



**PRIVATE MEMBERS, LIBERALISM, AND POLITICAL PRESSURE:**

**A MID-VICTORIAN CASE STUDY**

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY . . . . .	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. . . . .	viii
INTRODUCTION. . . . .	1
CHAPTER	
1. ANTECEDENTS . . . . .	7
2. COMMON PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS. . . . .	28
3. ESTABLISHING AN ALLIANCE. . . . .	84
4. FOREIGN POLICY 1: CRIMEA, PERSIA, CHINA. . . . .	156
5. EMERGENT LIBERALISM . . . . .	225
6. ACCOMMODATION WITH PALMERSTON . . . . .	281
7. ASSOCIATION WITH GLADSTONE. . . . .	314
8. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM . . . . .	350
9. FOREIGN POLICY 2: THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR . . . . .	409
10. MILITARY INTERESTS. . . . .	490
11. POLITICAL RADICALISM: DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL RIGHTS . . . . .	516
12. SOCIAL ROMANTICISM: LABOUR AND CAPITAL, EDUCATION AND CLASS CONCILIATION . . . . .	571
EPILOGUE. . . . .	645
APPENDICES. . . . .	650
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . .	666

SUMMARY

During the early 1850s Lord Goderich (de Grey/Ripon), Thomas Hughes, W.E. Forster, H.A. Bruce (Lord Aberdare) and A.H. Layard coalesced in a political pressure group, an affiliation which was of significance for two decades. Marshalling 'public opinion' in support of their objectives, they were representative of private members in the fifties who merged with Liberalism in the sixties.

Their personal and political intimacy was achieved despite diverse antecedents, and was founded on common philosophical foundations. They espoused a hybrid romantic-radical ideology, emphasising Christian brotherhood, social unity, democratic and civil rights.

Establishing an alliance focussed on the house of commons Goderich, Bruce and Layard co-operated as a definitive political entity during the 1850s. Whilst broadly Liberal, their peculiar philosophy effectively isolated them within parliament.

Their foreign policy illustrates this isolation. During the Crimean war a bellicose stance was adopted, and Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard attempted to bolster both popular and official enthusiasm for the war. On the issues of Persia and China, however, they allied themselves with radical pacifists. These responses were in fact ideologically consistent, but were alien to most political contemporaries.

The late fifties and early sixties witnessed a gradual accommodation with the emerging Liberal party. This demanded some compromise with Palmerstonian complacency, but also permitted enhanced administrative influence. Between 1859 and 1865 de Grey, Layard, Bruce and Forster all joined the Liberal ministry, and continued to collaborate on specific questions.

Gladstone's leadership of the party permitted fulfilment of many radical ideas, and de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard became committed Gladstonian liberals. All but Hughes joined Gladstone's reformist ministry of 1868.

Throughout the fifties and sixties the five men co-operated with one another on a number of significant issues. Layard and Goderich were especially prominent in the administrative reform debates of the fifties, and implemented their ideas where feasible when in office in the sixties.

De Grey, Hughes, Forster and Layard were closely involved in American civil war issues. Hughes and Forster consistently attempted to channel public opinion in favour of the north and of British neutrality. At the foreign office Layard endeavoured to prevent confederate abuse of the foreign enlistment act. Their efforts for Anglo-American reconciliation culminated with de Grey's negotiation of the treaty of Washington in 1871.

Military affairs provided a mutual fascination, and de Grey, Hughes, Forster and Bruce were staunch supporters of the volunteer movement.

Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard held advanced democratic views, committed from the fifties to household suffrage as a practical long-term objective. As radicals they also endorsed the extension of civil rights, and helped achieve the secret ballot.

Their social romanticism induced a commitment to the conciliation of labour and capital. They advocated co-operation as a panacea, but also countenanced trade unionism and the moral regeneration of employers. Social unity was encouraged through such institutions as the working men's college and working men's clubs. The attainment of national elementary education was perceived in

terms of social unity, and exemplifies their rejection of laissez-faire.

The political alliance of Ripon, Hughes, Forster, Aberdare and Layard effectively terminated after the early seventies, though personal friendships endured.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

(G.A. Baker)

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Lively discussions with Tony Denholm have helped me to formulate my ideas, and I am sincerely grateful for his unfailing interest and assistance. Professor Austin Gough has also read a draft of this thesis, and I wish to express my appreciation for his many valuable comments.

I have been greatly assisted by the staffs of the various libraries and archives in which this research has been conducted; this was especially true at what Layard referred to as "that monstrous nightmare of a building -- the British Museum."<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank the New York Public Library and Houghton Library, Harvard University for permission to quote from manuscripts in their possession.

I am grateful for the financial assistance which has made this research possible. The decision of the Australian Labor government to abolish university tuition fees encouraged me to pursue my studies. I have received from the University of Adelaide a postgraduate scholarship under the university research grant in 1977 and 1978, and was awarded a travel grant which enabled me to carry out research overseas.

To Erica Baker I am indebted for her remarkable patience.

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1. A. Henry Layard, *Autobiography and Letters from his childhood until his appointment as H.M. Ambassador at Madrid*, edited by the Hon. William N. Bruce, with a chapter on his Parliamentary career by the Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur Otway, (London, 1903), ii: 226: L to Benjamin Austen, Dresden, 9 Sept. 1860.

ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been employed in footnotes:

A	Aberdare
B	Bruce
BL Add Ms	British Library Additional Manuscript; only the first folio number of a document is cited
BP	Bruce Papers
CUL	Cambridge University Library
deG	de Grey
Ed	Education Department Records (PRO)
F	Forster
FO	Foreign Office Records (PRO)
FP	Forster Papers
G	Goderich
GCRO	Glamorgan County Record Office (Cardiff)
H	Hughes
<u>H</u>	Great Britain, Parliament, <i>Hansard's Parliamentary Debates</i> ; thus 3 H 136, 1035-6: 26 Jan. 1855 refers to <i>Hansard's Parliamentary Debates</i> , 3rd series, volume 136, columns 1035-6, debate of 26 Jan. 1855
L	Layard
LP	Layard Papers
NYPL	New York Public Library
<u>PP</u>	Great Britain, Parliament, <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>
PRO	Public Record Office
R	Ripon
RP	Ripon Papers
TCD	Trinity College Library, Dublin
WO	War Office Records (PRO)

Ellipsis points have been used, as necessary, only within quotations and before and after lengthy quotations from letters. In all other cases it may be assumed that the quotation is preceded and/or followed by other material in the original document.

## INTRODUCTION

Between December 1850 and November 1853 George Frederick Samuel Robinson, Lord Goderich,<sup>1.</sup> established a personal friendship and political alliance with four of his contemporaries: Thomas Hughes, William Edward Forster, Henry Austin Bruce<sup>2.</sup> and Austen Henry Layard. The personal intimacy of these five men endured throughout the next two decades, and their political affiliation, by adapting to modified party circumstances and by effectively utilising parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressure, made a significant impact on the social and political evolution of mid-Victorian Britain.

As young men in the forties Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard had all imbibed a sense of the tension, concern and unease so prevalent in Europe during that tumultuous decade. The radical, democratic and socialist ideas then to the fore were examined and in many respects embraced. Transition to the mood of the fifties and sixties demanded a difficult and frustrating adjustment, for the two eras were in a sense qualitatively distinct. From the early fifties a period of relative prosperity, though tenuous and inequitable, helped to consolidate the dominance of the

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1. Goderich was known by three titles during his lifetime. In 1833, at the age of five, he assumed the courtesy title Viscount Goderich, his father's former title, when the latter became Earl of Ripon. On the death of his father in January 1859 he became the second Earl of Ripon, but when his uncle died a few months later he assumed his earldom of de Grey as well. The latter was the senior earldom, and from 1859 to 1871 he was officially styled the Earl de Grey and Ripon, though he was generally referred to simply as de Grey. In 1871 he was rewarded with a marquessate following his successful negotiation of the treaty of Washington, thereby becoming the first Marquess of Ripon.
  2. Bruce was created the first Lord Aberdare of Duffryn when he succeeded Ripon as lord president of the council in 1873.

capitalist ethic in British society. Protracted political stability appeared conceivable, even probable, and recalcitrance against prevalent social and political norms became relatively exceptional. Faith, optimism and complacency were typical attitudes amongst mid-Victorians, and fundamental reform was widely perceived as superfluous. A hierarchical and deferential society remained virtually unchallenged.

## 2.

The widespread absence of reforming zeal, of the will to change, was reflected in a factional house of commons elected on a restrictive franchise. Since 1846 none of the four major party groupings -- whigs, protectionists, Peelites or radicals -- had been effectively cohesive. Though the Derby-Disraeli protectionists registered some gains in the general election of 1852, protection as an issue had clearly disintegrated, and the government therefore lacked a coherent policy. The radicals were divided and uninfluential. Having substantially won the battle of free trade in 1846, the authority of Cobden, Bright and the Manchester school was in decline. Their parliamentary and financial reform association, founded in 1849, proved largely irrelevant to contemporaries; the drive for British capitalist hegemony resulted in a growing emphasis on foreign policy, and domestic prosperity obviated demands for social and political reform. Moreover the anti-colonialist, pacifist and non-interventionist bearings of the Manchester school's foreign policy alienated 'patriotic' radicals such as John Arthur Roebuck, thus creating discord in parliamentary reformist ranks. The Peelites, as a result of the 1852 general election, had been weakened as a party, and the Irish members in fact held the balance. Their aversion to the whigs, principally a reaction to Russell's anti-catholic Durham letter and the ecclesiastical titles bill,

emphasised Lord John's increasingly discredited position, with both traditional supporters and opponents. The viability of a government depended to some extent on the support and inclusion of Lord Palmerston, whose whig allegiance in 1852 was far from incontrovertible. Thus parliament, as a forum for competing political parties, verged on deadlock: Goderich asserted in 1855 that "the great parties which in former times contended for power no longer existed, and the House was divided into a number of disunited sections."<sup>1</sup> Furthermore the role of the commons as the 'grand inquest of the nation' had not yet been superceded by its character as an instrument of legislation. The private member, enjoying significant procedural privileges and unfettered by the existence of strong party affiliations, was therefore uniquely influential in the years between 1852 and 1859.

In these circumstances a number of viable independent parliamentary alliances were formed during the 1850s, particularly amongst those who desired reform. For the most part these tended to be informal in organisation and ephemeral, but they were nonetheless influential in contemporary political calculations. The existence of such independent liberal or radical affiliations became progressively less relevant from the early sixties. Gradually-increasing tensions in society were reflected in greater political polarisation. The demands of trade unionists, of political reformers, of dissenters, of educationists, of the Irish, produced in response a fragile yet potent Liberal party. The process begun in Willis's rooms in 1859 was precariously consolidated under Gladstone in 1868. Independent liberals and radicals of the 1850s could no longer effectively operate as private members;

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1. 3 H 138, 2159: 18 June 1855.

the lure of Gladstonian Liberalism -- at least for a time -- was irresistible.

Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard were as a political coalition representative of this transformation from private radical member in the fifties to more committed Liberal in the sixties. Goderich, Bruce and Layard were elected to the commons in 1852, Forster and Hughes not until the following decade. Throughout this period they operated as a political pressure group in pursuit of their common objectives. More cohesive, and certainly more enduring, than many contemporary political affiliations, their alliance was inevitably a significant factor in mid-Victorian political circles.

### 3.

In order to exert influence as a pressure group Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard appealed extensively to, and claimed to speak in the name of, 'public opinion'. Such opinion was in the fifties and sixties, and remains, an amorphous and indeterminate entity. Because individual beliefs and motives are complex, they cannot easily be interpreted from election results, newspaper editorials or Gallup polls. Frequently the available 'indicators' of public opinion from mid-Victorian Britain were in fact individuals or organisations attempting to modify prevalent attitudes. Press bias, whether in leading articles or news reports, was overt and unexceptional. Newspaper proprietors and editors typically perceived their roles as educative; too often historians have misinterpreted the press as merely representative of 'public opinion'. Election campaigns can be similarly uninformative, with many political leaders attempting to mould the debate in order to satisfy their individual requirements. Authors, like journalists,

frequently propagandised a personal cause. Spontaneous public protests were often indicative of underlying tensions or widespread discontent rather than of concern with a specific issue. The organised pressure groups of the mid-Victorian era primarily represented the views of participating militants. Acting in self-interest or as philanthropic humanists, for a specific objective or in the context of a moral or ideological crusade, pressure groups influenced, and were influenced by, the individuals attempting to manipulate social and political power. Prevalent 'public opinion', in short, cannot easily be discerned from the press, from literature, from election campaigns, or from spontaneous or organised protests. Instead of merely reflecting popular beliefs, these media were generally employed in order to reshape people's ideas.

Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard were manipulators of 'public opinion'. Expressing in their own right legitimate (if frequently minority) points of view, they sought to persuade others in order to achieve popular endorsement of their objectives. Through books, journal articles, newspapers, constituency organisations, public addresses and structured interest groups, they appealed to public pressure in furtherance of their political objectives. At the same time they recognised that the forum for their political influence was primarily parliament and/or the Liberal party, and they were therefore forced to balance the appeal to pressure from without with the hostility frequently expressed in Westminster towards such external influence.

#### 4.

This thesis examines the *modus operandi* between 1852 and 1868 of a small but cohesive and effective political alliance. Two processes are investigated. Within the confines of parliament

and political Liberalism, the independent alliance of the fifties merged into the evolving Liberal party. Throughout this period parliamentary tactics were complemented where appropriate by the invocation of 'public opinion'. Both processes were in fact the strategies employed by Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard in order to augment their political influence. For similar reasons they established their alliance, effective because of its comparative stability, endurance and cohesion. This cohesion was achieved in spite of diverse antecedents.



## CHAPTER 1

### ANTECEDENTS

The young Robinson was born at 10, Downing Street in October 1827, during the period of his father's short tenure of the prime ministership. Lord Goderich combined ambition and opportunism with personal weakness and vacillation. In turn an adherent of Castlereagh, Liverpool, Canning, Grey and Peel, he unperturbedly sacrificed his indecisive political principles in favour of immediate personal motives. His term as prime minister was disastrous. Unable to assert himself in the struggle for predominance between whigs and tories in the cabinet, he resigned within five months. Goderich's leadership has been roundly condemned: Kitson Clark, for example, refers to him as "the most feeble Prime Minister the country has ever had."<sup>1</sup> Given the irresolute nature of his statesmanship and philosophy, it seems improbable that Goderich's political influence on his son during his youth was other than marginal. In contrast, the younger Goderich was to become noted for the stability of his political principles,<sup>2</sup> and their radical tenor was in fact to estrange

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1. G.S.R. Kitson Clark, *An Expanding Society: Britain, 1830-1900*, (Cambridge, 1967), 22; see also W.D. Jones, 'Prosperity' *Robinson*, (London, 1967).
  2. Lord Buxton, Ripon's under-secretary at the colonial office from 1892 to 1895, and a close associate in the last years of his life, commented that the "most marked feature of Lord Ripon's career was his unswerving attachment and fidelity to the Radical principles which he had embraced and adopted in his youth." (quoted in Lucien Wolf, *Life of the First Marquess of Ripon*, (London, 1921), ii: 320). Wolf's central thesis of Goderich's gradual conversion from radicalism to whiggery has been contradicted by Asquith (Earl of Oxford and Asquith, *Fifty Years of Parliament*, (London, 1926), i: 8) and disproved by Denholm (A.F. Denholm, *Some Aspects of the Radical and Democratic Career of the First Marquess of Ripon (1827-1909)*, (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wales, Swansea, 1966), *passim*).

him from his father during his early manhood. Through his father, however, Goderich claimed descent from Oliver Cromwell, an affiliation of which he became extremely proud. In addition, one of his mother's ancestors was John Hampden. It is not surprising, therefore, that events of the seventeenth century captivated Goderich's imagination from early years.

He grew up on the family estates in Yorkshire and Lincolnshire. The Robinson estate was at Newby, near Ripon, and the family's connections with Yorkshire dated back to the sixteenth century, to William Robinson of York, a merchant and shipowner who amassed a large fortune in the Hamburg trade, returned to York, and became Lord Mayor of the city and its representative in parliament in 1581.<sup>1.</sup> In addition to Newby, Goderich's uncle, Earl de Grey, had added to the family holdings the historic estates of Studley Royal and Fountains Abbey. Lady Ripon, Goderich's mother, was the only daughter of Robert, fourth Earl of Buckinghamshire, and Goderich in fact passed the greater part of his childhood on her property at Nocton, in Lincolnshire.

Goderich was privately educated; the instruction was somewhat haphazard, both unmethodical and undisciplined. Much of his youth was devoted to shooting, fishing and entomology. Nevertheless, he became an avid reader, with regular habits and very miscellaneous tastes. It is probable, as Denholm has suggested,<sup>2.</sup> that his advanced views as a young man may be attributed to his exposure to the radical and revolutionary literature flooding Europe during the

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1. For this, and other family history, see RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 200.

2. Denholm, 5.

late 1840s, though this must remain largely conjectural.

His aristocratic origins necessarily influenced both Goderich's character and the degree of his social awareness. His detachment from the mainstream of society during his early years at Nocton was no doubt responsible for a certain shyness or sensitiveness as a young man.<sup>1</sup> Lady Ripon attempted to impress her pious evangelicalism on Goderich, and Wolf believed that "her negative influence upon her son's upbringing was considerable."<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, Nocton's strict religious environment undoubtedly inculcated in Goderich the earnestness and idealism which he in later years evinced. The Robinson estates, in Yorkshire and elsewhere, were amongst the wealthiest in the country, and Goderich's youthful isolation from non-aristocratic circles inevitably sheltered him from much of the social and industrial upheaval which the country experienced during the era of Swing and the charter.

In the autumn of 1848, Ripon obtained for his son, now aged 21, an appointment as attaché to Sir Henry Ellis, his maternal uncle, on a special mission to Brussels to consider the affairs of Italy. Another member of the party was Goderich's cousin, and Sir Henry's son, Robert Staunton Ellis, a radical and a civil servant in Madras. The Brussels mission proved abortive; Goderich and his cousin seized the opportunity to tour Italy, Switzerland and France. In Paris, in April 1849, Goderich was able to satisfy some of his radical curiosity, by investigating the operations of the *associations ouvrières*. He quickly became a convert to the idea of productive co-operation and, following another European tour in the summer of 1850,

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1. Hughes recognised the difficulties which accrued from Goderich's sensitiveness; see RP. BL Add Ms 43549, 123: H to R, Chester, 4 Feb. 1884.

2. Wolf, i: 19.

formally joined the Christian Socialists in their co-operative endeavours in London. Of all his new comrades, he was to develop the closest personal and political affinity with Thomas Hughes. By 1852, Goderich was able to write to Hughes of their increasing fraternisation: "For my part I cannot find that I have a friend to whom I can turn more often or with more affection than to you."<sup>1</sup>

2.

The Tom Hughes whom Goderich came to know during the autumn of 1850 was characterised by extroversion and self-confidence. Optimistic and cheerful, he was a tonic not only to Goderich, but to the Christian Socialists in general.

The second of eight children, he had been born at Uffington, in the Vale of the White Horse, in 1822. His father, John Hughes, has been aptly described as a "scholarly dilettante."<sup>2</sup> After his marriage to Margaret Wilkinson, he was content to settle down in Uffington, leisurely pursuing his literary interests, and comfortably assuming the role of the local squire. Financially secure, he cultivated a firm association with the Uffington villagers, revolving round cricket and football, and never lost sight of his notion of squirearchical duty: Thomas was quite aware that his father was the most active magistrate in the district during the Swing disturbances of 1830-1, describing him as "an old fashioned Tory, but with true popular sympathies."<sup>3</sup> These sympathies did not apparently extend to dissenters, whom he regarded as "a stiff-necked and perverse generation."<sup>4</sup> It is perhaps not surprising that only one Uffingtonian joined the gangs of Captain Swing's rick-burners.<sup>5</sup>

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 56: G to H, Nocton, 21 Oct. 1852.

2. E.C. Mack and W.H.G. Armytage, *Thomas Hughes*, (London, 1952), 8.

3. Thomas Hughes, *True Manliness*, (Boston, 1880), viii.

4. *ibid.*

5. Mack and Armytage, 10.

In this ordered and superficially stable environment, Tom spent a remarkably carefree boyhood. With his older brother George, and the village children, he explored the surrounding countryside, amused himself in sports and games, and absorbed the traditions of rural Berkshire. He also absorbed many of the assumptions of the country gentry. From his earliest years, he was warm and sociable, perfectly at ease with a wide variety of people.

At the age of eight he was sent, with George, to a private school at Twyford, near Winchester. But in 1833 his father purchased Donnington Priory near Newbury, an ideal setting for a patriarchal squire. The family changed abodes, and Hughes changed schools. Thomas Arnold had been a friend of John Hughes since his Oxford days, and George and Tom were accordingly enrolled at Rugby.

The full import of the intellectual and philosophical influence on Hughes of Rugby and Arnold will be discussed in more depth below,<sup>1</sup> but it would be misleading to overemphasise this aspect of his public school career because, for Hughes, Rugby primarily signified the development of sportsmanship and character rather than academic achievement. In *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, Hughes stressed the importance of the gentlemanly ideals of good form and social responsibility, rather than the merits of intellectual pursuits.<sup>2</sup> Hughes relished the public school environment as it subsisted at Rugby and when the time came, he was loath to leave.

Tom joined his brother at Oriel in 1842. The college was chosen because his father was an Oriel man, though its dedication to intellectual development compared unfavourably with other Oxford

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1. See chapter 2.

2. Thomas Hughes, *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, (London, 1937), *passim*. For further discussion of Hughes and the public schools, see Asa Briggs, *Victorian People*, (Harmondsworth, 1975), 148-175.

colleges at the time. Hughes was not unduly concerned with this circumstance; he rapidly and enthusiastically directed his energies to cricket, rowing and boxing. This untroubled existence was not to endure, however. In the winter of 1842-3 he first met Frances Ford, then 17. She was the daughter of James Ford, a Donnington resident, who was to become prebendary of Exeter in 1849. In August 1843 Hughes and Fanny became secretly engaged. Her parents, on account of her youth, forbade them to correspond, and Hughes, realising the necessity of establishing a career, threw himself into his studies. Though attracted to the life of a country clergyman, he eventually resolved on the law rather than ordination. By January 1845 he was keeping term at Lincoln's Inn, his engagement to Fanny was announced in the spring of 1846, and they were married in August 1847. Hughes was finally admitted to the Bar in January 1848, though he was never to derive any pleasure from the conveyancing and real property law for which he had been trained.

Hughes, by his own account, entered Oxford a tory and departed a radical, though the transformation was not solely dependent on the influence of university life.<sup>1</sup> His social conscience was further amplified by the shocking conditions he witnessed in the areas adjacent to Lincoln's Inn.<sup>2</sup> As his reflections were wholly within Christian bounds, it was natural that he should be impressed with, and further influenced by, F.D. Maurice's sermons in the chapel at Lincoln's Inn, which Hughes regularly attended from the autumn of 1846. He was consequently an early recruit to Christian Socialism

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1. Hughes, *True Manliness*, xii. Hughes attributed his altered views largely to the influence of commercial travellers whom he encountered in Lancashire.

2. *ibid.*, xiv.

as envisaged in 1848 by Maurice, J.M. Ludlow and Charles Kingsley.<sup>1.</sup>

It has been previously demonstrated that it was as Christian Socialists that Hughes and Goderich were first allied. It was also through "the good cause"<sup>2.</sup> that they were to become associated with W.E. Forster. Hughes personally encountered Forster's sympathy with the plight of the working classes on a tour he made, with Ludlow, of the Yorkshire co-operative societies in September 1851. He recalled this first meeting in a letter to his old friend, and Forster's brother-in-law, Matthew Arnold, written shortly after Forster's death:

... I have written to your sister, tho' with much diffidence, about her husband. I got to know him first 35 years ago, at Rawdon, on my first round of the Yorkshire & Lancashire Cooperative Societies, & from that day till the end never heard him say word, or saw him do deed, which did not add to my admiration of & love for him... 3.

3.

At the time that Hughes and Forster first became acquainted, the latter had established his position in Bradford not only as a woollen manufacturer, but also as a renegade: a chartist sympathiser,

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1. The influence of Maurice, Ludlow, Kingsley and other Christian Socialists on Hughes, Goderich and Forster will be discussed below, in chapters 2 and 11. The most complete and reliable examination of Christian Socialism is Torben Christensen, *Origin and History of Christian Socialism 1848-54*, (Aarhus, 1962).
  2. Goderich and Hughes frequently referred to Christian Socialism as "the good cause"; for example, see RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 49: G to H, Nocton Hall, 27 Sept. 1852.
  3. Parrish Collection, Princeton: H to Matt [hew Arnold], Chester, 13 April 1886.

a socialist of sorts, an espouser of co-operative principles. For nine years he had been the business partner of William Fison, having striven throughout the 1840s, both as a wool-stapler and manufacturer, to construct a viable and prosperous commercial enterprise. It was his reputation as an honest, just and sympathetic employer of labour, and his disquietude over the 'condition-of-England' question, which had attracted the attention of the Christian Socialist co-operators, Hughes and Ludlow.<sup>1</sup>

Forster was not a Yorkshire native, though by 1850 he had wholly adopted the speech and manner of the people of the West Riding. He was in fact born in the village of Bradpole, in Dorset, in July 1818. Both his parents were members and recognised ministers of the society of friends. His father, William, accredited as a minister in 1805, had subsequently devoted himself to preaching missions throughout the British isles, despite frequent bouts of lethargy and despondency. His mother, Anna, was a daughter of the elder Thomas Fowell Buxton. Her brother, Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, was the prominent chairman of the anti-slavery society. The Buxtons were a wealthy and established Essex family. Though her father was affiliated with the church of England, her mother was a friend, and whilst still young Anna had joined the society.

William and Anna Forster devoted much of their lives to their religion. Having no secular occupation, William Forster was yet able to provide his family with a comfortable, if simple home. Wealthy friends and relations provided insurance against abject poverty. The quakerism of Forster's parents was so intense that it verged on

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1. See Ludlow's article in the *Christian Socialist: A Journal of Association*, 29 Nov. 1851.

the fanatical. Indeed, his mother undertook a three-month preaching mission to Ireland whilst pregnant with Forster. His father absented himself from his wife and young son for over five years, from 1820 to 1825, on a similar mission to the United States. Reared in such an environment, Forster naturally developed personal characteristics of earnestness, priggishness, and maturity beyond his years, characteristics which retained their influence throughout his life.<sup>1</sup> He had little contact outside the immediate family. Educated until the age of ten by his mother, then privately for two years by the curate of Bradpole, it was not until August 1831, when he was enrolled at a friend's school in Bristol, that he experienced the company of other boys. This school was succeeded in October 1832 by another, also associated with the society of friends, at Tottenham. Forster was throughout a diligent student, with a predilection for mathematics.

A decided advantage of the Tottenham school was its proximity to the London home of the Fowell Buxtons. Forster frequently visited his anti-slavery relations, and was naturally fascinated by the abolitionist agitation of 1833. He took cognisance of the moral forces influencing the anti-slavery commotion, realised this suited his character, and envisaged himself as a future, reformist, member of parliament. He saw the study of law as the most direct route to the house of commons, but this was not in accordance with his father's wishes. Forster's relations with his father were not so much of a "peculiarly frank and tender character," as Wemyss Reid suggests,<sup>2</sup> but were rather of a somewhat sycophantic nature. Accordingly, Forster

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1. According to Esher, who reviewed Wolf's *Life of Ripon*, Lady Ripon (i.e. Goderich's wife) once said of Forster: "He is an overgrown baby who never had his fling when young." (Viscount Esher, 'Studley Royal', *Quarterly Review*, 237, 471, April 1922, 231). Forster certainly *never* had any sort of 'fling', and her assessment may well be accurate.
  2. T. Wemyss Reid, *Life of the Right Honourable William Edward Forster*, (London, 1888), i : 12.

obediently reconciled himself to his father's desire that he should embark on a business career.

For five years, from 1836 to 1841, he undertook a variety of short-lived occupations, as a clerk in a Norwich business which manufactured hand-loom camlets, as a gentleman-apprentice wool-sorter in the Darlington mill of Joseph and Henry Pease, as a clerk in a London counting-house. It is evident from Forster's correspondence of this period that slavery, rather than a prospective business career, remained his primary interest.<sup>1</sup> His father, however, insisted that he pursue a commercial profession, though it was not until the summer of 1841 that he was able to arrange for his son permanent employment, in Bradford, as the partner of Thomas Fison in the wool-stapling business. Forster brought with him to this enterprise capital advanced by the quakers Samuel and J.J. Gurney.<sup>2</sup> The following year he joined William Fison in partnership as a woollen manufacturer. It was to this side of the business that Forster devoted his energies, and in 1849 he eventually withdrew from wool-stapling entirely. The business venture, initiated on borrowed capital, proved profitable, and his unprecedented prosperity enabled Forster to move from lodgings at Bolton to an established house at Rawdon in 1846. It was to Rawdon that Forster took his new wife Jane, daughter of Thomas Arnold, following their marriage in the summer of 1850.

His interests during this decade were not confined to domestic or commercial matters. He read widely, formed a genuine concern with the social and economic predicament of the working class,

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1. e.g. *ibid.*, i : 117-120: F to William Forster, Darlington, 3 July 1839; *ibid.*, i : 122-124: F to Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, Darlington, 7 July 1839.
  2. Matthew R. Temmel, *W.E. Forster and Liberal Politics, 1847-1875*, (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Maryland, 1974), 57.

visited Ireland three times (in 1846, 1847 and 1849) in conjunction with the friends' efforts to alleviate the sufferings caused by the famine, and travelled to Paris twice (in the spring of 1848 and again in 1849) to examine the implications of the revolution. His consequent philosophical and political views rendered him receptive to co-operative principles and, following his initial meeting with Hughes and Ludlow in 1851, he encouraged attempts at co-operative production in Yorkshire, chaired co-operative meetings and, when in London, regularly discussed social questions with Hughes.<sup>1</sup> Of the Christian Socialists, he declared: "Well, for a set of revolutionists, I must say you are the pleasantest ones I know!"<sup>2</sup>.

#### 4.

It was possible, in jest, for Forster to refer to Hughes and Goderich as revolutionists, but such an appellation could never have been accorded to Henry Austin Bruce, one of whose foremost characteristics was cautious moderation.<sup>3</sup> Bruce was not to become acquainted with Goderich, and through him with Hughes and Forster, until after his election to the house of commons in December 1852. His previous experience as Merthyr Tydvil's stipendiary magistrate, however, qualified him to share the social concerns of Goderich, Hughes and Forster, and though he had had no direct contact with the Christian Socialist co-operators in London, he was nevertheless sympathetic towards co-operative principles.

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1. See chapter 11 below. The relationship between Hughes and Forster as Christian Socialists must have been reasonably close, as Hughes retained "a whole bundle of dear old Forster's" letters from the Christian Socialist days of 1850-1 (RP. BL Add Ms 43549, 165: H to R, Chester, 6 Jan. 1886).
  2. Reid, i : 282-3: Ludlow to T. Wemyss Reid, n.d. [probably 1886-8].
  3. His son, for example, indicated Bruce's concurrence with Dryden, his favourite poet, that a sound political constitution "Is not the hasty product of a day, But the well-ripened fruit of wise delay." (W.N. Bruce, 'Henry Austin Bruce, First Baron Aberdare', in J. Vyrnwy Morgan, ed., *Welsh Political and Educational Leaders in the Victorian Era*, (London, 1908), 228).

Born at Duffryn, near Mountain Ash in the parish of Aberdare, in April 1815, Bruce passed six years of his childhood with his parents at St Omer, in the Pas-de-Calais, and from age twelve to seventeen was a student at Swansea Grammar School, where he imbibed a true affection for classical studies. He was the second son of John Bruce-Pryce and Sarah Austin. The family was of Scottish descent, but had been established at Duffryn since 1747. Bruce's father, as a member of the anglicised Glamorgan gentry, had little sympathy with either nonconformism or the Welsh nationality and was, true to his class, a staunch tory. As a young man, Bruce was guided by these parental traditions. One of his earliest political functions, in fact, was to support Lord Adare, the Conservative candidate, in the Glamorgan county election of 1837. <sup>1.</sup> Consonant with these views, he was to maintain five years later at the Mansfield, a lawyers' debating club in London, "that Algernon Sidney has been falsely called a Patriot, that he was a Traitor to his King & country & deserved to die."<sup>2.</sup>

Though coal seams were discovered on the Duffryn estate as early as 1815, it was not until the mid-1830s that large-scale sinking of pits was undertaken. Thereafter, the family's fortunes were relatively secure.

Following the completion of his studies at Swansea, at the age of seventeen, Bruce was sent to London, where he read law in the chambers of his uncle, James Lewis Knight, afterwards Lord Justice Knight Bruce. He was called to the Bar as a member of Lincoln's Inn in 1837, and joined the Oxford circuit. Though occasionally enthusiastic in the study of law (he wrote to his

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1. Earl of Bessborough, ed., *Lady Charlotte Guest: Extracts from her Journal, 1833-1852*, (London, 1950), 51-52: journal entry of 22 July 1837.

2. Records of the Dyffryn, Aberdare Estate. GCRO, D/D Br F/15: B's diary entry of 13 June 1842.

sister in February 1836: "I am at present in a curious fit of diligence. I am gnawed with the desire of making myself a good lawyer"<sup>1.</sup>), he became progressively more disenchanted and morose. By 1843, having practised fitfully for over five years, he had accepted the reality of his disillusionment with the legal profession:

... For myself, I am becoming daily more discontented with my lot in life. I am an indolent, reserved, and peaceful man. I have no taste for that clash of wits, that intellectual warfare, which is as the breath of life to the Heaven-born barrister. I am tired of pursuing a career for which I have no calling, tired of the hypocrisy of pretending to work, tired of the uncertainty which prevents me from applying myself to anything better, tired, in short, of being a useless member of society... 2.

Loss of confidence led him to the belief that he was fit only to "lounge through life"<sup>3.</sup> as a "very indifferent country squire."<sup>4.</sup>

In addition, though he had read widely, formed numerous friendships, and joined a club, the Alfred, he found life in London increasingly distasteful.<sup>5.</sup>

The consequence of his mental turmoil was Bruce's withdrawal from London and the legal profession, followed by extensive travel on the continent. When he returned to Britain in June 1845, he settled down in Glamorgan. He was subsequently offered the lay chancellorship of the diocese of Llandaff, but believing himself

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1. H.A. Bruce, *Letters of the Rt. Hon. Henry Austin Bruce G.C.B. Lord Aberdare of Duffryn*, (Oxford, 1902), i : 31: B to Sarah Bruce, London, 28 Feb. 1836.
  2. *ibid.*, i : 43: B to J.J. Ormsby, London, 13 Jan. 1843. Ormsby, a close friend in Bruce's youth, died in 1855.
  3. *ibid.*, i : 51: B to Ormsby, Aberdare, 4 Nov. 1843.
  4. *ibid.*, i : 36: B to Ormsby, London, 9 Dec. 1841.
  5. See Records of the Dyffryn, Aberdare Estate. G CRO, D/D Br F/15: B's diary, 1842, *passim*.

inadequately qualified,<sup>1.</sup> declined the position.

In January 1846 Bruce married Annabella Beadon, and was established by his father at Duffryn in Mountain Ash. Later in the year, he assumed a deputy-lieutenantship of Glamorganshire. But it was not until the spring of the following year, 1847, that he discovered his local niche, the stipendiary magistracy for Merthyr Tydvil and Aberdare, a position apparently obtained for him through the influence of his father<sup>2.</sup> and of the Bishop of Llandaff, Edward Copleston.<sup>3.</sup> The employment suited his tastes admirably. Not only did the salary of £600 per annum provide financial independence from his father, but the regular hours, without being oppressive, helped to order his life. More importantly, in the role of "Bruce the Beak," as he irreverently referred to himself,<sup>4.</sup> he was able to obtain substantial knowledge of the social and economic condition of the industrial working class of South Wales. The insight thus procured helped to modify the traditional, conservative opinions which he had inherited from his family and class.

Bruce remained as stipendiary magistrate in Merthyr for over five years until his election to parliament in 1852. His only public position outside the county during this period was as a permanent member of the commission for the 1851 exhibition, for which his genuine interest in, and knowledge of, the arts and sciences certainly qualified him. His artistic sense no doubt attracted him to Austen Henry Layard,

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1. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 81: B to Ormsby, Aberdare, 25 Nov. 1845.

2. *Truth*, 20 April 1882. *Truth* was a radical 'society journal', owned and edited by Henry Labouchere.

3. H.A. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses by the Right Hon. Henry Austin Bruce, First Lord Aberdare, G.C.B., D.C.L.*, (London, 1917), v-vi.

4. *ibid.*, i : 95: B to Ormsby, Aberdare, 15 Dec. 1851.

the explorer and archaeologist of Ninevah. Layard visited his cousin, Lady Charlotte Guest, and her husband, at their Dowlais ironworks in March 1848, and over 45 years later Bruce could write:

I have vividly before me the scene of our first acquaintance, when, being on a visit to his relations Sir John and Lady Charlotte Guest, he [Layard] described to the Dowlais workmen in vigorous and graphic language his wonderful discoveries of buried monuments, with -- what specially interested them -- their close bearing on Biblical history, and their illustrations of Bible language and imagery. 1.

This was, added Bruce, the commencement for him of "many years of close personal and political intimacy with Layard."<sup>2</sup>.

5.

Bruce was not alone in his admiration for Layard, both as a character in his own right and as the archaeologist responsible for the excavation of Nimrud.<sup>3</sup> Layard's *Ninevah and its Remains*,<sup>4</sup> when first published at the beginning of 1849, took the reading public by storm. Oxford had already, in July 1848, bestowed on him

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1. A.H. Layard, *Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana, and Babylonia, including a Residence among the Bakhtiyari and other Wild Tribes, before the Discovery of Ninevah*, (London, 1894), 11-12; Aberdare wrote the introduction to the 1894 edition.
  2. *ibid.*, 27.
  3. Layard first believed that the mound at Kuyunjik, opposite Mosul, contained the remains of Ninevah, but he was persuaded by Sir Henry Rawlinson that Nimrud, less than 100 km south and also on the Tigris, was in fact Ninevah. By the early 1850s both men had reverted to Layard's original proposition: that the remains of Ninevah were at Kuyunjik, and that Nimrud was an important find in its own right.
  4. A.H. Layard, *Ninevah and its Remains, with an Account of a Visit to the Chaldean Christians of Kurdistan, and Yezidis, or Devil-Worshippers*, edited by H.W.F. Saggs, (New York, 1970). This abridgment is based on the original 1849 edition, with corrections and additions from the sixth edition (1854).

the honorary degree of D.C.L.; he had been elected a member of the Athenaeum, and had also received the gold medal from the Royal Geographical Society, all in recognition of his work at Nimrud. Furthermore, he was lionising society through his family connections, particularly Benjamin and Sara Austen, and Lady Charlotte Guest. His subsequent excavations at Kuyunjik (Ninevah), across the Tigris from Mosul, from 1849 to 1851, further consolidated his archaeological reputation. The attraction which Bruce felt for Layard in March of 1848 was, therefore, far from exceptional. The enduring relationship then fashioned was portentous indeed.

From his birth in 1817 until his Assyrian exploits, Layard had experienced an unconventional life. His family was of Huguenot stock, having left France after the revocation of the edict of Nantes. Layard's father had been forced to abandon his civil service career in Ceylon due to chronic asthma. On his return to England, he had married the daughter of a Ramsgate banker, Nathaniel Austen. Living on a small pension, he devoted much of the remainder of his life to the search for a suitable climate and abode, in which he might breathe and live freely. This peripatetic existence was to profoundly influence Layard as a child.

Born in Paris, Layard attended in turn a day school for infants in Florence, a preparatory school in Putney, the *lycee* at Moulins, a boarding school in Geneva, and an *istituto* in Florence. He was also for a time privately tutored. It is not surprising that this continual upheaval should have affected his character, and he later described himself as a "very idle, self-willed, and troublesome"<sup>1</sup>. child, admitting he possessed a "refractory and independent disposition."<sup>2</sup> Having attained, through his travels and experiences,

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1. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, i : 12.

2. *ibid.*, i : 23.

tastes and interests virtually unique for a boy of his age, it is conceivable, as Saggs suggests, that he was "perilously near to becoming a precocious prig."<sup>1</sup> It appears improbable that Layard acquired much knowledge at school, with the exception of a decent grounding in French and Italian. His real education occurred at home. In Florence, where he spent most of his childhood (the Layards lived on the first floor of the fifteenth-century Palazzo Rucellai, designed by Alberti), his father aided Henry in the development of his taste for literature and the arts. Layard traced to his father's teaching and example "that ardent love for Italy and the Fine Arts which I have preserved through life, and which has been to me the source of much enjoyment and happiness."<sup>2</sup> His mother's influence was less beneficial; her neuroticism could not fail to make an impact on her son. Layard later recalled that

although generally cheerful, she was naturally of a nervous and anxious disposition, which, with an over-sensitiveness and susceptibility, was the cause of unhappiness to herself and very trying to my father. I have inherited, to some extent, her constitutional infirmity. 3.

At the behest of Layard's uncle and godfather, the prosperous London solicitor Benjamin Austen, the Layards left Florence for England in the spring of 1829, in order that Layard and his brother might receive a 'liberal' English education. Layard regretted the loss of his independence. He was enrolled at a school in Richmond, kept by the Rev. James Bewsher, where, once again, he proved "not altogether an idle nor a bad boy, although high-spirited and somewhat disposed to get into mischief and rows, and to resist legitimate discipline."<sup>4</sup> He remained there until the autumn of 1833;

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1. Layard, *Ninevah and its Remains*, 4.
  2. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, i : 12.
  3. *ibid.*, i : 9-10.
  4. *ibid.*, i : 40.

in January of 1834, at the age of 16, he was articled to Benjamin Austen. He quickly developed a repugnance for the drudgery and routine of a solicitor's office and, despite a varied and interesting social life in London, described his existence during this period as desolate.<sup>1</sup> Monotony and uncertainty as to the future led inevitably to despair, and Layard experienced a nervous breakdown. Therefore, in the summer of 1835, he passed his long vacation touring France, Switzerland and Italy. This journey was followed in subsequent summers by a walking tour in the south of France in 1836, a sojourn with friends in northern Italy in 1837, and an excursion through Scandinavia and northern Russia in 1838. By the end of that year it had become abundantly clear to both Layard and Benjamin Austen that the former could never adopt the sedentary life of a London solicitor, and Layard determined to act upon his uncle's advice that he emigrate to Ceylon, with the intention of practising there at the Bar. He passed his legal examinations in June 1849, and was consequently enrolled as an attorney of H.M. Court of Queen's Bench at Westminster.

It is clear that his distaste for legal practice was not the sole reason for Layard's departure from England. By his own account, he had evidently developed as a child radical and democratic views,<sup>2</sup> which hardly corresponded with his family's staunch toryism. It was inevitable that conflict on religious, economic and political questions ensued, and the unpleasantness thus occasioned provided an additional motivation for Layard to leave. His decision to travel overland to Ceylon caused surprise and consternation, and he admits that his plans "were, after all, vague and somewhat wild."<sup>3</sup>

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1. *ibid.*, i : 45.

2. He referred in his autobiography to "those radical and democratic opinions which I sturdily professed even when a boy." (*ibid.*, i : 25; also, i : 39-40).

3. *ibid.*, i : 108.

Layard's eastern travels and excavations have been well documented.<sup>1</sup> He promptly abandoned his intention of continuing to Ceylon, and from 1839 to 1842 wandered throughout Mesopotamia and Persia, closely associating himself with the nomadic Bakhtiyaris, and satisfying his burning desire for independence and adventure. From 1845 to 1851 his attentions were turned to archaeology, and he occupied himself with the excavations at Nimrud and Ninevah, the spoils of which form such an impressive collection at the British Museum.

During the three year interlude, from 1842 to 1845, Layard initiated his diplomatic career. He had returned to Constantinople in July 1842 with despatches for the British ambassador, Stratford Canning, from the political resident at Baghdad. Layard impressed Sir Stratford, and accepted his proposal that he visit Bosnia and Servia, then in a state of rebellion, in a purely unofficial capacity, and report to Canning on their economic and political condition. Following this mission he became Canning's private aide, with the prospect of being officially appointed as an attaché to the embassy. The promise was not to be fulfilled, largely on account of the opposition of the foreign secretary, Lord Aberdeen, to Layard's -- and Canning's -- Russophobia. Thus for his entire sojourn in

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1. Layard, *Ninevah and its Remains*; A.H. Layard, *Discoveries in the Ruins of Ninevah and Babylon: with Travels in Armenia, Kurdistan and the Desert; being the result of a Second Expedition undertaken for the Trustees of the British Museum*, (London, 1853); A.H. Layard, 'A description of the Province of Khuzistan', *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, 16, 1846, 1-105; A.H. Layard, *Early Adventures*; Gordon Waterfield, *Layard of Ninevah*, (London, 1963); Nora Kubie, *Road to Ninevah: The Adventures and Excavations of Sir Austen Henry Layard*, (London, 1965); Robert Silverberg, *The Man Who Found Ninevah: The Story of Austen Henry Layard*, (Kingswood, Tadworth, Surrey, 1968).

Constantinople, Layard was destined to act in an unauthorised capacity. He was dependent partly on his own financial resources, partly on the magnanimity of the ambassador. Layard was also employed for a time as Constantinople correspondent of the *Morning Chronicle* and was successful in obtaining financial support for the *Malta Times*, through both of which he was able to foster British, and Canning's, interests in the eastern Mediterranean. His multifarious duties as Canning's aide included an examination of the Turko-Persian frontier and a mission to Albania, but for the most part Layard assumed the role of Sir Stratford's go-between in his secret dealings and intrigues on behalf of the reform party of Reshid Pasha. Layard thus became well acquainted with the leading Turkish liberals. He afterwards admitted that "the task he [Canning] imposed upon me was a very delicate and difficult one, and, even in those days, not unaccompanied with danger. But it suited my adventurous and somewhat romantic disposition."<sup>1</sup> Indeed, he thrived on the independence, freedom and excitement of the Orient, leading a riotous social life. But an attachéship was not forthcoming, and Layard's interest gradually shifted to the mounds near Mosul. With Sir Stratford's encouragement, he departed from Constantinople early in October of 1845.

Layard returned to England, after an absence of eight years, in December 1847. At the end of the following year, however, he rejoined the embassy at Constantinople, having finally been appointed an unpaid attaché. Palmerston, now foreign secretary, promoted him to a paid position (with a salary of £250) the following April,

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1. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, ii : 56.

requesting at the same time that he continue his archaeological endeavours on behalf of the British Museum. Layard therefore returned to Mesopotamia, and remained there until April 1851.

Following his return to London in July, Layard busied himself at the British Museum with unpacking the crates of antiquities from Nimrud and Ninevah, and with the writing of *Ninevah and Babylon*, but his energies were also directed to society: his time, he wrote in September, "has been principally taken up with visiting friends and country house amusements."<sup>1</sup> The company he most preferred was that of his cousin, Lady Charlotte Guest, and her husband Sir John, proprietor of the Dowlais ironworks and M.P. for Merthyr. In July of 1851 Layard addressed gatherings of miners at Dowlais, recounting Arab tales and stories of his Ninevah discoveries.<sup>2</sup> He also guided parties from Canford, the Guest estate in Dorset, and from Dowlais, each numbering a hundred, through the Ninevah display at the British Museum.<sup>3</sup>

Layard, however, could not long be satisfied with this excess of relaxation. Moreover, his income was limited. By the end of 1851 he was considering two possibilities: entering parliament<sup>4</sup> and obtaining a diplomatic posting of some kind.<sup>5</sup> In the event, opportunities in both spheres were to materialise. Layard's decision was to enter political life.

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38980, 124: L to Henry Ross, Eastnor Castle, 25 Sept. 1851.

2. Bessborough, 277.

3. *ibid.*, 276.

4. LP. BL Add Ms 38980, 183: L to Ross, 30 Nov. 1851.

5. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 9: L to Lady Aboyne, Canford, 28 Dec. 1851 (copy). The Countess of Aboyne (afterwards the Marchioness of Huntly) was a cousin of Layard, a sister of Lady Charlotte Guest, and a close friend of Goderich.

## CHAPTER 2

COMMON PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

Henry Layard recorded in 1861 his conviction that:

nothing can be more interesting than the study of the youth of a great man, than to mark the early dawn of his intellect, and to trace the first tendency of his mind. The lives of most men are shadowed out before they are five-and-twenty. The impulse given to the thoughts and disposition by that time generally continues in the same direction with little change. The foundation is laid, development alone ensues.<sup>1</sup>

Despite their divergent backgrounds Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard had, by the early fifties, individually acceded to a mutual intellectual foundation. There were, of course, gradations of opinion on various issues, but their beliefs were in basic accord. Furthermore, their common philosophy remained essentially intact during the subsequent two decades;<sup>2</sup> 'modifications' were effected to meet changing political exigencies, but these were generally limited to scope or strategy, and did not challenge their fundamental assumptions.

The ideas which they shared in the early fifties allowed Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard to coalesce as a political force. Empirical, even anti-intellectual, their philosophy was neither rational nor in all respects internally consistent. A peculiar hybrid of social romanticism and political radicalism, it was nevertheless a potent force in their personal lives, and a crucial factor in their political intimacy.

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1. [A.H. Layard], 'Cavour', *Quarterly Review*, 110, July 1861, 215-6.
  2. Forster, for example, commented in 1885: "I formed my political opinions with some care and thought, and have hardly had to change one of them." (*Bradford Observer*, 3 Aug. 1885: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 1 Aug. 1885).

2.

John Stuart Mill designated Jeremy Bentham and Samuel Taylor Coleridge as "the two great seminal minds of England in their age."<sup>1</sup> Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard each adopted a composite ideology, adhering to most aspects of Coleridge's Platonist-idealist-romantic philosophy, but also succumbing to the attraction of specific elements (especially the commitment to democracy) of Bentham's philosophic radicalism. It was their common adherence to this particular ideological hybrid of the Coleridgean and Benthamite traditions which furnished the philosophical basis of their personal and political intimacy.

Coleridge was undoubtedly the principal seer of nineteenth-century English romanticism, and his influence was profound. The romanticist notions of Maurice, Carlyle and Thomas Arnold, for example, were all inspired by Coleridgean idealism. Indeed it was to his disciples, rather than to Coleridge himself, that Goderich and his friends attributed much of their intellectual growth.

Goderich, Bruce, Hughes and Forster were each inspired by F.D. Maurice's example and teachings. Bruce asserted that "a better man does not live, incessantly occupied with action as well as thought."<sup>2</sup> For Goderich the influence was primarily personal, and very much linked to the co-operative endeavours of the Christian Socialists. When they differed so fundamentally on the question of democracy,<sup>3</sup> Goderich strove to maintain Maurice's good opinion,

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1. J.S. Mill, *Dissertations and Discussions Political, Philosophical, and Historical*, (London, 1867), i : 331.
  2. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 204: B to John Bruce, 19 Dec. 1863.
  3. In 1852 Goderich wrote a pamphlet, entitled *The Duty of the Age*, (London, 1852), advocating manhood suffrage. Whilst accepted and praised by fellow-Christian Socialists Hughes, Ludlow and Kingsley, it was condemned and suppressed by Maurice (see 69-71 below).

and continued to view him as "the Prophet."<sup>1</sup> Forster was principally indebted to Maurice, whose acquaintance he made in the mid-forties,<sup>2</sup> as a theologian, whose treatises helped to assuage his doubts<sup>3</sup> and whose sermons he attended with Hughes.<sup>4</sup> Hughes was probably the most fervent Maurician of the four, referring to him ebulliently as "the best man far and away" he had ever known, and as "the greatest theologian of the century,"<sup>5</sup> though he stressed the paramountcy of Maurice's personal influence in stating that "while his writings have exercised an enormous influence on theological thought, his life has been even a greater witness for the truth which he taught."<sup>6</sup>

The influence of Thomas Arnold served to reinforce the Coleridgean dispositions of Goderich, Bruce, Hughes and Forster. Hughes personally experienced the strength of Arnold's character at Rugby, though it was not until after the publication of Arnold's *Life* in 1844<sup>7</sup> that his ideas permeated Hughes's mind. Thereafter, Hughes thought of Arnold as one of the "foremost souls of heroes [sic] of my time."<sup>8</sup> It was through Hughes's influence<sup>9</sup> that Goderich

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 8: G to H, Ollerton, Notts., 18 May 1852.
  2. Reid, i : 167.
  3. Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/10/63: F to J.M. Ludlow, Otley, 16 March 1856; also [W.E. Forster], *Maurice's Theology*, (London, 1856).
  4. FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 49: F to Jane Forster, London, 18 March 1861.
  5. Violet Martineau, *John Martineau: The Pupil of Kingsley*, (London, 1921), 168.
  6. F.D. Maurice, *The Friendship of Books and other Lectures*. Edited, with a Preface, by T. Hughes, M.P., (London, 1874), xxvii.
  7. A.P. Stanley, *The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D.D.*, (London, 1844).
  8. Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard, bMS Am 1484.1, 210: H to James Russell Lowell, Chester, 21 April 1891.
  9. Frederick Maurice, *The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice*, (London, 1885), ii : 126.

quoted Arnold ("If there is any one truth short of the highest for which I would die at the stake, it would be Democracy without Jacobinism") on the title page of *The Duty of the Age*; Goderich apparently assumed he could turn to Arnold for the endorsement of both his romantic and democratic inclinations. Bruce's connection with Arnold must have been close. He certainly read Arnold in the mid-forties,<sup>1</sup> and he is found visiting Arnold's widow in the mid-fifties.<sup>2</sup> Forster too was deeply moved by Arnold's example, believing his life to have been "both humbling and inspiring," and viewing Arnold pre-eminently as a representative of Christianity.<sup>3</sup> Forster's relationship with Arnoldian thought was of course consolidated after his marriage in 1850 to Arnold's daughter Jane, who, according to her niece, perpetuated her father's ardent Christian faith and political and historical interests.<sup>4</sup>

Thomas Carlyle has been aptly described as "a man with a message, if ever there was one, and the message was essentially that of the great Romantic poets and thinkers, applied to the condition of England in the days of Chartism and the dismal science [i.e. political economy]."<sup>5</sup> His message was directed to the intellectually-adrift youth of the thirties and forties, and Carlyle, the prophet-sage, appealed immensely to Goderich, Forster,

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1. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 64: B to Sarah Bruce, Rome, 6 Feb. 1845.
  2. *ibid.*, i : 146: B to Norah Bruce, Ambleside, 9 Oct. 1856.
  3. Reid, i : 162: F to Mrs. Charles Fox, Bolton, 1 Dec. 1844.
  4. Mrs. Humphrey Ward, *A Writer's Recollections*, (London, 1919), 34.
  5. Basil Willey, *Nineteenth Century Studies: Coleridge to Matthew Arnold*, (London, 1964), 102.

Hughes and Bruce.<sup>1.</sup> Bruce and Goderich held frequent discussions with him in London throughout the 1850s; on one occasion, for example, Bruce reported to his wife that "on Sunday I lunched with him [de Grey], and walked on to Carlyle's, where we sat for nearly two hours, and had much interesting talk."<sup>2.</sup> Goderich's relationship with Carlyle in this period was widely recognised (even the door-keeper of the house of commons referred to him as "the intimate friend of Carlyle"<sup>3.</sup>), and *The Duty of the Age* is suffused with Carlylean terms such as 'Morrison's Pill remedies' and 'Bobus of Houndsditch'. Goderich was deeply influenced by the medievalism of *Past and Present*: at Fountains abbey, he wrote Bruce, "I am able to indulge my Medieval taste without fear of scoffs from Layard or Blackett," and he wanted Bruce to read the account of its foundation "by a certain old Monk who writes very much in the style of Jocelyn of Brakelond, whom 'Past and Present' has taught us so much to love."<sup>4.</sup> Hughes, writing to Ripon in the 1880s, mentions the monument to Carlyle shortly to be erected, and suggests that they "go & see it

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1. Whilst Layard recognised his status as a "celebrated English writer," and applauded his condemnation of the absence of effective national leadership (3 H 136, 1035-6: 26 Jan. 1855), he deprecated Carlyle's style of writing as "that vague German declamation, which appears to those who are not followers of Mr. Carlyle to consist of the very smallest amount of meaning conveyed in the largest possible number of big-sounding words." ([A.H. Layard], 'German, Flemish, and Dutch Art', *Quarterly Review*, 109, April 1861, 464).
  2. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 176: B to Norah Bruce, London, 30 July 1860; also *ibid.*, i : 159: B to Norah Bruce, London, 24 Feb. 1858; BP. GCRO, D/D Br 144: Carlyle to B, Chelsea, 12 April 1856; Napier Papers. Bodleian Library, Ms Eng Letters d.237, 163: B to Sir William Napier, Cardiff, 14 July 1856; D.A. Wilson, *Carlyle to Threescore-and-Ten (1853-1865)*, (London, 1929), 220; W. Holman Hunt, *Pre-Raphaelitism and the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood*, (London, 1905), ii: 129-132.
  3. William White, *The Inner Life of the House of Commons*, (London, 1897), i : 68: entry of 29 May 1858.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 13: G to B, Ripon, 25 Sept. 1854; see Thomas Carlyle, *Past and Present*, (London, 1843), Book 2: The Ancient Monk.

together ... in testimony of the good the old man did us when we were raw youths."<sup>1</sup> Hughes frequently acknowledged his indebtedness to Carlyle. In the quasi-autobiographical *Tom Brown at Oxford*, Tom "had scarcely ever in his life been so moved by a book" as he was by *Past and Present*,<sup>2</sup> with its diatribes against the heartlessness of laissez-faire. There is no reason to think this was not equally applicable to Hughes himself. He held that Carlyle, as a teacher, prophet, and seer, had "in many ways moved more deeply than any other the hearts of this generation."<sup>3</sup> Forster was similarly roused by Carlyle's inspiration. They had become acquainted, through their mutual friendship with John Sterling, in the early 1840s.<sup>4</sup> Whilst not accepting Carlyle's notions in their entirety, nor admiring his peculiar style,<sup>5</sup> Forster was nevertheless an ardent sympathiser, describing Carlyle as "decidedly, to my thinking, the highest, or rather the deepest mind of the age."<sup>6</sup> Their personal relations strengthened in the late forties. Carlyle and his wife paid Forster a three-week visit at Rawdon in the summer of 1847. The Carlyles

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43549, 1: H to R, 19 May 1881.
  2. Thomas Hughes, *Tom Brown at Oxford*, (London, 1929), 347.
  3. Thomas Hughes, *Alfred the Great*, (London, 1901), 7.
  4. J.A. Froude, ed., *Letters and Memorials of Jane Welsh Carlyle*; (New York, 1883), i : 332; also Alexander Carlyle, ed., *New Letters and Memorials of Jane Welsh Carlyle, annotated by Thomas Carlyle*, (London, 1903), i : 111: Jane Carlyle to Thomas Carlyle, Chelsea, 8 July 1843; and Sir Charles Gavan Duffy, *Conversations with Carlyle*, (London, 1892), 24: Carlyle to Charles Gavan Duffy, 1 March 1847.
  5. Reid, i : 148-151: F to Barclay Fox, Bradford, 22 March 1842. Barclay Fox, brother of Caroline Fox of *Journal* fame, was an intimate friend of Forster during the forties.
  6. Reid, i : 155: F to Elizabeth Nicholl, Bradford, 3 Nov. 1842.

certainly enjoyed this sojourn;<sup>1.</sup> Forster, somewhat overwhelmed by the presence of a famous intellect, admitted that "catching such a visit is of course quite a trophy in life."<sup>2.</sup> A return visit to Rawdon in July 1849 was partially marred by Jane Carlyle's petulance.<sup>3.</sup> Notwithstanding the delicacy of the situation, Forster joined Carlyle and Gavan Duffy<sup>4.</sup> on their 1849 tour of Ireland. Forster's indebtedness to Carlyle was considerable: when he visited him with Lord Houghton in 1871, the latter reported that "it was touching to hear him [Forster] tell the old man that if he ever did or became anything useful or notable, he owed it to the influence of his writings."<sup>5.</sup>

Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard extended their philosophical allegiance to other thinkers and writers in the romantic-Coleridgean mould. For example Goderich and Hughes, as Christian Socialists, were colleagues of Charles Kingsley, and though

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1. Alexander Carlyle, ed., *New Letters of Thomas Carlyle*, (London, 1904), ii : 42-45: Thomas Carlyle to Mrs. Aitken, Rawdon, 17 Aug. 1847; also A. Carlyle, *New Letters and Memorials of Jane Welsh Carlyle*, i : 228: Jane Carlyle to Mrs. Jameson, Rawdon, [ ] Aug. 1847.
  2. FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 17: F to Barclay [Fox], Rawdon, 27 Aug. 1847.
  3. Carlyle, *New Letters and Memorials of Jane Welsh Carlyle*, i : 261-2: Jane Carlyle to Thomas Carlyle, Rawdon, 16 July 1849.
  4. Charles Gavan Duffy, Irish nationalist, proprietor and editor of the *Nation*, a Young Irelander. Duffy had been imprisoned in 1848 for his political activities, and was not discharged until April 1849. He was elected to the house of commons in 1852, where Goderich supported him, and other Irish members, in attempts to legislate for Irish land reform (Sir C. Gavan Duffy, *The League of North and South. An Episode in Irish History, 1850-1854*, (London, 1886), 231). Gavan Duffy and Ripon co-operated in support of home rule in the 1880s.
  5. T. Wemyss Reid, *The Life, Letters, and Friendships of Richard Monckton Milnes, First Lord Houghton*, (London, 1890), ii : 250: Houghton to Lady Houghton, London, 5 Feb. 1871.

their relationship was never close (Goderich only saw him twice between 1850 and 1853<sup>1.</sup>), they learned to value his literary contribution to English romanticism.<sup>2.</sup> Forster formed a close personal relationship with Kingsley, which endured throughout the fifties.<sup>3.</sup> Layard fashioned a unique connection with Coleridgean romanticism through his friendship with Henry Crabb Robinson, the lawyer and diarist who was a disciple of Goethe and Schiller, and an intimate not only of Coleridge, but also of his fellow-romantics Wordsworth and Southey, and of Carlyle. Layard met Robinson in 1835, breakfasted with him frequently thereafter, and attributed to his influence the direction of his developing literary tastes.<sup>4.</sup>

Layard's uncle, Benjamin Austen, accused Robinson of misleading his nephew, and Robinson pleaded guilty to having "set his mind in motion."<sup>5.</sup> Layard stated in his autobiography that he had "ever felt grateful" to Crabb Robinson for having misguided him,<sup>6.</sup> adding that Robinson was "the person who exercised the greatest influence upon my future career."<sup>7.</sup> The substance of this influence, though never

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1. Martineau, 167: H to John Martineau, [ ], 1888; RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 100: G to H, Nocton Hall, 30 Oct. 1853.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 1: G to H, Nocton Hall, 7 Dec. 1850; Thomas Hughes, 'Charles Kingsley', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 35, March 1877, 337-42.
  3. Kingsley was a guest of the Forsters soon after their marriage (FP. TCD, Ms 4995, 728: Jane Forster to Mrs. Thomas Arnold, Rawdon, 13 Sept. [1850]); also FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 37: Kingsley to F, Eversley, 23 Sept. 1856; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 152: F to G, Burley, 25 June 1858.
  4. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, i : 54-6; also Edith J. Morley, ed., *Henry Crabb Robinson on Books and their Writers*, (London, 1938), ii : 571.
  5. Thomas Sadler, ed., *Diary, Reminiscences, and Correspondence of Henry Crabb Robinson*, (London and New York, 1872), ii : 335: Henry Crabb Robinson to Thomas Robinson, 14 Feb. 1852.
  6. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, i : 57.
  7. *ibid.*, i : 54.

explained by Layard, must have been an amalgam of romantic and democratic ideals, for Crabb Robinson accompanied his romantic proclivities with an apparently contradictory attraction to philosophic radicalism and unitarianism. Not only did Robinson set Layard thinking, therefore, he also provided the ideological model which he was later to adopt. Layard also recognised Walter Savage Landor, who lived in the Fiesole near Florence during Layard's youth there, as a formative influence in his intellectual development.<sup>1.</sup> Years later, Landor was to write an ode to Layard.<sup>2.</sup>

3.

Whilst it is evidently demonstrable that Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard acknowledged their indebtedness to the idealism of Coleridge, Maurice, Arnold, Carlyle and their romantic coterie, the precise philosophy of which they were the heirs is not easily delineated. English romanticism of the early nineteenth century was by its very nature illogical and irrational, and an explicit definition of its theories is therefore unfeasible. But the emphasis of the romantic argument is unmistakeable: it was essentially a protest, a reaction against the eighteenth-century enlightenment's adherence to reason, common sense, moderation and rationality. The romanticists abhorred the purely logical and mechanistic, utilitarian and materialistic approach to the solution of society's difficulties. Instead they appealed to the imagination, to the emotions, to enthusiasm, to faith, with an emphasis on moral

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1. *ibid.*, i : 24-5.

2. Stephen Wheeler, ed., *The Poetical Works of Walter Savage Landor*, (Oxford, 1937), ii : 419-20: 'To Layard, Discoverer of Ninevah!'

regeneration, on the unity of the spiritual and the secular, on the heart instead of the intellect. Fundamental to romanticism was the concept of society as an organic whole, an entity in which men co-operate as brothers rather than compete as individuals. Selfish materialism should be avoided, the paramountcy of the national spirit should be recognised. Escapism was a common romantic attribute: the love of the exotic, the idealised conception of a medieval past, the rejection of the new urban-industrial society, and consequent espousal of the divinity of nature. Hostile to industrial progress the romantic nature, in stressing the need to improve the quality of life (this was, for example, the essence of Matthew Arnold's appeal to sweetness and light), remained optimistic rather than critical or sceptical. Moral leadership was seen as a crucial requisite, hence the attraction to the romantic philosophers of hero-worship and paternalism.

In spite of the disparity of their origins, and of their experiences in life before they became acquainted, Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard each accepted wholeheartedly these rather vague romantic criticisms of contemporary society, and the concomitant ideals prescribed for its future regeneration. They somehow felt in their hearts that the rising utilitarian ideology was wrong, yet they were unable to demonstrate its errors intellectually. They were forced, therefore, to eschew a rational rebuttal to utilitarianism and to rely instead on an existentialist approval of the romantic-idealist protest.

#### 4.

An emphasis on the spiritual, on faith rather than on rational logic, was certainly characteristic of their common ideology, and its importance as a component of this ideology

justifies a detailed examination.

Hughes, in rejecting as irrelevant the doubts cast by scientific discovery on religion, stated: "Granting all that they tend to prove, they deal only with the outer garment, with the visible universe, and the life which must be lived in it, leaving the inner and real life of mankind quite untouched."<sup>1</sup> Only with an acceptance of faith in God and Christ, and a rejection of doubts, agnosticism and atheism, could he perceive "all sorrow and misery melting away and drawn up from this fair world of God's, like mountain mist before the July sun."<sup>2</sup> Faith, he believed, was a necessary component of human contentment: "Alas when a man has drifted from his old moorings & lost his compass in the invisible without giving up his longings for the victory of truth & love in the visible creation, the rest of his pilgrimage cannot but get sadder & sadder."<sup>3</sup> Though Hughes no doubt imbibed an elementary Christian faith from his father, he emphasised the importance of Rugby, and Arnold, in developing his trust in and loyalty to Christ.<sup>4</sup> No doubt Arnold, as well as Maurice, influenced his romantic concept of the necessity of moral regeneration, his rejection of

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1. Thomas Hughes, *Memoir of a Brother*, (London, 1873), 174.

2. Thomas Hughes, *A Layman's Faith*, (London, 1868), 29.

3. Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard, bMS Am 765, 447: H to Lowell, Bath, 1 Sept. 1889. Hughes was referring specifically to the agnosticism of Leslie Stephen.

4. Hughes, *True Manliness*, x.

... that specious old heathen ... idea of *external* aiding & disciplining of the citizen & raising him by law; whereas for 1885 years it has been known to Christendom at any rate that the motive force must be *internal* -- the wills of men gradually raised & purified by love, working out from within a state suited to their aspirations...<sup>1.</sup>

This thesis certainly lies within the Coleridgean idealist tradition.<sup>2.</sup>

Hughes accepted the Maurician belief<sup>3.</sup> that God's rule on earth was a reality, though not always recognised by man. He considered that

through our whole history the same thread has run. The nation, often confusedly and with stammering accents, but still on the whole consistently, has borne the same witness as the Church, that as God is living and reigning there must be a law, the expression of His will, at the foundation of all human society, which priests, kings, rulers, people, must discover, acknowledge, obey. 4.

Government will succeed or fail precisely as it acknowledges, or fails to acknowledge, the ruling will of God.<sup>5.</sup>

Christianity provided for Hughes the framework for that organic unity so cherished by romantics. This concept pertained especially to his idea of the brotherhood of man: men, recognising God as their father, were brothers rather than competitors.

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43549, 157: H to R, Chester, 19 May 1885.
  2. See S.T. Coleridge, 'Reason, Religion, and the Will', printed in R.J. White, ed., *The Political Thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, (London, 1938), 88-92.
  3. F.D. Maurice, *The Kingdom of Christ*, (London, 1958), ii : 284.
  4. Hughes, *Alfred the Great*, 327.
  5. *ibid.*, 322.

Above all, Hughes is renowned as the principal representative of muscular Christianity: the thesis that the Christian religion is strong, manly, courageous, persistent, truthful and dutiful.<sup>1</sup> His faith, indeed, was devoid of doubt, simple and tolerant, rejecting the relevance of dogmatic and doctrinal controversy. As such, it was a model to Goderich, who stated to Hughes in 1856: "My dear friend, I have learnt more of what real faith & real Christianity is from you, now & before, than from anything else."<sup>2</sup>

Goderich's evangelical upbringing undoubtedly influenced his religious views. He reflected many evangelical values: the emphasis on moral conduct and individual commitment, the need to change the individual in order to reform society, the rejection of the doctrine that salvation was only for the elect. But the evangelical stress on salvation through deep emotional experience he found unattractive. He therefore searched elsewhere for religious guidance, and found Maurice. Maurice's influence on Goderich was profound: the latter subsequently argued that "if Christianity ... is to become once again a real religion to men, & bring to us the solution of our present doubts & difficulties & fightings it must be preached as Maurice preaches it."<sup>3</sup>

The need of an inner faith was of paramount concern to Goderich. He believed that a people's true prosperity could only "be founded on the sound basis of justice and of truth, and ...

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1. Thomas Hughes, *The Manliness of Christ*, (London, 1880).
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 293: G to H, Ripon, 11 Dec. 1856.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 104: G to H, Nocton Hall, 7 Nov. 1853.

without that the greatest outward prosperity can but sooner or later crumble to the dust."<sup>1</sup> (The truth to which he referred, of course, was Christianity; he was fond of quoting John 8:32: "and you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free."<sup>2</sup>.)

He protested against the inclination to substitute faith in science and material progress for inner spirituality:

... We have advanced so much of late in our knowledge of Physical Science, we are so proud of our discoveries in it, that we are apt to fancy that no other knowledge is certain, that those laws are only to be heeded, and can alone avenge their violation. But a terrible waking will dispel this dream, if we do not take care. The utmost knowledge of the nature of the outward world, the most orthodox faith in the doctrines of Political Economy, will not save us from the results of our rejection of that righteousness which now as in the days of old alone truly exalteth a Nation...<sup>3</sup>.

Goderich, like Hughes and Maurice, accepted the supposition that God's rule on earth was a reality, his governance based "on his own eternal and unchanging laws."<sup>4</sup> History, he argued, was only intelligible if seen as God's work, its study indicating "that institutions, races, nations have endured & done great deeds by virtue of the truth a[nd] right alone that was in them."<sup>5</sup>

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1. *Leeds Mercury (Supplement)*, 15 Oct. 1853: G's address to the Huddersfield auxiliary of the British and foreign bible society, 11 Oct. 1853.
  2. For examples of Goderich's reference to this passage, see *Leeds Mercury (Supplement)*, 15 Oct. 1853; *The Duty of the Age*, 11. Hughes also experienced the strong attraction of this passage: see Hughes, *Tom Brown at Oxford*, 272. And Coleridge employed it as the motto of his journal, the *Watchman*.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 59-60: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'. 'Fragmentary Wild Oats' was an assessment of the current political situation which Goderich wrote in December 1853.
  4. G. [oderich], 4; also RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 171-2: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 71-81: rough draft of a lecture on the study of history.

Based on this foundation, men should seek a reform "not of outward machinery alone, but of the inward principles of our acts, of the very ground of thoughts."<sup>1</sup> Christian principles should be applied to both political and commercial life;<sup>2</sup> the religious and the secular cannot be viewed as distinct;<sup>3</sup> for reformers, it is fatal to separate God and the cause;<sup>4</sup> a Christian faith is false which is kept "in our pockets all the week and only brought ... out on Sundays to make us look respectable."<sup>5</sup>

At the core of Goderich's faith was the concept of the brotherhood of man under God: the Christian faith, from the time it was first proclaimed, has "told all men that they were brothers, because they had a common father."<sup>6</sup> This attitude, though a direct inheritance from Hughes and Maurice, can also be attributed to Coleridge, and helps to explain Goderich's perpetual emphasis on the organic unity of humankind, the binding together of men of all classes and races. An example of his desire for fraternal unity was Goderich's adherence to freemasonry,<sup>7</sup> and it seems logical to assume that, when he converted to catholicism in 1874, he merely substituted

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 170: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats!.'

2. *Leeds Mercury (Supplement)*, 15 Oct. 1853.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 102, 162-5: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats!.'

4. G. [oderich], 21.

5. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 165: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats!.'

6. G. [oderich], 8.

7. Goderich was admitted to the Huddersfield 'Lodge of Truth' in May 1853, and became English grand master in 1870. (Denholm, 309 n62). Layard, in similar vein, was an Oddfellow (*Daily Telegraph*, 23 Jan. 1864: L's address to an Oddfellow banquet in London, 22 Jan. 1864), but Hughes preferred the wider union of national brotherhood: "Men of the same nation do not want an *imperium in imperio*, -- they ought to be good fellow-citizens and brethren already, without the ties of secret oaths, signs, grips, and passwords" (J.M. Ludlow, *A Sketch of the History of the United States from Independence to Secession. To which is added, The Struggle for Kansas. By Thomas Hughes*, (Cambridge, 1862), 333-4).

for the brotherhood of freemasonry the larger fraternity of the church of Rome.<sup>1.</sup>

If Goderich and Hughes knew the certainty of an undoubting faith Bruce, Layard and Forster certainly did not. This discrepancy in commitment, however, was never the cause of alienation. On the contrary, it tended to augment the centripetal forces of their relationship for, despite their difficulties, the three doubters earnestly and persistently longed for the assurance of a comfortable faith. To Hughes and Goderich, both staunch admirers of Tennyson and in particular of *In Memoriam*<sup>2.</sup> (in which Tennyson delineates his doubts and misgivings and eventually vindicates the beliefs of the heart as against the reason of the intellect<sup>3.</sup>), the plights of their three uncertain colleagues encouraged a disposition of sympathy and understanding.

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1. It is unnecessary to consider Ripon's conversion in depth, as his religious and denominational uncertainties fall outside the period considered in this thesis. Bruce attributed the beginnings of his difficulties to the deaths of his two brothers-in-law in 1870, stating: "From that time he seemed to find consolation only in attending Church Services. He ceased to challenge me, as of old, to Sunday walks. The habit & the necessity grew as time went on, & the services of the R.C. Church best supplied his cravings" (LP. BL Add Ms 39007, 381: A to L, London, 31 March 1875). John Ball confirms the devastating effect on de Grey of Vyner's murder by Greek brigands (LP. BL Add Ms 38998, 18: Ball to L, London, 5 June [1870]). There is no evidence that Ripon's earlier beliefs were in any way modified before 1870.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 16-38: draft of a lecture on Tennyson which Goderich delivered at the Hull mechanics institute, 9 April 1853. He refers to Tennyson as the greatest English poet since Milton, and describes *In Memoriam* as his best work. For Hughes's praise of Tennyson and *In Memoriam*, see RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 179: H to G, Torquay, 28 Aug. 1855; also Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard, bMS Am 1483, 176: H to Lowell, Chester, 20 June 1890.
  3. See Basil Willey, *More Nineteenth Century Studies: A Group of Honest Doubters*, (New York, 1966), 53, 56, 79-103.

Bruce received the traditional church of England indoctrination as a youth. In typical nineteenth-century Anglo-Welsh vein, his family had little sympathy with Welsh nonconformity. It is to Bruce's credit that he overcame these tendencies and, whilst remaining, as his son commented, "a sincere and active Churchman,"<sup>1</sup> he developed a tolerance and moderation in the broad church spirit, and recognised the church's own responsibility for its failure. In 1870, for example, he supported the principle of Welsh-speaking clerical appointees for Wales, and attributed the strength of Welsh dissent to the ignorance, torpidity, and frequent drunkenness and dissoluteness, of earlier church clergy.<sup>2</sup> To some extent, he was therefore enabled to surmount the nonconformist prejudices which were so prevalent in both the religious and social-economic life of industrial south Wales.

As a young man, both in Glamorgan and in London, Bruce was befriended and guided by Edward Copleston, the Bishop of Llandaff (who, as it happened, had been appointed by Goderich's father in 1827). It was probably this relationship with Copleston, the originator of the Noetic group at Oriel (which examined and criticised accepted Christian beliefs) and a moderate in the church controversies of the 1830s and 1840s, which contributed to the mellowness of Bruce's anglicanism. He certainly eulogised the bishop after his death.<sup>3</sup> But Copleston could not, apparently, provide Bruce with a secure faith. Bruce could not believe in the verbal and literal inspiration of the scriptures but, fearful of disturbing religious sentiment, he was

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1. W.N. Bruce, 'Henry Austin Bruce', in J.V. Morgan, 230.

2. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44086, 70: B to Gladstone, 8 Jan. 1870.

3. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 3 and 10 Nov. 1849, 21 and 28 June, 12 July 1851. A more realistic assessment by Bruce of Copleston's attributes is found in Bruce, *Letters*, i : 93: B to Ormsby, Aberdare, 12 July 1851.

hesitant to foist his honest doubts on those who depended on strict dogmatism as the foundation of their faith.<sup>1</sup> He described his religious state of mind as

... neither of entire belief nor unbelief. I know not what to think of the great mystery, but knowing that I desire most entirely to think reverently of God and all that He has done for man, and that I have no natural relish for scepticism, I feel no fear and no positive pain at my mental condition. All that the Saviour taught I heartily believe and weakly endeavour to practise. Any error of the understanding in the mode of my belief, I am as sure will be forgiven, if my life be good and useful, as that I am now writing to you. But I should far prefer the state of undoubting belief in those dogmas in which many find such support and comfort... 2.

Bruce's transparent craving for faith could not fail to attract the Christian sympathies of both Hughes and Goderich.

Layard's intense predilection for spirituality is best illustrated in his role as an art critic. Greek art, he argued, "appealed to the highest intellectual faculties of man, Gothic to his feelings and imagination."<sup>3</sup> Gothic was therefore superior: he described the Gothic cathedrals of France and England as "the noblest monuments that any faith can boast."<sup>4</sup> Moreover, he stated that the Gothic spirit in Italian architecture in the thirteenth century "was followed by the birth of that noblest school of modern painting -- fresh and original in its character -- stamped with its own individuality, and eminently the representative of the new faith -- in a word, Christian art."<sup>5</sup> These paintings had noble

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1. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 190: B to Norah Bruce, Ripon, 24 Sept. 1862.

2. *ibid.*, i : 205-6: B to Norah Bruce, Ripon, 30 Dec. 1863.

3. [A.H. Layard], 'Architecture', *Quarterly Review*, 106, Oct. 1859, 316.

4. *ibid.*, 309.

5. [A.H. Layard], 'Fresco-Painting', *Quarterly Review*, 104, Oct. 1858, 283.

themes: "the beauty of holiness, the reward of virtue, the triumph of faith, the punishment of sin and heresy, the duties of civil life, and the blessings of good government."<sup>1</sup> Fourteenth-century Christian art was the "highest and most spiritual development"<sup>2</sup> of painting in the history of mankind. It was, Layard believed, by nature spiritual, "soaring to heaven, and seeking to elevate the human form and sentiments to the utmost limits of the imagination."<sup>3</sup> In contrast, he deprecated German, Flemish and Dutch art, with their tendencies to the material, to "portraying nature with the greatest truth, but without any feeling for the highest order of ideal beauty."<sup>4</sup> Turner he admired; his use of colour appealed to Layard's romantic sensibilities, and he commented that Turner "worked from that inspiration of genius which seems to require neither thought nor analysis."<sup>5</sup> To argue that Layard ignored the relevance of faith or possessed no sense of the spiritual would obviously be misleading.

Whether or not Henry Layard had little religious faith, as Waterfield asserts,<sup>6</sup> is therefore disputable. But he certainly rejected many of the tenets of orthodox Christianity. Raised in a church of England environment, he acknowledged that his mother's religious liberalism and tolerance had made an impression on him.<sup>7</sup>

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1. *ibid.*, 282.

2. *ibid.*, 287.

3. [Layard], 'German, Flemish, and Dutch Art', 482.

4. *ibid.*

5. A.H. Layard, 'Eastlake and Gibson', *Edinburgh Review*, 131, April 1870, 404.

6. Waterfield, 285. Waterfield appears to confuse Layard's rejection of organised Christianity with a rejection of the Christian religion itself.

7. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, i : 9.

During his education in France, his protestantism induced schoolboy persecution, and Layard afterwards considered that he had "a better right and title than most people to the credit of having been a martyr for my religion's sake."<sup>1</sup> It is unlikely that W.S. Landor's agnosticism made an impact on the youthful Layard, but Henry Crabb Robinson was certainly influential. Through Robinson, Layard became acquainted with William Fox, the unitarian preacher, and frequently attended his sermons. He attested that the "eloquence and powerful rhetoric of this remarkable man were a great attraction to me. His discourses and the conversation of my friend Mr Crabb Robinson rapidly undermined the religious opinions in which I had been brought up."<sup>2</sup> Layard's rejection of church of England doctrine may have led to alienation from his family, but it did not lead to the abandonment of his sense of religiosity. He certainly continued to refer to himself as a Christian<sup>3</sup> and, in stressing the importance of the study of history and the classics, he added that the sciences "should purify and elevate the mind, and imbue it with true religion. Much of *their* value will be lost unless they teach us the inexhaustible goodness of the Creator, and fill us with a deep and earnest reverence for his wisdom and power."<sup>4</sup> There was little certainty in his faith, however. He was unsure whether there was a providence who specially intervened in human affairs,<sup>5</sup> and sometimes wondered

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1. *ibid.*, i : 15.

2. *ibid.*, i : 56.

3. 3 H 131, 739: 13 March 1854.

4. *Aberdeen Herald*, 7 April 1855: L's speech at his installation as lord rector of Marischal college and university, 5 April 1855.

5. LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 3: L to G.T. Clark, Constantinople, 25 July 1849.

... what Christianity and civilization have done for the world & in what respect they have raised us above the Mohammedan & the barbarian. When I see & hear such things as I saw & heard in India [Layard visited India during the 1857 rebellion] & read the account of the wanton bombardment of Jeddah in cold blood & not in the heat of the moment I am almost a convert to Mr. Buckle's doctrine that science alone & not morality or religion can improve men... 1.

'Almost' is the operative word, for Layard never made the conversion to rationalism. But whilst he acknowledged his adherence to the duties and spirit of Christianity,<sup>2</sup> supported the concept of a 'true' Christian education and held "the sincerest respect for those who do believe," he remained disillusioned with the professors of Christianity.<sup>3</sup> Layard, like his friend Charles Dickens, can best be described as a Christian sympathiser, accepting the moral appeal of Christianity and hating intolerance, whilst ignoring doctrine.<sup>4</sup> He never renounced the necessity of spiritual faith.

Forster's doubts, of a speculative theological nature, were probably more profound than those of either Layard or Bruce. He was undoubtedly influenced by the quaker emphasis on the 'light within' as opposed to a more 'intellectual' faith, and when writing on quakerism in 1852 stressed the primacy of 'inner' knowledge and experience of God,<sup>5</sup> an attitude very similar, in fact, to Maurice's thesis of Christ in every man. But whilst the quakers excluded the

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 57: L to Lady Huntly, London, 21 Aug. 1858 (copy).
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 5: L to Lady Aboyne, Baghdad, 30 Dec. 1850 (copy).
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 21: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 1 March. 1853 (copy).
  4. See Asa Briggs, *The Age of Improvement*, (London, 1962), 463-5.
  5. [W.E. Forster], 'The Early Quakers, and Quakerism', *Westminster Review*, n.s., 1, April 1852, 593-624.

relevance of any other experience, Forster attributed to rational thought a secondary role. He had, therefore, by the late forties abandoned fidelity to the rigid doctrines of the society of friends,<sup>1.</sup> and was pleased to sever his formal ties with quakerism when he married.<sup>2.</sup> Probably his acquaintance with John Sterling served to accentuate his loss of a comfortable faith. And one result of Carlyle's visit to Rawdon in 1847 was Forster's desire to sift his beliefs, to attain a living faith in the Coleridgean spirit. He realised that this would necessitate "both earnest humble prayer and hard struggling thought," for he understood that existing Christian doctrines were intellectually insufficient and that "a new expression, a fresh texture (?) of the Christian idea was needed to suit the increased stature of the human mind."<sup>3.</sup> But whatever the origin of his doubts, Forster found them extremely disquieting, for he was not by nature introspective, believing it "most unhealthy to be constantly examining one's self, either mind, soul, or body."<sup>4.</sup> Without doubt he regretted the loss of his earlier, unsophisticated beliefs, and he earnestly struggled to overcome his difficulties. In doing so, he looked to Arnold as a "striking illustration of the power of Christianity to soften and ennoble,"<sup>5.</sup> and to Coleridge he attributed his ideas on the inspiration of the scriptures.<sup>6.</sup> But it was Maurice, above all, who apparently provided the key. Maurice's dislike of systems attracted Forster, and he described his position in the

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1. Duffy, *Conversations with Carlyle*, 24: Carlyle to Charles Gavan Duffy, 1 March 1847.
  2. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 266.
  3. *ibid.*, i : 212-3: F to Mrs. Charles Fox, Rawdon, 6 Sept. 1847.
  4. *ibid.*, i : 160: F to Barclay Fox, Bradford, 6 Nov. 1844.
  5. *ibid.*, i : 163: F to Mrs. Charles Fox, Bolton, 1 Dec. 1844.
  6. *ibid.*, i : 147: F to Barclay Fox, n.d. [1842?].

church of England as "most new and important, as being that of the founder of a new school, which more than any other Church school, attempts to solve the questions of the age."<sup>1</sup>.

The basis of Forster's doubts and difficulties was the contradiction between man as a part of the whole, and man as a distinct individual.

... When I speak of man as a 'part of the All' [he wrote], I do not mean that the all is divided into separate parts or is a sum of such separate parts, on the contrary I inveigh myself (& hail Maurice as inveighing) against the notion that man is thus apart from God... 2.

His reason and understanding, he said (note the Coleridgean terminology, reason in this sense representing intuitive factors, understanding rational factors), as well as his conscience, indicated to Forster that he was united with God, and was not a distinct existence; but they also continually reminded him of his individuality, they "never cease telling me that I can oppose God's will & are ever proving to me by the evidence of my suffering that God punishes me for this opposition."<sup>3</sup> These contradictory statements, he believed, could never be reconciled; one must be discarded. It was Maurice who led Forster to the "belief in God which is the direct intuition of Him by my reason [in the Coleridgean sense] not that belief which

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1. *ibid.*, i : 287: F to [        ] , n.d.        [1852?].

2. Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/10/63: F to Ludlow, Otley, 16 March 1856. This letter was written as a further explanation of Forster's beliefs, in response to comments which Ludlow had made on Forster's privately-printed pamphlet on Maurice's theology, which was originally intended for, but rejected by, the *Westminster Review*; and which defended Maurice's teaching of Christ in every man; see [W.E. Forster], *Maurice's Theology*.

3. Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/10/63: F to Ludlow, Otley, 16 March 1856.

is a notion of what God must be in order to fit in with my intuition of myself."<sup>1</sup> In saying this, Forster believed that Maurice was not limiting God's will by man's nature, but stating that God's will was rather the law of man's nature, and that Christ is therefore in the life of every man.<sup>2</sup> One cannot help but be struck by the tortuous arguments employed by Forster to fulfil his intense desire for faith. He could not avoid this process, though he admitted that he couldn't expect to know or understand the ways of his God.<sup>3</sup> In the late forties and early fifties, Forster reflected so admirably the honest doubt of many Victorian intellectuals. It is perhaps surprising that, according to J.M. Ludlow, he was soon afterwards fully possessed by a secure Christian faith.<sup>4</sup>

The romantic emphasis on the desirability of intuition and faith as opposed to logic and rationality was thus shared by Hughes, Goderich, Bruce, Layard and Forster. Whether an assured belief was achieved or whether doubts persisted, this longing for faith was without doubt the most important component of their personalities and their philosophies, and repeatedly influenced the direction of their political lives.

The importance of faith in their ideological schema did not of course preclude all appreciation of scientific values. As did many nineteenth-century romantics, Goderich and his colleagues worshipped nature, seeing therein a beneficent moral and spiritual influence on mankind. Forster, Goderich and Layard all botanised in

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1. *ibid.*

2. *ibid.*

3. Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/10/64: F to Ludlow, Otley, 23 March 1856. Some facts, he believed, were too clear for a rational exposition (W.E. Forster, 'Imperial Federation', *Nineteenth Century*, 17, Feb. 1885, 205).

4. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 281.

their youths, and entomology became a passion with Goderich.<sup>1.</sup>  
 It was probably Forster's susceptibility to the influence of grandiose scenery which led to his membership of the Alpine club.<sup>2.</sup>  
 Bruce thought Venice the only work of man which could compete with the "sublime scenes of nature."<sup>3.</sup> Apparently some sciences, such as biology or botany, were considered acceptable because they (allegedly) induced reverence for divine creation.

5.

One of the consequences of their romantic-idealist philosophy was an abhorrence of Benthamite utilitarianism. Bentham's identification of right and wrong with man's preference for pleasure over pain they perceived as vulgar hedonism and a renunciation of all higher motives in human affairs. As Goderich commented:

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1. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 42; Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, i : 20, 23-4. Goderich frequently lectured on entomology -- in the Christian Socialists' hall of association and at the Kirkby Malzeard mechanics institute, for example -- and displayed his collection of insects and butterflies to the students of the working men's college in 1856 (J.M. Ludlow, 'The Origin of the Working Men's College', in J.L. Davies, ed., *The Working Men's College*, (London, 1904), 16-7; *Leeds Mercury (Supplement)*, 15 Oct. 1853: G's lecture on entomology to the Kirkby Malzeard mechanics institute, 7 Oct. 1853; J. Roebuck, 'Reminiscences of an Old Student', in Davies, 74-5). Goderich saw in the study of insects God's work in the world, the harmony throughout nature and the impossibility of living in isolation from others, all of which represent a romantic conception of nature. He also emphasised the beauty of all, large and small -- thus the democracy rather than aristocracy of nature (RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 40-70: 'Entomology!'). Unlike Ruskin, he also admired and appreciated the curl of railway smoke and the working of a steam engine. (RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 12: G to H, Ollerton, Notts., 22 May 1852).
  2. Forster joined in 1859, and made an excursion to the Eastern Alps in 1865 (John Ball, 'In Memoriam -- W.E. Forster', *Alpine Journal*, 12, 92, May 1886, 520-1).
  3. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 42: B to Ormsby, London, 13 Jan. 1843.

We need something which will teach us not a bare cold morality, founded upon some notions that virtue is profitable, and that to do good will get us on in the world; but we need something which will teach us that the foundations of that morality are laid far deeper than any such calculation -- something which will remind us of the eternal difference between right and wrong. 1.

It was partly the utilitarians' reduction of morality to the mechanism of arithmetic and the syllogisms of logic which perturbed Goderich and his friends,<sup>2.</sup> but they also rejected in principle the idea of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Goderich, for example, did not think happiness should be man's ambition in life,<sup>3.</sup> and Hughes accepted the test of the greatest good, not happiness, of the greatest number.<sup>4.</sup> Similarly, Forster disdained what he considered the crass expediency of Benthamism.<sup>5.</sup>

It was the prevalent belief of contemporaries that Bentham perceived society as atomistic, based on individual self-interest. Such views alienated Goderich and his colleagues,<sup>6.</sup> and inevitably led to their espousal of a romantic-idealist conception of society emphasising organic unity, class conciliation and national spirit.

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1. *Leeds Mercury (Supplement)*, 15 Oct. 1853: G's address to the Huddersfield auxiliary of the British and foreign bible society, 11 Oct. 1853.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 71-81: rough draft of a lecture on the study of history; G. [oderich], 18.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 155: G to H, Turancon, 15 Jan. 1855.
  4. Hughes, *The Old Church; What Shall We Do With It?*, (London, 1878), 24.
  5. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 162: F to Mrs. Charles Fox, Bolton, 1 Dec. 1844.
  6. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 100-1 and 146-8: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'; G. [oderich], 14-6.

The plea for unity, for the fraternity of mankind as opposed to individual self-interest, occurred repeatedly.<sup>1</sup> This fraternal union they envisaged<sup>2</sup> as being founded on Christianity, in the notion that all men are brothers under God, an idea widely prevalent amongst romantic philosophers. Carlyle's *Past and Present* was apparently influential in fashioning their ideas on the organic nature of society. Hughes commented that there

was no narrowing of the ground here -- no appeal to men as members of any exclusive body whatever to separate themselves and come out of the devil's world; but to men as men, to every man as a man -- to the weakest and meanest, as well as to the strongest and most noble -- telling them that the world is God's world. 3.

But it should be noted that they were none of them able to overcome a strong sense of class-consciousness. Though Goderich sometimes attempted to minimise the deference shown him by non-aristocratic friends such as Ludlow and Kingsley, Hughes reminded him that "you was born a Lord & bred a Lord & I suppose must take the consequences of being found in that dreary & disgusting situation."<sup>4</sup> Rather than an elimination of class, they sought a common ground which could lead to class conciliation.

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1. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 29: 'On Amusements, as the Means of Continuing and Extending the Education of the Working Classes', a lecture delivered at Merthyr Tydvil on 20 March 1850; Hughes, *Alfred the Great*, 186-7; RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 160-2: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'; [W.E. Forster], "Strikes" and "Lock-outs", *Westminster Review*, n.s., 5, Jan. 1854, 140-5.
  2. Thomas Hughes and E.V. Neale, eds., *A Manual for Co-operators*, (London, 1888), xii, xiv-xvi (Hughes was the sole author of the preface of the Manual, quoted above, whilst Neale was responsible for the bulk of the text. See Thomas Hughes, 'Edward Vansittart Neale as Christian Socialist. II.', *Economic Review*, 3, 2, April 1893, 174-89); RP. BL Add Ms 43549, 128: H to R, Chester, 28 March 1884; RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 147: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.
  3. Hughes, *Tom Brown at Oxford*, 348.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 264: H to G, 23 Sept. 1856.

Their revolt against individualism was largely a revolt against selfishness, materialism and commercialism. Hughes, attacking the contemporary "want of faith in anything but money,"<sup>1.</sup> pleaded for idealism rather than materialism,<sup>2.</sup> arguing that the latter ignored "the higher instincts and faiths of the nation,"<sup>3.</sup> and in so doing had a detrimental effect on both the individual and the national character.<sup>4.</sup> The threat of materialism, he believed, must be overcome in order "to awake the higher life again, and bid the nation arise and live."<sup>5.</sup> Layard described money as "filthy lucre,"<sup>6.</sup> and in considering the role of the artist as an individual and as a member of society, protested against that

... great modern school of political economists [which] would reduce everything to a mere money value. A man of genius is not to think of the good he can do to mankind, what honor he can bring to his country, how far he can civilise and elevate his fellow-men, but how he can make the most money in the public market out of his genius... 7.

Layard further deplored the fact that "our forefathers raised monuments to the glory of God and of their country: we raise them to our own profit and for a dividend."<sup>8.</sup> In rejecting Manchester school economics, he stated:

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1. Thomas Hughes, *A Lecture on the Slop-System, Especially As it bears upon the Females engaged in it, delivered at the Literary and Mechanics' Institution at Reading, on February 3rd, 1852, (Exeter, 1852), 24.*
  2. Hughes, *The Manliness of Christ*, 159.
  3. Thomas Hughes, *Rugby Tennessee*, (Philadelphia, 1975), 123.
  4. Hughes, *The Manliness of Christ*, 171.
  5. Hughes, *Alfred the Great*, 131.
  6. Waterfield, 92.
  7. LP. BL Add Ms 38990, 303: L to Cobden, London, 15 Aug. 1864.
  8. [A.H. Layard], 'Communication with India: Suez and Euphrates Routes', *Quarterly Review*, 102, Oct. 1857, 355.

I believe that a nation which buries everything in its mere worldly prosperity -- that looks merely to its commerce -- is very much like a man who has worldly transactions, and who says, 'It signifies little whether I have any principle or religion so long as I effect my sales, or my shop pays me.' 1.

Bruce spoke out against the reckless and selfish pursuit of wealth, which he believed would "stifle the generous emotions of the heart."<sup>2</sup> Goderich, hating both 'mammon-worship'<sup>3</sup> and the utilitarian "trading-morality,"<sup>4</sup> deprecated the tendency to ignore national life, patriotism and duty to one's country in a selfish pursuit of wealth,<sup>5</sup> believing that such wealth, if created amidst human suffering, hatred and strife, would in fact destroy the life of the nation.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless it should not be inferred that they rejected commercial activity *per se*; after all, Bruce's wealth derived from coal, Forster's from manufacturing, and Layard's at least partly from banking. But they loathed the pursuit of wealth for wealth's sake, or as a means to respectability, or as a denial of the primacy of a man's obligations to his nation.

There was generally a strain of moderation evident in their emphasis on the national spirit: Bruce admitted the "many grave defects" in the English national character,<sup>7</sup> Layard opposed the imposition of English cultural standards on India and elsewhere.<sup>8</sup>

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1. *Times*, 23 April 1855: L's Liverpool address, 21 April 1855.
  2. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 74: 'Art and its Cultivation'; also H.A. Bruce, *The Present Position and Future Prospects of the Working Classes in the Manufacturing Districts of South Wales*, (Cardiff, 1851), 5, 8, 10.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 93-6: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.
  4. G. [oderich], 14.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 100-1: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.
  6. *ibid.*, 149-50.
  7. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 363: B to J.G. Phillimore, n.d. [1847].
  8. [Layard] , 'Architecture', 329n.

Their nationalism can perhaps best be interpreted as a glorification of the 'volk', an approbation of John Bullism.

6.

Their conception of the organic nature of the nation, thus based on a disdain for competitive individualism, naturally influenced Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard in their assessment of contemporary 'political economy'. Clearly national brotherhood could not be grounded on a crude self-help philosophy or on an economic substructure of laissez-faire. The nation-state, they postulated, had both a right and a duty to intervene in the affairs of society. Tom Hughes possessed the vehement conviction that trade and industry should be regulated by the principles of Christianity, and consequently espoused co-operation, rather than competition and the grab for riches, as the legitimate economic code of conduct.<sup>1.</sup> He feared the threat of social disintegration<sup>2.</sup> and argued that the laissez-faire principle of unimpeded individual activity, even when accompanied by equal individual rights, was inadequate as a panacea for society's ills.<sup>3.</sup> This is a view he propagated, for example, on behalf of the London ballast-heavers and coal-whippers in 1851, when he attacked their victimisation by the truck system and promoted interference between capital and labour.<sup>4.</sup> He was fully cognisant

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1. Thomas Hughes, *Address, on the Occasion of the Presentation of a Testimonial in Recognition of his Services to the Cause of Co-operation, December 6th, 1884*, (Manchester, 1885), 5-6.
  2. Thomas Hughes, 'Problems of Civilization', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 27, March 1873, 408.
  3. Thomas Hughes, 'The Working Classes in Europe', in *Atlas Essays*, No. 3. *Labor. The Republic*, (New York, 1878), 7.
  4. *Christian Socialist*, 2, 54, 8 Nov. 1851.

of the working class rejection of laissez-faire,<sup>1.</sup> thought the masses felt the need of a wise, strong and interventionist government,<sup>2.</sup> and believed even secular socialism more acceptable than unrestricted competition.<sup>3.</sup> Bruce was an equally forceful proponent of state intervention. If the economic and social needs of the working classes continued to be habitually and flagrantly neglected, he wrote,

they have a right to expect that the Government of this country will at last interfere, and that public funds will be devoted to objects which no one can deny to be of public interest, and essential to the public welfare... The conviction of the necessity of such an interference is growing stronger day by day among all thinking men in this country. 4.

Bruce's pro-interventionist stand was confirmed when, as Merthyr stipendiary magistrate, he ruled against the truck system ("that organised system of plunder and oppression"<sup>5.</sup>) which Richard Fothergill and the Aberdare Iron Company had established,<sup>6.</sup> a decision which must be judged as courageous considering the employers' influence.<sup>7.</sup> Goderich, like Hughes, rebelled against the

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1. Thomas Hughes, 'Problems of Civilization (Part II)', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 28, May 1873, 91.
  2. Hughes, *Alfred the Great*, 8-10.
  3. J. Carter, ed., 'Some Letters of Thomas Hughes', *Economic Review*, 24, 4, Oct. 1914, 381: H to [?], 23 Dec. 1890.
  4. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 34-5: 'On Amusements'.
  5. Bruce, *Present Position and Future Prospects of the Working Classes*, 12.
  6. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 10, 17, 24 May 1851.
  7. Despite their misgivings, the ironmasters acquiesced in Bruce's judgment (BP. GCRO, D/D Br 163/2: Henry Thomas to [?], 1 Dec. 1851).

social disorganisation inherent in the laissez-faire principle,<sup>1.</sup> which, he argued, preached anarchy as the ideal of a perfect state.<sup>2.</sup> Laissez-faire, he stated, implied the tyranny of capital,<sup>3.</sup> it induced employers to ignore God's moral laws, it assured workers only of the unattractive right to long hours or starvation.<sup>4.</sup> Throughout his life, therefore, Goderich supported state intervention in order to regulate wages and eliminate unemployment.<sup>5.</sup> Forster's renunciation of laissez-faire is best documented in his lectures on pauperism delivered in 1848, and in a series of letters addressed to the *Leader*, the radical, quasi-socialist journal founded in March 1850. In his Bradford lectures, attended principally by working men,<sup>6.</sup> Forster delineated his opposition to laissez-faire. He objected, for example, to the designation of employees as 'hands', which "seemed just an expression of the meaning of *laissez faire* or let-alone system, a system which forgot that men had heads, hearts, forgot that they had mouths, forgot that they had anything but hands."<sup>7.</sup> Speaking of laissez-faire in specific economic terms, Forster argued that

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 1: G to H, Nocton Hall, 7 Dec. 1850.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 101: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.

3. G. [oderich], 19.

4. *Journal of Association*, 31 Jan. 1852.

5. Wolf, ii : 321.

6. F. Seebohm, 'Mr. W.E. Forster's Early Career, an Economic Retrospect', *Contemporary Review*, 50, Sept. 1886, 309. The choice of excerpts from this speech printed in Reid's *Life of Forster* (i : 255-9) gives a misleading impression of its import.

7. *Bradford Observer*, 9 Nov. 1848: F's lecture on 'Pauperism and its Proposed Remedies; Communism, Competition, and Organization of Labour', 31 Oct. 1848.

"the principle of freedom of trade -- of selling goods in the highest market, and buying them in the lowest, was a mockery, an insult, a bitter lie to the man whose goods was his labour and whose best market was the poor-house."<sup>1</sup> The selfishness and heartlessness of laissez-faire, Forster believed, ignored man's duty to help his fellow-man, prompting him to ask: "And what ought government to be, if not the help of the most helpful, the guidance of the most wise, the fulfilment of the duty of the most strong."<sup>2</sup> Forster proceeded to equate state intervention with the will of God, stating: "The government of man was in its ideal, but the earthly garment of the government of God. He then who denied the duty of earthly government [i.e. the laissez-faireist] must, to be consistent, doubt the justice of the All-wise -- the power of the Omnipotent."<sup>3</sup> As an alternative to laissez-faire Forster, perhaps influenced by the example of the second French republic, proposed the right to work, a right which could only be achieved through the intervention of the state. He suggested that the government remedy the deficiencies of capitalism by employing the unemployed, paying their wages from an increased tax on capital.<sup>4</sup>

In the final analysis, therefore, Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard rejected the theoretical framework of laissez-faire not on practical but on ethical grounds, holding that selfish competition should not be condoned as the principal motive force of society. It should not be inferred, however, that their aversion to

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1. *Bradford Observer*, 19 Oct. 1848: Forster's lecture on 'Pauperism', 11 Oct. 1848.

2. *ibid.*

3. *ibid.*

4. *Leader*, 9, 16, 23, 30 Nov., 7 Dec. 1850: 'Le Droit au Travail'; also *Bradford Observer*, 9 Nov. 1848.

laissez-faire led Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard to reject every tenet of contemporary 'political economy'. On the contrary, each of them vigorously supported the repeal of the corn laws, basing their advocacy of international free trade on the interests of the consumer.<sup>1</sup> However they also cautioned that free trade was no panacea for the wider ills of society.<sup>2</sup> The new poor law of 1834 they begrudgingly accepted. It was, argued Bruce, a necessary evil;<sup>3</sup> Forster believed it better than no provision at all, for at least it enshrined the right to live.<sup>4</sup>

7.

In their transcendental emphasis on faith and the national spirit, and in their aversion to utilitarianism and laissez-faire, Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard each reflected conventional aspects of the nineteenth-century romantic revolt. Their protestations were inspired by ideals with which Coleridge, Carlyle, Landor, Kingsley, Maurice and Arnold would undoubtedly have sympathised. Goderich and his colleagues also demonstrated the romantic-idealist fascination with medievalism; the appeal of the

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1. e.g. *Huddersfield Chronicle*, 23 April 1853: G's Huddersfield nomination speech, 20 April 1853; Hughes, *True Manliness*, xii-xiii; Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 156: F to William Forster, 3 March 1844; Bruce, *Present Position and Future Prospects of the Working Classes*, 7; Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, i : 103-4; ii : 49.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 148-9: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.
  3. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 31: 'On Amusements'.
  4. *Bradford Observer*, 12 Oct. 1848: F's lecture on 'Pauperism', 11 Oct. 1848.

middle ages<sup>1</sup>. was probably a corollary of their reaction against the materialism, utilitarianism and doubt of the nineteenth century, and consequent admiration of what they supposed to have been an age of faith.

Much of their credo is strongly reminiscent of Young England, but the affinity between the two groups should not be exaggerated. Undoubtedly they shared the emotional revulsion of Disraeli, George Smythe and Lord John Manners against Benthamite utilitarianism, competitive laissez-faire and the horrors of industrialism. They also concurred with the Young Englanders' disquietude over intensifying class antagonisms and the absence of community in contemporary urban society. Nevertheless, though the emphasis on the duties of the propertied classes was a mutual attribute, Goderich and his friends never contemplated the restoration of a paternal, feudal society as a panacea. Certainly they flirted with medievalism, but they never made it a cult, and they understood the utter impracticality of Young England's nostalgic escape (with its implications of the reaction of a defeated class to a sense of its own defeat<sup>2</sup>.) to an imaginary and idealised past.

Pragmatism, based on an acceptance of contemporary circumstances, was in fact one of the foremost characteristics of the political pressure group which Goderich created -- a pressure group which became more of a political party than the impractical idealism of Young England could ever have allowed Disraeli and his cohorts to be.

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1. The best example of the attraction the middle ages held is RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 134: G to H, Ripon, 21 Aug. 1854, in which Goderich, sitting by Fountains abbey, dreams of the alleged age of faith in which such buildings were constructed.

2. See Robert Blake, *Disraeli*, (London, 1966), 171.

Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard may have been dogmatic in their insistence on the paramount importance of faith and intuition, but they were seldom doctrinaire in a political sense. Their predilection for common sense and empiricism as opposed to theory and utopianism may have masked latent anti-intellectual tendencies, and their assiduous concern with political realities in fact left them open to charges of being unprincipled.<sup>1.</sup> However their practical bent was certainly not emblematic of nineteenth-century romanticism and, whilst accepting the basic criticisms of contemporary society inherent in the Coleridgean-romantic reaction of the nineteenth-century, they either ignored or rejected many of the specific remedies proposed by the various romantic philosophers. For example, both Goderich and Hughes rejected Carlyle's appeal for an aristocracy of talent, which would become, Goderich believed, a "despotism of the intellect" and cause, as all aristocracies do, exclusion, division and selfishness.<sup>2.</sup> Hughes thought that if aristocracies were inevitable, that of birth was less mischievous than that of either intellect or wealth.<sup>3.</sup> Bruce and Forster also abhorred the autocratic implications of Carlyle's philosophy.<sup>4.</sup>

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1. Temmel greatly exaggerates the case, however, in stating that Forster's political creed "cannot be intellectualized or reduced to a set of maxims," and that political expediency in fact prevented his earlier philosophical views influencing his actions as an M.P. ( Temmel, 13, 80). Temmel generally underestimates the prevalence, and necessity, of compromise in the political arena.

2. G. [oderich], 17-8.

3. Thomas Hughes, *Vacation Rambles*, (London, 1895), 24.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 90: B to G, Aberdare, 6 Nov. 1858; Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 287: F to [ ] , n.d. [1852?].

In addition, whilst accepting the romantic notion of the necessity of moral regeneration in order to effect reform, they nevertheless disregarded the romantics' consequent aversion to political action. And unlike Coleridge, Maurice, Carlyle, and most nineteenth-century romantics, they were never fundamentally averse to social and industrial progress. Though at times the demise of traditional customs was regretted,<sup>1.</sup> even Bruce (whose favourite poet was the conservative Dryden, with his preference for an authoritarian, hierarchical society) favoured cautious reform rather than reaction. He believed France had demonstrated the dangers of revolutionary improvement,<sup>2.</sup> but from the time when as a young man he had abandoned his father's toryism, he argued "that the great danger of England was not in being too rapid but in being too slow in progress."<sup>3.</sup> Goderich's acceptance of progress was based on his belief that God governs the world, and that his "order goes on vindicating itself in spite of all our self-will, and his education of mankind continues, whether we set ourselves up against it or not."<sup>4.</sup> He presumably 'knew' that God's will was neither conservative nor reactionary.

8.

Despite their emphasis on intuition and faith, they did not consequently accept without question the romantics' notions of church-state relations. Instead they grafted radical reformism to a conviction that church establishment should be perpetuated.

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1. e.g. Thomas Hughes, 'Beating the Bounds'. Berg Collection, NYPL: holograph, unsigned and undated, 22p. This is not the ms. of the article of the same name in *St. Nicholas Magazine*, April 1879.
  2. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 364: B to J.G. Phillimore, n.d. [1847].
  3. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 18 April 1857: B's address at a public dinner in his honour, 14 April 1857.
  4. G. [oderich], 4.

Coleridge's concept of the clerisy (a spiritual and cultural elite of the learned class, embodied in the national church) balancing the opposing forces of permanence (the landed interest) and progression (manufacturing and commercial interests, and the professions) is conspicuous by its absence in their letters and published works.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless with the possible exception of Layard, they envisaged a continuing role for the established church. Hughes longed for the church of England to become the basis of a Christian and fraternal union within society, thus conciliating clergy, aristocracy, middle and working classes.<sup>2</sup> Establishment was necessary, he argued, if the religious and secular aspects of life were not to become distinct,<sup>3</sup> and "as an Englishman," he wrote, "I will resist, always and in all ways, the attempt to sever the secular from the religious life of the nation, to keep religion and politics in separate boxes for national consumption."<sup>4</sup> Hughes simply could not envisage the state as antagonistic to the church.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless he certainly recognised the necessity of church reform, including the

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1. Forster, whilst rejecting Coleridge's static and conservative ideals, recognised the role which the clerisy might play, and lauded the ideal of "a man in every parish of good character, more or less devoted to the high objects set before him, and in a position to look after, not only the spiritual and moral, but also the temporal welfare of the people of his parish" (3 H 192, 785: 22 May 1868).
  2. [Thomas Hughes], *Tracts on Christian Socialism. No. II. History of the Working Tailors' Association, 34, Great Castle Street, (London, [1850])*, 10-1.
  3. Thomas Hughes, *The Old Church*, 28.
  4. Thomas Hughes, 'National Education', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 35, Jan. 1877, 238.
  5. Martineau, 156: H to John Martineau, 28 Feb. 1885; also Alex R. Vidler, *F.D. Maurice and Company*, (London, 1966), Chapter 12, 250-8: 'Thomas Hughes and the National Church'.

abolition of church rates and the opening of the universities.<sup>1.</sup>

Hughes accurately classed himself as a liberal broad churchman, in the tradition of Arnold, Maurice, Kingsley and Stanley.<sup>2.</sup>

Goderich, with a similar emphasis on the unity of the religious and the secular, was not, predictably, in favour of a separation of church and state.<sup>3.</sup> His emphasis too was on church reform: he supported the abolition of church rates and Easter dues, and believed all state endowments for religious purposes should be terminated.<sup>4.</sup>

Bruce held very similar views. A churchman sympathetic to establishment, he joined Goderich in advocating church reforms in the house of commons.<sup>5.</sup> Forster, the only dissenter by birth, nevertheless

accepted throughout his adult life the connection of the church of England with the state.<sup>6.</sup> Unlike many other nonconformist sects, the friends were not generally strong liberationists, and extreme antagonism to the established church was not therefore instilled into Forster during his youth. Though he never joined the church, from the time of his marriage in 1850 he acted consistently as one of its members.<sup>7.</sup> The reaction to his stance was mixed. In 1870 he was exposed to the violent abuse of the nonconformists who supported secular education. His friends, on the other hand, welcomed his

1. George Hill, *The Electoral History of the Borough of Lambeth*, (London, 1879), 179: H's election address, June 1865.
2. Thomas Hughes, 'Arthur Penrhyn Stanley', *Quarterly Review*, 178, Jan. 1894, 246.
3. He only briefly flirted with the notion of disestablishment in the mid-fifties.
4. *Huddersfield Chronicle*, 23 April 1853.
5. See chapter 3 below.
6. *Leeds Mercury*, 12 March 1857: F's address to the Liberal electors in Leeds, 11 March 1857; *Bradford Observer*, 3 Aug. 1885: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 1 Aug. 1885.
7. *Times*, 6 April 1886: F's obituary.

position. Indeed Hughes, "in all good will and much sympathy," dedicated his pro-establishment book, *The Old Church; What Shall We Do With It?*, to Forster and those others who, whilst dissenters, were unwilling to abandon the concept of establishment.<sup>1</sup> Puzzlement was possibly the most common reaction; as Gladstone commented: "By political creed a Radical, he [Forster] dissented from the first article of Radicalism by maintaining, on grounds of permanent principle, the maintenance of a Church Establishment in England."<sup>2</sup> Layard was the only one of the five who expressed overt hostility to the church, but even his attacks were persistently aimed at the numerous abuses the church condoned rather than at the concept of establishment *per se*. He had little patience, he stated, with the "staunch and bigoted Tories of the old school of 'Church and State' men,"<sup>3</sup> and abhorred the spirit of controversy, intolerance and religious fanaticism which England exhibited during the 1851 dispute over Roman catholic ecclesiastical titles.<sup>4</sup> The clergy he attacked for ignoring their duties to society's oppressed.<sup>5</sup> He found ritualism distasteful, referring to the "attempts which have of late years been unhappily made to foist upon our Church, ceremonies and observances opposed to its spirit and repugnant to the sentiments of the people."<sup>6</sup> His earnest estrangement from the established forms of religion prevailed for many years, though in his old age Layard became an anglican churchwarden in Venice.<sup>7</sup>

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1. Hughes, *The Old Church*, dedication page.

2. W.E. Gladstone, 'Mr. Forster and Ireland', *Nineteenth Century*, 24, 139, Sept. 1888, 451.

3. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, i : 103.

4. LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 14: L to G.T. Clark, Baghdad, 12 Feb. 1851.

5. *ibid.*

6. [Layard], 'Fresco-Painting', 324.

7. LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 316: L to G.T. Clark, Venice, 30 May 1892.

9.

It was their common advocacy of democratic rights, however, which was most incongruent with traditional nineteenth-century romanticism. The evidence concerning the origins and spirit of their advanced democratic views is incomplete, and therefore somewhat inconclusive. Undoubtedly it was based partially on a broad Christian-humanitarian sympathy with the sufferings of their fellow-men. It was perhaps natural that Forster, brought up in quaker surroundings to despise slavery, should develop a concern for the plight of the workers he encountered daily in Bradford. Furthermore, he was deeply moved by the sufferings of the Irish people during the famine, believed the fearful inequality then exposed was a national sin, and suggested that the English people, through their government, bore the responsibility for rectifying the situation.<sup>1</sup> Bruce too was touched by the Irish famine, and blamed in part both the "selfish and cruel" policy of England<sup>2</sup> and the "utter selfishness and indifference of the [Anglo-Irish] upper classes."<sup>3</sup> And, like Forster, he developed experience of the working class predicament in the late forties, in his case in his functions as stipendiary magistrate in Merthyr. It was his experiences in the middle east, according to Bruce, which evoked in Layard "indignation at acts of cruelty and oppression" and an "intense sympathy with suffering."<sup>4</sup> Layard himself partly

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1. FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 15: F to the chairman of the British association for the relief of distress in Ireland and Scotland, Tottenham, 1 Feb. 1847; [W.E. Forster], *Narrative of William Edward Forster's Visit in Ireland from the 18th to the 26th of 1st month, 1847*, (London, [1847]); *Bradford Observer*, 9 Nov. 1848: F's lecture on 'Pauperism', 31 Oct. 1848.
  2. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 364: B to J.G. Phillimore, n.d. [1847].
  3. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 89: B to Ormsby, Aberdare, 6 Oct. 1848.
  4. Layard, *Early Adventures*, 13.

attributed this sympathy to his contacts with Polish refugees in London and with the Carbonari in Italy during the 1830s.<sup>1</sup> Hughes may have imbibed democratic leanings from Arnold at Rugby, but he first witnessed the degradation of poverty when resident at Lincoln's Inn from 1845. And he credited the appalling disclosures of sweating and poverty in the *Morning Chronicle* articles of 1849 for helping to awaken his compassion.<sup>2</sup> Goderich was moved by the same source, as well as by the hopelessness of the workers following the failure of chartism.<sup>3</sup>

Humanitarian sentiment may be a precondition to the espousal of democracy, but the latter is hardly an inevitable corollary. Most nineteenth-century romantics empathised with the working classes; few prescribed democracy as a tonic for their ills. The atypical position which Goderich and his colleagues thus adopted was a fundamental element of their ability to coalesce as an effective political pressure group. And their reconciliation of romantic faith with democratic liberalism in fact preceded T.H. Green's synthesis by more than twenty years.

Goderich in 1852 supported the concept of universal manhood suffrage. He explained his views in a pamphlet entitled *The Duty of the Age*, originally intended as a Christian Socialist tract.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, i : 59-60, 90-2.
  2. Charles Kingsley, *Alton Locke, Tailor and Poet: An Autobiography (with a prefatory memoir by Thomas Hughes)*, (London, 1895), xi. For a general expression of Hughes's empathy with the poor, see Hughes, *A Lecture on the Slop-System*, *passim*.
  3. Wolf, i : 23.
  4. The tract was printed, but suppressed due to Maurice's opposition. Few copies are now extant; I am grateful to David Muspratt for making available to me the copy held in the archives of the working men's college, London.

He argued therein that the idea of democracy in nineteenth-century England was novel in that, unlike Greek or American democracy, it precluded slavery. This innovation he attributed to the inclusion within democratic theory of Christian principles, with their emphasis on the brotherhood of man, for if men were all citizens of a heavenly kingdom, they were all equally justified in claiming earthly citizenship. Thus the crux of Goderich's argument was that Christianity sanctioned democracy. It was in accordance with God's will, he wrote, "that a day should come, and that all history should be ever tending towards that day, when every man shall, merely because he is a man, be a free and equal citizen of his earthly country."<sup>1</sup> As a citizen, every man must therefore possess the duty and responsibility to partake of his country's government. Self-government, in two senses, became Goderich's objective: self-government in a political, democratic sense, and self-government in the individual, that is, a Christian, moral regeneration in order to prepare himself for his democratic trust.<sup>2</sup> Because men were brothers equal in the eyes of God, all aristocracies, which by nature preach exclusion, were evil.

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1. G. [oderich], 8.

2. Denholm is only partially justified in his claim (Denholm, *Radical and Democratic Career of Ripon*, 28) that Goderich's intellectual position at this time was more Owenite than Christian and more Rousseauite than either: the influence of Rousseau's thought is certainly evident, but it seems unlikely that Owenite theory could have made a significant impact, considering Owen's atheism and his insistence that personal character was totally dependent not on Christian regeneration but on environment.

*The Duty of the Age* initiated a furore within the Christian Socialist movement. Hughes (undoubtedly Goderich's closest confidant<sup>1.</sup>), Ludlow<sup>2.</sup> and Kingsley<sup>3.</sup> staunchly supported Goderich's democratic views, but Maurice was aghast. He argued that Christianity might imply universal citizenship, but it certainly did not imply universal democracy. On the contrary, Maurice believed that Christianity sanctioned a hierarchical society based on monarchy and aristocracy.<sup>4.</sup> Because of his opposition *The Duty of the Age* was suppressed, though Goderich never repudiated his concept of democracy. Given the ethical basis of his democratic leanings, it is not surprising that he found it difficult to reconcile himself to a suffrage which, in his words, "tells men that in order to be fit to vote you need not be industrious or educated or patriotic, but rich to a certain amount."<sup>5.</sup>

None of the others delineated the origins or philosophical assumptions of their democratic ideals as clearly as Goderich had done. Hughes, for example, said he was born with his strong democratic bias, and that even as a child he could not understand why the village children should be relatively deprived.<sup>6.</sup> Thus he did not attribute his democratic instincts to Arnold and Rugby,<sup>7.</sup> though he was later haunted by Arnold's famous plea for democracy without Jacobinism,

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1. See Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/11/86: G to Ludlow, London, n.d. [spring of 1852].

2. *ibid.*

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 2: Kingsley to G, Eversley, 5 March 1852. Kingsley suggested *The Duty of the Age* as the title.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 11: undated memorandum [spring of 1852] by Maurice on *The Duty of the Age*.

5. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 94: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.

6. Hughes, *True Manliness*, xi.

7. *ibid.*

and also felt the attraction of chartism, thereby repudiating his tory upbringing.<sup>1.</sup> His democratic philosophy seemed often to rest on a desire to conciliate the working class and to achieve unity in the nation. This extended to symbolic gestures such as allowing local boys the use of Rugby's cricket ground,<sup>2.</sup> and encouraging (until he was stopped by the authorities) ragged children to play in the private gardens of Lincoln's Inn.<sup>3.</sup> Hughes's stand on *The Duty of the Age*, however, would seem to indicate that he was in close accord with Goderich's democratic ideals. Layard's theory of democracy, at least before he met Goderich, was not maturely considered. He certainly felt in 1851 that "a more equitable adjustment of the franchise and a better division of the boroughs" were desirable.<sup>4.</sup> He attributed his radical and democratic opinions, which he said he professed even as a boy, to the influence of Landor's *Imaginary Conversations*.<sup>5.</sup> In so doing, Layard must have fundamentally misinterpreted Landor's message, for the latter, though he was often indignant against injustice, protested against materialism, possessed revolutionary sympathies and termed himself a republican, nevertheless abhorred democracy. Landor was a rebel against conformity rather than a democrat. Like his mentor, Layard was probably more rebellious than democratic before his election experiences of 1852. Bruce, on the other hand, saw as a lesson of

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1. Hughes, *Memoir of a Brother*, 89. Arnold's democracy without Jacobinism implied extension of the suffrage (though Arnold was not convinced England was yet ready for universal suffrage), but in a hierarchical society.
  2. Hughes, *True Manliness*, xi.
  3. *ibid.*, xiv.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38980, 124: L to Henry Ross, Eastnor Castle, 25 Sept. 1851.
  5. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, i : 25.

history that the people should progressively achieve greater influence.<sup>1</sup> He believed that "the desire of political power, however mixed it may be with extravagant ideas and expectations, urges men to self-improvement and inspires them with a sense of the dignity of their nature."<sup>2</sup> Experience and history therefore justified his idea that the British constitution was "sufficiently elastic to admit to a share of political power all those whom education and good conduct have qualified for the trust."<sup>3</sup> Like Goderich and Hughes, Forster was less cautious, and advocated manhood suffrage during the forties.<sup>4</sup>

Their advanced democratic views did not rest on humanitarianism or abstract theory alone. In addition, there was a strong component of fear of violent revolution. The events of 1848 in France and the abortive chartist activities in Britain profoundly influenced Goderich and his colleagues. Hughes and Forster, both of whom had expressed chartist sympathies,<sup>5</sup> nevertheless enrolled as special constables on

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1. Bruce, *Present Position and Future Prospects of the Working Classes*, 16.
  2. *ibid.*, 15.
  3. *ibid.*, 16.
  4. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 220.
  5. Hughes, *True Manliness*, xv; *Bradford Observer*, 13 April 1848. Forster bore primary responsibility for an address, signed by over 500 Bradford manufacturers and other influential citizens, to the chartists of Bradford, expressing sympathy with their desire for political reforms, offering to assist them "in all legal, orderly, and constitutional efforts to enforce the claim" for the vote, but deprecating any resort to violence.

10 April 1848. (Hughes, characteristically, was involved in a scuffle with a chartist orator in Trafalgar square, and was consequently arrested by police.<sup>1.</sup>) Forster also visited Paris (including Blanc's workshops) in May, in order to personally assess the impact of the revolution. He fraternised with everybody, and made himself "equally at home in the salons of the Legitimists and the soirées of the Communists."<sup>2.</sup> Bruce mixed freely with the Merthyr chartists at their meetings, and as stipendiary magistrate spoke of confounding their politics.<sup>3.</sup> Their reaction to the events of 1848 was to promote democracy partially in order to prevent revolution and preserve what they believed to be the valuable legacies of the past; there was a significant 'conservative' component to their ideology. Thus Bruce saw the poverty and oppression of the workers as "the raw material for every social danger, every political convulsion."<sup>4.</sup> In Europe in 1848 he saw a correlation between countries with despotic government and political upheaval, and between those with liberty and popular government and quiescence.<sup>5.</sup> He sympathised, as did "all lovers of humanity," with the goals of the popular parties,<sup>6.</sup> but he concluded from the results of the 1848 uprisings that liberty and progress must be attained by evolutionary means.<sup>7.</sup> He was wary of granting manhood suffrage immediately,

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1. *Cooperative News*, 28 March 1896.

2. Reid, *Life of Monckton Milnes*, i : 404.

3. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 86: B to Mrs. Ormsby, Aberdare, 23 June 1848.

4. Bruce, *Present Position and Future Prospects of the Working Classes*, 9.

5. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 101: 'The Year 1848: Its Revolutions and Results', a lecture delivered at Dowlais, 19 Dec. 1855.

6. *ibid.*, 107.

7. *ibid.*, 106, 143-4.

before the workers were decently educated: "If we are to escape intestine convulsions and the misery of revolutions, power must drop like mellow fruit into their hands, and not be snatched, crude and immature, from the reluctant branch."<sup>1</sup> Hughes warned against complacency in England: despite the failure at Kennington common, he believed democracy was no less inevitable in England than on the continent.<sup>2</sup> Layard, referring to the "wonderful occurrences" in France during the February revolution, was nevertheless anxious as to the result: "The main point seems to be, whether the Provisional Government will succeed in settling any Executive sufficiently powerful and firm to keep the lower classes in subjection."<sup>3</sup> Goderich's support of democracy was clearly linked to his fear of proletarian revolution. The principal reason for his studying the condition of the working class, he said, "was because I desired to see this country spared the revolutions that were devastating the continent."<sup>4</sup> By promoting progress and political reform, he argued, England could preserve her valuable institutional legacies.<sup>5</sup> Forster was in complete accord. Early in April 1848 he wrote:

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1. Bruce, *Present Position and Future Prospects of the Working Classes*, 16.
  2. Hughes, *Alfred the Great*, 10.
  3. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, ii : 189: L to Henry Ross, Canford, 7 March 1848.
  4. *Huddersfield Chronicle*, 23 April 1853: G's Huddersfield election speech, 20 April 1853.
  5. *ibid.*

... Unless some political concessions be made to these masses, and unless all classes strive earnestly to keep them better fed, first or last there will be a convulsion; but I believe the best political method of preventing it is by the middle-class sympathizing with the operatives, and giving themselves power to oppose their unjust claims by helping them in those which are reasonable. 1.

10.

Their simultaneous espousal of political democracy and Coleridgean romanticism inevitably contributed to certain philosophical dilemmas. Their disposition towards paternalism illustrates the quandary in which they found themselves. Paternalism, as a romanticist notion, implied a conservative, authoritarian, hierarchical society. Goderich and his colleagues frequently manifested a sympathy with the hero-leadership which paternalism implied, a leadership which they thought must originate with the middle class and/or the aristocracy.<sup>2</sup> Thus the initiative in alleviating working class discontent they saw as lying with the upper classes.<sup>3</sup> Whilst Hughes could only write of his paternalism, which was of a traditional, corporate, squirearchical type,<sup>4</sup> Forster, Goderich and Bruce were able to practise theirs. Forster's industrial community at Burley-in-Wharfedale, for example, bore a close resemblance to Sir Titus Salt's Saltaire. Certainly

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1. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 223: F to Anna Forster, 4 April 1848.
  2. e.g. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 197: 'Education of the Middle Classes'.
  3. e.g. Hughes, *Tom Brown at Oxford*, 100; Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 155: F to Mrs. Elizabeth Nicholl, Bradford, 3 Nov. 1842.
  4. [Thomas Hughes], *The Scouring of the White Horse; or, the Long Vacation Ramble of a London Clerk. By the author of "Tom Brown's School Days"*, (Cambridge, 1859); and, Thomas Hughes, 'The Ashen Faggot: a Tale for Christmas', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 5, Jan. 1862, 234-52.

Forster wished to improve the living standards of his workers, and his having constructed gas and sewer facilities for the village during the fifties bears witness to his humanitarianism.<sup>1</sup> But an element of control was also involved: whilst providing a library and a reading room, he also established and managed a savings bank, proud that his employees were not afraid to disclose to him the value of their savings.<sup>2</sup> Goderich admired Forster's Carlylean role as a captain of industry. These 'captains' he viewed as heads of industrial families, or commanders of industrial battalions, discharging their responsibilities in their personal relations with their workers.<sup>3</sup> He spoke of the grand duties of a landowner, if performed rightly,<sup>4</sup> and lamented that Bruce was only a trustee of the Dowlais ironworks:

... Certainly the power of governing ... such a community as your Dowlais people is a grand position & my only regret is that the whole affair don't *belong* to you, so that you might have long years before you in which to work out many a problem that requires time for its solution... 5.

The tone of their comments seems to indicate that they enjoyed their paternal roles as leaders of communities. Nevertheless Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard all advocated a substantial extension of democracy. Their reconciliation of the hierarchical,

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1. Temmel, 70.

2. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 277-9.

3. Lord Ripon, 'Co-operation', *Month*, 17, 67, July 1879, 374.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 79: G to H, London, 20 July 1853.

5. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 30: G to B, 19 Sept. 1855.

authoritarian implications of paternalism with the libertarian implications of democracy was essentially pragmatic. Their consistent goal was to ameliorate the working classes' quality of life. In a society in which state intervention was both meagre and crude, they inevitably looked to aristocratic landowners and captains of industry to perform tasks for which they believed the state should ultimately become responsible. As democracy was extended, and the lot of the workers consequently improved, society's hierarchical structure could, they believed, be modified. Nevertheless, despite this theoretical reconciliation of two conflicting principles, in practice they remained emotionally torn between the paternalistic and democratic approaches to working class improvement.<sup>1.</sup>

Their attitude toward the mid-Victorian glorification of the hero is another example of their philosophical dilemma. They were far from immune to hero-worship. Bruce, for example, saw the study of past heroes as a means to elevating the character of the student.<sup>2.</sup> Goderich described Cromwell as "one of the greatest & best heroes the world ever saw -- a truly noble man, such as we rarely grow in these days."<sup>3.</sup> Perhaps they saw the hero-leader (as did their friend Daniel Macmillan's wife<sup>4.</sup>) as a counterforce to

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1. Temmel's statement that Forster was no democrat, but rather a benevolent paternalist emphasising social stability (Temmel, 15), is a misleading assessment of his philosophy. Despite all the implied contradictions, Forster was both a democrat *and* a paternalist, and never believed social stability and democracy were incompatible.
  2. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 291-2: 'The Study of History', inaugural address as president of the royal historical society, 14 Nov. 1878.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 10Q: G to H, Nocton Hall, 30 Oct. 1853.
  4. Charles L. Graves, *Life and Letters of Alexander Macmillan*, (London, 1910), 219.

the prevailing self-help ideal. In *Alfred the Great*, David Livingstone,<sup>1</sup> James Fraser,<sup>2</sup> and 'Hodson of Hodson's Horse',<sup>3</sup> Hughes exemplified their hero-worship. In the first chapter of *Alfred the Great*, he defended Carlyle's romanticist call for a hero-king to lead the nation, a hero-king in sympathy with the masses and carrying an authority from God.<sup>4</sup> Yet Hughes also advocated manhood suffrage, and recognised the difficulty of reconciling these potentially-conflicting claims: democracy and government by God's authority, he realised, were not necessarily complementary, as the people might not choose God's appointed hero as leader.<sup>5</sup> Maurice drew attention to Goderich's similar inconsistency in *The Duty of the Age*, when he emphasised that Goderich, on the one hand, acknowledged the Carlylean view that a ruler's authority is derived from God, yet on the other hand, proposed universal suffrage, with the concomitant notion that a ruler's authority is derived from the people.<sup>6</sup> Theoretically their dilemma was not insoluble:

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1. Thomas Hughes, *David Livingstone*, (London, 1889).
  2. Thomas Hughes, *James Fraser: A Memoir*, (London, 1887).
  3. Thomas Hughes, 'Hodson of Hodson's Horse', *Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country*, 59, 350, Feb. 1859, 127-45.
  4. Hughes, *Alfred the Great*, 7-13.
  5. Hughes, *Tom Brown at Oxford*, 405-6.
  6. RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 11: undated memorandum [spring of 1852] by Maurice on *The Duty of the Age*; and Frederick Maurice, *Life of F.D. Maurice*, ii : 129: Maurice to Ludlow, 8 Sept. 1852. Maurice's own philosophy was no more free of contradictions. He maintained that God's order was the foundation of the existing society, and only needed to be recognised and acknowledged by men, but nevertheless joined in co-operative endeavours whose precise purpose was to change the existing social order.

following the moral elevation of the masses through acceptance of the truth of Christianity, their will would be God's will, their choice as hero-leader God's choice as hero-leader. Yet the practical difficulty remained, of convincing the masses that their right to the suffrage depended on their moral regeneration through Christianity. Furthermore Goderich, Hughes and the others never contemplated a religious test for prospective electors, and must have realised that in supporting practical measures for reform they would in fact be admitting morally 'ineligible' voters to the suffrage. Thus their attempt to reconcile the dilemma of divine versus popular authority, by stating that the people must be Christianised in order that God might rule England through them, was essentially naive and politically unrealistic.<sup>1.</sup>

11.

The common philosophy which Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard espoused was a hybrid of social romanticism and political radicalism. In accentuating the significance of faith as opposed to reason, in stressing the desirability of social and national unity, in rejecting individualism, utilitarianism and economic laissez-faire, in espousing medievalism and the glorification of nature, and in flirting with hero-worship and paternalism, it was essentially romantic.

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1. See Hughes, *Alfred the Great*, 330-3. Almost thirty years later, Hughes reiterated their theoretical reconciliation of divine and popular authority, in stating to Ripon that he was "... much comforted & encouraged to be once more assured, that you stand so strongly on the old foundations, & are as little inclined to turn your back on democracy (as we always understood it) as you were 30 years ago. Mind I always thought the prophet [Maurice] wrong in suppressing the Duty of the Age, tho' quite right in drubbing into us that power does not come from the demos..." (RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 232: H to R, London, 16 April 1880).

But to the traditions of Coleridge and his ideological disciples was grafted an advanced liberal political radicalism which emphasised civil and democratic rights. This conjunction of radical and romantic theory dissociated Goderich and his colleagues from most of their political contemporaries. Their philosophical isolation made it natural, therefore, that they look to each other for support. There existed a solid theoretical basis for an effective political alliance.

Their mutual philosophy, developed during the social, industrial, economic and political upheavals of the 1840s and maintained essentially intact thereafter, was in many ways incompatible with the accepted norms of mid-Victorian Britain, which were largely a result of the prosperity, stability and consolidation of the 1850s and 1860s. To their contemporaries capitalism appeared boundless in its ability to provide goods and services. During the mid-Victorian era prices remained reasonably stable, capital investment expanded markedly, there was an increase in production growth rates. (The wool and iron industries, with which Forster and Bruce were respectively associated, proved especially prosperous. The enduring viability of agricultural concerns -- Goderich became one of England's largest landowners - helped mask the declining importance of the landed interest.) Economic fluctuations were less wild than previously, with the exception of the intense, but brief, depression of 1857. Whilst real wages didn't rise appreciably until the mid-sixties (until then, the workers' share of national income probably fell, and middle incomes increased more than proportionately), the economic advances of the fifties provided employment on an unprecedented scale, and mid-Victorians generally perceived substantial improvement in living standards. The result was a

relaxation of social tensions which led to proletarian apathy and deference, and which promoted amongst the middle and upper classes complacency and a general acceptance that society had struck a satisfactory balance.

This comfortable optimism was a characteristic with which Goderich and his colleagues continued to feel uneasy. In their minds the increase in prosperity, and resultant social stability, merely camouflaged underlying tensions. They continued, for example, to view theirs as an age of doubt and transition, somewhat strange and fearful.<sup>1</sup> They persisted in emphasising the dangers of industrial anarchy, which for the time being appeared obviated by increased prosperity. Their endorsement of state intervention clashed with the theoretically-dominant laissez-faire mentality. They maintained their interest in political reform, despite the overwhelming prominence given by their contemporaries to foreign affairs. Though in general accepting mid-Victorian moral exhortations to work and to do one's duty earnestly, they wholeheartedly rejected the common equation of respectability with wealth and success. Unlike most of their contemporaries, they were never convinced that class divisions would inevitably heal themselves, or that their

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1. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 213: F to Mrs. Charles Fox, Rawdon, 6 Sept. 1847; G. [oderich], 3. Hughes viewed the years between 1848 and 1856 as an "anxious and critical" period in English history (see his prefatory memoir in Charles Kingsley, *Alton Locke*, vii). Goderich recognised the uncertainties evident in "these latter doubting days, when almost everyone is often asking himself in the middle of his strongest conviction, 'Is this really so; there's a great deal to be said after all on the other side'" (RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 200: G to H, Ripon, 8 Nov. 1855).

hierarchical society would endure indefinitely, and found it difficult to reconcile themselves to the mid-Victorian faith in industrial, material and moral progress. Though undoubtedly influenced to some degree by the torpor and apathy of the mid-Victorian era, they remained on the whole apprehensive and critical, in the tradition of Carlyle, Dickens, Ruskin, Matthew Arnold and William Morris, and continued to focus on society's faults and problems rather than to smugly conform to what they viewed as the false and shallow optimism of the majority of their contemporaries.

As individuals destined to form a political pressure group, they had by 1852 adopted a mutual philosophy which, opposed as it was to many current norms and not always pertinent to the political realities of mid-Victorian Britain, differentiated them from all other recognised parliamentary parties or groupings.

## CHAPTER 3

ESTABLISHING AN ALLIANCE

Henry Layard returned from his eastern excavations in the summer of 1851 to find England "greatly improved in every way. We are enjoying great prosperity, the harvests have been most abundant, the manufacturing districts are, on the whole, well employed and there is no strong popular cry of any kind."<sup>1</sup> This whiggish complacency, which contrasted so acutely with the social and political unease of Goderich, Hughes, Forster and Bruce, was to be fundamentally altered by his early political experiences.

His initiation into the mainstream of public life, a result of his friendship with Lord Cowley, was sudden, unexpected and brief. Layard had met Cowley in Constantinople in 1844, and a close friendship had subsequently developed.<sup>2</sup> Cowley was appointed ambassador to Paris early in 1852, and had "stipulated that he might take Henry with him, nominally as an attaché, but really as a friend and adviser."<sup>3</sup> Granville's<sup>4</sup> endorsement having been received, Layard was offered the appointment on 4 February.<sup>5</sup> Layard had also been considered as a possible parliamentary candidate at Poole, the

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38980, 124: L to Henry Ross, Eastnor Castle, 25 Sept. 1851.
  2. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, ii : 141.
  3. Bessborough, *Lady Charlotte Guest*, 289: journal entry of 4 Feb. 1852.
  4. Granville had replaced Palmerston as foreign secretary on 26 December 1851, when the latter resigned from Lord John Russell's government.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 58171, 50: L's diary, n.d. [Feb. 1852].

Dorset seat under Canford (i.e. Guest) control. After consultations with Lady Charlotte, however, he determined to accept Cowley's offer.<sup>1.</sup> But his diplomatic prospects were short-lived; on 11 February Layard met Granville for the first time and, to his surprise, was appointed under secretary for foreign affairs. Cowley, in asking for him at Paris, had spoken of Layard in flattering terms, and had also suggested the appointment in England.<sup>2.</sup> Because of his Ninevah discoveries, Layard's public standing was considerable, and Granville's decision to include him in Lord John Russell's government was generally well-received by the press.<sup>3.</sup> Layard, however, was dogged by bad luck. In December 1851 Russell, backed by the queen and cabinet, had forced Lord Palmerston's resignation as foreign secretary, ostensibly for his precipitate recognition of Louis Napoleon's coup d'état; on 20 February Palmerston had his famous 'tit-for-tat', defeating the government in the house of commons on their militia bill. Derby and the tories assumed power and Malmesbury, the new foreign secretary, requested that Layard retain his office until Stanley (Derby's son) could return from India to replace him, probably in May. Layard consulted Granville, Carlisle<sup>4.</sup> and Labouchère,<sup>5.</sup> all of whom urged him to remain in office, assuring him

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1. Bessborough, 290: journal entry of 4 Feb. 1852; LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 9: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 4 Feb. 1852 (copy). Poole was subsequently represented in the Guest interest by Danby Seymour.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 58171, 50: L's diary, n.d. [Feb. 1852].
  3. e.g. *Daily News*, 14 Feb. 1852.
  4. George William Frederick Howard, 7th Earl of Carlisle, whig politician, at this time chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster. As chief commissioner of woods and forests from 1846-1850, he had promoted sanitary legislation, and was also a supporter of mechanics' institutes. Carlisle served as lord-lieutenant of Ireland under Palmerston from 1855-1858, and again from 1859-1864.
  5. Henry Labouchère, MP for Taunton, whig president of the board of trade in the Russell government of 1846-1852, and son-in-law of Carlisle.

that he would not thereby connect himself with the tory ministry.<sup>1.</sup> Cowley concurred in their counsel,<sup>2.</sup> and Layard determined to accept this advice, despite doubts "as to how he could conscientiously co-operate with people whose views were so opposite to his own."<sup>3.</sup> His dilemma was resolved, however, when Granville informed him on 25 February that Russell thought he should resign.<sup>4.</sup> Though Granville disagreed with this advice, and though Layard was no doubt tempted by Malmesbury's offer of a diplomatic mission, Layard resolved to withdraw from the tory ministry, whose members he saw as "utterly unsuited by character, abilities & experience" to fill their offices.<sup>5.</sup> He saw his decision as a choice between a diplomatic career and English public life.<sup>6.</sup> Granville immediately promised to see Hayter<sup>7.</sup> about a seat for Layard in the house of commons,<sup>8.</sup> and Layard was led to believe that, should the whigs return to power, his claims would not be overlooked.<sup>9.</sup> He hoped for the early return of a government composed of whigs and moderate liberals.<sup>10.</sup>

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 58171, 51: L's diary entry of 23 Feb. 1852.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38980, 257: Cowley to L, Paris, 25 Feb. 1852.
  3. Bessborough, 294: journal entry of 25 Feb. 1852.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 58171, 51: L's diary entry of 25 Feb. 1852.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 10: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 27 Feb. 1852 (copy).
  6. LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 27: L to G.T. Clark, London, 6 March 1852.
  7. Sir William Hayter, MP for Wells, Liberal whip.
  8. LP. BL Add Ms 58171, 51: L's diary entry of 25 Feb. 1852.
  9. LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 27: L to G.T. Clark, London, 6 March 1852.
  10. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 10: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 24 Feb. 1852 (copy).

In the meantime, Layard had to find an acceptable constituency to contest in expectation of the forthcoming election. On 2 March he met with Hayter, with whom both Russell and Granville had spoken on his behalf.<sup>1</sup> A number of possible seats were canvassed, including Peterborough, Glasgow, Merthyr Tydvil<sup>2</sup> and the Tower Hamlets, which Layard rejected as he could not support the dissenters' policy of abolishing all government grants for education and for Maynooth.<sup>3</sup> Eventually he determined on Aylesbury, which had previously been a tory, protectionist stronghold. Layard had a Liberal contact in Aylesbury, Acton Tindal, dating from his parents' residence there in the 1830s. His decision to stand followed a meeting on 10 April with Tindal and the locally-influential Lord Carrington, who promised to pay all expenses in excess of £500, and who demanded no specific pledges.<sup>4</sup> A meeting of Aylesbury liberals on 30 April confirmed his candidacy, along with that of Richard Bethell.<sup>5</sup>

Layard issued a rather tepid election address shortly thereafter, pledging himself to support free trade, extension of

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 58171, 52: L's diary entry of 2 March 1852.
  2. In place of Sir John Guest, who was ill; in the event Guest was re-elected.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 58171, 53: L's diary entries of 15 and 26 March 1852. Government grants to Maynooth, the catholic college in Ireland, produced much fanatical protestant opposition in England. Layard, Goderich and Bruce all supported the retention of the Maynooth grant so long as financial subsidies to protestant denominations continued.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 58171, 56: L's diary entry of 10 April 1852.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 58171, 59: L's diary entry of 30 April 1852. Bethell favoured the ballot and abolition of church rates. He served as solicitor general from December 1852 to November 1856, and attorney general from November 1856 to March 1858 and again from June 1859 to 1861, when he was appointed lord chancellor (Lord Westbury).

the suffrage, and vote by ballot.<sup>1</sup> As he warmed to the fray, he began to disparage the "wicked Tories" and the "bigoted and intolerant clergy," and stated that Aylesbury had made him "a confirmed Radical,"<sup>2</sup> much to the chagrin of more conservative friends such as Cowley.<sup>3</sup> In a speech on 6 July, he attacked tory hypocrisy on the Maynooth grant, and argued the necessity of suffrage extension. He promised that he would "never support Lord Derby or his associates," and pledged that he would take an independent line.<sup>4</sup> Thus Layard began the abandonment of his loyalty to his former whig colleagues, and after the election, which he easily won,<sup>5</sup> he vehemently protested against accusations that he was merely the nominee of Lord Carrington, and asserted his absolute political independence.<sup>6</sup>

Events of the winter and spring of 1852 had left Goderich embittered and somewhat disillusioned. The demise of many of the Christian Socialist co-operative experiments, Maurice's rejection of *The Duty of the Age*, and the failure of the amalgamated society of engineers' efforts to combat their employers' lockout, all contributed to his mood of despondency. He realised that a new direction was essential, and in April announced to Hughes his intention, on behalf of the Christian Socialists, of standing for the house of commons:

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38981, 42: L's election address, London, 8 May 1852.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 15: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 30 May 1852 (copy).
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38981, 86: Cowley to L, Dieppe, [16?] July 1852.
  4. *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 10 July 1852: L's Aylesbury election speech, 6 July 1852.
  5. *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 10 July 1852: Layard (558); Bethell (525); Bayford (447); West (435). The poll was held on 7 July.
  6. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 16: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 16 July 1852 (copy).

"I think, if I can, I ought to try what can be done in Parlt, as I seem to be the only man among the faithful who can come in; except Van[sittart Neale] & he's little use with his Tory crochets -- though I hope he'll get in for all that."<sup>1</sup> Goderich's apparent assumption that one of the family's pocket boroughs would be made available for his candidacy proved inaccurate, due primarily to the aversion of his uncle (Earl de Grey) to his radical-socialist activities. As an alternative Goderich decided on the seat of Hull, a tough seafaring borough with a large and electorally independent artisan vote. He issued his election address on 30 April, expressing his support for free trade, for measures "likely to conduce to the independence of Electors, and to the free exercise of the Franchise" [i.e. the secret ballot], for extension of the suffrage, redistribution of present constituencies, and shortening of the duration of parliaments, and pledging himself to support proposals for the amelioration of the condition of the people, including the extension of education.<sup>2</sup> His initial platform was deliberately vague, in order to conciliate his moderate-liberal ally, the sitting member James Clay. But as the campaign progressed, and as Goderich concentrated on obtaining the support of engineers and ships' carpenters, rather than that of the middle classes ("although on all Commercial & Financial Questions I ought to please them"<sup>3</sup>), his promises became more specific. In a major speech on 14 June he advocated a "large and comprehensive" extension of the suffrage, triennial parliaments,

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 5: G to H, Wrest, 5 April 1852.

2. *Hull Packet and East Riding Times*, 7 May 1852: G's election address, London, 30 April 1852; also *Leader*, 8 May 1852.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 8: G to H, Ollerton, Notts., 18 May 1852.

abolition of property qualifications for MPs, a substantial redistribution, abolition of church rates, and the ballot.<sup>1.</sup>

Goderich's relationship with his fellow-candidate, Clay, was necessarily tenuous. Indeed his electoral programme and political ideals, based as they were on a radical-romantic philosophy, differentiated him from all established political and ideological factions. During the campaign he came to "feel every day more how widely I differ from all existing Parliamentary Parties & on what utterly different grounds my faith rests."<sup>2.</sup> As Christian Socialists, he wrote to Hughes, "we are, none of us, of any party, & I could sometimes fancy myself a Conservative except for my unchanging belief in Democracy & Socialism."<sup>3.</sup> Despite the vagaries of electioneering, he assured Hughes that his political ideals had remained intact:

... My dear fellow, don't think that this turmoil of Political Botheration will have changed me, when I get out of it. I am like a cork in the middle of a whirlpool & remain just where I was -- there is far too much row to change a man, & anyhow I shall never forget the old days of buns & porter, & council & tracts. If I don't get in, we'll have lots more of it... 4.

Nevertheless Goderich despised the "turmoil of this Election by beer-barrels, as Carlyle would call it,"<sup>5.</sup> and looked to the charter to obviate excesses on the hustings.<sup>6.</sup> Without strong local influence,

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1. *Hull Packet and East Riding Times*, 18 June 1852: G's Hull election speech, 14 June 1852.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 8: G to H, Ollerton, Notts., 18 May 1852.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 12: G to H, Ollerton, Notts., 22 May 1852.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 18: G to H, Hull, 27 June 1852.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 8: G to H, Ollerton, Notts., 18 May 1852.
  6. *ibid.*

he sought support outside Hull. Through Hughes, he scouted Forster's aid.<sup>1</sup> Harney, impressed with Goderich's previous support for co-operation and the A.S.E., enthusiastically endorsed his candidacy in the *Star of Freedom*, describing Goderich as "precisely the man to face and fight the supporters of injustice and the enemies of right."<sup>2</sup> In the event Goderich was comfortably returned, trailing Clay by only six votes.<sup>3</sup>

Henry Bruce did not contest the general election of 1852, as Goderich and Layard had done, but when Sir John Guest, Merthyr's sitting member, died on 26 November, Bruce was sounded out by both Guest and Crawshay interests as a possible candidate. With the support of the ironmasters Bruce realised his return would be assured, and by 3 December had committed himself.<sup>4</sup> In his election address, issued on 6 December, Bruce stressed the importance of the support "of the principal Ironmasters of the Borough," but also committed himself "to every prudent and well-digested scheme for the Extension of the Suffrage." He added that, "of all subjects for legislation, none however have in my eyes the interest and importance of those which affect the social condition of the working-classes."<sup>5</sup> In a speech to his prospective constituents on 14 December, he expanded upon these views; his suffrage proposals were circumspect, and he opposed the ballot. He denied assertions that he was a conservative, a Peelite, or a Derbyite. As a free-trader, he stated that he could never support Derby. He was a conservative only in the sense "that I desire to

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 12: G to H, Ollerton, Notts., 22 May 1852.

2. *Star of Freedom*, 3 July 1852.

3. *Leader*, 10 July 1852: Clay (2264); Goderich (2258); Moore (1831); Butler (1646).

4. Records of the Dyffryn, Aberdare Estate. GCRO, D/D Br F/16: B's diary entries of 29 Nov., 3 and 4 Dec. 1852.

5. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 11 Dec. 1852: B's election address, Aberdare, 6 Dec. 1852.

maintain the institutions of the country; but to maintain them by adapting them to the altered circumstances of society, and the onward march of events and progress of ideas." He gave Peel fulsome praise, but added that

... though I reverence his name, and should have gladly supported his policy, I can be no follower of his followers. Doubtless, Sir James Graham, Mr. Gladstone, the Duke of Newcastle, and Mr. Sidney Herbert, are men distinguished for abilities and high statesmanlike qualities, and likely to support the cause of popular progress; but they have no coherent or defined system of policy; they do not act together, and no man can tell where they might be found next year. I am, therefore, no Peelite...1.

Instead he considered himself as an independent, "wishing to enter Parliament free from all party ties, and to form my own opinions on questions as they arise according to the light of my reason and the dictates of my conscience." The house of commons, he argued, was presently divided into many factions. "Never, therefore, was there a better opportunity for forming an independent party, whose votes shall be guided not by the interest of faction, but by the merits of the measures proposed."<sup>2</sup> Bruce was elected unopposed as Merthyr's representative to Westminster.

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1. This is in contrast to the statement of Bruce's son (W.N. Bruce, 'Henry Austin Bruce', in J.V. Morgan, *Welsh Political and Educational Leaders*, 227-8) that his father's real sympathies on entering parliament were with the Peelites. It also contradicts Conacher's classification of Bruce as a Peelite (J.B. Conacher, *The Aberdeen Coalition: 1852-1855*, (Cambridge, 1968), 547) and his assertion that Bruce was one of a hard core of 44 Peelites who regularly supported the government (124), which is belied by house of commons voting statistics (see appendix 1).
  2. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 18 Dec. 1852: B's election speech, 14 Dec. 1852.

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During the next two years Goderich, Bruce and Layard were to form the nucleus of an independent coalition within the house, relying to a great extent on the advice and support of both Hughes and Forster out of doors. Bruce and Goderich had emphasised during their election campaigns an independence from all existing political parties, a realistic parliamentary status for new members in the factional house of commons of the early fifties. Goderich reasserted these views in assessing his political options following his election victory. He referred to himself as being "pre-eminently the Working Class member,"<sup>1.</sup> at the same time realising he was alone in his glory.<sup>2.</sup> He was also aware of the necessity in the house of commons of the appearance of moderation: "I really can't dress all in red or grow a beard, & bring in a bill to hang half England."<sup>3.</sup> As the autumn session of parliament approached, he wrote to Hughes:

... I greatly think of what I may be able to do for the Good Cause in the National Palaver, & I hope that much Radical & some purely Socialist work may be possible -- & that perhaps on all questions it may be possible to force or to lead people to look honestly at them, basing themselves on Fact & working only for Truth. But perhaps this is *too* sanguine, for the present time. Anyhow we must be very steady & cautious in what we do... 4.

Unlike both Goderich and Bruce, however, Layard held the expectation of official appointment should the whigs return to power.<sup>5.</sup> Yet once again, as in February, he was wooed by the conservatives.

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 24: G to H, 14 July 1852.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 22: G to H, Hull, 10 July 1852.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 40: G to H, Nocton [Hall], 29 July 1852.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 49: G to H, Nocton Hall, 27 Sept. 1852.
  5. See above (86) and LP. BL Add Ms 38981, 123: L to Henry Ross, London, 23 Sept. 1852.

Bruce writes that

soon after Layard's entrance into Parliament, he met D'Israeli, 1. who, after a few words of friendly congratulation, invited him into the Carlton Club for a quiet talk. They entered a private room, when D'Israeli, after dwelling in flattering terms upon Layard's foreign experience and general talents, urged him to join the Conservative party, assuring him that he would be cordially welcomed, and might safely look to an official appointment. Layard, who had been returned as a rather advanced Liberal, pledged to several measures to which the Conservatives were opposed, of course declined the offer. 2.

His rejection of Disraeli's overture was not, as Waterfield argues,<sup>3.</sup> due principally to his contempt for Disraeli's youthful character, but rather to his growing opposition to conservative policy. In fact Layard's more radical views, which had first surfaced as a result of his election campaign, were becoming progressively consolidated. He spoke of the tory magistrates and clergy of Aylesbury as bigoted and ignorant,<sup>4.</sup> convincing him of "the perfect justification of the lower classes in this country becoming radicals & dissenters."<sup>5.</sup> He was rapidly becoming disgusted, not only with church of England clergy, but with the general dishonesty of his political colleagues in the house of commons,<sup>6.</sup> an attitude fully in accord with that of Goderich and Bruce.

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1. Disraeli, as a youth, had been a protégé of Sara Austen, and Layard had initially made his acquaintance in the 1830s.
  2. Layard, *Early Adventures*, 17.
  3. Waterfield, 475.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 58156, 118: L to Sara Austen, London, 23 Nov. 1852.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 19: L to Lady Aboyne, London, n.d. [after 24 Nov. 1852] (copy).
  6. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 19: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 27 Nov. 1852 (copy).

Nevertheless when Disraeli's budget, an expedient attempting to satisfy conservative interests (the landed, the sugar and the shipping lobbies), was defeated in the house on 17 December, Layard was initially confident that he would be included in a new whig ministry.<sup>1</sup> But a purely whig government, under the discredited Russell, was no longer acceptable or possible, and after considerable discussion a whig-Peelite coalition, under the Peelite Lord Aberdeen as prime minister, eventuated. Layard initially rejected this innovation, probably because he realised the likelihood of his exclusion from such an alliance.<sup>2</sup> In fact the formation of the Aberdeen coalition witnessed "one of the most unabashed place-hunting rat races since the eighteenth century,"<sup>3</sup> and Russell was unable to satisfy all his whig friends. Layard, proposed by the whigs as a secretary at the board of control,<sup>4</sup> was one of these unfortunates. An initial offer from Aberdeen of the secretaryship led him to refer to the coalition ministry (with substantial hypocrisy, considering his initial opposition) as "the first great experiment in accordance with the spirit of the age."<sup>5</sup> But Layard was subsequently forced to acquiesce in Russell's request that he withdraw his claims in favour of Sir Thomas Redington.<sup>6</sup> Disillusionment, and uncertainty as to

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 19: L to Lady Aboyne, 17 Dec. 1852 (copy).
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 20: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 21 Dec. 1852 (copy).
  3. Donald Southgate, *The Passing of the Whigs 1832-1866*, (London, 1962), 239.
  4. Conacher, 31; also LP. BL Add Ms 38981, 125: Granville to L, London, 25 Dec. 1852.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 16: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 28 Dec. 1852. The appointment was, precipitately, announced in the *Times*, 28 Dec. 1852.
  6. *Times*, 1 March 1855: L's address to his Aylesbury constituents, 28 Feb. 1855.

his political future, followed the realisation that he had been excluded from office.<sup>1.</sup>

Layard at first doubted that his limited means would allow him to continue his parliamentary career.<sup>2.</sup> However in March 1853 *Ninevah and Babylon* was published and, together with the subsequent release of a second series of *The Monuments of Ninevah*,<sup>3.</sup> helped to alleviate his financial uncertainties. In the meantime he discovered that his whig friends had not entirely deserted him. In February Lord John Russell, now foreign secretary under Aberdeen,<sup>4.</sup> offered Layard the position of consul general in Egypt, presumably in recognition of his unfulfilled claims to office. He added that, should Layard prefer to remain in parliament, he (Russell) would "be happy, when occasion offers, to consider your interest & wishes."<sup>5.</sup> Layard accepted this second option and declined the diplomatic appointment;<sup>6.</sup> for the time being his connection with whiggery remained secure, through his personal relationships with Russell, Granville and Cowley,<sup>7.</sup> though his recently-acquired radicalism was at variance with their more complacent political ideology.

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 20-21: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 30 Dec. 1852 and 2 Jan. 1853 (copies).
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 20: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 30 Dec. 1852 (copy).
  3. A.H. Layard, *A Second Series of the Monuments of Ninevah, made on the Spot during a Second Expedition to Assyria*, (London, 1853).
  4. Russell was first foreign secretary, then held a seat in the cabinet without portfolio, and was finally president of the council, in the Aberdeen coalition of 1852-5. He was also leader of the commons.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38981, 220: Russell to L, London, 5 Feb. 1853.
  6. LP. BL Add Ms 38981, 245: L to Russell, London, 7 Feb. 1852.
  7. Layard dedicated *Ninevah and Babylon* to Granville and *The Monuments of Ninevah* to Cowley, overt attempts to consolidate his position within whiggery.

In March 1853, with the approval of both Russell and Clarendon, Layard acceded to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's request that he accompany him, in an unofficial capacity, on his mission to Constantinople, the purpose of which was to neutralise the influence of Menschikov over the sultan. Layard undertook the assignment partly from a sense of obligation to Stratford for his past patronage, and partly because he thought his knowledge of the east might prove useful to Stratford.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless he was unenthusiastic from the outset, his association with Stratford was delicate, and within a month he was anxious to return to the house of commons.<sup>2</sup>

Whilst Layard appeared to have partially re-established his political status in the winter and spring of 1853, Goderich's position had disintegrated. Shortly after his Hull election he had realised that John James Bezer, the chartist-Christian Socialist whom he had appointed, and implicitly trusted, as his election agent, had engaged in corruption and bribery during the campaign, and had subsequently absconded with the remaining funds.<sup>3</sup> Goderich despaired of his situation and, to no avail, attempted to conceal his agent's dishonesty from his tory opponents. When they initiated their petition in October 1852, he confided to Hughes that he was bored by the prospect of returning to private life.<sup>4</sup> But though the house of commons select committee inquiring into the proceedings declared the Hull election void, it exonerated Goderich and Clay of any

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1. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, ii: 243: L to [?], London, 1 March 1853.
  2. *ibid.*, ii : 199: L to Henry Ross, Constantinople, 2 April 1853. For an assessment of the importance of L's mission to Constantinople in 1853, see chapter 4 below.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 34: G to H, Nocton Hall, 22 July 1852. Corruption in the 1852 general election was widespread, and probably more obvious than in the preceding few elections.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 58: G to H, Nocton, 26 Oct. 1852.

knowledge of misconduct,<sup>1.</sup> and Goderich consequently had little difficulty in finding a new constituency to contest: the radical mill-town of Huddersfield. Once again he received the journalistic support of Harney and the personal support of Forster,<sup>2.</sup> and his campaign platform, reminiscent of that of Hull, included the advocacy of the secret ballot, redistribution of constituencies, triennial parliaments, household suffrage (though he argued that, as this was impractical for the present, he would support any reasonable measure of reform), and a national system of education. He stressed his interest in matters relating to the working class and, whilst giving tentative support to Aberdeen's coalition government, asserted his independence of all parties or sections.<sup>3.</sup> Goderich won a comfortable victory over his tory opponent, Joseph Starkey,<sup>4.</sup> and returned to the house of commons with a more influential position, if also with a somewhat chastened enthusiasm.

### 3.

It is not possible to ascertain the precise date or circumstances of the first encounter between either Goderich or Hughes, and Layard. The three were certainly acquainted in November 1852,<sup>5.</sup> but there is no evidence to suggest that they were particularly close during this period. However throughout the autumn of 1852 Layard and

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1. *Hull Packet and East Riding Times*, 11 March 1853. The committee met on 4, 5 and 7 March.
  2. F.G. Black and R.M. Black, eds., *The Harney Papers*, (Assen, 1969), 18: G to Harney, London, 10 May 1853; RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 75: G to H, Huddersfield, n.d. [April 1853].
  3. *Huddersfield Chronicle*, 23 April 1853: G's Huddersfield nomination speech, 20 April 1853.
  4. *ibid.*: Goderich (675); Starkey (593).
  5. Goderich informed Hughes on 16 November that he was invited to (the artist Henry?) Phillips's "to meet Layard, myself & other distinguished gents" (RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 60: G to H, London, 16 Nov. 1852).

Bruce were often together. They co-operated in promoting the Guests' efforts at Dowlais to provide schools and savings banks for their workers,<sup>1</sup> and Bruce arranged for Layard to lecture on Ninevah at Merthyr.<sup>2</sup> Their relationship during this early stage was probably based to a considerable extent on their mutual interests in art and literature,<sup>3</sup> undoubtedly strengthened by their compatible radical-romantic philosophies. In addition, Layard was clearly influenced by Bruce's social concern with the circumstances of the working class: he acknowledged his indebtedness to Bruce in a speech delivered in Wisbech.<sup>4</sup> It was therefore natural that, when elected to the house of commons on 14 December, Bruce should look to Layard for companionship in London. He arrived at Westminster just in time to join Layard and Goderich in voting against Disraeli's budget,<sup>5</sup> the rejection of which brought down the government.

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1. See LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 17: L to Lady Aboyne, Dowlais, 26 Oct. 1852 (copy); Records of the Dyffryn, Aberdare Estate. GCRO, D/D Br F/16: B's diary entries of 25 and 28 Oct. 1852; LP. BL Add Ms 58174, 75: unidentified newspaper clipping referring to addresses of Bruce and Layard to the Dowlais workers on savings banks, 28 Oct. 1852.
  2. Records of the Dyffryn, Aberdare Estate. GCRO, D/D Br F/16: B's diary entries of 27 and 29 Oct. 1852.
  3. L's involvement in the arts is demonstrated throughout both his correspondence and his published works; for Bruce, see 'Art and its Cultivation' in *Lectures and Addresses*, 71-97: an address delivered at the opening of the Cardiff art exhibition, 10 Dec. 1855.
  4. *Lynn Advertiser*, 6 Nov. 1852. Layard accompanied the Earl of Aboyne to the opening of a hall in Wisbech to accommodate a mechanics institute and other public bodies. Aboyne, who on the death of his father in 1853 became the 10th Marquis of Huntly, was married to Layard's cousin. His country seat was at Orton Longueville in Huntingdonshire, and his local influence extended to Wisbech.
  5. 3 H 123, 1693-7: 16 Dec. 1852.

Layard in fact consulted Bruce on the vote, and they agreed that Disraeli's speech was politically immoral and dishonest.<sup>1.</sup> In the following days, whilst Layard waited expectantly for news of his re-appointment to public office, the two men consulted each other frequently.<sup>2.</sup>

As political neophytes Goderich, Layard and Bruce were naturally reticent in their contributions to parliamentary debate. However during their first six months in the house of commons their votes generally reflected radical principles. Goderich and Layard both supported Villiers' free trade motion in November 1852, though all three later united in rejecting the repeal of the excise duty on hops, thus illustrating their joint denial of Manchester's extreme laissez-faire philosophy. They mutually endorsed initiatives to remove the civil disabilities of Jews.<sup>3.</sup> And Goderich, Bruce and Layard were all enthusiastic supporters of Gladstone's first budget. Though Bruce had earlier opposed the extension of probate and legacy duties to real property (i.e. land, houses, quarries, mines, etc.) as well as personal property,<sup>4.</sup> he subsequently followed Gladstone's lead and joined Goderich and Layard in endorsing the

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 19: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 17 Dec. 1852 (copy).
  2. Records of the Dyffryn, Aberdare Estate. GCRO, D/D Br F/16: B's diary entries of 21, 28 and 29 Dec. 1852.
  3. 3 H 123, 696-704: 26 Nov. 1852; 3 H 124, 194-6: 17 Feb. 1853; 3 H 124, 622-5: 24 Feb. 1853.
  4. 3 H 124, 834-5: 1 March 1853.

concept.<sup>1.</sup> Indeed Gladstone's budget proposals to retain the income tax for seven years, and to extend legacy duties to all successions, whether of personal or real property, were generally interpreted as a middle class blow to whig and tory landed interests, especially in that the revenue thus raised was used to reduce indirect taxation, pressing on industry and consumption, by £5 million. It was a popular, relatively egalitarian budget which Goderich, Bruce and Layard so strongly approved.

From November 1852 until May 1853, there was only one issue before the house on which they differed: Bruce did not join Goderich in advocating total repeal of state aid for ecclesiastical purposes.<sup>2.</sup> By May it was clear that Bruce and Layard were in close consultation on a wide variety of political matters. This is best illustrated by a letter Bruce wrote to Layard shortly before the latter's return from Constantinople, describing in considerable detail the latest parliamentary machinations. It is evident from his comments that Bruce relished his political life, and that he considered Layard an ally:

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1. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 120-4: B to L, London, 7 May 1853. Goderich praised the budget proposals in his Huddersfield election address (*Huddersfield Chronicle*, 23 April 1853) and leant aristocratic support in the commons to the extension of succession duties to land, basing his argument on the justice and equality of the measure, and the social unity it would therefore help engender (3 H 127, 352-6: 13 May 1852). Gladstone personally thanked Goderich for his support on this occasion (Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/6/23: H to Ludlow, Wimbledon, [16 May 1853] ). Goderich, Layard and Bruce voted together in favour of the budget proposals (3 H 126, 1004-8: 2 May 1853; 3 H 127, 1212-4: 6 June 1853; and 3 H 128, 121-4: 13 June 1853).

2. 3 H 124, 926-8: 2 March 1853.

"You are much asked for," he wrote, "and we shall all be very glad to see you again when you have put our friends the Turks *à l'abri* from their grasping enemy."<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, though their interests coincided, they were not invariably in agreement on specific issues. This is well exemplified by their subsequent activities concerning the status of the church, and the reform of Indian administration.

Both Bruce and Goderich co-operated with R.J. Phillimore in pressing for church reform. In July Goderich unsuccessfully moved the second reading of the simony law amendment act, which he and Phillimore had proposed, and which would have prohibited the sale of church of England livings.<sup>2</sup> But Goderich and Layard were manifestly more radical than Bruce on church questions at this time: whilst Bruce had seconded Phillimore's motion to exempt dissenters from church rates, Goderich and Layard supported an amendment which would have secured their total abolition.<sup>3</sup> Layard and Bruce were however in complete accord in condemning Russell's absolution of the Irish church, which they regarded as iniquitous.<sup>4</sup>

Their reactions to Sir Charles Wood's India bill evinced similar discrepancies. Wood, as president of the board of control, introduced his legislation to renew the east India company's charter on 3 June. He proposed to retain the existing system of dual government, but to reconstruct the EIC's court of directors and the governor-general's

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1. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 120-4: B to L, London, 7 May 1853.
  2. 3 H 129, 150-3, 156: 13 July 1853. R.J. Phillimore, lawyer and Peelite MP for Tavistock, had befriended Bruce in London in the 1830s.
  3. 3 H 127, 588: 26 May 1853 and 3 H 127, 643-6: 26 May 1853.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 24: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 4 June 1853 (copy).

council, though continuing to prohibit native membership. In addition, appointment by competitive examination was to replace civil, though not military, patronage.<sup>1</sup> During the spring Bruce had joined Danby Seymour,<sup>2</sup> J.F. Blackett,<sup>3</sup> John Dickinson,<sup>4</sup> J.G. Phillimore,<sup>5</sup> Cobden and Bright in the founding of the Indian reform society, commonly referred to as Young India. The reformers numbered about forty MPs and their purpose, as Bruce explained to Layard, was to secure either a delay in introducing Indian legislation until further information was available, or "a vigorous measure of reform, involving the abolition of the present system of double government,"<sup>6</sup> to be replaced by the unitary authority of a secretary of state responsible to parliament. However, as representatives of the Manchester school, a number of the Young Indians were primarily interested in cotton cultivation, and therefore stressed the need to develop railways and construct public works. Abolition of EIC rule, they believed, would help to achieve these aims. Young India also opposed the annexationist policies which had been practised in the Punjab, Satara and Jaitpur. And they wished to introduce a free press, and to encourage native participation in government. Therefore, despite their undoubted concurrence with Wood's attempts to abolish

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1. 3 H 127, 1092-1169: 3 June 1853.

2. Member for Poole; see 125-6 below.

3. Member for Newcastle; see 128 below.

4. A meeting in Dickinson's rooms on 12 March 1853 had founded the Indian reform society, of which Dickinson became honorary secretary.

5. Member for Leominster and brother of R.J. Phillimore; a moderate liberal, his wife was a cousin of Bruce.

6. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 122: B to L, London, 7 May 1853.

patronage, they offered concerted opposition to his bill, arguing that it was not sufficiently reformist. As relatively few members were interested in the Indian question, Young India possessed unwarranted influence in the house of commons debates. From the outset Layard was sceptical of Young India's potential efficacy, though he initially opposed the India bill.<sup>1</sup> But whilst supporting the claim for a secretary of state for India and the abolition of EIC rule, Layard argued that constitutional government for the natives was impractical, and therefore attempted to steer an independent course, aligning himself with neither the government nor Young India. Shortly after Wood's legislation was introduced, Layard stated that he would "probably vote against the Government but shall not join the 'young Indians'."<sup>2</sup> In the event, however, he inexplicably broke with both Bruce and Goderich and supported the second reading of the bill.<sup>3</sup>

These differences of opinion over the specifics of church and Indian legislation indicate that, during the summer of 1853, Goderich, Bruce and Layard had not yet formed a cohesive parliamentary alliance. Nevertheless their basic philosophies were compatible, their specific interests had proved similar, and they had frequently consulted each other during this period. And the issues which had demonstrated slight disagreements soon paled into insignificance in their minds. Events in Constantinople and Preston were shortly to

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 58156, 149: L to Sara Austen, London, 6 June 1853.

2. LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 32: L to G.T. Clark, London, 7 June 1853.

3. 3 H 128, 1074-7: 30 June 1853.

overshadow all other concerns, uniting not only Goderich, Bruce and Layard, but also Hughes and Forster.

Within a month of his return from Constantinople Layard, disillusioned with Russell and the Aberdeen ministry in general, described himself as "rather going into opposition."<sup>1</sup> The principal cause of his discomfiture was Turkey, for on 22 May Menschikov had broken off negotiations with the Porte and left Constantinople, and on 27 May the czar had ordered the occupation of the Principalities (though this action was not executed until the beginning of July). Layard informed Russell on 6 June of his intention to bring the eastern question before the house,<sup>2</sup> but Russell pleaded against his doing so, arguing that he might thereby jeopardise the negotiations then proceeding at Vienna.<sup>3</sup> In fact the Aberdeen cabinet were irrevocably divided over the matter, with Palmerston, Clarendon and Russell believing that the pacificism of the Peelites (Aberdeen, Gladstone, Sidney Herbert and Sir James Graham) was in fact encouraging Russian aggression. Despite Russell's request, Layard decided to persevere with his motion, in conjunction with Lord Clanricarde in the upper house.<sup>4</sup> Clanricarde eventually succumbed to coalition pressure<sup>5</sup> and Layard was thus forced, on appeal from Palmerston, to withdraw his motion. In doing so he emphasised his status as an independent member, unconnected with any party,<sup>6</sup> a clear warning to

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 58156, 149: L to Sara Austen, London, 6 June 1853.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38981, 352: L to Russell, London, 6 June 1853.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38981, 354: Russell to L, London, 8 June 1853.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38981, 378: Clanricarde to L, London, 22 June 1853. Clanricarde, a whig, had been postmaster general under Russell from 1846 to 1852, but held no office in the Aberdeen ministry. He served for three weeks as lord privy seal under Palmerston in 1858.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38982, 10: Russell to L, 7 July 1853.
  6. 3 H 128, 1422-4, 1429: 8 July 1853.

the government that he could not be conveniently manipulated. His position, he realised, was precarious, but he believed that he held "the strings of a great movement" in his hands.<sup>1</sup> Having failed in an attempt to bring on a debate on 22 July,<sup>2</sup> it was not until 16 August that Layard was enabled to express his condemnation of the government's indecisiveness in dealing with the Russian threat to Constantinople.<sup>3</sup> The following day he reported to Bruce that his speech had been well-received by the house.<sup>4</sup> He also understood the obvious consequences of his action:

... The split between myself & Ministers is now complete, I suppose, & all chance of employment out of the question. I do not mind. I have done what I believe to be my duty & I trust I shall always be able to refer back to what has occurred with conscientious satisfaction...5.

Immediately parliament rose, Layard travelled to Italy, to recuperate and to indulge his artistic tastes. He could not support the government's present eastern policy, and was pleased to be away from England:

... Were I in England I could not avoid taking part in public meetings, thereby lessening my influence & doing away with every chance of future connection with the Government. All my political friends writing from England congratulate me upon being absent & urge me to remain so until I can take my seat in Parliament...6.

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 35: L to G.T. Clark, London, 8 July 1853.
  2. 3 H 129, 647-50: 22 July 1853.
  3. 3 H 129, 1769-80: 16 Aug. 1853. Only Palmerston escaped his abuse.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 58159, 128: L to B, 17 Aug. [1853].
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 24: L to Lady Huntly, London, 17 Aug. 1853 (copy).
  6. LP. BL Add Ms 58156, 172: L to Sara Austen, Naples, 5 Nov. 1853.

In December of 1853 Goderich composed the treatise which he later dubbed 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.<sup>1</sup> Whilst mentioning the necessity of parliamentary reform, attacking his contemporaries' widespread complacency, and railing against electoral corruption (an obvious reflection of the intense impression his Hull experience had left), he clearly concentrated on two important issues: the threat of war with Russia, and the Lancashire strikes and lockouts. Though he counselled caution, he evidently believed that war with the czar would eventuate, and would be fully justified. Yet he evinced even greater concern with the class war which had erupted at Preston, and which he believed threatened the stability, harmony and unity of society. Prior to the Preston conflict, Goderich had demonstrated renewed interest in social and industrial questions. Early in September, he had suggested to Hughes that the Christian Socialists seek the co-operation of sympathetic manufacturers,<sup>2</sup> though Hughes was hesitant to consider such an approach.<sup>3</sup> The Preston dispute, commencing in October, altered the direction of Goderich's thoughts. The year had been distinguished by frequent, and usually successful, demands for increased wages by many organised workers. But in Preston the employers, united in a federation, locked out some 20,000 cotton operatives, and refused to negotiate with their unions. Goderich now considered arbitration as a possible solution to this industrial crisis. In developing his ideas, he initiated a substantial

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 82-172.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 86: G to H, Great Malvern, 6 Sept. 1853.

3. Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/6/28: H to Ludlow, 16 Sept. 1853.

correspondence with Hughes,<sup>1.</sup> Bruce<sup>2.</sup> and Forster.<sup>3.</sup>

Goderich's friendship with Hughes had been well established since 1850, and Hughes was without doubt his most intimate colleague.<sup>4.</sup> His decision to write to Forster served to consolidate their previous acquaintance, and to palpably demonstrate their mutual interests and approach. He contacted Bruce because he had had dealings with him in the house of commons, knew of his experience with working class questions as Merthyr's stipendiary magistrate, and generally considered him "a good fellow."<sup>5.</sup> Goderich was rewarded with "a *capital* letter" from Bruce on strikes and arbitration, and looked for his "good & zealous help" in future struggles.<sup>6.</sup> Thus the correspondence of November and December 1853 marks the first instance of close accord and collaboration amongst Goderich, Bruce and Forster, and as such is of critical importance.<sup>7.</sup> From this period their personal and political intimacy dated, and their relationship subsequently developed and strengthened.

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 104, 109, 114, 117: G to H, Nocton Hall, 7, 17 and 29 Nov., 6 Dec. 1853.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 1, 7: G to B, 22 Nov. and 3 Dec. 1853.
  3. Unfortunately, the correspondence with Forster is not extant, but is frequently referred to in the letters cited in the preceding two footnotes, and also in Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/10/60: F to Ludlow, Otley, 4 Dec. 1853.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 86: G to H, Great Malvern, 6 Sept. 1853, in which Goderich asked Hughes to be trustee to his estate, and to bring up his son Oliver should he and Lady Goderich die, stating: "I don't know anyone whom I should so like to feel was going to look after what I left behind me ... as you."
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 109: G to H, Nocton Hall, 17 Nov. 1853.
  6. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 117: G to H, Nocton Hall, 6 Dec. 1853.
  7. The relevance of the correspondence to their attempts to lessen class alienation will be discussed in chapter 12 below.

4.

The nature of the Goderich-Hughes-Forster-Bruce-Layard affiliation was complex, and was progressively modified throughout two decades in response to changing political exigencies. During the mid-fifties they perceived themselves as a definitive independent alliance, sharing a mutual romantic-radical philosophy and a concern with political questions of a common character. They constantly consulted one another in devising political strategy on a wide range of issues. Though neither Hughes nor Forster were parliamentarians during the mid-fifties, which prevented the house of commons becoming an unquestioned focus of activity, their significant consultative role on such matters as foreign policy and administrative reform cannot be dismissed, if the subsequent actions of Layard, Goderich and Bruce within the house are to be correctly understood. Frequently Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard worked in pairs or groups of three in order to exert political pressure, these temporary sub-group associations being remarkably fluid.

Whilst consciously identifying themselves as an independent alliance during the fifties, Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard generally expressed loyalty to the concept of a broadly-based Liberal party. They saw themselves as a party within a party until, with the gradual strengthening of political affiliations from the early sixties, Liberal loyalties were accorded precedence. Then, with Goderich, Layard, Bruce and Forster having attained office, they continued to collaborate, no longer as an identifiable and consistent alliance, but as individual Liberals and on individual issues. This metamorphosis from private member in the early fifties to committed Liberal in the late sixties was in fact representative of the process

experienced by many non-conservative members as the disparate forces of Gladstonian Liberalism were precariously consolidated. The example of the Goderich-Hughes-Forster-Bruce-Layard alliance is particularly significant in that three of their number -- Goderich, Forster and Bruce -- became senior members of Gladstone's first ministry, and all continued throughout to co-operate with one another on specific policy objectives.

Their personal intimacy not only guaranteed consultation, but illustrated fundamental accord on a wide variety of political questions. Because the initiative in forging the alliance had rested with Goderich, he formed for some time the focal point of their association, but in time Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard also achieved close personal familiarity with one another.

The germ of the alliance was the correspondence of November and December 1853, though of course Goderich and Hughes, and Bruce and Layard, had previously developed close friendships. Throughout 1854 Goderich's personal and political intimacy with both Bruce and Forster steadily developed. It was presumably through Bruce that Goderich developed his very close attachment to Layard; by the end of 1854 he confided to Bruce: "Personally I am greatly more attracted to him [Layard] than I was last year; for he grows wonderfully upon one on further acquaintance."<sup>1</sup> A year later, when Layard was absent from London on vacation, he disclosed to Goderich: "I long to see you again & often think of you."<sup>2</sup> When Layard travelled to Constantinople in

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 13: G to B, Ripon, 25 Sept. 1854. The first Layard-Goderich correspondence which appears in the Ripon Papers dates from November 1855, but the two men were obviously close colleagues well before this time.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 83: L to G, Arazzo, 6 Nov. 1855.

1856, he decided to entrust Goderich with the safekeeping of his personal papers and the disposal of his worldly goods, should accident befall him. He asked that his papers remain unexamined by anyone but Goderich, adding: "I have the utmost confidence in you & if you will kindly consent to undertake the task I have ventured to impose upon you I shall be deeply grateful."<sup>1</sup> Goderich willingly acceded to Layard's request, expressing in doing so his gratitude for "the confidence this wish has shewn you to feel in me,"<sup>2</sup> and Layard subsequently indicated his satisfaction that his reputation would be "in the hands of so kind & judicious a friend."<sup>3</sup> The amity which this correspondence undoubtedly illustrates was extended at all times to Bruce. Years later, when writing to Layard (then ambassador to Madrid) to explain Ripon's conversion, he referred to Ripon as "our old friend with whom we lived for so many years in such intimate & affectionate relations."<sup>4</sup> Indeed, from 1854 the friendship between Bruce and Goderich grew progressively deeper. They spent six weeks together on the continent in the spring of 1855, and had another joint vacation in the autumn, so that when they were separated in the following year Bruce felt constrained to write: "My dear Goderich, I have often yearned to be with you! I would have given anything for a friendly grip of your hand, or to hear your wife's cheery laugh."<sup>5</sup> Goderich's relations with Hughes remained extremely close; in early 1857, for example, when Hughes and his family were suffering from

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 109: L to G, London, 17 Nov. 1856.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 71: G to L, Wakefield, 22 Nov. 1856.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 111: L to G, Constantinople, 15 Dec. 1856.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 39007, 381: A to L, London, 31 March 1875.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 63: B to G, Ambleside, 3 Oct. 1856.

scarlet fever, Goderich wrote of the privation of not seeing Hughes -- "but I do trust, my dear Tom, that you understand the reason of my keeping away, & that you don't ever attribute it to want of affection or sympathy for one whom I so really love."<sup>1</sup> Forster also spoke of his love and sympathy for Hughes during his quarantine.<sup>2</sup> And he developed increasing intimacy with Goderich, writing in 1858:

... Thank you very much for what you say about my coming to London... It is very good of you to keep caring for me to be with you in the House. I can most truly say that if you were out of it one very great inducement to me to get in would be taken away, for I can never hope to form any public companionship so rooted in private friendship as is ours, which friendship is indeed one of the two or three things in the world I value... 3.

Their intimate companionship was certainly not dependent on identical personal characteristics, as these were in fact somewhat disparate. To some extent centripetal forces were patently prevalent: they all worshipped manliness and cultivated military interests; Bruce, Goderich and Hughes were enthusiastic sportsmen; Bruce and Layard shared a love of art. Nevertheless their individual dispositions varied considerably, a factor which appeared not to cause alienation but rather to cement their relationship. Layard was somewhat temperamental, at times enthusiastic, at times despondent. Without doubt talented and intelligent, he was also frequently impatient and often brusque and curt in demeanour. It was perhaps true that only those who knew him well appreciated his finer qualities. Forster affected straightforward and rough Yorkshire mannerisms, as demonstrated by his celebrated sartorial

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 4: G to H, London, 4 Feb. 1857.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 83: F to G, Otley, 16 Dec. 1856. Hughes's eldest daughter died of her illness.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 166: F to G, Ambleside, 31 Dec. 1858.

carelessness. In fact he was extremely earnest in all his endeavours, and was inwardly tender and sympathetic. Serious reflection, caution and pragmatic moderation characterised Goderich's intense nature. Hughes, on the other hand, was extroverted, entirely unintellectual, and somewhat precipitate: he was conscious of his "tendency to believe too much what people tell me, and to rather go too fast and hard along any road I think I perceive to be the right one."<sup>1</sup> Bruce, steady and moderate, was widely respected for his genial character. It was largely through his influence that the group frequently adopted a jovial and carefree, almost frivolous, attitude. On one occasion, for example, he wrote to Goderich asking for accommodation:

... We should then be able to indulge in a long talk -- plan the ruin of Palmerston -- the interruption of the Peace conferences -- the overthrow of the British constitution, or whatever else might be necessary to clear the way to that blessed consummation when 'Goderich shall rule, & laws be all repealed.'...<sup>2</sup>.

Another time he commented: "Pam is a humbug. Ben Hall d<sup>o</sup>. Luckily there is a virtuous Goderich, a strenuous Layard, a patriotic Bruce or where wd England be?"<sup>3</sup>.

Throughout the mid-fifties, and on into the sixties, Bruce, Layard, Hughes and Forster frequently breakfasted with the Goderiches at 1, Carlton Gardens, their London home. These social occasions must have witnessed wide-ranging discussions on economic and political topics. And at Carlton Gardens the four visitors came under

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1. Rosa Hobhouse, *Mary Hughes: Her Life for the Dispossessed*, (London, 1949), 84: H to Mary Hughes, 1884. Mary ('Comrade May') was Hughes's daughter.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 47: B to G, Aberdare, 22 Jan. 1856.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 53: B to G, 25 May 1856. The mention of Ben Hall refers to his attitude on Sunday concerts (see 154 below).

the influence of Lady Goderich, a forceful character in her own right. She and Goderich were cousins, and had been married in 1851.<sup>1</sup> Lady Goderich shared her husband's advanced political views, and helped cultivate his alliances. She and Fanny Hughes were great friends, and both Bruce<sup>2</sup> and Layard<sup>3</sup> attested to the attraction they felt for her. Her greatest impact, however, was probably on Forster: according to Esher, "her loving kindness often proved a balm for the sensitive misgivings of W.E. Forster."<sup>4</sup>

One of the most intriguing aspects of their social relationship during the fifties, and beyond, was their common membership of the cosmopolitan club. There is some dispute as to the origin of "ye Cos," as Hughes jocularly referred to the club.<sup>5</sup> Some accounts hold that it developed from gatherings at Colonel Sterling's house, the White Cottage, in Knightsbridge.<sup>6</sup> But the more plausible explanation seems to be that accepted by Escott,<sup>7</sup> that it began during the winter of 1852,

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1. Born Henrietta Vyner, she was the daughter of Captain Henry Vyner of Gautby Hall, Lincoln, and granddaughter of Goderich's uncle, the Earl de Grey.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 181: B to de G, 31 May 1867.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 58159, 147: L to A, Madrid, 14 April 1875. Lady Ripon also stated to Layard: "I always think of you as one of my oldest friends & take the greatest interest in what concerns you" (LP. BL Add Ms 39012, 30: Lady Ripon to L, London, 9 April 1877).
  4. Esher, 'Studley Royal', 222. Lady Ripon was extremely disappointed when Forster withdrew from the Liberal leadership contest in 1875 (FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 253: Lady Ripon to F, London, 6 Feb. [1875]).
  5. Houghton Library, Harvard. Autograph File: H to J.W. Parker, [London], 29 Nov. 1858. Parker was the publisher of *Fraser's Magazine*.
  6. e.g. Sir Algernon West, 'The Cosmopolitan Club', *Cornhill Magazine*, n.s., 15, Aug. 1903, 163. Colonel, subsequently Sir Anthony, Sterling was appointed adjutant general of the Highland brigade in the Crimea, where he was chief of staff to Sir Colin Campbell. This account is confirmed by A.J. Munby, lawyer, lecturer at the working men's and working women's colleges, diarist, and club member (Derek Hudson, *Munby: Man of Two Worlds: The Life and Diaries of Arthur J. Munby, 1828-1910*, (London, 1972), 24).
  7. T.H.S. Escott, *Club Makers and Club Members*, (London, 1914), 167-8.

on Layard's suggestion, in the Bond Street lodgings of Robert Morier.<sup>1</sup> This account is confirmed by Henry Reeve, who claimed that "the Cosmopolitan Club was founded, meeting first at Morier's. Morier, Layard and myself were the first members."<sup>2</sup> It is generally substantiated by Grant Duff<sup>3</sup> and by Morier's daughter.<sup>4</sup> But whatever the specific origins, the small coterie quickly grew in number, and migrated to G.F. Watts's former studio at 30, Charles Street, Berkeley Square. Here the club remained, with the exception of one short interval,<sup>5</sup> until 1902, when the premises were "discovered to be literally afloat with sewage under the basement."<sup>6</sup> Goderich and Layard were among the twenty-five founding members, Hughes and Bruce both joined in early days. Forster became a devoted cosmopolitan from early 1860, having been elected to the club on the recommendation of Goderich.<sup>7</sup> According to Escott,<sup>8</sup> himself a member in later years,

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1. Morier, then a clerk in the education department, entered the diplomatic service in October 1852, where he served for 23 years in German countries, then in turn as ambassador to Lisbon, Madrid and St Petersburg.
  2. J.N. Laughton, *Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of Henry Reeve*, (London, 1898), i : 265: Reeve's journal entry of 2 Dec. 1852. Henry Reeve, earlier clerk of appeals and registrar of the privy council, was foreign editor of the *Times* from 1840-1855, and editor of the *Edinburgh Review* from 1855-1895, and of the Greville Papers.
  3. Sir Mountstuart E. Grant Duff, *Notes from a Diary, 1851-1872*, (London, 1911), 35-6: diary entry of 22 Feb. 1858. Grant Duff was elected to the cosmopolitan in February 1858. An early instructor at the working men's college, with which both Goderich and Hughes were closely associated, he was Liberal MP for Elgin district from 1857 to 1881, under secretary for India in Gladstone's 1868-74 administration, and was appointed governor of Madras in 1881.
  4. Rosslyn Wemyss, *Memoirs and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Robert Morier, G.C.B., from 1826 to 1876*, (London, 1911), i : 113-4.
  5. In March 1856 the club hired the old supper room at Crockford's, but returned to 30 Charles St within a couple of years (Laughton, i : 351: journal entry of 28 Jan. 1858, and West, 168).
  6. T.H.S. Escott, *Anthony Trollope: his Work, Associates and Literary Originals*, (London, 1913), 155.
  7. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 185: F to Lady de Grey, Burley, 19 Feb. 1860.
  8. Escott, *Club Makers and Club Members*, 168.

by the beginning of the season and session of 1853 the cosmopolitan had become a brilliant success, with membership much sought after. Meeting only during the London season, it soon included 120 carefully-chosen members. Cosmopolitan was no misnomer, for the club "was the place where any foreigner or colonial of distinction who happened to be in London was sure to be met."<sup>1</sup> In addition, it encompassed a wide variety of occupations and interests: Hughes described the cosmopolitan as "a queer little talk & smoke club, of Lords & big wigs, authors, artists, travellers, soldiers, scientific men."<sup>2</sup> The membership was certainly diverse. Soldiers included Sterling, Sir Colin Campbell and General Mansfield. Literature was represented by Trollope, Browning, Tennyson, Thackeray, Kingsley, and many others (Munby once described the cosmopolitan as "the arcanum & the Parnassus of literary swells"<sup>3</sup>), art by Millais, Watts, Leighton, Palgrave, Phillips, Ruskin and Woolner, journalism by Reeve, Spedding, Venables and Higgins ('Jacob Omnium'), and most shades of politics by Lowe, Harcourt, Wodehouse, Chichester Fortescue, Danby Seymour, Bright, Granville, Stanley and Monckton Milnes. Civil servants included Tom Taylor and Lingen; India was represented by Sir John Lawrence, Sir James Outram, and Henry Maine. The peripatetic Laurence Oliphant was a cosmopolite, as were the alpinist John Ball and the Assyriologist Henry Rawlinson. Even the Prince of Wales was a member. On two evenings per week the members would converge on Berkeley Square to participate in wide-ranging discussions and allegedly brilliant conversation.

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1. Frederic Harrison, *Autobiographical Memoirs*, (London, 1911), ii : 85.
  2. Lowell Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard, bMS Am 765, 441: H to Lowell, London, 2 Jan. 1870.
  3. Hudson, 24: diary entry of 2 March 1859.

In many respects the cosmopolitan was a tangible example of the brotherhood amongst men which Goderich and his political colleagues so often stressed: Morier's reference to the "sacred tie of cosmopolitan brotherhood"<sup>1</sup>. was uttered only partly in jest. In fact the cosmopolitan represented the camaraderie which was feasible amongst men of widely-divergent character and interests. (At times, however, the club was almost chaotic: Bruce once wrote to Layard that the cosmopolites "want an autocrat to give them some unity of purpose. At present Reeve, Higgins, and Milnes provide much sparkling gossip. But we want you to give as an impulse in some useful direction."<sup>2</sup>.) Unique amongst London clubs, it was a social assemblage of wit and talent, for Hughes "about the pleasantest place in Great Babylon."<sup>3</sup> It was chiefly at the cosmopolitan that Trollope gained the insight into political manoeuvring evident in so many of his novels.<sup>4</sup> (In fact, the cosmopolitan was the model for the 'universe club', at which Phineas Finn and Bonteen quarrelled immediately preceding Bonteen's murder.<sup>5</sup>.) One of the cosmopolitan's most assiduous votaries was heard to comment in the sixties: "I have seen a good deal of Bohemia, and this is the pleasantest bit of Bohemia in Europe."<sup>6</sup> But despite the constant presence of Monckton Milnes (who possessed

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 39105, 17: Morier to L, Berlin, 8 Feb. 1863.
  2. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 123: B to L, London, 7 May 1853.
  3. Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard, bMS Am 765, 446: H to Lowell, Chester, 29 June 1884.
  4. Escott, *Anthony Trollope*, 155.
  5. Sir Algernon West, *Recollections 1832 to 1886*, (London, [1899]), 298; see Anthony Trollope, *Phineas Redux*, (London, 1973), ii : 51-7, and i : 308 for Trollope's description of the club.
  6. Sir M.E. Grant Duff, *Sir Henry Maine: a Brief Memoir of his Life*, (London, 1892), 22-3.

one of the largest collections of pornography in England, who on at least one occasion frequented the club whilst "maudlin with drink,"<sup>1</sup> and whom Carlyle had designated 'the President of the Heaven and Hell Amalgamation Society') and a life-size fresco on one of the walls of the club, painted by Watts, of a nude young woman, it seems very unlikely that the cosmopolitan ever witnessed a relaxation of the rigid code of Victorian morality.

For Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard, the cosmopolitan club represented a refuge from the stresses of political life, providing a common social involvement for many years. And having been instrumental in its inception and early existence, they shared some of the credit for its outstanding success. However the ideal of cosmopolitan fraternity was not applicable to the house of commons, where Goderich, Bruce and Layard, in consultation with Hughes and Forster, were attempting to further their common aims. In fact with no political party had they sufficient in common to consistently cooperate, and this fact became increasingly evident through 1854.

The tories, as consistent opponents of parliamentary reform, could never claim their sympathies. Their creed, according to Goderich, was as "dead as a doornail,"<sup>2</sup> and Disraeli was seen as the most unprincipled man in the house of commons.<sup>3</sup> Their attitude to the Peelites was somewhat diffident. Gladstone's honesty, ability and allegedly democratic finance won kudos, though Goderich was suspicious of his "Puseyism."<sup>4</sup> However the Peelites' pacificism vis-à-vis the

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1. Hudson, 223: diary entry of 25 April 1866.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 174: misc. paper, indexed 1855, headed 'State of "Parties" in England'.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 123: G to H, Nocton Hall, 23 Dec. 1853.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 174: misc. paper, indexed 1855, headed 'State of "Parties" in England'.

Russians merited nothing but hostility from Goderich and his friends. The difficulty, according to Goderich, was that the Aberdeen ministry was all that prevented the "degradation" of Disraeli returning to office.<sup>1</sup> By the whigs' aristocratic exclusiveness and administrative ineptitude they were appalled, and Lord John Russell, despite his desire for reform, was discredited in their eyes. Nevertheless Layard was loath to completely abandon his whig connections, and refrained from doing so until 1855. On Crimean policies Palmerston's attitude very closely resembled theirs and, in a period in which foreign affairs dominated all other issues, he would normally have won their support. However he completely estranged them for a number of reasons. Firstly, he declined to condemn Aberdeen's policy either publicly or within cabinet, perhaps through loyalty to Aberdeen, but more likely because of personal ambition: he saw no point in turning out Aberdeen merely to replace him with Russell at the head of the same cabinet.<sup>2</sup> Secondly, Palmerston was consistently averse to suffrage extension, and during December 1853 he briefly resigned over this issue. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Goderich and his colleagues detested Palmerston's 'swagger', so well exemplified at this time by his frivolous and jocular speech at the reform club, early in 1854, on the eve of Sir Charles Napier's departure with the fleet to the Baltic. They did not consider war merited levity; Barrington's assertion that Palmerston could be "weighty and impressive, when he chose"<sup>3</sup> would have left them unimpressed. They despised what Burn had termed "the sense that there

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 13: G to B, Ripon, 25 Sept. 1854.

2. This is suggested by Donald Southgate in *'The Most English Minister . . .': The Policies and Politics of Palmerston*, (London, 1966), 327.

3. C.G. Barrington, 'Recollections of Lord Palmerston', *History Today*, 11, 3, March 1961, 186. Charles George Barrington was Palmerston's private secretary from 1856 to 1865.

was, at the bottom of him [Palmerston], a moral vacuum."<sup>1</sup>.

Goderich vehemently asserted that

... few things make me so indignant as the way in which men speak of & admire Disraeli & Palmerston & Graham -- bad is best perhaps now-a-days among "statesmen", but when you have got an honest man like Gladstone to go & take up with a self-seeking political adventurer like Lord Palmerston is really grievous...<sup>2</sup>.

Another honest, and transparently moral, political figure with whom they could not align themselves was John Bright. On suffrage questions, of course, they were in basic accord with Manchester radicalism. But the Manchester school's economic individualism, its denial of national life, its doctrines of laissez-faire and self-interest, and its middle-class exclusivism, held no appeal. Neither could nonconformist radicalism's desire to disestablish the church be considered acceptable or politically practical in their eyes.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore Goderich, Layard, Bruce, Forster and Hughes were entirely alienated by the Bright-Cobden foreign policy, which appeared to forbid intervention under all circumstances -- ignoring, for example, the plight of the oppressed Poles, Hungarians, and Italians, and dismissing the czarist threat. Only with the renewed reform agitation of 1858-9 were Goderich and his colleagues to partially reconcile themselves with the Manchester school.

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1. W.L. Burn, *The Age of Equipoise*, (London, 1964), 18.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 123: G to H, Nocton Hall, 23 Dec. 1853.

3. Jane Forster admirably summarised her husband's consistently peculiar position vis-à-vis the radicals -- in agreement on suffrage questions, in opposition on church issues and on the role of the state in education (Library of the Society of Friends, Temp Ms Box 100/40: Jane Forster to Fan, Wharfeside, 20 Nov. 1882 (copy)).

Thus in the house of commons at the end of 1853 Bruce, Layard and Goderich discerned no party nor recognised statesman to whom they could turn. Moreover at this stage they were optimistic that the concept of exclusive party might itself disintegrate: Goderich wrote to Hughes of the "remarkable, & I think hopeful, circumstance, this breaking up not merely of Parties; but of party-ideas; & it seems from all I see to be spreading in every direction."<sup>1</sup> In this situation they comprised an independent alliance in their own right. Asquith has described them as a "minute party,"<sup>2</sup> Wolf as "a sort of prehistoric Fourth Party,"<sup>3</sup> and Denholm as "a small but highly volatile group of likeminded friends [which Goderich formed] into an embryonic party."<sup>4</sup> Their concept of themselves as a party or alliance, however, was not static. At the end of 1853 and throughout 1854, they certainly made no pretense to formal party organisation, nor did they perceive themselves as a united, if miniscule, political party as such. Rather, they considered their position that of like-minded individuals acting in alliance, with tacit discipline, but always retaining their political individuality. As they grew more intimate throughout 1854, they began to consult each other regularly on all issues before the

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 100: G to H, Nocton Hall, 30 Oct. 1853.
  2. Earl of Oxford and Asquith, *Fifty Years of Parliament*, (London, 1926), i : 8. Asquith mentions only Bruce, Goderich and Forster as being included in the party, apparently in the context of their later membership of Gladstone's cabinet.
  3. Wolf, i : 63.
  4. A.F. Denholm, 'The Making of a Liberal Viceroy', *Bengal Past & Present*, 85, Jan-June 1966, 3.

house, and to co-ordinate their actions.<sup>1.</sup> Towards the end of 1854, however, Goderich apparently abandoned his previous antagonism to the idea of party *per se*, and began to consider the possibility of their informal alliance constituting the basis of an original and organised political movement, based on their mutual radical-romantic philosophy. He mooted this notion in a letter to Bruce in September 1854, indicating his wish that

... we could see any way of procuring such an union, were it but of a few men, as might form the nucleus of future operations, or prepare materials for the use of the 'coming man', whenever he comes. Gladstone & Bright are the only two men in the House in whom I have hope of [?] work, I mean of course among those entitled to be called statesmen, but I fear that they have neither of them, at all events as yet, an insight into such a policy as would recreate a strong parliamentary party & raise the country from its present indifference on most political matters to support measures really worth fighting for...<sup>2.</sup>

When, in February 1855, events totally isolated them, practically as well as philosophically, from all existing party arrangements,<sup>3.</sup>

Goderich determined to further develop his theme. He composed a series of papers, dealing respectively with home politics, the state of parties in England, and foreign affairs.<sup>4.</sup> Having dismissed all existing parties as inapposite, he spoke of the "necessity of abandoning

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1. In 1854 this applied particularly to Crimean war questions, and in 1855-6 to various aspects of administrative reform. Both these issues will be dealt with separately below (see chapters 4 and 8).
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 13: G to B, Ripon, 25 Sept. 1854.
  3. See 138-49 below.
  4. Wolf refers to these documents under the title of 'A Political Memorandum'. Significantly, however, he omits all reference to their true purport: the establishment of a new political grouping (Wolf, i : 75-6).

all the four existing parties [Peelites, whigs, Manchester radicals, and tories] & laying a new foundation."<sup>1</sup> He proceeded to compose a draft letter,<sup>2</sup> presumably destined for sympathetic parliamentarians, and written with a view to establishing a new party or finding new ministers to lead the country, should the present parties or men prove unable to cope.

... If the result of this examination [Goderich wrote] should be that none of those parties any longer hold out a reasonable hope that they can carry on the government of England wisely & with true insight into the want of the time, we must then inquire whether such a grievous want in the Governing Classes can by any means be supplied, & if so, in what way, & how far it is in the power of men like ourselves to aid in so needful an undertaking...

He then delineated the political philosophy which he believed this new party must adopt. Firstly, concentration on foreign affairs must not preclude the consideration of domestic questions. Secondly, the inevitability of democracy must be recognised. The task of the statesman would be to ease its coming, with a view to its potential dangers (he mentions the possible tyranny of the majority) as well as to its advantages. Thirdly, a reformation of the industrial system should be undertaken, with a view to surmounting the existing alienation between employer and employee. Fourthly, a new understanding amongst religious groups must be attained, especially as the extension of education had to date been so hampered by spiritual complications. Any acceptable ruler, Goderich wrote, would at least recognise the importance of the second and third criteria, though he stressed this

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 174: misc. paper, indexed 1855, headed 'State of "Parties" in England'.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 175-99: draft letter, indexed 1855, headed 'Dear -----'.

did not imply that he must rush into reforms, and uproot and destroy the past and present in order to build the future. His social legislation must recognise that men need to be bound by moral, and not mere economical, relations, and will thus reject laissez-faire. Complete religious freedom should be guaranteed. Finally, Goderich added, this new ruler or minister would "strive to raise again among us a true feeling of National Life." He realised these principles were vague, but stated that until their application became possible (and foreign affairs prevented this at present) it was unwise to be too detailed. Goderich then began to consider the possibility of these principles being adopted and acted upon by a new parliamentary alliance. (He dismissed the relevance of any party 'out of doors' in the consideration of new ministerial arrangements.) Unfortunately he terminated his draft letter at this point. Considering his pragmatic bent, he probably realised the futility of his vision: with the exception of Bruce, Layard and a very few others, members of parliament would not have accepted the peculiar romantic-radical philosophy which Goderich espoused. Certainly none of the recognised 'statesmen' would have done so. Furthermore Goderich may have realised the extreme improbability of the whigs, tories, radicals, or even Peelites, abandoning their traditional allegiances at this stage. From 1855, therefore, Goderich, Bruce and Layard were increasingly conscious of their political and philosophical isolation, and the following years witnessed the zenith of their alliance as a cohesive and effective parliamentary pressure group. They had in fact attained the status of a minute party within a party, as they continued to view themselves in a Liberal context. Thus Layard explained to his Aylesbury

constituents in 1856:

... There has scarcely been a liberal measure brought forward in the House of Commons since I have been in it, that was not opposed, not only by the [Aberdeen or Palmerston] Government but by a large portion of the liberal party, and only supported by a small portion of that party of whom I have the honour to be one, sitting below the gangway... 1.

Informal in discipline and organisation, they recognised no specific or consistent leader. Whilst Layard was undoubtedly in the forefront on questions dealing with foreign affairs, it was Goderich who eventually took the principal role in administrative reform agitation. Nevertheless Goderich's status was of paramount importance for two reasons. Firstly, he bore the responsibility for having originated the alliance, and it was initially through his efforts that Hughes and Forster, outside the house of commons, became involved in the group's activities. Secondly, outsiders, with traditional deference to aristocratic origins, tended to emphasise his relative importance.<sup>2</sup> Wolf has referred to the group as the 'Goderichites', clearly implying Goderich's recognised leadership. But there is no evidence in their correspondence that they employed this term as a designation, nor apparently did anyone outside the alliance.

During the session of 1854 Goderich, Bruce and Layard were not entirely isolated in the house of commons, and on various issues co-operated with a number of their parliamentary colleagues, including Henry Danby Seymour, Edward Horsman, A.J. Otway, John Ball and J.F. Blakett. Danby Seymour had entered their orbit as a result of his connections with the Guest family, and consequently with Layard.

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1. *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 26 July 1856.

2. Goderich apparently recognised his implicit leadership: Ludlow later recorded that during the fifties Goderich "found himself, to his surprise as he told us, a kind of small party-leader, four or five men generally asking him how he meant to vote and voting with him. Except Bruce, the late Lord Aberdare, I do not remember the names of his followers" (Ludlow Papers. CUL 41/3: Ludlow's unpublished autobiography).

He had in fact visited Layard at Mosul in 1847, and in 1850 offered to send Layard "as much gossip as I can, & if you like it, write frequently."<sup>1</sup> A staunch free-trader, and an advocate of civil and religious liberties and of a gradual extension of the franchise, Danby Seymour had obtained Sir John Guest's patronage<sup>2</sup> and was returned for Poole, the Guests' Dorset borough, in September 1850. He was one of the principal organisers of the Ninevah fund, founded in 1851 expressly to tender Layard financial assistance for his excavations.<sup>3</sup> But Layard's acquaintance with Seymour was of a superficial nature at this stage,<sup>4</sup> and it was not until he returned to England in July 1851 that it further developed. Despite his vote in favour of the Maynooth grant, which caused considerable opposition, Seymour was returned for Poole in the general elections of 1852. As a Young Indian inside the house, and as a cosmopolite out of doors, he developed close ties not only with Layard but also with Bruce and Goderich.

Another member with whom Goderich, Layard and Bruce associated themselves in 1854 was Edward Horsman. Horsman had represented Cokermonth from 1836 to 1852, when he lost the seat at the general election. He had for a short period served as a junior lord of the treasury under Melbourne. As early as 1839 Horsman had advocated corn law repeal,<sup>5</sup> but he was no doctrinaire laissez-faireist<sup>6</sup> and in fact

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38979, 229: Danby Seymour to L, London, 18 May 1850.

2. *ibid.*

3. LP. BL Add Ms 38980, 20-1: printed pamphlet issued by the Ninevah fund, London, 7 Jan. 1851.

4. LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 16:L to G.T. Clark, Nimroud, 31 March 1851.

5. 3 H 45, 656-8: 19 Feb. 1839.

6. 3 H 102, 810-5: 16 Feb. 1849.

favoured a graduated income tax.<sup>1.</sup> During the forties he evinced strong sympathy with Irish grievances.<sup>2.</sup> He supported the civil rights of catholics and Jews,<sup>3.</sup> and was severely critical of Russell's ecclesiastical policies as being too favourable to the church hierarchy.<sup>4.</sup> During Russell's 1846-52 prime ministership Horsman's liberalism became progressively more independent. He was returned unopposed for Stroud, a small agricultural borough, in June 1853. As an experienced parliamentarian, whose views on economic, religious and foreign questions resembled their own, Goderich, Layard and Bruce probably considered Horsman a useful associate in their political endeavours. By the end of 1854 their relationship was sufficiently close for Horsman to assure Layard that, in the house of commons, "where you lead the way, I will follow heartily in your wake."<sup>5.</sup>

Arthur John Otway, the son of admiral Sir Robert Otway, was educated at Saxe Meinengen and Sandhurst. In 1839 he entered the 51st light infantry, and served in India and Australia before retiring from the army in 1846. Called to the bar at Middle Temple in 1850, he never actually practised law. He was returned for Stafford as a liberal,

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1. 3 H 97, 162-75: 3 March 1848.

2. e.g. 3 H 72, 1106-10: 19 Feb. 1844; 3 H 87, 488-91: 15 June 1846; 3 H 105, 607-22: 17 May 1849; 3 H 107, 834-61: 23 July 1849.

3. 3 H 40, 944: 9 Feb. 1838; 3 H 96, 486-93: 11 Feb. 1848.

4. e.g. 3 H 94, 243-61: 13 July 1847; 3 H 95, 1083-97, 1118-20: 14 Dec. 1847; 3 H 97, 1260-9: 4 April 1848; 3 H 100, 1075-82: 1 Aug. 1848; 3 H 103, 1032-45: 20 March 1849; 3 H 108, 348-67: 5 Feb. 1850; 3 H 110, 944-59: 29 April 1850; 3 H 118, 93-8: 1 July 1851.

5. LP. BL Add Ms 38982, 382: Horsman to L, 29 Dec. 1854.

in favour of the assimilation of the county and borough franchises, in July 1852. Otway's military interests, and his belief in the rectitude of the Crimean war, led to co-operation with Goderich, Bruce and Layard. His association with Layard was to become particularly close.

John Ball never became intimate with Goderich, Bruce or Layard, but they nevertheless joined forces on certain issues during 1854. Ball, born an Irish catholic, was trained as a lawyer. He unsuccessfully contested the borough of Sligo in 1848, and was returned to the house for Carlow county in July 1852. An advocate of suffrage extension, the ballot and complete religious equality, he was also a devotee of botany and alpine scenery, all of which characteristics were shared by Goderich. Ball and Forster were also close friends, principally due to their shared alpine interests. In addition, Ball took an interest in industrial questions as they related to the working class.

Finally, John Fenwick Burgoyne Blackett, MP for Newcastle-upon-Tyne from July 1852, had been elected on a platform of suffrage extension, short parliaments, vote by ballot, and opposition to withdrawal of the Maynooth grant. Goderich apparently established the liaison with Blackett, because the latter supported the principle of arbitration to settle strikes.<sup>1</sup>

There were, in addition, a number of other 'patriotic' radicals, such as J.A. Roebuck, with whom they were in basic political accord, but with whom they neither closely associated nor actively co-operated. These men were not, therefore, participants in the parliamentary alliance which Goderich, Bruce and Layard has forged.

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 127: G to H, Nocton Hall, 6 Jan. 1854.

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The 1854 parliamentary session was a critical, if disillusioning, experience for Goderich, Bruce and Layard. In fact Goderich had been generally despondent since the acute embarrassment of the tories' Hull petition, but it was the witnessing of parliamentary machinations which caused his most serious doubts. As early as August 1853 he began to question the viability of existing political procedures: "Whether a Palaver [a notoriously Carlylean term] is much use, is one thing, & may be fairly questioned, though I still think it is."<sup>1</sup> He became particularly frustrated by the prevalent political inertia, though by October 1853 had practically come to terms with this difficulty: "I'd rather believe that the world was going to be regenerated in about ten years, as I once practically did, than that period won't arrive by express train from heaven, as I now see. -- however as long as one can keep working *towards* it, that is quite enough."<sup>2</sup> This gradualist approach was to become the crux of Goderich's reformist ideology. He never abandoned his advanced liberal, or radical, philosophy, but rather altered his political methodology. In the meantime, however, Goderich anticipated that both reform and education might legitimately be considered in the house of commons in 1854, and even contemplated introducing educational legislation himself.<sup>3</sup> On both counts, his expectations were unrealistic. Lord John Russell had in fact attempted an education bill in 1853.

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 83: G to H, London, 25 Aug. 1853.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 100: G to H, Nocton Hall, 30 Oct. 1853.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 83: G to H, London, 25 Aug. 1853; also Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/6/28: H to Ludlow, 16 Sept. 1853.

It was, however, a halting measure, admitting the principle of local rating but confining it to municipal corporations, and introducing local management of the funds but strictly limiting the manner in which they could be applied. Despite nominal radical support, there was no enthusiasm for the measure, and the bill had been abandoned after first reading. Goderich should have realised that this parliamentary apathy would remain in evidence the following year. In the event, it was reinforced by the impact of the Crimean war, which deflected parliamentary concern from virtually all domestic issues. Naturally reform was another question thus affected. Russell had agreed not to disturb the Aberdeen government with a reform bill in 1853, but when he raised the question in cabinet that summer was strongly opposed by Palmerston. Partly prompted by the queen, Aberdeen subsequently seized the opportunity to accept Palmerston's resignation over the issue in December 1853. But the 'massacre' of Sinope had occurred in the meantime, and the general public took this to be the real reason for Palmerston's resignation. (The *Morning Post*, Palmerston's journalistic mouthpiece, in fact printed this assertion.) Public approval of Palmerston was thus consolidated, and Aberdeen was forced to acknowledge his indispensability in cabinet. Thus Palmerston rejoined the ministry on 24 December, having received assurances from Aberdeen that Russell's proposals had not definitely been accepted. Nevertheless, with Aberdeen's support, Lord John introduced a moderate measure to an unenthusiastic house on 13 February 1854, but under the pressure of impending war announced on 3 March the postponement of the second reading until 27 April. With the outbreak of war, the reform bill was subsequently abandoned. Two of Goderich's principal interests,

education and reform, were therefore overwhelmed in 1854 by events in the Crimea.

The war itself was crucial in consolidating the Goderich-Layard-Bruce relationship, as it isolated them from both the government and the peace party. Aberdeen's coalition cabinet had demonstrated unexpected solidarity throughout most of 1853, but the tensions of war exacerbated their fundamental differences of opinion. Aberdeen, Gladstone and the other Peelites could not accept the warlike propensities of either Palmerston or Russell. Layard led the group's attack on the coalition for its vacillation and indecision,<sup>1</sup> despite the advice of friends such as Tom Taylor that this would be "unpatriotic & suicidal,"<sup>2</sup> and he was supported, in general, by Horsman, Blackett, Ball and Danby Seymour.<sup>3</sup> Layard was apparently attempting to create division in the coalition in order that the pacific Peelites might be ousted, or at least their influence in cabinet minimised. In doing so he had also alienated Russell and Palmerston: Conacher argues that "if there was any truth in his charges of divisions in the cabinet, at least these ministers were not going to be trapped into substantiating them, especially now that their policy had won out over that of Aberdeen."<sup>4</sup> Layard only partially understood the implications of his actions. He knew that he had, in general terms, alienated the government:

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1. e.g. 3 H 130, 831-60: 17 Feb. 1854 and 3 H 132, 217-43: 31 March 1854. These speeches will be fully examined in chapter 4.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38982, 182: Tom Taylor to L, London, 31 March 1854.
  3. 3 H 130, 959-71: 20 Feb. 1854; 3 H 130, 132-4: 31 Jan. 1854; 3 H 132, 267-9: 31 March 1854; 3 H 132, 1032-3: 28 April 1854; and chapter 4 below.
  4. Conacher, 285.

... I am in sad disgrace with Ministers in consequence of the line I have taken in this Eastern question... [he admitted in April to his friend Henry Ross] Personally I have perhaps injured myself considerably but I hope I have done [tho'?] still more service by keeping this vacillating, undecided Ministry to a somewhat more definite line than they would otherwise have been inclined to follow. As it is there is not yet much to boast of...1.

Nevertheless he seemed to believe his performance in the house justified optimistic expectations of his future position in a broad-based Liberal ministry:

... I have a fair chance of hereafter holding office of a higher character than I could before have aimed at. For the present, however, I must be content to remain an independent member, for having grumbled with the present men & having no inclination whatever to join the Tories I have no particular friend in high places...2.

The absence of a particular friend was underlined in June 1854, though it is uncertain that Layard was aware of the events which then occurred. He was at the time, according to his cousin, now Lady Charlotte Schreiber, "in a very uncomfortable state of mind,"<sup>3</sup> and she decided to use her influence in his behalf. On 3 June she conferred with Bruce, who had recently consented to act as a trustee of the Dowlais estate. They agreed it was "a pity that now a War Minister was going to be appointed"<sup>4</sup> something could not be done to get him [Layard]

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38982, 189: L to Henry Ross, London, 13 April 1854.

2. *ibid.*

3. Earl of Bessborough, ed., *Lady Charlotte Schreiber: Extracts from her Journal 1853-1891*, (London, 1952), 36: journal entry of 2 June 1854.

4. On 9 June 1854 the war office and colonial office were divided by order-in-council. The financial and military administration of the army was thereby consolidated in one office, the secretary of state for war assuming control over the commander-in-chief, the board of ordnance, the secretary at war and the commissariat.

into office," and Bruce consented to see Russell about the matter.<sup>1.</sup> He met with Lord John on 4 June, but was informed that Layard's appointment was impossible because he had made a personal enemy of Aberdeen.<sup>2.</sup> His position as an independent member was thereby confirmed.

Though the continued emphasis on the Crimean war occupied most of their attention in 1854, Goderich and Bruce were not entirely precluded from pursuing other questions in the house of commons. In their efforts on behalf of the working class, Bruce adopted an anti-Manchester, state interventionist position against truck,<sup>3.</sup> and Goderich spoke in favour of limited liability.<sup>4.</sup> In addition Goderich once again supported Phillimore's unsuccessful efforts to control the sale of ecclesiastical presentations, arguing that the moral and social considerations which this issue involved were at least as important as the legal considerations.<sup>5.</sup> Horsman also spoke in support of the episcopal and capitular estates bill, which proposed reforms in the management of church funds, and of the total abolition of church rates, on the grounds of justice to dissenters.<sup>6.</sup> On various occasions Ball defended the religious liberties of his fellow Roman catholics.<sup>7.</sup>

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1. Bessborough, *Lady Charlotte Schreiber*, 36: journal entry of 3 June 1854.
  2. *ibid.*, 36-7: journal entry of 5 June 1854.
  3. 3 H 130, 762-3: 16 Feb. 1854; 3 H 131, 826-9: 15 March 1854.
  4. See chapter 12 below.
  5. 3 H 131, 1198-1201: 22 March 1854.
  6. 3 H 132, 36-41: 29 March 1854 and 3 H 134, 443-5: 21 June 1854.
  7. 3 H 131, 85-91: 28 Feb. 1854; 3 H 132, 127-8: 30 March 1854; 3 H 133, 553-4: 18 May 1854; 3 H 133, 1413: 12 June 1854.

In addition, Horsman and Blackett played prominent roles in Gladstone's successful efforts to pass the Oxford university bill, which began the long process of reform by admitting dissenters to first degrees and reconstituting the government of the university.<sup>1</sup> And Blackett, Seymour and Otway joined fellow-Young Indian John Bright in unsuccessfully pressing for an inquiry into the system of land tenure in the presidency of Madras,<sup>2</sup> though they were somewhat placated in August when Wood gave proof of public works in progress and railway lines under construction in India.

There was no occasion throughout 1854 on which Goderich, Bruce and Layard differed in their house of commons votes. They consistently supported religious liberties, voting together or as individuals against an inquiry into convents and monasteries, in support of the total abolition of church rates, in support of Russell's oaths bill, and against the rescinding of grants for priests to visit imprisoned catholics.<sup>3</sup> They concurred with all efforts to enable dissenters to take degrees at Oxford.<sup>4</sup> And they opposed aristocratic privilege in voting for the excise duties bill (which proposed a malt tax) and the

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1. For Horsman, see 3 H 132, 932-50: 27 April 1854; 3 H 132, 1105-8, 1111, 1121-2: 1 May 1854; 3 H 133, 195: 11 May 1854; 3 H 134, 184-5: 15 June 1854; and 3 H 134, 621, 626-7: 23 June 1854. For Blackett, see 3 H 130, 1111-2: 22 Feb. 1854; 3 H 131, 911-2: 17 March 1854; 3 H 132, 694-703: 7 April 1854; 3 H 132, 985-6: 27 April 1854; 3 H 133, 178, 184, 194: 11 May 1854; 3 H 133, 1052-5, 1056, 1057: 26 May 1854; 3 H 133, 1191: 1 June 1854; 3 H 134, 209-11: 15 June 1854; 3 H 134, 278, 279: 16 June 1854; 3 H 134, 347, 351: 19 June 1854.
  2. 3 H 135, 43-51: 11 July 1854; 3 H 135, 59-66: 11 July 1854; 3 H 135, 89-90: 11 July 1854.
  3. 3 H 131, 133-5: 28 Feb. 1854; 3 H 133, 834-6: 23 May 1854; 3 H 133, 971-4: 25 May 1854; 3 H 133, 1419-22: 12 June 1854.
  4. 3 H 134, 585-8, 590-2, 891-3: 22 June 1854.

succession to real estate bill (which would recognise primogeniture only if the principle were contained in the will).<sup>1.</sup>

Despite minor successes Goderich, Bruce and Layard must have realised during the 1854 session that their ideas were in general acceptable neither to the government nor to the house as a whole, and it is no wonder that Goderich wrote to Hughes in August in a mood of

... low spirits & listlessness... Now it seems to me that I have been two years in the Palaver & that I have done no good there whatsoever, & that the possibility of doing any & the means thereto appear greatly less clear to me than they did when I first got in. This may be the fault of the place; but it is much more likely to be my fault, & for this & sundry other reasons I begin to be of opinion that a summary shooting of me as a useless beast would be a reasonable & just punishment... 2.

The session, he concluded, had witnessed "a lamentable display of vacillation, & weakness, of petty party hatreds & yet worse bigotries," and had been partially redeemed only by the Oxford bill, the sanction given to Gladstone's finance, and the protest made against his peace policy.<sup>3.</sup>

Neither, apparently, was Layard satisfied with his performance: Goderich reported to Bruce that when Layard left London on an excursion to the Crimea "he was so low & out of spirits about himself & about everything, that what he wants is encouragement, & in no degree its opposite."<sup>4.</sup> Nor did Goderich feel that Layard had improved his prospects, believing that he would

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1. 3 H 133, 393-7: 15 May 1854; 3 H 131, 506-8: 8 March 1854.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 134: G to H, Ripon, 21 Aug. 1854.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 13: G to B, Ripon, 25 Sept. 1854.

4. *ibid.*

... have done better, not for himself only, but in every point of view, if he had taken a more decided line, either justifying his attacks on the Govt [over the Crimean war], by following out his opinions to their legitimate consequence, a hostile motion, or else justifying his support by more reticence ... You [Bruce] & I know that his seeming defects arose from his thorough honesty on the one hand, & his dislike to break with his party & with Lord John on the other, but unluckily other people don't know or don't believe this, & I fear therefore that he stands now in a less good position than he did when the Session began...1.

Their despondency, however, was soon to be replaced by the excitement and rapidity of events. In August 1854 Layard travelled to the Crimea in the company of Delane and Kinglake, where he witnessed the battles of the Alma, Balaclava and Inkerman. When he returned to London in early December he found himself in an authoritative position, being the only MP who had visited the theatre of war. He described his situation as "a very critical one" requiring "the greatest caution to know how to act. I have not yet made up my mind."<sup>2</sup> Bruce, in the meantime, had both married and contracted scarlet fever,<sup>3</sup> and was to be virtually incapacitated for several months. Goderich, because of his wife's poor health, was on vacation in Turancon. In these circumstances Layard turned to Horsman for co-operation and advice. Horsman's suggestions as to their methods of procedure were inconsistent. Initially he counselled patience and moderation, and was optimistic that Layard would yet establish a high position for himself.<sup>4</sup> But he

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1. *ibid.*

2. LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 38: L to G.T. Clark, London, 6 Dec. 1854.

3. There was no correlation between the two events. Bruce's first wife, Annabella Beadon, had died in July 1852. In August 1854 he married Norah Napier, daughter of Sir William Napier, the historian of the Peninsular war. Shortly afterwards he contracted scarlet fever from his children, and the disease proved almost fatal.

4. LP. BL Add Ms 38982, 365: Horsman to L, 20 Dec. 1854.

subsequently argued that, if the opposition made no motion concerning the conduct of the war in the new year, Layard himself ought to do so. Horsman assured Layard that his personal ground was strong and that public opinion supported him, and expressed his conviction that "matters going on as they have been doing can no longer be endured & perilous as I feel it is for you & me to incense our party, public duty leaves honest men no choice."<sup>1</sup> This advice was fundamentally unsound, and proved to be motivated by selfish considerations of political gain. Public support for Layard was indeed considerable, but within the house of commons he had no significant political base on which he could depend. Furthermore his personal attacks on Lord Raglan and Admiral Dundas, whilst militarily justifiable, were rash and impolitic, having aroused the fury of military and aristocratic interests within the house. Goderich's fears that Layard might easily be made the "cat's paw" of men such as Horsman<sup>2</sup> were to prove only too accurate, and Layard might have been warned of Horsman's dubious loyalty when the latter abstained from voting on the foreign enlistment bill, arguing that "when the two first Cabinet Minrs made it a vote of confidence I could not so far fetter myself as to the future as to agree to that."<sup>3</sup>

In preparation for the opening of parliament, Layard stayed with Horsman for a few days in mid-January. "As we have hitherto acted together," Layard informed his cousin, "it is very desirable that we should understand one another."<sup>4</sup> In the meantime, Goderich rushed home from the continent.

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38982, 382: Horsman to L, 29 Dec. 1854.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 13: G to B, Ripon, 25 Sept. 1854.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38982, 365: Horsman to L, 20 Dec. 1854.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 33: L to Lady Huntly, Eastnor Castle, 13 Jan. 1855 (copy).

The events of the following month demonstrate the solidarity of the Goderich-Layard-Bruce alliance, and their significance in this regard justifies a detailed examination. Parliament reassembled on 23 January 1855 when Roebuck, the member for Sheffield, gave notice of his famous motion for an inquiry into the conduct of the war and the condition of the army before Sebastopol. Russell, who had consistently sought a way to remove Aberdeen from the prime ministership in his own favour, promptly resigned, employing the specious argument that he couldn't defend the war policy of the government in the house -- the war policy, that is, of a government of which he had been a leading member from the outset. On 25 January Roebuck moved his resolution. Bruce, Goderich, Layard and other 'patriotic' radicals, Russell and the Conservatives, united in opposition to the government, and Roebuck's motion was carried by the convincing majority of 148 on 29 January. Aberdeen, having of course considered the vote as one of confidence in his government, resigned forthwith, and the queen, in a desperate attempt to prevent Palmerston becoming prime minister, asked in turn Derby, Lansdowne, Clarendon and Russell to form ministries. All failed, and on 4 February Palmerston, 'l'inévitable', was finally invited to form a government.

The Peelites Argyll, Gladstone and Herbert, out of loyalty to Aberdeen, were reluctant to join the new ministry, but were persuaded to do so by Palmerston on 5 February. On the same day Russell, though he had said he wouldn't serve under Palmerston, nevertheless reviewed with him the distribution of offices. Among other recommendations Russell suggested Panmure as secretary for war and Layard as under secretary for war,<sup>1</sup> a new post created in place of the secretary at war,

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1. A.C. Benson and Viscount Esher, eds., *The Letters of Queen Victoria: a selection of Her Majesty's correspondence between the years 1837 and 1861*, (London, 1907), iii : 125: memorandum by Queen Victoria, 6 Feb. 1855.

which was to be abolished. Palmerston saw the queen later in the day and, in recommending Layard as under secretary for war, argued that his having lately been witness to the conflict would give confidence. Victoria recorded in her journal that evening:

... We remonstrated [with Palmerston] against Mr. Layard's appointment as Under-Secretary for War, on account of his ill-conditioned abuse of Lord Raglan and Admiral Dundas, -- though not against his employment. Lord Palmerston was not averse to reconsidering this...1.

The queen's opposition to Layard rested not only on his abuse of Raglan and Dundas, but was influenced by his social origins. The military was a preserve of the nobility, and she relied on the aristocratic hierarchy to promote her interests. Furthermore, the Duke of Cambridge had informed her that Layard's appointment would make the worst impression on the army.<sup>2</sup> Endorsement from sympathisers such as Walter Savage Landor<sup>3</sup> scarcely compensated for Layard's miniscule support within the house of commons. It is not surprising that Palmerston was unwilling to further press Layard's claims.

Layard, of course, had no notion of the opposition to his appointment from the queen. In any event his personal ambition to attain office for its own sake, so evident in earlier years, seemed to

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1. Brian Connell, *Regina v. Palmerston: The Correspondence between Queen Victoria and Her Foreign and Prime Minister, 1837-1865*, (London, 1962), 163.
  2. Elizabeth Longford, *Victoria R.I.*, (London, 1964), 247. Monckton Milnes recorded that "... Lady P. [Palmerston] told me to-day that the Duchess of Cambridge was quite pleased with Mr. Layard's not being in the Government; this is what the aristocracy call 'public opinion.' My Quaker friend Forster was with me this morning, saying the whole West Riding was indignant with the Government..." (Reid, *Life of Monckton Milnes*, i : 506: Milnes to [ ], Jan. 1855). Forster was presumably in London to consult with his colleagues.
  3. *Examiner*, 10 Feb. 1855: letter to the editor from Landor, 3 Feb. 1855.

have given way to a greater emphasis on political principle, a result in all probability of his affiliation with Goderich and Bruce. He reported to his cousin on 2 February that he expected nothing personally and cared only that an honest and vigorous government eventuate.<sup>1</sup> Even when Layard was incorrectly designated by the *Times* as under secretary for war on 8 February,<sup>2</sup> he wrote: "I confess that I shall join the Government with considerable regret. I am afraid we cannot expect much from the old lot put into a new shape," adding that he would not accept "unless I have my own way."<sup>3</sup>

Layard was not to have his own way. Palmerston acquiesced in the queen's protests, and appointed Frederick Peel as under secretary for war. Layard he offered the clerkship of the ordnance.<sup>4</sup> But Goderich, Bruce and his other friends, with whom Layard was in constant communication, advised him to decline the office. Horsman was particularly adamant:

... We agreed that you ought to take any thing that would give you *a position* -- & an acknowledgement of your usefulness. But you should decline any thing that would only enable the Govt. to use & muzzle you.

We agreed you should take the Undersecretary of War if offered, but not an insignificant post...

It will be political annihilation -- with additional disadvantage to you -- that after having been published in all the papers as the man [ap]ointed for the Under-Secretary of War, your being offered a lower post & accepting it will enable your enemies to say that you jumped at the first bait held out to you & sold yourself to the Govt. on cheap terms.

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 33: L to Lady Huntly, London, 2 Feb. 1855 (copy).
  2. *Times*, 8 Feb. 1855.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 34: L to Lady Huntly, London, 8 Feb. 1855 (copy).
  4. *Times*, 1 March 1855: L's address to his Aylesbury constituents, 28 Feb. 1855.

So I return to our first judgment -- a mere Under Secretary or Clerkship is using without establishing you. We agreed that a generous Minister would acknowledge your value & place you in your right place, & a shabby one would only try to muzzle & extinguish you.

The latter Palmerston has done to his dishonor.

His placing Peel at the War Office shows also that he is not a 'convert'... 1.

Layard accepted the advice of his friends, which probably corresponded with his own inclinations: he later stated that, because he didn't consider himself the right man for the job, he would be betraying his principles in accepting the offer.<sup>2</sup> Had he accepted, in fact, it may have caused a ministerial crisis, as the Peelites vehemently opposed Layard's inclusion in the ministry, on account of his virulent abuse of their peace policy and his personal attacks on Aberdeen.

Parliament reassembled on 16 February, when Palmerston faced the house of commons for the first time as prime minister. His cabinet omitted Aberdeen, Newcastle and Russell, but was otherwise identical with the previous coalition ministry. Despite Palmerston's appeals that the house trust his leadership and his determination to personally investigate the conduct of the war, Roebuck decided to press his motion for a committee of inquiry. In addition the new government came under concerted attack from Layard's friends. Horsman argued that there was nothing in the change of administration which justified the house in receding from its earlier position. He blamed the war disasters on both the Aberdeen government and the absence of a strong opposition:

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38983, 65: Horsman to L, n.d. [Feb. 1855].
  2. *Times*, 1 March 1855: L's address to his Aylesbury constituents, 28 Feb. 1855.

One side of the House almost became cowardly from the fear of being considered factious, and the other sank into subserviency from the fear of being regarded as insubordinate, and he was quite prepared to accept his individual share of the blame which was to be attributed to their conduct. The course pursued by one hon. Member, however, stood out in strong contrast with that taken by the rest. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) had endeavoured to do his duty throughout the whole of the period in question. He had pointed out to the House that the Government were undertaking an expedition to the Crimea at the wrong season, and without having made sufficient preparation. That hon. Gentleman had, in fact, made no statement in that House with respect to the conduct of the war in the East which had not been verified by the result, and he exhibited in making those statements an earnestness, an ability, and a foresight, which he thought merited for his words a much greater degree of attention than at the hands of Her Majesty's late advisers they seemed to have received. 1.

Danby Seymour joined in defending Layard's previous conduct, and expressed his regret over the unaltered nature of the ministry under Palmerston. In particular he questioned the appointment of Peel instead of Layard as under secretary for war.<sup>2.</sup>

These speeches produced no evident results, and on the 18th, according to Bright, Layard's feeling was one of "great despondency."<sup>3.</sup> The following day, 19 February, Layard mounted his own attack in the house of commons. In a powerful address, he dismissed Palmerston's new government as almost identical to that of Aberdeen, and therefore not deserving the confidence of the house.<sup>4.</sup> In the meantime Palmerston had informed cabinet on the 17th that he intended to acquiesce in the commons' desire that Roebuck's committee of inquiry

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1. 3 H 136, 1446-9: 16 Feb. 1855.

2. 3 H 136, 1463-5: 16 Feb. 1855.

3. R.A.J. Walling, ed., *The Diaries of John Bright*, (London, 1930), 185: Bright's diary entry of 18 Feb. 1855.

4. 3 H 136, 1514-30: 19 Feb. 1855.

proceed, and on 21 February the Peelites, with the exception of Argyll, resigned in protest. The vacancies caused by the departure of Gladstone, Herbert and Graham left open the possibility of a major ministerial re-shuffle. With this in mind, a meeting was held in Layard's rooms on 23 February. According to Otway, writing many years later, six or seven members of parliament were present.<sup>1.</sup> Bruce and Blackett, due to illness, were both absent, but Layard, Goderich, Horsman, Danby Seymour and Otway must have participated. According to Otway, "the Superior Person," that is, Edward Horsman,<sup>2.</sup> spoke as follows: "I think Layard has won the Cabinet, but perhaps that is too much to expect for him at once; but I say, that we ought all to agree to decline acceptance of office, unless a suitable position is offered to Layard."<sup>3.</sup> The assembled members agreed to act accordingly. In addition they agreed not to join the government unless their views on war policy were specifically accepted by Palmerston.<sup>4.</sup>

Clearly they were acting in a self-recognised role as an independent pressure group. Equally clearly they were overestimating their political influence, especially with regard to Layard.

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1. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, ii : 265. Though 23 February is not specified as the day on which this meeting occurred, it can be deduced as such by subsequent events: that evening, according to Otway, Horsman received the office of chief secretary; on the following morning he wrote to Layard, his letter dated 24 February 1855.
  2. Sir Henry Lucy, *Men and Manner in Parliament*, (London, 1919), 125. Lucy refers to Horsman as the 'Superior Person', and confirms Otway's assertion that he had been so named by Disraeli.
  3. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, ii : 265.
  4. *Times*, 1 March 1855: L's address to his Aylesbury constituents, 28 Feb. 1855.

Though Layard had been warned a few days previously that the Dundas affair was the impediment to his attaining office,<sup>1</sup> he could not have known this comprised a royal veto. The political ineptness of his actions over the next forty-eight hours must be interpreted in this light.

On the evening of 23 February Layard, Goderich, Horsman and Seymour were each offered positions: Layard as under secretary for war, Horsman as chief secretary for Ireland, and Seymour as a secretary to the board of control. The office which Goderich was offered is unknown. Layard immediately reported these events to Bruce:

... I am sorry to hear that you are again ill and at such a moment. Yourself & Blackett are great losses to us. I feel sure that you would both have been valuable additions to the new Government. I think it highly probable that Goderich, Horsman, Seymour & myself may join Palmerston. I have accepted conditionally and shall know in the course of the evening whether my offers are accepted. I think there is some prospect of better things, but our only hope rests in bringing men together & joining a strong honest liberal party. This I am labouring to do and hitherto with some success. I must only take care that in going into office I do not render such an organisation more difficult & break up the little which has already been done. I shall take office with great reluctance & only with the conviction that of the two courses it is the best for the public service... 2.

Layard's personal integrity in this matter clearly outweighed any possible considerations of political ambition. With Horsman the exact opposite was the case. No word came from Palmerston on the evening of the 23rd as to their conditions, so Layard, Horsman, Goderich and Seymour determined to meet once again the following day, each pledging

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 58162, 30: Richard Bethell to L, 19 Feb. [1855]. Bethell was Layard's co-Liberal for Aylesbury.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 58159, 131: L to B, London, n.d. From the context, the letter clearly must have been written on the evening of 23 February 1855.

in the meantime not to accept Palmerston's offer of office.<sup>1</sup>  
 Horsman, having obtained his appointment largely through Layard's influence, cynically proceeded to disregard this pledge. His actions were in marked contrast to his earlier stance, when he had advised that Layard decline the clerkship of the ordnance, as on that occasion Horsman had not held the prospect of office himself. Now, having attained his ambition and having informed Palmerston of his acceptance, he wrote to Layard on the morning of 24 February, informing him that

... As you told me last night that you had pretty well made up your mind to accept Ld. Palmerston's offer [!], I prefer adopting that as your resolve to attending your meeting today to hear the subject reopened and "conditions" discussed.

I cannot too strongly express my conviction of the responsibility that is on you. I have never wished you to undervalue your position, but I must warn you as a friend not to overrate it...

Such a warning, not given until this stage of the proceedings, was both dishonest and condescending. Horsman proceeded to comment that Palmerston's offer to Layard of the under secretaryship for war was an "immense concession," considering Layard's lack of discipline and control, and argued that "Lord Palm. would be quite justified in imposing conditions on you instead of your doing so on him."  
 Horsman, having gained his own ends in the best traditions of Machiavelli, had the audacity to state:

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1. Layard, in later years, endorsed Horsman's letter of 24 February 1855 (see below): "This letter was written to me by Horsman after accepting Ld. Palmerston's offer of office, altho' he had pledged himself with Ld. Goderich (De Grey) myself & others not to do so" (LP. BL Add Ms 38983, 72). Note that Waterfield (257-62) illustrates considerable confusion when describing Layard's position at this time, frequently mistaking the sequence of events, and apparently not realising that Palmerston in fact formed two ministries in February 1855.

... I have been working for you for weeks harder than I ever worked for any similar purpose, and the disinterestedness and zeal with which such friends as Goderich and myself have made your cause our own ought to avail with you in what is a crisis of your fortunes...

Horsman then informed Layard that he proposed to accept Palmerston's offer, without regard to potential conditions.<sup>1.</sup>

Having been thus betrayed, Layard and Goderich found there was worse to come. Later on 24 February Palmerston saw Layard and withdrew his offer of the under secretaryship for war.<sup>2.</sup> Presumably this was once again due to royal intervention, though Layard believed it due to cabinet pressure.<sup>3.</sup> Russell, who had been appointed colonial secretary, persuaded Palmerston to offer Layard the colonial under secretaryship, which Layard declined on the grounds of being unsuitable for the position, and of having received no guarantees as to policy alterations.<sup>4.</sup> Layard believed there was

... only one place in the Government except a Cabinet office which I could have accepted without losing my excellent position & forfeiting my reputation & that was the conduct of the war in the Commons. Palmerston would have given it to me but his cabinet is too strong for him & this shows me that he cannot last. He also withdrew Danby Seymour's appointment to the Board of Control & has behaved in the same way to others. In fact the Brookite Whigs are determined to maintain their monopoly of Government but it will not do...

He was, he reported, "free again & not sorry for it."<sup>5.</sup>

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38983, 69: Horsman to L, 24 Feb. 1855.
  2. Walling, 191: Bright's diary entry of 24 Feb. 1855.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 34: L to Lady Huntly, London, 27 Feb. 1855 (copy).
  4. *Times*, 1 March 1855; L's address to his Aylesbury constituents, 28 Feb. 1855.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 34: L to Lady Huntly, London, 27 Feb. 1855 (copy).

Goderich, loyal to his colleague, declined to serve under Palmerston, but both he and Layard were understandably bitter. Not only had Palmerston retracted his original offers, but he had also in general reverted to a highly whig-aristocratic government: as Southgate comments, "he did not think highly of these colleagues. But he was loyal to his class."<sup>1</sup> And not only had Horsman joined the government, as chief secretary, but Danby Seymour was to do so within a few days, at the board of control. Two years later Layard commented that Seymour had been an ardent Indian reformer until Palmerston appointed him secretary of the board of control. "What was that for? Either to get the benefit of his information or else to stop his mouth. I believe it was the latter; at any rate, we have heard nothing on India from Mr. Danby Seymour from that time to this."<sup>2</sup>

Layard, in declining the colonial under secretaryship, had told Palmerston he would support his government if he found it merited his, and the people's, confidence.<sup>3</sup> Shortly afterwards, rubbing salt in the wound, Palmerston once again proffered Layard the clerkship of the ordnance, which the latter indignantly refused, believing his position in the country was now established.<sup>4</sup> His public status following the events of February was indeed augmented. The *Illustrated London News*, for example, spoke of Layard's "steady rise to political distinction," adding: "Let him act as he is now acting, and the highest honours of the State will be his and while he is yet young."<sup>5</sup> And the *Times* in a leading article strongly condemned the government

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1. Southgate, 'The Most English Minister', 363.

2. *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 29 Aug. 1857: L at a testimonial dinner in his honour at Aylesbury the previous week.

3. *Times*, 1 March 1855: L's address to his Aylesbury constituents, 28 Feb. 1855.

4. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 34: L to Lady Huntly, London, 2 March 1855 (copy).

5. *Illustrated London News*, 3 March 1855.

for rescinding Layard's appointment as under secretary for war.<sup>1.</sup>  
 Goderich's individual stature was also enhanced: it was during 1855, according to Maccoby, that he was first thought of as "a possible Prime Minister of the 'advanced Liberal' future."<sup>2.</sup>

But at the end of February Goderich, Layard and Bruce found their pressure group in parliament sadly diminished. Horsman and Seymour had proved traitors; Otway and Blackett remained, yet the latter was ill in Paris, and would die in the following year. Nevertheless Goderich, Layard and Bruce, now as before the nucleus of the group, could look back with satisfaction on the integrity and courage of the stand they had taken, and learn from their purely political errors of judgment. Bruce returned to Turancon with Goderich, where they vacationed together for six weeks, and from where Goderich wrote to Hughes:

... Looking back at the strange six weeks I spent in England I feel the satisfaction at least, that I did honestly & rightly in the important personal question I had to decide about taking office -- & I think that the near approach of that position, which has many attractions for me especially in the change from talk to work, & its deliberate rejection will dissipate any remnants of a petty & false ambition for mere office, which I confess has sometimes haunted & troubled me...<sup>3.</sup>

And Blackett wrote approvingly to Layard from Paris:

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1. *Times*, 2 March 1855.
  2. S. Maccoby, *English Radicalism 1853-1886*, (London, 1938), 40.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 159: G to H, Turancon, 8 March 1855.

... You & Goderich have just set an example that was very much needed among Parliamentary Liberals, one of you refusing office because the other was proscribed, & the other refusing to be bribed into lucrative silence by being shelved in a pigeon hole where his abilities & attainments would not find a proper field for their exertion. Such an example of loyalty & self respect has not been shown by Liberals for the last 20 years...<sup>1</sup>.

Thus isolated from their former friends and from every political party, Goderich, Layard and Bruce relied on each other for support, and collaborated closely throughout the 1855 session. Once again Crimean issues attracted much of their attention, but they also co-operated in attempts to effect substantial administrative reform, and in various measures designed to assist the working classes.<sup>2</sup> On all votes within the house of commons they were, of course, in complete accord.

Whilst reiterating their independence from party<sup>3</sup>, they could not avoid the conclusion that of all the possibilities, from their point of view the present administration was the best that could realistically be expected. Thus when Disraeli moved a vote of no confidence in May, though it focussed on the prosecution of the war, Bruce, Goderich and Layard joined in support of the government.<sup>4</sup>

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38983, 86: Blakett to L, Paris, [3 March 1855].

2. See chapters 4 and 12 below.

3. e.g. Layard: 3 H 138, 1252, 1269: 25 May 1855.

4. 3 H 138, 1296-1300: 25 May 1855. Layard stated in the debate preceding the vote that, though he had attended a meeting called by Palmerston the previous day, this in no way committed him to support of the government. Whilst he later voted against Disraeli's motion, he nevertheless attacked Russell for his role in the Vienna peace negotiations, and accused Palmerston of being untrue to his principles on administrative reform and of providing poor war leadership. Having no trust in Disraeli, Layard stated that "as an independent Member of the House, he knew not wish way to turn" (3 H 138, 1252, 1255-7, 1268-70: 25 May 1855).

Goderich continued to view Palmerston as "a mere mountebank,"<sup>1.</sup> but confided to Layard that his government was "probably the best that under present circumstances we are likely to get; & though that is to me a most humiliating confession, I can see no other course to be taken than to leave things alone at present, though keeping a watchful eye on their course."<sup>2.</sup> Layard was in complete accord with this view, though he stressed the necessity of their continuing to exert pressure.<sup>3.</sup> Layard also attempted to keep his options open by ingratiating himself with Granville.<sup>4.</sup> Of Gladstone they continued to express mixed feelings. His peace policy they found abhorrent,<sup>5.</sup> but his obvious integrity won their respect. Bruce, though he believed Gladstone "much the best" of their contemporaries who had been tried in office, nevertheless agreed with Goderich (and demonstrated a remarkable absence of political foresight) that Gladstone was "an incomplete man -- may make a brilliant & useful member of a Ministry -- but will never be Prime Minister."<sup>6.</sup>

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 185: G to H, Brighton, 4 Oct. 1855.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 183: G to L, Ripon, 16 Oct. 1855.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 83: L to G, Florence, 3 Nov. 1855.
  4. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/18/8, 9: L to Granville, London, 27 April 1855; LP. BL Add Ms 38983, 189: Granville to L, 27 April 1855; Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/23/5, 151: L to Granville, London, 19 June 1855.
  5. Layard strongly attacked Gladstone on these grounds in the house (3 H 139, 1833-4: 3 Aug. 1855). Gladstone said of Layard that "from that quarter issue the coldest and most bitter blasts of all" (quoted in T.A. Nash, *The Life of Richard Lord Westbury*, (London, 1888), i : 166).
  6. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 26: B to G, Aberdare, [7 or 1?] Sept. 1855.

Clearly the war and administrative reform were the principal issues upon which their collaboration was based, and on 30 May 1855 Goderich, in his first speech to his constituents since his election for Huddersfield, concentrated on these questions at the expense of reform, the ballot, and the church.<sup>1</sup> On both matters success appeared elusive, and Layard became particularly distressed. In order to escape his political despondency, and a physical and mental exhaustion which threatened a nervous breakdown, he left England for Italy in August, intending "to do nothing but amuse myself."<sup>2</sup> Goderich, despite the "long & most unsatisfactory session,"<sup>3</sup> tempered his disillusionment with the conviction that within parliament lay his future career.<sup>4</sup> He assured Layard that the latter had taken

... a needlessly hopeless view of the state of things here, which though bad enough, God knows, is yet not, I trust, past all hope of remedy. Last session was no doubt pretty full of disappointments & disillusionments, but it taught me many lessons, which I am not sorry to have learnt, & from which I hope to profit hereafter. Looking back at it, I am quite clear that your position at its close was not at all less good than at its beginning...<sup>5</sup>

At the end of November, in a very intimate letter, Goderich stated his conviction that much of the bitterness towards Layard so evident in the previous session had passed away. He would be personally delighted, Goderich stated, when Layard returned from Italy, "thoroughly refreshed and able to take a vigorous part in the coming parliamentary campaign."<sup>6</sup>

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1. *Times*, 2 June 1855: G's address to his Huddersfield constituents, 30 May 1855.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 40: L to Lady Huntly, London, 4 Aug. 1855 (copy). The following summer he wrote: "Last year my Italian trip completely set me up & I was very ill when I left England" (LP. BL Add Ms 58157, 6 : L to Sara Austen, Milan, 22 Aug. 1856).
  3. Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/11/91: G to Ludlow, [London], 9 Aug. 1855.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 170: G to H, Ripon, 20 Aug. 1855.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 159: G to L, Ripon, 25 Aug. 1855.
  6. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 183: G to L, Brighton, 30 Nov. 1855.

Due to recurring bouts of scarlet fever, Bruce's participation in their parliamentary campaigns in 1855 was less frequent than he, Goderich or Layard would have wished. For example his temporary absence during the June administrative reform debates, wrote Goderich, was "greatly to be lamented" as he had "a thousand things to talk to you about & to consult you upon."<sup>1</sup> Though Bruce's role in the house had been less prominent than that of either Layard or Goderich, his advice remained very influential. Thus Goderich asked in December if Bruce could return to London a few days before the next parliamentary session began, "as I think it would be important that we should talk over matters before we begin our H of C work. Your return among us will indeed be an advantage. I cannot tell you what a comfort it will be to me personally."<sup>2</sup> Layard concurred in Goderich's assessment of Bruce's importance, insisting that his return to the house was necessary in order "that we may profit by your [Bruce's] advice & experience. Your loss last year was irreparable and we cannot bear it another session."<sup>3</sup> Layard assured Bruce he would not be overworked, but reserved "as a great gun for grand occasions."<sup>4</sup> They had, in fact, become so dependent on one another that when Layard and Bruce were temporarily absent from London in May 1856, Goderich wrote to Bruce: "I miss you very much. Now you & Layard are gone our Bench is not worth sitting on."<sup>5</sup>

In March 1856 hostilities with Russia were terminated. For two years the conflict in the Crimea had provided the parameters of

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 23: G to B, 19 June 1855.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 41: G to B, Brighton, 21 Dec. 1855.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 58159, 124: L to B, [London], 8 Jan. 1856.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 58159, 133: L to B, Aldermaston, 21 Jan. 1856.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 49: G to B, 22 May 1856.

British foreign policy and political life. Within these parameters Goderich, Layard and Bruce had forged their relationship within the house of commons, receiving advice and encouragement from Hughes and Forster without. The ascendancy of foreign policy in English public life did not, however, end with the war, for the ensuing disputes in Persia and China were responsible for critical political imbroglios. Goderich, Layard and Bruce contributed significantly to the debates on both these issues.<sup>1.</sup>

Nevertheless co-operation within the group in the early months of 1856 was not limited to foreign policy. Forster made common cause with Goderich on the labour question, testifying at his request before a select committee of the commons.<sup>2.</sup> Goderich, Bruce and Layard continued to vote *en bloc* on all issues before the house during the 1856 session, supporting such measures as the abolition of church rates, the alteration of the lords' role as a court of appeal, and the opening of the British museum and national gallery on Sundays.<sup>3.</sup> Their advocacy of Sunday opening was to cause future political embarrassment. In 1855 Otway, one of their few remaining supporters in the commons,<sup>4.</sup> had staunchly opposed Lord Robert Grosvenor's Sunday trading bill, which had proposed to curtail Sunday shopping in the metropolis, and which was primarily responsible for the Hyde park riots of June-July 1855.<sup>5.</sup> In March 1856 proposals that the British museum and national gallery remain open on Sundays were defeated in the house of commons by

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1. See chapter 4 below.

2. See chapter 12 below.

3. 3 H 140, 1924-7: 5 March 1856; 3 H 143, 485-8 and 613-5: 7 and 10 July 1856; 3 H 140, 1118-21: 21 Feb. 1856.

4. Blackett's ill-health prevented his participation in the debates of 1855. He accepted the Chiltern hundreds in January 1856, and died in April.

5. 3 H 139, 79, 158-9, 369-70: 25 and 26 June, 2 July 1855. Goderich endorsed Otway's protests (3 H 139, 368: 2 July 1855). Also, see Brian Harrison, 'The Sunday Trading Riots of 1855', *Historical Journal*, 8, 2, 1965, 219-45.

376 votes to 48, with Bruce, Goderich and Layard voting in the minority. They based their vote on the assumption that Sunday opening of the museums would provide working men with rational and elevating recreation,<sup>1.</sup> and did not apparently accept the conviction of a section of the working class that it would inevitably lead to Sunday employment in manufacturing industry. In May 1856 Benjamin Hall, first commissioner of works, initiated Sunday military band concerts in London parks. The initial support of Palmerston, however, was withdrawn under sabbatarian pressure (led by the evangelical Shaftesbury and the Archbishop of Canterbury) and under the threat of defeat in the house of commons. Goderich's disgust with Palmerston's expediency was reinforced by the latter's surrender on this issue "in a most cowardly & disgusting manner," illustrating his "want of any real policy on anything."<sup>2.</sup> But sabbatarian pressure was later to cause Layard to renege on his previous support of Sunday opening in order to court votes during the 1859 election campaign.<sup>3.</sup>

Their independence from the Palmerston government was confirmed in mid-1856, when Layard refused an offer that he assume the under secretaryship for foreign affairs.<sup>4.</sup> His declining to serve cannot be attributed to the specific office, which Layard would undoubtedly have considered suitable. It was probably a result, rather, of his

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 44: L to Lady Huntly, London, 6 March 1856 (copy); LP. BL Ms 38948, 43: L to Benjamin Austen, London, 16 March 1855. Goderich confirmed this view in a parliamentary speech (3 H 142, 1123: 6 June 1856).

2. LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 16: G to L, 23 May 1856.

3. *York Herald*, 30 April 1859: L's address to the Liberal electors of York, 27 April 1859.

4. The offer is not well documented. Layard spoke of a rumoured proposal on 26 June, adding that it was very doubtful whether he would accept. Lady Charlotte Schreiber recorded in her journal that he had been offered, and refused, the under secretaryship for foreign affairs in the spring (LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 30: L to Henry Ross, 26 June 1856; Bessborough, *Lady Charlotte Schreiber*, 59: journal entry of 1 Aug. 1856).

fundamental aversion to Palmerston and the government, of a realisation that he was being tempted into an uncritical silence, and of a sense of loyalty to his colleagues, especially Goderich. (Neither Bruce nor Otway were yet in a position to be seriously considered for a Liberal ministry.) It has been asserted<sup>1</sup> that Layard's alleged factiousness during the mid-fifties was simply a result of his disappointment at having been repeatedly excluded from office -- any office. The charge is transparently false: between December 1852 and March 1857 he was in fact offered governmental positions on four separate occasions, as well as a diplomatic posting. In fact by mid-1855, though he may have been disillusioned and embittered, Layard had formed very decided political views, believed he had established his influence in the country, was genuinely independent of traditional party, and was therefore unwilling to sell cheaply his political soul.

6.

If by 1856 their integrity as a group was assured, Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard might legitimately have attributed this circumstance largely to their common approach to foreign policy, a most significant issue of the mid-fifties and a principal agent of their cohesion and co-operation. It now seems appropriate to consider the various roles of Layard, Goderich, Forster, Bruce and Hughes during the Crimean war, and their subsequent preoccupation with British policy towards Persia and China.

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1. Olive Anderson, 'The Administrative Reform Association, 1855-1857', in Patricia Hollis, ed., *Pressure from Without in Early Victorian England*, (London, 1974), 276-7.

## CHAPTER 4

FOREIGN POLICY 1 : CRIMEA, PERSIA, CHINA

If foreign affairs became Britain's principal preoccupation throughout most of the 1850s and 1860s, it was not without cause. In general terms, the quarter century following the European revolutions of 1848 witnessed relatively extensive international conflict: the Crimean was the first significant and protracted war involving European powers since 1815; Germany and Italy both achieved national unification during this period; the Franco-Prussian war destroyed the second empire; the European states partook of numerous imperial skirmishes, notably in the east. In explanation of this phenomenon, Hobsbawm has argued that global capitalist expansion during these years multiplied tensions, and that rulers were free to revert to war as a normal instrument of policy after 1848 without the fear of internal revolution.<sup>1</sup> Britain's burgeoning industrial and commercial wealth certainly encouraged an expansion of her trade and influence. Friction, whether with competing European states or with the aboriginal natives of prospective political or economic colonies, was an inevitable corollary.

A national mood of self-assertiveness in foreign policy prevailed during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Amongst non-Conservative politicians, the Peelites, Palmerstonians and Manchester radicals were united in their conviction that British influence abroad should be strengthened and extended, in the name of progress and civilisation. But the methods which they desired to

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1. E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital 1848-1875*, (London, 1975), 78.

employ in order to fortify this influence illustrated fundamental differences in attitude. Manchester radicals and Peelites envisaged free trade and commercial endeavour as the sole morally-acceptable tools with which to effect their goal of an 'informal empire',<sup>1.</sup> and therefore tended to oppose all political intervention, whilst flirting with the concept of international arbitration. Palmerstonians, on the other hand, generally sought to consolidate Britain's economic influence by pursuing an active and interventionist foreign policy.<sup>2.</sup> Each of the three political groupings which would eventually merge in the Liberal government of 1859 thus based their foreign policy on the criterion of political interventionism, and their divergent approaches are well-illustrated in their reactions to Britain's three principal foreign involvements of the mid-1850s: the Crimean war, and the Persian and Chinese conflicts of 1856 and 1857. The Palmerstonians, brash and confident, advocated forceful intervention in all three instances; the Manchester radicals formed the nucleus of the peace party, and opposed British participation in the Crimean war as well as in China and Persia; the Peelites, appeasing and quite unconcerned with national 'honour', drifted with extreme reluctance into half-hearted support of the Crimean war, reasserted their more natural emphasis on economy and peace after February 1855, and opposed Palmerston on both the Persian and Chinese conflicts.

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1. The term is employed by Bourne, and defined as "the expansion of trade and influence so far as possible without incurring the expense and responsibility of colonial sovereignty" (Kenneth Bourne, *The Foreign Policy of Victorian England*, (Oxford, 1970), 5).
  2. The Conservatives in many respects conformed with the Palmerstonian-liberal approach, though they differed in specifics, and tended to rely more unscrupulously on immediate political opportunism.

Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard could not equate their foreign policy in the mid-fifties with any of these groups for, unlike Palmerstonians, Peelites or radicals, their approach was not primarily based on the question of the propriety of Britain adopting a policy of political interventionism. Indeed their staunch support of the Crimean war, and equally forceful opposition to British actions in both Persia and China, is yet another significant illustration of their philosophical isolation from political contemporaries.

2.

As the likelihood of war with Russia heightened inexorably throughout 1853, the reactions of Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard to the potential conflict were tempered by a number of considerations. Foremost amongst these was the necessity of combatting Russian autocracy.

The Russophobia so prevalent in Britain immediately preceding the outbreak of the Crimean war had its origins in the decades before 1853,<sup>1</sup> and the emotional hysteria then demonstrated by paranoid Russophobes such as David Urquhart may in fact have contributed to the onset of war. The hatred of Russia exhibited by Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard was founded on their mutual abhorrence of czarist despotism. Goderich, for example, spoke at the time of "that great grim shadowy power, which sits brooding over Europe and Asia," and of the "dark silent Russian Czar, the hater of Freedom, the foe of every people struggling to cast off oppression."<sup>2</sup> Addressing his

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1. See J.H. Gleason, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1950).

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 105-6: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.

Huddersfield constituents in 1855, he emphasised the suppression of Russia's reactionary despotism as the primary object of the conflict: "The policy and influence of Russia," Goderich argued, "had always been exerted to stop the onward progress of the world. (Cheers.) It was not merely political, but intellectual progress to which he alluded."<sup>1</sup> He once went so far as to describe the war as "a contest of civilization against barbarism."<sup>2</sup> Forster seconded Goderich's views, and attempted to impress them on the reading public, in an article entitled 'The Autocracy of the Czars', published in the *Edinburgh Review* in April 1855. Having traced the history of czarist tyranny, he propounded the view that, though despotism elsewhere had contributed to national weakness, in Russia the czar's autocracy had "always been the measure of the power he could direct against his neighbours."<sup>3</sup> Forster further argued that this autocracy encouraged aggression abroad, primarily because "whatever there is of aspiring ambition among the people must be satisfied at the expense of foreign nations."<sup>4</sup> He believed Russia operated "by brute force and lust of conquest."<sup>5</sup> Layard also concurred in this approach, referring to Russia as "powerful, ambitious, and unscrupulous,"<sup>6</sup> and on the declaration of war stating in the house of commons that its result must be to place her "in such a position as will prevent her again threatening the liberties and civilisation of Europe."<sup>7</sup>

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1. *Times*, 2 June 1855: G's address to his Huddersfield constituents, 30 May 1855.
  2. *Leeds Mercury*, 30 Oct. 1855: G's address at the Ripon mechanics institute, 26 Oct. 1855.
  3. [W.E. Forster], 'The Autocracy of the Czars', *Edinburgh Review*, 101, 206, April 1855, 513-4.
  4. *ibid.*, 524.
  5. [W.E. Forster], 'The Foreign Policy of the United States', *Westminster Review*, 64, July 1855, 172.
  6. [A.H. Layard], 'The Peace and its Effects on the Condition of Turkey', *Quarterly Review*, 98, March 1856, 531.
  7. 3 H 132, 241: 31 March 1854.

It was in fact the reactionary nature of Russian influence within Europe which was their primary consideration in opposing czarist tyranny. Goderich, for example, insisted that the war was not fought merely to maintain Turkish independence and integrity, but that European independence was an equally critical factor.<sup>1.</sup> Together with other romantic radicals such as Roebuck, he perceived Russia as the principal barrier to any revision of the obsolete and iniquitous European settlement of 1815, which ignored the justice of nationality and democracy, particularly in the Austrian empire and Poland.<sup>2.</sup> In 'Fragmentary Wild Oats', written just three months before British involvement in the conflict, he expressed his conviction that war against the czar would induce revolutions in Italy, Hungary and Poland, and that the Austrian empire, "that most anti-national and consequently unnatural agglomeration of disunited peoples," could not survive intact.<sup>3.</sup> Layard professed very similar opinions. He too asserted that the Crimean war affected not only Turkey but also "the future welfare and civilization of Europe,"<sup>4.</sup> and even towards the end of the conflict stated that the war had demonstrated the need for England to resist the czar, or else acquiesce in forever "the claims of Russia to supremacy in the East, her ultimate appropriation of the fairest portion of the Ottoman Empire, and her consequent ascendancy in Europe."<sup>5.</sup> He too was

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 3: G to F, Brighton, 30 Nov. 1855 (copy).
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 175-99: draft letter, indexed 1855, headed 'Dear \_\_\_\_\_'; *Times*, 2 June 1855: G's address to his Huddersfield constituents, 30 May 1855.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 125-6: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.
  4. *Times*, 1 March 1855: L's address to his Aylesbury constituents, 28 Feb. 1855.
  5. [A.H. Layard], 'The Results and Prospects of the War', *Quarterly Review*, 98, Dec. 1855, 252.

sympathetic with the nationalist aspirations of Hungary and Poland,<sup>1.</sup> though he was never quite as explicit as Goderich in defining the liberation of European nationalities as a war objective. Layard argued that England must fulfil her treaty obligations in defence of Turkey in order that the European balance of power not be tipped in Russia's favour.<sup>2.</sup> Years later, he explained that he was not averse to the notion of the balance of power in itself, but that the balance of power as exemplified in the treaty of Vienna of 1815 was capricious and partial because it disregarded the legitimate aspirations of the European nationalities, and the artificial boundaries thus created could only be maintained by force.<sup>3.</sup> Forster also considered the liberation of the Poles and other peoples under Russian subjugation as an important justification for the war,<sup>4.</sup> and held that "the subjection of Germany, and possibly of the whole Continent, ... might follow that of Turkey."<sup>5.</sup> And Bruce, in general concurrence with his colleagues, added his concern over the reactionary nature of the 1815 settlement, under which European monarchs had withheld the provision of free institutions and personal liberties.<sup>6.</sup>

Goderich and his colleagues thus founded their advocacy of the Crimean war effort on the need to control czarist despotism, and in particular to diminish its influence in Europe, in order that the

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 3: L to G.T. Clark, Constantinople, 25 July 1849; 3 H 136, 189: 12 Dec. 1854.

2. 3 H 129, 648: 22 July 1853; 3 H 129, 1770: 16 Aug. 1853.

3. [A.H. Layard], 'England's Place in Europe', *Saint Pauls*, 1, Dec. 1867, 275-6.

4. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 301.

5. [Forster], 'Foreign Policy of the United States', 171.

6. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 102: 'The Year 1848: Its Revolutions and Results', a lecture delivered at Dowlais, 19 Dec. 1855.

treaty of Vienna might be undermined. Their plea for the liberation of the European nationalities from multi-national empires, which must in retrospect be interpreted as an immediate Crimean war objective which was essentially delusory, can evidently be attributed to their romantic proclivities (in particular the emphasis on national spirit) as well as to their abhorrence of Russian and Austrian political retrogression.

Because of this approach they were confronted with significant ideological inconsistencies, for the solution of which they employed a number of explanatory expedients. Of most importance was the immediate cause and theatre of war for, though they might have preferred to have opposed Russian autocracy in 1849 through the medium of Hungarian independence, it was in fact for the maintenance of the Ottoman empire that they were forced to contend. They undoubtedly believed that Russian domination of Turkey would in turn endanger the liberties of Europe,<sup>1</sup> but in effect, their consequent support for the Ottoman empire required them to ignore the national claims of the Porte's Christian, European subjects, a direct philosophical contradiction of their advocacy of the national claims of Italy, Hungary and Poland. Layard's reaction to this dilemma typifies their confusion. He recognised, for example, that many Greek Christians in the Ottoman empire believed themselves oppressed by the Porte and looked to the czar for protection, but argued that with the spread of education and commerce a liberal spirit would be fostered, which the sultan's Christian subjects would come to realise was inconsistent with Russian views. Thus the legitimate policy of England, he argued,

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1. e.g. *Times*, 23 April 1855: L's Liverpool speech, 21 April 1855; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 3: G to F, Brighton, 30 Nov. 1855 (copy).

was "to maintain the [Ottoman] Empire in its present state until the Christian population may be ready to succeed to the Mussulman."<sup>1</sup>.

He later propounded the view, however, that Balkan nationalism was not analagous to German or Italian unification, primarily because it was impractical to create a myriad of small and weak nation-states in European Turkey.<sup>2</sup> This pragmatic explanation nevertheless contributed nothing to the solution of a fundamental ideological inconsistency, for if nationalism were truly a valid principle, the preservation of the Ottoman empire in Europe was clearly incompatible with its achievement. Thus in 1854 when Layard repudiated Cobden's assertion that, since England had helped suppress the recent Greek Christian rebellion in the Turkish empire she would if consistent also be obliged to help suppress the Italians and Hungarians in any rebellion against Austria, he could only justify his stance by the wartime necessity of inhibiting Greek Christian fifth-column support for Russia.<sup>3</sup>

If their vindication of the Crimean war led to the paradox of their simultaneously espousing and opposing national claims in Europe, it also led Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard to align themselves with Turkish, French and even Austrian tyrannies in order to suppress a Russian despot. In recognising the uncomfortable

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1. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/23/3, 119: L to Granville, Constantinople, 16 April 1853. Layard expressed similar views in [A.H. Layard], 'Turkey and Russia', *Quarterly Review*, 94, Dec. 1853, 294-9.
  2. [A.H. Layard], 'What is the Eastern Question?', *Saint Pauls*, 2, June 1868, 282-91; [A.H. Layard], 'How to settle the Eastern Question', *Saint Pauls*, 2, July 1868, 403-6, 410-1. Hobsbawm recognises the validity of this approach, in describing the nationalists' dilemma: that the liberal, progressive, bourgeois nation-states they envisaged would in fact be too small to develop viable economies and political organisations (Hobsbawm, 86).
  3. 3 H 135, 644-5: 24 July 1854.

position they were thereby forced to occupy, they offered a somewhat unconvincing explanatory rationale.

In many respects their support of a decadent Turkish autocracy was the most difficult to explain away. They never denied the existence, or the severity, of such a despotism, and Goderich, in fact, in describing the consequences of the sultan's "yoke," postulated that the Turks neither would nor could resuscitate themselves on the basis of liberal reforms, and that their occupation of the Balkans was therefore doomed.<sup>1</sup> Hughes also believed that the Turks, "a worn-out horde, the degenerate remnant of a conquering race," would inevitably abandon their European possessions. Yet faced with the czarist threat, he supported the maintenance of the Ottoman empire as a necessity, "quite apart from any consideration as to the internal state of the country."<sup>2</sup> Neither was Layard unaware of the severity of Turkish despotism, which he described at the onset of war as comparable to, though less crushing than, that of either Russia or Austria,<sup>3</sup> but as war progressed he could not avoid the tendency to minimise the extent of Turkish oppression,<sup>4</sup> and he deluded himself into the belief that Ottoman rule could be significantly liberalised.<sup>5</sup> The fact that this chimera was a common British attitude at the time cannot exonerate Layard, who understood better than most the Turkish

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 117: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.

2. Hughes, *Vacation Rambles*, 32-3: H's letter to the *Spectator*, Constantinople, 24 Sept. 1862.

3. 3 H 131, 734: 13 March 1854.

4. e.g. [A.H. Layard], 'The Turks and the Greeks', *Quarterly Review*, 94, March 1854, 519-20, 533-4; Gladstone imputed to Layard "a perfectly sincere fanaticism" in his alleged exoneration during the war of Turkish misrule (3 H 139, 1302: 23 July 1855).

5. e.g. 3 H 131, 739: 13 March 1854; *Times*, 1 March 1855: L's address to his Aylesbury constituents, 28 Feb. 1855; [Layard], 'The Peace and its Effects on the Condition of Turkey', 523-6.

reality, for assuming a fundamentally untenable judgment.

The alliance with France also occasioned considerable discomfiture, for their aversion to Napoleon III's dictatorship was profound. Hughes, for example, referred to Napoleon's reign as frightful, "begun in perjury and bloodshed, and continued by constant pandering to the worst tendencies of France."<sup>1</sup> Layard spoke of the "wickedness" of Louis Napoleon's 1851 coup d'état,<sup>2</sup> and maintained that the mainspring of his policy was merely to establish his dynasty, for which he might adopt an unscrupulous and hazardous policy of territorial aggrandisement.<sup>3</sup> Bruce asserted at the time of the coup: "Were I a Frenchman, I would not rest till I had kicked that scoundrel L.N.B. across the frontier. I would (always supposing I were a Frenchman) send a ball through his gizzard with less remorse than I immolate a timber-doodle [woodcock]."<sup>4</sup> Most of their contemporaries had shared this disgust with Louis Napoleon at the time of his coup, only to later overwhelm him with praise as a Crimean war ally. Goderich, Layard and their colleagues were not so fickle, and remained thereafter mistrustful and suspicious.

They were, finally, chagrined by Austria's maintenance of neutrality. Layard, for example, though he initially accepted the inevitability of Austrian non-involvement,<sup>5</sup> was disillusioned when she occupied the Principalities, thus freeing Russian reinforcements

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1. Hughes, *Vacation Rambles*, 119: H to Fanny Hughes, [on board the *Peruvian*, 14 Aug. 1870].
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38980, 192: L to Henry Ross, 12 Dec. 1851.
  3. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/18/3, 9: L to Granville, Paris, 16 March 1853.
  4. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 94: B to Ormsby, Aberdare, 15 Dec. 1851.
  5. 3 H 135, 736: 25 July 1854.

for the Crimean campaign.<sup>1.</sup> Goderich disparaged the Austrian position principally because he feared she would be accorded undue influence, and would thereby succeed in maintaining not only her reactionary policies but also her territorial integrity, thus denying national ambitions.<sup>2.</sup> Whilst mistrust of Austria was a common attribute of liberal Britons during the Crimean war, few were as vehement or as consistent in their hostility as Goderich, Layard, Bruce, Hughes and Forster.

With such a contradictory stance on nationalist aspirations, and with serious reservations regarding their despotic allies, it is somewhat surprising that Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard so staunchly advocated a war policy. The key to their enthusiasm is to be found in their obsessive conviction that, were Russian domination of Turkey to be achieved, European liberal civilisation would be threatened. Despite their distrust of Britain's alliance with a French despot and collaboration with Austrian tyranny, they came to believe these were necessary factors in the desired defeat of Russia. To Goderich, the justification of these expedients was clear: though despots ruled in both Paris and Vienna, "the Russian system was something more than a despotism -- it was a despotism the principle of which was retrogression."<sup>3.</sup> Forster agreed that Russia was "the greatest of all despotisms."<sup>4.</sup>

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1. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/11F, 21: L to Russell, Lines of Sebastopol, 8 Nov. 1854.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 13: G to B, Ripon, 25 Sept. 1854; and RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 175-99: draft letter, indexed 1855, headed 'Dear \_\_\_\_\_'.
  3. *Times*, 2 June 1855: G's address to his Huddersfield constituents, 30 May 1855.
  4. [Forster], 'Foreign Policy of the United States', 171.

In conjunction with their principal objectives of resisting Russian autocracy and promoting the nationalist ambitions of Poles, Italians and Hungarians, Goderich, Layard and their colleagues justified their warlike tendencies by a number of additional considerations. Of course they never seriously accepted the suggestion that the dispute over Russian and French religious rights was anything but an excuse for hostilities. They were, however, apprehensive about the ease with which Russia could blatantly debase standards of international law by her unwarranted aggression in the Principalities in July 1853, and believed that Britain was morally bound by her treaty obligations to defend Turkish independence and integrity.<sup>1</sup> In addition, they repeatedly alleged that the nation's 'honour' was central to the conflict, but they were also aware that England's material interests were at stake. Goderich, for example, was adamant in his belief that it was "an error to say that it was merely *for Turkey* that we engaged in this war. We engaged in it at least equally for ourselves."<sup>2</sup> Forster added that Britain's prestige in India and trade route through Egypt were threatened.<sup>3</sup> Layard reminded the house on a number of occasions of Britain's direct interest in the fate of Constantinople, stating in February 1854, for example, that

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1. e.g. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 107, 120-1, 127: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'. Throughout his life Ripon proposed that international relations should involve Christian, moral considerations, rather than those of mere national prestige or influence (see Lord Ripon, 'Some Thoughts on International Morality', *Month*, 16, 62, Feb. 1879, 157-66).

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 3: G to F, Brighton, 30 Nov. 1855 (copy).

3. [Forster], 'Foreign Policy of the United States', 171.

"we are about to be engaged in a great struggle in support of right against wrong, *and for the maintenance of principles upon which our material interests*, as well as the cause of liberty and civilisation itself, may depend."<sup>1</sup>. He even argued that Russia was "aiming at such acquisition of territory as would render her dangerous to the very existence of this country."<sup>2</sup>. Layard further asserted that, were Russia to control Constantinople, Britain's tenure of India would be materially threatened.<sup>3</sup>

It would be difficult to argue that the abhorrence felt by Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard for czarist tyranny was not wholly justified. Moreover in expressing this view they reflected not only the mainstream of British public opinion, but also the approach of socialists such as Karl Marx.<sup>4</sup> Unencumbered by Mancunian strictures on non-interventionism, the propriety of British interference was not, in their view, a significant factor. Nevertheless in the early, euphoric days of war, and despite the obvious paradoxes of their nationalist aspirations and England's alliances with European despots, they tended to oversimplify the issues, to think, for example, in terms of civilisation and barbarism, and in general to ignore the realities and nuances of international diplomacy. This was perhaps a result of their enthusiasm for the

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1. 3 H 130, 860: 17 Feb. 1854, my italics; also 3 H 131, 739: 13 March 1854.
  2. 3 H 132, 241: 31 March 1854.
  3. 3 H 129, 1776: 16 Aug. 1853.
  4. Marx, the London correspondent of the *New-York Daily Tribune*, strongly praised Layard's knowledge of and approach to the eastern question (*New-York Daily Tribune*, 2 Sept. 1853).

military aspects of the conflict, which was almost boundless.<sup>1.</sup> Unlike Aberdeen, Gladstone, Cobden, Bright and others who dreaded the horrors of combat, they were never unsympathetic to the state of war itself which, popular as it was throughout virtually the entire community and involving all segments of the populace, they perceived in part as an illustration of the basic organic unity of the nation. Their war enthusiasm, though it undoubtedly reflected a significant proportion of public opinion, resulted in a degree of irrational judgment to which neither Palmerston nor Bright, Disraeli nor Gladstone, succumbed. They perceived the war primarily on an ethical basis, as a necessary and justifiable struggle between right and wrong, and decried the tendency (which they attributed particularly to the Manchester laissez-faireists) to weigh its pros and cons merely in a selfish and materialistic manner. In so doing they tended to lose sight of the fact that other war enthusiasts based their support wholly on practical considerations of British political and economic interests in the east, and were therefore unprepared for attacks from their opponents on these grounds. And in assessing, for example, the merits of the Austrian position, their emotional reaction to Hapsburg tyranny caused them to lose sight of the fact that Austria's neutrality served to isolate her not only from western European powers, but also from czarist Russia, and was thereby indirectly responsible in

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1. In view of his quaker origins, Forster's militarism is particularly surprising, and illustrates the extent of his ideological alienation from the society of friends. Goderich, Hughes, Bruce and Layard had all whetted their military appetites at the cosmopolitan club, where they formed a sort of soldierly coterie with Colonel Shadwell, Sir Anthony Sterling, and General Mansfield. Bruce, in addition, experienced the impact of his new father-in-law, Sir William Napier. For a full discussion of their military interests, see chapter 10 below.

the long term for the disintegration of her influence in both Italy and Germany.<sup>1.</sup>

The influence of Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard on British foreign policy during the Crimean war was relatively marginal. However the impact of the war on their developing relationship cannot be overemphasised, for it intensified their isolation from their 'natural' radical allies, from the Peelites and, paradoxically, from Palmerston, the man whom the nation trusted would win the war. With the peace party, whether Mancunian or Peelite, they had little patience. Goderich, for instance, stressed the injustice and ignorance of their approach, by which they

preferred to denounce all war, to abuse and calumniate all soldiers, to deny all history, and to lay themselves open to the imputation of every low motive, and of spewing forth but another phase of that Mammon-worship and that denial of National Life, which form the great evil and sin of our time, and they thus cut off from association with them the best and wisest men of our time. 2.

He further asserted that

if we fear to lose our money, or even to see our commerce injured, or our trade stopped, in the doing of our duty or the maintaining of our honour, we shall lose them all without fail in the stagnation of a coward peace, when we might have kept [them] through the dangers of a righteous war. 3.

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1. For an analysis of Austria's diplomatic isolation after 1856, see W.E. Mosse, 'The Triple Treaty of 15 April 1856', *English Historical Review*, 67, 263, April 1952, 203-29.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 108-9: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.
  3. *ibid.*, 128.

Layard stated that, though he respected the views of Bright and Cobden on other issues, in their peace policy they "assume those to be facts which are not facts" and "argue the question upon a false basis."<sup>1</sup> The false basis of strict non-interventionism was seen as hypocritical, in that the Mancunians, though sympathetic, would not actively support the liberation of European nationalities from their Hapsburg oppressors. Layard and his colleagues could not, moreover, understand how Cobden and his ilk could despise Turkish tyranny with an equal or greater vehemence than they hated czarist oppression. And Gladstone Layard contemptuously accused of "squeamish sentimentality" in not wishing to humiliate Russia.<sup>2</sup> Of course the Crimean war also caused Bruce to abandon any Peelite sympathies he may previously have possessed, and Hughes asserted that "with our own peace-at-any-price party, no one has less sympathy than I."<sup>3</sup>

Their contempt for Palmerston did not diminish as a result of his role in helping to formulate war policy, though they were forced to admit that his leadership held more promise than that of either Aberdeen or Derby-Disraeli. The difficulty was that, despite his ostensible support of liberal-national movements abroad, Palmerston had in fact welcomed Napoleon's coup and believed the Austrian empire should be maintained, and therefore could not merit the trust of radical-romantic democrats such as Goderich, Layard and their colleagues. And they disliked in particular his casual and contemptuous attitude to what they believed was a contest critical to Britain's

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1. *Times*, 1 March 1855: L's address to his Aylesbury constituents, 28 Feb. 1855.
  2. [Layard], 'The Results and Prospects of the War', 255.
  3. James Russell Lowell, *The Biglow Papers (newly edited, with a preface by the author of "Tom Brown's School-days.")*, (London, 1859), xix.

national survival. Goderich was especially incensed that the British nation, in its crusade against czarist despotism, should look for leadership to Palmerston, the man who as foreign secretary in 1849 had done nothing to impede Russia's flagrant interference in Hungary, and had offered merely "a feeble protest and a little clap-trap swagger to a London deputation."<sup>1</sup> Of course Palmerston's aversion to domestic reform did not help to assuage their distrust of his motives.

The views which have been examined here are those which Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard embraced at the commencement of hostilities and in the early stages of the war. To some extent their initial aspirations were later modified by pragmatic considerations. Their fundamental attitudes in justification of the conflict remained basically unaltered throughout, but their immediate war aims, especially on the question of nationality, in time reflected practical and unavoidable amendments.

### 3.

When Layard decided to accompany Lord Stratford to Constantinople in March 1853, he unwittingly assured for himself a reputation for knowledge and understanding of eastern diplomacy which, fortified by his reputation as an eastern scholar, was later to afford him a position of some influence both within the house of commons and with the British public at large. The mission itself was not a success for Layard, who chafed under Stratford's "irritable, suspicious &

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 112, 123-4: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.

jealous" nature.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, he appeared to entirely misconstrue the gravity of Menschikov's mission to Constantinople. In one of a series of informational letters to Granville he expressed his belief that Russian preparations for war were merely meant to intimidate Turkey, for he could not accept "that the peace of the East will be disturbed for questions of mere national ambition."<sup>2</sup> By the end of April, seeing "so little chance at present of any disturbance of the peace,"<sup>3</sup> he had decided to return to London; within a month Menschikov, his ultimatum regarding Russia's right to intervene on behalf of Ottoman Christians having been rebuffed by the Turks, had peremptorily departed from Constantinople, and the czar had made his decision to invade the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 22: L to Lady Aboyne, Vienna, 24 March 1853 (copy). The nature of Layard's position vis-à-vis Stratford on this mission has been misconstrued by Kingsley Martin, who mistakenly believed that Layard was a long-time employee of the British embassy at Constantinople, and had originally gone out to the east as a newspaper correspondent. He quotes at length from Layard's autobiography in an attempt to prove that Layard, as a correspondent, was responsible for Stratford's persistent popularity with the press during this period. Martin's assertion is grossly misleading, for the passage in the autobiography which he quotes in fact refers to Layard's role as a *Morning Chronicle* correspondent in 1843! In truth, Layard was extremely critical of Stratford's high-handed manner in dealing with the Turks in 1853 (see B. Kingsley Martin, *The Triumph of Lord Palmerston: A Study of Public Opinion in England before the Crimean War*, (London, 1924), 108-9. Martin attributes the quote from Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, to ii : 123-4; in fact it is found on ii : 102-4. The page reference is omitted in the 1863 edition of his book.) This fallacious description of Layard's role at Constantinople has unfortunately been accepted by other historians, e.g. R.W. Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge, 1938), 317n; J.L. Herkless, 'Stratford, the Cabinet and the Outbreak of the Crimean War', *Historical Journal*, 18, 3, 1975, 512n.
  2. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/23/3, 119: L to Granville, Constantinople, 16 April 1853.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 58156, 145: L to Sara Austen, Constantinople, 25 April 1853.

Shortly after reaching London, Layard's disenchantment with the eastern policy of the Aberdeen government had become evident. It must be recalled that, though he was acquainted with his fellow-members Bruce and Goderich at this time, their alliance was still tenuous, and it was not until the following year that their actions in the house of commons became positively co-ordinated. They found open to them three principal avenues by which they could propagate their views. The most obvious was through house of commons debate. Their personal contacts with ministers, however, could perhaps have been a more effective tool of influence. Unfortunately neither Bruce nor Goderich had yet established connections with Aberdeen or his subordinates, and Layard soon undermined his influence through his truculence in the house and his personal attacks on Aberdeen. Finally, they attempted to disseminate their ideas in print. Layard had a connection with John Murray as a result of his archaeological publications, and the pages of the *Quarterly Review* were therefore open to his pen. During the course of the conflict, he published five anonymous articles through this medium: 'Turkey and Russia' in December 1853, 'The Turks and the Greeks' in March 1854, 'Campaign in the Crimea' in December 1854, 'Objects of the War' in December 1855, and 'The Peace and its Effects on the Condition of Turkey' in March 1856.<sup>1.</sup> In addition John Murray consented to two separate publications of Layard's parliamentary speeches.<sup>2.</sup> Forster, having previously

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1. All have been previously cited except [A.H. Layard], 'Campaign in the Crimea', *Quarterly Review*, 96, Dec. 1854, 200-60; and [A.H. Layard], 'Objects of the War', *Quarterly Review*, 97, June 1855, 245-90.

2. A.H. Layard, *The Turkish Question. Speeches delivered in the House of Commons on Aug. 16, 1853, Feb. 17, and March 31, 1854*, (London, 1854); A.H. Layard, *The Prospects and Conduct of the War. Speech delivered in the House of Commons, on December 12, 1854*, (London, 1854).

contributed to the *Edinburgh Review*, was able to have 'The Autocracy of the Czars' published in that journal in April 1855, but Hughes had no means by which to propagate his opinions. In fact the influence of Hughes and Forster on Crimean war issues was primarily exerted through Goderich,<sup>1</sup> and indeed via Goderich through Layard, in the house of commons. Therefore, though neither Hughes nor Forster directly participated in Crimean agitation (except through political contacts they made in such venues as the cosmopolitan club), to ignore the impact of their ideas on Goderich, Bruce and Layard in the house would be to misunderstand the nature of their relationship.

Layard's initial actions in the house of commons in June-July 1853 have been briefly described above.<sup>2</sup> It is evident that during this period he was looked to not only by Bruce and Goderich but also by a broad cross-section of the house of commons as an expert on the eastern question.<sup>3</sup> However it is necessary to realise that he was not yet experienced in either house of commons traditions or

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1. The Ripon Papers for the years 1854-1856 contain abundant references to Crimean questions, particularly in the Goderich-Hughes correspondence (BL Add Ms 43547) but also in that of Goderich and Forster (BL Add Ms 43536). The most pertinent examples are incorporated in the text below.
  2. See chapter 3 above.
  3. See LP. BL Add Ms 38982, 30: L to Henry Ross, London, 18 July 1853, in which Layard states: "... My own position as far as that of a public man & an independent member of the House of Commons is concerned, is a very good one. The greatest interest is felt in the present state of the East, and my long connection with it makes me in public opinion an authority upon the subject..." Not only did Layard possess significant experience of the east in his own right, but he had established sources of information through diplomatic and consular connections such as Humphrey Sandwith, Charles Alison, Charles Blunt and I.A. Longworth.

procedures and was, for example, extremely nervous about placing his first important motion before the house.<sup>1.</sup>

Layard's forays during question period, when he inquired about movements of the British and French fleets to the Dardanelles and the Russian blockade of the mouth of the Danube,<sup>2.</sup> together with his July attempts to discuss Russian aggression in the Principalities, were evidently part of an effort to expose and then modify what he interpreted as the vague and uncertain policies of the Aberdeen government. His attempt to bring forward the matter on 22 July was abortive, in that Russell successfully pleaded with the house to trust to the government's judgment in pressing the Vienna note,<sup>3.</sup> and Layard's efforts were subsequently denigrated by the Aberdeen-controlled press.<sup>4.</sup> However by mid-August the government was convinced that the Vienna note provided a basis for peace, having been accepted by the Russians and not yet rejected by the Turks, and a debate was therefore allowed on 16 August. It marked Layard's first major contribution to house of commons debate and, in addition to justifying the necessity of opposing Russian aggression, he condemned the government for its pacifist and indecisive approach.<sup>5.</sup>

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 58156, 151: L to Benjamin Austen, London, 6 July 1853.
  2. 3 H 128, 57-8: 13 June 1853; 3 H 128, 1087-8: 1 July 1853.
  3. 3 H 129, 647-50: 22 July 1853. The Vienna note was an attempt by Britain, France, Austria and Prussia to mediate the Russo-Turkish dispute. Based essentially on the *status quo* as regards Russian influence in the Ottoman empire, it was initially accepted by the Russian government, but on 20 August rejected by the Turks. Early in September, Nesselrode's interpretation of the note was publicised, clearly indicating Russia's belief that it gave her the unquestioned right of intervention in Turkey on behalf of orthodox Christians. The note was thereafter abandoned.
  4. *Times*, 25 July 1853.
  5. 3 H 129, 1769-80: 16 Aug. 1853.

The crux of Layard's attack on the ministry at this time was his belief that Russia's crossing of the Pruth should have been considered a *casus belli*, and he argued that, had England been firm from the outset and had the czar been convinced of her determination, Russian troops would never have invaded the Principalities. He forcefully propounded this view in his article entitled 'Turkey and Russia' in December 1853, repeating his conviction that peace would have been preserved and Turkish independence guaranteed had the czar been persuaded that Britain would have declared war if Russia crossed the Pruth.<sup>1</sup> Layard continued to press his point, and as late as December 1854 reminded the house of the fatal mistake which had been made.<sup>2</sup> Goderich at this time was perhaps more cautious than Layard, and was certainly explicit in warning against entering lightly into war.<sup>3</sup> Whether he then accepted Layard's propositions regarding the occupation of the Principalities as a *casus belli* cannot be ascertained. He wholeheartedly endorsed this view in 1855,<sup>4</sup> but this may have been a result of Layard's later and growing influence.

The validity of their judgment is perhaps impossible to determine. Palmerston evidently agreed with their assessment, but was unwilling to cause government collapse on this issue: he proposed in cabinet on 18 June that a Russian invasion of the Principalities ought to be considered a *casus belli*, but was overruled and gave way gracefully.<sup>5</sup> Historians of nineteenth-century British foreign policy such

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1. [Layard], 'Turkey and Russia', 276.
  2. 3 H 136, 165: 12 Dec. 1854. He also reiterated the view in his address to his Aylesbury constituents on 28 Feb. 1855 (*Times*, 1 March 1855).
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 109-12: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.
  4. *Times*, 2 June 1855: G's address to his Huddersfield constituents, 30 May 1855.
  5. Herkless, 510.

as Bourne and Seton-Watson have concurred, and even Conacher, the historian of the Aberdeen coalition, whilst exonerating Aberdeen from any blame nevertheless admits in retrospect that "one may agree that in terms of results, if not morally, it [the firm approach advocated in cabinet by Palmerston and Russell] was preferable to the compromise policy which was substituted and which did result in war."<sup>1</sup> However it was in the final analysis a risky approach which Layard proposed. Had the czar called her bluff, Great Britain would have been committed thereby to hostilities, without positive assurances at this early stage that public opinion would have been supportive or that the French alliance was yet sufficiently secure. Aberdeen, who dreaded the prospect of war and remained unconvinced of its necessity, wished instead to preserve and explore all other options.

Throughout 1853 and in the first three months of 1854, Britain and France drifted slowly and somewhat pathetically into war with Russia. Nicholas, Napoleon and Aberdeen faced the prospect with increasing dismay, but were in a sense trapped by their circumstances. The Turks, Palmerston and much of the British public, on the other hand, greeted the inevitable with growing enthusiasm, and the public became progressively more frustrated with the government's obvious vacillation and distaste for the conflict. Layard, Goderich and Bruce, in conjunction with Hughes and Forster,<sup>2</sup> therefore envisaged a definitive role for themselves in the house of commons: to undermine

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1. Bourne, 75; Seton-Watson, 313; Conacher, 267.

2. Reid states that, "like the majority of his fellow-countrymen, he [Forster] was disgusted by the unpreparedness, the vacillation, and the weakness displayed by our ministers in carrying on the struggle" (Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 302).

what they perceived as the dangerous and ignominious impact of all those who were less than enthusiastic in their support of the war, whether Peelites within the cabinet or peace party Mancunians without.

The policies of Cobden and Bright were decried on a number of occasions, and Layard went so far in one instance as to accuse the Manchester peace party of having unintentionally caused the war, in that its attitudes had helped delude the czar from a true appreciation of Britain's commitment to protect Turkey.<sup>1</sup> But in the final analysis they realised that if a consistent and forceful opposition to the threat of czarist autocracy were to be attained, it was primarily necessary that the cabinet be expurgated by the removal of the hesitant Peelites. Goderich was always circumspect in his distaste for Aberdeen's policies: he never descended to personal attacks, and reassured Bruce that he had "not shared the *suspicious* against Id. Aberdeen; but of course I never thought him a safe guide in foreign politics."<sup>2</sup> On the other hand Layard, who led their attack in the house of commons, was needlessly obstinate and offensive, and was not unnaturally considered by many to have a personal animosity against Aberdeen. His speech on the declaration of war is an excellent example of his attitude. Attacking the ministry for its equivocation, he asserted that

there were two parties then in the Cabinet, and ... there are two parties now, and ... these discordant elements have been striving to counteract the influence of each other, and ... one of these parties wishes to pursue a policy which I, and I believe the country, most completely concur in. 3.

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1. 3 H 138, 1254: 25 May 1855; also 3 H 135, 640-6: 24 July 1854.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 13: G to B, Ripon, 25 Sept. 1854. The suspicions to which Goderich referred were presumably the allegations of complicity with the Russians levelled against Aberdeen (and even Palmerston) by the Urquhart lunatic fringe.
  3. 3 H 132, 231: 31 March 1854.

Had he gone no further than this, and simply been content with bringing attention to the divergent views within cabinet, all would have been well, but Layard then felt compelled to speak in the following terms:

We have now entered upon a most vital question, which demands the whole of our energy, and which must be met with a conviction that a great cause is at stake of the deepest interest to the country. If any Member of the Government -- if any right hon. Gentleman on the Treasury benches -- doubt that we are going to war to maintain great principles, if he have scruples about fighting for Mussulmans against Christians, if he have misgivings as to the justice and necessity of this war -- let that man, I say, retire at once -- for if he do not, he is betraying his country. This is not a moment for half-convictions and shams. If men enter into a war of this magnitude, they must do it heart and soul. The vessel of the State is in danger, it is tossed to and fro by the waves, and if there be an unsteady hand at the helm, or some person who has mistaken his mission, or who is treacherous to the cause -- I say, throw your 'Jonah' overboard. If you do not, your vessel will be wrecked. 1.

Layard persevered throughout 1854 with this type of attack on the alleged vacillation and indecision of the Peelite component of cabinet. In July, for example, he called for an explicit statement from a 'peace' minister (he suggested Gladstone) that the entire cabinet was united in pursuit of a vigorous and energetic policy.<sup>2</sup> In addition to major house of commons speeches in July and again in December,<sup>3</sup> he also published his views.<sup>4</sup> In retrospect, however, he believed he had been too restrained in his opposition: he stated in

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1. 3 H 132, 240-1: 31 March 1854.

2. 3 H 135, 662: 24 July 1854.

3. 3 H 135, 639-62: 24 July 1854; 3 H 135, 728-39: 25 July 1854; 3 H 136, 160-95: 12 Dec. 1854; see also 3 H 130, 831-60: 17 Feb. 1854.

4. [Layard], 'The Turks and the Greeks', 510.

February 1855 that he almost felt degraded in his own eyes that he had not spoken out "more boldly" the previous year.<sup>1</sup> Gladstone nevertheless considered him to have been sufficiently forceful, and in describing Layard as an unrealistic Turcophile, accused him of a "perfectly sincere fanaticism."<sup>2</sup>

Layard's assessment of the Peelites' uncertain commitment to the war effort was undoubtedly justified. When the cabinet finally realised its error of judgment regarding czarist intentions, it based its hostility to Russia on the desire to protect English influence in the east rather than on the desire to protect Turkey from Russian aggression *on principle*,<sup>3</sup> and even the sympathetic Conacher admits that Aberdeen's exoneration of Russia from charges of long-term aggression, in a house of lords debate in June 1854, went "further than it was politic for a war-time Prime Minister to do."<sup>4</sup> Layard was induced on this occasion to withdraw a condemnatory motion in the house of commons when Aberdeen 'explained' his previous language,<sup>5</sup> but Layard's distrust of Peelite intentions was strongly confirmed by the incident. Unfortunately, he spoiled much of his case by exaggeration, impolitic personal abuse, and self-justificatory remarks. His colleagues recognised the fatal weakness in Layard's attacks, and Goderich urged on him the view that,

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1. 3 H 136, 1515: 19 Feb. 1855.

2. 3 H 139, 1302: 23 July 1855.

3. See Herkless, 519, 522.

4. Conacher, 391.

5. 3 H 134, 749: 27 June 1854; Conacher, 392-3.

... if you will only learn that in speaking *in* the House of Commons it will never do to forget that you are speaking *to* the House of Commons, you will have little else to learn to enable you to do what you like in that poor trade of talking, to which we are both serving our apprenticeship. 1.

In fact the haranguing nature of many of Layard's speeches served only to lessen his influence, for instead of dividing the peaceful from the warlike elements of the ministry the effect was to unite Russell, Palmerston, Aberdeen and Gladstone in a mutual defence of their government from what they perceived as the unwarranted bitterness of Layard's opposition. Their subsequent allegations that Layard's attacks were founded purely on motives of personal ambition had little foundation in reality, however. Bruce, in defence of his friend, argued that Layard's journey to the Crimea (in the company of Delane and Kinglake) in the autumn of 1854 was animated by his "keen sensitiveness to human suffering" and "ardent desire to protect the oppressed," and stated:

I know but too well that his motives ..., and his consequent action, were impugned and attributed to ambition, to political and personal passion and what not, by those -- and they were many -- who misunderstood his character, and failed to appreciate the strength of his sympathy with suffering. His nature was vehement, his convictions strong, and when he exposed incompetence or injustice, he smote and spared not, possibly with occasional injustice or exaggeration, which, given the man and his nature, were, I fear, inevitable ... But those who knew him well ... were able to supply more generous and truer explanations than could occur to his prejudiced and ill-informed critics. 2.

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 159: G to L, Ripon, 25 Aug. 1855.

2. Layard, *Early Adventures*, 27-8.

In attempting to create division in the coalition and thus lay the basis for a new strong and united government, the group inevitably placed themselves in the position of supporting the cabinet's warlike members. In effect this meant backing Russell and the despised Palmerston as the most effective war leaders available. Layard, for example, praised Palmerston in the house as early as August 1853 (and wrote to Bruce at the time that Palmerston was "undoubtedly *the* favourite" in the commons<sup>1.</sup>), and again in February and July of 1854;<sup>2.</sup> he was also forced to turn to Russell on a number of occasions.<sup>3.</sup> And though his personal attacks on the Peelites merited the contempt of both Russell and Palmerston as well as that of Aberdeen, Layard nevertheless contributed, if unwittingly, to Palmerston's growing image as the man destined to lead the country to victory. Moreover with Roebuck he bore much of the responsibility for the demise of the Aberdeen coalition in February 1855, admitting at the time of Roebuck's motion for a committee of inquiry that, though sceptical of the practical results of such a committee, he would seize the opportunity presented to him and support Roebuck simply in order to defeat the government on a vote of confidence.<sup>4.</sup> Though Layard may have been more frank as to his purpose than either Goderich

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 58159, 128: L to B, 17 Aug. [1853].

2. 3 H 129, 1770, 1773: 16 Aug. 1853; 3 H 130, 853: 17 Feb. 1854; 3 H 135, 651: 24 July 1854.

3. e.g. 3 H 135, 640, 653: 24 July 1854; 3 H 135, 738: 25 July 1854; 3 H 136, 163: 12 Dec. 1854.

4. 3 H 136, 1034: 26 Jan. 1855. Of his speech, Palmerston reported pointedly to the queen: "Mr Layard, ... in a speech of much animation, gave very strong reasons to show the great impropriety of the Motion, and ended by saying he should vote for it" (Benson and Esher, *Letters of Queen Victoria*, iii : 96: Palmerston to Queen Victoria, 26 Jan. 1855).

or Bruce, the others agreed with his stance and voted against the ministry. Their goal of dividing and thereby defeating the Aberdeen coalition had been achieved; paradoxically Palmerston, whose character they so fundamentally mistrusted yet whose Crimean policies most closely accorded with their own, was the chief beneficiary of their actions and, despite the enthusiasm of his committed proponents, he proved no more determined nor effective in prosecuting the war effort than Aberdeen had previously been.<sup>1</sup>

4.

Two great difficulties were inherent in Crimean war operations: where the conflict could be fought, and why. On 20 April 1854 Austria and Prussia signed an accord, the effect of which was to guarantee Austrian neutrality so long as Russia remained on the defensive. This was succeeded in June by an agreement between Russia and Austria that the czar's occupation forces in the Principalities should be replaced by Austrian troops in return for an Austrian guarantee of non-intervention in the war, and in July and August the Russian army accordingly evacuated the Principalities. Not only did this manoeuvre free Russian troops for action elsewhere, it also made redundant the original Anglo-French war aim of expelling the Russians from the Principalities. The immediate result was to limit the ambitions of the western powers, both militarily and diplomatically: the decision was made to invest Sebastopol, and the 'four points' were adopted as the basis of an acceptable peace. Austria, anxious to terminate hostilities and thereby avoid

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1. Layard in fact very forcibly stated this view in May 1855 (3 H 138, 1268: 25 May 1855). Goderich also took considerable interest in this debate (3 H 138, 1300-1: 25 May 1855).

participation, initiated the discussions from which emerged in July 1854 the Anglo-French definition of their war aims: the renunciation by Russia of her special rights in Serbia and the Principalities and their replacement by a general guarantee of the European powers (including Russia); free navigation on the Danube; revision of the straits convention of 1841, which regulated the presence of warships in the Black Sea; and the renunciation by Russia of her claim to an exclusive protectorate over the orthodox Christians of the Ottoman empire, to be replaced by a general European guarantee (including Russian).

For Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard, these limited modifications of Russia's power and status were from the outset perceived as inadequate. Even if Britain's war objectives were confined to a redefinition of Russo-Turkish relations, the four points were considered unacceptable as a basis for peace. Thus Layard persistently decried any notion of a simple reversion to the *status quo ante bellum*,<sup>1</sup> and argued even before hostilities commenced that Russia must in future possess no protectorate in any form over Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia, that Circassia must be declared free to foreign traders, and that the passes of the Caucasus must be closed against the entry of Russia into the centre of Asia, all in addition to free navigation of the Danube, revision of the straits convention so that the Black Sea would no longer remain a *mare clausum*, and complete abolition of Russia's protectorate over the sultan's orthodox subjects.<sup>2</sup>

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1. 3 H 130, 854: 17 Feb. 1854; 3 H 131, 356, 357: 6 March 1854;  
3 H 132, 241: 31 March 1854.

2. 3 H 130, 854: 17 Feb. 1854.

However as demonstrated above Layard, Goderich and their colleagues based their mutual advocacy of the Crimean war effort not merely on the narrow question of Russo-Turkish relations, but on the wider need to control czarist despotism, and in particular to diminish its influence in Europe, in order that the 1815 treaty of Vienna might be discarded in favour of a European settlement recognising the claims of nationality. Goderich confirmed this approach in a letter to Hughes in January 1855, stating that the war must end in a real limitation of Russia's power, and that "a resettlement of Europe lies at the end of this war -- & yet the Government dare not face it, but hamper themselves with Austrian alliances & four points." Goderich still argued that Britain must adopt "a policy abroad which will correct the injustice & inequity & imbecility of 1815."<sup>1</sup>

The four points were submitted to the Russians in August 1854, and indignantly rejected. Layard was actually fearful at the time that the czar would accept the peace proposals and thereby avoid hostilities in the Crimea, which Layard was convinced would result in a profound Russian defeat.<sup>2</sup> Following the allied victories of the Alma and Inkerman, however, the Russians decided to acquiesce in the peace terms proposed in the four points, but by this time the British had broadened their scope and implications, and insisted in particular that the third point encompass the end of Russian naval dominance in the Black Sea. The French were not as vehement at this time on the Black Sea neutralisation clause, but British attitudes had stiffened largely as a result of public enthusiasm for the war and pressure on

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 154: G to H, Turancon, 1 Jan. 1855.

2. George Paston, *At John Murray's: Records of a Literary Circle, 1843-1892*, (London, 1932), 135: L to Murray, Therapia, 8 Sept. 1854.

the government to persevere. Layard contributed to this pressure in a letter he wrote Russell from H.M.S. *Agamemnon*, off Eupatoria, from where he witnessed British and French operations. He argued that the four points would not substantially modify Russia's objectionable influence, and would therefore be "the source of infinite misfortune to Europe." The first point, Layard believed, would in practice result in the Principalities becoming the focus of an Austro-Russian power struggle, thereby abandoning their hopes for independence, and the quintuple guarantee for Serbia was equally "mischievous," in that it would place Serbia at the mercy of her real enemy, Austria, enabling the latter "to check the development of free institutions and to destroy all prospects of the formation of a strong Christian state in Turkey in Europe." Layard concluded his letter by emphasising that he could not believe

... that the people of England will be satisfied with such a settlement after the enormous sacrifices they have made. [Note that this letter was written before the army had actually landed and engaged in battle.] We have it in our power to place this great Eastern question upon such a basis as may ward off for many years to come at least a renewal of the dangers to which we have been exposed. I trust we shall not lose an opportunity which may never occur again. 1.

Russell, though he didn't subscribe to all Layard's opinions, was nevertheless so impressed with Layard's views that he requested further advice as to possible terms.<sup>2</sup> It seems plausible, therefore, that Layard was partially responsible for the enlargement of the government's war aims in the autumn of 1854. On his return to London, he reaffirmed in a very telling and effective house of commons speech his contention

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1. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/11E, 48: L to Russell, H.M.S. *Agamemnon*, 25 miles N. of Sebastopol, 16 Sept. 1854.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38982, 311: Russell to L, Scarborough, 9 Oct. 1854.

that Britain should continue her military struggle, rather than accept "a hollow -- I might almost say disgraceful -- peace, utterly inconsistent with the great sacrifice of blood and treasure that this country has been called upon to make."<sup>1</sup>

Throughout the war Layard, Goderich, Bruce, Hughes and Forster were profoundly distrustful of Austrian intentions, and with considerable justification. The Hapsburgs' prime motivation was to avoid participation in the hostilities, and thereby to preserve their sway in Italy, Hungary and Poland, and if possible to extend their influence in the Balkans and the Danubian Principalities. The Austrians broke their previous alliance with Russia principally in order to counteract czarist influence in the latter two regions, and along with the Prussians saw no reason to abrogate their neutrality in order to make Napoleon the master of Europe. As early as June 1854 Layard unsuccessfully pressed Russell to publicly clarify the positions of Austria and Prussia,<sup>2</sup> and a month later voiced in the house his opposition to Austria's mediatory role, mistrusting both her despotic principles and her inherent interest in restoring the *status quo ante bellum*.<sup>3</sup> The Austrian occupation of the Principalities certainly did nothing to alleviate the natural mistrust of her motives entertained by Goderich, Layard and their colleagues.<sup>4</sup> Thus they greeted with dismay

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1. 3 H 136, 161: 12 Dec. 1854.

2. LP. BL Add Ms 38982, 251: Russell to L, 5 June 1854; LP. BL Add Ms 38982, 253: L to Russell, London, 6 June 1854.

3. 3 H 135, 659: 24 July 1854.

4. A year later, Layard persisted in doubting the wisdom of British acceptance of Austria's role in Moldavia and Wallachia (3 H 139, 952-3: 17 July 1855; 3 H 139, 1202-3: 20 July 1855); see also 3 H 138, 970: 24 May 1855, for Otway's collaborative efforts to denigrate Austria's role in the Principalities. Layard was in contact at this time with a group of Moldo-Wallachians, including I.C. Bratiano, then in exile in Paris (LP. BL Add Ms 39065, 141-218).

the formal establishment on 2 December 1854 of an Anglo-Franco-Austrian alliance for the defence of the Principalities, which in effect condoned Austria's occupation and precluded any possibility of the national liberation of Austrian possessions in Italy and eastern Europe. On two occasions in the house, Layard sought enlightenment from ministers as to the terms of the treaty which had bound England to Austrian reaction, but to no avail.<sup>1.</sup>

Thus in March 1855 when Austria, having successfully fortified her influence in the Principalities and Balkans and having maintained her position in Italy and eastern Europe, naturally considered it in her interests to stop the hostilities at this stage and therefore proposed that the powers convene in Vienna to discuss peace on the basis of the four points, Layard, Goderich and their colleagues were exceedingly sceptical as to her designs.<sup>2.</sup> Nor were they mollified by the abortive results of the conference, in which basic accord had been reached on the first, second and fourth points; in addition, Russell and Drouyn de Lhuys had agreed in the names of Britain and France with Austria's suggestion that disagreement over the third term could be resolved by accepting a limitation of the Russian Black Sea fleet to its pre-war strength. After some hesitation in both Paris and London as to the acceptability of this arrangement, Drouyn de Lhuys and Russell were both repudiated on the issue by their respective home governments.

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1. 3 H 136, 910: 23 Jan. 1855; 3 H 137, 1068: 26 March 1855.
  2. 3 H 136, 180-1: 12 Dec. 1854; *Times*, 1 March 1855: L's address to his Aylesbury constituents, 28 Feb. 1855. Goderich indicated his profound mistrust of Austrian motives in July (3 H 139, 606-7: 6 July 1855).

The very fact that Palmerston had agreed to negotiations on the basis of the four points seemed to confirm fears that his commitment to the destruction of Russian power was only slightly more dependable than his predecessor's. In fact Palmerston's war aims, despite occasionally-unrepressed rhetoric to the contrary, were essentially pragmatic, designed to deter Russian expansion in the near east for fifteen years and to leave intact, at least for the present, conservative rule in Poland, Hungary and Italy. Layard, Goderich and Bruce, who had contributed to Aberdeen's demise and Palmerston's inevitable accession to power, were hardly disillusioned by his not unexpected stance: they had not in early 1855 entertained a high regard for or trust in Palmerston.

Another factor, however, had also entered into their calculations by mid-1855. After their initial military victories at the Alma, Balaclava and Inkerman, the French and British troops, with their Turkish and Sardinian allies, found themselves committed to a lengthy and demanding siege of Sebastopol. The prolonged absence of military success or progress, and the incredible maladministration of army services which was sustained throughout the first half of 1855, led Layard, Goderich and their friends to the gradual realisation that the Crimean war would not engulf and transform all Europe. They did not subsequently abandon their interest in the question of nationality but rather limited their ambitious European designs, concentrating thereafter on establishing nation-states in the Principalities and extending Serbian independence.

On 25 May 1855, therefore, when Layard seized the opportunity provided by Disraeli's motion on the conduct of the war to condemn the

government's handling of the Vienna conference, he limited his vision more strictly to the specific question of Russia's predominance in the east.<sup>1</sup> In so doing he publicly accepted the inevitability that the four points, suitably modified to Russia's disadvantage, would form at least the partial basis of a peace settlement. The arguments which he then advanced were expanded upon a month later in his *Quarterly Review* article entitled 'Objects of the War', in which Russell quite naturally attracted his particular criticism, and in which Layard reiterated his contention that joint Russian-Austrian-French-English protectorates over Serbia, Moldavia and Wallachia would in fact render Britain and France powerless, thereby enabling Austria and Russia to prevent any form of liberal-national self-government. In this way, whilst not abandoning his commitment to nationalism, Layard implicitly limited his proposals to Serbia and the Principalities and abandoned the national liberation of Poland, Hungary and Italy as unrealistic. He believed the second point, regarding free navigation of the Danube, had forced no important concession from Russia. The fourth point, that the contracting powers have a joint right of interference on behalf of Turkey's Christians, he considered unsatisfactory, in that a state of confusion over rights and obligations would inevitably result, thereby ensuring Russia's exclusive power over the sultan's Greek orthodox subjects. The four points, Layard concluded, formed an unacceptable basis for peace, and the end of the war was impossible before the fate of Sebastopol had been ascertained. Layard proceeded to describe his principles for a just peace. Firstly, there should be

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1. 3 H 138, 1251-70: 25 May 1855. A later and similar exposition of his views on the Vienna negotiations was made in the house in August (3 H 139, 1825-32: 3 Aug. 1855).

no foreign interference in the Principalities, but the two provinces, preferably with Bessarabia, should be united as a constitutional monarchy recognising the nominal suzerainty of the sultan, thus creating an effective barrier against Russia. All interference in Serbia should be similarly eschewed. Secondly, the navigation of the Danube should be completely free, and the construction of a Danubian railway to facilitate Turko-European trade should preferably be undertaken. Thirdly, Circassia should be granted independence under a western protectorate, Sebastopol should be razed, Russian fortifications and warships should be forbidden on the Black Sea (though Layard recognised the difficulty of enforcing such a provision), and the straits should be generally closed to foreign warships. Fourthly, the Russian protectorate over the Christian populations in Turkey and the Principalities should be entirely abolished, with no joint protectorate undertaken as a replacement. His misgivings and anxieties as to the results of the war, he remarked in this anonymous article, "arise more from the character of the statesmen who direct the affairs of the nation than from any other cause, as was justly remarked by Mr. Layard in one of his able speeches"!

Goderich's ideas as to peace terms were almost identical with those of Layard. To accept the four points, he stated, would illustrate a "most pitiful & inadequate conception of the object for which England entered so freely & nobly into this contest," and would not ensure peace or stability.<sup>1</sup> Goderich detailed his peace

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 175-99: draft letter, indexed 1855, headed 'Dear \_\_\_\_\_'; also RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 3: G to F, Brighton, 30 Nov. 1855 (copy).

proposals in a long letter to Forster<sup>1</sup>. (with which Forster was in complete accord<sup>2</sup>.) in which he envisaged the necessity of erecting barriers which would effectively limit Russian influence. He agreed with Layard that the Danubian provinces should be united under the suzerainty of the Porte, that navigation of the Danube be freed, that Sebastopol be destroyed, and that all protectorates over Ottoman Christians be abolished. In addition Goderich desired the cession of the Isles of Aaland to Sweden and the prohibition of any Russian prince succeeding to the Danish throne. His scheme for the independence of Circassia varied only in detail from that of Layard. Goderich, however, accepted with disquiet the necessity of abandoning the wider European claims which he had previously championed: he reiterated to Forster his conviction that Europe would not obtain

... a reason[able] probability of prolonged tranquillity so long as the present territorial arrangements remain unchanged. -- from the very commencement of this war the names of Italy, Hungary & Poland have been in every ones' mouth -- sympathy with these nations has had much to do with the popularity of the war, & everyone who desires their freedom has had a feeling vague perhaps & undefined, but still strong, that it would result sooner or later from this contest. It is therefore to me very painful, I confess, to feel myself compelled to say that I would accept terms of peace by which nothing would be done for any of these countries -- but I cannot help feeling that, from the way in which this war & its diplomatic affairs have been conducted & from the nature of the alliances & quasi-alliances, in which we are involved, any general & permanent resettlement of Europe cannot be looked for unless the war be greatly prolonged...

and Goderich admitted that he was not then prepared to alter the limited

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 3: G to F, Brighton, 30 Nov. 1855 (copy).
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 17: F to G, Otley, 9 Dec. 1855; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 19: F to G, Ambleside, 16 Dec. 1855.

objects of the war, would "not dare to refuse peace even in the hope of hastening the hour, when the wrongs of 1815 may be finally redressed." He attempted to rationalise this position by claiming that "every wound we inflict upon Russia is really a gain for 'the nationalities'. A peace which should lessen her prestige & crush her power, would advance their cause incalculably." Nevertheless by the end of 1855 he, Layard, Forster, Bruce and Hughes had obviously succumbed to the pragmatic realities, and had renounced their original justification of the Crimean war, narrowing their objectives from a fundamental restructuring of Europe to a simple modification of Russia's role in the east. In effect their position now resembled the prime minister's, despite their continued qualms that his ideological aspirations for the European nationalities differed so markedly from theirs.

Throughout all the peace negotiations of 1855 their most obvious fear was that Britain might conclude a premature and unsatisfactory peace. In this regard they directed their venom not at Palmerston, whose approach was at least relatively acceptable, but to the peace party, both Peelite and Mancunian, whose influence they perceived as pernicious. The Peelites had, since their resignation from Palmerston's ministry in February, gradually reasserted their pacifist position. They believed the interpretation of the four points agreed upon at Vienna formed an acceptable basis for peace, and by the summer of 1855 they in effect constituted an integral portion of the parliamentary peace party. Layard commented to this effect in July:

... The Peelites have now fairly united with the Manchester men & a large section of the Tories. They have declared for peace & seem determined to obtain it by offering every opposition to the Government & embarrassing as much as possible the country in the prosecution of the war. The result will probably be that they will only encourage the Russians & render peace more difficult than ever. The course they are pursuing is equally unstatesman-like & unpatriotic, as I told Gladstone the other night to his great disgust... 1.

Layard spoke to this effect in the house of commons, castigating Gladstone for his present willingness to compromise and thus abandon England's honour, despite the fact that he bore partial responsibility for the original declaration of war.<sup>2</sup> His friend Otway supported Layard's anti-Peelite inclinations,<sup>3</sup> and one of Forster's American friends, on a visit to Wharfeside during this period, recorded in his journal that Forster too "was furious against Gladstone especially, for thus abandoning his colleagues, he having been answerable equally with them for the beginning of the war."<sup>4</sup> Hughes as well was "terribly disgusted with Gladstone" at this juncture.<sup>5</sup>

Entertaining all these considerations, their support at the end of 1855 for another year's campaign must be deemed unexceptional, and their collaboration in pursuit of this objective was particularly close in the autumn of 1855 and early months of 1856. Apart from the peace party, in fact, the British public were virtually unanimous in expressing their enthusiasm for continued fighting, largely in order to redeem the national honour which had not been enhanced during the

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 39: L to Lady Huntly, London, 25 July 1855 (copy).
  2. 3 H 139, 1833-4: 3 Aug. 1855; also 3 H 138, 1263-6: 25 May 1855. Gladstone commented of Layard: "From that quarter issue the coldest & most bitter blasts of all" (Nash, *Life of Westbury*, i : 166).
  3. 3 H 138, 2036, 2037-8: 15 June 1855.
  4. FP. TCD, Ms 4991: extracts from a lecture entitled 'William Edward Forster', delivered in Philadelphia in 1896 by Ellis Yarnell.
  5. This according to Alexander Macmillan in July 1855 (Graves, *Life of Macmillan*, 74).

capture of Sebastopol. Goderich argued in October that the Crimea would not likely be captured from Russia until the following year,<sup>1.</sup> and believed peace should not be concluded until the military situation was more advantageous to Britain: "We owe it to those who have fallen, we owe it to our children," he wrote Forster, "not to conclude it [the war] while we are not forced to do so by ill fortune, until we can make a peace which will give us reasonable ground to hope that we have stayed for years to come the tide of Russian advance & Russian influence," and he thought that "we shall be likely to get much better terms after another campaign than now."<sup>2.</sup> He and Layard were in complete accord that "any negotiations for peace ought to be watched most carefully, & one can have little confidence in *our* diplomacy; but as yet the *attitude* of this Govt is certainly not of a nature to lead one to fear an hasty & patched up peace."<sup>3.</sup> Goderich also assured Hughes that, despite Cobden's recent comments to the contrary, the British people still backed the war effort.<sup>4.</sup> Layard, in total agreement with Goderich, wrote him that "as far as the war is concerned the Government appears to be acting with as much vigour as one would expect," though England's general mismanagement to date, by encouraging Russia to persevere, meant that the end of hostilities was not yet at hand.<sup>5.</sup> Bruce, journeying through France at the beginning of December, encouraged Goderich with misleading reports of the war's increased popularity in that country,<sup>6.</sup> and the two men

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 183: G to L, Ripon, 16 Oct. 1855.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 3: G to F, Brighton, 30 Nov. 1855 (copy).
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 190: G to L, Brighton, 30 Nov. 1855.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 200: G to H, Ripon, 8 Nov. 1855.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 83 : L to G, Florence, 3 Nov. 1855.
  6. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 33: B to G, Golden Grove, 2 Dec. 1855.

earnestly discussed possible battle techniques for the following year's campaign.<sup>1</sup> They continued to express particular concern for the situation in the Principalities, under Austrian occupation. Goderich wrote Layard that they should endeavour the following year to bring about an end to Austria's dominion there, for "if anything like a wise & righteous settlement of their affairs were to be made, it would do more than anything to bring out the real proper objects of the war,"<sup>2</sup> that is, the establishment of nation-states. Layard agreed that, despite Austria's entrenched position, the Principalities must in future be organised so that neither Russia nor Austria could exert undue influence.<sup>3</sup> Forster was also concerned lest a winter of negotiations kept "peace-maker Austria" in the Principalities, and he was particularly worried that compromises with Russia might be reached in order to satisfy the peace party without achieving the necessary results.<sup>4</sup> News reached England in December of the fall of Kars, the Turkish fortress in Asia Minor under the command of General Fenwick Williams which had been beseiged by Russian troops since June, and this merely consolidated their conviction that a further campaign was necessary.<sup>5</sup> Layard wrote in the *Quarterly Review*, for example, that the four propositions which Austria, through Count Esterhazy, was reputedly submitting to Russia, formed a generally satisfactory basis for peace, but would never be accepted by the czar in the existing state of affairs. In the following year,

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1. e.g. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 41: G to B, Brighton, 21 Dec. 1856.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 183: G to L, Ripon, 16 Oct. 1855.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 83 : L to G, Arazzo, 6 Nov. 1855.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 19: F to G, Ambleside, 16 Dec. 1855.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 41: G to B, Brighton, 21 Dec. 1855;  
RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 87: L to G, London, 21 Dec. 1855.

he wrote, England would have to insist on strict Prussian neutrality, undertake a military expedition in Asia Minor, and conduct effective naval operations in the Baltic. "When Russia is really defeated," Layard added, "and when she can no longer hope to maintain her ambitious pretensions, we may then think of an European congress. But not until then."<sup>1</sup>.

It was therefore with considerable surprise that they learned in January of Russia's apparent acceptance of the proposed peace terms, nor were they yet convinced that the war should now end. Clearly they were as yet unaware of Russia's growing difficulties: the impact of her diplomatic isolation (following Sweden's understanding with the western powers, only Prussia remained sympathetic), her appalling financial straits, the military difficulties which resulted from her anti-insurgent troop commitments in Poland, the Baltic provinces and the Caucasus. Their attitude was demonstrated in a letter Goderich addressed to Hughes:

So we are to have peace! I still *doubt*. I scarcely even wish for it, for I cannot persuade myself that if we have peace now, even a tolerably good one, old England will not have *lost*, who ever else may have gained -- have lost at least in position & prestige, & I would not for worlds have one pleat of the old Lady's cap injured, or one breath to dim the brightness of her fame. I know such views are very old fashioned & unchristian according to the Xtianity of people with whom religion appears to be nearly synonymous with cowardice -- but whether it is old or new, jew, turk, infidel or heretic, it is right & that's all I care about.

The only thing is that we may under such guidance as we have or are likely to have, do no better next campaign than we have done hitherto, & if so, perhaps it is better that we should stop now, if we have a good chance... 2.

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1. [Layard], 'The Results and Prospects of the War', 256 and *passim*.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 212: G to H, Wrest Park, 19 Jan. 1856.

Layard confirmed in a letter to Bruce their scepticism regarding the propriety of accepting peace at this stage:

... Everyone in London seems confident of peace. I confess that I cannot believe Russia will accept our propositions if they are urged upon her in the sense alone in which they will really curtail her power & afford some compensation for the war we have waged. For the sake of our national credit & honor I cannot but hope that we shall have another campaign. We cannot afford to leave off now, forfeiting the reputation and position which the last great war earned for us. If we do cease now the country will bitterly repent it before long... 1.

As late as 20 March he expressed his conviction that, under the circumstances, the present peace could be neither satisfactory nor enduring, leaving Europe as it did in the same general state as when war began.<sup>2</sup> But by now Layard also recognised the extent of Russia's internal weakness, and the reluctance of Napoleon to persevere with the contest, both of which necessitated an early peace.<sup>3</sup>

It was therefore with mixed feelings that they greeted the publication of the terms of the treaty of Paris. Despite Austrian endeavours to consolidate her occupation of the Principalities, and the obvious French anxiety to treat Russia leniently, Clarendon and Cowley, the chief British negotiators at the Paris conference, had obtained better terms than had generally been expected, terms which in fact closely resembled the minimum conditions previously urged as acceptable by Layard and Goderich. The independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire was indeed strengthened, and the sultan issued a *hatti-humayun*, or 'humanity firman', which proclaimed religious

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 58159, 133: L to B, Aldermaston, 21 Jan. 1856.
  2. *Aberdeen Herald*, 22 March 1856: L's address to the students of Marischal College, 20 March 1856.
  3. [Layard], 'The Peace and its Effects on the Condition of Turkey', 504, 509.

equality throughout the empire and initiated some economic improvements, thus theoretically obviating any necessity of foreign interference on behalf of Ottoman Christians. (All external protectorates were abolished.) The Black Sea was completely neutralised, its waters open to all merchantmen and closed to all warships, its shores to be cleared of naval arsenals and dockyards. The Principalities were freed from their former Russian protectorate, Austrian troops were to withdraw, and the Turks reasserted their suzerainty. No specific political organisation, however, was proposed. Serbia was placed under a joint protectorate of the powers, the navigation of the Danube was entrusted to a European commission, and Russia ceded southern Bessarabia, though the British were not satisfied with the punishment meted out to the czar in this area. In addition the idea of creating a buffer state between Russia and the Ottoman empire in Circassia was abandoned.

In general terms the treaty of Paris provided a check, if only a temporary one, to Russian expansionism in the east. The neutralisation of the Black Sea, though difficult to enforce, in effect controlled her naval operations for fifteen years, thus ensuring for the Turks the opportunity to reform. (The fact that they declined this challenge is in a sense irrelevant.) The application of the treaty provisions concerning the Danubian Principalities, whilst the cause of confusion and friction for a decade, nevertheless laid the foundations of an independent Romania. And in retrospect it is clear that Russian influence in western Europe, at its peak after the 1848-9 reaction, gradually declined following her Crimean war defeat, thereby easing the accomplishment of Italian and German national unification.

In March-April 1856, however, many of these considerations were not obvious, whilst it remained all too apparent to those -- like Layard, Goderich, Hughes, Bruce and Forster -- with warlike tendencies, that Britain's 'prestige' and 'national honour' had not been vindicated. Thus the majority of the British populace probably shared the combination of misgivings and relief which Layard, Goderich and their companions expressed: the hissing of the peace terms when they were announced at Temple Bar would seem to symbolise this disappointment. Forster was frustrated "by the manner in which the war came to a close, feeling that great European interests had been sacrificed to the exigencies of parties at home and the interests of our French ally."<sup>1</sup> In the debate on the treaty Layard stated in the house that, though all the chief objects of the war had not been attained and that neither he nor the country, therefore, were entirely satisfied with the peace, nevertheless the 'humanity firmans' effectively emancipated the Christians in Turkey,<sup>2</sup> the Principalities had been liberated from Russian domination and the free navigation of the Danube achieved. He expressed some reservations, however, that the situation in the Principalities had not been finalised, that the enforcement of the Black Sea neutrality provisions might prove impossible, and that Russian influence over Circassia had not been abrogated. Despite these drawbacks, Layard believed that overall the government deserved great credit for the treaty: "He confessed that the terms far exceeded any reasonable expectation which he had formed; and, in all fairness, he was bound to congratulate the Government on the

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1. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 302.

2. In passing, he mentioned that the sultan and Moslems shouldn't be criticised too strongly, for "even in this country we had some relics of barbarism - a band playing in Hyde Park on Sunday, or a grant to Maynooth excited the opposition of educated and worthy gentlemen" (3 H 141, 2075: 5 May 1856).

treaty they had made, and on the principles which it embodied."<sup>1</sup>  
 He also exonerated the government of responsibility for the debacle at Kars, attributing the blame primarily to the former Aberdeen ministry for its refusal to expand the war to Asia.<sup>2</sup> Three months later, Layard spoke at length on the peace treaty to his constituents, contending that despite the unsettled state of the Principalities and the abandonment of the Circassians, the treaty was necessary due to French qualms about the war.

No one could contend that the peace which had been concluded had given entire satisfaction to the country. (Hear, hear.) It was received without enthusiasm, and was accepted only because we felt that we were not in a position to carry on the contest single-handed. He knew it did not give satisfaction to him; but, probably for the same reasons which influenced public opinion, he did not oppose it. 3.

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1. 3 H 141, 2081 and 2071-86 *passim*: 5 May 1856.
  2. 3 H 141, 1756-66: 29 April 1856; also Aberdeen Papers. BL Add Ms 43255, 155: L to Aberdeen, London, 2 May 1856. Layard in fact shared some of the responsibility for the fall of Kars, having for some reason failed to raise the matter the previous year despite frantic appeals from Sandwith, the medical officer at Kars (e.g. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 157: Sandwith to L, Kars, 25 Aug. 1855, in which Sandwith censures Layard for having ignored the plight of Kars in the house, and adds: "We looked hopefully to you as our champion, no other M.P. knows anything at all about the Asia Minor question, we are forsaken now by all the world."), and this factor probably explains his hesitation to condemn the Palmerston government over the issue. Bruce also excused the government from responsibility for the surrender of Kars (*Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 5 April 1856: B's Dowlais lecture on the fall of Kars, 2 April 1856).
  3. *Times*, 25 July 1856: L's address to his Aylesbury constituents, 23 July 1856.

Layard continued throughout 1856 to question the efficacy of the treaty of Paris, particularly as regards the Principalities and Black Sea neutralisation.<sup>1.</sup>

Waterfield suggests that Layard overdid his support for the government following the Crimean war, and Wolf states that, "except for one angry fling at the Tripartite Treaty," Goderich "ceased from grumbling."<sup>2.</sup> The implication that on foreign policy Goderich and Layard were becoming less inimical to Palmerston's approach is quite misleading. In fact they accepted the treaty of Paris as adequate only in a limited sense. And they remained very angry about the triple treaty of 15 April 1856, by which an Anglo-Franco-Austrian alliance was formed in defence of the provisions of the treaty of Paris.<sup>3.</sup> Forster wished them to press the government on this question in the house,<sup>4.</sup> and Goderich wrote Bruce of Palmerston:

... I had tried to screw myself up into a better opinion of him after reading the Protocols, but this Sunday business[5.]has convinced me that it is altogether unsafe to put the least confidence in him -- and besides, the Treaty of the 15th April between England, France, and *Austria* goes far to destroy the hopes of a sounder foreign policy, which were raised by the Protocols...

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1. e.g. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 91: L to G, Constantinople, 29 May 1856; RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 94: L to G, Constantinople, 9 June 1856; RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 111: L to G, Constantinople, 15 Dec. 1856. Wolf quotes Layard's statement in the first of these letters that "we have done nothing for liberty" as proof that Layard opposed the peace settlement, but neglects to mention that Layard was here referring specifically to the situation in the Principalities, not to the treaty of Paris as a whole.
  2. Waterfield, 283; Wolf, i : 96.
  3. See Mosse, 203-29 *passim*.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 53: F to G, Otley, 18 May 1856.
  5. See chapter 3 above.

The treaty, he wrote, was unnecessary, and he disliked the idea of any accord with reactionary Austria;<sup>1</sup> Goderich repeated these views in a letter to Layard,<sup>2</sup> and six months later stated to Layard that the difficulties surrounding the Principalities, despite Palmerston's appropriate opposition to Russian claims, proved "how ill the work of pacification was done at Paris. My dear Layard we want an *English* policy. At present we have an hybrid one more French than national in many things, & then becoming half Austrian as a sort of compensation. It is very painful to me."<sup>3</sup> In the light of these statements, and of their subsequent opposition to Britain's policy in both Persia and China, it is clear that their half-hearted acceptance of the treaty of Paris in no way marked a more general concurrence with the Palmerstonian approach to foreign policy, with which they had only temporarily converged during the Crimean war on the basis of a mutual Russophobia.<sup>4</sup>

5.

Before the treaty of Paris ending the Crimean war had in fact been signed, England had become embroiled in yet another eastern conflict, on this occasion with Persia. The shah and his fellow-Persians regarded the British, Russians and Turks with comparable enmity; both Britain and Russia perceived the importance of Persia's position as a buffer state between southern Russia and British India, and consequently attempted to maximise their influence in the region.

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 49: G to B, 22 May 1856.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 16: G to L, 23 May 1856.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 71: G to L, Wakefield, 22 Nov. 1856.
  4. The subsequent financial support of Layard and Bruce for Turkish independence and integrity is briefly discussed in the 'Note on the Ottoman bank' at the end of this chapter.

During the Crimean war the Persians had remained neutral despite secret overtures from Russia, but Anglo-Persian relations nevertheless deteriorated from early 1856. The immediate cause of this quarrel related to the activities of the British minister in Teheran, Charles Murray. In brief, Murray had a sexual liaison with the wife of a Persian government employee, one Mirza Hashim. When Hashim sought refuge in the British embassy, Murray named him British agent at Shiraz, despite an 1841 treaty regulation that Britain had no consular rights there. Hashim's wife, of royal blood, was confined by her brother to his harem, and Murray submitted an ultimatum to the Persian government demanding her release, the recognition of Hashim as British consul at Shiraz, and an apology from both the shah and his prime minister, the Sadr Azim, for their actions and for their allegations regarding Murray's love affair. When no satisfactory response was received, Murray suspended diplomatic relations and departed from Teheran. Soon afterwards the incensed shah sent troops to Herat in Afghanistan, ostensibly to assist one of the factions in a complicated civil war, and in so doing broke the terms of an Anglo-Persian agreement of 1853 which had defined the terms on which Persia might interfere at Herat. Palmerston seized this Persian intervention as a pretext for a war which he hoped would fortify British influence in Persia, and an Indian army was landed at the Persian gulf port of Bushire in the autumn of 1856. Though Russia was in no position to intervene, the United States chose this occasion to sign a commercial treaty with the shah, much to Palmerston's annoyance.

The group's efforts in opposition to Palmerston's Persian involvement were motivated by two principal considerations.

Firstly, they did not believe that it was in England's material interests to so proceed. That they regarded English interests *per se* as a legitimate and imperative concern is demonstrated in a letter Forster wrote to Goderich expressing his conviction that the U.S. commercial treaty with Persia was an important factor for British consideration, and asking Goderich to consult Layard on this question.<sup>1</sup> Goderich subsequently conferred with Layard on the American-Persian agreement, which he thought "might be very contrary to our interests."<sup>2</sup> In an article in the *Quarterly Review*, Layard contended that the legitimate British desire to form in Persia a strong neutral barrier between Russia and India could best be accomplished by befriending Persia rather than by alienating her and in compensation creating in Afghanistan a new power friendly to Britain.<sup>3</sup> But if the necessity of the defence of British interests were admittedly a factor in their Persian policy, a more important consideration was the method which Palmerston employed in the name of England to assert this influence. It was primarily Palmerston's bullying and self-assertive swagger, based on expediency rather than on moral principles of international behaviour, to which they objected. Thus Bruce expressed to Goderich his presumption that "Palmerston will bully & retreat, & disgrace us as usual. Oh for a man to drag us out of the degradation into which we have fallen, & are falling deeper every day."<sup>4</sup> Layard also protested against the "eternal bully bully policy" which had exacerbated the Persian difficulties,<sup>5</sup> and stated that, though

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 53: F to G, Otley, 18 May 1856.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 16: G to L, 23 May 1856.
  3. [A.H. Layard], 'Persia', *Quarterly Review*, 101, April 1857, 539.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 67: B to G, Ambleside, 19 Oct. 1856.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 94: L to G, Constantinople, 9 June 1856.

Stratford's own insulting manner was partly to blame, he "utterly & entirely repudiate[d] the whole of our Persian policy."<sup>1</sup> Layard expanded on his views in a letter to his cousin:

The Persian War is most unjustifiable & may perhaps lead to complications of a very serious nature in central Asia. We are completely in the wrong & having taken up arms to insist upon an act of injustice we cannot get out of the affair without serious loss of character & influence. Our foreign policy is guided by no principle it is a mere policy of expediency... We are endeavouring to teach the Turks what civilization & Christianity are & as an example we violate every law of both. 2.

In particular Layard protested against the principle adopted by Palmerston

that in dealing with Eastern nations we are not bound by the same laws of right and wrong as in treating with Christian states. Against such a doctrine it is the duty of all Englishmen to protest, as diametrically opposed to the spirit of that religion and civilization, of which we profess to be the pioneers. 3.

This sympathy with non-European races, and conviction that they should be treated as equals, was not generally shared by romantic thinkers, but was instead more characteristic of radicals and democrats. Layard retained his views throughout his political life, commenting in 1869:

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 111: L to G, Constantinople, 15 Dec. 1856. Stratford is referred to in the letter simply as Lord S.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 52: L to Lady Huntly, Constantinople, 22 Dec. 1856 (copy).
  3. [Layard], 'Persia', 530.

It is to be hoped that this unhappy and unchristian prejudice may in time pass away, and that the day is not far distant when the Englishman in the East may no longer look upon every man whose skin is somewhat darker than his own as 'a nigger' without the feelings or qualities of a human being. 1.

Forster was also a particularly strong advocate of this approach. Probably influenced by his anti-slavery antecedents he had, for example, argued in 1854 that England must determine to treat non-whites "with the same forbearance and the same consideration as that which we now use towards civilised nations."<sup>2</sup>.

Their disapproval of Palmerston's Persian policy was therefore based on the conviction that he was not effectively promoting England's legitimate interests, and that his racist swaggering was morally unjustifiable. It was in no way based on the assumption that England was ethically bound to pursue a non-interventionist policy, for they believed it essential that England bolster her influence in the east. What they protested, rather, was the mode in which Palmerston (and Murray) proceeded in order to achieve this goal.

Layard attempted on a number of instances to raise the Persian issue in the house of commons. In early March 1856 he attributed to Murray's performance the responsibility for Anglo-Persian friction, and stated that "we have neither right nor justice on our side in the present quarrel."<sup>3</sup>. He argued that a war with Persia would serve only to alienate her from England and force her to seek

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1. [A.H. Layard], 'Rassam's Abyssinia', *Quarterly Review*, 126, April 1869, 322-3.

2. [W.E. Forster], 'Kafir Wars and Cape Policy', *Edinburgh Review*, 100, 203, July 1854, 139. A leader in the *Times* following Forster's death also cited the "sympathy with the oppressed, and especially with the native races which are brought into collision with European civilization, [which] was one of the ruling principles of Mr. Forster's life" (*Times*, 6 April 1886).

3. 3 H 140, 1716: 3 March 1856.

Russian assistance, that Britain's Indian subjects, "already bowed down to the dust by taxation,"<sup>1</sup> would bear the brunt of the struggle, and he appealed to the government not "to precipitate this country into a needless and an unjust war."<sup>2</sup> When Layard reiterated his concern later the same month,<sup>3</sup> he found himself in the unusual position of receiving strong support from Gladstone; the open disagreement over foreign policy with the peace party, so evident during the Crimean war, was not to be repeated during hostilities with either Persia or China. However Layard achieved no success before the summer recess of 1856 in his attempts to force an explicit declaration from the government of its Persian policies. Goderich and Layard both vacationed in Italy during the parliamentary recess (Layard in order to lay in "that stock of health, which I find a quiet autumn can generally give me"<sup>4</sup>), though they met there only briefly. Later in the year Layard travelled to Constantinople on Ottoman bank business. Thus during this period, when the English attack on Bushire actually occurred, they found little opportunity to discuss Persian affairs *viva voce*. Goderich and Forster, meanwhile, spent a week together in December,<sup>5</sup> and also wrote to each other regarding British foreign policy.<sup>6</sup> The considerable correspondence which Goderich and Layard

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1. 3 H 140, 1719: 3 March 1856.

2. 3 H 140, 1721: 3 March 1856.

3. 3 H 141, 162-4: 14 March 1856. Gladstone's support on the Persian question was reinforced in February and March of 1857 (3 H 144, 626-7: 13 Feb. 1857 and 3 H 144, 1946-7: 6 March 1857).

4. LP. BL Add Ms 58157, 6: L to Sara Austen, Milan, 22 Aug. 1856.

5. See RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 298: G to H, Ripon, 19 Dec. 1856.

6. e.g. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 75: F to G, Otley, 9 Nov. 1856, in which Forster writes: "I shall be exceedingly glad to hear what you know and think of the present aspect of our foreign relations, for I never felt more in ignorance. Only this I am sure of, what little I do know I do not at all like."

also conducted on the Persian issue in the autumn and winter of 1856-7 illustrates their obvious chagrin that the public remained unconcerned about Persia. This was particularly worrisome in that, unlike Cobden, Bright, Gladstone, and others of the non-interventionist peace party, Goderich, Layard, Bruce, Hughes and Forster were unaccustomed to being in dispute with the general public on foreign policy issues. Therefore Layard lamented the fact that "the prospects of a good harvest & the state of the funds keep people well satisfied,"<sup>1</sup> and Forster doubted that the existing political stagnation was the calm before a storm, admitting to Goderich that he did not "see where any storm is to come from and it will take a very wild storm to stir the heart of the British people in these comfortable times."<sup>2</sup> What they seemed not to perceive, however, was that the voting public was not simply apathetic towards, but actually supported, Palmerston's brash, Don Pacifico-like manner in defence of Charles Murray.

In December 1856 Layard wrote to Goderich of his strong disapproval of the duplicity of the government's policy, in simultaneously instructing Stratford in Constantinople to negotiate for peace and Canning in India to seek war. He told Goderich that "anything more unjust or worse managed it is impossible to conceive. The case against the Government is so strong that if there is any sense of justice in the House of Commons they will be called to account. Keep these things to yourself until we meet."<sup>3</sup>

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 98: L to G, Milan, 20 Aug. 1856.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 65: F to G, Otley, 22 Aug. 1856.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 115: L to G, Constantinople, 22 Dec. 1856.

His indignation was apparently so pronounced that, despite commendatory remarks from Palmerston, he insisted that he and the prime minister were "destined to have another fight or tow [sic] -- as I certainly differ from him on much of his foreign policy and shall probably have to protest very energetically against it."<sup>1</sup> Despite these strong words, however, Layard had decided to protest against but not to actually oppose the government's mode of procedure in Persia, for he argued that, matters having reached their present state, English interests must now predominate. The factor which tempered his opposition was the Persian occupation of Herat, for Layard was concerned that, though Palmerston and Murray had initially pursued a morally-bankrupt policy, the Persians in having subsequently attacked Herat had in fact illegally defied their treaty obligations. Goderich, who believed that Layard had been right all along about Persia (that is, that Murray's actions were unjustifiable, and that the war was unnecessary and counterproductive), also argued at this time that "things having come to this pass, we cannot let her [Persia] have Herat."<sup>2</sup> In a subsequent letter to Layard, in which they arranged to consider the political situation before parliament reconvened, Goderich discussed the Persian question in some depth. He entirely agreed with Layard that, though both Palmerston and Murray had acted dishonourably, Persia could not now be permitted to retain Herat, stating that

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38948, 52: L to Benjamin Austen, Constantinople, 2 Jan. 1857.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 71: G to L, Wakefield, 22 Nov. 1856.

... even before I got your letter I inclined to act much as you suggest in the Persian affair, except that I was shaken by a rumour which you mentioned in your former letters that the Persians had agreed to give up Herat, & that we were standing out about Murray's recall & other yet more unjustifiable demands. If that should turn out to be true, I do not see how it would be possible to approve directly or indirectly of a war for the sake of Charles Murray. But if the breach of [?]'s [1853] convention involved in the seige & capture of Herat, however much it may have indirectly been caused by Murray's errors, be still the real cause of quarrel & if no sufficient reparation for that violation of treaty had been offered up to the attack on Bushire, I should then be inclined as far as voting goes to agree with the view you take, although like yourself, if I were to speak, I must condemn distinctly the whole conduct of Minister & Govt in the "Mrs Hashim affair."... 1.

Layard made repeated but unsuccessful attempts in the following weeks to force the government to divulge its negotiating strategy in the peace conference, then proceeding, which had followed the decisive defeat of the Persian forces.<sup>2</sup> Goderich meanwhile confided to Hughes that

... to take one's way wisely & righteously through the mess of our Foreign Politics, as they present themselves in the H. of C. is a very hard task to an honest man, as it seems to me. -- one can't help preferring the pluck of Palm to the peace humbug of Milner Gibson & Gladstone, or the friendship with decayed despotism which Dizzy advocates, & yet the Palmerston Policy is a miserable muddling affair after all most unsatisfactory, and very unworthy of England...

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 106: G to L, London, 30 Jan. 1857.
  2. 3 H 144, 346-7: 9 Feb. 1857; 3 H 144, 622-3: 13 Feb. 1857; 3 H 144, 840-1: 19 Feb. 1857; 3 H 144, 943-4: 20 Feb. 1857; 3 H 144, 1488: 27 Feb. 1857; 3 H 144, 1944, 1945: 6 March 1857. In the event the peace terms were not unduly harsh: Britain did not annex any territory, or claim indemnity for the cost of the war, but merely required the Persians to withdraw from Herat, to use England's mediation in any future dispute with Afghanistan, to apologise for the 'insult' to Murray, and to suppress the slave trade in the Persian gulf.

He would, he thought, give "a grumbling vote for Palm. as against his rivals,"<sup>1</sup> though obviously supporting Palmerston's unethical approach to foreign policy only in a tentative and reluctant manner. However when news reached London of the British bombardment of Canton, and when Palmerston gave his unconditional approval to this questionable procedure, Goderich, Layard and Bruce joined in formally censuring the prime minister for his domineering manner of conducting British foreign policy.

6.

By the treaty of Nanking of 1842, ending the Opium war, the Chinese government had conceded to Britain consular and trading rights in five ports, the principal of which was Canton. This was the first of many concessions which the European trading nations, and the United States, literally forced from the son of heaven in the nineteenth century, despite the traditional reluctance of the Chinese authorities to grant consular, commercial and Christian missionary privileges to the European 'barbarians'. But the treaty had left matters essentially unresolved: the Chinese actively resented the concessions they had been forced to make, and attempted to evade their treaty obligations; the foreign merchants on the other hand pressed for further concessions. In order to protect those Chinese who collaborated with the British in their newly-expanded trade, the authorities of Hong Kong had adopted the practice of granting British registration to ships belonging to Chinese subjects nominally resident in Hong Kong, as the Chinese authorities were prevented by the treaty terms from interfering with British ships flying the British flag in Chinese territorial waters.

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 4: G to H, London, 4 Feb. 1857.

One such ship, owned by a Chinese pirate and fitfully engaged in smuggling and attacks on other shipping in the Canton river, was the lorcha *Arrow*. In October 1856 the Chinese commissioner at Canton, Yeh Ming-chin, ordered that the *Arrow* be seized and its crew arrested. The British consul at Canton, Harry Parkes, and the governor of Hong Kong, Sir John Bowring, demanded the release of the crew and an apology for the insult to the British flag, though during the course of these proceedings they had become aware that the *Arrow's* British registration had in fact expired. Yeh eventually released the twelve crew members under protest, but refused to apologise. Bowring decided to use this incident as a pretext to extend British privileges in Canton, believing that advantage should be taken of the weakened Chinese position which resulted from the Taiping rebellion. He therefore ordered a bombardment of the city, from which there was considerable loss of life and property damage, including the destruction of Yeh's palace. The Chinese of course retaliated, destroyed the British 'factories' (really warehouses) in Canton, and made various attempts to poison the foreign community. The mini-war which ensued was vigorous, but localised, and the four other treaty ports remained unaffected.

The proceedings of Bowring and Parkes when revealed in England caused a storm of public controversy, but Palmerston and the cabinet offered unconditional support to their far eastern agents, who had of course felt constrained to act before instructions from London could be obtained. The government's attitude is perhaps best exemplified by the Duke of Argyll, formerly a Peelite with pacifist inclinations. Argyll admitted the technical correctness of the

attorney general (Richard Bethell's) view that Britain had proceeded illegally, but he held that this argument

was founded on the assumption that our representative officers on the Canton River were bound by the same highly complex rules of so-called international law which govern the relations of the civilized nations of the Christian world, and that assumption appeared to me to be absurd...

I did not care to ask [in cabinet] whether the conduct of Sir John Bowring had or had not been somewhat more high-handed than was absolutely necessary. It was enough for me to see that the disavowal of our Commissioner, when such serious action had been taken, would inflict a severe blow on all our officers who might succeed him, and throw into confusion the whole system on which our commerce rested in that part of the world. 1.

This view was shared unanimously by cabinet, which agreed with Palmerston that the government had no choice but to support Bowring.<sup>2.</sup>

Attitudes such as these left Goderich, Bruce and Layard aghast, and they were joined in their moral indignation by Manchester men such as Cobden and Milner Gibson, and Peelites like Gladstone. Goderich, Bruce and Layard did not so much object to the motives of the government and its agents in wishing to effect an open-door policy in China, but rather to the methods employed to achieve this goal. Their attitude on the China conflict therefore closely resembled their previous stance on Persia, and Layard in fact emphasised the similarities of the two conflicts.<sup>3.</sup>

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1. George Douglas, Eighth Duke of Argyll, *Autobiography and Memoirs*, edited by the Dowager Duchess of Argyll, (London, 1906), ii : 68-9.
  2. Jasper Ridley, *Lord Palmerston*, (London, 1970), 466.
  3. [Layard], 'Persia', 501, 529; *Times*, 17 March 1857: L's address at a public meeting in London, 16 March 1857.

Goderich, Bruce and Layard attempted to influence public opinion and government policy on the *Arrow* incident in three arenas: in the house of commons, within the Liberal party itself, and in a public meeting. For the first time on a foreign policy issue Goderich led the group's offensive in the house of commons. In addition to successfully pressing Palmerston for the tabling of the explicit instructions sent to Bowring as to the rights of the British authorities and merchants in Canton,<sup>1</sup> he spoke during the debate on Cobden's motion, which expressed dissatisfaction with the *Arrow* documents tabled as having failed to establish satisfactory grounds for Bowring's violent measures, and asked that a select committee be appointed to inquire into Anglo-Chinese commercial relations. Goderich expressed his support for the motion because it censured Bowring for the violence he had initiated despite the satisfactory reparation the Chinese had made in this and previous cases. As legislators, he stated, they "would best preserve the honour of England untarnished, best maintain respect for her flag, by entering their earnest protest against a policy which combined, in strange and unnatural union, the insolence of power and the duplicity of weakness." Goderich did not question the propriety of England extending her trade and influence in China, merely whether peace or violence should be employed to achieve this end, and he stressed in conclusion the need to select in future competent and trustworthy representatives abroad.<sup>2</sup>

The speech served to augment Goderich's parliamentary reputation, which was further consolidated a few days later at a meeting of Liberal MPs. The meeting was held at Lord Palmerston's on 2 March.

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1. 3 H 144, 744-5: 17 Feb. 1857.

2. 3 H 144, 1543-8: 27 Feb. 1857.

Though Layard was unavoidably absent, Bruce and Goderich attended together, and Bruce recorded that "Goderich spoke for those who, giving a general support for the Government,<sup>1.</sup> intend to vote against them to-night; and he did it very well."<sup>2.</sup> Layard later affirmed that he would have attended this meeting had he been able to.<sup>3.</sup> He explained that Goderich had urged Palmerston to simply admit to the commons that Bowring had violated his instructions and gone to war on "unjustifiable" grounds, to recall him for this reason but, because the Chinese had long been disregarding their treaty obligations, to continue the war in order to defend British interests.<sup>4.</sup> Layard stated that, had Palmerston agreed to so act, Goderich "and others who acted with him" would have tendered their support, but Palmerston instead replied that Bowring, as the representative of the British government, merited its support whether right or wrong.<sup>5.</sup> In these circumstances Goderich, Layard and Bruce felt obliged to vote against the government the following day, and with Peelites, Mancunians and Conservatives joining forces,

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1. They had, for example, recently supported, if reluctantly, the government's budget proposals (3 H 144, 1150-3: 23 Feb. 1857).
  2. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 150: B to Norah Bruce, London, 3 March 1857.
  3. *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 21 March 1857: L's Aylesbury election speech, 18 March 1857.
  4. *Times*, 17 March 1857: L's address at a public meeting in London, 16 March 1857.
  5. *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 21 March 1857: L's Aylesbury election speech, 18 March 1857.

Palmerston was defeated by sixteen votes.<sup>1.</sup> The prime minister, confident of public support, subsequently took up Disraeli's challenge and dissolved parliament.

During the election campaign which ensued Layard joined forces with Cobden and Roebuck in organising a public meeting at the freemason's hall in Gt. Queen Street, Holborn, hoping thereby to rally support for his cause. He spoke at some length to the crowded assembly, stressing that he was not a 'peace-at-any-price' man, as proven by his support of the Crimean war, and protesting against assertions that he was part of an anti-Palmerston coalition. His opposition to the government's China policy was largely founded on the same protest he had made over its Persia policy, that is, that it was inherently racist: "He was told that in dealing with the Easterns they must adopt a different course than when dealing with the Westerns; but he protested against that doctrine; he considered that they ought to deal honestly with people all over the world. (Cheers.)"<sup>2.</sup> (Whether or not this would have been a practicable

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1. 3 H 144, 1846-50: 3 March 1857. That Goderich actually consulted Cobden and Gladstone, his former Crimean opponents, on the China issue can be inferred from letters he later wrote them following receipt of correspondence from Meadows, a government interpreter in China, which confirmed the correctness of the approach they had jointly adopted (Cobden Papers. BL Add Ms 43669, 154: G to Cobden, London, 11 June 1857; Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44286, 10: G to Gladstone, London, 11 June 1857). Bruce also attested that Meadow's correspondence with Goderich proved the correctness of their views (*Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 9 Oct. 1858: B's address to his Merthyr constituents, 4 Oct. 1858). As discussed immediately below, Layard also co-operated with Cobden on the *Arrow* question.
  2. *Times*, 17 March 1857: L's address at a public meeting in London, 16 March 1857.

approach in the opening of China remains uncertain, but in any case Layard apparently believed that international morality was a more important consideration than commercial gain.) Though the meeting adopted resolutions condemning the government's policies on both China and Persia, there was considerable dissension evident. Palmerston's election gambit was proving to be an astute political manoeuvre.

7.

An assessment of the approach to foreign policy adopted by Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard in the years 1853 to 1857 yields a number of significant conclusions. Perhaps the most important factor of their common approach was a rejection of the relevance of the controversy over active interventionism as opposed to pacific isolationism. Thus in 1853-4 the threat of czarist despotism, the blatant Russian disregard for international law and morality in crossing the Pruth and thereby endangering the Ottoman empire, and the possibility of liberating oppressed European nationalities, all justified in their view Britain's decision to proclaim war; intervention was, they held, a necessity. In Persia and China on the other hand they believed Britain the culprit in ignoring the accepted code of international conduct, and therefore condemned her intervention. Their opposition was not to the extension of British influence *per se*, but rather to the violent and unethical methods employed. Their having rejected interventionism or non-interventionism as a suitable basis of international morality or conduct effectively isolated them from their political contemporaries. Because foreign affairs was of paramount importance in the mid-fifties, this was a

critical factor in establishing and consolidating their personal and political alliance.

On the other hand their unique attitude to foreign policy, in accentuating their more general philosophical isolation, served not only to alienate them from existing political factions but also to effectively limit their influence both within the house of commons and with the public at large, for they were sustained by no significant bloc of supporters. They did exercise a marginal influence, of course. The Crimean war brought Layard especially, with his extensive knowledge of the east, to the public forefront, and his opinions were at least listened to by politicians and public alike. Their attitudes contributed to the formation of British Russophobia before the outbreak of the Crimean war, and during the conflict they helped create a climate which made government approval of unacceptable peace terms impossible. Nevertheless they too were forced by military circumstances and political realities to limit their vision, in essence to abandon many of their original war aims. And though their opinions with regard to Persia and China may have helped sway fellow-parliamentarians, the voting and non-voting public remained unsympathetic, even hostile. In a general sense, therefore, their foreign policy protestations during the mid-fifties remained largely ineffective.

These protestations did, however, serve at least one useful purpose: their support of a popular foreign policy during the Crimean war made their radical attacks on civil and military mismanagement appear principled rather than unpatriotic and expedient. Nevertheless their immediate achievements with regard to administrative

reform<sup>1.</sup> were less than they had expected, so that their two principal interests of the middle years of this decade had apparently yielded somewhat fruitless results. With this in mind, Layard's commons reference to "that Government Maelstrom in which so many independent Members are shipwrecked in this House"<sup>2.</sup> can be understood, and an appreciation gained of his plaintive letter to Granville, in which he referred to his conscientious and selfless motives and expressed the hope that

... the time may come when it will be admitted that, altho' misjudging, I have been honest & disinterested, and that when this [the Crimean] war is over & I shall sink back into that quiet which is more congenial to me than the exertions & turmoil of public life I may recover some of those [Liberal party] friends whom I have now lost...<sup>3.</sup>

The most important lesson which Goderich, Layard and Bruce, as well as Forster and Hughes, drew from the relatively ineffectual nature of their mid-fifties foreign policy stance, was a realisation that their influence would continue to be minimal so long as they remained private, independent members. This view is evident, for example, in Layard's hollow-sounding defence of their bench's impact on Crimean issues,<sup>4.</sup> and is reinforced by his repeated complaints that both the Persia and China wars had been conducted without the knowledge, consideration or consent of parliament.<sup>5.</sup> In fact, despite

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1. For a full discussion see chapter 8 below.
  2. 3 H 140, 1714: 3 March 1856.
  3. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/23/5, 151: L to Granville, London, 19 June 1855.
  4. 3 H 141, 2085-6: 5 May 1856.
  5. e.g. *Times*, 17 March 1857: L's address at a public meeting in London, 16 March 1857; [Layard], 'Persia', 501, 539.

the extensive independence of private members in the mid-nineteenth-century house of commons and the procedural ability to bring on debates, their impact on foreign policy was normally of a retrospective and ineffectual character, for foreign relations were traditionally a prerogative of the crown as advised by ministers.<sup>1</sup> Even prior to the 1857 election, therefore, Goderich, Layard and their colleagues had from necessity to consider the possibility of an accommodation with Palmerston, in order that their influence might eventually be brought to bear in an administrative capacity. The disastrous results of that electoral campaign simply reinforced this inclination.

Note on the Ottoman Bank

In his consideration of the peace terms Layard had asserted that the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire could best be achieved by the strengthening of internal Turkish prosperity and stability. He argued that the 'humanity firman', though a liberal and just decree, would be less efficacious in this respect than the extension of commerce and the construction of public works, particularly transportation systems. 2. Acting on such motivation Layard extended his political co-operation with Bruce to the economic sphere, and throughout 1856, and in the years that followed, these two colleagues attempted through commercial activity to fortify Turkish stability.

For many years Layard had taken an interest in Turkish finances: his first contribution to the house of commons in 1852 had in fact dealt with this issue. 3. In 1855 he had supported the Turkish war loan, which the British government, and Gladstone, were reluctant to guarantee because of the Porte's financial mismanagement. 4.

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1. See Valerie Cromwell, 'The Private Member of the House of Commons and Foreign Policy in the Nineteenth Century', in *Liber Memorialis Sir Maurice Powicke*, (Louvain/Paris, 1965), 200-4, and 191-218 *passim*.
  2. [Layard], 'The Peace and its Effects on the Condition of Turkey', 510-26.
  3. 3 H 123, 243-4: 19 Nov. 1852.
  4. 3 H 139, 1297-1301: 23 July 1855; RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 84: B to G, London, 16 Sept. 1855; see Olive Anderson, 'Great Britain and the Beginnings of the Ottoman Public Debt, 1854-55', *Historical Journal*, 7, 1, 1964, 47-63.

With the prospect of hostilities with Russia ending, Layard and Bruce determined to attempt an involvement in Turkish finances. The result, with the backing of financiers such as George Glyn and Arthur Hankey, was the foundation of the Ottoman bank, sanctioned by the sultan in April and incorporated by the British government in May 1856. Layard visited Constantinople in both May-June and December-January 1856-7 on behalf of the Ottoman bank. He became chairman of the court of directors, a position which he retained until his appointment to office in 1861, when Bruce took his place (though Bruce had also temporarily assumed the chairmanship in 1858, whilst Layard was in India 1.). Bruce subsequently resigned the chairmanship in 1862, when he too entered public office.

In that the Ottoman bank does not represent specifically political co-operation between Bruce and Layard, it is unnecessary to discuss here the details of their involvement, or of the bank's activities. Nevertheless it remains an incontrovertible proof of the extremely close liaison between these two rising politicians. In addition, the bank served to consolidate their financial independence. Having been intended in principle to confine its activities to ordinary commercial banking, the rapid deterioration of Turkish finances from 1857 to 1861 virtually eliminated the Ottoman bank's rivals, and by 1861 it had become the mainstay of the Turkish treasury, concentrating on government rather than private business. The combination with French interests in 1863 as the Imperial Ottoman bank merely consolidated this position, and augmented the profits. 2. For Bruce and Layard, therefore, the Ottoman bank proved a rewarding investment. Nevertheless, though profit was in all likelihood their primary motivation, they seemed sincere in their conviction that benefits to Turkey, as well as the extension of "the legitimate influence of England," 3. would accrue from Ottoman bank involvement in the Porte's economic affairs. Thus Layard assured Goderich that he could not identify himself "with financial matters & become a mere agent for the shareholders. I had only one object in accepting the chairmanship -- to serve the Turks & rescue them from the hands of mere speculators." 4.

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 65: G to L, Brighton, 1 April 1858. Bruce commented of his position at the time: "Certainly of all the strange turns of Fate, the strangest would have appeared to me that I should have presided [at a meeting of shareholders] at the London Tavern as a chairman of a Bank of Turkey!" (Bruce, *Letters*, i : 161: B to Norah Bruce, Paris, 31 March 1858).
  2. See D.S. Landes, *Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt*, (London, 1958), 62-7, 136-7; and, A.S.J. Baster, *The International Banks*, (London, 1935), 78-112.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 91: L to G, Constantinople, 29 May 1856.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 98: L to G, Milan, 20 Aug. 1856.

Goderich approved of Layard's participation,<sup>1</sup> but expectations, partly a result of their faith in the efficacy of commerce in extending Christianity and civilisation, 2. that the Ottoman bank might induce Turkey to reform her finances and develop her resources, were to remain generally unfulfilled. One specific attempt which Layard promoted, the financing of a railway to link the Danube with the Mediterranean, was a victim of the 1857 recession, 3. but in the long run it was Turkish intransigence and corruption which nullified all efforts to ameliorate the Porte's economic plight.

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 48: G to L, Bellagio, 28 Aug. 1856.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 47: L to Lady Huntly, Constantinople, 2 June 1856 (copy). Bruce expressed his admiration for Layard's reliance on commerce as a civilising agent in his introduction to Layard, *Early Adventures*, 30-1.
  3. Layard, who in early 1857 was the chief proponent of this scheme, attributed its failure both to the crisis in the money markets and the uncertainty caused by the dissolution of parliament (LP. BL Add Ms 39054, 19: L to Reshid Pasha [the Grand Vizir], London, 22 April 1857).

## CHAPTER 5

EMERGENT LIBERALISM

Goderich was well-prepared on a personal level for the 'China' election of March 1857, for throughout 1856 he had, in concert with Forster, systematically endeavoured to augment his status in West Riding liberal political circles.

Forster's support, and his influence within Liberal councils in both Bradford and Leeds, were critical in the negotiations leading to Goderich's acceptance as a candidate for the West Riding in 1857. The West Riding was the largest parliamentary constituency in Britain, and highly esteemed because of its great concentration of wealth, both landed and industrial. In contrast to most county constituencies, the landed élite had to share political power with urban industrial interests; thus in order to return two whig-liberals, the landed whigs were forced to co-operate with urban liberals. In 1847, however, when the urban liberals endorsed Cobden's candidacy, and the whigs supported his tory opponent, these two groups had ceased to collaborate. During the fifties there occurred a gradual process of reconciliation.<sup>1</sup> The choice of Goderich as candidate during 1856 can therefore be interpreted as a credible compromise between landed whigs and urban liberals. Because of his origins the whigs saw him as one of their own, though remaining disturbed by his radicalism. On the other hand the urban liberals approved his political radicalism whilst remaining sceptical of his endorsement of state intervention on both industrial and educational issues. (Edward Baines, editor of the *Leeds Mercury*,

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1. See F.M.L. Thompson, 'Whigs and Liberals in the West Riding, 1830-1860', *English Historical Review*, 74, 291, April 1959, 214-39; and N. McCord, 'Cobden and Bright in Politics, 1846-1857', in Robert Robson, ed., *Ideas and Institutions of Victorian Britain*, (London, 1967), 87-114.

and Francis Carbutt, a merchant and mayor of Leeds, led the urban liberals' fanatical voluntaryist opposition to all state aid for education.) Goderich never explained his preference for the West Riding over Huddersfield, but it seems likely that it was an attempt to reinforce his parliamentary status through representing what he referred to as "the first seat in the House of Commons."<sup>1</sup> The consequent necessity of political pragmatism, the toning down of his advanced views on political, social and industrial reforms in order to placate both whigs and liberals in the Riding, does not appear to have disturbed Goderich. He had not abandoned his earlier radicalism, but merely changed his tactics, having become persuaded that the innovations he desired to effect neither could nor would be achieved overnight.

Goderich's candidature was initially supported by both Forster and the reformist whig Sir W.M. Milner in mid-January 1856, at a meeting of the West Riding reform and registration association committee. Forster, acting specifically as Goderich's agent, had first ascertained that Talbot Baines, Edward's brother, would not stand, and that Goderich would therefore obtain Baines's support.<sup>2</sup> The negotiations continued throughout the year, however,<sup>3</sup> and it was not until December that Forster, still acting on his friend's behalf, was able to assure Goderich that he had the support of all Liberal leaders, and that his election was virtually guaranteed.<sup>4</sup>

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 298: G to H, Ripon, 19 Dec. 1856.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 29, 31, 33: F to G, Otley, 22 Jan. 1856, Leeds, 25 Jan. 1856 and Otley, 26 Jan. 1856.
  3. e.g. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 51 and 65: F to G, Otley, 27 April and 22 Aug. 1856.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 83, 88, 92: F to G, Otley, 16 Dec. 1856, Otley, 21 Dec. 1856, and Ambleside, 28 Dec. 1856; also RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 298: G to H, Ripon, 19 Dec. 1856.

Thus when Palmerston appealed to the voters in March, Goderich remained confident of his return to the house of commons. In his election address he reiterated his adherence to progressive liberalism: "It is only by timely reforms, wisely conducted, that we can hope to maintain unimpaired the real spirit and essence of our institutions." In particular, he repeated his advocacy of political reform, of the abolition of church rates, of law reform, and of administrative reform in both the military and civil branches of the public service. As for the *Arrow* incident, he explained that he had supported Cobden's motion "not because I wished to overthrow the present Administration, and put another in its place," but rather "because I believed, after an earnest study of all the papers laid before Parliament, that the course pursued by Sir John Bowring was unjust and unsound in policy" and would, if left unchecked, have provided a dangerous precedent. Goderich, fully aware of the prime minister's charismatic appeal to the electorate and of the potential political suicide involved in alienating himself from the Palmerstonian groundswell, also took pains to express his essential Liberalism and to explain his political relationship with Palmerston:

Since the formation of Lord Palmerston's Government, I have given to it a general support; and, if you return me to Parliament, I shall be prepared to continue to do so for the future, *as far as may be consistent with those Liberal principles which will always direct my political course.* I think that Lord Palmerston deserves the thanks of the country for the manner in which he directed our diplomatic affairs during that difficult period, and especially for the course which he pursued at the time of the Vienna Conferences, and in respect to the disputes about the Isle of Serpents and the Bessarabian frontier, and I

am of opinion that the present Government is more entitled to our confidence than any other which would be likely to be substituted for it. 1.

Wolf submits that this election address indicates that Goderich now figured as a definite Palmerstonian,<sup>2</sup> though he later qualifies this view.<sup>3</sup> The description is misleading, or at least premature, as evidenced by Goderich's continued antagonism to Palmerstonian concepts in the following year.<sup>4</sup> In addition to its immediate political expediency, what Goderich's address illustrates is rather an implicit admission that Palmerston would not easily be dislodged from the prime ministership. But Goderich need not have been concerned over the safety of his seat, despite the *Arrow* controversy, for he and Forster had effectively established his local reputation. The whig-liberal coalition in the West Riding remained secure, and Goderich and the sitting tory, Denison, were returned unopposed. Goderich commented to Layard that his "election came off today without a breath of opposition, & in a manner very gratifying to me."<sup>5</sup>

Bruce was initially anxious about his re-election prospects, as he explained to his wife early in March: "This dissolution is a troublesome business; but we must make the best of it... I find Lord Palmerston very popular -- people troubling themselves very little about the justice or injustice of the war, and angry at the supposed

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1. *Leeds Mercury*, 14 March 1857: G's West Riding election address, London, 13 March 1857 (my italics). An abridged version was printed in the *Times*, 20 March 1857.

2. Wolf, i : 128.

3. *ibid.*, i : 132.

4. See 244-8 below.

5. LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 208: G to L, Leeds, 30 March 1857.

coalition."<sup>1</sup> His apprehensions were not allayed when the Merthyr ironmasters abandoned their support of his candidature, which he had assumed to be intact. He made no mention of this factor in his election address, which was issued on 11 March and which concentrated purely on policy issues. The similarity with Goderich's address is striking. Bruce espoused a large and liberal measure of reform, and defended his constant support for measures asserting or extending civil and religious liberties, such as the abolition of church rates and the Maynooth grant. He concentrated, however, on Palmerston and China: "The House of Commons, which cheerfully and resolutely supported Her Majesty's Government in a just and honourable war with Russia, has shrunk from prosecuting an unjust and discreditable war with China," a war which Bruce described as "unjust in its origin and cruel in its conduct," a war "disgraceful to England, to civilization and Christianity." However Bruce hastened to assert that he was not a factious opponent of Lord Palmerston:

I have given to Lord Palmerston, ever since the formation of his Government, a loyal and steady support. In times of difficulty and danger, abandoned by the ablest of his colleagues, his [foreign] policy was steadfast and patriotic, until he succeeded in concluding a formidable war by an honourable peace. For this conduct I felt well inclined to overlook those shortcomings in his domestic policy, of which every member of the Liberal party was painfully conscious. In the recent division on the Budget, although I disapproved of many of its details, I gave him my vote. I thought the maintenance of his Government of greater importance than the overthrow of an objectionable Budget.

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1. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 151: B to Norah Bruce, Aberdare, 8 March 1857. The 'coalition' which Bruce mentions refers to Palmerston's allegations that the Peelites, Manchester radicals and Tories had coalesced in a factious opposition, the purpose of which was simply to defeat the government in the Commons.

But the war in China was not a question upon which I could sacrifice my private opinion.<sup>1</sup>

Bruce recognised that his address savoured of the consciousness of having given an unpopular vote<sup>2</sup> and, as with Goderich, the extent of his somewhat expedient support for Palmerston was deliberately exaggerated, though perhaps in Bruce's case this was necessary if he were to retain his parliamentary seat.

George Clark, his fellow-trustee of the Dowlais ironworks and also a close friend of Layard, managed Bruce's campaign admirably. His first campaign speech occurred on 17 March at Dowlais, where Bruce reiterated the opinions previously expressed in his address, justified his China vote by the concurrence of "such prominent members of the Liberal party" as Russell, Roebuck, Layard and Goderich, and emphasised that, though he had generally supported Palmerston and would continue to do so, on reformist questions such as suffrage extension and church rates he would continue to vote against him.<sup>3</sup> It was a bold approach, which paid handsome dividends. Bruce reported that the meeting, friendly but hesitant at first, was finally warm and supportive, adding:

... I never spoke half so well before, and my success was so complete that the general feeling was that there would be no opposition. Matthew John, the leading Chartist here -- a very fine fellow, whom I have always liked and respected -- seconded the vote of satisfaction at my explanation.

Clark spoke capitally... 4.

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1. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 21 March 1857: B's election address, 11 March 1857.
  2. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 152: B to Norah Bruce, Aberdare, 8 March 1857.
  3. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 21 March 1857: B's Merthyr/Dowlais election speech, 17 March 1857.
  4. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 152: B to Norah Bruce, Dowlais, 18 March 1857.

In a subsequent speech on 23 March Bruce added to the views previously stated a promise to meet his constituents annually thereafter, a defence of his commons vote in favour of opening the national gallery and British museum on Sundays (a contentious issue in non-conformist, sabbatarian Wales), his support for admission of dissenters into Oxford, as proved by his commons vote, and his continued opposition to the ballot. Bruce also commented to the gathering on the withdrawal of the ironmasters' endorsement of his candidature:

The vote I have given on the China question, and also other votes, have caused gentlemen who then [December 1852] supported me to alienate from me; some of the most powerful of my supporters who then gave me their influence have deserted me. Gentlemen, I regret that circumstance as much as anybody, but that regret is somewhat mitigated from the fact that it throws me completely upon the great body of electors, and from them, I am happy to say, I have received the most cordial and generous support. 1.

Bruce's liberalism was undoubtedly more advanced in 1857 than it had been in 1852, a factor which can largely be attributed to the influence within the house of commons of Layard and Goderich. Hence his support in Merthyr was sufficiently widespread to achieve his unopposed return to parliament.

Layard's position at Aylesbury was less secure, though he was apparently unaware of its precarious nature. The market town of Aylesbury was traditionally a conservative, protectionist preserve, and the return of two Liberals, Bethell and Layard, in 1852 had been exceptional. Layard might have been warned in July 1856, when his

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1. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 28 March 1857: B's Merthyr election speech, 23 March 1857.

annual constituency meeting was very sparsely attended,<sup>1.</sup> that his popularity had significantly diminished. Instead he had so deluded himself that in March 1857, despite offers in a dozen seats including Lambeth and Newcastle, he decided to "stick to Aylesbury where my seat is secure."<sup>2.</sup> In an election speech at the county hall in Aylesbury, Layard denied that he and those who thought with him had entered into a conspiracy or combination with others to oust Palmerston, emphasised that "the humble individual now addressing you, with some others of liberal opinions, took the lead in almost every question when the [Crimean] war was under discussion," and pointed out that, if questions such as administrative reform, franchise extension and China were excepted, "those gentlemen who act with myself have always given the Palmerston Government a firm and consistent support."<sup>3.</sup> These desperate and somewhat misleading assurances were not sufficiently convincing to persuade the electorate, for which the China war had become the principal issue in the campaign, and Layard's status was further undermined by Bethell's public support of Palmerston's China policy despite his private misgivings. The final result was that the Conservative candidate led the poll, with Layard trailing Bethell.<sup>4.</sup>

Layard subsequently considered contesting the Wigtown burghs in southwest Scotland, and stressed at a meeting in Wigtown that political radicalism was impracticable under present Liberal leadership and that a vague endorsement of Palmerston should not supplant political

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1. *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 26 July 1856: report of L's annual meeting with his Aylesbury constituents.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 54: L to Lady Huntly, London, 13 March 1857 (copy).
  3. *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 21 March 1857: L's Aylesbury election speech, 18 March 1857.
  4. *Times*, 30 March 1857: Bernard (546); Bethell (501); Layard (439). The poll was held on 28 March.

principle as a voting rationale, for Palmerston was an old man whom Layard predicted would never rule for seven more years. His support in Wigtown was apparently insufficient, for Layard withdrew from the contest before the poll.<sup>1.</sup>

Layard afterwards attributed his Aylesbury defeat without qualification to the Palmerstonian landslide,<sup>2.</sup> but this was probably an oversimplification, for he failed to perceive that his radical politics were not likely to be endorsed by the voters of agriculturally-minded and socially-conservative county towns. It was a misconception in which he persisted for over two years, and which also caused electoral defeat at York. However in a *post mortem* address at Aylesbury, he questioned whether

too much has not been sacrificed to a Minister who has been invariably opposed to every measure of true reform, however moderate, and has ever failed to justify the confidence of those nations which have trusted in him for the support and defence of their liberties

and added that it was for him

no dishonour to suffer with Cobden, Bright, Gibson, Clay, Cardwell, Otway, and a host of others, who have ever been found on the side of the people, and have been intimately associated with almost every recent measure for enlarging their liberties or contributing to their welfare. 3.

Layard was convinced that public opinion would soon shift, and that he would not long be excluded from the house of commons.<sup>4.</sup>

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1. *Times*, 4 April 1857: report on election proceedings in the Wigtown burghs.
  2. *Times*, 22 April 1857: L's address to his former Aylesbury constituents.
  3. *ibid.*
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 243: L to Henry Ross, London, 8 May 1857. Similar sentiments were expressed in a toadyish letter Layard wrote Russell to congratulate him on his unexpected and personally triumphant victory in the city of London (LP. BL Add Ms 58168, 62: L to Russell, London, 29 March 1857 (copy)).

For Bruce and Goderich, of course, Layard's defeat, coupled with that of Otway, was disastrous. Bruce's disappointment can only be indirectly ascertained,<sup>1</sup> but Goderich recorded his obvious despondency in a letter addressed to Layard:

I was most truly grieved to learn that you had been beaten at Aylesbury. Your loss in the House of Commons will be a great one to the country, as well as to your friends, & no one will feel it more than I.

I do not doubt that in or out of Parliament you will be alike usefully employed; but we can ill afford to lose such a man as you, especially at a time when the House of Commons has been shorn of so many others among its distinguished members.

I hope you will not let this temporary defeat annoy you, or disgust you with public life. There is sure to come a strong reaction & before long, for this Parliament cannot last, you will be once more in your proper place, which is not Aylesbury; that borough ought never for the future to be represented by anything higher than Bethell.

I do not at all like the aspect of the new Parliament. I shall feel very lonely in it, & expect to be able to do little good... 2.

During 1856 Forster initiated his first serious attempt to obtain Liberal endorsement for one of the West Riding boroughs. In so doing he found himself in direct conflict with the voluntaryist interests. As early as April 1856 he confided to Goderich that "*between ourselves*, I jumped the ditch on Monday," agreeing to stand in Bradford if requested to do so by the Bradford Liberals.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Sir William Napier reassured Bruce that Layard's abilities in other areas (for example, the Ottoman bank) would see him out of his plight, which would seem to indicate Bruce's considerable concern (BP. Bodleian Library, Ms Eng Letters d.246, 46: Napier to B, 3 April 1857).

2. LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 208: G to L, Leeds, 30 March 1857.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 49: F to G, Otley, 23 April 1856.

In addition, Forster had the support in Leeds of an advanced liberal association, consisting of former chartists, Owenites and various co-operators, which advocated five of the six charter points and administrative reform, but which remained disunited on questions of disestablishment, national secular education, and abolition of the laws of entail and primogeniture.<sup>1</sup> He thus found himself throughout 1856 entertaining two possible options, and was undecided as to the best course to follow. In some respects Bradford would have made a more comfortable choice: Forster's local influence was greater there, and he would have thereby avoided direct confrontation with Edward Baines, editor of the *Leeds Mercury* and extreme voluntarist. On the other hand his Leeds proponents were enthusiastic and relatively confident. Forster's indecision is demonstrated in a letter to Goderich, in which he stated that

... with regard to my own position I am in a peck of perplexities respecting which were we together I should ask your advice. Between ourselves the Leeds proposition is on again more hot than before and pressed by much more influential persons. Carbutt will not stand and my name I understand is now under the discussion secretly of the Borough Registration Committee. Whether it will ever get further I know not, but think not, as I cannot but suppose that the general opinion will be what certainly were I a Leeds elector would be mine, viz. that failing a Leeds man they ought to get a man of political prestige. Still if a deputation does result from it my answer is not altogether clear... 2.

Goderich advised that Forster settle on Bradford,<sup>3</sup> but he eventually

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1. Temmel, 102-3.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 81: F to G, Otley, 12 Dec. 1856.

3. See RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 92: F to G, Ambleside, 28 Dec. 1856, in which Forster wrote: "I agree with you Bradford is my best card."

withdrew from the contest there in favour of a fellow-radical, Col. Perronet Thompson, in order not to split the radical vote. It was at Leeds, therefore, that Forster came forward as a parliamentary candidate.

The Liberal reform and registration association in Leeds was dominated by Edward Baines and Francis Carbutt, both extreme voluntaryists in education, laissez-faireists on social and industrial issues, strong disestablishmentarians, and in foreign affairs, staunch non-interventionists. On all these grounds, they were at odds with Forster, whilst in other ways their mutual political radicalism was compatible. As one Liberal candidate, the registration association had settled on Talbot Baines who, though Edward's brother, was nevertheless a churchman and no voluntaryist. As a second candidate a voluntaryist was sought and, after an unsuccessful London canvass, Carbutt was so designated at a meeting of the registration association on 9 March 1857.<sup>1</sup> The advanced liberals took exception to this 'undemocratic' decision, and on 10 March invited Forster to declare his candidacy. As a result Forster held a public meeting of Liberal electors on the following day at the music hall, during which he explained his policies in considerable detail. He defended his support for state education, advocated both administrative and political reform, as well as the abolition of church rates, disestablishment of the church of Ireland, a more equitable distribution of church revenues, and a readjustment of taxation in favour of the poor. In deference, presumably, to his listeners, he was non-committal on the sabbatarian question, and on foreign policy he observed that "his rule of policy would be, -- 'Non-intervention with other nations,' --

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1. *Leeds Mercury*, 12 March 1857.

(hear, hear) -- a rule with this exception, that it might be her duty sometimes to prevent other nations from interfering."<sup>1</sup> As to the ministry, Forster accurately echoed the views of Goderich, Bruce and Layard, and maintained that "whether or not he would support Lord Palmerston's Government would depend upon what Lord Palmerston's Government was; but this he could say, that he did not know any man in the Legislature whom he would put in Lord Palmerston's place. (Applause.)"<sup>2</sup> The meeting resolved to recommend Forster's candidacy to a general meeting of Liberal electors scheduled for 13 March.

At this second meeting Talbot Baines and Forster were chosen as Liberal candidates by show of hands, but there was considerable confusion, and allegations by the Edward Bainesite clique that non-electors and tories had infiltrated the meeting on Forster's behalf.<sup>3</sup> Carbutt initially refused to withdraw from the contest, and on the following day Forster retired in order to preserve party unity. Carbutt himself followed suit two days later, and a deputation to London named John Remington Mills an alternative candidate. Despite Baines's support,

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1. My italics; note that this qualification was entirely unacceptable to the rigid non-interventionists of the mid-1850s. An example of Forster's resistance to non-interventionism is found in [Forster], 'Kafir Wars and Cape Policy', 162, in which he advocates British interference in southern Africa in order to prevent the Boers from ill-treating the blacks.
  2. *Leeds Mercury*, 12 March 1857: F's address to the advanced liberal electors of Leeds, 11 March 1857.
  3. *Leeds Mercury*, 14 March 1857: report of the meeting of Liberal electors of Leeds, 13 March 1857; the allegations regarding non-electors and tory infiltration are mentioned in John Noaks [pseudonym], *A Letter to Edward Baines, on his Treatment of W.E. Forster and the Leeds Electors*, ([Leeds and Manchester, 1857]), 7. The pamphlet is a panegyric on Forster's behalf.

however, Mills was defeated in the general election by the Conservative candidate, Robert Hall.

The education issue was undoubtedly the principal question dividing Forster and the Baines-Carbutt registration reform association faction.<sup>1.</sup> It would however be misleading to ignore the other divisive factors. Though China, and foreign policy in general, were not prominent issues in the 1857 Leeds elections, Forster's qualification of strict non-interventionism did not stand him in good stead with Bainesite radicals. His endorsement of church establishment and his rejection of extreme laissez-faire (his "socialism", as he called it<sup>2.</sup>) were of course both considered suspect. Had he persevered with his candidacy, it is doubtful whether Forster could have achieved success in an election campaign which would have featured strenuous opposition from both Bainesites and Tories.

Following his withdrawal from Leeds, overtures from both Huddersfield and Newcastle proved fruitless, but Forster was again considered as a candidate for Leeds in May after the death of Robert Hall, the newly-elected Conservative MP. Once again a general meeting of Leeds electors was called upon to choose a candidate, and J.M. Mills, with the backing of Baines, was selected over Forster.<sup>3.</sup> Despite this second rejection, however, Forster had clearly succeeded in forming a power base

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1. Carbutt spoke to this effect at the 13 March meeting (*Leeds Mercury*, 14 March 1857: report of the meeting of Liberal electors of Leeds, 13 March 1857), a view confirmed by Noaks (Noaks, 11-2). Forster also attributed his rejection largely to the education issue (*Leeds Mercury*, 30 June 1857: F's address at a public dinner in his honour at Leeds, 29 June 1857).

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 92: F to G, Ambleside, 28 Dec. 1856.

3. *Leeds Mercury*, 28 May, 30 May and 2 June 1857; also Noaks, 12-3.

in Leeds which contributed to his enhanced political stature.<sup>1.</sup> He could not in future be ignored as a potential candidate. Nevertheless, his immediate electoral failures were a blow to Bruce and Goderich, who could not but perceive the relative isolation and impotence of their parliamentary status following the 1857 general elections.

The electoral setbacks of 1857 were to prove a significant climacteric in the political fortunes of Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard. Their unique radical-romantic ideological amalgam had isolated them from political contemporaries on both foreign and domestic questions, but it had not won them notable public support, and their impact in parliament had not been conspicuous. The elections of 1857 crystallised their frustrations, and forced them to seriously consider the notion of wielding administrative power if their ideas were to be influential.

## 2.

The election results had, of course, been equally disastrous for Manchester radicals and Peelites, and had superficially consolidated Palmerston's prestige. In fact the electorate's endorsement of Palmerston in the spring of 1857 merely demonstrated the appeal of his personal charisma, and was not a sanction of specific policy initiatives.

Amongst parliamentarians Palmerston's apparent political ascendancy was in truth ephemeral. This unexpected phenomenon may in part be attributed to the intense economic depression of 1857.

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1. A public dinner in Forster's honour on 29 June, sponsored by his political 'friends', attests to this stature. Goderich's parliamentary duties necessitated his absence, but he wrote to the meeting: "I need hardly tell you that my friendship for Mr. Forster, and my admiration for his abilities and his character, would make me very glad to join at any time in showing him that respect which he so well deserves" (*Leeds Mercury*, 30 June 1857: report of the public dinner in F's honour at Leeds, 29 June 1857).

As the first significant hiatus in the industrial and financial stability which had prevailed since 1850, it temporarily shocked politicians from their complacency. News of the mutiny in India exacerbated the sense of public uncertainty. The ostensible Palmerstonian majority in the house of commons was shortly to abandon its professed champion, amid an atmosphere of party chaos, confusion of issues, surprise and intrigue. Only in retrospect is Palmerston's underlying strength undoubtedly evident, though Layard accurately analysed the situation two years later, stating that "Lord Palmerston's government was puffed up with pride and victory, and he assumed an insolent and arrogant tone. (Hear, hear.) A man, and not a principle was recognised, a great mistake."<sup>1</sup> For radicals, the obvious absence of a Palmerstonian commitment to parliamentary reform rendered his leadership suspect. Forster, for example, acknowledged this mistrust at a reform meeting in Bradford in January 1858, though he was constrained to admit that he did not consider Palmerston "a bad minister, as ministers go," adding that "he had great ability, and his energy was admirable. When others failed, during the late [Crimean] war, he came in and probably did the best that a man could do (hear, hear)."<sup>2</sup>

The parliamentary session of 1857 witnessed only meagre legislative achievements, and Bruce and Goderich were accordingly disenchanted. They rarely spoke in the house, and Goderich assured Hughes that "really the present state of things in this Palaver is enough to make any man despair of his kind."<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless Bruce and Goderich joined in voting for a measure which would abolish taxes levied on Irish towns for the

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1. *York Herald*, 16 April 1859: L's York election speech, 13 April 1859.

2. *Bradford Observer*, 4 Feb. 1858: F's address at a Bradford reform meeting, 28 Jan. 1858.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 15: G to H, London, 22 June 1857.

maintenance of church of Ireland ministers, and supported the admission of Jews to parliament and the reform of divorce proceedings, a measure which merited the enmity of Gladstone.<sup>1</sup> In addition Goderich voted in favour of the abolition of the property qualification for MPs and of the secret ballot.<sup>2</sup>

In August Layard entertained the possibility of contesting Birmingham, even in opposition to Bright,<sup>3</sup> but in the end deferred his re-election attempt. Bright wrote a conciliatory letter, expressing his hope that a vacancy would soon materialise for Layard "& that we may yet pull together in our old field. There is much to be done. I only grieve that on matters of foreign policy you & I have not seen alike."<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless Layard must have been depressed about his prospects, for in October Dickens "observed an extraordinary deterioration" in his condition.<sup>5</sup>

Palmerston's false parliamentary supremacy was abruptly shattered by the consequences of Orsini's attempt to assassinate Napoleon III. Orsini, an Italian patriot frustrated by the emperor's irresolute advocacy of Italy's liberation and unification, was found to have manufactured his bombs in England, where he lived in exile. The ensuing French anger was considerable, particularly amongst army officers, whose protestations over English legal negligence were published in the quasi-official *Moniteur*. The French government formally requested that Britain

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1. 3 H 145, 617-21: 19 May 1857; 3 H 145, 1790-4, 1857-60: 15 June 1857; 3 H 146, 365-8: 25 June 1857; 3 H 147, 192-5: 21 July 1857; 3 H 147, 892-4: 31 July 1857.
  2. 3 H 145, 1545-8: 10 June 1857; 3 H 146, 682-5: 30 June 1857. Bruce was absent on both occasions.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 292: Wm. Nash to L, Birmingham, 26 Aug. 1857.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 290: Bright to L, Rochdale, 22 Aug. 1857.
  5. Edgar Johnson, ed., *Letters from Charles Dickens to Angela Burdett-Coutts, 1841-1865*, (London, 1953), 350: Dickens to A. Burdett-Coutts, 4 Oct. 1857.

strengthen her conspiracy laws; the British ministry neglected to officially reply to Walewski's allegedly-objectionable despatch (though concurrence in the French demand was unofficially intimated), but determined to comply with the emperor's suggestion. This compliance with a French requisition was a political mistake on the part of Palmerston, clearly illustrating that though he was always prepared to be bellicose to an innocent foreigner unable to retaliate, he would be prudently civil if England's 'honour' were threatened by a more powerful adversary.

The conspiracy to murder bill, establishing conspiracy to murder as a felony rather than a simple misdemeanour and thereby increasing the punishment from five years to life imprisonment, was introduced on 8 February 1858 and, with Conservative endorsement, easily passed first reading on the following day. Within a week, however, parliament's mood had substantially altered. Peelites, Manchester radicals and Russellite whigs skilfully attacked their despised foe, by condemning Palmerston not on the basis of the bill, but by inducing the pacifist Milner Gibson to introduce an amendment censuring the ministry for having neglected to answer Walewski's despatch. The suggestion that peace party Peelites and Manchester radicals were motivated by Palmerston's alleged failure to defend national dignity is an untenable proposition, for many MPs must have known that Walewski's despatch had in fact been unofficially answered. Instead, a sincere detestation of the prime minister, an acrimony largely caused by their continued exclusion from office, precipitated the revolt by Gladstone, Graham, Russell, Milner Gibson, Bright and their adherents. Disraeli quickly sensed the shifting mood and, with no theoretical justification, led the

tories into opposition when the second reading was debated and voted on 19 February. The Palmerston government was therefore defeated by nineteen votes, by a combination which was virtually identical with that which had opposed his China policy in the previous year. It is significant that Goderich and Bruce refused to rebel on this occasion.

The two colleagues' initial response to the measure was indecisive, illustrating the conflicting considerations of national honour and international morality. Bruce, for example, informed his wife that he was

... greatly puzzled how to vote. Reason says 'in favour' of the bill. Feeling argues against it. For even if right in itself, if the concession lowers England in the eyes of foreign countries, much mischief is done. But shall we permanently be lowered by doing what is abstractedly right? I think not. Then ought I not to vote for the bill? I have been talking over the matter with Goderich, who is just as full of doubt as I am... 1.

Goderich confirmed his uncertainty in a letter to Forster, admitting: "I do not know that I have ever felt greater difficulty in making up my mind what course to take in regard to any public question."<sup>2</sup>

He and Bruce ultimately decided to support Palmerston, and voted both for the introduction of the bill and for the second reading.<sup>3</sup> Goderich carefully explained his vote to Forster, "anxious to lay my views concerning it clearly before you, in order that you may tell me what you think of them. Pray do so fully and frankly." He justified his position on four grounds: firstly, there was a good *prima facie* case for the proposed amendment of the law; secondly, existing circumstances,

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1. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 155-6: B to Norah Bruce, London, 9 Feb. 1858.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 104: G to F, London, 10 Feb. 1858 (copy).

3. 3 H 148, 1078-81: 9 Feb. 1858; 3 H 148, 1844-7: 19 Feb. 1858.

including the abusive language of French officials and military, did not in themselves justify a refusal to acquiesce in a legitimate request; thirdly, the bill in no way abrogated the right of asylum in England; fourthly, a refusal to consider the bill meant risking an unjustifiable war with France.<sup>1</sup> No doubt Goderich was relieved to find that Forster supported his stance, provided that no extradition bill was concealed in the legislation<sup>2</sup>. (and Goderich could assure Forster that protection for refugees from extradition was in no sense altered by this measure<sup>3</sup>).

Despite their support of Palmerston's conspiracy measure, however, they viewed his demise with mixed feelings: Goderich reported to Forster on the day after the second reading defeat that

The Govt of Palmerston has fallen: the Parlt. which raved in his favour not 12 months ago, and was ready to endorse every act he might do, has turned against him and the very same combination of individuals, which defeated him on the China question, has now upset him again. I think it a righteous judgment both upon him and upon the Parliament, though I voted in the minority, and though I believe the decision of last night to be fraught with much danger. As far as Palmerston is concerned it is right that he, who unscrupulously pandered last year to the worse [sic] parts of our English character, should find himself unable to control that swaggering spirit which he did everything to excite. It is right that the instrument of his overthrow should be that very Parliament which got itself elected upon no other principle than the name of the man they have now deserted. It is right that the injustice with which he treated others should recoil now upon himself...

Yet Goderich proceeded to express his conviction that relations with France were now at a crisis stage, and that the Milner Gibson amendment

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 104: G to F, London, 10 Feb. 1858 (copy).
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 114: F to G, Burley, 12 Feb. 1858.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 118: G to F, London, 20 Feb. 1858 (copy).

had been directed solely against Palmerston, not against the bill itself. He was particularly annoyed with the role of the Manchester radicals in the debacle: "I confess that I have no patience with the peace men. It is true that they have great excuses for hating Palmerston, but Bright at least ought not to have run the risk he has, to gratify any feeling of that kind, however natural."<sup>1</sup>.

The adverse vote had been intended by his opponents as a mere rebuke to Palmerston, a jealously-dealt check to his personal prestige. It was evidently interpreted as such by Goderich, Bruce and Forster, none of whom could conceive of an enduring Derby ministry nor of a novel Liberal combination; each of them expected an enfeebled Palmerston ministry to be reinstated.<sup>2</sup> Bruce felt constrained to admit that a Palmerston government was "the only possible Ministry" in the circumstances,<sup>3</sup> and Forster, having charged that "the conduct of the Peace-men is most reckless factious and disgraceful," held that for the sake of their India bill and of parliamentary reform the ministry should retain office.<sup>4</sup> He and Goderich agreed that the crisis warranted his travelling to London in order to counsel his parliamentary friend.<sup>5</sup>

The formation of a minority Conservative government left both Goderich and Bruce unimpressed. Bruce considered the establishment of such a minority government "most unfortunate."<sup>6</sup> He described Derby's initial appointees as generally "a wretched lot,"<sup>7</sup> though he later

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1. *ibid.*

2. *ibid.*; Bruce, *Letters*, i : 158: B to Norah Bruce, Clifton, 21 Feb. 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 122: F to G, Burley, 21 Feb. 1858.

3. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 157: B to Norah Bruce, London, 20 Feb. 1858.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 122: F to G, Burley, 21 Feb. 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 126: F to G, Burley, 23 Feb. 1858.

5. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 118: G to F, London, 20 Feb. 1858 (copy); RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 122: F to G, Burley, 21 Feb. 1858.

6. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 158: B to Norah Bruce, London, 22 Feb. 1858.

7. *ibid.*, i : 159: B to Norah Bruce, London, 24 Feb. 1858.

admitted that the final outcome was somewhat more satisfactory.<sup>1.</sup>  
 He welcomed Gladstone's refusal to serve,<sup>2.</sup> a decision of considerable political importance, for Gladstone was yet poised between his Conservative past and Liberal future. Bruce pertinently argued, however, that a temporary Conservative government might allow the Liberal party "time to forget its present jealousies, and to be consolidated, so that the next Ministry may be drawn from its ablest members."<sup>3.</sup> Goderich's view of the new government entirely accorded with that of Bruce: he expressed disapprobation of Derby's policy speech, and reiterated to Bruce his conviction that

...the more I think over matters, the more satisfied am I with the course, which we have taken. The present state of things is so utterly unsatisfactory, so fraught with future difficulty, and so ominous of a continued succession of weak governments, that I rejoice increasingly that we had no hand in bringing it about... 4.

In a letter to Layard, then in India, he gave his assurance that he and Bruce had "acted steadily together throughout all the recent events," and delineated his assessment of the unsatisfactory prospects for the immediate future:

... The Liberals are divided, & do not as yet seem much inclined to draw together again, while the weakness of the new Govt is so great, & their practical incompetence, as displayed in the India Bill, so flagrant, that it is certainly not desirable & scarcely possible, that they shd remain in. For the interests of our Party, it would probably be better that we should remain in opposition for a year or so; but it does not seem as if Ld Derby & Dizzy would give us a chance of doing so...

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1. *ibid.*, i : 160: B to Norah Bruce, London, 26 Feb. 1858.
  2. *ibid.*, i : 158: B to Norah Bruce, London, 22 Feb. 1858.
  3. *ibid.*, i : 159: B to Norah Bruce, London, 23 Feb. 1858.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 77: G to B, Brighton, 2 March 1858.

Goderich added that, were the Tories to be promptly defeated, he thought Palmerston would

... return to office with a modified Cabinet. All his friends & toadies say that he has no idea of bringing back the old lot, as it was before, & I don't expect that he would attempt it. If the present Govt holds on till next year & we come to the discussion of Parly Reform, I wd back Ld John for Prime Minister... 1.

Layard, absent in India throughout these events, was apparently unsympathetic with the stance of his former parliamentary colleagues, for a year later he described the conspiracy bill as "without exception ... the greatest insult that could have been introduced into parliament."<sup>2</sup> This was the first fundamental divergence of views within the group since its inception as a cohesive parliamentary and extra-parliamentary alliance, but it was not the harbinger of substantial incompatibility. The conspiracy bill apart, Layard continued to closely consult and co-operate with his parliamentary allies.

The political significance of the early months of 1858 should not be ignored, nor their impact on Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard underrated. A number of important conclusions emerge from their role in these critical events. Their dismay with constant and unprincipled political faction-fighting is evident, and the conclusion may be drawn that the necessity of more strictly-defined party structures was beginning to replace the importance of independent parliamentary alliances in their estimation. The corollary to this notion was the desire for inclusion in a broadly-based liberal coalition, and their references in letters previously quoted to membership in the Liberal

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 65: G to L, Brighton, 1 April 1858.

2. *York Herald*, 16 April 1859: L's York election speech, 13 April 1859.

party should be viewed in this context. Wolf has apparently extrapolated from this attitude the assumption that Goderich was reconciling himself to Palmerstonian leadership in the early months of 1858.<sup>1</sup> This assertion is both misleading and premature. Goderich and the others, in emphasising the importance of Liberal unity, necessarily tempered their aversion to Palmerston as a possible leader of the party. However Palmerston's leadership was far from secure following his resignation as prime minister; his status and popularity declined markedly, and in fact Granville assumed many leadership responsibilities during this period. Moreover Goderich had expressed a preference for Russell as prime minister if parliamentary reform were to be seriously contemplated, and Wolf's description of Palmerston as "chastened and more malleable.... than the reactionary bogey he [Goderich] had so long figured to himself"<sup>2</sup>. is simply a specious statement by an over-enthusiastic whig apologist. Finally, the events surrounding the Orsini crisis signify an important phase in the group's attempt to reconcile international morality and national 'honour'. In an instance in which even Gladstone and Bright ostensibly placed English 'prestige' above a rational response to a legitimate request, Goderich, Bruce and Forster eschewed the desirability of a swaggering attitude. Paradoxically it was an approach which would eventually ingratiate them with Gladstone rather

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1. Wolf clearly vacillates on his assertion. For example, he argues that Goderich had "for some time been gradually overcoming or, at any rate, restraining his aversion from [sic] Palmerston," yet admits that his acceptance of Palmerston's leadership "remained reluctant and negative," subject to curious "relapses" (Wolf, i : 128). He then admits that Goderich demonstrated little empathy with Palmerston during the Orsini crisis, and that his supportive vote was based on political principle rather than on Palmerstonian discipleship (*ibid.*, i : 132-41), but subsequently states that the "unpardonable factiousness" of the anti-Palmerstonians forced Goderich to accept Palmerston's leadership as "his only possible refuge" (*ibid.*, i : 141).

2. Wolf, i : 141.

than with Palmerston, for the former had been but temporarily diverted from his moral international tone, and the latter had reacted with a reasoned and dignified approach virtually unique in his long career. Layard's discordant response was important in this context, as the first demonstration of a divergence in their views on foreign policy which, largely camouflaged by frequent compromises as office-bearers in the 1860s, finally became apparent following Palmerston's death in 1865.

### 3.

The parliamentary intrigues of late 1857 and early 1858 were conducted in an atmosphere of crisis for which the Indian rebellion was largely responsible. Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard reflected the nation's concern: for Layard the revolt was "one of the most deplorable catastrophies in the history of this country,"<sup>1</sup> for Hughes "a time of real agony."<sup>2</sup> The mutiny was a final passionate protest of the traditional, conservative, nationalist forces in (mainly northern) India against the imposition of British rule and consequent westernisation. In its attempts to alter the basis of Indian society, the east India company had for fifty years increasingly alienated traditionalist elements of the Hindu and Moslem upper classes -- native princes, landlords and religious leaders. Legal reforms, attempts to improve road and rail communications, a land policy dominated by the ideal of peasant proprietorship, had all apparently threatened the indigenous religious, cultural and social order. The avowedly annexationist policy of Dalhousie, governor-general since 1848,

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1. [Layard], 'Communication with India: Suez and Euphrates Routes', 397.

2. Hughes, 'Hodson of Hodson's Horse', 127.

intensified these resentments by openly challenging the privileges of native princes and of the taluqdar, or landowning, class. The 1856 annexation of Oudh, rich, fertile and densely populated, exacerbated tensions, and the introduction of greased cartridges in May 1857 served as a flashpoint. The sepoys of the Bengal army, almost one-third of whom had been recruited from the upper-caste Hindus and Moslems of Oudh, mutinied. A serious uprising at Meerut resulted; Delhi fell; the Ganges valley from West Bengal to the Punjab witnessed insurrection; Cawnpore capitulated; Lucknow was seriously threatened. Confined largely to northern India, the rebellion did not represent a national rising, but in Oudh and elsewhere the peasantry joined the taluqdar class which had instigated the revolt. Outnumbered British troops and loyal sepoys gradually regained control; widespread and indiscriminate reprisals and revenge ensued.

In reaction to the course of events of 1857-8, the dominant British approach of the later nineteenth century entailed a greater acceptance of existing native institutions and traditions, a growing solicitude for the native states, and an attempt to conciliate the taluqdars by reinstating their 'aristocratic' system of land settlement and thereby achieving their support in restoring and maintaining order and tranquillity. After 1857, though reforms were acceptable, British attempts to regenerate Indian society along western lines were largely abandoned.

In October 1857 Layard decided to abandon his Italian holiday plans and instead journey to India, to investigate for himself the causes and progress of the rebellion. Before leaving he consulted Goderich and Bright amongst others, and Goderich was able to share with

Layard the recent counsel of Forster.<sup>1.</sup> Layard had hoped to travel lightly (Otway even armed him with a revolver for his protection<sup>2.</sup>), but discovered that the absence of native succour rendered it impossible to travel "as free from encumbrances and luggage as I used to do in Turkey."<sup>3.</sup> Despite this handicap, he ranged widely and established numerous sources of information, both native and Anglo-Indian.<sup>4.</sup> As early as January 1858 Otway urged Layard to return to England in order to participate in Indian discussions,<sup>5.</sup> and Goderich wrote in April that, in the event of a dissolution, "I earnestly hope that you may be here in time to stand for some safe place."<sup>6.</sup> He eventually arrived in London from the seat of rebellion in May, armed with explanations and suggestions.

Layard was naturally his friends' principal source of Indian intelligence during the mutiny: in addition to writing Goderich, he had sent two letters from India to Otway which were passed on to both Goderich and Bruce.<sup>7.</sup> But the others had additional sources of knowledge: Forster had long interested himself in Indian questions,<sup>8.</sup>

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1. See LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 326: G to L, Otley, 13 Oct. 1857; LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 328: Bright to L, North Wales, 17 Oct. 1857. Note that Goderich's letter was written from Wharfeside, where he was visiting Forster.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 39036, 142: Otway to Lady Layard, London, 2 Nov. [1882].
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38948, 59: L to Benjamin Austen, Moominabad, 13 Jan. 1858.
  4. Layard entered his Indian observations in two notebooks, describing numerous conversations with a variety of contacts (LP. BL Add Ms 58181 (53ff) and 58182 (72ff) *passim*). His most enduring information source was Macleod Wylie, secretary to the Bengal legislative council (see LP. BL Ad Mss 58160 (158ff) and 38986 *passim*).
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 32: Otway to L, 18 Jan. [1858].
  6. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 65: G to L, Brighton, 1 April 1858.
  7. See LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 32 and 55: Otway to L, 18 Jan. and 25 Feb. 1858.
  8. e.g. Library of the Society of Friends, Temp Ms box 100/27: F's notes on *Arthur's Mission to the Mysore*, 20 March 1851.

and he and Hughes were both influenced by Ludlow;<sup>1.</sup> Bruce received correspondence from Cecil Beadon, his brother-in-law through his first marriage and a Bengal government official;<sup>2.</sup> Goderich, in addition to contact with his cousin R.S. Ellis, in 1857 deputy commissioner at Nagpur, conducted an extensive correspondence with Bartle Frere, the commissioner of Sind.<sup>3.</sup> The diversity of intelligence sources, combined with their differentiated roles within and without parliament, caused Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard to draw conflicting conclusions on some aspects of the Indian rebellion. Nevertheless frequent communications throughout this period established accord on many others,

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1. See W.E. Forster, *How We Tax India: A Lecture on the Condition of India under British Rule, more especially as affected by the mode of raising the India Revenue: delivered before the Leeds Philosophical & Literary Society, March 30th, 1858*, (London, [1858]), 4; Hughes's family was living communally with Ludlow's at this time, and Hughes was much influenced by Ludlow's Indian views: he sent Layard a few days before the latter's St James's hall speech (11 May 1858) a book on India and pamphlet on Oudh by "a great friend of mine from whom my ideas on India have been gained" (LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 94: H to L, London, 7 May 1858). The reference was almost certainly to Ludlow's two recent publications on India: J.M. Ludlow, *British India, its races and its history, considered with reference to the mutinies of 1857: a series of lectures*, (Cambridge and London, 1858); J.M. Ludlow, *The War in Oude*, (Cambridge, 1858).
  2. BP. G CRO, D/D Br 140/2: Cecil Beadon to B, Calcutta, 24 Dec. 1857.
  3. Much of Goderich's correspondence with Frere concerns Indian army re-organisation, but a variety of Indian issues is also discussed (see RP. BL Add Ms 43617, 1: Frere to G, Kurachee [sic], 5 May 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43617, 3 and 12: G to Frere, London, 13 July and 17 Nov. 1858 (copies); RP. BL Add Ms 43617, 20, 26, 30, 32: Frere to G, Camp Sind, near Hyderabad, 4 Jan. 1859, Kurachee, 5 Sept. 1859, Calcutta, 31 Dec. 1859 and Calcutta, 25 Feb. 1860). A number of these letters are printed in Wolf, i : 118-21 and in John Martineau, *The Life and Correspondence of Sir Bartle Frere*, (London, 1895), i : 260-70.

and their mutual interest in military aspects of the mutiny was a unifying factor.<sup>1.</sup>

A number of methods were employed in order to propagandise their views. Forster lectured at Leeds in March 1858, and subsequently published his address.<sup>2.</sup> Layard addressed mass meetings in both London and Birmingham, directed letters to the editor of the *Times*, and further expressed his views in the *Quarterly Review*.<sup>3.</sup> Goderich confined his efforts to the house of commons.

Their concurrent activities contributed to a less impassioned assessment of the rebellion, an assessment which afforded greater justice to Britain's Indian subjects. All concentrated on Anglo-Indian racist attitudes. Layard, for example, condemned "the pitying condescension displayed by a superior to an inferior race. The Englishman in India rejects the notion of any equality between himself and the dark inhabitants of the land,"<sup>4.</sup> and on another occasion lamented that

... the people we govern are treated like a distinct race -- inferior to us -- more indeed as if they were of a lower order of creatures -- not always actually unkindly, tho' in too many instances with brutality -- but with that kind of kindness which would be shown to a pet animal... 5.

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1. e.g. Hughes, 'Hodson of Hodson's Horse', 127, 145; RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 29: H to G, Wimbledon, [6 Jan.] 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 33: G to H, Brighton, 7 Jan. 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 71: G to B, Brighton, 19 Jan. 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 73: B to G, London, 21 Jan. 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43617, 3: G to Bartle Frere, London, 13 July 1858 (copy).
  2. Forster, *How We Tax India*.
  3. *Times*, 12 May 1858: a report of L's address at St James's hall, 11 May 1858; L's Birmingham address was organised in conjunction with Joseph Sturge, quaker chairman of the peace society (Sturge Papers. BL Add Ms 43845, 61: L to Sturge, London, 12 May 1858 and LP. BL Add Ms 58162, 73: Sturge to L, Birmingham, 5 Oct. 1858); *Times*, 27 May, 21 Aug. and 25 Aug. 1858; [A.H. Layard], 'British India', *Quarterly Review*, 104, July 1858, 224-76 and [Layard], 'Communication with India: Suez and Euphrates Routes'.
  4. [Layard], 'British India', 237.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38948, 62: L to Benjamin Austen, Burwai, 1 Feb. 1858.

Bruce endorsed the view that Englishmen ought to consider Indians "their fellow subjects, and not slaves, and put them on an equality with ourselves."<sup>1</sup>

Given these attitudes, it was natural that they should abhor the widespread vengeance which followed Britain's suppression of the mutiny, and they spoke out frequently against the racist spirit which had engendered such retribution. In so doing they strongly endorsed Canning's clemency orders, which restrained the army from indiscriminately executing captured sepoys, though they remained unimpressed with Canning's overall statesmanship.<sup>2</sup> Layard was particularly strong in abusing those who called for revenge. Even prior to his Indian trip he had publicly called for justice to the natives,<sup>3</sup> describing himself as "disgusted & horrified" by the revenging tone of the *Times* and supporting Canning's moderation.<sup>4</sup> His St James's hall speech of 11 May 1858 roundly condemned the false or exaggerated reports of Indian atrocities, and the whites' subsequent "thirst of blood."<sup>5</sup> Layard remained undeterred by the protests and abuse of the Anglo-Indian press which succeeded his statements, and reiterated his advocacy of Canning's clemency.<sup>6</sup> Forster too deprecated the atrocity fabrications of Anglo-Indian factions,<sup>7</sup> and Goderich defended Canning's bold and courageous clemency orders in the house.<sup>8</sup> Only Hughes faltered in support of clemency, justifying

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1. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 9 Oct. 1858: B's address to his Merthyr constituents, 4 Oct. 1858.
  2. e.g. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 117: L to G, Indore, 31 Jan. 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 158: F to G, Burley, 10 Oct. 1858.
  3. *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 29 Aug. 1857: L's address at a testimonial dinner in his honour at Aylesbury.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 56: L to Lady Huntly, London, 23 Oct. 1857 (copy).
  5. *Times*, 12 May 1858.
  6. *Times*, 21 Aug. 1858 and 25 Aug. 1858: letters to the editor from L; LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 57: L to Lady Huntly, London, 21 Aug. 1858 (copy); RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 124: L to G, London, 16 Sept. 1858.
  7. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 100: F to G, Burley, 31 Jan. 1858.
  8. 3 H 150, 943: 20 May 1858.

the decision of Hodson (an old Rugby friend<sup>1.</sup>) to kill the sons of the king of Delhi following his capture of that city.<sup>2.</sup> Nevertheless their fundamental defence of justice and clemency was certainly atypical of contemporary attitudes, for it was not until the autumn of 1858 that public opinion in Britain (including the Liberal leadership) began to desist from its vilification of Canning's order. Their strong denunciations had contributed to this process, which was further advanced by Palmerston's expedient pro-clemency guildhall speech on 9 November 1858.

In his concern that the British public had misinterpreted the nature of the uprising, Layard repeatedly insisted that it was a widespread rebellion with considerable popular support, and not confined to a military mutiny.<sup>3.</sup> In his interpretation of the traditionalist alienation, however, and in his prescriptions for future policy, he differed from both Goderich and Forster. Layard's analysis of the causes of revolt emphasised the disaffection which ensued from British tampering with native traditions. The complexities of the English judicial system, the imposition of laws relating to adoption and remarriage of Brahmin widows, the misunderstood interference of sanitary

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1. Houghton Library, Harvard. Autograph File: H to Parker, [London], 29 Nov. 1858.
  2. Hughes, 'Hodson of Hodson's Horse', 143. Layard condemned these murders, which were committed by Hodson despite promises of safety to the king and his family (see Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower, Second Earl Granville, K.G., 1815-1891*, (London, 1905), i : 296: Canning to Granville, Allahabad, 16 March 1858; LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 168: L to Col G.J. Greathed [deputy adjutant general of H.M. Forces in Bombay], London, 29 Dec. 1858).
  3. e.g. LP. BL Add Ms 38948, 59: L to Benjamin Austen, Moominabad, 13 Jan. 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 117: L to G, Indore, 31 Jan. 1858; *Times*, 12 May 1858; [Layard], 'British India', 228.

commissions, had all in his view aroused traditionalist Indian suspicions, suspicions heightened by annexationist policies.<sup>1</sup> On the question of land settlement he was not in accord with either Forster or Goderich, both of whom praised and wished to continue the policies of peasant proprietorship.<sup>2</sup> Layard, on the other hand, asserted that the confiscations of taluqdar properties had destroyed the native gentry and gained England the enmity of both owner and cultivator.<sup>3</sup> All were agreed, however, that the ryots' relative taxation burden should be lightened.<sup>4</sup> Hughes's specific ideas are difficult to determine, though a letter to Layard indicates that a discussion the two men held on India a few days prior to Layard's St James's hall speech had "remarkably confirmed" his own and Ludlow's views.<sup>5</sup>

The practical question to be faced concerning India in 1858 was the future institutional role of the east India company. Parliamentarians across the political spectrum were generally agreed that company rule must be abolished, and Goderich, Forster, Bruce and Layard conformed with this view.<sup>6</sup> Goderich welcomed Palmerston's espousal of E.I.C. abolition, stating to Hughes: "Well done Palm, say I. If you go on like that I shall get quite inclined to support you heartily."<sup>7</sup>

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1. e.g. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 117: L to G, Indore, 31 Jan. 1858; LP. BL Add Ms 38948, 62: L to Benjamin Austen, Burwai, 1 Feb. 1858; [Layard], 'British India', 265-9; *Times*, 12 May 1858.
  2. Forster, *How We Tax India*, 31-3; 3 H 150, 933-5: 20 May 1858.
  3. e.g. LP. BL Add Ms 38948, 62: L to Benjamin Austen, Burwai, 1 Feb. 1858; [Layard], 'British India', 255, 261-2, 275; *Times*, 12 May 1858.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43617, 12: G to Bartle Frere, London, 17 Nov. 1858 (copy); Forster, *How We Tax India*, 8, 34n; [Layard], 'British India', 275.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 94: H to L, London, 7 May 1858.
  6. e.g. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 65: G to L, Brighton, 1 April 1858; Forster, *How We Tax India*, 37; *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 9 Oct. 1858: B's address to his Merthyr constituents, 4 Oct. 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 117: L to G, Indore, 31 Jan. 1858.
  7. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 22: G to H, Brighton, 27 Nov. 1857.

Though Layard thought the transfer of the government of India to the crown "absolutely necessary," he was anxious that Palmerston should not legislate before the causes of revolt were known and the excitement had moderated, and he was concerned that crown rule might provide opportunities for aristocratic jobbery.<sup>1.</sup> In response Goderich pleaded that legislation was essential before public indifference to Indian affairs reasserted itself.<sup>2.</sup>

Goderich's guiding principle regarding the rule of India asserted that the subcontinent should not be ruled from London, but that the government should establish guidelines and allow the governor-general to implement them at his discretion.<sup>3.</sup> In his correspondence with Frere in 1858, Goderich emphasised the authority of the governor-general vis-a-vis both the India council in London and his own council in Calcutta, a 'right man in the right place' approach which verged on sanctioning benevolent despotism.<sup>4.</sup> Forster also emphasised the relative importance of the governor-general's personal ability as opposed to the specific system of government devised.<sup>5.</sup>

Goderich and his colleagues reflected these ideas in their responses to the India bills of 1858. Bruce and Goderich supported the introduction of Palmerston's initial measure,<sup>6.</sup> a measure which lapsed when his ministry fell over the conspiracy bill. Disraeli's first bill, introduced by Ellenborough on 26 March, proposed a governing council partly elected by the £10 householders of five commercial cities in

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 117: L to G, Indore, 31 Jan. 1858.

2. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 65: G to L, Brighton, 1 April 1858.

3. As viceroy over twenty years later, he ruled India with "exactly the same" opinions (RP. BL Add Ms 43535, 142: R to A, [India], 24 May 1881).

4. See RP. BL Add Ms 43617, 3: G to Frere, London, 13 July 1858 (copy); RP. BL Add Ms 43617, 12: G to Frere, London, 17 Nov. 1858 (copy).

5. Forster, *How We Tax India*, 33.

6. 3 H 148, 1715-8: 18 Feb. 1858.

Britain, and was roundly condemned: Goderich commented to Layard that "it is really incredible that any set of men pretending to be statesmen and hitherto believed to be sane shd have devised so ridiculous a measure."<sup>1</sup> Disraeli subsequently deferred to Russell's Indian resolutions, and by introducing a new measure avoided parliamentary defeat. The act finally adopted provided an India council of fifteen members, with limited powers, to advise the secretary of state for India in London. Goderich actively participated in the commons debates on this legislation. His most significant contribution was on 14 June, when he justified the council's existence solely on the proposition that it would prevent future secretaries for India pleading ignorance in parliament. However Goderich stressed that the council should be purely advisory, should exercise only a general superintendence over the governor-general and refrain from meddling in the details of Indian administration, and should be nominated by the secretary of state rather than elected by ex-administrators of India, so as to ensure native interests were considered.<sup>2</sup> (The government abandoned these provisions, and succumbed to the principle of a nominated council.) Forster joined Goderich in his anxiety over the bill's producing an "irresponsible bureaucracy of a Council really governing India."<sup>3</sup> Bruce considered the act as a temporary stop-gap until a system of government based in India could be established,<sup>4</sup> and Layard concluded that there must be

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 65: G to L, Brighton, 1 April 1858. Bruce's condemnation can be found in the *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 9 Oct. 1858: B's address to his Merthyr constituents, 4 Oct. 1858.
  2. 3 H 150, 2052-6: 14 June 1858. For Goderich's other Indian speeches, see 3 H 149, 1584, 1585: 23 April 1858; 3 H 149, 1709-10: 26 April 1858; 3 H 151, 867, 900: 2 July 1858.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 128: F to G, Burley, 7 April 1858.
  4. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 9 Oct. 1858: B's address to his Merthyr constituents, 4 Oct. 1858.

an India council at home "but India itself must be governed in India. (Cheers.)"<sup>1</sup>. Their fears of unnecessary intervention from London were in the event unjustified: conflicts within the India council served in fact to blunt attempts by the home government to implement its control over Calcutta.<sup>2</sup> When the governor-general's council in Calcutta was revamped by Sir Charles Wood in 1861 Goderich, Layard and Forster were able to influence the legislation adopted.<sup>3</sup>

Goderich's most prominent role in the Indian debates of 1858 was in fact on Cardwell's motion of censure in May. Canning had issued an apparently draconian proclamation, declaring indiscriminate land confiscations in Oudh. Before receiving Canning's explanations the president of the board of control, Lord Ellenborough, reprovved the governor-general in an arrogant and offensive despatch. The Liberal opposition, through Shaftesbury in the lords and Cardwell in the commons, decided to attack the immoderacy of Ellenborough's rebuke, despite the latter's resignation over the controversy. Forster and Layard, worried that censure of Ellenborough might be interpreted as acquiescence in annexation and land confiscation, were wary of supporting Cardwell's motion,<sup>4</sup> but Goderich even considered seconding Cardwell.

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1. *Times*, 12 May 1858.

2. See Donovan Williams, 'The Council of India and the Relationship between the Home and Supreme Governments, 1858-1870', *English Historical Review*, 81, 318, Jan. 1966, 65.

3. See chapter 6 below.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 134: F to G, London, 17 May 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 136: F to G, Windermere, 17 May 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 138: F to G, Ambleside, 18 May 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 142: F to G, Ambleside, 23 May 1858; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 144: F to G, Durham, 25 May 1858; *Times*, 12 May 1858: Layard appealed to the more than thirty MPs present at his St James's hall speech "not to set their faces against all justice" when considering Cardwell's motion and Canning's proclamation.

In his speech on 20 May he expressed no opinion on Canning's proclamation, but strongly condemned Ellenborough's despatch and endorsed Cardwell's censure motion.<sup>1</sup> His comments, according to the commons' doorkeeper, were "highly praised by the Opposition, and listened to with great respect by the adherents of the Government."<sup>2</sup> The debate caused considerable excitement, for it threatened government defeat, but the opposition, intimidated by a threatened dissolution, eventually withdrew its motion, thus affording the Conservatives a great parliamentary victory. Canning's intentions were soon found to be more reasonable and conciliatory than he had initially implied.

4.

Goderich's contribution to the debate on Cardwell's motion was politically significant, for it publicly illustrated the growing adherence to the Liberal party which he and Bruce had demonstrated over the conspiracy bill, and reinforced his increasingly influential position in parliament. Bruce had earlier in the year referred flippantly to Goderich as a future prime minister,<sup>3</sup> but Forster now seriously spoke to him of the Indian crisis as "a turning point in your political career" which presaged the early attainment of "high office,"<sup>4</sup> and at the end of the session noted "the capital vantage ground" which Goderich had gained.<sup>5</sup> Goderich was described at this time as "a rising young politician, with a good deal of talent, and very liberal principles."<sup>6</sup>

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1. 3 H 150, 932-44: 20 May 1858.

2. White, *The Inner Life of the House of Commons*, i : 69: entry for 29 May 1858.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 75: B to G, Aberdare, 28 Feb. 1858.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 138: F to G, Ambleside, 18 May 1858.

5. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 154: F to G, Burley, 24 Aug. 1858.

6. G.W. Curtis, ed., *The Correspondence of John Lothrop Motley*, (London, 1889), i : 265: Motley to Mary Motley, London, 13 June 1858.

It was commonly expected that he would be included in the next Liberal administration,<sup>1.</sup> and Sir Charles Douglas even urged that anything less than a cabinet position should be refused as a decline in power and influence from his current position as member for the West Riding.<sup>2.</sup>

Dissentient views prevailed throughout 1858 as to the nature of the Liberalism which might emerge from the political flux of that year. Palmerston's unpopularity appeared enduring, but though his Russellite whig and radical opponents within the party could prevent opposition unity under his leadership, they could produce no viable alternative. In a state of intra-party volatility expressions of opinion were necessarily tentative and evanescent. The uncertainty portrayed by Goderich and his colleagues was in the circumstances representative of Liberalism's lack of unity, direction or purpose.

Layard admitted that the Conservatives "seem to be giving satisfaction & an abusive attack on the Government will become as rare in the country as a bustard," and attributed popular complacency to good harvests and returning commercial prosperity.<sup>3.</sup> Hughes believed that, "however broken the liberal party may be," the "gross cap-in-hand dishonesty" which the Tories had exhibited "must be punishable at once."<sup>4.</sup> Bruce's attitudes to the state of parties clearly emerge from his constituency address at Merthyr in October. Having defended his support of the conspiracy to murder bill he condemned Bright, Roebuck, and Milner Gibson for their factiousness in ousting the

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1. White, *The Inner Life of the House of Commons*, i : 69: entry for 29 May 1858.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 36: Douglas to G, Brussels, 19 May 1858.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 124: L to G, London, 16 Sept. 1858.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 51: H to G, Wimbledon, 7 Dec. 1858.

Liberal government, not on the principles of the bill but on the desire to scuttle Palmerston. The resultant 'alliance' between Bright and the Tories was false and unrepresentative, he argued. Yet Bruce, whilst obviously throwing in his lot with a broadly liberal party, and whilst expressing admiration for Palmerston's "great ability," "statesmanlike qualities" and "earnestness of purpose," termed himself "no friend of Lord Palmerston's,"<sup>1.</sup> especially as Palmerston's whiggish exclusivism precluded Herbert, Cardwell and other efficient and reformist administrators from the cabinet.<sup>2.</sup> Goderich's approach to the political confusion of 1858 is intriguing. Though increasingly 'ministrable', he had not abandoned his aversion to Palmerston. In Indian affairs, despite the latter's decision to abolish E.I.C. rule, Goderich later challenged Palmerston's alleged confidence in Disraeli's legislative intentions.<sup>3.</sup> As the reform question came to the fore in the autumn of 1858, Goderich prepared himself to "lay aside all thoughts of office" in the quest for a suitable bill.<sup>4.</sup> Entertaining this priority he could hardly desire Palmerston's leadership, and informed Hughes that "clearly the Radicals are the only one of existing parties in whom there is any good at all."<sup>5.</sup> Their analysis of established

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1. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 9 Oct. 1858: B's address to his Merthyr constituents, 4 Oct. 1858.
  2. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 157: B to Norah Bruce, London, 20 Feb. 1858.
  3. 3 H 149, 1709: 26 April 1858. This is somewhat at variance with Denholm's view that "it was the affairs of the subcontinent that attracted Ripon to Palmerston, the only man who could give him office. Without it he could have stayed in the political wilderness much longer, perhaps indefinitely" (Denholm, 'The Making of a Liberal Viceroy', 6).
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 98: G to B, 20 Dec. 1858.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 53: G to H, [before Jan. 1859].

radicalism remained contradictory: despite aversion to Manchester's economic and foreign policies, the Bright-Cobden radicals were admired both for their democratic instincts and their moral tone. Though Forster could refer to Milner Gibson as "his devilship,"<sup>1</sup> he could also say of Bright and Cobden:

... For years I have been raging and grumbling against the Manchester school, and yet could I have worked for either Cobden or Bright [in the 1857 elections] I should have done so with all my might. After all, they are men, and mean what they do, and that is something in these times, and I suppose in most times... 2.

Forster was clearly anxious that Palmerston was untrustworthy,<sup>3</sup> and after the debacle of Cardwell's Indian motion asserted that "we must now look towards some new Liberal combination for the next Ministry. I fear Palmerston has lost his chance."<sup>4</sup> As the Tories consolidated their position in government, he argued that they could become more progressive than the Whigs, and more competent and less exclusive administrators. "If so they will at least last long enough to break up entirely and for ever the old parties." In such a fluid situation, it is not surprising that Forster hoped he could "manage to meet [Goderich] somehow before long for a good talk, for I never wanted one with you more than now."<sup>5</sup>

In a state of Liberal uncertainty and torpor, there was little they could effectively achieve as a pressure group. The 1858 parliamentary session nevertheless witnessed continued co-operation between

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 166: F to G, Ambleside, 31 Dec. 1858.
  2. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 309: F to Ludlow, Burley, 5 April 1857.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 138: F to G, Ambleside, 18 May 1858.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 142: F to G, Ambleside, 23 May 1858.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 154: F to G, Burley, 24 Aug. 1858.

Bruce and Goderich, who persevered in their support of radical measures such as the abolition of church rates, admission of Jews to parliament, abolition of property qualifications for MPs, and permitting marriage with a deceased wife's sister.<sup>1.</sup> Their electoral positions also appeared secure: Bruce was safe at Merthyr, and Forster continued to represent Goderich in the West Riding.<sup>2.</sup> Forster himself had consolidated his position in both Leeds and Bradford, though he admitted that "this riding two horses at once is a feat which I am hardly clown enough to perform much longer,"<sup>3.</sup> and settled on Leeds. Layard, during his exclusion from parliament, had pursued his interests in art,<sup>4.</sup> but he also considered standing for such diverse constituencies as Wycombe, Westminster, Banbury, Birmingham and Chester.<sup>5.</sup> Until he found a suitable seat he was "well satisfied to remain as I am,"<sup>6.</sup> but nevertheless confessed to Goderich that, "notwithstanding my love of ease & art ... I [have] sometimes envied you the opportunity of doing good & making your voice heard."<sup>7.</sup>

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1. e.g. 3 H 150, 1727-31: 8 June 1858; 3 H 149, 547-50: 22 March 1858; *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 9 Oct. 1858: B's address to his Merthyr constituents, 4 Oct. 1858; 3 H 149, 622-3: 23 March 1858 and 3 H 150, 145-7: 5 May 1858.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 158: F to G, Burley, 10 Oct. 1858.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 148: F to G, Bradford, 14 June 1858.
  4. See [A.H. Layard], 'Manchester Exhibition', *Quarterly Review*, 102, July 1857, 165-204; [A.H. Layard], 'National Gallery', *Quarterly Review*, 105, April 1859, 341-81; LP. BL Add Ms 39072 (262ff) and 39073 (422ff): mss of, and notes for, a course of seven art lectures which Layard delivered at the royal institution, Albemarle Street, in April 1859.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 58175, 263.
  6. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 124: L to G, London, 16 Sept. 1858.
  7. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 128: L to G, London, 7 Dec. 1858.

The personal relationship of Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard endured and deepened throughout the final years of the decade. Hughes acted as godfather to Goderich's daughter,<sup>1.</sup> for example, and Bruce wrote candidly to Goderich of "our intimacy."<sup>2.</sup> Moreover their affiliation had gradually become less centred on Goderich: in 1857, for example, Bruce had expressed a close affinity to Hughes,<sup>3.</sup> and Hughes himself had developed closer ties with both Layard and Forster. By the end of 1858, however, their political alliance had altered in character. Of course they maintained close consultation on a number of issues,<sup>4.</sup> and regularly met each other for political discussions and on social occasions. But no longer did independence from established parties appear a valid and realistic ambition. Partly as a result of the 1857 electoral failures of Layard and Forster, and partly as a result of the Liberal factionalism of 1858, they came to adopt the view that, as a ginger group, their impact on decision-making processes was limited. By early 1859 they believed they could best achieve educational, social, administrative and parliamentary reform through membership in the radical element of a broadly-based and more strictly disciplined Liberal government.

5.

Outside parliament, attempts to influence public opinion through the press afford a good example of their collaborative endeavours in the late fifties. By about 1850 journalism was becoming an accepted profession for a 'gentleman', and a rapid expansion of respectable

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 20: G to H, London, 21 July 1857; RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 82: G to B, London, 9 July 1858.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 102: B to G, Aberdare, 24 Dec. 1858.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 22: G to H, Brighton, 27 Nov. 1857.
  4. Representative of these discussions was a considerable correspondence on parliamentary reform; see chapter 11 below.

journalism occurred in the middle decades of Victoria's reign. Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard were convinced that the press played a powerful role in moulding public opinion. Layard had early established a connection with John Murray, publisher of the *Quarterly Review*, through his Ninevah publications. This provided an influential forum: the pages of the *Quarterly* were thereafter open to Layard ("altho' I am so great a radical"<sup>1</sup>), though he described its readers as principally "old women & ecclesiastics."<sup>2</sup> Layard had also established a personal rapport with John Delane of the *Times*, a friendship which persisted despite political disagreement.<sup>3</sup> However his influence over such an entrenched and conservative organ was limited, and Layard and his friends consistently disparaged the *Times*'s political bias: Goderich referred to it as "that detestable engine of the Devil;"<sup>4</sup> Hughes wrote that "I probably could not if I would, & certainly would not if I could, write for that paper;"<sup>5</sup> Layard asserted that "English newspapers are in general so dishonest that the truth is but a secondary matter with them. The 'Times' moreover, always sticks to a lie."<sup>6</sup> Thus on relatively few occasions was Layard able to exert pressure on Delane. One notable exception was his successful attempt to induce the *Times* to report Forster's American civil war speech in 1861.<sup>7</sup>

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38960, 27: L to Hammond, London, 6 July 1866.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38990, 189: Macpherson to L, London, 25 April 1864, in which Macpherson quotes Layard's statement to him.
  3. e.g. LP. BL Add Ms 38987, 3: Delane to L, 12 Dec. 1860; Arthur I. Dasent, *John Thadeus Delane, Editor of "The Times": His Life and Correspondence*, (London, 1908), ii : 28: L to Delane, July 1861.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 22: G to H, Brighton, 27 Nov. 1857.
  5. NYPL, Manuscripts Division, Misc. Papers: H to [?], London, 25 March 1864.
  6. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/28, 450: L to Lord Russell, London, 17 Aug. 1863.
  7. Forster requested that Layard use his influence to accomplish this (LP. BL Add Ms 39101, 81: F to L, Burley, 18 Sept. 1861). The lecture was reported in the *Times*, 3 Oct. 1861.

Forster and Goderich attempted a personal connection with the newspaper press at the end of 1857, when the *Leeds Express* was founded by a syndicate of advanced liberals which included them both, as well as Edward Akroyd (MP for Huddersfield) and James Hole (Leeds social reformer), with Lloyd Jones as editor. The paper's professed principles, as stated in the initial number, countenanced practical political reform and national rather than sectarian education. The partners disclaimed their involvement after a hesitant beginning, but the *Leeds Express* became a popular and financially successful penny weekly in the 1860s.<sup>1</sup>

In the late 1850s Hughes was also prominent in the effort to redress the journalistic imbalance. His previous journalistic experience was confined to a brief editorship of the Christian Socialists' *Journal of Association* in 1852. Through Christian Socialism, however, Hughes had made acquaintance with Daniel and Alexander Macmillan, fellow-admirers of Maurice, Carlyle, and association. *Tom Brown's Schooldays* was first published by Macmillan in April 1857, by which time Hughes's relationship with the Macmillan brothers was intimate.<sup>2</sup> Thus in the late fifties, when Hughes's concern over press bias was growing, he naturally turned to the Macmillans for support. Their first proposition was a quarterly, to be entitled either the *Citizen* or the *Englishman*, and a considerable correspondence regarding this scheme

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1. Tenmel, *Forster and Liberal Politics*, 116-7, quoting Fred R. Spark, *Memories of My Life*, [Leeds, 1913], 173-5, 201.

2. Hughes became godfather to Daniel's son Arthur in June (see Macmillan Archive. BL Add Ms 54917, 11: H to D. Macmillan, London, 17 June 1857) and was later commissioned to write his biography: Thomas Hughes, *Memoir of Daniel Macmillan*, (London, 1883).

occurred in the spring and summer of 1858.<sup>1</sup> Few definite concepts were decided upon. Hughes, who agreed to edit the journal,<sup>2</sup> referred to it vaguely as "this regenerating journal Review Magazine or whatever it is to be."<sup>3</sup> He explained its rationale more fully, however, in a letter to Layard, in which he stated that a number of men including Maurice, Kingsley and Forster were "going to start a quarterly in which the contributors are to sign their names. Many men can't get heard in the present quarterlies because their opinions are unpopular, the editor is afraid, or for one reason or another equally futile."<sup>4</sup> Evidently the proposed quarterly was intended to cater to a range of liberal opinions. Hughes's insistence that anonymous articles be eschewed "embodied the Coleridgean-Arnoldian ideal of the Christian gentleman ready to stand up and be counted for his beliefs," and was representative of the amateur approach to journalism.<sup>5</sup> Maurice was closely involved in the project,<sup>6</sup> as was David Masson,<sup>7</sup> and both Layard and Forster were approached by Hughes for contributions to the first number.<sup>8</sup> However the planned publication did not eventuate,

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1. The bulk of this correspondence is located in the Berg Collection, New York Public Library.
  2. Berg Collection, NYPL: H to A. Macmillan, London, 22 May 1858.
  3. Berg Collection, NYPL: H to A. Macmillan, London, 13 April 1858.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 94: H to L, London, 7 May 1858.
  5. Christopher Kent, 'Higher Journalism and the Mid-Victorian Clerisy', *Victorian Studies*, 13, 2, Dec. 1969, 190. See Thomas Hughes, 'Anonymous Journalism', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 5, Dec. 1861, 157-68.
  6. Berg Collection, NYPL: H to A. Macmillan, London, 26 March and 13 April 1858; Frederick Maurice, *Life of F.D. Maurice*, ii : 321-4: Maurice to Kingsley, 27 May 1858.
  7. Berg Collection, NYPL: H to A. Macmillan, n.d. [spring 1858].
  8. Layard on India, Forster on general politics. Forster agreed to contribute, but Layard had already committed himself to write on India in the *Quarterly Review* (LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 94: H to L, London, 7 May 1858; Berg Collection, NYPL: H to A. Macmillan, n.d. [before 22 May 1858] and London, 22 May 1858).

and it was to be another year before the idea of a monthly journal was seriously mooted.

In the autumn of 1858 Alexander Macmillan initiated his regular Thursday evening 'round table' discussions,<sup>1.</sup> where subjects including Italian unification, labour questions, the volunteers and many others were ventilated.<sup>2.</sup> Hughes, Forster and Layard were all 'knights' of the Macmillan round table, and it was probably in these dialogues that the detailed concepts of *Macmillan's Magazine* were decided upon. *Macmillan's* was the first of the shilling monthlies, preceding Thackeray's *Cornhill* by two months, and Macmillan emphasised its aim as the encouragement of what was manly and elevating.<sup>3.</sup> With signed articles and a religious tone, it provided a useful liberal platform for almost fifty years. The magazine was officially launched, under the editorship of David Masson, in November 1859. Hughes and Forster (along with former Christian Socialists J.L. Davies, Ludlow, Maurice and Neale) wrote articles for the first volume, and Hughes was a regular contributor for years. Goderich's role in the founding of the magazine remains somewhat obscure. He never wrote for the journal, but was certainly consulted by Hughes,<sup>4.</sup> and attended a dinner celebrating *Macmillan's* birth on 1 November 1859.

Hughes retained his £700 share in *Macmillan's Magazine* until 1865,<sup>5.</sup> but he also developed other press contacts during the early sixties.

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1. Parrish Collection, Princeton: A. Macmillan to James MacLehose, Cambridge, 27 Oct. 1858.
  2. See [Thomas Hughes, J.M. Ludlow and David Masson], 'Colloquy of the Round Table', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 1, Nov. 1859, 72-80; [Thomas Hughes and David Masson], 'Colloquy of the Round Table', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 1, Dec. 1859, 148-60.
  3. Graves, *Life of Alexander Macmillan*, 137: A. Macmillan to Franklin Lushington, 12 Nov. 1859.
  4. Berg Collection, NYPL: H to Macmillan, n.d. [prob. Oct.-Dec. 1859].
  5. Macmillan Archive. BL Add Ms 54917, 36: statement renouncing interest in *Macmillan's Magazine*, signed Thomas Hughes, London, 14 June 1865.

In 1861 he became an occasional leaderwriter for the *Spectator*, and immediately offered to transmit any views Goderich wished published.<sup>1.</sup> Hughes also possessed influence with the *Daily News*, an influence which he used on behalf of Goderich when the latter was under secretary for war.<sup>2.</sup> But Hughes's authority in Fleet Street was of course limited. For example, Bruce edited the *Life* of his father-in-law, Sir William Napier,<sup>3.</sup> and when it was published attested that "Lady de Grey & Tom Hughes were in an ecstasy, & I expect a flaming panegyric in the *Spectator* next week by sd T.H."<sup>4.</sup> Hughes, however, was unable to impose his view, with the result that the *Spectator* was "the only Paper whose tune is ungenerous & carping."<sup>5.</sup> Hughes's other major journalistic involvements in the 1860s were with the *New-York Daily Tribune*,<sup>6.</sup> the *Manchester Guardian*<sup>7.</sup> and the *Reader*, a weekly review of literature, science and art which ran from January 1863 until June 1865.

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 71: H to Lady deG, Cromer, 8 Aug. 1861.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 75: H to deG, London, n.d. [early 1862]; also Nightingale Papers. BL Add Ms 45761, 178: de G to Douglas Galton, Ripon, 20 Oct. 1863, in which de Grey wrote to Dalton, an official in the war office, that he considered the controversy over the Mhow court martial to be very important to him personally, and that "Hughes may be able to write about it, & if he should wish to see you upon it and ask any questions, you may tell him all you know, as he is entirely to be relied upon."
  3. H.A. Bruce, ed., *Life of General Sir William Napier*, (London, 1864).
  4. BP. Bodleian Library, Ms Eng Letters d.246, 73: B to Sir Patrick McDougal, [London], 13 April 1864.
  5. BP. Bodleian Library, Ms Eng Letters d.246, 75: B to McDougal, [London], 2 June 1864.
  6. See chapter 9 below.
  7. H.D. Nichols, 'The "Guardian" before Scott', in *C.P. Scott, 1846-1932: The Making of the "Manchester Guardian"*, (London, 1946), 29.

During the sixties Layard also expanded his sphere of influence in the press, establishing useful connections with Trollope's *St Pauls Magazine*,<sup>1.</sup> the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Daily News* as well as with Delane and the *Times*.<sup>2.</sup>

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Their press connections and involvement in *Macmillan's Magazine* illustrated that the group's co-operation extended beyond a strictly-defined political sphere, but in the crucial first months of 1859 it was parliamentary politics which absorbed their immediate attention. Goderich's own circumstances were substantially modified when his father died in January 1859, and he succeeded as second Earl of Ripon. His relationship with his family had been extremely strained in the early fifties, principally as a result of his political radicalism, and though some improvement was evident in more recent years Goderich had nevertheless been restricted in income and was not provided with an establishment of his own. Succession to his father's earldom, and later in the year to that of his uncle, de Grey, therefore marked a break in personal lifestyle of considerable importance. He became a settled individual. As a wealthy landowner he concerned himself with estate matters. In politics he was released from the progressive influence of Yorkshire public opinion and relegated to the enervate atmosphere of the house of lords. His claims to influence as the member for England's largest

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38994, 226: Trollope to L, 15 July 1867.

2. Layard's assertion in his *Autobiography* that he had "never taken the slightest pains to conciliate newspaper writers and correspondents with a view to obtaining their praise and to influence public opinion in my favour" (ii : 104) must be interpreted as a convenient lapse of memory. In April 1859 he spoke of pressure from without, which of course included pressure from the press, as "absolutely necessary in this country to effect any great reform or improvement" ([Layard], 'National Gallery', 361).

constituency vanished. If he were to make his mark in public life, administrative experience was now essential.

Reform and Italy became the principal political concerns of 1859. Ripon, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard all desired Italian unification and a considerable measure of parliamentary reform; on both issues they distrusted the tory government, and particularly Disraeli. The Conservative reform bill of March 1859 was interpreted as a gross party-political manoeuvre. Russell composed a vaguely-worded motion condemning the bill for not lowering the borough franchise, a motion which both Palmerston and Bright felt constrained to endorse. Bruce joined in defeating the government on this vote of confidence,<sup>1</sup> and Derby dissolved parliament.

Though Bruce faced a contested election at Merthyr he was comfortably re-elected, his election address and campaign speeches emphasising the issue of parliamentary reform.<sup>2</sup>

Layard entertained a number of electoral options in 1859, including Huddersfield, where Ripon helped organise a Liberal deputation to secure his candidature.<sup>3</sup> But Layard's success there was considered doubtful, and his candidature was not proposed.<sup>4</sup> He decided instead to contest York, where Ripon was "very anxious to hear how you get on ... Pray write as soon as possible. I wish you heartily all success."<sup>5</sup> The choice of Layard as a radical candidate in York was

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1. 3 H 153, 1257-61: 31 March 1859.

2. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 23 April 1859: B's election address, London, 7 April 1857 [sic]; *ibid.*: B's Merthyr election speech, 19 April 1859; *ibid.*, 7 May 1859: B's election speech.

3. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 195: R to L, London, 7 April 1859.

4. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 203: C.H. Jones to L, Huddersfield, 10 April 1859.

5. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 205: R to L, London, 11 April 1859.

dictated by the need to counter John Brown-Westhead's whiggish inclinations and thereby achieve Liberal unity. However a number of complications existed for Layard: Westhead remained uncomfortable with his radicalism; the lord mayor, contrary to tradition, headed the conservative forces, attacked Layard as an outsider, and charged him with religious laxity for his support of Sunday opening of the crystal palace and British museum (Ripon wrote urgently to Layard to remind him that he had never in fact voted on Sunday opening of the crystal palace, only the British museum and national gallery<sup>1</sup>); and the York electorate included a large number of freeman voters, many of whom were concerned that a franchise qualification might deprive them of the suffrage. In his election address Layard pledged himself to a "very considerable" reduction of the franchise, to the secret ballot, and to a check on public expenditure.<sup>2</sup> In platform speeches he defended his previous pleas for justice in India, called for British non-intervention in Italian affairs, and described himself as neither Derbyite nor Palmerstonian.<sup>3</sup> His appeal was largely to the working classes of York, but their support was insufficient for his election. A fortnight before the poll he was optimistic,<sup>4</sup> but the result placed him behind both Westhead and Smyth, the Conservative.<sup>5</sup> The wealthy wards of York had voted conservative over radical by 2:1, whilst in the others Liberal votes had exceeded Conservative by over 60%.<sup>6</sup> Layard was naturally chagrined,

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 211: R to L, London, 23 April 1859.

2. *York Herald*, 16 April 1859: L's election address, York, 13 April 1859.

3. *York Herald*, 16 and 30 April 1859.

4. Ripon wrote Layard: "The account it [Layard's last letter] gives of your prospects at York is cheering, & affords me much hope of your success" (LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 211: R to L, London, 23 April 1859).

5. *York Herald*, 7 May 1859: Westhead (1875); Smyth (1805); Layard (1706).

6. W.L. Guttsman, 'The General Election of 1859 in the Cities of Yorkshire', *International Review of Social History*, 2, 1957, 255-6.

and Ripon wrote sympathetically: "I am grieved indeed at your defeat ... I cannot tell you how sorry I am."<sup>1</sup>.

The result for Forster in Leeds was equally disappointing. The reform registration society, anxious to avoid the Liberal splits of 1857, sponsored Edward Baines and Forster as representative of the moderate and radical factions of the party, and the Leeds mayor, Sir Peter Fairbairn, who stood against Forster at the Liberal nomination meeting, received only a handful of votes. As in other Yorkshire boroughs, the question of parliamentary reform dominated the contest in Leeds. Forster was more radical than the moderate Baines (who would countenance nothing further than £6 rental) on the suffrage question, and also advocated a reduction in defence expenditure, the ballot, a non-interventionist foreign policy and justice towards India in his address.<sup>2</sup> Leeds in 1859 had a smaller working class electorate than the other major cities of Yorkshire, but the non-electors organised in support of Baines and Forster because of their suffrage stance. Nevertheless Forster failed to win victory, trailing the Conservative Beecroft by twenty-two votes.<sup>3</sup> Jane Forster's analysis of the defeat was probably accurate: she attributed it to his not being a Leeds townsman and to the "hopeless state of confusion" in the Liberal register following past party dissension, but she added that Forster was not disheartened.<sup>4</sup>

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 226: R to L, London, 2 May 1859.

2. *Leeds Mercury*, 14 April 1859: F's election address, Leeds, 13 April 1859; also *ibid*: report of Liberal nomination meeting, 12 April 1859.

3. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 313: Baines (2343); Beecroft (2302); Forster (2280).

4. FP. TCD, Ms 4992, 18: Jane Forster to Tom Arnold, Burley, 6 May [1859].

The general election was essentially indecisive, both for the Conservative government and its opposition. Though the Tories had gained about twenty-five seats, they remained a minority in parliament. Opposition leaders, however, finally realised that a return to the treasury benches was unfeasible whilst Liberal party fragmentation persisted, and two issues eventually permitted the famous reconciliation at Willis's rooms in June 1859. The first of these was parliamentary reform, the principal national issue of the election campaign just concluded. Palmerston, Russell and Bright-Cobden were embarrassingly divided on the reform question, but Russell insisted as a condition of Liberal unity that a reform bill be introduced within a year. Palmerston, though unenthusiastic, was sufficiently apathetic to acquiesce; the radicals were thus placated. The second unifying force was the Italian *Risorgimento*. Though the Derby government had demonstrated, in legalistic terms, an impeccable neutrality in response to the French and Austrian conflict in Italy, they were justifiably suspected of pro-Austrian sentiments. (Derby had, for example, attempted to mediate and propose disarmament, which would have favoured the *status quo* and therefore Austria.) Hence, though non-intervention had to date been espoused by the government, the Liberals feared that reactionary Toryism, bolstered by a sympathetic court, might in future endorse Austria's cause.

Palmerston, Russell and Gladstone all desired Italy to successfully unite. Despite their suspicions of Napoleon's role, all believed England should refrain from intervention, excepting moral support. All were therefore willing to disregard their differences on other issues, and their personal aversions to each other if necessary, in order to unite in support of Italy. Though ambition was a factor,

Italy and reform were undoubtedly the issues which in 1859 permitted Palmerstonians, Russellite whigs, Peelites and radicals to coalesce in a Liberal party.

The meeting of 280 Liberals in Willis's rooms on 6 June ratified this conscious effort to re-establish a two-party system, and is often regarded as the formal foundation of the Liberal party. Palmerston and Russell both offered to serve under the other, Herbert and Bright spoke for the Peelites and Mancunians respectively.<sup>1</sup> Four days later the Conservatives, on an essentially party vote, lost the confidence of the house of commons, and after Granville's abortive efforts to fulfil the queen's commission, Palmerston began his second term as prime minister. Whigs, Peelites and two radicals (Villiers and Milner Gibson) were included in his new cabinet, and the ministry survived until his death in 1865 largely because of his personal popularity, persuasive attributes, and his reflection of public complacency.

The response of Ripon, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard to the Liberal fusion of 1859 was significant both for their own careers and for the future composition and policies of the Liberal party. On the issues of Italy and parliamentary reform they were in fundamental accord with Liberal trends. All five were prepared to sanction a more extensive measure of reform than was likely to be contemplated by the new Liberal ministry, but they were also reconciled to acceptance of a moderate bill from Russell. As for Italy, respect both for Italian nationalism and principles of international morality necessitated non-intervention in

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1. Gladstone did not attend, nor did he oppose the government on the ensuing vote of confidence, but he nevertheless accepted office when Palmerston offered it him.

their view. This approach merely confirmed their stance on foreign affairs during the fifties, and in no way represented a doctrinaire commitment to non-intervention.<sup>1</sup> They had long been sympathetic to Italian liberation and anxious as to England's response, as correspondence dating from the mid-fifties indicates.<sup>2</sup> In 1859-60, because they welcomed the *Risorgimento* and because they opposed English intervention as counterproductive (except if necessary to prevent powers hostile to the Italian cause from interfering) they found themselves in basic accord with Liberal Italian policy.<sup>3</sup> Moreover the achievement of Italian unification was of sufficient importance to them to justify

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1. See chapter 6 below for a further discussion of their response to foreign affairs during the sixties.
  2. e.g. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 183: G to L, Ripon, 16 Oct. 1855; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 65: F to G, Otley, 22 Aug. 1856; RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 59: G to B, Paris, 27 Sept. 1856; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 69: F to G, Ambleside, 14 Oct. 1856; LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 106: G to L, London, 30 Jan. 1857; RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 128: L to G, London, 7 Dec. 1858.
  3. Sources for their views are plentiful, and include: Thomas Hughes, 'Italy Resurgent and Britain Looking On', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 1, April 1860, 494-6; [Layard], 'Cavour'; Layard's preface to Roberto d'Azeglio, *The Court of Rome and the Gospel*, (London, 1859); Layard in 3 H 161, 1357-74: 4 March 1861; *Times*, 22 Nov. 1861: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 21 Nov. 1861; LP. BL Add Ms 43550, 130: L to R, Subiaco, 13 Oct. 1859; Guttsman, 248 (on Forster). It is interesting that two years previously Goderich had called for an Italian policy "which is neither the peace at any price of Milner Gibson, the alliance with absolute despotisms of Disraeli, nor yet the profitless meddling of Palmerston" (LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 106: G to L, London, 30 Jan. 1857). The sort of policy Goderich then envisaged -- moral support for Italy but no active intervention unless Austria interfered beyond her own Italian dominions-- became the Liberal policy of 1859.

in itself a Liberal government: Layard, for example, suspicious of Conservative Italian policy, asserted in early 1861 that "he would rather see anything happen than that a tory government should again come into power;"<sup>1</sup>. Forster stated with reference to Conservative interventionist tendencies that "he thought that the difference in which foreign affairs would be conducted if the [tory] Opposition were in power was the great reason why the country should rally round the present [Liberal] government."<sup>2</sup>.

Nevertheless Italy and reform did not comprise their entire rationale for participation in the Liberal alliance. A growing disillusionment with parliamentary factiousness and histrionics had characterised their political attitudes since 1857, and a party spirit had gradually evolved in place of their previous insistence on political independence. In this sense they were eminently representative of a large number of independent liberals of the 1850s. That decade is often considered the 'golden age' of the individual member, and a myriad of small alliances played a significant role in political calculations. This common phenomenon of aversion to party justified in their view the independent pressure group which Goderich, Layard and Bruce had then fashioned in the house of commons. By the end of the decade, however, altered circumstances necessitated revised responses. As the two parties polarised, Liberals (that is, whigs, the remaining Peelites, and radicals) and Conservatives who had previously espoused independence were virtually compelled to declare their allegiances. At Willis's rooms,

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1. *Daily News*, 16 Feb. 1861: L's speech at a reform meeting, 15 Feb. 1861.
  2. *Bradford Observer*, 7 Feb. 1861: F's Bradford election address, 5 Feb. 1861.

for example, only a handful of liberals refused to sanction unity.<sup>1</sup> Whether in or out of parliament Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard were thereafter declared Liberals. Whereas four years previously Layard had proclaimed himself "no party man," willing to attend either government or opposition meetings,<sup>2</sup> he was in 1859 committed to one faction.

Their conversion to committed Liberalism was not wholly a response to a predicament beyond their control; it was also for Goderich, Bruce and Layard a welcome opportunity to fulfil their increasingly ambitious desires to join the ruling administration. As members of the government, their loyalty to Palmerston's ministry became more pronounced during the sixties than that of either Forster or Hughes. The leadership of Palmerston was accepted by Ripon and his companions in June 1859 as a *fait accompli*, and they were able to rationalise adherence to their former foe by virtue of his Italian policy, his apparent acceptance of parliamentary reform, and the inclusion within his ministry of a radical element. This was for Ripon and Bruce the final test of Palmerston's conversion. After the Conservative defeat, Bruce wrote his wife: "We are, of course, very anxious to see what the cast of the parts will be, as upon that will depend the union of the Liberals."<sup>3</sup> Palmerston's broadly-based ministry was apparently acceptable. Moreover, though forced to admit the relevance of his personal popularity, they never imagined Palmerston's age would permit another six years of active leadership.

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1. Horsman, their companion of the mid-fifties, was one of these.

2. 3 H 138, 1252: 25 May 1855.

3. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 169-70: B to Norah Bruce, 11 June 1859.

Speeches by Layard in July 1859 symbolise the novel stance they had adopted. He admitted that the role of independent members was crucial, in asserting that he "should not like to see too many, we shan't see too many, but almost everything gained in politics has been mainly gained through the independent members." Nevertheless he stressed that he had personally "found the position of an independent member of parliament by no means a pleasant or agreeable one,"<sup>1</sup> and he welcomed the new Liberal government and Palmerston's prime ministership:

He believed Lord Palmerston to be a very altered man to what he was a year ago, for he had had the good sense to see that the time had come when the truly Liberal party in this country must be listened to. (Applause.) He had often found himself opposing Lord Palmerston, but if he were now in the House of Commons he should feel it his duty to give him his hearty support. 2.

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1. *York Herald*, 23 July 1859: L's address at a testimonial presentation on his behalf from the working men of York, 21 July 1859.
  2. *ibid*: L's speech at a dinner in York, 22 July 1859.

## CHAPTER 6

ACCOMMODATION WITH PALMERSTON

Following the Conservatives' defeat in the commons on 10 June 1859,<sup>1</sup> Ripon and his friends entertained unrealistic expectations that he would be offered a cabinet post.<sup>2</sup> Palmerston's proposal on 15 June of the under secretaryship for war<sup>3</sup> was therefore greeted with disappointment. Ripon accepted the offer, but informed Layard that he had "only done so on certain conditions, which I will explain to you when we meet."<sup>4</sup> Evidence of the nature of Ripon's conditions has not survived, though some guarantee as to political or administrative reform is probable. Forster, though dissatisfied with Ripon's proffered position, nevertheless recognised the necessity of his acceptance:

... Now that you are out of the H. of C. and therefore have no constituency to back your claims you must act on general position in the country. In order to gain that you must earn an administrative reputation. I am sure you will do this as soon as you get the chance, but I agree with you that it will not do to let the chance slip any longer. With four distinct parties squabbling for office, I dare say holding off would have ended in no place at all rather than in a better place, so that I think you have done the best thing for yourself in pocketing this, poor though it be, and as regards the public question it is plain enough that the duty is to rally round the Govt.... 5.

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1. Bruce of course voted with the Liberals (3 H 154, 416-21: 10 June 1859).
  2. e.g. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 172: B to Norah Bruce, London, 15 June 1859.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43512, 84: Palmerston to R, London, 15 June 1859.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 250: R to L, London, 19 June 1859.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 171: F to R, Burley, 19 June 1859. Forster added to this an intriguing comment regarding Gladstone's inclusion in the ministry: "... I cannot believe that Gladstone will remain with you after this session. Meantime as there is a hole in the budget to fill up, there is no great objection to his throwing himself into it if that is what he is bent upon. Still it is a mistake having him in and thereby throwing unnecessary suspicion on the Reforming sincerity of the Ministry..." Wolf, in quoting this letter (i : 143-4), omits this section, presumably because the implication that Ripon shared Forster's radical views on reform contradicts his thesis that Ripon was by this time a convinced whig.

Forster's conception of this duty extended even to Cobden, whom he hoped would also accept office: "If he does not, he will surely make an enormous mistake and stamp himself irrevocably as the representative of a section rather than a statesman."<sup>1</sup>.

Ripon's administrative reputation was, as Forster expected, established within a short period. By the end of 1860 his abilities at the war office had earned the praise of Sidney Herbert, the war secretary, of the Duke of Cambridge, the commander-in-chief, and of Prince Albert.<sup>2</sup> When ill-health necessitated the removal of Herbert to the lords, de Grey was transferred to the India office, where he served under Wood as under secretary for the first six months of 1861. Herbert died in July of that year, and de Grey returned to the war office, not, as he had hoped, as secretary of state, but once again as under secretary, subordinate to Sir George Cornwall Lewis. Lewis had little interest in the war office, and much of its administration fell to de Grey. Nevertheless he remained conscious of his impotent position in a subordinate role, commenting on policy formation in November 1861, for example, that he did "not know how far in my secondary position I may be able to influence the ultimate decision."<sup>3</sup>.

De Grey's cabinet ambitions were finally realised in 1863 when Palmerston, realising his administrative talents and no doubt esteeming his aristocratic claims, appointed him war secretary when Lewis died.

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 175: F to deG, Burley, 30 June 1859. Cobden however valued his independence; moreover, he had commercial treaties in mind.
  2. Lord Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert: A Memoir*, (London, 1906), ii : 404-5; 409; 408: Herbert to Palmerston, Wilton, Salisbury, 23 Dec. 1860; Duke of Cambridge to Herbert, 2 Jan. 1861; Prince Albert to Herbert, Windsor Castle, 27 Dec. 1860.
  3. Nightingale Papers. BL Add Ms 43396, 179: deG to Lady Herbert, Ripon, 3 Nov. 1861.

The appointment was the cause of some controversy, and was achieved, according to the *Times's* editor, "after much intrigue."<sup>1</sup> Gladstone, anxious for military economy, wished the secretary of state to be a member of the commons. Lowe, Granville, Cardwell and Wodehouse were all affronted by de Grey's success. Lowe, who wished to resign in protest and was with difficulty placated by Gladstone and Palmerston, was particularly bitter, and condescendingly referred to de Grey not only as "of very much shorter service" than, but also as intellectually "far inferior to the dullest" of, his competitors.<sup>2</sup> De Grey possessed some outside support for his claims,<sup>3</sup> but this was of marginal importance. His attainment of cabinet rank apparently owed more to Palmerston's personal endorsement: the latter attested that de Grey's "peculiar qualifications" induced him to make the appointment.<sup>4</sup> De Grey was the only newcomer appointed to cabinet during Palmerston's 1859-65 term of office, a tribute both to his competence in subordinate office and to his assiduous efforts to ingratiate himself with the Liberal establishment. If his success was deprecated by some party competitors, it was warmly welcomed by Bruce and Layard,<sup>5</sup> two old companions both serving under Palmerston by 1863.

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1. Dasent, *Life of Delane*, ii : 64: Delane's diary entry for 20-1 April 1863.
  2. *ibid.*, ii : 67: Lowe to Delane, 23 April 1863.
  3. Florence Nightingale, anxious to retain de Grey as an ally in her attempts to reform the war office, persuaded Harriet Martineau to write a leader in the *Daily News* on his behalf (Sir Edward Cook, *The Life of Florence Nightingale*, (London, 1913), ii : 29-30; John C. Nevill, *Harriet Martineau*, (London, 1943), 117; *Daily News*, 17 April 1863).
  4. Dasent, ii : 101: Palmerston to Delane, 3 April 1864.
  5. See RP. BL Add Ms. 43534, 136: de G to B, 20 April 1863; LP. BL Add Ms 58222, 100: deG to L, [London], 22 April 1863.

Layard was finally re-elected to the house of commons in December 1860. Having apparently realised that an industrial district best suited his radical programme, he considered standing in both Lambeth and Preston,<sup>1</sup> but eventually determined on the large, working class constituency of Southwark.<sup>2</sup> He was challenged on the Liberal side by the radical laissez-faireist Henry Fawcett, whose earliest biographer, Leslie Stephen, described Layard as the government candidate with employer endorsement.<sup>3</sup> Even if accurate, his radical credentials won Layard considerable working class support: George Julian Harney, for example, gave sympathetic editorial encouragement from Jersey.<sup>4</sup> Fawcett eventually withdrew from the contest and Hughes, who had promised Fawcett support before realising Layard proposed to stand, at de Grey's request transferred his allegiance when Fawcett retired.<sup>5</sup> Layard was an easy victor at the polls, with nearly 1200 votes more than his local opponent, Scovell,<sup>6</sup> and commented with validity that

... the majority I have secured and the position I now hold in the Boro' makes my seat a certain one for years to come. I knew this would be the case & consequently the battle was worth fighting. The seat is one of the best in England and suits me in every respect... 7.

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 309: John Thompson to L, Preston, 24 Jan. 1860; LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 428: Edin to L, n.d. [1860].
  2. Approximately half of Southwark's electors were working class. In 1865, for example, 5515 of the 11,631 electors were thus classed, a ratio which would not have altered since 1860 (see 3 H 182, 1423: 16 April 1866).
  3. Leslie Stephen, *Life of Henry Fawcett*, (London, 1885), 192-3.
  4. Black and Black, *The Harney Papers*, 128-9: L to Harney, 1 Feb. 1861.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 69: H to deG, London, 27 Nov. 1860.
  6. *Times*, 14 Dec. 1860.
  7. LP. BL Add Ms 58157, 70: L to Sara Austen, London, [11 Dec. 1860].

When de Grey left the war for the India office shortly after the Southwark election, Sidney Herbert, possibly influenced by de Grey, sent Palmerston a list of potential replacements which included Layard and Bruce. The prime minister, however, commented of Layard: "though he is a clever man, he is a wild one, and I should doubt his being to be depended on in harness."<sup>1</sup> Unsuccessful on this occasion, his consistent support for the Liberal ministry over the next six months consolidated Layard's position within the party.<sup>2</sup> In July 1861 Russell accepted a peerage and Palmerston, eager to retain radical support for his government, now suggested Layard as under secretary for foreign affairs. As in 1855, however, the queen strenuously objected to Layard's appointment. As monarch she felt a personal involvement in the foreign office and, whilst recognising "the importance of the Parliamentary exigencies,"<sup>3</sup> was unwilling to sanction one whom she remembered for his previous attacks on the aristocracy. In contrast to 1855, however, Palmerston was this time adamant, and the queen indicated her acceptance of this "serious evil" only if the alternative were Palmerston's resignation.<sup>4</sup> The prime minister impudently expressed his gratitude "for your Majesty's gracious and condescending acquiescence" in Layard's appointment.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Stanmore, 407: Palmerston to Herbert, n.d. [late 1860 or early 1861].
  2. Layard stated that, following his election, he had "calmly considered his position and, there being no great principle involved, he thought he should be recreant to his party by entering the House of Commons opposed to the present Government" (*Times*, 25 July 1861).
  3. Benson and Esher, *Letters of Queen Victoria*, iii : 567: Victoria to Palmerston, Osborne, 24 July 1861.
  4. *ibid.*, iii : 569-70: Victoria to Palmerston, Osborne, 25 July 1861.
  5. *ibid.*, iii : 570: Palmerston to Victoria, London, 26 July 1861. Extracts from this correspondence are reproduced in Connell, *Regina v. Palmerston*, 305-7.

Layard informed Russell that he had joined the ministry, "cordially sympathising as I do in the foreign policy of the Government."<sup>1</sup> Justifying his decision to his constituents, he urged that the government's foreign policy deserved "the hearty support of the country," and whilst admitting that Palmerston's domestic policy was unsatisfactory, asked: "How were they... to carry out their views, unless they had men to represent them in the Government?" With the conviction that a more liberal domestic policy must in future be adopted, Layard had accepted office, "and in doing so I believe I have neither renounced my opinions, broken my pledges, nor neglected your interests."<sup>2</sup> De Grey's reaction was jubilant: he wrote that he was "truly rejoiced" to be able to claim Layard as a colleague.<sup>3</sup> Forster, who had been closely co-operating with Layard on Indian questions, hoped his influence within the government would now be significant: "I intend to do my best to understand the whole subject [the relationship between indigo planters and ryots] before next Session especially as now I suppose you can not speak though I trust you can act."<sup>4</sup>

Such optimistic expectations could not be wholly fulfilled, for in a subordinate position Layard possessed limited scope for independent judgment or action. Russell considered Layard "a man of ability, & of an upright character but somewhat hasty in his opinions;"<sup>5</sup> only during the summer recesses, when country house amusements furnished

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1. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/28, 389: L to Russell, London, 29 July 1861.
  2. *Times*, 22 Nov. 1861: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 21 Nov. 1861.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38987, 140: deG to L, London, 27 July 1861.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 39101, 52: F to L, Burley, 11 Sept. 1861.
  5. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/14D, 157: Russell to Victoria, London, 14 Nov. 1862 (copy).

an irresistible appeal, would Russell trust Layard to conduct the business of the office independently.<sup>1.</sup> Within the house Layard's responses to questions were strictly controlled by Russell and Palmerston. Representation of the foreign office in the commons by a subordinate was in fact queried,<sup>2.</sup> and Russell admitted that he had "not given you scope & [swing?] enough in your replies on foreign questions. But I know not how to furnish the house of commons with daily information as to what is passing in foreign affairs without doing mischief."<sup>3.</sup> Initially challenging, Layard's secondary role in government became increasingly dissatisfying in the later years of the Palmerston ministry.<sup>4.</sup>

In the confusion of government transfer in 1859, Bruce realistically assessed his own status. Despite rumours that he was to be offered a position in the new ministry<sup>5.</sup> (a telling comment on his growing reputation), he recognised that there were "so many greedy aspirants to office among all sections, that a man with no strong claims, who keeps aloof from the dispensers of place, is not very likely to be selected."<sup>6.</sup> Nevertheless esteem for Bruce in 1860 was sufficiently pronounced for Sir Charles Wood, the Indian secretary, to consider offering him the governorship of Madras. Wood sounded him out through de Grey, but Bruce had no inclination to leave England.<sup>7.</sup> Along with

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1. On at least one occasion (the decision to detain the Laird rams in 1863) Layard's control over events proved critical (see chapter 9 below).

2. 3 H 170, 1958-62: 19 May 1863.

3. LP. BL Add Ms 38989, 102: Russell to L, London, 20 May 1863.

4. He even considered asking for a diplomatic posting in preference to his unsatisfactory political role (LP. BL Add Ms 39106, 392: Cowley to L, Paris, 23 July 1863).

5. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 171: B to Norah Bruce, London, 13 June 1859.

6. *ibid.*, i : 172: B to Norah Bruce, London, 15 June 1859.

7. *ibid.*, i : 178-9: B to Norah Bruce, Ripon, 30 Sept. 1860.

Layard, he was considered a possible replacement for de Grey as under secretary for war at the beginning of 1861, and Palmerston asserted at the time that "of Austin Bruce one has heard a good account."<sup>1</sup> He and de Grey seriously discussed Bruce's standing within the party at this juncture, and Bruce reported to his wife that "de Grey is certain that if I take any trouble, I can get office, and spoke to me very seriously and sensibly on the subject."<sup>2</sup> Though passed over on this occasion, thereafter attainment of office became Bruce's principal ambition. In the summer of 1862 he declined to be considered for the post of financial member of the Indian council,<sup>3</sup> and by November of that year reported that he had taken "a more active part in public business last session than I had ever done before," and that it was "not improbable that I may be offered office at home before long."<sup>4</sup> His appointment, as under secretary at the home office, followed shortly. Bruce officially acceded to office on 17 November 1862, thereby joining de Grey and Layard in government. Having co-ordinated their activities as independent members throughout the fifties, they had joined Palmerston on an individual basis over a period of three years. Bruce noted on his entry to the home office that it was "curious" that he, Layard and de Grey should be in office together.<sup>5</sup>

Bruce was a diligent administrator, and soon established a sound relationship with Sir George Grey, the home secretary. From the beginning of 1863 he persistently extended his personal contacts with

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1. Stanmore, 407: Palmerston to Herbert, n.d. [late 1860 or early 1861].
  2. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 182: B to Norah Bruce, London, 10 Jan. 1861.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 118: deG to B, London, 19 July 1862; RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 126: B to deG, Aberdare, 21 July 1862; Bruce, *Letters*, i : 194: B to Norah Bruce, Furness Abbey, 30 Sept. 1862.
  4. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 194: B to John Bruce, Aberdare, 10 Nov. 1862.
  5. *ibid.*, i : 197: B to Norah Bruce, Paris, 15 Nov. 1862.

his ministerial colleagues, including Wood, Cardwell, Lewis and Gladstone.<sup>1</sup> Personable, clever and industrious, he so impressed his superiors that when Robert Lowe resigned as vice president of the committee of council on education, Bruce was designated as his replacement in this prominent post. He was pleased with the appointment for more than one reason: "The work will be lighter and the pay higher than the Home Office, and I have always taken an interest in the subject of education."<sup>2</sup> This minor ministerial shuffle necessitated the dismissal of one of the five under secretaries, and it is significant of their performance and party stature that Palmerston commented in cabinet: "Well, at any rate we must keep Layard and Bruce. They are too good to lose."<sup>3</sup> A renewed offer from Wood at the end of 1864 of the position of financial member of the Indian council did not of course deflect Bruce from his increasingly successful public career at home.<sup>4</sup> De Grey welcomed Bruce's decision to decline, adverting to the importance of his position in the education 'department', and attesting that "it is very pleasant to me to see how steadily you are rising in the estimation of all my colleagues."<sup>5</sup>

Thus de Grey, Layard and Bruce each abandoned his political independence in the late fifties and early sixties, becoming instead committed and respected members of the Liberal administration. Hughes and Forster however both remained outside the corridors of power.

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1. *ibid.*, i : 199: B to Norah Bruce, 21 Feb. 1863.

2. *ibid.*, i : 208: B to John Bruce Pryce, 17 April 1864.

3. *ibid.*

4. *ibid.*, i : 210: B to Norah Bruce, Aberdare, 30 Dec. 1864; RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 149: B to deG, Aberdare, 3 Jan. 1865.

5. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 151: deG to B, London, 6 Jan. 1865.

Hughes had long desisted from contesting an election because of limited financial security. In 1862, however, on the advice of Forster and Layard, he thought of standing for Finsbury at the next election, reporting to de Grey:

... I am sufficiently before the world now, professionally & otherwise, to risk it, & am always for facing the stiffest place one can find in the first instance to get one's hand in. I shall probably be licked as I don't mean to pay [bribe], but it will be good practice, & after having once fought the place where I work & [where] folk will be sure to know anything bad about me which is to be known, I can go further afield with a good conscience. Don't say anything about it (unless to Forster & Layard whom I have consulted) but I shouldn't like you after all that we have seen & done together to have heard of it from any one else first... 1.

No election was forthcoming, however, and a year later Hughes remained torn between literature and law as a means to earn a living.<sup>2</sup> It was not until 1865, when Palmerston sent the country to the polls, that he was enabled to enter parliament.

Forster's electoral circumstances were more propitious, largely as a result of his established political position in West Riding Liberalism. Thus when Titus Salt resigned as member for Bradford in early 1861, Forster declared his candidacy for the Liberal nomination, and was endorsed by the recently-formed radical reform association and by the *Bradford Observer*.<sup>3</sup> Within the party he faced opposition from two quarters: those who mistrusted his commitment to political

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 85: H to deG, Brighton, 23 Dec. 1862.

2. Macmillan Archive. BL Add Ms 54917, 26: H to A. Macmillan, London, 24 Dec. 1863.

3. *Bradford Observer*, 7 Feb. 1861.

dissent, and those who resisted his pronounced radicalism. Edward Miall and John Priestman, respectively representing these two schools, opposed Forster's nomination. The Liberal electors of Bradford met to choose their candidate on 5 February 1861, and Forster overwhelmed dissenter objections by reiterating his support of the total abolition of church rates and of the right of dissenters to participate in the management of endowed schools. He also praised Russell's performance as foreign secretary, whilst expressing his doubts over Palmerstonian domestic policy.<sup>1</sup> Forster's candidacy was endorsed by a large majority of the Liberal electors,<sup>2</sup> and on the following day (6 February) he issued an address in which he promised to promote parliamentary reform, the ballot, a redistribution of seats, the abolition of church rates, economy and retrenchment in government expenditure, non-intervention in Europe, commercial treaties, the strengthening of colonial ties, and the just government of India.<sup>3</sup> The Conservatives declined to contest his candidacy, and Forster was accordingly returned unopposed on 11 February 1861.

His brother-in-law, Matthew Arnold, predicted at the time of his election that Forster would find in the house of commons "an air that suits him and in which he will thrive."<sup>4</sup> This perceptive anticipation proved accurate, and Forster established an influential position for himself in little more than four years as a private MP. He was

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1. *Bradford Observer*, 7 Feb. 1861: F's speech to the Liberal electors of Bradford, 5 Feb. 1861.
  2. Within a year, his dominance over the Liberal party in Bradford was sufficiently established that Priestman moved the vote of confidence in Forster as the borough's member, and was seconded by a Miall disciple (RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 198: F to deG, Burley, 2 Jan. 1862).
  3. *Bradford Observer*, 7 Feb. 1861: letter to the electors of Bradford, 6 Feb. 1861.
  4. Arnold Whitridge, ed., *Unpublished Letters of Matthew Arnold*, (New Haven, 1923), 51: Arnold to Jane Forster, London, 8 Feb. 1861.

undoubtedly ambitious,<sup>1.</sup> and his involvement in American civil war issues engendered his reputation as an astute and forthright politician. His appointment as financial member of the Indian council was considered in 1862, but Forster was intent on a parliamentary career. He referred to himself in 1862 as "an independent supporter of the Government,"<sup>2.</sup> but in subsequent years became increasingly vocal in his opposition to Palmerstonian conservatism. In 1863 he assured his wife that

... the want by the Liberal party of a new man is great and felt to be great. The old Whig leaders are worn out. There are no new Whigs. Cobden and Bright are impracticable and un-English, and there are hardly any hopeful Radicals. There is a great prize of power and influence to be aimed at. There is no denying this; and I do not think duty tells me not to keep the prize before me... 3.

Whatever his ambitions, however, Forster remained in these years committed to the continued existence of, and his participation in, the Liberal party as a united political entity.<sup>4.</sup>

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1. However G.J. Holyoake, his attitudes perhaps coloured by his having feuded with Forster during Garibaldi's 1864 English tour, exaggerated Forster's ambitious tendencies in stating: "Mr. Forster was ambitious, and without recognising that there is no understanding him. Ambition was stronger in him than any other sentiment. Humanity and liberal principles were, to the end of his days, characteristic of him, and he preferred advancing his personal ascendancy by these means; but they had not the personal dominion over him that ambition had" (George Jacob Holyoake, *Sixty Years of an Agitator's Life*, (London, 1906), ii : 126).
  2. 3 H 166, 1382: 8 May 1862.
  3. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 362: F to Jane Forster, n.d. [1863].
  4. Lord Acton's assertion that Forster, though he dreaded his foreign policy, preferred Disraeli's views on retrenchment to those of Palmerston, and that he was "the man among the Radical leaders Dizzy has best succeeded in catching," entirely misinterprets Forster's role, ignoring his fundamental loyalty to Liberalism during the sixties (see J.L. Altholz, D. McElrath and J.C. Holland, eds., *The Correspondence of Lord Acton and Richard Simpson*, (Cambridge, 1875), ii : 315: Acton to Simpson, 4 June 1862).

2.

The accession to office under Palmerstonian leadership of de Grey, Layard and Bruce did not necessitate their abandoning all sense of political morality. A number of reforms instituted during Palmerston's premiership, such as the introduction of post office savings banks, the abolition of the 'taxes on knowledge' and Gladstone's budgetary efforts to substitute direct for indirect taxation, accorded entirely with their previous attitudes. Administrative reforms in the war and foreign offices, Britain's response of neutrality to the American civil war, and the extension of the volunteer movement were all encouraged by de Grey, Layard or Bruce in their official capacities. They were also enabled to pursue in office their objectives in other spheres, including the foreign policy of non-intervention in Europe, Indian legislation, education, the improvement of sanitary and barrack conditions in the army, and the negotiation of commercial treaties.<sup>1.</sup>

One specific aspect of Palmerstonian foreign policy, the maintenance of the Ottoman empire, was wholly consistent with their position in the 1850s and, though a relatively minor issue during the sixties, was consonantly unchallenged by de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard.<sup>2.</sup> But within Europe itself Palmerston's approach in

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1. Issues involved in administrative reform, the American civil war, the volunteers and education will be discussed in chapters 8, 9, 10 and 12 below. De Grey's success in ameliorating soldiers' living conditions has been carefully examined in Denholm, *Radical and Democratic Career of Ripon*, 184-94.
  2. Layard, as under secretary for foreign affairs, defended both Ottoman territorial integrity and the sultan's treatment of Serbian Christians (3 H 171, 41-115: 29 May 1863), a speech which caused some controversy (see Goldwin Smith's comments in the *Daily News*, 13 Aug. 1863 and Ph. Christitch, *A Few Remarks on the Speech of Mr Layard, delivered in the House of Commons, concerning Servia, on Friday, May 29th, 1863*, (London, 1863); Christitch was a Serbian senator). Layard was also accused on one occasion of commending Turkish finances as part of an effort to raise the value of Ottoman bank shares, an assertion bitterly refuted by both Layard and Bruce (3 H 165, 1519-26: 14 March 1862; 3 H 167, 823-6, 826-7, 829-34: 20 June 1862; 3 H 167, 839-40: 20 June 1862). Layard also confirmed his Crimean views of the mid-fifties in [A.H. Layard], 'Kinglake's *Crimea*', *Quarterly Review*, 113, April 1863, 514-76.

his final years was less assertive and brash than previously demonstrated, perhaps reflecting the more benign nature of an old and somewhat mellowed premier. Non-intervention in Italy has been cited as a critical factor in the adhesion of de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard to the Liberal party fashioned at Willis's rooms in June 1859. In the 1850s, over the Crimean war, Persia and China, they had rejected the interventionist/non-interventionist debate as a relevant criterion for the determination of foreign policy, and had instead adopted an approach founded on respect for international law and 'morality', for national ambitions, and for the defence of political liberties. In the sixties these ideals were not so much abandoned as subjected to practical considerations, and in most instances -- Italy, America, Poland and Schleswig-Holstein, for example -- a non-interventionist policy was espoused as the only reaction both practical and moral. In all these instances Palmerston's response was in their view acceptable if not wholly admirable.

Various statements made during the sixties re-emphasise the fact that de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard did not accept strict non-interventionism in a doctrinaire, Bright-Cobdenite sense, as a moral basis on which to found foreign policy. Hughes, for example, stating in 1860 that Britain should pledge herself to non-intervention in Italy, added that war should be declared if either France or Austria occupied with hostile designs any part of Italy. He justified this declaration by affirming that "non-intervention is a good doctrine; we are for it to a man. But we do not mean by non-intervention that England is to allow Louis Napoleon and the Emperor of Austria to act as they will in Italy and elsewhere, so long as they let US alone."<sup>1</sup>

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1. Hughes, 'Italy Resurgent and Britain Looking On', 496.

Forster confirmed this ideal in general terms in 1865:

I do not go upon the principle that one country should resolve always to be isolated from all other countries. There may be cases in which isolation would be selfishness and a national crime. But look at the state of Europe now, and I think every one of us must come to the conclusion that, in all probability, a policy of strict non-intervention, a policy of isolation, will be the policy which England ought to adopt, on the ground of duty as well as on the ground of interest. 1.

Layard asserted similar sentiments in 1861, when he declared that Liberal foreign policy was based on two distinct principles:

first, non-intervention in the affairs of other countries, allowing every people to do what it chooses with its own; and, secondly, giving the moral support and sympathy of England to those nations which are endeavouring to establish their liberties by means of institutions in conformity with our own. (Hear, hear.) 2.

Identical arguments were advanced by Layard in subsequent years,<sup>3</sup> though he was at pains to point out that rigid non-intervention was impracticable.<sup>4</sup>

These basic ideas were applied to the three major European conflicts of the 1859-65 era: Italian unification, the Polish rebellion of 1863, and the Schleswig-Holstein dispute. The *Risorgimento* has been demonstrated to have been a prime consideration in their adherence to the Liberal party and Palmerston in 1859.

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1. *Bradford Observer*, 12 Jan. 1865: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 10 Jan. 1865.
  2. *Times*, 22 Nov. 1861: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 21 Nov. 1861.
  3. *Times*, 24 Dec. 1862: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 22 Dec. 1862; *Times*, 11 Dec. 1863: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 10 Dec. 1863.
  4. *Daily News*, 3 Dec. 1864 and *Times*, 3 Dec. 1864: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 2 Dec. 1864; also see the supportive leader in the *Times*, 5 Dec. 1864.

Non-intervention in Italy appeared to sanction their concept of international morality; moreover the success of nationalism in Italy furnished an example of the possibilities of non-intervention buttressed by moral support.

The Polish uprising in 1863 severely tested the non-interventionist doctrine. Forster and Layard, for example, both expressed deep sympathy with the Poles, and both also defended the government's decision to abstain from intervention.<sup>1</sup> Practical difficulties in challenging Russia on Polish territory evidently outweighed nationalist empathies in their calculation; they felt constrained to endorse Palmerston's stance, and no ideological conflict occurred between government policy and the individual opinions of de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce or Layard.

The Schleswig-Holstein dispute between Germany and Denmark served to confirm the British posture demonstrated during the Polish rebellion. Palmerston's bluff, without effective military support, without support from the queen, and without a unanimous cabinet, irresponsibly encouraged the Danes without deterring Bismarck. As events developed it was inevitable that Britain remained isolated. Bismarck's triumph was Palmerston's humiliation. The reaction of de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard was once again to condone non-intervention as the sole practicable policy. Hughes was initially prone to defend the Danes against Bismarck's aggression, but de Grey dissuaded him from his warlike instincts.<sup>2</sup> De Grey and Layard closely

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1. *Times*, 13 Jan. 1864: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 8 Jan. 1864; *Times*, 3 Dec. 1864: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 2 Dec. 1864.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 117: H to deG, London, n.d. [c. 21 June 1864].

consulted one another on the issue,<sup>1.</sup> and Layard transmitted de Grey's views to Andrew Buchanan, ambassador to Berlin.<sup>2.</sup> Within cabinet de Grey ranged himself decidedly with the 'peace party', thus siding with Gladstone against Palmerston and Russell, and helping to tip the scales.<sup>3.</sup> In the house of commons Layard staunchly defended the government's ultimate decision not to interfere,<sup>4.</sup> and he told his constituents that, despite national sympathy for the Danes, "it was the duty of the Government not to be carried away by such sympathy."<sup>5.</sup> Forster, unrestrained by strictures of office and encouraged by the doctrinaire non-interventionism of much of his constituency, supported the government's final position regarding Denmark, but challenged the meddling, dishonest, misleading and vacillating process by which it had been reached.<sup>6.</sup> On Disraeli's crucial censure motion in July 1864, Forster voted with the ministry.<sup>7.</sup>

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1. e.g. LP. BL Add Ms 58222, 109: deG to L, London, 29 Nov. 1863; LP. BL Add Ms 39108, 220: deG to L, London, 21 Jan. 1864.
  2. See LP. BL Add Ms 39108, 291: Buchanan to L, Berlin, 6 Feb. 1864.
  3. John Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, (London, 1908), i, 562: Gladstone's diary entry of 7 May 1864; RP. BL Add Ms 43622, 18-9: undated [but 1864] document opposing singlehanded intervention on Denmark's behalf.
  4. e.g. 3 H 174, 1350-60: 19 April 1864; 3 H 176, 953-99: 7 July 1864. The latter was one of the major speeches of Layard's political life, earning him the fulsome praise of Russell -- an unusual occurrence (see LP. BL Add Ms 38990, 282, 286: Russell to L, London, 8, 11 July 1864). The speech was subsequently printed: A.H. Layard, *The Danish Question. Speech delivered in the House of Commons on Thursday, July 7, 1864*, (London, 1864).
  5. *Times*, 3 Dec. 1864: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 2 Dec. 1864.
  6. *Times*, 13 Jan. 1864: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 8 Jan. 1864; 3 H 173, 396-403: 9 Feb. 1864; 3 H 176, 853-60: 5 July 1864; *Times*, 13 Jan. 1865: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 10 Jan. 1865.
  7. 3 H 176, 1301-5: 8 July 1864.

The non-interventionism of the years 1859-65 marked a new era in England's relations with the established powers of Europe and America. If less than successful for Denmark and Poland, the policy had demonstrated its worth in both Italy and the United States. De Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard were all particularly impressed with its necessity and effectiveness during the American civil war,<sup>1</sup> and all but Layard tended during the years after 1865 to extrapolate from this experience a philosophy which, whilst never equating morality in foreign policy with non-interventionism *per se*, nevertheless recognised their frequent compatibility. This assumption, with its basis in moral fervour, coincided with that of Gladstone in the late sixties, thus providing a link in their relationship with the future premier.<sup>2</sup> Layard, though equally convinced that non-interference was in most instances a valid policy, nevertheless lamented that "under these circumstances she [Britain] can no longer maintain that high and exceptional position amongst the nations of the world that she so long enjoyed."<sup>3</sup> Unlike the others he tended to emphasise national prestige over international honour, never becoming committed, for example, to a Gladstonian foreign policy which accepted the arbitration of international disputes. These disparities were not apparent before the 1870s, but their foundations nevertheless lay in the years immediately following 1864.

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1. See chapter 9 below.

2. Admittedly Gladstone's foreign policy was often contradictory, these inconsistencies culminating in the occupation of Egypt in 1882. Nevertheless in the late sixties their mutual adoption of non-intervention on moral principles provided a bridge between Gladstone and his foreign policy critics of the 1850s, de Grey, Hughes, Forster and Bruce.

3. [Layard], 'England's Place in Europe', 285.

Though in fundamental accord with Palmerston's European foreign policy de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard found little scope to influence or participate in its development. In other spheres, however, they were more successful in exerting effectual authority, two instances being the negotiation of commercial treaties and the development of legislation for India.

Forster and Layard collaborated closely on the negotiations for European commercial treaties in the 1860s. In desiring reduced tariffs on British manufactured goods, Forster was of course acting in his own economic interests as well as those of the Yorkshire chambers of commerce on whose behalf he agitated. Layard, a committed free trader since the 1840s, was conveniently responsible within the foreign office for commercial questions. The commercial treaties whose negotiations they influenced were patterned on the Cobden-Chevalier treaty of 1860 (which de Grey had vigorously endorsed in the house of lords<sup>1.</sup>), and were in fact reciprocity rather than free trade agreements. Gladstone and the radicals were enthusiastic in their support, Russell and the whigs tended to apathy. Despite confusion as to the respective jurisdictions of the foreign office and board of trade in foreign commercial relations,<sup>2.</sup> negotiations were conducted with Belgium, Spain, Sweden, the Zollverein, Austria, Russia, Italy and Switzerland. Layard's involvement was significant,<sup>3.</sup> and he frequently relied on Forster's

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1. 3 H 157, 590-3: 15 March 1860.

2. Forster and Layard were instrumental in initiating administrative reforms to allay these difficulties; see chapter 8 below.

3. Numerous letters and memoranda, principally between Layard and Russell, are interspersed among the Layard Papers. BL Add Ms 38987-38993 (1861-6).

advice, and on his assistance in bringing outside pressure to bear.<sup>1.</sup>

In the government of India legislation of 1861 the co-operation of de Grey, Layard and Forster was a substantial factor. In his term at the war office de Grey's principal involvement with Indian questions concerned army re-organisation, the product of which was enacted in the European forces (India) bill of 1860, which amalgamated the former E.I.C. forces with the regular army.<sup>2.</sup> But his tenure of the under secretaryship for India in 1861 coincided with Sir Charles Wood's legislation restructuring the legislative council in Calcutta, and reforming the Indian civil service and courts. It was to the legislative council changes that the attention of de Grey, Layard and Forster was primarily focussed, and their basic viewpoint -- that the council should fulfil a purely consultative role for the governor general, and should include Indian natives in this official capacity -- was identical with that expressed after the mutiny.<sup>3.</sup>

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1. Examples include: LP. BL Add Ms 39101, 287: F to L, Burley, 15 Nov. 1861; LP. BL Add Ms 39107, 326: F to L, Burley, 13 Nov. 1863; LP. BL Add Ms 39113, 111: F to L, Burley, 30 Jan. 1865; LP. BL Add Ms 39113, 147: F to L, Burley, 3 Feb. 1865; LP. BL Add Ms 39113, 354: F to L, n.d. [Feb. 1865?]; LP. BL Add Ms 39115, 442: F to L, 23 June 1865; LP. BL Add Ms 39116, 167: L to F, London, 26 July 1865 (copy); LP. BL Add Ms 39116, 400: F to L, London, 25 Aug. 1865; memoranda from Layard to Russell in LP. BL Add Ms 38988, 138; 38991, 46, 292, 404: dated 14 May 1862, n.d. [Jan. 1865?], n.d. [c. 25 July 1865], 25 Aug. 1865.
  2. See de Grey's lords speech in 3 H 160, 1068-73: 10 Aug. 1860. Many of de Grey's ideas in 1859-60 regarding Indian military affairs were derived from his old cosmopolitan friend General William Mansfield, then chief of the staff in India (see RP. BL Add Ms 43619, 7-159: Mansfield-Ripon/de Grey correspondence, 1859-60). A number of these letters were employed to influence Herbert, the secretary for war (e.g. RP. BL Add Ms 43533, 28, 66, 142: Herbert to R/deG, London, 6 Oct. 1859, Wilton, 25 Dec. 1859, Ashridge, Gt. Berkhamstead, 4 Dec. 1860; RP. BL Add Ms 43533, 106: deG to Herbert, London, 11 June 1860).
  3. See [Layard], 'British India', 275; RP. BL Add Ms 43617, 12: G to Bartle Frere, London, 17 Nov. 1858 (copy).

They were agreed with Wood that, were legislative independence accorded India, racist Anglo-Indian rule would emerge. De Grey reiterated this consideration in April 1861,<sup>1</sup> and Forster and Layard consistently defended native rights in the commons debates on the east India council bill. Wood's legislation provided for a legislative council for India comprising the governor general's supreme councillors and no more than twelve nominees of the governor general, half to be government officials, half non-officials, English or Indian. Legislative bodies based on similar principles were to be established for local governments. Forster and Layard attempted to amend three provisions of the legislation, all of which they believed would benefit native Indian interests. Layard moved in committee that at least one-fourth of the non-official members of council be natives, and withdrew the clause only on Wood's assurance that he would recommend such a course to the governor general.<sup>2</sup> Forster and Layard also joined in emphasising the importance of council sessions being open to the public, and the debates reported daily, so that native opinion might influence discussion.<sup>3</sup> Though Wood, fearing adverse reaction to the racist comments of Anglo-Indian councillors, was reluctant to publish the debates, he agreed to do so. Finally, Layard and Forster pressed for a three-year term for non-official councillors, instead of the one-year term proposed by Wood, so that native members would be less subservient to the governor general's patronage.<sup>4</sup> A two-year term was eventually accepted. In the lords de Grey effectively guided the councils bill

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1. 3 H 162, 1160-4: 26 April 1861.

2. 3 H 163, 1350-1, 1354: 20 June 1861.

3. 3 H 163, 1012-4: 13 June 1861; 3 H 163, 1014-9: 13 June 1861;  
3 H 163, 1362: 20 June 1861; 3 H 163, 1364: 20 June 1861.

4. 3 H 163, 1359: 20 June 1861; 3 H 163, 1360: 20 June 1861.

through second reading and committee stages.<sup>1.</sup>

The anti-racist foundations of their successful intervention in the east India council bill debates were equally evident in the response of de Grey, Layard and Forster to the English indigo planters' treatment of native ryots. In 1861 Canning succumbed to planter interests and introduced into the legislative council a bill making a ryot's violation of his civil contract to grow and deliver indigo a matter of criminal prosecution by the planter, punishable by fine or imprisonment. Layard, Forster and de Grey each condemned this action in parliament, both for its racist overtones and for its virtual establishment of bondage status with forced labour.<sup>2.</sup> Layard made extensive use of his Indian contacts for information,<sup>3.</sup> and consistently shared his findings with Forster.<sup>4.</sup> Though Wood was very sympathetic, and directed Canning to withdraw the 1861 legislation, he was never in his term of office wholly successful in regulating contract laws between indigo planter and ryots. Nevertheless the Palmerston government's policy in India was sufficiently scrupulous for Layard to assert that Wood and his colleagues deserved "infinite credit" for its accomplishment, and to partially justify his accession to the ministry on these grounds.<sup>5.</sup>

### 3.

Though in basic accord with Palmerston's policies on India, European relations and commercial treaties, in many other spheres de Grey, Layard and Bruce were forced to compromise their principles in

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1. 3 H 164, 586-93: 9 July 1861; 3 H 164, 940-65 *passim*: 16 July 1861.
  2. 3 H 162, 507-8: 12 April 1861; 3 H 162, 802-12: 19 April 1861; 3 H 163, 370: 31 May 1861; 3 H 163, 1338-9: 20 June 1861.
  3. See LP. BL Add Ms 58163 (167ff).
  4. e.g. LP. BL Add Ms 39101, 81: F to L, Burley, 18 Sept. 1861; LP. BL Add Ms 39101, 115: F to L, Burley, 22 Sept. 1861; LP. BL Add Ms 38988, 103: Macleod Wylie to L, Calcutta, 22 March 1862.
  5. *Times*, 22 Nov. 1861: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 21 Nov. 1861.

order to join the government, and in doing so were often effectively contaminated by the entrenched and conservative atmosphere into which they merged. On a number of significant issues, the contrast with Forster as a private member became progressively more pronounced.

British policy in China provides a good example of compromise. It has been previously suggested<sup>1.</sup> that de Grey, Layard and Bruce held the extension of British trade and influence in China to be a legitimate undertaking but objected in 1857 to the use of violence as a tactic, and emphasised that China should be treated on the same terms of international law as any other nation. In June 1858 Palmerston's envoy, Lord Elgin, had imposed on the Chinese the humiliating treaty of Tientsin, which compelled China to pay an indemnity, to open eleven more ports to trade, to admit Christian missionaries and traders into the interior, to recognise British diplomatic rights at Peking, and to legalise the opium trade and opium use throughout China. When the emperor prevaricated over the treaty's provision that foreign diplomats be admitted to Peking, the British under Elgin endeavoured to force their passage to the Chinese capital and were repulsed at the Taku forts on the Peiho River. De Grey, now in office, wholly abandoned his previous insistence on the use of peaceful means, and stressed "the necessity of now striking a blow which will re-establish our reputation in China."<sup>2.</sup> The blow was indeed struck in 1860, when an Anglo-French expeditionary force captured Peking and, in retaliation for the Chinese torture of several envoys, razed the emperor's summer palace. Palmerston was jubilant, and de Grey, Layard and Bruce responded to this

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1. See chapter 4 above.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43619, 26: R to Mansfield, 19 Sept. 1859.

disgraceful and uncivilised act with a deafening silence.<sup>1.</sup> By 1860 de Grey expressed a belief that treaties with the Chinese based on international law were impracticable.<sup>2.</sup> The treaty of Peking, forcing open China and legalising the opium trade, did not apparently offend his sensibilities. For de Grey, Layard and Bruce, their standing in the Liberal party apparently took precedence over moral indignation.

During the 1860s the British government became actively involved in the suppression of the agrarian, proto-nationalist and quasi-Christian Taiping rebellion; the policy of non-intervention exercised in Europe was not extended to China, divided and susceptible to the royal navy. Though western aid was not decisive, it contributed to the Imperialist victory. In the late fifties Goderich had advocated "not interfering in any way between the rebels & the Imperialists. I am convinced that it is the only sound course for us to pursue."<sup>3.</sup> But in the sixties Layard, as under secretary for foreign affairs, spoke in defence of Palmerston's policy on a number of occasions,<sup>4.</sup> and rationalised his support by the need to protect British trade and treaty ports, by the anarchic nature of Taiping rule, and by the Imperialists' present willingness to treat with Europeans, which he held should earn them Britain's moral and logistical support. Layard even asserted that his present and former attitudes were consistent, in that diplomatic niceties, rather than violent pressure, were now accepted by both Britain and the legitimate government of

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1. The only indirect comment came from Bruce who, in discussing the military aspects of the expedition, indicated no remorse (Bruce, *Letters*, i : 179-80: B to Norah Bruce, London, 8 Nov. 1860).
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43619, 162: deG to Mansfield, 17 Dec. 1860.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 45: G to Meadows, 25 Nov. 1858.
  4. e.g. 3 H 165, 1306: 11 March 1862; 3 H 165, 1806-15: 18 March 1862; 3 H 168, 52-63: 8 July 1862; 3 H 172, 301-17: 6 July 1863; 3 H 174, 1523-40: 22 April 1864; 3 H 175, 933-41: 31 May 1864.

China.<sup>1.</sup> However neither Layard nor de Grey approved the direct engagement of British officers to quell the Taipings;<sup>2.</sup> though both attempted to influence Russell on this issue,<sup>3.</sup> it was not until after the massacre of Taipings at Soochow by Imperialist troops that the government prohibited the direct involvement of British officers. Until then, Layard and de Grey simply acquiesced in a decision they considered improper. In contrast, Forster was able, uninhibited by ministerial strictures, to honestly and forthrightly oppose all British intervention beyond defence of the treaty ports.<sup>4.</sup>

The shelling of Kagosima in 1863, in defence of British interests in Japan, aroused corresponding sentiments on both sides. Layard, de Grey and Bruce acquiesced in and defended this barbarous act,<sup>5.</sup> apparently overwhelmed by their instincts of political survival. Forster reacted to this condonation "with great pain,"<sup>6.</sup> and his relative independence permitted him to persistently attack British policy.<sup>7.</sup>

Domestic affairs, however, forced the greatest compromises in principle from de Grey, Layard and Bruce. De Grey had initially joined

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1. *Times*, 24 Dec. 1862 and *Daily News*, 3 Dec. 1864: L's addresses to his Southwark constituents, 22 Dec. 1862 and 2 Dec. 1864; 3 H 172, 301: 6 July 1863.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 151: L to deG, London, 2 Jan. 1863; LP. BL Add Ms 39104, 267: deG to L, 5 Jan. 1863.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38989, 10: memorandum, L to Russell, 9 Jan. 1863; RP. BL Add Ms 43512, 31: deG to Russell, London, 18 April 1864 (copy).
  4. e.g. *Bradford Observer*, 7 Feb. 1861: F's address to the Liberal electors of Bradford, 5 Feb. 1861; *Times*, 13 Jan. 1864: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 8 Jan. 1864; 3 H 173, 215: 8 Feb. 1864; 3 H 174, 1540-5: 22 April 1864.
  5. e.g. 3 H 173, 376-95: 9 Feb. 1864; *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 25 Dec. 1863: B's address to his Merthyr constituents, 20 Dec. 1863.
  6. 3 H 173, 396: 9 Feb. 1864.
  7. e.g. *Bradford Observer*, 14 Jan. 1864: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 8 Jan. 1864; 3 H 173, 396-403, 422-4: 9 Feb. 1864.

Palmerston's ministry, and Layard, Bruce and Forster declared their allegiances to the Liberal government, on the assumption that a substantial measure of parliamentary reform would be effected. The reform bill of 1860, as introduced by Russell in the commons, was greeted in the house not so much with hostility as with indifference, and was in June 1860 indefinitely deferred. During the remaining years of Palmerston's life there was to be no government-sponsored reform bill, a constant reminder to de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Layard and Bruce of their misplaced trust in Palmerston's sincerity over parliamentary reform.

In the early years of the ministry they justified their loyalty on the basis of the non-interventionist (in Europe and America) foreign policy. Forster, for example, though characterising the 1862 session as one "in which so little had been done in the way of legislation,"<sup>1</sup> nevertheless assured his constituents that he would not enter into an anti-Palmerston pact.<sup>2</sup> By 1863, however, when a national consensus on non-intervention had been virtually established, de Grey, Layard and Bruce had clearly reconciled themselves to a Palmerston government, and presumably believed influence from within (de Grey was now in cabinet) to be more effective than pressure from without. Perforce defenders of the established order, they were to a degree contaminated by the comfortable complacency, the relaxed indecision and hesitation, of the majority of their ministerial colleagues. Increasingly committed to party and government, they savoured an era which Southgate has designated "the Indian summer of Whiggery."<sup>3</sup> Though still emerging in 1865

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1. 3 H 168, 384: 16 July 1862.

2. *Bradford Observer*, 27 Nov. 1862: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 21 Nov. 1862.

3. Southgate, *The Passing of the Whigs*, 295.

as 'advanced' liberal reformers, they had temporarily abandoned membership of the radical vanguard.

Bruce admitted in 1863 that the whigs had "exhausted their political programme" and were "not prepared with a fresh one," but asked "Who is?" for, "the good work having been done, the country does not much care who administers the state. Herein they are partly right. Except that I maintain that we still have the ablest men among us."<sup>1</sup> This tone of conservatism and complacency was reinforced in his annual constituency address.<sup>2</sup> Layard contemporaneously found consolation for the government's conservatism in the appointments of Stansfeld to the admiralty and Lawrence as governor general of India.<sup>3</sup> Whilst he continued to endorse the notion of parliamentary reform, even Layard's friends recognised that since 1859 he had been less committed to change, more willing to accept "faits accomplis,"<sup>4</sup> and the *Times* commented approvingly that

the most merciless of critics has become the most versatile of apologists; the most dashing of assailants has shown himself a master in the tamer arts of defence... Though we cannot help smiling at his altered tone and official complacency, we should be the last to reproach him with it as a fault. 5.

De Grey's papers are remarkably void of statements of general principle during these years, but almost half a century later he commented on his evolution from a radical youth to a pragmatic administrator:

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1. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 204-5: B to John Bruce, 19 Dec. 1863.
  2. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 25 Dec. 1863: B's address to his Merthyr constituents, 20 Dec. 1863.
  3. *Times*, 11 Dec. 1863: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 10 Dec. 1863.
  4. See LP. BL Add Ms 38991, 238: F. Sloane to L, Florence, 13 June [1865].
  5. Quoted in Waterfield, 299.

I started at a high level of Radicalism, and in 1852 I was considered to be a very dangerous young man. (Laughter.) I am a Radical still (cheers), just as much as I was then, but I am afraid that I am much more respectable -- perhaps that has come from association with my noble friends in the House of Lords. (Laughter.) ... What is the course that I have pursued? My right honourable friend [Asquith] said that I was a member of Lord Palmerston's last Government. That is true, but Lord Palmerston's last Government was not a very advanced Government (laughter), but I did under that Government what I have done ever since. I took what I could get and waited to get more (laughter), believing that that was a wise and sound principle in public life. 1.

Thus de Grey, Layard and Bruce waited for Palmerston to die, the fervour of their earlier radicalism momentarily abated, convinced while the premier lived that significant reforms were unattainable. Previous ideals were not abandoned, but their accomplishment was perceived as less urgent. De Grey, Layard and Bruce were not isolated within the government; Gladstone, Stansfeld, Goschen and others also chafed under Palmerston's paramountcy. Yet their decision to work the system was in marked contrast with that of experienced radicals such as Bright and Cobden: Bright wrote in 1859 that it was "better [to] teach the people something good for the future than resign oneself to work institutions already in existence;"<sup>2</sup>. Cobden commented that he

... would never be tempted by any consideration to enter upon official life. When I see what cabinets sometimes do and with the tacit approval of a minority of conscientious men, I am almost inclined to add a verse to our litany and in addition to 'plague, pestilence and famine' to pray for deliverance from a seat in the cabinet. Yet I am free to confess the world cannot go on upon my theory, I admit that men must co-operate... 3.

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1. *Times*, 25 Nov. 1908: R's speech at a luncheon of the eighty club, held to honour his services to Liberalism, 24 Nov. 1908.
  2. J.B. Conacher, 'Party Politics in the Age of Palmerston', in P. Appleman *et al*, eds., 1859: *Entering an Age of Crisis*, (Bloomington, 1959), 177: Bright's diary entry.
  3. W.E. Williams, *The Rise of Gladstone to the Leadership of the Liberal Party 1859 to 1868*, (Cambridge, 1934), 66: Cobden to Gladstone, 15 Jan. 1862.

Like Cobden, Forster and Hughes were reluctant to co-operate with Palmerstonian conservatism. (In fact Hughes chastised Cobden himself for his apathy and absence of reforming zeal in the early sixties.<sup>1</sup>) Forster's response was of some political significance, for he had by the mid-sixties established his reputation (mainly through his American civil war stand) as an effective radical parliamentarian. Reid attests that, with Forster's distrust of Palmerston's domestic policy, "it is certain that nothing would have induced him to serve in a ministry of which Palmerston was the chief."<sup>2</sup> By early 1864, Forster was in company with many fellow-radicals openly attacking the "Tory ministry under a Whig name," the ministry "liberal in profession but conservative in action,"<sup>3</sup> and admitting that

he had little hope to see much advancement of the Liberal cause until that party was in Opposition. (Hear, hear.) A year ago he would not have stated that, because he considered the foreign affairs much safer with a Liberal Ministry than with the Conservatives (hear, hear); but the country had spoken so clearly, and Lord Russell had acted so well and so honestly upon the two most important matters -- Italian and American (hear, hear) -- that he had made it impossible for his successors to do much harm. (Hear, hear.) 4.

Forster's growing disillusionment was reiterated in August 1864, when Palmerston spoke at a Bradford banquet and was repudiated both by the working men of the borough and by Forster for his unwillingness to countenance parliamentary reform.<sup>5</sup> A few months later Forster

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1. Thomas Hughes, 'To Mr. Cobden and other Public Men in search of Work', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 4, Aug. 1861, 329-35.
  2. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 336.
  3. *Bradford Observer*, 14 Jan. 1864: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 8 Jan. 1864.
  4. *Times*, 13 Jan. 1864: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 8 Jan. 1864.
  5. *Times*, 10 Aug. 1864.

illustrated his absolute lack of enthusiasm for the premier by stating that, "until this Government becomes more entirely Liberal than it is, it is not worthy of the support of the Liberal party (hear, and applause)."<sup>1</sup>.

From their differing perspectives de Grey, Layard, Bruce and Forster were each attempting during the early sixties to further their political objectives and personal ambitions. Yet the disparity in political perspective between Forster on the one hand and de Grey, Layard and Bruce on the other, is striking, and apparently confirms Acton's dictum on the corrupting nature of power. When Palmerston, the detested "mountebank" of the 1850s, finally died in October 1865, Bruce mourned "the noble Pam,"<sup>2</sup> and Layard commented: "The loss to the country is great. No one can feel it more than I do who has had an opportunity of knowing his great powers of mind, and who found in him the kindest and the most considerate of chiefs in the House of Commons."<sup>3</sup> No such eulogies were pronounced by Forster.

#### 4.

The nature of their political relationship was naturally modified by the accession to office of de Grey, Layard and Bruce. With various responsibilities they laboured in their own spheres, no longer collaborating on a broad scale but rather on specific issues of mutual concern.<sup>4</sup> If political considerations produced divergent responses to

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1. *Bradford Observer*, 12 Jan. 1865: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 10 Jan. 1865.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 167: B to deG, Aberdare, 22 Oct. 1865.
  3. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15F, 245: L to Russell, Florence, 30 Oct. 1865.
  4. Hughes, for example, wrote to de Grey in 1862: "... Our ways of life must necessarily be very much more apart than they used to be, & our beliefs & opinions may probably diverge more than they used, but it is a great comfort to think that in the most essential article of friendship we are the same, & that if either of us ever want a friend for a pinch we know where to find him." (RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 81: H to deG, Sandgate, 10 Aug. 1862).

Palmerstonian complacency, this was a temporary phenomenon which would disappear with the prime minister's death, and did not prevent the continuance of an intimate relationship.

Their political collaboration was promoted by personal affinities which endured, and in some respects strengthened, during the mid-sixties. Shared breakfast and dinner engagements and visits to each others' country houses were common occurrences. A very few examples of their companionship must suffice. De Grey continued to describe Bruce as an intimate friend.<sup>1</sup> Hughes was involved in a legal capacity in de Grey's estate affairs.<sup>2</sup> Layard described Bruce and his wife as "my best friends," a friendship "which will I trust ever exist between us."<sup>3</sup> Hughes wrote of Forster, then seeking a London house: "He wants to come near us but nothing to suit him *will* turn up, & be hanged to it. Besides the pleasure of having him & his wife near, our children have all become so intimate that the present distance has become a positive nuisance."<sup>4</sup> Two days after a rare disagreement in parliament, on defence expenditure,<sup>5</sup> Bruce cheerfully dined with the Forsters (and Fanny Hughes).<sup>6</sup> Whereas in 1859 Hughes lamented that his association with Layard had not hitherto been closer, and promised "to be a willing & staunch helper" in future,<sup>7</sup> in 1865 Layard was one of a few close friends (Maurice, Ludlow and Louis Blanc were among the others) invited as outsiders to Hughes's election celebration at the working men's college.<sup>8</sup>

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 111: deG to B, 19 July 1861.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 85: H to deG, Brighton, 23 Dec. 1862.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 58159, 141: L to Norah Bruce, London, 15 Sept. 1865.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 85: H to deG, Brighton, 23 Dec. 1862.
  5. See chapter 7 below.
  6. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 186: B to Norah Bruce, London, 26 June 1862.
  7. LP. BL Add Ms 38986, 259: H to L, 30 July 1859.
  8. LP. BL Add Ms 58175, 176-7: unidentified newspaper clipping, c. 2 Aug. 1865.

Though they had abandoned their identity as an independent parliamentary alliance after Willis's rooms, their enduring personal intimacy and political co-operation remained a significant factor not only on questions of education, labour and capital, the volunteers, parliamentary reform and the American civil war, but also within the broader evolution of political Liberalism.

5.

Following the dissolution of parliament, the re-elections of Bruce, Layard and Forster in the summer of 1865 were relatively uneventful. Opposition to Bruce was minimal, based on his refusal to support either the ballot or the prevention of the Sunday liquor trade; Layard stressed his continuing advocacy of suffrage extension, but his principal difficulty was to convince Southwark electors that Liberals and Conservatives held distinctive opinions.<sup>1.</sup> Hughes's election for Lambeth, on the other hand, was an exciting affair. His principal opponents, Doulton and Lawrence, were both Liberal employers in the borough, and Hughes relied for his support almost exclusively on working class votes. Assistance for his candidacy derived from a number of diverse groups and individuals. Ruskin chaired his election committee. George Howell tendered support from the reform league, which Hughes had recently joined.<sup>2.</sup> Holyoake was instrumental in introducing Hughes to liberal constituents.<sup>3.</sup> The *Spectator* endorsed his candidature,<sup>4.</sup> and even the reactionary *Saturday Review* indicated a grudging admiration.<sup>5.</sup>

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1. *Times*, 13 July 1865: L's address at his unopposed election for Southwark, 12 July 1865; *Times*, 30 June 1865: L's election address.

2. See George Howell Collection, Bishopsgate Institute: H to Howell, London, 1, 12 June, 23 July 1865.

3. George Jacob Holyoake, *Bygones Worth Remembering*, (London, 1905), ii : 106-10; Joseph McCabe, *Life and Letters of George Jacob Holyoake*, (London, 1908), ii : 18-9: H to Holyoake, [?] May 1865.

4. *Spectator*, 24 June, 15 July 1865.

5. *Saturday Review*, 3 June 1865.

Hughes's platform was straightforward and radical. He expressed his desire for a very considerable extension of the suffrage, committed himself to the ballot as a necessary evil, opposed church rates, supported the extension of education, endorsed non-intervention in foreign policy ("that is to say, for neither interfering ourselves or allowing interference by other Powers in the home politics of any foreign nation") and pledged himself to the amelioration of relations between labour and capital.<sup>1.</sup> Hughes's election was no foregone conclusion,<sup>2.</sup> but in the event he led the poll.<sup>3.</sup> Against his will, his working class supporters insisted on paying his election expenses,<sup>4.</sup> and Hughes's success was described by the borough's historian as "the purest and proudest performance" in the electoral history of Lambeth.<sup>5.</sup>

6.

On 18 October 1865, before the new parliament convened, Lord Palmerston died. His death symbolised the end of an old era, and the beginning of a new. Sir Charles Wood, reflecting whig anxiety, commented at Palmerston's graveside that "our quiet days are over, no more peace for us."<sup>6.</sup> During the following three years de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard responded to the appeal of Gladstonian Liberalism's "restless, reforming creed,"<sup>7.</sup> a creed which provided the means by which they escaped the relative torpor of the Palmerston years.

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1. *Times*, 30 May 1865: H's address at his nomination, 29 May 1865; Hill, *Electoral History of Lambeth*, 179: H's election address, June 1865.
  2. The London correspondent of the *Sheffield and Rotherham Independent*, for example, predicted his defeat (*Sheffield and Rotherham Independent*, 8 July 1865).
  3. *Times*, 13 July 1865: Hughes (6373); Doulton (6280); Lawrence (4743); Haig (514).
  4. *Spectator*, 22 July 1865; S.M. Ellis, ed., *The Hardman Papers: a further selection from the Letters and Memoirs of Sir William Hardman*, (London, 1930), 34: Hardman's journal entry of July 1865.
  5. Hill, 178.
  6. West, *Recollections*, 220-1.
  7. Southgate, *The Passing of the Whigs*, 324.

## CHAPTER 7

ASSOCIATION WITH GLADSTONE

How little we thought when discussing the possible future [Bruce wrote de Grey shortly after Palmerston's death], how near the change had approached... He has left an anxious task to his surviving colleagues. As you predicted & desired, Lord Russell has been sent for, & will, I presume, accept the Premiership. I am naturally anxious to hear what changes, if any, will be made... 1.

Anxiety was not confined to Bruce, and events of the next few months were to bitterly alienate de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard from Russellite leadership. An alliance with Gladstonian Liberalism was consequently fashioned, based partly on grounds of political expediency, but largely on congenial policy and philosophical ideals.

The arch-whig Russell was intent on introducing a second reform bill and, in an effort to consolidate both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary support, appointed Gladstone leader of the house of commons. During discussions on the ministry's composition Gladstone urged that the division of offices between the upper and lower houses be altered in favour of the house of commons,<sup>2</sup> thus especially jeopardising de Grey's tenure of the war secretaryship, which was the department of largest expenditure.

De Grey offered the prime minister his "hearty support,"<sup>3</sup> and routinely placed his office at Russell's disposal.<sup>4</sup> The Duke of Somerset had similarly proffered his position as first lord of the admiralty, but Russell decided to sacrifice de Grey. Despite Gladstone's

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 167: B to deG, Aberdare, 22 Oct. 1865.

2. e.g. Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, i : 589: Gladstone to Russell, London, 23 Oct. 1865.

3. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15F, 94: deG to Russell, London, 21 Oct. 1865.

4. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15F, 154: unsigned summary of Russell's cabinet considerations (not in Russell's hand), 23 Oct. 1865.

warning that "only in the last resort ... should either offer be accepted, at least if it involves the retirement of either from the Cabinet,"<sup>1</sup>. the premier informed de Grey on 24 October that he accepted his resignation, adding tactlessly that he "should be glad if you could remain in the Cabinet, but I know not how it could be."<sup>2</sup>

De Grey's claims to consideration were evidently tenuous in Russell's eyes, but he obtained support from the whig Indian secretary, Sir Charles Wood. Wood remonstrated with Russell on de Grey's behalf on 25 October, suggesting the India office as a suitable position,<sup>3</sup> and Russell consequently decided that it would "not be necessary to make a change, & at all events I do not propose to do so at present."<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless his desire to remove de Grey from the war office persisted, and the colonial office and duchy of Lancaster were both considered as alternatives.<sup>5</sup> Yet on 30 October even de Grey's cabinet status remained dubious, as Gladstone continued to question his role, and attested that "we should all be sorry to miss de Grey in the Cabinet: but the obvious exigencies of the situation relieve the whole affair from any appearances which might be personally disagreeable."<sup>6</sup>

Without the patronage of either Russell or Gladstone, de Grey's position remained uncertain for weeks. Endorsement from the horse

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1. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15F, 157: Gladstone to Russell, London, 24 Oct. 1865.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43512, 57: Russell to deG, London, 24 Oct. 1865.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43529, 8: memoranda by deG and Wood, n.d. [24 Oct. 1865]; RP. BL Add Ms 43529, 12: Wood to deG, London, 24 Oct. 1865.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43512, 62: Russell to deG, London, 25 Oct. 1865.
  5. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15F, 160: undated 'Plan No. 1', in Russell's hand, of his government; Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15F, 257: Gladstone to Russell, London, 30 Oct. 1865.
  6. Russell Papers. PRQ 30/22/15F, 257: Gladstone to Russell, London, 30 Oct. 1865.

guards<sup>1</sup>. did not deter Russell from deciding that Cardwell and de Grey should exchange offices as war and colonial secretaries,<sup>2</sup> but Cardwell was unhappy with this arrangement.<sup>3</sup> By 19 November Bruce reported that it appeared "doubtful whether de Grey will leave the War Office;"<sup>4</sup> on 2 December Russell finally advised that he might "consider that all notion of a change in your office, which you administer so well, is given up."<sup>5</sup>

Layard's ministerial status in the aftermath of Palmerston's demise was less insecure than that of de Grey, not even requiring his return to London from an Italian holiday. Like his friend, he desired Russell's accession to the premiership,<sup>6</sup> and expected no alteration in his personal position: "I would not accept any other subordinate place and it is not very probable that I shall be offered anything better."<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless a certain disillusionment surfaced when Layard

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1. See Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15F, 261: Victoria to Russell, Windsor Castle, 30 Oct. 1865 (copy). The queen transmitted the Duke of Cambridge's anxiety lest de Grey be transferred, but later indicated her entire confidence in Russell's deliberations (Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15F, 262: Gen Grey to Russell, Windsor Castle, 31 Oct. 1865).
  2. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15G, 70: Russell to Victoria, London, 11 Nov. 1865 (copy).
  3. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15G, 81: unsigned notes on ministerial arrangements (not in Russell's hand), 14 Nov. 1865.
  4. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 233: B to Norah Bruce, London, 19 Nov. 1865.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43512, 64: Russell to deG, London, 2 Dec. 1865.
  6. LP. BL Add Ms 38959, 183: L to Edmund Hammond, Venice, 20 Oct. 1865; Layard assured Russell of "all the support and assistance that I may be able to afford," and accurately prophesied that "from the condition of that [the Liberal] party itself you will not find the task you have undertaken an easy one. I trust, however, that we shall be true to ourselves and rally round you" (Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15F, 245: L to Russell, Florence, 30 Oct. 1865).
  7. LP. BL Add Ms 58157, 111: L to Sara Austen, Venice, 22 Oct. 1865.

commented that "English political life is a thankless business, unless one has a fair chance of getting high up on the ladder," and he considered the possibility of a diplomatic mission.<sup>1</sup> Layard placed his office at Clarendon's disposal<sup>2</sup>. but the new foreign secretary, who considered his own task "nauseous to me beyond what I can express,"<sup>3</sup> was grateful for an experienced subordinate in the commons and requested Layard's support in very flattering terms.<sup>4</sup>

Bruce's growing administrative reputation ensured retention of his position as vice president of the privy council, but a promotion was also canvassed: Helps informed him that he was "much talked of as Lord Clarendon's successor in the Duchy of Lancaster,"<sup>5</sup> and Childers assured him that he would succeed Sir George Grey whenever the latter left the home office.<sup>6</sup> Bruce frequently consulted de Grey throughout these weeks, and de Grey professed that "if there had been any reconstruction of the Ministry -- for instance, if Sir G. Grey and Sir C. Wood had retired -- I [Bruce] should certainly have been in the Cabinet."<sup>7</sup> As no reconstruction occurred, Bruce remained where he was.

Forster's decision to join the Russell ministry was of considerable significance. By 30 October 1865 Forster had declared his

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38959, 183: L to Hammond, Venice, 20 Oct. 1865.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38992, 36: L to Clarendon, Florence, 30 Oct. 1865 (copy).
  3. Sir Herbert Maxwell, *The Life and Letters of George William Frederick, Fourth Earl of Clarendon*, (London, 1913), ii : 299: Clarendon to Granville, 'The Grove', 21 Oct. 1865.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38992, 38: Clarendon to L, London, 4 Nov. 1865.
  5. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 230: B to Norah Bruce, London, 27 Oct. 1865. Sir Arthur Helps was clerk of the privy council, 1860-75.
  6. *ibid.*, i : 234: B to Norah Bruce, London, 25 Nov. 1865. H.C.E. Childers, MP for Pontefract, had in August 1865 been appointed financial secretary to the treasury; a staunch Gladstonian.
  7. *ibid.*, i : 233: B to Norah Bruce, London, 21 Nov. 1865.

willingness to participate, apparently accepting after Palmerston's death the de Grey-Layard-Bruce doctrine that influence from within was more effective than pressure from without. Bruce learned the news through de Grey:

... I called on de Grey in the afternoon and heard important news, viz. that Forster was willing to join the Government in a subordinate position. This is excellent. If we get him and Goschen, we not only secure two very able men, but conciliate the Liberal party, and educate men for future high office. It is wise too in Forster, as preliminary official experience will be of great advantage to him... 1.

Forster's willingness to serve was no guarantee of his appointment, however, for Russell believed he was "not to be trusted, his object being... to get rid of the present Govt & after a short interval of tory rule to come in himself in high office."<sup>2</sup> Though an exaggerated view of Forster's ambitions, this statement is important as revealing Russell's misgivings. Gladstone, however, suggested Forster as under secretary for the colonies, recommending him as an advanced liberal and "a very good man, whom you have not known much in the H of Commons."<sup>3</sup> This view prevailed, possibly assisted by Forster's differentiation from the Manchester school, which rendered his radicalism relatively acceptable to Russell.<sup>4</sup> The premier had considered appointing him to the India office,<sup>5</sup> but on 16 November

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1. *ibid.*, i : 231: B to Norah Bruce, London, 30 Oct. 1865.
  2. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15F, 154: unsigned summary of Russell's cabinet considerations (not in Russell's hand), 23 Oct. 1865.
  3. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44292, 211: Gladstone to Russell, 27 Oct. 1865 (copy).
  4. Temmel suggests that this differentiation was "a crucial fact which allowed his views to be heard and made him an acceptable Radical to be called into the Liberal government" (Temmel, *Forster and Liberal Politics*, 130).
  5. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15F, 161 and 162: undated 'Plan No. 2', in Russell's hand, of his government; and undated memorandum, in Russell's hand, on his government.

offered instead the under secretaryship for the colonies. Forster stipulated that his appointment should be conditional on the government's commitment to parliamentary reform; having received assurances from Russell, he accepted office on 24 November.<sup>1</sup> Bruce, Layard, de Grey and Hughes all welcomed Forster's acceptance.<sup>2</sup>

Having finally settled his ministry, Russell almost immediately began the process of modification. Gladstone believed the treasury required the parliamentary aid of some minister of weight and position, and he and Sir George Grey devised a scheme whereby the chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster would assume these extra duties.<sup>3</sup> Gladstone then recommended Bruce as "an excellent man" for this new position,<sup>4</sup> but Grey argued that unless Bruce were to be in the cabinet he should remain at the education department. Instead Grey suggested Goschen,<sup>5</sup> and on 8 January 1866 Russell recommended this appointment to the queen.<sup>6</sup> At the cabinet meeting of 10 January Russell announced to his surprised colleagues Goschen's appointment to the duchy and the cabinet. His decision was not well-received, not so much because of Goschen's alleged radicalism as because the cabinet had not been consulted and others with better claims had been overlooked. Gladstone commented that

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1. For a detailed examination of Forster's conditions, see chapter 11 below.
  2. For Bruce, see immediately above; for Layard, see LP. BL Add Ms 38954, 11: Hammond to L, London, 23 Nov. 1865; for de Grey, who was "most cordial and pleased," see Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 381: F to Jane Forster, London, 24 Nov. 1865; for Hughes, see *Times*, 5 Dec. 1865: H's speech at a public dinner in his honour, 4 Dec. 1865.
  3. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15H, 224: Grey to Russell, London, 31 Dec. 1865.
  4. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15H, 191: Gladstone to Russell, Hawarden, 28 Dec. 1865.
  5. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15H, 224: Grey to Russell, London, 31 Dec. 1865.
  6. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/16A, 128: Russell to Victoria, Pembroke Lodge [Richmond], 8 Jan. 1866 (copy). Goschen had been vice president of the board of trade.

Russell's "precipitancy amounts to disease,"<sup>1</sup> and de Grey reported that "there was a good deal of plain speaking," that "Gladstone objected most strongly," and that "there was no need for it; Goschen was quite content where he was, and it has disgusted many of those in office who have been passed over; and some out of office, who think they ought to have been taken in. Layard resigned, but will, I think, remain, though in a discontented state." De Grey, disgruntled since his treatment of the previous autumn, added splenetically that "we shall never be safe until some patriotic individual burns down Pembroke Lodge."<sup>2</sup>

In late December 1865 Russell had decided that Layard should succeed the late Sir Charles Eastlake as director of the national gallery, and Layard provisionally accepted the post without leaving the foreign office.<sup>3</sup> Following the 10 January cabinet, however, he submitted his resignation as under secretary for foreign affairs, asserting that "after Mr. Goschen's appt & his promotion to the Cabinet I could not, with a due regard to my own honor and to my position in the country, retain my present post."<sup>4</sup> Clarendon urged Layard to remain and elicited support for him from the queen, an excellent example

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1. W.E. Gladstone, *The Gladstone Diaries*, (Oxford, 1978), vi : 410: entry of 10 Jan. 1866.
  2. Maxwell, ii : 306-7: deG to Sir C. Wood, 11 Jan. 1866. Pembroke Lodge was Russell's Richmond residence.
  3. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15H, 218: L to Russell, London, 30 Dec. 1865; Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/16A, 102: Clarendon to Russell, 'The Grove', 6 Jan. 1866; Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/16A, 118: L to Russell, London, 6 Jan. 1866; Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/16A, 128: Russell to Victoria, Pembroke Lodge [Richmond], 8 Jan. 1866 (copy).
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38992, 154: L to Clarendon, London, 10 Jan. 1866 (copy).

of Layard's metamorphosis from an 'unacceptable' radical agitator in 1861 to an approved Liberal administrator in 1866.<sup>1</sup> The result was that Layard withdrew his resignation, though refusing the privy councillorship thrown his way as a sop.<sup>2</sup> He was hardly rewarded for his actions; within a few days Russell withdrew his offer of the directorship of the national gallery.<sup>3</sup>

Forster's role in the colonial office was also apparently threatened by the Goschen-induced ministerial alterations, for he wrote to his wife:

... I certainly should not like to leave the C.O. just yet. Matters apparently little, but really of importance turn up every day on Jamaica,<sup>4</sup> & hitherto I have *always* got my way. For instance I prevented the Flogging Act being confirmed a day or two ago. Cardwell walks so cautiously that it is not difficult to change his direction...<sup>5</sup>

Forster's apprehensions proved unfounded, however, enabling him to continue exerting influence over colonial policy.

Yet further ministerial rearrangements followed within weeks, when Wood resigned as Indian secretary on grounds of ill-health. Russell appointed de Grey as his replacement so that the war secretaryship could revert to the commons. Layard was a hopeful candidate,<sup>6</sup> but Russell decided to appoint Hartington. Gladstone protested, arguing that Goschen's cabinet appointment had already weakened

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1. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/16A, 160: Clarendon to Russell, Osborne, 11 Jan. 1866; LP. BL Add Ms 38992, 156: Clarendon to L, 12 Jan. 1866.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 39118, 71: Cowley to L, Paris, 12 Jan. 1866.
  3. See Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/16A, 185: L to Russell, London, 17 Jan. 1866. Layard was appointed a gallery trustee in February.
  4. Concerning the Governor Eyre controversy.
  5. FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 66: F to Jane Forster, London, 13 Jan. 1866.
  6. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/16A, 293: L to Russell, London, 5 Feb. 1866.

"the cohesion of the corps" and that men such as Paget, Fortescue, Gibson and Layard would feel slighted. Layard, Gladstone stated, "has performed in some respects the ablest service of all, certainly by much so as a Speaker, and you must be prepared for his feeling this a fresh blow."<sup>1</sup> Russell, however, was unwilling to change his opinion. His unpredictable behaviour, sometimes prevaricating, sometimes wantonly stubborn, had by early 1866 earned the contempt of many Liberals, including de Grey and his colleagues. New and more responsive leadership was seen to be necessary.

Reform and Jamaica dominated the parliamentary session of 1866. De Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard all abhorred the excessive cruelty with which Eyre repressed the black Jamaican rebellion (Hughes went further than the others in advocating Eyre's prosecution), an illustration of the paramountcy of the radical over romantic elements in their natures, for other romantics such as Carlyle, Kingsley, Maurice, Tennyson and Ruskin endorsed the Jamaican governor's action. The government was defeated on its reform bill in June 1866, and resigned in consequence. In the two years which followed Gladstone gradually established his position as Liberal leader, and de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard all moved into his political orbit.

2.

Gladstone's interminable, frequently-irresolute and unassured conversion from high toryism to political liberalism was finally consummated in the late 1860s. He brought to the Liberal party new justifications, new directions, new concerns. Whilst never egalitarian

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1. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/16A, 258: Gladstone to Russell, London, 1 Feb. 1866.

or truly democratic, Gladstonian liberalism emphasised the claims of individual self-determination, human justice and the mutual duties of classes. Gladstone, imbued with ethical Christian fervour, earnestly cared for the working class and trusted in its moral sense. Paternalistic rather than radical, he urged social reform in order to preserve the established order, based on a modified, less selfish aristocracy. Whilst emphasising peace, economic retrenchment and reform, Gladstone's concept of liberalism was that of the free competition of ideas in a flexible alliance; he desired a Liberal party devoid of class exclusivism, representative of the general interest. Above all, his was a progressive posture at a time when there existed in the nation a vague but powerful mood in favour of change.

Gladstone's power basis rested, if somewhat uneasily, on mass popularity. A cheap daily press, militant dissent and organised labour (principally representing skilled craftsmen) all cast hopeful visions towards the parliamentary Liberal party, and Gladstone in particular, for leadership and expression of their desires. Gladstone was able to channel this outside support, thus imposing reformist notions on the parliamentary party. He was for the most part not admired by his parliamentary colleagues in the period 1866-8. Radicals in the commons, whilst esteeming his commitment to reform, distrusted his views on church establishment; his popular support earned him the enmity of most whiggish Liberals; though admitting his intellectual superiority, many found him incomprehensible and unpredictable. Gladstone's control over the party before 1868 was tenuous and the Liberal coalition remained fragile, but he was nevertheless an indispensable element.

De Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard were during this era more committed Gladstonians than most of their parliamentary Liberal colleagues. Their interests coincided, their goals coincided. If Gladstone used the parliamentary party in order to further his personal aims and ambitions, he did so with the consent and encouragement of de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard. By 1868 their independent alliance of the 1850s had effectively dissipated: de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard were committed and, in varying degrees, influential Gladstonians.

A range of factors influenced their attitudes towards the emerging Liberal leader, amongst them parliamentary and administrative reform, economic policy, Ireland, church-state relations, education and foreign affairs. Each helps to explain their relative adherence to Gladstonian liberalism.

All five apparently welcomed Gladstone's commitment to parliamentary reform, a commitment, be it noted, which never countenanced universal suffrage but rather a gradual and limited franchise extension. Their enthusiasm for reform was no longer, as in the fifties, virtually identical,<sup>1</sup> but all could look to Gladstone for guidance and leadership on this issue in 1866-7. Thus Bruce, for example, praised Gladstone's performance as "magnificent" during the 1866 reform bill debates.<sup>2</sup> At the same time Layard spoke of Gladstone's "burning and generous words, coming straight from the heart," which had "touched a chord amongst the working men which has vibrated through the length and breadth of the land."<sup>3</sup> He assured Gladstone after a reform meeting in Southwark that

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1. See chapter 11 below.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 171: B to deG, London, 28 April 1866.

3. 3 H 182, 1456: 16 April 1866.

"every allusion to you was received with the most enthusiastic and unanimous approval," adding that "you would have been pleased, I feel sure, to have witnessed the decorum and earnest manner of those present."<sup>1</sup> Layard praised Gladstone for his "enlightened policy and ... generous sympathy for the working classes."<sup>2</sup> Hughes early latched on to Gladstone's 1864 declaration that every man not mentally or morally incapacitated was entitled to the franchise.<sup>3</sup> In 1867 he urged Gladstone to persevere, stating to him that "you, & you only, can rally the real liberals [i.e. advanced liberals and radicals] in the House," and assuring him that, amongst mechanics and artisans, "your name [is] a power with them above that of all other public men put together."<sup>4</sup> As early as 1864 Forster asserted to reformers that they would "not be forsaken by Mr. Gladstone. (Loud cheers.),"<sup>5</sup> and in the following year noted that "the Reform coach stopped everything, and they must get Mr. Gladstone on the box to drive it on."<sup>6</sup> In October 1866 Forster commented that Gladstone, "more than any other man, had been the means of making the reform question a serious question" by obliging Liberal members to choose between supporting liberal measures and a Liberal ministry.<sup>7</sup> Forster participated in Liberal conferences on both the 1866 and 1867 bills and, though a more advanced reformer

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1. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44411, 92: L to Gladstone, London, 7 July 1866.
  2. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44416, 142: L to Gladstone, London, 6 Nov. 1868.
  3. *Times*, 30 May 1865: H's address at the Liberal nomination meeting for Lambeth, 29 May 1865.
  4. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44412, 209: H to Gladstone, Brighton, 13 April 1867.
  5. *Daily News*, 10 Dec. 1864: F's speech at a Bradford reform meeting, 8 Dec. 1864.
  6. *Bradford Observer (Supplement)*, 13 July 1865.
  7. *Leeds Mercury*, 9 Oct. 1866: F's speech at a Leeds reform meeting, 8 Oct. 1866.

than his chief, nevertheless faithfully supported him during his 1867 trials, referring to Gladstone's "sacrifices in the cause of Reform, which were well known to the people."<sup>1</sup> Throughout this period de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard remained entirely loyal to Gladstone, and the question of political reform thus provided a crucial link in their alliance with Gladstonian liberalism.

Gladstone's faith in administrative reform similarly attracted de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard. With the exception of Forster and Hughes, they could rely on little organised pressure from without, and throughout the sixties had demonstrated increasing indebtedness to their administrative skills. This popular insecurity, and consequent dependence on stature within the parliamentary party, was taken for granted by the late 1860s. Gladstone's relative emphasis on executive power as opposed to parliamentary influence must therefore have appeared especially attractive to de Grey, Bruce and Layard; his recognition of the need for an administrative intelligentsia was indeed one of the principal unifying factors amongst the Liberal front bench. Moreover de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard had since the fifties shared with Gladstone an admiration of efficiency within the civil service, and a belief that this could best be achieved through open and competitive examination.<sup>2</sup> In the late sixties they must have anticipated the realisation of this goal were Gladstone to achieve the premiership.

Levels of government expenditure, and the desirable extent of state interference in the economy, were issues on which there existed no firm basis of accord. Moreover Forster was frequently at odds with

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1. 3 H 186, 1609: 12 April 1867; see chapter 11 below.

2. See chapter 8 below.

his colleagues on the question of economic retrenchment. Disagreements first surfaced in the early 1860s, and centred on defence expenditure. In the protracted and often acrimonious conflict between Gladstone and Palmerston on the economic size of government in general, and on military expenses in particular, de Grey, Bruce, Hughes and Layard were in entire agreement with the prime minister that national defence necessitated substantial funds. In 1862, for example, de Grey on behalf of the war office defended the government's decision to construct south coast fortifications (later dubbed 'Palmerston's follies') at a cost of over £10 million.<sup>1</sup> Bruce expressed simultaneous approval in the commons, speaking "at de Grey's request" because the latter was "somewhat nervous... as to the manner in which Sir G. Lewis [the war secretary] will acquit himself, and I shall be ready to supplement him."<sup>2</sup> Hughes, outside parliament, publicly backed this approach in the early sixties, commenting for example that free trade and economy, though good doctrines, should not be allowed to "deadens our love of, and service to, nobleness, and righteousness, and truth," nor to denigrate "the honour of England."<sup>3</sup> Layard, who did not directly participate in these debates, paid lip service to Gladstone's drive for economy<sup>4</sup> but nevertheless stressed that the desire for peace

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1. 3 H 167, 1080-3: 26 June 1862; 3 H 168, 796-8: 25 July 1862.

2. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 184: B to Norah Bruce, London, 23 June 1862; 3 H 167, 920-3: 23 June 1862; 3 H 168, 153-6: 10 July 1862. His performances were sufficiently impressive to materially promote his ministerial claims, which were realised within months. Bruce also induced Forster, who opposed his views, to "doubt whether he was right" (Bruce, *Letters*, i : 186: B to Norah Bruce, London, 26 June 1862).

3. Hughes, 'Italy Resurgent and Britain Looking On', 496.

4. *Times*, 11 Dec. 1863: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 10 Dec. 1863.

should not lead to a reduction in British defences.<sup>1.</sup> He presumably agreed with Palmerston that military superiority should be maintained "in spite of Economists and Radicals."<sup>2.</sup>

In contrast, Forster sympathised with the Gladstonian view, though the circumstances of his adoption of a retrenchment policy are rather obscure. When pressed in 1861 he was noncommittal on defence expenditure;<sup>3.</sup> a year later, undoubtedly harried by his Bradford constituents, he publicly supported Gladstone's view that expenditure, and particularly military expenditure, should be reduced.<sup>4.</sup> In an effort to afford Gladstone moral support, he participated in the preparation of Stansfeld's June 1862 resolution advocating economic retrenchment.<sup>5.</sup> The chancellor of the exchequer was clearly sympathetic,<sup>6.</sup> but the economic radicals were outmanoeuvred by Palmerston (Forster referred to the affair as a "*fiasco*"<sup>7.</sup>), the resolution was quashed,<sup>8.</sup> and Forster felt constrained to reiterate in parliament his basic adherence (because of foreign policy) to the government.<sup>9.</sup> Despite this apparent setback, however, Gladstone's approach increasingly prevailed, thereby establishing middle-class radical sympathy for his motives but also involving him in clashes with

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1. *Times*, 3 Dec. 1864: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 2 Dec. 1864.

2. LP. BL Add Ms 38991, 3: Palmerston to L, Broadlands, 8 Jan. 1865.

3. *Bradford Observer*, 7 Feb. 1861: F's speech at the Bradford Liberal nomination, 5 Feb. 1861.

4. 3 H 166, 1382-5: 8 May 1862.

5. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 349-50.

6. Philip Guedalla, ed., *Gladstone and Palmerston, being the Correspondence of Lord Palmerston with Mr. Gladstone 1851-1865*, (London, 1928), 217-8: Gladstone to Palmerston, London, 9 May 1862.

7. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 350: F's diary entry of 3 June 1862.

8. 3 H 167, 382-8: 3 June 1862. The resolution was defeated 367-65; Bruce and Layard voted against Forster and with the government.

9. 3 H 167, 386-7: 3 June 1862.

de Grey at the war office. De Grey attempted to conciliate Gladstone by efforts to reduce the colonial garrisons, but was nevertheless harrassed. The controversy over serjeant cooks in the army is illustrative of their basic disagreements. De Grey wished their appointment in order to ameliorate soldiers' living conditions and health. Though the estimated cost was only £10,927 per annum, treasury initially refused consent, and de Grey appealed to Gladstone on sanitary grounds (tactfully invoking the name of Sidney Herbert, Gladstone's late Peelite companion) to reverse this decision.<sup>1</sup> Gladstone prevaricated, urging economy;<sup>2</sup> de Grey expressed willingness to compromise,<sup>3</sup> and it was eventually agreed that serjeant cooks could be appointed on condition that one private be sacrificed from the corps thus augmented.<sup>4</sup>

Confusion rather than disagreement was evident on the question of state intervention versus laissez-faire. Gladstone's deep aversion to public expenditure did not prevent inconsistency in his attitudes towards laissez-faire. De Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard, however, were more involved than Gladstone, and than most Liberals and radicals, in questions of education, poverty, unemployment, housing and industrial relations. They were as a result much more inclined than most Gladstonian liberals to invoke state interference.<sup>5</sup> This quite fundamental disparity in philosophies, however, was virtually irrelevant in the 1866-8 period, for Gladstone's successes at the treasury (progress towards free trade, provision for parliamentary scrutiny of accounts and treasury control of expenditure had all been

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1. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44286, 27: deG to Gladstone, London, 17 Jan. 1863.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43513, 16: Gladstone to deG, London, 20 Jan. 1863.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43513, 24: deG to Gladstone, London, 27 Jan. 1863 (copy).
  4. WO 123/6: general order no. 828, 13 July 1863.
  5. See chapter 12 below.

achieved by 1865) provided him little scope for further fiscal or financial 'reforms'. Gladstone turned instead to legislative schemes (such as political reform and Ireland), and economic questions were rarely at issue as he consolidated his leadership. De Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard therefore discerned few difficulties in the late 1860s in accommodating themselves with Gladstonian economics. Their lack of foresight was to be a matter of considerable regret after 1868, for Gladstone consistently supported Lowe's<sup>1</sup> efforts to reduce government spending. De Grey, for example, was resentful as lord president of the treatment meted out by the treasury.<sup>2</sup> Layard, who as first commissioner of works endeavoured to expend financial resources on works of art and architecture, was effectively resisted by the treasury, Gladstone, and especially Gladstone's parsimonious ally in the treasury, Acton Ayrton, who objected to public expenditure on those whom he classified as "painters, sculpturers [sic], architects, and market-gardeners."<sup>3</sup>

It was pre-eminently Gladstone's Irish policy which permitted the reconciliation of all Liberal factions -- radicals, dissenters, Adullamites, whigs and centrist liberals -- in 1868, whilst simultaneously dividing the Tories between high church stalwarts and broad churchmen prepared to make concessions. Not only did de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard adhere to Liberal Irish policy, they were enthusiastic participants in its innovation. Bruce expressed conciliatory opinions and religious tolerance in 1865, when as vice president of the committee of council on education he visited Ireland with a view

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1. Robert Lowe, chancellor of the exchequer from 1868-73.

2. See RP. BL Add Ms 43513, 218: deG to Gladstone, London, 9 April 1869 (copy); deG - Lowe correspondence from 1869-71 in RP. BL Add Ms 43529, 1-31 *passim*.

3. Quoted in Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, ii : 258.

to establishing a scheme of university education. He informed Layard candidly that he

... would make any reasonable concession to prejudice, and even to ignorance, and so undo gradually by fairness, conciliation, and patience that deep-seated suspicion which reigns in the Irish heart.

I wish I had *carte-blanche*. I am not fool enough to think that I could erase in one or two years the effects of centuries of misgovernment, but I would make a large beginning... 1.

"What a series of ignominious blunders our attempt to introduce Protestantism by force or fraud has been!" he exclaimed to de Grey.<sup>2</sup> He impressed on Granville the need for conciliation, trust and tolerance, urging him to speak with Russell in these terms.<sup>3</sup> Unable to effect his university proposals, Bruce turned his attention to church establishment and land tenure in Ireland. In 1867 he described the church of Ireland as "a standing mark of inequality" and "gross partiality,"<sup>4</sup> and referred in parliament to "acts of violence and confiscations [which] had placed almost the whole property of Ireland in the hands of men different in religion, different in many cases in race, from the majority of the Irish people."<sup>5</sup> The others shared these concerns.

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1. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 222: B to L, Tervoe, Limerick, 12 Aug. 1865.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 161: B to deG, Aberdare, 12 Sept. 1865.

3. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/18/8, 127: B to Granville, Aberdare, 7 Nov. 1865. This letter is incorrectly dated 7 October in Bruce, *Letters*, i : 226-8. For further correspondence on the Irish university question, see TCD, Mss 2161, 2161a, 2161b.

4. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 251: B to John Bruce, London, 25 March 1867.

5. 3 H 189, 6: 24 July 1867.

Hughes, for example, carefully studied the legal implications of tenant land rights, and suggested that the customary rights of the tenant-at-will be recognised by law, for he argued that "we could not expect that suspicion and discontent would vanish while the land was held upon its present uncertain tenure."<sup>1</sup> In addition, of course, he endorsed the disestablishment of the Irish church.<sup>2</sup> Layard also expressed his support for Gladstone on disestablishment.<sup>3</sup> De Grey did not speak out on Irish questions before 1868, though like Forster he had befriended the Young Irelander Charles Gavan Duffy in the fifties, and as war secretary in the sixties was reluctant to increase the army in Ireland in response to Fenian agitation.<sup>4</sup> His obvious sympathies emerged in 1869, when he spoke in the lords on the Irish church bill. Asserting that "it has been, indeed, the misfortune of Ireland that for long centuries she has been governed in the interests of a minority," he referred to Irish establishment as "a real and substantial grievance," representing a small minority, which reminded the Irish people of the conquest, coercion, and ascendancy to which they had been subjected.<sup>5</sup> Denholm argues that this speech "shows quite convincingly that he [de Grey] was by 1868 a committed Gladstonian;"<sup>6</sup> Wolf's claim that de Grey was dominated by a conservative passion for compromise, and by anxiety for the perpetuity of the house of lords,<sup>7</sup> can be dismissed. De Grey's speech exudes commitment to this radical cause, and he was concerned at this time not so much with the preservation of

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1. 3 H 190, 1503-7: 12 March 1868.

2. *Times*, 20 Dec. 1867: H's address to his Lambeth constituents, 19 Dec. 1867.

3. *Times*, 13 Nov. 1868: L's Southwark election speech, 12 Nov. 1868.

4. See Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15H, 113: deG to Russell, Ripon, 21 Dec. 1865.

5. 3 H 196, 1878-85: 15 June 1869.

6. Denholm, *Radical and Democratic Career of Ripon*, 264.

7. Wolf, i : 224-5.

the lords intact as with its reform by the introduction of life peerages.<sup>1.</sup> Forster too was wholly committed to Irish reforms. As early as January 1864 he drew attention to the need for disestablishment and the amelioration of tenant grievances.<sup>2.</sup> In the following year he argued that the tenant laws "fill the Irish estates with impoverished tenants and keep these tenants impoverished," and described the church of Ireland as a "sign of conquest," a "memorial of oppression," and a "legacy of injustice."<sup>3.</sup> Forster seconded J.F. Maguire's motion of March 1865 for a select committee to investigate Irish law of landlord and tenant, emphasising in his speech that it was unsatisfactory to simply dispose of the question, as Gladstone had previously done,

by agreeing to an abstract proposition, "that the law of landlord and tenant in Ireland was unsatisfactory," and by pointing to a future when an attempt might be made to render it satisfactory -- that future being the "better time coming," the not distant future, as he hoped, of which the right hon. Gentleman [i.e. Gladstone] would himself be the guiding star. 4.

When that future arrived, in 1868, Forster advised Gladstone as to parliamentary tactics on his Irish resolutions,<sup>5.</sup> strongly supported his established church (Ireland) bill,<sup>6.</sup> and urged in May 1868 that possible agitation or friction arising from the Irish question necessitated the earliest practicable date for the general election.<sup>7.</sup>

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1. Altholz, McElrath and Holland, *Correspondence of Acton and Simpson*, iii : 260: Simpson to Acton, 21 Nov. 1868.
  2. *Bradford Observer*, 14 Jan. 1864: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 8 Jan. 1864.
  3. *Times*, 13 Jan. 1865: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 10 Jan. 1865.
  4. 3 H 178, 591: 31 March 1865.
  5. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44157, 6: F to Gladstone, London, [22 March 1868].
  6. 3 H 192, 783-7: 22 May 1868.
  7. 3 H 192, 1053-6: 29 May 1868.

Undoubtedly, therefore, a mutual sympathy existed amongst Gladstone, de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard over Irish grievances. Moreover all six were more committed than most Liberals to a radical solution of these injustices. Significantly, Gladstone was especially attracted to the others because, whilst staunchly advocating Irish disestablishment, they as firmly endorsed continued establishment in England. Gladstone's espousal of disestablishment in Ireland was a successful bid to obtain dissenter support, but he remained uncomfortable with militant nonconformity. In 1863 he had voted for the burials bill, but only in 1866 had he supported the abolition of church rates, and his high church principles rendered him apprehensive of the Liberal dissenters' concomitant advocacy of Irish and English disestablishment. He therefore viewed de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard as ideal allies on this issue, conferring 'advanced' or radical support for Ireland, yet remaining romantically conservative for England. Forster, as the sole nonconformist by birth amongst the five, is perhaps the best example of this unique appreciation. In 1865, for instance, when Russell was devising his ministry, one of his confidants commented on Gladstone's predicament vis-à-vis the dissenters:

Gladstone did not much like Goschen being one of those to be brought in -- preferred Forster... His [Gladstone's] church principles come much in the way now that he is brought in contact with a class who are utterly opposed to his ideas on that subject tho' agreeing on others... 1.

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1. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15G, 81: unsigned memorandum (not in Russell's hand), 14 Nov. 1865.

When Forster spoke on Irish disestablishment in 1868, it is significant that he reiterated his commitment to the church of England:

He wished for the preservation of the English Church. He was not brought up in it. He was born and brought up as a Dissenter. But he believed that the English Episcopal Church as an Established Church was a great blessing, and that this was the feeling of the English people. 1.

De Grey ratified this dichotomy between English and Irish churches during the lords' 1869 debate on the Irish church bill. Emphasising that the church of Ireland represented a small minority, he argued that its disestablishment would in fact strengthen the English church, and stated:

Consequently, it seems to me to be dangerous, indeed, and most unjust, that you [the Conservative opponents of the bill] should persistently endeavour to unite the English Establishment, full as it is of life and vigour, and strong in the affections of the people, with her dying sister, who has failed to win the sympathies of the nation. 2.

Education was another issue of substantial concern, particularly to de Grey, Bruce and Forster, in the late 1860s. Bruce, for instance, described the extension of education in 1866 as "our most crying want just now, and when the inevitable subject of Reform is disposed of ... [education] must occupy the public attention."<sup>3</sup> He assured Layard that "Goschen, Stansfeld, and Forster are eager about it, and it would be a good and fruitful battlefield for the Liberal party."<sup>4</sup> Paradoxically, it was Gladstone's lack of interest in educational issues,

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1. 3 H 192, 784-5: 22 May 1868.

2. 3 H 196, 1878, 1882, 1883: 15 June 1869.

3. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 244: B to John Bruce, Aberdare, 9 Nov. 1866.

4. *ibid.*, i : 247: B to L, Oldham, 14 Dec. 1866.

and the apparent weakness of his leadership status, which allowed de Grey, Bruce and Forster to assume they could carry an education bill under a Liberal government. Thus Gladstone's attitude assumed prime importance, and he informed Russell in November 1867 that internal caucus dissensions necessitated the avoidance of "all acts of leadership which can be dispensed with," so that "in affairs generally I follow others, Bruce for example on education, and wait for a breeze."<sup>1</sup>

Foreign policy was not a critical factor in the formation of the Gladstonian Liberal party from 1866-8, and for this reason presented no barrier to the adhesion of de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard to their parliamentary leader. It has been previously suggested that their 1850s foreign policy was based on a somewhat vague respect for international morality, for nationalist aspirations, and for the defence of political liberties, and that in the 1860s, on the specific issues of Italy, America, Poland and Denmark, they had accepted non-intervention as a compatible response. On these bases they deemed Gladstone's foreign policy of the late 1860s acceptable, despite earlier contretemps over the Crimean and American civil wars. In practical terms there was little to choose between Conservative and Liberal foreign policy, but Gladstone's ostensibly moralistic (but often simply confused) approach appealed to their sentiments. Layard's was the sole dissentient view, with an increasing tendency to reject the

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1. G.P. Gooch, *The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell 1840-1878*, (London, 1925), ii : 363: Gladstone to Russell, 2 Nov. 1867. Chapter 12 examines educational policy in more detail.

ethical tenets of peace and isolation.<sup>1.</sup> This factor was virtually irrelevant before 1868, but during the seventies was to create a policy gulf between Gladstone and himself. One specific issue, that of international arbitration, would alienate him from his former companions.<sup>2.</sup>

Gladstone's leadership qualities did not of course rely solely on a peculiar conjunction of policy decisions. De Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard were attracted by the very Christian earnestness and high-principled purity which the worldlier members of the aristocracy found so uncongenial. After the experiences of Palmerston, whose morality in a Christian sense was certainly questionable, and of Russell, whose petulance and incompetence had alienated their sympathies in 1866, Gladstone appeared virtuous, conscientious and incorruptible. In the late 1860s the contrast with Disraeli was particularly evident. Layard in 1868 described Disraeli's career as "one continuous, cynical contempt of everything honest, upright and true," and his accession to the premiership as "the triumph of Jugglery and political immorality."<sup>3.</sup> Forster commented that Disraeli "always seems to me to treat English politics and English politicians as if they were tools to play with, and as if he had no feeling, no instinctive sympathy with what is

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1. Layard commented in 1866, for example: "... There is every desire in England to remain neutral and to avoid being dragged into any interference or intervention. The prevailing opinions upon foreign policy are very different from those which existed a few years ago -- whether they are wiser and better calculated to maintain the interests of this country may be doubtful..." (LP. BL Add Ms 39120, 8: L to A. Buchanan, London, 4 May 1866 (copy)).
  2. The arbitration issue is discussed fully in chapter 9.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 51: L to G.T. Clark, London, 28 Feb. 1868.

going on."<sup>1</sup> Hughes also denigrated "this accursed tricky Israelite & his crew -- how any fellow can go into the lobby with such a lot even if he agrees with them I can't conceive."<sup>2</sup>

Gladstone's entire personality was in marked contrast with Disraeli's practical expediency, which de Grey and his colleagues were not slow to realise. Hughes argued that the "New Jerusalem" could not depend on the consciences of the many liberals who demonstrated "an utter absence of political thought & principle... & the presence of meanness & petty self-interested motives, but what is almost worse, no shame whatever at avowing the springs of their action."<sup>3</sup> He commented of Gladstone, however, that he was "about the best man to lead them in these times."<sup>4</sup> Bruce noted Lady de Grey's respect for Gladstone's "earnestly eloquent" conversation,<sup>5</sup> and in this she probably reflected her husband's empathy. Bruce himself recognised in Gladstone attributes of "talent & eloquence as apart from connection & personal influence."<sup>6</sup> Forster, having worked under Gladstone, cited the "example of purity, of self-sacrifice, and of disinterestedness he has set to politicians throughout the country."<sup>7</sup>

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1. *Times*, 13 Jan. 1865: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 10 Jan. 1865.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 166: H to deG, London, 24 July 1867.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 156: H to deG, London, 10 May 1867.
  4. Derek Hudson, *Martin Tupper: his Rise and Fall*, (London, 1949), 217. In 1881 Hughes praised Ripon as Indian viceroy for his qualities of "firm religious conviction" and "broad popular sympathies," the same qualities he had admired in Gladstone in the late sixties (RP. BL Add Ms 43549, 1: H to R, 19 May 1881).
  5. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 192: B to Norah Bruce, Hickleton, 27 Sept. 1862.
  6. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 167: B to deG, Aberdare, 22 Oct. 1865.
  7. G.B. Smith, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, (London, 1879), 486. The statement was made shortly after Gladstone's resignation as Liberal leader in 1875.

Layard expressed to Gladstone in 1867 his desire that he would continue to lead "those who like myself have the highest admiration for your character, your earnestness, your sincerity and your genius."<sup>1</sup> This virtual hero-worship was, however, not founded in 1866-8 on a close personal relationship with the Liberal leader, for the evidence clearly indicates that their affiliation never encompassed individual intimacy prior to 1868.<sup>2</sup>

One other factor may have influenced their response to Gladstonian liberalism. In the late 1860s the parliamentary Liberal party drew support from all sectors of Victorian society: whig aristocracy, a considerable portion of the gentry and of the liberal professions, the manufacturing and commercial classes and, significantly, the wage-earning class. This coalescence of interest groups, contrasting so markedly with the factions which Conservatives represented, must have appealed to the corporate, romantic sensibilities of de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard; Aberdare later criticised the Conservatives for acting and legislating "not in the public interest, but on the dictation of classes -- be they Peers, Lawyers, Officers, or trustees of Friendly Societies."<sup>3</sup>

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1. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44412, 262: L to Gladstone, London, 1 May 1867.
  2. The Gladstone Papers contain correspondence from Goderich/deGrey on administrative reform and war office administration from 1853-1864, but between November 1864 and December 1868 there is no correspondence extant (see BL Add Ms 44286). There is a similar gap in the Ripon Papers between February 1866 and December 1868 (see BL Add Ms 43513). Gladstone, however, expressed "private friendship" in November 1869 (RP. BL Add Ms 43513, 284: Gladstone to deG, Chester, 21 Nov. 1869). The Forster correspondence in the Gladstone Papers contains only four letters prior to December 1868 (see BL Add Ms 44157). Forster later stated that he did not develop strong personal affection for Gladstone until after 1880 (RP. BL Add Ms 43537, 192: F to R, Ambleside, 1 Jan. 1883). In similar fashion, there are only three letters from Bruce in the Gladstone Papers before December 1868 (see BL Add Ms 44086). Layard's correspondence, scattered throughout the Gladstone Papers, demonstrates no evidence of a close personal relationship.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 39007, 381: A to L, London, 31 March 1875.

Thus they approached the 1868 general election as convinced and ardent Gladstonian liberals.

3.

Layard's return for Southwark was unexceptional. The Tories produced a candidate at the last moment, and managed to effectively disrupt the nomination meeting.<sup>1</sup> Layard in his election address urged dissenters particularly to support him, and Gladstone,<sup>2</sup> and he was easily re-elected.

The contest at Bradford was the harbinger of future Liberal discord in the borough. Forster's official fellow-Liberal was Edward Miall, but Forster consistently refused to commit himself to Miall's advocacy of disestablishment in England, thus alienating the militant nonconformists of Bradford. A third Liberal, Henry Ripley, joined the contest in opposition to Miall, and the liberation society proponent was relegated to third position and defeat. Miall's supporters then petitioned against Ripley's return, and Ripley in turn petitioned against Forster. Though the former was eventually unseated, Forster was cleared of the bribery charges levelled against him. Nevertheless his relationship with Bradford dissent henceforth deteriorated.<sup>3</sup>

Hughes was forced to abandon Lambeth for quite different reasons. He had in the Commons introduced legislation to regulate Sunday trading,<sup>4</sup> supported the Sunday limitation of hours for public houses,<sup>5</sup> and railed against the prevalence in shops of false weights

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1. *Times*, 17 Nov. 1868: L's speech at his electoral nomination, 16 Nov. 1868. The crowd was so noisy and unruly that almost nothing could be heard by the *Times*'s reporter.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 39053, 34: L's election address.
  3. See Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 447-54; *Spectator*, 6 Feb. 1869; *Times*, 6 April 1886.
  4. 3 H 187, 576-81: 15 May 1867; 3 H 191, 1084: 22 April 1868.
  5. 3 H 190, 1865-7: 18 March 1868.

and measures.<sup>1.</sup> All these activities, together with his support for co-operative distribution, naturally incensed the shopkeepers and publicans of Lambeth, and Hughes judged his re-election chances as dubious.<sup>2.</sup> In consequence, he successfully contested the Somerset market town of Frome. Layard was distressed with Hughes's forced departure from Lambeth, and after the general election publicly commented that he

deeply regretted that he could not call Mr. Hughes his colleague in one of the south metropolitan boroughs. Mr. Hughes was a man who did honour to the constituency which sent him to Parliament -- (cheers) -- and he... hoped the time might come when those influences which sent other men to Parliament to represent metropolitan boroughs would cease to exist. 3.

Bruce was challenged at Merthyr by two Liberals, Henry Richard and Richard Fothergill. Fothergill was a local ironmaster, drawing support from the middle commercial classes, from local baptists and other nonconformists (through Dr Thomas Price), and from his own perforce-loyal employees. Richard, with his peace society and liberation society credentials, stood on a liberal, Welsh nationalist and non-conformist platform. Jones has argued<sup>4.</sup> that Bruce's defeat<sup>5.</sup> at the hands of his two Liberal opponents was primarily a factor of his

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1. 3 H 193, 1924-7: 29 July 1868.

2. *Times*, 2 Oct. 1868: H's letters to the *Times*.

3. *Morning Star*, 5 Jan. 1869.

4. I.G. Jones, 'The Election of 1868 in Merthyr Tydfil: a Study in the Politics of an Industrial Borough in the Mid-Nineteenth Century', *Journal of Modern History*, 33, 3, Sept. 1961, 278-83.

5. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 21 Nov. 1868: Richard (11,683); Fothergill (7,439); Bruce (5,776).

rejection by the working classes on industrial grounds. As evidence of his thesis Jones cites Bruce's denunciation of the colliers in the 1857-8 coalfield strike, his apparent support of the double-shift system, and his rejection of the notion of a sub-inspectorate to police safety standards in the mines. Jones partially destroys his own case by admitting firstly, that Bruce was associated with the radical vanguard of the parliamentary Liberal party,<sup>1</sup> secondly, that he had intervened in the 1857 strike to persuade the government to withdraw the troops, the men to return to work, and the coalowners to refrain from further reductions in wages,<sup>2</sup> and thirdly, that Bruce wished an increase in the mines inspectorate, but opposed the scheme of *sub*-inspectors because there was a shortage of qualified men, and their low salaries would encourage bribery.<sup>3</sup> Bruce defended his call for an enlarged inspectorate in his election address, and also refuted charges that he had asserted 12s. per week a sufficient wage for colliers, that he had stated the electors were neither educated nor respectable enough to vote for him, that he had unfairly treated dissenters while in office (citing published statements by Baines, Morley, T.B. Potter and Hadfield in his defence), and that he had stated support for the double shift.<sup>4</sup> If industrial questions seriously influenced the vote, innuendo and falsification rather than genuine grievances were largely responsible, but it seems unlikely that the

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1. In which he includes Bright, Mill and Forster (Jones, 270).
  2. See *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 12 Dec. 1857. Furthermore it seems unlikely that a strike conducted eleven years previously should materially affect the 1868 election when it had not apparently influenced the elections of 1859 and 1865.
  3. Jones, 278-83.
  4. *Aberdare Times*, 10 Oct. 1868: B's election address, 3 Oct. 1868. Though Bruce had not publicly endorsed the double shift, he was privately an advocate of its introduction (Bruce, *Letters*, i : 253-4: B to John Bruce Pryce, London, [] March 1868).

predominantly working class voters of Merthyr should turn from Bruce on industrial questions to either a local ironmaster such as Fothergill, or a laissez-faireist, Cobdenite radical such as Richard. The more plausible explanation lies in nonconformist and nationalist sentiments: Fothergill was endorsed by Merthyr's leading nonconformist, Price, and was able to 'influence' his own employees; Richard's meetings were conducted in Welsh, and emphasised Bruce's anglicanism. Moreover Bruce's opposition to the ballot was as always a point at issue, and his involvement with the volunteers had apparently angered local dissenters.<sup>1</sup> Bruce himself attributed his defeat to the "nonconformist spirit," and admitted to Layard that he was

... vexed & mortified at being beat by such a transparent imposter as Fothergill. The ignorance & credulity of the people exceeded all belief. They believed every extravagant lie invented by the enemy, & there was no want of them, & had at last worked themselves into a belief that I was the determined enemy of the working-class...

Fothergill has acted throughout like a cur. The other man, Richard, & his friends behaved with perfect decency... 2.

The *Daily News* deplored his loss, adding that "Mr. Gladstone had not a more trustworthy and valuable lieutenant in the House of Commons than Mr. Bruce."<sup>3</sup>

4.

The elections resulted in a Liberal majority in excess of a hundred seats, and induced Disraeli to resign forthwith. Gladstone was of course commissioned with the formation of a government, and on

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1. See *Truth*, 20 April 1882.

2. LP. BL Add Ms 38995, 375: B to L, 20 Nov. 1868.

3. *Daily News*, 18 Nov. 1868. The *Manchester Guardian*, 18 Nov. 1868, also spoke of Bruce's defeat as "a real loss," primarily referring to his education expertise.

6 December asked de Grey to become lord president of the council,<sup>1</sup> an appointment which made Bruce "wild with joy."<sup>2</sup> De Grey would have preferred the war office, but was nevertheless very satisfied with the jurisdiction afforded him over the question of education.<sup>3</sup> He apparently delayed his acceptance, however, for two days later he received a cryptic note from the prime minister:

It is all right -- once for all. 4.

Wolf concludes that in the intervening period de Grey received assurances that he could deal with education in whig temper, but cites no corroborating evidence.<sup>5</sup> It seems much more probable that de Grey's hesitation was prompted by Forster's reluctance to join the administration.

Various factors evidently impinged upon Forster's decision. He was hesitant to assume office on two counts: firstly, he had expected to be included in cabinet, but Gladstone offered him the vice presidency of the council without cabinet rank; secondly, he considered he might more effectively support the government in his old role as an independent member 'below the gangway'. Thus when Gladstone

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43513, 166: Gladstone to deG, London, 6 Dec. 1868.
  2. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 258: B to Norah Bruce, London, 7 Dec. 1868.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43619, 190: deG to Mansfield, 21 Dec. 1868 (copy).
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43513, 168: Gladstone to deG, 8 Dec. 1868. Gladstone saw de Grey three times on 7 December and again on the evening of 8 December (Gladstone, *Diaries*, vi : 645-6: entries of 7, 8 Dec. 1868).
  5. Wolf, i : 244. The only 'evidence' produced by Wolf is Gladstone's classification of his cabinet under the headings "Peelites", "Whigs" and "New Men", in which de Grey is described as a whig (Maxwell, ii : 354). This vague categorisation is notoriously unreliable as a measure of political ideology; rather, it simply delineates original Peelites (one of these, Argyll, defected from Peelite ranks in 1855), ancestral whigs, and all others. Bright and Lowe, for example, are loosely classed as new men, but their political interests were hardly compatible. De Grey was certainly a whig by ancestry, but his ideology was virtually identical with that of Bruce, classed as a new man.

offered him the vice presidentship, Forster requested that he consider the latter proposal, and withdraw his offer if he thought Forster correct.<sup>1</sup> Forster immediately consulted with de Grey,<sup>2</sup> and subsequently decided to accept the premier's renewed offer of the vice presidentship with responsibility in the commons for education. Two considerations were foremost in his mind: his interest in education, and the opportunity to co-ordinate his efforts with de Grey. He stated shortly after his acceptance: "I think I have done the right thing, at least I tried to do it, though I did not '*insist*', but I have an office I like because I care so much about the subject."<sup>3</sup> And Forster later assured his constituents "of my good fortune in having as my immediate colleague and chief, Lord de Grey, my old personal friend, with whom I am able to work in the most full concord, and who gives me every assistance that it is possible for one man to give to another."<sup>4</sup> Gladstone apparently considered Forster "to have acted very generously"<sup>5</sup> in accepting office.

Bruce's parliamentary status was somewhat awkward as a result of his Merthyr defeat. On 5 December he wrote de Grey: "I do most earnestly hope that you will be in the next Cabinet, whether I am there or not. It will be so pleasant to take sweet counsel together -- if I am there. If not, I shall feel the slight less -- or not at all -- if you are there."<sup>6</sup> On the following day de Grey received his appointment, and on the 7th Gladstone requested Bruce to become home

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1. *Times*, 22 Dec. 1868: F's re-election speech at Bradford, 21 Dec. 1868.

2. FP. TCD, Ms 4992, 102: Jane Forster to Mrs Arnold, Burley, [8 Dec. 1868].

3. Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/10/73: F to Ludlow, [London], 11 Dec. 1868.

4. *Bradford Observer*, 21 May 1869: F's address to Bradford Liberals, 20 May 1869.

5. FP. TCD, Ms 4996, 15: Jane Forster to E. Jackson, London, 15 Dec. [1868].

6. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 206: B to deG, 5 Dec. 1868.

secretary, admitting that "some objection might be raised on the score of my not being in Parliament" but nevertheless believing "the appointment would give general satisfaction."<sup>1</sup> The accuracy of this assessment is evidenced by the *Spectator's* reaction, welcoming Bruce's success and describing him as "radical through the firmness and clearness of his intellect, which cannot endure to see a real evil merely trimmed or truncated, when it might be eradicated."<sup>2</sup> The fact that Gladstone persisted in this appointment obviously confirms his great respect for Bruce's abilities, and early in 1869 Bruce was found a safe Scottish seat, Renfrew.

Layard also received his appointment on 7 December, and was clearly disappointed with his status. The office, that of first commissioner of works, he found attractive, permitting as it did the indulgence of his artistic tastes, but he believed he should also have achieved cabinet rank. Gladstone had of course many claims to satisfy, and it may be that recent controversies involving Layard<sup>3</sup> militated against his promotion. Layard himself had become somewhat disillusioned with political life<sup>4</sup> and Gladstone may have been aware of this.

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1. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 259: B to Norah Bruce, London, 8 Dec. 1868.

2. *Spectator*, 23 Jan. 1869.

3. For example, he became embroiled in a fruitless controversy over the Abyssinian captives and in an unnecessary personal conflict with Harvey Lewis, MP for Marylebone (see 3 H 189, 244-9: 26 July 1867; 3 H 190, 245-79: 26 Nov. 1867; 3 H 190, 607-9, 617-24: 5 Dec. 1867; 3 H 190, 667-8, 668-70, 672-3: 6 Dec. 1867; LP. BL Add Ms 38991-5 *passim*. (Jan. 1865 - Nov. 1868); Charles T. Beke, *A Confutation of Mr. Layard's Calumnies in the House of Commons*, (London, 1868); LP. BL Add Ms 39053, 46: "Memorandum of what took place between Mr. Harvey Lewis and myself in the House of Commons, on Thursday night, May 16, 1867.").

4. In February 1868 he commented: "I am constantly half making up my mind to leave political life and to retire here [Venice]. However I suppose that one must go on" (LP. BL Add Ms 58157, 147: L to Sara Austen, Venice, 2 Feb. 1868).

Nevertheless the potential of architecturally reshaping London appealed to Layard, and he informed Gladstone of his acceptance and of his "personal devotion" to the prime minister.<sup>1.</sup> The premier had indeed admitted Layard's cabinet claims;<sup>2.</sup> Layard publicly stated that, despite his own exclusion from cabinet, the government merited support, and cited Bright's accession as an important factor.<sup>3.</sup>

Hughes was not included in the ministry, and it was by late 1868 becoming increasingly evident that he would never make his mark in parliament. Though a fervent Gladstonian, he could not easily inure himself to the clash and compromise of party politics. In the autumn of 1868, therefore, he had little inclination for office. On the contrary, believing that his interests ("labour & capital, the chaotic state of London, pauperism &c") were unlikely to be seriously considered, and holding that "everything shd give way to the duty of strengthening Gladstone's hands," he generously offered to relinquish his Frome seat in Bruce's favour.<sup>4.</sup>

5.

The accession to office of de Grey, Forster, Bruce and Layard in 1868 was a significant achievement, for all but one member of their independent political alliance of the fifties now possessed ministerial status and considerable influence. They were sworn in at Windsor on 9 December 1868, de Grey and Bruce in cabinet, Layard and Forster as privy councillors. (Unlike Bright, they did not refuse to kneel before

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1. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44416, 328: L to Gladstone, London, 7 Dec. 1868.
  2. See LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 52: L to G.T. Clark, London, 7 Dec. 1868.
  3. *Times*, 22 Dec. 1868: L's re-election speech at Southwark, 21 Dec. 1868.
  4. BP. Bodleian Library, Ms Eng Letters, d.246, 52: H to B, n.d. [between 18 Nov. and 7 Dec. 1868].

the queen.<sup>1.</sup>) That evening Bruce, Hughes and de Grey dined together in celebration.<sup>2.</sup>

The personal intimacy amongst de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard had endured since its inception in the 1850s. Hughes, for example, increasingly reflective and nostalgic as the years passed, commented to de Grey in 1868: "Your handwriting always gives me a sort of pleasurable twinge<sup>3.</sup> (like the sudden opening of a window on an old familiar scene) reminding me as it does of the critical years of early manhood & phases of life which we were & are all the better for having passed through."<sup>4.</sup> Yet their political relationship had altered quite fundamentally. In the fifties they had fashioned a cohesive political alliance; in the sixties they contributed to the progressive, if irresolute, consolidation of political Liberalism under Palmerston and Gladstone. This response to, and participation in, emerging trends was typical of many private liberal members of the 1850s house of commons.

As their prestige and influence were augmented during the sixties de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard became dominated by the issues inherent in the various offices which they individually held. Though no longer able to co-operate on a broad parliamentary level, they nevertheless retained the ability to co-ordinate their activities and influences on specific issues, and the transition from Palmerstonian to Gladstonian Liberalism enhanced this capability. It is now appropriate to examine their collaboration as it developed throughout the

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1. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 259-60: B to Norah Bruce, London, 10 Dec. 1868.

2. *ibid.*

3. No historian who has attempted to decipher de Grey's cursive scrawl could possibly agree with this statement.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 167: H to deG, London, 20 Nov. 1868.

fifties and sixties on the significant questions of administrative reform, Anglo-American reconciliation, the volunteer movement, suffrage extension and class relations.

## CHAPTER 8

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

The political alliance of Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard coalesced during the Crimean war period, and issues then prevalent were inevitably crucial to their developing relationship. A significant subject of mutual concern was the administrative mismanagement and ineptitude of the military effort in the Crimea.

Layard's personal experience with the army before Sebastopol was perhaps the most important contributory factor to their dissatisfaction. Consternation had nevertheless been evident prior to this excursion. As early as 1847 Bruce had referred to the "monstrous folly of our naval and military systems,"<sup>1</sup> and in parliament Layard had drawn attention to the inadequacy of preparations regarding supply and transport,<sup>2</sup> to the resultant poor condition of the troops,<sup>3</sup> and to the desirability of employing business principles in military appointments and management in order to obviate such inefficiency.<sup>4</sup> In the pages of the *Quarterly Review* of March 1854, Layard had also criticised the absence of precautionary arrangements.<sup>5</sup> These apprehensions were confirmed by Layard at the theatre of war. Having witnessed the battles of the Alma, Balaclava and Inkerman, he was also privy to the appalling conditions which the troops were forced to endure

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1. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 365: B to J.G. Phillimore, 1847.

2. 3 H 132, 236: 31 March 1854.

3. 3 H 132, 1012-7: 28 April 1854.

4. 3 H 135, 652: 24 July 1854; also 3 H 135, 728-39: 25 July 1854.

5. [Layard], 'The Turks and the Greeks', 514.

in their seige positions by Sebastopol. Medical and sanitary facilities were wholly inadequate, with the result that of a total of 18,053 British deaths in the Crimea, 16,297 men were victims of cholera, dysentery and other disease.<sup>1</sup> In his diary Layard cited frequent instances of ineptitude,<sup>2</sup> and he felt obligated to inform Russell not only of general mismanagement but also of "the apparent complete incompetency and culpable negligence of Admiral Dundas."<sup>3</sup> Returning to London in November 1854, Layard was imbued with the urgency of ameliorating the troops' privations, and with the realisation that wider administrative reforms were requisite if this goal were to be accomplished: he later stated that he "came home to denounce that system of jobbery, of corruption, and of party serving which led to the sacrifice of thousands of lives."<sup>4</sup> For Layard and his colleagues, governmental efficiency was not envisaged primarily as a means to economise, but as a vehicle by which working class suffering in the Crimea might be minimised.

The movement for administrative reform with which Layard and Goderich became closely associated at the end of 1854 had been promoted rather than instigated by events in southern Russia; as Kitson Clark comments, aristocratic jobbery had been declining since about 1780, but "took an unconscionable time to die."<sup>5</sup> A stimulus was afforded the reformers in the late forties and early fifties, when various

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1. P. Warner, *The Crimean War: A Reappraisal*, (New York, 1973), 212-3.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 58172, *passim*: L's Crimean journal, 8 Sept. - 6 Nov. 1854.
  3. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/11E, 48: L to Russell, H.M.S. *Agamemnon*, 25 miles N. of Sebastopol, 16 Sept. 1854; also Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/11F, 21: L to Russell, Lines of Sebastopol, 8 Nov. 1854.
  4. *York Herald*, 30 April 1859: L's electoral nomination speech at York, 29 April 1859.
  5. G. Kitson Clark, '"Statesmen in Disguise": Reflexions on the History of the Neutrality of the Civil Service', *Historical Journal*, 2, 1, 1959, 21-2.

departmental investigations were conducted under the auspices of Gladstone, Sir Charles Trevelyan and Sir Stafford Northcote. The successful introduction of competitive examinations in the Indian civil service, and reform of the universities, provided models for advocates of progressive administration. These initiatives culminated, in 1853, in the famous Northcote-Trevelyan inquiry into the organisation of the permanent civil service, which produced a damning indictment of the selection procedures and *modus operandi* of public departments. The Northcote-Trevelyan report recommended that future appointments be determined not on the basis of political patronage but through open competitive examination, that a distinction should be drawn between intellectual and mechanical tasks, and that promotion should be determined on merit rather than seniority.<sup>1</sup> The implications of such proposals were considerable, and much commented upon by contemporaries. Entrenched noblemen tended to view the suggestions as a presumptuous challenge to aristocratic control, and found repugnant the notion that the lower orders might be introduced to positions of influence. Many held that patronage was essential in order to manage a house of commons containing few adherents to strict party discipline. Civil servants tended to fear that promotion by merit would in practice encourage preferential treatment to those with influential patrons, which promotion by seniority avoided. Probably the majority of administrative reformers perceived competitive examination as a method by which the commercial middle classes might successfully appropriate the civil service in their interest, and impose commercial and capitalist values and (alleged) efficiency.

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1. pp 1854 [1713.] xxvii.1-23: report on the organisation of the permanent civil service; also pp 1854-5 [1870.] xx.1-554: papers relating to the re-organisation of the civil service.

The approach of Layard, Goderich and their colleagues to civil service reform did not easily conform to existing, progressive moulds. Army and civil service reforms were considered inseparable. Administrative reform was also viewed in a broader radical context of formal civil equality: Layard expressed the desire to place public administration "on a footing that should conduce to the liberties of the people -- which should place all men on a footing of equality before the law. ('Hear, hear,' and cheers.)"<sup>1</sup>. Thus through administrative reform the illegitimate corruption inherent in personal patronage might be superceded by a legitimate, neutral and competent civil service, this process simultaneously enhancing political morality. The tendency of patronage to counteract the representative principle would also in their view be overcome. (Goderich in fact refused to seek patronage for his constituents, an attitude remarkable both for its public morality and political courage; Edward Hughes refers to Goderich as "the author of the famous 'Goderich test'" or "Goderich pledge."<sup>2</sup>.) Nor did Goderich or Layard perceive administrative reform and competitive examinations as an avoidance of democracy by effectively limiting the public service to the educated upper and middle classes. They envisaged instead an egalitarian and democratic result which was not in their view incompatible with a professionalisation of the service. They hoped moreover that working class educational facilities (such as mechanics institutes and working men's colleges) would be sufficiently developed to remove competitive inequalities.

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1. *Times*, 28 March 1857: L's Aylesbury nomination speech, 27 March 1857.
  2. E. Hughes, 'Civil Service Reform 1853-5', *History*, 27, 105, June 1942, 82, 59. Hughes described Goderich as "the Bright of the movement."

It was, in short, as much to the working as to the middle class that they directed their appeal.<sup>1</sup> Layard was probably more alive than Goderich to the class dilemma of competitive entry to the civil service: whilst Goderich mildly protested that examinations were "too purely literary"<sup>2</sup> (and therefore in effect favoured the products of public schools and universities), Layard was really fearful lest "competitive examination carried too far will have the effect of throwing every place into the hands of those who have money eno' to give a false education to their sons. You know I never went quite so far as you did about competition."<sup>3</sup> A national education system, they believed, would obviate these difficulties. Thus more to naivety than to malevolent design can be attributed their endorsement of a movement which ultimately evolved in an essentially undemocratic and inegalitarian manner, consolidating and legitimising class structures. Moreover they expressed some uncertainty and unease over the imposition of the capitalist ideology of efficiency and economy in the public service. They certainly considered efficiency desirable, in order to service the requirements of the people, and particularly of the troops in the Crimea. Thus commercial and business performance was frequently lauded. Yet they rejected the notion that capitalist *mores* should be introduced in the public service, and were especially averse to the desire for economy. Inherent in their support for administrative reform was the assumption that government should fulfil a more positive role in future, and that it therefore required to be purged of its corrupt or

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1. It is interesting that F.D. Maurice, representing the Christian Socialist tradition, also perceived the apparent relevance of administrative reform to the working classes and to working class education (F.D. Maurice, *Administrative Reform, and its connexion with Working Men's Colleges*, (Cambridge, 1855)).
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43617, 12: G to Bartle Frere, London, 17 Nov. 1858 (copy). The comment is made in reference to open competition in the Indian civil service.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 124: L to G, London, 16 Sept. 1858.

inept elements. Less and cheaper administration was never their objective.

2.

Layard returned from the Crimea prepared for parliamentary battle. Referring to the desire that existing officers be replaced with younger and more capable commanders, he informed John Murray of the *Quarterly Review*: "I think that I may prove of some little use in getting this done on my return home, notwithstanding the personal odium which I shall, of course, incur."<sup>1</sup> In the *Quarterly* he decried "the neglect and improvidence in the Government, and the gross negligence and incompetency of the departments to which the details and conduct of the war had been confided."<sup>2</sup> His principal onslaught, however, was reserved for the house of commons. Layard's knowledge of the grim realities induced consternation in government circles: Sidney Herbert, for example, predicted that "we shall have warm work on Tuesday night [12 December 1854] with this gentleman [Layard], who is come home full of criticism of everything and everybody."<sup>3</sup> Thackeray, a sympathetic administrative reformer, reported that Layard had returned with "stories of incapacity mutiny imbecility," and had predicted that he might "make a great place for himself if he uses his opportunities well."<sup>4</sup> Moreover in support of his cause Layard could depend on the *Times*, whose editor, Delane, had journeyed

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38982, 320: L to John Murray, Lines of Sebastopol, 23 Oct. 1854.
  2. [Layard], 'Campaign in the Crimea', 258.
  3. Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert*, i : 307: Herbert to Lord Raglan, 8 Dec. 1854. Herbert, as secretary at war, appeared impressed with Layard's allegations that sanitary arrangements were being neglected.
  4. G.N. Ray, ed., *The Letters and Private Papers of William Makepeace Thackeray*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1946), iii : 403.

with him to the Crimea. From mid-December the 'thunderer' strongly criticised army disorganisation: one leading article, for example, asserted that

the noblest army England ever sent from these shores has been sacrificed to the grossest mismanagement. Incompetency, lethargy, aristocratic hauteur, official indifference, favour, routine, perverseness, and stupidity reign, revel, and riot in the camp before Sebastopol, in the harbour of Balaklava, in the hospitals of Scutari, and how much nearer home we do not venture to say. 1.

Layard's first parliamentary opportunity to raise the issue of Crimean maladministration occurred on 12 December 1854. In an important and effective address to the commons he abused the government for its indecisiveness and lack of preparation, stating that he knew

nothing more reprehensible -- I had almost said more wicked -- than this abandonment of a gallant army on an enemy's shore, without a reserve, and without supplies; whilst those who had thus sacrificed them appear to have given scarcely one thought more to their fate.

He called for a reform in the administrative system which placed old and incapable men in command of troops and departments, and asserted that the public service should "be administered as any private undertaking would be if it had the slightest chance of success."<sup>2</sup> The speech was a notable achievement, but Layard's political position was unfortunately damaged in consequence of his personal abuse of the incompetent Admiral Dundas. According to Layard, Delane had returned to London "if possible to bring about Dundas' recall."<sup>3</sup> Without Layard's consent,

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1. *Times*, 23 Dec. 1854.

2. 3 H 136, 168, 193: 12 Dec. 1854.

3. LP. BL Add Ms 58172, 9: L's Crimean journal entry of 18 Sept. 1854.

Delane published one of his private letters, anonymously, in the *Times*, and Dundas's commons apologists naturally smelt blood. On 15 December Layard replied to the challenge of Henry Drummond; he expressed his regret for the letter's publication, but reiterated and offered to substantiate the charges of incompetence which he had levelled at Dundas.<sup>1</sup> Layard was undoubtedly correct in his assessment of Dundas's capacities, but his uncompromising stance was nevertheless impolitic. Dundas's naval and military friends rallied to his support, and the government, though unimpressed with his performance, felt obligated to defend their senior admiral. It was perhaps inevitable that Layard, seeking to expose a military system which tolerated and promoted incompetence, should cite specific individuals in proof of his contentions. Yet he unnecessarily and intemperately aggravated his opponents on this occasion, and even his friend A.J. Otway, who spoke in his defence,<sup>2</sup> later admitted that he should have limited himself to an expression of regret.<sup>3</sup> Adverse publicity persisted for months, much to Layard's political detriment.

In January 1855 Goderich, who was vacationing in southern France, proposed a concerted action with Layard on administrative reform. He had earlier suggested to Hughes that aristocratic promotion in the army be curtailed, and that the class/professional character of the force might be mitigated in favour of a more national army.<sup>4</sup> Now Goderich proposed to Layard that a debate be raised on "the present system of Promotion in the Army & the exclusion of the Private Soldier from all *real* chance of promotion." His priorities regarding

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1. 3 H 136, 407-8: 15 Dec. 1854.

2. 3 H 136, 413-4: 15 Dec. 1854.

3. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, ii : 250.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 148: G to H, Turancon, 3 Dec. 1854.

administrative reform thus coincided with those of Layard, whose implicit leadership he also recognised:

... I want, before I take a single step in it, to know whether you or any other person, as far as you know, fitter than myself, are thinking of taking the question in hand. If so I would gladly abandon my idea & take any secondary part in the discussion which might be thought best...

Having expressed his preference for a general debate rather than a definitive motion, Goderich asserted that he "should however be very willing if I brought forward the matter, to take any course in this respect, which you & others interested in the subject might think best on consultation." He concluded with a request that they meet for such consultation prior to the parliamentary session.<sup>1</sup> On the following day Goderich advised Hughes that he was "thinking of having a go at the Promotion System in the House as soon as I get back, whereby I shall probably obtain much love from the aristocracy."<sup>2</sup>

Before Goderich's suggestions could be implemented, however, the Aberdeen government was confronted with Roebuck's motion for a select committee to inquire into the conduct of the war and the condition of the army before Sebastopol. Confronted with the commons' anticipated refusal of confidence, Russell resigned from the ministry. In the debate on Roebuck's motion Layard condemned the "evil system" which obtained in both diplomatic and military appointments, but he endorsed Roebuck not because he anticipated beneficial results from the committee but merely because it was a vote of confidence;<sup>3</sup> he was roundly condemned for his stance by Gladstone. With the defeat

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38983, 11: G to L, 14 Jan. 1855.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 155: G to H, Turancon, 15 Jan. 1855.

3. 3 H 136, 1026-38: 26 Jan. 1855.

of Aberdeen's coalition Layard and Goderich entered a political crisis from which they did not emerge unscathed.<sup>1</sup> Though disillusioned with their failure to attain office, they were also more than ever determined to advance the cause of army and civil service reform. Thus Layard consented to join the Sebastopol committee which Roebuck chaired, and repeatedly attacked the new Palmerston administration in the commons. The most significant of these assaults occurred on 19 February, and illustrated Layard's incipient appeal to pressure out of doors as well as an emphasis on 'the right man in the right place'. Layard and Goderich both understood the interrelationship between the two principal components of efficiency, methods of organisation and choice of personnel. They desired both hero-leaders and their 'democratic' selection, with the emphasis varying according to circumstance and audience. In his 19 February commons speech, Layard stressed that "the country wants a man," and that "the men to command armies should be men of iron will and unflinching determination -- men ready to sacrifice relations, private friends -- even all they hold dear in the world, if it be necessary to do so, in order to perform what is an imperative duty." He proceeded to threaten his fellow parliamentarians with external agitation, in populist rhetoric which was clearly directed as much to outside reformers as to the commons itself:

It is the nature of the English people to be patient and long suffering; but the time comes when public feeling, with the force of a torrent, causes itself to be heard. It was so in the case of Roman Catholic Emancipation, of the Reform Bill, and of free trade. You may say now that the people are quiet, that the lake is still, but you have no security that it will continue so. A storm will arise, and, unless you do something

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1. See chapter 3 above.

to prevent it, not only you, but others besides you, will be shipwrecked. 1.

Palmerston in response accused Layard of making "vulgar declamation against the aristocracy of this country."<sup>2</sup>

There can be little doubt that from this time Layard and Goderich were committed to opposing the Palmerston government on the issue of administrative reform. Both were prepared to elicit popular support on their behalf, though Layard was somewhat less hesitant in doing so. In fact a tone of anti-aristocratic fanaticism was evident in Layard's demagogic pronouncement that there was

... a spirit rising in the country which will be more formidable than our good easy aristocratic families, who look upon ministries as their perquisites, can now comprehend. I only hope it may be changed in time. Circumstances may lead me into leading the great movement which is now in progress. I have no wish to do so but if I am forced into it nothing will turn me aside from my end & an immense struggle will be the result -- in which I do not think I shall fail. Before many months are over things will change. 3.

Having considered with Goderich his scheme for army promotion, Layard condemned the Palmerston government on 19 February for not having declared its position on this issue.<sup>4</sup> Speaking to his Aylesbury constituents at the end of the month, Layard drew attention to the impending motion of Goderich ("a noble friend of mine... well known in this country as a friend of progress"), which would effect army promotion by merit rather than by purchase or family connection. Layard described this proposition as a test of the new government's political opinions, and suggested that Aylesbury "should demand the

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1. 3 H 136, 1522, 1527, 1530: 19 Feb. 1855.

2. 3 H 136, 1534: 19 Feb. 1855.

3. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 34: L to Lady Huntly, London, 27 Feb. 1855 (copy).

4. 3 H 136, 1524: 19 Feb. 1855.

recognition of this great principle, throughout all the departments of the public service, that every man, whatever his station, shall have at least the chance of rising to the highest position in the department in which he is placed."<sup>1</sup> Army and civil service reform were thus equated, and Aylesbury tendered it support: on the following day Layard, along with Roebuck, presented a petition to the house favouring Goderich's motion. The result of this initiative could not confidently be anticipated by either government or reformers, and Herbert assured Gladstone that it would "require very delicate handling."<sup>2</sup> Whether Layard's support from out of doors was an aid or a hindrance remains dubious, however.

In support of his proposal that promotion by merit be encouraged in the army, Goderich spoke in a characteristically moderate fashion, but nevertheless emphasised that democratisation of both army and civil service was a popular demand. Purchase, he contended, was both unjust and inefficient, and engendered a class gulf between officers and soldiers. 'Democratic' appointments and promotions would in Goderich's view encourage greater efficiency, and would also mollify public misgivings:

The people of this country out of doors, and the wisest amongst them, were inclined to believe that there was but one principle by the application of which we could hope to obtain a safe deliverance from the difficulties and dangers in which we were now placed [in the Crimea], and the deep and earnest, but silent demand of the people, and, as it seemed to him, their just requirement, was, that that House and the Government, whatever that Government might be, should act upon one principle only in their selection of persons to fill every office, civil or military, namely, that of placing in every post

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1. *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 3 March 1855: L's address to his Aylesbury constituents, 28 Feb. 1855; also *Times*, 1 March 1855.
  2. Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert*, i : 264: Herbert to Gladstone, n.d. [1 March 1855]. Neither Herbert nor Gladstone were members of the government at this time, but both remained defensive concerning their previous responsibilities.

of trust or command such men only as were qualified to fill it, and that in appointing any man to office, they should look simply to his capacity for discharging efficiently the duties of that office, considering nothing of either his position in society, his family, his connection with one party or another, or any personal influence whatever.

Goderich concluded what he intended to be a reasonable address by expressing the hope that Palmerston "would not accuse him, as he did his hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) the other night, of having indulged in vulgar declamation against the aristocracy, for he (Lord Goderich) had done no such thing."<sup>1</sup>.

The reaction to Goderich's speech was indicative of the growing tension between the respective supporters of popular and aristocratic government. In the commons Goderich's views were endorsed by Cobden, Bright and Roebuck, as well as by his friends John Ball<sup>2</sup> and A.J. Otway. Layard, though declining to enter the debate, acted as joint teller with Goderich for the 'ayes'. Palmerston, and more significantly Gladstone, were unwilling to countenance the democratic implications of Goderich's stance, and both spoke against his motion, which was ultimately rejected. Forster attributed its defeat directly to the unrepresentative and undemocratic nature of the existing house of commons, later stating in Leeds that

his friend Lord Goderich -- with whom he trusted all the people of the West Riding would soon be better acquainted -- (applause) -- brought forward a measure for putting an end to the system which made the qualification for promotion in the army the weight of a man's purse; and how is it that his Lordship met with slights

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1. 3 H 136, 2091-2107: 1 March 1855.

2. Ball had in fact been consulted a year earlier by both Gladstone and Trevelyan on the issue of administrative reform, an interest which helps explain his temporary affinity with Layard and Goderich in the mid-fifties (see Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44581, 11, 13: Ball to Gladstone, 10 Feb. [1854], with accompanying memorandum; Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44333, 230: Ball to Gladstone, 24 Feb. [1854] (copy, with Trevelyan's comments)).

and obstacles, and indifference? Because there was not a House of Commons to express the will of the country in its support. (Applause.) Until they had a Parliament which was more exactly an expression of the will of the people, they would not get that administrative reform which they all desired. (Loud cheers.) 1.

The *Times*'s response to Goderich's motion is particularly instructive, for that journal more than any other public organ expressed in 1855 the frustration of the educated middle classes with aristocratic ineptitude in government. Yet the *Times* charged that Goderich's motion was impractical and carried "too levelling a look." Commissioned and non-commissioned officers, in the view of the leader-writer, could never mix socially ("Can oil and vinegar be made to coalesce?"), and Goderich should have examined the position of the regimental rather than the non-commissioned officer. It was evident, however, that Goderich's democratic and co-operative antecedents were the principal motive for the *Times*'s consternation:

As a philanthropist, and something more, that is, as a man who has freely and generously laid himself open to the charges of Socialism, Trades-Unionism, and we know not what, he is about the very last man to enter with a clean bill of health into the jealous domain of the Horse Guards. The suspicion against him will of course grow the stronger when it is found that he has selected just that one salient point of the subject that has recommended itself to his democratic tendencies.

The leading article proclaimed that

the whole cause of military reform, is injured, when an ultra-philanthropic and speculative nobleman, who has had equivocal relations with "Christian Socialists,"

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1. *Leeds Mercury*, 12 March 1857: F's address to the advanced liberals of Leeds, 11 March 1857.

"co-operative tailors," and various other projects aiming at the elevation of the unit and the dethronement of the capitalist, stands up in the House of Commons to urge the lavish infusion of corporals and sergeants into the regimental mess. If we give up Lord Goderich, it is simply because it is impossible to keep company with him, and it can come to no good. 1.

Thus Goderich and Layard, in initiating their agitation for administrative reform, alienated the middle class commercial sympathies on which they might have expected to rely. Their actions over the following months indicate an awareness of this tactical error: Goderich explained to Hughes, who was somewhat critical of his conciliatory tone in the commons, that had he been "less Democratic & less pressing, & merely moved for a Committee, I should have had a large majority & much praise in the morning papers." His motion, he admitted, was "clearly a Parliamentary mistake."<sup>2</sup> In the future they were to make a determined effort to attract middle class support; inevitably, their previous appeal to the working classes was downgraded and camouflaged.

Throughout the spring of 1855 Layard served on the Sebastopol committee which Roebuck had instigated. On 8 March he testified himself, offering evidence concerning transport inefficiencies, unsanitary conditions, poor food, tents and medical facilities, attributing these defects largely to ineffective leadership.<sup>3</sup> By April Layard expected two principal results from a committee to which he had initially demurred: a radical change in the system of appointments and employments in the state, and the realisation of his notion "that the right

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1. *Times*, 2 March 1855.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 159: G to H, Turancon, 8 March 1855.

3. PP 1854-55 (156.) ix. Part 1. 122-40.

man shall be put in the right place."<sup>1</sup>. A series of interim reports were issued by the select committee over a three-month period,<sup>2</sup> culminating in the fifth and final report on 18 June, which condemned the "dilatory and insufficient arrangements for the supply of this army with necessaries indispensable to its healthy and effective condition;" "what was planned and undertaken without sufficient information, was conducted without sufficient care or forethought. This conduct on the part of the Administration was the first and chief cause of the calamities which befel our army."<sup>3</sup>. Despite its strident language, the select committee's deliberations and recommendations produced, surprisingly, a negligible effect on parliamentary or public opinion; of greater consequence were organised manifestations of a popular demand for administrative reform.

In early April Layard took his case to the citizens of Aberdeen, having recently been elected lord rector of Marischal college. Speaking at the launching of the *Schomberg*, he urged promotion by talent and merit rather than by influence, solicited popular support for his proposal to raise the issue in parliament, and argued that, in the Crimea, "if matters had been left to private enterprise, we would have been spared some of the disgraceful occurrences which have lately taken place."<sup>4</sup>. At his installation as lord rector, Layard contended that competitive examinations for the public service would

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1. *Aberdeen Herald*, 7 April 1855: L's address to the students of Marischal college, 5 April 1855. Layard was their newly-elected lord rector.
  2. PP 1854-55 (86.) ix. Part 1. i-vi: first report from the select committee appointed to inquire into the condition of the army before Sebastopol (1 March 1855); PP 1854-55 (156.) ix. Part 1. .01-.04, 1-729: second report (30 March 1855); PP 1854-55 (218.) ix. Part 2. i-iv, 1-516: third report (3 May 1855); PP 1854-55 (247.) ix. Part 3. i-iv, 1-360: fourth report (17 May 1855).
  3. PP 1854-55 (318.) ix. Part 3. 367, 387: fifth report from the select committee on the army before Sebastopol (18 June 1855).
  4. *Aberdeen Herald*, 7 April 1855: L's speech at the *Schomberg* launch, 5 April 1855.

require remediation of the "defective condition" of the existing system of national education, and urged the "true cultivation of the intellect" rather than of memory and rote.<sup>1</sup> A fortnight later, however, Layard committed a major tactical blunder. Invited to speak to prominent commercial men, shipowners and industrialists in Liverpool, Layard faulted Palmerston and the whigs for maladministration of the war, abused the commander-in-chief, Lord Hardinge, as "utterly unable to discharge the duties imposed upon him," and proceeded to deprecate specific military appointments. (He also acknowledged that "you cannot carry on Government and war upon the principles of commerce, but still you can adapt such principles to both."<sup>2</sup>) It was probably necessary for Layard to single out individuals for criticism, but his tone was somewhat offensive throughout, and his facts were in some instances incorrect. Much of his speech was greeted with enthusiastic applause and laughter, and Nathaniel Hawthorne, American novelist and consul to Liverpool, thought that Layard reflected English public opinion and that his address "was exceedingly to the purpose, full of common sense, and with not one word of clap-trap."<sup>3</sup> Layard himself stated that he had "never yet been to a public meeting in which as a *political* man I have been so well received," and believed it inaugurated a popular movement; he concluded that "the safest course is to hurry it on & to endeavor to direct it rather than to allow it to take that course which might eventually lead to far greater mischief."<sup>4</sup>

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1. *Aberdeen Herald*, 7 April 1855: L's speech at his installation as Marischal college lord rector, 5 April 1855.
  2. *Times*, 23 April 1855: L's Liverpool speech, 21 April 1855.
  3. Randall Stewart, ed., *The English Notebooks by Nathaniel Hawthorne*, (New York, 1941), 108: Hawthorne's notebook entry of 24 April 1855.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 35: L to Lady Huntly, Liverpool, 22 April 1855 (copy).

The military and aristocratic interests which he had offended, however, were not easily placated. A series of objectionable letters were published in the *Times*,<sup>1.</sup> and on 27 April he was bitterly roasted by the military and naval members of the house of commons. Layard was forced to admit factual errors but reiterated his basic attack on jobbery, and threatened the commons with a public opinion which was "in no mood that admits of its feelings on this subject being trifled with."<sup>2.</sup> Parliamentarians decried this appeal to popular pressure, as well as the threat of their perquisites. The house was brutal; Palmerston once again accused Layard of a class attack on the aristocracy; the basic justice of his position was conveniently obfuscated; with respect to political influence, the debate was costly to Layard's commons reputation. The result of this debate did not, however, alienate Layard's committed advocates either in parliament or without. Goderich, for example, was not duped by Palmerston into the belief that Layard represented an anti-aristocratic class influence, and later made light of the idea of his confrere "as a sort of ravening wolf of insatiable ambition, which the British Aristocracy are wont to entertain."<sup>3.</sup>

In the circumstances, an appeal to his supporters out of doors appeared to Layard a necessary tactic for the exertion of pressure. There are indications too that Layard was intoxicated, almost delirious, over his future prospects. On 1 May he wrote that he anticipated "a hard fight before me & [I] shall have to suffer some hard knocks, but I have no doubt of the result & whether I perish or not in the attempt

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1. *Times*, 25, 26 April 1855.

2. 3 H 137, 1885-90; 27 April 1855.

3. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 190; G to L, Brighton, 30 Nov. 1855.

it signifies little."<sup>1</sup> Two days later he asserted that the possibility of losing both in character and in position "has almost invariably been the case hitherto with those who have embarked in enterprises of this nature, defying the upper classes & the House of Commons, & relying entirely upon the people for support;" Layard expressed his willingness "to make the required sacrifices."<sup>2</sup> Such statements, made privately, were of little political consequence. However in a reply to an abusive attack from his military critics in the house, Layard damaged his credibility in that assembly in a public diatribe in which he warned members:

if you think that by crushing me -- crush me you may, for I am a poor man, and have no weight in this House -- you may succeed in that, but you will not crush the cause with which I am identified. You are here and shout me down because I attack a system, by which you, hon. and gallant Members, rise in the ranks of the army and sit in the House of Commons without encountering the dangers and fighting the battles of your country [Oh, oh!]. You may hunt me down, but the country will not stand it [Oh, oh!]. 3.

Layard had undoubtedly attracted public support, both from the press and from a broad cross section of middle and working class opinion.<sup>4</sup> Yet the house of commons remained the focal point for his

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 36: L to Lady Huntly, London, 1 May 1855 (copy).
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 36: L to Lady Huntly, London, 3 May 1855 (copy).
  3. 3 H 138, 775-6: 18 May 1855.
  4. See *Daily News*, 28 April 1855 for an example of press endorsement. LP. BL Add Ms 38983-4 contain numerous letters of support for Layard, from both the middle and working classes, and characterised by a John Bullish patriotism and an anti-aristocratic tone; an address from Newcastle (LP. BL Add Ms 39053, 9-16) dated 5 May 1855 was signed by labourers, shopkeepers, manufacturers and professional men; an address from the artisans of Wolverhampton (LP. BL Add Ms 58193) was predominantly endorsed by the working class. According to Layard, he received the latter, "from the working men of Wolverhampton," after a commons debate on administrative reform in which he "was hunted down like a wild beast because I dared to tell the truth," and he attested that he had "nothing in my possession... which I value more than that small token of sympathy which was sent at such an hour. (Cheers.)" (*York Herald*, 23 July 1859: L's address to the working men of York, 21 July 1859).

agitation, for it was there he hoped radical changes might be advanced. By alienating not only his natural opponents but also more moderate members, he unnecessarily injured his cause.

Layard initially proposed that a committee of the house of commons be appointed, the sanction of which would be necessary for all important appointments, but in consultation with Goderich Layard changed his tack. Goderich objected to Layard's plan as impractical, especially when the house was not in session, as likely, with a government majority on the committee, to be ineffective, and as tending to lessen ministerial responsibility: "What we want is to get good, honest, and wise men *at the head*, that once done, the rest will be comparatively easy; without it no system of checks will really avail us." Goderich advised that "if you throw it out now as the measure which is to bring about administrative reform, you run a great risk of diverting the attention of the People from their loud demand for *fit men* to a piece of political *machinery*, which will never do in their stead."<sup>1</sup> Having apparently reached agreement with Goderich on an acceptable motion, Layard asked Palmerston on 7 May whether the government could specify a suitable day for its debate. Palmerston's response was indicative of the bitterness and hostility to which Layard was subjected in the commons: "I really, Sir, cannot undertake to find the hon. Gentleman a day; he must find one for himself."<sup>2</sup> Procedural wrangles were to prevent a debate on administrative reform for over a month.

During this period Bruce, whose scarlet fever had limited his attendance in the house, twice raised the issue of administrative mismanagement. On one occasion he pressed Horsman, an old 'colleague'

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38983, 343: G to L, London, 3 May 1855.

2. 3 H 138, 184: 7 May 1855.

now chief secretary for Ireland, to remedy the existing situation wherein "a large proportion of the Irish Judges were incapacitated by age or other infirmities for the full and regular discharge of their duties."<sup>1</sup> It was eventually agreed that absenteeism through infirmity in the Irish judiciary should be investigated. A week later he requested that future cadetships be accorded, not by nomination, but by recognising "young men of ability, unaided by interest."<sup>2</sup> Bruce was never, however, an enthusiastic administrative reformer in the sense that Layard and Goderich were. Nor was Forster, despite his sympathies, able to offer much assistance. Layard contacted him in May, but neither Forster nor the West Riding liberals he approached believed administrative reform agitation would be effective: Forster wrote that there was

... a vagueness about the whole affair which perplexes us. We are discontented dissatisfied & suspicious enough, but we do not know who to be at.

We would cry out loud enough for the 'right man in the right place', if we knew where were the right men, or indeed if we knew exactly who were the wrong men...

Forster realised that Layard would "think us very flat, but Lord Goderich comes down here the end of next week, & possibly he may help us to brighten up."<sup>3</sup> Such was not to be the case, however, for Yorkshire public opinion was never conducive to administrative reform agitation.

On 5 May the administrative reform association conducted a successful inaugural meeting, at which a manifesto for civil service

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1. 3 H 138, 766: 18 May 1856.

2. 3 H 138, 1190: 25 May 1856.

3. LP. BL Add Ms 38983, 399: F to L, Otley, 18 May 1855.

management was approved.<sup>1</sup> The association and its sympathisers did not constitute a monolithic interest group, though the leadership was primarily composed of successful businessmen, technical experts and professional men. Their philosophy was directed both to the need for practical knowledge and commonsense business techniques in government, and to an idealist myth of the ancient constitution emphasising personal, political independence and absence of nepotism. For the most part the association was consciously middle class in values and ambition; typical in this respect was the perceived necessity of promoting the moral regeneration of the electorate. Anderson has argued that the Crimean disasters "allowed a group of ambitious minor politicians to give the movement a stridency not envisaged by most of the professional and business men who initiated it."<sup>2</sup> Foremost amongst these, in the association's early days, was Layard.

Neither Layard nor Goderich was in fact a member of the administrative reform association,<sup>3</sup> but Layard utilised and encouraged the public pressure which the association aroused. In doing so he necessarily came to emphasise the commercial ideology of Samuel Morley

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1. *Daily News*, 7 May 1855; *Times*, 7 May 1855.

2. Olive Anderson, 'The Janus Face of Mid-nineteenth-century English Radicalism: The Administrative Reform Association of 1855', *Victorian Studies*, 8, 3, March 1965, 240.

3. Despite Layard's close connections, he denied having assumed membership (*Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 26 July 1856, in which Layard confirmed that he "was not a member of the Association, but I thought it was a move in the right direction, and I gave it what assistance I could") though admitted having given "adhesion" to the association (*Times*, 14 June 1855: L's address to the administrative reform association, 13 June 1855).

(the nonconformist hosiery manufacturer who was association chairman) and his followers. He did not, as demonstrated at Liverpool, accept such commercial ideology without qualification, but for a period of three or four months in 1855 Layard habitually employed middle class commercial rhetoric. Goderich too appealed to business instincts, but was somewhat less susceptible than Layard to the exclusivist philosophy of capitalist efficiency: commenting on draft proposals for administrative reform, for example, he criticised Layard's reference to practical commercial men as opposed merely to practical men.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless Goderich did on more than one occasion cite business practice as an example to government. Whilst sympathetic with the administrative reform association's objectives, however, he declined to overtly identify himself with its activities. Goderich was not averse to the employment of public pressure to expedite administrative reform, but unlike Layard he was in the spring of 1855 beginning to doubt that an appeal to a popular pressure group, given the limitations of the existing franchise, provided effective authority in the house of commons on this issue. This minimal divergence in their strategies, however, did not represent any disagreement as to objectives, and throughout the spring of 1855 Goderich and Layard continued to consult and collaborate with one another.

Neither Layard nor Goderich attended the inaugural gathering of the administrative reform association, though a number of other MPs were present. The *Times* gave its influential support to the association for reasons of efficiency and business management.<sup>2</sup> Through his friend Charles Dickens, a sympathetic administrative reformer, Layard was also able to elicit editorial support from *Punch*, the

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 78: G to L, 2 [8?] June 1855.

2. *Times*, 28 April 1855, 8 May 1855.

*Illustrated London News* and the *Weekly Chronicle*;<sup>1.</sup> Dickens himself later wrote an article entitled 'Cheap Patriotism' in *Household Words*.<sup>2.</sup> This growing expression of public dissatisfaction was sufficiently authoritative to elicit government concern, and on 21 May, in an attempt to curtail the agitation, Palmerston issued an order in council on administrative reform. The order in council established a permanent civil service commission of three, empowered to arrange with heads of departments the conditions of entry into their civil service domains. Examinations were to be conducted, but competition was permissive rather than compulsory, and not necessarily open. Power of appointment remained, subject to minimum tested standards, with the political heads of departments. Other recommendations of the Northcote-Trevelyan report, such as the division of labour between intellectual and mechanical tasks and the concept of promotion by merit, were not entertained. The impact of the new regulations was predictable: in most instances candidates continued to be nominated, either singly or in small numbers, and were then tested by the civil service commission primarily to authenticate their suitability. Despite the more uniform and somewhat higher standard of entrants which might be expected, the order in council accomplished no thorough reform, and Layard and Goderich were accordingly dissatisfied.

Goderich publicly expressed his concern on 30 May, when he addressed 2000 of his Huddersfield constituents, and the tone of his speech indicated that, like Layard, he felt considerable frustration. Goderich emphasised the necessity of ministers' accepting their political and moral responsibilities (for condoning incompetence he

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1. See LP. BL Add Ms 38947, 16: Dickens to L, London, 10 April 1855. Layard met Dickens in 1851 (LP. BL Add Ms 38947, 6: Dickens to L, London, 16 Dec. 1851).

2. *Household Words*, 9 June 1855.

viewed as immoral), and stated that the future watchword must be 'the right man in the right place' throughout the public service. He also argued that it was incumbent upon members of parliament to decline seeking patronage for their constituents -- an expression of the famous 'Goderich pledge'. Though he trusted that the order in council would prove useful, he was clearly sceptical. As Layard and other administrative reformers had done, Goderich praised commercial and industrial business techniques, and stated that "those who are engaged in that industry and that commerce know, and to them I appeal, whether, if they had conducted their affairs for an hour as the affairs of the nation have been lately conducted, they would not have soon found themselves in the *Gazette*." In an obvious reference to Layard, he lamented the fact that "if any one, indeed, ventures to attack an individual, there are plenty of gentlemen to howl him down (hear); there are plenty of gentlemen to shield those who are so attacked." Administrative reform, Goderich argued, would only be accomplished by more fundamental political reform and by popular pressure,

by the earnest co-operation, I may say, of every man in the country; and I believe, if what you mean is that the administration of the country shall be carried on, as we often hear the phrase, in the manner in which a private business is carried on, before you arrive at that condition of affairs you will find yourselves called upon to make far deeper and far wider changes than perhaps now are contemplated. (Hear, hear.) I, for one, am prepared to face the consequences of my opinion. 1.

Layard chose to continue his public appeal at the first formal meeting of the administrative reform association, held at the Drury Lane

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1. *Times*, 2 June 1855: G's address to his Huddersfield constituents, 30 May 1855.

theatre on 13 June. In a wideranging attack on misgovernment, he stressed that the army and navy, the diplomatic and civil services, all required reform. The May orders in council, he asserted, were not a final solution, but an argument in favour of further administrative reform which, once achieved, would ensure better legislation. Layard appealed to parliamentary candidates to pledge their support to Goderich's recommendations, "and not darken the doors of Mr. Hayter. (Cheers.)"<sup>1</sup>. Layard also urged that, "however dangerous agitation might be in general, there was a time when agitation was necessary in order to correct a greater evil than agitation itself could produce, and that time had now arrived. (Hear.)" Administrative reform was essential in his view if the soldiers' sufferings in the Crimea were to be alleviated. Though denying he wished to attack the aristocracy, he desired in future that the public's voice penetrate to parliament, supporting "a new party in the House of Commons, not representing a class, but representing the feelings and opinion of the people of the country, and relying for support not upon family connexions, but upon the people. (Cheers.)" Finally, Layard abused Palmerston for having, "in no very English spirit -- seeing him [Layard] down, ... trampled him under his feet." The premier, he argued, had been exposed as a man "jesting upon the sufferings of the people, and making light of their unfortunate position. (Loud cheers.);" Layard "had never seen Lord Palmerston in earnest except when vilifying the people of this country. (Hear, hear.)"<sup>2</sup>.

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1. Hayter, as secretary to the treasury, was effectively patronage secretary.
  2. *Times*, 14 June 1855: L's address to the administrative reform association, 13 June 1855.

The climax, or more accurately, the anti-climax, of the 1855 agitation for administrative reform occurred in the house of commons on 15 and 18 June when Layard, seconded by Goderich, moved

that this House views with deep and increasing concern the state of the Nation, and is of opinion, that the manner in which merit and efficiency have been sacrificed, in public appointments, to party and family influences, and to a blind adherence to routine, has given rise to great misfortunes, and threatens to bring discredit upon the national character, and to involve the Country in grave disasters.

In speaking to his motion, Layard adopted an uncharacteristically moderate tone, though he reiterated his contention that the existing evils in public administration could "only be remedied by some kind of pressure from without." Declaring that the government was a "class monopoly" dependent on party and family influence, Layard nevertheless denied that he was engineering an anti-aristocratic movement: "That accusation is odious to me. The noble Lord [Palmerston] is welcome to say that I am attacking an oligarchy, but I utterly deny that I am making any attack upon the aristocracy." In the army, Layard requested that purchase be abolished; in the diplomatic service, he urged an entrance test and payment of all appointees; in the civil service, he argued that the 21 May order in council was inadequate, and that open competitive examinations should be instituted.<sup>1</sup> Speaking as seconder of Layard's motion, Goderich also condemned army promotion by purchase, a system "fraught with injustice and with manifold evils," and agreed that only open competition, and not the May order in council, would prevent patronage. He explained and defended the morality of the 'Goderich pledge', remarking however that competitive examination would

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1. 3 H 138, 2040-79: 15 June 1855.

render it nugatory. Goderich argued that the aristocratic monopoly of government endangered the aristocracy itself, and urged members "to strive by every means in our power, regardless of personal or party feelings, to show to the world that free institutions and good administration could exist and flourish together."<sup>1</sup>.

The motion was treated as one of confidence by the government, but Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton's amendment<sup>2</sup> was deemed acceptable because less strident. The Conservatives might have seized the opportunity to overthrow the ministry, but the party leadership shied from power and many Tories trusted Palmerston. The government, thinking to stave off defeat, accepted Bulwer Lytton's compromise. Thus both major parties combined in adopting the amendment, and the motion of Layard and Goderich was defeated by the massive margin of 359 votes to 46. It is significant, however, that both supporters and opponents of Layard considered the outcome uncertain until these political manoeuvres were effected: Otway (who spoke in favour of Layard<sup>3</sup>) and Malmesbury are representative of these schools.<sup>4</sup> The government had been

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1. 3 H 138, 2155-63: 18 June 1855.

2. "That this House recommends to the earliest attention of Her Majesty's Ministers the necessity of a careful revision of our various official establishments, with a view to simplify and facilitate the transaction of public business, and, by instituting judicious tests of merit, as well as by removing obstructions to its fair promotion and legitimate rewards, to secure to the service of the State the largest available proportion of the energy and intelligence for which the people of this country are distinguished" (3 H 138, 2114: 15 June 1855).

3. 3 H 138, 2219-20: 18 June 1855.

4. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, ii : 252-3; Earl of Malmesbury, *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, (London, 1855), 364: diary entry of 19 June 1855.

threatened on the issue of administrative reform, and had triumphed. This was partly the result of the procedural delays successfully imposed on Layard, and of the partial concessions afforded by the order in council. The populist rhetoric which Layard, and to a lesser extent Goderich, had employed, probably exacerbated their parliamentary isolation, but it nevertheless remains doubtful that an aristocratic government imbued with Palmerstonian conservatism would have succumbed to pressure for administrative reform under any circumstances.

The Manchester radicals, led by Cobden, gave their expected endorsement to administrative reform. A more significant consequence of the debate, however, was the extraction from Gladstone of a public statement in support of open competition for civil service appointments. On this issue he expressed agreement with Layard "in the abstract proposition," and "heartily wish[ed] him 'God speed' on his way."<sup>1</sup> The typical mental tergiversations which prevented Gladstone's voting in favour of the motion were in the circumstances unimportant. In the immediate aftermath of the debate Layard was somewhat despondent, but in the longer term neither he nor Goderich despaired of the result. Goderich wrote to Bruce that Layard's speech, with its moderate tone, "did him a great deal of good in the House," and that he had "much recovered himself," "in spite of Palmerston's impudence." The debate, he believed, had been useful, and Gladstone's civility towards Layard "well done & pleasant."<sup>2</sup> Goderich also assured Layard "that your speech upon your motion is one on which you may look back with, I may say, unmixed satisfaction."<sup>3</sup>

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1. 3 H 138, 2099, 2114: 15 June 1855.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 23: G to B, 19 June 1855.

3. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 159: G to L, Ripon, 25 Aug. 1855.

Two important conclusions were drawn by Goderich and Layard in consequence of their experience of administrative reform agitation in the spring and early summer of 1855. Firstly, they virtually rejected for the future the overt elicitation of popular pressure. This was partly a result of its apparent inefficacy in parliament, partly a reflection of the public's ebbing enthusiasm. By the summer of 1855 the administration of army supply, transport, sanitary and medical services had markedly improved; a war committee of cabinet had been established to supervise the military effort; of greatest significance to waning reform enthusiasm was the fall of Sebastopol. The *Times* withdrew its support from the administrative reform association, and a meeting convened in early August was poorly attended.<sup>1</sup> Goderich reported to Layard that "the Administrative Reform Association seems to be coming to grief... I am sorry for it, although I confess that, as you know, I never much believed that *that* Association would make much of it."<sup>2</sup> By the autumn both Layard and Goderich deprecated public meetings as positively damaging to their parliamentary influence. Thus Goderich expressed his disagreement with Otway that meetings would be useful: "in the present state of the country I should be against their being got up by us, or our going out of our way to attend them. I think this would only weaken our position next session."<sup>3</sup> In response, Layard indicated his complete concurrence: "One might to a certain extent take advantage of the feeling during the recess, & attend public meetings, as Otway suggests. But it appears to me more dignified & more prudent to wait until Parliament meets. You appear

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1. *Times*, 9 Aug. 1855.. Neither Goderich nor Layard was present.

2. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 159: G to L, Ripon, 25 Aug. 1855.

3. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 183: G to L, Ripon, 19 Oct. 1855.

to agree with me in this."<sup>1</sup> This evident reversion to a more traditional conception of popular and parliamentary roles in the national polity was afterwards confirmed by Layard when he asserted that the people should elect men to parliament "who will not be dependant [sic] on any Administrative Reform Association, but whose reliance will be on the great constituencies of this country (loud cheers)."<sup>2</sup> Thus as chastened reformers they emerged from their trial, Layard publicly admitting his impolitic indiscretions.<sup>3</sup> The second consequence of their failure to overtly rally the commons in support of administrative reform was a decision to concentrate more explicitly on the two issues of competitive examinations and army promotion, rather than to indulge in a broader, and more revolutionary, campaign. The first opportunity to test this approach in fact occurred in July 1855.

3.

On 10 July Goderich seconded the motion of Vincent Scully, member for county Cork, congratulating the government on its May order in council and requesting that the examinations for civil service entry be open and competitive, and extended to the consular and diplomatic services. Goderich argued in debate that the defeat of Layard's administrative reform motion had committed the government to no further reforms, and had therefore effectively left the issue in abeyance, and he "hoped that the present Motion would extract from the Government something more definite than had been obtained from them in the recent

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 83: L to G, Florence, 3 Nov. 1855.
  2. *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 26 July 1856: L's address to his Aylesbury constituents, 23 July 1856.
  3. *Aberdeen Herald*, 22 March 1856: L's address to Marischal college students, 20 March 1856.

discussion upon this subject." The nomination system, Goderich contended, was "injurious to the public service" and calculated to exonerate unfitness; open competition would be neither unstable nor apt to denigrate a candidate's "moral qualities." The principle having been accepted for India, Goderich requested its extension to England herself.<sup>1</sup> The ensuing debate conclusively demonstrated that the government was unwilling to countenance open competition, but the motion was nevertheless supported by an impressive array of members, amongst others Cobden, Fortescue, Milner Gibson, Gladstone, Lowe, Miall, Northcote and Roebuck. Defeated by only fifteen votes in a house of 265, administrative reformers drew encouragement from the result.

By the end of 1855 the activities of the civil service commissioners in examining nominated candidates had demonstrated the absolute unsuitability of many. Goderich attested to Layard that these minor successes were "the fruits of our labours,"<sup>2</sup> and reported that in consequence of such candidates' rejection

... there have been loud & bitter complaints on the part of the plucked & their friends & protectors. Therefore the Examiners went to Palmerston & said that if they were to be shackled in any degree, they must resign. P. backed them, told them to pluck whom they pleased, & the result has been, that Hayter cannot find people to fill the vacancies, & a resort to the competitive system seems almost inevitable. This is excellent, & shows how right those were who said that the system of the late Order in Council could not be final, as it would either become a delusion, or would render any kind of nomination by Hayter impossible. Happily the latter seems likely to be [the] case; & it would appear that Palmerston has behaved well & honestly in the matter. As in these days one must be thankful for small mercies, this is good news... 3.

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1. 3 H 139, 679-82: 10 July 1855.

2. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 183: G to L, Ripon, 16 Oct. 1855.

3. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 190: G to L, Brighton, 30 Nov. 1855.

This assessment of the situation was certainly overly-optimistic, but it was not an indication of complacency on the part of Goderich. Both he and Layard were of opinion, however, that circumstances rendered an attack on the exclusiveness of promotion in the army the most pressing requirement: Goderich stated that promotional opportunities in the army were "as bad as ever,"<sup>1</sup>. Layard that "when Parliament meets we must press again upon the Horse Guards & endeavour to obtain some substantial reform in principle."<sup>2</sup> In the interim both men sought the advice of their cosmopolitan club friend, General William Mansfield.<sup>3</sup>

When parliament reassembled in February 1856 both Goderich and Layard pressed the government, without success, to abolish purchase in the army.<sup>4</sup> Then in March Goderich seconded Sir de Lacy Evans's motion for a select committee to investigate the expediency of abolishing promotion by purchase. Goderich urged the committee's acceptance primarily on the grounds of efficiency, and pointed out that existing practice discouraged army reforms and the extension of military education, and exerted generally "an evil effect upon the lower ranks of the army." No private undertaking, Goderich argued, could possibly operate through promotion by purchase. Instead Goderich proposed that a system of promotion combining seniority and merit be adopted.<sup>5</sup> This appeal to efficiency, as opposed to Goderich's earlier emphasis on class justice, was politically astute; the receptiveness of the commons may be inferred from the fact that Palmerston, despite his

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38984, 183: G to L, Ripon, 16 Oct. 1855.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 83: L to G, Florence, 3 Nov. 1855.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43619, 3: Mansfield to G, Constantinople, 31 Dec. 1855.

4. 3 H 140, 90: 1 Feb. 1856; 3 H 140, 1625: 29 Feb. 1856.

5. 3 H 140, 1795-1807: 4 March 1856.

tolerance of purchase and class exclusiveness in the army, was persuaded to appoint a commission of inquiry into the subject. De Lacy Evans's motion for a select committee was therefore withdrawn.

The purchase commission took evidence from May 1856 until June 1857. Though Goderich told both Bruce and Layard that the principal difficulty of the friends of purchase abolition was to persuade military men to speak out in opposition to the horse guards,<sup>1</sup> the commission's report, in strongly condemning promotion by purchase,<sup>2</sup> entirely justified his position. In the meantime Layard had persevered with pressure for military reform. On the government's negative reaction to the Crimean report of McNeill and Tulloch, which condemned army maladministration and negligence, and which Forster believed provided "a good opportunity if well seized,"<sup>3</sup> Layard scored frequent and valuable political points, though the government remained unmoved.<sup>4</sup> In addition he protested in parliament against promotion inequities in the navy.<sup>5</sup>

Having apparently accomplished something with respect to the army, it was increasingly to civil service reform that their attention was directed during 1856. The tabling of the first report of the civil service commissioners provided ample ammunition for an effective attack. The commissioners themselves clearly favoured open competition for entry to the civil service, and recorded that 250 of 903 nominated candidates had in the previous year been rejected as unsuitable.

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 49: G to B, 22 May 1856; LP. BL Add Ms 38985, 16: G to L, 23 May 1856.

2. PP 1857 [2267. Session 2.] xviii. 1-496: report and minutes of evidence from the commission appointed to inquire into the purchase of commissions in the army.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 39: F to G, Otley, 15 Feb. 1856.

4. 3 H 140, 834: 15 Feb. 1856; 3 H 140, 1051: 21 Feb. 1856; 3 H 140, 1615-25: 29 Feb. 1856; 3 H 141, 195-6: 14 March 1856; 3 H 143, 1426-8: 25 July 1856.

5. 3 H 141, 1533-4: 25 April 1856; 3 H 141, 1927: 2 May 1856.

Such statistics were invaluable in confirming the contentions of administrative reformers. In planning his parliamentary tactics, Goderich consulted both Gladstone and Samuel Morley, of the administrative reform association. Morley wished Goderich to sponsor, on behalf of the association, a bill regulating admission to the civil service, but Goderich preferred merely to encourage the civil service commissioners through a congratulatory address and a resolution favouring open competition.<sup>1</sup> Forster perused and analysed the relevant blue books for Goderich's benefit, noting passages which

... strike me as worth your attention for your speech.

I suppose you will make a main point of the failure of patronage to provide fit candidates, proved by the number which the examiners have had to pluck as shown by the Folio Report of the Civil Service Commissioners. 2.

He believed at the time that "both the army and the civil service would no doubt very soon be open, as the result of the great efforts now being made for that purpose."<sup>3</sup>

Seconded by Stafford Northcote (a political coup in itself), Goderich moved his resolution on 24 April, congratulating the commissioners as planned and expressing the support of the house for open competition. He reiterated in his speech his view that private enterprise would not tolerate the incapacity evident in government employees, and emphasised that only open competition could remedy the evil. Requesting that the house agree in principle, Goderich also

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1. See Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44286, 2: G to Gladstone, Wimbledon, 20 March 1856.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 45: F to G, Otley, 20 April 1856.
  3. *Halifax Courier*, 29 March 1856: F's address at the inauguration of the Halifax working men's college, 26 March 1856.

indicated the advantages of open competition for the promotion of national education. Finally, he appealed to the desirability of securing independence for legislators: the nomination system "tended to reduce the Members to mere delegates and distributors of patronage instead of leaving them at freedom to give their votes as seemed best for the interest of the country."<sup>1</sup> Though the government opposed him (Sir George Lewis, the chancellor of the exchequer, whilst not opposing the principle of open competition insisted that the May 1855 order in council system deserved a proper and undisturbed test), the house was willing to entertain Goderich's objective, and Forster wrote enthusiastically that he was "more pleased than I can say with the success of your motion. I do not see how you could have done it better or obtained a more satisfactory result."<sup>2</sup> Open competition had finally been accepted in principle by the house of commons.

The campaign for its actual introduction was not of course concluded by this admission, and in July Goderich once again raised the issue in the commons. On this occasion Lewis defended the existing system, by which candidates were nominated, then examined, and termed open competition impractical; nevertheless the chancellor of the exchequer, on behalf of the government, made an admission to the house which, despite its qualifications, was of considerable significance:

that experience was in favour of the principle [open competition] recommended by his noble Friend [Goderich], and it would be the study of the Government, by gradual means, by feeling their way as they advanced, by avoiding those difficulties the existence of which experience might point out, to give as much extension as could with safety and propriety be done to the principle advocated

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1. 3 H 141, 1401-8: 24 April 1856.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 51: F to G, Otley, 27 April 1856.

by his noble Friend. He trusted that his explanation would satisfy the House that it was the sincere wish of the Government to carry into effect, and to give as much practical extension as circumstances would permit, to the principle of competitive examination for appointments in the civil service. 1.

Gratified by the apparent concession which he had elicited, Goderich did not persevere with the debate. This was to prove, however, a Pyrrhic victory, for the government's pledge was not fulfilled.

Thus in the following year Goderich perforce resuscitated the question of civil service reform, and did so in close consultation with a sympathetic Gladstone. Seeking Gladstone's advice as to parliamentary strategy, Goderich reminded him of

... the hopes held out last year by the Chr of the Exqr as to the intentions of the Government in respect to admission to the Civil Service. Now the [civil service commissioners'] Report shows that up to the date, at which it was issued, literally nothing had been done to realize those hopes. Indeed it would seem that matters had rather gone back than forward... 2.

Accepting the counsel of Gladstone and of Sir James Graham that a division should not be risked in the newly-elected and ostensibly Palmerstonian commons,<sup>3</sup> Goderich raised a discussion on the civil service on 8 June without proposing a specific motion. He reminded parliament of the adoption of his 24 April 1856 motion, and of Lewis's July 1856 pledge, and reiterated his rationale for supporting open competition: to raise civil service efficiency, to deter political patronage, and to encourage education. Citing the favourable experience

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1. 3 H 143, 528: 9 July 1856.

2. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44286, 7: G to Gladstone, London, 30 May 1857.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43513, 1: Gladstone to G, Oxford, 31 May 1857; Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44286, 9: G to Gladstone, London, 6 June 1857.

of two years' limited competition, Goderich urged that the government "not stand still, and, above all, not go back."<sup>1</sup> The chancellor of the exchequer in response was unco-operative, indicating that the government had no intention of extending competition. Goderich therefore informed Gladstone that he intended moving a resolution,<sup>2</sup> and with the co-operation and support of his Peelite coadjutor<sup>3</sup> proposed to the commons that the principle of open competition "ought to be extended in conformity with the Resolution of the House, agreed to on the 24th day of April, 1856." The same arguments were, with considerable fervour, once again repeated,<sup>4</sup> and Palmerston subsequently acquiesced in the motion, which was therefore passed without a vote.

Despite his assurances, however, the premier had no inclination to proceed with administrative reform, and the commons' expression of support for the principle of open competition was in future virtually ignored. Largely a consequence of the personal complacency of Palmerston, the failure to achieve more extensive reform of the civil service was also attributable to the termination of the Crimean war and the reassertion of public indifference. In this environment the army commission's recommendation that purchase be abolished was also shelved. Forster had recognised the inauspicious situation in 1856, when he commented to Goderich that "there is some care still about administrative reform certainly, but that too is much slackened now the war is

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1. 3 H 145, 1324-30: 8 June 1857.

2. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44286, 10: G to Gladstone, London, 11 June 1857.

3. See Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44286, 12: G to Gladstone, London, 17 June 1857, with draft resolution; RP. BL Add Ms 43513, 5: Gladstone to G, Hawarden, 19 June 1857; Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44286, 15: G to Gladstone, London, 25 June 1857; Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44286, 16: G to Gladstone, London, 8 July [1857].

4. 3 H 146, 1463-72: 14 July 1857.

over."<sup>1</sup> No further political progress was made towards administrative reform until 1860, when at Gladstone's insistence a select committee on civil service appointments was established. Its report demonstrated that since May 1855 91% of civil service positions had been filled by non-competitive nomination, with examinations merely confirming these candidacies. It was thus evident that relatively few abuses had been checked since 1855, though wholly unsuitable candidates had of course been rejected. The select committee agreed that open competition should in future be adopted, but the impact of the prevalent conservative state of opinion and of vested interests was sufficient to impose a compromise on committee members, and their report recommended that, in the interim, restricted competition amongst nominated candidates, each of whom had passed a preliminary examination, be implemented for all appointments throughout the civil service.<sup>2</sup> During the 1860s this compromise was gradually accepted by the various government departments.

The campaigns of the fifties for administrative reform, in which Goderich and Layard were prominent participants, thus resulted in limited success. The principle of open competitive examination for civil service entry had been publicly debated, and had won widespread theoretical approval. The worst abuses of nomination and patronage

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 65: F to G, Otley, 22 Aug. 1856.

2. PP 1860 (440.) ix. 3-15: report from the select committee on civil service appointments. Only for the lowest grades (e.g. letter carriers) would the select committee tolerate uncompetitive examination. The preliminary examination was recommended in order to prevent practices such as existed at the treasury, where Hayter employed two simple young men (the 'treasury idiots') for the express purpose of 'competing' against candidates nominated through patronage.

had also been eliminated. The ultimate objective of administrative reformers nevertheless remained unfulfilled. It was significant that Goderich aligned himself with Gladstone on this issue in the fifties, for it was under the leadership of 'the people's William' that open competition was to be introduced in 1870, when Goderich (then de Grey) was one of his cabinet colleagues.

4.

In the interim, however, both de Grey and Layard effected during the sixties minor reforms in their respective administrative jurisdictions, despite the constraints of Palmerstonian complacency. Both men continued to perceive two aspects to administrative reform: reorganisation of departmental structures, and the appointment of 'the right man in the right place'. For de Grey the latter implied not only competitive entry to the civil service and promotion by merit, but also the acceptance at a political level of ministerial responsibility and efficiency. As both under secretary and secretary of state for war he was adamant that his personal duties would be capably fulfilled, so that in future military operations the repetition of Crimean mismanagement would be averted. Perhaps the best example of his administrative proficiency was the successful embarkation of troop reinforcements to Canada in 1861-2.

The *Trent* incident<sup>1</sup> focussed attention on the inadequacy of military forces in British North America, particularly in Canada. Palmerston acknowledged to de Grey, for example, his fear that "we may find ourselves in a Scrape for having left the Canadas [Canada East

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1. See chapter 9 below.

(Québec) and Canada West (Ontario)] without Troops and without arms & ammunition."<sup>1</sup> Confronted with the threat of hostilities in America, cabinet determined on 4 December 1861 that substantial reinforcements should be despatched to Canada. A small war committee founded to consider the military implications of the crisis, and comprising Palmerston, Somerset,<sup>2</sup> Lewis,<sup>3</sup> Newcastle,<sup>4</sup> Granville<sup>5</sup> and Cambridge,<sup>6</sup> authorised on 9 December the detailed military recommendations which would effect cabinet's decision. There is no evidence that de Grey either participated in or influenced the political decision to send reinforcements, though he was undoubtedly receptive to this action.<sup>7</sup> He bore, however, primary responsibility for the implementation of the government's proposals: the military plans which the war committee approved were drafted principally by de Grey, and he assumed responsibility for subsequent arrangements.

The operation was certainly efficient from a military standpoint. Between 12 December 1861 and 3 January 1862 over 11,000 officers and troops, together with arms, ammunition, clothing and stores, departed from Britain for North America, more than doubling the size of the existing force.<sup>8</sup> Because the St Lawrence river was frozen over during the winter season, virtually all troops destined for Canada

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43512, 90: Palmerston to deG, London, 11 Nov. 1861.
  2. Duke of Somerset, first lord of the admiralty.
  3. Sir George Lewis, who succeeded Herbert as war secretary in mid-1861.
  4. Duke of Newcastle, colonial secretary.
  5. Earl of Granville, lord president of the council.
  6. Duke of Cambridge, commander-in-chief.
  7. RP. BL Add Ms 43551, 1: Cardwell to deG, Brighton, 3 Dec. 1861, in which Cardwell states: "I quite share your feeling that you must prepare for War."
  8. WO 33/11, 1-12: returns relating to the sending of troops and munitions to British North America, 3 Jan. 1862.

were transported by sleigh across New Brunswick from Fredericton to Rivière du Loup, on the south shore of the St Lawrence, where the railway line from Montreal terminated. Between early January and mid-March 1862 almost 7000 men undertook this journey, in detachments of between 50 and 150, each taking approximately one week.<sup>1.</sup> De Grey prepared and closely supervised the execution of this operation. Unabashedly seeking outside expert advice, he frequently consulted Florence Nightingale concerning sanitary and medical facilities, and the clothing, supplies and transport of the troops.<sup>2.</sup> He refused to entrust transportation arrangements to General Doyle, whom he considered incompetent,<sup>3.</sup> and General Rumley was instead given responsibility. Considerable attention was paid to the soldiers' comforts, so that generous allotments of winter clothing and camp equipage were despatched.<sup>4.</sup> De Grey in fact desired that the transportation of troops through New Brunswick to Canada would "turn out a model operation of the kind."<sup>5.</sup> Such was to be the case, despite a ludicrous aspect to the

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1. WO 107/6: memoranda regarding troop strengths and movements through New Brunswick, Jan. - March 1862. The remaining troop reinforcements from Britain remained in the maritimes.
  2. Nightingale Papers. BL Add Ms 45778, 1: deG to Nightingale, London, 8 Dec. 1861; RP. BL Add Ms 43546, 1: Nightingale to deG, London, 9 Dec. 1861; Nightingale Papers. BL Add Ms 45778, 3: deG to Nightingale, London, 9 Dec. 1861; RP. BL Add Ms 43546, 3: Nightingale to deG, London, 16 Dec. 1861; Nightingale Papers. BL Add Ms 45778, 8: deG to Nightingale, London, 17 Dec. 1861; RP. BL Add Ms 43546, 5: Nightingale to deG, London, 17 Dec. 1861; RP. BL Add Ms 43546, 7: Nightingale to deG, London, 10 Jan. 1862.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43551, 3: deG to Cardwell, London, 9 Dec. 1861 (copy).
  4. WO 33/11, 1-12: returns relating to the sending of troops and munitions to British North America, 3 Jan. 1862.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 192: deG to Lord F. Paulet, 8 Feb. 1862.

episode.<sup>1.</sup> Fortunately the army itself was co-operative: Nightingale reported that "the Horse Guards were so terrified at the idea of the national indignation if they lost another army, that they have consented to everything."<sup>2.</sup> Bourne has questioned the wisdom of the route chosen through New Brunswick, arguing that the Temiscouata road was so close to the American border that it could easily have been attacked had war commenced.<sup>3.</sup> It would appear, however, that the decision to employ the Temiscouata rather than the Matapediac route was undertaken by Rumley only when an immediate declaration of war was considered unlikely.<sup>4.</sup> De Grey's thorough attention to detail was impressive: for example, when Paulet reported that some sleighs sent from England were badly designed and therefore unserviceable,<sup>5.</sup> de Grey replied that he was "much obliged to you for telling me about the sleighs sent out with the artillery. I like to know everything so as to be able to profit for the future by the mistakes of the present."<sup>6.</sup> Reports from Montreal on the conclusion of the operation testify to its success. Paulet advised that, "such have been the

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1. The military staff, responsible for preparations in Montreal, travelled to that city by rail, through American territory, from Boston! Stores were also transported to Montreal through Maine! Though Bourne discounts the latter statement (Kenneth Bourne, 'British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862', *English Historical Review*, 76, 301, Oct. 1961, 617n), the testimony of Colonel Mackenzie appears to substantiate its veracity: on 14 January 1862 he wrote that "the Heavy Baggage belonging to Corps proceeding through New Brunswick will be forwarded from Halifax and St. Johns [sic] N.B. by way of Portland and a contract has been entered into with the Montreal Ocean Steam Ship Packet Company to carry this out" (WO 107/6: Mackenzie's journal entry of 14 Jan. [1862]). The deputy quarter master general's account should have been authoritative.
  2. Cook, *Life of Nightingale*, ii : 9-10: Nightingale to Madame Mohl, 13 Dec. 1861.
  3. Bourne, 'British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862', 617.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 185: Paulet to deG, St John, N.B., 15 Jan. 1862. For the Americans, the logistics of mounting an attack across the Maine-New Brunswick border during the winter months were in fact extremely unfavourable.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 187: Paulet to deG, St John, N.B., 20 Jan. 1862.
  6. RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 192: deG to Paulet, 8 Feb. 1862.

arrangements that if you were to post from London to York you would find greater difficulties to encounter."<sup>1</sup> Kenneth Mackenzie, deputy quarter master general, reported that only three men deserted during the transit of the first two regiments through New Brunswick,<sup>2</sup> and stated that "during the whole operations no discomfort or inconvenience has been experienced by the Troops, and the very rare cases of Desertion, Sickness or frost-bite prove, that all concerned have done their duty, and that all arrangements have been satisfactorily carried out."<sup>3</sup>

The contrast with the soldiers' conditions during the first Crimean winter was extraordinary, as Hughes subsequently averred. In an article by implication creditable to de Grey and deprecatory to the extreme Manchester school, Hughes contrasted in *Macmillan's Magazine* the Crimean horrors (when in the winter of 1855 British troops died of disease at the rate of 60% per annum) with the efficient Canadian expedition:

the expedition to Canada in mid-winter has at least proved, that now we have an administration that does not break down and bring us to shame in the face of all Europe. It is to be hoped that we shall never again drop back into the ante-Crimean state of helplessness. It is a mere costly and cruel sham to pretend to keep up an army without an effective commissariat, and hospital and transport staff and machinery. We have no right to send brave men into the field to fight our battles, whom we can neither feed, nor clothe, nor shelter, nor tend in sickness. Ours are not times in which any reduction of the army is possible, or likely to be called for... The most earnest financial reformer, if he has any honest patriotism in him, will never, by paring down a branch of the service which is the foundation of all military efficiency, put his country in peril of losing her soldiers in the field at the rate of 60 per cent.

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 194: Paulet to deG, Montreal, 10 Feb. 1862.
  2. WO 107/6: Mackenzie's journal entry of 31 Jan. [1862].
  3. WO 107/6: 'Report of Colonel Mackenzie, Deputy Quarter Master General, of movement of Troops through New Brunswick and Canada in January & February 1862', Montreal, 7 March 1862, 8-9.

per annum, and so renew the bitter national repentance and wild penitential extravagance which followed in England on the winter of 1854-5. 1.

The improved administrative arrangements to which Hughes referred, and the philosophy with which he justified them, reflected the concern and achievements of de Grey at the war office in the early sixties. Administrative arrangements within the war office boasted a history of inefficiency and chaos. Before the Crimean war the secretary of state for war and the colonies possessed overall responsibility for army affairs, though the commander-in-chief, appointed directly by the crown, exercised effective executive control over the military force itself. The secretary at war, a distinct minister of the crown, supervised army finances and a host of minor matters. The commissariat was a department of the treasury. The master-general of the ordnance was responsible for artillery and engineering matters, including construction of fortifications and barracks. The home secretary possessed partial control over the militia. Finally, the board of general officers arranged for the clothing of the cavalry and infantry. These independent departments were nominally amalgamated in 1854-5, under a separate war secretary who also assumed the duties of secretary at war. In practice, however, interdepartmental jealousy and independence persisted, and there was little co-ordination amongst the various branches of the war office. In addition, the effective dual control of the commander-in-chief and secretary for war perpetuated not only confusion and inefficiency but also antagonism between the

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1. Thomas Hughes, 'The Last Voice from the Crimea', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 9, Dec. 1863, 162.

military and civil departments.<sup>1.</sup>

The situation which subsisted when de Grey entered the war office in 1859, therefore, was wholly unsatisfactory: administrative chaos reigned within the war office itself; the dual control of war secretary and commander-in-chief persisted; desirable reforms such as the abolition of purchase had not been accomplished. Neither as under secretary nor as secretary of state for war did de Grey believe it was politically feasible to tamper with the status of the commander-in-chief, though he undoubtedly desired the amalgamation of the war office and horse guards.<sup>2.</sup> Nor was de Grey able to abolish purchase. When the government moved in 1860 to exclude the rank of lieutenant-colonel from the category of commissions to be sold or purchased, de Grey expressed obvious displeasure in parliament that further reform was not contemplated.<sup>3.</sup> Yet political opposition and vested interests also prevented de Grey from so proceeding when he became war secretary in 1863. Thus major administrative reforms were not instituted under de Grey, and his tenure of the war office was, in this sense, a disappointing follow-up to his agitation of the fifties. He was, however, able to accomplish substantial, if relatively minor, reforms in the administrative arrangements of the war office itself.

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1. The best accounts of war office administration during and after the Crimean war, and of the reforms of the 1860s, are two memoranda of Captain Douglas Galton, assistant under secretary of the war office during most of the sixties (WO 33/19, 217-84: 'Memorandum on the Organisation of the War Office and Administrative Departments of the Army', December 1867; WO 33/20, 268-92: 'Memorandum on the Organization of the War Office', November 1868). Useful summaries may be found in Wolf, i : 174-83 and in Sir R. Biddulph, *Lord Cardwell at the War Office: A History of his Administration 1868-1874*, (London, 1904), 1-16.
  2. See RP. BL Add Ms 43511, 250: Cambridge to deG, London, 9 April 1868; RP. BL Add Ms 43511, 252: deG to Cambridge, Ripon, 10 April 1868 (copy).
  3. 3 H 157, 1123-8: 23 March 1860.

Before de Grey became under secretary in June 1859, a select committee had been appointed to investigate war office administration. This committee, under the chairmanship of Sir James Graham, reported in July 1860.<sup>1</sup> A departmental committee under de Grey was subsequently appointed, producing a memorandum which substantially reflected the recommendations of the select committee. The memorandum, composed by de Grey, grappled with the consolidation of the unco-ordinated and frequently-conflicting departments and branches of army administration. It recommended that a planned division of labour be effected, with four departmental jurisdictions responsible for (1) war materiel, (2) fortifications and buildings, (3) supplies (including clothes, food, camp equipage, transport and stores), and (4) superintendence of questions relating to promotions, rewards, pensions and discipline, all of which necessitated correspondence with the horse guards. The relationships amongst these differentiated divisions would be co-ordinated by the permanent under secretary of state, a civilian, but the heads of division would be directly responsible to the secretary of state. The parliamentary under secretary was envisaged as a coadjutor of the secretary of state, with no specific departmental responsibilities except supervision of volunteers, yeomanry and militia.<sup>2</sup> Had these proposals been fully implemented, they would have created the framework of a general staff.

De Grey's minute, submitted through Herbert, was approved by cabinet, Herbert apparently "quite 'provoked at the facility' with which they accepted it, when he was 'primed with arguments' against

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1. PP 1860 (441.) vii. 5-23: report from the select committee on military organisation.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43533, 150: memorandum, deG to Herbert, Dec. 1860.

their expected opposition."<sup>1</sup> The prime responsibility for implementing change rested with de Grey, for neither Herbert nor Lewis were sufficiently interested or knowledgeable to provide leadership. Herbert, for example, admitted that "as to organization I am at my wits' end. The real truth is that I do not understand it. I have not the bump of system in me. I believe more in good men than in good systems. De Grey understands it much better."<sup>2</sup> And de Grey apparently believed in 1862 that he could "reorganize the War Office with [the aid of] Captain Galton, because Sir G. Lewis will know nothing about it and never inquires."<sup>3</sup> Despite entrenched resistance from the horse guards and from traditionalists in the war office (led by Sir Benjamin Hawes, the permanent under secretary), de Grey managed before leaving the war secretaryship early in 1866 to accomplish most of the proposals outlined in his 1860 memorandum: a director of ordnance was appointed, responsible for war materiel; an inspector-general of engineers and director of works assumed supervision of fortifications and buildings; the military under secretary of state controlled questions of promotions, rewards, pensions and discipline.<sup>4</sup> Thus three of the four divisions which de Grey had envisaged were effectively established by 1866. The fourth, that concerning clothing, food, camp equipage, transport and stores, was less easily established. In 1865 de Grey proposed to the treasury an interim measure, associating the heads of the commissariat, military store, barrack and purveyors departments in a board, but stopping short of complete amalgamation of the departments. The treasury, however, demurred to this plan.<sup>5</sup>

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43546, 19: Nightingale to deG, London, 16 May 1862.

2. Cook, i : 404: Herbert to Nightingale, 7 June 1861.

3. *ibid.*, ii : 63: Nightingale to her father, 24 May 1862.

4. WO 33/20, 268-92: 'Memorandum on the Organization of the War Office', Nov. 1868.

5. *ibid.*

De Grey also appointed a committee under Lord Strathcairn to investigate army transport; when the Conservatives attained power the government, instead of acting on de Grey's proposal to the treasury, widened the committee's terms of reference to include an inquiry into the administration of the various supply departments. The committee's report recommended that the supply departments be amalgamated under a controller-in-chief.<sup>1</sup> In the lords de Grey pressed the government to act on this recommendation,<sup>2</sup> and the reform was eventually accomplished. Thus all four of de Grey's administrative divisions were established by 1868. These reforms, by consolidating all supportive services under war office control, tended to lessen the influence of the commander-in-chief. De Grey was not as fortunate, however, in his plans for reorganising the upper ranks. In addition to the secretary of state, permanent and parliamentary under secretaries, and four heads of departments which he had envisaged, the permanent post of assistant under secretary remained. Moreover the permanent under secretary was a military man, not a civilian as de Grey had proposed. And the parliamentary under secretary, instead of merely sharing the executive role with the secretary of state, remained responsible for such services as stores and ordnance. De Grey did, however, succeed in formally abolishing the office of secretary at war, the duties of which were officially transferred to the war secretary.<sup>3</sup>

An example of the opposition with which de Grey was forced to contend in his efforts at war office reform may be found in the 1864-5

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1. PP 1867 [3848.] xv. 353-88: report of a committee appointed by the secretary of state for war to enquire into the administration of the transport and supply departments of the army.
  2. 3 H 188, 586-92; 27 June 1867; 3 H 193, 1233-8: 16 July 1868.
  3. 3 H 170, 552: 23 April 1863; PP 1863 (72.) iii.191-4: a bill to abolish the office of secretary at war, and to transfer the duties of that office to one of her majesty's principal secretaries of state.

attempt to rearrange personnel and regulate promotion within the office. The various administrative divisions which de Grey helped create necessitated the redeployment of much of the clerical staff, and de Grey evidently sought to utilise this situation to further the reforms in the war office. One obvious existing defect related to promotions. Despite the unrelated nature of the tasks involved in the various technical departments, promotion positions were open to clerks throughout the office. When promoted they could not in most instances perform their new duties, so that they generally remained in their own branch, continuing their previous work, but at a higher rate of pay. Throughout 1864 a committee of three senior war office officials, appointed by de Grey and with Hartington (the parliamentary under secretary) acting as chairman, gathered evidence from the various department heads.<sup>1</sup> A second committee, also chaired by Hartington and including two members from the treasury as well as two war office officials, was appointed by de Grey in June 1864 to investigate office organisation. Finally, de Grey imported Hughes into the war office to advise, and to codify and co-ordinate old warrants and regulations on such subjects as duties, pay and allowances. The treasury/war office committee submitted progress reports in September and November 1864, and in January and March 1865, all of which were tabled in parliament in April 1865.<sup>2</sup> On the issue of promotions the committee noted that the various war office establishments were distinct in functions and requirements, and recommended that promotions be confined within each branch. Ominously, however, one of the senior war office officials,

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1. WO 33/17A, 497-621: 'Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State to inquire into the Civil Establishments of the Army'. The committee met intermittently from 12 January to 19 November 1864.
  2. PP 1865 (184.) xxxi. 601-30: reports relating to the organisation of the war office.

Sir Edward Lugard, dissented from this proposal. One of Hughes's tasks was to mitigate obstruction to reform from within the office, where clerks fought to preserve their present and future privileges.<sup>1.</sup> To palliate discontent he even suggested that Saturday half-holidays be introduced forthwith.<sup>2.</sup> Hughes also arranged journalistic support in favour of administrative reform in the war office, following the tabling of the treasury/war office committee's report. Announcing his *Spectator* editorial proposals to de Grey, he added that, "if you would like to see the affair before it is published I could send you proofs."<sup>3.</sup> The *Spectator* (in fact Hughes) duly commented on the planned administrative reforms, approving the promotion and other recommendations of the committee and congratulating de Grey for attempting the reforms despite the claims of patronage and opposition of permanent officials.<sup>4.</sup> In the house of commons Forster also came to the aid of de Grey, commenting that the present war office arrangements were irrational, that the committee's recommendations were sensible, and that "the thanks of the [house of commons] Committee [on supply -- army estimates] were due to the noble Lord at the head of the War Department for the exertions he had made to reform it."<sup>5.</sup> Yet despite good intentions, and despite the private and public support of both Hughes and Forster, de Grey ultimately failed to fulfil all his objectives, and many of the office arrangements remained unco-ordinated and illogical. Because of obstruction from within the permanent ranks and from the horse guards, and because de Grey in a Palmerston administration did not possess sufficient political clout, only minor changes were realised. Hughes was philosophical about the

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1. See RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 129, 133, 135, 137: H to deG, London, n.d., London, 18 April 1865, London, 7 Aug. 1865, Luton, 29 Aug. 1865.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 131: H to deG, Brighton, 15 April 1865.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 131: H to deG, Brighton, 15 April 1865.
  4. *Spectator*, 22 April 1865.
  5. 3 H 178, 991-2: 24 April 1865.

result: "I despair of anything really satisfactory being achieved while present opposition in certain quarters lasts, but still there are degrees of chaos."<sup>1</sup>.

De Grey's efforts to achieve administrative reform in the war office during the sixties were, in relation to the agitation and aspirations of the fifties, something of an anti-climax. Substantial war office reform required a strong political lead and a supportive public opinion. These conditions did not obtain until Gladstone's 1868-74 ministry, when Cardwell successfully abolished purchase and ended dual control, thus subordinating the commander-in-chief to the secretary of state. De Grey's limited reforms of the sixties, though failing to satisfy his objectives, had nevertheless prepared the ground for more fundamental change under Cardwell.

Layard encountered similar obstructionism at the foreign office, particularly from the conservative permanent under secretary, Edmund Hammond. An example of such opposition may be found in the attempt to reform the diplomatic service. Diplomatic attachés had been traditionally selected not by the foreign secretary, but by diplomats themselves as personal aides, most being young family members with no intention of pursuing a diplomatic career. The quality of such attachés was, predictably, abysmal. By 1860 the foreign secretary's approval was necessary before attachés, still beneficiaries of patronage, were appointed, and almost half the appointees were paid. Nevertheless diplomatic attachés remained for the most part amateurs, though in highly significant and politically sensitive roles.

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 144: H to deG, London, 7 Nov. 1865.

Both Layard and Goderich had espoused reform of the diplomatic service during the administrative reform debates of the mid-fifties. In 1861 a select committee, chaired by Monckton Milnes and of which Layard was a member, recommended amongst other things that entry to the diplomatic service be regulated by examination, and that the attachéship be regarded as a probationary period not exceeding four years, followed by paid appointment to graded, secretarial positions.<sup>1.</sup> The effect of these recommendations would be to regularise promotion and professionalise the diplomatic corps, and Layard as under secretary was largely responsible for their implementation. This was accomplished despite his subordinate position, and despite the hostility of Hammond and apathy of Russell.

In July 1862 Layard delineated to the commons the government's scheme, which was based on the select committee's report.<sup>2.</sup> Later in the month he defended the requisite supplementary estimate, and in doing so indicated that the reform which the government contemplated, though substantial, was not in his view sufficient. The fact that entrance examinations were to be optional, as the committee had recommended, did not satisfy Layard, who favoured a compulsory and stringent examination in order to obtain "really first-class men." He also objected to the notion that the four year probationary period for attachés should remain unpaid:

His own opinion was, that they should be paid at an earlier period. It was a hard thing that a man should be called upon to serve his country without remuneration; and he did not think the Liberal party were acting wisely in trying to cut down the salaries

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1. PP 1861 (459.) vi.iii: report from the select committee appointed to inquire into the constitution and efficiency of the present diplomatic service of this country.
  2. 3 H 167, 1430-4: 4 July 1862.

of public servants. On the one hand, it was made a complaint that none but the relatives of the aristocracy and rich persons were appointed to the diplomatic service; and on the other, by keeping down the salaries of those who were appointed, they made it impossible for any but comparatively rich persons to enter the service.

Layard desired that, by means of adequate salaries, "the profession should be open to all who by their abilities were able to serve their country."<sup>1</sup> Layard was unable to fully realise his objectives, however, for such radicalism was anathema to Hammond. The latter opposed any professionalisation of the service, and wished to revert to the old system whereby the majority of attachés were personal dependents on their ministers, unpaid, and with no claim on the foreign office for advancement.<sup>2</sup> Layard nevertheless persevered, and by September 1862 the reforms were inaugurated and Monckton Milnes could report that, "with Layard's assistance, I have got a very fair reform of the Diplomatic Service, the regulations of which you will see in the *Gazette*. Lord Russell did not take much interest in it."<sup>3</sup> By 1866 Layard could appropriately aver that "the experiment had fully succeeded, and a highly competent body of men was now attached to the missions abroad."<sup>4</sup>

Similar obstruction from foreign office officialdom surfaced when Layard and Forster attempted in 1864 to rationalise procedures for commercial and trade negotiations abroad. The numerous commercial treaties negotiated during the sixties focussed attention on the administrative arrangements in both the foreign office and the board of trade. Whilst the board of trade had specific officers responsible

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1. 3 H 168, 626-8, 633-4: 21 July 1862.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38951, 110: Hammond to L, Wiesbaden, 26 July 1862.
  3. Reid, *Life of Monckton Milnes*, ii : 84: Milnes to C.J. MacCarthy, 17 Sept. 1862.
  4. 3 H 183, 739: 10 May 1866.

for foreign commerce, the foreign office was divided administratively into geographic sections, and commercial negotiations were included in the responsibilities of each of these. In such circumstances questions of trade were almost inevitably subordinated to political issues. The foreign office actually negotiated the treaties, having sought the advice of the board of trade on technical matters. In practice this procedure resulted in considerable friction between the respective 'empire builders' of the two departments. And commercial interests in Britain, through their chambers of commerce, found this dual jurisdiction perplexing and inefficient. It was on behalf of the chambers of commerce that Forster acted.

Forster first drew the attention of the commons to the "want of proper administrative arrangements at the Foreign Office for the promotion of commercial interests" in 1862.<sup>1</sup> In the following year he repeated that

some arrangement should be made by which the information collected by the Board of Trade in regard to our commercial relations with other nations should be systematically submitted to the Foreign Office. As far as his hon. Friend the Under Secretary [Layard] was personally concerned, he had done all in his power to meet the wishes of the manufacturers; but unfortunately free trade was not one of the traditions of the Foreign Office. 2.

In April 1864 Forster moved that a select committee be appointed to investigate the problem, expressing his preference for an amalgamation of the board of trade with the foreign office.<sup>3</sup> Layard was now placed in an awkward position, for though he agreed with Forster that present

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1. 3 H 165, 277-81: 14 Feb. 1862.
  2. 3 H 169, 422: 17 Feb. 1863.
  3. 3 H 174, 1083-92: 15 April 1864.

arrangements were inefficient he had necessarily to justify the activities of Russell, Hammond and the foreign office. These divided loyalties were reflected in his conciliatory yet defensive response to Forster's motion,<sup>1</sup> which was in fact accepted by the government.

Layard faced the same predicament during the sittings of the select committee, which Forster chaired and on which Layard represented the foreign office. Layard, for example, thought that Forster's request to see the communications between the two offices should, with the exception of matters still in negotiation, be granted;<sup>2</sup> Russell and Hammond, however, demurred.<sup>3</sup> Foreign office officials appearing before the select committee invariably defended the *status quo*. When the committee ultimately recommended that "an officer or officers be appointed in the Foreign Office to conduct its correspondence with the Board of Trade"<sup>4</sup> Hammond, who was averse to any changes and therefore very hostile towards Forster,<sup>5</sup> instructed Layard as follows: "Lord Russell says you are not to compromise his future freedom of decision by agreeing to the resolutions of the Committee, but he leaves it to you to decide how you will shape your disagreement, whether by simple enunciation of it, or by dividing the Committee."<sup>6</sup> Layard, with the tact of a skilled politician, in fact informed Russell that "the report

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1. 3 H 174, 1092-1102: 15 April 1864.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38990, 194: memorandum, L to Russell, 26 April 1864.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38990, 195: memorandum, Russell to L, 26 April 1864; LP. BL Add Ms 38952, 145: Hammond to L, London, 2 April 1864.
  4. PP 1864 (493.) vii. 284: report from the select committee on trade with foreign nations. Other recommendations were that the board of trade be upgraded, and that it be enabled to conduct correspondence through the foreign office with missions abroad.
  5. e.g. LP. BL Add Ms 38952, 168: Hammond to L, London, 10 July 1864; LP. BL Add Ms 38952, 175: Hammond to L, London, 12 July [1864].
  6. LP. BL Add Ms 38952, 173: Hammond to L, London, 11 July 1864.

is much more moderate than I had anticipated and I confess that I do not see the objections in so strong a light as Hammond,"<sup>1</sup> but he was nevertheless forced to oppose the recommendations in committee.<sup>2</sup>

The suggestion of Forster's select committee that a separate commercial department be created in the foreign office was implemented in the autumn of 1864,<sup>3</sup> Layard and Hammond having drafted the regulations.<sup>4</sup> Even so Hammond and other foreign office officials remained unsympathetic, and Layard complained to the permanent under secretary that "if I could have my own way I believe I could make the department very useful."<sup>5</sup> He wished, he explained, to see "the men employed in the new division taking an interest in their work & really striving to make the department a useful and efficient one."<sup>6</sup>

Despite entrenched indifference within the foreign office, however, Layard and Forster had succeeded in establishing the separate commercial division which they desired. This arrangement, though, was discontinued under the Conservative government,<sup>7</sup> and only resuscitated in 1872.<sup>8</sup> Thenceforth a commercial department of the foreign office existed in some form until after the turn of the century.

The minor administrative reforms which de Grey, Layard, Hughes and Forster implemented, either independently or co-operatively, were an indication of their continued concern for departmental efficiency, but

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38990, 287: memorandum, L to Russell, 11 July 1864.
  2. PP 1864 (493.) vii. 292, 295.
  3. FO 366/386: minute, signed by Russell, 29 Oct. 1864; FO 366/675, 539a: circular to missions abroad, 7 Nov. 1864.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38952, 200: Hammond to L, London, 13 Sept. 1864: "the duty of drawing it up is delegated to you and me alone."
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38959, 71: L to Hammond, London, 1 Nov. 1864.
  6. LP. BL Add Ms. 38959, 75: L to Hammond, London, 4 Nov. 1864.
  7. FO 366/386: Stanley to the treasury, London, 24 Sept. 1866 (copy).
  8. FO 366/386: Granville's minute of 13 Feb. 1872 (copy).

did little to modify the real evils of the civil service, including the continuance of patronage. Only with Palmerston and Russell removed, and Gladstone at the helm of the Liberal party, could fundamental reforms be achieved. The accommodation with Palmerstonian complacency had nevertheless blunted their reforming enthusiasm of the fifties. The morality of the 'Goderich pledge', for example, was rather cynically disregarded once they had attained power. Bruce was not above asking favours of both Layard and de Grey for friends or relations.<sup>1.</sup> Nor was Hughes averse to such requests, even on his own behalf.<sup>2.</sup> And Forster, Hughes and Bruce co-operated (unsuccessfully) in 1870 in support of their friend J.M. Ludlow's application as registrar of friendly societies.<sup>3.</sup> Layard himself, of course, accepted appointment as ambassador to Madrid in 1869 without having risen through the ranks of the diplomatic corps, an instance of favouritism which caused consternation in the service and elicited a protest from Clarendon, the foreign secretary.<sup>4.</sup>

The policy of open competition for civil service employment for which Goderich and Layard had agitated during the fifties was finally

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 58159, 137: B to L, Ripon, 31 Dec. 1863; RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 149: B to deG, Aberdare, 3 Jan. 1865; LP. BL Add Ms 39117, 354: B to L, Ripon, 17 Dec. 1865.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 141: H to deG, London, 19 Oct. 1865; RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 146: H to Seton [de Grey's private secretary], n.d. [December 1865?]; RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 177: H to deG, 1 June 1869 (in which Hughes writes: "... I feel that I can tell you things which I would not say to others, & ask advice, & even favours. So as the Government has constantly arbitration cases & other business which is not done by the Law Officers I should be glad, if you think I have a fair claim, to get a turn at some of it... If you can put me in the way of anything of the kind I know you will..."); Parrish Collection, Princeton: H to B, Horsham, 10 Oct. 1869 ("If you happen to have any work going out from your office which an MP can do don't forget me").
  3. Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/20/1;3;5;20: H to Ludlow, [10 Jan. 1870]; F to Ludlow, [London], 12 Jan. 1870; F to Ludlow, [London], 13 Jan. 1870; F to Ludlow, [London], 27 Jan. 1870.
  4. See Agatha Ramm, *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1868-1876*, (London, 1952), i : 70: Granville to Gladstone, London, 29 Oct. 1869.

achieved under the Gladstone ministry in June 1870. The home office under Bruce opted out of this procedure, however. Bruce had never exhibited the same enthusiasm for open competition as had Goderich or Layard, but he had nevertheless been supportive as an independent member.<sup>1</sup> Though not averse to open competition in 1870,<sup>2</sup> he had neither the political will nor, perhaps, authority, to impose the order in council on a reluctant home office. In contrast de Grey and Forster enthusiastically adopted the principle of open competition in the education department,<sup>3</sup> the culmination of almost two decades' commitment to administrative reform.

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1. When, for example, Goderich received a letter from Bartle Frere in 1858 objecting to competition, he had forwarded it to Bruce for his comments; Bruce replied that the objection that 'moral' factors were discounted when selection was conducted by examination was but a specious argument: "If the best intellects are only equal to others in morality, why then you have intellect X morals, & what more can you hope to get from any system of selection or appointment?" (RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 102: B to G, Aberdare, 24 Dec. 1858). Yet Bruce did not participate in the open competition debates which Goderich and Layard initiated, a probable indication that he was never a wholehearted convert to the notion.
  2. Lowe, the prime exponent within cabinet of open competition in 1869-70, told Gladstone in November 1869 that Cardwell, Childers, Goschen and de Grey were supportive, and that Bruce would not object (Maurice Wright, *Treasury Control of the Civil Service 1854-1874*, (Oxford, 1969), 81, quoting Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44301, 106: Lowe to Gladstone, 22 Nov. 1869). Clarendon and Bright were certainly the chief opponents of open competition in cabinet.
  3. See Ed 23/272: Arthur Helps to Geo. A. Hamilton, London, 19 Feb. 1870 (copy), in which Helps, on de Grey's behalf, submits education department proposals to the treasury, and describes de Grey as a "decided advocate" of open competition.

## CHAPTER 9

FOREIGN POLICY 2: THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

When open hostilities between unionists and confederates finally erupted in 1861, British reaction was neither definite nor uniform. Those who cited slavery as the cause of the struggle tended to support the north, despite the union's pledge to protect that institution wherever it existed. Others perceived the confederates as a people striving to achieve independence from the economic domination of the union. Many democrats envisaged a northern victory as a vindication of the principles of universal suffrage. Free traders, however, abhorred the north's substantial tariff barriers. Conservative and aristocratic elements frequently espoused their natural affinity with southern landowners. Workers defiantly unreconciled to capitalism hesitated to endorse the northern cause, whilst new model unionists committed to industrialisation and democracy were sympathetic. Many Britons wished a divisive conclusion in order to consolidate imperial prestige in North America. Few understood Lincoln's caution regarding emancipation, the exigencies inherent in retaining the loyalty of the border states. Opinion, in short, was undoubtedly divided and somewhat tentative, and cannot be unconditionally ascribed to traditional social or political lines. Nevertheless there was a general tendency for the north, the working class and manufacturing interests to support the union, and for southern England, the aristocracy and merchant interests the confederacy.

Layard, de Grey, and to an even greater extent Hughes and Forster,<sup>1</sup>

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1. Bruce demonstrated little interest in the American civil war or in its consequences regarding Anglo-American relations. He did not apparently accept that slavery was the principal issue (Bruce, *Letters*, i : 195-6: B to John Bruce, Aberdare, 10 Nov. 1862), though he endorsed the British policy of non-intervention (*Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 25 Dec. 1863: B's address to his Merthyr constituents, 20 Dec. 1863).

were convinced that the issue of slavery was the paramount cause of the American civil war, and were therefore committed sympathisers of the union effort. From the early fifties, in fact, they had taken considerable interest in American developments, and had consistently decried American tolerance of slavery. In *The Duty of the Age*, Goderich had described the United States as

a Republic which it is much the fashion to hold up to Englishmen as the model of all governments, whose citizens dare to call themselves democrats, dare to talk of freedom, equality, and brotherhood, with the whip of the slave-driver in their hands, and the blood of the negro crying out for vengeance against them. 1.

Later in the decade, at the prompting of Forster,<sup>2</sup> Goderich expressed to parliament his concern over the American slave trade and Britain's efforts to restrict it.<sup>3</sup> Forster himself possessed impressive abolitionist credentials. Through the influence of his uncle, Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, Forster had contributed to the anti-slave trade agitation of the late 1830s.<sup>4</sup> In the early fifties, with the aid of an introductory letter from a sympathetic Lord Palmerston,<sup>5</sup> he personally submitted the quaker anti-slave trade memorial to at least nine European monarchs,<sup>6</sup> in an attempt to persuade them to actively oppose the trade. In an 1853 *Westminster Review* article on American slavery, Forster foreshadowed his sixties stance by arguing that

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1. G. [oderich], *The Duty of the Age*, 7n-8n.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 148: F to G, Bradford, 14 June 1858.

3. 3 H 150, 1853-4: 10 June 1858.

4. See Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 102-27 *passim*.

5. FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 32: Palmerston to Sir Hamilton Seymour, London, 11 March 1851. Palmerston was foreign secretary at this time.

6. See G.B. Henderson, 'The Pacifists of the Fifties', in *Crimean War Diplomacy and Other Historical Essays*, (Glasgow, 1947), 138.

if the South wills to withdraw from the Union, rather than allow the North the exercise of its constitutional rights, and the fulfilment of its constitutional obligations, the North cannot allow it to withdraw in peace; for while it keeps the Constitution itself, it will be its duty, as well as its right, to prevent this withdrawal, until at least it has consulted the slaves as to their wish in the matter. In a word, *such* a dissolution of the Union means first a *civil*, and then a *servile* war; and brave and chivalrous as may be the slave-owners, they will count the cost before they engage in it. 1.

In a subsequent article Forster cited the Jamaican experience as a model for America, attempting (not wholly successfully) to demonstrate that in Jamaica British philanthropy in emancipating the slaves had proved economically feasible.<sup>2</sup> By 1856 Forster was convinced that the union must exorcise the taint of slavery: "The slavery question is no longer a question of philanthropy and feeling but a question of the existence of the commonwealth and the freedom of all its members white as well as black."<sup>3</sup> He lectured accordingly to West Riding audiences in the late fifties,<sup>4</sup> and in 1860 evinced northern sympathies, through hero-worship of John Brown, before a national reading public.<sup>5</sup>

Thus when civil war eventuated in 1861 Hughes, Forster, Layard and de Grey seized early opportunities to attribute to slavery its cause, and to attest to their sympathies with the north. In parliament Forster insisted that "the question had arisen out of the question of slavery," and urged the government not to relinquish its contractual

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1. [W.E. Forster], 'American Slavery, and Emancipation by the Free States', *Westminster Review*, 59, Jan. 1853, 160.
  2. [W.E. Forster], 'British Philanthropy and Jamaica Distress', *Westminster Review*, 59, April 1853, 327-62.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 65: F to G, Otley, 22 Aug. 1856.
  4. e.g. *Bradford Observer*, 27 Nov. 1856: F's address to the Bradford mechanics institute, 25 Nov. 1856; *Leeds Mercury*, 23 Nov. 1858: F's Leeds address to the church institute and the young men's anti-slavery society, 22 Nov. 1858.
  5. W.E. Forster, 'Harper's Ferry and "Old Captain Brown"', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 1, Feb. 1860, 306-17.

obligations for suppression of the slave trade.<sup>1.</sup> In Bradford he lectured on the civil war at the mechanics institute, informing the audience that "he conceived it was a war to solve the problem whether Christian and civilised men, in this age of the world, could, in peace and safety, keep millions of their fellow-beings in slavery, and treat them as beasts." Forster asserted that the confederate states had seceded as a result of the north's insistence that slavery should not be extended into new territories, and from a determination to revive the slave trade. Whilst admitting that the north, by justifying their position solely on unionist principles, had not "taken up the highest ground," he was sympathetic with their difficulties and held that northern opposition to slavery would be augmented as the war proceeded. Forster dismissed out of hand the contention that economic questions were at issue:

the question of free trade or protection was an afterthought, believed in by no-body in America and only started for the purpose of blinding English feeling and only adopted in England by those who disliked the Northern States and loved the Southern States, and wishing to have an excuse for helping them, or feeling it profitable to their own interests to help them.

For these reasons, "he wished success to the North so long as the war lasted, and he wished no success to the South, because he loved freedom and hated slavery."<sup>2.</sup> Taking advantage of Layard's friendship with Delane, Forster asked his friend to induce the *Times*'s editor to report the speech.<sup>3.</sup> Layard successfully accomplished this task, and Forster reached a national audience.<sup>4.</sup> Hughes similarly cited slavery as the

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1. 3 H 161, 815: 22 Feb. 1861.

2. *Bradford Observer*, 3 Oct. 1861: F's lecture on the 'Civil War in America' at the Bradford mechanics institute, 1 Oct. 1861.

3. LP. BL Add Ms 39101, 81: F to L, Burley, 18 Sept. 1861.

4. *Times*, 3 Oct. 1861.

rationale for the confederate secession. In the pages of *Macmillan's Magazine*, he attacked the pro-Southern bias of the *Times* which had "disgusted and angered many of us." Hughes admitted that when the war began the north may have been content to limit slavery to its present boundaries, but contended that total abolition had become its undoubted goal. Finally, Hughes appealed to his readers to reject economic explanations or patriotic jealousy and to support the union struggle:

It is the battle of human freedom which the North are fighting, and which should draw to them the sympathy of every Englishman, and make him cast to the winds all Morrill tariffs and angry talk about Canada, all bad manners, and hard words. If the North is beaten, it will be a misfortune such has not come on the world since Christendom arose. 1.

In a lecture to the working men's college in November 1861, which was subsequently published, Hughes described the role of the slavery issue in the struggle for control of Kansas, and concluded that "the Confederate states have seceded because they found that the North would no longer permit the extension of slavery in the territories of the United States." The free trade question, he contended, was irrelevant: it "was unheard of in America [before the outbreak of the civil war], and was invented by the South for English consumption."<sup>2</sup> The *Saturday Review* virulently abused Hughes's slavery explanation in September 1861, and argued for southern independence;<sup>3</sup> in his rebuttal Hughes disparaged the

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1. Thomas Hughes, 'Opinion on American Affairs', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 4, Sept. 1861, 416.
  2. Hughes, 'The Struggle for Kansas', in Ludlow, *A Sketch of the History of the United States from Independence to Secession*, 379-80. Ludlow, candidly admitting his pro-north sympathies, explained in the preface (viii-ix) that the book was written in order to inform Englishmen of the situation in America.
  3. *Saturday Review*, 14 Sept. 1861.

English press for alienating American sensibilities, and appealed to the public to sympathise with and encourage the north in its fight against slavery.<sup>1</sup> Layard also recognised the causal nature of slavery in the south's secession, and was accordingly sympathetic with the union. In November 1861 he informed his constituents, and possible American listeners, that England appreciated the struggle of her "brethren on the other side of the Atlantic." This sympathy was evident, he declared, "because we know that slavery is at the bottom of the struggle, and has led to it."<sup>2</sup> Nor was Layard jealous of increasing American prestige and influence, for he expressed his admiration for "the youthful vigour, the growing power, and the marvellous vitality of the great republic."<sup>3</sup> During the civil war period, one of Layard's departmental responsibilities as under secretary for foreign affairs was supervision of English efforts to suppress the slave trade. Layard energetically performed this task, anxious to inhibit "these most infamous & disgraceful proceedings."<sup>4</sup> Negotiations with the union were particularly rewarding. Answering Forster in what was likely a pre-arranged question, Layard informed the house in May 1862 that the government had succeeded in negotiating a fresh anti-slave trade treaty with the United States, and that this treaty was "of a highly satisfactory nature, as it confers the right of search on British vessels, and consequently gives good reason to hope that the Slave Trade, which has been carried on to so great an extent during some years under the United States flag, will be suppressed."<sup>5</sup> The bill to

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1. *Spectator*, 21 Sept. 1861. In his autobiography, Mill praised Hughes for his early protests against the existing "perverted state of public opinion" (J.S. Mill, *Autobiography*, (London, 1882), 269-70).
  2. *Times*, 22 Nov. 1861: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 21 Nov. 1861.
  3. [Layard], 'England's Place in Europe', 290.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38990, 1: memorandum, L to Russell, [1863].
  5. 3 H 166, 1360: 8 May 1862.

amend the Anglo-American slave trade treaty duly passed the commons in July 1862,<sup>1</sup> and at the end of the war Layard publicly praised the union's "hearty co-operation" in helping Britain to extinguish the slave trade.<sup>2</sup> De Grey's position, finally, was similarly pro-north. He rarely expressed his sympathies, however, a fact which may be attributed to official strictures as well as to his unaccountability to constituency pressures. His attitude nevertheless was apparent in official circles and to influential Americans. J.L. Motley, for example, described de Grey in September 1861 as "a warm friend of the North,"<sup>3</sup> and Benjamin Moran attested in early 1864 that "his feelings are strongly on our side."<sup>4</sup>

Throughout the contest Hughes, Forster, Layard and de Grey continued to accept that the American civil war had been induced by disagreement over slavery. Hughes, for example, commented in 1863:

... my point has been throughout, & I have never swerved from it, 'this Southern confederacy is setting itself up as the slave power of the world, the one nation which confesses slavery as its corner stone -- *therefore* I am against them wherever & whenever I can get the chance of speaking or acting, & with any allies that like to join me, I care not who or with none. I have never been able to understand *why* people think the South likely to turn round & belie their whole past by either emancipating or treating their slaves better after this war. 5.

In an obituary over thirty years later, the *Saturday Review* still recalled that Hughes's "partisanship for the North amounted almost to a

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38988, 216: memorandum, L to Russell, 29 July 1862.
  2. 3 H 179, 1281-2: 8 June 1865.
  3. Curtis, *Correspondence of Motley*, ii : 34: Motley to his mother, Burley, 5 Sept. 1861. Motley, the historian of the Dutch republic, canvassed union sympathies in England during the civil war.
  4. S.A. Wallace and F.E. Gillespie, eds., *The Journal of Benjamin Moran, 1857-1865*, (Chicago, 1949), ii : 1266: journal entry of 20 Feb. 1864. Moran was secretary to the American legation in London.
  5. Berg Collection, NYPL: H to Sully, London, 7 Feb. 1863.

religion."<sup>1</sup> In similar style, Forster persevered with the slavery explanation. In a Bradford speech he contended that the north, despite its unwillingness, was being forced by circumstances to fight against slavery, and he denied that the confederates were struggling for true 'freedom':

They might fancy so; he believed they did; but for what freedom were they fighting? They were fighting for the freedom to enslave; for the freedom to oppress; for the freedom to tear the wife from the husband, and the mother from the child; for the freedom to make it legal to torture or kill a black father for defending his outraged daughter; for the freedom to make it legal for a white father to sell his own child in the market-place; for the freedom to make it a crime to teach boys and girls to read and write; for the freedom to extend that system which makes labour a curse. 2.

It may be noted that this insistence on the primacy of the slavery issue, and sympathy with the north's allegedly anti-slavery crusade, not only distanced Hughes, Forster, Layard and de Grey from Liberal colleagues such as Palmerston, Russell and Gladstone, but also differentiated them from most of their contemporary romantic idols. Thomas Carlyle, for example, referred contemptuously to Forster as a "Nigger-Emancipator."<sup>3</sup> F.D. Maurice held that the anti-slavery cause was not necessarily connected with the north's success, and accordingly absented himself from a crucial demonstration which Hughes was instrumental in organising.<sup>4</sup> Distrusting northern democracy, it was not until well after Lincoln's emancipation proclamation that Maurice came to identify with unionist aspirations.<sup>5</sup> And Charles Kingsley, in

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1. *Saturday Review*, 28 March 1896.

2. *Times*, 31 Jan. 1863 and *Bradford Observer*, 5 Feb. 1863: F's speech at a Bradford emancipation meeting, 29 Jan. 1863.

3. Froude, *Letters and Memorials of Jane Welsh Carlyle*, i : 332: T. Carlyle's notation of 3 Aug. 1866.

4. See Maurice's letter to the editor of the *Spectator*, 31 Jan. 1863.

5. F. Maurice, *Life of F.D. Maurice*, ii : 439-40.

explaining to Hughes his southern sympathies, argued that the war would prove "a blessing for the whole world by breaking up an insolent and aggressive republic of rogues, and a blessing to the poor niggers, because the South once seceded, will be amenable to the public opinion of England, and also will, from very fear, be forced to treat its niggers better."<sup>1</sup> Political radicals, such as Bright, Cobden and Mill, were on the other hand overwhelmingly pro-north. In this sense the civil war represents a significant factor in the relative emphasis of de Grey, Hughes, Forster and Layard on radical and democratic aspirations at the expense of racist and authoritarian romanticist assumptions. Moreover substantial civil war co-operation with sympathetic democrats and trade unionists further radicalised Hughes and Forster in particular.

Despite their rhetoric, it should not be inferred that in endorsing the unionists' stand Hughes, Forster, Layard and de Grey were blind to northern faults and hypocrisy, or were unduly unrealistic regarding the eventual outcome of the war. Forster emphasised his cognisance of "the faults of the North" and of "the inconsistency in which this war is carried on,"<sup>2</sup> and he freely admitted that the north had not initially resisted secession merely from philanthropy for the slaves.<sup>3</sup> He regretted the restrictive nature of the proclamation of emancipation, and wished Lincoln had based it more on principle than on wartime exigencies.<sup>4</sup> Hughes recognised the "tremendous army of

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1. M.F. Thorp, *Charles Kingsley 1819-1875*, (Princeton, 1937), 150: Kingsley to H, 13 July 1863.

2. *Leeds Mercury*, 22 Sept. 1863: F's address to a Leeds emancipation meeting, 21 Sept. 1863.

3. [W.E. Forster], *Speech of Mr. W.E. Forster, M.P., on the Slaveholders' Rebellion; and Professor Goldwin Smith's Letter on the Morality of the Emancipation Proclamation*, (Manchester, 1863), 4-5.

4. *Bradford Observer*, 5 Feb. 1863: F's address to a Bradford anti-slavery demonstration, 29 Jan. 1863.

jobbers & scoundrels in the north,"<sup>1.</sup> and took note of charges that northerners despised blacks and had freed the slaves merely as an expedient war measure.<sup>2.</sup> What was in their view critical, however, was the conviction that the confederacy was pledged to the perpetuation of slavery and that the union would necessarily promote abolition through force of circumstances.

Whilst endorsing the north's cause, they were not for a considerable time confident that unionists would accept their responsibilities or that victory was attainable. In March 1861 Forster expressed concern lest the Republicans should compromise principle in order to retain the border states, and believed Lincoln would allow the south to secede if peaceable reunion proved impossible. He asserted that the cause of freedom would gain either through reunion on northern terms or through the confederates continuing their independence as, bereft of northern support, they would be "far less powerful for harm."<sup>3.</sup> By October he anticipated that the north might militarily defeat the south, but nevertheless "thought it not improbable that the South might form an independent but subordinate slave republic, with the coastline of Florida taken off. He was not sure, however, that the result might not be the restoration of the union; he did not expect it, but he did not think it impossible."<sup>4.</sup> By mid-1862, with the union armies demonstrating but meagre prowess, Hughes predicted that the civil war

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1. Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/6/57: H to Ludlow, London, 5 Nov. 1864.
  2. Thomas Hughes, *The Cause of Freedom: Which is its Champion in America, the North or the South?*, (London, [1863]), 5.
  3. Curtis, *Correspondence of Motley*, i : 366-7: F to Motley, Burley, 30 March 1861.
  4. *Bradford Observer*, 3 Oct. 1861: F's civil war lecture at the Bradford mechanics institute, 1 Oct. 1861.

... can't last long, & no good can come of it. If they would only just leave things as they are, holding the Mississippi New Orleans Missouri & the portions of Tennessee & Virginia which they now have with a firm hand & throwing free settlers into Texas New Mexico Arkansas &c. But this driving on the war at such places as Richmond Charleston & what *can* come of it but misery & bitterness... 1.

In early 1863 Forster thought the war would end by mid-year.<sup>2.</sup> In June,

he could not help thinking that if Vicksburg were taken [by the northern army], and the other side of the Mississippi cut off from the slave territory, we should see an end of the war. He thought the men of the North would then feel that they had gained their great object -- namely, the prevention of the formation of a powerful Slave Confederation

-- and that the north would permit independence to an enfeebled confederacy to work out its own solution to the slavery question.<sup>3.</sup>

As late as the summer of 1864 neither Hughes nor Layard were confident that restoration of the union was feasible.<sup>4.</sup> Given the uncertain military position of the north these views were perhaps realistic, yet they highlight the remarkable nature of the group's consistent endorsement of unionist aspirations. They were not confident of successful reunion, yet continued to espouse the northern cause. They resolutely insisted that slavery was the principal issue of the war, and tried to impress their conviction on the British public. There were two apparent objectives in this attempted persuasion: to rally anti-slavery sentiment

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1. Macmillan Archive. BL Add Ms 54917, 24: H to A. Macmillan, London, 10 July 1862.
  2. *Bradford Observer*, 5 Feb. 1863: F's address to a Bradford anti-slavery demonstration, 29 Jan. 1863.
  3. 3 H 171, 1816-7: 30 June 1863.
  4. See Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard. bMS Am 1484.1, 204: H to Lowell, 18 Aug. 1864; LP. BL Add Ms 38959, 53: L to Hammond, Venice, 15 Sept. 1864.

on behalf of the union, and to prevent any British interference in the struggle. Whilst these two factors were undoubtedly related, the latter was of prime significance.

2.

On 22 February 1861 Forster made his maiden parliamentary speech, and raised for the first time in the house of commons the question of Britain's response to the American civil war. Asking that relevant correspondence be tabled, Forster referred to the dilemma of the British consul at Charleston and to the difficulties of British shippers consequent on South Carolina's secession.<sup>1</sup> Russell agreed to produce the papers and, of greater significance, publicly indicated approval that the consul had not acknowledged the legitimacy of the new government. Forster therefore considered his question to have been "really useful."<sup>2</sup> Within a month he had accepted responsibility as "the mouth piece for the North in the House as against Gregory for the South."<sup>3</sup>

Forster's query regarding British shipping in fact identified the initial problem confronting Great Britain, as an unrivalled maritime power, in reacting to the American hostilities. Existing international arrangements as to blockades and privateering were founded on the declaration on maritime law which had been included in the treaty of Paris in 1856. The operative clauses of this declaration stipulated that, in a state of belligerency, blockades (normally the weapon of the superior naval power) must be effective in order to be legally

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1. 3 H 161, 814-5: 22 Feb. 1861.

2. Library of the Society of Friends, Temp Ms Box 100/54: F to Jane Forster, [London], n.d. [c. 22 Feb. 1861].

3. FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 49: F to Jane Forster, London, 18 March 1861.

binding, that is, must be maintained by a force sufficient really to prohibit access to the coast of the enemy. This concession by Britain in the Paris discussions was balanced by an accord that privateering (pre-eminently the weapon of the inferior naval power) be abolished. In a state of belligerency, both contenders were afforded the right to stop and search neutral ships for contraband of war, and could not be treated by neutrals as pirates. Unfortunately the United States refused to accede to these rules, and at the commencement of hostilities the south issued letters of marque to privateers, whilst the north declared a paper blockade of the confederate coastline. The British government was immediately confronted with a critical decision, for the 1856 accords referred specifically to the operative rules in a state of belligerency. In order, therefore, that privateers be prevented from using British seamen or ports, and that the government recognise the blockade and inform British merchants they were entitled to no protection if they attempted to evade it, it was necessary that Britain recognise the belligerent rights of the confederacy. Attempting to press the government on this issue Forster asked the home secretary, Sir George Cornwall Lewis, on 9 May whether it was not a criminal offence against the foreign enlistment act for British subjects to assist in equipping or to serve on board confederate privateers and, if so, what action the government contemplated in order to uphold the law. The question proved immensely significant, for it elicited from Lewis the response that a proclamation prohibiting any interference by British subjects would shortly be issued.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, Britain proclaimed neutrality and recognised the belligerent rights of the confederates five days later. Early in June Forster obtained further clarification

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1. 3 H 162, 1763: 9 May 1861.

of the legal situation from Russell, who indicated that privateers would be prohibited from carrying their prizes into British ports,<sup>1.</sup> a regulation which especially disadvantaged confederates unable to reach their own blockaded coast. Forster considered that Russell's answer finished privateering.<sup>2.</sup>

Forster envisaged his attempt to clarify the legal situation through proclaiming neutrality as advantageous to the north. His good intentions were not, however, appreciated by the American government, which considered the proclamation to be precipitate, unprecedented, and of material injury to the United States. The Americans were primarily aggrieved because they believed the recognition of belligerent rights implied Britain's bestowing some political status to the confederacy. Moreover they asserted that the proclamation of neutrality was premature, and in fact caused the ensuing maritime war. These alleged grievances inflamed traditional Yankee anglophobia, and remained a contentious issue for a decade as one of America's 'indirect' claims on the British government. Forster consistently defended his role in the controversy, and his position was sustained by both Hughes and de Grey. Forster insisted that the proclamation of neutrality was essential if southern privateering were to be avoided and if England were to remain uncommitted.<sup>3.</sup> Hughes later admitted the discourtesy involved in issuing the proclamation the day C.F. Adams, the American minister, arrived in England, but emphasised to disgruntled northerners that

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1. 3 H 163, 471-2: 3 June 1861.

2. Wallace and Gillespie, ii : 825: journal entry of 3 June 1861.

3. *Bradford Observer*, 21 May 1869: F's address to his Bradford supporters, 20 May 1869.

if the publication of the proclamation of neutrality was a mistake, it was made by our Government at the earnest solicitation of Mr. Forster and other warm friends of yours, who pressed it forward entirely, as they supposed, in your interest. They wanted to stop letters of marque and to legitimize the captures made by your blockading squadron. The Government acted at their instance; so, whether a blunder or not, the proclamation was not an unfriendly act. 1.

De Grey, finally, stressed that the recognition of belligerent rights enabled Britain to recognise the northern blockade, and as such "surely so far from our conduct having given any cause of complaint it ought to have been accepted as the most convincing proof of our anxiety to avoid any risk of rupture with the North."<sup>2</sup>.

The legal recognition of the northern blockade implied the blockade's substantial effectiveness, and it was on this score that Forster, Layard and de Grey impressed the necessity of British non-intervention. Forster warned American diplomats in London that an effective blockade was indispensable,<sup>3</sup> and in his Bradford address on the civil war in October 1861 strongly urged absolute non-intervention.<sup>4</sup> He also entreated Layard at the foreign office to respect the blockade.<sup>5</sup> The latter needed no convincing, however. Layard had already stated to Russell that breaking the blockade meant declaring war against the north.<sup>6</sup> Moreover J.L. Motley, attempting to consolidate British respect for the blockade's effectiveness, informed

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1. Thomas Hughes, 'John to Jonathan', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 23, Dec. 1870, 88.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43622, 117: deG to Gen Adam Badeau, 22 April 1870. Badeau, a protégé of General Grant, was in April 1870 secretary of the American legation in London, and in the following month was appointed consul-general at London.
  3. Wallace and Gillespie, ii : 852-3: Moran's journal entry of 27 July 1861.
  4. *Bradford Observer*, 3 Oct. 1861.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 39101, 52: F to L, Burley, 11 Sept. 1861.
  6. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/28, 387: memorandum, I. to Russell, 2 Sept. 1861.

Layard that he had spent three days visiting Forster, finding him "as staunch as ever in our cause, & I reckon upon him & upon you to resist the pressure that will be brought upon government to break our blockade."<sup>1</sup> At Layard's request Forster supplied reassuring information on existing cotton supplies,<sup>2</sup> which was duly passed on to Russell,<sup>3</sup> presumably in an effort to avoid any panic response to the blockade's effect. De Grey also worked to influence the government from within, believing, according to Cobden, "that it would be better to make any sacrifice to support the cotton interests than to violate our principle of blockade and international law to furnish the raw material of this industry."<sup>4</sup>

The climax of their efforts to obtain recognition for the blockade's effectiveness occurred in March 1862. To this point, the blockade had not in fact been wholly effectual; the long coastline and inadequate naval forces militated against immediate rigour in its fulfilment. Nevertheless Forster held that it was substantially successful, and persuaded the government to this effect. The critical debate took place on 7 March, in response to Gregory's motion that the blockade was ineffectual and should not be recognised. Forster, according to Hughes, "had what we lawyers should call the watching brief, with Cobden and Bright behind him as leading counsel, and... used to go round the lobbies in those anxious days with his pockets bulging out with documents to prove how effective the blockade was."<sup>5</sup> These documents,

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38987, 192: Motley to L, Ripon, 8 Sept. 1861. Motley spent a week at Studley with de Grey on this occasion.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 39101, 81: F to L, Burley, 18 Sept. 1861.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38987, 218: memorandum, L to Russell, 20 Sept. 1861. The need to locate other sources of cotton supply, in order to lessen the impact of the blockade and consequent demand for its violation, was well appreciated by Layard. Responsible for trade matters at the foreign office, he encouraged the importation of Moroccan and Indian cotton.
  4. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 342: Cobden to F, n.d. [October 1861].
  5. Hughes, 'John to Jonathan', 88.

in fact, were obtained from the U.S. mission in London,<sup>1.</sup> and were employed by Forster in the commons to wholly destroy Gregory's case. In a powerful and clever speech, Forster admitted that the blockade's effectiveness must be demonstrated in order to justify neutrality. Marshalling his statistics, he cogently proved that relatively few ships had evaded the blockade, and asserted that "no facts have been produced to warrant the Government in breaking the blockade, or in departing from the wise course of non-interference which they have hitherto pursued. I cannot but express my gratitude for the line of conduct adopted by the Government."<sup>2.</sup> Gregory's motion was subsequently defeated, to the chagrin of the interventionist lobby. But Bright deemed Forster's performance "quite destructive of [the] case against [the] blockade,"<sup>3.</sup> Forster's wife said it was praised by parliamentarians as a "masterly speech" and a "clever statement" despite their confederate sympathies,<sup>4.</sup> and Moran of the American legation attested that Forster "had killed Gregory, his motion, and the blockade... I never saw success so complete. Everybody seemed convinced."<sup>5.</sup> Undoubtedly of greatest significance, Palmerston reported to the queen that Forster

... in a very able speech, proved, by reference to returns and despatches laid before Parliament, that the blockades have been effective, and that they could not have been disregarded without a violation of principles of international law, which it is most important for Great Britain to maintain... 6.

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1. Wallace and Gillespie, ii : 961: Moran's journal entry of 6 March 1862.
  2. 3 H 165, 1187-97: 7 March 1862.
  3. Walling, *Diaries of John Bright*, 258: diary entry of 7 March 1862.
  4. Library of the Society of Friends, Temp Ms Box 100/40: Jane Forster to Mrs Arnold, n.d. [c. 7 March 1862].
  5. Wallace and Gillespie, ii : 963: journal entry of 8 March 1862.
  6. G.E. Buckle, ed., *The Letters of Queen Victoria: a selection from Her Majesty's correspondence and journal between the years 1862 and 1878*, (London, 1926), i : 23: Palmerston to Victoria, 7 March 1862.

Thereafter the case for the blockade was assured. From time to time shipowners complained to the foreign office of federal obstruction, but received scant consolation from Layard. On one occasion, for example, Layard peremptorally stated that

the true remedy would be that the merchants and shipowners of Liverpool should refrain from this species of trade [blockade-running]. It exposes innocent commerce from vexatious detention and search by American cruisers; it produces irritation and illwill on the part of the population of the Northern States of America; it is contrary to the spirit of Her Majesty's proclamation; and it exposes the British name to suspicions of bad faith. 1.

3.

While the effectiveness of the blockade still remained undetermined, Anglo-American tensions were dangerously frayed by the *Trent* incident in the autumn of 1861. James Murray Mason and John Slidell had been appointed as confederate envoys to Europe and, having evaded the blockade and reached Havana, they embarked for Southampton on the British mail steamer *Trent*. Off the Cuban coast, Captain Wilkes of the *San Jacinto* intercepted the *Trent* and seized Mason and Slidell as prisoners. He received for his actions a hero's welcome in the United States, countered in London by a bellicose eagerness to vindicate the insult to the British flag.

International precedent stipulated that Wilkes might legally have seized the *Trent* as a prize and carried her to a U.S. port, but that he was not entitled to remove the confederate agents and allow the ship to proceed. In both London and Washington, tempers rose and war threatened.

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1. *Times*, 5 Aug. 1862.

The response of Forster, Hughes, Layard and de Grey was directed towards defusing this confrontation. Throughout the crisis Forster, Layard and de Grey were in frequent communication. Well before knowledge of the *Trent* incident reached England, Layard had expressed to Russell his concern that the government adopt a cautious and conciliatory attitude vis-a-vis the right of search.<sup>1</sup> With the seizure of Mason and Slidell, Forster, Hughes, Layard and de Grey agreed that Britain must uphold international law and request the envoys' surrender, but they also attempted to soothe public and governmental tempers. Forster was in fact staying at Monckton Milnes' with C.F. Adams, the American minister, when news of the arrest of the confederate agents arrived on 27 November. Adams's son Henry described this fortuitous circumstance as "singular luck," for the English Yankophiles and the American envoy required each others' support and, according to Henry, Forster and Milnes "lost no time in expressing to all the world their estimate of the Minister's character."<sup>2</sup> At meetings on 29 and 30 November, the cabinet decided that Britain must demand their release and demonstrate determination to fight; war was thought likely. On the 30th Forster spoke at the opening of the Bradford volunteer barracks, where "he urged his hearers not to take it for granted that on account of what had happened therefore the American Government would not make reparation. He could not believe that they would be guilty of the insanity and wickedness of involving themselves in a war with this country," for "such a conflict must be regarded as a civil war."<sup>3</sup>

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38987, 271, 347: memoranda, L to Russell, 27 Sept. and 21 Nov. 1861.

2. Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams: An Autobiography*, (Boston and New York, 1918), 123-4.

3. *Times*, 4 Dec. 1861.

On 29 November Russell had drafted a bellicose despatch demanding of the American government the release of Mason and Slidell; on 1 December the Prince Consort, in one of the final acts of his life, amended the wording so as to conciliate the American government through absolving it of responsibility. The despatch was duly transmitted to Washington, and whilst a reply was awaited uncertainty and tension prevailed. During this period Forster continued his efforts to mitigate belligerent attitudes. From London he wrote his wife in early December:

I have been busy talking all day, and trust I have thrown some oil on the troubled waters, but struggling for peace is like the struggles of a drowning man. I breakfasted with De Grey, then spent more than an hour with Layard, then some time with Townsend and Hutton. 1. On the whole, though both sides expect war, I am hopeful... 2.

The anxiety of the following week is well illustrated in their correspondence. On 11 December Forster could "not help thinking that the Americans are coming to their senses, but I do not like the Boston reception of Wilkes."<sup>3</sup> On the 17th de Grey reported that "matters seem to get more warlike."<sup>4</sup> On the 23rd Forster informed Layard that he felt "rather encouraged by the general tone of today's news [from America]. A happy Christmas to you & peace at the end of it."<sup>5</sup> Hughes later recalled to northern friends the effect of the *Trent* incident, when northern sympathies

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1. Meredith Townsend and Richard Holt Hutton, joint editors and co-proprietors of the *Spectator*.
  2. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 344: F to Jane Forster, 4 Dec. 1861.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 39102, 44: F to L, Burley, 11 Dec. 1861. Captain Wilkes was acclaimed by Boston residents.
  4. Nightingale Papers. BL Add Ms 45778, 8: deG to Florence Nightingale, London, 17 Dec. 1861.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 39102, 101: F to L, Ambleside, 23 Dec. 1861.

were silenced for the moment; for though, putting ourselves in your places, we could feel how bitter the surrender of the two arch rebels must have been, we could not but admit that our Government was bound to insist upon it, and that the demand had not been made in an arrogant or offensive manner. 1.

Forster hastily arranged a constituency meeting, explaining that "he did not think it safe for further time to elapse without giving them an opportunity of hearing his opinions with regard to the possibility of war and, to give them an opportunity of expressing theirs." He castigated the seizure of Mason and Slidell and approved the British government's response "in demanding the reparation of this outrage (hear, hear)." In an effort to encourage British forbearance Forster also reminded his listeners that the Americans had endured similar insults from Britain during the Napoleonic wars, and that were England to declare war now she could not avoid fighting for slavery. He proposed, therefore, that a resort to arbitration be considered if the American government refused to comply with the British request, and his constituents unanimously approved this recommendation.<sup>2</sup> Throughout the first week of January 1862, Layard kept de Grey informed of developments at the foreign office.<sup>3</sup> His pacific role was recognised by Motley, who wrote from Vienna that he shared Layard's desire "that so dire a calamity as war between our two countries may yet be averted." Motley admitted the illegality of Wilkes's action, and pleaded with Layard to exert his influence:

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1. Hughes, 'John to Jonathan', 85.

2. *Bradford Observer*, 2 Jan. 1862: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 31 Dec. 1861; also *Times*, 3 Jan. 1862.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 141, 143, 145: L to deG, London, 2, 4, and 7 Jan. 1862.

... Above all things, my dear friend, I implore you to disabuse such of your acquaintance, as sympathise with you & with myself in the desire that Engd & America shd be on amicable terms, of that most contemptible delusion, that the U.S. govt. desires & has desired a war with Engld, in order to cover its inability to cope with the South, & to procure an excuse to retire from the civil war... 1.

The impact of their conciliatory attitudes was never put to the test, for war was averted when the Americans reconsidered their position and released the confederate agents. Nevertheless de Grey and Layard had distinguished themselves in the ministry as northern sympathisers and non-interventionists, while the upshot of the *Trent* affair had further consolidated Forster's position in the country. The incident served as a political preparation for the subsequent battles over mediation and recognition.

4.

The first real trial<sup>2</sup> of the government's neutral and non-interventionist policy occurred in July 1862, when W.S. Lindsay, member for Sunderland, shipowner, and confederate apologist, proposed to the commons that Britain offer mediation between north and south. The indecisiveness of the contest, and the tragic suffering it had entailed, had encouraged public opinion to consider such a peace initiative, and the idea had gained French endorsement. Nevertheless any mediation implied pro-southern intervention, for it could only proceed on the basis of division. On these grounds Layard persisted in rejecting intervention: "there is no prospect at present of any

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38988, 9: Motley to L, Vienna, 7 Jan. 1862.
  2. W.H. Gregory had indefinitely postponed a proposed recognition motion in June 1861; consequently Forster had at the time withdrawn a counter motion declaring the inexpediency of such an act (see 3 H 163, 763: 7 June 1861). The issue was not fully debated in the commons on this occasion.

compromise between the two parties or of any intervention being allowed."<sup>1</sup> Even Palmerston, despite his confederate sympathies, rejected intervention as premature: "The South may & probably will maintain the Contest but we ought to know that their separate Independence is a Truth and a Fact before we declare it to be so."<sup>2</sup> Thus the government opposed Lindsay when he brought forward his motion on 18 July. Forster spoke effectively on this occasion, arguing that no common basis for mediation existed and that the attempt to do so would aggravate the civil war and risk hostilities with the union. To considerable opposition, he reiterated his contention that slavery and not the tariff had caused southern secession, and concluded by praising the government for its strict non-interventionist policy.<sup>3</sup> Moran reported that "great respect was paid to Mr. Forster's speech and it did good;"<sup>4</sup> Palmerston considered that Forster "was more moderate than heretofore in his championship [of the north]."<sup>5</sup>

Lindsay's motion was not approved, but the threat of intervention did not immediately dissipate with the rising of parliament. Palmerston, Russell and Gladstone were each convinced that southern independence was ultimately inevitable, and were each suspicious of northern political and social values. At the end of August 1862 the confederate army won the second battle of Bull Run, and Palmerston, Russell and Gladstone considered accepting the French emperor's

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38959, 1: L to Hammond, Paris, 25 April 1862.

2. LP. BL Add Ms 38988, 165: memorandum, Palmerston to L, 19 June 1862.

3. 3 H 168, 534-8: 18 July 1862.

4. Wallace and Gillespie, ii : 1042-3: Moran's journal entry of 19 July 1862.

5. Connell, *Regina v. Palmerston*, 329: Palmerston to Victoria, 15 [sic] July 1862. Palmerston was reporting on the debate of 18 July.

mediation proposal. Palmerston initiated discussion in mid-September by suggesting to Russell that, were further southern victories to follow, Britain should join France in mediating on the basis of separation, confederate independence to be recognised if the north refused.<sup>1</sup> Russell was enthusiastic to proceed immediately,<sup>2</sup> but the premier cautioned that a more decisive military advantage was a prerequisite.<sup>3</sup> The battle of Antietam opportunely intervened; though substantially indecisive, Lee's invasion across the Potomac was strategically checked. Russell nevertheless persevered with his desire to intervene;<sup>4</sup> Gladstone, asserting at Newcastle that the south had made a nation, was equally receptive provided both France and Russia could be persuaded to co-operate.<sup>5</sup> The strongest cabinet voice in opposition to intervention was that of Sir George Cornwall Lewis, de Grey's chief at the war office. Though an advocate of southern independence, Lewis believed European interference to be premature.<sup>6</sup> The final decision to abstain from mediation may be attributed to Palmerston. Desiring confederate secession, he nevertheless accepted by early October that "the whole matter is full of Difficulty, and can only be cleared up by some more decided Events between the

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1. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/14D, 3: Palmerston to Russell, London, 14 Sept. 1862.
  2. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/14D, 9: Russell to Palmerston, 17 Sept. 1862.
  3. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/14D, 30, 32: Palmerston to Russell, Broadlands, 22 and 23 Sept. 1862.
  4. e.g. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/14D, 92: 'Note' on mediation, 23 Oct. [1862].
  5. Guedalla, *Gladstone and Palmerston*, 239-47: Memorandum by Mr. Gladstone on the War in America, 25 Oct. 1862.
  6. WO 33/12, 825, 830: Lewis's memoranda on intervention in the civil war, 17 Oct. and 7 Nov. 1862; RP. BL Add Ms 43533, 269: Lewis to deG, London, 23 Oct. [1862].

contending armies."<sup>1</sup> His attitude remained constant throughout the autumn,<sup>2</sup> and was apparently strengthened by Lincoln's foreshadowed emancipation proclamation.<sup>3</sup> Of greater consequence, perhaps, was pure expediency: Palmerston contentedly bullied weaker nations, but the northerners whom he so despised were proving unexpectedly strong.

With parliament recessed and Forster, Hughes, de Grey and Layard scattered, their role in the mediation debates of the autumn of 1862 was minimal. From Paris Layard nevertheless pressed on both Russell and Hammond (permanent under secretary at the foreign office) his notion that the French attached little significance to their mediation proposal.<sup>4</sup> Interference avoided, both Layard and Forster were able to praise the government's strict neutrality before their respective constituents.<sup>5</sup>

The realisation that the government were not committed to neutrality on principle, however, encouraged Forster and Hughes in the winter of 1862-3 to appeal to public sympathies, a task much facilitated by Lincoln's proclamation of emancipation. Their rationale was straightforward: if expediency directed Palmerston's determinations, the knowledge of popular endorsement of non-interference would influence his ultimate decision. As the focus of their proposed agitation, Hughes and Forster utilised the London emancipation society

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1. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/14D, 40: Palmerston to Russell, Broadlands, 2 Oct. 1862.
  2. e.g. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/14D, 57, 84: Palmerston to Russell, Broadlands, 8 and 22 Oct. 1862.
  3. e.g. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/14D, 76, 8Q, 124, 242: Palmerston to Russell, Broadlands, 20 Oct., 21 Oct., 2 Nov., 17 Dec. 1862.
  4. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/28, 428: L to Russell, Chantilly, 13 Nov. 1862; LP. BL Add Ms 38959, 32: L to Hammond, [Paris], 14 Nov. 1862.
  5. *Times*, 24 Dec. 1862: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 22 Dec. 1862; *Bradford Observer*, 27 Nov. 1862: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 21 Nov. 1862.

and the Manchester union and emancipation society. Organised late in 1862, the societies disseminated abolitionist literature and arranged a total of 150 public meetings. The approach to the civil war of the emancipation societies, which had originated in the pro-union and abolitionist protests of George Thompson, William Evans, T.B. Potter and F.W. Chesson, perfectly suited the predilections of both Hughes and Forster, who were both vice presidents of the union and emancipation society. For Hughes, concern with American issues provided the first significant opportunity for involvement in political agitation, and he later recalled that he had through the emancipation society "made a plunge into public life, and was one of the leaders of a semi-political party."<sup>1</sup>.

The initial action of the emancipation societies was to forward to Lincoln a congratulatory address for the proclamation of emancipation. Hughes averred that this address "was enthusiastically adopted by a large meeting [in Manchester on 31 December 1862], chiefly composed of working men. It was clear at once that there was a grand force behind us, for we became objects of furious attack," mainly from the press.<sup>2</sup>.

The climax of their campaign occurred on 29 January 1863, when enthusiastic demonstrations took place in London and Bradford. Forster chaired the Yorkshire gathering, which was attended by over 4000 supporters. In his address to the meeting, he stated that it had been called "for the purpose... of manifesting a detestation of negro slavery, and expressing sympathy with President Lincoln and the free people of North America in their efforts to destroy slavery -- the great cause of the present war." Lauding the working classes for their support of the

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1. Hughes, *True Manliness*, xix.

2. Hughes, 'John to Jonathan', 86.

north despite personal privations ("Talk about the class having earned a right to the suffrage!") and deprecating the pro-south interventionist efforts in both press and parliament, Forster emphasised that, with emancipation the avowed policy of the union,

it would be especially disgraceful for us to depart one iota from our principles of neutrality and non-intervention in this war (cheers). And, therefore it is that I hail this great meeting as strengthening my hands in protesting against any such interference when Parliament meets (loud cheers). 1.

A warm reception had been expected in Bradford, a city known for its unionist sympathies,<sup>2</sup> but the reaction of Londoners to the Exeter hall demonstration was less predictable. The organisers need not have been concerned. Exeter hall itself was so densely crowded with over 10,000 people that there was no standing room available; the two lower halls were appropriated and filled; impromptu gatherings were organised and addressed on the Strand and adjacent streets. Hughes attested that, "familiar as I am with this kind of thing, I have never seen in my time anything approaching this scene."<sup>3</sup> The difficulty of attracting prominent political speakers from an unsympathetic parliament was reflected in the fact that Hughes himself was the best-known orator on the platform; though famous as the author of *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, he had no previous political reputation. Hughes informed his audience that his object in speaking was "to maintain before you that the cause of the South is not the cause of freedom [to secede], but that it is the cause of the most degrading and hateful slavery that has been before the world for thousands of years." He proved in an historical context

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1. *Bradford Observer*, 5 Feb. 1863; also *Times*, 31 Jan. 1863.

2. For an examination of Bradford opinion on the civil war, see D.G. Wright, 'Bradford and the American Civil War', *Journal of British Studies*, 8, 2, May 1969, 69-85.

3. Hughes, 'John to Jonathan', 86.

that Davis and other confederate leaders were exponents of slavery, and was extremely critical of much of the press for its "cruel and unfair abuse of Americans." Hughes's address was subsequently printed by the emancipation society,<sup>1.</sup> but received a very mixed editorial response from Fleet Street. The *Times* commented that

the speakers were a minor novelist and two or three Dissenting ministers [Baptist Noel, Newman Hall, W. Landells], who seem to be of the usual intellectual calibre. Not one man whose opinion the country would listen to on any political subject, -- not one statesman, not one person endowed with genius, however self-willed and erratic, no representative of the Peerage, only one of the House of Commons [P.A. Taylor], not one of the Church, of the gentry, or the commercial world -- was found to stand on the platform.

Of what was said, the leader continued, "it is needless to comment upon, for it is quite in accord with their personal insignificance."<sup>2.</sup>

Similarly the *Saturday Review*, in a scathing and abusive attack, referred to the "perfectly irrational fanaticism" of the "vast cheering, howling horde of men, women, and Dissenting preachers," and warned Lincoln not to assume that "this sort of trash" reflected English opinion.<sup>3.</sup> On the other hand the *Spectator* praised the emancipation society meetings, and disparaged "the smug bourgeoisie, who take the *Times'* exposition of Christianity for gospel,"<sup>4.</sup> whilst the *Illustrated London News* believed the Exeter hall demonstration would "prove the turning-point of new and serious political issues."<sup>5.</sup>

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1. Hughes, *The Cause of Freedom*. It was also reported, though in a much-truncated form, in the *Times*, 30 Jan. 1863.

2. *Times*, 31 Jan. 1863.

3. *Saturday Review*, 31 Jan. 1863. The attack was continued in the following week (see *Saturday Review*, 7 Feb. 1863).

4. *Spectator*, 31 Jan. 1863.

5. *Illustrated London News*, 7 Feb. 1863.

Hughes himself concluded that the success at Exeter hall was so complete that further agitation in London was unnecessary.<sup>1</sup> Of real significance was the reaction of Henry Adams, future historian and son of the American ambassador, whose report of the meeting was enclosed by his father in an official despatch to Seward. In a letter to his brother, Adams commented that the Exeter hall meeting was

... likely to create a revolution, or rather to carry on a complete revolution in public opinion which was begun by the great Manchester Meeting on the 31st December. Last night's meeting was something tremendous, unheard of since the days of reform. The cry was "Emancipation and reunion" and the spirit was dangerously in sympathy with republicanism... As for enthusiasm, my friend Tom Brown of Rugby school-days, who was one of the speakers, had to stop repeatedly and beg the people not to cheer so much... The effect of such a display will be very great ... The strong outside pressure that is now aroused to act on this Government will, I hope, help us to carry through all we want in time and with patience. 2.

The demonstrations of 29 January in London and Bradford were significant indicators of a large body of public sympathy with the union and of support for English non-interference. As such, Palmerston and his colleagues necessarily took cognisance of their impact, and it is probable that they contributed to the government's continued espousal of neutrality. Further meetings of course followed during the year; Hughes himself spoke at Birmingham and even at confederacy-

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1. Hughes, 'John to Jonathan', 87; Hughes, *True Manliness*, xix-xx.
  2. Worthington Ford, ed., *A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-1865*, (London, 1921), i : 251-2.

inclined Liverpool, whilst Forster lectured at Leeds.<sup>1</sup> In addition, Hughes was involved in the establishment of freedmen's aid associations, thus providing abolitionists the opportunity to financially support their principles. If the agitation were successful in demonstrating the considerable popular support for non-intervention, it also afforded Hughes and Forster the occasion to consolidate their relations and reputations with the working class and its trade union leaders. Hughes in fact maintained that "it was mainly in consequence of these doings that I was asked by the working folk in South London to stand for Lambeth in 1865."<sup>2</sup>

In parliament in 1863, southern sympathisers attempted in vain to achieve recognition of the confederacy for, influenced both by northern military successes and by English unionist sympathies, the government and most members were unwilling to interfere imprudently. During the spring, however, Forster, Hughes, Layard and de Grey remained anxious as to English public opinion and Anglo-American tensions. De Grey, for example, described relations as "delicate & critical,"<sup>3</sup> and Layard confessed to Russell

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1. Forster's 21 September 1863 lecture as chairman of an emancipation meeting at Leeds, where pro-northern feeling was never as strong as in Bradford (see D.G. Wright, 'Leeds Politics and the American Civil War', *Northern History*, 9, 1974, 98), reiterated his beliefs on the slavery issue and the government's policy of neutrality (*Leeds Mercury*, 22 Sept. 1863), but also dealt with the issue of the Laird rams' detention. Forster subsequently transmitted to the foreign office a resolution passed at the meeting praising the north's emancipationist policy (FO 5/929: F to Russell, Burley, 22 Sept. 1863, and accompanying resolutions). The speech was also published by the union and emancipation society under the title *Speech of Mr. W.E. Forster, M.P., on the Slaveholders' Rebellion; and Professor Goldwin Smith's Letter on the Morality of the Emancipation Proclamation*.
  2. Hughes, *True Manliness*, xx.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43546, 43: memorandum, 27 April 1863.

... as to much anxiety as to the irritation against the United States which I see springing up on all sides. There were very unmistakeable indications in the House last night of the temper of the country. The 'Times' and other public papers are fanning the flame. The 'Times', with its usual unscrupulous perversion, misrepresents what takes place in the House, adds 'loud cheers' to anything which may be uttered offensive to the United States and hostile to the Govt, and would lead the public to infer that anything said on our side of the House is received in silence. All this is working to one end and I am really very anxious as to what may happen if any fresh news from the West arrives to add to the irritation... 1.

The climax to their concern over possible recognition of the confederacy occurred in June and July, when Roebuck introduced his motion that the government negotiate with other European powers in order to obtain their co-operation in recognising southern independence. As part of their strategy Roebuck and Lindsay had visited the French emperor in order to ascertain his attitude, and Napoleon had allegedly informed them that he favoured recognition, had in fact approached the British government earlier in the year with a view to mediation, and that that offer had been communicated by Lyons, the British ambassador in Washington, to Seward, the implication being that the British government had misled parliament and had been guilty of a pro-north breach of confidence by relating a secret French despatch to Washington. Roebuck repeated these allegations in the commons, and the government's credibility was clearly threatened. However in a series of co-ordinated questions and answers, Forster and Layard were able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the house that no communication had been received from the French since November 1862 regarding mediation or recognition, and that on that occasion the proposal had been communicated to Seward by

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1. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/28, 443; L to Russell, London, 24 April 1863. Layard also complained in this letter that he was afforded insufficient scope in answering commons questions.

Mercier, the French ambassador.<sup>1.</sup> Their co-operation in denying Roebuck's allegations made a significant impact in the house, for Gladstone in reply to Roebuck had supported neutrality but implied a belief that the south would ultimately separate. E.D. Adams comments that

If Gladstone's had been the only reply to Roebuck he and his friends [and other members of parliament] might well have thought they were about to secure a ministerial change of front. But it soon appeared that Gladstone spoke more for himself than for the Government. Roebuck had made a direct accusation and in meeting this, Layard, for the Foreign Office, entered a positive and emphatic denial. 2.

Furthermore, Russell commented to Layard at the time: "Nothing can be better than all you have done on this subject."<sup>3.</sup> In addition Forster twice spoke in the debate on Roebuck's motion. On 30 June he repeated his contention that slavery and not tariff considerations had caused the war, and disagreed with Gladstone that southern independence was the best way to end slavery. He disparaged Lord Robert Cecil's reference to the confederates as Britain's natural allies, and argued that recognition would imply a breach of neutrality and consequent war with the north.<sup>4.</sup> On 10 July he confidently pressed the house to proceed with the debate, and to pronounce an opinion on recognition.<sup>5.</sup>

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1. 3 H 171, 1769: 30 June 1863; 3 H 172, 68-73: 2 July 1863.
  2. E.D. Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War*, (Gloucester, Mass., 1957), ii : 171.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38989, 177: memorandum, Russell to L, n.d. [July 1863].
  4. 3 H 171, 1812-8: 30 June 1863.
  5. 3 H 172, 564-5: 10 July 1863.

With Roebuck and Lindsay discredited, the house refused to countenance southern recognition.

By the autumn of 1863, therefore, the threat of English mediation or recognition had clearly passed, despite continued French enthusiasm evidenced by Layard in September.<sup>1</sup> Thus Layard and Forster, who continued to share ideas on American affairs,<sup>2</sup> could confidently face their constituents during the parliamentary recess. In Southwark Layard commented that "for the policy of strict neutrality pursued by the Government in regard to America he confidently claimed the approval of the country."<sup>3</sup> In Bradford Forster asserted that he was no longer required to seek constituency support for neutrality, for the fear of English intervention was now removed.<sup>4</sup> And Hughes, writing to his hero Lowell, averred that "the tide of opinion here has swung slowly & sullenly round."<sup>5</sup> During his 1865 election campaign Layard asserted that

the greatest Parliamentary battles that have taken place during the late Parliament have been waged upon the question of the recognition of the Southern States; and therefore I say that the Government which is in deserves the support of every Liberal in this country for their policy with regard to the United States. (Hear, hear.) 6.

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1. See Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/28, 485: L to Russell, Paris, 11 Sept. 1863; Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/14F, 232: Palmerston to Russell, Broadlands, 14 Sept. 1863.
  2. See LP. BL Add Ms 39107, 259: F to L, Burley, 9 Oct. 1863.
  3. *Times*, 11 Dec. 1863: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 10 Dec. 1863.
  4. *Bradford Observer*, 14 Jan. 1864: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 8 Jan. 1864.
  5. Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard. BMS Am 765, 439: H to Lowell, London, 18 Feb. 1864.
  6. *Times*, 13 July 1865: L's address to Southwark electors, 12 July 1865. Layard's citation of American issues (as opposed to Schleswig-Holstein, for example) as forming the principal parliamentary controversies of the early sixties, gives an indication of the importance he attributed to the civil war in British politics.

The public and parliamentary activities of Forster, Hughes and Layard had materially contributed to the Liberal government's perseverance in a policy of neutrality.

5.

An equally significant contribution to neutrality was furnished by Layard in his administrative role in the foreign office. Disparate interpretations of the foreign enlistment act were perhaps the most intense and protracted determinants of Anglo-American hostility both during and after the civil war years. The foreign enlistment act was initially passed in 1819, modelled in most respects on similar American legislation of 1784. It forbade British subjects to arm or equip vessels of war intended for use by one belligerent against another with whom Britain was at peace with the status of declared neutrality. The act did not prohibit the export of other war materiel such as arms or ammunition; it did not prohibit British subjects from equipping a ship outside crown jurisdiction, even if the ship were intended to cruise against a friendly state; it did not prohibit British subjects from equipping a warship within crown jurisdiction if that ship were not intended to cruise against a friendly state; it did not prohibit all ship construction within crown jurisdiction, merely equipping a ship for hostilities against a friendly nation. Unlike the American act, as amended in 1818, there was no provision in the act for the detention or seizure of a vessel merely suspected of being equipped or armed for the use of a belligerent with which Britain was at peace through proclaimed neutrality. In short, under the foreign enlistment act a vessel could be detained by British authorities only if there were a *prima facie* case that it was being equipped for the purpose of hostilities against a friendly power.

British shipbuilding facilities were envisaged by the confederate government as a means by which they might effectively conduct naval warfare against the northern merchant marine and navy. The south's own capacity to construct warships was strictly limited; moreover the northern blockade of the confederate coastline posed almost insurmountable difficulties for a navy which depended on southern ports for sustenance. It was therefore decided to contract for construction of warships in Europe, and principally Britain, and to sail from British ports in order to conduct 'guerilla' raids against the union's merchant marine. In order to evade the letter of Britain's foreign enlistment act, confederate agents resorted to two principal ruses: firstly, the warships were not to be armed within British waters; secondly, as far as practicable the ownership and/or destination of the ships under construction were to be obfuscated. The escape of the confederate gun boat #290, later christened the *Alabama*, from the Laird yards at Birkenhead in July 1862 was a significant indication of the inadequacy of the foreign enlistment act. The *Alabama* was of a warship design but, whilst at Liverpool, remained unarmed. Furthermore her ownership was technically uncertain, though suspicions that she was destined for confederate use were virtually conclusive. The situation was complicated by the fact that the local customs officials at Liverpool were sympathetic to the confederate cause. Adams, the American minister, drew the attention of the foreign office to the construction of gun boat #290 early in 1862, but the Liverpool customs officials ruled in June that she did not infringe the foreign enlistment act. On 4 July Adams was asked to provide documentary evidence upon which seizure could be ordered, and he

transmitted to the foreign office a set of deputations and supplementary deputations on 22 and 24 July.<sup>1</sup> This documentation was submitted to the law officers of the crown for an opinion, but the mental breakdown of one of their number (not apparently related to the *Alabama* case) engendered a critical delay. On 29 July the law officers advised that the *Alabama* be seized, despite their misgivings that the foreign enlistment act did not legally justify such an action: "The wording of the Act might be taken so as to put the present case beyond its reach but such a narrow construction ought not to be adopted, and, if allowed, wd. fritter away the Foreign Enlistment Act altogether."<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately on the morning of the 29th, before this advice was received by the foreign office, the *Alabama* had sailed from Liverpool. In a memorandum to Russell written later in the day, Layard stated:

You will see by the papers I send the gun boat which has been fitting out for the Confederates at Liverpool, left that port this morning. This afternoon we receive the Law Officers' opinion urging that we should stop her. The papers were sent to the law Officers last week, with an intimation that they were of urgent importance. 3.

On the following day Layard (whose administrative jurisdiction in the foreign office did not normally include American affairs) asserted that "the delay arose from not having the Queen's Advocate at hand. I did all I could to get the Attorney & Solicitor General to send us their opinion last week."<sup>4</sup> Undoubtedly the escape of the *Alabama* contravened the spirit if not the letter of the foreign enlistment act. The delay in receiving the law officers' opinion was perhaps unavoidable, though

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38991, 129: memorandum entitled 'Case of the *Alabama*', 14 March 1865.
  2. FO 802/40, 3: register of letters regarding the *Alabama*: summary of law officers' advice of 29 July 1862.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38988, 216: memorandum, L to Russell, 29 July 1862.
  4. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/28, 412: L to Russell, London, 30 July 1862.

Layard did his utmost to expedite their ruling. Nevertheless Russell was negligent in the interim in not ordering the provisional detention of the gun boat pending the law officers' report. Had he so acted, the depredations for which the *Alabama* was responsible, and the consequent deterioration in Anglo-American relations, might well have been avoided.

Apparently wishing to increase the stringency of British neutrality laws, Russell and the law officers discussed amendments to the foreign enlistment act which would bring the building or constructing, altering and adapting, and the sale or delivery of warships, within the same category as equipping and arming. In addition it was suggested by Russell that the home secretary be accorded discretionary powers to seize vessels infringing the provisions of the act.<sup>1.</sup> On 28 January 1863 the law officers were requested to draft a bill incorporating these amendments;<sup>2.</sup> by early February, however, Russell had decided that no alterations were required, and greater stringency in the act was consequently abandoned.<sup>3.</sup> Near the end of March, Forster raised the subject of the foreign enlistment act in the house of commons, citing the case of the *Alabama* as a flagrant breach of British and international law. In this he was mistaken, at a technical level, but Forster's real purpose was to pressure the government to adhere to the spirit of accepted international maritime neutrality conventions. If British law were insufficient to do so, he argued, the government should ask parliament to strengthen it. Forster also emphasised that American indignation was justifiable, for the *Alabama* "was manned by a

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1. FO 83/2216, 73: William Atherton, Roundell Palmer and Robert Phillimore to Russell, London, 12 Jan. 1863; FO 83/2216, 85: Hammond to the law officers, London, 13 Jan. 1863 (copy); FO 83/2216, 87: Atherton, Palmer and Phillimore to Russell, London, 16 Jan. 1863.
  2. FO 83/2216, 127: Hammond to the law officers, London, 28 Jan. 1863 (copy).
  3. FO 83/2218, 323: Palmer and Phillimore to Russell, London, 29 July 1863.

British crew; she sailed out of a British port under a British flag; she had been built by British builders, contracted for by British agents, and paid for by money borrowed from British capitalists." Finally, Forster reminded the house of the dangerous precedent which Britain was now condoning, and which might be very detrimental to future British interests when she was at war and the U.S. neutral.<sup>1.</sup>

Forster's attack, which was endorsed by Bright, may have been counterproductive, for he in fact alienated Palmerston and encouraged him to reassert the correctness of the government's response to the *Alabama*. Cobden afterwards commented to Forster: "The course Palmerston has taken will involve England in a war or a great humiliation. Every word of his insulting taunts and puerile recriminations in the above debate will be burnt as with hot iron into the memories of the Americans, who have a special dislike for the man."<sup>2.</sup> However despite the fact that neither the premier nor the solicitor general made any pledge as to future policy on confederate cruisers, the government in fact determined to test the law within a fortnight of the commons debate which Forster had initiated. On 5 April 1863 orders were issued to seize the *Alexandra*, a small steamer under construction at Liverpool, in the suspected belief she was destined for confederate use. Thus suspicion as opposed to proof was accepted by the government as a rationale for detention. Within a few months, however, the courts ruled otherwise, and it was only through protracted and entangled legal procedures that the government succeeded in preventing the ship's departure. Clearly the foreign enlistment act was an inadequate legal guarantor of maritime neutrality.

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1. 3 H 170, 33-43: 27 March 1863.

2. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 359: Cobden to F, Midhurst, 5 April 1863.

This inadequacy was further scrutinised during the crisis surrounding the imminent departure of the Laird 'rams' in the summer of 1863, and on this occasion Layard played a crucial role. The two ironclad steam 'rams' under construction in the Laird yard at Birkenhead were so called because, in addition to a gun turret about midships, the vessels were armed with a large projecting ram or piercer, on the bow and beneath the waterline, designed to perforate and thus sink other ships. This technological 'advance' was judged of significant import, for it was generally held that the rams were capable of breaking the northern blockade of the confederacy, thus materially affecting the course of the civil war. In terms of the foreign enlistment act there was no difficulty in proving that the rams were indeed 'equipped' as warships, but in order to detain them it was necessary to procure reliable proof that they were intended for confederate use.

Adams officially drew the government's attention to the construction and equipment of the Laird ironclads on 11 July 1863, referring to this situation as "the last and gravest act of international hostility yet committed."<sup>1</sup> Adams enclosed with his letter a number of supportive affidavits, mainly of Laird shipyard workers willing to attest that the rams were intended for confederate use. For example the deposition of John Brady, a boilermaker, stated that he had seen the same confederate agents (especially Captain James Bullock) inspecting the rams as had inspected the *Alabama*.<sup>2</sup> Similar affidavits were forwarded to the foreign office by Adams or by Thomas Dudley, the American consul at Liverpool, throughout July and August 1863. To a large extent the decision whether to seize the rams depended on the

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1. FO 5/1000, 65: C.F. Adams to Russell, London, 11 July 1863 (copy).

2. FO 5/1000, 98: deposition of John Brady, Liverpool, 11 July 1863.

perceived credibility of these working class witnesses; unlike Layard, both Russell and the law officers doubted their reliability. In order to camouflage their involvement with the Laird rams, the confederates utilised Francois Bravay, a Paris banker, as their agent. Bravay in turn devised a strategem whereby he claimed to be acting on behalf of the viceroy of Egypt. Bravay's assertion, and probably his character, initially persuaded both the foreign secretary and the law officers.

On 13 July, two days after the receipt of Adams's official notification, Layard transmitted his letter and its enclosures to the crown law officers for a legal opinion.<sup>1</sup> Ten days later, he pressed the law officers for their decision.<sup>2</sup> On the 24th they advised that the vessels ought not to be detained or interfered with in any way; the alleged superintendence of Captain Bullock was not considered reliable evidence, whereas the French consul at Liverpool had confirmed that the vessels were French property and were destined for a non-belligerent.<sup>3</sup> Neither Layard nor Russell, however, were entirely convinced by the Bravay ruse, and the foreign office accordingly directed that the government "institute a searching enquiry with regard to the suspicious circumstances."<sup>4</sup> Layard himself concentrated on obtaining either confirmation or denial that the Egyptian viceroy had ordered the ironclads through Bravay. He telegraphed to the British ambassador in Egypt for information,<sup>5</sup> and received assurances from the Turkish ambassador in London that the Egyptian pasha had not obtained

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1. FO 83/2218, 238: L to the law officers, London, 13 July 1863 (copy).
  2. FO 83/2218, 278: L to the law officers, London, 23 July 1863 (copy).
  3. FO 83/2218, 291: Atherton, Palmer and Phillimore to Russell, London, 24 July 1863.
  4. FO 5/1000, 118: L to G.A. Hamilton, London, 28 July 1863 (copy). Hamilton was a treasury official.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38989, 269: memorandum, L to Russell, n.d. [Aug. 1863].

the required permission of the sultan to purchase the ironclads.<sup>1.</sup> Layard informed Russell that he remained "very uncomfortable about those large ironplated rams now fitting out at Liverpool."<sup>2.</sup> Russell replied, however, that nothing could be done about the rams without evidence of confederate destination.<sup>3.</sup> In the meantime the treasury enquiry into the suspicious circumstances at Birkenhead had revealed nothing,<sup>4.</sup> though Adams had sent further testimonials regarding confederate agents at the Laird yards.<sup>5.</sup> The law officers were asked to review their earlier opinion on the basis of this new 'evidence', but once again ruled that no interference whatsoever was legally justifiable. Bravay's credentials, they averred, appeared reliable, the shipyard workers' affidavits contained "nothing but hearsay evidence and common gossip," and there was no evidence whatever that either ram was intended for the confederates.<sup>6.</sup>

Their legal position under the foreign enlistment act once again appeared to favour the confederate conspirators, for though both Russell and Layard wished to detain the rams no evidence of confederate destination could be found to legally warrant their doing so. Russell commented to this effect in a memorandum of 21 August, written immediately prior to his departure from London on holiday: "With regard to the 'Iron-clads' now fitting out at Birkenhead all we can do is to endeavour to procure evidence that they are intended for the purpose of

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1. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/28, 453: L to Russell, London, 21 Aug. 1863.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38989, 264: memorandum, L to Russell, n.d. [before 21 Aug. 1863].
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38989, 266: memorandum, Russell to L, n.d. [before 21 Aug. 1863].
  4. FO 5/1000, 126: commissioners of customs to the lords commissioners of the treasury, 4 Aug. 1863.
  5. FO 5/1000, 137: Adams to Russell, London, 14 Aug. 1863.
  6. FO 83/2218, 403: Atherton, Palmer and Phillimore to Russell, London, 20 Aug. 1863; also FO 83/2218, 392: Roundell Palmer's 'Opinion', dated 19 Aug. 1863 (copy).

carrying on war against a friendly Power, viz. the United States of America." He was clearly unwilling to place the onus on the ship-builder to prove that his vessel was not intended for hostile use against a friendly power.<sup>1.</sup> From the fourth week of August, with Russell vacationing in Scotland, Palmerston in Wales, and Hammond, the permanent under secretary at the foreign office, in Europe, Layard was primarily responsible for the government's policy regarding the rams, and he was less influenced than either Russell or Hammond by legal technicalities.<sup>2.</sup>

On 31 August Layard received a telegram from R.G. Colquhoun, Britain's representative in Egypt, to the effect that the viceroy had not and would not purchase the vessels. He immediately requested the law officers to reconsider the subject,<sup>3.</sup> though Layard expected no alteration in their opinion,<sup>4.</sup> presumably because confederate involvement remained unsubstantiated. On 1 September Russell confirmed his reliance on legal niceties, when he wrote to Layard: "I do not think we must wait for the opinion of the Law Officers for detaining the vessels *if we have any evidence whatever to shew there is reason to think they are intended for the service of the Confederates.*"<sup>5.</sup>

Layard accordingly informed both the treasury and the home office that "if sufficient evidence can be obtained to lead to the belief that they are intended for the Confederate States of America, Lord Russell thinks

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1. FO 96/14/11, 182: Russell's memorandum, 21 Aug. 1863 (copy).
  2. For Russell, see immediately below; Hammond informed Layard on 12 September of his opinion that the ironclads "ought not to have been stopped, for there is no case against them" (LP. BL Add Ms 38952, 93: Hammond to L, London, 12 Sept. 1863).
  3. FO 83/2218, 450: L to the law officers, London, 31 Aug. 1863 (copy).
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 38989, 289: memorandum, L to Russell, n.d. [31 Aug. 1863].
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38989, 293: Russell to L, 1 Sept. 1863; my italics.

the Vessels ought to be detained until further examination can be made."<sup>1</sup> On the same day, 1 September, Russell drafted a letter to Adams in which he stated that

... whatever suspicions may be entertained by the U.S. Consul at Liverpool as to the ultimate destination of these vessels, the fact remains that Mr. Bravay a French Merchant residing at Paris who is represented to be the person upon whose orders these ships have been built, has personally appeared and has acted in that character at Liverpool. There is no legal evidence against Mr Bravay's claim nor anything to affect him with any illegal act or purpose, and the responsible Agent of the Customs at Liverpool affirms his belief that these vessels have not been built for the Confederates.

Under these circumstances and having regard to the entire insufficiency of the depositions to prove any infraction of the law, H.M.'s Govt are advised that they cannot interfere in any way with these vessels...

Only if an act or proceeding contrary to the statute could be shown by trustworthy evidence, or if a reliable person furnished the government "with such declaration as may suffice to justify the detention of the vessel till further enquiry can be made," would Russell consent to detain the rams.<sup>2</sup> Upon receipt of this letter, Adams simply indicated that it meant war.<sup>3</sup>

To this point Russell's attitude appeared sufficiently decisive and consistent: the rams could not be detained on the existing evidence. Over the next few days, however, his letters and telegraphs to London were frequently contradictory, providing a clear indication of his

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1. FO 5/1000, 219: draft letter, L to treasury/home office, London, 1 Sept. 1863.
  2. FO 5/1000, 221: Russell to Adams, London, 1 Sept. 1863 (copy).
  3. FO 5/1000, 314: Adams to Russell, London, 5 Sept. 1863. Sumner and Seward concurred that were the rams not detained, a retaliatory war was inevitable (Charles C. Beaman, Jr., *The National and Private "Alabama Claims" and their "Final and Amicable Settlement"*, (Washington, 1871), 165).

irresoluteness and hesitancy. Had he been present at the foreign office, it is by no means evident how he might have responded to the crisis. The first illustration of Russell's uncertainty concerned the letter to Adams quoted above, for though written on 1 September it was not immediately posted, presumably in an effort to keep options open. On the 2nd Russell wrote Layard that the rams were almost certainly intended for the confederates, and that "if the Law Officers do not consent to detain them, I will go to London, & argue the point with them & the Treasury."<sup>1</sup> In an accompanying memorandum, he asserted that the Lairds' willingness to furnish the government particulars, and the flying of the French flag on a war vessel the ownership of which the French government disavowed, should both suffice for the detention of the ironclads.<sup>2</sup> These views were wholly contrary to those Russell had previously, and consistently, expressed. Also on the 2nd, Layard met with Sir Roundell Palmer, who advised once again that there was no legal justification for detaining the rams, but that their departure should nevertheless be prohibited. Layard subsequently informed Russell that, in his view, "the stopping of the vessels must be a question of Policy" rather than of strict neutrality.<sup>3</sup> Strong pronouncements such as these from Layard may in fact have been partially responsible for Russell's abandonment of a policy based on strict legal interpretation of the foreign enlistment act.

Layard's views were put to the test on the following day, 3 September, after he received information from the treasury that one of

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 38989, 299: Russell to L, 2 Sept. 1863.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38989, 301: undated memorandum accompanying Russell's letter to Layard of 2 Sept. 1863.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38989, 295: L to Russell, London, 2 Sept. 1863.

the ironclads was preparing to sail.<sup>1</sup> The vessel could be detained by customs authorities only if the law officers advised this was warrantable under law, or on a requisition from the secretary of state. The former option was clearly inconceivable, and responsibility for an immediate decision thus rested on Layard. Until the end of August his chief had frequently and persistently argued that the rams could not be detained unless further evidence were procured; only in the past two days had he apparently indicated otherwise. Yet Layard, acting without instructions, immediately determined to disregard the legalities, and directed that the customs authorities stop the ironclads "as soon as there is reason to believe that they are actually about to put to sea and to detain them until further orders."<sup>2</sup> Explaining his decision to Russell, Layard stated:

I have been much at a loss to know exactly what to do about the Iron-clads. Your last directions had scarcely arrived when Hamilton sent over from the Treasury to say that one of the vessels might go to sea at any moment and that if the Govt. intended to stop her there was no time to lose. The Treasury had no further evidence and on the evidence they possessed nothing could be done.

Judging from the general sense of the several memoranda you have sent me I came to the conclusion that it was your wish that these vessels should not be allowed to put to sea until their destination was known -- and further enquiries could be made...

I venture to suggest that this question of stopping the Ironclads is become one of so much importance that the members of the Cabinet should come to some understanding on the subject. I do not wish to shirk any of the responsibility of acting, and I will do my best to carry out what I gather to be your wishes, but a decided course should be laid down and definite instructions given.

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 39107, 166: Hamilton to L, London, 3 Sept. 1863; FO 5/1000, 248: Hamilton to Hammond, London, 3 Sept. 1863. Though addressed to Hammond, the permanent under secretary did not return to the foreign office until after 9 September.
  2. FO 5/1000, 246: L to the treasury, London, 3 Sept. 1863 (copy).

Under the circumstances I have not sent your letter 1. to Adams... 2.

Coincidentally, Russell had seemingly decided to stop the rams. In a letter dated 3 September, but which did not reach the foreign office until after Layard had acted, he stated: "I have made up my mind that the vessels ought to be stopt, in order to test the law, & prevent a great scandal."<sup>3</sup> Yet Russell's 'conversion' to this viewpoint was apparently indefinite, for he wished the decision to be kept secret and even directed that his 1 September letter to Adams, which indicated that the government would *not* detain the rams, be now posted. Adams received this letter on 5 September, unaware that Layard's order was in direct contrast to its purport. Russell's actions can be plausibly explained only as an effort to temporise; had he been convinced that the ironclads' detention was essential, he would neither have kept the decision secret nor sent Adams a contrary letter. Layard, on the other hand, felt no qualms about the merits of the decision, stating to Russell on 4 September: "You will have seen by my letter of yesterday that the vessels are stopped, or rather will be, should they attempt to leave. Under any circumstances this must be done."<sup>4</sup> His only apparent concern was that he may have misjudged Russell's inclinations, the indecisiveness of which made a definitive interpretation unfeasible. By 5 September Russell's secrecy orders remained in effect,<sup>5</sup> but on that day Layard forced the foreign secretary's hand by writing a private letter to Stuart at the British embassy in Washington, informing him of

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1. FO 5/1000, 221: Russell to Adams, London, 1 Sept. 1863 (copy).
  2. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/28, 467: L to Russell, London, 3 Sept. 1863.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38989, 303; Russell to L, 3 Sept. 1863.
  4. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/28, 471: L to Russell, London, 4 Sept. 1863.
  5. See FO 5/1000, 318: Hamilton to L, London, 5 Sept. 1863, in which Hamilton asks whether secrecy can yet be abrogated and concerned parties informed of the decision.

the decision and authorising him to communicate it to Seward.<sup>1.</sup>

Secrecy could no longer be contemplated. Advising Russell of his action, Layard wrote:

... I have written a private letter to Stuart to tell him that orders have been given to stop the vessels, in order that he might tell Seward if he thought it advisable to do so. I hope I have done right. The mail leaves tonight, and there was no time to telegraph to you. I wrote to Lord Palmerston and he quite approves. 2.

Layard clearly wished Adams to be notified as well;<sup>3.</sup> on the 8th Russell finally gave permission for the American minister to be informed,<sup>4.</sup> and on the 13th the press were advised of the decision,<sup>5.</sup> which was by now virtually irrevocable.

Whether Russell, acting on his own initiative, would have detained the Laird rams in early September 1863 and persisted with their detention, is impossible to determine. Undoubtedly he was uncertain of his position, and wished to keep his options open. Layard's response to the crisis, however, was essentially resolute, and there can be no doubt that he materially contributed to the government's eventual decision to detain the rams. Russell himself, in the aftermath of events, congratulated Layard on his performance at the foreign office: "I am sorry you have had to bear so much on your own shoulders, but your shoulders have proved themselves quite equal to the weight."<sup>6.</sup>

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1. FO 5/1000, 305: L to Stuart, London, 5 Sept. 1863 (copy).
  2. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/28, 473: L to Russell, London, 5 Sept. 1863.
  3. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/28, 476: L to Russell, London, 8 Sept. 1863.
  4. FO 5/1000, 334: telegram, Russell to L, Couper Angas, 8 Sept. 1863. Adams was so informed on the same day (see FO 5/1000, 337: [?] to Adams, London, 8 Sept. 1863 (copy)).
  5. FO 5/1000, 400: foreign office statement, 13 Sept. 1863, forwarded to the *Times*, *Daily News*, *Morning Star* and *Daily Telegraph*.
  6. LP. BL Add Ms 38989, 334: Russell to L, 8 Sept. 1863.

Apart from the probability that war with the United States was only narrowly avoided, the legal precedent which was set on this occasion was very significant. The rams had been detained merely on suspicion, with no corroborating evidence that they were intended for the confederates. After the fact, the law officers continued to aver "that no legal grounds have yet been shewn to exist, on which Her Majesty's Government can interfere with either of the two vessels in question."<sup>1</sup> The suspicions were in fact justified, for it was later demonstrated that Bravay's Egyptian connection was a mere ruse to obfuscate his real intentions.<sup>2</sup> Legally-acceptable evidence was never obtained, however, and the government was forced to contend with the fact that it had disregarded (or as Forster later claimed, had "strained"<sup>3</sup>) its own law as expressed in the foreign enlistment act. In order to avoid legal embarrassment the government eventually purchased the ironclads, which became H.M.S. *Scorpion* and *Wyvern*. What was seized on by contemporaries, and particularly by Americans,<sup>4</sup> was the contrast between the British government's response to the *Alabama* and to the Laird rams. By seizing the latter, the government was in fact admitting its culpability for the escape of the former, for it could no longer convincingly justify its

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1. FO 83/2219, 55: Atherton, Palmer and Phillimore to Russell, London, 12 Sept. 1863.
  2. FO 5/1002, 41: Colquhoun to Russell, On the Nile near Atfch, 6 Oct. 1863; FO 5/1002, 360: Colquhoun to Russell, Cairo, 16 Nov. 1863; FO 5/1003, 3: Colquhoun to Russell, Cairo, 23 Dec. 1863.
  3. *Bradford Observer*, 21 May 1869: F's speech to his Bradford supporters, 20 May 1869.
  4. For example C.C. Beaman, solicitor for the American delegation to the Geneva arbitration, stated categorically that "the English Government cannot maintain that their action in the case of the rams was justifiable, and also maintain that they used all the means in their power to prevent the escape of the Florida and the Alabama" (Beaman, 198 and 162-70, 194-202 *passim*).

remiss on the basis of foreign enlistment act technicalities. The Laird rams precedent, in which Layard's role had been instrumental, was not forgotten when the *Alabama* claims were negotiated and arbitrated.

Forster envisaged an important role for himself in persuading the British public that the government had acted correctly in disregarding its own foreign enlistment act. On 21 September 1863 he chaired a large demonstration in Leeds and appealed to his listeners to endorse the government's action not solely on anti-slavery grounds, but also from regard for future English interests:

I say that as a great maritime nation -- the greatest commercial nation in the world -- it is to our interests more than to those of any other nation that it should not be international law that ships may sail out of neutral ports to aid in belligerent operations such as the *Alabama* has engaged in, and which those two steam rams would do if they were not stopped. (Cheers.) ... If we allow this to become international law, the result will be that whenever we carry on war we shall be obliged to do one of two things -- either to blockade every large port of every nation in the world as well as the ports of the nation with which we are at war, or else to give up our commercial trade and sail our marine under the flags of other nations. There never was a case in which our interest was more clear than it is to have this stopped. 1.

A motion was unanimously passed by the meeting in support of the government decision to detain the Laird rams, and this motion was transmitted by Forster to Russell.<sup>2</sup> The Conservatives, however, opposed the ministry on the issue of the rams, and a debate was raised in the reassembled commons in February 1864. Speaking at the ministers' request,<sup>3</sup> Forster once again defended the government's

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1. *Leeds Mercury*, 22 Sept. 1863.

2. FO 5/929: F to Russell, Burley, 22 Sept. 1863, with accompanying resolutions.

3. FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 51: F to Jane Forster, [London], 24 Feb. 1864.

decision, which he said both prevented war with the United States and retained neutrality precedents which favoured British interests. Defending Russell from charges that he had succumbed to American pressures, Forster argued that

the case alleged against the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was that in the beginning of September he wrote a letter to Mr. Adams, in which he stated that he did not think there were grounds on which the Government could interfere with those rams, and that within two or three days after writing in those terms, he found there were grounds, and took measures to detain the vessels. From those facts he presumed that there had been great doubt on Earl Russell's mind as to whether there were any grounds for detaining them, and that the noble Earl would not, under such circumstances, accede to the demand of a Foreign Government for interference; but that between the time at which he wrote his first letter and the date of his second he received information upon which he determined to act.

Not unexpectedly, Forster believed the government should not divulge the information (which he must have known from Layard was nonexistent) which had allegedly led to Russell's change of heart.<sup>1</sup> In May, in a debate on the *Georgia*, Forster reiterated his conviction that international neutrality precedents which would tell against Britain in a future war should be avoided,<sup>2</sup> but by this time public opinion on the whole endorsed the government's attitude. In the following years, Layard cited Conservative opposition to the rams' detention as a major justification for the return of a Liberal government.<sup>3</sup>

The loopholes in the foreign enlistment act were eventually closed in 1870, following the report of a commission of inquiry, on which

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1. 3 H 173, 984-7: 23 Feb. 1864.

2. 3 H 175, 488-96: 13 May 1864.

3. *Times*, 13 July 1865: L's address at his unopposed Southwark election, 12 July 1865.

Forster served, in 1868.<sup>1</sup> Following the commission's recommendations, the government was accorded the power to detain a ship, or prohibit its construction, on suspicion of its being intended for a belligerent hostile to a nation with which England was at peace. Thus Britain effectually admitted that her foreign enlistment act had proved inadequate during the American civil war to uphold her international obligations of neutrality.

6.

The failure of the British government to prevent the *Alabama's* escape in 1862 continued to rankle long after the conclusion of the civil war, and Anglo-American relations remained tense. In the five years from 1865 to 1870 Hughes, Forster and de Grey made a concerted effort to cultivate good will and to promote a settlement of outstanding disagreements, an effort which was partially responsible for the 1871 agreement by Britain and America to submit conflicting claims to a joint high commission.

Sustaining their desire for Anglo-American reconciliation was a romanticist concept of the English-speaking 'nation' which they wished unified on a global basis, a concept which occasionally approached an Anglo-Saxon supremacist position. Layard, for example,

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1. The report of the neutrality laws commissioners (PP 1867-8 [4027.] xxxii. 265-344) recommended that the foreign enlistment act be amended to include the construction of a ship to be used by a belligerent against a friendly power (269), and that a secretary of state might detain a ship if there was "reasonable and probable cause for believing" it had been built, equipped, fitted out, or armed contrary to the enactment, the onus being on the shipowner to prove it was not intended for the use of a belligerent against a friendly power (270). The foreign enlistment act of 1870, as introduced by the government (PP 1870 (228.) ii.61-76) and as amended in the commons (PP 1870 (258.) ii.77-92), enacted these recommendations, employing the terminology quoted above.

described Americans and Englishmen as "brethren; we had the same language and literature, and the union of the two people was, he believed the best guarantee for peace and the progress of human liberty throughout the world. (Cheers.)"<sup>1</sup>. Hughes even hoped "to see England and her colonies and America bound together as one great family of free nations, acknowledging virtually one common citizenship without surrendering their separate political life."<sup>2</sup>. Forster also supported colonial federation, possibly including America, referring to a world alliance of "our enterprising, colonising, civilizing Anglo-Saxon race."<sup>3</sup>. And de Grey was, as Wolf attests, "profoundly influenced by the ideals of the North in the Civil War and by the Pan-Anglo-Saxonism of Forster and Tom Hughes."<sup>4</sup>.

They possessed a firm base of personal friendship with influential Americans on which to build conciliatory attitudes. One useful contact which Forster and Goderich had forged in the fifties was an acquaintance with Charles Sumner, the irascible anti-slavery Republican senator from Massachusetts. Forster wrote to congratulate Sumner on his fugitive slave law speech in 1852,<sup>5</sup> and in the following year directed his attention to his 'American Slavery' article in the *Westminster Review*. In an appreciative reply, Sumner commented that Forster's article would

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1. *Times*, 13 Nov. 1868: L's Southwark election speech, 12 Nov. 1868.
  2. Hill, *Electoral History of Lambeth*, 179: H's election address, June 1865.
  3. *Times*, 13 Jan. 1865: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 10 Jan. 1865.
  4. Wolf, i : 241.
  5. Edward L. Pierce, *Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner*, (Boston, 1893), iii : 311.

... carry the Anti-Slavery argt. into houses closed against all American efforts. In this respect the writer in an English review has a vantage-ground, which I am glad you are willing to use for the benefit of the slave. All that we can do is circumscribed in its influence; but your words fly across state lines & domestic thresholds in every part of the country... 1.

When Sumner visited England in 1857, he dined at Carlton Gardens with Goderich and Hughes,<sup>2.</sup> and stayed for a day with Forster at Wharfeside.<sup>3.</sup> Sumner's influence on Anglo-American relations became significant in the later sixties, and this earlier friendship with Goderich and Forster could then be utilised. Forster, for example, retained his amicable contacts with Sumner in 1869 despite the latter's hostile and extravagant comments during the senate debate on the Johnson-Clarendon convention.<sup>4.</sup>

They were not as fortunate with all their attempts to form American friendships, W.H. Hurlbert being a case in point. Hurlbert, an unstable and erratic<sup>5.</sup> but nevertheless charming author and journalist, was in the late fifties when he met Hughes and Goderich the foreign editor of the *New York Times*. Potentially influential in his own right, he was also the half brother of the Illinois Republican, Stephen Hurlbut. Affecting intimacy with Lowell,<sup>6.</sup> and genuinely opposed

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1. FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 33: Sumner to F, Washington, 11 April 1853.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 17: G to H, London, 3 July 1857.

3. Pierce, ii : 553: Sumner's journal entries of 27, 28 Oct. 1857.

4. Reid, *Life of Forster*, ii : 15-21: Sumner to F, Washington, 8 June 1869; F to Sumner, London, 20 June 1869; Sumner to F, Boston, 28 June 1869; F to Sumner, 17 July 1869.

5. C.G. Leland, Hurlbert's successor as the *New York Times*'s foreign editor, commented that "there was a screw loose somewhere in him" (Don C. Seitz, *Joseph Pulitzer: His Life and Letters*, (New York, 1924), 126).

6. Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard. bMS Am 1483, 177: H to Lowell, Chester, 25 April 1891.

to slavery, Hurlbert naturally appealed to Hughes, who described him in March 1858 as "one of the best of brethren & men."<sup>1</sup> Hurlbert simply took advantage of Hughes's hospitality, staying at his Wimbledon home for four or five weeks and holidaying with the Hugheses and Goderiches at Vevey. Though Hurlbert introduced Hughes to Benjamin Moran, the secretary of the American legation in London,<sup>2</sup> he did not overall prove a useful contact, and Goderich and Hughes found it difficult to rid themselves of his presence.

It was in the late fifties that Hughes first made contact with James Russell Lowell, Boston author and Harvard professor. In 1859 he wrote the preface to the first English edition of Lowell's *Biglow Papers*, in which he praised the author's "exuberant and extravagant humour, coupled with strong, noble, Christian purpose" as well as his attacks on "military braggadocio, political and literary humbug, and slave-holding."<sup>3</sup> In 1861 Hughes dedicated the American edition of *Tom Brown at Oxford* to Lowell,<sup>4</sup> and thenceforth their friendship flourished. Though they did not in fact meet until 1870, Lowell had already achieved the status of hero in Hughes's eyes.<sup>5</sup> During the civil war Hughes and Lowell emphasised to each other the pacific intents of their respective nations,<sup>6</sup> and it was through Lowell's

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1. Berg Collection, NYPL: H to [probably Daniel] Macmillan, London, 2 March 1857 [sic]. Hurlbert visited England in 1858, not 1857.
  2. Wallace and Gillespie, i : 370-2: Moran's journal entry of 12 July 1858.
  3. Lowell, *The Biglow Papers*, xv, xviii.
  4. Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard. bMS Am 765, 440: H to Lowell, London, 15 June 1861.
  5. Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard. bMS Am 765, 441: H to Lowell, 21 Nov. 186 [7 or 9].
  6. e.g. Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard. bMS Am 765, 440: H to Lowell, London, 15 June 1861; C.E. Norton, ed., *Letters of James Russell Lowell*, (London, 1894), i : 373: Lowell to H, Cambridge, Mass., 9 Sept. 1863; Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard. bMS Am 765, 439: H to Lowell, London, 18 Feb. 1864.

prestige that Hughes was able to exert a conciliatory influence in 1870.

Another American author whose friendship was canvassed during the late fifties was the historian J.L. Motley, whose *Rise of the Dutch Republic* had been published in England in 1856. Motley met Layard, Goderich and Hughes in the spring of 1858,<sup>1</sup> when he lived in England, and by 1860 was breakfasting with Layard<sup>2</sup> and visiting de Grey at Studley Royal.<sup>3</sup> At the outset of the confederate secession, Forster and Hughes jointly sought his views, and Motley clearly relied on Forster's pro-union influence in England.<sup>4</sup> In August 1861 Lincoln appointed Motley U.S. minister to Austria, on the strong recommendation of Sumner. Motley travelled to Vienna via Britain and France. He visited Russell in Scotland, Forster and de Grey in Yorkshire, and Layard in London, and described Forster at this juncture as "the warmest and most intelligent friend that America possesses in England."<sup>5</sup> Layard conferred with Motley again in Paris,<sup>6</sup> and he and Hughes remained in contact with their American acquaintance at Vienna during the civil war years.<sup>7</sup> Undoubtedly their relationship helped augment

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1. Curtis, i : 228, 232-3: Motley to Mary Motley, London, 28 May 1858; *ibid.*, i : 285: Motley to Mary Motley, London, 4 July 1858.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 58165, 150: Motley to L, [London], 12 May 1860.
  3. Curtis, i : 349-50: Motley to his mother, Ripon, 27 Sept. 1860. Motley described de Grey in this letter as "one of the rising politicians of England" and as "a hard-working public man, and a most amiable and agreeable companion." Fanny Hughes was also at Studley during this visit.
  4. FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 49: F to Jane Forster, London, 18 March 1861; Curtis, i : 366-7: F to Motley, Burley, 30 March 1861.
  5. Curtis, ii : 34: Motley to his mother, Burley, 5 Sept. 1861.
  6. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/28, 396: L to Russell, Chantilly, 29 Oct. 1861.
  7. LP. BL Add Ms 39104, 67: Motley to L, Vienna, 25 Oct. 1862; LP. BL Add Ms 38988, 386: Motley to L, [Vienna], 27 Nov. 1862.

Anglo-American understanding, particularly after March 1869 when Motley was appointed American minister to Great Britain.

Their most important American connection, however, was with the U.S. ambassador to Britain during the civil war, C.F. Adams. Forster and Hughes frequented the American legation in London during the civil war years, and Adams visited Forster at Wharfeside on at least two separate occasions.<sup>1</sup> Hughes made a special effort to befriend Adams's son and private secretary, Henry Adams, even introducing him to the delights of the cosmopolitan club. The 'cos' in fact provided a forum for Anglo-American debate during the late fifties and sixties; Motley, Henry Adams and later General Adam Badeau were all guests of the club, and Hughes later commented: "I always catch any good American & bring him here, & I find your folk appreciate it more than most things here."<sup>2</sup> Hughes and Forster thus helped acclimatise the Adamses to London society, and were rewarded for their efforts with the Americans' trust and friendship. Henry spoke of his "close alliance" with Hughes,<sup>3</sup> and described Forster as

pure gold, without a trace of base metal; honest, unselfish, practical; he took up the Union cause and made himself its champion,...partly because of his Quaker anti-slavery convictions, and partly because it gave him a practical opening in the House... With such a manager, the friends of the Union in England began to take heart. 4.

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1. Ford, i : 192-3: C.F. Adams to his son, London, 17 Oct. 1862; Wallace and Gillespie, ii : 1337: Moran's journal entry of 7 Oct. 1864.
  2. Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard. bMS Am 765, 441: H to Lowell, London, 2 Jan. 1870.
  3. H. Adams, *Education of Henry Adams*, 127.
  4. *ibid.*, 125.

In 1868 Charles Francis Adams referred to Forster as "the person whom I most esteem, as well for his staunch and unvarying support of a policy of goodwill to America as for his personal qualities."<sup>1</sup>.

After 1865, Hughes endeavoured to exert his conciliatory influence through the press. To *Macmillan's Magazine* he contributed an article entitled 'Peace on Earth', in which he expressed admiration for northern sacrifices during the war, and declared that Englishmen should honour their American brethren "by graceful and loyal word and deed."<sup>2</sup> Hughes had also attempted during the latter years of the civil war to establish a journalistic influence in the United States. In March 1864 he contributed a letter to the *Spirit of the Fair*, a paper published in conjunction with the fund-raising metropolitan fair in New York City, in which he attempted to demonstrate that unionist sympathies were widespread in Britain; Mill, Goldwin Smith, Houghton, Trollope, Dicey, Browning, Newman, Argyll, Milner Gibson and, to some extent, Russell and Roundell Palmer were cited as proof of his contention. (Russell's credentials were certainly dubious, but the others were genuine Yankophiles.) Hughes tactfully admitted in his letter that the British were chiefly responsible for the "estrangement and bitterness" between the two nations, but anticipated

a closer and more hearty alliance between my country and yours, as soon as this war is over, than has ever been possible since we parted in last century. Slavery has been the only real cause of our estrangement for the last thirty years; as soon as that has been taken away the laws of gravitation will surely bring us together again. 3.

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1. Reid, *Life of Forster*, ii : 10: C.F. Adams to F, London, 14 March 1868.
  2. Thomas Hughes, 'Peace on Earth', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 13, Jan. 1866, 195-201.
  3. Nelson F. Adkins, 'Thomas Hughes and the American Civil War, a letter', *Journal of Negro History*, 18, 3, July 1933, 322-9, reproducing Hughes's letter dated London, 10 March 1864 and published in the *Spirit of the Fair* on 11 April 1864.

Hughes was not, however, content with the limited clientele of a short-lived journal. In September 1865 he declared to Lowell that England and America "want sadly better knowledge of each other, & I shd. like to do my little possible towards it by writing letters or articles on our goings on & thinkings for one of your papers or periodicals."<sup>1</sup> From September 1866 to January 1867 Hughes, writing as London correspondent, contributed a range of social and political gossip to the columns of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.<sup>2</sup> Only on one occasion, however, did he specifically address himself to Anglo-American tensions, when he disclaimed English jealousy of America's growing wealth and power, exhibited his quasi-racist admiration of Anglo-American pan-Anglo-Saxonism, and proffered a sentimental "'God-speed the United States' from the bottom of my heart."<sup>3</sup> Reactions to Hughes's attempts at conciliation in the *Tribune* were apparently so negative<sup>4</sup> that he discontinued his column from January 1867; only in September 1869 did he resume his correspondence. Hughes was if nothing else honest in his convictions, for in December 1869 he attacked American immoderation in pressing 'indirect' claims (the U.S. senate had recently rejected the Johnson-Clarendon convention), dismissed the relevance of "sentimental" grievances and the desire for apologies, and declared that it was "high time that your people should know that the warmest friends of your country among us do not sympathize the least with your attitude on the subject of our differences."<sup>5</sup> Through forthright and direct appeal to the American public, and through friendship with *Tribune* journalists such as Smalley

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1. Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard. BMS Am 1483, 173: H to Lowell, [London], 20 Sept. 1865.
  2. *New-York Daily Tribune*, 6 Sept. 1866, 15 Oct. 1866, 31 Dec. 1866, 7 Jan. 1867.
  3. *New-York Daily Tribune*, 31 Dec. 1866.
  4. See R-V Autographs, Misc English, Pierpont Morgan Library: H to [?], Brighton, 3 Jan. 1867.
  5. *New-York Daily Tribune*, 25 Dec. 1869.

and Whitelaw Reid, Hughes exerted significant pressure on American opinion for compromise and understanding. The New York press, including the conciliatory *Tribune*, was undoubtedly influential; according to Sir John Rose, a British emissary to Washington, New York newspapers had "largely influenced -- if they have not wholly controlled -- American public sentiment as to the relations with and feeling towards England."<sup>1</sup>

Hughes followed up his journalistic initiative with a personal visit to the United States in 1870. Hughes hoped thereby to improve relations between the two countries, and intended to do so not through public lectures but by personal contacts.<sup>2</sup> Arriving in August, he stayed for a time with Lowell at Cambridge, Mass., where he discussed matters with Sumner, Emerson and Judge Ebenezer Hoar (an American member of the joint high commission in 1871) among others. Hughes never conceded Britain's guilt in abrogating neutrality during the civil war, with the exception of the *Alabama* claims. Rather, he defended the British government's effectual response to hostilities (if not its members' sympathies), and assured his American listeners that much of England had been unionist-inclined. Writing to Fanny on 31 August, Hughes commented that he was "at last quite sure I am doing some good with some of these men, all of whom are influential, and most of them badly prejudiced against us still as a nation."<sup>3</sup>

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1. FO 5/1298, 126: Rose to Granville, London, 26 Feb. 1871 (copy).
  2. Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard. bMS Am 765, 441: H to Lowell, 26 July 1870.
  3. Daniel Goodwin, *Thomas Hughes of England and his Visits to Chicago in 1870 and 1880*, (Chicago, 1896), 29: H to Fanny Hughes, [Cambridge, Mass.], 31 Aug. 1870.

Ten days later he stated rather condescendingly of the influential Americans with whom he had spoken:

... as I spend the greater part of my time in showing them how mistaken they must be in their views as to England, else how is it that we didn't interfere and get to war, I feel I am doing good work. They take to me, I can see, apart from my proclivities. I am obliged to give up poor old Pam, the mercantile community of England, and the majority of the aristocracy; but when I have made a Jonah of these, I always succeed in bringing these good, simple, candid, impulsive fellows to admit that we did them no bad turn in their troubles. 1.

Undoubtedly Hughes's personable character assisted his task of promoting understanding and conciliation: when he left America, for example, Lowell commented that "parting with you was like saying good-bye to sunshine."<sup>2</sup>

Hughes discussed Anglo-American relations with a wide range of literary and public men, including the secretary of state, Seward. He also succumbed to pressure that he speak publicly, and in October addressed a notable gathering of over 3000 New Englanders in Boston. Hughes's audience included the governor of Massachusetts, two former governors, senators Sumner and Wilson, Josiah Quincy, Wendell Phillips, Hoar, Longfellow, Lowell, Richard Dana and Oliver Wendell Holmes. In 'John to Jonathan' Hughes emphasised that "true men and women on both sides of the Atlantic feel, with Mr. Forster, that a war between America and England would be a civil war," defended at length the British government's response to the war, discussed and urged arbitration of the *Alabama* claims, recalled Exeter hall and stressed that, the aristocracy and mercantile classes aside, Britons had in general sympathised with America's plight: "The dress suit, and the stomach

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1. Hughes, *Vacation Rambles*, 146; H to Fanny Hughes, Garrison's Landing, 9 Sept. 1870.

2. Norton, ii : 76: Lowell to H, Cambridge, Mass., 18 Oct. 1870.

and digestive apparatus, of England were hostile to you, and you have taken them for the nation: the brain and heart and muscle of England were on your side, and these you have ignored and forgotten."<sup>1</sup>  
 In England the speech was published in the December issue of *Macmillan's Magazine*; in America it was received with respect and even enthusiasm. The *New-York Daily Tribune* reproduced the speech in its entirety,<sup>2</sup> and commented editorially:

Mr. Thomas Hughes may have failed the other night to show us good reasons for abandoning our position on the Alabama claims, but he certainly succeeded in showing us good reasons why we should prize the friendship of the English people and approach the settlement of our international quarrel in an amicable and generous spirit.

Expressing some surprise at the extent of English goodwill which Hughes claimed during the civil war, the leader writer stated that

no man could have told us this story better than Thomas Hughes. We trust him entirely. We can speak with him more freely than with any Englishman who has ever been here; and when we tell him that we feel he is one of us, it is not, as he seems to fear, that we question his entire devotion to his own Government, but that we know he can take a broad view of both sides of the question and put himself in our place for the purposes of argument. 3.

Such generous praise was not confined to the columns of one newspaper, and the British ambassador in Washington informed Granville that Hughes's speech had "been of some service. It has produced some Articles in the Newspapers which betray an impatience that the question [of the *Alabama* claims] should be settled, and advise the abandonment of the pretension that we had no right to recognize the Southern States

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1. Hughes, 'John to Jonathan', 81, 87-8, and 81-91 *passim*.
  2. *New-York Daily Tribune*, 12 Oct. 1870.
  3. *New-York Daily Tribune*, 13 Oct. 1870.

as belligerents."<sup>1</sup> Hughes himself believed that he "had done some good work towards a better understanding between the nations."<sup>2</sup> The reward for his energies followed shortly, when his colleague de Grey successfully negotiated the treaty of Washington.

The public efforts of Hughes, Forster and Layard to achieve Anglo-American reconciliation were not of course confined to the United States. Forster organised and addressed an emancipation society meeting shortly after Lincoln's assassination, an occasion which the positivist Frederic Harrison described as "one of the grandest memorial gatherings that ever occurred in my lifetime."<sup>3</sup> Hughes founded an Anglo-American association on his return from America in 1870, the purpose of which was to promote "peace and amity" between the two nations.<sup>4</sup> Hughes envisaged the association cultivating "a more intimate knowledge of your [i.e. American] politics & specially of all questions at issue between us, & I think it is likely to prove a useful & influential organization."<sup>5</sup> Though short-lived, the association was active in pursuit of its goal. In parliament Forster attempted on more than one occasion to minimise Anglo-American alienation<sup>6</sup> and to his fellow-Bradfordians stressed the popular support in England for the union during the civil war.<sup>7</sup> Privately, Hughes impressed his views

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1. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/80, 21: Edward Thornton to Granville, Washington, 18 Oct. 1870.
  2. Hughes, *Vacation Rambles*, 178: H to Fanny Hughes, Ithaca, N.Y., 16 Oct. 1870.
  3. Frederic Harrison, *Autobiographical Memoirs*, ii : 71.
  4. *Manchester Guardian*, 10 Dec. 1870.
  5. Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard. bMS Am 765, 442: H to Lowell, London, 31 Dec. 1870.
  6. 3 H 177, 1555-65: 13 March 1865; 3 H 177, 1938-40: 20 March 1865; 3 H 190, 1983-94: 20 March 1868.
  7. *Bradford Observer*, 21 May 1869: F's address to his Bradford supporters, 20 May 1869.

on Granville<sup>1.</sup> and attempted, through Bruce, to influence Gladstone.<sup>2.</sup> He also befriended General Adam Badeau, secretary to the American legation in London during the late sixties and confidant of Grant, whom he took to the cosmopolitan and described in notable Americanese as "a real good fellow."<sup>3.</sup> De Grey also defended Britain's stance to Badeau in the spring of 1870.<sup>4.</sup>

During the years prior to the 1871 Washington negotiations, therefore, Hughes, Forster and de Grey materially assisted in the establishment of a conciliatory and amicable atmosphere on both sides of the Atlantic. Though their influence and activities could not eradicate deep-seated sentiments of hostility, their pacific appeals to the people and officials of both nations were frequently productive. Considered separately, these writings, speeches or discussions appear insignificant; considered in their entirety, they form an impressive attempt to cement Anglo-American understanding. It should be recalled, moreover, that in the late sixties Hughes, Forster and de Grey were prominent and influential public figures: Forster as a member of the Liberal ministry, de Grey in the cabinet, and Hughes, in America as in Britain, renowned for his authorship of *Tom Brown's Schooldays*. Their authority thus contributed to a political environment in which the *Alabama* dispute could be negotiated.

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1. Ramm, *Political Correspondence of Gladstone and Granville*, i : 161: Granville to Gladstone, Walmer Castle, [20 Nov. 1870]; Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard. bMS Am 765, 442: H to Lowell, London, 31 Dec. 1870. In the latter, Hughes speaks of having been "to see Lord Granville & indoctrinate him with my American views."
  2. Parrish Collection, Princeton: H to B, Horsham, 10 Oct. 1869.
  3. Lowell Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard. bMS Am 765, 441: H to Lowell, 29 July 1869; also see nine letters from Hughes to Badeau dated 1870-2 in the Autograph File, Houghton Library, Harvard.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43622, 117: deG to Badeau, 22 April 1870.

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As a method of settlement the concept of arbitration appealed to de Grey, Forster and Hughes. Arbitration, it may be noted, was not perceived merely as a means to solve international disputes. In a wider, romanticist context arbitration was also envisaged at this time by de Grey, Forster and Hughes as a method by which hostilities between capital and labour might be mitigated, and social unity thereby encouraged. Extended to international considerations, arbitration would in their view promote co-operation and fraternity amongst mankind, sentiments particularly applicable to Anglo-American, Anglo-Saxon, unity.

British liberals had previously restricted their approval of international arbitration to the settlement of minor disputes; Palmerston and Russell, for example, were unwilling to submit to arbitration questions such as the *Alabama* involving national 'honour'. Unlike de Grey, Forster and Hughes, Layard too was loath to subject England's prestige to foreign arbitrament. In 1866 he informed Britain's ambassador to Washington that some matters were susceptible to arbitration, "but there are surely some which cannot [be arbitrated] without admitting a precedent of a very serious and dangerous nature -- and such were the Alabama claims."<sup>1</sup> In 1868 Layard averred that schemes of international arbitration and general disarmament were utopian.<sup>2</sup> Layard's approach was the harbinger of fundamental disaccord on foreign policy with his former colleagues, an incongruity which became pronounced during the 1870s after his ambassadorial appointment to Madrid. Whilst de Grey, Forster, Hughes and Bruce all accepted Gladstonian morality as a basis for foreign policy, Layard reverted to a Palmerstonian insistence on

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 39120, 112: L to Sir F. Bruce, London, 12 May 1866 (copy).

2. *Times*, 13 Nov. 1868: L's Southwark election speech, 12 Nov. 1868.

British prestige and power. Publicly, with an eye no doubt on his personal diplomatic ambitions, Layard continued to accept for some years that the Gladstone government had by the treaty of Washington consented to the *Alabama* arbitration

so as to justify unjust and unprecedented demands upon his own country, in order that they might place upon a more broad, just, and equitable basis -- one more consistent with the advanced civilisation of our time -- the intercourse of all countries, and define their obligations as neutrals. 1.

In contrast, he privately remarked to his friend George Clark that he "always (*entre nous*) detested the Treaty," and thought that "a diplomatist of experience and tact would have done something better."<sup>2</sup> England should not, Layard held, have accepted any responsibility for the escape of the *Alabama* and other cruisers.<sup>3</sup>

For de Grey, Forster and Hughes, however, arbitration appeared an effective and morally-attractive method by which to resolve the *Alabama* claims. Hughes canvassed the possibility in his maiden parliamentary speech in February 1866.<sup>4</sup> Forster, who had suggested arbitration to settle the *Trent* dispute,<sup>5</sup> argued before the commons in 1868 that England might confidently accept arbitration on her allegedly premature recognition of belligerent rights, and might give indemnity for the *Alabama*'s escape in order to secure international neutrality obligations for the future.<sup>6</sup> Forster proposed that a joint commission be established to consider these issues.<sup>7</sup> Early attempts by the

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1. [A.H. Layard and William Smith], 'The Eastern Question and the Conference', *Quarterly Review*, 143, Jan. 1877, 318.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 79: L to G.T. Clark, Madrid, 13 Feb. 1872.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 80: L to Clark, Madrid, 21 March 1872.
  4. 3 H 181, 1053-4: 23 Feb. 1866.
  5. *Bradford Observer*, 2 Jan. 1862: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 31 Dec. 1861.
  6. 3 H 190, 1178-83: 6 March 1868.
  7. *ibid*; 3 H 190, 1983-94: 20 March 1868.

Conservative government to achieve arbitration were abortive, principally due to American insistence that her indirect claims against Britain be considered.<sup>1.</sup> With the senate's rejection, instigated by Sumner, of the Johnson-Clarendon convention in 1869, arbitration appeared an unlikely solution to Anglo-American alienation. The convention had been negotiated between the foreign secretary, Lord Stanley, and the American minister in London, Reverdy Johnson, and provided for a somewhat ill-defined arbitration. Sumner, as chairman of the foreign relations committee, led his fellow-senators in pressing for the inclusion of indirect claims in America's stated grievances, for the rejection of arbitration, and for demanding a British apology and immediate financial compensation. Tensions were exacerbated by the ill-disguised desire of Sumner and Fish, the American secretary of state, to annex Canada. Forster and Hughes joined the antagonistic British response to these expressed views. Forster publicly deplored Sumner's senate speech rejecting arbitration,<sup>2.</sup> and Hughes commented:

... There is no more bigoted Philo-Yankee, or Philo-American than I in this country but I would sooner be ordered out to Canada with my Volunteer regiment than give in an inch to this swagger of Sumner Chandler 3. & Co. There is plenty of fight in the old country yet but I hope to Heaven the United States will not be the nation to bring it to the proof. 4.

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1. The so-called indirect claims included reparation for the loss by the transfer of the mercantile marine from the American to the British flag, higher premiums for marine insurance, and the costs of the prolongation of the war which Britain's 'premature' declaration of belligerent rights had allegedly caused. The direct claims referred only to the depredations committed by the *Alabama* and similar escaped cruisers.
  2. *Bradford Observer*, 21 May 1869: F's address to his Bradford supporters, 20 May 1869.
  3. Senator Zachariah Chandler had with Sumner vehemently opposed the Johnson-Clarendon agreement.
  4. Parrish Collection, Princeton: H to [?], 10 May 1869.

There were nevertheless significant forces favouring a settlement. Financiers on both sides of the Atlantic pressed for stable relations. In 1870 the Franco-Prussian war and the Russian abrogation of the Black Sea neutrality clauses of the treaty of Paris threatened Britain's position in Europe, and emphasised her military weakness. If troops were to be withdrawn from North America, friendly relations with the United States were essential. In addition there were further points of conflict between Britain and America, concerning American fishing rights in Canadian waters, the free navigation of the St Lawrence, the island of San Juan and other border disputes, and Fenian raids from American territory into Canada. These made feasible the balancing of concessions in one sphere by gains in another; the *Alabama* claims need not be settled in isolation. Finally, the effective public and personal lobbying of de Grey, Forster, Hughes and others had demonstrated and augmented the substantial good will which existed in both nations.

After protracted diplomatic manoeuvring, Britain and America agreed to the establishment of a joint high commission in Washington to consider their respective claims. Forster had been considered as a possible commissioner,<sup>1</sup> but Gladstone and Granville eventually resolved to appoint de Grey as head of the British negotiators, his colleagues being Sir Stafford Northcote, Sir Edward Thornton (British ambassador to Washington), Sir John A. Macdonald (the Canadian prime minister) and Mountague Bernard (Chichele Professor of International

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1. Ramm, i : 165-6: Granville to Gladstone, London, 22 Nov. 1870; Gladstone to Granville, 23 Nov. 1870.

Law and Diplomacy at Oxford).<sup>1.</sup> Utilising his connection with the *New-York Daily Tribune*, Hughes anonymously attempted to ease the commission's task by informing the American public that

Lord de Grey and Ripon... is the man in all the Government of the best liberal record, except the Duke of Argyle [sic]. 2. Almost his first public act, when he was only 21, was to take the men's part in a great struggle between the engineers and their work-people, in which the men were in the right, as has since been acknowledged. This brought many hard words on him, especially in *The Times*. He was always intimate with Forster, Hughes, and other prominent Liberals, and was one of the founders of the Workingmen's College. He was member for Hull, then of Huddersfield, and lastly for the West Riding of Yorkshire, the biggest constituency in England. Notwithstanding his pronounced Liberalism he was put in office, and by hard work became a Cabinet Minister earlier than any man (perhaps with one exception, Lord Hartington) that I can remember. You will ask -- What was he doing during the war that we heard nothing of him? The fact is, he was in subordinate office then -- Under-Secretary for War -- and so, by our official etiquette, had to hold his tongue absolutely. 3.

Negotiations proper commenced on 27 February 1871. Forster was instrumental in devising Britain's approach to the Washington conference: in January he had drafted for the foreign office a document transmitted to Washington which expressed a desire to arbitrate the *Alabama* question, an acceptance of jurists rather than heads of state as arbitrators, a willingness to express regret for the *Alabama's* escape and depredations, and a desire to negotiate future obligations

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1. The American commissioners were led by the secretary of state, Hamilton Fish, and included Robert Schenck (the designated ambassador to Britain), Samuel Nelson (a senior supreme court justice), Ebenezer Hoar (a former attorney general), and George H. Williams.
  2. Argyll was presumably singled out because of his strong public commitment to the north during the civil war.
  3. *New-York Daily Tribune*, 2 March 1871.

of maritime neutrality.<sup>1.</sup> This document formed the basis of the government's official instructions to the British commissioners.<sup>2.</sup> The United States, on the other hand, wished Britain to admit her liability for the *Alabama*'s escape and to pay compensation without reference to arbitration. On 8 March, however, Fish indicated American willingness to submit the *Alabama* claims to arbitration if accompanied by guidelines on mutually-accepted principles of international law applicable to the case.<sup>3.</sup> The British were instructed to seek unrestricted arbitration; de Grey, though prepared to "fight for arbitration to the point of death,"<sup>4.</sup> was unwilling to insist that it be unrestricted, and on 10 March privately recommended to Granville the acceptance of arbitration guided by agreed principles.<sup>5.</sup> Cabinet, though uneasy, eventually yielded. Forster's influence was undoubtedly significant in cabinet deliberations on this issue, for he held that stated guidelines were superior to unrestricted arbitration in affording "some guarantee for the future, in case America should choose to return to her old position of pushing neutral rights to the utmost."<sup>6.</sup> These principles of international maritime law, if agreed upon, were to be operative for the future as well as applicable to the *Alabama*.<sup>7.</sup>

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1. FO 5/1296: telegram, foreign office to Thornton, London, 24 Jan. 1871 (copy). The rough draft of this despatch is in Forster's handwriting.
  2. FO 5/1299, 1, 49: foreign office instructions to the British commissioners, 9 Feb. 1871 (copy).
  3. FO 5/1300, 96: secret despatch, British commissioners to Granville, Washington, 8 March 1871.
  4. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/63, 74: deG to Granville, Washington, 3 March 1871.
  5. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/63, 92: deG to Granville, Washington, 10 March 1871.
  6. RP. BL Add Ms. 43536, 269: F to deG, London, 18 March 1871.
  7. FO 5/1300, 110: secret despatch, British commissioners to Granville, Washington, 9 March 1871.

(In order to save face, Britain agreed that the principles arrived at should be applied to the *Alabama*, without technically admitting they were in effect at the time of her escape.) For the future, it was clearly in Britain's interest as the world's leading naval power, and with the world's largest mercantile marine, that neutrality laws be as stringent as possible, but such stringency would inevitably operate to her disadvantage in the *Alabama* arbitration. American interests contrasted on both counts. From the British point of view, therefore, the question became one of balance between past and future considerations; de Grey and Forster were far more willing than their cabinet colleagues to sacrifice the past for the future. De Grey's task at Washington was further complicated by such issues as San Juan and the Canadian fisheries, for Macdonald proved an obstinate and self-interested colleague. Thus de Grey complained to Forster: "Our task here is no easy one with the U.S. Commrs on one side, Canada & Macdonald unreasonable & playing their own game on the other, & my excellent friends H.M. Govt firing into us behind as well."<sup>1</sup>

Four rules regarding international maritime neutrality were debated by the joint high commission. The first dealt with the neutral's obligations concerning warships attempting to escape from its ports to carry on hostilities against a power with which the neutral country was at peace. Both the American and British foreign enlistment acts had referred to a neutral's obligation to prevent such vessels being armed or equipped within its jurisdiction. The British were also morally obliged to admit that, despite the legal problem in proving their confederate destination, "the point of international law as to

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 274: deG to F, Washington, 4 April 1871.

the admissability of furnishing unarmed ships of war from a neutral port to a belligerent was, in principle, abandoned when Lord Russell bought Lairds ironclads."<sup>1</sup> The American commissioners, however, wished in addition to prohibit the actual construction of such warships, a stipulation which would necessarily have told against Britain in the *Alabama* arbitration. De Grey, with an eye to the future, agreed that the construction of future *Alabamas* should be prohibited, as "in the abstract they [the Americans] have a great deal to say for themselves on that point."<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, warship construction had actually been prohibited in Britain's 1870 foreign enlistment act. Yet the majority view of cabinet on this issue, as conveyed by Granville, was negative and obstinate:

... Your suggestion as to the term "construction" savored too much of letting our intentions for the future being taken as a guide for the liabilities of the past.

Lowe & Gladstone & Halifax were unyielding on it, and the Chancellor thought that it would be impossible to surrender so much... 3.

After much wrangling within both cabinet and the joint high commission, the term 'construction' was weakened to 'specially adapted, in whole or in part'.<sup>4</sup>

The second and third rules at issue created less controversy. The second stipulated that a neutral forbid either belligerent the use of its ports or waters as a base for naval operations, for the supply of war materiel, or for the recruitment of men; the third simply directed

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1. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/106: Tenterden to Granville, Washington, 10 March 1871. Lord Tenterden, a senior foreign office official, served as secretary to the British commissioners. The damning precedent of the Laird rams was rarely cited in public by British officials.
  2. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/63, 92: deG to Granville, Washington, 10 March 1871.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43520, 72: Granville to deG, London, 11 March 1871.
  4. See appendix 2, article VI.

the neutral government to use due diligence to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties, neglect of which rendered it liable for damages. The wording of these clauses was of course subjected to amendments, but both British and American governments were committed to the principles involved.

The fourth rule, proposed by the Americans, introduced a concept not previously accepted in international law. It stated that a vessel which had departed from a neutral's jurisdiction in violation of its neutrality should be detained if afterwards found in the neutral's jurisdiction, unless it had in the interim been commissioned as a public ship of war; if such vessel had been commissioned and were not therefore liable to detention, the neutral would remain responsible for subsequent losses until the *bona fide* termination of its offending cruise. De Grey thought this proposal "quite fair,"<sup>1</sup> but the majority of cabinet, undoubtedly looking primarily to the past and the *Alabama*, was loath to accept the neutral government's responsibility for detaining a vessel when its local authority might not have the resources to do so. Had the fourth rule been accepted, international maritime neutrality obligations would have become significantly more stringent and effective. Forster, whom Granville variously described as "a tower of strength, most active and judicious"<sup>2</sup> and as "the mainstay of the affair,"<sup>3</sup> advised the foreign secretary at this juncture that "the best thing we could do is to give de Grey & his colleagues carte-blanche & tell them we will back them in whatever they do."<sup>4</sup> Cabinet, however,

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1. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/63, 134: deG to Granville, Washington, 21 March 1871.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43520, 101: Granville to deG, London, 18 March 1871.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43520, 173: Granville to deG, London, 1 April 1871.
  4. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/56; F to Granville, London, [30 March 1871].

insisted on placing the onus on the local authority,<sup>1.</sup> and Forster reported privately to de Grey:

... I have watched over your affairs like a lynx. At one time I much feared the Cabinet would refuse to depart from unrestricted arbitration, but Granville stood firm, & he & I at last pushed through the consent we have given you to your first three articles. The fourth was impossible as it is... 2.

Despite Forster's assurance to de Grey that he might "rely on my doing my very utmost to prevent your being bullied from here,"<sup>3.</sup> cabinet amended the fourth rule so as to lessen the liability of the neutral government; de Grey complained that such alterations appeared to "relieve the central Government from *all* obligation to order the detention of a vessel, which has escaped in violation of the rules laid down in the preceding paragraphs," and that such limitations "surely go beyond what you ought to require."<sup>4.</sup> The American negotiators, though reluctant to admit the mention of any other authority than the neutral

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1. It may be noted that Gladstone's cabinet role throughout the Washington negotiations was relatively minimal and indecisive. He rarely took the initiative in discussion, was not wholly committed to the principle of international arbitration, and was reluctant to sacrifice past 'honour' for future considerations. In general he believed de Grey too lenient with the Americans, and unconsciously biased towards a settlement regardless of its implications. Of the other cabinet members, Chichester Fortescue, Argyll, Stansfeld, Halifax and Kimberley were with Gladstone generally indecisive in attempting to balance past and future considerations; Lowe, Cardwell, Goschen, and Hartington definitely inclined towards protecting Britain's 'prestige' despite future consequences; Granville, Hatherley, Forster and Bruce consistently endorsed de Grey's attitude (see RP. BL Add Ms 43520, 173: Granville to deG, London, 1 April 1871; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 269: F to deG, London, 18 March 1871; Ramm, i : 233: Gladstone to Granville, London, 4 April 1871).
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 269: F to deG, London, 18 March 1871.
  3. *ibid.*
  4. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/63, 149: deG to Granville, Washington, 24 March 1871.

government itself, with which foreign governments had alone to deal,<sup>1.</sup> were nevertheless prepared to compromise to some extent.<sup>2.</sup> British cabinet, however, would not agree "to be responsible for a local authority being unable from want of sufficient force at his disposal to enforce detention," and proposed that the fourth rule be dispensed with altogether.<sup>3.</sup> This was agreed to by the Americans, to the considerable chagrin of de Grey, who wrote to Granville:

... I have some doubts whether the abandonment of any Article in the nature of the 4th will be a good thing for us in the future. It has been one of the difficulties of the subject that we have had to consider both the past & the future. I am inclined to think that you at home have looked too exclusively at the former & have somewhat sacrificed the latter; perhaps on our side we may have been apt to go too much in the opposite direction, but there can be no doubt that we in England have the strongest interest, far stronger than the Americans have, in preventing future Alabamas, and therefore I am obstinate enough to believe that our tendency has been in the right direction... 4.

To Halifax de Grey stated after the fourth rule's abandonment: "I look upon the importance to England of taking precaution against future Alabamas as so great, that I should have liked to have seen the rules which are to be binding hereafter between the two countries, made somewhat more precise and stringent than they will now be."<sup>5.</sup>

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1. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/63, 186: deG to Granville, Washington, 31 March 1871.
  2. FO 5/1301, 172: telegram, British commissioners to Granville, Washington, 30 March 1871 (copy).
  3. FO 5/1299, 192: telegram, Granville to British commissioners, London, 1 April 1871 (copy).
  4. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/63, 204: deG to Granville, Washington, 4 April 1871.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43529, 63: deG to Halifax, Washington, 4 April 1871 (copy).

Forster, his strongest ally in cabinet, commented to de Grey that he "always thought & said that men generally on this side would gladly buy the future by the past. The danger is that the Americans will think *that* a bad bargain, but why all the Cabinet does not jump at it is to me astounding."<sup>1</sup>.

The remaining *Alabama* questions were settled by the joint high commission with relative ease. Britain acceded to a formal expression of regret for the *Alabama*'s escape, whilst denying liability. The method of arbitration was determined, and a gross sum payment was agreed upon should the arbitrators rule against Britain. There was however considerable bickering over the wording of the preamble to the treaty, with the British cabinet insistently proposing insignificant amendments. Gladstone, for example, strongly objected to the use of the word 'rebellion' to describe the confederate secession,<sup>2</sup> and was supported by the cabinet majority. De Grey informed Granville that he "must honestly say that I do not see the necessity for insisting upon its being left out," especially with regard to senate ratification of the treaty;<sup>3</sup> in cabinet, Forster assured de Grey that he had "fought very hard for 'rebellion' but was almost alone."<sup>4</sup> The offending word was eventually omitted.

The treaty of Washington was signed on 8 May 1871. Much of the credit for its successful conclusion may be attributed to de Grey's diplomatic finesse. Northcote, for example, wrote that "de Grey deserves even more credit than he is likely to receive. None but those who have

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 278: F to deG, London, 20 April 1871.

2. Ramm, i : 238: Gladstone to Granville, Hawarden, 12 April 1871; Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/81, 43: draft of *Alabama* articles preamble, with Gladstone's suggested alterations, 13 April 1871; Ramm, i : 244: Gladstone to Granville, London, 28 April 1871.

3. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/63, 283: deG to Granville, Washington, 28 April 1871.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 278: F to deG, London, 20 April 1871.

worked with him can appreciate his merits."<sup>1</sup> Thornton, the British ambassador, commented that "Lord de Grey has wonderful tact and is much liked by all."<sup>2</sup> Tenterden, secretary to the British commissioners, praised

... the *very* able way in which Lord de Grey conducts the discussion. He never loses temper, never presses an advantage too far and hits hard when required -- and is wonderfully quick in catching at and making his points. In fact he is a great deal more than a match for Fish or any of them... 3.

On a separate occasion, Tenterden declared: "It is lucky Lord de Grey is with us. No one but a Yorkshireman could manage five Yankees and a Scotchman [Macdonald]."<sup>4</sup> And Bancroft Davis, secretary to the American commissioners, informed de Grey that "all the American gentlemen connected with the Commission feel most sincerely how much it is due to you personally that the two Countries have advanced so far towards an amicable and just settlement of these difficult questions."<sup>5</sup>

Whilst in Washington, de Grey was consistently alive to the necessity of conciliating American senators in order that the treaty might be ratified by the necessary two-thirds majority. On 10 April de Grey spoke at a freemasons dinner in Washington attended by thirty-eight congressmen, and considered that he might thus "have done some little good by giving a friendly inclination to public opinion & public talk."<sup>6</sup>

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1. Lang, *Life, Letters, and Diaries of Sir Stafford Northcote, First Earl of Iddesleigh*, (Edinburgh and London, 1890), ii : 16: Northcote's diary entry of 3 May 1871.
  2. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/80, 111: Thornton to Granville, Washington, 14 March 1871.
  3. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/106: Tenterden to Granville, Washington, 10 March 1871.
  4. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/106: Tenterden to Granville, Washington, 24 March 1871.
  5. FO 5/1310, 129: Davis to deG, Washington, 9 May [1871].
  6. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/63, 244: deG to Granville, Washington, 11 April 1871.

Early in the negotiations he informed Granville that the British commissioners were "steadily dining Senators of all parties & with apparent advantage; indeed some stern patriots in the Press have begun to warn public men against our aristocratic blandishments."<sup>1</sup> In particular de Grey understood the need to conciliate the irascible<sup>2</sup> senator Charles Sumner, who remained powerful despite his deposition from the chairmanship of the senate foreign affairs committee during the negotiations. Sumner's biographer has recorded that de Grey strove successfully to attain the senator's co-operation;<sup>3</sup> certainly Sumner's relations with his old acquaintance de Grey were cordial,<sup>4</sup> and Sumner was in fact unexpectedly amicable during the negotiations. Against the advice of cabinet, de Grey remained in Washington during the senate's ratification debates, and attributed to his continued presence Sumner's endorsement of the treaty,<sup>5</sup> which was eventually ratified by a vote of fifty to twelve.

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1. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/63, 81: deG to Granville, Washington, 7 March 1871. A total expenditure of £12,000 was in fact claimed by the British high commissioners, indicative of a lavish scale of entertainment (FO 5/1310, 203).
  2. An intriguing and very un-Victorian explanation of Sumner's irritability was offered by Lord Tenterden: "... there is a crisis in Sumner's family history now in progress which may account for a certain acerbity of temper. He was fool enough some year or so ago to marry a young and pretty widow. She found that he was not gifted with 'full powers' and has left him and I am told that there is a suit proceeding for dissolution à vinculo. He therefore makes up by vigour of tongue for his want of capacity in other organs" (Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/106: Tenterden to Meade, onboard *Cuba*, 21 Feb. 1871).
  3. Pierce, iv : 488-9, 491-2.
  4. e.g. RP. BL Add Ms 43623, 245: Sumner to deG, Washington, 23 May 1871.
  5. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/63, 327: deG to Granville, Washington, 19 May 1871.

In parliament, Russell objected to the treaty on the grounds that the arbitrators should not be bound by municipal or international laws other than those operative when the *Alabama* escaped. In the lords debate de Grey defended his friendly relations with the American negotiators (which Russell had criticised), denied charges of weakness on the part of the British negotiators, and instead asserted that the three 'rules' would be

a great improvement in International Law -- they are less stringent than the rules of the [1870] Foreign Enlistment Act at the present time, and, looking to the future, they are less stringent than I should like to have seen them made if it had not been for considerations of the past. 1.

Outside parliament Ripon again defended, in a Cobden club dinner speech, the appeal to arbitration on the basis of future international relations.<sup>2</sup> Hughes took the same argument to the working and middle classes, speaking in aid of the working men's club movement.<sup>3</sup> Hughes also continued to preach Anglo-American accord in the American press,<sup>4</sup> and his efforts may have been partially responsible for the treaty's generally positive reception by American leader writers.

The de Grey-Forster relationship, of almost twenty years standing in 1871, was undoubtedly a significant factor in the cabinet's acceptance of the treaty of Washington. Forster, by his own admission, "fought hard & constantly" against changes in de Grey's submissions from Washington. Though not entirely successful, he could nevertheless report by mid-April that the cabinet were "coming round."<sup>5</sup> De Grey

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1. 3 H 206, 1869 and 1864-71 *passim*: 12 June 1871; also see 3 H 207, 732: 29 June 1871.
  2. *New-York Daily Tribune*, 10 July 1871. A political and social association, the Cobden club comprised many influential Liberals, including Hughes and Forster.
  3. *New-York Daily Tribune*, 28 June 1871.
  4. e.g. *New-York Daily Tribune*, 30 June 1871, 13 July 1871.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 278: F to deG, London, 20 April 1871.

recognised Forster's "constant & able support," and informed his friend during the negotiations that it was

... a very great advantage to me to hear from you because you heartily sympathize with the work in which we are engaged here, & understand the importance of its being brought to a successful issue & the danger of a failure after having gone so far.  
*Granville's letters are not substitutes for yours...* 1.

Though Bruce played a minor role in cabinet discussions, he too consistently endorsed de Grey's efforts.

Their mutual concern was not merely the amelioration of Anglo-American relations, nor even the future consideration of banishing anti-British *Alabamas*. A prime factor in their dedication to the treaty was its resort to arbitration, for the first time, in a dispute involving national 'honour': de Grey informed Bright that he would

... always esteem it a high honour to have had a share in an arrangt, wh: will, I trust, form the starting point of a new era of friendship betw: this country & the United States, & wh: embodies principles, wh: I wd fain hope may be accepted hereafter in the settlement of international disputes, & may thus tend to diminish the probability of future wars... 2.

The entire treaty was unexpectedly threatened in 1872 when America resuscitated her 'indirect' claims before the Geneva arbitration tribunal. British opinion was naturally indignant, for the high commissioners remained under the definite impression that America had abandoned her indirect claims during the Washington negotiations.<sup>3</sup> Bruce interpreted

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 274: deG to F, Washington, 4 April 1871.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43624, 47: deG to Bright, London, 26 June 1871 (copy).
  3. e.g. FO 5/1300, 96: secret despatch, British commissioners to Granville, Washington, 8 March 1871; FO 5/1302, 230: telegram, British commissioners to Granville, Washington, 15 April 1871 (copy); RP. BL Add Ms 43528, 16: Tenterden to deG, London, 6 June 1871; FO 5/1298, 451: 'Memorandum explanatory of some of the Articles of the Treaty of Washington, by Lord Tenterden', printed for the use of the foreign office, 10 June 1871. No definitive American statement was recorded, however, because detailed protocols of the daily conferences were not extant.

the American manoeuvre as "a sad blow to arbitration, and therein a universal misfortune."<sup>1</sup> Gladstone (who estimated the indirect claims at £1600m.<sup>2</sup>) and the cabinet majority were violent in their response, and Ripon informed Forster that "it may become necessary for you & me to resist to the *last* extremity"<sup>3</sup>. (presumably resignation). Whilst most ministers wished to abandon arbitration unless the indirect claims were withdrawn, Ripon and Forster urged in cabinet that the American case be allowed to proceed, with a British protest against the indirect claims and a declaration that, if awarded, America would not be indemnified.<sup>4</sup> In the *New-York Daily Tribune* Hughes urged America to abandon her indirect claims,<sup>5</sup> and in the *Times* attempted to assuage British outrage.<sup>6</sup> Forster meanwhile was in frequent contact with his American connections in London. He, and especially Ripon, maintained their pacifist position within cabinet whilst the controversy raged during the first half of 1872. In April it was only through their threatened resignations that cabinet desisted from officially adopting Russell's view that the government decline arbitration until the indirect claims were withdrawn.<sup>7</sup> In early June Ripon helped to soothe house of lords unease on this issue.<sup>8</sup> The significance of their joint actions

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1. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 327: B to Norah Bruce, London, 10 Feb. 1872.
  2. Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, ii : 5.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43537, 1: R to F, London, 4 Feb. 1872 (copy).
  4. Ethel Drus, ed., John, First Earl of Kimberley, *A Journal of Events during the Gladstone Ministry 1868-1874*, (London, 1958), 27: Kimberley's journal entry of 10 Feb. 1872.
  5. *New-York Daily Tribune*, 13 Feb. 1872.
  6. *Times*, 4 March 1872.
  7. Reid, *Life of Forster*, ii : 27; Wolf, i : 261.
  8. 3 H 211, 1149-55: 4 June 1872.

should not be underrated. Jane Forster, for example, believed it was "clear that but for his [Forster's] & Lord Ripon's persistency the negotiations must again and again have been broken off."<sup>1</sup> The impasse was eventually resolved when the arbitration tribunal ruled that the indirect claims were inadmissible; they were subsequently withdrawn by the American representatives.

The Geneva arbitration, which ruled Britain liable for over £3 million damages, was the climax of the efforts of de Grey, Forster, Hughes and Layard to ameliorate Anglo-American relations both during and after the civil war. The precedent of the Laird rams' detention, in which Layard's role was significant, conclusively demonstrated the recognised inadequacy of Britain's foreign enlistment act. After 1871 neutral obligations were more precisely defined, and the emphasis on the future of de Grey and Forster proved critical after 1914, when Germany was unable to launch *Alabamas* from neutral American territory. In addition, controversies over the extension of belligerent rights, recognition of southern independence and mediation in the civil war gradually faded after 1871-2, to be replaced by more constructive attitudes in both Britain and America. In the realm of domestic politics, however, the treaty of Washington and consequent arbitration decision proved immediately unpopular with the British public, gradually reasserting a jingoist tradition, and may be cited as one of the factors in the Liberals' electoral debacle of 1874.

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1. FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 79: Jane Forster's journal, 1872.

## CHAPTER 10

MILITARY INTERESTS

A mutual fascination with military affairs was during two decades an important centripetal force in the personal and political relationships of Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard. To some degree Goderich's aristocratic origins may account for his devotion to military questions; the nobility and army were traditionally affiliated, the de Greys being no exception. Hughes brought to the group his Rugby experience, with the well-ingrained public school emphasis on character formation, team spirit, and manliness. Layard had fighting experience with the Bakhtiyari, and Bruce was associated through marriage with the Napiers. Forster, despite his quaker origins, had by the early fifties adopted a degree of militarism. With Hughes and Goderich, he was associated with the Christian Socialists' espousal of muscular Christianity, the encouragement of manly, self-disciplined and intrepid characters. These attitudes were subsequently developed, in part by Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard, into the Christian militarism of mid-Victorian Britain, which identified British soldiery with Christianity: Sabine Baring-Gould wrote *Onward, Christian Soldiers* in 1864, and Hughes himself composed a militarist hymn.<sup>1</sup> This equation of Christianity and militarism inevitably attracted the sympathies of Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard.

Their common interest was in a sense, therefore, eminently representative of dominant mid-Victorian values. An emphasis on competitive instincts, pride in the physical and moral strength of the English character, confidence in the power of industrialism and capitalism

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1. *O God of Truth*; see Mack and Armytage, 117.

to diffuse Britain's economic and political influence, respect for the honour and prestige of the British nation, all contributed to the Victorians' admiration of might and force. Despite certain ambivalence towards these values Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard both reflected and contributed to the militarist aspects of Victorian philosophy, as befitted the romanticist assumptions in their ideology. In a manner wholly alien to the instincts of Manchester radicals, they perceived soldiery and the army as suitable vehicles for expressing their romantic natures.

A wide range of romantic values could be espoused through their military interests. Hero worship of great soldiers and commanders is an obvious example. Cromwell was a mutual hero, largely because of his military prowess. Contemporaries and friends such as General William Mansfield, Colonel Shadwell, Sir Colin Campbell, Sir Anthony Sterling and Sir de Lacy Evans provided further heroic inspiration, particularly during the Crimean war and Indian rebellion. Another attractive aspect of military life was their romantic perception of the army as a corporate body, in which a paternalistic leadership might perform its social duties, and whose members necessarily ceased acting as selfish, individualistic 'atoms'. In addition, however, their militarism comprised a democratic admiration for the virtues of the common soldier, and a concern for his welfare. Formation of a citizen army, based on the concept of Cromwell's new model army, was in fact one of their military objectives.

## 2.

The Crimean war, during which the political alliance of Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard was consolidated, provided the first significant opportunity to indulge their obsession and to publicly

demonstrate their attitudes. The common military interests they then expressed helped also to strengthen their personal affinity. Layard exhibited his approach in a journal article published in December 1854, in which he described in excruciating detail the battles of the Alma, Balaclava and Inkerman. Analysing the actions of "the most gallant army that nation ever sent forth," Layard praised the "irresistible courage and daring" of the troops at the Alma, and described Inkerman as "a struggle which has rarely if ever been equalled in modern warfare." He credited the allied victory to the British troops' "calm and steady courage that has never been surpassed," adding that "we owe our preservation to the indomitable courage and heroic conduct of the soldier."<sup>1</sup> Layard reiterated his enthusiasm for military strategy and the common soldier in a later journal article, referring once again to the "indomitable courage and unfailing devotion" of the troops.<sup>2</sup> In his private journal,<sup>3</sup> and in a letter to Bruce,<sup>4</sup> he similarly exhibited intense fascination with military tactics. In the house of commons Layard demonstrated great interest in, and considerable knowledge of, techniques of warfare;<sup>5</sup> in according special notice to individual heroism, he associated military characteristics with manliness and national prestige:

he was one of those few who thought the time had come when, without questioning its political necessity, and however great might be the sacrifices imposed by a struggle of this character, war was almost necessary for our national safety and our national honour. There had been many who believed that the people of

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1. [Layard], 'Campaign in the Crimea', 239, 220, 251, 257.
  2. [Layard], 'The Results and Prospects of the War', 250.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 58172 : L's Crimean journal, 8 Sept. - 6 Nov. 1854.
  4. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, ii : 290-4: L to B, Balaklava, 8 Oct. 1854.
  5. 3 H 136, 160-95: 12 Dec. 1854.

this country had relapsed into a state of effeminacy -- that a long peace of fifty years' duration had destroyed that British spirit to which we owed our liberties and our high position in the scale of nations. The recent events in the Crimea must, however, have dissipated all such gloomy apprehensions -- the troops who fought at Alma, though they had never seen a battle before, showed that they possessed the true British spirit. Would that that great Captain who had been the noblest example to the true British soldier [presumably Wellington, who died in 1852] had been permitted to tarry a little while longer among us, that he might have seen that the British soldier had not degenerated! 1.

Even considered as a political attempt to bolster patriotism and anti-Russian sentiment, Layard's speech must be interpreted as an enthusiastic endorsement of militarist values.

Through his marriage in 1854, Bruce became associated with Sir William Napier, the soldier and historian of the Peninsular war. During the Crimean campaigns he conducted extensive correspondence with his father-in-law on tactics and strategy, on the strength of which he "crushed in argument many military dilettantes, and ... gained a high reputation as a tactician."<sup>2</sup> Bruce also discussed such matters with Goderich,<sup>3</sup> and lectured in Dowlais on the siege of Kars.<sup>4</sup>

Goderich's involvement in military questions predated the Crimean war, as his commons forays with regard to army education<sup>5</sup> and barrack improvements<sup>6</sup> demonstrate. During the war these interests

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1. 3 H 136, 404-5: 15 Dec. 1854.

2. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 126: B to Napier, Cardiff, 19 Oct. 1854. See *ibid.*, i : 125-6: B to Napier, Aberdare, 13 Oct. 1854; Bruce, *Life of Napier*, ii : 372-97 *passim*; BP. Bodleian Library, Ms Eng Letters d.246, 1-18, 24-6, 30-4: various letters dated from 21 Oct. 1854 to 13 April 1856.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 33: B to G, Golden Grove, 2 Dec. 1855.

4. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 5 April 1856: B's Dowlais lecture on the fall of Kars, 2 April 1856.

5. 3 H 130, 1301: 24 Feb. 1854.

6. 3 H 124, 764: 28 Feb. 1853.

ripened into an obsession. To Hughes he dilated on strategy: the Alma he described as "a glorious affair, as to hard fighting & cool courage," though he questioned the tactics employed;<sup>1.</sup> he believed the siege of Sebastopol was "terribly interesting" and "may go down in history with Troy & Syracuse;"<sup>2.</sup> he relished "the heart-stirring story of Inkermann, and most truly do I feel the great worth and nobleness of the men who there fought."<sup>3.</sup> With Bright, Cobden and the peace society, whom he stated "preferred to denounce all war, to abuse and calumniate all soldiers, to deny all history,"<sup>4.</sup> he held no brief. In parliament he argued that "when men were fighting side by side, those social difficulties [relating to class] were not felt; bullets were no great respecters of persons -- the brotherhood of danger bound men together."<sup>5.</sup>

Thus the Crimean war effectually elicited their military interests, concern for the common soldier, and an interpretation of the army in a corporate, romantic sense. This military preoccupation was recognised both by themselves and by others in later years. Hughes, for example, spoke to de Grey of his "having as you know a horrid hankering for all that relates to soldiering;"<sup>6.</sup> Kimberley referred to de Grey as "a man of war from his youth;"<sup>7.</sup> Gladstone recognised the militarist tendencies in Forster: "While descent and education associated him with the peaceful Society of Friends, he leaned rather more readily than the average Liberal to the employment of force."<sup>8.</sup> By the late fifties their

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 141: G to H, Pau, 15 Oct. 1854.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 146: G to H, Turancon, 18 Nov. 1854.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 148: G to H, Turancon, 3 Dec. 1854.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 24-5: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.

5. 3 H 136, 2097: 1 March 1855.

6. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 197: H to deG, London, 17 Nov. 1870.

7. Wolf, i : 77: Kimberley to deG, 26 Aug. 1870.

8. Gladstone, 'Mr. Forster and Ireland', 451.

reputation as militarists was consolidated, for during this period Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard continued to emphasise and utilise their combative instincts; their interest in army affairs during the Crimean war was not merely a wartime exigency, as they afterwards remained unabashedly militaristic. At the working men's college Hughes initiated boxing classes to encourage the development not only of physique but also of character and a sense of community. In *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, he recorded his conviction that,

from the cradle to the grave, fighting rightly understood, is the business, the real, highest, honestest business of every son of man. Everyone who is worth his salt has his enemies, who must be beaten, be they evil thoughts and habits in himself, or spiritual wickedness in high places, or Russians, or Border-ruffians, or Bill, Tom, or Harry, who will not let him live his life in quiet till he has thrashed them.

It is no good for Quakers, or any other body of men, to uplift their voices against fighting. Human nature is too strong for them, and they don't follow their own precepts. Every soul of them is doing his own piece of fighting, somehow or somewhere. The world might be a better world without fighting, for anything I know, but it wouldn't be our world; and therefore I am dead against crying peace when there is no peace, and isn't meant to be.

"And if you do fight," Hughes admonished his boyish and adult readers, "fight it out; and don't give in while you can stand and see."<sup>1</sup> The Indian mutiny enhanced this disposition to manliness and muscular Christianity,<sup>2</sup> and a growing concern with the common soldier permitted an integration of their military interests with involvement in the amelioration of working class conditions. At the war office in the sixties de Grey effectively encouraged educational and recreational facilities for soldiers, the improvement of sanitary and medical conditions, provision of military savings banks, and the promotion of decent

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1. Hughes, *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, 288, 309.

2. Hughes's 'Hodson of Hodson's Horse', published in 1859, is probably the most convincing example of the militaristic impact of the events in India.

accommodation.<sup>1.</sup> He also imported Hughes into the office as reviser of military regulations, an appointment which a self-opinionated tory, who objected to Hughes's radicalism, described as Tom Brown's sinecure.<sup>2.</sup> It was, however, in the volunteer movement of the 1860s that de Grey, Hughes, Forster and Bruce most appropriately satisfied their military longings and social philanthropy.<sup>3.</sup>

3.

The creation of the volunteer force in 1859 was in fact a continuation and revival of a citizen army tradition which had existed in one form or another for centuries. The various corps were initiated in response to the French invasion panic of 1858-60, which can itself be attributed to a number of factors. The French reaction to the Orsini assassination attempt in 1858 created considerable British suspicion, which was accentuated by the development of the port of Cherbourg. Napoleon's motives in Europe were also questioned and scrutinised. A Franco-Russian alliance was predicated, and the French intervention in Italy mistrusted. Fears of Napoleonic hegemony in Europe were buttressed by the annexation of Savoy and Nice in 1860; English influence on the continent and in the Mediterranean was apparently threatened. Incredibly, the view prevailed in England that the French emperor was actively contemplating invasion.

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1. See Denholm, *Radical and Democratic Career of Ripon*, 169-74, 184-94; A. Denholm, 'Lord de Grey and Army Reform', *Army Quarterly*, 102, 1, Oct. 1971, 57-64.
  2. S.M. Ellis, ed., *The Letters and Memoirs of Sir William Hardman*, (London, 1925), 242-3.
  3. Layard was never affiliated with the volunteer movement, possibly because he was associated with no identifiable social community (estate, factory, college or profession) on which to base a corps.

Volunteer corps were first sanctioned by the Conservative government in May 1859. Frustrated by aristocratic inefficiency in the army during the Crimean war, the middle classes desired participation in military organisation, but the regular army, with its aristocratic officer corps and its working class soldiers, virtually precluded a middle class role. Many professionals and businessmen thus envisaged the volunteers as a viable alternative. An important segment of middle class opinion was nevertheless hostile; the pacifist tenets of the Manchester school were inherently inconsistent with the military, economic and foreign policy implications of the volunteer movement. Cobden, for example, wrote to Russell of the volunteers: "I must in candour say that I think the so-called Liberal party is in a false position whilst heading such a crusade (through the Government) as has been going on."<sup>1</sup> At the same time, many Englishmen admired the volunteers as an illustration of the nation's forsaking Manchesterism, the capitalist profit motive, and an indulgent love of comfort.

Working class adherence to volunteer corps was a social phenomenon which occasioned considerable comment amongst Victorians. If patriotism were one motive for workers' participation, the provision of recreational facilities, the attainment of 'respectability', and the possibility of upward social mobility were equally important factors. Roughly half the volunteers in both urban and rural corps were of the working class; the proportion gradually increased during the sixties, and this working class component became less exclusively upper working class.

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1. Gooch, *Later Correspondence of Russell*, ii : 251-2: Cobden to Russell, Paris, 23 Dec. 1859. Cobden was negotiating the commercial treaty with France when this letter was written.

From 1859 to 1861 there was a virtual explosion in the number of volunteer corps sanctioned by the government and lords lieutenant. The great majority were rifle corps, though light horse, artillery, engineer and mounted rifle corps were also created.<sup>1.</sup> The volunteers were generally led by their social superiors, whether professionals, noblemen or capitalists. A few exclusively middle class or working class corps were formed, but the majority contained a social mix. Most observers and volunteer apologists praised the class unity the volunteer corps allegedly encouraged, and cited such co-operation as evidence of improved class relationships. Relatively few, like Palmerston, feared that armed volunteers in Ireland or in industrial conurbations might be infiltrated by revolutionary chartists or socialists. It is evident in retrospect that the volunteer movement tended to strengthen the existing social structure: middle class and aristocratic control dominated, the traditional subordination of the working class was thus emphasised, the attention of the people was diverted from domestic reform, military values of discipline and obedience were inculcated. Initially admired by their peers, working class volunteers were more often in later years objects of ridicule, and even antagonism.

It was predictable that de Grey, Hughes, Forster and Bruce should be enthusiastic supporters of, and participants in, the volunteer movement. Fascination with military affairs, the desire to encourage class conciliation, and sympathy with paternalism were factors which appealed to their romantic instincts. A concomitant attraction, however,

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1. In April 1862 there were 162,681 enrolled volunteers, of whom 662 were light horse, 24,363 artillery, 2904 engineer, 656 mounted rifle and 134,096 rifle volunteers (see PP 1862 [3053.] xxvii.93: report of the volunteer commission).

was an appreciation of the role the volunteer movement might play in the social and political liberation of the working class; a citizen army, with the workers armed, was in many respects a revolutionary concept. Their endorsement of the volunteers admirably illustrates the romantic versus radical philosophical conundrum of de Grey, Hughes, Forster and Bruce.

Goderich's conceptual approval of citizen armies dated from the early fifties. He informed Hughes in 1854, for example, that

... the foundation of my thoughts on these matters remains unchanged. I think the citizen soldiers of the antiquity & of the Middle Ages... a better institution than the modern standing-Army (though I was wrong in imagining that the new style of soldiers could not individually feel like citizens), I must still dislike or disapprove very strongly the life of such standing-Armies in time of peace... 1.

From the time of his appointment to the war office in June 1859 (with a brief interval of seven months at the India office in 1861), de Grey was enabled to practically implement this ideal through his administrative responsibility for the volunteer movement, which he contended was "popular in its nature, as springing from the spontaneous patriotism of the nation."<sup>2</sup> The Conservatives' initial concept when approving the volunteer force in May 1859 was based on the notion of individual corps, voluntarily raised and funded, being sanctioned under certain conditions by the government and lords lieutenant. It was expected that uncontrolled working class participation would thus be precluded. Under de Grey and the Liberals the government progressively

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 148: G to H, Turancon, 3 Dec. 1854.

2. *Times*, 7 Feb. 1861.

assumed a more positive role in the movement, despite continued lip service to its original philosophy.<sup>1.</sup> On 1 July 1859 Ripon announced to parliament that the Liberal government would supply 25% of the corps' arms, in order to ensure their becoming effective military bodies and not mere rifle clubs. Eligibility for such assistance was confined to corps which could provide a satisfactory rifle range and a safe place under a custodian's supervision for storage of arms, which would submit to inspection by a military officer, and whose rules and regulations were approved by the war secretary. In addition, Ripon advised that staff of the disembodied militia would be employed to instruct the corps in drill, and that government support would be extended to the formation of artillery as well as rifle corps.<sup>2.</sup> He subsequently clarified the position of artillery corps, in declaring that instruction and ammunition would be provided at public expense.<sup>3.</sup> The government's involvement continued to gradually increase under de Grey's supervision in the early sixties. By early 1860 rifles were supplied to every effective volunteer; de Grey later defended this decision on the grounds of encouraging volunteer enlistment, ensuring a satisfactory quality of arms, and effecting their general standardisation.<sup>4.</sup> In January 1860, in order to ensure the corps were properly

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1. De Grey commented to the lords in 1860, for example, that "it must be borne in mind that the nature of Volunteer corps, as they were now being raised, was essentially that they came forward and offered their unpaid, voluntary services to the country; and it would be inconsistent with their present character to become a charge on the public revenue" (3 H 156, 553: 6 Feb. 1860).
  2. 3 H 154, 512-6: 1 July 1859.
  3. 3 H 154, 947-9: 11 July 1859.
  4. PP 1862 [3053.] xxvii.295: deG's evidence to the volunteer commission, Q. 4594.

drilled, de Grey recommended to Sidney Herbert, the war secretary, that adjutants be appointed to volunteer corps, and expressed his preference for a total government subsidy of their services, including forage costs, "because we shd. thus retain *complete* control over these Offrs."<sup>1</sup> In February he informed parliament of the decision to provide paid adjutants; for purposes of organisation and instruction an inspector of volunteers and six assistant inspectors were also appointed; guns, ammunition and instruction were also provided to artillery volunteers.<sup>2</sup> De Grey's next organisational effort was to create administrative battalions in addition to the existing consolidated battalions, a manoeuvre which he hoped would encourage greater efficiency as well as facilitate government control.<sup>3</sup> In August 1860 he sponsored the rifle volunteer corps bill, which empowered rifle corps to acquire shooting ranges, and which de Grey described as an urgent matter.<sup>4</sup> Finally, at the end of 1861 the government provided (through a supplementary estimate in parliament) drill sergeants for volunteer corps.<sup>5</sup> De Grey's countenance of increased government intervention in the funding and operations of volunteer corps was possible because he felt no hesitation in abrogating laissez-faire injunctions. This interference was significant on two principal counts: firstly, financial subsidies permitted and encouraged greater working class participation in the volunteer movement; secondly, increased government control prevented the abuse of volunteers by reactionary elements in the community. De Grey drew Herbert's attention

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43533, 87: deG to Herbert, London, 31 Jan. 1860 (copy).
  2. 3 H 156, 553-6: 6 Feb. 1860.
  3. De Grey's intentions were announced in parliament on 20 February 1860 (3 H 156, 1317-8).
  4. 3 H 160, 818-9: 7 Aug. 1860.
  5. See PP 1862 [3053.] xxvii.295: deG's evidence to the volunteer commission, Q. 4594. De Grey was clearly responsible for drafting the regulations for sergeant instructors (see RP. BL Add Ms 43511, 1: deG to the Duke of Cambridge, London, 16 Aug. 1861 (copy)).

to this problem early in 1860, when he protested that a Liverpool volunteer corps appeared to be "infested with Orange fever to an alarming extent," and suggested that

... Nothing can be more undesirable than the formation of party Corps, and of all parties the worst are religious. In Liverpool especially, where there are so many Irish, these demonstrations are peculiarly objectionable, and I feel that we must do something to check this sort of thing in the bud...

Herbert approved de Grey's proposal of government intervention in this instance.<sup>1.</sup>

De Grey's commitment to the volunteer cause frequently involved friction with his ministerial colleagues. Herbert was essentially uninterested, and both he and Palmerston remained anxious lest an armed populace should prove dangerous to the ruling class. Gladstone predictably objected to the government expense which was increasingly involved.<sup>2.</sup> There was also considerable jealousy from the regular army on the attention, respect and status accorded the volunteers. De Grey's painstaking efforts<sup>3.</sup> were nevertheless appreciated in many quarters. In the house of lords, Fortescue praised his "courtesy, ability, and zeal" in regulating and organising the force.<sup>4.</sup> Herbert professed that de Grey had managed the volunteer business "with the greatest success and

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43533, 85: deG to Herbert, London, 12 Jan. 1860.

2. De Grey once told a group of volunteers, in an unusually impolitic admission, that "the impressions which my right hon. friend [Gladstone] received in this room last year may have greatly contributed to the readiness with which he opened his pockets (cheers and laughter) and heartily consented to increase the grants to Volunteers" (*Times*, 12 Nov. 1863).

3. For evidence of his attention to detail, see RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 78, 95-105, 107, 113, 123, 125, 131, 135, 145.

4. 3 H 160, 184: 26 July 1860.

credit."<sup>1</sup> When he quitted the war office in 1861, de Grey received a testimonial of gratitude from London volunteers.<sup>2</sup>

Hughes, Forster and Bruce each served the volunteer movement at the operational level (de Grey was also honorary colonel of the first volunteer battalion of the West Yorkshire regiment), though Hughes in addition propagandised the cause. In 1859, for example, he contended that the question

of readiness for war, is one of life or death -- in which the temptation, always so strong, to subordinate national honour to what is supposed to be policy, is in our day for most statesmen almost irresistible, because political influence is so evenly balanced, that a peace party of perhaps twenty votes has often the destinies of a ministry in its hands. 3.

Hughes therefore welcomed the volunteers' inception, and in *Macmillan's Magazine* drafted what he termed the volunteer's catechism. Having cited the need to avoid invasion panics through a knowledge of military strength, and having urged volunteering as a means to diminish army expenditure, Hughes emphasised the volunteers' role in stimulating class unity:

The difficulty of finding a common standing-ground, anything in which we may all work together and take our pastime together; where we can stand shoulder to shoulder, and man to man, each counting for what he is worth; the peer without condescending, and the peasant without cringing, is almost as great as ever. Here, in volunteering, we think we have found what may, when rightly handled, do much towards filling up this gap, -- a common subject of interest, a bond which may in the end bind the nation together again. 4.

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1. Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert: A Memoir*, ii : 405: Herbert to Palmerston, Wilton, Salisbury, 23 Dec. 1860.
  2. *Times*, 7 Feb. 1861.
  3. Lowell, *The Biglow Papers*, xxi.
  4. Thomas Hughes, 'The Volunteer's Catechism', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 2, July 1860, 193.

It was to the students and staff of the working men's college that Hughes primarily directed his volunteering enthusiasm. The formation of a college corps was not effected without difficulty, for the lord lieutenant of Middlesex, the 2nd Marquess of Salisbury, was reluctant to certify the formation of an overwhelmingly working class corps. In response to an application from Hughes in May 1859, Salisbury was noncommittal as to whether the idea of a volunteer corps not pledged to defray its own expenses would be entertained.<sup>1.</sup> It was not until 3 November that provisional certification was accorded, conditional on the corps' obtaining a rifle range of at least 300 yards in length, a stipulation which according to Hughes involved a prohibitive expense.<sup>2.</sup> Hughes immediately appealed to Ripon for assistance, but the latter could only report: "I have seen R. Cecil. He can do nothing for your Corps with his horrid old Father but recommends that you should not breathe the words Working Men's College to Old Sarum, but describe your storehouse for Arms by the street & number."<sup>3.</sup> Hughes failed in attempts to join established corps as a separate company, due to the excessive costs of their dress uniforms. However de Grey, whom Hughes described to college students as "one of the earliest and warmest supporters of the College," promised to arrange with another metropolitan corps for the availability of a practice range; in the meantime, he gave sanction for the working men's college corps to drill.<sup>4.</sup> Having successfully located an available rifle range, de Grey finally informed Hughes, on 6 December, that he had "just sanctioned your Corps & you as its Captain Commandant. The moment you get official information of the fact you can get your rifles on sending in a Requisition for them."<sup>5.</sup>

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1. *Working Men's College Magazine*, 1 June 1859.

2. *ibid.*, 1 Dec. 1859.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 66: R to H, London, 4 Nov. 1859.

4. *Working Men's College Magazine*, 1 Dec. 1859.

5. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 68: deG to H, Ripon, 6 Dec. 1859.

The college corps of which Hughes was captain had within a month recruited three companies, and by 1860 half the college's students were enrolled. The corps was later incorporated into a regiment, the 19th Middlesex, of which Hughes served as colonel until his resignation in favour of a professional soldier, Lieutenant-Colonel Bathurst. For twelve years Hughes was officially associated with the working men's college corps and the 19th Middlesex,<sup>1</sup> during which time he constantly emphasised the earnest nature of volunteering. In March 1860, for example, he explained that he had not attended a volunteer court levee because "I think the business of the Rifle movement a very serious and solemn affair, and that we ought to keep as far aloof as we can from the frivolity and dandyism which is being imported into it." When the working men's college corps were properly trained they might claim her majesty's recognition; until then, Hughes believed "dancing and dining and kissing of hands" should be avoided.<sup>2</sup> Hughes's stance implied that a citizen army should not be susceptible to ridicule.

De Grey continued to extend his assistance to Hughes and the working men's college corps in the early sixties. According to Hughes, the opportunity in 1860 to send a man from the corps to rifle training at Hythe "came to me as a matter of private friendship from Lord de Grey, and had nothing whatever to do with the corps in an official way."<sup>3</sup> When adjutants were sanctioned by the government, it was through the influence of Hughes and de Grey that Philip Read, a veteran of Crimean campaigns, was appointed to the 19th Middlesex, "the only adjutant of

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1. Thereafter he retained his interest in the college corps' activities (see Working Men's College Archives, Nos. 44, 45, 46: H to Jennings, [London], 21 Feb., 10 April, 19 May 1877.
  2. *Working Men's College Magazine*, 1 April 1860.
  3. J. Roebuck, 'Reminiscences of an Old Student', in Davies, *The Working Men's College*, 86: H to Roebuck, Burley, 8 Sept. 1860.

volunteers ever taken from the ranks and made Captain, and then Major."<sup>1</sup> In return Hughes kept de Grey informed of the movement's pulse.<sup>2</sup>

In Wharfedale, Forster organised his factory workers in the Burley rifle corps, explaining his rationale to Hughes:

I too am volunteering: *mirabile dictu*. I am calling our mill people together this evening, and hope to raise from them a subdivision. I am anxious about this, because I think, if it takes, it may be followed in many other mills, and this would not only lead to a large increase of volunteers, but would do great indirect good by bringing masters and men together, giving them good-fellowship and *esprit de corps*, giving the young factory men capital training and exercise, and, most important of all, enlisting the working-men, and thereby not only making them patriotic, but preventing the middle classes being confoundedly conservative, which we shall be, if we are armed, and the operatives are not... 3.

Forster's paternalistic desire to consolidate control over his workers was unstated on this occasion, but he later defended in parliament the right of a volunteer commanding officer to dismiss "black sheep" and to carry out "whatever might be necessary for the maintenance of discipline."<sup>4</sup> De Grey also heartily endorsed the benefits of discipline; speaking to volunteers on one occasion he commented that it was

a great and almost inestimable advantage to this country that 160,000 men, taken from the very heart of the nation, should within the last few years for the first time have been placed in a position to learn the benefits of being under disciplined authority. I believe, too, that advantage will be felt in social life and in political life. 5.

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1. F.J. Furnivall, 'The Social Life of the College', in Davies, 59-60.
  2. e.g. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 77: H to deG, Brighton, [22 April 1862], in which Hughes reported on the Brighton volunteer review.
  3. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 320-1: F to H, 2 Dec. 1859.
  4. 3 H 171, 360: 4 June 1863; also 3 H 171, 960: 15 June 1863.
  5. *Times*, 12 Nov. 1863.

For both men the theoretical defence of a citizen army was tempered by the knowledge that working class volunteers would be under the control of their social superiors.

Forster's metamorphosis from a captain of industry to a captain of volunteers was effected despite his having never previously handled a rifle, and by mid-January 1860 the Burley rifle corps boasted seventy men drilling three times per week.<sup>1</sup> Hughes tendered Forster the benefit of his expertise, and later reminisced to Bruce:

... What a *thorough* man he was ... I recollect in the Louis Napoleon scare, when we all turned Volunteers & he got up a Company amongst his workmen & captained them, I taught him to load a rifle for he hadn't the slightest inkling of the process, & lo in a few months, certainly within a year or two he was one of the House of Commons team shooting in the match with the Lords at Wimbledon... 2.

And in September 1860 Hughes reported Forster as "very well & jolly. He is coming over here [Studley Royal] to get up his [volunteer] review movements with me."<sup>3</sup> Thus Hughes and Forster co-operated with de Grey in propagating the volunteers' message. In Forster's case this resulted in criticism from Bradford nonconformists and laissez-faireists objecting to his military interests. At his election in 1861, he defended his adherence to the volunteer movement on the politically-acceptable grounds that it would permit diminution in the size and expense of the standing army.<sup>4</sup>

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 181: F to deG, Burley, 17 Jan. 1860.
  2. BP. Bodleian Library, Ms Eng Letters d.246, 56: H to B, [Chester], 14 April 1890. It was not uncommon for members of parliament to be associated with the volunteers; in January 1869, for example, a total of 90 MPs were volunteer officers (*Volunteer Service Gazette*, 2 Jan. 1869).
  3. Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/6/51: H to Ludlow, Ripon, 14 Sept. 1860.
  4. *Bradford Observer*, 7 Feb. 1861: F's Liberal nomination speech, 5 Feb. 1861.

Nor did Bruce's involvement with the Merthyr volunteers increase his popularity with Welsh nonconformity. In a lecture delivered in January 1860, Bruce rendered an historical account of invasion attempts on Britain, and emphasised the present necessity of "that spirit of vigorous manhood without which, wealth and number and the powers of civilisation are of no avail." Clearly fearful of Napoleonic ambitions, he urged the desirability of trusting the people with arms, and praised the volunteer movement as an effective military deterrent which was also "honourable to the manhood and patriotism of our countrymen."<sup>1</sup> Bruce discussed volunteer training, tactics and strategy with Sir William Napier,<sup>2</sup> and shared his practical experiences as captain of the Mountain Ash corps with de Grey.<sup>3</sup> In parliament he envisaged a valuable role for the volunteers in the event of an invasion.<sup>4</sup>

4.

The favourable disposition towards volunteering of de Grey, Hughes, Forster and Bruce was altogether a remarkable testimony to their mutual interests and philosophy; when the volunteer movement encountered something of a crisis in 1862, they co-operated closely in its behalf.

By 1862 the majority of corps had been operational for two or three years. Initially they had in most instances availed themselves of funds donated by voluntary subscriptions (of middle and upper class officers and patrons) in order to establish headquarters, drill grounds, rifle ranges, and in the purchase of clothing and equipment; annual operating expenses were generally met by subscriptions of the corps'

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1. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 145-93: 'The Invasions of Britain, and how to meet the next'.
  2. Bruce, *Life of Napier*, ii : 477-81.
  3. e.g. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 109: R to B, 15 Nov. 1859.
  4. 3 H 168, 184: 10 July 1862.

members. By 1862 the financial demands consequent upon the need to replace uniforms threatened working class enrolments. Forster raised this issue in parliament during the debate on supply, stating that he "feared that unless some assistance [were given] in the refitment of Volunteers, when the present uniform was worn out the numbers would fall off for want of means," and suggesting a capitation grant for effectives in future.<sup>1</sup> By previously encouraging government aid for arms, ammunition, instruction and drill, de Grey had materially facilitated working class participation in the volunteers, and in 1862 he remained alive to the persistent monetary demands of many corps. In response to requests for an investigation of volunteer finances, a royal commission was appointed in May 1862. Hughes and de Grey, with forty-nine other witnesses, testified before the commissioners. Hughes's evidence was effective and convincing. He decried "the excessive expense to which most corps have gone in the shape of prizes and bands, and so on, [which] has demoralised the corps," and argued that many men

come from right motives, considering that it is their duty to take part in the defence of the country if necessary. But a very large proportion of them come from the vanity of the thing, and because there are those immense prizes held out to them. There is extraordinary expense gone to in entertainments of all sorts, and follies which have in my opinion done more harm to the volunteer movement in the metropolis than any other single thing. 2.

Hughes expressed reluctance to accept government aid, and stated that his object was "to have an efficient force at as cheap a rate as possible to the country."<sup>3</sup> Having thus earned a sympathetic hearing from both

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1. 3 H 165, 987: 3 March 1862.

2. PP 1862 [3053.] xxvii.152: H's evidence to the volunteer commission, Q. 1070, 1071.

3. *ibid.*, Q. 1080, 1082.

the economically-minded and the professional soldier, Hughes contended that increased government aid was "absolutely necessary, if you desire to keep up the force at anything like its present numbers;" the corps however should be accountable for their financial outlays, and those which had exhibited extravagant expenditure should be excluded from such assistance.<sup>1</sup> De Grey's evidence was extremely circumspect, as befitted his political role. Having defended the present financial arrangement as "a perfectly intelligible one," he was reluctant throughout his testimony to commit himself on the desirability of increased government aid, but nevertheless noted that without such assistance the volunteer force would be greatly diminished.<sup>2</sup> If aid were afforded, he emphasised that efficiency must be required, and advised the commission to "lay down very decidedly what are the objects for which such payments are to be made;" the money should not, he argued, be "expended at the absolute discretion of the commanding officers."<sup>3</sup> Both de Grey and Hughes, therefore, favoured augmented government financial assistance under more stringent guidelines.

The commissioners apparently accepted this approach, in recommending a 20s. capitation grant for every efficient volunteer (as measured by specified requirements) in order to prevent a diminution of the force. Further monies were to be made available for those who had undergone rifle practice, for rural corps, and for artillery volunteers. In order to prevent 'extravagance', use of these funds was limited to provision and maintenance of headquarters and drill grounds, care and repair of arms, ranges, clothing and accoutrements (approved by

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1. *ibid.*, 152-3: Q. 1083, 1097, 1099.

2. *ibid.*, 295, 297: deG's evidence to the volunteer commission, Q. 4594, 4612.

3. *ibid.*, 297-8: Q. 4605, 4609, 4616.

the war secretary), cost of conveyance to and from battalion and brigade drill, and rifle practice.<sup>1.</sup> The government, under de Grey's influence, substantially implemented these recommendations in the volunteers bill of 1863. The requirements as to efficiency were stipulated in a series of regulations, on which de Grey sought Hughes's comments; the latter wrote in December 1862: "I am at work on the Vs Regulations & you shall have my interleaved copy with the results of much experience & reflection when you get back."<sup>2.</sup> Hughes also promised to employ his press influence on behalf of the bill,<sup>3.</sup> and the *Spectator* duly complimented de Grey for his efforts and commented that the bill had been framed "honestly and conscientiously."<sup>4.</sup> Hughes also kept de Grey informed of the volunteer reactions to the regulations defining efficiency,<sup>5.</sup> and contributed to the *Volunteer Service Gazette* on his friend's behalf: on one occasion he wrote de Grey that, "if you will let Seton<sup>6.</sup> write me what is to be said [regarding one of the regulations] ... I will put it into the form of a letter & get it prominently put in next week's number."<sup>7.</sup> Hughes's anonymous letter (from 'an officer') was accordingly published.<sup>8.</sup> In parliament, the bill passed both the commons and the lords with few amendments. Forster defended a number of its provisions in committee, and clarified the stipulations regarding battalion drill for rural, administrative battalions.<sup>9.</sup> De Grey successfully steered the bill through the lords, though a clause permitting

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1. *ibid.*, 93-6: report of the volunteer commission.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 85: H to deG, Brighton, 23 Dec. 1862.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 93: H to deG, London, 26 May 1863.

4. *Spectator*, 6 June 1863.

5. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 97: H to deG, London, 6 July 1863.

6. Sir Bruce Seton, de Grey's private secretary.

7. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 99: H to deG, London, [9 July 1863].

8. *Volunteer Service Gazette*, 18 July 1863.

9. 3 H 171, 346, 347, 348, 360: 4 June 1863.

compulsory acquisition of land for rifle ranges was necessarily abandoned.<sup>1.</sup> The volunteers act of 1863, by initiating substantial government aid to individual corps, effectively ensured that the volunteers should remain largely working class, and by 1869 it was "expected by Volunteers, and generally admitted throughout the country, that all their actual necessary expenses should be borne by the public."<sup>2.</sup> Largely through the influence and efforts of de Grey, Hughes, Forster and Bruce, the spectre of a reactionary and oppressive middle and upper class corps had been banished.

5.

During the Conservative government's tenure of office in the late sixties, however, the volunteers' role in civil disturbances was widely canvassed, and the threat of a second Peterloo could not be discounted. The question arose in an atmosphere of uncertainty resulting from the Fenian scares of 1866-7 and the reform agitation of the same period. The issue of volunteer employment in the suppression of civil riots had been debated in the commons in 1863. The volunteers bill of that year had proposed that no volunteer be obliged to join his corps in such instances, and that the corps could voluntarily assemble only with governmental approval. Forster balked at this suggestion, argued that the voluntary nature of the clause would encourage partisan warfare, and stated that "nothing would be so fatal to the Volunteer movement as to generate the suspicion that the force was a power behind a class for any purpose whatever."<sup>3.</sup> In the same debate Bruce reminded

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1. 3 H 171, 1244-5: 22 June 1863; 3 H 171, 1428-9, 1430: 25 June 1863.
  2. WO 33/21B, 1: report of the committee appointed to inquire into the financial state and internal organisation of the volunteer force, 20 Dec. 1869.
  3. 3 H 171, 352: 4 June 1863.

the house that, unlike the militia, "the Volunteer force was one over which the Government had no control."<sup>1</sup> In the face of considerable hostility, the clause was abandoned.

Their objection to the politicisation of the volunteer movement was confirmed in 1864, when de Grey refused permission for a volunteer corps to act as a guard of honour to Garibaldi, on the grounds that the volunteers as an armed unit should avoid activities of a political character.<sup>2</sup> In February 1867 de Grey was aroused by the use of volunteers in a Fenian scare at Chester, and by a statement from Lord Belmore, the Conservative under secretary for the home office, that volunteers might as civilians act as special constables and use their government arms. De Grey argued that the government possessed "no [legal] power to employ Volunteer Corps for the suppression of civil disturbances" and, whilst admitting that a volunteer might, as any citizen, be sworn in as a special constable, protested against the notion that his government arms and ammunition should be issued in such a case.<sup>3</sup> De Grey followed up his lords remonstrance with a similar letter to the *Times*.<sup>4</sup> A week later he again debated the matter in parliament, following an intimation from Lord Chelmsford, the lord chancellor, that a volunteer might enlist as a special constable, might be issued with government arms at the discretion of a local magistrate and, though not to be organised as a volunteer force, might "join with others, and take advantage of his previous organization in order to enable him to act more efficiently as a special constable."<sup>5</sup> De Grey again contended that

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1. 3 H 171, 366: 4 June 1863.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43512, 182: deG to Palmerston, London, 20 March 1864 (copy).

3. 3 H 185, 372-3: 15 Feb. 1867.

4. *Times*, 18 Feb. 1867.

5. 3 H 185, 926: 25 Feb. 1867.

volunteers should not be issued with government arms and ammunition, nor should local magistrates have discretionary powers. He "thought the distinction between a body of Volunteers acting as Volunteers, and a body of Volunteers acting as special constables, but armed with Enfield rifles and Government ammunition, was too fine a one," and "entertained very serious doubts as to the advisability of employing Volunteers for such purposes."<sup>1</sup> Forster joined the attack in the house of commons, when he initiated a debate on the employment of volunteers in civil disturbances. He requested specific clarification from the government of its position, cited de Grey's letter to the *Times* and the lords debates, pointed out that volunteers acting in their individual capacities were not subject to ordinary discipline and were thus potentially-dangerous oppressors, and decried the employment of uniformed volunteers using government arms. Only in extreme cases, with special parliamentary permission, would Forster consent to the use of volunteers in suppressing riots, for he feared the class divisions which might ensue: "Working men and, indeed, men of all classes and political opinions were brought together by, and joined in, the Volunteer movement;" if used for law enforcement, "instead of a national movement it would become a class movement; many would leave it because of their class and of their political opinions, and, what was still more dangerous, many might remain in it because of their class and of their political opinions."<sup>2</sup> Hughes supported Forster in this debate, agreeing that volunteers should be permitted to defend their armouries, "but in all other cases of civil tumult it ought to be emphatically laid down that they should go out as special constables with staves,

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1. 3 H 185, 927: 25 Feb. 1867.

2. 3 H 185, 1550-7: 8 March 1867.

and staves only." Unless the situation were clarified by the government, he threatened to resign his volunteer commission.<sup>1.</sup>

Forster continued to agitate for the issuance by the government of instructions relating to volunteer employment in suppression of disturbances,<sup>2.</sup> and a memorandum was finally promulgated in June 1867.

In parliament Forster, Hughes and de Grey each intimated his displeasure with the vagueness of the government's proposal, and called for its reconsideration.<sup>3.</sup> Under pressure, the war secretary withdrew his instructions. Though an incomplete victory, their protests nevertheless had the effect of markedly discouraging the future use of volunteers in civil conflicts.

6.

The involvement of de Grey, Hughes, Forster and Bruce with the volunteer movement, and with military affairs in general, demonstrates a practical, if somewhat contradictory, application of the dual aspects of their mutual philosophy: social romanticism and political radicalism. The army, and especially the volunteers, were interpreted as a corporate body encouraging social and national unity under paternalistic guidance. The volunteers were simultaneously perceived as a progressive force, a citizen army which would counteract reactionary tendencies in society. These ideals were applied in a broader sense to the social status of the British working class; the extension of the suffrage, the co-operative movement, trade unions, and working class education were all examined by Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard, as means for promoting a democratic society, and as salves for social and national disunity.

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1. 3 H 185, 1575-6: 8 March 1867.

2. 3 H 186, 727-8: 28 March 1867.

3. 3 H 187, 1936-7, 1937-8: 17 June 1867; 3 H 188, 734-6, 740: 28 June 1867; 3 H 188, 751-4: 1 July 1867.

## CHAPTER 11

POLITICAL RADICALISM: DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL RIGHTS

Despite their romantic proclivities Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard were for the most part receptive to mid-Victorian radicalism's political demands, the most important of which in the 1850s and 1860s were the attainment of civil and religious liberties, the extension of the suffrage, redistribution of parliamentary constituencies, and the secret ballot.

It is emblematic of the uniqueness of their radical-romantic philosophy that Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard opposed virtually all other radicals in advocating retention of the English church establishment as a matter of principle. On only one occasion, in the mid-fifties, did Goderich consider the possibility of disestablishing the church of England,<sup>1</sup> and this was but a temporary aberration from an otherwise consistent view. In Ireland, where the church represented a small minority, they were invariably willing to countenance disestablishment, but in England the romantic notion of the unity of church and state prevailed. This divergence from traditional radical attitudes did not however preclude their adopting a radical stance on the elimination of church privileges, including the abolition of church rates.

In the commons in 1853 Bruce had been unwilling to join Goderich and Layard in endorsing the total abolition of church rates.<sup>2</sup> However by 1854 he had been sufficiently influenced by his newly-fashioned alliance with Goderich and Layard to agree wholeheartedly with this

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 174: misc. paper, indexed 1855, headed 'Home Politics'.

2. See chapter 3 above.

notion.<sup>1.</sup> Thereafter Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard consistently supported the abolition of church rates, and in so doing hoped in romanticist fashion to promote national harmony. De Grey, for example, spoke as follows in parliament on church rates abolition:

Believing ..., as he did, that the present system entailed a distinct hardship upon Dissenters, and that that hardship had been admitted by almost everybody whose opinion on this question was worth having; believing that the existence of the grievance inflicted great injury on the Established Church by weaning from her the affection of a large portion of the people; believing that the impost tended to destroy peace and harmony throughout the country, and to prevent that community of Christian feeling which ought to exist among various denominations of Christians; seeing no mode of compromise open, ... he should feel it his duty to vote for the second reading [of the church rates abolition bill]. 2.

In addition, their advocacy of civil and religious liberties extended to such issues as the abolition of tests for university admission and degrees, the retention of the Maynooth grant so long as state funds were available to the church, the reform of ecclesiastical presentations, prison visiting rights for catholic chaplains, the admission of Jews to parliament, and the abolition of property qualifications for members of parliament.<sup>3.</sup> Indeed their persistent commitment to such reforms was sufficiently specific and pronounced to virtually preclude discussion or controversy amongst themselves. Their radical credentials in the sphere of civil and religious liberties pass unchallenged. Democratic extension of the franchise, however, was a more contestable public issue, with the result that their opinions and policies were less immutable or definitive.

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1. 3 H 133, 834-6: 23 May 1854.

2. 3 H 159, 645: 19 June 1860.

3. See appendix 1.

2.

Subsequent to the turmoil of 1848 Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard had each declared his advocacy of suffrage extension, a markedly progressive stance in the atmosphere of political reaction and material prosperity which obtained amongst the middle and upper classes in the late forties and early fifties. Their espousal of 'democracy' was an attempt to link the radical and romantic elements of their mutual philosophy. Whilst accepting the romantic notion that a moral regeneration of the working classes was a prerequisite, they urged the radical notion of suffrage extension as a means to achieve class reconciliation in a fraternal, corporate nation-state. The franchise was perceived as a tool which would both emancipate and placate the working man, whilst preserving the essence of Britain's heritage.<sup>1.</sup>

The diffusion of democratic rights, as a mutual concern which helped weld their political alliance, was more prominent in their minds than in those of most political contemporaries. Though Forster in the buoyant spring of 1848 had "look[ed] upon the suffrage as being as good as won,"<sup>2.</sup> by 1852 the difficult nature of the struggle was evident. For fifteen years they were to consider the movement towards democratic rights a major political *raison d'etre*.

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1. Mack and Armytage, referring to Hughes's dream that church, squirearchy ("the [supposed] repositories of true patriotism and true democracy") and working classes merge in national-fraternal unity, comment: "That such medieval paternalism, which has its echoes in the anti-rationalism of our own day and its grim perversions in the doctrines of Hitler and Mussolini, was inconsistent with Hughes' own belief in democratic socialism never bothered Tom Hughes" (99-100).
  2. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 245: F to Thomas Cooper, n.d. [May 1848?].

Goderich's theoretical endorsement of manhood suffrage in *The Duty of the Age* was dependent upon the achievement of individual self-government (a Christian, moral regeneration) in prospective electors; man's natural right to elect his rulers was limited by 'moral' factors. Thus manhood suffrage, though accepted in principle, was perceived as an ultimate objective rather than an immediate goal. Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard basically concurred in this evaluation. Hughes accepted the theoretical framework of *The Duty of the Age*. Forster endorsed the chartist ambition of manhood suffrage in 1848. Bruce believed the people's influence should be progressively augmented. A cautious gradualist, he would admit to the franchise those qualified by education and good conduct. Though Layard's ideas remained embryonic, he spoke of the franchise in 1852 as "the right, and not the privilege, of the people," adding, perhaps for the benefit of his less radical supporters in Aylesbury, that it would content the people with their position in the social scale.<sup>1</sup>

The distinction between ultimate theory and immediate practice was to dominate their democratic considerations during the 1850s. For Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard, the task at hand was to define the franchise extension they would immediately confer on the working classes. Three considerations continually recur in this examination. Firstly, a material franchise was naturally queried as an appropriate measure of 'moral' eligibility. Secondly, the dichotomy between

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1. *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 10 July 1852: L's Aylesbury election speech, 6 July 1852. For a survey of their democratic theories prior to 1852, see chapter 2 above.

immediate and ultimate objectives permitted and encouraged an ample degree of pragmatism. Finally, this pragmatism was electorally expedient, providing the opportunity both to mask real intentions, and to alter democratic emphases without public admission, and consequent political embarrassment.<sup>1</sup> For Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard, the fifties was a decade for discussion and preparation. As their political alliance matured, their joint deliberations produced a common policy as regards practical and immediate suffrage extension.

It should be noted at the outset that Goderich, Forster, Bruce and Layard did not consider the franchise a fundamental human right, but rather a prerogative of adult males. Layard's condescension towards women, as expressed to his Aylesbury supporters, was eminently typical of middle class mid-Victorian male attitudes:

the rights of women are the rights which they exercise over the male sex, the rights which they exercise over their families and households; and those rights, bachelor as I am, I pledge myself always to support. I would ask you gentlemen -- for these things must be put in a plain homely manner -- supposing you were to go home to-night for your supper, and before your wives gave you your bread and butter, they were to ask you, "For whom do you intend to vote at the next election?" Would you like that? (laughter). Would that not be introducing into your homes strife and contention, instead of that which ought invariably to exist, love and good will? (hear). No, let woman reign in her proper domain -- her home, but let not her

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1. Goderich's differentiation between his ultimate objective of manhood suffrage and his immediate, practical franchise proposals was never recognised by Wolf, who accuses him of progressively modifying his views as expressed in *The Duty of the Age*. In so doing, Wolf has fundamentally misunderstood the philosophical implications of Goderich's democratic theory. Denholm has redressed the balance by emphasising Goderich's consistent belief in the ultimate triumph of democracy, whilst utilising pragmatic and gradualist means to achieve this objective. Denholm has tended, however, to ignore the significance of the expedient modifications which Goderich made to the franchise extensions he perceived as immediately acceptable. Whilst it may have been convenient for Goderich to persistently espouse as a principle the eventual advent of democracy, alterations in immediate goals are certainly indicative of his fluctuating democratic ardour, and will therefore be examined in this chapter.

attempt to interfere in that peculiar department where Providence has ordained that it is man's province to reign alone (hear). 1.

Throughout their political careers, the others entirely ignored women's suffrage, with the exception of Hughes, who with Mill and Hare supported the concept in 1865.<sup>2</sup>

Goderich, Bruce and Layard did not enter the house of commons in 1852 with identical views on the suffrage. During his Hull election campaign, Goderich countenanced a "large and comprehensive" extension of the franchise, but pledged himself to no specific proposal.<sup>3</sup> Bruce argued circumspectly in Merthyr that suffrage extension would elevate the character of the working classes, but cautioned that they must not be admitted *en masse* so as to swamp the existing electorate, for "that would be pure class legislation: it would virtually invest the working-classes with the whole power of the state (hear, hear)." Admitting the £10 limitation to be a "clumsy device" for securing voters "of intelligence and good character," he nevertheless defended its basic efficacy, whilst suggesting a number of supplementary qualifications, such as £50 savings bank deposits or promotion in employment to foreman level. Bruce defended electors of high 'quality' in quasi-utilitarian terms: "the object of the franchise was not to give a vote to the greatest number of individuals, but to secure the return of 658 good members (hear, hear)."<sup>4</sup> In Aylesbury, Layard made no commitment to a

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1. *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, 14 Aug. 1852.

2. See Hugh S.R. Elliot, ed., *The Letters of John Stuart Mill*, (London, 1910), ii : 39: Mill to Max Kyllman, 30 May 1865; Hill, *Electoral History of Lambeth*, 179. In 1878 Hughes referred to women's suffrage as a reform question yet to be dealt with, the implication being that he still tendered his support in principle (Hughes, 'The Working Classes in Europe', 7).

3. *Hull Packet and East Riding Times*, 18 June 1852: G's Hull election speech, 14 June 1852.

4. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 18 Dec. 1852: B's election speech, 14 Dec. 1852.

specific degree of suffrage extension.

Goderich entered the house of commons optimistically expecting the successful consideration of parliamentary reform, on which issue, he assured Hughes, he had "a stronger crochet than ever."<sup>1</sup> Yet reform was not seriously countenanced by the commons before the Bright-led agitation of 1858-9. In the intervening period, Russell's 1854 bill was the sole government-initiated reform measure. It proposed to give the county franchise to £10 occupiers, to lower the borough qualification to a £6 rateable value, and to introduce a number of fancy franchises -- for £2 direct taxpayers, university graduates, those with an annual salary of £100 or annual income of £10 from government stock, or those with £50 in savings banks. But the 'independence' of members from their constituents, the absence of popular agitation and the national pre-occupation with foreign affairs all precluded sympathetic parliamentary consideration of reform on this occasion and throughout the fifties. Goderich and his colleagues were to have ample opportunity for deliberation.

A practical bent was dominant in their approach to the suffrage question in the early fifties. Addressing the Huddersfield electors in 1853, for example, Goderich stated:

my own individual opinion would lead me to support household suffrage, 2. yet I don't think the introduction of that suffrage is possible at this time; and I am not going, by any course I may take, to endanger the safety of the Reform Bill which I think

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 22: G to H, Hull, 10 July 1852.
  2. This stated commitment to household suffrage did not logically preclude the desire that manhood suffrage eventually be attained. Goderich was wary in Huddersfield of expressing opinions (such as the endorsement of manhood suffrage) too advanced for the electors.

we shall get next year. I will give my support to any measure which will be practical and not deceptive and illusory. (Hear, hear, and applause.)

He would, he declared,

feel bound to support that measure which had the best chance of being carried; and not by running after any Will O' th' Wisp lose all, but having first caught one hare I would cook that, and if by doing so, it lead to my catching another afterwards, it would be time enough to cook that when I got it. 1.

Pragmatism was undoubtedly a convenient mechanism by which to conceal uncertainty as to the appropriate criteria for immediate admission to the franchise. During the mid-fifties Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard groped unconfidently for a moral or educational, as opposed to a material, suffrage test. A letter from Goderich to Hughes in August 1853 illustrates this approach. Goderich, "laying down principles which if one could once get them accepted must lead to the desired end very soon," argued that

... if you have a "Representative System" the only sound base on which it can now rest is universal suffrage, restricted by exclusions on account of insufficient education or moral wrong, to be applied of course in each individual case & not to classes. I don't mean that you can get there at once, for I don't think, from what I have seen of Electors, that you could especially in the counties, but you must get there soon by one road or another, & you had better start without delay by the road of Law. I want to see a *large* extension of the franchise, larger in Towns than in Counties, the improvement of the present distribution of members, & a beginning of the recognition of a moral -- & education -- principle, which might easily be done... 2.

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1. *Huddersfield Chronicle*, 23 April 1853.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 83: G to H, London, 25 Aug. 1853. Denholm pertinently argues that this statement is not a recantation of the principles of ultimate manhood suffrage, the operative word being now (Denholm, *Radical and Democratic Career of Ripon*, 52).

Two years later, Goderich again toyed with fancy franchises based on moral or educational factors. He continued to look to the ultimate advent, by gradual means, of manhood suffrage, with the next reform bill admitting the upper echelons of the working classes as the first stage in this process.<sup>1</sup> But he also asserted that the electoral system should be

based on something more truly national and more stable that [sic] the size of a man's House or the fluctuating amount of his fortune and ... in some degree recognize that it is on the moral & intellectual qualities of its citizens that the safety of a State depends. 2.

Forster too stated that a reform measure must give "to numbers and to intelligence more of their due share of the franchise."<sup>3</sup> This concentration on moral and intellectual qualifications in all likelihood derived from the influence of Bruce, for of the alliance he was the most fascinated with such proposals. Yet Bruce also understood the impracticality of such solutions: in 1854 he was advised that his concept of a simple literacy test (a requirement to write, say, ten words) was neither "expedient, or just & equal."<sup>4</sup> By 1857 the educational test was virtually abandoned as a workable principle. Bruce, for example, informed his electors that the money qualification was

a very false and imperfect one. I wish that the educational test or some other means might be adopted for increasing the number of electors,

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 174: misc. paper, indexed 1855, headed 'Home Politics'.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 175-99: misc. papers, indexed 1855, headed 'Dear \_\_\_\_\_'.
  3. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 310.
  4. BP. G CRO, D/D Br 157: H.S. Tremenheere to Bruce, 15 March 1854. A civil servant, Tremenheere probably met Bruce in his role as a commissioner inquiring into the state of the population in mining districts, 1844-58.

which would introduce into that body intelligent men who are now excluded. But there is a great difficulty in doing so. 1.

The national absence of reform enthusiasm gradually permeated their thinking in the mid-fifties. Addressing his constituents in 1855 Goderich expressed regret that parliamentary reform had been again postponed, and argued that the government's poor administration of the war might engender popular agitation. Though he believed reform would be better accomplished by timely wisdom, Goderich expressed his support under any circumstances.<sup>2</sup> By the following year, however, Forster asserted to Goderich that prosperity had induced apathetic conservatism, and that "as to political reform I think there is utter indifference to it and faithlessness in it."<sup>3</sup>

Facing the electors in 1857 Goderich, Forster, Bruce and Layard were forced to contend with this middle class absence of interest in reform. Their opposition to Palmerston over the *Arrow* having been generally misunderstood, a forthright commitment to manhood suffrage threatened possible political annihilation. Only in this context can their relative moderation be appropriately interpreted. Goderich's election address was suitably vague. Pledging himself to "progressive improvement," he promised to

continue to advocate, as I have hitherto done, the improvement of our Electoral System, and the introduction of such alterations in the Reform Act as the change in circumstances during the last twenty-five years, and the great increase in intelligence and sound political knowledge among the people have rendered necessary. 4.

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1. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 28 March 1857: B's election speech, 23 March 1857.
  2. *Times*, 2 June 1855: G's address to his Huddersfield constituents, 30 May 1855.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 65: F to G, Otley, 22 Aug. 1856.
  4. *Leeds Mercury*, 14 March 1857: G's election address, London, 13 March 1857.

Forster was similarly noncommittal at Leeds. Despite endorsement by the advanced liberal association, which favoured manhood suffrage, he repudiated the concept as an immediate objective and emphasised his flexibility:

he wished all who paid taxes to have a share in the distribution of them. (Cheers.) 1. He was of opinion that universal [manhood] suffrage would give a power rather more to the enemies of the people than to the people themselves. There would not, he believed, be any measure brought forward in Parliament for the extension of the suffrage which would go too far to prevent his voting for it. (Applause.) 2.

Bruce was somewhat less vague at Merthyr. Whereas in 1852 he had limited his suffrage concessions to fancy franchises such as £50 savings bank deposits, he now espoused more liberal measures, undoubtedly influenced by five years of collaboration with Goderich and Layard in the commons. His election address, whilst moderate, reflects the advancement of his ideas:

The Bill for Electoral Reform and Extension, introduced by Lord John Russell, was, necessarily perhaps, abandoned during the absorbing struggle with Russia. The progress of Education among the unenfranchised classes, their increased intelligence and blameless moderation of conduct, are reasons why every delay in extending the suffrage, should at least ensure a larger and more liberal measure of concession than any hitherto offered to the acceptance of Parliament and the People. 3.

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1. This nebulous statement defies accurate interpretation. If Forster meant direct taxes, the franchise would remain severely limited; if indirect taxes, universal suffrage would result; if rates, household suffrage.
  2. *Leeds Mercury*, 12 March 1857: F's speech to the advanced Liberals of Leeds, 11 March 1857. Reid argues (*Life of Forster*, i : 307) that Forster's opinions had "undergone some modification" since his espousal of universal suffrage in 1848. While doubtful in a theoretical sense, for all practical purposes this was true.
  3. That is, lower than Russell's £10 county, £6 borough qualifications of 1854. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 21 March 1857: B's election address, 11 March 1857.

On the hustings Bruce expressed disapproval of manhood suffrage, but endorsed a £5 franchise.<sup>1.</sup>

The temperance of their reform advocacy was perhaps a necessary political expedient in the enervate circumstances of 1857. For practical purposes, however, they had essentially abandoned the possibility of achieving manhood suffrage, and the subsequent pragmatic limitation of their horizons represents a decline in reform enthusiasm. Nevertheless they remained more advanced reformers than almost all other parliamentarians.

In January 1858 Forster, anxious not only to impress his reform opinions but also to advance his own political prestige, was one of the principal speakers at a Bradford reform meeting which he described as "a large mustering of respectable folk."<sup>2.</sup> Simultaneously portraying his essential radicalism and his willingness to compromise, he urged on his listeners the proposition that

the very least the ratepayers of Bradford could ask for was, that every man who paid rates, directly or indirectly, through the landlord or otherwise, had a right to vote [i.e. household suffrage] (cheers). That was the least they could ask for. Many of them wished to have more, but if they got this, the more would not be long in coming. 3.

This local agitation was the precursor to that of Bright and other radicals in the subsequent autumn and winter. From October 1858 to January 1859 Bright gave a series of public addresses in Birmingham, Edinburgh, Manchester, Glasgow and Bradford, in which he espoused reform and abused the aristocracy and house of lords. Though largely unsuccessful

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1. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 28 March 1857: B's election speech, 23 March 1857.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 100: F to G, Burley, 31 Jan. 1858.
  3. *Bradford Observer*, 4 Feb. 1858: F's speech to the Bradford reform meeting, 28 Jan. 1858.

in arousing popular fervour, Bright's speeches once again whetted the democratic appetites of Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard. Amidst rumours of a forthcoming tory reform bill, they devised a common strategy in the final months of 1858.

Early in November Goderich wrote Bruce that he was "very anxious to have some talk with you on the state of political affairs, & our prospects for next year." He expected Disraeli to produce a reform bill the real object of which, "however speciously they may try to conceal it, will be to 'redress the balance', as Dizzy is so fond of calling it, that is to increase the power of the landowners. If they try anything of that kind, we must resist." Though impressed with one of Bright's recent speeches, Goderich "deeply regretted the attempt to stir up once more the ... class-hatreds of 20 or 30 years ago."<sup>1</sup> Bruce replied that he "agree[d] entirely with your estimate of Bright's speeches," in which he had unfortunately "enact[ed] the demagogue rather than the statesman,"<sup>2</sup> and Layard also informed Goderich that he "quite agree[d] with you about Bright."<sup>3</sup> On two counts they expressed concern over Bright's approach. Firstly, the tenor of his anti-aristocratic remarks clashed with their romantic sensibilities, for they clung to the vague delusion that working class enfranchisement would enhance class conciliation and fraternity within the nation, whilst palliating class conflict. Secondly, they questioned Bright's political tactics in himself taking charge of a reform bill. Layard referred to this manoeuvre as a "great blunder," and in this context informed

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 86: G to B, London, 3 Nov. 1858.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 90: B to G, Aberdare, 6 Nov. 1858.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 128: L to G, London, 7 Dec. 1858.

Goderich that he "should be heartily glad to talk over many things with you. Is there any chance of your being in town?"<sup>1</sup>. On the *extent* of enfranchisement, however, they had no quarrel with Bright or other advanced radicals. Bruce, for example, commented to Goderich that he

... agree[d] with you that, barring unnecessary & mischievous attacks on existing Society, there is nothing extravagant in his [Bright's] views of the franchise... If the extension is to be simply one of lowering the pecuniary qualification, his plan seems to me as good as any. Objections there are to it obvious & not unimportant. Show me the plan to which no weighty objections can be offered. But the Reform Bill must be no sham. The extension must be considerable. If it admits many who are not qualified for the franchise by their intelligence & public spirit, we must look to their speedy improvement... 2.

Bruce's willingness to confer the vote on his compatriots, then educate his masters,<sup>3</sup> was written in response to Goderich's comment that "we must be very careful not to be drawn into acquiescence in a merely sham Bill, whether Derbyite or Whig. If we are to have Reform at all, it must open the door to the best of the Working Classes really and in good faith." They should seek to secure, he informed Bruce,

... such a Reform Bill as, while it satisfies the real & just requirements of the country in respect to the reform of Parliament, will enable us, when it is passed, to resist any further alteration of that kind for some time to come; so that, having repaired our political machinery, we may begin [sic] to use it for some practical purpose. I am sure that you will agree with me in these views & be ready to back me up in acting upon them. 4.

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1. *ibid.*

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 102: B to G, Aberdare, 24 Dec. 1858.

3. Bruce's desire to 'educate his masters' did not result from the fear of democracy which characterised Robert Lowe's attitude a decade later; it was rather a simple acceptance of political and educational realities.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 98: G to B, 20 Dec. 1858.

The specific democratic instalment which they determined to advocate in 1859 was explained on the part of Goderich in a letter to G.G. Glyn, and on the part of Forster, Bruce and Layard at reform and election meetings. At Glyn's request, Goderich delineated his reform ideas in December 1858, arguing that the franchise should be extended so as to include

... the upper portion of the working classes. They are now fully entitled by their intelligence & political knowledge to have votes, & if we pass any Reform Bill at all it would be neither safe nor just to exclude them. I feel strongly on this point & should be glad to see them return some candidates of their own choice to every Parliament...

Rejecting schemes of class representation or complex fancy franchises, Goderich envisaged an electoral system which

... would keep up a difference, such as now exists, between the Borough & County populations; & then, if I consulted my own opinions only, I should be quite ready to accept the present *Municipal* suffrage, *guarded as it now is*, for Boroughs & a £10 household Suffrage for Counties...

This endorsement of household suffrage in the boroughs (where all ratepayers, direct or compounders, would be granted the vote) Goderich correctly considered would be unacceptable to parliament in 1859, and he therefore expressed his willingness to compromise, to prescribe "a £5 rental suffrage in Boroughs & a £15 in Counties. I would disfranchise all the corrupt old Freemen in Towns, as such; but would retain unaltered the 40 shilling freehold suffrage in Counties, which I believe to be in practice an excellent one." Goderich regretted that an educational franchise was impractical, but was willing to enfranchise *ipso facto* all university graduates, members of professions and

certified schoolmasters.<sup>1.</sup> Despite his disregard of manhood suffrage, Goderich's advocacy of household suffrage was certainly a radical position for 1859; even the endorsement of a £5 rental suffrage (approximately equivalent to a £3 rated suffrage) was sufficiently advanced for all but the most impatient radicals. Yet Wolf insists that Goderich's opinions had "matured in a conservative sense," had become cautious "to a degree which would have warmed the hearts of the unbending Tories."<sup>2.</sup> This assessment is simply false.

Unlike Goderich, who at this time was contemplating the possibility of office with the attendant proclivity to compromise, Forster was able to publicly pursue their mutual objective. He remarked of Goderich's letter to Glyn:

... you know my position is different from yours. I have to consider how much I will join with others in *asking* for, whereas you have to think how much you can get folk to *give*; so the upshot is I have decided to go with Bright for municipal borough suffrage and £10 counties... 3.

identical with the provisions Goderich actually desired. When Bradford reformers organised a reform meeting in January 1859, Bright was invited to speak. Forster, involved in the preparations, "sadly affronted the Bright people at Bradford by complaining loudly when I heard Milner Gibson was also asked, which I said would tack Bradford to the tail of the Manchester School."<sup>4.</sup> Goderich, though invited, was unwilling to address the meeting.<sup>5.</sup> Forster, on the other hand, proposed to the

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 61: G to Glyn, London, 23 Dec. 1858. The banker Glyn was Liberal MP for Shaftesbury, 1857-73, and party whip from 1868-73. As Lord Wolverton, he remained a staunch Gladstonian during the 1880s.

2. Wolf, i : 142.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 166: F to G, Ambleside, 31 Dec. 1858.

4. *ibid.*

5. *ibid.*; Forster wrote Goderich: "They asked me for your address yesterday to invite you. I gave them a notion, if any way, that you would not come which I suppose you will not."

gathering a resolution on behalf of the Bradford reform registration society favouring a £10 county franchise and household suffrage in the boroughs. He praised Bright as the champion of reform, argued that foreign questions should not preclude consideration of reform, and asserted that

every man who has a family to care for should have a vote -- and I say this, that these family cares, these family ties, are as great a guarantee for the patriotism of the poor man as are his consols for that of the fundholder, or his acres for that of the landlord. 1.

In the April election campaign Forster described himself as a radical on parliamentary reform, a member of the advanced section of the Liberal party.<sup>2</sup> More advanced than his co-Liberal, Edward Baines, he committed himself in his election address to the £10 county franchise (whilst retaining the county freehold franchise) and to household suffrage in the boroughs. He expressed his willingness, however, to support the sort of measure which Lord John Russell proposed to introduce,

in the hope that its discussion might result in a satisfactory settlement of this question for some time to come; and in enabling Parliament to attend to those financial and administrative reforms, for the attainment of which I believe an improved representation of the people is required. 3.

Bruce and Layard expressed identical sentiments during their Merthyr and York election campaigns of 1859. In his address Bruce reminded his electors that he had "never, as you well know, advocated a sweeping measure of Reform. I have always maintained that all progress,

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1. *Bradford Observer*, 20 Jan. 1859: F's speech to the Bradford reform meeting, 17 Jan. 1859.
  2. *Leeds Mercury*, 14 April 1859: F's address to the Liberal nomination meeting in Leeds, 12 April 1859.
  3. *ibid*: F's election address, Leeds, 13 April 1859.

to be safe and lasting, must be gradual." Yet the moderate conduct of the working classes "entitled them to an early and considerable participation in the electoral franchise."<sup>1</sup> Bruce was prepared to support an elective franchise of £10 in the counties and £6 in the boroughs.<sup>2</sup> The latter figure embodied Russell's view, but Bruce insisted at Merthyr that he himself "was prepared to go further, and thought we should ultimately come to household suffrage (hear, hear)."<sup>3</sup> At York Layard cited the valour of the working classes at the Alma, Balaclava and Inkerman as justification for extending the suffrage,<sup>4</sup> and stated that he "should rejoice to see a household franchise." Yet Layard pledged himself, as a practical man, to accept a "fair instalment,"<sup>5</sup> and optimistically predicted that a £5 franchise was attainable.<sup>6</sup>

Their mutual desire to achieve household suffrage, though tempered by a tolerance for compromise, nevertheless precluded acquiescence in the Conservative reform bill of 1859. Derby and Disraeli proposed to enfranchise the £10 tenant at will in the counties and to leave the borough franchise intact, except for the introduction of some fancy franchises and the transfer of freehold voters in towns from the county to the borough rolls. Capitalising on rural hierarchical control, the measure was a conspicuous attempt to strengthen the landed interest, especially as it incorporated little redistribution. Ripon, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard joined other Liberals in rejecting the

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1. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 23 April 1859: B's election address, London, 7 April 1857 [sic].
  2. *ibid.*, 7 May 1859: B's election speech.
  3. *ibid.*, 23 April 1859: B's Merthyr election speech, 19 April 1859.
  4. *York Herald*, 23 April 1859: L's York election speech, 21 April 1859.
  5. *ibid.*, 16 April 1859: L's York election speech, 13 April 1859.
  6. *ibid.*, 23 April 1859: L's speech to the non-electors of York, 20 April 1859.

bill. Bruce commented that there was "no other course open to Liberal Members."<sup>1</sup> Ripon, forwarding to Hughes a copy of his letter to Glyn, stated that it was "difficult to conceive anything at all in the shape of a Reform Bill more opposite to my views than Dizzy's measure."<sup>2</sup>

Their common espousal of household suffrage in 1859 did not represent a modification of their theoretical commitment to the eventual realisation of manhood suffrage. However the attainment of the radical objective of manhood suffrage was in the immediate term improbable and its endorsement, in alienating cautious reformers, tended to be counter-productive. With these factors in mind, and considering the necessity to compromise in order to obtain and retain office, manhood suffrage was thereafter publicly repudiated.

It has been previously suggested<sup>3</sup> that the Liberal party's commitment to reform at Willis's rooms in June 1859 was an important factor in the philosophical adhesion to the alliance of Ripon, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard. Russell duly introduced a reform bill in 1860. He proposed to reduce the county franchise to £10, the borough franchise to £6, and to partially disfranchise some twenty-five small boroughs. The misgivings of the landed interest induced Russell to raise the franchises to £8 and £15 for the borough and county suffrages respectively, but general indifference nevertheless dispatched the bill. Bruce commented resignedly that "there were eighty-nine amendments proposed in Committee, and it would have been physically impossible to have dealt with them and with the mass of business still remaining undone."<sup>4</sup>

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1. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 23 April 1859: B's election address, London, 7 April 1857 [sic].
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 61: R to H, London, 19 March 1859.
  3. See chapter 5 above.
  4. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 174: B to Norah Bruce, London, 11 June 1860.

Layard agreed with Bright that "if parliament had passed that bill, imperfect as it was, it would have improved the electoral list, and a parliament would have been returned which would in all probability have passed such a measure as would satisfy the country." He thought anyone who believed the existing government would again attempt reform "must be an idiot."<sup>1</sup> Forster, who ascribed the failure to the absence of popular agitation, expressed to de Grey his concern that "you should too much suppose you have been beaten and so let the Tories crow over you and allow them to be cocky."<sup>2</sup> Within months, however, he felt constrained to admit that the bill had been introduced "as though they [Russell and the government] hardly intended to carry it, and it was received in Parliament in a way which could only be called contemptuous and disgraceful (cheers)."<sup>3</sup>

Before Palmerston's death in 1865, no further measure of reform was sponsored by the government, a natural circumstance undoubtedly under a prime minister who held that

... the History of the world in all Times & Countries shews that Power in the Hands of the Masses throws the Scum of the Community to the Surface and that Truth and Justice are soon banished from the Land -- we should all fare in the same way under the sway of Bright and his associates... 4.

The complacency which office engendered in de Grey and Bruce is nowhere so evident as in their apparent tolerance of Palmerstonian conservatism on reform.

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1. *Daily News*, 16 Feb. 1861: L's speech at a Southwark reform meeting, 15 Feb. 1861.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 193: F to deG, Burley, 17 June 1860.
  3. *Bradford Observer*, 7 Feb. 1861: F's speech at the Liberal nomination in Bradford, 5 Feb. 1861.
  4. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/14D, 117: Palmerston to Russell, Broadlands, 28 Oct. 1862.

Their resignation to official complacency was not of course sudden. In early 1861, for example, when Palmerston gratuitously obstructed Locke King's county franchise bill, Forster reported that "Lord De Grey with whom I breakfasted this morning is much disgusted with his Chief."<sup>1</sup> Yet in the remaining years of the premier's life, de Grey's papers are remarkably devoid of references to reform. Though not opposed to suffrage extension he essentially lost interest in the issue, a probable result both of his succession to the peerage in 1859 and of his preoccupation with war office administration. Bruce's enthusiasm similarly waned. Though he reiterated in 1863 his belief that the suffrage should be extended, on the basis of "possession of property or superior intelligence or education,"<sup>2</sup> he also expressed anxiety lest the working classes "swamp" constituencies.<sup>3</sup> Whilst de Grey and Bruce had not abandoned their commitment to household suffrage they ceased to be its forceful propagandists, and were not truly impatient with Palmerstonian indifference.

Layard, perhaps influenced by the radical nature of his Southwark constituency, was less tolerant of the prevalent complacency on reform, though his commitment, like that of de Grey and Bruce, was tempered by official obligations. In February 1861 he joined a group of less than fifty members in support of White's<sup>4</sup> amendment to the address in the interest of reform, and in the same month convened a public reform meeting in south London.<sup>5</sup> Throughout the early sixties he regularly reminded his constituents that popular agitation and a less reactionary

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1. FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 42: F to Jane Forster, [London], 20 Feb. 1861.

2. 3 H 170, 539-40: 22 April 1863.

3. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 25 Dec. 1863: B's address to his Merthyr constituents, 20 Dec. 1863.

4. James White, MP for Plymouth, 1857-9, and for Brighton, 1860-74; a strong reformer and Gladstonian.

5. See *Daily News*, 16 Feb. 1861: L's speech at a Southwark reform meeting, 15 Feb. 1861.

parliament were essential ingredients in a successful reform campaign.<sup>1</sup> As a member of the government Layard perhaps necessarily remained silent in the house of commons, though he joined Bruce and Forster in their consistent endorsement of private members' franchise bills<sup>2</sup> (an unsuccessful and unsatisfactory alternative to a government-sponsored measure). During the 1865 election campaign Layard reiterated his endorsement of suffrage extension ("my opinions upon Reform have not changed. On the contrary, every day convinces me the more that the time has come when the working man ought to be admitted to the franchise. (Hear, hear.)") and cited the elections of Hughes and J.S. Mill as proof of working class suitability for the franchise.<sup>3</sup> At Hughes's victory celebration in August 1865, Layard commented that

he did not believe that he [Layard] was a formidable democrat, although he was what was some time ago (the word seemed now to be dying out) called a radical. But he had more than once stood for large constituencies, and he had always had the earnest, sincere, and independent support of the working men.

Whilst Hughes could authoritatively speak in the name of the working class, Layard endorsed the subsidisation of election expenses in order that working men themselves could enter the house of commons.<sup>4</sup>

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1. *Times*, 22 Nov. 1861: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 21 Nov. 1861; *Times*, 11 Dec. 1863: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 10 Dec. 1863; *Daily News*, 3 Dec. 1864 and *Times*, 3 Dec. 1864: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 2 Dec. 1864.
  2. Specifically, the regular proposals of Locke King on the county franchise, and those of Edward Baines on the borough franchise (see 3 H 161, 1932-5: 13 March 1861; 3 H 162, 410-3: 10 April 1861; 3 H 175, 347-51: 11 May 1864; 3 H 178, 1705-9: 8 May 1865).
  3. *Times*, 13 July 1865: L's address at his unopposed election for Southwark, 12 July 1865; also *Times*, 30 June 1865: L's election address.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 58175, 176-7: unidentified newspaper report (c. 2 Aug. 1865) of the meeting held at the working men's college to celebrate H's Lambeth election victory.

The reform ardour of Hughes and Forster remained pronounced throughout the sixties. During the 1865 election campaign Hughes expressed his willingness to countenance manhood suffrage, and his attraction to Hare's scheme of proportional representation,<sup>1.</sup> but committed himself to support a useful Liberal bill.<sup>2.</sup> In June 1865 he formally joined the reform league,<sup>3.</sup> and was duly installed as a vice president. Forster was similarly fervent. In the commons he welcomed Gladstone's declaration that "every man who is not presumably incapacitated by some consideration of personal unfitness or of political danger is morally entitled to come within the pale of the Constitution,"<sup>4.</sup> stating that "the conduct of the Government hitherto had been marked by hesitation and indifference on Reform questions; but after the speech of the right hon. Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) it would be difficult for them to continue that policy."<sup>5.</sup> In 1865 Forster again urged on the house the necessity of the government's declaring its hand: "We who are called upon to support them want to know whether we shall be supporting a Reform Ministry. We who sit on this side of the House have a right to know who we are supporting." Forster also argued that members must be held to their reform pledges on the hustings, called on the Liberal party to purge itself of reactionary elements [i.e. Lowe and his sympathisers], and assured members that working men would never

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1. Hare's scheme envisaged a national constituency which would elect a national list of candidates on a quota system.
  2. *Times*, 30 May 1865: H's address at his nomination, 29 May 1865; Hill, 179: H's election address, June 1865. He later termed such a compromise "a half loaf" (*Times*, 5 Dec. 1865: H's speech at a public dinner in his honour, 4 Dec. 1865).
  3. George Howell Collection, Bishopsgate Institute: H to Howell, London, 1. June 1865.
  4. 3 H 175, 324: 11 May 1864.
  5. 3 H 175, 343: 11 May 1864.

combine to promote class legislation.<sup>1.</sup> Outside parliament Forster involved himself in the growing reform agitation. In 1861 he had spoken at a Leeds conference convened to unite Yorkshire and Lancashire reformers, committing himself to household suffrage, expressing his willingness to accept £6 as a first instalment, and disparaging Bright's proposal that trade unions become organisations for agitation.<sup>2.</sup> In December 1864 he chaired a reform demonstration in Bradford attended by about 3000 people, where he attempted to pressure Liberal members into commitment on reform.<sup>3.</sup> At his annual constituency meeting early in 1865, Forster repeated his pledge to household suffrage and his belief that the franchise would be extended gradually.<sup>4.</sup> Speaking at a Leeds reform meeting in January 1865, he contented himself with a £6 borough and £10 county franchise, blamed Palmerston for the Liberals' complacency over reform and praised Gladstone and Russell as sympathetic ministers.<sup>5.</sup> In the following May he spoke in Manchester at the national reform conference of the reform union, at which the relative merits of manhood and household suffrage were discussed. Forster supported the majority decision that a "comprehensive measure," but not manhood suffrage, be recommended. Urging reformers not to split on theories of future ideal representation but to unite on a practical measure, he emphasised that "one thing which they must determine to get done was that any instalment which they could obtain should be taken as a stepping stone to the future rather than a barrier against the future.--(Applause.)"<sup>6.</sup>

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1. 3 H 178, 1640-9: 8 May 1865.

2. *Manchester Weekly Times*, 23 Nov. 1861: F's speech at Leeds reform conference, 18-19 Nov. 1861.

3. *Daily News*, 10 Dec. 1864 and *Times*, 10 Dec. 1864: F at Bradford reform meeting, 8 Dec. 1864.

4. *Bradford Observer*, 12 Jan. 1865: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 10 Jan. 1865.

5. *Times*, 2 Feb. 1865: F's speech to Leeds reformers, 31 Jan. 1865.

6. *Manchester Guardian*, 17 May 1865: F's speech at the national reform conference, 15-16 May 1865.

His theoretical commitment to eventual manhood suffrage had not been abandoned.

### 3.

By the mid-sixties pressure for reform emanated from new model unionists, middle class radicals, and others whom the ruling classes inevitably perceived as increasingly 'respectable'. The reforming temper so evident during 1866-7 further stirred the enthusiasm of Hughes, Forster and Layard for franchise extension, but did little to counteract the phlegmatic torpor of Bruce and de Grey. Though undivided on policy, there was little unity within their personal alliance on tactics or spirit.

The mutual support tendered each other by Hughes, Forster and Layard was nevertheless a significant factor in the political calculations of 1866. Forster had in November 1865 made his acceptance of office under Russell conditional on the government's commitment to reform. When Russell first offered a position, he was unable to assure Forster that a commission of inquiry into the electoral system (an obvious delaying tactic) would not be countenanced.<sup>1</sup> On 18 November the two men agreed that Forster should proceed with his proposed reform speech at Bradford before definitive arrangements as to office were completed.<sup>2</sup> Despite pressure from Brand, the whiggish whip,<sup>3</sup> Forster contended in his address that the government was pledged to a "comprehensive" bill which would admit the working classes to "a substantial and real share" of the constitution. Russell and Gladstone, he stated, were the two statesmen "most pledged before the country on

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1. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 374: F's diary entry, and i : 375-6: F to Russell, Rugby, 16 Nov. 1865.

2. *ibid.*, i : 376: F's diary entry, 18 Nov. 1865.

3. *ibid.*, i : 376-7.

this question of Reform (hear)," so that the country "not only expected it, but demanded it -- (cheers) -- and the Government were aware it was necessary to their continuance as a Government that they should meet the demand."<sup>1</sup> Russell subsequently renewed his offer to Forster, abandoning the notion of a commission.<sup>2</sup> Though no agreement had been reached as to the content of the measure, Forster's conditional acceptance had undoubtedly influenced its timing. Hughes publicly welcomed the outcome of this manoeuvre. He had plumped for Russell as prime minister immediately after Palmerston's death,<sup>3</sup> and stated his belief that Russell's decision to recruit men such as Forster "from the most advanced and vigorous section" of the Liberal party augured well for reform.<sup>4</sup>

Forster, Hughes and Layard attempted to exert influence on the Liberal leadership during the critical early weeks of 1866, when the scope of reform was determined. On 10 January Forster told de Grey, Cardwell and Gibson that a £6 rating proposal was too conservative, and on the following day met with Russell.<sup>5</sup> On 16 January Hughes joined a reform league deputation to Russell and Gladstone,<sup>6</sup> and on 17 January Forster discussed with the commons leader the merits of reform:

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1. *Bradford Observer*, 23 Nov. 1865: F's speech to the Bradford reform meeting, 22 Nov. 1865.
  2. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 380-1: F to Jane Forster, London, 24 Nov. 1865; Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/15G, 84: unsigned memorandum (not in Russell's hand) on ministerial arrangements, 26 Nov. [1865].
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 141: H to deG, London, 19 Oct. 1865.
  4. *Times*, 5 Dec. 1865: H's speech at a public dinner in his honour, 4 Dec. 1865.
  5. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 390-1: F to Jane Forster, London, 11 Jan. 1866.
  6. George Howell Collection, Bishopsgate Institute: Howell to H, 2 Jan. [1866] (copy) and H to Howell, Luton, 7 Jan. 1866. Howell continued to forward Hughes factual material relevant to reform (e.g. Howell Collection, Bishopsgate Institute: Howell to H, 12 March [1866] (copy)).

"I went over the Reform question with him up & down & I think he really took in what I said."<sup>1</sup> Following a Liberal banquet in Guildford in early February, at which both Hughes and Layard spoke,<sup>2</sup> the latter reported to Russell that public opinion in Surrey (mirroring Layard's opinion?) favoured franchise reduction before the consideration of redistribution.<sup>3</sup>

The Liberal reform bill as finally introduced was an extremely moderate attempt to include the labour aristocracy in the franchise, its moderation largely dictated by the necessity to conciliate whigs and proto-Adullamites. It provided a £7 rental or £10 lodger qualification in boroughs and a £14 occupier or £50 savings bank qualification in counties. Forster, Layard and Hughes were prepared to accept this halting measure as a practical and honest, though imperfect, attempt to settle the question. Forster, for example, described himself as "agreeably disappointed. He had expected to be obliged to leave the Government when it should be announced, but now thought the £7 franchise would be accepted by the Liberals as a compromise."<sup>4</sup> Lowe, Horsman, Elcho and the Adullamites, however, were not receptive, unwilling to entertain any advance of dreaded 'democracy'. Layard contended in late March that the parliamentary success of the bill might "depend upon the demonstration of opinion in the country during the next fortnight."<sup>5</sup> In an attempt to influence debate on second reading, both he and Hughes

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1. FP. TCD, Ms 4986, 65: F to Jane Forster, London, 17 Jan. 1866.
  2. *Times*, 3 Feb. 1866: speeches by L and H at Guildford, 2 Feb. 1866.
  3. Russell Papers. PRO 30/22/16A, 275: L to Russell, London, 3 Feb. 1866.
  4. Lang, *Life of Iddeleigh*, i : 252: Northcote's diary entry of 14 March 1866.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 39119, 278: L to Henry Elliot, London, 26 March 1866 (copy). Elliot, brother-in-law of Lord Russell, was ambassador to Florence in 1866.

participated in reform agitation. Layard organised a reform meeting in Southwark, where he was received with "rapturous applause," and where he argued that the absence of public turbulence proved the people's suitability for the suffrage, that the government's was an "honest measure. (Cheers.)" which proposed "as much as it was possible to carry," and that the opposition were merely opposed to all reform. He bitterly attacked Lowe, instanced once again the elections of Mill and of "his friend Mr. Hughes" as justification for a working class electorate, and called for the election of working men to parliament. Layard defended his consistent support for reform, even under Palmerston, and compared his views with other government members such as Forster, Stansfeld, Gibson and Villiers.<sup>1.</sup> Layard's was a forceful attempt to impress upon both constituents and members the necessity of reform, though his disparagement of Lowe may have been counterproductive. Two nights later, Hughes defended Lord Elcho's right to address a crowded reform league meeting, whilst proceeding himself to defend the suffrage as a human right.<sup>2.</sup>

Having attempted to arouse a considerable measure of popular enthusiasm Layard, Hughes and Forster turned to parliament, supporting each other's efforts during the commons' debate on second reading of the reform bill. Forster's speech was an attempt to allay Adullamite concern. In a tone of moderation, he expressed his support of the £7 rental suffrage despite a preference for a more substantial reduction.

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1. *Daily Telegraph*, 10 April 1866 and *Times*, 10 April 1866: L's speech at Southwark reform meeting, 9 April 1866.
  2. *Times*, 12 April 1866: H's speech at reform league meeting, 11 April 1866.

He argued that only the labour élite, deferential to those in authority, would be admitted, and deprecated the notion that a working class political union could ever be achieved -- he thought the miners of Cornwall, masons of London and textile workers of the north would never combine were the franchise granted them. Forster urged a settlement in order to avoid violence, and in order that pressing issues such as Ireland, education and pauperism could be considered by parliament.<sup>1.</sup> Later in the same evening Layard adopted similar tactics, but despite a moderate speech appealing to the right's sense of justice he was ill-received. He reminded members of their electoral pledges and referred to the £7 franchise as a practical measure. Contending that working men required direct representation in parliament, and not only through others such as himself, Bright or Forster, he argued that elections should be subsidised through the rates, and that the proposed reduction would not permit working men to swamp other classes. Morally deserving of the suffrage, the working class also possessed a material stake in the country through co-operative and friendly societies, and through mutual benefit societies such as the odd fellows. Layard praised Gladstone, stressed that reform would prevent violent agitation, disparaged the tory fear of 'democracy', and assured the Liberal right that he could

entirely corroborate what my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W.E. Forster) stated this evening in his calm, able, and convincing speech, that the working men of this country in their difficulties and troubles look up to men of rank and position, and are always ready to consult them, and to be guided by them. 2.

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1. 3 H 182, 1387-95: 16 April 1866.

2. 3 H 182, 1423-59: 16 April 1866.

Though one of Layard's most powerful parliamentary speeches, Conservative and Adullamite predispositions rendered its impact ineffectual. Hughes nevertheless persevered with the effort to win Adullamite votes through moderation. As an advanced, or extreme, Liberal, he nevertheless offered "the best support in his power to the Government on this Franchise Bill," which he interpreted as an essentially conservative measure. Hughes referred in his speech to both Forster and Sir Francis Crossley,<sup>1</sup> "than whom no better friends of the artizans and mechanics of this country, and no men who knew them better or were more trusted by them, though they were both masters, existed in England." The Tories, Hughes stated, should be reassured by these two manufacturers, both of whom wanted even greater reform and had no fear of the working class. Hughes also expressed his agreement with Layard "that neither his hon. Friend [Layard], nor himself, nor any other Member of that House could really and efficiently represent the working men of our great towns," for "it was impossible that those who lived in the affluence and luxury which the majority of that House enjoyed could really represent" the working class. He concurred with Forster that the working class would be as divided on social and labour questions as other classes were. Hughes cited trade unions and co-operative societies as responsible working class endeavours to develop their economic and social principles, which rejected supply and demand. He believed these fraternal concepts should be represented in parliament by working men, for parliament had hitherto ignored their requirements.

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1. Crossley, the Halifax carpet manufacturer, was Liberal MP for Halifax from 1852-9, and for the West Riding from 1859-69. In 1864 his business became a limited liability company, and he instituted a partnership of industry through sharing profits with his workers.

With working class legislators, he contended, deplorable housing conditions, adulteration of food, provision of education, arbitration courts, revision of the master and servants act, the state of work-house infirmaries, the existence of dangerous trades and the regulation of alcohol sales would all be considered and debated.<sup>1.</sup>

Despite the concerted efforts of Forster, Layard and Hughes, the Liberal reform bill of 1866 was repudiated by the Adullamite 'cave' and therefore doomed to failure. Grosvenor's blocking amendment, that redistribution and suffrage extension be jointly considered, was defeated by only five votes in a large house.<sup>2.</sup> Layard had earlier predicted that "if there is to be a majority it will I think be a small one, and I believe that for the liberal party and for the cause of *real* reform we had better go out upon the Bill."<sup>3.</sup> But Russell and Gladstone instead capitulated, introducing a measure of redistribution which, by threatening Liberals in pocket boroughs, ensured the bill's demise. Henceforth Disraeli was increasingly able to manipulate not only his own backbench but also the Liberal malcontents. Without public agitation in support of their cause, reformers could not avoid a disadvantageous position. Layard was adamant that the government must not consent to a modified borough franchise,<sup>4.</sup> and Forster pressed similar views on behalf of the Bradford reform union.<sup>5.</sup> He spoke belatedly against Dunkellin's amendment to substitute a rating for the rental franchise, holding that £7 rating was often equivalent to £9 rental, and that county magistrates could through a rating franchise influence electoral rolls in boroughs,

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1. 3 H 182, 1700-10: 19 April 1866.

2. 3 H 183, 152-6: 27 April 1866. Bruce, Forster, Hughes and Layard all supported second reading of the unamended bill.

3. LP. BL Add Ms 39119, 541: L to Cowley, London, 25 April 1866 (copy).

4. LP. BL Add Ms 39120, 28: L to Cowley, London, 5 May 1866 (copy).

5. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44157, 2: F to Gladstone, London, 11 May 1866.

thus ensuring the preponderance of agricultural interests.<sup>1.</sup> The government however was defeated on this issue and consequently resigned. A reform meeting which Layard organised in Southwark in early July<sup>2.</sup> was largely irrelevant, though it provided him the opportunity to panegyrise, and thereby ingratiate himself with, Gladstone.<sup>3.</sup>

The roles of Bruce and de Grey in the reform movement of 1866 were minimal. Bruce, together with Hughes, Forster and Layard, consistently voted with the government in the commons,<sup>4.</sup> but he made no contribution to debate. And when Grosvenor's amendment was only narrowly defeated, he merely comforted himself "by thinking that no course cd. have been successful."<sup>5.</sup> Though de Grey's papers contain few references to reform in 1866, he was undoubtedly willing to accommodate himself to suffrage extension. For example, he expressed himself "much pleased" with Forster's 22 November 1865 speech which committed the government to proceed on reform without a delaying commission.<sup>6.</sup> Rumours that de Grey, with Somerset and Clarendon (both staunch whigs), walked out of a February cabinet meeting "in disgust" over Gladstone's and

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1. 3 H 184, 598-601: 18 June 1866.
  2. See *Times*, 7 July 1866: L's speech to a Southwark reform meeting, 6 July 1866.
  3. See Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44411, 92: L to Gladstone, London, 7 July 1866; LP. BL Add Ms 38993, 149: Gladstone to L, London, 7 July 1866.
  4. 3 H 183, 152-6: 27 April 1866; 3 H 183, 1344-7: 28 May 1866; 3 H 183, 2071-5: 7 June 1866; 3 H 184, 405-9: 14 June 1866; 3 H 184, 639-43: 18 June 1866.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 171: B to de G, London, 28 April 1866.
  6. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 381: F to Jane Forster, London, 24 Nov. 1865. F.B. Smith states (*The Making of the Second Reform Bill*, (Melbourne, 1966), 61) that in January, when the extent of the existing working class suffrage became known, de Grey joined the cabinet whigs in their desire either to ignore reform or shelve it with a commission. No reference is given for this assertion, however, and the balance of evidence would appear to sustain the view that de Grey supported reform in 1866.

Russell's hastily-proposed alteration from a rating to a rental franchise, can probably be dismissed.<sup>1</sup> The only accurately-documented instance in which de Grey aligned himself with the cabinet whigs over reform was in consideration of the response to Dunkellin's rating amendment,<sup>2</sup> and his belief that the government should resign following its defeat was substantiated by events. Throughout 1866 de Grey was close to Sir Charles Wood, whom F.B. Smith has described as "the radicals' go-between."<sup>3</sup> Yet what is most remarkable, perhaps, about de Grey's performance in 1866 was his virtual abstention from participation in the cabinet's reform discussions. Clearly he was not truly involved with reform, and was in this sense complacent or conservative.

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1. The reference is from Lang, i : 245-6: Northcote's diary entry of 28 Feb. 1866, and is quoted in Maurice Cowling, 'Disraeli, Derby and Fusion, October 1865 to July 1866', *Historical Journal*, 8, 1, 1965, 51. The opposition of cabinet whigs on this occasion was not so much to a rental franchise as to parliamentary reform *per se*. De Grey was certainly not averse to reform and, with his conciliatory nature, it would have been out of character for him to peremptorily abandon a cabinet discussion. Apart from the rumour itself being suspect (false political rumours were particularly rife at the time), much doubt is cast on de Grey's role by Northcote's actual entry: "Dis.[raeli] told me on Monday that he heard that the Cabinet on Saturday broke up in admired disorder, three members -- the Duke of Somerset, Lord Clarendon, and Lord de Grey (?) -- having left the room in disgust." The question mark following de Grey's name may be attributed to two possible causes. Firstly, it might refer to illegible handwriting, in which case Sir George Grey, a strong anti-reformer, may have been the actual deserter. Secondly, it might refer to Northcote's own doubt that de Grey could possibly have left a cabinet meeting in opposition to reform. Given all the circumstances, the accuracy of the rumour as regards de Grey is suspect, and should not be credited.
  2. Gladstone, *Diaries*, vi : 444: diary entry of 19 June 1866. Gladstone, Russell, Argyll, Gibson and Cranworth wished to appeal to the country; de Grey, Clarendon, Somerset, Grey, Hartington, Goschen and Cardwell wished to resign; Granville, Stanley of Alderley and Villiers wished a further commons vote of confidence to be attempted.
  3. Smith, *Making of the Second Reform Bill*, 58.

4.

Party machinations and popular agitation were both significant factors in the parliamentary acceptance of household suffrage in 1867. Within a month of attaining office Derby and Disraeli were confronted with the Hyde Park disturbances of July 1866. Denied permission to meet in the park, reform leaguers broke the surrounding railings; three days of intermittent skirmishing ensued, and order was restored by the league only when Walpole, the home secretary, agreed to withdraw the police. In the commons Layard defended the right of reformers to meet in public parks, described the government's impedimental actions as "most injudicious and foolish," and held the ministry "entirely and exclusively responsible" for the resultant riots.<sup>1</sup> Hughes, though a member of the league and sympathetic with its agitation, was nevertheless worried by the lawlessness and violence which had been threatened, but he asserted that the league "had done nothing illegal."<sup>2</sup>

The government's humiliation over the Hyde Park demonstrations provided a fillip for reformers: Forster commented to de Grey in August that "the temper of the strong Reformers is good, they seem to me both earnest and reasonable."<sup>3</sup> Whilst Gladstone and Russell retreated to Italy, middle class reform demonstrations in Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Glasgow and London in the autumn of 1866 added to the prevailing sense of expectancy and optimism. One of the greatest demonstrations occurred in Leeds, where Forster addressed a working class crowd on Woodhouse moor, and where he and Bright spoke to the middle class in Victoria hall. Forster committed himself to household as opposed to

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1. 3 H 184, 1400-3: 24 July 1866.

2. *Times*, 20 Nov. 1866: H's address to his Lambeth constituents, 19 Nov. 1866.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 208: F to de G, Burley, 24 Aug. 1866.

manhood suffrage, stressed the need for unity amongst middle and working class reformers and credited Gladstone above all others for the progress of the reform movement.<sup>1</sup> A fortnight later he addressed his Bradford constituents, where he attempted to placate the fears of reluctant reformers by emphasising that social unity and the existing class arrangements would in fact be preserved if reform were granted, adding, however, that he could not "merely reconcile myself to the future; I believe in it."<sup>2</sup> In November Forster joined Bright and others at a reform union banquet in Manchester, where he urged Liberals to give "a fair and candid consideration" to any honest Conservative proposal.<sup>3</sup>

Hughes and Bruce also held constituency meetings in the autumn of 1866. Hughes stated that he adhered in principle to Hare's plan for proportional representation, but would not press it exclusively. He toyed with the notion of an educational test, but stated his support for "something like household suffrage."<sup>4</sup> Hughes, like Forster, wished to give the prospective tory bill "fair consideration," for "it would probably be far more easy to let the Tories bring in a measure and knock it into good shape in committee while our side is in opposition."<sup>5</sup> In Merthyr Bruce "observed that there seemed to be, and he hoped that there was, a growing desire for the extension of the suffrage," and he believed with Hughes and Forster that "if the Ministers introduced a Reform Bill they would have many advantages which the Liberal Ministry

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1. *Leeds Mercury*, 9 Oct. 1866: F's speech at Leeds reform meeting, 8 Oct. 1866.
  2. *Leeds Mercury*, 23 Oct. 1866: F's address to his Bradford constituents, Oct. 1866.
  3. *Times*, 21 Nov. 1866: F's speech at reform union banquet in Manchester, 20 Nov. 1866.
  4. *Times*, 20 Nov. 1866: H's address to his Lambeth constituents, 19 Nov. 1866.
  5. *New-York Daily Tribune*, 15 Oct. 1866. Hughes was writing as the paper's London correspondent.

had not, and if their measure was a fair one it would meet with the support of a large portion of the Liberal party."<sup>1</sup> Supporting public agitation, he argued that the reform bill's success "did not depend upon the Cabinet but upon the will of the people, strongly expressed." He desired "a large and popular infusion" of new voters, but "though he considered household suffrage the measure which they ultimately looked for, he was not prepared to give an immediate vote in favour of it. He should not be afraid of a £5 franchise. (Cheers.)"<sup>2</sup>.

The agitation which occurred in the latter half of 1866 undoubtedly convinced both Conservatives and Liberals that a suffrage extension more fundamental than the 1866 bill was inevitable. But neither party was united, nor had most parliamentarians precisely defined their views, except that virtually all wished to exclude the 'residuum'. At the beginning of 1867 Forster, Bruce, Hughes and Layard were more advanced than most members of the commons in their opinions on reform for, despite Bruce's immediate reservations,<sup>3</sup> they were all committed in principle to household suffrage. At the same time, conscious of the progressive radicalisation of the working class, they were by late 1866 increasingly concerned (as were many MPs) that popular agitation would get out of hand, beyond the control of middle class parliamentarians.

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1. *Times*, 5 Dec. 1866: B's address to his Merthyr constituents, 3 Dec. 1866.
  2. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 7 Dec. 1866: B's address to his Merthyr constituents, 3 Dec. 1866.
  3. Bruce's reservations should not be exaggerated, for he desired household suffrage but favoured its gradual attainment: "... The position I have taken is that household suffrage would be the ultimate resting-point for the borough franchise, but that I should prefer an intermediate halting-place - say £6 - in order to prevent too great a disturbance of the present electoral system..." (Bruce, *Letters*, i : 249: B to L, Aberdare, 26 Dec. 1866).

Thus Forster had opposed the league's demand for manhood suffrage,<sup>1.</sup> Bruce believed that the conservatives' "stupid, short-sighted distrust" of the working men "simply throws the people into the hands of Bright and agitators of his stamp,"<sup>2.</sup> and Hughes, aware of the growing panic prevalent amongst the middle classes,<sup>3.</sup> was unwilling to speak on reform league platforms.<sup>4.</sup> Layard was perhaps most affected by loss of nerve. The "factious & unpatriotic course" which the Conservatives had adopted regarding the 1866 bill had in his view caused the working classes to be

... deeply agitated on the subject and we shall now have constant agitation, and very troublesome, and perhaps dangerous agitation if the Trades Unions throw themselves thoroughly into the movement. Last year I had no difficulty whatever in managing a meeting of my constituents and in carrying resolutions in favor of the most moderate reduction of the franchise. Now I am endeavouring to avoid my usual public meeting, feeling pretty certain that I should have resolutions in favor of manhood suffrage carried in my teeth... 5.

Layard consulted Bruce on his dilemma, and the latter advised that Layard point out to his Southwark constituents that their reform 'heroes', Russell, Gladstone, Bright and Mill, had all substantially declared against manhood suffrage, and that he should himself offer "a manly declaration against manhood suffrage" though "not against the principle absolutely."<sup>6.</sup> Layard's anxiety over agitation and consequent

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1. *Leeds Mercury*, 9 Oct. 1866: F's speech at Leeds reform meeting, 8 Oct. 1866.
  2. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 245: B to John Bruce, Aberdare, 9 Nov. 1866.
  3. *New-York Daily Tribune*, 31 Dec. 1866.
  4. Howell Collection, Bishopsgate Institute: Howell to H, 5 Feb. [1867] (copy); H to Howell, London, 9 Feb. 1867.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 58162, 200: L to [Arthur?] Russell, London, 30 Dec. 1866.
  6. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 248: B to L, Aberdare, 26 Dec. 1866.

reluctance to meet his constituents should not in themselves be confused with reluctance to reform, but rather interpreted as a conviction that manhood suffrage was not yet advisable or feasible. When the threat of violence passed, Layard acknowledged the contribution made to the reform movement by public demonstrations, and like Bruce reiterated his theoretical accord with the principle of manhood suffrage.<sup>1.</sup>

Their parliamentary tactics during the 1867 session were tempered by three principal considerations: the need to avoid violent extremism, the need to conciliate, if not the whiggish, at least the centrist, Liberals, and the desire to retain party unity under Gladstone's leadership. Disraeli, motivated by the desire to prevent agitation and to 'dish' Gladstone, floundered through his resolutions<sup>2.</sup> and the ten minutes bill<sup>3.</sup> to the notion of household suffrage. However his bill, introduced on 18 March, hedged this concept by personal payment of rates and two years' residence, and presaged a number of fancy franchises (for those with educational qualifications, with £50 savings, who paid 20s. in direct taxation) together with dual votes for property. The county suffrage was to be lowered from £50 to £15. The Liberal dilemma, and particularly that of Gladstone, was evident. If the bill passed second reading, there was every possibility that the safeguards would then be jettisoned and true household suffrage

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1. *Beehive*, 23 May 1868: L's speech at a soiree celebrating the second anniversary of George Potter's London working men's association.
  2. The government first attempted to deal with reform by introducing into the house a series of nebulous resolutions as a basis for discussion, the very vagueness of which necessitated their speedy abandonment were an effective Liberal attack to be avoided.
  3. The Conservatives' ten minutes bill, which provided for a £6 rating franchise, was concocted by a panicky cabinet on 25 February in order to prevent Cranborne's and Carnarvon's threatened resignations over the concept of household suffrage.

achieved, too radical a concept for Gladstone to accept. If a traditional rating or rental qualification were substituted, the Adullamites would once again defect. In either case, the Liberal party would inevitably split.

Bruce had predicted difficulties early in February, when he commented to de Grey that "anything wd be better [for party unity] than a premature move -- & without some further consolidation of the party, I do not see how we can venture to overthrow the Govt."<sup>1</sup>. Whilst the resolutions and ten minutes bill survived Liberal unity was assured. But the tory sham of nominal household suffrage limited by personal payment of rates,<sup>2</sup> which Forster had canvassed prior to its introduction,<sup>3</sup> was as divisive as Disraeli could have wished, whilst permitting considerable scope for tory expediency. Bruce commented to this effect in March:

We are in a state of great political difficulty. The Government measure, if the checks be retained, is a sham, and no settlement of a question which all reasonable men want to have settled for a generation at least. Without the checks, it is household suffrage, far too democratic a measure to suit nine-tenths of the Liberal party. We are sincerely anxious to aid the Government, and I hope they will meet us halfway... 4.

Gladstone's principal effort to counter Disraeli's strategy culminated in the 12 April vote on his amendment to substitute for nominal household suffrage a £5 rating franchise, a tactic which he had

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 177: B to de G, Aberdare, 3 Feb. 1867. Bruce and de Grey breakfasted together before the first Liberal party meeting of the session.
  2. Which excluded about half a million householders who compounded for their rates through their rents.
  3. *Bradford Observer*, 14 March 1867.
  4. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 250-1: B to John Bruce, London, 25 March 1867.

adopted in order to prevent household suffrage 'pure and simple', and with the hope of preserving intact the Liberal party. In the event forty-five Liberals, chiefly Adullamites, either voted or paired with the government. Though the party's right wing actually defected, the left was also disturbed by Gladstone's manoeuvre, for the advanced liberals hoped that, were second reading passed, the restrictions on household suffrage could be removed in committee. However throughout this crisis in Liberal fortunes Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard remained entirely faithful to their parliamentary leader.<sup>1</sup> Following the debacle of 12 April (which Gladstone described as "a smash perhaps without example"<sup>2</sup>.) Layard assured Gladstone of his

... warm sympathy and constant and cordial support. I entirely approve of what you have done, and you will always find me voting with you upon every question in which the equal extension of the franchise, without any distinction between those who are entitled to it, is concerned... 3.

Commenting at the time on Gladstone's leadership status, Layard asked: "How can you lead an army to battle when you have fifty traitors in the camp?"<sup>4</sup> Hughes was similarly loyal. On the day after Gladstone's rout on his £5 rating amendment, Hughes urged that he "ought not to draw back in any way or to leave the free lances to get what may yet be got out of this Government in the coming debates." He suggested that

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1. And all voted in support of Gladstone's £5 rating amendment (3 H 186, 1699-1703: 12 April 1867).
  2. Gladstone, *Diaries*, vi : 513: diary entry of 12 April 1867.
  3. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44412, 262: L to Gladstone, London, 1 May 1867.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 39053, 46: 'Memorandum of what took place between Mr. Harvey Lewis and myself in the House of Commons, on Thursday night, May 16, 1867.'

Gladstone "should at least have two distinct party fights, on the 2 years clause, & the lodger franchise," adding however that he would "not be sorry if you allow the household suffrage to pass, & I do not see that you are now bound to propose the £5 line."<sup>1</sup> Forster's position vis-à-vis Gladstone and £5 rating was particularly uncomfortable, in that his example was influential amongst parliamentary radicals. He spoke on Gladstone's amendment on 12 April, but had beforehand consulted Bright,<sup>2</sup> and had informed a Bradford reformer that he had "repeatedly told Mr. Gladstone that if Disraeli drops his checks I would support his bill against a £5 rating; but the question does not lie there, but is between a fair £5 rating franchise and an illusory household suffrage."<sup>3</sup> Forster's commons speech emphasised the 'fine' (in higher rates) which would be levied on a compounder if he chose to pay his rates personally in order to become a registered elector. If such a 'fine' were dispensed with, Forster indicated that he would support the government rather than Gladstone's amendment, but as the bill stood it would act unfairly and unevenly throughout the country. Thus despite his clear commitment to an honest measure of household suffrage, Forster in the circumstances endorsed Gladstone's £5 rating proposal.<sup>4</sup> The difficulties he endured in so doing were explained by his wife to her sister:

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1. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44412, 209: H to Gladstone, Brighton, 13 April 1867.
  2. Walling, *Diaries of John Bright*, 301: Bright's diary entries of 8 and 9 April 1867; FP. TCD, Ms 4992, 89: Jane Forster to Mrs. Arnold, 8 April [1867].
  3. Temmel, *Forster and Liberal Politics*, 173: F to Robert Kell, 1 April 1867.
  4. 3 H 186, 1608-16: 12 April 1867.

... it was only by an immense amount of care & planning & altering & re altering the form & the time & the scope of his [Gladstone's] amendments that such men as William & all the Radical side of the Bench were able to go with him while he stuck to his £5. I told you that they spent hours over it together -- & it required all their personal admiration for him & disgust at Disraeli's crooked policy & dislike of the personal rate paying -- to enable them to do so. He must remember this, & feel that his views on the Reform question do not at present fully coincide with those even of that section of the Liberal party who are most warmly in sympathy with his character & general policy... 1.

The defeat of Gladstone's amendment not only weakened his leadership, but also caused a radicalisation of Liberal policy, a willingness to accept household suffrage and sacrifice whigs and Adullamites. Thus Russell wrote Forster: "I agree with you that Gladstone's amendment having been thrown out, the struggle of reformers ought to be to obtain a real household suffrage without personal payment of rates."<sup>2</sup> The leadership of both parties subsequently lost control of the bill's details. In the house, Forster pressed the government repeatedly on the issue of compound householders,<sup>3</sup> and Hughes supported the introduction and extension of the lodger franchise<sup>4</sup> as well as his pet project of minority representation.<sup>5</sup> Outside parliament, popular agitation revived. The most significant reform demonstration was that of the league in Hyde Park in the first week of May. Though prohibited by the government the meeting nevertheless proceeded, indicating that the league could impose its will on humiliated authorities who feared prolonged intransigence and revolutionary violence. Hughes as a league

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1. FP. TCD, Ms 4992, 90: Jane Forster to Fan, Burley, 23 April [1867].
  2. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 400: Russell to F, Richmond Park, 25 April 1867.
  3. 3 H 184, 1875, 1876: 2 May 1867; 3 H 186, 1939, 1942, 1945: 3 May 1867; 3 H 187, 6: 6 May 1867; 3 H 187, 262: 9 May 1867.
  4. 3 H 187, 462, 474: 13 May 1867.
  5. 3 H 188, 1043-4: 4 July 1867.

vice president advised the abandonment of the demonstration,<sup>1.</sup> but his role was nevertheless questioned in the commons, where he defended his league membership and admitted the effectiveness of popular agitation.<sup>2.</sup> Other demonstrations were also of considerable importance. Forster, for example, spoke at a West Riding reform meeting (which encompassed somewhat uncomfortable leaguers) on 23 April.<sup>3.</sup> He was also present when a reform union deputation called on Gladstone, and stated that "the only possible settlement ... of the question of Reform was household suffrage. Mr. Gladstone was, above all things, sincere, and therefore he had confidence in him as a leader."<sup>4.</sup> Finally, Forster spoke on 15 May at what was to be the first of a series of weekly meetings which combined league and union spokesmen. He proposed to a crowded St James's hall that "agitation be at once renewed, and continued until those restrictions [on household suffrage] be abolished, and an honest and straightforward measure be secured."<sup>5.</sup> The impact of this agitation, combined with Disraeli's expediency (which may have been promoted by his faith that the working class would remain deferential regardless of the extent of democracy granted) and his burning desire to denigrate Gladstone and destroy Liberal unity, effected a series of Conservative retreats in May 1867. The residency qualification was limited to a year, a lodger vote was granted, the fancy franchises were quietly abandoned. On 17 May Disraeli finally announced his concurrence (without a division, without having consulted his party, and without concern that he thereby abrogated his previous insistence on the personal ratepaying principle)

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1. Howell Collection, Bishopsgate Institute: minutes of the executive committee of the reform league, 6 May 1867.
  2. 3 H 186, 1967-9: 3 May 1867.
  3. *Bradford Observer*, 25 April 1867: report of West Riding reform meeting, 23 April 1867.
  4. *Times*, 13 May 1867: report of reform union deputation to Gladstone, 11 May 1867.
  5. *Times*, 16 May 1867: report of reform meeting in St James's hall, 15 May 1867.

with Hodgkinson's famous amendment abolishing compound rate-paying, thus enfranchising all householders. Forster was apparently the sole leading Liberal on the opposition front bench when Disraeli conceded the amendment,<sup>1</sup> and he "hailed with the greatest delight the concessions which the right hon. Gentleman was prepared to make."<sup>2</sup> Later that evening, he was observed "dancing down the Lobby."<sup>3</sup> Forster was justifiably satisfied. Not only had he contributed to the achievement of household suffrage, he had also consolidated his own prestige by effectively occupying the vacuum in Liberal counsels which the post-12 April whig desertion had created.

With household suffrage effectively assured, the bill was tidied up and submitted to the lords, where de Grey offered two major speeches. Accepting the franchise provisions of the bill, he supported Halifax's resolution that its redistribution scheme was inadequate, and contended that more representatives should be afforded to large and important boroughs. Despite this apparent radicalism, however, de Grey expressed a belief that "the tendency of a measure of this description was to place our institutions on a democratic basis, and there was thus a danger of bringing everything to a dead level."<sup>4</sup> His fifties enthusiasm for reform had indeed waned, for he could not have thus spoken ten years previously. De Grey nevertheless favoured the bill's provision of borough household suffrage, and even five years later, when his catholic inclinations had induced a transitory conservatism,<sup>5</sup> Ripon decidedly "approve[d] the extension of the franchise which we have seen within the last few years."<sup>6</sup> His concern for the "dead level" should be

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1. *Bradford Observer*, 3 Aug. 1885: F's address to his Bradford constituents, 1 Aug. 1885.

2. 3 H 187, 753: 17 May 1867; also 3 H 187, 733-5: 17 May 1867.

3. G.M. Trevelyan, *The Life of John Bright*, (London, 1913), 377.

4. 3 H 189, 285-9: 29 July 1867.

5. See the 'Note on Ripon's resignation in 1873' at the end of this chapter.

6. 3 H 211, 1425: 10 June 1872.

interpreted primarily as an opportune effort to conciliate the conservative-minded lords. In a subsequent debate de Grey countered Salisbury's proposal for optional election by voting paper (to be completed in the presence of a justice of the peace), which he justly remarked would encourage intimidation and bribery.<sup>1.</sup> Though the clause was accepted by the lords it was later rejected in the commons, where Bruce, Forster, Hughes and Layard joined in the majority vote.<sup>2.</sup> De Grey was more successful in the lords in adding a clause which prevented returning officers acting as election agents.<sup>3.</sup> A final effort on behalf of working class rights occurred in mid-August, when Forster and Hughes appealed to the commons not to sanction the tory bill which would have prohibited political meetings in parks.<sup>4.</sup>

5.

An analysis of the actions of de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard during the reform movements of 1866-7 does not reveal a consistent or co-ordinated exertion of political pressure, though some co-operation was indeed evident. Layard, Hughes and Forster, for example, had supported each other during the commons debates on the 1866 bill, and throughout 1867 consultations had occurred on the subject of reform. Bruce told Layard, for example, in reference to reform, that he "should greatly like to talk over with you our public affairs."<sup>5.</sup> Hughes commented to de Grey in May 1867 that "politics as you may guess are not just what one would call cheerful just now for us," and advised him of reform proposals which were "a great temptation for a radical at a

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1. 3 H 189, 709-14: 2 Aug. 1867.

2. 3 H 189, 1193-7: 8 Aug. 1867.

3. 3 H 189, 737: 2 Aug. 1867.

4. 3 H 189, 1485-6, 1486-7: 13 Aug. 1867.

5. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 247: B to L, Oldham, 14 Dec. 1866.

loose end like your savage friend."<sup>1</sup> Bruce reported to de Grey on commons deliberations, as in late May 1867 when he commented that "we had a good day yesterday, & gave the Government 3 defeats."<sup>2</sup> Though close friends who sought each others' advice on reform, they were not persistent collaborators on the issue. Yet in 1867 as in 1859 they were committed in principle to household suffrage, and were thus in the forefront of radical opinion. De Grey, Bruce and Layard, less enthusiastic and more gradualist, differed from Hughes and Forster only on the timing of reform. It was significant to Liberal democratic theory and tactics that their views, which had been jointly developed in the fifties, persisted into the sixties. Despite contrasting enthusiasms, their friendship and their mutual adherence to Gladstone and the Liberal party helped consolidate the opposition's unity both during and after the contentious and divisive clashes on reform.

Certainly Forster and Hughes were more fervent in their beliefs by 1866-7, as exemplified by the paltry contributions to debate of Bruce and Layard.<sup>3</sup> Undoubtedly Bruce would have preferred a more gradual extension, but he accepted without rancour the immediate attainment of his longer-term objective, commenting lightheartedly that the Conservatives' "pleasure of beating Gladstone is beginning to lose its charm -- & the naked truth of Household Suffrage is beginning to dawn upon their drowsy intellects."<sup>4</sup> And two years later he asserted (rather misleadingly) that "the great extension of the franchise which

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 156: H to deG, London, 10 May 1867.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 181: B to deG, London, 31 May 1867.

3. Layard made no contribution to the 1867 reform debates. Bruce's sole effort was a perfunctory expression of gratitude for Disraeli's having granted Merthyr a second member (3 H 187, 1988: 17 June 1867).

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 181: B to deG, London, 31 May 1867.

was made during the last Session of Parliament gave universal satisfaction to the country."<sup>1</sup> Though the entire country was not in fact satisfied, Bruce presumably was. De Grey's essential disinterest should not camouflage his willingness to accept extensive reform. He is much more accurately described in 1866-7 as "a Gladstonian liberal with strong democratic leanings"<sup>2</sup> than as "a centre of more or less mild reaction in the Liberal camp."<sup>3</sup> The enduring nature of his relationship with Hughes, Forster, Layard and Bruce is a certain indication that de Grey was never overtly antipathetic to household suffrage, for their continued co-operation on other matters (education, Anglo-American relations, the co-operative movement) could not have proceeded during the tense Liberal feuds of the late sixties without some understanding on the issue of reform. Moreover in 1870, when he and Forster momentarily disagreed on the implementation of the education act, Forster wrote de Grey that "for the first time in our lives, I think, we disagree on an important question."<sup>4</sup> Reform was certainly an important question; thus one may confidently infer that de Grey had endorsed Forster's desire for household suffrage in the late sixties.

Having achieved household suffrage, they anticipated further reforms to the national polity; de Grey in fact perceived a direct relationship.<sup>5</sup> The prospect of a national scheme of elementary education, which they had contemplated since their group's inception, was perhaps their foremost consideration, though Ireland was also prominent in their calculations. However two political reforms -- redistribution of seats and the introduction of the secret ballot--were more directly related to the suffrage extension which had been attained.

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1. 3 H 194, 648-57: 4 March 1869.

2. Denholm, *Radical and Democratic Career of Ripon*, 55.

3. Wolf, i : 222.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 252: F to deG, Beckenham, 20 Nov. 1870.

5. RP. BL Add Ms 43511, 252: deG to the Duke of Cambridge, Ripon, 10 April 1868 (copy).

6.

Throughout the 1850s and 1860s Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard maintained identical and consistent views with regard to the distribution of parliamentary constituencies. This was never, however, as prominent an issue as suffrage extension in their political credos. In subordinating the significance of redistribution, they necessarily underrated its importance in the extension of democratic rights.

The radical objective of equal electoral districts was repudiated by Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard, who contended that established county and borough 'communities' should be represented as such rather than divided into manageable and isonomic portions. Thus the romantic notion of the organic community achieved precedence over the individual egalitarianism inherent in the concept of one vote, one value. Within these limits, however, they forcefully argued the case for a more just distribution of constituencies.

Goderich represented their views in his letter to Glyn of December 1858, in which he argued that the smaller boroughs, "especially those completely under the influence of one man, *must* be deprived of one or both of their members." Goderich asserted that the disposable seats thus obtained should not be given to the counties (except in a very few instances such as the West Riding and South Lancashire), for

... the Landed Interest is in almost exclusive possession of the House of Lords, its natural tendencies are & always must be strictly conservative, & if we wish our legislative machine to work at all, we *must* keep the majority of the other House thoroughly progressive...

Nor did Goderich think that a large number of seats should be given to any one town, believing three or four members to be the limit that one set of electors could properly choose -- and he reiterated his unwillingness to divide constituencies into separate electoral districts. Instead, Goderich proposed giving the great majority of the disposable seats to the largest unrepresented towns and to the unrepresented universities.<sup>1.</sup>

Goderich's ideas were wholly representative of his colleagues'. Forster, for example, wrote that "with regard to the redistribution I entirely agree with you and for your reasons,"<sup>2.</sup> and in his 1859 election address advocated "such treatment of the small boroughs as would, without any attempt to divide the kingdom into electoral districts, to which I should be opposed, no longer disregard the claims of population and property to a more fair apportionment of the representation."<sup>3.</sup> Moreover, identical views were expressed by de Grey eight years later in response to the second reform bill.<sup>4.</sup>

However in consequence of their relative apathy and non-radical attitudes Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard possessed during their political careers little influence on the issue of redistribution.

7.

In contrast, their contribution to the introduction of the secret ballot was significant. Goderich and Layard endorsed the ballot as early as 1852. During his Hull election campaign Goderich contended that the ballot was essential in order to protect the tenant from the coercion of

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 61: G to Glyn, London, 23 Dec. 1858.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 166: F to G, Ambleside, 31 Dec. 1858.

3. *Leeds Mercury*, 14 April 1859: F's election address, Leeds, 13 April 1859.

4. 3 H 189, 285-9: 29 July 1867.

his landlord, the workman from that of his employer, the tradesman from that of his more powerful customers.<sup>1.</sup> In Aylesbury Layard initially endorsed the ballot not as a matter of principle but as a concession to the views of Aylesbury liberals.<sup>2.</sup> His experiences during the campaign, however, converted him to "a friend of the ballot."<sup>3.</sup> Thereafter both men remained committed advocates of secret voting, though it was not perceived as a *sine qua non* of any reform legislation.<sup>4.</sup>

In 1848 Forster had opposed the ballot, disliking secrecy and believing that were manhood suffrage obtained it would prove unnecessary.<sup>5.</sup> Nevertheless by 1857 he was willing to support optional secret voting,<sup>6.</sup> and by 1859 had become an unconditional advocate.<sup>7.</sup> Hughes was a less willing convert. He accepted it as a disagreeable necessity in 1865,<sup>8.</sup> though he believed "that open voting was a much more noble thing than secret voting."<sup>9.</sup> In 1868 he informed de Grey that he was "a convert to the ballot not of course as a principle, but as a method worth trying to stop the awful wickedness of our small borough elections."<sup>10.</sup> To the Frome electors he stated that if voters "had not the courage to resist coercion and intimidation, then he must say he would join, though reluctantly, in giving them the ballot."<sup>11.</sup> Bruce was undoubtedly the most

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1. *Hull Packet and East Riding Times*, 18 June 1852: G's Hull election speech, 14 June 1852.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38981, 42: L's election address, London, 8 May 1852.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 38944, 15: L to Lady Aboyne, London, 30 May 1852 (copy).
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43621, 61: G to Glyn, London, 23 Dec. 1858.
  5. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 220.
  6. *Leeds Mercury*, 12 March 1857: F's address to the advanced liberal electors of Leeds, 11 March 1857.
  7. *Leeds Mercury*, 14 April 1859: F's election address, Leeds, 13 April 1859.
  8. *Times*, 30 May 1865: H's Lambeth nomination speech, 29 May 1865; also *Times*, 1 June 1865.
  9. *Times*, 13 July 1865.
  10. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 167: H to deG, London, 20 Nov. 1868.
  11. *Times*, 3 Sept. 1868: H's speech to the Frome working men's liberal union, 2 Sept. 1868.

resistant opponent of the ballot in the alliance. In 1852 he delineated to the Merthyr electors his opposition to the ballot: the loss of the high moral character in the voters which is encouraged by public voting would outweigh the possible gains of eliminating bribery and corruption.<sup>1</sup> Five years later, however, he informed his constituents that in deference to their opinions he had abstained from opposing the ballot in the commons for the past three sessions and would continue to do so.<sup>2</sup> It was not until after the experiences of his 1868 election campaign that Bruce's misgivings were cured; thereafter he was a proponent of secret voting.

Agitation in favour of the secret ballot culminated in the legislation and debates of 1871 and 1872, in which Bruce, Forster and Ripon were prominent participants. In 1869 it had fallen to Bruce to move in the commons for a select committee to inquire into the ballot's introduction. In doing so, he cited the pressure brought to bear on voters by landlords and employers, and on tradesmen by their powerful customers. He contended that he had previously supported open voting, despite its shortcomings, because he "felt that the general moral effect of open voting was to encourage manliness and truth." After Merthyr in 1868, however, Bruce confessed "that the scenes I witnessed during the last election have made me doubt very much whether, admitting to its fullest extent all that can be said against the system of secret voting, the arguments on the other side are not the weightier." Bruce also recognised that "this conviction has come to me very slowly, but I will undertake to say, that in less than five years after the introduction of the ballot, the practice of pressing a man for his vote,

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1. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 18 Dec. 1852: B's election speech, 14 Dec. 1852.

2. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 28 March 1857: B's Merthyr election speech, 23 March 1857.

or even of asking him for it, would entirely disappear."<sup>1</sup> Bruce's conversion was apparently complete. A select committee was duly appointed, and Hartington unsuccessfully proposed legislation in 1870. In January 1871 Gladstone wished Bruce to undertake a revived ballot bill, another significant indication that Bruce realised its necessity. Gladstone appreciated, however, that the legislative pressures on his home secretary might prevent his taking charge of the bill, and asked Bruce's opinion as to Forster, a recent addition to the cabinet: "what would you say to giving it to Forster?"<sup>2</sup> Bruce replied that legislative commitments and his wife's ill health precluded his seeing the bill through the commons, and summarily added: "I am therefore only too glad to resign the conduct of the measure into the hands of so competent & convinced an advocate as Forster -- to whom I have written."<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless Bruce contributed to the measure's drafting, and his name appeared on the back of the bill.

Forster introduced the elections (parliamentary and municipal) bill to the commons on 20 February 1871, contending that

almost from the very first moment when I took part in politics I have been in favour of the Ballot, on the ground that bribery and intimidation are two of the greatest evils we have to contend with in connection with our Parliamentary and representative system -- and that the best way to prevent an evil is to stop the cause of it. 4.

Appealing to the conservative instincts of the opposition, he emphasised that "we have to guard as much against mob tyranny as against landlord intimidation."<sup>5</sup> Second reading was debated and passed in early April,

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1. 3 H 194, 648: 4 March 1869.

2. BP. GCRO, D/D Br 149/43: Gladstone to B, London, 26 Jan. 1871.

3. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44087, 10: B to Gladstone, Bristol, 30 Jan. 1871.

4. 3 H 204, 529: 20 Feb. 1871.

5. 3 H 204, 545: 20 Feb. 1871.

but a long delay before committee stage ensued. On 4 June Forster pleaded with Gladstone for immediate action on the ballot bill, even if this necessitated postponing Cardwell's army reform, because a delay in the commons on the ballot would give the lords an excuse to reject or shelve it, and Forster asserted that upon the success of the ballot depended party morale and public support.<sup>1</sup> Because of the tory filibustre, however, clause by clause consideration was extremely protracted,<sup>2</sup> and the bill did not pass third reading until 8 August. Ripon sponsored the bill in the lords, with debate on second reading occurring on 10 August. He recalled that he had advocated the secret ballot throughout his political life, and asserted that it would diminish bribery, prevent intimidation, and effect more orderly elections. Ripon attempted to persuade the lords that, the suffrage having been extended in 1867, it was their "duty to afford to them [the new voters] the means of exercising the right that you then conferred without the fear of undue pressure, not merely from powerful employers of labour, but also from the trades unions and other combinations among their own class."<sup>3</sup> Most lords, however, were more concerned with their own influence as landlords. Inclined to grouse over August sittings, they pleaded lack of time for proper consideration and rejected the bill.

Forster introduced a somewhat modified parliamentary and municipal elections bill on 8 February 1872.<sup>4</sup> Interminable debate again occurred in committee, but the measure passed third reading on 30 May. Ripon took charge in the lords, reiterating the argument that

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1. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44157, 36: F to Gladstone, London, 4 June 1871.
  2. There were in total twenty-seven sittings and seventy-three divisions, the commons debating the ballot bill longer than it had the education bill of 1870.
  3. 3 H 208, 1256-64: 10 Aug. 1871.
  4. 3 H 209, 172-5: 8 Feb. 1872.

the ballot was needed as protection against intimidation by landlords, employers and trade unions.<sup>1.</sup> Accepting the inevitable the lords succumbed, and the bill passed second reading. Ripon guided it through committee stages and third reading, and he and Forster deserve principal credit for its successful passage: Morley has in fact acknowledged that it was due to Forster's "persistent force and capacity for hard and heavy labour" that the ballot bill passed through the commons.<sup>2.</sup> A radical ambition of the 1850s had finally been achieved.

Note on Ripon's resignation in 1873

In August 1873 Ripon resigned from Gladstone's government, ostensibly in opposition to the ministry's alleged commitment to household suffrage in the counties. This apparent deviation from his earlier, and later, political radicalism can only be explained in the context of his religious difficulties, prevalent since the murders of his brothers-in-law in 1870. Ripon's theological doubts caused a sense of aimlessness and uncertainty which was incompatible with the continuation of his ministerial career: Aberdare later recorded that de Grey had demonstrated "an increasing indifference to political affairs & to the subjects which usually interested him." 3. In August 1871 de Grey had referred to "the many reasons, which make me long for the day when I may be able to free myself without impropriety from the shackles of office." 4. In 1872 he had again considered resigning, and had remained only in deference to his continued association with Forster. 5. When Gladstone was defeated in March 1873 on the Irish university bill, Ripon was reluctant to rejoin the resuscitated ministry. His intimacy with Forster was once again a critical factor. The latter, urging Ripon to remain, stated: "I know how anxious you are to get free from office, but if others assent I do not see how you can refuse." 6. Ripon admitted that he found political life "intensely distasteful," and consented to remain only "because I am most anxious to give Gladstone every support in my power," and on condition that no further concessions be made to the national education league and that the government were not committed to franchise extension in the counties. 7. Clearly Ripon's spiritual troubles had

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1. 3 H 211, 1421-7: 10 June 1872.

2. Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, i : 753.

3. LP. BL Add Ms 39007, 381: A to L, London, 31 March 1875.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 288: R to F, London, 12 Aug. 1871 (copy).

5. RP. BL Add Ms 43537, 29: R to F, Balmoral, 29 May 1872 (copy).

6. RP. BL Add Ms 43537, 92: F to R, London, 15 March 1873.

7. RP. BL Add Ms 43537, 99: R to F, Cannes, 18 March 1873 (copy).

unsettled his political commitment in the two or three years before 1873. Moreover his drift towards Roman catholicism, currently influenced by the retrogressive religious, political and social doctrines of Pius IX, undoubtedly induced more conservative political attitudes, which helps to explain Ripon's opposition to the household franchise (counties) bill. At the same time, this was probably an excuse for resigning, the real motives being personal, and religious, considerations. Ripon offered Gladstone his resignation on 24 July 1873, contending that household franchise in counties was "not necessary" and "mischievous" and that, disliking uniformity of suffrage, he did not desire its adoption even in the future. He suggested that he resign at the end of the session, "without giving any reason beyond the claims of my own private affairs, which I can very truly allege." 1.

Ripon had approved borough household suffrage in 1867, and in the 1880s he unwhiggishly endorsed both county household suffrage and Irish home rule. His provisional renunciation of these beliefs in 1873 must be attributed to religious tergiversation. Temporarily under the influence of reactionary catholicism, he seized on the issue of county household franchise as a pretext for resignation. His conversion, in September 1874, followed a period of intense introspection.

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1. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44286, 184: R to Gladstone, London, 24 July 1873. Gladstone accepted Ripon's resignation on 5 August.

## CHAPTER 12

SOCIAL ROMANTICISM: LABOUR AND CAPITAL, EDUCATION  
AND CLASS CONCILIATION

Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard, in espousing the romanticist aspects of their social ideology, emphasised notions of corporateness, of the organic unity of society, of the brotherhood of man in a Christian context. Concomitantly, they decried the laissez-faireism of the Manchester school: national brotherhood could not be established on the basis of individualism and competition.<sup>1</sup> Views so forcefully held, and of such pertinence in a post-1848 environment which apparently threatened social disintegration, inevitably caused their attention to be focussed on the tense and uncertain relationships between capital and labour.

Unbridled capitalism was deprecated primarily because it ignored man's spiritual relations with his fellows: industry should emphasise partnership rather than individual profit. Capital and labour, they believed, should be linked by more than a 'cash nexus', and wages, as indicators of industrial relationships, should not be dependent merely on market forces. Without entirely dismissing the relevance of supply and demand, they rejected the view of most contemporary political economists that such 'natural' laws were inviolate. Goderich, for example, argued that wages should depend, not on supply and demand, but on the amount the labourer helps to make,<sup>2</sup> a notion which he associated with the traditional, and extremely vague, concept of a fair day's wage for a fair day's work.<sup>3</sup> Layard's "fiery indignation at human suffering,

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1. See chapter 2 above.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 137-40: 'Fragmentary Wild Oats'.

3. *ibid.*, 151.

which impelled him at all risks and hazards to make himself the champion of the weak and oppressed,"<sup>1.</sup> also impelled him to question the efficacy of market forces in determining the value of a man's labour.<sup>2.</sup> Significantly, he linked arguments for suffrage extension to a defence of the workers' right to combine to obtain a fair return for their efforts from capitalists likewise united to regulate wages.<sup>3.</sup> Hughes clearly perceived the political economists' confusion between profitability and distribution:

The men don't deny the necessity of an accumulation of capital in the country any more than their masters do. They know how necessary it is for the carrying out of great works just as well as their masters. The necessity they deny is, that it should be all in one pocket instead of in a thousand

and Hughes confessed that he was "quite of their opinion, and don't believe that any scientific law is against them."<sup>4.</sup> Like Goderich, Forster believed wages should be based on the principle of a fair day's wage for a fair day's work,<sup>5.</sup> but he could not entirely ignore the effect of market forces. What he desired was that wage rates should be determined not on the supply and demand basis of confrontation between masters and men (and he recognised that a 'fair' wage must always depend on a fair bargaining position, which a destitute worker, without the support of a union, could never achieve) but by the recognition of their *de facto* partnership in industrial enterprise. Forster described such

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1. Layard, *Early Adventures*, 24.

2. LP. BL Add Ms 38990, 303: L to Cobden, London, 15 Aug. 1864.

3. 3 H 182, 1455: 16 April 1866.

4. Thomas Hughes, 'More about Masters and Workmen', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 4, Oct. 1861, 494-5.

5. *Leader*, 30 Nov. 1850: 'Le Droit au Travail'.

views as "rank socialism."<sup>1.</sup>

In search of such partnership in industry, and of the means for determining the relative rewards of capital and labour, Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard explored a variety of options: the co-operative movement, trade unionism, paternalistic capitalism and industrial arbitration. All yielded, in varying degrees, solutions to their dilemma. This search was also instrumental in the formation of their personal intimacy and political alliance.<sup>2.</sup>

2.

A society founded on co-operative principles formed the basis of their ideal, particularly for Hughes and Goderich. In 1852 Goderich held that "co-operation was the practical application of human brotherhood to matters of trade, was the only possible reconciliation of that fearful quarrel between the labourer and the capitalist."<sup>3.</sup> Over a quarter of a century later he reiterated these views; whilst recognising the useful roles of profit-sharing industrial partnerships, trade unions and arbitration, he averred that co-operative principles would supercede industrial combat by uniting capital and labour in a common interest.<sup>4.</sup>

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1. [Forster], "Strikes" and "Lock-outs", 131-5, 140-5. Forster stated that he was "quite horror struck to read the rank socialism which some how has flowed from my pen" (Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/10/60: F to Ludlow, Otley, 4 Dec. 1853). Temmel, in discussing this article (see Temmel, *Forster and Liberal Politics*, 77-80) tends to underplay Forster's intense concern over the divisiveness of strikes and his desire for conciliation between employers and employees, and to overemphasise his dislike of interference, of unions or of government, between masters and men. Forster, in his self-styled role as a captain of industry, may have begrudged interference, but he realised its necessity in some instances, such as those described above, and in his support of the legal regulation of hours of work (*Bradford Observer*, 12 March 1846).
  2. See chapter 2 above.
  3. *Journal of Association*, 1 March 1852.
  4. Ripon, 'Co-operation', 374-8.

Hughes similarly adopted co-operative ideals. Whilst recognising the contribution of trade unionism to workers' prosperity, he perceived the movement as a transitional stage to co-operation, "founded on higher principles and aiming at nobler ends."<sup>1</sup> Industrial arbitration and conciliation, whilst a valuable concept, would not obviate antagonism: "We shall still have two hostile camps. What we want is a fusion of the armies" in co-operative enterprise.<sup>2</sup> Forster too saw in true co-operation (as opposed to profit-sharing) the ultimate solution to industrial conflict,<sup>3</sup> and publicly stated his belief that co-operation would "strike out strikes from existence. (Loud applause.)"<sup>4</sup>

Co-operation, in short, satisfied their desires for a society based on Christian fraternity. Whilst approving co-operation for distribution, they concentrated their enthusiasm and efforts on producers' associations,<sup>5</sup> worker owned and managed, with profits shared amongst the labourers. Unlike many co-operators, they were prevented by their idealism from abandoning the 'new moral world' in favour of the 'divi'.<sup>6</sup> For Goderich, Hughes and Forster, the Christian Socialist associations of the early fifties became the agencies through which they might experiment and test their theories.

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1. Hughes, 'Problems of Civilization' (Part II), 86.
  2. Thomas Hughes, 'Trades' Unions, Strikes, and Co-operation', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 13, Nov. 1865, 78.
  3. FP. TCD, Ms 4987: W.E. Forster, *Address to the Section of Economic Science and Statistics* [from the Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1873], 181.
  4. *Times*, 10 Dec. 1864: F's address to Bradford reformers, 7 Dec. 1864.
  5. See Ripon, 'Co-operation', 375-6; Thomas Hughes, *Co-operative Production*, (Manchester, [1887]); FP. TCD, Ms 4987: W.E. Forster, *Address to the Section of Economic Science and Statistics*, 181.
  6. The new moral world of Owen, the dividend of consumers' co-operation.

Hughes joined Maurice, Ludlow and Kingsley shortly after the movement's inauguration in 1848. He attended Maurice's bible readings, helped keep order at the night school which the Christian Socialists initiated in Little Ormond Yard, and was one of a committee responsible for organising the successful conferences with working men at the Cranbourne coffee tavern. Hughes later recalled his state of mind at the time, "full of enthusiasm and hope," and convinced that they could but "found an association or two, in order to convert all England, and usher in the millenium at once."<sup>1</sup> Hughes became a founding member of the society for promoting working men's associations, and served on its governing council of promoters. Goderich, having investigated the Parisian *associations ouvrières* in 1849, joined the Christian Socialists in the following year, stating to Hughes that

... on that which I take to be the great object of the Society, namely the substitution of a Free Co-operative Organisation of Labour, for the present tyrannical *Disorganisation*, you know that I am entirely with you -- & if you are willing to have my help in spite of any differences, 2. I shall be only too happy to do anything I can to assist an object I have so much at heart. 3.

Goderich had before long joined Hughes, Maurice, Ludlow, Neale and others on the council of promoters.

In the early, heady days twelve co-operative workshops were founded in association with the Christian Socialists' S.P.W.M.A.: three tailors', three shoemakers', two builders', one piano makers', one printers', one bakers' and one smiths'. As promoters, Goderich and

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1. Hughes, *Memoir of a Brother*, 110.

2. Goderich realised at this early stage that many Christian Socialists (though certainly not Hughes) rejected his political radicalism.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 1: G to H, Nocton Hall, 7 Dec. 1850.

Hughes liaised between the society and the associations, and between the associations and the public.<sup>1.</sup> Both were in demand as trustees of associations. Significantly, they were not content to limit co-operative principles to small and threatened crafts, but wished to harness the industrial energy of the engineers. In 1851 Hughes prominently endorsed the abortive plan of Newton and Allan to found an engineers' co-operative.<sup>2.</sup> In 1852, when the employers took issue with the amalgamated society of engineers and locked out their workers, both Goderich and Hughes urged A.S.E. leaders to invest their accumulated funds in co-operative enterprises.<sup>3.</sup> They subsequently acted as trustees at the Mile End works of the Southwark working engineers' association,<sup>4.</sup> Hughes as a lawyer being entrusted with all business arrangements.<sup>5.</sup>

Whilst concentrating their efforts on co-operative production, Hughes and Goderich both accepted that association for distribution might play a complementary role. They wished to prevent the isolation of consumers' co-operatives from producers' which, as Hughes stated, might lead to the store movement's merely becoming "a shop keeping job."<sup>6.</sup> Hughes was partially responsible for the establishment of the London co-operative stores in October 1850, and acted as a trustee of Neale's central co-operative agency in 1851.<sup>7.</sup>

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1. Christensen, *Origin and History of Christian Socialism 1848-54*, 147.
  2. *ibid.*, 249; Mack and Armytage, 66.
  3. *Leader*, 17, 31 Jan. 1852: G's and H's addresses at A.S.E. meetings in St Martin's hall, Longacre, 12, 26 Jan. 1852; *Journal of Association*, 17 Jan. 1852.
  4. *Journal of Association*, 2 Feb. 1852.
  5. Thomas Hughes, 'Edward Vansittart Neale as Christian Socialist', *Economic Review*, 3, 1, Jan. 1893, 47.
  6. Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/6/9: H to Ludlow, Donnington, n.d. [28 Sept. 1851?]
  7. *Christian Socialist: A Journal of Association*, 16 Aug. 1851; Hughes, 'E.V. Neale as Christian Socialist', 42.

One of Christian Socialism's most important roles in the early fifties, to which Goderich and Hughes significantly contributed, was to propagandise the ideals and benefits of co-operation. Their principle forum was undoubtedly the *Christian Socialist*, later renamed the *Journal of Association*. Hughes edited the latter for a time from the beginning of 1852, and both he and Goderich were frequent contributors. Goderich, for example, defended the Paris associations against allegations of their failure in the *Times*.<sup>1</sup> He also effectively refuted a leading article in the *Weekly Dispatch* entitled 'Industrial Co-operation and its Prophets', which had scathingly attacked co-operative production and its English proponents, including Neale, Ludlow and Goderich.<sup>2</sup> Hughes was no less active in his authorship, contributing articles to the *Christian Socialist* on such topics as co-operative stores and the conditions of London ballast-heavers and coal-whippers,<sup>3</sup> and as editor of the *Journal of Association* describing the society's overall achievements.<sup>4</sup> In addition to articles addressed to working men sympathetic to co-operative principles, Goderich and Hughes attempted to reach a wider audience through publishing their lectures and essays. Hughes, in the second of a series of tracts on Christian Socialism, described the successful operations of the working tailors' association.<sup>5</sup> Again, he argued at lectern and in print that co-operative production was the sole salvation for needlewomen exploited at starvation wages, and forced to turn to prostitution.<sup>6</sup> And Goderich, in a closely-reasoned essay,

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1. *Times*, 28 Jan. 1852; *Journal of Association*, 9 Feb. 1852.

2. *Weekly Dispatch*, 29 Feb. 1852; *Journal of Association*, 8 March 1852. Goderich's draft may be found in RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 1-10.

3. *Christian Socialist*, 2 Aug. 1851, 8 Nov. 1851.

4. *Journal of Association*, 12 April 1852.

5. H. [Hughes], *Tracts on Christian Socialism. No. II. History of the Working Tailors' Association*, 34, Great Castle Street, (London, [1850]).

6. Thomas Hughes, *A Lecture on the Slop-System, Especially As it bears upon the Females engaged in it, delivered at the Literary and Mechar Institution at Reading, on February 3rd, 1852*, (Exeter, 1852).

asserted that economic competition caused the adulteration of food, that legislators, imbued with the "sacred principle of *laissez faire*," would not intervene, and therefore that co-operative stores provided the only suitable remedy.<sup>1.</sup>

Forster's association with Christian Socialism was less direct, more that of an external ally. His concern with social and industrial questions arose from practical experience in Yorkshire, and in the forties he had made contact with Robert Owen and Thomas Cooper.<sup>2.</sup> He found attractive the notion of national workshops,<sup>3.</sup> and in 1848 visited Paris in part to observe the operations of Blanc's tailors workshop at Clichy. Unimpressed,<sup>4.</sup> he admitted that, "how far the principle of association accords with human nature, I am as yet at a loss to determine."<sup>5.</sup> As with Hughes and Goderich, the synthesis of Christianity and co-operation espoused in Christian Socialist theory answered Forster's dilemma.

Forster had established Christian Socialist contacts by the summer of 1850: on his honeymoon in August he corresponded with le Chevalier about the associations,<sup>6.</sup> and in September entertained Kingsley and Lloyd Jones in Rawdon, where they "talked about the different French Socialists &c."<sup>7.</sup> Hughes met Forster in September 1851, when on his

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1. Viscount Goderich, 'On the Adulteration of Food, and its Remedies', in Viscount Ingestre, ed., *Meliora: or, Better Times to Come*, (London, 1852), 76-87.

2. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 157.

3. *ibid.*, i : 226: F's diary entry, 16 April 1848.

4. *ibid.*, i : 230: F's diary entry, 3 May 1848.

5. *ibid.*, i : 246: F to Thomas Cooper, n.d.

6. FP. TCD, Ms 4995, 729: Jane Forster to Marg, n.d. A.L. Jules le Chevalier (St André) supported the Christian Socialists in their London endeavours.

7. FP. TCD, Ms 4995, 728: Jane Forster to Mrs Thomas Arnold, Rawdon, 13 Sept. [1850].

northern co-operative tour with Ludlow. In Yorkshire, Forster arranged advertisements (at his own expense) for the *Christian Socialist* in the Leeds and Bradford press,<sup>1.</sup> interested himself in the Bradford co-operative store (and "frequently urged them to begin manufacturing on their own account"<sup>2.</sup>), and chaired co-operative meetings.<sup>3.</sup> In London, he participated in Christian Socialist debates on co-operation and trade unionism<sup>4.</sup> and, as Hughes reported to Bruce, "sat on the shop board of the Tailors Association in Castle St., the first we started, & told us with entire sympathy all the walls & pitfalls which we were going to run our heads against & tumble into with marvellous sagacity."<sup>5.</sup>

A combination of factors precipitated the collapse of the Christian Socialist co-operative movement in 1852-3. The associations themselves proved unstable, and the promoters clashed over such issues as democracy (Goderich's *The Duty of the Age* fomented this discord) and co-operation for production or distribution.<sup>6.</sup> The movement's effective termination evoked searching doubts in both Goderich and Hughes.<sup>7.</sup>

Neither Bruce nor Layard actively participated in Christian Socialism's co-operative activities; Layard's energies were concentrated on Ninevah until mid-1851, and Bruce was geographically isolated in South Wales. The latter, however, had as stipendiary magistrate demonstrated increasing concern with social-political-economic questions.

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1. *Christian Socialist*, 15 Nov. 1851.

2. *ibid.*, 29 Nov. 1851.

3. *Journal of Association*, 17 Jan. 1852, 23 Feb. 1852.

4. *ibid.*, 19 April 1852, 24 May 1852.

5. BP. Bodleian Library, Ms Eng Letters d.246, 56: H to A, [Chester], 14 April 1890. Hughes adds his accord with Aberdare that it is appropriate that Ripon should unveil a statue erected to Forster.

6. Only Goderich and Hughes were welcome in both producers' and distributors' camps.

7. See 583-4 below.

Merthyr chartists were active in 1848; Bruce "freely mixed with the people at their meetings, and never got an uncivil word or look."<sup>1</sup>. His abhorrence of the truck system led Bruce to advocate co-operative stores, and when Dowlais workmen complained of the price of provisions, Lady Charlotte Guest sought Bruce's advice: "I wished to know if Mr. Bruce could suggest any mode by which the men could be helped without my direct interference. He thought it possible a Co-operative Store, managed by a Committee of themselves and supported by their own funds, might possibly answer."<sup>2</sup>.

The demise of the association for promoting industrial and provident societies<sup>3</sup> in 1854<sup>4</sup> presaged an interlude in co-operative producers' activities which was to persist for more than a decade. As did other Christian Socialists, Hughes, Goderich and Forster redirected their attention to such issues as the working men's college, the Crimean and American civil wars, Tom Brown, party politics and political reform. Sporadically, however, and in alliance with Layard and Bruce, they espoused the co-operative cause during the fifties and sixties. Hughes, for example, wrote occasional journal articles,<sup>5</sup> became a director of the framemakers' and gilders' society in 1867,<sup>6</sup> and was influential in

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1. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 89: B to Ormsby, Aberdare, 6 Oct. 1848.
  2. Bessborough, *Lady Charlotte Schreiber*, 3: journal entry of 3 Feb. 1853.
  3. Successor to the council of promoters of the society for promoting working men's associations, established following passage of the industrial and provident societies act in 1852.
  4. A smaller committee was appointed to continue the work, through which individual promoters were able to offer legal advice and other assistance (see Hughes, 'E.V. Neale as Christian Socialist', 48).
  5. Thomas Hughes, 'To Mr. Cobden and other Public Men in search of Work', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 4, Aug. 1861, 329-35; Thomas Hughes, 'More about Masters and Workmen', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 4, Oct. 1861, 494-8; Thomas Hughes, 'Trades' Unions, Strikes, and Co-operation', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 13, Nov. 1865, 75-80.
  6. Mack and Armytage, 153.

the establishment in the same year of the successful agricultural and horticultural co-operative association.<sup>1.</sup>

Their most concerted effort in these years was perhaps directed to co-operative housing. In mid-century dwellings for the working class were woefully inadequate, a result of rapid and uncontrolled urbanisation, exacerbated in London by railway and dock extensions. Capitalists found it relatively unprofitable to invest in inexpensive yet sanitary housing, and the working class necessarily banded together to pool their savings for mutual benefit. The first building societies were established in the late eighteenth century, and were placed on a recognised legal footing by the benefit building societies act of 1836.<sup>2.</sup> In the precarious political climate of the late forties freehold land societies utilised this legislation in order to purchase estates, divide them into 40s freeholds, and sell these to members, thus conferring on them the right to vote.<sup>3.</sup> Forster participated in this effort to reform the constitution as vice-president of the Bradford freehold land and building society, which was founded in June 1849.<sup>4.</sup> In the mid-fifties Hughes and Goderich attempted to establish<sup>5.</sup> one co-operative freehold land, building, and investment society, the purpose of which was to promote working class investment not only in land and housing, but also in co-operative workshops and industrial communities.<sup>6.</sup> Goderich,

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1. George Jacob Holyoake, *The History of Co-operation*, (London, [1906]), ii : 392, 473.
  2. Sir Harold Bellman, *Bricks and Mortals: A Study of the Building Society Movement and the Story of the Abbey National Society 1849-1949*, (London, [1949]), 13-7, 22-3.
  3. J.M. Ludlow and Lloyd Jones, *Progress of the Working Class 1832-1867*, (London, 1867), 126.
  4. David Martin, 'Land Reform', in Hollis, *Pressure from Without in Early Victorian England*, 151.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 97: G to H, Nocton Hall, 21 Oct. 1853; RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 176: G to H, Ripon, 27 Aug. 1855.
  6. Denholm, *Radical and Democratic Career of Ripon*, appendix II: co-operative commercial circular of 1 Dec. 1854.

initially wary, became president and a trustee of this short-lived society. Building societies achieved real success in the sixties, however, with membership doubling to over 200,000 between 1861 and 1867.<sup>1</sup> Hughes and Layard pooled their energies in support of the movement. Layard stated to his constituents in 1864 that "he did not see why the co-operative movement, which had been so successful in other parts of the country, and upon other matters, might not be brought into operation in the metropolis for improving the dwellings of working men." He promised that "he should be very happy to aid in carrying out any plan that could be devised by those classes themselves for an improvement."<sup>2</sup> He subsequently accepted the trusteeship of the London and general permanent land, building, and investment society, of which Hughes was chairman.<sup>3</sup> Layard held this post until his departure for Madrid in 1869;<sup>4</sup> Hughes continued his involvement, and from 1869 served actively as vice-president of the newly-formed national association of building societies, a position he held until 1886.<sup>5</sup>

Not content to limit their activities to such organisations as building societies, de Grey, Hughes, Forster and Bruce gave parliamentary support to government intervention in the housing crisis. In 1865 de Grey successfully sponsored the metropolitan houseless poor bill, by which government funded accommodation for the homeless destitute.<sup>6</sup>

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1. Ludlow and Jones, 129.

2. *Daily News*, 3 Dec. 1864: L's address to his Southwark constituents, 2 Dec. 1864.

3. LP. BL Add Ms 38992, 285: [N.?] R. Selway to L, 6 March 1866. Selway was managing director of the society.

4. LP. BL Add Ms 38997, 90, 91: H to L, 30 Oct. 1869; L to H, 4 Nov. 1869.

5. Seymour J. Price, *Building Societies: Their Origin and History*, (London, 1958), 182, 579.

6. 3 H 179, 192: 12 May 1865; 3 H 179, 378-9: 16 May 1865.

In the following year Hughes attempted unsuccessfully to introduce an amendment to standing orders, the effect of which would have compelled railway companies to restore working class dwellings razed in construction of new lines.<sup>1</sup> He and Bruce also supported government low interest loans as a complement to building society schemes, a notion which one Manchester radical believed communistic.<sup>2</sup> Again, in 1867, Bruce, Hughes and Forster endorsed a private member's bill which would have empowered local authorities to raze slum housing and, if the landlord refused to do so, to construct adequate habitations. Bruce's attitude was representative. He admitted that the bill "involved a slight invasion of the rights of property as hitherto understood; but it was an invasion sanctioned by common sense." Such powers, he averred, were necessary when private enterprise proved incapable, and "the most valuable principle contained in the Bill was that the rights of property were not to be exercised to the detriment of human health and human life."<sup>3</sup> Such social radicalism was anathema to both landed and capitalist interests in the house, and the bill was accordingly quashed. Revived in the following year, the bill again won Bruce's approval;<sup>4</sup> passed in the commons, it was despatched by the lords.

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Despite continued, occasional efforts to promote productive co-operation after the mid-fifties, there can be no doubt that Goderich and Hughes, in particular, were seriously troubled by the

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1. 3 H 181, 1792-6, 1803-4: 9 March 1866; *Times*, 20 Nov. 1866: H's address to his Lambeth constituents, 19 Nov. 1866.
  2. 3 H 182, 811-2: 22 March 1866.
  3. 3 H 186, 682-4: 27 March 1867. For the contribution of Hughes and Forster, see 3 H 186, 693-4: 27 March 1867; 3 H 189, 759, 761, 762: 2 Aug. 1867.
  4. 3 H 191, 1567: 29 April 1868.

failure of the Christian Socialist associations. In this spirit

Goderich wrote to Hughes:

... True it is, as you say, that many of the regenerating schemes of late have broken down, which I take to be God's way of teaching us that we are not to bring about regeneration by any schemes of ours, but by a simple saying & doing of the truth in the midst of this untoward generation. 1.

Hughes echoed this sense of disillusionment:

... if the faith was all that we held it to be, not even our clumsy proclaiming of it & our astonishing differences in general beliefs could have made such a hash as we did of a good deal of our work: was *the* right thing for that time (1849, 50) the proclaiming of working associations as the practical Christianity to be got about before all other things? ... I doubt -- I don't doubt that Xn Socialism was is & for ever shall be *the* thing to preach, but *our* application of it for that time?... 2.

Such discouragement should not be interpreted as lack of faith in the working class. Goderich, for example, held his perspective: "working men are not angels & not likely to be as long as things are as they are -- but they are a great deal nearer angels than Aristocrats are, in spite of the latter being the representatives of 'spirit'."<sup>3</sup>

Nevertheless they were forced to admit that association did not offer an immediate panacea, and for this reason considered alternative proposals such as arbitration and the moral regeneration of employers, not as ends in themselves, but as transitional stages to a co-operative future. Goderich, for example, did not believe in arbitration

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 141: G to H, Pau, 15 Oct. 1854.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 188: H to G, 28 Oct. 1855.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 12: G to H, Ollerton, Notts., 22 May 1852.

"except as a mere palliative," and informed Hughes that he

... should like to tell the H. of C. that until the relations between Masters & Men is [sic] looked upon in a different light, until cash-payment the sole nexus be sent duly to the Devil its father, & the Working Man be placed in his true position as a Brother & Citizen (in the highest sense I mean, not in a mere suffrage sense, tho' we must have that too) no lasting remedy will be found for these terrible evils... 1.

Hughes entirely concurred:

... I am for securing a perfectly fair field for masters and men, so long as the present disastrous antagonism is to last. I believe that a system of arbitration may possibly be discovered which will do much towards healing old wounds, and preventing future strikes and lock-outs, but I look to industrial association as the only true remedy... 2.

Forster agreed with his colleagues that arbitration was an interim measure, that conciliation would occur only when the partnership of labour and capital was recognised.<sup>3</sup>

The A.S.E. strike/lockout of 1852 was the first instance in which Goderich and Hughes publicly condoned industrial arbitration. Both expressed their views in the columns of the *Journal of Association*<sup>4</sup> and, on behalf of the engineers' executive, sought (unsuccessfully) the

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 114: G to H, Nocton Hall, 29 Nov. 1853; also Ripon 'Co-operation', 376-8.
  2. Hill, *Electoral History of Lambeth*, 179: H's election address, June 1865; also Parrish Collection, Princeton: 'Work and Wealth', 12 (this is one of the missing pages of the holograph 'Work and Wealth' in the Berg Collection, NYPL); Hughes, 'More about Masters and Workmen', 498; Hughes, 'Trades' Unions, Strikes, and Co-operation', 77-9.
  3. [Forster], "'Strikes" and "Lock-outs"', 137-42.
  4. *Journal of Association*, 10 Jan. 1852, 31 Jan. 1852.

agreement of the employers to arbitration of the dispute.<sup>1.</sup> With the collapse of the strike, and subsequent failure of the engineers' associations, Goderich once again scouted the notion of arbitration.<sup>2.</sup> The strike/lockout of almost 20,000 Lancashire cotton operatives in 1853 revived Goderich's interest in arbitration, and he initiated a lengthy correspondence with Hughes, Forster and Bruce. Bruce had apparently altered his previous view that arbitration was economically impractical,<sup>3.</sup> for now he and Goderich envisaged a scheme, modelled in some respects on the French *Conseils de Prud'homme*, by which a board of employers and employees would publicise the conditions of their trade, mediate individual conflicts, and arbitrate (without powers of compulsion) any disputes referred by both parties.<sup>4.</sup> Forster and Hughes were more circumspect than Goderich,<sup>5.</sup> but Forster nevertheless suggested parliamentary action; as Goderich explained to Bruce, he had

... been in correspondence with a hard-headed Yorkshire Manufacturer on the subject, & he thinks that some system of arbitration might be possible, and would be better than the existing state of things -- and he at all events thinks that a Parly Comtee to go to the bottom of the question would do good -- What say you?... 6.

Goderich believed such a committee's terms of reference should not be limited to arbitration, but should encompass the broader issues of

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1. *Times*, 17 Jan. 1852, 19 Jan. 1852.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 43: G to H, Nocton, 28 Aug. 1852.
  3. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 18 Dec. 1852: B's election speech, 14 Dec. 1852.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 7: G to B, 3 Dec. 1853.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 104, 109: G to H, Nocton Hall, 7, 17 Nov. 1853.
  6. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 1: G to B, 22 Nov. 1853. That Forster was the instigator of the notion that a select committee was desirable is confirmed in a statement he made to Ludlow concerning strikes, arbitration and association: "I have had some correspondence with Lord Goderich on Parliamentary action next session, & am very desirous he should come out on the question" (Ludlow Papers. CUL, Add 7348/10/60: F to Ludlow, Otley, 4 Dec. 1853).

industrial relations.<sup>1.</sup> In his *Westminster Review* article of January 1854, "'Strikes" and "Lock-outs"', Forster urged just such a course.<sup>2.</sup>

Goderich wished to be the initiator of parliamentary action, for he did not

... want the question to fall into the hands of the Tories, for this reason that it would give the Manchester men a better pretense for opposing it, that it would probably be foolishly done, & that it would be set about by them in a vindictive spirit, & not in truth from a desire to prevent this terrible civil war. 3.

Immediate success was not forthcoming, however, and it was not until 1856 that a select committee was appointed "to inquire into the Expediency of establishing Equitable Tribunals for the amicable Adjustment of Differences between Masters and Operatives."<sup>4.</sup> In addition to serving on the committee, Goderich gave detailed evidence on the *modus operandi* of the Conseils de Prud'hommes in France.<sup>5.</sup> Forster also offered to testify,<sup>6.</sup> and made arrangements to do so through Goderich.<sup>7.</sup> His objective was arbitration of industrial disputes by a government nominee, as he explained to Goderich: "The suggestion I am aware is too mild and impartial, it would frighten the masters and not satisfy the men, the former dread any approach to interference and the latter desire compulsion. Nevertheless, just by reason of its mildness and moderation I should like to see it tried."<sup>8.</sup> Alive to the prejudices of a committee

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 7: G to B, 3 Dec. 1853.

2. [Forster], "'Strikes" and "Lock-outs"', 136-7, 143-5.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 104: G to H, Nocton Hall, 7 Nov. 1853.

4. PP 1856 (343.) xiii.iii: report and proceedings of select committee on masters and operatives (equitable councils of conciliation).

5. PP 1856 (343.) xiii.233-9: minutes of evidence before the select committee on masters and operatives (equitable councils of conciliation), 8 May 1856.

6. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 41: F to G, Otley, 23 March 1856.

7. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 43: F to G, Otley, 30 March 1856.

8. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 45: F to G, Otley, 20 April 1856.

sympathetic to employers, he alleged in his evidence that he thought good relations between employer and employee would obviate the need for arbitration tribunals, which would interfere in the partnership between masters and men. Nevertheless, where relations were poor and strikes prevalent, Forster contended that arbitration should be resorted to, and that such arbitration should have legal sanction. Wary of magistrates' bias in favour of employers, and of the operations of *Conseils de Prud'hommes*, Forster suggested to the committee that the home office provide the services of a qualified arbitrator, when requested by one or both parties of a serious dispute.<sup>1</sup> Goderich incorporated this notion in his draft report,<sup>2</sup> but it was not accepted by the committee as a whole. The final report endorsed the principle of arbitration, but its specific recommendations as to format were vague.<sup>3</sup>

The desire of Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard<sup>4</sup> for parliamentary sanction of some sort of industrial arbitration was for years to remain unfulfilled. Not until 1867 was a permissive bill, sponsored by Lord St Leonards, passed. Ad hoc committees of conciliation subsequently arose. In June 1869 Hughes successfully requested of de Grey appointment as a government arbitrator,<sup>5</sup> and afterwards adjudged disputes in the Teeside iron industry, in 1870 and 1871.<sup>6</sup>

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1. PP 1856 (343.) xiii.107-16, 150-1: minutes of evidence before the select committee on masters and operatives (equitable councils of conciliation), 8, 15 April 1856. Forster had previously advanced similar support of state mediation in "Strikes" and "Lock-outs", 136.

2. PP 1856 (343.) xiii.xiv: G's draft report.

3. PP 1856 (343.) xiii.iii-iv: report of select committee on masters and operatives (equitable councils of conciliation).

4. For Layard's endorsement of courts of conciliation and arbitration, see *Beehive*, 23 May 1868: L's address at a London working men's association soirée.

5. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 177: H to deG, 1 June 1869.

6. W. Hamish Fraser, *Trade Unions and Society: The Struggle for Acceptance 1850-1880*, (London, 1974), 112.

Having left office, Forster also acted as an arbitrator in the Durham coal industry in 1875.<sup>1.</sup>

Arbitration made little significant impact on existing economic relations; nor did their second palliative, the moral regeneration of employers. This too was perceived as a transitional stage en route to a co-operative future, as explained by Goderich in 1853:

... I am inclined to think that while keeping on hard at work at the Associations ... we should do good by trying to get at the Manufacturers themselves & getting them to do their duty by their workmen... I incline to think that while Association is of the future, & will require clearly years of more experimental working, such as all ours hitherto has been; this other work is often present, & has been too much overlooked & neglected by us... 2.

Goderich envisaged the masters converted "into noble Christian Captains of Industry," the men "into equally noble & Christian soldiers in the same Regiments,"<sup>3.</sup> such status helping to obviate "the extreme to which the laissez faire principle is carried in England."<sup>4.</sup> The possibility of effecting this theory of benevolent paternalism, with emphasis on partnership in industry, was problematic. Bruce and Forster made personal attempts on a small scale (Forster sharing profits with the élite of his employees<sup>5.</sup>), but the only systematic attempt to reconcile and associate workers with their paternalistic employers occurred in the mid-sixties. 'Partnerships of industry', whereby employees could share in profits without participating in management, were legalised

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1. *ibid.*, 113-4.

2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 86: G to H, Great Malvern, 6 Sept. 1853.

3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 109: G to H, Nocton Hall, 17 Nov. 1853.

4. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 7: G to B, 3 Dec. 1853.

5. Temmel, 63.

in 1865.<sup>1</sup> Both de Grey and Hughes accepted financial participation in such enterprises as Henry Briggs's Whitwood collieries and E.O. Greening's 'co-operative' wireworks, 'co-operative' mill at Clitheroe, and his South Buckley coal and fire brick company.<sup>2</sup> Hughes was a willing propagandist of the industrial partnership theory.<sup>3</sup> These enterprises were in no sense producer co-operatives (workers had no control over management, and only benefitted from profits after investing capitalists had appropriated the lion's share), but in that they emphasised both employer benevolence and some degree of partnership, they represented for Hughes and Goderich a satisfactory tendency. Successful in the short term, they did not endure on a significant scale.<sup>4</sup>

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Despite admirable dedication and repeated efforts -- in Christian Socialist associations, building societies, industrial partnerships -- the co-operative and quasi-co-operative movements with

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1. Bruce, Forster and Layard all supported the measure in the house of commons (3 H 178, 1300-1: 1 May 1865).
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43538, 150, 152, 154: H to G, London, 16 July 1866; Luton, 24 Sept. 1866; London, [9 Dec. 1866]; Mack and Armytage, 152-3; Denholm, *Radical and Democratic Career of Ripon*, 206-9.
  3. *Sheffield and Rotherham Independent*, 22 May 1866: H's address to Greening and Co. supporters, Manchester town hall, 19 May 1866; *Co-operator*, 1 June 1866; *Times*, 2, 9 Nov. 1866; *New-York Daily Tribune*, 31 Dec. 1866, 7 Jan. 1867; Hughes, 'Trades' Unions, Strikes and Co-operation', 80; Berg Collection, NYPL: Thomas Hughes, 'Work and Wealth', 14-5, [20]-1.
  4. Their reputation was not helped by the dishonesty of the Briggs firm, which cheated its workers by making large appropriations to a reserve fund -- ostensibly established to supplement wages and dividends in lean years -- before declaring divisible profits. Briggs's exploitation of his workers before 1865, which produced an abysmal strike record, rendered his intentions suspect, and his scheme was abolished in 1874 following a strike against reduced wages (G.D.H. Cole, *A Century of Co-operation*, (Manchester, [1944]), 160; Holyoake, *History of Co-operation*, ii : 413-4).

which Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard were associated were not markedly successful during the two decades between the chartism of 1848 and the reform bill of 1867. From 1854 until 1869 no national co-operative movement with a permanent national organisation existed. Increased prosperity, especially amongst the labour aristocracy, induced workers to involve themselves in less class-oriented issues, especially foreign affairs. Only consumers' co-operation achieved a measure of success in this period. Yet Goderich and his colleagues, though themselves preoccupied elsewhere, did not despair over co-operation's decline, and maintained their faith in its principles. Hughes epitomised their spirit; though having lost over £1000 in various co-operative endeavours, he averred that "every man must have some way of spending his spare cash. Some men like moors in Scotland; some men like keeping hounds and horses. For many years I have had a taste for Co-operation."<sup>1</sup>

The revival of the co-operative movement was inaugurated by the co-operative congress of 1869 and subsequent formation of the co-operative union; reaching its fruition in the late seventies and eighties it cannot be discussed in these pages, despite the close involvement of Ripon and Hughes. Yet the legislative framework for this revival was constructed during the 1850s and 1860s, largely through the influence of Goderich and Hughes. Without the legal safeguards which they helped achieve, later co-operative success would not have been feasible: Hughes stated that "the services rendered by Mr. Neale, Mr. Ludlow, Lord Ripon, and others, to the cause of co-operation [through obtaining amendments and modifications of the industrial and provident societies act]

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1. *Co-operator*, 1 June 1866: H's address at a Manchester co-operative soirée, 19 May 1866.

were invaluable, and deserve to be remembered with gratitude."<sup>1</sup>.

Theirs was a concerted and consistent effort which spanned more than two decades.

When the Christian Socialists formed their first associations, they found themselves confronted with certain legal disabilities concerning protection of funds from dishonest associates. To obviate these, associations could not realistically register under the friendly societies act, for its frugal investment clause prohibited their selling goods outside their membership, an economically-untenable position for producers' co-operatives. Societies registered under the act were also restricted to investing accumulated funds through the national debt commissioners, and were not empowered to federate. Furthermore, the act prohibited associations from owning real property, and required personal property (tools, equipment, etc.) to be vested in trustees, over whom workers had no managerial control, and against whose dishonesty associates had no legal recourse. Moreover, trustees could not actually join societies lest they be treated in law as co-partners, thus forfeiting legal protection. Such limitations were hardly conducive to industrial brotherhood. Co-operative associations not registered under the friendly societies act entered one of two legal categories. Associations of less than twenty-five members could be protected as a partnership, but in this case each member had the right to pledge the society's credit. Associations of more than twenty-five members had no legal protection unless registered under the joint stock companies act of 1844, which was expensive (£50 to £60) and required

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1. Thomas Hughes, *Lecture on the History & Objects of Co-operation, delivered at the Co-operative Hall, Downing Street, Manchester, on Monday Evening, April 22nd, 1878, (Manchester, [1878])*, 15.

transferability of shares. This last stipulation permitted capitalists to purchase shares in a co-operative enterprise who did not themselves intend to work there. It also permitted one associate to expand his shareholdings. In both cases, capitalism threatened co-operative arrangements. Finally, the absence of limited liability deterred both working and middle class financial involvement in productive associations, normally high risk investments.<sup>1.</sup>

The Christian Socialists were not without legal expertise within their ranks. As a lawyer, Hughes was naturally prominent in drafting and advising on appropriate legislation. They seized the earliest opportunity to put their case to parliamentarians: R.A. Slaney's select committee of 1850 on investments for the savings of the middle and working classes. Hughes and other Christian Socialists testified before the committee, introducing co-operative concerns under the guise of a 'savings' question. In his evidence, Hughes complained of the expense and of the requirement for share transferability of the joint stock companies act, urged legal protection for co-operators against fraud and misappropriation of funds, the power for associations to borrow and invest, and the extension of limited liability so as to encourage middle class investment and co-management.<sup>2.</sup> Slaney's draft report recommended the extension of all privileges of the friendly societies act to co-operative associations, and the introduction of

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1. The best descriptions of pre-1852 conditions are found in F. Hall and W.P. Watkins, *Co-operation: A Survey of the History, Principles, and Organisation of the Co-operative Movement in Great Britain and Ireland*, (Manchester, 1934), 96-7; Cole, *A Century of Co-operation*, 118-20.
  2. PP 1850 (508.) xix.218-23: H's evidence before the select committee on investments for the savings of the middle and working classes. Over half the witnesses (six Christian Socialists, two working class co-operators, and J.S. Mill) were sympathetic to co-operative experiments.

limited liability;<sup>1.</sup> the final report was more vague,<sup>2.</sup> and was never debated in the commons. Slaney nevertheless persevered, and secured a select committee on the law of partnership in 1851 which reported favourably, though cautiously, on co-operative associations and limited liability.<sup>3.</sup> On this occasion the Christian Socialists exerted further pressure. Hughes was one of a deputation which on 5 July 1851 waited on Henry Labouchere, the whig president of the board of trade, who appeared sympathetic to their claim for legal protection<sup>4.</sup> but subsequently procrastinated. Hughes helped draft a bill,<sup>5.</sup> and in the *Journal of Association* appealed to co-operators to pressure the government.<sup>6.</sup> A further deputation was organised on 27 January 1852, on which Hughes and Goderich represented the council of promoters,<sup>7.</sup> but a combination of the engineers' lockout and the fall of the Russell government created an inopportune climate. The tories when in office proved more receptive; Slaney introduced his bill in March, Hughes urged on him favourable clauses<sup>8.</sup> and appeared before the commons committee considering the legislation.<sup>9.</sup> The product of these efforts was the industrial and provident societies act, which became law in June 1852. The act essentially legalised consumer and producer co-operatives, which were recognised as corporate entities in their own right, without registering as joint stock companies. Transferability of

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1. *PP* 1850 (508.) xix.173-5.
  2. *PP* 1850 (508.) xix.171-2: report from the select committee on investments for the savings of the middle and working classes.
  3. *PP* 1851 (509.) xviii.309: report from the select committee on the law of partnership.
  4. *Christian Socialist*, 12 July 1851.
  5. *Times*, 30 May 1865: H's speech at his Lambeth election nomination, 29 May 1865.
  6. *Journal of Association*, 3 Jan. 1852.
  7. *Journal of Association*, 2 Feb. 1852.
  8. *ibid.*, 29 March 1852.
  9. C.E. Raven, *Christian Socialism 1848-1854*, (London, 1920), 299.

shares was restricted: an associate leaving a society was obliged to sell his share(s) to the society or to a person approved by its board of management. Thus co-operators were legally protected from capitalists. In order to promote reasonable equality, a limit of £100 was placed on subscribed capital, though loans of up to £400 were permissible. Societies were no longer restricted in investment of funds. Finally, many provisions of the friendly societies act were extended to 'industrial and provident' societies.<sup>1</sup> Some objectives were not achieved, however. Limited liability was not conferred, which continued to deter both middle and working class investment. No provision for joint or federal action was granted co-operative societies. And co-operation for banking and overseas mining were proscribed. The act was nevertheless a milestone in co-operative history: Ripon later attested that "the present cooperative movement may fairly be said to have taken its rise from the legislation of 1852."<sup>2</sup>

Having assisted in the passage of the original measure legalising co-operative societies, Goderich and Hughes remained active in promoting necessary amendments to the legislation. In parliament from 1852, Goderich was particularly well placed to achieve these goals. In 1854 he and Hughes concocted a measure,<sup>3</sup> on behalf of the association for promoting industrial and provident societies, which transferred the right of suing or being sued from the trustees to the associates of a society. The bill,<sup>4</sup> introduced on 4 May 1854,<sup>5</sup> was sponsored by

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1. PP 1852 (368.) ii.445-54: a bill to legalise the formation of industrial and provident societies, as amended by the select committee.
  2. Ripon, 'Co-operation', 370.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 130: G to H, London, 2 May 1854.
  4. PP 1854 (84.) iii.227-32: a bill to amend the industrial and provident societies act, 1852.
  5. 3 H 132, 1223: 4 May 1854.

Goderich, Sotheron<sup>1.</sup> and John Ball.<sup>2.</sup> Hughes and Goderich continued to consult each other during its passage,<sup>3.</sup> which was accomplished without debate in either house. A further minor amending bill to the 1854 act was sponsored by Goderich in 1856.<sup>4.</sup> Once again he consulted Hughes (as well as Neale and Ludlow),<sup>5.</sup> and the bill secured an easy passage through parliament, receiving royal assent on 7 July.

Of equal importance during these years was the attempt to secure limited liability for co-operators, chiefly in order to promote working class investment and participation in associations, but also to encourage workers' investment in their employer's company. The debate on limited liability had been a significant aspect of Slaney's select committees of 1850 and 1851, and the issue was again raised by Goderich in correspondence with Bruce in 1853. Goderich envisaged that his select committee on arbitration, proposed at Forster's instigation, would also consider the partnership laws, and he informed Bruce of his view that limited liability "might afford a means to the Working Men of investing their savings in many more advantageous ways than are now open to them;" workers investing in their employer's company would thereby help effect a "union and association of all concerned."<sup>6.</sup> Forster pressed for such a role for the proposed committee,<sup>7.</sup> which in the event didn't materialise. Nevertheless in 1854 Goderich twice advocated limited liability in the commons. In February he stated that, though capitalists

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1. T.H.S. Sotheron (after 1855, Sotheron-Estcourt), Conservative MP for North Wiltshire.
  2. See chapter 3 above.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 132: G to H, London, [17 May 1854]; RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 133: G to H, London, [2 June 1854].
  4. PP 1856 (127.) iv.161-4: a bill to amend an act of the seventeenth and eighteenth years of her present majesty relating to industrial and provident societies.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 231: G to H, Brighton, 28 March 1856.
  6. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 7: G to B, 3 Dec. 1853.
  7. [Forster], "Strikes" and "Lock-outs", 143-5.

would benefit from its introduction, it was "chiefly on account of the interests of the working classes that he advocated the principle of limited liability," which

would do something towards putting an end to the disputes between capital and labour ... A law which would enable the master, if he chose, to share a portion of his profits with those whom he employed, would tend more to bind together the interests of the two classes than any other measure that could be passed. And if workmen themselves wished to combine together to carry on manufacturing operations, whatever might be the opinion of the House as to the result, they ought not to be denied the opportunity of making the experiment. 1.

In June Goderich seconded R.P. Collier's motion favouring limited liability, emphasising the relative advantage which unlimited liability conferred on substantial and monopoly capitalism, and the need to promote "that community of interests which ought to bind together all classes."<sup>2</sup>.

Such pressure helped promote the principle of limited liability, which was accepted by parliament in 1855-56. In the former year Goderich successfully moved that the provisions of the limited liability bill not be confined to corporations having capital greater than £20,000, which he argued would have created a new and more potent monopoly. Because of his objections, this limitation was omitted from the bill.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless the bill contained one crucial defect for co-operators: limited liability was applied only to joint stock companies, not to industrial and provident societies. Between sessions, Goderich consulted Hughes on the issue ("The question is sure to be reopened

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1. 3 H 130, 313: 7 Feb. 1854.

2. 3 H 134, 760-4: 27 June 1854.

3. 3 H 139, 1451-2, 1458: 27 July 1855.

next session, & we ought to be prepared."<sup>1.</sup>), and during 1856 Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Goderich continued to share their views.<sup>2.</sup>

Goderich initially hoped that the more extensive legislation which Lowe introduced on behalf of the government in early 1856 would not be limited to joint stock companies at the expense of co-operative associations,<sup>3.</sup> but his aspiration was not to be fulfilled. This anomaly concerning limited liability and co-operative societies was not removed until 1862, by the industrial and provident societies act of that year. Through this legislation, Goderich and his colleagues finally achieved their objective, which they contended would promote social unity through encouraging workers to invest in their own or in their employer's enterprises. It is perhaps ironic that limited liability companies, increasingly operated by salaried managers, tended to supercede the more personal private, patriarchal, family firms.

The 1862 legislation, which was sponsored by de Grey in the lords, nevertheless contributed to a marked increase in co-operative activity. It replaced the 1852 act and the amending acts of 1854 and 1856; in addition to conferring limited liability on co-operatives, the 1862 legislation permitted societies to own land and buildings (though not without restrictions), to expend funds on education, to accept individual share capital of £ 200 (with no limit on loans), and to invest

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 192: G to H, Ripon, 29 Oct. 1855.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 215: G to H, London, 6 Feb. 1856; RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 216: H to G, London, 7 Feb. 1856; RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 219: H to G, London, [8 Feb. 1856]; RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 221: H to G, London, 15 Feb. 1856; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 39: F to G, Otley, 15 Feb. 1856; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 45: F to G, Otley, 20 April 1856; RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 49: G to B, 22 May 1856.
  3. 3 H 140, 144: 1 Feb. 1856.

surplus funds in other co-operative societies.<sup>1.</sup> This last stipulation provided the right to federal action, and thereby the legal basis for the very successful consumers' co-operative wholesale society, founded in 1863 as a direct consequence of the 1862 act.

Further legislative amendments followed, in all of which Hughes and de Grey were influential. In 1867 they jointly sponsored (Hughes in the commons, de Grey in the lords) a bill which cancelled the exemptions of mines and quarries from the working of the act, and removed the £200 limit which societies could invest in one another,<sup>2.</sup> thus stimulating further development of the C.W.S. and other federal co-operative bodies. Four years later Hughes introduced a measure which extended the right of societies to hold real estate, and authorised them to make loans to members on the security of real or personal property.<sup>3.</sup> Though restrictions on co-operative banking were not thereby entirely lifted, the C.W.S. opened its rudimentary 'banking' department in the following year. Hughes asked Ripon to help guide the 1871 legislation through the lords;<sup>4.</sup> although the bill was not debated in the upper house Ripon gave it his attention, and was later thanked by Hughes "for looking after the Industrial Societies Bill which I am happy to see has passed."<sup>5.</sup>

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1. PP 1862 (153.) ii.365-72: a bill [as amended in committee and on re-commitment] to consolidate and amend the laws relating to industrial and provident societies.
  2. PP 1867 (198.) iii.207-14: a bill to amend the industrial and provident societies acts; also see RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 158: H to deG, London, [24 July 1867].
  3. PP 1871 (188.) ii.431-78: a bill for the consolidation and amendment of the law relating to industrial and provident societies; PP 1871 (240.) ii.479-82: a bill [as amended in committee] to explain and amend the law relating to industrial and provident societies.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 206: H to R, Malvern Wells, 6 Aug. 1871.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 210: H to R, Malvern Wells, 20 Aug. 1871.

Two years later Hughes attempted to entirely remove restrictions on co-operative banking. He drafted the necessary legislation,<sup>1.</sup> which passed first and second reading without debate. Bruce as home secretary gave his approval, and Hughes requested Ripon to take charge of the bill when it reached the lords: "As you passed the governing Acts it would be natural that you should do it."<sup>2.</sup> Unexpected opposition from banking interests<sup>3.</sup> prevailed, however, and the bill was abandoned in committee. Finally, in 1876, Ripon assisted the passage through the lords of the great consolidating act which, incorporating all earlier measures, also specifically legalised co-operative banking.<sup>4.</sup>

Though Neale, Ludlow and others had helped draft the various co-operative bills, and Slaney, Sotheron Estcourt and others helped see them through parliament, the roles of Hughes and Ripon in assuring appropriate legal status for co-operative societies were crucial. Their co-ordinated efforts over a period of twenty-five years helped achieve a legal framework on which the co-operative movement could safely

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1. PP 1873 (51.) ii.159-62: a bill to amend the law relating to industrial and provident societies.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 216: H to R, London, 26 Feb. 1873.
  3. Mack and Armytage, 203-4, quoting *Report of Co-operative Congress held at Newcastle*, 12, 14, 15, 16 April 1873.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 224: H to R, London, 24 May 1876.

expand in the latter decades of the nineteenth century.<sup>1.</sup>

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The success of co-operators in achieving legal status was in part a consequence of their relative failure, especially in productive activity. Co-operation posed no overt threat to capitalist profits, and legislation was therefore generally greeted with apathy rather than antipathy by parliamentary manufacturing interests. The legal status, and social and economic role, of trade unions was another matter.

The responses of Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard to trade unionism was, like that of so many of their 'advanced liberal' contemporaries, ambivalent. Unionism, even the so-called 'new model'

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1. Significant revision work on co-operative history during the mid-nineteenth century has been undertaken in recent years by Arnold Bonner (*British Co-operation: The History, Principles, and Organisation of the British Co-operative Movement*, (Manchester, 1961)), Philip N. Backstrom ('The Practical Side of Christian Socialism in Victorian England', *Victorian Studies*, 6, 4, June 1963, 305-24 and *Christian Socialism and Co-operation in Victorian England: Edward Vansittart Neale and the Co-operative Movement*, (London, 1974)), N.C. Masterman (*John Malcolm Ludlow: The Builder of Christian Socialism*, (Cambridge, 1963)) and A.F. Denholm (*Radical and Democratic Career of Ripon and 'Lord Ripon and the Co-operative Movement'*, *Historical Studies*, 17, 1976, 15-26). Bonner, Backstrom, Masterman and Denholm all describe the practical achievements of Christian Socialists and co-operators during these years. Whilst Bonner argues that the Christian Socialists failed because they imposed their ideas as middle class philanthropists upon a generally indifferent working class, Backstrom, Masterman and Denholm have emphasised the important practical contributions rendered the co-operative movement by E.V. Neale, J.M. Ludlow and Lord Ripon. Whilst the 1850s and 1860s did not witness the successful introduction of co-operative production, the legal safeguards which Ripon and Hughes (in concert with Neale, Ludlow and others) helped establish undoubtedly represented a substantial and practical achievement.

of the 'responsible' labour aristocracy, was symbolic of both synthesis and disjunction. Thus Hughes, for example, recognised that "the sentiment of union ... is the nearest approach to a faith which the [working] men have now, as a class;"<sup>1</sup> he maintained that unions were "an absolute necessity," being "very useful in placing the work-people in a position in which they can make a fair bargain with employers, which they can never do when they are in fear of want."<sup>2</sup> Moreover trade unionists rejected traditional laissez-faireist political economy, the concept that enlightened individual selfishness benefits all.<sup>3</sup> Hughes nevertheless believed that unions were "simply a necessity, like standing armies," often "intolerably stupid and tyrannical,"<sup>4</sup> and no substitute for co-operation. Throughout his life Goderich shared these views, holding that, though unions helped workers in their competitive struggle, "unity, and peace, and co-operation, ... was better than battle. Trades' Unions were essentially combative institutions, and suited only to a transition state."<sup>5</sup> Forster similarly recognised that men could not bargain as individuals with their employers, for their individual poverty compelled them to work, even on the masters' terms; trade unions were therefore necessary and inevitable. Though he abhorred strikes, Forster admitted that the fear of strikes helped keep wages up.<sup>6</sup> In short, the necessity of trade unions was recognised but partially regretted for, though consolidating working class unity, they tended to impair wider social harmony.

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1. Hughes, 'More about Masters and Workmen', 496.

2. Berg Collection, NYPL: 'Work and Wealth', 25.

3. Hughes, 'To Mr. Cobden and other Public Men in search of Work', 334-5.

4. *Spectator*, 1 April 1865.

5. *Journal of Association*, 26 April 1852; also Ripon, 'Co-operation', 376-8.

6. [Forster], '"Strikes" and "Lock-outs"', 124-6.

Forster and Bruce had both confronted unions in their roles as employers,<sup>1</sup> and it is perhaps remarkable in the circumstances that they retained a large degree of sympathy. The 1852 engineers' strike/lockout initiated Goderich and Hughes into union activities. The amalgamated society of engineers, founded in 1850 and led by William Newton and William Allan, decided after a poll of its members to abolish systematic overtime and piecework. Employers responded with a wholesale lockout, in an obvious attempt to destroy union efficacy. In the long and bitter struggle which ensued Goderich and Hughes were, amongst Christian Socialists, particularly sympathetic and receptive to the men's cause.<sup>2</sup> Both wrote cautious, yet wholly supportive, articles in the *Journal of Association*. Goderich, for example, castigated the masters for their "cool, shameless, hypocrisy,"<sup>3</sup> and assured the engineers of his support: "We who can claim only to be your brothers in this great cause, must, in this case, follow where you lead; if you fight, we will fight with you, let the issue be what it may."<sup>4</sup> Hughes's support was perhaps less emotive, but equally sincere. He believed that "the condition of the working poor of England for the next ten years, hangs, in all human likelihood, upon the issue of this struggle."<sup>5</sup> The A.S.E., he asserted, were upholding a "righteous cause;"<sup>6</sup> despite his aversion to strikes, Hughes realised that "in this case the choice being simply between strike and starve, or, no

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1. Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 282; BP. GCRO, D/D Br 163/1: B to Sir George Grey, Merthyr Tydvil, 28 March 1850 (copy).
  2. Neither Maurice, Kingsley nor Ludlow favoured practical intervention, and the close association of Goderich, Hughes and Neale with the striking engineers contributed to the dissensions within Christian Socialist ranks.
  3. *Journal of Association*, 31 Jan. 1852.
  4. *ibid.*, 2 Feb. 1852.
  5. *ibid.*, 17 Jan. 1852.
  6. *ibid.*, 24 Jan. 1852.

strike and starve, the men chose the former alternative."<sup>1</sup> Hughes and Goderich attended public meetings, in both London and Leeds, expressing solidarity with the A.S.E.,<sup>2</sup> and Goderich made a substantial financial contribution to assist the society in prolonging the struggle.<sup>3</sup> Though the strike failed, Goderich's generous donation possibly prevented A.S.E. insolvency and destruction. Moreover their collaboration with the A.S.E. in 1852 cemented an alliance between Goderich and Hughes and the 'new model' unionism of Allan and Newton.

In the years that followed, Hughes in particular adopted a role as propagandist for trade unionism, emphasising 'new model' 'responsibility' to a wary middle class. During the builders' strike/lockout of 1861, for example, he formed a committee with Frederic Harrison, Ludlow, R.H. Hutton, E.S. Beesly, Sir Godfrey Lushington and others to present the men's case to the public,<sup>4</sup> the principal results of which were two

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1. *ibid.*, 2 Feb. 1852, 16 Feb. 1852, 23 Feb. 1852.

2. *Leader*, 17 and 31 Jan. 1852: G's and H's addresses at A.S.E. meetings in St Martin's hall, Longacre, 12 and 26 Jan. 1852; *Journal of Association*, 22 March 1852: G's report of a Leeds trade union meeting, 11 March 1852.

3. There is some doubt as to the size of Goderich's financial aid. The Webbs (Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, *The History of Trade Unionism*, (London, 1920), 215n) speak of £500, a figure apparently confirmed by Goderich in RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 8: G to H, Ollerton, Notts., 18 May 1852. Denholm, however, has argued (Denholm, *Radical and Democratic Career of Ripon*, 14n17) that Goderich's £500 gift was probably followed by a further loan of £500. This explanation is plausible: in 1869 Hughes spoke in parliament of a £500 loan (3 H 197, 1347-8: 7 July 1869), and many years later corroborated the larger figure in stating that "but for Lord Goderich, who advanced them £1000 in the last week before the works were reopened, to pay the strike allowances, the Amalgamated Society would have become bankrupt, and would probably have broken up" (Hughes, 'E.V. Neale as Christian Socialist', 46).

4. F. Harrison, *Autobiographical Memoirs*, i : 251.

joint letters to the *Times*,<sup>1.</sup> which may have helped produce a compromise. The national association for the promotion of social science, which emphasised rational analysis rather than moral indignation as a basis for social reform, provided an important medium through which to argue the union cause. Hughes and Forster both served on the association's committee on trade unions, which presented a report entitled *Trades' Societies and Strikes* to the Glasgow conference of 1860. This report has been described as "perhaps the most important breakthrough in the progress of trade unions towards acceptance."<sup>2.</sup> Hughes not only addressed the conference,<sup>3.</sup> but subsequently published his paper, a history of the engineers' lockout which called for social acceptance and legal recognition of trade unions.<sup>4.</sup> Hughes's pen was also active in journal articles and letters to the press, in which he defended the role of trade unions in society.<sup>5.</sup> One of his most important contributions was to edit the Comte de Paris's *The Trade Unions of England* in 1869, the first authoritative study of British unions.<sup>6.</sup> This type of endorsement undoubtedly helped legitimise the union movement in contemporary middle class eyes.

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1. *Times*, 15 July 1861 and 22 Sept. 1861.

2. Fraser, 82.

3. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 178: B to Norah Bruce, Ripon, 29 Sept. 1860. The discussions on trade unions occurred on 26 and 27 September 1860, after which Hughes visited de Grey and Bruce at Studley Royal. It is significant that the *Times* did not report these debates.

4. Thomas Hughes, *Account of the Lock-out of Engineers, &c. 1851-2. Prepared for the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, at the request of the Committee on Trade Societies*, (Cambridge, 1860).

5. e.g. Hughes, 'To Mr. Cobden and other Public Men in search of Work'; Hughes, 'More about Masters and Workmen'; *Spectator*, 1 April 1865, 27 Oct. 1866.

6. Le Comte de Paris, *The Trade Unions of England*, translated by N.J. Senior and edited by Thomas Hughes, MP, (London, 1869).

6.

As with the co-operative movement, however, it was probably the parliamentary activities of Goderich, Hughes, Forster and Bruce which were of greatest significance to trade unionism. Since 1824, when the combination laws were repealed, unions had effectively operated outside the law: combinations were not illegal, but their corporate status remained unrecognised. Soon after his election to parliament Goderich, in alliance with trade unionists, participated in an abortive attempt to modify the law of masters and servants, and to renounce the conspiracy implications of the combination of workmen act of 1825.<sup>1.</sup> In 1855, during discussion of the friendly societies bill, he was more successful. The bill provided an opportunity for unions to obtain legal protection for their funds against fraudulent officers or members. Hughes<sup>2.</sup> and Goderich co-operated with Allan, Newton and their pressure group, the metropolitan trades committee on the friendly societies' bill, which was endorsed by eighty-seven unions with 48,000 members.<sup>3.</sup> In Hughes's chambers,<sup>4.</sup> Ludlow drafted an appropriate clause which Goderich helped sponsor in parliamentary circles, with the result that the bill's author, Sotheron Estcourt, agreed to its inclusion as section 44 of his bill.<sup>5.</sup> The clause provided that a benefit society, established for any purpose not illegal, could deposit its rules with the registrar of friendly societies.

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1. F.E. Gillespie, *Labor and Politics in England 1850-1867*, (Durham, North Carolina, 1927), 47-9.
  2. Hughes later stated that he had at this time "rendered the trades unions such help as he could to bring them into a recognised position in the eye of the law" (3 H 185, 192: 8 Feb. 1867).
  3. Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, 243n-244n.
  4. 3 H 197, 1354: 7 July 1869.
  5. PP 1867 [3952.] xxxii.289-396: fourth report of the commissioners appointed to inquire into the organization and rules of trades unions and other associations, Qs 7475-7501.

and thereby receive legal protection for its funds. Unions, which invariably encompassed benefit functions, were thus apparently eligible for legal cognisance. This assumption appeared to be confirmed in the sixties when Gladstone agreed (after seeing a deputation introduced by Hughes<sup>1.</sup>) to extend to unions the same privileges as friendly societies to invest surplus funds in the new post office savings banks.

This recognition of unions' legal status was in time to prove illusory, however. The infamous *Hornby v. Close* decision of 1867 asserted that trade unions could not enjoy the financial protection of the friendly societies act because they were bodies in restraint of trade and, though not positively criminal, were therefore illegal at common law. Thus unions could exist, but without legal safeguards against absconding officers. The dubious status of unions was further aggravated by public reaction to the Sheffield 'outrages' in 1866, incidents of violence against non-unionists. It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty and recrimination that the Conservative government appointed a royal commission to investigate trade unionism, particularly in the context of the Sheffield violence.

In parliament Forster and de Grey vehemently protested against the association of individual instances of violence with the wider issue of trade union legality. Forster argued on 8 February 1867 that, if the two issues were not allocated to separate commissions, "the workmen would have a right to complain that their case was prejudiced by being joined together with a special case of violence at Sheffield."<sup>2.</sup> De Grey urged in the lords that the Sheffield inquiry "should be kept quite distinct"

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1. 3 H 197, 1354-5: 7 July 1869.

2. 3 H 185, 200-1: 8 Feb. 1867.

from the more general investigation.<sup>1.</sup> He, Forster and Hughes were in obvious accord on desirable terms of reference for the commission, especially as regards indemnity for witnesses (which encouraged apostate unionists to produce hostile testimony, even if personally incriminating), and Forster and Hughes combined their efforts in opposition to this notion on more than one occasion.<sup>2.</sup> Their influence in the house was at this time considerable, and they were accordingly successful to the extent that paid assistant commissioners investigated the 'outrages', whilst the principal commissioners concentrated exclusively on the broader issues of unionism. Forster and Hughes also hailed the inclusion on the commission of the positivist Frederic Harrison,<sup>3.</sup> doing so, according to Harrison himself, "on behalf of the workmen."<sup>4.</sup> Hughes was, of course, also a commissioner, and with Harrison represented the views of the moderate, 'new model' 'junta' of Allan, Applegarth and associates.

In the meantime, Hughes moved in parliament to temporarily protect union funds. He helped sponsor the associations of workmen bill,<sup>5.</sup> which would have restored pre-Hornby v. Close rights until the trade union commission had reported and further legislation passed. Despite a forceful vindication of unionism by Hughes on second reading debate,<sup>6.</sup> the attorney general opposed the bill on the grounds that it would in effect sanction illegality.<sup>7.</sup> Without government endorsement, and with

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1. 3 H 186, 268: 21 March 1867.

2. 3 H 185, 1441-2: 7 March 1867; 3 H 185, 998, 999: 25 Feb. 1867;  
3 H 188, 1399-1402, 1406-7, 1410, 1411: 11 July 1867.

3. 3 H 185, 191, 200: 8 Feb. 1867.

4. F. Harrison, i : 316. There was considerable controversy over the appointment of a 'revolutionary' such as Harrison to the royal commission.

5. PP 1867 (21.) i.129-32: a bill to exempt associations of workmen from certain disabilities for a limited time.

6. 3 H 186, 1450-2: 10 April 1867.

7. 3 H 186, 1449-50: 10 April 1867.

Liberal indifference, success was unattainable, and the bill was accordingly withdrawn in July 1867; Hughes's "one comfort," as he informed de Grey, was that the unions would be "as savage as bears" with the Tories as a result.<sup>1</sup>

The impact of the royal commission was critical in the evolution of British trade unionism. Hughes and Harrison effectively manipulated the hearings in order to provide the opportunity for 'junta' moderation to permeate middle class consciousness. Despite their protestations, however, the majority report was less than balanced in both tone and intent. It recommended that combination be legalised only if the closed shop were abandoned, and that unions might be registered, and thus accorded legal protection for their funds, only if their rules were unobjectionable (and objection was taken to such practices as limitation of apprentices, rejection of piecework, opposition to new machinery, and financial support for fellow unionists on strike). All of these stipulations affected the very *raison d'etre* of many amalgamated societies. The report further recommended that picketing laws be strictly enforced, and that unions' trade and benefit funds be kept distinct.<sup>2</sup> In a dissenting view Harrison, Hughes and Lord Lichfield delineated what would become the rationale of future trade union legislation. Unions, they argued, should be unequivocally legalised, with simple registration (and through it legal protection for property and funds) granted to all associations free from criminal designs. Thus no restrictions would be placed on union regulations regarding wages, hours, mode of work, the closed shop or financial support for unionists on strike. In addition,

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 166: H to deG, London, 24 July 1867.

2. pp 1868-69 [4123.] xxx.235-62: eleventh and final report of the royal commissioners appointed to inquire into the organization and rules of trades unions and other associations.

the minority report urged the repeal of special legislation dealing with employment of labour, any offences to be punishable under general criminal law, amended if necessary.<sup>1.</sup> An elaborate and closely-argued *apologia* followed, written by Harrison<sup>2.</sup> and signed as well by Hughes.<sup>3.</sup>

The royal commission, and in particular the minority report, undoubtedly helped lessen middle class prejudice against trade unionism. Misgivings nevertheless remained, and were well represented in Liberal ranks. These became evident in April 1869 when Hughes and Mundella sponsored a trade union bill drafted by Harrison and wholly based on the minority report of the commission.<sup>4.</sup> The Gladstone ministry initially balked, but a breakfast conference with William Rathbone, Henry Crompton, Robert Applegarth and George Howell apparently persuaded Bruce, now home secretary and therefore responsible for trade union legislation, that he should acquiesce in principle despite the Liberal malcontents. Thus the government decided to support second reading on condition that the bill be withdrawn in favour of a future governmental measure; in the interim, Bruce promised protection for union funds, and Howell recorded that "Mr. Bruce won respect and consideration by reason of his prompt and prudent action. It was a temporary solution of the difficulty."<sup>5.</sup> Accordingly, when Hughes moved second reading of the bill (and in doing so staunchly defended unionism) he indicated on behalf of trade unionists that he did not intend to press the measure in

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1. PP 1868-69 [4123.] xxxi.263-5: dissenting view of Lichfield, Hughes and Harrison.
  2. F. Harrison, i : 323.
  3. PP 1868-69 [4123.] xxxi.266-98.
  4. PP 1868-69 (68.) v.323-6: a bill to amend the law relating to trade combinations and trade unions.
  5. George Howell, *Labour Legislation, Labour Movements, and Labour Leaders*, (London, 1905), i : 177.

the current session.<sup>1.</sup> Bruce replied sympathetically; though asserting that intimidation must be prevented, he emphasised the necessity of legalising unionism without restrictions.<sup>2.</sup> And Forster (whom Howell described as "warmly in favour of a far-reaching measure"<sup>3.</sup>), speaking at Bruce's request, informed the house that if Hughes did not withdraw his bill the government would support it in principle, believing that "the working classes should have perfect freedom to combine, but all coercion should be prevented."<sup>4.</sup> The bill thus passed second reading without a division, and was withdrawn on 12 July. On the following day Bruce introduced a temporary measure to protect unions funds,<sup>5.</sup> which was virtually unopposed in both houses.

The references to coercion by both Bruce and Forster in this debate were significant, and illustrative of two apparent considerations, the first ideological, the second political. On a philosophical level they were confronted with a dilemma. Their advanced liberal creed committed them to sanctioning combination, but it also ensured their espousal of the right of an individual to betray his co-workers without being subjected to harassment. On this basis trade unionism, whilst legalised, would be rendered effectively impotent through removal of the right to picket. But the 'coercion' of picketing, perhaps more than any

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1. 3 H 197, 1344-57: 7 July 1869.

2. 3 H 197, 1379-83: 7 July 1869.

3. Howell, i : 181.

4. 3 H 197, 1385-6: 7 July 1869. This statement merely echoes Forster's earlier statement to parliament (in 1867) that "every facility should be given to workmen, not only to sell their labour to the greatest advantage, but to combine for the purpose of obtaining, by all constitutional means, the best price for it. They ought, at the same time, to be prevented from coercing others. It was desirable that the law on this point should be defined, as it did not appear to be accurately defined at present" (3 H 185, 200-1: 8 Feb. 1867).

5. PP 1868-69 (216.) v.327-30: a bill to protect the funds of trades unions from embezzlement and misappropriation.

other union activity, symbolised the confrontation they wished society to avoid. At a political level they were inevitably cognisant, as rising Liberals, of *real politik*. Opposition to trade unions in parliament and within the Liberal party was substantial, and it is doubtful that unrestricted union legalisation could have been obtained without concurrent statutory penalties for picketing.

The desire to prevent 'coercion', therefore, was not inconsistent with their ideological or political objectives. This could be accomplished either by strengthening the common law, or through reliance on a discriminatory statute. On the royal commission and in his 1869 trade union bill, Hughes had expressed preference for the former option,<sup>1</sup> and there is evidence that Bruce also favoured this approach.<sup>2</sup> In the event, however, neither was willing to sacrifice his parliamentary position or reputation over this distinction.

Liberal legislation on trade unions was not introduced until 1871, largely because of parliament's preoccupation in 1870 with education and Irish land reforms. Bruce considered the question "a hard nut to crack,"<sup>3</sup> and clearly sought the middle ground between trade unionists and Liberal manufacturers. The result was a compromise which satisfied neither.

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1. PP 1868-69 [4123.] xxxi.264, 291-2; 3 H 197, 1353-5: 7 July 1869.
  2. In 1872 Bruce apparently desired to conciliate the unions by accepting their proposal that the anti-picket statute, the criminal law amendment act, be repealed. According to George Howell, however, political pressures were "powerful enough to overawe Mr. Bruce's better judgment" (Howell, i : 215). It is noteworthy that in these circumstances Hughes helped Bruce thwart union pressure (*ibid.*, i : 248-9).
  3. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 293: B to Norah Bruce, London, 8 Dec. 1869.

In one sense the legislation Bruce introduced<sup>1.</sup> was remarkably just and progressive, considering employer influence in the commons. The bill legalised trade unions without restrictions, accepting virtually intact in this respect the royal commission minority report of Hughes and Harrison. At the same time the bill preserved unions from destructive litigation; George Howell attested that Bruce "resisted any pressure put upon him by open and secret foes to the Bill to make any provision in the measure for unions to sue and be sued, which would have become a means of destroying the unions."<sup>2.</sup>

Having satisfied the principal requirement of trade unionism, legal recognition, Bruce moved to conciliate the sceptics. When introducing the legislation in the house of commons he certainly advocated justice for unions, but concentrated on allaying employer fears,<sup>3.</sup> evidently convinced that his unrestricted legalisation would not readily be accepted. In order to emphasise the curtailment of 'coercion', he was willing to insist that the legislation codify existing definitions of intimidation, threats of violence, molestation and obstruction. Effectively this codification, in restating extant but obscure illegalities,<sup>4.</sup> prohibited the right to picket.

The suspicions of parliament were perhaps exacerbated in 1871 by events in Paris; its insistence on strict statutory controls over 'coercion' is best exemplified by the lords' insistence that picketing by just one person should be a criminal offence. (Bruce's original provision had been two or more.) Despite the protestations of Bruce,

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1. PP 1871 (28.) vi.235-52: a bill to amend the law relating to trades unions.
  2. Howell, i : 186.
  3. 3 H 204, 257-70: 14 Feb. 1871.
  4. The molestation of workmen act of 1859, though an attempt to define peaceful picketing, was suitably vague.

Hughes and Forster,<sup>1.</sup> the house of commons accepted this restrictive clause. Reliance on common law was simply unacceptable to a wary parliament.

In these circumstances Hughes welcomed the legislation in the house of commons; despite his unease regarding the penal clauses, he promised his support.<sup>2.</sup> By their acquiescence in a criminal statute specifically for trade unionists it should not be inferred that Hughes, Bruce and Forster, all of whom participated in the commons debates on the 1871 legislation, had abandoned their previous sympathies for unionism. Bruce's attitudes, much maligned, are representative. It was not his intention to alter existing criminal law practice,<sup>3.</sup> and he readily consented to separation of the civil and criminal aspects of the bill,<sup>4.</sup> the effect of which was to enable unionists to agitate for the repeal of criminal disabilities without threatening their newly-attained legal status.<sup>5.</sup> Bruce also cited the bias of ordinary magistrates (normally connected with employers) as justification for appointing stipendiary magistrates to preside over trade union - employer conflicts.<sup>6.</sup> Furthermore, he resisted moves to separate the benevolent and strike funds of trade unions.<sup>7.</sup>

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1. 3 H 207, 282, 284, 285, 288: 19 June 1871.

2. 3 H 204, 270-1: 14 Feb. 1871; 3 H 204, 2035-9: 14 March 1871.

3. Howell, i : 182-3.

4. 3 H 205, 808-9: 28 March 1871. The original bill was subsequently divided; see PP 1871 (94.) vi.253-66: a bill [as amended in committee] to amend the law relating to trades unions; PP 1871 (95.) i.341-6: a bill [as amended in committee] to amend the criminal law relating to masters and workmen.

5. Ostensibly the separation of the original measure into two bills removed the inference that the coercion provisions were directed specifically at trade unionists, but in practice this continued to be the case.

6. 3 H 205, 820, 821: 28 March 1871. Hughes had requested this provision (3 H 204, 2037: 14 March 1871).

7. 3 H 205, 1173-4: 4 April 1871.

The attitudes towards trade unionism of Bruce, Hughes and Forster in 1871 were no less sympathetic than they had previously appeared.<sup>1</sup> They continued to view trade unions as organisations for combat. Unions were not perceived as desirable ends in themselves, but as a valuable transitory stage to industrial co-operation. And if political realities compelled Bruce, Hughes and Forster to accept harsh and discriminatory legislation in order to curtail 'coercion', they did so without rancour. Whether 'coercion' was proscribed by statute or by common law was of relatively little consequence to them, and was not an issue on which they would consider separating themselves from Gladstonian Liberalism. Given this stance, it was predictable and inevitable that their influence on trade unionists would thenceforth diminish. Nevertheless their contribution to the movement, whilst inadequate, was not insignificant. Bruce and Hughes in particular had assisted in creating a sound legal framework for trade unionism; within five years unions were able to exert sufficient pressure to induce Disraeli to rescind the discriminatory criminal restrictions on picketing.

### 7.

In their approach to industrial relations Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard were motivated by the desire for class conciliation and corporate unity within society. These same objectives entailed an overall sense of moral responsibility, outside their strict roles as employers or landlords, towards the working class. One aspect of this paternalistic vision is instanced in the efforts of Goderich, Forster and Bruce to provide elementary educational facilities for their local communities. During the winter recess of 1855,

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1. Mack and Armytage, in referring to Hughes's 'honeymoon' and 'divorce' from labour, are somewhat misleading. His was never a marriage with trade unionism.

for example, Goderich informed Bruce that he had been engaged "in improving Schools & finding Schoolmasters in Yorkshire, & I should very much like to see what you have done in that way & to profit by your experience & example."<sup>1</sup> In the following year he once again worked with his schools, where he expressed himself much tormented with "stupid, touchy parsons & foolish parents."<sup>2</sup> Bruce's achievements in South Wales were considerable. With Layard, he had in 1852 encouraged Dowlais schools.<sup>3</sup> In 1855, when a Dowlais trustee, Bruce helped organise an ironworks school which could enrol 500 children and 600 infants.<sup>4</sup> In April 1857 Bruce opened a nondenominational (British) school at Mountain Ash,<sup>5</sup> a project he had contemplated since 1850.<sup>6</sup> By 1862, 976 students were enrolled at his local schools.<sup>7</sup> At Burley, Forster established similar educational provisions. Night schools for young men and women were inaugurated in 1853, to accompany the existing half-time mill school.<sup>8</sup> By 1860 the night school had become permanent throughout the year, and a second master was engaged.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to such community efforts, the provision of adult education on a broader scale attracted the concern of Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard. In the virtual absence of state support or participation, and in an era prior to the establishment of university extension, facilities for adult education depended exclusively on middle/

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 30: G to B, 19 Sept. 1855.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 298: G to H, Ripon, 19 Dec. 1856.
  3. See chapter 3 above.
  4. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 26: B to G, Aberdare, [7 or 1] Sept. 1855.
  5. *Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*, 25 April 1857: B's speech opening Mountain Ash school, 18 April 1857; Bruce, *Letters*, i : 153: B to Sir William Napier, [Aberdare], 19 April 1857.
  6. Bruce, *Letters*, i : 90-1: B to John Bruce Pryce, Merthyr, 11 Nov. 1850.
  7. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 134: B to deG, Aberdare, 5 Nov. 1862.
  8. FP. TCD, Ms 4992, 11: Jane Forster to Fan, 3 Nov. [1853].
  9. FP. TCD, Ms 4992, 24: Jane Forster to Fan, Burley, 28 Feb. 1860.

upper class philanthropy and working class self-help. Goderich and his companions strove not only to instil middle class values of moral and social progress in their working class clientele, but also to create a community spirit of mutual tolerance and respect. In this sense they attempted to quell revolutionary sentiments, simultaneously providing the means for evolutionary self-improvement, for freedom and liberation, both intellectual and social. Bruce, for example, looked to further education which would "really elevate the minds, strengthen the morality, and expand the understanding of the working classes, making them more happy, contented and virtuous, better workmen, better citizens, better Christians."<sup>1</sup>. And Goderich praised literary and mechanics institutes as "eminently calculated to promote the social, moral, and intellectual wellbeing of the general community."<sup>2</sup>.

Mechanics institutes were perceived as a tool by which effective adult working class education could be provided. Mechanics institutes were originally founded in the 1820s, with an emphasis on scientific and technical studies. The fifties witnessed an expansionary surge, with a peak membership reached about 1860,<sup>3</sup> and a growing emphasis on a cultural and literary curriculum. Such courses appealed mainly to skilled workers and the lower middle classes, but in the West Riding (where Goderich concentrated his efforts) a solid working class majority obtained.<sup>4</sup>.

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1. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 2: 'On Amusements'.

2. *Times*, 27 Sept. 1858: G's address to the Knaresborough literary institution, 21 Sept. 1858.

3. In 1831 there were 55 institutes with 7000 members, in 1850 610 institutes with 102,050 members, in 1861 about 1200 institutes with 200,000 members (Ludlow and Jones, 169; S.J. Curtis, *History of Education in Great Britain*, (London, 1965), 473).

4. The Huddersfield institute, for example, has been described as "a really working-class institute" in 1851 (Thomas Kelly, *A History of Adult Education in Great Britain*, (Liverpool, 1962), 128), and in 1856 over 70% of its membership was working class (*Huddersfield Chronicle*, 29 Nov. 1856).

In 1851 and 1852, Layard encouraged the mechanics institutes at Northampton and Peterborough. In an address to an institute soirée which emphasised class co-operation and social unity, he commented that

the people of this country had a great social question to determine, and one which they should solve as soon and as fully as possible. They had to give the very best education in their power to all classes of the community. There was an intense thirst after knowledge, and the question was whether that thirst should turn to the common benefit of all classes, or to their injury and detriment. The answer to that question was to be found in such institutions as that whose members he had then the honour to address. Such institutions were and should be self-supporting and self-regulating, but they should also receive too [sic] as great an extent as possible the sympathy and assistance of all those who, by their talents, their acquirements, their fortunes, or their influence, should give them substantial and beneficial aid. 1.

Presumably motivated by similar sentiments, Bruce co-operated in 1854 with local working men in organising a mechanics institute at Mountain Ash.<sup>2</sup> In the following year Goderich addressed the Ripon mechanics institute, and emphasised the role of lectures over the mere provision of library facilities.<sup>3</sup> In addition, however, he contemplated the establishment of colleges in small towns, for even where lectures were given in mechanics institutes "they still are very liable to do little more than give encouragement to desultory reading & a dipping into every kind of subject, but *learning* none." Goderich hoped that mechanics institutes could affiliate as colleges to the universities, which would

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1. *Northampton Mercury*, 20 Dec. 1851: L's speech at the Northampton mechanics institute, 16 Dec. 1851; similar opinions were expressed at the annual meeting of the Peterborough mechanics institute on 27 January 1852 (*Lincolnshire Chronicle*, 6 Feb. 1852).
  2. BP. Bodleian Library, Ms Eng Letters d.246, 104b: B to Norah Napier, Aberdare, 5 Aug. 1854.
  3. *Leeds Mercury*, 30 Oct. 1855: G's speech at the Ripon mechanics institute, 26 Oct. 1855.

provide travelling lecturers, examinations and degrees.<sup>1.</sup> Such university extension was not to be realised until after 1873, though Goderich initiated discussion on the issue in the working men's college council in 1855.<sup>2.</sup> Despite their imperfections, mechanics institutes continued to attract Goderich's patronage, for they provided the working class an opportunity to combine work and learning.<sup>3.</sup> The foundation of the Yorkshire union of mechanics institutes in 1857 gave added vitality to the movement in the north. Goderich was twice chairman of the Yorkshire union, participated in its annual meetings in 1874 and 1886, and subscribed fifteen guineas annually.<sup>4.</sup> Though Layard temporarily abandoned his involvement in adult education and working class conditions in the mid-fifties ("unfortunately for me the [Crimean] war & the Turkish question arose, & I was dragged into them"), he nevertheless assured Goderich of his continued belief that "the encouragement of Mechanics' Institutes & similar institutions is important."<sup>5.</sup> By the early sixties he had resumed lecturing commitments. In April 1860, for example, he spoke on Assyrian art for the benefit of the Chatham mechanics institute; Charles Dickens chaired the meeting, which had been arranged by Arthur Otway.<sup>6.</sup> The following year he addressed a working class audience on Ninevah, and according to

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1. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 192: G to H, Ripon, 29 Oct. 1855.
  2. *ibid.*; RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 198: H to G, London, 5 Nov. 1855; RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 200: G to H, Ripon, 8 Nov. 1855.
  3. *Huddersfield Chronicle*, 29 Nov. 1856: G's speech at the Huddersfield mechanics institute, 27 Nov. 1856.
  4. Denholm, *Radical and Democratic Career of Ripon*, 278, quoting the reports of the annual meetings of the Yorkshire union of mechanics institutes from 1874 to 1886, Huddersfield Public Library.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43550, 111: L to G, Constantinople, 15 Dec. 1856.
  6. *Chatham News*, 21 April 1860: L's speech of 17 April 1860.

Newman Hall "had a great effect on many who had been taught to despise the bible as unworthy of any evidence."<sup>1</sup> In the commons, Bruce promoted the system of grants and examinations instituted by the science and art department,<sup>2</sup> which contributed so significantly to the educational vigour of mechanics institutes.

It was primarily at the working men's college, however, that Goderich, Hughes and Forster were able to combine their educational philanthropy with notions of class conciliation and fraternal unity. An 1852 lecture by Hughes exemplifies the somewhat anti-intellectual educational theories to which they adhered:

the highest end of education is to teach them [Englishmen and women] a knowledge of themselves, and of the men and women amongst whom they live; and through that knowledge to teach them further, that the object of their most earnest struggles and highest hopes should be, not to have intellects full of the learning of all the schools, stored with the secrets of physical science, of logic and ethics, of history and metaphysics, but to have hearts full of love to God and their brethren, of zeal which shall burn, as a consuming fire, against all that wrong, and injustice, and iniquity, which is violating God's righteous order in His world. 3.

Christian Socialism's first educational efforts occurred in 1848, when a night school was opened in Great Ormond Yard, Bloomsbury. Pre-occupied with co-operative work, the society for promoting working men's associations did not resume working class tuition until July 1852, when the new hall of association was completed. There Hughes taught classes in English grammar, and Goderich lectured on entomology.<sup>4</sup> Hughes later

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 58165, 157: Newman Hall to L, Brough, Yorkshire, n.d. [April 1861].

2. 3 H 189, 1237-8: 9 Aug. 1867.

3. Hughes, *Lecture on the Slop-System*, 3-4.

4. Ludlow, 'Origin of the Working Men's College', in Davies, *The Working Men's College*, 16-7.

referred to these lectures and classes as "no doubt a sort of prelude to the WM College."<sup>1</sup>.

The foundation of the working men's college itself was a direct consequence of the failure of the Christian Socialists' co-operative endeavours in the early fifties. Thus Hughes recalled that

... the squabbles, & idlings, & swindlings, & incompetence of the workmen in the London Associations ... convinced Mr Maurice that they had to be educated before they wd be capable of the self restraint staunchness & obedience which are absolutely necessary in an Association for production... 2.

Goderich concurred: "it seems to me that if the Working Men only care for Cooperation when they are in distress, they don't much, in truth, care for it at all -- with here & there exceptions of course. Our Utopia will need to be built on foundations which can only be laid deep in men's hearts."<sup>3</sup> It had become evident to Hughes, Goderich and other Christian Socialists that

if the true ground of the fellowship of all men, and the duty which that fellowship involves, of bearing one another's burdens, and so fulfilling the law of Christ, were to be brought home to them it must be by other means. In a word, an education was needed for all of us -- parsons, lawyers, artists, and working men. 4.

The example of the Sheffield people's college inspired the Christian Socialists' efforts, which were initiated on 11 January 1854 when Hughes formally proposed to the council of promoters that a plan for the

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1. Working Men's College Archives, No. 112: H to F. Maurice, Dorking, Surrey, 9 Aug. [1883]. Frederick Maurice was F.D. Maurice's son and biographer.
  2. Working Men's College Archives, No. 99: H to Jennings, 31 Jan. 1886.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 93: G to H, Ripon, 11 Oct. 1853.
  4. [Thomas Hughes], *Early Memories for the Children. By the Author of "Tom Brown's Schooldays"*, (London, 1899), 49.

establishment of a people's college in connection with the associations be framed and implemented.<sup>1</sup> Goderich served on the committee which drafted specific proposals, and the working men's college was officially opened at 31, Red Lion Square on 2 November 1854. Goderich and Hughes were both foundation members, and Goderich donated £25 at the college's inception.<sup>2</sup> In addition, they both served on the college's governing council.

The aim of the founders was that the working men's college should cater primarily to unskilled manual workers, though all interested adult men were admitted. Goderich expressed to Hughes his concern on this score at the college's commencement: "Do you think that the men who come to you are real working men, in the class sense of the word, or to any considerable extent clerks & shopmen? If they be the latter, some of the most important objects of the College will not be attained."<sup>3</sup> Though lower middle class attendance was considerable, the working men's college was significantly more successful than mechanics institutes were in attracting working class students, and in 1855 Goderich could report that "the scheme was succeeding, and the members were burning to acquire the instruction offered to them."<sup>4</sup>

The curriculum was devised with a view to instilling a sense of humanity in the students, thus renouncing a purely utilitarian approach to adult education. The physical sciences and mathematics were not eschewed, but an emphasis was placed on languages, English

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1. Mack and Armytage, 77.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 144: G to H, Turancon, 5 Nov. 1854.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 146: G to H, Turancon, 18 Nov. 1854.
  4. *Leeds Mercury*, 30 Oct. 1855: G's speech at Ripon mechanics institute, 26 Oct. 1855.

grammar, art, and the humanities. Unlike the mechanics institutes, politics and theology were an integral part of the curriculum.<sup>1.</sup>

Though the working men proved more interested in vocational studies than their teachers had anticipated, Goderich accurately predicted that, in the atmosphere of fellowship which the college engendered, "the natural interest of all men, even in spite of their theories very often, in all that concerns Man himself will soon bring them to the other studies of the College."<sup>2.</sup> Goderich and Hughes found it difficult to directly participate in the teaching programme. Goderich cited lack of time and ability as reasons for his abstention,<sup>3.</sup> but he nevertheless, as Hughes reminisced, "repeated his lecture on butterflies & bittles" to the college students.<sup>4.</sup> Hughes's initial lectures on sanitary legislation were poorly attended, as were subsequent classes on the laws of combination and association, and he eventually decided that boxing was all he was competent to teach. Hughes also admitted that, although the college was initially motivated by co-operative ideals, "it was always a great trouble to me that I could not get the WMC more interested in the Cooperative movement."<sup>5.</sup> In the mid-fifties, however, Maurice perceived a connection between the working men's college and administrative reform, believing that the values of fraternity under God which were emphasised in the college curriculum were similar to those which the administrators of the state required.<sup>6.</sup>

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1. The initial programme is reproduced in F.D. Maurice, *Learning and Working*, (Cambridge, 1855), xxi-xxii.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 146: G to H, Turancon, 18 Nov. 1854.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43547, 144: G to H, Turancon, 5 Nov. 1854.
  4. Working Men's College Archives, No. 112: H to F. Maurice, Dorking, Surrey, 9 Aug. [1883].
  5. Working Men's College Archives, No. 99: H to Jennings, 31 Jan. 1886.
  6. F.D. Maurice, *Administrative Reform, and its connexion with Working Men's Colleges*, (Cambridge, 1855). Maurice's ideas regarding the working men's college are best illustrated in his *Learning and Working*, which was based on six lectures delivered in June and July 1854.

A sense of fellowship, of Christian brotherhood, of a corporate social life, was the college's most important achievement, and its greatest contribution to the conciliation of classes which its founders romanticised. The college was never regarded by its founders as an act of mere benevolence towards working men, but as a mutually-enriching experiment. Thus one of its exponents, J. Llewelyn Davies, recalled that

the idea of fellowship was to run through all its work; every teacher was to assume that he might gain as well as impart, might learn as well as teach; every student was to be made to feel that in coming to the College he was entering into a society in which he might hope to become more of a citizen and more of a man. 1.

Hughes's boxing classes were particularly effective in developing a sense of comradeship, and in addition he initiated a series of weekly social gatherings at which, according to Hughes, "every prominent question of the day was warmly debated ..., and I really think they did as much for the true education of the pupils as any of the classes."<sup>2</sup> An old student reminisced sentimentally about these "smoking concerts," over which Hughes -- "our well-loved teacher, companion, leader, and friend" -- presided.<sup>3</sup> Indeed J.F.C. Harrison has observed that the corporate tradition developed in the college "is unparalleled in the field of adult education."<sup>4</sup>

The idea of the London working men's college also spread to the provinces. Though on the whole less successful, between 1855 and 1868 over a dozen colleges were founded in England and two in Scotland.

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1. J. Llewelyn Davies, 'F.D. Maurice', in Davies, 11.
  2. Thomas Hughes, 'Fragments of Autobiography. III. The Working Men's College', *Cornhill Magazine*, 58, May 1925, 568.
  3. Roebuck, 'Reminiscences of an Old Student', in Davies, 71-2.
  4. J.F.C. Harrison, *A History of the Working Men's College*, (London, 1954), 22.

This was a direction of which Goderich wholly approved,<sup>1.</sup> and the first extension was at Halifax, under the inspiration of Edward Akroyd, Forster was closely associated with this venture, having evaluated through his companions the success of the London endeavour, and he spoke at the inauguration ceremony in March 1856.<sup>2.</sup> Bruce, however, was only involved in the movement indirectly, through his son Willie, who taught at the London working men's college in the 1880s.<sup>3.</sup>

8.

Their desire to bind society together, to conciliate disparate classes, extended from the working men's college in the fifties to the working men's club movement in the sixties. Thus Layard spoke of the necessity of working class contact with their social superiors, "in a manner and in a spirit that would tend to bind more closely together the ties between the two classes,"<sup>4.</sup> and Hughes believed that "it was a branch of the co-operative system to establish such clubs as these."<sup>5.</sup> Henry Solly, the energetic secretary of the working men's club and institute union, believed that the principle of brotherhood was a common feature of the working men's college and working men's clubs.<sup>6.</sup>

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1. *Leeds Mercury*, 30 Oct. 1855: G's speech at Ripon mechanics institute, 26 Oct. 1855.
  2. *Halifax Guardian*, 29 March 1856: F's speech at the Halifax working men's college inauguration, 26 March 1856.
  3. See Working Men's College Archives, AH292, AJ33, AK28: W.N. Bruce to Jennings, Aberdare, 16 Aug. [1881], London, 30 July 1884, London, 29 Jan. 1886.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 58175, 176: unidentified newspaper report (c. 2 Aug. 1865) of L's speech at the working men's college celebration of Hughes's election victory. Layard specifically mentioned Hughes as a man capable of unifying the classes.
  5. Thomas Hughes, 'The Three Tests', in [E.V. Neale, ed.], *The Co-operator's hand-book*, (Manchester, 1874), 3. Hodgson Pratt, the founder of the union, was also a strong proponent of both producer and consumer co-operation.
  6. Henry Solly, *Working Men's Social Clubs and Educational Institutes*, (London, 1867), 508, 31, 34.

The impetus to the club movement came from Hodgson Pratt, whom Hughes described as "their chief advocate and promoter."<sup>1</sup> The working men's club and institute union was founded in 1862, with the object of promoting clubs or institutes

as members of which the working men of the neighbourhood can enjoy rational social intercourse with each other, coupled with opportunities for mental improvement, recreation, and mutual helpfulness; and further, to give them facilities for carrying on various plans of social improvement, such as Co-operative Societies, Friendly or Benefit Clubs, Mutual Improvement Societies, Building Societies, and the like, in the prosecution of which working men are at present often obliged to resort to public-houses for the mere want of better meeting places. 2.

The emphasis on recreation did not preclude an educational function for working men's clubs; all were to have reading rooms and libraries, and one of the union's expressed objects was to encourage working men to progress from the clubs to the working men's college.<sup>3</sup> By July 1865, after two and a half years of operation, a total of 116 clubs with 30,000 members had been formed by the union; a year later 300 clubs with nearly 60,000 members were in operation.<sup>4</sup>

As early as 1850 Bruce had recognised the need

to provide, or to assist the working classes to provide, those means of innocent pleasure, of social enjoyment, at which moral and mental improvement rather insinuate themselves than are enforced -- where recreation may lead on insensibly to refinement, and pursuits commenced for the mere purpose of amusement and relaxation, may gradually improve the manners, elevate the tone, and expand the intellect of those, who little suspect the transformation they are undergoing. 5.

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1. Hughes, *James Fraser: A Memoir*, 221.
  2. Ludlow and Jones, 178-9, quoting the working men's club and institute union publication 'Hints and Suggestions for the formation of Working Men's Clubs and Institutes'.
  3. *ibid.*, 179.
  4. *Times*, 4 July 1865; *Times*, 6 July 1866.
  5. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 4-5: 'On Amusements'.

Bruce was accordingly an involved supporter of the working men's institute in Merthyr Tydvil.<sup>1</sup> In the mid-fifties Forster and Goderich worked together on behalf of the West Riding mutual assurance society and its self-improvement schemes.<sup>2</sup> In the sixties, however, it was Hughes and Layard who were most intimately involved in the working men's club and institute union. Both were vice presidents of the union from the outset,<sup>3</sup> and Layard president of the metropolitan district association of working men's clubs.<sup>4</sup> In 1863, when Hughes repudiated the *Spectator's* statement<sup>5</sup> that he was the soul of the working men's club and institute union, the editor replied: "Very good, we will alter it. He is only the Vice-President and most ardent supporter."<sup>6</sup> In 1868, when Layard's accession to office necessarily curtailed his involvement, he nevertheless consented to offer his help when urgently required.<sup>7</sup>

Undoubtedly the club and institute movement was in part an attempt to inculcate the workers with middle class values of social and moral improvement. In addition, middle class patrons hoped to wean the workers from public houses to the temperate atmosphere of a social club. Both Hughes and Layard cited moral elevation and the control of pub-induced intemperance as worthy objectives of the club movement.<sup>8</sup>

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1. *Western Mail*, 26 Feb. 1895: Aberdare's obituary.
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 73: F to G, Otley, 4 Nov. 1856; RP. BL Add Ms 43536, 75: F to G, Otley, 9 Nov. 1856.
  3. B.T. Hall, *Our Fifty Years: The Story of the Working Men's Club and Institute Union*, (London, 1912), 19. Aberdare joined his colleagues as a vice president in 1876 (*ibid.*, 55).
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 58166, 66: Hodgson Pratt to L, [London], 2 July 1866.
  5. *Spectator*, 23 May 1863.
  6. *Spectator*, 30 May 1863.
  7. See LP. BL Add Ms 38995, 17: Hodgson Pratt to L, Hastings, n.d. [Jan. 1869?]
  8. e.g. Hughes, 'The Working Classes in Europe', 15; *Times*, 4 July 1865: L's speech at the working men's club and institute union's annual meeting, 3 July 1865.

Unlike some middle class supporters, however, they never envisaged the clubs as a means merely to placate the working class to acceptance of the social, economic or political *status quo*. Their responses to worker management and trade union participation illustrate this approach.

With the middle class providing much of the finance for working men's clubs, some managerial friction was inevitable. The union's council considered it essential that at least half the managers in each club or institute were working men.<sup>1</sup> In accordance with this view, Hughes insisted that it was the self-financing and self-managing characteristics of the working men's clubs, as much as their social objects, which were of importance.<sup>2</sup> Layard also emphasised that

it was not an object of the union to interfere in any way with the working classes. He was one of those who believed that if any artificial fostering were given by those who were not themselves of the working class, the probability was that those institutions would have no true growth, and would not succeed.

The union should, Layard contended, limit its services to the provision of advice and consultation.<sup>3</sup>

In July 1866 Hughes chaired a *conversazione* held in conjunction with the working men's club and institute union, at which delegates from sixteen trade unions were present in order to debate the merits of union participation in working men's clubs. Trade unionists were generally mistrustful, fearing that the club movement meant to supplant unionism. But Hughes strongly supported union participation, observing

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1. Ludlow and Jones, 179.

2. Hughes, 'The Working Classes in Europe', 16.

3. *Daily Telegraph*, 29 Aug. 1865: L's speech at the working men's club of St Saviour's, Hoxton, 28 Aug. 1865.

that the association had not been so successful as he could wish in securing the co-operation of the trades societies in the promotion of these clubs, which were, he contended, calculated to do great good to the working classes, by talking them out of the narrow groove in which trades union societies, by reason of their constitution, moved.

Layard emphasised to the gathering the compatibility of trade unions and working men's clubs, contending that there was no reason "why it should be supposed that they [working men's clubs] were meant to supersede trades' unions, which were as necessary for the protection of the working man at the present day as the guilds of the Middle Ages were for the defence of commerce."<sup>1</sup>.

An adjunct to the working men's club and institute union in 1867 was the organisation of working class excursions to the Paris exhibition. Layard had considered the promotion of workers' expeditions as early as 1861,<sup>2</sup> and had participated as a vice president in the committee of the south London working classes industrial exhibition in 1864.<sup>3</sup> It was therefore quite natural that in 1867 he should be appointed president of the Paris excursion committee of the metropolitan district association of working men's clubs and institutes.<sup>4</sup> In this capacity Layard appealed for middle class subscriptions,<sup>5</sup> publicised the venture,<sup>6</sup>

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1. *Times*, 6 July 1866: report of a working men's club and institute union conversazione, 5 July 1866.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 39135, 100: Cowley to L, Paris, 11 March 1861; Forster had in fact sponsored an excursion to the London exhibition of 1862 for all 600 of his mill workers (Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 350-2).
  3. R-V Autographs, Misc English, Pierpont Morgan Library: L to [?], Riva, 4 Sept. 1864.
  4. LP. BL Add Ms 39053, 48-9: excursion circular to working men, April 1867.
  5. LP. BL Add Ms 38994, 66: open letter, signed by L, Henry Hoare and Hodgson Pratt, 1 May 1867.
  6. *Daily Telegraph*, 1 May 1867; *Times*, 28 May 1867.

organised the journeys (even arranging that Napoleon III should meet the British workmen<sup>1.</sup>), and himself accompanied the inaugural excursion.<sup>2.</sup> Layard expressed his support for the excursions (which cost only £3 per week per person) on the grounds that they would tend to unite the working men of France and England, thereby promoting peace and the advancement of science.<sup>3.</sup>

A further venture in middle and working class co-operation concerned the workmen's international exhibition organised for the summer of 1869. The purpose of the exhibition was to display, for educational purposes and as a competition, examples of artisans' workmanship, both individual and, when division of labour was necessary for the manufactured article, combined. Once again the working men's club and institute union backed the venture. Bruce, Forster, Hughes and Layard were among the vice presidents of the committee, and Bruce, Forster and Layard each contributed to the subscription.<sup>4.</sup>

A number of further educational efforts were undertaken with a view to working class subsumption under common national values. Bruce, for example, spoke of the "humanizing" influence of art on all men, but especially on the working classes.<sup>5.</sup> He similarly perceived music as a pleasure for all classes.<sup>6.</sup> In 1852 Layard was a leading member of

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1. See LP. BL Add Ms 38994, 136: Cowley to L, 15 June 1867.
  2. Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, ii : 235-6: L to Sara Austen, Paris, 13 June 1867.
  3. *Times*, 9 May 1867: L's speech as chairman of a metropolitan working men's exhibition committee meeting, 8 May 1867.
  4. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44416, 142: L to Gladstone, London, 6 Nov. 1868, with accompanying circular.
  5. Bruce, *Lectures and Addresses*, 72-3: 'Art and its Cultivation', address delivered on 10 Dec. 1855.
  6. *ibid.*, 203-10: 'Music', address delivered on 28 Dec. 1864.

the working man's friend society, which had prepared a number of designs from which young persons could be taught the rudiments of drawing.<sup>1</sup> He was a trustee of the guild of literature and art in the mid-fifties,<sup>2</sup> and a patron in the sixties of the national book union, the aim of which was to disseminate sound literature among the working classes.<sup>3</sup> Layard

believe[d] it to be of the utmost importance that in these days, when the different classes of society are being politically amalgamated and confounded, working men should be taught that, after all, there is something in the cultivation of the intellect, and that the high state of civilization to which we have attained, and our advancement in prosperity, happiness, and comfort, are not unconnected with the development of the human faculties, whether in the direction of literature, science, or art. 4.

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It was, however, through the state's provision of elementary schooling that their greatest efforts to include the working class in the national polity were directed. Their espousal of a national education system, which culminated in the act of 1870, was also the

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 58165, 88: J. Parke to L, Ampthill, 5 Oct. 1852.
  2. LP. BL Add Ms 38947, 12: Charles Dickens to L, London, 6 April 1854.
  3. LP. BL Add Ms 58165, 153: Blanchard Jerrold to L, London, 28 March 1861; LP. BL Add Ms 58162, 124: Jerrold to L, London, 19 Feb. 1862.
  4. [A.H. Layard], 'Italian Painting', *Quarterly Review*, 133, July 1872, 119.

most significant example of their mutual rejection of laissez-faire philosophy.<sup>1.</sup>

Perhaps the most notable, and certainly the most neglected, modification of public opinion vis-à-vis national education occurred in the late sixties. In 1865 most public men accepted that the voluntary system, extended and refined, could satisfy national requirements; by 1870, virtually all educationists and the great majority of parliamentarians favoured direct state involvement. This transformation of public opinion was in part a product of circumstances: the economic realities of the voluntary system, threats to British industrial supremacy from France and Prussia, the conviction after 1867 that it was necessary to "prevail on our future masters to learn their letters."<sup>2.</sup> De Grey, Forster and Bruce seized the opportunity to press their case for state intervention, and were perhaps the most prominent contributors to a climate of opinion receptive to governmental direction and a national system. The bases of debate were thereby defined and limited; the

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1. Bruce individually promoted state intervention in his capacities as vice president of the council and as under secretary and secretary of state at the home office. (Only once did he falter when, as a private member apparently motivated by self-interest, he opposed government intervention over working hours and employment of children in mines (3 H 159, 411, 415, 849, 852-3, 855, 970, 974: 13, 22, 25 June 1860); thereafter he was typically supportive of intervention.) As under secretary during the 1860s he served on commissions and select committees which investigated the impact of mining regulations and the factory acts and, despite Gladstone's reservations (BP. GCRO, D/D Br 149/2: Gladstone to B, London, 13 Feb. 1864), Bruce successfully pressed for the latter's extension to industries previously subject to no interference. As vice president of the council Bruce was primarily responsible for the health legislation of 1866, by which central government assumed the right to directly control local sanitary improvements. As home secretary in the first Gladstone ministry, his most significant assault on laissez-faire related to government intervention in the mining industry, through his important mines regulation act of 1872 -- an act which miners' leader Alexander MacDonald applauded (Bruce, *Letters*, i : 333: B to Norah Bruce, London, 4 March 1872).

2. Lowe: 3 H 188, 1549: 15 July 1867.

religious controversies of 1870, related to the mode in which the principle of state intervention was to be applied, was of secondary importance.

The 'system' of education operative prior to 1870 relied for its impetus on voluntary effort, principally forthcoming from the national (church of England) and British (nondenominational) societies. From 1833 government supplemented these efforts through grants in aid, contingent upon satisfactory inspection. The committee of the privy council for education was created in 1839, and a supervisory vice president appointed in 1856. The established church believed itself responsible for the education of the people; it dominated the field, and received the bulk of government assistance. From the late forties, nonconformists accordingly deprecated all state interference on grounds of religious equality and disestablishment. Thus, for reasons of religious jealousy, neither church nor nonconformist sects favoured direct governmental involvement in the provision of elementary education, despite the apparent incapacity of voluntarism to surmount educational deficiencies. This view was consolidated by the philosophy of laissez-faireism dominant in mid-Victorian Britain. Response to the Newcastle report in 1861 is illustrative of the prevalent inertia. The commission, appointed to investigate means "for the extension of sound and cheap elementary instruction," recommended that committee of council grants be awarded on the basis of payment by results, and be supplemented by a local rating system.<sup>1</sup> Lowe, the vice president, simply ignored the latter recommendation, and seized upon the former as a

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1. PP 1861 [2794 -- I.] xxi.PartI.7-552: report on popular education in England.

rationale for economic retrenchment through his revised code.

Goderich, Forster and Bruce were, throughout the fifties and sixties, consistent supporters of a national system of education. State education satisfied both their romantic and their radical ideals: it imposed uniform social mores and emphasised spiritual as opposed to material advances, and it prepared the masses for their democratic responsibilities.<sup>1.</sup> A centralised system was unacceptable to contemporaries (and perhaps to themselves), and Goderich, Forster and Bruce therefore opted for compulsory rating by local authorities. (Local rating was controversial in itself, as it imposed the principal financial burden on aristocratic landowners.) In the late forties, both Goderich and Forster supported the radical objectives of the Lancashire/national public school association: free and compulsory education financed by a local rate. Both were influential members of the association, Goderich a vice president. N.P.S.A. members could not agree as to whether purely secular, or merely unsectarian, education should be promoted. Goderich and Forster predictably rejected the separation of religion from education, and espoused the unsectarian option: Goderich emphasised that "the education imparted should not be devoid of religion, but most certainly devoid of all sectarianism. (Loud cheers.)";<sup>2.</sup> Forster admitted that he was not "a 'Secular,' having merely enrolled myself under their flag because there was none other hoisted, and I

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1. e.g. *Times*, 27 Sept. 1858: G's address on education at the Knaresborough literary institution, 21 Sept. 1858; *Bradford Observer*, 9 Nov. 1848: F's lecture, on pauperism, 31 Oct. 1848.

2. *Huddersfield Chronicle*, 23 April 1853: G's address at his electoral nomination, 20 April 1853.

confess that my object is simply a local rate."<sup>1</sup> It was thus the rating rather than the religious proposals of the N.P.S.A. which warranted the support of Goderich and Forster.

Thereafter, they consistently espoused a national elementary education system founded on local rates and local education authorities. They were not, however, prepared to sacrifice voluntary denominational achievements. Forster stressed in Leeds that

he was a voluntary, as well as a state-educationist -- (applause); -- he desired parents, citizens, and philanthropists to educate the young, and, after they had done that, that their efforts should be assisted either by the executive or through the different local bodies. (Applause.)<sup>2</sup>

Goderich desired universal education incorporating religion, in order that it not be "mere instruction." He therefore wished to retain "the vast efforts of voluntary endeavour which have hitherto been made."<sup>3</sup> Education rating, they held, should be applied as a supplement to existing voluntary facilities in order to found a 'national' system. Throughout the fifties Goderich<sup>4</sup> and Forster<sup>5</sup> frequently expressed support for the extension of education; Forster's election defeat in 1857 at the hands of Leeds nonconformists may be partly attributed to his advocacy of state intervention in education.<sup>6</sup>

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1. Frank Smith, *The Life and Work of Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth*, (London, 1923), 235: F to Kay-Shuttleworth, n.d. [c. 1850].
  2. *Leeds Mercury*, 30 June 1857: F's Leeds address of 29 June 1857.
  3. RP. BL Add Ms 43644, 175: draft letter, indexed 1855, headed 'Dear \_\_\_\_\_'.
  4. e.g. *Leeds Mercury (Supplement)*, 22 Oct. 1853; *Leeds Mercury*, 30 Oct. 1855; *Huddersfield Chronicle*, 29 Nov. 1856; *Times*, 27 Sept. 1858.
  5. e.g. *Halifax Guardian*, 29 March 1856; *Leeds Mercury*, 30 June 1857.
  6. *Leeds Mercury*, 30 June 1857: F's Leeds address of 29 June 1857.

During the early and mid-sixties de Grey, Forster and Bruce became more closely involved with educational reform at a political level, and co-operated extensively in support of their common objectives. As war secretary de Grey encouraged education in the army, and in 1865 was appointed to the committee of council on education.<sup>1.</sup> As vice president of the council from April 1864 Bruce joined battle with the church, and successfully insisted that all grants in aid be dependent on the acceptance of a conscience clause.<sup>2.</sup> Bruce also drew public attention to the insufficiency of school accommodation,<sup>3.</sup> and to the inadequacies and uncertainties of the voluntary system.<sup>4.</sup> He was also influential in obtaining Forster's appointment on the Taunton inquiry into (middle class) endowed grammar schools.<sup>5.</sup> Finally, both Bruce and Forster served on Pakington's select committee investigating the

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1. Ed 17/30: extract from *London Gazette*, 10 March 1865.
  2. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/19/4, 177, 181: B to Granville, n.d., 18 Feb. 1865 (Granville was lord president); Ed 17/30: report of the committee of council on education 1864-65. The conscience clause permitted students to withdraw from religious instruction.
  3. Ed 17/29: r.c.c. 1863-64, xxvi.
  4. Ed 17/30: r.c.c. 1864-65, xix-xx; Ed 17/31: r.c.c. 1865-66, xvi-xvii.
  5. Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/19/4, 114: B to Granville, Stonefield, Tarbert, Argyllshire, 17 Sept. 1864; Granville Papers. PRO 30/29/19/4, 149: B to Granville, London, 26 Oct. 1864, enclosing F to B, Burley, 25 Oct. 1864. Forster's membership was strongly opposed by Lowe (Fitzmaurice, *Life of Granville*, i : 433: Lowe to Granville, Sherbrooke, Caterham, Surrey, 21 Oct. 1864). The Taunton report (PP 1867-68 [3966.] xviii. Part 1. i-xi, 1-661: schools inquiry commission, report of the commissioners) recommended a state-initiated reconstruction of secondary education, admittedly on a class-stratified basis, and has been described as "a remarkably radical-collectivist document" (Burn, *Age of Equipoise*, 201). The endowed schools act of 1869, on which Forster, de Grey and Bruce collaborated, partially implemented these proposals.

administration and extension of state funding for education.<sup>1.</sup>

Stymied in their efforts within parliament de Grey, Forster and Bruce appealed for pressure from without, liberated after June 1866 from the strictures of office. They found in the Manchester and Salford education aid society suitable allies, and in the social science congress of October 1866 a suitable forum. The education aid society had been formed by Manchester capitalist philanthropists in 1864, with the intention of subsidising school fees for destitute children. Finding real educational deprivation, the society adopted a policy of free and compulsory schooling funded by local rates, and the Manchester education bill committee was established to achieve this objective. For two years Bruce, Forster and de Grey acted as parliamentary spokesmen for the committee, using outside pressure to bolster their political influence. Bruce presided over the education section of the social science congress held in Manchester in October 1866. Citing the educational destitution demonstrated in Manchester, and extrapolating from the local to the national situation, Bruce emphasised the inadequacies of the voluntary system. He dismissed the relevance of religious difficulties, and attributed previous government inaction "to the disinclination of the House to accede to the requests of statesmen of both sides to give them initiatory powers; so that they must look to the feeling of the country to bring about an improvement."<sup>2.</sup>

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1. 3 H 177, 894-902, 920-2: 28 Feb. 1865; PP 1865 (403.) vi.i-xii, 1-599: report from the select committee on education; together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence, and appendix (Bruce's evidence (49-56) concentrates on office administration, but endorses a national system founded on local school boards); PP 1866 (392.) vii.115-515: report from the select committee on education; together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence, appendix, and index. No formal report was tabled because of the uncertainty occasioned by the change in government.

2. *Manchester Guardian*, 5 Oct. 1866: B's address of 4 Oct. 1866.

Bruce then proposed "to maintain the present system where it works well, but wherever satisfactory evidence is given that the provision of education falls short of the wants of the population, to supply the deficiency by an education rate."<sup>1</sup> Having spoken his mind, Bruce travelled to Studley to confer with de Grey.<sup>2</sup>

Bruce subsequently reiterated his beliefs in Oldham.<sup>3</sup> He publicly claimed a desire to avoid party controversy,<sup>4</sup> and appealed to members of parliament "as Christian men and legislators" to support national education.<sup>5</sup> Aware of the need to conciliate laissez-faireists, anglicans and nonconformists, Bruce and Forster moved cautiously. They persuaded the Conservative member for Lancashire, Algernon Egerton, to join them as sponsors of a bill. The measure which they introduced on 5 April 1867 was endorsed by the Manchester education aid society.<sup>6</sup> It was 'permissive', empowering local authorities to levy education rates on the approval of the majority of ratepayers, such rates to subsidise both voluntary and new local authority schools which conformed to government standards.<sup>7</sup> During second reading debate both Forster and Bruce admitted their bill was a partial measure, designed to avoid giving offence, to raise public

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1. *ibid.*, 8 Oct. 1866; B's address of 6 Oct. 1866. Bruce's address was subsequently printed (H.A. Bruce, *National Education. An address delivered to the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, at Manchester, October 6, 1866*, (London, 1866)).
  2. RP. BL Add Ms 43534, 173: deG to B, Ripon, 9 Sept. 1866.
  3. *Manchester Guardian*, 14 Dec. 1866: B's Oldham address, 13 Dec. 1866.
  4. Privately, Bruce confided to Layard that education "would be a good and fruitful battlefield for the Liberal party" (Bruce, *Letters*, i : 247: B to L, Oldham, 14 Dec. 1866).
  5. 3 H 185, 1081: 26 Feb. 1867.
  6. S.E. Maltby, *Manchester and the Movement for National Elementary Education 1800-1870*, (Manchester, 1918), 101. I have drawn largely on Maltby's work with respect to the Manchester education aid society.
  7. PP 1867 (111.) ii.683-720: a bill to provide for the education of the poorer classes in England and Wales.

discussion, and to force the Conservative government to act; neither considered it the ultimate measure, nor envisaged its passing the commons. It is significant that both men clearly believed the church of England to be the principal obstacle to national education. They did not foresee the vehemence of later dissenter diatribes against rate subsidies for denominational schooling.<sup>1</sup> The bill met opposition both within parliament and in influential sections of the press,<sup>2</sup> and was withdrawn on 15 July. Bruce and Forster however continued to publicise the real extent of educational deficiencies, in print,<sup>3</sup> in speech,<sup>4</sup> and as allies in the house of commons.<sup>5</sup>

By the beginning of 1868 public opinion had begun to shift. The church was gradually modifying its conviction that education was its sole province, and nonconformists had finally abandoned their insistence on voluntarism. The national conference on education, organised by Bruce, Forster and de Grey in conjunction with the Manchester bill committee and convened in Manchester on 15 and 16 January 1868, consolidated and extended public willingness to endorse government action. Bruce chaired the first day's proceedings, and in his inaugural address defended the partial nature of the 1867 'permissive' bill solely on grounds of political expediency, recognising the existing state of public and parliamentary opinion. In principle, however, Bruce committed himself to a more ambitious course:

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1. 3 H 188, 1317-42, 1350-6: 10 July 1867.
  2. *Times*, 11 July 1867, 30 July 1867. The *Times* did not wish the voluntary system threatened by rating proposals.
  3. *Times*, 31 July 1867: B's letter to editor, 30 July 1867.
  4. *Morning Star*, 8 Jan. 1868; *Times*, 8 Jan. 1868: F's St James's hall address on education, under the auspices of the reform league, 7 Jan. 1868.
  5. 3 H 189, 367-8, 375-6: 29 July 1867. Bruce estimated that only two-thirds of eligible children attended school, many of them irregularly.

To me it will be a source of unmixed and unbounded satisfaction if the result of this Conference shall be to convince me that either I have under-estimated the force of public opinion in favour of large and comprehensive legislation, or that, under the pressure of peculiar circumstances, such has been the growth of the public mind within the last six months that we may safely venture to cast aside the modest measure of 1867 as inadequate to satisfy the aspirations and convictions of 1868. -- (Hear, hear.) 1.

Forster subsequently expanded on this theme and indicated that, having talked the matter over with Bruce, they were of opinion that the state should have the means to compel recalcitrant districts to rate themselves. Their cause, he argued, "had made great progress since last year -- (hear, hear); -- and, though they were only ripe for a permissive bill last year, he believed that now they were ripe for a complete bill. -- (Hear, hear.)"<sup>2</sup>. The culmination of the debate occurred when de Grey moved a resolution (seconded by the radical James Stansfeld) that Bruce and Forster re-introduce their 1867 measure, modified so as "to render it more complete" (by which, de Grey explained, he meant a compulsory rating provision).<sup>3</sup> To this resolution there was but one dissenting voice. For the friends of national education it appeared that, in de Grey's words, "the opportune moment had arrived."<sup>4</sup> The following day's debate on compulsory attendance,<sup>5</sup> presided over by Forster, was somewhat of an anti-climax.

On 14 February 1868 Forster gave parliamentary notice on Bruce's behalf that their 1867 bill would be re-introduced in a modified form.<sup>6</sup> The measure incorporated the Manchester conference resolve

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1. *Manchester Guardian*, 16 Jan. 1868.

2. *ibid.*

3. *ibid.*

4. *ibid.*

5. *Manchester Guardian*, 17 Jan. 1868.

6. 3 H 190, 738: 14 Feb. 1868.

that the state be empowered to compel local rating when educational destitution was proved;<sup>1.</sup> in introducing it, Bruce defended the conjunction of religious and secular instruction and the proposal to subsidise from the rates denominational schools.<sup>2.</sup> Within days the Conservative government introduced its own measure which, avoiding the imposition of compulsory rating, was unacceptable to Bruce and Forster. Both bills were in the event withdrawn, victims of the political atrophy of an election year. Yet Forster and Bruce, in final speeches on their abortive measure, gave ample indication of their future approach. Bruce attacked Lowe's scheme, whereby the gaps in voluntary effort would be filled by a local rate funding purely secular schools. An "immense majority of the people," Bruce contended (probably correctly), wished their children to receive an unsectarian religious education.<sup>3.</sup> Forster strongly defended the principle of supplementing voluntary action, and stated that the bill provided universal elementary education in the most "considerate manner" possible. He added that

the more attention was attracted to this subject the more surely would there be a national system of education, and the disgrace would cease to attach to this country of being almost the only civilized nation which did not acknowledge it to be the duty of the State to provide for the elementary education of the people. 4.

The 1867 and 1868 bills were obvious prototypes of the legislation Forster introduced as vice president of the council in February

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1. PP 1867-68 (64.) ii.359-414: a bill to provide for elementary education in England and Wales.
  2. 3 H 190, 1816-26: 17 March 1868.
  3. 3 H 192, 1983-9: 24 June 1868.
  4. 3 H 192, 2010-1: 24 June 1868.

1870,<sup>1.</sup> and their significance has frequently been ignored by educational historians. Popular support for state intervention through compulsory local rating had by 1868 been achieved, and this principle was incorporated in the famous memorandum submitted to cabinet by Forster and de Grey in October 1869.<sup>2.</sup> The religious controversies of 1870 should not be permitted to obscure the radical and collectivist implications of the Liberal education bill.

Throughout the late sixties Bruce, Forster and de Grey were in the vanguard of the Liberal party in advocating national education, and their collaboration helped make its realisation possible.<sup>3.</sup>

(Gladstone himself was noncommittal: he told Bruce that his "opinions on the subject of Education are not in detail so 'cut and dried' as to be capable of categorical statement."<sup>4.</sup>) They of course continued to

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1. Forster himself claimed in 1870 that the genesis of the bill of that year rested with the 1867 and 1868 bills which he and Bruce had jointly sponsored (*Bradford Observer*, 6 June 1870: F's address to a Bradford education league deputation, 4 June 1870). It is not my intention to unnecessarily reiterate their educational philosophy in the context of 1870, nor to enter a religious controversy which has been exhaustively canvassed, and is in my opinion of second-rate consequence.
  2. Ed 24/2/1-7: 'Memorandum by Mr. Forster of suggestions for consideration in framing the education bill for England'. Temmel has conclusively demonstrated (237-9) that Forster's attributing his proposals to Robert Lowe, rather than to the earlier bills, was a mere political ruse.
  3. Hughes and Layard were also supportive, but were not such active parliamentary participants. Nevertheless, Layard described the 1870 act as "a matter of great importance" (LP. BL Add Ms 38946, 69: L to G.T. Clark, Madrid, 11 Feb. 1871). In 1870 Hughes helped organise the national education union in defence of the Liberal bill, and as a counter to nonconformist national education league abuse. After the passing of the bill, he offered to stand for the London school board elections in Forster's and de Grey's behalf (RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 192: H to deG, London, 31 July 1870).
  4. BP. GCRO, D/D Br 149/3: Gladstone to B, Hawarden, 9 Jan. 1868.

consult and co-operate with one another in drafting the 1870 bill.<sup>1.</sup>

Espousing the principle that religion and education were indivisible Forster, de Grey and Bruce were naturally unwilling to dismantle voluntary denominational schools, or to countenance national secular education.<sup>2.</sup> Their object, as Forster explained, was "to complete the present voluntary system, to fill up gaps;"<sup>3.</sup> in de Grey's words, to "maintain and foster the existing system," and to "supplement it where it is defective."<sup>4.</sup> This insistence that Christianity be incorporated in education was almost certainly representative of contemporary middle class opinion, though the working class which was destined to benefit from the act probably deemed it largely irrelevant. In practical terms, however, their stance guaranteed the necessary sympathies of existing educators. But their conviction (probably justified) that the religious question was not a contentious issue amongst the general populace, and their continuing belief that the church of England constituted the principal obstacle to national education, caused them to entirely misjudge the nature and extent of nonconformist suspicions. Seeking compromise in order to establish some sort of national system (for above all they wished children to be

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1. Early in 1869 de Grey stated: "It is a thing rarely secured in public life, to be able to work hand-in-hand, not only with an old friend, but with a friend in whom one has perfect confidence and thorough sympathy. This is now my good fortune" (Reid, *Life of Forster*, i : 456: deG to Jane Forster, 3 Feb. 1869). RP correspondence indicates close collaboration in framing and promoting the bill, which Bruce co-sponsored in the commons.
  2. Forster, for example, once stated that "if the time should ever come when the fathers and mothers of England wish State education to be conducted upon the purely secular system, they must find some other individual than myself to do their bidding" ([W.E. Forster], *Speech of the Right Hon. W.E. Forster, on November 25, 1873, delivered after laying the memorial stone of the first school built by the Liverpool School Board*, (London, 1873), 34).
  3. 3 H 199, 443-4: 17 Feb. 1870.
  4. 3 H 203, 826: 25 July 1870.

educated<sup>1.</sup>), they consistently misconstrued the concern of religious critics. And the issues of free education and compulsory attendance were treated as ultimate rather than immediate objectives in order not to jeopardise the concept of national education itself.

Whilst the bill introduced by Forster in February 1870 was modelled closely on its 1867 and 1868 precursors, it did not emerge unscathed from either cabinet or parliament. Instead of local rates subsidising both voluntary and board schools in the framework of a national system, the former were excluded from the benefits of an education rate, and a dual system was thereby created. Nevertheless it was 'national' in its coverage and, whilst a compromise and a very imperfect one, was a significant advance. As seasoned politicians with tempered idealism, neither Forster nor de Grey were averse to such compromise. Whether better legislation could have been passed given prevalent political exigencies is debatable, but in the long term the board schools created in 1870 were destined largely to supplant voluntaryism in education.

The provision of elementary education on a national scale was of considerable benefit, as intended, to the working class. Its accomplishment in 1870, though in a halting form, was feasible partly because of the social romanticism which de Grey, Forster and Bruce espoused, and because their pragmatic approach was not inhibited by thoughtless adherence to *laissez-faire*. They would no doubt have been gratified by G.M. Young's assessment of their achievement. Forster, Young argued, "had a sound eye for essentials," and "in 1870 the essential was to get the children, somehow, into some sort of school."<sup>2.</sup>

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1. Forster declared that he wished neither to injure nor benefit either church or dissent, but "simply wished to get the children to school. That was really and solely the only object I had" ([Forster], *Speech on November 25, 1873*, 23).
  2. G.M. Young, *Victorian England: Portrait of an Age*, (London, 1974), 116.

EPILOGUE

The advent of the Gladstone ministry in December 1868 marked the apparent culmination for de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard of their associated political endeavours over two decades. They had successfully evolved from an independent parliamentary pressure group in the 1850s to positions of authority and prestige within the Gladstonian Liberal party. Throughout this political transformation they had collaborated on a broad range of issues, and in so doing had employed political strategies which produced significant results. Co-operatives had achieved legal recognition with their assistance. Public acceptance of trade unions had been encouraged. Household suffrage obtained in the cities. The initial stages of administrative reform had been approved. Voluntaryism was virtually extinct as an educational force. The volunteer movement had been provided a fillip. Britain had practised neutrality during the American civil war. To all of these issues de Grey, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard had contributed their energies and ideals.

Official status under Gladstone permitted the fulfilment of many of their ambitions. The Liberal administration of 1868-74 accepted challenges and undertook initiatives long overdue. De Grey, Forster and Bruce were prominent cabinet proponents of such reformist tendencies, and their collaboration proved influential in many spheres. During these years the basis of Anglo-American amity was established through the treaty of Washington, for which de Grey and Forster were largely responsible. Open and competitive entry to the civil service was introduced under Gladstone. With encouragement from Hughes, Forster, Bruce and de Grey, trade unions were afforded legal status. A scheme

of national education was conceived and implemented through the efforts of de Grey, Forster and Bruce. Forster and de Grey successfully fought for acceptance of the secret ballot.

These and other achievements of Gladstone's first ministry were remarkable testaments to political dedication and ability, and the contribution to government policies of de Grey, Forster and Bruce was substantial. By 1873, however, Gladstone's fragile coalition had languished. Public disquietude over the very pace of reform threatened the dominance and prestige of cabinet and tarnished the reputations of government supporters. Confronted with this general backlash, Ripon, Hughes, Forster and Bruce could not emerge unscathed from the years of the first Gladstone administration. Moreover, disenchantment was particularly pronounced over the education act, the prohibition of picketing, licensing legislation and the 'dishonour' of the treaty of Washington, and for all of these measures Ripon, Forster or Bruce were primarily responsible. Theirs was in some measure the liability for the 1874 electoral debacle, yet it is simplistic to attribute the Liberal demise merely to jingoism, to nonconformist enmity or to 'a torrent of gin and beer'. The rate of change overwhelmed the community, and Aberdare may have accurately assessed the situation by recognising in 1875 that "the Country is so exhausted with the pace at which the late Government took it on the path of reform, that it is at present profoundly Conservative."<sup>1</sup>

Despite their substantial achievements, therefore, the individual political reputations of Ripon, Hughes, Forster and Bruce, like those of their governmental colleagues, were sullied during the Gladstone years.

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1. LP. BL Add Ms 39007, 381: A to L, London, 31 March 1875.

Layard managed to escape this stigma. As first commissioner of works he did not long tolerate the restrictions of Gladstonian economy. The prime minister believed that Layard did "not seem very thoroughly to understand pecuniary responsibility and the management of Estimates;"<sup>1</sup>. Layard told Gladstone that his position rendered him "little better than ... a clerk in the Treasury."<sup>2</sup> Desiring a diplomatic appointment, Layard declined the governorship of the Cape,<sup>3</sup> and gratefully accepted appointment as ambassador to Madrid in October 1869.<sup>4</sup>

Hughes made an abortive attempt to join the Gladstone ministry in 1870, when he sounded out de Grey over the possibility of his replacing Knatchbull Hugesson as under secretary at the home office.<sup>5</sup> However Hughes's political stature was wholly inadequate for such an appointment, and he was destined to remain a relatively ineffectual backbencher. Strong opposition to his co-operative activities prevented his contesting Marylebone in 1874<sup>6</sup> and, despite attempts at Reading in 1878 and Salisbury in 1880, he was thereafter excluded from parliament.

Bruce's occupation of the home office witnessed a mixture of success and misfortune. His accomplishments in such spheres as trade union legalisation and mines inspection reform were considerable, but were in the end overshadowed by the licensing fiasco. Though Hughes

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1. Ramm, *Political Correspondence of Gladstone and Granville*, i : 45: Gladstone to Granville, 18 Aug. 1869.
  2. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44422, 158: L to Gladstone, Naples, 12 Oct. 1869.
  3. See Ramm, i : 44: Granville to Gladstone, London, 11 Aug. 1869.
  4. Gladstone Papers. BL Add Ms 44422, 158: L to Gladstone, Naples, 12 Oct. 1869.
  5. RP. BL Add Ms 43548, 200: H to deG, 20 Dec. 1870.
  6. Hughes, *True Manliness*, xx-xxi; Holyoake, *History of Co-operation*, ii : 371, 653.

referred to Bruce as "the first reforming Home Secretary,"<sup>1</sup> he was described by his critics as indecisive and insufficiently forthright, and emerged from the home office as 'bungling Bruce'. As Lord Aberdare Bruce briefly succeeded Ripon as lord president in 1873, but he was not included in Gladstone's 1880 ministry.

Racked by religious doubts, Ripon resigned from the government in 1873, and his Roman catholicism for a time prompted isolation from political affairs. Only occasionally did he emerge from his seclusion<sup>2</sup> before 1878, when he rejoined Liberal counsels. Ripon's substantial achievements as viceroy of India wholly restored his position, and he served prominently in subsequent Liberal cabinets -- as first lord of the admiralty in 1886, as colonial secretary from 1892 to 1895, and as lord privy seal and leader of the Liberals in the lords, under Campbell-Bannerman, from 1906 to 1908.

Forster established his reputation through the education act, an achievement of immense social benefit. Yet the education act also earned him the enmity of organised dissent, and a combination of unscrupulous nonconformist attacks and whig mistrust severely prejudiced his political career. Nevertheless he only narrowly failed in an attempt on the party leadership in 1875, and was a prominent member of the Liberal hierarchy whilst in opposition during the late seventies. However as chief secretary in the early eighties, Forster was destroyed by Ireland.

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1. Thomas Hughes, 'The Anarchy of London', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 21, Jan. 1870, 278; also Hughes, 'Problems of Civilization Part II', 91-2.
  2. For example, to defend Forster's education policy; see *Times*, 31 Oct. 1873: R's education speech at Ripon, 30 Oct. 1873. Forster stated that Ripon's speech was "one of those acts of true friendship which makes life liveable" (RP. BL Add Ms 43537, 133: F to R, Balmoral, 1 Nov. 1873).

Their dispersal after the mid-seventies effectively terminated the political association which Goderich, Hughes, Forster, Bruce and Layard had engineered two decades before. Many of their mutual aspirations and ideals of the early fifties had been successfully pursued through consistent collaboration as a parliamentary 'pressure group'. Despite the difficulties experienced under Gladstone, their co-operative achievements were considerable. After the mid-seventies, however, Hughes and Aberdare virtually abandoned parliamentary life, Layard undertook a diplomatic career, and Ripon served in India; a continued political alliance became largely irrelevant. In addition, the issues and political structures which had formed the basis for their political relationship no longer pertained during the eighties. Under the new pressures of imperialism, of Ireland and of Chamberlainite radicalism, the Liberal party was unable to maintain its fragile unity. Ripon, Hughes, Forster, Aberdare and Layard reflected these dilemmas, their views no longer remaining wholly compatible.

Despite any political divergence, however, personal friendships endured, virtually unaffected, until death. 'Twenty years' intimate association could never be renounced.

APPENDIX 1

TABLES OF VOTING PATTERNS, 1852-9

TABLE 1 - RECORD OF DIVISIONS

DIVISION	DATE	Bruce	Goderich	Layard	Bright	Cobden	Disraeli	Gladstone	Palmerston	Roebuck	Russell	Majority
On Hume's motion that house be called over for debate and vote on Villier's motion favouring extension of free trade	22.11.52	-	A	-	-	A	A	-	-	-	A	A
On Villier's motion favouring further extension of free trade	26.11.52	-	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	-	A	N
On amendment to above, approving previous extension of free trade	26.11.52	-	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	-	A	A
On accepting Disraeli's budget	16.12.52	N	N	N	N	N	A	N	-	-	N	N
On third reading of county elections polls bill	16. 2.53	-	A	A	-	A	-	-	-	-	-	A
On Frewen's motion favouring repeal of excise duty on hops	17. 2.53	N	N	N	A	A	A	N	N	-	N	N
On Russell's motion that house consider civil disabilities of Jews	24. 2.53	A	A	A	-	A	A	A	A	-	A	A
On Williams's motion that probate and legacy duties be extended to real property	1. 3.53	N	A	-	A	A	-	N	N	-	-	N
On Scholefield's motion that house consider repeal of all state aid for religious purposes	2. 3.53	N	A	-	-	-	-	-	N	-	-	N
On second reading of clergy reserves (Canada) bill	4. 3.53	A	A	-	A	A	N	A	A	-	A	A
On second reading of Jewish disabilities bill (allowing Jews to sit in parliament)	11. 3.53	A	-	-	A	A	A	A	A	-	A	A
On clause 3 of clergy reserves (Canada) bill (eliminating consolidated fund guarantees for funding deficiencies for Canadian clergy under the act)	18. 3.53	A	-	-	A	A	N	N	N	-	N	N

DIVISION	DATE	Bruce	Goderich	Layard	Bright	Cobden	Disraeli	Gladstone	Palmerston	Roebuck	Russell	Majority
On third reading of clergy reserves (Canada) bill	11. 4.53	A	-	-	A	A	N	A	A	-	A	A
On third reading of Jewish disabilities bill	15. 4.53	A	-	-	A	A	A	A	A	-	A	A
On Hamilton's motion for a select committee to investigate whether the non-denominational national education system in Ireland should be continued	26. 4.53	N	N	-	N	N	-	N	N	-	N	N
On budget proposal to continue the income tax	2. 5.53	A	A	-	A	A	N	A	A	-	A	A
On Chamber's motion for leave to introduce a bill legislating for inspection of convents	10. 5.53	-	N	-	N	N	-	N	N	-	N	A
On Phillimore's motion for leave to introduce a bill providing only partial abolition of church rates (as opposed to Clay's motion for their total abolition)	26. 5.53	A	N	N	N	N	A	A	A	-	A	N
On third reading of judges exclusion bill (prohibiting judges holding commons seats)	1. 6.53	N	N	N	-	A	-	N	N	-	-	N
On third reading of income tax bill	6. 6.53	-	A	A	A	A	-	A	A	-	A	A
On motion that house consider the succession duty bill	13. 6.53	A	A	-	A	A	N	A	A	-	A	A
On Berkeley's motion for leave to introduce a secret ballot bill	14. 6.53	N	A	A	A	A	-	N	N	-	N	N
On second reading of recovery of personal liberty bill (providing for regulation of convents), and against amendment that bill be referred to a select committee	22. 6.53	A	A	A	A	-	N	A	-	-	A	N
On second reading of government of India bill	30. 6.53	-	N	A	N	N	N	A	A	-	A	A
On Pakington's proposed clause for the government of India bill repealing the salt duty in India and terminating EIC monopoly over salt manufacture	28. 7.53	A	A	-	-	-	A	N	N	-	N	A

DIVISION	DATE	Bruce	Godrich	Layard	Bright	Cobden	Disraeli	Gladstone	Palmerston	Roebuck	Russell	Majority
On Chambers's motion for a select committee to investigate the need for legislation on convents and monasteries	28. 2.54	N	N	-	-	N	A	N	-	-	N	A
On second reading of succession to real estate bill (limiting principle of primogeniture)	8. 3.54	-	A	-	A	A	N	N	N	A	N	N
On Cockburn's motion for leave to introduce legislation preventing bribery at Canterbury elections	20. 3.54	A	-	-	-	-	N	A	-	A	-	A
On clause 1 of Oxford university bill	1. 5.54	-	-	N	-	-	N	A	A	-	A	A
On clause 3 of Oxford university bill	1. 5.54	A	A	A	-	-	N	A	A	-	-	A
On clause 6 of Oxford university bill	1. 5.54	A	A	-	-	N	N	A	A	-	A	N
On amendments to clause 6 of Oxford university bill	1. 5.54	N	N	-	-	-	A	N	N	-	N	N
On introducing a malt tax	9. 5.54	-	-	A	-	-	N	A	A	-	A	A
On clause 18 of Oxford university bill	11. 5.54	A	-	-	-	-	N	A	A	-	A	N
On clause 19 of Oxford university bill	11. 5.54	-	A	-	-	-	-	A	A	-	A	A
On second reading of excise duties bill (which introduced a malt tax)	15. 5.54	A	A	A	-	-	N	-	A	A	A	A
On motion empowering Gladstone to issue exchequer bonds	22. 5.54	A	A	A	-	A	N	A	A	A	A	A
On Clay's motion for leave to introduce a bill to abolish church rates	23. 5.54	A	A	-	A	A	N	-	N	-	N	A
On second reading of oaths bill (providing a standard oath for protestant and catholic MPs)	25. 5.54	A	A	A	A	A	N	A	A	A	A	N
On Spooner's motion disallowing grants for catholic priests to visit imprisoned catholics	12. 6.54	N	-	N	-	-	A	N	N	-	-	A

DIVISION	DATE	Bruce	Goderich	Layard	Bright	Cobden	Disraeli	Gladstone	Palmerston	Roebuck	Russell	Majority
On Heywood's proposed clause to the Oxford university bill (that Oxford matriculants not be obliged to subscribe to the 39 articles)	22. 6.54	A	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	A	N	A
On Heywood's proposed clause to the Oxford university bill (that Oxford students taking degrees in arts, law and medicine not be obliged to subscribe to the 39 articles)	22. 6.54	A	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	A	N	A
On Heywood's proposed clause to the Oxford university bill (that Oxford students granted bachelor's degrees in arts, law, medicine and music not be obliged to subscribe to the 39 articles)	29. 6.54	-	A	-	A	A	N	A	-	A	A	A
On second reading of enlistment of foreigners bill	19.12.54	-	-	-	N	N	N	A	A	A	A	A
On third reading of enlistment of foreigners bill	22.12.54	-	-	-	N	N	N	A	A	-	A	A
On Roebuck's motion for a committee to inquire into the conduct of the war and the condition of the army before Sebastopol	29. 1.55	A	A	A	-	-	A	N	N	A	-	A
On Goderich's army promotion motion	1. 3.55	-	A	A	A	A	-	N	N	A	-	N
On Heywood's motion for leave to introduce a bill permitting marriage with a deceased wife's sister or niece	13. 3.55	-	-	A	A	A	N	N	A	-	-	A
On second reading of bills of exchange bill	28. 3.55	-	-	-	-	A	-	A	-	-	-	A
On second reading of education (Scotland) bill	27. 4.55	-	A	A	A	A	N	A	A	A	-	A
On clause of the loan bill providing for Crimean war debts to be repaid at the rate of flm. p.a. after the end of war	30. 4.55	-	N	-	A	A	N	N	A	-	A	A
On second reading of marriage law amendment bill	9. 5.55	-	A	-	A	A	-	N	-	-	-	A

DIVISION	DATE	Bruce	Godrich	Layard	Bright	Cobden	Disraeli	Gladstone	Palmerston	Roebuck	Russell	Majority
On Wise's motion for reform of diplomatic establishments	22. 5.55	-	A	-	A	A	-	-	N	-	N	A
On Berkeley's motion for leave to introduce a secret ballot bill	22. 5.55	-	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	-	N	N
On Disraeli's motion of no confidence in the government's prosecution of the war	25. 5.55	N	N	N	-	-	A	N	N	N	N	N
On Layard's administrative reform motion	18. 6.55	-	A	A	-	A	N	-	N	A	N	N
On resolution that the British government guarantee a £5 m. Turkish loan	20. 7.55	-	A	-	N	N	N	N	A	-	A	A
On Walmsley's motion to allow Sunday opening of British Museum, National Gallery	21. 2.56	A	A	A	-	-	N	N	N	A	N	N
On second reading of church rates abolition bill	5. 3.56	A	A	A	-	A	N	N	A	A	N	A
On second reading of police (counties and boroughs) bill	10. 3.56	A	-	A	-	N	A	-	A	-	A	A
On Cowan's motion for abolition of troop billeting in private homes in Scotland	7. 4.56	-	-	-	-	N	N	-	A	-	-	A
On second reading of oath of abjuration bill (abolishing abjuration oath for MPs, office holders)	9. 4.56	-	A	A	-	A	A	A	-	A	A	A
On terminating a debate initiated by Russell on committee of council on education	11. 4.56	-	N	N	-	-	A	A	N	-	N	A
On Spooner's motion that house consider withdrawal of Maynooth grant	15. 4.56	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	N	-	A
On Bulwer Lytton's motion that debate on fall of Kars be adjourned	1. 5.56	N	-	N	-	-	A	N	N	N	N	N
On Berkeley's motion for leave to introduce a secret ballot bill	20. 5.56	-	A	-	-	-	N	N	N	A	N	N

DIVISION	DATE	Bruce	Godrich	Layard	Bright	Cobden	Disraeli	Gladstone	Palmerston	Roebuck	Russell	Majority
On Miall's motion that house consider temporalities of Irish church	27. 5.56	-	A	-	-	-	-	N	N	-	-	N
On Walpole's motion that Irish church schools receive education grants	17. 6.56	-	-	-	-	-	A	N	N	-	-	A
On proceeding with second reading of Spooner's Maynooth college bill (removing Maynooth grant)	25. 6.56	N	N	-	-	-	-	-	N	N	-	N
On amendment to Elcho's motion, asking that royal commission investigate desirability of combining fine art and archaeological collections of British Museum with National Gallery	27. 6.56	A	A	-	-	-	N	-	N	A	-	A
On motion to adjourn (and against Moore's amendment censuring the government for its poor relations with the U.S. over enlistment)	1. 7.56	-	A	-	-	-	-	A	A	N	-	A
On second reading of appellate jurisdiction (house of lords) bill, changing the conditions of the house of lords acting as a court of appeal	7. 7.56	N	N	N	-	-	A	-	A	N	N	A
On whether house consider in committee the appellate jurisdiction (house of lords) bill	10. 7.56	N	N	N	-	-	A	N	A	N	N	N
On second reading of bishops of London and Durham retirement bill, providing for voluntary or compulsory retirement of infirm or senile bishops	23. 7.56	N	-	-	-	-	N	N	A	N	-	A
On Locke King's motion for leave to introduce a bill for £10 franchise in counties	19. 2.57	-	A	A	-	A	N	N	N	A	A	N
On Spooner's motion that house consider in committee the abolition of the Maynooth grant	19. 2.57	N	N	N	-	-	-	-	N	N	-	N

DIVISION	DATE	Bruce	Godereich	Jayard	Bright	Cobden	Disraeli	Gladstone	Palmerston	Roebuck	Russell	Majority
On Cobden's motion censuring the government over the <i>Arrow</i> incident	3. 3.57	A	A	A	-	A	A	A	N	A	A	A
On second reading of Fagan's ministers' money (Ireland) bill, to abolish taxes levied on Irish towns for church of Ireland ministers	19. 5.57	A	A	-	-	-	N	-	A	A	A	A
On Spooner's motion for a committee to consider abolishing Maynooth grant	21. 5.57	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	N	N	N
On second reading of sale of beer bill	10. 6.57	-	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	N	N
On second reading of Locke King's property qualification bill (abolishing property qualification for MPs)	10. 6.57	-	A	-	-	-	-	-	N	-	-	N
On clause 1 of oaths bill (and against Deasy's amendment enabling catholics to take the oath)	15. 6.57	N	N	-	-	-	A	-	A	N	A	A
On Thesiger's motion that oaths bill include a phrase limiting MPs to Christians	15. 6.57	N	N	-	-	-	N	-	N	N	N	N
On third reading of oaths bill	25. 6.57	A	A	-	-	-	-	-	A	A	A	A
On Berkeley's motion for leave to introduce a secret ballot bill	30. 6.57	-	A	-	-	-	N	-	-	A	N	N
On motion that speaker leave the chair (and against Roebuck's motion censuring the government for conducting the Persian war without consulting parliament)	16. 7.57	A	-	-	-	-	A	N	A	N	-	A
On Russell's motion for leave to introduce a bill to amend the oaths validity act (thus allowing Jews in parliament)	21. 7.57	A	A	-	-	-	A	A	A	A	A	A
On second reading of superannuation act amendment bill	29. 7.57	A	-	-	-	-	A	N	N	A	N	A

DIVISION	DATE	Bruce	Goderich	Layard	Bright	Cobden	Disraeli	Gladstone	Palmerston	Roebuck	Russell	Majority
On second reading of divorce and matrimonial causes bill (replacing house of lords jurisdiction over divorce with that of a judicial tribunal)	31. 7.57	A	A	-	-	-	N	N	A	A	-	A
On Lewis's motion for a select committee inquiry into the bank acts	11.12.57	-	A	-	-	-	N	N	A	A	A	A
On Palmerston's motion for leave to introduce the conspiracy to murder bill	9. 2.58	A	A	-	-	-	A	-	A	N	N	A
On second reading of church rates abolition bill	17. 2.58	-	A	-	A	-	N	N	-	A	N	A
On Palmerston's motion for leave to introduce the government of India bill, transferring government from EIC to the crown	18. 2.58	A	A	-	-	-	N	N	A	A	A	A
On second reading of conspiracy to murder bill (and against Milner Gibson's amendment censuring the government)	19. 2.58	A	A	-	N	-	N	N	A	N	N	N
On clause 5 of oaths bill, allowing Jews to sit in parliament	22. 3.58	A	A	-	-	-	A	-	A	A	A	A
On Roebuck's motion for the creation of a secretaryship of state for Ireland	25. 3.58	A	A	-	-	-	N	N	N	A	N	N
On Packe's motion that house not consider the church rates abolition bill in committee	21. 4.58	N	N	-	N	-	N	N	N	-	N	N
On government proposal that all men entering Woolwich must first pass through Sandhurst (and against Monsell's motion that present method of open competitive entry to Woolwich remain unaltered)	26. 4.58	N	N	-	-	-	A	A	-	N	N	N
On Puller's motion that an annual rent charge replace church rates	27. 4.58	N	N	-	-	-	N	-	-	N	N	N

DIVISION	DATE	Bruce	Goderich	Layard	Bright	Cobden	Disraeli	Gladstone	Palmerston	Roebuck	Russell	Majority
On second reading of marriage law amendment bill (allowing marriage with a deceased wife's sister)	5. 5.58	A	A	-	A	-	-	N	-	-	-	A
On motion that Rothschild be a member of the committee appointed to draw up reasons for house of lords why Jews should be allowed to sit in parliament	11. 5.58	N	A	-	-	-	A	N	A	A	A	A
On third reading of church rates abolition bill	8. 6.58	A	A	-	A	-	N	N	-	A	N	A
On Berkeley's motion for leave to introduce a secret ballot bill	8. 6.58	-	A	-	A	-	N	N	N	A	N	N
On second reading of Locke King's county franchise bill (for £10 franchise in counties)	10. 6.58	A	A	-	A	-	N	N	A	A	A	A
On Stanley's motion that the India council be partly nominated, partly elected	14. 6.58	N	N	-	-	-	A	A	N	N	N	A
On second reading of Russell's Jews bill (allowing Jews to sit in parliament)	16. 7.58	A	-	-	-	-	A	A	A	A	A	A
On second reading of Walpole's church rates bill	9. 3.59	N	-	-	-	-	A	A	-	N	N	N
On second reading of church rates abolition bill	15. 3.59	A	-	-	A	-	N	N	-	A	-	A
On second reading of Conservatives' representation of the people bill	31. 3.59	N	-	-	N	-	A	A	N	N	N	N
On Hartington's no confidence motion in the Conservative government	10. 6.59	A	-	-	A	-	N	N	A	N	A	A

KEY:    A        Aye  
          N        No  
          -        not present

TABLE 2 - VOTING PATTERNS

% of votes on which Bruce, Goderich, Layard disagreed - Nov. 1852 to June 1859	6%
% of votes on which Bruce, Goderich, Layard disagreed - Nov. 1853 to June 1859	1%

Disregarding the 6% of votes on which Bruce, Goderich and Layard disagreed between November 1852 and June 1859, their votes coincided with those of selected parliamentarians according to the percentages indicated in the following table:

Roebuck	91%
Bright	90%
Cobden	85%
Russell	68%
Palmerston	65%
Gladstone	51%
Disraeli	28%

APPENDIX 2

TREATY OF WASHINGTON between Great Britain and the United States. Concluded 8th May, 1871. Ratifications exchanged 17th June, 1871.

The United States of America and Her Britannic Majesty, being desirous to provide for an amicable settlement of all causes of difference between the two countries, have for that purpose appointed their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: The President of the United States has appointed, on the part of the United States, as Commissioners in a Joint High Commission and Plenipotentiaries, Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State; Robert Cumming Schenck, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain; Samuel Nelson, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar, of Massachusetts; and George Henry Williams, of Oregon; and Her Britannic Majesty, on her part, has appointed as her High Commissioners and Plenipotentiaries, the Right Honourable George Frederick Samuel, Earl de Grey and Earl of Ripon, Viscount Goderich, Baron Grantham, a Baronet, a Peer of the United Kingdom, Lord President of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, etc., etc.; the Right Honourable Sir Stafford Henry Northcote, Baronet, one of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, a Member of Parliament, a Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, etc., etc.; Sir Edward Thornton, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of America; Sir John Alexander Macdonald, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, a Member of Her Majesty's Privy Council for Canada, and Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Her Majesty's Dominion of Canada; and Mountague Bernard, Esquire, Chichele Professor of International Law in the University of Oxford.

And the said Plenipotentiaries, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed to and concluded the following articles:

ART. I. Whereas differences have arisen between the Government of the United States and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, and still exist, growing out of the acts committed by the several vessels which have given rise to the claims generically known as the "Alabama Claims:"

And whereas Her Britannic Majesty has authorized her High Commissioners and Plenipotentiaries to express, in a friendly spirit, the regret felt by Her Majesty's Government for the escape, under whatever circumstances, of the Alabama and other vessels from British ports, and for the depredations committed by those vessels:

Now, in order to remove and adjust all complaints and claims on the part of the United States, and to provide for the speedy settlement of such claims which are not admitted by Her Britannic Majesty's Government, the high contracting parties agree that all the said claims, growing out of acts committed by the aforesaid vessels, and generically known as the "Alabama Claims," shall be referred to a tribunal of

arbitration to be composed of five Arbitrators, to be appointed in the following manner, that is to say: One shall be named by the President of the United States; one shall be named by Her Britannic Majesty; His Majesty the King of Italy shall be requested to name one; the President of the Swiss Confederation shall be requested to name one; and His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil shall be requested to name one.

In case of the death, absence, or incapacity to serve of any or either of the said Arbitrators, or, in the event of either of the said Arbitrators omitting or declining or ceasing to act as such, the President of the United States, or Her Britannic Majesty, or His Majesty the King of Italy, or the President of the Swiss Confederation, or His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, as the case may be, may forthwith name another person to act as Arbitrator in the place and stead of the Arbitrator originally named by such head of a State.

And in the event of the refusal or omission for two months after receipt of the request from either of the high contracting parties of His Majesty the King of Italy, or the President of the Swiss Confederation, or His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, to name an Arbitrator either to fill the original appointment or in the place of one who may have died, be absent, or incapacitated, or who may omit, decline, or from any cause cease to act as such Arbitrator, His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway shall be requested to name one or more persons, as the case may be, to act as such Arbitrator or Arbitrators.

ART. II. The Arbitrators shall meet at Geneva, in Switzerland, at the earliest convenient day after they shall have been named, and shall proceed impartially and carefully to examine and decide all questions that shall be laid before them on the part of the Governments of the United States and Her Britannic Majesty respectively. All questions considered by the tribunal, including the final award, shall be decided by a majority of all the Arbitrators.

Each of the high contracting parties shall also name one person to attend the tribunal as its Agent to represent it generally in all matters connected with the arbitration.

ART. III. The written or printed case of each of the two parties, accompanied by the documents, the official correspondence, and other evidence on which each relies, shall be delivered in duplicate to each of the Arbitrators and to the Agent of the other party as soon as may be after the organization of the tribunal, but within a period not exceeding six months from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.

ART. IV. Within four months after the delivery on both sides of the written or printed case, either party may, in like manner, deliver in duplicate to each of the said Arbitrators, and to the Agent of the other party, a counter case and additional documents, correspondence, and evidence, in reply to the case, documents, correspondence, and evidence so presented by the other party.

The Arbitrators may, however, extend the time for delivering such counter case, documents, correspondence, and evidence, when, in their judgment, it becomes necessary, in consequence of the distance of the place from which the evidence to be presented is to be procured.

If in the case submitted to the Arbitrators either party shall have specified or alluded to any report or document in its own exclusive possession without annexing a copy, such party shall be bound, if the other party thinks proper to apply for it, to furnish that party with a copy thereof; and either party may call upon the other, through the Arbitrators, to produce the originals or certified copies of any papers adduced as evidence, giving in each instance such reasonable notice as the Arbitrators may require.

ART. V. It shall be the duty of the Agent of each party, within two months after the expiration of the time limited for the delivery of the counter case on both sides, to deliver in duplicate to each of the said Arbitrators and to the Agent of the other party a written or printed argument showing the points and referring to the evidence upon which his Government relies; and the Arbitrators may, if they desire further elucidation with regard to any point, require a written or printed statement or argument, or oral argument by counsel upon it; but in such case the other party shall be entitled to reply either orally or in writing, as the case may be.

ART. VI. In deciding the matters submitted to the Arbitrators, they shall be governed by the following three rules, which are agreed upon by the high contracting parties as rules to be taken as applicable to the case, and by such principles of international law not inconsistent therewith as the Arbitrators shall determine to have been applicable to the case.

#### RULES.

A neutral Government is bound -

First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace; and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use.

Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.

Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties.

Her Britannic Majesty has commanded her High Commissioners and Plenipotentiaries to declare that Her Majesty's Government cannot assent to the foregoing rules as a statement of principles of international law

which were in force at the time when the claims mentioned in Article I arose, but that Her Majesty's Government, in order to evince its desire of strengthening the friendly relations between the two countries and of making satisfactory provision for the future, agrees that in deciding the questions between the two countries arising out of those claims, the Arbitrators should assume that Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to act upon the principles set forth in these rules.

And the high contracting parties agree to observe these rules as between themselves in future, and to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime Powers, and to invite them to accede to them.

ART. VII. The decision of the tribunal shall, if possible, be made within three months from the close of the argument on both sides.

It shall be made in writing and dated, and shall be signed by the Arbitrators who may assent to it.

The said tribunal shall first determine as to each vessel separately whether Great Britain has, by any act or omission, failed to fulfil any of the duties set forth in the foregoing three rules, or recognized by the principles of international law not inconsistent with such rules, and shall certify such fact as to each of the said vessels. In case the tribunal find that Great Britain has failed to fulfil any duty or duties as aforesaid, it may, if it think proper, proceed to award a sum in gross to be paid by Great Britain to the United States for all the claims referred to it; and in such case the gross sum so awarded shall be paid in coin by the Government of Great Britain to the Government of the United States, at Washington, within twelve months after the date of the award.

The award shall be in duplicate, one copy whereof shall be delivered to the Agent of the United States for his Government, and the other copy shall be delivered to the Agent of Great Britain for his Government.

ART. VIII. Each Government shall pay its own Agent and provide for the proper remuneration of the counsel employed by it and of the Arbitrator appointed by it, and for the expense of preparing and submitting its case to the tribunal. All other expenses connected with the arbitration shall be defrayed by the two Governments in equal moieties.

ART. IX. The Arbitrators shall keep an accurate record of their proceedings, and may appoint and employ the necessary officers to assist them.

ART. X. In case the tribunal finds that Great Britain has failed to fulfil any duty or duties as aforesaid, and does not award a sum in gross, the high contracting parties agree that a board of assessors shall be appointed to ascertain and determine what claims are valid, and what amount or amounts shall be paid by Great Britain to the United States on account of the liability arising from such failure, as to each vessel, according to the extent of such liability as decided by the Arbitrators.

The board of assessors shall be constituted as follows: One member thereof shall be named by the President of the United States, one member thereof shall be named by Her Britannic Majesty, and one member thereof shall be named by the Representative at Washington of His Majesty the King of Italy; and in case of a vacancy happening from any cause, it shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

As soon as possible after such nominations the board of assessors shall be organized in Washington, with power to hold their sittings there, or in New York, or in Boston. The members thereof shall severally subscribe a solemn declaration that they will impartially and carefully examine and decide, to the best of their judgment and according to justice and equity, all matters submitted to them, and shall forthwith proceed, under such rules and regulations as they may prescribe, to the investigation of the claims which shall be presented to them by the Government of the United States, and shall examine and decide upon them in such order and manner as they may think proper, but upon such evidence or information only as shall be furnished by or on behalf of the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain, respectively. They shall be bound to hear on each separate claim, if required, one person on behalf of each Government, as counsel or agent. A majority of the Assessors in each case shall be sufficient for a decision.

The decision of the Assessors shall be given upon each claim in writing, and shall be signed by them respectively and dated.

Every claim shall be presented to the Assessors within six months from the day of their first meeting, but they may, for good cause shown, extend the time for the presentation of any claim to a further period not exceeding three months.

The Assessors shall report to each Government, at or before the expiration of one year from the date of their first meeting, the amount of claims decided by them up to the date of such report; if further claims then remain undecided, they shall make a further report at or before the expiration of two years from the date of such first meeting; and in case any claims remain undetermined at that time, they shall make a final report within a further period of six months.

The report or reports shall be made in duplicate, and one copy thereof shall be delivered to the Secretary of State of the United States, and one copy thereof to the Representative of Her Britannic Majesty at Washington.

All sums of money which may be awarded under this article shall be payable at Washington, in coin, within twelve months after the delivery of each report.

The board of assessors may employ such clerks as they shall think necessary.

The expenses of the board of assessors shall be borne equally by the two Governments, and paid from time to time, as may be found expedient, on the production of accounts certified by the board. The remuneration of the Assessors shall also be paid by the two Governments in equal moieties in a similar manner.

ART. XI. The high contracting parties engage to consider the result of the proceedings of the tribunal of arbitration and of the board of Assessors, should such board be appointed, as a full, perfect, and final settlement of all the claims hereinbefore referred to; and further engage that every such claim, whether the same may or may not have been presented to the notice of, made, preferred, or laid before the tribunal or board, shall, from and after the conclusion of the proceedings of the tribunal or board, be considered and treated as finally settled, barred, and thenceforth inadmissible...

ART. XLIII. The present treaty shall be duly ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Britannic Majesty; and the ratifications shall be exchanged either at Washington or at London within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.

In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in duplicate at Washington the eight day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-one.

HAMILTON FISH.  
ROBT. C. SCHENCK.  
SAMUEL NELSON.  
EBENEZER ROCKWOOD HOAR.  
GEO. H. WILLIAMS.  
DE GREY & RIPON.  
STAFFORD H. NORTHCOTE.  
EDWD. THORNTON.  
JOHN A. MACDONALD.  
MONTAGUE BERNARD.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

## (a) Manuscripts

The collections of papers listed below demonstrate the lacunae, or more accurately the considerable imbalances, in available sources. Whilst the Ripon Papers and Layard Papers are very complete, only small collections of Hughes, Forster and Bruce manuscripts are extant. Despite this imbalance, however, the overall abundance of material permits a competent treatment of their personal inter-relationships and political affiliation.

Aberdeen Papers (British Library)

Autograph File (Houghton Library, Harvard University)

Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection (New York Public Library)

Bruce Papers (Bodleian Library)

Bruce Papers (Glamorgan County Record Office)

Cobden Papers (British Library)

De Coursey Fales Collection (New York Public Library)

Education Department Records (Public Record Office)

Foreign Office Records (Public Record Office)

Forster Papers (Trinity College Library, Dublin)

Gladstone Papers (British Library)

Granville Papers (Public Record Office)

George Howell Collection (Bishopsgate Institute, London)

Layard Papers (British Library)

Lowell Papers (Houghton Library, Harvard University)

Ludlow Papers (Cambridge University Library)

Macmillan Archive (British Library)

Miscellaneous Autograph File (Trinity College Library, Dublin)

Miscellaneous Papers (Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library)

Napier Papers (Bodleian Library)

Nightingale Papers (British Library)

Parrish Collection (Princeton University Library)

R-V Autographs, Miscellaneous English (Pierpont Morgan Library,  
New York)

Records of the Dyffryn, Aberdare Estate (Glamorgan County Record  
Office)

Ripon Papers (British Library)

Russell Papers (Public Record Office)

Sturge Papers (British Library)

Temporary Manuscripts (Library of the Society of Friends,  
London)

War Office Records (Public Record Office)

Working Men's College Archives

(b) Contemporary Periodicals

*Aberdare Times*

*Aberdeen Herald*

*Alpine Journal*

*Beehive*

*Bradford Observer*

*Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*

*Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian*

*Chatham News*

*Christian Socialist: A Journal of Association*

*Contemporary Review*

*Co-operative News*

*Co-operator*

*Cornhill Magazine*

*Daily News*

*Daily Telegraph*

*Economic History Review*  
*Economic Review*  
*Edinburgh Review*  
*Examiner*  
*Fortnightly Review*  
*Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country*  
*Geographical Journal*  
*Halifax Courier*  
*Halifax Guardian*  
*Household Words*  
*Huddersfield Chronicle*  
*Hull Packet and East Riding Times*  
*Illustrated London News*  
*Journal of Association*  
*Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*  
*Leader*  
*Leeds Mercury*  
*Lincolnshire Chronicle*  
*Lippincott's Magazine of Popular Literature and Science*  
*Lynn Advertiser*  
*Macmillan's Magazine*  
*Manchester Guardian*  
*Manchester Weekly Times*  
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*New-York Daily Tribune*  
*Nineteenth Century*  
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*Notes and Queries*

*Pall Mall Gazette*

*Punch*

*Quarterly Review*

*Saint Pauls*

*Saturday Review*

*Sheffield and Rotherham Independent*

*Spectator*

*Standard*

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