FROM CULTS TO CHRISTIANITY:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN TAKURU

by

Jeffrey L. Clark

Department of Anthropology,
The University of Adelaide.

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ABSTRACT

Against the background of an intensive period of colonial development and mission proselytization, the thesis examines the social processes which shaped post-pacification Wiru society. The Wiru people rapidly abandoned, in the face of labour intensive development schemes and a strong evangelical effort, warfare, cults, and many other exchange and social practices of the pre-colonial era. It is argued that this society was organized around life cycle exchanges and cult performance directed at exchange between men and spirits; cults frequently celebrated these exchanges. Individuals and groups were reproduced through these activities and continue to be today, although Christianity has been synthesized into the same cosmological concerns of cults. Christianity, labour migration, money and the like radically altered, however, the context in which this reproduction takes place. The cessation of warfare, Christian ideology, and the introduction of new avenues to status achievement have changed the concept of the individual and the group to which s/he belongs. Descent and agnation continue to play an important role in the constitution of groups but church attendance and ritual have taken over the group definitional aspects of cults which, along with cosmological changes, have produced a perception by Takuruns of a 'new' society. Christianity, like descent, provides a moral symbol for the group and circumscribes the behaviour of its members, such that the clan is not only a descent group but a denomination, and the church has become the focus of a cult of Christianity.
(a) The thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any University and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis; and

(b) I consent to the thesis being made available for photocopying and loan if accepted for the award of the degree.

Jeffrey Clark
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The hospitality and kindness I received while in Papua New Guinea deserve more of a response than a brief 'thank you' in these pages. In Port Moresby I would like to thank Jackie Franklin and Brian McClintock for accommodation and commensality. My stay in the Southern Highlands was immeasurably enhanced by the assistance of the Southern Highlands Rural Development Project, and in particular that of Dr. Lyn Clarke and Bruce French; by Don Burkins and Brigitte Krause, and Marc Schiltz and Lisette Josephides, who were anthropologists I stayed with in the field who graciously housed and fed me, and with whom I shared many stimulating and entertaining days; and by John and Pat Hardy, and John and Ann Sharp, both of Wiowei cattle project in Pangia. Special thanks must go to Merle and Cathy Anders, whose continual generosity and support made my stays in Mendi a memorable experience.

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Gratitude must also be expressed to Andrew Strathern and Marilyn Strathern, whose correspondence both during and after fieldwork contributed greatly to my research and thesis writing. Their articles on Wiru society considerably facilitated my research; this is reflected in my thesis, in which the contribution of these scholars could not be acknowledged by citation only.

Writing-up in Adelaide was under the supervision of Dr. Tom Ernst, but I would also like to thank members of the Anthropology Department who contributed many ideas and criticisms during seminar presentations of most of the parts of this thesis. Mike Nihill, Neil MacLean, Deane Fergie, Andrew Lattas, Lee Sackett, John Gray and Kingsley Garbett deserve special mention. Mike Nihill kindly read and commented on much of the thesis. For errors and shortcomings in my thesis I accept, of course, full responsibility.

I reserve until last my gratitude to the people of Takuru who, for the most part, cheerfully tolerated my presence and questions. A list of all who helped me would fill the next few pages, but particular thanks must go to Kaiyape Wilson, Wili, Dani Kambi, Kambi, Koiya, Lea, Wendeka, Wembi, Tame and Silas.
INTRODUCTION

The Wiru people inhabit the easternmost district of the Southern Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea (see map 1A). They number about 20,000 and the majority live between altitudes of 1,220 and 1,680m. This district, called Pangia, occupies about 1,200sq.km. or 9% of the total area of the Southern Highlands. Approximately 750sq.km. is utilized by Wiru, giving a population density of around 27 per sq.km.

A number of rivers running to the south-east drain this area, which is located on the southern foothills of the Pleistocene volcano Mt. Ialibu (3,465m.). The hills and valleys contained in this district are referred to as the Poru Plateau. Takuru settlement, the fieldwork site (see map 1B), is situated centrally in the plateau and its hamlets are found on ridge tops of the southern side of a valley formed by the Polu river. About 400 people live in these hamlets. Takuru is about 8km. to the south-east of Pangia station, a forty minute drive or a two hour walk, and is on the northern section of a loop road which connects the majority of settlements in the south Poru area (the road is about 65km. in length). The north Poru area is serviced by a 28km. road that runs in a north-westerly direction to the southern edge of the Kaugel valley.

Landforms vary from rugged and steep valleys to undulating grasslands, with areas of secondary regrowth dominating apart from stands of rainforest on hill tops or steep slopes. Dense rainforest surrounds the fringes of the district. It appears that men in settlements closer to the 'big bush' spend more time in hunting and are relatively more successful than their Takuru counterparts who, in their central position, are surrounded by the grasslands of their neighbours.
MAP 1A.
The location of Pangia district in the Highlands.

MAP 1B.
Settlements in Pangia.
(Source: Southern Highlands Directory).
Rainfall is heavy in Pangia, moisture-laden trade winds here encounter for the first time the Highlands barrier. Over an eight-year period for thirteen weather stations in the Southern Highlands, Pangia recorded the highest rainfall, between 480 to 865 cm. a year. While it rains regularly there are seasonal variations in rainfall intensity, and months when it rains lightly with intermittent dry spells of up to two weeks. The climate is temperate and warmer than the Highlands; temperature variation is mostly diurnal, with extremes of 10°C to 31°C and an average range of 13°C to 27°C. Seasonality, hence variations in crop yields, is slightly more pronounced in Pangia than in the Central Highlands.

Wiru practise shifting cultivation and pig husbandry, with many of these animals being killed in periodic pig festivals. The staple crop is sweet potato, with taro, bananas, pit-pit, sugar cane, yams, a variety of green leafed vegetables and the red pandanus also being grown. Introduced crops include corn, pumpkins, tomatoes and cassava. Sweet potato is cultivated in mounded plots at varying distances from houses and is harvestable for most of the year. Mounds are not as high or meticulously built as in many other Highlands areas; indeed in new or bush gardens the sweet potato runners may be planted without any attempt at mounding (this practice is a relatively recent introduction from the west).

Sugar cane, bananas, taro, yams and corn are often grown close to the house, with mixed gardens at varying distances from settlements, frequently close by. Most of the mixed gardens situated around hamlets are now under the only major cash crop, coffee, thereby replacing an important source of variety and nutrition in the traditional diet.
would not characterize Wiru horticulture as 'intensive', and the average to poor soil quality, combined with a high rainfall which leaches nutrients out of the soil, are probably factors which contribute to the occasional short-term famine (limestone figures prominently in Pangia geology, and the high pH of the soil was blamed by some agronomists for its low productivity).

In subsistence activities the division of labour by sex is unchanged. Men are responsible for clearing the ground, cutting trees, making fences, digging trenches and planting crops that 'belong' to men, such as bananas, sugar cane and taro. Women do the majority of planting work, as well as the burning of cleared garden material, mounding of plots, weeding and harvesting. In the domestic sphere women look after children, pigs and the cooking of meals.

Coffee is prepared for sale by both men and women, although a greater proportion of the work in picking and preparation is done by women. The latter carry the heavier or more cumbersome items when stocks for tradestores are walked in from Pangia; men carry bags of rice, women the boxes of tinned fish.

Located in Takuru are a government aid post, a community school and a Wesleyan mission station. The mission established both the school and aid post, and runs the former in conjunction with the Administration, strongly influencing the selection of teachers and the curriculum (the government pays the teachers' salaries). The mission, situated on the highest hill overlooking the Takuru hamlets, leased a large section of alienated land from the colonial administration, on which the school, aid post, and teachers' and missionaries' houses were built.
The Takuru mission station was previously staffed with more expatriates than it has today, partly because a Bible school once resided in this settlement. There are three large European houses on the station but only one American family is in residence at the present time. This is due to a shortage of manpower and finance, as well as a mission policy of less involvement in the running of the national church since Independence. Pre-Independence Takuru was a hive of mission activity as the rusty tractor, bulldozer and deserted houses testify.

At present a World Bank funded rural development project is operating in the Province, aimed at making improvements at the local level - in health, literacy, nutrition and agriculture - and in conjunction with small business and development schemes. It is too early to tell what influence this will have in Pangia but at the Provincial level it will be many years before the Southern Highlands catches up with its neighbours.

The purpose of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, it is intended as a contribution to the growing ethnography of the area (see Bibliography for references to A.J. and A.M. Strathern). Its primary concern, however, is to examine some of the reasons for the Wiru response to colonial and post-colonial influences, and in particular to Christian missions and the administration's development schemes. This is done with specific reference to the settlement of Takuru, although this is often made against the general background of post-pacification Pangia.

Part 1 provides an ethnographic 'baseline' against which the nature of change can, to some extent, be assessed. It is difficult to discuss change unless some impressions are conveyed of Wiru society before
colonialism. To this end the social organization and warfare, marriage and alliance patterns of Takuru society are presented. The social and political consequences of colonialism are elaborated on in Parts 2 and 3, and the changing ideological dimensions of group definition are the focus of Part 4. While the socio-political organization of Takuru Wiru has significantly altered since pacification, the existence of an underlying continuity is a topic returned to throughout the thesis.

Part 2 examines the pacification of Wiru, the construction of a perception of Europeans and their resources, and the particular effects of Pangia's late encapsulation into the colonial order. The history of development and missionisation is considered with specific attention to the response made by Wiru to administration and mission demands, and to the failing of both to take into account the social milieu which influenced the reception of these demands and the success of plans for 'civilizing' Wiru. The political effects of development schemes in Takuru illustrate the persistence of a logic towards wealth, status, resources and intergroup relations.

A central concern of the thesis is continuity through change, and Part 3 demonstrates how an exchange model of society continues to inform the interaction of Takuru Wiru with new institutions and beliefs, and reproduces society partly in terms of this model. The cult aspects of group definition are discussed in terms of their relation to exchange practices; cult activity is viewed as a type of exchange in which men engage to ensure the conditions for social reproduction. Money, as a new wealth item, is shown to have had a significant socio-political impact on the nature of exchange, and on intergroup and intersexual relations. Wiru society is to a large extent organized around life cycle payments,
and the way in which these exchanges have been affected by Christianity and development is examined in detail.

Part 4 takes up the implications of Parts 2 and 3 in respect of the Christian dimensions of group definition, and elaborates on the 'new' group and society which intense missionization has produced. The teachings of Christianity, and its moral and behavioural requirements, are shown to have had dramatic effects on the perception of spirits and the cosmological concerns of exchange, such that by worshipping in church a new world is created.

The colonial history of Pangia is not just a recounting of the activities and influence of 'kiaps' and missionaries. History is a product of structural processes within a society and is viewed as a series of progressive transformations or permutations, much as Sahlins does in his monograph (1981) on the meeting and confrontation between Europeans and Hawaiians.

In order to present this history Parts 2, 3 and 4 combine ethnography with discussion of the changes inaugurated under the colonial order. Ethnography, like tradition, is not a static concept. 'Before and after' views of society present a distorted picture of social change and inhibit an understanding of the processes which transform and reproduce society. Contemporary Wiru society is a version of all those which preceded it, and of all those which will follow.
A note on orthography

'g', 'b', and 'd' as in kage, tibu and ludu are all prenasalised and pronounced 'ng', 'mb' and 'nd' as in 'bang', 'timber' and 'pond' respectively. 't' and 'r' are a single phoneme but for the sake of consistency, and the preference of literate Takuruns, 'r' is used exclusively (e.g., 'Wiru' instead of 'Witu'). This orthography was established by Dr. Harland Kerr of the Summer Institute of Linguistics.

Pidgin terms used in the text

The spelling of pidgin words follows that found in Mihalic's dictionary (1971).

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<th>Term</th>
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<tr>
<td>bisnis</td>
<td>business</td>
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<tr>
<td>calabus</td>
<td>jail</td>
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<td>digim stik</td>
<td>digging stick</td>
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<tr>
<td>dina</td>
<td>debt</td>
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<tr>
<td>givim nating</td>
<td>to give with no expectation of return</td>
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<td>gris</td>
<td>fat; essential substance</td>
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<tr>
<td>hevi</td>
<td>power</td>
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<tr>
<td>kanaka</td>
<td>bush person, often used as a perjorative</td>
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<td>kaunsil</td>
<td>councillor</td>
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<td>kiap</td>
<td>government officer</td>
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<td>komiti</td>
<td>ward committee officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>kristen</td>
<td>Christian</td>
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<tr>
<td>lain</td>
<td>a descent group, a group or collection</td>
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<td>lotu</td>
<td>church</td>
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<td>matmat</td>
<td>cemetery</td>
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<td>Word</td>
<td>Translation</td>
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<tr>
<td>meri</td>
<td>woman</td>
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<tr>
<td>nabaut</td>
<td>around</td>
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<tr>
<td>nambawan</td>
<td>first, or most important</td>
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<td>nogut</td>
<td>no good</td>
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<tr>
<td>nogut</td>
<td>no good</td>
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<tr>
<td>pamuk</td>
<td>prostitute</td>
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<tr>
<td>pinis</td>
<td>finished, completed</td>
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<td>prenim</td>
<td>to make friends with</td>
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<tr>
<td>raskol</td>
<td>larrikin, thief</td>
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<tr>
<td>raunim</td>
<td>to wander about, to travel</td>
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<td>save</td>
<td>knowledge, wisdom</td>
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<td>body</td>
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<td>skin kristen</td>
<td>superficial Christian</td>
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<td>sympathize</td>
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<tr>
<td>tingting</td>
<td>thought</td>
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<tr>
<td>wantok</td>
<td>friend, relation, same language speaker</td>
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<tr>
<td>wok kontrak</td>
<td>work contract</td>
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</table>
A note on abbreviations

Abbreviations of kinship terms are as follows:

F = father
M = mother
S = son
D = daughter
B = brother
Z = sister
H = husband
W = wife
"The area in question is the Wiru Census Division which contains the Poru Plateau and the country to the north-east and south-east of the Plateau ... when the patrol was moving through the area, no difficulty was experienced in obtaining adequate supplies of native foods for the use of patrol personnel. Each group had built rough houses of native material for the accommodation of police and carriers. In every instance these preparations were made well before the patrol arrived. Furthermore in some areas a considerable amount of work had been done on clearing and improving those tracks that the patrol was expected to use. Attendances at each camp were good and no difficulty was experienced in assembling the people for census purposes. At each camp women and children came in with food with no show of fear at all and when women or children were encountered while the patrol was on the move their reactions were friendly rather than fearful ... such that I have no hesitation in recommending early derestriction" (Pangia Patrol Report 1/61-2).
la. A NOTE ON ORIGINS AND LANGUAGE

Although no archaeological evidence has been produced for the history of settlement in Pangia district, some hypotheses can be made. A. Strathern (1971A), on the basis of similarities in beliefs about matrilateral exchange, has argued for a possible past connection between Wiru and Daribi of the Karimui area in Chimbu province. Wiru notions of ancestral origins, and Wagner's material on the Daribi, provide further evidence for the existence of such a link (Wagner, 1967).

The distance today between the closest Wiru and Daribi settlements is approximately 20 km. (it appears that the westernmost Daribi population is in the Southern Highlands Province) but it seems likely that several hundred years previously both societies were living further south and in closer proximity (see map). Wagner makes several interesting statements about Daribi origins and migrations to account for their present-day location, statements which in general terms could be equally as applicable to Wiru. He suggests that the:

'centre of gravity' of the Daribi population was at some time in the past in the valley of the Tua, to the west of Mt. Karimui (ibid:5),

and that stories and legends support their origins on the Bore river (the Erave), into which the Tua flows, and Bumaru, a grass plain alongside the Tua river (see map). Some Daribi still live in this vicinity but the majority moved to the north-east:

facilitated by the introduction of the sweet potato; and ... by the introduction of malaria into the low-lying lands along the river (ibid:6).
Map 2: Possible migration routes of Wiru.
- Closest Wiru and Daribi settlements
--- boundaries of Wiru and Daribi
The significance of this to Wiru is apparent in that:

the tribal environment of the people seems ... to have changed in the past few centuries; legends of the time when they lived at Bumaru in the Tua Valley tell of continual warfare with the Baria (i.e., 'Pangia', the Wiru people of Pangia Patrol Post) ... (ibid:6).

If warfare was continual there must have been a population of ancestral Wiru living near the western edge of the Tua Valley which, in response to the same factors precipitating the Daribi migration up the foothills of Karimui, may have been moving to the north-west following the drainage pattern of the Iaro and Polu river valleys. The nearest Wiru settlement to the Daribi, itself isolated from the bulk of the population and the only one to grow sago, is today at least a two-day walk from the area where fighting was said to have occurred (as far as I know there is now no communication between the two societies). It is possible that this Wiru settlement, Tangupane, is a remnant of the posited migration from the south, rather than a place to where people moved to forego a dependence on sweet potato.

But were these ancestral Wiru, like the Daribi, moving upwards? or were they the western edge of a population widely spread over the Poru plateau and down to the Erave, who were starting to concentrate their numbers to the north (perhaps with the introduction of sweet potato)? The linguistic evidence needs to be considered before answers to these questions are attempted.

Wurm puts Wiru in the Eastern Central Trans-New Guinea Phylum, and suggests that it is a family-level isolate of East New Guinea Highlands Stock. He goes on to write that:
Wiru was originally classified tentatively as a sub-family level isolate in the West-Central family, but to some extent, there have always been problems in attempts at classifying it. Its lexical relationship to other East N.G. Highlands Stock language is comparitively low and rather diffuse ... However, much of its lexical resemblance with at least the languages of the West-Central family (within the Stock) may be due to borrowing, and ... regular sound correspondences are not greatly in evidence ... (Wiru) shares some structural features ... with languages outside the stock such as those of the Tebera (Daribi) sub-phylum-level family (Wurm, 1975:471-2).

Franklin considers that Wiru is a member of the West Central family (Franklin, pers. comm.), all members of which, except Wiru, show a lexicostatistical relationship of well over 40% (Wurm, 1975:155). The percentage of cognates which Wiru shares with the West Central family varies from the mid to high 30's; with the Central family from the mid to high 20's; and with the Teberan family 15% (ibid:471). The paucity of published data on the Wiru language, and the uncertainty of that which is, makes any statement on Wiru origins based on linguistic data problematic, at least until more work is done or published.

Assuming the validity of the data, there is evidence to suggest that there was an original southwesterly migration into the Pangia-Erave area from the Enga homeland, which occurred over 2,000 years ago (Franklin, 1978:72). A later migration out of this area possibly followed the Erave river to the northwest into what became another proto-Engan language area, Kewa (Franklin 1968:41). This left behind a pocket of population which formed the basis for the emergence of Wiru as a language and culture. Franklin states that the "relationship of Wiru is clearly at a more extreme historical horizon than other members of proto-Engan" (Wurm, 1975:263), and suggests the following schema for language divergence (Franklin, 1978:90).
The original migrants, one may assume, followed the Erave into the southern edge of the Poru plateau, implying that the plateau was gradually colonized from the south. It is quite likely that the limits of northern expansion were only being reached in the last hundred years or so (see Hughes, 1977:179).

These original migrants I will call Pobori, after the Daribi word for the people they fought at Bumaru, to distinguish them from latter-day Wiru. At some stage in their occupation of the southern rim of the Poru plateau, Pobori came into contact with Teberans who were then living around the junction of the Erave and Tua rivers. Although Wiru and Daribi are from different stock languages, their cognacy of 15% suggests that some cultural interaction went on, regardless of hostility.

A.Strathern postulates that "Wiru social structure is a transformation of the Daribi structure" (Strathern, 1971:461), but the Daribi make a clear distinction between themselves and Wiru in their legendary past, indicating that if both were once the same people this state of affairs preceded "the past few centuries" long enough for any connections to have been forgotten.¹ At the time of warfare the two
enemies possibly experienced similar cultures, and probably intermarried. Hughes reports that Alia men believed that one of their female ancestors had married a Daribi man of Mt. Suaru (Hughes, 1977:177), although Wiru-Suaru relations were relatively recent in the history of Pobori-Teberan relations.

One hypothesis is that sometime in the last millenium Pobori, as hunters and gatherers or swidden horticulturalists (perhaps with taro as a staple), spread out over the Poru plateau and, in their westwards movement, came under the cultural influence of Highlanders. The latter may have been migrating onto the plateau, forming a Highlands-Pobori interface (Wagner estimates that Daribi first encountered Highlanders around 1900 (Wagner, 1967:6)). Two distinct influences, then, were at work on Pobori culture, Teberan and Highlands, and there are grounds for viewing present-day Wiru society as a product of this overlap. Within the last 300 to 400 years Wiru and Daribi started to move further north and away from each other, during which time Wiru emerged as pig-raisers and sweet potato cultivators.

That the Wiru were expanding their territory to the north and moving away from their most eastern settlements is supported by Hughes, who bases his claim on accounts of garden locations in Champion's 1936 patrol report, and on the strong possibility "that the Wiru-Lower Kaugel contact was first made at about the time the Daribi moved north over the Tua, perhaps as recently as 100 years ago" (Hughes, 1977:179). He also records that Alia people at some stage in the past lived further to the south of their present location (ibid:177).
Additional support for Wiru living further east than they do today is the presence on Army survey maps of large areas of abandoned gardens around the confluence of the Polu and Tua rivers. This movement to the west was perhaps a result of the realization that the future—in terms of trade and innovations—lay with the Highlands and not with the increasingly unhealthy Erave-Tua region.

As the Daribi and Wiru moved to the north-east and north-west respectively, their trading contacts became more attenuated and probably ceased altogether in the 1950's with the introduction of European goods and the changes this forced in traditional trade routes. The only remembered contacts informants had with Daribi were with those of Mt. Suaru, which is well to the north of Bumaru (see Map.)

These Daribi traded stone axes to the more eastern Wiru settlements.

The above, however, admits of another scenario if Wiru are only 'possibly' members of the West Central family. According to Kerr, the nearest neighbours of Wiru in this family are "linguistically remote" (Wurm, 1975:277), although it shares:

sufficient probable cognates (with them) ... to justify the assumption that this reflects genetic relationship rather than convergence and borrowing (ibid:277).

He also writes that even if (or when) this genetic relationship can be proved, it would be a remote one (ibid:292). An alternative hypothesis to the one presented is that Pobori were originally an offshoot of Teberan people who later came to be strongly influenced—linguistically and culturally—either by eastward migrations of Highlanders into the
Poru region, or by Pobori moving westward and meeting Highlanders at their easternmost limits.

One of Wagner's maps (1967:13) refers to Pobori as a Daribi clan or district which is a member of the Noru phratry that originally lived at Bumaru. The Daribi use of the term 'Pobori' for Wiru could indicate a connection between Wiru and this Daribi group, possibly at some stage they were one and the same, intermarried, or allied, with fission or hostility eventually splitting them up into separate groups.

In this scenario, the original migration from the Enga homeland came to a halt in the area of present-day Sau speakers in Samberigi, and it was not until the Kewa and Imbonggu regions were becoming established that Pobori first contacted Highlanders. In effect, this is proposing that Wiru are the cultural and linguistic product of two separate cultures, which finds some support in Wiru accounts of their origins, to which I now turn (this may appear to be a rephrasing of hypothesis I, which states that Pobori were first influenced by Teberans and later by Highlanders, but hypothesis II suggests Pobori were of Teberan origin, and that the impact of Highlanders on language and culture was of a greater order of magnitude).

In the area I worked there is a predominance of origin stories in which ancestors came from the Imbonggu speaking area northwest of Pangia; to the southwest of Takuru there was some emphasis on Kewa ancestry. I was told that people in the more eastern settlements such as Undiapi and Tangupane may have had their origins towards the Erave, but informants were vague as to who these southern ancestors were
(suggestions of some link with present-day Polopa speakers were nonetheless discounted).

Not one person I discussed origins with claimed their ancestors always lived in Pangia, all stated their extra-district genesis. This does not fit in with the linguistic evidence (or with hypotheses I and II), although it may be a vague referral to the ancient migration from the Enga area. The 'Pobori' origins of Wiru are more or less denied, perhaps because these people became more 'Wiru' as they came more under the influence of the Highlands (as argued above, people of the Poru region came to identify more with the Highlands of the west and north as it became more the direction of their best interests).

There are many problems, however, with accepting informants' accounts of what they regard as true movements in the past (cf. Hayano, 1978). The emphasis on northwest origins could comment on the proposed identification Pobori made with Highlanders, and on the direction in which they were moving in terms of trade and their view of the future. It could also be a denial of Erave origins by inverting southwest for northwest, in order to mask the former for a closer identification with Highlanders. In many instances, origin stories from different settlements refer to the same reason for leaving the homeland, namely a disagreement over the distribution of cassowary meat (see 1b). The widespread sharing of elements of this story (and apparently it also occurs among the Kewa) questions the validity of northwest origins, and suggests that the story was adopted more for the reasons described above, i.e., the story combines past events and perceptions and recasts them into a socially acceptable 'history'.
In seeming paradox, informants relate stories of ancestors who pre-dated this northwest genesis, and whose aetiology was within Pangia district. These people belong to a time which has an element of myth about it, in comparison to origin stories which are said to be true accounts of occurrences in the not too distant past (which implies that the latter are not commenting on the ancient migration from Enga). Takuru Wiru did not seem to be aware of any inconsistency in these opposing claims of origin, and it may be that a belief in local ancestors is a covert recognition of the Pobori predecessors of Wiru. Significantly, descent is emphasized only in respect of north-west ancestors, providing a moral link with the Highlands (which supports claims made above).

Local ancestors are said to have been much taller than Wiru today (English-speakers referred to them as giants) and their bones are supposedly located on the tops of mountains far to the east, between the Soaru range and the Polu-Tua confluence. This is close to the area where, in hypothesis I, Pobori would have started their north-western migration that colonized Pangia district (the 'tallness' of ancestors may relate to a perception of Pobori as different from latter-day, Highland influenced Wiru).

Bone fragments of these ancestors are sometimes sought after for their magical healing properties, and I was shown some by an Undiapu man who sells them all over Pangia. He told me that to collect them he had to walk many days through the bush, then climb to the top of a mountain where the bones were scattered about on the ground and in caves. This may have been an ancient burial site or ossuary of Pobori. This healing property may be because of perceptions of shared power with
the benevolent deity of Wiru, which has the same name as these ancestors, akolali (man above, or on top). Informants were equally as vague on akolali as ancestors or deity, but it may be a case of deifying Pobori as ultimate male ancestors of Wiru, i.e., this locus, because of its time depth, is conflated with supernatural origins (descent from 'sky people' is reported for other Highland societies).

Several centuries ago Wiru were similar to the so-called 'fringe Highlanders' (characterized by an emphasis on swidden cultivation and hunting) although their culture today shares as many similarities with these people, including Daribi, as with 'true' Highlanders. In a way, Wiru were more 'successful' in their northern adaptation than were Daribi, the former moved to a higher, healthier area and one where topography suited a more intensive cultivation of sweet potato. At the time of Wagner's fieldwork, Wiru population was about three times greater than Daribi (16,000 to 5,000), although this may not accurately reflect a population expansion of the original Pobori stock.

It is possible that Wiru adopted more efficient gardening techniques from the Highlands, leading to a shift away from swidden agriculture to a more intensive fallowing system of shifting cultivation. Daribi claim to have not had domesticated pigs until contact with Highlanders (ibid:15). Wiru claim that sweet potato and the practice of mounding were introduced from the west, and the more open terrain of the Poru plateau and an earlier access to more efficient Highland stone axes for clearing, may have led to an independent development by Pobori of pig husbandry. The introduction of new agricultural techniques would have encouraged the domestication of pigs and a rise in pig populations (domesticated pigs would also have been
introduced through marriage payments of Highlanders in border areas where intermarriage occurred).

Wagner states that in their progress northwards Daribi were swept with Highland cults and cultural practices (ibid:7). Pobori also underwent much the same experience—implying to some degree a desire or willingness to accept 'outside' influence—and were probably more affected as their contacts with Highlanders were earlier and more direct, including marriage. The cults adopted were imports from the west and as such had the traditional Highlands emphasis on the killing of pigs. This provided a stimulus to pig production (although the emphasis in pig-killing was perhaps more on ritual performances than on the politics of exchange) which transformed the agricultural scene and, as a consequence, affected aspects of social organization.

In his comparison of Wiru and Daribi, A. Strathern writes that the:

greater size and density of the Wiru population, their more extensive dependence on sweet potato agriculture and on pigs and pig-killing festivals, as well as their closer proximity to other large Highlands population, suggests that they have expanded faster than the Daribi possibly (but not necessarily) after the introduction of the sweet potato ... With this expansion may have come a greater intensity of warfare and with this a greater fragmentation and dispersal of social groups (Strathern, 1971:461).

I have suggested some reasons for this expansion, hence cultural divergence, in terms of different patterns of migration from a common area of interaction or origin, and of a more intensive contact of Pobori with Highlanders which led to their transformation into 'Wiru' (accounting for many of the shared and borrowed cognates with the West Central Family). Prior to 1900, the latter did not develop largely
independent, as did Daribi, of Highland genetic and cultural influence. It is likely that both societies moved to higher elevations in the recent past but an explanation for their different expansion rates is not to be located solely in variant systems of production. The historical factors contributing to a more pronounced dependence on sweet potato need to be considered, as well as intermarriage with Highlanders, and the likelihood of Highlanders following affinal links to settle in Pangia.

Patterns of warfare and marriage emerged in response to the ecological, horticultural and cosmological changes which Pobori experienced, and these, too, affected the form and content of Wiru society. This form could have perhaps owed more to the structural determinants of Pobori society, and its content to an appropriate selection from different social and cult practices:

Many of the peculiarities of Karimui are explicable in terms of its situation on the edge of the Highlands: it is a region of overlapping influences from the Highlands and the low country to the south (Wagner, 1967:11).

The 'peculiarities' of Pangia may be traceable to the same influences.

Granting some validity to the above discussion it has to be related to one of the more prominent features of Wiru society, which is that the "exchange system is predominantly based on matrilateral kin relationships" (Strathern, A. 1968:550). I am not suggesting that this matrilateral bias did not exist in Pobori times. Daribi have a strong emphasis on obligations to maternal kin and their pivotal role in child development (a mother's brother in both societies can curse his sister's
son), suggesting that this emphasis, for Wiru, goes back to the Erave-Bumaru period.

The history of migration and contact in Pangia district accounts for the qualitative difference in the Wiru and Daribi stress on matrilateral exchange, especially in respect of group formation (see Strathern, 1971A). Although Daribi underwent social change in their migration from the Tua Valley, they were less affected than Pobori, and hence are closer than Wiru to a Bumaru 'type' of society. It follows that the Daribi exchange system, which is related to group definition, according to Wagner (1967), and to the ideal marriage cycle of women being directly exchanged for one another (ibid:156-7), is closer to the Bumaru 'type' of exchange and marriage.

My interpretation of Wagner's material is that the Daribi marriage system allows for an equality in exchange relations between groups. The colonization process in Pangia resulted, as A. Strathern infers, in population expansion and a greater intensity of warfare, which encouraged group fission and dispersal. In these circumstances exchange would not serve to define groups and marriage would no longer unite them in an ideal cycle of reciprocity in women. As a result, exchange relations between groups became attenuated, such that the majority of exchange relations were between individuals of diverse groups (see 1b). The latter were not equitable as at this level it is difficult to balance women given in marriage with those received.

This change to the exchange system reflects, I believe, differences in Wiru and Daribi notions of procreation. The Wiru mother is totally responsible for a child's constitution, while the Daribi father and
mother combine in its physical creation. The former comments on the inequality in the exchange relationship between a person and his/her matrikin. In other words, the exchange system met the requirements of social change by itself changing.

The nature of Wiru exchange, on which colonialism had a significant impact, is a central concern of the thesis. Although the comparison between Wiru and Daribi will not be pursued, it does provide a background for considering this impact insofar as some indication has been given of how the exchange system could have altered to accommodate new and external influences; the Wiru capacity and readiness for innovation continued under the colonial regime. Before the effects of colonialism are considered, social organization in Takuru has to be discussed.

FOOTNOTES

1. Strathern makes a similar point ... "any theory of recent social divergence ... would have at least to note that their languages share only about 10.6% of cognates, suggesting that linguistic divergence, at any rate, between them, goes back much further than a few hundred years" (Strathern, A., 1974, p. 461). If Wiru are members of the West Central family, the linguistic divergence with Daribi is expected. This does not preclude the existence, allowing for their sharing of the same environment for a considerable period of time, of many similarities in social structure between the two societies. Hypothesis II is not quite as convincing in this regard. Nonetheless, in terms of the argument presented, it would be as fair to say that 'Daribi social structure is a transformation of the Pobori structure'.

2. Using data from the 1978 village survey, only 23% of the Wiru population lives north of the Polu river, which roughly bisects the district, but this may reflect on poorer soils to the north. If a line is drawn through Takuru from north to south, also roughly bisecting the district, the population is evenly spread over the eastern and western halves, although the eastern half contains perhaps 2000 Kewa speakers. This suggests the bulk of the monolingual Wiru population is to the south and south-east of the Polu river, which supports claim made about the direction of Pobori migrations.
3. Hughes provides some information which suggests that Wiru may have partly understood Daribi, unless this is a reference to a trade language (Hughes, 1977:177). I admit to being intrigued by one statement from the patrol reports: "intrepid souls from Undiapu and Kota have irregular and rare contact with Wiru speakers on the western slopes of Mt. Karimu" (P.R. 4/70-1).

4. Agronomists, with many years of work experience in the Highlands, invariably opined that Pangia appeared relatively 'new' in terms of gardening practices, suggesting that the Poru plateau has only recently been more intensively settled (perhaps in the last few hundred years).

5. There are some intriguing correspondence between Wiru and Daribi words for substance. A mother's blood is pagekamine (base blood) in Daribi, whereas page is Wiru for semen, and kamare is blood (Wagner, 1980:426; see also Kerr in Wurm, 1975:289). Daribi kawa is paternal substance, while Wiru kauwa is grandfather or paternal spirits.

6. I also include this account of Wiru origins, despite the fact that it raises as many questions as it attempts to answer, to convey a feeling for the ambience of fieldwork in Pangia, i.e., for the enigmatic nature of Wiru society which appears to be a combination of generalized aspects of 'Highlands' and 'fringe Highlands' societies. Also, it partly exorcises some of my puzzlement over who the Wiru are, how they arrived in Pangia, and their place in the evolution of Highlands social systems.
1b. THE TREE OF KOLIRI: SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN TAKURU

A discussion of social organization provides the necessary background for a consideration of social process and the particularities of colonial change. After 1962 Takuruns were no longer the sole actors in this process and had little control over the direction of colonial development; their social system, however, was a significant factor affecting the type of change which occurred (see 2b).

The tapinago (place base man) groups of Takuru district, together known as Koliri, are said to be descended from people who live around Umbuna lake in the Imbonggu area to the northwest of Pangia (about 35 km away). The tapinago groups are four, and in order of 'birth' are known as Baipo, Kawali, Wanuwane and Toe. The following is an account by a Takuru headman of the settlement of his district:

We are Umbuna Koliri. We came here with our brothers, fathers and mothers after the father (of the first migrants) died at Umbuna. For the mourning ceremony they (his agnates) killed a cassowary and cooked it. While it was cooking they roasted its insides in a fire and ate them, without giving any to the dead man's (immediate) family. Because of this his family (said to consist of his wife, son, brother and brother's wife) left and walked around Mt. Ialibu to Loroapa, then to Tindua and on to Korau village in Pangia, where they stayed the night. On this long journey they brought with them a tree which they planted in Korau. This tree was a wiru tree. The next morning they went to Poloko where they decorated themselves and danced to help one of their grandfathers recover from kauwa sickness. At that time in Koírapu (a settlement close to Poloko) there was some sugar cane growing in an old garden and two young brothers were sent to fetch it while the older people waited. When it was becoming dark and the brothers had not returned, a Koliri man told some boys who were playing nearby that they were going on and to tell the brothers to follow them later. The brothers came to where Koliri had waited but it was dark and the group Yumbiri took them to Koírapu. The group Koliri living in Koírapu today is called Kima Koliri (Kimari) because the brothers started a new group as sugar cane suckers (kima) grow out from the main stem. The rest of Koliri continued travelling with their mother, who was the bravest and led
them. When they reached Lomoi the groups Poriri and Tuando asked them why they were coming into their district, they replied that they left their Umbuna people because they were not given any cassowary meat. Poriri said they were looking for men to join them, so Koliri could settle with them in Lomoi, and showed them a house to live in. While at Lomoi they heard about a 'singsing' to be held at Melike by the Kaimari, so the men of Lomoi decorated themselves and practised dancing. Only one Koliri man participated but he was such a good dancer that Poriri chose him as their leader in the 'singsing'. When this man led the others in dancing around the ceremonial ground at Melike a girl called Komikiame was attracted to him, she ran away with him and they married. Komikiame gave birth to a son Bai, a second son Kawai, and a third son Wanu. The last born was Toe. There were now many people at Lomoi and too many faeces accumulating around the houses, so Koliri left to find their own settlement, which they did at Pokoropini and Talowai Yapu. They moved to Takuru after buying the land from Piendi group of Wambi for two valuable pearl shells. Later came other groups to live in Takuru with the four tapinago groups.

The oral history of Takuru Koliri presents a picture of continual migration and re-settlement (see 1c). The headman's account, although presented as 'true', is only partly a folk history, it also has a mythical dimension which combines elements of symbolism and moral commentary. The story may be a factual recording of previous settlement - with the possible exception of Umbuna origins - as Koliri once did live at Lomoi, according to Lomoi informants, and at Pokoropini and Talowai Yapu. Piendi people do claim to have sold their land to Koliri about 6 generations ago (and can remember the names of the pearl shells), which is also the length of time Koliri say they have lived in Takuru. The other elements the story contains are to comment on principles underlying social organization (exogamy, patrilineality, etc.).

The 'cassowary' motif needs elaboration. This animal is a symbol of maleness, in particular of male aggression, and it was important in exchanges, especially those concerned with death. Its shared
consumption, I was told, denotes brotherhood, which is denied to the ancestors of Koliri (or perhaps what is denied is a sharing of paternal substance through commensality).

The story starts, then, with a denial or inversion of the moral order, and the agnates of the deceased have their 'maleness' questioned—perhaps they are not worthy of cassowary commensality. A frequent cause of group fission, and previously of intra-district fighting, is sexual intercourse or attempted marriage between male and female agnates, which again is not the behaviour expected between brothers. The failure to share meat (paternal substance?) may allude to the necessity for men to marry women other than their sisters, i.e., to go outside of the natal group for a wife. It is only through marriage that a man can achieve wealth and status, but the contradiction is that it involves men in debts and obligations which threaten or compromise their masculine individuality and freedom (and allows the potential for poisoning). The failure to share cassowary perhaps points to the conflict between patrilineality and exogamy.

The story concludes with a Koliri man finding a Wiru girl to marry; this is also an inversion of the normal order in which wives come to lie at their husband's natal place and, like in-marrying women, the Umbuna migrant family is not of the same group as its hosts, on whom it is dependent for gardens and support. The inversion in each case may be to stress the importance of the norm, but notice again how in both the 'maleness' of the migrants is made problematic. Significantly, the person who leads Koliri to Lomoi, the 'bravest', is the 'mother', as if there were not capable men (an observation returned to below).
The lack of logical continuity and time compression relate to the mythical aspect of the story. For instance, the impression is given that the original migrant family settles at Lomoi, but before this are mentioned two young brothers, a grandfather at Poloko, and the young bachelor - a brother of the other two - who marries Komikiame. The migrant family, which is basically a lineage plus wives, is the core unit of social groups and its importance in the story, and the neglect of facts which contradict its basic nature, may be to affirm the primacy of lineages as the building blocks which initiate larger group formation, which is what happens with the birth of Komikiame's sons.

The emphasis on 'one family', however, may be to underscore that Koliri did not exist as a large and strong group until after the marriage with a Wiru girl, after the birth of the four group founders, and after Koliri lived in their own district and were no longer associated with host groups. That is, the eventual independence, size, and level of social organization of Koliri were legitimized by, and dependent on, the contracting of a union between a migrant Umbuna man and a resident Wiru girl. This relates to a point made above, namely that without marriage a man, hence groups, is limited in his ability to assert his masculinity (Umbuna males did not become Wiru men until after this marriage).

The story opens with the blunt statement that "we are Umbuna Koliri". There is no attempt to hide or disparage supposed non-Wiru origins. Umbuna ancestry is seen as a source of pride and unity. The genealogical 'I' was also used, e.g. "I came from Umbuna and settled at Takuru", again emphasising the continuity with Umbuna. I have written in 1a. how Wiru identified their future with the Highlands, and possibly
the assertion of Umbuna genesis is another manifestation of this identification. Claiming descent from Umbuna augments the status of Koliri and confirms their identity as Highlanders. Descent again becomes a feature of the story after the birth of the four sons and their relocation to Takuru, i.e., after the union with a Wiru woman. In this instance, descent has a legitimizing aspect which converts the Umbuna migrants into land-holding, independent Wiru.7

The mother of the four sons is named but not the father, she is a more important link in the story than her husband. Some men even stated that "Koliri doesn't have a father, only a mother", which again downplays the masculinity of the Umbuna migrants. In other versions of the story no bridewealth is given for Komikiame, which corresponds to the lack of emphasis on the father of the four sons. If bridewealth was given this would detract from the legitimizing and converting aspect of this marriage, hence minimizing the cultural importance of women which is a theme of the story. This is another inversion of the norm, the third in the story, which strongly suggests that before Takuru is settled the migrant Koliri present the mirror or reverse image of society (and of typical male behaviour). This image is only corrected by the appearance of Wiru sons who found their own settlement and initiate a proper order of things, i.e., the story comments on the primal state of disorder before social groups, created by marriage, existed.

It is women who are focal points in the story, as the mother who leads male relatives into new territory, and as the wife of the anonymous male ancestor of Takuru groups, and Wiru mother of same. Women are important, as wives and mothers, for the social relationships they provide; through marriage links of exchange are created between
individuals or groups, links which may be followed. But after Komikiame's marriage Koliri are no longer reliant on host resources, so marriage is also presented as the basis of social groups, i.e., women are needed for group continuity (implying that this is contingent on affinal/matrilateral exchange connections).8

A symbolic element in the story is the wiru tree, which is carried by Umbuna migrants and planted on the first night of residence in Pangia. The idiom, and practice, of planting trees by new settlers is to establish claims to land and other resources. Certain trees, like statements of descent, give a diachronic dimension to these claims; they are a living symbol of group identity and continuity. Many settlements are named after an important tree, e.g. Epapini, 'at the base of the Epa tree', which could also mean that the tree is one 'base' (source) of group continuity.

It is said that men are 'like trees' — they 'plant' themselves in one place — and can 'change' with them as a son 'changes' with his father (this may only refer to casuarina trees which men plant to mark their residence and gardens). A direct connection is being made here between trees and descent; by being 'like trees' informants also meant that as men have body, skin and semen, so do trees have trunk, bark and sap (tigini, kepene and page for both respectively), and the trunks of trees grow through the shedding of successive 'skins' (bark) as do people. There seems to be a sense in which a man's spirit at death may be incorporated into certain trees, which become repositories of group 'power'. A headman who stands out from his peers is known as an ali yomo
(tree man) because he represents, like trees, the people of his settlement.

_Yomo_ can also mean 'the whole of anything' (Strathern, A. pers. comm.), usually in reference to such things as a whole pig, _yomo kai_, but there may be a cosmological dimension to trees as boundary markers for the local and Wiru universe; settlements are clearly demarcated by lines of planted casuarina trees. Also, in a society where the major exchanges are concerned with the life-cycle, the tree is an apposite metaphor for the cosmological concerns of growth, continuity and regeneration.⁹

The use of a _wiru_ tree in the story is particularly appropriate. The tree itself is a hoop pine (_araucaria cunninghami_). I can only briefly speculate on why it is that Wiru take their name from this tree. When asked why _wiru_ is important informants state that it is because the inner bark of the tree is used to make the pouches in which pearlshells are stored. Pearlshells are an important symbol of 'maleness' and individuality, and incorporate notions of internality and externality which complement procreation beliefs (see 3a.). That the _wiru_ tree is used as a 'cover' for pearlshells extends on their symbolic importance, such that the tree provides an apt cosmological metaphor for the language grouping (given that trees, in general, encompass concepts of descent and residence). The _-ri_ (_-ti_) of Koliri is a common suffix in Wiru group names, and is said to be derived from _ti_ _piruko_, an expression which refers to male crops planted close together and growing straight. This use of a botanical metaphor for groups (and descent and locality) lends credence to my interpretation of Wiru tree symbolism.
While Takuruns make statements the equivalent of "we are descended from the sons of Komikiame", an idiom of 'planting' for groups is not used as a complement of such statements. The act of planting a wiru tree by migrant Koliri, and the planting of other trees by non-agnatic groups arriving after Takuru's foundation, is to some extent the 're-planting' of a group in another territory. Trees, however, are used more as an idiom of residence than membership, although residence and locality are important dimensions of group membership.

Bringing the wiru tree from Umbuna is a significant feature of the story, it signifies a connection with Umbuna people as the ancestors of Takuru Wiru. Planting the tree in Pangia is to symbolize the continuity of Umbuna and Takuru Koliri, but it also establishes the migrants' potential 'Wiru-ness' – later confirmed through intermarriage – among Wiru already living in Pangia, i.e., it is a transfer of allegiance whilst continuing to recognize the ancestral locus. Indeed, the Umbuna time is ideologically coterminous with the present, and people refer to Umbuna Koliri as still existing (as do wiru trees, the symbol of origin and group continuity) while Takuru people die and are replaced. Takuru Wiru traditionally felt disadvantaged in comparison with their north-western neighbours, which may help to account for the problematic nature of Umbuna migrant 'maleness' as they leave their (superior?) Umbuna agnates further behind in time and place.10

Kaiyape, my research assistant, produced on his own initiative a drawing of the tree of Koliri (reproduced in clearer form below). The base (pine) of the tree he labelled 'Umbuna Koliri', clearly signifying that the roots of Takuru Wiru are at Umbuna. Pine also connotes 'cause' or 'ownership', such that there is a strong sense in which Takuruns
Figure I: The tree of Koliri
continue to be obligated to Umbuna for existence. This relates to a
previous comment made about Umbuna Koliri persisting, as a 'cause',
while Takuruns die and reproduce.11

The drawing has elements of the classic model, including the time
dimension of descent, but it does have some unusual features. The
tapinago group 'branches' incorporate or adjoin non-agnatic groups,
combining them into the tree, which suggests that it not only
illustrates descent but also a concept of 'group-ness' based on co-
residence and locality (almost as if they were 're-planted' or 'grafted'
on to the Koliri tree, an idea expressed above). The two major non-
agnatic groups, Lai and Alue, are shown as boughs of the main Ba'ipo and
Kawali 'branches', to which these groups respectively 'belong'. Other
non-agnatic groups are not attached to any main 'branch', although in
theory they do 'belong' to host groups (see 1c).

Another interesting feature is that attributes are assigned, in the
drawing and in exegesis, to the four tapinago groups, namely:

Baipo — poine yarene, fight group (drawing of a stone axe and bow
and arrows). Baipo is seen as aggressive, easily provoked
and vitally concerned with the 'power' that comes from
being the 'nambawan' group.

Kawali — kaine yarene, pig group (drawing of a pig). Kawali are
renowned for their hard work and ability in pig
production; this group was referred to as the 'woman' of
the other groups.

Wanuwane — (drawing of a Wanu tree). Wanuwane are identified with
the Wanu tree which drops lots of seeds as this group
produces lots of children; it is also known as a 'fight
group'.

Toe — (drawing of a fire). Toe are known as the 'hot people'
(toe is 'fire') and are associated with a certain tree
(pipi toe) linked to the penis and growth. A connection
with spirits is made through the fire motif (see pp. 234-
5).
The four groups are ranked not only in order of birth but also in importance. Individual men of, say, Wanuwane, certainly do not feel themselves ranked lower than men of Baipo or Kawali, but groups may be so judged on the basis of their size, number of headmen, prowess in warfare and exchange, and the extent of their resources. This ranking is not non-negotiable, as groups continually try to assert themselves over other groups, and the birth order in the origin story may even be changed in its telling by an upwardly mobile group (implying the story is not a static account but subject to ongoing events and a group's present status).

Between them the four groups encompass fighting, pig production, human reproduction and a connection with spirits and growth. These are all elements crucial to the survival and continuity of social groups. This suggests that Koliri, the sum of these groups, is a cosmological construct as well as a social grouping (an observation related to the aims of cult performance, see 4b).

A species of snake, which is the taboo animal for consumption by Koliri, is shown in the drawing as encircling the trunk, which in terms of the metaphor is the group Koliri out of which the tapinago branches emerge. The snake comments on many things, but it does not represent an attribute of Koliri as does, for example, the pig of Kawali. Firstly, by encircling the trunk — which supports the branches — there is a sense in which the snake holds Koliri together, i.e., it provides an important idiom of group identity and connects the past with the present. Secondly, trees represent growth and regeneration, and the snake is a common symbol of rebirth and resurrection (Worsley, 1970:260-1). The snake provides a link to Umbuna ancestors who, like trees and snakes,
are long-lived if not immortal, supporting the notion of the snake entwined tree as a cosmological metaphor for the continuity of the group since its Umbuna origins. It is possible that Umbuna is identified as the origin place in many Wiru stories because it was where salt was traded from, this item being a significant symbol of 'maleness' and one at the same time identified with the Highlands (see 3a).

One of the Umbuna ancestors did, of course, die, and this was the death that led to the migration of an Umbuna family to Pangia. This death also led to the formation of social groups and a political district, and to the disjunction between Umbuna and Takuru Koliri, i.e., between a better world (paradise?) and the world people live in today.13

The snake is described as a 'friend' of Koliri which looks out for them and, although this was not expressed to me (not unexpected as paternal spirits are now seen as agents of Satan), this role of the snake is similar to that of paternal ancestors. This claim is supported by statements made by Takuruns after missionaries and 'kiaps' ridiculed food taboos. Informants said that they tried to eat the snake - so many people told this story I am sure it is apocryphal - but it broke their teeth. The skulls (and teeth) of male ancestors were often kept in cult houses, and sometimes the skull of a headman was buried at the base of a tree associated with his group. Skulls 'store' group power, and it is not surprising that if the snake - which has a role congruent with that of paternal ancestors - is eaten the teeth of the consumer are broken. The snake is a symbol of the continuity of Koliri and of the line of paternal ancestors which extends back to Umbuna. It is a compelling symbol which is why its consumption is punished; what it represents cannot be denied.
The story, among other things, does account for the social organization of Takuru (which the tree demonstrates). There are four groups which are wamene, brothers, tapinago, place owners, and eponymously descended from the four sons of Komikiame. To preserve the patrilineal bias of the system they are collectively known, after their Umbuna ancestors, as Koliri. The order of birth largely reflects the primacy, in terms of population and resources, of these four groups today and perhaps more exactly in the past before economic and political imbalances were introduced under colonialism.

The birth of the four sons allows for the use of an agnatic descent construct which operates as a "moral symbol" (A.Strathern 1972:216) for the group and circumscribes the behaviour of its members. Takuruns explain that the expected relationship between co-resident groups is, regardless of agnation, modelled on that obtaining between brothers. Brotherhood implies descent, yet this idiom is rarely invoked in statements about the requirements of group membership (cf. A.Strathern, 1979A:152). In practice, it is co-residence, intermarriage - and the relations of exchange and cooperation this engenders - and locality which, as much as descent, serve to define Koliri and the district it occupies.

A group of people who claim common descent and/or links of blood is called a yarene. The 'and/or' may lend a certain vagueness to notions of groups but in respect of the affiliation or alliance of non-agnates (an important consideration when endemic warfare and migration prevailed) this aspect of group definition is useful. Sometimes it is co-residence, or the sharing of blood, rather than descent, which are the major factors in group membership.
Several non-agnatic groups refer to an original marriage as the reason for 'belonging' to their host, while others are unclear if they ever intermarried with their hosts and point to co-residence and shared garden land as the reason for 'belonging'. A non-agnatic group may refer to itself by the name of its host or retain its own name, or do both on different occasions. Upon discovering that Kokori, a lineage of Kawali, was in fact entirely composed of non-agnates of Kimbori varene (a descent group), I was informed that this lineage was still Kawali regardless of descent and because of intermarriage. At this point it is necessary to consider the relation of procreation beliefs to group definition.

More than one attempt is necessary to trigger pregnancy, and success may take years of endeavour. The foetus forms in the womb (toboroi), which envelops the aroane tomonu, described as egg-like or mu. Semen, page, is produced in the region of the umbilicus, where the tomonu is also located. Testicles are known as muu, and are not associated with semen production. Their function is to achieve penile erection, and muu are closely connected to certain cult stones and fertility (see 3d).

During the act of sexual intercourse the umbilici rub together and semen and the tomonu are shaken loose, a process which somehow primes the tomonu for conception. Once semen reaches the tomonu, which is composed of a yellow substance (not identified to me) and surrounded by and perhaps containing blood, kamare, it binds itself around this substance. More semen is needed to successfully bind together with the tomonu and blood, at which point menstruation and intercourse cease (continued intercourse would harm the foetus and mother). Menstrual
blood (abea kamare, dirt blood) is regarded as waste blood which no longer has procreative potential.

An informant stated that "men start children but women grow them and carry them", and there is a proverb Wiru use about the work required in creating and carrying the foetus - men sit at the top of a tree and cut down branches and women have to collect all the wood from where it falls and carry it away. That is, men initiate foetal development but women are entirely responsible for foetal growth and nurture; they do all the 'hard work' (which is perhaps why the father of the four sons receives so little emphasis in the origin story).

Semen and blood as necessary elements in procreation conform to a typical Highlands pattern but after conception Wiru notions appear to diverge; the yellow female substance also seems unusual. The father in particular gives the yomini or 'soul' to a child. Ancestral spirits have no role in yomini formation as they do in other Highland societies, but they can facilitate conception if the appropriate sacrifices are made. It is the mother, however, who creates the body - the bones, blood, flesh and organs of the child.

A Wiru father's substance affects the shape a foetus develops but does not contribute to the actual growth, nurturance or physical constitution of the body. If a male child is born it is said that "the man won the fight" (and the mother's nose is said to point downwards; the nose is associated with male attributes), suggesting that the father's yomini triumphed over the mother's influence on sexual destiny, although the competition may be unfair for men as it takes place in the womb under female control. Yet women can determine the sex of a child,
especially daughters, by taking certain medicines, implying that women need to have recourse to external aids to combat the strength of a man's yeomini.

Nonetheless, the alternatives of gender are seen as equal possibilities within the womb and not determined by any properties of male substance, either quantitatively (more increasing the likelihood of foetal maleness) or qualitatively (by page having a capacity to affix maleness). Whether yeomini is present in semen or transmitted at a metaphysical level is a question for which I could obtain no answers, although the environment of the father is a factor further influencing a child's development.

While women create bodies, men give individuality to appearance, especially remarked upon in reference to noses (or lenye-timini, eye-nose; the face) and calves of the leg, as well as to personal ability and intelligence. I was told that "mama givim skin, papa givim tingting", but some men thought that it was possible for women, through a sharing of substance with the child, to influence the paternal transmission of yeomini. Hence, women may also contribute to a child's emotional and mental make-up, wene, which is supposedly derived only from the father's yeomini, his environment, and by eating food grown on yarene land. Clearly, procreation beliefs provide a basis for a theory of personality.

As a generalization (by male informants), a woman's wene is said to be weak compared to a man's. Women have fewer thoughts—mostly about children and food—whereas men have many thoughts, greater capacities and a strong wene. The act of production also defines wene potential,
the female wene is not located behind the forehead as is a man's but at the back of a woman's head where it has been pushed by the weight of a woman's netbag (worn on the back and supported by a strap across the forehead), such that today all women are born with wene in this position. This provides another example of the 'weakness' of woman, as one minor blow to the back of their heads is enough to kill them.

In Takuru, there is no concept of a sexually transmitted paternal substance which links lineages and higher levels of agnatic group membership. The idiom of group membership is odene kamare (one blood), but the rule of exogamy and a radial marriage pattern means that although the 'one blood' idiom is stressed, the actual blood which agnates share is not the same for all yarene members.

So why this emphasis? With respect to shared substance a person has more in common with cognates than agnates; for Wiru this is translateable as a debt owed to one's maternal kin for 'body'. There is a strong emphasis on patrilineality but when descent is discussed it is 'blood' which is most often referred to, and not idioms such as 'one father', 'one penis' or 'one semen'. A lineage is usually named after an important polygynous founder, and is said to be 'one father'. Groups hierarchically above the lineage, which at the structural and linguistic level are relatively permanent, are 'one blood' or are described in maternal terms, e.g. Koliri and its four constituent groups are said to be odene aroane mana yarene, one woman's sons' group(s).

It appears from this that the 'blood' referred to is not that which individual agnates inherit from their mothers, but that of Komikiame. That is, membership of permanent groups is defined primarily, or
diachronically, in terms of an original 'blood' contribution which initiated group formation.

Although a lineage can be known as 'one father', their most common referent is 'one netbag'. Again, it is a maternal rather than paternal idiom of membership which is used; lineage members are descended from men who shared the same netbag which their mother carried them in, and 'netbag' in this usage is probably a symbol of the womb (cf. Burridge, 1969:167, where the idiom of 'one womb' describes "a line of male filiation"). I suggest that, for the idioms of 'one blood' and 'one netbag', an analogy is being drawn between individual and group formation; agnates are the 'children' of yarene founders and as such it is their ancestral mother that is ultimately responsible for bearing them into the world. Komikiame-meo opiane yarene refers literally to a woman 'giving birth' to groups.

In this context, then, claims to agnatic identity through a sharing of 'blood' or 'netbag' are not contradictory, rather they are necessary in a society where paternity individuates but where, given procreative beliefs, it is blood and not semen which provides the most apt idiom of group membership in terms of shared physical substance. This use of 'blood' is clearly metaphorical, and is relevant only to the level of groups at which the differential contributions of in-marrying women to the 'bodies' of individual agnates does not have to be acknowledged.

Wiru notions of patrilineal groups, their membership and reproduction, are influenced by procreation beliefs which state that a child shares substance only with its mother—reflected in the singular importance of matrilateral exchange. This does not imply a tendency to
bilateral descent, rather these beliefs are affirmed within a dogma of patrilineality and present no intellectual problem (the maternal contribution to the body can, however, pose problems to the individual for the debt owed maternal kin for his 'body' and health). The normal transmission of maternal substance "cannot become a metaphor for clan continuity" (Strathern, M. 1981:682) because it opposes patrilineal descent. But this substance as transmitted by the apical ancestress can become such a metaphor insofar as all her descendants are perceived as her children; one mother, hence 'one blood'.

Clan continuity is partly achieved through a man marrying and having male children to 'change' with him when he dies. A man may not share substance with his father but other idioms exist which reinforce patrilineality and counter the 'female' make-up of men, such as the inheritance of male wene, the practice of naming15, links to the land and food consumption, previously the performance of cults, and the assertion of male solidarity and superiority over women, both ideologically (through brotherhood, for example) and in practice (only men kill pigs, wage warfare, etc.).

While the idiom of 'one blood' credits a woman's crucial role in a child's creation and nurturance, the payment which ego makes for 'body' is to his/her male matrilateral kin, opianago (men who bear), as if the reproductive ability of a woman is controlled by her close male agnates, and perhaps their ancestors. The fact of payment emphasizes a woman's importance but its direction indicates the locus of control. Women are not property but they are a source of wealth and children and it is this capacity which is transacted between men.
Women produce 'bodies' - or 'femaleness' (insofar as all children are total products of their mothers) - for the impress of male individuality, and this collective imprinting helps to reproduce agnatic groups. But through this production women also create affinal-maternal ties and social groupings (or kinship networks) not based on descent. While men are responsible for clan continuity it is women and exchanges of the "affinal-maternal nexus" (Strathern, A. 1978:80) that reproduce society and the elements necessary for its existence - children, food and wealth.

Insofar as Koliri is an exogamous group, identified with a territory, and composed of four exogamous sub-groups descended from a common ancestress, I will gloss Koliri as a 'clan' and the sub-groups as 'sub-clans'. (The latter are the major units involved in marriage and exchange*). Both of these groups are known as yarene, as are lineages and families.16 The only way in which these levels of membership are distinguished is by use of the adjectives 'big' or 'small'. Yarene may be named after eponymous ancestors, lineage founders (or an activity associated with lineages), or a feature of the environment, but as noted no terminological distinction is made, apart from size, between clan, sub-clan and lineage. That a distinction is made through naming suggest that groups are non-problematic in discussion as everyone knows their nominal referent (and that a term yarene exists means ideological significance is attached to the concept of group).

For Takuru society it is an ideology of brotherhood more than declarations of descent which works to maintain group and district

* These units do not exchange women but they are often the unit involved in raising bridewealth.
solidarity. People did produce the origin story to explain why they were brothers but a common response was "we have all lived here together a long time". This was so even for non-agnates, many of whom would only admit to this identity under prompting. Many non-agnates also subscribe to the Koliri origin story, which is another way of sharing descent apart from co-residence and ties of blood. Larger non-agnatic groups usually retain their original names, and group chauvinism may be a factor in this decision.

It is not so much group identity that non-agnates lose upon incorporation into host groups as a loss of political identity and the assumption of a different one (de Lepervanche, 1968:158). By providing an idiom of membership descent is open to political manipulation and this is its real importance in respect of non-agnatic recruitment. Descent operates as an ethical imperative by providing a charter for the type of behaviour appropriate to brothers. Non-agnatic groups which do not hide their separate descent still live with their hosts and share their resources, consequently they act as 'brothers' and are likewise constrained by descent as a 'moral symbol'. Implicit in this assertion is that descent is concerned with categories and not actual groups of people (cf. Strathern, 1973).

For Wiru, the name of the district is different from the name of its major occupying group, hence Koliri of Takuru district. These two names are used as interchangeable referents by Takuruns themselves, although enemies or allies are designated by their district rather than their tueba yarene (large group) name, again stressing the importance of locality and co-residence in group definition. This designation may be
because a district is the largest political unit, and may contain more than one 'large group'.

References to a group's territory are closely associated with its major (and probably first) settlement area, not only because of the link between locality and group definition but also because, in the case of Takuru, the name of the district has a meaning which relates to Koliri history. Various explanations were given for the origin of the name 'Takuru'. It is derived from the verb takurukako, which means the insertion and use of a lever to expose something hidden. 'Takuru' reflects on the initial discovery of this area by Koliri and its subsequent 'exposure' by clearing and cultivation. Alternatively, I was told that it commented on Takuru men being cleverer than other Wiru in acts of stealth, warfare and access to and comprehension of secrets, i.e., knowledge. The name 'Takuru' relates to Koliri identity and chauvinism, and as such is retained as the name of the district even though today it is the least populated hamlet, and in danger of complete abandonment (except when pig-kills are held as it still has ceremonial importance when Koliri is on 'display'). I now discuss some of the residential aspects of social organization, and the impact on these of colonialism.

Before pacification many men - and probably all headmen - lived in a ridge-top settlement called Takuru, which today is one of 5 major hamlets (see Map 3). Men's houses (pokou) were arranged around a ceremonial green (poma), a line of houses being parallel to a line on the other side of the green. Pokou were U-shaped, with a closed sleeping and storage compartment at the base of the U; the rest of the house was a 'verandah' under which men could gather around a fire. A man and his
older sons, and often his brothers, were the usual occupants of a single pokou. Men of one yarene, together with their non-agnatic groups and individuals, tended to form one section of the line, i.e., the settlement was organized in terms of sub-clan affiliation. Other men lived in small groups in hamlets close to this major residence place. Women lived in their own houses (aroa yapu) of an oval construction with pig stalls along the rear wall facing the door, and with sleeping and storage space at each end; daughters and young sons lived with their mothers in these houses, which were scattered through the bush close to a woman's gardens.

The presence of many tall trees, mainly casuarina, provide a good indication of the location of Wiru settlements. Casuarinas, as noted above, are said to 'change' with men; also, because of the plentiful number of seeds it drops, a connection is made between this tree and the ability of men to produce many children. Casuarina (kalipe) represent continuity through reproduction and as such are an apt symbol for a settlement. These trees are also planted on the poma, with a mound of earth buttressed by plank palisades at their base, an arrangement called a kedo.

Each sub-clan had its own kedo, which were the focus of certain stages of cult activity as well as being the repository for skulls of important men, especially headmen. The connection between headmen and the spiritual and political vitality of their groups has always been strong, and kedo were often destroyed when settlements were raided. These mounds today do not have the cult significance of 'traditional' times and may not be maintained or even made. Casuarinas, however, are still planted to mark new settlements, and a new type of kedo is often
made at the grave of a headman, on the poma, implying a connection is still made between this construction and a headman's power (and that of his group's, see 4b).

The most visible change since pacification is (apart from changes in clothing) in the pattern of residence and style of housing. After 1960 there was a movement towards 'village' settlement, with wives sharing houses with their husbands and children. The patrol reports make it clear that Pangia 'kiaps' did not encourage this movement, rather it was the missions which preferred villages because it made it easier for their congregations to attend church, hence facilitating proselytization (PR3/65-6;PR1/68-9). The administration position seems to be supported by statements such as Wiru "would gain nothing by moving into village groups" and, by the Assistant District Officer, "I personally do not like these village settlements owing to fire and health risks and also as they tend to cause friction between households" (PR3/65-6).

While the missions encouraged this movement, it seems that it was Wiru, on their own initiative, who started to change their residence pattern, a response "derived from the Ialibu example some time ago" (PR/63-4). In Ialibu, the 'kiaps' had encouraged people to live together and closer to roads or tracks in order to assist in social control and census work. In other words, the perception of what 'kiaps' wanted at Ialibu influenced Wiru to shift to villages, so as to be close at hand when patrols arrived.

This willingness to please whites was partly out of fear but, like the spontaneous construction of an airfield, it was also motivated by the assumed rewards or cargo that this action would bring. Many people
went to great lengths to please the 'kiaps', even to the extent of constructing false villages and pretending to live in them during visits by patrols, a ruse quickly seen through (PR7/62-3).

Coastal methods of housebuilding, using woven pitpit 'blinds', were soon used to construct new houses modelled on European designs, i.e., taller, with hinged doors, raised floors, and sometimes windows (a rarity as they make it easier to housebreak). House frames became higher because of the availability of blankets and clothing. Pokou and aroa yapu styles often fell into disuse, although there were many instances of husbands and wives living together in a pokou, and with aroa yapu this style is sometimes still built for families.

One Takuru headman, in 1981, decided he was tired of living with his wife and told her to live in her own house by her gardens, he also pulled down his 'new' house and erected a pokou, which he thought more fitting to his status. There are signs, then, of more traditional architecture being returned to, although the headman had to give in to community pressure and allow his wife to share his pokou (her eviction was seen as unChristian). Nonetheless, the more 'European' a house, the more status this brings to its owner, who is usually a younger, ambitious man (the most 'European' house in Takuru belongs to a man acknowledged as its foremost 'rasKol').

Although a new residence pattern emerged it was based on 'traditional' lines, and houses are arranged parallel to each other across a ceremonial green or a cleared section of ground running the length of the settlement. There is still a tendency for men of one sub-clan to live in adjacent houses. Some of these 'haus lains' can be
quite long, with 40 or more houses. Village-style settlement had many problems, it brought increased social frictions over such things as pigs in gardens (pigs were formerly kept in the aroa yapu), and the tendency for people to argue more the closer they live together. Many villages broke up into hamlets and moved closer to their garden lands, a shift accompanied by a desire for a more autonomous lifestyle. Also, social friction meant acrimony between agnatic groups, and today in Takuru the hamlets are becoming increasingly oriented around one of the four tapinago yarene and their non-agnates, with some settlements composed exclusively of one group.

During ceremonial pig-kills the men's houses were joined by temporary living quarters to form one long line of houses connected in a U-formation, which was a visual demonstration of district or settlement unity for this important exchange and cult event (see 3e). This arrangement was constructed for the last pig-kill in Takuru hamlet in 1978, regardless of the fact that the majority of people had by then moved to other hamlets. I was told that this may have been the last pig-kill to be held in Takuru hamlet (as intra-Koliri conflicts escalate) and that separate pig-kills could be held by alliances of yarene in their own hamlets. Killing pigs together is another idiom of brotherhood, such that separate pig-kills indicate the last stage of group fission.

Residential unity, in part created by notions of a Christian brotherhood, was temporarily achieved under colonialism but proved to be too precarious for the realities of proximity (which possibly exacerbated a fear of poisoning) and group rivalries and hostility. The absence of any need to unite in common defence may have contributed to
this situation, in which suspicions, angers and hostilities have become more internally directed without the release of warfare. The reasons for fission are, however, more or less the same as those of the pre-pacification era - land disputes, sexual intercourse between agnates, poisoning accusations, etc. (see 2d).

While more people came to live together, the major difference with previous times was the existence of nuclear family households. This was partly a response to the Christian model of household composition (husbands and wives do not sleep together but at opposite ends of the house, often in cubicle-like arrangements), and partly to patterns observed in Ialibu and among European families.

It is tempting to conclude that this was the start of a marked change in intersexual relations, yet the alacrity with which women moved in with men does not, as it would seem, support such a view. Rather, in a society where there was a relatively low emphasis on female pollution, the concept of sharing a house with a woman - prompted by the new taboos of Christianity, i.e., living apart from one's wife, or treating her harshly, was sinful - did not cause such consternation among men as it did elsewhere in the Highlands, and did not overly threaten the sexual status quo. Men accepted this situation as one of the changes necessary for 'development' (women attending church was another). Women, as noted below (2b), were not slow in using colonialism in attempts to improve their position relative to men (and co-residence was a start in this direction). Also, many married couples pointed to the convenience of living together for such things as cooking, eating and household decision-making.
It may be that it was the pragmatics of warfare which encouraged the residential separation of the sexes more than an ideology stressing the exclusivity of men and women. Indeed, procreation beliefs, which point to the basic 'femaleness' of all bodies, suggest that sexual differences did not have to be symbolized by residence. Perhaps with the absence of warfare, women could move in with men without causing any great ideological strain. Group definition is not so much based on men living together as on the activities which define male sexual identity, irrespective of female co-residence. Colonialism and Christian edicts brought benefits to women, but their overall position and status in society vis-à-vis men is relatively unchanged; the existence of nuclear family households did not significantly affect the quality of male-female relations.

Given that this is a society which has experienced considerable and sometimes traumatic change since pacification (see 2b), it is possible that concepts of group definition and membership have to some extent altered in response to the exigencies of a different socio-economic and 'cult' situation. A dogma of descent may be redirected to new priorities in a context where its 'traditional' relevance is no longer entirely appropriate, or challenged by other means of affirming groups.

The cessation of warfare, the migrations this entailed, and of cult ceremonies of exchange are factors which have affected 'descent' today. Also, mission activity to weaken, or widen as the case may be, the application of descent terms. For example, the Bible provides another explanation for existence or origins, and people talk of sharing descent from Adam and Eve, and of a common 'brotherhood' of men (usually only those sharing the same religious denomination).
Group membership in Takuru can be defined as 'Wesleyan' as well as by district or tubea yarene names. If descent is an emergent property of a system which encourages an agnatic model of social relations (see Strathern, 1972), there is no reason why it should not respond to, or be transformed by, post-pacification experiences to meet the demands of the colonial era (including, for example, the concept of a Christian brotherhood or of a political party).

Descent, as an idiom of membership affecting behaviour, may be in competition or congruence with church allegiances which supply new idioms and moral symbols for behaviour. Correspondences still exist between the 'old' and the 'new', and there is a political dimension to church affiliation as there is to descent. Some Wesleyans of Kawirene yarene (a non-agnatic group) expressed their political differences with Koliri by becoming Seventh Day Adventists (S.D.A.), a decision accompanied by a residential shift to their own hamlet, as often occurred with changes of alliances affecting 'traditional' group membership (see above).

While it is possible to discuss change in social practice, it is rather more difficult to do so for changes at the ideological level. Nonetheless, descent still continues as a 'moral symbol' even when it has different implications for membership and behaviour, e.g., the Christian behaviour incumbent on Wesleyans. These points will be returned to in 4b, and I now consider patterns of warfare, marriage and alliance for further background to an understanding of social change.
1. Following Tuzin, social process is "the inherent dynamic of a society" in the advancement "towards the receding image of homeostasis" (Tuzin, 1976:xxiii). However, like Tuzin, I am concerned with investigating process "through an ambiance which is itself changing significantly" (ibid:xxiii-iv), in this case the era of colonialism.

2. This was not necessarily to the benefit of the system. For example, the acquiescence of Takuruns in mission directives halted the observance of post-partum taboos, which in turn affected infant mortality rates and levels of malnutrition. This could not be handled within the system except for the intervention of health services (although infant malnutrition is still a problem in some settlements). Again, declining garden yields were often related to whites stealing soil fertility rather than to inadequate gardening practices, with the result that these practices were not overly improved.

3. As far as I know, there is no Wiru myth for the creation of people; if there is Takuruns did not know of it.

4. Wanu became Wanuwane (-wane, place). Bai became Baipo as -po is the terminal form of certain names.

5. Some people preferred to give Biblical versions of their origins, in which God let down a ladder to distribute people over the world.

6. This does not detract from my point that Umbuna migrants were somehow less than men, as it is only resident Umbuna people who are seen as 'superior' (or living in a better world).

7. It is interesting that for the Wiru settlement of Tunda, Strathern reports that there is "no serious attempt to link ... groups as descendants of a single ancestor" (Strathern, A.1979A:152), whereas in Takuru there is a definite stress on the apical ancestress of the four tapinago groups. Such a discrepancy points to a significant difference in social organization between the two places, or at least to the fact that descent may receive more emphasis in some settlements than others. Also, the idiom, of 'one semen' starting a group (Strathern, A. 1979A:456) was not recorded in Takuru, and Koliri have no notion of a patrilineally transmitted substance as Strathern states for Tunda (ibid:460).

8. Heather Barham, a Cambridge undergraduate at Takuru for 5 weeks in 1983, recorded a version of the origin story in which a fifth child was born to Komikiame, a daughter called Paname who married to Poloko (Barham, pers. comm.). This settlement is Takuru's major ally and where the majority of their marriages are contracted. Again, this emphasizes the important role women play in constructing and maintaining intergroup relations, which are mediated by exchange.
9. In many Wiru myths partly human cannibalistic creatures figure prominently, and they are often described as having branches growing out of their bodies— as if when man was not truly human he was part tree. Also, sorcerers, mua i ago, could turn themselves into trees in pursuit of their aims, suggesting that the man-tree conjunction is within Wiru understanding.

10. The notion of Umbuna 'superiority' makes for an interesting comparison with perception of akolali, the ancestors (and deity) of Wiru, who were 'giants'. That 'big-ness' can mean that these ancestors were somehow 'better' than Wiru is a possible interpretation, in the same way that medieval scholars called their Biblical/classical predecessors 'giants' (and not only in the intellectual sense).

11. This mirrors the debt a person has to his/her MB for his/her 'body', of which the MB holds the 'base'/pine (see 3b). The story may comment on the important cultural theme of ego-MB relationships by pointing to a similar relationship of 'debt' between Takuru and Umbuna Koliri.

12. Some of the 'traditional' qualities of groups do translate to the present. Baipo is still seen as aggressive and forward in 'bisnis', but it is also known for its provocative role in encouraging group frictions, and is often called into disrepute as the 'steal group' for the number of 'raskols' it contains. Kawali, in keeping with its traditional perception, quietly proceeds with its 'bisnis' activities (as well as with pig production). Some Kawali headmen, because of the success of their 'bisnis' orientation, now refer to their founder as the 'first-born'.

13. This provides as interesting correspondence with Wagner's discussion of the Daribi myth of origin, in which people once lived in a state of paradise and were immortal until a shameful act was committed (Wagner, 1967:38-41). Perhaps the failure to give cassowary meat was also a shameful act.

14. Tomonu is also the thick (yellow?) fat of pigs which was rubbed on cult stones to promote fertility.

15. While there is no concept of a paternally transmitted substance in Takuru, I would argue that the practice of naming perpetuates the notion of patrilineal descent by individuating people in opposition to their maternal substance. That is, naming helps to confirm agnatic identity and contributes to agnatic group continuity (see also Strathern, 1970, 1982A). Naming relates to the fact 'that it is men who start or are the beginning points of new descent groups' (Strathern, A. 1982A:76), although Komiklame may be an exception to this claim. A foster father names or re-names an adopted male child, such that this child can 'change' with the foster father upon his death. In this case, naming has conferred a paternal identity in the same way as a man transmits his yomini to a 'real' son.
16. Takuru yarene, above the lineage level, are referred to as 'one blood' and not, as I have written, by such terms as 'father' or 'father-son' groups; yet -rene means 'father of' in a teknonymic system, although this was not part of any explanation of yarene I encountered (yarene may be derived instead from yene, a group of men). Kerr writes that -rene can also mean 'place of', and possibly yarene has a locality referent but again this explanation was not forthcoming (Wurm, 1975). It is the membership and not descent aspect of yarene which is a feature of exegesis; the term implies exclusivity, a sharing of qualities, and opposition (and one yarene is named after a cult activity which only that group performed). Yarene can also refer to a pig herd or a political party, stressing again the membership dimension of this term.

17. It can also be used to describe sexual intercourse (A. Strathern, pers. comm.), and the allusion made was inserting a stick into rotting vegetation and moving it up and down.

18. Wiru women could also perform some activities associated with male tasks in the division of labour, and even use (but not own) axes. That is, male-female differences as symbolised by such things as the division of labour are not rigid.
1c. WARFARE, MARRIAGE AND ALLIANCE

Wiru, in company with most if not all Highlanders, show no evidence of prescriptive marriage rules, and in marriage choices appear constrained little by proximity and more by the nature of warfare, alliance and exchange. A short history would be useful before an investigation of this 'nature' is attempted.

Before about 1930 it is likely that the Takuru hamlet of today was not the first or only male residential place, and seems not to have been occupied as a major settlement. Some people may have remained at Talowai Yapu (see origin story) but much of Koliri was dispersed outside of its district: many Wanuwane lived at Wiowei and Lumbene, while some Baipo and Kawai resided at Wambi and Poloko. It is difficult to know whether warfare had split Koliri into scattered segments or whether at this time Takuru was even fully established as a political district.

At some stage in the 1930's Takuru appears to have become more heavily settled with Koliri sub-clans moving in (again?) and creating a degree of structural unity as a district which, however, was temporary. There was a series of raids and retaliations from and to enemy groups to the east and south, notably Wire, Takupini, Marapini and Kerepali, which forced Koliri to flee when its settlements were finally burned to the ground. Most fled to Kalue, Kerepali and Poloko, following affinal or alliance connections. Some men reported being taken captive as children, with their families, to Kerepali to increase its size and in particular that of a headman's group; other people used these connections to establish themselves in Kerepali as refugees from warfare, even though Kerepali had fought Takuru previously. Kalue was also an enemy of Koliri
and only one sub-clan, Kawali, went there because of its many marriage links to this district. Poloko was a major ally of Takuru, and intermarriage was also quite high. Already some indication is being given that relations of affinity between groups of different districts can override the fact of inter-district enmity.

In the late 1930's or early 1940's, most Koliri returned to their district and it may be significant that this was when the Takuru hamlet appears to have been first cleared as a major area for male residence. If districts are named after the major residence place of men it is possible that this was when Koliri fully established Takuru as a political district. Alternatively, if in this case the tubea ta (big place) was relocated but named after the extant district, it does give some indication that Koliri, after recovering their strength and numbers, were as a clan concerned to re-establish themselves and their district and were not satisfied to live elsewhere as migrants.

This re-settlement was the start of a series of raids, waged to varying effects, against Mele, Kauwo, Wire, Marapini, Kerepali, Maupini, Wanu, Wiowei, Kumiane, Maia, Pomba and other places. This was accompanied by intra-Takuru fighting, sometimes resulting in death, which was often caused by adultery accusations, or attempts at sexual intercourse or marriage by abduction with women of another sub-clan. Other reasons for this hostility were vengeance killings for affines killed by other sub-clans in fights against various districts, and from suspicion of sorcery. These internal clashes could be serious, as houses were burnt, kedo cut down, and the losers forced to flee elsewhere.
The level of violence within Koliri is perhaps unusual in comparison with other Highland societies and, as will be seen, is partly related to the divided loyalties caused by marriage. Regardless of internal fighting, Takuru survived as a political district, even after its rout in warfare. The question is whether it was a concept of brotherhood which encouraged re-settlement or an attachment to 'place' and the autonomy this provided which overcame local hostilities.

The main reasons given for warfare against other districts are as follows:

1. Revenge for deaths resultant from fighting or sorcery. Deaths are never forgotten and people were always eager to exact vengeance for themselves or allies. The failure to make good exchange obligations may also come under the heading of 'revenge'.

2. Confrontation over land ownership in border areas with other districts.

3. Disputes over women and pigs; the latter either dig up gardens or are stolen, while the rape of women, or their illicit relations with extra-district men, often led to fighting.

These reasons also apply to intra-district fighting to varying extents, and perhaps more so today now that warfare is abandoned. The second in particular has been the cause of much recent friction in Takuru, and it also continues to influence relations with other districts; Takuru was involved in a bow and arrow skirmish with Maupini in 1973 over a garden site, and is presently aggrieved towards Poloko and Maia for encroaching on its border land.

These disputes may become more common as pig and human populations increase, although at present there is no real land shortage. Yet any increasing frequency of land disputes may be more for political than
demographic reasons, as it gives one group a chance to prove its claims in court (usually) and to score a minor victory over what may be ex-enemies (see 2b, and A. Strathern, 1978:100, where he relates these disputes to needing land for development schemes although many, such as cattle projects, have since failed).

To return to the history, in the late '40's or early '50's Takuru was again burnt, this time by Wiowei, and the revenge raid obliterated the perpetrators' settlement and forced its residents to flee to Mele and Talipiko. Takuru managed to remain an active district until the end of the '50's when an epidemic occurred, believed to be ulo sorcery wrought by their Poloko allies (using Kewa sorcery specialists) for involving them in a minor fight over women in which many of their men died (the impression given by informants was that Poloko was tired of helping Takuru and losing men in this sort of fight).

This event decimated the Takuru population and dispersed the survivors to Pokale (Baipo), Weriko and Kalue (Kawali), Talipiko and Mekepini (Wanuwane), and Poloko (Toe, which had to flee here from suspicion of helping Poloko in the ulo attack). At some stage during pacification, supposedly with the encouragement of 'kiaps', Koliri returned to Takuru district to rebuild and to reclaim their land (although sub-clans had been moving back into the district before this, and living close to their major gardens but not residing together).

The preceding gives some indication that the recent history of Takuru has been anything but static, and that while it had many enemies this did not prevent intermarriage between groups within Takuru and
enemy groups, nor did it prevent groups of people taking refuge in places which were enemies to Takuru.

To attempt to fit marriage patterns into a schema of groups which Takuru warred with or against is difficult; temporary alliances could be formed and friendly groups sometimes fought. Also, while informants gave the district name for an enemy or ally, there were often groups within those districts with which groups within Takuru married. A sub-clan which married within an enemy district did not necessarily view that group as an enemy, although its brother sub-clans well might. Groups do not have to intermarry to consider themselves allies or friends, in contradiction to the relationship of their districts, a factor which could help explain the level of intra-district hostility.

The creates a confusing picture on enmity and alliance as informants from different groups varied in their accounts of who were usually enemies or friends (except for major allies and enemies). Takuru did not always fight as a district and loyalties were sometimes divided. Proximity did not mean alliance and, even when a close settlement was friendly, this did not prevent occasional hostility, although if this occurred it was usually not related to the reasons given above. For example, Baipo gave poison to Kauwepini for them to use on a Kawali headman, but Kauwepini refused and Koliri attacked them because they were afraid the poison would 'come back' at them, and also because they were angry at Kauwepini for not helping them.

Before I continue this discussion I need to make a distinction between allies and friendly groups. The latter I propose to call 'neutrals', although this is a loose term and does not necessarily mean
that these groups never fought or allied with Takuru; what it does mean is that as the 'battle front' changed these groups may be drawn into or dropped out of alliance with Takuru or with its enemies.

There is a degree of overlap between marriage patterns, alliances and neutralities, but a totally coherent picture does not emerge (I recorded 45 different settlements where Takuruns married to or from). Alliances may change over time, or a settlement where marriages are concentrated may not be a strong ally but neutral. Too, marriages may occur between only one Takuru group and another in an allied or enemy group, or many groups may have some marriage links with an enemy or allied settlement (see Table 1).

One informant stated that "we marry everyone, enemies or friends". This appears to deny any considerations of strategy, although it is likely that unions with distant places were contracted with some concern for trade connections. Does this statement indicate that Takuruns perceive their marriage choices as less constrained by the requirements of politics or group solidarity than do many Highlanders (see Glasse and Meggitt, 1969, pp.1-15)? Before an answer is attempted, the pattern of marriage needs more attention.

Enemy districts were to the north over the Polu river, and these could call on their allies further north. Mele, for example, could join with Molo or Alia to fight Takuru. More enemies were located to the south and east, especially Wire, Marapini and Tunda. Takuru also fought places to the west such as Kalue and Maia, but its hostilities appear to have been confined to the eastern half of the map. It should be emphasized again that temporary alliances between enemies were possible
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TAKURU GROUPS</th>
<th>A POLOKO</th>
<th>N WERIKO</th>
<th>A POKALE</th>
<th>A NIRIPU</th>
<th>N WAMBI</th>
<th>N KEREPALI</th>
<th>N APENDA</th>
<th>E KALUE</th>
<th>E KALANE</th>
<th>MELE/TALIPKO</th>
<th>TAKURU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAIPPO</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAWALI</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAI</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALUE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAWIRENE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WELUKAWE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>252</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Intermarriage rates with 10 districts and within Takuru.
N.B. This table represents 65% of all marriages.

A = ally
E = enemy
N = neutral
Map 4: The enemies, allies, neutrals, and marriage connections of Takuru.

--- Ally --- Neutral --- distant marriage, perhaps trade motivated

Alliance between enemies (6) number of marriages with Takuru
and that separate groups within warring places could be allies against other districts when fighting was not occurring, or against enemies in common at the time. The need for alliance is partly a result of the preferred style of warfare, in Takuru at least, and partly from the greater population of some enemy places.

One aim of military endeavours was to form an alliance with a settlement(s) so placed to the enemy that the latter could be caught in the middle by a 'pincer' attack, or the threat of it. Takuru, for example, would join with Apenda to fight Mele, or with Mamuane to fight Kerepali. It was hoped that this would make these 'centre-places' wary of Takuru or in debt to it if an attack was not proceeded with; sometimes the bridewealth was reduced if a Takuru man married a woman from a place previously spared in warfare.

The pattern of warfare was, as Strathern states, "radial" (Strathern, A. 1968:547), but the map shows that the distribution of marriages to allies and neutrals complements this pattern, like the spokes in a wheel. There is a network of marriage, alliance and neutrality around Takuru but it is quite obvious that this is no security circle. Takuruns do marry their enemies but it is apparent that unions with major enemies were (and are) low: Mele 3, Wire 0, Marapini 2, Maupini 2, Wiowei 2, Tunda 1; with its major ally, Poloko, 42 marriages have occurred. These figures include marriages of Takuru non-agnates with both enemy and ally.

However, marriages between enemy districts may not reflect the actual marital relationship between these places as districts, but rather the particular relationship of groups within those districts (see
above). This should be taken into account when examining the map, e.g., Wanuwane married to Kumiane and considered it an ally, as they did Wiewei, in opposition to the rest of Koliri. In this respect the map is not presenting a 'real' picture of marriage between districts; also, the 19% of marriages to allies as opposed to 24% with enemies is not as significant as it appears inasmuch as the 19% represents three districts while the 24% is from over twenty districts (see Table 4).

The radial warfare and marriage pattern is possibly a result of the shifting over time of 'battle fronts', and a statement that "we marry everyone" is a reflection of the historical operation of a system of alliance and warfare; the marriage pattern is also a reflection of trade networks. "We marry everyone" means that at some stage Takuruns have married just about everywhere, not that at one moment in time Takuruns marry to all places. The major allies and enemies do provide some stability within a relatively fluid (diachronic) system of warfare, marriage and alliance. While Takuru does marry its enemies (24% of all marriages) it prefers, from this perspective, to marry its allies and neutrals (51% of all marriages; see Table 3). At this point it is worth considering some of the structural and statistical aspects of marriage.

As stated above, Takuru is composed of four exogamous sub-clans, together known as Koliri. Also in Takuru are non-agnatic exogamous groups of two kinds, the first being two relatively large groups which were 'second-comers' after Koliri (Lai and Alue), and the other are groups and individuals which came later as migrants or refugees, and represent eleven different groups which joined with the sub-clans, 'second-comers' or with other refugees. Both kinds are known by the same term, pirikanago (thrown away man) but for the sake of clarity I will
SUB-CLANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baipo</th>
<th>Weriko 6, Poloko 6, Wanbi 6, Takuru 6</th>
<th>Lai</th>
<th>Takuru 13, Poloko 5, Kalue 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kawali</td>
<td>Kalue 10, Weriko 9, Takuru 8, Poloko 6</td>
<td>Alue</td>
<td>Takuru 12, Apena 5, Kalue 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanuwane</td>
<td>Takuru 13, Poloko 10, Niripu 6, Kumiane 4</td>
<td>Kawirene</td>
<td>Takuru 9, Weriko 2, Kerepali 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toe</td>
<td>Poloko 9, Weriko 4, Pokale 3, Takuru 3</td>
<td>Welukauwe</td>
<td>Takuru 9, Poloko 2, Weriko 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Number of marriages to 4 most favoured places. N.B. For sub-clans, this is 48% of all marriages (227), with a range from 43% to 58%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL MARRIAGE</th>
<th>INTERMARRIAGE/TAKURU</th>
<th>% INTERMARRIAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUB-CLANS</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirikanago</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agnates</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Percentage of intermarriage of agnates and non-agnates within Takuru district.
call the 'second-comers' *pirikanago* and the others 'migrants'. The way in which *pirikanago* and migrant groups are incorporated into the Koliri 'tree' (Fig. 1) suggests that their political attachments to Koliri are of different orders. A list of the non-agnatic groups which 'belong' to each sub-clan follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-clan</th>
<th>Pirikanago</th>
<th>Migrants (associated or incorporated)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baipo</td>
<td>Lai</td>
<td>Kawirene, Waluapiri (joined Kawirene), Kaimari, Poriri, Yoarene.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawali</td>
<td>Alue</td>
<td>Kabiri (joined Alue), Tawidi, Kimbori, Peri, Welukauwe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanuwane</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Tewiri, Tawidi, Welukauwe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toe</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Pirikanago* groups retain their names and supposedly cannot intermarry with their hosts, although there may have been an original marriage in the past to mark their alliance. I gloss the relationship of migrant groups and individuals to their hosts as one of 'affiliation', with whom they may or may not intermarry depending on whether they are associated or incorporated. Associated groups appear not to have strong political connections with their hosts but use or own the host sub-clan's land or the land of the group they are joined with. These groups are often recent arrivals and may become incorporated over time at which point intermarriage is prohibited. There are exceptions, Kawirene is from Poloko but it did not arrive in Takuru as an entirety, but in small groups over a period of time from two to four generations ago. Even

* Some groups are represented by only one man; other groups 'belong' to more than one sub-clan because they arrived from different districts or at different times.
though it can consider itself a long-term resident of Takuru it prefers to maintain political independence and has not become incorporated (perhaps because it hails from a major allied district).

Groups which have become incorporated frequently refer to themselves by their host sub-clan's name, such that there is a merging of political identity. The prospect of association or incorporation, then, is largely a matter of choice for the group concerned, although perhaps less so for smaller groups or individuals who may find it more expedient to express a shared identity with their hosts. Many individual men who have followed their Koliri mothers to Takuru as children now claim they are, for example, 'full' Baipo as are their children, and Baipo marriage restrictions are then followed. Kibori, a non-agnatic group of comparable size to Kawirene, chose to lose its identity and today insists it is 'Kawali' and is even recognized as one of its lineages.

Associated groups can marry their hosts but prefer to marry other large groups within the district, probably to reinforce their position and access to resources by spreading their affinal ties within the security circle of Takuru (53% of all marriages of migrants are within the district; Table 3). Whether intermarriage is prohibited or not is not always an indication of a group's incorporation. The small size of some migrant groups make it difficult to tell from informants if they are incorporated or prohibited from intermarriage by a previous union (rather than by an unconditional ban). Also, statements made about who one can marry are not categorical, agnates within migrant or pirikanago groups sometimes differed in their opinions about whom they, as a group, could marry.
While all non-agnatic groups or individuals are said to 'belong' to their hosts, this 'belonging' prohibits intermarriage only if the former are pirikanago or incorporated. A migrant group also cannot marry the non-Koliri group it joins with, usually because both groups were wamene (brothers) in the same district before their separate migrations to Takuru. Some of these groups are spoken of as if they were paired, as in Alue-Kambiri, and even though Alue is to some extent the 'host' the relationship between the two is formally one of equivalence.

All pirikanago and migrant groups can intermarry, barring the exceptions just given, regardless of whether they 'belong' to the same host sub-clan. Yet 65% of non-agnatic marriages in Takuru are with tapinago groups, implying that unions with larger and traditional land-owing groups have political aspects vis-a-vis securing non-natal rights to land and resources. Intra-district marriage, in general, creates, supports or widens residential rights and social relationships.

Apart from these marriage 'rules', and a prohibition on cross-cousin unions (same blood), the only other restriction follows an initial marriage for three generations. Some men stated that this restriction is eternal, and the generation limit may indicate the time period after which the original union is forgotten (perhaps this is a too pragmatic recognition of marriage 'amnesia', as it may be generally accepted that three generations have to pass before another marriage is possible). What this restriction entails is that the children and grandchildren resultant from this union cannot intermarrry with their mother's and grandmother's group respectively. A person also cannot marry into a paternal grandmother's group. That these rules are sometimes broken is indicated by a class of compensation payments which
exist to cover such an eventuality, and make restitution for the 'shame' that is caused (the reason for exogamy in general is to not bring shame to the ancestors).

The reasons given for marriage restrictions vary with group level. For sub-clans exogamy is the rule because they are 'one blood' and 'brothers'; groups incorporated with their hosts do not marry because they are 'brothers' and help each other in pig-kills and warfare; and restrictions arise between individuals and their mother's, MM's and FM's groups because a relationship of debt and prescribed behaviour exists between ego and these groups which is based on the obligations ego has for 'body' and 'blood' (and which carry over to ego's children). It is also said for the latter that by one marriage the newlywed has 'prenim pinis' the group of the bride or groom, suggesting a political consideration is made about not replicating exchange links to the affinal group (although this is more at the level of the groups which raise and receive the bridewealth).

A man who marries a Baipo woman is not prevented from taking another wife from one of the other Koliri sub-clans, he is also not prohibited from marrying into an agnate's wife's group, although true brothers cannot marry true sisters. It is an individual man and his descendants, and not his clan or sub-clan, who are opposed to the groups of MB or WB. As noted above, it is the sub-clan (and clan) which constructs itself internally as an agnatic patrilineal unit, and not so much in opposition to other groups. In 1a, I related this fact to the history of settlement in Pangia, i.e., the continual dispersal of groups diminished the potential for exchange relations between groups. In that section I also proposed that procreation beliefs are a reflection of
individual-group exchange relations, but it may be that these beliefs came to encourage a further breakdown of intergroup exchange relations.

The 'body' of each agnate is derived from the MB's group, and it is possible that this differential maternal input 'threatens' group solidarity by allowing the potential for each agnate to have a different 'body' (which admittedly receives a patrilineal impress). In this situation, any imbalance in the number of women exchanged between groups could put a varene into a relatively subordinate position of obligation and debt. This subordination may be desired by co-resident non-agnates who want incorporation into the 'blood' of the host, but it perhaps also accounts for the relatively low rate of intermarriage with major enemies.

The spread of affinal ties throughout Pangia may be to offset a singular indebtedness to any one group as a wife-giver, i.e., it occurs because of the difficulties associated with exchanging women between groups. This would appear to undermine an alliance system based on marriage, yet it is districts which ally themselves and not groups; there are more than eight groups in Poloko which have affinal connections with Takuru. It is possible, then, for districts to exchange women without any great imbalance in debts for 'body' arising.

In other words, the implications of procreation beliefs for alliance can be politically circumvented, but only at the level of the district and not the group. There is still a lack of emphasis on group definition through exchange between groups, and this allows a son to marry into a classificatory mother's group, and a man to marry a female agnate of his brother's wife (but not a true sister). In some instances
it has even been possible for a man to marry a woman of his clan or group if they are not co-resident, suggesting that residence affects the definition of agnates as a category of people one cannot marry. To sum up, patterns of alliance and marriage have been affected by Pangia's history of settlement and by the nature and construction of the agnatic group (this needs to be related to exchange, see 3e).

In Takuru, these patterns are similar to those described for Tunda by A. Strathern, although the situation in Takuru appears more clear-cut insofar as the former has a more complex and fragmented arrangement of settlements and groups. What will be examined is a statement that:

"overall, there appears to be no particular correlation between marriage into a place and military alliances with it ... (and) marriage patterns indicate a separation between the politics of war and territory on the one hand, and kinship-affinal alliances on the other". (Strathern, A. 1978:86)

The applicability of this quote to Takuru may help to clarify some of the claims made above. Map 4 and Table 4, which is a comparison of marriage patterns in Takuru and Tunda, should be consulted in reference to the following discussion (the data for Tunda being drawn from Table 1, Strathern 1978:85; I am not sure if Strathern has counted non-agnates in his survey, I assume so and have done likewise. Also, his survey is of 76 living men while for Takuru it is of 305 people over three generations).

Taking into account the differences in social organization between the two places, and the differences in the samples, the statistical correspondence between their marriage patterns is remarkable. It could be argued that the comparison of the two districts is not valid because
Table 4: A comparison of Takuru and Tunda marriage patterns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TAKURU</th>
<th>TUND</th>
<th>TUNDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intermarriage</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Allies</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Enemies</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Near Settlements</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrals</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Far Settlements</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>398</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  Takuru Allies - Poloko 42, Pokale 16, Niripu 15
        Takuru Enemies - Marapini 2, Tunda 1, Wire 0, Wiowe 2, Maupini 2, Mele-Talipiko 6, Kalue 19, Kalane 15, Noiya 6, Kauwo 6, Maia 5, Kumiane 7, northern 12, southern 9, eastern 2.
        Major Takuru Neutrals - (from near and far settlements) Weriko 23, Kerepali 16, Apenda 13, Wambi 12, (Total 64)
        - comprise 51% of marriages to all members.
the data for Takuru were collected more than twenty years after pacification, but many of the marriages tabulated refer to unions contracted before or just after this event. Takuruns told me that apart from being able to marry further afield they still marry in the same way, 'nabaut, nabaut', and to the same districts as they did previously; recent marriages tend to confirm this. The cessation of warfare and a diminished need for alliance (for defence) have not appreciably altered the post-pacification marriage pattern or, I would argue, significantly affected the emergent pattern on the map (with one possible exception, an increasing tendency to marry to the west; see 2.a.1).

The basis for Strathern's claim is the larger percentage of enemies, and near and far places, which Tunda marries in comparison with its allies. This may be true for Tunda but I have argued that, for Takuru, given the number of allies married to (3) as opposed to the number of enemies (over 20), a comparison of the two is not especially revealing. Some enemy groups have a significant number of marriages with Takuru, but I have explained this in terms of a particular relationship between these groups and a sub-clan of Koliri (e.g. Kawali and Kalue Tawindi), a situation which Strathern states does not occur in Tunda (Strathern, A.1978:86).

Also, in Takuru marriages with major neutrals could almost be put into the 'marriage with ally' category - in the sense that refuge could be sought at these places, they were often invited to pig-kills, and sometimes did help in warfare - raising the number of unions with 'allies' to 137 (in comparison to 73 with enemies). Strathern does not indicate whether this relationship of 'neutrality' existed between Tunda and any of the near and far settlements which, together with the
possibility that marriage with distant enemies (and neutrals) may have been for trade connections (see 2a), suggests that the separation between the politics of warfare and affinity is, for Takuru at least, problematic. That is, whether Takuru marriage is more concerned with 'kinship-affinal alliance' than with strategic considerations is not as clear a distinction as Strathern makes for Tunda; it is a separation which is perhaps more apparent than real when viewed from a long-term perspective. The fact that enemies and allies were constantly changing as hostility peaked on one front and waned on another, would give the appearance of such a separation but marriage choices, seen in the context of the time they were made, may reflect political considerations (and allow a spread of affinal connections for groups to make use of if dispersed in fighting). In Takuru, there is a correlation between marriage into a place and military alliance and neutrality.

An investigation of more specific aspects of the marriage pattern supports this correlation. The rate of intermarriage within Takuru is 25%, and is obtained from dividing the sum of the number of marriages between sub-clans and non-agnates, and non-agnates and sub-clans, by the total number of marriages \( (30 + 66 ÷ 389 \times 100 = 25\% \); see Table 3). The percentage of intra-district sub-clan marriage is 13.2% (1 in every 7.6 unions), as compared to 41% for intra-district non-agnatic marriage (1 in every 2.4 unions), which relates to the different political environments in which the two 'types' of Takurun live. For non-agnates, who marry intra-district three times more than agnates, this strategy reinforces their position as non-natal residents.

These statistics for the sub-clans are more meaningful if they are related to the marriage pattern. For the four sub-clans, Takuru ranks
among the four most preferred marriage places*. Of these marriages, 25% of Baipo unions are in Takuru, 24% for Kawali, 39% for Waniwane, and 16% for Toe (Table 2). The percentage for the four largest non-agnatic groups varies from 57% to 75%.

Sub-clans can afford a greater spread of affinal connections — and probably need them for alliance, exchange, trade and refuge — and the 13.2% of intra-district marriage reflects the greater proportion of agnatic Takuruns, and that there is a limit to the number of resident non-agnates which Koliri can marry. But that marriages within Takuru comprise 27% of unions to the four most favoured places (28% to the major ally Poloko) suggests that the figure of 13.2% perhaps detracts from the importance of sub-clan marriages within Takuru.

Intra-district marriage supports district solidarity not by narrowing the number of extra-district people whom one owes for 'body', these connections are after all important for producing Koliri children, but by establishing links between people located in various kinship networks as donors or recipients of 'body' payments. These payments can be received by a classificatory MB or WB but an agnatic or non-agnatic man who marries within Takuru is more likely for political reasons to make these payments to his real WB, and his children to their real MB, which promotes a flow of wealth within the district.

These intra-district exchange relationships are between individuals, whereas at the level of extra-district exchange they are, I would argue, also between groups. That a relationship between groups is

* These places are not necessarily allies or the same places for each sub-clan
created by marriage is shown by Koliri taking refuge in other districts as sub-clan groups or sub-clan lineages, and rarely as individuals (although refuge may also be taken where connections are more historical or 'agnatic' than affinal).

Only two sub-clans in Takuru have lineages, Baipo and Kawali. There are three in each sub-clan, and they are ranked in order of importance if not always size. Table 5 is a breakdown of lineage marriage patterns for both sexes, and should be read with reference to Table 2. The four districts represented are those most preferred in marriage, and about 44% of both sub-clan lineages are to these four places.

It is interesting that the districts where these lineages have married figure prominently in the history of Takuru as allies and/or places of refuge. It should also be noted that there is a general tendency for lineages to not concentrate their unions to one district, but to spread them out and marry where other lineages of the same sub-clan have affinal connections. One intriguing feature is the consistency of spreading in affinal connections to the four districts: 6,6,6,6 for Baipo's lineages, and 8,10,8,7 for Kawali's lineages. This may be coincidence but it could reflect an attempt to construct 'equal' political relations with these districts (including Takuru itself) in order to assert some degree of control over a flow of wealth and pork around the 'body' payment circuit. If this is the case, the separation between the politics of affinity and warfare becomes, for Takuru, even more untenable.

The fact that marriage preferences for groups and individuals do exist is indicated by an expression used to convey this preference, poka
Table 5: Marriage patterns of lineages within sub-clans Baipo and Kawali

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weriko</th>
<th>Poloko</th>
<th>Wambi</th>
<th>Takuru</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAIPO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapoka</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wandue</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kauwe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kalue</th>
<th>Weriko</th>
<th>Takuru</th>
<th>Kalane</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KAWALI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awari</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mondaiya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokori</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
*tiakara tiaweyo,* which refers to a woman going to the same place in the bush to get the raw materials necessary for making netbags. Rope(*po*) is also an idiom used in tracing maternal connections, and may be a reference to the umbilical cord. That women and netbags are central in this exegesis emphasizes the role of women in creating relationships of exchange and alliance; the image of making netbags pointing to the production of children, wealth and food which confirm and support these links. If women, through marriage, childbirth and labour, make possible all the connections between men as groups or individuals, then "one sees the utility of the fiction of patrilineal descent and of male solidarity" (Langness, 1969:53).

Although marriage ties, like those of the Bena Bena, connect individuals and not groups (ibid:51), the sum of these ties can relate groups if enough clan or sub-clan members marry into the same place. If this occurs, the connection between groups (or places) may be analogously reduced to a kinship relationship between individuals, that of *pewa* or cross cousin. That is, by marriage a group can be perceived as a kinship 'individual' which has the rights and obligations of this 'individual': sometimes the idiom invoked for inviting a group to a pig-kill is that they are *pewa*, i.e., they are connected through women (incidentally people cannot marry their *pewa*).

I am not maintaining that the Takuru marriage and alliance system is strongly coherent or that marriage patterns are the result of political choices in all instances. Langness shows how for the Bena Bena marriages are widely dispersed for pragmatic rather than political reasons, and that there is "little direct relationship between marital ties and warfare" (ibid:50). Yet he suggests that ideally men do desire
this direct relationship, which for many reasons is not worked out in practice (ibid).

Bena have fought everyone around them, inviting comparisons with the Wiru radial warfare pattern, but the difference between Bena and Takuru Wiru seems to be that this relationship has worked out closer to marriage preferences for the latter, in that over 60% of Takuru marriages are within the district or with allied or neutral places. This testifies to the strength of this preference in a system of endemic warfare and migration into and out of "districts (that) are emergent rather than clearly defined and stable political groups" (AStrathern, 1971A:453).

Given this figure of 60%, it is probably more a measure of the usefulness or flexibility of this preference than of a correspondence to reality (which reflects structural and ideological differences between Takuru Wiru and Bena society which will not be examined here). In other words, the Takuru marriage pattern is a product of this 'reality' and not an approximation to it. My problem is whether the extent of the congruence between the marriage and alliance/neutrality pattern is the result of political choice, or is a product of forced migration and long periods of co-residence with certain groups or places, or from historical links with districts which I did not discover.

At an individual level the choice of marriage pattern may sometimes be arbitrary, except when men prefer not to marry major enemies. But if enough people prefer to marry to allied or neutral places a pattern builds up which transcends individual choice. This choice is 'political' at a higher level of the system - of marriage between districts not
groups - even if it is not a directly intentional decision. To conclude, I favour the interpretation of some degree of political choice in individual marriages. 11

FOOTNOTES

1. Strathern writes that Wiru "ally groups were simply allies; they were not at other times minor enemies." (Strathern, A. 1968:547). The situation in Takuru is more complex; Koliri was an enemy of, e.g. Marapini and Kauwo, but it did have allied groups within these districts (Marapini Koliri and Kauwo Epari). Strathern relates the lack of a competitive aspect in Wiru exchange to the fact that allies could not sometimes be minor enemies, but for Takuru these cross-cutting ties, together with relationships of neutrality, meant that groups within enemy districts could be allies. Clearly, that a moka type exchange system is not evident in Pangia needs to be related to more than the nature of alliance.

2. Tunda people do linguistically distinguish between 'second-comers' and migrants (Strathern, A. 1971:453); Takuruns were not this precise.

3. Toe is said to 'belong' to Baipo because of its small size and need for protection (which is why Toe has no non-agnatic groups 'belonging' it it). This 'belonging' to Baipo is to reduce Toe to the status of a non-\text{tapinago} group as Baipo has designs on Toe land.

4. This includes, obviously, a man not marrying actual sisters, their \text{kemearoa}, although one man did this and his second wife was sent to jail for three months. The husband was not punished.

5. It may be that this blood 'lasts' for three generations, and many informants stressed that these restrictions were because mother's people are those with whom one shares blood. Although sharing of blood is a reason, it is a different reason for sub-clan exogamy inasmuch as the bloodagnates share is as 'brothers' from a common ancestral mother.

6. This compares to the loss of a daughter in marriage, which threatens a father's male individuality (see 3c).

7. Some places do appear to exchange women over time, but this seems to be less an intentional aspect of marriage practice and more an outcome ofproximity, or from a previous residence with the other group as refugees which, after a return to natal land, gives the appearance of places exchanging women.

8. In which case it would be expected that a high proportion of men relative to women marry intra-district. Given the size of the sample and its lack of time-depth, such a claim is hard to statistically verify; for what it is worth out of a total of 80
marriages by male non-agnates 56% are within the district, and of 61 female marriages 48% are within Takuru. Tawindi, a small refugee group from Kalue, arrived in Takuru about two generations ago and for 5 men 7 marriages were contracted, whereas for 6 women only 3 marriages were made. Also, Kawali, which fled to Kalue in the 1930's, records 4 men of that generation which married Kalue women but no Kawali women marrying.

9. Groups with which Takuru temporarily allied for their benefit would often lower their bridewealth requirements and sometimes gave a bride for 'nothing' as a way of thanking Takuru for its assistance (brides could also be obtained for 'nothing' by capture).

10. A man was not specifically precluded from fighting his affines, but was expected not to; if he did his affines would become angry and make special attempts to kill him.

11. This has to be reconciled with a high divorce rate prepacification, but fits in with the assertion that political relations between groups are constructed through, and at the whim of, individuals.
"I was struck by the marked contrast of attitude between these people and those of, say, Mendi. The Wiru speakers are cooperative, keen and certainly not afraid of doing a bit of work (but) the are not really aware of the outside world" (Pangia Patrol Report 3/61-2).

"The Pangia sub-district with continued good administration will remain one of the most stable and productive areas in the Southern Highlands if not the whole of the Highlands region" (Pangia Patrol Report 9/72-3).

"The people were told, (a) that we had started in the dark and progressed along a 'road' of law and order, developmental roads, economic projects and council growth towards a clearing where the people could see that the 'road' was good, straight and indeed the only one possible if they were to progress; (b) that they could now continue along this road in sunlight and see where it would take them; (c) that Australia had controlled Papua New Guinea in the past but had aimed at training and teaching the people in order that they could run their own affairs ..." (Pangia Patrol Report 3/71-2).

Jesus said: "Go then to all peoples everywhere and make them my disciplines: baptize them in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit" (Matthew 28:19).

To replace paganism by the acceptance of the Christian faith, and the ritual of primitive life by the practice of religion – an objective proposed by Paul Hasluck, Minister of Territories.

"... in this new and competitive world, Christians have a better chance of survival than others ... the combined efforts of government and missions have given new life to interesting and charming peoples who were in danger of dying out" (S. Neill, A History of Christian Missions, 1982:536).
2a.1 TRADE AND THE EARLY PATROLS

There exist certain geographical and ecological features in Pangia which, I would argue, have influenced the nature of Wiru society and today affect local development. This district, although relatively large in area and population, was before pacification what Strathern describes as a "backwater" (Strathern, A. 1968:551) in terms of its trade connections and contacts with other language groups.

Wiru trade has been discussed by Hughes (1977), and no significant differences were found between his observations and my own. In the Highlands study area selected by Hughes he remarks that the:

longest described individual trade links were those between northern Poru (Wiru of the Poru plateau) settlements and the west Kambia people around Kegu and between the north-eastern Poru and the Daribi of the lower Kaugel area (Hughes, 1977:203).

This reflects on the isolation of Wiru from trade networks and also on the fact that Wiru "had no specialized exports of their own" (ibid:74). Wiru had access to forest products but, as Hughes notes, they were disadvantaged even in this because their northern customers had closer sources of trade (ibid).

A brief summary of trade in Pangia is required, for our purposes dealing mainly with pearl shells, stone axes and steel. Shells came up from the south coast via the Kikori river, where they were traded on to 'Okani', the Samberigi Valley, and from here to the Poru plateau by way of Kewa middlemen. The number of shells which Wiru received was probably limited in comparison with areas closer to the trade routes and
with more to offer in the way of 'exports'. Pangia's isolation from trade routes was reinforced by location, it is virtually hemmed in on three sides by mountain ranges or large expanses of rainforest, with the easiest and most rewarding access to shells, salt and cultural innovations being to the west. Even this access was limited vis-a-vis obtaining shells:

... informants who knew both the Kewapi speaking area north of Pangia station and the Wiru area itself suggested that Kewapi men had always been 'richer', and had prevented the Wiru from getting many shells by taking most of the trade from links with Mendi and passing the shells up to the north again ... thus cutting out the Wiru (Strathern, 1978:89).

Settlements to the north and north-east of the Poru plateau were better placed in terms of the stone axe trade, but even here Wiru access appears to have been limited and their axe blades of a smaller size, and more worn because of the difficulties of replacement and continual regrinding (cf. M. Strathern, 1969). Very few axes were passed through the Poru area to the Kewa, and the stone axe-shell connection was not made to any great extent via Wiru; "the Wiru speakers say that they had few (stone axes) and could not afford to trade many southwards" (Hughes, 1977:181). Like so many other trade items in Pangia, surplus was rare; many men obtained their stone axes as an inheritance from their fathers rather than in trade.

These blades came mainly from trade with the west Kambia people, (see Map), who obtained them for the most part from quarries at Abiamp in the Western Highlands, and some from Dom in the Eastern Highlands (ibid). Daribi of Mt. Suaru perhaps traded axes with Wiru at some stage in the last century, which they manufactured from Dom material, but the
Map 5: Trade routes in early 20th, and the first patrols

- 1931
- 1936
- Shaler and Green, 1957
majority of these axes went up the Kaugel river to the Kambia (who traded them south to Wiru) (ibid). Wagner (1967:6) states that Daribi did not have access to Highlands stone axes until relatively recently, suggesting that Wiru-Daribi trade contacts developed long after hostilities in the Bumaru area (see 1a).

Pigs were the major item given by Wiru in trade, although shells and plumes were also used. The limited access to shells, however, reinforced the use of pigs in trade as they were the only item which could be produced in anything like large numbers (countered to some extent by the fact that external trade partners also raised pigs). Pangia, according to agronomists, is a marginal sweet potato producing area due to high rainfall and poor to average soils. This restricted the size of pig populations, which were also needed for ceremonial exchange, and hence reduced the quantity of items for which Wiru could trade.

Wiru settlements to the southwest and west controlled what shell trade there was into Pangia. These places, and those which controlled the stone axe trade, also had a greater access to forest products than settlements more centrally located, such as Takuru, which may have been relatively disadvantaged in trade, unless they acted as middlemen in passing shells from the south to the north in exchange for stone axes, and vice versa.

Internal trade for exotic items, especially axes, shells and salt, must have been quite vigorous if limited by the amount of valuables passing into Pangia. All of these items were significant components of bridewealth, and it seems likely that the radial distribution of marriage ties was of greater importance than 'middlemen' in ensuring a
flow of wealth over a wide area. The establishment of trading connections between groups is an important feature of bridewealth transactions (see 3c).

Steel followed the shell trade route from the south, and although Wiru had steel before more northern people, such as Melpa, it is reasonable to assume that steel, like shells, did not enter into Pangia in any great quantities. The real importance of steel was that it presaged the arrival of Europeans and the drastic changes that new sources of valuables, and new valuables, forced in traditional trade routes (see Hughes, 1978).

By the 1920's steel had passed over the Iaro river into Pangia in trade with the Kewa. Older Takurun informants told me that when they were young children the first steel they saw came from two white men who were in the Samberigi valley, and that the axes were named after them, kapona bina. This term also became the name for aeroplanes which were seen during and after WWII, and thought by some to be flying axes sent by European 'spirits' or Kewa sorcerers to kill them.

Accounts of early exploration suggest that kapona bina were either Flint and Saunders in 1922 or Champion and Faithorn in 1929. These men were government patrol officers who were exploring the headwaters of the Purari river (Hughes, 1977; Sinclair, 1969). They traded extensively for food and assistance but, for the Flint patrol:

these goods were insufficient to meet the local demand ... the few items passed on further were rarities and remained outside the established pattern of trade, travelling slowly and not going far (Hughes, 1977:47).
Steel was present in the Samberigi Valley before Flint arrived (ibid) but this quote from Hughes, and Pangia's trade isolation, suggest it was more likely that steel did not enter Pangia, at least in any quantity, until after this patrol. Kapona bina was probably a Wiru version of the Sau or Kewa rendering of the names of the first Europeans to be associated with steel, and when it became more prevalent in Pangia kapona bina had by then become the generic term for steel, and its origins traced to this first association of Europeans with the new valuable.

Sinclair, in a description of the 1929 patrol, relates how Claude Champion crossed the Erave River on a cane suspension bridge, followed a track and:

climbed a high ridge and saw, away in the distance, grassed valleys and the smoke of many fires. Champion suggested to Faithorn that they should cross the river and go to investigate but Faithorn held that his instructions were to follow the Erave downstream and so they missed the chance of being the first into the populated inland valleys of the Papuan grasslands (Sinclair, 1969:123).

Given their location it seems likely that Champion was looking towards Pangia district and Faithorn's reluctance to investigate deprived Wiru of being among the first Southern Highlanders (along with 'fringe Highlanders' like Sau and South Kewa) and perhaps Highlanders in general to encounter Europeans. Wiru had to wait another five years before seeing Europeans, and below I hope to give some indication of the interplay between society, trade, and a perception of the 'outside world' and Europeans.
Direct contact with Europeans was made in 1934 by the famous Leahy brothers, Mick and Dan. From their base in the Wahgi Valley they conducted a series of explorations throughout the Highlands from early 1933 to late 1934. The brothers were searching for gold and in April 1934 this took them south through Imbonggu territory, past the western shoulder of Mt. Ialibu into the Kewa area, eastwards onto the Poru plateau and then north-east around Mt. Ialibu, over the Kangel River and back into Mandated Territory (see map).

While camping in a Kewa settlement to the west of Pangia, Leahy noted that:

we were now on a main route to the Papuan coast, as indicated by the number of steel knives and axes in the possession of the natives ... (and by the fact that) shell currency had been somewhat inflated by importation from the south (Leahy, 1937:227).

A day's march to the east and the expedition was amongst Wiru speakers but their isolation from the trading network and their 'backwater' nature is immediately made clear:

the mountain natives had few shells and we saw no more steel axes. None of our interpreters could speak their language and once more we had to fall back on signs (ibid:228).

It soon became apparent that Pangia was not gold country and the Leahys hurried back to their base, encouraged no doubt by the inclement weather, the hostility of Wiru, and their non-comprehension of offers of trade for much needed food:
we struggled over steep tracks that seemed to lead in every
direction except north, we were drenched to the skin by almost
constant rain and rarely had enough to eat. The natives, as is
the case with bush country natives everywhere, were sullen and
suspicious, and the women were kept out of sight. This
hampered our trading for food, as the women are usually the
gardeners and traders (ibid:227).

Leahy reports a markedly different reception from Wiru than that
received from their ethnic neighbours, creating an impression of
material and cultural differences, reflected in the protection of women
(there was not the frequent relationship between them and carriers,
with payments of shell valuables for 'services' (ibid:226)), in the
characterization of the indigens as 'mountain' and 'sullen and
suspicious', and in the difficulties of trade:

at each camp, two or three hundred kanakas would collect to
gape at us and clap their hands together in amazement but when
we offered them shells, knives, axes, salt and even cloth for
food they brought us sugar cane and bananas.

Unwilling to see the boys starve in a land of plenty, I took
matters into my own hands at last, leading a group of natives
to a flourishing garden of sweet potatoes and indicating quite
plainly that we must have food. I spread out a generous amount
of trade goods on the ground, which the natives accepted
eagerly. But they still made no move to dig the sweet
potatoes.

"Ah!" said I "there must be a good reason for such conduct.
Perhaps the men in these parts have a taboo against entering
the gardens. Clever of the lazy hounds at any rate". I then
told the boys to dig the sweet potatoes for themselves.

At this there was a loud protest from the kanakas and they all
stampeded for the village, to reappear presently with bows,
arrows and spears. Before they came within bowshot, we fired a
few shots over their heads, at which they drew off some
distance for a conference ....

It was know almost nightfall and had begun to rain. While our
half-starved boys were trying to coax the fire to burn enough
to cook the potatoes, there was a wild yell from the kanakas
and several arrows landed among us. We promptly replied with a
volley, firing blindly into the woods ....
Throughout a miserable night of torrential rain the whole camp remained awake, the kanakas occasionally coming near enough to pelt arrows at us. We were forced to fire into the darkness ... I think it was the rain which really saved us a fight. Long before daylight we had pulled down the tents and packed up for the road, and as soon as we could see the track, we moved ahead (ibid:228-9).

According to informants, Leahy neglects to mention an action on their part which could have contributed to the escalation of hostilities at a place identified by him as Ilyoi. The map which accompanies his account in the Geographic Journal (1936), places Ilyoi in the neighbourhood of Molo, but the incident which helped to precipitate violence took place at Laiyo, several kilometres to the south. There are different versions of what happened but all informants agreed that a man was shot and killed by one of the Leahy brothers. In one version the victim objected to the appropriation of his wife for carnal purposes, and in another he was shot while attempting to break his way into the house where his wife was either with one of the brothers, or taking refuge from her husband who was threatening to kill her for participating in sexual intercourse with the strangers (one mission account has it that a half-caste male resulted from this encounter (Ridgway, 1976) but in actual fact it was the native police accompanying the patrol who were responsible for the rape and killing).

People in Takuru, even today, know little of these first contacts with Europeans, and some men who were children at the time claim to have never heard of Europeans until the 1950's, which testifies to a certain insularity in the spread of knowledge. From this point in time it is difficult to ascertain the contribution of this homicide to the clash at Ilyoi. Informants gave more emphasis to the destruction of gardens, which was seen as a hostile act of greater moment than a solitary death.
It is significant that the type of behaviour which initiated or accompanied warfare — the destruction of gardens and the abduction or rape of women — was a feature of this patrol and, from the Wiru perspective, they could hardly be blamed for retaliating. They had been good hosts, providing luxury crops of sugar cane and bananas, and their hospitality had been abused. It was beyond their comprehension that these strangers, who were obviously creatures of incredible wealth, would want to trade valuables for food.

The fact that Europeans were initially perceived as cannibals or associated with malevolent spirits (which accounts for the hiding of women and the 'suspicious' behaviour of Wiru) would have made the idea of trading with them even more unlikely. Throughout their journeys the Leahys were often fitted into the category of 'ancestor' in an attempt to explain their presence. The construction of Europeans as 'ancestors' seems not to have been made by Wiru (at least in the vicinity of Takuru), such that they were more prone to react aggressively to what they conceived as provocation by entities known for their malevolent attitude to people (although ancestors too can be malevolent, but not so arbitrary). It could be argued that Wiru attacked simply because they wanted the wealth of the patrol, but it is noteworthy that the conflict reported by Leahy did not occur until after gardens were destroyed, a woman was 'raped' and a man was killed.

Nevertheless, the problems of trade which the Leahys experienced in Pangia still need to be considered. Hughes notes that at the first Wiru settlement encountered they were offered two small cassowaries for one pearl shell (Hughes, 1977:57). This would have been a place more familiar, from its proximity to the trade route, with external trade than the settlements they passed through further east. It is conceivable
that the people who offered cassowaries (who may have been bilingual with Kewa and influenced by Kewa culture) had heard stories from their Kewa trading partners about white men in the Samberigi valley, and hence were more prepared to trade than their less experienced eastern neighbours (note that trade was still of valuable for valuables). It appears that people to the west and north of Wiru, who were closer to trade routes, were more amenable barterers (see Leahy, 1937; Champion, 1940).

For most of the Wiru contacted by this patrol, an initial relationship with Europeans was not made through trade as happened elsewhere in the Highlands, an outcome partly due to an insularity which "was an effective barrier to the movement of persons and ideas" (Hughes, 1977:100, in reference to the Poru plateau). The 'ideas' referred to here are ones connected with technology, such as the manufacture of salt. It is interesting that Wiru were quite receptive to 'ideas' in the form of imported cults, and there was a large 'market' in Pangia for cults or rituals. People, years later, had not heard of the Leahys and following patrols, but cults spread over the entire Pangia district.* This implies that at a ritual but not a 'technological' level there was a receptivity and eagerness for a new and more effective control of the cosmos. The point being made is that innovation or the acceptance of new ideas were more common in the domain of ritual, and this influenced the perception of Europeans and the type of Wiru-European relationships which emerged in the context of development.

Wiru were next visited in 1936 by the Bamu-Purari government patrol of Ivan Champion and Bill Adamson. Walking from the west, they skirted

* These early patrols were confused by some with patrols of the fifties.
north of Mt. Ialibu and then dropped south to the Poru plateau (incidentally naming it after the first Wiru settlement they camped near). They proceeded in a south-easterly direction, without Champion's Imbonggu guides who refused to enter Wiru territory (Champion, 1940:249), along the western fringes of Pangia until they met the Tua River, which they followed to the Erave (see map).

Champion noted the presence of many 'very old' steel axes (PR 1936:98), whereas less than two years previously the Leahys saw no steel. It is tempting to conclude that it was only in the mid to late thirties that steel in any quantity appeared on the Poru plateau, especially as the Leahys were further west of Champion and closer to the trade route. That the axes were 'very old' may indicate that they had been well used by previous owners and been a long time in the north-south trade route before being passed on by Kewa to Wiru. The latter were not in a strong bargaining position and received the older, blunter blades that were of less value to Kewa in their trade with Imbonggu and Mendi.

Difficulties of trade with Wiru were again encountered but this time of a different nature; Wiru were now willing to trade food for steel but only for small piles of sweet potato, "we asked the natives for food and they brought little bundles of potatoes for which they wanted axes" (Champion, 1940:250). Assuming that a bargaining instinct is more developed with a well-defined trading route (cf. Hughes, 1977:55), it can be seen why Wiru were not as realistic in their expectations of trade as their neighbours.
Champion remarks, dryly one suspects, that eventually "we managed to buy a few pounds with calico and shell" (Champion, 1940:250). However, the next day the situation changed markedly, but only after Champion had made strenuous efforts to convince Wiru of his desire to trade valuables for food:

When I saw the exorbitant demands the men were making I told them that we could see that they had plenty of food and that I was willing to pay one tomahawk for a large swag bag of it. I told them in sign language that we would sleep here and if they did not bring food in the morning we would take it ourselves. If they fought us we would fight and I showed them the magazine rifles. They grinned sheepishly.

This is the first time on the patrol that I have used threats of any sort ....

At 8 a.m. men and boys gathered around the flies but they made no attempt to bring any food, though they are quite friendly. We waited an hour and then Adamson and two police took three men and went over to the garden.

Adamson showed them that he wanted potatoes and they dug them and filled a bag. When the bag was brought to the camp he gave the owner of the potatoes a large knife. At this several men asked if they would get a knife if they filled the swag, and being answered in the affirmative, went off and brought the bag back full of potatoes. Then they all brought potatoes. By noon we had half a ton bought with seven large knives and five plane irons ....

I do not think they believed us at first that we would pay a knife for a bag of potatoes ... the difficulty was to get them started (PR 1936:97-8).

These actions marked the realization, finally, that if steel goods were to be obtained the relationship with Europeans would have to involve the trade of valuables for food (which would also be on the Europeans' terms).

Champion was less provocative in his patrol than were the Leahys, and handled the trade situation more sensitively by not forcing the
destruction of gardens and demonstrating that the people themselves should dig up sweet potatoes. Stories of the clash with the Leahy expedition may have spread to the settlements where Champion camped, and if the men 'grinned sheepishly' at the display of rifles they must have had some idea of their power (this usually had to be demonstrated by killing pigs or people). Yet no outright hostility was shown by Wiru and Champion apparently used threats only in frustration at the failure to obtain food, and not because Wiru were being surly or unhelpful.

There is no mention of the presence of women in Champion's report, which suggests that people were still suspicious of these strange intruders and, given the hostility which marked the Leahy patrol, it was perhaps only Champion's handling of the situation - and a fear of rifles - which prevented another outbreak of fighting. These two early patrols were the first phase of a relationship with Europeans and after the departure of Champion even this relationship, in respect of trade, had changed. The perception of Europeans also came to be influenced by the gradual spread of stories and rumours about kianago (red men), their power, and their willingness to trade, especially after Ialibu patrol post was established in 1953.

The 1934 and 1936 patrols had come from the west and north respectively, the directions in which valuables and cults came (this was also the direction in which enemies, cannibals and sorcery were found), and later patrols in the fifties also came from the west, which may have affected the attitude towards, and acceptance of, kianago. While Wiru remained wary of Europeans, they were starting to recognize that, unlike spirits, they could be negotiated with as if they were people but, like spirits, they were a stronger and sometimes arbitrary power.
The indigenous trading system initially hindered relationships between whites and Wiru (cf. Hughes, 1977:12), yet once it was realized that a European presence offered much in the way of material advantages to a 'backwater' people, then this presence was not only tolerated but eventually desired. This development was related to the extensive use of shells and steel, in the central valleys of the Highlands, by patrol officers, prospectors and missionaries. Regional inflation resulted in the areas which profited from this trade, eventually reversing the directions of traditional trade routes (Hughes, 1978). People to the south of the central Highlands, traditionally the source of shells and steel, became disadvantaged in their trade relations with northerners, who now received these valuables directly from Europeans (ibid).

It is difficult to know what effects this had on Wiru, they may have been better off in trade as their major export, pigs, were now, due to inflation, traded for more valuables than was usual. Yet Wiru, who were peripheral in the trade network anyway, were probably not inundated by shells and steel, and only benefited from the surplus of these goods among their non-Wiru trading partners. While steel was fairly common in the 1950's (Mendi PR5/52-3), shells have never been prolific. Still, even a minor improvement in their trading position could have been attributed to Europeans (and the use of kapona bina indicates that Europeans were seen as the source of the new valuables), and it is not surprising that during the 1950's many Wiru men made the long and dangerous walk to Ialibu station to trade food with the 'kiaps' for steel, shells and scraps of white civilization. If such a walk was necessary, it provides support for the view that Pangia's trade prospects were not overly improved by European interference in trade,
and that these prospects would, from the Wiru perspective, benefit from a closer contact with kianago.

In other parts of the Highlands this reversal of trade routes led to the emergence of cargo cults among people who had previously controlled the entry of items into and out of these routes (Strathern, 1971). Wiru never exercised this sort of control but I will argue later that a sense of 'deprivation' affected the acceptance of Europeans, and in particular of missions, by Wiru in an attempt to increase their access to wealth through 'ritual' means (see 2b and 2c).

Recent articles by Healey (1982, 1983) provide another dimension to this discussion. He argues that the sociological implications of trade have been neglected in preference to concentrating on its economic and ecological importance for the areal integration of people:

Trade can mediate relationships between distant people by more than the equitable transfer of material goods. It does this by providing a context for other expressions of social solidarity, such as hospitality, trust and generosity. These are articulated in the idiom of kinship, and serve to bind the individual into an open-ended moral universe far exceeding the limitations of the everyday exigencies of group definition and political process (Healey, 1982:32).

Healey bases his argument on data he collected on trade among the Maring, a people who have been and continue to be heavily involved in trade both inside and outside of their geographical boundaries. Trade within Pangia undoubtedly had sociological significance, although Pangia's lack of specialized exports and its peripheral relation to the wider trade system meant that the social impact of trade, in comparison with Maring, was of a different order.
I have suggested above that the Wiru radial marriage pattern* was partly to ensure a distribution of trade valuables within Pangia district. This makes for an interesting comparison with Maring; Healey states that kinship relations can be patterned on trade relations (ibid.), whereas for Wiru I would argue that, rather than constructing kin where they trade, as do Maring, there is more emphasis in Pangia on marriage creating trade connections (see 3c).

The way in which trade serves to construct social relationships is, therefore, different in various societies, and the relationships which Highlanders made with Europeans, through trade or through the manner in which trade affected their outlook, will vary from society to society. Because trade outside of Pangia was not well developed and the economy relatively insular, Wiru were initially less 'sophisticated' in their dealings with Europeans but, once they were better known, their presence was eagerly anticipated for the rewards this would bring. The trade experience of Wiru, I would argue, affected the acceptance of kianago and the course of development in Pangia.

Trade remains important for Maring partly for its social aspects but also because they continue to have an export market for their forest products (Healey, 1983). Regardless of similarities in the Wiru and Maring colonial experience, trade out of Pangia has virtually ceased (yet see 3c) with the exception of cassowary exports to Mendi in the mid-sixties to early seventies (during the cassowary 'boom' for competitive exchange). There are various reasons for this; one already presented is that Pangia never really had an export market or any

* If a generalization from Takuru data is permitted.
specialized exports, another is that Pangia is better served by a road network and has become, relative to Maring, more integrated into the national capitalist economy through coffee sales, better access to regional markets, etc. Wiru were quite prepared to forego their traditional dependence on external and better placed trading partners to overcome what was, until recently, a marked imbalance in the flow of valuables.

Wiru perceptions of their disadvantaged position in the trade network (to which I think the origin story alludes) and of the fact that they were among the last people in the Southern Highlands to be encapsulated into the colonial order, influenced their response to the eventual European presence, as well as their enthusiasm for development. Two observations will be made here that are centrally related to the issue of trade. The first is that twice as many marriages, in Takuru, are made to the west than the east, i.e., affinal connections are more numerous the closer to the traditional shell-stone axe trade route. Out of 33 marriages contracted in the last ten years, 2.7 times as many unions are made to the west than east, as it is still the west (the northern stone axe trade is no longer important) which controls the 'trade' in valuables (money), as well as being the direction from which roads enter Pangia and which connect to the Highlands Highway. Also, villages closer to Pangia have more coffee and 'bisnis' and are 'richer', and make more attractive settlements with which to set up exchange relationships. This suggests that the internal flow of wealth in Pangia is regulated or channelled in much the same way, i.e., money can be redistributed, as are valuables, through the marriage-trade network. Secondly, that money is treated as a valuable as well as commodity by Wiru (see 3c) strongly implies that the principal
source of money — coffee — is an item which, like pigs, is 'traded' for money in much the same way as valuables were traded before pacification (although the 'trade routes' are, of course, different).

The significance of the above is to indicate that post-pacification economic relationships can be viewed as 'doing' to some extent much the same thing as trade, and that the coffee-money transaction can be understood in terms of an areal integration into a wider 'trade' network. Yet there is still a social dimension to the use of money in marriage transactions, perhaps evidenced by statements that daughters are 'coffee trees' (see 3c). Money has replaced other traded items, with the exception of shells, in bridewealth, and that unions are sometimes made outside of Pangia may mean that a social relationship through exchange, created by marriage, is desired.

FOOTNOTES

1. When steel was first introduced it seems that headmen especially obtained it as they had more wealth, and initially one axe fetched more than one pig, and kina shells were also exchanged for steel.

2. There is a story that one of these men was eaten and his boots cooked because it was thought they were flesh (the fact that they were inedible provoked great delight). This probably refers to the killing and consumption of the missionary Chalmers on Goaribari island in 1901, the story of these acts being passed up the trade route to eventually reach Pangia in the 1920's.

3. The Wiru language was called Abage by Leahy, either after a local group name or his recording of the word for speech or talk — agale.

4. I know of no myth where ancestors will return bearing gifts, common in areas which supported cargo cults, and which influenced the reception of whites.

5. Strathern reports a cargo cult was in the Ialibu area in the early forties (A. Strathern, 1971B:257). It spread north but not to Pangia, perhaps because Wiru did not have the chance to 'buy' it before 'kiaps' stamped it out. An alternative reason is that Wiru did not experience the same problems in the exchange system as
Ialibu big men, who lost their monopoly over shells, and therefore would not have felt a 'need' to redress an imbalance in exchange by engaging in cargo cult activity (cf. Brunton, 1971; A. Strathern, 1971B). An argument against this is that Wiru did experience a degree of 'relative deprivation' in terms of trade with the 'outside' and may have accepted a cult to rectify this perception. I do not know, however, if Wiru even knew of the Ialibu cult.

6. It is interesting to compare the experiences of the two expeditions, Leahy commented on the prevalence of warfare while Champion remarked that the area he explored appeared quite peaceful (Leahy, 1936; Champion, 1940).

7. One plus in Pangia's trade position may have been the pacification of areas that Wiru traded with, allowing for wider contacts to be made. Yet there were still villages in 1955 which used stone axes, and which filed steel axes in two because of their rarity (Ialibu PR3/55-6).

8. An interesting comparison can be made with the Pubi people of the Nembí Plateau, which supports my argument. Pubi were advantaged by trade until the arrival of Europeans, and the loss of their importance in the trade network influenced their reception of whites and led to Pubi resentment, lack of assistance, surliness, etc. (Crittenden, 1982:246).
2a.2 PACIFICATION AND MADNESS

World War II slowed down the rate of pacification and Pangia was probably not visited again until 1952 by a government patrol led by D. Sheekey and R. Claridge (see map). It went for 87 days starting from Mendi and took in the eastern portion of the Southern Highlands, Mt. Karimui and the lower Wahgi Valley, finishing in Mt. Hagen (Mendi PR5/52-3). This was Takuru's first experience of Europeans, which was repeated in 1955 when a headman was arrested for killing a Mele man, and taken to Ialibu for sentencing (Ialibu PR4/54-5).

Mendi was the centre of administration for the then Southern Highlands District and the post-war period saw an expansion of Australian authority and patrolling. In its drive towards District control, Ialibu in 1953 became, for nine years, the administration's most eastern station. Between 1953 and 1961 there were a number of patrols through Pangia in an attempt to halt fighting and to initiate relations prior to the establishment of Pangia station, which occurred in September 1961. Some of these patrols were for medical purposes, such as anti-yaws control, and a few informants remember being given injections.

Although Pangia was derestricted later than most large language areas in the Southern Highlands, it did receive a reasonable amount of attention from seven patrols in the decade up to 1960. It was not until 1958 that a major patrol led by P.O.'s Keenan and O'Neill contacted most Wiru groups on the Poru plateau. Pangia station, in fact, was supposed to have been opened in 1956 or '57, soon after Ialibu was established, but delays due to lack of assistance and resources moved its opening to
1961 (Mendi PR5/53-4). By this time many Wiru had been to Ialibu or Kaupena, and some had found employment outside Pangia (mainly as mission hands).

During the fifties Wiru became aware that kianago were not just transitory figures passing through their country. Ialibu station was less than 10 km. from the nearest Wiru population and in the mid to late fifties visits were made there by men from close lying as well as more distant settlements. The incentive was to obtain steel, shells and the like, which Wiru believed were being distributed by station personnel. Usually, though, people were disappointed and the food they took for exchange was barely reciprocated by bottles, paint or salt. Often they had to labour (as did Wiru prisoners) on construction at Ialibu station or on the road to Pangia, such that Wiru had a fair experience of 'kiaps' before 1960, and often refer to the fear and insecurity they felt in the presence of Europeans. This was compounded by their association with uali, hostile wild spirits.

These visits were often made by headmen or adventurous young men, who were frequently appointed as representatives of the new power in their home area, and given blue 'laplaps' and 'numbers' (badges of authority). This, together with patrols into Pangia and the relation of observations made in Ialibu - airstrips, wealth, what Europeans required of indigenes, etc. - led Wiru to the realization that at some stage they were next in line for colonial control and to some notions, however vague, of what this forthcoming presence would entail. Demonstrations of the potential of 'kiaps' were being given by patrols suppressing warfare, arresting killers, and arranging compensation between enemies by making them kill pigs together.
By 1956, it was only Wiru to the south of the Poru plateau, where fighting continued perhaps until 1960, who still regarded the colonial presence "as a force which they may have to reckon with, but which for the most part is something situated far away from them, and with little concern for them and their actions" (Ialibup R1/56-7). Yet this observation fails to acknowledge that Wiru in this region were aware of this impending external control and displays of autonomy may have been a response to this awareness, as were later outbreaks of 'madness'.

Although Pangia was a restricted area, during this period at least one mission had been into the district encouraging young Wiru men to travel to outside mission stations, where they were indoctrinated in a variant of Christianity and received more information about Europeans and their intentions and promises:

The mission had the wise plan of taking some boys from the areas they planned to enter, and training them in advance of their coming, so that on the doors opening, they would have ready-trained nationals to go with them to the new field (Ridgway, 1976:72).

Perceptions of the consequences of colonial encroachment varied throughout Pangia with the extent of direct experience, and with the spread of rumours based on limited knowledge.

There were two major outcomes of this increased European contact with Wiru, which occurred at about the same time in the early sixties. One was the start of influenza epidemics, which killed significant numbers of people. I have no accurate figures for deaths in Takuru but informants stated that nearly everyone died. This exaggeration implies how serious the situation was, at least forty people died on evidence
from my genealogical records. In Tunda, a settlement of comparable population size, A. Strathern estimates about one hundred deaths from this epidemic, a greater number than that judged by medical teams for the entire Pangia area (A. Strathern, 1977:132). These estimates from Takuru and Tunda suggest mortality rates of between 10% to 20% for the district.

The other outcome was fits of collective 'madness' among young men, analysed in detail by Strathern (1977). Initially, the presence of small parties of Europeans was largely a mystery and did not provoke any general response from the Wiru population. This situation changed when patrols increased in frequency and a colonial power base was established in Ialibu. The object of these patrols was not only to pacify and assess the area, they also spread news of the administration's intentions to colonize the Poru plateau. The scale of madness, and its particular manifestation, which Strathern reports for Tunda and surrounding settlements was not apparent in Takuru or further north over the Polu river. That this more southerly region was the last to be effectively patrolled, and that people here had the example of the north Poru already under control, may be the reason for the local nature of this outbreak. By being 'last', these Wiru felt even more threatened and confused by the approaching colonial embrace.

The collective madness in the south was thought to be spread by Europeans (ibid:138). In Takuru, it was further stated that 'kiaps' put 'chemicals' in the river which 'tamed' Wiru upon drinking its water, and caused the onsets of fits in some individuals, mostly young men. 'Taming' made Wiru ready for the acceptance of European authority: the injections given by medical patrols were also said by some to have
'tamed' them, as well as initiating madness. Wiru men needed an explanation for the loss of their image as aggressive fighters and for their complicity in 'kiap' directives to abandon warfare, which relates to the notions of emasculation discussed in 2d. This 'chemical' interpretation is not found in Strathern's account which is based on data collected in 1967, and is perhaps a result of education and other experiences after twenty years of colonialism; incorporating chemicals into the explanation serves to update versions of what happened.

A reason why young men, bachelors or recently married, exhibited this behaviour is that madness in many Highlands societies may be an anti-social response (but also cultural, see Robin, 1981, and Clarke, 1973 on madness as theatre) at the collective or individual level to highly emotional conflict situations. Young Wiru men "on the verge of feeling, or coming under the pressures of the exchange system, of adult society and its possible accompanying rivalries" (Strathern, A. 1977:133, translation), were more susceptible to such situations as it them that the future threatens most. And, with warfare put down, young men were lacking in ways to channel their aggressiveness and prove themselves as men (which relates to the notion of 'taming'). Madness took a form common to Highland societies, that of 'wild man' behaviour, which "fulfils for a time the cultural ideal of being an aggressive and dynamic man" (Clarke, 1973:208) in a situation where male adulthood, and its achievement, becomes problematic.

Strathern suggests that the telling of stories of madness, their elaboration and the element of humour they contain, is a way of reflecting on the changes preceding colonization and on the reasons
for Wiru responses. The behaviour itself was partly the result of realizing that change was imminent, and choice was not being offered:

What the white men were bringing with them was a new system of control over ownership, behaviour and power. Wiru could not avoid subjugation to this control ... Policeman, guns, labour, rules and regulations, all these together must have given rise to the image of powerful control. If that is the case, the reaction of madness was reversal; to put one's self 'out of control', thus giving a powerful temporary 'answer' to the whites' arrival (A. Strathern, 1977:139, translation).

It seems likely, as in the example given by Strathern (ibid:139), that madness resulted when new authority, represented by 'kiaps' and appointed policemen, was made manifest, or in situations where the dramatic impact that this authority presaged was perceived.

Those who became mad frequently ran to other settlements where they produced this behaviour in other young men, also aware of these new pressures, by the power of their displays; "ideas can be as contagious as actions" (Frankel, 1976:117). Madness, in this situation, was indeed spread by Europeans although, because of their association with hostile spirits, to:

attribute the cause of the fit to the strange intruding Europeans is, in a way, equivalent culturally to attributing it to evil spirits (A. Strathern, 1977:138, translation).

There are similarities between madness and the trance or possession states common to cargo cults, which invert relations of power and domination. The mad young men were to some extent acting like whites by behaving arbitrarily and causing disorder. By acting out their transformations, these young men were perhaps attempting to gain control
or power over others as a response to their loss of autonomy. That is, they were putting themselves 'in' and not 'out of control'.

Walí can possess people and drive them mad, but this can give those possessed a power as ritual specialists. Tangu, as reported by Burridge, saw whites as sorcerers (Burridge, 1969:159), which is a similar and apt perception to that of Wiru given the uncontrollable and non-reciprocal nature of Europeans. The latter were also known as kapona, as were their manifestations such as axes and aeroplanes, and as recorded above it was thought by some Takuruns that a flying axe (aeroplane) would come and kill them. This illustrates the fear and uncertainty Wiru felt in anticipation of European arrival, or at least felt towards objects associated with these strange new people (which influenced their reception). But by acting like Europeans, who had great wealth and were now in control, young men may have been identifying with them as a new type of 'ritual specialist', with the power of this position flowing to young men through possession by Europeans.3

These notions of 'possession' and 'response to colonial control' will be returned to in a later section (4a), but it is worth noting here that there may be 'religious' dimensions to madness and that "possession .. may be the source of importance relevations to the community" (Stephen, 1979:13). Also, psychological explanations of madness are problematic and, ultimately, unprovable. I have to some extent subscribed to this explanation, but prefer a 'cultural' interpretation of this behaviour, which is explored further in 4a.
The 'epidemic' proportions of the madness and its spread throughout parts of Pangia suggest, if madness can be used as an indicator of varying receptive states, a qualitative difference in the reactions of Wiru, as opposed to other Highlanders, to European intrusion (which also reflects differences in the history of pacification in the Highlands). This does not deny that 'wild man' behaviour was a response to colonialism in other areas. Clarke reports that 20% of the male population of his Maring fieldwork village demonstrated this behaviour (Clarke, 1973:206), but it did not spread throughout the Maring area to the extent it did in Pangia, nor was it collective or directly attributed to the influence or intentions of Europeans.

I suspect that the scale and nature of Wiru madness was to do with Pangia's isolation, its late entry into colonialism, and the traditional expectations and fears of spirits and the 'outside world'. Paradoxically, the uncertainty and confusion which contributed to the madness was exacerbated by Wiru wanting Europeans to arrive so that the benefits and goods associated with them would come to Pangia — as the preliminary construction of an airstrip, independently of administration requests, illustrates (Pangia PR1/61-2) — while at the same time having no control over this presence. The airstrip construction also suggests possible cargo cult overtones to the European arrival, or at least a magical belief in the presence of airstrips bringing wealth. 4

The interesting aspect of these two 'epidemics' was that the madness was said to be caused by Europeans whereas the sickness, in Takuru at least, is still believed to be the result of ulo sorcery. Influenza followed or was contemporaneous with the madness but Europeans
were not blamed for it even though the connection would appear to have been obvious. The severity of the sickness outbreak would also seem to have pointed to a non-traditional explanation; the scale of madness was, after all, attributed to whites. (The ulo interpretation did, however, have a novel dimension as this type of sorcery was, along with the arrival of whites, a relatively recent phenomenon).

I can only suggest that madness, because of its 'novel' aspects, was interpreted in terms of novel causes, while the prospect of death through sorcery was an ever-present fear and a readily available explanation for misfortune. It was reported that more would die from ulo unless Takuruns became Christians (people said they went to get missionaries to stop these deaths) and at this stage of pacification Christianity was perceived, I would argue, as a cult (and continues to be so perceived, see 4b). The need for a superior ritual control after epidemics has been commented on by Glasse (1980) for the Huli of Tari district, and as in Tari this was a factor in the acceptance of Christianity and the mission in Takuru.

In a sense, the causes of both sickness and madness were 'traditional' and assessed as such in terms of existing knowledge and experience. The scale of the madness was novel but ultimately not life threatening, and blamed on European 'spirits'; unnatural death was not novel and the symptoms of influenza were more easily explained as sorcery. Sickness and death were seen to have their origins in social relationships, and the non-social or asocial relationship with Europeans would have prevented the attribution of this form of sickness to them. Sorcery has a rationale located in morality, while madness is arbitrary and caused by amoral, non-reciprocal spirits.
FOOTNOTES

1. See Rodman, 1979 for the use of the term 'pacification'.

2. World War II had little affect on Pangia, people reported seeing formations of 'planes flying overhead and it was said a 'plane crashed between Takuru and Weriko. Takuruns went to investigate but found only a hole in the ground and few scraps of metal which were used, they say, to make bushknives. This sounds more like a bomb, but stories of bombs being dropped occur elsewhere in Pangia and even in Kewa district. These stories, like the cooked boots tale, are most likely apocryphal, although what purpose they serve I am not quite sure, except that they herald the arrival of whites. In many bomb stories a woman was killed by the explosion while gardening. The details in these stories, and their spread, may be part of an attempt by Wiru to construct their own history of early relations with Europeans, just as madness tales relate to these first contacts.

3. The madness was not an attempt to supplant the control of authoritative Wiru men, rather it was to deny this control (as no longer capable) and perhaps to create the illusion of an equality of power with whites. In common with the trance and possession states reported for cargo cults, it may have been 'adaptive' for the short term by allowing young men an outlet for their fears, and perhaps to act them out in preparation for accepting a new order (cf. Clarke, 1973). The causes of such behaviour are still open to debate (see Clarke, 1973, Frankel, 1976, Robin, 1981).

4. Compare with Wagner's account of Daribi engaging in special introduced rituals to attract whites into their region in the 1940's (Wagner, 1967:2). See also Morren (1981:59) who compares the independent construction of airstrips by Miyanmin to a cargo cult, which did not eventuate because 'cargo' did arrive, as it did in Pangia.

5. Influenza was the forerunner of venereal disease, respiratory tract infections, and of an increase in malaria (from new strains and from the ability of malaria to 'follow' roads, i.e. from the greater number of puddles and pools that roadbuilding causes).
2b. "A BETTER WAY OF LIFE": DEVELOPMENT IN PANGIA

In 1951, the Central Highlands District was divided into three separate districts - Eastern, Western and Southern. The ruggedness and isolation of the latter contributed to delays in the consolidation of Australian control, and in the following decade the Southern Highlands was low on the list of colonial priorities. This situation continues to some extent and today, as the last district elevated to Provincial status (granted in 1978), it lags behind in economic development, health and education (although it can compete strongly with other Provinces in the number of missions per head of population):

The Southern Highlands is indeed the 'poor sister'. Surely no responsible person seriously believes that the economic development of 40% of the population of Papua can continue to be neglected indefinitely with impunity (Pangia PR1/66-7).

It was only with the imposed responsibility of preparing Papua and New Guinea for independence that the Australian administration attempted, through a policy of rapid development (ibid), to bring the Southern Highlands more into line with other Highlands areas. Initially this was made more difficult because of

1. the stagnation caused to the local economy by years of migration to plantations under the Highlands Labour Scheme (see Amarshi et al., 1979:41),
2. the problems and time involved in road construction in inhospitable terrain, and
3. lack of finances, resources and manpower.

It should be noted that the Mendi administration did as much as they could with the men and materials at hand, and patrol reports indicate
the frustration of not being able to do more, and of not getting the assistance thought necessary (see Pangia PR3/61-2). Still, the emphasis was on progress in as little time as possible, and it is arguable that this accelerated development was always in the best interests of the people.

The following is largely a description of the development of Pangia district by the Australian administration, interlaced with quotes from patrol reports of the period, which convey a picture of the colonial scene in Pangia much better than I can (not that they always present a 'true' account of development). Some of the consequences of colonialism are addressed, and will be discussed in greater detail in 2d. and later sections. I hope to have indicated above how Pangia's pre-pacification history and trade experiences may have had a particular effect on the acceptance of the colonial regime, missions, and plans for progress.

The history of development in Pangia has to be viewed in the context of this same history for the Southern Highlands:

But the goals of an encapsulating power alone do not determine the content of the linkages forged by pacification. Each episode of pacification occurs in a particular historical context that affects the course of subsequent events (Rodman, 1979:22, author's emphasis).

The time in which these events took place made the post-pacification history of Pangia different from other districts in the Southern Highlands, and Highlands in general. The reason for colonial control was not merely the creation of a 'pax Australiana', rather this was viewed as a necessary step towards achieving the Pangia administration's primary objective - development. I will discuss the period 1962 to 1975
under various headings, and attempt a brief conclusion at the end of this section.

(a) ATTITUDES TO DEVELOPMENT BY WIRU AND 'KIAPS'

By the time Pangia station was established in August 1961, and completely derestricted by June 1962, both Wiru and Pangia personnel seem to have had a clear idea of what was wanted in this district. Development was desired by all but Wiru, of course, had less of an idea of, and less control over, the way in which it was to be achieved. J. McCarthy, the Director of Native Affairs, wrote in 1961 that "excellent contact over the past decade has had its results of amicable relations and unusual co-operation from the people" (PR1/61-2). This led to recommendations for the early derestriction of the district (PR1/61-2). It appears that earlier patrols and experience with 'kiaps' and missionaries at Ialibu and Kaupena made Wiru eager for a European presence of their own, and they did appreciate the greater safety and mobility which came with prohibitions on fighting (PR3/61-2; PR4/70-1).

As early as 1961 the reports indicate the major purpose behind colonization:

it is to the energetic younger generation that we must look to for our major support in developmental programs and acceptance of our aims and hopes. For success obviously our aims, hopes, etc. must become theirs.

To this general purpose talks were given to each group dealing with overall need and necessity for improvement, aims, policy - general Administration propaganda - and a comparison drawn between coastal, other highland development, and the Wiru; pointing out the difference in the period of Administration control but stressing that the gap must be closed ....
These talks were extremely well received and in every case the people claimed the desire to progress and even stated that, while sometimes the actual needs and loftier ideals were somewhat obscure to them, all the Government had to do was direct the activity and they would provide it.

The several patrols to this area have pointed out that work, work and more work is necessary if any headway is to be seen ... they have received some pay, trade, plus the thrill of seeing planes land on the strip and so on, but this alone will hardly be enough to maintain enthusiasm. They want something of their own.

Patrols have stressed the importance of education and cash economy ... and it is here that they are especially keen.

The point of all this is that if we want to show real headway in this area we have the perfect opportunity now. With a positive economic development plan and the appearance of schools, aid posts, etc., there is no reason why Wiru should not surge ahead. Delay may cause waning interest which will make implementation of such plans much more difficult later on.

This can't realistically be called "going too fast". It is simply a case of catering for needs and demands. It was the government who stopped them fighting and told them if they heard the good word we could show them a better way of life and help them achieve it. They want the gap filled (PR3/61-2).

As Strathern rightly remarks, although Wiru were enthusiastic for development there was a strong element of coercion on the part of the administration (Strathern, 1982:93). Government work days were rigidly enforced and gaol sentences handed out for non-attendance - with prisoners supplying another pool of labour - and for failures to obey new rules, e.g. maintaining a proper standard of hygiene. One 'kiap' confided to me that people were even jailed for such things as not planting any or enough coffee trees (i.e. hindering development) under various pretexts such as not turning up for road work.

This coercion was partly from the necessity of 'catching up' with other areas, but it was also seen as an efficient "developmental technique" (PR3/61-2) in its own right:
Half-hearted stabs at it (development) are not good enough - could result in frustration and loss of interest. The Wiru, agriculturally, has not been tampered with and thus the Agricultural Department has a golden opportunity to go all out for a particular crop in the first instance; diversification can be considered at a later date. A well planned, fullscale assault, with clear policy as to crops and full support from the Agricultural Department is the answer. I believe anything falling short of this is nearly a waste of time; will result in a bitty, scratchy development ... and eventually fall flat on its face (PR3/61-2).

This coercive technique and the desire for development have to be seen in the context of the trepidation Wiru felt towards 'kiaps' and later symbols of colonial control, including Councillors and rural police officers, which influenced their willingness to commit their labour to Pangia's progress.

Nonetheless, that Wiru had development thrust upon them did not lessen their enthusiasm for undergoing this process, or for what they saw as its benefits:

there is a universal cry for money which is found from one side of the division to the other. Although the people's way of life has not been affected by the introduction of new foods or cash crops the realization of the value of money has produced almost a pre-occupation, at least while in the presence of 'white men', about complaining of their limited access to economic advancement (earning money). The people are more than willing to allow a European, be he a Mission representative or the lauded, almost mythological 'Company Master' to establish himself permanently amongst them (PR6/63-4).

... the people want progress, they realize they are well behind other Highland peoples economically and they fully appreciate that the best way of catching up is by cooperation and hard work (PR8/65-6).

* This 'pre-occupation' is related to the traditional perception of Pangia's disadvantaged trade position, which affected the Wiru response to development initiatives (see 2a.1).
The administration at Pangia saw clearly that if this district was to achieve in ten years what other areas were already experiencing in respect of development, then one of the greatest barriers to this were the forces of tradition and conservatism, which meant that people "must be politically, economically and socially adjusted" (PR1/70-1; see also PR3/62-3). 'Kiaps', together with the missions, attempted to change such things as marriage practices, agricultural practices, beliefs which were 'irrational' such as food taboos, etc. They also regulated pig-kills in terms of labour requirements, and tried to encourage the participation and dominance of younger men in Council activities and development schemes (PR3/61-2; PR8/67-8; see also 2d).

The administration was aware that Pangia was in a more or less unique position regarding the imposition of a concentrated development - there was talk of a 5 year development plan (PR5/69-70) - and 'propaganda' programme, but they were not totally oblivious that this approach could be having unforeseen effects:

the change and development of the area has been rapid and very satisfactory for so short a space of time. No doubt there have been quite remarkable stresses and strains to the society unknown, unnoticed by us ... bordering on the traumatic. Without question there has been quite an upheaval to the traditional existence and maybe the excellent conditions prevailing here are to some extent due to the nature of the people but largely to good fortune.

Pangia is lucky that it hasn't had to pass through the most frustrating periods of waiting for development ... Development has kept ahead of demand and this has been possible through a prevailing cooperation and willingness to work together by people and administration. Continuity of staff has proved itself most effective here (PR5/69-70).

However, in some areas not even the enthusiasm or coercion of 'kiaps' could prevail over traditional values and practices, especially when it came to pigs and gardening:
The Pangia pig culture is the basis of the society and is thus the real reason why the agricultural economy and probably political growth, as we are promoting it, are so slow in developing. The very best thing that could happen here would be complete extermination of pigs or at least a complete change in pig husbandry methods (PR3/71-2; see also PR4/70-1).

The "cult of the pig" (PR5/73-4) and the force of tradition seriously interfered with the administration's plan to turn Wiru into a "farming peasantry", even though it was recognised that there was a "price to pay" for these designs (PR1/70-1). There was an almost total neglect of the social impact of turning Wiru into peasants, and of the fact that societies themselves affect the course of development, hence they should be understood before plans are made. Encouraging the emergence of a peasantry - this was aimed at as a terminal not transitional stage (see Howlett, 1973) - and the example of peasant entrepreneurs was seen as the best method for removing customs which delayed development, as well as for bringing Pangia more into line with other areas.

The role of individual personalities and the continuity of staff in bringing development, often in the face of criticism or inaction from superiors, has to be acknowledged, as does the fact of their unceasing efforts to do what was thought to be best for Pangia in the face of the "inequity of government assistance" (PR5/69-70):

Had we stuck rigidly to 'policy' we would have no economic projects under way at all and the area would be backward, economically bereft and politically unhappy (or potentially so). The truth is that we have pressed ahead in the face of continued opposition for which we are unpopular at Regional and H.Q. levels ... (PR8/69-70).
The lack of financial and technical assistance from the central administration moved the Pangia A.D.C. to write that:

it almost appears that there are forces in this country determined to cripple development ... It would seem that everyone with a say in these matters is very busily pretending that Pangia doesn't exist - possibly as it may be acutely embarrassing to have Pangia develop quicker than some of the longer established areas (PR1/66-7).

The paucity of aid which Pangia 'kiaps' received meant a strong dependence on self-help concepts to promote development, and Wiru were initially very keen in road-building so that 'their plantation' could start (PR8/65-6). Yet the apparent lack of return on investments and arduous labour led to much disillusionment and perhaps anomie by the end of the 1960's (cf. A.Strathern, 1982B), and to critical comments on this attitude by some 'kiaps':

The theory of self-help and Rural Development funds seems a little absurd to these people as they are only interested in the money they can get in their hands, not in some nebulous figure which includes the self-help component. At present the people will work for 20c. per day and are fairly happy to do so, not through any selfless motives of self-help, but merely because its a cash wage. When they refuse to work for 20c./day no appeals to their patriotism or the advancement of Pangia will make them work, unless the rate is raised (PR16/71-2).

The enthusiasm for hard work in the sixties was transformed by the seventies to an attitude which was perceived as "completely mercenary and equally as astute" (PR10/71-2).

Pangia administration continued to see a bright future for Wiru if the hard work, self-help and government assistance were kept up:
the Pangia area ... is poised on the brow of the hill and once over should gain momentum rapidly (PR3/71-2); I predict within 10 years the area will be really moving and prosperity will result (PR4/66-7).

Expressions of optimism were sometimes contradicted by statements such as:

Pangia may be considered to be ahead of most Southern Highlands areas but, if it is, the reason is simply continuity (of staff) rather than any real self-help or local drive or ambition (PR3/71-2).

Independence, a desire for wages rather than self-help, and disappointments with development schemes proved the optimism of the administration ill-founded. Pangia never quite made it over the hill, but one has to respect the single-mindedness and energetic, if sometimes naive, pursuit of what was, with hindsight, an unrealistic goal (given the limited time-span with which 'kiaps' had to work).

(b) SOME EFFECTS OF, AND RESPONSES TO, DEVELOPMENT

Other consequences of development will be discussed below, here I confine myself to the topics of land and marriage disputes, and dependence.

1. Land disputes: one of the first problems to receive attention from the administration was the increasing frequency of land disputes, and this gradually became the "largest problem" (PR1.70-1) by the late sixties. The original cause of this increase was the cessation of warfare, which led to the return of groups vanquished from their natal lands (now being claimed by the victors in warfare):
... most land disputes originate from ... one side claiming the ground by conquest, the other by heritage and usage (PR1/73-4).

This problem, with 'kiap' intervention, eventually started to sort itself out as there is no land shortage in Pangia. But these disputes were then exacerbated by new factors such as the introduction of cash crops and cattle projects, and the alienation of land for government purposes or expatriate development. Intra-district disputes were usually over usage rather than ownership, and compounded by population increases after pacification (PR1/70-1), and by a breakdown in traditional authority:

The power of the older leaders in designating land for usage and having some measure of control over what individuals may do on that land seems to be rapidly dwindling (PR10/72-3).

The changing perception of land with its potential to earn money led to increased vigour in claims of refugees to natal land, as well as increased contesting of claims of usage (PR4/73-4) and to some outbreaks of skirmishing:

... land was used usually by more than one group in the past, but now with the desire to consolidate ownership for future development, economic or subsistence, much land that was not disputed before is now being contested for the first time (PR14/72-3).

Other categories of land which were previously of little concern also caused acrimony between groups and individuals; this was land shared by allies or co-resident groups, no-man's land between enemy groups, and land bordering enemy or neutral groups (PR2/72-3). There was a traditional flavour to these disputes as they were sometimes used as a
new method of gaining revenge on enemy groups (PR9/66-7). Another outcome of this changing perception was that more land was desired by some men to increase their status, especially those who had seen plantations in other areas; this was the start of new inequalities between men, and of the possible emergence of elites and class differences (see 'tea', this section).

The administration was concerned over the extent and persistence of these disputes because of the threat they posed to Wiru unity, hence district development, and attempted to legislate because:

only when there has been a sensible land tenure system imposed on the people will we get any real order and planning into rural development. The brawls and upheaval will be great but once done there will exist a system conducive to rapid development .... The present system ... is a severe handicap to any semblance of unity within the area (PR3/71-2).

Although it was thought that when the older generation died these disputes would cease with the end of old animosities (PR11/73-4), younger men inherited the rivalries and antagonism of their fathers. Disputes continue today and could cause serious problems in the future; claims may be satisfied by legal process but the social and political dimensions of land tenure are unlikely to be controlled by legislation (which never occurred anyway) and will cause more problems if they are not considered for their part in dispute initiation.

2. marriage disputes: these problems also received early mention in the patrol reports, although they were not regarded as serious as land disputes for their adverse affects on development (changes in marriage practices and bridewealth are dealt with in 3c). The Pangia
administration and Local Government Council (L.G.C.) succeeded in changing some aspects of marriage practice, notably preventing the taking of child brides (PR4/66-7). They had less success, however, in dealing with problems arising from the Highlands Labour Scheme (H.L.S.) and the introduction of cash into bridewealth transactions. The Council also considered setting upper limits on bridewealth and on the kin categories of people who received it, but these actions were never put into effect. Social change and inflation in bridewealth, according to the administration, led to much friction and dispute (PR9/66-7) and as I argue in 3c. this was strongly linked to a change in the form but not the content of the bridewealth transaction.

Money certainly had a significant impact:

The role of bride price appears to be changing from that of cementing a marriage to a profit-making one. There are cases of women leaving their husbands because of insistence by their relatives. The relatives then repay as little as possible of the bride price (PR2/72-3);

and education had little effect on bridewealth vis-a-vis changing the perception of women as a source of wealth:

Girls are considered by parents here to be a commercial asset due to their value in bride price, there is reluctance to educate them for fear they will leave the village to seek employment outside the area and deny their parents of an income (PR11/73-4).

The H.L.S. attracted many married men out of the district and when they returned often found their wives living with other men, leading to disputes over the return of bridewealth. The other factor which led to an increase in the number of divorces, disputes, and assaults on women
was what 'kiaps' refer to as the start of female 'emancipation' (PR9/66-7), which was their description of women's efforts (under colonial and mission protection) to improve their status and role in society (see Appendix A on women and development). The absence of men as migrant labourers meant that women assumed more responsibilities in food and coffee production, and women thought this should reflect on their status (cf. Hayano, 1979:44-5). Some women refused to look after their husband's gardens and pigs, upon which a man's status ultimately depends (PR9/66-7). This is related to what Hayano calls the "socio-marital autonomy" of women, which is a product of the extent of their economic independence which comes from earning money, especially selling coffee and keeping the proceeds when the husband is absent (Hayano, 1979:46).

In a survey I conducted in 1981, women's share of the coffee income varied from a few kina to 50% of this income.

It seems that Wiru women were much more open than many of their Highlands counterparts to the benefits to their sex of colonialism, and much quicker to realize the potential for improving their position (and more likely to directly confront men over these new issues):

In marriage the traditional role of women is changing rapidly - they are no longer willing to be completely subject to the male whim. Increasingly marriages are breaking up, because of the women wanting to 'do their own thing' (PR2/72-3; see also PR4/73-4).

It is unlikely that Wiru women were ever "completely subject to the male whim" but, in Takuru at least, they continue to experience a 'traditional' male perception of their roles, partly to contain this 'emancipation', such that their status in society has not undergone any
significant transformations and in some respects may have worsened (cf. Hayano, 1979:50; and see 3c).

3. dependence: one outcome of the style of colonial management was the encouragement of a dependence on the administration. "With every new initiative on the part of an official ... a measure of indigenous autonomy was lost" (Hughes, l.1978:318), although a "sense of backwardness and dependency" (ibid) was not for Wiru initially fostered by the use of shells as currency by representatives of an intrusive economic and political power. In Pangia the use of money, in trade and as payments or compensation, had the same consequences as the use of shells in respect of creating new dependencies and inequalities, especially as development only gradually spread from the centre of power to the peripheries of settlement.

To accelerate the rate of progress in Pangia, 'kiaps' had to become very authoritarian in their imposition of a rigid discipline of work, and often punished those who disobeyed or neglected their developmental responsibilities (called the 'kiap system' of development (PR3/71-2)). It is not surprising that as early as 1966 the reports stated that:

the most insignificant quarrels and problems are brought before the patrol for arbitration and it would appear, merely to satisfy the pride of one party or another to have a decision given in his favour (PR9/66-7).

Yet the 'kiaps' did not see this tendency for what it really was, a shift in the locus of power relations which created a dependence on the administration for motivation, direction, funding, and leadership (cf. Strathern, A.1982B, Hughes, l.1978):
so long as the present system remains no real sense of urgency will drive these people forward as they consider the benevolent government - as it now exists - will provide and will protect (PR3/71-2);

... they would rather earn a regular wage and sell their resources to others than develop their own land and become entrepreneurs themselves (PR4/73-4).

The prospect of an immediate money income was more attractive than promises about the future success of labour intensive development schemes. The 'cocooning' affect of a management style in fact encouraged this attitude, and running to the 'kiap' was not to satisfy pride but because there was no other alternative to dispute settlement with the ban on warfare and the dissolution of traditional leadership and the social order (PR2/71-2). One officer was "amazed to see to what extent the people relied on 'kiaps' to solve their problems no matter how small" (PR4/72-3), and another, writing of the Wiru fear that Europeans would leave after independence, reported that:

It is perhaps a natural sentiment as this area has had to take the leads and examples from expatriates in government and mission organizations in the relatively short time that the area has come under European contact. They still rely heavily on the presence of these expatriates for direction, advice and the opportunities to earn a little cash. This strong reliance ... hasn't made it easier to develop a confidence in the ability of themselves (PR10/72-3).

This situation did not improve with time, and in a 1980 report it was commented that "the people have to be led hand in hand or rather spoon fed" (PR1/80).

The same constraints inhibited the function and performance of the L.G.C., which was dependent on European field staff for expertise and supervision (PR10/73-4), and as soon as this was withdrawn the Council
floundered and was actually accused of hindering development (PR4/81). Also, part of the power invested in the Council was from its association with colonial authority (PR8/70-1), and even in 1971 it was predicted that the end of this association would bring failure (PR3/71-2).

Various propaganda campaigns addressed social, political and economic aspects of development in an attempt to make Wiru aware of the need for self-help and cultural unity, but it seems that they could not keep up with the rapid and extensive social changes which occurred in Pangia. The failure to consider this in planning contributed to the moribund state of affairs post-independence.

(c) LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL

One of the first developmental initiatives was to create a Local Government Council as a means of focusing attention on the potentialities of Pangia (PR3/61-2). The first elections occurred in 1965 and they resulted in 19 men obtaining Councillor positions, but by the late sixties 41 Councillors represented 36 wards in Pangia. The administration had high hopes for the important role the Council would play in promoting development and the concepts necessary for its acceptance, and for bridging the gap between administration and Wiru (PR5/65-6):

The Council has involved itself readily and deeply in many facets of local affairs. It is particularly active in the field of economic development whilst being involved also in social matters such as education, health and women's activities. Through its involvement in local affairs the Pangia Council is becoming ever-increasingly accepted as a decision and policy making body in this area. It is proceeding well to the day when it will be able to take over complete control of local affairs in this area (PR7/69-70).
Yet the optimism with which the Council was perceived masked to some extent the fact of its dependence on the administration and the negative consequences this would have after independence.

The majority of Councillors were older men and traditional leaders, and the administration was concerned at their conservatism and with the difficulties of replacing them with younger and more innovative men (PR10/71-2). By the early seventies, as with many other development projects, the signs were there that the L.G.C. could be headed for failure from the "growing communication gap between the village people and their elected leaders" (PR8/70-1). In 1976 most of the Councillors re-elected were older men, previous incumbents or mature 'bislismen' (PR4/76-7), partly because young men were viewed suspiciously (PR3/71-2) or as not competent, but also because older men were voted for out of loyalty, or for their unwillingness to make people work. Ironically, the older Councillors favoured a gradual over a forced development:

The bulk of the Pangia Council is made up of older, conservative men who, whilst in favour of development, are against any rapid changes and wish to see gradual development taking its own course without any real pressure on the people to hurry along (PR2/70-1).

It is perhaps a minor tragedy that these wishes were ignored, as they were relevant to the long-term realities of development. Nonetheless, the inadequacies of the L.G.C. system were recognized and predicted:

If, for example, the Pangia Council were to take over full and complete control of its area and the overseas advisors and controls were removed, the efficiency would be reduced to a shambles. The Councillors would give themselves a large pay increase and buy one or two cars. The area may vaguely survive but only because villages do behave and may be prepared to follow (our) reasonable guidelines (PR3/71-2).
The Council, which was multi-racial, received much praise for its work and its input into local development, but its central weakness—hinted at in the above quote—was that by the 1970's the (non-Wiru) clerk and adviser were "doing the great majority of the work" (PR1/70-1). Also, many people had little idea of what the role of the Council was, and interest in it was "appalling low" (PR8/70-1). Simply, the L.G.C. lacked experience, capable members, and the expertise to carry on projects initiated under colonial rule. This was a situation recognised by the administration (PR9/73-4), yet the failure to respond to such things as dependence rendered the Council into a low profile, if not ineffective, organization after independence.

The holding of elections also diminished the authority of Councillors which, in turn, affected the efficiency of the Council. One 'kip' reported that the majority of Councillors were "abysmally ignorant and ineffective", and were elected as the people least likely to disrupt the lives of the voters with work (PR13/71-2). Another wrote that "the Councillors' contribution to the running of the Council or the Council area is appallingly low" (PR3/71-2). This was related to the 'youth' of Pangia in comparison with other areas, and twenty years was seen as a period necessary for the emergence of a viable Council (PR3/71-2). The coercive and rapid pace of development is hard to reconcile with this knowledge; the administration felt more responsibility in bringing Pangia into line with other areas for the arrival of independence, and less for preparing Pangia for this eventuality.

The L.G.C. was involved in financing development schemes in Pangia, and was responsible for the allocation of funds to cattle projects,
coffee nurseries, roadbuilding, etc. The tax collected from Wiru went straight to the Council and, by the mid-seventies, comprised up to 20% of its total revenue of about $100,000 p.a. ($40,000 in the late sixties, $60,000 in the early seventies). Some figures on incomes and taxes are now presented for various financial years to give an indication of the growth of the Pangia economy (head tax was gradually raised as the economy improved, from 50c. for men, 30c. for women in 1966, to K6 for men, 50t. for women in 1977).

Table 6: Incomes and taxes in Pangia districts in various years.

| Tax collected:          | 1966/7  $1,759.60; 1967/8  $1,113.50; 1968/9  $8,500; 1969/70  $10,088.50; 1970/1  $13,073; 1972/3  $13,404; 1973/4  $20,000; 1975/6  K18,159. |
| Per capita income:      | 1964 90c.; 1967/8  $1.77; 1968/9  $2.80; 1970/1  $3.35 |
| Cash distributed:       | 1968/9* | 1970/1 |
| $8,300  | food and firewood purchased by mission, government, private sales | $8,950 |
| $13,600 | earnings from internal wage labour | $25,000 |
| $10,000 | earnings from sale of timber | $4,100 |
| $18,000 | earnings from other sources | $22,000 |
| $49,000 |  | $60,550 |

* in this year $10,000 was held in savings accounts in the Pangia bank.

Unfortunately, the information under 'cash distributed' in the table could not be found in other available reports, so a long-term view of the economy is not obtainable (although an income of $10 p.a. was
expected by the mid-seventies (PR1/70-1), and my crude estimate for 1980 is between K25 and K30). I assume that 'earnings from other sources' includes money from wage labour outside Pangia; the amount of money from deferred wages is only referred to twice in the reports. This does, however, give some indication of the large amounts of money involved: for the first six months of 1970 $29,187# (PR8/69-70), and in 1973/4 it was estimated that $200,000, perhaps more, was earnt in outside work (PR4/73-4).

When this is combined with the $100,000 invested in development by the Council in the seventies, it can be seen that a reasonable amount of money was circulating in the Pangia economy, and the desire for it was probably commensurate with the increasing volume of money flowing into the area over the years. This is one reason why a demand for wages overshadowed the necessity for self-help in development, especially as money was increasingly coming into use as a valuable in bridewealth and other exchanges. This contributed to the lessening appeal and influence of the Council.

Interestingly, according to the reports a significant amount of money was absorbed by donations to missions. In 1970 it was estimated that upto $26 p.a. was given by adult men in donations, as opposed to $2 p.a. head tax for adult males. This was seen as unsatisfactory by the administration because this was money 'wasted' that would otherwise have gone into the local economy or development schemes (PR8/70-1). If only $10 p.a. was given by each man in 1970, the missions accounted for perhaps $30,000 annually. Missions were also blamed for defaulters at

# This figure suggests that deferred wages were not included in 'earnings from other services'.
tax time after baptisms and donations had drained money from local communities (PR2/70-1).

The failure of labour intensive development schemes and the lack of direction in Council leadership brought forth an observation in 1981 that was very different from early expectations of the future performance of Councillors:

Councillors are a hindrance to development in all areas. They tend to coach their people that they are to expect payment for whatever work they do ... (they give) no consideration ... to the Council's finance capability and willful contribution to district development (PR4/81).

The Pangia L.G.C. was, to an extent, a 'front' for the colonial administration - but without any of its powers - and Councillors became more concerned with parochialism as the L.G.C. lost even this function, and as frustration with the Councillor role increased (cf. Salisbury, 1964:234). Generally, Councils were received favourably in the Highlands because of their strong association with a positively viewed administration and with development; in coastal areas which had a longer experience of colonialism, many educated younger people "saw councils as parasitical colonial puppets" (May, 1982:373). Since Independence, Highland Councils have generally escaped this classification and, in Pangia today, do little to attract outright criticism or praise (they do maintain roads, aid posts, markets, etc.). The Councillor position and local politics are discussed in 2d.
This scheme was a thorn in the side of 'kiaps' for years, and they constantly objected to a policy favoured by the Mendi administration (PR5/65-6):

I consider it (the H.L.S.) pure exploitation of cheap labour, a definite damper on local development and the major cause for numerous divorces and consequent running battles to repay or collect bride prices (PR1/66-7).

Many women returned to their natal land during their husband's absence, hence neglecting his gardens and pigs, or took up with other men to satisfy their various needs. The growth in migration to coastal or Highlands plantations, usually for a period of two years, is shown in the following table:

**Table 7**: The rise in labour migration from 1966 to 1973.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>673</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,129</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,400 to 1,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,472</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that in some years over 60% of the population of married men was outside the district, and upto 50% of the total workforce missing, suggests that much social, demographic and horticultural disruption occurred (see Harris, 1972, for a statistical breakdown of migration
The H.L.S. was also blamed as a reason for the increasing frequency of famines in Pangia, reinforcing the opinion of 'kiaps' that little was returned to Pangia for labour recruitment (PR5/67-8). Some Councillors tried to control the outflow of labourers by threatening a refusal of permission to plant cash crops on group land when they returned (PR1/66-7) but this had little affect on stemming the tide. A desire for cash and the boredom of post-pacification life encouraged migration, especially that of younger men who had received some education and who wanted to see the outside world.

The prospects of earning money from smallholder coffee started to lure people back, or discouraged them from going, in the mid-seventies (PR1/73-4; see also Harris, 1972:132). Previous experiences of and stories about plantation work also played a role in keeping people in the village, and in 1981 in Takuru people were much less keen to go to plantations. In this year nine men were working at plantations, six men were absent looking for work, and about forty men had previously worked at plantations and returned with no intention of engaging in this sort of work again. The limited potential for earning money, boredom and problems at home were among reasons given for labour migration, but most young men preferred to stay in Takuru if money could be earned there (the romance of the outside world seldom lures people away today).

People who have non-labourer work - sales assistants, drivers, mechanics, aid post orderlies, etc. - tend to be permanent or long-term migrants (about 15 men and 3 women in Takuru), whereas plantation workers usually return to Takuru. About 15% of the workforce is engaged in, or looking for, plantation work, which is down from 50% at the peak of the H.L.S. Now that the practice of wage deferrals has stopped (the
H.L.S. ceased in 1974) little money is in fact returned to the home area by labour migration. In the category of skilled migrant the percentage absent from Takuru is about 18%, yet this is not a meaningful statistic if these people are permanently absent from Takuru (out of a total of 18 only three of these migrants have made any significant contribution to Takuru 'bisnis', such as helping towards the purchase of a truck or the setting up of a trade store). Labour migration continues to have an impact, if a diminished one, on village life and the local economy, although I would not want to generalize from the Takuru data to Pangia as a whole.

The return of migrants had many social effects, as well as contributing to an increase in venereal disease (PR4/70-1):

The Councillors and the people generally complain that the returned recruits play cards, refuse to work with the people and generally try to adopt the status of 'bosboi' which naturally causes discontent (PR4/66-7).

The administration was more concerned with the economic than social implications of the H.L.S., although a few reports stated that the latter were not as serious as expected, mainly because men over thirty quickly adjusted back to life in the village; younger men were more disaffected and changed by the experience (PR2/72-3).

Returning recruits, who had a wider experience of Europeans and colonialism, helped to undermine the unsophisticated acceptance of self-help schemes and encouraged the demand for wages for labour (especially if gardens were suffering from lack of attention due to development projects, and food had to be bought). Older men were 'frightened' by
these younger returnees who neglected their responsibilities and ignored requests from their elders (PR3/71-2). This suggests that, together with the rise in marital disputes, some 'kiaps' had underestimated the breakdown in social order caused by the H.L.S., although they were willing to accept the threat it posed to the 'kiap style' of development.

By 1970 the situation vis-a-vis the H.L.S. had worsened to such an extent that the administration recognised the wider consequences of this scheme:

no other single factor has such a profound social, economic and moral effect as the H.L.S. on the Pangia area ... The initial work on cattle projects and coffee development is wholly dependent on cheap, intensive labour combined with financing by the Pangia Council. The stark fact is that this area has been grossly over-recruited to the detriment of any development plan (PR2/70-1).

The people who were actually praised for the stage of development reached in Pangia were women and old men (ibid), especially as little money was actually returned to Pangia from migrant labour until wage deferrals started in 1968. Even though this involved much cash being brought into the Pangia economy, the reports continued to maintain that the:

argument that they are earning money does not hold much water as the obvious long-term advantage to Pangia is for them to develop the economy and road system of this area first .... History may well condemn a system which permitted such a stripping of undeveloped rural Papua New Guinea to the detriment of the home area and, probably in the long term, the country as a whole to assist already developed areas (PR3/70-1).
In fact, later publications did blame the H.L.S. for stagnant local economies (see Amarshi et al., 1979).

(e) The main development schemes with which the administration and Wiru became involved will now be discussed.

1. Cattle projects: like all the other schemes, strong expectations were held for the establishment of a cattle industry in Pangia which would help to make the area economically self-sustaining (PR5/69-70). The L.G.C. was used as a means of promoting interest in cattle projects and for encouraging notions of good returns for cash and labour investments. Initially, land was alienated by the administration to give it "the necessary control over a new industry" (PR5/67-8), and by 1967 plans were developed to occupy all settlements south of the Polu River with cattle projects (PR2/67-8), with at least 25 acres under pasture per settlement. A minimum of 200 acres per project was aimed at (PR5/67-8), and eventually 1,000 acre plots for "future large-scale projects" (PR2/67-8) were desired. Alienated land was usually leased to individuals or small groups of men (PR2/71-3) although larger groups were involved in projects as a labour force. Individual lessees were selected for training in animal husbandry at Baiyer river in the Western Highlands (PR2/67-8).

The Council was actively involved in cattle projects - partly to encourage trust in them by the locals - but the expertise was supplied by field staff and D.A.S.F.* extension officers, later under the direction of a Rural Development Officer (PR8/69-70). One of the first

* Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries.
leases, developed in 1967, was of 172 acres with twenty head of cattle and five lessees; the $6,703 invested by the L.G.C. in fencing, stock and grass was mostly repaid by the lessees in a few years (PR7/69-70).

Many other projects of varying scale followed and in 1970 it was reported that "the cattle industry in Pangia shows much promise and should develop well and rapidly" (PR5/69-70). 2,400 acres were hoped to be fenced as the total for all original projects, with a total loan of about $15,000 (PR7/69-70), and $30,000 one year later (PR1/70-1). At the end of 1971, seven projects had been started or established with a total area of 2,028 acres (1,500 acres fenced) holding 221 cattle; four of the projects were run by missions or private enterprise, of 100 cattle on 12 acres (PR1/70-1). An average of K180 per beast was obtained and there was a high demand with no problem of selling meat locally and at Pangia station (PR3/72-3). It as at about this time that a realisation emerged that inexperience, lack of supervision and poor fodder could hurt the future of cattle projects (PR8/70-1), although their long-term economic viability was not considered.

At first, it was necessary to alienate land because people were not willing to commit their own land and resources to the unknown (PR2/72-3), but with the progress of established projects people became more disposed to use their own land and invest money (PR18/71-2). Some projects became a mark of district pride (PR17/71-2), which was one reason why districts without them wanted to establish their own projects on unalienated land. Cattle projects were initially preferred by Wiru over tea and coffee because they showed a quicker return - $2,640 from two projects in two years (PR8/69-70) - and did not require, according to the reports, as much labour in maintenance (PR17/71-2) although it
seems that Wiru did not fully comprehend the reasons for a continual upkeep of fences and the care of stock.

The first indications of waning enthusiasm for cattle appeared in the early seventies and were related to the demonstrated lack of large returns from the longer established projects (PR5/72-3). The individual ownership of projects also contributed to this attitude, as those who had helped with money and labour became disillusioned when returns did not filter down to them (as was required by the administration) (PR5/72-3). Optimism prevailed, and cattle were envisaged as eventually taking over from coffee as the major source of income when problems were overcome (ibid), with smaller projects of thirty to fifty acres with less people involved as one solution (PR8/72-3).

Shareholding was also introduced as a means of financing projects and making the distribution of returns more equitable. Once a loan was repaid all profits, theoretically, went into a savings account and were paid out to shareholders and/or used to buy more stock and maintain the project (PR12/72-3). One 'kiap' accurately predicted a reason for the failure of this initiative:

a cattle project with several thousand dollars of share certificates issued has sold off all or most of its stock, repaid its loans and has no capital to restock or maintain. To continue the project either further loans will have to be negotiated or the villagers will again have to contribute. In other words the people will continually be putting money into a business venture without receiving any return. No doubt disillusionment will occur (PR12/72-3).

The Development Bank eventually took over most of the outstanding loans owed to the Council, which left it with more money to invest in other
projects (PR2/72-3). In 1981 a representative of the Bank was asked to reclaim cattle in lieu of debts still outstanding, but he refused due to the logistic difficulties and hostilities this would have involved.

Ultimately, the lack of any real returns was the major cause of a declining interest in cattle projects (cf. A. Strathern, 1982b), and where herds or single animals are found today they are usually owned by men for status in much the same way as are pigs (and can be obtained in bridewealth). In Takuru, cattle are rarely killed for money.

2. Coffee: this cash crop was judged suitable for the area in the first Pangia patrol report (PR1/61-2), but it had to take a back seat to other labour intensive development schemes such as roadbuilding and cattle, which were seen to have a greater priority (PR4/68-9). The potential of coffee was neglected for many years and accompanied changing attitudes to its suitability: by 1965 it was thought that the distance from coffee-buying centres and problems of transport meant that "coffee would not be an economical crop" (PR3/65-6), an unfortunate comment as it became the main Wiru cash crop by the eighties (PR1/80). During the early seventies coffee was finally being stressed as necessary for economic development (PR3/70-1), and as "the safest, most stable, and best crop for the local people" (PR3/71-2) (although D.A.S.F. had started to promote coffee by 1966 (PR9/65-6)).

The following table gives an indication of the growth of coffee cash-cropping; contrary statements are made by the reports on the amounts of coffee sold, and where figures are in doubt I chose those most repeated in the reports or which seem more realistic.
Table 8: Coffee statistics for the years 1961 to 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of trees</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Pounds Sold</th>
<th>Sales</th>
<th>Price/lb.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>5,817</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/9</td>
<td>127,413</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>$1,005</td>
<td>15c./lb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>141,720</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>$1,632</td>
<td>17c./lb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>$3,600</td>
<td>20c./lb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25,658</td>
<td>$5,131</td>
<td>20c./lb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/3+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>$9,900</td>
<td>22c./lb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/4x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>102,737</td>
<td>$19,520</td>
<td>19c./lb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/7*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>K55,000</td>
<td>50t./lb.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes on Table

#   60% of trees were still immature at this period (PR8/69-70).
+  I found no figures for this year but 45,000 lbs. were predicted (PR6/71-2), and 32,000 lbs. were sold between July and September (PR3/72-3).
x  Pounds sold this year not available, but $19,520 ÷ .19 = 102,737 lbs.
*  Figures in this line based on K11,000 given for 22,050 lbs. sold for months June-July, and that marginally more pounds would have been sold than for the previous year. The sharp rise in the price of coffee was due to extensive crop failures in Brazil.

Despite the late start of coffee in Pangia, the 'development style' resulted in Pangia producing by 1973 more coffee than the rest of the Southern Highlands put together (PR9/72-3). The rapid increase in plantings was not accompanied by much attention to the horticultural demands of coffee; regardless of D.A.S.F. efforts "they expected coffee to grow in jungle conditions and produce colossal yields without any effort on their parts" (PR12/72-3), and people were often observed climbing ladders to pick coffee. People preferred to plant coffee as individual smallholders rather than as community plantations, which they
saw as less renumerative (PR2/73-4), but the conservatism and expectations of Wiru in agricultural matters reduced productivity as they were convinced that the pruning of trees lessened the yield, or killed the tree (PR11/73-4).

D.A.S.F. ran six or more coffee nurseries, funded by the L.G.C., of upto sixty acres per nursery costing upto $3,000 to establish (PR10/73-4). The nurseries were to supply seedlings and to instruct people in techniques such as shading for young plants, pruning, etc. Some nurseries were started by Wiru but most new trees came from the D.A.S.F. or from seedlings growing under older trees, which were replanted. Today, many men are keen to extend their coffee gardens, and land has been bought for this purpose (PR3/71-2), but as many are content to rely on those trees already planted, which still grow in jungle conditions (see Clarke, 1980:185). The latter attitude may relate to some disillusionment with coffee in the mid-seventies when not all coffee was bought, for which the D.A.S.F. was blamed (PR1/75-6), and to fluctuations in coffee prices which discouraged planting or harvesting if prices were low (cf. Finney, 1973:48-9).

The administration considered that an acre of coffee per household was a reasonable economic unit (PR13/71-2) but my figures show that .16 acre per household is the average unit. This is an interesting finding, given that there is no land shortage, and raises questions about the motivation of people to earn money and engage in business. It also suggests that coffee is to some extent a 'subsistence' crop if only enough is harvested, by the majority, to maintain a certain standard of living ("the use of cash partly replaces subsistence production" (Brown, 1970:256)).
Buyers from outside Pangia started to enter the district in the late seventies, and people preferred to sell to Hageners and Chimbu who drove close to their settlements and offered better prices than the D.A.S.F. (now D.P.I.), to which coffee had to be carried to Pangia for sale. From this point it is impossible to know the amount of coffee sold in Pangia annually, as no records are available for non-D.P.I. sales (buyers still paid lower prices for coffee because of the distances involved and wear and tear on vehicles (cf. A.Strathern, 1982)). Local entrepreneurs also emerged who either bought coffee in bulk and hired trucks to carry it to Hagen, where better prices are available, or bought their own trucks with loans from banks or kin (the sort of problems this created are discussed in 2d).

Three, perhaps more, coffee plantations have been started by local men prominent in business or politics, but the dubious benefits of plantations for future social and economic development has been questioned (see Mullens, 1978, and 'tea' below). Kawali sub-clan in Takuru has started its own plantation in conjunction with a Goroka coffee company, which has leased Kawali land and planted 800 coffee trees of a new variety. Kawali plan to plant out seedlings after shade trees have grown, and increase the size of the plantation around the central nursery; Kawali men have bought shares in this project with money from the lease, and invested K100 in extra shares. There is a strong desire to make the scheme work, and a group based project may be more socially viable than individually owned plantations as there is no problem of wages (yet). The success of this venture depends on whether the Goroka company gives Kawali a good return on their shares,

* Department of Primary Industries.
but it still takes money out of the district and people are still dependent on external sources for incentive and reimbursement. Also, working for a dividend from shares could turn out to be merely exploitation of labour. Problems have already arisen over this plantation because of hostility from other sub-clans competing in 'bisnis', usually taking the form of disputed claims to the land on which the plantation is situated (problems could also arise in the future if the land is needed for gardening).

In a survey I conducted in Takuru of the number of coffee trees per household and the estimated income from coffee per annum, an average figure of K160 was arrived at for an average of 240 trees per household (income varied from nothing to around K800; trees varied from none to 1,200). Given that there are approximately 22,000 coffee trees in Takuru, which is 2.5% of the population of Pangia, it can be estimated that the number of trees in Pangia today is around the half million mark (bearing in mind that Takuru is somewhat atypical, and the villages further from Pangia sell and grow less coffee). If all this coffee was harvested it would return about K400,000, but the real figure is probably closer to K200,000 as not all coffee is harvested, sold or properly maintained. Hand-treating methods may be inefficient to process all coffee picked (cf. Brown, 1970:248), and because extra labour is often paid for it may be difficult for a household to pick all its coffee trees without a capital outlay which minimizes its profits. This may be part of the reason for a resurgence of interest in polygamy among some younger men.

Whatever the real figures are, it is obvious that without coffee Pangia's economy would be in dire straits. Nonetheless, monocrop
reliance and a dependence on an overseas market for sales and consumption is hardly a stable basis for long-term development (see Howlett, 1973).

3. Tea: in 1965 expatriate tea plantations were proposed as a major means of giving people local employment and making Pangia economically viable. Employment of 2,000 labourers was predicted (PR5/69-70), with the hope that they would provide models for smallholder or local plantation development (PR3/65-6; PR5/69-70), as well as slowing the exodus of H.L.S. recruits. To this end, four large blocks of land, a total of 4,600 acres, were alienated for $2,800 in the north Polu region, with the expectation of expatriate investment. Wiru and expatriate tea plantations were seen to be the future of cash-cropping in Pangia as soon as roads were built (8,000 acres were eventually proposed (PR4/65-6)).

The local desire for tea plantations:

was encouraged and enthusiasm now runs very high ... the people want the road as quickly as possible so that "their plantation" can be started and hence prosperity and development will follow (PR8/65-6).

The four blocks were leased to private companies but by 1972 the only block being developed was Wiowei (1,290 acres employing 200 people), which was also running cattle (75 head). This did not diminish the administration's enthusiasm for tea, which was actually "succeeding magnificently", yielding 9,500 lbs. of green leaf/acre/year (PR4/70-1). This did not take into account the lack of suitable roads for taking tea out of Pangia, the dependence on expatriate companies or the Southern
Highlands Development Corporation for initiative and responsibility (PR8/69-70), the fragile nature of tea vis-a-vis picking and transport, the declining overseas market for tea, and the growing disillusionment of Wiru with the lack of development on alienated land. The latter, together with the experience of the amount of labour required to create and maintain a tea plantation, led to non-cooperation and an unwillingness to pay tax (PR11/72-3), and to a preference for cattle which yielded quicker returns for less labour (PR17/71-2).

Tea, as an expatriate project, never eventuated and Wiowei became a privately owned cattle station, eventually taken over and run by the Rural Development Bank; two of the other tea blocks have become pasture for Wiowei cattle. These blocks have been the centre of acrimonious dispute and group demonstrations, with people wanting the land returned to them as they received little, except in wages for some, from original promises of development (the expatriate manager at Wiowei received much verbal abuse and covert hostility from neighbouring settlements).

The remaining block, at Apenda, was developed as a communal self-help tea plantation by the Southern Highlands Project (World Bank funded). The problems of this sort of development for Apenda have been discussed by Mullen, notably

1. the neglect of its social impact,
2. the possible short and long-term effects on nutrition through labour requirements which decrease time spent in gardening,
3. the alienation of land which may be needed for gardens with future population growth,
4. the minimal wages paid under the gloss of a 'self-help' concept which in reality is an exploitation of cheap labour for a government run profit oriented plantation, and
5. the possible creation of elites - who start their own plantations - and a dependent labourer class (Mullen, 1978).
There is, in all probability, no future for tea in Pangia, which is also the opinion of many of those who manage it; at best it was an ill-conceived and short-sighted experiment.

It can be seen that coffee, on a smallholder basis, has been the only 'success' of these three projects, which indicates (with hindsight) the direction in which development should have been pursued, i.e. at the level of the household and concerned with improving the quality of life and the subsistence base, rather than large-scale capital and labour intensive projects. The effects of the failure of these schemes - anomie, disillusionment, distrust and non-cooperation - will also influence the acceptance of future administration initiatives which may be of benefit to the people.

(f) TRADE STORES

I include trade stores because they are an indigenous response to social and economic changes, and an attempt to buy into development without being under the direct control of the administration; they were also used by older men to maintain their status in competition with younger returned migrants (cf. Harris, 1972). Trade stores demonstrate some of the problems associated with the development style in Pangia, and the sort of stumbling blocks which 'culture' presented to this style. Trade stores were a development which the administration did not really want to promote, partly because it could not control them, and doubts were expressed as to their future success in 1965 after the first local stores were established (PR4/65-6).
Mission trade stores were in existence before this - and "used as a lever to gain a hold in a village" (PR9/66-7) - and, along with the arrival of Namasu in 1966*, provided a model for local stores which proliferated in response to the perceived success of mission stores (takings of $1,000 per month from the Lutheran trade store in Pangia station (PR4/65-6)). The first three Wiru stores were in fact financed by missions to the sum of $1,400, but later stores suffered from lack of funds to restock and from competition with the better organized and stocked mission stores.

There were other reasons for an increasing interest in trade stores:

large amounts of money (are) floating around the area from purchases of land, road work and all other sources of income so the demands (for stores) are steadily mounting (PR4/66-7).

The problem was that many people started their own stores, with little or no business expertise, when the economy simply could not support all of them. The attraction, according to reports, was the belief that stores would return money for little physical effort, and the "economic fact that there must be need and existing cash to warrant 5 or 6 trade stores in every village escapes them" (PR8/70-1).

There were 16 stores in 1966 and 297 by 1972, and only about 15 of the latter were making a reasonable profit. The average turnover was estimated at one carton of tinned fish and a 60 lb. bag of rice every 6 to 8 weeks (PR12/72-3), with a net profit of perhaps K10 to K15. 'Kiaps'

* Namasu is a Lutheran operation which established a large store on the station.
reported that store owners were not happy with their returns because there were,
1. too many stores,
2. too many debts from credit given on the 'wantok' system, and
3. lack of capital for re-investment and no business sense (PR13/71-2).

These reasons continue to apply today, only men who sell a lot of coffee or who have become successful entrepreneurs can run reasonably profitable rural stores (unless an owner has a sleeping partner with a job).

Many stores remain shut until the coffee flush starts, and in some instances they act as 'larders' for storing fish and rice out of the reach of 'wantoks'. Nonetheless, one reason for the efflorescence and persistence of trade stores which make little or no profit is that they are related to the prestige of the owner (PR4/68-9), be they individuals or groups, to which profit is to some extent secondary (trade stores have even been given as a part of bridewealth).

Because of the difficulties of transport, store prices are higher in Pangia than in places closer to sources of supply, but despite this the amount of processed food bought at stores increased enormously in the seventies (PR6/69-70). It is a sign of status to consume more purchased than grown food, and the man who does not have to work in gardens or who does garden work only occasionally (because he has a job) is envied by all. This type of man is known as a loiyali (day man) because he spends the day in his house and not the garden.
Traditional crops such as wing beans and yams were neglected in favour of planting coffee to buy the preferred store goods; people said they were tired of the time involved in planting and maintaining these crops in mixed gardens, it was easier to plant coffee and buy rice and fish (cf. Brown, 1970:256) (some men said that these crops did not grow well after pacification⁶). The necessity for gardening is not being undermined by store food but it has introduced a perception of people who rely entirely on gardens for food as 'kanakas'. Given the uncertain future of development a more positive attitude to gardening activities should be encouraged.

People told me that they would like to live only on fish and rice, statements based more on the status of this diet than on any dissatisfaction with garden foods, although the role of 'gardener' does have these negative connotations. Yet a reliance on store food, coffee and a conservative and perhaps retrogressive agriculture (A. Strathern, 1982B) could generate future subsistence problems, and short-term famines have probably increased in scale and frequency since pacification (see note, end of this section). The failure of the administration to first educate people to a stage where they could keep up with and understand development, to plan a development best suited to that society, or even to maintain a healthy subsistence base, suggests that colonial priorities were misplaced and suited more to a western capitalistic model of progress. Development was aimed more at nebulous future profits than improving the quality of life; the administration assumed that the achievement of the first would ensure the latter.⁷

Despite the enthusiasm, hard work and optimism of Pangia personnel and Wiru, the state of affairs today reflects the illusory nature of the
development 'boom'. The decline which followed the Australian withdrawal after Independence (in 1975) was to some extent caused by the removal of a strong, if unperceptive, colonial power. But this was most likely an inevitable outcome of the development style in Pangia, and one merely accelerated by Independence. The type of progress envisaged was not practical or suitable, and an infrastructure was laboriously constructed with little attention to its 'superstructural' consequences. Even when Pangia was still under the colonial regime there were many signs of future disappointment, but these were often blamed by 'kiaps' on the lack of a "mental ability to keep pace" (PR8/70-1).

The tempo of change was such that parochialism and lack of interest became defence mechanisms, a means of coping with the enormous changes which followed pacification (see PR16/71-2); these are what Howlett calls the "negative traits" of peasantry (Howlett, 1973:272). Conservatism was partly a response to change, it gave people time to adjust to a coercive and rapid development style, and partly because people were not educated to manage or comprehend the type of progress required (it was easier to rely on the certainty of pigs and gardens). The nature of social change emerges out of the dialectical relationship between development and 'tradition', and it is this nature which is examined in later sections.

A note on the 'taim hangri' (or kobu igi)

I have already discussed some of the effects of activities such as cash-cropping and labour migration on the system of production, with particular reference to the declining yields of gardens. Short-term famines occurred in Pangia before pacification, and were related to
slight seasonality, especially heavy periods of rain, abandonment of gardens after a loss in warfare, frost and inadequate garden techniques (gardens are frequently used 3 or 4 times before fallowing and the soil is often too poor to support such usage). Wiru themselves blamed such crop failures on, e.g. enemy sorcery, and today the action of God may also be cited as a 'cause' (as a punishment for sinful behaviour).

It seems that a major contributory factor in famines is the tendency to not prepare new gardens until the old ones are nearly finished, such that there is a large time gap in which the vagaries of climate can have greater effects than if gardens were better spaced. A propensity for temporary food shortages was exacerbated under colonialism by the time and labour which people had to devote to development projects. Yet while acknowledging the truth of this situation the administration consistently placed most of the blame on poor agricultural practices, and had to introduce compulsory garden days, and then months in March, July and November (PR3/71-2):

It seems extraordinary ... that after so many years of clearing, planting, harvesting and eating that these people still cannot regulate their plantings to ensure a continuous supply of food.

About twice a year they barely get by, scrounging for every little last morsel. It is ridiculous really and they admit it, but it is their way that they live from one day to the next. Advanced planning (except for pig-kills) is relatively unknown (PR3/61-2).

The food shortage in the Pangia area is now a regular affair which reflects rather more on the local farmers than on the government or missions. It has been mentioned at both village and district headquarters level that demands on the people's time for roadwork, economic projects and mission tasks are the real cause but this now must be discounted as purely an excuse as I have taken particular care to ensure everyone has had enough gardening time (PR1/70-1).
Wuru, instead of blaming labour intensive development schemes and the absence of men, preferred the explanation of declining soil fertility as a cause of famine, an explanation which may have some validity as, in the face of "the rapidly increasing population" (PR5/69-70) and an absence of labour, gardens were re-used continually instead of clearing new ones:

... old gardens are being used more and more often and are thoroughly leached. With 40% of the male workforce absent in Mt. Hagen or on the coast and development projects, and missions using quite a bit of the available time of those remaining, there is not much time for the clearing of bush before new gardens can be constructed (PR4/70-1).

Informants stated different reasons for this belief, ranging from partial eclipses of the sun in 1962 (accompanying the arrival of Europeans), whites stealing the fertility of the soil and taking it to Australia (local Members were lobbied to get it back), to the abandonment of cults ensuring fertility (Christianity was seen, by some, as less effective in this respect, which may relate to the notion of God 'causing' food shortages). The latter folk explanation may also have some validity as a decline in cults meant that less pigs were killed, implying that there is less pressure to produce a surplus with a possible result of famines increasing in scale. The Sunday observance of work taboos by Christians would also contribute to this problem, although this may have had more impact at the height of the H.L.S. Also, with the extraction of men out of the exchange economy, it is possible that production was sufficient for the household only and that there was no incentive to surplus production, which would cover people in times of shortage (cf. Sahlins, 1972, ch.2).
While the division of labour by sex is more or less unchanged, there has been a marked decline in group cooperative garden activity. This is related to the introduction of steel tools which enable one man to do tasks that previously required several men (yet see 2d.), and also to a "frightfully splintered society" in which "brother wouldn't help brother" (PR3/71-2). The colonial experience certainly contributed to a breakdown in the spirit of community and group cooperation, which was exacerbated by new notions of the 'wok kontrak' and of pay for labour. Some men do pay people to help in such tasks as garden preparation and housebuilding, and the making of labour a commodity has underscored the importance of the domestic household as the main unit of production and consumption. However, the degree to which a decrease in cooperative work has contributed to the frequency of famines has to remain problematic, although in exceptional circumstances, as when many men were away as labour migrants, the absence of cooperative labour to help deprived households must have had an effect on productivity.\(^8\)

A common complaint is that while more and bigger gardens are planted today (informants explained that this was because of the end of fighting which inhibited gardening practices, suggesting that this is not such an innovative step as it first appears) and men work harder, a person ate much better before pacification. Even though many new varieties of sweet potato and other crops are now grown, the conservatism in agricultural practice and the preference for store foods, to the neglect of mixed gardens, indicate that the 'taim hangri' will remain a problem into the future.
FOOTNOTES

1. From Strathern, 1978, comes the following: Pangia station, 177 acres, was bought for 106 shells in 1961; a mission station of 43 acres was bought for 35.8.0 pounds in 1964. Money was used after 1964 in nearly all government and mission transactions, and Pangia did not experience a pearl shell 'boom' as did other Highland areas (although the use of money as a valuable did mean the exchange economy suffered inflation of a sort).

2. Strathern reports a whole settlement of men being taken to jail for not building latrines (Strathern, 1978: 81).

3. For instance, one report states that "the introduction of tea and pyrethrum into this area will definitely make it boom" (PR4/65-6). Tea is discussed above, but pyrethrum here and elsewhere in the Southern Highlands was a disaster. Silk, chillies, poultry projects and other schemes were attempted but by and large they were failures for the same reasons as tea and coffee - withdrawal of administration expertise and support, and lack of financial returns.

4. For 1978, the total amount of coffee bought by D.P.I. was K3,038, but I am not sure if the records are comprehensive. If it is accurate, it does indicate a marked decline in sales of coffee to D.P.I. after private buyers entered the area. D.P.I. prices for coffee varied from 43t./kg. to K1.31 between 1978 and 1981 (source, D.P.I. records, Pangia).

5. In 1980 the S.H.P. produced 455,580 kg. of coffee beans, which was about 1% of all the coffee sold in the Highlands (44,389,080 kg: W.H.P. 47%, E.H.P. 31%, Simbu 17%, Enga 4%). At an average price of 90c./kg. this was K410,022 of sales in the S.H.P. The 1% of coffee which the S.H.P. produces reflects its development lag, whereas Pangia's share of this 1% (perhaps half) reflects the 'kiap style' policy and the suitability of Pangia - land availability, altitude, etc. - for coffee. In monetary terms, Pangia's 'trade' position vis-à-vis the 'outside' world has certainly improved, and is much better than many other districts in the Southern Highlands.

6. An agronomist suggested that seeds for such crops as wing beans, which were stored in the rafters of men's houses, may have been eaten by weevils introduced from bought rice. Many crops not grown today were 'male' crops used in cults, and mission and evangelist disapproval contributed to this decline in Tunda (Strathern, 1982b), although this reason was not given in Takuru, where people said they were simply 'tired' of growing these crops.

7. This is not to demean the benefits of aid posts, education, a money income, etc.; Wiru are certainly appreciative of these aspects of development. The administration, however, did express some concern over one of these benefits. In a survey of school leavers, "none of whom have seen a town bigger than Pangia ... not one expressed a wish to take up rural employment or village life after leaving school. All wished for office or town type employment. Of those (surveyed) a small percentage will go to High School and possibly become useful citizens. The remainder ... needed ... to carry out
the important agricultural role are already potential misfits and malcontents. There seems to be little point in a national education system unless it can turn out the type of person this country needs — that is both educated people for the jobs available and educated people capable of leading the life of an agriculturalist" (PR2/72-3).

8. Strathern states that Wiru women could manage in garden preparation without men, and were not so disadvantaged as Melpa women by labour migration (Strathern, pers. comm.).
While it is difficult to gauge how colonial attitudes to Papua New Guineans changed over time, different stances on 'culture' can be recognized. Generally, they reflect more on the changing priorities of development policy. This was susceptible to international opinion and political changes in Australia, both influencing the perception of the 'native situation'. There was little recognition of the human benefits of maintaining cultural integrity. Instead pacification and administration were affected by paternalistic attitudes towards 'native protectionism', often tempered by convictions of racial and moral superiority, which nonetheless were amenable to demands for native labour and land. What were considered to be appropriate plans for the welfare and development of the people usually did not take into account their opinions and needs. Rather they were:

to be segregated, looked after, legislated for and against, missionised and exhorted, until in the fullness of time they should by some magical means become European in all but colour when they would, of course, be accepted as members of the community (Hastings, 1969:55).

Culture was preserved where it did not interfere with policy, business or the maintenance of peace, but the conflict between tradition, development and the obligations of Europeans towards 'civilizing' the people was more often than not a result of politics than of confusion over what were the moral responsibilities of a colonial power to those it governed.

F.E. Williams, in his capacity as Government Anthropologist, wrote in 1923 of the Vailala Madness that:
compared with the wholesale destruction of native practice and tradition, the collective nervous disorder is a matter of small and transitory importance (Williams, 1976:323).

The colonial authorities of the day were concerned to suppress this cult as a threat to order, in which the 'destruction of native practice' was the most visible and important contributory factor. The colonial setting which precipitated the Madness had changed nearly forty years later, such that in Pangia this destruction, while not overtly encouraged, was not a pressing concern of the Australian administration. To a large extent the District administration was responsible for, and its policies stood to benefit from, the abolition of many traditional practices (Christianity was seen as an integral part of capitalism). The lack of finance, manpower and the exigencies of a development plan set the stage for mission intervention in traditional culture and ensured its crucial role in shaping post-colonial Wiru society. The reasons for the mission presence, its influence and success will be the theme of this chapter, presented against the background of Takuru settlement and its resident Wesleyan mission.

Christianity is inherently a proselytising religion, encouraging the work of missions in foreign lands as a priority of the church, which, as a secular and spiritual organization, is responsible for the diffusion of Christian doctrine:

The old non-Christian past must sink below the horizon. That which comes from the west must be so absorbed and assimilated that it can be transformed and re-expressed in categories different from those of the world of its origins (Neill, 1982:537).
The origins of this missionary impulse are found in Christ's exhortations about the 'Great Commission' for all Christians: it is incumbent upon all believers to spread their faith wherever they reside (Matthew 28:19). However selfless and dedicated individual missionaries may be, the processes of change they initiate are usually predicated on the assumption that those to be evangelized exist in a state of ignorance (sin) and suffering only to be alleviated through the embrace of Christianity (see also Bustin n.d.:55). Those who bring this relief have often answered a call from God or see their work as part of a divine plan, as this quote from one of the first representatives of the Evangelical Bible Mission (E.B.M.) in Pangia and Takuru indicates:

I can still see a small group of men sitting beside the road planning a big pig feast, trying to be prepared, but yet lost ... because the Bible says without Christ there is no salvation. I can hear them yet, as they ask what they must do to avoid Hell and to make it to Heaven. I can see them as blind men groping for the wall, with no one to help them. It seems I can hear another voice, more powerful ... saying "And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free". But can they know the truth unless we tell them? (Bustin n.d.:52).

Other incentives to missionary work are the rewards it brings to the individual, in the extreme case as martyrs but:

the days when the blood of the martyrs formed the seed of the new church have gone from New Guinea ... The denial to the missionary of the chance to martyrdom rather reflects the secularisation of our own culture, with relegation to a secondary place of those religious concepts which to our ancestors appeared to provide the main justification for unwelcome interference in the lives of New Guineans (Rowley, 1965:130).

Yet through self-denial, hard work and physical discomfort there was a chance at martyrdom of another kind, the separation of a person from his
own culture for the greater glory of God, a choice often rewarded by the esteem in which missionaries are held in their own religious communities.

While the impetus for missionisation is located within the logic of western culture, those members involved in 'bringing light' would in many instances be viewed as unrepresentative. I do not mean that they are seen as a specially selected, educated and talented religious elite (which may be true for some missions) but that taken out of the Melanesian context they could be viewed by some as religiously or socially eccentric, often ethnocentric and poorly equipped and trained to deal with the real needs, in times of cultural dislocation, of the "black, savage, heathen New Guineans" (Bustin, n.d.:53). Individual motivations and styles of presentation, while influencing local level responses to missionaries, are usually inaccessible to the anthropologist although one can assume there is a range here from a genuine desire to help people through difficult periods of adjustment, to a grudging 'God called me to lead them out of darkness' approach which is only concerned with producing Christians.

Missionaries are often interesting subjects of study but any further comments on motivation are outside the scope of this section: suffice it to say that wishes are often indulged (the 'gentleman farmer', the 'cowboy', the 'businessman') which can provide models for local behaviour. I have frequently heard missionaries admiringly described as 'anarapela kain man', cowboys (a macho hero model provided by the Hagen cinema) and even as big-men (in reference to their capabilities and possessions). Such perceptions obviously affect
attitudes towards Christianity. But the attitude to missionaries was not always, as the patrol reports indicate, one of reverence:

there is quite a degree of cheekiness towards, and lack of any real respect for, some American missionaries. This may be due to the fact that quite a few are unable to speak Pidgin or Wiru and some appear to have difficulty with English too and cannot communicate effectively ... (when he is accepted) the locals will endeavour to milk him of his last penny (PRS/69-70).

Given that the same basic reasons underlie the mission presence throughout Melanesia, and that on the whole the response to Christianity has been highly favourable, what sort of variables need to be studied at the local level? Mission techniques, resources and policies vary from area to area such that one mission may be more successful in conversion than others. In Pangia, however, there have been perhaps up to 10 missions at one time which established themselves in given territories or in places away from their competitors (though today they compete in villages, particularly since the arrival of different evangelical groups).

Rivalry between missions for settlements and souls was intense, partly from a belief that theirs was the 'true' religion, and partly from the size of the congregation strengthening a mission's position and claims in Pangia. If a mission could maintain itself and was not threatened by another it seems that the type of mission was not a significant variable in its local acceptance, the principle operating being 'first come, first served', as long as the first could outbid latecomers in the amount of material goods given to assure a welcome. The initial E.B.M. denomination of Takuruns was, so the story goes, finally decided by the third missionary 'prospector' to arrive, (after
Catholics and Lutherans), who offered the most and best variety of goods (blankets, axes and shells) and managed from its base in Mele to win over an influential sub-clan that steered people away from Catholicism. It was always possible to sway local opinion against other denominations once contacts had been made and mission-settlement alliances cemented through gifts, labour contracts, etc. Although bribery and coercion were techniques peculiar to most Pangia missions in the first years, the promises, threats and emphases of the evangelists lent a distinct quality to the Christianity of the settlements they occupied.

The varying mission approaches to conversion is one factor which needs to be considered in explanations of different responses to proselytization. Another is the pre- and post-colonial history of Pangia which informed the Wiru reaction to missions and facilitated their success throughout the entire Pangia district. This uniform reaction (after a short time all missions were warmly accepted and clamoured for) has been briefly considered above. The first factor will now be discussed.

In the first years of colonialism Takuru experienced two evangelical missions. The E.B.M. occupied Takuru for about a year before selling the station for 1,000 pounds to the Wesleyan mission in 1963, a sale prompted by the shortage of E.B.M. missionaries. The Wesleyans were chosen because they were seen to be of similar fundamental persuasion. They were versed in:

the methods of John Wesley (once a missionary) ... who emphasized the presence of evil spirits, and the threat of eternal hellfire and damnation for non-believers, always allowing an escape, however, through acceptance of Christianity (Robin, 1982:330).
The Wesleyan missionaries believed in total human corruption and that Takuruns existed in a state of 'aboriginal sin'. For most missionaries this meant a total break with the past and tradition for those to be missionised, which meant an onslaught on traditional values. Wesleyan policy was more abolitionist than syncretistic. The stresses and anxieties produced by this approach, with its interest more in 'converting' than 'civilizing', affected local interpretations of Christianity as well as its later Takurun characteristics: a rigid adherence to dogma, strong beliefs in an impending end of the world, prohibitions on drinking and smoking, etc.

Figure 2: The fate of sinful pagans (from 'Wordless Gospel' for New Guinea, a booklet used in Pangia).

In his study of the Ilahita Arapesh, Tuzin remarks that faced with a wide range of mission imposed prohibitions on traditional activities "the great majority follow the easier course and remain pagan" (Tuzin, 1976:33). He cites demographic and political reasons for the mission failure, in that Ilahita village was so large that evangelism was
curtailed to hamlets close to the mission station, and that its size encouraged extreme factionalism which counteracted a widespread acceptance of Christianity (ibid:34). These hindrances occurred to some extent in Pangia, yet acceptance of missions was enthusiastic and where factionalism arose it was expressed not in rejection of the mission but as a selection of denomination in opposition to other factions (cf. Strathern, A. 1971:455). The reasons for a Wiru reaction opposite to the Ilahita Arapesh are found in their different cultures and colonial history. The Pangia case will be examined below, after an initial comment on anthropology and missions.

It is easy to be critical of missionary activity but it must be remembered that in Pangia missions were an essential part of the colonial scheme and were viewed by the administration, if sometimes grudgingly, as integral to the development process. This did not stop the criticism of most missions for their lack of assistance in development and in inspiring district unity:

missions must be convinced that they should contribute to the growth of the economic and political Pangia and not simply remain with their churches and schools. In fact at this time missions are failing to support Council (and) development and are generating petty jealousies and lack of understanding through a general - with one or two exceptions - and total inability to communicate either through English, vernacular or lingua franca (PR5/69-70).

In some ways the destruction of certain aspects of Wiru culture was the aim of both missions and colonial officers, overtly for the former and covertly (insofar as it was not a stated policy) for the latter. To a certain extent these officers had their hands tied and in some situations had to develop a 'look the other way' attitude to missions.
To be fair, the Pangia administration was against many of the means of persuasion used by missions to gain converts, and it initially emphasized to Wiru the freedom of religious choice (PR1/62-3). 'Kiaps', however, had little control over missions and even less after the following message arrived from Mendi H.Q.:

To advise people of their rights of choice could easily lead to more confused thinking by both Papuan locals and European missionaries. It is quite possible for your advice to be construed as anti-mission and if that did occur, with the type of people with whom you are dealing, then the Administration work in the area would be hampered (PR1/62-3).

Clearly, the Mendi administration had to bow to the pressure which could be exerted by the mission lobby in government, as well as acknowledging that at the local level missions had the power to thwart 'kiap' directives. This is one reason why missions in Pangia enjoyed a wide and successful influence and were rarely interfered with by the administration, which must share responsibility for mission excesses.

While there is much to be critical of, this does not help our understanding of the processes which transformed society or of the mission as an agent of change. If Christian proselytization was the inevitable accompaniment of colonialism in Oceania as Lätůkefu states "and, therefore, ought to be studied as objectively as possible" (Boutilier, et al., 1978:457), then only the methods and results of missions, as opposed to their presence, is open to criticism (unless, of course, the whole process of colonialism is questioned).

It should be made clear that a fundamental antagonism separates many missionaries and anthropologists, which Hughes suggests is a
product of their different attitudes to the sacred and profane (ibid: 65). This may be resolvable at the level of individual interaction but it nonetheless colours the anthropologist's interpretation of mission work. The antagonism is exacerbated by the morally ambiguous roles held by both (cf. Burridge, ibid: 7), and by disagreement over the value or place of culture:

The idea of preserving cultures is good, but we must be careful that we do not regard cultures as sacred. Men's souls are more important than their cultures (Wakatama 1976:17).

The missionary may neglect the fact that 'men's souls' need a culture to exist in, but the dilemma for the anthropologist, and where his objectivity may be tested, is in assessing whether the achievements of missions are more or less beneficial in the overall process of, for lack of a better word, development. This assessment is to a large extent independent of the problematic of God's existence and can be made regardless of faith (bearing in mind that we are investigating results and not reasons). It is not separate, however, from the biases of anthropologists in the way they present and select from their material.

It would be fair to say that Pangia has received a more diverse missionary influence than most if not all districts of comparable population size in the Southern Highlands. At last count there were European representatives from six missions, running eleven mission stations, and nine other denominations. About 60% of the population is Lutheran, 30% Catholic, the rest consisting mainly of fundamentalist sects. There have been more missions and sects in the past, creating a situation made further perplexing by fluctuation in the number of operating stations from year to year. Needless to say this has been
confusing for Wiru sought as congregations for churches competing in ideology and promises. Those who had made a choice could find their missionary had returned to whence he came.

Inter-mission conflicts contributed to this confusion:

None of the missions in the area have any respect for another's work insofar as each one is prepared and willing to go into a village and break new ground on an already established set-up run by another church organization (PR2/76-7).

Criticisms which missions made of one another would have minimized the unifying affects of Christian brotherhood and at least woken people to the benefits of playing on mission rivalries (see PR5/69-70; PR13/72-3).

The following gives some insights into the way in which one mission viewed other persuasions, expressed through a personal attack on a Catholic missionary, no doubt reciprocated in kind:

While the children needed to be taught in English and their own language, he was teaching them songs and prayers in Latin. (The songs they were taught were actually chants and sounded fully as weird as their own pagan songs). While the children needed to be saved by the blood of Jesus Christ, he had not had that blood applied to his own heart... he himself was immoral. By teaching them how to play cards and to gamble, and by... taking part in the sensual dances... in which foul and suggestive language was prevalent and immorality the ultimate outcome, he was propagating the things of the devil rather than fighting them (Bustin, n.d.:9).

If nothing else, this vitriolic outburst demonstrates the prejudices and insularity of some of the evangelical missions in Pangia.

The rapid pacification of Pangia, coupled with the enthusiasm shown for the white presence, allowed missions their eagerly awaited first
entry for the conversion of Wiru away from their idolatry and pagan beliefs. As mentioned elsewhere, at least one mission contravened government regulations and entered the then sub-district before derestricotion to make first contact with the 'heathen' and to give it the edge over rivals in the keen competition for souls. The entry of missions after derestricotion was recorded by the administration:

the ensuing scramble for the plum spots, however undignified, no doubt provided all groups with sufficient of their "own territory" to even satisfy them (PR3/61-2).

The missionisation of Pangia, compared to other areas, was more of an assault insofar as pacification occurred at a time when missions were organized in other districts and could work from established bases. The expectation of a new area (simultaneously one of the last) attracted many missions including those that had arrived late on the scene elsewhere:

Waiting for the opening door ... Word came to us one day ... that the Widu (Wiru) Valley would soon be opened for missionary activity. It was a well-known fact that some other missions were making plans towards going into the valley with the intentions of proselyting some of our followers. Some of these missions have a form of godliness but have little or no power. One of them could, by no stretch of the imagination, be considered evangelical ...

To protect our interests in the Widu Valley, we felt it necessary to build some houses on the border of this area and prepare to enter it as soon as it was declared opened (Bustin, n.d.:8).

Mission attempts at conversion were not a sporadic but an intensive affair due to Pangia's late entry into the sphere of colonial control, and to the planning and organization this allowed the missions from
bases nearby in the Highlands (the S.I.L. had special permission to install a representative in Pangia in 1959).

The period during which Pangia came into this sphere and liable to mission influences is, then, a significant part of any explanation of the Wiru responses to colonialism. By 1961 all of the major districts within the Southern Highlands were subject to, with various degrees of pressure and intervention from, a network of district headquarters, patrol posts and mission stations. This network was older and/or more efficient in some areas than it was in others. Nevertheless, when Pangia came under the control of this network a policy towards development and the treatment of recently contacted peoples was fairly well established. The fact that the Southern Highlands was the last District to come under Australian control also contributed to the mission impact in Pangia:

The missions have been an especially important and influential force in the Southern Highlands Province. Because the province remains less developed than most others in the country, it relies heavily on the contributions of missions to provide health and education services. And because the national and provincial governments have had relatively little awareness of mission activity here, missions have been permitted to settle anywhere and to propagate such religious doctrines as they have seen fit. Missions have been regarded largely with favour and have been permitted to proliferate (Robin, 1982:323).

The Wiru response to proselytising was comparable in many ways to the reactions of other Highlands societies but for an explanation of differences we must return to the historical and geographical factors previously considered. I argued that the 'backwater' nature of Pangia and its lack of extra-cultural contact through trade, had implications for the perception of, and desire to obtain access to, wealth and knowledge from the 'outside', i.e., largely from the west. This operated to influence the Wiru reaction to externally induced change, making them
susceptible to the imagined benefits accompanying the acceptance of a new order and the rejection of the old.²

This susceptibility was demonstrated by such things as the scale of 'epidemic madness' preceding white arrival, the virtually spontaneous pacification of the district (cf. Sorensen, 1972:362), and the willingness bordering on total obedience to white directives in the first years following 1962. There was also a strong desire for missionaries (which, as I have written above, was linked to a need to control epidemic sicknesses):

While we were ... waiting for the Widu Valley to be opened, the natives from across the border were constantly coming to us and asking when we would come to their villages. We would explain ... that we were ready as soon as the doors were opened. They would then ask how many missionaries we had ready to go in ... (and) where we were going to be located ...

Many of the natives were disappointed because those two places (selected as stations) didn't include their villages. They offered us land and told us they would help build the houses if only we would come to their places too (Bustin, n.d.:10).

The enthusiasm for missions is shown, although the popularity of the E.B.M. declined when it was known that they burnt down cult houses, and this mission was warned away by some settlements (PR3/62-3).

Combined with a geographical isolation which militated against a wider experience of the indigenous and European 'outside' as well as the extent and timing of its intrusion, the phenomenon of social change proceeded in a milieu qualitatively different to other areas. Development schemes were carried out in a fashion similar to mission efforts at conversion, not piecemeal but according to a plan with
objectives and time limits imposed by an awareness of impending self-determination and independence.

It has been suggested that in the Highlands:

the contact situation has never been such as to make the people self-conscious about or reliant on any religious ideology (Lawrence and Meggitt, 1965:23).

In Pangia, this is understating the case, many Wiru did become 'self-conscious' of, and were made to feel deep shame in, their traditional cults, which increased their reliance on Christianity as a 'functional alternative' for sinful cult practice. The Pangia contact situation was such as to make 'religious' ideology a central concern for Wiru just from the attention paid to it by missionaries. By concentrating on 'shame' the missions, perhaps inadvertently, used a potent tool of social control which reinforced their position and contributed to their success in conversion. In fundamentalist settlements especially this also led to the abandonment of traditional dress and bodily decoration, and to haircuts as a prerequisite of conversion.

To sum up, Pangia was different in its history of 'progress' because it received from the start a concentrated and zealous attention at the level of the district as opposed to individual settlements and in comparison with other districts, partly as a result of the timing of colonization in terms of its resources and imperatives, and partly from the geographical and cultural isolation of Pangia which encouraged a particular style of white management.
Development was the prime consideration of Pangia personnel and was initiated practically from the start of derestrication, with Wiru being more in the position of a 'captive audience' for administration and mission pronouncements and perhaps less in a position to verify or discredit them than their ethnic neighbours. The cultural basis of Wiru society was attacked rapidly and efficiently by both colonial officers and missionaries, the former viewing it as a hindrance to development and the latter seeing exchange and cult activity as pandering to Satan. Robin, in an overview of mission enterprise in the Southern Highlands, aptly describes what happened next:

At the same time as the old order was declining, the missionaries were presenting a new one. They brought with them a set of policies and codes of behaviour (and) ... services, goods, and technological advances. The old ways alone were no longer sufficient to explain the origins or future direction of the world; but the missionaries offered new solutions and explanations ... The mission, in effect, initiated cultural dislocation ... then seized the opportunity ... promoting large-scale conversions to Christianity (Robin, 1982:337).

Missions enjoyed a widespread influence in the Southern Highlands and even more so in Pangia, where traditional practices appeared to disintegrate quicker than in almost any other area of the province. Today, Pangia is regarded by many Southern Highlanders as one of the most Christian of districts.

Before and after pacification Wiru were open to innovation in cult belief and practice. Spirit cult and Christian evangelists were quickly, often eagerly accepted and demonstrations of new practices associated with the introduced cult or religion were soon adopted. An E.B.M. school at Kaupena (in Ialibu district) appears to have accepted about two hundred young Wiru men to train as representatives for the mission some
time before derestriction, probably about 1959 or 1960. This inundation of Wiru males anxious to join the school was the result of a previous selection of a few young men to be trained and sent back into Pangia as 'front men' for the mission. Other missions, too, had schools in Ialibu to the west which accepted Wiru students before 1962. The enthusiasm for Christianity shown by Wiru must have surprised even the mission:

The natives wanted us to come or send another white man to go and teach them about God ... We were temporarily blocked from going, but we were led to send for several boys and young men of school age to come to our station at Kaupena to be taught.

When word got out among the people of the Widu Valley that we were enrolling students from their area, they started flocking in by the dozens ... We finally had to refuse enrolment to those coming later. For even months after that they continued coming and we had to continue refusing ... still it was through those same boys we were able to reach the natives of the Widu Valley (Bustin, n.d.; see also :10).

It is unclear what promises, if any, were made to entice these young men from their homes to strange and forbidding lands, or what expectations they had for these actions, but what is illustrated clearly is the desire of Wiru, by sending their children to be trained in the white man's 'cult' (as it must have been viewed at the time), to have access to European goods and power. That the young men were not necessarily drawn by a need for Christianity is evidenced by a fight involving many enemy Wiru which broke out at Kaupena station (ibid). Apart from a Wiru readiness for innovation, what is also shown is the extent to which missionaries were prepared to go to follow their interpretations of God's wishes, and to beat their competitors, even if the legality of their actions was questionable. Statements such as 'we were led to send' are distortions justified by the ethics of mission endeavour.
That the acceptance of missions was influenced by their perception as a source of wealth was recognized by the administration:

the bane of the mission organizations, the reason for (their acceptance) does ... not ascend higher than the simple strategy of importing the means of acquiring greater material wealth (PR6/63-4);

There is no doubt that material gain, or the belief that it will ensue, is the major Christianising influence ... The art of playing one (mission) against the other is well known to the local people (PR13/72-3).

The connection between acquiring wealth and cult practices suggests that the church was to some extent another cult 'imported' for its control of the cosmos (which attracting valuables demonstrates), and playing missions off against each other was to select the most efficient church in terms of its provision of an access to wealth. Such a conclusion is supported by the link made between missions and their (ritual) control of epidemics, and by the fact that missions which were more overt in promising material rewards and supernatural control were the most popular. In the north Polu area this led to a great deal of unrest when the Full Gospel Movement (Pentecost) arrived and attracted many followers away from the Wesleyans at Alia by its stress on faith-healing (which it demonstrated by showing 'miracle films', which was a new medium of evangelism):

People have been quick to accept belief in this kind of power and the appeal is instantaneous. It is believed by most that the F.G.M. can do a lot for the area in a short time and the people... believe that the F.G.M. is coming to stay and bring with it all the 'benefits', material and otherwise, in order to cater to their wants (PR4/73-4).
The administration went so far as to compare the shift to the F.G.M. as having "cargo cult overtones" (ibid).

Some disillusionment did occur when the expectations associated with missions did not come to fruition:

The early attitude of respect and awe for the missions by locals has died and become somewhat mercenary. There is a fair amount of disappointment that missions have not helped in the economic field as was hoped (PR4/70-1).

This "respect and awe" was perhaps related to the 'cult' perception of Christianity, and of missionaries as the representatives of God (and instructors in the new 'cult').

New cults were practised in a framework of traditional beliefs about ancestral and cult spirits and their control or influence over health, growth and productivity. This practice was attacked by native evangelists and missionaries and rapidly abandoned. The type of Christianity which these non-Wiru evangelists spread, most with only a poor understanding of the Bible, was criticised by the administration:

By the time the particular Bible lesson comes to the ears of the Wiru people one wonders if Genesis becomes a football match ... the final result is very different from the original (PR1/62-3).

The legacy of this ill-conceived introduction to Christianity is apparent in many settlements today, where only the haziest notions of basic Christian beliefs and practices, such as communion, are held by many (see 4b).
Beliefs associated with cults have to a large extent remained, although they may have been muted after contact or expressed through a different framework. This raises the problem of syncretism and cultural continuity. Many authors have argued that Christianity is interpreted in terms of the traditional belief system and what emerges out of this recasting of the moral universe is a local version of Christianity, often based on a selection of appropriate Biblical references (see Lawrence, 1964; Robin, 1982). The question that really concerns us here is 'what is Christianity in Takuru'?

The Wesleyan mission has churches, pastors, deacons and a congregation; worship and sermons are organized along lines familiar to western observers, prayer meetings are held during the week, testimonials are given, communion received. The outward form of Christianity is reassuring to the missionary but, given the assumption made about Holy Spirit induced conversions, the 'Christianity' of the people is taken for granted and hence the substance of it not readily comprehended. Still, missionaries occasionally obtain insights into local Christianity which can lead to anger, frustration and accusations of 'skin kristen' behaviour. The organization of church ritual follows mission guidelines but, as will be shown, the type of Christian belief in Takuru is specific to that society:

the basic concepts on which they (traditional cults) rest may persist and influence reactions to any innovations impinging on them (Lawrence and Meggitt, 1965:23).

This persistence is responsible for many of the features of the church in Takuru, but a contributory factor was a belief in "the almost magical significance of baptism" (PR2/72-3). Conversion, which in fundamentalist
settlements was often through revivals (see 4a.), was related, I would argue, to a cult perception of the church and Christianity; some people expressed disappointment at the failure of conversion to bring promised rewards, although the material benefits of colonialism supported this perception by many. 3

What many missions fail to realize is that for the majority of people they seek to convert, without a historical and cultural experience of a world religion it is difficult in the space of a few generations for people to become Christians in the commonly accepted sense of the word. Christianity exists within the western capitalistic system and, given the stage of development in Pangia, it is doubtful if money will provide the 'enabling conditions' for the 'new man' Burridge postulates as a necessary transformation for the emergence of a valid Christianity (Boutilier, et al., 1978:15, 18).

Missions cite the power of the Holy Ghost as conferring the equivalent of this experience, that is, it makes people comprehend what being a Christian means. I would argue, to the contrary, that people and groups construct a notion of Christianity out of their experience and interpretation of White behaviour and oratory, and their traditional expectations of 'cults' as a technological and moral system. But is Takuru Christianity

1. the superimposing of the new on a traditional system which continues to give a similar morality and function to 'cults', or
2. a syncretic fusing of elements of the old and the new or
3. is it something else again?
Consider the following conversation I had with a man found cooking pork near his house:

Q. What are you doing?
A. I am cooking some pig because my daughter is sick.

Q. Will eating the pig cure your daughter?
A. Yes, an oroiago (curing specialist) gave me some medicine to mix with the pig.

Q. What is the medicine made of?
A. How would I know, I'm a Christian and don't believe in that (the consultation and curing done by an oroiago).

The man did, of course, believe in the power of the medicine, he was merely disassociating himself from practice considered sinful by the mission through a declaration of Christianity. At the level of morality a distinction is made between the old and the new, whilst at the level of efficacy this discrimination is not so rigidly adhered to (pigs are commonly killed when people are sick). The old still has power but the new takes exegetical precedence. Proposition one cannot explain the complex interplay between tradition and Christian elements of morality and social behaviour. The concept of 'sin' held by Takuruns is not so much based on a philosophy of good and evil as on properties of ritual and prohibition. It is something approaching an 'uncleanliness' or taboo quality which attaches itself to an object or act which categorizes them but does not diminish their effectiveness. In most cases the image of sin for Takuruns is any traditional belief, or behaviour characterized as like 'taim bipo' (there was no word for 'sin' so the missions appropriated abe, the term for dirt, which can have connotations of pollution, e.g., abe kamare, menstrual blood. Abea is also a generic term for male and female genitals. The connection between sin
and sex is linked to mission crusades against promiscuity and the spread of venereal disease, the latter supporting the mission cause).

Oftentimes a statement of Christian belief can justify recourse to traditional activities, especially those dealing with sorcery. A deacon who consulted a divination specialist over the cause of a death said that he momentarily lost his Christianity (but not his belief) yet after receiving a verdict he was able to be a Christian again. To cease acting like a Christian is relevant to the group definitional aspect of denomination, which is dealt with later. It may appear that people are Christians when it suits them but I suggest that a declaration of church membership, for the first time or after a relapse, has a force which emanates from the utterance of the word 'Christian' itself. This incantory property of English words, and 'Christian' is a powerful English word, has been commented on by Rowley (Rowley, 1965:132) and Burridge, the latter writing that (for Tangu):

\[
\text{there is power in the word itself... whether they are intelligible as language or not. Indeed, the strange or uncommon word may, potentially, have more power than words in normal use (Burridge, 1969:186).}
\]

These words, and the accompanying church procedures (such as prayer) and codes of behaviour, are intelligible in traditional terms but have a greater impact from their association with whites and their manner and wealth.

Takuruns say that they no longer practise magic or sorcery because 'mipela stap kristen nau', but this does not stop them from consulting other Wiru or non-Wiru ritual specialists for curing or divination. To an extent this non-practice is observed as a ritual prohibition of
Christianity but Takuru magic* is also seen to have lost its force because people are Christians, although the magic of pagans is still viewed as powerful. Magic still exists as a technique but Takuruns are prevented from performing it themselves (ideally) because of their embrace of a different moral system that, in terms of its logic, dismisses it as an alternative. Denying magic but seeking it elsewhere is only an apparent contradiction, it may not be part of the technique of Christianity but it is recognized as existing outside of it. Magic is sinful but, as the work of Satan, even the mission credits its existence while forbidding its practice. This inadvertent dovetailing of mission and traditional beliefs is one reason for the continuation of pre-colonial notions. By acknowledging native spirits, reclassified as Satanic agents, and their intervention in human affairs, the mission is to a large degree responsible for local interpretations of Christianity.

The introduced beliefs of Christianity are strongly governed by behavioural prohibitions and a concept of morality, much like the traditional system. The prohibitions and morality are different but are adhered to for similar reasons, to appease a spirit (God) to maintain the quality of life on earth and (a new reason) to ensure an afterlife without suffering. Commitment to Christianity is on behavioural more than philosophical grounds, if one acts like a Christian God will provide. It is not necessary to have worked through constructs of sin, charity or love to understand what makes a Christian in western religious terms (this statement, of course, idealizes Christianity in western society). This attitude to Christianity is often encouraged by the techniques of particular missions, for example, the

* This term is used loosely to describe manipulations of objects, potions, spells, etc., to achieve a desired effect or inflict harm.
preference of evangelists for mass conversion. This minimizes an individual commitment to Christianity (Smith, A., 1980), but such a technique is facilitated by a sharing of "similar etiologies... the difference between the conceptual level of the villager and the Christian fundamentalist is not really very great" (Rowley, 1965:132).

Regardless of any continuity between cults and Christian beliefs, Takuruns themselves regard the two as antithetical; the former is rejected because it is not appropriate to post-colonial life. Indeed, Christianity (and to an extent the colonial order) is perceived as a civilising if not humanising influence, it turned Wiru from 'wild pigs' to people, emphasizing its acceptance as a new moral order with new reciprocities. It is wild pigs that are referred to and not the domestic variety, which to some extent represent their owners (see 3a), i.e., they are too 'human'. Wild pigs are used as a "metaphor to indicate relative capacities" (Burridge, 1969:180); they are non-reciprocal and unobliged and by comparing themselves to such animals Takuruns point to the introduction of a new moral order by Europeans.

The socio-political situation in Takuru has changed enormously since contact and it is to this that a 'cult' expression of Christianity is directed. To a large extent this has been precipitated by the teachings of the mission through its proferring of a morally transcendent system, hence more effective, and through its providing a technology superior in its control of nature and dangerous spirits (which is influenced by behaving in the manner the new moral order dictates, such as allowing women entry into church).
The adoption of this technology entailed taking on its ethical and explanatory baggage, which was not to prove difficult. The hope and optimism accompanying the acceptance of Christianity, and the relief which greeted the abandonment of warfare implies that an idea of a world free from violence and suffering existed as a potential within Wiru society (cf. Sorensen, 1972:362); some people requested the Ialibu 'kiaps' to come to Pangia and stop Wiru from fighting, and peace was prophesied in dreams. One reason for the initial success of the missions was the model they provided for peaceful relations between enemy groups (and between agnates): they supplied a rationale for pacification. Yet Takuruns were not latent Christians, rather they were historically predisposed to accepting a new cult for a greater control of the world and its resources, although the cult and church modalities were more similar than distinct, which helps explain the ease of conversion (see Robin, 1982:339).

Wiru have a rather Hobbesian view of their life before pacification and reflect upon it as a time of darkness and savagery; Christianity supplied a highly appropriate ideology both for Wiru expectations of whites and for what whites promised and demanded of Wiru. It should be made clear that traditional morality was not negated, rather its ideological and behavioural import shifted, as along a continuum, with Christianity. For example, one should not kill obeys the strictures of the mission but the fear of hell (and prison) provides the stimulus for acquiescence more than a Christian love of one's neighbour. More importantly, the new version of morality enforces behavioural rules for reciprocity between people, and between people and spirits (including God). But, as most missionaries will tell you, to act like a Christian is not necessarily to understand what Christianity is about.
My emphasis on the functional commonalities of cult and church appears to support not deny proposition one, but Takuruns see Christianity as the ideological inverse of spirit cult belief, and the transition from one to the other was not a passive but dynamic process:

One of the early victories on the Wiru field was the destruction of the village spirit house at Taguru (Takuru). There were housed two stone fetishes ... These were the last of such stones in the village, and apparently the people were somewhat fearful about destroying them. They sent for our leading national Christian, to come and take away the stones for us to destroy them, which had great pleasure in doing! This act of renunciation of the old spirit-worship practices gave an impetus to the work there ... God had famished the gods of the Wirus!

The people themselves burnt their spirit houses and swung clear of their old idolatries and superstitious beliefs. They eagerly walked in the light (Ridgway, 1976: 75, 86).

The extent to which these acts were completely voluntary has to remain problematic; many pastors and missionaries demonstrated the superiority of God by entering cult houses and denigrating the power of cult stones. Their survival was evidence of this superiority and encouraged people to abandon cults. The fear of hellfire was certainly one reason why most Takuruns converted first to the E.B.M. and then to the Wesleyans. The 'renunciation' was also from a lack of choice, in an historical sense, yet the decision to discard the old cults was motivated, as I have written, by a desire to import a new 'cult', and to welcome missionaries as a source of power and knowledge. The rapid acceptance of Christianity supports this view:

When we went to New Guinea, I sanguinely expected that it would take ten years to establish a viable Christian community. We saw God do it in as many weeks (ibid:81).
The first proposition cannot explain why some elements of the old remain and why some of the new receive more emphasis than others. Christianity was not superimposed over cults, it is likely that they both represent the working out of potentialities within the system of belief under different historical conditions. This eventuated in a re-expression of spirit cults as a Satanic practice, an outcome which also allows cults as a functional, if socially undesirable, alternative to Christianity. Cults and churches are structurally similar and both portray attempts to comprehend and control the natural and supernatural world.

Initially, the notion of a syncretic fusing seems better suited to promoting an understanding of Christianity in Takuru. Basically, what is implied is that the old and the new combine into a belief system of more or less 'traditional' cosmological function and I have argued as much above. But this is only a partial explanation, for the old is also reinterpreted in terms of the new, cults are recast as Satan worship. There is dialectical relationship between the pre- and post-colonial eras (cf. Burridge, 1969:xviii) and events which transpired after 1962 can only be understood in reference to the history of Pangia and the social specifics informing the Wiru response to colonialization. The perceptions which generate this relationship change over time and, as the situation alters, Takuruns ascribe different meanings to their intercourse with missionaries, administrators, development etc.

The following discussion illustrates the shortcomings of a syncretic approach. The ideological basis of the mission attack on cults

* The word 'dialectic' in this thesis is used in the sense of opposition leading to transformation.
was not that ancestral and deity spirits did not exist (and therefore did not have to be sacrificed to) but that these forces are actually agents of Satan. By worshipping God, a stronger spirit than Satan, i.e., stronger than ancestors and cult deities (evidenced by the success of whites, their assurance, etc.), control was exercised over those agents which desired to cause harm to individuals. Takuruns saw no logical problems with these substitutions, especially at the level of deities. Cult appeasement of paternal ancestors ceased with that of the deity spirits, but now these ancestors were in a confusing category. The mission allowed a belief in ancestral spirits but as Satanic forces, in other words they were not really ancestors but agents of Satan, or what Takuruns took to be ancestors. This distinction was too subtle for the majority of people, and ghosts of the dead in this society are not so easily vanquished. A strong fear of these ghosts, indicated by a dread of cemeteries, still persists even though Takuruns are taught that people upon death go to heaven or hell. Ancestral spirits have always been malevolent, and the next step of classifying them as evil or Satanic was obvious yet, although missionaries have offered to spend nights in cemeteries to allay this 'superstition', to discount their existence was not so easy (and merely would have proved the superior control of whites over ghosts, or that these ghosts were not interested in or had no power over whites).

The connection between the dead and their ability to intervene in daily life is still made if not openly acknowledged, and is against mission dogma. If questioned people make vague references to cemeteries as places of Satan and occasionally it may be said that spirits of the dead are controlled or sent by Satan to act for him in the world. If most Takuruns accept the superiority of Christianity over cults it
seems perplexing that some of these traditional beliefs tenaciously remain. To put it another way, Christianity is not obtuse when it comes to explaining what happens to people's souls, and encourages an attitude of sadness not fear towards cemeteries, so why are Takuruns so unwilling to assign the dead to the relatively clear-cut categories of heaven and hell? An area of ideological uncertainty exists between traditional and Christian beliefs which reflects on mission techniques, assumptions made about conversion and the inadequacy or failure of missions to inculcate into the minds of Takuruns a singularly western notion of Christianity (this is not to say this is the only form of Christianity or, in this instance, the most appropriate but it was the one with which missionaries were concerned). The persistence of beliefs about sickness, sorcery and spirits testify to this failure, in part because Christianity is a world religion and cannot satisfy the specifics of causality which cults addressed.

Although similar to cult beliefs, Christianity is in some respects very different: behavioural and ideological aspects of the new religion have been adopted but the humanistic philosophy - traditionally located in a system of moral reciprocities - which impels and provides the essence of Christianity is lacking. The church cult does not answer to all the needs of a people who have been confused and disappointed by over two decades of involvement with the outside world. Christianity did not fit as neatly into native cosmology as cults imported before pacification, and the resultant grey areas are covered by local explanations that continue to make sense. This is not a simple rationalization on the part of Takuruns; beliefs about spirits and sorcery, for example, are underpinned by a cultural logic which now gives meaning to Christianity (a part of the dialectic mentioned above)
which is why it co-exists with these beliefs without causing too much intellectual discomfort to those so logically embraced.

Cultism and Christianity are polar opposites but are contained within an encompassing system of belief, if one does not suggest an explanation the other will: Takuruns are encapsulated within this system and can select a belief which is the most contextually relevant. Christianity was a successful implant because it supplied a rationality for the white presence and a means to emulate their achievements. Also, and as fundamental, it was accepted in the manner by which introduced cults were adopted, as a more efficient practice directed at worldly control and prosperity (when people decided to become Christians pigs were killed and offered up to God—and also to mark a move to residential unity in Takuru—and to missionaries in what seems to have been a payment for being 'cult' originators. Some missionaries continue to receive meat from pig-kills because God created pigs, and missionaries (the agents of God) are thanked for this creation).

While cargo cults have received attention as a particular response to colonial change, little emphasis has been placed on Christian conversion as a process of adjustment to a new order. Until recently, studies of Melanesian Christianity were often concerned with the negative aspects of mission excesses, the destruction of culture, the anomie of post-contact village life, and so on. That the missions were not able to provide a totally meaningful substitute for traditional morality and belief is only partly their fault, the conditions under which they delivered their messages were more alien and difficult than previous cult innovators experienced. By the same token, the missions were partly successful in creating a framework, albeit an unstable one,
in which people may come to evolve a more relevant notion of Christianity and one in which wider social relationships may be constructed (through national churches, unity for development through Christian brotherhood, etc.).

Granted that Takuruns had little choice in their acceptance of Christianity, it remains problematic that spirit cults could have successfully coped with exposure to an external politico-economic control, especially when the particularities of the colonial period are considered. At some stage in Pangia's development the mission presence may have served a useful psychological purpose by providing intellectual and emotional support for Wiru at a time of rapid change and trauma (to which the missions made their own contribution), and by allowing them the possibility of entry to a white world in which they initially felt markedly inferior (they were wild pigs). One outcome of the evangelical process in Takuru and its outlying Wesleyan settlements was the creation of a dependence on European missionaries for expertise and motivation, similar to that described in reference to the administration in 2b. Attempts to nationalize the church continue to be hindered by the lack of management skills needed to give coherence and structure to the wider dimensions of church organization. For many Takuruns, the presence of European missionaries is seen as an integral part of 'their' Christianity from the advantages and prestige that a mission presence confers. Nationalization has to cope with a common perception that it is a retrograde and not advantageous step.

It is no accident that many Takuruns characterize the mission as 'mother' and the administration as 'father', the former taking on a nurturing and caring role which prepared its 'children' (congregation)
for entry into the world of the 'father' (demands of, and methods for achieving, development), especially in a culture where strong emphasis is placed on the obligations due to maternal relations.

In this respect, the adoption of Christianity could have been a response to an authoritarian colonial control. The more claims were made on time and labour for development schemes and the more disillusioned Takuruns became with them, the more was Christianity retreated into as an alternative for meeting expectations. The power of the mission and a reason for its continued attraction for Takuruns, is that to some extent it does meet these expectations by providing positions of status and services. More importantly, it combines two aspects of Takuru society which traditionally and today are central to its continuation - cult belief and performance, and the nurturance debt owed to the matriline. These two factors were brought into sharp relief in ceremonial pig-kills and to a degree continue to be today (a subject dealt with in 3e).

If the effects of the mission in Takuru had to be briefly summarised, all that could be said is that traditionally cults were tightly bound up in political and social life and remain so to the present. An examination of the role of the church today indicates that what is practised in Takuru is a cult of Christianity, historically determined and socially constructed.

The foregoing was an attempt to explain the mission presence and influence in Takuru, and to indicate that arguments of syncretism in 'cult' belief are not concerned with social process. Syncretism is a conclusion or description made about process and is not concerned with its analysis. Nor does the term suggest reasons for the particular form
which syncretism takes in different societies. To respond to proposition three I would argue for a process of synthesis rather than syncretism, in which the 'cult' present is largely constituted through a dialectical relationship with the past, and that different emergent possibilities occur in a structural transformation which includes elements of the old but in novel combinations, "in this sense every present situation is pregnant with new forms and precedents" (Burridge, 1969:35).

The problem arises with conflict between 'traditional' values and those evolving with the 'new man' in a changing moral context, i.e., when taken for granted assumptions become problematic, which leads to a restructuring of social relations. Whether this problem, or the need for a 'new man', will stabilize or decline with the prospects for development is difficult to predict, but what is created out of this ongoing dynamic could only be Christianity by divine intervention.

Many missions have left the field in the belief that their work has been done, mistaking outward conformity for inner conviction, but in reality only a (Christian) cult infrastructure has been precariously created. If a capacity for alternatives in the face of change exists, this may be expedient for Takuruns but not entirely congruent with the missions' plans for the future of Christianity. These arguments are continued in Part 4, after exchange is discussed in Part 3 to set the scene for a wider examination of the mission and colonial impact.
FOOTNOTES

1. Wiru settlements are not as large as Ilahita but if they are regarded as like the separate hamlets of the latter, the difficulties of making contact and of conversion are comparable. Factionalism in Ilahita is more intense because of the larger size of political units in one village.

2. By 'imagined benefits' I mean in the sense of being perceived as, for example, cargo, and not that these benefits did not exist in some form—health, education, etc.—which were not at first comprehended.

3. The Takuru attitude to conversion was similar to that of the Kewa: The head water (used in baptism) is the blood and water of Jesus which was collected in bottles by the white men when Christ died. When the water is poured on the head it goes inside of the stomach where it guards God's talk. It cleanses us from bad thoughts and helps us do good work. Its power is reactivated through eating the food (communion) (Franklin, 1972:135).

Takuru informants indicated that, at least in the early days of the mission, there were expectations of some rewards for conversion and Christian behaviour, and baptism was seen to have a 'magical' influence on this behaviour. Wiru for Baptism is ue moroko (water hold) and during mass baptisms in Takuru they would wear long white shirts, supplied by the mission, and be held under water in a small pond. Whites were associated with the pale-skinned uali (water men) and baptism may be understood in terms of this connection, i.e., the 'power' of baptism makes Takuruns 'like' whites—emphasized by donning white clothing—from a link to the 'power' of spirits (the Takuru missionary was once mistaken for uali while swimming in the river Polu).

4. The use of the term 'tradition' needs to be clarified. It is used here to mean a collection of pre-colonial beliefs and practices which themselves were not static and were capable of change. Tradition continues into the present through those aspects of the social universe which continue to be perceived in terms of an underpinning cultural logic, even if that logic is adapted to fit new circumstances. Bateson uses tradition in a synchronic sense as the "given facts of a culture, facts which are 'given' as premises" (Bateson, 1936:24, his emphasis). In a diachronic sense, I would argue that these facts inform new understanding, and in the process may themselves be altered.

5. There is a story, probably apocryphal, that a man in Wambi castrated himself so that he could become a Seventh Day Adventist, i.e., to avoid committing the sin of sexual intercourse. The story goes on to mention that the man only removed one testicle in case he changed his mind.
6. Alternatively, as the following evangelical cartoon shows, people were 'worshipping' God but in the wrong fashion by offering blood sacrifice through the encouragement of Satan. The latter, however, as the first two panels show, is not only responsible for all sin in the world, but is also the true recipient of pagan man's 'worship'.

Figure 3: Men and Satan
That colonialism had major implications for the political system has been hinted at above, and I now consider this dimension of change with particular reference to development in Takuru. Systems of status achievement and decision-making in Melanesia have invariably been affected by:

a. changes to the sphere of production,
b. marked inflation in traditional wealth,
c. the introduction of new resources, and
d. competition for new positions of status under colonialism.

I discuss the first three factors briefly and the last in more detail.

a. changes to the sphere of production: after the introduction of mounding in sweet potato gardens, the most recent agricultural innovation would have followed the arrival of steel tools. As I have earlier suggested, while steel was first imported in the twenties it was probably not until the mid to late thirties that anything like significant quantities of it were present. Champion, in 1936, reported many very old steel axes in a northern Wiru settlement (Champion, 1936:98),1 but the efficiency of old and probably blunt steel axes in comparison with stone has to remain problematic. Most settlements had steel by the fifties, although some still used stone axes (apparently from local imbalances in the internal trade network), and after Ialibu station was well established it is likely that steel was everywhere by the end of the fifties. Takuru men stated that few had good quality steel axes until about the mid-fifties.
The effects of the introduction of steel have been documented by others (e.g., Salisbury, 1962) and undoubtedly when 'newer' steel axes arrived in Pangia, men would have found their work in production affected (it is possible that the anthropogenic grasslands in Pangia became more extensive after steel). Elsewhere, the greater freedom from productive tasks which steel allowed, had outcomes such as an increase in warfare or, with pacification, an efflorescence of exchange (ibid.; Strathern, 1971:109). The length of time steel has been present in Pangia makes it difficult to assess its early effects; warfare was certainly endemic in the decades before pacification but causative statements about any increase in its frequency with the arrival of steel cannot be proved. Informants did not react to my suggestions that either warfare or exchange were influenced by steel, and the situation is further confused by the decade of intensive development in the sixties which diminished the time spent in production, and perhaps discouraged a greater build-up in pig populations under an administration which controlled the timing and frequency of pig-kills (and the high level of labour migration probably affected pig numbers, the absence of men removing one stimulus for surplus production for the exchange economy).

Today, men are seldom seen in their settlements during the hours of daylight but, whereas I often encountered women in gardens I only occasionally saw men involved in garden work. Men spend much time in activities such as visiting, looking for pigs, hunting, etc. Male labour input is somewhat seasonal and many informants said that before pacification they hardly ever worked in gardens because of the requirements of defence, exchange and the like.
Yet men stoutly maintain that they actually work harder in gardens since the introduction of steel (partly because of a perceived deterioration in soil fertility, such that men have to make bigger and more gardens for the same returns of the pre-colonial era). Statements about an increased male workload (relative to 'before', men today are not overly strained by garden labour) may refer to labour intensive schemes which, like steel, were associated with Europeans and "we work harder today" may be, in part, an allusion to the development experience which steel presaged. People told me that they make larger gardens today—more as a consequence of pacification (see above) than steel, as smaller gardens close together were easier to defend— but do larger gardens, with steel, require less labour?

Sillitoe provides quantitative evidence, from another Southern Highlands society, for a negative response to this query. He suggests that:

the efficacy of steel tools has increased the amount of work men do, which reduces their comparable effectiveness with stone measured by the time spent on a task (Sillitoe, 1979:155),

with the proviso that "time alone is an inadequate measure of efficiency" (ibid:160). In other words, if men do spend longer hours in garden work this does not necessarily mean that their productivity is increased (the same area of garden may still be cleared—more efficiently granted—for a longer time input; given that gardens are larger today the amount of time men spend in productive tasks would be further increased). Yet if men do work longer (rather than harder), then
conclusions about steel giving men more freedom for warfare or exchange becomes questionable.

The basically non-competitive* and cyclical nature of exchanges associated with Wiru pig-kills and cults, together with the possibility that an effectively greater surplus of food (hence of pigs) was not created by steel, suggest that any tendency which pig-kills had to effloresce may not have been overly encouraged with the use of steel tools.³ Some informants said that pig-kills are in fact smaller today because young men are less interested in the work and trouble involved in raising pigs. Warfare was the real barrier to exchange, and once removed the latter could proceed at regular intervals uninterrupted by flight or garden destruction (exchange is not a functional equivalent for warfare, it became more frequent in some areas as constraints to its performance were removed, i.e., as a response to political change and not from a simple connection between a greater productivity, more time and the frequency of exchange).

In these terms, the traditional exchange economy would have been most affected, if allowed to continue, after pacification. But in Pangia the missions, the administration and the H.L.S. combined to prohibit or limit exchange if it was sinful or interfered with development, and by taking men away from it. Older men, with the pressure to develop, did not have the opportunity to bolster their status in response to colonialism by increasing the frequency and scale of exchange, or their control of the valuables used in it, to the same extent as Strathern reports for the Melpa (Strathern, 1978) - especially in competition with

* In the sense of being non-incremental.
younger men who earnt money as labour migrants. Exchange in Pangia did not have the chance to effloresce, regardless of whether such an outcome would have occurred.

In light of the above, the most significant changes, for politics, to the sphere of production were -

1. the long-term use of land for coffee (up to 30 years) which returned money for use in the local and wider economy. It was the use of money, with its new possibilities for social relationships and status achievement, which helped to transform the nature of exchange in Pangia.

2. the removal of people by development schemes and labour migration from time otherwise spent in production, with the result of a decline in exchange (in conjunction with its control and prohibition by the administration and missions respectively).

b. inflation in traditional wealth: Pangia's trade isolation and its relatively late experience of colonialism meant that Wiru did not undergo a pearl shell 'boom' as did other areas of the Highlands (Strathern, 1978). Pearl shells retain their importance - and scarcity - to the present, partly because their 'value' was not undermined by inflation (see 3a and 3c). Also, the economy of Pangia is not such to allow the supplanting of shells entirely by money (Strathern, 1982b). That shells were not inflated suggests that shell exchanges concerned with individual or group status (kage, see 3d) did not have the opportunity to increase in scale. Even if some shell inflation did occur, the dampening of exchange under colonialism discouraged this form of status achievement (along with the emergence of alternative means for this achievement).
c. **Introduction of new resources:** money was used very early in Pangia's colonial history, and soon replaced the use of shell valuables in the majority of transactions between 'kiaps', missionaries and Wiru. This implies that a large proportion of white-Wiru relationships were initially constructed through the use of money, a medium which was almost completely under the control of Europeans, such that any autonomy on the part of Wiru in these relationships was minimal. This, I would argue, had two effects -

1. money was a prime factor in creating an early dependence on Europeans in Pangia, as well as reinforcing their authority.

2. money quickly became incorporated into exchange as a 'traditional' valuable before its 'commodity' aspects were fully understood - and the use of money in exchange further increased a dependence on Europeans - which influenced perceptions of development, self-help concepts, wage labour, etc.

Patrol reports soon noted a "double system" of value, with money and native valuables "operating jointly and within their own spheres" (PR6/69-70).

Money was certainly an important factor in the acceptance of and response to the administration and missions in Pangia, and strongly influenced the nature of white-Wiru interaction. Coffee and other introduced resources were ultimately means of obtaining money, and of asserting a measure of independence from administration control. Money penetrated into all aspects of Wiru life, and made exchange relations more expensive to maintain and reproduce.

d. **New positions of status:** men with wealth, status, respect and, formerly, prowess as warriors or cult leaders, are known as *ali tobo*. 
which translates as 'head man' (tobou also means 'skull'). I use the term 'headman' to refer to this person, but hasten to add that it is a position of status and not one of formal authority: it allows for some influence in decision-making and arbitration. The force of a man's personality, his stock of wealth, and his capacity for violence and as a fight leader may, for a time, select out one man as a pre-eminent headman for the district, but 'serial despotism' (Salisbury, 1964) does not seem to have been a feature of political life in Takuru.

The rapidity of change in the colonial era gave headmen little time to maintain their established positions by using traditional methods as a basis for innovation in the control of introduced resources (and of younger men). The power base of headmen is in polygyny and productivity (in gardens, pigs, and children), and with mission proscriptions against the former and government work days undermining the latter, the response by headmen was to compete for new roles offered by missions and the administration. This helped to buttress their loss of power in the political system, a loss also caused by the dampening of exchange (which narrowed the channels through which men could augment or maintain their status).

Headman and older men continued to exercise control over land and traditional wealth, which was used to bring younger men back into line (PR2/72-3). But their control over land distribution was in some instances being transferred to administration representatives, and money quickly became the prime valuable, which younger men could obtain without depending on older men (although help was still needed in raising bridewealth). These were other factors which encouraged headmen to subscribe to 'development' rather than 'tradition'.
It has to be stressed that men continue to derive much status from exchange, and in particular from their activities in pig-kills at which men incur and pay off debts in pork. In exchange, headmen tend to compete as much, if not more, with headmen from their own district as with those from other districts. Yet this competition is not to extend a headman's political influence outside of his group boundaries, rather it is to give 'shame' to recipients if they fail to return the same quantity as the original gift; this augments the status of the headman and his group (which he represents). The political context in which men aspire to prominence is still largely a parochial one.

The administration introduced the elected positions of councillor and ward committee officer, 'kaunsil' and 'komiti' respectively, the function of the former being to represent his settlement or census unit at meetings of the Pangia L.G.C., in order to communicate back initiatives for development or to ask for local considerations. The 'komiti' is the man who polls the second most votes in councillor elections, but in Takuru it is also a role which falls to representatives - usually headmen or 'bisnismen' - of major local groups (sub-clans) who contested the election, and won the most votes in their group. 'Komiti', then, is not only a deputy to the 'kaunsil' but a person who supports his group's interests, hears its complaints, delegates government work to his group, etc.

In the late seventies a new position was introduced, that of village court magistrate (also elected), who hears cases for informal adjudication in his own settlement, and also passes judgement on cases from a wider area at local village courts, in company with other magistrates; this avoids accusations of group or settlement bias. Land
disputes and serious crimes are dealt with in Pangia by the administration.

Each of the groups that constitute the Takuru clan has one, sometimes more, ali tobou, depending on the size of a group, the number of its lineages, the percentage of capable men in that group, etc. The 'kaunsil' is different from the headman in that he is perceived by many as a district representative (as were some headmen) and as a link to the wider politico-economic system. He has, however, taken over and undermined some of the functions of headmen vis-à-vis influencing the course of decision-making, mainly in respect of his area's interaction with a wider world.

The headman is still largely concerned with a 'traditional' role—the organization of his group and its resources for pig-kills (and sometimes for 'bisnis', such as buying a truck), confronting people threatening members (e.g. suspected poisoners), and the 'chairing' of discussions on group affairs. Headmen in consultation make decisions for their district or settlement on such matters as the timing of pig-kills, and previously were the organizing force for forays into enemy territory. Takuru is a consensus based society but the ali tobou provide a focal point for the discussion of group affairs and the initiation of its decisions, as well as being mediators with other groups within the district (or conversely encouraging factional disputes).

With the introduction of money, wage labour, etc., exchange did not become politicized to the extent it did, say, in Hagen, as a response by older men to retain control of traditional and new wealth, and to maintain their status and importance in competition with younger,
moneved men. Wiru headmen posed no threat to the rise of councillors, pastors, etc., and in fact often assumed these roles themselves, especially in the first decade of development. (If there were any tendencies to cargo cult development in Pangia, the early incorporation of headmen into colonial power structures would have inhibited cult emergence). Headmen continue to be important figures but they have lost their singularity. Some informants said that in small settlements many headmen have died not to be replaced, at least by someone who fits the concept of 'headman'. This implies that relatively large populations with inter-group rivalries may be necessary for the headman role to be perpetuated.

A number of other new positions of status have arisen in Pangia since pacification, but the one most likely to reduce the ranks of men aspiring to be headmen is the 'bisnisman' — unless the two roles become incorporated over time. There are various activities in which rural 'bisnismen' can be engaged, ranging from trade/bulk store owners to P.M.V./truck owners to coffee middlemen, with some men being combinations of all these types. Headmen may be 'bisnismen' — the reverse is less likely — but significantly successful 'bisnismen' may be called ali kamo (man of wealth), an alternative name for a headman, suggesting these roles have something in common.

In the future, the achievement of headmanship may come to rely also on 'bisnis' as an attribute of this position. Yet this may be unnecessarily confusing the issue, as 'bisnis' does not conform to western notions of business and economic rationality, and it relates to the attainment and maintenance of group and individual status as does the wealth raised by headmen through production. These new roles,
whether achieved by elections or 'bisnis', indicate that substantial political changes have occurred in Pangia. Nonetheless, within the settlement individual status and group competition are still the ultimate concerns of politics.

Another new contender for status is the pastor, who is frequently involved in 'bisnis', usually as a trade store owner. There are no old pastors, or headmen who are pastors, at least in Takuru. They are either young or middle-aged men who were brought up in the mission environment, or worked for the mission as young men. These men saw Christianity as an alternative avenue to status achievement (also imparted by a connection with the mission) without going to the trouble and hard work involved in the 'traditional' way of accumulating wealth (this is not to decry a personal commitment to Christianity as a motivation for seeking roles within the church).

Christianity, like cults, is linked to a control of resources and the environment, a proposition elaborated on elsewhere in the thesis (2a, 4b). In 1981, the 'kaunsil' was also the head pastor of Takuru, a combination of roles which does not seem to take place in other regions of the Highlands. This overlap of roles is perhaps connected to a 'cult' perception of the promises of development and Christianity, and to the expertise of pastors in helping to fulfil these promises through their connection with God. This may be one reason why commerce did not replace Christianity in Pangia, as Clarke reports for the Maring with whom he worked (Clarke, 1980:179). Commerce was not an alternative to Christianity for Takuruns, rather the two were inextricably bound together (in the sense of resource control).
In Takuru, the first 'kaunsi' also combined the roles of pastor and headman, but this incumbent was criticised for the contradiction between his supposed Christian example and his habit of sending people to jail for not working on roads. The conflict between his role as pastor and councillor led to his losing both positions. Eventually, the headman-councillor became a more viable role than that of headman-pastor, as the functions and expectations of headmen and pastors are largely incompatible and headmen soon realized that competition for administration positions provided the better avenue to status. This led to the position of pastor being filled more by younger 'wordly' men, who desired status at a time when 'tradition' was in disrepute. The existence of alternatives for men aspiring to positions of renown was a significant factor affecting the rate of political change. Also, the intrusion of the mission into local politics was a factor in its acceptance and use by Takuruns.

Councillor and church positions are, with minor exceptions, occupied entirely by men (see footnote 9), reflecting the continuing male control of politics and the resources used in its manipulation. 'Bisnis' is a recourse open to councillors, headmen and pastors as a means of strengthening their positions, and it has helped in the emergence of the councillor-pastor role mentioned above. A pastor is a well established and respected position, such that a pastor with 'save', a wide range of support, and some sort of 'bisnis' as an indicator of his secular abilities (and success in 'bisnis' reflects his pastoral abilities), can be voted in as councillor.

The epitome of the 'bisnisman', for Takuru and many of those settlements dominated by what Wiru call 'Baibel' missions, is the
District Supervisor (D.S.) of the church. These types of mission are characterized as fundamental and evangelical, and it is interesting to speculate that the upholding and propagation of a 'Protestant work ethic' is connected to the rise of their foremost representatives from the ranks of houseboy to positions which most closely approximate, in the use of capital, the ideal of the western businessman; it may be that their upbringing in the mission environment, the use of the mission as a 'bank' for savings (out of the reach of 'wantoks') and loans, and their separation from their natal settlements has greatly facilitated the rise of this type of 'bisnisman'; some pastors are also as 'successful' as D.S.'s.

Of the three D.S.'s with whom I am acquainted all are around forty, all own cars, tradestores (one owns a large store and petrol outlet in Pangia), have various 'bisnis' projects running (chickens, piggeries, etc.) and all make large amounts of money during coffee season as middlemen between Pangia and Hagen buyers, using their vehicles for the conveyance of coffee and backloading with cargo and passengers. Howlett describes this type of individual as a "big peasant" (Howlett, 1980:196), and to some extent they are seen by Wiru as outside of their own society; they are referred to as 'black red men' and are a part of an emerging 'elite' group which includes plantation owners.

These D.S.'s, as leaders of the church, provide an example of individual achievement through 'bisnis' to the ordinary Wiru, as well as further reinforcing the link between Christianity and a control of resources. Also, fundamentalist D.S.'s are helped in their accumulation of money because they do not drink, and do not have to treat their 'wantoks' to financially draining beer parties.
Rather than there occurring an integration of 'traditional' and innovative means for the achievement of status, as may have happened elsewhere, there appears to have been more of a divergence with the emergence of a new type of person who manipulates the introduced resources of coffee, Christianity, money and contacts with Europeans and with people outside of the district. This is not to say that the split is complete or that headmen do not also use money in transactions which maintain their position. The entrepreneur still uses pigs and pearl shells as one bulwark of his position when the occasion demands, but increasingly it is money which is coming to play a major role in status acquisition.

This poses problems for the 'bisnisman' in that, whereas quantities of pigs and pearl shells are not determined seasonally, he has to cope with a variable supply of money, a commodity seasonal with coffee (most trade stores only operate during the coffee flush). Presently there are two men in Takuru who are capable of maintaining a fairly regular supply of money, the D.S. and a bulkstore owner, although in both cases the majority of their money is accumulated during the coffee season (and in the case of the latter there is the support of a sleeping partner who works in Hagen). 11

It is the individual who manipulates money and new symbols of power, rather than the headman whose position exists in the context of kinship and group membership, who provides a different and perhaps more appealing model for achievement. These new positions of status coexist with the 'traditional' ones, for which there will continue to be a need as long as groups require a spokesman-representative for their affairs; as hopes for development recede there is every chance that headmanship
will make up for its loss of singularity (cf. A. Strathern, 1982b). It is as if the various aspects of a headman's role were split up under colonialism and allocated to new and more relevant positions, and with the passage of time 'bisnismen' may come to take on a more 'traditional' aspect (they are often strongly identified with their groups, as are headmen), or 'bisnis' may just become a feature of headmanship (a process apparently under way in Hagen (Strathern, A.1982c:155)).

The political consequences of colonialism and the emergence of new positions of status are recorded in the patrol reports (see also 2b). The creation of a L.G.C. initiated large-scale political changes but even before this event there were new roles, such as pastor and village constable, which demonstrated that control was now external and intrusive. The administration understood that traditional 'leaders' would be their representatives, but hoped to replace these conservatives with younger, more progressive men; to an extent 'kiaps' concentrated on individuals rather than the group for promoting development:

it is anticipated that (in the next council elections) a number of the present Councillors will be passed over in favour of younger, more vigorous men who can instil enthusiasm and obtain active cooperation from the local people during the political and economic advancement of the area (PR8/67-8).

By 1970 only five of the forty Councillors were younger men, yet while the administration was not successful in ousting the conservatives these younger men exerted an effect disproportionate to their numbers:

The members of the Pangia L.G.C. comprise an interesting mixture of the progressive and the conservative. There is a nucleus of mostly young, progressive men who are keen to get on with the job of development. This group is often highly critical of the other Councillors who they feel are a drawback
to the progress of the area. A second force in the Council is
the older, conservative group. These men, whilst keen for
development to come and vocal in their demands for roads,
cattle, etc., are often held back by their lack of full
understanding of the need for their people to provide the
labour, and often the cash (in the form of tax), to get
projects under way. In the majority of cases the young men
have their way, especially in developmental matters (PR4/68–
9).

Pangia's 'concentrated development' led to a breakdown in the
social order, exacerbated by the H.L.S., which diminished the influence
of headmen in decision-making and threatened the viability of their role
model for younger men. The administration's preference for the latter as
a spearhead for their programs also contributed to a possible decline in
the respect shown for older men and their opinions (reflected in the
changing quality of father-son relationships, in which many sons refer
to their fathers as 'kanaka').

There are certain discernible stages in the evolution of the
Councillor position in Pangia. At first, when people were willing and
keen to follow administration directives, the 'kaunsil' was a much
sought after status from its association with the administration and
development. The next stage occurred when the attraction of labour
intensive projects began to pall, and when the chance to earn money was
desired more than local progress. It is possible that colonialism
introduced a degree of authority into positions of status (authority
comes with the institionalization of power), and the 'bosboi' nature of
some Councillors was cited as a reason for voting them out of office.
But any authority which Councillors may have had was compromised by
elections:
on the whole the leadership at village level is not good. This is so because traditional headmen who once held position by their abilities to lead and exert authority are now dependent on the whim of the voters to remain as Councillors. It is unrealistic to expect a man to be firm and incur the displeasure of the people he relies on for election. Too, Councillors are missing out on the new wealth - trade stores, cars, etc., by being involved in time-consuming village and Council matters. This all leads back to the fact that Councillors are expected to do too much of what is not primarily a Council job - petty dispute settlement, law enforcement, etc., (PR2/72-3).

Another effect of colonialism was that any powers of arbitration, in land disputes for example, which headmen had before pacification were precluded by the presence of 'kaunsil' and 'komiti' (PR7/73-4) (except when these incumbents were themselves headmen, who nevertheless continued to be compromised in their decisions by parochialism and a dependence on votes). Voters were influenced by the type of 'kaunsil' they needed to elect to assure them of a constant source of money from work contracts (PR6/73-4). This was another factor in social breakdown:

discipline in the village appears to be breaking down. The elders no longer have control of the young... It seems almost as if the elders are afraid of the young and thus have lost control of them. It has been my contention for many years that Councils will not get too far until they have a majority of younger Councillors and this problem only strengthens this theory. Younger Councillors would probably be better able to handle the younger bloods. Stealing is noticeably on the increase (PR3/71-2).

By the early seventies, as disillusionment was setting in with the failure of various development schemes, the 'kaunsil' position became increasingly untenable for the incumbent. As a representative of the administration and responsible for encouraging work in projects, the Councillor of this time was often not perceived as a position of status and respect, and "weak and indifferent people" were voted for as a consequence (PR13/71-2).
After Independence, the negative connotations of Councillorship began to recede as concerns became more parochial and local politics again made 'kaunsil' a desired position; competition for these roles increased as their status improved. 'Bisnismen' began to compete with headmen, indicating how these two roles started to converge in respect of local perceptions of their importance; 'bisnis' was an alternative but acceptable road to status, which councillorship helped to consolidate (and, as I have written, ali kamo is a synonym for 'bisnisman').

It is worth noting that even in the mid-seventies young educated men were still seen as largely incapable of fulfilling expectations held of Councillors (PR1/76/7). Many headmen-Councillors continued to be voted for out of loyalty (verging on reverence in some cases), and if these positions were lost it was not unusual for the loser to be financially compensated by his co-residents who 'felt sorry' for him (and empathised with his 'shame'). The 1982 Councillor list indicates that about 30% of 'kaunsil' are still headmen, the rest being mostly 'bisnismen'. Today, the Councillor role is more closely associated with 'bisnismen' who are seen as more capable and relevant — they speak pidgin, have travelled, etc., — in their mediating role between the census unit and the outside world. Just as a headman's son may 'change' with him, a deceased Councillor's son (if he is seen as capable) may be voted into the vacant position as a show of sympathy for the son and respect for the deceased. This, together with comments made previously, suggests that the positions of headman, 'bisnisman' and Councillor are still all roles concerned with status and group representation.
As mentioned above, the first Councillor in Takuru was a headman and also a pastor. He lost both his colonial roles because of their incompatibility, and the next 'kaunsil' (in 1966) was the most respected headman - from his wealth and prowess as a killer - and a former village constable. This position was retained until 1981, even though dissatisfaction with his capabilities had been expressed for years, when the head pastor became the new incumbent. The ex-Councillor was voted back in as village magistrate because people were sorry for him, and he continues to be held in high esteem by most as a wealthy and industrious headman. His co-residents felt that someone more progressive and 'kristen' was needed to represent Takuru on the L.G.C. (and settlements derive status from the calibre of their 'kaunsil').

The history of colonialism in Takuru reflects on-going processes of group fission and fusion; after Pangia station was established the inhabitants of Takuru district moved to a village style of residence, encouraged by notions of Christian brotherhood and mission suggestions about the desirability of nuclear families. Yet co-residence led to much social friction and to the splintering of groups to other hamlets along group (and in one case denominational) lines. When Koliri lived closer together they contributed to a truck which was to be managed by two resident non-agnates, who arranged the loan for purchase of the vehicle.

This truck apparently made a reasonable profit and clan donors soon requested their money back to buy their own car. One of the managers replied that there was not yet enough profit to repay the loan, but offered to finance a fence for a Takuru cattle project. A clan headman received a splinter in the eye while cutting posts and went partially blind. This was the start of much antagonism between the clan and
Kawirene (the group of the non-agnate) which led to court cases for compensation and for the return of loans, and finally the poi mokora (loosely, ill feelings which can be malevolent) resulted in Kawirene leaving the Wesleyans to form their own S.D.A. settlement.

The truck was repossessed and the manager fled to Lae never to return. The other manager was taken to court, ostracized, and had his trade store ransacked by police to recover some of the money invested. This was the end of his attempt at being a 'bisnisman' in Takuru, and he continues to claim, today that his litigants remain his enemies, who miss no chance to 'down' his and his son's name.

The next truck was bought by two sub-clans, but one tried to appropriate it for its own purposes and crashed it on the road to Hagen; this was after numerous conflicts over continual costs for repairs and breakdowns. The result was more court cases for the return of invested money, and poi mokora also remains from this 'bisnis' endeavour. As Takuru fragmented into different hamlets there was a tendency for sub-clans to buy their own trucks, and sub-clans now compete with each other on the basis of cars, stores and other 'bisnis' activities which a sub-clan owns (this competition became noticeably more vigorous during the course of fieldwork, as Kawali vied with Baipo for the status of 'nambawan' group). Rivalry, covert hostilities, occasional violence and marriage and land disputes, although common before pacification, appear to be on the increase, as are accusations of poisoning between sub-clans. Poisoning is feared more by those groups which are most successful in 'bisnis'; it is also used as a threat in elections for such things as the Pangia M.P., with supporters of one candidate threatening to poison supporters of another. It is only at these times
that a return to warfare is discussed, i.e., at the level of Pangia district. An individual successful man also fears poisoning from his jealous agnates or co-residents.

Headmen are prominent in encouraging group divisions, residence shifts and rivalries, and the ex-Councillor encouraged segmentary opposition by suggesting that the sub-clans should no longer kill pigs together but at their own hamlets - the ultimate act of fission. This man also urged the complete abandonment of Takuru hamlet, the residential symbol of Koliri unity, and encouraged Takuruns to sell their pigs rather than save them for ceremonial pig-kills. His justification for the latter was the money this would bring to his co-residents, but in reality it was to punish them for voting him out of his Councillorship, insofar as Takuru's standing with other districts would have been significantly damaged by a failure to pay back debts in pork.

Antagonisms in Takuru became more intense after the death of a headman in 1980, said to be the result of poisoning, which resulted in many accusations, veiled threats and court cases which continue to the present. Divisiveness and rivalry assure headmen of a role of continued importance in Takuru (cf. A. Strathern, 1982b), and while the colonial experience affected their influence and singularity the predicted loss by the administration of their 'leadership' function has yet to occur. Whether headmen encourage these sentiments is difficult to know, they cannot all be 'kaunsil' and they are concerned to reinforce their status in their settlements and groups.
It was these men who, as a counter to labour migrants returning with money, planted the most coffee and were most enthusiastic in starting cattle and other development projects. Headmen were certainly concerned — by engaging in development — to maintain their control over resources, and in this they were mostly successful. Some headmen have become 'bisnismen' or partners in 'bisnis', especially in the more prominent sub-clans; while they did not particularly try to control money and younger men through manipulations of the exchange system, they did and do compete (or join) with younger 'bisnismen' through more modern means, i.e., development, be it bulkstores, P.M.V. management, coffee plantations, etc. Some younger men, disillusioned with development and Christianity, opt out altogether and become 'raskols', or spend periods between village and urban centres looking for work, which usually adds to their frustration.

The fact that more 'traditional' means were not used to bolster male and group status was not without its effects. Takuruns say that to engage in development is to 'act like a women', i.e., they must work hard, be non-aggressive and obey an external power beyond their control. (Interestingly, it is Kawai, the 'producer' group, which is becoming the most successful at 'bisnis'). Men, in particular the older ones, feel that their masculinity has been threatened, and there is a suggestion of emasculation in statements that men have been 'shrinking' since pacification. Takuruns much prefer peace and development to their pre-colonial situation, but men are aware that a price has been paid for their complicity with and subservience to the administration and missions. Christianity, as an ideology stressing obeisance, meekness, non-violence, brotherhood, etc., has contributed this
perception men have of their changing nature, and some of its effects on exchange and social organization are discussed in Parts 3 and 4.

FOOTNOTES

1. This settlement may have had more steel than elsewhere from its advantageous position in this stone axe trade.

2. Sillitoe estimates that steel axes are, on the whole, 1.5 times more efficient than stone axes (Sillitoe, 1979). As far as I know there is no published data on the effects of steel tools such as shovels and bushknives on Highlands women's work in production; shovels would have made women's labour easier but may not have decreased their overall time spent in production - bigger gardens may have been made for example especially after cash crops and other development schemes were introduced. Also, whether shovels and the like were traded in before pacification is not clear.

3. Informants said that headmen were among the first men to have steel because they had the most wealth. Headmen have a vested interest in productivity so household production for men of this status may have increased.

4. It was the use of money in transactions which affected exchange, rather than 'new' use of exchange in the colonial situation as a response by headmen to threats to their position.

5. Headmen were known by other names: ali kamo (man of wealth), ali timini (nose man, a reference to the nose as a marker of ability and inherited male characteristics), ali kebi (cassowary man, a reference to a headman's singular and aggressive nature), ali yomo (tree man, see 1b), ali mudu po (a reference to the string used to fix a man's hat to his head; the head is an important referent because it is the seat of a man's wene and characteristics).

6. I use 'power' in the sense of it being an attribute of a headman's status; the 'power' of arbitration for example. Power is not to be confused with authority in this case.

7. It is worth noting that I did not observe headmen until more than two decades after pacification, and that I could be presenting a distorted picture of headmen in 'traditional times'. Headmen may exaggerate their pre-colonial importance, while younger men may be biased in their recollections by the loss of singularity of headmen under colonialism.

8. 'Bisnis' is a confusing category of activity. For example, one man amassed a fair sum of money as a coffee middleman and, at first sight, appeared to be an individual maximizing his assets. But he was an S.D.A. and, to bolster his own and his sect's status in competition with the Wesleyans, he bought three cows with his
profits, and cows are not an economic proposition (and are kept for prestige and rarely killed).

9. The number of pastors in Takuru varied between three and four, with four male deacons and six female deacons. Male deacons compete for pastorship, and the position of 'head pastor' is also competed and voted for. Female deaconship entails such work as putting flowers in the church, leading singing in church, etc.

10. Quite a few 'bisnismen' are ex-pastors, their fall from grace is explained in terms of the 'bisnis' aspect of their calling becoming too tempting. One ex-pastor tried to use the status of this position to attract women. He recently sold his truck to obtain the bridewealth for a second wife, indicating again how 'bisnis' feeds into a 'traditional' perception of the 'economy'.

11. One of the main drawbacks for 'big peasants', and one which inhibits the rise of 'true' capitalists, is the drain on a man's resources from his 'wantoks' and kin. The D.S. in Takuru often had to contribute the lion's share to a relative's bridewealth.

12. Ali koloi toko (man, to not spread out from one stem), this is a verb used to describe a plant which the longer it grows the smaller it becomes. Informants say that men are getting smaller—they are 'like rats'—because 1. soil has deteriorated and less food is produced; men eat less and are therefore shrinking, 2. missions made men put on clothes so that their 'skin' and traditional dress could not be seen. The body is used as a metaphor for change and this supports a view that 'shrinking' is to do with notions of emasculation (a process associated with the arrival of whites, as is the belief in soil deterioration). This makes for an interesting comparison with my interpretation of the Koliri origin story, in which men were less than 'male' until in control of their own destiny. Perhaps the notion of 'emasculature' is a cultural theme (which may relate to procreation beliefs). Read suggests that a "preoccupation with the body" (1955:268) is to do with a lack of distinction between a man's psychic and physical self, such that the body can be a metaphor for a perception of the self. This 'preoccupation' is related to my discussion of revivals (4a).
"... we can take social reciprocity in the broadest sense as embodying deeply felt cultural assumptions concerning not only transactions but also the way that the world and events are constructed, as well as how problems may be resolved" (Schieffelin, 1980:506).

"When Tombema-Enga abandoned the ‚tee‘, they did so in favour of millenarian activity. The moral and social encumbrances of the ‚tee‘ gave way to a new morality and vision of a new society where the ‚tee‘ would not matter, or in some cases, the end of presently constituted society altogether ... overt government and mission edict would not stop the ‚tee‘, for they offered no comprehensive alternative" (Feil, 1983:94).

"... there is nothing in its nature that causes money to destroy gift exchange systems. They are destroyed by the political power of foreign institutions when conflict emerges. More often than not gift exchange systems flourish and develop under the impact of such opposition" (Gregory, 1980:648).
Before I consider Wiru exchange, I need to focus on the meaning of items used in this activity. This meaning can only be understood, in a society where major exchanges are concerned with the life cycle, in terms of procreation beliefs (see 1b). The symbolism of exchange items emerges out of the investigation of one exchange in particular, the gifting of shells by ego to his/her MBs (considered in more detail in the next section), for which a return of pork ribcages is made. I contend that this symbolism is invariant in other exchanges of the life cycle, which should become clear when these are presented below. The sections which follow set the background for a discussion of a major concern of Part 3, which is the effects of colonialism on exchange, with more specific reference to missions in Part 4.

Shells are given by ego to mother's brothers as a payment for his/her 'body'. They can be given at any time but especially at ceremonial pig kills, oino. It is said about these shells that people give them with no expectation or even wish for a return, but the recipients do make a counter-gift of pork ribcages, lunori. This return is certainly not of the same equivalence as shells but the latter are given in exchange for something which has already been obtained - one's body - and for an ongoing benevolent 'maintenance' of it by MBs (who can curse ego and affect his health or growth if he offends them or is niggardly in his payments). This "imbalance reflects a structurally 'given' situation generated from the context of wife-giving and receiving and the reproduction of children" (Strathern, A. 1978:87), and the gift of lunori refers to the symbolic not material nature of this
return. Why a counter-gift should be made is considered later, but first I will discuss the symbolic aspects of what is exchanged.

The objects which are used to mediate between ego and MBs obtain their meaning from the context in which they are used, the paying off of a debt for 'body' which simultaneously structures and reproduces social life. The pig, kai, is a pan-symbolic animal, its meaning in exchange is relevant to the context of prestation and whether the pig is given live, dead, whole, cooked or in special cuts. Live pigs are "the nearest complete equivalent to people" (Strathern,A. 1981:223) and in exchange relate to the people involved or, when sacrificed in cults, to agnates in general.

An interview with a headman produced the following observation: live pigs presented in bridewealth means that people 'giving nature' or yomo, but when they are given as meat 'dina' or debt is settled, lessened or created. A bride is not 'property' transacted for, it is her ability to produce children for which the 'bodies' of pigs are given. Live pigs are given in other contexts, most notably in trade, buying knowledge (e.g., of sorcery techniques) and life cycle payments. For the latter, they represent the person or the social relationship between people and, when people are engaged in an exchange relationship, it is a comment on and a recognition of their social identity; a live pig given from one person to another is a special gift. People are not the objects of transaction and, to a large extent, neither are the pigs which represent them.

A live pig is called wene kai (wene; a capacity for thought), underlining the fact that they are seen to have an emotional and mental
existence, as do humans. Pigs are carefully looked after by women, who have a special magic to make them grow, and nurtured as are their children. Women may give choice cooked sweet potato to pigs and, to an extent, they are another form of 'body' which women create. Pigs are most often used in bridewealth or death compensation where they represent or substitute for people on the basis of a negotiated equivalent between the person concerned and a number of pigs (and other wealth items, notably shells and today money).

When a pig is killed, just as it is transformed from one category to another, i.e., live to dead, so too does its meaning in exchange, as different cuts of meat, relate to different categories. To understand the meaning of items used in ego-MBs exchange, I will have to discuss other contexts in which pork is offered as exchange or sacrifice.

The importance of a woman's role in reproduction is recognized in the matrilateral bias in the exchange system. The fact that this ability is incorporated into the domain of male control, through the opianago idiom (men who bear), again emphasizes that while women produce 'bodies' it is men who produce individuals, groups and wealth. In a sense, the individuals which men produce are the result of 'maleness' superimposed over 'bodies' derived from female substance.

This relates to the ambiguity of the colour red, which is associated with men but is also the colour of blood which is derived from the maternal line. Why is red, then, a colour associated with men? Paradoxically, it is the only substance which men share and can use as a symbol of agnatic group identity and continuity. In Takuru an apical ancestress is stressed to the exclusion of a common ancestral father,
and it is the 'blood' from this woman that the clan and agnates share. Wealth may also be 'red', not only from its link with men, but as a comment on its ultimate source—women.

Whereas live pigs represent people in exchange, pork ribcages refer to what is exchanged. The aspects of lunori which concern us here are that it is composed of flesh, bone and blood, it is the 'inside' part of a pig, and it is the return made by opianago in recognition of the continued payment of shells made by ego for 'body'. Ribcages can be given raw but are usually cooked; in terms of symbolic consistency it would seem to be more logical for lunori to be always given raw (wenea) as it represents female substance in its essence. The 'new' or 'unused' aspect of lunori reflects on the nature of the body which women create—it is free of 'maleness' at birth, i.e., its potential use as a medium of masculinity is inherent within it but at birth it is 'new' and awaiting a paternal conditioning. To cook ribcages is akin to socializing them, to render the bodies which they represent less specifically 'female' and more generally 'human'. This is to equate rawness and cooking with female substance and male individuation, such that the raw or cooked nature of lunori may be a comment on these twin aspects of its meaning: a body is never only female but the product of female substance and male yomini.

The act of giving shells to opianago is called pine teigu (I cut the base), conveying a sense in which ego is paying off the obligations owed for existence, which his/her body metaphorically and visibly expresses. It is the inside of a body which particularly belongs to MBs, even though women create it entirely, i.e., the chest cavity, lungs, etc. When matrilateral spirits send sickness, tepene yene (trunk sick),
it is this part of the body which is affected (cf. A. Strathern, 1980:62). The *lunori*, then, is a convenient symbol for the return made to ego as it represents what he/she is paying for - the 'body' inside of an individuated person. Ribcages are tepene and composed of flesh, bone and blood, the three elements of physical make-up. They can be given raw or cooked, reflecting the basically female constitution of individuals, and after consumption leave bones, as do bodies which decompose after death, perhaps to demonstrate the power MBs have over ego's life or the point at which body payments cease, death (Strathern suggests that MBs, by controlling birth, perhaps to a degree control death (Strathern, A. 1981:211)). These features of *lunori* condense into a potent image of the maternal contribution to ego's *pine* (base, origin, cause of existence).

In contrast pork sides, *midiko*, which are external to and envelop this symbol of the 'body', are exchanged between men in a political context where what a man does is on the 'outside', an outcome of his paternally derived individuality (fathers create the 'face', an external representation of *yomini* and *wene*). Sides of pig are cooked in earth ovens and formally presented during *pino* to the decorated and armed recipients who are lined up silently awaiting these gifts, which are heaped at their feet. This context is also egalitarian and debt or an imbalance in exchange can be cancelled out by the return of an equivalent gift. Sides of pork, which symmetrically oppose each other as halves, comment on the balanced if delayed nature of this exchange relationship.

To delve even further into the pig, the intestines and other offal (with the exception of certain organs of delicacy formerly eaten in cult houses and offered to spirits) belong entirely to women, it is their
reward for their work in production. The movement from skin to entrails, outside to inside, maleness (individuality) to female substance (bodies), is symbolically reflected in porcine anatomy. The more one progresses 'inside' a pig, the more associated with female substance it becomes, just as the closer one comes to the core of a person the more 'body', as derived from this substance, predominates (and it is the 'inside' of women where foetuses are created).

To continue the analysis of objects of mediation we turn our attention to kina shells, maiyo. These are given either by themselves or with pork but the return gift of lunori, frequently made at an oino, is for the shells. The symbolic import of shells in Highland societies is often problematic, partly because they are an introduced wealth item and not locally manufactured to fit a native cosmology. In the Wiru case they do have certain qualities which make their use appropriate in exchange, or rather the reverse, they are symbolically worked upon to fit this cosmology.

Hughes reports that in comparison with most other Highlands regions, the pearl shell for Wiru "was said to be of great antiquity" (Hughes, 1977:189). This is possibly related to the symbolic elaboration of shells now discussed, i.e., the length of time Wiru have had shells may help to explain the emphasis put upon them, although the context of prestation cannot be separated from any explanation of their symbolism.

Maiyo are not the product of female labour and so can be directly related to a male domain of status and wealth production. A potential conflict exists, however, insofar as shells are accumulated from a
woman's role in reproduction, but this is embodied in the shell itself, as we shall see.

Shells are durable male wealth—given for perishable female substance, symbolized by the return of lunori (cf. A. Strathern, 1981:212) —and vary in 'name', history and the extent of their public veneration; they can be owned by the same man for long periods of time (this applies particularly to valuable shells, kianea maiyo (red shells), although their prestation confers much prestige on the donor, who is often under considerable pressure to give them up). A man can identify himself with his shells by adding various markers attached by string—or by tying knots in the string itself—to the woven red carrying band threaded through the 'legs' of the shell. He may join the bristled end of a pig's tail to the band if the animal has drawn wealth (or that particular shell) to him, or add marsupial scrotum to mark vagi gifts (payments for the wife's or children' fertility and growth respectively), or add snail shells, kalo, to indicate a pig which has been given him or for which he is still waiting; markers and knots also indicate kage gifts (see 3d) and deaths from sorcery. Shells record death, debts and exchange achievements, and the more markers there are on a shell, or the more knots it has in the attached strings, the more valuable it is.

Men can personify their male-created wealth in shells just as a child is individuated by his/her paternity. It is precisely because shells have a propensity for standing for the person who owns them, who has their pine, that the use of shells as payment for 'body' is highly appropriate. Ego is obliged to make this prestation to opianago and to continually confront his own pine or 'base', but he can counter these claims to some extent by presenting through his maiyo a representation
of what he has become by his own efforts, i.e., his masculine individuality. Put simply, what a man owns through his own creative acts he gives for what his MBs have created and 'own' – ego's 'body'. This parallels the logic of giving cooked ribcages as basic female substance which have to be transformed, through cooking, to be of value.

Maiyo embody other facets of meaning; when they initially come into circulation shells are yellow in colour but men soon rub a red powder over them (obtained from a mineral deposit found near streams which is treated by fire and crushing), a procedure repeated before their use in exchange or display. As I have written, red is a colour associated with men, especially their noses, and with wealth (it was also used as a point or powder to coat certain cult stones). This colour is related to the sphere of male endeavour and is not directly linked to the nexus of body payments; it makes statements about a male potential to generate and control wealth as opposed to a woman's (and a MB's) control over bodily creation.

The bottom edge of the shell crescent is coated with tree sap of a darker red colour which perhaps emphasizes the fact that it is the outside of the shell which is rendered 'male'. The only other work done on the shell itself is a pattern incised under the top rim of the crescent, said to represent the markings on the larval stage of a certain beetle (see Figure 4). The red edge of maiyo opposes this design, tobe keli, an observation which becomes significant when it is related to the constitution of the shell; it is yellow underneath, in its 'body', before it is externally transformed through an application of redness.
Figure 4: The pearlshell and its parts.
The larva, *tobe*, is yellow, a colour associated with women and their *tomonu* (see 1b); it lives in the ground and metamorphizes into a black, horned flying beetle which is said to live in trees. Black is another colour strongly linked with men and used in bodily decoration. Its use comes from a connection between cassowaries and particular male qualities (cassowary headdresses are a feature of certain important exchanges). The name of the tree sap which coats the bottom edge of shells is *pouwe*, but the generic term for sap or resin is *page*, the same term used for semen. An analogy may be being constructed between the colour red and semen, such that male:female: *pouwe*: *tobe*: *semen*: *tomonu*. Shells encompass notions of gender and procreation; if 'semen' is at the edge, *nami*, of shells then perhaps this is a reference to procreation being the cause of exchange relationships (*nami* also refers to the cause of gift return).

*Tobe* is in the category of things belonging to women, *aroanea*, which includes animals or crops grown or found in the ground or just above it. This is contrasted to male food, *alinane*, which is crops or animals grown or found above the ground, such as bananas and marsupials, or tubers such as yam and taro which have tall growing parts. Symbolic oppositions between men and women are muted in Wiru society for reasons which should be becoming obvious, and statements of the order male:female::high:low are unusual. This particular example is deduced from food classifications, but even this may be forcing a comparison as informants reacted to my observation as if it was novel, although they did not dismiss it once considered. This could be a reflection of a cosmology lacking coherence, a common state of affairs in the Highlands (see Brunton, 1980), but other reasons are suggested below.
What does emerge out of shell symbolism is a strong statement that male:female::red (or black):yellow, yet these opposing qualities are contained within the shell as a singular entity. This mirrors the constitution of people as 'bodies' (female, yellow) over which is superimposed the paternally contributed self (male, red). The individuation of a newly-formed 'body' corresponds to the personification of shells by attaching objects or markers to the shell band signifying male acts of exchange. Interestingly, shells are decorated with colours and objects which men wear when they decorate, and in both cases the decoration is on the the 'skin'.

A man does not permanently own shells, and they carry not only his individuating marks but those of other men. Maiyo relate to the men who have owned them, and the more 'history' they have the greater their value. This does not detract from my argument that shells are a presentation of self as the ownership of a shell, regardless of its varied history and previous possessors, is enough to convey a sense of the owner's individuality. At a diachronic level shells do not represent a clan 'history' as they are continually passing between people of different districts and descent. Yet at a given moment the combined shells of a clan may stand for its present status and viability. This is not the same as Wagner's notion of a stock of male wealth as groups do not oppose each other on the basis of marriage (Wagner, 1967:pp.150-151; see also Strathern, A. 1971); shell gifts are normally made by individuals not groups. The exchange of maiyo from generation to generation complements the reproduction by women of a succession of physical bodies through time.
Brief mention should be made of another wealth item which people give, along with shells, for their 'bodies' - salt, to. This item is no longer regularly used, but this may be from problems of supply rather than from its falling into disuse (Hughes remarks that in 1968 Pangia was unique in his study area for the continued circulation of traditional salt (Hughes, 1977:99)). Salt was traded in from outside of the district and, although salt springs exist in Pangia, Wiru did not have the technology to process it (ibid:100), and hence had no elaborate symbolism related to its manufacture. There was, however, an "elaborate terminology for to and its role in economic and social life" (ibid:99), and salt was an important ingredient in the ritual consumption of pork (it was also used as a medicine).¹

Yet what are the properties of salt which make its use appropriate in prestations to MBs? Salt found its way to Wiru in trade from Enga salt springs (ibid:98), pigs being exchanged for salt packages with their Kewa and Imbonggu neighbours. Before pacification Wiru did not know where salt originated, or rather they did not know it came from Enga. Many people though that to was manufactured south of Mt. Giluwe at Lake Umbuna, a perception heightened after pacification even though people now had wider horizons with labour migration, etc. (cf. Hughes, 1977:98). Umbuna figures prominently in origin stories and, for Takuruns, it is the place from which a Wiru tree was brought for planting in Pangia (see 1b).

Salt has associations with agnatic groups - it is eaten communally in male ceremonial and comes from Umbuna - and with 'maleness' and possibly its source in the Highlands. It is involved in the public sphere of exchange and is a 'male' wealth item which, like shells and
stone axes, comes from outside of Pangia. Salt is the only wealth item which is traded for and eaten; it is added to pork and is said to give vitality to the body and to especially affect the skin (by heating it), the latter quality relating to its perceived medicinal properties. This association with the skin is important as it is the outside 'male' part of the body. Men perhaps augment their 'maleness' by eating salt, which makes it a very apt gift with which to represent the masculinity of the donor (this also suggests why a bride's father returns salt with shells in a stage of bridewealth transactions, as the father is concerned to emphasize his masculine identity threatened by the loss of his daughter, see 3c).

Formal prestations to groups are made with pork sides not shells because the latter obtain their meaning from life-cycle exchanges and do not lend themselves to the sort of intergroup statements which midiko can make (except in some instances of kage, a category of death compensation). Groups which exchange at oino are not necessarily affinally related. Pork sides are suited to delayed reciprocal exchange between men outside of the affinal-maternal nexus, they are the 'outside' parts of a pig for which the same parts are returned, and beyond this they do not need a symbolic loading of the type associated with shells.

Men 'create' shells as they do the self (and agnates). People then give these shells, which represent their (and others') acts of individuation, to their MBs as a payment for 'body', their original female substance, for which a return of lunori is made. Shells are strongly associated with men and belong in a category of 'male' wealth, yet they are not themselves sexed because, like pigs and people, maiyo
are both 'male' and 'female' - internally 'female' and externally 'male'. Truly, "there is a sense in which each sex defines the other" (M. Strathern, 1981(MS):36).

Pigs are pearlshells, in their use as exchange items, reflect on beliefs about procreation and individuation, i.e., on the essential bisexual constitution of each person, which is why rigid gender distinctions are not made using oppositions found in nature and culture. It is not surprising that women can 'own' male wealth, shells, and use them to pay off their debts for 'body'. The act of giving shells to MBs is to some extent, perhaps, a sacrifice of self, a presentation of one's own individuality to ensure a continued beneficial maternal influence, which is recognized by the return of lunori as a symbol of undifferentiated female substance. Giving shells is also a statement of the donor's worth or status, and to an extent this gift opposes the maternal contribution to 'body'.

It is worth noting that the shell-ribcage exchange is also a social as well as a symbolic transaction, and maintains a relationship between donor and recipient. Every time a person returns lunori he is acknowledging the individuality of the donor, to whom his relationship gradually changes insofar as the donor becomes more his 'own' individual with each gift of shells.

I now need to discuss another type of pearlshell, yobo maiyo. This is an especially valuable shell which has its own aesthetic qualities of colour and size; it is decorated in a singular fashion and has a more impressive 'history' than other shells. It is said that one could not possibly buy one today with money, if an ordinary man somehow comes into
possession of a *yobo* he will immediately become a headman (wealth is the
mark of a man's abilities). *Yobo maiyo* are so valuable that individual
men cannot own them, unless they are a very wealthy headman, such that
agnatic groups are often their possessors; it is groups and not
individuals which usually gift and receive these shells.

Informants stated that one *yobo maiyo* was worth all the shells
given in bridewealth, although this shell is not used in bridewealth or
in 'body' payments. It had two traditional uses —

1. it was given to a group to obtain ownership of land, and
2. given to allies as a reward for killing many of one's enemies (see
   3d for 'new' uses of *yobo maiyo*).

The significant aspect of this shell is that it is said to be *aroa*
(female), it is sexed unlike ordinary shells. This, I suggest, is
related to its decoration; a band of Job's tears is attached to the
shell, which is displayed on a woven fibrous mat of the same shape as
the shell, and fringed at the bottom with green leaves (unidentified).
*Yobo maiyo* are 'female', I would argue, because they acknowledge that
the ultimate source of wealth is women (see 3c). Job's tears were worn
as necklaces in mourning by women, and a connection may be being made
between wealth, women and death which reflects on the fact that
'maleness' and agnatic identity has to be continually constructed over a
generational transmission of female substance (men may die but wealth
and agnatic groups continue).

Ordinary shells are not sexed because of their bisexual
connotations and the context of individual prestation, the former
relating to the shared substance of those who exchange (cf. M.
Strathern, 1984(MS):18). Yobo maiyo, through their association with groups rather than individuals, are not so bound by the ambiguities of gender and are identified as 'female' as a comment on the origins of wealth through female reproduction. By being an ultimate form of wealth, yet 'female', yobo maiyo are transcendent of these ambiguities as they negate the necessity of making male-female distinctions; yobo refer to unity not difference insofar as they relate to the underlying 'female' constitution of people and wealth.

The association of these shells with death refers to their transcendent nature; at death the internal is rendered external, i.e., a man's bones remain after his flesh decomposes. It is death which releases a man from the obligations of matri-exchange and renders him fully individualized (free of 'femaleness'), such that his bones can be stored in the male cult house (see fn.2, 3e).

The display of shells against green fernleaf backgrounds or green fringed mats - which sets off the 'red' of the shell - is related to the power of shells to augment fertility and growth (also, lunori when gifted are often wrapped in yoro ferns). Shells were used by ritual specialists to scrape the ground while uttering spells designed to improve soil fertility, and to increase crop yields and pig populations. The use of certain green leafed foods with cult stones was also strongly related to maintaining fertility and health, as was the gifting of fern leaves as yagi in a stage of bridewealth (see 3c).³ All good quality shells have a connection with wider cosmological concerns, but yobo maiyo have an extra quality which precludes their use in life cycle exchanges because they relate more to groups, and relations between groups, than to the individual.
Procreation beliefs, and their articulation into exchange and exchange item symbolism, have, as would be expected, profound implications for male-female relations. The debt which men owe for a female source of creation, and the contradiction of 'maleness' enveloping an internal feminine constitution, can not only lead to ego-MB tensions or resentment, but also to antagonistic and sometimes violent intersexual relations. Wiru women, relative to their Highlands counterparts, may have a greater autonomy in daily life and be more outspoken, and can to some extent enter the public domain of exchange. This is not because men offer encouragement but because they cannot deny women some participation without drawing attention to the ambiguities of gender; women also participate because they take advantage of these ambiguities.

It is not surprising that there is a relatively high incidence of father-daughter incest, brother-sister rape, rape, and wife murder among Wiru. Antagonism is generated by the ambivalence of a man's sexuality; rape is an act of sexual politics in a context in which women say men are their 'enemies'. It is perhaps too much to argue that these occurrences are entirely the result of a structural contradiction, but at the same time their existence cannot be ignored and deserves explanation.

To finish this section one more object of mediation has to be discussed. This is the adapini or tail meat of a pig, which traditionally was one of the major offerings to cult deities and ancestral spirits. It comes from a pig specially selected for sacrifice at the base of the spirit house. The smell of this meat being burnt pleased the spirits because this was their favourite food, informants
stated that spirits actually 'lived' in this part of a pig's anatomy. I do not have complete data on the symbolic significance of adapini but can venture some tentative remarks.

Adapini could be a reduction of adene pini, base of the penis, a possibility supported by the close positioning of a pig's scrotum to its tail, and by the importance of male scrotum in relation to certain cult stones. Also, fertility, growth, spirits and human and marsupial scrotum are linked, such that this relation to certain cult stones (in which male ancestral spirits also reside; the tapa muu (ancestors' testicles) is one such stone, to which certain headmen attach their testicles at a stage in cult ritual). Fertility, growth, spirits, and human and marsupial scrotum are linked, such that this derivation of adapini makes cultural sense at least. A statement that spirits 'live' in this portion of meat refers to the extent of their control over human and garden fecundity. Through this spirits hold the 'base' (pine or pini) of people - for whom pigs are a referent and it is the 'base' of pigs where spirits reside - just as MBs hold the 'base' of a person through his 'body', and as men hold the 'base' of their shells, which represent their selves. While cosmology lacks coherence, the symbolism of wealth and sacrificial items shows a remarkable consistency in acts which are concerned with mediating the relationship between people and their 'base', and which are concerned with the statement that male:female::outside:inside. This consistency is strongly and perhaps causally related to beliefs about procreation and the locus of reproductive power.

The sacrifice of pigs and the offering of adapini to paternal spirits and cult deities - a wider collectivity of spirits than those
associated with MBs, which can send sickness to ego - is to ensure that continuity of the sacrificing group by a recognition of its spirit 'base'. The argument of this chapter is that where the 'base' of individuals or groups has to be recognized through prestation, this offering is, or is like, a sacrifice. The following attempts to summarize the above:

(1) **affinal-maternal nexus**: outside - inside

- shells —> exchange of individuated person for 'body' and continued vitality —> lunori

(2) **intergroup relations**: outside - outside

- pork sides —> delayed balanced exchange between men from different groups —> pork sides

(3) **group - spirit world relations**: 'base' - reproduction

- adapini —> offering of meat for continued group viability —> fertility, growth, health

**Figure 5**: A cosmology of mediating objects.

It has been suggested that pearlshells given to MBs are a sacrifice of self. I now want to consider a case of actual human sacrifice for the light it may shed on comments made so far. In the early sixties an influenza epidemic raged through Pangia district and this event in Takuru was judged, as I have written (see 2a.2), to be the result of ulo sorcery. The scale of death was unprecedented and, because of the reigning confusion, many of the obligatory death compensation payments, kioli, were not made to the maternal relatives of the deceased. The
mortality rate was exacerbated by the actions of maternal spirits, *nine ipono*, who were angry that these payments were not being made and as a result they started killing people in retribution. The spirits of those killed by *ulo* also attacked the living because *kioli* was not made for them. Also, there was a strong suggestion that patrilineal spirits, *tapa yene*, were angry about an impending sense of change under colonialism, with the result that people continued to die from spirit attack after the sorcery assault had waned.

At the height of the epidemic many headmen had also died, and people were becoming alarmed at their failure to control the deaths by the normal means of *kioli* (involving the presentation of pigs) or pig sacrifice. Perceiving the need for a new means of dealing with these spirits Wili, an intelligent informant and a respected headman, decided to innovate to bring the deaths to an end (this desire for a more powerful and efficient control of the cosmos often facilitated, as suggested above, the initial acceptance of Christianity; Wili claimed to have been responsible for first bringing the mission to Takuru). He selected the body of Loko, a recently deceased headman, and burnt it over a fire in the same manner as *adapini* are burnt, and as pigs' bodies are singed to remove bristles prior to butchery; the smell of burning is said to attract and appease spirits.

It is the burning of flesh which is the actual sacrifice. Wiru for fire or flame is *iripono oko* which translates as "the spirit of the wood speaks" (Kerr, in Wurm, 1975:290). Special wood is used in fires which heat stones to cook pork from pig kills, and to burn sacrifices. *Casuarina* is often used, a tree strongly associated with settlements and the individual men or ancestors who planted them. Fire, by 'eating' the
offering, may represent spirits which are appeased by sacrifice. Nonetheless, the sacrifice of this body worked, according to Wili, and the deaths ceased soon after.

It was no accident that a headman - who was specially selected for this sacrifice as are pigs for cult occasions - was chosen for this offering. It is only headmen, and today successful businessmen, who are said to be able to finish their 'body' payments while still in their prime or before they become old. Most people continue to pay for 'body' their whole lives (as do most headmen), although payments may become irregular or stop in old age when the body wears out and the skin loses its tightness, even then descendants of the aged may continue to make payments for them. The significance of being able to finish one's debts for 'body' is that any man who is capable of doing this must be wealthy in shells. If he can afford to give enough of these representations of his self to cancel out his obligations to opinanago, then he has the potential for becoming his own man which, in Wiru society, is akin to becoming the ultimate individual - one who is no longer compromised in his achievements by the necessity for acknowledging debt to his MBs.4

The sacrifice of a headman would have been more efficacious than that of an ordinary man or of a woman; headmen are the epitome of men and his 'smell' would have been more attractive to and assuaging of spirits (this choice also suggests that pigs offered in sacrifice are 'male'). Also, it was the headman's skin which was burnt, the outside and truly male part of his body which demonstrated his individuality. If shells, which have 'maleness' on the outside, are given to MBs to appease them (and by extension nine ipono), then the sacrificial burning
of the skin of a headman is perhaps the ultimate act of giving what is externally 'male' in exchange for maternally derived 'body' (this sacrifice perhaps also assuaged those spirits recently joining the ranks of *tapa yene*, who are responsible for group continuity).

What the preceding suggests to me is that, while burning the headman's body was innovative, the potential for doing this already existed insofar as pigs stand for people in contexts such as bridewealth transactions and death compensation payments. Instead of giving pigs in *kioli* death compensation the body or 'skin' of a headman was offered, so not only was this act innovative but also a combination, I would argue, of *kioli* and sacrifice (insofar as the body was not given live). Another conclusion which is difficult to escape is that, if a man can be cooked, the potential for cannibalism exists as well, as at least the recognition that pigs substitute for people in sacrifice and consumption. Interestingly, blood from the wounds of dying or dead men could be tasted by his children or brothers, apparently to absorb his substance. Anthropophagy is abhorred by Wiru and seen as unnatural, yet the equation between people and pigs raises the possibility that the pork offered to spirits is an act of symbolic cannibalism. This may also be true of the consumption of *lunori* returned by MBs, which is a symbol of the substance from which one's own body is derived.

Relating procreation beliefs to cosmology and the life cycle exchanges, it can be proposed that the wealth of pigs and shells are metaphors for the person and that in certain situations their use is similar to acts of sacrifice. This one and perhaps unique example, for the Highlands, of human sacrifice suggests that in extraordinary
circumstances these metaphors are transcended by the use of an actual human body.6

FOOTNOTES

1. Salt was stored in rectangular woven cane wrappings, like shells, and may have had a similar aesthetic. The salt container turned black from ceiling storage above household fires. Black is a colour associated with men, and the 'black' and 'red' of salt and shell prestations may have had a symbolic significance. The salt traded in was probably rendered rectangular by the Mendi, who broke up the flat, spherical packages they received from the north, used what they required, and then repackaged it after setting it in rectangular mould (Hughes, 1977:99). Wiru did have their own salt moulds, so they could break up traded packages and form salt to their preferences.

2. Eaten literally, that is, as wealth items given in exchange are often said to have been 'eaten'. The consumption of salt with pork, symbols of 'maleness' and of people respectively, may have an element of symbolic cannibalism. While to is associated with 'maleness' I do not think it is symbolically linked to male procreative substance.

3. In the male house of the aroa ipono cult, shells were hung from male cult stones planted vertically in the ground; in shape they resemble penes such that the planted stones are obvious symbols of penile erection (which is a function of the testicles). This is another example of the link between shells, testicles, cult stones, ancestors and fertility.

4. The expression for this ultimate development is pine kako, 'the base stands up', which acknowledges the maternal 'base' while simultaneously inferring an independence from it.

5. The fat of enemy pigs, seized in raids, was rubbed into the main cult stone of the paternal cult, tapa yapu. This stone was the tapa muu (ancestors testicles), in which ancestors 'lived'. The inference is that the ancestors are 'eating' their enemies' 'bodies' (which the pigs represent). Also, the bark of casuarina trees was chewed to give men courage in warfare; these trees held the essence of male ancestors, which is 'consumed' to augment the fighting prowess of their descendants.

6. For an illustration of the relation of shells to the body in certain exchanges, see Appendix B. Self-decoration, like shells, reflects notion of gender, although further fieldwork needs to be done on this observation.
3b. CHILD AND 'BODY' PAYMENTS

Child, bridewealth and death payments are connected by a logic which underlies all life cycle exchanges, which is the negation of a debt for the 'body' of the donor, or of those for whom these payments are given. Gifts for 'body' or tigini are given to MBs, WF and WBs, and they are concerned with creating agnatic individuals (with the exception of gifts given for the 'body' of the bride). This section discusses 'body' payments made for children and for one's own tigini.

I take it as axiomatic that children are recruited into their father's group at birth, and in this schema 'body' payments are less to do with recruitment than with severance from the maternal line. While patrifiliation is ascriptive, agnatic groups come into being through the creation of individuals; 'body' payments reify rather than constitute patrilineality.

Following the career of an individual man will provide useful background to the argument. Upon conception and birth the father of the child starts to make payments to the son's MBs for the 'body' they created through the conduit of the mother; these gifts continue until the son commences to raise and accumulate his own wealth, at which point he takes over the payments for his 'body'. When he marries he may or may not assist in the payment for his wife's 'body', but with the birth of children he starts to give gifts for their tigini to his WF and then WBs. Throughout his life he continues to make prestations to his MBs and when he dies his agnates and close kin give a more or less final payment, kioli toko, for his 'body', which involves the distribution of
much of the wealth of the deceased as well as of contributions from his co-residential kin.

A woman follows much the same career, including making some of her 'body' payments, until her marriage. At this point the male locus of her payments changes from her father to her husband (a bride's MBs may receive some of her bridewwealth). The father is now in an unusual position, he has given wealth for his daughter in respect of her 'body' and now he receives it (a circumstance which may be behind father-daughter tension at marriage, see 3c). After marriage or the birth of the first child, the husband appropriates the payments for his wife's 'body' which in fact started with the bridewwealth.

A wife may continue to make the occasional payment to her opianago, yet this is no longer a concern of men as husbands, fathers or brothers, i.e., her father or brothers take over after her marriage as the recipients of her 'body' payments. The death of a woman also involves a final gift to her brothers, but this is not on the same scale as that of a man, nor is her death likely to be as elaborately mourned. Kioli is not always given for a woman but her husband does give compensation for the loss of her 'body' to her agnates (as if she was a member of her husband's yarene).

From the male perspective, it is not so important for women to individuate themselves through shell prestations as it is for men. A woman's role is in reproduction and payments to her MBs made for her cease at the point a woman engages this role, upon marriage and childbirth. Only men create agnatic groups, hence only men need to be individuals; the 'body' of a wife is not so much compensated for, by
shifting the payment from her MBs to her brothers, as is her potential for reproduction. Her 'body' at this point ceases to be a real concern for others, but not for herself, except for this potential and the labour it provides.

The birth of a child generates ties of exchange between it and its mother's kin, and its eventual death as an adult to a large extent, by a final exchange, severs them. Birth and death parallel the creation and abrogation of exchange connections forged through marriage. As a man matures he becomes gradually involved in a larger number of 'body' payments' first his own, then for his wife's 'body' in bridewealth which he continues to compensate for after marriage, and finally for his children's tigini and the bridewealth he has to help raise for his sons' wives' 'bodies' (he may also give payments to his father's MBs for his father if he is old and has no wealth, and gives kioli at his death.

The gifts a married man makes are basically to two categories of kin, his WBs or keme, and his MBs or awene (opianago for maternal kin in general). The payments are -

1. to keme of aroa mari-ke mereko (given for (the 'bodies' of) wife and children) or marikiri-ke yagi (yagi is discussed below);

2. to MBs of pine teigu or togu (I cut or pull the base) for his own 'body'; also, ipono lene kaugu (to break the eye of the spirit) is the name of a gift given to MBs so that spirits do not attack for failure to give wealth.

That payments for the children's tigini are merged with those of the wife is indicated by the title of 1., which supports the statement made above that when gifts are made for the bride's 'body' they are for her reproductive capacity.
Separate gifts can be made for the children, especially at stages in the body's development, such as taking solid food for the first time, first hair cutting, reaching puberty, etc., when it could be argued, the body itself significantly changes (as does the nature of the exchange relationship) - which demonstrates a continued benevolent maternal influence. A yapí gift is sent to the WF and/or WBs on pregnancy, and growth payments, mari yane tigini-ke mereko, are also given to the same people.

After birth, the mother of the new mother takes the 'skin' of the child, (the foetal membrane and perhaps umbilical cord) and wraps it in a pandanus leaf and buries it in the bush, toma ka. The impression given is that this is the first of a series of 'skins' which a person progresses through, and its appropriation and disposal by MM emphasizes its maternal locus. That this first 'skin' is compared to a netbag, ka, suggests a comparison between netbags and the womb (the netbag a foetus is carried in), and points again to the maternal source of creation, as if a person is always enclosed in opianago ka.

There is a real sense of obligation to opianago and keme, particularly in the case of the former and which sometimes causes tension. A synonym for child payments is modo pono tikipu (sweet potato runners trap); the trap refers to a device for catching wild animals but the reference to sweet potato runners is interesting as it suggests that the act of propagation is a 'trap' which no man can avoid upon marriage, after which he has no alternative but to start and continue to make child payments (sweet potato may be a metaphor for sexual intercourse; they are not eaten during the end of the tibu cult cycle). Another point of interest is that a comparison is drawn between a woman's labour in
making gardens and her sexual reproduction - women mound and plant sweet potato gardens - which indicate again that it is a woman's attributes and capabilities which are compensated for, albeit to men as opianago, for which her 'body' is a metaphor.

Gifts to a person's MBs may be made aggressively to indicate the donor's displeasure, or wealth can be heaped at the recipient's feet, wene kowiroa pokoko toko (to heap to forgive feelings), to make him feel 'good' so that he will not complain; there is also a sense in which this gift relieves the donor's ill-feelings towards his MBs (although such heaped gifts often convey covert hostility).

There is a complex of sickness beliefs which revolve around the failure to make adequate tigini or vagi payments. Ekelo vene (inside sickness) is caused by spirits who are related to ego through blood, i.e., maternal ghosts, nine ipono, who have to be appeased by offerings of pork, rats or marsupials. The person afflicted has to take special medicine combined with the kidneys, lawene, of a pig to recover.

 Spirits may cause illness not only for a lack of 'body' payments (which have to be made good by the sufferer) but also to punish people for wrongdoing or moral failure. Ipono may, for instance, send sickness, miscarriages or permanent physical impairments such as deafness, to a man's family if he keeps secret the name of a poisoner of affinal relatives, or is himself a poisoner. Pigs can also be attacked and killed by spirits, particularly nine ipono, suggesting that displeasure can be shown by harming a 'substitute' person which a woman raises as she raises children (a maternal nurturance rather than a blood link is used in this example).
If a man has no children but is remiss in sending yagi for his wife, she may be sent crazy by the influence of her father's or brother's displeasure (the husband could not be so affected because he is not related by blood to her male agnates). It is not only spirits, then, which can send sickness to a person; MBs, as I have written above, can curse a ZS as a child or adult, which is another instance of the mystical influence that maternal or affinal relatives have over health and growth (fathers have a similar influence over their daughters, see 3c).

Strathern remarks that yagi is a general term for 'body' payments (Strathern, A. 1980:62), yet in Takuru it is used only in reference to bridewealth and child payments. There are reasons, considered in the section on bridewealth (3c), why yagi would not be used to describe one's own 'body' payments from its particular associations with fertility, pregnancy and the growth of children, an emphasis made to me by informants. Also, yagi is more often a presentation of live animals or meat (and today tinned fish) than of the shells or money characteristics of pine teigu, and of formal prestations of aroa marikiri-ke mereko. It is possible that yagi is given more for ensuring the nurturance and vitality of a man's children, than as a straight gift of wealth given for debt in 'body'.

A father has a different physical constitution from his children but his gifts for their tigini is the start of an individuating process which renders them into agnates, a process continued by his children as they mature and make their own gifts to MBs. The valuables given to opianago are also partly to extract the donor, or those for whom wealth is given, from their control (togu, I pull, i.e., remove). These
prestations were also described as cutting the 'rope' (a possible
reference to the umbilical cord) which joins people to their opianago,
which again suggests that one of their major purposes is to separate not
recruit.

Payments for 'body' do not have to be to the actual MBs of the
donor, and classificatory maternal kin, opianago, or opianali, are often
chosen as recipients from considerations of proximity, political choice
or both. Still, "there is a notion that all one's opianali kin should
receive some measure of payment from one" (Strathern, A. 1971:456), and an
opianago recipient will, if he has 'good thoughts', endeavour to pass on
some of the wealth given to him to the actual MB of the donor. Strathern
suggests that a selection of opianago over awene, for the purpose of
constructing more relevant and productive exchange relations, means that
recruitment is not the only function of 'body' payments (this is related
to the example of a man living with his children's MBs, who receives
gifts for these children even though they will not be residentially
affiliated into their father's natal group (ibid:458-9)). I argue that
it is disengagement rather than recruitment which is the main purpose of
these payments, such that it makes sense to continue them when a man
lives permanently with his own or his children's MBs - they both need to
become 'individuals' and distanced from maternal kin. Male continuity is
assured by this autonomy. Another reason is that non-agnates, as shown
above, have a greater rate of intra-district marriage than agnates, and
the making of 'body' payments reinforces or legitimizes non-agnatic
claims to district resources.

In the example given by Strathern, the children of their migrant
father retain their descent even if "for most social purposes they will
be merged with their mother's people" (ibid:458). Yet in a similar situation in Takuru a man who followed his Wanuwane wife to Takuru was himself regarded as a Wanuwane and his children explicitly so, even though payments continued to be made to their awene (actual MBs). This suggests that the political problems which descent poses for individual non-agnates varies with the particular situation, and that incorporation may follow in some instances.

These payments never become, as far as I know, problematic, and this Wanuwane example indicates that they may, for individuals in specific instances, be directed towards incorporation as well as individuation. This is, however, in response to the political and pragmatic consequences of non-agnatic residence. The incorporation of non-agnatic children into Wanuwane implies that descent is not a rigid idiom of group membership if a child's paternity can be so easily nullified. But from another perspective it could be argued that child payments, through their individuating effects, enable a child to identify itself with its father's varene name such that, when it is living with its mother's people, it is more viable for the child to take its mother's varene name - which is still 'paid' for (see fn. 15,1b).

This does not explain why at other times the father's varene name is retained, but it may be significant that the children of the wife-follower were born and nurtured in Takuru and not brought from elsewhere, i.e., residence at birth may affect descent group membership and, because his children were born in Takuru, this may bear some relation to the labelling of the father as 'Wanuwane'. This is related to the issue of adoption.
The idiom for adoption is opia mereko (born gives), and is used to describe events such as looking after the child of a dead mother or for taking care of children from a wife's previous marriage. In the case of adoption 'body' payments, as in the example given above, do appear to have a recruitment aspect insofar as the descent of these children is open to question. The adoptive father, if he makes payments for these children to their MBs, can incorporate them into his yarene if they are young enough, but the real father may chose to continue his paternal duty (especially if the children are older and he has already made payments for them) even though for all intents and purposes the children remain with their stepfather and will not return to live with their father or his agnates. Significantly, older male children often remain with their divorced father; it was said that this is because bridewealth is given for sons, who 'change' with their fathers.

Sometimes a child is returned to its father if he remarries or when the child is old enough or on solid food, in which case those who looked after it, if the child was female, are entitled to a share of her bridewealth in return for giving her milk and nurturance. The genealogical father of an adopted girl is not entitled to any part of her bridewealth if he has not contributed to her nurture or 'body' payments.

The act of giving child payments is sufficient to incorporate adopted children, as babies, into their stepfather's yarene irrespective of the father's agnatic identity. Child payments in this case are partly to do with affiliation but are not ultimately concerned with paternity, which is not surprising if one considers that fathers do not share physical substance with their own children. It is of little concern to
the WB if a man who exchanges with him is the real or adoptive father of his sister's children. It is the exchange relationship itself which is important, otherwise the choice of classificatory MBs over awene would not be feasible. To this extent, exchange is concerned with people as members of categories rather than of agnatic units.

Illegitimate children, kode mari opiko (stolen - in the sense no brideweight is given - child born), are incorporated into their mother's yarene with few difficulties (except for the mother, in the past she may have been killed) if the father cannot be found for marriage. This is not the equivalent of adoption as the idiom for this is not opia mereko but pakale mari egereko (child look after), and the child is invariably converted into an offspring of the mother's father, ie., into a sibling of the mother). Child payments for it may still be given to its mother's opianago - to whom it is connected by blood - such that its contradictory existence does not pose any problems (there is no father to give its 'body' payments to ensure its growth). This is not really a logistical problem but a structural one, the child will be living among its MBs and affiliated with their group, and they will be unlikely to send sickness to it (although extended matrilateral kin may still have to be compensated). The husband of an illegitimate woman is required to make payments for her and her children to his wife's MF and MBs as they raised and nurtured her.

Illegitimate children are not so much adopted as 'converted', although the outcome of both processes is usually membership of the yarene of the nurturant family. Adopted sons can inherit land belonging to their stepfathers and can 'change' with them even though they were not 'started' by his semen, and the same applies to illegitimate 'sons'.
Informants stated that nurture and consumption of food grown on *yarene* land is enough to give an adopted or 'converted' child the physical and mental characteristics of the stepfather and MF respectively. As an aside to this, if a man's sons do not have any male offspring but his co-resident daughter does, her sons can inherit their MF's land if no other claims to it are made. In this situation a man is also not connected by shared substance to his daughter's children but co-residence, nurture and food consumption do provide grounds for access to what otherwise would be a restricted resource. If a man gives an adopted or illegitimate child a name or re-names it, this is enough to create the child as his legitimate descendant and as a member of his *yarene*, perhaps as a result of the sharing of a metaphysical substance transmitted through naming.

How do women fit into this nexus of 'body' payments and, more specifically, if my arguments that these payments relate to disengagement is valid, what does this imply about bridewealth transactions which compensate for the 'body' of the bride? Upon marriage there is a strong separation of a wife from her natal group and residence; she is enjoined to move to the house of her spouse even if it is only a hundred feet away, and is discouraged from returning home in the event of marital problems or divorce. A woman's attempts at controlling some aspects of her life are a source of much annoyance to her father and brothers, who are dependent on her for the construction of exchange relationships with affines (and a bride is encouraged to marry into a wealthy family). Clearly, bridewealth is partly concerned with severing a bride's connection with her natal group, and to remove her from its 'control'.
It is significant that the recipients of a woman's tigini payments change after marriage from her MBs to her brothers. This shift has to take place to allow for the creation of an exchange link between a woman's husband and her brothers, which her children take over as they mature. MBs are always gifted to but the focus of gifting has to change with every marriage in order to allow the exchange system to continue. After she has borne a few children the payments a man makes to his keme (WBs) for the wife's 'body' may even cease, as the husband has received what he has 'paid' for—children. Traditionally, a man made a last payment to his keme for his wife upon her demise. This was called ipono yagi toko (yagi for the wife's spirit); this was part of death compensation but was probably also concerned with ensuring that the mother's spirit did not harm her children if this payment was not made. Ipono yagi toko is not a kioli payment which, if it is given at all, will be made by her male agnates to her MBs.

It is only men's 'bodies' which have to be continually compensated for because only men are 'true' individuals, in the sense that it is men who control the public domain of exchange, cults and formerly warfare. By engaging in these activities men further individuate their 'bodies'. There are no overt statements made to the effect that, by giving bridewealth, a woman becomes a member of her husband's varene, but the emphasis on the separation of a wife from her natal kin and residence suggests an implicit incorporation of the wife as a start on wrestling her children from their MBs.

A husband takes over his wife's 'body' payments, which were previously a task of her father. Gifts given to keme are for the capacities and potential of a wife's 'body', and are not concerned with
substituting for payments made to her MBs. But a woman is concerned with her 'body'/individuality and she may continue making these gifts regardless of their cessation from her father, or of the cessation of payments from her husband to her brothers.

The descent of women is remembered but both men and women refer to wives as 'belonging' to their husband's varene - a woman's future lies with her children's varene - and some wives appropriate the varene names of their husbands, especially if they are outside of the husband's district. This identification with the husband's group is reflected in the requirement for women to change to the religious denomination of their husbands upon marriage (in Takuru at least).

At the level of normative statements, wives are not incorporated into their husband's agnatic groups but, after marriage, a woman is in an ambiguous position as she is neither fully of her father's varene (he has stopped making her 'body' payments to MBs) or of her husband's (who may cease payments to her brothers after a few births). This may be a reason why women refer to themselves as pake, at the edge yet centrally between affinal men (discussed further in 4c). This ambiguity is, as Weiner notes (1976:118), a feature of societies with patrilineal descent, yet in a sense Wiru women are less ambiguous than their Highland counterparts because of their central role in transmitting 'bodies' over time, and the lack of emphasis on shared substance in bodily constitution. This is perhaps one reason why Wiru women can engage in and initiate exchanges in the public domain (and in some respects they are expected to).
Women's ambiguity poses a problem for men insofar as they come from outside of the group and have other loyalties, but here I am concerned with the response women have to their ambiguous position as wives. Women attempt to make statements about their individuality (and membership when they still live with their fathers) by participating in exchanges of the affinal-maternal nexus, which involve raising wealth as a condition of this participation. To deal with this, a discussion of lagni toko exchange must first be made.

This is a category of exchange which involves gifting between men and women which can lead to exchanges between men linked by a woman, notably as brothers-in-law. Cross-sex exchange provides the model for lagni gifting, for which cross-sex sibling exchange, laine lagni, is in turn the basis. A woman can also gift to her pewali, male cross-cousin, to whom she is not related by shared descent or blood but through a connecting woman, her M or FZ. Laine lagni - between people who share substance - provides the basis for lagni exchange between people who do not share substance (blood) but who are cross-sex to each other or connected by a woman. Sharing substance is not particularly important in this context but what is indicated is that it is the B-Z relationship which is generalized out into wider lagni exchanges, which comments on the male-female nature of the exchange relationship and on the moral obligations of the partners.

These exchanges are of vegetables for wealth and are conceptualized as being 'female' in origin, which relates to the meaning of lagni - to promote growth through a combination of foods which have properties based on a folk nutrition of vegetables and meat which give blood, 'skin' and vitality. An unmarried woman will give vegetables she has
produced to her married brother, and lagi may refer to this unilateral gift only. The return a brother makes is described as ne tukuku (I give back the food), which the sister can use to engage in exchange with other people (by herself or through her husband) and, when shells are reciprocated, to pay off her debt for 'body' to her MBs.

There is no Wiru word encompassing the 'gris' qualities of vegetables, meat, soil, and human procreative substance. The vegetables most often involved in lagi are red pandanus, bananas and sweet potatoes, and the return prestation can be of pork as well as shells. These vegetable foods, in combination, assist bodily growth and provide energy, while pork gives 'fat' to the body and prevents sickness. Lagi, as a 'female' exchange, relates to the body in an obvious way and is not disconnected from the life cycle exchanges. It acknowledges a woman's centrality — she is given 'male' wealth — which is disguised or made subject to male control on other occasions.

Women engage in these exchanges to assert their individuality which, to an extent, is denied them by their fathers, brothers and husbands. Men see women as important primarily in relationship to themselves, e.g., as wives, sisters or daughters, while women perceive their importance as stemming from their role in production and in promoting exchange between men they connect. If women do engage in a "public documentation" of their roles as Strathern, pace Weiner, states (Strathern, A. 1978:87-8), then I suggest this is because men cannot deny women participation in exchange as much as it is a result of women actively taking on an exchange role to emphasize their social importance (see 3a).
I am not suggesting that Wiru women exist as a class or subculture in opposition to men. Rather, it is that individual women, given the stress on matrilateral exchange, can hardly be unaware of their centrality in the scheme of things (cf. M. Strathern, 1981:680), and it is to be expected that they try to use this to their advantage. When women do exchange it is most often with men and not other women; their independence is partly a result of their ability to act like men, i.e., to overcome their femaleness. Women obtain their status, and appellations such as aroa tobou (headwoman), from the praise of men and of their own sex (although it is aroa tobou who are most at risk of being accused by men of being 'meri nogut' because these are the women who most threaten them). Such status is also obtained from using 'male' wealth, indicating that women do not create an autonomous domain of their own through the use of 'female' valuables (cf. Weiner, 1976).

It is noteworthy that when women give wealth to their MBs they say it is going to their 'mothers', and if women become sick, especially with menstrual problems, they point to a female ghost, ninene ipono (mother's spirit), as causing it. As with 'body' payments, an unmarried woman or her father placates her MBs with gifts if she is sick but, once married, her husband gives wealth to her father or brothers if she is suffering from problems with lactation or menstruation. Women undoubtedly see the power of creation as being maternally derived (cf. Strathern, A. 1981:211), and so too do men through the use of the opinanago idiom which points to this fact at the same time that it disguises it by appropriating this power.

Single women give lagi to their brothers, pewali, ZH, M, MZ, F and FB. Married women can expand this range of recipients by gifting to
their HB, HF, ZS, HBW, DS, BS and other categories of kin. While women give their own produce as lagi, it is interesting that other food products they give, especially as wives, are 'male', e.g., red pandanus and bananas, which are the properties of their fathers, brothers or husbands. If men give lagi to other men it is still a vegetable-wealth exchange and they do it using their wives or sisters as intermediaries. This implies that men wish to become involved in 'female' lagi gifting such that both sexes are engaged, if to different extents, in the public exchanges of the other.

That women can give 'male' foods implies that men support their female relatives in exchange, which reflects on the complementarity of the sexes in production and distribution. "The logic of the Wiru gift is that of a cross-sex transaction indeed" (M. Strathern, 1984(MS):18), yet in the case of lagi it does provide a context in which affines can exchange without the unilateral debts or obligations of 'body' restricting the relationship.

Lagi mirrors the giving of wealth to MBs, it is from rather than to a 'female' source, and wealth is returned rather than given. It is like a life cycle exchange in that it comments on male-female relations, 'body' and wealth but unlike them in that lagi does not particularly relate to birth, marriage or death. It is perhaps to do with life in general as it celebrates growth and good exchange relationships, and lagi is especially engaged in during the season of red pandanus fruiting, which relates to the maturation of individuals and the timing of pig-kills.5
Women extract out of lagi the wherewithal to make their own payments for 'body', or to help their husbands with these payments, which is a statement of female individuality; women also use this wealth to initiate other exchanges between affines. If her husband is remiss in making lagi payments to her fathers or brothers, a woman can make these gifts herself and further involve both parties in a continuing exchange relationship: if she gives lagi to her father he may reciprocate with pork to her husband, who will be prompted into making 'body' payments for his wife and children.

A wife may also chose a classificatory male agnate(s) for her husband to make payments to for her children, hence to some extent influencing the networks through which wealth flows (as Langness notes for Bena Bena, 1969:47). She can also express her dissatisfaction with men as husbands or brothers with respect to discharging their exchange obligations, and by stressing her opinions commit men to exchanges and perhaps to larger gifts if she convinces her agnates or affines that they have been niggardly in their gifting. The latter prestations are often of pork heaped into piles, a gift called aroa pokoko (for the woman heap), as lagi or aroa urukakko for recently married women (see 3c). This is a gift given to a woman to make her 'happy'.

It can be seen that a woman's wishes are often taken into account by men in their disposal of wealth, and that women are themselves active in directing the flow of valuables by participating in the life cycle exchanges. Any autonomy which women have is allowed more by the particularities of the exchange system, and its accompanying ideology, than it is by men. This can lead to intersexual tension and sometimes violence, and perhaps to a more overt domination of women by men in an
attempt to deny them their 'male-threatening' independence. Men may kill their wives but they cannot entirely control them; they resort to homicide or rape as the ultimate deterrent to female individuality (a woman was gang-raped during my fieldwork because she was acting 'like a man'. Her husband was compensated, after court action, by the rapists).

Tigini payments are part of life cycle exchanges which are concerned with creating and presenting the individual in varying social contexts - childhood and puberty; the birth, growing and marriage of one's children; and one's death. A person who gives payments is not always opposing a bounded unit but a category of people, opianago. Insofar as a person creates and asserts his/her individuality through these exchanges, it suggests a reason why classificatory and proximate MBs are often chosen as recipients for 'body' payments; there is little point in demonstrating oneself to MBs one may rarely, if ever, meet.

Agnatic groups are formed less by descent than by the collective imprinting of fathers on their children, and by the attempts of the latter to 'pull' themselves as they mature from their debt to opianago. As indicated above, agnation is always compromised by residence and by the politics of choice in gifting. This is not to deny the importance of agnatic groups but rather to suggest reasons for their structure.

Child and 'body' payments continue today and, unlike other exchanges, appear not to have diminished under colonialism and the missions. The context of group membership may have changed, but individuals and agnates still need to be created, even though the punitive dimensions of spirit attack (for failure to make payments) may
have shifted from *ipono* to Satan (see 4b). The underlying logic of life cycle exchanges remains, as the following sections hope to show.

**FOOTNOTES**

1. When a man gives shells to his MBs for his 'body', he says *noke wiane maraku* (I plant (for what is) built). This seems to mean that a man 'plants' himself — or his shells which represent him — in opposition to his MBs, who 'built' his 'body'.

2. Compensation may also be given to MBs for haircuts which follow baptism (long hair is pagan) or incarceration in jail.

3. Yet see A.Strathern (1981:211), where he gives the example of a headman not paying for his children's 'bodies'.

4. A.Strathern (1981:11, manuscript) suggests that *lagi* went into decline after pacification because mixed gardens were not planted as often. If this is so, women may have been disadvantaged during and after colonialism in their attempts to engage in exchange, and hence to improve their status.

5. The idiom of maturation is *kamare kako* (blood stands up), which also refers to pandanus ripening, at which point they turn red. The growth of individuals and the maturing of pandanus appear to be related to the concerns of pig-kills.
3c.1 BRIDeweALTH AND MARRIAGE

The Wiru marriage system is based upon the exchange of wealth for women, and involves transactions between a network of people associated with the bride and groom. This network can include affinal kin and friends, although in larger sub-clans the groom's lineage tends to be the main if not the only group concerned. The father usually contributes more to the bridewealth than other individual donors, and is the most active person in the organization of the marriage. While young men and women are said to be able to choose their partners, all marriages I witnessed were arranged by fathers (or FB, stepfather or an older brother if the father was dead), except when an older man contemplated taking another wife or a widower remarried.

Young people could meet each another at courting parties, oi, or girls formed small bands which roamed Takuru district prospecting for suitable husbands (cf. Kerr, 1984:31). These activities, however, seem to have been more an occasion for sexual interludes than serious attempts to find marriage partners, and girls were no less reticent than boys in arranging these encounters (although it seems that it was the more experienced younger men involved in the encounters; less experienced boys were afraid of sexual contacts). It did happen that a couple met at oi and eventually married after the young man informed his father of his wishes, but the sexual freedom allowed to young people was and is matched by the father's choice of a suitable partner.

The arrival of Europeans brought many changes to courting practices in Takuru: oi was regulated by the 'kiaps' because it encouraged promiscuity and disrupted plans for development, and prohibited by the
mission for its emphasis on pre-marital sexuality (ibid:32). The practices of 'taunim het' was imported from the Ialibu area as a replacement of oi, and may have been more tolerated by the administration and mission because it was less openly sexual (it was more ceremonial) and did not involve the whispering of closely seated couples in oi which led to assignations.

Today, 'taunim het' has largely fallen into disuse and been replaced by the 'six to six' or 'haus social'; also, letter-writing was cited by more educated informants as another method of 'courting'. It is likely that the level of sexuality which accompanied oi continues into the present, despite the best efforts of missions. The 'six to six' is very popular and often involves a band which provides music for dancing, and sometimes beer is drunk (needless to say these affairs have never been held in Takuru, where the mission forbid the building of a 'haus social'). The pattern followed is similar to oi, single and married men select young girls to dance with and, according to male informants, the object of the evening is sexual intercourse or, failing this, to have a good time. As in oi, it is more or less prohibited for a married woman to attend 'socials', and one who does is invariably labelled 'pamuk' (prostitute).

The end of warfare means that young people, through 'socials' and the fact that groups of young girls sometimes roam outside of the district, meet a wider range of prospective marriage partners than was previously possible, or at least a wider range of people with which to have casual sex. While the marriage pattern has changed in one significant respect (see 2a.1), which in turn affected bridewealth (see
below), I would argue that this greater 'freedom' bears little relation to this change.

When a marriage is arranged there is still some room for individual choice: a girl in company with her female friends may visit the groom's residence to assess his looks and suitability, or the groom may hide and watch his prospective bride while she is doing garden work, to gauge her industriousness (cf. Kerr, 1984:32). Although appearances are important, it is apparent that men and women are concerned with different qualities esteemed in marriage partners, and if these are not deemed satisfactory bridewealth negotiations can fall through. When marriages are not arranged, both sexes can use magic and love potions to attract or keep a desired partner, a practice which continues to cause much dissension between a father and his daughter if his marriage choice is disregarded because the daughter is thought to be under a spell. The father's loss of control over marital destinies can lead to much argument and even violence, and in one case in Takuru a father took his daughter to court for wanting to marry the man of her choice (who had bewitched her). The daughter lost the court case and paid her father compensation, eventually marrying as her father wished.

While I have no statistics on the number of proposed marriages aborted by individual choice, the bridewealths I observed suggest that the father's wishes can be satisfied even when one or both of the partners are unhappy with the union. A woman forced into marriage has to be strong-willed indeed to disobey her father or return to his house after marriage. One woman, who was notorious for her 'strength' and had already left one husband, went to jail for her insistence on marrying an
agnate of another sub-clan, which caused much acrimony between the two sub-clans concerned.

Most fathers, especially headmen, prefer their children to marry into wealthy families of good repute, given that it is exchange which defines the strength of the affinal relationship (and this is one reason for a father's concern to arrange marriages). Wiru fathers are often dominating of their children in this respect and especially of their daughters, who may be beaten to encourage them to obey and to bring more bridewealth by impressing the groom's group by her work and desire for marriage. Another reason given for beating daughters was that the bridewealth obtained from a marriage she may not have wanted was to make up for the loss of valuables given in the bridewealth for her mother.

A girl who resists an arranged marriage risks losing the future support of her kin, who may express their indignation at a union not of their choice by giving few or no 'dowry' pigs for the new couple's herd. They may also refuse to have anything further to do with her. The bridewealth is likely to be smaller in this sort of marriage as good exchange relations between affines are not expected to follow. In the long term it can be disadvantageous for a daughter to go against her father's wishes; fathers and brothers seem remarkably indifferent to the future of their daughters and sisters after marriage - for men and women it is the exchange relations generated out of marriage and the production of children which are important.

Yet it is daughters more often than sons who vocally (if not successfully) object to marriage, and sons appear to be more subservient
to their father's wishes. This is possibly a reason why Wiru women use 'sexual persuasion' to attract potential husbands in an effort to pre-empt their father's decisions on marriage (at least sons had the alternative of polygamy). Women have been known to commit suicide if forced into a union against their will, the strongest objection possible and an alternative unthinkable to a man for whom marriage represents different commitments and hopes. A woman's body is the only means she has of opposing male control, and of asserting her independence; she uses it to try to obtain a husband and, in the extreme case, suicide is the ultimate use of her body to express individuality. This type of suicide seems as much a personal statement as an act of frustration which may attract sympathy for the deceased (see Healey, 1979). Women also committed suicide so as to not have sex with their husbands (which denies him children and exchange relations). Suicide and seduction are two ways a woman can use her body to express her individuality.

Although the negotiations which broke down in Takuru were mostly over disagreements on the quantity of bridewealth, on one occasion the bride-to-be brought the proceedings to a halt by simply refusing to marry the groom; women who are determined do have some freedom if they are strong enough to oppose their fathers, and a father may respect his daughter's wishes. A son is less likely to oppose his father and kin because he is dependent on them for raising most if not all of his bridewealth, and in this respect a son may have less freedom of choice in marriage than a strong-willed daughter. Arranging a marriage is not without its problems, and the tensions, arguments and violence which can accompany this event, and influence its success, are due to in a large part to the varying personalities and strength of character of those involved.
Female informants said that the major change in marriage since pacification was that more women, especially those with some education, refuse their fathers' choice because they do not want to marry 'kanaka' men, preferring instead men with jobs, education or some sort of income. Conversely, men do not object to marrying 'kanaka' women because they are less trouble and are better workers. Men state that the major change in their opinion is bridewealth inflation, which again reflects the different expectations of the sexes in marriage. With the introduction of new resources and perspectives into the conjugal process, it seems likely that the problems associated with bridewealth negotiations have been exacerbated since pacification.

Another observation made by men is that they marry older today because, prior to European arrival, so many men were killed in warfare that a man had to marry ("as a boy", it was said) to produce children for the future defence of the district and for the continuation of his 'name'. Some men reported that they married before they could grow beards, which is the opposite of the situation found in other Southern Highlands societies, where men did not marry until they were suitably hirsute. Also, inflation in bridewealth means that a man has to wait longer today for the necessary items to accumulate, inflation being seen as a direct result of the planting of coffee; i.e., of the first significant earning of money.

It is difficult to ascertain people's correct ages and more so to retrospectively discover their age at marriage, but a statement that men marry older, as a generalization, may not be true. It is perhaps that men seem older at marriage because time is quantified by different measures today, and not broken up by periods of warfare, cult activity
or flight. Presently, a child goes to community school and then to high school if possible, or to distant places in search of employment. These stages, together with the 'slower' pace of life, may have produced a different perception of the age at which men marry. As far as I can judge, the range of variation in a man's marriageable age was from 18 to 25 years, and it is much the same today although more men may marry at the older end of this range if they have been away at migrant labour, or if their fathers have many sons (the latter would have been a similar constraint before pacification, regardless of bridewealth inflation).

Women usually marry within the same age range as men, but in this case they probably are marrying older as the marriage of overly young girls was discouraged by both administration and mission, and the practice of taking child brides prohibited. This practice may not have been as common as the administration thought; bridewealth could be given for young girls who continued, nonetheless, to live with their parents until puberty was reached (yet quite a few women reported that they went to live with their husbands before menarche).

The argument for inflation is also problematic; while less items were involved in bridewealth prior to pacification this does not necessarily mean, accepting that Pangia was a trade backwater, that their value was any less than those items displayed today. Older male informants said a wife could be obtained for a pig or one pearl shell, but this is an exaggeration to emphasize the fact that more items are required today (see below). That a bridewealth now involves more items does not necessarily imply that a bride's abilities are worth more, or are more 'valuable', than those of her predecessors (yet see 3c.2). It may have been as difficult to accumulate enough items for a bridewealth
in the past as it is in the present, such that relatively there is no inflation in the strict economic sense of the term – only in the number of items – but rather new variables such as money and roads, which have to be taken into account to judge what is adequate in the transaction.

One of the problems of dealing with social change is that the observer is never sure how much things have altered or why: the above could be argued differently, that in fact women have come to be assigned an economic value as 'wealth' which they did not previously have, and which has tended to diminish their status to that of a chattel of men. The latter do see the work ability of women as inferior to that of their pre-pacification counterparts which, together with the posited devaluation of women's importance in exchange, (see 4c), would complement this interpretation.

In this sense, bridewealth may well have inflated economically if men now see their daughters – as well as their capacities – as something to sell; the bridewealth transaction is labelled 'bisnis', and some men do call their daughters 'my coffee trees' (these expressions are not offered as proof because it is misleading to equate them with western concepts of business and property ownership: what they do is provide a basis for a different male perception of women).

I could not satisfactorily resolve whether or not there is now a 'price' for women which emerged out of the colonial context. Informants perceive bridewealth as 'doing' the same thing today as it did before, and if there has been a transformation in its meaning it was not one which was articulated to me. A presentation of the stages and payments
involved in bridewealth may provide some answers, in terms of how the actual practice of arranging and giving bridewealth has changed.

The encompassing name for the series of transactions involved in bridewealth is araɔ moroko, which translates as 'women they get', and 'they' referring to the group which helped raise the bridewealth and which is not always comprised only of agnatic kin. This again stresses that the groups of individuals involved as donors and recipients of bridewealth are not necessarily opposed as discrete kin groupings, a fact which inhibits the formation of exchange and alliance relations between descent groups or sub-clans of districts. As remarked above (1c), if there are high rates of intermarriage it is usually between districts and not sub-clans. Also, that a bride is brought into a kinship network as a producer of children is as much for the future viability and continuity of that network as of the lineage or sub-clan of the groom. It can be seen that marriage influences the construction of group identity and the applicability of descent as a criterion of membership (in a situation where agnates are opposed to different opianago groups). 2

The stages in bridewealth are -

1. Agale luruko (to tie up talk): a preliminary talk between the parties involved, particularly the respective fathers, which agrees or not on the potential for a marriage to occur. There is no fixed bridewealth and each one has to be negotiated.

2. Oi lawa or moroko (count sign or to get): the discussion held between the bride's and groom's parties prior to a display of
bridewealth to arrange, by using pieces of wood as markers, for the number of items to be given for no return, *vomo* (wood or tree). 1. and 2. occur before the actual day of showing bridewealth, after which further negotiations and stages may drag on for months.

3. *Kai maiyo yamereko* (pig shell show): this is the display of items involved in the bridewealth. Pigs are usually tethered in a location away from the other valuables, which were arranged in the verandah of the father's house or on the ceremonial green, and today are displayed in the decaying government rest house (which reflects on administration attempts to control bridewealth, and on the association made between the administration, development and wealth). The physical separation of pigs from shells and such is partly for pragmatic reasons; it is difficult to get large numbers of pigs to one spot and they are usually tethered where it is most convenient (today close to the road): also, people do not want pigs rooting up near their houses. But the separation of pigs from other wealth reflects, too, on a division between wealth which women openly help to raise, pigs, and that which men see as being owned and produced exclusively by men — shells, money, cassowaries, etc. This distinction between 'male' and 'female' activities and attributes arises in the following transactions, and relates to the difference between *topo* exchange and *vomo* gifting.

4. *Aroa luburuko* (to follow a woman in procession): the bride is followed to the groom's house by the bride's party in order to observe the bridewealth transaction.

5. *Aroa kai po mereko* (to give a pig rope to the woman): the bride, not decorated but wearing ornaments and a new grass skirt and netbag, is
led by the groom's father to where the yomo pigs are tied. He unties the rope tethering each of the pigs to a stake and passes it to the bride to hold, and then the animal is retied. At this stage the bride is usually carrying the yomo pearlshells in her netbag, and she has moved by now to the groom's group. The yomo pigs are the ones given directly for the bride's 'body', and by carrying the yomo shells and moving to the groom's group she illustrates her separation from one group and the beginning of her incorporation into another. The holding of the pig rope signifies the successful completion of the exchanges so far (cf. Kerr, 1984:34), if not the total acquiescence of the bride in the proceedings (the bride and groom are mute participants, although the bride is more involved as an actor than is her partner).

6. Maiyo urukako (to carry shells in a netbag): the yomo shells and today money (yomo kue) are put into the bride's netbag in preparation for the next stage. The connection between netbags, women, wealth and reproduction has been commented on above in reference to marriage preferences, but what this action indicates is an exchange of shells for the bride's 'body', or of something which is distinctly 'male' for female substance, i.e., of a 'maleness' which is carried away in return for a 'femaleness' which stays. The latter is emphasized by the fact that a bride must move to her husband's house upon marriage, even if he resides in the same settlement.4

Interestingly, valuable yomo shells are named and confer a special relationship between an individual and the shell he 'owns'. Names within a lineage are linked with an historical group identity (Strathern, A. 1978:77), suggesting that the shells which a man's lineage provide for his bridewealth represent a loss of 'maleness' which has to be
compensated for by the future production of children, which is the explicit reason for giving bridewealth and perhaps one explanation for a preference for sons - to replenish a stock of 'maleness' or group identity depleted by marriage payments (the name of a gifted shell is called out when a sister's brother makes a return for the child payments made by sister's husband).

7. Yono moroko (to hold hands): this event involves the lining up of pigs from both parties under the direction of the groom's father. The groom's line is longer because it contains both yomo and topo pigs, the latter being the subject of an equivalent exchange with pigs of the bride's group. Great care is taken to match as closely as possible a topo pig from one side with a topo pig from the other, such that men 'hold hands' through a pig changing sides. As remarked in stage 3, this exchange takes place in a location different to the display of other bridewealth valuables, which are yomo - given for no return for the 'body' of the bride; yomo gifts do not by themselves create social relationships.

Each topo pig is from a donor or recipient of bridewealth, clearly the exchange is a symbolic one and the exact matching is not just for economic reasons, i.e., not only because men do not want a smaller pig in return for the one they give, but for the construction of a relationship of exchange through the establishment of an initial equivalence between the two groups. The topo pig exchange may be partly to create the necessary social ambience for the bridewealth transaction to proceed. The idiom of 'holding hands' underlines the 'joining' aspect of this exchange and the setting up of a dyadic relationship, not only between the groom and his wife's kin but also between the kinship
networks of the groups involved. *Topo toko* refers to trade as well as exchange and, as I have written above (see 2a.1), this dimension of marriage may be related to the greater percentage of marriages to the west today (a direction closer to the new sources of wealth). Marriage may still regulate or stimulate a flow of wealth, especially money, around the district, and fathers continue to be concerned with their daughters' marriages so as to control and draw off some of this wealth. The preceding lends support to the argument that the establishment of trade connections was an essential part of marriage, and a contributory factor in the marriage pattern.

8. *Aroa urukako* (a woman carries (something) in her netbag): the bride's father will kill one or more *womo* pigs and cook their ribcages and send them to the groom's partly in the bride's netbag, in emulation of the later return of *lunori* for shells given as child payments. It is significant that a *womo* pig(s), given directly for the 'body' of the bride, is killed and its ribcage - a the ultimate symbol of female substance - presented to the husband's group: this gift encapsulates the meaning of bridewealth. *Aroa urukako* is also a return for the *womo* shells and *vagi* gifts given previously, and it normalizes the exchange relations which now follow the marriage and future childbirth. By this stage the bride's father will have distributed the bridewealth among his network.

During this stage the bride's group sends one or more pigs to the groom's group; this pig(s) is killed, then cooked for distribution and consumption among the latter. This seems to be the penultimate exchange between the networks involved, and the remaining gifts are mainly to or from the respective fathers until the collective rat hunt of 10. That
this pig is killed and eaten suggests that exchange relations between the two groups are now possible, as one side has given a gift which is 'eaten' to signify the commencement of a relationship, or alternatively to indicate that this relationship is amicable and all participants are satisfied with events regardless of any pursuance of future exchange connections.

The bridewealth yomo gifts presented by the groom's group are said to be 'eaten' because they are given for no return (pilia nako; shells broken, pigs eaten), implying that they have no exchange value in themselves but presage or enable exchange relations, just as the pig(s) which is sent from the bride's to the groom's network is also eaten to set up the possibility of these relations. Both of these gifts are in actuality exchanges, the first of yomo gifts for 'body' and the second of pig to acknowledge receipt and distribution of bridewealth.

The couple will later receive pigs as dowry from the bride's father, and sometimes from the groom's father, with which to start a pig herd of their own. These animals are known as iri kai, iri being a woman's walking and digging stick, implying two things. One is that these pigs are to help a wife 'stand up', that is to be a successful pig-raiser and producer, the other is that a woman's role, and the one from which she obtains status, is one of production (dowry pigs could also indicate that once a woman leaves her father's control she 'stands up', i.e., is adult).

9. Yoro tara mereko (to give fern leaves): the bride and groom adjourn to the bush to find fern leaves – a metaphor for sexual intercourse – to cook for a gift to the bride's father from the groom's father (the
leaves are cooked with pork and wrapped in a banana leaf). This is said to be a test of the couple's sexual compatibility; the groom's father awaits the return of the couple in anticipation of events going well, in which case the presentation is made and the marriage can go to its successful conclusion. If either partner finds the other sexually unacceptable the transaction so far is terminated and the bridewealth returned; it is said that the woman has fallen down, aroa kiliko. Informants stated that this outcome was common enough, although at this stage in the proceedings the couple, especially the bride, is under some pressure from respective fathers to ensure a successful outcome. In the past, an unenthusiastic bride may have been escorted to the bush by the husband's agnates who urged her compliance, and her hands may even have been tied.

There are grounds for considering that the style of consummation was rape, which seems odd in the face of statements made about the bride's freedom of choice (at least in sexual matters). Such statements mask the extent of male control over a woman's marital destiny; women may be forced into sex (and the groom may also have been intimidated into performing the act) because fathers cannot take the chance of the transaction failing. Men say that women have a choice insofar as it reflects badly on men, and particularly on the fathers involved, if compliance is not forthcoming.

It may be that a bride has some freedom to refuse a potential husband after this sexual encounter, but no freedom to participate in it. Some male informants suggested that even when a woman willingly participated, she could refuse marriage if the groom failed to satisfy her. It is possible that this stage provides a last opportunity for a
strong-willed bride to abort the marriage, but the introduction of choice for the bride, in a situation controlled by men, is also the introduction of uncertainty. This is probably one reason for the aggression a father may show towards his daughter as part of an attempt to control her behaviour. Because the conclusion of the bridewealth transaction is dependent on the sexual performance of the bride – as an indicator of her ability to bear children – it is not surprising that a father, whose status is affected by the success of this transaction, sometimes develops a hostile attitude to his daughter.

A daughter's errancy also reflects badly on her father as he is seen to have a non-physical influence over her sexuality (which her non-compliance questions), for the maintenance of which he is paid by the groom's father. The lack of hostility shown towards a son as groom reflects a difference in the quality of the relationship a father has with his cross-sex children, as well as a difference in what a father expects as the outcome of the marriages of his children; a father does not have to control his son's sexuality and may even encourage it.

The main purpose of this stage, however, is not to satisfy the vagaries of individual choice, as by now it is assumed that the couple are willing partners or at least reconciled to marriage. Rather, voro tara mereko is concerned with sexual concord only to the extent it is central to the raison d'être of bridewealth, the future production of children. If a couple is not to engage in frequent sex, and many acts of insemination are seen as necessary to initiate pregnancy, then the rationality of bridewealth and marriage is abrogated.
This gift is in the category of *vagi* and, insofar as it is the first *vagi* gift and follows directly upon a sexual act, it is the first payment for fertility and perhaps a guarantee for future child payments. It is for the 'work' which went into sexual intercourse as much as for the capacity of the bride to produce 'bodies' (*vagi* gifts are also given on the occasion of first pregnancy). This gift is connected to the influence a father exercises over his daughter's sexuality and fertility, for which previous gifts of marsupial (not *vagi*) have been made, and which for fertility continue to be made (as *vagi*) after marriage.

Kerr suggests a mother may connive with her daughter to run away from her husband's house (to which the bride usually goes after stage 9), especially in the case of the eldest daughter (ibid:35). This may be to exert some influence over a situation which the mother had no control over when she married, as well as expressing sympathy with the daughter (cf. Langness, 1969:45; Healey, 1979:96). In some instances a bride's mother may receive a payment of pork for her approval of the union — she may even hold the pig rope to signify this — but when women oppose the wishes of men it is as individuals and not groups. The following stages can take place over a number of days or weeks.

10. *Abu tepolo vagi* (wild pit-pit rat *vagi*): in the days or weeks following the marriage many rats are caught by the groom's group, gutted and put in leaves and immersed for a few days in a stream for storage, and supposedly to clean and soften the flesh (a connection may be being made here between flowing water and fertility). The rats are then cooked and put in the new wife's netbag and taken to her natal place and given to the recipients of bridewealth, who later return vegetable gifts.
The gift is *yagi*, and is similar to previous gifts made to ensure the father's control of his daughter's sexuality and fertility. The latter were usually of marsupial which is metaphorically related to fertility, and which is one story caused a woman to conceive a group founder by scratching her breasts (see also A. Strathern, 1980:61); marsupials are possibly a symbolic referent for the penis. These prestations are *tuu kaperuku* (I vomit marsupial for (pandanus?) plant not fruiting), an obvious gift for fertility, and also given after marriage as *yagi*. Gifts previous to marriage, *tuu piko*, were apparently not *yagi*, and what makes the rat prestation of this category is that the daughter's fertility is now tested by authorised sexual intercourse and eventual conception. The name of the gift supports this claim, for rats make their nests in wild pit-pit and are prolific breeders, just as the couple will form a household and have children.

The return of vegetables is to acknowledge this gift, and to send back what is a product of the bride's natal gardens is a symbol or an assurance of her ability in reproduction. That rats, marsupials and also cassowaries can be given as *yagi* for fertility suggests a connection between the 'wild', a father's influence over his daughter's procreative potential, and this potential itself.

The specific use of rats for the only major collective *yagi* following marital intercourse is interesting; rats are wild but come into houses and eat food meant for people; to an extent they bridge the gap between wild and domestic and - because they make their own 'houses' and interact with people - reflect on the purpose of this gift and on the bride moving from the psychic influence of her father to the
domestic control of her husband. That rats are a special food for women after childbirth may comment on this.

But the object of this yagi gift is not to oppose the categories of wild and domestic, which do not correspond in any rigid way with gender differences. Two points need to be made, one is that a father's influence has its locus not in the 'wild' but in the supraphysical domain of yomini transmission: a father is connected to his daughter by his contribution to her 'spiritual' make-up. Secondly, the daughter's sexuality/fertility is equated with the 'wild' only to the extent it is beyond the influence of men, with the exception of her father and her MBs and their ancestors (notice again the conflation of a bride's father with her MBs).

Nature reproduces itself and is its own source of fertility: wild animals, which live within it, can represent 'maleness' and hence are appropriate gifts for ensuring and symbolising the father's influence over his daughter's sexuality and his 'blessing' of fertility (which he does not create but only releases). In a sense, fertility/'femaleness' encompasses 'maleness' just as wild animals live in nature, such that different dimensions of nature represent 'maleness' and 'femaleness' (which could relate to the 'bisexual' constitution of people). Women do not pose a threat to men in general because they are closer to a state of nature, but their reproductive roles do threaten their immediate male kin because of the problems this poses for their essential maleness, and which again I would relate to the incidence of incest, rape and violence against women in Wiru society.
11. Kai tobou wiriko (to hit the pig's head): the bride's father fills his daughter's netbag with shells (and previously with salt) for presentation and display to the groom's group. The name of this stage may refer to the fact that it will be the bride's father who will later kill pigs and give ribcages to the DH in return for 'body' payments made by him for daughter's children (it also presages the killing of pigs in 10.).

The bride's father is concerned to return plenty of shells — the ultimate symbol of maleness — and I was told that a wealthy man (ali kamo) may even return most if not all of the yomo gifts he obtains as an individual recipient of bridewealth, an act which is seen to increase his status. Despite this, status acquisition is not a prime consideration in bridewealth, rather it is the objects exchanged — as symbols of the meaning of bridewealth — which are crucial to this and other stages. A father, through child payments and the transmission of his yomini, creates his offspring as individuals, and Marilyn Strathern suggests that this gift is "the father's last act of individuation towards his daughter" (1981:681). But this is not a gift to the bride's MBs, which again illustrates how marriage leads to a realignment of exchange connections, in the course of which the status of the bride's father is made problematic.

A father loses direct control over his daughter upon her marriage, although payments to ensure her fertility continue to be made to the father until pregnancy, an occurrence marked by more yagi gifts, and then often to the wife's brother(s) as if by now the father has lost control totally of his daughter and his paternity "swallowed up in a more generalized and feminized parenthood" (ibid.). I would argue that
kai tobou wiriko, by reversing the flow of valuables expected after marriage and childbirth, is as much to do with cutting loose an individualized daughter as it is with an expression of the father's male individuality which is weakened by the loss of his daughter. The father, by receiving valuables for his daughter's 'body', is temporarily conflated with her MBs (i.e. "feminised"), but by giving shells to the groom's group it is as if this group too are temporarily identified with the bride's MBs. In other words, the father attempts to set up some sort of equivalence between himself and the groom's group such that his status vis-a-vis the latter is made less problematic.

This gift is a temporary denial of the 'swallowing' of the father's paternity which becomes unavoidable with the birth of his daughter's children (who share substance with their mother, hence her mother, but not with their paternal grandfather). By giving shells and being generous with the amount, the bride's father is for a moment reifying his threatened maleness by making a prestation of it, and perhaps giving as much as he receives is to emphasize his masculinity, i.e., it lessens the identification between himself and his daughter's MBs. The threat his daughter poses hints at another reason for F-D incest; in effect, a father may have intercourse with his daughter to assert his maleness.

Yet as a father is losing his daughter he is also losing his shells, suggesting an alternative explanation for the name of this gift: if pigs stand for people the kai that it is 'killed' here could represent the father as a symbolic sacrifice of his self, or that part of the self which confers paternity and individuality to his children (it is the 'head' of the pig, which is 'male', that is hit/killed). Previous and future yagi payments are also said to be gifts to the
bride's father for taking his daughter, to 'tok sorì' or sympathise with him for his lose. Bridewealth seems to be as much for the bride's 'body' and her procreative potential as for providing a context for the redefinition of the status of the bride's father, and of his relationship to her husband's group (who take over some of his functions; cf. M. Strathern, 1982:35).

Informants were more pragmatic in their explanations, it was stated that this shell gift is a promise of the pork to come as a return to the husband for shells presented for his wife and children, and it also establishes the bride's father as a man of wealth who is worth making substantial gifts to - which facilitates the construction of affinal exchange links. Too, kai tobou wiriko validates the bride as a daughter of her father, i.e., it proves she is not illegitimate and indeed a product of her father's yomini and nurturance, a view which fits the interpretation of a father losing part of his 'self' through the marriage of his daughter.

The shells which are returned are those given as yomo, with some of the father's own if he wishes to make a large gift. Accepting the logic of the above, every father should give many shells as a proof of his paternity and 'maleness'. This may not work out in practice for various reasons - obligations to distribute the bridewealth shells, for instance - except for wealthy headmen, the ideal type of man. This gift is yomo pedeko (pedeko - to break off), and today money as well as shells may be returned.
The rhetoric of *aroa urukako*, and of the gift of pig which the bridewealth recipients send to the donors, is to make the latter 'feel better' about their contributions. *Yagi* gifts are also sent to the bride's father to sympathise with his loss, such that there are prestations made in both directions which deal with compensating people for emotional states produced during the bridewealth transaction. There is no notion any superiority of one group over another, indeed the *topo* pig exchange is concerned with creating equivalence between the two groups.

Yet there is one person whose status becomes ambiguous, the bride's father: his paternity becomes problematic and his 'maleness' threatened. It is as if exchanging 'body' for 'male' wealth is not an advantageous activity for men with daughters. A father does not share substance with his daughter but his sons do, which is perhaps why they take over the payments made for their sister's children. A father receives gifts for his daughter's 'body' which is not properly his but her MBs, and the recognition of this may contribute to F-D tension at marriage.8

*Yagi* gifts continue to be made to the bride's father after marriage and eventually become incorporated into child payments after pregnancy occurs, such that bridewealth prestations (for the wife's 'body') do not cease after marriage but are given instead directly for what the bridewealth is primarily exchanged for - children. The point at which
bridewealth is seen as terminated and replaced by child payments after the birth of a second child, which 'uses up' the bridewealth. After this event, the child is at some stage stood up with a shell on its front and back, and one on each arm. Then the wife's brother, keme, dances around the child so it will grow and be healthy, and takes the shells which cover the body of the child and returns home.

The end of bridewealth marks the point at which the wife's brothers more or less take over from the wife's father as the main recipients of child payments, supporting M. Strathern's statement that the father is absorbed into a "generalised and feminised parenthood" which detracts from his desirability as an exchange partner. The choice of wife's brothers is reinforced by the fact that the specific paternity of the father's daughter is denied and "obliterated" through her production of children (M. Strathern, 1981:681).

Child payments have been considered in the previous section but it should be noted again that they are not separated from bridewealth but express a continuation of its logic, eventually fulfilled in death payments, kioli. Changes to the above series of bridewealth transactions will now be discussed.

FOOTNOTES

1. Yet the relative lack of emphasis on female pollution may support informants' statements about not having beards at marriage, if grooms did not necessarily have to be adult men with some strength of resistance to this pollution.
2. Large agnatic units are not usually involved in bridewealth, rather it is the lineages or kinship networks of the bride and groom. In conjunction with this, individual marriages are spread out to various groups, such that there is no sense in which one group is constructed, through exchange, in opposition to another.

3. This does not mean that women cannot own wealth but that they are not directly concerned with its production, and that men are the ideological controllers of this wealth.

4. The practice of a husband and wife living together is, of course, a recent phenomenon and undoubtedly influenced by notions of a Christian household. It is the stress on a woman separating from her kin (and previously on moving into the husband's district) which is important in this context.

5. If this is the first occasion of sexual intercourse this supports a proposition that many marriages are arranged, unless this first sex act is a statement made about the bride moving to her husband's control (a statement which may be enforced by rape). A woman may retaliate by denying her husband sex, a decision which often leads to divorce.

6. The father can obviously attempt to physically control his daughter's sexuality once she has been promised in marriage.

7. A bride would wear some of her father's shells on her chest, which may be an attempt by the father to underline his masculine individuality.

8. This makes for an interesting comparison with Bena Bena, where fathers cannot accept bridewealth for their daughters because they share substance with them (Langness, 1969:42).
An obvious change in bridewealth is in the type of valuables given. Previously, items such as cowry shell ropes, cowry headbands, stone axes, containers of oil, packages of native salt, cassowaries and baler shells were given along with pigs and pearlshells. Many of these items are not longer used and the rest only rarely, yet pigs and shells have retained their importance in the gift economy because, as I have argued, of their symbolic articulation into gender and interpersonal relations. Money is now a major component of bridewealth but has not replaced those items fallen into disuse, rather in a 'gift' context it is seen as being 'like' pearlshells and displayed in a similar fashion — in separate, carefully arranged piles of different denominations of notes as clean and as new as possible.

As mentioned above, Pangia's economy is not of a kind to allow money to replace shells entirely, as it has in Hagen (see A. Strathern, 1982). Even if this was so it is doubtful that the use of shells would be discontinued, as men set great store by their shells and lavish care and attention on them, for reasons discussed in 3a. At the end of the coffee season Wiru men actually buy top quality shells for K30 or more from travelling Imbonggu salesmen. The near veneration of shells is similar to the attitude shown by Balinese men towards their fighting cocks, for reasons which may be similar, a symbolic expression of the owner's maleness (Geertz, 1973:419). It is unlikely that money could carry the same symbolic load in a transaction in which the construction of meaning is dependent on the use of shells as symbols and markers of male achievement. Money can certainly represent 'maleness' but it is not
as powerful a symbol in this regard as maiyo (although it is a more powerful symbol in other respects, see below).

The pig also remains an essential component in an exchange involving wealth and live 'bodies'. Pigs are the only items involved in both the topo exchange between groups and the yomo gifting, suggesting that it is the 'bodies' of pigs exchanged against the 'body' of the bride which most strongly comment on the twin aspects of bridewealth transactions – obtaining the bride's 'body' and creating ties of exchange (yomo pigs are also known as kai tigini, body pigs). They represent the production of wealth, food and exchange links, the combined efforts of husband and wife (who also combine to produce children) and, by being raised on group land, signify nurture. Pigs, as pan-symbolic animals, refer to what is exchanged in marriage and what is desired as its outcome – 'bodies' and wealth. As live animals they are not sexed in exchange but represent 'bodies' in general, i.e., people, and every person is a combination of male influence and female substance, including the bride. Being alive, pigs also comment on the expected durability of ensuing exchange relationships (Gregory, 1980:646).

Although pigs, like children, are viewed more as the product of women's labour, men do assist in the processes which give rise to both products and in their development. In this context, pig prestations are particularly appropriate in a society where the inherited physical substance of each person is 'female', and the individuality of each person 'male', i.e., pigs, like people, are both 'male' and 'female' in constitution (which reflects on their use in exchange as animals or pork).
Some typical examples of pre-pacification bridewealths are presented in Table 9. The marriages were made in the early forties to

Table 9: Bridewealths: early '40's to late '50's.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yomo pig</th>
<th>Yomo shell</th>
<th>Topo pig</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 oil container,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 cowry ropes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 salt, 1 baler shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 cowry rope, 1 salt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 baler shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 salt, 1 cowry headband, 4 steel knives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 salt, 2 steel axes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 salt, 3 stone axes, 3 cowry ropes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 salt, 4 stone axes, 5 cowry ropes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the mid-fifties and it is possible that by this time more shells were coming into Pangia from outside areas now under Australian control (see 2a.1). Steel tools are not common in bridewealths for this period, although this could be from their rarity — which comments on the trade situation — or from their retention for personal use rather than exchange, which again comments on the scarcity of steel at this time.

Bridewealths 5 and 6, although they appear smaller, may reflect the value of steel tools which had become available in limited quantities before these marriages took place. Most of the variation in the number of yomo and topo pigs occurs between 2 and 8, and for shells 8 to 16. Other items such as stone axes and cowry ropes were usually given in units from 1 to 5, and they depreciated in value after pacification due to their readyer availability or replacement by introduced items, such as steel axes. The fact that Pangia was isolated from trade routes indicates, from the number of valuables given in many instances, that brides' 'bodies' were highly valued and not bought for one or two items as a few male informants suggested.

Some bridewealths which I recorded in Takuru are presented for comparison in Table 10. They are not 'average' as are those presented in Table 9 because I wish to give some idea of the range of variation in present-day bridewealth. There is a good deal of divergence in the amount of pigs, shells and money given, as can be seen. Much of the variation, however, is from marriages which were contracted outside of Pangia to areas where the economy is more viable and brides 'cost' more. The reverse also holds as a non-Wiru husband often gives more bridewealth for a Wiru girl than is 'average'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yomo pig</th>
<th>Yomo shell</th>
<th>Yomo money</th>
<th>Topo pig</th>
<th>Pedeko</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 yomo cassowary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 yomo salt</td>
<td>K.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18 shells</td>
<td>K.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 shells</td>
<td>K.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6 shells</td>
<td>K.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 yomo cow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8 shells</td>
<td>K.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>K.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6 shells</td>
<td>K.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>K.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 shell</td>
<td>K.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 axe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Bridewealths: 1978-82.
N.B. at time of fieldwork K1 = A$1.31.
The other source of variation is the larger bridewealth given for girls who have been educated to high school level, and paying school fees is directly compared to paying bridewealth - in economic terms it is paying now with the hope of a good return in the future. That is, a man (and his group) gives bridewealth knowing that sons will result, and that his daughters will recoup some of his losses upon their marriage. The idiom used in asking for bridewealth is one in which a father gets back what was given for his bridewealth. A father who sends his daughter to high school expects to either get a good return for his investment when she marries, or to receive money from her (and educated sons) if she gets a job.

Giving bridewealth and paying school fees both outlay male wealth (a category including money) for the 'bodies' of children, which are individuated by their fathers. A father, by investing his wealth in his daughter's education, further individuates her and hence makes her 'body' more valuable than those of non-educated girls. That a girl has had a good education is secondary, when a man gives a large bridewealth for such a girl it is because of her relative singularity - as a product of her father.2

Marriages which involve more money than is usual often affect the other bridewealth components, more pigs and shells may have to be given for a bride whose 'body' is highly valued. Also, shells may no longer be acceptable in some places outside Pangia such that the money component has to be increased (pigs may not be given if the distances involved are too great and problems of transport arise: where exchange relations are not likely to follow marriage the bridewealth may be minimal. This could, however, reflect differences in marriage and exchange practices).
There are many more variables today, then, which affect the size of bridewealth in Takuru, and nearly half of the marriages recorded in Table 10 are of this 'affected' kind (although a larger sample would lower the number of these marriages).

The most consequential changes to Takuru marriage, marrying further afield and the introduction of money, have had the most significant quantitative effects on bridewealth, which have in turn affected the status of the bride. Marriages in the vicinity of Takuru with non-high school educated girls exhibit a degree of similarity in the number of items given which, when compared with pre-pacification bridewealths, suggest that while the number of pigs and shells involved may be higher, the real difference today is the addition of a money component.

Takuru men complain endlessly about inflation in bridewealth, the greed of fathers with daughters, and the difficulty of raising the necessary items, although relative to some Highlands societies the bridewealth is not especially high (the fact that shells and money are returned by the bride's father as pedeko, lowers what may initially seem to be an impressive bridewealth). In some areas of the Southern Highlands, where coffee is a more recent introduction, the bridewealth can be greater; yet these sorts of comparative statements are not particularly meaningful because of differences in the 'political' dimensions of marriage for Pangia and other areas.  

Marriage choices are not overly concerned with exchange relationships between sub-clan groups, and intergroup competitive exchange such as moka is not evident (see Strathern, A. 1978). That women are not central in creating links of exchange between sub-clans (but
rather between individuals and kinship networks) possibly reflects the size of bridewealth in a situation where groups do not compete for prestige or status on the basis of marriage alliance, and do not have to give large bridewealths as a part of this competition or to ensure the continuation of exchange relations.

While districts can be intermarried to a significant extent their political relationship is supported by exchange between individuals within various groups of those districts, and not usually by exchange relationships between groups. Wiru bridewealth acknowledges a woman's potential for reproduction and the exchange relations this generates, it can make political statements but these are tempered by the fragmenting influence of numerous and individualistic affinal connections.

Even ifWiru bridewealth is not particularly high *, a man can still receive a substantial amount of valuables from his daughter's marriage, which he has to distribute among his lineage or kinship network. Bridewealth 11 illustrates this, the father kept for himself K100, the cow, two of the best shells and distributed the rest among his agnates except for three pigs which he gave to his WB's sons, who in turn used them as part of one's bridewealth(9). A father with an educated daughter or a daughter who marries a non-Wiru man can accrue more wealth than is usually the case, and the potential for this has led to the characterization of all such fathers as 'greedy', and perhaps of fathers in general.

* this is in reference to 'average' marriages only.
Conversely, a father whose son wishes to marry a non-Wiru woman often has to expend more wealth than is usual. The gain or loss of wealth in both instances is primarily enjoyed or bemoaned as money, which lends support to the notion that the component of bridewealth which engages the most attention vis-à-vis inflation is money (and Takuruns directly link bridewealth inflation to the introduction of cash cropping).

This raises the difficult question of what sort of changes have occurred in the male perception of women with the introduction of money, which is not separate from other issues such as the adoption of Christianity (see 4c). It would be unrealistic to suggest that men have not always seen their daughters as a source of wealth, and calling bridewealth a 'bisnis' and daughters 'coffee trees' continues this perception. Nonetheless, this view may have become more pronounced after pacification, and the administration was concerned about an increasing tendency to promote child brides for 'bisnis' reasons (and note inflation at this time is not yet a problem):

All too frequently it appears as though these girls are having marriage thrust on them for the sake of a few pigs and pearlshells and this problem needs close surveillance to prevent native marriages in this area descending to an organized business (PR7/66-7).

The administration's emphasis on 'negative' marriage practices may not reflect the true extent of this problem. 'Kiaps' saw marriage as a major stumbling block to development and quite possibly overstated the situation in their enthusiasm for dismantling these practices. Nearly
ten years later, the reports record a Wiru man's views on the relationship between women and 'bisnis':

"... we have no business in the village, the only way we make money is through our daughters, therefore we regard females as ways of making money or business and the pigs (from bridewealth) we sell to the people. We are very worried as our daughters are being influenced in western ways and we are not getting bride price as good as we were in the last ten years. When the village court system is ... established Council should make rules to prevent our daughters from going to socials and smoking because they are the two main things which are taking our daughters away from our culture and traditions (PR3/75-6).

While one suspects the literal translation made by the 'kiap', I am inclined to accept what this statement strongly infers. This is that the introduction of money, together with the administration's emphasis on development through 'bisnis', significantly changed the position of women insofar as men became more reliant on women's wealth generating aspects.

What also emerges out of this quote is that, in the eyes of men, women were devalued because of "their apparent new freedom" (PR9/66-7) under colonialism, i.e., because they were not behaving like women did before pacification. This reflects badly on men as 'controllers' of women, and is one reason why there was a marked rise in the number of assaults on women during 'Law and Order' (PR9/66-7). It was a woman's attempts to improve her status, and to assert her individuality, that led to male comments about women's attitudes and labour being inferior to pre-pacification women. Paradoxically, I was told that women are more 'valuable' today since the introduction of coffee, which hints at the tenuous position in which women now finds themselves: they are personally devalued while their value as 'bodies' has increased.
But seeing a daughter as a means of obtaining valuables or like a valuable herself are two different things. If men said daughters are like shells the equation "daughters = valuables" could be proposed in terms of the logic of the exchange system this is improbable as shells/maleness have to be opposed to female substance. To say they are like coffee trees is to imply daughters - who, as individuals, are the product of their fathers - are more a source of wealth rather than wealth itself. Coffee trees by themselves are only valuable by producing beans, grown on varene land, which are transformed through a lengthy process of male and female labour to money, with husbands usually keeping the bulk of it.

Let us consider another metaphor: Koiya, on losing the 1981 Councillor election lamented that the people had taken his 'woman' away from him, i.e., his one continual source of prestige and money. The Pangia M.P., when contesting the 1982 national elections, asked his audiences "why do the other candidates want to take my wife?", another direct reference to his occupational status and source of income. These allusions to 'wife' are not just in terms of a wealth source but also in terms of what makes a man what he is. Wives give their husbands autonomy from other men, i.e., they are a crucial component of their individuality. A hard-working wife gives a man status and helps to produce wealth, without a wife's permanent labour he would be nothing (while wives and daughters are metaphors for wealth production, mothers are not. It is mother's people who take wealth away from men).

A man's status is acknowledged as significantly dependent on his wife - not all men have daughters - as a producer of food, his children and wealth, but women as a category of person are not culturally
esteemed or given any special status for their role in society. It is only as a diligent individual producer for her husband that a woman can obtain prestige. Marilyn Strathern points to the 'conflated substance' of man and wife through the use of the term adono, as conflation of the words 'breast-penis' to mean 'spouse' (M. Strathern, 1982). This term could also relate to the perceived interdependence between a man and his wife in the production of wealth (including coffee) and food, which in some respects is like the production of children, although the status a man receives from this cooperation is qualitatively different to his wife's.

A man is the composite of his father's influence, his wife's labours and his own actions in exchange, 'biznis', etc. He is socially constructed in numerous ways in contrast to his singular physical constitution, yet it is worth remarking again that in the first instance the locus of a man's status, his wealth source, is referred to as his 'wife' or 'woman', literally or figuratively. Women can make their own status, to the extent they can initiate and engage in exchange, and are not overly dependent on their husbands in this regard.

It appears, then, that women are not directly comparable to wealth, they are not an item of value and in bridewealth are seen as 'subject' not 'object' (M. Strathern, 1984). Nor are they in any sense the 'property' of a father or husband but rather an extension of the former's individuality and a critical component of the husband's status (the use of adono in this context seems particularly appropriate). With the introduction of money as an element in bridewealth it is possible that the distinction between 'subject' and 'object' does not hold as strongly today. This is related to the individuating effects of money
and its tendency to confuse male and female domains of wealth production.

It is evident that when *yomo* money is used in bridewealth it is displayed and thought of in much the same way as traditional 'male' wealth items, especially pearlsheells. It is given for the 'body' of the bride and a return can be made of *yomo kue pedeko*. But money can be produced in a way in which shells cannot, through coffee processing, 'bisnis' or the sale of a person's labour in various forms of employment. Yet the ultimate use of money is, I would argue, as a valuable and these avenues to its possession are alternatives to traditional forms of amassing wealth, and should not be viewed as altogether different from other activities within the exchange economy. There are grounds for viewing trade or bulk stores, for example, as another symbol of maleness (which can be used in bridewealth), group identity and wealth, and when they or their doors are painted it is frequently with the colour red, a colour associated with men, shells and cult stones. Red is also the preferred colour for trucks, which emphasizes that men control them, as they continue to control other forms of 'male' wealth, be it shells or money.

Although money, like all major valuables, *kamoiya*, is in the ideological control of men, women can keep the small amounts they earn from sales of vegetable produce or of coffee beans which have fallen to the ground. Wives, however, are expected to give their husbands access to the money they earn, and a woman who does this without argument is said to be a 'good wife'. Men say that all the money from sales of coffee is theirs, but they often give their wives a share of the coffee income. My 1981 household survey indicates that up to 50% of this income
may be given to wives, but an average figure is closer to 20%. The coffee income varies from household to household, and a woman's share of it ranges from a few kina to around K200. Some women maintain that this money is a present to them from their husbands.

The problems which money poses for men is that it is "too much like pigs and not sufficiently like shells" (Strathern, A. 1982c:313), that is, women's efforts in helping men to raise money is more visible, as it is in pig production, than their influence in the shell 'economy'. Because money, unlike shells, can be used in domestic consumption, women tend to emphasize their consumer's role to stress their contribution to the raising of money (cf. A.Strathern, ibid.). Wealth is said to be kau, dry, as it is meant for exchange and not 'eating' (domestic consumption), yet both men and women may accuse each other of 'eating' wealth when it is not used in their respective interests (buying food and clothes for the family, or for use in the exchange economy): to 'eat' wealth is to waste it. Shells, as I have discussed in 3a, embody the conflict between male and female domains of wealth production and usage. Yet this is only a symbolic resolution and money perhaps widens this conflict, and provides grounds for a changing male perception of women.

In bridewealth and other exchanges money is treated and displayed as a valuable, although in other contexts it is non-ceremonially handed over for purchase. Nevertheless, what men buy with money - trucks, trade store supplies, cows, etc. - is often determined by the local political economy and by considerations of individual and group status. Also, it is virtually impossible for men to permanently accumulate money, like all valuables it is determined by the demands of kin and the 'wantok' system, and is inexorably drawn into the exchange economy. A trade store
owner, headmen or entrepreneur has to continually make money to support this status, there is no point at which a man can opt out and live on his capital.6

It is perhaps significant that the money used for subsistence or minor transactions is most often coins (kue lena, stone eye), which never enter the sphere of exchange — not even the K1 coin which was partly designed for this purpose — in which only paper money (kue tara, stone leaf) is used. As shells are graded in value and appearance, so is paper money in terms of amount, denomination and age; old or soiled money is used in less prestigious exchanges or for non-ceremonial purchases. Even coins are graded, people refused to take copper coins from me, preferring silver coins as basic units (although 5t coins were not popular). K2 and K5 notes are the units preferred in bridewealth because there are more of them for display purposes.

In common with some Highlanders, Wiru use the word for stone, in this case kue, for money and for the first steel tools they saw; a comparison is drawn between the hardness and smoothness of stone and the introduced metal (as tools or coins). One older informant provided a different perspective, and said that kue, as money, was 'strong, i gat hevi', making an analogy between the power of money and that of cult stones. Whether this was also a factor which initially contributed to the labelling of money as kue I cannot say, but it does suggest that money may be perceived as more than a valuable, and that it has a 'power' which is stronger than other 'male' wealth from its primacy in the post-pacification context. Money is certainly seen as more 'powerful' than pearlshells in what it can do.7
Paper money is an universal wealth item unlike the culturally specific *maiyo*, and allows Wiru a greater and more efficient intercourse with the outside world, and a way of controlling their lives in respect of it: money can be used in exchange with or for all other wealth items, as well as being the only valuable which can be used in 'commodity' transactions (cf. Healey, 1983:20). Today, a man can augment his status not only through exchange and his own labor, but also through the production of money, which as become a new attribute of 'maleness'. A man who generates and distributes money is revered in his own settlement to a similar extent as headmen; this comparison is not accidental, a man who is successful at making money can be known as an *ali kamo* (man of wealth), a term which was previously synonymous only with headmen. At death, a successful 'bisnisman' is mourned as if he was a headman, and his body displayed on a *leo* (exposure platform).

To clarify my position, paper money is seen as a valuable in what could be described as the top sphere of exchange. Coins, like vegetables, are in a bottom sphere, where their use is more similar to commodity than gift exchange. Coins are most often used for non-ceremonial and trivial purchases (the latter often made by women and children). This does not mean paper money cannot be used like a commodity, i.e., for purchasing items in a transaction not based on an exchange relationship. Paper money, pace Gregory, can be used in both gift and commodity exchange because it can be used as a qualitative and quantitative measure respectively (Gregory, 1980:649). I would argue that even when money is used as the latter, it is still brought into the sphere of male status and intergroup relations (the purchase of a truck, for instance, makes a political statement about the viability of the group that owns it).
The use of money in bridewealth does not seem to have particularly affected the nature of this transaction, or by itself devalued the importance of women as creators of 'body'. What it may have done is to make marriage a more 'economic' occasion, for while money is used much as a traditional valuable it is recognised as a quantitative measure, i.e., for its capacity to obtain things in commodity exchange. This characteristic of money may lend emphasis to the pidgin expression for bridewealth, 'baim meri', encouraging the perception of women as something which can be 'bought'. The meaning of bridewealth remains but the status of women is transformed, an hypothesis linked to the devaluation of women's labour and of their role in exchange - a move from 'subject' to 'object'.

Wealth has its origins in women as wives or daughters, and it is not surprising that money has strong metaphorical associations with these female roles. The fact that money can be interpreted in terms of indigenous categories does not mean, however, that these categories persist unchanged. Money cannot be wholly subsumed as if it was a traditional valuable, it does things and affects life in ways these valuables cannot. Its use redefines these categories such that the relationship of men to women is transformed (cf. Sahlins, 1981:37). This will be explored in reference to other changes in the practice of giving bridewealth.

A noticeable feature of present-day marriage in Takuru is the lack of ceremony which previously accompanied this event. This has not been, as far as I know, the result of any specific injunctions on the part of the mission, although shows of ceremony may have been curtailed by Takuruns themselves in the belief that this was what the mission
required (ceremony is equated with the sinful past of cults and warfare).

While topo pigs are still an essential part of the transaction, the practice of yono moroko is infrequent. Informants state that it is now too difficult to move a number of pigs to other places because of fences and ditches which are today more prolific. Topo pigs are selected and viewed at the natal places of bride and groom and exchanged when it is convenient for both parties, usually after the marriage is finalized so that a man does not have to go to the trouble of bringing back his own pigs. The spirit of 'holding hands' may remain, that is, a relationship is still constructed between the bride's and the groom's group, but this change hints that the relationship is of a different order to the pre-colonial one (the need for refuge, allies and trade has either disappeared or changed). Topo pig exchange may be emphasized when Takuruns want to construct exchange relations with wealthy and better located groups, which may be non-Wiru.

A bride may put on her best laplap and 'meri' blouse for the bridewealth display, but the ceremony of handing over the pig ropes is not always performed. The bride may not be present, although this is unusual; yet it is not unknown for a marriage to take place in the groom's absence, if he was away on wage labour. Also, the bride does not necessarily carry the wealth items in her netbag and they may be taken by the men involved, effectively denying the symbolic importance of the bride's presence and actions.

I am not suggesting that women are now 'objects', but that these changes in bridewealth could reflect a growing tendency for men to
perceive women in these terms. This may be more marked in fundamentalist settlements where women are encouraged to accept this perception, and acquiesce in a chauvinist presentation of what makes women good Christians, i.e., these women willingly take on an inferior status by concurring in the presentation of a Biblical reality.

Yagi prestations of wild animals are no longer made with rats, although marsupials and cassowaries are occasionally given. The collective rat hunt is a thing of the past, and is viewed as an activity which men engaged in before they were Christians. This may imply that the rat gift had some connection with spirits and fecundity, and in separate sacrifices rats were offered with certain vegetables to spirits to facilitate conception and for garden fertility. This form of yagi is now often given as tinned fish which, while not as scarce as marsupial, is still largely a luxury food and one which one comes under the classification tawe, which is meat which promotes growth and health. This indicates that the logic of the yagi gift is still operating if subdued by Christianity.

The decline of ceremony is partly to do with the mission's prohibitions on 'Satan worship' but other factors have also influenced this development, notably the incidence of marriage with non-Wiru partners and a concentration of marriages to the west. Also, there is a possibility that a father's control in arranging marriages is diminishing. This has to be balanced by claims that women have less choice in marriage today because of their fathers' eagerness to marry them to suitors with the most money, and that arranged marriages are not decreasing regardless of a larger field in which to select partners.
Prestations and exchange that were central in the pre-colonial context of Takuru have had their importance undermined by unions contracted to more distant, non-Wiru areas. As mentioned above, many Takuru marriages still 'fit' a more or less traditional pattern; the point is that those which do not fit have affected, in conjunction with the introduction of money, the practice of all. Informants, speaking of changes in marriage custom, say that "today there are more types of sweet potato, before there was only one", an allusion to the fact that more and different alternatives are now possible.

Bridewealth in Table 10 aptly illustrates this development. The marriage was of a successful young Takuru man, with a well-paid and prestigious job in Banz, to a girl from Kaupena in Ialibu district. Takuru has many links to Kaupena through the E.B.M. which is located there, and through a former Takuru missionary who ran an aid project nearby (another missionary contributed K100 to the bridewealth because he was in favour of the marriage and knew the groom well).

As a rule, neither of the marriage customs of the bride's or groom's society take precedence and some sort of compromise is attempted, usually with one group trying to exert its will over the other. To a degree, though, the group of the bride is in a stronger bargaining position and its demands more readily met. The outcome is that the parties of Takuru men and women marrying non-Wiru spouses confront different bridewealth practices and innovate new and temporary ones in the spirit of compromise. These innovations may be temporary but together they have a long-term effect on the practice of Wiru bridewealth in general.
In this instance, no maiyo or kue pedeko was made so that none of the money and shells were recouped (this is common in external marriages). There was much complaint that the Kaupena men would not do the topo pig exchange correctly and gave one large pig in return for two small ones, as well as returning some of the yomo pigs as topo, an act which Takuru men found difficult to conceive. The confusion of yomo and topo categories and the repudiation of yomo pedeko partly denies the meaning of the transaction for Takuruns, as well as inhibiting the setting up of exchange links between the affinally connected groups. The latter was one reason for the marriage as the bride's group was conveniently located to Kaupena resources and the road to Hagen.

There is possibly another reason for marrying to the 'Highlands'. I have written in 1a how Wiru identified their future with the Highlands in terms of trade, cults, etc. Pangia's position vis-à-vis the rest of the Highlands has not radically changed, the latter is still 'richer' and better located in terms of development. In 1b I discussed how the origin story comments on Takuruns being less 'male' than Umbuna people, and I suggest that when one of Takuru's most successful men marries into Kaupena he is tapping into a source of greater 'maleness'. In other words, there are reasons other than economic for constructing marriage connections outside of Pangia (which perhaps shores up the threatened masculinity of 'shrinking' men).

It was directly after this marriage that informants stated that, because of high prices Takuruns paid for most non-Wiru brides, some Wiru fathers had to increase the bridewealth of their daughters to recoup the losses incurred in buying wives for their sons, a trend which encouraged other fathers to follow suit. Hence, as a direct result of these non-
Wiru unions, inflation and new possibilities are incorporated into the overall practice of bridewealth. That some marriages are now viewed as largely 'economic' transactions implies that a potential now exists for this aspect to receive increasing attention in all marriages. This is despite the fact that bridewealth in Takuru retains its meaning, that is, the integrity of its logic is undiminished by a posited increasing perception of women as 'object'.

This is perhaps one reason why women have become less visible actors in bridewealth exchanges and why some of the ceremony has disappeared: men are less inclined to give importance to women's central importance in the production of wealth and children. Instead, men can directly create relationships out of a transaction in which women as mediators receive a different emphasis, such that a woman's marriage no longer has to be celebrated. Because women can have a greater claim to money than pearlesheils, men have to more rigidly oppose women for its control, to which changes in marriage custom are related.

FOOTNOTES

1. Male rhetoric does exist to deny women's primary role: it is said that men make gardens, women only plant them, which implies that women need men more than the reverse, and in particular that women cannot exist without access to male resources such as land, strength, etc.

2. Because education was seen as an investment (PR5/73-4), more boys than girls were sent to school as boys were a better investment.

3. Pre-pacification bridewealths in Pangia may have been lower than in other areas because of its trade situation, but relatively bridewealths may have been more or less equivalent.

4. In the previous section I referred to a story in which a marsupial scratched a woman's breast, which led to conception. The story may relate to the derivation of the term adomo insofar as marsupials may be symbols of the penis, which 'scratch' (have sexual
intercourse with?) the breast. The source for M. Strathern's etymology of *adono* is A. Strathern.

5. It is true that shells can be obtained through purchase rather than exchange, but this transaction is usually with non-Wiru and is not relevant to the local political economy.

6. It is to be noted that money can be saved with the connivance of external institutions such as missions, which can hold back pay of those in their employ and keep their savings secret. People are secretive about how much money they have because they are afraid the government will take it away as tax (there is also a fear of 'wantoks'). I was occasionally accused of being a communist because of my queries about money.

7. Cult stones were protective if taken on raids, and related also to a control of the cosmos. It is possible that money is seen to have this protective and controlling function.

8. Sweet potatoes may be a metaphor for sexual intercourse, and the reference to sweet potatoes here may relate to how exchange connections follow the production of children.
3d. **DEATH**

This section continues the discussion of life cycle exchanges and 'body' payments, in particular the notion of 'severance' with respect to death and its accompanying compensation payments, **kioli**. These are in the nature of a final prestation for the 'body' of the deceased, which also assuages the grief of maternal relatives. **Kioli** is given, too, for the spirit of the dead person to ensure that it does not send sickness to its agnates, i.e., if this payment is not made to its matrilateral kin. Failure to give **kioli** could cause warfare between districts.

Upon a man's demise his **opianago** come to his residence place, where they may express their sorrow, and perhaps their anger at his co-resident kin for letting his die, by digging up his gardens, destroying his property and taking his pigs. This action is called **kaipo toa niki**; probably referring to the pig ropes (**kai po**) with which **opianago** lead pigs back to their settlement, and it emphasizes or points to compensatory claims for wealth - pigs and shells in particular. The taking of pigs which gives this activity its name could indicate the substitution of pigs for the dead person, pigs which MBs take back with them in place of this person.

Various kin and co-residents, including some who may be in the category of **opianago**, may contribute to the **kioli** put together by the deceased's agnates. This is known as **ela teigu** (sorrow cut) and is to demonstrate both empathy with the bereaved line and a relationship with the departed. The presentation of **kioli** is **ela teigako** (sorrow break), and pigs given to the MBs of the deceased allows them to rub off the mud they have been wearing in mourning, **kamo kogako**.
During a period of mourning the body is displayed to the accompaniment of much wailing, and activities described as tumai kamaroko (death (mourners) rise and leave) take place in the tumai yapu (death house), involving the killing of pigs and the distribution of meat to the mourners, as well as a communal feast, loiyo kai, and dancing by men and women, poro popoi toko. Taboos on garden work and certain food follow a death, their duration being related to the importance of the deceased in the community. Also, the group of the deceased do not wander far from their homes in case the ghost of the dead person attacks them, especially while the body remains on an exposure platform, leo.

Traditionally, bodies were wrapped in banana leaves and left on the leo to decompose, after which the bones of men were collected and put in caves, buried, or installed in the tapa yapu (patrilineal cult house). Skulls especially were put in the tapa yapu or in 'skull houses' near the poma, or in the kedo belonging to the deceased's yarene. There seems to have been some variation in mortuary practices. Bodies were also suspended from poles also called leo, by the hands and feet; they were not left hanging but interred in graves lined with banana and cordyline leaves, where they decomposed until exhumed for bones.

Smaller bones were sometimes worn on the neck or wrists by the widow or agnates of the deceased, and head hair was also removed from the body by means of a spring device attached to the leo. This hair was kept by the widow in a special netbag, or fixed to the wig of a brother to remind him to revenge this death. Widows also wore mourning skirts which were larger than normal, and Job's tears necklaces for the removal of which the husband's group has to be paid if she remarried.
There are other situations which the term kioli describes. Gifts given to redeem land or lost or stolen spirit stones are also known by this term. This implies that kioli given in these instances is for retrieving what is in the control of others. The other use of a kioli payment not associated with death is the most interesting, and I give two examples.

The first is of some Kawali men from Takuru who went to a 'singsing' at Pokale where they encountered an Alue man named Kandi, Alue being a pirikangago group of Kawali of which this man was a member, although he had never lived in Takuru. He was also a non-agnatic resident of Pokale. The Kawali visitors convinced Kandi to leave Pokale and to come and live with them at Takuru, where his real brothers (wamene) resided. But first, a kioli payment had to be given to Pokale for looking after Kandi, giving him land, etc. The purpose of this gift was 'for getting the man back', in other words it was for compensating Pokale for its nurturance - which affects the development of 'body' - and for bringing Kandi back to where he 'belongs' (to where he should be affiliated).

The other example involves a group of people and not a single man. At the time of fieldwork three of the Takuru varene were competing for the status of 'nambawan lain', and one of the determinants of this was group size (another was success in 'bisnis'). Kauwepini is a settlement close to Takuru which is composed of Koliri varene, although it is not connected to the Koliri of Takuru except by name: there is no strong overarching sense of group membership through a sharing of a group name, except as members of the same district.1 Kawali, in an attempt to increase its size relative to the other varene, offered each individual
Koliri man gifts as an inducement to leave Kauwepini, and to reside with Kawali - a residential realignment which would be accompanied by a pig-kill.

The payments were known as wenali kioli (man's thoughts or emotions kioli). In other words they were compensation for the disruption, at both an emotional and demographic level, such a move would pose to Kauwepini Koliri. As in the previous example, it could be argued that kioli is a payment for a transfer of affiliation and perhaps, in this case, to mark alliance. I would suggest, however, that kioli only sets the stage for an alliance, which is achieved later through pig-kills, co-residence, sharing land and food, etc., and that alternative acts of kioli operate within the same logic that motivates kioli prestations after death.

This is the logic of severance: obtaining by payment the 'ownership' of a person or thing, in response to its loss or capture for the latter, and for the former extracting men from residence elsewhere to that of the group which gives kioli. The Koliri men of Kauwepini would have had to change from being an independent group which nominally 'belongs' to Baipo (see fn. 1), to one which is affiliated to Kawali in a more demographic and rigorous sense.

Kioli given for a death finally extracts a man from the obligations he has to his MBs for his pine (existence) and tigini, such that at death he becomes a truly agnatic individual. There is a sense in which it is only the deceased who are 'fully paid up' members of their varene, which helps to explain the significance of the tapa yapu cult in the construction of group identity (see 4b). The bones left after bodily
decomposition are derived from female substance, but after death they become the property of the deceased's agnatic group insofar as the 'body' has finally been compensated for at the moment when kioli is given to MBs. Hence, there is no contradiction in installing bones in the ultimate representations of group and male identity, the tapa yapu and kedo.

After death, the spirits of people follow waterways to reside in a land to the east called Apera Takela where a similar existence to that prior to extinction is experienced, including pig-kills and feasting (cf. Kerr, 1984:18). Yet this similar post-mortem existence suggests that death is not seen as a total disjunction to life, and perhaps to an extent is a continuation of some aspects of it.

Kioli is also the name for a species of marsupial which is thought capable of transforming itself into a bat; it is also the species which in one group origin story was responsible for making the mother of the group founder pregnant. If such is the derivation of kioli, then this term has connotations of life and death involving a notion of transformation which complements a movement from life to death, and from yomini to ipono. Death is never natural but neither is it antithetical to life, they are part of the same process and without death the potential for achieving a complete agnatic individuality would not be possible.

The giving of kioli completes the logic of tigini payments: from gifts made by one's father and oneself for one's 'body', to bridewealth and payments for one's wife's and her children's 'bodies', to death payments given to MBs for one's dead 'body'. This gifting represents a
continual attempt to pay off debt in 'body', which also ensures his/her health and growth, as well as to sever the debtor from maternal control.

Kioli is made not so much to celebrate the loss of a person but to gather the person entirely into his/her group. The only real loss is a final separation of a person from an affiliation through shared 'existence' with matrilateral kin. It is only after death that a man's name can be used in the construction of names for his agnatic descendants (naming being related to group identity), reflecting that kioli is not about loss but incorporation.

In line with the above and the section on tigini payments, it is not surprising that kioli is not always given for women. If kioli is to do with severance, a woman's death does not alter the fact that her corpse, as was her body in life, is in an ambiguous position with respect to group membership. As discussed previously, this is because only men are capable of becoming agnatic individuals in a process which constructs the group and defines its members, such that women are denied a lasting or complete agnatic identity. Yet a wife is still more a member of her husband's varene than that of her father, and her bones are not returned to her natal settlement but remain in her husband's district. Because a woman does not become a complete agnate, it is possible that no kioli may be given at her death as there has been a direct replacement in her lifetime of her 'body' by wealth.

Gifts to MBs for one's tigini have already been compared to sacrifices. If, as I have argued, the life cycle exchanges are underpinned by the same logic, then it is reasonable to assume that kioli prestations are also sacrifices, an observation made by Strathern
(1981:219). He suggests that because of the "equation between 'wealth' and 'the person'", the giving of kioli to the deceased's MBs "bears the unmistakeable mark of an offering" and that the gift is a "sacrifice to, and for, the dead" (ibid.). Gifts given to opianago are, by presenting a version of the individual through his wealth, a sacrifice of self. The prestation of the wealth of the deceased, especially pigs and shells, plus contributions from kin and co-residents, is partly a 're-creation' of the individual in life to give force to his agnates' claims for his final separation from his MBs. The 'self' thus represented is offered to MBs as a final sacrifice which redeems the deceased into his warene.

While it is true that, through kioli prestations, "personal individuality is always being returned to the folds of matrilateral kinship" (ibid.), this is not to suggest that this individuality is extinguished at death. Instead, it is transformed or accumulated into an agnatic group identity which is the historical product of its members' 'faces'/individuality. Death is one of the means whereby agnatic groups are created. When the headmen of Takuru's sub-clans attached themselves to the central cult stone of the tapa yapu, the tapa muu (ancestors' testicles), by tying kalipo vine around their respective scrotum and laying the vine ends on the stone and pouring oil on them, then this is as much a demonstration of the process of group construction as of a "continuing male procreative presence"* (ibid:223). The bones of men are markers of this presence and of agnatic identity, and together with the tapa muu they store group 'power', which is tapped into to reproduce the cosmos and groups.

* This is in reference to the symbolism of male bones.
While spirits can intervene on behalf and perhaps at the behest of MBs, the separation of 'body' payments from cosmological concerns, managed through cults and pig sacrifices, is marked. Life cycle exchanges, although they often take place within a cult context, are concerned in the first place with severance and the creation of aganatic individuals, and only secondarily with – or perhaps as a result of this – the regeneration of the social system.

Regardless of women's transmission of female substance over time, it is men who control the constitution of 'bodies' as agnates, and who control the wealth used in exchanges with the affinal-maternal nexus which compensate for this constitution. Given that "the power of life .. is maternal" (ibid:211), while covertly recognised, is effectively masked by this control, it can be surmised that exchange maintains the political and social order involving relations between men, and between men and women.

In this scheme, death does not release exchange but is encompassed within it; people on their demise are "cut away (from) social relationships developed through exchange" (Weiner, 1976:120), but this outcome does not by itself regenerate the system. A.Strathern (1981:220) maintains that kioli could indicate a severance rather than a renewal of exchange ties, if it were not for the fact that it is also often given to classificatory MBs. I have previously stated that life cycle exchanges are best viewed as transactions between categories of people rather than between bounded kin units, in which case the choice of a classificatory MB does not alter the fact that an opianago has still been selected. This is because the meaning of the exchange relationship is derived from the donor presenting his 'self' through his shells,
prestation which is only viable if a relationship can be maintained between donor and recipient.

If this claim is valid, kioli which is made to classificatory MBs is still a severance of exchange relations between the deceased and his genealogical MBs - a 'cutting away' of the individual through the act of exchange. Social relations between the deceased's kin and his opianago do not necessarily cease upon payment of kioli, other marriages and kin connections may keep this connection open. Indeed, kioli may be elaborated into further exchanges called kage, discussed below, but I am not denying that death leads to exchange. Rather, I suggest that kioli cannot be viewed separately from the other life cycle exchanges or as 'doing anything' different from them. Exchange follows death but the prime purpose of this is the redemption of individual agnates by compensation payments made upon their demise.

If a woman has an abortion and is found out, she has to pay her husband compensation, mari wirane kioli mereko (child killed kioli given). The woman invariably has to go to her agnates to raise the wealth necessary for compensating the husband for the loss of an offspring. Suspecting a woman of persistently aborting is one of the main reasons men give for divorce, and women say that they practice abortion because they do not want the work involved in raising children, which 'spoils' their lives. Yet one would have expected the woman, in terms of the logic of the system, to pay her agnates or MBs for the termination of a foetal 'body' which they 'own', and of a potential for exchange.
Instead, it is the husband who is compensated as this child could have 'changed' with him. The husband is not being paid for the loss of a 'body', which properly belongs to its MBs, but for the loss of its potential agnatic identity. This change in the expected direction of gifting implies that kioli, even though the idiom is normally one of a final payment for 'body', is more to do with the creation of agnatic individuals than with a renewal of exchange ties through death.

For Wiru, death is not "the major regenerating mechanisms within the system" (Weiner, 1980:82) because it does not pose the same threat of loss or of the end of exchange as it does in other societies. Death is only a part of this 'mechanism', it is contained within the system and is its logical end point. It may temporarily rupture social relations which are mended through exchange, but in the final analysis mortality is required to relinquish exchange in a system which is about redemption, and where death allows for the continuance of the system but by itself does not ensure its reproduction. The "major regenerating mechanism" is the life cycle exchanges, starting with birth, a process which simultaneously initiates exchange and transmits female substance for male imprinting. The other exchanges celebrate this and kioli acknowledges their completion and the fulfilment of their purpose – severance from maternal control and the creation of agnatic (or incorporated) individuals.

This leads to a discussion of kage, which is another exchange generated out of death or its possibility. Unlike kioli, kage is a voluntary death compensation payment and has the potential for making political statements between groups. There are two kinds of kage (cf. Strathern, A. 1978:81) which are concerned with two levels of interaction,
between groups and between an individual and his opianago. The idiom of kage is one of ensuring peaceful relations, and of making the recipients feel 'good'. Status is also derived from kage prestations although not from any returns made to the donor (cf. Strathern 1978:88).

Both types come under the heading kage wiko (wiko, to plant something in the ground), which may be related to the planting of a cordyline, for a man killed in warfare for example, by those who give kage for the deceased. Kage may be derived from the verb kagekako, to prop up (especially in reference to male crops), but it is also the name of the black peaked hat, made from cassowary feathers attached to the kiwa gourd, which is worn by the kage donor. The two kinds of kage are now discussed.

1. Ali wirane kage (man killed kage) – this is basically a warfare compensation payment made to an allied or enemy group. It is an exchange of shells and sometimes cassowaries for a later return of pork, often given as ribcages. Men of the donor settlement or yarene, under the organization of headmen, would all contribute shells for a prestation to an allied group for help in warfare, which involves the possibility of a death, or for the death of an ally or enemy (if peace is desired with the group of the latter). When the recipients killed pigs, pork would be reciprocated to the kage donors. Kage gifting was the occasion for ceremonial dancing and bodily decoration, and it was often if not always performed as an adjunct to cult celebrations. Status accrued to the donors, especially to the headmen who organized kage prestations.

The impression given by Takuru informants was that kage given to allies was less frequent than that given to enemies, and men stated it
was even less so as a reparation for the deaths of allies incurred in warfare. It was said that if an ally was killed the procedure was to compensate the allied group not by giving kage, but by killing two men from the settlement of the killer. Apparently revenge killings were incremental even if kage exchanges were not.

Ali wirane kage has disappeared since pacification and mission injunctions on cult ceremony and display, but group prestations of kage still occur for different political reasons. This reflects changing political relations between groups now that warfare has ceased and people have become Christians (although enemies and allies are not forgotten). Kage by groups could become more frequent or important in the future, possibly as a response to a declining control, post-Independence, of the socio-political context by the administration and missions, and to an emerging need for making political statements between groups as the Pangia economy becomes more 'introspective' with the decline of development schemes.

Interestingly, a mechanism has been created to compensate enemies for their losses of property and people in warfare. These payments were kept secret from the colonial administration as people feared they might be jailed for making them, which gives an indication of the disapproval and regulation by the administration of exchange activity. This compensation consists of gifts of shells, pork and money, and was called takerene yomo wiriko, for the trees of the district killed (for the destruction of trees which mark a settlement's location and 'identity'). Whether these are 'one-off' payments or will lead to the development of exchange relationships between enemy groups remains to be seen.
Contemporary instances of group kage are considered in the conclusion of this section.

2. Nine yene kage (mother group kage) - this is a payment of shells or money, made by an individual to his MBs or keme, for which ribcages or live pigs are returned although people say no return is expected. These prestations still occur, and may be on the increase after a decline brought on by the demands of development (cf. Strathern, 1981:219). Like ali wirane kage it is motivated by death, either an actual one of the possibility of one, including one's own.

One Takuru non-agnate gave 24 shells to his actual MB, who was a tapinago of Takuru, because his brother had recently died. It was not a gift made for his brother but because this death had turned his thoughts to his own mortality and the need for recognizing this MB's role, after the donor left his natal settlement, in providing land and assistance in Takuru. This is a particular form of gifting to express appreciation and thanks and, although the donor's status may have been improved, it was not given primarily for political purposes. More 'typical' instances of nine yene kage would indicate, however, that they are partly concerned with augmenting the status of the donor, who is often a headman.

There is a sense in which kage, in both forms, is concerned with compensating for 'bodies' or debt, but not as explicitly, or in the same fashion, as life cycle payments. The giving of kage makes political statements and is related to status acquisition in a way which is not given adequate scope by these payments. Headmen from the same village can, for example, compete in kage gifting. Kage allows a person an outlet for expressing a greater individuality, which ultimately is
connected to a disengagement from opianago control; it overcomes for ambitious men the limitations of life cycle exchanges while still being influenced by them.

Although kage is separate from the context of life cycle exchanges (ideologically and often temporally) it is still fundamentally a response to them and operates within the same logic, in which the basis of exchange is derived from marriage, i.e., from relations between 'men' and 'women'. In writing about an alliance between two groups in Tunda, A. Strathern remarks that "Widiperi give pearl shells in kage to Agaliri, who return ribcages of pork as if they were 'wife-givers'" (1978:88). There were no such alliances in Takuru, but it is noteworthy that kage frequently involves gifting shells in one direction for a return of lunori from the other, an exchange characteristic of 'body' payments.

In all shell-ribcage transactions there is an element of gifting from a 'man' to the 'woman' (from ego to MB, from wife-taker to wife-giver, from 'body' taker to 'body' giver). The concept of individually based affinal relations underlies the nature of kage exchange; it is as if this exchange represents a 'marriage' relationship. Being so influenced is perhaps one reason why it has no competitive, incremental aspects (for a more detailed description of kage see A. Strathern 1978, 1981).

Just as the context for giving kage has changed, so can it avail itself to different meanings and situations today. For instance, the M.P. for Hagen, in oratory directed at the 1982 national elections, told Wiru audiences that if they did not appreciate the Member for Pangia they (the Hageners) would take him for themselves after giving kage for
him. I do not know if the Hagen M.P. was confusing kage with moka, which is the nearest equivalent Melpa have to kage, but it could be that kage is here being made to serve as a compensation for the loss of a 'political' rather than a physical 'body' (for the loss of a representative of Pangia, who is its 'face' in national government).

In a recent pig-kill at Noiya, kage was given to Baipo and Waniuwane sub-clans of Takuru, and consisted of shells, money and pork. This was 'free' gift to 'thank' Takuru for not burning Noiya to the ground when it had the chance in a series of raids waged against Takupini and other allies of Noiya (instead Takuru men broke the bows and arrows of Noiya men and hung them from a pandanus tree). This group pretstation of kage has, like the other example, political implications over and above its signalling of appreciation: Takuru and Noiya are both Wesleyan and it makes good political sense for Noiya to have a viable relationships with a close-lying mission settlement. There is also some notion of 'debt' involved here, and Noiya until recently provided 'cheaper' brides to men from Takuru as an acknowledgement of Takuru's benevolence (and a connection between marriage and kage is suggested again).

Another example of a use of kage in a changed political context is now given, and other instances are offered in 4c. Group kage is given to make political statements, and traditionally it was to 'make peace' with enemies (at least at the level of rhetoric, see fn. 4). But with the cessation of warfare there is still a need to express hostility towards enemies, especially if previous deaths or suspected poisonings continue to rankle. The custom of poi mokora mereko (see 3e) is often engaged in at the individual level as a revenge mechanism when actual fighting is not allowed, between agnates or keme for example. During a pig-kill in
Takuru in the late seventies, Baipo sub-clan gave a *yobo maiyo* (a valuable pearlshell) as a *poi mokora* gift to the enemy settlement of Talipiko, but they gave it as a part of *kage* prestations. This *kage* was still making a political statement, but a very different one from the statements traditionally made by *kage* in respect of ensuring good relations between groups (it was given to render infertile or 'kill' the ground, *irono wiriko*, of Talipiko). Soon after this a Baipo headman died, which some people saw as the result of Talipiko 'giving back' the *poi mokora* in the form of poison. This death continues to preoccupy Baipo men and is the source of muted hostility, court litigation and sometimes violence (see also 2d).

The above examples help to illustrate the flexibility of certain exchanges in response to colonial and post-colonial changes. These changes are still concerned with making political statements, or with acknowledging debt, with the possible exception of the example in which *kage* was given to Talipiko. This certainly made a statement about the relations between these two settlements, albeit a negative one, and one in which gender may continue to provide a basis for the exchange (*poi mokora* renders problematic the masculinity of the recipient while emphasizing that of the donor, see fn. 5, 3e).

This type of gift continues to be informed by the logic of pre-colonial *kage* but is now directed towards a different political end: it may be that *kage* is today becoming more politicized as a response to the need for expressing hostility in the absence of warfare. *Tigini, kioli* and marriage payments are more constrained by the system and are less 'political', but these too have undergone a different interpretation since pacification, a topic considered previously and in Part 4.
FOOTNOTES

1. Kauwepini is possibly in Takuru district but, if so, it is still a separate, autonomous settlement which owns the land it gardens. It was previously decimated in a raid by Takuru and resettled after pacification. Kauwepini may be geographically 'in' Takuru district but it is not politically 'of' it, although Baipo sub-clan say that Koliri of this settlement 'belong' to them, possibly because Baipo gave them land in Takuru district.

2. Informants differed widely on the frequency of abortion, in part because some said it did not occur today as people were now Christians.

3. Wiko can also mean 'to build or construct', and kage wiko may refer to a man 'building' his status through kage gifting.

4. Invitations to receive kage were sometimes excuses for taking the recipients by surprise so as to massacre them.

5. A sugar-giving ceremony took place before pig-kills to allocate the amounts of pork which would be given to recipients. A man who was to receive a side of pork would be presented with a length of sugar cane, and in this way the pig-killers could arrange their debts and plan their actions. It was during these ceremonies that kage was presented (possibly accompanying the erection of the central pole of the tubu yapu).

6. This fits into the 'body' taker/'body' giver dichotomy as Takuruns spared the 'bodies' of Noiya men, and interestingly emasculated them by destroying their weapons. This is also the logic of poi mokora.
3e. THE PIG-KILL

The following analysis of an oino kai wiriko (ceremonial pig-kill) highlights a dominant motif in Wiru society, expands on some points raised in 3a, and provides a background for assessing the colonial influence on ritual and social life. The oino is a context in which beliefs about the construction of individuals are demonstrated, and in which relationships between groups, individuals and spirits are negotiated.

The politics of pig-killing is not a major concern of this section, beyond stating that these are occasions when individuals and groups attempt to maintain or augment their status by paying off debts in pork, or by killing many pigs and giving generous gifts. Despite this, Strathern is correct when he states that:

it is as if not great political hopes or ambitions were placed on the presentation of legs of pork to the rows of formal male recipients. (Strathern, 1978:86).

Enemies could be invited to oino if peace was desired for a short or long-term period, and the idiom of gift-giving and receiving, and of competing in gift-giving, is very much one of fighting, such that prestations may be acts of sublimated aggression (and perhaps more so today now that warfare is prohibited). Yet allies or men of the affinal-maternal nexus are, in Takuru, the regular recipients at oino, so why this aggressive idiom?

The exchange relationship overrides distinctions between friend and foe by converting all acts involving gift, debt and reciprocation to one
having the same implications for this relationship. That is, giving an ally a gift of pork is, ideally, of little difference to giving an enemy a gift; they all become involved in the same connexion of debt and obligation. In reality, a person has better exchange relationship with an affine than with an enemy partner, but the idiom used nonetheless stresses the close link between warfare and exchange (this is not the same as stating that they are functionally equivalent).

I would argue that the recipient, regardless of the type of relationship he enjoys with the donor, becomes for the duration of the oino a non-individual in respect of the donor. This is a temporary status conferred on all recipients, be they enemy or ally, such that they become a generalized group of people deprived of individual social identity. They do, however, have a collective identity, which is that of a stereotypical male - warlike, aggressive, strong, etc. This is demonstrated by the recipients arriving similarly decorated (where decoration is a mask of individuality while simultaneously emphasizing maleness) and armed with bows, arrows and axes, and sitting or standing in groups. Little conversation is entered into among the recipients, as if they are aware of their collective role, and virtually none between donor and recipient with the exception of formal chants or insults accompanying the gifts: social connections are not acknowledged. Also, this is not an occasion for oratory on the part of headmen or groups (cf. A.Strathern, 1978:81), which would tend to 'personalize' the exchange.

By reducing all recipients to an equivalent identity, in a prestation emphasizing the potential for hostility or resentment, the oino comments on the basis of the tenuous nature of relationships
between men who exchange — as if they are connected by women. Nonetheless, that the hostility may remain muted and that peace is maintained or ensues, suggests to me that the oino is, in part, an attempt to transcend the reality of interdistrict relations by acknowledging the possibility of a world without war. I will return to these comments below, but first I need to present contemporary oino in more detail.

The pig-kill takes place on a settlement's ceremonial green, the number of pigs killed may be increasing since the early seventies but may not be as many as those killed pre-pacification. I would estimate that today about 100 to 150 pigs are killed in a settlement of 400 people. The animals are tied to stakes on the poma and clubbed to death in the morning; butchering follows with women carrying away the entrails for washing and cooking, they also prepare 'blood puddings' by wiping up blood with fern leaves and stuffing them into bamboo tubes for cooking in earth ovens.

A U-shaped longhouse (ludu or mi yapu) is constructed some months previously, and accommodates the family of the pig-killer and visiting kin for the duration of the oino, after which it gradually rots away or is used for firewood. In Takuru, sections of the longhouse belong to one of the four sub-clans and their non-agnatic co-residents. In front of each section a long pole(s) is erected horizontally up to six feet off the ground. Formerly, the central poles, lowalia, of the tibu yapu cult houses — each sub-clan having its own house, with oino occurring as an endpoint to the tibu ceremonial cycle — were brought from these houses and erected vertically on the ceremonial green in front of sub-clan sections of the mi yapu (Kerr, 1984:10). The horizontal poles are known
as leo, or kupoleo, which is the same name as the exposure platform for the dead. On the former are draped the pork sides from the pigs which each sub-clan has killed.2

After earth ovens have been prepared in pits running between the leo and the longhouse, the pork is cooked along with vegetables and offal. In this initial period of activity there occur many informal exchanges between individuals and their affinal-maternal nexus, i.e., various 'body' payments are made or reciprocated which involve pearlshells or pork ribcages. The name of the gift may be called out but otherwise there is little ceremony and the transaction is quickly over. These exchanges continue throughout the day but appear to be concentrated in the early stages of oino, and shells and lunori may change hands many times as people attempt to balance their gifts and debts. Regardless of the informality and brevity of these exchanges they are a crucial part of the pig-kill; the lack of ceremony is because the oino is directed more to exchange with formal recipients.3

While the pork is cooking the recipients, who have been waiting just outside the settlement, enter in single file and march around the poma several times. They then, as yarene and/or a district, line up in front of the leo opposite that section of the mi yapu which houses the donor group. Takuruns only went as Koliri to oino held by Poloko, with which it sometimes held simultaneous pig-kills. Poloko was Takuru's major ally, but ceased to be a guest at Takuru oino after the ulo incident (discussed in 2a.2). Sub-clans went separately to pig-kills held by other districts - or by groups within these districts - to which they were allied and/or had marriage links. Individuals also went to another settlement's pig-kills for exchanges of the affinal-maternal nexus.
Table 11 illustrates major oino relationships for Koliri and its constituent sub-clans. The situation, at first sight, is confusing. There is extensive intermarriage of Koliri with Poloko groups, but little between Baipo and its ally Pokale Lerì (and none with Marapini, perhaps because they are both Koliri, although the same group name does not necessarily prevent intermarriage between groups of the same name in different districts). Kawali maintains that it has no allies, and it is extensively intermarried with Kalue Tawidi (an enemy of Takuru Koliri) and Weriko Kaimari (neutral, but an occasional ally of Koliri).

Marriage at the sub-clan level does not support alliance or create it but, as argued in 1c, marriage choices do reflect patterns of alliance (or its potential) at the level of Takuru district. It may be that the sub-clan alliance existed first, and any ensuing marriages were more or less incidental to it. Wanuwane and Waliapini Kabiri are a case in point, they continue to be oino partners despite the fact that Waliapini is in Poloko district, which no longer exchanges with Takuru. This is because of a strong historical connection which exists between the two groups, Kabiri apparently having been host to Wanuwane migrants in the past and described by some Wanuwane as a 'mama lain' (possibly an antigamous relationship has developed between these groups).

It is this sort of connection, rather than marriage, which is important for allied oino partners (and these groups often took refuge with one another). Sub-clan allies do not have to be affines, the relationship of alliance stands by itself, but oino partners who are not allies are supported by ties of consanguinity. This suggests that, in the absence of an alliance between them, marriage may be necessary to construct a relationship between groups of different districts. Allies
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>Groups in allied and oino relationship with Takuru groups</th>
<th>Number of marriages between these groups</th>
<th>Groups invited to oino solely on basis of consanguinity with groups</th>
<th>Number of marriages between these groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koliri</td>
<td>Poloko - various groups</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baipo&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Pokale Leri</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marapini Koliri</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawali</td>
<td>No allies</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kalue Tawidi</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weriko Kaimari</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanuwane</td>
<td>Niripu Kabiri</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waliapini Kabiri</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Oino partners of Takuru district.

Notes on table
1 Toe sub-clan is included with Baipo; it 'belongs' to Baipo and has the same allies.
are described as wamene yarene brother groups, and they fight together and support each other's military endeavour (this is an extension of a kinship term to link groups, a relationship which must be supported by exchange).

It is interesting that both Baipo and Wunuwane are renowned as 'fight groups', while Kavali is known more as a 'producer' group, and has no allies (Kavali was referred to by the other sub-clans as 'our woman', which was also a reference to its limited role in extra-district politics). A. Strathern remarks that oino "gifts do not ... clearly reflect relations of alliance and enmity" (1968:547), yet the Takuru data indicates such a reflection at the sub-clan level and, in the case of Kavali, they reflect a relationship of neutrality.

These oino relationships, with the exception of Poloko, continue largely unaffected by pacification, and this may be related to the same sort of conservatism which underlies the relative stability of the marriage pattern (see lc). There is, however, one exception and this is Baipo. While it still has an oino relationship with its two allies, it does 'try' different groups and this seems to be for political reasons, i.e., to establish relations with groups in the changing context of colonialism. Baipo was the only group, apparently, which invited enemies, pre-pacification, to its pig-kills and went to enemy oino. This is partly to uphold the status of Baipo as 'nambawan' group, but it is also because Baipo is to an extent the spokesgroup for Takuru, and it is through Baipo that alternatives are tried.

For example, the enemy group Leri of Mele-Talipiko may be invited by Baipo as this district is important for its resident E.B.M. station
and for its successful 'bisnismen'. This process is still very much emergent and many things can go wrong to prevent an oino relationship being formed (enemies, for example, are more likely to be accused in cases of suspected poisoning). Also, there are some signs of a tendency to contract oino links with settlements of similar fundamental persuasion, such that the cult/group membership aspects of oino continue into the present (see below and 4b). 4

To return to the description of oino, when the recipients line up in front of the donor's leò they sit down and quietly wait as the latter continue with their preparations, during which they bring delicacies of cooked offal and vegetables to the recipients. This part of the ceremony, from the entry to the final gifting, certainly has the air of being 'stage-managed'; at one oino I attended three large European pigs were not killed until after the recipients had entered the poma, and could observe the satisfaction of a man clubbing an expensive and status enhancing animal in front of his guests.

After the meat has been briefly cooked, the earth ovens are broken open and the recipients stand to await their gifts. A donor carries a pork side, often over his head, or pork leg and dumps it in front of the recipient, who may or may not be related to him. A man may receive meat from more than one donor and, as the guest silently stands, a sizeable heap of pork can build up at his feet. At the conclusion of the gifting the female relatives of the recipients, particularly wives, converge in front of their male kin and stuff the pork into netbags, at which point the oino is over and most guests return to their settlements where the pork is redistributed.
The oino displays the unity but also the constitution of the settlement and/or district where it is held. It confirms the identity and status of the donor groups, in which the performance of cults also plays a part (see 4b). Yet the traditional pig-kill was as much directed at the cosmological locus of fertility, growth and health. Ideally, it was timed to coincide with the growth cycle of pigs, a certain number of fruitings of pandanus trees (corresponding to notions of human growth, using an idiom of 'blood' to signify maturation, see fn.5, 3b), and the point at which the lowalia pole was full of animal bones (which symbolise a male control of fertility).

Oino encompassed three different activities which together underpinned Wiru society and ensured its reproduction. The first was cult performance, second was life cycle payments, and third was paying off or creating debts in pork to extra-district groups (and sometimes to groups within the district, depending on its size). Cults and 'body' payments assured the continuity of groups and individuals respectively, while the formal gifting of pork pointed to the fact that a district was not a closed entity and needed intercourse with other districts, be it warfare, alliance or exchange, to survive.

The physical arrangement of the oino itself, and the ceremony accompanying the formal gifting, bear out this observation. The longhouse is basically composed of connected woman's houses (which encompass men's houses and render them 'female'), and its U-shape relates to this fact. The recipients, decorated in such a way as to stress their maleness, enter the poma and become enclosed by the arms of the longhouse, i.e., they invade a space which is symbolically female (it may be too much to suggest that the longhouse design is uterine,
which the recipient males 'penetrates'). The man who leads the recipients into the *poma* is often a headman or a man who somehow threatens his hosts (by being, for example, the brother of a man killed by the donor group, either in battle or by poisoning). In other words, the most 'male' man of a group is chosen to lead his fellows into the *poma*.

Donors act as 'women' to the recipient 'men' and it is the former who, on this occasion, do the domestic chores of food preparation and feed their guests. If we refer back to Figure 5, it can be seen that exchanges are between men and spirits, or men and men. Yet in the transactions of the affinal-maternal nexus the exchange is between a man and a feminized source (of one's body, or of one's bride and children) which controls "the generalised forces of fertility and good health" (Strathern, 1982A:76).

Exchanges involving intergroup relations, which have a more overt political content, are of the delayed, balanced variety and can be between unrelated men. These transactions do not involve notions of continual debt and obligation, but it is interesting that even these do not escape the categorization of all mundane exchange as being between 'men' and 'women' (where this use of 'women' refers to the feminized source).

When the donor becomes recipient at a later *oino*, it is his turn to be the consummate 'man' to his host's 'woman', although this may also reflect on the fact that a man who is in debt to his MB or WF may be a WF or MB to someone else, that is, 'man' on one occasion and 'woman' on another. Superiority is attempted by men over their recipients by giving a large pile of pork, which it is hoped cannot be reciprocated, thus
giving shame to the recipient and setting the stage for a reversal of 'gender' roles. The aggressive idiom of gifting, and a reason why oino are often occasions for reviling recipients and for covert hostility, is because exchange relations between men and groups are to some extent sexed. It is the tension inherent in such an arrangement that leads to expressions of aggression and insult.

The logic of life cycle payments informs all exchanges between people, by which I mean that whenever a man is in debt, temporarily or otherwise, he is less than a man in respect of the person he owes (see my discussion of kage in 3d).* This is why a man gives pork sides, a symbol of maleness, to the recipient, after which the latter is in debt and his maleness questioned (but note that this symbol, at the conclusion of the oino, is put into netbags, i.e., it is contained by a female source again). The above helps to explain the preoccupation with masculinity, and the theme of emasculation in the origin story and present-day exegesis.5

The basic conflict within Wiru society is that every man is indebted to another. Every man is less than a man while simultaneously, as MBs, they are more 'male' than those who owe them - but even MBs are a feminized source. Incest and incestuous rape are attempts by men to overcome the ambiguity of gender, in other words to assert their masculinity on those women who most threaten it, their daughters and sisters (brothers are physically more similar to their sisters than their fathers; see also 3c). This conflict impels the exchange system.

* This may contribute to the 'shrinking' of men post-pacification, insofar as men are 'in debt' to missions and the administration for development, and have lost autonomy in the control of their future.
and ultimately provides a basis for the reproduction of society. The oino is a forum in which the logic of this reproduction is displayed.

Enemies and allies are reduced to the same status in relation to the donor, the latter being temporarily in a position of inferiority to the assembled recipients. The pig-kill demonstrates the basic nature of exchange, which is why "no great political hopes" accompany gifts of pork as even these recognize the intersexual character of exchange, which limits its political usefulness (exchange is never between men as 'men'). Such prestations convert the relationship of exchange partners to one resembling that obtaining between a man and his affinal-maternal nexus. This gives a moral force to the relationship, which is part of the attempt to impose order on the wider environment of shifting alliances and enmities. The oino is certainly concerned with issues of status but its political aims are secondary to its desired transcendent qualities (and oino are also crucially concerned with ensuring fertility, growth, etc.).

Warfare and cults have been prohibited but groups and districts still have to interact, and the oino today provides a major context where this interaction can take place (and where new relationships can be negotiated). While oino continue, it is possible that less pigs are killed today now that cult occasions for slaughter have disappeared, and the incidence of kage decreased (cf. A. Strathern, 1978:92-3). The pressures of development affected the timing and size of pig-kills, and it is likely that until recently the political aspects of oino were dampened (as, for example, men left for years as labour migrants. Women still tended pigs but without the husband's presence the incentive for surplus production, to feed more pigs, diminished. As noted in 2b, women
also threatened to not look after pigs in an attempt to improve their status - a bargaining chip in their 'war' against men).

Informants stated that less pigs are killed today because young men are not interested in the work involved in pig-raising, and turn to other avenues for status, or marry later in life, or become 'humbug', etc. I would not, on the basis of this, suggest that oino could disappear and there are reasons, discussed above, for why these events may become increasingly important. As in many other instances, more obvious explanations are chosen to explain change, and people in response to questions about diet, for example, will say that "we ate better before because we killed more pigs", without going into the reasons for a decline in the number of pigs killed (except under prompting from the researcher). The real reasons for change may not be accessible to the individual because they are informed by a logic of society.

At this point in time, it is difficult to know if oino have lost some of their importance or if they suffered a temporary decline during the years of concentrated development. As the extent of external control and demands on labour lessened, it appears that interest in pig-kills is becoming more intense (cf. A. Strathern, 1982) as concerns become more parochial and freer of colonial constraints. It is also possible that oino are becoming politicized and larger, since Independence, as a response to a changing political economy. Districts now interact in a situation where resources are no longer equitably distributed (in a relative sense), and where such things as proximity to Pangia station, the amount of coffee grown, proximity to roads, or a mission presence advantages one settlement over another.
Oino have the capacity to make political statements if groups which formerly held one together decide to perform them separately or at different times (an option presented by some Takuru headmen, see 2d). These either expresses hostility or that a group feels that it is strong enough to independently oppose others. In such cases the outcome is group fission or the end of district alliance, and now that warfare is not a political alternative oino may become more competitive at the intra- and inter-district level. Contemporary pig-kills can also express a wider level of group allegiance, and the local candidate for the Pangu Pati was said to be arranging an oino, together with his agnates, for his supporters prior to the 1982 national elections. There may be a denominational aspect to adherence to political parties; in the first elections to the House of Assembly three candidates were from each of the three main missions, Catholic, Lutheran and E.B.M., each one receiving a majority of votes from areas influenced by his mission (PR4/63-4).

What about the cult dimensions of ceremonial pig-kills, have they disappeared since pacification? Districts often attempt to hold their oino at stages in the church ritual calender, such as Christmas or Easter, or at events such as the departure of missionaries. It may be a trifle fanciful to suggest that oino today are (attempted to be) held at endpoints of the Christian ceremonial cycle, but Christianity is certainly related to notions of exchange and the moral order which reciprocity generates. The following points illustrate this contention.

1. One reason given for staging an oino, by different informants for different pig-kills, was that the end of the world and the second coming were imminent, and people wanted to discharge their exchange obligations
before dying. This is connected to the transcendent aims of *oino*, as the 'new world' which these events herald are dependent on people fulfilling their exchange requirements. Christianity provided a convenient idiom for these aims to emerge with a stronger emphasis.

2. A Wiru politician, who survived a car accident, 'thanked' God by killing two pigs (a continuation of the logic of sacrifice).

3. The *adapini*, a symbol of reproduction and fertility, previously offered to spirits, were collected at one pig-kill I observed and put in a netbag for presentation to local pastors of the church. This porcine portion can also be given to a pastor when a pig is killed to help a person recover from sickness.

4. Minor pig-kills often accompany the opening and dedication of new churches, at which recipients line up for pork as they do at *oino*. Life cycle payments may also be made on such occasions (and *kage* prestations were made at a church opening in Takuru).

5. In fundamentalist settlements people are discouraged from eating 'blood puddings' because of Biblical dictates on diet. If people do eat these puddings they are said to get very sick as when food taboos are broken, i.e., Christian taboos are seen to have the same force as cult taboos.

A missionary once confided in me his concern that during *oino* there was still a small cult house hidden somewhere out of sight, where the 'heathen' continued to make offerings to *ipono/Satan*. Strathern writes that ceremonial exchanges were "shorn of their religious aspects and
impetus by mission influence" (Strathern, A. 1978:100). This impetus did decline but both are partly in error: 1 to 5 above suggest that cult notions of sacrifice and the cycle of growth—through the medium of a pastor's connection with God and missionaries—to some degree remain (prayer can also be directed to what were previously cult concerns). The missionary was wrong to suspect a 'cult house' in the bush, the 'cult' which was operating to render offerings to a 'spirit' was the local Christian church. This is an example of the synthesis of cult and church elements proposed in 2c. The preceding sets the scene for part 4, in which the continuity of the 'old' into the 'new' is discussed.

FOOTNOTES

1. As a man prepares to give pork to the recipient he says neke poiyo togu, your arrow (hurts and) I pull it out. When the gift has been given, the donor says one poiyo togu, (I shoot an) arrow (and) he pulls it out. The arrow is a metaphor for debt; men who complete in gift-giving are engaged in poi toko, fight do. A hostile gift is known as poi mokora, fight quarrel, which takes the connection between fighting and gifting to a logical conclusion. The idiom of exchange between men mirrors the idiom used by women to describe intersexual relations, they say that men are their 'enemies'. There is, then, an idea of hostile opposition between men and women, which relates to points made about exchange relations between men being sexed.

2. A case could be made for a symbolic connection between lowalia, leo of oino, and leo for the dead. On the former are hung bones of various animal sacrifices. The leo of the dead supports flesh and bone but ultimately bones only, which are then buried or put in cult houses or kedo. The lowalia/leo is also buried after the completion of the tibu cycle, which ensures the future growth of pigs, people and crops. Pork sides, as I have argued, represent an ongoing 'maleness' which is collectively displayed at oino on leo. The dead are also displayed on leo, and their decomposition—which parallels the butchering and cooking of pigs—into the ground may be part of ensuring the same cycle of fertility and growth with which tibu is concerned. Bones of men (and sacrificial animals?) also represent 'maleness' (I am hesitant to call it paternal substance) which the leo, and later their deposition in cult houses, demonstrates. Fertility, growth and 'maleness' are thus related in a process of cult performance, sacrifice and death which has as a major concern the display and construction of groups.
3. On other cult occasions, such as *aroa ipono yapu* (female spirit cult), gifts of shells to MBs were accompanied by much ceremony and decoration.

4. Denomination is not such a problem for marriage choice as the bride becomes the persuasion of her Koliri husband. The denomination of an oino recipient cannot, obviously, be subject to such manipulation (unless guests are selected from settlements of the same denomination).

5. The purpose of the hostile gift, *poi mokora*, is ultimately to question a man's masculinity. The gift involves heaping pork sides at the feet of the recipient, or giving him a whole pig. The donor, by giving more of his 'maleness', emasculates the recipient. *Poi mokora* is said to break the bow and arrow of the recipient because, due to the quality of pork given, he has to put down his weapons and spoil his decorations by acting like a woman in assisting his wife to carry the pork home. A prestation of a whole dead pig may also comment on the asocial relationship between donor and recipient.

6. In the light of this statement, some comments made in 3a have to be modified. I argued that formal gifts made to the decorated recipients were between men, whereas it it more between men as they alternate between the role of donor ('woman') and guest ('man').

7. There are other occasions when groups or districts come together, such as basketball and 'singsing' competitions, and Christian events like Easter. Traditional rivalries may influence these competitions, and violence has accompanied contentious decisions about who won. Courts are also a significant context of group interaction, and issues such as land disputes, and their increase, do reflect the state of relationships between settlements.

8. It is impossible to be more precise in these claims, as it is only just over 20 years since pacification, and less than a decade since the end of colonial development. Wiru are still reacting to these events, and the lability of the Pangia situation makes it difficult to predict what will happen in the future.
"Tell you what - I use ta get the people jumpin' an' talkin' in tongues, an' glory-shoutin' till they just fell down an' passed out. An' some I'd baptize to bring 'em to. An' then - you know what I'd do? I'd take one of them girls out in the grass, an' I'd lay with her ... You'd think that'd be one time when the devil didn't stand a snowball's chance in hell ... Why is it that when a fella ought to be just about mule-ass proof against sin, an' all full up of Jesus, why is it that's the time a fella gets fingerin' his pants buttons?" (Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath).

"The long-term effects of revival movements on the people of the Southern Highlands have yet to be determined. It seems probable, however, that at some stage in the future, cult or revival activities will once again surface. Eventually, these activities will probably take the form of a cargo movement, in a syncretic relationship with fundamentalist Christianity and traditional indigenous beliefs and practices" (Robin, 1982:341).

"Highlands religious beliefs and rituals stand out clearly as symbols of strong group unity" (Lawrence and Meggitt, 1965:23).

"Among many Highland peoples, the most likely reaction (to Christianity) seems to be either the total rejection of the new religion or its assimilation to the traditional cult of the dead" (ibid:24).
4a. THE JOY OF JUMPING: CHRISTIAN CONVERSION AND REVIVAL HYSTERIA

In this section I want to consider in detail the phenomenon of revival inspired conversion, and its relevance to the acceptance and comprehension of Christianity. Conversion is influenced by the proselytizing style of individual missions, reflected in variations in the form Christianity takes in settlements of diverse religious persuasion (see Read, 1952:230-1). Denominational differences are, of course, obvious between missions and churches in P.N.G., ranging in orientation from fundamentalist to non-evangelical; these bodies, too, have varying forms of Christianity, i.e., it is interpreted and stressed in line with basic theological preferences.

In Takuru these biases, emanating at first from the Evangelical Bible and then Wesleyan Mission, gave rise to a singular Christianity, one which was specific to Takuru (and doubtless other settlements under the Wesleyan influence) and not historically informed, as were the western Christian churches, by a sharing of common beliefs, tenets and religious traditions.¹ The reasons given by Read for mission acceptance in the Eastern Highlands hold equally as well for Wiru:

there is no major intellectual conflict between the native conception of God and the diffuse, unformulated belief in supernatural power which is the core of the indigenous religion. Indeed, in many respects Mission teaching has supplied an acceptable answer where there was formerly doubt and speculation ... there are no real logical inconsistencies between the old religion and the idea of God which the Mission has fostered (ibid:237; see also Bulmer, 1965:159).

This quote points to a central feature of Takuru Christianity, which is the synthesis between pre- and post-colonial 'cult' belief:
because one is understood in terms of and helps to explain the other, the form of Christianity is understandably different from that in western societies (which, in the case of persisting beliefs in sorcery and ancestors, suggests again why 'traditional' explanations rather than Christian ones may be used when more appropriate or when Christianity offers no solution). To underline this claim I will assign the label 'kristen' - in future without inverted commas - rather than Christian to the Takurun adherents of Wesleyanism (as practitioners of a cult of Christianity). The use of this term implies similarities yet major differences between mission and Takuru cosmology.

The purpose of the above is to indicate that care must be taken in applying such terms as 'conversion' and 'religious revival' lest they, from their "Eurocentric predisposition", shift analysis away from the particularities of the local situation (see Barr and Trompf, 1983) and confuse the issue by assuming a Christian nature to these events. There is no reason not to use these terms provided they are shorn of their western connotations, if this is done they may in fact be accurate descriptions of the activities and behaviour associated with conversion and revivals.

This sort of exceptional behaviour also occurred before pacification in cases of madness or possession, and similarities exist in the origins of this behaviour and its social effects. Pace Stephen, I distinguish between two types of possession, controlled and uncontrolled (Stephen, 1979:13). Individual or collective madness is related to the latter, while a controlled use of possession, as in a trance state for example, confers knowledge or power on an individual.² I must stress at this point that I am concerned with cultural explanations of possession
and, while this term is psychologically loaded, I retain it as an useful
description of an event. My use of 'possession' refers to an
ethnographic not psychological occasion, i.e., 'uncontrolled
possession', for instance, refers to a description of certain behaviour.
I will argue that both types of possession, with some qualifications,
occurred in the revival about to be discussed.

In the psychological explanation the 'causes' of madness are, in a
general sense, stress or an inability to cope with a novel situation or
circumstance; it is often described as a short-term adaptational
response to avoid obligations or a stronger control (see 2b). Yet the
outcome of a controlled spirit possession was a greater knowledge and
power it left with the possessed individual, who could become from this
experience a sorcery or curing specialist of renown (cf. Stephen,
1979:12). This, to me, suggests a cultural rather than a psychological
locus of possession. It remains to be seen if declarations of
Christianity were made in Takuru which left some individuals during or
after revival hysteria, said to be 'caused' by possession of the Holy
Ghost, with the knowledge of Christianity as a more powerful answer to
the technological and moral problems of the colonial world. (Following
Robin (1981), the use of 'hysteria' is retained because, although its
selection is arbitrary, it is commonly cited in the literature on
madness and innovative cults in Melanesia. Unlike Robin, however, I
retain 'hysteria' as an ethnographic term, like 'possession', and not as
a psychological symptom of a stressful state).

Conversion does not necessarily take place in a revival setting but
the pressures of group conformity (ibid:159) and the significance of
'cult' performance for the group in Takuru, combined with the
fundamental mission emphasis on mass conversion and baptism, means that the two are seen as closely connected by the mission and to some extent interdependent. In other words, there has been a tendency amongst the various Takuru missionaries to view group conversion as a logical consequence of Holy Ghost inspired revivals, rather than as the intellectual embracing of Christianity on an individual level.\textsuperscript{3}

The mission technique of promoting Christianity by focusing on the group, in contrast to missions which seek to convert prominent men in order to win over their groups (see R. Smith, 1979), affected the acceptance of Christianity and its development as a cult in a society where strong emphasis is placed on the group definitional aspects of cult performance.\textsuperscript{4} Takuruns became kristens from a combination of "precipitating and enabling conditions, the one being represented by the history of contact and the other by the native culture" (Lawrence, 1964:223). These conditions have, to varying extents, already been examined but they should be borne in mind for the following.

If 'conversion' describes the situation in which an individual (through group conformity or whatever) confesses to Christian belief and discards the past, and 'revival' the process whereby the individual and others are brought to this point, then two significant differences between traditional and Holy Ghost possession become apparent. One is that the former is not, as far as I know, a product of attempts at 'religious' change (which, in the psychological explanation, generates the causal factors of stress and uncertainty), and the other is that the revival was a collective event on a larger scale, involving both sexes, than was the case traditionally (for other differences, see Robin, 1981:160).
While precedents exist for the type of behaviour demonstrated in revivals, there are other features - the 'precipitating conditions' - which must be taken into account in explaining revival hysteria, such as the manner of conversion and an emphasis on an approaching millenium:

revival hysteria (in the Southern Highlands) has been the result of fundamentalist religious indoctrination, transformed into a rather extreme form of proselytization by overzealous church workers. The underlying cause of hysteria has been the presence of intense stress, introduced and developed through methods of intimidation, hellfire and brimstone evangelizing, and techniques that produce heightened stated of suggestibility (ibid:161-2).

I am not discounting a psychological cause of hysteria, rather I am unable to prove it, and suggest that other factors need to be considered. Terms such as 'revival' and 'conversion' are only expedient, in a study of this kind, if they are related to the social and 'religious' context in which they take place. A revival has been described, somewhat mechanistically, as a process and conversion as an effect, but they are not independent of this context which, together with the features mentioned above, gives them their form and characteristics.

I have elsewhere referred to a redisposition of Wiru towards accepting new cults, which influenced the reception of missions. This, with missionary metanoia and an emphasis on mass conversion, led to the first revival (or 'awakening') in Takuru in 1963, and one of the first large-scale revivals in the Southern Highlands (technically it was not a revival, given that the people were not Christians before this event). It occurred soon after the Wesleyans bought out the understaffed E.B.M., and hence could supply the manpower and techniques for a successful
'crusade'. Revivals were initiated, apparently, in the north Polu area by the E.B.M. at Mele, and quickly spread to eight other fundamentalist settlements, with over 2,000 Wiru involved at its peak (PR4/63-4). The Capuchin missionaries and the administration were both very critical:

Certain aspects of the activities of this sect are disturbing and will be observed closely from now on. In particular the apparent encouragement of forms of mass mystery seems to be a thoroughly undesirable activity among primitive people (PR4/63-4).

The majority of Takuruns were enthusiastic for the mission and many other Wiru came to attend church services, which initially were held three times a day (Ridgway, 1976:82). The few dissenters were those men who were threatened by the introduction through the mission of new power relations, but even these men came to see that Christianity had to be accepted in order to take advantage of these relations, a perception reinforced by group consensus and a realization of the superiority of the mission's deity and cult. Ridgway, one of the first Wesleyans in Takuru, writes of a headman's change of mind:

When the government came I was not afraid, and when you missionaries came I was not afraid of you. But now I see the change in the lives of our village people, and I am afraid of your God. I want my life to be changed too. Can God forgive a man like me? (Ridgway, 1976:85).

The missionary observer tends to put into Christian terms what is often a pragmatic evaluation of the facts and of the need to respond to a new situation. It is at this point that the efficacy of the traditional cults are reappraised and their assumptions and beliefs questioned. Individuals also reassess their positions and priorities, "Can God forgive a man like me?" is not so much a statement of regret
for past 'sin' but a recognition of a new moral order with certain requirements for its entry. It is probable that people came to condemn their past, worry about the present and fear for the future (the introduction of the notion of hell was a strong component of this fear), no doubt creating some anxiety and confusion. While it is impossible to know how much the emotions contributed to a cultural reaction to change, it can be seen that even a headman, under these conditions, could come to question his status and achievements for their worth in the colonial world.

It is no surprise that Christianity, with its promises for the future - exemplified by the confidence of missionaries and their comparative wealth - was fervently practised for its reassurance as well as for its benefits:

Deep conviction came upon our people, and they flocked to the churches to pray day and night. Gardens were neglected as the people sought the Lord, many of them literally shaking under conviction as they confessed their sins to God. And as they found peace in believing, they would leap to their feet, literally jump for joy, crying, "thank you Jesus" and testifying to all, "Jesus is REAL" (ibid:11).

The description of revivals by the administration, at least of those observed around Mele, was not so positive. It was reported that people were hitting themselves, climbing all over the church, and rolling around the ground in a frenzy; one unfortunate had to have his eyes removed after hitting himself in the head, (PR4/63-4), and in Takuru a man jumped off the church roof convinced he could fly and broke his legs.
Mission accounts also describe visions (of the cross, heaven, and Jesus), violent head-twisting, vomiting, hanging upside down from church rafters, and people falling unconscious:

There were agony of soul manifested by lying on the floor while the body writhed and twisted in seeming torments while the individual prayed in soul travail (Harvey, 1973:190).

Expressions of administration disapproval met with little response from the missions involved, and the latter often quoted Acts 2, Chapter 2 to patrol officers, "And they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance" (PR4/63-4). The sort of behaviour classified as 'hysterical' by Robin was demonstrated to various extents by the Mele and Takuru revivals (see Robin, 1982:330;334), and it is difficult to imagine that emotional states were not created in people which made them susceptible to belief in mission pronouncements, often originating more from local pastors than missionaries. That the message imparted was often imperfectly understood by the pastors themselves, was demonstrated when Ridgway had to assure a woman that just because she had not 'quivered' did not mean she could never become a Christian, a "young pastor apparently had taught that unless one trembled under conviction one was not truly saved" (Ridgway, 1976:84).

Implicit in Robin (1982) is the idea that these proselytizing techniques - including long periods of praying and sermonising, fasting, public confessions, threats of punishment for sin, etc.6 - were similar to 'brainwashing' which, in the physiological explanation, helps to account for the uncritical acceptance of Christianity and dogged obedience to Wesleyanism, in opposition to other denominations.7
F.E. Williams, in a typically perceptive remark, compared the extravagance of the Vailala Madness, "which was perhaps a product of religious zeal and boredom" (Williams, 1944:140), to a religious revival. He saw this cult primarily in negative terms as a 'disease' and overlooked its innovatory features as a cultural response to rapid social change. Yet, if the Eurocentric bias of the term 'revival' is discarded, the cult can be regarded as a revival of the traditional religion, an attempt to make it meaningful again and, by changing its emphases and adopting new insights and practices, making it more relevant to the colonial situation. Christianity and revivals have until recently occupied a nebulous place in Melanesian ethnography and are sometimes viewed in terms as negative as those Williams use for the Madness.

Cultural continuity in 'religious' understanding and the flexibility of ritual systems have been cited by many authors to explain cargo cults (Lawrence, 1971; Stephen, 1979), but the widespread acceptance of Christianity and its interpretation in traditional terms are often overlooked as examples of cultural assimilation in response to change:

With the intrusion of the white man, guidelines from the ancestors as to how to deal with the new and devastating force was sought through the usual channels, in some cases resulting in only minor modifications of existing ritual and social practice, and in others, the development of full-blown religious and social revolutions, depending on the circumstances of contact and the ideological adjustments made by different cultures (Stephen, 1979:20).

These 'circumstances' and 'adjustments' I have already outlined for Pangia and Takuruns, suggesting they led to the practice of Wesleyanism
as a 'cult'. Allowing for cultural continuity and ritual flexibility it seems unusual that few authors, if any, have described post-pacification Christianity in a like fashion, limiting the use of 'cult' to cargo movements and similar phenomena: perhaps the situation in Takuru is unique but preconceptions of Christian belief may be held which obscure the recognition of cult characteristics in Melanesian versions of Christianity.

Revivals have been compared to phases in a cargo cult's career when they both generate hysteria (Robin, 1981), but the suggestion that revivals may be a phase in cult activity is not made. Cargo cults are often explained in terms of their positive, innovatory qualities during social transformation but, while the adoption of Christianity is seen as functional, a dynamic incorporation of Christianity into traditional cosmology and its recasting as a cult, in response to change, is not reported (yet see Morren, 1981:59). Wesleyanism in Takuru is not as obvious, ideologically and in practice, or as exotic as traditional cults. A lack of fit between traditional and Christian aetiologies accounts for its relatively low profile as a cult but Wesleyanism, nonetheless, had directly replaced or made obsolete many traditional beliefs: it is represented by its own cult house, the 'lotu' yapu, and in many instances has helped remove the "doubt and speculation" of indigenous religion because, as Read states, the introduction of God supplied a logical coherence formerly lacking in the belief system (Read, 1952:237). 8

I have argued for a structural analogy between cults and Christian worship in Takuru, but there are other reasons for subscribing to this view. Evidence exists to suggest that in Melanesia new cults were
adopted or created to cope with disaster or social upheaval (see review in Stephen, 1979). Glasse (1980) avers that Christianity was accepted by the Huli as a means of coping with epidemics, and some Takuruns gave similar reasons. The problem becomes, was Christianity embraced for the same reasons as traditional cults, until more was learnt of it (when it became Christianity), or did it become a cult itself?

For Takuru, I clearly favour the latter course. Epidemics and new forms of authority and power were viewed by many as 'disasters' in the sense that they were totally out of the control of Wiru. The mission abrogation of the past, combined with the instilling of shame for this purpose, compounded this perception insofar as the "equating of natural disaster with sin is, of course, consistent with the well established Melanesian interpretation of individual illness, misfortune and death, as the result of (moral) transgressions" (Stephen, 1979:18). Stephen is not explicitly referring to missions or their techniques or persuasion, but in line with her argument the discovery that one's past (and a former moral scheme) was 'sinful' is a 'disaster', and perhaps enough of a revelation for people to seek or create a new cult. In Takuru both contingencies arose, Christianity was brought to the people - as a ready-made 'cult' solution - but its eventual interpretation and use in a transforming moral universe was innovative.

In a review of revival outbreaks in Tari district of the Southern Highlands, Robin asserts that it is difficult to know whether, in a psychological sense, they are "pathological or beneficial" (Robin, 1981:153). For Takuru, the psychological explanation is not a concern, rather it is the social dimensions of revivals which are important:
cult 'hysteria' should be recognized as a positive phenomena, an ecstatic validation of the new order and the means of breaking with the constraints of the old (Stephen, 1979:4).

Stephen is, perhaps, somewhat extravagant in her claims but I do agree with the gist of this statement. The point I raise is that if hysteria and possession are associated with stages in innovative cults, what is there to prevent us from applying this assessment to revivals as stages in a local Christian cult?

The correspondence between hysteria 'symptoms' in cults and revivals is marked (see Robin, 1981); behaviour including glossolalia, rhythmic dancing, shaking, etc., is common to both, as is the neglect of subsistence activities to perform new or introduced ritual. The major differences appear to be that Christianity is not an indigenous response to change, and whites were involved in promoting the cult's message and rituals. Yet these differences are not as crucial as they initially appear, the first is not greatly significant as cults were often imported from other cultures, not necessarily proximate (see Strathern, 1979B), and Christianity and introduced cults are each transformed to suit local conditions. While missionaries and other Europeans are not directly involved in the creation of cargo cults, for example, their presence is enough for the 'message' (the rituals and exegesis of a cult) to be given by indigenes in order to have access to what whites represent - power and wealth.

Cargo cults are often concerned with obtaining the true knowledge of cargo, hidden from people by whites, but this is a reaction to a certain stage in colonial history and often to a long-term experience of missions, plantation work and the administration. Pangia was innocent of
this experience when it entered a colonial phase similar to that described for Lawrence's third stage of cargo belief (Lawrence, 1964:74), and because it lacked this knowledge its inhabitants were prepared to accept the promises and statements of missionaries as a new truth. Takuruns did not see missionaries as withholding vital information, almost the reverse.

Traditionally, new cults were introduced by non-Wiru ritual experts who entered Pangia, or who trained visiting Wiru, in language border areas. The cult could then be spread further into the district by knowledgeable Wiru, who received payment for services rendered. The use of non-Wiru pastors, (plus those Wiru trained at Kaupena) who bore the brunt of mission proselytizing, is really not very different from this, and soon after derestriction some Wiru pastors were sufficiently trained, according to mission standards, to leave their settlements and spread the Christian message (they were given food and gifts for their efforts). Many non-Wiru pastors were solely responsible for the destruction of cult houses and stones and, in line with my discussion, replacing them with a new 'cult'.

The fact that in Takuru whites were involved in giving the message does not detract from the argument. At the time it tended to support the credibility of the cult, their presence lending it an aura of power and efficiency. Also, it was Wiru and indigenous non-Wiru, especially young men, who were largely responsible for the zeal of performance and attendance which led up to the revival. The latter was not totally imposed on Takuruns but an indigenous response to social change, and it appears that the revival was partly an attempt by younger men, as in the
'madness' described by A. Strathern (1977), to take control of the situation.

At this point it is worth considering another account of the revival, which was built up to a peak by demonstrations, gradually increasing in size and frequency, of hysteria, probably in a time period of about a month:

Such singing! And such praying! I was reminded of the rebuilding of the Temple under Ezra when people could not discern the noise of the shout of joy from the noise of the weeping of the people. Under conviction some trembled and cried aloud, confessing their sins and beating their breasts, even smiting their mouths as they were convicted of lying or cursing. Then as they grasped in simple faith the promise that "if we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness", there came a light of joy upon their dark faces, and they arose from their knees to give joyous testimony that God had pardoned and delivered them from their sins. They literally leapt for joy; and as one and another found peace in believing, they joined those already on their feet, jumping for joy. What a sight! Hundreds of redeemed heathen, rhythmically jumping for joy, shouting the praises of God. There was no mingling of men and women — the men kept to their side of the tabernacle, the women to theirs; and as if there were a divine conductor to that orchestra of praise — as I believe there was — if the women swayed towards the men's side, the men unconsciously gave ground (9). I watched carefully lest there be any scandalous behaviour, but there was none. (Ridgway, 1976:82).

If the Biblical phraseology is discarded, this is an accurate description of the revival and matches that given by Takurun informants who were involved (who were less 'religious' in their accounts, see below). What is noticeable from these quotes is the 'extravagant joy' of those caught up in the revival, but is this "an ecstatic validation of the new order"? There appears to be two parts to this revival, and to borrow from mission terminology I shall describe them as 1. Conviction, and 2. Liberation:
Pungent conviction seized sinners until they trembled and shook, unable to be still until God spoke peace to their souls. And their liberation was manifested in what might be thought to be extravagant joy (ibid.).

The first phase involved emphatic singing and praying, fasting and self-directed violent behaviour (Robin writes that Southern Highlands revivals are generally more emotionally intense and violent — in one case leading to a death from an exorcism beating — than revivals in other parts of the world (1981:158)). During this period the techniques of the mission perhaps worked on the suggestibility of the people by instilling uncertainty about traditional beliefs and practices; this whole moral scheme is attacked, seen as unworthy and finally rejected in favour of the alternative offered.

There was a rejection of the old but it is problematic whether exhaustion, hunger and the repetition of hymns, sermons and prayers created a susceptible psychological state for the experience of individual and group 'sin' (cf. Robin, 1982:330), further exaggerated by public confessions and self-condemnation. The psychological reasons underlying hysterical behaviour I am not equipped to explain, but the argument that it is a release from mental stress and bodily discomfort through a loss of physical and cognitive control does not hold up (see Worsley, 1970:256-8): people are reported doing 'normal' things, such as men and women dancing separately or re-fastening their clothes, while jumping. The form which hysteria took is also difficult to account for, although men and women did dance together (involving rhythmic jumping) in celebrations accompanying cult performance.
The body can be used as a metaphor for change (see 2d, and fn.12,2d) but during revivals it may be being used as a vehicle for change. That is, the mission emphasis on a complete transformation in the beliefs and behaviour of individuals led - because of the story connection between the 'psychic and physical self' - to people transforming themselves through 'renewing' their own bodies by self-directed violence (destroying their pagan 'bodies') in attempts to make a Christian 'body'. There are some similarities to the 'liminal phase' as described by Turner (1974), in which there is a movement between structures, in this case from the 'past' to the 'present' through the reconstitution of the 'body' (but see fn. 11).

The second part of the revival, liberation, involves a movement from a largely uncontrolled and individualistic response from within the group, to a controlled group response; the rhythmic jumping and swaying is in direct contrast to the trembling, crying and violence of conviction. This roughly parallels what could have been a shift from behaviour suggesting uncontrolled to controlled possession. It marked a shift from a perceived disorder of the past to a desired new order under colonialism, and the revival embodied the transitional atmosphere of the time.

Interestingly, one informant said that when the mission arrived tapa ipono (paternal spirits) became mad and went around slashing people with their axes* and urging the burning of cult houses: hence a denial and destruction of the past was culturally legitimized. If a literary allusion is allowed, the revival illustrates the tension and conflict

* Aeroplanes, which were associated with Europeans, were thought to resemble flying axes which would cut people. This could be a deliberate confusion of whites with ancestors to validate change.
between tradition and the demands of the colonial present, between a metaphorical possession by the past/sin and possession by the Holy Ghost, as an entity promising rewards in a new world. The shift referred to is almost an exorcism of the past, it indicates the point at which many aspects of tradition were rejected in favour of the promises and offerings of a new moral scheme.

Liberation was a collective action with no apparent leaders; it involved people in performing, from the observation of behaviour in others and from a shared social response to change, similar acts and vocalizations as a controlled reaction to a conflict between the old and the new – which had to be culturally resolved through the innovation of the 'joy of jumping', in which a total transformation of the individual was attempted, and encouraged by the mission.

While precedents exist for these types of behaviour, there was an event previously described in 2a which relates to this section. This is the 'madness' which reached large-scale proportions among young men prior to the establishment of Pangia station, in which possession was cited as a cause (Strathern, A. 1977), but which was more likely to have been the result of innovatory attempts to resolve role conflicts in a pacified society. The visits of madmen to other settlements encouraged this behaviour in men experiencing similar conflicts, and demonstrated a means for its short-term resolution, i.e., becoming mad. This madness, too, was a collective response by young men, who exhibited behaviour analogous to that of revivals (which spread like madness), including violence and hysteria.
The use of the terms 'controlled' and 'uncontrolled' needs to be further clarified; the difference can be summed up so:

**Pre-colonial era**
- spirit possession → uncontrolled group or individual madness.
- OR " " → controlled individual trance or post-trance state.

**Revival**
- conversion techniques → uncontrolled hysteria; conviction.
- Holy Ghost possession → controlled group response (or ecstatic state?); Liberation.

**Figure 6**: Controlled and uncontrolled possession in the pre- and post-colonial eras.

The movement from uncontrolled to controlled within the same revival event, in response to changes brought about by the colonial situation, is innovative and perhaps unique insofar as Takuruns could not recall any instance of a similar group response. Controlled is used here in the sense of its rhythmic group organization, and in the ability of this possession (metaphorically, by the past) to confer knowledge and power from a communication with the 'divine' (cf. Stephen 1979:12-13). Cries of 'thank you Jesus' and visions of Heaven imply this communication, as does glossolalia which was interpreted as speaking in the voice of the possessing spirit.

Many people now look back on the 1963 revival as an amusing episode in their colonial history, and relate humourous stories about it, which is the same attitude Strathern reports for post facto accounts of the madness preceding Pangia's pacification. Perhaps with the passage of time, as the past becomes less relevant, the force or necessity of the
'Holy Ghost possession' argument wanes and, instead of seeing it as a significant episode in their Christianization, as does the mission, most Takuruns see it as a time of inexplicable behaviour and as a source of humour.

If there was a logical continuity between cults and Wesleyanism why did the revival exhibit such exceptional behaviour? The answer lies in the fact that it was only fundamentalist settlements that experienced revivals (Catholic missionaries sprinkled holy water around the boundaries of their villages to prevent the entry of 'demonic' revivals, and Lutherans renounced their fleshly excesses (Ridgway, 1976:85)). Elsewhere, Christianity was accepted without too much disturbance. Revival hysteria was not the result of a cognitive disjunction between two belief systems, but of a technique of mass conversion that manipulated Takuruns into a rejection of, and an aversion to, the past (sin) in place of an intellectual adjustment to Christianity. Missions may have provided the occasion but it was society that shaped the response to the manner of conversion. Once the revival was over, there were few problems with incorporating Wesleyanism into a traditional cosmology - once its 'sinful' parts had been edited out - and vice versa.

To return to liberation, people were told that if they let God into their hearts, through the agency of the Holy Ghost, they would forget their future, and become eligible to share in Christianity's material rewards. Being possessed by the Holy Ghost was a cultural means of breaking with the constraints of the old order (Stephen, 1979:4), at a moment when Christianity was recognized as an alternative to cults and capable of being understood and used as a replacement of them.
My interpretation of the revival, then, along with the emphatic recordings of joy expressed through liberation, lead me to the conclusion that this particular case of revival hysteria was directed towards constructing a relationship with missions and the colonial order though the creation of a cult of Christianity, in which possession provided a "source of validation for new knowledge and cultural innovation" (ibid:14). That is, possession by God or the Holy Ghost validated the group acceptance of Christianity and the discarding of the traditional cult system, and supplied a rationale for a reappraisal of the moral universe during a period of rapid social change. The continual cries of 'Jesus is real, thank you Jesus' testify to the realization and acceptance of a new knowledge, and the joy and gratitude expressed is perhaps a result of intuiting that this knowledge was accessible and presaged the start of a new order:

When drastic change was necessitated by warfare, migration or natural disaster, innovative cults arose to meet the challenge, in which the possession of the whole community and not just the prophet or medium occurred, enabling a swift "conversion" to take place (ibid:20).

In Takuru the necessity for 'drastic change' was brought on by mission techniques aimed, ironically, at conversion. Possession by the Holy Ghost of "hundreds of redeemed heathen" was the start of Wesleyanism as an innovative cult of Christianity to cope with large-scale social transformations: "it might be said to represent a full religious 'conversion'" (ibid:19–20). Here, Stephen's use of "conversion" is especially appropriate and, as a conversion to Christianity was in fact desired, the term hardly needs inverted commas in this example. Yet it is worth noting that this is a moral conversion as well, which encompasses more than the 'cult' domain. Through the
acceptance of Christianity the moral order was reconstituted, as conversion through 'ecstatic states' reconstitutes the person and the group (with the revival providing the context for this process).

The revival demonstrated a reorganization of society. The 'meaning' of revival possession is that it embodied symbolically the nature of relations between Takuruns and white; it is an expression of a political situation in which there is a need to construct a relationship of equality with whites, be they patrol officers or missionaries (although the latter are more relevant and visible in local life). Power was seen in the practice of the white system, not in the structure of it: Takuruns attacked and discarded their own practices because they were seen as weak, 'sinful' and inefficient, and new practices were adopted to reorder the socio-political system (in the course of which the society underwent a permutation of its structure (cf. Sahlins, 1981)). Possession was an attempt to overcome a relative subordination by appropriating the power of Europeans, which was seen as being derived from a contact with God. 11

To conclude this section some more evidence is offered for viewing Christianity in Takuru as an innovative cult. In these movements there is frequently a charismatic leader who, if he does not initiate the cult, promotes and gives to it the cult's characteristics. It is the existence of these leaders which conveys to cult observers an impression of its indigenous and innovative nature. This leader appears to have been lacking in the early days of Wesleyanism in Takuru; there are grounds, however, for arguing that Wiru and non-Wiru pastors were cult leaders to an extent. These men were often revered, and were the major disseminators of the mission message and made many of the promises and
provided the ritual techniques (and cults, which led to a significant restructuring of societies, could be initiated by men from different cultures (see Burridge, 1969)).

But there was an attempt by at least one man to wrest some, if not all, of the control of the new 'cult' away from missionaries and pastors and to himself and Takuruns:

One man ... claimed to have special revelations from a bird which, he claimed, alighted on his shoulder. Among his revelations was one that the missionaries were all wrong; that he was the great power of God' that the people on the morrow were to wash and pray, for Jesus was coming when the sun was high. So at noon he clambered onto the ridgepole of the tabernacle and walked up and down awaiting the coming of Jesus!

Even though his prophecy failed, he drew away some followers by announcing that he was God ... His star set, however, when one of his adherents heard him invoking Satan to raise a dead boy from the grave. He found no place among us, but the Seventh Day Adventists tried to use him as a spearhead to establish a work in our territory and failed (Ridgway, 1976:83).

It is because Wesleyanism became a Christian cult that the rise of indigenous leaders seeking control was impeded. People were encouraged to become leaders within the framework of the mission or administration, but those who attempted to step outside this framework were thwarted by the ridicule of the mission which now controlled the symbols of, and access to the avenues of, cult knowledge.

The attempted apotheosis of this leader is common to innovative cults for purposes of tapping into the 'divine', indigenizing the cult and thereby allowing a new source of validation and power. This worked for a while as the man attracted followers, but this movement was stopped while nascent by the mission's external control over the
resources of the new cult, which hindered his rise (or anyone like him). The development of an indigenous cult was restricted by the imposition of a new moral scheme, which was offended by 'invoking Satan', and ultimately floundered because of a controlled access to the new domains of power and status.

There have been several revivals in Takuru since 1963 but none, as far as I can tell, has been as behaviourally eccentric as the first. The conditions of pacification and colonialism are no longer, after all, being experienced. Yet such is the human condition that doubt, uncertainty and the fear of an approaching millenium continue to produce periodic revivals in Takuru (the last in 1980, unfortunately finishing before my arrival), but ones which have different concerns and motivations as knowledge increases and the experimental world changes. This has been accompanied by a perception that rewards are more likely to be found in heaven than on earth. Transformations in Christianity, as they are expressed through the changing priorities and preconditions of revivals, suggest that a validation of a Christian order is today only a part of what revivals are about.

Latter-day revivals are characterized by attendance at church every day for many sessions involving prayer and singing. Revivals are similar to the periodic anti-witchcraft movements of Africa (see Willis, 1963), in which whole communities become aware of a need for protection against 'witches' — the negative and destructive elements of their societies. Revivals and these movements both involve this awareness and public confessions of 'sin': they deal with a failure of expectations and the contradictions of the colonial and neo-colonial order. Revivals in Takuru are also motivated by a strong fear of, almost an obsession with,
the end of the world and the second coming of Christ. Conversions in
revivals are partly a product of millenial thinking (Guirart, 1962), but
these events are also attempts to make Wesleyanism and society more
relevant to a changing socio-political context, i.e., to make a better
world in which people will be better christens (to create a new society
in the event of apocalypse, and to avoid going to hell). 13

FOOTNOTES

1. Wiru themselves do differentiate between various denominations as
this Tunda account of Wesleyanism demonstrates:

They are good Christians over there, they have turned
their stomachs and they cry a lot over their sins, and
their legs shake, but one thing is that they are always
saying Jesus is coming ... Really those people are acting
like God, predicting things, whereas only God himself
knows his own intentions (Strathern, pers. comm.).

Strathern comments that this last observation is distinctly
Lutheran influenced.

2. The most capable Wiru sorcery and curing specialists are reckoned
to have obtained their knowledge from an initial possession,
apparently uninvited, i.e., uncontrolled. Female spirit mediums,
possessed by ghosts who spoke through them in whistles, were common
in divination. There were also men who specialized in dreams which
predicted the future or identified sorcerers.

3. This emotional rather than intellectual conversion was often
referred to in missionaries accounts of their own conversion. Many
missionaries, from personal experience, are predisposed to belief
in the efficacy of mass conversion through revival.

4. The quote from Ridgway on p. 346 is an example of a headman won
over to Christianity from the pressures of group conformity. During
my own fieldwork a Kawirene headman finally became S.D.A. after
years of persuasion from his group.

5. J.K. McCarthy, the Director of Native Affairs, decried the
"extremist views" of many Pangia missionaries. He wrote that:

(hysteria) can be more dangerous in this Territory than
in most places, because the whole social system is going
through a period of great change and consequent strain,
and unbalanced views can therefore lead to considerable
social disturbance and trouble ... there are apparently
no limits to evangelistic effort. I hope your talks with
members of the mission have some effect, but I doubt it, and in the face of this belief it is probably impossible to reason with their native adherents (PR4/63-4).

He did go on to write that conversion was, nonetheless, not a matter for the administration.

6. The following is a mission account of the lead-up to the revival:

Last Friday night we heard our boys having a prayer meeting. Not too long after one of them ... came sobbing his heart out. When he quietened down enough to talk, he confessed a few things and asked forgiveness.

Next Monday night there was another terrific prayer meeting. It went on until midnight, with much crying and shouting. Early next morning they were back again. This time some found real forgiveness and then literally danced before the Lord. They just couldn't stay still ... Almost continuous prayer meetings have continued for a week.

The looks on the faces of those praying showed that to them were being revealed the wickedness of their past sins (Ridgway, 1976:81).

7. The conviction of belief in Wesleyanism invites comparison with the fundamentalist rural areas of the American mid-west, where many missionaries, especially those of the E.B.M., had their origins and, incidentally, where revivals are a feature of religious life. Similarities that exist, however, are more from the techniques used and a common religious 'mentality' than from a Christian impetus supplied by the Holy Ghost. There are real differences between the revival in Takuru in 1963 and Christian revivals in western countries, and these centre on the issue of possession and the recognition of Wesleyanism as an innovative cult of Christianity.

8. This is especially the case for fundamentalists who admit no doubts as to the veracity of the Bible and their interpretation of it. The common characterization of God as Akolali (see 1a, 4b), contrary to mission teachings, does suggest a 'traditional' interpretation of Christianity.

9. At Mele, it was reported that men and women seldom jumped together (Harvey, 1973:198). This may have been because the E.B.M.'s emphasized a more rigid separation between the sexes. The rhythmic organization of the jumping is demonstrated by this quote:

Together we saw a man we knew to be blind, jumping from seat to seat the length of the tabernacle, never missing a seat. Who guided him? We saw two teenage girls, hands linked, eyes fast closed, dancing the length of the tabernacle, parting hands as they approached the centre poles, joining hands in between, never missing a beat ... Who guided them? (Ridgway, 1976:82).
10. The nature of the violence exhibited in madness and conviction points to a difference in what possession achieved. For madness, violence was directed towards other people, perhaps in an attempt to control them. Violence in conviction was, however, inwardly directed, an attempt to punish the individual for 'sins' committed, and perhaps to 'cleanse' him/her for entry into a new world.

11. Turner describes, amongst the Ndembu, similar behaviour to that which occurred in the Takuru revival. For the Ndembu it was a result of possession by the European's cult (in order to become like whites) and Turner relates this to a communitas of sufferers (1974:250). It may be possible to discuss the revival in terms of communitas, during which innovative acts occur and people experience their basic humanity as a source of creative power (e.g., the making of a Christian 'body' during self-violence in the liminal phase of the revival). Nevertheless, the revival occurred in 1963 and there is insufficient evidence for the existence of communitas (although the abandonment of garden activities, the collapse of status positions, etc., are reminiscent of 'anti-structure').

12. The bird which alighted on the man's shoulder could be a reference to possession, as birds could be identified with ghosts of the ancestors (although the bird in this instance may have been a 'spirit' sent by God).

13. The message of these revivals continues, nonetheless, to be derived from interpretations of Christianity and the Bible, evidenced by a preoccupation with the number '666' from Revelations, which is strongly linked to the end of the world. Some people thought if '666' appeared on banknotes they could buy as much as they wanted with that money; the number '666' has a power like taboos or spells to control or enforce behaviour; people say that if, for instance, you lie, because of '666' you will go to hell.
This section continues an examination of the effects of the introduction of Christianity on social organization, in particular the changing nature of the group from its definition through cult observance (especially the *tapa yapu*) and exchange to its articulation today through church attendance and ritual. In 4c, some of the implications of this for male-female relations are considered in a society where the importance of women in exchange relationships between individuals and groups is to an extent devalued, I would argue, by an embrace of Christianity.

The evangelical style of the Wesleyan mission in Takuru, and its priorities regarding conversion, are reflected in conceptual changes about the properties and powers of ancestors. Whether these changes are common to all Wiru settlements is uncertain, especially those of different denominations and without resident missions, but there are indications that this is so. Nonetheless, the presence of the mission and its fundamental Christian ethic imparted certain characteristics to the group in Takuru (as it did to local Christianity).¹ Church denomination became a component of group membership, hence the criteria for becoming 'Wesleyan' affected the moral aspects of group definition in a manner different from, say, Catholic settlements.² Wiru of the latter persuasion differentiate themselves from Takuruns by calling them 'Baibel', which is a pidgin term commenting, in this context, on their fundamentalism. Church membership, by making statements about group identity and separateness, has a potential use for political purposes, and hostility between settlements or settlement factions has been expressed through religious opposition.
For the purposes of this section I aver that co-residence and agnation — with their implications for a type of behaviour appropriate to people who live together regardless of kin connection — are more important in everyday affairs than notions of descent. The latter does, however, provide a 'moral symbol' for this behaviour (see 1b). The mission and its presentation of Christianity had to deal with the definitional aspects of cult performance for groups (and vice versa, as this influenced the interpretation of Christianity). Mission repudiation of cults led to changes in the conception of ancestral spirits, and the problem for Takuruns was that an expression of group viability, in response to this ancestral reclassification (as Satanic), was required.

Wiru conceptions of individuals and groups are bound up in practices of exchange and the performance of cults and pig-killing festivals. I have argued that the rationale for exchange between individuals and groups is ultimately located in procreation beliefs, which provides a model for male-female relations which is extended into relationships between men, and finds its clearest expression in the ceremonial pig-kill (previously in conjunction with the major cult of the ceremonial cycle, tibu yapu).

The separation of individuals and groups in terms of these activities is related to the two categories of ancestors discerned by Wiru, matrilineal and patrilineal. There is a connection between individuals and maternal spirits, nine ipono, which is related to the production of children and of a debt to opianago, upon which social reproduction is contingent, i.e., the affinal-maternal nexus is responsible for the conditions under which agnatic groups replicate themselves and the individuals they contain. Traditionally, the
construction of agnatic group identity is in opposition to the 'female' contribution to 'bodies'. It is a cultural construction after a folk-biological act of creation and it is because groups have to be created that they are objectified at the local level by, for example, cult performance, and reinforced by ideologies of descent and brotherhood.

There was no cult directly concerned with propitiating *nine ipono* - the differential maternal input is to a large degree 'anti-group' - but there was none for paternal ancestors, the *tapa yapu*, although other cult celebrations did provide contexts in which 'body' payments could be made. The *tapa yapu*, sited on the ceremonial green, was a small round house with a conical roof, and contained a selection of bones primarily from male paternal predecessors; in Takuru there was one cult house for its clan. While 'body' payments promoted the growth and health of the individual, cult sacrifices perpetuated the group and productive fecundity. Patrilineal ancestors, *tapa ipono* (general, distant, perhaps even a singular reification) or *kauwa* (close), also aided men in warfare and their cult stones were often taken on raids or stolen from enemy groups, and their *kedo* destroyed. This was an attack on a group identity constructed through cults, and today competition between settlements can take the form of hostility between rival *kristen* communities over the issues of denominational membership, and one white Wesleyan missionary was physically threatened while supervising the construction of a new church building in a settlement where two factions, Wesleyan and Pentecost, coexisted (not altogether peacefully). This 'cult' basis of group membership, then, can still be manipulated in friction between or within settlements. Cult activity in the *tapa yapu* is concerned with and demonstrates agnatic group membership at the clan level and other cults,
notably the tibu yapu, bring the sub-clans together for ceremonial exchange with other districts.

Beliefs about the two types of ancestor are part of Wiru cosmology but it is by focusing on paternal spirits (together with cult deities) as a concern of cult ritual, that the group is constituted at one level through attendance and performance and its continuity promoted (which is one reason why pig-kills are held after group fission to demarcate new settlements). Appeasement of maternal spirits, based upon a relationship between individuals who make up the 'bodies' of their respective groups (of ego and opianago), does not define these groups, i.e., groups do not define each other through exchanges based on marriage connections (see 1c and A. Strathern, 1971a). While Christianity is often viewed as supplanting or extending on the moral dimensions of traditional cults (see Bulmer, 1965:159), the possibility of a transference of group membership associations from the latter to Christianity is overlooked.

The basis for cult abolishment was, as stated previously, that such activity was sinful and people were mistakenly worshipping Satan and not God. The immediate appeal of Christianity was in its similarity to facets of cult belief, and from its offering of a technological-moral system for reacting to the colonial situation. From this moment the ancestors, to fit in with mission cosmology, became agents of Satan (or Satan themselves; many informants are not clear on this distinction) and associated with sin, and their propitiation a sinful act. The Wiru word for spirit is ipono and this became the term for Satan and ancestral spirits.
The malevolent, non-human (in origin) denizens of stream and bush which physically send sickness, by shooting arrows or objects into the flesh, generally escape an association with Satan. To some extent their existence is taken for granted and is independent of exegesis about Satan and sin: *uali*, water spirits, are capricious and non-reciprocal and were outside of the realm of cult influence. In other words, they do not enter the moral domains of 'sin', although *ipono* may be gaining wider usage as a generic term for all 'bad' things.

Regardless of mission attempts to define ancestral spirits as a manifestation of Satan, a belief in these spirits coexists with notions of God and Satan, for reasons which Read describes:

... there is no real challenge to the belief in ancestral power, the generalised concept which lies at the heart of the indigenous religion. This power, by its very nature and its diffuseness is difficult to define or locate; indeed the natives themselves do not formulate it in any concise or explicit dogma; its existence and its nature have largely to be inferred from behaviour ... the essential belief is one of a supernatural force, not located in time or space, but deriving from the past and continuing in the future, a force which transcends human knowledge and on which society depends for its continuity, indeed, its very existence (Read, 1952:236).

Takuruns, like the Gahuku-Gama, envisage God as the creator of an 'enduring order', but one in which ancestors have a part (ibid:237).

So it appears that Christianity has only entered into or replaced certain features of the Takuru belief system, specifically those overt actions of ritual and sacrifice which most closely resemble Christian worship, prayer and communion, and which deal with spiritual entities that respond to the requests or behaviour of people. This helps to
explain the particular nature of local Christianity, and is responsible for mission observations of contrasting behaviour, which on some occasions is categorized as 'haiden' and on others as Christian (or as 'skin kristen' when it is suspected overall Christian behaviour is superficial). Takuruns react as kristens to those events which they know, through mission teaching, are sinful, and react more or less 'traditionally' to instances in which Christianity is not directly applicable or does not provide a solution, e.g., when sorcery is suspected. The merging of traditional and Christian beliefs in response to such a situation is illustrated in the following example.

Wiru believe that a particular bird, koruarō, which emits a melancholy cry at night, is the spirit of a dead person, not necessarily an ancestor, coming to announce an impending death in the community. When the person dies (the bird does not cause death but presages it, koruarō usually appears when somebody is ill or close to death) this bird will accompany the deceased's spirit to the land of the ancestors. This belief is held by all from high school students to those who regularly proclaimed that all pre-pacification activity was sinful. People remained adamant in their claims even when I argued that such a stance is not held and even scorned by the mission. The presence of koruarō roosting in the vicinity of Takuru for the night caused much distress, accompanied by the banging of tins, shouting and the throwing of objects into the tree to encourage its flight elsewhere to make intimations of mortality.\(^4\) Spirits of the dead, which send sickness and can cause death, have been rendered 'evil' by the mission and under the control of Satan.
Evil is more precisely the ability to effect harm rather than a metaphysical abstraction (as the opposite of good, for example). The bird is said to be Satan or ipono but the notion of a singular personification of evil—Satan—is not entirely obvious or relevant to most Takuruns and when, after a misfortune, Satan may be blamed it is often ipono plural, in the vernacular, which are the culprits (unless the identity of the offending spirit is known or guessed at). The syncetic qualities of this 'new' explanation point out

1. the innovative use of Christianity in times of change, and
2. the failure of the mission to promote a Wesleyan notion of Christianity.

This suggests that a Christian concept was adopted to account for a belief which has persisted since pacification, although it is used not so much for a different explanation but as a more appropriate one. The mission, instead of dismissing the existence of ipono, and by concentrating on cults as the major barrier to conversion, made a tactical mistake by allowing ancestors to remain in Wiru cosmology, albeit as Satanic agents. One missionary I spoke to was upset that people could still believe in koruaro, he called them 'skin kristen' as if they had not absorbed the true meaning of Christianity even after years of mission endeavour, and as if this was a failure on the part of Wiru. Takuruns, however, see no contradiction in preferring to be Christians and at the same time also believing in koruaro. This is basically what they understand about the requirements of Christianity from mission teaching, i.e., by calling the bird Satan they believe they are complying with mission edicts on the origins of evil. Also, Christianity does not account for the local specifics of religious belief or offer reasons for their discontinuation in every instance. It
is ironic that the Wiru notion of 'God' (Akolali) was dismissed as not helping the cause of conversion (because it was too 'human'; see Kerr 1984:7) while at the same time there was an acceptance of ipono as Satan which was, I would argue, more of a hindrance to the comprehension of Christianity.

The Kyaka, according to Bulmer, assign to God a greater power than ghosts and traditional deities, and filled in 'blanks' in their cosmology with Christianity (Bulmer, 1965:159). This has many similarities with the Takuru situation, where Christianity initially provided a cosmological embellishment more than an entirely new belief system. Nonetheless, once a process of reinterpreting cult belief and practice is started, the end result will not be a traditional cosmology with Christian additions, nor will it be a wholly Christian one, but a cosmology synthesised out of an historical and social process.

The avian manifestation of Satan is, then, also ipono, a spirit of the dead; it becomes a variation on a theme of causality. This is not to legitimize a belief which otherwise would be sinful, instead a style of proselytizing facilitated its incorporation into ideas about Christianity. The beliefs expressed by Takuru Christianity may be different from those of cults but they are encapsulated within a similar aetiological framework, with which Christian beliefs are not entirely congruent (although this may be less the case for areas served by fundamental evangelists). What is emergent out of this discussion is the likelihood that if missions abolished cult functions they must have to some extent replaced them - given the continuation of a cultural logic which now gives meaning to Christianity - raising the question of the effects of the mission on group definition.
The tapa yapu and deity cults helped to constitute patrilineal group identity, and distinguished it from other groups and districts. Cults had a political dimension vis-à-vis group membership which Christianity had to deal with and to a degree subsume. The converse also holds, as a response to the exigencies of change Takuruns came to see a potential in the new 'cult' to attain, as individuals, positions of leadership or status and, as varene, a moral identity as kristens which had implications for the articulation of group identity. The latter was based less on ethical considerations and more on the necessity for reacting to colonial conditions by creating a basis for interactions with Europeans, in part to increase control over introduced resources.

Groups are focused around important men, ali tobou (head man), or cult leaders, roles which often overlapped. If groups find expression through prominent individuals it seems probable that the new 'cult' leaders, pastors, have an ability or authority to structure moral behaviour by coalescing attributes of 'group' around them, i.e., the Christian elements of group membership - what it is incumbent upon a member, a Christian, to do or not to do - which help to define the group by religious attendance and activity. Cult specialists were known as mane lukago (teacher of spells and rites), and pastors are known as oluku kago (reduction lukago), that is as teachers or transmitters of the knowledge of Christianity. It is this knowledge, from training and an association with missionaries, which confers some power of control over the cosmos.

Headmen are still important figures in community politics but now other avenues exist for achieving status or influence over the decision-making process, such as 'bisnis', or becoming a pastor and perhaps
rising to the top position in the church hierarchy, that of District Supervisor; or by competing for the elected positions of 'kaunsil' or 'komiti'. The political context in which the group exists has altered, such that the group itself has had to transform to meet the requirements of mission and administration and as new statutes and activities come into being (see 2d).

New information and novel events were received in terms of traditional categories, yet this produced new insights and expectations with which Takuruns could plan their actions and understand the present. Sahlins, in his analysis of Hawaiian culture, opines that the differential relationship of Hawaiians to Europeans led to a redefinition of "categorical distinctions" because of the pressure "put upon the entire Hawaiian scheme of social distinction, together with its cosmological values" (Sahlins, 1981:37). While a major distinction is made in Wiru society between men and women, this society is more egalitarian than was the case in Hawaii; nevertheless, Wiru categories also came under great stress, and cosmological shifts imposed by the acceptance of Christianity led to a "pragmatic revaluation" of beliefs (ibid.). The timing of colonialism in Pangia, and the fact that Wiru could offer little to the outside world except their labour, meant that Wiru society, unlike its Hawaiian counterpart, could survive its meeting with Europeans, albeit as a structural variant.

The dialectical relationship between pre- and post-colonial eras constructs the present and re-interprets the past (as sinful, for example). Previously taken for granted assumptions about the world become problematic, leading to a transformation and a restructuring of the relationship between social organization and cult performance, but
while this had consequences for cult techniques and morality the function of Christianity remains similar to that of its cult forerunners— it is emblematic of the group and assures its continuity through a ritual control of the environment by propitiating spirits/God.

The Christian stress on 'brotherhood' provided a convenient idiom for the move to residential unity in Takuru and for the type of behaviour that people felt, with the optimism of the inexperienced, would soon be rewarded by development. Administrative encouragement for the re-settling of warfare refugees was helped by locals accepting them in the spirit of brotherhood, with the settlers prepared to forget their grievances and reclaim their land in the knowledge that their enemies are now Christians (and that warfare is punished by 'kiaps'). Christianity served political purposes in a changed context of group alliance and cooperation, in which the church was a symbol of new inter-group relations and of prospects for the future.

Instead of groups having their own cult houses and sharing others they now combined into one church (the tapa yapu represented Takuru Koliri), reflected in the trend towards one living area (churches are often built close to the poma of a settlement, as were tapa yapu and kedo). This marked other changes, to family structure for example, with women cohabiting with their husbands, a move reflected in their attendance at 'cult' observances if on the opposite side of the aisle to men. This implies that men continue to make a distinction between their 'cult' affairs and women's, which is supported by claims from both sexes that the Bible forbids women from 'talking' in church, effectively denying them positions of leadership.
This gives an example of the redefinition of categories, yet with an underlying continuity. The relationship between men and women is modified so that shared residence is possible, a move which, with the abolition of polygyny, satisfied the mission's desires for a more Christian form of family. But while this distinction is redefined it does not lose its force, and is perhaps even strengthened as a reaction to the concessions granted to women, for which men reassert their superiority and - because they now live together and women have become more visible in daily and 'cult' life - become more dogmatic in order to preserve this distinction.

Christian notions of the behaviour to be shown towards one's fellow man, manifested as brotherhood and the idea of a wider community of believers, allowed for the construction of new inter-district relations with former enemies or with groups previously non-reciprocal in warfare or exchange. The wamene idiom which linked allies can be used in this situation, suggesting political overtones to these relations - which are not always on the basis of shared denominations, although Takuru appeared to have closer ties with 'Baibel' settlements than with others. If people had to behave and live together as Christians to receive the promised benefits of development made by both mission and administration, then Takuruns were prepared to accept and even welcome these conditions. But there was cultural continuity in the acceptance and performance of Christianity. Groups which traditionally organized their exchange relationships through cult activity either conducted exchange as a secular affair or, as frequently happened, as an adjunct to some significant phase in church ritual or career, e.g., Christmas or the completion of a new church building (and traditionally the construction of cult houses initiated pig-kills and exchange).
In this way the term 'Wesleyan' signifies the group (the majority of Takuruns, Wesleyan yarene) insofar as Christianity is an activity in which they participate as a group in their district church, and which defines them apart from other groups not only in a traditional sense (as did the tapa cult for example) but also in a new sense, as denominations. A denomination can be known as tukili, school, which points to the control and dissemination of knowledge that are essential aspects of cult performance and transmission.

There is another larger church in Takuru on the mission station, which is used for special celebrations such as Easter when it accommodates Wesleyans from other districts, providing a demonstration and symbol of a wider alliance in Christianity through shared belief and membership. (There are several Takuruns who are clan agnates but Catholics, and these people do not attend church services in Takuru). Wesleyanism, through the metaphor of denomination and by allowing a wider participation in worship, unites a larger population than did cults.

If a cult, through its 'house' and performance, is emblematic and constitutive of the group, then Christianity has created a larger group and another basis for differentiation from other groups in terms of denomination. Takuru is still a relatively insular and self-sufficient community but Christianity does provide a potential, in any future situation, for a more extensive political alliance than was possible traditionally. It has also attempted to counteract tendencies to clan fission which is not 'kristen' behaviour in the eyes of the mission, church leaders or congregation. Unlike cults, Christianity provides an idiom of membership and, like descent, prescribes an ideal of
agnatic/brotherly behaviour (and even real brothers fight and move elsewhere to live). Perspectives on what constitutes Christian behaviour varies, however, from the mission to the congregation. For the former it is motivated by a Christian ethic, for the latter by a need for group solidarity; whereas before an agnatic principle was appealed to in times of friction, today Christianity (in situations where both are concerned with the moral dimensions of group membership) is just as much invoked.

I had occasion to ask strangers, while walking through the bush, what 'lain' they were and often the answer was a statement of church and not patrilineal group membership, implying a connection between the two is made in terms of group definition. It is possible this answer may have been the result of my being mistaken for a missionary, which supports rather than detracts from the point being made. Although the people of Takuru belong to one clan, Koliri, fighting between its sub-clans was (and is) not unknown. Evangelism and church attendance united groups, at least initially, into a closer collectivity. The clan could no longer use the tapa yapu and sacrifices to paternal ancestors as a means of group display and definition, yet Christianity continues to define the group at the clan or district level through the 'worship' of God who, like spirits, perpetuates the world, provides wealth and enforces a moral order:

Religion is the most important aspect that unites the various (Wiru) tribal groups together. People strongly believe that people who don't give their hearts to the Lord won't be a prosperous person here on earth nor in the spirit world. (Paia, 1977:55).

The difference is that God enforces directly or through the threat of not containing Satan, as a punishment for immorality, whereas traditionally ipono had free rein (although they could be directed by the anger of their descendants). Whites themselves are perceived as
having a similar control over Satan, when the time came for me to leave Takuru people were upset because my presence kept ipono away. Missionaries are seen to have a similar control over the 'raunim' of ipono, such that their presence maybe a form of social control (exercised through not controlling Satan). The mission and whites have a power over Satan which formerly resided in cult activity, a control which has been transferred to the church, 'lotu yapu, ('church house') as the locus of the 'cult' of Christianity.

Cosmological changes, then, have heralded transformation in cult practice and morality which have affected the nature of the group, hence social organization, although continuity in the latter is demonstrated in Figure 7.

![Diagram showing the relationship between Wesleyan yarene, group membership, yarene (clan), Christianity, descent, Wesleyan church, Koliri, tapa yapu, ('lotu yapu'), and brotherly/agnatic behaviour.]

Figure 7: Cults and group definition in Takuru: past and present.

A yarene is still organized around a core of male agnates claiming common descent, and continues to oppose and compete with other groups for status and resources; the point made here is that the group today is constituted and finds expression in other ways, e.g., through Wesleyan membership and church attendance. Adam and Eve are envisaged as the ultimate apical ancestors such that, while ancestral spirits are
condemned as Satanic, there still exists in cult belief a notion of descent, a more encompassing one than before admittedly, but also one more suited to the present now that a greater contact is possible outside of the narrow confines and concerns of the group. The use of Wesleyan *varene* indicates the group boundedness of religion, and hints at a notion of wider group membership from a shared descent from Adam and Eve. (This also indicates that Christianity is embraced by the moral dimensions of kinship; see Read, 1952:238). Christianity, as an aspect of group membership, allows for the establishment of relationships to a previously unknown 'outside', an understanding of which has been created by the intervention of missionaries, 'kiaps' and by direct experience through, e.g., labour migration.

I am not suggesting that whites or non-Wiru are viewed as 'brothers' in every instance, but that this potentially can be used as a basis for dealing with and comprehending the world, and can be manipulated by 'bisnis' men or groups to further their interests – using mission facilities outside the Southern Highlands to repair trucks is one example.

In Takuru, one of the ways for a person to demonstrate membership is to attend church services whether or not he or she is a devout Christian. It is worth pointing out again that an agnate of different denomination will not attend the Wesleyan church, so Christianity provides a new idiom for internal differentiation. Another way is to change church denomination in response to inter-group conflict and, as I have written, one non-agnatic *varene* in Takuru, to oppose other groups and the mission distribution of resources, became Seventh Day Adventist to illustrate their separation and autonomy, accompanied by a
residential relocation and the building of their own church. At an inter-district level, Pentecosts oppose the Wesleyans in the north Polu area to attract new members who were, I was told, promised material rewards for their defection. If groups have new criteria for membership and alliance, then regardless of any continuities in 'function' the group today is at least structurally different from its traditional predecessors (and it is defined differently; see Fig. 7).

This digression allows a return to the consideration of ancestors. God has taken over many, if not all, of the attributes and powers of ancestral and deity spirits and has a role, alien to the mission's concept of Christianity, in the control of malevolent ipono (God is also similar to MBs in this respect). Before, if a man was stricken by tapa ipono it was possible to cure him by sacrifice to the appropriate ancestor (identified through divination), now it is said that a man with tapa 'sik' will die as no cure is available, i.e., the 'cure' is sinful and divinations are no longer performed. It can be seen as a punishment from God who has decided not to control the responsible ipono. Administering European medicine is to no avail (perhaps from observations of people dying from illnesses such as V.D. and cancer soon after hospitalization) because the sick person does not have a disease, ipono are not amenable to dismissal by drugs. The two types of 'curing' are in different categories of belief about sickness causation (sorcery victims also cannot be cured by non-traditional medicine, the two categories are so antithetical that the act of attempting this would kill the sufferer).

Prior to pacification, ancestors were susceptible to human manipulation, to use Burridge's terminology they were 'divine'
(Burridge, 1969:152) but capable of being brought into a reciprocal relationship with people. Tapa and deity ipono remained divine but made non-reciprocal by the mission, as objects of appeasement they were replaced by a divine Christian pantheon, perhaps including the mission with which people now entered into a reciprocal relationship. Changes in morality accompanied these shifts in reciprocity from one divine domain to another, and the type of behaviour which now became appropriate for interpersonal and intergroup relations helped to construct Takuru Christianity and the colonial group.

Beliefs about maternal spirits were also incorporated into this new moral scheme, they were ipono and therefore Satanic. But these spirits support the basis for a relationship between individuals which continues unchanged into the present — ego's opianago (real or classificatory MB) mediates his/her relation with nine ipono, which only intervene if ego errs in 'body' payment or offends opianago, who can curse ego and afflict him without any assistance from nine ipono. Because there was not a direct contact through cults with a person's maternal ancestors, the mission classification of ipono as Satanic came down less heavily on these spirits. Opianago have a positive, nurturing role in bodily growth which offsets, by association, the malevolence of nine ipono. These spirits only become a negative force if opianago are angry or displaced, there is an idea that the latter control ego's maternal ghosts. Other spirits were managed through cults which, if a generalization is permitted, operate to maintain the status quo (cf. A. Strathern, 1968).

I have commented in 2c that the mission is referred to as 'mother' and is seen to have a nurturing role for its 'children' (congregation). So it is significant that a person suffering from tapa 'sik' (dysentery,
hemorrhoids, fever symptoms - sickness on the 'outside') dies while a victim of nine ipono (tepene vene - 'inside' sickness) or a child with stunted growth can have his/her condition ameliorated by praying to God, and if this fails opianago are paid. This latter recourse is not entirely pragmatic but stems from a perceived similarity between the mission, 'mother' (and its opianago overtones) and bodily creation and nurture. Patrilineal spirits still exist but now God is often sacrificed to, by presenting adapini to pastors, to control them. Spirit attack is caused today by sin.

Traditional beliefs made relatively clear-cut distinctions between cults, maternal and paternal spirits, and exchange between individuals and groups. Christian teaching has confused this order by collapsing categories (all ipono are 'Satan') and functions (ultimate supernatural control is now located in one deity, God). The cosmology has been simplified, instead of numerous cults to propitiate deity and ancestral spirits, belief in God reduces 'cult' activity to one church (there are, of course, many different denominations). For Takuruns, Christianity is a logical extension of cults and a more relevant replacement. Cults and spirits are discredited as Satanic but not disbelieved in, the former still exist as an alternative practice but one made redundant from the threat of hell and not because they were inefficient (some men said that they had changed their minds about Christianity and now considered cults to have been more efficient, even though this efficiency was achieved through appeasing Satan. This is not the same as renouncing Christianity for reasons that should have been made clear above). Christianity, as a combination of mission, church, God, Satan and ipono, operates within the traditional parameters of cult belief, and has taken over the
functions and attributes of the cults and spirits that were formerly its expression. This needs to be elaborated.

There is a continuing association of the 'lotu' with the tapa yapu, and an overlap in their cult concerns, through the link between the latter and kedo. Casuarina trees were often planted to mark the deaths of headmen, and their skulls were buried in the base of kedo, which, like tapa yapu, were repositories and symbols of group and ancestral power, and assure group continuity.

A 'new' type of kedo is made today for important headmen, and is called the ali tobou-ke marane yomo (headman planted tree). A connection is still made between this tree and the spirit of a deceased headman. The following illustration is of the grave of a Baipo headman, who died in 1980 of suspected poisoning. This grave was made on the poma of

![Illustration of a headman's grave and the 'new' kedo.](image)

Figure 8: A headman's grave and the 'new' kedo.

Takuru hamlet, and some Baipo men gave as reasons for staying on in this hamlet the desire to remain close to the deceased's spirit. The latter was buried in the hamlet and on the poma contrary to health regulations, which demonstrates the strength of the spiritual connection between headmen, their group and place.
The 'house', which was built on top of a concrete slab covering the grave, is a replica of the Wesleyan church on the mission station (as opposed to the local church) which is the centre of worship for the Wesleyan 'district', which encompasses Takuru and other settlements. This 'house', then, is associated with the mission rather than the local church, i.e., with a more powerful and wider symbol of group/Wesleyan identity. The bones of the deceased headman could not be put, as would have been the case traditionally, in the tapa yapu or kedo, so he was placed underneath the modern equivalent, the Wesleyan church (in miniature), and a kedo made near his grave so that his spirit would inhabit it, and protect his group. Graves and cemeteries feature in other instances of cult-Christanity synthesis; women who cause trouble, or go against male wishes, are threatened with being tied up and left in the Takuru 'matmat' (cemetery). In other words, these women will be punished by the spirits of paternal ancestors buried there. If a man is sick, and paternal spirits are suspected of causing it, the only recourse he has today to appease them, apart from appealing to God, is to clean their graves (spirits which send sickness may appear in dreams). Spirits can still intervene in daily life, and can be used or controlled in a krisen context.

The argument presented in this section can be summarized by adding the following to Figure 5, which is the krisen equivalent of (3).

**Group - God relations: 'base' - reproduction**

Church donations, prayers, communion, offerings of adaptini to pastors ----> group viability and continuity ----> fertility, growth, health

Figure 9: An addendum to Figure 5, p. 233.
Support for this kristen version of Takuru cosmology has been presented above, and I continue my reasons for this interpretation below.

God created Wiru and is largely benevolent but capable, directly or through not controlling Satan, of punishing moral transgressions; God is part of the moral order generated by kinship. God, unlike local spirits, can punish whites and when the house of a missionary burned down in the south Polu, it was said to be a punishment for opening his own trade store, i.e., for making money out of Wiru. God can also cause accidents such as car crashes. Spirits can act independently of God's control and if, for example, a child falls into the fire, Satan is blamed.

The church is symbolic and constitutive of group unity and Christian worship serves to maintain the social order by providing this appeasement. The mission, by introducing Christianity and instructing people in its use, is seen as nurturing and maternal (by producing kristens). God, and his agent the mission, bears similarities to an ultimate opianago—he is creative, nurturing, punishing, has to be appeased and controls ipono—but the comparison many Takuruns make is with Akolali (man on top; a sky being), a deity which holds an individual's 'rope of life' (Kerr, 1984:7) which may be a supernatural version of the rope (umbilical cord) which MBs 'hold'; it is responsible for lightning and is not malicious but benign. Akolali had no specific cult and is not appealed to for assistance. Takuruns speak of him as a vague notion of God that was held before the mission revealed his true nature (in line with Read's assertions about Christianity making traditional beliefs more coherent (1952:237)), so this deity has changed somewhat since contact as he now requires a 'house' for worship and
offerings directly made to him (of money, vegetables and meat), which go to pastors but are said explicitly to be given to God, Gote mereko.

I suggest that God has appropriated qualities of Akolali (not a creator deity) and opianago, in this case benevolence, responsibility for a person's life, and a creative, nurturing ability which has in the background a threat of ipono or, to pursue the point, of punishment for sin (which is behaviour not apposite to the 'new man' Christianity has created from 'wild pigs'). This punishment is still sickness sent by ipono or finally hell which is, after all, a domain of Satan/ipono. Hell is a capacity of ipono which Takuruns did not previously recognise, just as the Christian aspects of Akolali went unnoticed (like most Christians, Takuruns have a clear-cut picture of toera (hell, 'place fire') but little comprehension of heaven). Also, through his control over ipono God has taken over their roles in punishment, curing and assuring fertility, group continuity and attracting wealth (Kerr notes that those who possess Akolali's shinbones will multiply their wealth in pigs and shells (Kerr, 1984:7)). I now discuss communion in terms of 'synthesism'.

A mission account of a revival provides an insight into the connection between communion and sacrifice (see also fn. 3 on baptism, 2c). It describes a group which is worried because it was not 'demonstrating' their Christianity in a similar fashion to groups around Mele:

The Lowiti tribe left Mele station on August 4th and went home to cry to God. In nearly one hundred per cent strength, they fasted and prayed for five days. They told God, "We love you but we aren't demonstrating as others. Why?"
On Thursday noon, they saw heaven opened to their eyes. The entire tribe saw visions in the sky. Many saw Jesus on the cross. Others saw inside heaven where Jesus was with little brown-skinned children. Nearly all of them saw pieces of a red something falling from the sky. It seemed to fall like light flakes from the foot of the Cross. It landed on them and on the ground. Some tried to grab them up from the ground and found they had only earth in their hands. They rubbed this on their bodies (Harvey, 1973:200).

The meaning of the 'red flakes' becomes clear when the following evangelical cartoon is viewed -

![Figure 10: The blood of Jesus cleansing sin; from 'Wordless Gospel'.](image)

While the sacrificial aspect of communion is understood by most Takuruns, few understand the concept of God's sacrifice of Jesus for the perpetuation of a moral mankind (cf. Read, 1952:236). In other words, this aspect is understood in terms of its similarity to traditional sacrifice, in which pigs were killed and their blood and fat rubbed on cult stones to promote health, growth and fertility and to ensure group continuity. Pace Turner (1974) there is a transfer of the meaning of symbols, which leads to understanding. Communion, like sacrifice, is
transcendental, it unites a community of people in a relationship with God/spirits.

In 3a I suggested that, when the occasion demanded, a human body could be substituted for that of a pig in a sacrifice to the spirits (pigs usually substitute for people in exchange), and that human blood has an essence which can be absorbed through its consumption. This absorption is in the same sense as spirits being 'fed' by the blood of a sacrificial pig (which is rubbed into the stones in which spirits 'live'), and sometimes human saliva may be used which indicates that it is the 'maleness' or male 'substance' of group members which is offered to spirits).

In communion it is not the spirits which are 'fed' but the people themselves, and this reversal of the logic of sacrifice tends to confuse many Takuruns – why should they be appeased rather than God? Alternatively, some people recognize that communion, like the blood of dead agnates, should infuse the essence of Jesus into them, i.e., physically make them better kristens. This, too, confuses people as there is no demonstrable change in their behaviour after taking communion (usually of grape juice and wafers). Drinking the blood of Jesus (blood is an agnatic symbol) also converts him into an ancestor, suggesting again that Christianity is infused with the morality of descent. Nonetheless, confusion and disappointment with communion leads people to confess to ignorance as to its purpose, and to statements such as "I have eaten the body but I am still hungry".

The cartoon suggests that the 'red flakes' which people rubbed into their bodies is the blood of Jesus (red is also associated with maleness.
and wealth), and the rubbing was to absorb the potency of Jesus and to become 'like whites' who, like Umbuna ancestors, represent power and wealth. This blood, which people consume in communion, is not seen to be effective, in the main because this activity is perceived in terms similar to that of sacrifice to the spirits. Complaints that communion "doesn't work" really implies that it does not work like cult sacrifice.

The symbolism of communion is understood (it can be called kepene kamarera, skin and blood, or by the pragmatic, ne, food) but because spirits are expected to be sated by offerings made to them, so do people expect to be full after eating the wafer and juice, hence the complaints of hunger. Older men especially, refer to the wafer and juice of communion as yoborono, traditional medicine, and believe that it has curative power of the ability to ward off spirit/Satanic attack. Communion, in this explanation, has a 'power' like sacrifice to appease or control 'spirits'.

The emphasis in conversion was a total transformation of the person, i.e., a complete change in the 'hearts and souls' of people. The construction of a Christian 'body' was partly accomplished through baptism and revivals, accounting for the emphatic physical activities oriented around the body, such as self-violence, in revivals (see 4a). God is seen to create bodies and wene as do, in combination, the opinago and father of a child, such that Christianity encapsulates and crosses the boundaries of traditional categories. The Christian 'body' is also partly constructed through communion. People are in debt to God for this construction (as they are to MBs), but this belief is compromised by disappointment in the expectations of communion and in the efficiency of Wesleyanism as a cult. The narrower cosmological concerns of mission
Christianity limit its effectiveness at the local level, and as a greater awareness develops from post-Independence experience the distance between Takuru and mission Christianity may further increase, and the control of the mission over 'cult' expression recede (cf.ASmith, 1980). Such an eventuality is not the same as suggesting that the desire for a mission presence will diminish.

Christianity contains the reciprocities traditionally held between people, cult spirits and ancestors. In its practice it is, like tapa yapu, limited to one 'house'. Takuruns do not appear to be concerned about the overlap between pre- and post-colonial belief systems. Such an observation is not at variance with Bulmer's and Read's assertions about Christianity filling in cosmological gaps, thereby making the traditional system more coherent. There are elements of Christianity which do, however, puzzle Takuruns and these concern its failure to live up to the 'traditional' expectations of cult ritual. Takuru Christianity is seen as a total replacement of pre-colonial beliefs (that this is not actually the case is beside the point). In situations where Christian explanations do not apply or do not have the force of relevance of traditional interpretations, this does not weaken the cosmological coherence of a partly traditional, partly Christian belief system; one or the other, or a combination of both, will provide an explanation.

Bulmer and Read were both present in the early days of the mission presence, and I suspect that their assertions were more valid then than they are today. Christianity helped explain a certain vagueness about origins and deities but with the passage of time and a reworking of beliefs, the cosmology became less one with 'gaps' filled by Christianity and more a synthesised one with its own aetiology and
characteristics peculiar to the colonial and post-Independence situation. Some anthropologists have commented on the lack of coherence in Highlands belief systems (see Brunton, 1980), and it is not too much to expect that Takuru Christianity is also not an 'ordered' or exegetically coherent system, a notion which observations in Takuru support.

God can be prayed to for his assistance and intervention in worldly affairs, pigs may even be killed to 'thank' God. Wiru for prayer is kulio piko, which traditionally meant imploring spirits for help, and activity associated with magical spells. The mission can also be 'thanked' (and through it God) by giving it pork at sino time; this may be a payment for the Christian 'body' which it helped to create. This is an exchange, like that of 'body' payments, for the nurturing role of the mission. Opianago and groups produce 'bodies' and agnates; mission and church produce kristens and denominational groups. This is a cultural use of Christianity not intended by the mission.

Reciprocities between men and 'spirits' which affect the group's existence continue with prayer, worship and donations in the church context. MBs can curse their ZS independently of any intervention from nine ipono, and it is because of this that MBs are still paid for the 'bodies' they create. To pay or to pray are the two alternatives in Takuru society. Christianity has problems in dealing with the cult and exchange dimensions of both group and individual construction in a non-western society. It is because Wesleyanism (as a statement of group membership) has to be constructed that it is supported by idioms of a kristen brotherhood, but a person still has to be created and individuated, a process which the mission could not satisfactorily
account for, except to say that God created Man. This omits much of the social and moral dimensions of individual and group construction (although God is incorporated into the domain of kinship). The influence of 'Wesleyanism' on exchange and male-female relations is the subject of the concluding section.

FOOTNOTES

1. For example, the group is defined as 'Baibel', non-drinking, non-smoking, etc.

2. 'Moral' refers to the type of behaviour applicable to kristens which was not demonstrated by pagans. This moral identity is constructed through relationships of new reciprocities which affect behaviour. This use is adapted from Burridge (1969:xviii).

3. The number of clans or tubea yarene varies per district. Takuru had one tapa yapu/Koliri but also one for Kawirene which, interestingly, was the group which formed its own church after breaking away from Wesleyanism and becoming S.D.A.

4. It may be asked why koruaro is scared off if it does not cause death, the answer is that the death it announces will take place elsewhere if it is caused to leave.

5. This is part of the mission problematic; at first it needs similar concepts to promote itself, and 'sin' or 'evil' lend themselves to borrowing more than notions of 'good'.

6. This will depend to a large extent on the prospects for development in Pangia and the satisfaction or not of colonially created needs.

7. A distinction needs to be made between tapa sickness and that sent by the recently deceased of one's patrilineage. Tapa sickness is a more potent form of the latter insofar as the tapa stone represents the collective ancestry of Kolirí clan in Takuru, and as such was less amenable to manipulation (especially after pacification with cult abandonment) because individual ancestors could be divined for appeasement.

8. The mission to some extent encouraged the perception of Christianity as a cult. During the revival the mission constructed compartmentalized longhouses to accommodate visiting Wiru, just as these longhouses were built to accommodate visitors to oino (Ridgway, 1976:81). Missionaries demanded tithes of pork from oino because, I was told, they said God created pigs.

9. According to Kerr (1984:7) there is a purely fictional character called Kekulali (down below man) who only exists to oppose Akolali when lightning occurs. Structuralists can make what they want of this invention!
10. The concept of 'new man' used here is different from Burridge's (1978:15,18). In this context I mean simply kristen. God is also like a father in that he gives 'thought', wene, to people, thereby helping to create individuals.

11. There is an overlap because, in Feil's terms, Christianity is not a 'total' replacement. Feil tells of Christianity replacing the centrality of the te in some areas of Enga (Feil, 1983).

12. Williams gives another reason for the enthusiasm for prayers:

... prayer represents a great advance on magic. It exerts a far more potent influence because, it presupposes a personal Being, a spirit of love and protectiveness, who if it suits His divine purpose, can grant any request that is made to Him. No unschooled Papuan magician ever rose to such noble heights ... of faith ... or self-deception (Williams, 1944:120).

13. cf. Burridge (1978:19): "... whether seen subjectively as a force for good or a force for evil, at the sociological level of negation of a present social order, which is contained in the notion of individuality, coupled to the necessity for creating a viable social organization, remains the central paradox and dynamic of Christianity".
4c. CONCLUSION: A DIFFERENT KIND OF DEVELOPMENT

One of the first things the mission did to assert its authority and increase its control over Takuruns was, apart from denying cults, to prohibit the more visible demonstrations of tradition. The past was proclaimed sinful and although some recognition of the worthwhile aspects of tradition were later made, in the first years its total condemnation was considered the best policy and the one most suited to the cause of conversion. This was not a 'blitzkrieg' on the part of the mission, Takuruns were quick to catch on to what they saw as mission requirements and ceased practices of which it was thought the mission would disapprove (a selection based on similarities shared with practices already receiving mission attention). Hence, many exchanges involving oratory or display, which from their nature were noticed if not understood by the mission, were vulnerable to censure as features of a 'sinful' tradition by Takuruns themselves. This influenced male-female relations.

Wives are said to be pake, a term which I found difficult to translate; roughly, it means 'at the edge' but, because women are at the edge of two groups of men they are also, in a way, in the centre of them, and pake was also translated as 'namel' in pidgin - the middle or centre. Another opinion was that pake referred to a gap between things. Nonetheless, this variety in the meaning of pake, or more strictly the range in individual interpretations of meaning, indicates the cultural ambiguity attached to a woman's crucial biological role, yet points also to her centrality in exchange despite her assignation to the 'edge' of men's affairs (see 3b). To some extent this is a downgrading of a woman's importance in creating children and links of exchange; in a male
oriented society this denigration is to be expected, but at the same time it is not a blanket denial of a woman's status, to be pake, in this context, is to separate yet bind.

The greater freedom allowed women in the colonial era may be outweighed or at least counterbalanced by additions to the male ideological armoury for 'keeping women in their place' - the sphere of production. Well-educated male informants laughed at my suggestions that women, through education, could become the equals or betters of men and compete with them, and stated emphatically that all women, even those who had been to high school, were 'bilong digim stik, tasol' (for gardening only). One reason for this male view has been given above, i.e., the concern of men to reassert their superiority after a redefinition of categories: another reason is that, by the adoption of Christianity, Takuru men have appropriated much of the chauvinist baggage of the fundamental church. The imported belief system has merely reinforced male perceptions of women's status and given them added legitimacy.

If the Bible can be referred to as confirmation for this view, as in the example given above of Paul's injunctions against women speaking in church, then it would be expected that the ideological necessity for men to assert their superiority becomes less critical once it is touted as a Biblical fact. This is not the case. Women are so rigidly defined by men because they no longer fit neatly into their cultural category. The Bible can be used to support a male view but for Takuruns it is not as incontrovertible a document as it is for missionaries, and the ambiguity of women's position is perhaps greater today, which produces in response this more dogmatic perception of them. Women are supposed to
be treated in a Christian fashion but for many Takuru males this is too close to treating them 'like men'.

This development, then, reflects the sexual biases of the Wesleyan mission, in which women are rigorously excluded from male domains of public performance and leadership, but it also builds upon and strengthens a traditional perception of women (I have no data on Catholic women but it would be interesting to see if their position is any better than their Wesleyan counterparts). Yet colonialism and Christianity have led to direct benefits for women, as in changes in patterns of female residence, the choice of church attendance, no work on Sundays, the ban on polygyny, etc. (see Appendix A on women and development). Christianity is less problematic for women than for men because it does not constrain or alter their behaviour to the extent it does for the latter by prohibiting certain exchanges, violence, polygyny, etc. The issue is whether these benefits have led to a marked improvement in women's lives, and statements made by them indicate a definite perception of betterment exists, although their status relative to men is basically unchanged. The emphasis on monogamy, for instance, may increase the workload of wives of politically ambitious men, and create tensions in such households when one woman bears the brunt for production of food and children.

Another factor which has perhaps diminished the status of women, to return to the theme of this section, is that the exchanges banned or transformed by the mission have affected the centrality of women's role in creating personhood. It is quite possible that this capacity of women is being displaced or muted by Christianity and the mission, which helped to create 'new men' at the same time as they redefined exchange
and moral behaviour, and hence affected the way in which women relate groups. The status which women derive (even if the cultural credit goes to opianago) from their connecting ability for individuals and groups, through the production of children, is supplanted by the church's role in defining groups, which involves a denial of many exchanges which confirmed this ability.

Let us consider first those exchanges revolving around birth and nurturance. Payments made to one's opianago have continued more or less unaffected in the post-contact era, with one significant difference. While this life cycle payment is made as a matter of course, with women seemingly still credited for their pake importance, the occasions when sickness queries the frequency and quantity of these gifts point to a perceptual shift in the locus of creative control. Opianago continue to be acknowledged for this control but are no longer its sole arbitrers, this role is now shared with God and, if God is the source of creation, the power of women in this respect is diminished. Instead of women being the sole means of procreation, they have become to an extent its conduit; the fact that God is prayed to when sickness sent by opianago or nine ipono is suspected indicates this shift in locus, and the payment which is then made if prayer is unsuccessful does not mean that God's power to heal is questioned, but that the moral aspects of this payment (which govern a set of social relationships) have been upset and need to be restored in God's eyes.

The above lends weight to my claims of women's declining importance, but by itself is not conclusive. It could be argued, for instance, that women's positions have been strengthened by the 'blessing' of God's procreative hegemony. If my assertions so far are
accepted, however, it becomes evident that this interpretation would not be in men's interests or one they would be inclined to invest with belief. Nor would it be one to which women would subscribe insofar as control over procreation is ideologically in male hands (and God is seen as 'male'), a view not challenged by women. A review of contemporary death exchange supports the argument so far.

In Takuru, at least, the obligatory death exchange, kioli, is today not always practised, and many deny it is ever practised. Two reasons are cited for this. One is that it is unChristian for matrilaterals to expect payment from the recently bereaved and grieving agnates and co-residents of the deceased. Such statements are related to the fact that kioli is also concerned with appeasing the deceased's ipono, and ipono are now equated with Satan which renders kioli a sinful act. This may be a justification for not disposing of the deceased's property (through transference to his or her matrilaterals), as kioli often does occur when prominent men die or suspicious deaths arise, i.e., when social relationships are strained and need to be normalized. The ceremonial aspects of kioli are not always practised - the violent removal of the deceased's property and property destruction, mourning in the 'death house', etc., - but the property transference may still take place. This is called ela teigako because of the sinful connotations of kioli, but also because it is said that compensation is now only given to the deceased's MBs (and not for the spirit; see 3d). These aspects, however, have not so much disappeared as been replaced by acts of prayer and Christian burial, and it could be argued that God is now appeased for death as well as opianago, the former 'owning' the body of the deceased in a more cosmological than procreative sense.
Mortuary feasts of pork have been replaced in Takuru by an event known as the mou yoroko, fish cooking, involving the consumption of much tinned fish and rice. Just as this is a 'new' form of death celebration, it relates to the 'new' context of colonialism by using those powerful and popular symbols of development – tinned fish and rice. All pig-kills which were not oino and not associated with overt cult activity were known as loiyo kai or iponu kai, to which allies and matrikin could be invited. Loiyo kai was the name for pigs killed for the mortuary feast, but these events were often a celebration, a chance to 'singsing' and eat pork with kin and friends.

The other aim of loiyo kai was to request spirits to promote fertility, growth and to dispel sickness (ipono kowiriko, spirit request). These pig-kills ceased because of their spirit association, and today occasions of celebration, such as church openings, and of mourning are marked by mou yoroko. These events may accompany the sugar-giving ceremony in which sides of pork are allocated to future recipients; the latter eat the fish and rice and say when they are sated, "our bellies are full now, as they will be when pigs are killed". Because fish and rice are symbols of the benefits of the 'new' (for which God is to large extent responsible), this also makes them efficient political symbols in situations such as that previously described. It is said that if a man has no money, he kills pigs, but if he has he buys fish for a mou yoroko and to feed his guests.

While the present form and vitality of kioli is, to me at least, problematical, statements made about its demise are not; not only is it unChristian to accept or expect kioli, it was also stated that there was no point to it if people did not really die but would live again after
the second coming of Jesus (to which end people were frequently buried without coffin lids being nailed shut, so that the occupant would have no trouble rising and leaving the grave!). It occurs to me that this re-interpretation of death and of the locus of creative control has transformed the significance of kioli more than its condemnation as a 'sinful' practice, which does not stop payments being made when the social situation demands it. Nonetheless, I maintain that the decline of kioli has affected women's status to the degree that this reduces the occasions when links through women are formalized in exchange (see also 3c.2).

I have argued that kioli is a final disengagement from opianago control, the point at which the deceased becomes for a short time a complete agnatic individual, such that the agnatic group can be maintained and reproduced (see 3d). What does the decline of kioli imply for this viewpoint? This decline was related to the fact that people do not really die, in other words there can be no final disengagement from God's control, God being the ultimate locus of creation (God creates, lariko, he does not 'give birth', opiko). To paraphrase Strathern, "personal individuality, as a kristen, is not always being returned to the folds of matrilineality". Kristen identity is part of a wider and much more embracing notion of group. A person is always a kristen, and this identity is never constructed in opposition to God, as agnatic individuality is created by opposing MBs through presentations of the 'self'.

Informants stated that men are alive longer today and are responsible in their own lifetimes for compensating their MBs for their 'bodies': it is not kristen behaviour to expect one'sagnates to do this
upon one's demise. A kris ten individual is responsible for his own salvation for his redemption into the kris ten group of Wesleyanism. A man today is not only an agnate, he is a kris ten agnate, which is a status he must aspire to before his death so that he will be able to rise again after the second coming (and not go to hell — presumably the fate of pagan agnates).

The voluntary death exchange, *kage*, relates to the preceding in a similar fashion; its practice, too, went into decline from its association with stages in cult ceremony (see 3d). Group prestations of *kage* are today uncommon, and Christianity does not appear to have much influence over these political occasions, perhaps because the aims of this form of *kage* are opposed to kris ten behaviour. But Christianity can encompass the political aspects of individual *kage*; at a celebration for the opening of a new church in Takuru some men gave *kage* to visiting matrikin, implying that this exchange is linked to the Wesleyan 'cult' and that many of the group definitional features of spirit cult performance have carried over into the practice of Christianity. Takuru men continue to define themselves into groups through participation in 'cult' ceremony and exchange.

Notions of kris ten behaviour have affected other forms of exchange. I was present when a man gave an instant return of K60 for his son-in-law's gift of three *aroa marikiri-ke* pearlshells (for the 'bodies' of his wife and children). A return is often made, but it is delayed and not of the same equivalence as the 'body' payment. When I asked why the man gave such an expensive return gift, he replied "I didn't want to take his shells for nothing so I gave him K60, if I took them for nothing I would go to hell". Exchange is an articulation of the moral
order, and because Christianity has been incorporated into this order, this is reflected in exchange such that not reciprocate in a kristen fashion is to invite the possibility of going to hell. Insofar as exchange constructs the individual and group, it can be seen that the kristen person and the kristen group are transformations of 'agnate' and the yarene.

The use of the church and Christianity as a backdrop to these post-pacification exchanges lends credence to 1. the synthesisism of Wesleyan and traditional cosmologies, and 2. fundamentalist claims about sexual roles being fitted into extant male beliefs about their superiority over women. Both propositions help to make sense of changes in exchange and in the position of women; not only are women removed one step from their contribution to procreation but they themselves limit their achievements by believing that to be 'like men' is sinful. When I mentioned that some Highland women owned their own 'bisnis', it was suggested to me that perhaps these women were not Christians (and perhaps 'pamuks').

Takuru women consider their lives to be a great improvement on their pre-colonial existence (a consideration based on the quality of life today rather than on a greater equality with men) but it is likely that this has increased their social ambiguity and affected their cultural status, as well as making men more intent on classifying them into the 'digim stik' category. While most women are content to justify their present position in terms of Christian beliefs, it is the young and educated who are caught between dogma and their reluctance to be 'kanaka meri'. It is not easy to see what changes could occur for a socially equitable prospect for women but if they have been deprived of
a source of status by the appropriation of Christianity, their positions could become more untenable if hopes for 'development' recede.

Through the church, 'Wesleyanism' owes some of its success to its incorporation of elements of group definition and, through the mission, to its production of a 'new man'. As a cosmology its ongoing form will be affected by the way in which individuals and groups - in their constitution as kristens and denominations through new rituals, reciprocities and moralities - adapt or discard Christianity to meet the requirements of change. For the present, Christianity has become integrated into a cosmology which favours men over women, and it reinforces male dominance while devaluing women's role in society. The thesis has broadly considered the impact on Takuru society of colonialism and Christianity. I have attempted to explore some of the dynamics of change in reference to two crucial features of this society, namely exchange and cult performance. Together, these operate to reproduce society which, in "the structure of the (colonial) conjuncture" (Sahlins, 1981:32), experienced a changing political economy with new statutes and sources of wealth, and a change in the nature of exchange and male-female relations. As a result of this Takuru society underwent a permutation of its structure.

Wesleyanism became a cult with aims similar to those preceding it, but also directed towards exigencies arising out of the post-pacification era. In the process of 'becoming', Takuru cosmology and social organization had to be reordered. The 'semantic field' of cults and exchange had to take on the ideological baggage and behavioural requirements of Christianity and development, in the course of which this field widened to encompass new insights and actions. Development
was originally interpreted in terms of an exchange model of society, although the colonial intrusion changed the political and economic context in which social reproduction takes place. This reproduction is still informed by the logic of exchange, but today not solely determined by it, and external factors now help to shape this process as the following shows.

Feil (1983), pace Brunton, argues that millenarian movements in Enga Province are similar to cargo cults in that they "are generated in a native attempt to deal with problems in the traditional exchange system" (Brunton, 1971:115). Revivals in Takuru, as they have been discussed in the thesis, certainly have many elements in common with millenarian movements but how do they relate to exchange?

The tee only lapses when these movements occur, but never disappears entirely because its "totalness" could not be substituted for by Christianity (Feil, 1983:94;104). Exchange in Pangia is not as competitive, large-scale or politically significant as is the tee for Enga. The former is characterized by life cycle payments, such that problems faced by Wiru in the practice of exchange have been of a different order from those confronting Enga. Many Wiru exchanges were dampened, made defunct, or removed from their traditional cult context. Yet because Christianity has been incorporated into the logic of exchange, the strong association between exchange and cult activity continues to the present.

In other words, Christianity has not substituted for the "totalness" of Takuru exchange but has become subsumed within it. This is why exchange is not discontinued in times of revival activity. The
millenium will still usher in a world without exchange but only because society itself, with which exchange is so interwoven, will cease to exist. Revivals are dealing as much with problems of society as problems in the exchange system.

There was a changing perception of the world under colonialism which generated different expectations, and encouraged notions of an entirely new beginning (in which, it must be remembered, men are 'shrinking'). It was felt that development and Christianity would inaugurate this new age, which had a moral dimension appropriate to it. Wiru did not exist in a political vacuum, but this helps to explain the alacrity with which many Wiru discarded 'tradition' as a symbol and continual reminder of a sinful past inhibiting the success of development. Tradition had to be cast out, and its rejection provided a convenient symbol of unity around which people could organize to dispel what was wrong with their society, and make it more relevant to the times.

Exchange and cult performance construct reality, and in the post-pacification context this led to declarations that Takuru is the "home of peace" or the "place of love". This relates to the new world envisaged by Takuruns, and which is a focus of revival activity (this could also be a reason why warfare has not been a serious resurgent problem in Pangia, as has proved to be the case in many other Highland areas after Independence). People perceive contemporary Takuru society as radically different from its pre-colonial form, and this is largely a valid perception which is related to the practice of exchange and Wesleyanism today. The underlying logic of society has largely persisted
and continues, along with an ideology of development, to influence this form.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT

The administration in Pangia was concerned from the start to bring women into development and to try to overcome some of the disadvantages of their traditional role. Women were encouraged to join women's clubs where they learned domestic skills such as sewing and knitting, but where they were also informed about health, hygiene and nutrition. There was some expectation that cottage industries such as chillies, silkworms and passionfruit would be solely managed by women, thereby providing an important contribution to the development of Pangia and the advancement of women's position in society. Women were subject to political propaganda to make them aware of Pangia's role in the colonial order, and of women's importance in furthering development schemes.

The following quotes illustrate the administration's attitude to women in development:

It seems to me that women are being left out of things and this will be a costly error for this country to perpetuate. Highland women are traditionally ignored in political matters and it seems that the administration is doing little to bring them into it (PR1/70-1);

Pangia has reached a stage now where the gains already made must be consolidated ... I believe that one agent that can and must be used is women's clubs (which would be) an ideal way of introducing silkworms, chillies and other cottage industries (PR8/70-1);

Women need attention and need to feel part of general development, part of the overall plan, and the country needs them to have this attitude too if it is to develop rapidly and permanently (PR5/69-70);
To become a feminist or not to become one is one of the Territory's leaders decision of the very near future as half the population is female and thus must be mobilised if real development at all levels is to take place (PR8/69-70);

Women's participation may well be the biggest boost to local development if it receives the support necessary from central and local government, missions, public service and essentially from the men and women themselves (PR8/69-70).

While the administration's attitude to women is commendable it is problematic that women were seen to be deserving of special attention because 'kiaps' were feminists. The administration realized that to change society it had to change the nature of male-female relations. This is one reason why changing marriage practices was a preoccupation of 'kiaps' as they impeded plans for progress, and if their abolition improved the lot of women so much the better.

Women soon realized the benefits of the protection offered by the administration:

Women are becoming even more self-assured and independent in the Wiru, and in fact appear to be upsetting the status quo by their outspokenness and independent stand in such matters as marriage payments, pig exchanges, etc. Women now realize that they can get away with doing many things (PR4/73-4).

The administration was increasingly inundated by requests for divorce by women, partly because of the awareness of this protection but also because, with husbands away on the H.L.S., women were "not prepared to interrupt their regular sexual habits" (PR3/71-2) and wished to remarry. Women may have experienced some improvement in their position but this caused many social problems and exacerbated men's hostility to women in general. With the imposition of monogamy, women may even have been
disadvantaged by what they perceived as improvements in their social position:

In general, the evidence reveals that women in polygynous unions enjoy many social and economic advantages over their monogamous sisters: the burden of work is lighter, cooperation is assured, adversity is shared, the attentions of an obnoxious husband are usually more easily avoided, and the care and nurture of children are made lighter (Burridge, 1978:22).

Women's clubs were initially very successful, especially after the arrival of a female welfare officer in 1969, and received the support of men as well as women. By the end of 1972 there were thirteen clubs with 350 regular members (PR3/71-2). For a while, Wiru women had every reason to be optimistic about their future. There was talk of establishing three special wards for female Councillors after five female candidates received "quite a lot of second and third preference votes" (PR1/70-1) in the 1970 Council elections. The Pangia L.G.C. had already accepted three female observers who could speak when recognized by the chair, but could not vote (PR1/70-1). Unfortunately an amendment was required from Pt. Morseby for such a development but there was no support (PR1/70-1):

Pangia Council wants special female Councillors to force female involvement and cause women to feel that they too have a role ... however it seems that H.Q. is against this. Pangia as a whole is very disappointed by this lack of cooperation from Konedobu as the amendment is truly a harmless one which can only advance the national strength (PR1/70-1).

Together with the continuation of a traditional male perception of women, reinforced by the male chauvinism of many missions, this lack of support and the failure of cottage industries contributed to the decline
of women's clubs. By 1973 they were reported as more or less defunct (PR12/72-3). In general, women's clubs appear to have followed much the same course as other development schemes initiated by the administration (some clubs still exist, although not in Takuru, and I have no information on their form or recent history).

Women have recourse to courts for the settlement of conjugal problems, and under colonialism their wishes were often upheld to drive home the message that women were also important in development. The courts today are not prejudiced against women, but nonetheless women are relatively disadvantaged by a legal system in which fines are imposed. Women have less money and less of a network to call upon for raising it, being more prone to go to jail for failing to pay fines. Young girls do, however, use the courts as a weapon or threat against young men, who are often accused of sexually interfering with them; many young Takuru men spent a month in the Pangia 'calabus' for supposedly taking liberties with girls.

Regardless of female 'emancipation', women will continue to have limited autonomy as long as the present system of production remains. Another factor which contributed to the decline of women's clubs was that many men forbade their wives from attending because they believed women would not work as hard in gardens and that it encouraged wives to leave their husbands (PR6/71-2). Also, men still perceive women as having no significant place in development, apart from maintaining the subsistence base. In a sense, the 'kiaps' were right; as long as the social relations of production — reproduced through marriage — continue, women and development will not conform to a western model of development.
APPENDIX B: SHELLS AND THE 'BODY'

Drawing (1) – shells cover the 'body' of a kage donor. The shells are given to the man's MBs.

Drawing (2) – the shell, which is to be presented to the donor's MB, covers the 'face' of the donor which represents one aspect of his male individuality.

Both drawings are by Kaiyape Wilson.
(1) HOME OF VALUE

HOME OF VALUE
IDANGIA NGI BIGUINE.
DRAWN BY WILSON -
KIVAPE WILI TAKUW
HOME OF PEACE SINCE 1959

DRAWN BY WILSON KINAPAE
WILI TAGURA PANGIA SHAW
HOME OF PEACE
SINCE 1959
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