid., p.172. Compare chapter 1, p.45.

25. ibid., p.37.

26. See Copleston's criticisms of Stewart, previous chapter, pp.30f. Sir William Hamilton complained that Whately made logic "convertible with Syllogistic", and stated his belief "that the laws of thought, and not the laws of reasoning, constitute the adequate object of the science". W. Hamilton. "Logic. The Recent English Treatises of that Science". in Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1866, p.134.

27. ibid., p.136.

28. See p.154; R. Whately. Use and Abuse, p.201; R. Whately. Elements of Rhetoric. London: John W. Parker and Son, 1857, p.13.

29. R. Whately. Logic, p.192.

30. ibid., pp.177f.

31. R. Whately. The Right Method of Interpreting Scripture, in what relates to the nature of the Deity, and his dealings with mankind, illustrated in a Discourse on Predestination, by Dr. King, late Archbishop of Dublin (bound with Use and Abuse 4th edit.). London: J.W. Parker and Son, 1859, Appendix 1, pp.327-329, where he quotes Hobbes' warning against mistaking counters for money. See also Five Sermons preached before the University of Oxford (bound with Use and Abuse 3rd edit.). London: John W. Parker, 1833, pp.352f; Essays on Some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion. Oxford: John Murray, 1825, pp.234f; The Errors of Romanism Traced to their Origin in Human Nature. London: B. Fellowes, 1830, pp.21f. See Five Sermons, pp.420f and Errors, p.335, for cases in which Whately considered the name to be important.

32. R. Whately. Logic, p.182; Use and Abuse, pp.62f; Errors, p.18 and 227; Right Method, footnote, p.331.

33. R. Whately. Logic, pp.7f, 13, 185. For a consideration of the importance of language in religious discussions, see part two of Lecture VI in Use and Abuse (pp.201-210), where the similarity with Copleston's views is very apparent. Copleston accused Locke of slipping into Realism: "in his chapter upon words [Locke] seems to be fully impressed with the truth of nominalism, but in all the rest of his argument he plunges headlong into realism..." Letter of Copleston to R.P. Ward, quoted in E. Phipps. Memoirs of Robert Plumer Ward, vol.2, p.123.

34. R. Whately. Peculiarities, pp.58f.

35. He wrote Introductory Lessons on Christian Evidences, which were originally published in Saturday Magazine 11 and 12, 15 July and 23 Dec. 1837, and 20 Jan. and 3 Feb. 1838.

36. E.J. Whately. Misc. Remains, pp.368f.

37. Boyd Hilton discusses the comparative popularity of Paley and Bishop Butler. The Age of Atonement. The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought, 1785-1865. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, pp.170ff. Hilton (p.4) notes a dissatisfaction with Paley's utilitarian ethics, a dissatisfaction which can indeed be discerned in Copleston (see Commonplace book, p.123). However, in his letter to R.P. Ward (see above) Copleston praises Paley's Natural Theology.

38. In the same year he gave a lecture on Paley's works and edited with annotations Paley's Moral Philosophy.

39. For a summary of the Bampton lectures see John Hunt. Religious Thought in England in the Nineteenth Century. London: Gibbings and Co., 1896.

40. A course of lectures delivered between 1827 and 1830, which amplified earlier lectures of 1819. See Overton. op.cit., p.168.

41. R. Whately. Logic, pp.261f.

42. R. Whately. Remains of E. Copleston, p.83.

43. R. Whately. Peculiarities, p.216.

44. R. Whately. Right Method, pp.340, 346f, 356f; Use and Abuse, p.184; Peculiarities, Note B p.92, 125f.

45. R. Whately. Right Method, pp.356f; Use and Abuse, p.93; Peculiarities, pp.258f; Errors, p.183.

46. See chapter 1, p.107.

47. R. Whately. Use and Abuse, p.198.

48. R. Whately. Peculiarities, p.xv. Like Butler's Analogy, Peculiarities addressed the deist, rather than the infidel.

49. ibid., p.196.

50. R. Whately. Use and Abuse, p.185. See Logic, p.217: "Nothing, indeed, can be more decidedly established by Scripture, - nothing more indistinctly explained (except as far as relates to us) than the doctrine of the Trinity".

51. R. Whately. Logic, 9th edit., p.217. The wording of the 1827 edition is different, but the thought is the same (see p.296 of 1827 edition).

52. R. Whately. Peculiarities. p.208. See also Use and Abuse, pp.19ff.

53. I Cor. 14.26 and Rom. 14.19.

54. R. Whately. Peculiarities, p.215.

55. ibid., p.200. Compare Copleston, chapter 1, p.40.

56. See Whately. Peculiarities, pp.197f.

57. ibid., p.215.

58. II Tim. 2.23 and I Tim. 6.4.

59. See Use and Abuse, pp.184-187.

60. Newman. Rationalistic Principles, p.57.

61. ibid., p.81. For Pusey's criticisms of Hampden see next chapter.

62. R. Whately. Essays on some of the Difficulties in the writings of St. Paul, and in other parts of the New Testament. London: B. Fellowes, 1828, p.312; Logic, pp.217f.

63. R. Whately. Errors, pp.204f.

64. R. Whately. Logic, p.218. On the surface Whately appears to contradict this position in Letters on the Church. By an Episcopalian. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1826. In that work he maintains, in agreement with Hawkins, that the ministers of the Church were intended by Christ to teach "the Christian religion in a regular and systematic form, to their children, and others, who may need instruction", "referring to the inspired writers for the proofs of everything advanced" (pp.67f). However, neither he nor Hawkins countenanced the systematisation of Scripture, that is, adding to or subtracting from the Bible, or in any way altering it in order to make it fit some theological system. They merely argued that when it comes to teaching the doctrines which are revealed in the Bible, then that teaching must be systematic, as, indeed, it must be in any

area of knowledge. For example, the teaching must be adapted to the age and capabilities of the learner, and advance from the simple to the more complex. The Bible itself, then, being unsystematic, might not be the best instrument for instructing beginners in the doctrines of Christianity, but the Bible provided the proof that what was thus taught was genuine Christian doctrine. This topic is discussed at greater length in the section on Hawkins.

65. R. Whately. Difficulties, pp.60ff and 198; Use and Abuse, p.191; Logic, note, pp.296f.

66. R. Whately. Essays on Some of the Dangers to Christian Faith, which may arise from the teaching or the conduct of its Professors. London: B. Fellowes, 1839, pp.143-149. See also E.J. Whately. Misc. Remains, pp.202ff.

67. R. Whately. Use and Abuse, p.91.

68. ibid., p.93.

69. ibid., pp.123f.

70. R. Whately. Logic, p.218.

71. A reference to Acts. 20, 26 and 27.

72. E.J. Whately. Misc. Remains, pp.375f.

73. R. Whately. The Kingdom of Christ delineated in Two Essays on our Lord's own account of His Person and of the nature of His Kingdom, and on the constitution, powers, and ministry of a Christian Church, as appointed by Himself. 2nd edit. London: B. Fellowes, 1842, pp.12 and 61f.

74. Akenson. Protestant in Purgatory, p.15.

75. R. Whately. Use and Abuse, pp.129f.

76. R. Whately. Errors, p.122; Dangers, p.88.

77. R. Whately. op.cit., p.173.

78. See chapter 1, p.70.

79. R. Whately. Use and Abuse, p.189. See also the quotation from Peculiarities, p.208, given above on page 161.

80. R. Whately. Dangers, pp.88f.

81. R. Whately. Peculiarities, pp.261f. Whately was well aware of the difficulty of drawing a line between those subjects which were and those which were not within the province of human reason. See Use and Abuse, p.187.

82. R. Whately. Peculiarities, p.264.

83. R. Whately. Elements of Logic. 2nd edit. London: J. Mawman, 1827, p.300.

84. R. Whately. Difficulties, p.18.

85. A point which Coleridge also made in his cautions against private judgment. "I condemn only", he wrote, "the pretended right of every individual, competent and incompetent, to interpret Scripture in a sense of his own, in opposition to the judgment of the Church, without knowledge of the originals or of the languages, the history, customs, opinions and controversies of the age and country in which they were written..." Quoted in C.R. Sanders. Coleridge and the Broad Church Movement. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1942, p.51.

86. R. Whately. Errors, p.82.

87. E.J. Whately. Life, p.146.

88. See chapter 1, p.59.

89. R. Whately. The Kingdom of Christ. Appendix. Note M, pp.281-284.

90. ibid., p.284.

91. Ker and Gornall. Letters and Diaries. vol.15, pp.456f.

92. R. Whately. Logic, p.48.

93. R. Whately. Dangers, pp.140f and 178f; Use and Abuse, p.104; Letters on the Church, p.67; E.J. Whately. Misc. Remains, p.253. For Whately's views on schism, see The Kingdom of Christ, Essay II, pp.200ff.

94. Lland. Cath. MS. vol.1, fol.3. Also quoted in W.J. Copleston, Memoir, p.130.

95. R. Whately. Errors, footnote, pp.193f.

96. The "power of the keys" was also exercised at baptism. See Kingdom of Christ, p.62. Copleston subscribed to this interpretation. See The Power of the Keys, pp.33ff.

97. R. Whately. Use and Abuse, pp.252f. See also Letters on the Church, pp.63f, 68f, and 76; Errors, pp.172, 207f.

98. R. Whately. Use and Abuse, pp.77f. See also pp.145f; Logic, p.111 (the same passage is in Errors, p.228); Errors, pp.235f.

99. R. Whately. Use and Abuse, pp.44f and 226f; Letters on the Church, pp.45f.

100. E.J. Whately. Misc. Remains, pp.96f. (Feb. 1818). See also p.256.

101. R. Whately. Use and Abuse, pp.254-257.

102. See above, pages 171f and 176-178.

103. E.J. Whately. Misc. Remains, p.348.

104. R. Whately. Dangers, pp.59-61, 125-128.

105. R. Whately. Five Sermons, pp.403f. Whately quotes the phrase "know nothing but Christ" again on pages 390 and 396. For the criticism of Copleston, see chapter 1, p.71.

106. Compare Copleston's views on self-appointed preachers (see chapter 1, pp.85f).

107. R. Whately. Five Sermons, p.409. See also ibid, p.411, Dangers, p.132, and E.J. Whately. Misc. Remains, pp.368f. (quoted above, p.155), for Whately's views on personal inspiration.

108. R. Whately. Peculiarities, pp.258f.

109. R. Whately. Difficulties, p.169. See also pp.122 and 194f.

110. ibid., pp.71f. Bentham's book was published in 1823. Whately's essay was perhaps also prompted by Belsham's translation of St. Paul's Epistles (published 1822).

111. R. Whately. Peculiarities, p.x. Copleston, too, thought that the study of natural religion should follow that of revealed. See Phipps. op.cit., pp.121f.

112. ibid., p.xi.

113. E.J. Whately. Life, pp.148f.

114. Grinfield. Vindiciae Analogicae. I, p.45, and E. Copleston. Enquiry, pp.138f. Copleston had denounced the practice of deducing a future state of retribution from ideas of God's justice. To the question of how else can we know it, Copleston answered, "we know it from the Scriptures, and we could know it in no other way". Whately also argued (in Essay I of Peculiarities) that it is Revelation, not natural religion, which reveals the doctrine of a future life.

115. R. Whately. Peculiarities, p.181.

116. R. Whately. Five Sermons, pp.309f.

117. Phil. 4.5; Romans 14.13; I Cor. 3.13; Ep. 4. 1-3; Col. 3. 12 and 13; 2 Tim. 22-25. Many of these were used by Whately as texts for sermons and lectures.

118. R. Whately. Five Sermons, p.308.

119. R. Whately. Use and Abuse, p.243.

120. R. Whately. Remains of E. Copleston, pp.58-63.

121. ibid., p.59.

122. ibid., pp.60-62. Whately expressed the same views in Dangers, Note C to Essay III, pp.183f.

123. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.389. April 1, 1831.

124. "Speak to their reason; you can always make them comprehend what is fit for them to know; my children know nothing they do not understand". Quoted in Fitzpatrick. op.cit., vol.1., p.243. See Errors, pp.59-67 on the religious education of children.

125. E.J. Whately. Life, pp.139-143.

126. W.R. Ward. Victorian Oxford, p.92; Tuckwell, op.cit., p.80.

127. E.J. Whately. Life, p.96.

128. Whately was quite happy to deliver Copleston's lectures on the church when he was Bosworth lecturer (see note 28 to chapter 1, section 4, p.397), and, indeed, thought them worthy of being included in Copleston's Remains and quoted in Kingdom of Christ (Appendix, Note K).

129. R. Whately. Letters on the Church, pp.83, 89, 115ff, and 157f. Whately also thought, unlike Copleston, that the alliance, besides being wrong, was inexpedient.

130. S. Rashid. "Richard Whately and the Struggle for Rational Christianity in the Mid-Nineteenth Century". Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church. vol.47, 1978, pp.294f.

131. R. Whately. Remains of E. Copleston, pp.67f.

132. See, for example, Peculiarities, pp.233, 242f, and 258f. These essays were written about 1820 (see p.xv).

133. R. Whately. Dangers, p.61.

134. R. Whately. Difficulties, pp.17f.

135. R. Whately. Errors, p.120.

136. R. Whately. Dangers, pp.59ff.

137. R. Whately. Logic, pp.172f. See also p.146.

138. R. Whately. Dangers, pp.71ff.

139. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS letter no. 241.

140. R. Whately. Dangers, p.111.

141. ibid., pp.88f and 125-128.

142. ibid., p.109.

143. ibid., p.241.

144. ibid., p.239.

145. See above, pages 169f; also R. Whately. Dangers, note pp.120f; Remains of Copleston, p.66.

146. E.J. Whately. Misc. Remains, pp.214f; R. Whately. Kingdom of Christ, p.315.

147. E.J. Whately. Misc. Remains, pp.281f.

148. Rashid. "Richard Whately and Rational Christianity", p.310. Akenson. Protestant in Purgatory, pp.38 and 53.

149. Church. op.cit., pp.255f and p.258.

150. W.R. Fey. John Henry Newman, Empiricist Philosophy and the Certainty of Faith. Oxford D. Phil. thesis, 1973, p.6. Fey is here using the quotation from Whately out of context. At the beginning of the Logic, Whately stated the view that the most appropriate intellectual occupation of MAN, as man, is reasoning (a version of the Aristotelian dictum that it is reason which distinguishes man from the other animals). Whately was not there making any reference to religious belief, but merely justifying the formal study of logic: "To understand the theory of that which is the appropriate intellectual occupation of Man in general, and to learn to do that well, which every one will and must do, whether well or ill, may surely be considered as an essential part of a liberal education". Logic, p.xf.

151. Fey. op.cit., p.7.

152. Quoted in Fey, ibid., pp.7f.

153. Compare ibid., p.23.

154. ibid., p.8.

155. See above, pp.149f.

156. R. Whately. Logic, p.217.

157. Corsi makes similar criticisms of the view of the Noetics given by Fey, although he overstates the case when he says that the Noetics believed that reason "was capable of proving that the Christian truth had to be accepted even against reason" (Corsi. op.cit., p.101). While the Noetics acknowledged that certain religious truths might appear incongruous, they took pains (especially Copleston) to show that such doctrines were not actually against reason (see, for example, Copleston's treatment of the problem of God's fore-knowledge and man's free-will. Chapter 1, above, p.48).

158. In the extract from his Commonplace book, given above, he acknowledges as much: "...a mere address to the understanding is not sufficient (and no one ever said it is) to make anyone a good Christian ..."

159. Fitzpatrick. op.cit., vol.1, p.221.

160. R. Whately. Peculiarities, p.166. Similarly, p.177. "...a cold address to the understanding - a mere chain of arguments - serves rather to teach men what they ought to do, than to excite them actually to do it; it may lead them to think rightly about religion, but not to feel and act rightly".

161. ibid., p.175.

162. R. Whately. Errors, p.120. On the need to seek the assistance of the Holy Spirit, see above, page 181.

163. Blanco White wrote of Whately's "logical or controversial character", and maintained that "he was spoilt at college". [J.H. Thom.] "Archbishop Whately and the Life of Blanco White". Theological Review. vol.4, 1867, p.116.

164. R. Whately. Peculiarities, p.178.

165. ibid., p.169.

166. Akenson. Protestant in Purgatory, p.39.

167. See chapter 1, p.107.

Section 2. Hampden's Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity

1. Hampden held curacies at Blagdon, Faringdon, Hungerford, and Hackney. He then resided in London, where he occupied himself writing his Essay and editing the Christian Remembrancer.

2. For bibliographic details, see the Dictionary of National Biography and H. Hampden. Some Memorials of Renn Dickson Hampden, Bishop of Hereford. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1871.

3. T. Mozley. Reminiscences, vol.1, pp.351f. See also chapter LVIII. Whately thought Hampden's style "dry" (Oriel. Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.201).

4. Opinions on the merits of the Bampton lectures are varied. The Tractarians, to say the least, were highly critical. Charles Marriott complained of "much confusion of thought", although according to Church, he appreciated Hampden as a philosopher. (A. Mozley. Letters of the Rev. J.B. Mozley, D.D. London: Rivingtons, 1885, p.189; Church. op.cit., p.79). Tulloch, however, discerned "seeds of thought in Dr. Hampden's writings far more fertile and enduring than any to be found in the writings of his chief opponents". (Tulloch. op.cit., p.74).

5. R. Whately. op.cit., p.x.

6. In the Preface of his work Hampden attempts to explain the distinction between the external and internal evidences. The external evidences consist of "the events which have accompanied the promulgation and establishment of the religion in question" - that is, the performance of miracles and the fulfilment of prophecy - and are concerned with religion considered as an historical event. The internal evidences, which are not limited to appeals to the heart, are concerned rather with a religion considered as a system of truth. Thus, the evidence of the natural world is rightly classed under the head of internal evidence, "inasmuch as it respects the internal system and character of the religion itself contained in any revelation". Hampden does, however, make the point that the evidence provided by natural religion is "also an evidence from external facts, inasmuch as it is conversant about the phenomena of nature". R.D. Hampden. An Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity; or, the Credibility obtained to a Scriptural Revelation, from its coincidence with the facts of nature. London: John Murray, 1827, pp.iif.

7. ibid., p.3.

8. See the Preface to the Essay.

9. ibid, pp.2f.

10. ibid., p.134.

11. Whately concerned himself mainly with proof. Newman, on the other hand, was more interested in conviction.

12. R.D. Hampden. op.cit., pp.243f.

13. ibid., p.245. Hawkins also accepted that miracles did not prove the divinity of Christ. See E. Hawkins. Principal Means, p.135.

14. R.D. Hampden. op.cit., p.11 and 105. This raises an interesting question. If disagreement can disprove the authenticity of a revelation, does this mean that the evidence of natural religion takes precedence over the evidence of miracles, in that it can show that a revelation, apparently supported by miracles, is not authentic?

15. ibid., p.278. Hampden continually referred to things revealed in the Bible as "facts", by which he meant not only historical facts but what would usually be called "doctrines". This terminology was to cause trouble later.

16. John Toland, 1670-1722. He published Christianity not Mysterious in 1696, and a collection of essays, Tetradymus, in 1720.

17. David Hume, 1711-1776. His Essay on Miracles was published in Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding in 1748.

18. D. Hume. Of Miracles. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1987, p.51.

19. R.D. Hampden. op.cit., p.228.

20. Hawkins, too, was familiar with Hume's essay. Burgon relates an interesting story regarding Hawkins' election to a fellowship:

> "It was Milman, since Dean of St. Paul's" - (the Provost related long after) - "who brought me tidings of my election. When he entered my rooms, he found me reading a book. After telling his news, he glanced on the book in my hand, and burst out, - 'But I'll tell you what it is, sir! If the Provost of Fellows had known what the book is which I have found you reading, they would never have elected you to a fellowship at Oriel'. The book I was reading", - (proceeded Hawkins, his feature assuming a look of the quaintest humour) - "was Hume's Essay on Miracles". J.W. Burgon. Lives of Twelve Good Men.

3rd edit. London: John Murray, 1889, vol.1, p.385.

21. Quoted in D.G. Wigmore-Beddoes. Yesterday's Radicals: a study of the affinity between Unitarianism and Broad Church Anglicanism in the Nineteenth Century. The Attic Press, Greenwood, S.C., 1971, p.61.

22. R.D. Hampden. op.cit., pp.172 and 174, and 307-309.

23. ibid., p.48.

24. ibid., pp.26f, 154f, 164, 277.

25. ibid., p.20.

26. ibid., p.22f.

27. Hampden refers to Copleston's Enquiry on pp.18, 60f, and 72. He also recommends Whately's edition of Archbishop King's Discourse on Predestination and Essay V of Peculiarities (see Hampden. op.cit., p.18). For the observation that "the imperfection of language, as an instrument of thought", also hinders our understanding of the Scriptures, see ibid., p.45.

28. ibid., p.17.

29. ibid., pp.76f, 95, 137, 251 and 276.

30. ibid., p.289.

31. ibid., p.291.

32. ibid., p.264.

33. ibid., pp.264ff and 274f: "No one, for instance, whatever his speculative opinions may be, can deny that there are signs of a moral administration in the course of the world. But the advocate of the doctrine of necessity, or the philosopher who denies the fundamental existence of right and wrong as elementary principles to which all actions must be referred, is fortified against the conviction resulting from the notions of liberty and moral fitness". Hampden's first sentence would be unlikely to go unchallenged today.

34. ibid., p.277.

35. ibid., pp.279f.

36. ibid., p.142. See also p.164, where Hampden refers to the "experimental test of its divine philosophy".

37. See chapter 1, pp.86 and 91.

38. R.D. Hampden. op.cit., p.185. Copleston had used a similar line of argument against fatalism in his Enquiry.

39. ibid., pp.191f.

40. ibid., pp.304f.

41. ibid., p.193.

42. ibid., p.305.

43. ibid., p.197.

44. ibid., p.282.

45. ibid., p.287. Whether this is in fact possible is a modern debate.

46. ibid., p.262.

47. ibid., pp.25f.

48. ibid., pp.293ff.

49. ibid., p.297.

50. For the contention that some things in religion are above reason, see ibid., pages 22ff, 109, 137, 250f. Hampden held that supernatural revelation is "conversant about matters confessedly above the reach of human investigation" and "many things must naturally appear in it hard to be understood, many things irreconcilable with themselves and with our previous ideas". "Mysteries must exist in a divine revelation" (pp.194-6).

Section 3. Edward Hawkins: private judgment and church authority, a middle way

1. Burgon. op.cit., vol.1, p.391.

2. William Chillingworth (1602-1644), an Anglican divine, wrote Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation (1638).

3. E. Hawkins. A Dissertation upon the Use and Importance of Unauthoritative Tradition as an introduction to the Christian Doctrines; including the substance of a Sermon, preached before the University of Oxford, May 31, 1818. Upon 2 Thess. ii.15. Oxford: J. Parker and F.C. and J. Rivington, 1819.

4. Newman. Apologia, p.35.

5. Tuckwell. op.cit., p.153.

6. See p.231.

7. Q.R. vol.21, no.42, April 1819, pp.352-9; Letters on the Church, p.67; Logic, p.258; Errors, pp.197 and 199; Dangers, p.181. Whately also expressed his agreement in a private letter to Hawkins: MS Oriel Coll. Lib. letter no.218.

8. Newman. Apologia, p.35.

9. Hawkins. Unauthoritative Tradition, p.14.

10. ibid., p.17.

11. ibid., p.18.

12. ibid., p.21.

13. Whately, for example, could not see the difference. Of Pusey's explanation of the difference between his theory of tradition and that of the Roman church, Whately wrote: "As for the distinction drawn between making Tradition on the one hand 'an authority co-ordinate with Scripture', on the other hand, 'subordinate and blended with Scripture', I cannot but think it worse than nugatory. The latter doctrine I have no scruple in pronouncing the worse of the two; because while it virtually comes to the same thing, it is more insidious, and less likely to alarm a mind full of devout reverence for Scripture". Kingdom of Christ, p.160.

14. Hawkins. Unauthoritative Tradition, p.68.

15. Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.1, p.165, vol.2, p.236.

16. Hawkins. Unauthoritative Tradition, p.22. W.R. Ward states that this idea, although "novel" to Newman, was a familiar argument in Oxford against the Bible Society.

17. E. Hawkins. Christianity not the Religion either of the Bible Only, or of the Church. A Sermon, preached at Maldon, July 28, 1830, at the Primary Visitation of Charles James, Lord Bishop of London. Oxford: J. Parker and C.J.G. and F. Rivington, 1830, p.23. Later Hawkins acknowledged the other purposes of the church. Its three main functions were to be an instrument of discipline, a channel of grace, and a witness, keeper and teacher of truth (E. Hawkins. Sermons on the Church, preached before the University of Oxford. London: B. Fellowes, 1847, pp.8 and 83ff). But even so, Hawkins was most interested in the first and third, that is, the problems of truth and unity, and how to reconcile these without sacrificing the one to the other.

18. E. Hawkins. Systematic Preaching Recommended, in a Sermon, preached June 4, 1825, in the Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Oxford, at the Visitation of the Venerable Archdeacon. Oxford: J. Parker and C. and J. Rivington, 1825, p.5.

19. ibid., p.6.

20. ibid., pp.7f.

21. Christian Observer and Advocate. No.203, Nov. 1818, p.740. See above, chapter 1, p.71.

22. A.P. Stanley. Stanley's Life of Thomas Arnold, D.D. London: John Murray, 1901, p.82.

23. They placed especial importance on the doctrine of the Atonement, which was, indeed, a characteristic of the age (see B. Hilton. The Age of Atonement). Copleston stressed the necessity of faith in the atoning virtue of Christ's death and declared the fundamental article of the Christian creed to be, that man is justified by faith alone (E. Copleston. Penitent Thief, p.180). Although, as Hilton remarks, Copleston cannot be seen as an Evangelical, he certainly had things in common with them.

24. Hawkins. Christianity, p.18.

25. ibid., p.16. By "whole society" Hawkins means the national church rather than the universal church. For his view of the principle of "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus", see p.236 and note 52 below. Hawkins' views on the church were similar to those of Copleston and Whately. The national church he regarded as a part of the universal church. For his views on the church see his Sermons on the Church and E. Hawkins. The Apostolical Succession. A Sermon preached in the chapel of Lambeth Palace, on Sunday, February 27, 1842, at the Consecration of the Right Rev. Ashurst Turner, Lord Bishop of Chichester. London: B. Fellowes, 1842.

26. Hawkins. Christianity, p.16.

27. ibid., pp.16f.

28. J.B. Mozley. Essays. vol.2, p.57.

29. R. Palmer. Memorials. Part I. Family and Personal. 1766-1865. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1896, pp.208f.

30. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter no.218.

31. Hawkins. Principal Means, p.x.

32. ibid., pp.29f.

33. ibid., pp.178f.

34. See Keble. Sermons, pp.202f.

35. Hawkins. Principal Means, p.180.

36. ibid., pp.210f.

37. ibid., pp.60f.

38. ibid., p.195.

39. ibid., p.199. See also a passage from Hawkins' sermon on The Ministry of Men (quoted in R. Whately. Kingdom. Appendix, note L, p.280), where it is argued that the early church and the Fathers held "substantial truth not unmixed with subordinate deviations from it".

40. Hawkins. Principal Means, pp.189ff and 279.

41. ibid., p.92. That he did not countenance neglect of the Bible is indicated by the fact that the last sermon of his Bampton Lectures ended with an exhortation to study the Bible.

42. E. Hawkins. The Duty of Private Judgment. A Sermon preached before the University of Oxford, Nov. 11, 1838. Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1838, p.11.

43. E. Hawkins. "Church Music", in Original Family Sermons. vol.5. London: John W. Parker, 1835, p.150. Compare Whately's quotation of St. Paul's precept, "in malice be ye children; but in understanding be ye men" (see above, p.190).

44. Hawkins. Principal Means, pp.25f; Private Judgment, p.12.

45. Hawkins. Private Judgment, pp.13f. Like Hampden, Hawkins considered that the opinion that religion was not within the province of reason to be a dangerous fallacy. He saw the conventional dichotomy of faith and reason as a convenient way of indicating the different sources of religious knowledge, viz. Revelation and the rational faculties. But although the source of knowledge is different in the two cases, "our knowledge, as knowledge, is the same in kind" (ibid.).

46. ibid., p.11.

47. Hawkins. Principal Means, pp.239, 247, 256.

48. Newman also stressed the role of antecedent probability or antecedent dispositions, by which he meant a bias of the mind which inclined a person to accept one thing rather than another as probable. Antecedent probability, Newman maintained, was a contributing factor to the assent of faith. Newman was more interested than were the Noetics in the question of whence comes the assent of faith, whereas the Noetics were more concerned with justifying that faith, with showing it to be reasonable. Newman was interested in "certitude" rather than "certainty", to use a Noetic type of distinction made by Newman himself. (See note 46 on page 434: "certitude was a habit of mind, ... certainty was a quality of propositions"). Newman was searching for something more than moral certainty in matters of faith. He objected that, according to Butler's (and the Noetics') interpretation, moral certainty was "only the highest step of mounting probabilities, not differing from probability in kind, but only in degree". This was, he thought, to equate moral certainty with practical certainty, and he asked: "in the experience of every day ... we are positively and absolutely and speculativé (not practicé only) certain of a thing by a combination of arguments, each of which is only probable; and if so why not in the case of Faith?" (Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.15, pp.456f).

49. Newman mentioned in the Apologia (pp.34f) his friendship with Hawkins between the years 1822 to 1825. Hawkins also seems to have been on good terms with Pusey, for he named his first son, born in 1833, after him (Burgon. op.cit., vol.1, p.441). Pusey was the child's godfather.

50. See Burgon. op.cit., vol.1, pp.430f. Liddon throws doubt on Hawkins' impartiality (op.cit., vol.2, p.315), but even in his account of events, it is possible to discern Hawkins' concern both for the correctness and the fairness of his actions (see vol.1, p.66; vol.2, p.174, 319 and 352). See above, pp.142f and note 6, p.410.

51. T. Mozley. op.cit., vol.1, p.38. It should be noted that Mozley is not here referring to the 'thirties and 'forties, but to the time of the election to the Provostship (that is, 1827). However, as a summary of Hawkins' character it applies also to the later period, although Hawkins was not so successful then in keeping the love and esteem of all. His friendship with Pusey was finally severed by the part he played in Pusey's suspension from the university pulpit.

52. Hawkins. Principal Means, pp.204f. Hawkins held that catholicity, while not the supreme test of truth, afforded a strong presumption in favour of certain doctrines, and conversely, that the absence of any Primitive testimony to an alleged doctrine was a strong negative argument against its truth. Compare Whately's treatment of the principle of "quod semper..." in Dangers, pp.138f, note L. Hampden viewed this principle as a relic of the Scholastic Theology (See R.D. Hampden. The Scholastic Philosophy Considered in its relation to

Christian Theology, in a course of lectures delivered in the year MDCCCXXXII, before the University of Oxford, at the Lecture founded by John Bampton, M.A., Canon of Salisbury. 3rd edit. Hereford and London: J. Head and Simpkin, Marshall, and Co., 1848, pp.354-363. Hawkins' greater readiness to consider the Tractarian point of view is perhaps indicated by Newman's rather surprised comment to Hurrell Froude, when reporting in 1833 on the progress of the tracts, "The Provost listens!" (A. Mozley. Letters of J.H. Newman. vol.1, p.419).

53. Hawkins. Private Judgment, pp.7-9. See also Principal Means, Sermon II, pp.65f and Sermon IV, pp.119 and 130f.

54. Hawkins. Private Judgment, pp.28f; Principal Means, p.228.

55. ibid., p.230.

56. Hawkins. Private Judgment, pp.20ff; Principal Means, p.8.

57. Hawkins. Principal Means, p.11.

58. ibid., p.19f.

59. ibid., p.273.

60. ibid.

61. ibid., pp.142f.

62. ibid., p.299.

63. ibid., p.143.

64. ibid., pp.63 and 95.

65. Hawkins. Systematic Preaching, pp.29-31: "Let it be once more repeated, that the attention to system which I would recommend is not designed to inculcate systematic divinity, much less to make Scripture bend to human systems of any kind. Let our sole object be edification, and that founded upon the peculiar doctrines of the cross..."

66. Hawkins. Principal Means, pp.232ff.

67. ibid., p.243.

68. ibid., p.255.

69. On this, see next chapter.

70. Hawkins. Private Judgment, see especially pp.17, 27f, and 31f. This idea of the duty rather than the right of private judgement is also to be found in a sermon of Keble's (v. Keble. Sermons. Sermon III, p.56). Newman, too, wrote in a letter of 1830 that he understood the duty but not the right of private judgement. (A. Mozley. Letters of J.H. Newman. vol.1, p.194).

71. Hawkins. Principal Means, pp.236f.

72. See, for example, R. Whately. Difficulties, p.9.

73. See p.265 for Keble's view of these texts.

74. Hawkins. Private Judgment, pp.11f and 16.

75. Hawkins. Principal Means, p.213.

76. ibid., p.238.

77. The Tractarians, of course, also believed in the need for a learned clergy, and the Tracts were intended to improve that learning (although they understood "learning" in a narrower sense than the Noetics and concentrated on strictly theological learning). But Keble spent most of his life in pastoral work, and consequently was more concerned with the faith of simple people than was Hawkins, who passed his life in Oxford.

78. Hawkins. Principal Means, p.280.

79. ibid., pp.277-281.

80. ibid., p.277.

81. ibid., p.281.

82. ibid., p.288.

83. ibid., p.289.

84. ibid., p.293.

85. Rannie. op.cit., pp.188 and 194.

86. Hawkins. Principal Means, p.294.

87. ibid., p.181.

Section 4. Oriel College

1. Baden Powell married Whately's sister-in-law, Charlotte Pope, in 1837.

2. Corsi, op.cit., pp.44f and 89.

3. B. Powell. "The Christian Sabbath", in The Christian Remembrancer. vol.8, April 1826, p.196.

4. See above, chapter 1, p.40.

5. See Corsi. op.cit., pp.209ff. For a reference to this difference of opinion see above, p.183.

6. This essay was by the Rev. J. Davies of Queen's College, Cambridge, and formed the first part of his subsequent book An Estimate of the Human Mind.

7. B. Powell. "Davies' Inquiry into the Just Limits of Reason", in the British Critic. n.s. vol.22, Nov. 1824, pp.447f. The above statement indicates not only Powell's acceptance of Noetic views on the limits of reason, but Noetic values such as the importance of correct reasoning and clear language. The idea that "sound views" were more important than originality was also typical of the Noetics. Whately held that the "love of novelty" tended "to create and strengthen parties" (R. Whately. Use and Abuse, p.61).

8. Their views on church and state, for example, were opposite. Arnold held that church and state should be identical, Whately that they should be entirely separate.

9. T. Arnold. Principles of Church Reform. London: S.P.C.K., 1962, p.148. See also Stanley. Life and Correspondence of T. Arnold, pp.201f.

10. T. Arnold. op.cit., p.156.

11. Stanley. op.cit., p.190.

12. T. Arnold. op.cit., p.156. Hampden said much the same in Scholastic Philosophy (Lecture VIII, pp.352f), although he was more concerned there to point out the difference between fact and theory. Theories, he held, may be of varying importance, but the facts of the Bible must all be equally received and followed as true; it is not up to anyone to decide which are more or less important. Hampden was recommending an inductive approach to the Bible, and Arnold agreed with this. Bonamy Price stated (in a sentence immediately preceding the passage quoted above) that Arnold's purpose in studying the Bible "was not, according to the usual practice, to establish by its means certain religious truths, but to study its contents themselves - to end, in short, instead of beginning with doctrine". (Stanley. loc.cit.).

13. Berens was a fellow of Oriel from 1799 to 1804, Marsh from 1805 to 1813, Barter from 1811 to 1825, and Tyler from 1812 to 1827.

14. Berens. Church Reform, pp.2 and 54f. The latter reference, without mentioning names, praises the qualities of the recently appointed bishops, of whom Copleston was one.

15. E.G. Marsh. On Clerical Education: a Letter addressed to the Right Reverend Father in God, Edward, Lord Bishop of Llandaff. London: J.G. and F. Rivington, 1832; On the Office of Deacon: a Second Letter, addressed to the Right Reverend Father in God, Edward, Lord Bishop of Llandaff. London: J.G. and F. Rivington, 1832.

16. E.G. Marsh. A Brief Survey of the Evidence and Nature of the Christian Religion, in Seventeen Sermons, preached in Hampstead Chapel, at Hampstead. London: R.B. Seeley and W. Burnside, 1829, pp.12ff.

17. W.B. Barter. On Party Spirit in the Church. A Sermon, preached in the Parish Church of Andover, on Friday, Sept. 16, 1831. At the Visitation of the Chancellor of Winchester. London: C.J.G. and F. Rivington, 1831, p.15. In a footnote to page 12, he refers to Whately's Use and Abuse, "to which admirable work I acknowledge myself indebted for many useful suggestions". Two years later, however, Barter was more critical of Whately in his An Answer to a Pamphlet, entitled "Thoughts on the Sabbath by Richard Whately, D.D. Archbishop of Dublin". London. J.G. and F. Rivington, 1833. Barter was not the only Oriel man to object to Whately's views on the Sabbath. R. Mant and G. Richards also disapproved, with Mant actually being prompted to publish his own thoughts on the subject (v. W.B. Mant. Memoirs of the Right Reverend Richard Mant, D.D., M.R.I.A., Lord Bishop of Down and Connor, and of Dromore: with an introductory sketch of the History of those Diocese from the beginning of the seventeenth century. Dublin: McGlashan and Gill, 1857, p.245).

18. Barter. Party Spirit, p.15.

19. ibid., p.19.

20. T. Mozley. Reminiscences, vol.1, p.81.

21. J.E. Tyler. A Sermon preached in the Chapel of Lambeth Palace, on Sunday, Jan. 13, 1828 at the consecration of the Right Reverend Edward Lord Bishop of Llandaff. London: C. and J. Rivington, 1828.

22. There were, of course, exceptions, some of which have already been mentioned, such as Evangelical criticism of Copleston's sermon of 1818 and Grinfield's of the Enquiry. In 1830 Whately's Thoughts on the Sabbath created a stir.

23. The first part was published in May 1828. The second part was published in May 1830.

24. Tulloch. op.cit., p.90.

25. E.B. Pusey. An Historical Enquiry into the Causes of the Rationalist Character Lately Predominant in the Theology of Germany. Part II. Containing an Explanation of the Views Misconceived by Mr. Rose, and Further Illustrations. London: C.J.G. and F. Rivington, 1830, pp.33f.

26. Liddon. op.cit., vol.1, p.166.

27. ibid., pp.168-176.

28. Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, p.80. See also Liddon. op.cit., vol.1, pp.165f. Liddon states that of Keble, Newman, and Blanco White, only Blanco White received it with entire approval. However, Newman agreed with Blanco White's description (see Ker and Gornall, vol.2, p.79), and although he advised Pusey to insert a protest against schism in the second part, the tone of the suggestion does not in any way imply criticism (see Liddon, p.167).

29. In 1826 Blanco White, on whom the University of Oxford had conferred the degree of M.A. in recognition of his services to the Anglican church, settled at Oxford and was made a member of Oriel College and Oriel common room. Although Blanco White formed good friendships with the Oriel men, he found his position at Oriel a bit awkward, for he was sensitive to the fact that junior fellows took precedence over him as he was not a fellow. He left Oxford in 1832 to join Whately's household in Dublin.

30. Newman. Apologia, p.39.

31. ibid., pp.34-38.

32. Sumner's teaching had many points in common with that of the Noetics. To give just one example, he wrote that, "The real faith of an inquiring mind must be raised upon the rational conviction of the understanding, and that conviction must rest upon historical evidence as its basis" (J.B. Sumner. Apostolical Preaching, Note, p.286).

33. Newman. Apologia, pp.37f.

34. This review, which was written between 29 September and 11 October 1829, was entitled "Poetry with Reference to Aristotle's Poetics", and is the first essay in Newman's Essays Critical and Historical.

35. A. Mozley. Letters of J.H. Newman. vol.1, p.192.

36. Tristram. Newman's Autobiographical Writings, p.211. This was written in February, 1828. Note that Copleston liked the sermon. This is perhaps an indication that doctrinal differences between Newman and the Noetics were not as serious at this time as they were to become in the 'thirties, although Copleston was always slower than the other Noetics to object to Tractarian views.

37. Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, p.15.

38. See A. Mozley. Letters of J.H. Newman, vol.1, p.192. The journal entry in 1828 also states that Whately, Hawkins, and Blanco White were verging towards Sabellianism, but this comment is in brackets and has the appearance of a later addition (see above, pp.257f). The Apologia (p.48) implies that Newman had not yet read Bull's work early in 1828.

39. Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, p.16. Newman's italics.

40. Newman criticised it in his tract on Rationalistic Principles, as did Pusey in Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements and the Thirty-nine Articles Compared. By a resident member of Convocation. With a Preface and Propositions extracted from his works. Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1836, pp.xvff.

41. Newman's diary entry for Saturday 23 May, 1829 reads: "began lecture in Chapel (Wh's) as Bosworth Lecturer (they were mainly Copleston's and Whately's writings)..." Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, p.144.

42. T. Mozley. Reminiscences, vol.1, pp.20ff.

43. Newman. Apologia, p.42; R.W. Church. The Oxford Movement, pp.29 and 31.

44. On Davison, see below.

45. T. Mozley. op.cit., vol.1, p.220. Mozley refers to the Noetics as the old Oriel school, and the Tractarians as the new school.

46. Keble. Sermons. Preface, pp.viiiff; Sermon III, pp.49f, 52f, 57. In the Apologia Newman speaks of the danger of Butler's doctrine, that is, "its tendency to destroy in [many minds] absolute certainty, leading them to consider every conclusion as doubtful, and resolving truth into an opinion, which it is safe to obey or to profess, but not possible to embrace with full internal assent" (p.43). Newman describes how Keble met this difficulty, but expresses dissatisfaction with Keble's solution as not even professing to be logical. His own solution would seem to indicate his debt to the Noetics, distinguishing as it does in Noetic fashion, between certainty and certitude, and asserting that

> certitude was a habit of mind, that certainty was a quality of propositions; that probabilities which did not reach to logical certainty, might create a mental certitude; that the certitude thus created might equal in measure and strength the certitude which was created by the strictest scientific demonstration...(p.44).

47. Keble. Sermons, pp.39ff.

48. ibid., p.74.

49. Corsi. op.cit., p.39.

50. ibid., p.83.

51. John Davison was a fellow of Oriel from 1800 to 1817. He died in 1834.

52. J.W. Ward. Letters, p.186. Copleston described Davison's book on Prophecy as "an able and valuable work", although he found fault with the seventh discourse, for there Davison took a different line from the one Copleston had taken in his Enquiry, on the question of divine prescience (W.J. Copleston. Memoir, p.100).

53. Bodl. MS. Eng. lett. d. 309, fols. 3 and 4. This letter, of 5 January 1818, indicates the healing of a rift between Copleston and Davison.

54. J.T. Coleridge. A Memoir of the Rev. John Keble, M.A. Late Vicar of Hursley. Oxford and London: James Parker and Co., 1880, p.268. This picture is corroborated by a comment of another of Copleston's correspondents: "Would not an Asiatic bishopric suit the autocratical spirit of Davison?" Bodl. MS. Eng. lett. d. 309, fols. 7-9. Letter from C.E. Grey, Aug. 3, 1822.

55. R. Whately. Right Method, footnote to page 271.

56. H. Hampden. Memorials, p.40; Tuckwell. op.cit., p.18. Hampden had been Davison's student and was probably influenced by him. Hampden's regard for natural religion may have been learnt not only from Bishop Butler, but also from Davison. For Davison's thoughts on the importance of natural religion, see his Primitive Sacrifice in Remains and Occasional Publications of the late Rev. John Davison, B.D., formerly fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, author of Discourses on Prophecy. Oxford: J.H. Parker and J.G.F. and R. Rivington, 1840, pp.91ff.

57. J.T. Coleridge. op.cit., p.266.

58. ibid., pp.119f and 220.

59. A. Mozley. Letters of J.B. Mozley, p.33. This seems also to have been Newman's opinion in later years. See Newman. The Idea of a University, pp.139f, and "John Davison, Fellow of Oriel" in Essays Critical and Historical, vol.2, p.375, where he describes Davison as "one of the most original thinkers of his day, deep, serious, reverential, various" (this essay was originally published in the British Critic, 1842). In 1827, however, Newman classed Copleston with Davison as "two minds wider and deeper than any two known minds of the present day" (Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, p.8), and shared in the Noetics' admiration of Copleston.

60. T. Mozley. Reminiscences. vol.1, p.370. See also H. Hampden. Memorials, p.109.

61. T. Mozley. Reminiscences. vol.1, p.372.

62. Newman. "John Davison", pp.408f. See also A. Mozley. Letters of J.H. Newman, vol.1, pp.100f, where Newman places Davison with Copleston, Whately, Hawkins, and Arnold as the "principal ornaments" of the old Oriel school.

63. Newman. "John Davison", pp.406f.

64. J. Davison. "Tracts on Baptismal Regeneration" in Quarterly Review. vol.15, no.30, 1816, p.486; Primitive Sacrifice, p.158.

65. Davison. Primitive Sacrifice, pp.138ff.

66. Tuckwell. op.cit., p.18.

67. Keble, by comparison, was not one to spar with Whately in common room debates.

68. See above, chapter 1, p.78, where the passage from Pusey is quoted. Copleston cites the passage in vindication of Pusey and states that the whole of Pusey's letter to the Bishop of Oxford "is an able and learned exposition of [Pusey's] views, and a decisive answer to the current misrepresentations of [Pusey's] opinions" (E. Copleston. Pastoral Address, pp.87f). Compare Whately. Kingdom of Christ, pp.158-170 (part of this is quoted above; v. note 13, p.425.

69. Rannie. op.cit., p.184.

70. It should be kept in mind that in the 'twenties neither Whately nor Keble were continuously resident in Oxford. Keble resigned his tutorship in 1823 to retire to Fairford, and Whately was rector of Halesworth from 1822 to 1825.

71. Newman. Apologia, pp.39 and 42.

72. Rannie. op.cit., p.184.

73. V.H.H. Green. Religion at Oxford and Cambridge. London: SCM Press, 1964, p.264.

74. Church. op.cit., p.69.

75. Keble. op.cit., Sermon I (1822), p.22.

76. It must be remembered, however, that Hampden acknowledged the importance of conscience (see above, p.217), and Hawkins in Principal Means repeatedly linked reason and conscience (see above, p.235).

77. Keble. op.cit., Sermon II (1823), p.39. See also Sermon III.

78. ibid., Sermon III, pp.56f.

Chapter 3

Section 1. Oriel divided

1. Samuel Hinds (1793-1872) graduated as B.A. in 1815. In 1827 he was Whately's vice-principal at St. Alban Hall. From 1831 to 1833 he was Whately's domestic chaplain in Ireland, a post which he resigned due to ill-health. In 1843 he returned to Ireland as one of Whately's chaplains. In 1849 he was appointed Bishop of Norwich. Charles Dickinson (1792-1842) was one of Whately's chaplains in 1832, and became his domestic chaplain and secretary on the retirement of Hinds in 1833. He became Bishop of Meath in 1840.

2. Peel's resignation was read out in Convocation immediately after the passing of a petition against Roman Catholic claims.

3. This view was espoused by Blanco White. See Thom. Life of Blanco White, vol.1, pp.495ff. It was also Copleston's view (see chapter 1).

4. W.R. Ward. Victorian Oxford, p.75.

5. Newman. Apologia, p.39. Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, p.123.

6. A. Mozley. Letters and Correspondence of J.H. Newman, vol.1, p.220.

7. ibid., p.153. Pusey also thought highly of Hawkins. At the time he wrote to the fellow H. Jenkyns: "As a member of the board of Heads of Houses, which we are also electing, I can conceive no one whose practical, moderate, and unbiased views, yet not slavishly adhering to everything hereditary, would, as far as a single opinion and voice have influence, be more serviceable to the University". Liddon. op.cit., vol.1, p.137.

8. Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, pp.122, 124f, and 248.

9. Pattison. Memoirs, pp.85 and 90. See also pp.67 and 84.

10. ibid., p.85.

11. ibid., p.99.

12. E.G.W. Bill. University Reform in Nineteenth-Century Oxford. A Study of Henry Halford Vaughan, 1811-1885. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1973, p.56.

13. Quoted in D. Newsome. The Parting of Friends. A Study of the Wilberforces and Henry Manning. London: John Murray, 1966, p.194.

14. T. Mozley. op.cit., vol.1, p.19.

15. A. Mozley. Letters and Correspondence of J.H. Newman, vol.1, pp.130 and 140.

16. This seems to have been the opinion of Wilfred Ward. See Newsome. op.cit., p.95.

17. Pattison states in his Memoirs (p.97) that Newman would have made such a use of his office.

18. Storr. op.cit., p.95.

19. Tristram. op.cit., pp.92, 98 and 102.

20. Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, p.97. Letter to R.J. Wilberforce, Sep. 23, 1828.

21. ibid., pp.247f. Compare the "Autobiographical Memoir" (Tristram. op.cit., p.99): "They did not formally communicate to the Provost what they were doing, though he was from the first made aware of it..." Actually, Newman and the other tutors only explained the new system (begun in January 1829) to Hawkins when it became obvious, during a discussion concerning the award of an exhibition, that the tutors did not know all of each other's students (that is, at the end of May, 1829). See Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, pp.248 and 145.

22. ibid., p.118. Letter to S. Richards, Feb. 6, 1829.

23. ibid., p.247.

24. Tristram. op.cit., p.100.

25. It would seem that there were precedents for the position taken by Newman. See Copleston's letter to Hawkins (3 May 1830), quoted in Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, p.213.

26. Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, p.248.

27. ibid., pp.117f.

28. Not that Hawkins and Newman agreed on all matters of religion. See chapter 2 (p.254f) for Hawkins' disapproval of Newman's Easter sermon of 1827. Newman and Hawkins also disagreed over compulsory attendance for undergraduates at holy communion (see Tristram. op.cit., pp.89f). But there is no evidence that Newman suspected the existence of important differences of religious principle which he later identified as at the base of the dispute, or that such a suspicion dictated his behaviour.

29. This is perhaps suggested by Newman's letter to Robert Wilberforce, Sep. 23, 1828 (Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, p.97), as well as by his letter to Richards.

30. Tristram. op.cit., p.87.

31. Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, p.231.

32. Burgon. op.cit., vol.1, pp.411f; Tuckwell. op.cit., p.155.

33. Quoted in Bill. op.cit., pp.56f.

34. Liddon. op.cit., vol.1, p.299; Tuckwell. op.cit., p.156.

35. Tristram. op.cit., pp.104 and 107.

36. T. Mozley. op.cit., vol.1, p.231.

37. Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, pp.213f. This debate over the respective powers of the Heads and tutors was an issue which would assume greater importance in the years to come. The Tutors' Association, formally organised in 1852, wished to weaken the power of the Heads and proposed that a new, more representative, Hebdomadal Board be established. The university reforms of 1854 actually replaced the old Hebdomadal Board with a Hebdomadal Council, elected by Congregation, and consisting of six Heads, six Professors, and six members of Convocation (as well as the Vice-Chancellor and the Proctors).

38. T. Mozley. op.cit., vol.1, p.230; Tuckwell, op.cit., p.156.

39. For the above quotations see Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, pp.223, 230 and 240.

40. Tristram. op.cit., p.92. David Newsome rightly states that Hawkins' objections arose from fear of favouritism (op.cit., p.93). However, his account of events is misleading in that he states that Hawkins did not intervene at first, and that when he did intervene it was because of vexation at "the triumph of the Church party in securing the election of Sir Robert Inglis". Hawkins' demand that the tutorial reforms be rescinded is depicted as retaliation for Newman's support of Inglis. The truth is that Hawkins did not intervene at first because he did not know of the reform, and that as soon as he did learn of it (three months after the Peel election), he demanded that it be altered. See Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, p.248: "we must alter this next term, as the difficulty must not exist".

41. E. Copleston. Reply, p.156.

42. A.R. Vidler. The Church in an Age of Revolution. Penguin, 1983, p.47; E.L. Woodward. The Age of Reform 1815-1870. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1949, pp.331f. Whately described the situation in the Irish Church as follows: "In large districts of Ireland the Established Church is such as, by the help of a map, you might establish in Turkey or in China - viz. no place of worship, no congregation, no payment". (E.J. Whately. Life and Correspondence of Richard Whately, D.D. Late Archbishop of Dublin, 2 vols., 1st edit. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1866, vol.1, p.112).

43. ibid.

44. See chapter 1, p.74. For Copleston's attitude to the Irish Church Bill see Lland. Cath. MSS. vol.1, fol.17 and vol.2, fols. 106 and 107.

45. A. Mozley. Letters and Correspondence of J.H. Newman, vol.2, pp.62f. Letter to Whately, Oct. 28, 1834.

46. ibid., vol.1, p.395. Newman's accusation that Whately's actions in Ireland were prompted by his "love of applause" is patently unfair to Whately. Copleston, in fact, was of the opposite opinion, that Whately in general showed too much indifference to public opinion (see chapter 2, p.142).

47. For descriptions of the prevailing atmosphere of trepidation, see Church Oxford Movement, p.100-104.

48. A. Mozley. Letters and Correspondence of J.H. Newman, vol.1, pp.243 and 395.

49. Newman. Apologia, p.67.

50. A. Mozley. Letters and Correspondence of J.H. Newman, vol.1, p.175.

51. ibid., vol.2, p.115. Letter to his aunt, Aug. 1835.

52. ibid., vol.2, p.77. Letter to R.H. Froude, Jan. 18, 1835.

53. ibid., vol.2, p.116.

54. ibid., vol.2, pp.63 and 69. Letter to Whately, Oct. 28, 1834 and letter to Hampden, Nov. 28, 1834. These letters do not show Newman in his best light. The tone (especially of the letter to Whately) is arrogant and objectionable, and was bound to give offence. In neither letter did Newman impugn the personal faith of Whately or Hampden, but he suggested rather that their teachings might lead others into infidelity. It is ironic that in 1838 the Bishop of Oxford objected to some expressions in the Tracts "as likely to lead others into error; he feared more for the disciples than the masters" (ibid., vol.2, p.230).

55. Newman. Apologia, pp.73f.

56. A. Mozley. Letters and Correspondence of J.H. Newman, vol.2, pp.143f. Letter to Keble, Jan. 30, 1836.

57. Newman's Elucidations did not look at the main purpose of Hampden's book or treat it as a whole, but merely selected passages which could be interpreted as unorthodox.

58. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter H.4a

59. A. Mozley. Letters of J.B. Mozley, p.54.

60. T. Arnold. "The Oxford Malignants and Dr. Hampden". The Edinburgh Review, vol.63, no.127, April 1836, pp.225-239.

61. R. Whately. Remains of Edward Copleston, pp.56f, 62 and 67.

62. J.H. Newman. Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements. Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1836, p.3.

63. T. Mozley. op.cit., vol.1, p.352. It is possible that Mozley is getting mixed up with a later letter of Rose to Newman, complaining of Hampden's Moral Philosophy Lectures (see immediately below).

64. A. Mozley. Letters and Correspondence of J.H. Newman, vol.2, pp.14f, 23ff and 133.

65. ibid., vol.2, p.150. Letter to J.W. Bowden, Feb. 17, 1836.

66. R. Whately. Remains of E. Copleston, pp.63f and 71f.

Section 2. Hampden's Bampton Lectures

1. Liddon. op.cit., vol.1, p.373. Liddon states that the report "betrays Pusey's hand" (p.372).

2. See E. Pusey. Dr. Hampden's Past and Present Statements Compared. Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1836, pp.3f: "no theologian ever cast any imputation on the direct personal faith of Dr. Hampden, although many feared that it, and much more the faith of those who should follow his teaching, would be ultimately endangered by the theological principles which he holds".

3. R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.xx.

4. A. Mozley. Letters of J.B. Mozley, p.190.

5. Quoted in Newsome. op.cit., p.339, where an account of the background to this letter is given.

6. H. Hampden. op.cit., p.152.

7. A. Mozley. Letters of J.B. Mozley, p.189.

8. R. Palmer. op.cit., vol.1, p.213. Church puts it a little differently, maintaining that Hampden "did not consciously mean all that he said" and implies that Hampden was muddleheaded. Church, op.cit., pp.165f.

9. R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.149.

10. ibid., pp.374ff.

11. ibid., p.378.

12. Oriel College Library. MS. letter H-4a. 18th Feb. 1836.

13. Newman. Elucidations, p.5.

14. R.D. Hampden. Observations on Religious Dissent, with particular reference to the Use of Religious Tests in the University. Oxford: B. Fellowes, 1834, 1st edition, pp.14f. In the second edition (also 1834) this passage was suppressed.

15. R.D. Hampden. Parochial Sermons Illustrative of the Importance of the Revelation of God in Jesus Christ. London: C. and J. Rivington, 1828, p.25.

16. R.D. Hampden. Inaugural Lecture read before the University of Oxford in the Divinity School on Thursday, March 17th, 1836. 2nd edition. London: B. Fellowes, 1836, pp.32f; R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.xlf.

17. Oriel College Library. MS. letter H-4a.

18. R.D. Hampden. Parochial Sermons, pp.27f.

19. ibid., p.30.

20. The same letter.

21. R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, pp.187, 224f, 252, 387.

22. ibid., p.391.

23. ibid., pp.145-150.

24. Newman. Elucidations, pp.29f. The whole tenor of Newman's Elucidations is that Hampden's Bampton Lectures tend to Unitarianism, but see especially the section on the Trinity. See also Pusey. Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements, pp.xixff and p.62; Dr. Hampden's Past and Present Statements Compared, Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1836, p.4.

25. R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, pp.xlff and lixff.

26. ibid., p.liii.

27. ibid., pp.lxvf.

28. ibid., p.lxvi.

29. ibid., p.351.

30. ibid., p.350.

31. ibid., p.371. See also p.357 and Introduction, p.xliii.

32. See Introduction, pp.liiif, and Lecture VIII, pp.366f.

33. ibid., p.352.

34. ibid., p.lvi.

35. ibid., pp.350f.

36. Copleston made the same point in 1810. See chapter 1, pp.44f.

37. R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, pp.xlviif.

38. ibid., pp.256f and 386f.

39. ibid., p.355.

40. ibid., pp.70f.

41. ibid., pp.87f.

42. ibid., p.54.

43. ibid., pp.363f.

44. ibid., p.55.

45. ibid., p.xxvii.

46. ibid., p.lxxxiv.

47. ibid., p.xxi.

48. ibid., p.xxiii.

49. ibid., p.xxvi.

50. A. Mozley. Letters of J.H. Newman, vol.2, p.77.

51. Although this suspicion might seem a natural result of Hampden's position, as Newman maintained, Hampden himself did not entertain it. He believed that the doctrine of the Trinity was a revealed "fact".

52. R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.xxvi. Hampden gives as an example, "Justification".

53. ibid., p.53. For other statements concerning the persistence of logical theology, see pp.201, 257, 364, 384-7.

54. ibid., p.56.

55. ibid., p.366.

56. ibid., p.367.

57. ibid., p.201.

58. ibid., p.199. See also pp.90f.

59. ibid., pp.203f. See also pp.374f.

60. ibid., p.146.

61. ibid., p.147.

62. ibid., p.54.

63. ibid., pp.343f and 200.

64. Pusey. Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements, p.xvii.

65. Oriel College Library MS. letter H-5. 19th March, 1836.

66. See chapter 1, p.57. Copleston's most dogmatic statement on this subject is to be found in his earliest published sermon (1805): "Mere philosophical truth, independent of moral and religious instruction, is not the object of the inspired writings, and is never to be found there". A Sermon, Preached for the Devon and Exeter Hospital, p.7.

67. Pusey. Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements, p.xvi.

68. See chapter 2, p.211.

69. Pusey. ibid., p.xix.

70. R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, pp.xlviiif.

71. ibid., p.xlv.

72. Newman. Idea of a University, p.324.

73. In the Idea Newman argued that not only the "Religion of the Bible", but also "Historical Religion" (or Antiquity) and "Physical Theology", were instances of the application of the inductive method to theology. (Idea, pp.328ff).

74. ibid., p.323.

75. R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.lvii.

76. ibid., pp.lxvif.

77. ibid., p.lvii.

78. ibid., p.lxviii.

79. ibid., p.xlix.

80. ibid., p.lvii.

81. See above, p.299.

82. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, pp.200f.

83. ibid., p.199.

84. Hampden. Observations, p.17.

85. In other words, Hampden held that the Bible revealed the "fact" that there is only one God, and it also revealed the "fact" of the three-fold nature of God - Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Hampden maintained that we should accept these "facts", but not try to reconcile or explain them. Compare Copleston's argument regarding God's foreknowledge and man's free-will.

86. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, pp.257f.

87. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.xlviii; Observations, pp.17f.

88. Hampden. Observations, pp.17f.

89. ibid., p.18.

90. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.1i. This leaves an opening for drastic "improvements", for it is easy to assert that what is being proposed for belief are not new truths, but merely old truths, purified of corruptions or more clearly explained.

91. ibid., p.1ii. The wording of this passage follows closely that of Copleston's letter of advice (Feb. 18, 1836). See chapter 1, pp.91f, where Copleston's letter is quoted.

92. Compare Hampden's attitude to the articles of religion (see pp.319f).

93. Hampden. Observations, p.14. The same is implied in the Bampton Lectures where he speaks of the natural realism of the human mind, for realism, Hampden thought, led inevitably to speculation (see Scholastic Philosophy, pp.332 and 380).

94. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.1xxif. Hampden, of course, also allowed moral conclusions: "Moral arguments there are in abundance, from every page and passage of Scripture" (Observations, pp.12f).

95. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.1xx.

96. ibid., p.1xxi.

97. ibid., pp.1xxiii-v.

98. ibid., p.353.

99. ibid., pp.353f.

100. ibid., pp.370f.

101. ibid., p.372.

102. See Hampden. Observations, pp.17-90. This topic regarding the truth of opinion versus the truth of fact is a good example of the confusion and misunderstandings caused by Hampden's terminology.

103. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.146.

104. Hampden. Observations, p.18.

105. See above, p.291.

106. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.376.

107. ibid., pp.376f.

108. ibid., p.380.

109. Hampden. Observations, pp.42f and A Postscript. London: B. Fellowes, 1835, p.13.

110. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.383.

Section 3. Tractarian criticism of the Bampton Lectures

1. See above, p.289.

2. R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.391.

3. See above, p.296.

4. As mentioned above (p.289), the Hebdomadal Board in 1847 expressed confidence in his orthodoxy. Hampden was subsequently critical of parts of Essays and Reviews, insisting on the historical nature of Revelation, and also of Colenso's book (see H. Hampden. op.cit., pp.210-221, 230ff).

5. R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, pp.145f.

6. R.D. Hampden. Observations, pp.20f.

7. Similarly, he held that Arian and Sabellian ideas of Christ were erroneous. These were not supported, Hampden thought, by the evidence of Scripture (v. Scholastic Philosophy, p.lxviii).

8. ibid., pp.lxxivf, 146, 150.

9. This is also indicated by the distinction between theological truths and theological opinions (v. above, pp.315ff). If all opinions were equal, then there could be no distinction between truths and opinions. Either all opinions would then become truths (which creates a problem when opinions conflict) or else they would all be merely opinions.

10. In the Observations Hampden seems to imply that this is the case even with Unitarians (Observations, pp.19ff). However, in so far as Unitarians denied the divinity of Christ, Hampden must have considered that they denied what he saw as a fact of Scripture.

11. R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, pp.lxxxivf.

12. ibid., p.lxxxvii.

13. H. Hampden, op.cit., p.230.

14. R.D. Hampden. A Postscript. London: B. Fellowes, 1835, p.14.

15. R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.200.

16. R.D. Hampden. Observations, pp.31f.

17. Newman's rejection of Hampden's position thus foreshadows his rejection of the Anglican church.

18. R.D. Hampden. Scholastic Philosophy, p.lxxxv.

19. For comments on this see Conclusion.

20. Especially the influence of German theology.

21. Arthur Hugh Clough (1819-61). Clough was educated at Rugby under Thomas Arnold, and was an undergraduate at Balliol College and then fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. Henrietta Hampden was one who saw Clough as an example of Tractarianism causing a loss of faith (H. Hampden. op.cit., footnote, p.89).

22. ibid., p.177. For Whately's views, see chapter 2 above, p.192.

23. D.G. Wigmore-Beddoes. Yesterday's Radicals, pp.106-110.

24. Corsi. op.cit., p.138. "Political" here refers to the intention of embarrassing Hampden.

25. T. Mozley. op.cit., vol.1, p.357. Mozley's evidence for this is that Blanco White and Hampden had as mutual friends William Bishop and Philip Shuttleworth, and he concludes, "Here, then, were the two Bishops, Shuttleworth, Blanco White, and Hampden, all in a bond of close intimacy in 1814". However, Blanco White makes no mention of Hampden in his account of this early stay in Oxford, but only lists as his circle of acquaintance Shuttleworth, Nicoll, Parsons, the Duncan brothers and the Bishop brothers (Thom. The Life of Blanco White, vol.1, pp.216f).

26. T. Mozley. op.cit., vol.1, p.230.

27. ibid., vol.1, pp.352 and 354; J.B. Mozley. Essays. vol.2, footnote p.100; Wigmore-Beddoes, op.cit., p.109.

28. Wigmore-Beddoes. op.cit., pp.107, 109, 110. D. Newsome also quotes this statement of Liddon's and takes a similar view of the importance of Blanco White. For example, he says "Hampden certainly first learnt from him to distrust all theological systems, and there is some substance in the common allegation that behind Hampden's Bampton Lectures of 1832 lay the fertile, enquiring mind of this sad, unusual man" (Newsome. op.cit., pp.66f). Similarly, after quoting from Blanco White, he comments, "Here is the true spirit of Noeticism, expressed in the words of its true founder - the spirit of bold, though respectful, enquiry, calculated to invigorate a moribund theology and to alleviate the acerbity of religious disputation" (ibid., p.87).

29. T. Mozley took part in the Tractarian Movement. Liddon's hostility is amply illustrated in his Life of Pusey; see, for example, his derogatory comments on the supposed toleration of the Noetics (vol.1, pp.384f, and vol.2, pp.285f).

30. H. Hampden. op.cit., p.29.

31. T. Mozley. op.cit., vol.1, pp.354ff.

32. Tuckwell. op.cit., pp.136f.

33. Tulloch. op.cit., p.45.

34. Corsi. op.cit., p.137. Blanco White's diary shows that this was a two-way process; that they sought each other's opinion on their sermons (v. Thom. Life of Blanco White, vol.1, p.438).

35. Newsome. op.cit., p.89.

36. These terms suggest familiarity with Kant, and indeed Blanco White was reading German philosophy in the 'thirties and expressed admiration for the moral portions of Kant's and Fichte's works (v. Thom. Life of Blanco White, vol.3, p.76). On imagination, conscience, faith, and reason, see vol.2, pp.125f, 221f, 230, 235, 277f, 283; vol.3, pp.8-12, 116f, 121ff, 160, 387.

37. Wigmore-Beddoes. op.cit., p.109.

38. Thom. Life of Blanco White, vol.1, pp.261f.

39. ibid., vol.1, p.358.

40. R.D. Hampden. Philosophical Evidence, pp.1f.

41. ibid., p.157. Similarly, in his Parochial Sermons Hampden had written that Christianity "instructs us what God is, by what it tells us he has certainly done in regard to us" (see above p.292).

42. Philosophical Evidence, p.284.

43. This is recognised by Corsi: the Bampton Lectures were "a systematic development of themes often touched upon by high Churchmen and Noetic thinkers in the 1810s and 1820s" (op.cit., p.138).

44. Hawkins considered Hampden's Observations an incautious pamphlet and thought that some of his opinions concerning tests, creeds, and articles were "dangerous and unsound". However, he defended Hampden, averring that his statement concerning Unitarians had been misapprehended. [E. Hawkins]. Oxford Matriculation Statutes. Answers to the "Questions addressed to Members of Convocation by a Bachelor of Divinity", with Brief Notes upon Church Authority, etc. Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1835, p.20.

45. See below, p.339.

46. H. Hampden. op.cit., p.63.

47. Hawkins. Sermons on the Church, p.23.

48. E. Hawkins. Christian Unity. A Sermon preached before the University of Oxford, on Quinquagesima Sunday, Feb. 18, 1855. Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1855, p.8.

49. Hawkins. Sermons on the Church, p.30.

50. Hawkins. Christian Unity, pp.8f.

51. R.D. Hampden. Observations, p.28.

52. ibid.

53. See chapter 1, p.41.

54. See chapter 1, p.37 and chapter 2, p.151.

55. R.D. Hampden. Observations, p.17.

56. Corsi. op.cit., p.136.

57. See chapter 2, p.211.

58. Oriel Coll. Lib. MS. letter No.193.

59. Corsi. op.cit., pp.102ff.

60. J.H. Newman. Sermons and Discourses. p.80. Sermon VIII, "The Usurpations of Reason".

61. Ker and Gornall. op.cit., vol.2, p.60.

62. J.H. Newman. Apologia, p.65. Newman went on to say that these tempers were not in themselves desirable, but were preferable to "heathen obduracy, and a cold, self-sufficient, self-wise tranquility" (Sermons and Discourses, p.136).

Section 4. The Admission of Dissenters

1. Pusey House. Earl of Radnor Papers. MS. letter of Hampden to Lord Radnor, May 21, 1835.

2. R. Whately. Remains of Edward Copleston, p.62.

3. See above, p.284.

4. See chapter 1, p.132.

5. Corsi. op.cit., p.141; Oriel College Library MS. letter 204.

6. Corsi. op.cit., pp.145f and 167-173.

7. See chapter 1, p.130.

8. [E. Hawkins]. A Letter to the Earl of Radnor, upon the oaths, dispensations, and subscription to the XXXIX Articles at the University of Oxford. Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1835, pp.16f.

9. Pusey House. Earl of Radnor Papers. Letter of Hampden to Lord Radnor, 1835.

10. See chapter 1, p.132.

11. Pusey House. Earl of Radnor Papers. Letters of Hampden, May 21, 1835; R.H. Hampden. Observations, p.36; A Postscript, p.15.

12. R.D. Hampden. Observations, pp.33f.

13. H. Hampden. op.cit., pp.37f.

14. A.P. Stanley. op.cit., pp.330f. Arnold is perhaps going even further than Hampden, for Hampden did not advocate that the university avoid all theological opinion. Like Hampden, Arnold's attitude to Unitarians is ambiguous and, in fact, occasioned misunderstanding (v. Stanley. op.cit., p.444). The above Declaration expressly excluded Unitarians. In 1829 he felt qualms about giving religious instruction to a Unitarian student, because he held himself bound to teach the essentials of Christianity to all committed to his care, and yet felt that "with these the tenets of the Unitarians alone, among all the Dissenters in the kingdom, are in my judgment irreconcileable" (ibid., p.226). On the other hand, like Hampden, he did not deny to them the name of Christian:

> ...whatever they may think of His nature, I never meant to deny the name of Christian to those who truly love and fear Him, and though I think it is the tendency of Unitarianism to lessen this love and fear, yet I doubt not that many Unitarians feel it notwithstanding, and then He is their Saviour, and they are His people. (ibid., p.306).

Thus, in the Principles of Church Reform he laid stress on the worship of Christ, rather than on belief in the divinity of Christ, saying that, "If a man will not let me pray to and praise my Saviour, he destroys the exercise of my faith altogether; - but I am no way injured by his praying to him as a glorified man, while I pray to him as God" (op.cit., p.156). He explained his attitude in a letter to H. Crabb Robinson. To those Unitarians who, while differing from other Christians in their intellectual tenets, kept Christ's moral law, he was willing to accord the name of Christian.

> An Unitarian, as such, is a Christian - that is, if a man follows Christ's law, and believes His words according to his conscientious sense of their meaning, he is a Christian - and, though I may think he understands Christ's words amiss, yet that is a question of interpretation and no more; the purpose of his heart and mind is to obey and be guided by Christ, and therefore he is a Christian. (Stanley, op.cit., p.444).

Arnold in no way sanctioned Unitarian theological beliefs, but he was of the opinion that moderation and charity towards them was a better policy than controversial disputation (ibid., p.322).

15. E. Hawkins. Letter to the Earl of Radnor, pp.17f.

16. Oriel College Library. MS. letter no.400.

17. R. Whately. Remains of Edward Copleston, pp.38f.

18. H. Hampden. op.cit., p.47.

19. R.D. Hampden. Observations, p.35.

20. R.D. Hampden. A Postscript, p.4.

21. R.D. Hampden. Observations, p.37. Hawkins put forward many of the same arguments in his Letter to the Earl of Radnor and in his answer to Pusey in Oxford Matriculation Statutes.

22. R.D. Hampden. Observations, p.35.

23. H. Hampden. op.cit., p.64.

24. ibid., p.89.

25. ibid., p.186. For other similarities with Copleston's educational ideas, see ibid., p.33.

26. Stanley. op.cit., pp.383-6, 449f, 456, 468, 479, 485f; E.J. Whately. Life of Richard Whately, p.142. Arnold was so convinced of the close connection between religion and education that he "would just as soon vote for an unbeliever to be a Divinity Professor as Professor of Logic", because he "would not put an unbeliever into any place of instruction in a Christian university if that place implied that he was a member of the

university generally and not merely called in to lecture on a particular subject" (Letter to H.H. Vaughan, 2 June 1839, Quoted in Bill. University Reform, p.49).

27. Baden Powell, for example, placed more emphasis on science than did the other Noetics, Thomas Arnold on modern history. Edward Hawkins opposed the institution of a fourth school in modern history and law at Oxford, thinking that it would seduce men to take this as their second necessary school "instead of cultivating something of Mathematics and Natural Science", which he considered "severer studies which w^{d} have given them a sounder Education". Oriel College Library. MS. letter 292. (Hawkins to Whately, Dec. 22, 1849).

28. R. Whately. Remains of Edward Copleston, pp.16ff.

29. E.J. Whately. Miscellaneous Remains, p.216.

30. R. Whately. Remains of Edward Copleston, p.21.

31. Tuckwell. op.cit., p.162.

32. E. Hawkins. Letter to the Earl of Radnor, pp.4-12.

33. E. Hawkins. Private Judgment, pp.24f. Hawkins agreed with Copleston in preferring the Ancients to the Moderns, even to a Christian writer such as Paley (v. Private Judgment, p.25).

34. E. Hawkins. Noetics, p.13.

35. E. Hawkins. Letter to the Earl of Radnor, p.10.

36. This information was gained from reading a draft copy of the new History of Oxford University (volume on the nineteenth century). The reference given there is British Library Add. MSS. 44206. vol.CXXI, Hawkins to Gladstone, 29 April, 1850.

37. See chapter 1, p.129.

38. Hawkins' letter to the University Commission, quoted in Bill. op.cit., pp.56f. It is quite possible that Hawkins' greater emphasis on post-graduate study was due to the mid-century debates on research versus teaching. That he should advocate a balance between the two, a "via media", was a typically Noetic response.

39. W.R. Ward. Victorian Oxford, p.208; Burgon. op.cit., vol.1, p.428. Hawkins also opposed the abolition of close fellowships because he felt that "some variety of qualification is useful. We might be a very strange set of fellows if all were elected solely for literary merit". B.M. Add. MS. 44206. vol.CXXI. Like Copleston, Hawkins sometimes displays an element of anti-intellectualism.

40. Some clerical restrictions survived still longer, for example, restrictions regarding Heads of Houses, clerical fellowships, and professors of Divinity.

Conclusion

1. Whately, for example, favoured the separation of church and state, Thomas Arnold complete identification.

2. Samuel Hinds and William Fitzpatrick may be counted as followers of Whately.

3. See chapter 3, pp.335f.

4. Even Copleston, in 1841, seemed willing to accept Pusey's exposition of tradition and church authority. See chapter 1, p.78.

5. Hansard. 3rd series. vol.XXIV, p.808.

6. On this see chapter 1, pp.36-38, especially notes 42 and 53 (pp.385 and 386).

7. Newman. Apologia, pp.36 and 42.

8. Newman. Loss and Gain, p.50.

9. See chapter 2, section 4, pp.264f.

10. See chapter 2, pp.195ff.

11. See chapter 1, pp.104f.

12. Sumner. Apostolical Preaching, p.286.

13. This was not so true of the Old Testament, for geology had already come into conflict with the Biblical account. Thomas Arnold, according to Francis Newman, held that "the account of Noah's deluge was evidently mythical, and the history of Joseph 'a beautiful poem'". F.W. Newman. Phases of Faith. Leicester University Press, 1970, p.68. Copleston believed that the universal flood was history, but he was prepared to admit the possibility that the six days of creation might require a loose interpretation of the word "day".

14. On the debate on miracles and Baden Powell's gradual change in attitude, see Corsi. op.cit., chapter 12.

15. Merton A. Christensen. "Thomas Arnold's Debt to German Theologians: A Prelude to Matthew Arnold's Literature and Dogma". Modern Philology. vol.55, no.1, Aug. 1957, p.20.

16. Blackburn. "Matthew Arnold and the Oriel Noetics", p.78.

17. J. Barr. "Jowett and the Reading of the Bible 'Like Any Other Book'". Horizons in Biblical Theology. vol.4, no.2, Dec. 1982 and vol.5, no.1, June 1983, pp.30f.

18. ibid., pp.14f.

19. ibid., p.37.

20. Baden Powell provides an example of this progression, for he was both a Noetic and a Broad Churchman.

21. Classics and religion no longer retain the prominent position assigned to them by both Copleston and Newman.

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